J-S05022-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYLER MICHAEL MANUEL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 552 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-16-CR-0000234-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: June 10, 2024

Appellant, Tyler Michael Manuel, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Clarion County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial 

conviction for access device fraud.1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

Beginning in 2017, Appellant worked as the librarian at the Foxburg Free 

Library.2 As part of his duties, Appellant occasionally needed to buy books 

and other supplies for the library. To effectuate such purchases, the library 

board’s former president, Verne Mahood, obtained a business credit card from 

Chase Bank. Although Appellant retained possession of the credit card, he 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4106(a)(1)(ii). 

2 Throughout the trial, witnesses referred to Appellant’s position as both 

“librarian” and “director.” 
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was not allowed to use it for personal expenses. Appellant resigned from his 

position with the library in March 2020. Appellant, however, did not return 

the library’s credit card. When library officials contacted Appellant to ask for 

the card’s return, Appellant claimed that he had destroyed it. 

In June 2020, the library board’s current president, Denise Shekell, 

discovered that the credit card had an unpaid balance of over $14,000.00. 

Ms. Shekell reviewed the credit card account statements and discovered that 

Appellant had made several unauthorized transactions for personal expenses. 

Ms. Shekell contacted police about the matter on July 6, 2020. On October 7, 

2020, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Joshua Bauer interviewed Appellant 

about his use of the credit card. During the interview, Appellant admitted that 

“he used the card to make personal purchases and used the card to pay 

outstanding bills.” (Affidavit of Probable Cause, dated 3/24/21, at 2). 

Appellant’s personal purchases included fast food, video games, automobile

repairs, and the rental of a self-storage unit. 

The trial court set forth the subsequent procedural history of this appeal 

as follows: 

On March 24, 2021, the criminal complaint was filed and 

[Appellant] was charged with using an access device issued 

to another who did not authorize use, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

4106(a)(1)(ii). On the preliminary hearing date, July 6, 

2021, the Clarion County District Attorney (hereinafter, 

“district attorney”) offered to recommend [Appellant’s] case 

for the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program 

(“ARD”) with restitution to be paid during the term of ARD. 

[Appellant] waived his preliminary hearing on that date, 

however, said waiver was contingent upon [Appellant] 
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retaining his ability to contest the amount of restitution he 

would ultimately be required to pay. Thereafter, there was 

no activity in the case until November 1[6], 2021 and again 

on December 13, 2021, when the district attorney emailed 

[Appellant’s] prior counsel, Attorney Alexander Lindsay, Jr., 

Esq. (hereinafter, “Attorney Lindsay”) to inquire as to 

whether [Appellant] had discovered any “proof” warranting 

a reduction in the amount of restitution owed. Attorney 

Lindsay responded to the District Attorney’s email on 

December 14, 2021, stating that [Appellant] wanted to 

challenge the restitution amount and that he would send the 

related figures to the District Attorney on December 15, 

2021. However, the figures were never delivered, and 

Attorney Lindsay did not contact the District Attorney again 

until January 12, 2022, at which time the District Attorney 

and Attorney Lindsay agreed that [Appellant] should be 

scheduled for a special plea hearing on January 26, 2022. 

The January 26, 2022 hearing was continued by the court 

to February 9, 2022.[3] 

On February 7, 2022, Attorney Lindsay withdrew as 

[Appellant’s] counsel. Attorney John Bongivengo, Esq. 

(hereinafter, “Attorney Bongivengo”) thereafter entered his 

appearance and requested a continuance of the February 9, 

2022 special plea hearing, the request was granted but 

rather than scheduling a special plea hearing, the case was 

scheduled for a criminal conference on March 9, 2022. On 

March 9, 2022, following the criminal conference, the 

parties agreed that the case would be scheduled for a 

special plea hearing on April 20, 2022 and submitted a 

conference form indicating the same to the court. At the 

special plea hearing on April 20, 2022, defense counsel 

informed the court that [Appellant] rejected the 

Commonwealth’s offer of ARD and wanted to proceed to 

trial. The court scheduled [Appellant’s] criminal pretrial 

conference for July 15, 2022. [Appellant] filed [a 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600] motion on July 14, 2022 and requested a 

continuance of the pretrial conference pending the 

resolution of this motion. 

____________________________________________

3 The January 26, 2022 hearing was continued “due to the unavailability of 

the court,” and “all plea and sentence hearings scheduled on January 26, 

2022” were continued. (Order, filed 1/26/22). 
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(Opinion and Order Denying Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 Motion, filed 9/14/22, at 1-3)

(unnumbered) (some capitalization omitted). 

The court conducted a Rule 600 hearing on August 22, 2022. By opinion 

and order entered September 14, 2022, the court denied Appellant’s Rule 600 

motion. Appellant proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty of one count 

of access device fraud. On March 8, 2023, the court sentenced Appellant to 

three (3) years of probation and restitution in the amount of $4,227.90. 

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on March 17, 2023. In it, 

Appellant challenged the weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented at 

trial. On April 18, 2023, the court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on May 16, 2023. On May 18, 

2023, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule 

1925(b) statement on June 7, 2023. 

Appellant now raises five issues for this Court’s review: 

Whether the court erred and abused its discretion in denying 

[Appellant’s] motion to dismiss pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 

600? 

Whether the court erred and abused its discretion in finding 

the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to 

establish the charge of access device fraud, where the 

device was issued in the name of [Appellant] by Chase 

Credit Card? 

Whether the court erred and abused its discretion by finding 

the conviction was not against the weight of the evidence? 
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Whether the court abused its discretion in allowing 

[Appellant’s] statement to be introduced prior to the corpus 

delicti being established? 

Whether the court abused its discretion in ordering 

restitution to Foxburg Free Library where there was no 

evidence presented at sentencing that the Foxburg Free 

Library paid any amount towards Chase Credit Card? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 9). 

In his first issue, Appellant contends that his trial did not begin until 

December 2022, well after the Rule 600 mechanical run date of March 24, 

2022. In evaluating the periods of delay throughout the case, Appellant notes 

that the parties participated in criminal conferences in September, October, 

and November 2021. At these conferences, the parties addressed the 

possibility of Appellant’s admission into the ARD program, as well as the exact 

amount of restitution. Appellant maintains that the amount of restitution 

remained an issue during the first months of 2022, even while the 

Commonwealth attempted to schedule the matter for a plea hearing. 

Appellant asserts that plea negotiations ultimately broke down, and the 

Commonwealth decided that the matter would go to trial in the spring of 2022. 

Appellant maintains that the scheduling of a plea hearing “is within the normal 

progression of a case and ... is not ‘delay’” for Rule 600 purposes, and he 

emphasizes that there was no evidence that he ever accepted the 

Commonwealth’s ARD offer, such that he could have created a period of

excludable delay. (Id. at 22). 

Appellant also disputes the trial court’s findings of fact set forth in the 
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opinion denying the Rule 600 motion. Specifically, Appellant claims his 

attorney did not agree “with a special plea hearing being set or requesting a 

continuance.” (Id. at 23). Regarding the disputed amount of restitution, 

Appellant acknowledges the court’s finding that the Commonwealth sent 

emails to defense counsel at the end of 2021 to ask whether counsel had 

discovered evidence warranting a lesser amount of restitution. Appellant 

argues, however, that “the request for proof does not show due diligence on 

behalf of the Commonwealth.” (Id.) Further, Appellant insists that the parties 

were arguing over the amount of restitution as early as the July 5, 2021 

preliminary hearing, and the Commonwealth “at that time could have simply 

offered ARD and requested a restitution hearing for a determination of the 

appropriate amount.” (Id.) Appellant concludes that he was not responsible 

for any periods of delay, the Commonwealth did not act with due diligence, 

and the court erred by denying his Rule 600 motion. We disagree. 

The following principles apply to our review of a speedy trial claim: 

Our standard of review in a Rule 600 issue is whether the 

trial court abused its discretion. Our scope of review when 

determining the propriety of the trial court is limited to the 

evidence in the record, the trial court’s Rule 600 evidentiary 

hearing, and the trial court’s findings. We must also view 

the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party[.] 

Commonwealth v. Risoldi, 238 A.3d 434, 449 n.14 (Pa.Super. 2020), 

appeal denied, 664 Pa. 562, 244 A.3d 1230 (2021). 

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this 

Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind 

Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: 
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(1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and 

(2) the protection of society. In determining whether an 

accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, 

consideration must be given to society’s right to effective 

prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty 

of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the 

administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to 

insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution 

delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth. 

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental 

speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be 

construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to 

punish and deter crime. In considering these matters ..., 

courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not 

only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the 

collective right of the community to vigorous law 

enforcement as well. 

Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 809-10 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1134-35 (Pa.Super. 2011)). 

Rule 600 sets forth the speedy trial requirements and provides in 

pertinent part: 

Rule 600. Prompt Trial

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial 

* * *

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time 

periods. 

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written 

complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence 

within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is 

filed. 

* * *
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(C) Computation of Time 

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at 

any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth 

when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due 

diligence shall be included in the computation of the time 

within which trial must commence. Any other periods of 

delay shall be excluded from the computation. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a), (C)(1). 

Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be 

determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence does not 

require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a 

showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has 

been put forth. Due diligence includes, inter alia, listing a 

case for trial prior to the run date, preparedness for trial 

within the run date, and keeping adequate records to ensure 

compliance with Rule 600. Periods of delay caused by the 

Commonwealth’s failure to exercise due diligence must be 

included in the computation of time within which trial must 

commence. 

Martz, supra at 810-11 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, “time attributable to the normal progression of a case 

simply is not ‘delay’ for purposes of Rule 600.” Commonwealth v. Mills, 

640 Pa. 118, 122, 162 A.3d 323, 325 (2017). “[C]ourts of original jurisdiction 

must apply judgment in distinguishing between delay attributable to the court 

and that which should be allocated to a party.” Id. “These courts also have 

discretion, however, to differentiate between time necessary to ordinary trial 

preparation and judicial delay arising out of the court’s own scheduling 

concerns.” Id. 

Instantly, the trial court analyzed the pretrial progression of Appellant’s 

case and determined that the Commonwealth had acted with due diligence: 
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On November 1[6], 2021 and December 13, 2021, the 

district attorney sent an email to Attorney Lindsay, asking 

whether he had discovered any “proof” warranting reduction 

of [Appellant’s] restitution amount and Attorney Lindsay did 

not respond until December 14, 2021. On January 26, 

2022, [Appellant] was scheduled for special plea court, but 

the hearing was continued by the court until February 9,

2022. On February 7, 2022, Attorney Lindsay withdrew as 

counsel for [Appellant] and [Appellant’s] new attorney, 

Attorney Bongivengo continued the proceeding, with a 

criminal conference scheduled by the court for March 9, 

2022 and a special plea hearing date of August 20, 2022 

requested by the parties at which time the court scheduled 

the criminal pretrial conference for July 15, 2022. These 

delays were not caused by the Commonwealth’s failure to 

exercise due diligence but instead by continuances 

requested by [Appellant] and the general progression of the 

court calendar. It is clear upon review of the progression of 

this case that dismissal of [Appellant’s] charges is not 

required under Rule 600 at this time. 

(Opinion and Order Denying Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 Motion at 4-5) (unnumbered) 

(some capitalization omitted). 

Here, the record confirms the court’s conclusions. At the Rule 600 

hearing, Appellant asked the court “to take judicial notice of the docket in this 

case,” and he did not offer additional evidence to support his claim. (N.T. 

Rule 600 Hearing, 8/22/22, at 10). In contrast, the Commonwealth submitted 

a bundle of documents to confirm the pretrial timeline for Appellant’s case. 

(See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, dated 8/22/22). These documents 

established that the Commonwealth offered ARD to Appellant, with restitution 

in the amount of $4,317.96, at the preliminary hearing. (See N.T. Rule 600 

Hearing at 4; N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 7/6/21, at 5, attached to 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1). Also at the preliminary hearing, Attorney Lindsay 
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indicated that he was investigating whether Appellant owed a lesser amount 

of restitution. 

After the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth repeatedly contacted

Attorney Lindsay to find out whether he had discovered evidence warranting 

a reduction in restitution. In the email sent to Attorney Lindsay on November 

16, 2021, the district attorney stated: “Have you had any update on this? I’d 

like to put this on for a date for him to enter into ARD, but also want you to 

have time to contest any of the restitution prior to that as I don’t want to have 

a restitution hearing on an ARD offer.” (See Email, dated 11/16/21, attached 

to Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1). The district attorney followed up with Attorney 

Lindsay on December 13, 2021. On December 14, 2021, Attorney Lindsay 

responded, indicating that Appellant still wanted to challenge the amount of 

restitution, and Attorney Lindsay would “try to get the new figures to you 

tomorrow[.]” (See Email, dated 12/14/21, attached to Commonwealth’s 

Exhibit 1). Nevertheless, by email dated February 2, 2022, the district 

attorney again contacted Attorney Lindsay to reiterate that he had yet to 

receive Appellant’s “list contesting/justifying some of the allegations.” (See

Email, dated 2/2/22, attached to Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1). Shortly 

thereafter, Attorney Lindsay withdrew from the case, Attorney Bongivengo 

assumed representation, and Appellant expressed his intent to reject the ARD 

offer. 

Although Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to 
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demonstrate due diligence under these circumstances, we cannot agree. The 

Commonwealth offered Appellant admission into the ARD program, along with 

a fixed amount of restitution, at the preliminary hearing. While Appellant 

questioned the amount of restitution as calculated by the Commonwealth, the 

record does not reveal that he made timely efforts to offer the Commonwealth 

a revised amount. Instead, the record demonstrates that the Commonwealth 

was the party who attempted to keep the case moving toward a resolution, 

especially when faced with defense counsel’s continued promises that 

Appellant was working to determine a revised amount of restitution. Thus, 

the court correctly determined that any pretrial delay occurred despite the 

Commonwealth’s exercise of due diligence, and Appellant is not entitled to 

relief on his first issue. See Martz, supra. 

In his second and third issues, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth 

“utterly failed to present any evidence [demonstrating that the credit card] 

account or the access device belonged to Foxburg Free Library.” (Appellant’s 

Brief at 26-27). Rather, Appellant claims that the credit card statements 

reflect that it was issued in Appellant’s name “with his own separate and 

distinct card number.” (Id. at 27). Appellant also complains that “[t]he 

Commonwealth produced no evidence of the account agreement between 

Chase Bank and the Foxburg Free Library, nor any credit report from the 

Foxburg Free Library to indicate the Chase Bank account.” (Id.) 

Regarding the weight of the evidence, Appellant maintains that the 
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credit card statements were addressed as follows: “Verne T. Mahood, Foxburg 

Free Library, P.O. Box 304, Foxburg, Pennsylvania.” (Id. at 29). Appellant 

insists that “[m]aking the jump from address to account holder is not a 

reasonable inference,” and the address makes it more likely that Ms. Mahood 

was an individual account holder. (Id.) Moreover, Appellant emphasizes Ms. 

Shekell’s testimony that she could not obtain the credit card statements until 

a representative from Ms. Mahood’s estate provided authorization.4 Under 

these circumstances, Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth presented 

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. We disagree. 

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard 

of review is as follows: 

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the 

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the 

verdict when it establishes each material element of the 

crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the 

Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be 

resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of 

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. 

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that 

the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a 

____________________________________________

4 Ms. Mahood died in May 2019. (See N.T. Trial, 12/13/22 at 28). 
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crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where 

the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. 

Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that 

of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, 

accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s 

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld. 

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super. 

2013)). 

Additionally, 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder 

of the fact who is free to believe all, part or none of 

the evidence and to determine the credibility of the 

witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its 

judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may 

only reverse the ... verdict if it is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. 

Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, [435,] 741 A.2d 

666, 672-73 (1999). Moreover, where the trial court has 

ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is 

not to consider the underlying question of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, 

appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably 

abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. 

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408 

(2003), cert denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004) 

(most internal citations omitted). 

The Crimes Code defines access device fraud as follows: 

§ 4106. Access device fraud
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(a) Offense defined.—A person commits an offense if 

he: 

(1) uses an access device to obtain or in an 

attempt to obtain property or services with knowledge 

that: 

* * *

(ii) the access device was issued to 

another person who has not authorized its use[.] 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4106(a)(1)(ii). The definition of “access device” includes credit 

cards. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4106(d). 

Instantly, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Ms. Shekell, 

who explained that she had been a member of the library’s board for twentythree (23) years and served as the board’s president “for probably six.” (N.T. 

Trial, 12/13/22, at 27). Ms. Shekell testified that Ms. Mahood was the prior 

president of the board. During her tenure, Ms. Mahood obtained the Chase 

Bank credit card to give librarians more flexibility when purchasing books and 

supplies:

... Brenda Beikert was the librarian at the time, and at board 

meetings there was some discussion that Brenda was 

having a hard time sometimes buying things because we 

tried to have an account when we bought books, etc., but 

sometimes if there wasn’t an account, she needed a credit 

card to buy, occasionally buy books or things like that. 

(Id. at 30). Ms. Shekell emphasized that the librarian could use the credit 

card only “[f]or the occasion when we didn’t have an account and the librarian 

needed to buy something[.]” (Id. at 35). 

The district attorney then showed Ms. Shekell reports from the board’s 
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treasurer. The treasurer’s reports memorialized payments made to Chase 

Card Services to pay the credit card debt. Each report included handwritten

notations from Appellant to list the items he had purchased using the card. 

Appellant, however, did not disclose any personal purchases in these 

notations. Ms. Shekell first learned about Appellant’s personal purchases in 

June 2020, after Appellant had resigned from the library. At that time, “[t]he 

library received a letter in the mail from a collection agency ... seeking 

$14,000.00 to Verne Mahood’s deceased account.”5 (Id. at 47). Ms. Shekell 

was “very surprised” to see the letter from the collection agency, and she “had 

no idea” how the library could owe so much money. (Id. at 48). 

After learning about the amount owed, Ms. Shekell obtained copies of 

the itemized billing statements for the credit card. These statements revealed 

charges for unapproved expenses, including video games, fast food, 

automobile repair services, and a self-storage facility rental. (See id. at 44-

46). Ms. Shekell subsequently contacted the state police, who interviewed 

Appellant on October 6, 2020. During the interview, Trooper Bauer showed 

Appellant the list of purchases that were made with the credit card, and 

Appellant admitted that some of the purchases were his own personal 

expenses. (See id. at 73-74). 

____________________________________________

5 As noted by Appellant, the credit card statements issued by Chase Bank

listed both “Verne T. Mahood” and “Foxburg Free Library” as addressees. (See

Commonwealth’s Trial Exhibit 1.1, dated 12/13/22). The bank sent the 

statements to the library’s post office box. (N.T. Trial, 12/13/22, at 48). 
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Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 

as verdict winner, sufficient evidence supported Appellant’s conviction. See 

Sebolka, supra. We emphasize Ms. Shekell’s unequivocal testimony that: 1)

Ms. Mahood, in her capacity as board president, obtained the credit card on 

behalf of the library; 2) a librarian could use the credit card to purchase items 

from vendors with whom the library did not have an account; and 3) a librarian 

was not permitted to make personal purchases with the credit card. Regarding 

Appellant’s weight claim, the court concluded that the verdict was not against 

the weight of the evidence. (See Order Denying Post-Sentence Motion, filed 

4/18/23, at 4). Specifically, the court found that the jury weighed the 

evidence and “properly concluded that the Library Board authorized 

[Appellant] to use the credit card only to make Library purchases and he knew 

he was not authorized to make personal purchases.” (Id.) Following our 

review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling on the weight 

claim. See Champney, supra. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his 

second and third issues. 

In his fourth issue, Appellant asserts that “Pennsylvania law precludes 

the admissibility of a confession absent proof of the corpus delicti, literally the 

body of the crime.” (Appellant’s Brief at 30). Appellant maintains that the 

Commonwealth did not establish the corpus delicti in the instant case where 

it did not prove “that a loss occurred and Appellant is responsible for the loss.” 

(Id.) Appellant also notes that “[a]ny loss suffered by the library occurred 
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due to the library’s own incompetent bookkeeping and a simple failure of the 

accountant, treasurer or any board member to simply look at the credit card 

statement delivered to the library.” (Id. at 31). Under these circumstances, 

Appellant concludes that the court erred by admitting his inculpatory 

statement to police. We disagree. 

This Court’s standard of review for issues regarding the admissibility of 

evidence is well settled: 

Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are 

within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not 

reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility of 

evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An 

abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but 

is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the 

exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the 

evidence of record. If in reaching a conclusion the trial court 

overrides or misapplies the law, discretion is then abused 

and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error. 

Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 78 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal 

denied, 664 Pa. 546, 244 A.3d 1222 (2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 9-10 (Pa.Super. 2014)). 

The corpus delicti rule is an evidentiary rule designed to guard against 

the danger of a conviction based on a confession or admission where no crime 

was committed. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 410 

(Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 619 Pa. 700, 63 A.3d 1244 (2013). 

Specifically, “[t]he corpus delicti rule places the burden on the prosecution to 

establish that a crime has actually occurred before a confession or admission 
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of the accused connecting him to the crime can be admitted.” Id. (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 956 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 591 Pa. 664, 916 A.2d 633 (2006)). 

The Commonwealth need not prove the existence of a crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt as an element in establishing the 

corpus delicti of a crime, but the evidence must be more 

consistent with a crime than with [an] accident. The corpus 

delicti, or “body of the crime,” may be proven by 

circumstantial evidence. 

* * *

Establishing the corpus delicti in Pennsylvania is a two-step 

process. The first step concerns the trial judge’s admission 

of the accused’s statements and the second step concerns 

the fact finder’s consideration of those statements. In order 

for the statement to be admitted, the Commonwealth must 

prove the corpus delicti by a preponderance of the evidence. 

In order for the statement to be considered by the fact 

finder, the Commonwealth must establish the corpus delicti

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Harper, 230 A.3d 1231, 1240 (Pa.Super. 2020) (internal 

citations and most quotation marks omitted). 

Instantly, Ms. Shekell’s testimony established that the library’s board 

obtained a credit card for its librarian to use for certain purchases of books

and supplies. During the period when Appellant worked as the librarian and 

possessed the card, the card was used to purchase several personal items that 

were unrelated to library business. This testimony constituted evidence that 

was “more consistent with a crime than with an accident,” and it demonstrated 

the corpus delicti by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. On this record, 

the court did not err in admitting Appellant’s statement to the police, and 
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Appellant is not entitled to relief on his fourth issue. See LeClair, supra. 

In his final issue, Appellant argues that “there must be a direct nexus 

between the restitution ordered and the crime for [which] the defendant was 

convicted,” and “the amount ordered must be supported by the record[.]” 

(Appellant’s Brief at 32). Appellant claims “the Commonwealth cannot show 

a nexus between the crime of access device fraud and Foxburg Free Library” 

where “the Commonwealth presented no evidence that the Foxburg Free 

Library paid for any purchase that wasn’t authorized.” (Id. at 33). Appellant 

further argues that the Commonwealth did not present any evidence to 

support the specific amount of $4,227.90 in restitution. Appellant concludes 

that this Court must vacate the restitution portion of the sentencing order. 

As a prefatory matter, we must determine whether Appellant challenges 

the legality or discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed. In 

Commonwealth v. Weir, 662 Pa. 402, 422, 239 A.3d 25, 37 (2020), our 

Supreme Court reiterated that “a challenge to the sentencing court’s authority 

to order restitution raises a non-waivable legality of sentencing issue. A 

challenge to the manner in which the sentencing court exercises that authority 

in fashioning the restitution implicates the discretionary aspects of the 

sentence.” Therefore, when an appellant claims that the trial court lacked 

statutory authority to impose restitution, it is a legality of sentencing issue. 

See id. Conversely, where an appellant “challenges only the amount of the 

award based on the sentencing court’s consideration of the evidence of loss 
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presented by the Commonwealth, it is a challenge to the discretionary aspects 

of sentencing.” Id. at 425, 239 A.3d at 38. 

Here, Appellant’s challenge to the court’s authority to impose restitution 

based on its finding that the restitution was a direct result of the criminal 

conduct is a non-waivable challenge to the legality of the sentence. See id. 

See also Risoldi, supra at 460 n.23. Nevertheless, Appellant’s claim that 

the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to support the amount of 

restitution awarded implicates the discretionary aspects of sentencing. See 

Weir, supra. Because Appellant failed to raise this challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing in a post-sentence motion or by presenting 

the claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings, it is waived.

6

 

See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(en banc). 

We proceed to address Appellant’s challenge to the legality of the 

restitution sentence, and the following principles guide our analysis: 

____________________________________________

6

Immediately prior to the imposition of sentence, defense counsel made the 

following argument: “Honestly, Judge, if the [c]ourt were to order that amount 

of restitution, I think it should go to Chase because regardless of how Chase 

applies it, it benefits the library either way because they still owe the money.” 

(N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 3/8/23, at 17). Thereafter, defense counsel added: 

“Your Honor, he’ll comply with the sentence. If the [c]ourt orders it, you 

know, then we can discuss whether we want to ultimately challenge that or 

whatever. But if the [c]ourt sentences it, and he’s to make payments on it, 

he’ll pay.” (Id. at 18). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court imposed 

the sentence, and Appellant raised no further objection to the evidence 

supporting the restitution award. (See id. at 24-25). 
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Restitution is a mandatory component of the sentence for 

any crime in which a victim’s property is stolen, converted 

or otherwise unlawfully obtained. In determining the 

amount and method of restitution, the court: [s]hall 

consider the extent of the injury suffered by the victim. 

However, a restitution order in a criminal case does not bar 

the victim from further recovery from the defendant in a civil 

action.

When determining the amount of restitution to be imposed 

as part of a defendant’s sentence, the trial court must look 

to the losses the victim would not have suffered but for the 

defendant’s criminal conduct. 

Because of the statutory language “directly resulting from 

the crime,” restitution under [Section] 1106(a) [of the 

Crimes Code] is proper only if there is a direct causal 

connection between the crime and the loss. ... Thus, the 

sentencing court is statutorily required to impose restitution 

under [Section] 1106(a) when the Commonwealth has 

established that the defendant committed a crime, the 

victim suffered injury to person or property, and there exists 

a direct causal nexus between the crime of which defendant 

was convicted and the loss or damage suffered by the 

victim. 

Risoldi, supra at 460-61 (internal citations, footnotes, and most quotation 

marks omitted). 

Instantly, the aforementioned testimony established that Appellant used

the library’s credit card to make unauthorized, personal purchases while 

working as a librarian. Additionally, during his interview with Trooper Bauer, 

Appellant explained that it was his responsibility to pay the credit card bill “by 

submitting receipts to the treasurer who then approves the money from a 

[bank] account to be used to pay off the credit card balance.” (N.T. Trial, 

12/13/22, at 73). Thus, the library suffered damages when Appellant utilized 
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library funds to pay for credit card bills that included Appellant’s unauthorized 

purchases. Because Appellant’s criminal conduct was the but-for cause of the 

damages, the court properly awarded restitution. See id. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

DATE: 06/10/2024