Affirmed and Opinion filed August 16 , 2016

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 15

- 00688

- CR

DAMONTE BONDS , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 337th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1436427

O P I N I O N Appellant Damonte Bonds raises two court

- costs issues in this appeal from his aggravated

- robbery conviction. He asserts that (1) he was not provided a bill of

court costs as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 103.001 and (2) asses sing court costs under Texas Local Government Code section 133.102
violates the Texas Constitution and United St ates Constitution. We affirm.2 B ACKGROUND Appellant pleaded “ guilty ” to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and
was convicted of that offen se

. The trial court sentenced him to seven years ’
confinement

. A ssessed court costs amounted to $259.00 , including $13.06 to fund
rehabilitation services

. A ppellant challenges the assessment of these court costs.

B ILL OF C OSTS
In his first issue, a ppe llant asserts that he was not provided a bill of costs as required by Code of Criminal Procedure article 103.001

. Appellant requests that we enjoin the Texas Department of Criminal Justice from taking money from his
inmate account until he is provided a b ill of costs.

In 2015, the Legislature amended Code of Criminal Procedure article 103.001, entitled “Costs Payable,” effective June 19, 2015, to read:
(b) In a court other than a justice or municipal court, a cost is not payable by the person charged wit h the cost until a written bill containing the items of cost is: (1) produced; (2) signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer who is entitled to receive payment for the cost; and (3) provided to the person charged with the cost.
Tex. Code Cr im. Proc. Ann. art. 103.001 (West , Westlaw through 2015 R.S. ). To resolve appellant’s first issue, w e must determine if appellant was provided with a bill of costs within the meaning of this statute.
Issues of s tatutory interpretation are question s of la w that we review de

novo. See Williams v. State, 253 S.W.3d 673, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When interpreting statutory language, we focus on the “‘collective’ intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation.” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 7853

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

. To determine the collective intent of the Legislature, we
look first to the literal text. Id. Th e statutory language provides the best means to determine “the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment.” I d. We construe an unambiguous statute according to its plain meaning, unless such a construction would produce an “absurd result.” Clinton v. State , 354 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785

– 86).
Appellant asserts t hat the costs assessed against him are not payable because he was not provided with a written bill containing the items of costs, as required by
article 103.001. Because t he Code of Criminal Procedure does not define “provided ,” the word is “to be taken an d understood in [its] usual acceptation in common language.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 3.01 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.)

. The verb “provide” means “make available for use; supply.” N EW O XFORD A MERICAN D ICTIONARY 1406 (3rd Ed. 2010). The word, as commonly used, means that if one is to be “provided” with something, one must have that thing supplied to him or at least made available to him. See id. Appellant states in his appellate brief that “[a]n accompanying bill of costs, dated August 10, 2015, lists court costs as $259.00 ,” and he cites page 65 of the
clerk’s r ecord to support this statement. Appellant’s statement shows that appellant has seen “a written bill containing the items of cost

. ” See Tex. Crim.
Proc. Co de Ann. § art. 103.001

. Article 103.001 does not identify a particular actor who must provide the bill of costs but specifies that the cost is not payable until the bill is provided. Because appellant has seen and examined the bill of
costs, w e conclude that the bill of costs wa s supplied to appellant or at least made
available to him. Thus, a ppellant has been provided a bill of costs. See id.4

Inasmuch as our record reflects that the bill of costs has been provided to appellant, we find no merit in his first issue

. Without dec iding whether the relief

a ppellant seeks is proper, we overrule appellant’s first issue

. C ONSTITUTIONAL C HALLENGES

In his second issue, a ppellant asserts Local Government Code section
133.102 violates the Texas Constitution and United States Constitution by authorizing the trial court to collect $133.00 as court costs, $13.06 of which is used for comprehensive rehabilitation. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 133.102 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Appellant argues that using court costs to
fund rehabil itation efforts violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and a rticle I
, s ection 17 of the Texas Constitution because his private property was taken for public use without just compensation.
See U.S. Const. amend. V ; Tex. Const. art. I, § 1 7

. Appel lant asserts rehabilitation
is w ithin the province of the executive branch.

To prevail on appeal, a ppellant was required to preserve error in the trial
court on his challenges to the c onstitutionality of the statute under t he United
States Constitution and Texas Constitution

. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Johnson v.
State , 475 S.W.3d 430, 434 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. filed). Appellant relies on the Court of Criminal Appeals’s holdings in Johnson v. State
, C ardenas v. State
, and Landers v. State in arguing that he was not required to object in the trial court regarding his constitutional challenge to the court costs assessed against him to preserve his complaints for appellate review

. See Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ; Cardenas v. State, 423 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ; Landers v. State , 402 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). But, a s this c ourt stated in Johnson
, neither Johnson nor Cardenas hold s “that a defendant who had an op portunity to present a challenge to the5

constitutionality of a statute imposing court costs in the trial court may raise his constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal. ” Johnson , 475 S.W.3d at 435. Similarly, the defendant in Landers did not h ave an opportunity to object in the trial court, and the high court limited its holding to situation s in which the
defendant had no opportunity to object. See Landers , 402 S.W.3d at 255.

A ppellant had an opportunity to object to the $13.06 of court costs a llocated

to fund ing rehabilitation. These court costs , established in section 133.102, are mandatory and convicted persons have “constructive notice” of mandatory court costs imposed by statute. Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 389 ; Cardenas
, 423 S.W.3d at 399

. Becau se appellant had constructive notice of the court costs, appellant had an opportunity to object in the trial court. See Johnson , 475 S.W.3d at 435. Appellant was required to preserve error and b y not v oicing his complaints in the
trial court , a

ppellant f

ailed to preserve error

. See id. We overrule a ppellant’s
second issue.

C ONCLUSION Appellant has been provided a bill of costs as required by Texas Code of
Criminal Proce dure article 103.001. Appel lant did not preserve error in t h e trial

court on his claim that Texas Local Government Code section 133.102 violat es the
Texas Constitution or United States Constitution. Having overruled both of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Wise. Publish

— T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2( b).