IN THE MATTER OF )

BOBB IE SUE LAWSON, an ) incapacitated and disabled person, )
)

JOHN MURPHY and LINDA MURPHY, )
) Appellants, )
) No. SD34141

vs. )
) FILED: May 23, 2016

SHERRY PRUIETT and )

PAMELA HALE, )
) Respondents. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DUNKLIN COUNTY

Honorable Robert N. Mayer , Judge

(Before Scott, P.J., Bates, J., and Sheffield, C.J.)

APPEAL DISMISSED

PER CURIAM. The Murphys appeal a probate

- division order that ratified

respondents’ actions relating to leases of the protect ee’s farm and denied the

Murphy s ’ opposin g motions for lack of standing. W e dismiss the appeal because t he

Murphys do not allege and we do not see how th at order aggrieve s them

.2 Background

In 200 6

, Bobbie Sue Lawson leased the Murphys her 1127

- acre farm through

2013, with options to r enew by mutual agreement for up to seven more years. During

the initial lease term, i n 2011, Ms. Lawson was adjudicated totally disabled and

incapacitated

. Respondents were appointed her c o

- guardians and co

- conservators

and have served continuously since then. 1

Separate Litigation

Several years into the conservatorship, disputes arose between the Murphys

and respondents regarding farm rights after the Murphys’ initial lease term. The

Murphys would not vacate the farm and res pondents sought to evict them. Litigation

ensued, including the Murphys ’ five

- count circuit court action against respondents

a

nd the farm ’ s new lessees

. When r espondents filed counterclaims, the Murphys

moved to dismiss them , asserting that respondents lacked proper authorization to

file counterclaim s or even to continue their protectee ’ s farming business.

Probate Motions

Two weeks later, respondents moved in the probate division for “ this Court to

authorize the actions they have taken and allow them to continue to deal with

1 The record does not indicate respondents ’ relationship to Ms. Lawson , if any

. We glean only that Ms. Lawson had given her farm manager a n instrument nominating him as guardian and conservator, but the court did not appoint him “ due to criminal charges being filed against him ” or appoint Ms. Laws on ’ s second nominee due to a

conflict . Rather

, the court a ppointed respondents

, who lived in Texas, “ to serve

without bond at this time” with certain restrictions on acting without written court

authorization. In the next four months, t he court twice confirmed respondents’ appointment and au thority to act and set a $500,000 fiduciary bond which respondents posted. Later docket entries through 2015 reflect respondents’ substantial activity on behalf of the protectee and estate, all apparently approved, confirmed, or ratified by the court.3 farming operations on the Lawson Farm and to prosecute and to defend certain

lawsuits that have arisen f rom the Ward ’ s farm property. ”

The Murphys responded with two probate

- division motions that oppose d

respondents ’ request and disputed respondents ’ authority as conservators both in

general and specifically regarding farm operations, leases, and related lit igation.

After a hearing, t he p robate division denied the Murphys ’ motions for lack of

standing and sustained respondents ’ motion. The Murphys seek to appeal th at

order.

Analysis

As a threshold issue, we must determine that the Murphys have standing to

bring this appeal. In re Estate of Whittaker , 261 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Mo.App.

2008). Otherwise, we must dismiss. Id

.

The right to appeal is statutory and it is fundamental that a n appellant be

“ aggrieved ” by the challenged ruling

. See Klagge v. Hyundai Motor Am erica

,

148 S.W.3d 857, 859 (Mo.App. 2004) ; § 512.020 (party aggrieved by judgment in

civil case may appeal). 2 Here , § 472.160 “ requires the interested person seeking to

appeal from an order, judgment or decree of the proba te court to have been

‘ aggrieved thereby. ’ ” In re Estate of Soengen , 412 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Mo.App

1967)

.

The Murphys’ assertions of standing focus on whether they are “ interested

persons ” ( § 472.010(15) ) . They never claim the order aggrieves them and we cannot

2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory citations are to RSMo 2000. Cited chapter 472 probate code provisions apply to the subject proceedings pursuant to § 475.020.4 see how it does

.

• Removal/suspension of conservators : O n this record, we fail to discern

the Murphys ’ cognizable interest in the identity of court

- appointees

who represent t he protectee generally or in litigation with the Murphys.

Cf

. Campbell v. Dir ector of Revenue , 297 S.W.3d 656, 658

- 59 (Mo.App. 2009) (litigant lacked legally cognizable interest in how

, or by

whom , his opponent was provided legal representation; also no attempt to show prejudice and only prejudicial error is reversib le).

• Ratification : Below, t he Murphy s suggested some uncertain ty whether respondents had acted on the estate ’ s behalf or personally in farm and

farm

- lease dealings

. Even if we credit this alleged uncertainty, the probate division ’ s order resolve s it

, which should not aggrieve the Murphys either. 3

Conclusion

Our inability to see how th is probate order aggrieve s the Murphys , coupled

with their failure to assert, argue, or claim that it does, effectively ends our inquiry.

We deny all motions taken with the case and dismiss the a ppeal.

3 This issue further illustrates the “interested ” vs. “aggrieved” distinction. The Murphys had suggested uncertainty whether respondents had (1) any authority as

conservators due to a failure (later remedied) to designate a Missouri agent for service of process per § 473.117.3 ; or (2) sufficient court ap proval to continue the protectee’s farming business, etc., under their initial appointment described in note 1

supra

. Arguably the Murphys thus had “an interest in knowing that the person ... who may obtain judgment against [them] is lawfully entitled to receive such money or to obtain and enforce such judgment” and they we re not at risk “of being required to pay an unauthorized person once and later be required to pay again upon demand or suit of validly appointed administrator

, ” In re Dugan’s Estate , 309 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Mo.App

. 1957) , and similarly that any judgment the y might get on their own claims would be against the “right” party

. However, the p robate court satisfied this interest by confirming respondents’ authority , a ruling that did not aggrieve but benefitted the Murphys, whose interest did not include “obtaining a decision according to some view of the law that they may have themselves enter tained, or have been advised by counsel.” State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.

Sartorius , 164 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Mo. banc 1942) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).IN THE MATTER OF )

BOBBIE SUE LAWSON, an ) incapacitated and disabled person, )
)

JOHN MURPHY and LINDA MURPHY, )
) Appellants, )
) No. SD34141

vs. )
) Filed: May 23, 2016

SHERRY PRUIETT and )

PAMELA HALE, )
) Responden ts. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DUNKLIN COUNTY

Honorable Robert N. Mayer, Judge

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur with the principal opinion’s dec ision. In a separate lawsuit, the Murphys

have brought multiple causes of action which seek to pres erve and defend an asserted

leasehold interest in the farm in question . If the Murphys are successful, such action

would provide a complete remedy for any damages they may have sustained. The

identity of the conservators (who are vested by statute with t he obligation to bring and

defend claims against the estate) is immaterial because it is the estate that will be bound2 by the outcome of th at separate lawsuit. Since the estate will be bound if the M urphys

win their separate lawsuit, no standing exists for the Murphys to appeal the denial of

their motion to change conservators.

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, C.J.

– CONCURRING OPINION AUTHOR