alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 530.8 Preservation of individual homeworker certificates.

A copy of all certificates provided to the employer under this part shall be maintained for a period of at least three years after the last employment under the certificate.

[49 FR 44271, Nov. 5, 1984]
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT (21)

                   LUFKIN INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES

                       SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

                                                         Name under which
                                      Jurisdiction       such subsidiary
Name of subsidiary                 of Incorporation        does business
------------------                 ----------------      ----------------


Lufkin Industries Canada, Ltd.     Province of Alberta,         Same
     Canada

P. T. Lufkin Indonesia             Republic of Indonesia        Same


Lufkin Industries FSC, Inc.        Barbados                     Same


Lufkin Industries Europe, Bv.      The Netherlands              Same


Lufkin Japan, L. L. C.             Japan                        Same


Lufkin France                      France                       Same
Exhibit
10.5.2


 


	 	April 13, 2015


 


PAXmed, Inc.


420 Lexington
Avenue, Suite 300


New York, New
York 10170


 


CRT Capital
Group LLC


262 Harbor Drive


Stamford, Connecticut
06902


 


Re:         Initial Public
Offering


 


Gentlemen:


 


This letter is being delivered
to you in connection with the initial public offering (“IPO”) of PAXmed Inc. (the “Company”) to be underwritten
by several underwriters for whom CRT Capital Group LLC will serve as representative (collectively, the “Underwriters”).  In
order to induce the Company and the Underwriters to proceed with the IPO, and in recognition of the benefit that such IPO will
confer upon the undersigned as beneficial owner of securities of the Company, and for other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the undersigned hereby agrees as follows:


 


1.           In order to minimize
potential conflicts of interest which may arise from multiple affiliations, until such time as the undersigned ceases to be an
officer of the Company, he will present to the Company for its consideration, prior to presentation to any other person or entity,
any suitable business opportunity which may be reasonably required to be presented to the Company, subject to any pre-existing
fiduciary and contractual obligations the undersigned might have.


 


2.           The undersigned has
full right and power, without violating any agreement by which he is bound, to enter into this letter agreement.


 


3.           This letter agreement
shall be governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, without giving effect to
conflicts of law principles that would result in the application of the substantive laws of another jurisdiction.  The
undersigned hereby (i) agrees that any action, proceeding or claim against him arising out of or relating in any way to this letter
agreement (a “Proceeding”) shall be brought and enforced in the courts of the State of New York of the
United States of America for the Southern District of New York, and irrevocably submits to such jurisdiction, which jurisdiction
shall be exclusive, (ii) waives any objection to such exclusive jurisdiction and that such courts represent an inconvenient


 




    	 



    	 



    

 


forum and (iii) irrevocably agrees to appoint
Graubard Miller as agent for the service of process in the State of New York to receive, for the undersigned and on his behalf,
service of process in any Proceeding.  


 


4.           The undersigned acknowledges
and understands that the Underwriters and the Company will rely upon the agreements, representations and warranties set forth herein
in proceeding with the IPO.


 


	 	Michael Glennon
	 	Print Name
	 	 
	 	/s/ Michael Glennon
	 	Signature


 




    	2
#### Thompson *v.*Hiatt et al.

[No. 17,839.

Filed June 19, 1896.]

Liquor License. — Remonstrance— *Statute Construed.*— A remonstrance against granting a liquor license under section 9, Act of 1895 (Acts of 1895, p. 248), directed against “ John W. Thompson or any applicant,” is against John W. Thompson ; the words “ or any applicant ” may he rejected as surplusage.

*531From the Jay Circuit Court.

*Affirmed.*

*J. M. Smith, Walker & Garrett, Lamb & Beasley,Baker & Daniels, Elliott & Elliott, Zollars & Worden, S. R. Hmill,*and *Stuart Bros. & Hammond,*for appellant.

*W. A. Ketcham,*Attorney-General, *C. E. Wiltsie, Duncan, Smith & Hornbrook, LaFollette & Adair, E. F. Ritter*and *F. E. Matson,*for appellees.

Jordan, J.

— The only question, if any, that may be said to be properly presented by the record herein is, that of the right of remonstrators. to withdraw their names from a remonstrance against granting a liquor license, under section nine of the Act of 1895 (Acts of 1895, p. 248), after the period of limitation for filing such remonstrance has commenced to run. This right to withdraw, under such circumstances, was denied in the case of *State*v. *Gerhardt, ante,*439, and is controlling in this appeal. Some complaint is made by the appellant that the remonstrance herein was general, and was not directed against him alone, for the reason that it read against “John W. Thompson or any applicant.” We think, however, that the remonstrance may be said to be against John W. Thompson, and, as there was no legal authority for inserting the words “or any applicant,” they may be rejected as surplusage.

There is no error shown by the record, and the judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6024

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY ALSTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Malcolm J. Howard, 

Senior District Judge. (4:01-cr-00001-H-1; 4:09-cv-00173-H)

Submitted: July 27, 2011 Decided: August 3, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Alston, Appellant Pro Se. Edward D. Gray, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Alston seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011) 

motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. We have independently reviewed the record 

and conclude that Alston has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We deny the motion to remand for resentencing and 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
3

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Triad Hospitals, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, W. Stephen Love, Acting Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                              
|------------------------------
|/s/ W. STEPHEN LOVE           
|W. Stephen Love               
|Acting Chief Financial Officer
|May 6, 2005                   



This certification
shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to liability pursuant to that section. This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference
into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference. A signed original of this written statement required
by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 32.2



Section 906 Certification of Chief Financial Officer



I, David M. Gernak, Chief Financial Officer of Patriot Motorcycle Corporation (the Company), certify, pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



| | (1) | the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 780(d)); and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: October 27, 2005



|                                       
|---------------------------------------
|                                       
|/s/ David M. Gernak                    
|David M. Gernak Chief Financial
Officer
§ 779.310 Employees of employers operating multi-unit businesses. ( a ) Where the employer's business operations are conducted in more than one establishment, as in the various units of a chain-store system or where branch establishments are operated in conjunction with a main store, the employer is entitled to exemption under section 13(a)(2) or (4) for those of his employees in such business operations, and those only, who are “employed by” an establishment which qualifies for exemption under the statutory tests. For example, the central office or central warehouse of a chain-store operation even though located on the same premises as one of the chain's retail stores would be considered a separate establishment for purposes of the exemption, if it is physically separated from the area in which the retail operations are carried on and has separate employees and records. (*Goldberg* v. *Sunshine Department Stores,* 15 W.H. Cases 169 (CA-5) *Mitchell* v. *Miller Drugs, Inc.,* 255 F. 2d 574 (CA-1); *Walling* v. *Goldblatt Bros.,* 152 F. 2d 475 (CA-7).)
( b ) Under this test, employees in the warehouse and central offices of chainstore systems have not been exempt prior to, and their nonexempt status is not changed by, the 1961 amendments. Typically, chain-store organizations are merchandising institutions of a hybrid retail-wholesale nature, whose wholesale functions are performed through their warehouses and central offices and similar establishments which distribute to or serve the various retail outlets. Such central establishments clearly cannot qualify as exempt establishments. (*A. H. Phillips, Inc.* v. *Walling,* 324 U.S. 490; *Mitchell* v. *C & P Stores,* 286 F. 2d 109 (CA-5).) The employees working there are not “employed by” any single exempt establishment of the business; they are, rather, “employed by” an organization of a number of such establishments. Their status obviously differs from that of employees of an exempt retail or service establishment, working in a warehouse operated by and servicing such establishment exclusively, who are exempt as employees “employed by” the exempt establishment regardless of whether or not the warehouse operation is conducted in the same building as the selling or servicing activities.
```

[115th Congress Public Law 191]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

Public Law 115-191
115th Congress

                                 An Act

 
 To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to acquire approximately 44 
 acres of land in Martinez, California, for inclusion in the John Muir 
    National Historic Site, and for other purposes. <<NOTE: June 22, 
                         2018 -  [H.R. 1719]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, <<NOTE: John Muir 
National Historic Site Expansion Act.>> 
SECTION 1. <<NOTE: 54 USC 320101 note.>>  SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``John Muir National Historic Site 
Expansion Act''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Historic site.--The term ``Historic Site'' means the 
        John Muir National Historic Site in Martinez, California, 
        established by Public Law 88-547 (78 Stat. 753).
            (2) Map.--The term ``map'' means the map entitled ``John 
        Muir National Historic Site Proposed Boundary Expansion'', 
        numbered 426/127150, and dated November 2014.
            (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of the Interior.
SEC. 3. JOHN MUIR NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE LAND ACQUISITION.

    (a) Acquisition.--The Secretary may acquire by donation the 
approximately 44 acres of land and any interests in the land that is 
identified on the map.
    (b) Boundary.--On the acquisition of the land authorized under 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall adjust the boundaries of the 
Historic Site to include the acquired land.
    (c) Administration.--The land and any interests in land acquired 
under subsection (a) shall be administered as part of the National 
Historic Site.

    Approved June 22, 2018.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 1719 (S. 729):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 115-208 (Comm. on Natural Resources).
SENATE REPORTS: No. 115-47 (Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources) 
accompanying S. 729.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
                                                        Vol. 163 (2017):
                                    July 11, considered and passed 
                                        House.
                                                        Vol. 164 (2018):
                                    June 6, considered and passed 
                                        Senate.

                                  <all>
```
EX-10.2



 Exhibit 10.2 

Consent of Independent Public Accounting Firm 

The Board of Directors 
 Atrium European Real Estate Limited:

 We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No. 333-188107) on Form F-3 of Gazit-Globe Ltd of our report dated
March 10, 2015, with respect to the consolidated statements of financial position of Atrium European Real Estate Limited and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and the related consolidated income statements, statements of
comprehensive income/(loss), cash flow statements, and statements of changes in equity for each of the years in the two-year period ended December 31, 2014; as well as our report dated March 11, 2014, with respect to the consolidated
statements of financial position of Atrium European Real Estate Limited and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2013 and 2012, and the related consolidated income statements, statements of comprehensive income, cash flow statements, and statements
of changes in equity for each of the years in the two-year period ended December 31, 2013 which reports appear in the December 31, 2014 annual report on Form 20-F of Gazit-Globe Ltd. 

KPMG Channel Islands Limited 
 Jersey, Channel Islands 

April 22, 2015
#### Anthony v. The St. Louis, Iron Mountain *&*Southern Railway Company, *Appellant.*

1. Practice. This court will not review errors in instructions, unless they were called to the attention of the trial court in the motion for new trial.

2. -, in justices’ courts. While section 16, chapter 82, Wagner’s ‘ Statutes, (p. 815,) was in force, a summons issued by a justice of the peace was not required to contain a statement of the nature of the suit and the sum demanded. This statement was" required for the first time by section 2858, Revised Statutes 1879.

*Avveal from Madison Circuit*Court.—Hon. J. H. Nicholson, • Judge.

Affirmed.

*19
      *Bennett Pike*and *Geo. H. Benton*for appellant.

*B. B. Cahoon*for respondent.

Henry, J.

This suit originated in a justice’s court, in Madison county, and was for double damages for the alleged killing of plaintiff’s mare, by one of defendant’s trains of cars. A judgment by default was rendered against defendant by the justice, from which defendant appealed to the circuit court, where, on a trial by the court, a jury having been waived, plaintiff again obtained judgment, from which defendant has appealed to this court. There was evidence to show that the mare got on the track of defendant’s road through a pair of bars at a farm crossing, placed there by the company for the use of the farm; that the bars had been out of repair for a long time, and their condition had been reported to the company; that the bars were three planks high, and the top plank was so short that it barely touched the post, so as to be easily thrown off by the wind; that the two planks were off when the mare was found dead. No instructions were asked by plaintiff; no declarations of law were made by the court, and the court refused one asked by the defendant to the effect, that after it has erected a fence on the sides of its road, and it is broken down, defendant has a reasonable time to find out its condition and repair it, before its liability begins.

It is sufficient to dispose of the point made by appellant on the refusal of that instruction, to say that the error, if any, committed in its refusal, was not called to the attention of the court in the motion for a new trial.

Counsel also contend that the judgment is void “because it does not appear on the face of the papers that the justice obtained jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action;” and base this objection on the omission from the summons issued by the justice, of' a statement “ of *20tbe nature of a suit and the sum demanded.” The act in force when this suit was instituted did not require that the summons should contain that, or any statement of the kind, and the summons issued was in exact conformity with that required by section 16, page 815, 2 "Wagner’s Statutes.

We cannot say that there was no evidence to support the finding and judgment of the court. Even if defendant’s refused instruction had been given we could not say that “ the finding was against the law and the evidence,” or “ against the instructions of the court.”

All concurring,

the judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-1326

In Re: NORWOOD COOK,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (5:02-cr-30087-jpj-mfu-1)

Submitted: March 28, 2008 Decided: April 16, 2008

Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Norwood Cook, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Norwood Cook petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking an

order to compel the district court to enforce his plea agreement.

We conclude that Cook is not entitled to mandamus relief and deny

his petition.

Mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has

a clear right to the relief sought. In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, mandamus is a

drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary

circumstances. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394,

402 (1976); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987).

 Cook alleges the Government breached his plea agreement

when it used self-incriminating evidence against him in the

presentence investigation report. However, we previously denied

Cook relief on this claim when he asserted it in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000) motion. The district court properly construed Cook’s

complaint as a § 2255 motion and dismissed it as successive because

Cook sought recalculation of his guidelines sentence, and such

challenges to the fact or duration of confinement should be

asserted in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973). The relief Cook seeks is not available

by way of mandamus. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of

mandamus. 
- 3 -

To the extent that Cook’s writ of mandamus could be

construed as a motion for authorization to file a successive § 2255

motion, we deny such authorization. See In re Williams, 330 F.3d

277, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2003). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

PETITION DENIED