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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. OTERRIO R. BROWN

(AC 41139)

Alvord, Devlin and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted under two informations of the crimes of breach of peace in the

second degree, criminal violation of a protective order and assault in

the third degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant’s

convictions stemmed from two incidents, which occurred a few days

apart, in which he assaulted his roommate at their apartment in a dispute

involving the defendant’s wife. After the first alleged assault, the trial

court issued a protective order against the defendant, and shortly thereafter, the defendant violated the order by assaulting the victim again.

During voir dire, the state characterized the allegations against the

defendant as ‘‘domestic violence,’’ and ‘‘family violence,’’ to which the

court advised the state against using such language. Thereafter, the state

described the allegations as a ‘‘dispute between roommates.’’ On appeal,

the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly granted

the state’s motion for joinder of the cases for trial by allowing the jury

to consider prejudicial evidence of two different crimes and that the

trial court improperly allowed the state to use prejudicial language

during voir dire questioning, violating his federal right to a fair trial. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the state’s motion

for joinder, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that joinder resulted

in substantial prejudice to him; the two incidents leading to the charges

against the defendant were discrete and easily distinguishable, even

though they concerned the same victim and defendant, the record demonstrated that the events occurred at different times and locations, and

resulted in different injuries, and although the assaults were violent,

the defendant could not prevail on his claim that both assaults were so

brutal or shocking as to interfere with the jury’s ability to consider each

offense fairly and objectively.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his right

to a fair trial was violated when the trial court allowed the state to use

prejudicial language during its voir dire questioning of potential jurors

and, thereafter, allowed the facts of the case to be introduced in an

effort to remedy the use of the prejudicial language; the introduction

of phrases such as ‘‘domestic violence,’’ ‘‘family violence,’’ and a ‘‘dispute

between roommates’’ was not improper because the defendant did not

dispute that the alleged crimes concerned disputes between roommates

and the title of the protective order, which was admitted into evidence,

referred to family violence, and, therefore, under the circumstances of

the present case, the defendant failed to prove that a constitutional

violation existed and that he was deprived of a fair trial.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s

request for a continuance at the start of trial to accommodate the presence of a witness that the defendant claimed was crucial to his defense

of property argument; because the defendant’s request was made at the

last moment, substantial delay of the jury trial was likely to result if

the request had been granted, there was no guarantee from the defendant

that the witness would have appeared had the request for the continuation been granted, and the defendant, at the time of the ruling, did not

provide any additional reasoning for the importance of the witness’

testimony, which had been discussed at earlier proceedings, nor did he

make any representation regarding the witness’ specific testimony.

Argued September 10, 2019—officially released January 14, 2020

Procedural History

Information, in the first case, charging the defendant

with the crimes of breach of the peace in the second

degree and failure to appear in the second degree, and

information, in the second case, charging the defendant
with the crimes of criminal violation of a protective

order, assault in the third degree and breach of the

peace in the second degree, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, geographical

area number four, where the court, K. Murphy, J.,

granted the state’s motion for joinder; thereafter, the

matter was tried to the jury; verdicts and judgments of

guilty of two counts of breach of the peace in the second

degree and of criminal violation of a protective order

and assault in the third degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

J. Patten Brown, III, for the appellant (defendant).

Linda F. Currie-Zeffiro, assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s

attorney, and Marc Ramia, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

BEACH, J. The defendant, Oterrio R. Brown, appeals

from the judgments of conviction, following a jury trial,

of two counts of breach of the peace in the second

degree, and of violation of a protective order and assault

in the third degree. The defendant claims that the court

improperly (1) granted the state’s request for joinder

of the two informations; (2) allowed the state to use

prejudicial language during the voir dire process; and

(3) denied the defendant’s request for a continuance.

We disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. On January 22, 2016, two police officers, Paul Calo

and Kyle Cosmos, were called to a location in Waterbury

to respond to a domestic disturbance. The officers found

the defendant and the victim at the scene.1The defendant

had blood on his shirt and a cut under his eye. When

asked by Cosmos what had occurred, the defendant

responded that there had been an altercation between

him and the victim. The defendant further explained

that he believed that the victim was sending naked

photographs of himself to the defendant’s wife, Grace

Quackenbush, so the defendant ‘‘kind of went at him

with clenched fist.’’ After speaking with the defendant,

the officers observed a trail of blood that led from the

kitchen to the back hallway where the victim was found.

Cosmos testified that the victim had a swollen left cheek

and a bloody nose. The officers arrested the defendant.2

He was charged with breach of the peace in the second

degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a)

(2), and, subsequently, a charge of failure to appear in

the second degree3

in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-173 (a) (1) was added.

At a hearing on January 25, 2016, the trial court issued

a protective order. The defendant was ordered not to

have contact with the victim. The prohibition also

included refraining from assaulting, threatening, abusing, harassing, following, or returning to the victim’s

home. Approximately thirty minutes after the issuance

of the protective order, the defendant returned to the

victim’s home. Shortly thereafter, the police received

a call regarding an incident at this location. Police found

the victim outside the house, screaming that the defendant had just beaten him up. The officers also observed

blood in the snow and physical injuries to the victim,

including a swollen cheek and blood on his teeth. Calo

testified that these injuries were in addition to those

that he had observed on January 22, 2016.4 The defendant was arrested and charged with criminal violation

of a protective order in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-223a; breach of the peace in the second degree

in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (2); assault in the third

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1);

and failure to appear in the first degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-172 (a) (1).
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion for joinder of

the separate informations, and the court granted the

state’s motion. After a week long jury trial, the defendant was convicted of breach of the peace in the second

degree regarding the January 22, 2016 incident. He also

was convicted of criminal violation of a protective

order, breach of the peace in the second degree, and

assault in the third degree arising from the January

25 incident. The defendant was sentenced to a total

effective sentence of ten years of incarceration, execution suspended after two years, followed by three years

of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and

procedural history will be set forth as needed.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly

granted the state’s motion for joinder. He contends that

combining the two informations substantially prejudiced him according to the factors set forth in State v.

Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 722–24, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987).

The state counters by asserting that the Boscarino factors were not met and that the evidence in this case

was cross admissible. We agree with the state that the

Boscarino factors were not met.5

We first set forth the appropriate standard of review.

‘‘The principles that govern our review of a trial court’s

ruling on a motion for joinder . . . are well established.

Practice Book § 41-19 provides that, [t]he judicial

authority may, upon its own motion or the motion of

any party, order that two or more informations, whether

against the same defendant or different defendants, be

tried together. . . . In deciding whether to [join informations] for trial, the trial court enjoys broad discretion,

which, in the absence of manifest abuse, an appellate

court may not disturb. . . . The defendant bears a

heavy burden of showing that [joinder] resulted in substantial injustice, and that any resulting prejudice was

beyond the curative power of the court’s instructions.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McKethan,

184 Conn. App. 187, 194–95, 194 A.3d 293, cert. denied,

330 Conn. 931, 194 A.3d 779 (2018). ‘‘Despite our reallocation of the burden when the trial court is faced with

the question of joinder of cases for trial, the defendant’s

burden of proving error on appeal when we review the

trial court’s order of joinder remains the same. See

State v. Ellis, 270 Conn. 337, 376, 852 A.2d 676 (2004)

([i]t is the defendant’s burden on appeal to show that

joinder was improper by proving substantial prejudice

that could not be cured by the trial court’s instructions

to the jury . . .).’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538, 550

n.11, 34 A.3d 370 (2012).

‘‘Substantial prejudice does not necessarily result

from [joinder] even [if the] evidence of one offense

would not have been admissible at a separate trial
involving the second offense. . . . Consolidation

under such circumstances, however, may expose the

defendant to potential prejudice for three reasons: First,

when several charges have been made against the defendant, the jury may consider that a person charged with

doing so many things is a bad [person] who must have

done something, and may cumulate evidence against

him. . . . Second, the jury may have used the evidence

of one case to convict the defendant in another case

even though that evidence would have been inadmissible at a separate trial. . . . [Third] joinder of cases

that are factually similar but legally unconnected . . .

present[s] the . . . danger that a defendant will be

subjected to the omnipresent risk . . . that although

so much [of the evidence] as would be admissible upon

any one of the charges might not [persuade the jury]

of the accused’s guilt, the sum of it will convince them

as to all. . . .

‘‘The court’s discretion regarding joinder . . . is not

unlimited; rather, that discretion must be exercised in

a manner consistent with the defendant’s right to a fair

trial. Consequently, [in State v. Boscarino, supra, 204

Conn. 722–24] we have identified several factors that

a trial court should consider in deciding whether a

severance [or denial of joinder] may be necessary to

avoid undue prejudice resulting from consolidation of

multiple charges for trial. These factors include: (1)

whether the charges involve discrete, easily distinguishable factual scenarios; (2) whether the crimes were of

a violent nature or concerned brutal or shocking conduct on the defendant’s part; and (3) the duration and

complexity of the trial. . . . If any or all of these factors

are present, a reviewing court must decide whether the

trial court’s jury instructions cured any prejudice that

might have occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, supra, 303 Conn. 544–45.

A

The defendant first claims that consolidating his

cases allowed the jury to consider prejudicial evidence

of two different crimes. See State v. Holliday, 159 Conn.

169, 172, 268 A.2d 368 (1970). When a request for joinder

is made, the state ‘‘bears the burden of proving that

the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced by

joinder pursuant to Practice Book § 41-19.’’ State v.

Payne, supra, 303 Conn. 549–50. To overcome this burden, the state must prove ‘‘by a preponderance of the

evidence, either that the evidence in the cases is cross

admissible or that the defendant will not be unfairly

prejudiced pursuant to the Boscarino factors.’’ Id., 550.

In the present case, the defendant was charged in

two separate informations with crimes that occurred

on two different days. The trial court found that joinder

was proper as none of the Boscarino factors were present. Specifically, the court reasoned that the informations were ‘‘easily distinguishable.’’ On appeal, the
defendant relies on the first and second Boscarino factors to support his claim that joinder of the two informations was improper. He concedes, in his brief, that the

third factor was not met.

The first Boscarino factor is whether two or more

factual scenarios were discrete and easily distinguishable. State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 722–23. If

the two events were not easily distinguishable, the first

Boscarino factor is met. Id. The defendant asserts that

the joinder of the informations was prejudicial because

the jury was presented with factual scenarios that were

not easily distinguishable. In particular, the defendant

contends that the evidence of the scenarios presented

to the jury created a ‘‘gross violation of his fundamental

right to due process and a fair trial’’ because the two

incidents involved the same defendant, the same victim,

and similar alleged conduct, which occurred at the same

location. The defendant further asserts that even if the

state referred to each incident separately in its questioning and the court provided specific curative jury

instructions, the defendant would still be prejudiced.

We disagree.

In State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78, 96, 554 A.2d 686,

cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912, 109 S. Ct. 3230, 106 L. Ed.

2d 579 (1989), our Supreme Court addressed the first

Boscarino factor. The court concluded that the evidence involving two murders did not risk the degree

of confusion and prejudice that were present in Boscarino. Id. The court in Herring explained that the two

murders were discrete and easily distinguishable

because the victims in the separate incidents suffered

different injuries and the crimes occurred in different

locations. Id.

Here, as in Herring, the jury was presented with

evidence of two criminal scenarios, which occurred on

January 22, 2016, and January 25, 2016. Even though the

informations concerned the same victim and defendant

and took place at the same general location, the events

were easily distinguishable. Although both crimes

occurred at the victim’s home, the January 22, 2016

incident occurred inside the home, and the January 25,

2016 incident occurred outside the home. In reference

to the January 22, 2016 incident, Cosmos and Calo both

testified as to finding blood inside the home. With

regard to the January 25, 2016 incident, Calo testified

that blood was found in the snow, outside of the home.

Second, although the victim suffered a swollen cheek

in both incidents, there was evidence of new injuries

to the victim following the January 25, 2016 encounter.

Specifically, when questioned as to whether the victim

incurred new injuries during the January 25, 2016 incident, Calo responded: ‘‘The injuries that [the victim]

sustained on the 22nd were still there but . . . there

were more injuries because there was fresh blood on

his mouth. . . . His face seemed more swollen and he
showed me a laceration on the inside of his mouth.

. . . It wasn’t bleeding out but it was fresh. It looked

fresh to me.’’Additionally, the two events occurred at

different times of the day. The January 22, 2016 incident

occurred at night, while the January 25, 2016 event

occurred during the day.

On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear from the

record that the two scenarios were easily distinguishable in that the events occurred at different times and

locations, and resulted in different injuries. The court

did not abuse its discretion in finding the two incidents

discrete and easily distinguishable. Therefore, the

defendant was not prejudiced by joinder under the first

Boscarino factor.

B

The defendant next claims that joinder was improper

under the second Boscarino factor. He maintains that

his conduct in both assaults was violent and resulted

in visible injuries to the victim, resulting in prejudice.

We disagree.

‘‘Whether one or more offenses involved brutal or

shocking conduct likely to arouse the passions of the

jurors must be ascertained by comparing the relative

levels of violence used to perpetrate the offenses

charged in each information.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Payne, supra, 303 Conn. 551. The

assault on January 22 must be compared to the assault

on January 25 to determine whether the ‘‘alleged conduct in one incident is not so shocking or brutal that

the jury’s ability to consider fairly and objectively the

remainder of the charges is compromised.’’ State v.

LaFleur, 307 Conn. 115, 160–61, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012).

In Payne, the court compared the charge of felony

murder to a separate charge of jury tampering and determined that the secondBoscarino factor regarding prejudice was satisfied ‘‘[b]ecause the defendant’s conduct

in killing the victim in the felony murder case was

significantly more brutal and shocking than his conduct

in attempting to tamper with the jurors . . . [t]he evidence from the felony murder case was prejudicial to

the defendant with regard to the jury tampering case.’’

State v. Payne, supra, 303 Conn. 552. Furthermore, in

Boscarino, the defendant committed multiple sexual

assaults, all with the force of a deadly weapon. State

v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 723. The court held that

joinder was improper as it ‘‘gave the state the opportunity to present the jury with the intimate details of each

of these offenses, an opportunity that would have been

unavailable if the cases had been tried separately.’’ Id.

In the present case, the defendant was charged with

breach of the peace in the second degree with regard

to the January 22 incident and breach of the peace in

the second degree and with assault in the third degree

with regard to the January 25 incident; both incidents
involved punching the victim. Neither incident was

shockingly violent. The defendant concedes that the

alleged conduct was not as brutal as the conduct that

occurred in Payne and Boscarino.

Our Supreme Court has addressed the second Boscarino factor in the context of an assault. In State v.

LaFleur, supra, 307 Conn. 160, the court held that an

assault, in which the defendant punched a woman in

the face, was not ‘‘so shocking or brutal as to preclude

joinder.’’ In State v. Jennings, 216 Conn. 647, 659, 583

A.2d 915 (1990), our Supreme Court held that an assault

was not so brutal or shocking as to create a serious

risk of prejudice when tried with an allegation of kidnapping. Citing to State v. Herring, supra, 210 Conn.

97, the court noted that although physical harm was

inflicted on the victim, it was not disabling and did not

satisfy the second Boscarino factor. State v. Jennings,

supra, 216 Conn. 659.

In the present case, the defendant assaulted the victim on two separate dates. These assaults, although

violent, were not so brutal or shocking as to interfere

with the jury’s ability to consider each offense fairly

and objectively. As such, we conclude that the second

Boscarino factor is not met.

We conclude that the defendant has not shown that

he was prejudiced under the Boscarino factors and that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting

the state’s motion for joinder.

II

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly

allowed the state to introduce facts and prejudicial language during its voir dire questioning. The defendant

argues that the trial court violated his sixth amendment

right to a fair trial by allowing the state to use the terms

such as ‘‘domestic violence,’’ ‘‘family violence,’’ and

‘‘dispute between roommates’’ during voir dire. We

disagree.

The state argues preliminarily that the issue is unpreserved and, thus, unreviewable. We agree that the issue

is not preserved. Practice Book § 60-5 states, in relevant

part, that ‘‘[this] court shall not be bound to consider

a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose

subsequent to the trial.’’ An unpreserved constitutional

claim, however, may be considered by this court if all

of the following conditions are met: ‘‘(1) the record is

adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the

claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the

[defendant] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless

error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond

a reasonable doubt.’’ State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233,

239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel
R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

The record is adequate to review this claim, and the

defendant is alleging a violation of his fundamental right

to a fair trial pursuant to the sixth amendment of the

United States constitution. Because the claim is reviewable, we address the merits of the defendant’s claim.

The federal constitution guarantees a defendant the

fundamental right to a trial by an impartial jury. U.S.

Const., amends. VI and XIV. ‘‘Although the conduct of

voir dire is within the broad discretion of the trial court

. . . that discretion must be exercised within the

parameters established by the right to a fair trial.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Mercer, 208 Conn. 52, 58, 544

A.2d 611 (1988).

‘‘The actual impact of a particular practice on the

judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined.

But [the United States Supreme Court] has left no doubt

that the probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny. . . . Courts

must do the best they can to evaluate the likely effects

of a particular procedure, based on reason, principle,

and common human experience. . . . Due to the serious constitutional implications of the defendant’s claim,

[courts] have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mercer, supra, 208

Conn. 58.

The following additional facts are pertinent to this

claim. On June 5, 2017, the voir dire process began.

During the state’s questioning of a venireperson, the

state characterized the allegations against the defendant as ‘‘domestic violence.’’ The state asked: ‘‘[T]he

term ‘domestic violence,’ does that conjure up any

thoughts, feelings, opinions or anything like that?’’ The

state continued to use the term ‘‘domestic violence’’

until the court, on its own accord, cautioned against

its use in voir dire. The court stated: ‘‘I will caution

the state [not to] use [a] term as general as domestic

violence. I don’t know . . . that [the relationship

between the parties] fits . . . the traditional definition

of a domestic violence . . . so I don’t want to disqualify

jurors when this isn’t even going to be the kind of

case that they’re talking about [referring to domestic

violence].’’ The state then altered its questioning and

used the term ‘‘family violence’’ rather than ‘‘domestic

violence.’’ The court advised against using either term

and suggested that an appropriate question would be,

‘‘how do you feel about violence between roommates.’’

The state indicated its concerns about discussing the

facts of the case, to which the court responded: ‘‘There’s

nothing getting into the facts of the case if it goes to a

prejudice or bias . . . the allegations are violence

between roommates. I don’t have a problem with that.’’

Ultimately, the state adopted the court’s suggestion and

referred to the allegation as a ‘‘dispute between
roommates.’’

The defendant contends that the court’s supervision

of voir dire questioning was improper in two ways: (1)

the court improperly allowed prejudicial language to

be used initially; and (2) to remedy the process, the

court improperly allowed facts of the case to be introduced during the voir dire process. The defendant further contends that the use of facts in voir dire gave the

jurors preconceived notions about the case, thereby,

violating the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair

trial.6

Our Supreme Court has warned counsel and the trial

courts not to engage in voir dire questioning that

touches on the facts of the case. ‘‘We have noted with

concern increasing abuse of the voir dire process . . .

It appears that all too frequently counsel have engaged

in wideranging interrogation of veniremen in a not too

subtle attempt to influence the ultimate decision of a

venireman if he should be selected for service or to

ascertain the attitude of the venireman on an assumed

state of facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Bleau v. Ward, 221 Conn. 331, 339–40, 603 A.2d 1147

(1992). In the present case, however, we do not find

that the challenged language gave potential jurors preconceived notions about the case.

We conclude that the introduction of the phrases

‘‘domestic violence,’’ ‘‘family violence,’’ and a ‘‘dispute

between roommates,’’ was not improper. Language in

the protective order concerning ‘‘family violence’’

would be admitted into evidence. The order was titled

‘‘protective order—family violence.’’ Under the circumstances of the incidents, we cannot conclude that the

use of ‘‘family violence’’ or ‘‘domestic violence’’ was so

harmful to the defendant. It was never disputed that

the alleged crimes concerned ‘‘disputes between roommates.’’ We, therefore, conclude that the defendant has

failed to prove that a constitutional violation existed

and that he was deprived of a fair trial.

III

Lastly, the defendant claims that the trial court

improperly denied his request for a continuance, thus

violating his sixth amendment right to a fair trial. We

disagree.

‘‘A reviewing court ordinarily analyzes a denial of a

continuance in terms of whether the court has abused

its discretion. . . . This is so where the denial is not

directly linked to a specific constitutional right. . . .

If, however, the denial of a continuance is directly

linked to the deprivation of a specific constitutional

right, some courts analyze the denial in terms of

whether there has been a denial of [such right].’’ In Re

Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App. 592, 601–602, 767 A.2d

155 (2001). ‘‘The defendant’s burden on appeal is to

show that the trial court acted arbitrarily, in light of
the information available at the time of its decision,

and thereafter, if an abuse of discretion has been established, that the defendant’s ability to defend himself

has thereby been demonstrably prejudiced.’’ State v.

Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 246, 636 A.2d 760 (1994). Our

analysis, then, first considers whether the court abused

its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a

continuance. See State v. Godbolt, 161 Conn. App. 367,

374 n.4, 127 A.3d 1139, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 931, 134

A.3d 621 (2016).

‘‘There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a

denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due

process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons

presented to the trial judge at the time the request is

denied. . . .

‘‘Among the factors that may enter into the court’s

exercise of discretion in considering a request for a

continuance are the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay; the age and complexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in

the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses,

opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request;

the defendant’s personal responsibility for the timing

of the request; [and] the likelihood that the denial would

substantially impair the defendant’s ability to defend

himself. . . . We are especially hesitant to find an

abuse of discretion where the court has denied a motion

for continuance made on the day of the trial. . . .

‘‘Lastly, we emphasize that an appellate court should

limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial

court’s exercise of its discretion to a consideration of

those factors, on the record, that were presented to the

trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the

time of its ruling on the motion for a continuance.’’

(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 374–75.

In the present case, the defendant contends that the

denial of his request for a continuance was unreasonable. To support this claim, the defendant asserts three

arguments: (1) because the court granted the state’s

request for a continuance earlier during the proceedings, the court should have also granted his request for

a continuance; (2) the state did not object to the request

for a continuance; and (3) the denial of the continuance

greatly impaired the defendant’s defense, because

Quackenbush was a crucial witness in support of the

defendant’s claim that he was acting in defense of property. The state counters by asserting that the court

properly denied the request for a continuance. We agree

with the state.

The following facts are relevant to this issue. On June

13, 2017, the defendant informed the court that his
witness, Quackenbush, would not appear at trial that

day because she had a work conflict. In his view, the

witness was important, and he orally requested a continuance to the following day. The court denied the defendant’s request, reasoning that a continuance would ‘‘just

[be] delaying this case.’’ The court noted that it ‘‘had

directed that [the defendant] be prepared to start evidence . . . on Friday the 9th,’’ such that a continuance

would disrupt the time frame of the trial. The court

noted its concern that a delay might result in the loss

of a juror: ‘‘[w]e told this jury they would potentially

have this case on the 9th but we definitely would give

it to them by the 13th and now we’re telling them the

15th and . . . there is at least one juror who has work

problems.’’ In addition to the potential delay, the court

also mentioned the timeliness of the request, stating,

‘‘If you had raised this issue at an earlier time . . . the

witness was supposed to be here today. . . . So this

is not a minor request. The record should reflect I would

certainly consider this if it weren’t for the fact that

defense isn’t available the 15th, the state’s not available

the 16th. But the result of me granting this continuance

is more likely forcing this case into next week and I’m

potentially losing other jurors.’’ Accordingly, the trial

court properly considered the potential delay to the

proceeding, the untimeliness of the defendant’s request,

and the resulting prejudice to the trial management.

The trial court’s ruling was not arbitrary.

The defendant further alleges that his sixth amendment right to present a complete defense was impaired

because Quackenbush was a key witness in support of

his claim that he exercised a reasonable degree of force

in defense of property. He argues that he notified the

court of the importance of Quackenbush’s testimony,

and that she was present at both altercations. The suggestion regarding the importance of Quackenbush’s testimony was not made at the time of the request for a

continuance, however, but, rather, was made earlier in

the trial during a discussion regarding instructions to

the jury. The defendant’s attorney stated: ‘‘[I]n regards

to the evidence about defense of property . . . the plan

was that evidence was going to come through Grace

Quackenbush, [she] did make the 911 call. I wasn’t

planning on introducing that, because I was going to

elicit her testimony. If she doesn’t appear . . . I’m

going to call [the 911 dispatcher] in my case-in-chief

and introduce her 911 call. . . .’’7 At the time of its

ruling on the defendant’s request for a continuance, the

court stated that ‘‘Ms. Quackenbush’s . . . her statement . . . has come in through a 911 call.’’

The defendant, at the time of the ruling, did not provide any additional reasoning for the importance of

Quackenbush’s testimony nor did he make any representation regarding her specific testimony. The defendant has not persuaded us that his sixth amendment

right to a fair trial was violated by the denial of his
request for a continuance. See State v. Godbolt, supra,

161 Conn. App. 374 n.4.

Because the request for a continuance was made at

the last moment, substantial delay was likely to result

if the request had been granted, and there was no assurance that the witness would have appeared if the continuance had been granted, the court’s ruling was not an

abuse of discretion and, accordingly, did not violate the

defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victim of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through

whom the victim’s identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes

§ 54-86e.

Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)

(2012); we decline to identify any party protected or sought to be protected

under a protective order or a restraining order that was issued or applied

for, or others through whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.

2 At trial, Cosmos stated his reasoning for arresting the defendant: ‘‘[W]ith

. . . everything that we observed on the scene, with all the blood, the

injuries to [the victim], and the motive that he had, we believed that [the

defendant] was the one that should be arrested.’’ Calo testified: ‘‘I took the

whole scenario and it had a lot to do with credibility and motive. I found

that [the defendant] was upset because he found pictures of his wife—he

found pictures of [the victim] naked on his wife’s phone. So he confronted

[the victim] about it. And [the victim] really had no reason to lash out at

the defendant.’’

3 The defendant failed to appear for a scheduled hearing on August 26,

2016.

4 Calo testified: ‘‘The injuries that he sustained on the 22nd were still there

but there . . . were more injuries because there was blood in his mouth

. . . . His face seemed more swollen and he showed me a laceration on

the inside of his mouth.’’

5

In light of our determination regarding the Boscarino factors, we need

not decide whether the evidence was cross admissible.

6 With regard to the use of the term ‘‘dispute between roommates,’’ each of

the three venirepersons who were informed that the parties were roommates

indicated that the factual scenario would not affect his or her ability to be

impartial. Ultimately, none of the jurors who were informed that the parties

were roommates was selected to sit on the panel of jurors. One, however,

was selected as an alternate juror.

7 The referenced 911 call was subsequently introduced into evidence by

the state.