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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

August 23, 2016 

v No. 327622 

Ingham Circuit Court 

LAWRENCE SMITH VANBUREN, LC No. 14-000998-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: OWENS, P.J., and SAWYER and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of torture, MCL 750.85, and assault with 

intent to rob while unarmed, MCL 750.88. Defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, 

fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 25 to 40 years for the torture 

conviction and 20 to 30 years for the assault with intent to rob while unarmed conviction, with 

credit on both sentences for 281 days served. Defendant appeals as of right and we affirm. 

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his torture and 

assault with intent to rob while unarmed convictions and that he was therefore deprived of due 

process of law. Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecution presented insufficient 

evidence on the “intent” element for torture and the “intent” element for assault with intent to rob 

while unarmed. We disagree. 

 “Criminal defendants do not need to take any special steps to preserve a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence.” People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 116-117; 605 NW2d 28 (1999).1

 

 

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 In any event, we note that defendant did move for a directed verdict at the close of the 

prosecutor’s case-in-chief, essentially raising the same “intent” arguments that he has presented 

to this Court on appeal. In denying defendant’s motion, the trial court provided the following 

explanation for its decision: 

The defendant also says there’s not enough evidence to go to the jury of cruel and 

extreme physical harm. [The victim] testified that while he was being restrained, 
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However, when reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “evidence is reviewed de novo, in a light 

most favorable to the prosecution, to determine whether the evidence would justify a rational 

jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v McGhee, 268 

Mich App 600, 622; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). Similarly, “[d]ue process requires that the 

prosecutor introduce sufficient evidence which could justify a trier of fact in reasonably 

concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant can be 

convicted of a criminal offense.” People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 

(1979). “All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution and [this 

Court] will not interfere with the jury’s determinations regarding the weight of the evidence and 

the credibility of the witnesses.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 222; 749 NW2d 272 

(2008). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can 

constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 100; 

505 NW2d 869 (1993). 

 

and even attempting to have his hands tied behind his back, he was assaulted 

multiple times. It began with the first assault at the kitchen table. And in that 

assault he said that he was struck with such force that it knocked him off the 

chair, it fractured his jaw, and it knocked out several teeth. After that first initial 

attack he was continued [sic] to have been beaten multiple times. He said that he 

was in extreme pain. He was bleeding profusely and he, again, indicated that 

after the first attack he had the fractured jaw and the teeth broken out. 

 Despite that extreme injury that caused extreme physical harm to him 

from the first attack there was a continued beating where he was on the couch and 

he was being beaten, where he ran up the stairs and was thrown down the stairs, 

where he ran up the stairs again. He was thrown into the bathroom. He was 

beaten in the bathroom. Despite the fact that he had already suffered a significant 

and severe injury he managed to make it—and in the course of being beaten in the 

bathroom and trying to get out of the bathroom he was choked. 

 And despite all of that once he was able to get out of the home he was 

beaten again outside the home. So the jury could certainly find from those facts 

that there not only was cruel and extreme physical harm, but there was an intent to 

cause cruel and extreme physical harm, because despite how badly he was injured 

in the first attack there were multiple repeated attacks after that causing him 

extreme pain. With respect to the Assault with Intent to Commit Armed Robbery 

or Unarmed Robbery, there is certainly evidence from which the jury could 

conclude there was an intent to rob that happened in the course of that, either an 

armed robbery or an unarmed robbery in that the victim testified that—that hands 

were going through his pockets as he was being assaulted on the couch. And, in 

fact, his property was stolen, not only his wallet, but the car. And from that the 

jury could find evidence of intent to rob either while armed or unarmed. 
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A. TORTURE 

 A person commits torture if, “with the intent to cause cruel or extreme physical or mental 

pain and suffering, [he] inflicts great bodily injury or severe mental pain or suffering upon 

another person within his or her custody or physical control . . . .” MCL 750.85(1) (emphasis 

added). Further, MCL 750.85(2)(a) defines “cruel” to mean “brutal, inhuman, sadistic, or that 

which torments.” “Because of the difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal 

circumstantial evidence is sufficient.” People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 

95 (1999). 

 Here, there was evidence giving rise to an inference that defendant’s intent was to inflict 

cruel or extreme physical or mental pain and suffering on the victim. As the trial court noted in 

denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the victim suffered a severe facial injury 

during the first attack in the kitchen, but defendant continued the assault at the top of the stairs, 

in the basement, in the bathroom, and outside the house. These multiple and repeated assaults 

evidence an intent to cause the victim extreme pain. We also note that the victim testified that 

defendant attempted to tie his hands behind his back during the assault in the basement, an action 

which would likely cause a person to have severe mental pain and suffering, rightfully fearing 

for one’s life. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish intent to 

cause cruel or extreme physical or mental pain and suffering. Likewise, because the prosecutor 

introduced sufficient evidence which could justify a trier of fact in reasonably concluding that 

defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of torture, defendant’s conviction for that 

offense did not deny him due process of law. 

B. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO ROB WHILE UNARMED 

 “[T]he essential elements of assault with intent to rob while unarmed are (1) an assault 

with force and violence, (2) an intent to rob and steal, and (3) defendant being unarmed.” People 

v Chandler, 201 Mich App 611, 614; 506 NW2d 882 (1993). Again, “[b]ecause of the difficulty 

of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient.” McRunels, 

237 Mich App at 181. 

 Here, there was ample evidence giving rise to an inference that defendant’s intent was to 

rob and steal. As the trial court noted in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the 

victim testified that hands were going through his pockets as he was being assaulted on the 

couch. And, in fact, the victim’s wallet and car keys were stolen from him during the assault on 

the couch and the car was driven away shortly thereafter. Additionally, there was evidence that 

defendant’s accomplice invited the victim into the house under the guise of receiving money for 

gas merely as a ruse for her and defendant to rob him. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

evidence was sufficient to establish an intent to rob and steal and accordingly, that there was no 

due process violation. 

II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 

 Defendant next argues that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and 

that the sentence was not reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case. We disagree. 
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 Defendant failed to preserve this “cruel and unusual punishment” issue by raising it 

below. People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 382; 741 NW2d 61 (2007) 

(“For an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, addressed, and decided by 

the lower court.”). This Court reviews unpreserved constitutional errors for plain error affecting 

substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 

 The United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. 

US Const, Am VIII. The Michigan Constitution prohibits cruel or unusual 

punishment, Const 1963, art 1, § 16, and “[i]f a punishment ‘passes muster under 

the state constitution, then it necessarily passes muster under the federal 

constitution.’” People v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 204; 817 NW2d 599 (2011), 

quoting People v Nunez, 242 Mich App 610, 618–619 n 2; 619 NW2d 916 (2007). 

[People v Costner, 309 Mich App 220, 232; 870 NW2d 582 (2015) (emphasis in 

original).] 

“In deciding if punishment is cruel or unusual, this Court looks to the gravity of the offense and 

the harshness of the penalty, comparing the punishment to the penalty imposed for other crimes 

in this state, as well as the penalty imposed for the same crime in other states.” People v Brown, 

294 Mich App 377, 390; 811 NW2d 531 (2011). 

 In People v Steanhouse, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2015) (Docket No. 

318329), slip op at 24, this Court held “that a sentence that fulfills the principle of 

proportionality under [People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990)] and its progeny 

constitutes a reasonable sentence under [People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 

(2015)].” Under Milbourn and its progeny, a sentence falling within the minimum range 

specified by the advisory judicial guidelines was presumptively proportionate. People v 

Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 609; 560 NW2d 354 (1996) (“As a general rule, a sentence that 

falls within the guidelines’ range is presumed to be neither excessive nor disparate.”); People v 

Dukes, 189 Mich App 262, 266; 471 NW2d 651 (1991) (“Milbourn left intact the Court’s prior 

observation, in People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 354; 408 NW2d 789 (1987), that sentences 

falling within the recommended guidelines range are presumptively not excessively severe or 

unfairly disparate.”). 

 Further, as noted in People v Williams (After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 543; 499 

NW2d 404 (1993), citing People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 40–41; 485 NW2d 866 (1992), where 

“sentences are not disproportionate in relation to the crimes, they are therefore not cruel or 

unusual.” See People v Powell, 278 Mich App 318, 323; 750 NW2d 607 (2008) (A sentence 

within the guidelines range is presumptively proportionate, and a proportionate sentence is not 

cruel or unusual). “In order to overcome the presumption that the sentence is proportionate, a 

defendant must present unusual circumstances that would render the presumptively proportionate 

sentence disproportionate.” People v Lee, 243 Mich App 163, 187; 622 NW2d 71 (2000). 

 Here, defendant acknowledges that his sentence is within the appropriate advisory 

sentencing guidelines range and, therefore, presumptively proportionate. Further, defendant has 

failed to set forth a meritorious argument that would render his presumptively proportionate 

sentence disproportionate. See People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d 830 (1994) 

(concluding that the defendant had not cited “unusual circumstances that would overcome” the 
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presumption of proportionality). It appears that defendant believes that his sentence is not 

reasonable or that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in light of his criminal history, his 

11th grade education, and his age of 39 years. However, defendant’s criminal record was 

extensive. Indeed, he was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender. He had prior felony 

convictions for second-degree home invasion, assault with a dangerous weapon, and receiving 

and concealing stolen property over $100. The first two offenses occurred in 1996 and the third 

occurred in 1995. He also had a misdemeanor domestic violence charge in 2011 and a 

misdemeanor resisting and obstructing charge in 2013, and he violated his probation in relation 

to the 2011 charge. This criminal record establishes a pattern of violence and disregard for 

others and Michigan law. Furthermore, defendant’s age and 11th grade education are 

insufficient to overcome the presumptive proportionality of his sentence, especially considering 

his lengthy criminal record and the gravity of his offenses. Indeed, his conviction for torture 

could have subjected him to a life sentence.2 

 Finally, defendant also has failed to provide any argument or evidence demonstrating that 

his sentence is constitutionally deficient in comparison to the penalties imposed for other crimes 

in this state or for the same crimes in other states. Brown, 294 Mich App at 390. Defendant 

offers no argument or evidence that, in relation to other crimes and other states, his sentences 

were somehow abnormally harsh. In his brief he does not mention one other state or one other 

 

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 Regarding the gravity of the offense and the proportionality of defendant’s sentence, we note 

that the trial court spoke in detail on this matter at defendant’s sentencing, stating as follows: 

 All right. Okay, well I have given some thought along the lines of what 

[defense counsel] was addressing and that is, you know, we have the guidelines 

but we also have, what’s, what’s fair and proportionate to similar type cases, 

similar type offenders. And [defendant] does have, as the Prosecutor has pointed 

out, a history of assaultive offenses and quite dangerous offenses as well. 

 And on the other hand, as the defense attorney’s pointed out, we’ve seen 

sentences in the low range of these guidelines for homicide cases. And yet, even 

though the victim did not die, I cannot minimize the seriousness of this offense. 

It’s more than an 8 minute assault. The victim was basically set up. Held captive. 

The event had to have been terrorizing to him, knowing that he could not get out 

of the house, that he was at the mercy of the individual, [defendant], according to 

the jury who was beating him viciously beyond anything, beyond the first blow, 

which was bad enough, and injured him severely. But, continued to beat him in, 

in a way that the victim must have thought that he was going to die and this would 

be the end, stuck in this house and being beaten to death. 

 That is a very terrorizing situation and the fact that it’s not a homicide 

really doesn’t bring it downward in the severity to me because of the fact that, that 

the victim was so terrorized and so severely beaten and, and held under such 

circumstances that would be terrifying. 
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crime in this state. “An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this 

Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment 

with little or no citation of supporting authority.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 

588 NW2d 480 (1998). Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has failed to overcome the 

presumption of proportionality, and therefore also conclude that his proportionate sentence is not 

unreasonable and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Donald S. Owens 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro