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PEARL HARBOR: 


WhYJ HowJ Fleet Salvage 


and Final Appraisal 


by 


VICE ADMIRAL HOMER N WALLIN 


USN (Re[ired) 


with a Foreword by 

REAR ADMIRAL ERNEST McNEILL ELLER, USN (Reti« d) 

Director of Naval History 

NAVAL H ISTORY DIVISION 


WASHINGTON: 1968 


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L.e. Card 68-60091 

UNITED STATES 


GOVERNMENT PRlNTmG OFFICE 


WASHINGTON : 1968 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. (!overtlmen! Prtntln~ Ol!lce 


W""h!lI8l.On, D.C. 2OtO'1. Price $7.00 

Foreword 

Pearl Harbor will long stand out in men's minds as an example of the 

results of basic unpreparedness of a peace loving nation, of highly efficient 

treacherous surprise attack and of the resulting unification of America into 

a single tidal wave of purpose to victory. Therefore, all will be interested 

in the unique volume that follows. It is Admiral Wallin's own handicraft, 

with only minor modifications by this staff. 

The Navy has long needed a succinct account of the salvage operations 

at Pearl Harbor that miraculously resurrected what appeared to be a forever 

shattered fleet. We were delighted when Admiral Wallin agreed to under· 

take the job. He was exactly the right man for it-in talent, in perception, 

and in experience. He had served intimately with Admiral Nimitz and with 

Admiral Halsey in the Sou th Pacific, has commanded three different Navy 

Yards, and was a highly successful Chief of the Bureau of Ships. 

On 7 December 1941 the then Captain Wallin was serving at Pearl 

Harbor. He witnessed the events of that sha ttering and unifying "Day of 

In famy'-' His mind began to race at high speeds at once on the problems 

and means of getting the broken fleet back into service for its giant task. 

Unless the United States regained control of the sea, even greater disaster 

loomed. Without victory at sea, ty ranny soon would surely rule all Asia 

and Europe. In a matter of time it would surely rule the Americas. 

Captain Wallin salvaged most of the broken Pearl Harbor fleet that went 

on to figure prominently in the United States Navy's victory. So the account 

he masterfully tells covers what he masterfully accomplished. The United 

States owes him an unpayable debt for this high serv ice among many 

others in his long career. 

FoUowing graduation at the Naval Academy in the Class of 1917, 

Ensign (and later Lieutenant) WaHin entered into the Navy's then Con ­

struction Corps. He intensively studied ship construction in all its in tricate 

facets, then he went on to various efficiently performed duties. At the time 

of Pearl Harbor Captain Wailin was serving as Battle Force engineer and 

was charged with overall responsibility for fleet repair and alterations. So 

he was in the thick of the Pearl Harbor attack from its onset. 

When I asked him to write the account of the salvage I expected a well 

, 
written one from his experience, his profound mind, his thoroughness, his 

broad perception, and his skill in expressing himself in writing. What .we 

got, as the reader will note, is not just salvage, but a succinct summary of 

internationa l aggression during the '30's-the surprise attack that inevitably 

followed weakness in face of aggression,- and the resurrection and superb 

service of the fleet that suffered treachery. At first some of us looked upon 

the three as strange shipmates. But the more we thought about it the more 

we came to the conclusion that they made a un ique team. Someone who had 

lived through all these, had thought about them at the time, had intimate 

personal contact in the attack and full responsibility for salvage had told 

them as the connected story they are-the three acts in a giant drama of 

world struggle. 

Admiral Wallin has written with tireless effort to portray the truth. 

Whether or not one agrees with all that he says about the events through 

Pearl Ha rbor (and I do with all but a few ) , the reader ca n know that 

Admiral Wallin has assiduously sought just the truth. We sent him large 

cargoes of manuscript materia l and photographs to add to his own extensive 

collection. We supplied him with books or titles in numbers for his wide 

range of reading of published works in addition to the manuscript-he is 

one of the few people who has se riously read the 39 volumes of the Pearl 

Harbor Congressional Hearings. 

Rear Admiral r. Kent Loomis, Commander C. F. Johnson, Dr. William 

Morgan, Dr. Dean Allard, and others of us read the manuscript offering 

suggestions. Commander Victor Robison's assistant in the Curator Section, 

Mrs. Agnes Hoover, searched far and wide to obtain photographs to 

supplement the good ones supplied by Admira l \Vallin. Dr. Allard, Mr. 

Bernard Cavalcante, and Miss Sandra Brown ably edited the manuscript 

for publication and have carried the burden of building a manuscript into 

a book. Mrs. Robert W inters of Fort \'ifashington, Forest, Maryland, prepared the competent index to this volume_ The story, however, is Admiral 

Wallin's and a significant one it is. ' 

A host of Americans should thank Admiral Wa llin for this work. May 

it help strengthen in the United States our sense of responsibility of service, 

our readiness to resist tyranny wisely, our integrity and devotion to the 

cause of liberty and dignity of man under God. May it also help to 

strengthen in all American minds understanding of the vast role the sea 

has played in America's destiny and is still to play. In the words of President 

Kennedy: "The sea means security. It can mean victory. 

E. M. ELLER, 

Rear Admiral, USN ( Retired), 

Director of Naval His/at)'. 

"' 

Preface 

Ever since the successful completion of Fleet Salvage at Pearl Harbor in 

1942, I have freguently been importuned to write a comprehensive report 

of that gratifying outcome of the Pearl Harbor disaster. However, in view 

of other work and avocations, and especially because of the immensity of 

the task, if it was to be authentic, I was negatively indincd,-at least 

until a more propitious time. 

It was not until the early part of 1965 · that the Director of Naval 

History, Rear Admiral Ernest M. Eller, U.S. Navy, Retired. persuaded me 

to take the pen in hand. His argument was that the Pearl Harbor Salvage 

Operation should be made a matter of historical record, and could in 

addition serve as a ready reference book for any future work of that nature; 

also that he knew of no other person who could write a reasonably authentic 

account with the data and information still ava ilable. So, in a way, I was 

"Hobson's Choice" if the work was to be done at all. 

Fortunately, I had rather complete files covering the work. inasmuch 

as through the years 1 had become some sort of '·pack rat'" on technical 

records pertaining to my specialty of ship design, construction, and repair. 

Although I had turned over most of these fi les and photographs to the 

Bureau of Ships of the Navy Department, they were returned to me when 

I agreed to undertake the writing job. 

Despite the fact that nearly a quarter of a century has elapsed since 

the event a great portion of the impact of my experiences at Pearl Harbor 

and the salvasI.' work i~ still gu ite clear in my memory. At that time I 

was Material Officer on the staff of Vice Admiral William S. Pye, Com· 

mander of the Battle Force of the Pacific Fleet. Therefo re the handlins of 

the damage sustained by ships of the fleet immed ia tely became of first 

concern to me as an existent responsibility. W ithin a short time I was 

relieved of all other duties and ordered to full time work as Fleet Salvage 

Officer. 

Ever since those days I have at times pondered the events which occurred 

before and after the Japanese air raid, and have often wished that tbe 

American people miSht have obtai ned a more cor rect understanding of 

the "Whys and Wherefores." It bothered me greatly when, following the 

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attack, so many Americans and so much of OUf news media took a "Who 

dunnit" attitude toward the disaster and seemed to be more anxious to 

blame military negligence and inattention to duty rather than to gain a 

right appraisal of the panorama of events. Perhaps it is an element of 

human nature to accuse ind ividua ls and to find scapegoats whenever distasteful events occur. 

Consequently, with the knowledge of one who was on the scene at the 

time, and of one willing to undertake a vast amount of research from 

official and other sources, I agreed to p roceed with the salvage write-up,­

provided I could at the same time pinpoint the situation which pertained 

in the fleet and in our relations with Japan at that period. 

In order to do thi s with some semblance of authenticity I have rev iewed 

a goodly portion of the testimony given before the Roberts Commission in 

December 1941 and January 1942, the Hart Investigation in 1944, the 

Hewitt Inquiry of 1945, the Naval Court of Inguiry of 1944, the Army Investigation in 1944 , the Congressional Investigation of 1945, and the State 

Department releases published in 1953. This latter has been drawn upon 

freely as it is the official report of the United States' Foreign Policy from 

1931 to 194 1 inclusive, and is entitled "Peace and War." Also I have read 

a considerable number of books and reports on the Pearl Harbor attack, 

some written by Japanese participants. Virtually all of this information has 

the advantage of hindsight so far as evaluation is concerned and is therefore of inestimable value in piecing together a momentous event which 

reguires retrospection as a primary ingredient. 

The Pearl Harbor episode brought forth multitudinous opinions and 

convictions, some highly emotional and some perta ining to personalities. 

Others were based On cold logic and technical facts. In the over-a ll we must 

all agree that the event which set off a cruel and bloody war is fraught 

with many lessons and guideposts for the future. I have endeavored to 

pinpoint a few of these which are particularly worthwhile, and have 

striven honestly to be fair to all persons who were involved in any way 

either before, during, or after the event. 

The final appra isal of the Pearl Harbor attack is given in Chapter XV. 

It reveals indisputably that th e Japanese government made a great mistake 

in attacking Pearl Harbor, as it did also in other aspects of the struggle 

for dominance in the Pacific. There is now no doubt that the attack resulted 

from the gross unpreparedness of the American military forces, as was 

VII I 
attested by the 1945 statement of President Truman and the 1965 statement 

of Admiral Nimitz. 

I am indebted to the Director of Naval History and his staff for 

invaluable assistance throughout, and of course for general guidance. That 

office has furnished much valuable data and information such as official 

damage reports from the Bureau of Ships, descriptions of rehabilitation 

work from various naval shipyards, pertinent excerpts from ships' logs, 

and so forth. 

Also. I am most grateful to the Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval 

District, Rear Admiral William E. Ferrall, U.S. Navy, and his staff for 

much assistance, including office space and equipment. some secretarial 

work, and a widespread spirit of cooperation and helpfulness. 

HOMER N. WALLIN, 

Vice Admiral, USN (Reti,.ed). 

;x 
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Contents 

FOREWORD ., 

PREFACE 

Chapter I. INTRODUCTION 

Chapter 11. THE TRENDS TOWARD WAR 

1. Basic CaUSC's of War , 

2. Germany's Insatiable Appetite for Aggression 

3. The Aggressions of Italy . 

4. The Brutal Aggressiveness of Japan 

Chapter 1II . 	 PROBLEMS AND DILEMMAS OF THE UNITED STATES 

AND EVENTUAL PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR 

1. American 	 Attitudes and Policies 

2. Retrenchment in Military Preparedness 

3. 	 Diplomacy at Work to Prevent War and to Improve Prepa redness for 

W" 

4. Hardening of Public Opinion 

5. Assistance to Friendly Nations 

6. Military Preparedness Measures 

Chapter IV. 	 THE FLEET AT PEARL HARBOR 

_ 1. 

- 2. 

t 3. 

4. 

5. 

_ 6. 

-7. 

Why 	Was the Fleet There? ..." 

Army-Navy Defense of Pearl Harbor 

Reconnaissance 

Radar ,..................... 


Operation of 	the Fleet .. " 

How 	Powerful Was th~ Fl c~t? 

Wh~[e Were 	the Fleet Ships on 7 December? 

Pag. 

v 

V" 

9 

9 

12 

l4 

"

26 

2. 

3l 

33 

35 

4l 

43 

44 

4. 

'0 


"

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x, 
Chapter V. IMMINENCE OF WAR 

PIIlt 

1. Breakdown of Diplomacy . ........... _....._.... . .... ................. _ ...... 59 


......2. Japan's Knowledge of Pearl Harbor ................... ....... ..... ......................... .. 60 


...... 3. America's Knowledge of Japan's Intentions .............................. 65 


4. Warning to the Fleet . 	 ............ ................_ ... ............. 74 


5. What Information Did Hawaii Not Receive? ..................................... . 79 


Chapter VI. JAPANESE ArrACK, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS 

1. Preparedness, War Games, and Drills ................. 83 


2. Assembling of Attack Force ....................... .................. ... ......................... 


3. Route of the Pearl Harbor Attack Force . . ........ .................................. . 85" 


4. The Attack Force . 	 88 


5. The Attack ............................ . 	 88 


6. Direction of Attack 	 94 


7. Submarines . ..........._....... . .................. 	 94 


8. Japanese Losses ............................_ .... ,. ,.".,., .. ,.,., .. ,........ _.... 	 9' 


9. Japanese Estimates of Damage to the Americans 	 96 


Chapter VII. RESULTS OF JAPANESE SURPR ISE AIR RAID 

I. Sunday Was a Day of Rest in Hawaii in Peacetime 	 99 


2. Submarines 	 100 


3. We Are at War , .................. 	 100 


4. All Air Bases Immobilized 	 101 


5. Ships Attacked by Torpedo Planes . 	 102 


6. Inboard Ships Hit by High-level Bombers . 	 104 


7. Losses in Honolulu .,.................... ......."".".,.,.,.,.,_,., 	 105 


8. Officers and Men Aboard Ship and Fit for Duty .............. 	 105 


9. Anti-aircraft Batteries Which Opposed the Japanese Planes . 106 


10. Deeds of Heroism . 	 108 


II. Total Dead and Wounded in the Services 	 108
 ( 12. Sabotage ' ...... " .........._............... 	 108 


13. State of Mind of Mil itary Personnel' 	 109 


Chapter ·Vlll. 	 WASHINGTON'S RESPONSE TO THE JAPANESE 


ArrACK 


f

l. Military and Gviiians Taken by Surprise 113 


2. Declaration of War . 114 


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3. Secretary of the Navy Visits Pearl Hiltbor . 	 114 


4. The Roberts Commission _" ..., "..........---	 115 


5. President Roosevelt's Fireside Chat 	 116 


6. Admiral Kimmel and General Short Relieved 	 117 


7. Admiral C. W . Nimitz Takes Command ....... "................... _ 	 118 


8. Admiral Ernest }. King Becomes Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet 118 


9. Admiral Nimitz's Policy of a "Limited Offensive" . __ ____ __-. ..~._........ 120 


10. Halsey's Early Raids . 	 121 


Chapter IX. 	 OBSERVATIONS AND STATEMENTS MADE BY 

SURVIVORS 

1. Condition of Ships at 0755 "". .. ""...............__._.___ 125 


2. Impressions and Actions on USS. WEST VIRGINIA . 126 


3. Impressions and Actions on US.S. OKLAHOMA .......................... .. ............... 132 


4. Impressions and Actions on U.S.S. ARIZONA ............."...... ...__ ___....._.._.... 136 


:s. Impressions ilnd Actions on U.S.S. CALIFORNIA 140 


6. Impressions ilnd Actions on U.SS. urAH ..______ __ ____-. ...."". . 146 


7, The Performance of U.S.S. NEVADA _... _________ -. ................__ 150 


8. Impressions and Actions on U.SS. MARYLAND . 152 


9. Impressions and Actions on U.SS. TENNESSEE . ___ __ _____........ 156 


Chapter X. OTHER SHIPS' OFFICIAL REPORTS 

1. Destroyers ,,__ 161 


2. Battleships ____ ____ __ __.............. "."........._..._ 16, 


3. Cruisers 16, 


4. Miscellaneous Auxiliary Ships 168 


5. Submarines .'" ...... .......".. ...._..._... .. ..................___......._.•... 169 


6.' OGLffLff ........-.-_... 170 


Chapte,' X I. 	 "ALL HANDS" ENGAGED IN SALVAGE WORK 

1. Priority of Work 	 m 

2. Helping Each Other and Repelling Enemy Attacks 	 176 


3. Freeing the Trapped Men 	 176 


4. Salvage Operations f rom ARGONNE . 	 178 


5. Start of Salvage Organization .... 	 179 


6. Recovery of Ordnance Material 	 186 


7. Med ical Help for Wounded or Burned . 	 186 


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Chapter XII. 	 GETfING THE LESS DAMAGED SHIPS READY 

FOR ACTION 

Page 

I. U.S.s. PENNSYLVANIA, Battleship (Launched in 19n) .......................... 189 


2. USS. HONOLULU, Cruiser (Launched in 1936) ,............._......... _ 191 


3. VSS. HELENA, Cruiser (launched in 1939) .......... . 	 192 


4. V.SS. MARYLAND, Battleship ( Launched in 1920) 	 192 


5. U.S.S. TENNESSEE, Battleship (Launched in 1919) 	 193 


6. USS. VESTAL, Repair Ship (Launched in 1908) 	 194 


7. U.SS. RALEIGH, Cruiser ( Launched in 1922) 	 19' 

8. USS. CURTISS, Seaplane Tender (Launched in 1940) 	 197 


9. USS. HELM, Destroyer (Launched in 1937) 	 198 


Chapter X III. 	 SHiPS SUNK AT PEARL HARBOR 

I. U.S.S. SHAW, Destroyer (launched in 1935) . 	 203 


2. FLOATING DRYDOCK NUMBER TWO ...... ..., _,... 20~ 

3. The Tug SOTOYOMO _ 	 ............"., ......"........._........... 206 


4. 	 USS. CASSIN (Launched in 193~) and DOWNES (Launched 


in 1936) ...... ... .. .................... 206 


~. U.S.S. NEVADA, Battleship (Launched in 1914) .......... , .. _..,.... 211 


6. U.S.S. CALIFORJUA, Battleship (Launched in 1919) 	 222 


7. U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA, Battleship (Launched in 1921) 233 


8. U.S.S. OGLALA (Launched in 1907) 	 243 


9. USs. PLUNGER (Launched in 1936) .... _....._..... .. .. _.............. 2 

10. US.S. OKLAHOMA, Battleship ( Launched in 1914) 	 2~3 

II. U.SS. UTAH, Former Battleship (Launched in 1909) . 	 262 


12. USS. ARiZONA, Battleship (Launched in 1913) 	 267 


Chapter XlV. 	 COND ITIONS W HICH PREVAILED OR WERE 

ENCOUNTERED IN SAL V AGE WORK 

1. Lack of Material ., 273 


2. Fire Hazards on the Ships Themselves 273 


3. Salvage of Ordnance Material 274 


4. Electrical Equipment 27l 


~. Japanese Torpedoes and Bombs 276 


6. Diving Experience .. 277 


7. Deadly Gas Encountered on Most Ships , 	 277 


8. Gasoline Explosions . 	 279 


9. Electric-Drive Battleships . 	 280 


10. Classified Correspondence and Personal Property .. 280 


xiv 

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11. Removal of Hwnan Bodies . 280 


12. Clean ing of Compartments 281 


13. Work Performed by the N avy Yard .... 281 


14. Use of Sunken or Damaged Ships in the War Effort 282 


15. Spirit of the Salvage Crew ................ . 283 


Chapler XV . FINAL APPRAISAL OF PEARL HARBOR ATIACK 

_1. Japan's Mistake in Attacking Pearl Harbor 287 


- 2. Other Mistakes Made by the Japanese 291 


3. United States' Aversion to War 292 


Appendim 

A. Survivors' Statements and Actio05. 297 


B. Restoration of Unwatered Compartments and Machinery of Sunken Ships. 328 


C. Gas Hazard and Protection Against Gas. .................... 337 


D. Electric-Drive Machi nery of Battleships. ......... .............................................. . 339 


E. The Salvage of U.S.S. West Virginia. .. ............................. 342 


F. The Plan (or the Salvage of USS. k/~ho ma. ........................ 356 


G. Ships Present at Pearl Harbor and Vicinity, 7 D«ember ·194 1. 362 


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1 

CHAPTER I 


Introduction 


7 DECEMBER 194 1 marked an abrupt turning point in world history. The 

treacherous Japanese air attack on the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor 

and the Army Air Forces in Hawaii triggered a World War of unprecedented proportions. 

On 8 December 1941 the Congress of the United States declared war on 

Japan, whereupon Germany and Italy three days later, on 11 December 

1941, declared war upon the United States. Their action was in compliance 

with their mutual assistance treaty with Japan known as the Tripartite Pact 

of 27 September 1940. It is worthy of note that the United States did not 

formally cnter the European Wa,r until afte r Germany and Italy declared 

war on the Un ited States. 

Thus the Pearl Harbor attack brought the full potential of the United 

States into the European War which had continued since September 1939 

and which up to that time seemed destined to bring victory to the aggressors. 

But, as a consequence of United States involvement, an all·out war was 

touched off around the g lobe. The tide of battle was gradually turned 

against Hitler's Nazi Germany and Italy's Fascist Mussolini. Their dictatorships, as well as the brutal militarism of Japan, were doomed to ignominious 

defeat. The war lords of Japan's efficient military machine eventually 

suffered complete rout, and were doomed to humiliating defeat and uncon· 

ditional su rrender. The defeat of these three powers was accomplished only 

after a long series of bloody battles, land, sea, and air, which continued 

at an ever-increasing tempo for nearly four years. 

The titanic world struggle not only changed territorial boundaries and 

governmental framework, but affected basically the whole fabric of civilization, even the manner of living and the peoples' attitudes, standards, and 

ways of life. Indeed, the consequences of Japan's surprise attack on Pearl 

Harbor and Hawaii were world-shaking, and they are of a continuing nature 

which will influence history in all phases for years yet to come. 

The immediate result of the Pearl Harbor attack was seeming disaster 

to the sea power of the United States, but this proved only tempora ry. The 

3 
4 Peart Harbor 

psychological effect on fleet personnel was to arouse a fighting spi-rit "'hieh 

turned disaster~ into victories. 

Among the AmericaR civilian population too, the attack utlified wide 

diversities of viewpoint and opinion, and solidified the total population 

in a spirit of ~jlling sacrifice :lnd determined effort which gave unlimited 

support to the armed forces. The mobilization of moral, mental, physical, 

and spiritual effort produced a miracle of production such as has never been 

imagined by man. The output of ships, airplanes, tanks, guns, and landing 

craft was astronomical. Likewise, the over-all logistic support to the millions 

of Americans and their Allies who manned these weapons of war, was 

'1uite beyond calculation. 

Thus, the Japanese militarists who had planned the Pearl Harbor attack 

over many months of careful and arduous preparation triggered for themselves a disaster guite the opposite of their dreams of conguest. Rather 

than conguerors they became the supine victims of their own machinations. 

The Japanese government had been led into violating its solemn agreement9 

signed at The Hague in 1907 not to attack another nation without a declaration of war or an ultimatum . That government was entirely dismantled an 

reinstituted as a democra tic government by a generous · and compassionate 

America. 

So, in retrospect, the ambitions of the military forces of Japan, which 

culminated in the treacherous attack on the Fleet and Hawaiian Air Forces, 

proved calamitous. Its perpetrators failed entirely to understand that unrighteousness. although Aourishing for a time, cannot eventually prevail 

in a world whose major powers stand for peaceful pursuits and fair dealing. 

The Japanese government failed miserably in underestimating the recuperative power of its newly made enemy and the American potentia l for all-out 

combat. The success of the Japanese attack was more than compensated for 

by the aroused moral and spiritual powers of the American people as they 

applied themselves to the task before them. 

However, it must be recognized that the Japanese performed a masterful 

job in planning. preparing, practicing, and executing the attack. The efficiency of all aspects was well-nigh unbelievable. especially by peopl e who 

habitually underestimated the capabilities of the Japanese. It is worthy of 

note that the weapons employed by Japan were the airplane and the aeria l 

torpedo. Both of these were developed by the United States, but not as 

efficiently as used by the Japanese. Why? Because the United States was 

unprepared for war due to a public fetish that preparedness invited international misunderstanding and eventual conflict. 
Introduction j 

So, before outlining the damage wrought and the remedial measures 

taken, it seems appropriate to describe in some detail the strategy and 

tactics employed in delivering the attack, and why it was so successfuL 

Thereafter we might cover the Fleet's response to the onslaught, the effect 

on specific ships, remedial action taken including details of salvage operations, and so forth . But first it would seem profitable to pinpoint the basic 

causes underlying and overlying the international situation which set off 

the holocaust. 

Although much has been written regarding the world turmoil which 

developed during the 1930's, a short and specific recounting of the fateful 

events which culminated in World War II is necessary. Now it is Cjuite 

clear that the war was the result of wanton military aggression by Germany, 

Italy, and Japan, and that the United States was forced to take up arms 

against these predatory. forces if freedom and peace were to survive in 

the world. These basic facts have never been fully comprehended by the 

American people; neither have they understood how it was possible for the 

Pearl Harbor disaster to occur. One of the purposes of this book is to enlighten the public on these points, especially the new generations. Such is 

a responsibility of historical writings, and it is particularly important that 

the oncoming personnel of the Navy and the other military services should 

have a ready reference from which to select guidelines when confronted 

with comparable problems and cirrumstances. It is well to take account 

of the words of George Santayana: "Those who cannot remember the past 

are condemned to repeat it." 

It is interesting to note that our wartime enemies are now our closest 

friends. Japan, Germany, and Italy enjoy the compassion and generosity 

of America, and are industrial leaders in their parts of the world. When 

we speak of Germany we mean, of course, West Germany, under the 

influence of the United States and her Allies. East Germany is a satellite of 

Russia and has been subjected to Soviet influence rather than to the influence 

of the Western World. 

Changes have also occurred among Allies in the war, including Russia 

and China. Russia has been the mother country of communism and has been 

our principal adversary for at least twenty years while she has fomented 

unrest throughout the world. China, whom we befriended against Japan, 

has fallen to communism and has turned out to be our mortal enemy. 

Strange indeed are the anamol ies that occur in international relations. 

ll:3:LdYH::J II 

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CHAPTER II 

The Trends Toward War 

1. BASIC CAUSES OF WAR 

Warfare with its tremendous sacrifice in lives and treasure is abhorrent to 

all civilized people. Some wars of the past have been considered justified 

when waged for religious or idealistic purposes, such as to right the wrongs 

imposed upon a people. But here we are concerned with warfare based 

primarily on aggression and greed. History tells us that armed conRict is 

and always has been a fact of life whenever covetous governments desire 

their neighbors' property, or whenever th irst for power dictates the purpose 

and aim of offici als in control. In such circumstances the relative weakness 

of the intended victim is a contributing factor. It has been proved that it 

is impossible for a nation to run away from a bad situation, to believe that 

a serious situation does not exist, or that freedom is not involved. 

Peace-lov ing people teach and preach that national aggression and military force do not pay. But that wou ld depend, it seems, whether or not the 

agg ressor is met and repelled by a more powerful force in which hopefully 

righteousness adds to the power. This fact is true among nations even as 

among citizens who are menaced by criminals and bandits. 

2. GERMANY'S INSATIABLE APPETITE FOR AGGRESSION 

One of history's outstanding examples of wanton aggression and thirst for 

power is Hitler's Germany. Following his coming to power in 1933 Hitler 

initiated an armament build-up and psychological aggression which were 

awesome to all peace.loving nations. Even so, the various acts of aggression 

were gradual and limited, as if to make them somewhat natural and more 

acceptable to the victims and to onlookers. In effect, Germany pursued the 

"Nibble Theory" by taking a little here and later a little there, but always 

professing a fervent desire for peaceful practices and an end to expansive 

9 
10 Penrl Harbor 

ventures. Coupled with this were the appeasement policies of the leading 

world powers interested in world stability, but nonetheless trying desperately to avoid coming to grips with a formidable aggressor. 

IUs of immense importance to review the germination of the European 

Wa r because it became a direct threat to American security, and certainly 

an indirect cause for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In addition, the 

experience of European nations with Nazi Germany was in many ways 

parallel to America's experience with pre-wa r Japan. 

The record shows that Hitler became ChanceUor in Germany's government in 1933. In 1934, he took the title of Fuehrer, which means in effect 

"all-powerful leader," and set out to build up the peoples ' desire for 

expansion and the establishment of a so-ca ll ed "New Order" in Europe. 

Some of the significant steps taken before and after the declaration of the 

war in Europe were the following: 

a. In 1933 Hitler denounced and quit the League of N ations. Violation of several provisions of the Ve rsailles Treaty which ended World War 

I followed in short order. 

b. In 1936 Germany violated the Lacarno Treaty of 1925, which guaranteed the status quo in Western Europe, and reocrupied the Rhineland. 

c. In 1936 Germany joined Italy in entering the Spanish Civil \Var. 

d. In March 1938 Germany annexed Austria in violation of its pledge 

made in July 1936. 

e. In September 1938 Hitler demanded control of part of Czechoslovakia. This aroused all major nations to the danger of general war, whereupon England's Prime Minister Chamberlain journeyed to Munich to confe r 

with Hitler in order to avoid war in Europe. The result was that Great 

Britain, Fra nce, Germany, and Italy met and agreed to Hitler's demand for 

taking over that part of Czechoslovakia called Sudetenland. 

f. Six months later, in March 1939, Germany took over most of 

Czechoslovakia in violation of the agreement made at Munich. 

g. By this time Hitler had put in high gear the persecution of the 

Jews in Germany and the annexed territories, such that President Roosevelt 

"could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a twentieth century 

civilization." t 

h. At this point the United States appealed to Hitler and Mussolini 

I P,IiIU IiIl1d War, VI/if,d S'tlln Foreigll Poliq 1931- 1941, Department of State Publiation, 

Unitt<! States Government Printing Office, Washington, D .C., 194 2, p. ~8. Hereafter cited 

a.s Pure and W ...r. 
The T rendJ T oward Wor 11 

for assurance of no further attacks on independent States of Europe and 

the Near East. Neither replied directly. The American Secretary of State, 

Cordell Hull, stated that all other nations were confronted with the '"tragic 

alternatives of surrender or armed defense."2 

i. In August 1939 Hitler demanded the return to Germany of Danzig, 

which was declared a free city in the Versailles Treaty. Following this 

demand Great Britain and France warned Germany that in compliance with 

their treaties with Poland, aggression against Poland would mean war. 

j. At this point the President of the United States appealed to Germany, 

Italy, and Poland to agree to settle their differences by direct negotiation or 

by arbitration. While Poiand replied favorably, no direct reply was made by 

Germany because, the German Ambassador explained, the invasion had 

already begun due to the uncooperative attitude of Poland.~ Thus with the 

invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 the Eur.opean War began. 

k. As the tempo of war developed, Germany asserted its power in 

every direction, especially its aggression toward neutral and unoffending 

nations. 

I. In April 1940 Germany took over Denmark without opposition, and 

soon occupied Norway after overcoming Norway's spirited but futile resistance. This was denounced by the United States. 

m. Then Belgium and the Netherlands were invaded and subjugated, 

as well as Luxembourg, in May 1940. 

n. Early in 1941 Germany went to the assistance of Italy in its faltering 

invasion of Greece. By April 1941 the German forces overran both Greece 

and Yugoslavia and persuaded Rumania , Bulgaria, and Hungary to join the 

Tripartite Pact. 

o. In June 1941 Germany attacked Russia in violation of their non· 

aggression pact. 

p. Following its declaration of war in 1939, Germany carried on a 

vigorous submarine campaign against merchant ships, and gradually expanded its campaign against ships of neutral nations with little or no 

consideration for the safety of the crews. 

q. By September 1941 Germany had sunk numerous American owned 

merchant ships in the Atlantic, and had attacked U.55. Greer. The first 

shots were fired in the Battle of the Atlantic 

"Ibid., p. 6}. 


~ Ibid., p. 66. 

12 Pearl Harbor 

USN 0210M 

VSS Greer was al/acJud by a German JUbmarine 011 4 September 1941. 

r. On 17 October 1941 Germany torpedoed V.s.s. Kearney in the North 

Atlantic causing severe damage and killing eleven men. Later in the month, 

destroyer Reuben Jam e; was sunk by a V-boat and lost 115 officers and men. 

3. THE AGGRESSIONS OF ITALY 

Although Germany's aggressions covered a larger field of action, Italy's 

predatory acts were even more devoid of presumed justification. Whether 

Mussotini copied Hitler, or vice versa, is not clear, but both came into office 

originally as purported socialist reformers and developed into absolute dictators in the fateful years between 1934 and 1941. Both exercised emotional 

leadership over their populations to a degree which bordered on hypnosis, 

and thus they had full and loyal civilian support in their nefarious ventures. 

a. As early as 1934 diplomatic circles were aware that Mussolini was 

making preparations to take over some territory in Africa. Defenseless 

Ethiopia was selected as his first victim, and in October 1935 Italian armed 

forces invaded that country. Emperor Haile Selassie resisted valiantly, but 

his primitive forces were no match for Italy's army and navy. The con· 

quest of Ethiopia was completed by May 1936. 
The Trends T award War 13 

h. The League of Nations became interested in this aggression and 

declared that Italy had violated her obligations under the Covenant and 

recommended commercial and financial sanctions against Italy. The imposition of sanctions by world powers was regarded with some fear and indiffe rence; consequently the limited sanctions that were imposed proved wholly 

ineffective. 

c. The United States held that Ita ly violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact 

of 1928 which renounced war as an instrument of national policy. 

d. Together with Germany, Italy participated in the Spanish Civil Wa r 

in 1936, contrary to commitments previously made. 

e. Together Germany and Italy formed the Berlin-Rome Axis and 

Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact against Russia in 

late 1936. 

f. In November 1937 this Pact was expanded to include Italy, the 

same having been under negotiation among the three powers since 1934-35. 

g. In March 1939, when Hitler took Czechoslovakia, Mussolini's Fascist 

legions occupied Albania on Good Friday, 7 April 1939, 

h. When Germany invaded Belgium, The Netherlands, and France in 

May 1940 the United States appea led to Italy to refrain from participation 

and thus extending the war. Mussolini replied: "Italy is and intends to 

remain allied with Germany and that Italy cannot remain absent at a 

moment in which the fate of Europe is at stake.""' 

i. In ptem~r 1940 Germany, Italy, and Japan announced to the 

world that they had signed a treaty of alliance which provided mutual 

assistance-political, economic, and military-and recognized the leadership 

of Germany and Italy in establishing a "New Order" in Europe, and the 

leadership of Japan in establishing a "New Order" in Greater East Asia. 

j. When the German Army was at the gates of Paris in June 1940, Italy 

declared war on France and Great Britain. Then it was that Winston 

Churchill called Mussolini "a jackal for plunging a knife into the back 

of his prostrate neighbor." 

k. Italy invaded Greece in October 1940 but was unable to ove rcome 

its brave defenders. When the Italian Army was forced to retreat into 

Albania, Germany came to Italy's assistance. The result was that Greece and 

Yugoslavia fell to the Axis Powers in April 1941. Then Rumania , Bulgaria, 

and Hungary joined the Tripartite Pact, thus extending the war. 

• ibid., p. 72 . 
14 Pearl Harbor 

4. THE BRUTAL AGGRESSIVENESS OF JAPAN 


japan's program of belligerency and expansion had been in operation for 

nearly ten years prior to signing the treaty of a lliance with Germany and 

Italy. However, Japan made common cause with Hitler and Mussolini as 

early as 1934. Japan 's pattern of expansion, conquest, and terrorism was 

quite similar to that of Germany, especially with regard to expressing 

idealistic motives and promises while still moving forward with new invasions and increased demand s. japan's record of treaty violation and agsressian exceeds those of either Germany or Italy. This fact should be comprehended and understood by any person interested in the basic causes of the 

war which was started at Pearl Ha rbor. Let us therefore list some of the 

rtant items: 

' a. Following W orld War I Japan was granted a mandate over the 

islands formerly beld by Germany in. the Marshalls and Carolines. Contrary 

to stipulations in the Treaty of Versailles the Japanese proceeded to fortify 

certain islands and to build military bases in those islands, and to deny 

entry to the islands by foreigners. It might be noted parenthetica ll y that the 

later capture of these formidable bases in World War II cost tbe Uni ted 

States tbousands of casua lties. 

h. In 193 1 the Japanese Army invaded Manchuria and set up a puppet 

government under the name of Manchukuo. The Un ited States protested 

this action as an act of war in cynica l disregard of Japan's obligations under 

the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 regarding the 

principles and policies to be followed concerning China.~ The United States 

declared that it would not recognize any arrangement which impaired the 

rights of its citizens in China. 6 

(. For several months in 1932, Japan occupied Shanghai and refused 

to consider the proposals for peaceful settlement put forth by Great Britain, 

France, Ita ly, and the United States. 

f

d. In 1932 Japan developed an interna l campaign of public animosity 

~oward s foreign nations, es ec~al1y the United States, even proposing war 

If necessary. Setf·confidence was stimulated by the constant reminder that 

ttne Japanese military forces had always proved invincible. 

e, In 1933 Japan extended the bou ndaries of Ma nchukuo by occu pying 

the province of Jehol in North China. 

' Ibid., pp. 4 and . 

' Ibid., p. ~. 
The Trends T oward War 1) 

f. When the League of Nations in 1933 adopted a report finding Japan 

an aggressor in China and acting wrongly in principle, the Japanese delegation walked out and the Japanese government gave notice of withdrawal 

from the League of Nations. 

g. In resJXInse to the American protests against .aggression and disregard of treaty rights, Japan in early 1934 advised the United States it 

had no intention of making trouble with any other power, and that no 

question between Japan and the United States was incapable of amicabl~ 

solution.' During diplomatic exchanges however, when the United States 

insisted on adherence to treaties including trade and commercia l agreements, 

Japan grad ually put forth a claim of super-sovereignty over parts of Asia 

on the basis of its special rights and responsibilities.s 

h. In 1934 Japan gave notice of its refusal to renew the 1922 Treaty 

for the Limitation of Nava l Armament. 

i. By 193;, Japan had considerable domination over China and was 

building up its military strength. Japanese diplomats repeatedly pointed oU' 

that Japan was destined to be the leader of oriental civilization and criticized former Japanese government officials for "signing agreements which 

could not be carried out if Japan wanted to progress in the world." 9 

y 

j. At the London Naval Conference in 1935- 1936 Japan asked for 

naval parity with Great Britain and the United States. When this was not 

agreed to by the other powers Japan withdrew from the Conference and 

refused to abide with any limitation on naval armament. 

k. During these times the United States emphasized the importance of 

amicable conferences and such principles as equality in commercial and 

industrial affairs without resorting to force or threats of force. Japan expressed general agreement, and its diplomats frequently regretted the 

misunderstand ing and misapprehension of the United States as to japan's 

intentions, and gave assurance that their armaments were not intended for 

war against anybody, especially the United States.1O 

l. Encouraged by the apparent improvement in the general progress 

and spirit of the people in Germany and Italy a grou p of Japanese Army 

officers fomented a mutiny which was directed towa rd setting up military 

control of national policies. The Japanese Army did many things to force 

the government to pursue a policy of expansionism in China . 

•""•. , pp. 18 and 39. (This vicwpoint was expressed many times.) 


' Ibid., pp. 38 and 39. (Kurusu. Yoshida. alld others put fonh this argument.) 


' Ibid. , p. 38. (Kurusu's statement to the U. S. EmbaS5Y in Tokyo. n December 193'.) 


"Ibid., p. 39. (Stul'ment by Yoshida. ) 

16 Pearl Harbor 

m. On 2S November 1936 Japan and Germany signed their AntiComintern Pact, which foreshadowed the similar patterns of aggression 

which each nation was to follow. 

n. In July 1937 the Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred. This was 

a planned clash between troops of Japan and China, which resulted in 

Japanese occupation of additional Chinese territory including Peiping in 

North China. At this point the United States addressed a note to all nations 

regarding the fundamental principles and international policy toward 

peaceful existence. The United States offered its good offices to compose 

differences between China and Japan and to negotiate an agreement. The 

diplomats of Germany and Italy agreed but Japan refused on the ground 

that the objectives and principles could only be attained in the far eastern 

situation by full recognition and realization of the actual particular circumstances of that region. II As Japan poured more manpower and engines of 

war into China, the United States warned of the serious consequences to 

peace, goodwill, and cooperation as compared to the distrust and antipathy 

being generated among world powers by the brutal policies pursued by the 

Japanese government. 12 

o. The Assembly of the League of Nations on 6 October 1937 adopted 

a report stating that Japanese activities in China violated Japan's treaty 

obligations. The United States, though not a member of the League, proclaimed a similar position. 

p. The following month nineteen nations assembled at a conference 

in Brussels to consider peaceful means for ending the Japan-China conflict. 

Japan refused to attend on the ground that the dispute applied only to 

Japan and China and was outside the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. 

All members of the conference except Italy went on record opposing 

Japan's position.1 3 

q. On 12 December 1937 the United States was shocked by the airbombing and destruction of the United States gunboat Panay and three 

United States merchant vessels on the Yangtze River, followed by the 

machine gunning of crews and passengers. The United States demanded 

formal apologies, complete indemnification, and assurances against future 

attacks on American nationals and property in China, or any unlawful interference whatsoever with its legal rights and appropriate business. To this 

"16id., pp. 44 and 4). 


"[bid., p. 47. 


"1bid., pp. 49 and ~O. 
The T l'endJ T award W ttl' 17 

strong representation Japan replied favorably, expressed profound regret, 

and fervently hoped that friendly relations would not be affected by this 

unfortunate affair. 14 

1\\1 ' . 

, 

U8N :<n4 L 1101001 n_ 

USS Panay U/dJ Jlmk bJ Japanese a;rrrafl, 12 December 1937. 

- r. In November 1937 Italy became a partner of Japan in the AntiComintern Pact. 

s. After Germany's subjugation of the Netherlands in May 1940, 

Japa n expressed some concern as'to the status of the Netherlands Indies. 

The United States informed Japan and the world that any alteration of 

the status 9uO would prejudice the cause of stability, peace, and security of 

the whole Pacific area on account of the importance of the area's rich 

resources of oil, rubber, tin, and other commodities.

15 

"Ibid., p. 51 . 


II Ibid., p. 89. 

18 Pearl Harbor 

t. Early in June 1940 Japan delivered a fu!l -scale bombing raid on 

Chungking, endangering American lives and property. The United States' 

protest was answered by japan's request for the removal of our nationals. 

A few days later 113 Japanese aircraft repeated the bombing. Thereafter, 

Japan requested all nations to remove from China all troops and war 

equipment which they might have in that area. 

u. During these times the Japanese occupation forces in various parts 

of China harassed and assaulted American citizens, destroyed their property, 

and even attacked missions and missionary hospitals. This was part of a 

terrorist campaign to compel foreigners to evacuate. 

v. Upon the fall of France in June 1940 Japan asked the French 

government at Vichy for rights and military bases in the French possessions 

in Indo-China. This request was backed by an ultimatum and threats of 

force, but even while awaiting a favorable reply the Japanese occupied 

strategic points. The Japanese had occupied the island of Hainan in 1939, 

which is abreast of Indo-China. 

w. On 27 September 1940 Japan signed a treaty of alliance with Germany and Italy which provided for mutual assistance in the establishment 

of Japanese leadership of a "New Order" in Asia, and for German-Italian 

leadership of a "New Order" in Europe. This was highly important to 

japan's objectives, and it was a clever move on the part of Germany and 

Italy. It was intended to require the United States to defend itself in the 

Pacific and thus to reduce her strength in the Atlantic. In case the United 

States should enter the European conAict its military forces, especially its 

Navy, would be divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific. 

x. At about this time the Un ited States announced discontinuance of 

steel and scrap exportation to Japan. This was in accordance with the Export 

Control Act of July 1940. Japan immediately protested this action as an 

"unfriendly act," whereupon Secretary of State HuH stated that it was 

"amazing" that, after violating American rights and interests, to question 

this sort of response, especially' when in the subjugation of China the 

United States is called unfriendly unless we sit on the sideline cheerfully 

and agreeably as these acts go on. 16 

y. Many discussions were held between the diplomats of the United 

States and Japan to improve a deteriorating situation. The United States 

pointed out Japan's program of expansion by military force, together with 

,. Ibid., p. 94. (The above is a paraphrase of Senetary Hull"s reply to Ambassador 

Horiguchi.) 
~ 

The Trends Toward War 19 

in tensive construction of military and nava l armament, and the openly 

declared intention to achieve and maintain by force of arms a dominant 

position in the Western Pacific. Secretary of State Hull, cautioned that 

Japan's "best interests lay in the development of friendly relations with 

the United States and with othe r countries ·which believed in orderly and 

peaceful international processes. " Ii 

z. In January 1941 the United States Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. 

Grew, reported rumors that Japanese military forces planned a surpnse 

attack on Pearl H arbor in case of trouble with the United States. 

aa. Beginning in March 1941 continuous conferences were held in 

Washington between Japanese Ambassador Nomura and the State Department for the settlement of differences with regard to the Japanese policy 

which was sloganized as a "New Order in Greater East Asia. " As it turned 

out, this included taking territory by force and violating freedom of trade 

and freedom of the seas. 

bb. In May 1941 Japan proposed a settlement based on recognition by 

the United States of Manchukuo, recognition of peaceful expansion of Japan 

to the south, and discontinuance of United States material assistance to 

China. In retu rn Japan would guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine 

Islands. The Japanese were not willing to commit themselves unreservedly 

to a policy of peace, and would not abandon their ties with Hitler and 

Mussolini. ' B However, the Department of State wrote a comprehensive 

statement in which important concessions were made to Japanese policy, 

but with reservations intended to exert a restraining influence}9 

cco In the summer of 1941 Hitler pressured the French Vichy Government to g rant Japan military base rights in Southern Indo·China. These 

became effective in July 1941 whereupon the President of the United States 

proposed neutralization of Indo-China so that all nations could carryon 

trade and commerce. Japan rejected this proposal. Then on 1 August, the 

United States imposed an oil embargo on Japan. 

dd. For severa l years military control of the Japanese government had 

been in the ascendancy. Almost full army control had been gained by threat, 

pressure, and assassination. The conservative elements, even including the 

Emperor, were shunted asidc. Prcmier Konoye was required to resign in 

October 1941 , and the new premier was Army Genera l Hideki Tojo. Thus 

"Ihid., p. 113 . 

'"Ihid.. p. 1 16. 

"Ihid., p. 117. 
20 Pearl Harbor 

the militaristic element was in full control of Japan and took ove r the 

government with the purpose of consolidating their aggressions in China 

and proceeding with the "Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." 

ee. In return for discontinuance of the United States' trade restrictions, 

Japan offered to cooperate in a development of natural resources and trade 

in the southwest Pacific. There was a Japanese th reat to move into Thailand 

and to dominate the Indian Ocean while efforts of Germany and Italy 

were aimed at the Near and Middle East. At the same time the survival of 

Great Britain was in serious doubt. 

ff. Japanese di plomats now proposed a conference between their 

Premier Konoye and President Roosevelt to reach an overall settlement. 

But they were unwilling to agree in advance on the basic principles which 

the United States had consistently championed and which Japan had consistently violated, But, as always, the Japanese stated that they "had no 

intention of using 'without provocation; military force against any- neighboring nation," 20 

gg. On 3 November 1941 Ambassador Grew explained to the United 

States government that the militaristic government of Japan could not be 

stopped, and that war could not be averted by the imposition of economic 

embargoes or sanctions. On 17 November 1941 he suggested that vigilance 

against sudden Japanese naval or military attack was essential. 21 

hh. In November 1941 Japan's specia l envoy, Mr. Kurusl.1 , arrived in 

Washington and endeavored with the help of the Japanese Ambassador to 

justify Japan's situation, which was really fuHy understood by our State 

Department. He had nothing new to offer on the crucial guestion of japan's 

aggressions. The United States promised that if Japan wOllld indicate some 

peaceful intentions they would be well responded 10.22 

ii. Since Japan's expressions of peaceful intent contained qualifications 

and restrictions, and did not budge from the fundamenta l objectives stated 

by its military leaders, the United Slates under date of 26 November 1941 

made crystal clear its position. The American note was sent when it was 

fully realized that the long drawn-out negotiations to improve the relations 

between the two governments were failing, 

jj, In early December 1941 there were th rea tening Japanese troop movements into Southeast Asia. When this was protested by President Roosevelt 

"" Ibid., pp. 124 and In , 


"Ibid. , pp, no and 131­

"Ibid., pp. 132 and 13'1. 

The Trend! T award War 21 

USN NRol L (MOD) 31730 

R~ar Admiral 'William R. Furlong, USN, Commander Minefratt, &ule Force, waJ in 

hi! flagJhip, USS Oglala, during the fatal1eJe alfack. He became Commandant ot the 

Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, 011 25 December 1941. 

on 2 December, Kurusu explained that they were for protection against 

Chinese troops, and that Japan was concerned lest the allied powers should 

occupy Indo-China.n 

kk. On 6 December 1941 President Roosevelt transmitted a telegram 

to the Emperor of Japan appealing for cooperation toward elminating any 

form of military threat, and for restoring traditiona l unity. 

II. Under date of 7 December 1941 Japan's reply to the 26 November 

message was delivered to Secretary HulL The message was abusive and 

condemnatory, and ended with breaking off the negotiations. Secretary Hull 

said to the Japanese diplomats: "1 have never seen a document that was 

more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions-infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today 

that any Government on th is planet was capable of uttering them." 24 

The world now knows that when the Japanese note was written their 

naval task. force was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor, and the attack had 

"Ibid., pp. 139 and 140. 

I. Ibid., p. 142 . (Secretary Hull"s statement of 7 Dec~m ber 1941 to 'he Japanese diplomats.) 
22 Pearl Harbor 

already been delivered more than an hou r before the note was del ivered by 

the Japanese diplomats. This certainly shows bad faith on the part of the 

Japanese. Their attack force was assembled and underway before the 

26 November 194 1 note was received by them; their basis for peace was 

premised upon an unbending attitude regarding Japanese policies in the 

Pacific; their continued diplomatic efforts were fraudulent because they knew 

that the United States would not agree to their demands. Even as late as 

30 November 1941, General Tojo as Premier stated that the Japanese 

purpose was to purge East Asia, with a vengeance, of hostile British and 

United States influences. 
CHAPTER III 

Problems and Dilemmas of the 


United States and Eventual 


Preparedness for War 


1 

CHAPTER III 

Problems and Dilemmas of the 


United States and Eventual 


Preparedness for War 


1. AMERICAN ATIIWDES AND POLICIES 

The gathering d ouds of war in Europe and the Far East became more and 

more ominous to the United States dming each of the half dozen years 

preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. Because of OU f nation's firm commitment to peace there was much sympathy and concern among Americans 

for the victims of the aggression. In the early stages of unprincipl ed aggression abroad there seemed little need to worry about what was developing 

in other countries, or what OU( own welfare and eventual security might be. 

Yet as time went on and situations became more critical we found ourselves 

the only ma jor world power that was not engaged in warfare. Even when 

our foreign trade and property were jeopardized and our citizens abroad 

were endangered we were rel uctant to take decisive actions which might 

possibly embroil us in the w<;>r1dwide conflict. Even while condemning the 

aggressor nations fhe large majority of our people demanded peace and 

neutrality for themselves. 

As pressures mounted our diplomatic poticy stood fi rmly for cooperative 

observance of law and order by all nations. Yet in most cases we found 

ourselves impotent in negotiating settlements for the benefit of world 

peace or our own interests. The unremitting efforts made by our country, 

as well as the efforts made by the victimized nations, proved that talk, discussion, and negotiation were almost futile. Aggressor nations are no more 

susceptible to logical argument than outlaws bent on plunder. Both operate 

by force of arms, and it requires force of arms to restrain them. 

The major dilemma confronting the United States was whether to tolerate 

a wholly unsatisfactory world situation, or to resort to forceful intervention. 

Neither was acceptable nor rea ll y possible, but nevertheless the great prob­

" 
26 Pearl Harbor 

tern of the United States was to determine how to restore peace and lawful 

practices among nations in a disrupted world without going to war. How 

to strengthen Ollr diplomatic voice in the world without building a sufficient 

military force to back up adequately that voice was a real dilemma faced by 

OUf government. 

A specific dilemma in the case of Japan's policy in China, the Secretary 

of State noted, was to come to amicable agreement with Japan but not at 

the expense of China. 

A related dilemma was how to make prepa rations against the possibility 

of armed conflict when public opinion opposed military expenditures and 

seemed obsessed with the benefits of neutralism and perhaps by selfrighteousness. These and other contradictory factors of our national life 

and well-being are touched upon in this chapter, as are the steps taken to 

reconcile opposing considerations. 

2. RETRENCHMENT IN MILITARY PREPAREDNESS 

For a dozen years or more after World War I the United States followed 

a program of drastic retrenchment in military preparedness. Much of this 

was quite in order because we had built up a gigantic military machine by 

the end of World Wa r I, and there were in va rious stages of completion 

large nava l building programs. The Washington Treaty for the Limitation 

of Naval Armament, signed in 1922 by the United States, Great Britain, 

Japan, Italy, and France was in this tradition. 

But public opinion demanded much greater military curtailment to demonstrate America's support of the worldwide yearning for peace as exemplified by the various peace-keeping treaties of those years. Also, it is interesting to note that in the mid 1930's the Nye Committee of the United 

States Senate held numerous hearings to show that war was caused in large 

part by the manufacturers arid vendors of armament and milita ry equipment. It was pointed out that drastic reduction in the purchase of such 

materials would presumably tend toward peace. 

Many peace organizations were active during those times in promoting 

general disarmament. In the absence of any over-all agreement among the 

world powers there was a strong feeling for "disarmament by example," 

the theory being that other nations would probably follow the strongest 
Pfoblems t1nd Dilemmas of the United Sldtes 27 

nation in the world. Professional propagandists were likewise busy. The 

result was that throughout the 1920's the military forces of the United 

States were steadily .reduced in effectiveness. Very few new ships were 

authorized, and manning leve ls in the military services were greatly curtailed. In short, the military services existed on a starvation diet. 

However, when the economic depression began after 1929, the nation was 

fortunate that a portion of the Congressiona l appropriations for the 

National Industrial Recovery Act was assigned to a rehabilitation program 

in ship construction, but not without opposition from well-meaning organizations devoted to the hope of peace through disarmament. Included in 

this program of ship construction were a number of major vessels. The 

design and construction of such ships re<Juires four to five years. But some 

of these became availabl e and were of inestimable yalue in the early days 

of World War II. An important national benefit was the reactivation of 

the famished American shipbuilding trade which thus was available for 

the gigantic programs of production in the days ahead. 

At this time there was no comprehension of the magnitude of the military needs which shortly would be thrust upon us. Of course, there was 

very little COncern that such needs wou ld require several years of lead 

time for the design, pla nn ing, development, and manufacrure, or for the 

training of personnel for operation. The large portion of our population 

was determined to avoid wa r at any cost, and they were guite sure that 

the best way to avoid war was to avoid preparing for war. 

Naturall y the Congress reflected the viewpoint of public opinion. 

Although supporting most of the President's recommendations for national 

defense, in the late 1930's it acted otherwise repeatedly. For example, 

in 1938 the House of Representatives barely defeated the proposed 

Ludlow constitutional amendment which would have required a popular 

vote as a prereguisite to a declaration of wa r by the Congress. Except for 

the strong representations made by the President and the Secretary of State 

this proposal wou ld probably have been passed. I 

Near the end of 1938 Secretary of War Woodring reported that despite 

improvements made, the United States stood eighteenth in relative strength 

among the standing armies of the world. In 1939 Congress refused to 

'P art" and If/ar, p. 52. (President Roosevelt wrote to the Speaker of the House on 

6 January 1938. and Secretary Hull warned On 8 January 1938 that thi$ proposal would 

hamstring the Government.) 
28 Pearl Harbor 

modify the prohibition against U.s. merchant ships trading with friendly 

nations under attack, but did allow these countries to buy ou r war materia ls 

on a cash and carry basis. 

Although the Congress approved calling up for active duty the Reserves 

and the National Guard, in August 1940 it was required that they be used 

only within the Western Hemisphere or in United States territories. As 

late as August 1940 Congress passed the fi rst peacetime Selective Service and 

Training Act in our history by a small margin, but with the same restrictions as for the Reserves and National Guard. At about the same time 

Congress defeated a bill for improving the defenses of Guam, on the basis 

that the United States should not do anything to provoke or irritate Japan. 

So while some progress was made in building up the national defense 

forces, public opinion was divided as to the advisability of doing anything 

which had the appearance of warlike measures. Except for the strong 

leadership and insistence of the President and Secretary of State, backed 

by U.S. naval and military leaders, our military structure might weil have 

been guite impotent in late 1941 when World War II broke upon us. 

3. DIPLOMACY AT WORK TO PREVENT WAR AND 

TO IMPROVE PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR 

In a world beset with ever-increasing international outlawry, the diplomatic 

work load of a leading world power committed to peace and legal procedures 

among nations was enormous. The United States exerted every means to 

impress upon the offending nations the importance of peaceful processes 

and the avoidance of violence. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was a patient 

and reasonable man. He continuously emphasized the inviolability of treaties 

and agreements among the nations if peace and orderly progress were to 

be maintained. The logic of his arguments was clear to most people. And 

let it be said that his work during those critical years bears the stamp of 

excellence in building a framework of definite action which late r could be 

properly taken. Together with President Roosevelt, the State Department 

took progressive steps toward exposing internationa l outlawry, and in time 

toward taking specific action to oppose it. We might list a few of the most 

important steps which were taken. Many of the specific measures taken 

pertain primarily to problems in the Atlantic, but of course are clearly 

related to the problems presented by the Japanese in the Pacific. Many 
P.,.ob/emJ and DilemmaJ of the United StateJ 29 

of the steps taken by government officials were for the purpose of informing the American people of the implications of the world conflict, and 

alerting them to possible involvement if principles of peace and honor 

were to be preserved. 

a. Freedom of trade and commercial activity as guaranteed by treaties 

and agreements were the subject of frequent notes and discussions. The 

situation became crucial when freedom of the seas became involved. 

Ultimately the United States took decisive action by instituting a naval patrol 

in the Atlantic in 1941. 

b. When public opinion seemed willing to overlook violations of 

American rights in 1938 Secretary Hull warned that our security would be 

menaced if we abandoned our legitimate principles because of fear or 

unwillingness. Only by meeting aUf responsibilities and making our proper 

contributions to the firm establishment of a world order based on law "can 

we keep the problem of our own security in true perspective.. " 2 

c. When war broke in Europe in 1939 the United States declared its 

neutrality and also declared a Limited National Emergency. The embargo 

on the export of arms under the Neutrality Act was repealed in November 

1939 so that some aid could be rendered to Great Britain and France. 

d. In order to exert a restraining influence on Japan's warlike policies 

it was decided that the fleet exercises in May of 1940 would be held in the 

Hawaiian area. The Fleet remained in Hawaii after the maneuvers. This 

was a diplomatic decision, which was not concurred by all military leaders. 

e. On 19 May 1940, President Roosevelt said, "We are shocked and 

angered" by the over-running of the Lowlands by the Germans and he said 

that- it is a mistaken idea that the American republics are wholly sa fe from 

the im'pact of the attacks on civilization in other parts of the world.~ A 

month later, on 20 June 1940, the Secretary of State stated that, because 

of the imminent fall of France, never before has there Ixen such a powerful 

challenge to freedom, that we could meet it only by retaining an unshakable 

faith in the worth of freedom and honor, of truth and justice, of intellectual 

and spiritual integrity, and by determination to give our all for the 

preservation of our way of life! 

f. When the Japanese bombed Chinese civilians the United States 

declared a "Moral Em bargo" against Japan. The American government 

I lhiJ., p. 55. (Senetary Hull's addttss in Wuhinston, D.C. On l7 March 1!H8.) 


~ lhill., p. 73. 


"[hid., p. 78. 

I 

. 


30 Pearl Harbor 

appealed to manufacturers and exporters of aircraft parts and armaments 

not to send these products where they would be used against civilians. 

g. In September 1940 American Ambassador Grew reported that Japan 

felt that she had a "golden opportunity." Japan, he said, was a predatory 

power and a fully opportunist nation seeking to profit through the weakness 

of others. She has been deterred from taking great liberties with interests 

U

f the United States because she respected our potential power, and she 

trampled on our rights in exact ratio to the strength of conviction that the 

United States public would not permit that power to be developed and used.

5 

h. Embargoes and sanctions against Japan were frequently considered 

and carefully evaluated as to risk of provocation. However, in July 1940 

the Export Control Act authorized the President in the interest of national 

defense to prohibit or curtail the export of certain war materials, including 

scrap metal and oil. 

i. In January 1941 President Roosevelt declared in his State of the 

Union Message to Congress that American security was threatened, that 

we supported resolute people resisting aggression, and that our own security 

would "never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors or 

sponsored by appeasers." 6 

j. In March 1941 Congress passed the Lend Lease Act and appropriated 

seven billion dolla rs to aid friendly nations. President Roosevelt made a 

statement that this action ended any compromise with tyranny and the 

forces of oppression.7 

k. On 27 May 1941 the President declared an "Unlimited National 

Emergency." A major objective was to authorize naval action to prevent 

the aggressors from gaining control of the seas. 8 

I. Following attacks on American merchant and nava l ships in September and October 1941 President Roosevelt stated: " History has recorded 

who fi red the first shot." We had sought 110 shooting war with Hitler, but 

we were not willing to pay for peace by permitting Hitler to attack our 

ships when they were on legitimate business.

9 

ffi. On 21 October 194 1 Secretary Hull stated with regard to the Congressiona l authorization for American merchant vessels to carry cargoes to 

belligerents that the "paramount principle of national policy is the preservaI Ibid., p. 92 . 

• Ibid., p. 9). 


1 Ibid., p. 96. 


'Ibid., pp. 101 and 102. 


"/bid., pp. 110 and 112. 

Problems and Dilemmas of the United S,ates 31 

tion of the safety and security of the nation;" and the "highest right flowing 

from that principle is the righ t of self-defense." 10 

n. On 17 August 194 1 President Roosevelt and Secretary HuH conferred with Japanese diplomats and delivered a note which contained the 

statement that the government of the United States "finds it necessary to 

say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any 

further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of mi litary domination by 

force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the 

United States wilJ be compelled to take immediately any and all steps 

which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and 

interests of the United States and the American nationals and toward 

insuring the safety and security of the United States," 11 

o. On 1 December 1941 Secretary Hull stated to Japanese diplomats 

that the United States would give all the materials Japan requ ires if the 

Japanese leaders will show some movement toward peace and discontinue 

bellicose threats and bluster. 12 

Thus it is seen that American diplomacy was active throughout the 

decade preceding Pearl Harbor, in endeavoring to restrain the aggressors 

on the one hand, and on the other, to educate the American people regarding 

the issues at stake and the threat to their freedom and security. 

4. HARDENING OF PUBLIC OPINION 

As the people became informed of the progress of events in Europe and 

Japan, and were alerted to the effects on American interests and principles, 

they gradually assumed stronger views against the three aggressor nations. 

Yet despite the actions of those nations, the clear mandate of the people 

was to refrain from war or the appearance of war. 

There were wide differences of opinion as to the rightness or wrongness 

of every nation's actions, including our own. Some of these were based on 

race, nationality, or personal experience. Others were influenced by paid 

propaganda outputs in this countryXBllt the great majority of the people 

were sincere and honest in their desire to avoid warfare if at all possible, 

and were willing to make concessions and even sacrifices to that end. There 

10 Ibid., p. HI. 


II Ibid., pp, 123 and 124 . 


"Ibid., p. 139. 


.. 
32 Pearl Harbor 

Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, USN, COfflllumdal1l, 


Fourteenth Naval District 011 7 December 1941. 

,/ 

!


. 


; 

! 

! 

\, 

\ 

Problem! and DilemmaJ of the United Slate! 33 

were some who deprecated the mild and patient manner of the State 

Department over the years, and felt that any nation whi,ch violated our 

legitimate pursuits or hazarded our nationals abroad should be sternly 

dealt with. Such persons criticized the State Department for writing notes 

rather than acting forthrightly and forcibly. 

The unprovoked bombing of USS Panay and three merchant ships in 1937 

by the Japanese hardened the American viewpoint, as did the brutal attacks 

on missionary hospitals in China, and the terror-bombing of the Chinese 

people. 

There was strong opposition to the exportation of scrap metal and oil 

to Japan before these items were embargoed in 1940 and 1941 especially 

when these commodities were in short supply in the United States. Yet 

Ambassador Grew stated that economic sanctions were more likely to cause 

war than to avoid it. This was one of the dilemmas which the Administra· 

tion had to face. The Japanese, he explained, could not be bluffed or forced 

into submission. They would not "back down" as the Oriental psychology 

would consider this a "loss of face." 

By 1941 the great majority of our people were quite aware of Japan's 

unprincipled behavior, but still regarded the Japanese people with some 

sympathy and with considerable admiration for their industriousness, objec~ 

tiveness, and national loyalty. But the ever-increasing tempo of japan's 

depredations and the belligerent demands of their government changed 

attitudes of sympathy and admiration into anxiety and antipathy. When 

Japan took virtually full control of Indo·China in the summer of 1941 and 

demanded that Thailand grant special concessions, the American people 

approved our imposition of an oil embargo. Nevertheless public opinion 

tried hard to take these aggressions in stride, and it remained for the 

Japanese to solidify public opinion completely by the surprise attack on the 

American flag at Pearl Harbor. 

5. ASSISTANCE TO FRIENDLY NATIONS 

The American public seemed in large part to be naive regarding the full 

implications of the European War and the Sino.Japanese War. Our high 

government officials, however, were 9uite aware of the threats to American 

interests and eventual security. It soon became crystal clear that the basic 

contest was between the forces of predatory authoritarianism and the free 

I 

•

I 
Pearl Harbor 

nations of the world. Therefore, regardless of personal attachment to one 

country or another, the effort and influence of the United States were 

naturally directed toward restraining the predatory powers and assisting 

the free nations. This diplomatic position became increasingly active and 

forceful each year as even ts became more threatening. 

Our endeavors to render material support to the beleaguered free nations 

required some military protection. As the contest widened, the need for 

defense indicated the importance of grea ter military potency. Thus the 

American stance against world aggression gradually developed from the 

diplomatic stage to the economic, and finally to the military, culminating in 

the United States becoming, clearly, if not formally, allied with the free 

nations against the Axis Powers. 

We have already mentioned some of the more significant measures of 

diplomacy; now we might consider a few of the more important steps taken 

to render assistance to the friendly nations. 

a. American trade with China had been of importance to both countries 

for many years, and was essential to China in resisting japan's depredations. 

From the start of the conflict we furnished assistance to China by shipping 

important materials to meet economic and military requirements. Such 

assistance to China was characterized by Japan as "an unfriendly act." 

b. The Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937 placed a rigid embargo on 

the export of arms to all belligerents, and thus had an injuriOUS effect on 

friendly nations which were comparatively defi cient in military equipment 

with which to resist the aggressors. At various times President Roosevelt 

and Secretary Hull endeavored to persuade Congress to amend the Acts 

favorably to the victimized nations, but to no avail until November 1939 

when the Acts were partially repealed. Although the Congress continued to 

st~nd firm for military neutra lity, the apathy and complacency of the people 

were challenged and gradually broken down because of the shockingly 

predatory events abroad. 

c. In June 1940 President Roosevelt reported that the United States 

would provide surplus material resources to Great Britain and France, and 

pointed out that this was in our self interest. In justifying this action he 

stated that we as a nation were concerned that "military and naval victory 

for the gods of focce and hate would endanger the institutions of democracy 

in the western world," and that our sympathies were with these nations 

that were giving their lifeblood in combat against these forces.IS 

" Ibid., p. 74 . 
Prob/emf aud Dilemm(ll of the United Stales 35 

d. In September 1940 the American government agreed with Great 

Britain to transfer fifty old-type destroyers in exchange for long-term leases 

of certain bases in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean. These bases would 

be essential in case of war, which they eventually proved to be. 

e. In December 1940 it was plain that the European aggressors intended 

to dominate all of Europe and ultimately the rest of the world. President 

Roosevelt proclaimed that the United States would act as the "Arsenal of 

Democracy," and stated that we must help defend the free world by furnishing needed materials. In January 1941 the President asked Congress to 

authorize the lending of arms and other assistance to such nations when this 

was vital to the interests of the United States. 

f. Despite the bitter protests of isolationists Congress passed the Lend 

Lease Act in March 1941 and appropriated seven billion dollars to put it into 

effect. This Act permitted all direct military aid to Great Britain. 

g. By 194 1 the loss of British ships to German submarines exceeded 

the rate of production in the shipyards of both Great Britain and the 

United States. In order to deliver to Great Britain the material aid required, 

the Un ited States instituted a naval patrol force to protect British ships In 

the Western Atlantic. 

h. On 30 October 1941 Roosevelt informed Stalin of his decision to 

grant the Soviet Union up to one billion dollars of Lend Lease Aid to 

counter Hitler's invasion of Russia. 

i. By November 194 1 it was clear that the surviva l of Great Britain 

was essential to the whole free world, and therefore the United States 

removed v.irtually all restrictions on arms shipments to that nation. 

j. In spite of continued protests of Japan we had for several years 

assisted China by furnishing military equ ipment for shipment over the 

Burma Road, which by 194 1 was the only open route to China as all others 

had been blockaded by Japan. 

6. MILITARY PREPAREDNESS MEASURES 

The military capabilities of the United States in the early 1930's were small 

compared to what might be required to match the powerful fo rces of the 

Axis. This fact was fully realized by responsible government officials, but 

public sentiment was quite fixed in opposition to any warlike gestures. 

including the buildup of armament. Furthermore, the economic depression 
36 Pearl Harbor 

affected expenditures for military preparedness. Yet, paradoxica lly, it was 

the depression which permitted significant improvement in preparedness. 

This was because the National Industrial Recovery Act provided funds for f/; 1'([\,"1\" 

industrial activity which would give jobs to the unemployed. President 

Roosevelt knew that the building of armaments, partiOllarly ships, made 

jobs in nearly every phase of industry, and therefore in ~he exercised 

the authority granted by Congress and ordered the construction of thirty-two ~ 

naval vessels. This was the first significant step in preparing for the needs 

o World War II , and hindsight proves that it was a fortunate and 

indispensable step. 

Other steps were taken as the grim events abroad pressed on the national 

consciousness and brought a change in the public attitude toward military 

preparedness. Some of the more important were the folJowing: 

a. In 1934 the Vinson-Trammel Naval Bill authorized the navy to 

build up to treaty limitations. This did not provide funds for constructi on 

but indicated Congressional opinion as to the need for correcting our naval 

deficiencies. 

b. In 1937 President Roosevelt announced that the Navy was proceed. 

ing with the construction of two new battleships, the first since the 1922 

treaty. These were Wa shinglon and NQrlh Carolina which rendered valiant 

service in World War II. The Army also received new equipment, and an 

increase in officers and men from 118,000 to a new limit of 158,000. 

c. In his Janu ary 1938 message to Congress the President recommended 

increasing our defenses to insure reasonable security against worldwide pressures and assaults. Congress authorized a twenty percent increase in ships 

for the Navy and appropriated for two new battleships and two aircraft 

carriers. Debate in Congress showed that much doubt existed on the need 

for these increases, and some isolationist groups suspected that the real 

purpose was to aid Great Britain. Secretary Hull replied that neither extreme 

internationalism or extreme isolationism was desired , but that inaction meant 

aiding the lawless nations. Ii 

d. Again, in his January 1939 message to Congress, the President 

recommended further strengthening of the national defense, especia ll y in 

air power, and the mobilization of industry for quantity production. 

e. When France sued for an armistice with Germany in June 1940 the 

United States insisted that the French fleet should not be surrendered to 

Germany, and received assurances accordingly, 

u Ibid" pp. H-~~, 
Problems and Dilemmas of the United States 37 

f. Just before the surrender of France)n June 1940 President Roosevelt 

asked Congress for authority to build ~O,OOO military airplanes, and stated 

to Congress that nations unable to defend themse lves were easi ly subjugated. 

Old defense systems, he pointed out, were inadequate if American liberties 

and principles were to be maintained.15 

g. Following the fall of France the President requested Congress to 

appropriate five billion dollars for further increases in defense. This was 

granted on 27 August 1940. At the same time Congress authorized calling 

up the Reserves and National Guard for active duty. In July 1940, fortyfive additional warships were ordered for the Navy Department. 

h. In the summer of 1940 the President recommended to Congress the 

authorization for a "Two Ocean Navy," which was approved. 

i. The first peacetime Selective Servic:e and Training Act in United 

States history was passed in September 1940, and in August 1941, when the 

international situation was very foreboding, Congress extended the period 

of service to one and one-half years. But th is was done by only a one vote 

margin in the House of Representatives. 

In keeping with Congressional authorizations and appropriations for the • 

building up of national defense, many important steps were taken in 1940 

and 194 1 to improve American power on land, sea, and air. For instance, 

there were ordered or authorized for the Navy in 1940: 

6 Iowa class battleships of 45,000 tons 

5 Montana class battleships of 56,000 tons (None of the ships were 

ever finished.) 

6 battle cruisers of about 27,000 tons (None were completed.) ~~~" <~ 

11 aircraft carriers of 27,000 tons ·w,; $;z.7 

40 crUIsers 

115 destroyers 


67 submarines 


Many auxiliaries and small craft 


With the exception of the larger battleships and the battle cruisers most 

of these vessels were expedited following the Pearl Harbor attack, and 

together with other shi ps which were ordered later, formed the irresistible 

force which vanquished the Japanese Navy. 

n Ibid., p. 79. 
,. 

AIlllldYH:) 

CHAPTER IV 


The Fleet at Pearl Harbor 


1. WHY WAS THE FLEET THERE? 


Pearl Harbor had been a relatively minor naval base for many years, and did 

not become a major base until the early summer of 1940. The decision to 

base the Reet at Pearl Harbo r was a dipl omatic decision, and was taken in 

the hope that it would accentuate OUf concern over the situation in the 

Western Pacific, and serve as a rest raining influence on japan's aggression. 

From a military viewpoint Pearl Harbor was not a satisfa ctory fleet base 

for many reasons, such as: 

a. It was restricted in area and had only one access to the open sea. 

Due to limited area it was necessary for ships to be clustered rather than 

dispersed. 

h. It was far removed from the source of essential supplies, such as 

oil, food , mechanica l materials, technical installations, and industrial 

capacity. 

c. Transportatiqn from the W est Coast was slow and inadequate. 

d. Essential services for regu lar Beet activities and exercises were in 

short supply. These included tugs, target practice facilities, and a host of 

other things required by ships of the fleet. L 

e. Hawaii lacked adequate housing and recreationa l facilities for 

military personnel. 

f. The great majority of fleet personnel were separated from their 

fami lies and friends over long periods of time. This was an unsuitabk 

morale situation in peacetime. 

g. The defen ses of Pearl Ha rbor were almost non-existent. This was 

an Army responsibility, bu t the Army lacked the wherewithal to provide 

much defense, especially in anti-aircraft batteries and pu rsuit aircraft. 

For these reasons, and others, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet 

protested strenuously and repeatedly the decision to base the fleet at Pearl 

Ha rbor instead of Southern California . He doubted that the presence of 

the fleet at Pearl Harbor was a deterrent to the Japanese, and pointed out 

41 
42 Pearl Harbor 

Ship! dodted at Ten-Tell Dorle . 

that it might have the opposite effect. The final result was that he, Admiral 

Joseph O. Richardson, was relieved of command on 1 February 1941 and 

was succeeded by Admiral Husband E.' Kimmel. At that time the fleet 

became the U.s. Pacific Fleet, and the separate Atlantic Fleet was established. 

It migh t be well to mention here that Admiral Richardson felt that the fleet 

was not prepared for war and was seriously lacking in logistic support, 

especially oil tankers. ' 
The Fleet at Pearl Harbor 43 

Despite the inade<Juacies at Pearl Harbor it is correct to say that during 

the year or so before the Japanese attack many of the handicaps were partially overcome through persistent and hard work. In retrospect, it appean 

that even though Pearl Harbor was in many ways an unsatisfactory fleet base, 

the fact that the Fleet was there prevented the Japanese from initially occupying Hawaii and Midway, thereby using them later as bases to intercept 

our naval forces. Our Fleet in that case would have had to operate from the 

West Coast 'during at least the early part of World War II. Most impor· 

tantly, after the war started Pearl Harbor became the largest and most 

efficient nava l base in world history, Its value as a springboard for mounting 

our unparalleled offensive actions against the Japanese was incalculable. 

2 ARMY -NAVY DEFENSE OF PEARL HARBOR 

As has been indicated, the military defenses of Pearl Harbor were quite 

meager. The development of a great military base takes years of planning, 

coordination, copious funds, and continual construction, installation, and 

support, Such development required close coordination of the various military services. This, of course, can be quite difficult in the face of separate 

evaluations both in Washington and on the scene. However, it is noteworthy that, contrary to views expressed by much of the news media after 

the Japanese attack, there was a high degree of cooperation and coordination between the Army and the Navy in the years prior to the Pearl Harbor 

episode. This was a friendly and hard working joint effort. Here are some of 

the results of that effort: 

a. Hawaii was defended by Army forces including heavy and light 

artillery, infantry, and air force. The Air Corps was part of the Army at 

that time. 

b. The Army Air Corps operated largely from the three fields at 

Hickam, Bellows, and Wheeler. The first two were principally bomber fields, 

whi le Wheeler operated pursuit planes. All fields were in process of develop· 

ment and were training personnel to operate planes On a combat basis. 

Hickam Field was busy receiving new 8-17's from the West Coast, outfitting 

and commissioning them, and fiying them to bolste r the defenses of Wake 

Island and the Philippines. It is estimated that only about ninety-four Army 

Air Force planes were ready for combat by 7 December. Many of the 

planes were under overhaul or having new equipment installed . • 
44 Pearl Harbor 

c. The Army had 26 fixed three-inch anti-aircraft guns and 60 mobile 

three-inch guns. None of the latter were emplaced as the assigned locations 

for wartime emplacements were on private property. Also 140 thirty-seven 

millimeter guns were assigned, but only 20 were delivered, and these were 

without ammunition. A large number of so caliber machine guns were on 

order but only 40 percent had been delivered. 

d. The Na'.'y and Marine Corps had three airfields: Ford Island in the 

center of Pearl Harbor, the Marine Corps fighter field at nearby Ewa, and 

the seaplane fie ld at Kaneohe. The Ford Island fi eld served primarily to 

receive aircraft carrier planes and to operate them while the carriers were 

in port. Like the Army airfields, the Navy was busy training men, installing 

improvements and new equipment, and overhauling wornout parts. The 

total number of Navy and Marine Corps planes ready for combat was 

approximately fifty-two. 

e. All of these forces were busy every weekday in Aight operations, 

target practice, and training. Citizens of Hawaii were accustomed to hearing 

planes overhead continuously every day except Sunday. Gunfire incidental 

to target practice was commonplace. 

£. Ships of the active Fleet when in Pearl Harbor were assigned ce rtain sections of arc to defend against possible air attacks. Standing orders 

of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet required that one-qua rter of 

the anti-aircraft batteries be in a ready state at all times, that gun crews be 

near at hand, and a supply of ammun ition be in ready service boxes near 

the guns. 

g. To defend against prowling submarines the channel entrance to 

Pearl Ha rbor was gua rded by a double submarine net or gate. It was kept 

closed at night; it was opened and closed as required by traffic of ships 

entering or leaving. Patrol vessels were always on duty in the approaches 

to Pearl Harbor to detect any submarines which might be attempting to 

enter. 

3. RECONNAISSANCE 

The need for air reconnaissance was clearly understood by the high com· 

mand at Pearl Harbor, and strenuous steps were taken to make it effective . 

As early as January 1941 Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, Commander of 

Patrol W ing TWO of the Fleet, and also in command of the Ford Island 

facilities, reported to the Navy Department that because of deficiencies in 
The Fleel at Pearl Harbor 45 

planes, equipment, material, personnel, and facilities "we are operating on 

a shoestring," and that all efforts to improve the situation had not been 

effective. I Similar correspondence ensued later with but little resul ts. The 

usual answer from Washington was that "we are doing the best we can. " 

The Army Air Corps and the N avy Patrol Force cooperated closely in 

developing a jOint operation to insure the best possible reconnaissance with 

the means then available. Admiral Bellinger, together with Major General 

F. 1. Martin of the Army Air Corps, got out a joint estimate of the situa tion 

under date of 31 March 1941 which set up a search and attack group to be 

used in case of hostilities or in time of emergency. In this document the 

following statement was made: "The aircraft at present available in Hawa ii 

are inadeguate to maintain, for an extended period, from bases on OAHU, 

a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange 

[enemy ] ca rrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a complete surprise." Thus 

the possibility of surprise air attack was envisioned long before the attack, 

and plans were developed to detect and defeat such an attack. A surprise 

attack without a declaration of war or of hostilities was envisioned at an 

early date, but the words "surprise attack" usually referred to a carrier raid 

after a proper declaration. Such a raid was in the minds of fleet officers, but 

as in WaShington eyes were turned to Southeast Asia. 

The shortage of planes and personnel to ca rry out a continuous daylight 

patrol was startl ing, especi ally when the need to modify and overhaul these 

planes is considered. It was estimated that one effective patrol through 560 

degrees at a distance of 800 mi les required not less than 84 planes on a 16 • 

hour flight. To do this continually with necessary reliefs in planes and 

personnel would reguire at least 180 reconnaissance planes. Of course no 

such number of planes was available, nor was the manpower required to 

operate them. 

With the air forces available, however, a considerable amount of air 

reconnaissance was conducted by ooth the Army and the Navy, at times as 

a joint operation. When aircraft carrier task forces of the Fleet were at 

sea there were simulated air strikes on Pearl Harbor to improve air recon· 

naissance and air raid defense. The last such drill was held on 12 November 

1941; the next was scheduled for 29 November 1941 but had to be post· 

poned until 13 December because of a task force sortie. As early as the 

spring of 1941 joint air raid drills were held weekly for a time to familiarize 

'Commandt r Patrol Wing TWO Jetter of 16 January ]941 to the Chief of Naval 

OptTlll ions. 

• 

46 Pearl Harbor 

personnel with requirements, but the frequency was gradually reduced 

because of interference with training as well as wear and tear on equipment. 

Communications of that time were not equal to the tasks put upon them. 

This was especially true of the communications with the Army and with 

outlying stations. Anti-submarine search by both aircraft and destroyers was 

a regular part of fleet movements. Carrier reconnaissance planes ranged 

out over wide areas of ocean whenever task forces were leaving or entering 

Pearl Harbor. 

On the morning of 7 December there were a number of reconnaissance 

planes aloft, and others were in a standby ready status. 

a. Three patrol planes were searching the fleet operating areas, and 

three others standing by on a thirty minute notice. 

b. Four other planes from Ford Island were in the air operating with 

submarines in joint exercises. 

c. At Midway five planes were on reconnaissance to a distance of 450 

miles, two others were enroute to rendezvous with the USS Lexington task 

force 400 miles to the southeast. Four additional planes were on ready alert. 

d. Three Marine Scout bombers at Ewa Field were on tv.'o hou rs notice, 

and fi fteen bombers and fifteen utility planes on four hOlIrs notice. 

e. Some forty Army planes could be ca lled upon for reconnaissance 

duty by Patrol Wing TWO in emergency but were never called except in 

connection with air raid drills. 

f. In addition, the three task forces at sea were conducting a regular 

wartime search by aircraft and destroyers, as required by fleet orders. 

The advisability of continuous and complete air reconnaissance was always 

in mind, but this presented a dilemma of the utmost difficulty. First there 

were insufficient planes and personnel; next was the intensive schedules for 

tra ining, instruction, maintenance, and improvement. The same principle 

applied to other elements of our military forces. In the fleet the workday 

was long and intensive, and reasonable consideration had to be given 

toward preventing staleness and poor morale among the limited manpower 

available. 

In the days just prior to 7 December we were at peace, although peace 

was overhung by ominous clouds. The various military forces were prepar· 

ing for probable hostilities, and it was imprudent to divert our efforts unduly 

in directions which would wear out planes and pilots in advance of actual 

needs. When Admiral Richardson was still the Fleet Commander, he took 

up the guestion of justification ·for continuous long range reconna issance. 

L 

The Fleet at Pearl Harbor 47 

USN l<RL ,MODJU1U 

ShiP! moored in £111 Loch, looking norlhlllelt. 

He addressed the Navy Department as follows under date of 28 November 

1940: " I feel that the fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, 

that is that we are at peace and no security measures are reguired; or, that 

wartime measures of security must be carried out. Heretofore, we have 

carried aLIt limited security measures largely as a basis for tra ining and on 
48 Pearl Harbor 

• 


the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an 

attack on the Fleet, but that some misdi rected or fanatica l nationals might 

undertake individual and irresponsible attack on Fleet units," 2 

This was answered by the Navy Department under the date of 23 

December 1940 as follows: "There will be an advantage in making occa· 

sional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft but it is not yet necessary to 

make these continuous. I agree with you that the wear and tear on ~uip. 

ment, and the detrimental effects on training, of full security measures 

should be given due weight.'" 

With these points in mind. and others too, it was a command decision 

based on calculated risks that reconnaissance as well as other defense matters 

should ~ on a moderate scale in peacetime. Thus there was a minimum of 

air reconnaissance on Sunday, 7 December. Of course the Japanese were 

fully aware that Sunday was a day of rest and relaxation among the defense 

forces at Hawaii, and they also knew no doubt that Americans accepted 

in good faith the Japanese legal commitment not to attack without an 

ultimatum or declaration of war. On top of this was the general feeling 

that the Japanese would not be so irrationa l as to make their initial attack 

on the stronghold of the Pacifi c. 

4. RADAR 

The importance of rada r for distant reconnaissance was recognized by the 

late 1930's. Scientists, engineers, and manufacturers were engaged in impor· 

tant programs of development. Military officials were expediting the 

purchase and installation of radar equipment to the extent that funds and 

qualified personnel would permit. The installations·in Hawaii at the time 

of the Pearl Harbor attack were new and quite experimental. There were 

few military personnel who were trained to operate a radar installation in 

a reliable manner. 

The Navy was installing production sets as fast as they could .be 

obtained and made reliable ; but in December 1941, only about a half·dozen 

ships of the Pacific Fleet had rad ar installed. The Army was then in the 

process of installing th ree large fixed radars on high ground in H awaii, 

I Hearingr bt/prt Ibt Joinl Commillu vn /h e llll!uliga/ion of the Ptarl Harbor Alla(~, 

Part 14. p. 9n. Hereafte r cited as Hearings. 

'Ibid., p. 980. 
The Fleet at Pearl Harbor 49 

and six mobile radars on trucks. The effective distance for detection would 

depend of course upon the height of the installation and the height or 

elevation of the target. Thus a large ship could be detected by another 

ship with the radar at a distance of about twenty miles, while an airplane 

at 10,000 feet could be detected by a fixed land radar at a distance up to 

200 miles. 

Arrangements had been made between the Army and Navy for joint 

utilization of radar insta ll ations. Since the Navy had more experience in 

the use of radar, it was agreed' that Army personnel would go to sea on 

four or more of the Navy ships for training and practice in rada r operation. 

This was done in June 1941. 

The Army radars were installed by the Corps of Engineers and operated 

by the Signal Corps. A system was worked out whereby radar information 

could be forwarded to an "Aircraft Wa rning Service" for evaluation and 

action. This came under the Army Air Corps wh ich passed the information 

to the "Interceptor Command" when defense action was indicated. This 

system of air raid defense was not fuUy operative by 7 December although 

some drills had been held. As will be observed, this was an all-Army set-up 

since Navy radars were secured in port because of their low elevation on 

the ships and the interference from the high surrounding land masses and 

buildings. However, some from the Navy were assigned on an unofficial 

basis to assist the Army's evaluation system. 

The Army radar service was operative every day except Sunday from 

0400 to 1600 hours, but on Sunday it was manned from 0400 to 0700 hours. 

General Short considered these hours the most dangerous time for an air 

attack. Except for the large installation where one enlisted man had volunteered to continue because of his interest and desire for experience, no radar 

was operating on the morning of 7 December. This turned out to be a well 

publiCized circumstance, because this man detected on the radar screen a 

large flight of aircraft bearing north at a distance of about 130 mi les. He 

was perplexed by what he detected, but reported it by telephone to a 

Lieutenant on duty at the "Aircraft Warning Service." The Lieutenant 

discounted the information as not being of much moment for several 

reasons: 

a. They cou ld be planes from our two U.S. aircraft carriers which he 

knew were at sea. 

b. They could be planes out of Hickam Field. 

c. They could be the twelve B-17's arriving from the West Coast for 

• 

)0 Pead Harbor 

transfer to the Philippine Islands. Actually these planes did arrive shortly 

thereafter and were badly shot up by the Japanese. 

d. At that time there was no proper identification system to determine 

whether planes on the screen were friend or foe, so there was no sure 

method by which the planes could be identified as other than American. 

The important fac t of cou rse was that the planes were the Japanese 

raiding force wh ich arrived an hour later. If the radar information had been 

fully utilized it is like ly that Pearl Ha rbor and all airfields wou ld have 

been fully alerted. If our forces had been ready, wha t would the results 

have been? No doubt a much greater number of Japanese planes wou ld have 

been destroyed, and possibly some of their ships damaged or sunk, But ou r 

own losses would not have been materi ally lessened, and the general out· 

come might well have been about the ,same. This interesting viewpoint will 

be covered in later pages. 

5. OPERATION OF THE FLEET 

During the eighteen months following the basing of the Pacific Fleet at 

Pearl Harbor great progress was made in training the sea forces for possible 

hostilities and in improving the facilities of the new base of operations. 

There were generous appropriations for new ships, equipment, man power, 

and for shore installations. The results were beginning to show, but there 

is always a great time lag between authorizing such things and their 

integration into the operating forces. 

New ships and planes were being delivered but the bulk of these were 

assigned to the Atlantic where actual war conditions existed and prospects 

were extremely grave. The new units required trained men: and therefore 

training had topmost priority. It became the duty of the...Pacific Fleet to do 

a vast amount of on·the·job training of men to be transferred back to the 

mainland for later assignment by the Navy Department. Many of these, 

especially officers, were reserves called to active duty. It is worthy to note 

here that these reserves became a major part of the fleet and fought with 

great distinction in World \"Var 11. 

A large proportion of the new air strength was diverted to the Philippines, Midway, and Wake. It was the policy to strengthen these islands. 

Such a policy originated in Washington, and was part of the war plan 

which would be followed in case of hostilities with Japan. 
The Fleel (It Pearl Harbor 51 

In shoreside activities great improvements were made to the shop fa cilities at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. A large new drydock, additional oil 

stowages, and genera l expansion of repair capacity were also incl uded. 

Without these, the wartime performance of the Navy Yard in supporting 

a greatly enlarged Aeet would have been impossible. 

In the summer of 1941 the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard was entirely competent to handle a limited number of overhauls of all but the largest ships. 

The Yard was gradually bui lt up in officers and civilian manpower so that 

it could do a very creditable job withi n the limits of its capacity. Although 

major overhauls of ships such as battl.eships and aircraft carriers were performed at the West Coast Navy Ya rds, the Pearl Harbor Navy Ya rd was 

able to handle many important items of work on all ships including the 

insta ll ation and testing out of new improvements such as radar, anti-aircraft 

guns, fire control gea r, radios, and so forth. The regu lar overhauls about 

once every eighteen months for battleships, aircraft carriers, and most 

cruisers and submarines were handled at the West Coast Navy Ya rds. The 

ships we re rotated in the fleet schedules so th at a minimum was absent at 

anyone time. The arrangement insured a program of maintenance and 

improvement, and at the same time gave the ship crews an opportunity to 

visit the mainland for seve ra l months and to be with thei r families and 

friends. 

The active units of the fleet operated on a strenuous schedule of training. 

They were engaged in sea maneuvers about 60 percent of the time and 

were in port at Pearl Harbor the other 40 percent. The submarines based at 

Pearl Harbor operated on a special schedule, while all other ships were 

divided into three separate task forces wh ich overlapped each other in their 

scheduled time at sea and in port. While at sea, major units of the fleet 

were screened by aircraft and destroyers to be sure that enemy submarines 

were not in the operatin g areas. It was assumed that the operating areas 

were infested with Japanese subma rines, and that a surprise attack would 

be by submarines against major uni ts of the fleet. 

6. HOW POWERFUL WAS THE FLEET? 

\ Among most Americans, and even most military personnel, Pearl Harbor 

was believed to be a mighty bastion of defense. Together with the powe r 

of the Pacific Fleet, Hawa ii was considered by the public to be impregnable. 
52 Pearl Harbor 

The Aeet itself was assumed to be invincible as compared to that of any 

prospective enemy. ,Even some of the high ranking personnel of the State 

Department had fajth in the supposition that if hostilities occurred. the sea 

forces of Japan could be vanquished in a few weeks. But as we well know 

• that viewpoint was quite mythical. 

~ Just prior to the Japanese attack the Pacific Fleet had a total of 1~9 

vessels assigned, induding some smaller craft such as mine layers, mine 

sweepers, and patrol vessels. This compared to 224 such vessels assigned to 

the Atlantic Fleet. If we exclude the smaller vessels, the Pacific Fleet had 

III ships and the Atlantic Fleet 188. The Pacific Fleet had nine of the 

fifteen battleships and most of the modern submarines, but the Atlantic 

Fleet exce lled in other types. At the time of sending the United States Fleet 

to base in Hawaii, that Aeet was relatively stronger than the fleet based in 

the Atlantic, but events in Europe and the Atlantic forced Washington to 

transfer some of the ships from the Pacific where peace sti ll prevailed. In 

May 1941 the following were detached from the Pacific and sent to the 

Atlantic for duty: 4 

3 battleships 


I aircraft carrier 


4 cruisers 


9 destroyers 


To show Washington's concern over the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, it 

was proposed in the summer of 1941 that a like force from the Pacific be 

transferred to the Atlantic, but this proposal was dropped. These transfers 

indicate that the Atlantic was deemed to be the scene of needed strength. 

The three major task forces comprising the Fleet were organized as 

foHows: 5 

Task Force I, Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, Commander Battle Force, in 

USS Cahjomia 

6 battleships 


aircraft carrier 


• RtpOrl of Iht l oim Commilfu on th~ Im·tlligalion of the Pearl Harb or AI/ark, nnd 

Additional Vitlll' 0/ Air. Ku/t Together lI'ith Minorit)' Vitll'J r>f Mr. Fergusoll and Mr. 

Brew/ur, Unitl'd States Goven>ment Priming Office, Washington, D.C.. 1946, p. 167. 

Hereafter dted as Report 0/ Ibe loilll Commiflu. 

• Hearings, Part 17. p. 2B~. 
" 


The Fleet al Pearl Harbor l3 

5 light cruisers 


18 destroyers 


;> mine vessels 


Task Force II, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander Aircraft 

Battle Force, in USS Enterprise .. 

3 battleships 

1 aircraft carrier 

4 heavy cruisers 

I S destroyers 

4 mine vessels 

Task Force III, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, Commander Scouting Force, 

In USS Indianapolis 

I aircraft carrier 

8 heavy cruisers 

9 destroyers 

13 mine vessels 

6 attack transports 

At least one of these three task forces was always at sea. Usually two 

of them were at sea for overlapping periods during tactical operations. 

In addition the submarines were organized as a task force for independent 

operations to provide an efficient Submarine Observation and Attack Force 

and to conduct patrols as ordered by the Fleet Commander. The operating 

schedule called for about thirty submarines and their supporting vessels. 

The above gives a good approximation of the strength of the Pacific 

Fleet. However, all the ships were not in Pearl Harbor or not in full 

operating status. Some ,",'ere at West Coast Navy Yards for regular overhaul, some at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard for re<juired material improvement work, and many were operating at sea. 

While the sfrength of the fleet seemed quite formidable, it was realized 

by "those in the know" that the Japanese fleet was considerably stronger. 

Definite information, of course, was unavailable, but it was known that 

Japan had been busy building and training for at least a half-dozen years. 

The extent of their superiority was demonstrated in the early days of the 

war, especially in the category of aircraft carriers and aircraft carrier planes. 
S4 Pearl Harbor 

7. WHERE WERE THE FLEET SHIPS ON 7 DECEMBER ? 

Contrary to popular belief, many ships of the fleet were not present at 

Pearl Harbor on 7 December. A rough estimate wou ld show that about 

one-half of the total force was absent. Fortunatel}' all three of the aircraft 

carriers assigned to tile fleet were elsewhere, but eight of the nine battleships 

assigned were present and took the brunt of the attack. 

Several of the ships were absen t in connection with Navy Yard overhauls 

on the West Coast. Bu t others were on special missions, such as: 

a. A special task force under Vice Admira l Halsey in Enfe rpriJe .....as 

about 200 miles west of Hawaii eoroute to Pearl Harbor after having 

delivered Marine Corps fighter pl anes to beef up the defense of Wake 

Island. T his task force consisted of 1 aircra ft carrier, 3 heavy cruisers, and 

9 destroyers. 

b. Another special task force und er Rear Admiral J. H. Newton with 

Lexingtol1 was about 400 miles southeast of Midway enroute to that island 

to deliver Marine Corps scout bombers. This force consisted of 1 airc raft 

carrier, 3 heavier crui~rs, and 5 destroye rs. 

c. A specia l task force ll nder Vice Admiral \'{!ilson Brown consisting 

of 1 heavy cruiser and 5 destroyers together with minesweepers was off 

Johnston Island to test a new type of lan ding craft. 

d. Two heavy cruisers were on convoy duty in the Samoa and Solomons 

areas in connection with protection of shipping to Australia. 

e. One heavy cruiser and four destroyer minesweepers were abou t 

twenty-five miles south of Oahu cond ucting special exercises. 

£. Two submarines were in the Midway a rea, and two others in the 

Wake Island area. 

g. Other ships, such as oil tanke rs were enroute to Hawaii from the 

\'Q"est Coast. 

AU of these ships at sea were in a status of wartime alert, fully armed, 

and ready for any emergency. Their absence from Pearl Ha rbor left the 

follow ing ships present : 

8 battlesh ips 


2 heavy cruisers 


4-10,000 ton cruisers 


2-7,000 ton cruisers 


30 destroyers 


4 submarines 

A"''''\1 V ' "¥ .1 ' 1'1 '

~~& ... ~ ... ":~' :; , , 

(}tqp ,:" ,rI' 

bo., .. '''-~'- ... 

;->.~) . .. (

~ 

''

. .

~ 
56 Pearl Harhor 

1 gunboat 

9 minelayers 

14 mmesweepers 

27 auxiliaries such as repair ships, tenders, store ships, and tugs. 

All of the vessels at Pearl Harbor, except those undergoing overhaul 

at the Navy Yard, were, in accordance with fleet orders, in readiness can· 

clition three, which required about one-quarter of the anti-aircraft batteries 

and their control stations to be in a ready status with gun crews and ammunition at hand. All fleet vessels had. ready for use their full supply of 

ammunition plus a reserve supply. Also, these vessels were required to be 

on twelve hours notice for getting underway. Actually. however, none of 

the Jhips requi red twelve hours steaming notice to get underway, as will 

shortly be seen; the requirement for twelve hours was for a fleet sortie. 
, 


;)Ju;)u~mmI JO .M. l~, 

lIlldVID A 

CHAPTER V 


Imminence of War 


1. BREAKDOWN OF DIPLOMACY 


The numerous diplomatic discussions in Washington, and the many exchanges of diplomatic notes and proposals were not fruitful in lessening 

the gap between Japan's adamant demands and America 's vigorous opposition. Anal ysts of the facts could readily see that the two countries were 

on a collision CQurse which could only result in hostilities. However, the 

American public was fa r from convinced that the actual situation could be 

so extreme, and continued to put great fai th in the negotiations which had 

been going on in Washington for eight or nine mon ths. W hether or not 

these diplomatic efforts were bona fide on the part of Japan might now be 

doubted. Unquestionably the United States could have delayed the conflict 

for a time by agreeing to the various demands of the Japanese. These 

demands were so extreme that Japan did not ex pect full agreement, but 

nevertheless pursued the policy of di plomatic exchanges until the last. Even 

the attacking force had instructions to withhold the attack in case the 

diplomats came to an agreement. 

It is fair to say that the great majority of the people, even in the military 

services, did not visualize a direct attack by Japan. Rather it was taken for 

granted that Japan would move toward the south which was rich in oil 

and other resources. There were some who felt that Japan would take 

the Russian maritime provinces to the northward. This was especially so 

since th is region was greatly desired by the Japanese Army, but Russia 

was still unconquered by Germany and Japan did not want that nation to 

be counted as an enemy at that time. 

However, the policies and actions of Japan were dominated by the 

extreme militarists headed by Premier General Tojo. Their estimate of the 

situation was so favorable that they were determined that now there had 

been presented to them a "golden opportunity" to strike and accomplish 

their purposes. Their trea ty of alliance with Germany and Ita ly gave them 

full confiden ce because at that time the Axis Powers were eminently success59 
60 Pearl Harbor 

ful. France had fallen , Great Britain was wobbling, Hitler's army was near 

the gates of Moscow, Rommel's German army was overrunning Egypt, the 

Near East was threatened, and the United States stood alone in remonstration without any formal allies. 

2. JAPAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF PEARL HARBOR 

The information received from the Japanese after the war shows that their 

methodical observations and espionage kept them well informed of everything concerning the defenses of Hawaii and the activities of the Pacific 

Fleet. In our open democratic society Japanese agents were free to observe 

Aeet practices, take photographs with their high-powered equipment, and to 

solicit almost any information desired. Any person could roam the hills 

around Pearl Harbor or other areas of Hawaii and witness the comings and 

goings of each and every ship, exactly; where they were moored while in 

port, and what their schedules seemed to be. Also, such persons could 

readily obtain specific information on the air fields and various defense 

measures such as anti-aircraft guns, torpedo nets around ships, and barrage 

balloons. High-powered binoculars were hardly necessary, but they showed 

particular details which in large measure were unknown even to any single 

officer of the Aeet. In fact, one of the espionage officers in the Japanese 

Consulate has admitted that he rented a plane at a commercial airport of 

Honolulu and regularly flew over Hawaii's military air bases. He also stated 

that he watched flee t sorties from Mount Tantalus or from Aiea. 

Testimony before the Roberts Commission and the Congressional Investigation showed that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was headquarters 

for an espionage ring. There, was at least one German spy. At that time 

there were about 37,000 Japanese aliens in Hawaii and some 117,000 

American citizens of Japanese ancestry. 

The Consulate's spy ring was unbelievably effective. Tokyo asked for 

and received regular reports from the Consulate at Honolulu and from other 

Pacific ports regarding the movements of ships, their specific location in 

port. air reconnaisance, defense measures, troop movements, and other 

matters. As 7 December drew near, such reports were requested by Tokyo 

at shorter intervals, and they were furnished as re'luested. The exchanges 

were numerous and intensely interesting. Here are excerpts from a few 
• • • • • 

• • • • • 

Imminence of IVar 61 

typical examples. These may be seen in their entirety in Part 12 of the 

Copgressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor. 

From Honolulu to Tokyo 16 January 1941: 

2. The number of vessels seen in the harbor on the morning of the 16th 

was as fo llows: five battleships ... five light cruisers ... nineteen destroyers, 

two destroyer tenders about six small submarines. . and three 

transports. 

The Yorktown is not in port . 

The CinCUS shifted the flag from the New Mexico to the Pennsyhania 

on 1'5 January. [Trans. 1/31 /41] 

From Honolu lu to Tokyo 21 February 1941: 

1. The capital ships and others departed from Pearl Harbor on the 13th 

and returned on the 19th. (It is said that they wi ll depart again on the 

coming Wednesday and return on the following Wednesday). Judging from 

the statements by various sailors who were on these vessels, the training was 

apparently held in the vicinities of Kauai, Lahaina and Hilo. (Trans. 

2/28/41] 

From Tokyo to Honolulu 21 September 1941: 

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels 

along the following lines insofar as possible: [The message divides Pearl 

Harbor waters into a number of areas which are delineated.] 

2. With regard to war ships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have 

ylfu report on those at anchor . . tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. 

(Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you 

make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the 

same wharf.) [Trans. 10/ 9/ 41] 

From Tokyo to Honolulu 15 November 1941: 

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make 

your 'ships in harbor reporf irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. 

Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain 

secrecy. [Trans. 12/3/41] 

From Tokyo to Honolulu 29 November 1941: 

We have been rcce)\'ing reports from you on ship movements, but in 

future will you also report even when there are no movements. [Trans. 

12/ '/41] 
• • • • • 

62 

From Tokyo to Honolulu 2 December 1941: 

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane 

carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of 

your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not 

there afe any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there ace any 

indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the 

warships are provided with anti-mine nets. [Trans. 12/ 30/ 41] 

From Honolulu to Tokyo 4 December 1941: 

On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu 

harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th . ... 

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some 

mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return. [Trans. 

12/ 12/ 41 J 

From Honolu lu to Tokyo ~ December 1941: 

1. During Frida.y morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my 

message [ previously] arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days. 

2. The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day. 

3. The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers. 16 destroyers. [Trans. 12/ 10/ 41] 

From Tokyo to Honolulu 6 December 1941: 

Please wire immediately .. . the mo\'ements of the fleet subse'luent to the 

fourth. [Trans. 12/ 12/ 41] 

From Honolulu to Tokyo 6 December 1941: 

l. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they 

ordered fOur or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are 

considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. 

In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in 

the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring e<{uipment, 

nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no 

indication that any training for the maintenance of ba lloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipmenl. 

In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, 

even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control 

the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of 

Pearl Harbor, Hickham, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon 

defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is consider­
Immillet1ce of War 63 

able opportun ity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these 

places. 

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. . [Trans. 

12/8/41) 

From Honolulu to Tokyo 6 December 1941: 

... The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th : 

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in 

addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy 

cruisers and airplane carriers have all left) . 

2. It appears that no air recon naissance is being conducted by the fleet air 

arm. [Trans. 12/ 8/ 41] 

The diplomatic codes used by the Japanese in the exchange of com· 

munications regarding Pearl Harbor and the fleet became known to us, but 

at the time of the attack most of their military codes were still secure. 

Actually they used a number of different codes and changed them occasionally. Also, they devised a system to report movements of fleet ships 

by the display of lights at night. The lights would be at certain land areas 

in Hawaii, and these could be observed by Japanese submarines on surveillance patrol off shore. The exact time of display and the number of lights 

shown would identify the type and number of large vessels which had 

departed, or were about to depart, from Pearl Harbor. 

Another method was to include in regular news broadcasts certain information regarding the breaking off of diplomatic relations. This was known 

as the "hidden word" method. The intended message was clear when the 

key was understood and applied. 

Tokyo sent out to their embassies throughout the world the key to a 

weather report message to give advance information to its agents of the 

impending termination of diplomatic relations with pa rticula r countries. 

This was done by adding a "ringer" in the weather report, and repeating 

it three or more times. Thus "east wind rain" referred to the United 

States-Japan relations; "west wind dear" to the British; and "north wind 

cloudy" to the Ru ssians. 

Clearly. the Japanese informational system gave specific· knowledge on the 

American structure of defense. The Pacific Fleet situation prior to the 

attack was almost an open book to Japan. Their complete information permitted them to provide each attacking plane with a specified target and 

its exact location in the harbor. Sketches on official Navy charts were 
64 
 Pearl Harbor 

r , 

Flee' Admiral ENUll ,. King, USN. He waJ appointed Commalldu-ill-Chiej of the 


Unh,d SIdle! Fleet on 20 Duember 1941 and QJJ/I1f1ed (ommalld 011 30 December 1941. 

I 

imminence of Waf 6~ 

recovered from Japanese airplanes and midget submarines which were shot 

down or captured cluring the attack. 

3. AMERICA'S KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN'S INTENTIONS 

Most Americans have traditionally frowned upon espionage and spying 

as sources of information pertinent to our security and military defense. 

Consequent I), we had but liule knowledge comparable to the knowledge 

Japan had regarding Pearl Harbor and OUf defenses. The United States' 

representatives in Japan were greatly restricted in obtaining definite information, as indeed were all foreigners, in the totalitarian atmosphere which 

prevailed there. Rumors were rife and there was plenty of evidence that 

Japan was intent on a great program of expansion of military capabilities. 

Yet we lacked details on how much had been accomplished in augmenting 

their naval and air power, and the training of operating personnel. We 

were yet to learn, to Our sorrow, how extensive their preparations had 

been and how proficiently their manpower had been developed and trained. 

It was still an American tendency, and indeed a world-wide one, to 

underrate the Japanese. For instance, we rated them as excellent copyists, 

but lacking in originality; we smirked at the stories of some of their ships 

havi ng capsized at lau nching; some .accepted the myth that because of their 

eye structure the Japanese could never be good combat aviators. Events 

soon proved that such ignorance of a prospective enemy might be termed 

the "valor of ignorance" because our misconceptions produced a false sense 

of security, a feelIng of over-confidence, and a presumed inherent 

superiority. 

From many sources, however, we knew beyond question that Japan 

would strike when the circumstances suited her, but nobody knew when, 

where, or how. Her plans and the execution of them were closely guarded 

secrets which were known to only a few within the Japanese government 

or among her military st rategists. 

As has been seen, there had been rumo[s of an attack on Pearl Harbor. 

But then; we[e also rumors on many other targets and it seemed far-fetched 

and foolhardy to attack Hawaii, especially without a suitable declaration. 

Why would Japan attack such a concentration of American power nearly 

3,500 miles away while its real objectives in the Far East were nea r at hand 

and almost defenseless? 
66 Pearl Harbor 

In addition to Southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies, Japan coveted 

the maritime provinces of Russia bordering on the Pacific. This fact was 

widely recognized, and now with H itler's army nea r to Moscow, that move 

seemed q uite logical to military analysts, especially as it was known that the 

Japanese Army was particula rly anxious to occupy those areas. And after 

all, the Army was running the government, which was headed now by 

General T ajo. 

The imminence of hostile action pointed to attacks in the Western 

Pacific area. There seemed to be little probability that the initial attack 

could be against Pearl Harbor. This was the ourent estimate of the situation 

among American officials. There was no person "in the know" who had 

forecast an attack on Pearl Harbor. The secret knowledge In possession of 

the United States In Washington at the time supported the general!y-held 

viewpoint that Japan's first move would be in the Western Pacifi c. 

For over a year many of the Army and Navy radio stations had been able 

to intercept, and certain ones to decode, most of the Japanese secret diplomatic messages. This was indeed an accomplishment of the highest value. 

It gave our government the basic information concerning Japanese conversations with Germany and Ita ly, and even Tokyo's instruction to its d iplomats 

in Washington. Such infomation was referred to as "mag ic," and pertained 

specifically to the diplomatic code which was designated as "purple." Credit 

for the remarkable achievemen t of breaking this code goes to both Navy 

and Army personnel, and was carried to the point of actually being able to 

manufactu re machines for coding and decoding "purple" messages. 

The diplomatic messages did not contain specific warning of the attack 

on Pearl Harbor. Even the Japanese diplomats in WaShington were kept 

entirely uninformed of that military project. They were purposely kept 

from military secrets so that they would continue their diplomatic efforts 

without g iving an inkling of what the military had in mind. 

At that time we had not completely broken the Japanese military codes. 

Even if they had been in ou r possession at the time of Pearl Harbor it would 

not have been of great assistance because the attack was hand led in strict 

secrecy with complete radio silence. Inasmuch as the objectives of Japan 

with reference to their program in Asia, as well as their relationships to 

Germany and Italy, were well documented by these many exchanges, let us 

set down as interesting sidelights a few excerpts from the numerous 

"purple" messages printed in Part 12 of the comprehensive Hearing! Before 

the Joint Committee on the b1t'tJligaliol1 of the Pearl HarbOf AfldCk. 
• • • • • 

67 

From Tokyo to Berlin 2 Ju ly 1941: 

The Policy. 

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace 

by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of 

how the world situation may change. 

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the 

China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward 

in order to establish firmly a basis for her self·existence and self-protection. 

[Trans. 8/ 8/ 41] 1 

From Tokyo to All Diplomatic Offices 26 July 1941: 

Depending upon how Japanese relations with England and the United 

States turn out, we may have to consider divesting England and the United 

States of all their interests in China. If and when things come to the worst, 

I want all areas concerned to cooperate in either destro)'ing or seizing the 

considerable mining and other industrial equipment and ships of these 

countries. Be particularly SUfe to let nothing be taken away. I want you all 

to be ready at any moment to take this precautionary step of transferring 

the property of these two nations to our control. [Trans. 7/28/41J 2 

From Nomura in Washington to Tokyo 30 July 1941: 

Today I knew from the hard looks on their faces that they meant business 

and I could see that if we do flOt answer to suit them that they are going to 

take some drastic steps. 

During my first conversation with R~ve t after I took office the President, referring to the Panay incident, said that at the time he cooperated 

with the Secretary of State and succeeded in restraining popular opinion but 

that in case such a thing happened a second time, it would probably be quite 

impossible to again ca lm the storm. The latest incident brought all this back 

to me and I can see just how gravely they are regarding it. Think of it! 

Popular demand for the freezing of Japanese funds was subsiding and now 

this had to happen. I must tell you it certainly occurred at an inopportune 

moment. [Trans. 8/ 2/ 4 1] 3 

From Tokyo to Embassy in Washington 31 Ju ly 1941: 

We are expanding our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows 

it and ought to understand our actions. 

6. \'\feU, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order 

to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each 

'HearingI, Put 12, p. l. 


• [bid., p. 7 • 


• [bid., p. 8. 
68 Pearl Harbor 

country to have a certain Aexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that 

each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean com· 

plete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and 

while striving toward onc general obj ective, each use our own discretion 

within the bounds of good judgment. 

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will ~ based upon a 

determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite 

Pact. That this is a fa ct is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial 

rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and 

now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light 

unpremeditated or over-speedy ateion. Please send to Rome. [Trans. 

8/4/41] ~ 

From Tokyo to Japanese Embassy in Washington 16 October 1941: 

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the JapaneseAmerican negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early Ihis month, following the 

German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) 

of the movement fo r re\'ision of the Neutra lity Act, the German authorities 

demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if 

the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers in· 

creasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise betwC(:n Germany 

and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would 

provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the ThrC(: 

Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. [Trans. 10/17/4 1) ~ 

From Tokyo to Washington 22 November 1941 : 

... Stick to our fix ed policy and do your very besl. Spare no efforts and try 

to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond yOUf ability 

to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, 

but if within the next three or four days you can finish your con\'ersations 

with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me 

write it out for you-twenty ninth); if the perti nent notes can be exchanged; 

if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and 

in short jf everything can be finis hed, we have decided to wait unti l that 

date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. 

After that things are automatically going 10 happen. Please take this into 

your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, 

• Ibid., p_ lO . 

• Ibid., p. 71. 
• • • • • 

Imminence of W'4f 69 

for the present, is for the informtion of you two Ambassadors alone. [Trans. 

11 / 22/41]' 

From Washington to Tokyo 27 November 1941: 

On the 27th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the President. (Secretary Hull was also present.) The resume of our talks follows: 

The President: " In the last Great War, Japan and the United States were 

together on the side of the Allies. At that time, both Japan and the United 

States were given ample proof that Germany fail ed to comprehend the way 

the people of other countries think. 

"Since these com'ersations were begun, I am aware of the fact that much 

effort has been made by the Japanese side, too, by those who cherish peace. 

I am highly appreciative of this fact. It is clear that the majority of the 

American people arc anxious to maintain peaceful relations with Japan. 

I am one of those who still harbors much hope that Japanese-U.S. relations 

will be settled peacefully." 

I: "Your recent proposal will no doubt be the cause of painful disappointment to the Japanese Go\'crnmcnt." 

The President : "To tell you the truth, I, too, am very disappointed that 

the situation has de\'eloped in the manner that it has. However, during the 

several months that these conversations were being conducted, cold water 

was poured on them when Japan occupied southern French Indo·China. 

According to recent intelligences, there are fears that a second cold water 

dousing may become an actuality." (He apparently meant the increase in our 

troops to French Indo-China and our occupation of Thai.) (See my message 

# 1205.) "1 fully understand that the general public in Japan who has been 

living in war condi tions for the past year, cannot see a parallel with conditions in the United States, which is living under peaceful conditions. 

"During all of the time, however, that Your Excellency and Secretary 

Hull have been conversing, we have never heard of or seen concrete proof 

of any peaceful intention by the leading elements of Japan. This has made 

these talks an exceedingly difficult undertaking." [Trans. 11 /29/ 41] 7 

From Tokyo to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin 30 November 1941: 

4. If when you tel! them this, the Germans and Italians question you about 

our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we ha\'e already clarified our attitude 

toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present 

moy'es southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet 

and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States 

and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our 

I Ibid., p. 16). 


'Ibid., pp. 192 and 193. 

• • • • • 

• • • • • 

• • • • • 

70 Pearl Harbor 

might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for 

the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the 

north. 

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must 

under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes with· 

out saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and 

Italians how important secrecy is. 

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this 

to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLIN I and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a confercoce with the Germans and Italians, please let me know. [Trans. 12/ 1/41] ~ 

From Berlin to Tokyo 29 November 1941: 

1. Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any. reports regarding the Japanese·U.S. negotiations. I replied that 

I had received no official word. 

Ribbentrop: " It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia 

without losing this opportun ity. There never has been and probably never 

will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and estab· 

lishes her European New Order, all the mi litary might of Britain and the 

United States will be concentrated against Japan. 

"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the 

very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. \Vle 

have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the 

Japanese·U.S. negotiations being concluded succe55fully, because of the fact 

that the United States is putting up a stiff front. 

"If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to 

fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only 

be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about 

favorable results for Japan herSelf." [Trans. 12/ 1/ 41)9 

From Tokyo to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin 30 November 1941: 

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says 

that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will 

not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, 

namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the 

'IMd., pp. 204 ~nd 20'. 


'Ibid., p. 200. 

Imminence of W.ar 71 

Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give 

assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let 

alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the America!! proposal 

for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this 

plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and Chinathey did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is dear that the United States is now 

in collusion with these nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with 

Germany and Italy, as an enemy. [Trans. 12/ 1/41] 10 

From Tokyo to Ambassador in Washington 1 December 1941: 

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch 

with the N aval Attache·s office there and make use of chemicals they have 

on hand for this purpose. The Attache should have been adviS("d by the 

Navy Ministry regarding this. [Trans. 12/ 1/ 41) II 

From Rome to Tokyo 3 December 1941: 

On this day, at 11 o·clock in the morl1:ing, I, accompanied by Ando, called 

on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present) . 1 described the developments in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations in accordance 

with the contents of your message #986 to Berlin. 

Mussolini : " I have been carefully watching the progress of the JapaneseU.S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not at all surprised to 

receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness 

of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I 

should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected . One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her 

owo, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if 

it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis 

first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail 

because of Japan·s loyal and sincere nature. 

"As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I wholehearted ly endorse Japan·s policy of n eating a New Order in East Asi a. This 

has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am 

one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of 

the Great East Asia area." 

I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to 

in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I said that I 

had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our 

Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop). With regard to paragraph 2, Mus· 

solini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid 

'" Ibid., p. 206. 


11 Ibid., p. 208 and 209. 

• • • • • 

I 

72 Pearl Harbor 

she had at her disposal, i.e., that she would make evcr)' effort to keep the 

British navy checked in the Mediterranean. 

Mussolini: "Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air fo rce bloc 

was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to ap ply 

fu rther pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on 

this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day 

now," 

Regarding paragraph 2 agai n, should Japan declare war on the United 

States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? 

Mussolini replied : "Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of 

the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, 

we would like to confcee with Germany on this point." 

With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your meso 

sage #987, as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be 

separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously 

with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done 

jointly he thought it would give the impression of mOfe strength. 

Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter 

was not brought up at all. [Trans. 12/6/4 J] 12 

The total group of "purple" messages showed that Japan was unwilling 

to give up her alliance with Germany and Italy, would not remove troops 

from Indo·China, and refused to abide by the American demands regarding 

China and free trade for U.S. nationals as gua ranteed by commercia l 

treaties. 

The Japanese were qu ite un aware that the United States was in possession 

of their diplomatic code, and therefore able to read their communications. 

However, they fully realized that the various radio stations under the 

control of the United States were regularly monitoring the radio traffic 

of the Japanese Fleet. This was a customary practice . among nations and 

furnished valuable information. One of the obvious advantages was the 

accumulation of sufficient informa tion and data to enable cryptanalysts to 

eventually break the codes. It is now common knowledge that the military 

code of the Japanese was broken shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, and 

this achievement was an incalculable benefit. 

Another purpose of moni toring was to fix the location of the enemy's 

ships. This could be done qu ite handily by means of obtaining cross-bearings. 

For instance, each ship of the Japanese Fleet had a specific call signa l. When 

that ship answered its call one could use a directi on finder to ascertain its 

" Ibid., pp. 228 and 229. 
imminence of U'/ar 73 

USN '2<38. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operatioll! frol1l I AlIgll!1 193910 12 

Marrh 1942. 

general location, and when several of ou r radio stations from distant areas 

did likewise, the cross-bearings on that ship would show its defi ni te location. 

In many cases it would not even be necessary to get cross-bearings, especially 

when the habitual operations of the fleet vessels were understood. 
74 Pearl Harbor 

For quite some time before 7 December the Pearl Harbor radio stations 

maintained a fairly accurate record of the location of the major units of 

tbe Japanese Fleet. This radio intelligence was reported to the Commander· 

in-Chief almost daily and was considered quite reliable until just prior to 

the attack, when its reliability was greatly reduced by counter measures 

taken by the Japanese. First they changed the call signals of their ships on 

1 November, and then again on 1 December. This had been done before, 

and was confusing for a time but not usually for very long. Then the 

Japanese used deceptive call signals to give the impression that ce rtain 

major ships like aircraft carriers were elsewhere than where they actually 

were. For several weeks in late November our monitoring stations lost 

contact with the Japanese carriers and some other major vessels. This gave 

rise to the suspicion that these ships might have taken up stations at the 

naval bases of the Mandated Islands. 

The chief countermeasure to defeat monitoring is radio silence, and 

that is what the Japanese used so effectively. A certain amount of radio 

silence by the carriers was observed in the early stages of their preparations 

for the attack, and absolute radio silence was in effect for all ships of the 

attacking task force which assembl ed in northern Japan and sailed fo r 

Hawaii on 26 November 1941. 

4. WARNING TO THE FLEET 

The probability of hostilities between the United States and the Axis Powers 

was well recognized by a large portion of the American public. But how 

this might come about, and when, was entirely speculative. The news media 

featured the growing tensions which existed in both the Atlantic and the 

Pacific, and even the Mediterranea n, but few visualized that a direct attack 

on the United States was imminent. The general concept seemed to be that 

if we were drawn into the wa r it would be by going to the defense of a 

victimized area, such as Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. 

In order to relieve the pressure on Malaya and other areas which were 

held by our allies, the American plan for a possible war with Japan was 

for the fleet to attack the Japanese Mandated Islands in the Marshalls and 

the Carolines and to establish a fleet base at Truk. Blit because of many 

problems and shortages, such an expedition was looked upon unfavorably 

by most naval officials. The American public of that time would not support 

a war of that nature. Then the Japanese solved this dilemma by making 

a direct attack on the American flag at Pearl Harbor. 
lmmmellce of Wat 75 

The people of Hawaii, including the military, were accustomed to news 

reports showing the continuing controversy between opposing powers, but 

in Hawaii there was little turmoil or tension. Business went on routinely, 

people pursued their usual activ.ities, and military personnel were carrying 

out the program of preparedness. There was little suspicion that Japan 

would launch a direct attack prior to a state of war, or at least an ultimatum, 

against the strong-hold of the Pacific. Among the military the prevailing 

talk seemed to be that if war should come it would be somewhere else, 

probably in the Southwest Pacific. 

From official Washington there had come to Hawaii, as to other Pacific 

outposts, almost a superfluity of alarms and alerts for over a year. These 

were usually of a general nature as reflecting the new aggressions of Japan, 

or the widening gap in diplomatic relations. In most cases such warnings 

were precautionary and were not intended for public mformation. In fact 

the Hawaiian commanders were always cautioned to limit the warning 

information to those who needed to know , and to avoid arousing or irritating Japan by any overt or unfriendly action. The rank and file of the 

military, as well as the general public, were probably not aware of the 

serious implications which existed just prior to 7 December. And some 

of the most important implications were not known to the high commands 

in Hawaii because Washington had not transmitted them. 

The warning signa ls sent from Washington had value, but were lacking 

in important essentials. Naturally, in Washington they could not be specific 

enough to forecast what would happen. There were sometimes differences 

in the estimates of the situation behveen the Army and the Navy. Furthermore, the separate signals sent out by the Army and the Navy were received 

and evaluated separately in Hawaii. There was not unity of command but 

there was a remarkable d~gree of discussion and coordination regarding the 

information which was received. 

The first alert came from the War Department to the Hawaiian Army 

Command and to Panama in June 1940. The date marked the fall of France, 


. indications of possible German aggression in South America, and also the 


Japanese bombing of Chungking. This alert continued for a month. The 


Navy was not included in the Washington instructions but was told of the 

situation locally, and participated by increasing its long-range air patrol and 

continuing it for some months. Washington cautioned Ha\vaii to avoid 

publicity or in any way from provoking curiosity of news media or alien 

agents. 
76 Pearl Harbor 

In February 1941 the Secretary of the Navy advised the Secretary of War 

of the possibility of air attack on Pearl Harbor. Copies of this communication were received by the Army and by the Navy in Hawaii. In July 1941 

Hawaii was warned of the tense situation caused by the Japanese occupation of Southern Indo-China and the United States' imposition of an embargo on trade with Japan. 

When the Konoye cabinet fell in Japan and General Tojo took ove r the 

government as Premier in October 1941 , the Hawaiian commands and other 

Pacific commands were again advised of the seriousness of the situation in 

the Pacific. This dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington went to all commanders directly concerned. 

Admiral Kimmel issued a new serurity order under date of 14 October 

1941 which superseded the security order which was in effect dated 15 

US); NRoI.L (MOD) 27317 

Adm;ral HtlJballd E. Kimmel, USN, Commallder-ill-Chief PaCIfic Fleet Oil 7 December 

1941, 
imminence 01 War 77 

February 1941.. This delineated actions to be taken in the anti-aircraft 

defense, anti-submarine defense, Army and Navy coordination, communications plans, drills, and so on. In his order Admiral Kimmel stated: "That 

no responsible foreign power will provoke war ... by attack on the Fleet 

or Base, . [but] that a declaration of war may be preceded by; (1) a 

su rprise aHack on ships.in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack 

on ships in the operating areas, (3) a combination of these two." I~ This 

eventual ity had been mentioned in the letter sent to the Secretary of War 

by the Secretary of the Navy in January 1941. It had also been covered 

in great detail by the Martin-Bellinger order for the defense of Pearl 

Harbor 31 March 1941. In that order it is stated: " In the past Orange 

[Japan) has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war." The 

Chief-of-Staff of Admiral Kimmel, Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, stated at 

the Hewitt Inguiry that "they were aware of the possibility of hostile 

action without a declaration of war, but they expected the Japanese might 

hit the Philippines, Midway, or Guam, but not Pearl Harbor.;' 14 This was 

the thought "universally held. 

The Navy Department dispatch of 16 October 1941, was essentially as 

follows: 

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If 

a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and antiAmerican. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect wi ll be that it will 

operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with th!" 

U.S. In !"ith!" r case hostiliti!"s betw!"en Japan and Russia arc a strong possibility. Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her 

pres!"nt despt"ratc situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack 

thes!" two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions 

including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic inten· 

tion nor constitu.te provocative actions against Japan.15 

On 24 November 1941, a message was received from the Navy Department as foll ows: 

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. 

This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in OUf opin ion that a sur· 

prise aggressive movement in any direction includi ng attack on Phil ippines 

or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has ~e n this dispatch concurs and 

,. Pacific Fleet Confidential Lctter No. 2CL- 41 (Reviscd), 14 October 194 1, p. 1. 


"Ibid., Part ;6, p. 442 . 


.. Report of Ih, l oint Commjllee, p. 96. 

78 Pearl Harbor 

requests action adees to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost 

secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or 

precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.IS 

The final and most important warning was sent from Washington and 

to other Pacific outposts on 27 November 1941. It was specifically desig. 

nated as a "war warning." It reads as follows: 

This despatch is to be considered a war warning_ Negotiations with Japan 

looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an 

aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The nurn· 

her and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task 

forces indicates an amphibious expedition against cither the Philippines 

Thai or Kra Pcninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate dcfensivc 

deployment prcparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46. 

Inform district and Army authorities. A simila r warning is being scnt by 

War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts Guam 

Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage. 17 

It is noted that at no time did Wash ington indicate any belief of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor in advance of a forma l dedaration of 

hostilities. On the contrary, the supposition continued to be that Japan's 

moves would be to the south, and evidence was at hand giving validity to 

such beliefs. This belief was supported by the fortnightl y summary sent 

out from Washington under date of 1 December 1941 from the Director 

of Naval Intelligence. On the Japanese naval situation it stated : 

Deployment of naval fOfces to the southward has indicated dearly that 

extensive preparations afe underway for hostilities. At the same time troop 

transports and freighters afe pouring conti nually down from Japan and 

northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo·China 

and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried 

oul by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, 

now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few 

days . . To dale this task force, under the command of the Commander in 

Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, 

one gradually concentrating oR' the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the 

Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light 

cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destro},er and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned the major 

capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion 

of the carriers. 

II Ibid., p. 98. 


If Ibid., p. 98. 

Imminence of War 79 

The c'Iuipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including land· 

ing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval 

control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, 

munitions but also of conshuction material with yard workmen, eng ineers, 

etc. 18 

Washington's acute desire to avoid war in the Pacific should also be 

noted. In fact both the War and Navy Depa rtments expressed the hope in 

November 1941 that firm diplomatic attihIdes toward Japan not be taken 

for a period of three months or more, during which time reasonable pre· 

paredness would be obtained. It was especially desired to improve defenses 

in the Philippines as it was recognized that the Japanese coveted this ter· 

ritory. Its location was critical to Japanese expansion. The United States was 

in process of adding a large number of B~17's to the air power of the 

Philippine Islands. Under date of 27 November 1941 General Marshall, the 

Army's Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, 

lsked the President and Secretary of State for more time to prepare, stating: 

"The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to 

gain time .. . . Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided 

so long as consistent with national policy." 19 

Although the additional time was not to be, the fact was clear that the 

United States did not commit any overt military action against Japan. The 

final overt hostile act was Japan's treacherous bombing of Pearl Harbor 

with a conseguent toll of destruction and human lives. 

5. WHAT INFORMA nON DID HAWAII NOT RECENE? 

While Washington furn ished to Hawaii and elsewhere a great volume of 

information on the critical relations between Japan and the United States, 

it is a fad that some very important information was not ~nt to Hawaii. 

This was the "purple" information regarding the specific ships in designated 

locations in Pearl Harbor during the few days prior to 7 December, and 

the instructions to various places to burn certain codes. However, it should 

be mentioned here that the work of decoding and translation of the multitude of messages was not completed until after 7 December. The amount 

.. FOr/nighlly SlimmaT)' oj Currenl National SiIU/ltions, Na.vy Department, ~r al No. n, 


D«cmber 1941, p. 9. 


"Reporl oj Ih, / oi"l CommillU, p. In. 

80 Pearl Harbor 

of work over-taxed the section in charge of this specialty and some of it 

was not completed until after the air attack. 

At an earlier time, shortly after "purple" messages became available, 

the Fleet was an addressee for this information. But this was discontinued 

about six months before the attack in the interest of security. Obviously the 

value to our government of intercepting and reading Japanese secret diplomatic messages was so great that it would be foolhardy to risk any compromise of our advantage. 

Likewise, the instructions to Japanese Embassies and Consulates to destroy 

their codes and coding machines were highly significant. Here again, 

Hawaii was not cut in directly. However, the commands in Hawaii were 

aware of it through their own surveillance of the Japanese Consulate as 

American representatives observed the burning of records there. 

While we must recognize the possibility that the Pearl Harbor attack 

should have been blunted to some extent if more of the information available in Washington had been transmitted to Hawaii, there is room for other 

viewpoints. Harassed by the pressure of events and torrents of information, 

the responsible officials in Washington were subject to human limitations 

as to relative urgency, evaluation, and necessary action. Without doubt 

some officials, using their hindsight, ~}l ld jater see that certain things might 

have been done differently and better. At the time, however, it would seem 

that their estimate of the situation indicated that little could be gained by 

alerting Hawaii beyond what already had been done. 

As for the Hawaiian commands, some people observed that they were 

"fed up" on alarms, alerts, rumors, and an overdose of pressures and cautionary messages. Fleet operations were at times subordinate to alerts and 

defense drills, and suffered accordingly. The cry of "wolf" had become 

so customary that it no longer made an impact. And even if the Pacific 

Fleet had been fully ready, the damage would not have been much less. 

In fact, it might well have been much more. 
'l 

CHAPTER VI 


Japanese Attack, Strategy, 

and Tactics 
•. 

CHAPTER VI 


Japanese Attack, Strategy, 

and Tactics 

1. PREPAREDNESS, WAR GAMES, AND DRILLS 

The attack on Pearl Harbor was the brain-child of Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. He was 

well schooled in American ways, having had a tour of duty in Washington. 

Moreover, he was well regarded by American officers, was a sophisticated 

poker player, giving to successful bluffing.! He was regarded as bold and 

venturesome. But, to some he was head-strong and lacking in prudence. 

He had worked his way up jn the Japanese Navy, was vice-minister in 

1939, but became the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet in 1941 

due to his familiarity with aircraft and carriers. He was a proponent of 

the attack on Pearl Harbor. The purpose was to sink or cripple large units 

so as to immobilize the Pacific Fleet while the Japanese invaded the Philippine Islands, the East Indies, and improved the defenses of the Mandates. 

Thus a perimeter could be drawn which would discourage the United 

States, British, and Dutch responses and would in due time destroy the 

American will to fight an enemy so far from home. 

Yamamoto proved an aggressive naval commander. He carried through 

the attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as the naval operations against other 

points in the South, proving to an unbelieving world that the Japanese were 

capable of more than one major offensive at the same time. Fortunately for 

the Allied Powe s, especially the United States, Yamamoto's plane was shot 

down in April 1943 while on a naval inspection trip to the Solomon Islands. 

In January 1941 Rear Admiral Onishi was appointed Chief of Staff of the 

Japanese Eleventh Air Fleet and ordered to make a study of the Pearl 

Harbor operation. In early September 1941 Admiral Nagano, Chief of 

General Staff, and selected members of the Combined Fleet and the First 

1 The Campaigns of the Pacific War, United States Strategic Bombiog Surve)', Naval 

Analysis Division, Washington, D.C, 1946, p_ 13_ Hereafter cited as Campaign!. 

83 
84 Pearl Harbor . 

Air Fleet commenced work on details of the actua l plan of attack. It was 

then that the attack on Pear! Harbor was played several times on the wa r 

game-board and each time it showed a successful attack with a maximllrn 

loss of about one-third of the Japanese force, including airplanes. 

By August 1941 or carlier aviators were trained to drop torpedoes from 

very low altitudes; the torpedoes were fitted with wooden fins or stabilizers 

to prevent diving. To defeat nets around capita l ships, the aviators were 

trained to use bombs from high-level planes and diving planes. Some of 

these bombs were made over from 14 or IS-inch armor-piercing shells in 

order to penetrate the armored decks or tu rret tops of battleships. 

The Japanese were fully awa re of the U.S. Fleet doctrine to get underway 

in case of attack and to pass out to sea through Pearl Ha rbor's narrow 

entrance channel. To take full advantage of this eventuality the Japanese 

stationed five fleet submarines near the entrance and had about thirteen 

more submarines on patrol duty in other areas bordering Hawaii. These 

submarines left Yokohama on 11 November 1941 and sa iled by different 

routes. 

Five of the large submarines carried midget submarines on their decks. 

ues l'RotL (Mom ' 13M 

Fleet Admiral iJorokll Yamamoto, lIN, Commander-ill_Chief Combined Fleet. 
Japanese Attack, Strategy, and Tactics 85 

The midgets were to enter Pearl Harbor if they could and fire torpedoes 

against the capital ships. The midget submarines had only two men aboard, 

carried only two small torpedoes, and were about seventy·nine feet long. 

After launching midget submarines from their decks not later than the 

evening of 6 December, the large submarines were to patrol around Ha· 

waiian waters to intercept enemy ships leaving Pearl Harbor. In no case 

were submarines to attack prior to the air attack. 

2. ASSEMBLING OF ArrACK FORCE 

The task force under command of Vice Admiral Nagumo, assembled at 

Hitokappu Bay on the island of Erotufu in the Aleutian Islands of Japan 

on 22 November 1941 , although some -of the vessels had come earlier. The 

assembling of ships was spread out as utmost secrecy was to be observed. 

The government knew of the proposed attack on the United States Fleet 

but this knowledge was withheld from all not directly connected with the 

project. The Emperor knew of the plan in general, but the attack was not 

to occur until after the message concluding negotiations with the Un ited 

States Government was delivered. 

Complete radio silence was practiced and some radio deception was 

engaged in. Careful planning of the route to Pearl Harbor was undertaken 

and the northern route was chosen despite anticipated bad weather for 

refueling in order to avoid meeting other ships and to make detection less 

likely. 

Prior to departure the aviators were deemed sufficiently trained, and 

refueling exercises had proved very successful. The task force sailed for 

Pear! Harbor on 2'5 November 1941 , United States time. 

3. ROUTE OF THE PEARL HARBOR ArrACK FORCE 

The Pearl Harbor attack force proceeded along the track shown on page 

89. The force operated under certain instructions which should be men· 

tioned. "X" Day 2 was selected as 7 December (U.S. time) because it 

was Sunday. A few days later would have been more desirable because of 

• "X" Day in military parlanc~ means the day of actual attack or opening of hostilitie!;. 
- - -

86 Pearl Harbor 

the darkness of the moon. The refueling was undertaken on 3 December 

(U.S. time) without mishap. 

No shipping was encountered, but if the attack force was discovered prior 

to "X- 2" day the force was to return to Japan without executing the attack. 

If discovered prior to "X-I " day the decision became the responsibility of 

the attack force commander, but jf discovered On "X- I" or "X" day the 

attack was to continue. If the Uni ted States Fleet interfered in any way it 

was to be attacked and sunk. 

On 1 December 1941, (U.S. time) the Japanese Naval General Staff 

approved the Pea'!" l Harbor attack. This was supplemented by the approval 

of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto. 

The orders issued are given below.! The times given are Japanese times 

which are one day later than United States times. 

::; November 1941 

From: The Chief of Naval General Staff' 

To: CinC Combined Fleet 

1. In view of the fact that it is feared war has become unavoidable with 

the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, and for the self· 

preservation and future existence of the Empire, the various preparations for 

war operations will be completed by the first part of De<:ember. 

2. The CinC of the Combined Fleet will efl e<: t the re'luired preparations 

for war operatio ns. 

3. Execution of details will be as directed by Chief of the Naval General 

Staff. 

7 November 1941 

From: CinC Combined Fleet 

To: First Air Fleet 

The Task Force, keeping its mOl'ement strictly s«ret, shall assemble in 

Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for refueling. 

Note: (Upon arrival at Hitokappu Bay all ships with a limited cruisi ng 

range were deck loaded with drums of fuel and oil was stowed in all avail· 

able spaces inside the ships.) 

2~ November 1941 

From : CinC Combined Fleet 

To: First Air Fleet 

(Pearl Harbor Attack Force) 

The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret and mainta ining d ose 

' Paraphu :;cd versions of the:;c orders may be found in Htar;"gf, Part 13, pr. 41)-4 17. 
Japanese Attack, 51raugy, and Tacl;o 81 

guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, 

and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the 

United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid 

is planned for the dawn of X-day (exact date to be given by later order). 

Upon completion of the air raid, the task force, keeping close coordination and guarding against the enemy·s counterattack, shall speedily lea\'e the 

enemy waters and then return to Japan. 

Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the task 

fo rce shall hold itseI{ in readiness fo rthwith to return and reassemble. 

25 November 194 1 

From: CinC Combined Fleet 

To: First Air Fleet 

( Pearl H arbor Attack Force) 

The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26th November and advance to 42 0 N. 

1700 E. on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete refueling. 

1 December 1941 


From: The Chief of Naval General Staff 


To: CinC Combined Fleet 


Japan under the necessity of her self-preservation, has reached a decision 

to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire, and the 

Netherlands. Time to sta rt action will be announced later. The CinC Combined Fleet shall, at the st"art of war direct an attack on the enemy Reet in 

the Hawaiian area and reduce it to impotency using the First Air Fleet as 

the nucleus of the attack force. 

Note: (The above despatch was issued by Admiral Nagano under authority 

delegated by Imperial Order. The commencement of hostilities was decided 

upon by Cabi net Counril on I December.) 

2 December 1941 


From: The Chief of Naval General Staff 


To : CinC Combined Fleet 


The hostile action against the United States of America, the British 

Empire, and the Netherlands shall be commenced on 8 December. Bear in 

mind that, should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations 

wiJ( reach an amicable sett lement prior to the ommencem nt of hostile 

action, ;1. 11 forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and 

return 10 thei r bases. 

Note that if the American government agreed to the Japanese demands 
88 Pearl Harbor 

the attack force would not attack but would return to their bases. The likelihood for this was remote indeed. Yet the Japanese diplomats were kept 

active in Washington as it was intended that they should not present the 

final note until one-half hour before the scheduled time of the Pearl Harbor 

attack. Actually they did not present it until after the attack, due to their 

own delay. 

Of cou rse the diplomatic efforts were not successful and as a result the 

Japanese attack force continued. It received the signal "Climb Mount 

Niitaka" on "X-I" day, which was the order to attack. The attack force 

arrived at its destination, 200 miles north of Oahu at 0730 on 7 December 

1941 (V.S. time). The fi rst air attack took off from the carriers at 0600, 

preceded by two float planes each from two heavy cruisers. These visited 

Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Roads and reported "all dear." 

The strategy of the Japanese was to immobilize the various air bases on 

the Hawa iia n island of Oahu so that fighter pl anes could not get into the 

air and offer opposition. 

4. THE ATTACK FORCE 

The attack force consisted of the following six aircra ft carriers: Akngi, 

Kngn, Soryu, ZlIiknkll, Hiryu, Shoknku. To these had been added a number 

of seasoned aviators from carriers not included in the attack force. 

The Screening Unit had the mission of furnishing cover. This unit was 

composed of one light cruiser and nine destroyers. The Support Force was 

composed of two battleshi ps and two heavy cruisers. 

The Patrol Unit was three "1 "-type submarines which preceded the attack 

force and patrolled the ship lanes. In addition there were eight tankers 

which returned to Japan following the refuel ing on 3 December. 

5. THE ATTACK 

The force launched 360 planes. The first wave of 189 planes took off at 

0600 under command of Commander Fuchida. The second wave of 171 

planes. under command of Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki, were scheduled to take off one hour and fifteen minutes later. Because these overl apped 

somewhat, and because the second wave was about fifteen minutes ahead of 
68 

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90 Pearl Harbor 

Admiral Chllichi NlIglltllO, lIN, Commandt,..;n-Chie! FirJ! Air fleel and Commande,' 

Pearl Harbor Striking Farct. 

schedule, United States observers at Pearl Harbor were unable to state 

accurately when one wave ended and another began. 

In addition to the 360 planes in the attacking wave, the carriers retained 

S4 type Zero fighters to take turns as combat air patroL The patrols 

alternated every two hours and continued from an hour before sunrise until 

forty-nve minutes after sunset. 

The first wave consisted of 50 horizontal bombers each carrying an 800 

kilogram (1760 pounds) armor-piercing bomb, 40 torpedo planes each 

ca rrying an BOO ki logram ~ ,aerial torpedo, and 54 dive-bombers each carrying a 250 kilogram land bomb as well as machine guns for strafing. In 

addidon 45 fighters were over these planes for air control and strafing 

attack as might be rquire-d. 

The targets of the huriwntal bombers, attacki ng from 10,000 feet, and 

the low flying torpedo planes were the battleships and carriers. The battle­

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ships were mostly secured in pairs. so that the inboa rd battleships could 

not be reached with torpedoes. Therefore the horizontal bombers intended 

to hit inboard battleships with enough large armor-piercing bombs to put 

them out of commission. It is well to remember that the ships were entirely 

stationary while the Japanese airplanes were operating in ideal visibility and 

wind conditions. 

The fi rst objective of the dive-bombers was the air bases at Ford Island 

and Wheeler Fi eld where the fighters were located. The air patrol was to 

strafe the air ba~s if the United States fighters failed to appear. They were 

also to attack the air bases at Ford Island, Hickam, \'(Iheeier, Ewa, Bellows. and Kaneohe with their 20 millimeter ~ and 7.7 millimeter machine 

guns. 

The second wave consisted of 54 horizontal bombers each carrying one 

• One millimeter ~ual5 1/1000 of a mner. One meter equ.1s ~9.n inc~. 
92 • Pearl Harbor 

250 kilogram bomb and six 60 kilogram bombs. In addition 36 fighters were 

overhead to meet Hawaiian based fighters or for strafing airfields with 

their 20 millimeter and 7.7 millimeter machine guns. The mission of the 

horizontal bombers was the various air bases, while the objectives of the 

dive-bombers were the major ships of the Pacific Fleet. 

The attack started at Wheeler and Ford Island at 0755, while the torpedo 

planes attacked the battleships at 0757. The grounded aircraft were attacked 

at 0800 and the horizonta l bombers got into action about 0805. It was 

estimated that although the 250 kilogram bombs would not pierce the 

armored decks of the battleships they would be effective against cruisers 

and carriers. But finding no carriers present, these 'bombs were directed 

against battleships. 

The Japanese torpedoes were especially effective. There were no torpedo 

nets spread for the protection of battleships, and each battleship was a 

stationary target which could hardly be missed by the forty torpedo planes 

flying 50-100 feet above the water. We were to learn that Japanese torpedoes were more lethal than American torpedoes; first, because they had ' 

been tested for explosive effect whereas American torpedoes had not been so 

tested on grounds of economy; secondly, because the Japanese used oxygen, 

which is highly explosive, instead of air for propulsion of torpedoes; and 

thirdly, because the torpedoes carried an explosive charge of over 1000 

pounds as compared to the America n charge of about 500 pounds. 

The question was asked why torpedo nets were not used by the flee t, 

and why captive ba lloons were not employed. The answers are very simple. 

Due to the restricted area, and the need for seaplane lanes for taking off 

and landing, torpedo nets could not be used. Balloon barrages were considered undesirable because they interfered with our own aircraft ove r the 

fleet. Probably, the best answer is that these items were not available in 

suffi cient quantity at that time. 

6. DIRECfrON OF ATTACK 

The illustration on page 93 gives the plan of attack, and indicates the 

reason local observers concluded that the planes came from a southerly 

direction. It will be noted that the first wave was to leave the northerly 

rendezvous at 0740 and the second wave at 0850. The torpedo bombe rs 
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94 Pearl Harbor 

were to approach the battleships from the port beam, which they did with 

disastrous results. 

Each aviator had a chart or map show ing the exact location of his target. 

Finding no aircraft carrier in Pearl Harbor, these fli ers used some of their 

ammunition on battleships and some on the old battleship Utah which 

had been converted to an aircraft target ship. She was presumably identified 

by some aviators as an aircraft carrier. 

7. SUBMARINES 

The damage caused by the submarines stationed at the entrance to Pearl 

Harbor was negligible. Of the five midget submarines all were eventually 

lost without inflicting any damage. No ship was damaged by torpedoes fired 

from the 'T'.type submarines on' patrol duty after launch ing their midget 

submarines. One ''1'' -type was lost on 10 December in an attack by Elltuprise planes. The fleet type submarines were on patrol duty in the Hawaiian 

area until early January, but caused no damage. Thereafter they were on the 

West Coast of the United States, accomplishing only minor results. 

8. JAPANESE LOSSES 

After completing its missiOn each Japanese aircraft was to return to its 

carrier. The losses reported from American sources were freguently duplicated and gave an inflated figure. Japanese admissions after the surrender 

presumably gave a true picture and were as follows: 

Aircraft in fi rst wave: 

Fighter Pl anes .... 3 

Dive-Bombers ............. ............................. .......... ................................. 1 

'Torpedo Bombers .. ...................................... ............. .............................. ;. 


Total .... ................... .................... .................................... 9 


Aircraft in second wave: 

Fighter Planes .... ...................... .................. .. .................. 6 

Dive-Bombers ................... .... ............................. .... ............_ 14 

Total ........ ............... .......................................................................................... 20 

Grand total of aircraft lost: 29 
/(lpaneU AI/ack, Strateg" and TactiC! 95 

e ll,," SR"'L (MOO) 381M 

/aptJlleJe midget submarine N o. 19 

The losses of the Japanese do not include planes lost or damaged when 

returning to the carriers. 

Submarines lost: 


Fleet type "I" 1 


Midget type 5 


Total 6' 


The airplanes returned to their carriers immediately after rendezvousing 

with their fighters at a point about 20 miles bearing 340 0 from Kaena 

Point. The aircraft carriers were underway for Japan at that time. There 

was no rearming of airplanes for renewed attacks on Pearl Harbor. Admiral 

Nagumo felt that the mission was completed and he was intent on getting 

clea r of the area as quickly as possible as had been ordered. He was some· 

what afraid of an attack by American carrier planes whose whereabouts 

I Campaign r, pp. 18 and 19. 
96 Pearl Harbor 

were unknown, and from land based pursuit planes of. the Army at Pearl 

Harbor. Nagumo assumed that as many as fifty of these were operable 

after the attack. 

He had one mission yet to perform. On his return voyage to Japan he 

detached two aircraft carriers, two heavy cruisers, and two destroyers for 

an attack on Wake Island. 

9. JAPANESE ESTIMATES OF DAMAGE 

TO THE AMERICANS 

From pilot reports and photographs taken from attack planes of the second 

wave the Japanese estimate was: 

Ships damaged or sunk: 

Sunk-4 battleships, 1 cruiser, 2 tankers 

Heavily damaged---4 battleships 

Lightly damaged-l battleship 

Aircraft shot down or damaged: 

Shot down-lO 

Destroyed on the ground- 250 i 

7 Ibid., p. 19. 

-

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slIns;;)lI JO ;;)S;;)utdtf ;;)s~ldms 

1!lldVH::> IIA 
• 

CHAPTER VII 


Results of Japanese Surprise 


Air Raid 


1. SUNDAY WAS A DAY OF REST IN HAWAII 


IN PEACETIME 


Sunday, 7 December 1941 was a typical day of rest in Hawaii. The weather 

was perfect with some cloud cover overhead. The people were taking it easy 

as was their custom on Sundays. The military was sleeping in or eating 

breakfast a bit late since this was a day of relaxation and rest. The 

accounts of battleship survivors, which are included later in this work, give 

the state of mind general among the military as well as among alJ Hawaiian 

residents. 

Although Admiral Kimmel in his Fleet Order warned of a surprise air 

raid on Pearl Harbor as a possibility, few thought "it could happen here," 

Most people felt the Japanese would not attack without a declaration of 

hostile intent. The fact that they had attacked China in 1895 and Russia 

in 1905 without a declaration of waf was considered not applicable to 

modern Japan. The military personnel, however, were not sure of Japan's 

code of honor in this regard, and made preparations accordingly. Yet, in 

the various hearings no American military man excused the air raid on the 

ground that Japan had vio lated her solemn agreement to the Hague 

Convention. 

There was little real reconnaissance on 7 December. There was none to 

the north, whicli proved to be the vulnerable direction. It was taken for 

granted that if the Japanese attacked, the attack would be from a southerly 

direction, where the Mandated Islands were. But, the trade winds were 

northerly and would be helpful to the Japanese in carrying a bomb load 

over 200 miles of water. 

99 
100 Pearl Harbor 

/ apaneJe plann over Ford f jJand. 

2. SUBMARINES 

The first indication of hostile action by Japan was a submarine periscope 

sighted at 0350 by the minesweeper Condor. The destroyer Wa rd, which 

was on patrol duty at the Pearl Harbor entrance, was notified and opened 

fire and dropped depth charges. Also a PBY seaplane dropped depth 

charges which showed a noticeable oil slick afte r the explosions. It was 

assumed that the subma rine was sunk in about 1,200 feet of water. 

A message was sent at 0654 which was delivered to the Duty Officer of 

the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet at 07 15. After requesting confirmation Patrol Wing TWO verifi ed the report at 0732. But a second 

confirmation of this unbelievable circumstance was requested. Before verificati on was received the attack on Ford Island dispelled all doubt. 

3. WE ARE AT WAR 

At 0755 the N avy Yard signal tower telephoned to the Commander-inChief at his quarters, "Enemy air raid- not drill." At about the same time 

the Commander Patrol Wing TWO broadcasted from Ford Isl and the warn­
ReJultJ of JapaneJe SurpriJe Air Raid 101 

ing: "Air Raid, Pearl Harbor- This is Not a Drill." Within a few minutes 

an identical message came from the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific 

Fleet. 

Fleet doctrine required all ships to get underway as soon as possible but 

some were not able to overcome the damage which the Japanese attack 

wrought. As it turned out, it was better that ships stayed moored because 

there was some fear that the planes had dropped mines in the entrance 

channel; and let us not forget that enemy submarines awaited the ships in · 

the various sea lanes. Most destroyers and a few cruisers did get underway 

and joined forces to find and confront the Japanese Fleet, but these searched 

southward instead of northward. Perhaps it was best that they were unable 

to contact the Japanese forces, for these forces were much superior and 

had plenty of air power. Sunk at sea, they would have been lost beyond 

recall-though they would have been far tougher targets. 

4. ALL AIR BASES IMMOBILIZED 

True to the Japanese plan all air bases were first put out of commission so 

that air interference with Japanese attacks on the ships of the fleet was 

minimaL Ford Island was attacked at 0755 and all fighting planes were 

effectively disposed of prior to torpedo attacks on ships which occurred 

at 0757. Likewise Ewa, Hickam, Wheeler, Bellows, and Kaneohe were 

subjected to dive-bomber attacks and machine gun strafing. The Army field 

at Haleiwa was not attacked because the Japanese knew it had only a few 

reserve training planes. 

The Army was on sabotage alert only, and therefore its planes were 

grouped together with ten feet or less from wing-tip to wing-tip. Only 

machine gun ammunition was available to Army personnel until well into 

the morning. This fact plus the sabotage philosophy resulted in a perfect 

target for the Japanese dive-bombers and machine gun strafers. 

The score board shows that the attackers put all of the air bases virtually 

out of commission for several hours. The figures given before the Joint 

Congressional Investigating Committee on 15 November 1945 are as 

follows: 

Ford Island-33 out of 70 totally destroyed or damaged. 

Ewa- 33 out of 49 totally destroyed. 
102 Pearl Harbor 

16 out of the remainder were too damaged to fly. (3 were on 

patrol. ) 

Hickam-IS out of 30 combat planes totally destroyed. 

Wheeler-42 out of 83 combat planes totally destroyed. 

BeJlows-3 out of 12 combat planes tota lly destroyed. 

Kaneohe-26 out of 35 seaplanes totally destroyed. 

6 were severely damaged. (3 were on patrol.) ! 

The true story is that the Japanese put out of commission the half dozen 

potent air bases in, Hawaii. Although the Army Air Force and Naval Air 

acted heroically when the true nature of the attack was comprehended by 

the personnel, the fact remains that only a token air force was able to resist 

the Japanese or follow them to their carriers. 

5. SHIPS ATTACKED BY TORPEDO PLANES 

Within a very short time after Ford Island and Hickam were struck, the 

moored ships were attacked by torpedo planes. The forty planes came in 

Wru kage al Naval Air Sra,ion, Ford Island, with ships burning in badground, 7 


December 1941. 


'H~"r ss, Part I, pp. , ... and " . 
ReIult; of lapaneu Surprise Air Rflid 103 

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.: ]il\lI~ ~ \lillllill\~IW ., " =:\Ul lk .. ,hUnl-._. '''' &1l-O-32n7 

Plane! and hangar! wrecked during the lapal/eJe attack (ni Naval Air Station, Ford 


liland. 


groups in the early stages of the assault and their targets being stationary, 

the accuracy of fire was lethal. The torpedoes were let go 50-100 feet 

above the water only a few hundred yards short of the ships. There were 

four groups of torpedo bombers in all, the first one on the port beams of 

the ships. The following ships were hit: California, W est Virginia, Okla· 

homa, Arizona: The second group also attacked the port sides, The third 

was from the west and was directed against ships tied up at the Navy Yard 

dock. It was then that Helena was hit by a torpedo after it had passed 

under Oglala. The force of the explosion opened a hole in the old mine· 

layer Oglala which eventually caused her to capsize. The fourth group 

came from the northwest and was successful in putting at least two tor· 


pedoes in Utah and one in Rflleigh, The old battleship Utah was rigged - _ 


as an aerial target ship and resembled an aircraft carrier; she capsized to 

port at OSt3. It is interesting to note that Utah and Raleigh occupied berths 

usually assigned to aircraft carriers, The forty torpedo planes presumably 

fired forty torpedoes, of which about half found their mark. 

A few of the Japanese torpedoes were recovered from the mudbanks in 

which they ended their runs. All of them were fitted with wooden fins to 

prevent diving, and they were modified to explode after a very short run: 

These were new features to the Americans as it had been believed a depth 
104 Pearl Harhor 

of at least seventy-five feet was necessary for modern torpedoes, and a run 

of several hundred yards was required prior to explosion. 

6. INBOARD SHIPS HIT BY HIGH·LEVEL BOMBERS 

The inboard ships could not be reached by torpedoes, for which reason 

the Japanese endeavored to immobilize them by armor-piercing projectiles 

dropped from a height of about 10,000 feet. The following, ships were hit 

~y 14 or 15-inch projectiles or later by smaller bombs: Pennsylvania, 

Nevada, Arizona, California, Wesl Virginia, Maryland, TenneJ"Jee, Honolulu, Vestal, Shaw, Floating Dry Dock Number Two, and Curliu. CaHin 

and DoumeJ were in Dry Dock Number One ahead of Pennsylvania and 

Japaneu pltlfuJ attacking Pearl Harbor. 
ReJul1J of /apaneu SlIrpriu Air Raid 105 

were hit by diving planes using the smaller bombs. The extent of the 

damage caused is covered in a later chapter. 

7. LOSSES IN HONOLULU 

Honolulu did not escape. Several people were killed on the streets of the 

city or elsewhere, and several buildings were destroyed, including a Japanese language school. Whether all losses resulted from bombs being jettisoned by planes before their return to their carriers or whether some were 

5-inch shells fired by fleet ships at Japanese planes is not clear and proba. 

bly never will be solved. 

A number of private planes, out for flying in balmy Hawaiian skies, 

were shot down by the Japanese in the early stages of the attack. Such 

planes were entirely inoffensive and the slaughter of their occupants was 

wanton murder in the first degree. 

8. OFFICERS AND MEN ABOARD SHIP AND FIT FOR DUTY 

Some mainland newspapers published stories of a dearth of manpower at 

air bases and on boa rd ship on Sunday morning, or unfitness for duty on 

account of drunkenness. The Roberts Commission had as witnesses the 

President of the Temperance League of Hawaii and its Executive Secretary. 

Both. of them admitted that the letter signed by them to the people of 

America was exaggerated and slanderous. Although there were about 11,000 

soldiers and sailors in Honolulu on the night of 6 December, that fig ure 

represents only about ten percent of the total milita ry force, and onl y a few 

were drunk or disorderly. In fact the police records indicate that more 

civilians were arrested for drunkenness on the night of 6 December than 

were military. It should also be noted that leave or liberty ex pi red at 

midnight, and the military personnel who imbibed beer at the various service 

dubs could not obtain beer after midnight on 6 December. No liquor was 

served on military ships. 

Officers and selected enlisted men whose families lived at the, time in 

Honolulu were- granted weekend leave over 7 December. Yet the figures 

were kept within the limits set by the fleet order. The hearings of the Can· 
106 	 Pearl Harbor 

gressional Committee show that the actual number of men on board and 

available for duty at 0800 on 7 December were: 

Admirals .. .................... .........._............"............. .............. 5 or more 

Commanding offi cers of battleships ........ ,.... " ........................ 5 out of 8 

Commanding offi cers of cruisers .... . .........."..".... " " ....... 6 out of 7 

Commandi ng offi cers of destroyers .................... . ..... " ............. 63 ~h 

Damage.control officers of battleships ............ ....".. ,. 6 out of 8 

Average percentage of offi cers: 

Battleships (approximate) .......................... " .. " .............................. 60-7070 


Cruisers, battle force (approx imate) .... ........... 659'0 

Destroye rs, battle force ( approximate ) ....... 50% 

Average percentage of men : 

Battleships ... .................... 	 . ............... _..... 951f'o 


Cruisers, battle force ..................... _.. .. ..................................... 98% 


Destroyers, battle force. ..................................... 85 1f'o 2 

The Army exceeded these figures somewhat because the Army had quarters 

available at the duty sites for offi cers and enlisted men. 

9. 	ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES WHICH OPPOSED 

THE JAPANESE PLANES 

As has been seen the fleet order rC<:Juired that about one-fourth of the antiaircraft batteries be man ned, with ammunition near at hand. The batteries 

selected were in various sectors, with range fi nders and directors appropriate 

to those sectors. The 50 caliber machi ne guns were furnished with 300 

roun ds of ammunition, and the two 5-inch guns with 15 rounds each in 

ready service boxes. Additional ammunition was furnished from magazines 

by personnel regularly assigned to that task and by volunteers. The number 

of shots fi red by various guns was given at the Congressional Investigation 

as follows: 

Rounds of machine gun ammunition .................... 27 5,807 


3 /{0 --7 Rounds of~ h 50 caliber .......................................... . 1,74 1 


Rounds of 5-inch 25 ca liber 	 1,) 23 

Rounds of 5-inch 38 caliber . . . .................. ................................... . 1,665' 


' Ibid. , p. 49. 

' Ibid., p. n. 
Results of japal1eJe Surprise Air Raid 107 

• 


, , , , • 

• .' 

81)-0 _32702 

Heavy barrage of tJnti-tJircrtJfl fire which the JapmJtJe p/tJ1/tJ encollllfered. 

The machine guns got into action promptly while the '-inch guns were 

firi ng within four minutes. The destroyers had all anti -aircraft batteries firing 

in about seven minutes although the machine guns opened fire immediately. 

As will be seen from survivors' reports printed la ter, general quarters was 

sounded on practically all ships promptly. The effectiveness of the Navy 

fire is evidenced by the fact that five of the torpedo planes which began the 

attack on the large units of the fleet were shot down. 

Mention should be made of the midget submarine which ga ined entrance 

to Pearl Harbo r. At 08 35 on 7 December C"r/iss sighted a periscope and 

immediately opened fi re. The submarine surfaced and fi red one torpedo 

toward the nested destroyers. Cur/iss hit the conning tower twice as Monaghan dropped depth cha rges. There was never any doubt that the submarine 

was sunk. It is shown on page 169 as finally recovered severa l weeks later. 

As for the Army, only a limited amount of ammunition was at hand, 

although machine gun ammunition was availabl e on some of the Army 

planes. None of the 3·inch mobile batteries were emplaced. There was not 

at the time any anti-aircraft batteries around airfie lds or around the Navy 

compound. 
lOS Pearl Harbor 

10. DEEDS OF HEROISM 


Deeds of heroism in both the Army and Navy were common and in keeping 

with the highest traditions of the services. The Army awarded five Distinguished Service Crosses and sixty-fi ve Silver Stars; the Navy recommended 

fifteen Medals of Honor and awarded sixty Navy Crosses. 

11. TOTAL DEAD AND WOUNDED IN THE SERVICES 

The Army list given at the Congressional Investigating Committee was 

as follows: 

Killed in action or fatally wounded ................................................. 215 


Wounded in action ................... .............................."..... . 360 


Missing in action ............"..... ............................. 22 

The Navy was as follows : 

Killed in action or fatally wounded ................._. 2,036 

Wounded in action .......,...............~.. . ...................... 759 

Total killed or fata lly wounded ...................... ................................ 2,251 


Tota l wounded in action ............. ............................................. ............................... . 1,119 


12. SABOTAGE 

Let it be recorded that there was no sabotage or insurrection in Honolulu 

or anywhere in Hawaii. It is true that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

immediately took into custody suspected enemy agents, including ~70 

Japanese, 98 Germans, and 14 Italians. 

Contrary to the stories printed in some mainland papers there was no 

organized glutting of roads to Pearl Harbor. In the early stages of the 

attack no one had any trouble driving from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor 

although such roads became crowded in due course. 

Here it should be mentioned that staff officers and others received tele· 

phone calls at Honolulu '" to return to the ship immediately; we are under 

enemy air attack." Commercial radio assisted in th is. All complied promptly, 

although the great majority thought it was a Sunday drill, and th at the 

"boom boom" which they heard (a customary sound on weekdays) was 

intended to add realism to the drill. 'Even when entering the Navy Yard on 
ReJultJ of JapaneJe SurpriJe Air Raid 109 

the way to the boat dock most officers were unbelieving until seeing the 

wreckage and the burning oil on the waters, and the bottom of Oklahoma 

in the distance. 

The prevalent story of poisoned drinking water was pure fabrication, as 

was also the story of cutting direction markers in sugar cane fields to indicate the course to Pearl Harbor. Many similar stories were ill-founded. 

Martial 'law was promptly put into force in Honolulu. All except those 

with military business were off the streets at nine o'clock in the evening. 

Strict black-out was practiced at night. All women and children except 

those women holding government jobs were evacuated as soon as ships were 

available. 

13. STATE OF MIND OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 

There was now no doubt that the Japanese had scored a great victory. Most 

of the air bases were a shambles and a large pa rt of the fleet was immobilized. The damage -done .seemed great indeed, and spirits were at a low 

ebb. On 10 December came the news that Prince of WaleJ and Repulse 

had been sunk near Singapore. Two days earlier the air bases in the 

Philippine Islands were successfully attacked. It did not seem possible at 

the time that the Japanese could be so victorious. 

What if another air raid was made on the fleet and its reserve oil supply 

or its repair base at the Navy Yard----or a landing force of the Japanese 

hit the beaches? Families in Honolulu were indeed in jeopardy and many 

took to the hills to escape the danger that seemed to threaten. 

For several months the Army was unable to guarantee that the islands 

of the Hawaiian group were safe against successful Japanese landing attack. 

This included Midway, from which land-based airplanes could operate. 

Therefore the Navy was forced to consider Pearl Harbor as a base with 

limited capabilities. With the possibility of Japanese land-based planes near 

at hand it was decided that Pearl Harbor should be used by the fleet as 

little as possible, that task forces should stay at sea a maximu~ of time, that 

rest and relaxation were things that had to take second place in wartime. 
t 


f 

f

r 

• 

"-'--~-- -----_. -­
CHAPTER VIII 


Washington's Response to the 


Japanese Attack 


CHAPTER VIII 


Washington's Response to the 


Japanese Attack 


1. MILITARY AND CIVILIANS TAKEN BY SURPRISE 

When President Roosevelt read the intercepted "purple" messages just prior 

to Pearl Harbor he remarked : "This means war," He did not foresee a 

Japanese attack on the Pacific Fleet but he knew that the Government of 

Japan would rather go to war against the United States, Great Britain, and 

the Netherlands than give up their alliance with Germany and Italy, or 

recede from their depredations in China. By now it was easy to anticipate 

that eventuall y we would have to go to the assistance. of Great Britain 

against Hitler if freedom was to prevail, but it was hoped that peace in 

the Pacific wou ld continue until the Atlantic peril was satisfactorily met. 

Thus was war thrust upon us, and hi ndsight proves that the attack on 

Pearl Harbor, despite its losses. brought the blessings of a nation un ified in 

spirit and purpose and was for us the easiest way to open hostilities with 

Japan and the Axis Powers. If the United States had not been attacked, the 

alternatives were a naval attack on the Mandated Islands or a naval excursion into southern Asia. Either would have been hazardous and the milita ry 

recoiled from the necessity of fighting a long war against such odds with 

a divided public opinion at home. 

The losses at Pea rl Harbor seemed staggering at the time. W ashi ngton 

was as surprised as the personnel at Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had 

decided somewhat inscrutably to attack the Pacifi c Fleet. Four years of 

bloody warfare lay ahead and victory over the fanatical "Sons of Heaven" 

seemed assured,-at least eventually. The attack on Pearl Harbor proved 

that the impossible was possible after ap. 

113 
114 Pearl Harbor 

...,­

USS Arizona burning afler the magazine explolion. The'Jhip forward;1 USS Tennessee 

which ;1 plaing water over the stern 10 keep oil fireI from Arizona at a diJlanu, 

uss W est Virginia;J on the far left. 

2. DECLARATION OF WAR 

The President lost no time in taking official action against Japan. On 8 

December 1941 the President told Congress: "Yesterday, December 7. 1941 

- a date which will live in infamy-the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attqcked by naval and air forces of the Empire 

of Japan." Congress then declared war on Japan. One vote was cast against 

the measure by a Congresswoman from Montana. Agreeable to their alliance 

with Japan, Germany and Ita ly declared war on the United States four days 

later. So the United States was at war not only with Japan but with the 

front-runners of the European War, Germany and Italy. 

3. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY VISITS PEARL HARBOR 

Almost immediately the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, set out for 

Pearl Harbor to see at first hand what damage the Japanese had wrought. 

He remained until Friday the 12th. On his return he had a conference with 

the President, and held a news conference on the following Monday, D 

December 1941. He lauded the heroic action of the fleet in resisting the 
Washington's ReJpome fo the Japanese Attack 115 

enemy, and gave a number of instances of fearless and intrepid action. 

Secretary Knox admitted that the attack was a surprise to all concerned. 

Before leaving Washington for Pearl Harbor he sent a message to all Naval 

ships and stations. It is quoted because it is so appropriate for all times: 

The enemy has struck a savage, treacherous blow. \X'e are at war, all of 

us! There is no lime now for dispu tes or delay of any kind. \Ve must have 

ships and more ships, guns and more guns, men and more men- faster and 

faster. There is no time to lose. The Navy must lead the way. Speed upit is your Navy and your Nation! 

Frank Knox 

Secretary of the Navy 

Although the Japanese took pichues of the damage they had caused, 

and these pictures were published abroad, Japan was relatively uninformed 

of the full extent of the damage. As is customary in warfare, the enemy 

was not told more than he already knows. For that reason Secretary Knox 

minimized the damage. At that time the fleet in Pearl Harbor felt that 

the Secretary's report was less than half the truth,-but time proved that 

his estimates were excessive and that the full extent of the damage was less 

than at first visualized. This proves the adage that people are prone to see 

the worst or pessimistic sides of a situation rather than the best or optimistic aspects. 

4. THE ROBERTS COMMISSION 

Official Washington lost no time in appointing' a Commission to investigate 

Pearl Harbor. This was headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of the 

United States Supreme Court, a Republican. Three of the members were 

retired office rs of the Army and the Navy while one member was on active 

duty with the Army Air Corps. 

The Com mission met as early as 18 December 1941 in the Munitions 

Building at Washington. After.gctting statements from the top offi cers of 

the Army and Navy it went to Hawaii where it viewed the wreckage and 

held hearings at Fort Shafter, at the Submarine Ba se, and at the Royal 

Hawai ian Hotel. The Commission received sworn testimony until 10 January 1942. After that it returned to Washington where it received sworn 

testimony from various Army and Navy officers from 19 January 1942 to 

23 January 1942 when the Commission's report was made to the President. 

The report to the President disposed of a number of wild rumors, and 
116 Pearl Harbor 

included a number of basic facts about the Hawaiian Command. Washington knew the possibility of air raids, and so did H awaii, but both considered such a circumstance remote. Both were of the firm opinion that 

collision courses in national interests would result in eventual warfare. but 

neither considered Japan so desperate or foolhardy as to attack Pearl Ha rbor. 

The Roberts Commission went on record with the following summary 

and recommendations, among others: "Army preparations were primarily 

based on fear of sabotage while the Navy's were based on fear of submarine 

attack.. . The first surprise attack .' caught them completely unprepared. It was abput fom minutes before the first anti-aircraft fire by the 

N avy began, and as the Army aircraft batteries were not manned nor their 

mobile units in position it was some time before their anti-aircraft fire 

became effective .... The final results ... left the Army airfields and the 

Naval station very badly damaged and resulted in the practical immobilization of the majority of the Navy's battle fleet in the Pacific for months to 

come, the loss of 75 percent of the Army's air forces on the Islands, and 

the loss of an even larger percentage of the Navy's air force on Oahu .... 

The loss of life and the number of wounded in this attack is a shocking 

result of unpreparedness." 

The Commission concluded: "This attack has emphasized the completeness of the Nava l and Military information in the heads of the Japanese, 

the meticulous detail of their pl ans of attack, and their courage, ability 

and resourcefulness in executing and pressing home their operation. It 

should serve as a mighty incentive to our defense forces to spare no effort 

to achieve a 6nal victory," 

5. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S FIRESIDE CHAT 

On 23 February 1942 the President gave a fireside chat to the nation entitled 

"We Must Keep on Striking our Enemies Wherever and Whenever We 

Can Meet Them," This was delivered on the day after Washington's 

Birthday, and the President drew a parallel between Valley Forge of 

colonial days and the odds wh ich faced the American people of the present. 

He discounted wild rumors and called attention to the relatively moderate 

losses which we suffered at Pearl Harbor. Although we had been compelled 

to yield ground to the enemy he said, "we will regain it. So spoke Americans 

in 1776, and so speak Americans today!" 
Washington's Response to the Japanese Attack 117 

6. ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT RELIEVED 

The President did not wait for the Roberts report before taking action with 

regard to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter 

Short. It was traditional in the services that they should be relieved. Their 

commands had suffered a tragedy, one which was greatly exaggerated in 

the mind of the public, but nevertheless one which seemed sizable at 

the time. There was no air reconnaissance to the north on that fateful 

Sunday. They left their posts with the good wishes of their subordinates. 

Admiral Kimmel was affectionately regarded in the Reet as an officer of 

ungualified loyalty and efficiency. His going was deeply regretted, but the 

nature of things required that he be relieved. Had he remained as Commander-in-Chief he would undoubtedly have proven himself one of the 

Navy's greatest heroes of all time. 

The poisonous rumors that gained credence is illustrated by letters which 

Mrs. Kimmel received following his departure. The first was from a woman 

who deprecated the fact that two pregnant women were required to get off 

the clipper plane to the mainland (planes were very infrequent in those 

days) to make room for her and her belongings. The nephew of the woman 

asserted that demands upon the plane's personnel deprived other passengers 

of the attention which was due them. In the other letter the woman writer 

said that she had it on good authority that Mrs. Kimmel and Mrs. Short 

were never invited to the same party because of their conflicting tempera· 

ments. To both of these letters Mrs. Kimmel replied that she had never been 

on a clipper plane and had never been in Hawaii! Too bad that other illfounded rumors and gossip could not be scotched so easily at the time! 

Vice Admiral William S. Pye relieved Admiral Kimmel on 17 December 

1941 as temporary Commander of the Fleet. He was I)umber two in the 

fleet echelon of command and assumed the job as additional duty until a 

regular relief arrived. Admiral Pye was hard put to decide whether to take 

action in relieving Wake Island. He had two task forces near enough to 

the island to subject the Japanese forces to an aircraft carrier raid. But to 

do so rC<Juired him to risk the loss of a carrier, which at that stage he 

could ill afford. Hindsight proves that action even against the land-based 

planes of the Japanese from the Marshall Islands only about 500 miles 

away would have been successful. But Wake is nearer to Japan than Hawaii, 

and holding it would have been impossible without changing the whole 

complexion of the war which lay ahead. The relief of Wake would have 
118 Pearl Harb or 

prevented the capture of military and some 650 civilian personnel which 

the Japanese took into custody. There were a number of other conside rations involved, including the state of the wea ther, the shortage of fleet 

oi lers, and the lack of loading and unload ing facilities at Wake. As it 

appea rs now, Admiral Pye acted wisely, about 22 December 1941 , in sacrifi cing the man power on Wake without risking the loss or crippling of onc 

or more aircraft ca rriers. 

7. ADMIRAL C. W. NIMITZ TAKES COMMAND 

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz , formerly Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 

took command on 31 December 194 1. He was a fortunate choice for the 

position. Although he was unknown to the public at that time, his appointment restored public confidence in the abilities of the Un ited States Navy. 

NR.t.L (MOD I 21111_.11 

Admiral Cherie,· lf7. Nimitz auuI1Je! dfllieJ dJ Coml1ldnder-il1-Chief Parifir Flul, 

31 Dutmb,,· 1941, on boal·d USS Grayling at Pearl Harbor. 
Washingtoll's Respome Jo Jhe Japanese Attack 119 

He not only got along with all elements of a unified command but proved 

a strong commander in his quiet sort of way. He was destined to remain in 

command throughout the war and to be promoted in due course to Fleet 

Admi ral. 

Fleet Admiral Nimitz was a plain man who had no use in wartime for 

furbelows and ruffles. He was non-argumentative, but used his common 

sense to arrive at decisions which had to be made. He was a good listener, 

but used his own judgment in making decisions. He re was a man who in due 

time gained the confidence of all by the sheer demonstration of abi lity and 

good wi ll. 

Although originally a pessimist in salvage operations, his inte rest is well 

illustrated by the fact that for six months he required the Sa lvage Officer to 

see him at an appointed time once a week to talk over the progress of the 

work . Whenever significant salvage operations occurred, such as the entry 

into dry dock of a ship that once rested on the bottom of Pearl Harbor, he 

and others in high command were always present to show their interest 

and to add their prestige to the work. 

8. ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING BECOMES 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE U.S. FLEET 

In order to coordinate the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, the Commander of 

the Atlantic Fleet was, on 30 December 1941, assigned as the Commanderin-Chief of the United States Fleet. He became the over-all Commander-inChief of the Navy under the genera l direction of the Secretary of the Navy 

and the President of the United States. Admiral King later became the 

Chief of Naval Operations as additional duty, when he relieved Admiral 

Harold R. Stark as the Chief of Naval Operations in March 1942, and 

eventually was promoted to Fleet Admiral. For the rest of the war Admiral 

King wore both hats. 

Admiral King sent the following message to the Navy shortly after taking 

the oath as "Cominch :" 

The: way to victory is long 


The going will be hard 


We: will do the best we can with what we've got 


We: must have more planes and ships at once 


Then it will be our turn to strike 


We will win through in time. 

120 Pearl Harbor 

He and Admiral Nimitz made a strong team which operated harmoniously throughout the war. To them island hopping was not new or novel 

because in their naval warfare they had many islands to contend with and 

many isl ands to conguer. These two officers were a portent to our enemies, 

especially to Japan, that no effort would be spared to bring ultimate unconditiona l victory. 

9. ADMIRAL NIMITZ'S POLICY OF 

A "LIMITED OFFENSIVE" 

Since the days of John Paul J?nes the Navy had pursued the policy of using 

the offensive as the best defense. Nimitz was hard put to find means in the 

Pacific Fleet to take the offensive without undue risk. Obviously we were 

fa r inferior to the Japanese. and undue risk was out of the question until 

the industrial ma rvel of American production permitted the fleet to sail for 

Japan's strongholds. Nimitz was under g reat pressure from Washington, to 

take the offensive aga inst j apan's Navy. He refused to move until he had 

sufficient time to size up the situation wh ich confronted him. Then, about 

the first of February he solved this ridd le by the adoption of the "Limited 

Offensive" policy in directing fleet operations. This policy was inaugurated 

for the purpose of restoring morale in the Pacific Fleet, of holding the line 

against any furthe r expansion of Japanese power in the Pacific, of staging 

raids against the Pacific enemy, of diverting Japanese strength away from 

the East Indies if possible, and of safeguarding communications to Hawaii, 

Midway, and Australia. 

10. HALSEY'S EARLY RAIDS 

Admiral Nimitz used the intrepid Vice Admiral William F. Halsey to carry 

out his policy. On 1 February 1942 Halsey bombed the Ma rshaUs with the 

Enterprise force while Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher with the Y orkt OWII force bombed the Gilberts. On his way home Halsey struck Wake 

and Marcus, the latter only about 600 miles from Japan. Then Fletcher 

joined Vice Admiral Wilson Brown's Lexington force which bombed Lae 

and the Solomons as well as the northern coast of New Guinea. The military effect of these raids was not consequential but they proved to the 
Washington's Respome to the /a paneJe Attdck 121 

Japanese that American forces were on the loose and had to be reckoned 

with. They proved that aircraft carriers were capable of air raids even when 

the enemy was fully alert. 

As early as mid-April 1942, the Halsey-Doolittle team bombed Tokyo 

and other Japanese cities. This was accomplished with sixteen medium range 

8-25's launched from the deck of Hom el, commanded by Captain Marc 

Mitscher. The carrier Enterprise carried Admiral Halsey in command of the 

expedition which besides the two carriers was composed of the cruisers 

Nashville and Vincennes, four destroyers, and one oiler. Enterprise main· 

ta ined air patrol over and in advance of the task force. 

The air raid was origina lly conceived by Captain F. S. Low and Captain 

Donald Duncan of the Staff of Admiral King in Washington. They with the 

cooperation of General "Hap" Arnold, who was head of the Army Air 

Corps, modified the Army B-25's for their mission. 

The raid had to take off from a distance of about 650 miles to avoid 

detection by one of the many Japanese patrol vessels. All of the Ameri· 

' 

Lieutenant General l ameJ H. Dooliltle, USA, alld Admiral Mar( A. Mit!cher, USN, 

on board USS Hornet. 

till< NR/tL (MOm 
122 Pearl Harbor 

can pilots landed in China or Russia or in waters near China; the few who 

were captured by the Japanese in China were imprisoned or put to death. 

Nevertheless, the raid was successful and served notice on the Japanese as 

early as April 1942 that even Tokyo was not exempt from American sea 

and air power. 

The President referred to the Halsey-Doolittle air raid as having originated from "Shangri-la." This was released for the benefit of the American 

public, but primarily for the confusion of the enemy_ 
;)pq;~ AS: SlOA!AlnS 

SUOPEAl;)SqO 
 PUE SlU;)UPlElS 

lIlldVH::J XI 
r 
CHAPTER IX 

Observations and Statements 


Made By Survivors 


1. CONDITION OF SHIPS AT 0755 

On 7 December 1941 , all major combatant ships at Pearl Harbor were in 

condition "X" with two machine guns manned and two S-inch anti-aircraft 

guns with ready ammunition and crews near at hand. After the attack 

began, the ships assumed condition " Y " or "Z" as rapidly as possible. The 

battleships had been in port for several days and had been refueled. Most 

of the ships were ninety-five percent full of fuel oil. The degree of closure 

of water-tight doors and hatches is determined by the conditions named. 

Condition "X" is the minimum safety condition, while condition "Z" is 

,the battle closure condition. Condition "Y" is between the two. These are 

usually designated by their alphabetical names, that is "X-ray," "Yoke," 

and "Zed." 

The survivors from the battleships sunk at their berths and the many 

ships round about furnish ample evidence as to the nature of the various 

attacks. In summary, many of the battleship surviVOrs considered that a 

"fire and rescue party:' was required because of a disaster at Ford Island 

before the true nature of events was ascertained. Among the crews, many 

wondered why a drill was taking place on a Sunday morning. 

The cruisers, destroyers, and service vessels some distance away saw the 

enemy planes earlier and witnessed the torpedo plane attack on the battleships. The impressions held by the various personnel, as well as the actions 

they took, can best be determined from excerpts of these statements, which 

are taken from official reports of the engagement. These statements are given 

here to refute the many irresponsible statements which have been made 

rega rd ing the behavior of Navy men at Pearl Harbor. The survivors' state· 

ments are known to only a few and have not therefore been referred to 

genera ll y. Some are reproduced here to present a true picture of these 

important events. 

l2l 
\26 Pearl H arbor 

A erial tJ;~ w of Battleship Row. From left 10 right: Arizona, Tennessee (inboard ) alld 

W est Virginia, Maryland alld O klahoma (capsized). 

2. IMPRESSIONS AND ACfIONS ON U.s.S. WEST VIRGINIA 

Lieutenant C. v , Ricketts wrote as follows: 

At about 0755 on 7 December, 1941 , I was sitting at breakfast table in 

the wardroom when assembly was sounded and the fire and rCKue party 

called away. Almost immediately thereaft er, as I was leaving the wardroom, 

general quarters was sounded. As I went up the ladder to the starboard side 

of the qua rter deck, I heard the word being passed by word of mouth that , 

"The Japs are attacking." As I reached the quarterdeck I felt the ship ~ing 

hit. She was shaken some but I was not knocked from my feet. 1 thought 

then that instead of actual hits the vibration might be caused by bombs fa ll· 

ing close aboard. I went up the starboard side of the boat de<k to the anti· 

aircraft battery which was being manned. Ensign Hunter was present on the 

starboard battery and I told h im to open fi re as soon as possible. Ensign 

Hunter, incidentally, was attached to the fi ve inch anti·aircraft battery and 

that was his regularly assigned battle station. Ensign Graham, who is also 

in the anti-aircraft battery, was present during the fi ring although I do not 

remember giving him any actual orders or seeing him at that time. r then 
OburvaJiom and Stl1teme1ll! Aiade By Survivors 127 

, 

OrF!C IA L U,I, NAVY PKOTOORArti 

AdmirdJ Cliff/de V. Ricketts, USN. 

went to the Fire Control tower as I was the ~nior officer in the gunnery 

department aboard. The tower was locked so we broke it ~n. Thco Captain 

then appeared and as the ship was listing n.pidly to port and I knew 

probably few C&R officen were aboard I said, "Captain, sha ll I go below 

and oountetflood ?" He replied, "Yes, do that." I went down through times 
128 Pearl Harbor 

square where I picked up Bill ingsley, 8.M.l /c, to help. We went to the 

main deck and aft on the starboard side and down to the second deck 

through the escape scuttle in the hatch in front of the Executive Officer's 

Office. The hatches in this vicinity were closed with escape scuttles open. 

Wounded were being brought up the hatches forward. The ship was now 

listing so heavily that on the linoleum decks it was impossible to wa lk without holding on to something. I reached the third deck by the ladder at 

frame 87 starboard and went forward to the fi rst group of counterflood 

valves. Billingsley went aft and got a crank for operating the valves. When 

he came back Rucker and Bobick, shipfitters from Repair III, came with 

him. Billingsle), and I started 8 -163 counlerflooding while the other men 

assisted at other valves. \'(Ihen I was assured that counterBooding was well 

underway, I told Rucker to counterflood everything on the starboard side 

unti l the ship was on an even keel. It was not long before the excessive list 

to port began to decrease. Rucker told me later that he had not previously 

received any orders to counterBood but he and Bobick decided that they 

should anyway and they actually opened the valves to two voids in Repair 

III. This action on their part, in my opi nion , showed excellent initiative 

and judgment. 

I then went to the anti-aircraft battery on the boat deck and found that 

all ammunition from the ready boxes had been expended. I went to times 

Dense Jmoke frame! USS West Virginia and USS Tennessee. 
, 

ObJervations and StatementJ Made By Surv;vDrJ 129

square and formed an ammunition train, opening hatches as necessary. However, when the hatch to the third deck A-420 was opened we found it to be 

flooded. This hatch was again closed and further attempts to obtain ammunition were abandoned. Ensign Ford, who was assisting me in this attempt, 

then very properly used the ammunition train and other personnel available 

to evacuate the wounded from the second deck. 

When all the men had left and Lieutenant (jg) White was on the line, 

I went dowl) the fire hose to the crane. From that time on until relief fire 

fighting parties arrived we fought the fire on the boat deck starboard casemates, and port side of the main deck forward . Ensigns Hinel Hazelton, 

Lombardi, Graham, and some others did excellent work in this fire fighting. 

The personnel that worked with me on the bridge I cannot commend too 

highly. They carried out every order promptly and enthusiastically, even 

when it meant danger to themselves, They did not attempt to abandon the 

bridge until ordered to do so. These personnel were: Lieutenant (ig) F. H. 

White, Ensign V. Delano, Siewart, A. A., C.S.M., Leak, L. N. Cphm., 

and Miller, D ., Matt.2 / c. Two or three other men, signalmen I believe, 

were also present. Lieutenant (ig) F..H. White is to be especially com· 

mended for his great help, many suggestions, and disregard of personal 

danger. Ensign Graham and Ensign Lombardi provided us a means of 

escape by passing us lines from the starboard crane and by directing the fire 

fighting on the after side of the mast structure. 

The Captain deserves the highest praise for his noble conduct to the last. 

Although in great pain he kept inquiring about the condition of the ship, 

whether or not we had any pumps running, etc. He was particularly con· 

cerned about the fires on board and the oil on the surface of the water. 

I assured him that everyone was doing everything possible to fight the fire 

and control the damage. He ~id not want to be moved and after the fire 

started, kept insisting that we leave him and go below. For a short time 

after he was wounded it would have been possible to lower him down, but 

his wound was so serious I knew that he would be better off with as little 

handling as possible. Leak concurred with me in this opinion. However, 

when the fire broke out around the after part of the bridge structure I moved 

him regardless because of the suffocating smoke and the approaching fire. 

The Executive Officer, Commander R. H. Hillenkoetter, the senior surviving officer of West V irgil1ia wrote: 

I was in my cabin just commencing to dress, when at 07Y5 the word 

was passed "Away Fire and Rescue Party."' This was followed about thirty 

seconds later by "General Quarters"; at the same time, 0755, the marine 

orderly rushed into the cabin and announced, "The Japanese are attacking 

us," Also, just at this time two heavy shocks on the hull of the West Virginia were felt. It seemed as if these shocks were somewhere forward on 

the port side. 
1)0 Pearl Harbor 

By this time I had reached the Quarterdeck. and the ship was beginning 

to Jist rapidly to poct I proceeded along the starboard side until just forwa rd 

of Number Three Turret, when there was a third hea,'}, shock fclt to port. 

The planes on top of Turret Three caught on fire, and there were flames ali 

around the Turret Top. The quarterdeck sentry informed me that the Captain had already gone to the bridge, so I remained aft to assist the extinguishing of the fire around Turret Three and on the quarterdeck. There was 

another heavy explosion at this time, that threw me flat on the deck . During 

all this time the ship was continuing to list to port, and at the time of this 

latest shock, I should estimate that the list Wali about 200 or 2,0 (this is 

purdy an estimate) . I called to the sound power telephone watch to tell 

Central to counterRood, but do not know whether or not this word got 

through. 

\ . "'..... 

. -' " \"..., 

.,: \\ , ,, '"1 _.,,, w.. " 

I, i ~ 

" 

"' 

USN NR41. ()lO D) all'1U 

USS Argonne fighting (ires on West Virginia. 

Immediately following this latest explosion, I saw a Rash of flame about 

fifteen 'feet high somewhere forward on the ARIZONA and had just 

gotten to my feet again when there was a terrific flash of flame from the 

ARIZONA, this S(!cond flash being higher than the foretop , Burning debris 

of sizes from a fraction of an inch up to ""e inches in diameter rained on 

the quarterde<k of the WEST VIRG INIA. 
• • • • • 

• • • • • 

ObJel'tII1fiollJ dnd Stdtements Made By SUI"vil'ors 131 

Duri ng all of the aix)\'e the ship's batteries continued firing, and shortly 

after the ARIZONA explosion, the list on the WEST VIRGINIA stopped 

and she gradually started to right herself. Meanwhile, efforts to push overboard the burning embers on the quarterdeck and to extinguish the fire on 

top of Turret Three and in the planes was continued. There was another 

heavy shock, distinguishable from the shock of the ship's own guns firing, 

and it was reported that a large fire had broken out amidships. I went into 

the deck·house and found the repair parties already working agai nst a fire, 

but without much success, as the fire increased by leaps and bounds. At this 

time, a Telephone Talker said "Central Station says Abandon Ship," As it 

was ev ident the fire fighting party had no chance to extinguish the fire, they 

were ordered to leave the ship. The fire had by then, from all appearances, 

from aft, isolated the after and forward parts of the ship. I went out on the 

port side of the quarterdeck, and seeing no boats on that side went over to 

the starboard side, B}' this time the stern of the TENNESSEE was burning, 

and a wall of fl ame was advanci ng toward the WEST VIRGINIA and the 

TENNESSEE from oil on the water from the ARIZONA. I looked around 

and saw no one else aft on deck and then I dove overboard and swam to 

the TENN ESSEE. On getting on deck of the TENESSEE I found about ten 

WEST VIRGINIA people gathered under the ove-rhang of the TENNES· 

SEE's Number Three Turret. As the TENNESSEE people were busily engaged in fire fighting but in no need of any extra help, I took the WEST 

VIRGINIA people o\'er the starboard side on to the pipe.line to help in 

extinguishing the fi re that had started in the rubbish and trash and oil 

covered water between the- TENNESSEE and Ford Island. Several of our 

people that were hurt were loaded into a truck and taken to the dispensary. 

I then brought the truck back to that part of Ford Island oppos ite the 

TENNESSEE and kept on with efforts to distinguish the fires among the 

trash and oil on the water. More and more WEST VIRGINIA personnel 

kept arriving at this point, some by swimming, some by hanging on to 

wreckage, and, I think one whaleboat load . 

Lieutenant C. V, Ricketts, the Senior Gunnery Officer aboard, and regular 

Second Battery Control Officer, who, as his battery was not firing, busie-d 

himself with aiding the Damage Control Officer in counter-flooding, in 

caring for the Captain whe-n wounded, in attempting to get additional am· 

munition to the Anti -aircraft battery, and was unsparing of himself in his 

efforts during the action and during the fire-fighting which followed. 

Lieutenant F. H. White, D-V(G), U.S.N.R., who, aided by Miller, Doris, 

Mess Attendant second class, U.S. Navy, was instrumental in hauling peopk 

;Llong through oi l and water to the quarterdeck, thereby unquestionably saving the lives of a number of people who might otherwise have been lost. 
132 Pearl Harbor 

National tnJi&n jlyin& from stern of USS West Virginia 

Because the above named people are particularly mentioned, it must not 

be construed that the act ions and work of their shipmates and associates was 

any less valuable or less courageous. The entire ship's company is deserving 

of the highest commendation, both (or their work on December 7th and on 

the days following. All the ship's company. officers and men, ask is another 

chance at the enemy. Their devotion to duty and their performance of duty 

have given new meanings to thoS(: phrases. 

3. IMPRESSIONS AND ACTIONS ON U.s.s. OKLAHOMA 

Lieutenant Commander Will iam M. Hobby, Jr., wrote as follows: 

On the morni ng of Sunday, De(em~[ 7, 1941 , the OKLAHOMA was 

s«ured at berth F- '5, Pearl Harbor, outboard of the 'MARYLAND and star· 

board side of the MARYLAND. Commander J. L. Kenworthy was senior 

officer on board, and I was second in command, At about 0800 I heard the 

",'ord over the loud speaker to man the anti-aircraft battery, then shots from 

an indeterminate direction, then a second time the word to man the antiaircraft battery for a real attack. As I was going topside the word was passed 

to man all baHle stations. I ran up the starboard side out to the main deck 
ObJel'valiollJ and Statements Made By SUI"vivors 133 

aft by the break of the deck. Before I reached the main de'!ck aft there'! was a 

din of gunfire'! and e'!xplosions from all directions. 

I started up the ladder from the'! main deck aft to the anti·aircraft gun 

platform on the'! starboard side; at this point I felt what I believe was the 

first torpedo hit-a dull thud and a powerful reverberation, on the port side, 

and the ship began listing to port. I started back down with the idea of 

getting to Ce'!ntral and directing the flooding of the starboard blisters, but 

almost immediately there'! was a second torpedo hit and then a third and the 

ship listed more; at this time streams of me'!n were pouring up through 

hatches to the topside. A second or so later, at about the lime I was back 

down to the mlin deck aft again, came the fourth torpedo hit, and the ship 

continued to list to port-at least a twenty degree list at this time, I estimate, 

and still listing. 1 dire<:ted petty officers near me to spread out over the 

length of the ship and keep the men as orderly and calm as possible'!. I 

sighted Commande'!r Kenworthy on the starboard catwalk and made'! my way 

to him and told him that 1 thought the best now was to save as many rne'!n as 

possible, that it was now impossible to make further wate'!rtight closures and 

C'!Stablish any further watertight inte'!grity. He agreed and we both passed the 

word to abandon ship. I called to men on main deck aft to attempt to get to 

work on the loud speaker. 

Although there were now hundreds of men on the starboard side, the 

general conduct of aU hands was 'luiet and calm. There was an explosion 

around the port side of the fo recastle, which I thought was a bomb hit. I 

worked my way forward and Commander Kenworthy worked his way aft. 

There was another shock and concussion and vibration and fuel oil splashed 

in streams over everything topside. This was either another torpedo hit or 

a large bomb hit close aboard. The ship continued to list over to pori, now 

about 30 degrees, or more, I thought. I entered # 1 casemate to see about 

the escape of men (rom below to topside. Men were still coming out through 

casemates, and thence out through gun ports to the catwalk and onto the 

side. When no more men were to be seen in casemates, I climbed up through 

a gun port and out over the side; the ship was capsizing and the angle was 

about 90 degrees. I pulled myself along the side and bottom as the vessel 

keeled over; the ship finally settled when the mast and stack apparently 

hit bottom, with an angle of approximately 14:; degrees, starboard side 

uppermost. 

I sat on Ihe bottom at about frame 60; hun.dreds of men were along the 

hull making their way to the water's edge. Keenum C. W., CBM, joi ne'!d me 

and rendered much aid in steadying the men and directing them to swim to 

the MARYLAND, to the Ford Island Landing, or to a motor launch, 

depending on the location of the men. The air attack continued and bombs 

were dropping nearby, but none struck the OKLAHOMA aft er she capsized. 

All men who reached the topside were apparently saved, swimming either to 

the MARYLAND, the shore, or to a motor launch. There were many cases 
134 	 Pearl Harbor 

..,\:;tr"':l:. , ,\;...:II·' •. 

1O-O..aIOU 

USS Oklahoma. 	Thirty·one men were 'CHlied by the working force (filling holn 

through the bottom. USS Maryland iJ 011 the right. 

of men aiding ot hers to swim, and in some cases actually towing them to 

shore or the MA RYLAND or a boal. The general conduct of the crew 

continued to be excellent. 

I saw the O KLAHOMA officers and men who boarded the MARYLAND 

go to the MARYLAND anti-aircraft battery and aid in the anti-aircraft lire 

on the MARYLA ND. I saw Boatswain Bathol' acting as coxswain of a 

motor launch and picking up men and taking them to Ford Island landing. 

After ali others had clea red the hull of the ship, as far as we could see, 

Keenum and I made OU f way out to the bow. I discarded shoes and uniform, 

expecting to swim in, at this juncture Boatswain Bolhne approached in a 

motor launch, having already landed one load of men. There were about 

fifty men in this second load. Keenum and I entered the motor launch. The 

boat made the dock and un loaded all but Boatswain Bothne, four men, and 

myself. OKLAHOMA men on the dock were handling lines of a tanker 

which was getting underway, and some of them boa rded the tanker upon 

being told that the tanker needed more men to go out on her. Other men on • the dock were asking where they (ould go to aid in anti·aircraft fire; all 

seemed to be thinking of how to fight rather than seeking safety. 

I remained in the motor launch, and with Boatswain Bothne and four 

men patrolled up and down the line facing the OKLAHOMA, WEST 

VIRGINIA, and ARIZONA, looki ng fo r survivors to pick up from the 

water. By this time it appeared that all men had reached shore and the water 
ObJe r'liatiol/J and StatementJ Made By SurvivorJ 135 

was clear of men. \'<'e patrolled for about twenty minutes (estimated), until 

it seemed that the attack was ovef, or at least that no more bombs were 

being dropped that we could see, and we could see no more enemy planes. 

Then we took the motor launch across the harbor to the Mine Dock 

landing. Here wefe survivors, other boards, and Navy Yard personnel 

along the dock. A truck driver volunteered to drive those of us without 

clothes to the Receiving Station for clothes. We drove there, and I obtained 

dungarees, shoes and a white sailor's hat. Then the truck returned me to the 

landing. I commandeered a motor boat and returned to the hull of the 

OKLAHOMA: Others were on the OKLAHOMA and still more were 

coming aboard as I arrived. With several men I went over the hull discussing 

possibilities of salvaging those still alive inside. Commander Kranzfe1der, 

Lieutenant Commander Benson, Lieutenant Commander Henderson were 

now on the hull. Also Boatswain Bothne and twenty Or thirty men from the 

OKLAHOMA who had returned. I believe that all returned at approximately 

the same time. Thenceforth we concentrated on salvage work for the rescue 

of survivors trapped inside. I remained on the hull or inside the hull for 

the next sixty hours as senior OKLAHOMA officer on salvage work. A 

detailed report of salvage work is submitted as a separate report. 

Boatswain A. M. Bothne wrote : 

About 0800 December 7, I was on the after end of the superstructure 

deck. The first indication I had of the attack was when Hilton , BMI / c 

started to (all fo r the sixth division men to man the anti ·aircraft battery. 

I ~aw three torpedoes hit the OKLAHOMA, one forward at about frame 35 

or 40. The ship started to lisl immediately when the fi rst torpedo hit. After 

the third torpedo hit the sh ip listed to an angle of about 45 degrees. All 

lines to the MARYLAND were still holding with about 150 or 200 men 

sitting on the sta rboard blister ledge. The ship seemed to be stationary in 

that iX'sition fOr a short interval when another torpedo hit the port side, 

then the lines to the MARYLAND carried away and the OKLAHOMA 

rolled on over to about 13 ~ degrees. I swam out to # 3 motor launch and 

started rescuing the men who were left on the edge of the hull. 

The fire burned around the CALIFORNIA and was extinguished. With 

the aid of a waler barge and tug #31 the tire around the WEST VIRGINIA 

was brought under control. I then noticed activity on the bottom of the 

OKLAHOMA and reported 10 Lieutenant Commander Hobby to aid in 

rescue and sa lvage work. 

Chief Machinist, Second Class, W . F. Staff wrote as follows: 

Sunday morning at 0750 on 7 December 1941, I was in the Carpenter 

Shop when the general alarm was sounded. I immediately went along the 

starboard side of the third deck to my battle station. I felt several explosions 
136 Pearl Harbor 

on the way to Repair II. When I got to Repair II I took my phones and 

went to get a AashIight but they were locked up so I went on down to 

11.-28, the fo rward air compressor room, and started to set Zed. 

There was an electricians mate and a fireman also Centers, J.P., MM2 / c 


and myself in the compartment. \Vhen the lights went Qui the fi reman and 


electricians mate started to go out the zed hatch which had been set by 


repair 11 ; they were yelling and screaming. Water and fuel oil was coming 


down the hatch. I tried to stop them from opening the hatch but couldn't. 


The next thing we knew we wefe all under water and oiL Centers and 


myself were the only ones that came up. 


It took us some time in the dark to find Qut that we were back in 11.-28 


and the ship had capsized. 


We then tried to get into the li nen storeroom. It was on the starboard 


side and was out of the water. A-28 was about hal{ full of oil and water. 


The storeroom was locked and it took several hours to beat the lock off with 


a wrench that we found on the air compressor. We could not get into the 


storeroom as gear must have wedsed against the door. 


We tried to get into a small storeroom which was on the o\'erhead, but 


it was also locked and we could not get into position to beat the lock off. 


About Monday noon we heard tapping and we answered them . After so 


long they were right overhead and we could hear them talking. When they 


started to cut into us it let out our air and we we[e under air pressure; the 


water came up as our air escaped. 


The water came up and tan out the hole they were cutting and they left. 


But we still had about six inches of air space. 


We tried the linen room again and it gave a little. Apparently the water 


had cleared the gear from the door, we went in and started tapping again. 


The rescuers soon got out to us again and we left the ship at 0200 Tues­


day morning. 


I wish to thank these men for their hard work in rescuing us: Keenum, 


CBM, Thomas, SFI C, and Harris CM2c. 


4. IMPRESSIONS AND ACTIONS ON U.s.S. ARIZONA 

Aviation Machinist's Mate, Third Class M. T. Hurst wrote as follow s: 

When the attack on Pearl Harbor ~8an on Decem~r 7, 1941, I was on 

the quarter de<k smoking a cigarette. The first bit o f excitement r noticed 

was the Oflicer·of-the-Deck and the Junior 0.0. standing near the 

Admiral's gangway, pointing and looking west toward Ford Island. Out of 

curiosity I went over to the life line to see what everyone was looking at. I 

saw a large column of smoke going up into the air. At this time the 0 .0 .0. 

told the boatswain's mate of the watch to sound general alarm which he did 
..J 

Observations and Slatements Made By Survivors 137

SO-G-UIIOI 

ReJcue parI, alongside Arizona. 

on the double. At the time 1 thought there was a fire on one of the ships 

or the air station so I went up into #:; casemate to see what was going on. 

lt was now that the first word was said about an air attack and then 

everyone seemed to think it was the Army having a mock attack. I watched 

several planes SWttp over Ford Island and when one went over our fantail 

I saw the red spot on the wing. OUf guns then opened up and it first struck 

me that we were being attacked. I then went back on the quarter deck and 

just as I reached the armor deck, general quarters was sounded. My generaL 

quarters station was not down there so I started back up the ladder which 

was made a little difficult by a marine officer fighting his way below. 

When I reached main deck there was a fir e in the Executi"e Officer's 

office. Lane, an aviation radioman, Burns, our yeoman, and I started to 

get a hose to fight the fire. At this time a fire broke out on the quarter deck, 

and we dragged the hose out there. Lane screwed on the nozzle while I 

went to turn on the water at the plug forward of # 3 turret. 

A bomb then hit somewhere forward of me and knocked me down. I 

finished turning on the water and started out to where I was to help Lane, 

but he was no longer there. I noticed there was no water coming out of 

the nozzle so I started to go forward and saw many marines and sailors 

lying about the deck badly burned. I tried to help one but he was pretty 

well blown up. 

Someone yelled, "Get out of here," so I picked up someone and started 

to carry him off. Someone said to let him go since he was dead. It was 

pretty hot then and several men were running around badly burned, so with 
138 Pearl Harbor 

a couple of other fellows, onc of them Burns, I helped to get these men 

ovcr to the life line and told them to go over the side. I then went over to 

the blister and jumped into the water. I was near a mooring quay so I went 

under it and took off my pants and socks. My shoes got separated (rom me 

some place. From there I swam to the motor launch tied up along side of 

the quay. Someone helped me out onto the quay. Then we wccc all busy 

for some time helping others out and putfing injured into the launch. The 

launch was going to the SOLACE so when it started pulling away I dove 

over the side and started to swim to Ford Island . It was the farth~t and 

fastest swim I have ever made. Upon reaching land we were directed to 

the bomb shelter whtre I remained until taken over to the Reedving Bar· 

racks. I stayed there until coming to Ford Island. 

It should be explained that each ship was moored to two quays which 

were near Ford Island. Most of the men called them "keys" and the state· 

ments of survivors often refer to them as keys. 

Seaman First Class W. W. Parker wrote as follows: 

On December 7, 1941, about 7:50 a.m. I was on the blister top of the 

USS ARIZONA when a s<juadron of Japanese dive bombers began to bomb 

the air·drome on Ford Island. I stood there a few minutes and watched, 

thinking it was a bombing practice. Air raid sirens began to blow. I went 

up to the battery on the double time and manned gun one. After one round, 

the gun captain ordered us to take cover when they began strafing us with 

machine gun fi re. All took cover with the exception of three of us who 

kept on firing. We still did not understand what was taking piace. Then 

we saw the WEST VIRGINIA topedoed. Next, we saw a flight of horizontal 

bombers that began to drop their bombs. One bomb hit in front of the 

forward turret. We think it went down in the magazine for the whole 

forward part of the ship blew up and caught fire. One of the other men and 

I must have b~n blown over the side of the galley deck. About that time a 

bomb went down the stack. That's all I remember until I was on the quarter 

deck and aware that they were taking men from the quay over to Ford 

Island in whaleboats. About that time all the ships were getting organized 

and were putting up a heavy barrage of fire. The Japanese planes were not 

doing so good then for they were being driven off. I saw four or five 

planes shot down. There were two planes shot down by our machine gun · 

ners who were on security watch on the ARIZONA. None of the ammuni· 

tion we fi red exploded in the air; why r do not know unless it was because 

the fuse was not set. This is all I can actually say that I saw. 

Ensign H. D. Davison wrote as follow s: 

It was just before colors, in fact I had already sent the messenger down to 

make the 8 o'clock reports to the Captain. Then I heard a dive bomber 
OburvatiofII and Statements Made By Survivors 139 

, 

USN NR.L (MOD) U73ti 

Arizona Junk. 

attack from o\'~rhea . I looked through my spyglass and saw the rcd dots on 

the wings. That made me wonder but I still couldn't believe it until I saw 

some bombs fall ing. The first olle hit up by the air Station. I sounded the 

air raid alarm and notified the Captain. The Captain and Lieutenant Commander Fuqua came on deck, and the Captain went on up to the bridge. 

Mr. FUCjua told me' to sound General Quarters. About that time we took a 

bomb hit on the starboard side of the quarterdeck, just about abreast of #4 

turret. We grabbed the men available and started dropping the hatches and 

leading om hose on the quarterdeck. 

About th is time, the planes that "had made the initial dive bomb attack 

strafed the ship. Mr. Fuqua and I told all hands to get in the marine compartment. It was reported to us that we had a bomb in the executive officer's 

office. Mr. Fugua told me to call the center engine room and get pressure 

on the fire mains. Then he 'went up to the boat deck. I told the boatswain's 

mate of the watch to do that. Then I went into the 0.0:5 booth to do it 

myself. Just after I stepped in the booth we took another hit which seemed 

to be on the starboard side of the quarterdeck just about frame 88. The 

boatswain's mate and I were trapped in the booth by the flames. We started 

out of the booth, trying to run through the flame aft on the quarter deck. 

We cou ld not get through so we went over the lifeline into the water. I 

was conscious of a swcrtish sickening smell to the flame. 

After I got in the water my fi rst intention was to go to the guay and 

then onto the '1uarterdeck or to swim to the gangway and get aboard. But 
140 Pearl Harbor 

after I took one look at the ship, I dedded that it was useless. She had 

settled down by the bow and appeared broken in two. The foremast was 

toppled over, she was a mass of fl ames from the fo recastle to just forwa rd 

of turret #3. 1 was helped into a motor launch by Ensign Bush and another 

man. Then we in turn took the motor launch and picked up as many survivors as we could find in the water. We took them over to the landing at 

Ford Island. There we wefe met by Air Station Marines who helped us. 

o Ensign Bush and I took the barge which had come up and took it back 

over alongside the quarterdeck where we gathered another load of injured. 

Upon our return to Ford Island we noticed three more boats alongsi de 

the ARIZONA SO we proceeded to the air raid shelter. Then I wcnt up to 

the dispensary for first aid treatment. 

5. IMPRESSIONS AND ACTIONS ON V.s.s. CALIFORNIA 

Lieutenant Commander M. N. Little, First Lieutenant and Acting Com· 

manding Officer wrote as follows: 

About 0750 or 0755, Sunday, ~ember 7, 1941, I was working in my 

office when I heard a series of explosions foUowed by the word passed over 

the loud speaker system, "Air Raid! Air Raid! Seek Shelter! Seek Shelter !" 

I rushed from my office and as I reached the door the general alarm was 

sounded. I paused long enough to order Baldwin, R. M. , my Chief Yeoman, 

to assume command of the Damage Control personnel in Central Station 

and tell him that I was going to the bridge to take command. I then ran 

up to the conning tower on the emergency platform. Enroute I noticed 

several dark gray planes with red wing markings attacking the moored line 

of battleships. As I reached the emergency platform I heard several heavy 

explosions and looking aft saw large columns of water arising along the 

ships moored abaft the CALI FORNIA. I entered the conning tower and 

found it already partially manned Lieutenant Fritschmann was in control 

of the ship's armament: I ordered him to complete the manning of the A.A. 

Battery as soon as possible, to get up ammunition , and open fire on any 

enemy planes sighted. I then ordered Main Control to make preparations 

for getting underway and Central Station to have repair parties set conditions YOKE and ZED throughout the ship . 

I next stepped out on the emergency platform and walked around the 

superstructure in order to see whether I could sight planes attacking from 

any direction. Within a few minutes I saw a low flying plane approach 

from the di ion of Merry Point, bank steeply and launch a torpedo. The 

bubble track of the torpedo was clearly visible as it headed for us and struck 

the ship somewhere slightly abaft t.he port beam about frame 100. As the 

torpedo exploded a heavy column of water arose alongside the port side 
~'V" "_ ......... _ .. ""'w _ __ _· ..,£ , , .... , 

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and the ship lurch~d and began to list to port. I returned to the conning 

tower where I informed ccntral station that we had been struck by a torpedo 

on the port quarter in Repair III area and directed Baldwin to countcrBood 

starboard voids as nttessary to reduce the list and restrict it to four degrees 

or less, at the same time cautioning him to watch the draft and not to 

fl ood SO many voids that he would be in danger of sinking the ship. 

I spent the next ten or fifteen minutes alternately in the conning tower 

checking the progress of counterfiooding operations with Central Station 

and on t.he emergency platform observing the efforts of the personnel to 

procure ammunition. There was none available to the A. A. Battery except 

that in ready boxes on the ready guns and at the time of the first torpedo 

hit ammunition from the magazilles had not been receil,red by the battery. 

Lieutenant Fritschmann assured me that every effort was being made to get 

the ammunition supply functioning and I refrained from disturbing him by 

repeated questioning. After the first torpedo hit it was reported that power 

was lost on the A.A. hoists and I directed that the ammunition supply be 

started using hand power. Central Station had reported that counterAooding 

was in progress and the list had apparently b~n checked, at least temporarily, when the second torpedo struck. 

Oil fim approachillg USS California. 
143 

• 

ObJervationJ and Statements Made By Survivors 

I caught only a glimpse through the conning tower eye port of the track 

of the second torpedo as it approached but believed that it had struck 

forward of amidships, about abeam of turret II. I notified Central Station 

of this second torpedo hit and ordered further counterftooding as necessary 

to restrict the list of the ship but again cautioned Baldwin not to flood 

so many voids that he would sink the ship. I also ordered that 1 be informed 

of the 'damage when it was ascertained. The OKLAHOMA which was 

moored astern of us outboard of the MARYLAND was already listing 

heavily and was obviously about to capsize. At this time I was more concerned about the possible danger of the ship capsizing than of sinking. I 

soon received a report from Central Station that further voids were being 

counterAooded and a report from Lieutenant Fritschmann that the ammunition supply was functioning, although slowly. The list after the second 

torpedo hit had increased markedly and Wa5 about six or seven degrets but 

apparently checked at that point so I took advantage of the lull to order 

Lieutenant Commander Eckhoff who was also in the conning tower with 

me, to assume direction of activities on the Bridge while I took a quick 

turn about the ship to see personally how matters were going. 

I then took a quick turn around the Casemates and Boat Deck. In the 

course of this round I noted that the personnel on the various stations were 

on the whole. cool and collected and eager to have ammunition so they could 

fight back in the event of a reoccurrence of the attack. After the round of 

the gun stations I returned to the emergency platform outside of the Conning Tower a few moments before the commencement of the bombing 

attack. 

Just before the bombing attack on this ship Commander Stone, the Executive Officer, ap~ared on the bridge, having returned to the ship from shore 

leave at 0845. I informed him of the situation and he thereupon assumed 

command. 

Shortly after Commander Stone's arrival the bombing attack commenced. 

I was still with him when what appeared to be a whole stick of bombs 

landed on our starboard side in the water between the ship and the shore. 

A few seconds later the ship was hit by a bomb admidships on the star· 

board side. There was a heavy explosion below decks followed by light 

smoke from the starboard side and later heavy smoke. This bombing was 

followed by strafi ng with machine guns. Such guns of our battery as had 

ammunition and could bear were in action . I informed Central of the bomb 

hit amids hips and ordered Repair I to report to the scene. There appeared 

to be several recurrent waves of strafing attacks but no further bombing. 

I returned to the Captain who was on the Emergency Platform and gave 

him a brief surrunary of the damage at that time insofar as r knew it. From 

there I went to the 9uarterdeck intending to enter the main deck and reach 

the scene of the fire which was then raging on the starboard side in the 

interior of the ship. I undoggC'd the door on the starboard side of the quarter­

• 

144 Pearl Harbor 

deck leadi ng into the main cle<:k but was met by a rush of heavy smoke 

and heat so intense that it was impossible to enter the compartment. I 

closed the door and started to enter the Crew's Reception Room hoping to 

get in that way but found the same conditions existing there. The 2JZ talker 

of Repair I had leEt the Crew's Reception Room and was crouched on the 

platform of the officers' ladder leading from the quarterdeck to the boat 

deck where his telephone lead would reach. I asked him if he still had 

Central Station and he said yes that Baldwin wanted to speak with me. 

Baldwin informed me that he had lost communication with all repair parties 

save Repair I. I inquired whether Central was intact and personnel safe 

and he said yes everything was all right there. 

I started across to the port side intending to try again to gd inside to 

the main deck but upon my arri val there noted that the fire on the next 

ship astern had worked down to the oil which formed a heavy coating on the 

surface of the water and was coming down rapidly toward the CALlFOR· 

NIA with the wind which waS blowing a fresh breeze from that direction. 

I returned to the Emergency Platform where I pointed out the approaching 

fire to the Captain. He left me presumably to confer with Admira l Pye who 

was aboard by this time and was on the Flag Bridge. Upon his return a few 

minutes later the Captain directed the Executive Officer to order the crew to 

abandon ship. 

I went immediately to the Conning Tower where I had the JA talker 

dirttt Baldwin in Central to order all repair parties to abandon ship and 

Baldwin himself to evacuate Central Station with the personnel therein via 

8II-Q-1~1 

California engulfed by oil fi res. 
Observat;onJ and Statement! Made By Survivor! 14) 

the Conning Tower tube. When I saw that the tube was open and the 

personnel of Central Station on their way up I left the Conning Tov.'er and 

went to the forecastle , where I stood by and directed the men to slide down 

to the Mooring lines to the quay rather than to jump or dive into the 

water. As the fire came forward on the port side of the CALIFORNIA 

I slid down one of the mooring lines to the quay where I remained tern· 

porarily. Fire passed down the port side setting many fires on the weather 

decks but the ship as a whole did not catch fire. Seeing that the fi~ was 

passing I swam over from the quay to the dredge pontoons and went 

inshore to where a large group of men were gathered at the water's edge 

and ordered them to return to the ship in an attempt to salvage her. 

I myself returned to the quay in a punt and climbed up the mooring lines 

to the deck where I started to organize the personnel to fight the fires 

still burning amidships and to prevent the ship from sinking or capsizing. 

As I spent most of the time during the actual engagement either on the 

Emergency Platform or in the Conning Tower I did not witness any acts of 

extraordinary heroism or bravery because there was no opportunity for such 

display. On the other hand every man whom I observed was manning his 

station and performing his duties with coolness and without fear in entire 

disregard of any danger to which he might be subject. Of the performance of duty of all members of the damage control organization both 

during the action and in the subsequent rescue work thereto I cannot speak 

too highly. I cannot single out any one individual from this group for 

special mention without doing an injustice to all the others. As described 

by the reports of their leaders the work of all members of the damage 

control organization was most gratifying and praiseworthy, fully in keeping 

with the highest traditions of the service. 

Private A. E. Senior, U.S. Marine Corps, wrote as follows: 

When General Quarters was sounded I went to my battle station, 

5 inch/ 'H Gun #8 in Casemate #8 on the port side. The Battery Officer 

then asked for volunteers to go below for gas masks. I volunteered, but 

we could not get down to the storeroom where the masks were stored, so 

we returned to our gun stations. Again the Battery Officer asked for two 

volunteers to go below and haul 5 inch/ 25 A.A. ammunition to the topside 

because the hoists were out of commission. We went down through the 

escape hatch in Casemate #6, through the Division Compartment, and 

finally through the hatch on the starboard side to the 'Col' Division Compartment. This is where ammunition was being taken out of the hoist which 

was being operated by hand in the handling room. It was being passed 

from there to the topside by hand. It was here, at this time that I first saw 

Ensign H. C. Jones. He was standing on the third deck at the foot of the 

bdder directing the hand passing of ammunition up the ladder. In passing 

the ammunition, I was at the top of the ladder from the handling room, and 
1rbor 

U8N )<IR"'L (MOD) a""7 

Tugs auisting in ~JCU~ and salvag~ Iua, California. 

on ly one man was between myself and Ensign Jones. We had been down 

there about fifteen or twenty minutes when the bomb hit on the starboard 

side of the ship. The on ly light we had was blown out when the bomb hit. 

\X'hen it hit, the compartment filled with smoke and I reached for my gas 

mask, which I had layed on top of a shell box behind me, and put it on. 

Then someone said, 'Me. Jones has been hit' so I flashed the flashlight I 

had on Ensign Jones' face and it was all bloody. His white coat also had 

blood all over it. Two other men and myself took a hold of Me. Jones 

and started up the ladder with h im. We got him as far as the M Division 

Compartment. Then he wouldn't let us carry him any farther. When we 

tried to he said, 'lea\'e me alone, I'm done for. Get out of here before the 

magazines go off: Then there was another shock from below and that's the 

h.st 1. letnt;mbet \1l\t\\ the)' ~'e;te tl\1~hl\g tnt; up \htough tne e;(ape natch 

in Casemate #3. 

6. IMPRESSIONS AND ACTIONS ON U.s.S. UTAH 

There are only a few su rvivor's reports from Utah, which was a fo rmer 

battleship converted to a ta rget ship. One of the best was written by the 

Acting Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander S. S. Isquith, which 

is as follows: 
ObJervdtions and Statements Made By Survivol'S 147 

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, while moored at Berth FOX-ll, Pearl 

Harbor, T.H., 3 planes whose identification were not questioned but taken 

for U.S. planes maneuvering, were observed just as colors were being 

hoisted at 0800, heading northerly from the harbor entrance. They made a 

low dive on the southern end of Ford Island and each dropped a bomb. 

Immediately thereafter the air was filled with planes dearly distinguished 

as yellow colored planes with brilliant red Rising Sun insignia on fuselage 

and red wing tips, flying low at about 100 knots speed and dropping aerial .. 

torpedoes and bombs. They appeared to be Henkle 11 3, or similar type, with 1 

very silent engines. The general alarm was immediately rung and word was 

passed, "All hands to bombing quarters." About this time, 0801, a severe 

underwater hit, at approximately frame 84, port side, was felt and the ship 

immediately commenced to list to port. Another underwater hit was 

felt almost immediately thereafter in about the same general location 

and the listing of the ship increased immediately to about 15 degrees. At 

this time I rea lized that the ship would capsize and word was passed. 

"All hands on deck and all engineroom and fireroom, radio and dynamo 

watch to lay up on deck and release all prisoners:' 

All hands were ordered to the starboard side, which was the high side, 

to escape danger of loose timbers pinning men down. Word was passed 

for aU hands to equip themselves with life jackets but due to the fact that 

the life jackets were stored in canvas bags in the air castle, it was not 

practicable for many men to obtain li fe jackets due to miscellaneous gear 

stored in the starboard aircastle moving and a bomb explosion in the 

port aircastle which took place at that time. At about this time the engine 

room reported that steam had dropped and that they were unable to cut 

in the drain pumps, that the port engine room was flooded and that the 

starboard engine room was taking water rapidly, the water at that time 

being above the high pressure turbine and reduction gear. The lights were 

still on in the engine room. The engine room watch cleared the starboard 

engine room. No.2 fireroom, NO.4 boiler steaming, reported steam dropping 

rapidly and additional burner cut in to hold steam, The second hit put out 

all fires. The fireroom watch then abandoned the fireroom, closed the 

quick dosing fuel oil valve, leaving the auxiliary feed pumps operating 

but slowing down due to lack of steam. 

By about 0805, the ship had listed to about 40 degrees to port. l ights 

were still on. No report had been received from the dynamo room; word 

was again passed. "All hands on deck and abandon ship over starboard 

side," The crew commenced getting over the ·side, the ship continuing to 

list but somewhat slower. The attacking planes were now returning from a 

northerly direction flying low and strafing the crew as they abandoned 

ship. The loose timbers about the decks were moving to port, interfering 

greatly with the efforts of the crew to abandon ship. 

Observing the strafing and the moving of the timbers and loose gear in 
148 Pearl Harbor 

tht: aircasties, I directed that the crew divide into three groups, one group 

going up the ladder leading from the starboard aircastle to the Captain's 

cabin , one going up the ladder from the starboard wardroom country to the 

passage inboard of the Captain's stateroom, and one going up the ladder 

leading from the starboard wardroom country Mar the wardroom pantry to 

the forecastle. A large number of these men escaJXd through the ports 

in the Captain's cabin. 

lieutenant (jg) P. F. Hauck, Machinist S. A. Szymanski, and myself 

were the last to leave the ship going through the ports in the Captain's 

cabin. At this time, about 0810, the ship was listing about 80 degrees to port 

and planes were still strafing the ship. Mooring lines were parting and two 

motor launches and the motor whale boat were picking up men in the 

water. Many men were observed swimming to the north and south quays 

of Pier FOX-ll, and as planes were still strafing, the men were ordered to 

the sides of the quays for some protection. 

At about 0812, the last mooring Jines had parted and the ship was 

capsized, the keel plainly showing. All men picked up by ship's boats were 

taken asho[(' to Ford Island and boats were ord('red to return and pick 

up any men still swimming about. 

On reaching shore on Ford Island, all hands were ordered into the trenches 

that had been dug there for some Public Works Proj ect, in order to protect 

themselves from the strafing planes. Noting that many m('n w('ce injured 

and wounded, Commander G. H. Larson, (Me), u.s. Navy, with Kerns, 

Jean W., HSl c, U.S. Naval Reserve, who had brought a .lirst aid kit 

ashore with him, set up a fi rst aid station in the quarters of Lieutenant 

Church (CEC), Building N o. 118, Ford Island. Commander Larson, Gray, 

PhM, and two other pharmacist's mates proceeded with the first aid 

treatment of all men who had been injured and necessary cases were sent 

to the Naval Air Station Dispensary in Naval Air Station trucks supplied 

for this purpose. 

While in the trenches, a short time later, knocking was heard on the 

ship's hull. At this time planes were slill strafing and dropping bombs. I 

called for a volunteer cr~ to return to the UTAH to investigate the 

knocking heard. Machinist Szymanski and a volunteer crew consisting of 

MacSelwiney, CMM, and two seamen, names unknown, returned to the 

ship and located the tapping coming from the void space V-98, under the 

dynamo room. They answered the knocking with knocks on the outside 

which in turn were answered by knocking within the ship. 

Realizing that there were personnel trapped inside the ship, Machinist 

Szymanski obtained a cutting torch and ' equipment from the U.S.S. 

RALEIGH and cut a hole in the bottom of the ship and rescued Vaessen, 

John 8., F2c V-6, USNR, who reported that he had been the last man in 

that part of the ship. He was on watch on the forward distribution board 

when the ship was hit and the voltage commenced dropping. He cut out 
• • • • • 

ObJervatiom and Statements Made By Survivors 149 

i\' 

1 

&0-0_18_ 

ReJcue partieJ working on opening! in the hull of rapJized uss Utah. 

power forward and then aft in an endeavor to maintain lights in the ship. 

Finally the lights dimmed and went out and he, then being unable to 

escape to the deck, proceeded to the dynamo room, entered the starboard 

dynamo work shop, opened the manhole to compartment V -98 and clim~d 

up to the ship's bottom taking his wrench and flashlight with him . 

All officers and enlisted personnel are to be commended for the initiative 

and prompt execution of all orders during the entire period and I am of the 

opinion that the coolness and lack of excitement as well as the small loss 

of life was due to a great extent to the training they had received during 

the previous nine weeks of duty as a bombing target. The boat crews 

acted in a manner well worthy of commendation, picking up men from the 

water during the entire strafing period. 

The reports of surviVors agree with the report given above. It should be 

mentioned here that Utah did not open fire against the Japanese planes 

because the guns were all inoperative. By reason of acting as target ship 

in the rurrent operations all of the anti-aircraft guns were covered with 

steel housing while the smaller machine guns were dismantled and stowed 

below decks. 

There were 58 men lost on Utah, The majority of those lost were killed 

or injured by 6 x 12 timbers which covered the ship in two layers; the 

swim to Ford Island was considerable, although shipmates helped each 

other in getting through the oily water. 
150 Pearl Harbor 

7. THE PERFORMANCE OF V.S.s. NEVADA 

Nevada was moo red just astern of Arizona. In accordance with the fleet 

doctrine she got underway and headed for the entrance before the order 

was cancelled. The senior officer aboard at the time was Lieutenant Commander Thomas of the Naval Reserve. 

The Japanese planes were first seen at 0801 and General Quarters was 

sounded immediately. The Captain's official report indicates that the rna· 

chine guns forward and aft opened fire at 0802 and the 5·inch opened 

fire about 0803 with local control as it was deemed inappropriate to wait 

for director control personnel to reach their stations in the top of masts. 

The machine guns fired effectively at enemy torpedo planes approaching 

from the portside. One plane was brought down by machine gun fire and 

fell about 100 yards off the port quarter. Another plane dropped a torpedo 

which struck N evada on the port bow. The 5-inch guns on the portside 

downed a torpedo plane before it released its weapon. 

About 0830 aIJ guns opened fire again and continued until 0915 when 

the attack slackened. The official reports differ as to the number of enemy 

planes shot down, but as many as five were reported. Some of these were 

dive bombers which attacked Nevada while she was underway. 

She got underway at 0840 and headed southwest. When abreast Drydock 

Number One she was heavily attacked by Japanese dive bombers. At this 

time Admiral Furlong, standing on the deck of his doomed flagship, Oglala, 

ordered the ship to seek refuge in the Middle Loch. He feared tha t she 

might block the entrance channel, especially if the enemy had dropped 

mines in that area as then seemed probable. Accordingly, he ordered two 

tugs to assist N evada, and she was grounded near the entrance at Waipio 

Point. 

"There were no more Japanese attacks. Nevada had fought gallantly, 

and had received one torpedo hit and at least six bomb hits. Her crew 

was magnifi cent. The Captain, Captain F. W. Scanland, reported as follows: 

The Commanding Officer finds it extremely difficult to single out in · 

dividual members of the crew as deserving of special praise. Every officer 

and man aboard, without exception, performed his duties in a most com· 

mendable manner and without regard to personal safety. The courage 

and spirit of the anti-aircraft gun crews, where bomb hits caused most of 

the casualties, was of the highest order. Every man on the ship carried 

on in accordance with the best traditions of the service. 

It is considered that Lieutenant Commander Francis ). Thomas, U. S. 
ObservatiollJ and Statements Made By Survivors III 

8O-O-lnll' 

USS Nevada beached. 

Naval Reserve, the Commandi ng Officer during the greater part of the 

attack, is deserving of special commendation. This officer got the ship 

underway within forty minutes and headed down channel. Although the 

NEVADA had been torpedoed and had recei\'ed one or two bomb hits, 

Lieutenant Commander Thomas correctly decided that it was urgently 

necessary to get underway to avoid de5truction of the ship due to the 

proximity of the ARIZONA which was surrounded with burning oil and 

afire from stem to stern. Throughout the action Lieutenant Commander 

Thomas cooly and calm ly fought the ship despite many bomb hits and 

casualties. After the attack and for two days afterward, Lieutenant Commander Thomas performed damage control duties in a most creditable 

manner although near the point of exhaustion by his two days of strenuous 

work. 

In addition, the Captain named the following for special recognition: 

Chief Boatswain E. J. Hill, who was killed in action. 
• • • • • 

1)2 Pearl Harbor 

Ensign J. K. Taussig, Jr., who, although ba:dly wounded, refused to leave 

his post. 

Ensign Taylor, who was in charge of a , inch anti-aircraft battery and was 

outstanding in leadership. 

Among others he mentioned Lieutenant L E. Ruff, Chief Quartermaster 

R. Sedferry, Boatswain's Mate, First Class A. SoJar, and Seaman First Class, 

W. F. Neudorf, Jr. 


He ended with the following: 


The Commanding Officer believes that all members of the Cfew of the 

NEVADA who were aboard during the attack are deserving of special 

praise, and the courage and spirit of the crew both during and after the 

attack cannot be over-emphasized. The performance of duty of the 

Medical Department under the difficult conditions is most gratifying, and 

the members of that Department exhibited the same courage and devotion 

to duty under fire as any other member of the crew. The dead and 

wounded were quickly and effectively handled. 

8. IMPRESSIONS AND ACTIONS ON U.s.S. MARYLAND 

The Commander Battleships, Rear Admiral W. S . . Anderson, wrote as 

foHaws: 

On the occasion of the treacherous surprise attack on Pearl Haroor on 

December 7, 1941, battleship readr guns opened fire at once. They were 

progressively augmented as the rest of the anti·aircraft battery was manned 

as all battleships went to Genera! Quarters with commendable promptness. 

This resulted in an early and great volume of anti·aircraft fire. Considering 

all the circumstances, including the necessity fo r local conlrol in the early 

stages of the attack, the control of fi re was gratifyingly good as attested 

by the fifteen to se\'enteen enemy planes which were brought down. That 

such an anti·aircraft fire could be inaugurated and sustained in spite of 

the difficulties resulting from early damage by torpedoes and bombs and 

great and menacing oil fires is a tribute to the courage, constancy, efficiency 

and resourcefulness of the officers and men. Not only were they maintaining 

a sustained and aggressive 'fire whenever the enemy threatened, but they 

were engaged in valiant efforts to save the ships, prevent their capsizing 

and fighting large and menacing oil fires , enveloped in dense clouds of 

smoke, Severe structural damage and flooded magazines made replenishment 

of ammunition a serious problem, which in overcoming great courage and 

ingenuity was exhibited . 
• • • • • 

• • • • • 

Observations and Statement! Made By Survivor! 153 

When the attack first started, the Chid of Staff, Operations Officer and 

Assistant Material Officer were on board the Bagship, MARYLAND. 

Other members of the Staff returned to the ship as soon as practicable, all 

arriving on board either during the action or shortly thereafter. Commander 

Battleships arrived on board about 0905 and immediately took general 

charge not only of the salvage and rescue work of the battleships but also 

assisted in retransmitting messages received from the Commander· in-Chid 

addressed to various light forces. 

Burning oil from the ARIZONA was being carried on the surface of the 

water surrounding the TENNESSEE-WEST VIRGINIA group and at 

times on the MARYLAND and capsized OKLAHOMA. The YG 17 upon 

the initiative of her commanding officer, Chief Boatswain's Mate, L. M. 

Jansen, U.S. Navy, took aggressive action in figh ting the fire, taking station 

at the guarter of the WEST VIRGIN IA and maintaining her position 

there in spite of dense smoke and fl ame. Commander Battleships directed 

the TERN to assist and later when the W IDGEON reported to assist in 

the rescue work on the hull of the capsized OKLAHOMA, directed that 

vessel to fight the fire, Later, the BOBOLINK was also directed to assist. 

These vessels kept the fire under control throughout the night and with the 

assistance of the NAVAJO on December 8 succeeded in extinguishing the 

fire in the WEST VIRGIN IA. These vessels were then directed to fight 

the fire in the ARIZONA which was gotten under control before dark the 

night of December 8. 

The CALIFORNIA was listing dangerously to port, The NEVADA, 

which had gotten underway from her berth, and had been bombed in the 

channel, was beached in order to prevent sinking or capsizing . 

The TENNESSEE was pinched between the WEST VIRGINIA and the 

forward interrupted quay. There is no evidence of excessive strain of the 

ship's structure. Armor bolts have been examined and found tight. 

MARYLAN D was struck by a light fragmentation bomb on the forecastle deck forward, which blew a hole about 12 feet by 20 feet in the 

deck, and caused minor structural damage in the compartments on the 

main deck below. This has been repaired. 

A I '-inch A.P. bomb entered the water on the port bow close aboard, 

and pierced the shell at the twenty-three foot water li ne, n~u frame 11 , 

exploding in compartment A-103-A, sail and awning stowage, causing 

widespread structural damage and Booding. Repairs are underway to make 

the ship seaworthy. 

The torpedo air compressor rooms were Booded incident to this hit, 

placing both compressors out of commission. A steam air compressor has 

been installed in the ship to provide H.P. air until these compressors can 
• • • • • 

• • • • • 

1)4 Pearl Harbor 

Maryland and capJizea Oklahoma with West Virginia"s mast! viJibt, in fht bac/tground. 

be repaired. Small urns and .50 caliber machine gun magazine was flooded 

by the ship. 

Information available at present indicates that machinery and hrerOOrn 

,spaces have incurred little or no damage from explosion or fire. On the 

NEVADA, OKLAHOMA, ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA the engineering plants afC submerged. 

The fires in the forward portions of the WEST VIRGIN IA and ARI· 

WNA have caused warpi ng and collapse of a considerable portion of 

structure. 

The need for adequate splinter protection for topside personnel was 

vividly demonstrated. f or examp le, the protection afforded by the King 

Board bulkheads provided considerable protection so far as it went. These 

bulkheads Wele pitted by many .lO ca libec bullets and fragments. In no 

case wece the bulkheads which were insptXted holed. However, the protection afforded was inadequate. There should be gun shields, oc better 

still, gun turrets. In the case of the NEVADA, a bomb hit the boat deck 

and wiped out most of the personnel because no protection was afforded 

from inboard. 

The need for splinter protection with lateral, all around, and overhead 
• • • • • 

• • • • • 

ObJervationJ and StatementJ Made By SurvivorJ 15) 

protection has been stressed by Commander Battleships in previous corre· 

spondence and the attack on Pearl Harbor served to emphasize its urgent 

necessity. 

Rescue work on the hull of the capsized OKLAHOMA was initiated by 

Commander Battleships and directed by Commander E. P. Kranzfelder 

and Lieutenant Mandelkorn of Commander Battleships' staff, assisted by 

officers and men of the OKLAHOMA, men from the RIGEL and Navy 

Yard Pearl Harbor and fire and rescue parties from the battleships. As a 

result of these efforts 32 men were rescued alive from the hull of the 

OKLAHOMA. 

The following named Division Commanders and Commanding Officers 

were killed: 

Rear Admiral 1. C. Kidd, U.S. Navy, Commander Battleship Division 

One. 

Captain F. Van Valkenburgh, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. 

ARIZONA. 

Captain M. S. Bennion, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. WEST 

VIRGINIA. 

eOnallel oj I'cHollne/. In separate correspondence Commander Battle· 

ships has submitted to the Commander-in-Chief a report of the distinguished 

conduct of various individuals, as well as the ships· companies in general. 

Commander Battleships cannot, however, conclude th is report without 

paying homage to the universal exhibition of courage and magnificent 

fighting spirit by absolutely all the personnel of the battleships. Their 

conduct was in accord with the highest traditions of the Service. 

The Commanding Officer, Captain D. C. Godwin reported : 

All anti-aircraft batteries were promptly manned at the beginni ng of 

the attack. The machine gun battery placed torpedo planes under fi re 

immediately, it being believed that the fi rst two such planes approaching 

this ship and the OKLAHOMA met destructive fire. All A.A. batteries 

were employed against the dive bombing and strafing attacks which 

followed the torpedo attack. The approximate amount of ammunition expended is as follows : 

5"/25-450 rounds 


1".1-4500 rounds 


.50 cal. M.G.-2500 

• • • • • 

• • • • • 

Pearl Harbor 

9. IMPRESSIONS AND ACTIONS ON V.s.s. TENNESSEE 

The Captain of Tennessee, Captain C. E. Reardan, wrote: 

At about 07.55, planes, observed to be Japanese by their markings, were 

seen dropping bombs on Ford Island. This ship went to General Quarters 

and started setting condition Zed. Immediately, after the bombing of Ford 

Island, planes began torpedoing and bombing the battleships and other 

ships in me Harbor. This ship opened fire with 5" 25 caliber, }".50 

caliber, and .:;0 caliber machine guns about five minutes after the first 

attack. Orders for sortie were received but later cancelled fo r battleships. 

This ship was ready to get underway with both plants and 6 boilers 

about 09}0. Shortly after the attack began, the OKlAHOMA, WEST 

VIRGINIA, and CALIFORN IA received torpedo hits. The OKLAHOMA 

listed over and in about 10 minutes capsized. The WEST VIRGINIA listed 

heavily but was righted by counter flooding. The CALIFORNIA listed. The 

ARIZONA received several large bomb hits at least one of which apparently penetrated the magazines. There was a large explosion forward. The 

foremast fell forward and burning powder, oil, and debris was thrown on 

the quarterdeck of the TENNESSEE. The ARIZONA settled rapidly by the 

bow. The N EVADA got underway, but was struck by bombs and torpedoes 

and grounded in the channel. Large fi res were raging around the 

ARIZONA and WEST VIRGINIA. The ARIZONA was moored to quays 

about seventy-five feet astern of the TENNESSEE and the WEST 

VIRGINIA was moored to the TENNESSEE. The burning powder, oil, and 

debris from the ARIZONA explosion plus the intense heat from the fires 

started fi res in the stern and port quarter of this ship. These fires and the 

subsequent wetting caused considerable damage to the wardroom and 

officers' qua rters In this vicinity. The fires were brought under control 

about lO}O. 

There are 21 blanked 'Off ports in the area which was exposed to great 

heat. Of these blanked ports the welding pulled apart due to the distortion of the shell plating. The regular POtts in this area had the lenses 

{used, rubber gaskets burned, and the canvas stopwater between the port 

frame and the side of the ship destroyed. Except in small isolated cases, 

mere was no burning of linoleum. This was probably due to the fact 

that me heat was above all linoleum rather than under. 

The following ammunition was expended during the battle: 760 rounds 

5'·/25 A.A. common, 180 rounds }"/:;O, 4000 rounds :;0 caliber machine 

gun. 

• • • • • 
Observat;OI1J and StatementJ Made By SurvivOrJ 157 

~.

Tennessee and West Virginia with capJ;zed Oklahoma ;/1 Joreg roNlld. 

The conduct of the officers and crew of the TENNESSEE was uniformly 

in accordance with the highest traditions of the Service. Not only did they 

fight the battle with calmness and ddi~ration but for the next twenty-four 

hours they fought the oil fires in the ARIZONA and WEST VIRGIN IA 

which threatened to destroy the TENNESSEE. The ARIZONA was eighty 

feet to windward and her burning oil was a real menace to this ship; the 

WEST VIRGINIA was alongside with her forward magazines in danger 

of explosion ; neverthdess, the crew carried out their gunnery and damage 

control dUlies as if at drill. The Commanding Officer considers that the 

conduct of the following officers was especially distinguished: 

1. 	 Liell/·Comdr. Jolm Jr!'. Adami, Jr., US. Navy: 

As Gunnery Officer aRd temporary Commanding Officer he fought 

the ship with a calmness and precision that was an inspiration to the 

entire sh ip's company. 

2. 	 LielllManl Robert R. Aioore, US. Navy: 

As sen ior Damage Control Officer aboard he carried on all of 

his duties in an extremely calm and efficient manner. 

3. Captain Ch,ve) S. White, U .S. Marine CorpJ: 

Acting as Air Defense Officer, he displayed outstanding coolness and 

courage during the engagement. Whi le exposed to enemy bombing 
158 	 Pearl Harbor 

and strafing attack at his unprotected battle station he directed 

the lire of the A.A . battery in a calm and efficient manner. 

4. 	Ensign William S. Thomas, D·V(G). U.S.N.R: 

As A.A. Group Control Officer, while exposed to enemy bombing 

and strafing attack in an unprotected battle station, he carried out his 

duties in a calm and efficient manne r. 

~. Ensign Donald M. Kable, U.s. Navy: 

~ .50 caliber machine gun Control Officer, he directed the fire 

of his guns while being strafed by enemy planes until he was so 

seriously wounded that he was carried below. 

6. 	Chief BoatJwain uwis W . Adkim, u.s. Ndvy: 

In charge of the after repair party, his leadership and heroic conduct 

while fighting the lires contributed much toward saving the ship 

from destruction. Throughout the attack he was in an exposed 

position and continued to fight the fires until they wcrc brought 

under control. 
• 


1!tI.LdVH::> x 

• 

• 


• 

• 


CHAPTER X 


Other Ships' Official Reports 

1. DESTROYERS 

Bagley was at the Navy Yard and witnessed the action over Hickam Field, 

believed at first to be Army bombers. At about 0758 Bagley saw torpedo 

planes attack Oklahoma from a height of only 50 or 60 feet. The ship went 

to general quarters, opened fire at once with forward machine guns, and 

saw one plane drop and its torpedo land in a mud bank ahead of Bagley. 

Bagley shot down, or saw shot down, several Japanese torpedo planes. Although limited by Navy Yard work Bagley was able to get underway at 

0940 and patrolled at sea near the entrance. 

Blue saw Utah torpedoed at 0800, and sounded Genera l Quarters. Although undergoing buoy upkeep, she prepared to get underway. At 0805 she 

opened fire with 50 caliber machine guns, and about two minutes later with 

5-inch guns. The shi p got underway at 0847 and continued firing at enemy 

planes while steaming out of the harbor. Blue passed the channel entrance 

buoys at 0910 and proceeded to the patrol station of sector three. Here Blue 

claimed one midget submarine, and possibly two more , due to depth charge 

attacks. Oil slick and air bubbles were in evidence. 

It should be related that the Acting Commanding Officer of Blue was 

Ensign Nathan F. Asher, only two years out of the Naval Academy. The 

officers aboard were in large part Reserve Officers. The ship got underway 

promptly, opened fire with its machine guns at once, and got the 5-inch 

anti-aircraft battery fi ring within a few minutes. They shot down at least 

one Japanese plane, probably sank one enemy submarine, and acted as 

screen for fleet cruisers sea rching for the Japanese Fleet. When the gun 

captain of number 1 gun went to repair the ammunition hoist of number 

4 gun he got on his knees and prayed, "Oh, Lord! Oh, Lord! Make this 

ammunition hoist work just this once." While he was praying with tears 

coming from his eyes, a tall colored man stationed in the handling room 

looked down and said, "Why, Smith, you got the oil turned off." 

Helm was enroute to the deperming area in the West Loch at 0726. Her 

16 1 

" 
162 Pearl Harbor 

IIO-G_1M71 

USS Shaw exploding. 

crew saw the Japanese planes attacking Ford Island at 07:)9, before going 

to Genera l Quarters. Although ammunition was at hand the forward 

machine guns did not open fire on the torpedo planes that passed over the 

ship because these guns did not bear and were in a state of preservation. 

However, fire was opened at 0805 by the after machine guns and were 

followed shortly by the forward guns. This was followed at 0807 by firing 

from the '-inch battery. A Japanese torpedo plane was observed to catch 

on fire and crash-land near Hickam Field. 

Helm changed its destination and put out to sea, ultimately to act as a 

screen for cruisers. In the meantime she sighted a periscope near the eotrance. The submarine appeared to be fast on a reef but it escapt;d and 

submerged. A torpedo passed close to Helm and its plates were sprung due 

to near misses of light bombs and constant strafing. 
• 


Olher Ships' Official Reports 163 

Jarvis was at the Navy Yard and witnessed the torpedo planes attacking 

the battleships at 0759 and immediately went to General Quarters. Promptly 

the anti-aircraft batteries were manned and the machine guns opened fire 

at 0804. At 0805 the number 3 five-inch gun joined the action, and all guns 

were in use by 0815. 

Shaw was in Floating Drydock Number Two and eventually came to grief. 

The vessel saw the planes attack Ford Island but did not open fire because 

she was in an overhaul status with ammunition stowed below. At 0840 

Shaw and the floating drydock were heavily bombed by the planes which 

attacked N eMda which was then near. As a result the floating drydock was 

sunk and Shaw heavily damaged due to a magazine explosion forward. The 

magazine explosion on Shaw is shown on page 

There were 35 or 40 destroyer types in Pearl Harbor at the time of the 

Japanese onslaught. Except for three, none suffered serious damage. The 

great majority showed the mettle which characterized the fleet. Those that 

did not get underway to patrol for enemy submarines were on the job with 

their anti-aircraft batteries, were rescuing men from the water and oil, or 

were sent to the battleships to help fight the fires which were raging. A 

number were under overhaul at the Navy Yard or alongside repair ships or 

tenders, and were therefore in an unalert state as far as concerns guns, 

ammunition, or propulsion. Their efficiency in patrol work is attested by the 

fact that not a single ship of the American Navy was successfully attacked 

by the Japanese submarines that lay in wait off the entrance channel or in 

operating areas. 

Space is not available to describe the various destroyers which rendered 

major service in combatting the enemy or patrolling for enemy submarines, 

but mention should be made of W aJT1Iulh, Tucker, Tracy, Breese, Dewey, 

Heliley, Preble, Sumner, Reid, Hull, Gamble, CummingJ, Thol'lllolJ, RamJay, Mugford, Conyngham, Sicard, Ralph Talbol, and others. 

Let it be recorded that both mine divisions acquitted themselves well. 

They were undergOing overhaul at the Navy Yard and were without guns 

or ammunition. However, they went to General Quarters promptly and 

were sent to assist nearby ships 'in manning anti-aircraft batteries, in supplying ammunition, and in fighting fires on PennJyivania and Califorllia. Machine guns were reassembled and remounted, and with ammunition obtained 

from N ew Orleam and San Franciuo were used against the enemy in the 

late attacks. 

,

, 

o 
Other Ships' Official Reporll 165 

2. BATTLESHIPS 


As previously explained, Pennsylvania was in Drydock Number One to· 

gether with the destroyers Cassin and Downes which were forward and 

inboard. Cassin and Pel1l1Jylvania observed enemy planes attacking Ford 

Island and Hickam Field. When enemy planes attacked California, General 

Quarters was sounded about 07')7 or shortly thereafter. Pennsylvania, al· 

though in drydock, opened fire on the Japanese planes at 0802. During the 

second attack D ownes was hit and set on fire; the drydock service lines 

were hit and water pressure was interrupted. One bomb passed through 

Pennsylvania'S boat deck on the starboard side and put several 5·inch guns 

out of commission. At 0920 the drydock was flooded to put out raging fires 

on Downes. The result was that Cassin rolled Over on Downes. Both destroyers were severely punctured by fragments from bomb hits on the 

drydock, and wa rheads from CaJSin exploded and fell on Pennsylvania's 

bow. 

Tennessee was kept busy fighting fires on the oily water as a result of 

fires on Arizona and West Virginia. The after part of the ship was gutted 

by fires. In addition, T emzessee was hit twice by bombs, once on the face of 

turret II and again on the top of turret III. Although capable of getting 

underway, the sbip was held fast due to the pinching of the hull between 

West Virginia and the forwa rd quay. The latter had to be blown up with 

explosives before T elllleJSee could be extricated. 

Maryland was moored inboard of Oklahoma and was the least damaged 

of the battleships. She receiyed one bomb hit on the forecastle, but was 

moved to the Navy Yard as early as 11 December and was ready for duty 

a week later. 

The twenty-five observation planes of the battleships were hard hit. Only 

one was fit to fly immediately while nine more were repaired in a few 

hours. Four required major repairs, and eleven of the planes were stricken 

as complete wrecks. Their parts were used in repairing others. 

3. CRUISERS 

There were eight moden cruisers in Pearl Harbor, most of them at the Navy 

Yard, at the time of the Japanese attack. Many of the other Pacific cruisers 

were at sea with the various task forces. Only three were damaged: H elena, 

Honolulu, and Raleigh, 
166 Pearl Harb or 

Ufl<l "'Roll.. ~laD) 307l~ 

Damage to bow of Pennsylvania in Drydo(k Number D'Ie. 

Phoenix saw planes proceed ing to Ford Island at 0755. Hono/ulu, from 

the Navy Yard at 0755 saw planes attacking Hickam Field and shortly 

thereafter witnessed a wave of torpedo planes moving toward the battleship 

line. She immediately sounded General Quarters and passed the word 

"Enemy Air Raid," Machine guns fired at the torpedo planes and the '}-inch 

went in to action immediately. Hon-o/uill fi red about 2000 rounds of 30 

caliber, 4500 9f 50 caliber, and 250 of 3-incb. The ship kept firing until 

the attacks subsided. This ship saw two of the torpedo planes destroyed. 

Phoenix got underway at 1010, temporarily (ehuned to its moorage as 

ordered, but eventually joined other cruisers at sea. The ship fi red eighty 

rounds of 5-inch between 0900 and 0915 on planes dive-bombing Ford 

Island and the battleships. 

Honolllht Juffered one near-miss which caused considerable damage and 

leakage hard to control. One near-miss bomb passed through the Navy 

Yard concrete pier and exploded near the hull of the ship. 
Other ShipI' Official Reports 167 

Helena was moored to 10-10 dock and observed planes over Ford Island 

at 0757. A signalman, with previous duty on the Asiatic Station, identified 

the planes immediately and arranged for the general alarm to be sounded 

and service ammunition to be broken out. At 0801 Helena opened fire, 

which caused the Japanese aviators to disperse and shy away from Helena. 

A torpedo exploded against the port engine room after passing under 

Oglala which was tied up alongside and outboard. The hit on Helena caus~d 

serious flooding of machinery spaces. For tempora ry repairs before departing 

for the West Coast, the ship was put in the still incompleted Drydock 

Number Two, the first vessel to use this drydock. 

Raleigh was tied up at the quay customarily used by an aircraft carrier. 

At 0800 she opened fire with her anti-aircraft battery consisting of so 

caliber, l.l-inch, and 3·inch guns. She was struck by a torpedo about 0800 

and immediately listed to port. The forward engine room and forward fire 

rooms were completely flooded. All weights on the port side were jettisoned 

to prevent capsizing. The ship sent help to Utah, and the ship·s doctor 

to Solace, a hospital ship. 

New Orleans sounded General Quarters at 0757, immediately after seeing 

enemy planes dive· bombing Ford Island. The ship was tied up at the Navy 

Yard and manned I.I-inch battery and machine guns aft in time to fire at 

the Japanese planes launching torpedoes against the battleships. In the 

meantime, the Japanese were fired at with rifles and pistols from the fantail. 

By 0810 all guns except the 8-inch were in· use and caused the Japanese 

aviators to turn away or to drop their bombs erratically. The concentrated 

fi re from New Orleans and Honolulu had a salutary effect, causing the 

bombs to fall into the water between the ships and Rigel. 

Saint Loll;s was at the Navy' Yard but lost no time in going to General 

Quarters and opening fire with the 50 caliber and lot·inch batteries. The 

S-inch guns and the two boilers which were out of commission because of 

Navy Yard work were soon put into operating condition. SainI Louis got 

underway at 0931 with boiler power for twenty-nine knots. She cleared the 

entrance at twenty· fi ve knots and zigzagged after torpedoes were fired at 

her. She joined other cruisers and destroyers in pursuit of the Japanese 

forces. 

The Commanding Officer, Captain G. S. Rood, gave high praise for the 

performance of duty of all officers and men attached to the vessel. All 

hands responded promptly without confusion or delay. He especially commended Lieutenant Charles A. Curtze, on the Staff of Commander Cruisers, 
168 Pearl Harbor 

who was a visitor on board at the time Genera l Quarters was sounded. He 

proceeded at once to Central Station and performed the duties of First 

Lieu tenant and Damage Control Officer. 

4. MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARY SHIPS 

The auxiliary ships acguitted themselves with distinction. At/ocel was 

moored neaf Ford Island and observed the bombing of hangars and planes 

at the Naval Air Station. That small seaplane tender fired forty-four rounds 

of 3-inch and 1750 rounds of 30 caliber. The torpedo planes which attacked 

CaN/omia were fired upon by Avocet. 

We should not forget the seaplane tender Curtiss. She witnessed the 

bombing of the Naval Air Station and the torpedoing of Utah and Raleigh. 

Immediately the vessel went to General Quarters. She shot down an ~nemy 

plane about 1000 yards off the port bow and saw one plane crash in a suga r 

cane field. The vessel was ready to get underway when at 0835 it sighted 

a midget submarine periscope on the starboard quarter about 700 yards 

away. She opened fire at once and scored two hits on the conning tower. The 

submarine was later depth charged by Monaghan and was subse'luently 

recovered. Its picture appears on page 169. At 0905 an enemy plane was 

hit by CUl"tiJJ and crashed into the starboard crane. A bomb hit the boat deck 

and detonated on the main deck, its fragments destroying much gear. At 

the same time one bomb fell short and another struck the mooring buoy. 

Nor should we forget the indomitable repair ship VeJtal which was 

moored alongside the ill-fated Arizona. She sounded General Quarters at 

0755 and shortly thereafter opened fire with 5-inch, 3-inch, and 30 caliber. 

A blast from Arizona caused numerous casualties on Ve stal. It blew overboard the Captain who returned to his ship by swimming. He was Com· 

mander Cassin Young, who was later ki lled aboard the cruiser Sail Fran· 

6 1(0 at Guadalcanal. Venal had been hit by two bombs, had a list of over 

six degrees, and was down by the stern. When burning oil from Arizona 

jeopardized the ship by fire, Vesfal got utlderway at 0845 and grounded at 

0950 to prevent further list or loss of buoyancy. 

Swan, another small seaplane tender, was in the Marine Railway undergoing boiler repairs when at 0755 it observed the enemy assault on Ford 

Island. It immediately went to General Quarters and opened fire at 0803 

with its }-inch guns. 
Olher Ships' Official Reports 169

• 

. 

tJlIS NR.L (MOO) _, 

Stern view of Japaneu two·man submarine. Note "washboard" elful {dHIed b, depth 

charges. 

Rigel, a repair ship was tied up at the Navy Yard, saw Ford Island 

attacked by ten dive·bombers at 0758. At 0800 it was bombed and strafed 

by dive-bombers from a low altitude. The ship had no armament and was 

therefore unable to take action against the Japanese planes although seeing 

them attack the battleships with torpedoes. About 100 of her men were 

sent to West Virginia to help fight 'fires. The blasts from near-misses threw 

about 100 men into the oily water, and caused about 1')0 sma ll fragment 

holes in the port quarter. The men were rescued but one whaleboat was 

hit by a bomb and disintegrated. 

The submarine rescue ship Widgeon rendered first aid to whatever ship 

seemed in need. The ship re<:eived from Commander Battle Force a letter 

of commendation for the work of its intrepid divers and those of the 

Subma rine Base for their work on N evada and California. 

Various other auxiliary vessels witnessed the early Japanese forays and 

took offensive action. Among these were PeliaJ, AII/arn , Whitney, Dobbin, 

Ramapo, Caslor, and the tugs Vireo, Bobolink, and Rail. 

5. SUBMARINES 

There were four United States submarines present at the time of the 

Japanese attack, none of which were damaged. 
170 Pearl Harbor 

Tautog at once saw enemy planes approach and drop bombs .over Ford 

Island. She also saw the torpedo planes approach the battleships. The fourth 

plane in line was shot down by either Talllog or Sumner. 

Dolphin at 0800 used rifles and machine guns against Japanese planes. 

Another submarine which should be mentioned is CachaloJ which was 

at the Navy Yard at the time . It was in position to observe the attack on 

Ford Island and the torpedoing of the battleships. Bereft of military equipment due to Navy Yard overhaul it rendered assistance to stricken ships, 

especia lly Oglala. 

6. OGLALA 

Special mention should be made of the minelayer Oglala because she was the 

flagship of the minecraft. The Commander of Minecraft, Rear Admiral 

William R. Furlong, was walking the deck of Oglala and wa!> a valuable 

witness before the Robert!> Commi!>sion. He saw the bombs dropped on the 

Naval Air Station and !>aw the torpedo planes start their torpedoes toward 

the defenseless battleships across the water from him. As soon as he heard 

Starboard sid, of USS OgWa, looking aft from Ten-Till Dock. 
Other Ships' Official Repor15 171

the explosions he detected that they were enemy planes although up to that 

time he gave but little attention to planes buzzing about even on a Sunday. 

He called out: "Japanese. Man your stations." The word was immediately 

passed to call all men to General Quarters. All watertight doors were closed, 

guns were manned, and all men went to their stations. 

Oglala capsized eventually, about one and one-half hours after suffering 

a near-miss from the torpedo which struck Helena. Oglala set up a first aid 

station on the N avy Yard dock, and mounted guns on the dock. Men from 

Jr'est Virgillia who were wounded were landed there and received first aid 

treatment f rom Oglala'S crew. 

/ 

'

-
d~~AI~S ~l0M. 

nv" 
 "spmH Pd~~~U3 uI 

lH.LdYH:> IX 
, ", . 
CHAPTER XI 


"All Hands" Engaged In 

Salvage Work 

l. PRIORITY OF WORK 

No sooner had the attack been completed tha n Fleet Commanders got ready 

for another strike. Many put to sea in search of the enemy. Fortunately a 

repetition of the attack never came. The Japanese Commander considered 

that the mission w~s completed and missed his chance of finishing the job 

so efficiently begun. He could have set on fire the reserve oil supply of five 

mill ion barre ls, or he could have leveled the Navy Yard's shops and drydocks, thereby destroying the Navy's industrial capacity. Likewise he could 

have destroyed the submarine base which contained the headquarters of the 

Commander-in-Chief and which was of paramount value later in carrying 

on the submarine offensive against japan's milita ry and maritime ships. 

As has been stated, each ship was under twelve hours notice to get underway in case of attack. Yet, the smaller ships reguired much less than twelve 

hours. Some ships at Pear! Harbor did get underway and put to sea, but the 

la rger ships stayed in port due to a wise cancellation of the order. The two 

task forces then at sea were instructed to sea rch for the Japanese and to 

intercept them if sighted. Fortunately they were not found ; their strength · 

was far greater than any American force that was available at the time. This 

included air power, at which the Japanese had a great superiority. 

Of first importance to Fleet Commanders was the task of readying ships 

fo r a full fl eet engagement with the Fleet of Japan. At that time no 

information was at hand on the enemy's location, the strength of his force, 

or his intentions with regard to landing or seeking a fleet engagement. 

The situation which confronted the high comma nd was therefore to arrive 

at a priority of work on the various ships, since those needing a minimum 

of work should be taken in hand first and made ready for action. 

m 

, 

176 Pearl Harbor 

2. HELPING EACH OTHER AND REPELLING 

ENEMY ATIACKS 

We have seen from survivors' reports the spirit which pervaded our men. 

Both officers and enlisted were busy saving the lives of each other and in 

repelling the enemy. Cowardice was rare jf not unknown. Heroism and 

bravery were the qualities shown by the military. Taking undue risks was 

commonplace. 

The manning of anti-aircraft batteries and the rer.lenishment of ammunition came first. The removal and comfort of the wounded were of almost 

equal importance. Fighting fires and watertight integrity were the tasks of 

many. Men were overcome by fumes from the fuel oil which was everywhere, but a shipmate was usually at hand to carry a person to fresh air, 

or to rescue drowning persons from the water, or from oil and water mixed . 

Helping shipmates through portholes was the only means of escape still 

available in certain ships and was responsible for saving many lives. 

3. FREEING TRAPPED MEN 

As ships capsized in particular Oklahoma and Utah, some men were trapped 

in the ship's lower compartments. They made their presence known by 

tapping on the structures with wrenches or other tools. These were heard 

by the men on the hulls of the capsized ships and were answered; the 

Morse Code was used, and the rescue of the trapped men began. Oklahoma 

showed the maximum promise. The bottom of the ship was all that was 

visible above water. The ship had capsized through 170 degrees so that its 

bottom was nearest the surface. By cutting holes through the bottom of the 

ship .the rescue party was able to reach the men who had sought refuge in 

that part of the ship which was near the open air. 

A survivor who had escaped through a hatch at frame 117 stated that 

men were alive in that locality. At about that time, 0915, Commander Kranzfelder and Lieutenant Mandelkorn from the staff of Commander Battleships, 

were present, and at 0930 Lieutenant Commander Herbert Pfingstag from 

the Navy Yard arrived. At fi rst they tried to gain access to the inside of 

the ship by acetylene torch, using it in locations free of oil and wate r, but 

found that the fumes from oil and the cork used for insulation were deadly 

to the men who were trapped in the loca lity. Accordingly, they thereafter 
"A/J Hands" Engaged In Salvage Work 177 

8\J-O-!W<l 

Relate "~rtiel at work on USS Oklahoma. USS Maryland iJ ill the background . 

. used compressed air and corresponding tools which were furnished by the 

Navy Yard and various ships, including Maryland, Argonne, and Rigel. 

The Navy Yard and ships concerned provided submersible pumps, sound 

powered telephones, and air ducts for ventilating purposes. 

Soon the trapped men were located in the vicin ity of frames 131, 116, 

78~ and 22. The men were all near the bottom of the ship, which at that 

time was partly visible above the water level of the harbor. It was not until 

0800 on 8 December that six men were rescued, and at 1100 eleven marc 

were brought out. Five more were released at 1400 and eight at 1600 on that 

same date. The last man was not rescued from Ok/~homa until 0230 on 

9 !December. All were in good condition except for lack of sleep, food, and 

sufficient oxygen. Some of the thirty-two men were dependent on an air 

buoble for sufficient air. Of course the air bubble gradually disappeared and 

water rose as soon as an opening was made in a compartment. A watch was 
178 Pearl Harhor 

maintained on the hull of Oklahoma until 11 December but no fu rther 

signs of life were detected. 

A great part of the credit goes to the Navy Yard. One of its men showed 

intrepidity of the highest nature by staying on the job and risking his life 

as leader until all known survivors had been released from the hull of the 

ship. He was Julio De Castro, Leadingman Caulker and Chipper, who was 

awarded a Commendation by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

Ulah lost fifty-eight men in the action. Of those saved one man was rescued through the bottom after the ship had capsized. This was John B. 

Vaessen, Fireman Second Class, who was later lost. Nearly all of the men 

who had not been killed or wounded were clear of the lower compartments 

except Vaessen who remained at his post in the forward distribution room 

in order to keep lights on the ship as long as possible. He was rescued by 

helpers from Raleigh as well as by a volunteer crew from Utah consisting 

of Machinist S. A. Szymanski, Chief Engineman MacSelwiney, and two 

seamen. They heard tapping on the bottom and after answering. they cut 

a hole by acetylene torch, obtained from Raleigh, near enough to free 

Vaessen. 

4. SALVAGE OPERATIONS FROM ARGONNE 

Rear Admiral William L. Calhoun was in charge of sa lvage operations by 

virtue of his position as Commander of the Base Force. He was assisted by 

officers on his staff, especially Commander Rufus G. Thayer and Commander 

James H. Rodgers. It happened that Lieutenant Commander Lebbeus Curtis 

was enroute to the Far East for salvage work and, because of his considerable experience was put in charge as Salvage Engineer. He later was retained 

in the Base ~aJvage Organization for several months, at which time he was 

put in charge of all salvage in the Pacific as Mobile Salvage Engineer. He 

ultimately was promoted to Rear Admiral. 

Considerable progress was made in repairing ships which had only minor 

damage, especiall y by furnishing small craft to fight fires and supply pumping equipment. A hero of the times was the lowly garbage lighter, YG-17, 

which had a large pumping capacity. She tied up alongside West Virginia 

to fight her many fi res and was successful in her work though beset by 

Japanese aircraft and continuous strafing. This craft, which won commendations from the Commander of Battleships, had a nostalgic effect on the 
"All HandJ" Engaged Tn Salvage W ork 179 

I. 

\ 

\ 

1I>-LC_1UA_l 

Garbage Lighter YG- 17 which performed !Uch heroic dlffy 011 7 December 1941 ill 

fighting fim. 

author because her all -welded sister ship, YG-J6 (often ca lled Petunia ) was 

built under his jurisdiction at Mare Island and won a prize of $7500 in 

1932 for h imself and another officer. YG-J7 which was commanded by 

Chief Boatswains Mate L M. Jansen won a well-merited commendation 

for brave work following the Japanese surprise air raid, 

5. START OF SALVAGE ORGANIZATION 

The formal Salvage Organization began on 14 December '194 1, an even 

week after the Ja panese attack. It was under the direction of then Commander James M, Steele, who was previously in command of Utah. He 

remained in command of salvage under the Base Force until relieved by 

the author, Captain Homer N. Wallin, on 9 January, 194 2. At that time the 

Salvage Division became a part of the Navy Yard under the Manager, 

Captain Claude S. Gillette. 

The author is indebted to Vice Admiral William S. Pye and his Chief-ofStaff, ·then Captain Harold C. Train, for releasing him, fi rst on a part-time 

basis, from his duties on the Battle Force Staff so th at he could take direct 
180 Pearl Harbor 

charge of the salvage work. These officers were boosters of the salvage work 

and wcre extremely active in showing their support. So were all officers of 

the B~ttle Force Staff, especially Captain Allan E. Smith who was Operations 

Officer for Admiral Pye. 

The Staff of the Battle Force moved from the uninhabitable California 

and joined the Staff of the Commander·in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at 

the Submarine Base. Thus the three senior material officers of the fleet 

were in a single office and were called upon for a variety of duties. 

These were Commander David H. Clark of the Staff of the Commander-inChief; the author, Captain Homer N. Wallin, of the Battle Force; and 

uas /'o"""L {).J OD) a.7<1 

Imignia jor Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. 
"All Hands" Engaged In Salvage Work 181 

Commander Ralph S. McDowell of the Scouting Force. Commander Clark 

and Commander McDowell were very helpful to the author in all aspects 

of salvage work. 

In view of the Navy Yard's industrial importance its Commandant was 

switched from the Commandant of the District, Rear Admiral Bloch, on a 

part time basis, to the former Commander of Minecraft whose flagship, 

Oglala, capsized and sank. He was Rear Admiral William R. Furlong who 

was very interested in all Yard work and gave to salvage operations a 

great impetus. Formerly he was Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance. 

The headquarters of the Salvage Division was a contractor's shack nea r 

the waterfront. It was very unpretentious but served satisfactorily. As the 

Salvage Division grew, a number of other unpretentious waterfront build· 

ings were added. 

The original organization had liaison with the Navy Yard, and project 

officers in charge of each job. Originally Lieutenant Emile C. Generaux was 

project officer for Nevada, Lieutenant Commander Thayer for T enneJSee, 

and lieutenant Commander Rodgers for California. In addition to Lieuten· 

ant Commander Curtis, Lieutenant Commander Thayer and Lieutenant 

Commander Rodgers were general assistants to Commander Steele. Each 

specialty had an officer in charge. For instance, Boatswain W. A. Mahan 

under Lieutenant Commander O. 1. De Tar was in charge of all diving, 

Lieutenant Commander E. E. Berthold of ammunition, and Lieutenant 

Commander F. C. Stelter, Jr. of all other ordnance material. Office work 

was under Lieutenant Commander Solomon S. IS'Iuith, aided by Lieutenant 

Hal C. Jones. 

Each officer had help from civilian groups. Mr. Dillingham of Honolulu 

was available with necessary hoisting barges and other waterfront equipment. One of the most hel pful organizations was the Pacific Bridge Company. This company was accustomed to underwater concrete and large 

excavations with proper bulkheading, and therefore proved invaluable. 

The Pacific Bridge Company recommended unde~ater concrete in lieu 

of complete cofferdammi ng of ships resting on the bottom. An expert from 

the Navy Department finally agreed to this solution, but not until afte[ 

Lieutenant Commander Curtis had ordered a large supply of steel sheet 

piling for cofferdams around California. The underwater concrete proved 

entirely satisfactory, and the cofferdamming material was later used for other 

purposes in the far teaches of the Pacific. 
182 Pearl Harbor 

Sight should not be lost of the part which Navy Yard civilians gave to 

the salvage work. This is well illustrated by the letter which was written 

by a Ch inese photographer of the Yard named Tai Sing Loo. It follows: 

On the 6th of e(em~ r, Saturday afternoon, I had [made] arrange· 

ment with T«h. Sergent Christen to have all his Guard be at the Main 

Gate between 8:30 to 9:30 o'clock Sunday morning to have a group of 

picture taken in front of the new concrete entrance as a setting with the 

'Pearl Harbor' for Christmas card to send home to their family. 

Sunday morning I left my home for Pearl Harbor after 7:00 o'clock. 

I was waiting for my bus at corner Wilder Avenue and Metcalf Street. 

Saw the sky full of antiaircraft gun firing up in the ai r, I called my friend 

to look up in sky, explain them how the Na\'y used their antiaircraft 

gun firing in practising, at that time I didn't reaiile \',,'e were in actual war. 

Our bus stop at Bishop and King Streets. We heard the alarm ringing from 

the third story building of the Lewers & Cooke, Ltd. Saw the window 

shattered. I walk up to Young Hotel corner and cross the street. Stop 

for a cup of coffee at Swanky and Franky. Suddenly all excitement arouse 

the Honolulu Fire Engine rush down Bishop Street and all dira:tions. Taxi 

fuJI of sailor and marine dashing toward Pearl Harbor. I'm very much 

surprise what's all this excitement. I wave the taxi to stop and get on it 

to go back to Pearl Harbor. When I approached to Pearl Harbor surprise 

with great shock. Tho~ght one of our oil tanks caught on fire, showing black 

velum of thick smoke in the air. I got off at the main gate of Pearl Harbor, 

met all the guards with arms and Machine Gun in placed. I was great shock 

with surprise the war are on. Watching many Japanese war planes 

attacked Pearl Harbor, dropping bombs right and left on dry docks 

and Ford Island. Suddenly terrific explosion. Fire broke out. I was very 

calm and waiting for the opportunity to get a ride to the Studio to get 

my camera, I was at the Main Gates standby with Marines. Guards at 

the Main Gates were bra\'ery and cool headed to keep the by.standing away 

for safety and dear traffic. There were the young, fighting marines. We 

were under fire. The Japanese planes painted in aluminum, Red Ball under 

each wing, flew very low toward the Main Gates. 

I wish my Graflex wit h me. I would had a wonderful dose up shot of 

the Japanese. Again the Japanese flew around the Navy Housing Area and 

turn back, head direct to Hickham Field, very low to drop a bomb to the 

Hangers, with terrific explOSion, set fire the buildings. More planes flew 

direct the dry dock. Suddenl y, I saw one plane had a hit. It flew direct 

toward West Locke Stream of smoke screen. Now this my opportunity to 

get in the Yard, one of the Leadingman of Machine Shop drove in his 

automobile. I hop in, he take me to the Studio and pick up m}' Graflex 

Camera to take some picture, second thought I change my mind, reason is 

because first place I didn't had no order, the second place I didn't had 
"Ail Hal/ds" Engaged In Salvage Work 183 

USN NR.. L ( MOO) UT4~ 

uss Nevada's patch for torpedo hofe. Note photographe,. 1"ai Sitlg Loo at IOUlel· left. 

my famous Trade-Mark helmet on. I had a new English Helmet from 

Singapore, given by Admiral Murfin a year ago, so I' m afraid some one will 

make a mistake me as a Jap and shot me down. 

I went up to the Administration Building everything OK. I met Mr. 

\'\fm. McIlhenny and Mr. w. C. Boh ley at the stairway. We talk and both 

went toward the dry dock. I went to the Supply Dept. and saw many boy 

had a Steel Helmet on, so I, went to see Lt. Cdr. Supply Officer for permission to hat one, the size are too large and heavy for me so I select one 

smaller size, painted green and white stripe. I went direct to the dry dock 

to help put out the fife on U.S.S. Cassin had the depth charges on her 

stern the U.S.S. Pennsylvania bow between Cassin and Downes. I knew it 

was very dangerous it may explode damage the dry docks and the U.S.S. 

Pennsylvania. We put our hoses directed the depth charges keeping wet. 

An Officer came near by and keep up the good work we had out hose right 

at it all the time, and I turn around and saw Lt. Spear, order all men 

stand back, some things may happen, so I obey his order and ran back 
184 Pearl Harbor 

toward U.S.S. P~nnsy vania, suddenly really happen the tNeific explosion 

came from the Destroyer few people were hurt and some fell down. I notice 

some large pieces of Steel Plates blew over the dry dock when I turn 

around and look, afterward I notice two extra hoses without nozzles, SO 

I went to the Fire Station and brought back 2 volunteers pointed direct the 

depth charges, J call for more volunteers to help me dear and straighten up 

the hose around the FirSI Stred to clear for traffic at the $arne time purpose 

to gave the fire fighters a chance to extend the hose across over the bow 

of U.S.S. Pennsylvania to fight the fire at the Downes on Starboard side. 

Here come another Fire Engine from Submarine Base, I diem them to 

place their engine and connect this Hydrant # 15 1 and direct them to the 

depth charges, so everything are well done and successful accomplishment 

their service, A few words of my appreciation and vote of thanks and 

successful credit to lieut. Spear, in charge with his gallant spirit to kept 

his staff and volunteers calms, .right at the job to see the depth charges 

were wet and kept away the nre. The Marines o~ the Fire Dept. of the 

Navy Yard, are the Heroes of the Day of Dec. 7, 1941 that save the Cassin 

and Downes and U.S.S, Pennsylvania in Dry Dock No. 1. 

I saw the crew throw out empty Y' shell on the Dock, I gather up in 

Piles with some sailors so I met Chief LeTendre to help me order some 

hose from Supply Dept to place in this Hydrant No. 15 1, corner Avenue 0 

and First Street. I also request Lt. Foster to order me more hoses, with in 

half an hour and hou r the Ch ief brought back 6 new hoses and other load 

from Lt. Foster and other Chief which I have about 12 length of hose to 

stand by. Why I order this hoses for ? The Answer-for emergency something may happen I will be there with readiness, reason why, the magazines 

were taking out from the U.S.S, Pennsylvania, and many casing and empty 

shell, at the same time were under fired the Jap Airplanes flew over head 

where up in the clouds. The U.S.S. Pennsylvania Antiair-craft crews 

were in full action , I wasn't excited and very calm about Street to protect the 

2 new hoses, I were little worry_because I have no nai ls and lumber to nail 

between the two planks separated while the heavy traffic going by with 

Emergency Cases to the Naval Hospital without crushing the hoses. I met 

Captain Swain passing by I had his permission to have the Carpenter 

of the Boat Shop to help me nail this planks together, He went to telephone, 

within few minutes fOlJr men marching down with nails and lum~r. 

I were very happy, here comes the Carpenters ready to start nailing 

suddenly the roaring Anl i Air Craft Guns in action, I call my men to 

dodging for safety, after the Enemy Planes disappear we all returns to our 

duty, the four men didn 't (orne back at all left the hammers, nails and 

lumber, so I was very fortunely for two of our [ocal boys passing by and 

helping me to finish the job, it were very thankful to volunteers their 

service to stand by with me during the Emergency, I had two men standing 

by the Hydrant # 11 9 locate Corner Ave E and First Street near the 
" All HandJ" Engaged In Salvage Work I SS 

head of Dry Dock No.1, fou r men guarding the two hoses in emergency 

for readiness in case of fire broke out from the Magazine Casing. 

I was self volunteer to be Traffic Police and directing the Traffic 

during the rushing hours of Emergency, I get a big piece of Maroon doth 

to signaling the ambulance to look at those planks easily passing over, to 

save my hose and other word to give the wounded patients rest easily 

from rough crossing on the heavy plank I direct aU four hours to kept the 

First Street d ear of right away to the Naval Hospital. Many heavy Con· 

tractor Trucks passing by with all Defenders and Emergency Call Employee, to report to the Shop for standby. I di rect all this group of trucks 

turn up to Avenue E and unloaded the Employees. Every things were 

successfully appreciated to my volunteers friends of their bravery and 

couragrous to their service, during the emergency and Under Fired. 

Every thinks were under c;ontrol and we all secure and roll up the hoses 

and returns to the Supply Dept. We were hungry no lunch so I brought 

each one a Box Ice Cream for lunch and we all dismissed about 3:30 p.m. 

One of the Marine Patrol approaching toward me, if I will do the boys 

a great service of the Marine Guards and Sailor, which their have no 

lunch and some without breakfast, so I went to the garage to take my 

Red PutPut to the 3rd Defense Fleet Marine Mess Hall to see my 

fri end Tech. Sergt. Newland for help, I told the story regards the Post 

Guard have been neglected to release for lunch. Tech-Sergr. Newland were 

very kind and his Cook to prepared some sandwiches ham and chicken, 

fruit all I can delivery to the Post. You should hear what were their 

saying. Charles, you are one life saver. I have been riding round and round 

the dry dock until cvery one had a sandwiches on every post except the 

Fuel Oil a~ms. I scnd 50 chicken and hams sandwiches apples and 

oranges and buns with ham to the shops supt. office. After I returns the 

Mess Sergt. report no breads be served and water are being poison. I serving 

some civilians and the Post and Guards Hot Tacks, apples and orange. 

The water is poison. At the Dry Dock all the workmen have no lunch 

and hungry, working on the U.S.S. Downs and U.S.S. Cassin, I ran short of 

everything about 6:00 p.m. I told the r.,en go to the Mess Hall of the 

3rd Defense to have their meal without chuges and dri nk tomatoes 

juice and fruit. About 7 :00 p.m. I went to the garage to have them take me 

to the Main Gates. 

At the last thought I have the driver drove me to the Mess Hall , 

the Mess SergI. gave me 3 gals. can iced cold tomatoes juice and 3 dOzen 

oranges and bag full of Hot Tacks, I gave the driver to take back to 

Garage night force. I left the Navy Yard at 7:30 p.m. at Main Gates. I 

was very fortunely an automobile pass by. lady invited me to take 'me back 

to town, she just drive off the Ferry boat from Ford Island. She left 

me off the Hawaiian Electric Co. It was a black out night, I walk across 

the Army and Navy Y.M.C.A. to the Beretania Street to walk direct to 
186 Pearl Harbor 

the Thomas Square and stopped for a rest. I ask the soldier guard on 

patrol, with appreciated very kindly if he will halt an automobile to take 

me home, if convenience on their way home. I told him I came back from 

Pearl Harbor, I'm Chinese. He shake my h'and and glad to be of service. 

to the Chinese fri end. An automobile approach and stop. the soldier request 

the owner if he will help to take me home to the University. Happening the 

driver knew me very well, he heard my voice, so he invited me in his 

car and drove me to my home at the front door, I extended my appreciation and thanks him very kindly to see safe home. My wife and four 

children were happy and thankful I were safely at home. 

As the Confucious say, 'Every Kind Deeds its return many, many lime 

Folds,' 

6. RECOVERY OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL 

One of the most important projects of early salvage was the recovery 

of anti-aircraft guns and ammunition from sunk or disabled ships. Such 

guns with their directors and other necessary equipment were then installed 

around air bases and the Pearl Harbor compound. 

Much of this material w~s recovered by divers. Some of it was underwater and had to be unbolted and manhandled by men using diving gear. 

Likewise, much of the ammunition recovered was in magazines which had 

been flooded. 

7. MEDICAL HELP FOR WOUNDED OR BURNED 

The men of the Medical D epartment were commended for their efficiency 

during and following the attack. Many medical offi cers ap.d their staffs 

reported to the hospital or dispensaries for duty after their own facilities 

were no longer usable. They rendered first aid to the injured at the Naval 

Hospital, at various dispensaries, in the hospital ship Solace, or at the Navy 

Yard. Dispensaries were set up on Ford Island. Medical officers and pharmacist mates won high commendations for staying at their posts giving 

first aid treatment even though severely wounded or burned themselves. 

1 Tli Sing Loo, N,"r,,'iv~ of E;xptritnreJ of ChineJ ~ Pholog rtJphtr Employtd b, Pta,} 

Harbor NaIl, Yard during fapantu Raid "n 7 Dtumbu 1941, no datto 
CHAPTER XII 


Getting the Less Damaged Ships 


Ready For Action 

, 

CHAPTER XII 


Getting the Less Damaged Ships 


Ready For Action 


As mentioned before the fi rst aim of the high command was to get the less 

damaged ships ready as soon as possible for action. This work engrossed 

"all hands" around the dock. The crews themselves did considerable work 

in getting their ships ready. They were assisted by repair ships, tenders, 

tugs, and by the Navy Yard. 

As yet there was a dire shortage of pumping equipment, lumber, and 

other materials necessary for efficient salvage work. However, the spirit of 

the times was "to do our best with what we had," Each echelon of command 

did everything possible to overcome obstacles which were encountered. 

1. U.s,S, PENNSYLVANIA, BATILESHlP 

(LAUNCHED IN 19 15) 

The lightly damaged Penmyivania gave promise of being one of the first 

ships to be ready for action. The Navy Yard expedited the lining up of her 

shafts and propellers. One of the 5-inch anti-aircraft guns was put out of 

commission temporarily and one 5-inch 51 caliber gun was seriously damaged by the same 250 kilogram bomb which exploded two decks below. 

The latter was replaced by a gun from Wert Virginia. The fragmentation 

and explosion damage was quickly overcome. The splinter protection, 

wooden deck, electrical gear, water mains, and structural steel were soon 

repaired and the ship was ready to leave the drydock by 12 December and 

the Navy Yard by 20 December. 

Penmylvania'r drydock was flooded to within one foot of floatation when 

it was expected that the Nipponese planes might return. This flooding was 

precautionary in case a bomb explosion should take out the ca isson. When 

Penmylvan;a was removed from the drydock on 12 December, Downer was 

189 
190 

righted and set down on permanent blocks while CaHin was left in a toppled 

state until later. 

The hits by Japanese bombs on the ship and on the drydock sidewall 

resulted in the death of two officers and seventeen enlisted men and the 

wounding of thirty more. 

USS Pennsylvania in Drydod~ Number One with Cassin and Downes in foreground . 
Getting the Less Damaged Ships Ready for Action 191 

2. U.S.s. HONOLULU, CRUISER (LAUNCHED IN 1936) 

H Ollolulu was at the Navy Yard and suffered severe flooding forward . The 

ship was not hit, but a near-miss of a 250 kilogram bomb passed through 

the concrete surface of the pier and exploded about twenty feet from the 

hull. This resulted in an in-buckle five or six feet deep at about frame 40 

and extending fore and aft about forty feet. Although the shell of the 

vessel was not completely opened, the flooding was extensive and could 

not be stopped. Due to the rupture of a magazine sea-flood, the flooding 

included the handling room of turret II and several storerooms and 

compartments. 

Honolulu followed Penmy/vania in Drydock Number One, and remained 

in drydock for permanent repairs from 13 December until 2 January 1942. 

By 12 January the Yard completed permanent work to the structure, electric 

wiring, etc. 

U/110 1<0'11." " (MODI "1"7<3 

USS Honolulu, Jho/l.·illg damage 10 port Jide (awed b, bomb fuhich penetrated the dock 

llnd exploded alol1gJide the Jhip. 
192 Pearl Harbor 

3. U.5.S. HELENA, CRUISER (LAUNCHED IN 1939) 

As described, Helena was struck on the starboard side by the aerial torpedo 

which passed under Ogla/a at the lO- U) Navy Yard pier. The starboard 

side was opened up below the armor belt. Number 1 engine room and 

Number 2 boiler room flooded and the water percolated slowly into other 

spaces. 

Drydock Number Two was in an unfinished state at that time but the 

contractor, the Pacific Bridge Company, arranged to use part of the drydock 

for Helena after obtaining suitable bilge blocks from the Navy Yard. The 

vessel entered drydock on 10 December, the first vessel to occupy Drydock 

Number Two. 

Temporary repairs were made to H elena, including various piping systems, electric wiring, etc. On 21 December Helena was undocked and on 

5 January 1942 she sailed on half power for the Mare Island Navy Yard 

where permanent repairs were completed. 

4. U.s.S. MARYLAND, BATrLESHIP (LAUNCHED IN 1920) 

Maryland was berthed inboard of Oklahoma. She was struck by two IS-inch 

armor-piercing bombs. Fortunately both bombs had a low level of detona· 

tion. The first struck the forecastle awning and tore a hole about 12 feet 

by 20 feet and caused some damage in the compartments below. The second 

entered the hull at the 22 foot water level at frame 10. It exploded within 

the ship and caused considerable flooding. The bow was down about five 

feet. 

Since a drydock was not available, the Navy Yard assisted, by the forces 

afloat, made repairs without docking. A small caisson was fitted over the 

hole on the port side. When sufficient pumping facilities were available to 

control the flooding, temporary repairs were easy to complete. Maryland 

was fully repaired and ready for action by 20 December. 

5. U.S.S. TENNESSEE, BATILESHIP 

(LAUNCHED IN 1919) 

TenneJSee was moored inboard of W eJl Virginia and became wedged hard 

against the forwa rd quay as the latter ship settled and finally sank to the 
Getting the Less Damaged Ships Ready for Action 193 

bottom. Arizona'J oil fire engulfed the stern of the vessel and caused serious 

fires aft, especially in the officers' quarters on the second deck. 

The explosion of the magazines aboard Arizona showered T enneJJee with 

burning powder and debris. The forward magazines were purposely flooded 

as a precaution against the many fires on the ship. These fires were ominous 

for a long period and were so intense as to warp the stern plates and cause 

some pulling out of hull rivets. 

In order to minimize fires the vessel played several water hoses over the 

stern to keep the burning oil on the water at a distance. Also the engines 

were turned over to make five knots and the wake was effective in keeping 

the oil clear of the ship. There was no movement of the ship even when the 

engines were run at ten knots. This shows how securely the ship was wedged 

between WeJI Virginia and the quay. 

The vessel wa.s struck by two bombs of the 15 or 16-inch armor-piercing 

type from high-level bombers. Both bombs had a low order of detonation, 

or perhaps did not explode at all. 

!iSS N U L (MOD) 311744 

USS Tennessee, Jhowing pellttration of homb through catapult and top of turret III. 
Pearl Harbor 

The first bomb hit the centerline gun of turret II, causing the barrel to 

crack. All three guns were rendered inoperable. The second bomb passed 

through the roof plate of turret III and damaged the structure and the 

rimmer of the left gun. 

Several attempts were made to free the ship. About 650,000 gallons of 

oil were removed by pumping whjle work progressed on the quay and its 

buffer. The work proved more onerous than expected and was finished by 

dynamite blasting about 16 December. In the meantime, repajr ship Medusa 

and the Navy Yard patched the warped plates by welding, and blanked off 

a number of air ports. When Tennessee was finally freed she was moved to 

the Navy Yard where all inside damage was repaired. The ship was ready 

for service by 20 December. 

6. U.s.S. VESTAL, REPAIR SHIP (LAUNCHED IN 1908) 

Veslal was berthed outboard of the ill-fated At·izona. The first torpedo 

which hit the latter ship probably passed under Vestal. That vessel saw 

many of the torpedoes whjch hit Arizona and some which missed both ships. 

Vesta' was struck with two bombs which were dropped by dive-bombers 

early in the attack. They were, from Japanese surrender accounts, the 250 

kilogram type although the ship assumed that they were the 15 or 16·inch 

armor.piercjng variety. The first bomb hit the forecastle about 0805 and 

passed through several decks at about frame 43. This bomb exploded in 

the metal storeroom where the prevalence of metal products deadened the 

explosion and prevented the bomb from passing through other decks or 

the shell . Consequently there was no flooding, but the lower platform deck 

and other structures were badly ruptured. 

The second bomb was dropped from an elevation of about 1000 feet and 

struck the ship aft. It passed entirely through the vessel before exploding, 

and caused serious flooding. It lowered the stern about ten feet and produced 

a port list of about seven degrees. 

When the fuel oil between the two ships became ignited the captain of 

Vesta' decided to move. The vessel got underway about 0830, aided by two 

tugs as the ship's steering gear was inoperative. After coming to anchor it 

was decided that the damage was so extensive as to warrant beaching. 

Accordingly she got underway again at 0950 and grounded herself on 

Aiea Shoal. 
Gelling the Leu Damaged Shipl Ready for Action 195 

.I 

,, ' " '; . . . ' A\\\,;I 

USN NR«L (MODI 3~1 ~ 

uss Vestal after beach;'!!!. _ 

VeJlal was a repair ship, and her own artisans undertook the repair work. 

The temporary work was quite satisfactory but Vestal was placed in drydock 

as soon as one was available at the Navy Yard. The Yard finished permanent repairs on 18 February. 

The lesson to be learned from Veslal'J experience is that water-tight 

integrity cannot be counted on in the Case of older vessels. Thjs ship was 

about thirty-three years old at the time, and it was found tha t Rooding was 

progressive through the bulkhead and deck boundaries which supposedly 

were watertight. 

7. U.S.S. RALEIGH, CRUISER (LAUNCHED IN 1922) 

Raleigh was struck by a torpedo early in the a~tack. Like Utah , she occupied 

a berth usually used by an aircraft carrier. At 0756 the two torpedoes were 

dropped about 300 yards from the ship. One hit the ship below the eighty 

pound armor belt and another passed about twenty-five yards ahead of the 

ship. The one which hit the ship caused immediate flooding of the two 

forward boiler rooms and the forward engine room. 
196 Pearl Harbor 

,

-": 

H 

+ 

General Quarters was sounded at once, and the anti-aircraft battery went 

into action promptly. Men not at the guns were ordered to jettison weights 

on the port side, especially those high up on the ship. 

About 0900 the ship received a bomb hit from a dive-bomber. This was 

dropped from about 800 feet and passed through three decks and out the 

side of the ship. It exploded clear of the vessel at frame 112 and caused 

damage typical of a near-miss. Luckily the compartment, which held 3,500 

gallons of' aviation gasoline, was left intact. 

The ship counterflooded, but the construction of the ship was not favorable to a great deal of counterAooding as loss of buoyancy was more important than jist. Due to defective hatches the main deck had some free water 

surface, which, added to that produced by the damage. was almost fatal. 

The jettisoning of topside weights and the reduction of free surface by 

pumping water from the main deck saved the ship. It certainly would have 
Getting the Less Damaged ShipJ Ready for Action 197 

been lost in a seaway, as it developed negative stability. This was gradually 

overcome, partly by lashing an available barge alongside. 

1IO--{I--3 ..... 

USS Raleigh after taking one torpedo hit amidJhipJ and Olle bomb hit aft. 

Raleigh is an unusual case. The ship was almost lost even with moderate 

damage. The Commander Battleships commended the captain and crew 

for saving the ship by remedia l actions. 

The ship's force and repair ships repaired most of the inside damage to 

the ship, after removing almost all of the fuel, oil, and water which were 

aboard. It was not until 3 January that the Navy Yard had Drydock Number 

One available. Then the Yard completed permanent repairs to the hull and 

bulkhe¥-ds until undocking on 14 February. Soon Raleigh departed on one 

engine for Mare Island where new engine parts were provided and electrical 

repairs made. 

8. U.S.S. CURTISS, SEAPLANE TENDER 

(LAUNCHED IN 1940) 

The seaplane-tender Curtiss was moored near the Ford Island Air Station. 

General Quarters was immediately sounded and all guns were in action 

within five minutes. By 0825 the enemy planes were repulsed. At 0840 
198 Pearl Harbor 

Ctirl;u sighted a submarine periscope at 700 yards and promptly opened 

fire when the submarine partly surfaced. Two hits were made by 5-inch 

projectiles from number 3 gun. 

Damage to C1IrtiJJ resulted from an enemy aircraft colliding with the 

forward crane. The enemy plane burned on the boat deck. This occurred at 

0905. Another bombing attack occu rred at 0912. One bomb fell on the mooring buoy aft and two bombs fell alongside. Fragment damage from these 

three bombs was considerable. Another bomb struck the starboard side of 

the boat deck, passed through three decks, and exploded on the main deck 

causing considerable damage. 

These bombs were about 250 kilograms, measured about 12 inches in 

diameter, and carried abollt 130 pounds of T.N.T. They were released by 

dive-bombers from a height of about 300 to 400 feet. 

The widespread damage caused by fragments to the piping, electric wires, 

steam lines, and ammunition supply, etc. overshadowed entirely the structu ral damage which they caused. Even the after engine room was affected 

by fragments from the bomb hit. Many fires were started and these were 

difficult to extinguish due to smoldering cork insulation and poor lighting. 

Much of the fragment damage could have been prevented by use of some 

armor, which was forbidden in auxilia ry vessels under the arms limitation 

treaties. Later designs provided two-inch splinter protection for sixty percent 

of the length, as well as splinter protection for gun, fire control, and ship 

control stations. 

The Navy Yard undertook repairs to CurtiJJ on two separate availabilities; 

the first was from 19 to 27 December. When replacement parts were 

received, CurtiJJ was in the Yard from 26 April to 28 May 1942. At that 

time final repairs were made. 

9. U.S.S. HELM, DESTROYER (LAUNCHED IN 1937) 

We have seen how Helm got underway promptly and patrolled the waters 

for submarines outside of Pearl Harbor. She was attacked by a dive-bomber 

at 0915 when about five miles southwest of Aloha Tower. Helm reported 

that the enemy fighter dropped two bombs from a height of about 1000 feet. 

The first fell about 100 to 150 feet off the port bow, and the other about 

30 feet to starboard abreast frame 10. 

The second bomb deluged with water the forecastle and the gun director. 
Getting the Leu Damaged Ships Ready for Action 199 

,\I', 

&0-0-42TO I 

USS Curtiss, showing stdrboard (rane which was Jlrll(k by /apalleJe aircraft Olil of 

control. 

No fragments were observed. The forward part of the ship suffered con· 

siderable damage from the near-miss. The foundation of the gun director 

steadily grew worse, and the flooding forward was severe in the peak tanks 

and forward compartments. Some damage occurred due to short circuiting 

and kicking out of circuit breakers in the forward part of the ship. 

Helm was drydocked in the Yard 's marine railway on 15 January 1942, 

Here permanent repairs were made to the shell plating, structu re forward, 

gun directors, and electrical lines. The shell plating showed the effects of 

the near-miss. Shear lines were seen forward of bulkhead 14. The practical 

effects of the near-miss were in accordance with the naval architectural 

theory. 
.' -, 
1E1.ldVH::J I1IX 
· 

--, 

'Ol'J":"' 
CHAPTER XIII 

Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbor 

There was a gene ra l feeling of depression throughout the Pearl Harbor area 

when it was seen · and fi rml y believed that none of the ships sunk at Pearl 

Harbor would ever fight again. The scene to the newcomer was foreboding 

indeed. Nevada was oeM the en trancc. channel an d wa s a sorry spectacle to 

greet the eye of the new a rri va l. Yet she was the best of the lot. It did not 

seem possible thl'lt Shaw or Cat;jomia, and especially W eJ! V irgil1ia and 

Oglala, wou ld ever be able to take part in the war. Yet we had embarked 

on a long war and most of these ships were yet to prove their mettle. In 

fact, even though Shaw, CdHill, Downes, and Ogllda were officially reported 

as lost, they eventually fought against the Japanese. 

1. U.S.S. SHAW, DESTROYER (LAUNCHED IN 1935) 

Shaw was in Floating Drydock Number T wo when hit by three bombs from 

the same di ve· bombers th:tt attacked Net'ada about 0850. The first two 

bombs came from port to sta rboard and appa rently hit just aft of 5-inch gun 

number 1. They penetrated the forecastle and main decks and exploded 

with a low order of detonation in the crew's mess on the fi rst platform 

deck. These bombs, according to Japanese records, werc the 250 kilogram 

type. and were in part responsible for severing the bow forwa rd of the 

bridge. 

The third bomb was of the same type and passed through the bridge. It 

exploded in the wardroom pantry, and ruptu red the fuci oil tanks, scattering 

burning oil th roughout that portion of the ship. The heat from th is oil fire 

caused the forward magaz ines to blow up. This wrecked the forward part 

of the ship as far back as frame 65. 

When the floating drydock sank, the forward section of the ship went 

down with it, but the area from frame 60 aft was buoyant and remained 

afloat. There was considerable flooding of the forward boiler rooms, and the 

after boiler rooms had 10- 15 inches of water. This en tered through leaks in 

203 
204 Pearl Harbor, 

the periphery of bulkhead 106 but was controlled by the portable gasoline 

pump procured next day from the Navy Yard. 

USS Shaw;/1 Floating Drydock Number Two, Jhowlng damagea/ler magazille explosion 

demolished the Jhip j U!t forward of the bridge. 

Shaw was originally reported as a total loss but its machinery was in good 

condition. It was only from frame 6S forward that the vessel was severely 

injured. Accordingly, the forward part was entirely cut off and the portion 

abaft frame 60 was docked on the Yard's marine railway on 19 December. 

At that time the Navy Yard took measurements for the fabrication of a false 

bow. This was installed on Shaw on 26 January 1942 when the ship subsequently was docked on Floating Drydock Number Two. 

The Navy Yard scrapped the bridge area of Sbaw and installed a temporary mast and ship control station. The vessel was undocked on 4 February, and after a few trials departed for Mare Island on 9 February. She was 

the first severely damaged vessel to put to sea, and there was great jubilation 

at Pearl Harbor to see her leave under her own power only two months 
205 

U8S SR.L 1)100) 187.& 

uss Shaw burning in Floating Drydock Number Two. 

after she was given up for lost. She was under command of Commander 

W. G. Jones. 

Soon she became a first-line destroyer and took an activ~ part in W orld 

War II. She performed a variety of du ties common to a destroyer from the 

£all of 1942 until the end of the war. These duties ranged from bombardment of enemy islands to picket duty. She ran aground on a reef near 

Noumea, New Caledonia in January 1943 but was freed and drydocked 

after six days. Before World War II ended, Shaw won eleven battle stars, 

including those for the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands in 1942, Guadalcanal, 

Leyte Operation in 1944, and the Southern Philippines in 1945. 

2. FLOATING DRYDOCK NUMBER TWO 

This floating drydock was subjected to a heavy blitz about 08 50. The 

Japanese planes were dive-bombers dropping 250 kilogram bombs, five of 

which fell nea r the floating drydock. She was submerged for protection. 

Four of the bombs impaired her watertight integrity. At least 155 holes 

were welded or plugged by divers before she was raised on 9 January 1942. 
206 Pearl Harbor 

She had rested on the bottom of Pearl Harbor for over a month at an angle 

of over fifteen degrees. Besides the damage from fragments she suffered 

from the fires which occurred on Shaw_ 

This floating dock was restored to service on 25 January 1942, and the 

next day she docked Shaw as her first customer since the morning of 7 

December. For some time she operated on a limited basis because of a la rge 

hole which had not yet been repai red. It was not until 15 May that she 

was considered as good as new. 

3. THE TUG SOTOYOMO 

This sma ll tug was in the floating drydock with Shaw. It appeared to be a 

total loss, and little attention was paid to her at fi rst. Her name was aga inst 

her, as it sounded Japanese. However, S%lomo commemorates a part of the 

war-like Sioux tribe of Indians. The tug proved that it was properly named. 

It was taken in hand !:iy the recently arrived Pearl Harbor Repa ir and 

Salvage Unit, under command of Lieutenant Commander K. F. Horne. The 

organization's original name was Destroyer Repair Units I and II and was 

composed of about 6 officers and 60 men, all of whom we re special ists. 

They were housed and messed se pa ra tely from the ra nk and file of the 

Salvage Organization. W hi le SO/oJ'omo was their fi rst assignment, they also 

proved their worth late r in floating the famous Cassill and DoumeJ. To 

them was added a group of about seventy other ship salvage experts. 

The Sotoyomo was totally submerged. She suffered severely from Shaw' j 

fires ·and had some fragmentation damage. The Navy Yard ordered spare 

parts for the vessel which did not arrive until late in the summer. However, it soon assumed full-time duty as a small much-needed tug at Pearl 

Harbor. 

4. U.S.S. CASSIN (LAUNCHED IN 1935) AND 

U.S.S. DOWNES (LAUNCHED IN 1936) 

These two vessels were a sorry spectacle indeed, as can be seen from the 

illustration on page 207. They were docked forward of Pemll),/t'{W;a , and 

were the victims of serious fi res, much fragmentation, and precautionary 

flooding of the drydock. After the attack CaH;n and Downej were reported 

as total losses. The big question seemed to be how to get them clear of the 
207 

USN S R"L (M OD) aD,., 

Downes (upright) alld Cassin in Dr),dock N,,,nbtr Olle. 

drydock. They had gone through every kind of ordeal which ships could 

be sllbjected to, from bomb hits to severe fires, to explosions, to fragmentation damage, etc. These ,vessels were the only ones of the Pearl Harbor 

group that suffered all the kinds of damage enumerated, for which reason 

they are given specia l attention. 

The bombs which struck or exploded near CaHill and Downes were the 

2'50 kilogram type and were d!opped by both high-level and dive-bombers. 

Incendia ry bombs were not dropped as was reported originally by ship crews. 

High-level planes were active in the area at about 081 5, but it was not 

until 0850 that ten or fifteen dive-bombers approached. About ten of these 

attacked Nevada while the remainder covered the ships in Drydock Number 

One and in the floating drydock. At this time a hit was scored on CaJJin. It 

went out through the bottom of the ship at frame 140 and struck the drydock Roor between CaJJi" and DoumeJ, starting a fire immediately. A few 
208 

minutes later a bomb struck the edge of the dock on the starboard side, and 

another on the port side. These hits cut off the water supply of the Yard 

and also the electric power. A second bomb struck CaSJin and passed through 

the ship in the vicinity of frame 60. The fragments from this bomb penetrated both ships and their fuel oil tanks. By this time the oil fires extended 

the full length of both ships, and both were being abandoned when the 

second bomb landed. The third oomb hit D ownes and demolished the 

director platform, the bridge, and the charthouse. 

The fuel oil fires eventually reached the depth charges and the torpedoes. 

Without adequate water the fires raged on both ships and in the drydock. 

The Yard desired to Rood the drydock as early as 0815 hut no action was 

taken for an hour. At that time CaIJin came afloat astern and pivoted on her 

forefoot. This, together with the free surface, caused CaHin to become 

unstable. She fell over on DowneJ. 

The fuel oil fires caused havoc before the water revel was high enough 

to protect the hulls of the two ships. The fragments from the first bomb 

penetrated the oil tanks of both vessels and loose oil fed the fires which 

were started. The thick black smoke, which is characteristic of burning fuel 

oil, prevented the crews from fighting the fires which engulfed both ships. 

Explosions on DowneJ were the cause of much of the damage. The bomb 

hits were not in themselves of real account. The ex plosions were caused by 

fuel oil tanks becoming overheated, by 5-inch ammunition in ready boxes, 

by the powder in the forwa rd magazine, and either by torpedo air flasks or 

torpedo warheads. Regardless of which part of the torpedoes was the rea l 

ru lprit, one of the assemblies was found in the yard seventy-five feet from 

its starting point. The force of the explosions was sufficient to wreck everything in its path. The most severe damage on DowlleJ was caused by a torpedo explosion near the after stack. Here a large hole in the deck and side 

resu lted. 

The damage to the hu lis of the two destroyers from oil fires, the toppling 

of CaHin, and explosions, .etc. was extensive. Both vessels were pocked with 

holes. As for CaIJin, the flat keel was warped and was about 18 inches above 

the baseline, the hull was hogged (raised in the middle) from 10 to 17 

inches, the bow was about two feet high, and both struts were out of 

position. The shell pl ating of CaHin was badly wrink led especially on the 

starboard side. 

DowneJ was in worse shape as regards longitudinal strength. The bow 

was neady 40 inches high, the stern 40 inches' low, and the hull twisted and 
Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbor 209 

1I(I..O~3U USS Cassin. 

hogged. The plating was badly wrinkled from fire and strain, and damaged 

by many fragments. 

Both vessels, on later examination, showed that their main propulsive 

machinery was in relatively good shape, as were the hull fittings and 

machinery throughout. However, the aluminum plating of Downel deckhouse was completely destroyed and the corrosion-resisting steel panels of 

the deckhouses of both ships were badly wrinkled. 

Lessons learned included the following for vessels in drydock in a war 

zone: 

a. 	Portable pumps should be ~vailable. 

b. 	Means should be provided by the Yard to fight oil fires. 

c. 	 Rescue breathing apparatus and flame proof clothing should be 

near at hand. 

d. 	Torpedoes, depth charges, and warheads should be removed. 

e. 	 If circumstances dictate that the dock should be flooded, care must 

be exercised in maintaining correct blocking under the ships. 
210 Pearl Harbor 

..:'. 

The newly named Pearl Harbor Repair and Salvage Unit went to work 

to restore the floatability of these ships. They patched up hundreds of fragment holes on both vessels and on Downes they put in place some large 

sections of deck and side which had been blown Ollt by the explosions. They 

used electric welding after fitting steel patches to suit the contour. At the 

same time the unit removed much of the machinery and put some in a 

state of pmse rvation in suitable Navy Yard storage. 

When Pemuy/vania was taken out of the drydock on 12 December 

Downes was set on correct blocking, but e,min was left in a toppled state 

until holes could be patched on the port side. CaHill was righted on 5 

February, at which time patches were electric welded on the starboard side. 

She was floated and removed to the Navy Yard on 18 February. In the 

meantime D ownes was floated and removed from the drydock on 6 February. 

There was wide diversity of opinion as to the proper disposition of these 

ships. The Salvage Officer felt that in view of the dire scarcity of ships 

Cassin and Downes could be used for limited escort or patrol duties. 

Some felt that the machinery and suitable hull fittings should be preserved 

and installed in new hulls. Eventually the forces afloat agreed with the 

opinion of the Navy Yard that the hulls be scrapped and the machinery 

and usable fittings and parts of the vessels be sent to Mare Island. To this 

the Bureau of Ships and the Navy Depa rtment agreed. 

U81< NR4.L 1110D) ~H71 

USS Downes afloat, being ,·emoved Ir01ll drJdock, 6 Febn/ar) 1942. N ole wrinkled 

plating. 
Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbor 211 

It was ordered that both ships be scrapped after removing from them all 

the machinery and parts that would be helpful to Mare Island. It was 

important that these be properly labelled before the parts were sent in 

various ships to the building yard. The scrapping of DowneJ was completed 

in drydock in August 1942 and of CaSlin in October 1942. Mare Island 

Navy Yard completed the ships in November 1943 and February 1944 

respectively. They then left the West Coast to look for Japanese ships. 

CaHil1 was fortunate in her assignments, as she took part in the campaigns 

which brought the American flag to Marcus Island, Guam, Saipan, Tinian, 

Luzon, Iwo Jima, Palau, and the Philippine Islands. CaHill won seven battle 

stars and the Navy Occupation Medal for Asia. 

DOllmeJ, which went to sea first, won four battle stars. Besides winning 

the Navy Occupation Medal. for Asia, she participated in the taking of 

Saipan, Marcus Island, and Luzon. Both ships gave a good account of 

themselves after they were given up as "lost" on 7 December. 

5. U.S.S. NEVADA, BATILESHIP (LAUNCHED IN 1914) 

The reRoating and drydocking of Nevada showed unmistakably that such 

work should be under the direction of a person familiar with Roatability, 

trim, list, and stability. The availability of a technical group knowing these 

facts about a pa rticular ship as well as about the strength of various bulkheads is important to a satisfactory outcome. As was clearly shown later, 

the same applies to all ships which are flooded with water or filled with oil, 

ammun ition, and stores. The close cooperation which existed between the 

Salvage Officer and the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard was of invaluable assistance in finding a satisfactory solution in the case of all vessels which were 

sunk at Pearl Harbor. 

At this time, the Assistant Salvage Officer was a reserve officer named 

George M. Ankers. He had had some practical experience in Alaska but 

was quite unfamiliar with large naval vessels. Through hard work he 

progressed in the Navy from Junior Lieutenant on the Nevada job to Captain in the Bureau of Ships in charge of all salvage work. 

In addition to Lieutenant Ankers and Carpenter Mahan, other officers 

and men became available. Most of these were reserves who, as on regular 

shipboard duty, were assigned specialty jobs and continued on that specialty. 

Thus some had charge of cleaning, or of diving work, or of pumps, or of 
212 Pearl Harbor 

internal watertightness. These specialty officers progressed from ship to ship 

under salvage, while the Salvage Officer, himself, covered all projects, but 

spent most of his time on the ship destined for early drydocking. 

Nevada was beached to prevent sinking on 7 December. She was located 

near the entrance channel with stern up against the shore and bow in deep 

water. Her draft when flooding of compartments had been completed 

on the following day was about 48 feet forward and 39'1/2 feet·aft at high 

tide, which was about two feet above zero. This position was maintained 

by severa l anchors laid out astern, and she remained in such position until 

refloated in February. Her list at the time was about two degrees to starboard. This was to prevent any possibility of the ship's sinking in the 

channel which connected Pearl Harbor to the sea. 

The Salvage Officer, Captain Homer N. Wallin, was optimistic with 

respect to Nevada as she had reciprocating engines as compared to the 

electric-drive battleships California and WeJt Virginia which were in much 

worse shape. But, he was taken aback somewhat by the words of the new 

Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, who, when viewing Nevada for 

the first time, remarked that satsifactory sa lvage seemed impossible and 

that we should not be over-optimistic. It should be stated here that when 

Admiral Nimitz arrived on 31 December 1941 he wanted very much to be 

shown the various "wrecks" in the harbor. Captain Wallin, who was then 

the Senior Material Officer of the Battle Force, was assigned to him for 

this purpose. W hat Admiral Nimitz saw was a ship entirely filled with 

water, with her bridge and forward controls entirely burned out, and with 

the forecastle wrecked by the bombs which exploded beneath. No wonder 

he was pessimistic! 

Nevada was struck by a torpedo at frame 41 about 0810 about fourteen 

feet above the keeL The innermost torpedo bulkhead held but the joints 

permitted considerable flooding below the first platform. The original list 

was four to five degrees but this was soon corrected by counterflooding. 

The ship had. started warming up the machinery and was able to get underway at 0840. While underway near the Air Station the signa l was received 

that the ship should not leave the harbor but should continue to the west 

side of Ford Island. 

About 0950 five bombs hit the ship almost simultaneously. Two struck 

the forecastle near frame 15. One passed out th rough the side of the 

second deck and caused near-miss damage. The other exploded within the 

ship after penetrating the structure near the gasoline tank. This caused 
'§! "', • • I .' 

'\ I 1;? i .. 

• 

!

• 

I 
214 	 Pearl Harbor 

gasoline leakage and vapors in that part of the vessel. This added to the 

many fires and the diffirulty of extinguishing them. Another hit was near 

number I turret inboard from the port waterway. It blew large holes in 

the upper and main decks. A fourth bomb struck the port director platform 

in the foremast and exploded at the base of the stack on the upper deck 

The fi fth bomb exploded directly over the crew's ga lley, at about frame 80. 

New fires broke out immediately. They were intense around the foremast, 

the officers' quarters forwa rd, and the crew's ga ll ey. TIle forward magazines 

were flooded, and by mistake the after group was flooded too. When the 

fi res burned themselves out, the foremast structure containing the bridge 

was entirely destroyed. Air from the intakes was smokey and caused the 

boiler rooms to be abandoned. 

Flooding was progressive and emanated primarily froni the "bull ring" 

where the main ventilation air intakes we re located. By Monday nearly the 

whole ship was flooded including the machi nery spaces. This Rooding continued for a month ; only a few compartments were found partly dry when 

the ship was eventua ll y drydocked. 

The new Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was concerned about 

the flooding of the after part of the vessel where practica lly no damage had 

occurred. He therefore requested a report for the benefit of future operations. Nel1ada'j officers pointed out that the progressive flood ing was .clue 

to the following causes: 

a. Ventilation trunks permitted water to spread from the "bull ring" 

to various parts of the ship. There were inadeguate closures in the 

ventilation system. 

b. 	The second deck was not watertight. As water spread on the second 

deck it reached spaces be low th rough hatches and other openings. 

The second deck should have a large number of transverse bulkheads 

to prevent water from traveling forward or aft. 

c. There was leakage around piping and electric leads passing through 

armored decks and bulkhead s. 

d. 	Although it was found that practically aU "X", "Y", or "Z" closures 

\,:ere properly closed during the action, the flooding of the ship 

converted Nevada into a sa lvage job instead of a repair job. 

Salvage work commenced promptly. The bomb holes forward were covered by wooden patches externally as shown in the illustration on page 217. 

These are known as "window frames" and are held dose to the hull plating 

by hook bolts manipulated by divers. Of course the water pressure assists. 
Ships Slink At Pearl Harbor 215 

As the water level is lowered the inflow of water was partially stopped by 

stuffing rubber mats and kapok material in the bomb holes and using shores 

to tighten them. In one instance a steel patch was welded by divers in way 

of a serious leak. 

Where the torpedo hit, there was one void and two liquid layers of fuel 

oil. This was minimal protection against torpedoes and exists in major ships 

only forward and aft of vital spaces. The damage from the torpedo was 

roughly 48 feet long by n feet in depth. Over this it was proposed to fit 

a large patCh, but it was found that internal bulkheads in this area were 

reliable and would prevent the spread of flooding. Although the seams and 

butts of the inner bulkhead were opened somewhat as a result of the 

explosion, the flooding from th is torpedo hit was not enough to scuttle 

t.he ship or cause serious flooding. 

The large patch was made up at the Navy Yard and made to fit the 

upturned bottom of Oklahoma, the sister ship of N evada. It was delivered 

in early January but it was unwieldly for handling. Immediately dredging 

was resorted to and part of the docking keel was removed by dynamite 

Charges. Divers were bu.sy for a month to fit the patch but it was finally 

given up and the intact bulkheads properly shored and backed up with water 

pressure. The patch would have projected at least two feet below the keel, 

and therefore presented a docking problem. It was ascertained after docking 

that the blister had blown outboard about two feet, and, unknown to the 

divers, prevented the patch from seating properly. The large hole was 

therefore left open to the sea and the internal bulkheads were depended 

upon for restricting the flooding. 

Gradual reduction of the water level in the flooded ship was accomplished 

by suction pumps ranging in size fr om 10 inches to 3 inches. As spaces were 

unwatered prompt steps were taken to plug holes used for drains or sanitary 

discharges. The ship's crew also cleaned compartments of oil and refuse 

as the level receded. Personal property was guarded, classified information 

was turned over to a central point, and steps were taken to assure proper 

care and preservation of electrical and other equipment. 

Ammunition and stores were removed from the vessel, as was oil and 

fresh meat which was very smelly by th is time. The ammunition was sent 

to the ammunition depot for reconditioning. 

Credit should be given to the Acting Commanding Officer for the efficient 

work performed by the twenty men of the ship's force who remained to 

handle the salvage work. His name was Commander H. 1. Thompson. The 

• 

216 Pearl Harbor 

UBI< !<R"L (WOD) Inn 

USS Nevada, Jhowing bomb rupture on bow, forward of turret I. 

working force, which was recruited from the Receiving Ship and from the 

Salvage Division, performed va liantly in removing stores and ammunition. 

Oil was pumped into oil barges by the fuel oil pumps in the machinery 

spaces. These were operated by compressed air furnished by the compressors 

on barges alongside. The suction pumps on the oil barges were of considerable help. The valves for fuel oil lines were trated out by sense of feel by 

the divers. 

The Engineering Officer should not be overlooked, as he was a true 

optimist. He predicted that Nevada would sail to the West Coast under her 

own power. It sounded fantastic at the time, but his prediction was correct, 

not only for his own ship but for a!l the sunken ships except Cassill and 

DoumeJ. His name was Lieutenant Commander George E. Fee. . 

Naturally the living spaces and other compartments were a real mess. 

These areas had been under water for two months, and the contents of the 

compartments were strewn about. The first requirement was general wash· 

ing down with sea water ; thereafter a bot caustic solution was used to cut 

the oil which had per meated all materials and all spaces which were open. 
ssn N ;) PU. l U! ''1)OP,(Jp 'Ju!i1Ioqr "'OPU!'" ilUfv4 0/)/114 II! v,4 ';n

1l ~1I ''I'liN Or.:) (J ( !~!&t 

LIZ 

218 Pearl Harbor 

It was determined early that the proper uniform for men of the salvage 

crew and ship's crew were rubber boots and a one-piece overall. These 

permitted the men to wade in oily water and to contact oily objects. Again, 

care was taken to guard all pers"onal belongings and official papers . 

. Unwatering was a step by step process, in order to give the salvage crew 

time to plllg leaks and to give the working crew time to clean up the spaces 

which were unwatered. Care was taken later when the ship was aRoat to 

reduce to a minimum the free water surface. The use of small suction pumps 

in lower spaces facititated this purpose. 

The electrical gear held up remarkably well. At least ninety-five percent 

of it was salvaged, at least for temporary or limited duty. As the machinery 

spaces became free of water the motors were removed and sent to the Navy 

Yard for drying out and reconditioning. On account of the number involved, 

a Honolulu firm was reguisitioned to assist with the work. Even the delicate 

electrical instruments like ammeters and wattmeters were found to be satis· 

factory and capable of salvage if prompt steps were taken fo r their proper 

preservation following unwatering. About th is time "tectyl" was "dis· 

covered" by the salvage crew although the Bureau of Ships had become 

familia r with it before. Generous guantities of "tectyl" were used by an 

ships beginning with Nevada. 

"Tectyl" is the trade name of a liquid substance which does wonders for 

machinery submerged in salt water. It not only absorbs what water remains, 

but furnishes a thin protective film over all parts. The treatment should be 

given before the air is allowed to cause corrosion after the removal of 

salt water. 

The electrical wires or leads were found in relatively good shape. They 

cou ld be dried out and used satisfactorily. The vital leads were finally 

replaced by the Navy Yard wheh the ship was sent to the Yard. 

At about this time two fatalities occurred on Neflada due to poison' 

ous gas. On 7 February Lieutenant James S. Clarkson removed a cap from 

the air test fitting of the steering engine room. He was in a trunk which 

had lim ited space and air volume. Several men went to his rescue, but too 

late as escaping gas killed him. Machinist Mate DeVries who reached him 

first, later died at the hospital. In all, six men were overcome by the gas. 

At once a Board of Investigation was called, and the Navy Yard chemist 

ascertained that the gas was hydrogen sulphide. It is odorless in high can· 

centrations and acts without warning; it originates in stagnant water which 

has a quantity of paper products in the pressured space. Thereafter frequent 
Ships SUlik At Pearl Harbor 219 

samples of air were taken for analysis, and temporary ventilation was greatly 

increased on all ships under salvage. Confined spaces were not entered 

without wearing rescue breath ing apparatus. 

Besides the temporary ventilation which was provided as spaces were 

unwatered, temporary lighting lines were run. Both were essential for the 

efficient performance of the work. 

As weights were removed and water was pumped out, Nevada gradually 

came aRoat. She Roated on 12 February and was drydocked in Drydock 

Number Two on 18 February. It had been the original intention to drydock 

the vessel in Drydock Number One which is a smaller dock and has less 

clearance over the sill. This was given up gradually as trouble was encountered with fitting the large patch over the torpedo hole forward. As recounted, the patch was finally discarded and the magazine bulkheads were 

depended on for relative watertightness. The holding bulkheads were 

backed up by water introduced in the magazines. This water was pumped 

out as the vessel took up on the blocks of the drydock. 

The operating forces, especially Admiral Nimitz were concerned lest 

Nevada sink in the cha nnel when jostled by the tugs which conveyed her 

to drydock. To forestall th is, gasoline pumps were kept running and there 

was no fe.sinking. Accordingly, on 18 February Admiral Nimitz and Ad· 

miral Furlong stood at the head of the drydock to show their support of 

salvage work. A commendation was received from Admiral Nimitz for all 

hands whose hard work and persistence made possible the satisfactory 

outcome of the operations. 

The work of the divers is worthy of mention. Much of the diving fo rward 

could be done with shallow water diving outfits, which were widely used 

until it was discovered that the water was polluted. Nevada divers were 

helpful in finding the valves in machinery spaces and operating the right 

ones to permit the transfer of fuel oil from the ship's tanks to the oil barges. 

All of this work was done underwater and without lights. The ship had 

only two divers but they made 80 dives. Widgeon and Ortolan had over a 

a dozen divers each and together they made over 1:;0 dives. Even the 

Destroyer Repair Unit had a few divers who participated in the salvage 

work. Of major importance were the four civilian divers of the Pacific 

Bridge Company who made 160 dives for over 9:;0 diving hours. In all 

over 400 dives were made on Nevada totalling over 1500 diving hours. The 

divers performed all manner of work fom underwater cutting with oxyhydrogen and electric torches to hydraulic and syphon excavating, to using 
220 Pearl Harbor 

U~N Sllo/.L (MOD) , ,..,"" 

NC'vada. jhowing torp~do damage to port ride. 
221 

, 


Ships Sunk At Peart Harbor 

dynamite to remove sections of the dock ing keel, to the use of hand and 

pneumatic tools for drilling and setting patches. They also did much interior 

work for pumping operations, adjusting watertight closures, etc. The successful accomplishment of atl assigned diving tasks without casualty or 

injury was the result of excellent supervision on the part of Lieutenant 

Commander H. E. Haynes, who was in general charge of all diving, plus 

Gunner Duckworth of Widgeon, Gunner Arnold Larson of Ortolan, and 

Carpenter Mahan of the Salvage D ivision. 

The Pearl H arbor Navy Yard took Nevada in hand once she was in drydock. The torpedo hole was temporarily made watertight. The bomb damage 

was also repaired, although it was necessary to build a new structure and 

new decks in various locations. The gaUey was made suitable for limited 

service. The damaged starboard shaft and propellers, and the rudder, were 

put in temporary good condition. These were damaged as the ship backed 

into the shore at Waipio Point. The six boilers were all rebricked, rein ­

sulated, and properly tested. 

The Navy Yard worked assiduously on Net/ada and the vessel was 

undocked on 15 March 1942. The main and auxiliary machinery was thoroughly overhauled and tested. All Navy Yard work was compl eted on 

22 April 1942. On that date Nevada joined a convoy for the West Coast 

and set sail for Bremerton, \Vashington. She traveled on her own power 

with both screws in use, arriving at the Puget Sound Navy Yard on 1 May 

1942. 

There the ship was thoroughly overhauled and modernized. She left 

Bremerton before the end of the year with a bristling array of modern antiaircraft guns. She participated in the Aleutian Campaign in December 1942, 

and later took an important part in the landings in France. Thereafter she 

joined forces in the Pacific and took part in the campaigns wh ich brought 

victory at Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Japan itself. Here was a ship wh ich at 

one time looked like a total wreck but now was a formidable foe of the 

Axis Powers. 

Nevada won seven stars in World Wa r II as follows: one star for 

Pearl Harbor-Midway, one star for the Aleutian operations, one for the 

Invasion of Normandy (including oombardment of Cherbourg) , one star for 

the Invasion of Southern France. one star for the Iwo Jima Operation, one 

star for the Okinawa Gunto Operation, and one star for the Third Fleet 

Operations against Japan. She also received the Navy Occupation Service 

Medal (Asia clasp). 

Nevada was noted for the accuracy of her main battery of 14-inch guns. 
222 Pearl Harbor 

These were used tn bombardment in France and in the island campaIgns 

against Japan. 

6. U.S.S. CALIFORNIA, BATILESHIP 

(LAUNCHED IN 19 19) 

The Salvage Organi zation studied all jobs which Jay ahead and came to 

some concl usions regardi ng the salvage of each particul ar ship. As a resu lt 

there was little di ffe rence of opinion as the work progressed. The officers 

and men of the Salvage Division, the Navy Yard, and the Pacific Bridge 

Company were all included. 

While work was proceeding on Nn'ada, the wooden cofferdams for Calit omia were well underway, and the patches for lVest Virginia were being 

pllt in pl ace. Moreover, personnel were transferred from a ship which 

had been completed to the next ship scheduled for drydocking. Thus Lieutenant Ankers and Chief Carpenter Mahan were transferred, among others, 

from Netlada to California. The Salvage Officer, Captain H. N. Wallin, 

divided his time among all ships and concentrated on the one that seemed 

most in need of his services. Part of the officers of the Salvage Division are 

shown in the picture on page 224. This picture was taken on California 

during the planning for that ship's salvage. 

The crew of Califomia affectionately referred to her as "The Prune 

Barge," because that state produced a large quantity of prunes for export 

1't did not seem possible that the old " Prune Barge" was helpless on the 

bottom of Pearl Harbor. The salvage of California was studied by many 

interested persons. 

The salvage of California was somewhat similar to the work on Nevada, 

but the fi rst ship was damaged much more severely and recovery of human 

bodies was lnvolved. It was the recommendation of experts from Washington that a sheet steel bulkhead be dri ven entirely around the ship. But 

because of the nature of the bottom of the ha rbor, it was decided that the 

first work should be to close the torpedo holes with concrete patches. Before 

that could be done, it was necessary to wall off the water by driving steel 

sheet piling around the torpedo boles. But, as work progressed it was 

decided to reduce leaks through these holes from the inside and to eliminate 

entirely the patches on the outside. 

While Nevada lost some men, none of the bodies were in the ship. All 
Ships Sunk AI Pearl Harbor 223 

men had been blown overboard or killed near the impacts of the bomb hits. 

In the case of California, however, it was assumed that about fifty bodies 

remained in the ship. 

Another important difference was that the whole quarterdeck and a part 

of the forecastle of California were underwater. While Nevada was driven 

by reciprocating engines, California was electric·driven. The experts at hand 

figured that the salvage of electric·drive battleships would require at least 

four years. All in all, then, the salvage of California was a much more difficult job than the salvage of Nevada. 

Cali/ornia was struck by two torpedoes and one bomb. Serious damage 

was done by a bomb near·miss and minor damage resulted from bombs 

which exploded at a distance. A bad fire resulted from the bomb which 

struck the ship before it was stopped by the armored second deck. The 

vessel sank over a period of three days. This fact indicated that the torpedo 

bulkheads were reasonably intact. 

Flooding of the ship was progressive due to open manholes, ventilation 

systems, and ruptured pipelines. Water and oil permeated the ship and 

caused abandonment of fire rooms and engine rooms. Unfortunately a 

serious oil fire from Arizona swept down upon California at 1000 on the 

day of the attack. This caused temporary abandonment of the ship and 

interfered with the steps being taken to keep the ship afloat. Except for 

this, Califomia would no doubt have been saved from sinking. 

The list of the vessel was to port, and at one time was nearly sixteen 

degrees. There was considerable concern lest the ship turn turtle as 

Oklahoma had done, Or that she slide iota deeper water on the port side. 

In order to reduce the list, counterflooding was resorted-to, and two boiler 

rooms on the starboard side were purposely flooded. The Commanding 

Officer, Captain Joel W . Bunkley, asked the Material Officer of the Battle 

Force, Captain Wallin, if flooding by hose of the outboard starboard blisters 

would not be helpful, and this step was taken. The result was that the list 

to port was greatly reduced. It was about five and a half degrees eventually. 

Unlike Nevada, Cali/ol'l1ia was not in battle 'condition at the time of 

maximum damage. Although attempts were made to assume condition Zed 

after the surprise attack was begun it must be realized that passing from 

X-ray to Zed at breakfast time 00 a Sunday morning was no easy task. The 

fact that unwatering showed many Zed closures opeo substantiates the fact 

that the ship never attained the proper closure. 

A number of the manholes of the port blisters were off or were loose, 
N 

N

... 

i 

, 

~ 

vaN NR,U. (10100) ,"161 

Part of sa/vdg' cr4W dimming salvag, of uss CaJifornia. From left 10 right Ih,y are: f. At. Ephland, CSF, Alasler Div,r; LT W. L. 


Painter, USNR, 0Uiu r;n Charge of Work.. CDR f. F. War';s, USN, T,mporar] Commanding Offiu r; CAPT H. N. Wallin , USN, 


Salvage Offirer.. LT G. W. Greel], USNR, AuiJlanJ Salvag, Offia,; LT W . A1. Bjork, USNR, /fu iillml Salvage Offiu,; and LT J. W . 


Da"och, USNR, AJJiJtanl Salvage Officer. 

Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbor 225 

which contributed to the loss of the ship. This permitted fuel oil to flow up 

from the fuel tanks near the torpedo hits and eventually to find its way to 

the lower parts of the vessel. This together with non-closure of 8-inch fuel 

lines and ventilation ducts, permitted gradual seeping of fuel oil and water 

to vital parts of the ship. 

California was well designed. The holding bulkhead near the torpedo 

holes was adequate to its task. Except for a few discrepancies in the location 

of fuel oil lines and water lines the ship was entirely able to withstand 

the punishment received on 7 December. Staying afloat for three days and 

drydocking without a single patch attests to the toughness -and ability of 

the ship. Adequate pumping, if it could have been supplied at the time, 

would have kept the vessel afloat. 

The two torpedo hits at frames 46-60 and frames 95-100 respectively 

were the most serious damage sustained. The torpedo protection at these 

areas is approximately 17V2 feet deep consisting of five bulkheads. In each 

case the inboard bulkhead was practically intact. The torpedo hits were 

below the armor belts. 

The near-miss forward was a serious threat because of the 3000 gallons 

of Basoline carried in this area for the seaplanes and for the motorboats. 

The gasoline lines were not ruptured although some leaks occurred. Most 

of this gasoline was drained out during salvage operations. Flooding was 

genera!' in this part of the ship, and that put the bow down several feet. 

A "window frame" patch was installed over the hole blown by the near-miss 

on the level of the first platform deck. This was effective but was blown off 

a few days before docking by the explosion of gasoline vapor in the area. 

The explosion was severe and did additional damage to the structure. 

Fortunately all hatches and doors were tightly closed and dogged at the 

time of the explosion. It is likely that a naked light, possibly with defective 

wiring insulation, caused the explosion. Later, additional ventilation was 

provided to prevent such explosions. Some additional areas were opened 

to the sea, but it was possible to isolate the damage and to proceed without 

attempting further patching. By this time it was ascertained that the pumps 

in use were more than enough to keep up with the water which found its 

way into the ship. 

A 2~O kilogram bomb did considerable damage at about 084~ on the day 

of attack. Although it killed a large number of people, it did not directly 

affect the ship's stability or floatability . It entered at the .starboard upper 

deck level at frame 60, passed through the main deck, and exploded on the 
226 Pearl Harbor 

USI'< Nllolt!. {MOD} Q7~ 2 

Removal of one of the 14-;n,h gum f,.om VSS California. 

armored second deck. It caused a great deal of structural damage and a fire 

which was difficult to extinguish on account of the failure of water pressure 

at that time. The smoke from this fire, which was fought with carbon 

dioxide extinguishers by men using old type rescue breathing apparatus, 

infiltrated the second and third decks. The smoke found its way into the 

forward engine room through the ventilation system. By causing the 

abandonment of the engine room it had a bad effect on the fortunes of the 

ship. The fire was finally pu t out by three minesweepers which came 

alongside. 

A few high-level bombs were dropped on the sta rboard side, but the~e 

had little effect on the shi p aside from slight damage from near-misses and 

some fragmentation damage to smoke stacks and starboard anti-aircraft 

guns. 

After three days the ship came to rest with a Jist to port of about 5V2 

degrees with a draft of about 43 feet forward and 57 feet aft. This put sea 

water over the port side forwa rd and over turret IVan the quarterdeck. The 

ship was settled deeper in the mud than anticipated. 

The first requirement was to unload the ship. This was partly accomplished by the removal of all guns from the turrets except turret IV which 
Shipf SUlik At Pearl Harbor 227 

,..... ,. 

,~. 

'. "" 

• 'J;:" ·,m'. .'" .." .., t ,n' tf{ ,';·,.., , .. ~". 

~\'" 

',f:" L' '~'. ~ 

~ ,." ~ 

j ~" 

Sail/age ol'eratio!1J on Califor~ia showing removal of water from fOreC4JJie. 

was below the water level. Eventually the ship and flag conning towers were 

taken off, the broadside guns removed, and the mainmast, which had previously been recommended for removal, was cut off at the base and taken 

off the ship. Plans were made to remove all safes aboard, the catapults, the 

boats, the cranes, and the anchors and many shots of anchor chain. 

While this was being done a wooden fence-like cofferdam was erected 
228 Pearl Harbor 

around the quarterdeck, and in the forecastle area, which was flooded. The 

thickness of the timbers depended upon the pressures which were encountered ; they varied from four inches to eight inches_ The cofferdam was 

usually installed from barges in th irty foot sections. Each section was made 

watertight at the deck maming, was braced by divers against fixed objects, 

and was fitted with bins for sand bags to overcome the positive buoyancy of 

the lumber. The weight of the sections was taken by a fore and aft timber 

which rested in the waterway. The heights were sufficient to prevent seawater from entering in case a greater list was experienced or if the vessel 

should take a starboard list when afloat. 

About th is time, materia l from the mainland began to arrive. The most 

important were the electric deep-well centrifuga l pumps up to twelve 

inches in diameter. Although the ship received power from Ford Island it 

was self-sufficient with generators, air compressors, and drying out machines. 

These were set on the upper deck or some other dry spot on the ship. 

The Navy Yard received some mechanics from the mainland who were 

extremely useful in the heavy workload ahead. Among these were carpenters 

to fabricate the cofferdams and make them tight against water pressure. 

Most of the work was done by divers at this and later stages. A large part 

of it was done by the Pacific Bridge Company, which fabricated and installed the wooden cofferdams. Their six divers were kept busy bracing 

and making watertight the cofferdam around the quarterdeck. When the 

water level inside was below that outside, the flow of water was checked 

by stopping small leaks. At the deck coarning and between sections a soft 

material, or pudding, was used to attain watertightness. This was usually 

oakum enclosed in canvas. 

Other divers were busy below decks plugging sanitary drains, ruptured 

piping, sea scuppers, and ventilation lines. The closing of all ports was one 

of the most important tasks. They also closed off the leakage resulting from 

open or loose manhole covers. This was done by driving shores or wooden 

wedges in ruptures admitting seawater or oil. 

One big job efficiently performed by divers was the closure of gun ports 

on the port side. The Navy Yard made strongbacks which permitted the 

closures to be drawn up tight. After removal of guns it was hard to make 

the closures watertight except by strongbacks and wedges. 

When the electric and the gasoline-driven centrifugal pumps were placed 

in the various trunks and compartments the water was circulated to overcome 

stagnation. This was kept up everyday. It was then discovered th at the out­
I 

Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbor 229 

flow of the pumps was greater than the inflow of wate ~ and it was decided 

that with additional plugging it would be possible to float the vessel 

without patches over the torpedo damage. 

The lowering of the water level was kept in step with the removal of 

stores and oil, the care and preservation of the equipment which was un· 

covered, the removal of human bodies, and the cleaning of the compartments which were unwatered. A definite schedul e controlled this work. As 

soon as turret IV was above water, inspection was made of turret rollers. 

It was found that aside from slight corrosion and discoloration the rollers 

and their paths were perfectly all right. 

The Salvage Division never did get enough men to do a satisfactory 

cleaning job although men from the Receiving Station were added from 

time to time to augment the ship's force available. The amount of cleaning 

which is necessary in a sunken battleship is well-nigh incalculable. The 

maximum number required was about 500 men; at first only 6 officers and 

48 men were available. 

As the ship was pumped down in accordance with the schedule, divers 

plugged leaks in the structure and steps were taken to preserve machinery. 

A hot caustic solution was applied to machinery equipment as well as to 

all surfaces immediately afte r origina l washdown with seawater. This waS 

followed by fresh water, and machinery items were treated to a bath of 

"tectyl" to prevent corrosion. Many items were put on a barge and sent to 

the Navy Yard. They were tagged for identification under the able direction 

of Lieutenant Commander J. A. McNalley who was in charge of preserva· 

tion and identification. Eventually these items were sent to the Navy Yards 

at Puget Sound and Mare Island, but those needed for the homeward 

voyage were retained at Pearl Harbor. Because of the large number of 

electric motors on California all those not needed for the voyage to the 

mainland were preserved in pl ace aboa rd ship. Lieutenant J. W . Darroch 

was in charge under Commander McNalley, and did a good job of 

preserving and drying out these electric motors. 

On the second and third decks of California a number of human bodies 

were encountered. It was the practice to stop the pumping in time to leave 

about two feet of water above the deck. The bodies were then floated into 

large canva~ bags. These were securely tied and transported to the Naval 

Hospital at Aiea for correct identification and burial. 

The removal of oil, ammunition, and stores went on continually. About 

200,000 gallons of free oil were collected from va rious compartments. The 
230 Pearl Harbor 

free oil had a good effect in protecting machinery items from the seawater 

although, of course, it was also responsible for causing loss of life and the 

abandonment of certain battle stations. Stores were easy to remove when 

the water level permitted. The refrigerator spaces containing fresh meat 

were a notable exception. Ammunition was a valuable factor in reducing 

weight, especially the 14·inch shells and powder. 

Mention shou ld be made of the oil -skimming operation, which was followed in all ships. This was a part of the free oil recovered, and was used at 

all times particularly before final pumping at any deck level. All classified 

information and personal effects were turned over to the Commanding 

Officer fo r proper handling and disposal. 

The experience aboard Nevnda warned of the danger of toxic gases. 

Great care was taken to avoid subjecting the men to this danger. Before 

any compartment was entered the air was analyzed by the Yard expert, 

Lieutenant Commander C. M. Parker (Medical Corps) of the Industrial 

Depa rtment. He was available at all times and was a frequent visitor to the 

ships under salvage. Lieutenant Ankers and Carpenter Mahan were charged 

with watching for gas hazards. One of these officers was aboard at all times. 

Temporary ventilation was furnish ed for all spaces and temporary eleetric 

lights were installed in al1 compartments. All men were outfitted with boots 

and coveralls. 

As the machinery spaces were emptied , great care was taken to preserve 

the electric-drive alternators and motors. It was hoped they would be usable 

for the voyage to the mainland. The mechanical parts were washed out with 

fresh water and "teety!."' The electrical parts were cleaned and dried. The 

instruments in the control room were sent to the Navy Yard as quickly as 

possible following removal from the instmment board. 

Shortly after docking Commander Hyman G. Rickover arrived from the 

Bureau of Ships. He had a plan for reconditioning the electric-drive machinery and had consulted with Genera l Electric and Westinghouse Companies as well as with the Puget Sound Navy Yard. He held a conference 

on 11 April. He had with him a representative of the Puget Sound Navy 

Yard, Mr. McConnell, and Mr. C. E. Wilson of the General Electric Company. It was decided that elcctric motors which were subjected to high voltages could not safely be dried out and re-impregnated. This method was 

only suitable for low voltages especially in a sh ip which was twenty years 

of age at that time. 

It was not long before General Electric had fifty-three men working on 
ShipJ Slink AI Pearl Harbor HI 

one alternator and two motors. It was their estimate that the electric machinery necessary for a trip to Puget Sound could be completed in about four 

months. It was decided that one set, consisting of one alternator and two 

motors, would be cleaned in place and dried out for the voyage, and finished while other work was being performed at Puget Sound. All vital 

wiring and instruments were replaced at Pearl Harbor. The machinists, 

electricians, and riggers from the Puget Sound Navy Yard were partly 

responsible fo(' the fine record made. 

The turbine end of the electric-drive machinery gave no important trouble 

although it required the usual attention due to corrosion in some degree and 

the presence of fuel oil. 

As for the boilers wh ich had been submerged for four months, they were 

found to be in good condition although, as done on Nevada, it seemed best 

to rebrick and test them. 

California came afloat on practically an even keel or a slight list to port 

on 24 March 1942 and was placed in Drydock Number Two on 9 April 

1942. At that time her mean draft was about forty feet. Before docking, the 

wooden cofferdam around the quarterdeck and on the forecastle were removed from the vessel. As customary, the Commander-in-Chief of the 

Pacific Fleet and the Commandant of the Navy Yard were at the head of 

the dock to welcome California. In the spring of 1942 the office of Fleet 

Maintenance was established under Rear Admiral C. A. Dunn; after arriving 

at Pearl Harbor he was never absent from significant events in the salvage 

operations. 

California remained in dock, subject to seventy-two hours notice, until 7 

June 1942. During this time the Yard made permanent structural repairs 

to almost aU the ship's damage. After a few trial trips she left Pearl Harbor 

under her own power on 10 October 1942 and arrived at the Puget Sound 

Navy Yard on 20 October 1942. There she was modernized and fitted out 

with forty 40-millimeter Bofors in quadruple mounts and forty-eight 20­

millimeter Oerlikons in single mounts. The ship was entirely new with 

greater beam, greater stability, greater protection, and 154 miles of new 

electric cable. 

Credit for the successful salvage of Cali/omia has to go to the Nav.y 

Yard personnel as well as to the Salvage Division. Of the former we must 

not overlook the Planning Officer, Captain Fred M. Earle, and his able 

assistants. In the Salvage Division, by far the hardest worker and the one 

who set the pace for ali others was Lieutenant Wilfred L. Painter. His 
232 Pearl Harbor 

ueJ< NR<kL (M OO) 1~7U 

California just aJ Ih~ drydock emptied, 9 April 1942. 

assistants wefe Generaux, Bjork, Greel y, Walker, Ankers, and Mahan. The 

Manager of the Navy Yard, Captain Claude S. Gillette, was helpful at all 

times, especially in reconditioning the electric-drive machinery, with which 

he was in timately famil iar since he had served as Engineering Officer in 

one of these ships. We must not forget Lieutenant Commander J. A. 

McNalley who did so much in preserving and reconditioning all machinery 

parts and electric motors. He was a real optimist! The Pearl Harbor Repair 

and Salvage Unit uncler Commander Horne was on the job during most of 
Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbor 2ll 

California's salvage and did much good. work in cleaning and preserving 

electric equipment as well as stringing temporary lighting cables. 

Cahlomin remained at the Puget Sou'nd Navy Yard somewhat less than 

one year. After that she joined the Fleet and participated in the Marianas 

Campaign, bombarded Saipan under Rear Admiral J. B. Oldendorf, and 

bombarded Guam under Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly. She was a part 

of the American forces at the famous Battle of Surigao Strait in which she, 

on 25 October 1944, pumped over sixty 1500·pound projectiles into a 

Japanese battleship of the FIJSO class. 

Thus, v.s.s. California came out of a watery grave and won seven battle 

stars against the forces of Japan before World War II ended. They we re 

for Pearl Harbor.Midway, the Marianas Operation (Saipan, Tinian, Guam), 

the Leyte Operation, the Luzon Operation, the Okinawa Gunto Operation, 

and for Third Fleet's Operation against Japan. 

7. U.S.S. WEIT VIRGINIA, BAITLESHIP 

( LAUNCHED IN 1921) 

Here was a ship much more severely damaged than California or Nevada. 

Salvage was getting harder as the work progressed. Few there were in the 

early days after the Japanese attack who believed that West ViI'ginia would 

ever float again, much less be a formidable ship against Japanese sea power. 

Yet, so it turned out to be! 

The pet name for this formidable ship was the "Weevie." Most of the 

crew and officers were transferred to other ships and only a skeleton crew 

remained on board. The high command was hard pressed for exper en~ed 

mcn to man the ships of the Aeet, and after all, it did not seem reasonable 

to assume that "Weevie" would ever fight aga in. 

The vessel was hit by as many as seven torpedoes; the exact number is 

questionable because of the extent of damage on her port side. At least th ree 

torpedoes struck below the armor belt and one or more hit the armor belt 

knocking it askew. Seven armor plates and their keys were ordered by the 

Puget Sound Navy Yard. One or possibly two torpedoes entered the ship 

through the holes made by the first torpedoes when the vessel was listed 

about 20 to 30 degrees. These exploded on the armored second deck; and 

one hit the steering gear and wrecked the area aft, besides knocking ofT the 

rudder. Two bombs struck the ship but fortunately they were both duds. 
234 Pearl Harbor 

The torpedoes virtually opened up the whole port side. It was the composite opinion that a patch was required over the two major holes extending 

from the waterline to the turn of the bilge. One such concrete patch was 

needed at frames 43 to 52, and anOther of ample proportions from frames 

60/2 to 97Y2' The steering area could be isolated, and the rudder picked 

up from. the bottom of the harbor in due course. 

The torpedo bulkheads were severely damaged. The holding bulkhead 

was ruptured far more than in the case of California, and the intervening 

transverse members were bad ly accordianized. 

The bombs which struck 16-inch turret III and the foretop respectively 

did little damage. Both were the armor-piercing type of l5-inch projectiles. 

USS West Virginia, Jhowillg diJlorliOl1 il1 armOr belt and damage above mId befall" on 

port Jide looking aft. 
Ships SUlik At Pearl Harbor 235 

The first pas5ed through turret Ill's top but failed to explode within the 

turret. The other passed through the foretop and was found later unexploded in the debris on the second deck. 

Serious damage occurred due to an oil fire which was not extinguished 

for thirty hours. Part of the oil was washed in from Arizona and part of it 

came from the ship itself which was about 70 percent loaded with fuel 

oil. This fire caused warping of a large area of deck and bulkhead plating 

amidships. A peculia r aspect of the fire was that when it was put out in 

one area it broke out in another. 

W est Virginia suffe red some damage from being pinched by TemlesJee 

when that ship wedged aga inst the forward quay. Some damage to the bilge 

amidships was caused. But this may have prevented If/est Virginia from 

capsizing in the early stages of the attack before counterflooding was 

effective. In any event it reduced the amount of heel. 

Salvage work began while simila r work was underway on Nevada and 

Ca/ifomia. The experience which the salvage crew gained on those two 

ships was useful for the W est Virginia job. 

One significant aspect of the work was the use of underwater concrete. 

By this time, too, the electric driven deep well pumps of up to a ten-inch 

discharge; were available. Also, the gas hazard was recogni zed and steps 

were taken to consult Commander Parker of the Medical Corps frequently. 

In fa ct, regular tests were run in various parts of the ship, especially those 

recently unwatered, to assure that the air was safe before men entered 

without gas masks. By this time, too, the men had regu lar "tank" suits, 

as coveralls were now called, which were laundered continuously by a 

contractor in Honolulu. Men engaged in partirularly dirty work were 

furni shed knee-length rubber boots which were readily cleanable. A picture 

of the Acting Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander White, and the 

Sa lvage Officer is shown on page 240 in the garb which was regularly used. 

The underwater concrete was a great success. It extended from above the 

waterline to below the turn of the bilge. This material was used to seal the 

ends of the large patches as well as the bottoms of each individual patch. 

Its efficacy was proved by the fact that in drydock it stuck so well to the 

hull of the sl1.ip that small dynamite charges were required to break the 

concrete loose. \Ve were extremely fortunate that the Pacific Bridge Com· 

pany wa5 present and available to handle the design and install ation of these 

patches, and to make the large number of dives which was necessary to 

make the patches watertight. 
236 Pearl Harbor 

It is not practicable to give a compl ete description of the concrete-sealed 

patches, but some information should he included. In the first place, the 

patches were usually in thirteen and a half foot sections. Each section was 

about fifty feet long or deep. The bottom portion followed the contour of 

the ship. and the patch was pulled up snugly by means of hook bolts spaced 

horizontally every twelve feet or so. The hook bolts were spaced by divers 

and hooked into the side plating through holes bu rned by an underwater 

gas or electric torch. These bolts passed through the patches and wefe fitted 

with butterfly nuts. The mud which covered the bilge was washed away by 

waterjets. The bilge keel was cut away where it foul ed the patch, but in 

most instances the patch fitted over it. 

The joints between patches were made watertight by using old rubber 

hose for gaskets, and drawing one patch to another by lug bolts. 

The patches were made of four·inch planking. The 4·inch steel "I" beams 

and the lO·inch steel "H" beams were set vertically. This ingenious struc· 

ture took the inwa rd thrust of the patch as shown in the illustration on 

page 237. Fore and aft wales of 12" x 14" timbers were spaced about four 

and a ha lf feet apart. These members were shored directly to the armor belt. 

Negative buoyancy at the time of placement was obtained by a lead weight 

placed on an angle iron shelf on the outside of each patch. The clearance 

between the armOr and the inside of each patch was about eighteen inches. 

This gave sufficient room for a person to work between the armor and the 

patch. The forward patch had one door and the after patch three doors 

for divers to pass from the outside to the inside of each patch. After con· 

crete was poured these doors were secured. 

The 6nal operation was the pou ring of the underwater concrete to seal 

the bottoms of all sections and the sides of end sections. All were poured 

in succession from a stee l barge on which had been placed a mixing rna· 

chine. The concrete was a rich mixture consisting of one part cement to 

three and one·half parts of aggregate. The contractor utilized the Tremie 

process which he used in drydock construction. Ten·inch Tremie pipes were 

about ten feet apart. Ca re was taken, as is usua lly the case, that the concrete 

mixtu re did not disintegrate in the water. The concrete was installed about 

four feet deep along the bottom of each patch and at each ;nd. In all 325 

cubic yards, or about 650 tons of concrete were used. 

As soon as the concrete patches were finished the deep-well pumps were 

started to reveal large leaks in the patches, or elsewhere. It was easy to 

exceed the inflow when the leaks were rectified by the divers. Soon the 
Ship! Sunk At Pearl Harbor 237 

U6t; NR..L (MOO) 11764 

W~st Virginia, Jhowing lower portion of patch. Projerling Jttel beam WiIJ filled under 

the armor hell. 

salvage crew was in command. and it only remained to reduce draft by 

removing weights still in the ship. 

These weights consisted of free oil which was skimmed from the surface 

of each level by use of a skimmer operated ~y an eJectric motor. Fuel oil, 

which totaled about 800,000 gallons, was also removed. About 40,000 gal. 

Ions of free oil was picked up by the skimmers. This was only half of 

the free oil in California. However, Wesl Virginia had only 70 percent of 

its fuel oil aboard whereas Califomia had 100 percent. The fuel oil was 

taken out by ship's pumps operated by air. as in California. All of the 
238 Pearl Harbor 

16-inch shells and powder were sent ashore. This was a sizable weight. 

Many of the regular stores and canteen stores were landed also. Experience 

proved that the removal of fresh meat and dairy products was an unwholesome job, but a new method was devised. This consisted of pumping sea 

water into the compa rtments for severa l days, after which the meat was in 

shredded form and could be removed in its original bags without a noticeable stench. 

The hazard of capsizing was always present because of possible failure 

of the concrete patch due to an enemy air attack or structural failure. Steps 

were taken to prevent this. especially when the ship was enroute to the 

drydock. Temporary patches, similar to a collision mat, were made to draw 

over any damage which might be sustained. 

We asked to drydock in Number One instead of Number Two Drydock, 

if possible, because of the long time that W €II V i"ginia would require 

to make even temporary repairs. It should be understood that Number Two 

was a much larger dock with a greater depth over the sill and blocks. 

Th'erefore it had to be available for damaged ships returning from a fray 

with the Japanese. The lise of Number One Drydock established our goal 

for a draft of approximately thirty-three feet, which was hard to attain for 

this severely damaged ship. But it was reached by removing the fresh water 

from the double bottoms and all unattached weights on board. 

Air pressure was used extensive ly in W eil Virginia. It was tried out 

successfully in the area near the steering mechanism, and elsewhere wherever isolation of damage was possible. 

Human bodies were handled as in California and were taken out almost 

unknown to the working parties. Sixty-six bodies were found throughout 

the shi p. Several bodies were found lying on top of stea m pipes which were 

in the air bubble existing in the flooded areas. 

Three bodies were on a lower shelf of a storeroom near a fresh water 

supply. These men were clad in blues and jerseys. They presumably died 

from lack of oxygen. A calendar indicated that they had lived from 7 

December to 23 December. They had consumed the emergency rations 

which were available at the battle station, which apparently was the fresh 

water pump. This area had not been ' flooded. 

Great ca re was taken with the main propulsion plant. Little oil was allowed to percolate into the main units, and as they were unwatered 

prompt steps were taken toward preservation. The Genera! Electric Company and Puget Sound working parties on Califomia became available and 
Ships Sunk AI Pearl HarbOl' 239 

went to work promptly on West Virginia. They recond itioned the steam end 

without much trouble, and were able to start at once on the alternators and 

moto rs. As a result West Virginia had all her electric-drive machinery 

restacked and rewound before the voyage to the mainland. This was the 

biggest job ever undertaken on a ship afloat. 

W esl V irgiJlia came aAoat on 17 May and was received in Drydock Number One with blocks cut down to thirty-three inches on 9 June 1942. At that 

time she was practically on an even keel although she had been heeled to 

a maximum of twenty-eight degrees. When the salvage crew started working 

on her the draft was 50V2 feet forward and nearly 41 feet aft, with a list 

to port of about three degrees. 

It might be observed that the smaller pumps were used to reduce the 

water level in storerooms and smaller compartments. Even the Barnes 

three· inch suction pumps were put to work, as were the four-inch and the 

six-inch suction pumps. The 440 volt Pomona and the Peerless ten-i nch 

deep-well pumps were extremely effective in reducing the ship's water level. 

Adequate ventilation was a must in West Vit:gil1ia in order to reduce 

the gas hazard. Temporary lines were run by the Pearl Harbor Repair and 

Salvage Un it and hooked up to the ship's ventilation system. Temporary 

lights were rigged by the same crew, as lower compartments were unwatered. 

Nea rly all electric motors and auxiliary machinery were saved. This was 

due to the care exercised by Commander McNall ey's crew. Preservation was 

the watchword. All vital items were reconditioned at the ya rd; all others 

were retained on the ship for delivery at a West Coast Navy Yard. 

As usual, personal effects and classified material were turned over to the 

ship superintendent by order of the Commanding Officer. Great care was 

exercised, especially wh~n personal I()(k ~ were emptied of their contents. 

The enthusiasm and spirit of the crew deserves high praise. The Comman"ding Officer, Lieutenant Commander W. White, and his first assistant, 

Li eutenant Commander Levi Knight, were fine leaders and performed 

through the mO!1 ths most admirably. They, with less than ·500 men at an)' 

time, tackled almost a hopeless job. Yet they we re able to clean up the 

ship, remove the dead, take off every weight that could be moved, set up 

and man an anti-aircraft battery of nine machine guns, and reduce the 

draft to permit docking in Drydock Number One. At the same time they 

established temporary living quarters on Ford Isl and, built a walkway to 

to the ship, recommissioned the officers' and crews' galleys aboard ship, 

and from 27 April served three meals a day to all hands. 
240 Pearl Harbor 

USN NR.L (MOD) IQTIoS 

Salvage Officer, Captain Home, N. W allin, USN, and Commtmding Officer of West 

Virginia, Lieutenant Commander W . White, USN. 
ShipJ Sunk AI Pearl Harbor 241 

The Navy Yard's design and planning specialties were important to the 

success of salvaging WeJI Virginia. Various shops also applied their talents 

to the work. Without them the operation of air compressors and ventilation 

blowers would have been greatly hand icapped. 

The Navy was fortunate indeed to once again have the personnel and 

the experience of the Pacific Bridge Company. Their abilities in divi ng work 

and in design and installation of the patches was an achievement which 

excited the admiration of all. Without them the work could not have been 

done. Gratitude was expressed to Messrs. Graham, Ginella, Freeman, and 

Rice who hand led the outside work and to Messrs. Crocker and Foster 

who did so magnificently in design. 

The Salvage Division itself was on the job constantly. No harder worker 

or mare devoted man could be found than Lieutenant Painter who had been 

in charge of the California work, and who relieved Lieutenant Generaux so 

he could take the Plunger job. Lieutenant Painter was everywhere and spread 

enthusiasm and initiative. He was a Civil Engineer rather than a ship man. 

He was killed in Greece after the war by an ex plosion aboard a priva te 

yacht. His loss was a real one to his profession. 

Other Salvage Division officers who stood out were Lieutenant Com· 

mander Charles W. Rhodes, a machinery and electrical' expert; Darroch, 

Liedstrand, Bjork, and Beauchamp.Nobbs, acting as Lieutenant ~ainter 

desired, especially in the installation of patches, the setting of pumps, opening of drain lines, and ventilation_ During this time Commander McNalley 

spent only a small portion of his time aboard ship, but he was always active 

in recondi tioning mechanical and electrica l machinery. 

Some reference has been made to the work of divers. Without them it 

would have been impossible to sal vage W elf V il"gillia. They performed 

hazardous work, both inside and outside, without a casualty. These men 

came from the Salvage Division, WeJl Virginia, Widgeoll, the Submarine 

Base, the contractor, and the N avy Yard. In all from January to June, 527 

dives were made totaling nearly 1400 hours. Nearly half of the hours 

underwater were done by the contractor. Credit for the fine record achieved 

goes to the meticulous officer in charge of all diving, Lieutenant Commander Haynes and his assistants who were Calhoun, Ephland, and Suggs. 

In drydock W eJf Virgillia received the attention of the Navy Yard. It 

was agreed that the ship could be undocked to ma ke way for any battle 

casualty, but none appeared. The electric-drive machinery was the governing 

job, so final repairs in lieu of temporary repairs were possible in most cases. 

~ 
242 Pearl Harhor 

The Navy Yard did a great deal of work on lr?eJt Virginia ~fore her 

departure fo r the Puget Sound Navy Yard. 

She sailed under her own power, as was the habit of Pearl Harbor's 

sunken ships. She was modernized by the Puget Sound Navy Yard with 

greater torpedo protection, increased stability and floatabi lity, and a vastly 

improved anti-aircraft battery. 

It 

" 

I 

USS West Virginia approaching Jrydodt, 8 INl1~ 1942. 

Because of the unusual features of the salvage of Weil Virginia the full 

account is included as Appendix E for those who desire to read it. 

West Virginia left the Puget Sound Navy Yard on 4 Ju ly 1944 and took 

up the fight with the Japanese at the famous Battle of Surigao Strait where 

she poured ninety-three 16-inch projectiles into the Japanese Fleet. Before 

this she helped the landings at Leyte by bombardment. Later she took part 

as Aagship in the Mindoro Operation, and still later she participated at 

Lu zon, Iwo Jima , and Okinawa. She was present on 2 September 1945 when 

the Japanese surrendered formally on board MiJJouri. West Virginia was 
Ship1 SUlik AI Pearl Harbor 243 

the first of the "old" battleships to steam into Tokyo Bay and to anchor 

off the Japanese capital. Such is the history of the ship which was "lost" 

on 7 December at Pea rl Harbor. She had won five battle stars. 

8. U.s.S. OGLALA (LAUNCHED IN 1907) 

After California and Wef! Virginia , Oglala, ("Lalie" for short) was indeed 

a small ship, but she presented to her salvors new problems. She was on 

her side and almost submerged, she was an old ship designed in 1906, her 

construction permitted a maximum of free water, and her stability during 

salvage was of the worst. Because of the un iqueness of Oglala'1 damage 

she became a historic ship in salvage operations. 

8(I-G I7TOO~ 

USS Oglala, preparing to fink pontoonJ, -' April 1942. 

In the previous thirty-five years she had a checkered career. She was built 

by the Cramp's Shipyard in Philadelphia as a coastal passenger vessel 

between Boston and New York with the name of MaJSaclJJls(!w. She displaced about 4,200 tons and made twenty knots which made her very 

popular on the "Old Fall River Line" in those days of limited transportation. 

In World \Var I she was taken over by the Navy and converted to a 
244 Pearl Harbor 

minelayer with the name of U.sS. Shawlllut. She rendered heroic service 

in helping to lay the North Sca mine barrage. At the end of that wa r she 

was reconverted into a seaplane tender, as aviation was regarded as the 

weapon of the future and the Navy was abou t to make the three historic 

seaplane flights to Europe. This assignment continued until 1928 when she 

was again converted in to a minelayer with a new name. She was given the 

name of Oglala, which is derived from a formidable tribe of the Sioux 

Indians. 

On the morning of 7 December Oglala was moored outboard of H elma 

at "Ten-Ten" dock of the Pearl Ha rbor Navy Yard, an eight foot camel 

separating the two ships. An airplane torpedo, fi red from ~oo yards, passed 

under the shallow draft Oglala and exploded against the starboard side of 

Helena causing great damage in her machinery spaces. The pressure wave 

from the explosion ruptured the lower port shell plating abreast of Oglala'; 

fireroom. Although watertight closures had been rather well secured, the 

crew of this old vessel was unable to isolate the flooding. The ship gradu. 

ally took aboard large quantities of water and finally capsized to port about 

two hours after the explosion. 

The Commander of the Mine Force, Rear Admiral William R. Furlong, 

was aboard Oglala at the time and saw that the sinking of his flagshi p 

alongside H elena would foul the cmiser and prevent her removal from 

the dock. He therefore commandeered several tugs to pull Oglala clear and 

alongside the dock. In that position every effort was made to save Oglala 

but she finally capsized with -her masts and top hamper resting on the dock. 

As she rested on the bottom only the middle area of her starboard side 

was above water at the two foot tide which was the maximum at Pearl 

. Harbo r. Fortu nately the crew suffe red no loss of life nor serious injury. 

Oglala was initially written off as a total loss. Any planning for her 

future pertained to getting her clear of "Ten·Ten" dock by fair means or 

foul. For the next severa l months manpower and material were made avail· 

able only for salvage and repair work of the highest priority. The only 

work done on Oglala during these days was to remove her masts and 

topside structure, with the thought of preparing her for beaching Or for 

burial at sea. The purpose was to free the urgently needed dock site. 

To accomplish this worthy objective, much thought and discussion was 

involved. A logical and simple method was to unwater the flooded areas by 

means of compressed air, at least sufficiently to float the vessel on her side, 

and then tow her to the beach, to drydock for further handling, or out to 
245 

sea for sinking. But tests soon proved that the ship's hull would no t hold 

enough air pressure to utilize th is method. 

~'..W.'\l: 

_.,\.... 

"'"­

~ , . ' . , ... ~> . II,' I ", I:' ~ 

1\;.~,~ 

lif~ 

d 

( 'r\) .:...... lIaN N R4tL <M OD) Jt7&7 

Pontoon! Iurfaring near bow of Oglala, 11 Ap,iI1942. 

The next proposal was to rig four large lifting barges with multiple steel 

cabl es. It was found that this would require many alterations to the barges 

for proper subdi vision of compa rtments, suitable piping for flooding and 

pumping, and very special arrangements to protect the ba rges when they 

were subjected to a heavy and eccentric lift. Because all th is would divert 

manpower and materia! from urgent work, this method died aborning. 

Then, it was proposed that the easiest solution was to blow the shi p up 

with dynamite, and with the help of underwater divers and cutters to pick 

up the pieces for urgently needed scrap. While this method sou nded within 

the realm of reason, it had serious drawbacks. The re<juired crane service 

was more valuable elsewhere, and divers who were experienced in underwater cutting were at a premium. Of importance too was the possibility of 

serious damage to the dock from this drastic treatment. 
246 Pearl Harbor 

Finally after three or four months it was determined that all of the 

methods which seemed to promise an cas}' way out were unworkable or 

impracticable. So somewhat in desperation the decision was made to undertake the orthodox procedures of fi rst righting the ship. refloating her, and 

then drydocking her for repa irs. All of this was accomplished within a 

period of about th ree months but not without many problems and interesting episodes. 

The righting of the vesse l was pnmarily a parbuckling operation. Ten 

submarine salvage pontoons, each of eighty tons lifting capacity. were sunk 

inboard and attached to destroyer-type anchor chains which gird led th e 

ship. The chains were positioned under the hull by divers, and their free 

ends were secured to large steel stoppers which had been welded to the 

starboard side above water. In addition, compressed air up to three pou nds 

pressu re was injected in to the hu ll to remove as much water as it would; 

two barges were heavi ly anchored outboard to exe rt a rotational pull by 

means of winches which were placed aboard; and two 75 ton hydrau lic 

jacks made ready at the dockside to push against the deck edge if required 

to start the rotational movement. All preparations were meticulousl y made, 

and this part of the resu rrection of Oglala was scheduled for 11 April. 

A large number of interested observers were present, including Admira l 

Nimitz and the Navy Yard Commandant, Rea r Admiral Furlong, as usual 

consistently supporting and encouraging the sal vage tempo by being present 

'at every significant event. In spite of an enthusiastic audience the righting 

operation was a fa ilure, th e first of several mishaps in the Oglala job. 

The cause of the 'fai lu re was that several of the pontoons broke loose and 

rose to the surface when their chain bridles parted at the welds. However, 

it was observed that plel1ty of power was available to do the job. So the 

defective bridles were discarded and the pontoons re-rigged more securely 

for a second try on 23 April. This was entirely successful, although the 

initial list was about twenty degrees to port. Various steps were taken to 

red uce the list, including dredging, and new hitches by the pontoons. In a 

few days the list was less than seven degrees. This was considered acceptable 

for the next step, which was refloating. 

At this point the ship was sitting on the bottom in about forty-five feet 

of water, so very little of its remaining structme was visible. The wooden 

deckhouses had been removed, so only a few feet of the bow and a bit 

of the superstructure amidships were above water. 

The method of reJloating was the same lIsed successfully Oil California 
ShipJ Slink AI Pearl Harbor 247 

, 

..~\,

'" 

I\~ 

" 

, 

, 

!·1"',··,

:l 

j', 

tilSI' I'RoItL (!.IOIli as.I~. 

Rear Admiral William R. Furlollg, Admiral Chester 117, N!mi/z, a"d Cap/ai" Homer 

N. Wallin inspecting the salflage operafions in USS Oglala. 

and IVesl V;rginia- that is by extending the shell of the vessel upward 

from the deck edge to a point above high water. This was accomplished by 

the wooden fence· type cofferdam which was secured to her gunwa le. Then 

with sufficient pumping capacity and gradual control of the inAow of water 

the ship is sure to floa t in obedience to Arch imedes' Principle. The salvage 

crew had definitely learned that successful salvage work follows the proper 

applicat ion of the immutable laws of nature, 

Extending the shell upward is basically a simple operation although 

usuall y beset by obstacles and design complications. A fence ty pe caisson of 

wooden vertical sections was bolted to the waterway coaming. In this case 

they ranged in height from six feet to twenty-six feet, and the thickness 

varied from four inches to ten inches to withstand the maximum computed 

water pressu res. These high pressures necessitated a great amount of shori ng 

from the inside to insure no fa ilure at critical periods. A point of interest, 

too, is that for the floating cranes to properly position the thirty foot sections of heavy lumber in deep water required negative buoyancy. This was 
248 Pearl Harbol' 

attained by placing a large number of sand bags in boxes built into each 

section. 

While the caisson sections were being installed the diving detail was 

busy securing an 18 by 20 foot wooden patch over the ruptured shell area. 

Also they were active in closing aU hull openings and calking cofferdam 

sections. A tremendous amount of first class diving work was performed 

under excellent supervision. During the Oglala salvage some 15 to 18 divers 

were available, mostly from Ortolan. They made 542 dives totaling nearly 

2,000 hours under water. The divers experienced not a single injury or 

casualty in this work. The water level was lowered about three feet per 

hour, and at 1000 on 23 April 1942 Oglala came afloat. This was a proud 

moment for the salvage workers and for Oglala, but she still had several 

ordeals to withstand. 

Calculations had been made which proved that with the vessel afloat her 

stability, both transverse and longitudinal, would be guestionable and would 

soon become negative as the draft was further decreased. There were several 

reasons for this. An important one was that we had added over 1,300 tons 

of cofferdam, sand ballast, shoring, and pumps high above the ship's deck 

USN NR<lL (MOD) n7 

Oglala's cofferdam completed, 8 June 1942. 
Ships Stink At Pearl Harbor 249

edge. Another was the large area of free water surface, especially on the 

open mine deck. 

In order to improve transverse stability it was decided to remove the 

anchors, some 350 tons of sand bags, a few of the higher shores, and con ­

siderable loose water which was trapped in various locations. But improvement was meager because it reguired the removal of 150 tons of main deck 

weight to gain one inch of righting arm. Under existing conditions Oglala 

was certain to be cantankerous regardless of mathematical manipulation. 

This fact became clear as the pumping continued. The ship kept on an even 

keel until the draft was reduced to forty feet at which time she took a port 

list of eight degrees. 

Additional topside weights could have been removed but it was decided 

that this should await further developments, and it was fortunate that we 

did. On the night of 25-26 June the Salvage Officer was awakened by the 

mess boy on watch at a Makalapa bachelor domicile with the dolorous 

announcement that "the Og-Ia.la, she is sinking again." What had happened was primarily a lesson in longitudinal stability. First a forward pump 

stopped when its gasoline line became clogged. This permitted the inAow 

of wate r to exceed the outgo at the bow because the other pump in that 

location took suction several feet higher. As the bow went down a bit 

some of the water surged forward. This further increased the draft forward 

and caused still more water to surge toward the bow. The surging water 

carried some clothing and debris which clogged the strainers of both pumps, 

thus compounding the situation. Within a half hour the cumulative effect 

was that the bow reached the bottom in forty-eight feet of water, and the 

rest of the ship soon followed, ending up with a starboard list of 8 degrees. 

After strenuous work in tightening up the shoring and stopping leaks 

for three days the ship came aAoat again on an even keel. But still another 

chapter of Oglala's ordeals was near at hand. On 29 June while the writel 

was walking on the top of the cofferdam's stern section he felt a movement 

of the timbers, and within moments the whole section tilted sufficiently to 

Jet in large volumes of water, and again to sink the ship. Removal of the 

stern section disclosed another "practical" departure from design specifica. 

tions, in that steel tie-rods between the ship's structu re and the bottom of 

the cofferdam had been omitted. Somebody in the field assembly . gang 

guessed that the two 10 by 12 timbers, inside and out, would be adequate. 

Within two days the vessel was aAoat again and scheduled for the trip 

to the drydock two days later, namely 3 Ju ly. Except for some very efficient 
2~O Pend Harbor 

fire fighting this would not have occurred, for in the early evening of 2 

Jul y a spectacular fire raged on the interior water surface fed by oil and 

gasoline. The oil-soaked timbers of the cofferdam were soon aflame. The 

picture was ominous, but severa! fire brigades were soon on the scene and 

extinguished the flames within a half hom without serious damage. Another 

sinking of 0 glaltl was avoided, and next day she was in the drydock 

starting a new career. The fire started from a spl ash of gasoline on a hot 

exhaust pipe during refue ling. 

Again, the machinery was entirely recondition able , especially the reci procating main propulsion drive of 0 gIn/a. The electric motors were treated to 

proper ca re and preservation by the people in charge of this specialty. It 

had been learned that electric motors and modern wiring subjected to submergence could be preserved and dried out without too much difficu lty. 

Deep submergence, on the other hand, might show satisfactory characteristics in a non-humid atmosphere, but high potential lines were sure to 

break down ultimately in sea serv ice. All important wiring was renewed 

by the Navy Yard before the tri p to Mare Island. 

Oglala had a mean draft of about sixteen feet prior to sinking whereas 

it was over 39 feet when drydocked. Except for inherent instability the draft 

could have been further reduced. Great care was taken to avoid damage 

to the deck edge caissons which had dried out considerably and rC9uired 

constant tightening of shores. Such damage could come from tugs or their 

lines on the way to [he drydock. Stability could be affected by accelerated 

movement in any direction due to the large amount of free surface in the 

ship. All hazards were guarded against, and the trip to the drydock was 

made in fair weather with a min imum of difficulty. 

The interesting deta ils of getting a delicate and potentially unstable ship 

into drydock must for brevity's sake be ommitted here, as must also a 

multitude of details concerning the righting, refloating, and repair. For 

those especia lly interested most of the story can be found in the fi les of the 

Navy's Ship Systems Command. Suffice it to say that as far as salvage 

operations were concerned the challenge presented by Oglala covered the 

whole gamu t of technology and experience and its successful outcome gave 

to all personnel involved a sense of great satisfaction. 

After temporary repairs at Pearl Harbor she soon sailed away unescorted, 

under her own power, for reconditioning at Mare Island. However; it was 

decided that the Los Angeles Shipbuilding Company wou ld do the job and 

refit her as a repair vessel for diese l prope1ied craft which by that time 
Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbor 241 

The Navy Yard's design and planning specialties were important to the 

success of sa lvaging Wesl Virginia. Various shops also applied thei r talents 

to the work. Without them the operation of air compressors and ventilation 

blowers would have been greatly handicapped. 

The Na~y was fortunate indeed to once again have the personnel and 

the experience of the Pacifi c Bridge Company. Their abilities in diving work 

and in design and installation of the patches was an achievement which 

excited the admiration of all. W ithout them the work could not have been 

done. Gratitude was expressed to Messrs. Graham, Ginella, Freeman, and 

Rice who handled the outside work and to Messrs. Crocker and Foster 

who did so magnificently in design. 

The Salvage Division itself was on the job constantly. No harder worker 

or more devoted man could be found than Lieutenant Painter who had been 

in charge of the California work, and who rel ieved Lieutenant Generaux so 

he could take the Plunger job. Lieutenant Painter was everywhere and spread 

enthusiasm and initiative. He was a Civil Engineer rather than a ship man. 

He was killed in Greece after the war by an explosion aboard a private 

yacht. His loss was a real one to his profession. 

Other Salvage Division officers who stood out were Lieutenant Commander Charles W. Rhodes, a machinery and electrical' expert; Darroch, 

Liedstrand, Bjork, and Beauchamp-Nobbs, acting as Lieutenant Painter 

desired, especiaJly in the installation of patches, the setting of pumps: opening of drain lines, and ventilation. During this time Commander McNalley 

spent only a small portion of his time aboard ship, but he was always active 

in reconditioning mechanical and electrical machinery. 

Some reference has been made to the work of divers. Without them it 

wou ld have been impossible to salvage West Virginia. They performed 

hazardous work, both inside and outside, without a casualty. These men 

came from the Salvage Division, West Virginia, Widgeoll, the Submarine 

Base, the contractor, and the Navy Yard. In all from January to June, ">27 

dives were made totaling nearly 1400 hours. Nea rly ha lf of the hours 

underwater were done by the contractor. Credit for the fine record achieved 

goes to the meticulous officer in charge of all diving, Lieutenant Commander Haynes and his assistants who wefe Calhoun, Ephland, and Suggs. 

In drydock West Virginia received the attention of the Navy Yard. It 

was agreed that the ship cou ld be undocked to make way for any battle 

casualty, but none appeared. The electric-drive machinery was the governing 

job, so .final repairs in lieu of temporary repai rs were possible in most cases. 

-
rarbor 

The Navy Yard did a great deal of work on West Virginia before her 

departure for the Fuget Sound Navy Yard. 

She sailed under her own power, as was the habit of Pearl Harbor's 

sunken ships. She was modernized by the Fuget Sound Navy Yard with 

greater torpedo protection, increased stability and floatability, and a vastly 

improved anti-aircraft battery . 

..', .,0, 

uss West Virginia approaching dr)'dock, 8 June 1942. 

Because of the unusual features of the salvage of West Virginia the fuJI 

account is included as Appendix E for those who desi re to read it. 

West Virginia left the Fuget Sound Navy Yard on 4 July 1944 and took 

up the fight with the Japanese at the famous Battle of Surigao Strait where 

she poured ninety-three 16-inch projectiles into the Japanese Fleet. Before 

this she helped the landings at Leyte by bombardment. Later she took part 

as flagship in the Mindoro Operation, and still later she participated at 

Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. She was present on 2 September 1945 when 

the Japanese surrendered formally on board MiHofJr;. West Virginia was 
243 

./ 

Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbor 

the first of the "old" battleships to steam into Tokyo Bay and to anchor 

off the Japanese capital. Such is the history of the ship which was " lost" 

on 7 December at Pearl Harbor. She had won five battle stars. 

8. U.S.S. OGLALA (LAUNCHED IN 1907) 

After California and West Virginia, Oglala, ("Lalie" for short) was indeed 

a small ship, but she presented to her salvors new problems. She was on 

her side and almost submerged, she was an old ship designed in 1906, her 

construction permitted a maximum of free water, and her stability during 

salvage was of the worst. Because of the uni<Jueness of Oglala'S damage 

she became a historic ship in salvage operations. 

~O_ 1710Q; 

USS Oglala, preparing to sink pontoons, ..5 April 1942. 

In the previous thirty.five years she had a checkered career. She was built 

by the Cramp's Shipyard in Philadelphia as a coastal passenger vessel 

between Boston and New York with the name of MassachuJettJ. She dis· 

placed about 4,200 tons and made twenty knots which made her very 

popular on the "Old Fall River Line" in those days of limited transportation. 

In World War I she was taken over by the Navy and converted to a 
244 Pearl Harbor 

minelayer with the name of U.s.S. Shawmut. She rendered heroic service 

in helping to lay the North Sea mine barrage. At the end of that war she 

was reconverted into a seaplane tender, as aviation was regarded as the 

weapon of the future and the Navy was about to make the three historic 

seaplane flights to Europe. This assignment continued until 1928 when she 

was again converted into a mineLayer with a new name. She was given the 

name of Oglala, which is derived from a formidable tribe of the SiOllX 

Indians. 

On the morning of 7 December Oglala was moored outboard of Helena 

at "Ten-Ten" dock of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, an eight foot camel 

sepa rating the two ships. An airplane torpedo, fi red from 500 yards, passed 

under the shallow draft Oglala and exploded against the starboard side of 

Helena causing great damage in her mach inery spaces. The pressure wave 

from the explosion ruptured the lower port shell plating abreast of Oglala'S 

fire room. Although wate rtight closures had been rather well secured, the 

crew of th is old vessel was unable to isolate the Rooding. The ship gradually took aboard large guantities of water and fina lly capsized to port about 

two homs after the explosion. 

The Commander of the Mine Force, Rear Admira l William R. Furlong, 

was aboard Oglala at the time and saw that the sinking of his flagsh ip 

alongside Helena would foul the cruiser and prevent her remova l from 

the dock. He therefore commandeered several tugs to pull Oglala clear and 

alongside the dock. In that position every effort was made to save Oglala 

but she fina ll y capsized with 'her masts and top hamper resting on the dock. 

As she rested on the bottom only the middle area of her starboard side 

was above water at the two foot tide which was the maximum at Pearl 

. Harbor. Fortunately the crew suffered no loss of life nor serious injury. 

Oglala was initially written off as a tota l loss. Any planning for her 

future pe rtai ned to getting her clear of 'T en-Ten" dock by fair means or 

fou l. For the next several months manpower and material were made available only for salvage and repair work of the highest priority. The only 

work done on Oglala during these days was to remove her masts and 

topside structure, with the thought of preparing her for beaching or for 

burial at sea. The purpose was to free the urgently needed dock site. 

To accomplish this worthy objective, much thought and discussion was 

involved. A logical and simple method was to unwater the flooded areas by 

means of compressed air, at least sufficiently to float the vessel on her side, 

and then tow her to the beach, to drydock for further handling, or out to 
245 

sea for sinking. But tests soon proved that the ship's hull would not hold 

enough air pressure to utilize this method. 

, , 

--­ " 

,~" " 

, -" ':g. 

.:.... ',,,,,, 

I1BN N R ..J. (NOD) ,"7~1 

Ponloom Jflrftuing near bow 01 Oglala, 11 Afiri11942. 

The next proposal was to rig four large lifting barges with multiple steel 

cables. It was found that this would require many altera tions to the barges 

for proper subdivision of compartments, suitable piping for flooding and 

pumping, and very special arrangements to protect the barges when they 

were subjected to a heavy and eccentric lift. Because all th is wou ld divert 

manpower and material from urgent work, this method died aborning. 

Then, it was proposed that the easiest solution was to blow the ship up 

with dynamite, and with the help of underwater divers and cutters to pick 

up the pieces for urgently needed scrap. While this method sounded within 

the realm of reason, it had serious drawbacks. The required crane service 

was more valuable elsewhere, and divers who were experienced in underwater cutting were at a premium. Of importance too was the possibility of 

serious damage to the dock from this drastic treatment. 
246 Pear! Harbor 

Finally after three or four months it was determined that all of the 

methods which seemed to promise an easy way out were unworkable or 

impracticable. So somewhat in desperation the decision was made to undertake the orthodox proced ures of first righting the ship, refloating her, and 

then drydocking her for repairs. All of this was accomplished within a 

period of about three months but not without maoy problems and interesti ng episodes. 

The righting of the vessel was prima ri ly a parbuckling operation. Ten 

submarine salvage pontoons, each of eighty tons lifting capacity, were sunk 

inboa rd and attached to destroyer-type anchor chains which girdled the 

ship. The chains were positioned under the hull by divers, and their free 

ends were secured to large steel stoppers which had been welded to the 

starboard side above water. In addition, compressed air up to three pounds 

pressure was injected into the hull to remove as much water as it would; 

two barges were heavily anchored outboard to exert a rotational pull by 

means of winches which were placed aboard; and two 75 ton hydraulic 

jacks made ready at the dockside to push against the deck edge if required 

to start the rotational movement. All preparations were meticulously made, 

and this part of the resurrection of Oglala was scheduled for 11 April. 

A large number of interested observers were present, including Admiral 

Nimitz and the Navy Yard Commandant, Rear Admiral Furlong, as usual 

consistently supporting and encouraging the salvage tempo by being present 

at every significant event. In spite of an enthusiastic audience the righting 

operation was a failure, the first of several mishaps in the Oglala job. 

The cause of the 'failure was that several of the pontoons broke loose and 

rose to the surface when their chain brid les parted at the welds. However, 

it was observed that plenty of power was available to do the job. So the 

defective brid les were discarded and the pontoons re-rigged more securely 

for a second tf)' on 23 April. This was entirely successfu l, although the 

initial list was about twenty degrees to port. Various steps were taken to 

reduce the list, inc1udins dredging, and new hitches by the pontoons. In a 

few days the list was less than seven degrees. This was considered acceptable 

for the next step, which was reAoating. 

At this point the ship was sitting on the bottom in about forty-five feet 

of water, so very little of its remaining structure was visible. The wooden 

deckhouses had been removed, so only a few feet of the bow and a bit 

of the superstructure amidships were above water. 

The method of reAoating was the same used successfull y on California 
Ships Sunk AI Pearl Harbor 247 

I 

II

)rr... ~ 

\7 

ofF' .­ X, ""Wl 

/ . I 

, 

• 

, .," ''' ,II' ' 

" \' "...''.I.... . 

i 

. 

~' . .. 

U8:-1 "'Roll. (M Om a3IlH 

Rear Admiral William R. Furlong. Admira/ CheJler W. N{mitz, alld Captain Homer 

N. Wallin inspecting the la/vage opera#om in USS Oglala. 

and If/esl Virginia-that is by extending the shell of the vessel upward 

from the deck edge to a point above high water. This was accomplished by 

the wooden fence-type cofferdam which was secured to her gunwale. Then 

with sufficient pumping capacity and gradual control of the inflow of water 

the ship is sure to float in obedience to Archimedes' Principle. The salvage 

crew had definitely learned that successful salvage work follows the proper 

application of the immutable laws of nature. 

Extending the shell upward is basically a simple operation although 

usually beset by obstacles and design complications. A fence type caisson of 

wooden vertical sections was bolted to the waterway coarning. In this case 

they ranged in height from six feet to twenty-six feet, and the thickness 

varied from four inches to ten inches to withstand the maximum computed 

water pressures. These high pressures necessitated a great amount of shoring 

from the inside to insure no failure at critical periods. A point of interest, 

too, is that for the floating cranes to properly position the thirty foot sections of heavy lumber in deep water rcguired negative buoyancy. This was 
248 Pearl Harbor 

attained by placing a large number of sand bags in boxes built into each 

section. 

While the caisson sections were being installed the diving detail was 

busy securing an 18 by 20 foot wooden patch over the ruptured shell area. 

Also they were active in closing all hull openings and calking cofferdam 

sections. A tremendous amount of first class diving work was performed 

under excellent supervision. During the 0 gla/a salvage some 15 to 18 divers 

were available, mostly from Ortolan. They made 542 dives totaling nearly 

2,000 hours under water. The divers experienced not a single injury or 

casualty in this work. The water level was lowered about three feet per 

hour, and at 1000 on 23 April 1942 Oglala came afloat. This was a proud 

moment for the salvage workers and for 0 giala, but she still had several 

ordeals to withstand. 

Calculations had been made which proved that with the vessel afloat her 

stability, both transverse and longitudinal , wou ld be questionable and would 

soon become negative as the draft was further decreased. There were several 

reasons for this. An important one was that we had added over 1,300 tons 

of cofferdam, sand ballast, shoring, and pumps high above the ship's deck 

Oglala's cofferdam completed, 8 June 1942. 
J 

Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbol' 249 

edge. Another was the large area of free water surface. especially on the 

open mine deck. 

In order to improve transverse stability it was decided to remove the 

anchors, some 350 tons of sand bags, a few of the higher shores, and considerable loose water which was trapped in various locations. But improvement was meager because it required the removal of 150 tons of main deck 

weight to ga in one inch of righting arm. Under existing conditions Oglala 

was certa in to be cantankerous regardless of mathematical manipulation. 

This fact became clear as the pumping continued. The ship kept on an even 

kee l unti l the draft was reduced to forty feet at which time she took a port 

list of eight degrees. 

Additional topside weights could have been removed but it was decided 

that this shou ld await further developments, and it was fortunate that we 

did. On the night of 25-26 June the Salvage Officer was awakened by the 

mess boyan watch at a Makalapa bachelor domicile with the dolorous 

announcement that "the Og-Ia-la, she is sinking again." What had happened was primarily a lesson in longitudinal stability. First a forward pump 

stopped when its gasol ine line became clogged. This permitted the inRow 

of water to exceed the outgo at the bow because the other pump in that 

location took suction several feet higher. As the bow went down a bit 

some of the water surged forward. This further increased the draft forward 

and caused still more water to surge toward the bow. The surging water 

carried some clothing and debris which clogged the stra iners of both pumps, 

thllS compoundi ng the situation. Within a half hour the cumul ative effect 

was that the bow reached the bottom in forty.eight feet of water, and the 

rest of the ship soon followed. ending up with a starboard list of 8 degrees. 

After strenuous work in tightening up the shoring and stopping leaks 

for three days the ship came afloat again on an even keel. But still another 

chapter of Og/a/a'J ordeals was near at hand. On 29 June while the writer 

was walking on the top of the cofferdam's stern section he felt a movement 

of the timbers, and within moments the whole section tilted sufficiently to 

let in large volumes of water, and again to sink the ship. Removal of the 

stern section disclosed another "practical" departure from design specifications, in that steel tie-rods between the ship's structure and the bottom of 

the cofferdam had been omitted. Somebody in the field assembly. gang 

guessed that the two 10 by 12 timbers, inside and Out, would be adequate. 

Within two days the vessel was afloat again and scheduled for the trip 

to the drydock two days later, namely 3 July. Except for some very efficient 

• 
250 Pea'" Harbo1' 

fire fighting th is would not have occurred, for in the early evening of 2 

July a spectacula r fire raged on the interior water surface fed by oil and 

gasoline. The oil-soaked timbers of the cofferdam were soon aflame. The 

picture was ominous, but several fi re brigades were soon on the scene and 

extinguished the fla mes within a half hour without serious damage. Another 

sinking of Oglala was avoided, and next day she was in the drydock 

starting a new career. The fire sta rted from a splash of gasoline on a hot 

exhaust pipe during refueling. 

Again, the machinery was entirely reconditionable, especially the reciprocating main propulsion drive of Oglala. The electric motors were treated to 

proper ca re and preservation by the people in charge of this specialty. It 

had been learned that electric motors and modern wi'ring su bjected to sub· 

mergence could be preserved and dried out without too much difficulty. 

Deep submergence, on the other hand, might show satisfactory character· 

isties in a non-humid atmosphere, but high potential li nes were sure to 

break down ultimate ly in sea service. All important wiring was renewed 

by the Navy Yard before the trip to Mare Island. 

Oglala had a mean draft of abou t sixteen feet prior to sinking whereas 

it was over 39 feet when drydocked. Except for inherent instability the draft 

could have been further reduced. Great care was taken to avo id damage 

to the deck edge caissons which had dried out considerably and required 

constant tightening of shores. Such damage could come from tu gs or their 

lines on the way to the drydock. Stability cou ld be affected by accel erated 

movement in any direction due to the large amount of free su rface in the 

ship. All haza rds were guarded agai nst, and the trip to the drydock was 

made in fai r weather with a minimum of diffi culty. 

The interesting details of getting a delicate and potentially unstable ship 

in to drydock must for brevity's sake be ommitted here, as must also a 

multitude of details concerning the righting, refloating, and repair. For 

those especi ally interested most of the story can be found in the fi les of the 

Navy's Ship Systems Command. Suffi ce it to say that as far as sa lvage 

operations were concerned the chall enge presented by 0 gla/a covered the 

whole gamu t of technology and ex perience and its successful outcome gave 

to all personnel involved a sense of great satisfac tion. 

Afte r tempora ry repairs at Pearl Harbo r she soon sailed away unescorted, 

under her own power, for reconditioning at Mare Island. However; it was 

decided that the Los Angeles Shipbuilding Company wou ld do the job and 

refit her as a repair vessel for diesel propell ed craft which by that time 
Ships Slink At Pearl Harbor 251 

UR" ".1\"1. (MOD) agn,s 

USS Oglala raised. 

abounded in great numbers in the far reaches of the Pacific. 

The Board of Inspection and Survey had been called in to check Ogiala'J 

physical condition, especially because of the over-age and the wear and tear 

of hardy service and the debilitating ordeals of salvage operations. After 

a rigid inspection the Board reported favorably on her general strength and 

capability for further service. In February 1944 a fine and almost new 

repair ship, named Oglala, sailed for the South Pacific for duty, and in due 

time moved with the fleet to Hollandia and Leyte. She was an important 

unit of our sea forces, rendering essential services to her sister vessels and 

their crews on their steady approach to· Japan . 

At present Oglala is a part of the Maritime Reserve Fleet at Suisun, 

California. She is standing by awaiting a call to service. 

The Navy Yard was active in furnishing a large number of studies on 

Oglala, especially those pertaining to floatability versus stability. Mr. 

Hastrup of the Navy Yard was especially valuable in this regard. 

The successful outcome of salvage operations was due as usual to the 

assistance rendered by the Pacific Bridge Company, and to the constant 
2~2 Pead Harbor 

effort of the rescue ship Ortolan and its Commanding Officer, Lieutenant 

Latta. He was relieved by Lieutenant Holland, who was just as efficient. 

Gunner Arnold Larson was always on the job, assisted by his friend, Boatswain Wa lsh. All three of these men were active later with their ship in 

the Guaclalcanal area, 

The Sa lvage Division was fortunate in having Lieutenant M. 1. McClung 

in direct charge. Lieutenant Commander Rhodes took charge of the rna· 

chinery preservation on Oglala. At various times, espeCially after Weft 

Virginia was placed in dock, a number of officers were available for other 

salvage work in the Pacific, including Greely, Liedstrand, Bjork, and Brady. 

Ogla/a became a valuable vessel to the fleet, but at one time she was 

written off as a to tal loss. The lesson to be learned is that in time of disaster 

or adversity human nature is impressed by all that is wrong or baneful, 

and not by the good still remaining. The old ship Oglala, when drydocked, 

was ninety percent repairable. All the other ships rescued from the waters 

of Pearl Harbor showed similar percentages, and all of them proved it by 

helping defeat the enemy responsible for the 7 December attack. 

9. VSS. PLUNGER (LAUNCHED IN 1936) 

This submarine was not present at Pearl Harbor when the surprise Japanese 

attack occurred, but the Salvage Division inherited a job when Plunger 

was docked on the Marine Railway and fell over to port on 17 February 

1942. The blocking of the Marine Railway was repeatedly immersed in 

oily water and had therefore gathered a coating of oil which made the 

blocks unstable. The result was that PllInger came to rest on the Aoor of the 

dock at a list of only a few degrees. The Marine Rai lway was knocked off 

its tracks. It was assumed that severe damage had occurred to the tracks or 

to the wheels. In any event, the dock was immobilized. 

The Commandant of the Navy Yard finally asked the Salvage Division 

to take over the job. Reference has been made to the fact that Lieutenant 

Emile Generaux was taken off Californ;a and assigned to Plunger. He was 

reputed to be a rigger of more than ordinary capabilities, and he proved 

this on the submarine job. 

Fortunate ly a finger pier paralleled the Marine Railway, and this gave 

almost a straight pull for the purchases which Generaux rigged to Plul/ger. 

The rigging for the pull was of large proportions as about 2000 tons had 

,. 
-- Ships Sunk At Pearl Harbor 253 

to be skidded along the floor of the dock, or the floor itself had to move. 

Before lightening the ship several test pulls were made to insure that the rig. 

ging and th e motive power were sufficient. 

To reduce the pull required, the lead ba ll ast and the water were removed 

from the submarine. W ith this weight removed it was found that upon 

movement of the ship into deep water, the rigging at hand was quite sufficient. As the vessel entered the water the movement became easier as is 

na turally th e case. Of course, it was well that the concrete cross member 

had been removed, and. that a sliding shoe had been placed on the port 

side to ease the vessel outboard when leav ing the cradle. To facilitate this, 

a buoyancy tank with about 30,000 pounds lift was insta lled over the shoe 

as it was assumed that the track or wheels on that side were collapsed. 

In the meantime the Navy Yard made calculations on Aoatability and 

stabil ity. Th ese were used to good purpose. When Pillnger was almost 

afloat the lead ballast and ballast water were replaced in the shi p to insure 

positive stability when freel y afloat. In addition about fifty tons of pig iron 

were loaded into the vessel. Plunger had been pulled about forty feet before 

the ballasting material was added. Then the pull was resumed, and Plunger 

floated off the drydock apron into deep water after the vessel was pulled 

about thirty feet. 

The work on Pillnger was of little account. The apron of the Marine 

Ra ilway was put back into the position wh ich it would have when 

retracted. Whi le considerable work was originally expected, it was found 

that work by the divers in positioning the rails and some minor repairs 

were all that was rC;<Ju ired. The Marin e Rai lw ay went back into regular 

use on 3 August and USS. Barker was docked on schedule. 

10. V.SS. OKLAHOMA, BATTLESHIP 

( LAUNCHED IN 19 14) 

The Japanese planes which passed over the officers' boat landing at Merry 

Point seemed to concentrate their torpedoes on the battleships which were 

moored outboard near the northern end of the line. W est V irginia was hi t 

by as many as seven torpedoes, Arizona was sunk at her berth, and Okla· 

homa received fr om five to seven hits. Early in the onslaught she was put 

out of action and capsized at her berth. 

It was realized that the salvage of this ship would require a combination 

of the steps taken on W elt Vil'gillia and Oglala. The size of Oklahoma and 
2)4 


her genera l condition made salvage questionable, although it was deemed 

important to rid the harbor of a derelict and to make the be rth available 

for other ships. Accordingly, plans wefe made by th e Salvage Division to 

righ t her and to refloat her fo r further disposition. 

As early as May 1942 the Navy Department indicated a desire that 

Oklahoma be sa lvaged. Contractua l arrangements were therefore made with 

the Pacific Bridge Company so th at the company could get suitable priorities on required materia l, and at the same time could hire the ri,ght mcn for 

the job. A scheme of sa lvage was therefo re drawn up which divided the 

responsibi lities between the Navy and the company. In short, the scheme 

provided th at the shi p should first he righted and then floated to a drydock 

fo r repairs. 

RIGHTING 

The righting of a ship weighing about 35,000 tons was no easy task. It 

was accomplished by various means. The important element was, of course, 

the installation of shore winches on Ford Island. These twenty-one electric 

winches were anchored in concrete foundations and operated in un ison. Each 

el ectric winch was capable of about a twenty ton pull through a fl exible 

one-inch wire cable operated through a block system which gave an advantage of seventeen. The three-inch cable, in order to increase the leverage, 

passed over a wooden strut arrangement which stood on the bottom of 

the ship about 40 feet high. Then the cable divided into fOLlr "cat tails" 

wh ich were secured to lugs welded to the shel l of the ship at frame stations. 

Ca lculations indicated that the hul l strength was adequate. To assist the 

twenty-one winches it was at first proposed, that submarine salvage pontoons 

be used on the port side. This was given up because of the difficu lty of 

proper attachment, ;lnd the presence of mud. The air pressure proposed 

inside the hull seemed ample. 

The air bubble method accounted for almost 20,000 tons of weight initi ally and was highly effect ive. It was used on the starboard side after the 

oil had been removed th rough the bottom. This totall ed about 350,000 

gallons of the 1,000,000 gallons originaUy in the ship. It was placed ill oil 

barges as it was pumped out by three-inch steam reciprocating pumps and 

air-driven pumps. A steam blanket was used to prevent explosions from oil 

vapors. This was provided for by having ex-NaIJd/o moor alongside and 

furn ish steam and electric power. 

The air bubble was divided into five parts to prevent loss of air pressure 
ll "~ ~1'1I" J aOI~ GOUt 

JJPIS 10 ~~ aUIICf ~4o fUO!IP 10 I:W04!I'IO ' 8 f)JPIV H6f "

fI S K ~l'lIN J aOl~ est" 
256 Pearl Harbor 

for the whole ship at a crucial time. The air pressure was about 11 - 12 

pounds, so that the water level was blown down to about twenty-five. feet 

below the surface. This lightened the ship's weight considerably. 

There was a large amount of weight in the ship which could have been 

removed prior to righting or refloating, but difficulty of access made this 

impracticable. About onc-third of the ammunition was taken off but none 

of the 14.. jnch projectiles. Some of the machinery was removed from the dry 

evaporator pump room. The blades of the two propellers were taken off, 

more to avoid damage to them than to reduce weight. 

The above methods assumed that Oklahoma would roll instead of slide. 

Tests, including soil tests, were made to check whether restraining forces 

should be used to prevent sliding toward Ford Island. It was indicated 

that the soil of the after two-thirds of the ship facilitated rolling; but the 

bow section rested in soupy mud which surely permitted sliding. To prevent 

this about 2200 tons of cora l soil were deposited near the bow section, and 

anchorages along the port side were given up as not necessary. 

Consideration was given to some dredging and removal of mud on the 

starboard side prior to righting. but this was deferred to assure that the 

vessel would rotate rather than slide. When Oklahoma was righted with a 

list of about fifteen degrees to port the excess soil under the starboard side 

was washed away by high pressure water jets operated by divers. 

During and prior to the righting operation, ca re was taken that all purchases were equali zed. This was accomplished ·by the use of strain gauges 

on the hauling wires at each bent or strut. The one-inch Aexible cable was 

speeded up or slowed down to equalize these strain gauges. Observation 

posts were established on barges to note the effect of righting movements, 

and especially to note whether the shi p was rotating or sliding. 

The wooden bents became less effective as their leverage decreased when 

the ship gradually assumed a position approaching ninety degrees. When 

the list was about sixty-eight degrees to port the bents or head frames were 

cast off and floated clear. From then until the ship reached thirty degrees to 

port the pull was directly on the lugs welded to the port shell. Then the 

hauling cables were secured to the ship's topsides, especially to strong portions such as barbettes and the sta rboard crane foundation. 

The ship rolled as desired. The stern section traveled a greater distance 

than the bow section toward the quays. This was because of the greater area 

of the stern. In any event, the vessel (arne to rest with a mean draft of 49V2 

feet at high tide (high tide is something less than 2V2 feet above mean low 
Ships Slink At Pearl Harbor 257 

water). The list to port was only 2 degrees and 10 minutes. The behavior 

of the ship was in strict accord with the models which were constructed 

and tested before salvage operations were begun. Oklahoma was right side 

up by 16 June 1943, the work having started 8 March 1943. 

FLOATING 

When Oklahoma was nearly upright, divers investigated the damage on her 

port side. They found that the port side was pretty well opened up from 

torpedo explosions which occurred before and during capsizing. They cut 

away structural wreckage and took necessary measurements for temporary 

patches. The topside damage was apparent; contact with the bottom had 

broken off the masts and most other superstructure. 

The divers found that a large patch was required from frames 43 to 75. 

This patch was 130 feet long and 571/2 feet high as it extended well under 

the turn of the bilge. In addition, several patches were installed, usually of 

US!' NR.tL 

Lifting of Section I of the five -section main cofferdam patch for Oklahoma. 
258 Pearl Harbor 

wood and sealed with Tremie underwater concrete. For instance, one went 

be'tween frames 31 and 43, another between frames 74 and 96. 

The large patch was in five parts and was primarily steel and wood as 

shown on page 257. It was sealed by underwate r concrete at the ends as well 

as at the bottom. The sections were made watertight by puddings between 

the sections. Again, underwater concrete was essential. In aU over 1000 tons 

of concrete we re poured. Hook bolts were used by the divers in drawing up 

the patches to the hull of the ship. 

The main deck aft was underwater, but not enough to prevent refloa ting. 

However, in order to increase the waterplane area and in order to improve 

the stability during refloating a wooden cofferdam like Oglala and California cofferdams was installed from frames 85 to 115. 

In the meantime the divers were busy jetting out mud, closing drains and 

sanitary outlets, cutting sluicing holes, closing watertight doors and hatches, 

etc. In due time they followed the reduction of the water level and closed 

off the main leaks in the hull and the patches. 

During the last period of righting the weight of the ship was reduced 

by about 3500 tons through using the buoyancy forward of frame 30 and 

aft of frame 115. This was done primarily by deep-well pumps which 

quickly removed the water in those areas. 

Then 10 ten·inch deep-well pumps augmented by lesser pumps were more 

than enough to lower the water level in the ship, but by this time the Navy 

Yard was in possession of twelve· inch pumps, both electric and diesel. In 

the main patch eighteen and twenty-inch electric pumps were used at a 

later date. As in other ships, the water level was reduced according to 

schedule which permitted adequate testing for toxic gases, plenty of venti· 

lation and lighting, and removal of the 400 or more human bodies which 

were in Oklahoma. 

In order to insure positive stability, some ballasting by sea water was 

scheduled in the machinery spaces. Great care was exercised by the Salvage 

Superintendent to insure that the ship would come afloat with a minimum 

of list. Actually she came aAoat on 3 November 1943 with a mean draft 

of about forty-six feet and a starboard list of twenty-six minutes. The Jist 

was increased to about one degree to starboard and so maintained by 

pumping water from the port engine room to the starboard engine room. 

The hauling tackles were removed after the ship came afloat and the various 

leaks were well in hand. 

Thought was given to the damage caused by teredo worms on patches 
n .'IB N II ' I'I ' l W0 <1 ( t ~L

6~z 
260 Pearl Harbor 

after long submergence. This was found to be negligible, as was the teredo 

damage to the teak decking of the ship. 

For the purpose of refloating very little weight was removed. However, 

prior to drydocking, attention waS given to this important consideration. It 

was not practicable to remove stores, but anchors, chain, remaining oil, and 

so on were taken ashore. Mud in the ship was jetted to electric pumps by 

water jets in the hands of divers. 

DRYDOCKING 

The ship was placed in Drydock Number Two on 28 December 1943 with 

a mean draft of thirty-six and a half feet and a list to starboard of nearly 

three degrees. The list was purposely put on the vessel in order to favor 

the port side an4 its patches. In order not to lose buoyancy the introduction 

of water to attain the desired li st was no't permitted; instead four submarine 

salvage pontoons, each having a lift capacity of eighty tons, were used on 

the outside of the main patch. 

The total draft of Oklahoma was nearly thirty-nine feet because the main 

patch extended several feet below the keel. During the trip to the drydock 

the electric-driven pumps were replaced by diesel-driven. The list was taken 

off in drydock and the ship settled on the blocks provided without undue 

uaN NRoI.L (MOD) avr" 

Port sid, view of Oklahoma fOllr days hl/ort! en/Iring dr),dock. 

l 
Ship; Sunk At Pearl Harbor 261 

incident. The pontoons were removed, and the patches were likewise taken 

off to expose the damage which the ship had sustained. This is seen in the 

illustrations on page 262. A strict fire watch was maintained on board. 

The Navy Yard employees were quick to start with temporary repairs. 

They worked from inboard to obtain watertightness of the hull inasmuch 

as the drydock was available for emergency dock ings of damaged major 

ships of the fleet. Thus the drydock had to be vacated on seventy·two hours 

notice. However, no emergency developed, and Oklahoma rema ined there 

for several months. During her time at the Navy Yard she was stripped 

of guns and some of the auxiliary machinery. The ship was unloaded of 

ammunition and stores. She was decommissioned on 1 September 1944 and 

sold for scrap for $46,000 on 5 December 1946 ~o the Moore Drydock 

Company. On 10 May 1947 she left Pearl Harbor under tow of two tugs 

but was lost in a storm at sea about 500 miles northeast of Hawaii on 17 

May 1947. 

Much of the early salvage work was performed by divers under Lieutenant Haynes. This work was diffiOllt and hazardous, but no serious casualty 

occurred to the naval divers or to the civilian Navy Yard divers. Only one 

casua lty marred a perfect record of the contractor's divers. 

Exterior steel work by divers was done with oxy.hydrogen torches; interior work with the oxygen-carbon arc. Precautions were taken to avoid 

explosions from fue l oil and gases. No serious explosions occurred although 

several small ones were experienced without serious injury. In all about 

1850 dives were made with a tota l of 10,300 man-hours underwater. 

Credit for a great job must go to the Sa lvage Superintendent, Captain 

F. H. Whitaker and his corps of assistants. The Navy Yard should be 

included as should the Pacific Bridge Company which had shown their proficiency in previous salvage jobs. The work of this company in setting up 

the winches, in making the soil tests, and in design ing and installing the 

various patches is beyond calculation. The feats performed could not have 

been done without the cooperation of such men as Messrs. Graham, Ginella, 

Crocker, Davenport, Freeman, and Bisordi. Also, we should include the 

old Salvage Organization. It was they who made detailed plans of Oklahoma'; righting and refloating. 

In addition to Captain Whitaker, we should give credit to naval officers 

who spent time and energy in the long and arduous project. Among these 

who should be mentioned are the following: Greely, Liedstrand, Lindstrom, 

Tell, Baker, Leech, Morris, Calhoun, Chase, Keenum, Minor, Nordquist, 
262 Pearl H afbof' 

Damage 10 port Jide of Oklahoma after removal of patchn in drydo(k. View looking 

aft from about Irmne 3.:s. 

Smith, Urbaniak, Hendon, Snow, Arbogast, Hall, McDonald, and Smith. 

To these must be added the enlisted personnel who assisted wth the 

work, and also the Commandant and the Manager of the Navy Yard, 

Admiral Furlong, and Captain Paine, who were an inspiration to those entrusted with the project. 

Captain Whitaker's complete story of the salvage of US.S. Oklahoma may 

be found in the Tl"dllJactiom of Tbe Society of Naval ArchileCIJ fin d Aldrine 

Engilleers , Volume 52 (1944) . The original estimate dated 18 July 1942 

may be found as Appendix F of this book. This is the estimate prepared 

by the Salvage Division while Wel l Virginia and Oglala were being 

salvaged. 

11. U.s.S. UTAH, FORMER BATILESHIP 

(LAUNCHED IN 1909) 

This ship presented about the same problems of salvage as Oklahoma. 

H owever, she was a much older ship and was used only for aircraft target 

practice. She did not occupy a berth essentia l to the fleet. Some thought was 

given to llsing an air bubble to float the hu ll to the drydock for scrapping, 

but this idea was abandoned when it was revealed that Ufah would not 
Ships Sunk AI Pearl Harbor 263 

hold enough compressed air to make a safe trip to the drydock across the 

channel. 

It was .originally intended that the ship should be salvaged immediately 

after Oklahoma, but there was considerable doubt whether the time, energy, 

material, and cost warranted the operation, The ordnance gang under Lieu, 

tenant Commander Stelter and Gunner Manthei had already removed from 

this ship, and other disabled ships, considerable ordnance material. This 

,,', 

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\Ja N NR"'I. l MOD) • • 7.7 

Bow of Utah. 

consisted of anti-aircraft guns, ammunition, sma ll arms, etc. Most of the 

fuel oil had already been pumped out through the bottom. 

The decision was made by the Navy Department to forego salvage work 

on Utah as the space was not needed and economy did not warrant 

further work. Th~ matter was taken up anew in 1956 when the Commandant 

of tht Fourteenth Naval District pointed out that carriers of the Essex class 

had insufficient space in which to transfer ammunition, special weapons, 

and guided missile components. The removal of Utah wou ld faci litate such 

essential transfers. The cost of salvage would be about $4,000,000 whereas 
264 Pearl Harbor 

us:;' 1<R4t. (MOD) U1M 

Utah with righting headframes in place, IJ Novembe r 1943. 

Utah during {1m pllmng period, 8 February 1944. 
Ships Sunk A I Pearl Harbor 265 

the 7,000 tons of recovered steel would bring only about $30-$40 per ton. 

The Commandant showed, however, that the sa lvage of Utah would remove 

an obstruction from the channel and would obviate the necessity of building 

a new berth for the aircraft carriers. 

This view was concurred in by the Service Force, the Fleet Maintenance 

Officer, and by the Pacific Fleet. The plan was to use the refloating of 

U8S )/R. L (MOD) ~.77 0 

Utah at the (omp/~t;o" of first pullillg period showing hliJttr cut away to providt fairl~(ld 

10 hitch pNb. Ship iJ ;/1 about 680 pOJ;tiol1 . 
266 Pearl Harbor 

USN !'>' R.,tL ()(OD) 39,1, 

Utah in final pOJitiotl, 37° 4." to pori, 13 March 1944 . 

Utah as a training project for harbor clea rance. The ship had already been 

partially righted. The list to port had been reduced to about thirty-eight 

degrees, but she sat in water which nearly covered her hulL 

The Bureau of Ships stated that since the decision of 1944, by the Chief 

of Naval Operations, the material reCjuired for righti ng the ship had been 

disposed of by sale, that thc (divers were no longer available, and that the 

project wou ld consume one and a half to two years. Further, funds were 

not available and if the work was to proceed it should be under funds 

appropriated for the purpose. 

The Chief of Naval Operations did not favor fu rther work on Utah but 

had nO objectioll to IISillg the sh ip fur training of divers and harbor clea r· 

ance. He saw no emergency requirement which would warrant the project. 

He was probabJy in Auenced by the argument advanced a few years earlier 

that the final resting place of some fifty.eight men should not be disturbed. 

It was proposed that a survey be made to determine whether a new pier 
Ships Sultk At Pearl Harbor 267 

tangent to Utah could not be built for mooring and servicing aircraft 

earners. 

In any event Utah still remains at Pearl Harbor. She rests on the bottom 

although in a slightly different position than the bottom-up position she 

originally assumed. The Chief of Naval Operations has been consistent in 

his decision of April 1942 that because of the min9r military value of Utah 

any salvage work should be directed toward her ultimate use as scrap. 

12. U.s.S. ARIZONA, BATILESHIP (LAUNCHED IN 1913) 

There was no thought of raising Arizona because of her military value, but 

the divers and other salvors spent a lot of time investigating the wreckage. 

At one time it was believed that the after part of the ship was reasonably 

intact and that it could be raised if the underwater cutters could satisfactorily disconnect this portion from the rest of the ship. 

" 

~ • 

us:.: :.:r•• t {MOl)) )~rn 

USS Arizona, 10 December 1941. 
268 Pearl Harbor 

The Ordnance Section was successful in removing from Arizona in the 

ea rly days a great deal of the anti-aircraft battery with its ammunition. 

Much other ordnance material was recovered from the ship even as late as 

November 1942. The oil which fouled the harbor was gradually removed 

as it was released from the ship's opened tanks. 

Practically all of the survey conducted in the summer of 1942 had to 

be performed by divers, mostly from the inside of the ship. It was found 

that the bow portion was buoyant, the after portion relatively intact, but 

the centra l portion of the ship was badly wrecked. Lieutenant Ankers, 

assisted by Ensign Beauchamp-Nobbs and Carpenter Urbaniak make a thorough survey. Gunner Manthei recovered considerable ammunition from 

turrets III and IV. The 14·inch gu ns, except from turret II, were removed 

and offered to the Army. 

USS SR,U.. (MOD) ,o173 

Members of the Jit,ing crew emerge from water-fil1ed compartment! of Arizona, 
ShiP! Slink At Pearl Harbor 269 

It was decided that nothing further should be done toward salvaging 

Arizona, but that the ship should remain as a memorial to the men who 

lost their lives at Pearl Harbor. The hull of the ship is the final resting 

place of about 1100 men, including Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd. 

In due time "fuetoPsides of Arizona were removed, and all projections 

from the hull were cut off by divers. A memorial structure was built transversely Over the hull of the ship. It is supported by two concrete girders 

which weigh 250 tons each. This rests on concrete piling. The structure is 

185 feet long with a width of 27 and 36 feet respectively at the ends to 

14 feet at the center. The assembly area accommodates 200 people. 

The memorial is reached by a boat landing, and access is gained by formal 

stairs at the harbor end. Included is a carillon and a shrine. The shrine has 

a marble wall On which are inscribed the names of the men who were lost 

on Arizona on 7 December 1941. 

This structure is a fitting memorial to the 2335 service men who were 

lost and the 1143 who were wounded on 7 December. It is painted white 

and is surmounted by the American Flag which flies day and night. The 

memorial is visited by many Americans and foreigners visiting Pearl Harbor. 
• 


• 

CHAPTER XIV 

Conditions Which Prevailed Or 


Were Encountered In Salvage 


• 
I 
CHAPTER XIV 


Conditions Which Prevailed Or 


Were Encountered In Salvage 


I. LACK OF MATERIAL 

Pearl Harbor was noted for shortages. This was a fact of life in a comparatively new fleet base 2000 miles from home. It has already been pointed 

out that there was a great shortage of oil, of oil tankers, of service craft, 

and countless other things to support a fleet which was ever growing. 

The treacherous Japanese attack on a Sunday morning accentuated these 

shortages. If adequate pumping facilities had been at hand some of the 

ships would not have been sunk. If better fire protection had been available 

many of the nres which caused so much damage could have been 

extinguishe~. 

The salvage effort wou ld have been made much easier with ample 

supplies near at hand. The shortage of lumber and fastenings was acute; 

the shortage of manpower, especially electric welders and carpenters was 

keenly felt. All civilian mechanics and engineers were in short supply at 

the Navy Yard and in Honolulu. 

The right kind of pumps arrived late. These were the deep-well pumps 

which were used effectively on the later battleships, especially West Virginia 

and Oklahoma. They varied in size up to 10 inches, and for Oklahoma as 

big as 18 inches and even 20 inches. They were driven by electric or diesel 

power, and were essential in ridding a badly wounded ship of incoming 

water. 

2. FIRE HAZARDS ON THE SHIPS THEMSELVES 

The European War taught the fleet much regarding fi re hazards and floa tability. Before the surprise air attack many fire hazards had been removed 

from combat ships. There is a tendency on the part of all personnel to be 

273 
274 Pearl Harbor 

"pack rats," to have at hand anything that may sometime be required. This 

inclination of human nature resulted in stowing away an excess of rubber 

sheeting, paints, canvas, oakum, linoleum, and so on. These were remove.d 

and greatly reduced the fire hazard and improved the floatability. 

During the war all linoleum was taken off the ships and all oil paints 

were put ashore. Paint was chipped off down to bare metal and later was 

replaced with latex or water paints. These have satisfactory preservative 

qualities and are better than oil paints in resisting fi re and high temperature. 

3. SALVAGE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL 

Of all shortages, limited ordnance material presented the worst problem. 

Except for anti-aircraft guns on ships there was little defense of Pearl 

Harbor and the various airfi elds. No temporary batteries were insta lled, 

and 30 caliber machine guns were the main ones ready at the air bases. The 

AdjUJtillg diu hllrge hOJ(! from SHbmerJib/e pump ill 14·illch magazine JpareJ dllring 

refloating operations in Oklahoma. 
~ 

Conditions Whi ch Pretlaiied Or Were Ellcoul1Iered III Salt/age 275 

batteries of ships were restricted in their zones of action, and Sunday 

morning at "colors" was a time of max imum unreadiness. 

Thus it was that one of the prime jobs was to build up the anti-aircraft 

defense. This was done quickly by transferring the batteries and their am· 

munition from disabled ships to points of vantage around the Navy Yard 

and air stations. Much of the removal work from ships was done by 

divers, and though this slowed up the transfer it was not long before Pearl 

Harbor had a tolerable anti-aircraft defense. 

The Ordnance Section gave attention to other sa lvage as well as antiaircraft batteries and ammunition. They worked assiduously in saving range 

finders, directors, small arms, and fine ordnance instruments from various 

sunken ships. This material required care and preservation in most cases, 

and the material was soon ready for use aga~nst the enemy. 

11. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 

When it was ascertained from the experience on Nevada that total submergence in sea water permitted electrical equipment to be used again, 

there was much surprise in the fleet. Of course, proper steps for care and 

preservation had to be taken. Even the most delicate instruments, such as 

ammeters and wattmeters, were usable if properly cleaned and preserved 

before exposure to the air. The same pertained to cables and motors. If 

properly dried out and cleaned thoroughly they were usable. However, vital 

electric cables and motors were replaced . 

. It was learned that low humidity helped re-use. The humidity near the 

ocean meant that the eguipment would ultimately fail. To avoid th is, some 

of it was sent as far away as Denver. There it stood every test but proved 

questionable when returned to the seacoast. It should be clearly understood 

that here we are dealing with electric gear that has been submerged in sea 

water only a compa ratively short time and has not been sllbjected to the 

tidal currents of the sea. 

It was rea lized that no chance should be taken with respect to high poten tial lines and equipment. Accordingly, all such electrical gear was replaced as work progressed. No difficulty was experienced with either high 

potential or ordinary electrical eguipment later in the war. 

Due to the importance of this subject, additional deta il is included in 

Appendix B. 

• 

276 Pearl Harbor 

5. JAPANESE TORPEDOES AND BOMBS 


Salvage experience proved that a fair proportion of Japanese bombs and 

torpedoes failed to explode. This was especially true of the 800 kilogram 

bombs dropped from about 10,000 feet. These were made over from 

armor-piercing she lls of 14 or D-inch size, and were intended to pierce 

the armored decks of battleships, aircraft carriers, or cruisers. They had an 

explosive charge of about 430 pounds. On the other hand, the 250 kilogram 

bombs used by dive-bombers were very effect ive and were frequently mistaken for incendiary bombs by our forces. The explosive charge of these 

bombs was about 135 pounds. 

The torpedoes used by the Japanese seem to cover a variety of explosive 

charges. According to the Japanese story given after the surrender, they 

all were of the "Long Tom" variety which were so effective in the Guadalcanal Campaign. These use oxygen in lieu of air which is safer, and carry 

Removal of dud bomb found in West Virginia. 
-

Conditions Which Prevailed Or Were Encountered In Salvage 277 

an explosive charge of about 1000 to 1200 pounds. The American counterpart has an explosive charge of only 500 to 600 pounds. 

It is worth noting that American torpedoes fired by our submarines early 

in the war sometimes failed to explode "although they could be heard 

making contact with enemy ships. This deficiency was rectified after we 

developed a more reliable exploder. 

Likewise, OUf dose range anti-aircraft batteries had limitations. The 

American 1.1 inch in quadruple mounts seemed to be effective but frequent 

jamming curtailed efficiency. OUf Bureau of Ordnance was in the process 

of getting from Sweden the 40-millimeter Bofors gun which could be 

mounted in twos or fours, and the 20-millimeter Oerlikon gun from Switzer· 

land. These were used in great numbers on OUf ships from 1942 on. 

There was much strafing by Japanese airplanes. Aside from causing a 

few casualties, th is was ineffective. It has a value when it deters personnel 

from doing what should be done, but the evidence is clear that such things 

were done despite the strafing. So far as the ships were concerned, it is 

evident that strafing causes no real damage. At times, however, strafing is 

highly effective against personnel. 

6. DNING EXPERIENCE 

Without competent divers the salvage work would have been impossible·. 

Credit has been given to the various divers in each operation, but their 

outstanding efficiency deserves mention again. The supervision of the divers 

was excellent. Lieutenant Haynes was a stickler for safety, as were his 

assistants. The divers from the Salvage Division, the Navy Yard, Qrtolan, 

WidgeON, and elsewhere made about 4,000 dives totaling some 16,000 

hours underwater without a single serious casualty. The contractor had 

one casualty. The total of the contractor and the Navy was about 5,000 dives 

with about 20,000 hours underwater. ,Considering the difficulty, hazard, 

and importance of the work, this is a remarkable record. 

7. DEADLY GAS ENCOUNTERED ON MOST SHIPS 

The prevalence of hydrogen sulphide in Nevada and other ships was indeed 

a new phenomenon. While we usually think this gas has the smell of rotten 
278 Pearl Harbor 

eggs, the gas when absorbed in water at high pressure has no smell at al l. 

At higher concentrations it is undetectable because it tends to paralyze the 

sense of smell. There we re other gases encountered but none so dead ly and 

widespread. Lack of oxygen in the spaces unwatered was commonplace. 

Hydrogen sulphide is formed by polluted water working on paper 

products. It was found in compartments of every large ship. sometimes in 

let,hal doses. After the Nevada incident, in which two men were lost, great 

care was taken with regard to sending men into spaces recently unwatered. 

Tests were taken of the air and freCJuent inspections made by experts of 

this industri al hazard. Each man wore some litmus paper on his tank suit 

to reveal the presence of gas. 

Ample ventilation put fresh air into each compartment to insure the dilu· 

tion of deadly gases and to provide oxygen into spaces which were defi cient. 

When necessary to send men into untested areas they werc equipped with 

gas masks or rescue breathing appa ratus. Divers were prevented from using 

only face masks in waters which showed heavy pollution. 

URN NIU.L (M O D ) lQT78 

Divers emerging from gas·fil1ed compar,mm ls. 
Comb/iom If/hich Prevaded Or Were Encountered In Salttage 279 

U8N :<IRltL (Mom un1 

Venli/alion tor work in Oklahoma bliJter. 

In view of the importance of this subject, Appendix C is added for the 

information of those engaged in such work. 

8. GASOLINE EXPLOSIONS 

The gasoline vapor explosion on California taught an important lesson. 

Despite ventilation which was deemed adegua te, the accident occurred. It 

was a serious explosion too, and would have caused casualties to anyone 

in the vicinity at the time. As it was, the structure was ruptured and an 

efficient hull patch rendered useless near the time for drydocking. Lucki ly 

it happened in a location which permitted isolation of the flooded spaces. 

This allowed drydocking on schedule. 

Advantage was taken of this lesson in fu tu re sal vage work. On West 

Virginia and other ships, the gasoline tanks were thorough ly emptied and 

gasoline vapors eliminated. 

When a steam blanket cannot be llsed over oil, it is mandatory that 

divers engaged in welding or cutting drill holes somewhat higher than 

where they are working to allow oil va)Xlrs to escape. This method was 
280 Pearl Harbor 

used on Oklahoma, aDd though some small explosions occurred none were 

seClOUS. 

9. ELECTRIC·DRIVE BATTLESHIPS 

When two electric-drive battleships were among the casualties of the air 

raid, it was at first assumed that four or live years would be required to 

rehabilitate the propulsion machinery of Cttli/amia and Weft Virginia. But 

necessity is the mother of invention and the mainspring of action. 

Details are given in the account of California salvage of the rewinding 

of alternators and motors and the restocking of their iron elements. Suffice 

it to say here that California was on her way to Bremerton on 10 October 

1942 and West Virginia followed shortly after. Both travelled under their 

own power and emerged from the Bremerton Navy Yard as modern ships 

to participate fu lly in the wa r aga inst Japan. For more information on reconditioning these electric-drive ships see Appendix D. 

10. CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE AND 

PERSONAL PROPERTY 

Great ca re was always used to insure the proper handling of classified correspondence and papers. This included personal property which was retrieved from lockers of men who were lost Or who had departed on other 

ships. Ordinarily these papers or valuables were delivered to the Commanding Officer or to whomever he might designa te as the proper officer to 

receive them. Persona l property !emoved from lockers was tagged for 

identification and delivered in due course to owners or relatives. 

11. REMOVAL OF HUMAN BODIES 

Some of the ships had large numbers of buman OOdies in various compartmentS. A scheme was developed for handl ing these without the knowledge 

of the men who comprised the working parties. Two or three feet of water 

were left in each compartment so that the bodies could be floated into 

canvas bags. The bag~ were tightly tied and transported to the Nava l 
Cond;t;ons Which Prevailed Or W ere Encoulltered In Salvage 281 

Hospital for proper identification and burial. The method was very effective 

and was undisturbing to the salvage crew. 

12. CLEANING OF COMPARTMENTS 

The cleaning of compartments of unwatered ships was a beggarly job. There 

was always a shortage of manpower, as the original crews had largely gone 

to other duty. Trained men for the fleet were in short supply; even recruits 

were in great demand, as were naval reservists who had some training in 

their specialties. The men for salvage work came mostly from the Reseiving 

Ship or from vessels in ordinary. These men had numerous assignments and 

it was only near drydocking time that the total reached as many as 400 to 

500 men. The Salvage Officer re<juested 800 men near the end of a job, 

but this figure was never reached . 

Each man of the cleaning crew had a tank suit and knee+high rubber 

boots for especially dirty work. The suits which became oil soaked were 

turned in for a freshly laundered suit. Boots were cleaned by the wearer. 

Only se lected men were given gas masks for entering spaces that had not 

yet been ad~uately venti lated and lighted. They had litmus paper attached 

to their suits to show presence of toxic gases. 

The cleaning crew found materia l and equipment of all sorts strewn 

about, and oil everywhere. Their first job was the removal of wreckage. The 

next was waShing down by a high pressure hose. Both sea water and fresh 

water were tried, but fresh water did a better job. This was followed by a 

caustic solution which cut the oil coating. Then fresh water would do a 

clean and finished job. 

One of the chores of the cleaning gang was to remove ammunition from 

turrets and magazines, and to take off cases of canned goods and other 

stores. All of the latter was scrapped in accordance with the recommendation of the representative from the Department of Agriculture. In a region 

of food shortage it was hard to see unbulged canned food dumped at sea, 

but that was the order of competent authority. 

13. WORK PERFORMED BY THE NAVY YARD 

Too much credit cannot be given to the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, for its 

part in ship salvage and rehabilitation. There was a close tie between the 

Salvage Division and the Navy Yard. Consequently the Salvage D~ isi n 
282 Pearl Harbor 

was gIven up-to-da te information from Design and Planning with respect 

,to stability and floatability of any ship under varying conditions. True 

enough there was diffe rence of opinion at times, but these differences were 

always worked out between the parties involved. 

The performance of the Navy Yard when the raised ships entered drydock left nothing to be desired. In spite of the heavy workload of supporting 

a Reet at wa r, the Navy Ya rd was always availabl e to repair, on a perma· 

ncnt or temporary basis, the sbips presented to it. This was done despite 

a growing shortage of manpowe r in several of the engineering and mechani. 

ca l ratings. In due time this shortage was overcome by importing workers 

from the mainland Navy Yards and shipbuilding companies. It might be 

mentioned that all of these men were not desirable, and a keen eye was 

necessary to detect professional gamblers and other similar characters. 

Special mention should be made of the Navy Yard's work in rehabilitating electric motors and electric-drive battleships. Through the Yard various 

contracts were made for hand ling motors and othe r electrical gear. These 

contracts ranged from Honolu lu to Oakland. Full cooperation with the 

General Electri c men and the Navy Yard brought the electric-drive battleships to the point where they could go to Bremerton under their own power 

and later join the fleet which defeated Japan. 

The services rendered by the Navy Yard are too numerous to mention. 

Among others, it furn ished sca rce scrap materials to manufacturers on the 

ma inland. It gained the thanks of government officials in Washington who 

oversaw such work. The Navy Yard prided itself in sending large amounts 

of steel, rubber, electric ca bles, brass, and aluminum to the mainland. 

The Ja panese could not stop the flow of scrap materials to the mainland 

throughout the wa r. Neither were the Japanese effective in intercepting shi ps 

carrying personnel or other materia l to or from Pea rl Harbor; nor were 

they effective against the crippled shi ps which regularly crossed the ocean 

on the way to Bremerton or to Mare Island or other Ca lifornia ports. 

Japanese submarines proved to be a complete loss. 

14. USE OF SUNKEN OR DAMAGED SHIPS 

IN THE WAR EFFORT 

The enemy achieved much of his goal in the perfidious air raid of 7 Decem· 

her 1941. Although on ly 19 shi ps of the almost 100 that occu pied berths 
Conditions Which Prevailed 0,. l¥'ere Encountered 111 Salvage 283 

at Pearl Harbor were sunk or damaged, an important part of the fleet was 

immobilized for many months. 

The shortage of ships prevented decisive action against a superior foe. 

It was only after ney ships joined the fleet from building yards or the 

Atlantic that offensive warfare could be pursued in earnest. , 

In a war which lasted nearly four years all nineteen of the Pearl Harbor ~ 

victims, except Oklahoma, Arizontl, and Utah, saw action against the Japanese Navy. This included vessels which had been given up by the Secretary 

of the Navy as lost, or enumerated by the Japanese as destroyed at Pear! 

Harbor. The marvel of salvage surprised not only the Japanese but also om 

own forces. 

As described, many of the salvaged ships performed wonders during the 

war. Their strength augmented the fleet, and it was this overall strength 

that ultimately won the unconditional smrender of Japan. We learned that 

sunken or damaged ships can be put to work again and with greatly 

increased potential. 

It should be mentioned that the battleships at Pear! Harbor were ·ill 

prepared for survival. They were not in a battle condition. As a comparison, 

consider the German battleship Bismarck, or the two new Japanese 64,000 

ton battleships which were put into service in 1941 and 1942. The metacentric height of each ship was about ten feet or more. These ships were in 

action with all closures made, and with excellent damage repair facilities. 

They were finally sunk, but not until each of them had taken approximately 

10 torp~does and from 10 to 20 bombs. 

15. SPIRIT OF THE SALVAGE CREW 

Enough cannot be said in praise of the salvage crew. They worked hard 

and earnestly. They soon saw that the results of their efforts exceeded the 

fondest hopes of their supporters and they were urged on by their successive achievements. 

Much has been said of the men who contributed most to the salvage of 

each ship. Praise has been given to the Navy Yard and to the Pacific Bridge 

Company, but little has been said of the men in the Central Office. They 

consistently did much to keep the gears meshed and turning. Without them 

the Salvage Organization would not have functioned smoothly. 

All projects were pursued to a bappy conclusion. There was no bickering 
284 Penrl Harbor 

or an " I told you so" attitude. There was a meeting of the minds in all 

the jobs in which the Salvage Division was engaged. There was never a 

lack of confi4ence. Instead, there was a feeling of assurance in the outcome 

of each job. This consistent oneness of purpose can best be explained by 

the operation of the One Mind which governs all things well. 

t:8N NR..L ~1011 1 107i3 

Divers Jtdnding in front of decompr4uio l1 chamber. 

I made recommendations to the Commandant of the Navy Yard regarding 

the medals which a grateful Nation should bestow upon its benefactors 

engaged in salvage work. Before departing for the South Pacific I was 

recommended for the Navy's Distinguished Service Medal by the Forces 

Afloat, and th is was presented to me by Admiral Nimitz on the deck of the 

aircraft carrier Enterprise. At that time about a dozen other medals were 

presented for deeds of valor. Admiral Nimitz read the citation for the work 

performed by the Salvage Organization and ended by adding, "for being 

an undying optimist". The Medal was accepted by me in the name of the 

organization which I had the honor to head. 
){::n::ny lOql'CH P'C;)d 

;)lP ]0 T'CS~'Clddy T'Cu~d 

AX )!lldVH::> 

CHAPTER XV 


Final Appraisal of the 


Pearl Harbor Attack 


I. JAPAN'S MISTAKE IN ATTACKING PEARL HARBOR 

In retrospect, the Japanese attack on Pearl Ha rbor was a blessing for both 

nations, if not for the world. The "Day of Infamy" will long be remembered, because at the time it seemed real and portentous. Since that time, 

a quarter century ago, the results of that attack appear insignificant compared to the events which have since transpired. What seemed a great 

disaster at the time of Pear! Harbor has turned out to be a blessing in 

disguise. Tragically, it was the cheapest way in which a nation such as 

the United States could become unified and could therea fter go forth as the 

champion of liberty throughout the world. The results of the war put an end 

to many of the non-democratic governments in the world and at the same 

time led the United States to take decisive action and world leadership. 

True enol!gh, Genera l Tojo and Admiral Yamamoto were bad news for 

a peace-loving nation like the United States: The Japanese people became 

willing victims of a despotic militaristic regime which had never known 

defeat, and which had attac~ed without warning in the Chinese Wa r of 

1895 and the Russan ~ar of 1905. In later years they signed an agreement 

at The Hague which prohibited such uncivilized practice. Yet in 194 1 they 

attacked Pearl Harbor in peacetime without warning. Through a miscalculation by their diplomats in Washington, the half-hollr's interva l between 

the attack and the fina l note ending further negotiations turned out to be a 

warning which was received more than an hour after the event. 

The militaristic faction in Japan had been successful in their program of 

territorial and economic expansion. They had occupied a portion of Manchuria, Hankow, Shanghai, the island of Hainan, and Indo-China, and they 

had driven many foreisncrs out of China, Their expressed concern for in ternational amity and goodwill was not sincere. They yearned for the riches 

287 
288 Pearl Harbor 

of Southeast Asia and their golden opportun ity for fu rther expansion 

arrived in 1941 when the Axis Powers, Germany and Italy, were apparently 

successful in their programs of expansion. It was Ta ja who declared to a 

willing people that " japan's destiny is to return Asia to Asians." Though 

certain elements in Japan, including the Emperor, cautioned peace, the 

country had gone so far that it could not draw back without a loss of face. 

This was impossible, especially when Japan's military power was fully 

poised, trained, and ready. 

The Japanese Fleet attacked Pearl Harbor in r orce, and the results seemed 

calamitous then. The military pu rpose was to immobilize the Am rjca n 

America!l ces cou~_ not interfere preda~n 

Chma or in Southeast A~ia. The Japanese leaders accoQlplished their purpose, but- the ·puq)oSe"-;'as wholy illusory when viewed in the co~t of 

la er eveilts. The question now arises: What mistakes did Japan make in 

the £ttack on Pearl Harbor ? 

In the firs t pl~e, the -Japanese Commander of the attack ing force felt 

\ 

i that his mission was completed, and that he should return to Japan as 

ordered. It apparently did not occur to him that his planes could have 

destroyed the thirty-eight cruisers and destroyers that remai ned afloat at 

Pearl Harbor, or the reserve fuel oil supply of the flee t that would have 

immobilized the fl eet fo r months or even years. His planes could have 

destroyed the mechanical shops and drydocks which were indispensable to 

a fleet at war. These important adjuncts of military power were left intact. 

Possibly they were left to se rve Japan at a later date in case they occupied 

Pearl Harbo r. vJr;;' ~ 

--- In the second place" the American [...I eet was infJrior to the Fl eet of 

Japan, especially in aircraft carriers and aviators_ If the Americans did 

in tervene, where could they strike without undue risk from submarines and 

land-based aircraft ? The Ra inbow Plan ca ll ed for the fle et to attack the 

Marshall and Caroline Islands and to establish a fleet base there. Could this 

be done without great risk to the Ameri can Fleet ? Even if successfu l, whal 

impact would it have had upon the Japanese in their invasion of China, 

Indo-China , Ma laya, or Indonesia? 

If the Japanese had warned the Americans of the intended attack even 

a few days in advance, would the situation have been any better? Perhaps 

our land-based Army planes could have given a good account of themselves. The losses to the Japanese would undoubtedly have increased, but 

the (asses of our side in terms of shi ps and aviation manpower could have 
68Z 

The 

290 Peart Harbor 

been much greater. A fleet action would hardly have been in OUf favor, for 

we would have only two carriers in the Central Pacific against six Japanese 

carriers. Some of our battleships and cruisers would certainly have been 

deep water victims. The losses could easily have exceeded those suffered at 

Pearl Harbor, and would have been final in most cases. 

On 3 April 1965 Fleet Admiral Nimitz wrote to the Chief of Naval 

Operations, Admiral David L. McDonald, as follows: 

Several times in recent weeks I have been quoted-coN'utly- that as 

bad as OUf losses were at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941-they could 

have been devastatingly worse"-had the Japanese returned for more 

strikes against our naval installations, surface oil storage and our submarine 

base installations. Such attacks could av~ been made with impunity 

as we had little left to oppos~ them. Furthermore-I have been correctly 

'1uoted in saying that it was God's divine will that Kimmd did not have 

his fleet at sea to int t the Japanese Carrier Task Force that attacked 

P.H. on 7 Dec 1941. That task force had a fl eet speed at least 1. knots 

superior to our 5~d nd Kimmel could not have brought the Japanese 

to a gun action fill/ell they wanted it. We might have had one carrier 

but I doubt if the Lexingloll could have joined in time. Picture if you can6 Japanese carriers working on our old ships which would be without air 

cover- or-had the Japanese wanted to avoid American air_ attacks from 

shore- they could hav~ dela}'ed the action until out of range of shore based 

air. Instead of having our ships sunk in the shallow protected waters of 

P.H. they could have been sunk in deep water- and we could have lost 

!!! of our trained mcn instead of the 3800- approx. lost at P.H. Th~re 

would have been few trained men to form the nucleus of the crews for the 

new ships nearing completion. Not only were the ships of the enemy task 

force faster-they were more modern-and the Japanese main fleet under 

Yamamoto was in the rea r- in support-if nuded. Nagumo-the Commander of the P.H. Attack FOlce-missed a great chance by not following 

up his attack 

greatest mistake was purely psychological. The attack on Pearl 

Harbor solidified a people against Japan and her allies and brought about 

the greatest miracle of production that the world has seen. Before that happened, the people were divided in their feelings toward Japan and toward 

the Axis Powers. There was some sympathy for Japan. Going to war to 

interfere with her exploits in China and Southeast Asia would have failed 

to arouse a patriotic spirit among Americans. But the unprincipled attack 

on Peacl Harbor changed the people entirely; they were now committed to 

an all-out war with "unconditional surrender" as the objective. 
Filial AppraiJal of the Pearl Harbor AI/ack 291 

2. OTHER MISTAKES MADE BY THE JAPANESE 

For a military government to make the mistakes made by Japan is almost 

inconceivable. In addition, Japan did not use well the superiority which she 

possessed. Besides underestimating the power of an aroused America, the 

military leaders of the Japanese failed to gauge the potential of a great 

country at war. They assumed that the Americans would grow tired of the 

struggle and be content to let Japan keep her ill.gotten gains. No greater 

mistake could be conceived with regard to the true character of the Ameri· 

can people, in that age or any age. 

Overexpansion was without doubt the greatest error of Japan. The first 

steps of the war were so easy that the leaders departed from the original 

plan and included parts of Alaska_ Midway, and Australia in their pro· 

iected empi re. The resu lt was that when the real tests came they were unable 

to defend the expanded perimeter against their newly.made enemy. 

They assumed that they had insured security of their codes. Yet before 

Pearl Harbor we had hoken the diplomatic code. which was of inestimable 

value to Americans and their allies. 

The military leaders of Japan failed to protect their shi pping adequately. 

Our submarines were able to make intolerable inroads on Japanese merchant 

ships. In contrast, we lost very few ships to Japanese submarines in the 

Eastern Pacific or elsewhere. This all points to the fact that they failed to 

u~ properly their large fleet of submarines. 

We give the Japanese credit for the early.day efficiency which they dis· 

played. At Guadalcanal their destroyers were adept in the use of the "Long 

Tom" torpedo which had a fa r greater explosive force than our weapons. 

They also exce lled at first in night action. True, the Japanese were on the 

offensive and could select the time and place for the sea battles which 

ensued. 

Yet, at Guadalcanal the real caliber of American sea power and American 

character were shown. As we see it now, the Japanese were eventuall y 

turned back at Guadalcana l, as they were at Midway. The turning point 

of that great war occurred at Midway in June 1942 and at Guadalcanal 

after August 1942. They retreated from Alaska in the fall of 1942. 

The Japanese were not lacking in patriotism or willingness to die fo r 

their Emperor. If the atomic bombs had not been dropped on Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki it is possible that millions of Americans would have been 

lost in their effort to take the homeland from a relentless and fanatical foe. 
292 Pearl Harbor 

An amphibious assault on the Japanese homeland would have been very 

costly to the Japanese as well as to the Americans. 

In retrospect, we are thankful that America was with God during the 

ordea l which tried men's souls. In many ways, He showed that the right 

prevails over the wrong, provided that the right side perseveres. Truly it 

has been said that right motives give pinions to thought, and strength and 

freedom to speech and action. This is especially true of those who strive 

to perform the right. The final surrender of the hordes represented by 

Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese militarists, proved unmistakably that 

the power of God is on the side which is nearest right. 

3. UNITED STATES' A VERSION TO WAR 

Through the years of 1920-1940 the people of the United States were 

strongly opposed to war. Isolationism was rampant. World' War I was a 

great victory for America and the western democracies as a whole, but at 

a fearfu l cost. It was only when England was near coll apse and Japan was 

taking over China and Sout ea~t Asia that the people of America awoke 

to the real facts of international life. The American people gradually came 

to the realization that it was impossible to withdraw from the world or 

avoid its problems. Such is the way of a leading democratic society. Such 

is an inherent responsibility of a great world power. Even with this realiza· 

tion there were divisive forces in the body politic. 

In the 1920's and early 1930's the people had elected representatives in 

Congress who believed as they believed. The result was that disarmament 

was popul ar and preparedness was anathema. Consequently there was a 

minimum of money for the armed forces. The Army and Marine Corps were 

on a starvation diet and few new ships were ordered for the Navy prior 

to Roosevelt's Presidency. Even when the situation became ominous in 

1940, and it was apparent that the world was about to be taken over by 

predatory forces, it was impossible to make up for the years of neglect. 

The forces of 'peace at any price' were still powerful in Congress, and the 

majority of people was adamant in their aversion to war. 

That'state of mind did not persist among 'our citizens after the bombing of 

Pearl Harbor. The isolationists in our populace became patriotic Americans. 

Even the Japanese who were American citizens gave an outstanding account 

of themselves. The sons and daughters of all Americans went to war in the 
,6l 
294 Pearl Harbor 

global conflict which ensued. Those who remained at home put their shoulders to the wheel and the world witnessed the marvel of wartime 

productions. 

A few years later, when approving the 1945 Navy Court of Inquiry on 

the Pearl Harbor attack, President Truman made the following statement: 

I have lead it very carefully, and I came to the conclusion that the whole 

thing is the result of the policy which the country itself pursued. The 

country was not ready for preparedness. Every time the President made an 

effort to get a preparedness program through the Congress, it was stifled. 

Whenever the President made a statement about the necessity of preparedness he was vilified for doing it. I think the country is as much 

to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in 

Pearl Harbor. 

• 
APPENDIX A 


This appendix contains additional selections from survivor reports. 

1. U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA 

Lieutenant Commander T. T. Beattie wrote as follows: 

About five minutes to eight I was in the wardroom just finishing break· 

fast, when word came over the loud speaker from the officer-of-the-deck, 

"away fiee and rescue party," This was followed immediately by a second 

announcement over the loud speaker, "Japanese ifC attacking, all hands 

General Quarters," and the general alarm was rung. 

I heard several dull explosions coming from other battleships. Immediately I left the wardroom and ran up the starboard passageway to the 

bridge. The Captain was just ahead of me and proceeding in the same 

direction. 

At this time the ship listed at least five or six degrees and was steadily 

listing more" to port. The" Captain and I went to the conning tower, our 

battle stations, and at this time dive bombing attacks started to take place 

and numerous explosions were" felt throughout the ship. Upon testing our 

communications with central station and to the guns we found they were 

disrupted. I suggested to the Captain as long as no communications were 

in the battle conning tower that We" leave there and attempt to establish 

messenger communication and try to save the ship. We" went out on the 

starboard side of the bridge discussing what to do. During all this time" 

extremdy heavy bombing and strafing attacks occurred. The ship was 

constantly shaken by bomb hits. 

The Captain doubled up with a groan and stated that he had been 

wounded. I saw that he had been hit in the stomach probably by a large 

piece of shrapnel and was very seriously wounded . He then sank to the" 

deck and 1 loosened his cotlar. I then sent a messenger for a pharmacist's 

mate to assist the Captain. 

Just then the U.S.S. ARIZONA's forward magazines blew up with a 

tremendous explosion and large sheets of flame shot skyward, and I began 

to wonder about our own magazines and whether they were being flooded. I 

posted a man with the Captain and went down to the forecastle where a 

num~r of the crew and officers had gathered. I got hold of a chie"f turret 

a.ptain to check immediately on the magazines and to flood them if they were 

not floode"d at this time. Large sheets of flame and several nres Slatted aft. 

Burning fuel oil from the U.S.S. ARIZONA floated down on the stern of 

297 
• 


298 Pearl Harbor 

the ship. Just then the gunnery officer, Lieutenant Commander Berthold, 

came aboard and I asked him to try to flood the forward magazines. 

Shortly thereafter r was informed that the after magazines were completely flooded but that they wen~ unablt to flood the forward magazines 

as the water was now almost to the main de1:k. 

At about this time a large oil fire swept from the U.S.S. ARIZONA 

down the port side of the U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA. We had no water on 

board as the fire mains and machinery were out of commission and we were 

unable to do any fire fighting at all. I got into a motor launch to go to the 

stern of the ship to investigate the fire. The smoke was SO heavy that I 

could not S~ aft of the bridge. As I got into the boat, a sheet of flame 

swept on top of us and we bardy managed to get free of the fire. I then 

had the boat take me aft. The burning oil on the water swept by the ship 

and 1 managed to return to the quarterdeck. I realized then that the ship 

was lost. 

The attack lasted approximately thirty minutes. We were able to fire 

all our ready ammunition on the anti-aircraft batteries, but were unable to 

replenish it as the ship was flooded. I then told the men on the quarterdeck, 

with the exception of a small working party, to leave the ship. I believe 

at this time that all the wounded had been taken off the ship and it was 

extermely dangerous for anyone to remain aboard; that nothing could be 

done to save the ship and shells from the secondary batteries were constantly exploding due to the intensive heat of the fire midships. 

The conduct of the crew and officers was outstanding. There was no 

confusion and every man and officer did his duty as well as he was able 

under the conditions. 

Lieutenant (jg) H. B. Stark wrote as follows: 

Shortly before eight o'c1ock on Sunday morning, I was in my room 

double george on the half dec k. Double george is the th ird stateroom 

counting from aft on the starboard side of the half deck, in the third 

watertight compartment from aft. As I was getting up from my bunk I heard 

the cali "Away Fire and Rescue Party," followed immediately by General 

Quarters. This was followed almost immediately by two or three violent 

explosion in quick succession. The ship started listing to port right away. 

Grabbing an armload of clothes, I ran forward and found only aile man 

on the half deck manning the repair phone. Between us we started closing 

watertight doors working from aft, although we did not check the after 

door leading to the airplane crane room, which normally should be shut. 

As I dogged down the door forward of my room I heard samet.hing 

let go in the compartment, some leak starting violen tly. By that time there 

were a few more men in the compartment above. The large watertight hatch 

over that space was dropped and I crawled out through the escape scuttle. 
Appendix A 299 

As I did I skidded over to port and landed in about four fed of water 

with a scum of fuel oil. I decided to work my way along the starboard side 

of the third deck to see if counter·Hooding was being accomplished. To my 

mind there was no danger of sinking in that shallow water but there' was 

great danger of turning over on the port side, as the port list was getti ng 

greater. As I dropped down into the trunk to the steering motor room, fire 

and grains of burning powder showered around me. With the help of a 

muine sentry the slight fire was extinguished but we could not completely 

shut the hatch leading down to the steering motor room; it seemed 

jammed although almoSI shut. I sent the marine up 10 shut the hatch 

over me as I undogged the starboard door. When I stepped inlo the 

mess attendants' compartment someone helped me to shut the door. 

At that time I first noticed that it was completely dark except for a glimmer 

of a flashlight forward. I groped my way along the deck to the next com· 

partment through the open door and found the damage control gear locker. 

Puccio, S.F., Jc, I think, had broken into the locker and was hunting for 

counterflood cClinks. He found one and I found one; also a flashlight. 

I told him to flood forward while I did aft. I ran back into the after com· 

partment and started cranking. We worked for some time on Ihre(' voids, 

I believe, but were unable to bui Id up any pressure before the men started 

fa lling to the d«k. The valve settings were on open, we could not lift any, 

and the men were all passing out. I grabbed someone and told everyone to 

haul somebody out the sta rboard hatch on the guarterdeck just aft of 

the break of the deck. Then, again I remember nothing until I was 

under the overhang of turret two, my turret. My head ached lerrifieatiy, 

r could not breathe, and all my extremeties tingled as if they had been 

asleep and were just being awakened. Finding out from my CTC., Craw · 

ford, that no one was in control, I started for that station with the starboard 

anti·aircraft guns firing in my face, it seemed to me. That was the first 

time I real ized the anti·aircraft guns were firing. I ran into Lieutenant 

Ricketts on the boat deck by a number three anti·aircraft gun and asked 

him if he needed men. He said , "Yes, on the anti·aircraft ammunition 

supply." r noticed several anti·aircraft officers on the battery and it 

was functioning wonderfully. I got back under the overhang of the turret, 

but the hatches were d osed, I passed out in the exertion of opening the 

right tail halch, but was able to [I'll Crawford to get men on the anti· 

aircraft ammunition Ira in. How long I lay there tr~'ing to breathe I do 

not know until Crawford returned, told me that the ammun ition train was 

flooded, that all boat deck ammunition was exhausted, and that the 

Captain had ordered "Abandon Ship." I made sure that my lurret was 

evacuated, then remember hitting the water from the forecastle. I tried 

to swim but was too weak. Glover, E.E. , G.M. 2 c, and Bircher, H .C, Sea, 

le, of my di \'ision held me up and dumped me into a life raft. The next 

r definitely remember I was on Ford Island at the dispensary, 
300 Pearl Harbor 

2. U.S.S. OKLAHOMA 

Pay Clerk D. L. Westfall wrote as follows: 

At the time of the attack I was in my room shaving. The word was 

passed "Away Fiee and Rescue Party;" just as I was leaving my room the 

second word was passed for all ha~ds to man their General Quarters 

Stations closely followed by a shock of a hit. I glanced at my clock as 

I was leaving my room and noticed the time was a few minutes before 

8:00 A.M. 

I started for my station in Radio Central; as I was passing along the 

third deck up a port ammunition passageway, I felt two more hits. The 

lights went out in the passageway except for onc battle light and two panel 

iight5 in the boat crane machinery space. 

By 1ge time I reached the compartment abreast the armory the ship 

had picked up a 10-15° list to port; there were a couple of battle lights 

on in this compartment. Water and oil were bubbling up along the 

junction of the bu kh e~ d and deck of the electrical work shop, port side. 

Repair personnel were busy closing watertight doors. 

When I reached Radio Central, personnel there had just started 

evacuating on the orders of the Communication Watch Officer. Radio 

equipment apparently was out of commission as I noticed many pieces of 

equipment knocked over or dangling by wires. Back up on the third deck 

all lights were out and only a few flashlights were available. About this time 

the word came along from man to man to "Abandon Ship." I helped a 

partiaily incapacitated man to the second deck and then joined in a line 

passing injured men along to the ladder by the dental office. I lost all 

knowledge of time while here, but after SQme minutes, Ensign McClelland, 

who was beside me in the line, said he was fee ling faint and then 

collapsed. I noticed other men dropping around me. I stooped over to pick 

up Mr. McCleUand but when I stooped over I got dizzy and fe ll . I seemed 

to be paralyzed from the waist down, had great difficulty breathing, but had 

enough strength in my arms to drag myself to the ladder and up a couple 

of steps before collapsing completely. 

After passing out I had only flashes of consciousness until mid-after. 

noon. When I recovered I was at the Naval Air Dispensary on Ford Island. 

Shortly thereafter I joined a bunch of men going over to BOQ at the 

Air Station and st2rted a check on survivors from the supply department. 

The action of everyone I observed was cool and purposeful as soon as 

they ful ly realized we were actually under attack. The only confusion 

was occasioned by lack of lighting. My life itself is proof of the courage 

and disregard of personal danger on the part of unknown shipmates. 

Second Lieutenant William G. Muller, Jr., wrote as follows: 

J had just returned aboard ship on the 0745 motor boat; the boat came 
Appendix A 301 

alongside the gangway at approximately 0750. On reaching the Junior 

Officers' mess the word came over the loud speaker system, "Air attack, all 

unengaged personnel seek cover, these are real Japanese bombers." I could 

hardly believe that this was a real attack but the excitement and reality 

of the voice convinced me to move. I left the mess and started aft, first 

stopping off at my room to get my pistol. My room is on the starboard 

side, just aft of the Junior Officers' mess. I left my room and went over 

to the port side to enter the third deck via the hatch just adjacent to 

to the Warrant Officers' mess. A line had formed by this time and men 

were pouring down into the third deck. I finally found an opening in the 

line and started down the ladder. I had just reached the third deck and was 

almost opposite the ladder when the first torpedo hit. The explosion came 

from the vicinity of the Wardroom and was not a violent one. The line 

was still moving down into the third deck and I was opposite the Communication office .when the second torpedo hit. This explosion caused 

violent repercussions and the whole ship seemed to tremble. I figured the 

hit was almost adjacent to where I was standing. 

By this time I decided to leave as water was beginning to flood into 

the third deck and the ship started listing to port. I assume there were 

a couple hundred personnel in that third deck and only a few of us were 

able to reach a hatchway in time. Two more torpedo hits were sustained by the time I was able to work my way back to the hatch I had 

entered and to get up to the second deck. The ship was about 35° to port 

by this time and the decks were too slippery and steep to walk on. I worked 

my way to starboard by use of dogs and fittings on the bulkhead. During 

this time I heard the last two I!"xplosions which were somewhere amidship 

or aft. There were six torpedo hits that I heard in all. 

With difficulty I made the starboard side and climbed into my room 

which I knew had an open port. The porthole was almost overhead and I 

climbed through it, slid down the side which inclined about 50° and 

jumped into the water. 

Ensign H. F. Rommel wrote as foiJows: 

The first bombs were from dive-bombers on the hangars at Ford Island. 

Then a torpedo plane, coming in from over Ford Island, dropped a torpedo 

at a ship at 10- 10 dock. The ship was hit about mid-ships and the ex· 

plosion seemed upward with many splinters. 

I ran aft and passed the word 'A cruiser has jUlit been sunk. These are real 

bombs and real torpedoes, Man the anti-aircraft battery." 

The ship listed slowly but steadily. No word was received over the 

speaker to abandon ship. I escaped via the overhang hatch and was 

picked up by a battleship motor launch. We continued pulling men out of 

the water. It was difficult due to the oil making everyone slippery. Men 
302 Pearl Harbor 

with undershirts could be pulled into boats by grabbing the shoulder piece 

and sleeve on each side while men who had stripped were very slippery. 

It is recommended that men be instructed not to remove undershirts 

when abandoning ship . 

Ensign J. M. Doherty wrote as follows: 

When the word was passed to man battle stations I left the l.O. Mess for the third deck. On the way down the ladder, the first bomb or 

torpedo hit. Before I evcr got to the Communications Office, oil was 

pouring into the compartment A-122·P from a hole near frame 60. We 

had no time to set Zed and I guess there were four or five hits in about 

five minutes. The ship listed to port and oil was knee deep on the third 

deck after the first five to seven minutes. 

Bunks and bedding interfered considerably with people trying to get 

around. They were all over the deck at all angles and in everyone's way. 

The ladder to the second deck was bent and twisted and the lights 

went out after approximately the fourth hit. 

I got out a port on the second deck. I think that ports should not 

be sealed up but left open for personnel to escape. Ladders should be 

fastened at the lower end and not be allowed to hang loose as when the 

ship turns over the ladders jam up the hatches. There should be moce 

hatches in more compartments. Ships should not be overcrowded with 

people "training" if ships are in dangerous areas. Let the people train in 

peaceful waters on ships not likely to be hit. 

Shipfitter, First Class, W. T. Link wrote as fo llows: 

Time was short and in such time word was passed, "Japanese Airplane 

Attack-All unengaged personnel seek cover on the third deck-Set condition Zed- Man your Battle Stations." 

By sending the men to seek cover on the third deck, jammed ladders 

prevented quick access to repair stations and also crowded repair stations. 

Repair One was never fully manned and three men were dropping large 

hatches. Oil made it necessary to turn nuts with wrenches. 

Chain stanchions secured with nuts could not be removed in the short 

time we had and hatches were not closed at all. Countless parts were 

not dosed because of the necessity of using a wrench to turn the slick oily 

nuts. 

I never did heat "Abandon ship" and Repair One did not all escape. 

I escaped through a port in the A Division living space, had no trouble, 

and ran around or up to the bottom of the ship. I obtained a life jacket 

out of the water along side of the ship and put it on. I helped another 

sailor back Oil the ship and was pulled on the ship again myself by Biend 

SF2/ c. Then (swam to the rescue boat. I did not dive off the ship, 
303 

only shoved off into the water. I was never excited but was covered with oil. 

Chief Water Tender, L. C. Bickley wrote as follows: 

On or about 0800, 7 December 1941, the word was passed to man all 

battle stations. I went to #2 Fireroam Pumproom and was starting pumps 

until the water came in through the air ducts and flooded the pumprooms. 

The hatch to #2 Pumproom was down and I couldn't get it up, so I 

djved and swam into # I Pumproom and out. The lights wefe out and I 

couldn 't see where the two men went that wefe with me. I got to B 

Division living compartment and water started coming in so I went 

out through a port hole in the wash room after the ship rolled over, and 

was picked up by a motor launch and put ashore in the Navy Yard. The 

only word I got over the phone was to get ready to get underway. 

Many men were lost in the lower handling rooms of turrets. Falling 

14-inch shells killed and injured a great many. About 125 men remained 

in an air pocket in the shipfitters shop, but when the space was opened, 

water rushed in as air rushed out. Only one man of this group saved 

himself by swimming to the c.P.O. pantry on the third deck and out 

through an open porthole. His story is as follows as gained from excerpts 

of statement given by Chief Machinist, Second Class I. M. Hull: 

The lights were out. I went to the shipfitter shop and tried to get 

up the hatch leading to the c.p.a. quarters but water washed me back. 

The ship had listed 90° to port so I tried to swim out through the same 

hatch but was washed back again and landed in the C IOUs along the con· 

veyor. I dogged the door down to the shipfitter shop. The ship listed 

another 90° thus being all the way over. W e had about 125 men in the 

CIOOs. After 4 hours, the men tore the door off the shipfitter shop. 

Water and oil came into the CIOOs and rose to waist level. I swam to the 

c.p.a. pantry and out a port hole. None came with me. I left the ship 

about 1300, 5 hours after the ship sank. 

The story of D . Weissman, Seaman, First Class is as follows: 

I was io the lower handling room of Turret IV. After the rust hit, 

I weot to the shell deck. The lights went out and the ship started to turn 

over. I went to the lower handling room and followed a man with a flash· 

light. J entered the trunk just outside of handling room on the starboard 

side. The lower handling room flooded completely. Water entered the 

trunk. I dove and swam to the bottom of the trunk and left the ship through 

the hatch at the main deck and swam to the surface. 

Eleven men in the lower handling room of turret IV escaped through 

the lucky bag. \X' hen the rescue party cut a hole in the lucky bag, the 
:rbor 

wattr rose rapidly but all men were rtmoved before the water flooded 

the lucky bag completely. 

Five men were in the fivt inch twenty-five caliber handling room preparatory to sending up anti-aircraft ammunition. They escaped to the five 

inch hand ling room and reduced Hooding through ventilation ducts by 

stuffing rags in the Jines. They were eventually saved by the rescue party by 

way of the shaft alley. 

Eight men with water up to their necks were rescued from the steering 

compartment after these men, who had set condition "Z," wert enabled 

to enter the steering room through the hole made for them. Three holes 

were made in all; pumps were in use constantly to keep the level of the 

water and oil below the danger point. 

3. U.S.S. ARIZONA 

Lieutenant Commander S. G. FU9ua wrote as follows: 

I was in the ward room eating breakfast about 0755 when a short 

signal on the ship's air raid alarm was made. I immediately went to the 

phone and called the Officer·or·the-Deck to sound general quarters and then 

shortly therafter ran up to the starboard side of the quarter deck to see 

if he had received word. On comi ng out of the ward room hatch on the 

port side, J saw a Japan~ plane go by, the machine guns firing, at an 

altitude of about 100 feet. As I was running forward on the starboard side 

of the quarter dtck, approximately by the starbo~rd gangway, I was 

apparently knocked out by the blast of a bomb which I learned later had 

struck the face plate of # 4 turret on the starboard side and had glanced 

off and gone through the deck just forward of the captain's hatch, penetrating the decks and exploding on the third deck. When I came to and got 

up off the deck, the ship was a mass of flames amidships on the boat 

deck and the deck aft was awash to about frame 90. The anti-aircraft 

battery and machine guns apparently were stiU fi ring at this time. 

Some of the ARIZONA boats had pulled dear of the oil and were lying 

off tht stern. 

At this time I attempted, with the assistance of the crews of #2 and 

#4 turrets to put out the fire which was coming from the boat deck and 

which had extended to the quarter deck. There was no water on the fire 

mains. However, about 14 C02's were obtl'.ined that w~ e stowed on the 

port side and held the flames back from the quarter deck enabling us to 

pick up wounded who were running down the boat d«k out of the flames. 

I plactd about 70 wounded and injured in the boats which had been 

picktd up off the deck aft and landed them at the Ford Island landing. 
Appendix A 305 

This was completed about 0900 or 0930. Not knowing whether the Captain 

or the Admiral had ever reached the bridge, I had the Captain's hatch opened 

up, immediately after I came to, and sent officers Ensign G. B. Lennig, 

U.SN.R. and Ensign J. D. Miller, U.S.N. down to search the Captain's 

and Admiral's cabins to see if they were there. By this time the Captain's 

cabin and Admiral's cabin were about waist deep in water. A search of the 

two cabins revealed that the Admiral and Captain were not there. 

Knowing· that they were on board I assume that they had proceeded 

to the bridge. All personnel but 3 or 4 men, turrets #3 and #4, were saved. 

About 0900, seeing that all guns of the anti·aircraft and secondary 

battery were out of action and that the ship could not possibly be saved, 

I ordered all hands to abandon ship. 

From information received from other personnel on board, a bomb 

had struck the forecastle, just about the time the air raid siren sounded 

at 0155. A short interval thereafter, there was a terrific explosion on the 

forecastle, apparently from the bomb penetrating the magazine. Approxi· 

mately 30 seconds laler a bomb hit the boat deck, apparently just forward 

of the stack, one went down the stack, and one hit the face plate of # 4 

turret indirectly. The commanding officer of the U.S.S. VESTAL stated that 

2 torpedoeS passed under his vessel which was secured alongside the 

ARIZONA, and struck the ARIZONA. 

The first attack occurred about 0755. I saw approximately 15 torpedo 

planes which had come in to the attack from the dire(tion of the Navy 

Yard. These planes also strafed the ship after releasing their torpedoes. 

Shortly thereafter there was a dive bomber and strafing attack of about 30 

planes. This attack was very determined, planes diving within 500 feet 

before releasing bombs, about 0900. There were about twelve planes in 

flight that I ·saw. 

The personnel of the anli·aircraft and machine gun batteries on the 

ARIZONA lived up to the best traditions of the Navy. I could hear guns 

firing on the ship long after the boat deck waS a mass of flames. I can 

not single out one individual who stood out in acts of heroism above the 

others as all of the personnel under my supervision conducted themselves 

with the greatest heroism and bravery. 

Radioman's Mate Third Class, G. H. Lane wrote as follows: 

When the attack started on December 7, 1941, it was just before 0800 

and r was on the forecastl e of the U.S.S. ARIZONA. I saw torpedo planes, 

with the rising sun insignia under their wings, attacking ships ahead of 

us. General alarm was then sounded and we were all told to seek cover. 

I went aft to the aviation worl:cshop and helped wake men who were still 

sleeping there and dosed battle ports in the optical shop. The order came 

for all hands not assigned to anti·aircraft batteries to go to the third deck. 
Pearl Harbor 

I started for the third deck but just then General Quarters was sounded. 

I came back and started for my General Quarters station which is a repair 

station (patrol five). We were hit aft and also in one or two other places 

on the ship. Word came, "Fire in the Executive Officer's Office. " Hurst, 

Bruns, Wentzlaff, and J manned a lire hose and went on the 9uarterdeck to 

connect it and fight the fire aft on the 9uarterdeck where the bomb had 

hit us. Lieutenant Commander Fuqua was at his post on the quarterdeck 

where the bomb had hit us. I was on the nozzle end of the hose and told 

Hurst and Bruns to turn on the water. They did, but no water came. I 

turned around to see if the hose had any kinks in it and at that time 

there was an explosion which knocked me off the ship. I was taken aboard 

the NEVADA where I was brought to my ~nses in a casemate (no. 3) . 

I had been in the water because I was soaked with oil. The NEV ADA was 

underway and I helped handle powder for the 5 inch gun. When the NE· 

V ADA was hit in the dry dock channel, the gun was put out and the ship 

was afire. I helped get wounded aft and fought fire until I was choked by 

smoke and fumes. They sent me from the NEVADA to the SOLACE where 

I was put to bed and (uts and bruises treated. I couldn't see either until my 

eyes were washed out and treated. I was released from the SOLACE December 10, and was sent to Receiving Barracks where Mr. Fuqua told me to 

rejoin the aviation unit at Ford Island. I saw no signs of fear on the ship. 

Everyone was surprised and pretty mad. 

Corporal E. C. Nightingale of the U.S. Marine Corps wrote as follows: 

At approximately eight o'clock on the morning o( December 7, 1941, 

I was leaving the breakfast table when the ship's siren for air defense 

sounded. Having no anti·aircra(t battle station, I paid little attention to it. 

Suddenly I heard an explosion. I ran to the port door leading to the 9uarterdeck and saw a bomb strike a barge of some sort alongside the NEVADA, 

or in that vicinity. The marine color guard came in at this point saying 

we were being attacked. I could distinctly hear machine gun fire. I believe 

at this point our anti-aircraft battery opened up. We stood around awaiting 

orders of some kind . General Quarters sounded and I started for my battle 

station in secondary aft. As I passed through casement nine I noted the gun 

was manned and being trained out. The men seemed extremely calm and 

collected. I reached the boat deck and our anti-aircraft guns were in full 

action, firing very rapidly. I was about three guarters of the way to the 

first platform on the mast when it seemd as though a bomb struck our 

guarterdeck. I could hear shrapnel or fragm~nts whistling past me. As soon 

as I reached the first platform, I saw Second lieutenant Simonsen lying 

on his back with blood on his shirt front. I bent over him and taking 

him by the shoulders asked i( there was anything J could do. He was dead, 

or so nearly so that speech was impossible. Seeing there was nothing I 

could do for the lieutenant, I continued to my battle station. 
Appendix A 307 

When I arrived in secondary aft I reported to Major Shapley that Mr. 

Simonson had been hit and there was nothing to be done for him. There 

was a lot of talking going on and I shouted for si lence which came im· 

mediately. I had only been there a short time when a terrible explosion 

caused the ship to shake violently. I looked at the boat dttk and everything 

seemd aflame forward of the mainmast. I reported to the Major that the 

ship was aflame, which was rather needless, and after looking about, the 

Ma jor ordered US to leave. I was the last man to ka\'e s('(ondary aft 

be(ause I looked around and there was no one left. I followed the Maj or 

down the port side of the tripod mast. The railings, as we ascended, were 

very hot and as we reached the boat deck I noted that it was torn up and 

burned. The bodies of the dead were thick, and badly burned men were 

heading for the quarterdeck, only to fall apparently dead or badly wounded. 

The Major and r went between No.3 and No. 4 turret to the starboard 

side and found Lieutenant Commander Fuqua ordering the men o\'er the 

side and assisting the wounded. He seemed exceptionally calm and the 

Major stopped and they talked for a moment. Charred bodies were 

everywhere. 

I made my way to the qua}' and started to remove my shoes when I 

suddenly found myself in the water. r think the concussion of a bomb threw 

me in. I started swimming for the pipe line which was about one hundred 

and fifty feet away. I was about half way when my strength ga\'e out 

entirely. My clothes and shocked cond ition sapped my strength, and I was 

about to go under when Major Shapley started to swim by, and seeing 

my distress, grasped my shirt and to ld me to hang to his shoulders while 

he swam in. \'(fe were perhaps twenty.five feet from the pipe line when 

the Major's strength gave out and I saw he was floundering, so I loosened 

my grip on him and told him to make it alone. He stopped and grabbed 

me by the shirt and refused to let go. I would have drowned but for the 

Major. We fin ally reached the beach where a ma ri ne directed US to a 

bomb shelter, where I was given dry clothes and a place to rest. 

Aviation Machinist's Mate, First Class D. A. Graham wr?te as follows: 

On hea ring the explosions and gun reports, \'Ventzlaff, E., A.0.M.2/ c, 

came in saying we were being attacked and bombed by Jap planes. The air 

raid siren sounded, followed by the Genera! Quarters ala rm. I stepped out· 

si de the shop and started to my general quarters station on the quarterdeck, 

shouting "Let's go. " 

It seemed as though the magazines forward blew up while we were 

hooking up the fire hose, as the noise was followed by an awful "swish'· 

and hot air blew out of the compartments. There had been bomb hits 

at the first start and yellowish smoke was pouring out of the hatches 

from below decks. There were lots of men coming out on the quarterdffk 

with every stitch of clothing and shoes blown off, painfully burned and 
308 Pearl Harbor 

shocked. Mr. Fuqua was the senior officer on deck and set an example for the 

men by bdog unperturbed, calm, cool, and collected, exemplifying the 

courage and traditions of an officer under fire. It seemed like the men painfully burned, shocked, and dazed, became inspired and took things in 

stride, seeing Me. Fuqua, so unconcerned about the bombing and strafing, 

standing on the quarterdeck. There was no "going to pieces" or "growing 

panicky"' noticeable, and he directed the moving of the wounded and 

burned men who were on the quarterdeck to the motor launches and ooats. 

He gave orders to get the life rafts on # 3 bathetiC down, supervised the 

loading of the wounded and burned casualties , assisted by Ensign J. D. 

Miller who set a very good example for a younger officer by being cool, 

calm, and coll«:ted. 

The signal gang, quartermasters, and all hands on the bridge went up-­

as the signal men were trying to put out a lire in the signal rack and 

grabbing signal flags out to hoist a signal, the whole bridge went up, flames 

enveloping and obscuring them from view as the flames shot upward 

twice as high as the tops. A bomb hit on the starboard side of the after 

5 inch guns and anti·aircraft gun, and 80t most of the marine crew and 

anti·aircraft crews. It seemed as though one bomb hit the port after the 

anti·aircraft crew and came down through the casemate and Executive 

Officer's office. 

After the big explosion and "swish," the men painfully burned and 

wounded, dazed beyond comprehension, came out on the quarterdeck. I had 

to stop some of them from entering the flames later on and directed them 

over to the starboard side of the deck to the gangway for embarking, 

encouraging them to be calm. 

The VESTAL, tied up alongside the port side, did not seem to get 

hit hard and started to get underway, so I stood by to cast off lines on the 

quarterdeck portside and cast off their bow lines as the Lieutenant Commander on her wanted to save the line to tie up to one of the buoys. 

Assisted by a seaman from #4 turret, we rendered the bow line around 

and cast her off. Then getting the small life raft on # 3 turret barbette 

port side off and over the port stern , the water and oil being on deck, 

and the ship settling fast, we got orders to embark in the motor boat 

at the starboard stern quarter, Lieutenant Commander Fuqua and a few 

others still being aboard. We landed at B.O.Q. land ing, Ford Island . 

Smith, B.M.2c, USN, boat coxswain, made many trips for wounded and 

burned men being delivered by Lieutenant Commander Fuqua, still on 

board. 

Courage and performance of all hands was of the highest order imaginable, especially being handicapped by adverse conditions and shipmates 

being blOwn up alongside them. There was no disorder nor tendency to run 

around in confusion. The coolness and calm manner of Lieutenant Com· 
Appendix A 309 

mander Fuqua and Ensign J. D. Miller installed confidence in the surVIVing crew. 

4. U.S.S. CALIFORNIA 

Chief Yeoman, S. R. Miller wrote as follows: 

At about 1030, December 7, 1941, after the U.S.S. CALIFORNIA had 

been struck with torpedoes and bombs, a man reported to me on the Flag 

Bridge that he had just escaped from Central Station by the trunk leading 

into Flag Conn. This was reported to Ensign McGrath on the signal 

bridge. Stover, C.E., C.Q.M., Campbell (initials unknown), C.E.M., and 

I with Ensign McGrath entered Flag Conn to investigate. We obtained a 

line and lowered Ensign McGrath through the trunk to Central Station, 

which was then being flooded with fuel oil coming from vents and .various 

other places. The oil fumes were !>O strong that we feared Ensign McGrath 

would be overcome with the fumes before the trapped men could be 

rescued. At this time the sh ip was burning fiercely and there was also danger 

of the ship turning over as it was listing badly. Ensign McGrath completed 

his investigation and returned up the trunk to Flag Conn and reported that 

these men were in a compartment under Central Station and might be 

rescued by cutting a hole through the deck of Central Station. He reported 

that the deck of Central Station would soon be flooded with oil and that 

when this occurred, it would be too late to cut the hole through the deck. 

A cutting torch was quickly obtained and volunteers called for. The 

response of volunteers was so great among ' various men on the boat 

deck thaI most of them had to be returned to their stations fighting fires. 

Enrign McGrath, Campbell and the volunteer rescue party entered Central 

Station through the trunk and proceeded to cut an escape hole in the deck. 

Ensign McGrath and Campbell were both nearly overcome by fumes before 

the job was completed. The first who worked with the cutting torch was 

overcome by fumes and had to be replaced with another ex~ri n(ed man. 

During the time this hole was being cut, there was great danger of fire as the 

fuel oil was gradually working its way dose to where the hole was being 

cut. In addition to this danger, there was danger of the ship turning over 

as it was straining the mooring lines badly. The hole in the deck was just 

cut in time before fue l oil flooded Central Station. 

It is considered that Ensign McGrath, Campbell , and the several other 

men who assisted, accomplished saving the lives of these trap~d men at 

great risk of their own, and therefore distinguished themselves in bravery 

and gallantry above and beyond the call of duty. 

Under the strain and shock of the attack, it is regretted that the names 
310 Pearl Harbor 

of the other enlisted men were not obtained. They acquitted themselves 

equally as well to the bt:st traditions of the Naval Service. 

Lieutenant Commander H. E. Bernstein wrote as follows: 

I was aboard ship with the Head of Department duty sitting in my room 

half dressed, when the Genera l Alarm was sounded. I ran immediately 

to the quarterdeck and observed two torpedo planes approaching the ship 

perpendicular to it at an altitude of less than one hundred feet and as I 

moved aft, saw two torpedoes dropped by these plaes. I immediately 

gave orders that all ammunition be broken out and upon receiving the report 

that some ready boxes were locked, I gave orders that thq be broken open. 

The work of Commander Skillman in obtaining all available fire fighting 

equipment ashore was most commendable, as a very large supply including 

new extinguishers which were li lled on the landing, arrived. 

There was no sign of panic or fear displayed Dy any of the men on shore 

even when bombing planes were overhead and all continued in their work 

of supplying fire lighting equipment. 

Electrician Lion wrote as follows : 

At 0750 I left my room and went to the Warrant Officer's mess room 

for breakfast. I had just sat down when the word was passed "All hands 

to General Quarters." I heard a distant rumble, glanced out the port hole 

on the port side of the ship, and saw a black airplane with rising sun 

insignias. I immediately went to the main control room. Word was passed 

to set condition Zed, and about ten minutes later a torpedo hit. We started 

lighting off both engine rooms to .get underway. About live minutes after 

the torpedo hit, the steam pressure slowly dropped to zero. "'Ie received 

report that there was water in the fuel oi\. Everything possible was being 

done to clear lines of salt water and get fuel oil. About 0830 we received 

another torpedo hit and shortly after a report came in that a bomb hit had 

set a large lire forward. The lire main pressure was boosted to well over 

100 pounds. 

Shortly after bomb hit we had steam pressure on one boiler and furnished 

ship with light and power from after engine room. Forward engine room 

had to abandon. After engine room reported main set ready to come in on 

line. Steam pressure again dropped to about 100 pounds. We held off 

putting an after main set because of low steam pressure. Orders came over 

J.V. phones to abandon ship. Abandon ship orders belayed. Report that hatch 

or port thrust buckling. Informed personnel to ch&k logs and S~ that it 

was se<ure, before abandoning that area. About 1000 ordered to abandon 

ship which we did after dogging down all hatches. I checked motor rooms 

for personnel and found them dear of personnel and after dogging all 

hatches reported to topside. 
Appendix A 31l 

The wounded were being taken off the ship and others were being 

brought to top side from third deck passage where they were overcome 

with fuel oil fumes. All hands returned back aboard to fight fire with aid 

of tugs from Navy Yard. Our attention was called to the fact that five 

men were trapped in the center shaft alley. The only possible way to save 

them was cutting through bulkhead in center motor room. The water was 

running in center motor room from vent trunk which leaked terribly. Water 

was up to main motor bearings when five men from center thrust were 

pulled out. These men were hurt in no way and required no medical atten · 

tion. We started putting pumps in various holds and commenced pumping 

but the ship slowly settled at all times until it finally settled on bottom. 

Ensign E. R. Blair, Jr. had these comments on machine gun ammunition: 

I was in an undressed state in the forward bunk room when General 

Quarters sounded. The first torpedo struck as I left the bunkroom, quickly 

followed by the second. Zed was already set on the main deck hatches 

so that in order to get topside I opened the escape hatch. In the boat deck 

Ensign Canfield was acting as sta rboard battery officer and Ensign C. H . 

Hall as port battery officer so I rushed up to sky control to man a director. 

Both directors were inoperative. On the way to sky control I had noticed 

that machine guns number 1 and number 2 were firing but were short 

of ammunition. The ammunition that they were using was the 400 rounds of 

ready ammunition on that station. 

I gathered a working party of about 10 men from the vicinity of , inch 

~l caliber gun number I to bring up machine gun ammunition. We opened 

the amidships forecastle hatch which led to the shaft leading to the forward 

torpedo hold. We were under attack at the time but the men paid no 

heed to the enemy planes and worked quickly and eagerly. It was necessary 

to open five zed hatches including the armored deck hatch to get to the 

.~O caliber ammunition, but I believed that the need for the ammunition 

warranted the risk involved. 

Because of the previous torpedo hits I knew that it would be impossible 

to get to the .50 caliber magazine via the third deck and the opening of a 

similar number of zed hatches would be involved. I broke out the belted 

ammunition, about 1600 rounds, distribu ted it among eight men, 200 

rounds to a ready box, one ready box to a man. To each man I designated 

a station to which he was to take his ammunition. It was exceedingly hard 

going for these men to chink up the shaft with the ammunition. The ship 

was listing badly and they could use only one hand to chink the vertical 

ladders in the shaft. Everyone of the men made it to the main deck. 

With the remaining men r commenced belting up new ammunition. 

Shortly, howe,'er, we were hit again. It felt exactly as the concussion of a 

5 inch/5 1 caliber feels when you are sitting in the pointer's seat. Two glass 

gauges broke and diesel oil rlln out on the deck. I closed the valves and 
312 Pearl Harbor 

thought that glass gauges on a battleship should ~ done away with. 

There was a leak forward and we could hear water running close at hand. 

I was determined to get as much ammunition out as was possible and 

belt it above decks. Accordingly, incud ing two men who were on watch 

there, each man went topside with all he could carry. A Gunner's Mate 

remained with the men and I instructed him to bring the dipping machine 

with him. He had it half unfastened when I left. The clipping machine 

never reached topside. When I went back for it thirty minutes later the 

torpedo hole was completely flooded. 

From the magazine I headed for the main top, noting as I went that 

the main deck starboard side was a wreck; men we(e crawling out of the 

starboard forecastle hatch in a dazed condition, some badly burned. There 

was a neat bomb hole near ') inch ~ 1 calibe r gun three with smoke trickling 

out. There was no ammunition in the maintop. r retraced my steps. On the 

main deck near the forecastle hatch amidst smoke and debris was the ammunition scattered over the deck with a dead man beside each ready box. 

Two ready boxes that could be gotten to (there was fire all around) I 

.sent to guns numbered 1 and 2. I returned to the maintop hoping to find the 

dipping machine and the boxes of loose ammunition brought out last 

from the magazine. Two boxes were brought up by exhausted seamen, one 

of which was Shelton, SIC, 6·S Div. We turned to bc-lting the ammunition 

by han d. After bc-Iting about 100 rounds "Abandon Ship" was given. 

Reluctantly Ensign B. C. Hall and I left without firing our belt. 

Machine guns # I and # 2 were manned immediately aft er the enemy 

dropped her first bombs on Ford Island. They fired at the first planes 

which attacked this ship. Gun number 2, however, which could bear on the 

torpedo planes attacking this ship, would fire only one round without being 

given "immediate action" or reloading by hand. This was due to a faulty 

setting of the oil buffer. Gun number 1 with Price, 52c, 6-Div. firing, is 

credited by all men at the guns, includ ing Lieutenant (jg) Jakeman, with 

the feat of bringing down the plane which attacked immediately behind 

the plane which scored the bomb hit to starboard. The task of getting 

ammunition to the .50 caliber machine guns was one fOr the machine 

gunners themselves. That ~y didn't carry out their job was due principally 

to the fact that they were stopped by officers and put in the ') inchj 25 and 

3 inch/ 50 ammunition supply Jines where they did heroic work. Another reason was that Montgomery A.F., GMIC, who was in charge of the 

.')0 catiber machine gun ammunition supply, had been temporarily detached 

for patrol duty ashore. The man next in charge after Montgomery, a 

GM3c did not have the experience to cope with the situation. 

Machine Gunners who should be mentioned for their heroic work in 

ammunition supply line below decks and later in saving lives at the risk 

of their own were Beli, GM3c, Doran, SIc, Nix. Si c, and Cleveland, 

Sic, aU of 6-P Division. 
Appendix A 313 

Ensign W. A. J. Lewis wrote as follows: 

General Quarters was sounded and I proceeded at once to the Forward 

Engine Room. The room was fully manned within a few minutes and 

I gave the order to set all condition on the DOimage Control Fittings. 

We had just shifted.F.O. suction to the starboard battle tanker when we got 

the word from the oil king to make the shift. I checked the light and power 

mOichines and found them operating properly. I instructed the watch to 

watch all trips closely and if anything tripped out to reset it and hold it 

in if necessary. The first torpedo hit came just as I was re1.ching the engine 

room. It knocked out about one half of the lights in the machine ship and 

about one fourth of the lights in the engine room. No machinery was 

tripped or put out of commission by this hit. An inspection of the engine 

room showed that we had suffered no visible damage. I ordered a main 

feed pump put on the line along with both main fuel oil pumps. We had 

just started warming up the main plant when we got reports that # 1 boiler 

was getting water in its fuel oiL Steam pressure dropped rapidly so we 

secured from warming up main set, secured main circulator, and steam fuel 

oil pumps. 

After the second torpedo hit, we began to get large 9uantities of smoke 

down the ventilator blowers so we secured the ventilators. Smoke still came 

down and word was received that gas was present. We could detect nothing 

but powder gases so did not put on gas masks. Later on the smoke became 

thicker so J directed some of the men to put on their masks. They found 

a certain amount of relid by doing so; mainly I think because it took 

certain irritating particles out of the air and also because it protected the 

eyes. The smoke seemed to be coming now from burning paint rather than 

powder. The smoke began to take effect on .the crew so I ordered all hands 

except the talker on the upper level to go down to the lower level where 

the air was somewhat better. The forward part of the engine room had 

become very hot and the metal in some places was too hot to touch. This 

accounted for some of the paint fumes as the paint had btgun to blister. 

When the order came to abandon ship, (we did not receive the first 

order) I directed the men to leave these stations and go up after hatch. 

They did so but for some reason they could not get the watertight door 

above the hatch open. We then tried to open the forward hatch but the 

metal in that area was so hot that it led us to btlieve that there was a big 

fire just above us. We got all the fi re extinguishers in the engine room 

and all the extra clothes we could find to wrap around ourselves and began 

to try to force the forward hatch. At about this time we were assisted from 

above and the hatch was opened. The fire was just forward of us so we 

proceeded aft and came up on deck. By this time the ship had been aban· 

doned but the crew was rapidly returning to fight the fire in the midships 

section. 
314 Pearl Harbor 

The conduct of the crew was excellent. There wa$ no confusion and 

each man manned his station and obeyed ordNS without question or delay. 

Even at the time when all hands began to feel that we were going to be 

trapped below there was no hysteria or excite~nt. 

The Acting Engineer Officer, Lieutenant C. A. Peterson wrote as follows : 

I went to Main Control immediately when General Quarters was sounded. 

As soon as communications were manned I ordered the after steam lines 

warmed up. all boilers lighted off, and both main .sets warmed up and 

made ready for getting underway. Reports that General Quarters was set 

were received from all engineering stations. Shortly thereafter a heavy ~hock 

was felt and a report was received that a torpedo had hit the ship. (These 

events aU happened in very rapid succe5sion, and I am not sure of the 

sequence. I believe that the torpedo hit before the reports of all stations 

had been received.) About ten minutes after the torpedo hit the steam 

pressure sta rted dropping. Number 1 fireroom (which had been steaming 

for auxiliary ) reported water in the fuel oil. The forward fuel oil suction 

was at this time, and had been for 10 or 1'j minutes, on the starboard 

battle tanks. I ordered a shift to the starboard loop and called the oil ki ng 

by phone for consultation. He informed me that he had tried the starboard 

battle tanks, starboard loop, and engine room bottoms, but had been unable 

to get any good oil. ] ordered the fo rward auxiliary fuel oi l pump stopped 

and the fuel oil loop opened all the way around in order to get fuel from 

an after suction to # 1 fireroom. I ordered all forward firerooms to run 

the water from their burner connections to the bilges in order to dear 

the line of water. I also ordered aU after fire rooms to light off under 

natural draft using as many burners as possible. The after boilers reported 

that the oil was too cold to burn. I ordered them to keep trying and told 

Emergency Boiler Control to get a blow torch to heat the oil in the burner 

line to one of the after boilers. The forward light and power machines 

had been tripped out and the steam pressure rapidly dropped to zero. 

About this time a second torpedo hit the ship. A report was received from 

port thrust block room that it was fill ing with water rapidly. Orders were 

given to abandon the station. After gyro reported a short time later that 

the hatch from port thrust WIlS bulging Ilnd leaking and that station ( after 

gyro) was ordered abandoned and secu red. Prior to this it had been neces· 

sary to allow the Forward Torpedo Air Compressor crew and the Forward 

S. E. Air Compressor crew to abandon their stations due to heavy leakage 

of fuel oil into those spaces. Not long after the second torpedo hit, a 

bomb hit was reported in the machinery passageway. This turned out 

later to have been the bomb that exploded in A611 s. The forward engine 

room reported that they were getting a great deal of smoke and had stopped 

their blowers, also that the bulkheads and overhead were getting hot. Fud 

not having been regained on # 1 fireroom, and since the fires had been sue· 
Appendix A 315 

c~ssfully light~d in #6 boil~r. I ord ~r~d th~ main steam cut outs in the aft~r 

engin~ ~m dos~d to keep all the steam that we were about to g~t for th~ 

aft~ r main set and after light and power machines. The fuel oil loop had 

previously been iso at~ d between the forw ard and after engineering spaces, 

as the large amount of water being forced out of the fo rward lines dropped 

th~ pressure aft. The forward auxiliary fuel oil pump was started again and 

continued effort was made to find good oil for the forward boilers. This 

had still not been accomplished when the engine room was abandoned. 

Number 6 boiler came in on the line and about five minutes later number 

, boiler came in on the line. The after light and power machines were 

started as soon as one boiler was on the line, and light and power were 

restored to the ship. Numbers 3 and 4 bilge pumps were pat on the fire· 

main. Shortly after this I got a call via ships servic~ telephone from 

emerg~ncy boiler control and was asked, 'Oid you get the word in Main 

Control to abandon ship?' By this time the after engine room and some 

of the firerooms had gotten this word and started to abandon. I ordered 

th~m stopped while I verified this order. Conn said that no such order had 

been given. The men were ordered to return to their stations, and they 

did so with such speed that none of the operations which they had been 

~ngaged in were interfered with. That is, the boilers centered to steam 

and the light and power machines to run. Shortly after this the Chief En· 

gineer came down to Main Control and assumed charge. The after main set 

was ready to roll and word was re9uested from Conn if it were intended 

to get underway. As I recall it the answ~r was in the negative. A short 

time later word was received from Conn to abandon ship. It was stated 

to be on the authority of Commander Battl~ Force. Orders were accordingly 

given to all stations which were abandoned in an orderly manner. Fires 

were cut in the steaming boilers and the light and power machines slowed 

down and stopped. All spaces leading from the engineering passageway 

were checked and found to abandoned. All watertight doors were dosed 

securely, and with the space abandoned the Ch ief Engineer and 1 came 

topside. When we got to the 9uay Captain Smith was directing everyone 

to go back and fight the fire. After a slight con fusion due to this confli cting order, the crew started fighting the fire in the casemates with 

buckets and portable fire extinguishers. From the time that #6 boiler 

came on the line until the engineering spac~s were abandoned , the nremain 

pressure had been kept at, n pounds or more continuously. The rapid 

stroke of the two pumps on the line (I cou ld hear them) indicated that 

they were pumping large 9uantitics of wat~r. 

Chief Electrician, R. W. Miller wrote as follows: 

The morning of December 7, 1941, about ono, while ~ated in the \'(1.0. 

mess room at breakfast, I heard an unusual rattle of machine gun fire and 

an ~xplosion from the vicinity of the Navy Yard Dry Dock. The Genera! 
316 Pearl Harbor 

Alarm sound~d and I seemed to know without further thought that we 

had been attacked and that it was not just another drill. A quick glance out 

the port in the mess loom verified this. There in full view and an easy target 

was a gray plane on an opposite course paralleling our heading at the 

mooring. 

J ran to my room for my gas mask, etc. and then (or the unteal Station, 

my battle station. On reaching the ladder to the Central Station an explosion 

occurred seeming to come (rom forward; this I took to ~ a tOlpMO. Condition Ztd was immediately set around the Central Station and plotting 

room area. Officers present in plot were lieutenant Purdy, Ensign Reiley 

and Ensign Joys and in Central Station Ensign Walker and myself. In short 

order we had communications esublished with what was available. Some 

excitement existed at the start but things soon quieted down to almost 

routine. 

Upon arriving at Central J had the compasses started, made preparations 

to live up telegraphs, etc. for getting underway, and called the forward 

and after distribution switch boards to see how they were getting along 

and if everyone had reached his station. We seemed to be well manned and 

all had responded to the G.A. instantly. About this time, 0810 or 0815, 

the ship had a port list. Chief Yeoman Baldwin acted as D.C.O. and ordered 

starboard voids to be flooded to counter our list. In about 10 more minutes 

there was 9. terrific explosion almost under our feet; we knew this to be a 

torpedo. The list increased and Baldwin continued to counter flood. 

Word came into Central for power for the hoists to get up ammunition. 

I was asked if there wasn't some auxiliary power and told the ammunition 

the only auxiliary power was to use the hand hoisting gear. All lights were 

off but the auxiliary lights came on nicely. About this time word came in 

that the port lower S inch handling room was flooding. I left Central 

and went down to check to see if any more ammunition could be sent up 

before the boys abandoned this station. The water was about knee" deep 

and pouring down the hoist. I ordered the handling room abandoned and 

had hoist flaps and the watertight door secured. The crew to this station went 

up to Plot and we secured the trunk to the forward distribution room. Mr. 

Walker and myself were quite concerned with the list which by now was 

8°, checked with Baldwin frequently to see that all starboard voids were 

being flooded, and we were assured that they were. This concern was 

amplified by the fact that we had received a report that the OKLAHOMA 

was bottom side up. 

Explosions were felt at intervals but no damage reports came in. The 

fire alarm annunciator dropped from the maguines and started dropping, 

indicating them to be either on fire or flooded and the bell rang incessantly. 

I ordered the fire alarm bell to be cut out to stop the noise. I called up 

the forward board and pleaded with Ensign Gavin to See" if he could gct 

us power and was informed that there was water in the fuel oil. I then 
Appendix A 317 

called main control to find out if they couldn't use the steering batteries 

for power on the after distribution board. I called Ensign Gavin again to 

contact the engine room for power and was informed it would be on in a 

short while. About this time, 08}0 or 0840, a crashing explosion just over· 

head and to the starboard side led me to believe that a ::; inch magazine 

had gone since the fire alarm drops had indicated them on fire or flooded. 

All equipment seemed to hang together nicely especially the ship's 

service telephones. Anything that was secured. held fine; only a few loose 

things Hew around a bit. 

The telephone cabinet doors jumped out a little and we were all jolted 

but no harm was done below. The overhead of Central Stations started to 

drip fuel oil and water and we knew that the deck above us was Bonded. 

We put buckets under the leaks. Price, Chief Electrician's Mate, called me in 

the room to look at the leaks. I found the bulkhead between Main Radio 

and the IC Room buckled and the frames bent with some water squirting 

through but it looked as though it would hold for awhile. Sweavey, CM 1C, 

at the after gyro called up and said the hatch to the port thrust was bulging 

and so I ordered him out and told him to secure the hatch to the third deck. 

Sweavey is missing and a fine boy he was. The list had decreased some to 

about 6Y2 degrees and then increased again. Word was received in Central 

that they were dropping thermite bombs. Lights and power came on in 

Central again around 0840 approximately. When the word to abandon ship 

came we left through the Conning Tower tube. Things on top were a mess. 

I got a life jacket and after reaching the float promptly, fell in the' oil 

being temporarily blinded. A truck picked me up and ca rried me to the 

new BOQ where I received treatment for my eyes and some dry clothes. 

Gunner's Mate, Third Class, V. O. Jensen wrote as follows: 

During the air raid Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 , Robert Scott 

of the 'II' Division was in waist deep water and fuel oil and refused to 

leave his station after we had gotten word to abandon oue compartment. 

I called to him and told him eveeyone else had abandoned the compartment 

but he insisted on staying; "As long as 1 can give these people air, I'm 

sticking: His station was on the Forward Air Compressor by Main G.S.K. 

Things were blacking out for me so 1 was forced to eav~ the compartment 

and I never saw him afterwards. 

Ensign Champion wrote of a rescue party which freed five men from the 

Center Thrust Block Room. 

After the engagement Sunday I was standing on the quarterdeck organ· 

izing a party to rescue five men trapped in Center thrust. Campbell CEM, 

ran up to the men and said Ensign Gavin and several other men were 

trapped in the forwa rd distribution board and could be rescued by cutting 
• • • • • 

• • • • • 

318 Penrl Harbor 

through the plotting room deck. Taking the men I had with me, we went 

to the foundry and removed the acetylene cutting outfit. Wf! then proceeded 

to the conning tower. Ensign McGrath was there and asked me to keep 

everybody out of Central Station except a group of picked men. He then 

went down to Central Station with several men including Campbell, CEM, 

and Rountree, FIc. We lowered the cutting outfit down to them and then 

procured a sledge hammer and some chisels which we also lowered to 

them. Ensign. McGrath shouted up that the fuel oil fumes wcrc \'ery bad. 

We tried to rig a blower in the conning tower tube, but no power was 

available. The trapped men were rescued just before Central Station was 

flooded with fuel oil. 

5. U.S.S. MARYLAND 

Ensign W. O. Beach of Commander Battleships Staff wrote as foHows: 

Having ~ Communication Staff Duty, I was on board during th~ subject 

action and had just finis ~d eating breakfast a minute or two before the 

first ala rm. I was still sitting in the wardroom when r heard a short burst 

of machine gun fire which was immediately followed by the sounding of 

General Quarters. When General Quarters was sounded I walked to 

one of th~ O~n Ward Room ports and looked out, seeing a plane swoop 

up over the OKLAHOMA and MARYLAND, the an~ having evidently 

just dropped a torpc'do. I then wa lked aft to the Flag Ollice, finding En · 

sign Bradway there, getting what information he could from Radio Central 

and telephoning it to Flag Plot. l eaving the Flag Office, I went up the 

ladder to the port side of the quarterdeck and saw num~rous Japanese 

aircraft were bombing us and that the OKLAHOMA was already listing to 

port. Retu rning to Ward Room country, I sent the mess boys to dose the 

Ward Room ports a~d saw that Ens ign Bradway was having the ports in the 

Flag Office dosed. 

A group of men from the OKLAHOMA, standing near number three 

turret on the starboard side, asked for orders; I directed them to dog down 

the hatch leading to Office rs' Country, forward on the starboard side, 

which was still open and then get below the protective deck. On returning 

to the Flag Bridge, I found there was nothing in particular that I could 

do in Flag Radio so stayed out on the bridge to take Lt. Comdr. Horne's 

place as best I could until he returned to the ship . 

I did not not~ very carefully the type or number of planes attacking 

although there must have been fifty or more all told. Most of them seemed 
Append;x A ,19 

to ~ a low wing dive bomber type and their markings (the rising sun 

on the wings and fuselage), were very distinct. They seemed to attack in 

three or four waves, bombing and dropping torJX'd0e5, the first and main 

attack being a torpedo attack. Our anti·aircraft guns wefe relatively slow 

coming into action but it was amazing to me how fast they did get into 

action considering the circumstances. The attacks were centered on the 

heavy shi ps with other attacks being made on Hickam Field and the Naval 

Air Station. I saw only one plane shot down during the action. This plane 

was hit squarely and blown to pieces as it dived on the Naval Air Station. 

I ved another plane apparently disabled and headed for a crash. This 

plane was going from Pearl toward Hickam Field when last seen. 

Commander E. Kranzfelder of the Staff of Commander Battleships wrote 

as follows: 

Commander Sabin and I were at the Mo.ana Hotel in Honolulu when, 

at approximately 0820 on the morning of December 7th, we received a caU 

from the telephone operator telling us that an emerg~ncy existed at Pearl 

Harbor and that we should return to our ships as soon as possible. We 

proceeded to Pearl Harbor as expeditiously as possible and arrived on board 

the MARYLAND at about 0925 . 

Upon boarding the MARYLAND I proceeded immediately to the bridge. 

While on the bridge a man from the OKLAHOMA contacted me and stated 

that assistance was required on the OKLAHOMA and that there was 

urgent need for cutting equipment. At this time Lieutenant Mandelkorn 

proceeded to the OKLAHOMA to assist in the rescue work. A short time 

later I informed the Admiral that I believed I could be of assistance in 

connection with the rescue work on the OKLAHOMA and he directed me 

to do all I cou ld to release any entrapped personnel. Before leaving the 

MARYLAND I obtained a copy of the OKLAHOMA booklet of plans 

for use in connection with the cutting of holes in the OKLAHOMA's hull. 

With the energetic assistance of Lieutenant Mandelkorn the efforts 

of the rescue group were organized. Lines were rigged from the bilge 

keel at intervals along the bottom, telephone communication was estab· 

lished with the MARYLAND, an air supply line was quickly rigged from 

the MARYLAND to the OKLAHOMA, strainers were ' removed from main 

injections and over board discharge in an attempt to gain access to the 

engine room. Contact was established with two men entrapped in the 

evapor:l.tor pump room through a small overooard discharge connection 

in the hull. Food and waler was passed down to these men. From information obtained from these men as 10 their location in the ship and with the 

aid of the booklet of plans it was possible to determine the best locations 

to cut access holes in the ship's bottom. Since, with the exception of the 

reserve feed bottoms, practically the entire bottom of the OKLAHOMA 
320 Pearl Harbor 

consists of oil tanks, consid~rable care had to be exercised in cutting 

holes with an oxyacetylene torch in order not to opc'n holes in the bottom 

which would permit the eggress of oil with the attendant fire hazard. 

Fortunatdy the information obtained (rom the entrapped mcn was correct 

and entrance holes were out in a cofferdam . In Ihe meantime Lieutenant 

Commander W . L Benson had arrived on the OKLAHOMA and since 

I considered that Lieutenant Manddkorn's and my services would be required in connection with the remaining battleships in distress, we returned 

to the MARYLAND and I reported to the Admiral that the rescue work 

had been placed in charge of Lieutenant Commander Ikoson who would 

k~p me advised of the progress and of any additional assistance or equipment he needed for the rescue work, 

During the remainder of the day and until after midnight Lieutenant 

Mandelkorn and I made numerous tri ps to the other battleships in distress. 

I considered that we could be of most use in coordinating the delivery of 

essential salvage equipment suc~ as submersible pumps, diving equipment 

and arranging for tug service for the CALIFORNIA and NEVADA. At 

about 1930 the list on the CALIFORNIA had increased to about 90 and tecm~ndati ons were made to the Commanding Officer to counter flood two 

of the; starboard nrerooms to prevent the ship from capsizing. Likewise, 

arrangements were made with Commander Base Force to carry out two 

anchors ftom \he bow of the NEVADA to prevent her from slipping 

further into the channel. 

At about 2100 Lieutenant Mandelkorn and J were aboard the tug 

VIREO when all batteries in the harbor opened fire on approaching planes. 

A short time after firing subsided, a man was rescued from the water over 

the stern of the VIREO. The man was placed in a stretcher and taken on 

board the CALIFORNIA. From conve'rsations with personnel of the 

VIREO it was learned that he had been in an ENTERPRISE plane. 

Of the observations as to conduct of personnel that came to my notice 

during the day, I consider that of Lieutenant Commander W. 1. Benson, 

Engineer Officer of the OKLAHOMA as outstanding. His vigorous efforts 

in connection with the work of rescuing his entrapped shipmates on the 

OKLAHOMA deserves recognition. 

Com~an er W. F. Fitzgera ld, Jr ., Operations Officer, Staff of Commander 

Battleships wrote as follows: 

I was the regularly assigned Staff Duty Officer on the morning of 7 Decem· 

ber 1941 . .. Shortly before 8 o'clock I was undressed an d ready to take a 

bath when I became conscious of intermittent explosions. I quickly jumped 

into my trousers and grabbed a hat and blouse and started for the top· 

side. I was hardly out of my room when General Quarters were sounded. 

I proc~ded immediately to the Flag Bridge, telling all men I encoun· 
Appendix A ,21 

tered enroute to the bridge to man their battle stations and to be calm. 

Upon arrival on topside, which I estimate to be about 8 o'clock, J noticed 

smoke, flame and many explosions throughout the harbor. I believe I heard 

machine gun fire from the MARYLAND at this time but I am not 

positive. I am conscious of having seen the OKLAWOMA upright but 

with a perceptible list to port. My first glance did not indicate to me that 

she was rolling over. Heavy explosions continued. Upon arrival on the Flag 

Bridge I immediately checked with Captain Godwin to see if he was 

making all preparations for getting underway. He said that he was. Shortly 

after my arrival on the Flag Bridge, Captain W. R. Carter, Chief of Staff, 

said, "We can't do much good up here. Let's go down to the guns and give 

them a hand." We both proceeded to the '5'. AA batteries and split up, 

each one doing what he could to assist in organizing the gun crews, ammunition parties, and assigning to stations men who were not otherwise 

engaged. During all this time the fl ame, smoke and noise were terrific. 

My memory indicato that there was some '5" gunfire on the MARYLAND 

upon my arrival at the guns but of this 1 am not cernin since it was 

impossible to tell just who was /i ring, and the fact that I concentrated 

on getting in action guns which had not yet opened fire. I judge this 

time to be about 0810. At about this time I noticed Lieutenant Mandelkorn 

and gave him various directives such as organizing a party to obtain 

steel helmets for all men topside, getting air to the batteries. getting spare 

tools for the guns, etc. I judge that about 081'5 there was sufficient air 

pressure to use the power rammers on the starboard battery. It was not until 

an appreciable interval afterwards that the port battery obtained sufficient 

air. However, in the meantime the port battery fired by hand power. During 

the ensuing 10 or 20 minutes I was greatly assisted by the cool headed 

actions of Anderson, Charles G., Coxswain and Heiteman, Raymond A., 

GM3c of the MARYLAND. The actions of these two men were outstanding 

in every respect. They got not only their own gun into action but also 

assisted other guns. It may be doing an injustice to any number of other 

excellent men who performed their duties in an equally outstanding 

manner but who, due to their location, did not come particularly under 

my observation. 

Shortly after my arrival at the guns the OKLAHOMA rolled over. 

Numerous men from the OKLAHOMA swam to the MARYLAND and 

upon coming aboard I immediately assigned them gun stations or details 

in the ammunition party. After the gun crews were organized and in action, 

and under command of their own battery officers, I returned to the Flag 

Bridge. Upon arrival on the Flag Bridge I noted that a great number of 

bombs were still falling. A terrific explosion took place on what I thought 

was the stern of the TENNESSEE but which I have since learned was on 

the ARIZONA. A large fire was in progress on the WEST VIRGINIA. 

f believe it was about this time that 1 noted that the NEVADA was under· 
322 Pearl Harbor 

way and standing down the channel. She seemd to be in good a~ unti l 

about the time she arrived abreast of 10-tO dock at which time she was 

heavily bombed. I noted that she later turned around in the (hannd 

and was apparently aground. Up until this time I cannot definitely state 

that I saw any formation of enemy planes. However, I did set numerous 

planes which seemed to be conducting single dive bombing attacks. While 

on the sta rboard side of the Flag Bridge I felt the MARYLAND shudder 

from what was apparently a near miss off the port bow. Within a second or 

two I saw a bomb land on the fo r«astle of the MARYLAND and shortly 

thereafter (a matter of a seconds) a large geyser of water sprung up 

on the starboard bow of the MARYLAND apparently from another near 

mIss. 

\'Uithin a few minutes a dive bombing attack was noted coming in from 

the port side across the forecastle of the MARYLAND at an altitude which 

appeared to be at the lowest point not over 200-250 feet. There were about 

six or seven planes in this particular attack. One of the planes burst into 

Rames and crashed from what I believe was a direct hit from the 1.1" 

starboard battery of the MARYLAND. This was followed in a few moments 

by another plane which was shot down over Ford Island but which apparently 

was not in flames. About this time I noticed a bombing attack over the 

ships in the North Channel. One of the planes in Rame apparently landed 

directly on the CURTISS. By this time the guns of both the port and starboard batteries were firing continuously at the enemy planes. The ships 

seemed to be recovering from the shock of the origina l surprise and were 

performing excellently. The fires on the ARIZONA and WEST VIRGINIA seemed to be increasing and fre<juently the MARYLAND was 

entidy covered with hea,'y black smoke. In the meantime various offi ce rs of 

the staff had reported back on board and had immediately taken their 

stations. As near as I can remember I saw Commander Battleships on the 

Flag Bridge for the first lime about 09o,. 

I cannot speak too high ly of the conduct of the men during the entire 

action. There was no panic whatever. As I went from gun to gun and ammu ­

nition party to ammunition party I noted that even though there might 

have been surprised and fear present every man was willing and anxious to 

do his bit and after only a word or two of encouragement turned to his 

task with zest and efficiency. 

During the entire action broken clouds covered the entire sky. There 

were many patches of blue but in general the clouds and smoke made a low 

ceiling. 

Various tugs, lighters, and small boats were directed by Commander 

Battleships to proceed to the WEST VIRGINIA and ARIZONA to 

assist in putting out the fire. In addition rescue parties were sent to the 

OKLAHOMA, which by now had rolled over about 1::;0 degrees, in order 

to cut holes in the bottom and rescue the men who were trapped inside. 
Appendix A 323 

In regards to exti nguishing the fires, two incidents stand out prominently 

in my mind. One was the action of Garbage Lighter YG17 which, without 

hesitation, went alongside the WEST VIRGINIA and for over 24 hours 

poured water on the flames both on the ship and on the edge of the 

burning fuel on the water. The other was the outstanding action of a motor 

whaleboat from the HONOLULU which made repeated trips directly along 

the edge of the burning fuel oil on the water in order to extinguish it and 

prevent its spreading. This boat repeatedly caught fire itself but as soon as 

the flames were extinguished would return to its task of extinguishing 

the dangerous fire on the water. Incidentally, this fire on the water was a 

real menace to all the ships at the interrupted quay wall. Extraordinary 

effort s were made by all concerned to keep the flam es away from the 

TENNESSEE and the MARYLAND. 

At some time during the morning I saw an explosion in the vicinity 

of the PENNSYLVANIA and at another time saw a destroyer in dry. 

dock being blown up. It was not unt il later in the morning that I realized 

the CALIFORN IA had been badly damaged. I had noticed that s~e was hit 

but at first did not appreciate the heavy list which I subsequently noticed. , 

. ~ 

Lieutenant Commander D. H. Johnston of Commander Battleships Staff 

wrote as follows: 

About 0825, December 7, I received information via phone regarding 

the attack on Pearl Harbor. At this time I was at my home, Apt. 29, 

Edgewater Beach. 

I proceeded to Pearl Harbor with Comde. Curts, CincPac Staff and Ens. 

Tyng, U.S.S. HELENA. Enroute we observed heavy smoke over Pearl 

Harbor and Hickam Field. At the Fleet Landing I embarked in a MARY· 

LAND motor launch in company with Commander Haines, Lt.Comdr. 

Horne and several other officers attached to the MARYLAND. At this 

time the second attack began. Planes plainly marked as JAPANESE were 

dive bombing on the vessels in the harbor. Heavy AA fire was being maintained by all vessels in the Yard and harbor. 

Upon arrival on board about 0915 I proceeded directly to my station 

in Flag Plot, supervising the recording of information and plotting such 

contacts as were received. 

At 1030 Captain Bode (OKLAHOMA) was directed to go to the Naval 

Air Station to take charge of survivors from the disabled ships and to 

arrange for delivery of ammunition. 

By this time oil from the ARIZONA burning on the surface of the 

harbor was being blown down on the TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA 

and' the MARYLAND. The Yard garbage lighter YG17 took position on 

the port quarter of the WEST VIRGINIA and rendered invaluable service 

in fighting the fire. She maintained her position in spite of repeated ex­
;24 Pearl Harbor 

plosions of ammunition in the WEST VIRGINIA's ready boxes. Several 

ships' boats assisted by cutting in dose to the flames and using C02 

extinguishers. At 1142 the U.S.S. TERN was directed to assist. 

About 1300 divers reported on board and under the direction of Com· 

mander Kranzfelder and Lieutenant Mandelkorn proceeded with rescue 

operations on the hull of the U.S.S. OKLAHOMA. 

I had no opportunity to observe the conduct of the men during the actual 

engagement except for the crews of small boats which continued re~urnin8 

personnel to their ships in spite of the bombing attacks. The conduct and 

spirit of the men after the engagement I considered excellent. 

Lieutenant E. P. Holmes, Staff of Commander Battleships, wrote as 

follows: 

Early in the morning of December 7, 194 1, I was proc«ding with 

Lieut. Comdr. (Me) A. C. Hohn enroute to Fort Shafter. We o~rved 

OI'I'ICIAL u .s. NAY )· I'HOTOOAArll 

Admi,al Eph,aim P. HoimeJ, USN. 
Appendix A 325 

the sky in the general location of Pearl Harbor to be filled with bursts and 

heard heavy fi ring. 

We decided to proceed to Pearl Harbor and to go to our ship. Enroute we 

~rv('d the firing to continue and at om; point saw a great explcsion in 

or neaf Pearl Harbor which we thought to be an oil lank explosion, but 

which we have come subsequently to believe to have been the explosion 

of the ARIZONA. 

I saw ml!Tlerous groups of airplanes in the sky, but have no knowledge 

of their identity or number, I noted at this time that there was considerable 

cloud-cover over most of Pearl; otherwise dear. 

When wt: arrived in the Yard the fi rst attack was over. I ran to the 

Officers' Club La.ndingi Lieut. Comdr. Hohn stopped near the Fleet Landing to attend to some inju~d men who were just beginning to get ashore. 

At the Landing I saw the OKLAHOMA had turned over. Great fires 

on the surface of the water were burning near the WEST VIRGINIA and 

ARIZONA, completely obscuring the latter. The WEST VIRGINIA was 

already settling low in the water. I jumped in the first boat available, 

ComDesRon One gig, with a junior officer from the CALIFORNIA; left 

him at the CALIFORNIA (he stepped from the boat to the Main Deck of 

the CALIFORNIA) j and proceeded to the MARYLAND, a£tiving at 

about 0840-0850. A lull in the attack occurred at this time and when I 

boarded the MARYLAND. I went to my room to put on some shoes and 

get binoculars, Signal Book and revolver. While there another attack 

started. As soon as I could get out (Main Deck hatches were closed at 

this time), I proceeded to the Signal Bridge, pming over the Boat Deck. 

Somewhere enroute I felt a considerable shock which I thought a near 

miss. In passing across the Boat Deck I noted a large number of empty 

cartridge cases. All hands at the guns seemed to be very tense but coUected 

and determined. 

I remained on the Signal Bridge the rest of the day. Much intermittent 

firing occurred and several groups of Japanese planes were sighted and 

fired at. The planes observed were singie,wing, single-motored types of moderate speed, probably not over 200 m.p.h. at the most. I saw but one that 

gave evidence of being hit in the air. It was over the location of Hickam 

·Field; broke into smoke and appeared to be in difficulty but I did not see 

it crash. 

When the Commander-in·Chief, Pacific Fleet order was received not to 

sortie our bridge passed it by visual. to the PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and 

DETROIT who were underway. When later the order was intercepted for 

all cruisers and destroyers to sortie we made a hoist to all cruisers and 

destroyers to sortie indicating the originator as the Commander-in-Chief, 

Pacific Fleet. 

When the fire was raging in and alongside the WEST VIRGINIA, 

YG17 promptly and without orders put its bow into the fire and pu m~d 
326 Pearl Harbor 

water onto it for hours. The TERN and W IDGEON were ordered by Commander Battleships to assist. Their able work eventually checked the fire. 

At one point in this fire fighting episode a motm whale boat from the 

HONOLULU expended C02 extinguishers in the fire by the WEST 

VIRGIN IA by making reJXated runs along the edge of the fire. Each time 

this was done the sides of the boat broke into flames, which had to be put 

out before the next run. The heat was so intense that the men in the boat 

had to lean way over the unexposed side to prot«t themselves. 

The MARYLAND delivered a heavy All. fire from all AA batteries on 

each occasion of opening up. The 1.1 mounts near the Signal Bridge functioned very well. It is believed, however, that both" these guns and the 

.50 cal. machine guns had a tendency to open fire at too great ranges. 

Th is was caused, no doubt, by eagerness to engage the enemy but should 

be guarded against in the futu re. 

After the WEST VIRGINIA fire had been brought under control, YG1 7 

and the TERN were directed to shift their efforts to the fire burning In the 

ARIZONA. This was done in the forenoon of December 8. During that 

same day the NAVAJO reported to Commander Battleships for orders. 

After determining that the CALIFORNIA did not need her services she 

was likewise ordered to assist in fighting the fire in the ARIZONA. 

The Executive Officer of U.S.S. Tennessee, Commander Colin Campbell, 

wrote as follows: 

At 0800 Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, 1 was at my residence 

in \Vaikiki, Honolulu, T. H., on authorized liberty. At about that time I 

heard what appeared to be gun fire, and which J fi rst thought to be target 

practice of some kind. Shortly after, word came over the radio that Pearl 

Harbor was being attacked by Japanese planes, and all service personnel 

should proceed at once to their stations. I started immediately by automobile 

to Pearl Harbor, but the traffic congestion was such that I did not arrive 

until about 0915. I went to the Officer's Club Landing. Bombing planes were 

still attacking. I was finally able to commander a boat. The TENNESSEE 

was moored inboard of the WEST VIRGINIA at berth F-6. The WEST 

VIRGINIA had been sunk and was on fire. The ARIZONA, about n 

feet astern of the TENNESSEE had been sunk and was on fi re, and oil 

was burning on the water. I landed on Ford Island and about 0940 was 

able to get aboard over a pipe line. I went to the signal bridge and assumed 

command until the arrival of the Captain about 1000. Lieutenant Commander 

J. W. Adams, Jr., who had the head of Department duty, had been in 

command and was on the signal bridge. The stern of the TENNESSEE 

was on fire, and fires were raging on the ARIZONA and WEST VIRGINIA, threatening destruction of this ship. The officers on the bridge 

of the WEST VIRGINIA informed me that her after magazines had 
Appel1dix A 327 

been ood~d, but that effo rts had been mad~ to flood the forward magazin~s, but as th~ s~cond deck was under wat~r y were not sure that th~y 

had succeeded. I told them that their magazi nes must be flooded at all 

costs, as this ship was relatively undamaged and must ~ sav~d, When th~ 

Captain came abOard h~ directed me to go aft and take charge on the 

quart~rdeck, wher~ I remain d practically continuously supervising th~ fir~ 

fighting on this ship and against the oil fi res on the water coming from 

the ARIZONA, until about sundown Tuesday the 9th, by which time 

the oil fires 00 the ARIZONA had been extioguished by this ship aod 

yard tugs, The fires aft on this ship were under cootrol by about 10}0 

Sunday moming, but continued to break out sporad ically for the next 

couple of days due to the intense heat from the ARIZONA oil fires, During 

this time our main engines were run ahead and the wash from h~ propellers very successfully helped wash the buming oil astem, assisted by 

hoses from th is ship. The TENNESSEE was wedged between the sunken 

WEST VIRGIN IA and the forward quay, preventing any movement ahead. 

As long as the intense fires raged on the ARIZONA, the TENNESSEE 

was coostaotiy in danger. 

For me 10 mention the eSp«ially distinguished 'conduct of any particular 

individual would detract from the bravery, calmness, and efficiency of all 

officers and men. The conduct of all hands was su~r , and I am proud 

of every one of them. I cannot help, however, mentioning at this time 

the distinguished conduct of Lieutenant Commander J. W. Adams, Jr. , the 

gunnery officer; and that of Chief Boatswain 1. W . Adkins, who had 

charge of the repair party fighting the fires aft, and whose leadership and 

heroic conduct helped to save the ship by k~ep ing the fires under controL 
APPENDIX B 

Restoration of Unwatered 

Compartments and Machinery 

of Sunken Ships 

U.S. NAVY YARD 

Pearl 	 Harbor. T.H. 

March 14, 1942 

Salvage Bulletin # 14/1.. 

Subject: Restoration of Unwatered Com· 

partments, Damaged Machinery 

and Disposition of Recovered 

Material, Scrap and Trash 

Please" substitute this Salvage Bulletin 

(#14A) for Salvage Bulletin #14, 

dated February 13, 1942, which has been 

revised as a result of further experience 

and the development of additional deaning equipment, improved technique, etc. 

The following is published for the 

information and guidance of all personnel engaged in salvage o~ atiom, especially for the ships' personnel. Jt is hoped 

that a Ix-tter understanding of the problems and procedures involved in such 

operations will be gained thereby. Part I 

will concern itself with general cleaning 

operations around the ship and Part II 

with reconditioning of machinery. 

PART I 

1. Generally speaking, the very minImum amount of material will be reo 

moved from a ship. Prior to decision to 

remove material, careful consideration 

should b\" given to leaving the material 

in place for necessary cleaning, preservation, etc. If it is not considered practicable to carry out these operations with 

the material in place, consideration 

should be given to retaining the material 

on board and the utilizing of the portable 

cleaning and preserving units which are 

being made available. 

2. The material which may be removed falls into the following categories 

and disposition thereof will be made as 

indicated: 

a. Tralh may be defined as material unfit for any further use. It may be 

separated into two types, burnable and 

unburnable, the former including clothing, wood, etc. and the latter brickwork, 

etc. All trash should be thus separated 

and deposited at the Hickam Field dump. 

Ship superintendents will make arrangements regarding shipment of trash as per 

Salvage Bulletin #;. 

b. Scrap denotes all metal fit only 

for remelting. It will be stripped of all 

fittings, separated into ferrous and nonferrous piles and placed in the dump at 

Richardson Recreation Center. 

c. Material damaged and unfit for 

further use should not be brought to the 

Navy Yard fo r decision regarding ultimate disposition. Ships' personnel wi ll 

328 
A.ppendix B ,29 

decide if the material is to be regarded 

as trash or scrap and make the proper 

disposition thereof. 

d. M(llerial, the removal of which 

to the Yard will expedite rep(ljrJ will 

only be. sent to the Yard on job orders. 

Such material will ultimately be returned 

to the ship. This is to be taken to mean 

electrical equipment, damaged machinery, 

instruments and gauges, etc., repair facil ­

ities for wh ich obviously do not exist on 

board. Not to be included in this category is material which is merely water 

soaked or oil coated. Provision has been 

made for cleaning by Yard forces of material that is to be placed in stores and 

reissued to various activities. The arrival 

in the Yard of such equipment oil coated 

or water soaked as bunk springs, lockers, 

chairs, etc. is assume4 to mean that the 

ship from which this e<juipment was sent 

has no further use for same. Ships will, 

therefore, make provision for cleaning 

and reclamation of such material either 

on board or on the beach. Salvage Bulletin #6 is suggested as a reference in th is 

matter. 

e. Delic(lte imtrumentJ that reo 

quire temporary safe storage or routine 

care not available aboard ship. 

f. Material, the removal of which 

will reituce weight in accordance with a 

definite salvage plan or which, by its removal will remove a hazard to salvage 

operations. 

g. Material duly authorized for 

temporary or permanent tlJe e/sewhe,·e. 

3. Before a lower compartment is 

pumped down, oil, if it is present, should 

whenever possible, be skimmed off the 

water. A technique has bec:n dveloped to 

accomplish this. Otherwise, as the water 

lowers, much unnecessary work must be 

done in order to remove the oil which 

will (oat itself as a fine film over all interior surfaces. 

4. Emergency lights and ventilation 

must be provided in good quantity at an 

early date in order to h cilitate work. The 

importance of providing these services 

cannot be too highly stressed. (See Salvage Bulletin #21). Before entering Ut/­

watered wmparlmentJ air Ili/J mflJt be 

mltde 10 del ermine the prnenct of toxic 

gltses and adeqflale venlilation musl be 

supplied while work is being carried on 

in Juch space!. Lives have been lost and 

more will be unless all safety precautions 

are taken before attempting to enter or 

work in unwatered compartments. 

5. The most effective means of removing any fuel oil that may be present 

appears to be by use of a hot salt water 

wash.down, with a Wheeler unit removing the sludge from a "low point in the 

compartment. A hot fresh water washdown is then used to foll ow the salt wa· 

ter wash .down, unti l compartment is 

cleaned to a workable condition. Cleaning 

operation should start as near midship 

as possible and carried out board to prevent excessive tracking through clean 

compartments. In the event there is no oil 

or only light oil present, only hot fresh 

water is to be used. After and during the 

wash·down adequate ventilation must be 

provided, warm dry air being the best. 

The laggi ng and the wiring absorbs large 

quantities of oi l and water and after the 

space is clean personnel are continually 

annoyed by drops. A fter the wires are 

dry they should be scrubbed their entire 

length with a brush and fresh water. 

Then about a day later this operation 

should be repeated to wash off any salt 

crystals that tend to form. See Bulletin 

#24, paragraph (2h) on procedure to 

handle junction boxes. Evaporation and 
330 Pearl Harbor 

plenty of wiping by rags will eventually 

cur~ this. In connection with the usc of 

rags, reference should be made to Manager's Bulletin # 26/ 42. Receptacles 

should he provided on board (or soiled 

rags and sU(h rags brought ashore daily 

for laundering. 

6. "Tectyl" is the trade name of a 

substance ca lled thin fi lm polar compound. It does wonders fo r machinery 

submerged in salt water if the treatment 

is given very soon after the water has 

been lowered. It must not he used on 

d ectrical installation and wiring si nce it 

will make them soft and gummy. It can 

be used on any metal surface. Its action 

it two-fold. First it absorbs the water and 

then covers with a thin protective fi lm. 

It is primarily (or bearing surfaces and 

internal parts of machines like reduction 

gears, blowers, turbines, pumps, etc. Detailed instructions will be furnished by 

the Salvage Planning Officer on request 

since they are too voluminous to be covered here in any but a general manner. 

For large surfaces like boiler or turbine 

casings or firesides of boilers it is recommended that consol light grade be 

sprayed. All hands are again cautioned 

that this can be overdone and some day 

someone wi ll have to remove it. It is recommended that galvanized iron containers of tcctyl in which to dl.fnk gauges 

and small fittings, be provided. This is 

all that need be done, let them dry, no 

breakdown is required . If they were not 

mechanically damaged they will be as 

good as new. 

PART II 

1. It is recommended to Command· 

ing Officers that the enlisted personnel 

engaged in these operations be organized 

into groups of 10 to 12 firemen and machinist mates ratings from both the fi re· 

room and engineroom supervised by a 

Chief Petty Officer or a fi rst class P.O. 

2. The machinery to be reconditioned comprises the main propelling and 

auxiliary machinery and the operations 

pertaini ng to the reconditioning thereof 

will be indicated under separate headings. 

3. Pumps, reciprocating, in both engine and fire rooms: 

a. With a Kerrick Kleener, blast 

off all the fuel oi l. 

b. Clean the pump up externally 

as nearly as possible. 

c. Break the drain on the steam 

cylinder and remove the throttle bonnet. 

d. With the steam hose and hot 

water, wash out steam cylinder and valve 

chest, draining thru the drains. 

e. Hook up the drain and fill the 

steam cyli nder with the necessary amount 

of tectyl- l to 2 gallons, depending on 

the size of the cylinder. 

f. Replace the throttlt! bonnet, 

dost! up the valves; and commence pump· 

ing operations using compressed air, ex· 

hausting at the d rains o r thru the exhaust 

valves, aft er removing the bonnet. Before 

operati ng pump, clean rods and slack off 

on packing to avoid scoring rods. Run the 

pump thus about Y2 hour. All tcetyl must 

be d rained from the cylinder prior to this 

operation. 

g. While the pump is running, 

swab the rod and open the water end of 

the pump with discharge into engine or 

fire room. 

h. After running the pump, reo 

move valve chest from water end and 

wash out thoroughly. 

i. Close up pump and put in 

standby condition, either drying it out 

each day or put it in its regular duties. 
Appendix B 331 

J. These operations completed, be· 

gm testing suction and discharge lines 

to these pumps making sure that every· 

thing is tight. Renew gaskets and repair 

lines where necessary. 

This procedure is to be carried out on 

all pumps. In the case of main circulat· 

ing pumps driven by reciprocating en· 

gines, the procedure is as outlined above. 

Where lubricators are fitted to such en· 

gines, fi ll them with tectyl and lubricate 

the bearings first with tcetyl and then, af· 

ter having rinS(:d out the tectyl, lubricate 

with regular lube oil. All pumps should 

be run at least 1~ to 20 minutes daily 

after having bet=n thus reconditioned. 

4. Pumps, Turbine Driven 

a. External cleaning operations 

are the same as for the reciprocating 

pumps. The water end is to be very thor· 

oughly washed with hot water and lube 

oil replaced by tecry!. 

b. Open the turbine throttle, reo 

moving the throttle ~nnet, and wash the 

casing out thoroughly with hot water. 

c. While the turbine casing is full 

of hot water, jack the turbine over by 

hand and rinse out thorough ly. 

d. Drain the turbine and fill with 

about 2 gallons of tectyl and jack by 

hand for 10 to 1~ minutes. 

e. Connect an air hose to the unit 

and run the turbine and pump assembly 

for about one hour with tectyl in the 

bearings and turbine casing. 

f. Drain the tectyl from the bear· 

ings and replace with lube oil. 

g. Drain the tectyl from the tur· 

bine casing into a bucket and save for 

reclamation or for further use. 

The packing in all pumps should be 

removed at the earliest opportunity. 

Note: In cases where turbines are fitted 

with jacking gear dri"en by an electric 

motor, remove the motor immediately 

and send to the electrical shop for reo 

pairs. Temporarily replace electric 

driven jacking motor with compressed 

air jacking motor. 

5. Turbines, Main Propelling 

a. Remoyc electric motors from 

jacking gear and send to the electrical 

shop for reconditioning as soon as pos. 

sible. J( the motors are in such a condi· 

tion that they cannot readily be repaired 

and replaced, replace with compressed air 

driven motors. 

b. Clean 0l:lt lube system and 

drain tank, pump out all salt water. 

c. Clean out sump tank and after 

removing all salt water, wipe clean with 

kerosene. 

d. Open the complete system in· 

cluding the lube oil coolers and all bypasses and fill the sump tank with fresh 

hot water in which soda has been dis· 

solved to the proportion of 10 pounds of 

soda ash to about ~oo gallons of hot wa· 

ter. Using the regular circulating pump, 

circu late this thru the system fo r 6 to 8 

hours. In the meantime jack the main 

turbines over slowly. 

e. After the procedure in Paragraph d above has been carried out, all 

water will be drained from the system. 

Using an air hose, blast and dry out all 

water that remains. 

f. Have personnel clean out sump 

tank and put enough teetyl in the sump 

tank so that the circulating pump will 

take and hold a suction. Circulate tectyl 

to all bearings thm the enti re lubrication 

systcm and the reduction gears. 

g. All spring bearings and external thrust bearings, if fitted , should be 

flushed out as outlined above, fi rst with 
332 	 Pearl Harbor 

water, then with tectyl, then refilled with 

new lube oil. 

h. Spray all reduction gears and 

inside reduction gear casings with tectyl . 

i. In treating main turbine casings and rotors the procedure is as out· 

lined for smaller units. 

1. Fill up casing with hot fresh 

water to top of shaft and jack rotor for 

2 to 3 hours. 

2. Drain casing and using a 

spray outfit, spray teety! into the casing_ 

The recommended procedure for spraying t«tyl is as follows: 

a. Remove a valve near the 

first inlet to the turbine (usually the 

warming-up valve). 

b. Remove the bonnet of this 

valve, put in a blank flange drilled and 

tappc'd to receive a pipe. 

c. Introduce a pipe into the 

turbine theu this hole. By means of this 

pipe blast 10 to 15 gallons of teetyl into 

the turbine, thus creating a vapor which 

circulates thru the diaphragms and casing. By introducing enough tectyl while 

the turbine is slowly jacked all parts ace 

thoroughly covered with tectyl. When 

this operation is completed, drain al1 tee· 

tyl from the turbine casing. 

j. After all tectyl has been reo 

moved f tom the lube system, wipe down 

the sump tank with kerosene and put in 

enough lube oil so that the lube oil pump 

wi ll take and hold a suction while ci rculating thru the entire engine room lube 

system for approximately 2 to 3 hours. 

Jack the main turbine while circulating 

lube oil thru the system. 

k. While jacking the mai n turbine, two men familiar with the plant 

or two experts should go over all turbine 

and reduct ion gear casings, carefully 

scrutinizing the entire plant for cracks, 

ruptures or misalignments, listening for 

any drones or unusual noises and noting 

if the whole unit turns over as easily as 

usual. Men should be stationed at various 

points to note any unusual conditions 

found. This can best be accomplished 

by the Engineer Officer's Assistant or men 

who are familiar with the operation of 

the plant. 

I. Upon completion of the above 

operations the plant should be in a state 

of operation and regular operating routine established and request for Dock 

Trial be made as soon as practicable. 

m. 	 Reclamation of tectyl. 

1. Put all tectyl used in the operations detailed above into one of the 

ship's lube oil treating tanks that has 

been cleaned beforehand. 

2, Heat the tectyl up to about 

I :50° and pass Ihru a De Laval Separa. 

tor. By this operat ion approximately 60% 

of the teetyl used in cleaning the main 

lubrication system can be reclaimed. 

6. 	 Instruments, Gauges, etc., in 

Engineroom 

a. All gauges in the engineroom 

shou ld be removed, immediately submerged and rinsed thoroughly in a tank 

of hot fres h water. 

b. Dip them in a tank of tectyl , 

al10w to drain, then assemble them in 

boxes and send to the instrument shop. 

c. All electrical instruments in the 

engi neroom such as electrical1y operated 

telegraphs should be removed by elec· 

tricians and sent at Ol1 ce to the electrical 

shop. Do 1101 treat with teetyl. This will 

be taken care of in the electrical shop. 

Do not disassemble units, send to shop 

complete. 

7. 	 Piping, Valves, Condensers, etc. 

a. All steam lines should be gone 

over carefully to discover the presence 
Appendix B 	 333 

of ruptures and damage. A hydrostatic 

test to working pressure should bt: put on 

the lines using only cold water. Do not 

remove lagging at this time. 

b. All lubricating oil lines. firemains, etc. in the engineroom should be 

hydrostatically tested to working pressure. 

c. All main condenser connections 

and the condensers themselves should be 

scrutinized for drainage. If the condenser 

is undamaged it will not be necessary to 

wash it out immediately but as soon as 

possible a 15 pound test should be given 

to the fresh water side and the salt water 

side filled to determine the presence of 

any cracks, leaks or broken gaskets. 

Washing will be done when directed. 

d. All relief valves and other 

large valves should be thoroughly inspected and those found damaged should 

be removed and sent to the shop. 

e. All valves in place should be 

treated with "consol." All working parts 

such as valve stems should be sprayed 

with "consol." Ail valve stem packing 

should be removed as soon as possible 

in the event the system is not to be put 

in operation for some time. 

S. 	Bright Work and Finished 

Surfaces 

a. All bright work and finished 

metal surfaces in the engineroom should 

be thoroughly washed down and cleaned 

with t«tyl. 

9. 	Boilers 

a. A description of the procedures 

used on one damaged destroyer will, it is 

believed, be of value in the reconditioning of boilers damaged by submergence. 

It is presented herewith. This destroyer 

had been on fire for about three days and 

then had been submerged for some time. 

After raising the ship the forward fireroom was found to contain a large .. amount of buckled machinery. soot and 

a great deal of burned cork, etc. All bulkheads, boiler casings, etc., were for the 

first cleaning washed down and cleaned 

with hot fresh water and air hoses. The 

boilers were washed thoroughly inside 

and out, incuding the tubes. All fuel oil 

and debris was removed from the furnaces, tubes and top casings of the boilers. The water in the boiler drums was 

tested and found fresh, obviating the 

necessity for immediate worry about the 

internal condition of the boilers. All casings were wiped down with kerosene and 

all registers, soot blowers and external 

machinery sprayed with "consol" and 

worked until it moved freely. All boiler 

stops, safety valves and other external fit· 

tings were impregnated with "conso)"' 

and put in a state of preservation. After 

the firesides had been thoroughly cleaned 

with fresh water, a wood fire was built 

under the boilers and kept going for 24 

hours. Steam was formed and the air 

cock opened, permitting steam to blow 

f y thm the drum. An examination of 

the brickwork showed that it would not 

be necessary to withdraw any bricks. The 

brickwork was found sound enough to 

permit the ship to proceed under her own 

power to the states. The first consideration in the case of boilers is getting them 

immediately in a state of preservation by 

cleaning the firesides and spraying them 

with "consol." If it is, later deemed 

ne<:essary to remove or repair brickwork, 

this can be done after the fireroom is 

cleared of other work. The boiler having 

been cleaned up and dried out, all blowers, fuel oil pumps, feed pumps and all 

other auxiliary machinery in the fireroom 

were tested. All instruments in the fireroom, most of which had been damaged 
334 Pearl Harbor 

by fire were removed and a list made of 

those which would have to be tempora rily 

or ~rmane nt [y replaced. Boilers were 

then given a hydrostatic lest in accordance 

with M.E.l. The boiier stops were then 

opened and the main steam line to the 

engine bulkhead was testt'd at working 

pressure only, bel:ause of possible damaged gaskets and cold water. This test 

will show up any gaskets that have been 

carried away or any ruptures to the pipe. 

In view of the fact that the ship was 

going back to the states for repairs it was 

not deemed necessary to remove lagging 

from steam lines or boiler drums. It is 

believed that general procedure should 

concern itself with getting the machinery 

in a state of operation and getting the ship 

ready to move. Any removal of lagging 

found necessary can be done at a later date . 

When other matters have been attended 

to the Jagging may if necessary be removed and the piping wire brushed and 

put in a state of preservation. W here 

boilers or other machinery units have 

betn severely damaged, remove al1 lagging as soon as possible so that the extent 

of damage can be ascertained and the unit 

lightened for removal. The forced draft 

blowers in the forward lireroom had 

been damaged by fire and it was found 

necessary to remove them and take them 

apart and clean them. This is especially 

true in the case of the bal1 thrust bearings which had become gummed up. No 

parts had to bc replaced but the assembly 

had to be taken down and cleaned. # 2 

fi reroom had not undergone such intense 

heat as # 1 and thus it was found necessary only to dean the machinery up gen· 

erally with tcetyl. The blowers were run 

by air for several hours and found to be 

in satisfactory condition. Governors and 

overspced trips worked perfectly. One 

boiler at a time was lit off and steam 

raised with boiler stops open to the main 

and auxiliary steam lines. When steam 

pressure was about 100 Ibs. the machinery 

was tried out. It was discovered that in 

certain cases relief valve springs had lost 

their tension and also that the operation 

by steam of certain machinery uncovered 

conditions that had to be rectined. This 

re<juired two to thrtt days. The safety 

vah'es were lifted by steam and were 

found to be in perfect order without 

need of resetting. The main engineroom 

had not been seriously affected by water, 

but had sustained considerable heat. A 

small amounl of damage was repaired. 

The: most important points to be noted 

in the fo regoing are the:;c : 

I. Thc fact that a boiler has been 

submerged is nol prima facie evidence 

that the brickwork has been irreparably 

damaged and must be torn down. The 

immediate need of a boiler is a thorough 

cleaning and drying out and being placed 

in a state of presc[\'ation. 

2. An immed iate cleaning up and 

testing of all boi lers and fi reroom machi nery is the primary consideration on 

unwatering a fireroom. 

3. Lagging and other insulation 

should nol be immediately stripped off 

unless it is believed that it hides damage. 

10. Elcctrical Equipment 

General ill/o rmalion 

a. The electric wiring necessary 

for most jobs now in sight appears to be 

limited to that required to re-establish 

vital circuits. In many cases this involves 

jwnping past damaged areas. A word of 

caution is again necessa ry against blanket 

renewals and unnecessary work. Consult 

wiring diagrams, dry out the wi ring and 

bring up megger readings. Wiring al· 

ways appears to be in worse condition 
Appendix B 335 

than it really is. Discretion must be used 

in cutting cable in damage areas. Never 

make the mistake of chopping off cable 

too short to prevent latcr splicing with 

a junction box thereby necessitating 

costly renewals. As soon as possible sub· 

mit a list to the Salvage Planning Officer 

giving the approximate runs in feet, sizes 

and types required. This is needed in 

order to check avai lable stock and in 

many cases to locate equivalent substitutes. 

b. Elu /rical E'lllipmelll 

c. Main Orjve-See Salvage Bul· 

letin # 24. 

d. lIf%rs and GeneralorJ.- 1t is 

requested that in hand ling electrical Plan ­

ning Officer, Lt. (ig) Darrock, telephone 

425 ', b(' contacted as soon as a space 

is un watered. He will visit the ship an d 

make detailed arrangements on how each 

lot of e<juipment is to be handled. Do not 

dump .this equipment on the yard if it 

is desired to have the job run smoothly. 

Ships can ai d considerably in the task if 

they wi ll compile in advance a list of 

units prior to remov4-1 from the ship with 

the following information. 

1. Ships item Number (E- I , 

E-2, etc.) 

2. Name of motor or use (# 1 

De<k Wind) 

3. Location of motor ( Frame 

46-S on Forecastle Deck or # 8-46-1 

Deck #S.Framc 46---Starboard side.) 

4. Motor Serial No. and name 

plate data . Mark all equipment with 

metal tags, giving the above information. Ships are requested not t~ under· 

take removal of oil from motors, but 

rather to leave this to be done by the 

electrical shop. 

e. Instruments-See paragraph OC. 

f. Switchboards-See Salvage Bul· 

letin # 24, paragraph # ,. It is planned 

to disconnect, remove intact and recondition in the shop all switch board and 

control panels that can be more expeditiously repaired by this method. No wires 

are to be cut, put all nuts back. on the 

studs and carefully mark all leads. There 

will be no general removal of these items 

and each item will be in dividually inspected and scheduled fo r removal by 

the Salvage Machinery Superintendent, 

Lt. Comdr. C. W. Rhodes. 

g. Wiring 

1. Power LeadJ-Give as thorough fresh water wash as is possible. 

Dry by wiping and by drying compartment, and by drying compartments the 

intention is to dry the compartment as 

dryas is possible. No puddles or drip. 

pings can be permitted. Then all wires 

will be scrubbed with fresh water individuall y. Continue this process until no 

more salt forms on the wires or is divested. Do no work on the ends of the 

cable until specifically directed. The first 

step will be to dean ends. Then test with 

low voltage test and submit result to 

officcr in charge of work who will direct 

procedure from there on. 

2. Lighting-The cable and 

spaces will be given the same treatment 

as for power cable. See Salvage Bulletin 

# 24, paragraph 2b. 

3. I.C. Cirm;/J and F.C. Cir­

(uits-Establish a priority on what circuits will be required. Rewiring of 

circuits wi U be done in general as for 

lighting. All telephones (Ship's service, 

battle and sound powcr) will be carefully 

removed, tagged and delivered to the 

instrument shop as each compartment is 

unwatered. There must be no delay III 

th is respect. 

11. Comments and Suggestions 

a. It has been observed that the 
336 Pearl Harbor 

t~ndency is to tear down too much machinery. It is believed that the minimum 

amount of machinery should be torn 

down !lnd the maximum use made of the 

tectyl treatment. Machinery proven to 

be out of line or ruptured may have to 

be torn down for repairs. Machinery that 

shows no signs of damage other than 

submergence can readily be rttlaimed 

with tectyl and made to continue in seryice indefinitely. It may be necessary at 

some future date to replace packing or 

do minor repairs. 

h. Plans should be made well in 

advance to procure a plentiful supply of 

stc:am. It may be necessary to install a 

stationary or portable boiler on board or 

alongside the ship to give a steam supply 

at about #130; 10 to U portable water 

heaters such as ha\'e b«n bui lt up by the 

pipe shop at the Navy Yard should also 

be secured. 

c. For mixing operations preparatory to washing down bulkheads, use 

steam and hot water in a :50-:50 proportion and get close to the bulkhead and 

remove all mud and fuel oil. For wash· 

ing out machinery and boilers an ample 

supply of hot fresh water is necessary. 

Final cleaning is best done using steam 

cleaners. These should be assembled 

ahead of time and also obtain sufficient 

cleaning compound. 

d. Numerous air hoses should be 

provided, 2 to 3 for each engineroom, 

especially the larger size in order to 

secure the necessary VOlume' of air to jack 

over and operate all pumps and machinery. 

e. Battleships should have a supply of about 1,000 ga ls. of tectyl and 300 

gals. of "consol" on board. Provision 

should be made for reclaiming tectyl. 

lube oil treating tanks should be cleaned 

out and De Laval Separators se(Uced as 

soon as possible and a place to run the oil 

separated from the tectyl; 60 to 700/0 of 

the tectyl used can thus be reclaimed. Since 

this compound is bard to secure in this area 

and costs about $3.00 per gallon it is 

advisable to reclaim as much as possible. 

No amount of tectyl no matter how small 

should be discarded without some attempt at reclaiming part of it. In using 

teetyl the p resence of open flames should 

be avoided and adequate ventilation in 

compartments where teetyl is being used 

should be supplied. 

f. In organizing the personnel, it 

is recommended that they be given a lectUfe on the procedure, explaining the 

advantage of teetyl in getting machinC'cy 

again in operation without tearing it 

down. 

H. N. WALLIN. 

cc: Comdt. 

Mgr. 

Plan. Off. 


Prod. Off. 


PubWksOff. 


Hull Supt. 


Mach. Supt. 


e. O.Ships 


Ship SupiS. 


Lt-Comde. Rodgers 


Conf. Files 


All Salvo Officers 


PHR&S Unit (2:5) 

APPENDIX C 

Gas Hazard and Protection 


Against Gas 


February 14, 1942 

Salvage Bulletin # I) 

Subject: Hazard from Gas on Ships Under Salvage-Protection Against 

1. lethal concentrations of gas have 

been found on the NEVADA, CALIFORNIA, and UTAH and fatalities have 

resulted on the first ship named. A very 

careful inspection, study and analysis 

has been made in the case of the N EVADA by lieut.-Comdr. C. M. Parker, 

(M.C.) USN, who has submitted the 

following memorandum to the Salvage 

Officer: 

The following observations were 

made on the U.S.S. NEVADA on the 

7th of February, 1942 and subsequent 

days. They are quoted together with 

opinion for your consideration. 

On boarding the ship the odor of 

Hydrogen Sulfide was detected and on 

going below de<ks concentration ap· 

peared to be heavier. On analysis the 

gas on the lirst three decks was in a 

range from 40 to about 100 parts per 

million. 

In the trunk (where a disaster took 

place) at the level of the third deck 

a sample of the gas showed the following: Hydrogen Sulfide 400 parts 

per million, and a trace of Carbon 

Dioxide. 

About the 10th of February a sampIe of air taken from the compartment forward opening into the trunk, 

below the third deck was taken and 

the analysis showed in excess of 1000 

parts per mi llion. At this time no 

carbon dioxide was found in any compartment of the ship. 

Sampling with lead acetate paper as 

an indicator was continued. Only when 

the compartments were considered safe, 

were men allowed to go in them. 

The method used to free spaces of 

Hydrogen Sulfide was: suction blowers 

as near water level as possible, which 

pulled the gas from the compartments 

and deposited it over the side within 

a few inches of the water. This method of ventilation is being continued. 

The properties of Hydrogen Sulfide 

are relatively as (ollows: colorless, 

heavier than air, and at a low concentration it has the odor of a rotten 

egg, whi le at a high concentration it 

has a sweetish odor. However, at the 

higher concentration the nerves of 

smell in the noso are paralyzed rather 

quickly so that usually no odor is 

perceptable. 

The maximum quantity of gas in the 

air considered safe for people to work 

in is 20 parts per million. The latest 

authorities state the concentration of 

700 parts per million is sufficient to 

cause death in a short time, where as, 

337 
llB 

a concentration of 1000 parts per million may cau~ death instantaneously. 

&tween these two concentrations varying effects may be noted, depending 

upon the concentration. 

The symptoms are: irritation of the 

mucous membrane, of the eyes, nose, 

and the respiratory track, burning of 

the throat, and the general signs of a 

cold or a bronchitis, headaches and 

d izziness, gastro intestinal disturbances, 

easy fatigability, a slow pulse, irritabil· 

ity, certain physic disorders as temporary inability to concentrate, and 

that, all in feeling. 

My conclusions at the early point in 

the study make it seem advisable to 

take the following precautions. Men 

going into a ship with water in the 

compartments for the purpose of openiog hatches, and other necessary work 

in conjunction with salvage should 

only enter with oxyg~n rescue apparatus or a fac~ plate r~ceiv ing its air 

from outsid~ the ship. Di v~ s of 

course r~ weB prot&t~d. After these 

compartm~nts are fr ~d of wat~r, suction ventilation should be instituted. 

Tests then must be made, befor~ n 

ar~ allowed to entN these compartm~nts. This process must be continued 

for tach compartment, on each deck. 

Tests should be supervised by someone fami liar with this gas and possibly 

ot ~r gases is advised. 

2. On 13 February 1942, COMTRAINRON SIX arranged fo r Lieut.­

Comdr. Pa rk~r to give a lecture on this 

subject to'as many of the officers attached 

to Ships in Ord inary as could be spared. 

This lecture was of great interest and 

caused everyone present to appreciate the 

seriousness of the hazard which is cer · 

tain to be encountered on all ships where 

salvage operations are being conducted. 

It was decided that the Ship Superintendent of each ship would be responsible 

for seeing that proper procedure and pro· 

tection is carried out in connection with 

the gas hazard, and that he would co· 

operate closely with the personnel to be 

trained to make tests, etc., by Lieut. 

Comdr. Parker. 

3. All officers of the Sah'age Division 

are being furnish~d a copy of th is Bulle· 

tin and are instructed to take special care 

with respect to the gas hazard as dis· 

cuss~d in Dr. Parker's memorandum. 

They will take such steps as are neces· 

sary to assure themselves that they send 

no men unprotected into compartments 

except thos~ known to be safe. The nature of the hazard and the precautions to 

be taken should be made clear to all 

civilian workers who are assisting with 

salvage operations, whether th~y be Navy 

Yard orkm~n or Contractor's men. 

4. Arrangements are being made for 

Dr. Parker to lecture to officers of the 

Salvage D ivision at an early date. 

cc: Comdt. 

Mgr. 

Safley Eng. 

COMTRAINRON SIX 

All Salvo Off. 

Lt.-Comdr. Parker 

H. N. W .... LLlN 

Captain , U.S. Navy 
APPENDIX D 

Electric-Drive Machinery 

of Battleships 

U.S, NAvY YARD 

Pearl Harbor, T.H. 

March 4. 1942 

Salvage Bulletin #24 

Subject : 	Outline of Reconditioning Procedure fo r Main Electric-Drive 

Machinery- U.S.S. CALIFORNIA 

I. There follows an outline of proce· 

dure for reconditioning of mai n electric 

units on the CALIFORNIA. This procedure has bt=en worked up by Lieutenant 

Commander McNally, Salvage Planning 

Officer, who has discussed the problem 

with numerous persons including some 

connected with the General Electric Company and the Westinghouse Company. 

Also, the procedure is based on actual 

experience and results in the case of electric motors, wifing and instruments heretofore salvaged and reconditioned. As 

further experience is obtained, this procedure will be modified to insur~ ~tter 

r~sults and to improve faulty practices. 

.Suggestions for improvem~nt win be welcomed, and should b~ turn~d in direct 

to Lieutenant Commander McNally. 

2. General Proccdur~s fo r Mai n Motor 

Spaces, Main Engine Room, Boiler Room, 

Control Room. 

a. Before any uncover ing is done, 

skim all oil from surf c~ of the water. 

b. Rig exhaust ventilation. 

c. Imm~diatdy on unwatering, wash 

down with hot fresh water . 

d. Sufficien t working fo rce must be 

on hand to-wipe and dry down thoroughly. This is fa r more importlnt than on 

a steam drive installation. No puddles 

can ~ allowed since this will keep the 

air saturated and prevent drying of d ectrical equipment. 

e. Rig temporary lighting. Do not 

attempt to bri ng back ship's circuit at this 

time. To do 50 will slow down work. 

Remove al! elC{'tric meters carefully; do 

not (ut wires; save sC{'uri ng nuts. After 

proper tagging, immediately deliver them 

to the instrument shop of the Navy Yard. 

Segregate meters from the same board 

or same piece of machinery in wooden 

boxes as this will tend to keep records 

straight and avoid damage in transportation. 

f. Remove al! steam gauges, fl ush 

out with fresh water and then Rush out 

with "tecty!." Then after proper tagging 

deliver to the instrument shop in wooden 

boxes similar to the onC'S used for the 

e!ectrical instruments. 

g. RemovC' all electric motors as fast 

as they are uncovC'red, flush them out 

with fresh water and deliver to electric 

shop in accordancC' with procedure already established by the Electric Salvage 

Planning Officer, Lieutenant (jg) J. W_ 

Darroch. 

339 
340 Pearl Harbor 

h. When compartments and wires 

have 1>«:0 thorciughly dried, start reviving circuits. Do not remove junction 

boxes, fittings, tte. unless directed. First 

wash junction boxes and switches out 

thoroughly with hot fresh water in place 

and then dry by air blast; use alcohol or 

carbon tetrachloride in small amounts 

taking necessary precautions when using. 

Inside littings of boxes will require removaL After cleaning prior to replacement of the fittings the inside of the box 

should be given a coat of air drying in ­

sulating varnish. As soon as you are 

ready, run temporary dectric power 

source to the nearest feeder or distribution box and work out from there, c1t'aning and ringing out and relamping citcuits as you go. 

3. Main Moton . 

a. Immediately remove ventilation 

motors and di!>Connect panels and send 

to the electric shop for reconditioning as 

they will be ~uired just as soon as they 

can be restored. 

b. Connect fresh water up to the 

fire extinguishing spray and thoroughly 

wash motors with fresh water for approximately four hours, rotating motors 

if it can be done; detailed instructions in 

this respect will be given as work 

progresses. 

c. Connect steam up to motor 

steam heating service. 

d. Make or use blanks for end bells 

if available aboard so that motor casings 

can be used as its own leaching tank. 

Work into design at least one electric 

motor driven outboard motor propeller 

and arrange leads for maximum circula· 

tion of warm fresh water. During first 

24 hours use "Aerosal" in the water. 

Salvage Planning will specify the amount. 

Take salinity readings of the raw Rushing 

water and the discharge. When these 

readings have equalized at about the 

eighth day, con~inue flushing for one 

more day. 

e. Then remove water and heat 

motor by steam coils and dry by ventila· 

tion. Install cargocaire units in each motor 

room and maintain rooms in as dry a condition as possible. segregating from the 

rest of the ship. 

f. When satisfied that motors are 

sufficiently dry, ring out circuits and 

watch megger readings. If readings do 

not come up it will be necessary to pull 

rotors and use alcohol for clean ing and 

use glyptol where necessary for patching. 

In order 10 prevent local short circuit 

currents every stay bolt that holds the 

laminations will have to be rung and 

insulation tubes and washers renewed as 

necessary. Detailed instructions at this 

point will be given by Salvage Planning. 

At this point also additional drying might 

be gained by use of the generator wiring 

itself by blocking the rotor or use of 

windings themselves. Detailed instructions will be issued by Planni ng. Dielectric lest will be made. specific instructions 

will be issued by Planning. 

4. Main Generators- The same gen· 

eral principles will be applied to these 

as for the motors. The generato rs should 

be uncoupled in order to permit the reo 

conditioning of the turbine end at the 

same time. It will probably be more diffi ­

cult to make the generators their own 

leaching tank but it can be done and 

templates should be taken for preliminary 

work prepared from drawings in order 

not to delay operation on unwatering. 

). Control Room and SwitchboardsIt cannot be too strongly emphasized that 

after the first fresh water wash-down 

these spaces and ~uipment must be thor­
Appendix D 	 341 

oughly dried down and cargocaire units 

installed. Open all switches and ring 

through all circuits and re<:ord. This will 

provide the record of the worst condition. 

Then proceed to strip boards completely 

and thoroughly clean the board and fixtures and reassemble board. At the same 

time ring through again all cable when 

dear of the board and record. This is 

done in order to determine what percentage of the ground was at the board itself. 

Then clean aU cable ends, carefully dry· 

ing ends. When thoroughly dry paint 

with glyptol to seal ends. At this stage do 

not be impatient since all air in the compartments must be dry before the cables 

start to dry and glyptol should not be 

used unti l absolutely dry. Ring through 

and if not drar, report to Planning for 

detai led instructions. Dielectric test wi ll 

be specified by Planning on cables when 

specifically ordered by Planning after 

study of readings and results. 

6. Experience in reconditioning of 

steam and smaller electrical machinery 

procedure has already been developed to 

a point that detailed discussion is not 

ne<:essary in this Bulletin. Attention is 

invited to Salvage Bulletin No. 14 which 

has much valuable information. 

7. EX'perience has already shown that 

a very high percentage of electric motors 

and electric instruments can be reconditioned and put back into srrv ice if: 

a. Instruments are handled '1uirkl, 

after being uncovered, $0 that fine parts 

are not subjected to progressive corrosion. 

b. Motors and generators are handled quickly. Note that no windings 

should he subjected to megger tests until 

they are dried OHI,- otherwise the insulation may be destroyed by the teIt. 

H. 	N. WALLIN 

Captain, USN . 

cc: Comdt. 


Capt. Yard 


Mgr. 


Peod.Off. (5) 


Salvo Plan. Off. (5) 


e.O. CALIFORNIA (10) 


All Salv. Off. 


File 

APPENDIX E 


The Salvage of U.S.S. West Virginia 


U.S. NAVY YARD 


Pearl Harbor, T.H. 


C~L1 -1 BB4 Se r. 0116 1 

June l~. 1942. 

From: The Salvage Officer. 

To: T he Commandant, Navy 

Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H. 

Subject: USS W EST VIRGINIA, Report of Salvage of. 

Reference: a. Salvaging of the USS 

WEST VIRGINIAReport of progress, March 

16, 1942. 

b. 5ah'age Bulletin # 38, May 

26, .1942. 

c. 	Salvage Bulleti n #40, May 

30, 1942. 

d. Salvage Bulletin #42, 

June ~, 1942. 

1. The USS WEST VIRGINIA was 

Roated on May 17, 194 2, and placed in 

Drydock #1 on 9 June 1942. The draft 

was 33 feet forward and 33 feel 5 inches 

aft, and the ship was app oximatel~' on 

an even keel. In order to clear the dock· 

ing blocks in Drydock # I at least one 

foot it was necessary to cui their height 

down to 33 inches. 

2. Orig;lIId ConditiOIl of the Ship: The 

WEST VIRG INIA was sunk and rested 

on the ha rd bottom in the outboard berth 

of F6, with a list of about three degrees 

to port. The d raft was 50 feet 6 inches 

forward and 40 feet 10 inches aft. Ex· 

ploratory work by divers had revealed 

very extensive damage in the midship 

area, port side. In addition, divers had 

found that the rudder had been knocked 

off and was lyi ng on the bottom, and that 

the steering engine room was considerably damaged. A serious oil fire had 

burned on the W EST VIRGINIA for 

about thirty hours following the December 7th attack, and had caused extensi ve 

damage throughout the ship. For about 

three quarters of the length of the ship 

ali of the deck plating above the second 

deck and some of the bulkheading was 

seriously buckled from the heat. At the 

time of the attack on December 7th, the 

ship had on board approximately seventy 

percent of its capaci ty of fuel oil and was 

full y loaded with fresh provisions and 

meat. The records of the WEST VIR· 

GINIA indicated that there were approximately seventy bodies on board the \·essel. 

3. Scheme of Sa/flage: In view of the 

divers' fi ndings that at least three tor· 

pedoes had struck the shi p in the midship 

area alone it was deemed likely that the 

torpedo protection had been seriously 

ruptured. Further, it W3$ found that the 

hul! structure above the armor belt in Ihis 

area was very extensively damaged. The 

ship had reported that torpedoes struck 

in this area after th~ vessel was listed 20­

30 degrees to port. 

4. In view of the nature and extent of 

342 
Appendix E 343 

the damage to the WEST VIRGINIA it 

was apparent that the ship could not be 

raised without the use of patches to shut 

off the inflow of water . It was therefore 

decided to install one large cofferdamtype of patch in the midship area, frame 

6t Yr97Y2 ' This completely covered the 

damage resulting from torpedoes and 

bombs striking in this area both below 

and above the armor belt_ Also, a similar patch, it was decided, would be installed over the forward torpedo hit, at 

frame 43- n. In the case of the torpedo 

hit in way of the rudder and steering 

gear room it was decided to isolate this 

area by watertight doors and to uti lize air 

pressure if necessary to reduce the amount 

of flooding_ The salvage scheme adopted 

and carried through 9o'a5 therefore as 

follows: 

a. Install a cofferdam patch over torpedo damage on the port side at frame 

43-'2. 

b. Install a cofferdam patch over the 

damage to midship area, port side, frame 

61Yr97Y2_ 

(. Isolate ste-ering engi ne room area 

by watertight doors. 

d. Pump out the \'essel, using about 

ten large pwnps ( t o") to gain control 

of the inflow of the water. 

e. After gaining control, stop off 

leaks into the hull and improve tightness 

of patches, watertight doors, watertight 

covers, etc. 

f. Apply air preuure to tanks and 

voids on the port side to empty or partially empty those that were ruptured. 

g. Pump out all intact tanks and 

voids on the port side and empty starboard tanks and voids corresrwndingly. 

h. Apply ai r pressll ~ to fl ooded 

areas aft in order to r~du f! the amOlmt 

of water in those areas. 

i. Remove all weight possible, such 

as water, oil, stores, provisions, meat, ammunition, personal belongings, furnitur~, 

tush, eckag~, etc. 

). The above scheme of salvage was 

carried out as planned, but somewhat 

further than contf!mplated in th~ matter 

of w~ig t removals in order to f!duc~ 

the draft sufficiently to get the vessel in 

Drydock # 1. The original intent was to 

place the vessel in Drydock #2 (which 

has 42 feet of water over the blocks at 

mean low water) as soon as the dock was 

vacat~d by the CALIFORNIA. However, 

the military situation required that Drydod: # 2 be kept available, except for 

very short intervals, in order that major 

vess~ s damaged in action could be ~x· 

peditiously handled. For this reason the 

progress of salvage operations in the 

later stages called for e"ery possiblf! 

means to reduc~ the draft to permit dry. 

docking in # I,-even contemplating, if· 

necessary, some delay in docking in order 

to attain a suitable draft to accomplish 

this ~nd. This decision was made despite 

the fact that it was fully recognized that 

the WEST VIRGINIA was very vu lner· 

able to sinking or e\'en to capsizing in 

case of refloodi ng because of failure of 

th~ large p:ltch due either to injury from 

coll ision, :lir attack by the enCffiY. or v~n 

from weakening due to Teredo attack. 

6. Dt/ign 0/ Cofferdam Patch: The 

Nilvy was v~ry fortunate to have had 

available at Pea rl Harbor the personnel 

and equipment of the Pacine Br dg~ 

Company, contractors for new drydocks, 

new bomb-proof powerhouse, etc. This 

company is very experienced in cofferdam 

work and has been <juick to adapt their 

practices and experience to ship salvage 

requirements. With the co -operation of 

various offi cers of the Salvage Division of 
)44 Pearl Hal 

the Navy Yard, the Paci6c Bridge Com· 

pany worked up the detailed design of 

the cofferdam patches for the WEST 

VIRGINIA . A print showing the general 

design will be forwarded to the Depart. 

ment by the Commandant of the Navy 

Vard together with progress photographs 

of the installation of the patches. Suffice 

it to state here that the patch is made up 

in se<tions of about B Y2 feet long. Each 

section is about 50 fed in height and is 

made up of sled, wood and concrete. The 

patch 6tends down from above the exist· 

ing water line to below the turn of the 

bilge. At the bottom point it takes a 

right.angled turn SO that it extends under 

the bottom and is pulled up snuggly 

against the bottom. The end sections of 

each patch Irc shaped to fit in snuggly 

against the damaged shell. The patch is 

planked vertically with four inch material. 

The net clearance between the armor and 

the inside of the patch is about eighteen 

inches. 

7. In order to eliminate shoring below 

the armor belt each section has three steel 

vertical strength m.:mbers. Th.:se u.: 

twenty-four inch "I" be2ms running vertically about twenty fed to a point just 

above the low.:r edg.: of the armor bdl. 

On .:ach be2m a bracket is wddf!d and 

this bracket takes up on the und.:rside of 

th.: armor bdt to tak.: the upward thrust. 

Th.:re at.: ten wooden str.:ngth members 

(wales) running fore and aft; thes.: are 

12" X 14" timb.:rs. Thtsf! m.:mbers ar.: 

shored directly to the armor on fou r (oot 

six inch c.:nt.:tS and above the armor to 

special steel m.:mbers resting on the 

armor bf!1t. 

8. Imlalla/ion 0/ $lCliom oj. Pauhn: 

Th.: thirteen and one half foot sections 

of the coff.:rdam patches w.:re install.:d 

one al a time on a schedule calling for 

one to be installed each day. Slight neg.a.­

tive bouyancy was obtained by placing a 

lead weight in an angl.: bar frame at· 

tached to the outside near the bottom of 

.:~ch section. This lead weight was removed when the section was in place and 

used for the next section . .All of the 

installation work was handled with the 

assistance of the Pacific Bridge Company 

divers, who did a masterful job of 

properly securing the sections and subsequently making them relativdy water· 

tight. 

9. The sections were .secured to the 

hull by means of four horizontal rows 

of steel hook bolts. Holes were burned 

into the hull with an underwater glS 

torch for insertion of the bolts. The outer 

end was passed through the patch struc· 

ture and was drawn up snug against the 

side by large butterfly nuts on the 

threaded outer .:nds of th.: bolts. Proper 

distancing of .:ach section from th.: hull 

was maintained by th.: r~uired structural 

shoring between the hull and the wales 

of th.: section. Many of these shores 

(about 18 to 24 inches long) took up 

against the armor btlt. These shores 

varif!"d inasmuch as th.: armor belt had 

been displac.:d as much as fourteen inches 

from th.: original molded lines. Installing 

the patch in rdativdy narrow sections 

( eleven joints in the larg.: patch) allowed the patch to follow both the lines 

of the ship and curvature due to damage. 

10. The armor belt was found to be 

badly ask.:w but nevertheless furnished 

excellent backing for shores. The chief 

difficulty in shoring was to find suilabl.: 

structure above th.: armor belt in the 

midship area to shore agai nst.- Ihis for 

th.: r.:uon ~at all of th.: hull plating in 

me midship area ahov.: th.: armor belt 

was missing or badly wrecked. Shell plat­
Appendix E 34) 

iog that had been blown out was removed 

previously by underwater cutting. An "ingenious scheme for shoring in th is area 

was devised by ~tt ing ten inch "H" 

beams vertical1y on end on lOp of the 

umor with the lower end of the beam 

kept flush with the outer edge of the 

armor by means vf heavy angle bars 

which were welded to the "H" beams 

but not to the armor. A hook bolt was 

fastened by divers back of the armor. 

Above the water's edge the " H" beams 

we~ backed by steel sha~s which acted 

as struts between the "H" beams and 

the structure of the ship. These vertical 

members were tied together fore and aft 

by welded angles and channels. When 

thus secured and spa((:d about every eight 

fed they furnished a very substantial 

means against which to shore s«tions of 

the patch to take the pressure as the water 

was pumped down. 

II. The joints betw n the patches 

were made tight by using old rubber 

hoses for gaskets and by drawing up the 

adjoining sections by means of threaded 

bolts run through lugs on each sect ion. 

These were spaced vertically about every 

three feet. 

IZ. Use of Concrete in the Pdtrhc1; 

The forward patch consisted of three 

sections and the after patch of eleven 

S«tions. After these sections were all in· 

stalled, the next operation was the pouring of concrete, which was required to 

seal off the patch along the bottom and 

take the bottom reaction of the steel 

structural members and at each end. The 

concrete was of a rich mixture (about 

one cement to three and one half aggregate) and was mixed on a barge on 

which had been installed a contractor's 

cement mixing plant. The crawler crane 

which was also on the barge handled the 

two yard buckets to t.ransfer the concrete 

from the mixer to the hopper feeding 

down into the patch. Concrete was 

poured, of course, underwater by the 

Tremie process used by the contractor in 

drydock construction; ten inch Tremie 

pipes were placed at about ten foot intervals. The concrete was installed about 

four feet deep along the bottom of the 

patch {or its whole length and the ends 

of the patch had a fore and aft thickness 

of fou r feet. The total amount of concrete used in both patches was 325 cubic 

yards or about 6'50 tons. 

13. In order to take the weight of the 

sections in drydock after the water had 

been pumped down there were two 1­

'/.i'" st~1 rods running vertically from 

each twenty-four inch "I" beam (six 

rods for each section) at the bottom of 

the patch to an angle iron welded between the vertical " H" beams or to the 

sh ip·s plating where it was intact. In 

order to provide access (or divers into 

the patch, doors were fitted,---()ne on the 

three section patch and four on the eleven 

section patch. After concrete was poured 

and all shoring completed the doors were 

secured . 

14. UnwaJer;ng of the Ship: As in the 

case of the CALIFORNIA, the pump 

capacity which was installed was more 

than adequate for the estimated inflow of 

water. The 440 volt electric Pomona and 

Peerless deep-well pumps ( 10") and 

several Jaeger 10" gasoline pumps were 

used, a total of nine. Two deep-well 

pumps were installed in the large patch 

and one in the small patch. In the later 

stages these were changed from electric 

to diesel · driven in order to have them 

operative on the trip to the drydock. 

1'5. Before the patches were installed 

considerable pumping was done to circu­
346 Pearl Harbo r 

late w.ater through the ship for the purpose 

of removing water long stagnant,-together with gas (H!S) contained therein. 

}'Il mai n watertight doors and hatches 

were opened in order to insure free fl.ow 

of water throughout the main spaces of 

the ship. Also, a number of the pump 

suctions were set at low levels, in trunks 

and other areas to which various compartments could be drained. For instance, onc 

deep-well suction was set: in D-1 17 

through a hole burned through the first 

platform deck with an underwater cutting 

torch. Drainage holes were burned 

through the shaft alley bulkheads so that 

water from boiler rooms and other spaces 

CQuid drain to the pump through the 

main drain manifolds. 

16. Two stages of pumping were considered; fi rst to unwater the third deck 

by mass pumping and second to unwater 

individual compartments either by direct 

pumping or through the ship's drainage 

systems. Due to extensive damage to the 

third deck bulkheads in way of the 

patches there was little if any watertight 

integrity down to the third deck and the 

water in the patch had to be lowered to 

this level before the third deck could be 

made dry. 

17, As soon as the patches were con· 

si dered reasonably tight the unwatering 

of the ship was comm nced,~ ay 12, 

1942. The water level within the ship 

and patches was rapidly reduced four or 

five feet, bUI at this point the inflow al· 

most equalled the pumping capacity. 11lis 

difference in head, however, showed up 

at points of inflow, and it was a matter of 

a day or two for the divers to find the 

larger leaks in the patches, through open 

ports, etc., and to remedy them. Continuo 

ous effort was devoted to improving the 

watertightness of the patches and of stop· 

ping off leaks through holes in the ship. 

Much of the leakage was not in the patch 

itself but through damage in the areas 

contiguous to the patches, open seams, 

shrapnd holes, loose rivets, scuppers, etc. 

As the points of inflow were taken care 

of the water level within the ship was 

re,duced rapidly and the ship came afloat 

on 17 May 1942. 

18. After the third deck was uncovered 

a number of small Barns (3") pumps 

were connected up to the various store· 

rooms and small compartments. Pumping 

out of the lower compartments continued 

unabated until the ship was ready for 

drydock . The unwatering of these lower 

spaces has proved most difficult and slows 

the unwatering of the ship, principally 

fo r the reason that the spaces cannot be 

drained to other areas, and small pump 

suction must be brought to each indio 

vidual compartment. 

19. Removal of Oil: There was a very 

large quantity of f tee oil within the 

WEST VIRGINIA and early steps were 

taken to remove the same prior 10 reducing the water level. A fl oating Wheeler 

System took suction in \'arious places 

throughout the upper decks and spaces 

on the WEST VIRGIN IA and was oper· 

ated continuously for four or fi ve weeks 

before the ship pumping was commenced. 

Th is resul ted in removal of most of the 

fuel oil in the ship as a result of which 

there was considerably Jess oil nuisance 

on the decks and bulkheads as the ship 

was pumped down. In the later stages 

of pumping an additional Wheeler System was instaJied on the quarter deck to 

assist in the removal of oil from lower 

spaces such as engine room bilges, boi ler 

rooms, etc. About 40,000 ga llons of loose 

oil were removed by the Wheeler System. 

20. During salvage work. about 800,­
Appendix E 	 347 

000 gallons of oil were removed from 

the oil tanks of the ship. The oil from 

the tanks was pumped into fuel oil 

barges by use of the WEST VIRGIN IA'S 

fuel oil transfer pumps operated by air. 

In many cases air pressure was applied to 

the tops of the tanks in order to assist 

the pumps. In order to keep the ship 

, 	 approximately on an even keel no oil or 

water was removed from the starboard 

tanks Or voids unless a corresponding 

amount had been taken from the port 

side, in the emptying of ta nks and voids. 

When it became necessary to lessen the 

draft of the ship to a point permitting 

the docking in Drydock # 1 it was n~ces · 

sary to reduce the amount of oil or water 

in damaged areas to the very minimum. 

The pumping arrangement was such that 

spaces on the port side which were open 

to the sea through side damage were 

drained outboard into the patches and 

picked up by the pumps which took suc· 

tion from near the bottom of the patches. 

In order to reduce the water level in 

such spaces the pump suctions were 

finally set down to within about four 

inches of the concrete in the bottom of 

the patches. Inasmuch as some flooding 

of tanks and voids was through the bottom of the ship or through holes in 

bulkheads near the tops of these spaces 

it was apparent that such areas would not 

drain. In order to reduce their water level 

a combination of air pressure and indivi dual pumps was utilized. The air pressure was used to force the water out of 

the holes which permitted flooding 

through the bottom of the ship. Pump 

suctions (3") were USed to remove water 

which would not drain into the patches; 

air pressure was oftentimes used to assist 

the pumps. 

21. Hazard of Capsizing: Due to the 

fact that no drydock was available when 

the ship was fully afloat there came to 

exist a hazard that certain events might 

cause resinking of the ship and possible 

capsizing. The possibility of capsizing in 

the case of failure of the large patch 

(which might occur in caSe of an air 

attack) was clearly r«ognized. As the 

ship rose higher and higher this condition was accentuated, due primarily to 

the fact that the whole midship area of 

the port side above the armor belt was 

entirely open, and the decks down to 

and includ ing the second deck were col· 

lapsed. Watertight doors and hatches in 

this area were useless, and fore and aft 

of this area most of them were required 

to be open for the passage of suction 

hoses, air hoses, light leads, steam leads, 

etc. However, an air-raid biU was worked 

up to insure that as many watertight 

doers and hatches as possible would be 

closed in the eve-nt of such an emergency. 

Several other precautions were taken, 

such as: (a) construction of two seam 

patches and one- section patch to be .. available on the crane barge for placing 

over ruptures in the cofferdam patches, 

and (b) having available for counterfl oodi ng eight to ten voids on the starboard side with men assigned for the 

<Juiek operation of sea valves. Fortunately 

the air raid which might have occurred 

was stopped off at Midway and none of 

the- precautions were actuaHy n«essary. 

22. Emptying of Double Bollom 

Tank I, etc- Fresh water tanks, innerbottom tanks, etc., were emptied by use of 

ship·s pumps operated by air. It was the 

general rule to operate ship's pumps and 

ship's facilities to the maximwn possible 

extent with air in lieu of steam, 

23. RemOVdI of Ammlmit;Ol1: All ammunition was removed from the ship and 
;48 Pearl Harbor 

most of the ordnance: stores. The ship's 

force handled the removal of ammunition 

unusually wc:jI. Sixteen-inch shells were 

hoisted by the barge crane through the 

top of the turrets in the case of the upper 

stowages; the shells from the handling 

rooms were hoisted through the ammunition handli,ng hatches. The five-i nch 

shells were brought up by the regular 

ammunition hoists operated by air drills 

(corner type); in the later stages '5"/2' 

shells were passed by hand. Powder and 

ordnance gear were hoisted through the 

various hatches by means of sma!! air 

driven winches (tuggers) installed on the 

topside. 

24. Removal of Areal: Considerable 

apprehension was felt over handling approximatdy 70 tons of meat which was 

assumed to be in a bad state of decomposition. Some thought was given to 

pumping water at high pressure thrbugh 

the meat rooms so that the meat would 

be taken up by the water and discharged 

through a 10" pipe over the side. A 

modified arrangement of this kind was 

tried and although it did not prove 

wholly effective it reduced the odor (a 

disagreeable part of the task) to a point 

which was quite acceptable. The meat 

itself after being flushed with water had 

the appearance of ashes and its texture 

shreddy. This was shoveled up and 

placed in ten gallon cans (gas mask containers) and hoisted by air winches to 

the quarter deck and dumped into the 

garbage lighter alongside. All in all the 

removal of decayed meat and dairy products was not really so disagreeable as was 

anticipated. 

25. Removal of Storn: Small air 

driven winches were used to hoist canned 

goods, flour, etc., to the weather decks. 

These materials were then loaded on 

wheel barrows and dumped into the lighters alongside. The canteen stores and 

flour were most unpleasant to handle and 

it was necessary for the men working in 

the storerooms involved to wear protective masks. The canned goods were generally in a "bad state due to the corcosion 

of the cans which in many instances permitted deterioration of the contents and 

the generation of gas and disagreeable 

odors. 

26. Toxic GaJeJ: As in the case of the 

CALIFORNIA and the NEVADA there 

existed a considerable hazard due to the 

presence of toxic gases. The principal 

o~ende r was hydrogen sulphide, H2S 

(sewer gas), which was generated in the 

contaminated stagnant water. It was 

found that the most serious gas concentrations occurred in storerooms contai ning 

a large amount of paper or where there 

was a large quantity of cardboard containers. Numerous cases of oxygen deficiency were found and some cases of 

carbon monoxide. 

27. Pruau/iom Taken Againl/ Toxic 

GaUl: A systematic procedure for testing 

for toxic gas was employed, and was in 

charge of Lieutenant Commander C. M . 

Parker (MC), USN, who is a specialist 

in industrial gas hazards. A large bulletin 

board was kept marked up to indicate to 

personnel which compartments were safe 

and which should not be entered without 

proper mask protection. Although extraordinarily high concentrations of gases 

were found on the WEST VIRGIN IA 

(two hundred thousand parts to one million) there were no persons overcome by 

gas. If the concentration reached the 

point of 20 parts in a million, as shown 

by detectors, the space was considered 
Appendix E 349 

unsafe except with a rescue breathing 

apparatus or suitable face plate with air 

lead. 

28. Ven/italion: In order 10 combat the 

gas hazard and to permit work to go on 

with the least possible delay there were 

installed a large number of exhaust ven· 

tilation units. As the water was pumped 

down these were connected up to the 

ship's ventilation pipes so that all parts 

of the ship could be reached and the 

toxic gases withdrawn. 

29. Recover, of Bodin' During the 

salvage operations sixty-six bodies were 

recovered from the W EST VIRGINIA. 

These were found widely scattered 

throughout the ship. In most cases they 

wefe in an advanced state of decomposi· 

tion, and considerably dismembered. As 

in the case of the CALIFORNIA the 

bodies were handled in heavy canvas bags 

made for the purpose; when drawn tight 

at the top for closing the odors emitted 

were negligible. By this means the bodies 

were removed from the ship at various 

times almost unnoticed by the working 

parties on board. 

30. There were evidences that some of 

the men had lived for considerable periods and finally succumbed due to lack of 

oxygen. In the after engine room, several 

bodies were found lying on top of the 

steam pipes. which areas were probably 

within the air bubble existing in that 

flooded space. 

31. Three bodies were found on the 

lower shelf of storeroom A- I ll clad in 

blues and jerseys. This storeroom was 

open to fresh water pump room, A- I09, 

which presumably was the battle station 

assigned to these men . The emergency 

rations at this station had been consumed 

and a manhole to the fresh water tanks 

below the pumps had been removed. A 

calendar which was found in this compartment had an "X" marked on each 

date from December 7, 1941 to December 23, 1941 inclusive. 

32. Removal of PerJonal EffectJ and 

TraJh: All personal effects, furniture, 

etc., were thoroughly soaked with fuel 

oil and in some cases had been burned. 

As in previous salvage jobs it was necessary to remove all such material either 

as scrap or for reconditioning. The 

WEST VIRGINIA force handled the 

removal of trash in a very expeditious 

manner by using whed barrows on the 

lower decks. They attached shackles to 

four points on the barrows so that hooks 

from the hoist line could pick up the 

wheel barrows and raise same to the 

weather deck through open hatches. From 

this point the barrows could be wheeled 

on to trash lighters and dumped. 

33. Condition of Main and Auxiliary 

Machinery: The condition of the main 

propulsion plant and the auxiliary machinery throughout the ship was approxin:aately the same as in the case of 

the CALIFORNIA. There was more free 

oil removed from the WEST VIRGINIA 

than from other salvaged vessels and as 

a result there was less deposited on the 

decks, bulkheads, electrical machinery, 

etc. The program of removing the electric motors and sending same to the 

Navy Yard {or reconditioning locally or 

elsewhere was proceeded with as the water 

level was reduced. Yard workmen were 

avai lable in large numbers to assist in 

the removal and reconditioning of mechanical machinery, machine tools. instruments, etc. This fact insures that a 

larger percentage of the instruments and 

delicate installations such as gyros, fire 
3)0 Pearl Harhor 

control equipment in plot, d c., have been 

subj«ted to less corrosion than in the 

case of the CALIFORNIA. "Tectyl" was 

used freely as a preventative agent on 

mechanical parts of the nre control inst ruments, pumps, turbines, etc. 

34. The main machinery spaces were 

well doned down before the vessel was 

docked and preliminary steps were underway to disassemble main generators and 

main moton. It ap~ars certain that the 

job of rewinding these units will gd 

started very soon and wi ll prO(~d at 

a good rate. 

~5. All in all, the condition of all 

mechanical machinery is good to excellent, and it is anticipated that it can be 

r«onditioned 100%. All electrical machinery requires rehabilitation and the 

present decision is to rewind all vital 

items. It is expected that the rewind ing 

work will be done in part at the N avy 

Yard here but mostly under contract on 

the West Coast. 

36. Structural Damage: Pumping down 

of the drydock revealed the' full extent 

of the damage to tht: hull on the WEST 

VIRGINIA. The damage on the port 

side amidships from the lurn of Ihe bilge 

to the boat deck, is SO extelUive as to 

beggar description. AU of the ship's 

structure in this area, including a number 

of the armor plates, requires renewal. A 

detailed damage report will , of course, be 

submitted by the Navy Yard. Pearl Har· 

bor, but a general listing of Ihe damage 

appears pertinent to this Salvage Report. 

The general damage is as follows: 

1. Olle Torpedo Hit at Fram/! 46: 

This torpedo struck the armor belt about 

thret feet above its lower edge and 

burned into the armor a circular gfoove 

18"-20" in diameter for about 270 de· 

grees. The pressure wave from this tor· 

pedo blew in the hull structure below the 

armor belt some eight to ten fed , but 

did not disintegrate the material as is 

usual in the vicinity of a torpedo war· 

head detonation. The armor belt itself is 

pushed in some six to eight inches. The 

third deck is buckled up and ruptured, 

and indicates an inward movement of 

about two feet. One armor plate is 

cracked. 

2. Torpttlo Hit 111 Pramt 70: This 

torpedo also struck the armor belt, about 

four and one half feet above the lower 

edge. Circular grooves indicate that the 

torpedo struck a joint and caused the 

lower edge of the after plate to move 

inboard about ten inches more than the 

forward plate. Four armor plates in this 

vicinity show cracks. It appears that the 

armor belt at this point has moved in· 

ward in the neighborhood of two feel. 

The damage below the armor belt shows 

that the hull down to the bilse keel has 

been blown in and collapsed, but all of 

the shell material seems to be present. 

This wou ld indicate that the detonation 

of the torpedo warhead did not occur in 

contact with this structure. 

}. r orptJo Hit Of Bomb Neaf· J\fiJJ 

al Framt 81: Another torpedo struck at 

fume 80. Although there was no clear 

markings to show that the torpedo struck 

the armor belt it seems likely that such 

was the case. The damage below the 

armor belt was not believed to be suf· 

fi cient fOf close proximity to torpedo 

detonation; in fa ct it is considerably less 

than the correspondi ng damase of (a) 

and (b) abo\'e. However, the shell above 

the armor belt at frame 81 is ruptured 

and opened inward. This would indicate 

that the torpedo struck rather hiSh up on 
Appendix E 3)1 

the armor belt, or detonated before 

striking. 

Prior to drydocking it was considered that the damage above the annor 

belt at frame 81 was caused by a bomb 

near-miss. However, this could have been 

caused by a pressure wave from a torpedo 

explosion or from a large bomb near the 

lower edge of the armor. There is evidence that a bomb struck the top edge 

of the armor belt,-and probably exploded ten or twelve feet below that 

point. The armor at this point has been 

pushed in six inches or more. 

4. Torpedo Hil or Bomb Near-Mils 

al Frame 94: The damage here is very 

similar to that at frame 80, except that 

the damage above the armor belt extends 

further fore and aft. It is my present 

opinion that this torpedo (or large 

bomb)" detonated well up on the armor 

belt. The lower edge of the armor belt 

has been pushed in at least ten inches. 

5. Torpedo Hit Above the Armor 

Be" al Frame 68: At frame 68 the armored . second deck has been blown 

downward on to the third deck and the 

main and upper decks are collapsed. 

Before the ship was unwatered the extensive damage in this area was attributed 

to a large bomb which passed through 

the foretop and entered this area. How· 

ever, when the second deck was un· 

watered and the full damage revealed it 

did not seem possible that a bomb could 

have caused such serious damage to heavy 

armored structure. It was therefore concluded that a torpedo must ha'·e entered 

above the armor belt at this point. This 

conclusion was confi rmed during the removal of wreckage when a torpedo air 

flask, fully intact, was discovered in this 

area. 

6. T orpedo Hi' il1 Steering Gear 

Room: This torpedo apparently struck 

the rudder at its midheight and knocked 

it off the ship. The· rudder has been recovered Ul two parts, the line of rupture 

being at the midheight. The bottom of 

the steering gear room, just Over the 

rudder, was blown open and considerable 

damage was sustained by the ram levers, 

cross head, rams, etc. The rudder stock 

is still missing but search by divers is 

being continued. The stern post is badly 

broken and a new steel casting is required . The trimming tank area on both 

sides is opened up, particularly on the 

port side. There was no apparent damage 

to propellers or shafting. 

While the damage to the steering 

gear is severe and will require considerable replacement of materials and work, 

it would seem that the damage is less 

than is ordinarily expected from a first 

order detonation of a torpedo warhead. 

However, inasmuch as the after portion 

and the engine compartment of the torpedo was found on the bottom it is certain that the damage resulted from a 

torpedo hit. 

7. Bomb Hit ThrOllgh Foretop: A 

large bomb passed through the foretop, 

down through the flag bag, boat d«k, 

etc., and presumably exploded on the' 

main deck or second deck, port side. It 

was originally believed that the e'xplosion 

of this bomb caused the' very extensive' 

damage suffered by the ship on the port 

side. However, now that it has been 

proved that a torpedo explosion occurred 

on the second deck, might permit the' 

conclusion that this bomb was of little 

or no consequence. As a matter of fact, 

an unexploded 15" shell-type bomb was 

found on the second de<:k in this area. It 
;)2 Pearl Harbor 

is therefore my opiniOn that the bomb 

which pamd through the foretop was a 

dud and that the terrific damage sustained 

was caused by the torpedo hit over the 

armor belt at frame 68. 

8. Bomb Hit on Turr,J III: One of 

the 1~" shell-type bombs struck the top 

of Turret III , aft towards the starboard 

side. T his bomb passed entirely through 

the top plate and into the turret but 

fai led 10 explode. It was badly broken 

up. I believe that the parts of this bomb 

were packed and sent to the Navy 

Department. 

9. Damagl on fh, Slarboard Sid, Dllt 

to Conlaft With fb, TENNESSEE: Upon 

drydocking it was found that some damage had been sustained at the point of 

contact with the TENNESSEE, when 

that vessel was squ~zed against the quay 

as the WEST VIRGIN IA settled in the 

water after pivoting on the port bilge. 

This damage is comparatively slight, although voids wece opened to the sea by 

.a dozen or more pulled rivets. 

37. I th ink that the causes and dfccts 

of t~ various aspects of damage in the 

midship area of the WEST VIRGINIA 

is a matter for careful study, and any 

conclusions are pretty much a matter of 

individual opinion. B~d on the above 

it is my present opinion that the WEST 

VIRGIN IA was struck by six torpedoes 

and two large bombs, or by four lorpedoes and four large bombs. The torped~, it would appear were shallow 

running lorpedoes,- although some of 

them may have struck when the ship was 

well listed over. The maximum list at· 

tained by the ship was about twenty-eight 

degrees. 

38. Dllmage From Fire: Very exten· 

sive damage was suffered from fires 

which burned for nearly thirty hours. 

Most of the fire was from oil Aoating on 

the surface of the water, both inside and 

outside of the ship. The water level on 

the inside was three or fou r fttt below 

the main deck on the starboa rd side and 

the lim on the surface of the water 

there Ctusd serious buckling of main 

deck plating. In large part this will re-­

quire renewal or/ and straightening. 

39. The direct contact of torpedo and/ 

or bomb explosions against the armor 

belt cause-d the third deck to absorb con· 

siderably more- e-nergy than is usually thecase in way of torpedo explosions. As a 

result the damage to and on the third 

deck in the- midship area is ve-ry e-xte-nsive. This damage extended to #5 tor· 

pedo bulkhead which is pushed in as 

much as two fC'd in boile-r rooms two 

and four. Aho, there is considerablebuckling and failure of bulkhead stiffene-tS, bracket, etc. 

40. Ex/em of Smull/ral Damdge lind 

Time 10 Repair: The time required to 

make good the structural damage to the 

WEST VIRGINIA de-pends upon numerous considerations such as, avai lability of 

material, number of structural trades 

available, handling of armor, etc. Obviously the armor belt in way of the dam· 

age must be removed and the whole 

structure from the shell to tor~do bulk· 

head #5 inclusive must be replaced in 

large part. It seems that live armor plates 

are cracked and all or most of these may 

require renewal; also, it may be found 

that some of the armor keyways of others 

are broken open so as to requi re replacement of the armor plate. The bottom of 

the ship under the turn of the bilge is 

rumpled considerably and is pulled up 

in way of torpMo bulkhead #5. The 

docking kttl is pulled up six to eight 

inches. It is not blown out at any place 
Appendix E 35) 

and is damaged comparatively less than 

in the case of the CALIFORNIA. 

41. With material and men available 

it would seem that the structural job on 

the WEST VIRGINIA would require 

some four to six months. A large part of 

this work can be deferred until the vessel 

reaches a mainland yard, especially most 

of the renewal and straightening of 

main and upper decks. The time required 

for the steering gear job is anybody's 

guess at this stage and depends primarily 

on the delivery of new parts such a5 

stern post, rudder stock, crosshead, etc. 

42. The Yard is being pres~d to have 

the WEST VIRGINIA in condition to 

vacate the dock if emergency requires. It 

is likely that the inner bulkheads can be 

made tight to permit refloating of the 

vessel after a period of about three weeks 

in dock. Although structural repai rs can 

best be done in dock, it would be possible to handle the work so that only the 

outer layers n~ be done in dock and 

the inside layers completed thereafter. 

While this would not be the most efficient way of doing the job it would 

rut down the total drydock period to approximately ten to twelve weeks. 

43. Temporar, QuarterJ on Ford lJland: In order to house the WEST VIRGINIA's crew near their work and to 

avoid loss of considen.ble time in boat 

transportation, a temporary barracks was 

constructed on Ford Island. A walkway 

from the WEST VIRGINIA to Ford Is. 

land Wa5 carried on floats on the water. 

This arrangement paid high dividends and 

permitted a very satisfactory arrangement 

for handling the crew of the ship and 

added considerably to the morale of the 

working organization. 

44. Electrical Power-CompreJJed Air 

- Steam: The electric power was fur· 

nished to the ship through leads from 

Ford Island. Steam was furn ished by the 

tug EX-NA VAJO and piped through the 

ship in temporary piping. Compressed air 

Wa5 generated by about six large air com· 

pressors on the boat deck and on the 

main deck, and distributed from an 

accumulator. 

45. PerJonneJ AJJigned 10 the WEST 

VIRGIN IA: The officer assigned as the 

principal assistant to the Salvage Officer 

was Lieutenant Wilfred L. Painter, CECV(S), USNR, who had direct charge of 

all a5pects of the work including co· 

ordination with the ship's complement. 

Prior to completion of the CALIFORNIA salvage Lieutenant Emile C. 

Genereaux Jr., D-V(S), USNR, was in 

direct charge of the WEST VIRGINIA 

work hut due to his assignment to the 

PLUNGER job he w~ relieved by lieutenant Painter. Other officers assigned 

were as follows: 

A. lieutenant Commander Charles 

W. Rhodes, USNR, was in charge of facilities such a5 steam, air, portable lights, 

etc., of all electrical and mechanical machinery. In general, he assisted the Sal· 

vage Officer as Machinery Assistant. 

B, Lieutenant (jg) James W. Dar· 

roch, D-V(G), USNR, and lieutenant 

(ig) Earl H. liedstrand CC-V(S), 

USNR, were assistants to lieutenant 

Painter in charge of certain details of installation of patches, setting of pumps, 

furnishing ventilation, operation of 

pumps, drain lines, etc. 

C. Also, lieutenant (ig) Wilbert 

M. Bjork, D-V(G), USNR, and Ensign 

Edgar S. Beauchamp-Nobbs, CC-V(S), 

USNR, assisted part of the time with the 

above-mentioned officers in performing 

similar duties. 

D. lieutenant Commander James A. 
354 Pearl Harbor 

McNally, USN, although not specifica lly 

assigned to the WEST VIRGIN IA he 

was of assistance to the Salvage Officer 

in planning machinery work and the reo 

conditioning of electrical and mechanical 

units. 

46. The performances of the above of· 

heers in all aspects of the work from 

design of the cofferdam patches to installation of same, operation of pumps, 

removal of wreckage, removal of oil and 

water, etc., was of the highest order. 

They carried on the work with outstanding devotion to duty, enthusiasm, and 

high courage in the face of unusual 

hazard from toxic gases, dangerous 

wreckage, etc. I have recommended letters of commendation for Lieutenant W . 

L. Painter, l ieutenant (jg) ]. W . Darroch and Lieutenant (jg) E. H. Liedstrand in view of their excelJent work 

throughout the whole period of actual 

salvage operations, 

47, The great success attained in 

salvaging the bad ly damaged WEST 

VIRGINIA is in great part due to the 

personnel, experience and excellent cooperation of the Pacific Bridge Company, 

contractor for the new drydocks at this 

Navy Yard . Their work on design, installation, and upkeep of the cofferdam 

patches was of inestimable value. The 

underwater work performed by their 

divers in the fitting, attaching, and securing of the cofferdam patches was an outstanding achievement 10 underwater 

worK. Officers who viewed the work after 

docking expressed astonishment and mar· 

veled at the immensity of the achievment. 

J am preparing for the signature of the 

Commandant a letter to the Pacific Bridge 

Company expressing the appreciation of 

the Navy Yard for their fine work. This 

letter will make special mention of those 

representatives of the company who were 

utsta~ding in the WEST VIRGINIA 

work, such as; the local manager Mr. 

Jack Graham, the supervisor in dired 

charge of the WEST VIRGINIA work, 

Me. Les Freeman, the rigging supervisor, 

Mr. Bert Rice, the design superintendent 

Mr. Fred Crocker, and design assistant 

Mr. James Foster. 

48. The Pearl Harbor Repair and 

Salvage Unit rendered valuable assistance 

in operation of pumps and in removing 

and reconditioning certain auxi liary machinery. Due to the transfer of many of 

the officers and a considerable number of 

the men from this area it was not possible for this unit to assist in the same 

degree as they did on the CALIFORNIA. 

49. The various shops of the Navy 

Yard assisted in their specialties in the 

sah'age work, especially in the operation 

of air compressors and ventilation 

blowers. The work on the ship would 

not have been possible without the in· 

stallation of a tremendous ventilation system for the removal of toxic gases. Most 

of this work was performed by Navy 

Yard workmen and coordinated by the 

Shop Superintendenfs office. 

50. The officers and crew of the 

WEST VIRGINIA turned out a record 

of work and accomplishment which will 

probably never be equalled. The Com· 

manding Officer, Lieutenant Commander 

W . White, USN, and the Ship's Superin· 

tendent, Lieutenant Commander L. J. 

Knight Jr., USN, and many other officers were on the job at all hours to do 

the part of the salvage work assigned to 

them and to render any assistance which 

might be required for any purpose. Un ­

fortunately the shortage of enlisted men 

which has recently prevailed here, pre· 

vented the building up of the crew of 
Appendix E J~ ~ 

the WEST VIRGINIA . The maximum 

number in the crew did not exceed three 

hundred and seventy. Sixty of these were 

Marines, who assisted in their traditional 

spirit and were always willing 10 do 

nothing less than their share of the 

work, and then some. With the small 

crew available the WEST VIRGINIA 

work was carried along rapidly so that 

before drydocking the removal of the 

larger part of the wreckage and trash, all 

of the ammunition, and much of the 

stores and provisions had been accomplished. I should mention also, that the 

initiative and spirit of the WEST VIRGIN IA resulted in the recommissioning 

of the officers' galley which was operated continuously from April 27. 1942, 

to feed on board the ship th ree meals a 

day to all of the ship's officers and crew. 

I have prepared a letter for the Commandant's signature expressing appreciation of the excellent co-operation and assistance rendered by the officers and crew 

of the WEST VIRG INIA in the salvage 

of that ship. 

S1. The above is in general the story 

of the salvage of the WEST VIRGINIA, 

which may well be designated as a most 

difficult salvage job successfully completed. All hands assigned to the work 

performed their part intelligently, cooperatively and effectively. A successful 

outcome was never in doubt. 

et: Comserfor. 

Mgr. 

Prod. Off. 

Plann. Off. 

Shop Supt. 

H. N . WALLIN. 
APPENDIX F 


The Plan for the Salvage of 

U.S.S. Oklahoma 

U.S. NAVY YARD 


Pearl Harbor .. T .H. 


C- Lll- l/BBfNYIO 

Ser. Y- 01347 

July 18, 1942 

From: The Salvage Officer 

To The Commandant, Navy Yard, 

Pearl Harbor, T.H. 

Subject: USS OKLAHOMA-Progress 

Report on Salvage of. 

1. Complying with your Olal instructions I am submitting below a report of 

the progress of the salvage operations 

on the USS OKLAHOMA. In view of 

the termination of my assignment as Salvage Officer, I am including considerable 

detail and opinion in this report. 

2. Under date of 15 March 1942, the 

Bureau of Ships was advised regarding 

the situation existing on the ARIZONA, 

OKLA HOMA and UTAH and the Yard 

recommended that the salvage of these 

vessels, except for recoverable material, 

be not undertaken at this time. 

3. Under date of 22 Ap;il 1942, the 

Vice Chief of Naval Operations expressed the desire that the condition of 

the ARIZONA and OKLAHOMA be 

carefully surveyed and recommendations 

made based on the time and cost of salvage. This desire of the Department, it 

was stated, was based Oil the excellent 

v.'ork which had been accomplished in 

the salvaging of Naval vessels. 

4. Under date of 24 May 1942, the 

Commandant furnished the Vice Chief of 

Naval Operations a detailed estimate of 

the salvage of the OKLAHOMA and 

stated that the Yard was in position to 

proceed with the work jf ordered. Subsequently the Yard was directed to proceed with work on the OKLAHOMA 

and contractual arrangements have been 

made with the Pacific Bridge Company 

to handle a portion of the work; also, 

arrangements are being made by the Bureau of Ships for suitable p riorities for 

the material required. At the present time 

the local Manager and local Design 

Superintendent of the Pacific Bridge 

Company are at their home offices in San 

Francisco to review with their company 

certain aspects of the OKLAHOMA 

project, including by-out of righting 

forces, procurement of essential materials, 

recruitment of specialized man power, 

etc. 

5. The OKLAHOMA was berthed 

outboard of the MARYLAND at Berth 

F-5 and capsized outboard (to port) . 

The vessel rotated through an angle of 

about 150 degrees and came to rest on a 

fairly solid bottom. The starboa rd ha lf 

of the ship's bottom is above water as is 

also the lower part of the starboard side, 

including the starboard propeller. The 

356 
Appendix F 357 

topmost point of th~ Orq..AHOMA hull 

is now about twenty-six feet above mean 

low wat~r. Soundings have been taken all 

around the OKLAHOMA and these 

show that the turrets, superstructure, and 

masts are entirely submerged in mud. In 

view of the fairly solid bottom it is likely 

that the masts and lighter superstructure 

have been torn clear of the ship or badly 

bent. It is not practicable for divers to 

determine the facts on this point without 

some dredging, and dredging should not 

procud in this outboard area until hauling winches are rigged. 

6. Damage to Underwater Hull: In 

order to determine the underwater damag~ of th~ OKLAHOMA careful inspection of the hull has been made by divers, 

but most of the damage sustained is partially covered by mud. This has not been 

dredged out because of higher priorities 

of other work. However, the divers' in· 

spections indicate four large holes, in 

the port side as foUows: 

a. At about ftame 38 there is a hole 

which appears to be a bomb near-miss. 

This hole may be found to be considerably larger when mud is cleared away, 

and may be a torpedo hole. 

b. At about frame 48, one torpedo 

hit. 

c. At about frame 64, one torpedo 

hit. 

d. At about frame 94, one torpedo 

hil. 

There appears to be no important 

damage to the bottom of the ship or to 

the port side below the bilge keel. 

7. Scheme of Righting: Considerable 

study has been applied to the develop· 

ment of a suitable scheme for righting 

the OKLAHOMA. This has been 

handled jointly by the Salvage Division, 

Design Section, and the Pacific Bridge 

Company. The final details of the $C ~me 

are yet to be worked out but it consists 

essentially of the following: 

a_ Shore WincheJ: At present plans 

call for the installation of twenty-one 

electric hydraulic hauling winches on Ford 

Island, each winch having a pull ing ca· 

pacity of about twenty tons. The number 

of winches is based on an estimated 

maximum pull of about ~4~,OOO foot 

tons. 

In order to install these winches on 

Ford Island, two or three of the enlisted 

men's quarters will have to be temporarily moved dear of their present sites 

to allow sufficient space for the installation of concrete deadmen as winch 

anchorages. 

Each winch will haul on a 1" 

(about) flexible steel wire cable rove 

through blocks which will give a seventet"n part purchase. The moving end will 

be attached to a ~" wire cable which 

will pass over the bottom of the ship 

and will be attached to the starboard 

shell plating through four "cat tails" 

from each ~" line. These '-cat tails" will 

be shackled to pads or lugs welded to 

the shell at each frame. Preliminary 

strength calculations indicate that the hull 

structure is adequate. 

In order to increase the leverage, the 

3" pulling wire will pass over a strut ar· 

rangement about forty-eight feet above 

the mean low water level, wh ich will 

probably be of wood and built on th~ 

bottom of the ship with the load taken 

on the docking keels. 

b. Lift PoIllOOl/J: In order to provide adequate assistance to start the ship 

rolling, especially in view of the fact that 

most of the superstructure is buried in 

mud, it is intended that a number of 

large lifting pontoons be attached to 
3)8 Pearl Harbor 

parts of the superstructure in such a way 

as to give large righting moments. It is 

likely that these pontoons can be attached by chains to masts, cranes, turrets, 

guns, etc. It is not likely that there is 

room for more than abo;ut twenty such 

pontoons. In the later stages of righting 

it may be necessary to rig some chains 

around the ship in order to obtain satisfactory righting moments {rom the pontoons. 

H has been intended that the sub · 

marine salvage pontoons at Pearl Harbor, 

each having a capacity of eighty tons lift, 

be utilized. Inquiry was made as to 

whether the Department would authorize 

the tramportation of tcn similar pontoons 

from the West Coast for this project. A 

negative response has been received, so 

that it now appears that it may be necessary to manufacture ten additional pontoons if later detailed calculations show 

the necessity for same. 

Some informal conversations ha,'e 

~en had with the Army engineers regarding the loan of large gasoline tanks 

which could be adapted for lift pontoons 

of about eighty ton capacity each. The 

Army has indicated a willingness to coo~rate, but this would depend of course 

on whether the gasoline tanks are still 

available at the time we are ready to put 

them to use. No official action has yet 

~en taken with the Ar my on this point. 

c. Air Bubble: In order to lighten 

the OKLAHOMA, especially in such a 

way as to reduce the righting moment 

required it is intended to use compressed 

air to blowout some of the water-fi lled 

compartments on the starboard side. Cal· 

culations have been based on blowing 

the water down about twenty-five feet, 

thus requiring an air pressure of deven 

or twelve pounds per square inch. The 

idea is to divide the air bubble up by 

transverse bulkheads so that there will 

in effect be about five air bubbles in the 

hull along the whole length of the ship. 

This division will guard against the possibil ity of losing all of the air bubble at 

a critical period of the righting operations. 

In connection with the air bubble, 

rome of the liquid to be removed is oil, 

and steps are now underway to remove 

all of the fuel oil from the starboard 

tanks by pumping. Test holes are being 

drilled and access holes are being cut 

through the bottom of the ship for the 

purpose of getting hose and men into 

the oil tanks. Two three inch reciprocating simplex steam pumps will ~ used 

to remove the oil from the ship and place 

it into the oil barge INTREPID. There 

is some d anger of oil vapor explosions in 

this work and steps .are being taken to 

guard aga inst this hazard, principally by 

arranging for the EX-NAVAJO to moor 

alongside the OKLAHOMA and to fur· 

nish steam and eledric power. Thereafter 

all oil tanks will ~ steam·blanketed (or 

suitable air venting) before access holes 

are cut. Lieutenant Greely has direct 

charge of oil removal. 

The ship's tanks are practically full 

of (uel oil, about 1,000,000 gallons. The 

access holes are eighteen inches square, 

and fifteen or more of them will be required through the starboard bottom; 

other holes will have to be cut in longitudinal bulkheads later to sluice oil from 

other tanks into the wing tanks to be 

picked up by the pump suction. 

d. Need For Outboard Restrainer 

T o Prevent Sliding: Considerable thought 

has been given to the need (or a suitable 

anchorage out in the channel to prevent 

sliding of the OKLAHOMA instead of 
Appendix F 359 

rotating when the righting forces are applied. A study of the soil strength has 

been made by the Pacific Bridge Company in connedion with this matter and 

it now appears that no anchorages are 

required, except fo r one forward. These 

calcuJations, however, should ~ carefully 

checked as the work proceeds. 

e. Dredging: In order to ~rmit the 

OKlAHOMA to rotate without undue 

restraint, some dredging must ~ done 

just inboard of the ship. If too much is 

done it will increase the possibility of 

sliding so that the amount of dredging 

to be performed must be based on the 

strength of the soil. Also, if too Il!uch 

dredging is done the vessel will be unnecessarily low in the water when righted 

and this will greatly increase the problem 

of Aoating her. Thus from both view 

points a minimum amount of inboard 

dredging shou ld ~ performed, only 

enough to permit the vessel to rotate 

without undue obstruction. 

8. Alethod of RAiling: It is expected 

that the OKLAHOMA after righting 

will still have 8-12 degrees list to port, 

and the main deck (possibly the upper 

deck) will be under water. The scheme 

for raising the OKLAHOMA is to util· 

ize the fence·type cofferdam as in the 

case of the OGLALA. That cofferdam is 

being stowed on Waipio Point and will 

be available for adaptation to the OKLAHOMA. Based on pr~nt knowledge it 

is likely that the OKLAHOMA can be 

raised without installing exterior. patches 

over the holes in the port side, as in the 

case of the CA LIFORNIA . However, 

final decision on that point should wait 

for a more accurate determination of the 

damage. 

9. Divisiol1 0/ Dutiel: There has been 

considerable discussion as to whether the 

Pacific Bridge Company could not be 

charged with the complete job of righting and iloating the OKLAHOMA. My 

consistent opinion has been that the work 

can be handled satisfactorily only on the 

basis of the Navy assuming responsibility 

for the job as a whole, but to contract 

with the Pacific Bridge Company to perform certain parts of the work. As I 

understand it, their desire is not to take 

o\'er the job in its ent irety but merely to 

have a definit~'tcbntractual arrangement 

under which they could purchase large 

quantities of materials required and hire 

specialized men for the work; in other 

respects the working arrangements used 

on ships already salvaged would apply. 

10. I have discussed the general divisions of the work with the local Manager 

and local Design Superintendent of the 

Pacific Bridge Company, and we have 

agr~d that the division shown below 

appears most favorable: 

a. Design, installation, rigging, attaching, and operation of hauling 

winches-to be handled in its entirety by 

the Pacific Bridge Company, but subject 

to' Navy inspection and assistance. 

b. Lift pontoons to be attached and 

operated by the Navy, but assistance as 

necessary to be rendered by the Pacific 

Bridge Company. The detailed work , 

could best be done by the ORTOLAN 

or the WIDGEON; the necessary dredging primarily for the attachment of pontoons could be done either by the Navy 

or by arrangements through the Pacific 

Bridge Company. 

c. Diving work, primarily to dose 

watertight doors, hatches, valves, etc.,­

(and to see that certain others are left 

open) rCtJuires familiarity with ships and 

with na\'31 design and is es5entially a 

Navy part of the job. The Pacific Bridge 
360 Pearl Harbor 

Company de5ir~s that this be handled entirely by the Navy. The Diving Section 

of the Salvage Division has been studying this probJem for some time and is 

organized and ready to proceed with the 

work. 

d. Decision as to the amount of 

dredging inboard seems to be a joint 

matter for study and agreement. When 

the decision is reached the dredging itself can be performed by the Yard or 

by arrangement through the Pacific 

Bridge Company. 

c. In regard to raising the ship, the 

design, construction and installation of 

the fence-type colferdam should be a 

primary function of the Pacific Bridge 

Company. Decision as to the need for exterior patches should be made jointly but 

primarily by the Navy. AU interior work 

and pumping arrangements should be 

joint, but a Navy responsibility. 

£. Removal of Oil, Ammunilion, 

Wreckage, Debris, elc: This should be a 

Navy responsibility, as should also fire 

protection, hazards to life from toxic 

gases, explosion hazards, etc. There are 

supposed to be about 400 bodies in the 

OKLAHOMA which should be handled 

by Naval personnel. Also, there is a 

large amount of personal property and 

confidential matter which must be safeguarded in accordance with instructions 

of the Commander-in -Chief of the 

Pacific Fleet. 

II. Time Required To Do The Work: 

The time required to do the work is 

problematic and depends upon whether 

unforeseen difficulties develop and cannot be readi ly overcome. On the assumption that the materials to be procured by 

the Pacific Bridge Company are given 

sufficiently high priority the job can be 

started almost immediately. If the materia ls are delivered piece-meal and so 

scheduled as to be ready for installation 

when required I think that the OKLAHOMA can be righted within four or 

five months, and possibly within three 

months. The time required for raising 

her after she is righted depends upon 

how p she remains in the water and 

at what angle of inclination. If the depth 

of the water over the quarter deck does 

not excttd 20-22 feet it ought to be 

practicable to raise her within three 

months. 

12. POJJibie Difficulties: The salvage 

scheme has not yet been developed in 

such detail as to insure that all difficulties 

which may arise during the salvage operations have been taken into consideration. 

However, a few of them presented themselves and are as fo llows: 

a. Strength of the soil of the bottom 

is a critical aspect of the job. As the 

righting moment is applied to the vessel 

the pivoting point will tend to dig in 

and/ or to slide. If the soil is hard enough 

to prevent sliding but sti ll soft enough 

to permit the bilge to dig in, the vessel 

will tend to sink deeper into the mud. 

This will have several effects, one of 

which is to increase the moment required for rotation. 

b. When the vessel has rotated 

through about 60 degrees it will be on 

its port side, and thereafter the pivoting 

point will be the port bilge. If the mud 

is relatively soft the port bilge will dig 

in and cause the ship to sink deeper into 

the mud . This will also require an increased righting moment, and this at a 

point when the leverage and the effect 

of pontoons have been reduced. Thus 

the winch capacity required for the job 

should be based upon this consideration. 

At this point it may be necessary to con­
) 

Appendix F 	 361 

struct new leverage struts in order to insure adequate righting moment. 

c. When the vessel is lying on its 

side a decision can be made as to how 

much dredging need be done to facilitate 

roll ing of the ship and to permit the 

vessel to come upright without too much 

residua l list. By this time the actual 

strength of the soil will have been pretty· 

well determi ned so that this decision can 

be made having in mind the depth of the 

water in which the ship will be sitting 

when righted. It will probably be found 

that enough righting moment can be applied to lift the vessel's center of gravity 

some in this last part of the righting 

o~ration . In that case dredging should 

be minimized. 

13. PerJMmeJ Now AJJigned: A suf· 

ficient number of officers and enlisted 

men have been retained in the salvage 

organization to carry out the details of 

the OKLAHOMA work as outlined 

above. The officers assigned to the salvage aspect of the project are as follows; 

a. Lieutenant Haynes, in charge of 

all diving activities, eSpe<ially those in 

connection with a suitable air bubble. 

Lieutenant Haynes has organized the 

Diving Section for the great amount of 

interior work required and has adequate 

officer supervision for this work. In this 

connection the Navy Yard civilian divers' 

could be utilized and the Officer-inCharge (Boatswain Nordquist) might 

we[[ be assigned to the OKLAHOMA 

project. 

b. Lieutenant Lindstrom, has spent 

six or eight weeks in design calculations 

with the Pacific Bridge Company. He 

has worked primarily on the air bubble 

requirements, somewhat on the lift pontoons, etc. Some of these matters should 

be referred to the Design Section in due 

course for fina l review and pertinent 

recommendations. However, Lieutenant 

Lindstrom and Pacific Bridge Company 

have discussed design matters informally 

wi th personnel of the Design Section. 

c. Lieutenant Greely, in charge of 

practical work on the ship. He has instituted action for removal of fuel oil from 

the starboard side, and is making neces· 

sary arrangements for other work to 

proceed. 

14. Equipment Available: I believe 

plenty of equipment is available for the 

OKLAHOMA work. The contractor has 

the barges and crawler cranes used on 

the CALIFORNIA and the WEST VIRGINIA and thCS(" will be available when 

needed . Steps have been taken to have 

the EX-NAVAJO alongside to furnish 

steam and power as required . 

H . 	N . WALLIN. 

c(: 	Comserfor 

Capt. Yard 

Prod. Off. 

Plan . Off. 

e.0. OKLAHOMA 

Salv. Plan. Off. 

Capt. Hull 

Lt. Comdr. Isquith 

Lt. Comdr. Altland 

Lt. Lindstrom 

Lt. Greely 

Mr. J. Graham, Pacific Bridge Co. 

(2) 
APPENDIXG 


Ships Present at Pearl Harbor 


and Vicinity, 7 December 1941 


Ships I Present at Pearl Harbor! and Vicinity, ~ 0800 (Local Time) 

7 December 1941 

BB 38 Pennsylvan ia ( In d rydock) 

43 Tennessee 

44 California 4 

48 West Virginia i 

39 Arizona 4 (1 103 officers and 

men killed) 

36 Nevada 

37 Oklahoma" 

46 Maryland 

CL 	 48 Honolulu 

46 Phoenix 

8 Detroit 

49 St. Louis 

50 Helena 

7 Raleigh 

CA 32 N ew Orl eans 

38 San Francisco 

'" 

DO 360 Phelps 

349 Dewey 

351 MacDonough 

Aylwin 

348 Farragut 

354 Monaghan 

372 Cassin ( In drydock ) 

371 Conyngham 

m Downes (In drydock) 

369 Reid 

370 C", 

373 Shaw (In floating drydock) 

36> Cummi ngs 

66 Allen 

103 Schley 

106 Chew 

357 Selfridge 

350 Hull 

352 Worden 

353 Dale 

391 Henley 

388 Helm 

387 Blue 

386 Bagley 

389 Mugford 

390 Ralph Talbot 

393 Jarvis 

392 Patterson 

374 Tucker 

139 Ward 3 ( Patroll ing channe! ('ntrance to P.H .) 

SS 167 Narwhal 

169 Dolphin 

199 Taulng 

170 Cachalot 

CM 4 Oglala 4 

AM 20 Bobolink , 52 V ireo 

31 Tern 

43 Grebe 

26 Rail 

13 Turkey 

OM 22 Pruitt 

362 
Appendix G 363 

21 Sicard 

15 GambJ~ 

17 ontg ~ry 

20 Preble 

19 Tracy 

18 Breese 

16 Ramsay 

OMS 17 rry 

14 Zane 

D Wasmuth 

16 Tr~ver 

PG 19 Sacramento 

AO 3 Dobbin 

4 Whitney 

AV 4 Curtiss 

8 Tangi~ r 

AVP 4 Avocet 

7 S..... an (On marine railway) 

AVO 6 Hulbert 

11 Thornton 

AR I I Rigel 

1 Medusa 

4 Vestal 

AS 14 Pelias 

1 Ya rd (raft assign~ to th~ Fourteenth Naval 

District, and other small non-commissioned 

craft, ar~ not included. 

*For the purpose of this lis!, Pearl Harbor 

is defined as the II?! inJidt of the S guarding {he harbor ~n{ran(e. 

" Ind udes ships within {....~lv~ miles of th~ 

island of Oahu that wer~ not actually within 

ASR 1 Widgeon 

AG 16 Utah 4 

31 Argonne 

32 Sumner 

AH 5 Solace 

AK 17 VegaS (At Honolulu) 

AKS 1 Castor 

3 Antares' <A, P.H. 'n~ 

trance) 

AT 13 Ontario 

64 Na\·ajo! (12 miles outside 

P.H. entrance) 

28 Sunnad in 

38 Keosanqua S (At P.H . en· 

trance) 

AE 1 Pyro 

AO 12 Ramapo ( Had 4 MTB·s on 

deck & 2 more: on dock 

alongside waiting to be 

put aboard) 

23 N eosho 

AM, 8 Cockatoo 

9 Crossbill 

14 Condor 

30 Reedbird 

Pearl Harbor as defined above. Locations of 

these ships are indiCllted. 

' Indicatt'$ ships sunk or destroyed in th~ 

Pea rl Harbor attack. All of these ....ere later 

ra i,ed and rebuilt a(ept for ARIZONA and 

UTAH. OKLAHOfof A was rnised but was not 

rebuilt. 

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'IPY ! U'Il '11::> tog U' "1 "1.\\ ' 'S(I 'h'i 

Lt'i "

"WIPV 1"] ' JpwOJ ' uqo[ 'm,. "J[ HI ' { t '9

1 0 ~JJ p",ddlIl 'u;>w 'LLI LI 'S

y ;u"'I,(j.;I) I 'IPIO Old lq fw;! l!'U)5!11 l WOl n ;~

v 
366 Index 

Anti-aircraft ba t~ Co tinuM 

140, 141, 1,. 3, 14~. 150, I ~~, 1,6, 


1,8, 16 ~, .66, 167. ] 81 , 184. 196, 


298, 299. ~OI, 304, 306, 308, 323; 


Anti-Comintem Pact ( 1936 ), 13. 16, 17; 


Arbogast, Mach. E. C" 162; 


Archimedes Principle, 247. 


A.,gl)nne (AG-41) 130, 177, 363. 


Arholl4 (BB ~9) , n, 104, lIol-, Il6. 130, 


134. ' 36-40, 1.1, ' )0, 1)1, IB, 1)6, 


In, 164. 16" 168, 193. 194, 196. 23', 


253. 267, 268, 283. 304-9, 322, 3'13, 316, 


3'6, 362; 


abandon ship, }O, : 
 anti-aircra ft battery, removal, 268; 


bomb hit, 139, 1,6, 304. 305. 306: 


n plosion, ' 38, 168, ' 93, 213, 297. ,04, 


30', 306, 307-8, 32 1, 32'; 


lires 139, "4, 1)7, 193, 304; 


g UliS, removal of, 26,: 


hir by Japanese, 104: 


memorial, j,ontiJpiert, 269; 


torpedo hil, 103, 304, 30'; 


wreckage investigation of, 267---9 , 


/\(mor-picrdng projectiles, Ja pa , 

'4· or l~·inch, 84, 104, IB, 192, 19}, 


194, 234, 276; 


Soo-kilogram, 84, 90, 9 1, 276. 


Arnold, General y '·Hap;· bombing of 


Tokyo, tn. 

" AIK\U.I of Democracy," n. 

Asher, Ens. Nathan F., 161. 

A."out ( AVP- 4) , '5; .6B, 363. 

Axis, Berlin·Rome; S~ also Anti-Com;ntern 


Pact; ' 3, )9, 2BB. 


A.)'lwin (DD-}))) , ~ 5, 26}, 


B 

Bagl')' (DD-}86 ) , , 6 1. ;62_ 


&ker, Ens. W . D., 261. 


Baldwin, R. M., CYN, '40, 'H, TH. ,0,76. 


Ba,-,n (DD-2I;), 2B. 


Barrage Balloons, 60, 62, 92. 


Banle- of thc Atlantic, I I. 


Beach, Ens. W . 0 " 318-9. 


Beattie, Lt. Comdr. T.T .. 297---9 . 


Bcauchamp·Nobbs, Ens. dg~r S., 241 , 268, 


;B,3)4· 

Bell, C.R., GM 3/C, 312. 

Bellingcr, Rear Adm. P. N . L.. 44-). 

Bellows Field, 43; 

airplane damage, loa; 

at tack 011, 92, 101. 


Bennion, Capt. M. S., I)), 297. 


Benson, Lt. Comdr. W . 1., '3). po. 


rnstein, Lt. Comdr. H. E , 310. 


Berthold, Lt. Comdt. E. E., ,81. 298_ 


Bickley, L c.. CWT, 303. 


Billingsley, BM l /e, 1l7-8_ 


Bircher, H , c., S I/C, 299. 


Birnel, SF 2/c, 30}. 


Bismarr1 ( German) , 283. 


Bisordi, 261. 


Bjork, Lt. (ig) Wilbert M., 224 , 2P, 24 1, 


2P,3B· 

Blair, Eos. E. R. Jr., p t-2 _ 

Bloch, Rear Adm. Claude C , )2, t8 •. 

Blur ( 00-}1'I7), n , 362; 

sinking of midget submarioe, , 61. 


Bobick, SF, 1211. 


Bobolid (AM-Io ) , 15'» 169, ,62 . 


Bode. Capt. Howard D ., }2}. 


Bohley, W . C. (Civilian), ,8 3. 


Bombs, Japan.-se, 104. 137, 138, 139, 14 }, 


146, 1)0, 152, 165, 169. tBI ; 


explosive charge, 276; 


fragmeolarion. 153 ; 


6o-kilogram, 91, 92; 


2,o·kilogram bnd bomb, 90, 91. 9 2 ••89, 


19 1, 194. 198, 20}, 10~, 207, 225 , 


22 6, 176; 


remov21 of dud from Wnl Virginia, 276. 

Bothne, A. M " BM ,Ie, 134- 5. 

Bradway, EIU. William S. Jr., 318. 

Brady (Navy Officer). 2 ) 2. 

BruSt' (OM- IS), ~~. 163, 36~. 

Brown, Vice Adm. Wjlson, n, H. 121. 

Bunkley. Capt. Joel W ., 22 3. 

Borns, YN, 137-8. }06. 

Bush, Ens. William J., 140. 

c 

C;tch,.fol (55-170), 5', 170, }62. 


Caisson, ' 92, 247- 8 . 


Ca lhoun. 24 1. 


Calhoon, Lt. (jg) A., 26 1. 


Calhoon, Rear Ad m. William L., 178. 


Cali/omi,. (BB-44) , 52 , 55, 104, 13), 140-6, 


'B. 1,6. 163, 16), 168, 11>9, , 8o, ,ST, 20}, 


lIl. 21}, 23~. 24', 243, 247, 1~2, 2, 8, 


_~20, 323, 3 2 ~, }26; 


abandon 5hip, 144. 223. 310, 312, 313. 


} " , 317, 34', 3)3, 359, 361 . . ~6 2; 

battle record. lB; 


bomb hi! 143. 146, 22 3. 226; 


(Ounterfloodi ng, '42, 143, 21 3; 


damagr, 2B-6; 


dewatering, 117 ; 


electric motors, cepail of. 22.~, 2So; 


explosion. ' 43; 


explosion during salvage. 22), 279: 


fire, 'H, 223, 226; 


gas huard, H 7: 


guns, removal of, u 6: 


hit by Japanese. 104. 


ncar-miss, 223, 22 ', 226; 

Index 367 

C,.liforni" (BB-4~ )-ConfillUN 

rditting, 231; 


relloated, Ill ; 


al vagc and repair, 146, Ul-}3, H9: 


IOrpedo h it, 103, '40, , }6, 21,. 22,; 


Campbell, E. R" CEM, 309. 3'7. ~ 8. 

Campbell, Comdr. Colin. 326-,. 


Canfield, En$. Robert B., 31 J . 


Caner, Capt. W . R. 311; 


CIU~ ( DD-}10). ", ,62. 


C,mi.. (DD-372), ),. '41 , 16}, IS}, IS" 


203, 101. 109. 1I }. 216, ,62; 

abandon ship. 208; 

battle record, 21 J: 

damage. 206-8: 

explosion, 184: 

lire, 108; 

hit by Japanese bomb, 104, 207. 208; 

righting, 210; 

.ollC'd over, 16,; 

scrapping of hull, 110-11 . 

C.ulor (A~), ", 169. }6,. 

Casuall ies.~ 148, 1.9, ',I, ,,2. 168. 186. 

19 0 ; 

evaruation of wounded, 129. 1}8, '40; 


fiot aid, '48, 


NUM" boal deck, IH; 


poison gas during salvage, 218; 


Il'<:overy of bodies. 221-3, 119. 238, 1~8, 

18o, 341, 349, 360. 

Centers, }. P.. MM l I e, 136. 

Chamberlain, Neville, 10. 

Champion, Ens. Charles H., }17 . 

Chase, Lt. (jg) J. C .. 261. 

Ch"., (00-1 06 ), ". }62. 

Chid of General St.ff (japanese); see Ad· 

miral Osami Nagano. 

o.ief of Naval Operations; sec Admiral 

Ern~t J. King. 

Chid of Staff, Japanese Eleventh Air fleet; 

s~ Rear Adm . Takijiro Onishi. 

Chihm" (japanese) , 89. 

Christen. T/Sgl ., 182. 

Chunh, Lt. (jg). William C. G., 148. 

Churchil!, Winston, 1~. 

Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, 70, 71. 

Clarlc, Comdr. David H . ISo-I . 

Clarksoo, Lt. James S., death during salv.ge 

optratioru, 118. 

ClaSllilied papers, securit), of, 11" 2l9, 280, 

,60. 

Cleaning, 

• kohol and C1Irbon teuachloride, HO; 


caustic solution, 216, 229, 281, HI: 


dothing for persolll"lcl, 218, 281; 


fresh w'ler, 181, HO; 


high·pTt$,ure washing, 281; 


hot salt waler, ~29; 

lumint$, }}1-2; 


Cleaning-Continued 

"nwatered ships, 21" 216, 229, 28" 

,28-36. 

Cleveland, E. S l/C, 312. 

'·Climb Mount Niitax.,·· 88. 

CorlUlloo ( AMe-B). 363. 

Codes, Diplol1U;lic; sec also '·Purple" Mnngn; 

breaking of Japanese, 63. 66, 72, 291; 


dt$truction by Japanest. 71, 79-80; 


··elSt wind rain:· 6}; 


'" hidden word.·' 63; 


··north wind cloud)':' 6}; 


"wesl wind clear:' 6}. 


Codes, Military, ~rtaki g of Japanese, 6" 66,

". Cofferdams, 212, 227-8, 247, '4B, lH, 2,8, 

320, ~H-4. H7. 3~9, 360. 

Collision rna), 23B. 

Combined Air Force (j.pmese), 78. 

Commander of the Atl.ntic Fl~r; St1: Admiral 

Ernes t J. King. 

Commander of the fleet (temporvy); sec Vice 

Adm. William S. Pre. 

Commander·in-Chief of the Japanese Com· 

bined fleet; see Adminl horuku Y.ma. 

moto. 

Commander·in·Chief Second (Japant$t) fleet. 

Commander-in·Chief of the U.S. Fleet; see abo 

Adm. Joseph O. Richardson and Adm. 

Ernest j. King. 41. 

Compressed Air. 

u5e in freeillg trapped men. ' 77; 

in salyage operalions, 244, 246. 

Condor (AMc- 14), 36~; 

sighting of Japanese peris<opt, 100. 

Congressional Invesligation, 60, 61, 66, 101 , 

10,-6. 

Conolly, Rear Adm. Richard L.. 'n· 

··Consol,·· no. }B, ,,6. 

CO"J",haffl (00-371). ~~, 16;, 362. 

Co·Prosperity Sphere, '·Greater Easr Asi...· 

10,· 67. 


Cnral Soil, usc in SlI lvage operations, 2,6. 


CounterAooding. 


C"lifor"i., 141-" 2l}; 


R"lt"h, '97; 


W'JI Virl;"i., 127-8. I}O, 1". 1,6. 


2}~, 299. }47· 

Cnwford. crc, 299· 

000:1"'1, Mr. Fred, 241, 261 , 3". 

Crollhill (A}.fc~). 36,. 

C"mmhll,J (00-36,). 55, 16}. }62. 

Cunis, Lt. Comdr. Lebbe\lS, 178, 18l. 

C"T/;n (AV-4), ~" 107, 168, 198. ,11, 

,6}; 


bomb hits, 168. 198; 


Ctuh of Japan.-se plane, ,68, 198; 


damlge, 19B, 1)19; 


" 
368 Index 

CltrliJs (AV-.)-Continued 

lim, 198 ; 

fragment damage, 198; 

hit by japlnese, 1°4; 

repairs, 198. 

Curts, Comdr. Maurice E., 323 


Curtle, Lt. Charles A., ,67. 


o ~ (DD-3B), ,62. 

Damage to Ships (summary) , 


bombers. 104; 


Japanese eSlimates, 106, II,; 


lorped~, 102. 


Darroch, Lt. (ig) James W., n4, 229. 2.T , 

H'. H9. 3';, "". Davenport. Mr. (civilian) , 161. 


Davidson, Ens. H. D ., 138-40. 


DeCastro, Julio ( civilian yard worker), 17B. 


Oecl","'I;on of War, 


Germany, II; 


Germany and Ita ly on United 51I1C$, 3, 


114 ; 

Japan on United Slales, IH; 

Ludlow constitutional amendment, 17; 

Unite.:! States on Jap' n, 3, 114. 

Delano, Ens. Victor, 129_ 


Destroyer Repair Units I and II ; S~ also 


Peat! Harbor Repair and Salvage Unit; 21<). 

D~lr{)it (CL-B) , ", 32" ,62. 

DeTII, Lt. Comdr. O . L., 181. 

Diplomatic N"goliations (prewar) , 1)-9, 

20-2, 28-9, }I, )9, 61, 66--72, 77-8, 88, 


DeVries, Peter Corn~l ius, CMM, death dur' 


ins salvage, 218, 


DtwtJ (00'3049), )), 163, ,62, 


Dillingham, M r. (civilian) , 181 , 


" Disarmament by Eumple," 26. 


Dive.bombing; s~ Airplanes, Japanese; 


Armor-Pieldng Proj~l il es: Bombs, Ja· 

panese. 

Diviog Openlioo$, 169, 181 , 186, 20), n" 


219, 111 , 128, 23), 241, 248 ~6, 161 , 


277, 284, 3' 9-60; 


Adzona, survty of, 268-9: 
 pro ~ion against poison gu, n8-9, 278; 


recovery of ammunition, 186; 


safety r~ord , 214, 248, 26 1, 277 ; 


U,ah, training on, 26)·6. 


Dobbin (AD-3), ", 169, 363. 


Doherty, Ens. J. M., 301 . 


Dolphin (55-169), ", 170, ,62, 


Dooliule, Lt. Gen. JarMs H" bombing of 


Tokyo, Ill, IU, 


Doran, G. P. S 2/C, 3Il. 


Dow"tJ (DD-3n), ", 141, 16" 18}-" 


190, 20}, a07, 110, 113, 216, 36a; 


abandon ship, 208; 


baull:- record, 21 1 : 


DownlS (DD-3n)-Continued 


damage, 206-1 0; 


elplos;on damage, 108: 


fire, 1 6), 207 ; 


hit by Japanese bomb, 104, 107, 10 8 ; 


refloating, 210; 


righting, 189--90; 


scn pping of hull, 1 10-11 ; 


torpedo explosion, 208. 


Dry Dock Number One, 141, 1 6" 166. 184, 


18" 190, 191, "3, 21 9, 3042; 


flooding, 89; 


hit by Japanese bombs, 104, '90: 


salvage operalions u~, 2}8, 139, 3047. 


Dry Dock Number Two, 141, 167, 107, 238; 


salvage opentions use, 191 . 219, 260. 


Dry Dock Number Thr~, 14 1. 


Duckworth, Gunner Edward W " 22f. 


Duncan, Capt. Donald, bombing of Tokyo, 


tn. 


D unn, Rear Adm . Chules A., 231. 


Dynamite, use in sal...age op~ations, 194, 


21" 220, 13' . 


E 

Earle, upt. Fred M., 231. 


East Loch, 47. 


El~tric·Drive Mlchin!:'ry, 12 3, 2So; 


reconditioning, 130-1, 239-."', 280, 282, 


339-4 1 ; 


r!:'mova l from sunken ships, 3049- ,0, 


Electrical G!:'a r; 


cleaning, 332, 33~; 

replacement, In: 


replacement of high.potential, 2,o; In; 


salvas!:', 218, 239, 27), 282. 


Elec!ric MOlou; ~ also Electric·Driv!:, Ma· 

chinery; 


d!:'aning, }31, H~, 3040; 


salvage. 219, 230-3 1, 232, 239, 2,0, 280, 


282, H9. 

EI ~tr c Welding, 21 0. 


Eller, Rear Adm. Ern!:'s! McNeill, .... vi. 


Emba rgo against J'po.n; ~e also N!:'utlality 


Acts; 

aircraft parts and armammts, appeals 

against shipm!:'nt, 30; 


"moral," 29; 


oil, 19, H; 


steel Ind scrap shipments, 18, 23. 


Emer!!t'ncy, declara tion of, 


limit!:'d, 19; 


unlimited, 30, 


Euurp,iu (CV-6 ), B, H, 94, Ill , 284, 


320; . 


bombing of Tokyo, 122. 


Ephland, J. M., CSF, 214, 241. 


Eckhoff, Lt. Comdr. Fred!:'rick J., JH. 

Index 	 369 

EWil Field (MUlne airfield), <44 . 46, 62; 


ilirplane damage, 101; 


atlack on, 92, 101. 


Explosions, gasoline, 21 ), 179. 


Export Control Ad (July 1940), 18, , 0. 


Ex-Navajo, 255, 'B~ 3)8, ,61. 


F 

Fa,.raglll ( DO- H8), 55. 362 . 


Fee, It. Comdr. George E., 216. 


Fire- Hazard, 


linoleum removal, 274; 


oil paints removal, 274; 


prolC"(:lion, Ja ck of, ' n. 


Fitzgerald, Comdr. W . F., Jr., 320. 

Fleet Exercises of May 1940; 

held in Hawa ii, 29; 

observation by Japanese, 60. 

Fletche-r, Rear Adm. Frank Jack, I ll. 

FIO.oJing Dry Doc! Numbu Two (YFD- J), 

n. 	104, 1.41, 16 3, 10}-" 21;; 


bombe<l, 163, 20 '; 


damage, 205-6; 


flooding, . 6,; 


hit by Japanese, 104; 


raising, 20,; 


Sllivage and repair, 106; 


submerged for protC"(:tion, 10,; 


suok, 163. 


Ford, En$., 129. 


Ford Island, n. 115 , 141, 164. IS,. 196, 


21}; 


airfield, <44 , 62, 1}9; 


airplane damage, 101; 


attack on, 92, 100-1, 102, 103, 136-7, 


•,8, 147, '48, 1,6, 162, 163, . 66, 


167, 168, '70, T82 ; 


casuallies, Irander to, I } I , ,04; 


dive.dombing, ' 38, 147, 166, 167; 168, 


30 1 ; 


salvage crew qlUrters, 239, 3B; 


wreckage, I02-}. 


FO$ter. Lt., 184. 


Foster, Mr. James, 241, 3H. 


Freeman, Mr. Les, 241, 261. 


Fritschmlnn, LI. George, 140, 142, 143 . 


Fuchida, Comdr. Mitsuo, 88. 


Fuel Oil, 


fires, 109, 129, 1,2, 193, 19', 108, 109. 


2", 297- 8, 3'3, 327; during !llvage 


abo~f<1 Oglala, 2'0; explosion aboard 


DOIb'nn, 208; near C .. lilomi", ' 3', 


142/ 14'; aboard Shaw, 10}; near T en. 


ntSJU, 193; near Yn {"f, 168; near 


WtU Y irgiTl;a, 1", 11>9; on surface 


of water, 12 9. 1,1, '44, "I, I B, 


In, 165, ~97 8; 

r('fTIo"al from ships, 194, 197, 21" 216, 


Fuel Oil-Continued 


21 9, 119. 237, ~H-'. 268, H6, }58. 


360; 


~oo tages, 273. 


Fuqua, U. Comdr. S. G., 139, 30.-5. )06, 


307, 308, ;09· 


Furlon8, Adm. William R., 21, 1,0, 170, 181, 


219, 2<44, 246, 247, 262. 


G 

Gambit (DM-I) ), ", 163, ,G}. 


Gas Huard; see also Nuaa" ," 218, 230, 2", 


2,8. 277- 8, 329, 346, 348-9. 3'.; 


clearing, 337; 


deaths from, 118, 278. P9; 


lead acela te paper, n7: 


lilmus paper detection of, 278, 281: 


protC"(:tion, 278, 337; 


smell, lack of. 118, 278, H7: 


symptoms, H8; 


ventilation, n8. 


Gasoline, 


e"plosion on C"/;Iorni", 22', 279; 


lakage and fires aboard Nt"ada, 21 3-4; 


removal before salvage oper~l on. 179. 


Gavin, Ens. Robert W., 316, 311. 


Generau", Lt. Emile c., 181 , 2P, 241 , 2,2, 


35)· 


General Elec tric Co., 230-1, 138. 282. 


Gillette. Capt. Claude 5., 179, 2}2 . 


Ginel1a , Mr., 241, 261. 


Glover, E. E., GM 2/C, 299. 


Godwin, Capl. D. c., I", }II. 


Graham, D. A., AMM rI c, 307-<]. 


Graham, Ens. Henry, 116. 129 . 


Graham, Mr. Jack, 241, 26. , 3H. 


Gray, PhM., 148 . 


Grayling (55-209), 1I9. 


Grebe (AM-H), 55, 362. 


Gleely, LI. J. W., 224, 132, 2,2, 261, ,,8, 


361. 


Gru r (00-14))' It, 12. 


Gt<!"W, Ambasndor Joseph c., 19. 20, '0, 33· 


Guadakanal, 276, 29 1. 


Guam, 


a(lack warning, 77- 8; 


defeat of bill to improve defenses, 28. 


Guns, 

.30-caliber machine guns, 274; 

.)o·caliber machine guns, <44, 106-7, 1)6, 

In, 1,8; 

I. I-inch, .6,: 


3·inch anti·aircraft. 44, 167. t 68: 


,·inch mobile, 44; 


,·inch, 106-7: 


,-inch lnli·aircraft, 12" 161, 162, 163, 


166, 167, 189; 


,-inch, 51-caliber, 189; 

370 	 bldex 

Guru-Continued 


8·inch, .67; 


'4·inch, 2B; 


37·mm, 44; 


SlalU5o.n December 7. ~1, 106-7, .62 . 


H 

"H" Beams, 2~6. 34'. 


The Hague Convention (1907) , «, 99. a87. 


Haines, Comdr. John M., P3. 


Haleiwa Field CArmy airfidd), 1 0 1 . 


Ha!!, Ens. Benjamin C., 312 . 


Hall, Ens. Cary H .. 311 . 


H ill], c.rp. D. ) ., 262. 


Halsey, Vice Adm. W illiam F., B. H; 


early carrier raids, 111- 2. 

Harris, eM ale, 136. 

Hastrup, Mr. Herman, I . 

Haude, Lt. (jg) P. F.. !'48. 

Haw aii, 

ancestry of citizms. 60' 


attack warning. n; 


dd"ense of, <4 3: 


Fleet Exercises of May 1940, 29; 


housing and u'creational facilities, la cle 


oi, 41 . 

Haynes, Lt. Comdr. H. E., 2 21 , 241, 261, 


177, 361 , 


Hueltan, Ens. [},;mald E , 129. 


Heileman, Raymond A., 321 . 


Hd e"" (CL-~ o ) , ", 16), 171, 244 . 323. 


361, 


damage, 192; 


up..;r, 192; 


to rpedo hit. 103, ,67. 


Htlm (00-,,88 ), ", 161-2 , 362; 


bomb hits, 198; 


dama8e, 198--9; 


near-miss damage, r99; 


repair, 199­

Henderson, Lt. Comdr. Harry H ., 13 S. 


Hendon, Ens. Larry H ., 262 . 


HUIlt y (00-39 1), SS, 163, ,,62. 


Hewitt .Inquiry, 77. 


H ickam Field, H, 6,; 


airplane damage, 10 2; 

attack on, 92, 101 , 10Z, . 66, 182. 


Hill, Edwin J., CMS, 1, 1. 


Hillenkoettef, Comdr. R. H., 119. 


Hilton, BM l /e, 13S . 


Hine, Ens. Jonathan F., 1J9. 


Hirohito, Emperor of Japan, 2I. 


Hi' ] 11 (Japanese), 88, 89. 


Hitler, Adolf, 9-Il, 13. 19, 30. 70. 


Hitol:appu Bay, as, 86, a9. 


Hobby, LI. Comdr. William M., 132-S. 


Hohn, LI. Comdr. A. C. ( MC), 32-4, 32). 


Hoisting Barges, SCI' Lifting Barges. 


Holland, Lt. A. D ., 2S 2. 


Holmes, Lt . (Admiral) Ephraim P., 324. 


Honolulu (CL- 48 ) , SS, 16,-6, r67, 326, 


362 ; 


damage, 19 1; 


hit by J.panese, 104; 


near:m iss damage, 19 1; 


repalI, '9 1. 


Honolulu (dty) , 

bomb damagc, 10,; 

Japanese Coosulate spy ring, 60; 

casualties, 10). 

Horne, 1.1. Comdr. K. F., 206, 232, 318, ; 23. 


Homet (CV-S) bombing of T o"yo, 121 , 


Ill . 

Hulbert (AVD-6 ), n, ;6;. 


Hull (00 -3)0), 'S, 163, 361 . 


Hull, Cordel1 , II, la, 19, 2', 2S, 29. 30, 


31, H, 36, 67, 69· 


Hul1 , 01. Mach. I. M., 303. 


Hunter, Ens. Gl'Qrge M., 126 


Hum, M. T ., AM 3/C, 136--8, 306. 


Hydraulic Jacb, 346. 


Hydrogen Sulfide; ~ Gas Hazard. 


'T ' Bcams, 236, 30404 . 


indianapolis (CA-,,) , B· 


Intrepid (oil barge), "S. 


Isolationism, as, 3S, 292--4. 


Isquith, Lt. Comdr. $olomon S., 1-46--<), 181. 


J 

JaKeman, Lt. (ig) Lloyd F., 312 . 

Jansen. L. M., CMS, l B. 179. 

Japan, 

aggressions, S, 14- 22, 28-31, 33, 69, 76, 


99; Manchukuo, 14, IS; 


aid from Italy, 72 : 


antagonism toward foreigners, 1-4, : 8, 22; 


military buildup, 15, 19 ; 


m01l1 embargo against, 19; 


relations with Russia, 69, 99, 18,; 


U.S. knowledgc of, 6s . 

Jap,anese Attacl: Force; see also Japanese 

Fled; 


approach of, a)-7; 


I5sembly of, 8~. 86; 


call signals, 72- 4; 


count measur~, 74; 


departure for Pearl Harbor, a5; 


location of, 72- 4; 


radio deception, 8,; 


radio silence, a" 


refueiins , 86; 


route of, 89; 


ships, 88; 


war·game baud play, 8S . 


Japanese 	 Consulate in Honolulu, espionage 

ring, 60. 
Index 	 371 

.p.n~ Fl~ ; see . 1$0 Japll\~ Attack Force; 

deployment before hostilitir5, 78; 

~Iimat~ of st~lh by U.S., B; 

Support Force, 88. 

l ,m 'is (DO-}9}) , ". 16}, }62. 


Je1l$m, V. 0 ., GM , }17. 


Johnston, Lt. Comdr. D. H ., 2}l. 


JontS, Lt. Hal C , 181. 


JontS, Ens. Herbrrt C., I H - 6. 


Jonts, Comdr. W . G., 20). 


Joys. Ens. Hartley, 316. 


K 

Kable, Ens. Donald M., 1)8. 


Kala (Ja pan~ ) , 88. 


Kaneohe Air Field (seaplane airfield), 44: 


airplane damase, 101; 

att ack on, 92, 101. 


KU'fI'Y (00-432 ) , 1l. 


Keenum, LI. (ig) C. W., '33-4, 1}6, 261. 


Ke[[o88-Briand PaC! ( 1928) , ' }, 14. 


Kenworlhy, Comdr. ). L., 1}2- }. 


Keounqua (AT- ,8), 363. 


Kern', Jean W ., HS I/C, 148. 


Kidd, Rear Adm. hue C., I ) ), 21>9. 
 Kimmel, Admiral Husband E., 76, 290; 


re ri ~ed of command, 1' 7: 


$e('Urily orders, issuance of, 76-7, 99; 


succession 10 command, .2. 


King, Adm. ErneSl )., 6., 119"-20. 122. 


Knight, LI. Comdr. Levi J., Jr.• 1}9. 3)4. 


KnoK, 5«retary of the Navy, Frank, 76, 


114- ) . 


Konoye, Premier, Ayamaro. 19, la, 76. 


Konoye: Cabinet, lu ignltion of, 19, 77. 


Kranzfelder, Comdr. E. P.• (3), 1~', 176, 


31 9-20, 324. 


Kurusu, Mr. Saburo. 20-1, 69. 


L 

"Ldie," see Oglall (CM-4) . 


Lane. Glenn H.. RM }/ c, T }7, 30,. 


Larson, Gunner Arnold, 211, 2,2. 


La rson, Comdr. G. H .. 148. 


LIUI, Lt. Frank D.. 2)2. 


League of Nations, 


denunciation by Germany, II ; 


sanctions against Italy, I }: 


withdrawal by Japan. 1,- 6. 


Leak, L. N., CPhM, 1l9. 


Leech, Lt. H. H ., 261 . 


Lend·Lease Act (March 1941), }O, }); 


•id to Russia, 35 ; 

d~lroyer trarufer to Great Britain, 34-'. 


Lennig, Eru. G. B .. 30, . 


leTendre, Chid, 184 . 


u-,..is, Ens. W . A. J., 313. 


l..Ixilflfolf (CV- 2) 46, H, 62, 121, 290. 


Lied!trand, Lt. ( jg) Ea rl H.. 24r, lP, 261, 


3)3, 3,.· 


Liflins Barges, 181 . 
2,.,. 
 "Limited OfJtnsive" Policy, n0-2 . 


Lindstrom. LI. F. E., 26 . , 36 •. 


Link, W. T., SF I/C, ,01. 


Linn, Elee. Ray 5., 310. 


Liule, LI. Comdr. M. N., 140-). 


Locarno Treaty (192') , 10. 


Lombardi, Ens. TfK.Imu A.• 129 . 


London Naval Conference ( 19" -19}6), 
I'. " long Tom;" Stt . lso Torptd~. J apanne: 

276, 291. 


Low, Capt., E, 5., bombing of Tokyo, 122 


Ludlow Constitutional Amendment. 27. 


M 

M arDo1/0Jllh (00-3) 1) , )), 362. 


Machine Guns, Amtrican, un , '12), 1)0, In, 


161 . 162. 16" 166, 167, 170; 


30.caliber, 168, 27,.; 


)o-caliber, 106. 16 1, 167. 


M2chinc Guns, JaIn-nese; see .11iD Stralins. 90, 


}04: 


7.7·mm, 91, 92: 


l O·mm, 9 1, 92 . 


MacSelwinty, TcrranCt, CMM, 148, 178. 


"Magic;" see Codes, Diplomatic and "Purple" 


Messages. 


M.han, Carp. W. A.. 181, 211, 221, 222, 


2,0, lp. 


Mandelkorn, Lt. Richard S., I)), 176, 319, 


310, }21, }24· 


Manthei, Gunner Roman G., 263, 267. 


Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 1937), 


'6. Mari ne Railway, dama8ed by USS PIJl1/gtr, 

2 ) 2-3. 

Marshall, General George c., 79. 

Martin, Maj. Gen. P. 1., ,.). 

Matlin.Bellinger Ordcr for Ddense of Pearl 

Harbor, ,." 77. 

M4,yl,."d (B6-46), ", u 6, 1}2- 3, I~,., 

I", 141, IH. l )l-), 16., 16" 177, ; 18­

27, }6" 362; 


damage, 192; 


hit by fragmentation bomb, I", 16,; 


hit by Japanese, 10,.; 


repair, 192 . 


SS 	 MlI.llarhUJtlls; ~ . Iso Oglala (CM- .>' 


24' · 
 McClelland, Ens. Thomas A .. l Oa . 


McClung, Lt. M. L., 2, 2 . 


McConnell, Mr., 230. 


McDonald, Adm. David L., 290. 


McDonlid, Elec. R. V., 262 . 


McDowell, Comdr. Ralph S., 18 1. 


McGrath, Ens. Thomas P.• 309, 318. 


Mcilhenny, William, 183 . 

372 Index 

McNalley, Lt. Comdr. Jam" It., ng. 2P, 


239, 241 , lH; 


salvage of electric·drive ml(hin~, 

339-41. 


MtPlls. (AR-l), H. ,63; 


repair of T ",I/ru", '94. 


Merchant Skips, American, 


Ilfl Ck by GtTffi.ny. II, 30; 


bombing by j apan, 16, 31; 


prohibition Igain$t trade, 18. 


Midway Island, 43. 46; 


diversion of air strength to. ~o, H. 109, 


291. 

Milillry Anisl'Me by UnilM Stlt~ 

10 China, H , )); 

to Gre1t Brilain and Frlrw;:c, ,,-,. 

Military Buildup; ~ also Sde<livc SerVice 


. nd Training Act, and Pearl Harbor, 27-8, 


,6, n: 


airplane con§truccion, n; 


personnel in(rclSe, 36; 


Reserves . nd National Guard callup. :a8, 


Millet, "

Doris, . MAt! :a /c, 129. 1)1. 


Miller, Ens. J. D., }O), ,08, 309. 


Miller, Ch. Elt<. R. W ., "'-7. 


Miller, S. It, CYN, )09-10. 


Minor, Carp. Warner M., 261 . 


M IIS()lIri (88-6,), 242, 293 . 


Milsche!, Capt. (Admiral) Marc, Ill, 122. 


M Ol/alhal/ (DD-}H). )~, 101. 168, 36,. 


M Ol/tlomery (DM- I1 ), ", ~6~. 

Montgomery, A. F.• GM I/C. J2 . 

Moore. Lt. Robert R., rH. 


Manis, It. (jg) L P., 161. 


Mlillord (DD-}89). ~~, 6~, 361. 


Muller. 2nd Lt. William G., Jr., }OO. 


Munich Pact (Sept. 19}8), 10. 


Murfin, Rear Adm. Orin G., IS}. 


Mussolini. Benito, 10, 1l-3, 19. 10, 11. 11. 


N 

Nagano. Adm. Durni; Chief of Japl~ 

General Staff; 83, 8,. 


Nlgumo, Vice Adm. Chuichi, 8), 90, 96, 290. 


N",w,lul (55-,6,), ", }61. 


N"Jh,,;/I, (Cl-}2 ), bombing of Tokyo, 122 . 


Nalional Industrial Recovery Act, 11, }6. 


N"",,;o (AT-64) , 'B, 316. 363. 


Naval Buildup: $ee abo National Industrial 


Recovery Act and Vinson-Trammel Act; 

divenion to Atlantic, ~o; 

Pacific Fleet. ,0-1, '4; 

patrol, 29, 3), H; 

ship construction, 11, }6-" ,0; 

Task Forces strength, )2-3: 

training for hostilities. )0, ) 1; 

transfer of ships 10 Allantic, p; 

Two-Ocean Navy, 31, ,2. 

Naval Personnel. 

casualties, 108; 

on dUly II time of IttlCIi:, 10,. 

NnE·Miss Damage, 103, 162, 166, 169. 111. 


'91, 198, 10" 2]3, 22,. lH. 


Ntorh/J (AD- 13), ", 36,. 


Neutra!ity Acts of 19}' and 1937, 68: 


amendment to. H; 

repeal of trms embargo, 29. 


Neudorf. W . F., Jr. 5 I/C. 1,2. 


NtI,ad" (BB-36), ", 14 ' . , ,0-,. 1,6, 163, 


164, 169, 18 1, 103, 206, 222. 23\. }20, 


311, ,61; 


battle record, 221 ; 


bomb hiu, 1,0-1,2 11; 


counterflooding, Ill: 


damage. 212- 4, 116. no: 


fatalities during salvage, 1T8: 


gas hazard, 2'8, 271-8. B7, 348: 


grounding. "a, I~I, 113; 


hit on boat deck, IH: 


hit by Japlne:!t, 104; 


pat c~ for torpedo hole. 183, 219: 


repair, 214, 121 : 


sah·age. 214. 121; 


torpedo hit, 1,0, lll, 113; 


window frame p.tch, 117. 


Newland. T/ 5gt, 18,. 


New Mt,,;ro (BB-40). 61. 


"New Order;" :!t'e .Is.o Triplrle Pact ; I}, 


18, 19, 70, 71. 


New Ode."s (CA-p) . ". 16}, l<i7. }(,1 


N~ton. Rear Adm. J. H., H . 


"Nibble Theory," 9-- 10. 


Nightiogale, Cpl. E. C., 306-7. 


Nimit!. Adm. Chester W ., 211, 219. 2~6 . 

147, 284, 190. 


assumption of command al Commander·in· 


Chief Plcific Fleet. 118, 11 9: 


Jimi!~ offensive policy. 120--1. 


Nioe·Power Tre.ty of 1922: see also Wuh. 

ington Trnty for the Limitation of Naval 

Ann.ment; 14, ", 16. 

Ni:.:. J. P., S I/C, 3 12 . 

Nomura. AmbuSlidor Kichisaburo. 19. 6,. 

69· 

Nordquisl, 8osn. Arthur William. ~61. 

Norlh C''''olim, (BB-H ), construction. 36. 

Nye Committee. 26. 

o 

Oglala (CM-~ ) , H, n. 10), 1,0, 110--1. 


181 , 192, 20}. 24}, 24~, 141, 2,8, 262 . 


362: 


air pressure in SlIlvage attempt, 24~ -~; 

battle record, 2'1; 


capSizing. 103, 171, 244: 


((Ilfeldam, 248; 


damage. 1~~: 
Index 	 373 

OKIIli" (CM-4) --Conlinued 

~l«tric motor IIlvag~, 2)0; 

fi re during nlvag~, 2)0 ; 

history, 24~-4; 

n~ar·miss, 10};· 

rdioaling, ,~ 6-8, 149, 1)1; 

roinking, 249; 

righting, 246; 

Sllvag~ and ~plir, 2H-P. 

Oil·Skimming, 1}O, l }1, ~ 9, 319· 

OH"hoM" (BB-n), )), 109. 126, 132-6, 


14l, '43, IH-164, 16" 176, 177, 191,215, 


28~, 300-4, } I R, }19, }21, } H , Pl. 


31', ,61; 


abandon ship, lB. }OO; 


bomb hilS, IB; 


("lIpsi~ing . IB, In, 136, 143, IB, } .G, 


3,6; 


roff~ldlm, In; 


darnag~, lB, 1", 262. }57; 


d«ommiSJion~d, 26 .; 


dry·docking. 160-1; 


.,.plosion, '}" 


first attack, 161, }02; 


losl .1.1 sea, 161; 


r.,lIoating, 157-60; 


rCS<\l., parties, 177: 


righting, "4- 7, "7; 


53lvag., plan ,,6-61; 


511V18C and t~pajt, 1'3-61, 174, 279; 


sold for 5(tlp, 16.; 


to!pf"<io hiU, 10}, l B. I n. 1,6. 257, 


30 1 ; 


tnlppnl mm aboard. I }). I )), 176-8. 

0ldmdorf. Rur Adm. J. B., Ill. 

Oni)hi. R~1It Adm. Takijiro (Chid of Staff 

of Japanes~ Elevmth Air flet't), 8}. 


O"/"rio (AT-I}). 36}. 


Ordnance Material; see also Ammunition; 


removal. 163. 168; 


r«ov~ry. 186; 


salvage, 181, 186, 274-'; 


Jhortages. 274. 


Orloltln (ASR-), 219, 21 1, 248, lp. "9· 


p 

Pacific Bridge Company; see also Und~r· 

...·ater Concrete; 181, 192, 219. 288, ln, 


241 . 251, 114, 261, 28" 343. 314, 3'6, 


3n. ,,~. 361. 


Pacific Fleet. 41 -3, 44, 47-8, ,0-1, 60, 63, 


84; 


installation of radar, 48; 


Japanese esdmlle of damage, 96; 


Joution on «~mber 7, 1941 , H - 6; 


at Pearl Harbor at end of war, 189; 


pe SOllll~1 on board at time of attack, 


,06; 


u'storation of mor.l~. 120-2; 


Padfic Fl~t Continued 

strength, ,1-4: 

warning to, 74-9. 

Paine, Capt. Ros~r W., 261. 


Painter, LI. lfr~d L. 224. 2}1-2, 241. 353. 


314· 


p"""J (PR- ), 16, 17, H, 67· 


Parker. Lt. Comdr. C. M, (MC), llo, 1", 


H7, 3}8. }48. 

Parktr, W . W., S lIe. 138. 

Patching; see .lso "Windo.... Fra.mes" I nd 

Und~rw.tct COnc et~; 183, 110, 114. 119, 


tu. 2}4, 13). 136. 137. 248, 1)7, 340, 


~H . 

Patrol Wins TWO, 44, 4 ), 46, 100. 


P.flrm'" (00-392), n, 362. 


Pearl Harbor, 


attack, I' , 4', 100- 1, 136, 182-6; 


alternatives to, 113: 


.ss~mbling of attack for(~, 8,; 


diredion of, 94; 


fffea on Amerio.n peopl~, 3-4, I I }, 


190: 

for~1 of, 66; 


J.panese estim.t~ of damage, 96; 


Japanese koowledse of damaSf, II ). 


likelihood of, )9. 66, 78, "3; 


notifiution of hiSh .pan~se officials, 


84; 

ortler fo r. 87 ; 

purpose of, h, 92: 

r.d" det«lion, 49: 

rumors of, 6); 

WH gaming, 84; 

warning of, 19. 20, 7), 76-7, 80,99· 

Naval Base, 109. 18 1, 19'. 198, 261, 


277. 	 28 1-2, 28,. 344. 354; 


air nlid drills, 4); 


.ir r«onn.tissanc~, 44-8; 


anti·.ircraft, 44 ; 


anli·.irc(::lft dd"~n5t, 76-7; 


op.bilitie, after attack, 109; 


cnmmendalion (or sa1v18e work, 


184 ; 

cooperation betwem Army and 

Navy, H; 

d'ffil.8~. '44 ; 

defenses. status of, 41-,6; 

d~"~lop~t IS na\'al base, 41 ; 

d«tlic motors, repair of, 282, ,,0; 

f.cilities, improvement of, ) 1; 

insiAnia, 180; 


Japanese inte\lisenee on, 6o, 6}-4; 


Japanese miJI.kes, 288, 191-2; 


}apan~se tral ~gy, 83-4: 


naval Sl rC1lglh, ) 1-6; 


~.diness on D«C1llber 7, 1941, 46, 


H-6; 


,tltUS, )1: 

Index 

Pearl Harbor-Contiuued 

N aval as~lll ill ued 

slalus after e<~ber 7, 194', 109; 

submarill~ nets, 44; 

suitability, 41. 

Pearl Harbor Repair and S;.Jvage Unit; see 

also Oeslroyer Repair Units I and n, and 

Lc. Comdr. K. F. Horne; 206, 2'0, 231, 

239, 3'4· 

Peli,,! (AS-14) , " 1<'9, 363. 


p''IIIlI]Vallia (B8-3S). ", 61, 163, 16" 


IS3-4, 190, 191, 206, 210, 313, 362 ; 

bomb hits, 190; 

bomb through boat deck, ,65; 

damage and usu,hies, 166. 189--90; 

hit by Japanese, 104; 

repair, 189-90. 

Pur] (OMS-q), ", 363. 


Personal property of casualti es, handling of, 


11~ , lIS, 239, 180, 349, 360. 

P~=n, Lt. CA., 3' 4. 

··Petunia;" see also YG-r6; 179. 

Plingstag, Lt. Comdr. Herbert, 176. 


Phelps (00-360 ) , n, 362. 


Phili ppines, 


air strength, increase in, 49-,0, 79: 


attack on, 109; 


defenses, improvement of, 43, 79: 


warning of Japanese attad:, 78.


Photni/C (CL- 46 ) , n, 166, ,2"
 362. 

P/,lllgU (S5-J 79). 241, 353: 

repair, 2,2- 3. 

Pontoons, 

lifting, 3n--8; 

salvage, 146, 1'4, 160. 

Pr,ble (OM- l0), '5. 163, 363. 

Pre<autionary Measures. fot vessels dry 

docked in wat zone, 10<). 

Prepan~dness of United States, 4, 1~-38, 41; 

aircraft buildup. ;6-7; 

calling up Reserves lnd National Gua rd, 

18; 

industri al mobilizatinn, 36- 7: 

lack of, 116; 

military capabilities, 36; 

military curlailment, 26; 

plan for war with J apan, H, 113: 

··The Prune Barge;·· see also Caiifornilt; 111 . 

Price, S 2/(, ; 12 . 

Price, E. V., CEM, 3 17. 

P,inr, 0/ w.!..~ (British), 109. 

Pr"it/ (OM-ll ), n, 362. 

Puccio, SF 3/c, 299. 

'·Pudding,'· 128, 1,S. 

Puge( Sound, 

repair of Nef,ada, :1.21; 

working party, 23S. 

Pumps, 192, 204, 3I1, 31 ~ : 

Pump5--Continued 

cleaning with, 330-1; 

deep·wel l. 118, 2", 236, 139, 25S, 173, 

~; 

mud, removal nf, 260; 


oil, removal of, 116, n8; 


shortage of, 189, 22 ', 173; 


submersible, 274; 


$uction, It', 21 8, 239. 


Pu rdy, LI. Frederick W ., 316. 

··Purple·· Messages, 66-72, 79: 

mea ning of, f1 3: 

transmittal to Hawaii, 78--80. 

Pye, Vice Adm. William S., ,2, 144, 179 

180; 

$uCCCl'ds Adm. Kimmel. • '7-8. 

Py ro (AE-I), 36,. 

R 

Radar, 

air raid defense, 49: 

detection of Japanese attack, 49-50; 

effe<tiveneu, 49-}0; 

importance, 4S; 

installation of, 48; 

joint Army·Navy training, 49: 

operatinn scltedule, 49; 

wmrning service, 49. 

Radio, 

deceptiOn. 71- 4, 8 ,; 

silence, 74. s,; 

traffic, monitoring of, 72-4. 

Rltil (AM-16), 169, 362. 


Rainbo,,' Plan, lSS. 


Rltl .. igh ( CL- 7). ' 5, 148. , 6" 178, 32~, 

362; 


bomb hi t. 196; 


damage, 19)-7; 


nu r.miss dRmage, 197: 


repairs, '97 ; 


torpedo hit, 103, 167. ,68, 19). 


Ralph Talbot (00-390), ~~ • • 63, 361. 


Ramapo (AO-u), " , ,69, ,6:;. 


RltIflSll] (OM- I0 ), ", 163, 363: 


Reanbn, Capt. C. E., 1)6-8. 


~,Jbird (AMc-30), 363 . 


Reiley, Ens., 316. 


Reid (DD- 369) , ~~, 16;, 361 


Rep"lu (British), 109. 


Re"b"l1 Jam .. s (00-24), 12. 


Rhodes, Lt. Comdr. Charles W ., 241 , 2P, 33 5. 


Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 70, 7'. 


Ri cc. Mr. Bert, 241, 354 . 


Richardson, Adm. Joseph 0., 


long,"nge re<onnai.ssance, nCl'd for, 

46--8; 

presence of fleet at Pearl Harbor, 41-2. 

Ricketts, Lt. (Adm.) Oaude V., 126-9, t;r, 

199, 300. 
Index 375 

Rickoye!, Comdr. Hyman G ., 230. 


Rigel (AR-6 ), 55, 15~, . 67, ' 69, 177, 3iS} . 


Roberts. Justice Owen; i!C'e abo Roberts Commission; TT~ . 

Roberts Commission, 60, 1I,-iS, 170; 

erroneous testimony before, ro~. 

Rodgers, Comdr. James H., 178, T81 . 


Rommel, Ens. H. F., .'OT. 


Rood, Capt. G. 5., r67. 


Roosevelt, President Frank[in, 10, 1 3, 10, lI, 


28-31, 34-', <h, 69, 71, 1l3, uiS. 


Rountree, W. H.. F l/e, 318. 


Rucker, SF. I1S. 


Ruff, Lt. L. E., 1)1 . 


S 


Sabin, Comdr. Lorenzo, S., 3'9. 


Sabota!:e, 


a[erl, 101: 


Army prepuations against, '16: 


lack of, 10S"""9. 


S"""tnmlo (PG-19 ), )). ;63· 


SI. Lo"h (CL- 49) , )), 167, 362. 


Salvage D i" is ion 2:6, 111, U 9, 131, 241 , 


277, lS r-4· 


Salvage Project Offic rs, 179, 181 . 


Salvage Uniform, 218, 230, 3~, lS,; 


litmus paper, u~ of, 278. 181 . 


S"" F,a"dJ(o (CA-38), )), 163, 168, 36 2. 


Scanland, Capt. F. W ., 1 )0. 


5rhle)" (DD-t03), n, 362. 


Scou. Robert, 3'7· 


Sedferry, R., CQM. 1)2. 


Se1usie, Emperor Hai[e, 12 . 


Se!ecti"e S<:rYice and Training Act (Sept. 


1940), 18, 37: 


extension of (Aug. '941), 37. 


St ll,idgt (OD-3n ), n, ; 61 . 


Senior. Pvt. A. E., 145-6. 


"Shangri·La," HZ. 


Shapley, Maj . Alan, 307 . 


Shaw (OO-.H3), )', 14 1. 163. 203. 362; 


bau[e record, 20~ : 

bomb hits, 10,; 


burning, 10 ) ; 


damage, 203-4; 


explosion, .6}, 203, 113; 


hit by Japanese, 104; 


installation of false bow, 104; 


.~a lvage and repair, 204- ) . 


SS ShaU"IIIIII ; S('C Oglala (CM- 4); 2044. 


Shelton, S lIe , 312. 


Shimazaki, LI. Comdr., 88. 


Ship mo\"em~nts, Japanese r~poru on, iSo-}. 


Shol .. R .. (JaJlane~), 88. 


Short. Lt. G~n. WI[ter, 


policy on radar re.:on naissance, 49; 


relie\"ed of command, lq. 


Sira~J ( OM-H), )), 16}, ,6,. 

Siewart, A. A., CSM, 129. 

Simonsen, 2nd Lt., 306. 

Skillman. Comdr. Johll H ., 310. 

Sliding, Pre\"cnlion. 1)6, 3~8. 

Smith, Capt. Allan E., 180, 31). 


Smith, Bosn. ). c., 261 . 


Smith. Lt. (jg) Virgil, 26a. 


Smilh, BM 2/e, 30S. 

Smith, Rear Adm. W . W .. 77. 

Snow, Ens. R. H ., 262. 


SO/aU (AH- ). )), 138, 167, 186, 363 · 


Solar, A., BM ./ e, Ip. 


"Sons of He;ayen,'· rr3. 


S"r}'/i (Jap~nC$e), 88. 89. 


SOloJomo (YTM""""9 ) ; 


lires. 206; 


fr~gment ation danuge, 106; 


alvag~ and repair, 206. 


Spear. LI. William R., 18,-4. 

Staff, W. F., MM 2/ {, 13)-6. 

Stark, Lt. (ig) H . B., 298--9. 

Stark, Adm. Haro[d R., 73, 79, 120. 


Steam Blanket, to prevcnt explosions during 


welding Or cutting, 2)4-" 279, 358. 


Steele, Comdr. J ames M.. 179. r8I. 


Stel ter, Lt. Comdr. F. c., J r .. 181, 26,. 


StOne. Comdr. Earl E., 143. 


Stores, rcmov,[ from unwatered ships, 230, 


138, 28 1. 


Stover, C. E., CQM, 309. 


Strafing, 90-2, 101, 138, Iof}, 147-9. 


• )8 . •61, 1(>9, q8, a 77. 297, 3(1~, 308. 


Submarine. German campaign against mer· 


chant ships, I I. 


Submarines, Japanese, 


ao ti·submarine search, 46, 163; 


attack by, 88; 


damage inAicted by, 94; 


defen~ Igainst. 044; 


'·Iype, 88, 94; 


ineff~tiven ess, 182. 29 ' ; 


losst":5, 9); 


mid8ct, 6~, 8.1-), 94. 107, 161, 168, 


169: 


Midget Submarine No. 19, 9~; 

near Pearl Harbor, 84, B), 100, 10 1, 162, 


163 ; 


sighting, 100. 162. 198; 


sin1<ing. 100, 107. r6 1. 


Submarines, United SlUes, 11>9- 70; 

damage to Japanese' shipping, 291; 

Observation and Attack Force, B; 

organization, B . 

Subnlarine nets, 44. 


Sugg. Lt. Proctor A., 241. 


Sumntr (AG-3 2), ", 163, 170, 36 3. 


Simnadi" (AT- 28), )), 363. 


, 
376 	 Index 

Survivors, rap~ ;n sunken ships, '3', 1}6, 

148, IH. 176-8. 


Swain, Capt. Charles D., IS" . 


Swan (AVP- 7), 168, 36}. 


Sweavey, eM I/e, 317. 


Szymanski, Mach. Stanley Andrew, 148, 178. 


T 

Taj Sing Loo, .82--6. 


Tllnaltau (Japanese), 89. 


Tllnlitr CAV-8), '5, 36}. 


Tu le Force I; also Vice Adm. W. S. Pye, 


Commander Battle Force; ,2. 

Task Force II; ~ also Vice Adm. William 

S. Halsey, Commander Aircraft Battle 

Force; H. 

Task Force liT; see also Vice Adm. Wil50n 

Brown, Commander Scouting Force; B . 


Taussig. Ens. J K., Jr., 1)2. 


Tall/ot (S~ 99), 'j'j, ' 70, 362. 


Taylor. Ens. Thomas H., ~2 . 

T«lyl. 218, 119, 230, 330, 33 1- 2, 334. 336, 


339, 3'0; 


redamation of, 331, 336. 


Tell, Lt. (ig) ~er E., 261. 


Tnt71tlSu (BB-43), ,'j, II4, 116, 128, I}I, 


' 41, 	 ' B. 1,6-8, ,6". 16" 181, 23', 32 1, 


323. 	 326, 327, 3~2, 36~; 

bomb hits, 165, 19"; 


damage, 192- ,,; 


fires from Ariz",na, ~6, 193; 


flooding of magazine, ' 93. 


hit by Japanese, 10,,; 


rePllirs, '9". 


Ten·Ten Dock, "', ' 70, 192, 2"", 301, p2. 


Teredo Wonns, damage to ships, 1,8. 


T~n (AM-p ) , IB, 316, ,62. 


Thayer, Comdr. Rufus G., 17S, lS I . 


Thomas, SF I/C, 136. 


Thomas, LI. Comdr. Francis )., 150, t ~1. 

Thomas, Ens. William S., I:!S, 


Thompson, Comdr. H. 1., aI). 


Th()rn/()n (AVD-II), ", 163, ,6,. 


Tojo, Gen. Hidelci, 19, 22, '9, 66, 76, 181, 


lSS. 

Tokyo, bombing of, 112. 

Tone (Japancse), 89. 

Torpedoes, Amrric:an, 

compared to Japanese. 276-7; 


failu re to rxplodr, 277. 


Torpedoes, Japanese, ", 103 , 13S. 1,2, 167, 


'69, 	19', 276-7, 30, ; 


attack, 101; 


effectiveness, 92, 276; 


failure 10 explode, 276; 


from submarines, 9"; 


from midget submarines, S,; 


low altitude, S,,; 


;n mud nk, 16.; 


Torpedoes, Japanese-Continued 


operatiOnal depth, 103-", 


oxygen, (Ue of, 92, 276; 


ret:overy of, 103; 


shorl run, . 03. 


torpedo, Son-k.ilogram aerial, 90, 9 1, 1"7, 


192, 2",,; 

wooden fins, S", I O}. 

Torpedo Bombing; see Airplanes, Japanese 

and Torpedoes, Japanese. 


Torpedo NelS; 60, 6;, S4, 92. 


Tracy (DM- I?), ", 163, 363. 


Train, Capt. Harold C, 179'-


Tremie Process; see also Underwater Concrete: 


136, 2"" 1,S. 

T m'u (DM5- 16), n, 363. 

Tripartite Pact (27 Sept. 19"0); ~e also 

"New Order;" 3, 13, '9, 67-8, 70, 71, 


71; 

Japan joins, IS; 

Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary join, 

II, 	I;. 


Truman, President Harry, 29-4. 

Tucker (DD-.H4). ", 163, 362. 


Tur!uy (AM- I;), 361. 


Tyng, Ens., ,'~. 

u 

Underwater Concrele, lH, 2n-6, 2)S, H~' 

in lieu of coffeldams, . SI. 


Unwatered Compartments, 329. 


Unwalered Machinery, nO-I. 


Ufakau (JapaneJe). 89. 


Urbaniak, Carp. Edmund Leo, 162, 26S. 


Utah (AG-16 ), ~" 94, 146-9, .61 , . 6 7, 


168, '76, 178, 196, 262- 267, 283, }~6, 

~63; 

abandon ship, 147; 


bomb Nplos;on, 147; 


capsizing, 103, 1"7: 


ga~ huard. }37; 


ft'SCue parties, ' 49; 


righting, 264- 6: 


salvage and repair, postponemenl of, , 63; 


training proj«t, 16~-c; 

trapped survivors. 148, 176; 


torpedo hil, 103. 147, 161, 168. 


v 


Vaessen, John B., F 2/ e, .,,8, '7S. 


VanValk.enburgh, Capt. Franklin, 'n. 
 V~ga (AK-17), 363. 


Vrntilation; ~e also Gas Hazard; 22), 278, 


338. 


durin...: salvage, 119, 239, 179, 3~9, n6, 


339, H9, 3'''· 


Versailles, Treaty of, 	 10. ll; 

mandates to Japan, 14. 
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