* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 99-50443

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GREGG HERRERA, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(P-98-CR-281-1)

_________________________________________________________________

July 13, 2000

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Convicted for possession with intent to distribute marijuana,

Gregg Herrera, Jr., challeng es the denial of his motion to

suppress, contesting t he validity of the investigatory stop by a

Border Patrol Agent that led to the discovery of the marijuana. We

AFFIRM

.2 I.

The sole witness at the suppression hearing was Border Patrol

Agent Myers. He had been stationed in Presidio, Texas, for two and

one-half yea rs, had participated in hundreds of cases involving

apprehension of illegal aliens, and had been involved in over ten

narcotics smuggling cases. Upon arriving for duty at 6:00 p.m. on

25 November 1998 (Thanksgiving), his supervisor instructed him to

patrol Highway 67 north of Presidio, and to be on the lookout for

four suspected illegal aliens last seen traveling on foot

approximately one or two miles north of Presidio.

Presidio, with a population of about 3,500, is located on the

border with Mexico. Ojinaga, Presidio’s sister city across the

border, is known as a “staging” area for narcotics and alien

smuggling from Mexico into the Un ited States. Highway 67 is the

only road north out of Presidio.

At approximately 8:00 p.m., two hours after going on duty, and

while patrolling Highway 67 five or six miles north of Presidio,

the Agent observed an older model four-door sed an northbound on

Highway 67. The sedan appeared to be heavily loaded, because it

was riding low in the rear.

The Agent began following the sedan, and confirmed his initial

observation that the rear of the vehicle was riding low. He also

observed that the sedan had dark tinted windows and a muddy film on

the back window, which prevented him from seeing the vehicle’s

interior.3

The Agent ran a registration check on the sedan and determined

that it was registered to an individual from Natalia, Texas.

Because he did not know where Natalia is located in Texas, and the

sedan did not look familiar to him, the Agent believed the vehicle

was not from the local area.

After f ollowing and observing the sedan for about 11 miles,

the Agent suspected that its driver might have picked up the four

suspected illegal aliens, and that this was the reason the vehicle

was riding low in th e rear. Because he could n ot see into the

vehicle to determine the number of occupants, he decided, about 17

miles north of Presidio, to stop

— and did stop

— the vehic le to

conduct an immigration inspection.

Herrera, the driver and sole occupant of the sedan, answered

questions about his citizenship. He then consented to a search of

the vehicle, during which the Agent discovered marijuana behind the

back seat.

I n denying Herrera’s suppression motion, the district cour t

held: the Agent articulated specific facts that gave rise to his

reasonable suspicion that Her rera might be involved in illegal

activity; Herrera validly consented to the search of the vehicle;

and, when the Agent smelled marijuana in the passenger compartment,

he had probable cause to search the vehicle.

II.

Herrera challenges only the validity of the initial stop.4 A.

The Government contends we should review only for plain error,

because Herrera did not specifically contend in the district court

that the stop was unconstitutional. S ee United States v. Moser

,

123 F.3d 813, 823-24 (5th Cir.) (although defendant preserved one

Fourth Amendment ground, his failure to raise “knock and announce”

issue resulted in plain-error review), cert. denied

, 522 U.S. 1020,

1035 (1997), 522 U.S. 1092 (1998).

The purpose of requiring that an issue be raised in the

district court is to allow presentation of evidence and argument,

and to provide the distr ict court an opportunity to rule on the

issue. S ee United States v. Burton

, 126 F .3d 666, 671 (5th Cir.

1997). Although Herrera did n ot u se the terms “reasonable

suspicion” or “investigatory stop” in his suppression motion, the

Government apparently understood the motion to rais e that issue,

asserting in its response: “Based on a totality of the

circumstances Agent Myers had reasonable suspicion to stop the

vehicle”.

At the suppression hearing, the par ties elicited testimony

from the Agent on the bases for the stop. And, the district

court’s ruling that the Agent articulated specific facts supporting

a reasonable suspicion that Herrera was engaged in illegal activity

dem onstrates its understanding that the constitutionality of the

stop was at issue.5

Under these circum stances, plain error review is n ot

applicable. Instead, we review for clear error the district

court’s factual findings, and review de novo its legal conclusions,

including the determination that reasonable suspicion supported the

investigatory stop. E .g.

, United States v. Zapata-Ibarra

, 212 F.3d

877, ___, 2000 WL 650017, at *2 (5th Cir. 2000).

B.

“Border Patrol agents on roving patrol may stop a vehicle only

if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with

rational inferences from th o se facts, that reasonably warrant

suspicion that that particular vehicle is involved in illegal

activity.” U

nited States v. Villalobos

, 161 F.3d 285, 288 (5th

Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Cortez

, 449 U.S. 411 (1981);

and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873 (1975)).

The following, well known factors are relevant in determining

whether reasonable suspicion existed:

(1) proximity to the border; (2) known

characteristics of the area in which the

vehicle is encountered; (3) usual traffic

patterns on the particular road; (4) the

agent’s pre vious experience in detecting

illegal activity; (5) information about recent

illegal trafficking in aliens or narcotics in

the area; (6) particular aspects or

characteristics of the vehicle; (7) behavior

of the driver; and (8) the number, appearance,

and behavior of the passengers.

Zapata-Ibarra , 212 F.3d at ___, 2000 WL 650017, at *2.

Our analysis is not limited to any one factor;

rather, reasonable suspicion is a fact-6 intensive test in which we look at all

circumstances together to weigh not the

individual layers but the laminated total, and

factors that ordinarily constitute innocent

behavior may provide a composite picture

sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion in

the minds of experienced officers.

Id

. (brackets, internal quotation marks, and c itations omitted).

See also United States v. Gonzalez

, 190 F.3d 668, 671 (5th Cir.

1999) (“The validity of a stop depe nds upon the totality of the

circumstances known to the agents making the stop.”); Villalobos

,

161 F.3d at 288 (“each case must be examined from the totality of

the circumstances known to the agent, and the agent’s experience in

evaluating such circumstances” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)).

Herrera contends that, because the Agent did n ot cla i m

rel iance on a belief that Herrera’s vehicle had recently crossed

the border, the district court erred by apply ing a “presumption”

that, because the Agent first observed the vehicle within 50 miles

of the border, the Agent had reason to believe the vehicle had come

from the border. He contends further that, as a result of

improperly applying the border-origin presumption, the district

court accorded improper weight to the other factors offered by the

Agent to support the reasonableness of the stop.

Irrespec tive of the validity of Herrera’s contentions, “the

district court’s denial of the motion to suppress should be upheld

if there is any reasonab le view of the evidence to support it”.7

Gonzalez , 190 F.3d at 671 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see also United States v. Moreno-Chaparro

, 180 F.3d 629,

632 (5th Cir. 1999) (“whether the agent had reason to believe that

the vehicle in question had come from the border ... alone is not

controlling and other factors must be given appropriate

consideration in the determination whether reasonable suspicion

existed”).

Considering the totality of circumstances, the Agent

art iculated specific facts to support a reasonable suspicion

justifying the investigatory stop. The Agent, who had two and onehalf years’ experience in the are a, first observed Herrera

traveling in a vehicle on Highway 67, about five miles north of the

border town of Presidio, a route well-known for illegal alien and

narcotics trafficking. The Agent had received instructions to be

on the lookout for four suspected illegal aliens who were last seen

walking one or two miles north of Presid io. His suspicion that

those individuals might be in Herrera’s vehicle was based on the

following: he thought it possible that the suspected aliens might

have been hitchhiking along Highway 67 in the area where they were

last seen, and perhaps had obtained a ride; in his experience, that

type of four-door sedan was a common alien smuggling vehicle; and

it appeared to be heavily loaded, because it was riding low in the

rear. He was unable to determine the number of people in the8

vehicle without stopping it, because of the window tinting, muddy

film on the windows, and lack of light at the time.

These specific articulable facts, and the rational inferences

drawn from them, reasonably warranted the Agent’s suspicion that

the vehicle was involved in illegal activity. Accordingly, the

Agent’s decision to stop the vehicle to ascertain the number of

people in it, and their citizenship, did not violate the Fourth

Amendment.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the denial of Herrera’s motion to

suppress is

AFFIRMED.