J-S30033-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

HOWARD WILLIAM DEWEESE, :

:

Appellant : No. 1998 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order November 8, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-22-CR-0003531-2010

BEFORE: SHOGAN, RANSOM and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MAY 08, 2017

Howard William DeWeese (“DeWeese”) appeals from the Order 

dismissing his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm in part and reverse 

in part the Order denying PCRA relief, vacate DeWeese’s underlying 

judgment of sentence, and remand for resentencing in accordance with this 

Memorandum.

In its Opinion, the PCRA court concisely set forth the relevant factual 

and procedural history underlying this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 

11/10/16, at 1-2. We adopt the PCRA court’s recitation as though fully set 

forth herein, see id., with the following addendum. 

At trial, the trial court precluded some of the witnesses proffered by 

the defense. Specifically, as this Court previously explained,

the [trial] court precluded [DeWeese] from calling some of his 

so-called “mantra” witnesses [(hereinafter “the excluded mantra 
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witnesses”), most of whom had served as volunteers on 

DeWeese’s political campaigns, ruling that] the proffered 

testimony would have been cumulative. The trial court noted for 

the record that the [excluded] []mantra[] witnesses would have 

testified that [DeWeese] told [his staff] that “if you engage in 

campaign time you have to use leave slips[]” [(hereinafter 

referred to as “the mantra”)]. 

Commonwealth v. DeWeese, 83 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(unpublished memorandum at 2-3) (citation to record omitted, footnote in 

original moved to body). However, we explained that “eight of [DeWeese’s] 

witnesses testified to the mantra” at trial. Id. (unpublished memorandum at 

8) (quotation marks omitted). Additionally, at sentencing, the trial court 

ordered that the restitution imposed as part of DeWeese’s sentence 

($116,668.52) shall be paid directly to the Commonwealth. 

DeWeese appealed his judgment of sentence, asserting, inter alia, that 

the trial court erred and deprived him of due process by precluding the 

excluded mantra witnesses from testifying. We ruled that this issue had 

been waived for lack of preservation, stating that “[b]ecause we have no 

record of what [DeWeese] presented to the [trial] court regarding the 

[excluded mantra] witnesses’ testimony, we are unable to conduct 

meaningful appellate review of his allegation that the court abused its 

discretion in finding that the proffered testimony was cumulative.” Id.

(unpublished memorandum at 9); see also id. (stating that “the offers of 

proof for [the excluded mantra] witnesses are not in the certified record, in 

spite of [DeWeese’s] attempt to argue now that the proffered testimony 
J-S30033-17

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would not have been cumulative.”). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

subsequently denied DeWeese’s Petition for allowance of appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. DeWeese, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013). 

On November 26, 2014, DeWeese filed a PCRA Petition, after which he 

filed an Amended PCRA Petition in March 2015. On April 22, 2016, the PCRA 

court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Petition (hereinafter “the 

PCRA hearing”). Therein, several witnesses testified, including DeWeese’s 

trial/direct appeal counsel, William C. Costopoulos, Esquire (hereinafter “trial 

counsel”), and fourteen of the excluded mantra witnesses, each of whom 

stated that they would have presented testimony concerning the mantra at 

trial.1 

By an Order entered on November 8, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed 

DeWeese’s PCRA Petition. Thereafter, DeWeese filed the instant timely 

appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of 

errors complained of on appeal.

DeWeese now presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the PCRA court err in [dismissing DeWeese’s] PCRA 

Petition alleging ineffective assistance where [DeWeese] 

established that [trial] counsel was ineffective for failing to 

adequately proffer, or preserve for direct appeal, the 

testimony of fourteen [] [of the excluded mantra] 

witnesses[,] whose noncumulative testimony was essential 

to [DeWeese’s] defense[,] and which undermined the 

credibility of the Commonwealth’s primary witnesses on 

factual elements critical to the charges at issue?

 

1 Several of the excluded mantra witnesses testified as defense character 

witnesses at trial.
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2. Whether the restitution order in this case was illegal 

because the Commonwealth cannot be a victim under the 

subject criminal statutes?

Brief for Appellant at 4.

This Court examines PCRA appeals in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review 

is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of 

record. Additionally, we grant great deference to the factual 

findings of the PCRA court[,] and will not disturb those findings 

unless they have no support in the record. In this respect, we 

will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by 

evidence of record and is free of legal error. However, we afford 

no deference to its legal conclusions. 

Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) 

(internal citations, quotation marks and brackets omitted).

“To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must demonstrate that the underlying claim is of arguable merit, 

no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or inaction, and counsel’s 

error caused prejudice such that there is a reasonable probability that the 

result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error.” 

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 967 A.2d 376, 383 n.5 (Pa. 2009) (citation 

omitted). Concerning the third prong of the ineffectiveness test (hereinafter 

“the prejudice prong”), if it is clear that a petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that counsel’s act or omission adversely affected the outcome 

of the proceedings, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone, without 

a determination of whether the petitioner met the first and second prongs. 

Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa. 1995); see also 42 
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Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (noting that in order to be entitled to relief, a

PCRA petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must establish 

that it was of the type “which, in the circumstances of the particular case, 

so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication 

of guilt or innocence could have taken place.”). This prejudice inquiry 

requires consideration of the totality of the evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 834 n.15 (Pa. 2005).

DeWeese first argues that the PCRA court erred in determining that he 

was not entitled to collateral relief on his claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to proffer, or preserve for direct appeal, the testimony 

of the excluded mantra witnesses. See Brief for Appellant at 33-57. 

According to DeWeese, the proposed testimony of the excluded mantra 

witnesses 

was essential to the very crux of [DeWeese’s] case theory, and it 

impeached the Commonwealth’s key witnesses by calling into 

question [these witnesses’] allegations that [DeWeese] had 

rarely made efforts to enforce compliance[, i.e., with the 

mantra] .... However, trial counsel’s failure to make such an 

offer of proof waived [DeWeese’s] ability to challenge [the trial 

court’s] decision[, i.e., to preclude the excluded mantra 

witnesses’ testimony,] on direct appeal, as [the Superior] Court 

ruled that it was without a proper record to determine the 

content of the [excluded mantra] witnesses’ testimony. By 

doing so, [trial counsel] waived a substantial, meritorious 

appellate issue that, if preserved, would have provided a 

reasonable probability that, upon remand[,] and armed with 

testimony essential to [DeWeese’s] defense, the outcome of the 

proceeding would likely have differed.

Id. at 33 (citation to record omitted).
J-S30033-17

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In its Opinion, the PCRA court concluded that DeWeese’s claim of trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness does not entitle him to relief, determining that (1) 

DeWeese failed to establish the prejudice prong; (2) the excluded mantra 

witnesses’ testimony was cumulative to that already presented by the 

defense; and (3) even if the trial court erred in precluding the testimony of 

the excluded mantra witnesses, such error was harmless and caused 

DeWeese no prejudice. See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/10/16, at 7-11. We 

agree with the PCRA court’s analysis and determination.2 Given the 

cumulative nature of the proposed testimony of the excluded mantra 

witnesses, even if trial counsel had proffered their testimony (or adequately 

preserved the issue for review on direct appeal), there is no reasonable 

probability that there would have been a different result (1) if the excluded 

mantra witnesses had testified at trial; or (2) concerning DeWeese’s claim 

regarding the excluded mantra witnesses raised on direct appeal. See 

Travaglia, supra. Accordingly, we affirm based on the PCRA court’s 

 

2 We have reviewed the testimony offered by the excluded mantra witnesses 

at the PCRA hearing. This testimony supports the PCRA court’s 

determination that it would have been cumulative of the evidence presented 

at trial by several defense witnesses concerning the mantra, who stated that 

DeWeese had frequently repeated the mantra, on many separate occasions, 

over a period of years. Moreover, we observe that all of the excluded 

mantra witnesses stated on cross-examination at the PCRA hearing that (1) 

they did not work for DeWeese during the relevant time period; and (2) they 

did not know whether DeWeese’s staff performed campaign work during the 

business day. See generally N.T., 4/22/16. Additionally, at trial, the jury 

considered considerable incriminatory evidence, including, inter alia, the 

testimony of several of DeWeese’s staff that DeWeese ordered them to 

perform campaign work on legislative time at the office, a matter about 

which the excluded mantra witnesses conceded they have no knowledge.
J-S30033-17

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Opinion in rejecting DeWeese’s first issue. See PCRA Court Opinion, 

11/10/16, at 7-11.

In his second issue, DeWeese contends that the restitution portion of 

his sentence is illegal and must be vacated because the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has held that the Commonwealth cannot be considered a 

direct victim (nor a reimbursable compensating government agency), under

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106,3for purposes of restitution. Brief for Appellant at 57 

(citing Commonwealth v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435, 456 (Pa. 2016) (holding 

that a restitution order directing payment to the Commonwealth as the 

victim of a crime constitutes an illegal sentence)).4 We agree.5

Here, the Commonwealth is not a victim or a reimbursable 

compensating government agency under section 1106. See Veon, 150 A.3d 

 

3 Section 1106, governing the payment of restitution, provides, inter alia, 

that “[u]pon conviction for any crime wherein property has been stolen, 

converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially 

decreased as a direct result of the crime, or wherein the victim suffered 

personal injury directly resulting from the crime, the offender shall be 

sentenced to make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed 

therefor.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(a).

4 Though DeWeese did not raise this claim in his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) Concise Statement, it is nevertheless preserved for our review, 

since challenges to the legality of a sentence cannot be waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Foster, 17 A.3d 332, 336 (Pa. 2011) (plurality) (noting 

that a challenge to the legality of a sentence presents a non-waivable 

jurisdictional issue).

5 The Commonwealth concedes that the restitution portion of DeWeese’s 

sentence is illegal under Veon. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 51-52.
J-S30033-17

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at 454-55. Accordingly, DeWeese’s sentence of restitution to the 

Commonwealth is illegal, and must be vacated. Id. at 455-56.

Because vacating DeWeese’s restitution sentence may disrupt the trial 

court’s overall sentencing scheme, we vacate his judgment of sentence and 

remand for resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 140 A.3d 713, 718 

(Pa. Super. 2016) (stating that where vacating a sentence disrupts a trial 

court’s overall sentencing scheme, this Court will remand to the trial court 

for resentencing); see also Veon, 150 A.3d at 456 (same).

Based on the foregoing, we vacate DeWeese’s judgment of sentence 

and remand for resentencing consistent with this Memorandum. We affirm 

the PCRA court’s denial of PCRA relief on DeWeese’s claim of ineffectiveness 

of trial counsel, as the claim lacks merit.

Order denying PCRA relief affirmed in part. Judgment of sentence 

vacated and case remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/8/2017
J-S30033-17

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For over three decades, Appellant was a member of 

the Pennsylvania General Assembly, representing Greene 

County and portions of Washington and Fayette Counties in 

his capacity as a state representative. At all times relevant 

to. this appeal, Appellant was the highest-ranking member of 

the House Democratic Caucus, and held the position of 

either Speaker of the House or Minority Leader. 

On December 10, 2009, the twenty-eighth statewide 

investigating grand jury issued a presentment 

recommending that criminal charges be brought again· Appellant and Sharon A. Rodavich, an employee in 

Appellant's Waynesburg, Pennsylvania district office, for a 

variety of actions involving the misappropriation of taxpayer 

resources from 2001 through 2006. Criminal charges were 

filed against Appellant and Rodavich on December 15, 2010. 

Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on July 28, 2011, 

raising issues of, inter alia, and prosecutorial misconduct at 

the preliminary hearing, the constitutionality of the conflict of 

lnterest statute, and venue. On January 6, 2012, the court 

denied the motion asserting prosecutorial misconduct. 

dismissed the constitutional challenge, and stayed the venue 

issue pending voir dire. 

A fury trial commenced on January 23, 2012. The 

Commonwealth presented a total of · ten witnesses and 

introduced sixty-nine exhibits that the trial court admitted into 

evidence. Appellant called forty-two witnesses and entered 

thirteen documents into evidence. During the course of trial, 

the court precluded Appellant from calling some of his soca!led "mantra" witnesses because the proffered testimony 

Page 1 of 11 

in their Memorandum Opinion of August 16, 2013: 

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania summarized the facts of this case succinctly 

PROCEDURAL AND SACKGROUND HISTORY 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

PCRA 

H. WILLIAM DEWEESE, 

Defendant/Petitioner 

NO. 3531 CR 2010 

V. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Circulated 04/27/2017 10:00 AM
Page 2 of 11 

1 When the trial judge, the Honorable Todd A. Hoover, went out on indefinite medical leave, and ultimately 

retired, this matter was re-assigned to the Honorable Bernard F. Coates. With the untimely death of 

Judge Coates, this matter was re-assigned to this Judge. 

3. [Defense counsel] provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing 

to in anyways respond to Sidella's unsolicited, nonresponsive, and 

prejudicial testimony on cross-examination. 

2. [Defense counsel} provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing 

to adequately present and preserve the proffered testimony of these 

seventeen witnesses. 

1. Petitioner's inability to call fact witnesses in his defense violated his 

constitutional rights to due process. 

Petition and is currently before this court on the amended PCRA Petition, which was 

filed on March 12, 2015.1 Said Amended Petition asserted three (3) claims for relief: 

Petitioner filed a timely Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act ("PCRA") 

was denied per curium on August 23, 2013. 

Allowance of Appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on August 25, 2013, which 

trial court's denial of post sentence motions. The Petitioner filed a Petition for 

Appellant timely appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the 

would have been cumulative. The court also limited 

testimony from some campaign volunteers on the basis of 

relevance. On February 6, 2012, the jury convicted 

Appellant of the charges mentioned previously. 

· On April- 24,. 2012, the court sentenced Appellant to 

an aggregate term of no less than thirty months nor more 

than sixty months' incarceration, plus restitution in the 

amount of $116,668.52, costs and fines. The-court found 

Appellant eligible under the Recidivism Risk Reduction 

Incentive Act (RRRI), and set his minimum sentence under 

the Act at twenty-two and one-half months. Appellant filed 

timely post-sentence motions that the court . denied on 

August 23, 2012. 

(See Superior Court Opinion, 1528 MDA 2012 at p. 1-3). 
Page 3 of 11 

Commonwealth witnesses. Her testimony on cross-examination was the first mention of 

Ms. Devecka's direct testimony was essentially consistent with the other 

action. 

or the hearing testimony of Attorney Brown based upon the unique nature of the present 

for this Court to evaluate the "credibility" of either the trial testimony of Brenda Devecka 

to supplement the record. A review of the entire record shows that there was no need 

This Court must first address the issue of recusal. Although this Court addressed 

the issue on the record during the April 22, 2016 proceedings, the Court feels compelled 

DISCUSSION 

facts and conclusions of law. This Opinion and Order follow. 

Following the evideniiary hearing counsel were allowed to submit proposed findings of 

trial counsel, William Costopoulous, Esquire, and K. Kenneth Brown, ll, Esquire. 

the witnesses who were precluded by the trial court from testifying at trial, as well as the 

During the evidentiary hearing, counsel were allowed to question fourteen (14) of 

colloquyed as to his waiver of any perceived conflict. 

beginning of the evidentiary hearing on April 22, 2016. At that time Petitioner was 

"abundance of caution", and was allowed to place concerns on the record at the 

was previously represented by. this judge prior to. his election to the bench, and 

disclosed same to counsel. The Commonwealth made a request for recusal out of an 

During the pre-hearing conference, the Court learned that a witness at the trial 

(Petitioner H. William DeWeese's Amended Petition under the Post-Conviction Relief 

Act, filed March 12, 2015 at p. 10-33). 
Page 4 of 11 

2 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987). 

-------¥--·--- 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held: 

petitioner suffered prejudice because of.counsel's ineffectiveness. In analyzing a claim 

merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the 

overcome the presumption that counsel is effective by establishing the three (3) prongs 

as set forth in Commonwealth v. Pierce2: (1) the underlying legal claim has arguable 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must 

[T]hat Mr. Costopolous provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel in failing to object to or otherwise ameliorate the 

unsolicited, nonresponsive, and prejudicial testimony of key 

prosecution witness Kevin Sidella and the result of the 

proceeding would have been different absent this error. 

(Petitioner H. William DeWeese's Amended Petition under the Post-Conviction Relief 

Act, filed March 12, 2015 at p, 4). 

(3) issues, and we will address the third one first: 

In Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Amended PCRA petition, Petitioner raises three 

on the recusal. 

Had this Court encountered such a problem, it would have re-visited the original ruling 

Ms. Devecka and Attorney Brown had no effect on this Court's evaluation of the case. 

As this Court's subsequent discussion of the case will reveal, the testimony of 

trial record which allegedly undermined the Petitioner's claim for relief. 

Similarly, Mr. Brown's testimony simply directed the Court's attention to portions of the 

as well as the proffered testimony of the fourteen (14) witnesses who were denied the 

opportunity fc.testify at trial, but testified at .the evidentiary hearinq on April 22, 2016. 

the Petitioner's "mantra" testimony which was consistent with other defense witnesses 
Page 5 of 11 

Q: Do you know Jay Allen Blaker? 

A: l know the name. I don't remember a face. 

Q: Did Mr. DeWeese tell you unequivocally in the 

presence of Shirl Barnhart to use vacation, comp or personal 

time when doing campaign work? 

A: I can count tfle amount of times I've been around Mrs. 

Barnhart probably on one hand. I don't remember him - I 

don't remember that interaction. 

Q: All right. Now, does this refresh your memory? Do 

you know Shirl Barnhart? 

A: He was the township supervisor. 

Q: My question is did Bill DeWeese tell you to your face 

in the presence of others, to you, if you're doing campaign 

work, Mr. Sidel!a, make sure you're doing it on legislative - 

make sure you're doing it on leave time? 

A: Actually, I did answer your question. And I said I 

don't recall a time where he told me that in the presence of 

others. 

examination of Kevin Sidella: 

Petitioner's challenge· arises from the following exchange during the crossWith regard to the second, reasonable basis prong, "we do 

not question whether there were other more logical courses 

of action which counsel could have pursued; rather, we must 

examine whether counsel's decisions had any reasonable 

basis." (citation omitted) We will conclude that. counsel's 

chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis only if Appellant 

proves that "an alternative not chosen offered a potential for 

success substantially greater than the course actually 

pursued." (citation omitted) To establish the third, prejudice 

prong, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome cf the proceedings would have 

been different but for counsel's ineffectiveness. (citation 

omitted) We stress that boilerplate allegations and bald 

assertions of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice 

cannot satisfy a petitioner's burden to prove that counsel 

was ineffective. 

(Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431 (Pa. 2011 )). 
Page 6 of 11 

3 See Notes of Testimony, PCRA Evidentiary Hearing ('"N.T. PCRA") at 153-56. 

----··------- 

Sidella's testimony in context, it would appear that an objection would have 

his tactical decision, and found his testimony credible.3 More importantly, looking at Mr. 

This Court listened to the testimony of Attorney Costopolous when he explained 

that campaign work would have to be done on leave time in the presence of Sidella. 

to identify other witnesses who would state that the Petitioner made repeated assertions 

compared to his entire direct testimony. Instead of objecting, counsel simply moved on 

unresponsive and prejudicial. However, that statement was nothing new when 

Petitioner is correct in concluding that the second part of that answer was 

would have said it in front of, again, to cover his butt." (N.T. Trial at 558:6-9). 

"I don't remember that interaction with Mr. Body, but all of these people are people Bill 

nonresponsive and prejudicial testimony during cross-examination" when he responded: 

Attorney Costopolous' failure "to object to or otherwise ameliorate Sidella's unsolicited, 

Q: Do you remember being with Sam Boyd when 

Deweese told you over and over that campaign work was 

not to be done on legislative time? Does that referse your 

member of a specific occasion? 

A: I don't remember that interaction with Mr. Boyd, but all 

of these people are people Bill would have said it in front of, 

again, to cover his butt. 

(Notes of Testimony, Trial ("N.T. Trial") at 556:22 - 558:9). The contention is that 

Q: Do you know Sam Boyd? 

A: I remember Sam Boyd. 

Q: You don't remember DeWeese telling you to make 

sure, Mr. Sidella, that you were on leave time if you're 

campaigning in - with him, overhearing it in your presence? 

A: . Well, l can't even picture his face so, no, I don't 

remember it. 
Page 7 of 11 

4 See Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2014). 5 Although this Court fully appreciates the fact that trial counsel attempted on a number of occasions lo 

place his proffer on the record, and that the trial court assured him that his objection was preserved, this 

Court is bound by the determination of the Superior Court. Therefore, this Court must conclude that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to create a legally sufficient record for appeal. 

-·-·------- 

constitutional right to due process? 

decision: did the Petitioner's inability to call fact witnesses in his defense violate his 

Accordingly, this Court is bound to accept the determination of the Superior Court 

that appellate counsel was ineffective.5 That would make the final PCRA issue ripe for 

Because we have no record of what Appellant presented to 

the court regarding proposed witnesses' testimony, we are 

unable to conduct meaningful appellate review of his 

allegation that the court abused its discretion in finding that 

the proffered testimony was cumulative. Hence, Appellant's 

-first issue is waived. 

Commonwealth v. DeWeese, 1528 MDA 2012 at 7-8. 

preserve the record for fair appeal: 

16, 2013. The Superior Court concluded that appellate counsel failed to adequately 

was denied, and Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Superior Court on August 

denial of Petitioner's request to call seventeen (17) witnesses at trial. That direct appeal 

counsel took a direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on the trial court's 

and preserve the proffered testimony of these seventeen witnesses. Essentially, trial 

Costopolous provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately present 

fact witnesses in his defense violated his constitutional right to due process; and (2) Mr. 

ineffectivenessfails as there is no arquable merit to the underlying legal claim. 

Petitioner's remaining two issues are inter-related: (1) Petitioner's inability to call 

even if the objection would have been sustained." Accord\ngly, Petitioner's claim of 

accomplished little tactically, but would have risked emphasizing the statement further, 
Page 8 of 11 

6 See N.T Trial at 1010-12. 7 See NT. Trial at 1013-14. 

question 

witnesses who would testify to the contrary - thereby calling Mr. Sidella's credibility into 

state time. Obviously, defense counsel intended to call a significant number of 

told by the Defendant in front of campaign volunteers to make sure that he was not on 

star witnesses, Kevin Sidella, succeeded in having Mr. Sidelfa testify that he was never 

claims. Similarly, the defendant, while cross-examining one of the Commonwealth's 

that he had between twenty (20) and thirty (30) witnesses who would substantiate his 

substantially on those witnesses. When the Defendant testified, he specifically stated 

significant number of "mantra witnesses", the defense strategy appeared to be based 

Nevertheless, it is clear that the defense had not only anticipated calling a 

before the court, off the record, the evening before. 

cannot be sure if the proffer on the record adequately documented what was placed 

There was an extensive discussion on the record with attempts to place the proffer on 

the record.' but unfortunately, there was not a lot of detail provided. Hence, this Court 

following morning, the court made a ruling to allow only one more "mantra" witness.6 

record discussion as· to which witnesses the defense intended to call. Then, the 

frustration in trying to determine exactly what proffered testimony was presented to the 

· trial court prior to the court's ruling. It would appear that there was an extensive offIn reviewing the trial court transcript, this Court shared the Superior Court's 
Page 9 .of 11 

differently, but rather, the test is whether there is manifest unreasonableness. or 

However, the test for reversal is not whether a reviewing court would rule 

Sidella's credibility. 

witnesses, and more importantly, allow defense counsel to further challenge Mr. 

defense counsel to satisfy Defendant's promise to provide twenty (20) to thirty (30) 

the cumulative character witnesses testified). Such a ruling would have allowed 

substantially similar to the previous "mantra" witnesses (similar to the manner by which 

allowed to identify the "cumulative" witnesses and state that their testimony would be 

If this Court were to rule on the issue at trial, defense counsel would have been 

to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

the proffered testimony was relevant. Whether it was cumulative is a question best left 

supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact, it is clear that 

material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or 

Since evidence is deemed to be relevant if it logically tends to establish a 

The admissibility of evidence· is a matter of trial court 

discretion and ruling thereon will only be reversed upon· a 

showing that the trial court abused that discretion. An abuse 

of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate 

court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires 

a result of manifest unreasonableness. or partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be 

clearly erroneous. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 58 A.2d 796, 800 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

appellate standard of review on evidentiary rulings: 

When the Superior Court decided this case on direct appeal, it cited 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 58 A.2d 796 (Pa. Super. 2012) when it stated the limited 
Page 10 of 11 

8 See Willi~ supra. 

possible that the result of calling the other witnesses may have made them actually 

sufficiently undermined the Commonwealth's case to alter the verdict. ft is equally 

subsequently testified at the evidentiary hearing on April 22, 2-16, would not have 

witnesses). The addition of the testimony from the fourteen (14) witnesses who 

Defense counsel succeeded in calling forty-two (42) witnesses (including character 

witnesses, was sufficient to prove the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

oath. That testimony, combined with the testimony of the ten (10) Commonwealth's 

grand jury was introduced. Essentially, the Defendant admitted his culpability under 

In the Commonwealth's case in chief, the Defendant's own testimony before a 

Thornton, 431 A.2d 248, 251 (Pa. 1981). 

A technique of appellate review designed to advance judicial 

economy by obviating the necessity for a retrial where the 

appellate court is convinced that a trial error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Its purpose is premised on the 

well-settled proposition that ''[a] defendant is entitled to a fair 

trial but not a perfect one." 

Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 182 (Pa. 2012), citing Commonwealth v. 

doctrine of harmless error is: 

harmless since an opposite ruling would not have affected the outcome of the trial. The 

In the event that the error was an abuse of discretion, the error would have been 

there was an abuse of discretion. 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-wil!.8 In this case, the transcript reveals no evidence of 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Instead, there appeared to be some level of trial 

fatigue and an obvious desire to wind up the trial. Therefore, this Court cannot find that· 
Page 11 of 11 

(This space intentiona!Jy left blank.) 

sound like "mantra" witnesses and thereby further undermine the defense's case. 

Therefore, if there was any error, said error would have been harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Accordingly, we enter the following Order: 
j(J/-/7- 

Postman< Street, Suite 3402, Philadelphia, PA 19103 ((\o:si 

Here 

W-,fYlCI · Op, f\11J1.,: 

~ 0 (C.li.K 

BY THE COURT: 

receipt requested. 

directed to send a copy of this Order to the Petitioner by certified mail, return 

Court within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. The Clerk of Courts is 

Petitioner is hereby advised of the right to the appeal this Order to the Superior 

Amended Petition is DISMISSED. 

and the evidentiary hearing held on April 22, 2016, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said 

Petition Under the Post Conviction Relief Act, the Commonwealth's Response thereto. 

AND NOW, this 81h day of November, 2016, upon consideration of the Amended 

ORDER 

: PCRA· H. WILLIAM D.EWEESE, · Defendant/Petitioner 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

NO. 3531 CR 2010 

v.