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S. HRG. 115–439 

AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE 

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 14, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

TODD, YOUNG, Indiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee .................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland ..................................... 2 

Kehler, General C. Robert, U.S. Air Force, Retired, Former Commander, 

United States Strategic Command, Alexandria, VA ......................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Feaver, Ph.D., Peter D., Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, 

Duke University, Durham, NC ........................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

McKeon, Hon. Brian, Former Acting Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC ...................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to General C. 

Robert Kehler, USAF (Ret.) by Senator Cory A. Booker .................................. 42 

Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Dr. Peter 

Feaver by Senator Cory A. Booker ..................................................................... 43 

Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Hon. Brian 

P. McKeon by Senator John Barrasso ................................................................ 44 

Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Hon. Brian 

P. McKeon by Senator Cory A. Booker ............................................................... 44 

Union of Concerned Scientists—Fact Sheet, ‘‘Close Calls with Nuclear Weapons’’ (2015) ............................................................................................................ 46 

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(1) 

AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE 

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio, Johnson, 

Gardner, Young, Barrasso, Flake, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, 

Murphy, Kaine, Markey, and Merkley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing itself will actually come to order. We 

thank General Kehler, Dr. Feaver, and Mr. McKeon for joining us 

today and for sitting through the business meeting over the last 15 

minutes. 

A number of members on both sides of the aisle on and off the 

committee have raised questions about the executive’s authorities 

with respect to war-making, the use of nuclear weapons, and, from 

a diplomatic perspective, entering into and terminating agreements 

with other countries. As I have mentioned publicly, this is one in 

a series of hearings where our committee will examine all of these 

issues. But today, it is my hope that we will remain focused on the 

topic at hand, the authority and the process for the use of nuclear 

weapons. 

The Congressional Research Service tells us this is the first time 

that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate or House has 

met on this topic since 1976, 41 years ago. 

Making the decision to go to war of any sort is a heavy responsibility for our Nation’s elected leaders, and the decision to use nuclear weapons is the most consequential of all. The Atomic Energy 

Act of 1946 and the subsequent practices recognize that the use of 

nuclear weapons must be subject to political control. This is why 

no general or admiral or Defense Secretary has the authority to 

order the use of nuclear weapons. Only the President, the elected 

political leader of the United States, has this authority. 

The nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet 

Union during the Cold War dramatically elevated the risk of nuclear conflict. As the Soviets developed massive numbers of nuclear 

weapons and the systems to deliver them to the United States, we 

planned for the unthinkable: How to get our missiles in the air 

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within those few minutes before their warheads could hit us and 

possibly destroy our ability to respond. 

In that kind of scenario, there is no time for debate. Having such 

forces at the ready has been successful in deterring such an attack. 

And for that, we are grateful. 

But this process means the President has the sole authority to 

give that order, whether we are responding to a nuclear attack or 

not. Once that order is given and verified, there is no way to revoke 

it. 

To be clear, I would not support changes that would reduce our 

deterrence of adversaries or reassurance of our allies, but I would 

like to explore, as our predecessors in the House did 41 years ago, 

the realities of this system. 

I want to thank all of our distinguished witnesses and the members of this committee for the seriousness with which they approach this topic before us today, and hope that, together, we can 

have a productive and enlightening discussion about this sober 

issue. 

With that, I would like to turn to my friend and our distinguished ranking member, Senator Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. I almost always, in a perfunctory way, thank you for holding hearings, but in 

this case, I really do believe this is a critically important discussion 

to have not just with ourselves in the United States Senate but 

with the American people. 

I must tell you, I am always amazed as to what subjects come 

up at town hall meetings that I hold throughout Maryland. Most 

of the subjects deal with the local economic or domestic issues. We 

do not normally get a lot of foreign policy questions at town hall 

meetings. But of late, I have been getting more and more questions 

about, ‘‘Can the President really order a nuclear attack without 

any controls?’’ That question is asked more and more by the American people. 

Of course, it is fueled by comments made by President Trump in 

regard to North Korea. Quoting the President in his August interview, ‘‘North Korea best not make any more threats to the United 

States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never 

seen,’’ or the President’s comments, ‘‘We will have no choice but to 

totally destroy North Korea.’’ 

Now, many interpret that to mean that the President is actively 

considering the use of nuclear weapons in order to deal with the 

threat of North Korea. That is frightening. 

And as the chairman pointed out, based on my understanding of 

the nuclear command and control protocols, there are no checks— 

no checks—on the President’s authority. The system as it is set up 

today provides the President with the sole and ultimate authority 

to use nuclear weapons. 

And that was developed because of the realities of the security 

of our country. The nuclear command-and-control system we have 

in place is the result of three factors. 

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The first was the particular threat and challenge of the Cold 

War. For decades, the United States faced a nuclear-armed adversary in the Soviet Union with a large and capable nuclear force. 

The United States settled on a strategy of mutually assured destruction, which placed distinctive demands on our nuclear 

warfighting command-and-control system. 

The second and related factor is the law of physics. An ICBM 

launch from Russia to the United States would have about a 30- 

minute flight time. There was not time to convene a special session 

of Congress or to have the type of consultations that would infringe 

upon our ability to have actually a deterrent. This means the President and his team have an incredibly short window to identify, assess, communicate, decide, and, if necessary, launch a nuclear 

force. There was no time for Cabinet meetings and no time for consultation. 

The Cold War may be long behind us, but such a scenario based 

upon the need to deter a massive Soviet nuclear attack with little 

or no warning time remains the driving force behind the current 

command-and-control architecture even today. 

The final factor behind the U.S. nuclear command-and-control 

system rests with the fact that nuclear weapons, ever since their 

development, have also always been considered unique, not like 

any other military weapon. Starting under President Truman, the 

point was made crystal clear that the White House was in charge 

of the atomic bomb and its uses, not the military. 

Nuclear bombs were not a military weapon whose use would be 

controlled by the Armed Forces but a strategic weapon under the 

strict control of civilian and elected officials. The President as both 

our highest elected civilian official and Commander in Chief under 

the Constitution played a unique role with this unique weapon. 

The President and only the President assumed the sole and unchecked power to launch nuclear attacks. 

As President Truman said, ‘‘You have got to understand that this 

isn’t a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women and children 

and unarmed people, and not for military uses. So we have got to 

treat this differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things 

like that.’’ 

Nuclear weapons remain unique, but today, we face a different 

question than the one we faced during the Cold War. Given today’s 

challenges, we need to revisit this question on whether a single individual should have the sole and unchecked authority to launch 

a nuclear attack under all circumstances, including the right to use 

it as a first strike. 

The most likely attack we face is not a massive surprise nuclear 

attack by Russia or China but a nuclear conflict that springs from 

an escalating conflict with the smaller nuclear forces, such as 

North Korea. In this sort of circumstance, where the United States 

would not face the same sort of ‘‘use them or lose them’’ pressure 

we faced during the Cold War, it may be possible and certainly 

wise for the President to take the time to consult Congress before 

the profound and historic decision to use nuclear weapons is made. 

I would like to be able to tell my constituents and the American 

people we have a system in place that prevents an impulsive and 

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irrational decision to use nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, I cannot 

make that assurance today. 

I look forward to hearing from our three very distinguished witnesses. 

I just would like to acknowledge Mr. McKeon’s presence here as 

a former counsel to this committee under Senator Biden. It is nice 

to have him back before our committee. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Our first witness today is General Bob Kehler, commander of the 

United States Strategic Command from 2011 to 2013. Thank you 

for being back with us today, and thank you for your service to our 

country. 

Our second witness is Dr. Peter Feaver, professor of political 

science at Duke University. Thank you so much for being here 

today. 

Our third witness is Brian McKeon, the Acting Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy during the Obama administration and once a 

staff member, as was mentioned, on this committee. Thank you for 

coming back. 

All of you are very familiar. If you can summarize your comments in about 5 minutes, we would appreciate that. Any written 

materials you have, without objection, will be entered into the 

record. And if you could just begin and proceed in the order introduced, we would appreciate it. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL C. ROBERT KEHLER, U.S. AIR 

FORCE, RETIRED, FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES 

STRATEGIC COMMAND, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 

General KEHLER. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Senator Cardin, distinguished members of the committee. 

It is my honor to appear today to discuss nuclear decision-making. I am also really pleased to appear with these two outstanding 

panelists and colleagues to my right. 

Command and control is a critically important component of our 

nuclear deterrent, and I applaud you for taking the time to understand it better. 

At the outset, I must say that the views I express this morning 

are mine. I no longer represent the department or Strategic Command or the U.S. Air Force. I will try to bring the perspective of 

almost 4 decades of military service in senior military command to 

my remarks today, and much of that was in nuclear-related duty. 

Let me also add that some of the Nation’s most closely guarded 

secrets are associated with nuclear weapons, with the plans associated with them, and with the processes as well. So there are limits 

on what I can say, even if some aspects of this matter are discussed openly by others. 

In the interest of time, I would like to make just three brief 

opening remarks. 

First, as this committee knows well, the U.S. now faces more 

complex security problems and greater uncertainty than it did during the Cold War. Nuclear weapons are not gone from world affairs, and it does not look to me like they are going to be gone from 

world affairs anytime soon. Russia and China are modernizing 

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their forces as the basis of strategies designed to expand their positions at our expense and the expense of our allies. 

Russia frequently makes explicit nuclear threats to include the 

threat of nuclear first use. China will soon deploy ballistic missile 

submarines, opening a new chapter in their nuclear history. North 

Korea threatens our regional allies and forward-based forces, and 

is pursuing the capability to threaten the U.S. directly. North 

Korea has also threatened nuclear first use. Iran, of course, remains a country of interest. 

Other strategic threats like long-range conventional weapons, 

cyber weapons, and threats against critical space assets have 

emerged and can arrive at our doorstep quickly. But nuclear weapons remain important in the strategies of our potential adversaries. 

The second point, while the U.S. nuclear force is far smaller, postured less aggressively, and occupies a less prominent place in our 

defense strategy than it did during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence remains crucial to our defense and to strategic stability. 

There is an old saying that I have used many times over the years, 

that deterrence exists when an adversary believes they cannot 

achieve their objectives, will suffer unacceptable consequences if 

they try, or both. 

U.S. nuclear weapons prevent the coercive or actual use of these 

weapons against us and our allies, which is their primary purpose, 

constrain the scope and scale of conflict, compel adversaries to ponder the consequences of their actions before they act, and obviate 

the need for additional allies to acquire their own. No other weapon 

can replace the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. And the ability 

to command and control our nuclear forces under all conditions of 

crisis and conflict remains central to the credibility of the deterrent. 

Third, U.S. nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. 

Only the President of the United States can order the employment 

of U.S. nuclear weapons. And the President’s ability to exercise 

that authority and direction is ensured by people, processes, and 

capabilities that comprise the nuclear command-and-control system. 

This is a system controlled by human beings. Nothing happens 

automatically. That system is designed to do two very important 

things. First, it is designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear 

weapons while preventing the unauthorized use or the accidental 

use or the inadvertent use of them; and two, to do so in the face 

of a wide variety of scenarios, including a nuclear attack. 

The challenge of the Cold War, which is a short-notice, massive 

attack, while less likely today, I would agree, still exists. A colleague and mentor of mine has always said that when you are looking at an adversary, you have to look at capability and intent. The 

Russians may not have the intent of attacking us today with a 

short-notice, massive attack, but they retain the capability to do so. 

And so long as they do, we have to deter that capability. 

The nuclear decision process includes assessment, review, and 

consultation between the President and key civilian and military 

leaders followed by transmission and implementation of any presidential decision by the forces themselves. All activity surrounding 

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nuclear weapons are characterized by layers of safeguards, tests, 

and reviews. 

Finally, I think it is important to remember that the United 

States military does not blindly follow orders. A presidential order 

to employ U.S. nuclear weapons must be legal. The basic legal 

principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality 

apply to nuclear weapons just as they do to every other weapon. 

It was my job and the job of other senior leaders like the Secretary of Defense and the chairman and the other combatant commanders to make sure these principles were applied to nuclear orders. 

As I close, I want to urge caution as you consider these matters. 

Changes or conflicting signals can have profound implications for 

deterrence, for extended deterrence, and for the confidence of the 

men and the women in the nuclear forces. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me. I appreciate 

being here today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[General Kehler’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF (RET.) 

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members of the 

committee, I am pleased to join you today to offer my perspective on the authority 

to order the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. The views I express today are mine and 

do not represent the Department of Defense, United States Strategic Command, or 

the United States Air Force. 

As I begin I want to thank the committee for helping to bring attention to these 

very important matters related to the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

21st Century Security Environment 

The United States now faces far more complex security problems and greater uncertainty than it did during the Cold War. Threats to our security are diverse, can 

arrive at our doorsteps quickly, and can range from small arms in the hands of extremists to nuclear weapons in the hands of hostile foreign leaders. Yesterday’s regional battlefield is becoming tomorrow’s global battle-space where conflicts may 

begin in cyberspace and quickly extend to space.most likely before traditional air, 

land, and sea forces are engaged. Violent extremists continue to threaten us, and 

we must remain vigilant to prevent the intersection of violent extremism with weapons of mass destruction. 

Russia’s and North Korea’s explicit nuclear threats (to include the threat of nuclear first-use) remind us that nuclear weapons are not gone, and it appears they 

will not be eliminated from world affairs anytime soon. Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear forces as the basis of strategies designed to expand their positions at our expense and that of our allies. In addition, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities now threaten our regional allies and eventually could threaten us directly. 

India and Pakistan threaten nuclear use in their disputes, and Iran will remain a 

country of interest as time passes. 

Despite significant differences from the Cold War, the ultimate paradox of the nuclear age is still with us—to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. must remain prepared to use them. 

Deterrence and U.S. Nuclear Weapons 

While the end of the Cold War allowed the U.S. to diminish the role and prominence of nuclear weapons in our defense planning and to dramatically reduce both 

the number of deployed weapons and the overall size of the stockpile, nuclear deterrence remains ‘‘crucial to our nation’s defense and to strategic stability’’. Although 

no longer needed to deter a conventional attack from the massed armored formations of the now extinct Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, nuclear weapons continue 

to prevent both the coercive and actual use of these weapons against the U.S. and 

its allies (their primary purpose), constrain the scope and scale of conflict, compel 

adversary leaders to consider the implications of their actions before they act, and 

(via extended deterrence) obviate the need for additional allies and partners to acquire their own. Nuclear weapons are only one of many important instruments that 

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must be orchestrated for maximum deterrent credibility and effect in the 21st Century; however, today no other weapon can replace their deterrent value. 

To remain a credible deterrent tool, the U.S. nuclear force must present any 

would-be attacker with little confidence of success and the certainty of an assured 

response against his highest value targets. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to 

take the necessary steps to field a modern nuclear force that presents an adversary 

with insurmountable attack and defensive problems, demonstrates resolve and commitment to allied security guarantees, provides the president with a range of options to deal with crisis or conflict, and serves as an effective hedge against technical failures or geopolitical uncertainty. Central to this force is an upgraded nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system that ensures the president always remains linked to his critical advisors and the nuclear forces for positive control. 

Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) 

US nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the 

United States can authorize the use of U.S. nuclear weapons, and the President’s 

ability to exercise that authority and direction is ensured by the people, procedures, 

facilities, equipment, and communications capabilities that comprise the Nuclear 

Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS has been designed with resilience, redundancy, and survivability to ensure that an adversary cannot hope to 

neutralize our deterrent by successfully attacking any of its elements and thereby 

‘‘disconnecting’’ the President and other civilian and military leaders from one another or from the nuclear forces—even in the most stressing scenarios. These features enhance deterrence and contribute to crisis stability. 

NCCS capabilities and procedures are designed to enable the authorized use of 

nuclear weapons while also preventing their unauthorized, accidental, or inadvertent use. Operations and activities involving U.S. nuclear weapons are surrounded by layers of safeguards. While many of the specifics are highly classified, 

general methods range from personnel screening and monitoring to codes and use 

controls. In addition, sensors and communications links that contribute to nuclear 

decision making are specially certified, and tests and exercises are frequently held 

to validate the performance of both systems and people. Before I retired in late 

2013, we had also begun to evaluate networks and systems for potential or actual 

cyber intrusions. 

Other factors contribute to the prevention of unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental use. ‘‘Today’s triad of nuclear forces is far smaller and postured much less 

aggressively than its Cold War ancestor.’’ Not only are the long-range bombers and 

supporting aerial tankers no longer loaded and poised to take off with nuclear weapons (unless ordered back into a nuclear alert configuration), but ballistic missiles 

are aimed at open areas of the ocean. Also, while the possibility of a massive surprise nuclear attack still exists (and must be deterred), decision time is longer in 

many other potential nuclear scenarios that may prove more likely in today’s global 

security environment. 

As I mentioned earlier, the decision to employ nuclear weapons is a political decision requiring an explicit order from the President. The process includes ‘‘assessment, review, and consultation (via) secure phone and video conferencing to enable 

the President to consult with his senior advisors, including the Secretary of Defense 

and other military commanders.’’ Once a decision is reached, the order is prepared 

and transmitted to the forces using ‘‘procedures.equipment, and communications 

that ensure the President’s nuclear control orders are received and properly implemented.’’ 

The law of war governs the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. Nuclear options and orders are no different in this regard than any other weapon. Here, U.S. policy as articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided important context regarding the consideration of U.S. nuclear use (i.e., extreme circumstances when vital 

national interests are at stake). The 2010 NPR also restated the ‘‘negative security 

guarantee’’ (i.e., the U.S. will not consider using nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapons state that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in 

compliance with their nonproliferation obligations). In addition, the legal principles 

of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality also apply to nuclear plans, operations, and decisions. Legal advisors are deeply involved with commanders at all 

steps of the deliberate and crisis action processes to offer perspective on how force 

is to be used as well as the decision to use force. 

The decision to use nuclear weapons is not an all or nothing decision. Over the 

years, successive Presidents have directed the military to prepare a range of options 

designed to provide flexibility and to improve the likelihood of controlling escalation 

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if deterrence fails. Options are clearly defined in scope and duration and the President retains the ability to terminate nuclear operations when necessary. 

Military members are bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to 

follow orders provided they are legal and come from appropriate command authority. They are equally bound to question (and ultimately refuse) illegal orders or 

those that do not come from appropriate authority. As the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, I shared the responsibility with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military and civilian leaders to address 

and resolve any concerns and potential legal issues on behalf of the men and women 

in the nuclear operating forces during the decision process. It was our duty to pose 

the hard questions, if any, before proceeding with our military advice. Nuclear crew 

members must have complete confidence that the highest legal standards have been 

enforced from target selection to an employment command by the President. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, I applaud your and the committee’s interest in these matters. 

However, I urge Congress to carefully consider the potential impacts to deterrence 

and extended deterrence that any potential changes to nuclear command and control 

might have. I also urge you to consider that conflicting signals can result in loss 

of confidence, confusion, or paralysis in the operating forces at a critical moment. 

Some of the lapses in discipline and performance we saw in the nuclear forces several years ago were attributed to conflicting signals regarding the importance of and 

support for the nuclear deterrence mission. 

Clarity and commitment regarding nuclear weapons, their continued foundational 

role in U.S. and allied defense strategy, and confidence in our nuclear command and 

control processes are as important now as they ever were during the Cold War. Deterrence credibility and national security demand it. 

Again, thank you for inviting me to offer my perspectives on this important topic. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Feaver? 

STATEMENT OF PETER D. FEAVER, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, DUKE UNIVERSITY, 

DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA 

Dr. FEAVER. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important topic, which I will refer to as nuclear command and control. 

My bottom line is simple. In the past, Congress has played a 

vital role in pushing the executive branch to strengthen command 

and control, and the time may be ripe for another close look. However, we must proceed with some caution because the topic is complex and susceptible to unintended consequences. 

I will make four points. 

First, at the heart of nuclear command and control is what might 

be called the always-never dilemma. For nuclear deterrence to 

work, we must have a high assurance that the country will always 

be able to present a credible nuclear strike capability to our adversaries even in the most dire scenarios. However, because even a 

single nuclear detonation would be so consequential and might trigger an escalatory spiral that would lead to civilization-threatening 

outcomes, we must also have a high assurance that there will 

never be an accidental or unauthorized of nuclear weapons. 

The challenge is that measures designed to improve the ‘‘always’’ 

side of the equation can compromise the negative side, and vice 

versa. 

Pre-delegating the authority to use nuclear weapons and spreading that capability to do so to lower echelons may thwart an enemy’s first-strike planning, for example, but it would increase the 

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risk that a weapon might be used in an unauthorized fashion or 

by someone confused in the fog of battle. 

The history of nuclear command and control is a history of civilian and military leaders debating the proper balance between ‘‘always’’ and ‘‘never.’’ It is a history of occasional discoveries that the 

risks on one side or the other side of the ledger were greater than 

originally understood. And it is a history of improvements. 

Some, like permissive action links, PALs, which are coded locks 

that block detonation of a weapon without inserting the PIN code, 

and were pressed by far-seeing congressional advocates, these improvements may have helped forestall disaster. 

This brings me to my second major point. We must be willing to 

invest the requisite funds to keep our technology up to date. But 

in the nuclear command and control business, hardware is trumped 

by software, and software is trumped by wetware. Hardware refers 

to the technologies like the PALs I just mentioned. Software refers 

to the rules and procedures that govern how the hardware is used; 

for instance, the code management system that determines who 

has the PAL codes and who is authorized to release them. Wetware 

refers to the human element, the reliability of people involved in 

enforcing the rules, and the civil-military relations that form the 

political context in which the software and hardware operate. 

At the end of the day, what would matter most is the human element. Would the President’s advisers be in a position to provide 

timely counsel? And would that counsel shape the President’s decision? Would the various echelons in the chain of command recognize a valid authenticated nuclear use order as being legal, given 

the military’s deeply ingrained training to refuse to implement any 

illegal order? Indeed, would subordinate elements of the commandand-control system do what they are supposed to do, no more and 

no less, but with appropriate judgment? 

This last point cannot be overemphasized. For decades now, it 

has been technically possible to build a nuclear command-and-control system that would eliminate the human element altogether. 

Every generation of strategic leaders has understood that such a 

system would be foolhardy in the extreme. The human element introduces risks, to be sure, but it also introduces the opportunity to 

mitigate risks. 

This brings me to my third major point. The best reforms to nuclear command and control would be ones that maximize the opportunity for the human element to mitigate risks by maximizing time 

for deliberation and assessment. Of course, efforts to extend decision times must not run afoul of the always-never dilemma. 

I conclude with my fourth and final point. The time is ripe for 

a fresh look. Changes in communications technology and rapidly 

evolving cyber threats alone would justify a fresh examination. 

Threats that were warned about 5 years ago have become urgent 

realities today. 

And finally, our divisive political environment has raised new 

doubts about the effectiveness of all our branches of government to 

wield the power they possess responsibly. In that context, a thoroughgoing review of nuclear command and control could help shore 

up nuclear confidence in this area. 

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Outside experts have suggested many possible improvements 

that are worth considering. For instance, there are a variety of proposals that involve requiring certifications by additional Cabinet officials of launch orders under certain circumstances. However, all 

of these proposals raise important constitutional questions about 

usurping the President’s authorities. 

Because the actual operations of the current system are exceedingly complex, I would recommend great caution before legislating 

any particular fix. Nevertheless, I would recommend diligence and 

perseverance in oversight of the system to reassure our friends and 

to warn our enemies that the nuclear arsenal will function as it is 

intended. 

Thank you. 

[Dr. Feaver’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENMT OF DR. PETER FEAVER

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members of the 

committee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss one of the most consequential 

issues this Committee could ever consider: The authorities and processes by which 

the United States might use its nuclear arsenal. For the sake of convenience, I will 

refer to this broad topic as ‘‘nuclear command and control.’’ 

Civilian and military leaders have wrestled with nuclear command and control for 

over 70 years—and it has been one of the issues I have focused on in 30-some years 

of studying the theory and practice of American civil-military relations. 

My bottom line is simple: in the past Congress has played a vital role in pushing 

the Executive Branch to strengthen the nuclear command and control system and 

the time may be ripe for another close look. In the course of reviewing previous 

choices made, scrutinizing established procedures, and looking at old problems with 

fresh eyes, we may well identify areas for improvement. 

However, we must proceed with some caution. The topic is highly classified and 

thus hard to discuss in open session. It is also highly complex, with de facto operations hinging on crucial details that are hard for outsiders to assess with confidence. 

Above all, there are some fundamental dilemmas at the heart of nuclear command 

and control that mean there are no simple solutions. Context matters and every fix 

may have unintended second or third order effects that may only be understood 

after the system has been thoroughly exercised. 

I will make four brief points in my opening remarks and then look forward to answering your questions as best I can. 

First, at the heart of the nuclear command and control system is what might be 

called the always/never dilemma. For nuclear deterrence to work, we must have a 

high assurance that the country will always be able to present a credible nuclear 

strike capability to our adversaries, even in the most-dire scenarios. Otherwise, if 

others believe that some sort of massive or cleverly designed first strike could 

render our nuclear arsenal unusable, adversaries will have a powerful incentive to 

strike us first and early in any unfolding crisis. 

A significant portion of the nuclear command and control system is thus dedicated 

to ensuring that the President would have a viable nuclear option, even under very 

demanding time constraints, or even after the United States has suffered a devastating attack. We spend enormous sums of money making communications systems as robust as they can be and training all echelons of command to be ready 

to present the national command authority with executable options under any conditions. Design features that increase the risk of failure—that would cause the system 

to fail impotent, rather than merely fail safe—could undermine deterrence. 

However, because even a single nuclear detonation would be so consequential and 

might trigger an escalatory spiral that would lead to civilization-threatening outcomes, we must also have a high assurance that there would never be an accidental 

or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. 

A significant portion of the nuclear command and control system is devoted to 

safety and security measures designed to minimize these risks. U.S. nuclear weapons are equipped with environmental sensing devices that inhibit nuclear detonation unless the weapon experiences the exact sequence of physical effects—spin, 

gravity, change in altitude, etc.—that would be associated with an intended use, 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

11 

thus ensuring that the warhead will not detonate simply because it is dropped or 

bumped. Launch control processes involve complex authentication measures designed to validate that an order is authentically emanating from the national command authority and not some rogue element. During the later period of the Cold 

War, weapons that were deployed in remote settings close to potential battlefields 

had protective devices known as Permissive Action Links (PALs) that rendered the 

weapon inert so that anyone stealing it or trying to use it without proper authorization would be stymied. 

The challenge is that measures designed to improve the always side of the equation can compromise the never side and vice-versa. Pre-delegating the authority to 

use nuclear weapons and spreading the capability to do so to lower echelons may 

thwart an enemy’s first-strike planning, for example, but it would raise the risk that 

a weapon might be used in an unauthorized fashion or by someone confused in the 

fog of battle. 

The history of nuclear command and control is a history of civilian and military 

leaders debating the proper balance between always and never. It is a history of 

occasional discoveries that the risks on one side or the other side of the ledger were 

greater than originally understood. And it is a history of improvements—some, like 

Permissive Action Links, pressed by far-seeing congressional advocates—that may 

have helped forestall disaster. Even though we never had a truly catastrophic nuclear accident it is now publicly known that there were far too many close calls. Accordingly, our nuclear commanders are wise to be ever-vigilant and open to reexamining existing procedures with fresh eyes. 

It is thus of vital national importance that our leaders, our adversaries, our allies, 

and our citizens have confidence that the nuclear command and control system continues to give due consideration to this always/never dilemma and that we have not 

inadvertently accepted too much risk of failure on either side. There is no single optimal solution. The right balance depends on the geostrategic context and advances 

in technology, among other factors, which is why we should never act as if the problem has been ‘‘solved.’’ On the contrary, it is a problem that must be managed on 

an ongoing basis, adjusting as appropriate with other changes. 

This brings me to my second major point: we must be willing to invest the requisite funds to keep our technology up to date, but in the nuclear command and control business hardware is trumped by software, and software is trumped by 

wetware. Hardware refers to the technology: for instance, permissive action links 

that block the firing mechanism until a proper code is inserted. Software refers to 

the rules and procedures that govern how the hardware is used: for instance, the 

code-management system that determines who has the PAL codes and who is authorized to disseminate them. Wetware refers to the human element: the reliability 

of people involved in enforcing the rules and the civil-military relations that form 

the political context in which the software and hardware operate. 

In the past, reviews of the command and control system uncovered hardware 

flaws that needed to be corrected—for instance, gaps in communications that could 

be fixed with more modern technology. But more often reviews identified software 

and wetware problems—for instance, discovering that rules were interpreted in a 

way that produced unintended effects or discovering that bureaucracies had resorted 

to understandable ‘‘work-arounds’’ to get around cumbersome procedures and, in the 

process, introduced uncertainties that were not properly understood by higher authorities. This latter process has been called the ‘‘paradox of control:’’ the more the 

higher levels of command seek to assert restrictive control of subordinate elements, 

even at the risk of making those subordinate elements incapable of doing their jobs, 

the greater is the incentive of those subordinate elements to establish ‘‘workarounds’’ that the higher authorities may not be aware of or, if they are, may not 

fully comprehend. 

At the end of the day, what would matter most is the human element. Would the 

President properly understand his/her role and his/her options and wisely weigh the 

second and third order implications of any decision he/she made? Would the President’s advisors be in a position to provide timely counsel and would that counsel 

shape the President’s decisions? Would the various echelons in the chain of command recognize a valid authenticated nuclear use order as also being legal, given 

the military’s deeply ingrained training to refuse to implement any illegal order? 

Would lower level operators, the proverbial ‘‘button pushers,’’ carry out their fateful 

assignment in light of what is now known about the risks of nuclear war? Indeed, 

would subordinate elements of the command and control system do what they were 

supposed to—no more and no less—but with appropriate judgment? 

This last point cannot be overemphasized. For decades now, it has been technologically possible to build a nuclear command and control system that would eliminate the human element in the launch sequence altogether. Every generation of 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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strategic leaders has understood that such a system would be foolhardy in the extreme. The human element introduces risks, to be sure, but it also introduces the 

opportunity to mitigate risks. 

This brings me to my third major point. The best reforms to the nuclear command 

and control system would be ones that maximized the opportunity for the human 

element to mitigate risks by maximizing time for deliberation and assessment. The 

best reforms are ones that would increase the time that the President and his advisors would have available so as to make considered decisions incorporating the 

widest set of inputs, including, if possible, inputs from leaders in Congress. Of 

course, efforts to extend decision times must not run afoul of the always-never dilemma. Reforms that maximized decision time but rendered the nuclear arsenal unusable in a crisis or conventional conflict would undermine deterrence and could actually make a nuclear war more, not less, likely. Moreover, measures aimed at providing radical solutions at the hardware level risk being undone by workarounds at 

the software or wetware levels. 

Nevertheless, investments—even costly investments—in systems that buy more 

decision time in crises are likely among the wisest expenditures we can make. For 

instance, enhanced missile defenses may be a prudent option in light of the growing 

threat from North Korea—one that gives the President more time to assess before 

reacting. And upgrading communications systems to ensure that the President will 

have immediate access to all of his/her relevant advisors even under demanding scenarios would be a prudent investment in national security. 

Earlier generations of strategic leaders found ways to improve the nuclear command and control system without exacerbating the always/never dilemma and, 

speaking as a citizen, I would ask the current generation of strategic leaders to do 

the same. However, I would likewise caution that not every proposed reform would 

actually reduce nuclear risks. 

This brings me to my fourth and final point: the time is ripe for a fresh look. The 

Trump Administration is going through a Nuclear Posture Review right now and, 

presumably, the adequacy of the nuclear command and control system is a priority 

focus of that review. Changes in communications technologies and rapidly evolving 

cyber threats alone would justify a fresh examination. It is likely that the command 

and control system is overdue for some major (and expensive) upgrades. At the same 

time, the geostrategic environment today is markedly different. Threats that were 

warned about five years ago have become urgent realities today. 

North Korea is only the most vivid example of this; a confrontational Russia and 

an assertive China have dramatically changed our threat picture. The nuclear command and control system is likely facing new strains because of these developments. 

And, finally, our divisive political environment has raised new doubts about the effectiveness of all our branches of government to wield the power they possess responsibly. In that context, a thoroughgoing review of nuclear command and control 

could help shore up public confidence in this vital area. 

Outside experts have suggested many possible improvements that are worth considering. One proposal calls for clarifying the chain of command to ensure that 

lower-echelons know that any order to use nuclear weapons has been adequately 

vetted. Another proposed approach recommends requiring certifications by additional cabinet officials of launch orders under certain circumstances. Still another 

proposal calls for specifying certain scenarios that would require prior consultation 

with Congress before a nuclear use order would be deemed legal. All of these proposals raise important constitutional questions about usurping the President’s authorities; I am not a lawyer but I will point out that the precise distribution of powers among the branches related to military decision-making has never been entirely 

clear, and so reforms that raise the hoary war powers issue, particularly in the nuclear area, are especially fraught. But there may be reforms that pass constitutional 

muster while also enhancing the ability of the President to wield his/her commander-in-chief powers in the most effective and responsible way possible. Finding 

those should be an urgent priority for this and other responsible legislative and executive bodies. 

Because the actual operations of the current system are exceedingly complex, I 

would recommend great caution before legislating any particular fix. Nevertheless, 

Congress can play an important role in strengthening nuclear command and control. 

Congress can stipulate that the NPR explicitly address these questions. Moreover, 

Congress will have multiple opportunities to give input through the authorization 

and appropriation process for the ongoing modernization of the nuclear arsenal. 

Above all, I would recommend diligence and perseverance in oversight of the system, to reassure our friends and to warn our enemies that the nuclear arsenal will 

function as it is intended. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

13 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McKeon? 

STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN MCKEON, FORMER ACTING 

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC. 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cardin, members of the 

committee, thank you for your invitation to be here today. It is nice 

to be back in this room after spending so many years of my professional life working on the staff of this committee. 

I will digress briefly, Mr. Chairman, to say I am very impressed 

by how quickly you mustered a quorum, having spent numerous 

hours waiting and waiting and waiting for that magic 10th Senator 

to show up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. It is one of the rare times that occurred. 

Mr. MCKEON. Your efficiency is impressive. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. MCKEON. I will briefly address three questions and try not 

to duplicate my colleagues. 

First, who has the authority to employ nuclear weapons? In one 

respect, the answer is simple. The President does. As Commander 

in Chief of the Armed Forces under the Constitution, he has the 

sole authority within the executive branch for such a decision. 

Some authority in military operations is delegated to the Secretary of Defense and then further delegated to appropriate combatant commanders. The authority to use nuclear weapons, however, remains with the President. That is as it should be in a republic, given the gravity of the decision and the consequences of 

any nuclear use. 

It bears emphasis that the President would not make this decision by himself. The system for a decision is designed to ensure 

that the President consults with the National Security Council and 

his other senior civilian and military advisers, and I would expect 

that to occur in every case where the use of nuclear weapons is 

contemplated. 

That is hardly the end of the inquiry. The authority to employ 

nuclear weapons is closely intertwined with an equally momentous 

question: Who has the authority to take the country to war? Article 

I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, 

grant letters of marque and reprisal, and several other powers with 

regard to supporting and regulating the Armed Forces. To the 

President, Article II provides that he is the Commander in Chief 

of the Army and the Navy. 

The constitutional text structure and our history provide Congress with primacy in this sphere. This power is not merely limited 

to formal declarations of war, which Congress has not done since 

World War II, but to authorizing most uses of military force. 

To be sure, the President possesses the constitutional authority 

to defend against sudden attack or to preempt an imminent attack. 

But Article II does not give him carte blanche to take the country 

to war. 

In the modern era, Presidents of both parties have often made 

broad assertions of authority to take military action without prior 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

14 

authorization by Congress in a manner that the Framers would not 

have recognized. Nonetheless, we need not resolve this general debate to answer the specific question presented in today’s world. 

In addition to the global terrorism challenge, our major potential 

adversaries today number on one hand: Russia, China, North 

Korea, and Iran. Three of these countries possess nuclear weapons, 

and the fourth has pursued such a capability. Therefore, conflict 

with these states could conceivably involve nuclear weapons use. 

Direct armed conflict with these countries would undoubtedly be 

war in the constitutional sense and, if initiated by the United 

States, would require authorization by the Congress. 

A recent executive branch opinion on the war power by the Office 

of Legal Counsel in 2011 supports this conclusion. It indicated that 

analysis of whether congressional authorization for use of military 

force is required would turn on examination of ‘‘the nature, scope, 

and duration’’ of the conflict, and that specific congressional approval would be necessary in cases of ‘‘prolonged and substantial 

military engagements typically involving exposure of U.S. military 

personnel to significant risk over a substantial period of time.’’ It 

is hard to imagine an armed conflict scenario with any of these 

countries that would not meet that test. 

The rapid advances of North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, and the escalating rhetoric between the President and the 

North Korean leader, are no doubt foremost in your minds. In the 

North Korean context, the view that Congress would need to authorize a war is buttressed by the recent letter to your House colleagues by the vice director of the Joint Staff, Rear Admiral Michael Dumont, where he stated that a ground invasion would be required in order to locate and destroy all components of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 

Given the high number of casualties that would occur in any conflict with North Korea, let alone during a ground invasion, no reasonable argument can be made that that would not be war in the 

constitutional sense. 

The President and his senior administration officials have stated 

that time is running out to address the North Korean challenge. 

And in August, the National Security Advisor suggested the possibility of a preventive war. Such a war is distinct from a preemptive 

strike in the face of impending attack, and would also require congressional authorization. 

For context on these two questions, I would answer a third: What 

is the current policy on use of nuclear weapons? 

In my prepared statement, I highlight several elements of the results of the Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 and the presidential 

employment guidance issued in 2013, which remain in place while 

the Trump administration completes the Nuclear Posture Review 

ordered by the President in January. General Kehler has described 

some of these elements as well in his statement. 

Most importantly, the 2010 NPR set forth a goal of reducing the 

role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. National Security Strategy, and 

it is important to understand there is nothing in the current guidance that compels the use of nuclear weapons in a high-end conflict. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

15 

Finally, I would note the Obama administration did not adopt a 

formal policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons, although, in the 

final month of the administration, Vice President Biden gave a 

speech in which he said that, given our nonnuclear capabilities and 

the nature of today’s threats, it is hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons would be necessary. 

He went on to say that he and the President were confident that 

we can deter and defend ourselves and our allies against nonnuclear threats through other means. 

In closing, thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[Mr. McKeon’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN P. MCKEON

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cardin, members of the committee, thank you for inviting 

me to address important questions regarding the authority to employ nuclear weapons. I bring to this issue experience both as a lawyer—as chief counsel for the 

Democratic members of this committee for 12 years—and as a policymaker in the 

Executive Branch, with service in three different national security positions in the 

White House and the Defense Department during the Obama administration, where 

I was regularly engaged in nuclear weapons policy matters. My position in the Defense Department ended on January 20 of this year; I speak only for myself and 

not the Department. 

I commend you for examining this issue, as well as the broader question of war 

powers, as you did last month with the Secretaries of State and Defense, and in 

June with outside witnesses. 

I will briefly address three questions. 

First, who has the authority to employ nuclear weapons? In one respect, the answer is simple: the President does. As Commander in Chief of the armed forces 

under the Constitution, he is the sole authority within the Executive Branch for 

such a decision. Some authority in military operations is delegated to the Secretary 

of Defense, and then further delegated to the appropriate combatant commanders. 

The authority to use nuclear weapons, however, remains with the President. That 

is as it should be in a republic, given the gravity of the decision and the consequences of any nuclear use. 

It bears emphasis that the President would not make this decision by himself. 

The system for decision is designed to ensure that the President consults with the 

National Security Council and his other senior civilian and military advisers, and 

I would expect that to occur in every case where the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated. If the order is given, the chain of command runs from the President to 

the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command in the case 

of strategic weapons, and, in the case of non-strategic weapons in Europe, to the 

Commander of U.S. European Command; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is not 

in the chain of command. If time and circumstances permit, I would also expect any 

President to consult with leaders of key allies, particularly in the region of potential 

conflict. 

That is hardly the end of the inquiry. The authority to employ nuclear weapons 

is intertwined with an equally momentous question: who has the authority to take 

the country to war? 

The members of this committee well understand the basic constitutional framework, given your jurisdiction over the war power under the Senate rules. Article I 

of the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, grant letters of marque 

and reprisal, and several other powers with regard to supporting and regulating the 

armed forces. To the President, Article II provides that he is the Commander in 

Chief of the Army and Navy. 

In my view, and the view of many respected scholars, the constitutional text, 

structure and our history provide Congress with primacy in this sphere. This power 

is not merely limited to formal declarations of war—which Congress has not done 

since World War II—but to authorizing most uses of military force. To be sure, the 

President possesses the constitutional authority to defend the country against sudden attack, or to pre-empt an imminent attack. But Article II does not give him 

carte blanche to take the country to war. 

In the modern era, presidents of both parties have often made broad assertions 

of authority to take military action without prior authorization by Congress, and 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

16 

have given a narrower reading to the Declaration of War clause, in a manner the 

Framers would not have recognized. 

Nonetheless, we need not resolve that general debate to answer the specific question presented in today’s world. In addition to the global terrorism challenge, our 

major potential adversaries today number on one hand: Russia, China, North Korea 

and Iran. Three of these countries possess nuclear weapons; the fourth has pursued 

such a capability. Therefore, conflict with these states could conceivably involve nuclear weapons use. Direct armed conflict with these countries would undoubtedly be 

‘‘war’’ in the constitutional sense, and if initiated by the United States, would require authorization by the Congress. Quite apart from the legal requirement, as a 

matter of politics and policy, any President should want the Congress, as the body 

directly representative of the American people, to provide its support—to join in the 

decision and the responsibility for such a national commitment of blood and treasure. A recent Executive Branch opinion on the war power—by the Office of Legal 

Counsel in 2011 regarding the military operation in Libya—supports this conclusion. It indicated that analysis of whether congressional authorization of a use of 

military force is required would turn on examination of the ‘‘nature, scope, and duration’’ of the conflict, and that specific congressional approval would be necessary 

in cases of ‘‘prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period [of 

time].’’ It is hard to imagine an armed conflict scenario with any of these countries 

that would not meet this test. 

The rapid advances of North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, and the escalating rhetoric between the President and the North Korean leader, are no doubt 

foremost in your minds. In the North Korean context, the view that Congress would 

need to authorize a war is buttressed by the recent letter to your House colleagues 

from the Vice Director of Joint Staff, Rear Admiral Dumont, where he stated that 

a ground invasion would be required in order to locate and destroy all components 

of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Given the high number of casualties 

that would occur in any conflict with North Korea—let alone during a ground invasion—no reasonable argument can be made that this would not be ‘‘war’’ in the constitutional sense. 

The President and senior administration officials have stated that time is running 

out to address the North Korean challenge, and in August, the National Security 

Adviser suggested the possibility of a preventive war. Such a war—as distinct from 

a pre-emptive strike in the face of an impending attack against the United States— 

would also require congressional authorization. 

For context on these two questions, I would answer a third: what is the current 

policy on use of nuclear weapons? The Trump administration is working on a Nuclear Posture Review ordered by the President last January. For now, my understanding is that the policy set by the Obama administration continues to obtain. 

That policy is set forth in the report of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 2010 

and presidential employment guidance issued in 2013. While the specific guidance 

to the commanders is classified, the NPR report is unclassified, and the Defense Department submitted an unclassified summary of the employment guidance to the 

Congress in 2013. A few elements of these documents bear highlighting. 

The 2010 NPR set forth a goal of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. 

national security strategy, and stated that, among other things: 

• The United States would only consider use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and 

partners. 

• The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies 

and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. 

• The United States updated the longstanding ‘‘negative security assurance’’ by 

stating that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 

in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. 

Additionally, the employment guidance directed the Department of Defense to: 

• Conduct deliberate planning for non-nuclear strike options to assess what objectives and effects could be achieved through such options. 

• Examine further options to reduce the role that Launch Under Attack plays in 

U.S. planning, while retaining the ability to do so if directed. 

Finally, the Obama administration did not adopt a formal policy of ‘‘no first use’’ 

of nuclear weapons, although in the final month of the administration, Vice PresiFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

17 

dent Biden gave a speech in which he said that given our ‘‘non-nuclear capabilities 

and the nature of today’s threats, it’s hard to envision a plausible scenario in which 

the first use of nuclear weapons would be necessary.’’ He went on to say that he 

and President Obama were ‘‘confident we can deter—and defend ourselves and our 

Allies against—non-nuclear threats through other means.’’ 

In closing, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you today. I look 

forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank all three of you for that outstanding testimony. As usual, I am going to reserve my time for interjections 

and turn to our ranking member. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me also thank all three of you not just for 

your appearance here today but for your service to our country on 

these very difficult issues. 

I am going to preface my question with my strong belief that 

there is not a military solution to the crisis in North Korea, that 

any military option carries unbelievable risk factors, whether it be 

conventional or the use of nuclear weapons. 

And I hope that the President’s trip to Asia has produced the 

openings to urge a diplomatic surge that will recognize that both 

China and the United States should be looking for off-ramps to this 

crisis, and they have a lot in common, and China can change the 

equation in North Korea. 

So I hope that is where we are heading, because the use of any 

military option has extreme risks. 

So this is not a hypothetical discussion. What concerns me is 

that the President may be getting military options, and the use of 

conventional weapons could lead to an extreme number of casualties in Japan or in South Korea. So there may be a discussion 

about whether a nuclear first-strike could prevent that from occurring or have less of a chance of that occurring. So this is not a hypothetical discussion. 

So, General, I was particularly impressed by your statement 

which says, in addition, the legal principles of military necessity, 

distinction, and proportionality also apply to nuclear plans, operations, and decisions. 

So how is the President legally restrained, if at all, on the use 

of a nuclear first-strike as a result of the orders that are there 

under command that it must be proportional or that there is a distinction that requires this military necessity? Is there any real restraint on the President on choosing a nuclear first-strike in a circumstance in North Korea? 

General KEHLER. Senator, I think there are. I think there are always legal constraints when any military option is being considered. 

There has been a longstanding debate about nuclear weapons 

and morality and legality, and where nuclear weapons fit in all of 

that, given that things changed in August 1945. And there has 

been, I think, a longstanding policy view from the United States 

that nuclear weapons are not inherently illegal. They can be used 

illegally. The question is under what circumstances and situation. 

And what I can tell you is that when I was involved as the commander of STRATCOM in preplanning options that we are ordered 

to do—every President has directed the military to preplan some 

options, more as time has passed for additional flexibility, et 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

18 

cetera, et cetera—we involved our legal advisers in every step of 

that process. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me interrupt you there. 

So there is discussion taking place at the National Security 

Council level with legal advisers, with military advisers. And the 

advice is that, under the guidelines on proportionality and necessity, that this is not appropriate for use of a nuclear first-strike. 

Is there action that can be taken by those advisers if the President overrules that decision and says, no, we are going with a nuclear attack? 

General KEHLER. Other than to state their view about the legality of the move, the President retains constitutional authority to 

order some military action. The military, you would be in a very 

interesting constitutional situation, I believe, because, again, the 

military is obligated to follow legal orders but is not obligated to 

follow illegal orders. 

The question about the legality—— 

Senator CARDIN. Who would make that judgment on behalf of the 

operational command under DOD? 

General KEHLER. Well, that is one of the things that would be 

on the plate of the commander of Strategic Command. I always believed that that was on my plate, that ultimately it is very difficult—— 

Senator CARDIN. So let me just drill down on this. If you believe 

that this did not meet the legal test of proportionality, even if ordered by the President of the United States to use a nuclear firststrike, you believe that, because of legalities, you retain that decision to disobey the Commander in Chief? 

General KEHLER. Yes. If there is an illegal order presented to the 

military, the military is obligated to refuse to follow it. 

Now the question is just the one that you described. It is the 

process leading to that determination and how you arrive at that. 

I would concede to you that that would be a very difficult process 

and a very difficult conversation. 

But in the scenario that you are painting here, I would also 

argue that there is time for that kind of a deliberate conversation 

on these matters. 

Senator CARDIN. And just to complete this cycle, part of this is 

that the protocols that have been established under executive orders on the use of nuclear that require the proportionality that you 

are talking about. Another is the inherent responsibility of military 

command to follow only orders that are lawful. Am I reading that 

correctly? 

General KEHLER. Yes, that is correct. 

Senator CARDIN. So there are two different sets, because you may 

very well be getting opinions from the White House that this is 

legal, but you would have to make your own independent judgment 

based upon history and based upon following only legal orders. 

General KEHLER. Yes. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to use my first interjection here. 

So in the event someone in your former position received an 

order that you knew had not been vetted through the National Security Council, for instance, that discussions had not taken place, 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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that you just got a call out of the blue, things were tense in a particular area and you received that order, would you consider that 

to be legal or not legal? 

General KEHLER. I never felt, Senator, that I had to vet orders 

through the National Security Council. I felt, as a military senior 

leader, that I had three obligations. One obligation was to provide 

my military advice. One obligation was to raise any concerns that 

I had; if they happened to be legal concerns, to raise those concerns. And then the third obligation that I had was related to the 

legality of the order, either follow a legal order or refuse to follow 

an illegal order. 

I had legal advisers myself. I fully expected that we would involve the Secretary’s legal advisers, the chairman’s legal advisers. 

Where DOD took that from there was sort of their issue to take. 

But this, I would certainly have been in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense and the chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson? 

Senator JOHNSON. General, I want to continue down this line of 

questioning. 

From my standpoint, there are really two basic scenarios, the 

scenario when we are under imminent attack, or there is an attack 

that is imminent, and then one where it is more preemptive, where 

there is time. You said there is always going to be time. There may 

not always be time, correct? 

General KEHLER. I did not mean to suggest that there would always be time. I agree with that. 

Senator JOHNSON. So when the President would determine that 

we are under the threat of almost an imminent attack, he has almost absolute authority, correct? 

General KEHLER. Yes. Context matters here and—yes. 

Senator JOHNSON. So is there any process to assess ‘‘imminent’’ 

at that moment? 

General KEHLER. So I am a former commander, not a lawyer, 

so—— 

Senator JOHNSON. I am an accountant, so—— 

General KEHLER [continuing]. So let me just say this, to try to 

shed some light on this. Context matters here. If, in fact, in a 

range of scenarios where nuclear weapon use is possible, or there 

is a potential for nuclear weapons use, U.S. policy has helped us 

clarify over the years under what circumstances we might expect 

to use nuclear weapons. 

So, for example, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review said, ‘‘extreme 

circumstances when vital national interests are at stake.’’ As a 

commander, I had that in my mind as a context for nuclear weapons. 

And if we had tactical warning that an attack was underway, 

then we were into a playbook, basically, that had been vetted for 

its legal viability, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. 

Senator JOHNSON. So we somewhat defined ‘‘imminent.’’ Obviously, if you see radar saying this is a launch, that is obviously imminent. 

General KEHLER. Right. 

Senator JOHNSON. What if it is right before? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

General KEHLER. Well, there is also the conditions where you 

might have strategic warning, where we have solid warning that 

something will happen. 

Senator JOHNSON. That is already game-planned out, in terms of 

what strategic warning is that would say it is imminent? 

General KEHLER. Well, it is not precisely defined, but I think it 

would be certainly one of those matters under consideration. 

Tactical warning, by the way, carries with it some amount of 

time urgency either for the survival of the decision-maker or for a 

decision about what to do in terms of responding. Strategic warning is not as time urgent. And so more time gets introduced into 

these scenarios as you go from the most extreme stressing scenario 

back to the left. 

Senator JOHNSON. So that is the next scenario, where it is more 

strategic, and you have time. 

Let’s say you get a presidential order to launch, but you are in 

the position and you know that you have not followed the process. 

It has not been properly vetted. In that case, in your position, you 

believe that is an illegal order? 

General KEHLER. No, I believe you have to determine whether 

that is a legal order. 

Senator JOHNSON. But you believe that is your responsibility. 

You have the authority to say—— 

General KEHLER. Yes. 

Senator JOHNSON.—this is not legal because we have not followed the steps. We have not gone through the process. 

General KEHLER. I would have said, ‘‘I have a question about 

this,’’ and I would have said, ‘‘I am not ready to proceed.’’ 

Senator JOHNSON. And then what happens? 

General KEHLER. Well—[Laughter.] 

General KEHLER. As I say, I do not know exactly. Fortunately, 

we have never—these are all hypothetical scenarios. I mean, they 

are real in terms of—— 

Senator JOHNSON. We are holding a hearing on this, so. 

General KEHLER. Exactly. This is the human factor in our system. The human factor then kicks in. It is what Dr. Feaver said. 

There is a human element to this. 

And at that point, I think, as with any military order—it does 

not matter, really. The consequences are higher if it is an order on 

nuclear weapons, but it is the same principle on any order. 

Senator JOHNSON. So the point is there is a lot of human intervention between a presidential order when there is time, it is not 

imminent, to really ask the questions, to lay out the fact that we 

have not gone through this process, this is not well thought out, 

it is not proportional. So we can have a little comfort that even 

though the President has the authority, there are limits to that 

even within this context, when there is time. 

General KEHLER. I believe that is true. And even if time is compressed, there are circumstances that I could envision where I 

would have said the same thing, which is, ‘‘Wait. Stop. We need to 

resolve these issues,’’ or we need to address this question, or whatever. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

And the process provides for that in that it is ultimately an 

interaction among human beings. The decision authority resides 

with the President, however. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you for those answers. Thanks for your 

service. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just, before we move to the next, the person who is in your position, it is a Senate-confirmed position, is 

that correct? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. That is right. 

The CHAIRMAN. And typically, the person that is put in your position is recommended by the military? How does it typically work? 

General KEHLER. Well, I can tell you how it worked for me. The 

Secretary of Defense, in my case, the Secretary of Defense interviewed a number of candidates, decided on a candidate to recommend to the President. There was a process that was gone 

through there at some level. And I became the President’s nominee 

to the Senate. And then you all—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Most of the people who ended up being in these 

positions, are they people that have moved up through the defense 

mechanisms solely? This is not a political position, typically? It is 

a position that is based on merit? 

General KEHLER. It is not a political position, and it is a position 

that is based on, I believe, experience, and I would like to think 

merit as well, but certainly experience. Certainly, there are a lot 

of factors that go into selection for senior command. 

That is a great question I think for you to pose to other witnesses who have been in the position to select senior commanders. 

I was the beneficiary of that selection. 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, I can tell you, at least from my 

vantage point in the Pentagon, but also as chief of staff to the National Security Council, the process General Kehler describes is the 

process. The Secretary and the chairman huddle and look at various candidates from the services for the four-star combatant commands. 

Under President Obama, he personally interviewed most of the 

candidates who were recommended for selection. 

General KEHLER. And typically, Mr. Chairman, in recent years, 

the commanders of some of the combatant commanders have been 

typically four-stars on their second or third assignment. So I was 

not a first-time four-star when I was nominated to take command 

of Strategic Command. That was my second four-star assignment. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Udall? 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank all the witnesses for being here today. 

The first use of U.S. nuclear weapons would appear to be a clear 

declaration of war. Certainly, the recipient of a U.S. nuclear attack 

would perceive it that way. Under the U.S. Constitution, only Congress can declare war. 

Should Congress require the President to seek authorization for 

the first use of nuclear weapons? Why or why not? 

Mr. McKeon, why don’t we start with you? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

22 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, as I laid out in my opening statement, it 

is my view, certainly, if the United States were to initiate a war 

with another nuclear state, and we conceive that the use of nuclear 

weapons might be possible, that is war in the constitutional sense 

that Congress should authorize. 

If we are under attack from a nuclear state using nuclear weapons, that is a different question, and the President would have the 

authority under Article II to respond, whether with conventional or 

nuclear weapons. 

The hardest question is the in-between question, and what Senator Johnson was getting at. Where do you define imminence on 

the continuum? 

Senator UDALL. How do you define it? 

Mr. MCKEON. Well, it would be very fact-specific, to give you a 

bit of a lawyer’s dodge. But kind of the most obvious case is we see 

a missile on a launchpad or several missiles on several launchpads, 

and we have good intelligence that they intend to not test them but 

launch them at the United States. That seems like a pretty clear 

case of imminence. 

Then you would move down a continuum away from that to 

where it becomes less imminent and looks more like a preventive 

attack. 

Senator UDALL. Dr. Feaver and General? 

Dr. FEAVER. What I would say is distinguish between scenarios 

where the military wake up the President versus scenarios where 

the President is waking up the military. 

Where the military wakes up the President and warns him that 

there is about to be an attack or that we are experiencing attack, 

in those settings, the President has a very limited time window to 

make a decision. He would make a decision. He alone would have 

the authority to make the decision. And I think we all believe that 

the system would carry out the order that he gave. The electorate 

on Election Day chose him to make that decision. 

But in the other context where the President is waking up the 

military, maybe in an extreme funk, saying, ‘‘I am angry, and I 

want something done,’’ in that setting, he requires the cooperation 

of a lot of people who would be asking exactly the questions that 

General Kehler outlined. ‘‘What is the context? Why is this?’’ And 

the President alone could not affect the strike. He would require 

lots of people cooperating with him to make the strike happen, and 

they would be asking the questions that would slow down that 

process. 

So the context matters greatly for this. 

Our experience is that the President has asked for authorization 

when he is initiating a conflict. That is what President Bush did 

in 2002. And I believe that if there was that kind of context, the 

President would expect to go to Congress for authorization for 

something in that style. 

Senator UDALL. Now per the U.S. Air Force instruction, the twoperson concept is designed to prevent an accidental or malicious 

launch of nuclear weapons by a single individual. In the nuclear 

chain of command, the only exception to this rule is the President. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

Would it not make sense to require at least one other person sign 

off on a decision to launch a first strike; for example, a constitutional officer such as the Vice President? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, there is an adage in the law that you may 

be familiar with that hard cases make bad law, and this is a hard 

case. And I think taking away the President’s authority as Commander in Chief or diluting it in some respect by requiring him to 

go to another constitutional officer in a formal sense, I am not sure 

that is a wise course. 

I do think, as I said, it would be a rare case where the President 

would not consult with all of his senior advisers, to include the Vice 

President. It is just automatic in the system, whether there is considerable time or not, that that would occur. It would be very unusual if it did not. 

Senator UDALL. Do you all disagree or agree with that? 

Dr. FEAVER. I do not disagree. I think any law that you pass that 

raises constitutional questions will be very difficult, one, to get 

passed, and, two, very difficult to implement. 

You want to make sure that you don’t propose a legislative fix 

that undermines the nuclear deterrent and, thus, compromises the 

effectiveness of why we have nuclear weapons. 

General KEHLER. And I agree with both of my colleagues. There 

are two different questions really at work here. One is a question 

of constitutional authority and what the Commander in Chief is allowed to do as the Commander in Chief. And the other is a principle, and a set of processes and procedures, that ensure that the 

authorized use remains at the most senior civilian authority, and 

that unauthorized or accidental use cannot occur. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Young? 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank all our panelists for being here today. 

General Kehler, I just want to follow up on what has been much 

discussed here. In your written statement, you indicate, ‘‘The legal 

principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality also 

apply to nuclear plans, operations, and decisions. Legal advisers 

are deeply involved with commanders at all steps of the deliberate 

and crisis action processes to offer perspective on how force is to 

be used, as well as the decision to use force.’’ 

So a few observations, and I will give you, General, and you, Mr. 

McKeon, since you are the attorney on the panel, an opportunity 

to respond to any you like. 

Number one, it is unclear to me what the legal standard is for 

a person to determine whether or not these legal principles have 

been satisfied. So is the standard that no reasonable person could 

conclude that the order was necessary or proportional? Or is there 

some other legal standard? Or is that left strategically vague? 

The second observation is it is unclear what the Commander in 

Chief’s recourse would be if, in fact, a military person decided not 

to move forward with these orders based on principled reasons that 

are grounded in the legal principles of military necessity and proportionality. That is, what if a military person regards the order 

as illegal, decides to do what we are taught in the military—make 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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known their decision and refuses to obey that order? What recourse 

does the Commander in Chief then have in the wake of such a decision? 

And then the last observation is that I am unaware of, and perhaps most others are as well, but I am unaware of any sort of what 

I will call discernment training; that is, the training of our military 

personnel to be able to apply these legal principles to different circumstances, to different military contingencies. 

Considering legal questions in advance, to me, seems distinct 

from making firm legal determinations in advance. And going 

through a series of wargames or contingencies could help sharpen 

one’s ability to apply the facts of different complicated, global circumstances to these legal principles. 

So with that, if you would like to comment on any of those observations, why don’t I start with Mr. McKeon as the counselor 

present? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Young, on the second question about the 

legal recourse, if you had a commander saying that he did not believe it was a legal order, the chain of command runs from the 

President to the Secretary to the combatant commander. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs is not in that chain of command. 

I suppose probably the first recourse would be to call the Secretary of Defense to tell him to order the commander to do it. Then 

if the commander still resisted, you either get a new Secretary of 

Defense or get a new commander. But you would have a real constitutional crisis on your hands, if that occurred. 

I am unaware that there is a strict legal standard like ‘‘no reasonable person’’ on the judgment of proportionality and distinction, 

because it is not an instance that would get litigated very often, although General Kehler may be more familiar with the UCMJ cases 

than I am, because I am not a DOD lawyer. I was a lawyer in this 

committee. 

It would be a judgment based on senior military officers like the 

chairman who would be in the conversation, and the combatant 

commander, and their legal advisers, all of whom would have had 

between 30 and 40 years of military service and experience, and 

understand how to make these assessments. 

I think that is the best answer I can give you on it. 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you. 

General, do you have anything to add? And also, perhaps you 

could answer the question—of course, these would be highly classified training regimens, and if you prefer, you could brief me in a 

classified setting—about our ability to train people to discern when 

proportional, necessary orders have been ordered. 

General KEHLER. We certainly do train everyone in the military 

on what we collectively call the law of armed conflict, and that 

training occurs probably somewhere every day. It includes the nuclear forces. It includes everyone wearing a uniform. So this is not 

a foreign concept to people who wear our uniforms. 

In terms of what is legal precedent here, I, frankly, cannot answer that off the top of my head. I don’t know. And what the legal 

standard is for determining distinction, proportionality, and military necessity, I cannot describe that off the top of my head either. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

25 

What I can say is that, for nuclear decision-making at the highest level, it is a consultative process, and there are senior people 

involved in that process. 

Where my expectation always was, if there was a question about 

the legality—first of all, if this was something we had planned, 

then those issues have been addressed and resolved prior to the 

time that the plan becomes part of a playbook that says, ‘‘Hey, you 

can pick this one,’’ because we have already been through all of 

that for this or this or this. And there are many options that have 

been preplanned. 

If we were doing crisis action planning, we would do the same 

thing. We would follow through. That happens faster, but we would 

follow through with the same thing. The same legal standards 

would be applied. 

I always assumed that, if issues got raised at the most senior 

level, that we would be able to resolve those issues. And then as 

was described, the chain of command is operative here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you both very much. 

Senator Murphy? 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this 

hearing. This is fascinating. 

Thank you all for being here today. 

Let me just pull back the cover for a minute from this hearing. 

We are concerned that the President of the United States is so unstable, is so volatile, has a decision-making process that is so quixotic, that he might order a nuclear weapons strike that is wildly 

out of step with U.S. national security interests. Let’s just recognize the exceptional nature of this moment in the discussion that 

we are having today. 

I want to maybe pin together some of the questions that have 

been asked here in a little bit more pointed form. We have been 

talking about the ways and the reasons that an individual in the 

chain of command may decide to refrain from carrying out a particular order because of its illegality. I think Senator Young raised 

some very good concerns around the difficulty of evaluating whether a particular order is necessary or proportional. 

But let me just ask a simple question. Is one of the questions 

that is asked in determining whether an order is legal whether or 

not there is a declaration of war that allows for that military action 

to take place? Would there have to be an independent legal determination made by those in the chain of command that there was 

an operational declaration of war, in the absence of an attack or 

an imminent threat? 

General KEHLER. Senator, you were looking at me. Are you asking me? 

Senator MURPHY. Sure. 

General KEHLER. Great. So the authority to use force and whether or not there is a declaration of war comes back to context here. 

At least from my perspective, I always viewed the use of nuclear 

weapons as fitting in with our declaratory policy, which is that we 

would be in extreme circumstances. And it was described pretty 

well. It was described in the last Nuclear Posture Review. But subsequent to that, it was described in other various ways by the 

United States, various administrations over time, that we would be 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

in some kind of extraordinary or extreme circumstances, and we 

would be dealing with national interests that are at stake here. 

I can’t go back and recite authority that has been granted in the 

past to respond with nuclear weapons, but my belief, and I could 

be wrong here, was that this issue of strategic and tactical warning 

had been addressed in prior epochs, and that we were not on shaky 

legal ground if we were talking about response to strategic or tactical warning. 

Senator MURPHY. But the question as to whether there is legal 

authority is part of the decision-making process regarding the legality of a particular order that the chain of command is being 

asked to carry out? 

General KEHLER. Sure. 

Senator MURPHY. Dr. Feaver, do you agree? 

Dr. FEAVER. Right. One of the things that the officers will ask 

themselves is, under what authority are we conducting this operation? That would require referring back to, what are the authorities? 

They could reach the judgment that it is the inherent authorities 

in Article II of the Commander in Chief clause. So you would require a legal judgment, and there are legal staffs throughout the 

chain of command. 

What would be the case, though, is it would not be the President 

alone persuading a single military officer alone on the other side 

of the telephone. There would be a large group of advisers and 

legal advisers weighing in on this. And that is an important part 

of the context that is sometimes lost in the media coverage. There 

would be a lot of people under the scenario that you described, not 

imminent, not waking the President up, but we have time to decide 

this. Many, many people would be weighing in, including many 

lawyers. 

Senator MURPHY. I think Mr. McKeon answered this to an extent, but I will ask you, Dr. Feaver. Would the possession of a nuclear weapon capable of reaching the United States constitute an 

imminent attack, in your opinion? The simple possession of a weapon, a nuclear weapon capable of hitting the United States, does 

that constitute an imminent attack? 

Dr. FEAVER. I am not a lawyer, and so I could not judge whether 

that would meet the legal test. I think it would, in most people’s 

minds, constitute a grave threat to U.S. national security. Particularly if it was a North Korean nuclear warhead atop a North Korean missile that was capable of reaching the United States, I 

think most Americans would view that as a grave threat to our national security. Whether that would meet the legal test of imminence would require a legal judgment. I will defer to counsel on my 

right. 

Senator MURPHY. Mr. McKeon? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, the mere possession of a nuclear weapon 

I do not think would meet that test. I think there would be time 

required for congressional authorization, if the decision were taken 

that the mere possession of a nuclear weapon by a state such as 

North Korea was unacceptable to U.S. national security interests. 

They have a nuclear weapon today. We know that much. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

27 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio? 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. I want to say at the outset this is 

an important conversation, but one we should tread lightly on. Our 

allies who rely on U.S. defense assurances are watching, and if we 

create doubt in their minds about the capability or the willingness 

of the United States to live up to those commitments in any way, 

and I am not claiming that is what anyone is doing, I think it could 

have repercussions that are significant, including encouraging 

some of them to perhaps pursue their own deterrent capability. If 

they come to doubt our political ability and/or willingness to live 

up to our commitments, we are actually making the world more 

dangerous, not less dangerous. 

I also think our adversaries are watching, and I will get to that 

part in a moment. But I think if anyone out there thinks they can 

somehow get away with something because the politics of the 

United States would prevent the Commander in Chief from acting 

expeditiously, that could also encourage miscalculation, particularly on behalf of people that are isolated from the world, don’t get 

a lot of information, and have never had anyone tell them they are 

wrong or no. And I have one person, in particular, in North Korea 

that concerns me in that regard. 

I don’t think there is any debate about imminent attack or under 

attack. I think we would all agree that the President of the United 

States has to have the capability to quickly respond if we are under 

attack and/or under potential imminent attack. Obviously, there 

could be some debate about it. 

I also think it is important for us, in the context of this new posture review, to know that the traditional Cold War threat of a massive exchange between the U.S. and the then-Soviet Union is probably not likely in the short term. I think the likelier threats remain 

the use of Russian tactical battlefield weapons to escalate in order 

to de-escalate a battlefield event, a terrorist organization that 

comes into possession of a nuclear device or some other weapon of 

mass destruction, and then a rogue regime that does not have any 

of these safeguards that we have talked about. It is basically one 

guy who has a bad night and gets up and decides he wants to do 

something about it. So these are things that it is important to understand. 

I think this whole debate is about first use, and I want to touch 

on a topic that was first innovated during the Cold War in the context of an overwhelming conventional advantage the Warsaw Pact 

had, but we also saw it operative in the first Gulf War, and that 

is the notion of calculated ambiguity. 

I believe it served us in both instances, particularly in 1991, 

when Saddam Hussein was perhaps tempted to use biological and/ 

or chemical weapons. One of the reasons why perhaps he did not 

pursue it was that there was calculated ambiguity about whether 

or not that would trigger a U.S. nuclear response. And I think we 

could all foresee what that conflict would have looked like had he 

deployed biological and/or chemical agents that he had in his possession and could have potentially used. 

Is calculated ambiguity still an important concept in the 21st 

century, the notion that adversaries should have doubt in their 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

28 

mind about whether or not the United States retains the right to 

strike first should they either use a weapon of mass destruction 

and/or move in a dangerous direction? Is calculated ambiguity still 

useful and still operative in this set of threats that we now face? 

General KEHLER. Senator, I believe that it enhances our deterrence to have some doubt in the mind of an adversary about under 

what conditions we would use a nuclear weapon. 

Dr. FEAVER. Senator, I agree. And I would go further and say 

that President Obama, who was no fan of nuclear weapons and 

who moved us back on the nuclear threat index in his 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, nevertheless left in place calculated ambiguity in precisely these scenarios. And his rewriting of it was taken 

to mean we would not threaten countries who were attacking us 

with nonnuclear weapons. But a close reading of what he decided 

left in place enough ambiguity to achieve precisely the deterrent effect you described. And that was from a President who was openly 

hostile to nuclear weapons. 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes, is the answer to your question. 

Senator RUBIO. The last point in the 40 seconds I have left that 

I just wanted to touch on is this whole notion of, if it is legal, you 

have a right. And I think we all understand what that means. If 

military officials are ordered to go into a village full of civilians and 

kill everybody, that clearly violates the law that governs armed 

conflict. 

I think there is also some danger in that regard here, and we 

have to be careful in how we talk about that as well. We cannot 

have a bunch of bunker lawyers that basically—or activists up and 

down the chain who decide that they are going to disobey any order 

that they disagree with. I mean, we can foresee where something 

like that can spin out of control. 

And ultimately, in this Republic, we have elections. And one of 

the things that voters think about when they elect someone to the 

Office of President of the United States is whether or not they 

want to entrust them with this capability. So it is good that people 

are aware of this issue, but I think we need to be very careful when 

we talk about that component of it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. I just want to say, I don’t think you were 

here for my opening comments, I cannot agree more that both for 

our adversaries and those who are our friends, that we need to be 

careful in how we discuss this. We do not want any of them to fear 

that somehow the ability to make decisions that benefit our country and them, or disbenefit them if they are acting against us, is 

being taken away. I couldn’t agree more. 

Senator Markey? 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

having this very important hearing. I requested this several weeks 

ago, and I just think it is so important that you have such an important discussion, because few questions are as important to U.S. 

national security as the question of presidential authority to use 

nuclear weapons not only to deter or defend against a nuclear attack but also to start a nuclear war. 

Nuclear weapons are for deterrence, not warfighting. Launching 

nuclear weapons first would be an unprecedented act of aggression 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

29 

and war. Whether limited or massive, any first-use nuclear strike 

would devolve into retaliatory strikes and war, causing unimaginable deaths, suffering, and destruction. 

Absent a nuclear attack upon the United States or our allies, no 

one human being should have the power to unilaterally unleash the 

most destructive forces ever devised by humankind. Yet, under existing laws, the President of the United States can start a nuclear 

war without provocation, without consultation, and without warning. It boggles the rational mind. 

I fear that in the age of Trump, the cooler heads and strategic 

doctrine that we once relied upon as our last best hope against the 

unthinkable seem less reassuring than ever. 

In other areas of government, our Constitution system of checks 

and balances ensures that the President does not have sole power 

to make extreme decisions without some level of national consensus. But on the President’s sole authority to start a nuclear 

war, even in the absence of a nuclear attack against our country, 

no one can tell the President no, not Secretaries Mattis or 

Tillerson. Even General Kelly, the President’s chief of staff, cannot 

control the President’s Twitter tantrums. 

As a result, many Americans share my fear that the President’s 

bombastic words could turn into nuclear reality. The fact that any 

American President has the unilateral ability to start a nuclear 

war is why I have introduced legislation cosponsored by 13 of my 

Senate colleagues to restrict any President’s authority to launch a 

first-use nuclear strike without congressional authorization. 

The Founding Fathers believed that Congress has an integral 

role in any decision to start a war. And today more than ever, it 

is imperative that Congress reassert that constitutional authority. 

Mr. McKeon, is the President legally required to consult with or 

receive approval from anyone else before ordering the launch of a 

nuclear weapon? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Markey, in the context that you described, 

in the absence of an attack or an imminent attack, I think the Constitution requires him to come to Congress to get that authority. 

Senator MARKEY. Does the protocol for the President to launch 

a nuclear weapon change if we are under nuclear attack or deciding to launch a first-use strike? It is different when we are not 

under attack? 

Mr. MCKEON. Those are two different questions. 

Senator MARKEY. Two different questions. 

Mr. MCKEON. If we are under attack, the President would have 

that authority under Article II to defend the country, and there is 

no distinction between his authority to use conventional or nuclear 

weapons in response to such an attack. 

Senator MARKEY. Is there a formal process by which anyone in 

the chain of command, from the Secretary of Defense down to the 

submariner or airman actually initiating the launch sequence, may 

object to or legally refuse to carry out a presidential order or 

launch a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. MCKEON. Well, as General Kehler has described, the officers 

in the chain of command, the senior officers and the Secretary, 

could raise objections, if they believe the order is illegal. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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I think the system is designed to protect the first or second lieutenant, 23-year-old Air Force officer sitting in the launch control 

center from having to make that grave decision. It is really the 

four-stars and the Secretary who need to bear that burden. 

Senator MARKEY. Because disobeying such an order would be 

considered a violation of Federal law under the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

So in your testimony, Mr. McKeon, you say that, in August, the 

National Security Advisor, Mr. McMaster, suggested the possibility 

of a preventive war, which would require congressional authorization. 

In other words, if there had been a decision that was being made 

by the President to use nuclear weapons, maybe small tactical nuclear weapons to hit the nuclear weapons system in known locations in North Korea as part of a preventative nuclear war, it is 

your opinion that the President would have to come to the United 

States Congress in order to receive congressional approval. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes, correct. 

Senator MARKEY. So when General McMaster talks in those 

terms, ‘‘preventative war,’’ and that is I think what most people are 

most concerned about, this question of the President actually using 

them as part of that kind of scenario, there is, in your opinion, a 

constitutional responsibility for Members of Congress to have to 

have voted on that before such a nuclear war is commenced by the 

United States. 

Mr. MCKEON. Correct. And in my view, the President would lack 

the authority. We had hearings not on this committee but in the 

Judiciary Committee before the Gulf War in 1991 when I was 

working for Senator Biden, then the chairman of that committee. 

One of the witnesses, Harold Koh, who was later the legal adviser 

in the State Department, said something that stuck with me ever 

since, which is: Silence has a sound. If the sound from Congress is 

silence, then the answer is no. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, the sound of silence has finally ended 

since 1976 to today on this issue. And I think, Mr. Chairman, that 

you deserve much praise for having this very important discussion. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much for your interest in the topic 

and for pursuing this for so many years. 

Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I also want to thank you 

for having this hearing. 

I have a strong belief that under administrations of both parties, 

and under Congresses of both parties’ leadership, there has been 

a significant kind of creeping abdication of power in the war, peace, 

and diplomacy space from Congress to the President. There are Article II powers that are very important with respect to being the 

Commander in Chief, and also with respect to the conducting of diplomacy. But there is also very strong congressional prerogatives 

in the power to declare war, but also in the powers to oversee treaties and other diplomatic matters. 

And in recent years, I think this committee has started to pull 

some of that power back to this end of Pennsylvania Avenue in imFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

31 

portant ways. That is what the Iran Review Act did. President 

Obama at that time was asserting an ability to do this deal with 

Iran on the nuclear program without seeking a vote of Congress, 

and we felt that no congressional imprimatur was very unwise, and 

we pulled that back. 

We have done that with respect to Russian sanctions, and the 

current administration tried to pull back a little bit of the oversight 

responsibility. 

I have been engaged in an effort with colleagues, and the chair 

has recently held a very important hearing on the question on the 

9/11 authorization, whether it still applies to military operations 

against other nonstate terrorist organizations and Al Qaeda. 

And I view this hearing as much the same way, trying to make 

sure we all share an understanding of what current protocols are, 

but then ask ourselves whether Congress is taking the steps we 

need to, to make sure that we are not abdicating the article and 

responsibilities that we were granted by Madison and the other 

Founders in 1787. 

General Kehler, I was really interested in your testimony about, 

just from a military standpoint, as somebody who was the head of 

STRATCOM, as a leader, your thought about an order, if a President gives an order and you would grapple with whether or not you 

viewed it to be lawful. 

The question of legality and lawfulness starts with the Constitution. You and we take oaths to the Constitution, not to a flag, not 

to a President, not to a party. We take an oath to the Constitution. 

So clearly, if you thought an order violated the Constitution, I assume that was incorporated in your testimony. 

But I wonder about your thought about internal protocols. If it 

is more than just the Constitution, but you were to feel that an 

order to use a nuclear weapon, say, violated internal protocols that 

had been agreed upon in the military either with respect to proportionality or some procedural protocol, is that the kind of, just using 

it as a hypothetical, would that be the kind of thing that might 

make you decide, ‘‘No, I cannot execute on that order?’’ 

And then I am interested in understanding whether there is a 

widely shared view of what this line between a lawful order and 

an unlawful order would be. 

General KEHLER. Senator, this issue about legality of orders exists at every level of command no matter whether the order is to 

use nuclear weapons or whether to use some other kind of weapon, 

perform some other kind of operation. 

The principle remains the same. In order for our military to follow the orders of the civilian leaders, then those orders have to be 

two things. There are a couple tests. One test is that it has to come 

from someone who has command authority. Second, it has to meet 

the legal tests of the law of armed conflict. 

So issues about the extent of presidential authority, et cetera, et 

cetera, are really constitutional issues for all of you to hammer out 

and then provide to the military. That is the way I think that 

works. 

And then second, though, when these issues are in military decision-making, I always had a legal adviser by my side. I think you 

would find that commanders across-the-board these days have legal 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

32 

advisers by their sides. The Secretary of Defense and people who 

would be part of a conference having a conversation about nuclear 

decisions, legal advisers would be part of that conversation. And 

certainly, my experience with this has been that legal advisers are 

not reluctant to raise their hand and say, before we go further, 

here are the things that you need to consider about legality. 

I think Brian’s points about at what point do we need Congress 

to weigh in, et cetera, et cetera, while they might not be at the fingertips of every military commander, they are certainly discussed 

in the military legal profession. 

So I was never concerned that I would not have the appropriate 

legal adviser at hand and that legal concerns would not be part of 

that conversation. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Feaver, I am about out of time, but if you 

would like to answer, that would help me. 

Dr. FEAVER. So the military has an obligation to follow legal orders, and there is a presumption that the orders that come through 

the chain of command and from competent authority are legal. But 

those orders are simultaneously vetted by the legal advisers, as 

General Kehler said. 

But as Senator Rubio pointed out, that does not mean that every 

order that comes down is an opportunity to discuss and debate between the chains of command. There is a presumption that the orders are legal. 

And when there is an extraordinary order, like an order to 

launch a nuclear weapon, that would require a lot of attention and 

would galvanize attention. 

The second point I would make is you may, Chairman, want to 

have lawyers back to talk about the legal authorities that are extant now regarding conflict on the Korean Peninsula. We are still 

under armed hostilities, just in an armistice, from the first Korean 

War, and there have been multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, all of which provide some legal basis for U.S. action. And I 

am not a lawyer to adjudicate those, but I am sure that the DOD 

lawyers are looking at those issues. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General KEHLER. Sir, may I add one more thing? I know the Senator is out of time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

General KEHLER. If I was not getting legal input, I was asking 

for it. And my obligation, my responsibility, as the commander of 

Strategic Command, was to clear up any of those concerns on behalf of the operating forces. They are not in a position really to 

make a legal determination with an order that is given to them. 

So, for example, I spent a lot of time in a missile launch control 

center over my early parts of my career. I had no way to know 

whether the target that I was being told to strike was a legal target or not a legal target. I was relying on people above me in the 

chain of command to carry that out. And my view as the commander of Strategic Command was that was my responsibility to 

do. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could go back, Dr. Feaver, what was your 

last admonition to me? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

33 

Dr. FEAVER. It was not an admonition but a suggestion, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. I took it as an admonition. [Laughter.] 

Dr. FEAVER. There have been many questions about what would 

be the legal authority for U.S. military action on North Korea, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons. While it would certainly 

be politically advisable that the President go to Congress to get 

new authorization for any new hostilities, it is at least possible, 

and I am not a lawyer, so I am suggesting that lawyers be consulted on what is the legal basis that is already existing because 

of prior U.N. Security Council resolutions that authorized the first 

Korean War, which is not over, it is just in a ceasefire, and then 

subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding North Korea’s illegal nuclear program. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. 

Yes, sir? 

Mr. MCKEON. Can I just comment briefly on Senator Kaine’s 

issue? Four-star generals are not shrinking violets, and I can recall 

a circumstance, I will not identify the commander, and it was not 

a nuclear issue, where a combatant commander was looking down 

the road and seeing a scenario where he saw he was going to get 

some order, and he was wondering whether that would be a legal 

order. And he started asking questions months in advance of the 

Office of General Counsel in OSD. 

So obviously, it is a human system, and the human system can 

break down, but people don’t get to be four-star generals unless 

they are strong individuals. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Risch? 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to thank all three of you for your thoughtful 

analysis of the issues here. 

I do want to state for the record, however, that every single word 

that has been uttered here this morning in this hearing is going 

to be analyzed in Pyongyang. They are going to look very carefully 

at how we, the American people, view this. 

And for those who are doing the analysis, I want to underscore 

that our discussion here today is not as practical as it is academic. 

We all have strong ideas about the power of the first branch, Congress, and the second branch, the President and the military. 

The Constitution was written in a day when things were much 

different than they are today, moved much slower than they are 

today. Every time that the President has used force, he has been 

backed by the American people and by Congress. 

So I want to make sure that Pyongyang understands that this 

talk about lawyers and this talk about standards and proportionality and all the other things that we all talk about is not a discussion that is going to take place in the heat of battle in today’s 

world. 

These decisions have to be made in moments. And it is not going 

to be made by courts or by lawyers or by Congress. It is going to 

be made by the Commander in Chief of the American forces. And 

he is going to do that, as you pointed out, in all likelihood, with 

the experts that he has surrounded himself with. But nonetheless, 

he will make that decision. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

34 

And Pyongyang needs to understand that they are dealing with 

a person who is Commander in Chief right now who is very focused 

on defending this country, and he will do what is necessary to defend this country. 

So lest anyone be confused, as most people would be, and I have 

sat through scores of hours of arguments about the power of the 

Commander in Chief, the power of Congress, et cetera, from a very 

practical standpoint, the President of the United States is going to 

make this decision, and he is going to make it quite quickly, if he 

has to. So I want everyone to understand how this works. 

And it isn’t a gray situation. It isn’t a situation where lawyers 

are going to get involved, and they are going to argue about proportionality and all these other standards we talk about. Unfortunately, we live in a world that is full of realistic decisions that have 

to be made, and they will be made. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is the reason we are having the 

hearing. Thank you. Thank you so much. 

Senator Merkley? 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Chairman, I have a few minutes left. Let me 

respond to that. 

I agree with that, and I think we should have the hearing. But 

the problem you have with that is there are legitimate disputes 

over the power of the President and the power of Congress when 

it comes to this sort of thing. I want everyone to understand, particularly those in Pyongyang, that these are pragmatic decisions 

that have to be made and will be made, and they are not going to 

be clouded by arguments of an army of lawyers on each side arguing what is proportional and what isn’t. 

Now, you can argue whether that is right or wrong, but those are 

the facts on the ground. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is correct. And I don’t think there 

is any question. And one of the reasons we have passed some of 

the pieces of legislation that we have through the years, whether 

it is the Iran review act, or whether it is the Russian sanctions bill 

we just passed, is that, through the years, there is no question 

there has been a tremendous tilt to the executive branch, and certainly still is, as it relates to war, there is no question. 

But that is the purpose of the hearing, and I think it has been 

a good one to ferret out some of these issues and cause us to think 

more fully about what happens during these periods of time. 

Senator Merkley? 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Feaver, I believe you said something to the effect that, in the 

case where you have time to consider a response, the cooperation 

of many strategic commanders is required to execute an order. Is 

that more or less accurate? 

Does that essentially sustain the vision that there has to be a 

person between the President and the nuclear briefcase who cooperates in order for that briefcase to be utilized? 

Dr. FEAVER. I can’t speak in open session about the particularities, but I will say that the system is not a button that the President can accidentally lean against on the desk and immediately 

cause missiles to fly, as some people in the public, I think, fear it 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

35 

would be. It requires the President to work with military aides who 

are attending him and who have possession of the materials that 

he needs. And it requires personnel at all levels of echelon command all the way down to the missile silo to carry out an order. 

The President by himself cannot press a button and cause missiles to fly. He can only give an authenticated order, which others 

would follow and then cause missiles to fly. 

Senator MERKLEY. In the context, you put the condition ‘‘when 

you have time to consider a response.’’ So when you do not have 

the time to consider a response, there has been a lot of conversation here today about reacting on short order to an assault, is it 

still the case that you have to have the cooperation of strategic 

commanders to execute an order? 

Dr. FEAVER. Yes, but in those settings, that is where the military 

is waking up the President, because they are the ones who are 

monitoring the intelligence picture. They are the ones who are getting the warning that a missile launched against the United States 

is about to happen. 

So they are already cooperating by waking up the President, advising him or her of the situation, and presenting them the range 

of options. So I would code that as cooperating with the President 

in order to give the President the options of making a decision. 

Senator MERKLEY. Those are the types of scenarios that really 

give people nightmares. There have been over a dozen such scenarios of false alarms where there were folks on both sides, the 

Russian side and the American side, that have been extremely worried that a major attack was underway with minutes to spare. 

I would like to enter in the record an article that details more 

than a dozen such events. There is the famous moonrise incident 

in 1960. There was the training video error of 1979. There is a case 

when Boris Yeltsin actually activated the nuclear briefcase in response to a nuclear research missile being launched by the Norwegians. 

[The information referred to is located at the end of this transcript.] 

Senator MERKLEY. And it is those cases that give people great 

worry. 

And part of the point of a nuclear triad, and this has not been 

mentioned today, so I wanted to make sure it is mentioned, part 

of the point was to have forces that could survive an initial attack, 

submarines and bombers that carry weapons, so that you did not 

have to make a decision within a couple minutes. You had assured 

retaliation with at least two legs of the triad that were more survivable. 

Can I just get a response as to whether that is a reasonable analysis? 

Dr. FEAVER. I think that is, Senator. And that is precisely why 

no previous strategic leader decided to put in place an automated 

response. They always wanted a human in the loop. 

And in the cases that you mentioned, and others, it was a human 

assessment that concluded this was not real, we have time to wait. 

And that is why I would support and advocate for anything that 

can be done to extend that time, whether through better missile deFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

36 

fense, more hardened communications technology so more people 

can be brought in, updating other aspects of the command-and-control system, so that there is time for the human element to make 

the assessments necessary to reach the right decision. 

We have had too many close calls over the course of the Cold 

War, but they were avoided in the end by wise human decision. 

Senator MERKLEY. In some cases, yes—well, I won’t go into details. 

So in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, is it not the position of 

the United States that we essentially are saying we would not use 

a nuclear first-strike against and a Non-Proliferation Treaty participant who does not have nuclear forces? 

Dr. FEAVER. I had written an op-ed in the New York Times about 

this at the time. That is how it was covered in the media, but when 

you read it closely, I believe it still leaves wiggle room, in particular because it says those countries in compliance with their 

Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. And it leaves opaque who determines whether they are in compliance. 

I inferred from that opacity that the White House would determine whether they were in compliance, which is a loophole that 

gives the President the strategic ambiguity that he might wish for 

deterrence purposes. 

Senator MERKLEY. Part of the reason for the discussion over no 

first use is because it creates more confidence among other nations 

that are nuclear-armed not to perceive a false attack by the United 

States, as occurred in the 1995 case in which Yeltsin activated 

their nuclear briefcase. 

Do you see any value, or do any of you three see any value, in 

strengthening the perception that the U.S. by policy would not utilize nuclear weapons in a first strike? 

Dr. FEAVER. I do see some value from such an assurance, but I 

also see some costs. And I think that is why every previous administration, including President Obama who might have been expected to adopt a no-first-use policy, chose not to at the end adopt 

a blanket no-first-use policy. I doubt that this administration would 

either. 

If President Obama could not be convinced that it was worth the 

risks, I doubt that President Trump would be. 

Senator MERKLEY. There is a longer conversation about the pros 

and cons of that, but I am out of time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding the hearing. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

Dr. Feaver, in your written testimony, you said that even a single nuclear detonation would be so consequential, it might trigger 

an escalatory spiral that would lead to civilization-threatening outcomes. 

Can I just ask if everybody on the panel agrees with that? 

General KEHLER. I would agree with it in principle, I think. One 

of the deterrence features, of course, that has been with nuclear 

weapons since the beginning is the high risk that any nuclear use 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

37 

will not be controlled or could not be controlled, although we have 

in place—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Absolutely, and that is what helps contribute 

to the deterrence factor. 

General KEHLER. It does. But we have in place means to try to 

control it, if deterrence ever fails. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. McKeon, do you agree with that? 

Mr. MCKEON. I agree with Peter’s statement. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I think it is that statement that is so concerning and certainly gives me pause and others pause, and I think 

is one of the reasons for the hearing. When we have an administration where the National Security Advisor has suggested that we 

can have a preventative war on the Korean Peninsula, when the 

President has said that he has asked our military leadership to 

come up with plans to address the North Korean regime, it suggests that what we are talking about is a nuclear war, a first 

strike. And, certainly, the potential for that to escalate, as everyone 

has suggested, is very difficult to even contemplate. 

And I think one of the challenges is that we are dealing with a 

President, as Senator Cardin has said, who has not seemed to be 

willing to accept advice on an issue, many issues affecting power. 

While I agree with Senator Risch’s comment that if the United 

States is threatened, we want the President to act, I want the 

President to act in a way that acknowledges input from a lot of experts and not to act based on a Twitter post. 

And the anxiety that that produces, I think, contributes to the 

concern about whether we are in a situation where we need to look 

at, in Congress, a first nuclear strike policy and banning that. 

So you talked about the importance of calculated ambiguity, Senator Rubio raised that, and the importance of that in enhancing deterrence and making war less likely. Can you imagine a policy that 

would both limit the President’s authority to use nuclear weapons 

and, at the same time, not weaken the deterrence value of our nuclear arsenal? 

Mr. MCKEON. In thinking about this hearing, Senator Shaheen, 

I have struggled to come up with constructs that make sense, and 

it is hard to develop a principled way to constrain the Commander 

in Chief’s power within the executive branch. 

As I said earlier, I think hard cases make bad law, and I think 

if we were to change the decision-making process in some way because of a distrust of this President, I think that would be an unfortunate precedent for future Presidents. And I say that as somebody who worked in this chamber for 20 years and feels strongly 

about congressional powers in this sphere. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Feaver? 

Dr. FEAVER. I think that there are proposals that are floating out 

there that are worth looking at. There is a group of academics like 

myself who study this issue, and we have been kicking around various proposals that would delimit the scenarios, so it would set 

aside the reprisal, the launch-under-attack scenarios. And then just 

where there is plenty of time, then specifying various protocols for 

authenticating an order, for validating that the order is legal and 

things like that. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

38 

Each of these proposals raises important questions about Article 

II, and so they would have to be closely vetted. But I think there 

are proposals like that that could be examined, and it might improve. 

However, there are some things that unambiguously would help, 

and that is modernizing the technology in the command-and-control system, which is overdue in some areas for upgrade. These are 

very expensive. But precisely for the reason you said, Senator, that 

an accident or unauthorized use would be so catastrophic, it is an 

investment worth making. 

Senator SHAHEEN. General Kehler? 

General KEHLER. Senator, we have talked about a lot of potential 

scenarios this morning. My view on this is it is not possible to envision all of the scenarios in advance. And when we try to come up 

with ways to place limits on various scenarios, my concern would 

be that we are creating some detriment to the overall deterrent. 

As unfortunate as it is, the big paradox of the nuclear age is still 

here. I said that in my written testimony. In order to prevent their 

use, which is the objective here, we have to be prepared to use 

them. 

And for us to presuppose all of the scenarios under which we 

would want to somehow limit the power of the Commander in 

Chief, I would just urge you to be very cautious here for all the reasons that were raised today. 

It has implications for the deterrent. It has implications for extended deterrence. And it has some implications, if these just remain unresolved issues, it has implications for our own military 

men and women, and the confidence and trust that they place in 

the chain of command. 

So certainly, I believe we always get better by having these conversations and debating and doing all the things that we have done 

throughout the Cold War and beyond. I would just urge you to be 

very cautious about suggesting changes to this particular system. 

Again, my perspective from my view was that the process accounts for the kind of scenarios that we have been talking about 

today. It certainly accounts for tactical warning that an attack is 

underway, and we have preplanned options, and the vetting has 

been done. It accounts for the potential for using before an adversary weapon has been used. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And I appreciate that, and certainly hear the 

caution that each of you are giving us. But doesn’t it also suggest 

that it is important for the Commander in Chief to also be cautious 

in how he talks about this issue, so that there is not a miscalculation on the part of our aggressors who would do us harm about 

what the real intent here is? 

Mr. MCKEON. I fully agree with you on that, Senator. The statements the President makes through his Twitter account no doubt 

cause concern and confusion on the other side of the Pacific. 

They don’t have a constellation of satellites to see where we are 

moving our forces. When he says an armada is coming, that obviously has to give them some pause. 

And people may say, ‘‘What he says on his Twitter account does 

not matter. We have policies. We have leadership of the national 

command authority. The Secretary and the chairman, they will 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

39 

take care of it.’’ That does not compute in Kim Jong Un’s mind, 

that what the President says does not matter. 

So I would be very worried about a miscalculation based on continuing use of his Twitter account with regard to North Korea, as 

I understand you are. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

So, as I understand it—first of all, this has been, from my perspective, a great hearing, very balanced, I think, obviously, informative after 41 years of not having a hearing on this topic. And I 

appreciate all those, including CRS, that somewhat encouraged us 

to do so, if, in fact, you feel like you did. 

I think Mr. McKeon and General Kehler, basically, you are saying you don’t see any legislative changes that ought to be made at 

this time. I think that is where you both are. 

And, Dr. Feaver, I think what you were saying was really not 

legislative changes as it relates to the power that the Commander 

in Chief has. You are talking about other types of more pragmatic 

changes as it relates to just the decision tree, is that correct, after 

the command has been given? 

Dr. FEAVER. I would be very wary of legislative fixes, because 

there are second- and third-order effects that are hard to anticipate. And the history of the nuclear command-and-control system 

is discovering that changes that have been made and well-intentioned on one level producing an unexpected result in another aspect. 

So I would be wary of legislative fixes, but that does not mean 

I would not review them. I think there are good proposals out 

there. And part of the value is reassuring the American public that 

they have a nuclear arsenal that is well-maintained and wellguarded against unauthorized use. 

I think the Senators are channeling some concerns that the public has about this. And reviewing and then deciding not to make 

a change, a legislative fix, would go some distance to reassuring 

the public. 

The CHAIRMAN. There is another component. 

I will let you go ahead. 

Mr. MCKEON. Just to comment on what you said, Mr. Chairman, 

I am wary of the legislative change on the decision-making process, 

but the larger conversation we have had in this hearing about the 

war power really falls on you and your colleagues here in this body 

to continue to step forward and make the case for the constitutional imperative. 

In both the Gulf War in 1990–1991 and even the Iraq War in 

2002, the executive branch was rather grudging in agreeing to, acceding to a congressional vote and authorization. George W. Bush 

either before or right after said something disparaging about: I 

don’t need some old goat in Congress to go to war against Iraq. 

So the institutional instinct in the executive branch will always 

be, ‘‘We can do this under Article II.’’ And you will need, as a political body, to continue to assert your rights to make the case that 

we have discussed. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

40 

General KEHLER. Sir, I agree with the points that have been 

made. I would not recommend any legislative changes at this point 

as well, but I would recommend a couple of things that I know are 

being openly talked about by my colleagues who are still wearing 

uniforms. 

And one of those is we can always do a better job, I think, in 

training our people who are involved in these processes in terms 

of where the safeguards are. And the point I was trying to make 

this morning about raising the legality issue is to remind everybody that the military does not blindly follow orders, and that is 

true with nuclear orders as well. I think that should be a reassuring piece for the American public, and it ought to be reassuring 

to our allies and our adversaries as well. 

The final thing that I would do is, it is time to invest, I know 

this committee does not have jurisdiction, but it is time to invest 

in the nuclear command-and-control and communications system. 

It has suffered from a lack of investment for too long, and I think 

it is very important that Congress be on board to modernize that 

system as a high priority, as well as the forces. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could, that coincides with what I wanted to 

close with. 

When we did the New START Treaty, I was part of a group on 

our side of the aisle that approved the treaty. And I am glad that 

I did, by the way. It was the right thing to do. As part of that, we 

pushed the administration toward modernization. 

Would all three of you agree that to have—our nuclear arsenal 

is coming down. We want to make sure that these weapons, in 

many cases created 50, 60 years ago, we want to make sure that, 

if they are called upon to be used, they will actually do the things 

they are intended to do. 

Would all three of you agree that continued modernization of our 

nuclear arsenal is something that protects our Nation and ensures 

that, in the terrible event they are ever necessary, we have the capability of delivering? 

General KEHLER. Yes, I do. 

Dr. FEAVER. Yes. People who are worried about a nuclear war 

should be in favor of reasonable modernization measures that will 

provide greater safety and security in our existing system. 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, I would use the word ‘‘recapitalization’’ of both the warheads and the platforms of the triad. 

On the latter, all the platforms of the triad are aging out simultaneously, and there are plans in place to replace them over the 

next decade, and I know that will be an expensive proposition that 

will be well-debated. But if the policy decision is made to maintain 

a triad, then those investments in those platforms will need to be 

made. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would just say this for the American people. 

Many of us have visited the facilities where these are modernized 

and developed, and it is amazing that some of the guidance systems that have been in existence are not much more sophisticated 

than the tubes on a black and white television. And we need to continue to invest and make sure we are using the proper technology, 

so, in the unfortunate case of them being utilized, they will actuFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

41 

ally be there for us. And other countries are aware of our need to 

modernize also. 

So with that—— 

Senator MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, may I just for a minute interject? 

The CHAIRMAN. You may. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, I want to divide this question for the committee between 

an imminent attack on the United States where the President has 

the authority to protect our country, that is and should be the case, 

from a President launching a preemptive nuclear war against another country. And I think that is really what is of the most concern to the American people, that no one human being should ever 

have that power. 

So from my perspective right now, given what General McMaster 

said about the potential for a preventive war, that means that 

there could be plans in place right now in the White House given 

to the President to launch a preemptive war against North Korea 

using American nuclear weapons without consulting with, informing Congress whatsoever, by aggregating that power to the executive branch in clear violation of the United States Constitution— 

in clear violation of the United States Constitution. 

And so to the extent to which we are having this discussion, and 

there is legislation that is pending before Congress to ensure that 

Congress reasserts its authority to ensure that a nuclear war has 

not begun in the name of the United States by this President or 

any President, I think that is a legitimate constitutional prerogative that we should be reasserting. 

I don’t think that we should be trusting the generals to be a 

check on the President. I don’t think we should be trusting a set 

of protocols to be protecting the American people from having a nuclear war launched on their behalf. I don’t think we should be relying upon a group of individuals to be resisting an illegal order 

when they have all pretty much been hired by the President to 

have the jobs they have. 

There is going to be a homogeneity inside of that decision-making 

process, Mr. Chairman, that does not, in fact, offer real resistance 

if the President absolutely insists on his way. That is just the reality of it. 

So I agree with Mr. McKeon that it should be the congressional 

prerogative to declare a nuclear war. I think that is something that 

we should just continue here to explore, given the assertions made 

by the National Security Advisor. 

And I would think that our other two witnesses would agree, 

that if there is a preemptive nuclear war which is being considered, 

that Congress does have the constitutional responsibility, although 

it has been left, as Mr. McKeon said, in ambiguity. An atmosphere 

of ambiguity in President after President has been created around 

whether or not they are going to defer to our authority. 

So this is the hearing. This is the place. I am glad that you are 

kicking it off. But I don’t think that the assurances that I have received today will be satisfying to the American people. I think they 

can still realize that Donald Trump can launch nuclear codes just 

as easily as he can use his Twitter account without a check and 

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balance the United States Congress would be seeking and constitutionally responsible to exercise. 

So I think this has been a historic hearing, and I hope there is 

more to follow. 

Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I thank each of you for being here. Again, I cannot imagine having a more balanced panel, a more sober panel. I think this was 

edifying for members of the committee but also the American public. We thank you for that. We thank you for your service to our 

country and being here and your previous service in other ways. 

And I think you know there are typically follow-up questions. 

First of all, I will say to committee members, we will close that 

process at the close of business on Thursday. 

To the extent you could answer those fairly promptly, we would 

appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have contributed greatly to the national debate and dialogue today, and we thank you very much for 

that. 

The CHAIRMAN. And with that, the meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

GENERAL C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF (RET.) BY SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

Question 1. In a crisis the National Command Authority and the President are 

going to be under enormous pressure. The President is going to make a decision 

that depends on information from the military that comes from sensors and satellites. There are documented cases and I am sure many undocumented ones of incorrect information regarding the launch of missiles reaching White House officials. 

• How reliable are the early warning systems and can they be hacked or fooled 

into giving false information? 

• What is the process for interpreting the information and in what time frame? 

Answer. The Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system is composed of satellites and ground-based radars that monitor and report on 

missile launches and other events around the world every day. The system and its 

human operators are tested and certified to extremely high standards and I was always highly confident in the information being reported. Air-based threats such as 

bombers and cruise missiles are detected and reported via a separate system. 

Warning information is presented to operators and command centers in real time 

as it is received. Senior commanders and civilian leaders are quickly brought into 

the discussion if a threat is indicated and, ultimately, a wide range of response options can be considered and implemented by the President. Response times can 

range from approximately 30–40 minutes for an ICBM from the Eurasian land 

mass, to less than 15 minutes for an SLBM from the Atlantic or Pacific oceans. 

Cruise missile threats pose additional problems. 

Cases of ‘‘incorrect’’ information are extremely rare and always result in thorough 

investigation and corrective action. In those rare cases I’m familiar with, human operators recognized the problems and intervened with appropriate corrections long 

before the point where offensive actions were even considered. While the ITW/AA 

system is designed to operate through various kinds of deliberate attacks, adversaries are deploying new threats like cyber and anti-satellite weapons that must be 

considered. Assessments of these new threats were underway when I retired. 

Question 2. During the hearing you emphasized that officers are taught not to 

obey any illegal order, and that a military response must be legal, necessary, and 

proportional. 

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• Can you cite specific instances in the past 50 years where American officers refused to carry out what they considered an unlawful order, and what were the 

results? 

Answer. I am not personally aware of any specific instances in the past 50 years 

where American officers were intentionally issued unlawful orders. I am aware of 

many cases where legal discussions occurred, and issues were raised and resolved 

before orders were issued. The military planning and execution system includes 

legal review at all phases from planning through implementation. American forces 

derive their authority to act from a variety of sources including law (a collection of 

laws typically referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict), policy, and regulation. 

Commanders and civilian leaders take great care to ensure that orders are legal before they are issued, and military members are trained and re-trained on their responsibilities regarding those orders. It is essential that military members at every 

level understand the review process and have trust and confidence in the chain of 

command. 

Question 3. In deciding whether to use nuclear weapons, either as a first strike 

or in response to an imminent or ongoing attack, my understanding is that the 

President will choose from a set of prepared options and responses. In terms of 

whether or not the response would be legal, you seemed to indicate that if the response option had been prepared in advance, then it would also have undergone 

legal review. 

• If the president simply chooses one of these options, would there be any legal 

review at all? 

Answer. Every scenario is different and context matters. All options either developed in advance of or during a crisis or conflict undergo legal review. However, in 

my view, additional legal discussion would be appropriate if the actual scenario is 

completely different than those considered during the planning process. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

DR. PETER FEAVER BY SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

Question 1. Communications are key to the process if the United States is responding to an imminent threat or attack. At several points information or orders 

need to be communicated between the military authorities or between the White 

House and military authorities. You noted how important it is to keep the technology up to date. 

• How secure is the communications network to ensure that accurate and reliable 

information is able to flow to and fromthe decision-makers and those carrying 

out the orders? 

Answer. Ensuring the reliability and security of the communications network 

should be a top priority for both the executive-led Nuclear Posture Review as well 

as any congressionally led oversight and review of nuclear command and control. 

Of course, communications security and reliability have already been high priorities 

for nuclear operations for decades, but the advance of telecommunications technology and the emergence of cyber threats from a range of adversaries collectively 

justify a fresh look. 

The communications network can be disaggregated into different stages for assessment purposes. One stage involves communications related to conveying indications and warnings of external threats as inputs to the decision-making team. The 

security and reliability of this part of the system can vary somewhat with geography 

and timing; if key principals are on travel or otherwise hard to reach, and if an attack is imminent, it may not be possible to reach all of the key advisors in time. 

Another stage involves conveying the President’s orders to the strategic headquarters responsible for nuclear operations. This stage is probably the most secure 

and most reliable. 

A third stage involves conveying those orders from strategic headquarters to the 

various platforms that could carry out a nuclear strike. The security and reliability 

here varies somewhat with the platform involved. During the Cold War, one of the 

most demanding scenarios involved assuring communications with the submarine 

force even in the event that the United States suffered a devastating first strike. 

A careful review may identify upgrades to the system to improve the security and 

reliability during any or all of these stages. 

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO HON. BRIAN P. MCKEON BY SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

Question 1. It has now become clear that the executive branch had information 

pertaining to Russia’s potential (now publicly-confirmed) INF violation during Senate consideration of New START. 

• Did you participate in the decision-making process to not inform the U.S. Senate of that potential violation during Senate consideration of New START? 

• If so, please describe that decision-making process and the rationale supporting 

that decision. 

Answer. I respectfully disagree with the premise of your question. I was not part 

of, and would have opposed, any effort to withhold information from the Senate 

while it undertook its important responsibility to consider the New START Treaty. 

The administration’s commitment to ensuring that the Senate had relevant information about Russian activity was demonstrated in September 2010. A day or two 

prior to the consideration of the Treaty in the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

intelligence community (IC) briefed me and other senior White House officials on 

an issue of concern related to Russia and arms control. We urged in the IC representatives to promptly brief the committee staff, which they did. As you may recall, Senator Risch made a general reference to the issue during the committee 

markup of the Treaty on September 16, 2010. Director of National Intelligence Clapper also addressed the issue during an all-senators briefing on the National Intelligence Estimate on the Treaty later that month. 

The Obama administration formally declared the Russian Federation in violation 

of the INF Treaty in 2014. It made that declaration public in the annual report on 

‘‘Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,’’ pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a), which was issued by the Department 

of State in July 2014. The report covered compliance in calendar year 2013 to such 

agreements and commitments. 

The detailed bases for that determination, including when the Executive Branch 

first concluded that there may be a potential treaty violation, is classified. I am no 

longer a government official, and do not possess an active security clearance, so I 

am unable to provide that information to you. I would refer you to the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, and the Departments of State and Defense, for further information. 

Question 2. In your prepared remarks you said, ‘‘the Obama administration did 

not adopt a formal policy of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons.’’ 

• Why wasn’t a no-first-use policy adopted? 

Answer. Department of Defense lawyers advise me that I am unable to answer 

this question, as it would reveal information that is considered to be internal deliberative process. 

For a general statement of the policy, I refer you to the discussion of the negative 

security assurance set forth in the report of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, particularly pages viii and ix. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO HON. BRIAN P. MCKEON BY SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

Question 1. The chain of command for information about an attack, the consideration of options, and the orders pertaining to the potential or actual use of American 

nuclear weapons, runs to and from the President. However, beyond this there are 

disagreements in the open literature as to how the chain of command functions and 

the role of key actors, such as the Secretary of Defense. 

• Please outline for me the chain of command and advisory structure for me, 

starting with the first detection of a launch, through the U.S. launch of a weapon and tell me what DoD or other procedural or decision memos or documents 

contain this information. 

Answer. The military chain of command is set forth in Title 10, United States 

Code, section 162(b). It reads: 

‘‘(b) Chain of Command. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of 

command to a unified or specified combatant command runs— 

‘‘(1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and 

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‘‘(2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.’’ 

By law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not in the chain of command, 

and does not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs or any of the armed 

forces. (10 U.S.C. 153(c)). The Chairman is the principal military adviser to the 

President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council and the 

Secretary of Defense (10 U.S.C. 151(b)(1)). In addition, the Joint Staff typically 

transmits detailed military orders to the combatant commander, consistent with 10 

U.S.C. 163(a)(1). 

For nuclear employment, the cognizant combatant commander for strategic weapons would be the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. For use of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe, it would be the Commander, U.S. European 

Command. 

As I stated in my testimony, I would expect that in any scenario, the President 

will consult with the National Security Council, and his other senior civilian and 

military advisers, about nuclear employment. The membership of the Council is set 

forth in statute (section 101(c)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 

3021(c)(1)). At a minimum, I would expect the President to consult with his chief 

of staff, the National Security Adviser, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the cognizant combatant commander. 

I am unable to provide further information about the decision-making process and 

applicable directives or memoranda, as this information is classified. I am no longer 

a government official and do not possess an active security clearance. I would therefore refer you to the Department of Defense for further information. Some unclassified information about the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) is available in the ‘‘Nuclear Matters Handbook 2016,’’ published by the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, and available at this link (the information 

on the NCCS is contained in chapter 6): 

https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nmhb/index.htm 

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UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS—FACT SHEET, 

‘‘CLOSE CALLS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS’’ (2015) 

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