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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-23-00023-CR

NO. 09-23-00024-CR

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TYE KOBI JACKSON-WELLS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 252nd District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. 21-38087 and 21-38089

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tye Kobi Jackson-Wells, the defendant in trial court cause numbers 

21-38087 and 21-38089, agreed to plead guilty in each case under plea 

agreements he made with the State. In cause number 21-38087, JacksonWells pleaded guilty to burglarizing a habitation, a second-degree 
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felony.1 In cause number 21-38089, Jackson-Wells pleaded guilty to theft, 

a state-jail felony.2 In exchange for his pleas, the State recommended 

that the trial court defer the adjudication of his guilt and place JacksonWells on community supervision.

In carrying out the plea agreement, the trial court found the 

evidence sufficient to find Jackson-Wells guilty of the offense, deferred 

the adjudication of his guilt, and signed and order placing Jackson-Wells 

on community supervision. In cause number 21-38087 the trial court 

ordered Jackson-Wells placed on community supervision for ten years, 

while in cause number 21-38089 the trial court placed him on community 

supervision for five years. 

Months later, the State moved to revoke the deferred-adjudication

orders. In the motions to revoke, the State alleged that Jackson-Wells

violated four conditions of his community supervision. Following the 

hearing the court conducted on the motions, the trial court found the 

allegations to be true. Rather than revoking the deferred-adjudication 

orders, however, the trial court amended the terms of its community 

1See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02. 2See id. § 31.03.
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supervision orders and required Jackson-Wells to serve 90-days upfront

jail-time and to complete a one-year residential treatment program.

Less than two months later, the State filed new motions asking the 

trial court to revoke its decision to defer the adjudication of JacksonWells’ guilt in the cases. In these motions, the State alleged that JacksonWells violated two of the conditions of the trial court’s communitysupervision orders while he was jailed in the Jefferson County 

Correctional Facility.

During the hearing on the State’s motions, Jackson-Wells pleaded 

“true” to one of the allegations in the State’s motion and not true to the 

other. When the evidentiary hearing on the State’s motions concluded,

and based on the evidence the trial court heard during the hearing to 

support the State’s motion, the trial court (1) revoked its communitysupervision orders, (2) pronounced Jackson-Wells guilty and sentenced 

him to twenty years in prison in trial court cause number 21-38087 on 

his conviction for burglarizing a habitation, and (3) pronounced Jackson-
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Wells guilty and sentenced him to two years’ in prison in trial court cause 

number 21-38089 on his conviction for theft.3

After Jackson-Wells filed notices of appeal, the trial court appointed 

an attorney to represent him in his appeals. The attorney discharged his 

responsibilities to Jackson-Wells by filing an Anders brief.4

In the brief, Jackson-Wells’ attorney represents there are no 

arguable errors that he can argue that would lead to the Court’s reversing 

the trial court’s judgments in these two appeals.5 In our opinion, the brief 

the attorney filed on Jackson-Wells’ behalf provides a professional 

evaluation of the record. In the brief, Jackson-Wells’ attorney explains 

why, under the records in these appeals, no arguable issues exist to 

reverse the trial court’s judgments.6 Subsequently, the attorney 

appointed to represent Jackson-Wells filed motions to withdraw, and he 

attached letters to his motions addressed to Jackson-Wells. They state 

3The trial court ordered Jackson-Wells’ sentences in both cases to 

run concurrently. See id. § 12.35 (providing punishment range of 180 

days to two years in jail for state-jail felonies), id. § 12.33 (providing 

punishment range of two to twenty years in prison for second-degree 

felonies). 4See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

5See id.; High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

6See id. 
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the attorney sent Jackson-Wells a copy of the brief and the records in 

these appeals. 

The Clerk of the Ninth Court of Appeals also notified JacksonWells, by letter, of his right to file a pro se brief or response on or before 

May 3, 2022. Thereafter, Jackson-Wells filed a pro se response. In it, 

Jackson-Wells argues he shouldn’t have received a twenty-year-sentence 

in his case for burglarizing a habitation because the offense was 

committed when he “was a juvenile.”7

When an appellate court receives an Anders brief and a later-filed 

pro se response, it has two choices.8 “It may determine that the appeal is 

wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it has reviewed the 

record and finds no reversible error. (citation omitted) Or, it may 

7The record includes an order signed by the presiding judge of the 

Jefferson County District Court who, in July 2021, was responsible for 

handling juvenile proceedings in Jefferson County. In the July 2021

order, the juvenile court waived its right to exercise jurisdiction over 

Jackson-Wells for the offense alleging that Jackson-Wells burglarized a 

habitation in February 2021 and for the offense alleging that he 

committed felony theft in March 2021. The juvenile court ordered 

Jackson-Wells “transferred to a Criminal District Court of Jefferson 

County, Texas for Criminal Proceedings to be dealt with as an adult in 

accordance with the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” 

8See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005) (cleaned up). 
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determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the cause 

to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the 

issues.”9

We have independently examined the records in Jackson-Wells’ 

appeals to determine whether the attorney assigned to represent him has 

a non-frivolous argument that would support either appeal.10 After 

reviewing the clerk’s records, the reporter’s records, and the attorney’s 

brief, we agree with counsel’s conclusion that no arguable grounds exist 

to support the appeals. Thus, it follows the appeals are frivolous.11 For 

that reason, we need not require the trial court to appoint another 

attorney to re-brief them.12

9Id.

10Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 

744).

11See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders 

briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in 

the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, 

the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 47.1.”).

12See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Jackson-Wells may challenge our decision in the cases by filing petitions 

for discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.
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The trial court’s judgments in cause numbers 21-38087 and 21-

38089 are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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 HOLLIS HORTON

 Justice

Submitted on August 10, 2023

Opinion Delivered August 16, 2023

Do Not Publish 

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.