In re COH, ERH, JRG, & KBH, MINORS 

Docket No. 147515. Argued December 10, 2013 (Calendar No. 2). Decided April 22, 2014. 

 The Department of Human Services (DHS) petitioned the Muskegon Circuit Court, 

Family Division, to terminate the parental rights of the mother and two fathers of the minor 

children COH, ERH, JRG, and KBH, who had been removed from the mother’s home and 

placed in foster care. At the dispositional hearing, Lori Scribner, the biological grandmother of 

three of the children, submitted a letter expressing interest in becoming all four children’s 

guardian if they were not returned to their mother. The court concluded that terminating the 

mother’s rights was not in the children’s best interests, although it granted the petition with 

respect to the fathers. The following year, the DHS again petitioned to terminate the mother’s 

parental rights. The mother pleaded no contest to the allegations in the petition, and Scribner 

moved to be appointed the children’s guardian under MCL 712.19c and MCR 3.979. The court, 

William C. Marietti, J., denied Scribner’s motion after considering the best-interest factors from 

the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., and admitted the children to the Michigan 

Children’s Institute (MCI) under MCL 400.203. Scribner requested consent from the MCI 

superintendent to adopt the children, but the superintendent denied it, and the trial court denied 

Scribner’s motion to reverse the denial. Scribner appealed both this decision and the order 

denying her petition for guardianship. After consolidating the appeals, the Court of Appeals, 

TALBOT, P.J., and MARKEY and RIORDAN, JJ., reversed the order denying Scribner’s petition for 

guardianship in an unpublished opinion per curiam issued June 25, 2013 (Docket Nos. 309161 

and 312691) and remanded for the entry of an order appointing Scribner guardian. The Supreme 

Court granted the DHS’s application for leave to appeal. 495 Mich 870 (2013). 

 In a unanimous opinion by Justice CAVANAGH, the Supreme Court held: 

 The preference created in MCL 722.954a for a child who has been removed from the 

parental home to be placed with relatives applies when the DHS is making its initial placement 

decision, but it does not apply to a court’s decision regarding whether to appoint a guardian for 

the child under MCL 712A.19c(2). In deciding whether to appoint a guardian under MCL 

712A.19c(2), a court must determine whether the guardianship is in the child’s best interests. In 

so doing, the court has the discretion to consider the best-interest factors from the Child Custody 

Act, MCL 722.23; the Adoption Code, MCL 710.22(g); or any other factors that may be relevant 

under the circumstances of a particular case. 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus Chief Justice: 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Stephen J. Markman 

Mary Beth Kelly 

Brian K. Zahra 

Bridget M. McCormack 

David F. Viviano 

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

Reporter of Decisions: 

Corbin R. Davis 
©2014 State of Michigan

 1. The Court of Appeals erred by holding that the preference set forth in MCL 722.954a 

for placing a child with relatives after the initial removal from a parent’s custody applies to a 

court’s decision under MCL 712A.19c whether to appoint a guardian for a child whose parents’ 

rights have been terminated. MCL 722.954a applies from the moment a child is removed from 

his or her parents’ care and throughout the review process, but there is no indication in the 

statutory language that the Legislature intended this preference to apply beyond the time frame 

identified within MCL 722.954a. Similarly, MCL 712A.19c expressly applies only to instances 

in which a child remains in placement following the termination of parental rights, which occurs 

after the DHS makes the initial placement decision regulated by MCL 722.954a. Moreover, 

MCL 712A.19c(14) expressly provides that MCL 712A.19c, which includes the court’s authority 

to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2), applies only to cases in which parental rights to 

the child were terminated, and MCL 712A.19a(7)(c) establishes a separate process for appointing 

a guardian before parental rights have been terminated. The fact that MCL 712A.19c(2) refers 

neither to MCL 722.954a nor to “relatives” bolsters the conclusion that the preference for 

placement with relatives created in MCL 722.954a does not apply outside the period for 

determining a child’s initial placement immediately after removal. 

 2. MCL 712A.19c(2) provides that at a review hearing for a child who remains in 

placement after parental rights were terminated, the trial court may appoint a guardian if it 

determines that doing so is in the child’s best interests. Because MCL 712A.19c(2) does not 

direct a court to apply certain factors or otherwise limit a court’s method for determining the 

child’s best interests, a trial court has discretion to determine the best method for analyzing the 

child’s best interests by considering the circumstances relevant to the particular case. While the 

Adoption Code factors set forth in MCL 710.22(g) provide a useful list of considerations that 

may be relevant to a guardianship decision, neither the language of MCL 712A.19c(2) nor the 

similarities between a guardianship and an adoption requires application of the Adoption Code 

factors to all guardianship petitions. Depending on the circumstances, a case may more 

reasonably lend itself to application of the Child Custody Act factors, some combination of the 

Adoption Code and Child Custody Act factors, or a unique set of factors developed by the trial 

court for purposes of a particular case. 

 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by applying the best-interest factors from 

the Child Custody Act rather than those set forth in the Adoption Code to decide Scribner’s 

petition for a guardianship under MCL 712A.19c. The Child Custody Act factors incorporate a 

comparative analysis, which was a logical method for determining which of the two placement 

options was in the children’s best interests. The court did not clearly err in its factual findings 

regarding these factors or in its conclusion that a guardianship with Scribner was not in the 

children’s best interests under MCL 722.19c(2). Because the Court of Appeals erroneously 

concluded that a preference for placement with relatives existed under MCL 712.19c(2) and 

substituted its judgment for the trial courts’ on questions of fact regarding the children’s best 

interests, the Court of Appeals judgment was reversed and the case remanded to that Court for 

consideration of Scribner’s appeal of the MCI Superintendent’s denial of consent to adopt the 

children. 

 Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to that Court for further 

proceedings. 
FILED APRIL 22, 2014 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

In re COH, ERH, JRG, & KBH, Minors. 

 

 No. 147515 

 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

CAVANAGH, J. 

This case requires us to consider the interplay between MCL 722.954a and MCL 

712A.19c. Specifically, we must determine whether the preference for placement with 

relatives created by MCL 722.954a is relevant to a court’s consideration of a petition to 

appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2). 

Because we conclude that the two statutes apply at different and distinct stages of 

child protective proceedings, we hold that there is no preference for placement with 

relatives as part of a guardianship determination under MCL 712A.19c(2). Accordingly, 

because the Court of Appeals in this case applied a preference in favor of creating a 

guardianship with a relative in support of its decision to reverse the trial court, we 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Opinion Chief Justice: 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Stephen J. Markman 

Mary Beth Kelly 

Brian K. Zahra 

Bridget M. McCormack 

David F. Viviano 
2

conclude that the Court of Appeals erred. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals 

and remand to that Court to consider issues not previously addressed. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

In February 2008, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed COH, 

ERH, JRG, and KBH from their mother’s care under MCL 712A.2(b).1

 The children 

were initially placed in two separate foster homes; however, in October 2008, all of the 

children were placed in their current foster home, with Holy Cross Children’s Services 

supervising the placement. 

At the December 12, 2008, review hearing, the DHS expressed its intent to seek 

termination of the mother’s and both fathers’ parental rights, and, in March 2009, the 

DHS petitioned to terminate all parental rights. A dispositional hearing occurred in June 

2009, and the trial court terminated the fathers’ parental rights but did not terminate the 

mother’s parental rights. The trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate the 

mother’s rights, but that termination of her parental rights was not in the children’s best 

interests at that time. One of the exhibits offered during the dispositional hearing was a 

letter dated June 2, 2009, written to the trial court by appellant Lori Scribner, who is the 

paternal biological grandmother of COH, ERH, and KBH. Scribner requested that the 

trial court return the children to the mother and stated that if the children were not 

returned to their mother, Scribner “would like to petition the court for guardianship and 

would like information on how to proceed.”2

 

1

 JRG does not have the same biological father as COH, ERH, and KBH. 

2

 Holy Cross’s foster care worker also testified that Scribner first expressed an interest in 

a guardianship in May 2009. 
3

In July 2010, the DHS again petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. 

Scribner moved to intervene and to be appointed the children’s juvenile guardian under 

MCL 712A.19c(2) and MCR 3.979. The prosecutor and the mother agreed that the 

mother would plead no contest to the allegations that she was unable to provide proper 

care and custody for the children, that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate 

the mother’s rights, and, if the plea was accepted, the prosecutor would agree that the 

children not be committed to the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI) until the trial court 

ruled on Scribner’s guardianship petition. The trial court accepted the mother’s plea 

under these conditions. 

On August 26, 2010, the trial court held a guardianship hearing. At the hearing, 

Scribner testified that she had lived in Florida since 2005. Scribner also testified that she 

had frequent contact with the children before moving to Florida, that she traveled to 

Michigan in the summer of 2007 to visit the children, and that she continued to have 

contact with the children after they were removed from the mother’s care in February 

2008. However, Scribner testified that, in her opinion, Holy Cross frustrated her efforts 

to contact the children after the children were placed in their current foster home in 

October 2008. Regarding her efforts to have the children placed in her home, Scribner 

testified that she began the process “a few months after” the children were removed from 

the mother’s care. Because Scribner was living in a two-bedroom apartment, she also 

began looking for a larger home to accommodate the children, but she did not purchase 

the home until July 2009 and did not move into the home immediately. Scribner also 

testified that she visited the children in Michigan during the summer of 2010. As part of 
4

the guardianship decision process, the trial court permitted the children to visit Scribner 

in Florida for Thanksgiving and Christmas in 2010. 

A February 2011 evidentiary hearing regarding Scribner’s motion for a 

guardianship included, among other things, testimony from multiple witnesses about the 

children’s visits to Florida and the foster parents’ living arrangements and parenting 

methods, some of which were incompatible with Holy Cross’s procedures.3

 Ultimately, 

the trial court denied Scribner’s guardianship petition. 

In making the guardianship decision, the trial court applied the best-interest factors 

from the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., and determined that it was in the 

children’s best interests to remain with their foster parents, who had petitioned to adopt 

the children. Accordingly, the trial court committed the children to the DHS under MCL 

400.203 for permanency planning, supervision, and care and placement. 

Scribner requested consent from the MCI superintendent to adopt the children, but 

the superintendent denied the request, finding that adoption by the foster parents was in 

the children’s best interests. Scribner filed a motion with the trial court under MCL 

710.45(2), alleging that the superintendent’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The 

trial court denied the motion. 

Scribner appealed by leave granted in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the 

trial court’s denial of Scribner’s petition for guardianship. In re COH, ERH, JRG & 

 

3

 Testimony established that the foster parents at times required the children to run laps 

around the house or consume fish oil and Tabasco sauce as punishment. The foster father 

testified that the foster parents discontinued those discipline methods at Holy Cross’s 

request. 
5

KBH, Minors, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 25, 

2013 (Docket Nos. 309161 and 312691). The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial 

court “failed to recognize the preference for children to be placed with relatives” and 

determined that “had the trial court recognized this preference and then given [Scribner] 

the special preference and consideration that she was due as the children’s grandmother, 

the court would have granted the guardianship petition.” Unpub op at 5. The Court of 

Appeals did not address Scribner’s appeal of the denial of consent to adopt, finding the 

issue moot under its disposition of the case. We granted the DHS’s application for leave 

to appeal. 495 Mich 870 (2013). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Detroit v 

Ambassador Bridge Co, 481 Mich 29, 35; 748 NW2d 221 (2008). “A court’s factual 

findings underlying the application of legal issues are reviewed for clear error.” In re 

Morris, 491 Mich 81, 97; 815 NW2d 62 (2012). 

III. ANALYSIS 

This case involves the removal of juveniles from the care of their biological 

parents. As explained in In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 93; 763 NW2d 587 (2009), the 

overarching goals guiding the juvenile code, MCL 712A.1 et seq., are established in 

MCL 712A.1(3): 

This chapter shall be liberally construed so that each juvenile coming 

within the court’s jurisdiction receives the care, guidance, and control, 

preferably in his or her own home, conducive to the juvenile’s welfare and 

the best interest of the state. If a juvenile is removed from the control of his 

or her parents, the juvenile shall be placed in care as nearly as possible 
6

equivalent to the care that should have been given to the juvenile by his or 

her parents. 

See, also, MCR 3.902(B). 

A. LEGAL BACKGROUND 

Child protective proceedings are generally divided into the adjudicative and the 

dispositional phases. “The adjudicative phase determines whether the . . . court may 

exercise jurisdiction over the child,” In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108; 499 NW2d 752 

(1993), and includes “a preliminary hearing at which the court may authorize a petition 

for removal of a child from his home, MCL 712A.13a(2),” In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 

154; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). 

If the court acquires jurisdiction, the dispositional phase determines what action, if 

any, will be taken on behalf of the child. In re Brock, 442 Mich at 108. The dispositional 

phase includes “review hearings to evaluate the child’s and parents’ progress, MCL 

712A.19, permanency planning hearings, MCL 712A.19a, and, in some instances, a 

termination hearing, MCL 712A.19b.” In re Mason, 486 Mich at 154. Additionally, 

MCL 712A.19c establishes the procedures applicable when a child remains in a 

placement after termination of parental rights. 

When a child is removed from a parent’s care during the adjudication phase under 

MCL 712A.2(b), as in this case, “the court shall order the juvenile placed in the most 

family-like setting available consistent with the juvenile’s needs.” MCL 712A.13a(12). 
7

The “agency,” which was the DHS in this case,4

 must complete an initial services plan 

within 30 days of the child’s placement. MCL 712A.13a(10)(a). As part of the initial 

services plan, the DHS is required to comply with MCL 722.954a(2), which, at the times 

relevant to this case, stated: 

Upon removal, . . . the supervising agency shall, within 30 days, identify, 

locate, and consult with relatives to determine placement with a fit and 

appropriate relative who would meet the child’s developmental, emotional, 

and physical needs as an alternative to foster care. [Emphasis added.][5] 

The DHS is also required, under former MCL 722.954a(2), to meet the following 

requirements not more than 90 days after the child’s removal: 

(a) Make a placement decision and document in writing the reason 

for the decision. 

(b) Provide written notice of the decision and the reasons for the 

placement decision to . . . each relative who expresses an interest in caring 

for the child . . . . 

Finally, former MCL 722.954a(3) provides for review of the DHS’s decision: 

 

4

 “Agency” is defined as 

a public or private organization, institution, or facility that is performing the 

functions under part D of title IV of the social security act, 42 USC 651 to 

669b, or that is responsible under court order or contractual arrangement for 

a juvenile’s care and supervision. [MCL 712A.13a(1)(a).] 

5

 The Legislature amended MCL 722.954a, effective December 14, 2010. 2010 PA 265. 

Because the trial court decided the issues relevant to the children’s initial placement 

before December 14, 2010, we analyze this case under the statutory provisions in effect 

when the trial court decided the issues and, as a result, the statutory citations in this 

opinion may not correspond to the amended version of MCL 722.954a. 
8

A person who receives a written decision described in subsection (2) may 

request in writing, within 5 days, documentation of the reasons for the 

decision, and if the person does not agree with the placement decision, he 

or she may request that the child’s attorney review the decision to 

determine if the decision is in the child’s best interest. If the child’s 

attorney determines the decision is not in the child’s best interest, within 14 

days after the date of the written decision the attorney shall petition the 

court that placed the child out of the child’s home for a review hearing. 

The court shall commence the review hearing not more than 7 days after the 

date of the attorney’s petition and shall hold the hearing on the record. 

In this case, Scribner seeks a juvenile guardianship under MCL 712A.19c, which 

applies during the dispositional phase of child protective proceedings and states in 

relevant part: 

 (1) [I]f a child remains in placement following the termination of 

parental rights to the child, the court shall conduct a review hearing not 

more than 91 days after the termination of parental rights and no later than 

every 91 days after that hearing for the first year following termination of 

parental rights to the child. If a child remains in a placement for more than 

1 year following termination of parental rights to the child, a review hearing 

shall be held no later than 182 days from the immediately preceding review 

hearing before the end of the first year and no later than every 182 days 

from each preceding review hearing thereafter until the case is 

dismissed. . . . At a hearing under this section, the court shall review all of 

the following: 

 (a) The appropriateness of the permanency planning goal for 

the child. 

 (b) The appropriateness of the child’s placement. 

(c) The reasonable efforts being made to place the child for 

adoption or in other permanent placement in a timely manner. 

 (2) [I]f the court determines that it is in the child’s best interests, the 

court may appoint a guardian for the child. 

* * * 
9

(14) This section applies only to a child’s case in which parental 

rights to the child were . . . terminated as the result of a proceeding under 

section 2(b) of this chapter . . . . This section applies as long as the child is 

subject to the jurisdiction, control, or supervision of the court or of the 

Michigan children’s institute or other agency. [Emphasis added.] 

B. INTERPLAY BETWEEN MCL 722.954a AND MCL 712A.19c 

When interpreting statutes, “our primary task . . . is to discern and give effect to 

the intent of the Legislature.” Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 

NW2d 119 (1999) (citations omitted). To accomplish that task, we begin by examining 

the language of the statute itself. Id. (citation omitted). “If the language of the statute is 

unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the 

statute must be enforced as written.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The plain language of MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c establishes that the two 

statutes apply at different stages of child protective proceedings. Specifically, MCL 

722.954a(2) provides that “[u]pon removal” DHS has a duty to “identify, locate, and 

consult with relatives to determine placement with a fit and appropriate relative who 

would meet the child’s developmental, emotional, and physical needs” and that duty 

must be satisfied “within 30 days” of removal. Accordingly, MCL 722.954a applies 

from the moment a child is removed from his or her parents’ care, i.e., before any 

placement decision is made, and, consequently, the requirements of MCL 722.954a are 

intended to guide the DHS’s initial placement decision. 

The preference for placement with relatives is also expressly preserved throughout 

the review process established in former MCL 722.954a(2) and (3). Specifically, 

subsection (2)(b) requires the DHS to make an initial placement decision within 90 days 
10

of removal and “[p]rovide written notice of the decision and the reasons for the 

placement decision to . . . each relative who expresses an interest in caring for the 

child . . . .” Additionally, subsection (3) permits a relative who receives notice to request 

an explanation of the decision and potentially obtain a review hearing if the person does 

not agree with the placement decision. However, the review process is limited to a 

narrow time period: the request for documentation of the reasons for the placement 

decision must be made within 5 days of receiving the placement decision, the potential 

petition for a review hearing must be made within 14 days of the written decision, and 

the review hearing must be held within 7 days after the petition. MCL 722.954a(3). 

Thus, there is no indication within the statutory language of MCL 722.954a that the 

Legislature intended that the preference for placement with relatives exists beyond the 

time frame identified within MCL 722.954a. 

Similarly, the plain language of MCL 712A.19c expressly limits the statute’s 

applicability only to instances in which “a child remains in placement following the 

termination of parental rights . . . .” MCL 712A.19c(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the 

plain language of MCL 712A.19c establishes that the statute only applies after 

termination of parental rights, which occurs after the DHS makes the initial placement 

decision regulated by MCL 722.954a. 

Although when considered in isolation MCL 712A.19c(2) does not expressly state 

that the court’s authority to appoint a guardian under that subsection is limited to the 

posttermination stage of child protective proceedings, we must consider the subsection’s 

“placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” Sun Valley Foods Co, 460 Mich at 237 
11

(quotation marks and citation omitted). As established, the subsection immediately 

preceding subsection (2) expressly limits the statute’s applicability to the posttermination 

stage. Moreover, subsection (14) expressly provides that “[t]his section,” meaning 

section 19c, “applies only to a child’s case in which parental rights to the child were . . . 

terminated . . . .” Because the court’s authority to appoint a guardian under MCL 

712A.19c(2) is part of section 19c, MCL 712A.19c(14) expressly limits its application to 

the posttermination stage of child protective proceedings. 

Additionally, MCL 712A.19a establishes the process for appointing a guardian 

before termination of parental rights. Specifically, MCL 712A.19a(7) provides that 

[i]f the agency demonstrates . . . that initiating the termination of parental 

rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s best interests, or the court 

does not order the agency to initiate termination of parental rights to the 

child . . . then the court shall order 1 or more of the following alternative 

placement plans: 

* * * 

(c) . . . [i]f the court determines that it is in the child’s best interests, 

appoint a guardian for the child, which guardianship may continue until the 

child is emancipated. 

Because the Legislature enacted separate statutes that create distinct processes for 

appointing a guardian before and after termination of parental rights, we must interpret 

those statutes in a way that avoids rendering either statute surplusage. Whitman v City of 

Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311-312; 831 NW2d 223 (2013). We conclude that the process 
12

for appointing a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2) is only applicable at the 

posttermination stage of a child protective proceeding.6

Finally, MCL 712A.19c(2) does not refer to MCL 722.954a, nor does it refer to 

“relatives,” which bolsters the conclusion that the preference for placement with relatives 

created in MCL 722.954a does not apply outside the time period for determining a child’s 

initial placement immediately after removal and, therefore, does not apply to a court’s 

decision to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2) after parental rights are 

terminated. Accordingly, although the Court of Appeals accurately concluded that MCL 

722.954a creates a statutory preference for placement with relatives, the plain language of 

MCL 722.954a limits the applicability of the preference to only the initial stage of the 

process, i.e., immediately after a child is removed from his or her parents’ care and 

during the statutory review period established in MCL 722.954a(3).7

 Therefore, we agree 

 

6

 The court rules likewise reflect the fact that the statutory scheme creates different 

processes for appointing a guardianship that apply at different stages of child protective 

proceedings. Specifically, MCR 3.979(A) states: 

Appointment of Juvenile Guardian; Process. If the court determines 

at a posttermination review hearing or a permanency planning hearing that 

it is in the child’s best interests, the court may appoint a juvenile guardian 

for the child pursuant to MCL 712A.19a or MCL 712A.19c. [Emphasis 

added.] 

Thus, MCR 3.979(A) recognizes that a court may appoint a guardian at a posttermination 

review hearing, which is governed by MCL 712A.19c, or at a permanency planning 

hearing, which is governed by MCL 712A.19a. 

7

 As noted, the Legislature amended MCL 722.954a, effective December 14, 2010. 2010 

PA 265. We also note that as part of the 2010 amendments, the Legislature added MCL 

722.954a(5), which expressly requires the DHS to “give special consideration and 

preference to a child’s relative or relatives who are willing to care for the child, are fit to 

do so, and would meet the child’s developmental, emotional, and physical needs” and 
13

with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion in In re AEG & LEG, unpublished opinion per 

curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 7, 2013 (Docket No. 316599), that the 

plain language of MCL 722.954a “indicates that the Legislature intended the statute to 

provide procedural requirements where a child is removed pursuant to a child protective 

proceeding,” but that there “is no indication that [MCL 722.954a] was intended to apply 

to . . . decisions after termination,” which includes a court’s decision regarding a 

guardianship petition under MCL 712A.19c(2). 

C. INTERPRETATION OF MCL 712A.19c 

Having established that MCL 712A.19c applies after termination of parental rights 

and does not include a preference for creating a guardianship with a relative, we must 

now determine what a trial court must do to satisfy MCL 712A.19c(2). The plain 

language of the statute simply provides that the trial court may appoint a guardian “if the 

court determines that [a guardianship] is in the child’s best interests[.]” MCL 

712A.19c(2). 

 As previously discussed, the trial court applied the best-interest factors from the 

Child Custody Act, MCL 722.23;8

 however, Scribner argues, and the Court of Appeals 

 

requires the DHS to do so “[b]efore determining placement of a child” in the DHS’s care. 

Emphasis added. Accordingly, although we do not expressly apply subsection (5) in this 

case, we note that our analysis is not inconsistent with this new statutory language, 

because subsection (5) expressly applies before the initial placement decision is made. 

8

 MCL 722.23 states: 

As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means the sum total of the 

following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court: 

(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the 

parties involved and the child. 
14

agreed, that the best-interest factors in the Adoption Code, MCL 710.22(g),9

 should apply 

to a guardianship decision under MCL 712A.19c(2). Therefore, the Court of Appeals 

 

(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the 

child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and 

raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any. 

(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide 

the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care 

recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical 

care, and other material needs. 

(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory 

environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. 

(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed 

custodial home or homes. 

(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. 

(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved. 

(h) The home, school, and community record of the child. 

(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the 

child to be of sufficient age to express preference. 

(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and 

encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the 

child and the other parent or the child and the parents. 

(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was 

directed against or witnessed by the child. 

(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a 

particular child custody dispute. 

9

 MCL 710.22(g) states: 

“Best interests of the adoptee” or “best interests of the child” means the 

sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and 
15

 

determined by the court to be applied to give the adoptee permanence at the 

earliest possible date: 

(i) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the 

adopting individual or individuals and the adoptee or, in the case of a 

hearing under [MCL 710.39], the putative father and the adoptee. 

(ii) The capacity and disposition of the adopting individual or 

individuals or, in the case of a hearing under [MCL 710.39], the putative 

father to give the adoptee love, affection, and guidance, and to educate and 

create a milieu that fosters the religion, racial identity, and culture of the 

adoptee. 

(iii) The capacity and disposition of the adopting individual or 

individuals or, in the case of a hearing under [MCL 710.39], the putative 

father, to provide the adoptee with food, clothing, education, permanence, 

medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the 

laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs. 

(iv) The length of time the adoptee has lived in a stable, satisfactory 

environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. 

(v) The permanence as a family unit of the proposed adoptive home, 

or, in the case of a hearing under [MCL 710.39], the home of the putative 

father. 

(vi) The moral fitness of the adopting individual or individuals or, in 

the case of a hearing under [MCL 710.39], of the putative father. 

(vii) The mental and physical health of the adopting individual or 

individuals or, in the case of a hearing under [MCL 710.39], of the putative 

father, and of the adoptee. 

(viii) The home, school, and community record of the adoptee. 

(ix) The reasonable preference of the adoptee, if the adoptee is 14 

years of age or less and if the court considers the adoptee to be of sufficient 

age to express a preference. 

(x) The ability and willingness of the adopting individual or 

individuals to adopt the adoptee’s siblings. 
16

concluded that the trial court erred by using the Child Custody Act factors to compare 

Scribner and the foster parents. 

In order to define the proper method for determining whether a guardianship is in 

the child’s best interest, we must first interpret MCL 712A.19c(2). Issues of statutory 

interpretation are reviewed de novo. Ambassador Bridge Co, 481 Mich at 35. The plain 

language of MCL 712A.19c(2) does not expressly require application of any particular 

set of factors; rather, the statute simply requires the court to base its decision whether to 

appoint a guardian on “the child’s best interests.” Because MCL 712A.19c(2) does not 

direct a court to apply certain factors or otherwise limit a court’s method for determining 

the child’s best interests, the statute grants the court discretion regarding how to 

determine what is in the child’s best interests depending on the case-specific 

circumstances. See Easton Sch Dist No 4 v Snell, 24 Mich 350, 353 (1872) (holding that 

when a statute grants a power “in general terms,” the statute “leaves the details to the 

sound discretion” of the entity to whom the power is granted). 

Because MCL 712A.19c(2) grants the trial court discretion in determining whether 

a guardianship is in the child’s best interest, a trial court’s decision regarding what factors 

to consider in making the best-interest determination is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome 

falling outside the range of principled outcomes.” Edry v Adelman, 486 Mich 634, 639; 

786 NW2d 567 (2010). 

 

(xi) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a 

particular adoption proceeding, or to a putative father’s request for child 

custody. 
17

A trial court may use its discretion under MCL 712A.19c(2) to determine the best 

method for analyzing the child’s best interests by considering the circumstances relevant 

to the particular case. The Adoption Code factors are a logical decision-making tool 

when only one party petitions for a guardianship, because the court need not compare the 

petitioning party to any other party. Rather, determining whether the guardianship is in 

the child’s best interests depends solely on whether a guardianship with the petitioning 

party is in the child’s best interests. Moreover, a juvenile guardianship has many 

characteristics that are similar to an adoption. Thus, the Adoption Code factors provide a 

useful list of considerations that may be relevant to a guardianship decision, and trial 

courts may therefore be led to apply the Adoption Code factors in deciding some, or 

perhaps many, petitions for guardianship. 

However, neither the statutory language of MCL 712A.19c(2) nor the similarities 

between a guardianship and an adoption require application of the Adoption Code factors 

to all guardianship petitions, as the Court of Appeals suggests. Rather, depending on the 

circumstances, a case may more reasonably lend itself to application of the Child Custody 

Act factors, some combination of the Adoption Code and Child Custody Act factors, or a 

unique set of factors developed by the trial court for purposes of a particular case.10 

 

10 In this regard, we note that the Child Custody Act and the Adoption Code factors 

permit a court to consider “[a]ny other factor considered by the court to be relevant[.]” 

MCL 722.23(l); MCL 710.22(g)(xi). Thus, although MCL 712A.19c(2) does not create 

an overarching preference for creating a guardianship with a relative, the statute 

nevertheless permits a trial court to consider familial ties in determining whether the 

guardianship is in the child’s best interests. However, we stress that if a court concludes 

that familial ties are relevant to the guardianship decision under MCL 712A.19c(2), the 

familial relationship is only a factor that must be balanced among all the other relevant 

factors—it does not give rise to a presumption in favor of creating a guardianship. 
18

Finally, we must review the trial court’s findings of fact regarding the best-interest 

determination, which are subject to the clear-error standard on appeal. See MCR 

2.613(C). See, also, In re BKD, 246 Mich App 212, 219; 631 NW2d 353 (2001) 

(applying the clear-error standard to the trial court’s findings of fact regarding the bestinterest factors in the Adoption Code).11 “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ if although 

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Mason, 486 Mich at 

152 (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Thus, under the clear-error 

standard, “a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless 

the factual determination clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Pierron v 

Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 85; 782 NW2d 480 (2010) (quotation marks, brackets, and 

citations omitted). 

D. APPLICATION 

Because we conclude that MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c apply at different 

stages of child protective proceedings, we conclude that the requirements of MCL 

722.954a have no bearing on a trial court’s decision regarding a guardianship petition 

under MCL 712A.19c. Thus, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erroneously held 

that, as a relative of the children, Scribner was entitled to a preference as part of her 

petition for a guardianship under MCL 712A.19c.12 However, that conclusion does not 

 

11 Cases in which this Court reviewed the trial court’s factual findings underlying its bestinterest determination for whether they were against the great weight of the evidence did 

so under MCL 722.28, which does not apply here. 

12 Although our grant order directed the parties to address whether Scribner “was entitled 

to [a] preference [for placement with relatives] where her son’s parental rights to the 
19

necessarily mandate that we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Scribner’s 

guardianship petition. Rather, we must also consider whether the trial court abused its 

discretion when it selected the Child Custody Act’s best-interest factors rather than some 

other set of factors to determine whether the guardianship was in the children’s best 

interests. Additionally, we must consider whether the trial court clearly erred in its 

findings of fact regarding the children’s best interests under MCL 712A.19c. 

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by applying the bestinterest factors from the Child Custody Act. In this case, the trial court was faced with 

two placement options for the children; therefore, logic required the trial court to 

compare the two options in order to determine which placement was in the children’s best 

interest. Under these circumstances, such a comparison was necessary because, although 

both placement options may be qualified to meet the children’s needs, only one of the 

placement options can truly be in the children’s best interests. Because the Child 

Custody Act factors incorporate a comparative analysis, and because comparison of the 

two placement options in this case was a logical method for determining which option 

was in the children’s best interests, the trial court’s decision to apply those factors rather 

than the Adoption Code factors was not an abuse of discretion.13

 

children had been terminated,” 495 Mich at 870, that question is dependent on holding 

that a preference for placement with relatives applies to MCL 712A.19c(2). Because we 

conclude that no such preference exists, we need not consider the impact of the 

termination of parental rights on a grandparent’s status as a relative under MCL 

722.954a(2). 

13 Application of the Child Custody Act best-interest factors outside the context of a 

custody dispute is not a novel approach in the area of juvenile law. For example, in In re 

Barlow, 404 Mich 216, 236; 273 NW2d 35 (1978), we concluded that consideration of 
20

We likewise conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in its application and 

findings of fact related to the Child Custody Act’s best-interest factors to decide 

Scribner’s petition for a guardianship under MCL 712A.19c. The trial court accurately 

emphasized that “the paramount concern is what is best for the children.” The trial court 

concluded that the children had developed a strong bond with the foster parents, while 

only JRG displayed a similar bond with Scribner. The trial court concluded that the 

foster parents had demonstrated the capacity to give the children love and guidance 

whereas Scribner expressed a desire to do so, but had not demonstrated the ability to do 

so, given that she had not cared for the children for a significant period of time. The trial 

court determined that Scribner had a superior financial ability to support the children, but 

that the foster parents also had sufficient income to support the children financially. The 

trial court also determined that the children’s stability with the foster parents and 

desirability of maintaining that stability “overwhelming[ly]” favored denying the 

guardianship. The trial court acknowledged that Scribner could have provided similar 

stability given the opportunity, but it would be improper to focus on “what may be fair 

for” Scribner rather than “the best interests of the children.” 

 

the Child Custody Act factors “for guidance” was proper in the context of termination of 

parental rights and adoption cases. We recognize that In re Barlow was decided before 

specific best-interest factors were added to the Adoption Code by amendment in 1980 

and thus should not be interpreted as condoning the application of different factors in the 

face of a statutory requirement to do otherwise. However, In re Barlow is nevertheless 

instructive in this case, in which the Legislature has not elected to confine the court’s 

decision-making process regarding guardianships to a specific list of statutory factors. 
21

The trial court likewise found the children’s school record to be a compelling 

reason to deny the guardianship. The trial court recognized that the school district where 

Scribner lived was highly regarded, but the court noted that the children made 

“significant progress in their school performances” while with the foster parents. 

Accordingly, the trial court stated, “[h]ow uprooting them and changing schools would 

serve their best interests is highly questionable.” The trial court recognized that 

significant testimony was devoted to the children’s preference and concluded that JRG 

was agreeable to either outcome, while COH, ERH, and KBH were “decidedly in favor 

of remaining in their existing placement [with the foster parents] on a permanent basis.” 

Acknowledging that the children’s preference had already been overridden when they 

were removed from the care of their biological parents, the trial court determined that it 

was not in the children’s best interest to again ignore their preference, particularly when 

that preference was for what the trial court determined to be a “stable, loving, secure, and 

trustworthy home . . . .” Finally, the trial court lamented its conclusion that neither the 

foster parents nor Scribner seemed willing to encourage a relationship with the other 

party. 

Overall, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was 

made in assessing the facts relevant to the children’s best interests and, thus, we conclude 

that the trial court’s best-interest determination was not clearly erroneous. First, the trial 

court provided an individualized analysis based on the relevant evidence for each of the 

applicable factors. Second, the trial court did not take a one-sided view of the evidence; 

rather, the court weighed evidence that favored each placement option and acknowledged 

that Scribner could likely provide a stable and caring environment for the children if 
22

given the opportunity. The trial court also recognized that its decision to deny the 

guardianship could appear unfair to Scribner. However, the trial court correctly 

explained that its focus remained on the children’s best interests, as required by law. See 

MCL 712A.19c(2). Finally, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial court erred by 

denying Scribner’s petition for guardianship under MCL 712A.19c(2) was largely rooted 

in its erroneous conclusion that Scribner was entitled to a preference because of her status 

as a relative. However, as previously established, the Court of Appeals erroneously 

interpreted MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c. Because there is no statutory preference 

for creating a guardianship with a relative under MCL 712A.19c(2), the entirety of the 

Court of Appeals’ review of the trial court’s best-interest determination is severely 

undercut. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erroneously substituted its 

judgment for the trial court’s judgment on questions of fact. Additionally, we conclude 

that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that a guardianship with Scribner was 

not in the children’s best interests under MCL 722.19c(2). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 We hold that MCL 722.954a creates a preference for placement with relatives, but 

that preference does not apply to a court’s decision regarding whether to appoint a 

guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2). We further hold that, in deciding whether to appoint 

a guardian, a court must determine whether the guardianship is in the child’s best 

interests, and to do so the court may consider the best-interest factors from the Child 

Custody Act, the Adoption Code, or any other factors that may be relevant under the 

circumstances of a particular case. 
23

Because the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that a preference for 

placement with relatives exists under MCL 712.19c(2) and substituted its judgment for 

the trial court’s on questions of fact regarding the children’s best interests, we reverse the 

Court of Appeals judgment and remand to that Court to consider Scribner’s appeal of the 

MCI Superintendent’s denial of consent to adopt the children. 

 Michael F. Cavanagh 

 Robert P. Young, Jr. 

 Stephen J. Markman 

 Mary Beth Kelly 

 Brian K. Zahra 

Bridget M. McCormack

 David F. Viviano