U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

57–735 CC WASHINGTON : 1999

S. HRG. 106–225

HEARINGS ON THE NOMINATION OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE TO SERVE AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 17, 22, AND 24, 1999

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

ROD GRAMS, Minnesota

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director

EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director

(II)
CONTENTS

THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1999

Page

Biden, Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ............ 4

Boxer, Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, prepared statement of ............... 34

Helms, Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, opening statement ................ 1

Holbrooke, Hon. Richard C., nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to the United

Nations .................................................................................................................. 10

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 16

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, U.S. Senator from New York, statement ................. 9

Warner, John W., U.S. Senator from Virginia, statement ................................... 7

TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1999

Biden, Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ............ 47

Helms, Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, opening statement ................ 45

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 46

Holbrooke, Hon. Richard C., nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to the United

Nations .................................................................................................................. 59

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 60

Johnson, Harold J., Associate Director, International Relations and Trade

Division, General Accounting Office, accompanied by Mr. Tetsuo Miyabara . 47

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 122

THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 1999

Ashcroft, John, U.S. Senator from Missouri, prepared statement of .................. 110

Biden, Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ............ 86

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 87

Helms, Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, opening statement ................ 85

Holbrooke, Hon. Richard C., nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to the United

Nations .................................................................................................................. 89

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 89

APPENDIX

Responses of Harold J. Johnson, General Accounting Office, to additional

questions submitted by Senator Rod Grams ...................................................... 119

Article submitted by Senator Boxer from the New York Times entitled, ‘‘Deny

Rape or Be Hated: Kosovo Victims’ Choice’’ ...................................................... 135

(III)
(1)

THE NOMINATION OF HON. RICHARD C.

HOLBROOKE TO SERVE AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1999

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room

SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Grams, Frist,

Biden, Sarbanes, Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone, Boxer and Torricelli.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JESSE HELMS, U.S. SENATOR

FROM NORTH CAROLINA

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order to begin consideration of the nomination of Richard C. Holbrooke to serve as

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and as a member ipso facto

of the President’s cabinet.

Mr. Holbrooke’s nomination was announced by the President on

June 17, 1998, but it was not forwarded to the Foreign Relations

Committee until February 10, 1999, almost 1 year later. The delay

was caused by an 8-month-long criminal investigation of Mr.

Holbrooke by the Department of Justice for alleged violations of

U.S. ethics-in-government while he worked for Credit Suisse First

Boston, and they always have initials after this, CSFB. In February, Mr. Holbrooke paid a $5,000 fine to the U.S. Government to settle that case and it took the Department of Justice

8 months to settle the case against Mr. Holbrooke and this committee obviously will be challenged to do so within the day’s hearings

alone.

The Justice Department’s task was to determine whether Mr.

Holbrooke violated the law. The committee has a broader mandate.

We are obliged to determine not only whether Mr. Holbrooke followed the law, but also whether he exercised good judgment of the

kind reasonably expected of and by a member of the President’s

cabinet.

U.S. ethics-in-government laws are based on a simple premise,

that government service must not be a means to advance private

interests. According to the executive branch’s own Office of Government Ethics, such laws are designed to ensure that executive

branch decisions are neither tainted by, nor appear to be tainted
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by, any question of conflict of interest on the part of the employees

involved in the decisions of government.

Now then, I can understand that some of these laws may be difficult to interpret for the average government employee, but Mr.

Holbrooke cannot scarcely be regarded as an average government

employee. He had the entire Credit Suisse legal team at his disposal, not to mention the counsel of the State Department Legal

Advisor’s office to help him walk whatever ethical minefields may

have existed, if any. But time and time again, Mr. Holbrooke chose

either not to seek ethics advice or to ignore it when it was given.

To most government employees, Mr. Holbrooke’s life, when he

left the State Department in February 1996 must have appeared

ideal. He was paid an annual salary of at least $1.35 million by

Credit Suisse First Boston while working long hours for the U.S.

Government as a special government employee from 1996 to 1999.

In addition to this impressive annual salary, he supplemented

his income during those last 3 years with almost $900,000 by

speaking with audiences and writing about the very issues that

were part of his duties while he was special government employee

to the U.S. Department of State.

Now, the ethics laws of this government are very straightforward

regarding what is expected of every senior government level employee in these circumstances. First, after leaving government,

every employee—Mr. Holbrooke included in that, must observe a 1-

year cooling off period. And he obliged to observe a 1-year cooling

period under that law and that statute, but the law broadly forbids

any business contacts with officials, for and including in Mr.

Holbrooke’s case, U.S. Ambassadors stationed all around this

world.

Second, senior government employees, including special government employees like Mr. Holbrooke, cannot earn outside income,

making speeches or writing articles on issues directly related to

their area of professional responsibility.

And the law barring contacts with an official foreign agency is

there for a very clear reason. It is intended to prohibit unfair or

undue influence or even the appearance of undue influence by such

officials over their former colleagues and subordinates.

Now, when Mr. Holbrooke began traveling abroad for his new

employer, Credit Suisse First Boston, he appears to have made no

effort to observe the legally prescribed cooling off period. In fact,

when Mr. Holbrooke called U.S. Ambassadors in Germany, they

hosted receptions, they precipitated meetings and even accompanied him to meet with the country’s top government leaders.

Mr. Holbrooke sought to justify these numerous meetings with

foreign leaders in the company of senior U.S. officials by arguing

that he was wearing, as he put it, his government hat as a special

envoy for Bosnia. In other words, he would not say on behalf of the

$1.35 million employer, CSFB. He was there on behalf of the U.S.

Government simply to discuss U.S. foreign policy interests. So each

meeting, he contends, was not covered by government ethics laws.

But U.S. embassies did not see things quite so clearly. Indeed,

some of them professed confusion over the nature of Mr.

Holbrooke’s professional role after he left the State Department.
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And I suggest a simple way to determine which hat Mr.

Holbrooke was wearing: Who paid the bill for his trip. In most

cases, CSFB, not the State Department, picked up the tab. And Mr.

Holbrooke says the CSFB had nothing to gain by these meetings,

and of course, Richard Holbrooke had nothing to gain either. In

which case, we must conclude the CSFB was simply being a good

corporate citizen, underwriting Mr. Holbrooke’s diplomacy on behalf of the American Government.

Then there is the matter of Mr. Holbrooke’s income from articles

and speeches. In 1996 to 1999, Mr. Holbrooke continued to speak

to private organizations and corporations about the Clinton administration’s foreign policy, whatever that is, especially Bosnia, and

he earned enormous fees for these speeches, according to the

record.

But here again, the law is simple and clear, it seems to be, a

U.S. Government employee, including special government employees, may not receive compensation from any source other than the

U.S. Government for teaching, speaking, or writing, or matters that

relate to the employee’s official duties.

Yet, throughout his tenure as the President’s special envoy for

Bosnia, Mr. Holbrooke capitalized on his post-Dayton Accords representation. In 1996 he was paid almost $200,000 in speaking fees

and another $150,000 in publishing fees. One article, ‘‘Backsliding

in Bosnia’’ was published May 20, 1996 by Time magazine and it

dealt exclusively with Bosnia and implementation of the Dayton

Peace Accord. Time magazine paid him $3,000 for the article and

he continued to receive such fees right up until January 1999. Indeed, over a 3-year period, his speaking fees earned him roughly

$900,000.

Now, Mr. Holbrooke could have avoided such conflict by seeking

and following the advice of either CSFB lawyers or the State Department legal adviser, but the fact is Mr. Holbrooke rarely asked

for legal advice to be sure he followed the appropriate rules. In the

one documented instance in which Mr. Holbrooke did request the

advice of the Office of the Legal Adviser, he didn’t like the advice

he was given and he simply disregarded the written counsel.

Finally, beyond the laws of conflict of interest, Mr. Holbrooke

was presumably obliged to follow the directives of the Executive orders 12731 and 12674, as well as Executive 12834 issued by President Clinton on January 20, 1993, his first day in office. The Clinton order required all senior appointees to sign a pledge to which

they agreed to forego lobbying any officer or employee of the executive agency that employed him for 5 years. Lest we forget, this

Presidential order was issued with promises by President Clinton

to have what the President then called or described the most ethical administration ever. Mr. Holbrooke signed that pledge, and the

information before the committee indicates that the pledge was implemented, so here we are.

I am being candid because I feel it is my obligation to be. I understand that Mr. Holbrooke denies that he violated either the letter or the spirit of any law, and I understand that he feels aggrieved by the scrutiny of the Justice Department as well. And this

hearing will provide him with an opportunity to answer publicly

once and for all the serious ethical questions arising from the State
4

and Justice Departments’ investigations. He will get a fair hearing,

and we will take as long as necessary to work through these issues.

Now, as Senator Biden knows, we have planned an additional

2:30 meeting this afternoon if it proves necessary to continue this

morning’s hearing. Senator Biden and I intend to move to executive

session immediately following the public question and answer period so that where the specific privacy of other individuals may be

involved, Mr. Holbrooke will have the opportunity to answer in private.

One final personal note. I continue to hear that the chairman of

this committee held up this nomination. I want it to be known that

we invited, we begged, we pleaded with the White House and the

Justice Department to furnish documents relative to this case. The

White House frankly said we were not going to get them. The Justice Department said nothing. It was not until a month ago that

the President of the United States called me late one night from

Germany and said how about the nomination? I said you will get

the nomination just as soon as we get the papers. He said what papers? I told him. He said by God, you will get them tomorrow, and

we did.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, U.S.

SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, let me say the press has been

asking me the last year, you and the chairman have such different

philosophies, how come you never disagree? Well, get ready. We

have become and have been close personal friends, and we made

an agreement early on in our careers and early on in this relationship that when we agreed to disagree, we’d be agreeable in the disagreement.

It will not surprise you that I disagree with the perception that

you have about Mr. Holbrooke’s ethical conduct, and I hope in this

hearing, and I know you will provide the opportunity that context

can be provided for a number of the assertions that have been

made, and I in no way question your motivation. I in no way question, I might add, by the way, you could not have held this hearing

much earlier, even if you didn’t ask for those documents because

there were ongoing investigations at the Justice Department and

at the State Department. So I, for one, do not fault you for delaying

the hearing. There are a lot of other reasons why we got to this

point.

Let me indicate, though, at the outset, that after having reviewed an incredibly voluminous record here, I will state my conclusion at the outset. I have reached a conclusion that there is

nothing in the background or conduct of Mr. Holbrooke that would

justify him not being confirmed based upon any of his behavior relative to the Ethics in Government Act or any other ethical conduct,

any other accusation relating to conduct.

I believe the President has made an excellent choice. In my view,

Mr. Holbrooke is one of the most able diplomats that this administration has put forward and quite frankly, has been put forward in

the 27 years that I have been in the U.S. Senate.
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This country has been, and I think will continue to be, very well

served by having a person of Mr. Holbrooke’s character represent

us at the United Nations and quite frankly at this juncture in our

history.

Mr. Holbrooke’s record as a diplomat stretches back into the

early 1960’s when he entered the Foreign Service and was immediately assigned to the embassy in Vietnam. In the late 1960’s he

served with one of the giants of this century, Averell Harriman, as

a member of the delegation to the Paris peace talks.

In the Carter administration, he served with distinction as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and at

the time he was the youngest person ever appointed to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

When President Clinton took office, Ambassador Holbrooke reentered government service as our Ambassador to Germany, but

this was very short-lived, when in September 1994 he was called

back to Washington to become an Assistant Secretary of State for

European and Canadian Affairs.

The key challenge facing him upon his return to the United

States was a conflict in Bosnia, an issue that in those earlier days

I spent a lot of time bending his ear on and he was always patient

to listen—which by then had been raging since 1972. As Assistant

Secretary, Mr. Holbrooke helped design and implement a strategy

that culminated in the signing of the Dayton Accord in 1995 which

brought an end to the war in Bosnia.

It cannot be denied that the Dayton Accord process was a singular achievement, I believe, for American diplomacy for which

many people deserve credit, including three fine government servants who gave their lives in the tragic accident in Mount Igman

outside of Sarajevo. But I’m convinced that Dayton would not have

succeeded without Ambassador Holbrooke’s tenacity and imagination, quite frankly, and the determination, tenacity and creativity

he brought to the job served this Nation well.

Along the way to Dayton, he and his team also resolved a longstanding diplomatic dispute that seems now not to be a big problem, but it was a big deal then, and that is the dispute regarding

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Three and a half years ago after Dayton, peace continues to prevail in Bosnia, though much remains to be done. But the dire predictions of the doomsayers I think will be proven wrong. The war

has not resumed and not a single American, thank God, has been

killed in military encounters.

Since leaving full-time government service in February 1996,

Ambassador Holbrooke has continued to serve the country as unpaid advisor and diplomatic troubleshooter for European security

matters and Balkan policy.

In 1997, the President asked him to take on an additional task

of Special Presidential Envoy to Cyprus. All the easy jobs. Even

while his nomination for the United Nations was pending earlier

this year, at a time when most nominees would have resisted any

assignment that may have jeopardized the nomination, Ambassador Holbrooke agreed to Secretary Albright’s request which I actually ran by you, if I am not mistaken, Mr. Chairman, to travel
6

to Belgrade to make a last-ditch effort to avert the conflict in

Kosovo.

Let me state it plainly. We need Ambassador Holbrooke at the

United Nations and we need him there now. Although the U.N. Security Council is no longer the dangerous place that our colleague,

Pat Moynihan described in his book over two decades ago, it is very

tough territory, with many challenges to U.S. interests by some of

the other permanent members of the Council.

The agenda for the United States and the U.N. and the Security

Council is a long one, from U.S. reform to Iraq to Kosovo. Ambassador Holbrooke is a determined defender of America and America’s interests and I am confident that he is just the person we need

in New York, particularly at this time.

Let me now turn to the primary subject of this hearing. The formal nomination of Mr. Holbrooke was delayed until February of

this year because ethics investigations undertaken not by this committee but by the Department of State inspector general and the

Department of Justice. As a result of these investigations, Ambassador Holbrooke paid a $5,000 fine in civil penalties to settle allegations that he violated the 1-year no contact limit set forth in section 207, subsection (c) of title 18 of the United States Code.

Although Ambassador Holbrooke did not and does not believe he

violated the law, he settled this matter in order to avoid further

delay in the nomination that would have resulted had the Justice

Department pursued a civil lawsuit.

As a matter of fact, for full disclosure, he called me to ask what

he should do about that. I told him that I believe that absent a settlement, this could drag on and it was his decision to make, obviously, but I believe were I he, I would settle the matter so this

could get to the point where we could have this hearing.

Our task as a committee is not to sit as a court of law, relitigating the legal issues involved in Ambassador Holbrooke’s action, but

our task rather is to review these matters and decide whether Ambassador Holbrooke, who has been confirmed by the Senate on

three previous occasions, should be disqualified from confirmation

because of these matters.

And I think you stated it accurately, Mr. Chairman, what our

role of our scope of responsibility is. I’ve closely reviewed the matter investigated by the inspector general. The record that has been

assembled during this review is voluminous, running several thousand pages.

I believe strongly that none of these matters even approach the

level where they should be considered as disqualifying. I left the

Judiciary Committee as—I didn’t leave it as chairman. I left as

chairman because the Republicans won, but I left as the ranking

member because I was sick and tired of investigating other people,

literally. But here I was back, with my old hat on after 17 years

of experience as the chairman and ranking member of Judiciary,

plowing through investigative reports and I’ll say again. I strongly

believe that none of these matters even approach the level where

they should be considered as disqualifying.

I do not dismiss the ethics charges lightly. The laws were written

for a good reason. But I do not believe for 1 minute that Richard

Holbrooke is an unethical person. I do believe, however, that Rich-
7

ard Holbrooke is a dedicated public servant and I find it incongruous with his character and his commitment to the public good

to suggest that he intended to violate the law.

The record before the committee demonstrates Ambassador

Holbrooke’s dedication to public service.

Over the course of three decades, he has made immeasurable

contributions to American foreign policy and U.S. security and over

the last 3 years he spent an extraordinary amount of his time serving the government without receiving a dime of compensation. It

should be noted that although if he in fact violated the laws, it

could be argued he benefited from the appointment.

The truth of the matter is this was not like the government was

paying him to do any of this. It was like it used to be 25, 30 and

40 years ago, I say to the Senator from Virginia, when men of stature and standing would divert from their primary responsibilities

and take on for no pay service requested of them from their President.

Mr. Chairman, we have a right and a duty to examine these matters. I believe the committee has done so thoroughly and I hope

this hearing will allow us to close the door on these ethical matters. I welcome the nomination and hope the committee will move

forward expeditiously once we conclude the hearing.

And again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for convening

these hearings. It has been a long road to this date, but I want to

emphasize again, you were not the reason for the delay.

And I would say it another way, which you will not maybe view

as particularly complimentary. If you had decided you didn’t want

him under any circumstances, we learned from experience that

that would be a fait accompli. We would not be having a hearing.

I am not suggesting you are going to vote for Mr. Holbrooke. I don’t

know what you are going to do. But I am suggesting that if you

wanted to kill Mr. Holbrooke’s nomination, you demonstrated that

you are fully capable of doing that, and so the delay here was not

of your making, and I am happy to say that we are underway and

by the grace of God and goodwill of the neighbors, maybe we will

get this finished in a timely fashion so that we can get an up and

down vote on the floor of the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, I think. We have two witnesses, two

distinguished Senators prepared to come here today to talk about

our nominee. Pat Moynihan of New York got tied up in another

thing that he is obligated to do, so we welcome Senator Warner of

Virginia. You may proceed, sir.

STATMENT OF HON. JOHN W. WARNER, UNITED STATES

SENATE

Senator WARNER. I thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of

the committee. I earlier met with Senator Moynihan. He is appearing before the Finance Committee for the purpose of introduction

of the prospective Secretary of the Treasury and his statement that

I ask be placed in the record ahead of mine as the distinguished

Senator from New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I listened very carefully to your

important remarks and may I say that as the chairman of the
8

Armed Services Committee and having been a member of that committee for 21 years and having dealt with many, many cases in

which questions of ethics have arisen, I commend you and your

staff for looking into this issue with great thoroughness, and I’ll

have further comments on it in my remarks, but I also join Senator

Biden, with whom I have consulted about this nomination for many

months, and corroborate without any equivocation or statement

that you personally or your staff or anyone else on this committee

contributed to the delay in this nomination.

The proper sequence of events had to take place. They were timeconsuming, and we are here today, nevertheless. As a matter of

fact, I think it is almost gratuitous that this nomination come before the Senate at this time because I cannot think of another individual that I have known in a public service career in national security matters, Armed Services matters over 30 years who is better

qualified or has had more experience to take on this position at

this critical time in America’s history.

I say that very forthrightly, Mr. Chairman, because obviously,

throughout this nominating process, I said to myself, yes, Dick

Holbrooke is a friend of several years, but he is not a constituent.

Why would you want to come and, so to speak, put my credibility

on the line when I do not know all the facts. But I decided it was

in the interests of the country to do so, and that is why I appear

here today.

I remember very well in September 1991 I flew into Sarajevo on

a C–130 bringing in food and witnessed for the first time the conflict in the Balkans. From that day forward, and after many, many

trips to that region, southern Europe, I am still perplexed as to

why and how these fights between these people predicated largely

on religious background, ethnic diversity continue not only to

plague that region of the world but indeed the whole world, to

some extent.

I think that situation is the most serious facing the United

States and its security today, paralleled only perhaps by strategic

balances between the former Soviet Union, now Russia, and China.

Therein is a problem that is going to be with us for many years.

I don’t know of any other individual who has spent more time trying to resolve the problems in that area, not only from the standpoint of America’s security, but that of our European allies, than

Richard Holbrooke, and it is for that reason that I am happy to

come here today and pleased to sit beside him and say that I think

he is eminently qualified and that I would hope that eventually

this committee would confirm this distinguished American.

Senator Biden went through his record. I think the members of

the committee have it before them. It is extraordinary. I wonder

how in a relatively short lifetime he has been able to achieve these

many public service undertakings and indeed undertakings with a

wide range of non-governmental organizations. Today joined in this

hearing room is the president of one of the refugee organizations.

Refugees is key to the solution of this problem and Mr. Holbrooke

was associated with that organization for many years.

I noted he made 65 trips to China. Can we think of another nation in terms of our own security, whether it be economic security

or national security that is more important. He brings to bear an
9

experience in that region. And I could go on, but I want to close

with the following observations.

Hopefully he will undertake this post and bring stronger influence in this country into the United Nations. No one has tried

harder than the chairman of this committee, together with others,

to bring more reality into that organization, which is an essential

organization to this world, but at the same time, the management,

loss of funds, many other issues which are better understood to the

chairman, have to be improved and indeed resolved. I think that

individual is the best qualified to do that job.

And last, as we look at the southern region of the Balkans, the

men and women in the Armed Forces of the United States and the

18 other nations that have joined together to bring us where we

are in Kosovo today, taking great risks in life, spending large sums

of money.

We must consolidate that situation. We must bring about relief

to the people of that region, whether in Kosovo or the innocent citizens of Serbia, but in doing so, we have got to hold steadfast to the

principle we will not bring about infrastructure improvement and

other improvements other than humanitarian until the government

of Milosevic is out of there.

This individual, I think, is best qualified not only to represent

our country, but to lead other nations in reaching that result.

And furthermore, to impress upon, primarily the European members, that the major cost of such reconstruction that is undertaken

in that region be borne by European nations and others. The

United States has done its share. I think this individual can be a

very strong advocate.

I close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I brought to bear what experience I have had in ethical matters. I have not had all the files

before me, but I did examine, I did speak with them at some

length, and I feel that your criteria, whether or not he exercised

good judgment, is the proper one. He who will shortly explain to

the committee that there were some errors made and he will, I

think in a very humble manner, press his views on that.

But I believe that the committee will be able to find in his conduct a pattern which is acceptable, and I say acceptable because

our committee does not have the complexity of this dual hat, on the

one hand being in the private sector and on the other hand, trying

to serve, as Senator Biden says, a dollar a year type person. We

do not have the volume of cases before my committee and of course

I think that is the challenge of this committee is to sort through

that.

Mr. Chairman, I see my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from New York has arrived. We will withdraw your statement

from the record and let you present it in persona. I yield you the

floor.

Senator MOYNIHAN. That will be the chairman’s prerogative.

The CHAIRMAN. You are welcomed and may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, UNITED

STATES SENATE

Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you. Briefly but with much emphasis

and conviction, I am here to introduce to the committee, who vastly
10

needs no introduction as such, but to remark generally about the

post to which he is going, has been assigned, which is to say to be

our Permanent Representative to the United Nations. That is a curiously ambiguous term. I was Permanent Ambassador to the

United Nations for 8 months, until I opened the New York Times

one morning and there was a column by James Reston which said

that the President and the Secretary of State wish he would go, but

they don’t know how to tell him.

Sir, that was a very low point in the history of the United Nations. The Soviets were on their last expansive mode. They had a

Third World alliance made up of a big majority in the General Assembly, and they used it just to terrorize Western interests, Western values, and the values of the other charter itself. That has all

seceded, but we have—now, we have real opportunities. We need

a real representative.

Ambassador Holbrooke has been there from the Mekong Delta

through service in every manner, position. He was our Ambassador

to Germany. He was the Assistant Secretary of State for European

and Canadian Affairs, and he was called back from private life to

manage the Dayton negotiations which led to the peaceful settlement, the settlement in Croatia and Bosnia.

Now, as U.N. representative, he will be presiding over the aftermath of our action, NATO’s actions against Serbia, against Mr.

Milosevic, and the emergence in Kosovo of a hugely damaged society with deep animosities. We won’t be out of Kosovo for a long

time, sir.

In the meantime, what we do there will be at the behest and

under the supervision, under the surveillance of the United Nations. Give me a man on the Security Council who is equal to that

challenge, and I know no better person than Mr. Holbrooke. I

thank you for the honor of making a statement.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be delighted for you to stay with us

for the entire hearing, but I expect you have other things to do.

Senator MOYNIHAN. I’d like to get out of the line of fire, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Holbrooke, if you would stand please and

raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole

truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. I will remind you that you will be under oath for

all hearings before this committee, and for the purposes of questions submitted to the committee. And I know you understand

those obligations. I thank you, sir, and you may proceed with a

statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, NOMINEE TO

BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE RANK AND

STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator Warner, and Senator Moynihan, and members of this distinguished committee, I am deeply honored and profoundly humbled

to appear before you today. I would like to thank President Clinton
11

for nominating me and for his continual support. Allow me also to

thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the patience and fairness with which

you and this committee have treated me during the long delay to

which you referred since the President announced his intention to

nominate me for this position.

I want to echo what you said in your opening statement, Mr.

Chairman, in regard to the fact that no part of the delay was

caused by this committee. Statements to that effect, including some

that unfortunately came from people in the executive branch last

year, were misinformed and inaccurate, and you, I am sure, know

that I never echoed those statements and regard the treatment of

this committee of me as entirely fair and appropriate from the beginning.

I want to thank the two Senators who just introduced me for presenting me; that they both took time to introduce me means more

to me personally than I can begin to say, especially since both of

them had senior positions in the executive branch, Senator Warner

as Secretary of the Navy, Senator Moynihan as Ambassador to the

United Nations.

Watching Senator Moynihan taught all of us a great lesson about

waging peace in what he called a dangerous world, a dangerous

place, and helped shape my vision of both the promise and the pitfalls of the U.N. I think his Ambassadorship while short, was a

turning point in our realization that the United Nations, although

full of promise, was deeply flawed, and that we had to work on reform.

Mr. Chairman, let me also speak about the long association that

I have had with this committee. You are the fifth chairman of this

committee I have had the honor to testify before, starting when I

appeared before Senator Sparkman in 1977, for the first of three

posts for which I was nominated, unanimously supported by this

committee and unanimously confirmed by the Senate. Beyond that,

sir, I am fully committed, and have been throughout my career, to

the principle that Congress must be involved throughout the policy

process, not just on the crash landings, but on the takeoffs, and I

have seen a number of crash landings on which I think the Congress was not adequately consulted.

If confirmed by the Senate, I would consider myself, as I have

in the past, responsible not only to the President and the Secretary

of State, who gave me my operational orders, but to this body

which has confirmed me. I hope each of you would consider visiting

the United Nations mission in New York where, if confirmed, my

door will always be open to you. The staff that works for the U.N.

mission will always be available and your advice always welcome.

It is very important that the American officials in New York get

a firsthand understanding of what their elected representatives

wish them to believe in and do, and that the U.N. Secretariat and

the other Ambassadors get a better understanding of why we have

such concerns, concerns which I share and will address in a moment.

Mr. Chairman, if you permit, I would like to briefly mention the

members of my family who are here today. May I do so, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, absolutely. I wish you would.
12

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Unfortunately, my wife Kati and her son Christopher Jennings cannot be here today. They have a long-scheduled

annual mother-son outing. My wife will be here for the subsequent

sessions. As you observed coming in, a large number of other family members are here, and I would like briefly to just mention

them. I am terribly fortunate that my two sons, my pride and joy,

are here. David Holbrooke is the one who you asked whether he

was a basketball player or not. He is tall enough, but not good

enough for your great teams in North Carolina. He is here also

with his fiance ́e, Sara Bosch, and I noticed that Sarah’s 3-year-old

daughter is here and behaving very well.

My second son, Anthony Holbrooke, a refugee worker, is also

here. My stepdaughter, Elizabeth Jennings is here as is my brother-in-law, Andrew Marton.

In addition, I’d like to just particularly thank my mother, who

has come here today from New York and is seated right behind me,

and my father-in-law, Endre Marton. Their lives illustrate in a

sense part of my lifelong commitment to public service. Both are

refugees from a Europe torn apart by war and by communism. My

mother left Germany because a farsighted person, her father, my

grandfather, in 1933 understood that Germany was not going to be

a safe place for Jews anymore. She came to this country where she

met my father, who also had left as a refugee from the Bolsheviks

at the time of the revolution in Russia.

My father-in-law and my mother-in-law, who is not here today,

are true heroes of the sort we always celebrate, survivors of Budapest under Hitler, and then survivors of Budapest under Stalin. As

a journalist for the Associated Press, Endre Marton was the last

journalist filing out of Budapest at the time of the revolution in

1956. I am sure many of you in this committee will remember, as

I do, the famous last message from Budapest saying, ‘‘the Soviet

tanks are coming in, will anyone help us?’’ He was the man who

sent that message, and I am proud he is here today.

I only wish that my father, who died when I was in high school,

could be here today also. Excuse me.

When I was a young boy, my parents often took me to see the

great buildings of the new organization rise in the East River in

New York. And—I am sorry, sir, it is very hard to talk about my

father because he is not here.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand, sir.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. My father talked to me about his—perhaps I

should just submit this for the record. I don’t think I am going to

be able to read the part about my father.

The CHAIRMAN. We’ll get together and I’ll talk about my father

as well. I feel the same way about mine. You are impressing me

on this point.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. My apologies. He dreamed—he took me to the

U.N. when I was a child, along with my mother, as buildings were

going up on the East River. He dreamed that these would be the

buildings that would change the world, and it is an extraordinary

full circle that I stand before you today as a nominee to be an

American representative to the U.N.

But that dream he had, that noble dream, is not possible anymore. That was an idealism of the 1940’s that crashed upon the re-
13

alities that Pat Moynihan and you and so many others have pointed out, and which I have encountered myself time and time again.

The goal of American policy should be to strengthen and reform

the United Nations, not to destroy it, but also to be very frank

about its shortcomings. Destroying it is not an option, and, in the

long run, weakening it would hurt us. The goal that best serves our

interest is to make the U.N. more effective, more responsive and

more efficient. I pledge to you, members of this committee, that if

confirmed, I will make this issue, U.N. reform, my highest sustained priority.

Before moving to a more detailed discussion of the United Nations, allow me to address briefly the chain of command in the executive branch. Although the job for which I am being considered

today carries with it cabinet rank, the person holding it should receive his or her instructions from and work for the Secretary of

State, the President’s senior foreign policy advisor and spokesperson. I believe strongly in this view, which I expressed for the

first time publicly over 18 years ago in an article, and I have never

wavered in that.

It is especially fortunate that I would be working for Madeleine

Albright, an old friend with whom I have worked closely during

two administrations and outside the government for over 20 years.

In the last 6 years, she and I have stood shoulder to shoulder on

such critical issues as Bosnia, NATO enlargement, Kosovo and

U.N. reform, sharing our thoughts in private over endless phone

conversations and meetings, advocating similar positions within

the Council of Governments, and sharing meals together. She gave

a wonderful dinner in honor of my wife and me when we got married. She shares with my wife, as she puts it, the common bond of

being refugees from Central Europe. My wife being Hungarian, as

I said a minute ago, a refugee of the class of ’56, Madeleine

Albright being from a family that left earlier. She was a professional colleague of my father-in-law at Georgetown, and they are

close on most issues. I would be delighted if the Senate confirms

me. We would be able to collaborate deeper.

It is precisely because of our position in the world today that the

U.N. has changed and offers challenges and opportunities. During

the cold war, most of the strategic issues we dealt with could not

be addressed within the U.N. because of the virulent racism which

some nations made use of in the U.N. for their own propaganda

purposes. I am thinking particularly of the ‘‘Zionism equals racism’’

resolution, but there were other examples as well, and they deeply

disillusioned people like myself, who began with that initial dream.

Things aren’t quite so bleak today, but an enormous amount still

remains to be done.

With the cold war over, we find that almost every issue from

Kosovo to the many crises in Africa, to East Timor, to the Middle

East is an important United Nations concern. We need to make the

system work with us and achieve outcomes that are compatible

with our national interests and our goals. This is not easy, but it

is far from impossible. It requires leadership, clarity of purpose and

strength. It requires the resolution of the difficult issues that include arrears payments and reform, bloated bureaucracies and

budgets. Thanks to the efforts of this committee, and especially
14

Chairman Helms and Senator Biden, the administration is now in

a position to solve the arrears problem and advance our reform

agenda at the U.N.

I want to affirm today to all of you my full support for the legislative package which this committee and the administration have

agreed upon. And if confirmed, it will be my highest priority to get

this package fully implemented.

In addition to the package, I would make one additional point beyond the package. I am a hard-line hawk on the issue of bureaucratic bloat, whether it is in Washington or New York, and I will

additionally do everything I can to reduce things which don’t make

sense to me as I walk the halls of the U.N.

Of deep personal and professional interest to me, in part because

of my family’s history, is the role the U.N. plays on the issue of refugees. On a personal note, I have served on the board of the International Rescue Committee, as Senator Warner mentioned, and as

chairman of Refugee International, whose president is here today.

My son Anthony works for Refugee International in Washington.

These issues, perhaps because of my family background, are of special concern to me. They are not going to go away. Each issue is

treated with urgency, but in fact they go on and on as we have

seen in Kosovo, the Sudan, Cambodia, and elsewhere, and the U.N.

must play a central role in dealing with them.

We also have to play a key role in pushing the U.N. and ourselves to deal with issues which don’t get enough attention but

could explode. One that comes to mind is the problem of AIDS in

India and in Africa, where the doubling rate is so large that we

have to deal with it or it will undo all of our other efforts.

I have not been satisfied with what I have seen with refugees

and other things from Cambodia to Bosnia in my travels, but my

goal is not to weaken them but insist on better performance. While

some academics call them soft issues, they are not. They are the

real issues of the future for our children and grandchildren.

The Security Council has also played an important role in promoting our interests, and we have to continue to strengthen it. The

U.N. has also done some good on keeping pressure on human

rights in some countries, including Iran, Iraq, Burma, the former

Republic of Yugoslavia by which I do not mean Macedonia, I am

talking about Belgrade, the Sudan and Cuba. And it has authorized the creation of the international war crimes tribunals for

Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

I have worked closely with the two chiefs. I talked to Ambassador Sheffer only yesterday about the attempt to bring criminals

to justice. I believe it is vitally important we do so, and as you

know, sir, I believe that the indictments of war criminals are an

important part of the policy.

No area of U.N. activity has been more controversial than peacekeeping. I have written elsewhere quite bluntly about the serious

problems that the U.N. and UNPROFOR confronted in Bosnia. The

operation did save lives, but it was deeply flawed. We paid a portion of that price because we had no control over its activities, a

fact which I do not think should be permitted to happen again.

This mission failed to deal with the underlying causes of the war

and almost destroyed the U.N. itself. And it took the NATO bomb-
15

ing, the Dayton peace agreement and the NATO-led peacekeeping

force to save Bosnia in the way that you and Senator Biden and

Senator Warner already mentioned.

On the basis of that experience, put me down as a skeptic about

some forms of U.N. peacekeeping, but not all. The U.N. has proved

it can deliver the goods in some areas, do some good, deliver important successes from El Salvador to Mozambique and the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. They have had partial success, at

a minimum, in reducing tensions and stopping fighting in Cambodia and Cyprus. I will work closely with our allies on these

issues to improve this critical function.

Mr. Chairman, allow me now at the close of my statement to

comment on the ethics issues which you referred to in your opening

statement. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1962, I have been

fully committed to public service, which has been the most challenging, rewarding part of my professional life. Indeed, for many of

the last 37 years, it was my life.

Like other public servants, I have been extremely sensitive to

issues concerning ethics and possible conflicts of interest. Less than

a year after I took up my post as Ambassador to Germany in the

fall of 1993, Secretary Christopher asked me to return to Washington to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

I agreed, on the understanding that, for family reasons, I could

stay only a year and would then have to return to New York City

as a private citizen. I then delayed my departure from Washington

for an additional 6 months because of the negotiations that culminated in the Dayton peace agreement and the end of the war in

Bosnia. Eventually the time did come to leave, but the Secretary

of State requested that I remain available to the State Department

as an unpaid advisor.

On February 21, 1996, I resigned as Assistant Secretary of State

and began work as an investment banker for CS First Boston with

both domestic and international responsibilities. At the same time,

I became an advisor to the State Department on a pro bono basis.

This created, as you have noted, a potentially complicated situation, but from the outset, I kept these two roles separate.

I was well aware of the fact that I could not ask for assistance

from any State Department official in regard to my business responsibilities. As a career Foreign Service officer, and a former Ambassador, I was especially careful not to take actions that would

undermine the role of American Ambassadors.

It was therefore common for me as a courtesy to inform Ambassadors when I would be traveling in their countries. They, in turn,

sometimes asked me to meet with government officials or journalists in order to explain or promote American foreign policy goals,

which I was honored and ready to do. Additionally, this was part

of what I had been asked to do as an advisor to the State Department while visiting both East Asia and Europe.

The issue later arose as to whether some of my contacts were inappropriate. I believe that these contacts were made in my role as

an advisor to the State Department, and I so asserted in the settlement agreement with the Justice Department. For its part, the

Justice Department did not allege a willful or intentional violation

of the law. They found no evidence that the contacts in question
16

resulted in financial gain to me or to CS First Boston. I settled

with the Justice Department on a civil settlement in order for the

confirmation process to move forward. Senator Biden’s memory is

correct of that conversation, and I had similar conversations with

other Members of the Senate.

In recent weeks, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I

have reflected long and carefully on these issues, and on what

caused the delay in scheduling this hearing since this delay was,

as we have all said, not a fault or result or caused by this committee. I knew the law, and I was careful to follow it. But I think I

did not realize how complicated it would be to avoid misperceptions

in some areas at some times because of the two roles which were

different. With regret, I must say that carelessness on occasion on

my part contributed to these misperceptions.

I recognize further that my recordkeeping and bookkeeping were

inadequate at times. Hence, the several corrections and messages

that I have submitted to the committee as I continually reviewed

the thousands of pages of documents which have been turned over.

I apologize to the committee and to your staff for any inconvenience

this has caused you, but as you know, as all of you know, I have

always turned over to both the executive branch and the legislative

branch every document requested in rapid fashion, seeking to withhold nothing.

Finally, I wish to assure you that I will pay even closer attention

to these matters going forward in the future. I believe deeply in the

need for the executive branch and Congress to work closely in the

formulation of national security policy. If confirmed by the Senate,

I look forward to continuing this close association.

I appear before you today with gratitude for your patience and

your understanding and the fairness with which you have treated

me and a continued belief that there is no higher calling for an

American than public service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and

members of this committee, for your kind consideration.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holbrooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the Committee: I am deeply honored

and profoundly humbled to appear before you today. I would like to thank the President for nominating me, and for his support. Allow me also to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the patience and fairness with which you and this Committee have treated

me during the long delay since the President announced his intention to nominate

me for the position of United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I particularly regret the reasons for the delay of the hearing. I am grateful

for your consideration and courtesy during this protracted period, and for holding

this hearing today.

I wish especially to thank Senators Warner and Moynihan for presenting me to

your Committee. That they both took time today to introduce me means more to me

than I can say. I have long relied on the wisdom, encouragement and advice of these

distinguished public servants, both of whom have held senior posts in the Executive

Branch as well, one as Secretary of the Navy, the other as Ambassador to India and

to the United Nations. Indeed, watching Ambassador, now Senator Moynihan,

‘‘wage peace’’ in the world he called a ‘‘dangerous place,’’ has helped shape my vision

of both the great potential and possible pitfalls of the UN. I am also intensely grateful for the associations that I have had with many other members of this Committee, past and present.

Those associations began in 1977, when this Committee first considered me for

a senior position in the State Department, the first of three times that this Committee, and the full Senate, unanimously confirmed me for positions in the service of

our nation. In the subsequent twenty-two years, I have testified repeatedly before
17

this and many other Congressional committees, and have had countless informal

discussions with members of Congress. I have always been committed to the principle that Congress must be consulted and involved fully throughout the policy process—that, in the words of the old adage, Congress should be in on the take-offs, not

just the landings. Foreign policy cannot be formulated, let alone succeed, unless it

is forged in a bipartisan spirit between the two branches. If confirmed by the Senate, I would consider myself responsible not only to the President and the Secretary

of State for whom I work, but also to the Congress. I hope each of you would consider visiting the U.S. Mission in New York, where my door will always be open

to you, the staff always available, and your advice always welcome.

If it is agreeable to the Chairman, I would like to introduce members of my family

who are here today. Unfortunately, my wife Kati Marton and her son, Christopher

Jennings, cannot be here today because this hearing coincides with a trip to Colorado they make every year. But Kati looks forward to being here for the hearing

on June 24. I am fortunate, however, to be joined today by so many other people

who are close to me, starting with my pride and joy, my two sons, Anthony and

David, and David’s fiancee Sarah Bosch, my stepdaughter Elizabeth Jennings, and

my brother-in-law Andrew Marton.

I am especially pleased that my mother Trudi Kearl, my father-in-law Endre

Marton and my mother-in-law Ilona Marton are all here. Their remarkable stories

mirror the drama of the century, and have given special personal meaning to my

efforts as a public servant. My mother left Germany, along with her family, as soon

as the Nazis took power, thanks to the farsightedness of my grandparents, who recognized instantly that Hitler meant what he had said about the Jews. My father

and his mother, my grandmother, had fled Russia earlier when the Communists

took over, and then left Europe altogether for much the same reasons as my mother’s family. I only wish that my father, who died when I was in high school, could

be here today.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, also to mention the extraordinary story of my parentsin-law, true heroes in the long struggle against Communism. Journalists for American wire services, they were both jailed by the Hungarian secret police as ‘‘CIA

agents’’ in the mid-1950s. In October 1956, Endre and Ilona Marton, now out of jail,

were the last journalists in Budapest with access to the outside world as the Soviet

Union crushed the Hungarian Freedom Fighters. It was Endre Marton who sent the

famous last message to the West pleading for help as the Soviet tanks closed in.

Then, after taking refuge in the American Embassy, they and their two small

daughters—one of whom is now my wife—were smuggled out of Hungary by the

American Embassy. Endre’s last message from Budapest helped bring many people,

including myself, into a new awareness of the evils of Communism, and was an important part of my own early political awareness.

When I was a young boy, my parents often took me to see the great buildings

of the new organization rising on the East River in New York, and my father talked

to me of his dream that these buildings would be the most important in the world,

that they would prevent future wars. My father did not live to see how far today’s

reality has deviated from those early dreams, how they dissolved in the face of the

harsh realities of the Cold War, the frequent inability of the international community to forge a consensus when faced with crisis, and weaknesses inherent in the

UN system itself.

But I never forgot those initial visits and my father’s noble dreams. I wish that

he could have known that those early trips would somehow come full circle with

your consideration of me for this post. For, despite its many shortcomings, the

United Nations is still important to our national interests. Destroying it is not an

option, and, in the long run, weakening it would hurt us. The goal that best serves

our national interest, in my view, is to make the UN more effective, more responsive, and more efficient. I pledge to you that, if confirmed, I will make this issue—

UN reform—my highest sustained priority, even while I deal with whatever immediate crisis demands attention.

It would be a great honor to succeed Bill Richardson and Madeleine Albright in

this post. These two great public servants worked hard on reform, and I shall try

to live up to their high standards. I would also like to mention several other friends

and treasured associates, some now gone, who have served in this position—my respected colleague Tom Pickering; my former boss, the late Henry Cabot Lodge, for

whom I served as a staff assistant when he was Ambassador in Saigon; the late

George Ball, with whom I worked closely; former President George Bush, who has

always been gracious to me; Jeane Kirkpatrick; and my colleagues from the Carter

Administration, Andrew Young and Don McHenry.

Before moving to a more detailed discussion of the UN, I would like to take a

minute to mention the chain of command in the Executive Branch. Although the job
18

for which I am being considered today carries with it Cabinet rank, the person holding it should receive instructions from, and work for, the Secretary of State, the

President’s senior foreign policy advisor and spokesperson. This view, which I first

expressed in writing over eighteen years ago, has never changed. In this regard, it

is especially fortunate that I will work for Madeleine Albright, an old friend with

whom I have worked closely during two Administrations and outside the government. In the last six years, she and I have stood shoulder to shoulder on such critical issues as Bosnia, NATO enlargement, and Kosovo, sharing our thoughts in private and advocating similar positions within the councils of government. I would be

delighted that, if the Senate confirms me we may soon have the opportunity to deepen our collaboration.

It is precisely because of our position in the world today that our relationship to

the United Nations has changed and offers both challenges and opportunities. During the Cold War, most of the major strategic issues confronting us could not be

dealt with inside the UN because of the Soviet veto and the virulent racist use

which some nations made of the UN for their own propaganda purposes. President

Reagan summed it up well on the fortieth anniversary of the UN, ‘‘We acknowledge

its successes: the decisive action during the Korean War, negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty, and the laudable achievements of the UNHCR. [But we] must not

close our eyes to this organization’s disappointments, its failures to deal with real

security issues, the total inversion of morality in the infamous Zionism-is-racism

resolution, the politicization of too many agencies, [and] the misuse of too many resources.’’

Things are not quite so bleak today, although an enormous amount must still be

done. With the Cold War over, we find that almost every major issue, from Kosovo

to the many crises in Africa to East Timor to the Middle East, has an important

UN component. In order to maintain our present position in the world, we need to

make the UN system work for us, to achieve outcomes that are compatible with our

goals and national interests. As a principal founding member and the organization’s

largest contributor, the United States has the right and the obligation to demand

a more effective, focused, and disciplined UN.

This is not easy, but it is far from impossible. It requires leadership, strength,

and clarity of purpose. It also requires the resolution of the difficult set of issues

that include arrears and reform. Thanks to the efforts of Chairman Helms and Senator Biden, we are now in a position to solve our arrears problem and advance our

reform agenda at the UN. I want to affirm today my full support for the legislative

package which the Committee and the Administration have agreed upon. If confirmed, I will do everything possible to get this important package of reforms fully

implemented.

For my part I plan to work hard to create a better relationship with the UN. This

means: implementing legislation that resolves the arrears problem; achieving meaningful reforms in the UN system for a more streamlined, more effective organization; lowering the assessment rates for U.S. contributions; maintaining strict budget

discipline; and strengthening the work of the UN in key areas of concern to the

U.S.—especially refugee and humanitarian assistance, promoting democracy and

human rights, fighting international crime and narcotics, and, of course, peacekeeping.

Of deep personal and professional interest to me, in part because of my family’s

history, is the role the UN plays in addressing the needs of refugees. On a personal

note, I have served on the Board of the International Rescue Committee, and am

currently Chair of Refugee International. My younger son, Anthony, is also a refugee worker, now here in Washington. These issues are, unfortunately, part of our

world; as we have seen in Kosovo and the Sudan and elsewhere, they will not go

away. The UN must play a central role in coordinating the many international actors involved during large humanitarian crises—such as that currently playing out

in Kosovo. The UN also plays a key role in international efforts to combat AIDS

and dramatic environmental degradation in Africa. Although I have not always been

satisfied with what I have seen from Cambodia to Bosnia, I believe the answer is

not to weaken the UN, but to insist on better performance. I care deeply about this

issue, and will make it a personal priority. But large, expensive international conferences are not the answer. They have seen their day.

The UN Security Council has also played an important role in advancing our security interests—from providing the authority to repel aggression in Korea in the

1950s, to aiding President Bush in his efforts to secure the Gulf War coalition. Perhaps less dramatic, but also of great importance, the UN plays a critical role in protecting human rights and advancing freedom and democracy. Over the years, the

UN has kept pressure on countries such as Iran, Iraq, Burma, the Former Republic

of Yugoslavia, Sudan, and Cuba to treat their citizens with the dignity and respect
19

we sometimes take for granted, and has authorized the creation of the International

War Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, so important to our efforts.

Another set of important issues to me is combating international crime and narcotics. At the UN a new, consolidated office with dynamic leadership has advanced

global cooperation in combating such ills as heroin and cocaine production and trafficking. More can, and should, be done in this area.

No area of UN activities has been more controversial than peacekeeping. I have

written elsewhere quite bluntly about the serious problems with UNPROFOR in

Bosnia, an operation that, while it saved lives, was deeply flawed from start to finish, cost over $5 million a day, failed to deal with the underlying causes of the war,

and almost destroyed UN peacekeeping. It took NATO bombing, the Dayton Peace

Agreement, and a NATO-led peacekeeping force to save Bosnia. On the basis of that

experience, put me down as a skeptic about some forms of UN peacekeeping—but

not all. The UN has proved that it can do peacekeeping right, delivering important

successes from El Salvador and Mozambique to Eastern Slavonia and the Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In addition, the UN has delivered at least partial

successes in Cambodia and Cyprus, bringing violence to an end in these tortured

lands. I hope to work closely with our key allies and others in the UN to seek ways

to build upon these successes and to improve this critical function.

Let us recognize, however, that American leadership and influence are the tools

necessary to advance our goals and interests at the UN. And, it is a fact that our

leadership and influence have been weakened by the continuing crisis over our arrears. We are caught in a dangerous cycle: our ability to gain reforms is weakened

by our failure to resolve the arrears issue, and the arrears issue cannot be resolved

without progress on reforms. Together we must cut through this Gordian knot, and

we must do it now. For my part, I will be fully committed to ensuring the success

of legislation being worked out between the Congress and the Administration.

Mr. Chairman, I fully recognize the immense challenges facing us at the United

Nations. At the same time, I recognize that no challenge is too great, no problem

too large, when American leadership is effectively applied. And therefore, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working with you and this committee to ensure

strong and active American leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome any questions that you and the other members of this

Committee may have, and I thank you again for your courtesy and consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Holbrooke. I believe we are getting somewhere.

You understand as chairman of committees, sometimes we have

unpleasant responsibilities. I have the responsibility of having you

respond to a great many things that were given to us formally and

informally, and I made a judgment myself if I were in your shoes,

would want to take the oath. That is why I asked you to do it.

Now, I suggest we try 10 minutes on the first round to see how

we get along with the first one. Again, my questions are discussing

your status as a special government employee while you were also

working as a vice chairman for Credit Suisse First Boston. You

touched on this, but let me understand if I understand exactly

what you said. You told investigators that there was a seamless,

s-e-a-m, transition for your job as Assistant Secretary of Government Affairs with that as a special government employee. Now, I

would like for you to state for the record the exact date that you

became a special government employee. If you want to be refreshed

on that, we can delay the answer.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No; I can answer that immediately, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your comment about taking the oath. I am happy

to do that.

I became, in my mind, and in the understanding of my colleagues

of the Department, a special government employee on the day after

I resigned as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs.
20

The CHAIRMAN. You are a little bit soft-spoken. If you would pull

the mike a little bit closer to you.

Was there any disagreement with your understanding of that relationship expressed by anybody?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Not at the time. The inspector general of the

State Department quizzed me closely on this point because of an

anomaly that they believe they had found, but that issue was completely resolved. Affidavits were submitted from Secretary Christopher and other senior officials of the U.S. Government saying

that they treated me as a special government employee,—although

they don’t usually use that phrase, they call it senior advisor consultant—from the day after I left, on.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you told investigators, did you not, that

your swearing in as a special government employee on February

21, 1996 was a mock swearing in while you were having a farewell

party. Is that what you told them?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No, sir. What I said was, at 5:01 in the afternoon, during the party, we went into another room, and I took an

oath as a senior advisor to the State Department. It was a lighthearted kind of atmosphere because in the other room people were

saying good-bye, but there was nothing mock about it. I took it extremely seriously. There are eyewitnesses to it, many eyewitnesses,

and everyone has the same memory, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you may know who gave us the information that I have just referred to. You may want to check with that

individual, straighten out the record if he is willing to do so.

In any event, what led you to believe that you were a special government employee immediately after resigning as Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I was so informed by my successor, Ambassador

Kornblum, by his chief of staff, and by the Deputy Secretary. And

they began consulting with me, asking me questions, asking my advice.

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t want to have a debate with you, sir, but

the State Department in a letter dated to you February 21, 1996,

the day after you retired from the Department said your special appointment as a special government employee would begin only

upon your completion of a financial disclosure report. Do you remember that letter?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You submitted that report June 1996 after several members of the State Department requested that information.

On July 15, 1996, you were officially sworn in to a 1-year position

as an expert advisor to the Secretary on the Dayton Peace Accords

in Bosnia, European policy concerns, end of quote.

Now then, tell me again, why did you believe that you were a

special government employee during the period between February

21, 1996 and July 15, 1996?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I believed it, Mr. Chairman, because I was informed that that was my status by everyone. The papers in question I was working very hard to fill out. They were extensive.In the

meantime, I was being called on, on occasion for either advice, not

too much in this initial period, but some advice, or to do other

things on behalf of the U.S. Government.
21

The CHAIRMAN. Who told you? Did Madeleine Albright tell you

this?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No, sir. At that time she was at the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Christopher tell you that?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Christopher was aware of my status and

communicated with me either directly or indirectly through his

chief of staff, and through the Deputy Secretary and through the

Assistant Secretary of State designate who was succeeding me. I

believe that it was very widely known that I had this role.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to impress a point. I know you understand that even as a special government employee, all contact between you and U.S. Ambassadors on matters related to your corporate interests was prohibited under these laws. You get a 1-year

cooling off period. You knew that, didn’t you?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Absolutely. I knew it. I respected it. As I said

in my own statement, I respect that law and respectfully tried to

fulfill it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yet you considered yourself to be a special government employee as of February 21, 1996, and on May 20, 1996

Time magazine published your article ‘‘Back Stabbing in Bosnia,’’

for which you were paid, I believe, $3,000. Now, the law, Mr.

Holbrooke, prohibits all U.S. Government employees, including special government employees, from receiving compensation from any

sort other than the government of teaching or speaking or writing

relating to the employee’s official duties.

Now, if you believed yourself to be a special government employee for Bosnia when the article was published, why did you consider it legal or ethical to be paid by Time magazine?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I did not consider myself a special government employee for Bosnia. I was told that I was to be

a consultant on general European affairs, including Bosnia. The article was solicited by Time. I wrote it. It expressed my own personal views. It was based entirely on public information, and at the

time that I wrote the article, I did not anticipate traveling to Bosnia.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had to do it over again, would you do it?

Would you write the article or take the money?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I believe that I should have consulted the chief

ethics officer and asked him if I should or should not accept the

honorarium. I would have then done whatever he told me to do in

accordance with what the regulations meant.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don’t want to badger you. I didn’t come

here to do that. But we have had a lot of people writing to us, people who have been associated with you or worked with you, et

cetera, and they have raised questions which we have looked into

as best we can, and I discussed this. We did not want to be overbearing, but we thought that we owed it to the Senate and to you

to raise a question so that you can explain.

Now, from February 21 until July 15, 1996, either you were a

private citizen and prohibited from all contact with any State Department official on matters relating to corporate interests, or you

were a special advisor to the Secretary of Bosnia and, therefore,
22

prohibited from being reimbursed on writing or speaking on matters.

One last thing. I need to know which law you think you violated.

He is not here to hear you.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I deeply regret that. I had the honor of having

a good conversation with him. The message did not come out.

Mr. Chairman, as numerous affidavits submitted to your committee made clear, I considered myself a consultant to the State Department and was so considered by other people. My successor, for

example, gave your committee an affidavit that stated that, ‘‘on

February 21, 1996, I was present at a ceremony at which

Holbrooke was sworn in as a special advisor to the Secretary of

State, European matters. It does not mention Bosnia. I also received and signed certain papers during that ceremony. I was considering that Holbrooke became a special advisor as of February

21, 1996.’’

The CHAIRMAN. Bosnia is in Europe, is it not? One quick question. In the months following your retirement from the State Department, you embarked on a number of business trips, including

an extended tour of Central Europe, Korea, and three trips within

8 months to Sweden, and the CSFB paid for the cost of travels to

these countries?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me quote what you told the investigators.

‘‘Permit me a brief explanation of how I function. I don’t normally

go in to solicit specific transactions. I go in to talk to people, and

on a particular trip I might see the head of the Central Bank or

Minister of Finance or the Prime Minister.’’ Would it be fair to say

that CSFB may have benefited by your merely talking to these senior leaders?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that to be the

case. The business that the CSFB was involved in and these meetings were not related.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to yield to Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because the ethics

laws are complicated, I think they are complicated, and because

you are in a complicated position of being a former employee, still

an unpaid employee, but paid by an investment bank to your primary job, the technicality of the rules cuts both ways. It can cut

in a way that hurts, or it can cut in a way that helps your position.

And I want to state to the chairman of the committee at the outset, the reason this is not going to merely be on my part point,

counterpoint but I am not taking issue with the chairman to take

issue but to further expand on each of the issues that are raised

to see whether or not the context clarifies or muddles the issue.

Let me begin with your special employee status. From our—from

the record, and from the committee’s investigation, Secretary

Christopher on February 21, when you were resigning and being

sworn in at the same time, one room and another room, said that

from that moment on, he—he thought the weeks and months after

your departure that he may have had contacts with you. He was

aware of these continuing contacts with the State Department.

Talbott said from February 21 on that he relied upon Holbrooke for

advice regarding significant foreign policy matters. I am quoting, ‘‘I
23

regularly benefit from Holbrooke’s counsel and assistance on issues

including Bosnia and NATO and other matters in late February

1996 and thereafter,’’ et cetera.

Now here, here is the problem. I mean, people sit home and you

watch this and wonder what’s this all about. The issue, if I can

frame it, is, you technically weren’t an employee until you filled out

your financial forms and an agency within an agency said, OK, he

can be a special employee. Technically, that’s what the law says.

But practically, from the day you had your party saying good-bye

there was nothing that stopped. Nothing stopped in terms of the

consultation of you by everyone from Kornblum to Talbott and others in the Department, and so the real issue here is did you technically violate? What did you think? Were you supposed to think

when they were calling you, well, I am really not a special envoy,

even though they called me to ask me to go see someone or to make

some comment or give some advice. That technically I am not an

employee until I get these forms filled out. That is really what we

are talking about here because the only significance is if, in fact,

you were not a special employee during that period, and if you saw

an Ambassador, there would be no rationale for you seeing an Ambassador, it is implied, other than for you seeking help with that

Ambassador for your company when, in fact, you have seen an Ambassador or any other government official was the purpose, you

thought, you are arguing during that period of fulfilling your responsibility as a special employee, an unpaid employee, is that

right?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator Biden, I never sought any business advantage for myself or my firm.

Senator BIDEN. I understand. The reason it is confusing to the

audience I think if they don’t know the minutiae of the law, and

what is the significance of whether or not you were an official employee on July 15 or February 21.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I understand—I never sought any business advantage, whatever my status, and no person interviewed by the inspector general made such an allegation.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. On your question, I was responding to requests

by the U.S. Government, the State Department and elsewhere. I

believe that that was the right thing to do. I believed I was doing

it as an advisor. You have the affidavits that support that contention. I did what the government asked and——

Senator BIDEN. Not having been a member of the State Department and no longer practicing law, let me try to convert this to the

way people in Wilmington, Delaware, understand it. You took a

trip, for example, to Slovakia, to carry a message to the President

of Slovakia during this interim period between February 21 and

July 15. Now, that trip wasn’t paid for by the Federal Government,

was it?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No, sir.

Senator BIDEN. So a reasonable person looking at it on its face

might say, wait a minute, now, this guy wasn’t a special envoy.

First Boston paid his ticket, so what the heck is he doing talking

to the President of Slovakia. It must be because he is doing it for

business reasons.
24

Now, the fact is you didn’t go there for the purpose of seeing the

President on your behalf or on the behalf of First Boston. You were

asked by the U.S. Government to go.

Now, the point the chairman is making is a legitimate one. If you

weren’t an employee, an unpaid employee of the government, then

you say wait a minute, what the hell were you doing there? It must

be for your personal reasons. But that is not why you were there,

so this issue of whether you were officially a special, whatever the

heck it is called, special employee of the government, whether that

occurred on February 25 or on July 15, whatever the relative dates

are is for purposes of whether or not you did anything wrong, in

my view, I would argue is irrelevant. You were asked by the Federal Government, the Government of the United States, to go in a

capacity of representing the government, even though probably

Kornblum and Talbott and the Secretary of State didn’t know at

that point you had not completed your financial disclosure forms,

and so you officially weren’t there. The only point I am trying to

make here is the context of these things is important.

It goes to motive. It goes to whether or not you were going to do

your job for the American Government or you were going to Slovakia in this case to do your job for First Boston. It seems to me

clear you were going to do the job for the American Government.

Now, the second point I would make to you is this Time magazine article. This is how things cut both ways. It may not have

been wise for you not to consult the ethics gurus at the State Department, although I am not sure how they clarify things very

often, having spent a lot of time with the ethics gurus at the Justice Department, but even if, as you say, you considered yourself

a special government employee, the article in question doesn’t violate the rule because the rule applied to you in a quite narrow way,

and let’s—this is the minutiae I am talking about. It bars ‘‘speeches or article for money if written, if the writing deals in significant

part,’’ that is the quote, ‘‘or particular matters involving specific

parties in which the employee has participated or is participating

personally and substantially.’’ By the standard of our own technical

rules, regardless of whether you were a special employee or not,

you did not violate the rule.

This writing about Dayton was a general piece. It was not about

particular matters involving specific parties; rather it was a general piece under which this narrow rule that applied to you is permissible.

Now, I am just trying to point out how this can catch you or not

catch you. I don’t—I doubt whether you sat there and thought

about the rule when you wrote the article. Maybe you did. But I

wouldn’t have. And said if I write this article is this a particular

matter of how specific parties participated.

The reason why the Justice Department said, hey, he didn’t do

anything wrong is because the particular rule, whether you know

it or not, you particularly satisfied. And—but it shows to me how

this gets very, very, very complicated, and, as we used to say in

law school, it emphasizes form over substance.

Now, the—this notion in the opening statement which is a legitimate point to make that you disregarded, simply disregarded written advice by the legal advisor from the State Department, I want
25

to make it clear what we are talking about here. The only advice

that you disregarded that I am aware of involved the guy sitting

behind you who had a crack at Cyprus, too, and he is your lawyer.

He has been your friend for how many years?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Twenty.

Senator BIDEN. Twenty years. And the issue is whether or not

Dick Beattie should have been involved in any way with you in any

legal matters where you sought his legal counsel, and in particular,

in negotiating your employment contract with First Boston. The

record contains a memo to you dated December 20, 1995 suggesting

that you should not use Beattie, then the Presidential envoy to Cyprus, but also your long-time lawyer, to negotiate any employment

or book contracts. The memo was written by Thessin, a deputy

legal advisor at State.

Thessin wrote that ‘‘because Beattie was a subordinate of

Holbrooke and Holbrooke intended to, and because you intended to

concentrate on Cyprus during your final days in office, he believed

it would not be prudent,’’ end of quote, to use him for negotiations

for your contract. You didn’t take the advice. You used him to negotiate your employment contract.

And the reason you didn’t follow the advice from my understanding from the record is that he had been a long time attorney and

personal friend and you considered this a personal matter. Moreover as a Presidential envoy, Mr. Beattie, although you gave him

personal policy guidance, he worked directly for the President, not

for you.

So to the best of my knowledge, the only State Department or

advice coming from anyone in the Justice or legal department of either the State or Justice that you disregarded, I think you disregarded without violating any law, but you did disregard it. You

said, I want Beattie. He may be special envoy to Cyprus. I may still

be doing this. You say it is not prudent. No one tells me it is not

illegal, I want Beattie. He has been my lawyer for 20 years. Is that

an accurate assessment of the relationship?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir. ‘‘Would not be prudent’’ is not an instruction not to do it. I discussed this issue with Mr. Beattie after

I received the memo. I never viewed him to be, and I am sure he

never viewed himself, as my subordinate.

Senator BIDEN. He still doesn’t.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. He was a Presidential emissary for Cyprus, and

we worked together on the issue. Moreover, he was to be compensated by First Boston and not by me. I respect Mr. Thiessen

enormously as the ethics advisor of the State Department, and I

followed the other parts of the advice in that memo to the letter.

But when he said it would not be prudent, I think everyone in the

State Department understands that that is not a formal ruling and

Mr. Beattie had been my lawyer, and as I said, we discussed this.

Senator BIDEN. My time is up. I thank the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I will give you advance notice that I have

in hand a copy of the eyes only memorandum of December 20 written to you by James H. Thiessen, and I am going to comment on

that later.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
26

Ambassador Holbrooke, the committee has received a memo that

states the background of the ethics questions that have been

raised. Chronologically, it indicates that when the President announced his plans to nominate you back on June 18, 1998, events

proceeded until July 8, 1998, when apparently a letter from an

anonymous source arrived at the State Department alleging that

you had violated Federal conflict of interest statutes. This apparently was the genesis of the investigation which proceeded for 8

months by the Office of the Inspector General of the State Department and the Justice Department.

I am curious, just from your observation of that process, whether

you have any idea what would have caused 8 months of investigations to ensue at that point. A letter was received, apparently from

an anonymous source; can you give us any clues from your standpoint on what took 8 months to look into?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for that question. I

was not, of course, aware of the anonymous letter at the time, but

once I was aware of it, I can say and I think this is fully confirmed,

that the specific charges in that letter were disproved, and that is

quite clear.

Senator LUGAR. How rapidly was that the case? When were

things approved?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. It is difficult for me to answer the larger part

of your question. Why the process took as long as it did is a question I think is more appropriately addressed to those people who

conducted the investigation. They did their job and it is over. It

wasn’t the most fun I have ever had in my life, but I cooperated

fully with it, as I intend to cooperate fully with this committee, and

the cause of the length of time is something you have to ask them.

Senator LUGAR. Was the letter itself so voluminous that it contains a raft of allegations each of which would call for exclusive

interviews with individuals? What I am trying to ascertain is how

did this anonymous letter from apparently someone who didn’t like

you blossom into a monumental issue involving thousands of

pages?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Again, Senator, the question needs to be more

promptly addressed to the inspector general. The investigation

went far beyond the charges in that letter.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I suspect that, and this is not the appropriate time to do that because we are hearing your statement today

and your testimony. I am simply curious as to what in the world

goes on over in the OIG office of the State Department. I think that

really is a subject of substantial inquiry of public interest.

It simply appears to me, having now witnessed this sort of thing,

that our country is not being well served when we cannot have an

Ambassador to the U.N. for a year simply because bureaucrats at

the State Department, all feeling they are doing their duty, are indulging themselves and making work for themselves in this process.

Now, I say this because you finally have come to the conclusion

of this when the settlement comes on February 9. Essentially the

agreement asserts that the communication did not result in any financial gain to Holbrooke or his firm.
27

The agreement also states your actions might have been in the

United States national interest. As a matter of fact, after all these

millions of pages have been addressed, you come down to the fact

that you made a contact with the South Korean Ambassador who

invited you to an opening in which CS First Boston’s first branch

was opening in Seoul, Korea. We finally get down to South Korea.

We come down to what happened with Ambassador Laney at the

branch opening or what didn’t happen. In essence, the agreement

states that the United States has not alleged that there was a willful violation nor did it result in financial gains. As I recall, Ambassador Laney has already given his side of the story, that he did not

feel importuned by the process, no matter whose office may have

been investigating this. You may finally come up at this point with

an interesting colloquy in dealing with South Korean affairs.

Admittedly, Senator Biden has developed that the Time magazine honoraria, in terms of subject matter and duty, that these are

questions of judgment which are fair game for inquiring to date.

But the agreement that you signed finally says that you asserted

at all times you were acting as a special government employee, and

therefore it was appropriate to communicate with State Department and embassy personnel.

I suspect that is probably right. A normal American looking at

all of this would say you have been sent out to these places as a

troubleshooter. I think arguably the best negotiator this administration has. It is clear that you probably would want to talk to

some of these people and if you didn’t want to talk to them, they

sure wanted to talk to you. This would require a monitoring of your

phone lines to keep out all the people from the State Department,

from the private sector, from the press, from everybody who would

want to talk to you continuously throughout all of these missions

to Cyprus or Bosnia, or wherever you were. These were high-risk

missions in terms of your diplomatic representation and this is a

reason why too many people weren’t asked to take them. You were

being asked to take them.

In the midst of all of this, somebody who doesn’t like you very

much is suggesting that, given this pause of a year, and this special representation situation, you exercised bad judgment, that you

made some contacts which you should not have made. That is, I

suppose, a fair question on which all of us must make judgment,

as we all will, in voting for you or not voting for you. But I just

simply want to use this as a colloquy in which I have done most

of the talking to indicate that it is important to me as a matter of

public interest what goes on in the OIG business.

We have had some problems in trying to confirm a Director of

the CIA. It ended up with committee members walking on eggs for

fear we were going to offend someone there working through a

George Tenet’s nomination. We needed a Director of the CIA. That

is what the country needed. As a matter of fact, he was absolutely

clean. But the country did not have the service of this individual

for a period of time because of these procedures. Something is occurring here in our government that is not good. Your nomination

brings it to the front in my judgment.

Having said that, my own view of you is that you are an extraordinary diplomat. Your service to the country has been remarkable.
28

I wish that in all cases that you had used impeccable judgment but

I know of no person in our government who ever has. I suspect in

this particular instance that you have had to prove more than most

of us ever will, and in my judgment, you have done so very well,

so I will support your nomination.

I am delighted that you are here and that you have survived the

process to date. I appreciate the chairman’s calling the hearing because it gives us an opportunity to have some clean air and water

on the whole process, and I hope you will be successful.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar, for those

kind remarks. I would just like to make one brief technical comment. I appreciate your comments on my general service because,

during these three and a half years, I was carrying out whatever

was requested of me. As you pointed out, these missions weren’t a

lot of fun and they involved danger, and, at least in one case, getting shot at last year in Kosovo. But there is one technical point

I’d like to clarify, and that is the ribbon cutting in Seoul. I did not

ask Ambassador Laney to go to that ribbon cutting ceremony. He

is a great Ambassador, and I have great admiration for him. As the

person who headed the Seoul office of First Boston noted in an affidavit, ‘‘I was arranging a ribbon cutting ceremony at a CSFB

branch in Korea to be held in May 9th. In connection with this

ceremony, I contacted the U.S. Embassy and did so entirely on my

own and having done so entirely on my own. Ambassador

Holbrooke did not suggest or request that I contact the Embassy.

I was responsible for making all the arrangements concerning the

ribbon cutting ceremony, including those relating to Ambassador

Laney’s participation.’’ Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am

pleased to welcome Dick Holbrooke before the committee. I have

read through all of this material and have thought about it. It

seems to me if we are not careful we are going to get to the point

where we lose an important asset, I think Dick Holbrooke is an important asset and am concerned we might discover we can’t use

him on behalf of the national interests of our country. Obviously

what happened here is, you left full-time government employment,

but there were many people in the government who thought that

you had the knowledge and an expertise that they wanted to continue to draw upon. Let me be clear on a couple of things. I can’t

find evidence anywhere that in any of these meetings or contacts

you discussed the private corporate business you were engaged in.

Is that correct?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. That’s correct.

Senator SARBANES. I have looked through the record and don’t

see any instance of anyone saying this meeting was arranged with

some government official of some country and Holbrooke used it as

an opportunity to push his private company. I can’t find that anywhere. I have looked for it pretty carefully.

Let me just follow this Korean issue for a moment. How long

have you known Kim Young Sam, the President of Korea?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I first met Kim Young Sam in 1978 when I was

at the State Department, and he was a private citizen in Korea.
29

Senator SARBANES. And were you at that time the Assistant Secretary for the area?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. As I understand it, part of your job was to

ensure his safety, is that correct?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir. He was in great danger during that period. I was working hard to promote democracy in Korea and elsewhere, and he was in danger of being jailed. I played a supporting

role in the policies under both the Carter and Reagan administrations that evolved Korea’s democracy and led to his becoming President.

Senator SARBANES. Ambassador Laney says, in this affidavit he

gave, that you were, ‘‘ well-known to Koreans as a former Assistant

Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, who had played

an important role in U.S.-Korean relations at a difficult period during the late 1970’s. In particular, he had been instrumental in formulating policies to help protect several leading dissidents in

Korea from either jail or death. One of them we assisted was President Kim Young Sam of Korea. Ambassador Holbrooke’s trip,’’ this

was your trip out to Korea, ‘‘provided the embassy with an unusual

opportunity. He would make a major speech at the Asia Society—

the first any American official had made in Asia concerning the

new European policy; he could discuss European policy with senior

Korean officials; he could discuss Korean and German unification;

and all of this would show the Koreans that we considered them

an important ally of the United States.’’

Now, you didn’t need Laney to arrange a meeting with Kim

Young Sam. Actually you could have arranged a meeting yourself.

I mean, you had a previous long-standing relationship with him. Is

that correct?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I make that point because Winston

Lord, who was then the Assistant Secretary of State for the region,

said that he discussed with you, ‘‘the importance of communicating

the evolving policies of the U.S. in Europe to leaders in Asia. Ambassador Holbrooke and I agreed that it would be especially useful

for him to communicate such policy to Asians because he is a

former Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs himself. He was very well-known in the region. This was particularly

true in Korea because of his long and intimate involvement there,

including his personal relationship with President Kim Young

Sam.’’

Winston Lord goes on to say, ‘‘as a former Ambassador, I believe

strongly that if Ambassador Holbrooke had visited an important

leader in Asia without involving the American Ambassador to the

country in question, it would have been improper as well as potentially damaging to the interests of the U.S. and the position of that

Ambassador. In my view, the most appropriate way to arrange

such a meeting would be to allow the Ambassador to arrange it directly—if he chose to—so that it would reflect most favorably on

that Ambassador’s role as the focal point of all significant contacts

with senior officials.’’ In fact, when you communicated with the

Ambassador, you asked if he thought it was appropriate to arrange

a meeting. So it raises a possibility that if you had ignored the Am-
30

bassador, it in effect would have undercut his position with the

Government of Korea, and with this newly elected President, for

whose protection you had fought for some 20 years earlier.

This thing is getting incredibly involved and complicated, but in

such a way that we are not really able to do what is obvious. Your

visit to Korea was important. The embassy sought to use it to further their purposes and the interests of the country. In fact, had

you not at least offered to work through the embassy channels, it

would have severely undercut the Ambassador in his position in

the country.

Now, I think it is very important for that to be understood. I

could go through a similar exercise with respect to Swedish allegations that exist.

Now, I can’t understand why it took so long to run through all

of this. When the inspector general got an anonymous letter, was

that letter then furnished to you by the inspector general?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. May I just check with counsel? It was not.

Senator SARBANES. Well, that was my understanding. That gives

me a great deal of concern. It seems to me that you should have

been furnished with these allegations. There wasn’t a name at the

bottom of the letter. I have read the letter. I don’t think the person

would have been identified by the concept of the letter. The notion

that these charges or allegations come floating over and the person

against whom they are made isn’t even furnished the allegations,

is something I can’t understand. Unless you let them do it anonymously, you won’t receive a copy. In other words it is kind of the

whistleblower argument. Even that gives me some pause. But nevertheless, it seems to me that at a minimum, the content of what

the person was alleging against you should have been furnished to

you. Otherwise, you are dealing with some cloud out there that you

can’t get your hands on.

Now, I don’t understand why the inspector general took so long.

Apparently, they went all over the place. I don’t know whether the

further matters they investigated were sort of engendered by the

inspector general or whether there were further allegations against

you. This thing grew into a full-time occupation for them. Meanwhile, you are held up. We can’t get your nomination here at the

committee. I think the committee has moved in a reasonable fashion since we received the nomination.

We received it in February of this year. Since the IG has done

all of this, we have had to do a certain amount. Here we are having

the hearing in June and hopefully, this will conclude the matter.

I think you have rendered over the course of your career a terrific

service to our Nation.

I don’t think people of this talent ought to simply be thrown on

a scrap heap, and I very much hope you will work through this

process in a conscientious and thorough way over the next few days

so that we may move this nomination forward.

I think our country’s interests are being hurt by not having a

Permanent Representative at the United Nations. It is an extremely important position. There are issues before the U.N. that

are of very pressing concern for the country, and we need to have

a Permanent Representative there. You would bring confidence,
31

ability and experience to that position, which I think would serve

the country well.

Thank you very much.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, may I very briefly, first of all,

thank you, Senator. Two quick points. In regard to the anonymous

letter, you asked if we received it from the State Department. The

answer is no, as I said earlier. But the person who wrote it, or

somebody else, did give it out to several journalists, in an effort to

further whatever their motives were. One of those journalists did

give it to us. So after about 2 or 3 months, we had a sense of what

was in it.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, that just only makes that

point so much stronger. Here is this anonymous letter that comes

in and starts an IG investigation. The IG doesn’t forward the letter

to the person whom the allegations are against. They then give it

to the press, who I presume came at you to ask about the content

of the letter. That is no way to do business and is not a fair process.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. May I make one more——

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I just wanted to make one more comment about

Korea, Mr. Chairman, in response to Senator Sarbanes’ comment.

If I could just quote from Ambassador Laney’s affidavit, his statement, which is available to your committee.

‘‘If Ambassador Holbrooke had arranged such a meeting, that is

with President Kim, without my participation, it would have been

a serious breach in protocol, given his continued role as advisor to

the State Department and his special stature, both of which were

known to me personally. Ambassador Holbrooke’s trip to Seoul was

helpful and useful and contributed significantly to U.S. and Korean

relations.

‘‘Holbrooke stressed to me that he needed to keep his government-related activities and his other activities entirely separate

and went out of his way to do so, refusing to use, for example, any

official embassy vehicles during his visit. At no time did he ask, did

he do anything or ask me anything that I consider either conflict

of interest or request made on behalf of any person on behalf of the

U.S. Government. I am grateful for him making this part of this

trip. It was helpful.’’

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grams.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that we are proceeding with the nomination of Richard Holbrooke to be the Ambassador to the United Nations. I think we are all aware of the importance of having that post filled and the fact that we can be voting this week on the U.N. reform package as part of the State Department reform recognizing the need for us to have an Ambassador.

If Mr. Holbrooke effectively addresses the concerns of this committee, I hope his nomination will be placed on the agenda the next

business meeting June 30. I am certainly going to have a longer

statement and questions later on for Mr. Holbrooke that will be at

our hearing at U.N. reform, however, given back the questions my

colleagues have, I want to yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Torricelli.
32

Senator TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I’d first like to thank you for

conducting this hearing procedure in this matter and doing so and

the serious nature of which this hearing has been held. I should,

however, in candor tell you that I more rightly should have appeared with Senator Warner and Senator Moynihan than here in

the position of asking questions.

I have known Mr. Holbrooke for more than 20 years. As a young

assistant to Walter Mondale, I traveled with Mr. Holbrooke around

the world and I saw it even when he was a young man the extraordinary talents he brought to this government.

It is, Mr. Chairman, I think now fair to conclude that on the

basis of the investigations of the last year, Mr. Holbrooke is now

potentially the most investigated member of the executive branch

of this government. And on the basis of thousands of hours of investigation and the expenditures of hundreds of thousands of dollars, we now know that Mr. Holbrooke cut a ribbon in Korea, wrote

a thoughtful article for Time magazine, and traveled throughout

Europe for the benefit of a private firm having paid some of his expenses while he was in furtherance of the interests of the U.S. Government.

I think it is fair that we should thank him for his service in

Korea in cutting the ribbon, commend to our colleagues that they

read the article, and express some gratitude to Credit Suisse for

paying expenses which more rightfully were owed by the taxpayers.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that like Mr. Lugar, I am left with the

impression that we are missing the real measure of character in

this government. The character of an individual that is necessary

to be in service to the U.S. Government is not measured by seeking

the most narrow interpretation of regulations against an endless

search for any facts that might in their most extreme interpretation be seen at variance.

Mr. Holbrooke, through his career, has more than proven his

character. He is in that unique position of an individual who can

actually look at his life and see wars that were not fought, villages

that were not destroyed, and people who are alive because of his

service. He has lived a most remarkable life.

It strains credibility to believe that a man who could have done

so much in the private pursuit of his interests has forgone such potential income because of his devotion to this government, would

have written an article, cut a ribbon, or engaged in these few trips

for any private benefit.

I have been, throughout my life, very proud to know Mr.

Holbrooke as a friend. It has been to the detriment of this government through the last year that Mr. Holbrooke has not been fully

available to the President of the United States and the Congress

of the United States at the United Nations.

This government needs Mr. Holbrooke in the United Nations far

more than Mr. Holbrooke needs to be at the United Nations. I am

grateful, Mr. Chairman, that you held this hearing because it is inexplicable at a time when the United States faces such perils from

the DMZ in Korea to resolving items in the Balkans to a changing

nature of our relationship with Russia and China that Mr.

Holbrooke is not in service to this government.
33

I have expressed, Mr. Chairman, to you privately as I have publicly my belief to the foreign policy team of the President of the

United States with matters in the Balkans coming to some resolve

at least temporarily that that team needs strengthening.

There is no one in this country, Democrat or Republican, who I

believe would bring more strength to that foreign policy team than

Mr. Holbrooke. I don’t know, I am the most junior member of this

committee, whether it is of any value, Mr. Chairman. I simply

want to add that if it is of some help to offer testimony to the character, to the service of Mr. Holbrooke, I want you to know I know

him as well as anyone in this government. You will not find someone of better character.

I also, Mr. Chairman, want you to know that I privately have

asked him very simply because I share the chairman’s views on

several issues regarding the United Nations, I believe the United

States has not paid its fair share of the United Nations dues

through the years. I believe we have paid our share and other people’s shares. I believe the United Nations has not been run efficiently. I believe it does require reform. I believe in seeing someone

in the United Nations for opportunities to save money and be sure

it is accountable and be sure this Nation is adequately represented.

I believe Mr. Holbrooke is sensitive to how that money is spent. I

believe you will never find a stronger personality or a better leader

to implement those reforms.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to leave the committee with this

if I could. I, like Mr. Sarbanes, am very troubled by the fact that

this government has been without this representation and this

man has endured this investigation based on an anonymous letter.

I believe that every department of this government has a file in

which anonymous letters should be filed. It is round, and it is

emptied every day.

We have whistleblower statutes to protect people who make allegations but people who have serious allegations should have the

courage to put their names with them. Finally, I want to just ask

Mr. Holbrooke a single question which I know he answers under

oath and on the record which comes to the central question of

measuring character. And that is simply this. In all of this travel,

Mr. Holbrooke, in all of these meetings, did in any way or your

firm ever gain privately by this travel or this representation for the

reimbursements they were making for travel, for the bills that they

paid, when you otherwise were in the pursuit of the business of the

United States Government? This comes down really to a single

question.

In the performance of your public responsibilities, was there ever

in any shape, manner, or form, private gain?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No, sir.

Senator TORRICELLI. It seems to me, Mr. Holbrooke, given the

service you have done to this country for which we are all very

grateful, the extraordinary character I believe you bring to public

life, that is the only essential question. No one can doubt your

abilities to perform this responsibility or the needs of the U.S. Government to have you in these responsibilities. That, therefore, Mr.

Holbrooke is the only question that I want to leave with the committee.
34

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the benefit of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I had to leave. The

women of the Senate held a press conference about Social Security

reform. I am very happy to be back here. I will be quite brief. I

would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be placed in

the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden for holding this hearing today.

I want to welcome Mr. Holbrooke and thank him for appearing before this committee today. I, for one, appreciate the patience and fortitude you have shown over

the past few months and am glad you could join us this morning.

It is so important that we have someone with your stature, your experience, and

your knowledge of international affairs representing U.S. interests in the United

Nations.

This nation owes you a debt of gratitude for your selfless devotion and public service to this nation over the course of your career. Let me just name a few of the positions you have held over the past four decades.

After joining the Foreign Service in 1962, Mr. Holbrooke was a delegation member

to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam. He later served as Peace Corps Director in

Morocco, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Assistant

Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Ambassador to Germany and as

a Special Envoy to both Cyprus and Kosovo.

And, of course, everyone knows of the key role Mr. Holbrooke played in ending

the hostilities in Bosnia through the Dayton Peace Accords.

He has represented American interests throughout the world, and this experience

will serve him well as U.N. Ambassador.

Because of his service to this country, Mr. Holbrooke has received countless

awards. Among these are the Humanitarian of the Year Award from the American

Jewish Congress and the Distinguished Statesman Award from the Anti-Defamation

League.

Mr. Holbrooke, you have been recognized by these and countless other organizations for your service and I wanted to add my name to those who appreciate your

hard work on behalf of the United States.

Mr. Holbrooke also brings his personal experiences to this position. Last June,

when he accepted the U.N. nomination, Mr. Holbrooke spoke about how when he

was eight years old, his father took him to the newly constructed buildings of the

United Nations.

His father told him how those buildings would become the most important in the

world and prevent future wars.

I’m sure that Mr. Holbrooke’s late father would be proud to see his capable son

representing the United States in those very same buildings.

I do want to say that I have reviewed the matters investigated by the State Department Inspector General and the Justice Department and am satisfied with their

conclusion that Mr. Holbrooke did not engage in a willful violation of the law, and

that neither he nor his firm benefitted from his actions. To that end, I will hold off

on any questions until the next two hearings dealing with the U.N. and Balkan policy.

Thank you again for appearing before this committee and your willingness to continue to serve this country.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator BOXER. I want to echo what Senator Biden said about

the fact that you had your reasons why you couldn’t schedule this

and the fact that you have called a hearing now is something that

I am most grateful for. I totally respect your views on this matter,

and I want to go into explaining why I respect them. Although I

do come to a different conclusion on this particular nominee, I

think you raise important questions that go beyond this nominee,
35

and I want to address that for a moment. After first saying that

Mr. Holbrooke, I was extremely moved by your statement. I feel

that in many ways this opportunity for you is in some ways fated,

given your background, the opportunity to give once again to your

country in this way in this particular institution that means so

much to you in terms of its potential, and that I do believe if we

are able to move this confirmation through, I think you will be outstanding because I think you will work—this is my belief, tirelessly

to move it in the right direction.

I also want to thank you for what you have done for your country. Many people would bypass the opportunity fraught with in

many ways danger, certainly didn’t enhance overall your ability to

earn funds in the private sector, and I want to pick up on the ethics issue in this way, Mr. Chairman, and I am saying it more for

you in a way.

For a long time, Members of the Senate and House were able to

take honoraria, until we voted not to do it any more. And the rules

on that said you could take up to $20,000 a year, and we took that

honoraria, most of us, not all of us and we gave a speech. It was

a bad system we have actually gotten rid of.

The reason I am bringing it up is this. There was something in

that rule that said the Senator or Congressperson had to look at

that and if there was a direct personal way you would gain, if there

was any other connection, you had to make that call. The point is

whether it is a cooling off period or the law bank the outside payment, their laws, I support. They are in some ways vague, and I

think the case in point here is a man with a tremendous amount

of experience, writes an article, I think he is right. He should have

gone to the ethics people and he should have lived by what they

said. He made a mistake on that. His call was it wasn’t a conflict.

The Ethics Committee may or may not have agreed with him.

The fact is there is room for this gray area so I think sometimes

it is a problem in interpretation of these laws, and a good person

can decide that they are obeying the cooling off period and another

person could interpret another way. That is why I think when we

just banned honoraria, it was the way to go. I think it is simpler,

it is clearer. And so what I want to say is I believe this is a good

man that is appearing before us today. I believe this is a man of

honor. I believe he has stated in retrospect he could have gotten

a little more guidance. And I hope that for the good of the country,

indeed for the good of the world, Mr. Chairman, we will move along

expeditiously.

If some people feel that it is a matter of principle that they can’t

go along with this, I respect that, but I would hope that the vast

majority would. I think that Mr. Holbrooke has now some months

ahead of him. The months are dwindling as the days go by, but I

think he will make the most of that time and again, I really want

to thank you because as Senator Biden has said, we have seen you

say no before. We know what that is, and what you are saying now

is maybe, and we appreciate it because we think this nominee is

worthy and we are ready to fight for him.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator, for a very eloquent statement, as have been the others. Let me clear up two or three points.
36

One, this hearing was prompted by an anonymous letter. That

certainly is not true. I don’t—I have not seen an anonymous letter.

I have seen the inspector general’s statement. I also have read the

law. I am not a lawyer and I am honest about that, no doubt, I

had staff put specific boards up so that you can be prompted by

them. It is all right to say that well, you know, everybody does it.

Didn’t mean to do it. But the most important thing the witness has

said this morning, the most important thing that the nominee has

said this morning is that he made some mistakes.

I believe if that had been the case, there would have been no

hearing, but I have heard from people in the government, responsible people, not necessarily people who love you or don’t like you.

I am not trying to make a judgment on that. And I agree that you

have served with distinction, certainly with sincerity, but I also believe that it is apparent that you have violated the law several

times, and I believe that justified this hearing.

Now, this hearing was not prompted by, upon pressure from anyone. We decided sometime back that maybe the record ought to be

made clear, and we are in the process of doing that. I read in the

paper this morning that three Senators had pressed me to the

point that I could not refuse to schedule this hearing. Well, I don’t

know any Senator who has pressed me to take anything but a wet

noodle, but their representatives are going to get whatever publicity they can get back home having some effect. I don’t know if they

have had any effect here this morning, but maybe they have had

somewhere else.

Let me pursue what we were talking about before. One of the

key trips that the State Department investigators reviewed, this

was not an anonymous letter. You traveled from April 28 to May

12 from Hungary, Bosnia, France, Great Britain and Korea. Now, you are an employee of the bank, CSFB paid $5,000 and

some for the air fare. Are those figures correct?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. If that is what we submitted, I accept them,

Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They are not subject to being argumentative,

right? Did your employer, CSFB schedule a meeting?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. They scheduled some of the meetings. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which ones did they not schedule?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I cannot recollect.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not schedule some of them by your own

statement?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I cannot recollect each meeting and who set up

each meeting, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Look, I am trying to help you, sir.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the truth of the matter is, and whether it

is a terrible violation or not, it is not our judgment, but you did

use Ambassadors. You had friendships with them obviously, and

Joe, I expect that I have known a few Ambassadors in my life and

I believe that when I leave this job, I might call on an Ambassador.

But the point is that at worst, the laws involved that were not adhered to.

Now, I take it that a representative of the bank indicated to you

regarding whom you should meet in these countries, did that not
37

happen? Yes. I am trying to establish that this business did not

hurt the bank. It helped it, right?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. First Boston suggested and set up some meetings for me. They did not ask me to set up meetings through American officials.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am sure of that. But I am not saying that

is an unforeseen conclusion. If you were in Bosnia April 30, 1996,

I believe you met with the Prime Minister, the Governor of the National Bank, Minister of Economy and Minister of Communications.

And you told the folks who were investigating long before I knew

anything about the investigation going on that CSFB representatives scheduled your meeting with the Prime Minister as a courtesy

call on your first trip to Europe, that’s correct, right?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I stand by what I told the inspectors.

The CHAIRMAN. And when you met with the Prime Minister, laying groundwork for future business or were you there on behalf of

the U.S. Government?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. The meeting with the Prime Minister in Slovakia was set up by First Boston. As Senator Sarbanes already

mentioned, there was a negotiation of the treaty and there was the

overriding issue of NATO enlargement plus Bosnia. I had seen the

Prime Minister in Hungary without any First Boston people

present. In fact, you have a memorandum available to you in which

I specifically rejected an attempt by First Boston employees to join

that meeting in order to emphasize that there would not be, and

could not be, any business connection to that meeting. In Slovakia,

the meeting had been set up directly by CSFB. The Hungarian

Prime Minister had given me a message concerning rather sensitive matters to deliver to the Slovakian leader. The Ambassador

was new, and I wrote him. You have his reply in the files. He obtained permission to join this meeting because he felt it would be

in the national interests and received appropriate approval to do

so.

The CHAIRMAN. The question would be why would you have bank

members present in matters unrelated to bank business? Which

was it?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. They set up the meeting. We gave the Ambassador the option to attend.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is they?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. In Bratislava, the CSFB person set up the

meeting but I knew, for the same reasons that Ambassador Laney

addressed in his affidavit, it would have been genuinely deleterious

to the stature of this Ambassador who was new, and to the national interests, if I were to carry communications between the

Hungarian Prime Minister and the Slovakian leadership without

an Ambassador present. I gave the Ambassador the option of participating in the meeting which we had set up. And it is my understanding, and I believe you have the documents, that he then consulted Washington and got approval to attend the meeting. I believe that it can be fairly stated that this meeting contributed significantly to the ultimate resolution of one of the most explosive

issues in Central Europe, the status of the Hungarian minority in

Slovakia and advanced our national interests.
38

The CHAIRMAN. I think what I am trying to emphasize is that I

can understand all of these things being fully in and the inspector

general saying we better look at it because this is not common

practice diplomatically. You want to say something?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. May I add one more thing, Mr. Chairman? We

did not discuss business in the meeting which you are addressing,

although it is true that a First Boston person or, if my memory is

correct there may have been two people, were in the room because

they set up the meeting.That was because I had a strict rule, that

rule being to obey the law, the law being the law we are here to

discuss, that we did not discuss business in that meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. About the trip to South Korea, and I have been

there and I have done that, but you had a number of contacts with

the Korean Government. You wrote the U.S. Ambassador in Korea

that you would be in the country and may I join you in meeting

the Korean President. Is that correct?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition you corresponded with the U.S. Ambassador to develop a guest list. He is a friend of yours. You have

known him years and years. I understand. But I am trying to point

out, emphasize for people who may come after you that either the

law should be changed, or it should be obeyed. That is the point

I am trying to make. Now, just prior to this trip, you also entertained a number of senior State Department officials here in Washington. That’s correct, isn’t it?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And one documented expense to your employer,

the CSFB, in April 1996 you met with then-Assistant Secretary of

State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, a good guy who I have

known, namely Winston Lord. Now, your expense account for the

bank, signed by you, identified you— identified the meeting as

Asian company. That is for the record.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I am a little bit unclear. Are we

talking about a meeting I had with Ambassador Lord?

The CHAIRMAN. Just prior to the trip you also entertained a

number of State Department senior officials, in Washington. I have

got this here in print. This is leading up to the question would

CSFB pay the bill for entertaining Ambassador Lord if expenses

were not business-related?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Ambassador Lord and I have been friends for

a very long time and it was not a business-related meeting. It was

old friends, social, discussing things that I might undertake for him

if I were in the region, but it was primarily social.

The CHAIRMAN. Nonetheless, the bank paid the billing for entertaining.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. The bank paid the bill for a meeting for entertaining? Is this a meeting that Ambassador Lord was at? I do not

have a memory of that exact event.

The CHAIRMAN. He was there. I to wish I had been there.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, are you talking about the larger

luncheon? Are you talking about a specific meeting with Lord? He

was with Lord and a number of other people, correct? I am just trying to clarify. I see I can’t help you. Sorry about that.
39

The CHAIRMAN. The same expense account used specifically, deducted those expenses that you discovered were not business-related. I wonder about the distinction.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I apologize, Mr. Chairman. Please forgive me if

my memory is incomplete here but I do not believe that Ambassador Lord was at the meetings we are discussing. If that is an

error, I apologize to you. I believe my conversations with Lord were

in another venue at another time, and were not anything expensed

to First Boston. If the record shows differently, I apologize. May I

just consult with counsel for one moment?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Certainly. That is why we are here.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. My counsel informs me that Ambassador Lord

was not at any of the meals I expensed that were discussed in the

IG’s report, which was also my memory.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am talking about the events in various

places which were paid for by the bank. Sweden, two dinners for

which the bank paid the bill and on May 29 the U.S. Ambassador

and others at Erik’s Restaurant, I hope that is a good steakhouse,

your expense account indicated it cost your bank $760.92. The

bank paid this bill, and it is fair to assume that business affairs

were discussed.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No, sir. That was not a business meal. This is

the first time I have been asked about this particular dinner, so I

hope you will forgive me if my memory is incomplete. But my memory is—did you say May 29?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. That was my first wedding anniversary.

The CHAIRMAN. We will strike that one.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. My wife was——

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

I assume that you did what she told you. Is the Government of

Sweden a client of your bank?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. The Government of Sweden is a client of my

bank, the London branch of the bank. It has been so for about 10

years.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I understand. On a May 1996 trip

to Sweden, your assistant at CSFB sent a letter to the political officer at the Embassy in Sweden requesting CSFB representatives be

permitted to attend your meeting with the Swedish Undersecretary. The American Ambassador scheduled CSFB participation at

the meeting.

All of this was fed into the inspector general. You had such a difficult time with those. But you have gone a long way with me, sir,

at the opening statement that you acknowledge that you did things

that maybe ought not to have been done. Maybe as much as anything else, we are saying to government employees, other officials,

look at the law and make sure you understand what it is. Mr.

Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just going to

make one comment. I think that first of all, we have been extremely fair. Second, I think what is sort of coming up here is a

lot of us, and we got here, I got here in 1973 as one of those reformers to reform the ethics in government. I think the conclusion

a lot of us are coming to is, I am not sure we did it the right way.
40

And Senator Sarbanes said it in a more articulate fashion. Senator

Lugar said it. Let me put this in, what I try to do and I realize

this may be somewhat homely. But I kind of look at this, what is

this all about?

Let me get for the record something straight that has confused

my mother who is smarter than I am if she is home watching this.

I mean this sincerely. I am not joking about it. Anybody watching

this maybe wouldn’t know what we know, is that if you had gone

straight to the President of Korea, straight to the Prime Minister

of Sweden, straight to any of the people that you went to in the

past, you would not have violated any law under any circumstance

for any reason. That is No. 1.

No. 2, the trouble that is raised by the inspector general, and the

Senator is correct, all the stuff that was voluntary is now strict,

and you have got to follow it, is the way the law is.

The CHAIRMAN. Sometimes they overreach, too.

Senator BIDEN. Sometimes they overreach. And what caused any

problem here is that it was a government official. I am going to say

for the record, you are the only guy other than possibly George

Shultz, Warren Christopher, Henry Kissinger, that the presence of

an Ambassador demeans your stature. I mean that sincerely. I am

not joking about that.

If I wanted to do business for a company in Bosnia to reconstruct

it, Joe Biden, because of my involvement in Bosnia, and because

of my relationship with President **Izetbegovic, I do not need the

Ambassador. I do not need the President. I do not need anybody.

I pick up the phone and phone as a former Senator, Mr.

Izetbegovic, I guarantee he will see me. I guarantee he will help

me if he can. I pick up the phone and call Mr. Barak, he will see

me. I do not need an Ambassador to set that appointment up. As

a former Senator, I do not need an appointment.

George Schultz picks up the phone and calls whoever is the one

in active control in Saudi Arabia, he does not need an Ambassador

to help him. Now, a lot of second-rate folks coming out of the operation need an Ambassador to set up an appointment for them. You

do not need anybody. And so the irony of all ironies here is—the

press has missed it, we have all missed it—is that the very rule

this was set up for was for people who needed the Federal Government to intervene on their behalf to have some clout with someone

abroad. The last thing you needed, if the President of Korea, South

Korea would not have seen you, I would have been dumbfounded,

and if he had a choice where it was ethically within his power in

Korea to help you working for First Boston or someone working for

Morgan Stanley and he did not help you, it would violate any rule

of human nature that I understand.

So this is kind of preposterous when you put it in context. The

last person that needed anyone in Europe, especially brand-new,

spanking-new Ambassadors who didn’t even get to meet the Presidents of these countries anyway. Some of these guys did not even

know the people you were meeting.

Every time I go into a country where I have dealt a lot with people, particularly in Europe, the new Ambassador said can you take

me along to introduce me? I do not need them. And the last guy

in the world, I can imagine, and I will conclude with this. If and
41

when you decide to leave the Senate, Mr. Chairman, if you represented anyone who had business in Taiwan, if you need anybody

in the Federal Government to get you an appointment with anybody in the Taiwanese Government, I would be dumbfounded. All

anyone could do, including the Secretary of State of the United

States of America if they accompanied you, is diminish your clout.

And I mean that sincerely. I am not joking. I am not joking.

And so the irony of all ironies here is you are getting ripped from

pillar to post after having made a couple million bucks for taking

$3,000 from Time magazine. I love to see people take money from

the press. I think that is wonderful. I love that. And even the reporters kind of like that. They like that stingy management giving

up money.

But beyond that, I mean, you needed that like you needed another hole in your head, and the second thing is, all of these meetings. Why would you want, if I were the chairman of the board of

First Boston and I found out some little dip working for me wrote

a letter to say accompany Holbrooke to a meeting, I would fire the

kid because obviously you are not helping me. You are not helping

me. And I would be a little bit disturbed with you if every time you

showed up, you showed up with an Ambassador. Because I want

to tell you something: if you could not get an audience for your

company on any matters relating to South Korea, when the guy

whose life you helped save who probably knows you personally better than any other foreign official he knows and feels he is indebted

to you, if you could not get it done alone in a room with him, legally, and it would all be legal to do it that way, you sure in hell

would not have it enhanced by having an Ambassador.

So I think it is important the American public understands. This

is what I mean about the minutiae of these rules. They are intended to capture second-rate people—second rate; wrong phrase.

Second-level people who on their own have no specific influence,

who in the past have tried to use the organs of the Federal Government to give them stature and influence to benefit their companies.

This is the exact opposite thing here. You could get an appointment with the editors, with the chairman, with the ownership of

every publication represented at that table before any one of those

guys at that table could get it. They are smiling, but they know it

is true. They know it is true. You have more swack with their management than they do, the same way you have more swack with

foreign leaders than any of the Ambassadors that you talked to.

I think it is kind of important that we kind of cut all this aside

and get right down to it. What was the rule about? The rule is

about not using the Federal Government to benefit you. And so we

prohibit it. We put up a wall between the former employee and the

Government officials. The irony is you can leapfrog that wall. You

do not need any of them. You do not need any of them.

Which is also part of your problem, I might add. Because sometimes you realize you do not need any of them. And one of the

things I suspect, look, you are not a shrinking violet—like me.

You are someone who is accustomed to being effective and I

think some of your ‘‘mistakes’’ were an intuitive knowledge of everything I just said to be the case. And my guess is, knowing you

as long as I have, and I doubt whether you have ever had any, I
42

will be presumptuous to say I am your friend, but a good acquaintance that is never been more blunt with you than I have privately

and publicly. But I think the extent to which you made a mistake,

it was a mistake borne, like for example people kept saying, I hope

he comes here and he is apologetic. Because everybody kind of expected you to kind of come here and say in your heart I think you

think: What the hell is this all about?

Part of the reason you think that, I suspect, is rational. Because

you know you did not need anybody that you contacted in the Federal Government to do anything to promote you financially or your

company. And I suspect you wonder how come other people do not

understand that, and I suspect you know enough to know you cannot say that. But that is the naked truth the press and the people

should understand. Any potential conflict that arose as a consequence of involving a Federal Government official in dealing with

any foreign government, power or individual, was totally unnecessary if your purpose was to make money for the company you

worked for.

You did not need them. You do not need them. You engaged

them because you thought you were doing the right thing. I realize

that I am putting words in your mouth, but as advice to you from

a good friend, I will let you let me do it and not comment, because

I think this is kind of crazy.

I think the Senator is right. I can picture as each of these pieces

come in, investigators, bright, serious people doing their job, sit

down there and saying we want to look at all of this and do it all.

But the bottom line is, maybe I have been a trial lawyer too long,

the bottom line is what I would say to the jury if this were a jury

trial is. Hey, keep your eye on the ball here. The question is, was

there any motive on the part of this individual in any meeting he

had with any government official that involved an American official, to enhance his prospects to make a deal for his company? And

the answer to that is no, unless you are very stupid, which you are

not, because you did not need any of them. I will lay you 8 to 5

every meeting you went to they said hello Dick, hello Mr. Ambassador, and by the way, who is the guy you are with and he may

have been one of our finest Ambassadors. They did not want to see

him.

It is the same way when we travel. Ambassadors do an incredible

job. They are often overlooked, and they are often undercut by us

as well, but I do not know any country where I go into where an

Ambassador says I don’t have time to go with you. They usually

say oh God, he is here. I better go, find out what he is saying. And

maybe by the way he can introduce me to somebody I do not know.

That is only because I have been in there 27 years. You are there

because of the significant personal relationships and substantive

issues you have engaged these people on over the years, so I understand how we got here. I hope we leave here pretty quickly, and

I hope we get on to the other point because to conclude, you did

not need any Ambassador, anybody in the State Department, anybody at all, any more than George Schultz needs anybody, Warren

Christopher needs anybody, or anyone of foreign policy significance

needs anyone to get to the leaders of countries that they engaged

when they were engaging in their official capacity.
43

And ironically, had you done it that way, had you done it that

way, and bypassed these guys, even though you were doing American business, America’s business, there would have been nobody

able to write any letters with any question about whether or not

you are benefiting each other. The problem is whoever wrote that

letter is obviously small-time and does not understand the deal,

and obviously is not going to be hired by First Boston or anybody

else when they leave because they sure as hell do not know how

it works. I yield back to you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You have an option to take your family to lunch

or listen to comments by Senators.

Senator BOXER. I do not have any comment.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, it is really your option, sir. I am

at your disposal and I am prepared to continue, especially if my

mother can hold out and wait for lunch a little bit.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions, except the few that

I will submit for the record. And I want to keep the record open

so that the Senators who are not able to be here this morning if

they wish can file some questions. I would be remiss if I did not

ask you if you have anything further to say.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make

a very brief closing statement. First, thank you again for holding

the hearing. To reiterate again for the record—I cannot say it often

enough because some of my associates in the executive branch

misspoke—that none of the delay was caused by this committee or

this branch of government. Finally, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just

pick up on the theme that you and your colleagues and Senator

Biden have just echoed.

Senator Biden has made a very important point which I did not

really make adequately. And that was that my sole purpose in associating with an American Ambassador in regard to a meeting

with the head of government of a country was to assist the Ambassador. Senator Biden’s description of Ambassadors is quite accurate. Since I had no intention of discussing business in these meetings because these were meetings on policy issues, and since I have

been an Ambassador and have seen people diminish Ambassadors,

I invited the Ambassadors because I felt we need to build them up.

I revere the Foreign Service. I revere the government, and I revere

the appointed and confirmed representatives of our Nation. Ambassadors speak not for the Secretary of State and not for the President; they speak for the Nation after they have been confirmed by

your committee.

First Boston never gained from any of these meetings. On the

contrary, as information we have submitted to you shows, and

there is a lot more, they were not happy with such things because

I had told them that I would not discuss business in such meetings.

They all knew that.

One last point, sir. I would like to come back to your very first

question, and the spirit in which you raised it. I believe strongly

that all those who serve in Federal Government, elected or appointed, confirmed or not, must maintain and respect the public

trust. That is what we are all here for. That was the spirit in

which I and you and the other people in this high bench entered

public service, as elected or appointed officials.
44

We have to be incredibly careful about ethical matters. I thought

I was. I tried to do that. Questions arose because of the immense

complexities which your questions have so clearly raised. But as I

said, I may not have been careful enough about the appearances,

and perhaps some anonymous letter writer, somebody else not in

the direct flow of contact with me misunderstood. But no one that

I am aware of with whom I dealt directly ever has contradicted

what we are talking about here.

I do not believe that I violated a law or any regulations, but I

should have been more sensitive, much more sensitive to the appearances, even though I did not use official cars, as two embassies

have stated. People maybe misunderstood. I should have been more

sensitive to that impression or appearance. I assure you that this

will be the case going forward—if you confirm me as a public servant, who would remain available to answer requests of his Government.

But I thank you again for your kindness, and I want to repeat

my respect not only for the Senate but for this particular committee. This is the one that I first testified before 23 years ago, and

I am honored to appear before you today as chairman. I am glad

I can now extend the string from Senator Sparkman to you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. Subject to the Judiciary Committee’s schedule, we are scheduled to hold at least two more hearings

on your nomination. On Tuesday, June 22 at 2 p.m., the committee

will focus on United Nations reform, and on Tuesday, June 24 at

10 a.m., the committee will examine U.S. policy in the Balkans. It

is a difficult time in a difficult world. And if there be no further

business, we will stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at

2 p.m., June 22, 1999.]
(45)

THE NOMINATION OF HON. RICHARD C.

HOLBROOKE TO SERVE AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1999

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:20 p.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Grams, Biden, Sarbanes,

Dodd, Feingold, Wellstone, and Boxer.

OPENING STATEMENT OF JESSE HELMS, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NORTH CAROLINA

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We have had

a busy day on the floor, and some Senators are not as rapid as Mrs.

Boxer and I are. We ran all the way, didn’t we. That is not the biggest story I will tell all day. I have got a little cart out there that

I ride in.

Senator BIDEN. Your cart is quicker than my legs.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say to Mr. Holbrooke that this is the second of the Foreign Relations Committee’s hearings regarding your

nomination. I expect you are already aware of that. I hope, indeed

I expect we can come to an agreement today about your precise

plans regarding your tenure at the United Nations if and when you

are confirmed to represent our country as a member of that dysfunctional institution.

But before you testify, the committee has asked Mr. Jim Johnson—and Mr. Johnson, if you will come and take a seat at the

table. Mr. Johnson is from the General Accounting Office, and I

think he has a presentation that all of us will consider important.

We are grateful to him for coming, and I am going to try to—

and these gentlemen here are to make a presentation so that those

of us who serve on this committee can be better informed about the

current state of reform at the United Nations. Then we will turn

to Mr. Holbrooke.

Now, Senator Biden and I had a discussion on the floor today

about the United Nations and some of the things that have got to

happen before I am going to be satisfied with anything payable in

the arrearages.

[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]
46

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

Mr. Holbrooke, this is the second of the Foreign Relations Committee’s hearings

regarding your nomination to assume the important responsibilities of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and as a member of the President’s Cabinet.

I hope—indeed, I expect—that we can come to agreement today about your precise

plans regarding your tenure at the United Nations, if you are confirmed to represent our country as a member of that dysfunctional institution.

Before you testify, however, the Committee has asked Mr. Jim Johnson of the

General Accounting Office (GAO) to make an important presentation, so that those

of us who serve on this committee can be better informed about the current state

of reform at the United Nations. Then, we will turn to you, Mr. Holbrooke.

Now then, Mr. Holbrooke, at the outset, let’s examine a few specific issues we expect you to address today:

There’s been a lot of talk to the effect that Congress need not impose reform

‘‘benchmarks’’ on the United Nations because Kofi Annan has already implemented

most of the reforms that the Congress was asking for.

Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the truth. One of Mr. Annan’s

pledges was that he would adopt negative growth budgets. Yet, this past December,

the United Nations approved a budget for the years 2000–2001 that exceeds the current 1998–1999 budget by $13 million. Now I was amazed to learn that, while the

United States representative at those negotiations, Ambassador Sklar, called that

growth budget a ‘‘disgrace,’’ he failed to exercise the U.S. prerogative to refuse consensus on that budget. In other words, the United States could have blocked it, but

chose not to.

Mr. Holbrooke, I ask your assurance today that, under your leadership, such a

fiasco will not be repeated, and that the United States will never give consensus

to any growth budget at the United Nations without seeking and receiving in advance the approval of this committee.

Another reform myth centers on the so-called ‘‘elimination’’ of almost 1,000 U.N.

posts. Now that sounds impressive, and the average American would presume that,

thanks to the Secretary General’s efforts, there are now 1,000 fewer people working

at the United Nations. Well, the presumption would be wrong.

Most of those 1,000 U.N. posts were eliminated only on paper because they were

vacant positions. In fact, there are more people on the payroll at the United Nations

today than before this so-called reform. Only in the U.N.’s Orwellian doublespeak

can 1,000 ‘‘posts’’ be eliminated, and yet have more people on the United Nations

payroll than before the cuts. The facts are: (1) not one single U.N. function was

eliminated in the Secretary General’s so-called consolidation, and (2) there are now

more senior-level U.N. positions than existed the day Kofi Annan took office.

We will hear more from GAO in a moment, but my point is this: Left to its own

devices, the U.N. is incapable of reforming itself. Only pressure from Congress, and

the withholding of the hundreds of millions of American taxpayer’s dollars, has up

to now had any impact on the U.N. And only conditioning payment of the U.S. arrears on real and concrete reform benchmarks will ensure that those reforms are

implemented.

Now, before I turn to our first witness, I have one other matter I must address

with Mr. Holbrooke—and that is the effort at the United Nations to create a permanent International Criminal Court, with the authority to indict and try American

citizens. I cannot overly emphasize the depth of my concern, and that of other Senators, about this proposed court.

In part because of Senate concerns, the administration last summer refused to

sign the Rome Treaty creating the court. But the delegates in Rome not only moved

forward with the court, but gave it jurisdiction to try American citizens, regardless

of whether the United States signed, and the U.S. Senate ratified, the Rome Treaty.

Now I know that there are some in this administration who still hold out the hope

that this Court can be ‘‘fixed’’ and that the United States can sign up to the court.

And this summer in New York the delegates will be meeting again, and they are

still hoping to convince the United States to join them.

I am not opposed to the ad hoc war crimes tribunals, created through the Security

Council (such as the Yugoslav tribunal which recently indicted Slobodan Milosevic).

But the Rome Treaty is irreparably flawed.

A permanent tribunal such as this, where an independent prosecutor is given almost unlimited powers, and where the United States has no veto power to stop a

politicized prosecution of American servicemen or officials, is quite flat out unacceptable.

Mr. Holbrooke, may I have your firm commitment today that, as U.S. Representative to the United Nations, you will do everything in your power to oppose the estab-
47

lishment of the permanent International Criminal Court? Some of the Court’s advocates have suggested we adopt a policy of ‘‘benign neglect.’’ To the contrary, the

United States must do everything it can to prevent this court from ever—EVER!—

coming into existence or being given any legitimacy whatsoever.

With that, I look forward to your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let us proceed with Mr. Johnson and Mr.

Miyabara.

OPENING STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S.

SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I have a very brief opening statement, and I apologize. The old joke used to be, I am from

the Federal Government, I am here to help you. Now it is, I am

from the GAO and I am here to help you.

But thank you both for being here. You perform an incredible

service to the Congress, but I just want to welcome Ambassador

Holbrooke back. I listened to his statement last Thursday with

great interest and I was, of course, gratified to hear that if he is

confirmed, implementing the U.N. arrearages and reform package

will be one of his highest priorities.

I might say to the Ambassador that the chairman just pulled off

another feat, and I mean this seriously. It does not happen often.

We had the State Department authorization bill on the floor, which

usually attracts every contentious amendment there is in the U.S.

Senate at the time. It is kind of like the Defense authorization bill.

And I must say the final vote had only one dissenting vote, and

one of the important parts of that authorization bill was the implementation of the reforms that the chairman is insisting upon that

the Secretary of State has agreed to, and that I support, along

with, essentially, full funding of our—essentially, I say, full funding

of our arrearages to the United Nations.

So I am looking forward to hearing from you, Mr. Ambassador,

on how you will deal with what I suspect is going to be laid out

here as some of the problems in terms of the management that

takes place at the United Nations and the conditions which we

have attached here, because it is a critical part of this.

We are going to have a possibility, at least, we have scheduled

another hearing on the Balkans, but I warn you, I may ask a few

questions about that when you come up today, if the chairman will

allow me. But with that, I welcome you back, and I thank the GAO

and put in a plug for you all. You do really first rate work in everything we ever ask you to do, and thank you for being here today.

STATEMENT OF MR. HAROLD JIM JOHNSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRADE DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY

MR. TETSUO MIYABARA

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. I do have a much longer

statement that I would like to have inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be done, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. I will try and be as brief as possible.

We are happy to be here today. You have asked us specifically

to talk about four areas of reform. The unified focus that is now

underway, and the organizational structure changes, and the deci-
48

sionmaking process, the budget process, control or improved oversight, and program evaluation and, fourth, the improved human resource management.

I must emphasize that our testimony today is based on our preliminary analysis. We still have work underway and, as you requested, we will provide a more complete report later on this fall.

Reform has a long history at the U.N. For more than 25 years,

member States have been seeking reform at the U.N. and demanding tighter budget controls. As a part of this consensus, budgeting

was adopted with the hope that this would give major donors a

larger voice in the process of establishing budgets.

Member States, including the United States and the Congress,

have demanded greater fiscal discipline, greater oversight. Through

the hard work of the Congress, as well as the executive branch, the

Office of Internal Oversight Services was created a few years ago.

There are other problems that have also been in need of reform in

human resource management.

The Secretary General realized several years ago, and I believe

in 1994 he called the human resource management situation at the

U.N. in a state of crisis. They were unable to determine who they

had on board, where they were at, and planned for new operations

that needed to be undertaken.

But in summary, as the Secretary General has said and I think

we agree, reform is a process and not an event. I do not want that

to sound like a cliche, but, based upon our preliminary assessment,

we believe the Secretary General has undertaken a serious effort

to reform the U.N. and improve its relevance to member States and

enhance its operational efficiency.

Progress has been made in some areas, but overall, the initiatives we examined have still not been fully implemented. Progress

has been made in unifying and focusing the organizational structure and the decisionmaking process at the U.N. and also the programs that are part of the U.N. proper.

Our assessment is that this has begun to make the Secretary a

more cohesive management unit. Actions taken include appointment of a Deputy Secretary General to function basically as a chief

operating officer and to strengthen internal coordination. Also, a

senior management group composed of Under Secretary Generals

and the heads of those programs that report to the Secretary General was also created. This group meets weekly to ensure that U.N.

actions are unified and focused on the same objectives.

The new committees include peace and security, humanitarian

affairs, economic and social affairs, and development operations, established to plan and implement focused and unified U.N. actions

as agreed to by the senior management group.

The Secretary General placed U.N. departments, offices, and the

funds and programs, into appropriate groups and named a convener for each committee from the senior management group and

expected and demanded that the committees coordinate, plan, and

implement their activities as teams. In sharp contrast with the

past, where Under Secretaries operated with great autonomy, this

new structure provides a regular opportunity to communicate, coordinate, focus the work of the departments on common program

objectives.
49

We believe that this new structure, which is now about 2 years

old, is a positive move, but the proof of its success will be measured

in the field, where programs are actually implemented. As I mentioned, because we are in the preliminary phase of our evaluation,

we have not yet tested this new structure’s actual impact on improving program delivery and effectiveness, but this is one area

that we believe needs to have a hard look.

I would also add that this new structure does not include the

specialized agencies. That comes under a different kind of rubric,

and specialized agencies like the FAO, the International Labor Organization and the others, still operate in a rather autonomous

way, and overlap and duplication and coordination will continue to

be a problem in that area.

The United Nations, while it has maintained essentially a nogrowth budget for the last couple of bienniums, our assessment

thus far indicates that no fundamental changes have been made to

the budgeting process that would be an impetus to control the

growth of the regular budget.

The process for developing the budget has largely remained unchanged, and adopting budgets by member States consensus does

not assure controlled growth as hoped for when consensus budgeting was adopted in 1986, and supported at that time by the United

States as part of the Kassebaum-Solomon amendments.

For example, in developing the budget for the 2000–2001 biennium, the United States and Japan, which together provide over 45

percent of the U.N.’s financial support, objected that the preliminary budget ceiling was set at a level higher than the previous

year’s budget. However, no vote was taken to record their dissent,

and the measure was adopted by consensus.

Also, the largest donors do not have permanent seats on the Advisory Committee on Budgetary and Administrative Questioning,

commonly known as the ACABQ, where they could be most effective in advocating budget restraint. Further, the candidates put

forward by the United States to become a member of the advisory

committee have not been elected in the last two elections. Consequently, we have no seat.

Moreover, although the Secretary supports the implementation of

the results-based budgeting and sunset provisions initiative intended to bring more discipline to the budgetary process, these

measures have not been adopted because some members, mainly

developing countries, have not supported them.

Results-based budgeting requires program managers to identify

indicators for judging the substantive impact of their programs and

justifying their programs’ effectiveness based on these results. According to senior U.S. and U.N. officials, implementing such a system would require a major cultural shift among both the members

as well as U.N. managers. Also a valid system for evaluating program effectiveness would need to be put into place.

At the General Assembly’s request, the Secretary General has

produced several reports in support of this initiative, and provided

prototypes of a results-based budgeting for sections of the Secretariat.

Although, as I have indicated, much remains to be done in this

area, some progress has been made in the area of cost control. The
50

Secretariat has introduced a program intended to cut overhead

costs and increase efficiencies, and thus far it has reported $13 million in savings for about 600 efficiency projects. We have not validated those claims of savings as yet.

An area where important improvements we believe has been

made is in the area of oversight, audit and oversight. However,

even here, the effort should not be thought of as completed. We reported to you about a year and a half ago that OIOS has resolved

its startup and operational problems in an organizational atmosphere and environment that has been previously without any effective oversight mechanisms. Moreover, we found that OIOS is situated to be operationally independent, and the head of OIOS reports

directly to the Secretary General.

We noted, however, that OIOS is not required to and does not

submit all reports to the Secretary General and thus on to the General Assembly. We suggested that the head of OIOS should clarify

the criteria for which reports would be submitted. In response, the

Under Secretary General for Internal Oversight said that he would

publish titles of all reports in the annual report, and has done so

since that time.

I would like to mention that, as of June of last year, OIOS had

made over 4,000 recommendations and about 73 percent of these

have been implemented, but again, we have not analyzed the recommendations or the actions taken to implement them.

OIOS has clearly strengthened the audit inspection and investigative functions of the United Nations. However, progress has

been much slower in developing and implementing the monitoring

and evaluation systems to measure and report on programs’ performance and effectiveness that would help member States make

program decisions.

According to one Under Secretary General, the main reason for

this lack of program evaluation is the jobs are attached to program

activities, and there is little incentive to cut jobs.

To begin addressing what the Secretary General considered to be

a crisis in human resource management, it recently introduced several initiatives and adopted a strategy to carry them out. These initiatives included a new performance appraisal system, the adoption

of a code of conduct, and actions to begin human resource planning.

However, these initiatives have not been fully implemented, and

some problems have developed in the implementation that has

taken place thus far.

For example, a new merit-based appraisal system, introduced 3

years ago, continues to produce inflated ratings in some departments. That should not be considered too unusual. It happens in

every organization, including our own, I would guess, but they are

aware of that, and that is something they are working on.

Also, the code of conduct that was adopted last December does

not provide the Secretariat with clear procedures for applying related disciplinary measures for systemic management problems or

negligence.

Additionally, the Secretariat has begun using an automated data

base for its human resource planning. The information system is

unable to account for and track all staff that work for the U.N. Secretariat. It does a pretty good job for those that are in the United
51

States, but some overseas employees are not accounted for in this

particular data base system.

Senator BIDEN. What kind of numbers are we talking about,

when you say compared to overseas versus New York?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don’t have the exact breakdown. It would be

about a third, probably, overseas, versus two-thirds.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSON. You have the organizations that are in Geneva,

Vienna, and Nairobi, as well as some of the peacekeeping missions

that would be included in that.

That concludes my prepared remarks, and we will be happy to

try and respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson is in the appendix on

page 122.]

The CHAIRMAN. All right. How about 5 minutes per Senator on

the first round. If we have a second round we will handle that.

According to a January 1999 report by the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N.’s IG found that a senior administrative officer of the

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—and you

are familiar with that organization——

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ‘‘Used his position to perpetrate at

least 59 separate instances of theft between 1987 and 1996 without

triggering any meaningful internal alarm of the ongoing long-term

illegal scheme.’’

Then the report went on to say, ‘‘It is reasonable to conclude

that, but for his absence for sick leave, he would have continued

his operation undetected until his retirement, which was then imminent.’’

Now, that leads me to ask you, sir, are there adequate accounting mechanisms in place to track all United Nations funds?

Mr. JOHNSON. There are two problems with that situation. One

is the basic internal control procedures that ought to be in place

for any financial system. Obviously, those internal controls were

not in place, and the auditors failed to detect that for a long period

of time, both the internal audit, as well as the external board of

audit.

The other problem that is evident in that situation is that, even

though the man’s supervisor was generally aware that there was

something wrong in this situation, he did nothing about it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The same report suggest the Chief of

Administrative Service who would have been responsible for monitoring this appropriation of funds was not fired. Instead, he simply

was sent to another organization, and my question to you, was anyone at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

held accountable for failing to discover the 59 separate instances of

theft during a 9-year period?

Mr. JOHNSON. No one that we are aware of, other than the perpetrator himself, who was tried and convicted.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1976, the U.S. Congress approved the Sunshine Act—I believe you referred to that in your statement—which

required that all committee meetings be held in public except when

meetings relate to national security, privacy, and/or other specifically identified issues.
52

Many Americans might be surprised to learn that to this day, all

meetings of the United Nations Budget Committee—the Budget

Committee, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, are conducted in secret, and even its rules of procedure are not made public. Am I correct about that?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, why do you think the rules of procedure

are not made public?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know. They should be. There is no reason

that I am aware of why they should not be, or why, and the budget

meetings themselves should not be open. As we understand it, the

rules and procedures do permit open meetings unless there is some

unusual circumstance for closing the meetings, but there seems to

be unusual circumstances in most cases, and what makes it even

less apparent to the United States now, what happens in that committee is that we do not have a seat on the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. My question is, obviously, is Kofi Annan doing

anything about making this transparency to the budget process

available to the public?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is an area that we still need to look into, but

I would make one comment on that. I think that is an area that

the members, because of the nature of that advisory committee, I

believe that is an area that the member States need to take specific

action on, probably more so than the Secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Johnson, one of the Secretary General’s task force reform initiatives—well, there were a number. Let me ask it a different way.

Of the Secretary General’s task force reform initiatives, what

percentage, if you can tell me, do you think have been implemented

or are in the process of being implemented? Have any of these reforms had any impact?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would hesitate to put a percentage on the ones

that have been implemented. The ones that we have looked at have

not been fully implemented. As I indicated, there continues to be

a need for work toward achieving the goal.

Senator BIDEN. Is the effort sincere?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I believe it is. I was going to say that the reorganization that took place in the headquarters in the Secretariat

and its management structure I think is very important. I know

that there is kind of a feeling among some folks that when in doubt

reorganize, but when we look at how he has reorganized, and the

guidance and direction that he has provided, it seems to be in a

way that will accomplish the more focus and more direct attention

to specific activities that the U.N. undertakes.

As you know, the U.N. has traditionally been a stovepipe organization, with every Secretariat doing their own business, and this

is an attempt to remedy that.

Senator BIDEN. In your testimony you refer to the budget outline

for the next biennium, and it has been the case, has it not, in the

past that the budget outline has been trimmed as the budget process has proceeded?
53

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, and State and also the Under Secretary for

Management has indicated to us that they expect it to be trimmed

some.

Senator BIDEN. Do you have a sense of what impact, if any,

Japan and Germany’s announced opposition to increases in the

budget may have in this debate?

Mr. JOHNSON. It will add some pressure.

Senator BIDEN. It would seem to me that it might. I may be

wrong. I know the Senator from Minnesota is an expert in this

area, and I mean that seriously, and I do not know whether I am

right about this, but my impression is that two major industrial

countries have not in the past, like Germany and Japan, independently but at the same time indicated they were not going to go for

any increases. Maybe they have. I do not know. I would assume it

would have some impact. At least, I hope it would have some impact.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Japan made a very strong statement about

not being in favor of that budget outline, but the concern always

is that since there is no vote, and people and countries would rather not call for a vote, sometimes those resolutions are passed.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I know. What I sense is, and maybe I am

wrong, and I do not want to give credit or blame to the Senate, but

I think a little credit is deserved in the sense that our friend from

Minnesota and the chairman of the committee have been pushing

on this reform thing for a long time. I think in one meeting, if I

can say—and I am not revealing any confidence—Kofi Annan—and

I spent two very long meetings with him, one in New York and one

here, on the issue of reform, and I get the distinct sense that he

is getting an increasing amount of pressure no longer just from the

United States but from other major donor nations, and major participants here.

And I get the impression—and there is no doubt there is countervailing pressure that comes from a number of countries that in the

past, particularly small countries that have viewed the U.N. as an

employer of first resort as opposed to last resort, but I hope I am

not being overly optimistic if I say I sense, and this is a characterization I am making, and you can comment on it or not, and I realize my time is up, but I get the sense that the Secretariat is much

more committed to wanting to put reforms in place, and that part

of the reason is some of the major industrial countries, as well as

some of the smaller countries who are responsible in their own internal budgeting combined want to see this happen, and that is my

sense.

Would you like to comment?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that is a fair characterization, and I think

there are two budget issues that support that observation, and that

is the support that the Secretariat has given, and it has been fairly

strong support, for results-based budgeting, which is very similar

to our results act here as well as sunset provision for new programs. They have provided strong support for that.

But of course, some of the smaller countries, as you mentioned,

are not quite ready to go along with that yet.

Senator BIDEN. I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd, we congratulate you, sir.
54

Senator DODD. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me—

I want to commend the chairman of the committee——

Senator BIDEN. We are not congratulating him on his foreign policy acumen. I want you to know that. It is on his very, very good

taste. I congratulate him on his good luck. It is pure luck, is the

way I look at it.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Joe. Thank you both very much.

The CHAIRMAN. You get an extra minute, sir.

Senator DODD. Thank you both. I really want to commend both

of you for the inclusion of the agreement for the United Nations

and the funding in the State Department authorization bill, and I

realize this was not easy, and the administration deserves a great

deal of credit as well for working out the package here that we

could adopt today, and I hope will end up being adopted by the

House.

And we almost had an opportunity a few weeks ago with the

chairman’s support, I might add, to include the funding request

and the release of funds in the emergency supplemental, which we

were unable to get achieved at the time, but this is a very important issue, and the two gentlemen here to my right deserve a great

deal of credit for reaching that agreement.

My question sort of goes along the line of Senator Biden’s questions. There has been an assumption, I think, over the past several

years that the United States—and maybe it is a correct assumption, but the United States is really the only country that has been

insistent on reforming the processes at the United Nations, and

that but for our insistence this situation would have continued to

deteriorate.

I wonder if you might share with us, based upon any of your

analysis, to what extent other nations have been as concerned

about this as we have been. Obviously, with 45 percent of the cost

being picked up by two countries, the bulk of it is ourselves and

the Japanese, but to what extent do we hear, or has the Secretariat

heard complaints from other nations in terms of the operational inadequacies of the United Nations, and to what extent can you tell

us that those concerns have been raised beyond just the functioning of the United Nations, but that would not undercut its underlying purpose in serving the peacekeeping role and a variety of other

functions.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not sure that I can respond to that on the

basis of analysis that we have done. We have not systematically

looked at the support that has come for reform from other countries, but on a less analytic level we have read a lot of minutes and

a lot of transcripts from the Fifth Committee and other committees,

and I think your basic assumption that pressure is building from

other countries for reform, sometimes not exactly the same reforms

that we are looking for, or not in the same format that we might

adopt, but nonetheless, countries are concerned, even some of the

smaller countries are concerned about seeing to it that the United

Nations functions in an efficient way and continues to have relevance.

One impression that I get from reading some of these documents

is that there is a concern out there that if reform does not occur
55

at some point, that the U.N. will become irrelevant to some of the

problems that are confronting the world community, and at that

time it will be too late.

Canada has been a strong supporter for reforms, Japan, obviously, in the area of budget and other areas, so there is support

among our friends as well as some of our maybe less friendly, but

there is support for reform at the United Nations, and I think I

would take that broader than just the U.N. proper in New York.

That extends to the specialized agencies as well.

Senator DODD. I wonder about the European Community specifically. Has there been enough insistence, based upon what you

know from our European allies, for reform efforts? You mentioned

Canada specifically.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, enough is a rather subjective kind of term.

There has been movement that the representatives from the EU as

well as individual countries have pressed for reform. Some of what,

again, has worked against reform is this whole problem of arrears.

It is very clear that in reading some of the transcripts and some

of the documents that even our friends tell us we would make

much better headway in the area of reform if we could resolve that

issue and move ahead.

Senator DODD. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Grams.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I

thank you both for taking time to join us today. I appreciate the

GAO’s work.

But a fundamental problem I think confronting the U.N. has

been a lack of coordination and cooperation among the various organizations within the U.N. system itself, and that results, I think,

in a lot of duplication of efforts, in efficient programs, but the primary goal of the Secretary General’s reform program was to look

at and to define some of the core missions of the United Nations

and to restructure the organization accordingly.

Now, I am concerned the U.N. appears to be emphasizing new

priorities, drug interdiction, terrorism, identifying those new directions but not curtailing its efforts in any other areas, so my question first of all is, has the Secretary General proposed to eliminate

a single function at the U.N. in order to devote more of those resources to the core missions which he has outlined recently?

Mr. JOHNSON. There are some functions that have been reduced

in budget and reorganized. Elimination, probably not.

Mr. MIYABARA. They have not actually eliminated any programs.

The focus of their reorganization was not so much streamlining so

much as it was to try and get the diverse organizations of the U.N.

system to work together more effectively, and at least through that

they hoped there would be elimination of duplication and more

streamlining, but so far the elimination has not taken place.

Mr. JOHNSON. I would like to add one comment to that. As I indicated in my summary statement, the reorganization that the Secretary General has put in place, his management team does not extend to the specialized agencies, and that is where a lot of the duplication and overlap is seen.

That does not mean that it does not exist in the funds and programs that the Secretariat does have some responsibility for, but
56

the specialized agencies are basically autonomous organizations on

their own, and that issue needs to be resolved by the member countries of all of those organizations. It probably goes beyond what the

Secretary General can do on his own.

Senator GRAMS. A lot of times in reorganization they shuffle the

deck but we still have 52 cards, and it might look like it from the

outside, but they actually accomplish nothing.

Two years ago the Secretary General created four new executive

committees to coordinate the implementation of U.N. programs and

other activities. First, has the U.N. permitted the GAO to have full

access to this management structure in order to now give you the

opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of this?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know yet, since we are still in the process

of doing this evaluation, but we have met with the Deputy Secretary General and had a full briefing on the operations and the

functioning of the committee structure.

We have not had copies of minutes. I understand that not always

written minutes are kept of the meetings, but at this point I believe the access that we have gotten to date is satisfactory, and we

will evaluate how effectively, or at least attempt to evaluate how

effectively those committees are working in an operational sense on

the ground.

And again, that is one area where that has always historically

been a problem in having even the funds and programs work together in the country, and how they pursue their objectives incountry, and they can do a lot of talking at the United Nations,

but——

Senator GRAMS. Well, right now you could not cite a specific——

Mr. JOHNSON. I cannot. Well, I can cite some directions that have

been given. For example, a good example I think is the Executive

Committee for Peace and Security developed a unified plan for East

Timor, and this involved both the Departments of Peacekeeping as

well as Political Affairs, the Human Rights Coordinator, and several other departments, and so in at least organizing how they are

going to address the situation in East Timor they have come together and laid out a unified plan. Again, the proof will be in how

well that is implemented in-country.

Mr. MIYABARA. I should add, there have been some difficulties in

this that illustrates the problem the U.N. system has. One of the

executive committees, the Development Executive Committee, has

actually done some work in Guatemala, and at least one of the

messages that came back from—I think there were something like

16 U.N. organizations in Guatemala. One of the messages that

came back when they tried to put together the U.N. development

assistance framework there was that individual agency results

were more important than system-wide results.

Now, I should add also that this is one of the more important

things the U.N. is trying to do, but at least the initial indications

are that they will have problems in doing this, and that I think underscores our point at the beginning that the reforms have not

been fully implemented.

I will give you one other quick example, too. The Committee on

Economic and Social Affairs recently undertook a study, and that

was to look at some of the major publications the United Nations
57

does. The study came back and said that there was considerable

duplication and overlap in the studies, and they recommended trying to reduce some of those.

For example, there are two population studies that come out, and

the committee said, well, I think you should think about reducing

a number of those studies, because they seem to overlap, and the

Executive Committee actually decided not to recommend any

changes at all, and so I think there are indications that, while they

are moving forward, there will be difficulties in doing so.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. That is OK, Mr. Chairman. I will wait until Mr.

Holbrooke testifies. I have a question for him, but I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. Johnson, perhaps both of you gentlemen would not mind

staying around for, say, 30 minutes, so that if we need to refer to

something to assist the distinguished nominee, I would be grateful

to you if you would wait around.

Mr. JOHNSON. We would be happy to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and thank you for coming here today

at the outset.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Holbrooke, the nominee, if you will

step forward, and you can relax. I think most of the questions that

will be asked of you will be easy for you to answer.

Let me make a general statement. There has been a lot of talk

to the effect that Congress need not impose so-called benchmarks

on the United Nations because Kofi Annan has already implemented most of the reforms that the Congress was asking for. Well,

I thought back to the day when Nancy Kassebaum and I and two

or three others were trying to implement a study of what the

United Nations was doing, and so forth. Unfortunately, that impression that some seem to be voicing could not be further from the

truth.

One of Mr. Annan’s promises to me personally, when he was first

installed in the post, was that he would adopt negative growth

budgets, yet this past December the United Nations approved a

budget for the years 2000 and 2001 that exceeds the current 1998–

1999 budget by $13 billion.

Now, I am amazed to learn that while the United States Representative at these negotiations called that group’s budget a disgrace, he failed to exercise the U.S. prerogative to refuse consensus

on that budget. In other words, the United States could have

blocked it, but chose not to.

Now, one of the things that I hope you will say today is that you

will block it in a case like that, and I would ask for your assurance

that under your leadership such a fiasco would not be repeated.

Another myth centers on the so-called elimination of 1,000 U.N.

posts. Now, that sounds impressive, and the average American

would presume that thanks to the Secretary General’s efforts there

are now 1,000 fewer people on the payroll at the United Nations,

and that presumption would be absolutely, flat-out wrong.
58

Most of the 1,000 U.N. posts referred to as eliminated were just

on paper, because they were vacant positions to start with. In fact,

there are more people on the payroll at the United Nations today

than before the so-called reform, and only in the United Nations

doublespeak can 1,000 posts—and I guess I ought to put quotation

marks around that—be eliminated and yet have more people on the

payroll than ever before.

So I think the facts are, at least as I understand them to be, No.

1 not one single U.N. function was eliminated in the Secretary

General’s so-called consolidation, and No. 2 there are now more

senior-level U.N. positions than existed the day Kofi Annan took

office.

So I hope that this sort of thing I want to address to you, and

one further thought is that the efforts at the United Nations to create a permanent international criminal court with the authority to

indict and try American citizens is absolutely abhorrent to me, and

I hope you will tell this committee that you will have no part of

it, and you will resist it.

I cannot overly emphasize the depth of my concern and that of

many other Senators about this proposed court, and in part because of Senate concerns the administration last summer refused

to sign the so-called Rome Treaty creating the court, but the delegates in Rome not only moved forward with the court, but it gave

jurisdiction to try American citizens, regardless of whether the

United States signed or did not sign, and regardless of whether the

U.S. Senate ratified or did not, the Rome Treaty.

Now, I know that there are some in this city who still hold out

the hope that this court can somehow be—what is the word, fixed,

I suppose, and that the United States could sign up for the court,

and I resist and desist and say, hell, no, and this summer in New

York the delegates will be meeting again, and they are still hoping

to convince the United States to join them. I hope you will not join

them, that you will say that you will not join them and all that.

Now, let me be clear, I am not opposed to the ad hoc war crimes

tribunals created by and for the Security Council, such as the

Yugoslavia tribunal which recently indicted Milosevic, but the

Rome Treaty, no, sir, that is irreparably damaged. A permanent

tribunal such as this, where an independent prosecutor is given almost unlimited powers, and where the United States has no veto

power to stop a politicized prosecution of American servicemen or

other officials is quite flat out unacceptable.

So I hope you will give your firm commitment that as the U.S.

Representative to the United Nations, you will do everything in

your power to oppose the establishment of the permanent international criminal court. Some of the court’s advocates have suggested that we adopt a policy of benign neglect. Not on your sweet

patooti. To the contrary, the United States must do everything it

can to prevent this court from ever, ever coming into existence, or

being given any legitimacy whatsoever.

With that, Mr. Holbrooke, we look forward to your testimony,

and we welcome you to this committee today.

Senator Biden.
59

Senator BIDEN. I do not have any opening statement at this time,

Mr. Chairman, just when we get a chance to get to questions I do

have some questions for the Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, OF NEW

YORK, NOMINEE TO BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO

THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding

these hearings and the one last week, and to you and your colleagues for your kindness, your fairness, and your generosity.

May I just start by congratulating you and your colleagues on

the vote just completed in the U.S. Senate. I hope this becomes the

law of the land, and I pledge to you again today, Mr. Chairman

and Senator Biden and your colleagues, that I will make it my

highest sustained priority to make it work once it is the law of the

land, if I am confirmed.

I listened with great interest to Mr. Johnson’s previous testimony. I am the beneficiary of your scheduling these events back to

back so that I could hear not only his report, which I intended to

review anyway, but the questions that this committee addressed to

it.

As I said to you last week, I believe, and have believed for my

entire career, that consultations with the Congress at the take-off,

and not just the crash landings, are essential. In no area I have

ever worked on is this more true than this issue, because, unlike

most of my career, which has been in bilateral and diplomatic

areas, these are budgetary issues in which the Congress has the

primary responsibility. I will work very closely with you and with

every member of this committee, to whatever level you and your

staff wish.

I repeat again that I hope there will be frequent trips to New

York by members of this committee and their staff to assist us. I

have already had some informal discussions with some members of

this committee and their staff about how that might be done if and

when you choose to confirm me.

Budgetary discipline will be my watchword, and I will work very

hard to do the things that have been raised earlier. We must return to the ACABQ, the committee that Mr. Johnson referred to

earlier. I cannot understand, Senator Grams, why the sessions

were ever secret. That does not make any sense. I will work on

that. I do not understand why we allow it, when we are on the

committee.

But I cannot address the past. All I know is that, as a person

committed to the view that the U.N. is an important part of our

national interest, which is my view and I believe that of yourself,

this kind of thing works against that goal.

Mr. Chairman, when I was Ambassador to Germany, and working closely with this committee, I inherited a mission of 2,400 people. I put into place a reduction plan to 900, a 60-percent reduction,

working with the administrative people and working with many
60

people including the GAO, which had a large office in Frankfurt.

This involved 33 agencies of the U.S. Government, not just the

State Department, and it involved 10 posts, and it is being implemented today.

I cannot promise to you anything comparable in New York, because we have 2 degrees of separation between the American Permanent Representative and this incredible structure. It is not a

structure, it is a thing. You and Admiral Nance have shown me the

charts, and I have seen the U.N.’s version of the charts. Whatever

the details, we all agree, as Admiral Nance said, that this carrier

would not get into port.

So I cannot promise comparable cuts to the ones that the State

Department team and myself in Bonn worked out for Germany, but

I sure can commit myself, because we owe it to the American taxpayer and to you as their representatives, to reform the U.N.

There are many observations that come to mind listening to the

GAO and speaking to your colleagues. The specialized agencies

which are not under the Secretary General’s control must be dealt

with.

Now, you have behind me in the audience today at least two important representatives of the United Nations, I hope, taking notes.

You have the Secretary General’s new personal representative in

Washington, and you have our former Ambassador to Norway, Tom

Loftus, who is now the WHO’s representative in Washington. I

know that Senator Boxer and her colleagues met with Gro

Brundtland yesterday to discuss their concerns, and so I hope they

are taking notes, too. As I analyze the performance of the State Department, I believe that perhaps a more aggressive coordinated

push in New York, Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Bangkok, wherever the U.N. exists, through our other people, not people

part of the U.S.-U.N. structure, plus an across-the-board effort,

would make a difference.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions. I am very grateful again for your time and your courtesy, and may I just on a personal note join Senator Biden in congratulating Senator Dodd on

a personal matter. He has been a long-time friend, and we share

Peace Corps connections and other connections, and I am honored

to see him here today on that basis.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holbrooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee: I am pleased to be here

with you again today. I look forward to a frank exchange of views with you on the

United Nations, U.N. reform and any other subjects of interest to you. If it is agreeable to the Chairman, since I made a full statement to you on Thursday, today I

will simply summarize a few important points so as to leave as much time as possible for your questions.

I cannot emphasize enough how important it is for us to tackle aggressively the

challenge of U.N. reform. In order to pursue our national interests, we need to solve

our arrears problem and build a more effective, efficient United Nations. For this

reason, I want to reiterate my pledge that, if confirmed, I will make U.N. reform

my highest sustained priority, even as I deal with whatever immediate crises demand attention.

Thankfully, Mr. Chairman, your efforts, along with those of Senator Biden and

the rest of this Committee, provide a strong basis for us to move forward. As you

know, I fully support the legislative package that this Committee and the Adminis-
61

tration have agreed upon. If confirmed, I look forward to doing everything possible

to see this crucial package of arrears and reforms implemented.

While not perfect, the U.N. does work. We must build on those successes. To restore our influence with the United Nations, we must also pay our arrears. With

a better relationship, I believe we can do the following: achieve meaningful reforms

for a more streamlined, more effective U.N. organization; lower assessment rates for

U.S. contributions; maintain U.N. budget discipline; and strengthen the work of the

United Nations in key areas of concern to the United States—especially refugee and

humanitarian assistance, promoting democracy and human rights, fighting international crime and narcotics, and peacekeeping.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this Committee on all of these issues. With American leadership, I am confident that we can

build on what is right with the United Nations and meet the many challenges before

us.I look forward to any questions that you and other Members of the Committee

may have.

The CHAIRMAN. We are just trying to decide whether to trouble

you with a problem of a very fine lady who visited me today, but

I will talk to you about that lady later, and perhaps you can help

because of your experience in Germany.

On June 14, 1982, you wrote for the New York Times about the

relationship between the U.N. Ambassador and the Secretary of

State, and the problem you said lies in a system that against reason has allowed the U.N. Representative to become a sort of second

Secretary of State, to tell someone that they have a Cabinet rank

and that they may demand independent participation in the national security decisionmaking structure. The President should

gently but firmly remove the seductive ornamental phrase, Cabinet

rank, from the U.N. job.

You wrote those words during Jeane Kirkpatrick’s tenure at the

United Nations, so at that time I might have been inclined to disagree with you, but do you still think the President should remove

the seductive ornamental phrase, Cabinet rank, from the U.N. job,

and will you make such a recommendation to the President? I

think I know the answer to that.

Senator BIDEN. I used to be against seniority, too.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, before I give you a serious answer, I was

tempted to say that was some other person with the same name

who wrote that.

Mr. Chairman, I do stand by what I wrote, and my acceptance

of this offer to be nominated for the job by the President had nothing to do with Cabinet rank. I would have accepted his request

with or without that rank, and I would be sitting here before you

with or without that rank.

As I said last week in my opening statement, I believe that, and

Madeleine Albright and I have discussed this many times, we can

only have one Secretary of State. The only thing I regret about that

article now is that it had an implicit criticism of a person I have

great respect for, whom you just mentioned, and that is my friend,

Jeane Kirkpatrick.

I may well have had more substantive agreements with her than

I had with Al Haig at that moment, but in retrospect, a public dispute of that sort is not in the national interest.

Now, I have studied this issue back to the time when Warren

Austin was our Permanent Representative in New York, and Dean

Rusk was head of the International Organizations Division in 1948.

And I can give you the history of this between Henry Cabot Lodge,
62

John Foster Dulles, Adlai Stevenson and Dean Rusk, Pat Moynihan and Henry Kissinger. Senator Moynihan’s book on the U.N.

is an extraordinary example.

It is just not right, and I stand by this. I will take my instructions from the Secretary of State, as all of us should. I am honored

that the job carries the additional rank, and I will accept that rank

because it is part of the job, but it will not in any way affect how

I perform.

I work for Madeleine Albright and, as I said last week, the good

news is, we have worked together a long time. In fact, she called

me last night from Slovenia after her meetings to talk about this

hearing. We went over this issue. She asked to be remembered to

you and your colleagues personally, and we went over this exact

issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I do want you to comment on—and you

heard my comments on the international criminal court.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. On what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. The international criminal court, and I do not

need to explain that to you, and I would just like to hear what you

think about it, and what do you intend to do about it, if anything?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. May I start by saying first of all again that I

will take my instructions from the Secretary of State and the President. Second, obviously everyone agrees on the following point: The

current draft, the Rome draft, is unacceptable to the United States.

As a person who has personally negotiated status of forces agreements in many countries, the Philippines, Japan, and elsewhere,

and who negotiated the equivalent for the Dayton peace agreements, which is the model for the NATO forces in Kosovo, I think

it is completely unacceptable for American citizens, in uniform or

out, to be in a situation where they could be seized and tried by

somebody else. This is a huge problem we have had wherever we

had stationed troops. It would be even bigger here.

As you yourself pointed out, the International War Crimes Tribunals on Yugoslavia and Rwanda have done some good. I was a very

strong supporter of that, and in principle, I think these specialized

approaches case by case make a lot of sense. I am very troubled,

however, by the fact that we did not have something like this for

Cambodia, for example.

I cannot imagine this, except that there was an individual country involved, China, that did not want to get into the Pol Pot relationship with the Chinese during the cultural revolution. As a person who has worked on that issue for many years, I was puzzled

by the fact that we were going after Karadzic and Mladic, as we

should, and there was a man who had murdered at least 10 times

as many people sitting in the jungles of Western Cambodia.

So I have a lot to learn on this issue. I have listened carefully

to what you said. I have studied the Neuremberg trials and what

has passed since then, because of my association with Yugoslavia.

I know of Senator Dodd’s involvement in Neuremberg, and I would

like to talk to you more, if you do not mind, sir, in private, to learn

more about your views and those of your colleagues as I inform myself and participate in the decisionmaking process on an issue that

will ultimately be decided above my pay grade, but into which I

will have a significant input.
63

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I cannot resist asking you a Balkans question, if

I may, and it does relate indirectly with regard to the War Crimes

Tribunal and, by the way, I do recall, because you briefed us on the

status of forces agreements, and one of the big issues was the ability, particularly in the Philippines, you remember, when that

young woman was raped, and allegedly by Americans, it has always been a problem, and your answer does not surprise me.

But at any rate, to make a long story short, the War Crimes Tribunal is a different animal than a blanket permanent commitment

relative to the ability to try American forces or American citizens

in any fora, including a host country, but I would like to go beyond

that in the remaining, probably 3 minutes I have here, to ask you

this question, and I do not expect agreement, because I do not

know that I am right. As I said, I want to put forward a proposition, and if you feel comfortable responding, I would appreciate

it, and if you do not, I understand.

Slobodan Milosevic has been indicted as a war criminal, to state

the obvious, but Slobodan Milosevic did not do this all by himself.

Slobodan Milosevic was empowered by either the nonfeasance, or

malfeasance of a lot of Serbs, and I have been of the view, and you

know this from my pushing, as you did, for the arrest of Karadzic

and Mladic and others in Bosnia, I am of the view that until there

are public trials and a genuine and fair look at the evidence as to

what crimes have been committed by these individuals, for the

whole world to see, but particularly for the Serbian people to see,

that until that occurs, this sense of—it is almost like it is permanently adopted, this sense of being victimized that characterizes

historically everything you read about the Balkans and the history

of the Serbian people.

It is replete with references to this feeling of victimization. I am

of the view that unless there are public trials, and unless the Serbian people are forced to look at what they have enabled, even

though they may not have intended, that this will just have another round. Another generation will feel justified in this sense of

repression and oppression inflicted upon them by others, particularly other Europeans.

I wonder whether you would be willing to comment, because I do

not know anybody who knows more about the Balkans than you do

that is active in either major political party these days. What is

your sense of that, and what does that say about what our policy

objectives should be in attempting to help implement the arrest of

the most notorious war criminals?

And I know we are working on it, but if you could just take a

few moments to talk to me about it.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator Biden, first of all, in regard to Karadzic

and Mladic, I think I would list among the four or five, half-dozen

things that are the biggest failures in the last 31⁄2 years since Dayton, that would be one of the hard-core failures. We should have

arrested at least Karadzic right after Dayton.

Had we done so, the signal to the region, including Belgrade,

would have been very strong, and we might have been able to avoid

some of what followed in Kosovo, because of the announcement to
64

the world that we would not just indict, we would pursue. Karadzic

was far more accessible, and still is, than someone in Belgrade, for

reasons we all understand.

Second, you have made an extremely important point about people beyond Slobodan Milosevic, and I mentioned earlier

Neuremberg. It is my understanding of the historical record here,

and I would defer to other people, particularly Senator Dodd on

this, that after Neuremberg tried the major war criminals, a continual process went on. It was not perfect. Some people got away,

and some are still unpunished inside Germany, but the process did

occur.

And we have to be very clear here. Anyone who has been in a

refugee camp, as many of you on this panel have been, in either

Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, or Albania, knows that the victims include the Bosnian Muslims, the Croats, the Albanians, and sometimes Serbs. This is because some of the war atrocities were committed tragically by the victims. Some of the people the Hague has

indicted are Bosnian Muslims, and eventually they may also indict

some Albanians.

This is the biggest difference between Cambodia and the Balkans. You go to a refugee camp, and they say we know exactly who

fingered us; we know exactly who brought the Serb paramilitary to

our house and who raped my mother, my sister, my daughter. I

have had these conversations, as many of you have had, with the

victims.

In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge just killed people if they wore

eye glasses or spoke a foreign language or had an academic degree.

This was retail, hand-to-hand killing, and I believe that until justice is done, peace is going to be very difficult. Making Albanians

and Serbs live together in Kosovo is going to be even harder than

making Serbs, Croats, and Muslims live together in Bosnia. Both

goals are necessary if we are ever to have a successful exit from

the region, which is our goal.

So I strongly support what you have said, and I have just

touched the front edge of a huge issue. Senator Biden, when I came

back to Washington in 1994, many people said the War Crimes Tribunal was just theater, just cosmetics. It proved to be an indispensable component of our policy. It allowed us to keep the indicted

war criminals out of Dayton, OH, and I believe that Louise Arbor’s

indictments were correct. I do not know if each person she indicted

will actually be convicted.

I know some of these people personally, as you know, and I

would differentiate between them, but the basic decision to support

the War Crimes Tribunal was of long-term historic importance. I

think a half-century from now, as we still talk about Neuremberg,

people are going to be analyzing the consequences of these War

Crimes Tribunals, and I hope we get it right. I think that with

some stumbling around we have done basically the right thing.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Holbrooke, when Andrew Young,

one of your predecessors, testified before this committee, he said

that serving in the United Nations as our Ambassador was much

like serving as a member of a large city council, that it was a very
65

cosmopolitan group of people, and the dynamics of persuasion were

one by one in that type of a council.

I ask this both to query you on your personal style as you have

analyzed the job as to how you might be effective and, second, to

what extent will your effectiveness be clouded in any way by feelings on the part of delegates at the U.N. now, either on the Security Council or in the General Assembly, that somehow or another

the United States has not been a player at the U.N. recently. We

have not been, at least there for them, at least in their causes.

I do not know to what extent you perceive that there is any deficit to be made up, but if so, how do you plan to do it? Can you describe, at least if you are confirmed, how you will do this job?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar. The first part

of your question about my style in regard to this job, I have read

a lot of things about my style over the years, not all of which my

mother, who is here today, and I would fully recognize. But I think

you have to suit your style to the situation and the circumstance.

I worked in Asia for most of my career, as you know, much of it

in collaboration with you, and that was one style. You do not treat

Koreans and Japanese the same way you treat the Serbs. We got

to Dayton. We had a different style.

In New York we have to deal with each country’s representatives, combining persuasiveness and pressure, depending on the

circumstances. I have talked already about what, if confirmed,

would be the appropriate style because I am very concerned about

this. I will reach out to every Permanent Representative that I

can—there are a lot of them—and to the Secretariat, and will be

very active in that area.

At the same time, I really think we have to make clear to them

that certain practices, several of which were discussed prior to your

arrival, really have to be cleaned up.

Now, the best way to strengthen the hand of the U.S. Government at the U.N. is clearly to get the bill that you have passed on

the Senate floor today by a vote of 98 to 1 into law, and then implement it. If that is done, and if I am confirmed, that will be my

highest priority, and it will greatly strengthen our hand on things

like the ACABQ and other issues.

Did I get the initials correct this time? Thank you.

So that will be my approach, Senator Lugar. I would only add

one thing. I have said this many times, but I cannot stress it highly

enough: To the extent that members of this committee can assist

us in New York by coming up and talking directly to the permreps

and to the Secretariat the way you talk to people in the job that

I have been nominated for, it will, I think, help, because I think

everybody understands that the United Nations is at a crossroads.

The cold war era was one era. The post cold war era, phase 1,

is another, and we have got to move forward.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I congratulate our colleague, Senator

Grams, for doing just that. He has been, as you know, a stalwart

on behalf of the chairman and this committee, and perhaps others

may be helpful, too.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.
66

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me

just briefly first of all, with regard to the international criminal

court question raised by Senator Helms, I certainly do not disagree

with him or you. I think the present structure as proposed by the

Rome accord is unacceptable, but I also happen to believe, and you

are very gracious in referring to my father at Neuremberg, who

was the executive trial counsel, that having a set of—the rule of

law is something we cherish in this country.

It has been part of our very solid foundation as a Nation over the

past 210-plus years of our existence, and if we are ever going to

achieve some order of stability in the world having a set of principles by which we try to relate to one another I think becomes

critically important.

While I do not disagree the ad hoc courts have done well, my

hope is that we could find a structure for an international permanent court. I think the idea of being isolated by the world, creating

pariahs, has value in countries where nations feel their leadership

may take them down that road, so I do not disagree about the analysis of the present proposal, but I would hope that that would not

be construed as a rejection of the concept and the idea of having

an international court of criminal justice.

Second, I want to thank Senator Helms and Senator Biden.

Today they accepted an amendment of mine dealing with the Inspector General’s Office at the State Department, and I offered another amendment which I withdrew that has to do with how criminal investigations are handled, and to enhance them, and instead

I have asked for the General Accounting Office to do an assessment

of these Offices of Inspector Generals across the Government.

I want to have a better idea of whether or not due process is

being followed, and I made note on the floor of the Senate that

even under the Independent Counsel statute laws, people under investigation have a right to know with what they are being charged,

and a right to refute and offer exculpatory information when reports are being presented to the Justice Department.

That is not being done, and I think any first year law student

would raise legitimate due process questions about how they conduct their business.

And again, I have a great deal of respect for the work they do

in auditing and so forth, and the role they were designed to fulfill,

but I am very anxious to hear how they might correct this situation

administratively rather than having to go the legislative route, and

so I withdrew the amendment, the second amendment, and I am

anxious to hear their reports.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to take, if I could, the remaining

few minutes of my time, and I was not here on Thursday, as you

have all made note of. I was busy in Connecticut with other matters, and I would like to take a moment or two, if I could, and talk

about our nominee, who has been an old and dear friend, and I am

not objective about Dick Holbrooke. I have known him for many,

many years, and he is a friend.

We sometimes try to be as objective as we can about these matters, but occasionally that becomes difficult, and I admit to the fact

that I am personally a good friend of this nominee’s and believe he
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would be a terrific Ambassador for the United States at the United

Nations.

I think we all know and appreciate, Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out on numerous occasions, how important a tool the United Nations is to America’s conduct of foreign policy, and our Ambassador

to the United Nations is a key to unlocking that power, in my view.

For the past 9 months, however, the post has remained vacant,

thereby unfortunately degrading, I think, our influence at the

United Nations. Today we have an opportunity to correct that

omission and restore some of the United States’s leadership in that

body.

There are very few things, Mr. Chairman, the United States as

a Nation holds more dear than the ideals our country was founded

on some 223 years ago. We continue to lead in the global fight for

freedom, for democracy, for peace, and for the respect of human

rights. For the past five decades, Mr. Chairman, it has been the

United States’ strong and clear and persistent voice in both the Security Council and the General Assembly which has convinced

other nations to support these same ideals.

Looking back on those 50 years, it is clear that our work at the

United Nations has by and large been a success. In the midst of

some criticism, I think it is important to recognize our victories.

Today, the United States is one of the most powerful champions of

human rights, freedom and peace around the world.

The United States has used the United Nations to support our

foreign policy in places as far flung as Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Bosnia. Without the United Nations, the two suspects in the bombing

of Pan Am flight 103 would probably never have faced a judge to

account for their actions. Similarly, Saddam Hussein would still be

free to terrorize both his neighbors and his own citizens if it were

not for the United Nations sponsored implementation force in Bosnia, I think war, bloodshed, and genocide would still rule that nation.

Today, the United Nations is engaged in helping to implement

certain aspects of the peace settlement in Kosovo which we all hope

and pray will put an end to the bloodshed there as well.

While we are familiar with the United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Iraq, we must not forget that the men and

women wearing the U.N. signature’s blue helmets are keeping the

peace in places as disparate as Angola and Tajikistan. In all, there

are currently 16 different ongoing peacekeeping operations on four

continents around the globe.

As we embark on the next stage of involvement in Kosovo, one

in which the United Nations will play a very important role, it is

tremendously important, in my view, that we are represented in

that world body. We must not allow any additional delay to further

erode that leadership.

Last fall, Mr. Chairman, as you know, President Clinton tapped

an exceedingly qualified diplomat to head the delegation to the

United Nations. Richard Holbrooke has served our Nation well in

a wide variety of posts, which I know this committee heard last

week, from Assistant Secretary of State for two different regions,

to the Ambassador to Germany.
68

Today, many of our thoughts are focused on the Balkans in this

first real chance to bring peace to Kosovo. I think it is particularly

fitting, Mr. Chairman, therefore, that among Ambassador

Holbrooke’s achievements are the Dayton Peace Accords which

ended the civil war and genocide in Bosnia.

Five years ago, it was the war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia,

not Kosovo, that captured the world’s attention. Innocent civilians

were murdered and raped simply on the basis of their ethnicity.

Venturing into the market to buy food entailed a risk of instant

death at the hands of snipers or soldiers with mortar on a nearby

hilltop. Each day was a struggle for survival.

Today, however, Bosnia is rebuilding, the 1995 talks held thousands of miles away from the battlefields in Dayton silenced the

sounds of gunfire. The man who brought the Serbs the Bosnians,

and the Croatians together for those talks is before us today as the

nominee to be the Ambassador to the United Nations.

As Ambassador Holbrooke knows, Mr. Chairman, it is often easier to wage war than to make peace, and in spite of daunting odds,

he did make peace, and for that he deserves ours and the world’s

praise.

Following his return to the private sector, Ambassador Holbrooke

continued to serve his country without compensation, I might add,

from the government, focusing his efforts on the dispute on the Island of Cyprus and the bloodshed in Kosovo. The success or the

failure of the Kosovo agreement will be determined by whether the

United States, our NATO allies, and Russia can stay the course.

The job of bringing the coalition together and keeping it together

will not be an easy one, but it is one in which Ambassador

Holbrooke has the experience at the United Nations which will be

crucial at this time. So Mr. Chairman, I want to add my voice to

those of my colleagues who were here on Thursday to support this

nomination, and to thank Dick Holbrooke for his willingness to persevere in this process.

I am one, Mr. Chairman, who worries deeply about our ability

to attract the best our society can produce to serve our country. It

is not easy to submit yourself and your families to the kind of public scrutiny that a nomination of this magnitude involves. We have

got to sort out some way in which we can go through this process

without making it so discouraging to people that those who watch

the process who think one day they might like to serve their country will be discouraged from doing so in any administration, and

I am deeply, deeply worried that if we do not get a better handle

on this, that will be the net result of what we accomplish.

So I think the chairman has done a good job by going through

the legitimate questions that have been raised. I think you, Mr.

Holbrooke, have done a very fine job in responding to those questions. That is a part of the process, but I know the chairman agrees

with me that we have got to sort out a better way in which we attract good people, to make it possible for them to bring their credentials to the table, and to move on to allow them to fulfill the

jobs that they have been willing to serve in.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I thank the nominee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grams.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
69

Welcome, Mr. Holbrooke. Nice seeing you again today.

Mr. Chairman, I must say I have had a chance to discuss the

United Nations with the nominee on a few occasions. And I am

very pleased with what I have heard to date. He has a reputation,

as we all know, for being a tough negotiator and a practiced arm

twister. And I think those are some of the exact attributes that we

are going to need in our next Ambassador to the United Nations.

Now, it is not going to be easy to get the U.N. to implement the

Helms-Biden package, even though there is widespread agreement

on the need for reform. And, again, I want to compliment the chairman and the ranking member for all the work they have put in,

in, again, putting this package together.

Two years ago, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in the

introduction to his reform proposal that the major source of institutional weakness in the United Nations is that certain organizational features have become, and I will quote, ‘‘fragmented, duplicative, rigid, in some areas ineffective, in other superfluous.’’ But

since that time, I think it is arguable whether any progress has

been made in addressing some of these shortcomings.

Now, I do not underestimate the problems that are inherent in

streamlining an international organization, where each member is

involved in the decisionmaking process. And a massive U.N. bureaucracy and numerous member States have a vested interest, as

we know, in resisting reform and maintaining the status quo. Well,

unfortunately, while they are reaping the benefits in the short term

by using the United Nations as a cash cow, I think in the long term

they are weakening the United Nations as a whole.

And, Ambassador Holbrooke, in essence, your job will be to try

and save the United Nations from itself. But to do that, you have

to get the U.S. Mission’s priorities straight. Now, if the U.S. Mission is truly as dedicated to creating a healthy and viable United

Nations, then its first priority should be to press for real reform.

And I know I have talked to you about this, and I think we are

in agreement. The practice of disassociating from the consensus on

major budget actions, in violation of Kassebaum-Solomon, should

never happen again, and the certification of the Senate’s benchmarks must reflect objective reality and not the U.N.’s wishful

thinking or creative accounting.

As the subcommittee chairman with U.N. oversight responsibilities, I look forward to working with you to ensure that we have

the information, and also analyses, necessary to assert and ascertain that true reform is being achieved at the U.N.

Now, the role of the United States in shaping the reform efforts

remain a matter of contention, as we all know, at the United Nations. The U.S. has been often called a deadbeat. We have been

called a bully. The U.S. has been accused of being heavy handed

and, quote, not doing its fair share for the international community. And the U.S. has been berated and belittled at every turn by

many of the countries that have been benefited most from the generosity of the United States, both in terms of security guarantees

and also in terms of economic assistance.

Now, Mr. Chairman, as I noted before, I believe Ambassador

Holbrooke has the skills that are necessary to leverage our position

as the most powerful Nation in the world and, as the largest con-
70

tributor to the United Nations, to ensure greater transparency and

accountability in the organization and, quote, a reformed United

Nations.

Now, the Secretary General noted, it will be more relevant, the

United Nations, in the eyes of the world. And in this age, being relevant means that the great powers, including the United States,

consider the U.N. to be a powerful tool in their foreign policy arsenal. So, to this end, I think the United States must help shape the

United Nations to be an organization that the U.S. needs as much

as the U.N. needs the United States.

Now, with that, I would like to follow that up with a question,

Mr. Holbrooke. As you are aware, the Secretary General’s budget

outline increases spending by some $13 million, I think as the

chairman noted, instead of making spending cuts, even though the

U.N. is $5 million under budget right now in the current biennium.

Are you confident that you would be able to get the U.N. to agree

to a zero nominal growth budget of the $2.533 billion for the next

biennium?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. First of all, Senator Grams, I appreciate your

opening comments. And I, too, look forward to working closely with

you and your colleagues and your staff.

On the specific question, I met informally over the weekend with

representatives of the Secretariat. And the first thing, of course,

that emerges is that everyone argues about what the actual numbers are. It is hard to get a straight figure out of them.

I have already told them that, if confirmed, the issue of zero

nominal growth will be critically important. I have expressed my

astonishment that such a comparatively small, but clearly gratuitous, increase in the current climate could take place. And I cannot pledge to you I can reverse it, because I can say it, but I cannot

promise I can do it. All I can tell you is that when I said to the

chairman earlier that the reform issue is my highest sustained priority, within that, as you and I have already discussed privately in

terms of prioritization, this comes right up at the top.

I just do not understand why this kind of increase would take

place now, particularly in light of the fact that they are under

budget in expenditures. And it goes hand in hand with Senator

Helms’ earlier comments about the number of personnel, which is

also hard to get a handle on. How many people actually work for

the U.N.? I have heard a lot of different numbers here.

In preparation for this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I said I think I

am going to be asked that question. What is the answer? The crack

team you see here in row behind me spent the whole morning with

it and finally came back and said there really is not any number

you ought to put before the committee today, because it is just impossible to define.

So these two issues, which are closely related—budget and personnel—are the things I will focus on. And I will report regularly

to you on how we are doing, and ask you to help.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have some other

questions, but I will wait until the next round.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
71

You did not know it, but Senator Wellstone suggested ladies

first. So, Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you. And I want to thank Senators Feingold and Wellstone for deferring. I have been here a while, because

I have been waiting for this opportunity to basically ask a question

on one particular topic. And I think, Mr. Holbrooke, you know what

it is, because we have talked a little bit about it. But I wanted to

get you on the record on it. And when I ask this question, I do so

on behalf of a lot of Members of the Senate, particularly the women

Members of the Senate, who have come together to discuss a matter that is really eating at our hearts. And that is the violence

against women in Kosovo—specifically, rape and sexual assault.

Mass rapes have been reported in the Djakovica area and in

other regions throughout Kosovo. And I want to read for you a section from the State Department report, ‘‘Erasing History: Ethnic

Cleansing in Kosovo.’’ And this is a direct quote:

Serbian forces raped women in an organized and systematic fashion in Djakovica

and Pec. Rape victims were reportedly separated from their families and sent to an

army camp, where Serbian soldiers repeatedly raped them. In Pec, refugees allege

that Serbian forces rounded up young Albanian women and took them to a hotel,

where they were raped repeatedly.

It goes on:

The commander of the local base reportedly uses a roster of soldiers’ names to

allow all of his troops an evening in the hotel.

In addition to these specific accounts, refugees claim that during Serbian forces’

raids on their villages, young women have been gang-raped in homes and on the

sides of roads. We believe that there may be many more incidents that have not

been reported because of the cultural stigma attached to this offense in traditional

Kosovar society.

And that is the end of the quote.

And in the next few months, I am afraid, Mr. Holbrooke, we are

going to hear even more chilling accounts of these atrocities. Just

days ago, NATO forces found a basement room in the Serb military

police headquarters in Pristina filled with torture instruments, including knives, bats, brass knuckles, a pick axe, chains, and a

black hood. One of the rooms of the torture chamber was described

as a place where women were raped, and still contained several

boxes of incriminating material, including pornography.

And I would like to ask unanimous consent to place in the record

an article, Mr. Chairman, that recently appeared—actually, today

in the New York Times. I think it was today—‘‘Deny Rape or Be

Hated: Kosovo Victims’ Choice.’’

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The article referred to is in the appendix on page 135.]

Senator BOXER. And, briefly, I am going to keep to my time. This

is a story about a 22-year-old woman, married 4 months ago. She

said she was taken from a small southern village by Serbian forces,

held for a day in a local police station, beaten, and threatened with

death, but she said, not raped. Her husband thinks differently: ‘‘I

am 100 percent certain they raped her,’’ he said. ‘‘I know that when

women get in their hands, there is no chance to escape.’’

And this husband goes on to say his wife denies the rape because, ‘‘she does not dare tell that kind of story.’’ And he says, if

she admitted it to him, he said, ‘‘I would ask for a divorce—even

if I had 20 children,’’ as his wife listened, silent and shame faced
72

in a corner of their empty home, looted of all furniture and possessions.

The husband said, ‘‘I do not hate her, but the story is before my

eyes. I feel very cold toward her. Kissing her,’’ he said, ‘‘is like kissing a dead body.’’

So I think, Mr. Holbrooke, that when you get there—and I hope

you get there—that you will make this issue a priority. Time does

not allow me to read some other things I really wanted to do. But

I need to know on the record what is your commitment to find help

and justice for these women. It is hard for me to find words to explain how I feel about this. And I think that means specifically including counseling for these women. The funding that we just gave

to help the refugees, some of it needs to go directly to help these

women; enough investigators for the International War Crimes Tribunal; ensuring privacy for the women who come forward; making

sure, again, that we do not let this be forgotten. Because, to me,

I do not know how these women go on.

In this other story—and I will close with this, Mr. Chairman,

very quickly—there is a story of a 20-year-old, tall, blonde and

shapely, the most beautiful girl in the village. She was with her

husband when the soldiers grabbed her by the hair and said, she

is our woman, not yours. They took her off. And when she came

back 1 hour later, she was beyond distraught. She was screaming,

pulling her hair, trying to stick her fingers in the electrical socket

to kill herself, and she kept denying the rape to the men. She could

not admit it. If she did, she would be done for. Her life would be

ruined.

Another woman in the camp was told by a Serb soldier: You Albanian women are strong. You have lots of babies. You are so

strong, you can have sex with the entire Serb Army.

And in conclusion, this person with—I think it is with the U.N.—

says: that shows the ethnic animus of it. And you have to think of

the deeper implication of these rapes. It can ruin marriages, prevent marriages. It can make them feel like damaged goods. Even

a culture not nearly as judgmental as this would feel vulnerable.

And that, of course, is part of the motivation—to humiliate and to

make women feel powerless, that they do not have power in their

soul.

So I just want to get on the record how I feel, how a lot of Members of the Senate feel. And I want to know what your commitment

is that you would bring to this issue in the United Nations.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator Boxer, of course I share your feelings.

I first encountered these issues personally in the Balkans in the

summer of 1992, when, as a private citizen, traveling at my own

expense with the International Rescue Committee, I went for the

IRC to some of the refugee camps in Karlavac, outside Zagreb, and

on the Bosnian-Croatian border.

And as I said earlier in response to the question from I think it

was Senator Dodd, it is even worse than your story, because in

many cases, the people know who the rapists are. And that is the

governing difference, to me. Rape is awful in all contexts, and rape

has always gone along with war in all contexts. But what makes

this uniquely bad—and the article you quote tells it—is that they

often know the perpetrators.
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There is a movie, Mr. Chairman, which I would recommend be

made available to any Members of the Senate who are concerned

with this, a documentary, called ‘‘Calling the Ghosts,’’ which was

produced by Julia Ormond, which is a lengthy interview with two

of the women who were at Ormuska camp in western Bosnia. I

think Senator Biden is familiar with the movie.

Senator Boxer, I do not know if you have seen the movie, but I

would be delighted to get a tape to you of the movie. By the way,

we have in the audience with us today our former Ambassador to

Croatia, Peter Galbraith, if he is still here, who is particularly familiar with this issue and did a wonderful job of working on this

issue.

Senator BOXER. He is.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. And Peter and I were very close colleagues on

that. Because there is less stigma in Bosnia than in the Albanian

clan system and these two women were lawyers, they just spoke

out and described it in detail. And they have come to the States.

One of the men killed and one of the men captured in the war

criminal actions of the British around Banja Luka were in that

group. So one of those people is now dead and another is under

trial.

Why men do this is beyond me. It obviously is not anything to

do with physical gratification. To actually talk to the people, to actually be there is just extraordinary. But as we both know, this is

not just Kosovo. It happened in Rwanda. It happens all around the

world.

Senator BOXER. So the main thing is can we count on you to see

that these people get help with that refugee aid that we all voted

for?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, you can. Barbara Larkin, who is here

today, our Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, can also

follow on this. We need to talk to Julia Taft, our Assistant Secretary of State for Refugees, and to other people, to make absolutely sure that this gets special attention. The risk, Mr. Chairman, here is—I know the bureaucracy so well—that this issue will

fall between the cracks. And money will be allocated for everything

else, and there will be nothing for this issue.

The victims need special counseling. And perhaps they may need

special dispensation to find another place to live. The story you tell

is not just one story. That is going to go on across the region.

I personally will commit myself to it. I have talked to Secretary

General Kofi Annan about it. He shares our concern. He also extends it to the larger issue of abuse of women in other ways, particularly in his native continent of Africa. And yes, you can be assured that I feel deeply about these issues personally and I will

work on them.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wellstone, if you will proceed.

Senator WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, just building on this question, Mr. Holbrooke, from

Senator Boxer, I appreciate your response. And I appreciate your

question, Senator Boxer. As I was thinking about this, I was almost thinking about the Torture Treatment Center in Minnesota,

which really is a holy place.
74

I mean you can focus on physical infrastructure. You can focus

on getting the food. And it is so easy to lose sight of the ways in

which people can just be so destroyed—in this particular case

women—and you meet with people at that Torture Treatment Center—God knows, I wish there was not such a need for such centers.

And God knows, I wish there was not going to be a need for this

kind of support—but there is. And I appreciate your response.

I have not know Mr. Holbrooke as long as Senator Dodd, but I

want also to associate myself with the remarks of other Senators,

saying that I really believe—I appreciate your leadership and I appreciate what you have done for our country, what you have done

for the world, and I certainly hope you will be our Ambassador, and

I really look forward to working with you.

I have three quick questions. One on Tibet. You have been there

several times. I wonder whether you could maybe talk a little bit

to the committee about your views on the need for some kind of a

political solution in Tibet, and, as Ambassador, how you might advance those views with the Chinese Government, if confirmed.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Wellstone.

Before responding to your question about Tibet, may I just say

that I have had the honor to visit the center in Minneapolis, run

by—if my memory is correct—Doug Johnson. Is that correct?

Senator WELLSTONE. That is correct. If in doubt, if you mention

the word ‘‘Johnson,’’ in Minnesota, you have got a pretty good

chance of getting it right.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. This center is remarkable. It was the first center in the United States. And I commend both you and Senator

Grams for your support of it. Your photographs and that of your

staff are on the walls there. And they talked very greatly about

what you had done for it. And I share your views.

On Tibet, Senator Wellstone, for various reasons, Tibet has always been a special personal interest to me. And I have, as you

said, made three trips there, including one to western Tibet, to the

nomad areas. I have talked often and frequently to Chinese officials, including President Jiang Zemin, about the Tibet issue.

Whatever one thinks of the rest of the Chinese issue, what is happening in Tibet must be an issue of enormous special concern.

And I feel that Tibet is a unique cosmology and a unique culture,

and it is severely in danger by encroachments on the high plateau

of a influx of Han Chinese. I have worked closely with His Holiness

the Dalai Lama and with his Washington representative, Mr.

Luddy Gary, and with other Tibetans, in assisting them in an informal and private citizen manner, and have done everything I can

to deal with this issue.

I was encouraged last summer at the press conference that President Clinton and Jiang Zemin had on the subject, and I am genuinely stricken, Senator Wellstone, by the fact that that dialog has

now broken down again. And without going into details, which I do

not think would be productive in a public forum, I would just say

that this issue is a very special concern to me, and I will do everything I can to further it.

And I believe that the Dalai Lama’s position has been misconstrued by some people in Beijing. And I believe a solution is

possible that protects the rights—cultural, religious and personal
75

rights—of the Tibetan people within the sovereignty of Beijing,

which the Dalai Lama does not question. And within that framework, I will be available to work on that issue if I can, because I

really care about it.

Senator WELLSTONE. This little light here is going to turn red in

a second, so I will not really ask for a response to the second question, but I maybe will put it in writing to you. I have been doing

a lot of work and I hope this will kind of reach fruition with Senator Helms, the State Department and other people, this whole

issue of—it is hard for me—it is almost like Senator Boxer’s question—it is hard for me to just comprehend what this means, those

stories she talked about—about dealing with the whole issue of

trafficking, trafficking mainly of women and children—in part,

used for prostitution; in part, used for forced labor in homes. And

I want to maybe talk to you some time about what role you would

see for the United Nations in trying to address this problem. I really believe there ought to be a response and we ought not to just

turn our gaze away from it.

Finally, since you mentioned Ambassador Galbraith, I wanted to

just say, Mr. Chairman, that I have had a chance to stay with the

Ambassador when I was traveling and I have had a chance to be

in touch with Peter Galbraith since. And I am really glad to see

him here. And I think he has been just an incredibly strong voice

for our country playing an important role in foreign affairs. And I

think he was a courageous, courageous Ambassador.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to

thank the chairman especially for the manner in which he has conducted this confirmation process—thorough, but fair, and I think it

is a very good thing. I do look forward to Ambassador Holbrooke’s

confirmation. I think he has been a brilliant influence on our country’s foreign policy. And I think he will do much more for us in this

position.

We talked about this briefly, privately, and you know of my interest, Mr. Ambassador, but the United Nations is supporting the

conduct of a consultation on autonomy in the troubled region of

East Timor on August 8—or we think it will be on August 8. This

has been one of my highest priorities since coming to the Senate

in 1993. If you are confirmed prior to August, as I certainly hope

you will be, I would like you to commit to helping ensure that U.S.

support for this effort, both financially and diplomatically, continues to be robust. This is not only of concern to me, but of many

Members who have been working on this issue in both the House

and the Senate, in many cases, long before I came to the Congress.

What do you think are the prospects there? And do you think the

poll will actually be held on August 8?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I cannot answer this question, particularly in

light of today’s newspaper accounts, quoting U.N. officials, talking

about a possible postponement. My instinct, Senator Feingold, is

that a postponement would not be the right thing to do, although

I have heard people argue both sides of it. I have not worked on

this problem for many, many years directly, but I have followed it

because of my prior involvement with Indonesia and with the re-
76

gion, and also because of a personal friendship with Jose Ramos

Horta and other people who work on the problem—one of whom,

David Phillips, is in the audience today, who has been a very close

supporter of the East Timorese.

The administration welcomed the creation of UNAMET, and

wants the consultations to take place on August 8. The U.S. has

given $9 million to the U.N. voluntary trust fund, and has made

available 30 American police officers for the civilian police—and

three military liaison officers, I might add. This puts us in the

same range of major donors as Australia, Portugal and Japan. Congressional support has made this possible.

I will pay a lot of attention to this issue for all the reasons that

you outlined and more. But in light of today’s news, which I know

only what I read in the newspaper accounts, I am a little bit concerned about it. And what I would like to do, with your permission,

Senator Feingold, is speak to other people and perhaps talk to you

privately about it in the next day or two. Because I know of your

deep personal concern about it, and I pledge to you that I will

share that concern, as I have since 1977.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I appreciate that. And what I am looking forward to is, given the tremendous contribution you have

made with regard to Dayton and Bosnia and Kosovo, this to me is

one of the very logical candidates for your energy and abilities to

be applied.

Let me just let you know that this news today only suggests that

the referendum may be postponed 2 or 3 weeks. So I would not

want to send a signal that any of us believe that it is an openended type of thing. It is an important opportunity. It needs to be

held either on August 8 or some time near that time, as long as

we can be assured of a safe and fair vote. And I do appreciate your

commitment.

Another thing I want to ask about has to do with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which has been responsible for indictments against more than 40 individuals and has in

custody several individuals presumed to have led and directed the

1994 genocide, the so-called Big Fish. And you even referred to this

situation.

I believe this is very important. If anything, the international

community has to send an unmistakable signal that such horrible

crimes cannot be committed with impunity. In fact, after Senator

Boxer’s powerful presentation and in fact your reference, Ambassador Holbrooke, I am not certain, but I believe the Rwanda Tribunal was the first to issue convictions as to rape as a war crime. So

this is highly relevant, the work of this tribunal, to the earlier discussion.

However, the mandate of the tribunal, as I understand it, is limited to acts committed during calendar year 1994. And I raised this

at a recent Africa subcommittee hearing, and today I appreciate—

thanks to the help of the chairman and the ranking member, Senator Biden—that my amendment was added to the State Department authorization bill today, which will extend the authority of

this tribunal beyond 1994, to make it essentially the same kind of

status as the tribunal with regard to the Balkans. Given these
77

facts, I am hopeful that you can express your support for this provision.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. May I just clarify, Senator Feingold? I share

your concerns. But what is the specific provision that——

Senator FEINGOLD. The current mandate of the tribunal with regard to Rwanda is limited only to events in 1994, not events since

that time. I would like to see that authority extended to the

present, just as is the case, as I understand it, with the authority

for the tribunal that is working with regard to Kosovo and some

of the crimes that were committed there. And as I said, this was

adopted by the Senate today as a part of the State Department authorization bill.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I have just been handed my talking point. But

since it does not address your question, I am going out on a limb

and just say I will support your proposal.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I knew I was going to like your tenure.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator, I am sure that as soon as the hearing

is over, I am going to be told I have broken all the rules, because

I did that. I can hear Barbara Larkin already laughing nervously.

But since I have no instructions, if confirmed, I will support your

proposal. I was unaware of the extension issue, but I think anyone

who has read Philip Greyovich’s book about the killings in Rwanda

understands that this was worse than Bosnia. It was worse than

Kosovo. We cannot forget it. And we must support this tribunal.

And to arbitrarily limit the scope of its area does not make any

sense to me.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I thank you. And if I know anything

about either the practice of law or politics, I will stop right now.

Senator GRAMS [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Senator Biden, did you have any other questions?

Senator BIDEN. I do. I have one, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

One of the first things you and I discussed, Mr. Ambassador, is

when I came back from a visit with Mr. Milosevic. I remember I

was talking about this both at the Department and at Blair House.

And I remember you agreeing with me, but giving me if not verbally, with your body language, some advice that I should be less

passionate about the way I was making my case to the President

about the rape camps that were set up in Bosnia, not in Kosovo—

I would not be surprised if we find that out—but in Bosnia.

And I want to relate one incident with you to underscore the

point of the extent to which—how deep the feelings are here in the

Congress. And I know from hours of discussions you and I have

had and my seeking your advice on the Balkans repeatedly, I know

how deeply you feel about it. But let me just recite this one incident.

I guess it was 1993 which generated all these flurries of meetings that your—well, maybe your predecessor some day, but Secretary Christopher—asked me to come to the State Department to

be debriefed on a trip I had just taken to Belgrade and to Sarajevo

and a failed attempt to get into Srebrinica. And I had then with

me two staffers that were on my staff then, John Ritch, who you

know well, and Jamie Rubin, who you know well.

And we had a meeting, a long, private meeting, with Mr.

Milosevic. And we sat in his office—I am guessing now—it was
78

from like 7 in the evening until close to 11:30. And you have been

in that office many times. You know that little, small conference

table on the back wall, down from his desk. And we were in argument over what was going on in Bosnia. And he kept saying he had

nothing to do with any of this. I had to talk to Mr. Karadzic. It was

not him, it was the Bosnian Serbs, et cetera.

And at one point, about 10 o’clock at night—maybe a little

later—he finally looked at me in exasperation and he said—he

never got flustered, I might add, by the way—he never got flustered—he looked at me and he said: Would you like to speak to Mr.

Karadzic? After telling me how he had no control over him at all.

And I said that yes, I would.

And I know you know the office. He got up from that desk, that

little table, and stepped two steps back to a phone against the wall.

And he got on the phone. And I do not understand Serbo-Croatian.

I do not understand what he was saying. And he put the phone

down. And we go back to arguing about the maps, because it was

the Owen plan then and cantons.

And about 25 minutes later, in that beautiful Hapsburg-era

building he has his office in, and that big center staircase that goes

up to his office—there is no one else in the building except

guards—and I hear somebody running up the stairs. The door

bursts open, and a guy with a full shock of hair—the only part

about him that I envied—a full shock of hair—turns the corner and

is gasping for breath. I am not exaggerating. I thought he was

going to have a heart attack. He immediately sat down in the seat

next to President Milosevic and said: Mr. President, I am sorry I

am late.

And I am wondering, who the hell is this guy. And he looks

across at me and says: Senator Biden, I am pleased to meet you.

And with that, the President said: Dr. Karadzic. And I looked at

Milosevic and I said: No influence? And he did not respond. And

then Karadzic made a few comments.

And here is the point. He finished his few comments, and I

looked at him and I said: I would recognize your voice anywhere,

Doctor. And he kind of lit up in recognition. And I said—and I was

not telling the truth—I looked at him and I said: Your voice sounds

exactly like those intercepts we have to the rape camps. And I am

not exaggerating when I say he turned as white as that sheet of

paper and did not say another word. That is when I knew for absolute certain that there were actually organized rape camps in Bosnia.

I suspect—and you know this so much better than I do—we are

going to find modified versions of that in Kosovo. And here is my

question. Notwithstanding Senator Boxer’s ardent plea for support—I have no doubt about your support of pursuing this—how do

we deal with the cultural difficulty? Because, as you know, one of

the reasons for the rape camps was to despoil Moslem women, because there is in fact part of the culture that these women will be

ostracized. And even worse, if they give birth to a Serbian baby,

they are done, gone.

Do you have any sense of how we get our hands around this

issue in a way that allows for the gathering of the evidence to be

able to be produced at trials without doing more damage from their
79

perspective to the women who are already victimized, so they are

not victimized twice like that woman accounted for in the New

York Times article, where she is victimized by the Serbs and then,

in my view—I am going to get in trouble for saying this—victimized by her own culture, by her husband, who patronizingly apparently kisses her on the head and said it is like kissing a cold body?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, Senator, the reason for the systematic

rapes—some of the rapes were not systematic—but the reason for

the systematic ones that took place in western Bosnia and may also

have taken place in Kosovo—that remains to be determined—was

precisely intentional. The people doing the rape were doing it because they understood the culture and they understood the consequences.

Senator BIDEN. Another form of ethnic cleaning in a bizarre way.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. And destroying the family structure. And that

story that Senator Boxer told, if it were a one-time-only story it

would be sad enough, but it is not going to be a one-time-only

story. There is nothing—I have to be honest with you—there is

nothing the United States, the United Nations or the world community can do to change a century-old culture’s attitudes toward

rape and toward women. And this is equally true in other parts of

the world, as well.

I lived in North Africa, in Morocco, for 2 years, and saw similar

problems. The de-stigmatization of rape has only begun in this

country in recent years.

Senator BIDEN. That is true.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. And we pride ourselves on being the most advanced country in the world on this. And it has taken some very

brave people. Those two women in Julia Ormond’s film, ‘‘Calling

the Ghosts,’’ which you are familiar with, are incredibly brave.

They knew what they were doing, and they are well-educated. They

stood up and said what they had to say.

That is why in my answer to Senator Boxer’s question I suggested that we need special programs and dedicated funds to deal

with the victims, and perhaps there may be cases where the victims cannot continue to live in their original culture. The damage

has been done, and we cannot change the culture.

My greatest concern is that there is no real dedicated, programmatic funds for this, that it falls between the cracks within

our own bureaucracies. And I would hope that Barbara Larkin and

her colleagues, and, if confirmed, myself, will go to work on this.

And I think we should be sure that Julia Taft and her colleagues,

people in AID, look at this from a programmatic point of view. Because it will take the kind of things which the Minnesota center

is doing on an individual basis, but en masse.

Senator Grams is more familiar than I am, and his staff more

familiar also, with the number of similar centers that exist in Europe, which have to be brought into this. But I believe that there

are now something like 180 centers of that sort. Is that correct,

Senator Grams?

I know that Pamela Thiessen is familiar with this issue. I had

understood from Doug Johnson that there are about 100 centers in

Europe working on this, and they all have to work on this issue.
80

I will work on it, but we are not going to be able to undo the damage. It was part of a war crime.

And I must say also, Senator Biden—and I expressed this to

Doug Johnson and his colleagues when I was in Minneapolis—I do

not understand the perpetrators either. I do not understand what

they think they are doing. The whole thing is so barbaric and so

grotesque. And the closer you get to it, the more details you get

from the people involved, as we saw in Minneapolis, the more unbelievable it is.

Senator BIDEN. The only thing it reminded me of—if I may, Mr.

Chairman—is this notion of absolute—to be going at that part of

a rival or enemy—in this case, culture—going at the thing that

they value the most, it reminded me of what we talked about, and

no one believed us—you talked about it, but no one believed this—

when we pointed out that the Serbs had a policy in Bosnia of sitting up on the hillsides with powerful high-caliber rifles with very

sophisticated scopes on them, with one express purpose: only to

maim Moslem children in the old sector of Sarajevo.

And I remember telling Bob Dole that. And he looked at me like

I was making it up. And it convinced him because the Ambassador

sitting behind you, a former staff member here, we went to see. We

went to Split. And the Ambassador came down and we went into

the hospitals in Sarajevo. And we stood at the bed. There was no

one in this gigantic hospital except seven children, Mr. Ambassador, if I am not mistaken.

And they were specifically the victims of snipers. They were not

sniping at men. They were only children. And they could not scare

them out by taking out adults, so they figured the one thing that

would have the effect of cleansing the area would be for a parent

to have to face the likelihood or possibility of their child being

maimed by a sniper.

And I will conclude by saying that when I first got to the sector

and saw, in a previous visit, the sheets and blankets hanging

across streets, like Crossing Delancey, it was like the East Side of

New York depicted in 1910, where clotheslines were across the

street and laundry hanging from them. And I thought, gee, this is

a strange thing. Why do they have these blankets hanging from the

street?

It looked like they were drying. I am old enough to remember

back in the fifties, you still put laundry out on the clothesline in

the backyard. And I realized it was done for one reason: to cutoff

the line of sight of a sniper so that the little tyke could go from

mom’s house to grand-mom’s house, across the street, with a diminished likelihood of being shot.

It is astounding to me how—and this is the closest thing that I

could think of—it is totally different in terms of the method, but

the purpose seemed to be the same as the rapes, seemed the same

as the rape camps. But I appreciate your necessarily sober assessment. I guess there is no way we undo the damage.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. The goal in every case is to debase people, dehumanize them, and destroy their social fabric. And it happens all

over the world. We are focusing on Kosovo today, but, in a sense,

they are actually slightly less unfortunate because we are sitting

here talking about them and because this conversation will result
81

in resources being addressed to it. But it happens elsewhere as

well.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you.

The people who have been through the Minnesota Center for Victims of Torture, and you hear the details you have talked about,

and you are surprised that such things go on. But, as you mentioned, how the perpetrators can even perform some of these acts

of torture on some of these victims is hard. So it is a story in itself.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, I know, Mr. Chairman, that they are incredibly grateful to you for your continual support. And that is an

inspirational thing. And I hope that more Americans are aware of

it and visit it.

Senator GRAMS. Just a couple of quick questions to wrap up the

hearing. I know we are going a little late and everybody would like

to leave, but just a couple of quick questions.

And you mentioned this earlier, with the ACABQ. And as you

know, right now, the elections are coming up. The United States,

to my knowledge, still has not put forward a candidate. I know

some of the other countries, like France and New Zealand, have already done so. And as you know, membership on the ACABQ is one

of the most effective tools that we have when it comes to the budgetary problems that we are all concerned about and want to work

on.

One of the benchmark is very important. And that is an assurance that the five largest contributors be a member or have a permanent seat on the ACABQ. And as you know, the United States

is the largest contributor. And the fact that we are not even a

member of one of the most important committees—and that is dealing with the budget.

So would you prod the administration into putting forward a

very qualified candidate, a nominee who is considered by the U.N.

to be an expert on budget matters, and to do this as soon as possible, to make sure that we regain that seat on the ACABQ?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, in preparation for today’s hearing, I was informed that in fact the State Department did put forward a candidate last week. Now, as a nominee with no involvement, I was uninvolved in that decision. I do not know the person

who was nominated. And I played no role in it. But I can report

to you that perhaps because they knew you were going to ask the

question, or for some other reason, that issue at least is resolved.

Senator GRAMS. We are looking forward to your help, then, also

in making sure we——

Mr. HOLBROOKE [continuing]. And on the other point, if the law

that was passed by the Senate becomes a fully enacted law, we will

batter these doors down. If, for whatever reason, we hit further obstacles, it is going to be a real struggle. But, either way, it has to

be one of my highest priorities, and it will be. And as you know,

under the regional grouping system, we are going to have to fight

for our place. But I will do so.

Senator GRAMS. Speaking of regional grouping, also the 185 nations which are U.N. members, Israel is the only one excluded from

possibly holding a seat on the Security Council, the Economic and

Social Council and many other commissions and committees be-
82

cause membership is restricted to countries belonging to regional

groups. And I have promoted efforts to get Israel accepted into

WEOG, the West Europe and Other Groups, which, by the way, the

United States also is a member of, and remains closed to Israel at

this time.

What efforts are you planning to ensure that Israel has the same

opportunities for influence at the U.N. that every other nation has?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I think this is outrageous that Israel is not in

a regional group. And I will really work on it. There are three or

four different ways to deal with this that come to mind. But I

would also just say to you, Mr. Chairman, speaking very much as

an outside observer, that the whole regional grouping system has

become a little bit weird.

Obviously there is nothing wrong with regional groupings. We

have regional bureaus in the State Department. You have subcommittees that are on a regional basis. You have caucuses in the

Senate and the House. But what is this Western Europe and Other

Group all about? What are Australia and New Zealand doing in the

Western European Group?

The State Department moved Australia and New Zealand out of

the European Bureau in 1961. And as I understand it, the Australians and New Zealanders would like to be considered part of

the Asian-Pacific region, which happens to be where they are.

What are these groupings about?

Should the United States even be a member of a grouping? If we

withdraw, we would reduce our chance of getting on committees.

Should we participate in a system which does not seem to have its

original rationale, or its original rationale has gotten perverted? I

need to learn a lot more about it.

But to anyone listening today, I want to say that I am prepared

to do a full-scale, bottoms-up review of this concept. I have talked

to the Secretary General on a personal basis about it. He knows

how I feel. And I will make this an important issue, working closely with them and with our European friends, who have not been

very helpful on this issue for reasons you are very familiar with.

Senator GRAMS. I think it is outrageous that Israel is the only

one excluded from these groups.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. It is ridiculous. One other country is not in a

group, Estonia, but that is by choice.

Senator GRAMS. And one final question. I realize you are probably not very keen on inspectors general at this time, but I hope

you recognize the need for effective oversight at the United Nations, particularly given that according to U.N. Under Secretary

General for Management, Joe Connor, OIOS is technically not a

priority at the U.N.

So my question to you is, would you work to ensure that all

OIOS reports are made available to all member States regardless

of whether they were forwarded to the Secretary General? And as

you know, last year, only 39 of 162 reports were made available.

So we would like to have some openness and transparency in these

reports.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I was not aware that only 39 had been made

available. I talked to Joe Connor informally over the weekend in

preparation for this hearing. He knows that whether it is his prior-
83

ity or not, it will be one of ours. I did not, by the way, Mr. Chairman, get the impression that he considered it an unimportant

issue. He understood its importance. I need to learn a lot more

about this, but of course I understand its importance. And I think

that it is going to require additional pressure. It may require additional funding. And we have to have these functions extended to

the specialized agencies. So that is a big issue.

I hope Ambassador Loftus is still in the room to hear your comments. I cannot see behind us here. But he can report them directly to Gro Brundtland of the WHO. I will certainly pursue it.

Senator GRAMS. That is all the questions I have.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. You mean you cannot see behind your head? I

thought you could, based on all the powers that had been attributed to you over the years.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. If I could have, I would have been here a lot

sooner, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, Chairman Helms asked me to

point out that Ambassador Holbrooke has one more hearing. The

final hearing will be on Thursday, at 10 a.m. And he indicated to

me that at that time we will consider the policy on the Balkans.

I know that we have begun to cover that. I apologize for jumping

the gun here. And he asked me to suggest that we also keep the

record open for 3 days for Senators to submit questions from today.

Senator GRAMS. We will do that.

And also for the members from the GAO, Mr. Johnson and others, I have some other questions that I would also like to submit

to them. So I would also hold the record open for that, in case other

Senators would like to submit questions.

[Submitted questions and responses appear in the appendix on

page 119.]

Senator BIDEN. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

I see Senator Sarbanes approaching.

Senator GRAMS. We were that close.

Would you like to have a couple of moments?

Senator SARBANES. I do not have any questions. I was going to

watch for a while, but I see you have finished. I want to say that

I think it is really important to get this nominee into place. We

have been without a permanent confirmed representative for a long

time. I just got a report the other day from someone who used to

be in the foreign policy operation here, who was up at the U.N.,

He got in touch with me to say that we really need a permanent

person on post. He felt that U.S. interests were really suffering in

many subtle ways. While nothing major or catastrophic, he mentioned many small small, subtle ways. I think we probably all

share that view.

Senator BIDEN. I think the chairman does, as well.

Senator SARBANES. I just hope we can move this nomination out

of here promptly at the conclusion of the hearings, and move it

through the floor. It is certainly within the realm of accomplishment that we could have Dick Holbrooke confirmed before we break

for the Fourth of July. I think it would be a terrific accomplishment

if we could do that. I hope we can work together to try to accomplish that.
84

Senator BIDEN. That is the objective.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Thank you, Mr. Holbrooke, for your patience.

This hearing is now concluded.

[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene

at 10 a.m., June 24, 1999.]
(85)

THE NOMINATION OF HON. RICHARD C.

HOLBROOKE TO SERVE AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 1999

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:23 a.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Smith, Ashcroft, Biden, Sarbanes,

Dodd, Kerry, Wellstone, and Boxer.

OPENING STATEMENT OF JESSE HELMS, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NORTH CAROLINA

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. This is the

third hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee’s consideration of

Mr. Holbrooke’s nomination to be United States Ambassador to the

United Nations.

This morning we will consider his role in crafting U.S. policy toward the former Yugoslavia, and let me say, Mr. Ambassador, and

I do not hesitate to call you that now, I received a letter on this

subject a few months ago from a citizen from our State who I do

not know personally. We checked into it, and I thought I would

bring it to your attention and maybe you would have an opportunity to discuss it.

His name is Mr. John Delich, D-e-l-i-c-h. Do you know him?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is what he wrote to me, and I will not quote

all of it. He says, ‘‘Slobodan Milosevic is the man we made a partner in resolving these crises, and has pulled the rug from under

our feet once again. We have supported him all along in order to

end the wars that he started, a classic case of the arsonist who

started the fires being appointed to be chief fire marshall.’’

Now, Mr. Holbrooke, I think it is accurate that you have spent

more time with Slobodan Milosevic than anybody else in the administration, and I believe at one point you held the view that he

could possibly play a useful role in achieving the Clinton administration’s policy in the Balkans.

Now, I am confident that you did various things in an effort to

make Mr. Milosevic a partner for peace in the Balkans, but in retrospect I would like your views as to whether making Milosevic our

partner was a misguided policy, especially in light of his indictment
86

last month as a war criminal. In any event, as my correspondent

from North Carolina has indicated, that policy had consequences.

It had consequences for the opposition forces in Serbia, struggling to develop an alternative to Milosevic’s undemocratic regime.

It also had consequences for the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, and

specifically in your testimony, I ask that you discuss for me and for

the record the deal, if I can use that word, that you reached last

October with Mr. Milosevic on Kosovo.

At that time, NATO was threatening air strikes if Milosevic did

not concede to NATO’s demands, but instead of telling Milosevic either to withdraw his forces or face NATO air strikes, you returned

apparently from Serbia with a deal which allowed Milosevic to keep

thousands of Yugoslav Army and Serbian police forces in Kosovo,

the same forces who later carried out the brutal ethnic cleansing

and mass murder that we have just witnessed on television and

elsewhere in the past months.

Now, to conclude, I am concerned that the fact that the United

States felt obliged to go to war against Yugoslavia this past March

was an obvious conclusion of doing business with Slobodan

Milosevic, and that is the view of my friend whom I do not know

personally from North Carolina.

I want you to have the opportunity today to discuss your relationship with Milosevic, that is to say, whether now in retrospect

you feel the U.S. policy of bolstering his position was, indeed, a

mistake, and more so than anything else I hope you will make a

commitment to support a vigorous policy aimed at getting rid of

Milosevic for once and for all.

Senator Biden, before he does that, we will hear from you.

OPENING STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S.

SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my

entire statement be placed in the record and, if I may, I would like

to briefly summarize it.

As is often the case with individuals who think outside the box,

who get the big picture and try to change it, Dick Holbrooke quite

frankly may be more appreciated in Europe than he is here, even

though he angers them because he has done the right thing by

moving when we have had to.

I think it is important to acknowledge that, as we look at the

Balkans policy, it is a tapestry which in large part in this administration has been woven by Dick Holbrooke. It may be that there

are parts of it that some would not like, but I would suggest that

without that Holbrooke tapestry hanging on the walls there, the

walls would be bare still.

I admit, I am grateful he returned my calls all the time. I was

sort of a pit bull on some of this stuff, and fortunately I was a Senator and he was a diplomat, because diplomats must have patience,

and he possessed it in abundance.

But the bottom line is, I think that I am going to try to avoid

in my questions, Mr. Ambassador, going back to what would you

have rather done. I am going to try to stay out of personalities

here, because when we talk about this policy, the Secretary of

State has played an enormously large role, and I believe her stead-
87

fastness has been one of the critical factors in our ultimately prevailing, thus far at least.

But I would like to explore with you, even though it is not your

primary brief as a U.N. Ambassador, what we do from here, and

I would like to—when my time to question comes, I think there are

certain lessons we should draw from the good work that you did

in the Dayton Accords and its implementation in Bosnia. I hope

you understand that I am going to suggest that you comment on

some of the lessons I think we should learn from Bosnia that are

not meant as criticisms of Dayton.

I think it is an enormous feat that Dayton was pulled off and you

got us where we were. It is like now. The very people who were

talking about not getting involved, about negotiating with

Milosevic, partitioning now, redrawing borders, stopping the bombing, et cetera, are now saying, you know, we really messed up,

Milosevic is still there. They are complaining that the very guy

they wanted to negotiate with is still there.

We tend sometimes not to focus on what we have accomplished,

and we go immediately to what is not right with the circumstance

as it exists.

I would like to respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman, that had we

not pursued the policy that Dick Holbrooke was in large part responsible for through the Kosovo crisis, that we would be facing

much, much more serious problems. There is no implicit criticism

in my questioning, because these are all tough calls, but I would

like to focus most on what do we do from here, and what differently

should we do in Kosovo than what we did or are doing in Bosnia,

because there are different circumstances.

So I welcome you back, and again, I cannot yield without saying

once again how much I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, how fair and

gracious you were. There is an old expression, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I hope now that we are completing the last

of the three hearings everyone will understand the absolute truth

of what I said at the outset, which was that you in no way were

the reason why this was delayed.

You in no way were the reason why we had difficulty getting to

this point in the first hearing. Once it was put in your hands, once

you were in charge, it has moved swiftly, smoothly, and fairly, and

I appreciate it.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both for expeditiously scheduling this series of confirmation hearings and for the cooperative spirit in which you and your staff have

prepared for them.

Today we are considering Ambassador Holbrooke’s role in recent American policy

toward the Balkans. In doing so, I would like to use a sports metaphor.

If anyone has ever watched a diving competition, in the Olympics or elsewhere,

he or she will remember that each kind of dive comes with a so-called ‘‘degree of

difficulty.’’ A relatively easy kind of dive might have a ‘‘degree of difficulty’’ of onepoint-eight. A more difficult one might have a two-point-seven, and so on.

The judges’ numerical evaluation of the competitor’s performance on each dive is

then multiplied by the ‘‘degree of difficulty’’ of that kind of dive in order to get the

competitor’s score.

Well, Mr. Chairman, translated into international politics, Balkan diplomacy must

surely have the highest ‘‘degree of difficulty’’ in the world.
88

I know of no other area with such an explosive mixture of jumbled ethnic and religious groups, geographic barriers to cooperation, economic complexity, tortured history, and—last but not least—assiduously cultivated, purposeful distortions of history in order to serve current political ends.

With that ‘‘degree of difficulty’’ even a mediocre performance in Balkan diplomacy

would result in a fine score.

But, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Holbrooke’s ‘‘raw scores’’—his accomplishments

at Dayton and elsewhere—have been excellent. Combined with the Balkan ‘‘degree

of difficulty’’ factor, his performance has been nothing short of remarkable.

Anyone who doubts this conclusion need only look at what others in the field of

Balkan diplomacy have failed to accomplish. In short, Dick Holbrooke has produced.

As is often the case with individuals who think ‘‘outside the box,’’ who get the big

picture and try to change it, Dick Holbrooke may well be more appreciated in Europe than here in his own country.

Many Europeans whom I know—and these are not unsophisticated types—grudgingly view Ambassador Holbrooke as some kind of a hard-driving magician, who

pulls rabbits out of hats after first flattening any other animals who might pounce

on the rabbit.

The Europeans may fault him for allegedly not having consulted with them

enough, but very few of them criticize his final product.

This is not to say that Ambassador Holbrooke is perfect. Nobody is, and in the

question-and-answer period, I plan to ask him what, in retrospect, he feels he might

have done differently at Dayton.

But let’s be honest. Whatever the flaws in the Balkan diplomatic tapestry Dick

Holbrooke has woven, without him the walls would still be bare.

I am confident that Ambassador Holbrooke knows that tactics that work in hammering out a deal with tough, recalcitrant Balkan leaders are not necessarily productive in the corridors of the United Nations. He is an urbane, experienced man,

who analyzes his task and his interlocutors, and adjusts his style accordingly.

I am eager to hear Ambassador Holbrooke’s testimony and to question him on it.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. We are beginning to be

known around the Senate as the odd couple.

Senator DODD. Don’t press that point.

The CHAIRMAN. He is the one that is odd.

Senator DODD. There will be no recorded vote on that one.

The CHAIRMAN. So really, I enjoy working so much with Senator

Biden, and I think we have accomplished a very great deal, and I

appreciate everything he has done. We could not have done it without him, notwithstanding what he claims, that it is all on this side.

He did a yeoman’s share of the work, and I am grateful to him, and

always will be.

I asked the folks I work for back here to remind me about Mr.

Delich, if I am pronouncing it right. He is the former head of the

Serbian Unity Congress, which has been identified to me as the

leading Serbian-American organization. Is that approximately correct?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. There are quite a few organizations. That is one

of the leading ones, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he said he would occasionally meet with

State Department officials, including yourself, as he recalls it. In

any event, I would like for you to discuss what he said, because I

think it is important to have it on the record.
89

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, NOMINEE TO

BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE RANK AND

STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, before I respond to your question about Mr. Delich’s letter and the questions from Senator

Biden, let me just thank you again for your courtesy and that of

the entire committee in holding these hearings, to reinforce what

Senator Biden has just said, the speed and precision with which

these hearings have been conducted, to reaffirm again to you and

to anyone who may be listening that the delays of the last year

were in no way caused by this committee, and to thank you for

your generosity and fairness.

I am very honored to be here this morning again to discuss an

issue which has taken up more of my time in the last 5 years than

any other issue, and one in which I have had many private and

public consultations with members of this committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holbrooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an

honor and a pleasure to appear before you again today to testify on the Balkans.

As the Members of the Committee know, I have been involved in the Balkans for

several years. I know all of the key players very well and how difficult these problems are. NATO’s military victory, like the Dayton Accords before it, is a great success for the Nation. I feel privileged to have played a role in this success, and I salute the Senate for passing a resolution last week commending the President and

the troops.

Why does NATO’s victory matter? It matters first because we had to stem the humanitarian crisis. Belgrade’s offensive against the ethnic Albanian population,

begun before the bombing campaign, created a humanitarian crisis of staggering dimensions. It is a measure of the greatness of the American people that they cannot

sit by and watch such horror on their televisions night after night without action.

Second, our success matters because we need to promote stability in the Balkans

and Southeastern Europe. Belgrade’s offensive proved the spillover theory correct.

Flooding its neighbors with refugees delivers a powerful economic and political blow.

The Serbs could have reignited chaos in Albania, destabilized or sparked a civil war

in Macedonia, undermined Dayton implementation and all we have gained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, set back political and economic reform in other neighboring

states—including some that border on NATO states or that even aspire to NATO

membership—and bred international crime and terrorism.

Third, and certainly not least, we defended the cherished values for which this

country and NATO have stood since their foundations: democracy, human rights,

and the rule of law.

We have prevailed in the air campaign, and now we must stay the course in helping to build the peace—with the Europeans taking the lead and paying the lion’s

share of the cost.

The United Nations will have its role to play in Kosovo—such as in providing an

interim civil administration for Kosovo, assisting through the United Nations High

Commission for Refugees in the return of the refugees and displaced to their homes

and coordinating disaster relief, or dealing with the land mine threat.

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will be vigilant to ensure that the roles assigned

to the United Nations in Kosovo are carried out in as constructive and as cost-effective a manner as possible. In doing so, I will be honored to continue to play whatever role the President and the Secretary of State ask me to take on, in support

of American’s objective of securing lasting peace and stability in the region.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to take your questions.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Let me respond to Mr. Delich’s letter both directly and indirectly by saying at the outset that I agree with al-
90

most everything in this letter except its references to my own role.

I agree with his characterizations of Slobodan Milosevic. The

phrase that Milosevic has both been an arsonist and a fireman is

not original to Mr. Delich. It was originated by Yugoslav journalists

in describing Milosevic, and it is one that I myself have used frequently, and it is very accurate.

Mr. Delich’s letter raises an isssue that has been a central concern to me since my first two trips to Bosnia as a private citizen

for the International Rescue Committee on Refugee Matters in

1992. Had the United States responded vigorously and appropriately early in the crisis we might have avoided three of the four

wars that the Belgrade leadership has caused. Senator Biden was

one of the leaders in that effort to bring attention to the issue. He

was there before I was involved in the issue officially, as were you

and many other members of this committee.

So 1991 was the year we should have dealt with this. By the

time I became directly involved in the issue at the end of 1994, the

beginning of 1995, three of the four wars were already taking

place. The first one in Slovenia was a week long. The second one

with Croatia was a mess beyond messes, and by the time I got involved the war was raging out of control in Bosnia, where over

300,000 people were killed and 21⁄2 million made homeless.

The first priority for the United States and our NATO allies at

that time was, in my view, and I believe this was echoed by most

people, regardless of where they stood on tactics, was to stop the

war from metastasizing into the rest of the region, and particularly

merging with the incipient crisis in Kosovo, which everyone understood was explosive.

We therefore, operating from a very weak hand, began a policy

in the summer of 1995, a policy in which NATO, led by the United

States, belatedly and reluctantly but ultimately decisively bombed

the Bosnian Serbs and then took them to the peace table at Dayton, OH, and ended the war.

Milosevic went to Dayton. He was not yet then indicted. He tried

to bring with him those people who were indicted. I told him that

I would be delighted if he brought them, and I would be waiting

at the airport with Federal marshals to arrest them, and of course

they did not come to Dayton. As I said in our last hearing, Mr.

Chairman, I profoundly regret that the NATO forces did not arrest

Radovan Karadzic and some of the others right away. They could

have, and they should have, and I still hope they do.

The Dayton peace agreement ended the war in Bosnia, and the

war has not resumed to this day. Under the most extreme tensions,

including the crisis in Kosovo, including overt attempts to destroy

it, not one NATO soldier has been killed or wounded from hostile

action, and the record of the American fighting men and women in

Bosnia, although they have not had to fight, has been magnificent.

I regret deeply that the administration put arbitrary time limits

twice on our duration in Bosnia, which may have inadvertently encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to think they could out-wait us, but

President Clinton removed those time limits in December 1997,

prior to his trip to Bosnia, and we will not repeat that mistake in

Kosovo.
91

Now, Mr. Delich says we were partners at Dayton. That is the

part of the letter that I would really like to address, and this has

come up many times. As President Clinton has often said, quoting

Prime Minister Rabin, ‘‘One does not negotiate with one’s friends;

one negotiates with one’s adversaries.’’ I was assigned by the President and two Secretaries of State, Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright, to be at times the lead negotiator and at other

times a special envoy. These were not easy assignments, and we

are neither friends nor partners.

It is true, as you said Mr. Chairman, that I have spent a great

deal of time with President Slobodan Milosevic, during none of

which, I would stress, he was indicted. The last time I saw him—

and I use the word ‘‘last’’ in both senses of the word—in my estimation, was March 23, 1999, and I said to him, ‘‘when I leave this

room, if you have not accepted the position that the United States

and our NATO and Contact Group allies and friends, including the

Russians, put forward at Rambouillet, is it clear to you that NATO

bombing of this country will start immediately, and it will be’’—and

I used the three words deliberately, and after consultations with

the Pentagon—‘‘swift, severe, and sustained.’’

The last meeting I had with him was just the two of us, because

I wanted to be sure there was no possibility of the kind of misunderstanding, Mr. Chairman, which had led to an unnecessary

war in the same area in August 1914—a war that historians now

agree could have been avoided, but took place because of miscalculation.

Milosevic said, ‘‘I understand this. You will bomb us. There is

nothing I can do to prevent it.’’ And I left the room, and he said

to me as I left, ‘‘I wonder if we will ever see each other again,’’ and

I said, ‘‘that will depend entirely on your actions.’’ Well, his actions

have given us the answer.

Now, in all of our prior negotiations, from 1995 until then, we

tried to reach agreements. Some of these agreements stuck. The

war in Bosnia is over, and I think that that is an important fact.

Again, I want to compliment you and your colleagues for the important role the Senate played in that.

Particularly, I do not want to single anyone out, but the Senator

on your committee I have spent the most time with is the man sitting immediately to your left, Senator Biden. He understates the

intensity of our colloquy, and the amount of advice he gave me,

some of which was very, very emphatic, and he was the first Senator I called on when I returned to Washington.

Emphatic, Mr. Chairman, is a euphemism for what he told me

in private, but Joe Biden is a man who went to Belgrade and called

Slobodan Milosevic a war criminal to his face long before it was either fashionable or the tribunal’s action, and we have worked together closely.

In any case, on the prior events that Mr. Delich refers to, it is

true we reached agreements with Milosevic. He was the recognized

leader of the Serbs under international law. He signed agreements

in Dayton which were then witnessed by President Clinton, President Chirac, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister Major,

and Chancellor Kohl in Paris a month later, and the Serbs have

roughly kept their word on those agreements.
92

He agreed to allow us to determine the final outcome of the one

unresolved issue in Bosnia, the town of Brcko. He turned that decision over to us, and I am proud to say that one of my dearest colleagues from the negotiating process, Roberts Owen, is here today

in the audience. He is the man who made the final decisions on

Brcko only a few months ago, very difficult decisions which are

being implemented now, and they were decisions the Serbs hated.

We made them on the eve of the bombing, and they have still held.

Mr. Delich talks about the consequences of the policy to democrats in Serbia and the Albanians in Kosovo. He is correct to a certain point. Let me address this issue and then make one last point.

I apologize for the length of my opening answer/comment, but this

is so critically important. I would also like to respond to Senator

Biden’s question on the question of democrats in Serbia.

This is a critical issue. As I wrote in my book, we made numerous mistakes in the last few years. I have already mentioned one

of them. Another one was a failure to give enough support to the

Together Movement at the end of 1996.

It happens that my wife was in Belgrade at that time in her capacity as chair of the Committee to Protect Journalists. She actually marched through the streets of Belgrade for three straights

days with the leaders of the Together Movement and, by the way,

the Belgrade leadership knew exactly that she was my wife. She

was there as a private citizen, but she was demonstrating her support, and I am very proud she did that. It was subfreezing weather.

But the Together Movement did not hold together. The U.S. Government did not do enough to support it, and it was the greatest

missed opportunity of the last 4 years. I would hope that, with the

impetus that you and your colleagues are providing and—if I have

the terminology correctly—with the Serbian Democracy bill or

amendment, we will move in that direction.

There was no intent to undermine democracy in Serbia, but the

Serb democrats are a pretty disparate group. Last year, on one of

my trips to Belgrade, I met with one of the bravest dissident journalists in Belgrade, a man named Vierren Matic, a very famous

man of immense courage, and I said to Matic, ‘‘I have 2 hours before my next meeting. I would like to meet with the leader of the

democratic opposition. Who do you want to take me to see?’’ After

a long pause, Mr. Matic said, ‘‘I don’t know. That is the tragedy

of our country.’’

I hope that, with the consequences of the success that has now

occurred—it is a messy success, but it is clearly a success—and the

impetus that has been given to new opportunities in Serbia, the

next time somebody is in Belgrade and asks that question, they

will know where to go.

Where is the Cory Aquino? Where is the Ausung Su Chi? Where

is the Dalai Lama? Where is the Kim Dae Jung figure who becomes

the obvious rallying point for the forces of democracy? All of the

people I have just named, all of whom you and I have both worked

with, were important leaders and symbols. There is no such clear

figure at this point in Belgrade, and that is the tragedy of Serbia.

Outside assistance and hortatory language is important and useful,

and we must encourage them. But as you yourself have often said,
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the impetus must ultimately come from the Serb people themselves, but with greater encouragement from us.

Secretary Albright and I have discussed this problem in the last

2 days between these two hearings in preparation for it, and I

know she feels equally strongly.

On Mr. Delich’s second point, the Albanians in Kosovo have often

said that Dayton was a betrayal of the Albanians. This is not Mr.

Delich’s point, because he is a Serbian-American, but I would say

that Dayton was about Bosnia. It ended the war, but we did bring

up Kosovo repeatedly, and the American presence in Kosovo was

negotiated by me.

From 1912, when the Serbs seized Kosovo from the domains of

the Ottoman Empire, until 1995, there had never been an American international presence in Kosovo. We negotiated the establishment of the USIA Cultural Center, which was really an embassy

extension, and in that regard I would say with your act that arbitrary distinction will be gone forever, and I cannot tell you how

pleased I am at that. I negotiated the Kosovo diplomatic observer

mission and the Kosovo verification mission.

However, in regard to Mr. Delich’s point about October, I was not

able to negotiate armed international security forces in Kosovo in

October because it was not possible to do that under the instructions I was given, in the context of the situation that occurred at

that time.

I believed firmly, Mr. Chairman, and have stated repeatedly in

public and private, that Albanians and Serbs will not be able to

live together in peace in Kosovo until they have had a period of

time with international security forces to keep them from tearing

each other to pieces.

In Kosovo, the animosity and ethnic hatred is real, not like in

Bosnia, where it was manufactured by demagogues and racists and

mafioso crooks. There was a lot of intermarriage in Bosnia. There

is a common language, a common history.

Albanians and Serbs are really different people. There is very little interaction and intermarriage, and the hatred is much deeper.

The international security presence, which I was not allowed to negotiate in October for various reasons and Milosevic then refused

after Rambouillet, is now in there without any casualties so far, although we have had incidents like yesterday’s, which illustrate the

great danger.

So again, Mr. Chairman, I would simply say that I well understand Mr. Delich’s comments. I would like to make one other comment about his letter and then move on. Throughout the last 3

years I received numerous letters and phone calls from Serbs and

Serb-Americans about the apparent anti-Serb bias of the American

policy. I know that you and Senator Biden and Senator Dodd and

others, Senator Smith, have surely received similar things. When

I went to Minneapolis at the request of Senator Grams I got picketed by Serb-Americans as I went in the room.

So let me say again, and I suspect that all of you have had these

experiences, that the policy has never been anti-Serb. As President

Clinton and Secretary Albright have said, we are well aware of the

fact that the Serbs fought on our side in two World Wars, rescued

many pilots, and are well-represented in this body, in the House
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and throughout American society, particularly in such great cities

as Cleveland and, indeed, in the Dayton area. And I do not believe

in collective guilt, and I think it is very important to make that

clear to the Serbs and Serb-Americans.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to Senator Biden’s comments

about what he called the tapestry. I appreciate very much what

Senator Biden has said, of course, and I share his view of the

steadfastness of Secretary Albright on these issues. She and I have

been shoulder to shoulder, or as she likes to put it, joined at the

hip, on these issues for many years now.

If I understood your question, Senator Biden, it was what would

we do differently in Kosovo than we did in Bosnia? Was that correct, sir?

Senator BIDEN. That is correct, but I do not know whether you

want me to go into that now, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I did not do this right, and the last time

I checked we had consumed about 12 minutes, and I think it would

be fair.

Senator BIDEN. We can do it on my time now, to let him answer

that question.

The CHAIRMAN. I am so glad you went into the detail you did.

I did not anticipate it, and I think I saw some guys over there furiously writing, so maybe they can straighten things out.

Now, I will recognize Senator Biden for his turn, 10, 12, 15 minutes, whatever you want.

Senator BIDEN. I would like to pursue just where you were going,

and just add one preface. It seems to me that few people speak as

clearly to the differences between the circumstances in Bosnia,

among Bosnian Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, and the difference between Albanian Kosovars and Serbs in Kosovo.

I think that is because the European Community in my view

during this period, where it was almost under anesthesia, tried so

hard to convince the world that in Bosnia there was never any coexistence, that this was only a civil war, that this has nothing to

do with anything other than racial hatreds, because if they did

that, then there was a logic for not being involved.

I would argue that the reason it took us so long, quote, to do the

right thing, close quote, was because we were engaged in self-delusion about what was happening in Bosnia and who was causing it.

I often point out to people that—I am quite sure this is correct—

of all the major cities in Europe, the one with the greatest degree

of intermarriage is Sarajevo.

Now, I have been given that statistic a number of times. I cannot

stand by it independently, but I believe that to be true, and all

anyone has to do as they travel through Bosnia, as you and I and

others have—I mean, I have been to every part of Bosnia, by helicopter, by automobile, by armored personnel vehicle, and when you

ride through these picturesque mountain towns and you see minarets sitting there and then you see a group of Muslim men sitting

in the corner cafe having a drink, you do not see women veiled,

walking down the streets.

I facetiously said, and I will probably get myself in trouble for

saying this, but in Bosnia there are a lot of the equivalent of Reform Jewish congregations, if you make an analogy to Islam. I
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mean by this parallel that there is not a fundamentalism about

Islam in Bosnia at all.

The second myth that was perpetrated by many Europeans and,

I might add, by Mr. Tudjman, who, as I once said before, is no box

of chocolates himself, is that there is a fundamentalist Muslim

state seeking to be constructed in the midst of Europe, et cetera.

That was like a red flag in front of a bull to many Europeans, but

now we are in a conundrum here.

Now, unless people like you continue to say what you have been

saying, that there is a real difference between Bosnia and Kosovo,

thereby calling for different tactics in dealing with the peace, I

think we may find ourselves in trouble.

With that very long preface, let me suggest several things I think

should change. I would like your candid view, if you disagree, because you and I have not talked about these pieces.

One is, I hope one of the lessons we have learned is that early

elections are not a good idea. You have got to give democracy a little bit of a chance to jell here, and in Kosovo what I mean by that

is, you have got to have a chance for the KLA and Rugova to be

able to begin to work out something. Because if elections were held

tomorrow, every KLA local leader would win every election in every

community and every district, and a military organization does not

a civilian government make, no matter how well-intentioned.

The second lesson I think we should learn is that it is a mistake

for KFOR apparently to allow some KLA units under fairly strict

agreements to essentially occupy the police headquarters in various

towns and cities. I think we should have the gendarme model of

Europeans, and I know this we have talked about with regard to

Bosnia.

I think for the next couple of years we should avoid the following

dilemma: either having our military or NATO’s military act as policemen, which they are not equipped to do, or on the other hand

turning over the civilian control of the police forces to the victors.

I think the answer is the gendarme-type apparatus made up of Europeans and setting up police academies, literally police academies

in Kosovo to train a new cadre of civilian law enforcement officers.

The third thing I think is a lesson that you have already spoken

to, and I will not ask you to spend any time on, is no time limits,

no artificial time limits on anything about our presence, KFOR’s

presence or anything else in the region.

The fourth lesson I take away from this is that in a strange

sense Kosovo is going to be easier than Bosnia. You are not going

to have Westendorp heading out there to decide who lives in which

house in which block, because there is much more homogeneity.

That is good and bad.

No matter all the intriguing we engage in, I doubt whether more

than 5 to 10 percent of the population in Kosovo is going to be Serbian 20 years from now no matter how hard we work. I think it

is a lot lower, but I am being optimistic.

So in one sense it is a lot easier to deal with setting up a transition in Kosovo, but in another sense it is a lot harder, as you pointed out, because of the depth of the hatred. So I hope that in this

process, quite frankly, we do not spend too much of our capital in
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a literal sense in terms of dollars, and also in a political and diplomatic sense in focusing on bringing Serbs back.

I would like very much for the Serbs to come back. Please do not

misunderstand me. But the reason we could not rebuild the infrastructure, the highways, the water system, the electric facilities,

get jobs up and going, attract businesses in the Republic of Srpska,

is because when they would not let in elected officials of a different

nationality, the international community rightly said, we are not

going to send the money.

But in Kosovo we are not going to have that problem. It is the

primary responsibility, as you said, and as the President has said,

of the European Union and the donor nations other than us to

carry the bulk of the burden. But I hope we quickly, swiftly move

to reconstruct the infrastructure, because I think there is nothing

more unifying, nothing more consoling than having the house rebuilt, the job reestablished, a routine put in place, and money coming in, and security being established.

Now, we took a long time doing it for necessary reasons. There

is actually one more point, and that is your job at the U.N. The

U.N. is essentially responsible for civilian implementation of the

peace. I think, to quote a Russian saying used by President

Reagan, we should trust but verify. The U.N. is well-intended, ofttimes slow, and sometimes incompetent. I would hope privately,

not publicly, that you would not hesitate to be a thorn in the side

of the United Nations for dilatory tactics in implementing the civilian side of this, because that is the key.

So I realize that I have raised five points and I have used up my

time, but I wonder whether you could comment generally, or maybe

for the record if you do not want to do it now, about whether those

kinds of policy changes from what we did in Bosnia and what we

should now do in Kosovo, or whether there are other lessons to be

learned and I have got the wrong ones.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator Biden, Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith,

Senator Biden raises five points, and I am tempted simply to say

I agree with everything he said and move on to the next question,

but a couple of points require elaboration.

First of all, let us learn from Bosnia. As I wrote in my book, the

Dayton agreement was particularly flawed in regard to the police

annex because for various reasons—budgetary arguments with the

Europeans, perhaps inadequate bureaucratic pressure from us, and

an ambivalence by the NATO command—we did not give the police

task force in Bosnia enforcement or arrest and detention capability.

I have been a very hard liner on this, and I have been assured

that the police will have detention and enforcement capability.

Therefore, the highest priority of the U.N. is to get them in there

fast, otherwise two things will happen. NATO will turn into policemen, and all of us know that there is nothing a man or woman in

uniform likes less than to become a policeman. That is one of the

great rules of the U.S. military.

Second, as Senator Biden said, the KLA will fill the vacuum in

a way which may not be appropriate to democratic approaches either. I would add that Senator Biden’s point of early elections is

obviously correct also.
97

That was one of the two or three great failures in Bosnia. I remember General Clark saying to me at the time, as we discussed

this because we knew it was not right, that this was going to be

the greatest gap in the food chain, never dreaming that he would

end up being the NATO Supreme Commander.

But we are fortunate that the NATO Commander is General

Clark, who was with me at Dayton, who drafted some of the annexes, and who knows them intimately, and who was aware of that

problem.

On the other questions—early elections, KLA, no time limits—I

completely agree.

On the U.N. role, Senator Biden, I am glad again to see that sitting behind me in the audience is the Secretary General’s representative in Washington. I have absolute confidence that she was

taking notes as you spoke and that your views and those of your

colleagues will be in New York by early afternoon today.

So you want me to be a thorn in their side. I would ask you and

Chairman Helms and Senator Smith and your colleagues to be

thorns with me, but friendly thorns, because as we said in our first

and second hearings, the goal here is not to destroy the United Nations, it is to reform it to make it serve our purposes. And nowhere

has it been tested like in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The Kosovo test will transcend anything that preceded it, including Cambodia, because they will be running the international protection authority, or whatever it is going to be called. Nothing like

this has been undertaken in a long time, and I have grave concerns

that it will not be pursued with the amount of vigor that the task

demands.

In Bosnia, we weakened the High Representative’s authority,

and that was another one of our mistakes. It was because of a battle between the civilians and the NATO people, and it was a mistake. Carl Bilt has written about that in his book.

I do not disagree with his criticism of what we did. In fact, I

echoed it in my book. Mr. Bilt was in to see me in New York yesterday and noted that he is advising Secretary General Kofi Annan

that the international presence in Kosovo must have greater power

and be enacted more vigorously. This will be one of my highest priority issues that I will pay attention to.

I said in my first hearing that U.N. reform will be my highest

sustained priority, and I will deal with emergencies. This is obviously the emergency that we are all most interested in.

Senator BIDEN. I hope they look at this as an opportunity. The

credibility of the United Nations worldwide was diminished for

whatever reasons in Bosnia. I think this is an opportunity for it to

increase its credibility and take on a role that at least I personally

would like to see it take in the 21st century.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I think the Secretary General feels that, too,

but that bureaucracy, like our own bureaucracies, has people of

varying qualities in it, and the proof will be in the selection of personnel and the vigor with which they carry it out.

I was very impressed with the GAO report to you 2 days ago, Mr.

Chairman, because I understood that it was the first time that the

U.N. had let the GAO look. It was constructive criticism, and I will

play that role if confirmed.
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That may not be fully responsive, Senator, but that covers your

main points.

Senator BIDEN. At some point—not now, because my time has

been long up, but I would like to talk about the gendarme notion

and the Europeans leading the charge on the policing side of this,

but I do not want to take the time now. Again, maybe in a second

round, or in private, or later, but Senator Smith has been deeply

involved in all of this.

The CHAIRMAN. You have waited a long time, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Biden.

Mr. Holbrooke, it is a pleasure to be here with you. I thank you

for your patience with the committee in dealing with all of these

questions.

So you will know the motive of my questioning, let me state at

the outset that I believe you are eminently qualified to be the

United States Ambassador to the United Nations, and I intend to

vote for you and for your confirmation, but as Senator Helms said,

part of the purpose of these hearings is to give you the chance to

respond to critics and charges, and I thought with that understanding I would ask you some questions. It may be difficult, but in fairness to you, you need an official forum in which to answer.

I doubt you read the Weekly Standard, and this is not an advertisement for the Weekly Standard, but I happen to have read it

this morning when I got up with a migraine headache, and there

is an article in here by a Mr. Ivo Daalder. I do not know him, but

the title of it is, ‘‘What Holbrooke Wrought.’’ Have you read this

article?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, I have.

Senator SMITH. I think it is a matter of historic record now that

the United States believed that Mr. Milosevic would cave after 3

days of bombing, and that no ground troops would be necessary,

and certainly perhaps not even possible, and therefore no preparations were made for that.

There is some dispute as to whether this ethnic cleansing was

going on before we began bombing. I personally believe it was, but

certainly not with the intensity that occurred afterwards. I would

like to get your response to this article, but to do that, let me read

two paragraphs that I think summarizes the thesis of this article.

However lamentable NATO’s failure to protect nearly 2 million

Kosovars, the larger failure lies in the policy that left the United

States and its allies no choice in mid-March but to bomb, without

the plans or capacity to stop Milosevic’s onslaught.

If the brutal Serb campaign was already underway before the

bombing started, as administration and NATO spokesmen repeatedly claimed, and if Milosevic’s plans for Operation Horseshoe, as

the Serbs term their attack, had been in Western hands since October 1998—in other words, we knew they were going to do this since

October 1998—why were no preparations made to prevent it? With

6 months’ notice, why were no military contingency plans drawn up

to enable the alliance to fulfill its stated mission of protecting the

Kosovars?

This author then states: ‘‘The answer to these questions are to

be found in the agreement Richard Holbrooke, the Clinton administration’s Balkan envoy, negotiated with Slobodan Milosevic in Octo-
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ber 1998. That agreement, reached after NATO feebly threatened

air strikes to avert humanitarian crisis, sowed the seeds of NATO’s

subsequent failure.’’

Mr. Holbrooke, your response.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, first of all, Senator Smith, I want to

thank you for your statement of support and to state also for the

record that you and I have had prior private conversations on these

issues. I look forward to continuing them and am very grateful for

your support.

In regard to this article and these charges, I am quite puzzled

by them. They are written by a person who ought to know the facts

better. The author has taken a few factoids and twisted them into

a different mosaic, to use Senator Biden’s word, a different tapestry. This is not the tapestry I recognize, and a full-scale rebuttal

really requires a full-scale history. Let me just address the key

points.

Senator SMITH. By the way, I am asking this because this probably has currency in the Republican cloakroom, and you need to get

a rebuttal out there.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. It may have currency, but the author, I believe,

worked for the National Security Council in the first term of the

Clinton administration.

Senator BIDEN. He is talking votes.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I would be happy to debate these issues with

the author sometime, but he chooses to make personal attacks on

me on television and elsewhere. That is his right. Let me just address the substance of these things. I do not know him, by the way,

but I find these statements quite factually misleading.

So let me go back first to the October agreements. As I said in

response to Senator Helms’ question, in October we did not negotiate the introduction of an international armed security presence.

We were not able to do so. In fact, Secretary Albright, Secretary

Cohen, and Sandy Berger came up to the Hill and talked to the

Congress about this, and it was a very clear sense of the Congress

that at that point ground troops were not going to be possible, and

that was my instruction.

I stated publicly and privately at the time that the agreements

reached in October would last only until March because of the winter and that if, during the interim period between October 12 when

we reached the agreement and the end of the winter, we did not

make progress on the core issue of Albanians and Serbs living together under a political framework that respected both communities, that the war would resume when the winter ended, but I

was wrong. It resumed before the winter ended, but it was inevitable when we could not make political progress.

Now, what the author of this article omits, Senator Smith,

among many other things, is, point No. 1: roughly 150,000 people

were living in the forests and woods of Kosovo at the point I went

there, scared to come home because Serb security forces were all

over Kosovo. And had Milosevic not reached the agreements, many

of those people would have frozen to death or starved to death in

the winter cold of the hills of Central Kosovo.

Those people all returned. Many of them were displaced again

during March and April and May, but far fewer died as a result
100

of our military action. Although many were displaced, more would

have died had they been left in the woods and forests over the winter.

Second, what the Belgrade authorities agreed to was an invasive

NATO surveillance regime while they shut down their radars,

which allowed us to track their military movements and withdrawal in accordance with U.N. Security Resolution 1199 to the

pre-crisis levels.

Now, those were the international community levels, and the author of this article says that our agreement allowed them to keep

people in place. Technically that is correct, but my instructions

from the Contact Group and the U.S. Government were to force

Milosevic back to the levels agreed upon in 1199. We did that, and

he did pull down to those levels temporarily, before the violations

began again.

Third, he agreed to a huge unarmed civilian contingent under

the OSCE, the so-called Kosovo verification mission with an American head, Ambassador William Walker. We agreed to put in at

least 2,000 people.

I regret deeply that because of bureaucratic delays we were only

at 1,200 by February. We failed to put in enough people, and I

hope we will not repeat that mistake again, Mr. Chairman, when

we buildup the civilians this time around. Now, as I said a moment

ago, those people were unarmed, but that is because we did not

seek to arm them, and I said at the time that that would cause a

problem.

A last point, and the most important, the article you cite says

that the ethnic cleansing had begun earlier and that the plans

were in place, and that we knew about them. I will leave for another time and place, and perhaps a classified session, a discussion

of what the administration knew and when it knew it.

I was not a full-time government employee at that point and, indeed, despite the characterization of me in that article, I was not

the special envoy for the Balkans or for Kosovo. I was carrying out

individual missions at the personal request of the President and

Secretary Albright, and the intelligence issues he alludes to are

ones that I think it might be useful to be briefed on, because much

has been written about them in the press.

It is clear that the Serbs had a plan to empty the province and

that it would have been impossible to put ground troops in to prevent that before they could have executed the plan. It is for that

reason that bombing became the preferred option and ultimately a

successful option—messy, as I have said before, but successful in

dealing with it.

So that is a brief response, Senator Smith, to some of the comments in the article, and I would be happy to respond to any other

questions you have.

Senator SMITH. Richard, you admitted on January 22, 1999 that

the October agreement you made with Milosevic had eroded because it did not have teeth. Those are your words. Why, then, did

you recommend the United States and NATO accept the agreement

in the first place, if it did not have teeth?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, the quote you have used is part of what

I was saying a moment ago. I said it earlier, and I said it subse-
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quently: The lack of teeth was the lack of ground forces, armed

forces of the sort we had in Bosnia. Why did we accept it? Because

No. 1, we got everything else, including the OSCE mission.

No. 2, if we had not made a deal and the Serbs had kept 40,000

security forces in Kosovo in October, we would have had people

freezing to death in the mountains and forests of Kosovo. I think

that the highest goal of a person in a difficult and complex situation of the sort that confronted the team of negotiators which I

headed is to save lives. We saved a lot of lives, and I have no regrets about that.

But repeatedly, Senator Smith, we stated publicly and honestly

and briefed you and your committee on the weakness of the agreement. We knew what the weakness was, and that weakness was

only corrected after we moved into this extraordinary phase that

began with the massacre at Racak on January 16. The quote you

have just used is interesting, because it comes 5 days after Racak.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, sir.

Some fear that there may have been a quid pro quo between you

and Mr. Milosevic that relates to the International War Crimes

Tribunal. Did you ever discuss or imply any such quid pro quo for

his actions in the Balkans in exchange for a U.S. position as to his

indictment?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Barbara Larkin has told me never to use the

word never, but I am going to violate her instruction and say

never, not once. Never.

Senator Smith, during my second meeting with Milosevic in August 1995, this was a constant subject. He never raised it. I never

raised it in regard to him, but what I did do, and I welcome the

chance to put this on the record, is tell him from the beginning and

relentlessly that we would support the War Crimes Tribunal, its

access, its jurisdiction and, as I said earlier in response to Senator

Helms’ question, to prevent him from bringing any indicted war

criminals to any of his negotiations.

Senator SMITH. When you returned from Belgrade in October, a

deal that you believed prevented, made it so that we would not

bomb, you stated you were not into making—again, your words—

making a moral judgment at this time about somebody with whom

I have had to negotiate.

Now, for the record, are you now prepared to make a moral judgment about Mr. Milosevic? Again, I ask this because these are

being used against you, these quotes, and I want to give you a

chance to refute them.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I understand this, Senator Smith. I have made

a certain number of public appearances, and every one of these

issues is raised fairly often, I might say, and I do not want this to

sound self-serving, by people who have not been there, who have

not tried to end wars and prevent wars.

Those comments, plus certain things that I felt it was necessary

to leave out of my book, were a result of the fact, which I discussed

with Secretary Albright and the President, that I might have to negotiate again, whether I wanted to or not. This is not fun. This is

not bridge or tennis. This is tough slogging, and my job was not

to make moral judgments in public, although those judgments are
102

clearly in the book, where I use the word ‘‘evil’’ to describe certain

events and people.

I pulled my punches in the book, as my editor, who is sitting

three rows back here, well knows. She wanted me to go further,

but as I was writing the book, which required government clearance, I was well aware of the fact that I might have to continue

to be engaged on these issues, and the highest goal here was to

avoid war and bring peace. I have made some of these moral judgments in the book and will make others in public later.

Twice in the last 4 years we bombed and then sent in ground

troops by NATO. Nobody in the founding fathers of NATO ever envisaged that, but it did work, and again it was messy, but it

worked, and your committee, and particularly your colleague here

to your left, did an extraordinary amount to lead us to that policy.

I have no regrets about it.

Senator SMITH. But my point is, I think we can understand why

you would not want to be making those kinds of pronouncements

while your negotiations were continuing, but as you sit here

today—and I believe it is the United States policy that this man

is not a part of the solution any more. We are treating him as a

war criminal and seeking his apprehension and trial. Do you have

moral judgment to make about Mr. Milosevic now?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I absolutely believe that Louise Arbor and the

tribunal did the right thing. He has been indicted. He should face

trial. I cannot conceive of the circumstances under which the kind

of negotiations that I conducted under instructions would be conducted again. This is a decision, however, for higher authorities in

these circumstances, but I am absolutely clear-cut that Louise

Arbor made the right decision.

I have written in my book in the last chapter about evil, and I

felt—Carl Jung, the great Swiss-German psychiatrist wrote that in

the face of evil, humankind is confused as to what to do. That is

what happened to us in the thirties, it is what happened to us in

the early nineties, and a few people saw it earlier than others and

spoke out earlier, but evil confused people, and that is what we

confronted there, and we have to recognize it.

The origin of these four wars was the Serb leadership, and that

Serb leadership meant Slobodan Milosevic. That is crystal clear,

and I did make that clear in my book, and I do not walk away from

moral judgments. It is just that on that particular quote you said

on that day it would not have served our national interest to say

so publicly, but thank you for giving me a chance to clarify my

views.

Senator SMITH. Thank you. With Senator Biden’s indulgence.

Senator BIDEN. This is important.

Senator SMITH. I have just two other questions.

I believe I heard you say earlier in response to Senator Helms

that your wife had participated with democrats in Serbia. In all of

your trips there, have you ever taken time to meet with democrats?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Certainly. I met with all of the leaders of the

Together Movement, but if I could take a moment to describe the

tragedy of it, at one point, vividly, Ambassador Dick Miles held a

reception which included all three leaders of the Together Movement. They were within 10 feet of each other on the same terrace,
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and they all were happy to talk to me, but they would not talk to

each other. It was that physical, and I talked to them about the

fact that in Washington Republicans and Democrats worked together. They would not even look each other in the eye, and that

is why I told my earlier story.

Every trip, Chris Hill and I always met, and I know Secretary

Albright did when she made her trip to Belgrade. We always met

with the other side.

Senator SMITH. Thank you for that clarification.

Now I am going to ask you a question that reflects my personal

bias. On the Rambouillet provision that we were going to seek, and

even impose autonomy, I think it has been clear from the beginning we have intervened in a civil war. We have picked a side, as

I see it.

I know it is not—I do not have any enmity toward the Serbian

people, but I certainly do to their political establishment, but I

think it has been clear for a long time that the Serbs want sovereignty over Kosovo and the Albanians want independence from

Serbia, and it seems to me we are coming to the table now and saying, well, by force of arms you are going to have autonomy, and we

are going to enforce that.

My fear is that such an arrangement will be to us and our allies

in Kosovo what Palestine was to Britain a few decades ago. I wonder if you think at this late date, as we read these grisly accounts

in Newsweek and Time that are as horrific, and perhaps not on the

same scale, but certainly in quality to anything we saw at mid-century from Nazi Germany, I wonder if you can tell me what your

feelings are about our policy with respect to autonomy. Are we

going to back off and let these people pursue a course of self-determination that ultimately could lead to independence?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator Smith, you said for some time, and

then you accurately described views which in fact date back to

1389. Both Serbs and Albanians, as we all know, consider Kosovo

sacred soil.

I was not involved in the Rambouillet negotiations, so I would

defer to other people as to what exactly was intended by the parts

of it you referred to. All I can say is that it is clear that the Belgrade leadership has forfeited any right to have any role or control

over the destiny of the Kosovo Albanian people, and that role will

now be played on the security side by NATO and on the political,

civilian, legal, juridical side by the U.N. structure that is now being

pulled together and which I intend to spend a lot of time trying to

focus, because as I said earlier, I am concerned.

How that will evolve as time goes on, it is very difficult to say.

Secretary Albright has stated clearly that under international law

and understandings, Kosovo is still regarded as part of Yugoslavia

on the maps, but Belgrade is not going to run Kosovo in the foreseeable future, and that is what this tremendously intense set of

negotiations now going on is all about.

Senator SMITH. Well, I hope it is more a conflict of a word game

as to what it is we are meaning, but in real life I think Kosovo is

going to end up being independent if you put it to a vote of the people who live there, and I just would see us having taken this action

to this date, then having risked allied and American lives, trying
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to enforce something that frankly is not realistic in my view, and

I have said this to Secretary Albright in person, and so I am not

speaking out of school here.

But I hope we have enough flexibility that we will not spend unnecessary life and treasure trying to enforce the unrealistic, and

that is my opinion, and I have said it to her, and I am saying it

to you, and I will say it to the President if I get a chance.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator Smith, Barbara Larkin feels I was not

clear enough in my answer on Slobodan Milosevic, so let me just

state again, he is an indicted war criminal. That was an appropriate thing for Louise Arbor to do. He should face the consequences that go with that, as should all the other people who are

in that similar position, and that should be a key goal of Western

policy as well, and I have not said this previously in this hearing,

but it is worth underlining as well as the larger goal of bringing

democracy to Serbia. Thank you for allowing me to clarify my

views.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, sir.

Senator BIDEN. One of the things that has been absent the last

6 or 7 years here is the kind of consensus on foreign policy and bipartisanship that we have experienced in the past. We have had

very, very tough fights in the past years I have been here: Democrats opposing Reagan and Bush, and Republicans opposing Clinton, et cetera. The nucleus of any bipartisanship that is, I believe,

thoughtfully arrived at here, includes my colleague on the right

here. It has cost him, I guess, in his party, but he and John

McCain and John Warner and a group of very well-respected Senators, Senator Hagel, have done from their perspective what they

think is the right thing. I happen to agree with them.

We have sort of a cabal here in each of our parties. My observation is that there is a strong sense of isolationism manifested in 50

different ways, and it is not always a partisan affair. It is more an

ideological instinct, and it is in my party as well, although I think

to a less extent than in this Senator’s party. Nonetheless, it has

caused us to build strong relationships across party lines in difficult places.

Let me begin my questioning by saying that I understand the

Senator’s frustration about the alleged inevitability of the independence of Kosovo. I hope we have patience and do not do anything to redraw boundaries right now. I hope we let time intervene

here a bit, and I hope we do not make any judgments that are premature. I am not suggesting that at the end of the day the Senator

will not be correct, that there is an inevitability to what he is suggesting. I think it would require a much grander scheme than just

the independence of Kosovo, and I am not sure the world or anyone

is ready for it at this moment.

If I could get your responses, you indicated you do not believe in

collective guilt. Nor do I, but I do believe in collective responsibility, and I do believe in a nation collectively informed.

I want to make it clear, I think the Serbian people are a noble

people, and I think any long-term solution in the Balkans has to

ultimately rest upon the integration of Serbian people, not just in
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Serbia, but Serbian people brought into the mix in a major way.

They are major, major players.

But I am a little concerned that we, to the extent Senators are

policymakers, and that is limited, as it should be, constitutionally,

but we sometimes ignore the historical facts and background as we

arrive at our judgments, and I think sometimes in our effort to

demonstrate that we do not believe in collective guilt we avoid the

notion of collective responsibility.

In 1993, I made my first trip to Yugoslavia, and you referenced

my meeting with Slobodan Milosevic when in private he asked me

what I thought of him, I told him I thought he was a war criminal,

and I documented why I thought he was one and said I thought

he should be tried as one.

But in that trip, I did meet with a group that was put together

in a hotel in Belgrade of, quote, the collective opposition, supposedly all the democrats in Serbia. I mean academicians, publishers, politicians, and over 80 people showed up in the ballroom to

meet with me. In 21⁄2 hours, a single Jeffersonian democrat I did

not discover. I did not find one, not a single one.

The intense opposition to Milosevic that was radiated in that

room still reflected an intense nationalism, no matter how they

characterized themselves, or oneself, and it leads me to the following point. I think until the Serbian people acknowledge that in a

thousand different ways they enabled Slobodan Milosevic, we are

never going to have a comprehensive peace or scheme of bringing

the Balkans into the 21st century.

The Balkans have lagged behind Europe at every stage of development for the last 500 years, and it is time for the sake of my

grandchildren, that not only do they be brought into the 21st century, but that there be parity, integration, a collective sense of

their European destiny. Absent a cold shower, if you will, unless

there is a realization that the Serbian sense of victimization is historically not justified here, I do not know how we get to the place

where there is a long-term strategy and prospect for nonrepetition

of what has taken place over the last 150 years in the Balkans.

So I want to make it clear, I have great respect for Serbian culture. I have made it my business for the last 20 years. It was my

avocation before I came to the Senate. I have been fascinated by

the Balkans since I was a student, and I think I have read nearly

every serious piece that has been written about the Balkans—well

that is an exaggeration, but certainly scores of treatises over the

last 30 years, and ultimately I think there comes a time, and it is

now, when not only the Serbs but others in the region have to have

that cold shower and look clearly into those mass graves. I know

of no way of accomplishing that short of fair, open, and internationally televised trials of these hideous actions allegedly perpetrated,

and I say allegedly because of my notion of due process, by

Karadzic, Mladic, Milosevic, and scores of others, some of whom are

Kosovars, some of whom are Bosniaks.

So that is a long preface to my question, which is that, notwithstanding all of this, when I read this article by Mr. Daalder—and

I think I have met him, and I may be mistaken, but I think I have,

I do not know where he has been—and I would like to take a

slightly different tack to that which you have taken.
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He indicates that having ruled out ground troops in the beginning, having prepared only for 3 days of bombing, and having

known of Operation Horseshoe since October, and having signed on

to an agreement that had no teeth, you, Dick Holbrooke, wrought

this outcome. I do not know where the hell he has been. I wonder

when he was in the government, whether he considered the following: the good news is that we are in an alliance; the bad news is

we are in an alliance. The good news is that we are a democracy.

The bad news is that we are a democracy.

Your critics now, and I will not name names, but I can, in both

the Democrat and the Republican Party, are suggesting that we

knew of Operation Horseshoe and did not act, but these are the

very people who were saying we should negotiate with Milosevic.

I have been on 50 television shows from Meet the Press, to

Nightline, to virtually every other program. The very people who

are criticizing you now were telling me how can you force Rambouillet on a sovereign nation? We know the Senator I am talking

about who says this—we did half a dozen shows together. I do not

know what has changed. We negotiated Rambouillet, and they did

not like our agreement. When Serbia refused to sign, we said we

were going to bomb them. This Senator than said that is not right.

It is a sovereign nation.

Well, we could not even get anything close to unanimous agreement in the Congress to bomb them. How the hell did he think we

are going to get agreement to put troops in, ground troops in. You

were not playing with a full deck.

Let me make it clear, the deck given to you.

Knowing you as well as I do, I cannot imagine your not having

wanted to have had 30, 40, 50,000 troops to seal that agreement

with Milosevic but what did you have? You had the State Department, I suspect, telling you, NATO will never go for this, so do not

push it. You were being told that the Republicans in the Congress

will kill you. There is no possibility of their voting for ground

troops, zero, none. After you get by three or four folks on the Republican side and maybe two dozen of the Democratic side, it is

like a gigantic void, no possibility.

I challenge anyone in this room, anyone listening to this, anyone

in the Congress to stand up and tell me that they ever thought

there would be 51 votes in the Senate and 218 votes in the House

to deploy American ground troops into Kosovo in sufficient numbers to allow you to put teeth in an agreement.

I challenge anyone in the press, anyone, to cite me a moment,

a time, or a rationale, when they thought that would have occurred.

The second thing I find astounding, absolutely astounding, is

that the President did not push for ground troops. I am the guy

who, among others, I suspect, called him—I am confident he will

not mind my saying this—after he had that interview with Dan

Rather, and I said, for God’s sake, boss, do not do that again.

Not only did he go on and say we were not going to put ground

troops in, he went on to say why it was a bad idea. That itself was

a bad idea. I think he figured it out pretty quickly, not because I

called him, and he did not do that again.
107

But I remember, and I am going to say something he might not

like me to say, because I never say what Presidents have told me,

but I am going to say it because it benefits him. I called him over

a month and a half ago and said, for God’s sake, Mr. President, get

a plan going for the deployment of ground troops to Kosovo to back

up the bombing if you need it. It is going to take time.

He said, well, you know NATO, and I said, well, do it at the Pentagon. He answered, somebody will find out, and I said, so what?

He said, Joe—and I will not go into the detail of this—you have

no idea how delicate this balance is in NATO now. You have no

idea. And then he went on to explain it, and he convinced me that

it was true.

I would respectfully suggest to anyone at Brookings who would

like to rewrite history these days to answer the following question:

Had the President of the United States by his actions led the Europeans to believe that he was preparing to use ground troops, would

they have stayed the course on the bombing? Would we have gotten

the approval to begin bombing had the President from the outset

said, ground troops have to be a part of this?

There was doubt in the world community whether NATO would

even follow through on what they said they would do if he violated

the agreement you negotiated.

I am a big supporter of NATO, but I want to tell you something.

I was calling everybody I knew, including the defense minister of

the United Kingdom, saying, just one little guy’s opinion, if you do

not agree, I am going to be talking about how you did not. So I

wonder how people now look back on this and say, hey, why didn’t

we have ground troops ready?

This is a process, but you cannot say it because you are the diplomat and you still work for the boss. He ain’t my boss. There is

separation of powers here. Nobody in the administration is my

boss. I have great respect for them, but they are not my boss.

I have got one group of people who are my boss, and they live

in Delaware, and so I can say this but you cannot. You did not

have a sufficient number of arrows in your quiver to negotiate the

agreement that I know you wanted last year. So I hope that the

gentleman who wrote this article, goes back and, as we former

Catholic school kids say, examines his conscience and tells me how

you could have done much more than what you did.

Now, but that leads me to the question, are you confident that

there are now enough tools or enough arrows in that quiver to do

what we have to do in Kosovo?

I must tell you, and I will say it publicly, I doubt it. I doubt the

resolve of NATO in going after Milosevic, Mladic, and the gang. I

am not saying it will not occur, but I worry about the resolve in

putting enough pressure on the Serbian people, who are good people, but to face the reality of what has occurred. For if they do not,

they will continue to buy into the lies of dictators who deny them

access to real information and spew lies to them.

Let me end by saying this. When I sat in the hotel in Belgrade

waiting to go meet with Mr. Milosevic in 1993, he wanted me to

meet him during the day. I refused to do it, because I did not want

to give him—not that I give anybody any credibility—but I did not

want a United States Senator meeting with him in public with the
108

press present. I only agreed to meet with him after dark—I was

surprised he agreed—in his office alone. There was no press, no

one around, except one aide of his and two aides of mine.

I was getting prepared to go into that meeting in a hotel room,

and a young Foreign Service officer was with me, when on the air

I saw babies that looked like they had been smashed up and beat

up. They looked like they were hung on meat hooks. I said, what

is that all about, and he translated it for me. He said, this is Statecontrolled television, and this is what the Serbian people in Belgrade at least, were being told that night that Muslims were doing

to their children in Bosnia.

It was a total, complete lie, but because people talk about 1389

in Serbia, there was an entire constituency prepared to believe it.

So it is understandable to me that the Serbian people believe that

what we are saying now is propaganda and lies. But I do not believe there is any possibility of a long-term settlement until we face

the reality of what has occurred, and until we figure out that there

is a difference among Albanians between Tosks and Ghegs, until

we understand that not all Albanians are Muslims.

One of the recent villages that were wiped out and massacred by

the Serbs is a Roman Catholic Albanian village. There are so many

myths, so many myths that exist. The reality is hard enough to

deal with. The myths are impossible.

So my question is, and I will not say any more, do you think

there are enough arrows in the quiver that our diplomats will have

in order to have a fighting chance to get a peaceful implementation

that has long-term possibilities in Kosovo?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator Biden, thank you, first of all for giving

a better answer to Senator Smith than I did. I am very grateful

for your comments, and they indicate again your extraordinary

command of the nuances of this incredible difficult issue.

I would just make one prior comment before I answer your question. Our goal in the region must be, in its simplest form, democracy and justice. Justice means truth, and democracy means the

people choose their own destiny, and until Serbia joins, and I am

quoting now, you, until extreme nationalism—which, by the way,

is a code word for racism. Let’s be clear in what it is. It is not simply patriotism in the American sense.

The key word is extreme, and we have seen it in other parts of

the world, and it always means suppression of the other. Until we

bring Balkans into Europe in the 21st century, and they fulfill

what you correctly call the European destiny, we are going to have

instability throughout the region, and that is a region with two important NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, and with their own unresolved differences, which also must be addressed.

Now, you asked—your question is very difficult for me to answer.

I am sure that the correct answer given to me in the briefing books

that I did not bring with me today is, yes, we have the resources,

but I cannot say that to you, Senator Biden. First of all, the resources are going to be the American participation, and the resources will be determined by you and your colleagues as the administration goes through the process, and those resources may be

larger than the initial estimates.
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We, the administration, misled the Congress on the duration at

an earlier time, and should not repeat that again, so all I can say

to you, Senator Biden, is my deep and profound hope that the resources will be mustered when they reach the right time.

Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator SMITH. We are pleased to be joined by our colleague,

Senator Ashcroft from Missouri.

Before I turn to Senator Ashcroft, I would like to get your response to a news article, and if you are not already aware of it,

make you aware of the plight of probably 1,500 Albanian Kosovars

who were in jail in Kosovo who were taken out of Kosovo into Serbia. It is possible they are being used as bargaining chips.

One of these is a doctor Flore Bravina. She ran an orphanage,

she taught first aid courses, but somehow was put in jail as being

part of a terrorist plot. She is 49 years old, not in good health, and

she and again perhaps as many as 1,500 ethnic Albanians have

been moved out of Kosovo and are now in Serbian jails.

My question is, are you aware of this, and did we or NATO make

a mistake in concluding a peace without getting some provision for

their release? What can we do about it at this point?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Well, Senator Smith, I am not aware of this

case, and I do not know the details of the NATO negotiations with

the Serb military authorities, so all I can ask is if I could submit

an answer for the record upon consultation with the State Department.

Senator SMITH. Absolutely. This comes from a June 23 article

from the Los Angeles Times, and it is tragic if we have let what

are political prisoners be taken and perhaps to be either killed or

used as bargaining chips, and I hope we can do something to help

them.

[The following response was submitted for the record.]

STATUS OF KOSOVAR DETAINEES IN SERBIA

The State Department is aware of the fact that Serb forces, in withdrawing from

Kosovo, took with them ethnic Albanians from Kosovo who were held in prisons

there, as well as other citizens the Serb authorities believe to be guilty of criminal

activity. We do not know exactly how many were transferred, or the charges on

which they are held. Initial press reports spoke of some 2,000, but Albanian sources

put the number much higher. We have publicly raised our concerns over the Serb

action in removing these people from Kosovo, urged authorities to grant ICRC access to those detained, and called for the return of those held. Serb authorities have

allowed ICRC access and provided the ICRC with a list of some 2,000 being held.

Serb authorities, soon after the issue became public, released over 150 individuals,

but the remainder continues to be held. We are also aware of Dr. Bravina’s detention, but do not have information beyond that in the press. The return of prisoners

was not a NATO condition to halt the bombing, but their accounting—and return—

is one condition for lifting the stringent sanctions imposed against the Milosevic

government by the United States and the European Union. We will continue to use

every opportunity to press for resolution of this issue.

Senator SMITH. Senator Ashcroft.

Senator ASHCROFT. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this

series of hearings regarding the nomination of Ambassador

Holbrooke. He has been nominated to fill a very important post. I

have an opening statement which I would like to submit for the

record so that I might go immediately to questions that I would

pose to the nominee.
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Senator SMITH. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Ashcroft follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN ASHCROFT

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this series of hearings regarding the nomination of Richard Holbrooke to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations. This

important post should be filled with the very best individual, and I look forward to

reviewing Mr. Holbrooke’s record carefully.

Mr. Holbrooke is a respected diplomat who no doubt was instrumental in securing

the Bosnia peace agreement in 1995. He has been a trusted advisor of the President

on issues throughout Europe and a mediator in the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus.

In his assessment of the Balkans, Mr. Holbrooke has shown good strategic sense

on several fronts. Prior to becoming Assistant Secretary of State for European and

Canadian Affairs, Mr. Holbrooke had been an opponent of the arms embargo—a policy which probably prolonged the war in Bosnia. As Assistant Secretary, Mr.

Holbrooke recognized that the improving position of Croat-Muslim forces on the

ground in the summer of 1995 would facilitate a peace settlement. He also opposed

giving Mr. Milosevic any relief on sanctions until the Bosnia agreement had been

implemented.

Other aspects of Mr. Holbrooke’s work in the Balkans are of concern, however.

From an account in his book ‘‘To End A War,’’ Mr. Holbrooke’s immediate rationale

for U.S. engagement in Bosnia was the fact that the United States would have to

help extract U.N. peacekeepers from Bosnia in the event a pullout was necessary.

As Mr. Holbrooke writes, ‘‘Clearly, we had to find a policy that avoided a disastrous

U.N. withdrawal. This meant a greater U.S. involvement.’’

As the situation on the ground became more tenuous for the U.N., NATO had approved an operational plan for intervention to get U.N. personnel out of Bosnia.

Amazingly, although the NATO Council had approved this plan, the President had

not been briefed on an operation that might require the deployment of 20,000 U.S.

troops to the Balkans.

This kind of neglect had, as Mr. Holbrooke rightly said, narrowed the options of

the Administration considerably. The President could stop the deployment of U.S.

troops, but if he did he would be undermining a U.S. commitment to help extract

U.N. peacekeepers. In international relations, the United States should be in a position to honor its commitments. Being forced to take responsibility for a civil war

out of simple neglect and lack of communication within the Administration is not

a sound rationale for committing American credibility, however.

In addition, Mr. Holbrooke’s assertion that failure to follow through on the NATO

plan to extract the U.N. peacekeepers ‘‘could mean the end of NATO as an effective

military alliance’’ was mistaken, in my opinion. In an effort to justify new missions

for NATO, Administration officials often have said that failure to follow through in

the Balkans would undermine the alliance. The question is seldom asked, however,

as to whether NATO should have been committed to these missions in the first

place.

It is precisely this mission creep of NATO which endangers the future strength

of the alliance. NATO has been transformed by this Administration from an alliance

with the clear mission of collective defense to an organization to defend the nebulous ‘‘interests’’ of NATO members. Mr. Holbrooke was a key participant in this

transformation, a transformation of a Treaty in which the Senate—with its constitutional role of advice and consent—has not been a participant.

While highly critical of the Bush Administration in the Balkans, Mr. Holbrooke

seems to downplay the shortcomings of the Clinton Administration’s policy in the

region. Mr. Holbrooke’s work in Dayton was impressive, but a NATO peacekeeping

force in Bosnia was not foreordained as the only solution to this conflict. As Noel

Malcolm writes in his book on Bosnia, the arms embargo was a disastrous policy

followed by the Clinton Administration and probably prevented the war from ending

much sooner.

Finally, the dependence of our peace initiative on Slobodan Milosevic—after he

had destroyed Yugoslavia—seems to have helped legitimate his continued repression

in Serbia.

Mr. Holbrooke is no doubt a capable negotiator and a respected strategic thinker

on foreign policy matters. I have additional questions to submit to Mr. Holbrooke

and intend to review his record carefully before the Committee completes its work.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
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Senator ASHCROFT. Mr. Holbrooke, in your book, ‘‘To End a War,’’

you discuss the administration’s efforts to build public support for

sending American troops to Bosnia. You quote the President as

saying, ‘‘I must be brutally honest with the American people when

I address the American people. When I address the people I must

be sure our military and intelligence people have signed off. I must

be honest about what we are getting into.’’

Now, U.S. forces have been in Bosnia for 31⁄2 years. Two deadlines given by the administration have been broken. Were we brutally honest in telling the American people what we were getting

into? Were we honest when the Secretary of State came to this

committee and told me we are going to be back in a year?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator Ashcroft, thank you for your question.

I can only repeat what I wrote in the book and what I have said

earlier this morning: The deadlines were a mistake, a grievous mistake. They were not realistic, and President Clinton has stood up

publicly and so stated repeatedly since he removed the last one in

December 1997. As the President recently noted during his interviews over the weekend, and as Senator Biden said earlier, no such

deadlines have been offered again.

And I think, Senator, that there was confusion in the minds of

some people between an exit strategy and an exit timetable. A

strategy for leaving is necessary with benchmarks which have now

been worked out with the Congress, and on which I believe the administration has to report to you regularly.

But a strategy does not automatically give a deadline, and the

worst part of this arbitrary deadline in my view was that it also

encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to think they could out-wait us, and

then take over once we left. So the deadline actually worked

against the goal, and I think it was deeply regrettable that this

happened.

Senator ASHCROFT. You and your negotiating team had considerable doubts about the 1-year time limit. Did senior Pentagon leaders have doubts about the 1-year time limit at the time?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I cannot speak for them, Senator Ashcroft. I

know that our negotiating team, which included General Clark,

who was then the J–5 of the Pentagon and now, as we all know,

is the Supreme Commander of NATO, shared my view at the time

that it was an unrealistic time limit, but what happened in the

senior leadership of the Joint Staff, I am not aware of. I was overseas in the shuttle at the time this all happened.

Senator ASHCROFT. You seem to indicate that there were senior

officials who had very serious reservations, reservations which time

has validated.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

Senator ASHCROFT. Do you think it was the duty of any of the

individuals with whom you were operating to express those reservations to Congress, or are you satisfied that the appropriate

thing is to give these iron-clad assurances to Congress about the

span of the operation that did not comport with your understanding at the time, or with the understanding of senior military officials?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Again, Senator Ashcroft, I cannot speak for

what every senior military official felt, and I fought for the maxi-
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mum amount of flexibility in the 1-year timetable. It was originally

going to be iron-clad. I fought for flexibility in it, and tried to operate within my instructions from the administration at that time.

Senator ASHCROFT. The deployment of NATO resources now appears to be going forward based on something other than a defense

of NATO territory, which I believe characterized NATO’s mission

in its first 50 years and contributed to the alliance being the most

successful, mutual defense organization in history.

It appears that NATO troops are to be deployed depending upon

the ‘‘interests’’ of member States. How would you define the term,

‘‘interests,’’ if that is consistent with your assessment of how NATO

is operating?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator, I am not sure I follow. Do you mean,

how would I define the term, ‘‘national interest,’’ in the American

context, or the NATO context?

Senator ASHCROFT. Well, I asked the Secretary of State when she

testified before the committee where we would deploy NATO

troops, and she said where it was in the interest of the NATO nations to deploy them. She said it could be the Middle East, it could

be Central Africa.

Now, that is a very serious departure—a significant departure

from what NATO was intended originally to do. I just wondered

how you would define interest, and I asked former Secretary Perry

how he would define it. He said it could be as far away as in the

Pacific rim. Is it your view that NATO deployments should be

based on interests, rather than the defense of territory and the political independence of member States, and if so, how would you define interests?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. First of all, it is clear, as you have stated and

as you and I discussed when I had the honor of calling on you, that

the founding fathers of NATO did not imagine for the alliance the

use to which it has been put in Bosnia and Kosovo. There is no

question of that.

The debate over the future of NATO has raged ever since the end

of the cold war. On one extreme, people said it fulfilled its mission;

let’s disband it. On the other extreme, people said, let’s turn it into

a 16, now 19-nation alliance that goes wherever it wants to go.

I believe that in the real world, Senator, these issues will be

quite narrowly defined, and I am just making a personal projection,

because I do not want to contradict Secretary Albright or—and I

believe you are referring to Secretary Perry.

Senator ASHCROFT. Yes.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I do not want to contradict them, particularly

since I have not studied their testimony, but let me give you a personal view that extends——

Senator ASHCROFT. I really am interested in what you think,

rather than what they said, anyhow. I have already had the chance

to talk to them.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. And also the conversation you and I had in

your office, this is like a continuation of it, because we ran out of

time. I think it is a hugely important issue and one in which continual dialog with the Hill must be conducted, so let me speak just

for myself here, because I do not think that this is an easy answer.
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I do not believe that Bosnia and Kosovo, dramatic as they are,

should be regarded as the beginning of an era of global intervention by NATO. On the other hand, I also reject personally the theory that they were somehow outside the bounds of NATO’s mandate.

If the 19 nations decided, in the face of the outrages which we

were seeing from Belgrade and from the Bosnian Serbs, that it was

appropriate and necessary to take these actions in this area, which

I would stress, sir, is in the middle of the NATO area, because

Greece and Turkey lie to its south and east, and because instability

in that area, which is only a few miles from Italy, could create vast

disruption, if the NATO nations decided to do it, I believe it was

appropriate.

And we have more than a single vote out of the 16, or the 19.

Ours is the deciding vote, and therefore if we did not believe—and

when I say we, sir, I mean not simply the executive branch, but

the two branches and the Nation, in that unique process which is

American democracy—if we did not believe it was in our national

interest, then we would not do it, or should not do it.

That does not mean it is going to be 100 percent. This is the

most contentious foreign policy action since Vietnam.

Senator ASHCROFT. Is it your view that the executive branch and

the legislative branch, the Congress, did express in some way a

consensus that this was an appropriate NATO deployment?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. It is my understanding, Senator, that the President exercised his authority after consulting with the Congress. I

am not a constitutional lawyer, and I will leave this to the experts.

This is beyond my brief. But the consultation process, as the dialog

this morning I think illustrates, was intense and continuous. Senator Biden in fact addressed this point earlier.

All I want to stress is that, had the United States decided that

it was not in our national interest to bomb Bosnia and send troops

and to bomb Kosovo, it would not have happened.

Senator ASHCROFT. It interests me that you indicate that the

founding fathers of NATO, to use a euphemism, those who founded

NATO, never imagined this kind of deployment or utilization of

NATO resources, and I agree with you, and I do not believe the

Senate of the United States, when it ratified the NATO Accord,

ever thought that this was a treaty——

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I agree with you, and I have read the exchanges between Secretary Acheson and Senator Vandenberg and

Senator Connelly, and none of the men in this chamber at that

time could have imagined this. That is clear.

Senator ASHCROFT. It appears to me what you argue is that

NATO now exists as something that has evolved from what

NATO—from the treaty which was ratified, and I will tell you

where I am going with this. I think Joe Biden knows. He has seen

me go here before, and so does the chairman of the committee.

Senator BIDEN. It is a legitimate argument.

Senator ASHCROFT. I want to know to what degree you, as a person of tremendous influence and consequence in the international

arena, can amend treaties of the United States to mean what they

were not conceived to have meant ab initio, at the beginning, when

they were ratified, and who you have to confer with.
114

This, to me, is a real question. I do not know how many times

or who you have to call—whether it is the ranking member or the

chairman of the committee—and say, well, now we are going to do

things with a treaty that were never conceived of and had not been

ratified by the Senate, but it is enough that we have continual dialog with the Hill.

You are going to be in a position, and have already been in a position to commit the United States to a certain course in the international arena. You have negotiated agreements, and we all ended

up having to follow through with what you negotiated. Whether

you have the formal authority or whether there is a line on a flow

chart which ever shows that, you have done that.

And so your philosophy about where you can go with your authority, and how far you can go, and what it takes to modify something as substantial as treaty commitments of the United States is

very important.

In one sense you have proposed a method of operating where the

administration can evolve a treaty, and that the ratification is assumed to extend to the evolution so long as there has been, to use

your language, continual dialog.

I do not really mean to say that anything you have done is inappropriate or not good for the country. I really do not want to question that. But the question of how treaties change, and is there a

role for the Congress to play in the amendment process, other than

‘‘continual dialog’’ is an issue of great constitutional importance.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator, I am not a constitutional lawyer, and

it would be way above my pay grade even if I were getting paid

on this issue, but let me just——

Senator ASHCROFT. Well, this is a place where you are going to

be, making the decisions, so I am not trying to ask you to be a constitutional lawyer. I am trying to find out how you conduct yourself

when you represent the United States of America, and what your

regard is for the underlying authority which would exist in treaties

that have with one meaning been ratified by the Senate, as opposed to a modified meaning which is shaped continuously by other

individuals.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. May I preface my specific answer by going back

to something I have said in the earlier hearings, which is my own

23-year record of consultations with Congress on the take-offs, not

just the crash-landings—a record which many of your colleagues

can attest to and, indeed, have.

I revere the Constitution, and I believe that if confirmed by the

Senate for a job anyone, myself included, has an obligation to consider that while he or she gets instructions from the executive

branch chain of command, he or she has an absolute responsibility

to talk to Members of Congress continually, in public and in private. My record shows that.

Now, to your specific point, again, I am not a constitutional lawyer, but I think that you are addressing an issue which has been

much debated—the issue of original intent versus the legislation—

but you are addressing it in the most important forum that exists

for the United States, the decision as to whether or not to put

Americans in harm’s way. Like you, Senator, I consider that the
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highest responsibility and obligation of a President, a Commander

in Chief.

You earlier made some comments about my own role, but I would

stress that, while I was a negotiator, I have no role to play and no

authority to play in regard to that ultimate decision. I recall vividly

our private conversation last week on this subject.

The fact that the founding fathers of NATO and the Senators

who voted to ratify it did not envisage Bosnia and Kosovo does not

to my mind mean that it is a violation of the treaty or an unconstitutional extension of it to proceed with something not envisioned.

The treaty provided—and again, sir, I am not a constitutional

lawyer. Provided is not specifically excluded, and under several articles of the treaty the State Department and Pentagon concluded

early on that these actions, while not envisaged in 1948, were constitutionally appropriate, and I believe this was so communicated

to the committee.

However, let me say again in furtherance of our private discussion, which for those of you who were not there concerned whether

or not Presidents can go to war without checking with the Senate

and the Congress, that I think that the consultative process has

not been adequate, and I think we all just have to try harder.

Senator Biden made a comment before you arrived concerning

the history of this issue, and it was very difficult. But I do not believe, for example, that the kind of stealth politics that President

Johnson conducted when I was a young Foreign Service officer in

Vietnam for 31⁄2 years, in which he really just lied to the American

public about our troop presence and what we were doing, has ever

happened in this administration, notwithstanding the very unfortunate position we took on the time limit. I pledge to you, Senator,

as I have to your colleagues in previous sessions, that I will be

available to you and seek you out to the maximum extent you are

available to discuss these issues as we go forward.

And, finally, I do not think Kosovo and Bosnia should be regarded as the beginning of an era of global intervention, and I cannot conceive of NATO being in the Pacific, with all respect to anyone else who might have suggested that. We have troops in the Pacific. We have treaties with Japan, Korea, the Philippines and

other countries. These are important treaties. Our troops there are

under unitary command, and that is not a NATO issue.

Senator ASHCROFT. May I, Mr. Chairman, just indicate my concerns here. I do not believe that the administration has the right

to modify a treaty on its own from what was ratified. I do not believe the Congress, in consultation with the President, has the

right to modify a treaty.

My own view is that it would be just as wrong for a group of congressional leaders to say, OK, we are going to modify the treaty

without the process that is called for in the Constitution. As a matter of fact, it might be worse to have a conspiracy between two

branches of government to avoid the Constitution than it would be

for one.

Consultation is an important thing, but what you do with treaties is to ratify them, and ratification is a process involving the full

Senate. I think there is a legitimate debate about NATO’s intended

role to how the alliance has endured.I believe that we obscured the
116

issue last year when we added new members, when the real change

that we adopted was a new philosophy and a new mission for

NATO.

I would urge you not to take the position that you can do anything with a treaty that is not specifically excluded by the treaty.

That was the language you provided: NATO’s actions in the Balkans were not explicitly excluded. I would urge you to have a different standard when you deal with treaties, and that is that we

only do those things which the treaty authorizes. Do not assume

you can do everything that you have not been explicitly forbidden

to do.

I emphasize that point because I have an affection for the Constitution, and your coming to me to consult with me to get my consent that you can avoid a treaty or expand it or enlarge it does not

set aside the democratic constitutional process. I should not personalize it because I am not accusing you. But do not come to me to

do that, because if I agree with you I have joined with you in setting aside the Constitution.

I think when we change treaties we ought to follow the constitutional process. If we have not changed the NATO treaty, we have

come very, very close to changing that treaty. I know that we have

not come close, in my judgment, to the kind of debate and discussion in which the Congress should be involved with regard to

NATO’s evolution.

I thank the chairman for his indulgence.

Senator BIDEN. Would you yield just a second? I think the point

the Senator raises is a very, very, very important one. Before the

Senator got here, when he was Governor, we adopted a thing that

is referred to in all treaties now as the Biden condition, which is

the inability of the President of the United States to redefine what

a treaty means different than what the Senate thought.

But I would call the Senator’s attention to something, but knowing his knowledge in this area he has probably already done it. One

of the most fascinating debates taking place in American jurisprudence right now was brought out in the open in the three decisions

the Supreme Court made yesterday.

I would recommend to him the dissent, written by Justice Souter,

and the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, on

three different cases, on this issue of whether or not what the

Founders envisioned limited what is constitutional. It is a fascinating dissent written by Justice Souter today. It is in the Times, and

I am sure you have it, but it was not about treaties.

Senator ASHCROFT. I think there is a difference.

Senator BIDEN. But it goes to the issue of whether or not what

was envisioned limits what is permissible. It is at least an interesting jurisprudential debate.

Senator ASHCROFT. I thank the Senator.

Senator SMITH. Ambassador Holbrooke, on behalf of Chairman

Helms and all members of the Foreign Relations Committee, we

thank you for your candid and complete responses over these past

2 weeks.

We will leave the record open for any Senators who wish to put

other questions to you and tell you we expect the committee to reconvene by Wednesday, where there is an expectation, barring
117

some unforeseen development, that your nomination will move

from the committee to the floor of the U.S. Senate and I believe,

with this said, I think it is safe to say your nomination hearings

are concluded and we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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APPENDIX

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,

Washington, DC, July 7, 1999.

Honorable JESSE HELMS,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate.

Subject: United Nations Reform Initiatives: Answers to Hearings Questions

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter responds to your Committee’s request for additional information related to the June 22, 1999, hearing on the nomination of Richard C. Holbrooke to be Ambassador to the United Nations, which covered, among

other topics, the status of reform initiatives underway at the United Nations. We

are also providing a copy of this letter to Senator Grams and Senator Biden, Ranking Minority Member. We will make copies available to others on request.

Our responses are based on prior and ongoing work at the United Nations focusing on management issues, as well as additional information on U.N. reform initiatives obtained from the United Nations and the State Department during the course

of preparation for testimony before your Committee.

If you have any further questions or would like to discuss any of these issues in

more detail, please call Tetsuo Miyabara or me.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD JOHNSON, Associate Director,

International Relations and Trade Issues.

Enclosure.

GAO RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR ROD GRAMS OF THE SENATE

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

The following text provides our response for the record to questions submitted by

Senator Rod Grams to follow up on GAO testimony at the June 22, 1999 hearing

on the confirmation of Richard C. Holbrooke as the Permanent Representative of the

United States to the United Nations.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING

Question 1. A fundamental problem confronting the U.N. has been a lack of coordination and cooperation among the various organizations within the U.N. system,

resulting in duplication of efforts and inefficient programs. The primary goal of the

Secretary General’s reform plan was to define the core missions of the United Nations and to restructure the organization accordingly. I am concerned that the U.N.

appears to be committing to emphasize new priorities like drug interdiction, disarmament, and terrorism—without curtailing its efforts in other areas.

• Has the Secretary General proposed to eliminate a single function of the U.N.

in order to devote more resources to the core missions which he outlined?

Answer. The Secretary General has not proposed to eliminate any functions of the

United Nations. Based on our preliminary analysis, all major budget programs that

existed in 1996 were continued as a line item in the 1998–99 biennium budget.

However, the Secretary General has restructured some departments and offices, and

this has led to reductions in staff and budget in these areas. For example, three Departments—Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, Economic and Social

Information, and Development Support and Management Services—were consolidated into the Department for Economic and Social Affairs, resulting in 48 posts

being eliminated and the budget for the consolidated office being reduced by $9.1
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million. The 48 posts were abolished and were not reclassified or moved to another

unit.

Question 2. Two years ago, the Sectretary General created four new executive

committees to coordinate the implementation of U.N. programs and activities. • Has the U.N. permitted the GAO to have full access to the new executive committees in order to evaluate its effectiveness?

Answer. We do not yet know whether the executive committees will provide us

with the access needed to complete our evaluation. Thus far, the United Nations has

given us adequate access, including access to the Deputy Secretary General and the

Under Secretaries General who head the departments.

• Are there specific examples that you can cite of how this new structure is working to better coordinate and reduce duplication of effort?

Answer. There are several examples of how the new structure has worked to improve coordination and reduce duplication. The Executive Committee on Peace and

Security recently developed a unified plan for the September 1999 referendum in

East Timor, coordinating the work of the Office of Human Rights and the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Political Affairs, and Management. U.N. officials

viewed it as a breakthrough for these departments to work together as a cohesive

team. Another example is where the Executive Committee on Economic and Social

Affairs commissioned a study of its six major publications, such as World Population

Monitoring and The State of the World Population. The review found considerable

overlap and redundancy among the publications, although the committee has not

yet moved to terminate publications or take other steps to reduce the overlap. Other

examples indicate that the Secretariat is making progress in coordinating some

work in the field, where the true test of the new management structure will occur,

but also faces challenges. We will provide a more systematic analysis of the work

of the executive committees in our report to be issued later this year.

Question 3. In response to Senator Kassebaum’s efforts in 1985, the U.N. agreed

to reduce the number of Under Secretaries General by 25%. It now appears that

we are getting back to the number of Under Secretaries General we had before this

reform. Secretary General Annan has created a number of new Under Secretaries

General, including one for the Millenium, one for the C.I.S, and one for the E.U. • Are you confident that all the Under Secretaries General are counted in the

budget proposals?

Answer. The authorized number of Under Secretaries General has increased from

21 in the 1994–95 biennium to 26 in 1998–99. This count includes all under secretaries general authorized in the U.N. regular budget and the extra-budgetary accounts. We could not identify any other Under Secretaries General.

• Do you see a management need for these new Under Secretaries General?

Answer. We have not completed our assessment of the organizational changes and

the reforms in managing human resources, consequently we do not yet have an informed view on this matter. We will provide further information on this question

in our report to be completed later this year.

REDUCING OVERHEAD

Question 4. Two years ago, the Secretary General stated his intention to reduce

by one-third the proportion of resources from the regular budget which are devoted

to administration and other non-program activities. • In this regard, does the U.N. have a cost accounting system so that overhead

costs can be properly allocated to program activities?

Answer. The United Nations does have a cost accounting system that can allocate

overhead costs to program activities. After costs are incurred, they are billed to an

allotment account and the cost is classified under an object of expenditure in accordance with the U.N. financial rules and regulations. For example, overhead costs for

servicing the General Assembly, such as translation services, office supplies, hospitality, temporary assistance, printing, and editorial services are classified under objects of expenditure such as general operating expenses and supplies and material.

These expenses are then charged to the program for General Assembly Affairs. Organizational overhead, such as the costs for preparing budgets, ensuring financial

control, contracting for goods and services, arranging transportation, and recruiting

and hiring employees are charged to the administrative offices that deal with these

issues. In its most recent report, the Board of Audit, stated that the income and

expenditures they examined on a test basis were properly classified and recorded.

• Has there been any measurable success in reducing overhead at all?
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Answer. The Secretariat has reported measurable savings of at least $13 million

in its efforts to reduce overhead costs. Some examples of savings that the Secretariat reports are $1.5 million saved by eliminating unnecessary documents for conferences and over $3 million saved by outsourcing services such as security, maintenance, and food service. The Secretariat has also reported that it saved travel costs

of $5 million by negotiating better rates and leasing planes to transport police monitors and other staff rather than purchasing them individual tickets.

DEVELOPMENT DIVIDEND

Question 5. One of the Secretary General’s reforms was to have any administrative savings transferred into development projects instead of back to countries with

advanced economies in the form of lower assessments.

• Does this violate the longstanding U.S. Government policy that U.N. regular

budget contributions must not be used to pay for technical assistance programs

in developing countries?

Answer. The development account will use savings from the regular budget to

fund technical assistance projects in developing countries. However, regular budget

funds are already being used to fund technical assistance. According to State Department officials, the United States discourages the use of the regular budget to

fund technical assistance programs in developing countries, but does not have a formal policy against this practice. We are currently examining whether 22 USC Sec.

1896(a) restricts the use of U.N. funds for technical assistance projects and will provide this information in our report to be issued later this year.

• Could this provide an incentive to over-budget on a permanent basis since the

Secretariat would retain all unspent funds at the end of the budget cycle?

Answer. Yes. For example, in developing the proposed 2000–01 biennium budget,

the Secretary General proposed that the development account receive $13 million

to be funded by anticipated savings in overhead costs. The Secretary General further estimated that the Secretariat would save an additional $20 million by undertaking greater administrative efficiencies, and he proposed that these savings be

used to lower the budget level. However, in deciding on a preliminary budget level,

the General Assembly included the $13 million for the development account and

also added back into the budget the anticipated savings of $20 million that the Secretariat’s estimates showed was not needed. The proposed budget for the 2000–01

biennium is currently $125 million higher than the previous biennium. The State

Department also concluded that the preliminary budget was much more than necessary to carry out all mandated programs efficiently and effectively and that any

budget containing $2.5 billion would easily contain substantially more than $20 million in savings opportunities.

OVERSIGHT AND MONITORING EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAMS

Question 6. Does the U.N. have an established set of guidelines for evaluating program effectiveness?

Answer. The United Nations does not have an established set of guidelines for

evaluating program effectiveness. The existing guidelines on evaluating effectiveness consists of the following two sentences: ‘‘The assessment should examine both

the efficiency with which the activity is conducted and the effectiveness of the results. Findings should be based on evidence, including records of opinions of independent experts and the views of clients and users.’’

• If the evaluation process does not focus on program effectiveness, and only looks

at the number of reports and conferences, what value do you see in it?

Answer. The current system for monitoring program performance reports only

program outputs and is of limited value in providing information about whether programs are accomplishing their intended objectives. Member States have also identified this weakness in the current monitoring and evaluation system and some have

come to the conclusion that the current system no longer meets the needs of the

United Nations.

SUNSET PROVISIONS FOR PROGRAM MANDATES

Question 7. The Secretary General’s reform initiatives have included calls for new

program mandates to include specific time limits or sunset provisions.

• Has the Secretary General been successful in his attempts to ensure that sunset

provisions are included in all new program mandates?
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1 Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, A/51/950 (New York, N.Y.: United

Nations, July 14, 1997); letter dated 17 March 1997 from the Secretary-General addressed to

the President of the General Assembly. 2 United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reform (GAO/NSIAD–99–71, Apr. 15, 1999).

Answer. No. The proposal to include sunset provisions on all new programs was

tabled during the session of the Committee on Programs and Coordination. There

are no further proposals to implement this measure.

• What is the source of resistance to sunset provisions?

Answer. Many developing countries are opposed to this measure. U.S. officials and

U.S. and U.N. documents indicate that the Group of 77, representing many of these

countries, is reluctant to support this measure because they perceive it could threaten the continuation of programs they consider important.

PERSONNEL

Question 8. While the number of authorized posts has decreased since the Secretary General announced his intention to eliminate 1,000 posts, the number of people working for the U.N. appears to have increased. Two years ago, the State Department certified that there were 8,500 regular budget posts filled. • In your opinion, why couldn’t the Secretary General succeed in eliminating

1,000 posts given that over 1,000 were vacant at the time he made the proposal?

Answer. The Secretary General has currently abolished 954 posts, but has not

been able to eliminate the 1,000 posts because the posts targeted for abolition were

not vacant and Member States have passed several resolutions indicating that no

staff were to lose their jobs as a result of the downsizing.

• Does the Secretary General propose increasing or decreasing the number of

U.N. posts in his most recent budget proposal?

Answer. For the regular budget for the 2000–01 biennium, the Secretary General

proposes an increase of 61 posts, from 8,741 to 8,802. The 8,741 posts are the number authorized for the end of the 1998–99 biennium.

• Do you know how many U.N. regular budget posts are actually filled at this

time?

Answer. No. The United Nations provides information on an annual basis about

the level of its on-board staff paid through the regular budget. As of the end of 1998,

the U.N. Secretariat had an on-board staff of 7,738 posts (a 12 percent vacancy

rate). U.N. officials informed us that the vacancy rate in 1999 is running higher

than anticipated.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HAROLD J. JOHNSON, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

UNITED NATIONS—OBSERVATIONS ON REFORM INITIATIVES

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of initiatives intended to reform the United Nations. Reform, according to the U.N. Secretary-General, means

embracing fundamental measures that strengthen the organization and its efficiency. Among these measures are initiatives demanded by member States, such as

increased accountability and budget restraint. Other measures include initiatives

the Secretary-General announced in 1997.1 To help Congress assess what progress

has been made in reforming the United Nations, you asked us to examine U.N. efforts intended to (1) unify and focus its organizational structure; (2) control its budget and institute new budget procedures; (3) improve oversight, program monitoring,

and evaluation; and (4) improve its human resources management. This testimony

represents our preliminary assessment. As requested, we will provide you a comprehensive report later this year.

My testimony is based on publicly available U.N. documents as well as documents

available only to member delegations and our prior work on U.N. activities, such

as our recent report on procurement reform.2 We also reviewed working files and

records obtained from U.N. officials and documents obtained from the Department

of State and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. In addition, we held discussions with numerous U.N. officials, including the Deputy Secretary-General and several assistant secretaries-general.

To provide context for my observations, I will first provide a brief background on

the conditions that led to the reform measures and initiatives.
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BACKGROUND

For the past 25 years, U.N. member States and others have made attempts to reform the United Nations, citing problems such as bureaucratic rigidity, poor program performance, duplication and rivalry across its many programs, and its high

cost. A specific concern of member States, particularly the major donors, was the

constantly growing budget of the Secretariat and the seeming inability to restrain

costs. Demands were made that U.N. member States adopt procedures to control the

budget, and, in 1986, the U.N. General Assembly adopted consensus budgeting—a

process for reaching broad agreement without calling for a vote. The United States

supported this measure as a step toward ensuring that sufficient attention would

be paid to the views of the major contributors in the development of the budget.

Member States demanded other initiatives to increase financial discipline, such as

the adoption of results-based budgeting and sunset provisions on new U.N. programs. In the early 1990s, the United States and other member States identified

the lack of effective internal oversight at the United Nations as a major problem.

They cited concerns about administrative waste and inefficiency. The Secretariat

itself identified a crisis in the U.N.’s procurement system that raised serious concerns about financial controls. The U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

was created in 1994 in response to concerns such as these. At the same time, member States also demanded systems that could evaluate and monitor the relevance

and effectiveness of U.N. programs so they could decide which programs to retain.

In 1994, the Secretary-General reported that the U.N.’s management of human

resources was in crisis. The organization was faced with new challenges, and its

human resources management had failed to adequately respond. Among the concerns of the Secretariat were a performance appraisal system that did not rate staff

fairly or consistently, the lack of a code of conduct that clearly laid out staff rights

and consequences for misconduct, and the inability to plan its human resource

needs.

These problems and the demands for change by member States culminated in reform initiatives announced in 1997 by the Secretary-General. According to the Secretary-General, the United Nations had become fragmented, rigid, and, in some

areas, irrelevant. The United Nations had also created duplicative bodies, rather

than instituting effective management structures. To build a cohesive organization

that acted with a unity of purpose and deployed its resources strategically, the Secretary-General incorporated many of the earlier demands for reform into his initiatives, as well as other initiatives to restructure the United Nations.

SUMMARY

The Secretary General has said, and I agree, that reform is a process and not an

event. Based on our preliminary assessment, we believe that the Secretary-General

has undertaken a serious effort to reform the United Nations to improve its relevance to member States and enhance its operational efficiency. Although clear

progress has been made in some areas, the initiatives we examined have not been

fully implemented.

Progress has been made in unifying and focusing the organizational structure of

the U.N. Secretariat, and the programs that are part of the United Nations proper,

to make the Secretariat a more cohesive management unit. The Secretary-General

appointed a deputy secretary-general to function as the chief operating officer and

to strengthen internal coordination. A senior management group, composed of the

under secretaries-general and the heads of those programs that report to the Secretary-General, was also created. This group meets weekly to ensure U.N. actions

are unified and focused on the same objectives. In sharp contrast with the past,

where under secretaries operated with great autonomy, this new structure provides

regular opportunities to communicate, coordinate, and focus the work of U.N. departments, offices, and programs on common objectives. While we believe this new

structure, now about 2 years old, is a positive move, the proof of its success will

be measured in the field, where programs are actually implemented. Because we are

still in the preliminary phase of our evaluation, we have not yet tested the new

structure’s actual impact on improving program delivery and effectiveness. Also, I

should add that this new structure does not include the specialized agencies, such

as the Food and Agricultural Organization, the International Labor Organization,

and the World Health Organization, and consequently, the long-standing concerns

about overlap, duplication, and coordination within the U.N. system as a whole are

not being addressed by this organizational restructuring.

While budgets have been level for the past two bienniums, our assessment thus

far indicates that no fundamental changes have been made to the budgeting process

to control the growth of the regular budget. The process for developing budgets is
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3 United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight Services (GAO/NSIAD–97–59, Apr. 9, 1997).

largely unchanged, and, adopting regular budgets by member state consensus does

not assure control of budget growth, as initially hoped. For example, in developing

the budget for 2000–2001 the United States and Japan, which provide over 45 percent of the U.N.’s financial support, objected that the preliminary budget ceiling was

set too high. However, no vote was taken to record their dissent, and the measure

passed by consensus. Also, the largest donors do not have permanent seats on the

Advisory Committee on Budgetary and Administrative Questions, where they could

most effectively advocate budget restraint. Moreover, although the Secretariat supports implementing results-based budgeting and sunset provisions, initiatives intended to bring more discipline to the budgetary process, these measures have not

been adopted. Nonetheless, some progress has been made. The Secretariat has instituted a program intended to cut costs and increase efficiencies. It has thus far reported over $13 million in savings by introducing more than 600 efficiency projects.

An area where important improvements have been made is in the oversight of

U.N. programs and activities; however, even here the effort should not be considered

complete. Through the efforts of Congress, the executive branch, and other U.N.

member States, the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services was created in 1994.

As we reported to you in 1997, OIOS has established itself as the internal oversight

mechanism for the U.N. Secretary-General 3 and, based on our continuing work at

the United Nations, this office appears to have become an institutional part of the

United Nations. OIOS has clearly enhanced and strengthened the audit, inspection,

and investigations functions at the United Nations. However, progress has been

much slower in developing and implementing a monitoring and evaluation system

to measure and report on program performance and effectiveness that would help

member States make program decisions.

To begin addressing what the U.N. Secretariat considered a crisis in its human

resources management, it recently introduced several initiatives and adopted a

strategy to carry them out. These initiatives include a new performance appraisal

system, adoption of a staff code of conduct, and actions to begin human resources

planning. However, these initiatives have not yet been fully implemented, and some

problems have developed in their implementation. For example, after the new meritbased appraisal system, introduced in 1996, was applied during the most recent rating period, the Secretary-General asked three departments to revise the ratings because they were too high and were out of line with the rest of the Secretariat. Also,

the code of conduct, adopted in December 1998, does not provide the Secretariat

with clear procedures for applying related disciplinary measures for systematic

management problems, negligence, and gross negligence. Additionally, while the

Secretariat has begun using an automated database as the basis for its human resources planning, the information system is unable to account for and track all staff

working for the U.N. Secretariat.

With that brief summary, I would like to discuss each of these reforms in greater

detail.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING

To begin unifying and focusing the United Nations, the Secretary-General announced a major reorganization in 1997 and since that time, has taken action to

implement the changes. In particular,

• a deputy secretary-general was appointed to essentially perform the functions

of a chief operating officer and ensure coordinated U.N. operations;

• a senior management group was established to set overall policy direction;

• four executive committees were formed to implement the policies and ensure

that the actions were coordinated among the U.N. organizations;

• the U.N. Development Assistance Framework was implemented to coordinate

the U.N.’s development efforts in the field;

• various departments and offices were restructured and consolidated to strengthen and focus the U.N.’s response to humanitarian emergencies; and

• human rights activities were consolidated, and steps were taken to strengthen

human rights activities and integrate them into the overall activities of the organization.

Deputy Secretary-General and the Senior Management Group

As an integral part of building a cohesive and unified management structure, the

Secretary-General asked the General Assembly to approve the position of deputy

secretary-general, whose job would be to strengthen coordination, collaboration, and

uniformity of focus in U.N. operations. The General Assembly approved the position
125

in December 1997, and the Secretary-General appointed an experienced diplomat as

Deputy Secretary-General in January 1998. Since then, the Deputy Secretary-General has worked on many of the day-to-day operational issues to ensure that U.N.

activities are unified. The Deputy Secretary-General chairs the senior management

group in the Secretary General’s absence and has also worked on ensuring a consistent U.N. response to personnel reforms and a coordinated approach to U.N. activities, such as in Afghanistan.

The Secretary-General also established a senior management group, composed of

all the under secretaries-general and the heads of the U.N. funds and programs, to

provide unified and clear leadership for the organization. (See App. I for a list of

the members of the senior management group.) According to the Under SecretaryGeneral for Internal Oversight, through the leadership of this group, communication

and coordination among U.N. organizations has improved. The senior management

group meets weekly with the Secretary-General to discuss U.N. operations and

agree on unified actions and policy direction. Full attendance almost always occurs

(sometimes by videoconference) because important decisions for the United Nations

as a whole are made, and the senior managers all have a stake in these decisions.

Previously, the heads of the funds and programs and other senior managers had no

regular mechanism to coordinate overall U.N. activities; some met with each other

only once a year at the General Assembly.

According to the Deputy Secretary-General, the senior management group discusses all major issues affecting the United Nations and agrees on a common strategy for them. For example, decisions such as how the United Nations would develop

a unified response to the crisis in Kosovo and how to implement personnel reforms

consistently across the organization have been discussed and agreed upon. In deciding on its responses to the unfolding events in Kosovo, the High Commissioner for

Refugees regularly reports to the group and describes her field visits. Since the

Emergency Relief Coordinator is also one of the group’s members, a unified U.N.

response has been planned. As such, it has been agreed that the High Commissioner’s office will lead the U.N.’s immediate response to the humanitarian crisis in

Kosovo with help from the Emergency Relief Coordinator. According to the Deputy

Secretary-General, the work of the executive committees provides a good indicator

of how well the senior management group is working because the executive committees plan and implement programs in accord with the direction set by the senior

management group.

Executive Committees

Four new executive committees—(1) peace and security, (2) humanitarian affairs,

(3) economic and social affairs, and (4) development operations—were established to

plan and implement focused and unified U.N. action as agreed to by the senior management group. The Secretary-General placed U.N. departments, offices, and the

programs and funds into appropriate groups; named a convenor of each committee

from the senior management group; and expected the committees to coordinate,

plan, and implement U.N. activities as teams, (App. II compares the U.N. organization before and after these reforms.) According to senior U.N. officials, the concept

of the senior management group and executive committees grew out of recognition

that the U.N. system was too vertical, with each organization operating in a stovepipe fashion, reporting only to the Secretary-General and, in some cases, their governing committees. There was also frustration that some programs, with their own

sources of funding, did not consider systemwide U.N. programming a priority.

All executive committees have been meeting regularly since late 1997. For example, as of April 1999, the economic and social affairs committee had met formally

15 times. According to members of these committees, the under secretaries-general

and heads of offices frequently attend the meetings because they all have a stake

in shaping overall U.N. programming in their areas. Some examples of the committees’ work include the following:

• The Executive Committee for Peace and Security developed a unified plan for

the referendum in East Timor, involving the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, the Human Rights Coordinator, and other committee members.

• The Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs developed a unified U.N. response to Hurricane Mitch and negotiated U.N. access to areas controlled by the

Union for the Total Independence of Angola, on behalf of all committee members including the High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. Development Program, and the U.N. Children’s Fund.

• The Executive Committee for Economic and Social Affairs developed an online

statistical database of all activities undertaken by 12 of its members, which can
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4 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/53/192 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations,

Feb. 25, 1999). 5The World Bank has introduced the Comprehensive Development Framework to involve all

aid donors in planning assistance activities within a country. The U.N. Development Assistance

Framework and the Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework are intended to be complementary. 6 HIV/AIDS: USAID and U.N. Response to the Epidemic in the Developing World (GAO/

NSIAD–98–202, July 27, 1998).

sort the activities by issue, type of activity (such as a conference or publication),

location, and date. • The Executive Committee for Development Operations has begun implementing

the U.N. Development Assistance Framework after completing pilot tests in 18

countries. (The framework is more fully described below.)

U.N. Development Assistance Framework

To better coordinate the efforts of U.N. organizations and build an integrated program for its development activities, the United Nations is implementing the U.N.

Development Assistance Framework in countries where it provides assistance. One

view of the framework is that it translates a country’s need for development assistance into a coordinated operational plan of action among U.N. agencies. The framework document is prepared jointly by a team composed of all U.N. organizations in

a country. The team agrees upon and specifies U.N. objectives; strategies of cooperation; projects to be undertaken; and proposals for follow-up, monitoring, and evaluation. In August 1997, a pilot phase was initiated to test the framework in 18 countries. In May 1998, an assessment of the pilot phase was started, with all the principal framework organizations in attendance. In April 1999, the United Nations approved the guidelines for preparing and implementing the framework, and the General Assembly passed a resolution recognizing the move to full implementation.4 As

of April 1999, final frameworks had been completed in 11 countries, with 6 frameworks co-signed by the World Bank.5

While progress has been made in implementing the framework, the critical question is whether participating U.N. organizations will work together. At the assessment workshop in September 1998, it was noted that a cultural change is required

for the framework to succeed. This necessitates commitment at all levels of the U.N.

system. The experience in Guatemala illustrates the issue. Seventeen U.N. system

organizations have activities in Guatemala, with a portfolio of about $400 million

and a total staff of about 800 local and international workers. The U.N. organizations and the World Bank participated in developing the framework and identifying

priority objectives with the Guatemalan govermnent. A shared information database

with indicators was also developed, and lead agencies were given specific tasks.

However, according to the U.N. country team’s report to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, the headquarters of each U.N. agency set the tone for cooperation. The

message from headquarters to the field was that individual agency results were

more important than overall U.N. system results. Our own reports have found similar problems in U.N. cooperation. Our 1998 evaluation of the Joint U.N. Program

on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome found

that U.N. agencies in the field had difficulty working together and coordinating

their activities.6 Concerns about a joint program led to lack of commitment to working together on the part of some agency officials.

Restructuring Humanitarian Affairs

In March 1998, the United Nations began reorganizing Secretariat units to launch

coherent and coordinated humanitarian operations. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs was dissolved and replaced with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, headed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator. The office’s role

was narrowed to focus on three core functions: (1) policy planning and development,

(2) advocacy (including fund-raising), and (3) coordination of humanitarian emergency response. Other emergency-related activities were redistributed within the

U.N. system. For example, demining activities were transferred to the Department

of Peacekeeping Operations, and demobilization of combatants was transferred to

the U.N. Development Program. In addition, the Office of the Emergency Relief Coordinator was reorganized and its staff was reduced from 250 to 137 professionals.

According to a Department of State official, this change represented the most visible

and positive indication of reform, as the previous directorate was overstaffed and

lacked leadership.

As part of the restructuring of humanitarian affairs, the United Nations initiated

the Strategic Framework concept. The framework is intended to unify the actions

of U.N. agencies in countries that are in conflict or have just completed peace agree-
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7Several U.N. human rights treaties, aimed at providing increased protection to vulnerable

groups, have been adopted and come into force upon ratification by the requisite number of

States parties, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination (1965) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984). The implementation of these core human rights treaties is monitored by committees, or ‘‘treaty monitoring bodies.’’ The Commission on Human

Rights and the Economic and Social Council have established a number of extra-conventional

procedures and mechanisms that have been entrusted to Special Rapporteurs or experts. Their

mandates are to examine, monitor, and publicly report on human rights situations in specific

countries or on major human rights violations worldwide. 8 Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations, GA Res. 41/213 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations Dec. 19, 1986).

ments. To date, the Strategic Framework has been employed only in Afghanistan,

but the United Nations plans to utilize the approach in Sierra Leone. According to

Department of State officials, the Strategic Framework faces challenges of coordination similar to the U.N. Development Assistance Framework. A U.N. report on the

experience in Afghanistan has not been completed.

Human Rights

In his reform proposals, the Secretary-General committed to strengthening the

U.N.’s human rights programs and fully integrating them into the organization’s activities. As a first step, representatives from the High Comnmissioner for Human

Rights were placed on all four executive committees. According to a senior official

in the New York Human Rights Office, the High Commissioner has taken advantage

of this opportunity and made human rights activities a part of all programs. For

example, the High Commissioner provided input into the formulation of guidelines

for the development assistance framework. Human rights activities are now a component of each framework and are included in country programs such as Guatemala,

Malawi, and Mozambique in the form of specific training and outreach programs on

human rights. According to U.N. officials, the elevation of human rights as an issue

and its inclusion into these programs represents a marked change from less than

2 years ago.

The United Nations has taken other steps to strengthen human rights activities,

such as

• consolidating the Center for Human Rights into the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and restructuring the Office by reducing the number

of divisions from five to three,

• upgrading the head of the High Commissioner’s office in New York to the level

of director and adding five staff,

• conducting an analysis of technical assistance related to human rights provided

by U.N. agencies in order to formulate proposals for their improvement, and

• working to establish a human rights data bank to disseminate information and

analysis.

Despite the gains made in reforming the U.N.’s human rights program, challenges

persist. For example, including human issues rights as a basic consideration in U.N.

activities is not supported by all countries. According to a Department of State official, human rights issues are highly political for member States, and U.N. agency

officials are often hesitant to raise these issues with member governments out of

fear of jeopardizing their access in the country and damaging their particular program. Reforms related to increasing the efficiency of the human rights entities have

also not progressed. According to State Department officials, the High Commissioner

has not reduced the duplication and overlap in human rights reporting by the 11

treaty bodies and 37 Special Rapporteurs because member States control the requirements and have not agreed to changes.7

BUDGET CONTROL AND RESULTS-BASED BUDGETING

Although the United Nations has maintained level budgets for the past two

bienniums, our preliminary assessment indicates that no fundamental changes have

been made to the budgeting process to control the growth of the regular budget—

an area of long-standing concern of your Committee. Under procedures adopted by

the General Assembly in 1986, the U.N.’s regular budget is approved by consensus.8

Under consensus budgeting, the Secretary-General submits to the General Assembly

a budget outline that contains a preliminary estimate of funding requirements. The

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions reviews the proposed funding requirements. A larger administrative committee, the Fifth Commit-
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9 Rules and Procedures of the General Assembly (A/520/Rev.15) (New York, N.Y.; United Nations, Dec. 31, 1984). 10France, Italy, and Japan are current members of the Advisory Committee on Administrative

and Budgetary Questions. The 16 members of the committee are elected by the General Assembly and serve 3 year terms. The rules of procedure of the Committee are confidential. 11 Under the accounting change adopted in 1998–99, net budgeting is used. Member States

are assessed only their share of costs payable for jointly funded activities. Programme Budget

for the Biennium 1998–1999. First Performance Report, A/53/693 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Nov. 23, 1998). 12Programme Budget for the Biennium 1996–1997. Second Performance Report, A/C.5/52/32

(New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Dec. 11, 1997). 13The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered ways

to stabilize the budget from currency fluctuations, neither creating a windfall when the dollar

is strong nor a deficit when the dollar is weak. To accomplish this, a separate account needed

to be established, and this action was not supported by member States.

tee, then tries to obtain the broadest possible agreement among members in approving a level for the Secretary-General to use in preparing the budget.

The process does not appear to have assured that the views of the major donors

have been sufficiently considered thus far in formulating the 2000–2001 budget. In

1998, the General Assembly approved a preliminary budgeting level equivalent to

$2.655 billion for the 2000–2001 biennium, in comparison to the estimated $2.527

billion for 1998–99 budget. Any member state can request a vote in the General Assembly if it dissents, thus breaking the consensus on the preliminary level.9 The

United States and Japan, which together pay about 45 percent of the regular budget, did not agree. However, neither member requested a vote. Consequently, the

level was formally approved by consensus, even though the two largest donors dissented. State officials predicted that the actual budget—developed later in the

year—would be lower than the preliminary estimate. State officials said they would

consider requesting a vote if the final budget level was considered to be too high.

Another aspect of controlling the level of the budget involves the work of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Although the advisory

committee plays a crucial role in determining the regular budget level, member

States that pay the largest share of the budget do not have permanent seats on the

committee. For example, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and Italy combined are assessed about 67 percent of the regular budget, but none has a permanent seat on this key financial committee.10 The committee’s role is to review the

budgets and finances of the United Nations and make recommendations to the General Assembly on budget levels and other financial issues. According to State Department officials, the committee is particularly influential because its members

have the most knowledge of and expertise about the U.N. budget process.

You requested that we examine whether the regular U.N. budget for 1998–99 will

have zero nominal growth. At this point, it is uncertain whether there will be zero

nominal growth in the 1998–99 budget compared to the prior biennium, although

the Secretariat estimates that the final budget amount for 1998–99 will be lower

than the final amount for 1996–97. However, the uncertainty comes about because

in comparing budgets, the amount for 1998–99 needs to be adjusted to reflect new

accounting procedures used in determining the budget levels.11 To make a valid

comparison with the 1996–97 biennium, the costs of jointly funded activities would

need to be included in the 1998–99 budget.

Another indicator of budget restraint is holding spending to the level initially ap- proved. For the 1996–97 biennium, U.N. budget expenditures were about $61 million less than the initially approved budget. However, expenditures were lower than

forecast because the strong U.S. dollar resulted in currency exchange gains of about

$49 million and the United Nations hired fewer staff than it had budgeted for, saving an additional $34 million. Some savings were used to pay for the costs for special political missions, such as the mission in Guatemala.12 The United Nations will

likely maintain a budget level at or below the approved level for the 1998–99 biennium. The United Nations estimates that it will spend about $6 million less than

the initially approved budget. However, savings of more than $56 million from a

strong U.S. dollar, lower-than-expected staff costs, and a lower-than-expected inflation rate are expected to provide the Secretariat a cushion.13

Results-based Budgeting and Sunset Provisions

The Secretary General recommended a shift to performance, or results-based

budgeting, to focus the organization more on accountability for achieving results

rather than completing tasks. Although strongly supported by the United States and

other major donors, this measure was not adopted because some members, mainly

developing countries, did not support it. Results-based budgeting requires program

managers to identify indicators for judging the substantive impact of their programs
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14See, for example, Report of the Secretary General: Addendum Results-based Budgeting, A/

51/950/Add. 6 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Nov. 12, 1997). 15 United Nations Reform: Measures and Proposals, A/53/500/Add. 1 (New York, N.Y.: United

Nations, Oct. 15, 1998). 16 United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight Services. 17Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services:

Note by the Secretary-General, A/52/881 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Apr. 28, 1998). 18 Allegations of Theft of Funds by a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Staff Member: Note by the Secretary-General, A/5381 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Jan. 28,

1999).

and justify their programs’ effectiveness based on these results. According to senior

U.N. and U.S. officials, implementing this system would require ‘‘a major cultural

shift’’ among members and U.N. managers and a valid system for evaluating program effectiveness. At the General Assembly’s request, the Secretary-General has

produced several reports in support of this initiative 14 and provided prototypes of

a results-based budget for sections of the Secretariat.15 Although the General Assembly has considered these reports, it has not adopted the initiative.

The Secretary-General’s initiatives also called for new program mandates to include specific time limits, or ‘‘sunset’’ provisions. Sunset provisions would require

the General Assembly to renew programs periodically, based on an evaluation of

their effectiveness. As with results-based budgeting, this initiative was supported by

the United States and other major donors, but some member States, particularly developing countries, did not support it. Many of these members are reluctant to approve an initiative that they perceive could threaten the continuation of programs

they deem important.

Initiatives to Reduce Overhead Costs

As part of the overall effort to improve U.N. operations, the Secretary-General

proposed to reduce overhead costs from 38 percent of the U.N. regular budget to 25

percent and set a savings goal of $200 million. These savings would be placed in

a development account. Projects to eliminate duplication and waste were to generate

these savings. The Secretariat has initiated over 600 such projects, some of which

have resulted in considerable savings. The Secretariat has not released an estimate

of the total savings generated by efficiency projects, but officials believe the goal of

saving $200 million is optimistic. Thus far, the Secretariat reports that $13 million

from these projects, primarily from consolidation of services and departments, has

been put into a development account. Examples of some efficiency projects undertaken with estimated savings are

• abolishing the High-level Board on Sustainable Development, which saved an

estimated $362,000; • shifting from subsidizing food services to a profit-sharing arrangement with contractors, which generates at least $500,000 in income annually; • chartering air service for police monitors rather than purchasing individual

tickets, which saved an estimated $1 million in 1997; and • consolidating mainframe computer operations, which saved an estimated $1.2

million annually.

OVERSIGHT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION

At the insistence of member States, the United Nations took steps to improve internal oversight of its programs by establishing OIOS. Since then, the United Nations has improved oversight and accountability is being taken more seriously. For

example, in 1997, we reported to you that OIOS had resolved its start-up and operational problems in an organizational environment that had previously operated

without effective internal oversight mechanisms for almost half a century.16 We

noted, however, that OIOS is not required to and does not submit all reports to the

Secretary-General and the General Assembly, and we suggested that it clarify its

criteria for which reports it will submit. In response, the Under Secretary-General

for Internal Oversight said he would publish the titles of all reports in the annual

report. Since then, he has done so. As of April 1999, OIOS had completed 64 reports

that were available to all member States. Some have been hard-hitting reports. One

found serious deficiencies, improprieties, and weaknesses in management control in

the U.N. operation in Angola that may have fostered fraud and financial abuse. 17

Another report found that a senior U.N. official had used his position to commit 59

separate instances of fraud to steal large amounts of the organization’s project

funds, without triggering internal alarms.18 As of June 1998, OIOS had issued 4,042

recommendations for management improvement or action to address misconduct.

The Secretariat had implemented 73 percent of these recommendations, according
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19Report of the Committee for Programme and Coordination on the first part of its thirtyeighth session. A/53/16, part 1 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, July 8, 1998); Report of the

Secretary-General: Methodology for Monitoring and Reporting the Programme Performance of the

United Nations, A/46/173 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, May 14, 1991). 20Strengthening the Role of Evaluation Findings in Programme Design, Delivery and Policy

Directives, A/53/90 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Mar. 25, 1998). 21 Existing U.N. monitoring and evaluation guidelines do not provide methodologic guidance

but state that each major activity should be the subject of a critical assessment every 4 years

that examines both the efficiency of the activity and its effectiveness. The guidelines also note

that findings should be based on evidence, including records of opinions of independent experts

and the views of clients and users. 22Strengthening the Role of Evaluation Findings in Programme Design, Delivery and Policy

Directives, A/49/99 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Mar. 23, 1994). 23Report of the Committee for Programme and Coordination on the work of its thirty-eighth

session.

to OIOS records. We have not analyzed the recommendations or the actions taken

to implement them.

An indication that oversight and accountability are being taken more seriously is

the consistent number of waste, fraud, and abuse reports made to OIOS’ investigations section. Between 1994, when OIOS was established, and December 1998, the

investigations section received 846 reports. In 1994, it received 110 reports and

since then has received at least 165 reports a year. According to the head of OIOS’

investigations unit, 595 investigations have been completed, and action has been

taken on every report in which a corrective persounel measure or disciplinary action

was recommended. Also, unit managers have increasingly asked OIOS to conduct

investigations within their units because they know they have a problem and need

advice on how to deal with it, according to the Under Secretary-General for OIOS.

Monitoring

An adequate system of monitoring program performance is essential in ensuring

greater accountability. However, not much progress has been made in improving the

Secretariat’s system for monitoring programs. Although many U.N. offices and departments now provide online data about program outputs, such as the number of

conferences held, member States find this data to be of limited value because it does

not indicate whether the program is accomplishing its mandate. For example, the

performance report on crime control states that 78 programs on planning, crime prevention, and collaborative effort have been implemented. The narrative explains

that an implementation rate of 77 percent was achieved, including over 70 advisory

missions to member States. However, there are no indicators or assessment of what

was achieved in planning and crime prevention or on these advisory missions or

how they helped the beneficiaries. For years, the U.N. Committee for Programme

and Coordination has recognized the limitations of this system and has recommended improvements. In 1998, the Committee concluded there was a need to

monitor and evaluate the quality of performance and recommended that the Secretary-General propose ways in which the quality of mandated programs and activities could be better assessed and reported to member States.19

Evaluation

Currently, the United Nations does not have an adequate system for evaluating

the effectiveness of its programs, including a standard methodology that uses performance indicators and would support results-based budgeting. Although many

U.N. departments and offices have their own evaluation units and they conduct various types of evaluations, ranging from efficiency reviews to self-evaluations to lessons learned, they do not have standard methodology guidelines or criteria.20 According to the Director of OIOS’ Central Evaluation Unit, evaluation guidelines on

methodology are being drafted but do not focus on program effectiveness.21 Evaluation emphasis is moving away from determining program effectiveness in meeting

goals and objectives to management and problem-solving reviews, according to this

official.22

Despite the emphasis on broad-based management reviews, developing an adequate system for determining program effectiveness is important for member States.

The U.N. Committee for Programme and Coordination recently stressed that evaluation should be based on standards that enable member States to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the program. It further stressed that evaluation standards and analysis should utilize performance indicators.23 According to the Under

Secretary-General for OIOS and other U.N. officials, the United Nations still has

a long way to go in developing a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs. The Secretary-General also agreed that evaluations of U.N. programs have
131

24Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services. 25 Human Resources Management Reform: Report of the Secretary-General, A/53/414 (New

York, N.Y.: United Nations, Oct. 13, 1998). 26Performance Management: Report of the Secretary-General, A/53/266 (New York, N.Y.:

United Nations, Aug. 14, 1998).

been primarily management oriented and have not addressed the question of the

continuing validity of the programs themselves.24

HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

The Secretariat has begun to reform its human resources management, introducing initiatives such as a new merit-based staff appraisal system and a code of conduct and beginning to plan for its human resources needs. The Secretariat also developed a comprehensive plan for reforming its management of human resources

and laid out a strategy for implementing it.25 According to U.N. officials, the success

of their plan will require the full cooperation of managers and staff and the support

of member States. Currently, however, the initiatives we examined have not been

fully implemented, and there have been problems in carrying them out.

For example, for the year 1996, the United Nations introduced a merit-based performance appraisal system. The appraisal requires the rater and the ratee to agree

on goals that the ratee will achieve during the rating period and to specify measurable criteria or indicators of success in reaching these goals. The ratee is rated on

a 5-point scale, ranging from ‘‘does not meet performance expectations’’ to ‘‘consistently exceeds performance expectations.’’ The guidelines state that the rating system is not intended to impose a mandatory bell curve. However, the guidelines also

state that when staff are honestly and appropriately appraised, about 5 percent will

have the highest and lowest rating.

The Secretariat used its performance appraisal system for a third time in its 1998

annual assessment cycle. About 8,000 of the 14,000 staff directly supervised under

U.N. authority were covered by the appraisal system, according to U.N. human resources officials. Out of the 8,000 staff participating in the 1998 appraisal cycle,

U.N. officials stated that fewer than 10 individuals had received the bottom rating,

the consequences of which could be dismissal for poor performance. Three departments were judged to have inflated ratings, and the Secretary-General sent letters

to the managers of these departments, telling them to ensure the ratings were consistent with the rest of the Secretariat. The Secretariat did not provide us with summary statistics for the 1998 performance appraisal cycle, stating that the results are

under review.

One problem with the current performance appraisal system is that organizational skills are not clearly defined and benchmarks for determining performance

on those skills are lacking. In October 1998, the Secretary-General reported that a

statement of core and managerial competencies was still under development and

that it would become a base for building other human resource systems, including

performance appraisals.26

Code of Conduct and Disciplinary Procedures

In December 1998, the United Nations issued a code of conduct for its employees:

Status, Basic Rights and Duties of United Nations Staff Members. The United Nations used the new code to clarify the applicability of the U.N. regulations and rules

to all staff under the Secretary-General’s authority, including the funds and programs. The code established systemwide guidelines for conduct rooted in the U.N.

charter. The code stated that the paramount considerations for staff employees are

competence, efficiency, and integrity. Accountability is also of primary concern. For

example, the code has conflict-of-interest provisions such as that staff members

shall not be actively associated with the management of or hold a financial interest

in any profit-making, business, or concern, if the staff member or the profit-making

business or other concern might benefit from such association because of the staff

member’s position with the United Nations. Staff members at the Assistant Secretary-General level and above are also required to file financial disclosure statements. In another section of the code, staff are obligated to respond fully to requests

for information from officials of the United Nations authorized to investigate possible misuse of funds, waste, or abuse. Finally, the code makes it clear that failure

to comply with the code’s obligations and the U.N.’s standards of conduct will subject a staff member to disciplinary procedures.

Although the United Nations has adopted a code of conduct, member States have

questioned the Secretariat’s ability to follow up and discipline staff for misconduct.
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27 Alleged Cases of Fraud in the United Nations: Study of the Possibility of the Establishment

of a New Jurisdictional and Procedural Mechanism or of the Extension of Mandates and Improvement of the Functioning of Existing Jurisdictional and Procedural Mechanisms, A/AC.243/

1994/L.3 (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Apr. 4, 1994). 28Management Irregularities Causing Financial Losses to the Organization, A/53/849 (New

York, N.Y: United Nations, Mar. 3, 1999). 29Management Irregularities Causing Financial Losses to the Organization: Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, A/53/954 (New York, N.Y.: United

Nations, May 11, 1999). 30Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Increase in Costs of the Integrated

Management Information System Development Contract: Note by the Secretary-General, A/53/829

(New York, N.Y.: United Nations, Feb. 16, 1999).

Concern about actions such as this have been an issue for years.27 Recently, the

U.N. General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it a report on

the follow-up of management irregularities that caused financial losses to the organization. The Secretary-General submitted his report to the General Assembly in

March 1999,28 but the General Assembly considered it incomplete. It did not explain

what had been done since 1994 to develop procedures to deal with cases of fraud

and other actions causing financial losses to the organization.29

The Secretariat does have procedures for dealing with fraud, including summary

dismissal. However, according to the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources, the Secretariat does not have clear procedures or policies for dealing with

cases such as systematic management problems, negligence, and generally poor performance. Its record on taking action against individuals falling into these categories has been inconsistent, Commenting generally on the situation, an official in

the Human Resources section said the Secretariat recognizes it has a problem in

this area and is now acting to address it.

Human Resources Planning

As part of its reform measures, the United Nations has committed to long-range

human resources planning so it can place the right staff in the right place at the

right time. As part of this effort, it has been developing an automated database that

would account for and track staff employed worldwide. The automated database is

the U.N.’s Information Management System (IMIS), which uses satellite relays to

link field offices with headquarters. The IMIS database contains basic management

information, such as data on employees, including position, years of service, specialization, and payroll information. However, IMIS is not yet functioning worldwide.30

According to U.N. officials, they still have to contact individual field offices and

posts to get the number of various employees and manually incorporate them into

the database at headquarters.

Also, as part of the U.N. reform initiatives, the Secretary-General set a goal of

reducing 1,000 posts paid for under the regular budget. Based on a comparison of

the number of posts authorized in the 1996–97 and 1998–99 biennium budgets, 954

posts have been eliminated. The number of posts has been reduced from 10,012 to

9,058. According to Secretariat officials no staff were let go as a result of the reduction. As staff retired or voluntarily left the organization, their posts became vacant,

and many of these posts were eliminated. As you requested, we provide additional

information in Appendix III about the number of staff hired by the U.N. system.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

CONTACT AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Harold J. Johnson.

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Tet Miyabara,

Richard Boudreau, Pat Dickriede, Mike Rohrback, Mark Speight, Richard Seldin,

and Rona Mendelsohn.

APPENDIX I

MEMBERS OF THE U.N. SENIOR MANAGEMENT GROUP

Secretary-General

Deputy Secretary-General

Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs

Under Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs

Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs

Administrator, U.N. Development Program

Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
133

Under Secretary-General for Administration and Management

Under Secretary-General for Internal Oversight

Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs

Under Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services

Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Chef de Cabinet, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Under Secretary-General, Executive Director for the U.N. Fund for Population Activities

Under Secretary-General, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for

Children in Armed Conflict

Under Secretary-General and Director General of the U.N. Office in Geneva

High Commissioner for Refugees

High Commissioner for Human Rights

Secretary-General of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development

Under Secretary-General and Director General of the U.N. Office in Vienna

Under Secretary-General and Director General of the U.N. Office in Nairobi and

the Executive Director of the U.N. Environment Program

Executive Director, World Food Program
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APPENDIX II

APPENDIX III

STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM, AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1998

Table III.1 that follows provides a snapshot of U.N. staff with an appointment or

contract of 1 year or more within the U.N. Secretariat, the funds and programs, and

the Specialized Agencies—commonly referred to as the U.N. system—as of December 31, 1998. As of December 31, 1998, staff financed from the U.N. Secretariat’s

regular budget numbered 7,738 or 15 percent of system-wide total U.N. staff of

51,832. These numbers reflect the actual total of staff on-board, including all U.N.

employees with a contract of 1 year or longer. This total number differs from the

number of authorized posts, which may be vacant.
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Table III.1—U.N. Staff as of December 31, 1998

Regular budget Extrabudgetary

funds Total

U.N. Secretariat:

Secretariat ................................................................................................... 7,738 6,385 14,123

Peacekeeping Missions (Support account) .................................................. 0 319 319

Secretariat Total ................................................................................. 7,738 6,704 14,442

U.N. Development Program .......................................................................... 3,631 1,325 4,956

U.N. Fund for Population Activiites ............................................................. 816 74 890

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees ........................................................ 218 3,827 4,045

U.N. Children’s Fund ................................................................................... 1,811 5,193 7,004

U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East ... 97 12 109

U.N. Training Institute ................................................................................. 0 16 16

U.N. Office for Project Services ................................................................... 0 1,032 1,032

U.N. Staff College ........................................................................................ 0 22 22

U.N. University ............................................................................................. 2 113 115

International Court of Justice ...................................................................... 31 0 31

International Civil Service Commission ...................................................... 0 38 38

International Trade Commission ................................................................. 0 186 186

Joint U.N. Program on HIV/AIDS .................................................................. 151 0 151

World Food Program .................................................................................... 0 1,038 1,038

Total for U.N. Subsidiary Bodies ........................................................ 6,759 12,876 19,633

Food and Agricultural Organization ............................................................ 2,768 1,322 4,090

International Civil Aviation Organization .................................................... 639 74 713

International Fund for Agricultural Development ........................................ 272 32 304

International Labor Organization ................................................................. 1,560 228 1,788

International Maritime Organization ........................................................... 252 22 274

International Telecommunications Union .................................................... 710 27 737

U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ............................ 2,049 256 2,305

U.N. Industrial Development Organization .................................................. 610 0 610

Universal Postal Union ................................................................................ 1151 122 173

World Health Organization ........................................................................... 2,437 1,178 3,615

World Intellectual Property Organization ..................................................... 683 0 683

World Meteorological Organization .............................................................. 204 45 249

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ................................................. 1,674 542 2,216

Total for U.N. Specialized Agencies and the IAEA ............................. 14,009 3,748 17,757

Grand Total U.N. System .................................................................... 28,504 23,328 51,832

Source: United Nations.

[From the New York Times, June 22, 1999]

DENY RAPE OR BE HATED: KOSOVO VICTIMS’ CHOICE

(By Elisabeth Bumiller)

ZRZE, KOSOVO, June 18.—The 22-year-old woman, married four months ago, said

she was taken from this small southern village by Serbian forces, held for a day

in the local police station, beaten, then threatened with death. But she was not, she

said, raped.

Her husband, Behan Thaqi, thinks differently. ‘‘I am 100 percent certain that they

raped her,’’ said Mr. Thaqi, 34, a farmer imprisoned by the Serbs for supplying

weapons to the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Albanian guerillas who fought Serbian

forces. ‘‘I know that when women get in their hands, there is no chance to escape.’’

Mr. Thaqi says his wife, who did not want her name published, denies the rape

because ‘‘she doesn’t dare tell that kind of story.’’ If she admitted it to him, he said,

‘‘I would ask for a divorce—even if I had 20 children.’’ As his wife listened, silent

an shamefaced, in a corner of their empty home, looted of all furniture and possessions by the Serbs, Mr. Thaqi added: ‘‘I don’t hate her, but the story is before my

eyes. I feel very cold toward her.’’

Kissing her, he said, ‘‘is like kissing a dead body.’’

There are few more harsh illustrations of the difficulties in getting Kosovo Albanian women to talk about being raped by Serbian forces than these words from Mr.
136

Thaqi, a rough-spoken man with an eighth grade education. Not all Kosovo Albanian men share his attitudes, but interviews with villagers and others made it clear

that it is a majority view.

A horrific social stigma accompanies rape in Kosovo, bringing lifelong shame to

a woman and her family. It is the biggest problem that rights groups face as they

begin to collect information on whether Serbian forces used rape as a premeditated

tactic. The act has been classified as a war crime by the international war crimes

tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

In Interviews during the last two weeks, dozens of women and men in Kosovo and

in refugee camps in Albania told stories suggesting that sexual assault and intimidation, if not rape, were widespread, used by Serbian forces to strike at the heart

of a Muslim society in which the virginity and fidelity of women are central.

So far, there is no solid evidence of systematic rapes by the Serbs, as was reported

in Bosnia, and not a single woman said in the interviews that she was sexually penetrated by a Serbian soldier. But one woman, Vase Racaj, 35, said she saw women

being raped. She said that on the afternoon of April 27, Serbian paramilitary forces

in black masks pulled 10 young women out of a refugee convoy of trucks, cars and

tractors that she was in. It had been heading toward the town of Prizren and the

Albanian border.

Ms. Racaj, who is from the southern town of Klina, said 10 men then raped the

women in an open field about 30 feet from the road, in view of the women’s families,

who were held at gunpoint by Serbian soldiers.

An hour later, Ms. Racaj said, the paramilitary forces slashed the women’s pants

around their thighs, then put the women on a truck heading toward the border with

her and their families.

‘‘They were crying and saying, ‘Better dead than what they did to us,’ ’’ Ms. Racaj

said, as her own eyes filled with tears.

A 28-year-old teacher from the city of Mitrovica, who agreed to be identified only

by her last name, Avdullahi, said that she had been threatened with rape on a

bridge while a Serbian soldier held a gun to her father-in-law’s throat, but that she

had eventually been allowed to go free.

Another woman, who asked that only her first name, Zyrafete, be used, said she

had been sexually assaulted at knifepoint in the village of Dragocina in southern

Kosovo. Both Zyrafete, 23, and another woman from the same village, Sherife Trolli,

48, said about 300 women were held in three houses for three days in the village,

with about one-third of them in each house.

Every night Serbian soldiers dragged three to four women out of each house for

an hour or two each, Zyrafete and Ms. Trolli said. The women were returned to the

house sobbing and refused to tell the other women what had happened to them.

Other refugees told of Serbian soldiers who took away the most beautiful women

from the groups driven from their homes, and five men from Mitrovica said Serbs

had written on a wall at a city high school, ‘‘We’re going to rape your women, and

they will give birth to Serbian children.’’

WAITING FOR EVIDENCE TO COME TO LIGHT

So far, there is no solid proof in Kosovo of the kind of systematic rape of tens

of thousands that was reported in Bosnia, or of Bosnian ‘‘rape camps’’ where women

were held captive for days, repeatedly assaulted and often killed afterward. Nor was

there any mention of rape in the war crimes tribunal’s indictment last month of

Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslav President, for crimes against humanity, although

the chief prosecutor has said she expects to expand the charges.

But just as in Bosnia, where a post-Communist urban feminist movement encouraged rape victims to speak, investigators expect that more testimony from women

will come to light during the next several months, after one million refugees settle

back home and bury their dead. ‘‘It’s too soon,’’ said Valentina Gjuraj, 24, a

journaifst in the western city of Djakovica, where one of the worst massacres of the

Serbian terror campaign occurred. ‘‘I found five bodies yesterday,’’ she said. ‘‘They

were the bodies of my best friends.’’

For now, State Department officals in Washington say they have received refugee

reports that Serbs were using the Hotel Karagac in Pec and an army camp near

Djakovica as rape camps. Human Rights Watch has reported the rape of two women

held with the 300 in Dragocina. And the United Nations Population Fund has released a report that Kosovo Albanian women ‘‘were individually raped by many

men,’’ and ‘‘sometimes even for days.’’

But the report did not specify the number of women raped, or interviewed; nor

did it give details of specific cases.
137

Djakovica, once beautiful, is a city in the shadow of the Accursed Mountains

where last week shocked citizens asked reporters they met on the street to come

see the burned bodies in their backyards. Virtually everyone questioned there reported hearing talk about the existence of a rape camp, either near the Serbian

army barracks by a stadium or near additional barracks next to a church.

One woman said she had heard that 12 women committed suicide after being in

the rape camp. But no one had any real information. Some had just come back from

refugee camps; some had been hiding for two months in their homes; some, perhaps,

were afraid to speak.

Yet at the Djakovica offices of the Kosovo guerrillas, who only days ago moved

into the cultural center to operate as an unofficial local government, there was no

uncertainty at all.

‘‘We know there was a camp,’’ said Shkendije Hoda, 28, a slight woman with a

revolver in her back pocket, who described herself as the commander for information

and who said she had just come out from hiding in the hills two days before.

Ms. Hoda based her assertion on information from women she knows, describing

them as witnesses to the camps, and she said the guerrilla group would soon be collecting its own information on rape. For now, Ms. Hoda said, the stories are secret.

She added that rape was a Serbian strategy of war, ‘‘to destroy the spirit of the

brave soldiers of the Kosovo Liberation Army.’’ The Serbs, she said, left many raped

women alive as psychological torture. Women ‘‘are not as afraid of death as they

are of rape,’’ Ms. Hoda said. ‘‘This is the weakest side of women.’’

Over in Cabrat, the once lovely neighborhood that is Djakovica’s oldest—where

house after big house was burned to ashes and rubble—Afrim Domi spoke in a

neighbor’s still-standing home about his daughter, Yllka, 17. He said she shouted,

‘‘Better to kill me than to rape me!’’ while running out into the woods to escape Serbian soldiers who had surrounded the family on May 17.

Mr. Domi said that his daughter was shot in the leg while fleeing, and that he

has not been able to find her since. She ran, he said, because Serbian soldiers had

tried to rape her days earlier. She escaped that time, he added, after she witnessed

the rape of another Djakovica teen-ager—whose family witnessed it, too.

But that victim’s father, whose hands trembled in an interview, said the Serbs

had not touched his daughter, who was at that moment safe with him at home. As

he spoke on the family porch, his brother, the young woman’s uncle, came out to

interrupt loudly that there had been no rapes in Djakovica, but, ‘‘If rape was going

on here, they only raped women from other towns.’’

One of the most extensive accounts of sexual assault was given by Zyrafete, who

was held with the 300 others in Dragocina. Zyrafete said she and her 4-year-old son

were herded with a large group of women and children into a central area of the

village on April 20. After she wound up with about 100 of the women in a house,

Serbs pulled her out of the group one morning, she said, and ordered her to make

them coffee.

FEARING DEATH LESS THAN RAPE

When she told them she wanted to bring along her son, they said no, then pushed

him into the basement with some other women. Her son became hysterical, Zyrafete

said, and cried out to his mother, ‘‘Do they want to kill you?’’ Zyrafete told him not

to worry, that she would be back.

The police took her into another room, she said. They demanded money and asked

if her husband was a rebel, She said no. Then they ordered her at gunpoint to wash

dishes, make coffee and clean their rooms.

‘‘When I finished all these things, one policeman said, ‘Take off your clothes,’ ’’

Zyrafete said. ‘‘I said, ‘Better that you should kill me.’ ’’ She said the policeman

kicked her, slapped her in the face, then ordered others to continue beating her. One

policeman, she said, put a knife to her throat. ‘‘He said, ‘Take off your clothes or

I will kill you.’ ’’

At this point, Zyrafete said, she fainted, and regained consciousness some time

later, dressed only in her underwear. ‘‘I was crying,’’ she said. ‘‘I didn’t know what

had happened to me.’’ She dressed, and a policeman returned her to the room.

Despite the crucial missing details of her account, Zyrafete says she is convinced

that she was not raped. Two weeks after the assault—when it is unclear how much

physical evidence there might have been—she said she went to the gynecologist at

her refugee camp in Kukes, Albania.

‘‘The doctor said I hadn’t been raped,’’ she said, adding: ‘‘I think a lot of women

have been raped. But women don’t want to talk about it.’’

Officials at the maternity hospital in Kukes, the grimy mountain border town

where 120,000 refugees made their temporary home during the war, say that abor-
138

tions tripled after the refugees began arriving in April, going from around one a day

to three. But the director of the hospital, Safet Elezi, said that no refugee woman

had admitted being raped and that many had sought abortions because their husbands were missing and they were living in tents.

Last week, across the border in Zrze, the 22-year-old woman who said she had

not been raped, and whose husband said she had, arrived home from Kukes. The

neighbors had been asking her, she said, what happened when the Serbian soldiers

took her away. She told them she had been beaten, not raped, but said she was still

ashamed that she was the one the soldiers had singled out.

To her husband of four months, everything is ‘‘black,’’ and the future with his

young wife is grim.

‘‘I have no will to have children,’’ he said.

Æ