alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT23.2**

**Consentof Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

The Board of Directorsand ShareholdersMacDermid, Incorporated:

We consent to theincorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos. 333-137253,333-115971, 333-66944, 333-66946) on Form S-8 of MacDermid, Incorporatedand subsidiaries of our report dated March 10, 2006 with respect to theconsolidated balance sheets of MacDermid, Incorporated as of December 31,2005, and the related consolidated statements of earnings and othercomprehensive income, changes in shareholders’ equity, and cash flows for eachof the years in the two-year period ended December 31, 2005, which reportappears in the December 31, 2006 annual report on Form 10-K ofMacDermid, Incorporated.

**KPMG LLP**

Denver, ColoradoFebruary 20, 2007

----
Motion Granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed February

14, 2019
.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14- 18 -01049- CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.L.L., A MINOR CHILD

On Appeal from the 246th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2016-20727

MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from a final order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship and nunc pro tunc signed August 30, 2018. On February 8, 2019, appellant I.L.L. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. The motion is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.
PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Hassan, and Poissant
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                  DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                        5176
<SECURITIES>                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                 3193638
<ALLOWANCES>                  177000
<INVENTORY>                   4765817
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              8163314
<PP&E>                        14027155
<DEPRECIATION>                4812731
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                17914987
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         2484615
<BONDS>                       4785174
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   0
<COMMON>                      113970
<OTHER-SE>                    10531228
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  17914987
<SALES>                       18098473
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              18098473
<CGS>                         13748868
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 3077874
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              (6415)
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            507374
<INCOME-PRETAX>               770772
<INCOME-TAX>                  (33000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           803772
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               (152228)
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  651544
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 .06
<EPS-DILUTED>                 .06
        


</TABLE>
#### § 780.619 Work “in connection with” livestock auction operations.

An employee whose agricultural employment meets the tests for exemption may engage in “other” employment “in connection with” his employer's livestock auction operations under the conditions stated in section 13(b)(13). The work which an employee may engage in under the phrase “in connection with” includes only those activities which are a necessary incident to conducting a livestock auction of the limited type permitted under the exemption. Such work as transporting the livestock and caring for it, custodial, maintenance, and clerical duties are included. Work which cannot be considered necessarily incident to the livestock auction is not exempt.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE NINE MONTH PERIOD ENDED
MAY 31, 1999, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1999
<CASH>                                         545,931
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    854,443
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,928,519
<PP&E>                                       3,609,910
<DEPRECIATION>                               (269,134)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,198,452
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,321,143
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,464
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,869,845
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,198,452
<SALES>                                      2,337,704
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               479,875
<CGS>                                        2,092,256
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,092,256
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,988,040
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             129,070
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,508,165)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,508,165)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,508,165)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.20)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Merrill Lynch Preferred
Capital Trust VI (the "Trust") and Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding VI, L.P. (the
"Partnership") for the period ended June 27, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ahmass L.
Fakahany, Regular Trustee of the Trust and Executive Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., the General Partner of the
Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
    of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust
    and the Partnership.




                              MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED CAPITAL TRUST VI


                              By:  /s/ AHMASS L. FAKAHANY
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                              Name:    Ahmass L. Fakahany *
                              Title:   Regular Trustee




                               MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED FUNDING VI, L.P.


                               By: MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC., as General Partner



                               By:  /s/ AHMASS L. FAKAHANY
                                    --------------------------------------------
                               Name:    Ahmass L. Fakahany *
                               Title:   Executive Vice President and
                                        Chief Financial Officer



Dated: August 7, 2003
_____________________

*  Ahmass L. Fakahany functions as the equivalent of the Chief Executive Officer
   and Chief Financial Officer of each of the Trust and the Partnership for
   purposes of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
792 A.2d 594

#### OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, v. Donald Joseph RICHMOND, Respondent.

No. 731, Disciplinary Docket No. 3.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 5, 2002.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 5th day of March, 2002, upon consideration of the Recommendation of the Disciplinary Board dated January 29, 2002, it is hereby

ORDERED that Donald Joseph Richmond is placed on temporary suspension pursuant to Rule 208(f), Pa.R.D.E., until further definitive action by this Court, It is further ORDERED that respondent shall comply with the provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E.

This Order constitutes an imposition of public discipline within the meaning of Rule 402, Pa.R.D.E., pertaining to ' confidentiality.
#### § 4907.140 Employment.

No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap, be subjected to discrimination in employment under any program or activity conducted by the agency. The definitions, requirements, and procedures of section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791), as established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 29 CFR part 1613, shall apply to employment in federally-conducted programs or activities.
Order 2010

- 9

- 18

Served: September 16, 2010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Issued by the Department of Transportation

on the 16 th Day of September , 2010

Docket DOT

- OST

- 2009

- 0155

ORDER EXTENDING COMMENT PERIOD

On September 14, 2010, Delta Air Lines and the above

- captioned affiliates of the Virgin Blue

Group (together referred to as the “applicants”) filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to

Show Cause Order 2009

- 10

- 4. 1

The applicants request a three

- week extension . They argue that there is good cause for granting

the request because the additi onal time will assist in the development of a more complete record and

enable the applicants to address the issues identified in the Show

- Cause Order. The applicants

further argue that an extension will not prejudice any party. Having polled representati ves of air

carriers, the applicants report that there are no objections to the motion. 2

Under the circumstances, we agree that there is good cause for an extension, and that the

additional time would not prejudice any party. We will, therefore, grant the motion.

1 Motion for An Extension of Time (September 14, 2010).

2 See Letter from Alexander Van der Bellen, Counsel for Delta Air Lines, to Dorothy Beard, Chief of DOT Dockets

(September 14, 2010). Joint Application of:

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.

VIRGIN BLUE AIRLINES PTY LTD

VIRGIN BLUE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES

PTY LTD D/B/A V AUSTRALIA

PACIFIC BLUE AIRLINES (NZ) LTD

PACIFIC BLUE AIRLINES (AUST) PTY LTD

Under 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308

- 41309 for approval of

and antitrust immunity for alliance agreements2 A CCORDINGLY :

1. We grant the motion submitted on September 14, 2010 by Delta Air Lines, Inc. (along with

its affiliates), Virgin Blue PTY LTD, Virgin Blue International Airlines PTY LTD d/b/a V

Australia, Pacific Blue Airlines (NZ) LTD, and Pacific Blue Airlines (AUST) PTY LTD;

2. O bjections or comments to our tentative findings and conclusions in Order 2010

- 9

- 4 are due

no later than October 13, 2010, and a nswers to objections or comments shall be due no later

than October 22, 2010 ; and

3. We will serve this Order on all parties on the service list in this docket.

By:

SUSAN L. KURLAND

Assistant Secretary for Aviation

and International Affairs

(SEAL)

An electronic version of this document is available at: http://www.regulations.gov
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5 
<LEGEND>
RESTATED FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE - SFAS NO 128 THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY
FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM LUKENS INC.FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE
TWENTY-SIX WEEKS ENDED JUNE 29, 1996, AND ISQUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000 
       
<S>                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                        6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              DEC-28-1996
<PERIOD-START>                 DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                   JUN-29-1996
 <CASH>                           6,780
<SECURITIES>                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                   130,966
<ALLOWANCES>                      7,618
 <INVENTORY>                    173,787
 <CURRENT-ASSETS>               314,295
<PP&E>                          945,876
<DEPRECIATION>                  402,314
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  968,558
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           191,243
<BONDS>                         265,952
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                      29,432
<COMMON>                            158
<OTHER-SE>                      254,163
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    968,558
<SALES>                         520,127
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                520,127
<CGS>                           488,807
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   488,807
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                  4,293
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                7,895
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (15,223)
<INCOME-TAX>                     (5,115)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (10,108)
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                    (10,108)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                     (0.75)
<EPS-DILUTED>                     (0.75)
        

</TABLE>
III 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 129 

To authorize testimony, document production, and legal representation in 

State of Alaska v. Robert S. Mulford and Don G. Muller. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 27, 2007 

Mr. REID (for himself and Mr. MCCONNELL) submitted the following 

resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

To authorize testimony, document production, and legal representation in State of Alaska v. Robert S. Mulford 

and Don G. Muller. 

Whereas, in the cases of State of Alaska v. Robert S. Mulford 

(Cr. No. 4FA–07–547) and Don G. Muller (Cr. No. 

4FA–07–548), pending in state court in Fairbanks, Alaska, testimony and documents have been requested from 

Diane Hutchison, an employee in the office of Senator 

Ted Stevens; 

Whereas, pursuant to sections 703(a) and 704(a)(2) of the 

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(a) 

and 288c(a)(2), the Senate may direct its counsel to represent employees of the Senate with respect to any subpoena, order, or request for testimony relating to their 

official responsibilities; 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

2 

SRES 129 ATS 

Whereas, by the privileges of the Senate of the United States 

and Rule XI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, no evidence under the control or in the possession of the Senate may, by the judicial or administrative process, be 

taken from such control or possession but by permission 

of the Senate; and 

Whereas, when it appears that evidence under the control or 

in the possession of the Senate may promote the administration of justice, the Senate will take such action as will 

promote the ends of justice consistent with the privileges 

of the Senate: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That Diane Hutchison and any other em2 ployees of Senator Stevens’ office from whom testimony 

3 or the production of documents may be required are au4 thorized to testify and produce documents in the cases of 

5 State of Alaska v. Robert S. Mulford and Don G. Muller, 

6 except concerning matters for which a privilege should be 

7 asserted. 

8 SEC. 2. The Senate Legal Counsel is authorized to 

9 represent Diane Hutchison and other employees of Sen10 ator Stevens’ staff in the actions referenced in section one 

11 of this resolution. 

Æ 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS
§ 548.200 Requirements. The following conditions must be satisfied if a “basic” rate is to be considered proper under section 7(g)(3) and subpart A of this part. ( a ) *Agreement or understanding.* There must be an agreement or understanding establishing a basic rate or rates. This agreement must be arrived at before performance of the work to which it is intended to apply. It may be arrived at directly with the employee or through his representative. The “basic” rate method of computing overtime may be used for as many of the employees in an establishment as the employer chooses, provided he has reached an agreement or understanding with these employees prior to the performance of the work.[3]
( b ) *The rate.* The established basic rate may be a specified rate or a rate which can be derived from the application of a specified method of calculation. For instance, under certain conditions the Regulations permit the use of the daily average hourly earnings of the employee as a basis for computing daily overtime.[4] Thus, a method rather than a specific rate is authorized. Also, under certain conditions, the cost of a single meal a day furnished to employees may be excluded from the computation of overtime pay.[5] It is the exclusion of the cost of the meals that is authorized and each employee's rate of pay, whatever it may be—an hourly rate, a piece rate or a salary—is his basic rate.
( c ) *Minimum wage.* The employee's average hourly earnings for the workweek (exclusive of overtime pay and other pay which may be excluded from the regular rate)[6] and the established basic rate used to compute overtime pay may not be less than the legal minimum.[7]
[20 FR 5680, Aug. 6, 1955, as amended at 21 FR 338, Jan. 18, 1956] Footnotes -
548.200
[3] The records which an employer is required to maintain and preserve for an employee compensated for overtime hours on the basis of a basic rate are described in §§ 516.5(b)(5) and 516.21 of this subchapter.
[4] See § 548.302.
[5] See § 548.304.
[6] See §§ 778.200 through 778.225 of this chapter for further discussion of what payments may be excluded.
[7] The legal minimum is the highest rate required by the Fair Labor Standards Act or other Federal, State or local law.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PHILLIP SANDS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 16

- 15100

D.C. No. 1:15

- cv

- 01140

- RRB

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding **

Submitted March 8, 2017 ** *

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Phillip Sands appeals pro se from the district court’s

judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth Amendment

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Ralph R. Beistl ine, United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation

.

** * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 15100

excessive force claims

. We have juris diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Resnick v. Hayes , 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v.

Harrington , 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). W e affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Sands’ action because the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as a state agency, is immune from

suit under the Eleventh Amendment, see Brown v. California Dep’t of Corr ., 554

F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009), and Sands failed to allege facts sufficient to show

that defendants Swift and Mar s h personally participated in the alleged

constitutional violations, see Starr v. Baca , 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)

(setting forth requirements for establishing supervisor y liability under § 1983);

Jones v. Williams , 297 F.3d 930, 934

- 35 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person

acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a

showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation . . . .”).

The district court did not abuse i ts discretion by dismissing Sands’

complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)

( standard of review).

We do not consider facts, documents, and declarations presented for the first

time on appeal. See United States v. Elias , 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990)3 16

- 15100

(“Documents or facts not presented to the district cou rt are not part of the record on

appeal.”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.
Argued and submitted September 2, 1992,

reversed and remanded March 3, 1993

#### Fred PHELPS and Thea Phelps, *Respondents, v.*Kelli WILLIAMS, *Appellant.*

(92-0047-C; CA A74014)

847 P2d 416

Janay A. Haas, Grants Pass, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief was Oregon Legal Services, Grants Pass.

Fred Phelps and Thea Phelps, Cave Junction, waived appearance for respondents.

Before Richardson, Chief Judge, and Deits and Durham, Judges.

PER CURIAM

Reversed and remanded. ORS 46.335; *Price v. Clint,*34 Or App 731, 579 P2d 873 (1978).
#### § 780.126 Contract arrangements for raising poultry.

Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements with farmers under which the latter agree to raise to marketable size baby chicks supplied by the former who also undertake to furnish all the required feed and possibly additional items. Typically, the feed dealer or processor retains title to the chickens until they are sold. Under such an arrangement, the activities of the farmers and their employees in raising the poultry are clearly within section 3(f). The activities of the feed dealer or processor, on the other hand, are not “raising of poultry” and employees engaged in them cannot be considered agricultural employees on that ground. Employees of the feed dealer or processor who perform work on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the raising of poultry on the farm are employed in “secondary” agriculture (see §§ 780.137 *et seq.* and *Johnston* v. *Cotton Producers Assn.,* 244 F. 2d 553).