WEBVTT

00:00.466 --> 00:03.216
(loud whooshing)

00:18.032 --> 00:19.390
- [Narrator] The Battle of Stalingrad

00:19.390 --> 00:23.300
is considered one of the most
epic battles of World War II.

00:23.300 --> 00:24.830
Stalingrad is one of the largest

00:24.830 --> 00:26.950
land campaigns in human history.

00:26.950 --> 00:29.250
And when viewed through
the lens of the US Army's

00:29.250 --> 00:33.120
operational framework and
doctrine on offense and defense,

00:33.120 --> 00:34.940
it provides rich opportunity for

00:34.940 --> 00:37.113
professional discourse at every level.

00:37.970 --> 00:41.070
At the strategic level
operations leading to

00:41.070 --> 00:43.300
and including the fighting at Stalingrad

00:43.300 --> 00:46.080
raised questions about
whether the Germans identified

00:46.080 --> 00:48.860
and maintained the right objective.

00:48.860 --> 00:50.410
At the operational level,

00:50.410 --> 00:53.130
Stalingrad illustrates
the challenges posed by

00:53.130 --> 00:56.130
the realities of a
resource-constrained environment

00:56.130 --> 00:58.610
where requirements to
supply shaping operations

00:58.610 --> 01:01.150
detracted from the decisive operation

01:01.150 --> 01:03.460
and how increasing lines of communication

01:03.460 --> 01:05.090
creates sustainment challenges

01:05.090 --> 01:07.653
which impact operational reach and tempo.

01:08.730 --> 01:11.440
At the tactical level
Stalingrad demonstrates

01:11.440 --> 01:13.960
the extreme brutality
of the urban environment

01:13.960 --> 01:15.940
during large-scale combat,

01:15.940 --> 01:18.290
the importance of de-centralized execution

01:18.290 --> 01:20.720
and a premium on junior leader initiative

01:20.720 --> 01:23.203
as well as rapid small unit innovation.

01:24.180 --> 01:26.060
Many predict future warfare

01:26.060 --> 01:28.320
will inevitably feature complex fighting

01:28.320 --> 01:30.130
in dense urban environments.

01:30.130 --> 01:32.110
If this is the case the lessons learned

01:32.110 --> 01:34.010
from Stalingrad and current doctrine

01:34.010 --> 01:37.400
for urban combat provide
warning, education,

01:37.400 --> 01:40.730
and guidance for those who
order forces in the cities.

01:40.730 --> 01:43.020
For the leaders who plan the operations

01:43.020 --> 01:46.740
and for the soldiers who
may pay the ultimate price.

01:46.740 --> 01:48.770
The Stalingrad campaign overview

01:48.770 --> 01:51.770
covers Case Blue in 1942.

01:51.770 --> 01:54.290
It will discuss the final
advance to Stalingrad

01:54.290 --> 01:55.770
and how the city became the major

01:55.770 --> 01:59.390
German objective of the 1942 campaign.

01:59.390 --> 02:01.080
The overview will examine the struggle

02:01.080 --> 02:04.200
for Stalingrad itself
noting major combat actions

02:04.200 --> 02:05.990
across the city.

02:05.990 --> 02:08.420
Finally this program briefly covers

02:08.420 --> 02:11.830
the major Soviet offensive,
Operation Uranus,

02:11.830 --> 02:13.890
which encircled and destroyed

02:13.890 --> 02:17.010
the German 6th Army in Stalingrad.

02:17.010 --> 02:19.940
This film primarily focuses on planning,

02:19.940 --> 02:23.500
coordinating, and conducting
large scale combat operations

02:23.500 --> 02:26.490
in a high intensity combat environment.

02:26.490 --> 02:28.780
It also provides an
account of urban fighting

02:28.780 --> 02:32.380
within Stalingrad and
focuses on the unique aspects

02:32.380 --> 02:33.903
of operating in a city.

02:34.860 --> 02:37.040
It will also highlight the insights gained

02:37.040 --> 02:38.670
from the German desire to maintain

02:38.670 --> 02:41.890
a swift advance despite
the terrain difficulties

02:41.890 --> 02:43.570
and the Soviet defense measures

02:43.570 --> 02:45.843
which attempted to thwart the attackers.

02:50.470 --> 02:52.980
In the spring of 1942 following

02:52.980 --> 02:56.440
the failure of Operation
Barbarossa the previous summer,

02:56.440 --> 02:59.250
Hitler and his commanders
became less ambitious

02:59.250 --> 03:02.790
regarding their objectives
for the upcoming campaign.

03:02.790 --> 03:05.740
Instead of major advances
along the entire front,

03:05.740 --> 03:09.640
the plan focused on a single
major advance in the south.

03:09.640 --> 03:12.510
He aimed more narrowly
at an economic objective,

03:12.510 --> 03:14.990
the Caucasus oil fields
which would help him

03:14.990 --> 03:17.393
sustain the German industrial capacity.

03:19.260 --> 03:22.210
US joint and Army doctrine
advices commanders

03:22.210 --> 03:25.050
to adhere to the principle of objective

03:25.050 --> 03:27.560
and to direct every military operation

03:27.560 --> 03:31.603
toward a clearly defined,
decisive, and achievable goal.

03:32.570 --> 03:35.010
Ultimately, however, Hitler's goals

03:35.010 --> 03:38.510
for the next campaign
would not be achievable.

03:38.510 --> 03:42.540
Hitler and his military leaders'
plan was called Case Blue.

03:42.540 --> 03:45.670
The operation was to begin
with a powerful offensive

03:45.670 --> 03:48.240
by Army Group South designed to destroy

03:48.240 --> 03:50.690
as much of the Red Army forces as possible

03:50.690 --> 03:52.563
without allowing them to withdraw.

03:53.670 --> 03:56.130
Then the decisive operation.

03:56.130 --> 03:58.850
Army Group South would
split into two groups,

03:58.850 --> 04:02.140
Army Group A and Army Group B.

04:02.140 --> 04:05.550
Army Group A would turn
south and drive towards Baku

04:05.550 --> 04:08.440
to seize the oil fields in the Caucasus.

04:08.440 --> 04:11.750
Army Group B would
simultaneously advance east

04:11.750 --> 04:15.750
and seize Stalingrad
located on the Volga River.

04:15.750 --> 04:17.480
The capture of Stalingrad,

04:17.480 --> 04:19.900
though of some value for its factories,

04:19.900 --> 04:23.310
was mostly important for
its geographic position.

04:23.310 --> 04:25.690
Seizing the city would allow Army Group B

04:25.690 --> 04:28.630
to control decisive terrain
along a defensive line

04:28.630 --> 04:31.500
behind the Don and Volga rivers.

04:31.500 --> 04:33.840
Army Group B would protect the flank

04:33.840 --> 04:35.930
and rear of Army Group A

04:35.930 --> 04:38.960
giving it freedom to
maneuver in the Caucasus.

04:38.960 --> 04:40.700
The German plan for the offense

04:40.700 --> 04:42.690
reflected three of the US Army's

04:42.690 --> 04:45.690
four characteristics of the offense.

04:45.690 --> 04:47.860
It would achieve surprise by initially

04:47.860 --> 04:51.150
dispersing its forces in
a deception operation.

04:51.150 --> 04:52.750
It would then concentrate its force

04:52.750 --> 04:56.550
at the right place and time
and it was most certainly

04:56.550 --> 04:59.390
audacious in its massive scale.

04:59.390 --> 05:01.010
Due to the extended distance

05:01.010 --> 05:03.940
of the offensive operation
and massive sustainment

05:03.940 --> 05:05.650
and protection requirements,

05:05.650 --> 05:07.980
Hitler's commanding
generals found it difficult

05:07.980 --> 05:10.560
to maintain tempo which
should characterize

05:10.560 --> 05:12.070
an effective offense.

05:12.070 --> 05:14.230
Stalin and the Soviet high command

05:14.230 --> 05:16.440
known by the Russian term Stavka,

05:16.440 --> 05:19.290
decided to transition to the defense.

05:19.290 --> 05:22.060
However the Soviets made two major errors

05:22.060 --> 05:23.380
which left them vulnerable

05:23.380 --> 05:25.230
to the German offensive in the south.

05:26.170 --> 05:29.080
Stavka incorrectly predicted
the German main effort

05:29.080 --> 05:32.900
would be in the center of
the front towards Moscow.

05:32.900 --> 05:35.390
Thus most of the Soviet reserves

05:35.390 --> 05:37.057
were located near the capital

05:37.057 --> 05:39.020
and Stavka was reluctant to release

05:39.020 --> 05:41.110
these reserves to the south.

05:41.110 --> 05:44.210
Second Stalin insisted on spoiling attacks

05:44.210 --> 05:46.600
in the center of the front near Rajev

05:46.600 --> 05:49.100
and in the south at Kharkov.

05:49.100 --> 05:51.480
Both offensives failed and the Red Army

05:51.480 --> 05:53.260
suffered massive casualties

05:53.260 --> 05:55.950
with nothing to show for their efforts.

05:55.950 --> 05:59.220
For the Germans Army Group
South was the main effort

05:59.220 --> 06:02.610
executing the decisive
operation Case Blue.

06:02.610 --> 06:04.820
The Army Group initially consisted of

06:04.820 --> 06:07.060
three German infantry armies,

06:07.060 --> 06:11.000
two Panzer armies, and one Hungarian army.

06:11.000 --> 06:12.440
It was assembled from more than

06:12.440 --> 06:14.880
one and a quarter million troops,

06:14.880 --> 06:19.750
950,000 Germans, and 300,000 Axis allies.

06:19.750 --> 06:22.780
It was also comprised
of more than 1,600 tanks

06:22.780 --> 06:25.340
and 1,600 aircraft.

06:25.340 --> 06:27.460
The Army Group was initially commanded

06:27.460 --> 06:29.670
by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock.

06:29.670 --> 06:33.140
Facing Army Group South
were two Soviet fronts.

06:33.140 --> 06:34.800
Note that the Russian term front

06:34.800 --> 06:36.310
refers to an Army Group

06:36.310 --> 06:38.570
with Soviet fronts being somewhat smaller

06:38.570 --> 06:40.210
than German army groups.

06:40.210 --> 06:42.160
The southwestern front was commanded

06:42.160 --> 06:44.930
by Field Marshal Semyon Timoshenko

06:44.930 --> 06:47.398
and consisted of four field armies.

06:47.398 --> 06:49.690
The southern front was commanded by

06:49.690 --> 06:51.870
Col. General Rodion Malinovsky

06:51.870 --> 06:54.660
and consisted of five field armies.

06:54.660 --> 06:56.660
The Soviet forces totaled almost

06:56.660 --> 06:59.513
one and three quarters
of a million troops,

06:59.513 --> 07:02.763
3,000 tanks and 800 aircraft.

07:09.850 --> 07:13.460
Army Group South opened
its offensive on 28th June

07:13.460 --> 07:16.130
and achieved some impressive advances.

07:16.130 --> 07:20.240
By 7 July Col. General
Herman Hoth's 4th Panzer Army

07:20.240 --> 07:23.460
had linked up with the
6th Army near Voronezh

07:23.460 --> 07:25.320
on the upper Don River.

07:25.320 --> 07:27.420
Two days later Army Group South

07:27.420 --> 07:29.890
was re-designated Army Group B.

07:29.890 --> 07:32.974
And Field Marshal Wilhelm
List's Army Group A

07:32.974 --> 07:35.020
consisting of the 1st Panzer

07:35.020 --> 07:37.560
and 17th armies was activated

07:37.560 --> 07:40.133
to begin its offensive into the Caucasus.

07:41.000 --> 07:42.500
The Russians believe this southern

07:42.500 --> 07:45.500
offensive in Ukraine
was a supporting effort

07:45.500 --> 07:46.900
and the main German offensive

07:46.900 --> 07:49.990
would still be in the
center toward Moscow.

07:49.990 --> 07:52.570
Thus the Soviets poured reinforcements

07:52.570 --> 07:54.510
into the fight for Voronezh

07:54.510 --> 07:58.140
but were hesitant to send
reinforcements further south.

07:58.140 --> 08:01.670
On 11 July Hitler ordered
the 4th Panzer Army

08:01.670 --> 08:03.730
which had been moving toward Stalingrad

08:03.730 --> 08:06.250
to change directions and move southeast

08:06.250 --> 08:08.800
to support List's Army Group A

08:08.800 --> 08:10.640
which was struggling to secure crossings

08:10.640 --> 08:12.130
over the Don River.

08:12.130 --> 08:14.470
At the same time the 8th Italian Army

08:14.470 --> 08:18.310
arrived as reinforcements
to bolster Army Group B.

08:18.310 --> 08:22.460
After bitter fighting
Rostov fell on 23 July

08:22.460 --> 08:24.430
and Army Group A was now poised

08:24.430 --> 08:26.093
to advanced into the Caucasus.

08:27.430 --> 08:30.020
With Rostov secured, Hitler transferred

08:30.020 --> 08:33.310
24th Panzer Corp from the 4th Panzer Army

08:33.310 --> 08:36.010
to Gen. Friedrich Paulus' 6th Army

08:36.010 --> 08:39.270
in order to reinforce the
drive towards Stalingrad.

08:39.270 --> 08:42.070
Stalingrad, now seem to be developing

08:42.070 --> 08:44.513
into a more important objective.

08:49.830 --> 08:52.130
The offensive of List's Army Group A

08:52.130 --> 08:53.817
into the Caucasus region received

08:53.817 --> 08:57.710
its own codename, Operation Edelweiss.

08:57.710 --> 09:00.350
Its objectives were oil
fields and refineries

09:00.350 --> 09:03.420
at Maykop, Grozny, and Baku.

09:03.420 --> 09:05.880
This offensive faced
significant challenges

09:05.880 --> 09:08.400
to include a long tenuous supply line

09:08.400 --> 09:11.130
which stretched across
more than 1,000 kilometers

09:11.130 --> 09:13.100
of a high plane salt desert

09:13.100 --> 09:15.010
and the Caucasus mountain range

09:15.010 --> 09:18.760
with peaks above 5,600 meters.

09:18.760 --> 09:22.190
List faced many challenges
with Operation Edelweiss,

09:22.190 --> 09:24.240
mainly of which would be the allocation

09:24.240 --> 09:26.610
of combat power across his incredibly

09:26.610 --> 09:28.683
long lines of communications.

09:29.540 --> 09:32.450
He needed to simultaneously
secure his supply routes

09:32.450 --> 09:34.930
to thwart attacks by insurgents,

09:34.930 --> 09:36.660
allocate enough strength on his flanks

09:36.660 --> 09:38.980
to prevent Soviet counter attack

09:38.980 --> 09:41.240
all while still
maintaining enough soldiers

09:41.240 --> 09:45.450
and machines for his main
effort to seize the oil fields.

09:45.450 --> 09:49.370
Facing Army Group A was
Marshal Semyon Budyonny's

09:49.370 --> 09:51.853
newly created North Caucasus front.

09:52.710 --> 09:56.950
Army Group A's advance began on 25 July.

09:56.950 --> 10:00.700
By 30 July Army Group
A had crossed the Don

10:00.700 --> 10:03.920
and was making good progress
toward the Caucasus.

10:03.920 --> 10:06.510
That same day Hitler detached the bulk

10:06.510 --> 10:09.730
of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army
from List's Army group

10:09.730 --> 10:11.960
and transferred him back to Army Group B

10:11.960 --> 10:15.193
under the command of Col.
Gen. Maximilian von Weichs.

10:16.180 --> 10:18.430
Hoth's Panzer Army was to turn northeast

10:18.430 --> 10:20.740
towards Stalingrad and assist Paulus

10:20.740 --> 10:23.770
and his 6th Army in taking the city.

10:23.770 --> 10:26.030
With the detachment of Hoth's army,

10:26.030 --> 10:27.780
List received the ill-equipped

10:27.780 --> 10:30.790
4th Romanian Army as reinforcements.

10:30.790 --> 10:33.520
List tried to continue his exploitation

10:33.520 --> 10:36.110
with far less forces than he had hoped.

10:36.110 --> 10:39.020
He directed 1st Panzer and 17th Armies

10:39.020 --> 10:42.800
to advance south toward
Maykop and Krasnodar.

10:42.800 --> 10:46.880
By 10 August Army Group A had
seized the Maykop oil fields,

10:46.880 --> 10:49.700
but the Soviets had burned
most of the storage facilities

10:49.700 --> 10:51.840
and destroyed the well equipment.

10:51.840 --> 10:54.380
With supply line stretched
to the breaking point

10:54.380 --> 10:57.230
and units strewn across the
Caucasus mountain range,

10:57.230 --> 11:00.010
Army Group A became bogged down.

11:00.010 --> 11:02.300
The Germans struggle
to adequately allocate

11:02.300 --> 11:04.730
combat power illustrates the importance

11:04.730 --> 11:06.660
and difficulty in applying

11:06.660 --> 11:09.690
US Army doctrine regarding
operational reach

11:09.690 --> 11:10.963
and culmination point.

11:12.400 --> 11:15.010
Operational reach is the
distance and duration

11:15.010 --> 11:17.330
across which a force
can successfully employ

11:17.330 --> 11:19.570
military capabilities.

11:19.570 --> 11:21.950
Extending operational reach is a major

11:21.950 --> 11:23.380
concern for commanders throughout

11:23.380 --> 11:25.800
the duration of an operation.

11:25.800 --> 11:27.950
The limit of a unit's operational reach

11:27.950 --> 11:29.343
is its culminating point.

11:30.230 --> 11:32.300
It was not until 10 September

11:32.300 --> 11:36.340
that the Soviet stronghold
of Novorossiysk was captured.

11:36.340 --> 11:38.180
List also tried to reinvigorate

11:38.180 --> 11:40.370
his group's offensive further south.

11:40.370 --> 11:42.750
But the Germans were unable to take Grozny

11:42.750 --> 11:45.563
and they were never able to
threaten the faraway Baku.

11:46.600 --> 11:48.590
Annoyed at the slow progress,

11:48.590 --> 11:53.030
Hitler fired List and took
personal command of Army Group A.

11:53.030 --> 11:54.440
As Army Group A's offensive

11:54.440 --> 11:56.400
was culminating in the Caucasus,

11:56.400 --> 11:57.740
the capture of Stalingrad

11:57.740 --> 11:59.920
began to take on a greater importance

11:59.920 --> 12:02.810
as the new main German objective.

12:02.810 --> 12:04.410
There were certainly valid reasons

12:04.410 --> 12:06.120
for wanting to seize the city.

12:06.120 --> 12:08.970
As mentioned earlier it
had some economic value

12:08.970 --> 12:11.560
and key location on the Volga.

12:11.560 --> 12:13.450
Perhaps even more critical,

12:13.450 --> 12:15.640
the psychological value of the city named

12:15.640 --> 12:17.830
after Stalin himself loomed

12:17.830 --> 12:20.470
as a major influence on German decisions

12:20.470 --> 12:22.600
which ultimately committed 6th Army

12:22.600 --> 12:24.430
to seizing the city.

12:24.430 --> 12:28.230
Also as the Caucasus goals
became more unattainable,

12:28.230 --> 12:30.100
Stalingrad became an alternate way

12:30.100 --> 12:33.293
to achieve victory in the 1942 campaign.

12:39.088 --> 12:41.650
While Army Group A was
fighting in the Caucasus,

12:41.650 --> 12:45.820
Weichs' Army Group B fought
its way towards Stalingrad.

12:45.820 --> 12:48.390
After pausing in mid-July
to allow supplies

12:48.390 --> 12:51.800
to catch up and reconstitute
his combat power,

12:51.800 --> 12:54.643
Weichs renewed his offensive on 23 July.

12:55.670 --> 12:59.490
Paulus' 6th Army now
spearheaded the advance.

12:59.490 --> 13:03.369
Opposing the 6th Army was the
newly created Stalingrad front

13:03.369 --> 13:06.380
under Lt. General Vasily Gordov.

13:06.380 --> 13:08.840
His command consisted of seven armies

13:08.840 --> 13:11.170
manning a front along the Don River

13:11.170 --> 13:13.170
and south to the Chir River.

13:13.170 --> 13:16.030
6th Army made significant early gains

13:16.030 --> 13:17.480
breaking through the right flank

13:17.480 --> 13:19.980
of the Soviet 62nd Army.

13:19.980 --> 13:21.660
However the German advance

13:21.660 --> 13:24.090
overburdened its sustainment capacity.

13:24.090 --> 13:26.560
The Soviets took advantage
of this vulnerability

13:26.560 --> 13:28.650
through a series of counterattacks

13:28.650 --> 13:30.900
which slowed 6th Army's progress

13:30.900 --> 13:33.080
and forced Paulus to
temporarily transition

13:33.080 --> 13:35.330
to the defense on 1 August.

13:35.330 --> 13:38.340
US Army doctrine 3-90 describes

13:38.340 --> 13:42.230
a counterattack as an
attack by a defending force

13:42.230 --> 13:44.370
with the general objective of denying

13:44.370 --> 13:46.070
to the enemy the attainment

13:46.070 --> 13:48.113
of the enemy's purpose in attacking.

13:49.060 --> 13:51.902
Just as 6th Army's advance slowed,

13:51.902 --> 13:54.290
Hoth's 4th Panzer Army began its offensive

13:54.290 --> 13:57.360
northeast towards
Stalingrad from the south.

13:57.360 --> 13:59.290
After some initial success,

13:59.290 --> 14:02.640
the Soviets forced Hoth's army to halt.

14:02.640 --> 14:05.350
During the German pause, Stalin and Stavka

14:05.350 --> 14:09.300
representative Lt. General
Aleksandr Vasilevsky

14:09.300 --> 14:13.420
reorganized the Soviet
forces defending Stalingrad.

14:13.420 --> 14:15.760
The large Stalingrad front was split

14:15.760 --> 14:17.580
with Gordov retaining control

14:17.580 --> 14:20.690
of the new reduced Stalingrad front

14:20.690 --> 14:23.260
which now consisted of four armies.

14:23.260 --> 14:26.440
To the south Col.
General Andrey Yeryomenko

14:26.440 --> 14:29.300
took command of the newly
created southeastern front

14:29.300 --> 14:31.930
consisting of three
armies which had belonged

14:31.930 --> 14:34.250
to the old Stalingrad front.

14:34.250 --> 14:37.080
By 7 August, the German supply situation

14:37.080 --> 14:40.040
had somewhat improved and Paulus' 6th Army

14:40.040 --> 14:42.217
launched new attacks on the Soviet forces

14:42.217 --> 14:43.623
in the Don bend.

14:44.570 --> 14:47.330
Late that night a German
double envelopment

14:47.330 --> 14:49.590
met near Kalash and isolated

14:49.590 --> 14:52.143
a large part of the Soviet 62nd Army.

14:53.080 --> 14:54.270
Over the next three days,

14:54.270 --> 14:56.860
several Soviet divisions were destroyed.

14:56.860 --> 14:59.150
However others survived and escaped

14:59.150 --> 15:01.020
to the east side of the Don.

15:01.020 --> 15:03.640
Paulus now faced a difficult choice.

15:03.640 --> 15:05.840
He could maintain the
tempo of his offensive

15:05.840 --> 15:08.500
and advance directly east to Stalingrad.

15:08.500 --> 15:12.010
Or he could continue fighting
in the Don river bend

15:12.010 --> 15:14.243
to destroy the remaining Soviet forces.

15:15.140 --> 15:17.530
By advancing he could maintain his tempo

15:17.530 --> 15:21.490
and limit Soviet defensive
preparation in Stalingrad.

15:21.490 --> 15:23.650
This however would leave significant

15:23.650 --> 15:25.640
Soviet forces available to attack

15:25.640 --> 15:27.143
his lines of communication.

15:28.290 --> 15:30.340
US Army doctrine on risk

15:30.340 --> 15:33.590
provides insight into Paulus' decision.

15:33.590 --> 15:36.180
Field manual 3-0 states

15:36.180 --> 15:38.700
when commanders accept risk in large scale

15:38.700 --> 15:40.790
ground combat operations,

15:40.790 --> 15:43.080
they create opportunities to seize,

15:43.080 --> 15:45.530
retain and exploit the initiative

15:45.530 --> 15:48.380
and achieve decisive results.

15:48.380 --> 15:50.080
Commanders balance the tension

15:50.080 --> 15:53.210
between protecting the
force and accepting risks

15:53.210 --> 15:55.693
in order to achieve military objectives.

15:56.540 --> 16:00.030
Experienced commanders balance
audacity and imagination

16:00.030 --> 16:02.230
with risk and uncertainty.

16:02.230 --> 16:04.570
Paulus shows to protect his supply lines

16:04.570 --> 16:07.030
and finish the destruction
of Soviet forces

16:07.030 --> 16:08.400
on his northern flank.

16:08.400 --> 16:10.780
However this pause gave the Soviet forces

16:10.780 --> 16:13.453
a chance to prepare their
defense of the city.

16:18.340 --> 16:21.080
With Soviet forces
cleared from the Don bend,

16:21.080 --> 16:23.020
Weichs planned his next offensive

16:23.020 --> 16:26.243
to first isolate and
then seize Stalingrad.

16:27.334 --> 16:29.210
Paulus 6th Army was to establish

16:29.210 --> 16:33.870
a bridge head over the Down
near Verdiachi with 51st Corp.

16:33.870 --> 16:37.260
Then 14th Panzer Corp would
pass through the bridge head

16:37.260 --> 16:39.170
and attack along the high ground

16:39.170 --> 16:42.370
north of the Orlovka and Machetka rivers

16:42.370 --> 16:45.680
to the west bank of the
Volga, north of Stalingrad.

16:45.680 --> 16:48.810
Hoth's 4th Panzer Army was to attack

16:48.810 --> 16:50.720
towards the north and east

16:50.720 --> 16:52.320
with the aim of reaching the Volga

16:52.320 --> 16:54.880
through the southern
suburbs of Stalingrad.

16:54.880 --> 16:57.610
By this time it was clear
to the Soviet leadership

16:57.610 --> 17:00.720
that a southern offensive
was the main German effort.

17:00.720 --> 17:02.590
Stavka now sent troops to reinforce

17:02.590 --> 17:05.810
both the Stalingrad front
and southeastern front

17:05.810 --> 17:08.430
hoping to build a viable linear defense

17:08.430 --> 17:10.590
and even launch spoiling attacks.

17:10.590 --> 17:13.340
However the German offensive was launched

17:13.340 --> 17:16.750
before the Soviets could
mount any serious offensives.

17:16.750 --> 17:19.010
Hoth's assault began on 20 August

17:19.010 --> 17:21.760
and Paulus' attack began the next day.

17:21.760 --> 17:23.900
By 22 August, Hoth had forced

17:23.900 --> 17:27.400
the Soviets to retreat to
the northeast to a new line,

17:27.400 --> 17:29.130
and finally Paulus' troops

17:29.130 --> 17:32.860
had established a solid bridge
head across the Don River.

17:32.860 --> 17:35.120
At daybreak on 23 August,

17:35.120 --> 17:38.330
6th Army spearhead the 14th Panzer Corp

17:38.330 --> 17:41.320
under Col. Gen. Hans-Valentin Hube

17:41.320 --> 17:44.480
initiating their advance
from the Verdoachi bridgehead

17:44.480 --> 17:47.080
and displaced the 62nd Army.

17:47.080 --> 17:48.960
At the same time the Luftwaffe

17:48.960 --> 17:52.570
began a series of massive
airstrikes against the city.

17:52.570 --> 17:55.550
The lead elements of
Hube's 14th Panzer Corp

17:55.550 --> 17:58.100
opted to move as rapidly as possible,

17:58.100 --> 18:01.270
assuming risk without
protecting their flanks

18:01.270 --> 18:02.320
and they reached the Volga

18:02.320 --> 18:04.730
north of the village
of Renok that evening.

18:04.730 --> 18:06.970
The 16th Panzer division historian

18:06.970 --> 18:10.300
gave his account of seeing
the Volga for the first time.

18:10.300 --> 18:12.040
- [Man] And then the first tanks stood

18:12.040 --> 18:14.430
at the high western bank of the Volga.

18:14.430 --> 18:17.770
The wide dark river was
flowing still majestic,

18:17.770 --> 18:20.350
carrying barges and tow down river.

18:20.350 --> 18:22.410
And on the other side the Asian steps

18:22.410 --> 18:24.260
spread out into infinity.

18:24.260 --> 18:26.610
- [Narrator] Although the
Germans had reached the Volga,

18:26.610 --> 18:29.660
6th Army's long northern
flank was vulnerable.

18:29.660 --> 18:32.640
The Soviet's Stalingrad
front saw this vulnerability

18:32.640 --> 18:34.700
and decided to exploit it by attacking

18:34.700 --> 18:38.560
the German northern flank
over the next several days.

18:38.560 --> 18:40.630
The attacks were costly and did not

18:40.630 --> 18:42.260
penetrate the German line,

18:42.260 --> 18:43.830
but they prevented 6th Army

18:43.830 --> 18:47.300
from diverting combat
power to the main effort.

18:47.300 --> 18:49.090
The integration of counterattacks

18:49.090 --> 18:52.483
is one of the US Army's
characteristics of the defense.

18:53.540 --> 18:56.320
Defending forces seek to disrupt attacks

18:56.320 --> 18:58.950
by employing actions that de-synchronized

18:58.950 --> 19:01.250
the enemy's forces preparations.

19:01.250 --> 19:03.940
They counterattacked
to deny the enemy force

19:03.940 --> 19:05.870
the ability to exploit.

19:05.870 --> 19:07.800
Simultaneously while the 6th Army

19:07.800 --> 19:08.857
advanced to the Volga,

19:08.857 --> 19:12.910
Hoth's 4th Panzer Army
resumed its offensive.

19:12.910 --> 19:15.290
But due to fierce Soviet resistance,

19:15.290 --> 19:18.920
it was forced to temporarily
transition to the defense.

19:18.920 --> 19:21.780
On 29 August Hoth renewed the attack

19:21.780 --> 19:24.520
and advanced almost 20
kilometers to the North.

19:24.520 --> 19:27.170
The German advance forced
Soviet General Yeryomenko

19:27.170 --> 19:29.840
to order the 62nd and 64th armies

19:29.840 --> 19:33.140
to withdraw to new defensive
lines near Stalingrad.

19:33.140 --> 19:34.790
Hoth now had a chance to cut off

19:34.790 --> 19:37.470
the Soviet retreat by driving due north.

19:37.470 --> 19:39.820
But instead 24th Panzer division

19:39.820 --> 19:43.040
turned east toward the southern suburbs.

19:43.040 --> 19:45.160
The Germans now faced a major struggle

19:45.160 --> 19:48.290
to capture the city of Stalingrad itself.

19:48.290 --> 19:50.330
From 3 to 12 September,

19:50.330 --> 19:52.940
the Germans tighten the
cordon around the city

19:52.940 --> 19:54.360
and began clearing the suburbs

19:54.360 --> 19:56.300
to the west of the urban area.

19:56.300 --> 19:59.130
Weichs' plan for Hube's 14th Panzer Corp

19:59.130 --> 20:01.070
to attack Stalingrad from the north

20:01.070 --> 20:03.130
while 51st Corp, commandeered by

20:03.130 --> 20:06.290
Lt. Gen. Walther Kurt
von Seydlitz-Kurzbach

20:06.290 --> 20:10.160
was to advance into the city
from the northwest and west.

20:10.160 --> 20:13.370
However, Soviet attacks
in the Kotluban region

20:13.370 --> 20:15.770
prevented Hube's 14th Panzer Corps

20:15.770 --> 20:18.540
from participating in the
advance on Stalingrad.

20:18.540 --> 20:22.160
Therefore, Paulus reinforced
Seydlitz's 51st Corps

20:22.160 --> 20:25.513
with a division from the German
Eighth Corps along the Don.

20:26.400 --> 20:28.610
51st Corps then slowly fought its way

20:28.610 --> 20:31.550
into the western suburbs of the city.

20:31.550 --> 20:33.930
This reinforcement from the 8th Corps

20:33.930 --> 20:36.600
was the beginning of a continuing pattern.

20:36.600 --> 20:39.690
As the fight for the city
ground down German units,

20:39.690 --> 20:42.270
Paulus and Weichs reallocated combat power

20:42.270 --> 20:44.500
from the flanks of the 6th Army

20:44.500 --> 20:47.550
to support the decisive operation.

20:47.550 --> 20:51.230
South of the city, both
sides fought for the suburbs.

20:51.230 --> 20:55.440
On 9 September, 4th Panzer
Army's 48th Panzer Corps

20:55.440 --> 21:00.270
under Lt. Gen. Werner Kempf
made slow but steady gains.

21:00.270 --> 21:03.400
Later that day, 29th Motorized Division

21:03.400 --> 21:05.900
became the first German
unit to reach the Volga

21:05.900 --> 21:08.310
on the southern side of the city.

21:08.310 --> 21:12.040
The 62nd and 64th armies
were now separated,

21:12.040 --> 21:15.080
and the 62nd Army could
only receive reinforcements

21:15.080 --> 21:18.800
and resupply by ferry boats
crossing the Volga River.

21:18.800 --> 21:23.260
Although separated, the 62nd
Army was not fully isolated

21:23.260 --> 21:26.050
and would continue to sustain
its defensive operations

21:26.050 --> 21:28.490
for the duration of the campaign.

21:28.490 --> 21:31.420
This ability to sustain
defensive operations

21:31.420 --> 21:34.400
created a massive and
continuous German requirement

21:34.400 --> 21:36.650
for additional forces and supplies

21:36.650 --> 21:39.820
to resource the decisive
operation in the city

21:39.820 --> 21:43.050
and contributed to their
inability to balance combat power

21:43.050 --> 21:46.130
between their decisive
and shaping operations.

21:46.130 --> 21:48.720
That same day, on 9 September,

21:48.720 --> 21:51.550
Hitler held a conference in
his advanced headquarters

21:51.550 --> 21:54.130
in Vinnytsi, Ukraine which was attended

21:54.130 --> 21:56.750
by both Weichs and Paulus.

21:56.750 --> 21:59.780
During the meeting, Hitler
believed that his commanders

21:59.780 --> 22:02.150
would quickly complete
the seizure of the city.

22:02.150 --> 22:04.670
While Hitler held his
conference in Ukraine,

22:04.670 --> 22:07.840
Stalin removed the
commander of the 62nd Army.

22:07.840 --> 22:10.450
At Yeryomenko's urging, Stalin appointed

22:10.450 --> 22:13.890
Lt. Gen. Vasily Chuikov
as the new commander.

22:13.890 --> 22:18.420
Chuikov was unable to reach
the 62nd Army Headquarters

22:18.420 --> 22:22.110
on the summit of Mamaev Kurgan
in the center of the city

22:22.110 --> 22:25.680
until three days later on
the evening of 12 September,

22:25.680 --> 22:28.801
the night before the
first major German effort

22:28.801 --> 22:30.163
to take the city.

22:35.450 --> 22:39.380
As Paulus's 6th Army prepared
to assault into Stalingrad,

22:39.380 --> 22:41.880
there were a number of important locations

22:41.880 --> 22:44.480
that would become crucial
in the fight for the city.

22:46.100 --> 22:50.810
The suburbs, north of the
city, the factory district,

22:50.810 --> 22:53.853
each of the factories had
workers' villages to their west,

22:54.710 --> 22:56.960
immediately south of the factory district

22:56.960 --> 22:59.640
was the hill known as Mamaev Kurgan

22:59.640 --> 23:02.483
which was the highest natural
elevation in the city.

23:04.020 --> 23:07.570
Central Stalingrad was the most
modern section of the city,

23:07.570 --> 23:10.570
a showplace for Soviet progress.

23:10.570 --> 23:12.840
Southern Stalingrad, which contained

23:12.840 --> 23:15.283
the 35 meter tall grain elevator,

23:16.230 --> 23:18.583
and further south were more suburbs.

23:19.670 --> 23:23.930
Paulus's 6th Army assault
force consisted of three corps:

23:23.930 --> 23:27.440
Hube's 14th Panzer Corps
with one panzer division

23:27.440 --> 23:29.253
and two motorized divisions;

23:30.170 --> 23:33.640
Seydlitz's 51st Corps initially consisting

23:33.640 --> 23:36.106
of three infantry divisions;

23:36.106 --> 23:38.700
and Kempf's 48th Panzer Corps

23:38.700 --> 23:41.330
initially consisting
of one panzer division,

23:41.330 --> 23:44.363
one motorized division
and one infantry division.

23:45.840 --> 23:48.640
The total German strength
in the Stalingrad area

23:48.640 --> 23:51.000
was 170,000.

23:51.000 --> 23:53.450
However, this included forces defending

23:53.450 --> 23:56.400
and unavailable for the initial attack.

23:56.400 --> 23:59.700
The assault force was about 80,000 men.

23:59.700 --> 24:01.630
Paulus's plan to take the city

24:01.630 --> 24:03.250
focused on seizing the center

24:03.250 --> 24:05.743
and southern portions of Stalingrad first.

24:06.635 --> 24:10.450
Hube's 14th Panzer Corps was
to hold the northern phase

24:10.450 --> 24:13.320
of the German penetration
north of Stalingrad

24:13.320 --> 24:16.270
against continued Soviet attacks.

24:16.270 --> 24:19.970
Seydlitz's 51st Corps was to
advance from the northwest

24:19.970 --> 24:23.480
to the southeast to the Red
October Workers' Villages

24:23.480 --> 24:26.620
and seize Mamaev Kurgan and also advance

24:26.620 --> 24:29.420
to Stalingrad city center
with the goal of taking

24:29.420 --> 24:31.053
Railroad Station number one.

24:32.200 --> 24:36.040
Kempf's 48th Panzer Corps was
instructed to advance east

24:36.040 --> 24:39.210
and northeast clearing
southern Stalingrad.

24:39.210 --> 24:42.430
On the Soviet side, Chuikov's 62nd Army

24:42.430 --> 24:46.110
was an ad hoc force of
untested reinforcements

24:46.110 --> 24:48.970
and several older units
which had been decimated

24:48.970 --> 24:50.193
in earlier fighting.

24:51.380 --> 24:53.450
Chuikov had no subordinate headquarters

24:53.450 --> 24:56.573
between his army and the
18 divisions, brigades

24:56.573 --> 25:00.113
and regiments that were
his subordinate commands.

25:01.530 --> 25:04.060
Prior to the initial assaults on the city,

25:04.060 --> 25:09.060
62nd Army strength was about
54,000 men on 13 September

25:09.760 --> 25:13.670
and it had about 100 tanks
distributed in small groups

25:13.670 --> 25:14.720
throughout the front.

25:15.560 --> 25:18.370
US Army doctrine advices leaders to assess

25:18.370 --> 25:21.240
relative combat power during planning.

25:21.240 --> 25:25.010
This involves making a rough
estimate of force ratios

25:25.010 --> 25:28.023
of maneuver units two
levels below their echelon.

25:28.910 --> 25:31.120
Planners then compare friendly strengths

25:31.120 --> 25:34.040
against enemy weaknesses and vice versa

25:34.040 --> 25:36.083
for each element of combat power.

25:37.000 --> 25:40.480
During the attack, the minimum
historic planning ratio

25:40.480 --> 25:41.563
is three to one.

25:48.610 --> 25:52.400
On 13 September, at 0645 hours,

25:52.400 --> 25:56.400
a German air and artillery
bombardment opened the attack.

25:56.400 --> 25:59.760
Stuka squadrons, artillery, and mortars

25:59.760 --> 26:02.670
heavily engaged targets
throughout the city.

26:02.670 --> 26:04.340
The Soviets, in response,

26:04.340 --> 26:06.720
as they often did in previous engagements,

26:06.720 --> 26:09.140
oppose the German advance
with heavy artillery

26:09.140 --> 26:12.250
and Katyusha rocket strikes
from across the river

26:12.250 --> 26:14.270
in counter-battery fire.

26:14.270 --> 26:16.710
As they had in prior urban operations,

26:16.710 --> 26:19.400
the Germans often began
each day's assaults

26:19.400 --> 26:22.250
with heavy artillery and air barrages.

26:22.250 --> 26:24.220
The intention of these bombardments

26:24.220 --> 26:26.490
was to demoralize the defending troops

26:26.490 --> 26:29.110
and facilitate the rapid
seizure of the city.

26:29.110 --> 26:32.090
However, the success
of this heavy firepower

26:32.090 --> 26:33.680
was mixed in Stalingrad.

26:33.680 --> 26:36.030
Often, the best German advances

26:36.030 --> 26:38.330
were made after these bombardments.

26:38.330 --> 26:40.460
But due to the lengthy operation,

26:40.460 --> 26:42.960
the city turned into a massive rubble,

26:42.960 --> 26:45.093
mangled steel and debris.

26:46.010 --> 26:48.100
Rubble piles provide excellent covered

26:48.100 --> 26:51.280
and concealed positions
for dismounted forces

26:51.280 --> 26:53.763
while hindering mounted
movement and maneuver.

26:54.750 --> 26:58.420
At 0800, following the pre-assault fires,

26:58.420 --> 27:01.740
Seydlitz's 51st Corps launched its attack.

27:01.740 --> 27:04.520
The Corps made slight gains in the north.

27:04.520 --> 27:07.540
In the center, it captured two key hills

27:07.540 --> 27:11.090
and four Soviet defenders
to withdraw to the west.

27:11.090 --> 27:14.260
On the core southern flank, the
German's reached the heights

27:14.260 --> 27:17.020
above the center city
and pushed the Soviets

27:17.020 --> 27:21.306
into a developing salient
north of the Tsaritsa River.

27:21.306 --> 27:25.720
Kempf's 48th Panzer Corps
also began its attack at 0800.

27:25.720 --> 27:28.400
The Panzer Corps made
only limited advances

27:28.400 --> 27:31.063
against the entrenched
and stubborn defenders.

27:36.250 --> 27:39.540
The German 6th Army focused
its attacks on southern

27:39.540 --> 27:42.810
and central Stalingrad
for the next two weeks.

27:42.810 --> 27:45.150
The force responsible
for clearing the south

27:45.150 --> 27:47.330
was initially Kempf's 48th Corps.

27:47.330 --> 27:49.370
His plan for clearing his sector

27:49.370 --> 27:52.533
was to advance with all
three divisions on line.

27:52.533 --> 27:55.270
Chuikov's 62nd Army had several units

27:55.270 --> 27:57.830
defending the southern
sector of Stalingrad.

27:57.830 --> 28:02.670
According to a 24th Panzer
Division report on 14 September,

28:02.670 --> 28:06.250
German gains were limited
and costly in the south.

28:06.250 --> 28:09.430
Despite the limited success
in the last two days,

28:09.430 --> 28:11.330
the Germans planned for
a major breakthrough

28:11.330 --> 28:14.130
in the southern sector on 15 September

28:14.130 --> 28:16.540
using specially organized task forces

28:16.540 --> 28:19.400
called Kampfgruppe for the urban fighting.

28:19.400 --> 28:21.650
These groups were combined arms forces

28:21.650 --> 28:24.920
with added firepower, attached engineers

28:24.920 --> 28:26.930
and flamethrower units.

28:26.930 --> 28:30.620
As in Army Techniques Publication 3-06,

28:30.620 --> 28:32.680
commanders select the
right subordinate force

28:32.680 --> 28:36.640
for the mission and balance it
with appropriate attachments.

28:36.640 --> 28:39.180
High commanders do not
direct how to organize

28:39.180 --> 28:42.090
the small tactical combined arms teams,

28:42.090 --> 28:44.490
but ensure that subordinates
have the proper balance

28:44.490 --> 28:48.020
of forces from which to form these teams.

28:48.020 --> 28:51.110
The attack began at 0330 hours.

28:51.110 --> 28:53.870
And by mid-afternoon, the
Germans had reached the area

28:53.870 --> 28:56.780
just west of Railroad Station number two.

28:56.780 --> 29:00.250
After a quick but harsh
fight, the Germans captured

29:00.250 --> 29:02.703
the railway station later that afternoon.

29:03.550 --> 29:06.090
The group then left a small force behind

29:06.090 --> 29:08.520
to defend the station, while the main body

29:08.520 --> 29:11.000
resumed its northern advance.

29:11.000 --> 29:13.440
During their advance,
the German Kampfgruppe

29:13.440 --> 29:16.360
could not help but notice the
massive towering structure

29:16.360 --> 29:18.690
of the grain elevator, and were amazed

29:18.690 --> 29:21.990
at how the building dominated
the terrain in this area.

29:21.990 --> 29:26.240
From 16 to 17 September,
part of the 48th Panzer Corps

29:26.240 --> 29:29.600
turned its attention to reducing
the pocket of Soviet troops

29:29.600 --> 29:32.560
west of the railroad line,
while other divisions

29:32.560 --> 29:35.150
focused on the fight
for the grain elevator.

29:35.150 --> 29:37.170
The Germans broke Soviet resistance

29:37.170 --> 29:40.590
and southern Stalingrad
from 19 to 21 September,

29:40.590 --> 29:43.290
finally clearing the grain elevator.

29:43.290 --> 29:45.650
By 23 September, the Germans cleared

29:45.650 --> 29:49.563
the last Soviet resistance
south of the Tsaritsa River.

29:54.560 --> 29:57.260
While fighting raged
in southern Stalingrad,

29:57.260 --> 30:00.000
Paulus's 6th Army simultaneously battled

30:00.000 --> 30:03.150
Chuikov's 62nd Army in the center city

30:03.150 --> 30:04.740
and at Mamaev Kurgan.

30:04.740 --> 30:09.070
The German 51st Corps renewed
its assaults on 14 September.

30:09.070 --> 30:12.390
At midday, the Germans took Mamaev Kurgan.

30:12.390 --> 30:14.720
The loss of Mamaev Kurgan caused a panic

30:14.720 --> 30:17.730
in some Soviet units in center city.

30:17.730 --> 30:20.770
When the Germans renewed
their advance in the afternoon

30:20.770 --> 30:24.260
they were able to seize
Railroad Station number one.

30:24.260 --> 30:27.680
Later that day, Chuikov
committed his last reserves

30:27.680 --> 30:29.610
to hold the landing stage.

30:29.610 --> 30:33.070
This enabled the Soviet
13th Guards Rifle Division

30:33.070 --> 30:35.900
under Maj. Gen. Alexander Rodimtsev

30:35.900 --> 30:39.190
to ferry across the Volga in
the remaining hours of daylight

30:39.190 --> 30:42.040
starting at about 1700 hours.

30:42.040 --> 30:43.950
Crossing while it was still light,

30:43.950 --> 30:46.600
and, thus, subject to German air attack,

30:46.600 --> 30:49.740
was a risk that Chuikov felt he must take.

30:49.740 --> 30:52.120
- The arrival of the 13th
Guards Rifle Division

30:52.120 --> 30:54.420
certainly saved Chuikov's 62nd Army

30:54.420 --> 30:56.570
in Stalingrad in September.

30:56.570 --> 30:58.710
It consisted of 10,000 men,

30:58.710 --> 31:00.500
but not all of them could
come over in one night,

31:00.500 --> 31:02.390
it took several days, and they can bring

31:02.390 --> 31:03.980
any of their heavy equipment.

31:03.980 --> 31:05.220
They had to leave the artillery

31:05.220 --> 31:07.200
on the other side of the Volga also.

31:07.200 --> 31:08.940
Now they did enter the city,

31:08.940 --> 31:11.320
retake the railroad station for a while

31:11.320 --> 31:12.530
and hold some other buildings.

31:12.530 --> 31:13.890
This is crucial.

31:13.890 --> 31:15.350
And this pattern of reinforcement

31:15.350 --> 31:17.760
repeated itself throughout the campaign.

31:17.760 --> 31:19.040
- [Narrator] For the next two weeks

31:19.040 --> 31:22.640
fighting raged back and
forth in three major areas.

31:22.640 --> 31:25.060
Near Red Square in the center city,

31:25.060 --> 31:27.360
the railroad station changed hands twice

31:27.360 --> 31:29.220
while the Soviets desperately held on

31:29.220 --> 31:31.860
to the nail factory and
the department store.

31:31.860 --> 31:34.010
By 24 September, the remnants

31:34.010 --> 31:36.130
of the 13th Guards Rifle Division

31:36.130 --> 31:37.980
were surrounded near Red Square.

31:37.980 --> 31:40.160
With better knowledge of the city layout,

31:40.160 --> 31:42.370
the remaining soldiers of the 13th Guards

31:42.370 --> 31:44.410
escaped through the German lines.

31:44.410 --> 31:47.460
Just to the north, the
Germans pressed home attacks

31:47.460 --> 31:50.830
with the intent of clearing
the rest of the city center.

31:50.830 --> 31:54.270
However, the Soviets held several enclaves

31:54.270 --> 31:56.580
and one of those gained
fame for holding out

31:56.580 --> 31:59.150
throughout the remainder
of the battle for the city.

31:59.150 --> 32:01.140
This location was Pavlov's House

32:01.140 --> 32:03.870
in the Ninth January Square area.

32:03.870 --> 32:06.850
The building was named
after Sgt. Jacob Pavlov,

32:06.850 --> 32:08.860
who led a group of Soviet soldiers

32:08.860 --> 32:12.800
who took the building by
surprise on 25 September.

32:12.800 --> 32:15.520
Further north, on 16 September,

32:15.520 --> 32:18.280
Soviet troops forced the
Germans off of the summit

32:18.280 --> 32:21.270
of Mamaev Kurgan shortly after dawn.

32:21.270 --> 32:24.110
Later, a German counterattack
pushed the Soviets

32:24.110 --> 32:25.350
back from the summit.

32:25.350 --> 32:28.540
The foes shared the hill,
with the summit usually being

32:28.540 --> 32:31.620
an artillery and air ravaged no-man's land

32:31.620 --> 32:33.850
for much of the rest of the battle.

32:33.850 --> 32:36.870
Towards the end of September,
the German 6th Army

32:36.870 --> 32:40.490
had cleared all Soviet resistance
from southern Stalingrad.

32:40.490 --> 32:43.550
The Germans had also cleared
much of the center of the city

32:43.550 --> 32:46.150
although a few enclaves
like Pavlov's house

32:46.150 --> 32:48.930
and the critical eastern
slope of Mamaev Kurgan

32:48.930 --> 32:52.000
remained in the hands
of the Soviet 62nd Army.

32:52.000 --> 32:54.460
Nonetheless, the 6th Army commander

32:54.460 --> 32:56.510
believed it was time to shift forces

32:56.510 --> 32:58.250
to the northern half of the city

32:58.250 --> 33:01.360
and transition to an
offensive in that region.

33:01.360 --> 33:04.040
In shifting forces, the Germans illustrate

33:04.040 --> 33:05.680
one of the four components

33:05.680 --> 33:08.200
of the US Army Operational Framework

33:08.200 --> 33:10.920
described in Field Manual 3-0,

33:10.920 --> 33:13.870
commanders designate the
main and supporting efforts

33:13.870 --> 33:18.503
to designate the shifting and
prioritization of resources.

33:24.920 --> 33:27.040
The 6th Army planned for its offensive

33:27.040 --> 33:29.110
on the northern sector of Stalingrad

33:29.110 --> 33:32.140
to begin on 27 September.

33:32.140 --> 33:33.960
Paulus believed that 6th Army

33:33.960 --> 33:35.710
needed to clear the workers' villages

33:35.710 --> 33:38.840
to the west of the
factories before moving on

33:38.840 --> 33:41.263
to the three main factory complexes.

33:42.150 --> 33:44.800
Paulus assigned Seydlitz's 51st Corps

33:44.800 --> 33:46.620
as the 6th Army's main effort

33:46.620 --> 33:48.500
for clearing the workers' villages,

33:48.500 --> 33:51.030
and later the factories themselves.

33:51.030 --> 33:55.080
At 10:30 on 27 September,
following two hours

33:55.080 --> 33:57.630
of artillery and aerial bombardment,

33:57.630 --> 34:01.220
51st Corps began its advance
on the workers' village.

34:01.220 --> 34:03.920
In the north, elements of Seydlitz's Corps

34:03.920 --> 34:06.240
pushed the Soviets back on the south side

34:06.240 --> 34:09.180
of the Machetka River
and entered into the area

34:09.180 --> 34:12.000
north of the upper
Barrikady workers' village.

34:12.000 --> 34:15.130
To the south, task organized kampfgruppes

34:15.130 --> 34:18.290
captured part of the upper
Red October Workers' Village.

34:18.290 --> 34:21.280
However, German units even further south

34:21.280 --> 34:23.830
encountered heavy
resistance and were stopped

34:23.830 --> 34:26.930
after minimal gains near Mamaev Kurgan.

34:26.930 --> 34:29.860
The Germans paused in the
workers' village area.

34:29.860 --> 34:33.397
While there, forces cleared
the Soviet resistance

34:33.397 --> 34:35.500
in the Orlovka salient.

34:35.500 --> 34:38.050
Then, the Germans reopened their offensive

34:38.050 --> 34:40.570
on the villages on 3 October.

34:40.570 --> 34:42.870
Elements of the German 51st Corps

34:42.870 --> 34:45.340
advance through the
Barrikady workers' village

34:45.340 --> 34:47.900
and captured the silicate factory.

34:47.900 --> 34:50.120
Other Corps units advanced just west

34:50.120 --> 34:52.150
of the Tractor Factory village

34:52.150 --> 34:55.380
and in the other village
districts making small gains.

34:55.380 --> 34:58.100
However, Chuikov received a fresh division

34:58.100 --> 35:01.360
from the east side of the
Volga and the Red troops halted

35:01.360 --> 35:03.490
the German advance the next day.

35:03.490 --> 35:06.020
The Germans had cleared much
of the workers' villages.

35:06.020 --> 35:09.920
But on the evening of 4 October,
Seydlitz informed Paulus

35:09.920 --> 35:12.850
that due to overwhelming
losses of men and equipment

35:12.850 --> 35:16.810
his Corps could no longer
engage in offensive operations.

35:16.810 --> 35:19.990
The Germans entered into a
pause and offensive operations

35:19.990 --> 35:23.160
for a full 10 days until 14 October

35:23.160 --> 35:26.040
in order to regroup and resupply.

35:26.040 --> 35:29.383
US Army Field Manual 3-90-1

35:29.383 --> 35:32.410
describes what the Germans experienced.

35:32.410 --> 35:35.390
Usually, offensive actions lose momentum

35:35.390 --> 35:38.450
when friendly forces encounter
heavily defended areas

35:38.450 --> 35:40.550
that cannot be bypassed.

35:40.550 --> 35:42.440
They also reach a culminating point

35:42.440 --> 35:46.420
when the resupply of fuel,
ammunition and other supplies

35:46.420 --> 35:49.020
fails to keep up with expenditures.

35:49.020 --> 35:51.400
Soldiers become physically exhausted,

35:51.400 --> 35:54.080
casualties and equipment losses mount,

35:54.080 --> 35:57.010
and repairs and replacements
do not keep pace

35:57.010 --> 35:59.500
with damage and losses.

35:59.500 --> 36:03.160
In some cases, the unit
can regain its momentum,

36:03.160 --> 36:05.970
but this only happens
after difficult fighting

36:05.970 --> 36:07.970
or an operational pause.

36:07.970 --> 36:10.970
During the lull, Weichs
reinforced the 6th Army

36:10.970 --> 36:13.260
at Stalingrad with two divisions

36:13.260 --> 36:15.133
from units outside of the city.

36:16.100 --> 36:18.000
Even with these reinforcements,

36:18.000 --> 36:20.470
Paulus was attacking with
units which had suffered

36:20.470 --> 36:23.520
devastating losses in
the overall campaign,

36:23.520 --> 36:26.360
and in particular, in
the fight for the city.

36:26.360 --> 36:29.920
The divisions of 51st Corps,
which had already been engaged

36:29.920 --> 36:32.213
in the city fight were only able to field

36:32.213 --> 36:37.060
1,700 to 2100 soldiers out
of an authorized strength

36:37.060 --> 36:39.693
of 4,500 to 6,300.

36:40.730 --> 36:44.300
24th Panzer Division was
down to 20 to 30 tanks

36:44.300 --> 36:47.030
out of 103 authorized.

36:47.030 --> 36:48.970
The reinforcing infantry division

36:48.970 --> 36:53.030
was only slightly better
off with just over 4,000 men

36:53.030 --> 36:55.200
while the newly assigned Panzer Division

36:55.200 --> 36:58.500
added 35 to 45 tanks.

36:58.500 --> 37:03.010
Chuikov's 62nd Army had also
suffered enormous losses.

37:03.010 --> 37:05.010
For the upcoming factory fight,

37:05.010 --> 37:08.340
his division's averaged
about 3,000 men each

37:08.340 --> 37:11.780
out of an authorized strength of 10,500.

37:11.780 --> 37:15.060
He had about 40 tanks to
use in the factory defense,

37:15.060 --> 37:17.400
almost all of which were light tanks.

37:17.400 --> 37:19.330
Counting on his reinforcements,

37:19.330 --> 37:21.740
Paulus was ready to enter what he hoped

37:21.740 --> 37:25.160
would be the final phase of
his attack on Stalingrad.

37:25.160 --> 37:28.160
Once again the 51st Corps
was the main effort.

37:28.160 --> 37:29.820
It was to attack northeast

37:29.820 --> 37:31.830
through the lower Tractor Factory village

37:31.830 --> 37:35.540
into the factory and to the
Machetka and Volga rivers.

37:35.540 --> 37:40.540
The German offensive began
on 14 October at 0730 hours.

37:40.650 --> 37:43.290
By early afternoon, the
Germans had advanced

37:43.290 --> 37:45.960
deep into the Tractor Factory complex.

37:45.960 --> 37:47.680
Fighting continued throughout the night

37:47.680 --> 37:50.490
and into the morning hours of 15 October

37:50.490 --> 37:52.130
with the Germans clearing the remainder

37:52.130 --> 37:55.563
of the factory complex
by the end of 15 October.

38:04.700 --> 38:06.540
On the evening of 15 October,

38:06.540 --> 38:09.460
Paulus ordered Seydlitz
to regroup his forces

38:09.460 --> 38:11.247
and reorient south to attack

38:11.247 --> 38:14.100
the Barrikady Factory the next day.

38:14.100 --> 38:18.110
At 0800 on 16 October,
51st Corps offensive

38:18.110 --> 38:21.000
in the Barrikady Factory district began.

38:21.000 --> 38:24.440
Initially, well-placed dug-in Soviet tanks

38:24.440 --> 38:26.360
halted the German advance.

38:26.360 --> 38:29.470
However, by 1600, the German Panzers

38:29.470 --> 38:31.850
had destroyed many of the Soviet tanks

38:31.850 --> 38:35.740
and advanced into the north
end of the Barrikady Factory.

38:35.740 --> 38:39.140
By nightfall, almost half
of the Barrikady Factory

38:39.140 --> 38:41.220
was in Seydlitz's hands.

38:41.220 --> 38:42.840
The Germans continued their assaults

38:42.840 --> 38:46.190
on the Barrikady Factory on 17 October.

38:46.190 --> 38:48.930
Over the next two days,
the Germans slowly cleared

38:48.930 --> 38:52.020
most of the buildings in
the Barrikady complex.

38:52.020 --> 38:54.220
Seydlitz's plan for new assaults,

38:54.220 --> 38:57.360
but heavy rain slowed the
movement of German supplies

38:57.360 --> 38:59.340
and prevented the launch of new attacks

38:59.340 --> 39:01.410
for the next four days.

39:01.410 --> 39:04.390
During this time, Paulus
received a fresh division

39:04.390 --> 39:06.510
to use in his assaults and make up

39:06.510 --> 39:08.160
for the devastating losses

39:08.160 --> 39:10.290
that his other divisions had suffered.

39:10.290 --> 39:13.090
While 62nd Army continued
to draw German forces

39:13.090 --> 39:16.140
into the battle at
Stalingrad, Stavka planned

39:16.140 --> 39:19.810
for Operation Uranus, a
vast double envelopment

39:19.810 --> 39:23.660
designed to trap and destroy
6th Army in the city.

39:23.660 --> 39:25.180
Paulus renewed the German attack

39:25.180 --> 39:27.960
in the factory region on 23 October.

39:27.960 --> 39:30.710
In the Barrikady area, one German division

39:30.710 --> 39:33.020
made little progress against the Soviet's

39:33.020 --> 39:36.163
defending the southern halls
of the Barrikady complex.

39:37.047 --> 39:39.200
In the Red October Factory complex,

39:39.200 --> 39:42.920
Seydlitz's fresh division
made good initial gains.

39:42.920 --> 39:45.520
Over the next two days,
the Germans continued

39:45.520 --> 39:48.500
to press their attacks on both factories.

39:48.500 --> 39:50.480
They succeeded in clearing almost all

39:50.480 --> 39:53.190
of the Barrikady buildings
but could not overcome

39:53.190 --> 39:57.180
the Soviet resistance, south
and east of the complex.

39:57.180 --> 39:58.900
The Germans also cleared a bulk

39:58.900 --> 40:01.140
of the Red October Factory buildings

40:01.140 --> 40:04.260
but they could not clear
the massive Martinovsky shop

40:04.260 --> 40:06.150
where the Soviet defenders held on

40:06.150 --> 40:08.470
with vicious determination.

40:08.470 --> 40:11.380
Over the next eight days,
the attacks on the factories

40:11.380 --> 40:14.863
were small in scale as
each side lacked manpower.

40:15.720 --> 40:18.930
Then, on 3 November, Weichs and Paulus

40:18.930 --> 40:21.510
began preparations for a new operation

40:21.510 --> 40:23.630
called Operation Hubertus.

40:23.630 --> 40:25.560
The 6th Army commander realized

40:25.560 --> 40:27.460
that his existing forces were unable

40:27.460 --> 40:29.640
to conduct further major attacks.

40:29.640 --> 40:31.150
And the Germans decided to bring in

40:31.150 --> 40:33.690
assault pioneer battalions
from other units

40:33.690 --> 40:35.780
in Army Group B to reinforce

40:35.780 --> 40:39.110
the 6th Army's final
assault on Stalingrad.

40:39.110 --> 40:44.110
The operation began on 11
November at 0340 hours.

40:44.230 --> 40:45.520
Although they were able to seize

40:45.520 --> 40:48.720
the massive Commissar's House
near the Barrikady Factory

40:48.720 --> 40:52.380
and penetrate the Volga River,
the Germans could not destroy

40:52.380 --> 40:54.460
the remainder of Chuikov's forces

40:54.460 --> 40:57.230
who grimly hung to their enclaves.

40:57.230 --> 41:00.490
On 18 November, the
Germans made slight gains

41:00.490 --> 41:02.780
and what amounted to be the last advance

41:02.780 --> 41:06.350
of the 6th Army in Stalingrad
before Operation Uranus

41:06.350 --> 41:09.803
forced the 6th Army to
transition to the defense.

41:15.660 --> 41:19.010
In September, while the Germans
were still advancing east,

41:19.010 --> 41:22.130
Zhukov and Vasilevsky
gained approval from Stalin

41:22.130 --> 41:24.030
for Operation Uranus.

41:24.030 --> 41:26.220
The plan called for the Voronezh Front

41:26.220 --> 41:28.560
to secretly assemble strong forces

41:28.560 --> 41:31.800
behind the Serafimovich
and Kletskaya bridgeheads

41:31.800 --> 41:33.450
and then attack 6th Army's

41:33.450 --> 41:36.620
and 4th Panzer Army's rear areas.

41:36.620 --> 41:40.760
As part of the plan, the Soviets
reorganized their forces.

41:40.760 --> 41:43.910
The Old Stalingrad Front
received a new commander

41:43.910 --> 41:46.760
and was redesignated as the Don Front.

41:46.760 --> 41:50.200
While the Southeastern Front
became the New Stalingrad Front

41:50.200 --> 41:53.340
with Yeryomenko remaining
as its commander.

41:53.340 --> 41:56.060
The New Stalingrad Front
was to assemble its forces

41:56.060 --> 41:58.360
for an offensive on the Sarpa Lakes region

41:58.360 --> 41:59.970
south of Stalingrad.

41:59.970 --> 42:02.400
These forces would advance west and north

42:02.400 --> 42:06.210
to link up with the advancing
forces of the Voronezh Front.

42:06.210 --> 42:08.560
The gathering Soviet forces both north

42:08.560 --> 42:11.700
and south of Stalingrad
were successfully concealed

42:11.700 --> 42:13.080
from the Germans.

42:13.080 --> 42:15.170
Military deception and the choice

42:15.170 --> 42:17.470
of an unexpected direction or time

42:17.470 --> 42:19.390
for conducting offensive tasks

42:19.390 --> 42:22.000
can result in the enemy being surprised.

42:22.000 --> 42:24.490
Surprise delays enemy reactions,

42:24.490 --> 42:27.330
overloads and confuses
enemy command and control,

42:27.330 --> 42:30.810
induces psychological shock
and reduces the coherence

42:30.810 --> 42:32.730
of the enemy's defenses.

42:32.730 --> 42:35.870
The rapid penetration and
destruction of the weak

42:35.870 --> 42:38.630
and less trained 3rd
and 4th Romanian armies

42:38.630 --> 42:41.690
on the 6th Army's flanks
would enable the encirclement

42:41.690 --> 42:46.140
of the Axis forces near and in Stalingrad.

42:46.140 --> 42:49.480
US Army doctrine describes
this form of maneuver

42:49.480 --> 42:51.351
as a double envelopment.

42:51.351 --> 42:54.340
A double envelopment becomes
an encirclement operation

42:54.340 --> 42:56.960
when one force losses
its freedom of maneuver

42:56.960 --> 42:59.630
because an opposing force
is able to isolate it

42:59.630 --> 43:02.560
by controlling all ground
lines of communication

43:02.560 --> 43:04.390
and reinforcement.

43:04.390 --> 43:07.760
For Operation Uranus,
Vasilevsky had command

43:07.760 --> 43:11.570
of three fronts consisting
of 700,000 troops

43:11.570 --> 43:14.550
and 1,400 tanks.

43:14.550 --> 43:16.910
With all of his forces finally in place

43:16.910 --> 43:21.910
at 0720 on 19 November,
Operation Uranus began.

43:22.180 --> 43:24.730
Soviet artillery began
an 80-minute barrage

43:24.730 --> 43:26.570
of the Axis positions.

43:26.570 --> 43:30.290
Then, the units of the
southwestern and Don Fronts

43:30.290 --> 43:33.100
attacked along a 300 kilometer sector

43:33.100 --> 43:36.580
north and northwest of Stalingrad.

43:36.580 --> 43:39.210
Southwestern Front's 1st Guards Army

43:39.210 --> 43:40.910
attacked along the boundary

43:40.910 --> 43:43.210
of the 8th Italian Army in the north

43:43.210 --> 43:45.510
to fix that element in place.

43:45.510 --> 43:48.460
In the center, the Soviet 5th Tank Army

43:48.460 --> 43:51.550
attacked the northern flank
of the 3rd Romanian Army.

43:51.550 --> 43:55.690
The Soviet 21st Army,
Southwestern Front's main effort,

43:55.690 --> 43:58.880
attacked the southern flank
of the 3rd Romanian Army.

43:58.880 --> 44:01.750
The Soviets chose to attack
the Romanian positions

44:01.750 --> 44:04.600
due to their lack of
training, outdated equipment

44:04.600 --> 44:06.550
and poor defensive terrain.

44:06.550 --> 44:10.172
Outnumbered, the Romanian
defenses rapidly collapsed.

44:10.172 --> 44:14.710
By noon, the Soviet 21st Army
had achieved a breakthrough

44:14.710 --> 44:17.560
and was heading for the
6th Army's rear areas

44:17.560 --> 44:19.240
and towards Kalach.

44:19.240 --> 44:21.500
The commander's decisive operation,

44:21.500 --> 44:22.980
avoids the enemy's strength,

44:22.980 --> 44:24.880
where the effects of enemy fires

44:24.880 --> 44:27.193
and obstacles are the greatest.

44:28.350 --> 44:31.150
Against the well-entrenched
and much better trained

44:31.150 --> 44:33.430
German units of the 6th Army,

44:33.430 --> 44:36.870
the Soviet Don Front ran
into stiffer resistance

44:36.870 --> 44:41.000
during 19 through 21 November
and made little progress.

44:41.000 --> 44:43.170
On the afternoon of 19 November,

44:43.170 --> 44:46.840
Army Group B realized the
attack by the Soviet 21st Army

44:46.840 --> 44:49.980
of the Southwestern
Front was the real threat

44:49.980 --> 44:53.920
and directed 48th Panzer
Corps to the besieged area.

44:53.920 --> 44:57.260
However, the Panzer Corps's
counterattacks failed

44:57.260 --> 45:00.230
and 40,000 men of the 3rd Romanian Army

45:00.230 --> 45:03.400
were encircled by the Soviet advance.

45:03.400 --> 45:05.640
The Romanian forces continued to fight

45:05.640 --> 45:07.500
even though they were surrounded

45:07.500 --> 45:09.540
and only a handful were able to breakout

45:09.540 --> 45:11.860
and return to friendly lines.

45:11.860 --> 45:15.290
On 20 November, the
Soviet Stalingrad Front

45:15.290 --> 45:17.000
began its attack.

45:17.000 --> 45:20.970
In the south, 51st Army
quickly breached the left flank

45:20.970 --> 45:24.050
of the 4th Romanian Army
and threaten to encircle

45:24.050 --> 45:26.190
the Romanians from the rear.

45:26.190 --> 45:30.430
In the center, the Soviet 57th
Army had made enough progress

45:30.430 --> 45:32.500
that the commander committed his reserve,

45:32.500 --> 45:35.940
a tank corps, in order to
accelerate his advance.

45:35.940 --> 45:38.760
In this case, however, the
Germans were still able

45:38.760 --> 45:41.010
to slow the Soviet progress.

45:41.010 --> 45:45.400
US Army Field Manual
3-90-1 guides commanders

45:45.400 --> 45:48.400
to employ the reserve to exploit success,

45:48.400 --> 45:50.290
defeat enemy counterattacks,

45:50.290 --> 45:52.980
or restore momentum to a stalled attack.

45:52.980 --> 45:56.850
The Soviet 57th Army
sought to exploit success.

45:56.850 --> 45:59.900
However, the German
29th Motorized Division

45:59.900 --> 46:02.490
was able to slow Soviet progress.

46:02.490 --> 46:05.380
The Soviet Fifth Tank Army
advanced through the night

46:05.380 --> 46:09.000
of 21 November towards Kalach
and captured the bridges

46:09.000 --> 46:11.913
by 0600 on 22 November.

46:12.780 --> 46:15.770
The 1st Guards Army then turned southwest

46:15.770 --> 46:17.600
toward the Chir River crossings,

46:17.600 --> 46:19.630
while the rest of the 21st Army

46:19.630 --> 46:21.449
formed a defensive blocking force

46:21.449 --> 46:25.440
west of Paulus' 6th Army
as the anvil portion

46:25.440 --> 46:27.720
of the hammer and anvil technique.

46:27.720 --> 46:29.570
When conducting an encirclement,

46:29.570 --> 46:31.330
the hammer and anvil technique

46:31.330 --> 46:34.600
employs a stationary
blocking force as an anvil

46:34.600 --> 46:37.440
on one or more sides
of the inner perimeter,

46:37.440 --> 46:40.710
while other elements use
offensive action as a hammer

46:40.710 --> 46:43.683
to push the opposition
against the blocking forces.

46:45.200 --> 46:49.400
Further south, 51st Army advanced
against little resistance

46:49.400 --> 46:52.380
until it made contact
with the 5th Tank Army

46:52.380 --> 46:56.250
near Sovetsky at 1400 on the 22nd.

46:56.250 --> 46:59.570
The encirclement of 6th Army was complete.

46:59.570 --> 47:01.540
Soviet intelligence estimated

47:01.540 --> 47:03.800
that the number of
troops caught in the trap

47:03.800 --> 47:07.200
was between 85,000 and 90,000.

47:07.200 --> 47:09.457
In actuality, the Soviets had surrounded

47:09.457 --> 47:13.393
250,000 mostly German troops.

47:14.930 --> 47:17.990
Hitler realized the Germans
faced a major disaster

47:17.990 --> 47:20.460
forcing him to take several actions.

47:20.460 --> 47:23.960
On 21 November, the Führer
ordered the 6th Army

47:23.960 --> 47:26.310
to establish an all-around defense

47:26.310 --> 47:28.940
rather than allow Paulus
to attempt a breakout.

47:28.940 --> 47:33.140
Hitler had also decided to
resupply the 6th Army by air.

47:33.140 --> 47:35.810
But despite promises from
the Luftwaffe's leader,

47:35.810 --> 47:39.110
Herman Göring, this effort largely failed.

47:39.110 --> 47:40.750
The next day, Hitler called

47:40.750 --> 47:42.860
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein,

47:42.860 --> 47:45.870
then commanding the 11th
Army in Army Group North

47:45.870 --> 47:48.400
and directed him to form Army Group Don

47:48.400 --> 47:51.090
and attack and save the 6th Army.

47:51.090 --> 47:53.924
From 25 November to 10 December,

47:53.924 --> 47:57.588
1st Guards, Fifth Tank and 51st armies

47:57.588 --> 48:00.190
continued to pursue the retreating units

48:00.190 --> 48:02.680
of Army Group B away from Stalingrad

48:02.680 --> 48:05.160
further isolating the 6th Army.

48:05.160 --> 48:10.160
At the same time, the 57th,
21st, 65th and 24th armies

48:11.740 --> 48:13.840
continued to tighten the 6th Army

48:13.840 --> 48:15.630
into a smaller perimeter.

48:15.630 --> 48:18.620
By 30 November, the troops of the 6th Army

48:18.620 --> 48:22.680
were now 65 kilometers from
their nearest would-be rescuers

48:22.680 --> 48:24.650
and were compressed into an area

48:24.650 --> 48:27.740
about 50 kilometers by 30 kilometers.

48:27.740 --> 48:30.420
The squeeze technique for an encirclement

48:30.420 --> 48:33.630
uses simultaneous coordinated
blows on the enemy

48:33.630 --> 48:35.380
from various directions.

48:35.380 --> 48:38.210
The squeeze technique
promotes the enemy's confusion

48:38.210 --> 48:40.370
and rapid dispersion of combat power

48:40.370 --> 48:42.050
and prevents the enemy commander

48:42.050 --> 48:45.880
from using the enemy's
reserves in a decisive manner.

48:45.880 --> 48:48.710
Manstein's counterattack
with Army Group Don

48:48.710 --> 48:51.480
in Operation Wintergewitter forces Soviets

48:51.480 --> 48:53.550
to adjust once again.

48:53.550 --> 48:55.990
The German offensive began on 12 December

48:55.990 --> 48:58.490
and initially had some success.

48:58.490 --> 49:01.980
The reinforced and
reconstituted 4th Panzer Army

49:01.980 --> 49:05.220
pushed about 50 kilometers
into the Soviet frontline,

49:05.220 --> 49:07.010
southeast of Stalingrad.

49:07.010 --> 49:10.170
However, Manstein's forces
were not strong enough

49:10.170 --> 49:14.400
to reach the trapped Axis
units in and around the city.

49:14.400 --> 49:17.710
The German attack ended by 24 December.

49:17.710 --> 49:20.160
After stopping Manstein's Army Group,

49:20.160 --> 49:22.890
the Soviet Don Front spends about 10 days

49:22.890 --> 49:25.120
building and positioning its forces

49:25.120 --> 49:29.180
before opening the offensive
designed to destroy 6th Army.

49:29.180 --> 49:33.830
The Soviet attack, codenamed
Koltso or Ring in English,

49:33.830 --> 49:37.540
opened on 10 January
1943 with an artillery

49:37.540 --> 49:41.200
and air bombardment even larger
than those of the Germans

49:41.200 --> 49:43.853
in October and November of 1942.

49:44.790 --> 49:47.010
The Red troops made steady progress

49:47.010 --> 49:49.200
compressing the German
pocket from the west

49:49.200 --> 49:53.360
and southwest and capturing
a key German air field.

49:53.360 --> 49:57.360
On 26 January, advancing
Soviet troops from the west

49:57.360 --> 50:00.210
made contact with the
13th Guards Rifle Division

50:00.210 --> 50:03.860
at Mamaev Kurgan cutting
the German pocket in two.

50:03.860 --> 50:08.860
Finally, on 2 February 1943,
German resistance ended.

50:09.320 --> 50:12.063
The battle for Stalingrad was over.

50:13.060 --> 50:15.270
The success of Operation Uranus,

50:15.270 --> 50:17.990
which was the culmination
of a long campaign

50:17.990 --> 50:20.440
starting in the summer of 1942,

50:20.440 --> 50:23.200
led to the destruction
of the German 6th Army

50:23.200 --> 50:26.010
and was a decisive
victory for the Red Army.

50:26.010 --> 50:28.670
Germany's Case Blue
illustrates the importance

50:28.670 --> 50:31.850
of the principal
objective and demonstrates

50:31.850 --> 50:33.590
the challenges commanders have

50:33.590 --> 50:35.830
with long lines of communication

50:35.830 --> 50:39.700
and how the distance impacts
tempo and operational reach.

50:39.700 --> 50:41.850
The chaotic scenes in Stalingrad

50:41.850 --> 50:44.250
reveal the challenges of urban fighting

50:44.250 --> 50:46.840
and the brutal compartmentalizing effects

50:46.840 --> 50:48.860
of a complex terrain.

50:48.860 --> 50:52.460
Ultimately, the German leadership
were unable to overcome

50:52.460 --> 50:55.720
the unfavorable conditions
they faced and culminated

50:55.720 --> 50:59.030
before fully isolating
and seizing Stalingrad.

50:59.030 --> 51:01.760
This provided an
opportunity for the Soviets

51:01.760 --> 51:03.580
to build their forces and conduct

51:03.580 --> 51:05.780
a well-executed encirclement

51:05.780 --> 51:08.670
which delivered a key
defeat to the German army.

51:08.670 --> 51:11.120
Stalingrad represented the high-water mark

51:11.120 --> 51:13.283
in Hitler's war against the Soviet Union.

51:14.150 --> 51:16.930
After 1942, the initiative shift

51:16.930 --> 51:19.490
into Stalin and his Red Army.

51:19.490 --> 51:22.000
The war would end, not
in the Soviet Union,

51:22.000 --> 51:25.010
but in Berlin, with the Soviet flag

51:25.010 --> 51:27.444
flying over the Nazi capital.

51:27.444 --> 51:30.194
(dramatic music)