[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-12184

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-01860-SDM-EAJ

SHAWN MARTIN, 

 Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Respondents - Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(June 23, 2017)

Before HULL, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Shawn Martin, a Florida prisoner, appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

habeas corpus petition. Following a probation-revocation hearing in Florida state 

court, Martin was sentenced to a 35-year imprisonment term. This Court granted a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) on one issue: whether Martin’s state trial

counsel, Rick Terrana, provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the probationrevocation hearing by failing to advise Martin of the State’s burden to show that 

Martin’s probation violations were “willful and substantial.” After thorough 

review, we affirm the district court’s denial of Martin’s § 2254 petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying State Court Convictions

In Florida state court (the “state trial court”), Martin pled guilty to charges of 

lewd or lascivious battery on a child, procurement of a child for prostitution, 

possession of photographs depicting sex with a child, promotion of child sex acts, 

and possession of child pornography. As part of his plea, Martin agreed to provide

assistance to the State and to law enforcement in exchange for a five-year 

maximum term of imprisonment.1 At sentencing, the state trial court sentenced 

Martin to a term of 48 months’ imprisonment and 10 years of sex-offender 

probation. In June 2004, following his release from prison, Martin began serving 

his probationary term. 

 1

Barring the plea agreement, Martin’s Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet provided 

for a minimum permissible sentence of approximately 34 years in prison. 

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In April 2005, the State filed an affidavit alleging that Martin violated his 

probation by: (1) leaving the county without the permission of his probation 

officer; (2) disregarding his probation officer’s instructions by not traveling 

directly from his job to his home; (3) failing to answer truthfully questions about 

whether he was driving; and (4) failing to maintain a driving log. 

B. Probation-Revocation Hearing and Sentencing

On April 21, 2005, the state trial court held a hearing concerning Martin’s 

alleged violations of probation. Martin testified, admitting to the four violations 

and offering explanations for each of them. 

As to the first violation, Martin testified that he had a travel permit to leave 

the county for his job. As to the second violation, Martin testified that, on one 

occasion, he made a brief detour on his drive home from work to pick up a lasagna 

that his aunt had made for him. As to the third violation, Martin testified that he 

was truthful in response to his probation officer’s questions because he had been 

receiving rides to work, which he believed was permissible. As to the fourth 

violation, Martin testified that his probation officer never presented him with a 

driving log to maintain. 

Martin’s probation officer offered contrasting testimony. Martin’s probation 

officer testified that Martin made several detours from his job commute, that he 

failed to tell the probation officer that he was driving his own car (not merely 

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receiving rides from others), and that he was repeatedly informed of the 

requirement to maintain a driving log. 

Following the probation officer’s testimony, Martin’s counsel Terrana

argued to the state trial court that Martin’s probation should not be revoked 

because Martin’s violations, even if admitted, were not willful and substantial. 

Martin’s counsel described Martin’s violations as “a couple of incidents where 

driving wasn’t reported or he was driving in an area that he wasn’t supposed to be 

driving without consent.” Martin’s counsel suggested that Martin’s violations were 

“something other than willful and substantial . . . [because] there is no reason for 

him to deceive or engage in a pattern of deception as the State is suggesting.” 

Following the arguments made by Martin’s counsel, the state trial court 

revoked Martin’s probation and imposed a sentence of 35 years’ imprisonment.2

C. Martin’s State-Court Challenges to His Sentence

On May 27, 2005, Martin moved to mitigate his sentence or withdraw his 

admissions to the probation violations. Martin argued that, at the April 21, 2005 

probation-revocation hearing, he did not make a full presentation concerning his 

probation violations. Martin also argued that, in the time since the April 21, 2005

hearing, Martin had obtained witnesses who would contradict his probation 

 2

Martin’s Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet reflected a minimum possible prison 

sentence of approximately 34 years’ imprisonment, with a maximum sentence of 85 years’ 

imprisonment.

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officer’s testimony at the April 21, 2005 hearing. On June 7, 2005, the state trial 

court held a hearing on Martin’s motion and denied relief. 

Martin appealed the state trial court’s judgment revoking his probation to the 

Florida Second District Court of Appeal (“Second DCA”). On April 18, 2007, the 

Second DCA summarily affirmed the state trial court’s judgment. Martin v. State, 

954 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).

D. Rule 3.850 Motions and Hearing

On April 17, 2008, Martin filed a motion for postconviction relief, pursuant 

to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in the state trial court. The state trial 

court dismissed the motion without prejudice as facially insufficient. 

On June 22, 2009, Martin filed an amended 3.850 motion for postconviction 

relief. In the amended motion, Martin argued that he received ineffective assistance 

of counsel at his April 21, 2005 probation-revocation hearing because his attorney

Terrana: (1) misadvised him about the sentence he would receive if he admitted to 

the probation violations; (2) failed to advise him of the State’s burden to prove that 

the alleged violations were willful and substantial; and (3) threatened to withdraw 

from the case if Martin did not admit to the violations. Martin asserted that, 

because of Terrana’s errors, Martin’s admissions were not made knowingly and 

voluntarily. Martin also asserted that, had he known of the State’s burden to prove 

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that his probation violations were willful and substantial, he would not have 

admitted to the violations. 

On November 17, 2010, the state trial court held an evidentiary hearing on 

Martin’s amended 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. Martin testified that, 

prior to Martin’s admissions, Terrana assured him that he would be placed back on 

probation because the violations were “just . . . technical.” Martin also testified that 

Terrana appeared “confused” at the April 21, 2005 probation-revocation hearing 

and entered the courtroom “empty-handed” with no files on Martin’s case. 

According to Martin, Terrana made no mention of the State’s “willful and 

substantial” evidentiary burden until after Martin admitted to the probation 

violations. 

Martin also called witnesses to testify about his probation violations. One 

witness, Martin’s aunt, testified that she only saw Martin once during his 

probationary term, when he briefly came to her house to pick up a lasagna. 

Martin’s aunt testified that Martin left her house “within . . . a minute or two” of 

arriving.

Counsel Terrana’s testimony contradicted Martin’s testimony. Terrana 

testified that, prior to the April 21, 2005 probation-revocation hearing, he

discussed Martin’s probation violations with him. Terrana testified that Martin 

“strategized with [Terrana] about getting a sentence . . . that would allow [Martin] 

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in effect to get out because of his credit time.” Terrana also stated that he had been

concerned that, if Martin were to go to a probation-revocation hearing, deny the 

violations, and lose, Martin could receive the maximum sentence of 80 years in 

prison. Terrana stated that he was in part concerned about this possibility because 

he knew the state court trial judge “to be an extremely hard sentencer.” According 

to Terrana, he shared this concern with Martin, and the two “agreed . . . that the 

best course of action for [Martin] would be to admit to the violations of probation 

and . . . explain [the violations] to [the state trial court].” Terrana considered this to 

be a “strategic decision” that was calculated to ensure a lesser sentence than what 

might result if Martin challenged whether the violations occurred. 

According to Terrana, he also did not assure Martin that Martin would be 

reinstated to probation if Martin admitted to the probation violations. Terrana 

testified that he only told Martin that such an outcome was possible “given all the 

circumstances.” Terrana further stated that, while he did not recall a specific 

conversation in which he informed Martin of the State’s “willful and substantial” 

evidentiary burden, he believed Martin was aware of this burden because Terrana

“argued [it] over and over to the judge.” 

On February 14, 2011, the state trial court denied Martin’s amended 3.850 

motion for postconviction relief, finding that Terrana’s testimony credibly refuted 

Martin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The state trial court determined 

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that Martin’s decision to admit to the probation violations was “a reasonable 

strategic decision under these circumstances.” The state trial court also determined 

that, “considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding [Martin’s] 

violations and admission, . . . there [was not] a reasonable probability that [Martin] 

would have proceeded to a revocation hearing.” Martin appealed the state trial 

court decision, but the Second DCA summarily affirmed. See Martin v. State, 111 

So. 3d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).3

E. Section 2254 Petition

On July 11, 2013, Martin filed a § 2254 petition, claiming ineffective 

assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. Martin raised allegations about Terrana’s performance, stating 

that Terrana never informed him of the State’s “willful and substantial” evidentiary 

burden and never investigated potential defenses to the alleged probation 

violations. Martin argued that, without that information, he could not make a 

knowing and voluntary decision to waive his defenses to the allegations. Martin 

also asserted that the state trial court’s conclusion—that Terrana’s performance 

was not deficient and that he made a reasonable strategy decision—constituted an 

 3

We need not decide here whether to look through to the state trial court decision or the 

summary Second DCA decision because it does not matter to the result. This avoids any 

complications whether the Supreme Court agrees or disagrees with our Court’s decision in 

Wilson v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1227, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert granted, 2017 WL 

737820 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2017) (No. 16-6855).

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unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. The State filed a response, and Martin filed a reply.

On April 5, 2016, the district court denied Martin’s § 2254 petition. Citing 

Jones v. Wainwright, 604 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1979), the district court 

determined that Martin’s ineffective-assistance claim was not cognizable in a 

federal habeas action because there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a 

probation-revocation proceeding, despite the fact that Martin had a state-created 

right to counsel under Florida law. 

The district court alternatively concluded that Martin failed to meet his 

burden under § 2254. The district court did not find Terrana’s performance to be 

constitutionally deficient because Terrana’s advised strategy—that Martin admit to 

the probation violations in hopes of a lesser sentence—was “a reasonable strategy 

under the circumstances.” Additionally, the district court determined that, even if 

Terrana never informed Martin of the State’s “willful and substantial” evidentiary 

burden, Martin failed to “show that every reasonably competent attorney would 

have advised him that his violations were not willful and substantial.” Martin also 

did not show that Terrana’s actions impermissibly prejudiced Martin’s case, as 

Martin’s claim “ignore[d] the strategy that, by admitting the violations, he was in a 

better position to argue that his acts . . . did not warrant the loss of his liberty.” 

This appeal followed. 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

In examining the denial of a § 2254 petition, “we review questions of law 

and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact for clear error.” 

Stewart v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007). When a 

state court denies relief on a federal constitutional claim, we presume “that the 

state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or 

state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” See Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 99, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011). “A state court’s determination that a 

claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists 

could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at 101, 131 S. 

Ct. at 786.

We follow a “general framework of substantial deference” when reviewing 

federal issues that state courts have decided. Diaz v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 

402 F.3d 1136, 1141 (11th Cir. 2005). To grant a § 2254 petition, we must find 

not only that the petitioner’s claims are meritorious, but also that the state court’s 

judgment: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

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State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Guzman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 

663 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2011).

B. Applicable Law

To make a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must show that: (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 

104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Deficient performance is “representation [that] 

f[alls] below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 

2064. Prejudice requires a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. If the defendant fails to satisfy the performance prong, 

the court need not address the prejudice prong, and vice versa. See Holladay v. 

Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000). 

When analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance under § 2254(d), this 

Court’s review is “doubly” deferential to counsel’s performance and the state 

court’s decision. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S. Ct. at 788. Under this 

standard, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The 

question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

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Under Florida law, a defendant’s probation can only be revoked on the basis 

of a willful and substantial violation, which must be shown by the greater weight 

of the evidence. See Gilbert v. State, 913 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).

C. Discussion

In his brief on appeal, Martin again asserts that Terrana failed to inform him 

of the State’s “willful and substantial” evidentiary burden. Martin argues that the 

evidence does not support that he understood the law in relation to the facts of his 

case. He also suggests that, had he been properly advised, he would have not 

admitted to his probation violations. 

However, the state court’s determination was not contrary to, and did not 

involve an unreasonable application of, federal law, nor was it based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).4 In this case, the 

state court considered Martin’s ineffective assistance claim according to 

Strickland’s requirements and concluded that Martin did not suffer from 

constitutionally deficient counseling. 

Regarding Terrana’s allegedly deficient performance, the state court 

considered the full evidentiary record, which included the testimony of Martin, 

witnesses such as Martin’s aunt, and Terrana. While the record suggests that 

 4

Because Martin’s ineffective assistance claim fails on the merits, we need not, and do 

not, address the district court’s discussion of the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 

at a probation-revocation hearing. 

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Terrana could not recall a specific conversation in which he informed Martin of the 

State’s “willful and substantial” evidentiary burden, Terrana also testified that he 

was “sure” he mentioned it to Martin because “[he] argued that over and over to 

the judge. That was [his] argument; [the violations] were not willful and 

substantial.” Terrana also testified, and Martin does not dispute, that the two 

discussed Martin’s admissions as a strategy designed to improve his chances of 

getting a lesser sentence before a judge known for harsh sentencing. “Because 

advocacy is an art and not a science, and because the adversary system requires 

deference to counsel’s informed decisions, strategic choices must be respected in 

these circumstances if they are based on professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 681, 104 S. Ct. at 2061. Given the record evidence demonstrating Terrana’s 

research of defense theories, consultation with Martin about those theories, and 

resulting strategic advice based on those theories, it was not unreasonable for the 

state court to determine that Terrana’s performance did not fall below the 

constitutional minimum.

And even if Terrana’s performance was constitutionally deficient, the state 

court also was not unreasonable in determining that no prejudice resulted. 

Specifically, the state court determined that “there [was not] a reasonable 

probability that [Martin] would have proceeded to a revocation hearing” barring 

Terrana’s alleged mistakes. Prior to Martin’s admissions, Terrana informed Martin 

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that, if he were to proceed to a probation-revocation hearing, challenge the 

violations, and lose, he could face a maximum sentence of 80 years’ imprisonment. 

Even assuming arguendo that Martin had been perfectly informed of the State’s 

burden to show that his violations were willful and substantial, it is far from clear 

from this record that Martin might have preferred to risk receiving such a sentence

instead of attempting to secure a lower sentence by admitting to the technical 

violations and offering mitigating explanations. Thus, the state court did not 

unreasonably determine that Martin had not carried his burden to show prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of relief.

AFFIRMED.

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