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THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS, ONE YEAR 

ON: A LOOK BACK TO LOOK FORWARD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 9, 2014 

Serial No. 113–64 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY

VACANCY

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts ........................................................................................ 8 

WITNESSES

Mr. Edward F. Davis III, Former Commissioner, Boston Police Department, 

Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Mr. Edward P. Deveau, Chief of Police, Watertown Police Department: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

Mr. Jeffrey J. Pugliese, Sergeant, Watertown Police Department: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

Mr. Herman ‘‘Dutch’’ B. Leonard, Professor of Public Management, John 

F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

APPENDIX

Questions From Honorable Susan W. Brooks for Herman ‘‘Dutch’’ B. 

Leonard ................................................................................................................. 47 

(1) 

THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS, ONE 

YEAR ON: A LOOK BACK TO LOOK FORWARD 

Wednesday, April 9, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul [Chairman 

of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, King, Broun, Meehan, Duncan, 

Chaffetz, Palazzo, Hudson, Brooks, Perry, Sanford, Sanchez, 

Clarke, Richmond, Keating, Payne, Vela, and Swalwell. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Committee on Homeland Security will 

come to order. 

The committee is meeting today to continue a series of hearings 

examining the Boston bombings of April 15, 2013. 

Today there will be a memorial service in my home State of 

Texas for the Fort Hood shooting that took place on April 2, 2014. 

So before we would continue this proceeding, I would like to take 

a moment of silence to recognize the victims of this horrific attack. 

[Moment of silence.] 

Chairman MCCAUL. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

This is a powerful and emotional day for the witnesses and for 

me and this committee. It is a time to remember the anniversary 

of the Boston Marathon bombings, and it is a time to remember the 

victims. 

I personally remember walking down Boylston Street with Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis, who is with us here today. I remember him pointing out to me the trash cans where the bombs 

went off, injuring 260 innocent people and killing 3, including a little 8-year-old boy, in cold blood. 

In the middle of the chaos, we also witnessed exceptional bravery. If not for the heroic acts of the first responders and Boston citizens who ran towards danger instead of away, many more could 

have died. 

I remember after the attack the marathoners tying their shoes 

together in the hundreds in a memorial out of respect and out of 

dedication. 

I also remember the Watertown police chief, who is with us here 

today as well—and thank you for being here—I remember him taking me and Congressman Keating on a tour of their once-quiet 

neighborhood and seeing the aftermath of the gunfight to take 

down two of the biggest terrorists since 9/11. 
2 

What happened after that is what heroes are made of. Tamerlan 

threw everything he had at these officers, including pipe bombs, 

rounds of ammunition, and a pressure-cooker IED. The Boston 

bomber was finally subdued after the heroic acts and efforts of our 

local law enforcement, who are with us today as well. 

What is not so well-known is that, had it not been for the efforts 

of Commissioner Ed Davis and those of the Watertown police force, 

our Nation could have been further terrorized. These terrorists had 

six more bombs in their car, and they were on their way to Times 

Square. If it wasn’t for these heroic acts of bravery, New York City 

could have been hit again. 

We will hear from these brave individuals today for the first time 

before Congress. 

This committee, through its oversight responsibilities, conducted 

a thorough investigation into what happened and what went 

wrong. We found that several flags and warnings were missed. We 

found that Tamerlan was on the radar of the FBI and somehow 

dropped off. 

We found that Tamerlan traveled to Dagestan, known for its 

Chechen terrorists. This is precisely what the Russian letter 

warned our intelligence community and FBI about. He came back 

even more radicalized. We also found that, unfortunately, Customs, 

FBI, and the intelligence community somehow missed it. Arrogantly, some U.S. officials said it would not have made a difference—it would not have made a difference if they had known 

about his overseas travels. 

We now know that a check of his public social media would have 

shown indicators, such as jihadist video postings. His mosque had 

seen escalating behavior, as well. It likely would have been clear 

that he was becoming more and more of a threat to the community. 

Which takes me to my last point. State and local police have a 

strong role in counterterrorism. They know the streets better than 

anybody, and they know the local threats. The Boston PD should 

have been given more information throughout the entire process. 

They must know the terror threats in their own backyards—they 

know those. This process, in my judgment, has to change. 

In an effort to do this, 2 weeks ago our committee issued our report about the Boston Marathon bombings. Over the course of the 

year, we held two hearings, had numerous briefings and engagements, traveled to Boston multiple times, had a bipartisan staff 

delegation travel to Moscow. I personally went to Boston and Moscow with Mr. Keating and spoke with officials on the ground. 

I want to thank the Democrats for their participation in the investigation and the report, and I am pleased that their input was 

reflected in the final report. 

Based on the lessons learned, we issued our findings and recommendations to fix some of the systemic problems that led to 

Tamerlan Tsarnaev falling off of our radar. I hope to think, in a 

small way, the recommendations we made in this report can make 

a difference in preventing the tragedy we saw in Boston from occurring again in the homeland. 

I am pleased to know and to hear and report that both the FBI 

and DHS are already constructively implementing the recommendations of this committee’s report, and I commend them for 
3 

that. Let us hope that such a tragic event like this never happens 

again. 

With that, I would now like to recognize the heroes in this hearing, in this committee room here today, the Watertown officers, 

who are with us here today, who were directly involved in 

Tamerlan’s takedown and being taken off the streets once and for 

all: Sergeant Jeff Pugliese, Sergeant John MacLellan, Officer Joseph Reynolds, Officer Miguel Colon, Officer Michael Comick, and, 

of course, Chief Deveau. 

Gentlemen, would you please stand and be recognized? 

[Applause.] 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

APRIL 9, 2014 

This is a powerful and emotional day for the witnesses, for me, and this committee. It’s a time to remember the anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombings, 

and it’s a time to remember the victims. I, personally, remember walking down 

Boylston Street with Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis, who is with us here 

today. I remember him pointing out to me the trash cans where the bombs went 

off, injuring 260 innocent people and killing 3 including a little 8-year-old boy, in 

cold blood. 

In the middle of chaos, we also witnesses exceptional bravery. If not for the heroic 

acts of the first responders and Boston citizens who ran towards danger instead of 

away, many more could have died. 

I remember after the attack, the marathoners tying their shoes together in the 

hundreds in a memorial out of respect and dedication. I remember the Watertown 

Police Chief, who is before us today. I remember him taking Congressman Keating 

and me on a tour of their once-quiet neighborhood and seeing the aftermath of the 

gunfight to take down two of the biggest terrorists since 9/11. 

What happened after that is what heroes are made of. Tamerlan threw everything 

he had at these officers including pipe bombs, rounds of ammunition, and a pressure 

cooker IED. The Boston Bomber was finally subdued after the heroic acts and efforts of our local law enforcement, some of who are with us today. 

What is not so well-known is that had it not been for the efforts of Commissioner 

Ed Davis and his efforts, and those of the Watertown police force, our Nation could 

have been further terrorized. These terrorists had six more bombs in their car and 

were on their way to Times Square. If it wasn’t for these heroic acts of bravery New 

York City could have been hit again. 

We will hear from these brave individuals today for the first time before Congress. 

This committee, through its oversight responsibilities, conducted a thorough investigation into what happened and what went wrong. 

We found that several red flags and warnings were missed. We found that 

Tamerlan was on the radar of the FBI and somehow dropped off. We found that 

Tamerlan traveled to Dagestan, known for its Chechen terrorists. This is precisely 

what the Russian letter warned our intelligence community and FBI about. He 

came back even more radicalized. We also found that unfortunately Customs, FBI, 

and the IC somehow missed it. Arrogantly, some U.S. officials said ‘‘It would not 

have made a difference’’ if they had known about his overseas travel. We now know 

that a check of his public social media would have shown indicators such as 

Jihadists video postings. His Mosque had seen escalating behavior as well. It likely 

would have been clear that he was becoming more and more of a threat to the community. 

Which takes me to me to my last point: State and local police have a strong role 

in counterterrorism. They know the streets better than anybody and they know the 

local threats. The Boston Police Department should have been given more information throughout the entire process. They must know the terror threats in their own 

backyards. This process in my judgment has to change. 

In an effort to do this, 2 weeks ago our committee issued our report about the 

Boston Marathon bombings. Over the course of the year, we held two hearings; had 

numerous briefings and engagements; traveled to Boston multiple times; and had 

a bipartisan staff delegation travel to Moscow. I personally went to Boston and Moscow with Mr. Keating and spoke with officials on the ground. I want to thank the 
4 

* See clarification, p. 33. 

Democrats for their participation in the investigation and the report, and I’m 

pleased that their input was reflected in the final report. Based on lessons learned, 

we issued our findings and recommendations to fix some of the systemic problems 

that led to Tamerlan Tsarnaev falling off of our radar. 

I hope to think in a small way the recommendations we made in this report can 

make a difference in preventing the tragedy we saw in Boston from occurring again 

in the homeland. I am pleased to know, to hear, and to report that both the FBI 

and DHS are already constructively implementing the recommendations of this committee’s report. Let us hope that such a tragic event like this never happens again. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chairman now recognizes the acting 

Ranking Member, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the Chairman for holding today’s hearing. 

I also extend my condolences to the families of the 4 people killed 

during last week’s shooting at Fort Hood, and additional prayers 

are with the 16 people who were injured during that shooting. I do 

want to recognize the first-responder community and medical personnel for their incredible response to the shooting. As of today, the 

Joint Terrorism Task Force does not consider the shooting an act 

of terrorism. However, the investigation is still on-going. 

I am going to read into the record the comments from our Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, which I concur with. 

Incidents like last week’s shooting and last year’s Boston Marathon bombing, the focus of today’s hearing, remind us of the importance of our first responders. With that being said, I again commend the service of our witnesses—former Commissioner Davis, 

Chief Deveau, Sergeant Pugliese. I also thank Professor Leonard 

for recognizing their courageous efforts in his research. 

Resilience and response are two of the reasons why almost a year 

ago the Boston metropolitan area—why almost a year from ago the 

Boston metropolitan area remains strong. I wish Mayor Walsh, 

president of the Boston Athletic Association Joann Flaminio, and 

all the runners and volunteers participating in the 118th Boston 

Marathon well as the race commences on the 21st of April of this 

year. 

Even though Boston is standing strong, it would be a disservice 

to the community not to take a look back. There are still unanswered questions about the history of the Tsarnaev brothers, the 

alleged Boston Marathon bombers, and we owe it to the people of 

Boston and the rest of America to make sure that the appropriate 

officials do a thorough review of that situation. 

Last April, the inspectors general of the intelligence community, 

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and the Central 

Intelligence Agency announced a joint investigation into whether 

intelligence was properly distributed and acted upon in the months 

and the years before the bombings at the Boston Marathon. 

I find it rather unfortunate, however, that the review was delayed because of the senseless 16-day Government shutdown in October 2013. Partisan disagreements create serious gaps in homeland security oversight, and this is just one example of the myriad 

of setbacks that the shutdown yielded. 

Another development since last year is Attorney General Holder’s 

January 13 announcement that the United States would be seeking 

the death penalty against Tamerlan* Tsarnaev, the alleged Boston 

Marathon bomber. He was arrested and indicted, and I have de-
5 

clared my confidence in his receiving a fair yet aggressive prosecution in the United States District Court for the Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts. 

Mr. Chairman, as a former Federal prosecutor, you know Attorney General Holder’s decision to seek the death penalty is a gamechanger. I am sure you are familiar with the intricacies involved 

in a capital case. 

As I reminded the committee last year, as we fulfill our Constitutional oversight responsibilities, we must be careful not to jeopardize a Federal prosecution. This applies in both the words that 

we speak to the public as well as the publications that stem from 

this committee. 

Unfortunately, some of the actions that have extended from this 

committee have not been helpful to the Department of Justice. On 

March 26, a Majority staff report, endorsed by a minority of the 

Members of this committee, was released to the public. Less than 

48 hours after the report’s release, Tsarnaev’s defense team filed 

a motion in the United States District Court citing this report. 

I reemphasize that, as Members of Congress, especially as Members of the Homeland Security Committee, we are held to a heightened standard. We are trusted with both Classified and Unclassified briefings and meetings with the members of the intelligence 

community. Therefore, the words that we speak or we publish 

about alleged terrorists transcend the halls of this Congress and 

are not taken lightly by the public. 

Furthermore, this not only applies to events surrounding Boston 

but also to other events with pending investigations. Reaching conclusions before facts are known puts the reputation of this committee at peril. Thus, we must exercise discretion in our questioning, in our statements about events, suspects, and the links to 

others that may not be in custody. 

But in spite of those limitations, Mr. Chairman, we can still use 

our platform to have a productive discussion about the Boston Marathon bombing and act on outstanding matters. For example, we 

can and we should discuss the funding given to the first-responder 

community. 

Last year, at the Committee on Homeland Security’s first hearing on the Boston Marathon bombings, former Commissioner Davis 

stated that, without grant funding, ‘‘the response would have been 

much less comprehensive than it was.’’ Without the exercises supported through the Urban Areas Security Initiative funding, there 

would be more people who died in these attacks. 

Professor Leonard’s testimony also indicates that this type of preparedness is what makes first response effective. Sargent Pugliese 

is also testifying today that local municipal governments are not financially equipped to take on the increasing burden of these catastrophic attacks like Boston. 

It is time that we not only listen to the first responders but that 

we also take action. 

Not only after last year’s hearing but also hearings throughout 

several Congresses, Members have heard about the importance of 

these grant programs and the success stories involving them. Accordingly, I urge Members to oppose the administration’s proposal 

to shift focus away from supporting State and local efforts to de-
6 

velop terrorism-related prevention and preparedness capabilities by 

morphing the Homeland Security Grant Program into an all-hazards grant. 

I am not convinced that the administration’s underfunded grant 

consolidation proposal would provide sufficient support for first responders across America to build and maintain the capabilities necessary to respond as effectively as the first responders in Boston 

and Watertown did after the bombings last year. 

We learned from 9/11 that it is the local responders that are 

there on the scene. I cannot support any grant reform proposal 

until I am convinced that it would provide the support necessary 

to maintain the terrorism preparedness capabilities that we have 

spent building—building now for over a decade. 

Also, I agree with the Chairman that we cannot ignore that information sharing between Federal, State, and local authorities 

needs strengthening. Since September 11, information-sharing silos 

that the 9/11 Commissioners recommended be addressed continue 

to be exposed after tragic events. We need to work together to develop ways to fix that problem as soon as possible. 

We must also consider the economic cost of terrorism. In response to the events of September 11, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. That measure increased the 

availability of terrorism risk insurance to at-risk American businesses by guaranteeing that the Government would share some of 

the losses with private insurance should a terrorist attack occur at 

a building. 

That act is set to sunset this year. According to the RAND Corporation, allowing this act to expire would harm our National security. Last year, Mr. Thompson introduced a bill that would extend 

the act and add some needed improvements, and I urge my colleagues to cosponsor that legislation. 

Even though it has been almost a year since the bombings, there 

have been some game-changing moments, and some ships are still 

anchored. As we continue to seek answers, I remind us to be responsible and to act within our Constitutional boundaries. The people of Boston are looking for our leadership on this issue. 

I yield back the balance of my time and ask that the full statement of Ranking Member Thompson be put into the record, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Without objection, so ordered. I thank the 

Ranking Member. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

APRIL 9, 2014 

I want to extend condolences to the families of the 4 people killed during last 

week’s shooting at Ft. Hood. Additionally, prayers are with the 16 people who were 

injured during the shooting. I want to recognize the first responder community and 

medical personnel for their incredible response to the shooting. As of today, the 

Joint Terrorism Task Force does not consider the shooting an act of terrorism. However, the investigation is still on-going. 

Incidents like last week’s shooting and last year’s Boston Marathon bombing—the 

focus of today’s hearing—remind us of the importance of first responders. With that 

being said, I again commend the service of our witnesses: Former Commissioner 

Davis, Chief Deveau, and Sergeant Pugliese. I also thank Professor Leonard for recognizing their courageous efforts in his research. 
7 

Resilience and response are two of the reasons why almost a year later the Boston 

metropolitan area remains strong. Hence, I wish Mayor Walsh, president of the Boston Athletic Association, Joann Flamino, and all the runners and volunteers participating in the 118th Boston Marathon well as the race commences on April 21. 

Even though Boston is standing strong, it would be a disservice to the community 

not to take a look back. There are still unanswered questions about the history of 

Tsarnaev brothers—the alleged Boston Marathon bombers. We owe it to the people 

of Boston and the rest of America to make sure that the appropriate officials do a 

thorough review of the situation. 

Last April, the inspectors general of the intelligence community, Departments of 

Homeland Security and Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency announced a 

joint investigation into whether intelligence was properly distributed and acted 

upon in the months and years before the bombings at the Boston Marathon. I find 

it rather unfortunate; however, that the review was delayed because of the senseless 

16-day Government shut-down in October 2013. Partisan disagreements create serious gaps in homeland security oversight and this is just one example of the myriad 

of setbacks the shut-down yielded. 

Another development since last year is Attorney General Holder’s January 30 announcement that the United States would be seeking the death penalty against 

Dzhokar Tsarnaev, the alleged Boston Marathon bomber. Since Dzhokar Tsarnaev 

was arrested and indicted, I have declared my confidence in his receiving a fair, yet 

aggressive prosecution in the United States District Court for the Commonwealth 

of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, as a former Federal prosecutor, you know Attorney General Holder’s decision to seek the death penalty against Tsarnaev was a 

game-changer. I am sure you are familiar with the intricacies involved in a capital 

case. As I reminded the committee last year, as we fulfill our Constitutional oversight responsibilities, we must be careful not to jeopardize a Federal prosecution— 

this applies to both the words we speak to the public as well as the publications 

that stem from our research. 

Unfortunately, some of the actions that have extended from by this committee 

have not been helpful to the Department of Justice. On March 26, a Majority Staff 

Report endorsed by a minority of Members of this committee was released to the 

public. Less than 48 hours after the report’s release, Dzohkar Tsarnaev’s defense 

team filed a motion in the United States District Court citing this report. I reemphasize that as Members of Congress, especially Members of the Homeland Security 

Committee, we are held to a heightened standard. We are trusted to have both Classified and Unclassified briefings and meetings with the members of intelligence 

community. 

Therefore, the words we speak or publish about an alleged terrorist transcend the 

halls of Congress and are not taken lightly by the public. Furthermore, this not only 

applies to events surrounding Boston but also to other events with pending investigation. Reaching conclusions before facts are known puts the reputation of this 

committee in peril. Thus, we must exercise discretion in our questioning and our 

statements about events, suspects, and the links to others that may not be in custody. 

In spite of these limitations, Mr. Chairman, we can still use our platform to have 

a productive discussion about the Boston Marathon bombing and act on outstanding 

matters. For instance, we can and should discuss the funding given to the first-responder community. 

Last year, at the Committee on Homeland Security’s first hearing on the Boston 

Marathon bombings, former Commissioner Davis stated that without grant funding, 

the ‘‘response would have been much less comprehensive than it was’’ and without 

the exercises supported through Urban Area Security Initiative funding, ‘‘there 

would be more people who had died in these attacks.’’ Professor Leonard’s testimony 

also indicates that this type of preparedness is what made the first response effective. Sergeant Pugliese is also testifying today that local municipal governments are 

not financially equipped to take on the increasing burden of catastrophic attacks 

like Boston. It is time that we not only listen to the first responders but also take 

action. 

Not only after last year’s hearing, but also hearings throughout several Congresses, Members have heard about the importance of these grant programs and 

success stories involving them. Accordingly, I urge Members to oppose the administration’s proposal to shift focus away from supporting State and local efforts to develop terrorism-related prevention and preparedness capabilities by morphing the 

Homeland Security Grant Program into an all hazards grant. I am not convinced 

that the administration’s underfunded grant consolidation proposal would provide 

sufficient support for first responders across America to build and maintain the capabilities necessary to respond as effectively as the first responders in Boston and 
8 

Watertown did after the bombings last year. I cannot support any grant reform proposal until I am convinced that it would provide support necessary to maintain the 

terrorism-preparedness capabilities we have spent over a decade building. 

Also, I agree with the Chairman that we cannot ignore that information sharing 

between Federal, State, and local authorities needs strengthening. Since September 

11, information-sharing silos that the 9/11 Commissioners recommended be addressed continue to be exposed after tragic events. We need to work together to develop ways to fix this problem post-haste. 

We must also consider the economic costs of terrorism. In response to the events 

of September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. 

That measure increased the availability of terrorism risk insurance to at-risk American businesses by guaranteeing that the Government would share some of the 

losses with private insurers should a terrorist attack occur. That act is set to sunset 

this year. According to the RAND corporation, allowing this Act to expire would 

harm National security. Last year, I introduced a bill that would extend the Act and 

add some needed improvements. I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this legislation. 

Even though it has been almost a year since the bombings, there have been some 

game-changing moments, and some ships are still anchored. As we continue to seek 

answers, I remind us to be responsible and act within our Constitutional boundaries. The people of Boston are looking for our leadership on this issue. 

Chairman MCCAUL. As a former Federal prosecutor, I understand legal standards very well and would do nothing to jeopardize 

the prosecution. 

I also, as a Member of Congress, understand our responsibilities 

and this committee’s responsibilities of oversight under the Constitution of the United States. As recently quoted in the Boston 

Globe, ‘‘This shouldn’t be about Democrats and Republicans. If you 

can’t put that stuff behind you on an issue like this, then I don’t 

know when you can.’’ I couldn’t agree more with the Boston Globe 

on that statement. 

With that, the Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from 

Massachusetts, who has had more impact out of this tragedy than 

any other Member of this committee, Mr. Keating, to introduce today’s witnesses. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

By way of introduction, I just want to realize, have us all realize 

that it is almost a year to the day of April 15, when we were all 

shocked, not just in Massachusetts but around the country, at the 

news that the lives of four young individuals were taken and hundreds more were injured in the Boston Marathon. 

If I could, in this introductory period, Mr. Chairman, I would like 

us to take a moment to remember and honor the lives of Krystle 

Campbell, 29; Sean Collier, 26; Lingzi Lu, 23; and Martin Richard, 

8. 

[Moment of silence.] 

Mr. KEATING. There is no doubt that Boston’s handling of the 

marathon attack will serve as a model for cities around the world 

on how to respond to mass homeland security incidents. For this 

reason, it is important to look back and analyze the steps taken before, during, and after the tragedy. 

We are honored today to have before this committee public safety 

officials from Boston and Watertown whose actions directly impeded further damage and loss of lives during the attack and in the 

days following. In that regard, all of our witnesses today can provide unique perspective on the best methods to increase our Nation’s resiliency, adaptability, and transparency within the homeland security realm. 
9 

* The information has been retained in committee files. 

Our first witness, former Boston Police Commissioner Edward 

Davis, is currently with the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Mr. Davis was appointed by another 

great leader during this period, former Boston Mayor Thomas 

Menino. In this role, Commissioner Davis led the Boston Police Department’s response to the Boston Marathon bombing on April 15. 

The heroic actions and quick thinking of the men and women 

under Mr. Davis’ leadership, as well as that of the Massachusetts 

National Guard, Boston Fire Department, EMS services, medical 

personnel, and, indeed, civilians, led to the survival of 17 critically 

injured civilians. 

I have known Mr. Davis throughout his 34 years of law enforcement. He served on the Lowell Police Department, was named superintendent to that police department in 1994. During this period, 

he was recognized for reducing the crime rate in Lowell quicker 

than any other superintendent in the United States of America in 

cities of over 100,000 residents. 

Commissioner, thank you for your service and your service to the 

city of Boston, the Commonwealth, and to our country. It is an 

honor to have you with us here today, and we look forward to your 

testimony. 

We also have joining the former commissioner the chief of police 

at the Watertown Police Department, Mr. Edward Deveau. Chief 

Deveau sits on the executive board of the Massachusetts Chiefs of 

Police Association and played a crucial role during the manhunt for 

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. His leadership made National headlines when 

five of his officers found themselves in a battle that involved both 

gunfire and homemade explosives on a small street in Watertown. 

Chief Deveau, it is my pleasure to see you again. We are all 

grateful for your service and for taking the time out of your busy 

marathon training to testify here today. 

Finally, Sergeant Jeffrey Pugliese is the second generation of a 

Watertown police officer, and he also served in the U.S. Army. He 

was born and raised in Watertown. 

Having been promoted to sergeant in 1993, he was on the night 

shift during the early hours of April 19, 2013, when he came to the 

assistance of his fellow officers on Laurel Street. After a grueling 

exchange of fire, he came within 6 feet of Tamerlan Tsarnaev and 

eventually chased the subject and tackled him to the ground, leaving him time to rush those hurt in the scene to the hospital. 

Members of this committee had the opportunity to visit the scene 

and were able to see just amazing signs of heroism in the impressions that the bombs and bullets made throughout that street. 

Sergeant, thank you for your incredible service. 

Even though I am not introducing him, I want to thank Professor 

Dutch Leonard from Harvard University. 

If I could, Mr. Chairman, for the record, ask unanimous consent 

that the report that Professor Leonard is going to talk about today 

be submitted in the record. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Without objection, so ordered.* 

Mr. KEATING. I yield back. 
10 

Chairman MCCAUL. Professor Leonard, thank you for being here 

today, as well. The Kennedy School, I guess I am somewhat of an 

alumni, being in the fellows program. My best to the faculty and 

staff. I know you produced an excellent report and analysis of the 

Boston bombing, and I look forward to reading that and sharing 

my thoughts with you. Thanks so much for being here today. 

Full written statements of the witnesses will appear in the 

record. 

The Chairman now recognizes Commissioner Davis for 5 minutes 

for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. DAVIS III, FORMER COMMISSIONER, BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, FELLOW, JOHN F. 

KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thomas, 

distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for inviting 

me before you today to once again discuss the events of April 15, 

2013, when the Boston Marathon and our Nation came under attack by a pair of extremist brothers. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Commissioner, I don’t believe your mike is 

on. 

Mr. DAVIS. Sorry about that. 

I came before you last May as commissioner of the Boston Police 

Department to offer my insights into the information sharing that 

occurred before and during the events of last April. 

I also came to you on behalf of the Boston community and specifically four people whose voices could no longer be heard because 

of the attacks of these cowards. Once again, before I begin my remarks, I ask you to remember the lives of Martin Richard, Krystle 

Campbell, Lu Lingzi, and MIT Police Officer Sean Collier. 

Let my comments today reflect that none of us should ever forget 

four lives that were senselessly cut too short by the events of that 

week. 

Next Tuesday afternoon at 2:50 p.m. will mark the 1-year anniversary since two pressure-cooker bombs were detonated on 

Boylston Street, on a historic stretch of a Boston street that leads 

to one of the most inspirational sites an athlete can view: The finish line of the Boston Marathon. 

A lot has changed in that 1 year. For the hundreds of victims 

wounded in the attacks, life has been altered. Yet, on a daily basis, 

we continue to see and hear the inspirational stories of those victims—stories like that of Adrianne Haslet-Davis of Boston, a professional dancer who returned to the stage last month despite losing part of her left leg in one of the explosions; or Jeff Bauman of 

Chelmsford. The iconic image of him being wheeled away from the 

devastation by a good Samaritan is emblazoned in our minds. He 

just announced he is engaged and is going to be a new father soon. 

Or Martin Richard’s sister, Jane, whose recovery has inspired a 

team of runners to run on her behalf in this year’s marathon. Or 

the dozens of nurses and first responders who will be undertaking 

their first marathon ever next week in honor of the victims whose 

lives they helped save. 
11 

There are literally hundreds more stories that I could share with 

you. I just want to make sure that none of them are lost to time 

as we continue to examine the events that led up to the attacks 

and the actions that unfolded in the days and weeks afterwards. 

I also want to speak on behalf of a community, not just the Boston community or even simply metropolitan Boston, but the greater 

community at large. In the year since, as I have traveled across 

this country talking about the lessons learned from this tragedy, I 

have come to realize that the community that rallied behind the 

‘‘Boston Strong’’ mantra numbers in the millions, because that is 

how aggrieved our Nation felt after these attacks on our freedom 

and the innocents caught in the path of these explosions. 

In the weeks after last April’s attack, many questions were 

raised about who knew what when and what kind of information 

was being shared between law enforcement agencies. I am here to 

tell you that throughout the past year the level of interagency cooperation and information sharing that has occurred between local, 

State, and Federal law enforcement agencies has been critical to 

ensuring that we found ourselves answers to the many questions 

that have been posed. 

Within the first few minutes of hearing about the explosions on 

Boylston Street, my first phone call was to my friend and colleague, 

Rick DesLauriers, at the FBI. He and I worked side-by-side 

throughout the ensuing week, and I consider him a staunch friend 

and ally. He offered all of the services of the FBI and other agencies to make sure that we not only apprehended the terrorists responsible for the crime but also to ensure that our interagency collaboration affords all of our agencies the critical amount of information sharing needed for our organizations to operate at peak efficiency. 

What all of us learned that week and in the ensuing 12 months, 

though, is just how big our community is beyond the partnerships 

within the levels of government. Our law enforcement community 

is obvious. With me today are some of my colleagues from the 

neighboring Watertown Police Department—and you will hear from 

those heroes in a minute—the community where the manhunt 

came to an end and a community that found its neighborhoods 

under siege like never before in our country’s history. 

Make no mistake about this: Boston Police, Watertown Police, 

none of our agencies could have enjoyed the success we achieved 

without the involvement of a much larger community, one that felt 

personally victimized by the attacks. That is the community which 

has come to be known as ‘‘Boston Strong.’’ 

In the past 12 months, ‘‘Boston Strong’’ has been used as a rallying cry for an indomitable spirit, a sign of resilience and perseverance. Our hometown baseball team, the Red Sox, showed its tenacity and found inspiration from its message to win a World Series. It came to personify our indefatigable patriotism and commitment to neighbor helping neighbor. In New England, we didn’t just 

see ‘‘Boston Strong’’ as a cliched hashtag on Twitter; we see it as 

a proclamation that we stand together, united in the face of previously unimaginable atrocities and determined to hold fast to our 

ideals and basic tenets of freedom. 
12 

‘‘Boston Strong’’ became an exclamation by a community that 

wants the world to know that it can rally in the face of adversity 

and, armed with the necessary information, can work with its government partners to achieve a safe and desired outcome to a horrible and senseless act of violence. 

When he came to our city a few days after the attacks, President 

Obama told the world that Boston will run again, and he was right. 

We run to support the dreams and personal aspirations of every 

man and woman who will be lacing up their sneakers to complete 

the grueling course. We run for the ideals that this kind of event 

brings our community together to celebrate everything that is great 

about our city, our State, and our Nation. We run for the men and 

women and children who can’t be there this year: Krystle Campbell, Lu Lingzi, Martin Richard, and Officer Sean Collier. All of 

us—Boston, Massachusetts; New England; the United States—we 

run together. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. DAVIS, III 

APRIL 9, 2014 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting me back before you today to once again discuss 

the events of April 15, 2013, when the Boston Marathon and our Nation came under 

attack by a pair of extremist brothers bent on challenging our freedom. 

I came before you last May as commissioner of the Boston Police Department to 

offer my insights into the information sharing that occurred before and during the 

events of last April. I also came to you on behalf of the Boston community, and specifically, four people whose voices could no longer be heard because of the attacks 

of these cowards. 

Once again, before I begin my remarks, I ask that you remember the lives of Martin Richard, Krystle Campbell, Lu Lingzi, and MIT Police Officer Sean Collier. Let 

my comments today reflect that none of us should ever forget four lives that were 

senselessly cut too short by the events of that week. 

Next Tuesday afternoon at 2:50 p.m. we will mark the 1-year anniversary since 

two pressure-cooker bombs were detonated on Boylston Street, on a historic stretch 

of a Boston Street that leads to one of the most inspirational sights an athlete can 

view—the finish line of the Boston Marathon. 

A lot has changed in that 1 year. For the hundreds of victims wounded in the 

attacks, life has been altered. Yet on a daily basis, we continue to see and hear the 

inspirational stories of those victims—stories like that of Adrianne Haslet-Davis of 

Boston, a professional dancer who returned to the stage last month despite losing 

part of her left leg in one of the explosions. Or Jeff Bauman of Chelmsford—the 

iconic image of him being wheeled away from the devastation by a Good Samaritan 

is emblazoned in our minds. He just announced he’s engaged and is going to be a 

new father soon. Or Martin Richard’s sister Jane, whose recovery has inspired a 

team of runners to run on her behalf in this year’s marathon. Or the dozens of 

nurses and first responders who will be undertaking their first marathon ever next 

week, in honor of the victims whose lives they helped save. There are literally hundreds more stories that I could share with you. I just want to make sure none of 

them are lost to time, as we continue to examine the events that led up to the attacks and the actions that unfolded in the days and weeks afterwards. 

I also want to speak on behalf of a community. Not just a Boston community, or 

even simply Metropolitan Boston, but the greater community at large. In the year 

since, as I have travelled across this country talking about the lessons learned from 

this tragedy, I have come to realize the community that rallied behind the Boston 

Strong mantra numbers in the millions, because that is how aggrieved our Nation 

felt after these attacks on our freedoms and the innocents caught in the path of 

those explosions. 

In the weeks after last April’s attack, many questions were raised about who 

knew what when, and what kind of information was being shared between law enforcement agencies. 
13 

I am here to tell you that throughout this past year, the level of inter-agency cooperation and information sharing that has occurred between local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies has been critical to ensuring that we have found answers to as many questions as we could pose. 

Within the first few minutes of hearing about the explosions on Boylston Street, 

my first phone call was to my friend and colleague Rick Deslauriers at the FBI. He 

and I worked side-by-side throughout the ensuing week, and I consider him a 

staunch friend and ally. He offered all of the services of the FBI and other agencies 

to make sure that we not only apprehended the terrorists responsible for this crime, 

but also to ensure that our inter-agency collaboration affords all of our agencies the 

critical amount of information sharing needed for our organizations to operate at 

peak efficiency. 

What all of us learned that week and in the ensuing 12 months, though, is just 

how big our community is beyond the partnerships within the levels of government. 

Our law enforcement community is obvious. With me today are some of my colleagues from the neighboring Watertown Police Department, the community where 

the manhunt came to an end and a community that found its neighborhoods under 

siege like never before in our country’s history. 

Make no mistake about this—Boston Police, Watertown police—none of our agencies could have enjoyed the successes we achieved without the involvement of a 

much larger community, one that felt personally victimized by the attacks. That is 

the community which has come to be known as Boston Strong. 

In the past 12 months, Boston Strong has been used a rallying cry for an indomitable spirit, a sign of resilience and perseverance. Our hometown baseball team, the 

Red Sox, showed its tenacity and found inspiration from its message to win a World 

Series. It came to personify our indefatigable patriotism and commitment to neighbor helping neighbor. In New England, we don’t just see Boston Strong as a cliche ́d 

hashtag on twitter, as see it as a proclamation that we stand together, united in 

the face of previously-unimaginable atrocity, and determined to hold fast to our 

ideals and basic tenets of freedom. Boston Strong became an exclamation by a community that wants the world to know that it can rally in the face of adversity and, 

armed with the necessary information, can work with its governmental partners to 

achieve a safe and desired outcome to a horrible and senseless act of violence. 

Anyone who has ever visited Boston in the spring, or spent any time there, you 

know that the Boston Marathon is the People’s Race. This is a 26.2-mile line that 

starts in Hopkinton, winds through Ashland, Framingham, Natick, Wellesley, Newton, and Brookline before ending in the heart of downtown Boston. And it occurs, 

appropriately enough, on Patriots’ Day, a State holiday in Massachusetts that helps 

recognize the birth of the American Revolution, but has also come to embody our 

patriotic love for our community and our country. In New England, you either watch 

the marathon, you know somebody who runs it, or you run in it yourself. I had close 

friends and colleagues running in last year’s race, many of whom were pressed into 

immediate service by the explosions. The marathon is part of our fiber, and an attack on the institution is an attack on our community as a whole. 

This is the same community who waited anxiously as the largest manhunt in New 

England history played out over 4 days. When law enforcement decided to release 

the photos of the two suspects, we knew the dissemination of information into the 

hands of the public would be one of the most effective ways we could apprehend 

the individuals we wanted. 

As we saw it play out on Thursday and Friday of that week, when the suspects 

took to the run, and began endangering innocents in other communities, we had to 

take the unprecedented action of asking more than half a million people to shelter 

in place while we search for these two men, who were throwing bombs at the police 

officers trying to catch them. 

And for that historic Friday after the marathon, when we asked our communities 

to work with us and remain at home to keep the streets clear so we could do our 

job, they listened. 

They listened because they shared a common goal, of wanting us to catch the men 

responsible. They listened because they trusted law enforcement, and by extension, 

their Government, to take care of them. 

As anyone who has followed my career with the Boston and Lowell Police Departments knows, I believe in community policing, and the critical role that our residents play in helping to keep a community safe. It was relationships built before 

the marathon attacks that allowed us to implement such drastic measures, and 

those relationships only grew stronger when our communities saw the professional 

responses from their police agencies. 
14 

Sir Robert Peel was the Conservative Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 

the early 1800s, and helped establish some of the modern concepts of our Nation’s 

police forces. 

It was Peel who said ‘‘The police are the public and the public are the police— 

the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention 

duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare 

and existence.’’ 

Nearly 2 centuries later, that basic tenet still holds true today. 

Together, we solve problems. 

In the case of the multi-agency responses required in the wake of the attacks, yes, 

we did identify some areas we could improve upon, especially in terms of information sharing. But I remain supremely proud of the work done not just by the first 

officers, firefighters, or EMS workers who responded to the attacks, but also by the 

sea of yellow-jacketed Boston Marathon volunteers, and the runners who stopped 

short of their 26.2-mile goal to help innocent people suffering on the sidewalks along 

Boylston Street. 

Beyond the successes we have achieved with the cooperation of the media agencies that cover our agencies, we also learned quickly what a valuable information 

tool our social media networks could be to us as that week unfolded last April. Systems that remain in place a year later, and allow our agencies to more effectively 

and more rapidly communication directly with the men and women we are sworn 

to serve and protect. 

Next Monday, an historic number of runners will take to the pavement again to 

run in the fabled Boston Marathon, and next Monday, they will be protected by an 

historic amount of law enforcement personnel from among a wide swath of agencies, 

all of whom have been meeting on a regular basis for months to ensure the safety 

of everyone who will be running and watching the event. We are all working together. 

When he came to our city a few days after the attacks, President Obama told the 

world that Boston will run again, and he was right. 

We run to support the dreams and personal aspirations of every man and woman 

who will be lacing up their sneakers to complete the grueling course. 

We run for the ideals that this kind of event brings our community together to 

celebrate everything that is great about our city, our State, and our Nation. 

And we run for the men, women, and children who can’t be there this year— 

Krystle Campbell, Lu Lingzi, Martin Richard, and Officer Sean Collier. 

All of us—Boston, Massachusetts, New England, the United States—we run together. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Commissioner. 

The Chairman now recognizes Chief Deveau for an opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD P. DEVEAU, CHIEF OF POLICE, 

WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT 

Chief DEVEAU. Chairman McCaul, it is an honor to come before 

you and your committee. Thank you for the privilege of doing that. 

I am extremely proud to be here today representing the men and 

women of the Watertown Police Department. Our goal has always 

been to be the best police department in Massachusetts. 

Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege of meeting you and other 

Members of your distinguished committee when you traveled to 

Boston and Watertown. I want to thank you and your Members 

who took the time to learn about how the Watertown Police Department and the Watertown community responded to the events 

of that day. 

Before I speak about the actions of the Watertown Police Department, I would like to give you some background on the events of 

last year. 

Patriots’ Day is a special day in Boston. It is my favorite weekend of the year. Businesses and schools are closed in Massachusetts for most people. Spectators line the 26 miles of the Boston 
15 

Marathon route from Hopkinton to Boston, cheering on the elite 

runners but also the regular people who run—many of them run 

for charities. The Boston Red Sox play at 11:00 a.m., and, after the 

game, all the fans walk down to Kenmore Square and watch the 

final mile or 2 of the marathon. 

You haven’t lived in Boston very long if you haven’t been a spectator, a volunteer, or a runner. This year, I will run with 12 of my 

officers. It is going to be an emotional day for my officers as we run 

that route and cross the finish line on Boylston Street. 

The Boston Marathon will be held in less than 2 weeks, and 

more people than ever want to be part of it. They want to come together to celebrate and remember those who died and those who 

were injured in last year’s explosions. They want to remember Officer Sean Collier of the MIT Police Department, who was ambushed 

and killed before the two brothers headed to Watertown. 

We have all seen what occurred at the finish line of the marathon on April 19, and Commissioner Davis has spoken about that 

and how well and impressive his department responded that day. 

I am here today to talk about the events that occurred in Watertown in the early morning hours of April 19. That seemingly quiet 

overnight shift suddenly turned into a war zone. For the first time 

in America, police officers were attacked with guns and bombs, and 

it happened on a quiet backstreet of my community. Those two 

brothers were trying kill my police officers and had plans to kill 

and injure more innocent people. 

The handful of Watertown officers on duty that night acted heroically and defended Watertown without regard for their own personal safety. They displayed courage and bravery as they stubbornly defended our community. Just as in Boston, my officers 

were at their very best when confronted with the biggest challenge 

of their careers. Their split-second decisions and actions went far 

beyond their academy training, but I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, it will now be taught in academies across the country. 

It has been said before but, as their police chief, I want to state 

it again: The actions of my officers saved lives here in Boston and 

in New York City. 

I want to introduce those officers, and you have already done 

that, Mr. Chairman, but, again, I would like to point out Officer 

Joe Reynolds, who was the first officer to confront those two brothers. Had no idea who he was up against. When we got notified in 

Watertown, we didn’t know it was related to the Boston bombings, 

we didn’t know it was related to Sean Collier. Joe stopped that car 

and was immediately shot on. 

John MacLellan, who is sitting behind him, was the next officer 

there to come onto that street. Got a round right through his windshield, glass in his face, and the bullet went right by his ear. And 

those two guys continued to fight on that backstreet of Watertown. 

Miguel Colon and Mike Comick showed up shortly after that. 

When Officer Colon showed up, he tried to put a spotlight down the 

street, and it was immediately shot out. He had trouble even getting out of his cruiser to help. 

You are going to hear from Sergeant Pugliese and all the heroic 

things he did. 
16 

Mr. Chairman, during these trying days last April, two individuals attempted to strike fear and take down a city. They attempted 

to terrorize us all. In the end, they accomplished nothing. They will 

never know what it is—when America gets knocked down, we pick 

ourselves up and become even stronger. We will not be intimidated. 

Watertown is stronger, Boston is stronger, and, in my opinion, 

the entire country is united and stronger. The strength and resilience and even defiance is what made Boston strong. I know if an 

attack occurs in another city within our country, they will respond 

in a similar way. 

The Watertown police officers on duty that night stopped these 

evil brothers from leaving with a carful of weapons to carry out 

their deadly plan. In the following 18 hours, our entire department 

of 65 officers was tested and worked around the clock to keep our 

community safe. We received unprecedented support from surrounding police departments and Federal agencies. As a result, the 

second Boston bombing suspect was finally captured. 

I want to thank the residents of Watertown for their patience 

and cooperation that day and for their continued support. It truly 

took an entire community. 

Mr. Chairman, when I began my comments today, I mentioned 

our goal was to be the best police department in the State, and I 

am not sure if we have reached that, but I can tell you one thing. 

For 81⁄2 minutes, we were the best damn police department in the 

world. 

Mr. Chairman, I conclude my remarks, and I am happy to answer any questions you and your committee may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Chief Deveau follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD P. DEVEAU

Chairman McCaul it is an honor to come before the U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Homeland Security. 

I am extremely proud to be here today representing the men and women of the 

Watertown, Massachusetts Police Department. Our goal has always been to be the 

best police department in the State of Massachusetts. 

Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege of meeting you and the other Members of your 

distinguished committee when you traveled to Boston and Watertown. I want to 

thank you and your Members who took the time to learn more about how the Watertown Police Department and the Watertown community responded to the events 

of last April. 

Before I speak about the actions of the Watertown Police Department I would like 

to give you some background on the events of last year: 

Patriot’s Day is a special day in Boston and my favorite weekend of the year. 

Businesses and schools are closed in Massachusetts so most people have the day off. 

Spectators line the 26 miles of the Boston Marathon from Hopkinton to Boston 

cheering on elite runners from all around the world, and the regular people, including so many that run for charities. 

The Boston Red Sox play at 11:00 a.m. and after the game all the fans walk down 

to Kenmore Square to watch the final mile or 2 of the marathon. You haven’t lived 

in Boston very long if you haven’t been a spectator, volunteer, or a runner. This 

year I will run with 12 of my officers, it will be an emotional moment when we cross 

the finish line on Boylston Street. 

The Boston Marathon will be held in less than 2 weeks, and more people than 

ever want to be a part of it. They want to come together to celebrate and remember 

those who died and those who were injured in last year’s explosions. They want to 

remember Officer Sean Collier of the MIT Police Department who was ambushed 

and killed before the two brothers headed to Watertown. 

We have all seen what occurred at the finish line of the Boston Marathon on April 

15 and Commissioner Ed Davis will speak about those tragic events and the Boston 

Police Department’s impressive response that day. 
17 

I am here today to talk about the events that occurred in Watertown in the early 

morning hours of April 19. That seemingly quiet overnight shift suddenly turned 

into a war zone. For the first time in America, police officers were attacked with 

guns and bombs and it happened on a quiet backstreet in my community. Those two 

brothers were trying to kill my police officers and had plans to kill and injure more 

innocent people. 

The handful of Watertown officers on duty that night acted heroically and defended Watertown without regard for their own personal safety. They displayed 

courage and bravery as they stubbornly defended our community. Just as in Boston, 

my officers were at their very best when confronted with the biggest challenge of 

their careers. Their split-second decisions and actions went far beyond their police 

academy training, but I can ensure you it will now be taught in police academies 

across the country. It has been said before Mr. Chairman, but as their police chief 

I want to state it again, the actions my officers took saved many more people from 

being killed and injured. 

I want to introduce the officers that have accompanied Sgt. Pugliese and myself 

here today. Each of these officers played a key role in that historic gun battle on 

Laurel Street. 

Mr. Chairman, during those trying day’s last April two individuals attempted to 

strike fear and take down a city. They attempted to terrorize us all. In the end they 

accomplished nothing. What they will never know is that when America gets 

knocked down we pick ourselves up and become even stronger. We will not be intimidated. Watertown is stronger, Boston is stronger, and in my opinion the entire 

country is more united and stronger. The strength, resilience, and defiance is what 

made Boston Strong and I know if an attack occurs in any city within our country 

they will respond in a similar way. 

The Watertown police officers on duty that night stopped these terrorists from 

leaving with their car full of weapons to carry out their next deadly plan. In the 

following 18 hours our entire department of 65 officers was tested and worked 

around the clock to keep our community safe. We received unprecedented support 

from surrounding police departments and Federal agencies. As a result the second 

Boston Marathon bombing suspect was finally captured. 

I want to thank the residents of Watertown for their patience and cooperation 

that day and for their continuing support. It truly took an entire community. 

Mr. Chairman, when I began my comments today I mentioned our goal was to 

be the best police department in our State and I am not sure if we have accomplished that, but what I do know is that for 81⁄2 minutes on a back street in Watertown we were the best police department in the world. 

Mr. Chairman, I conclude my remarks and I am happy to try and answer any 

questions your committee may have. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Chief, for that compelling testimony. You are right, for 81⁄2 minutes you were the best police department in the world. 

With that, the Chairman now recognizes Sergeant Pugliese for 

his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY J. PUGLIESE, SERGEANT, 

WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT 

Sergeant PUGLIESE. Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to 

speak here this morning. 

A little background on myself. I have been a police officer for 34 

years in the Watertown Police Department. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Is the mike on? Can the clerks help with the 

microphones at the witness table? 

Sergeant PUGLIESE. Is that better? 

Background on myself. Been a police officer for 34 years in the 

town of Watertown. Prior to that, I served in the U.S. Army from 

1974 through 1978 in the military police assigned to Berlin, Germany, in the Berlin Brigade. 

What happened that night is, it was just after midnight. I had 

finished my work shift when I heard a radio broadcast that officers 

from my agency were following an alleged carjacked vehicle. I knew 
18 

that the current shift had four patrol officers and a patrol supervisor on the street that night, and so I thought I would head up 

to assist the officers in the event that it became a pursuit or a foot 

pursuit or any assistance was needed. 

While en route to the area, I heard another broadcast that the 

officers were now taking gunfire from the occupants of the alleged 

carjacked vehicle and they were requesting assistance. 

When I arrived on the scene, I heard gunfire. I exited my vehicle, 

and within moments I heard an explosion. I advanced to the area 

where the other officers were taking cover and returning gunfire. 

The suspects were eventually taken into custody. I am not really 

at liberty to go into minute detail into the incident, as one of the 

suspects is still awaiting trial, but I will endeavor to answer any 

questions you may have. 

I would like to make note that, in today’s ever-changing environment of violence, local and municipal governments are not financially equipped to take on the increasing burden of such hostile actions. 

In closing, I would like to say that all of the officers in the Watertown Police Department, those officers that were there that 

night, they are ordinary guys who were put in an extraordinary situation and performed extraordinarily well. 

Once again, thank you for inviting me to speak at this hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Sergeant Pugliese follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY J. PUGLIESE

APRIL 9, 2014 

Good morning, thank you for inviting me to speak here this morning. My name 

is Jeffrey J. Pugliese, I’m a police sergeant with the Watertown Massachusetts Police Department. I’m a 34-year veteran of the Department. In addition to my duties 

as a patrol supervisor, I have been a department firearms instructor for over 29 

years. I am also a U.S. Army Veteran (1974–1978), serving in the Berlin, Germany 

as a military police officer assigned to the Berlin Brigade. 

I am here to discuss the events of the early morning hours of April 19, 2013. 

It was just after midnight and I had just finished my work shift when I heard 

a radio broadcast that officers from my agency were following an alleged carjacked 

vehicle. I knew the current shift had only four patrol officers and a patrol sergeant 

working, I decided to drive in that direction in the event any additional assistance 

would be needed by the officers. 

While en route to the area, I heard another radio broadcast that officers were now 

taking gun fire from the occupants of the alleged carjacked vehicle and they were 

requesting assistance. 

On arrival at the scene, I heard gun fire, I exited my vehicle and within moments 

I heard an explosion. 

I advanced to the area where other officers were taking cover and returning gunfire. The suspects were eventually taken into custody. 

While I am not at liberty to go into minute details as the incident is still awaiting 

trial of one of the suspects, I will endeavor to answer any questions you may have. 

I think it should be noted that in today’s ever-changing environment of violence, 

local municipal governments are not financially equipped to take on the increasing 

burden of such hostile actions. 

In closing, I would like to say that all of the officers involved in this incident are 

ordinary men who were put into an extraordinary situation and performed extraordinarily well. 

Once again, thank you for inviting me to speak here this morning. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Sergeant. Thanks for your act of 

heroism, taking down the biggest terrorists since 9/11. We appreciate what you did. 

The Chairman now recognizes Professor Leonard for 5 minutes. 
19 

STATEMENT OF HERMAN ‘‘DUTCH’’ B. LEONARD, PROFESSOR 

OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF 

GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. LEONARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson for inviting me to testify. My thanks also to Congressman 

Keating for his tireless work that has brought so much of the Boston Marathon set of issues to our attention. 

I am honored to appear today with three of the genuine heroes 

of that week—Commissioner Ed Davis and Chief Ed Deveau and 

Sergeant Pugliese—and also to be together with all five of the Watertown police officers, who gave such a great account of themselves in that gun battle in those 8 minutes when they were the 

best police force in the world. Each of them will tell you that he 

is not a hero, but I feel very strongly today and I think we all know 

that we are in the company of heroes. 

I am Dutch Leonard, the professor and co-director of the Program on Crisis Leadership at the Kennedy School of Government 

at Harvard. For the last year, Arnold Howitt, Christine Cole, Phil 

Heymann, and I have been doing research on the Boston Marathon 

bombing, supported in part by the International Centre for Sport 

Security. 

This was a team effort from the beginning, and all of my colleagues were huge contributors to this. One of my co-authors, 

Christine Cole, is here with us today. The views I am presenting 

here are our own, not those of Harvard University or any other organization. 

Our work was presented in honor and in memory of those who 

lost their lives or suffered grievous injuries in the Boston Marathon 

bombing, and it is dedicated to all of those who helped. 

We focused on the issues of command and coordination. Others 

on our team are examining issues, as the committee has, of preevent intelligence. Our report, entitled ‘‘Why was Boston Strong?’’, 

was released last week. The title refers to the local description, already referenced here, ‘‘Boston Strong,’’ of the resilience shown by 

first responders and by survivors and by the wider community during that week. 

My first message to the committee is about the first-responder 

part of ‘‘Boston Strong.’’ Incident command works. The National Incident Management System that this committee mandated in the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 502, Part 5, is starting to 

work. 

Before NIMS, first responders worked without an effective multiagency doctrine of how to combine in incident management. Too 

many times, we watched while vitally-needed capabilities were not 

effectively deployed but instead were idled by a lack of ability to 

coordinate and execute across agencies, jurisdictional boundaries, 

and levels of government. NIMS is now starting to work, and ‘‘Boston Strong’’ is a good illustration of what can be achieved. We believe that the response in Boston over the course of that week was 

as good as one could reasonably have hoped. 

So why were people and organizations able to be so effective? We 

found three answers. 
20 

First, because senior commanders, including Ed Davis and Ed 

Deveau, were able to come rapidly together to form an effective 

joint command and coordination structure. 

Second, that was not due to chance. It resulted from thousands 

of hours of joint planning, exercises, and operations, combining numerous agencies over many years in the planning for and production of fixed events, some of it funded through grants from the 

Homeland Security Department. 

Third, other communities can do this too. Any community can engage in joint planning and execution for any major fixed event. 

Paying your dues on good days builds the infrastructure of interagency familiarity, respect, and trust and has an immediate payoff. 

If a bad day ever comes, as it did in Boston, that infrastructure is 

literally a life-saver. 

Our research also suggested several areas where further work 

needs to be done, but if we had to choose just one thing to improve, 

it would be to add at the tactical level an effective doctrine for 

what we call micro-command, the ability of people quickly to come 

together in an organized way. That would be in parallel to the National Incident Management System doctrine of macro-command, 

which allows the senior people to come together at the strategic 

level. 

My second message today to the committee is about the community part of resistance to terrorism, which is again on display this 

year as my daughter and Chief Deveau and thousands of others 

train to run in this year’s marathon. 

‘‘Boston Strong’’ encompasses what everyone did and does to 

stand tall and proud in the face of two murderous thugs with terrorist intent. ‘‘Boston Strong’’ is not a form of hubris or arrogance 

or naivete. It is a form of pride and defiance and resilience. 

Terrorists, in the end, are few and weak. They could never defeat 

us, but we could voluntarily surrender to them, and we must not. 

If we cower in fear, if we abandon our commitment to a free and 

open society, then we do their work for them. We cannot defend the 

American way of life, as these five officers did that night, by surrendering it. 

Preserve, protect, uphold, and defend. ‘‘Boston Strong’’ affirms 

the oath of office. ‘‘Boston Strong’’ says that we will defend the 

American way of life by continuing to participate in it. The community part of ‘‘Boston Strong’’ is a pretty good place to start in thinking about what resilience actually looks like. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leonard follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HERMAN B. ‘‘DUTCH’’ LEONARD

APRIL 9, 2014 

I would like to thank Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson for inviting me to testify today, as well as Congressman Keating of Massachusetts for the 

tireless work he has done to advance understanding of the events surrounding the 

Boston Marathon bombing that took place during the week of April 15, 2013. 

I would also like to say that it is an honor for me to appear on this panel today 

with three of the genuine heroes of that week—Commissioner Ed Davis, Chief Ed 

Deveau, and Sgt. Jeff Pugliesi. One of the privileges of doing the research we have 

been carrying out is that we have regularly been in the presence of heroes—as I 

am again, and indeed as we all are today. 
21 

My name is Herman Leonard, known to my friends as ‘‘Dutch.’’ I am the Baker 

Professor of Public Management at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 

University, where I am also faculty co-director of the Program on Crisis Leadership. 

I am also the Snider Family Professor of Business Administration and faculty cochair of the Social Enterprise Initiative at Harvard Business School. 

Over the course of the last year, since the bombs exploded at the finish line of 

the Boston Marathon, I have been working together with Arnold Howitt, who is executive director of the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and faculty co-director 

of the Program on Crisis Leadership, and Christine Cole, who is executive director 

of Harvard’s Program on Criminal Justice Policy and Management, both at the Kennedy School, and with Professor Phillip Heymann of Harvard Law School to understand the sources of the strengths and weaknesses of the response to the marathon 

bombing. Our work was supported in part by the International Centre for Sport Security. In providing this testimony today, I am appearing as a representative of our 

research team; the views I am presenting here are our own, and not those of Harvard University or any other organization. This was a team effort, and while I’m 

providing the testimony today this work is the product of many hands. (Any errors 

made here, however, are mine.) 

Our work was presented in honor and memory of those who lost their lives or suffered grievous injuries in the Boston Marathon bombing. It is dedicated to all of 

those who helped. 

Our work focused on the issues of command within and coordination among the 

agencies and organizations involved in the response. Events like the Marathon 

bombing create a surge of demands and thereby create the need for sudden teams— 

groups of individuals and organizations, thrown together by circumstance even 

though they may not have worked together before, who must, in order to produce 

the best possible overall response, work effectively in tandem under conditions of 

uncertainty and stress in a rapidly-evolving situation. Our work concerns the response that began when the bombs exploded. Since we are seeking to understand 

and explain the quality of that response, we also focus on the extensive efforts made 

in advance to create the conditions that enabled it. Another part of our research 

team is examining some of the issues about pre-event intelligence; that work is not 

yet complete, and lies beyond the scope of the report I’m describing today. 

We conducted a series of extended interviews, mainly with senior command officials in the major organizations involved in the response to the bombing. We also 

drew extensively on public statements and media descriptions of the events. Three 

weeks ago, we convened an ‘‘expert dialogue,’’ gathering about 100 people, including 

many of the principals we had interviewed and other participants in the events of 

that terrible week, together with senior emergency management officials and academics from around the United States and from abroad. We spent an intensive day 

discussing the events and our proposed recommendations. 

Our report, entitled ‘‘WHY was Boston Strong?,’’ was released last week. Our title 

references the local description—‘‘Boston Strong’’—of the full spectrum phenomenon 

of response and resistance and resilience shown by first responders and by survivors 

and by the wider community during that week and since. 

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss some of the findings of our research with 

you. 

I have two simple messages for you today. 

The first message is about the first responder part of Boston Strong that was on 

display last April. 

That message is this: It works! Incident command works! When you build it in 

advance and use it in the moment, incident command is effective. The National Incident Management System is starting to work. 

It has been a long time in coming and it is long overdue—but we’ve made a lot 

of progress Nationally, and the events in Boston last year put that vividly on display. 

For something like 50 years, starting in the 1960s and continuing with greater 

energy after a devastating fire in California in 1970, people of goodwill in emergency 

management sought to develop and promulgate an effective, unified, coherent doctrine of incident management so that agencies and organizations that find themselves having to work together on terrible and dark days can efficiently and smoothly combine their capabilities and resources. The central purpose of having a single, 

unified approach is to enable a sudden team to produce the best performance reasonably possible given the nature of the challenge and the capacities that they have 

available. Too many times we have watched while vitally needed and clearly existing capabilities were not marshaled or effectively deployed—but instead were idled 

by a lack of ability to organize, coordinate, and execute across agencies, jurisdictional boundaries, and levels of government. 
22 

Finally, Congress—through the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, 

the original inception of this committee, in Part 5 of Section 502 of Public Law 107– 

296, the Homeland Security Act of 2002—mandated that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security build ‘‘a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond 

to . . . attacks and disasters.’’ In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security duly 

issued instructions to those it could command directly (and created incentives for 

those it could not) to organize themselves for emergency response purposes in compliance with the structures and precepts and procedures of that system. FEMA has 

since worked to develop the system further and to help Federal and other agencies 

implement the structures, procedures, and training associated with making this doctrine a practical reality. 

This mandate did not immediately succeed in enhancing performance in multiagency response to crisis events. In 2006, I gave testimony before the Senate Homeland Security Committee about Hurricane Katrina; incident management in the crucial early days of that response had been only sporadically applied and while it had 

proved helpful in the areas where it was used effectively it was clear that we were 

still a long way from having a fully operational National Incident Management System that worked smoothly across agencies of all types and all levels of government 

and all jurisdictions. 

My first message to you today is that it is now working far better. Boston Strong 

is a good illustration of what can be—and, in Boston and in other communities 

where significant efforts have been made, has been—achieved. There is more to do, 

as I will suggest—but the first and most important thing to note is that for those 

communities that make the effort, creating an integrated incident command process 

that will work in the moment is a goal that is demonstratedly within reach. 

There were some quite remarkably effective elements of the response in the aftermath of the bombing in Boston. As an example, the bombs caused literally dozens 

of fatal injuries, but, mercifully, there were only three fatalities on that terrible day. 

All of the seriously injured people were removed from the scene within 22 minutes. 

Every person who left the scene alive is alive today. The scene was rapidly secured 

and swept for additional explosive devices. It was then secured as a crime scene, 

collaboratively, using FBI and local and State assets, and the investigation was 

launched. Video from private and public surveillance cameras was quickly collected, 

additional photographic evidence (mainly from media and bystanders who volunteered their photographs and videos) was obtained, and an exhausting search 

through the video and photographic evidence began. Meanwhile, the public was informed by individual agencies and through a series of organized press conferences. 

Taken together, that seems like a very good performance. We can all point to elements where it could be further improved. But the standard can’t be an unrealistic 

expectation of perfection. Our question has to be this: Did the response accomplish 

what could reasonably have been expected, given the intrinsic nature of the event 

itself—the surprise, the physical and emotional shock, and the inevitable chaos of 

the immediate aftermath. We believe that the response in Boston was as good as 

one could reasonably have hoped. This then begs explanation, and forms the basic 

question of our research: Why were people and organizations able to provide as effective a response as this was? What were the strengths of that response, and what 

enabled them? And where were the weaknesses—and what can we do to further 

minimize them? These were the questions at the heart of our research. 

I want to emphasize three elements of our research findings about where these 

features of the response ‘‘came from’’—that is, what caused or created them: 

First, the core underlying reason for the effectiveness of the response in the moment was the rapid formation of an effective command and coordination structure that oversaw and directed all elements of the response. Senior officials 

from a wide range of agencies—Federal, State, local, and private—felt an immediate need to find one another and join into a concerted and unified command 

structure and were then able to do so reasonably quickly. 

Second, none of that was due to chance—it resulted from literally tens of thousands of hours of joint work, planning, exercises, and operations combining numerous agencies over many years in the planning for and production of fixed 

events ranging from the Democratic National Convention in 2004 (an event that 

got particularly attentive focus because it was the first National political convention after 9/11) to the Boston Marathon to the July 4 concert and fireworks 

on the Esplanade to Patriots and Red Sox and Bruins and Celtics victory parades. Each of those events provided an opportunity—and opportunity that was 

taken—to practice the process of planning and doing things together. This built 

knowledge of one another’s assumptions and priorities and procedures, fostering 
23 

understanding and mutual respect of individual and organizational competence 

and capabilities across agencies. This was the infrastructure that enabled command and coordination to be established quickly and to function effectively after 

the bombs exploded. 

Third, others can do this, too. To be sure, some of the features that contributed 

to the effectiveness of the response in Boston were unique to Boston. Boston has 

eight Level I trauma centers, for example, and by happenstance they are 

arrayed in every direction around the area where the bombs went off, so the 

injured could be transported in many different directions, reducing congestion 

among emergency vehicles. Some other elements were unique to the moment— 

for example, the fact that the marathon takes place on a State holiday, when 

hospitals are open and fully staffed, but are not doing elective surgery, meant 

that dozens of operating rooms were immediately available. A shift change was 

underway at the time of the bombing, which increased availability of skilled 

hands when they were needed. So there were elements of good fortune that reduced the terrible consequences on that awful day. But most of what made the 

response as effective as it was can be undertaken by other communities as readily and as well as it was by Boston. Any community can engage in joint planning across its agencies for any major fixed event—from a high school football 

victory parade to a Fourth of July celebration. Any community can find opportunities to engage in joint planning with other jurisdictions, and with other levels 

of government—both Federal and State. 

On a good day, joint planning and practicing inter-agency coordination—and 

carrying that out through an incident command structure—is helpful in making 

events go more smoothly. Paying your dues on the good days by building the 

infrastructure of interagency familiarity, respect, knowledge, and trust thus has 

an immediate pay-off—and if a bad day ever comes, that infrastructure is literally a life-saver. 

The single most important lesson of our research is that routine and constant 

practice and use of incident command is one of the best investments a community 

can make in its present well-being and against any future dark day that might 

arise. 

That said, there are still some things about the command and coordination processes that need some additional work. Our research suggested three areas where 

further work needs to be done on the development and implementation of incident 

command: 

(1) Distinguishing between strategy/policy issues and tactical/operational 

issues.—In a crisis situation, some of the issues raise policy questions that 

should be answered by elected political leaders, while other issues are more tactical and operational. Incident management is largely silent on the establishment of processes and procedures for identifying and separating these issues 

and getting appropriate resolution of them. NIMS focuses almost exclusively on 

the resolution of tactical issues and on organizing processes for carrying out the 

indicated operations once the issues have been decided. More attention needs 

to be devoted in the doctrine to making this distinction, to developing training 

to help officials practice the distinction, and to building an appropriate structure for interaction between policy makers and operational leaders. This interaction generally worked well in Boston, but not because of the doctrine. In fact, 

Boston’s experience may provide some guidance about what the doctrine should 

say. For example, the decision to issue a shelter-in-place request was appropriately framed as a policy issue by operational commanders and was put to political leaders for resolution, and this may provide a good illustration of the kind 

of process of issue identification and resolution that needs to be addressed in 

the doctrine. It is imperative for NIMS to provide more guidance about the process by which tactical commanders should work in conjunction with an appropriate process for decision making by elected leaders. Both have important but 

different roles to play, and NIMS currently lacks systematic ways to help these 

two groups each to stay within their own designated ‘‘lane.’’ 

(2) Helping senior operational commanders resist being pulled unduly toward 

tactical decision making and away from advising political leaders on strategic 

issues.—Related to the challenge of distinguishing policy questions from tactical 

issues, the natural flow of work in incident management structures tends to 

exert a strong pull on the senior commanders of operational agencies toward 

being involved in tactical decision making—at precisely the moment when they 

are also needed to help frame and provide advice to political leaders about more 

strategic issues. Illustratively, during the Monday afternoon discussions at the 

unified command at the Westin Copley Hotel, the Governor asked everyone to 
24 

put their phones down. The phones represented the pull on the senior operational leaders (by their subordinates) toward engagement with the (many and 

important!) tactical issues; the Governor wanted their attention to advise him 

on the (fewer, but even more important!) strategic issues. The attention of senior operational officials is a key resource for both tactical and strategic issues, 

so we need to develop better doctrine and associated training about how to focus 

and parse their concentration. 

(3) Developing more effective processes for quickly establishing ‘‘micro-command’’ 

at the tactical level.—While coordination, cooperation, and command among the 

senior leadership of the agencies involved was very strong during the week of 

April 15 in Boston, better doctrine and training need to be developed to produce 

similar results when lower-level officials from different agencies encounter one 

another in the midst of tactical challenges—as occurred in Watertown in the 

early morning hours of April 19 and then again later that evening. By virtue 

of doctrine and years of joint planning and practice and work on multi-agency 

events, the senior leaders of the relevant organizations for the most part knew 

one another personally and had knowledge of and confidence in each other’s capabilities—and they were able rapidly to form unified commands, both on Monday afternoon and again in Watertown in the early hours of Friday morning. 

Individual police officers arriving from other jurisdictions at the scene of the 

gunfight at Dexter and Laurel Streets Watertown had none of those advantages 

to help them form a coordinating structure. We need better doctrine, procedures, training, and practice to aid in the more rapid development of a command structure among people from different agencies arriving more or less 

independently and not under a pre-existing overarching command structure. We 

refer to this as the problem of establishing ‘‘micro-command,’’ and dealing with 

this requires that the doctrine that is now working well to coordinate agencies 

at the senior level needs to be cascaded downward so that it functions at any 

level where the agencies may encounter one another. 

The problem of micro-command needs a bit of further explanation. The issue is 

illustrated by the difference between what happened within the Watertown Police 

Department (including both officers and dispatchers), on the one hand, and what 

happened with arriving officers from other jurisdictions, on the other, at the scene 

of the gunfight at Dexter and Laurel streets. Watertown officers were first on the 

scene; they knew each other, knew their command structure, were in direct radio 

contact with one another, recognized each other’s voices, and had good situational 

awareness about where they were, where their assailants were, and what the street 

map around them looked like. As a result, they were able to coordinate their actions 

against their assailants and moved against them in a way that, considering the circumstances—they were being fired upon and having explosive devices thrown at 

them—seems to have been both coherent and largely effective. Their assailants arrived in Watertown armed with a semi-automatic handgun and enough ammunition 

to reload it at least once and with a collection of explosive devices; at the end of 

the confrontation with Watertown police, one was dead and though the other temporarily escaped and may still have been dangerous, he was no longer armed when 

he fled the scene. As a result of the ‘‘micro-command’’ structure they automatically 

brought with them to the scene by virtue of being from the same department, the 

Watertown Police Department officers engaged their assailants in an organized and 

effective way and coordinated well with the WPD dispatch team. 

Arriving officers from other jurisdictions, by contrast, did not know one another, 

did not know the surrounding area, did not have their own command structure 

present to help organize or guide them, and did not find nor did they immediately 

form a command structure that could help deploy them effectively. They were, in 

effect, forced to act on more or less uncoordinated individual initiative. To some extent, this is inevitable in the early moments of an intense and confusing engagement when people from different jurisdictions show up to help. And, to the credit 

of those present, micro-command was eventually established at the various sites in 

Watertown where significant police actions took place (of which there were several). 

In general, however, it required the arrival of very senior officers before the others 

present were able to recognize and to accept command. Some of these events involved crossfire situations that endangered fellow officers and nearby residents, so 

the need to develop an approach that will minimize such circumstances in the future is urgent. 

Let me now turn to my second message today, about the community part of resistance to terrorism that was on display last year in Boston and is on display this year 

as my daughter and Chief Deveau and thousands of others train to run in this 

year’s marathon—and yet more thousands of others prepare to make the event both 
25 

smooth and safe. It is about the community’s part in ‘‘Boston Strong’’—the local description that encompasses what everyone from first responders to bystanders to 

community members did to stand tall and proud in the face of two murderous thugs 

with terrorist intent. 

Boston Strong is not a form of hubris or arrogance or naı ̈vete ́—but a form of pride 

and defiance and resilience. 

Terrorists are, in the end, few and weak—which is, of course, why they choose 

the methods they use. We are many, and large, and strong. We could never be defeated by them—but we could voluntarily surrender to them... and we must not. 

If we cower in fear, if we abandon our commitment to a free and open society, then 

we do their work for them. We cannot defend the American way of life—which, importantly, includes our liberties—by surrendering that way of life. 

In every generation since our predecessors stood on the Lexington Green and at 

Old North Bridge in my hometown of Concord, Massachusetts—indeed, since their 

predecessors came ashore at Jamestown and at Plymouth—men and women have 

fought and some have bled and some have died to defend the American way of life. 

In the last century and a half—until 9/11—nearly all of that took place on foreign 

soil, and the Americans defending our way of life were mostly men and women in 

uniform. In an age where terrorism is an occasional fact of modern life, some of the 

battlefields are, unfortunately, now in the homeland and so the ‘‘soldiers’’ in that 

conflict now sometimes include ordinary Americans going about their daily lives. Resilience—psychological resilience by ordinary Americans in the face of the threat, 

and even in the face of casualties—therefore has to be seen as a core part of our 

defense strategy against terrorism. 

Preserve, protect, uphold, and defend—Boston Strong affirms the oath of office. 

Boston Strong says that we will defend the American way of life by continuing to 

participate in it. 

The community part of Boston Strong is a pretty good place to start in thinking 

about what resilience looks like—and perhaps about how to build it. 

Our full report contains more detail about the events and further discussion of 

the key implications and lessons about the challenges of organizing and operating 

command and coordination in events like this. For purposes of my testimony here, 

let me now enumerate more completely the main recommendations from our research: 

STRATEGIC COMMAND

• Senior leaders should participate in a unified command at the strategic level 

and avoid being pulled back into making tactical decisions and directly overseeing basic operations.—While some engagement with rapidly evolving tactical 

matters is necessary, top commanders should concentrate on working with their 

peers in other organizations to establish an integrated, cross-agency, policy perspective that looks at the big picture context and a longer time frame. 

• The management of intra-organizational, tactical matters should be undertaken 

by the next tier of institutional leaders, who should be carefully prepared in advance through training, exercises, and actual experience to assume these responsibilities during crises. 

• To help ensure leaders’ strategic focus and opportunity for effective coordination 

with peers, contingency plans for fixed events like the marathon should provide 

for well-equipped, secure facilities for top commanders to work together in the 

event of an emergency.—This command post should be close to but separate 

from the location of subordinates who manage tactical operations. 

• Organizations must develop sufficient depth of leadership so that they can rotate 

personnel regularly during extended events; otherwise, they will inevitably falter 

from fatigue.—By Friday evening, many of the people managing the overall 

event had been awake for 36 or more hours and, more generally, had been 

sleep-deprived since Monday’s bombing. Both they and their deputies had been 

more than fully deployed throughout the event, leaving no unused (rested) capacity in the system. Failure to provide for sufficient downtime for senior officials inevitably degrades their judgment, ability to comprehend information, 

and performance of even normal tasks. Allowing for regular rotation requires 

creating more personnel depth in these leadership positions. 

• Senior leaders should not to be unduly exposed to the enormous flow of raw information, lest their attention be diverted from strategic issues and problems.— 

In an event with 24/7 news and social media saturation, there is an enormous 

amount of information circulating at any given time, much of which is misleading or wrong. This stream of data needs to be filtered and organized for toplevel leaders so they can concentrate on interpretation and strategic issues. 
26 

TACTICAL/LOCAL COMMAND

• Response organizations must develop procedures and practices to better control 

‘‘self-deployment’’ by individual personnel to the scene of emergency action.— 

Dangerous situations that threatened both responders and bystanders developed at the scene of the Thursday night shootout and Friday apprehension of 

the second suspect in Watertown, in part because of an overload of individual 

public safety officers operating as individuals rather than in disciplined units. 

• Public safety organizations should develop improved doctrine, better training, 

and practice through exercises to ensure effective ‘‘micro-command’’ in crises.— 

While officers typically look for command authority when operating at a scene 

with groups from their own agencies, they are less likely to do so when they 

have deployed as individuals and arrive at an emergency site on their own. Except for situations when near-instantaneous action is required to preserve life, 

doctrine should be developed and officers should be trained to look for authority 

at a scene of mass action, even if command is taken by someone from another 

organization. 

• Improved discipline and training is needed to control weapons fire when public 

safety officers from many organizations are present.—Control over fields of fire 

and authorization to fire is another critical micro-command issue in any rapidlyevolving, high-stress, emotion-laden event. It is dramatically more complicated 

when a ‘‘sudden team’’ of people from different agencies are thrown together 

under circumstances where there is no pre-determined command structure. 

• Improved protocols and control systems for parking emergency vehicles at an actual or potential emergency site must be developed and effectively communicated/emphasized to officers by dispatchers and on-scene commanders during 

an event to prevent obstruction of further movement that may be required. 

• In complex, multi-agency events, teams of responders in the field should be structured to take advantage of both the local knowledge of conditions that the ‘‘home’’ 

organization possesses and the quantity and specialized resources that outside 

reinforcements can bring. 

PUBLIC COMMUNICATION

• Maintaining regular and open communication with the public—through traditional and social media—should be a high priority for senior officials, even when 

confidential investigations are on-going.—When accurate, frequent, official communications were absent, news and social media filled the gap, sometimes with 

speculation and misinformation. Development of protocols for crisis communication, incorporating utilization of social media, should be part of the planning for 

fixed events. This should include improving practices for dispelling widely-disseminated, inaccurate information or rumors. 

• Systems for coordinating and communicating information to families of individuals missing or injured in a crisis need to be improved, perhaps including revision of HIPAA rules governing the release of personal information about patients 

receiving care during public safety emergencies. 

PREPARATION FOR FUTURE CRISES

• Robust development, practice, exercise, and application of incident management 

processes and skills (codified in the NIMS system) greatly enhance the ability of 

emergency responders to operate in complex, multi-organizational, cross-jurisdictional crises.—The great value of common systems and the understanding that 

these produce among responders who have never previously met or worked together should not be under-estimated. They can literally be life-savers for responders and others at a crisis scene. 

• ‘‘Fixed’’ or planned events can be effective platforms for practicing incident management skills even when no emergency occurs, and they are highly useful if 

emergency contingencies materialize at a fixed event as happened at and after 

the 2013 Boston Marathon.—Skills honed at such events can also prepare responders and response organizations to perform more effectively even in ‘‘no notice’’ emergencies that may occur at other times. 

• Because coordinating multiple agencies and disciplines will be particularly difficult in ‘‘no notice’’ events, senior commanders should: 

• Themselves form a unified command structure to make decisions and implement them, 

• Identify a separate staging area to which deploying individuals and organizations should report and await before undertaking field operations, 
27 

• Establish protocols for the formation of ‘‘sudden’’ teams composed of individuals from different organizations that may not have previously worked together. 

• Community resilience should be systematically developed and celebrated.—In the 

face of the bombing, Boston showed strength, resilience, even defiance—and 

these were key drivers of the overall outcomes that is, of ‘‘Boston Strong.’’ These 

qualities are latent in many communities in the United States and elsewhere. 

Celebrating examples of community resilience—both local examples and from 

farther afield—may help to cultivate a culture of confidence and self-reliance. 

These are the central lessons that we have drawn from this difficult experience— 

from which we, with others emerge with a combination of sorrow and pride and resolve. 

So let me close where I opened: I thank the committee for the opportunity to 

present the findings of our report, I commend the committee for its historic role in 

mandating the platform from which the first responder’s part of Boston Strong 

sprang, and I offer the community part of Boston Strong as a positive model of the 

psychological resilience that is an essential part of the successful defense of the 

American way of life in a sometimes-threatening modern world. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Professor. 

Let me just say, we were all—on that day, we were all citizens 

of Boston that day. The way Boston, the people responded with resilience, with strength, was truly inspiring, I think, to the Nation. 

I am wearing my ‘‘Boston Strong’’ pin to show my support and solidarity, as well. So thank you for that. 

The Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Commissioner Davis, welcome back. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. You know, it has been almost a year, as we 

come up on the anniversary. You know, they say a man’s true character is tested in a time of crisis. Sir, your character really shined. 

You were a true leader. You were a calming influence for the Nation, a comforting influence for the Nation, in a very dangerous 

time of crisis. I can’t think of a better man at a better time than 

you, sir. 

Mr. DAVIS. That is very kind of you. I had a great team, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I know I speak for all of us on this committee to say how much respect not only we have but the Nation 

for your service and your dedication. You will be remembered for 

a very long time for that. 

You and I have talked quite a bit since that tragic day. Your response efforts were heroic and brought an end to these terrorists 

who were on their way to Times Square. 

Can you tell me, in terms of lessons learned—and, again, I don’t 

want this to be a ‘‘gotcha’’ exercise. I never intended it to be that 

way. But I always think, when something like this happens, we can 

always analyze and evaluate and determine what, if anything, we 

can do better to make sure that this never happens again. 

Can you tell me, just personally, from your background and experience from this event and your law enforcement background, what 

are the real lessons learned from the Boston bombing? 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend you for 

the work that you have done, Congressman Keating and all the 

Members of the committee that have reviewed this. I have taken 

a good, long look at the report that came out. I think that the recommendations that are broken down into four categories in the re-
28 

port are really the best steps to take to deal with any shortcomings 

that were identified. 

There is nothing in there that can’t be accomplished fairly simply. Those recommendations will cause a more comprehensive and 

effective system to protect our Nation to be put in place, and I 

think that those should be followed. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Right, I appreciate that. I was, as I said in 

my opening statement, pleased to see that the FBI has begun to 

implement these recommendations, along with the Department of 

Homeland Security. That is oversight, I think, at its best. Thank 

you again for your service, sir. 

Chief Deveau, you and I have talked about the tragic events that 

day but also the acts of heroism on the part of you and your officers, Sergeant Pugliese, in taking down one of the biggest terror 

threats since 9/11. 

What I was interested and maybe surprised to find out was that, 

once he was taken down, you weren’t even quite sure who this person was and then, after the fact, learned that he was indeed the 

Boston bomber. 

Can you tell me—and you and I talked about this. You know, always hindsight is 20/20. But would it make sense to include local 

police departments in the Boston community or in any community, 

when something like this happens, when a terrorist attack occurs, 

after the event occurs, to bring in the local police departments in 

the area for briefings and for participation with the Joint Terrorism Task Force? 

Chief DEVEAU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes, I do think so. I believe that—you know, Watertown is a 65- 

man department. You know, Boston has all the resources; the big 

cities have that. But Watertown kind of represents most police departments across the country. We have limited resources, and it 

doesn’t make sense for us to have somebody at the JTTF on a fulltime basis. 

But when something like this happens in my community or in 

any community across the country, we need to have access to that 

table and be brought into it, be updated, and play a role there. 

I think some of the recommendations that you are making in 

your report touch on that. We needed to have a seat right away, 

and there were obstacles that we had to do before we could. So I 

think there can be improvement. Your committee is helping to 

make that happen, so I appreciate it. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I appreciate your insight on that. I think 

that that is a potential future recommendation, that local police departments be brought into these crisis situations so you can possibly identify the suspect before rather than after the fact. 

But, again, I just want to commend you and Sergeant Pugliese 

and all the officers, the four behind you, for one of the biggest acts 

of heroism. You are correct; for 81⁄2 minutes, you were the best police department in the world. I would still argue that you are a 

great police department. Thanks for your great leadership. 

Chief DEVEAU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. My time has expired. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Ms. Sanchez. 
29 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Commissioner Davis and Chief, following the September 11 attacks, the Department of Homeland Security developed the National Incident Management System, NIMS, to improve the ability 

of first responders to coordinate multijurisdictional response efforts. How have Federal grants enabled response organizations to 

implement NIMS? 

Would reductions to or changes to the structure of our Federal 

Homeland Security grant programs, such as UASI, et cetera—you 

know, what the administration is suggesting is we clump everything together in an all-hazards thing and we have at it, versus the 

different programs that we have set up. Do you feel that the approach by the administration is correct? Would it harm you if we 

did it that way? Et cetera, et cetera. 

Mr. DAVIS. I can tell you from experience that the programs, as 

they are set up, have been very effective. Our ability to coordinate 

with other agencies, our ability to train on the NIMS system and 

to game it out on tabletops and in real-life situations when we were 

dealing with the sports victories and things like that in Boston, 

that money all comes from our Homeland Security grants and 

UASI funding. 

The other thing that we have is the equipment that is necessary 

to respond to something like this. Before the UASI program, our 

equipment was antiquated and not up to the task. When we were 

called to service that day, we had exactly what we needed to go in 

and clear the neighborhoods and do the work that had to be done 

in Watertown to catch these guys. 

So I think the program as it exists works very well. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Chief. 

Chief DEVEAU. I would agree with the commissioner’s comments. 

You know, in Watertown, we don’t get as much funding as Boston 

would, nor should we. But Watertown partners with 50 communities that surround Boston, and—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you are in a UASI together, or—— 

Chief DEVEAU. Yeah. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Like, in my area, I have two UASI grant recipients, Santa Ana and Anaheim, California, two large cities. But 

they work through the localized police departments to make sure 

that everybody is buying things that everybody can interoperably 

use. You know, I don’t need a SWAT thing, but if we need a SWAT 

situation, you got the right stuff over there. 

Is that the way that you do it with your 50 jurisdictions? 

Chief DEVEAU. Well, that is exactly right. It makes no sense for 

Watertown to buy SWAT equipment or a vehicle, but it makes all 

the sense for Watertown to partner with 50 cities and towns that 

surround Boston and team up. So, in my department, it doesn’t 

make sense for me to have a SWAT team, but it makes all the 

sense in the world for us to have a 40-man SWAT team made of 

all those communities, to have a rapid response team, and to have 

the armored vehicle and the tactical equipment that we can respond. 

So Watertown was able to participate with our Law Enforcement 

Council, along with Boston and the State Police and the National 
30 

Guard, and participate and be able to protect our own community. 

So those grants went a long way. 

The training that goes on, you know, you can never prepare for 

what happened in Watertown, but training makes police officers 

professional. Training, training, training—we need to do that to be 

able to perform when we are challenged like we were in Watertown. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I think my police departments are very concerned 

about all of this being lumped into one line item and also reduced, 

by the way. Whenever we consolidate programs into one line item, 

we generally also reduce at the same time the amounts of money 

available, so that makes it difficult. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

I also have a concern about—the Harvard white paper on Boston 

Marathon bombings identified communication to the public as an 

incredibly important issue. Particularly in the light of this 24-hour 

cycle, everybody is trying to put something up, all the rumors that 

go, all the things that fly, you know, and then get repeated and repeated, and America gets scared or is incensed or whatever goes 

on—social media, you know, things that we in the Congress face 

every day but, for a jurisdiction that all of a sudden has a real crisis on its hands, can be difficult. 

Can you tell me, what have you done? What did you learn from 

that experience? Have you set up different protocols of how you 

share information, what you say to the community, what you say 

to the public? How have you dealt with that? What are the lessons 

that we can learn from that? 

Mr. DAVIS. The Boston Police Department had a significant presence on social media prior to the event. I don’t think you can have 

an event and then try to stand up a Twitter or a Facebook account. 

You really have to understand how that works. 

In the years before the April 15 bombing, we used Twitter and 

Facebook to get information out. We don’t even do press releases 

anymore. We just post it on social media. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Really? 

Mr. DAVIS. The press monitors our social media account. 

What is good about that is that, not only do we speak one-way, 

you know, not only can we send information out to the public and 

to the media, but a dialogue exists on social media. So we are actually able to understand how people are—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Reacting, thinking. 

Mr. DAVIS [continuing]. Reacting to what we are saying and 

whether we are getting the real message across that we wanted to 

get across. 

It is a very, very effective means of getting information out to 

people quickly and effectively in a crisis. There was no cell phone 

usage—the cell phones shut down at the marathon because of overuse. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, we saw that on 9/11 also. 

Mr. DAVIS. Exactly. So we were able to revert to social media and 

get messages out to people, for instance, who were trying to find 

loved ones after the event to tell them where to go and what to do. 
31 

It is a very, very effective means of communicating with people 

and speaking back and forth to them. That dialogue is really critical. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Commissioner, and I also want to hear from the 

chief if you will indulge me, Mr. Chairman, if the chief will, and 

then I have just a little follow-up question to what you said. 

Chief DEVEAU. I will be brief. I think the Boston Police Department did an incredible job about getting the news out and getting 

reliable information out. I think that when the media came in, 

there was so much misinformation and I think people relied on the 

Boston Police Department to get it straight on those 4 days. 

In Watertown, we had to notify our residents at 2 o’clock in the 

morning to shelter in place, and we had a communication system 

where we could put that telephone notification out encouraging 

people to shelter in place, notify their neighbors, and that worked 

as well. 

But Boston really assisted us as the manhunt went on all day 

long to make sure the residents in greater Boston were getting the 

right information through the social media. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Just quickly, do you think that other agencies, 

other police departments, are as advanced as you are, Commissioner, and, for example, not even using the traditional media, but 

going and putting your press releases out? 

Mr. DAVIS. No, there are very few departments that do that. But 

I think it is becoming more and more of a realization among my 

colleagues and the major city chiefs that this is something that 

they should invest time in. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I want it associate myself with the remarks 

with respect to the response training. I know that the fall before 

the bombing that Boston’s first responders had an emergency response training exercise that was funded with Homeland Security 

grant dollars, and I know that made a big difference in saving lives 

that fateful day. 

Mr. DAVIS. There is no question. 

Chairman MCCAUL. With that, the Chairman now recognizes the 

gentleman from New York, Mr. King. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me at the outset thank 

you, and Congressman Keating, for the outstanding work you have 

done on this report. The time and effort you put into it really represents to me the very best of what a committee should be doing, 

especially when we have such a topic as this, which can inflame 

emotions, where there can be distortions. The fact that the two of 

you worked so well together in bringing out this product I think 

is really a tribute to the two of you, and I thank you and I am 

proud to be on the committee with you. 

Commissioner Davis and Chief Deveau and Sergeant Pugliese, I 

want to commend you for your heroic efforts that week. Professor 

Leonard, I want you to know I bring the best wishes of the FDNY, 

Chief Pfeiffer in particular, who has worked with you over the 

years and thanks to you for all the assistance you have given to 

the FDNY. 
32 

Commissioner Davis, when we are talking about what was done 

that week, first of all, and I am not just here to give tribute to you, 

I am a friend of yours, I have great admiration for you, but I think 

the calm and the confidence you projected was absolutely essential. 

But in addition to that, I thought the fact that within moments of 

the bombing happening, how you were able to call everything into 

place, securing the site, getting the ambulances, in other words, everything that had to be done was done. Chief Deveau, your men, 

the fact is they had no idea this was going to happen and you were 

within minutes involved in the gun fights for their lives and for the 

lives of the city of Boston. So that has to be a tribute to the training that went on. 

How much effort is put into the training every year? Because obviously you can prepare, but you can’t prepare. You have to have 

as many contingencies as possible and I guess hope for the best 

and then when it happens, all of that can be put into good use. 

So, again, I would just ask the two of you, I guess, how much 

training goes on? In the course of a year, how much training would 

you put into trying to provide for contingencies like this? 

Chief DEVEAU. We try to train as much as we can all the time. 

I think some of the best training that my department got with the 

regional team that I explained about is working with Boston. 

Whenever those championship parades or the celebrations took 

place, even going back to the Democratic National Convention that 

was in Boston a number of years back, we always worked with 

them. So that is kind of almost if you will training in itself, that 

we go in there and help them. So we support them. 

But we train all the time. Our units train kind-of with Boston, 

with the State police, trying to do that. I think, you know, it kindof looks like a sports team. A sports team practices, practices, practices to get it right on game day, and that is what we need to do. 

We need to train, train, train to make sure we are able to do that. 

Dollars are limited, it is hard to do, but I think we try to put it 

in the right ways, the money that we do get Federally. With Ed 

Davis’ leadership I think we have done a great job in the greater 

Boston area in working together and having that work, and that 

unified command of everybody doing it that particular day was 

based on all the training that we have done with the cities and 

towns around Boston with Boston. 

Mr. DAVIS. So there was a very specific training that occurred in 

the year prior to the marathon where we put a Mumbai-style attack scenario together and we used UASI to fund a full day—actually it was a couple of days of training. We took over several different venues in the city and played out what would happen if 

there were multiple attacks on the city. 

That was the first time we had engaged the medical people into 

the training. So that was called Operation Urban Shield. It was 

very effective because it got the medical people lined up with us. 

When we went to the hospitals and had to take over some of the 

emergency rooms because there were potential suspects there, I 

think because we had done training with them before-hand, it went 

much more smoothly. That same year we had done a Homeland Security training that came in through DHS, so two huge trainings 
33 

in addition to a continual process of training for our SWAT teams 

that happens routinely. 

Mr. KING. Commissioner, if I could ask you, we have already 

gone over the issue of the information not being shared before the 

event and that has been discussed and is apparently is being addressed, but also coming from New York I was struck by the fact 

that Dzhokhar, when he was being interrogated in the hospital, 

that is when it came out about Times Square. But the NYPD and 

nobody in New York was told about that by the FBI. 

Now, at that time, no one knew that those two brothers were the 

only two involved. It could have been a conspiracy and there could 

have been others on their way to New York, and yet New York was 

not told about it, and Commissioner Kelly first learned about it 2 

or 3 days later and he called me up on the phone asking why I 

didn’t tell him. I told him I didn’t know anything about it. I don’t 

think anyone knew about it other than the FBI in Boston. 

Going toward the future, what is the protocol if you do find a 

possible, additional attack that is being planned? Should that police department be notified? It could have been Philadelphia, it 

could have been anyone along the Atlantic coast there. 

Mr. DAVIS. I really think that we may be holding this information too closely in the interests of prosecution or having justice be 

the only thing that we think about, because in addition to justice, 

there is the issue of public safety and allowing people to get systems in place if there is a wider conspiracy. 

So I really—you know, our system is so focused on close hold and 

maintaining all the evidence for the prosecution. That is certainly, 

you know, the right thing to do, but I think that singular focus 

must be tempered with the overall safety and security of the community. 

Mr. KING. Because for all we knew at that moment there could 

have been another attack being planned in another city, New York, 

Philadelphia, Trenton, whatever. 

Mr. DAVIS. I understand Commissioner Kelly’s concern. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, commissioner and chief. Let me say about 

Chief Deveau, like others on the committee, I was up in Watertown 

to find out exactly what happened and not only did he give me a 

minute-by-minute briefing, but he stood in the pouring rain for an 

hour which was above and beyond the call of duty. Maybe you can 

get a line-of-duty disability for that. 

Thank you for coming. I thank all the witnesses. Yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask 

unanimous consent to clarify for the record in Congressman 

Sanchez’s statements that it was Dzhokhar Tsarnaev that is the 

bomber in Federal custody. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Like so many other people, I wondered what the motivations behind the attack were, how it came to be and how it could be prevented in the future. Because of that, it took me to Russia two 

times to try and get some information to see if there was a link 
34 

between the North Caucasus region, Dagestan and Chechnya, and 

if there was any connection for the motivations of this. In the 

course of doing that, I learned that authorities here in the United 

States, the FBI and later the CIA, were given detailed information 

about Tamerlan Tsarnaev through Russian security services and 

pursuing this information back home I did encounter some frustration with our own Federal agencies in that regard. 

There is a real concern about information sharing across the 

board, but there is an obvious multiplier benefit in sharing information. In the testimony before this committee this year, we were 

told that there is roughly 800,000 local police that could be utilized 

in this effort, and there is about 14,000 FBI agents. One of the sensitivities behind the lack of information sharing, at least I found 

as a DA, is a concern that as you spread information even among 

law enforcement sources, there could be leaks, and there is that inhibition. 

I would like to ask all of you, to me in your jobs right now people’s lives are in danger and you already hold very sensitive information that if that information were released in your own communities, that people could be in danger. So could you comment on 

how you have maintained that confidentiality every day, and how 

I think there is a greater risk in not sharing that information with 

local police authority? 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, since 9/11, police chiefs around the Nation have 

received Secret and Top Secret clearances so that they can be involved in the conversation around these issues, and the intent of 

that was to make sure that there was wider distribution, wider 

spreading of the type of information that would be helpful to Ed 

in Watertown and to myself when I was in Boston. So I think that 

the intent is really good and I think that people have recognized 

that that should be the way it works. 

But when you are dealing with such large organizations over a 

period of time, sustaining change is difficult. That elastic band 

tends to pop back to where it was. So besides having good intentions and having good policies, there has to be a constant testing 

of systems to make sure that they are, in fact, working, and I think 

that is where we need some work. 

Mr. KEATING. Chief, did you have a comment? 

Chief DEVEAU. Yes, I would agree. I think depending on what the 

intelligence is, it needs to get down to our level. It is our officers 

that are on the street that are interacting, and it is a value added. 

There could be more information that they are not aware of that 

the officers behind me are aware of and we can share information. 

I think we have to continue to build that trust and move forward 

and use this as an example to get better. 

Mr. KEATING. I had another question. During the whole course 

of this, this committee has tried to really have a continuum of what 

happened before with initial information, what happened during 

the attack, what happened afterwards, and I think this committee 

has done very well to fill in all those areas. There is an area that 

I still have questions about, and I want to learn about this, particularly former Commissioner Davis could be helpful in this regard, 

because there is an area, and I want to see procedurally what was 
35 

going on, and I think we could do that without jeopardizing anything frankly at all. 

There was a 60 Minutes segment just recently that was broadcast nationally about the marathon bombing and the FBI’s response that put into play for that and I learned for the first time 

in that segment that the images that ended up being the images 

of the suspects, those images were available on Wednesday. Furthermore, I recall on Wednesday there was a press conference that 

was announced for National audience, I believe at the Boston police 

station or wherever it was being held and then at the last minute, 

that was canceled. 

Now, could you shed light on what was the nature of that press 

conference being called, and why it was canceled and if there is 

some procedure in that period that took place or some steps to fill 

in that blank period I have? 

Mr. DAVIS. We did have the photographs on Wednesday and 

there was a press conference scheduled, but at that point in time, 

the FBI had taken jurisdiction of the case so they were making the 

decisions on when the press conferences would be or not. It was a 

desire among everyone at the table to be out front on this as often 

as possible, but at that particular juncture, I think there was a decision made somewhere above me that there would not be a press 

conference. But that was between the FBI and the Justice Department people. 

Mr. KEATING. You don’t know the reason behind that? 

Mr. DAVIS. I have no idea. 

Mr. KEATING. Or what happened in that 24-hour stretch before 

that there was another press conference? 

Mr. DAVIS. Right. 

Mr. KEATING. To me, and thank you for being that candid, to me 

that just goes to show one more time that maybe there should be 

more information sharing at all times during this too, because I 

would have thought whatever that period, whatever was going on 

during that period, frankly the Boston police should have known 

what was going on. 

I will just yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Keating. 

The Chairman recognizes Mr. King for the purposes of entering 

a question into the record. 

Mr. KING. Professor Leonard, the FDNY through Chief Pfeiffer 

has just asked me if I would ask this question, if you could submit 

the answer in writing. It is important to them. They have worked 

on it with you. 

You mentioned the idea of micro-command as an issue that needs 

to be better addressed in the NIMS system. What exactly did you 

mean by that and why is it important? If you could submit a written answer to that I would be very appreciative. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chairman recognizes the gentleman 

from Pennsylvania, Mr. Meehan. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank each and 

every one of your distinguished guests for being here today. Let me 

just say one thing, in addition to the way you responded in the past 

with all of your officers, I know, Sergeant, you were talking about, 
36 

and Chief Deveau, you are going to run in this next marathon, and 

the idea that it is not just how we responded in the past but the 

resolve to demonstrate to those who want to create terror in our 

communities that it is not going to happen, and the idea that the 

nurses and the officers and others are going to run 22 miles in a 

marathon is a commitment in addition. So thank you for doing 

that. 

Also I want to touch on this thing that Peter mentioned because 

I think, and I appreciate the professor’s focus on this, the concept 

of incident command was really a significant achievement. I know 

it is something that is practiced, but as a former prosecutor, I appreciate that while you were responding, Chief Davis, you were 

doing two things. The first and foremost you were responding to 

make sure that people who were injured were safely evacuated, 

and it was remarkable that within a half an hour, those people 

whose lives could have been lost were in trauma centers being 

taken care of. But at the same time, you were securing an incredible crime scene. That is the very substance of the information that 

becomes subsequently the evidence with chain of custody and other 

kinds of things that are necessary for the prosecution we are trying 

to protect. So I appreciate the concept of chain of command. 

But there really are two questions, and Peter asked one of them, 

and I would be interested in having the two chiefs and professor, 

if you have a moment. When you were making decisions and in 

that chain of command, and there were a couple of different kinds 

of things. There was a distinction between policy decisions and procedural decisions. That is where you get the command structure 

which includes those of you who know the policy or the procedures 

about how to secure a crime scene, how to keep a community safe, 

how to respond and put your officers in. 

But there is also questions. You made a determination to release 

the photographs of the two individuals. You made a determination 

to shut the city down for a period of time, to secure Watertown, a 

remarkably courageous political decision. 

If you can discuss how you distinguished between the two and 

how you worked with sometimes political officials that may not 

have the same sort of background. Then you were talking about, 

and, Professor, you focused on this micro, and that was these officers who were responding to the scene. They come, and the unit in 

Watertown knows each other, but in small communities, you know, 

it could be the next town over, Reading or Everett or somebody, the 

officers are coming in and they don’t work with these guys. So how 

do you create a structure where people are rushing in to a scene 

and the concept of being able to create an effective response? I 

think we have got after-action assessments of those kind of things 

and they are all good lessons learned. 

So if you can talk about that policy piece, chiefs, and, professor, 

if you want to take a moment to talk about the issue of the micro, 

I think it would be helpful for all of us. 

Mr. DAVIS. The procedural piece, and these are very astute observations, Congressman, and I appreciate you asking these questions, 

the procedural piece was fairly much laid out for us through our 

practicing and through our dealing with homicides, some multiple 

homicides, that occur in the city day in and day out. So we are fre-
37 

quently called to the scene where people have been badly injured, 

multiple people have been shot. Our first responsibility is to save 

lives and get them out as quickly as possible and get them the 

medical attention that they need. 

But very quickly after that, and it happens very fluidly, the 

crime scene gets locked down. This particular crime scene was complex because there was a distinct possibility that there was a third 

device there. So we were not only locking the crime scene down to 

preserve evidence, but to preserve the lives of the first responders. 

We had everybody leave the scene, leave the field after we got a 

perimeter set up until the bomb squad could go in and do their 

work. But it becomes very methodical at that point in time. 

So in the 18 minutes it took us to clear the victims, very quickly 

after that, a process was put in place, EOD clearing and then evidence collection, and one of the first things we did was tell our 

technical people to start to collect videotape. That videotape played 

an important role down the road. 

But as for the policy decisions, Mayor Menino left the hospital 

and came to the scene at the command post. He was joined there 

by Governor Patrick. So our job as police officials, myself, the Colonel from the State police, Rick Deslauriers from the FBI, was to 

give the political officials enough information so that they could get 

information out to the public and calm fears, but also make decisions around big political issues like the closing down of the transit 

system. 

Our role was to be advisors. We advised. We told our elected officials exactly what we had. At the time that the decision was made 

to shut down the transit, there were a series of events that were 

playing out that gave people the idea that there could very well be 

a broader conspiracy with other people involved. 

So there were courageous decisions made, but it was based on 

the best information that we had. We provided that to the elected 

officials and they did their job. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Professor, my time is up, but maybe you can jump 

into that because you have an appreciation for both that aspect, the 

policy decisions, as well as the micro piece. 

Mr. LEONARD. Congressman, like Commissioner Davis, I think 

you are focused on the most important question here. My message 

is, don’t take incident management for granted. It is not an accident. It takes a lot of work to build and it is incredibly important. 

What is important about it is that it facilitates the command and 

coordination across multiple agencies. Inevitably, the capabilities 

we need for these big horrible messy events are going to be in multiple different agencies, and they should be. The challenge is how 

to bring those collectively and creatively together effectively in the 

moment and that is harder than it looks. It is not self-executing, 

and it is not a natural act for those agencies to do it. So it has to 

be practiced in advance. 

It has to be worked on and developed. You pointed out all three 

levels. So there is the political interface with the strategic operational. So the Governor and the Mayor interacting with Commissioner Davis, with Chief Deveau and other operational officials to 

figure out are we going to shut down the city? Are we going to— 

the release of the photographs is really a more tactical kind of 
38 

issue. But that political issue is enormously important, and the National Incident Management System is silent on this question of 

how that is supposed to work. So that is an area where we need 

further work. That is the macro level of command and coordination. 

The micro level is what Sergeant Pugliese brought to the scene 

because he is naturally part of a system in which there is command, in which the officers know each other. That is in contrast 

to the dozens of other officers who showed up from many different 

departments at the same moment or a little bit thereafter, mostly 

after the gunfight was over at Dexter and Laurel. They didn’t have 

a natural tactical command structure, and we need to work on 

that. That is what I mean by micro command. 

So we need to work on the continuing coordination and command 

at all different levels, remembering this is the most important 

asset, and it is not a natural thing to have happen by itself, and 

it requires enormous amounts of work and development and practice ahead of time. We can do this. 

But I think for me, the most important lesson of this whole experience is that any community can do this, but not every community 

has done this, and we need to keep at that. Because Boston is 

strong and the incident management on display in Boston shows 

what can be done, but we shouldn’t assume that it is now universal. We need to keep working on that. 

So thank you for asking the question. It is an excellent question. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, before I yield back, I want to say it is frustrating as a Philadelphia fan to have to realize that you get all this 

practice because you have all these victory parades with Patriots 

and everybody else. 

Mr. LEONARD. Win the Series and you can practice too. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Commissioner Davis and Chief Deveau, the administration is 

proposing to consolidate the Homeland Security programs including 

UASI and the State Homeland Security Grant Program into one 

pool. Based on the testimony heard here and some of the comments 

in Ranking Member Thompson’s statement, quite a few of us are 

concerned about that prospect. Under the proposal, grantees would 

no longer be required to dedicate 25 percent of their grant awards 

to law enforcement and terrorism prevention. 

Do you have concerns about the proposed consolidation in reference to those grants? 

Mr. DAVIS. Congressman, I do. I think that the program as it is 

set up is working very well. I am not briefed in on the exact idea 

on the change, but if it results in a reduction in overall money, I 

think it is problematic. 

Mr. PAYNE. Right. As Congresswoman Sanchez stated, sometimes 

in those consolidations, the amount of the dollars are drawn down 

as well, consolidated. So that is a grave concern to quite a few of 

us on this committee and throughout the Congress because we 

know how those UASI and those grant programs have been exceptional, especially in an area such as mine. I am from North New 

Jersey and I have the Port Authority, I have the port, the rail, the 

airport, so the UASI grant has been phenomenal for us in that 

area. 
39 

Chief Deveau, would you like to make a statement in reference 

to that? Because it says it would no longer require them to dedicate 

25 percent of those grants to law enforcement and terrorism prevention activities, and that is what our concern is, that money 

could be deviated for reasons other than those? 

Chief DEVEAU. Congressman, I agree with the Commissioner. I 

think the current system is working and I think Boston is an example of it working very well. I think it should stay in place. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. I will yield back in the interest of time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. We certainly appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Payne. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Swalwell 

from California. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I also as my colleagues have noted 

stand with Boston and commend you for your work. 

Commissioner, you and I spoke before at this hearing and I 

pointed out that it was Urban Shield Training that your force had 

gone through, first in Alameda County, which I have the privilege 

of representing, but also an exercise that you held yourself. 

I wanted to bring to the witnesses’ and the committee’s attention 

that a year later, we still, I believe, face threats from terrorists, 

whether abroad or individuals in the United States, rogue actors 

who may be influenced by publications on the web or that they receive and are able to use materials that are readily available at different stores. 

I was disturbed to read and learn in the most recent edition of 

al-Qaeda’s Arabian Peninsula publication Inspire there is a picture 

of a young person sitting in a tram, which is used at San Francisco’s international airport, and the English translation with this 

person sitting in the tram says, ‘‘For how long will you live in tension. Instead of just sitting, having no solution, simply stand up, 

pack your tools of destruction, assemble your bomb ready for detonation.’’ 

This is one of the largest international airports in the world, certainly one of the largest on the West Coast, and thousands of passengers a day use the tram to connect from our BART system to 

the airport. I was wondering if that publication, in its most recent 

magazine, brings concern to you, Commissioner, about threats still 

existing. 

Mr. DAVIS. Congressman, it is good to see you again and it does 

bring concern to me. In the month after the April 15 bombing Inspire magazine had a whole issue devoted to the Tsarnaev brothers. 

This kind of extremist propaganda on the internet, if it is not 

countered with something, does tend to create problems for us. So 

we actually are talking about this at the Kennedy School right now 

trying to get college students engaged in putting proper information out on the web to really fly in the face of what these extremists are putting out there as the truth. 

But it goes beyond that. When you see that type of a picture in 

there, when you read about the attacks on the infrastructure 

around the transformers in California that were sniped at, it is 

hard to figure what is real and what isn’t real in this area. We 

need to be vigilant. It is clear that there is a threat and we need 
40 

to really be aware of it and do everything we can as a Nation to 

stop it from happening. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Commissioner, knowing that, at least in this 

most recent publication that the San Francisco area is depicted in 

this al-Qaeda publication, what do you think that would mean for 

local law enforcement and Federal law enforcement and what do 

you think they would need to do to coordinate efforts with the resources we provided or resources that you think may, in the future, 

need to provided? 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, the great thing about our country, Congressman, is that each of the police departments has that responsibility 

and I am sure the officials in San Francisco are looking very closely 

at this threat. But you just need to be vigilant. That is clearly what 

needs to happen. I am sure there are a series of inquiries that are 

occurring around this and what can be done to tighten up the system. That would just make a lot of sense. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Just to follow up on Mr. Payne’s, my colleague 

from New Jersey’s questioning, is it your position, Commissioner, 

that you would prefer a grant system through Homeland Security 

that is not consolidated, as is being proposed? Because as you 

know, Urban Shield and other exercises are funded through UASI, 

a specific grant, and that could be threatened should consolidation 

take place. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, make no mistake, the UASI program works because it goes right to the cities, and the problem is it gets watered 

down when it gets diverted to the State. So, yes, I think that that 

is my concern. 

Mr. SWALWELL. Thank you, Commissioner. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chairman recognizes Ms. Clarke from 

New York. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 

our witnesses for bringing their experience to bear as we sort of reflect on the response in light of the Boston bombings. 

I was a New Yorker, I am a New Yorker and was a member of 

the New York City Council during the 9/11 event and had jurisdiction in the Council over the rebuilding of the FDNY. So my question really goes to how well we have institutionalized NIMS and 

my first question goes to Professor Leonard. 

In your report you mentioned the response agencies should develop procedures and practices to better control self-deployment, 

and that is something that we New Yorkers were keenly aware of 

in the 9/11 event. Can you provide some best practices for the types 

of procedures and how do you suppose that self-deployment tactics 

may be warranted in certain situations to prevent immediately 

threats of death and destruction. How do we strike that balance? 

Is there a necessity to sort of create some space in the NIMS protocol to address that? 

Mr. LEONARD. Thank you, Congresswoman, I think that question 

goes exactly to the issue that we were trying to raise in the report. 

Self-deployment did happen in Watertown. There was also a lot 

of dispatched—many officers from many other areas were told that 

they should go. But when they got there, that didn’t mean that 
41 

they had any natural command structure to join in Watertown. So 

the Watertown Police Department is very organized in its response. 

I think to some extent, self-deployment is inevitable in some of 

these circumstances, and it is also not necessarily a bad thing. So 

it is not that we are trying to prevent that. The question is: In the 

presence of self-deployment, when have you a bunch of people from 

different agencies all arriving in a confused situation, arriving in 

sequence, because they don’t all get there at the same moment, 

what should they do? We don’t have a very good doctrine about 

that. 

We have lots of doctrine about how you can organize at the senior level, and the senior officials who arrived did that. They arrived 

in Watertown in the middle of night. Chief Deveau found Commissioner Davis and several others and they immediately began to 

form a command structure at the Watertown Mall. 

At the senior level that is all working. It is at the tactical level 

that we don’t really have a doctrine, we don’t have training. We 

can’t expect those officers to have known each other before, but we 

might be able to develop some protocols for how they could combine 

so that we get something a little bit more organized. The referenced standard for this is not that they should be able to be like 

a college drill team in a half-time show, but maybe we could provide some doctrine so they could, through training and knowing 

how to use those protocols, they could establish a somewhat more 

organized response somewhat more quickly. 

In Watertown, senior police officials on some of those incidence 

scenes were able to eventually get things organized, but it took a 

little longer than we might like and I think we could develop protocols that would help people to do that faster. 

Ms. CLARKE. Chief Deveau, from your experience, what would 

you take from your experience as to how we can best manage just 

the inclination of law enforcement and our first responders to create—you know, there is an inclination. People are just going to 

come knowing what it means to their jurisdiction, their town, their 

people, their families. What would you say would be something 

that we could move closer to creating to manage a circumstance 

like that? 

Chief DEVEAU. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think, first of all, 

that you mentioned NIMS and I think NIMS has worked. I mean, 

the unified command that we had in Watertown worked very well. 

So, as has been pointed out, at the command level, it worked because we have all been together. Ed Davis and I have known each 

other for about 15 years. So when he came walking down that back 

street in Watertown in the middle of the night we ended up being 

shoulder-to-shoulder for the next 18 hours and there was complete 

trust between us. As the other police commissioners showed up, 

Colonel Alben from the State police and everybody like that. 

I think there is a little bit of a disconnect when you get down 

to another level, when other departments start to show up from 

various cities and towns. We don’t train currently for them to start 

working together. I think we have to go back and look at that in 

our academies that when there is somebody of leadership, there is 

a sergeant or lieutenant on the street, regardless of what town or 

city he is from, he or she, if they are the highest-ranking person 
42 

in that area, then they have to have the knowledge and the ability 

to take control. 

We really don’t do that well now, and I think it is one of the lessons or takeaways that I see in a lot of people that came to Watertown that we need to do a better job in self-deployment. We needed 

those officers, but we needed to work a little bit quicker together 

and better together. 

Ms. CLARKE. Mr. Davis, did you want to add anything to that? 

Mr. DAVIS. Just briefly, Congresswoman. I think that Ed is correct that at the micro level, Dutch’s observations are exactly right. 

More work needs to be done there. We changed our doctrine after 

Columbine. Our protocols before Columbine were to secure the area 

and wait for the SWAT team to arrive. Columbine taught us that 

we don’t have that luxury anymore. So our officers are now trained 

to put together a contact team and to go in and address the threat. 

What we haven’t done is come to the realization that that contact 

team may comprise officers from several different agencies simply 

because when the call goes out, everybody responds. So how that 

team is structured and who is in charge of that team, that is sort 

of the nuts and bolts of this, I think. 

Ms. CLARKE. I thank you gentlemen and yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The Chairman recognizes Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the Chairman for the committee hearing, 

for the report and the excellent work the committee did on that. 

I will say that I appreciate you bringing up a little moment of silence for the Fort Hood shooting, and South Carolina stands with 

Texas, just as we stood with Boston last year. 

I will say for the record that the Red Sox are my AL team. I am 

a Braves and Nats fan, but as Mr. Keating and I talk about from 

time to time, I do like the Sox, 

One thing, after reading the report, Mr. Chairman, it kept coming back to me the term ‘‘stovepiping’’ and the failure of sharing 

information across so many lines that came out after 9/11 and how 

glaring that is today. The report points out that the information 

was there if the dots were connected, if the information was 

shared. I remember the testimony from Commissioner Davis last 

year about if the JTTF, your officers had been informed and would 

have had the ability to do a little more research, maybe this tragedy would have been prevented. 

So we hear a lot in this committee about lessons learned. Well, 

doggone it, I am tired of just learning the lessons. We have got to 

start applying those lessons. I mean, if we will do away with the 

stovepiping, as a government, as agencies like the FBI or components of DHS are willing to admit that they are not a fiefdom and 

they can’t just control that information and they need to realize 

they can’t be everywhere, nor do we want law enforcement to be 

everywhere, but if they will rely on the Boston police, the Watertown police, the elements in my State, whether it is the county 

sheriffs or local city police or whether it is the State law enforcement division, if that information can be more readily shared, I believe we could avert more tragedies. 
43 

So, Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to sit here a year from now or 

2 years from now and have this same conversation about we had 

all the information, we failed to connect the dots and we failed to 

let the folks that are closer to the situation let them know about 

the potential threats, because Government is large and Government is cumbersome in its response to a lot of things. Where the 

flexibility and true ability lies is on the ground with the guys that 

can actually ask the questions of the people in the local supermarkets or the churches or the community clubs or the neighborhoods. So I will get off that rant. 

But I will say although there unquestionably has been significant 

progress in 13 years since 9/11 on the issues of the barriers, the 

walls, the stovepiping and the things that are inhibiting information sharing, full partnership is necessary. 

So Commissioner Davis, I know you are not in your role as you 

were this time last year, but from your perspective could you share 

with the committee why you believe these barriers remain or if 

they do remain? Or maybe I am off base on that. I would love to 

hear your perspective. 

Mr. DAVIS. I think we have come a long way. I think Director 

Comey has done a tremendous job. He said all the right things and 

done all right things since he has become the new director to address these issues. I had a conversation with Chairman McCaul 

last night. It appears as though we are moving in the right direction. 

But the recommendations that this committee has come up with 

are exactly the way we should be going to make this a more comprehensive system. But if those recommendations aren’t put into a 

Federal code somewhere, they are simply that, recommendations. 

So if the Congress in its wisdom sees these things as good things, 

then it should be codified so that the system has to operate that 

way. Police agencies at every level follow the law, and if that is the 

law, that is what they will do. So that rubber band snapping back 

that we talked about a little earlier, it makes it impossible to do 

that. 

The other thing I want to mention is this is a story of numbers. 

If there are less than 20,000 Federal agents, FBI agents, working 

on the issue of terrorism, and there are 600,000 local police officers, 

we are a force multiplier. That has to be a recognition on the part 

of all agencies that if we are going to have a comprehensive—I 

have had the ability to work in the United Kingdom and other police agencies in other countries where there is a system from top 

to bottom, and that really should be our model so that everybody 

is working together and everybody recognizes this isn’t my ball, it 

basically is everybody’s responsibility. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me just ask you, wasn’t that the original purpose of the JTTF? 

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. I think the FBI came 90 yards down the field 

by establishing the JTTFs, but I think that there was some bureaucracy that prevented it to go over the goal line. I think we are 

right there right now. Those recommendations push it over the goal 

line. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I tell you, I sit in the stands and watch a lot 

of football games. I am a former football player and enjoy the sport. 
44 

I am glad you used that analogy. But one thing that frustrates me 

sitting in the stands is when I see the coach run the ball up the 

middle over and over and over and they are getting a yard, a yardand-a-half, when maybe around the outside or throwing a pass, an 

end-around or something like that would be more effective. The 

fans around me are hollering at the coach, why are you running 

the ball up the middle again? 

So sitting in the stands here and looking at the JTTF concept, 

looking at the failures that are pointed out in this report, I hope 

the coach, so to speak, reads this. I hope we don’t continue running 

the ball up the middle and getting that yard-and-a-half or getting 

down to the goal line and not being able to get across. We don’t 

need 99 percent. Those are the lessons learned. One hundred percent gets us across the goal line. We learn from those lessons, we 

apply those lessons and we keep America safe. 

I hope they listen to you. I hope they listen to all you guys that 

were involved in this. I hope they will read the report, the ones 

that can make the decisions. 

Mr. Chairman, you are doing a great job in pointing this out, laying out the roadmap, and we have, I think, a responsibility and I 

think we are doing a good job of telling the respective agencies 

where we need to go, laying out the direction, but not just laying 

them out, actually cranking the car up and helping them proceed 

down that road. So I thank you for that. 

Thank you guys. God bless you. May God bless Massachusetts, 

the folks in Boston, all the victims and families, and may God continue to bless America because America was with Boston that day. 

With that, I will yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Let me just close by saying, having worked 

with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, they do good work. It is a 

good model. It works 99 percent of the time. We have to be right 

100 percent. In this particular case I think there were some things 

that fell through the cracks. But it is our job not to make people 

feel bad about that, but see how we can do better in the future so 

we don’t have one of these events again. 

These one- to two-man operations are very, very difficult to detect and disrupt. That is the new evolution of both terrorism, of alQaeda, radical extremists, and that is what we need to stop. 

I do, as Commissioner Ed Davis said, I do want to commend the 

new FBI director, Comey, for ushering in, I think, a new era at the 

FBI, a model of cooperation. I have talked to him about the State 

and local cooperation. I think State and locals are a great force 

multiplier to an agency that is very resource-strapped. The locals 

know the streets. They are the eyes and ears on the ground and 

it makes perfect sense. I think it is indicative that one the first 

things that Director Comey did was to bring police chiefs to the 

table to enter into a memorandum of understanding with the police 

chiefs so that the police chiefs will actually know what their officers are doing on the JTTFs, because that wasn’t happening in this 

case. That needs to change. 

I think Director Comey’s emphasis of that, I know that his chief 

of staff is a big State and local fan and I look forward to, I think, 

a new era which I think will protect Americans ultimately and 

make America safer. 
45 

Commissioner Davis, I think your recommendation to codify 

these recommendations into law is an excellent idea. Reports come 

out all the time, recommendations come out all the time, but if it 

is codified and it has the full force and effect of law, I think that 

is even stronger. So I commend you for that recommendation as 

well. 

Just to end, I also want to thank the staff on both sides of the 

aisle for all the work they put into this report, particularly Alan 

Carroll on my staff, who has worked day in and day out for a year 

with all the relevant agencies doing a great job. 

I want to thank Bill Keating, my dear friend from Massachusetts. This hit home to you. But working together with you in developing this report, traveling with you to Moscow to conduct interviews, you and I have been joined at the hip on this report and I 

think it is very significant. 

But our heart does go out to the Boston community. As we approach the anniversary of this bombing, this tragedy, I think it will 

be a time to remember. It will also be a time to heal. But it will 

also be a time of pride, for Boston is strong. So let me thank the 

witnesses—— 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, if I could. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Yes, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to thank the staff. I want to thank you. You have 

been to Boston. You traveled every footstep of the way on these 

scenes. I want to thank you for your personal involvement. Congressman King came down to Watertown. This is very important 

to our area. It is very important to our country going forward. I 

want to thank our brave law enforcement officers that are here for 

the work you have done once again. I will say that moving forward, 

we have been working in our office on legislation which we will 

share with everyone that will make sure that, you know, some of 

the positions change, so you could have someone that is more open 

to cooperation and then he could be replaced or she could be replaced by someone that doesn’t share that same. 

So I think going forward it is important to get the laws or the 

codes changed so that we are not having another report that just 

sits on the shelf, because we can’t afford to have this kind of tragedy, and if we can prevent one of them, all our work will be important. 

Again, I turn back and again, thank the Chairman for his personal involvement in this important issue. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Let me just close by thanking the officers. 

You are the true heroes to me and this committee. I also want to 

thank you for my Watertown police patch and pin. I will wear this 

very proudly. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(47) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM HON. SUSAN W. BROOKS FOR HERMAN ‘‘DUTCH’’ B. LEONARD

Question 1. Dr. Leonard, you noted in your testimony that, ‘‘Others can do this 

too,’’ referencing the ability to replicate Boston’s effective response. In the aftermath 

of the Boston attacks, I held a hearing in my district to assess Central Indiana’s 

ability to respond to a mass casualty event. I was pleased to hear in this hearing 

that, like in Boston, there has been extensive pre-event coordination between law 

enforcement, the fire service, emergency management, and the medical community. 

How can we most effectively share these best practices to help ensure that other 

jurisdictions are similarly well-prepared? 

Question 2. Dr. Leonard, you mentioned in your written testimony that during a 

response effort it is imperative that first responders and Government officials maintain regular and open communication with the public and should utilize social 

media as a platform to reach their communities. I could not agree with you more. 

My subcommittee held two hearings last year that focused on how social media is 

transforming the way the Nation responds to and recovers from disasters. A recent 

survey showed that after a disaster 1 in 5 survivors contact first responders through 

social media. One of the challenges we discussed during these hearings was the 

amount of incorrect, misleading, and even malicious information that is posted on 

social media sites after a disaster. What best practices can we share with other first 

responders and Government officials to help them validate information posted on social media websites during a disaster? 

Answer. Thank you for the privilege of testifying about the findings of our research on the Boston Marathon bombings before your committee. I thought the 

hearing was well-designed and focused, and I hope it was helpful to you and your 

colleagues. 

I was honored to be a part of it and to appear with some of the true heroes of 

the hour—the other members of the witness panel, and the Watertown Police Department officers who responded in the early hours of April 19. 

In the aftermath of the hearing, you forwarded two written questions to me. I fear 

that the time for me to respond to them is now past, but hope that these responses 

may nonetheless still be of some use to you. 

The two questions were forwarded from Congresswoman Brooks. She asked, first, 

about how we can most effectively share the best practices of communities like Boston and her area of Central Indiana that have undertaken the necessary structural 

pre-work to build an architecture for coordinated response across agencies and jurisdictions under the National Incident Management System. 

This is an excellent and important question. As I observed in my testimony, the 

fact that multiple agencies and jurisdictions could quickly come together and coordinate their actions was crucial to the highly effective performance shown in Boston 

in the aftermath of the bombing. None of that ability was an accident; it came from 

years of hard work and practice, as well as from the efforts of DHS, mandated in 

the basic Homeland Security Act of 2002 (which originated in the House Select 

Committee that was the predecessor to the committee that you now chair). The best 

practice, as we outlined it, is for communities to take every available opportunity 

to practice mutual, coordinated planning and execution—from planning their Fourth 

of July celebration to handling local football games—by using the National Incident 

Management System as the basic planning and operational framework for every significant event in their area. 

Congresswoman Brooks’ question goes to the issue of how we can get other communities to do this—since, as I observed, while every community could do it, not 

every community has done it. I can’t give a fully satisfactory answer—but I would 

emphasize that one element of our strategy for spreading this practice is bringing 

greater attention (as we tried to do in our report) to why Boston was able to do as 

well as it did during that terrible week. These lessons need to be retold and re-
48 

peated. We are taking every opportunity to speak with public safety officials, political leaders, and community groups about the importance of this kind of practice 

and of the building in advance of the infrastructure of cooperation. We hope that 

this finding is something that you and your committee can also help to promulgate. 

One device that has been utilized to encourage practicing coordination, and that 

I think should continue, is providing grants for planning and exercises on a multiagency, multi-jurisdictional, ‘‘regional’’ basis. The requirement, under DHS grant 

programs, to undertake joint exercises and to form joint plans has been a useful and 

effective push in the right direction. 

Congresswoman Brooks’ second question refers to social media and inquires about 

the best practices for using and for verifying the information flowing through social 

media channels during crisis events. Once again, this is a very good question, with 

no simple answer. One important element is that the effort to utilize social media 

effectively should not begin at the time of the event; the infrastructure needs to be 

built well in advance. Public safety organizations need to build a trusted social 

media voice and populate it regularly during ordinary times, developing a collection 

of followers who will already be tuned in when a crisis moment breaks. The Boston 

Police Department had such an effort before the marathon bombing event, and 

many thousands turned to it in the moment; many say it was the most reliable and 

accurate source of information about what was known at any given time. This 

helped to damp down some of the less-grounded posts that were circulating from 

other sources—and this could only be done during the event because the infrastructure had been built in advance. 

As Congresswoman Brooks observes, one of the great challenges of operating in 

an environment drenched in social media—as crisis events now are—is that many 

posts from many sources are difficult or impossible to verify. Most putative eyewitness statements are by actual eyewitnesses, and most contain at least some accurate data—but some are complete (and sometimes malicious) fabrications, and even 

actual eyewitnesses are often confused about what they saw, so even with the best 

of intentions they may be providing highly misleading characterizations. Even those 

who are trying their hardest to get and report accurate information are caught in 

the inevitable fog of war. The simple fact is that there is therefore no straightforward and definitive method for determining which pieces of ‘‘information’’ flowing 

through social media channels are accurate. In general, the best we can do is to 

seek confirmation for information that seems important, and to try to differentiate 

between confirmed/verified claims, on the one hand, and unverified posts, on the 

other. Again, having a pre-established trusted social media voice for a given agency 

with loyal followers who have faith in the intentions and competence of the organization is critically important. That voice must then be operated in a way that: (1) 

Allows it to differentiate as carefully as possible between verified and unverified information, and that (2) keeps pace with the flow of information in the event. If all 

the official voice can say is that there is no verified information, people will quickly 

turn to other social media channels. This means that we can neither entirely rely 

upon, nor entirely ignore, the flow of unverified information in social channels. This 

is an area where further research and development is needed, but I believe it will 

remain (and indeed will increasingly become) difficult to manage, and will require 

operational resources devoted to it in the moment. This may seem like a diversion 

of resources that are needed elsewhere, but managing perceptions and information 

during events needs to be seen as a substantive contribution—as much as providing 

physical assistance. 

I hope these observations are helpful to you and the Members of your committee. 

I would be happy to elaborate further on any of my testimony or any of what I have 

said here, if that would be of use to you. 

Once again, let me thank you for the privilege of appearing before your committee. If there is anything you think I can do that would help advance the important work you are doing, I hope you will not hesitate to let me know. 

Æ