President John I? Kennedy: 'Well, Admiral, 

it looks as though this is up to the Navy." 

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 

George W. Anderson: CCMr, President, the 

Navy will not let you down." 
President John I? Kennedy: 'Well, Admiral, 

it looks as though this is up to the Navy." 

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 

George W. Anderson: CCMr, President, the 

Navy will not let you down." 
Cordon of Steel 

The US. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis 

by Curtis A. Utz 

No. 1 

The U.S. Navy in the Modern World Series 

Series Editor 

Edward J. Marolda 

Head, Coiltemporary History Branch 

Naval Historical Center 

Department of the Navy 

Washington 

1993 
Secretary of the Navy's 

Advisory Committee on Naval History 

William D. Wilkinson, Chairman 

CAPT Edward L. Beach, USN (Retired) 

David R. Bender 

John C. Dann 

RADM Russell W. Gorman, USNR (Retired) 

Richard L. Joutras 

VADM William P. Lawrence, USN (Retired) 

Vera D. Mann 

Ambassador J. William Middendorf I1 

VADM Gerald E. Miller, USN (Retired) 

Clark G. Reynolds 

Daniel F. Stella 

Betty M. Unterberger 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Utz, Curtis A., 1962- 

Cordon of steel : the U.S. Navy and the Cuban missile crisis 1 by 

Curtis A. Utz. 

p. cm. -- (The U.S. Navy in the modern world series : no. 1) 

ISBN 0-945274-23-8 

1. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. 2. United States. 

Navy--History--20th century. I. Title. 11. Series. 

E841.U89 1993 

973.922--dc20 93-35708 

For sale hy the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Warhington, DC 20'102.9328 

ISBN 0-945274-23-8 
Foreword 

This study launches the Naval Historical 

Center's new series entitled The U.S. Navy in 

the Modern World. The purpose of the series is 

to inform today's naval personnel and other 

readers of the contributions made by the naval 

service to the nation, in war and peace, since 

1945. During this period, the Navy contained 

Soviet and Communist expansion, deterred nuclear and conventional attack on the United 

States, protected American trade at sea and 

ashore, strengthened regional alliances, and 

fostered the growth of democratic and free 

market institutions worldwide. The strength 

and overseas presence of the U.S. fleet often resolved crises without the use of force, but 

when force was necessary the Navy fought 

hard and well. 

Broad in scope, The U.S. Navy in the Modern World series will include studies on the 

Navy's deterrence of war, support for U.S. foreign policy, refugee evacuations and other humanitarian activities, joint and multinational 

operations, ship and aircraft development, the 

projection of power ashore, ship, aircraft, and 

weapons development, and similar subjects. 

The 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, Atlantic Fleet 

diplomatic ship visits to European ports, the 

1991 disaster relief operations in Bangladesh, 

the maritime embargo of Iraq in Desert 

Storm, the Inchon amphibious landing in Korea, and the evolution of naval cruise missiles 

are only a few examples of topics that may be 

covered. 

It is entirely appropriate that Cordon of 

Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile 

Crisis, by Curtis A. Utz of our Contemporary 

History Branch, lead off our new series. His 

study is a dramatic example of how the U.S. 

Navy's multipurpose ships and aircraft, flexible task organization, and great mobility enabled President Kennedy to protect national 

interests in one of the most serious confrontations of the Cold War. 

The views expressed are those of Mr. Utz 

alone, and not those of the Department of the 

Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 

Dean C. Allard 

Director of Naval History 
, ------ -- QrrmO~ow41:'Tca 

(DO 51 Qj, m 

stmrnbrg her grar hrr bluasb wbmr&tm Fa the depths d 

ih ocean. 
Introduction 

I n the fall of 1962, the 

United States and the 

Soviet Union came as 

close as they ever would to 

global nuclear war. Hoping to 

correct what he saw as a 

strategic imbalance with the 

United States, Soviet Premier 

Nikita S. Khrushchev began 

secretly deploying medium 

range ballistic missiles 

(MRBM) and intermediate 

range ballistic missiles 

(IRBM) to Fidel Castro's 

Cuba. Once operational, these 

nuclear-armed weapons could 

have been fired against cities 

and military targets in most 

of the continental United 

States. Before this happened, 

however, U.S. intelligence discovered Khrushchev's brash 

maneuver. In what became 

known as the Cuban Missile 

Crisis, President John F. 

Kennedy and an alerted and 

aroused American government, armed forces, and 

public compelled the Soviets 

to remove from Cuba not only 

their missiles but all of their 

offensive weapons. 

The U.S. Navy played a 

pivotal role in this crisis, 

demonstrating the critical importance of naval forces to national defense. The Navy's 

operations were in keeping 

with its strategic doctrine, 

which is as valid today as it 

was in late 1962. The Navy, in 

cooperation with the other 

U.S. armed forces and with 

America's allies, employed 

military power in such a way 

that the president did not 

have to resort to war to 

protect vital Western interests. Khrushchev realized 

that his missile and bomber 

forces were no match for the 

Navy's powerful Polaris ballistic missile-firing submarines 

and the Air Force's land-based 

nuclear delivery systems once 

these American arms became 

fully operational. Naval forces 

under the U.S. Atlantic Command, headed by Admiral 

Robert L. Dennison 

(CINCLANT), steamed out to 

sea, intercepting not only merchant shipping en route to 

Cuba, but Soviet submarines 

operating in the area as well. 

U.S. destroyers and frigates, 

kept on station through underway replenishment by oilers 

and stores ships, maintained 

a month-long naval "quarantine" of the island of Cuba. 

Radar picket ships supported 

by Navy fighters and airborne 

early warning planes assisted 

the U.S. Air Force's Air 

Defense Command in preparing to defend American 

airspace from Soviet and 

Cuban forces. Navy aerial 

photographic and patrol 

aircraft played a vital part 

not only in observing the 

deployment of Soviet offensive 

weapons into Cuba but 

monitoring their withdrawal 

by sea. 

As the unified commander 

for the Caribbean, Admiral 

Dennison was responsible for 

readying Army, Air Force, 

Marine, and Navy assault 

forces for a possible invasion 

of Cuba. He also served as the 

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, 

and Marine forces of the subordinate Second Fleet, under 

Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, 

were poised to launch air, 

naval gunfire, and amphibious strikes from the sea 

against Soviet and Cuban 

forces ashore. With speed and 

efficiency, other fleet units reinforced the Marine garrison 

at Guantanamo on Cuba's 

southeastern tip and evacuated American civilians. 

Dennison also coordinated the 

maritime support operations 

carried out by Canadian, 

British, Argentine, and 

Venezuelan forces. 

Khrushchev, faced with the 

armed might of the United 

States and its allies, had little 

choice but to find some way 

out of the difficult situation in 

which he had placed himself 

and his country. President 

Kennedy did not press the advantage that the strength of 

U.S. and allied naval and 

military forces gave him. 

Thus, the Soviet leader was 

able to peacefully disengage 

his nation from this most 

serious of Cold War confrontations. 
U.S.-Soviet Conflict in the 

T he Cuban Missile Crisis 

was one in a long series 

of incidents in the 

global confrontation between 

Communists and anti-Communists in what came to be 

known as the Cold War. Relations between the Soviet 

Union and the United States, 

allies against the Axis powers 

in World War 11, were generally hostile during the late 

1940s and 1950s. The Soviet 

Union of dictator Joseph 

Stalin and his successors 

forced the nations of eastern 

Europe to establish Communist governments and supported insurgency movements 

in the eastern Mediterranean 

Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev emphasizes a point by striking a table during a Paris press conference in May 

1960. An impetuous and volatile man, 

Khrushchev deployed Soviet offensive 

missiles into Cuba without carefully considering the likeihood that the United 

States would discover the ploy and respond by threatening war. Seated next 

to Khrushchev is Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, the Soviet Defense Minister. 

and in Asia. 

The United States, a power 

with global responsibilities 

after the war, responded to 

these Soviet actions by 
Cold War 

strengthening threatened nations with economic assistance, like that embodied in 

the Marshall Plan for western 

Europe. In addition, 

Washington sponsored 

military assistance to and alliances with anti-Communist 

governments as part of a 

global "Containment 

Strategy" intended to prevent 

the spread of Soviet power 

and communist ideology. 

Serious clashes of interest 

between the United States 

and the Soviet Union occurred over Berlin in 1948, 

China in 1949, Korea in the 

early 1950s, Laos in the late 

1950s, and Berlin again at the 

end of the decade. The Soviets 

supported Chinese, Korean, 

and Vietnamese Communist 

guerrillas and conventional 

military forces fighting 

against the U.S. and other 

non-Communist governments. 

The Soviets killed few 

Americans themselves, but because Moscow was the power 

behind international communism and the patron of 

anti-American action around 

the globe, U.S. leaders 

regarded the USSR as their 

prime antagonist. Moscow, 

however, refrained from 

posing a direct military challenge to Washington and 

worked to prevent the outbreak of large-scale warfare 

between Soviet client states 

and the West. 

A major reason for this 

Soviet restraint was the overwhelming superiority of the 

United States in nuclear 

weaponry. In the 1950s, the 

U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air 

Command (SAC) fielded an 

array of medium and longrange bombers capable of 

devastating the major 

military and urbadindustrial 

centers in the Soviet Union. 

In addition, the Navy 

equipped several dozen Navy 

carrier squadrons with 

aircraft that could drop 

nuclear bombs. The Navy also 

commissioned several submarines that carried the surface-launched, nuclear-armed 

Regulus cruise missile. At the 

end of the decade, the United 

States brought on line 

nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) 

based in the United States 

and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) taken 

to sea in the Navy's new 

George Washington-class 

ships. In addition, with the 

concurrence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) allies, the United 

States deployed IRBMs to 

Great Britain, Italy, and 

Turkey. The power of the U.S. 

nuclear arsenal was tremendous. An American nuclear attack, to quote a Navy officer 

recounting a SAC briefing on 

the nuclear strike plan, would 

have left "virtually all of Russia . . . a smoking, radiating 

ruin at the end of two hours." 

Throughout the late 1950s, 

Khrushchev's government 

devoted enormous Soviet 

resources to the development 

of a nuclear arsenal and by 

1960 operated a fleet of long 

and medium-range bombers, 

and a few ICBMs. The Soviet 

Navy also developed several 

submarines to carry shortrange, surface-launched ballistic and cruise missiles. In 

addition, the ability of a 

Soviet missile to lift the Sputnik satellite into orbit around 

the globe in October 1957 

demonstrated Moscow's growing technological prowess. 

Lacking adequate intelligence 

of Soviet strength in these 

strategic systems, some in the 

American national security establishment worried that the 

United States no longer held 

the edge in the nuclear realm. 

The issue took on national 

prominence during the 

presidential election of 1960 

when many Americans became convinced of a "missile 

gap" between the United 

States and the USSR. 

Even though this issue 

helped Senator John F. 

Kennedy defeat Vice-President 

Richard M. Nixon, soon after 

his inauguration in January 

1961, the new president 

learned from intelligence sources that the United States 

had far more nuclear weapon 

delivery systems and warheads than the Soviets. This 

conclusion was based on the 

earlier surveillance missions 

of high-flying U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and the continuing orbits of American 

intelligence-collection satellites over the Soviet Union. 

Furthermore, the Soviets 

based their ICBMs and longrange bombers only in the 

USSR, far from most key targets in the continental United 

States. 

On 21 October 1961, Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Roswell L. Gilpatric made a 
speech proclaiming that the 

only "missile gap" which existed was in favor of the 

United States. Gilpatric informed the world that the 

U.S. nuclear arsenal was so 

destructive that any nation 

bringing "it into play" would 

be committing "an act of selfdestruction." Khrushchev 

knew the true balance of 

power, but to have it revealed 

in a threatening public statement was, he felt, a personal 

and political afront. 

Hoping to recover from this 

setback, and change the 

power equation in favor of the 

USSR, Khrushchev began extensive discussions with Fidel 

Castro, the leader of another 

country at odds with the 

United States. By the spring 

of 1962, the Soviet premier 

Thomas Edison (SSBN 61 0) underway in 

the Atlantic in 1962. This submarine and 

her sisters of the Ethan Allemclass each 

carried 16 Polaris ballistic missiles and 

were a key component of the U.S. strategic deterrent force. 

had succeeded in establishing 

close relations with Castro. 

These improved ties eventually resulted in the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Cuba and the United States 

W ith only ninety miles 

of water separating 

them, Cuba and the 

United States shared much 

history. Cuba, the largest island in the Caribbean, was 

colonized by Spain soon after 

Christopher Columbus 

opened the Western Hemisphere to Europe in 1492. By 

the late nineteenth century, 

Cuba had become the world's 

largest sugar producer and a 

key economic asset of Spain. 

That European kingdom, then 

in economic and political 

decline, needed the income 

from its Cuban possession. At 

the same time, the United 

States had developed important economic interests in 

Central America and the 

Caribbean, and staked its 

claim as the preeminent 

power in the Western Hemisphere. A dynamic United 

States and a decrepit Spain 

headed for a clash. 

In 1895, long-simmering 

Cuban opposition to the rule 

of the Spanish monarchy 

burst into rebellion. Many 

Americans were sympathetic 

to the Cuban insurrectionists. 

When the battleship Maine, 

on a port visit to Havana in 

1898, exploded and sank, the 

U.S. Congress blamed the 

Spanish authorities and 

declared war. Years later, examination of the wreck suggested that the American 

warship had suffered an internal explosion and was not 

sunk by a Spanish torpedo or 

mine, as first suspected. 

As a result of the SpanishAmerican War, known in 

Cuba as the Second War of Independence, the United 

States ousted Spain from the 

Caribbean and took possession of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 

The United States sponsored 

the creation of a new government in Havana, the Republic 

of Cuba. 

During the next half-century, the United States came 

to dominate Cuban foreign 

and domestic policy. An act of 

Congress, the Platt Amendment, until repealed in 1934, 

provided for U.S. military intervention into Cuba to 

protect American interests. In 

addition, U.S. companies 

largely controlled the Cuban 

economy, especially the sugar 

industry. Cubans increasingly 

resented this strong American 

presence in their country. 

The government of the 

Republic of Cuba was a 

failure. Corrupt politicians 

and military strongmen 

stifled democracy and undercut repeated attempts at 

reform. General Fulgencio 

Batista, who seized power in 

1952, proved to be one of the 

most ruthless of Cuban 

leaders. He held onto power 

through graft and the suppression of dissent. 

One of Batista's early opponents was Fidel Castro. On 

26 July 1953, the former 

lawyer and political extremist 

led a small band of supporters 

in an attack on the Moncada 

army barracks. It was a fiasco. Castro and most of his followers were captured and 

thrown into prison. Freed in a 

general amnesty in 1955, 

Castro went into exile in 

Mexico, where he formed the 

"26 July Movement." Two 

years later this group landed 

near Santiago, Cuba, hoping 

to inspire a rebellion against 

the government. Batista's soldiers killed most of the rebels, 

however, and forced Castro 

and a dozen fellow insurgents 

to flee into the Sierra Maestra 

Mountains. 

From his mountain redoubt, 

Castro sparked the revolution 

that many Cubans then 

longed for. He dispatched 

small guerrilla units that ambushed and harassed 

Batista's forces. Simultaneously, revolutionaries in the cities 

distributed propaganda, 

recruited more rebels, and 

blew up government buildings. On New Year's Day 

1959, with his domain 

reduced to a few pockets of 

resistance, Batista fled into 

exile in the Dominican 

Republic. 

On 8 January, Castro and 

his supporters entered 

Havana to the cheers of the 

capital's jubilant populace. Initially, the new leader did not 

publicly embrace any social or 

political ideology, but stressed 

his credentials as a Cuban 

nationalist. He promised the 

Cuban people prosperity, 

equality, justice, and personal 

liberty through the efforts of 

his revolutionary movement. 

Castro and his 

revolutionaries improved 

some aspects of Cuban life, 

but at great cost. Castro established an increasingly 

authoritarian regime, 

suspended many civil liberties, refused to hold elections, 

and suppressed not only op- 
LC Geography and Map Dims~on ' - ' l?+# 

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7 drl ti~i-j naru lXSd-@Bj 

<?LIf 1r4ji3 iMtli Cd ~swI@ @$a ! 4 I BILK3 W lKi 

-qr, \jrr~r Jrjl, b3sewqr@a bm3 3dj hmd sd 9 
A detailed map of Cuba, 1961. Photo Interpreters first discovered mlssile sites west of Havana, near the towns of San Cristobal 

and Guanajay. Lnter, U-2 photography also revealed MRBM and IRBM sites on the northern coast of central Cuba, close to the 

towns of Sagua La Grande and Remedios. 
ponents but even former supporters. Many Cubans were 

shot, imprisoned, or driven 

into exile. Moreover, Castro 

began an agrarian reform program that involved the expropriation of over $1 billion 

worth of American holdings. 

The trend of events in Cuba 

appalled U.S. President 

Dwight D. Eisenhower and 

the leaders of his administration. The American government first pressed Castro to 

moderate his behavior and 

when this brought no genuine 

response strongly criticized 

him. Mindful of U.S. support 

for the deposed Batista 

regime and America's long 

domination of the Cuban 

economy, Castro did not take 

kindly to Washington's involvement. He publicly and 

vehemently railed against the 

United States government for 

interfering in Cuban affairs. 

Washington responded by 

placing an embargo on nearly 

all of Cuba's goods. 

Of greater significance for 

US.-Cuban relations, Castro 

approached the Soviet Union 

for economic, political, and 

military support. In September 1959, he signed a treaty 

with Moscow for the Soviet 

importation of Cuban sugar, 

formerly a valued U.S. import. The next year, he requested and received Soviet 

military equipment. On 3 

January 1961, President 

Eisenhower finally severed 

U.S. diplomatic relations with 

Cuba. 

Even before that event, the 

Eisenhower administration 

began to consider the overthrow of Castro's government. 

The president directed the 

Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) to plan, support, and 

oversee an invasion of Cuba 

by anti-Castro guerrillas. 

With the endorsement of the 

incoming Kennedy administration, the U.S. national security establishment 

bent to the task. On 17 April 

1961, with ships of the U.S. 

Second Fleet steaming just 

over the horizon, the 1,300- 

man Brigade 2506 stormed 

ashore at Playa Larga and 

Playa Giron, the Bay of Pigs. 

For the next two days, the 

anti-Castro Cubans fought to 

break out of the beachhead. 

They were hampered by the 

lack of adequate training, 

weapons, and equipment. In 

addition, President Kennedy 

refused to provide them with 

air support for fear of making 

U.S. involvement in the 

enterprise apparent. Free 

from opposition, Castro's tiny 

air force sank two of the invading force's ships, and 

drove the rest out to sea, 

thereby denying the brigade 

Cuban leader Fidel Castro meets with 

Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the United 

Nations in New York in September 1960. 

The animosity of these leaders toward 

the United States prompted increased 

Soviet and Cuban cooperation in the political, economic, and military spheres. 

desperately needed reinforcements and ammunition. 

Castro's ground forces sealed 

off the beachhead and then 

overwhelmed the defenders. 

The survivors were herded off 

to prison. 

Not only did the Bay of Pigs 

fiasco strengthen U.S. hostility toward Castro and his 

movement but it prompted 

the Cuban dictator to openly 

and wholeheartedly embrace 

the Soviet Union and MarxistLeninist ideology. In his May 

Day 1961 address, Castro announced to hundreds of 

thousands of his compatriots 

assembled in Havana that the 

Cuban revolution was a 

"socialist" revolution. 
Rising Tensions in the Caribbean 

T he Soviet military buildup in Cuba soon followed. As with other 

third world nations like Egypt 

and Indonesia, Soviet arms 

shipments to Cuba came in 

stages, starting with small 

arms and ending with aircraft 

and warships. By the end of 

1961, the Soviets had 

provided the Cuban military 

with rifles, machine guns, 

tanks, artillery, over thirty 

early-model MiG jet fighters, 

and a few helicopters, 

transport planes, and small 

naval vessels. 

The CIA obtained much of 

its information on this buildup from the monthly flights of 

U-2 aircraft over Cuba. 

Developed in the mid-1950s to 

I gather intelligence on the 

f Soviet Union and the Communist countries of eastern 

Europe, the U-2 flew at 

I 70,000 feet, where Soviet 

fighters could not operate effectively. The aircraft also had 

tremendous range and 

provided a stable platform for 

specially designed cameras. 

The Soviet downing of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over the 

Ural Mountains in 1960 with 

SA-2 surface-to-air missiles 

(SAM) restricted the planes' 

operational flexibility, but the 

U-2s continued to fly over 

Cuba and other areas that 

lacked missile defenses. 

American intelligence 

learned of Soviet anns shipments not only by U-2 flights 

over Cuba but through Navy, 

Coast Guard, and Marine 

Corps observation of Soviet 

merchant vessels. Turkeybased Navy detachments and 

Sixth Fleet air patrol units 

photographed Soviet and Eastern Bloc vessels in the 

Bosporus Strait and in the 

Mediterranean, while Navy 

patrol squadrons based at 

Naval Station (NS), Bermuda, 

and Naval Air Station (NAS), 

Jacksonville, Florida, overflew ships in the Atlantic. 

Coast Guard and Marine 

I NHC 5-446-B(1) 

planes photographed Soviet 

and bloc ships as they neared 

Cuba. Photographic interpreters often could tell the 

type and amount of military 

material being transported by 

noting if the merchantman 

was high or low in the water 

and by analyzing the cargo on 

deck, whether stowed openly 

or crated. 

American intelligence 

agents, friendly foreign nationals, and journalists also 

provided information about 

Soviet activities in Cuba. 

Throughout the spring and 

summer of 1962, these 

sources reported the arrival in 

Cuba of large numbers of 

Soviet "technicians," who 

traveled under common Russian names to deceive U.S. intelligence. For instance, 

Marshal Sergi Biryuzov appeared on one passenger list 

as "the engineer Petrov." 

These men were sent to 

remote parts of the island, 

where they selected and 

A Navy patrol plane photographed the Soviet freighter Krasnogradas she steamed for Cuba in September 1962, probably carrying SS4 missiles. U.S. and allied aircraft and ships closely monitored the passage of Soviet merchantmen through the Atlantic 

and Caribbean. 
p%a~nerB missile sites and 

other military installations 

meant $0 accommodate incorning Soviet arms and '"technicians." Press sewice photos 

revealed that many of the latter were young, fit men with 

short htiir-learly soldiers 

out of uniform. Later that 

year5 U,S. intelligence identified htsr Soviet re~mentzal 

combat groaps in @&a, 

The increase in Soviet activity? including $he possible 

arrival of missiles in Cutsa, 

wonpied CIA Director JO~HP A. 

&f~Cone; conse~ently~ he 

doubled the number of 0-2 

1 U-2s, Crusaders, and Voodoos 

The intelligence provided by U,S, reconnaissance aircraft was vital to President Kennedy's 

su~essful management of the Cuban Misails 

Cfisis, These planes, flown with skill and 

courage by Ame~ican pilots, and equippd with 

~tate-of-the-a& cameras, captured phetomaghs 

sf ~uch quality that tkey coPgvinced U.S., United 

Nations, and Organization of American States officials of Soviet duplicit~p regarding Cubar 

The Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance plane was 

desimed during the 1950% to monitor the status 

of the Boa-let Union's Xong-ran& bomber, intercontinental balEistic missile, and nuclear 

\veapons proeams. Flying at 70,000 feet, the U2s could phodo~aph a100-mile-wide swath of 

$erritow equal tas the distance from Washin@on, 

D.G., to Phoenix, Arizong, The U-2's 36-inch 

focal len@h camera, known as the 'W' camera, 

carried two film canisters. Each c~nister was 

loaded with 5,000 feet of" $$-inch by $-inch film. 

The camera took pictures from smen different 

positions onto each role af f lm, producing a 

stereo image 18 by $85 inches. The resolutrtion of 

the photo~aphs produced was ~emarkablitems less than three feet square 023. the gound 

co~ld ba easily distinmish~d. 

Wrile the Central Intelligence Agency flew the 

F9-2 missions over and wound Cuba before midOctober 1962, &c &? Force carried oaxt the 

msmentsus f 4 October flight and mbsequent 

missile crisis Bights, g5-2 pilot Major Rudolf 

Anderson, USAF, paid the dkimate price for his 

brawry and dedication ts d~ty over Cuba. A 

Communist 524-2 surface-to-air missile downed 

hie airera& and killed Alderson on 294 %8ctober, 

at the height of the c~isia, 

Bavy and Marine aviators Byina the Vought 

FSU-IP Cmsader camied out many of the vital. 

low-level photo~aphic recr_annaissanee missions 

during the crisis" IPgtel%igence specialists considered the Navy*s Eight Phobpagkic Squadron 

{WPB 62 the best low-level reconnaissance unit 

in the armed forces, bmause the unit'^ pereonne1 

were weH bained and the Cmsader was an especially stable aerial photogaphy platform 

equipped with cameras of advanced design. 

Several Cmsadere of Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 2 were attached to WP-62 

at Key West, Florida. The cameras carried by 

the Navy and Marine Cmsaders were smaJHforrwat, six-inch focal len@h cameras-the KA-4S 

and U-46, Both cameras carried 260 feet of fiveinch-wide film. 

The mainstay of the &r Force tactical reconnaissance @?for% was the NcDonnell WF- 101 C 

Yosdoe. The aircrafk was a good plakforrn for 

medium sr high-altitude aerial photogaphie 

wo~k, bstrt its carn~$~ras groved less thsn satiafwtory for low-levell work. Consequently, Admiral 

George hderson, Chief of MavaS Operations, 

agreed to a request by General Ckarti~ LeMay, 

Air Fapee Chief of Staff? for a number of the new 

K4-45 eamaras due the Nay f~om the snacsnufac- 

%carer. Balf of the production ma wag divePt~d xo 

the Air Force so the RF-101s could be equipped 

with some of the best cameras then a~ailable, 

Air Farce tactical remnnaissance squadrons 

with the U-45s soosa became quite proEcienL at 

low-level photra~aphy. 
An Air Force Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance plane. This aircraft, while ungainly in appearance, was able to fly long distances at great speed and altitude. This was possible because the U-2 was built of lightweight materials. Indeed, the wings were so 

delicate that they needed wheeled supports, called "pogos," when the aircraft was 

on the ground. 

missions to two per month. 

These flights, however, did 

not confirm the presence of 

any missiles. 

While photographic reconnaissance discovered nothing 

untoward, Cuban agents and 

refugees began reporting that 

Soviet SA-2 antiaircraft missiles might be in Cuba. 

Despite the lack of clear proof, 

McCone concluded that SA-2s 

would soon be deployed on the 

island, and on 22 August so 

informed the president. 

Kennedy ordered another U-2 

mission, which the CIA executed on 29 August. When the 

information from this flight 

was evaluated, in the words of 

one analyst, "the sirens were 

on and the red lights were 

flashing." 

The photo intelligence confirmed the presence of eight 

sites on the northern coast of 

Cuba east and west of 

Havana that would soon accommodate SAMs. Analysts 

decided that these sites were 

the beginnings of an overall, 

integrated air defense network for Cuba, not just 

defenses for specific locations. 

McCone concluded that the 

principal target for the SAMs 

would be his U-2s. The 29 

August images also revealed a 

missile site that overlooked 

several possible amphibious 

landing areas near the city of 

Banes in eastern Cuba. A U-2 

mission flown on 5 September 

located additional sites near 

likely landing areas. Intelligence analysts eventually 

deduced that these installations contained SS-2-C coastal defense missiles. 

Naval intelligence also 

reported on the sighting of a 

Soviet-built Komar-class 

guided missile boat off the 

Cuban port of Mariel. Using 

the U-2 photography taken 29 

August, the Americans confirmed the presence of 13 

Soviet-built patrol vessels 

there, including seven 

Komars. These vessels substantially improved the coastal defense capabilities of the 

small Cuban Navy, which previously put to sea only a few 

old World War I1 frigates and 

subchasers. 

Even these older vessels, 

however, were not toothless. 

On 30 August, two Cuban 

frigates fired on an S2F Tracker antisubmarine warfare 

plane manned by a U.S. 

Naval Reserve crew and 

flying a training mission over 

international waters, 15 nautical miles from Cuba. The Kennedy administration lodged a 

diplomatic protest with Cuba, 

stating that in the future, 

U.S. armed forces would 

"employ all means necessary 

for their own protection." 

Castro personally denied 

Cuban involvement in the 

episode but also used the occasion to remind the world 

that Cuba's airspace had been 

violated numerous times by 

foreign military aircraft; this 

was an obvious reference to 

the CIA'S U-2s.The 5 September mission, flown over eastern and central Cuba, also 

revealed the presence of firstline, Soviet-made MiG-21 

fighters. These planes had the 

potential to shoot down a U-2. 

In response to this new information, the Pentagon ordered Navy Fighter Squadron 

(VF) 41 to NAS Key West, 

Florida. Manned by some of 

the best Navy pilots and 

equipped with state-of-the-art 

F4H-1 Phantom IIs, VF-41 

was one of the best interceptor squadrons in the U.S. 

Navy. 

Developments in other 

trouble spots of the world 

heightened Soviet-U.S. tensions. In late August, a U-2 

aircraft unintentionally 

entered Soviet airspace over 

Sakhalin Island on the 

USSR's Pacific coast. 

Khrushchev's government 

protested the "gross violation" 

of the Soviet frontier and suggested that U-2 bases in 

Great Britain, West Germany, 

Turkey, and Japan might be 

at risk. 

U.S. domestic politics also 

added to the growing international anxiety. In the midst of 

a midterm Congressional election, Senator Kenneth Keating 

(R-NY), although having no official access to intelligence, 

publicly stated his belief that 

there were Soviet SAMs and 

troops in Cuba. Keating 

accused the Kennedy administration of covering up this 

information. Other members 

of Congress called for a U.S. 

blockade of Cuba to compel 

Soviet withdrawal from the 

island. Some Democratic leaders demanded even more 

aggressive action by Kennedy. 

Faced with challenges in 

the domestic and international political arenas, and in possession of the most recent 

aerial intelligence, Kennedy 
A newspaper map of military and naval lnstallatlons In Cuba, October 1962. U.S. intelligence identified Soviet-made Komar-class 

missile boats at the port of Marie1 and 11-28 Beagle bombers at airfields near Holguin and San Julian (called Guane on this map). 

LC Geography and Map Divisim 

responded to the Cuban problem. In statements to the 

press on 4 and 13 September, 

the president revealed that 

the United States knew 

Soviet-supplied SAMs and 

other defensive weapons had 

been deployed to Cuba. He implied that the United States 

could tolerate their presence. 

He also stated that there was 

no substantive evidence of offensive weapons in Cuba. The 

president added sternly, 

"were it to be otherwise, the 

gravest issues would arise." 

During the first week of 

September, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met 

with several members of the 

Kennedy administration. Acting on directions from 

Khrushchev, Dobrynin told 

Attorney General Robert F. 

Kennedy, the president's 

younger brother, that the 

Soviet buildup in Cuba was of 

no significance. He assured 

Kennedy that no offensive 

weapons would be placed in 

Cuba, specifically ground-toground missiles. Kennedy 

reminded Dobrynin that the 

United States monitored 

Soviet activity in Cuba closely, and that the deployment of 

offensive missiles on the island would cause severe repercussions. In a meeting with 

Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Dobrynin again 

affirmed that no offensive 

weapons would be placed in 

Cuba. 

Dobrynin's communications 

were part of a program of 

deception orchestrated from 

Moscow to reduce U.S. 

suspicions. Khrushchev kept 

Dobrynin in the dark about 

the action long after approving deployment of the offensive missiles to Cuba. 

Despite Robert Kennedy's 

statement regarding the continued close surveillance of 

Cuba, the presence there of 

SAMs and fighters increased 

the danger to the U-2s. At a 

White House meeting on 10 

September, Secretary of State 

Dean Rusk and National 

Security Advisor McGeorge 

Bundy argued that the information obtained from the missions was not worth the 

military and political risks. 

Even though the CIA Deputy 

Director, Army Major General 

Marshall "Pat" Carter and 

Robert Kennedy disagreed 

strongly, the president 

directed that the missions 

over Cuba be stopped and 

that henceforth the U-2s fly 

out of harm's way over the sea 

and parallel to the Cuban 

coastline. These flights along 

the periphery brought back little useful information and 

revealed nothing about operations in the interior of the island. 

Navy reconnaissance of 

Soviet merchantmen, however, continued to pay 

dividends. An aerial 

photograph of the Soviet 

freighter Kasimov showed ten 

long, thin boxes on deck. 

Photo interpreters, practicing 

the mysterious art of "crateol- 
ogy," quickly identified the 

boxes as containers for the 

fuselages of 11-28 Beagle light 

jet bombers, long in the Soviet 

inventory. The arrival of these i : aircraft was not unexpected 

for the CIA had believed for 

some months that these 

v ,cca a;?: 

T mt 

planes would eventually arrive in Cuba. The 11-28s had 

an operating radius of 750 

miles and the capacity to 

carry 6,500 pounds of nuclear 

or conventional bombs. The 

CIA reported that the Soviets 

never provided nuclear munitions for these planes to other 

countries. Thus, although 

President Kennedy was uncomfortable with this news, 

McCone and other advisors 

downplayed the threat. 

- .-4,d U.S. ~ilitar~ Preparations 

'm The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the fall of 

he president was not 1962, IeR to rlght: Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Cuba but never exam- Army Chief of Staff; Gen. Cuds E. Leready to sound the ined his military's various May, Air Force Chief of Staff; Army Gen. 

alarm over Soviet ac- planning documents or asked Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint , tions in the Caribbean. Cer- probing questions about how Chiefs Of -ft; Adma George W- Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations; and tainly, he was not planning to combat operations would un- en. David M. shoup, Commandant of 

invade Cuba as some critics fold. Indeed, during the crisis the Marine Corps. 

would later charge. Kennedy he was surprised to learn that - -&.A . ..- 

followed developments in if he ordered an invasion, I? to? f r 5 'i 
U.S. forces could carry it out 

swiftly. Given Soviet activity 

there, however, prudence dictated that adequate preparations be made. 

In 1961, after the Bay of 

Pigs disaster, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff had directed Admiral 

Dennison's Atlantic Command 

to develop several Cuban contingency plans. The deterioration of the Cuban situation 

brought about the refinement 

of several relevant operation 

plans (OPLANs). OPLAN 312- 

62 (the latter two digits refer 

to the year the plan was issued) provided for three forms 

of air attack on Cuba: one for 

a strike against a single site 

of a specific type (e.g., a SAM 

site); one for attacks on all 

sites of one type (e.g., all SAM 

sites); and one for a broad, 

large-scale air assault. Navy, 

Marine, and Air Force units 

would be involved in these operations, as appropriate. If 

necessary, the air strikes 

would be followed by an amphibious and airborne invasion, embodied in OPLANs 

314-62 and 316-62, in which 

all the services would take 

part. 

Throughout early October 

1962, U.S. military, naval, 

and air forces carried out routine peacetime operations, but 

their center of gravity shifted 

south to America's Caribbean 

and nearby Atlantic frontiers. 

The nuclear-powered aircraft 

carrier Enterprise (CVAN 65) 

and her escorts returned to 

Norfolk, Virginia, from a deployment to the Sixth Fleet in 

the Mediterranean. Several 

destroyers patrolled the early 

warning picket line established in the Atlantic and a 

single ship stood watch in the 

Straits of Florida. 

Anti-Submarine Warfare 

Forces, Atlantic, led by Vice 

Admiral Edmund B. Taylor, 

conducted regular antisubmarine hunter-killer (HUK) operations. Each HUK group 

was composed of several destroyers, submarines, and an 

antisubmarine warfare (ASW) 

carrier equipped with S2F 

tracking planes and helicopters. Essex (CVS 9), only several days out of a refit at the 

New York Navy Yard, steamed 

toward Guantanarno Bay for 

six weeks of training. In support of the HUK groups were 

long-range P2V, P3V, and 

P5M patrol aircraft based at 

naval stations and facilities 

situated to cover the Atlantic 

and the Caribbean. They included Argentia, Newfoundland, in Canada; Lajes, 

Azores, off Portugal; Bermuda; Roosevelt Roads, 

Puerto Rico; Guantanamo, 

Cuba; and several bases in 

the continental United States. 

In early October, the Amphibious Forces, Atlantic 

Fleet, command prepared to 

carry out an annual amphibious landing exercise involving 

eighteen ships from Amphibious Squadrons 8 and 12, 

three Marine battalion landing teams (BLT), and several 

Marine aircraft squadrons. 

The objective in the 1962 exercise was to land Marine forces 

on Vieques Island off Puerto 

Rico to oust from the island 

the fictional dictator "Ortsac" 

(Castro spelled backwards). 

To reduce reaction time in 

case the president activated 

any of the CINCLANT contingency plans, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff instructed Admiral 

Dennison to deploy naval 

forces off eastern Florida. The 

aircraft carrier Independence 

(CVA 62), with Carrier Air 

Group 7 embarked, departed 
Norfolk on the 11th accompanied by destroyers English 

(DD 696), Hank (DD 702), 

O'Hare (DDR 889), and Corry 

(DDR 817). In addition, Marine Aircraft Wing 2 deployed 

elements of Marine Aircraft 

Groups 14 and 32 to NAS Key 

West and NS Roosevelt Roads 

on 13 October. 

Admiral Dennison's Army 

and Air Force components 

also enhanced their readiness 

for Cuban operations. A number of Army units heightened 

their alert status and prepositioned supplies in the southern United States. The Air 

Force moved selected squadrons, equipment, and war consumable~ to bases in Florida 

and its Tactical Air Command 

(TAC) trained intensively. 

An A3D-2 Skywarrior of Heavy Attack 

Squadron 11, Det. 8, lands on board 

Independence, 20 October 1962. CVA 62 

was one of the two fleet carriers involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Essex(CVS 9), whose crew is unaware of the crisis brewing in Washington, 

heads for Guantanamo, Cuba, and a training evolution in mid-October 1962. 

This ship was a key component of the fleet's antisubmarine warfare force, 

as shown by the presence on the flight deck of the Grumman S2F Tracker, 

Grumman WF-2 Tracer airborne early warning aircraft, and Sikorsky HSSP 

Sea King hellcopters of CVSG-60. 

Essex: A Gallant Old Lady 

The antisubmarine warfare (ASW) support car- embarked CVSG-60 off Quonset Point, Rhode Isrier Essex (CVS 9) was the oldest carrier in the land, and headed for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 

Navy at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Or- The ship, with many new crewmen and new 

dered in 1940, she was the lead ship of a carrier equipment aboard, was scheduled for six weeks 

class of 24 vessels. During World War 11, she of refresher training off the Cuban base. She 

saw extensive action in the Pacific, suffering a steamed into Guantanamo on Friday, 19 Ockamikaze attack off the Philippines. She was tober. Unaware of the crisis that was then breakdecommissioned in 1947 but brought back into ing, Captain Gerard S. Bogart set aside Sunday 

service during the Korean War and received four the 21st as a liberty day for part of the crew. 

battle stars for her contributions. Modernized in At 0330 on the 21st, the order "reveille, 

1955 with an angled flight deck and other im- reveille, all hands" echoed throughout the carprovements, she served as an attack carrier rier. The ship got underway immediately, but no 

until 1960. That year, the Navy converted the one seemed to know why. Radiomen strained at 

ship to an ASW support carrier. their receivers to pick up any news, official or 

In mid-1962, Essex was overhauled in the New otherwise. The crew soon heard that the presiYork Navy Yard in Brooklyn. New electrical and dent would make an important address the next 

sonar equipment made her one of the most night. When a radio broadcast of that speech anmodern ASW support carriers in the Navy. nounced the quarantine of Cuba, cheers rose 

These improvements included the installation of from all decks. 

a bow-mounted SQS-23 sonar, an Iconorama tac- For the next 26 days, until 15 November, 

tical display, and new electronic counter- Essex operated at sea. Her air department and 

measures equipment. CVSG-60 searched the waters off Cuba and the 

Essex employed Carrier Anti-Submarine Air Bahamas for 624 consecutive hours. The 

Group (CVSG) 60 as her combat component. Led carrier's aircraft and sonar and her escorting 

by Commander Robert L. Severns, the air group destroyers tracked a submarine contact-Soviet 

included two antisubmarine (VS) squadrons, an Foxtrot-class submarine F945--finally forcing it 

antisubmarine helicopter (HS) squadron, and a to the surface. 

detachment of an airborne early warning (VAW) Even though manned by a new crew using 

squadron. VS-34 and VS-39 flew Grumman S2F complex new equipment, the ship operated with 

Trackers, while HS-9 operated Sikorsky HSS-2 great effectiveness. This demonstrated how wellSea Kings. Detachment 9 of VAW-12 flew Grum- trained officers and bluejackets of the U.S. Navy 

man WF-2 Tracers, planes which could now be can adapt to changing situations. For their outoperated from Essex because of new data link standing performance during the Cuban Missile 

gear installed during the 1962 refit. Crisis, sailors and aircrewmen of the carrier 

Essex sailed from New York on 25 September, received the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. 

The "Milk Run" U-2 Mission of 

E vents in the Caribbean 

took a dramatic turn 

on 14 October, when 

American aircraft resumed 

flights over Cuba rather than 

around the island's periphery 

For the first time, U.S. Air 

Force U-2s were involved. Major Richard S. Heyser, one of 

only two Air Force pilots 

checked out on the CIA-modified U-2, took off from 

Edwards Air Force Base, 

California, flew over western 

Cuba, and landed at McCoy 

Air Force Base, Florida. Having encountered no MiGs or 

SAM activity over the Communist island, when the major landed he described the 

mission as "a milk run." 

Ground crews removed the 

film from his aerial camera 

and put it on a plane bound 

for Washington. Navy specialists processed the film and 

the following day took it to 

the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center 

(NPIC) for analysis. 

In the afternoon, following 

many hours of close scrutiny, 

members of the joint-service 

and CIA team made a discovery that immediately turned 

the routine "milk run" mission into an intelligence coup. 

The photo interpreters discovered a new missile site meant 

for Soviet SS-4 MRBMs-offensive weapons capable of incinerating American cities 

and the people in them. Art 

Lundahl, NPIC's director, 

passed the information to his 

superiors at CIA headquarters, who in turn alerted National Security Advisor 

McGeorge Bundy. He immediately arranged a meeting 

with the president at the 

White House for the next 

morning, 16 October. 

Beginning just before noon, 

Lundahl briefed the president 

and his chief national security 

advisors. He used the photos 

to identify and describe the 

MRBM site located on the 

14th. Based on additional 

analysis completed by the 

photo interpreters the night 

before, Lundahl also pointed 

NHC 5-446-B(2) 

This aerial photo was one of several captured by an Air Force U-2 plane from an altitude of 14 miles on 14 October 1962. When 

Arthur Lundahl of the CIA showed it to President Kennedy two days later, it started the Cuban Missile Crisis. The CIA's skilled 

photo interpreters, using special light tables and stereoscopes, verified that the Soviets had this MRBM site under construction. 
14 October 

out another MRBM site and 

another installation whose 

weapons could not yet be determined. Kennedy listened to 

the presentation calmly. But, 

according to Army General 

Maxwell D. Taylor, only recently appointed Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

president displayed a "rather 

deep but controlled anger at 

the duplicity of the Soviet officials who had tried to deceive 

him." The Cuban Missile 

Crisis had begun in earnest. 

To gather more information 

on Soviet activities in Cuba, 

Secretary of Defense Robert 

S. McNamara ordered the execution not only of additional 

high-level U-2 flights but lowlevel reconnaissance. Chief of 

Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral George W. Anderson, 

concurred with Art Lundahl's 

obsel-vation that the Navy's 

Light Photographic Squadron 

(VFP) 62 was best suited for 

the latter mission. VFP-62, 

based at NAS Cecil Field outside Jacksonville, Florida, 

was then perhaps the finest 

low-level photoreconnaissance 

organization in the U.S. military. The men of the Navy 

squadron were especially 

skilled in navigation, instrument flying, and intelligencecollection techniques, and 

their aircraft, F8U-1P Crusaders, were equipped with special cameras. Admiral 

Anderson alerted the squadron to ready a detachment for 

operations over Cuba. By the 

l%h, the squadron had deployed six F8U-1P Crusaders 

along with ground support 

personnel to NAS Key West. 

Sandals and Skeans 

On 14 October 1962, U.S. photoreconnaissance aircraft 

discovered that Soviet military personnel were hard at work 

on the island of Cuba constructing a launch site to accommodate nuclear-armed, medium range ballistic missiles 

(MRBM). This information sounded the alarm in Washington 

and touched off .the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most serious 

Soviet-American confrontation of the Cold War. 

The USSR had already set up intercontinental ballistic missiles on its own soil by 1962, but these weapons and their nuclear warheads could only reach certain areas of the 

continental United States. MRBMs positioned in Cuba, at one 

point only 90 miles from Florida, were a different matter. During the summer of 1962, the Soviets carried out Khrushchev's 

plan to secretly transport SS-4 Sandal missiles to Cuba. 

Forty-two arrived by October, and intelligence officers estimated that each Sandal carried a two or three-megaton nuclear warhead, devices sixty times more powerful than the 

bombs dropped on Japan in 1945. The SS-4s could strike 

within two miles of a target from 1,020 nautical miles away. 

This put at risk the entire southeastern United States, including the cities of Dallas, Texas; St. Louis, Missouri; and Washington, D.C.-the nation's capital. In addition, the Sandal 

could hit the Panama Canal, all of Central America, and part 

of northern South America. 

Even more threatening to the United States and her neighbors in the Western Hemisphere were the Soviet SS-5 Skean 

intermediate range ballistic missiles for which four launching 

sites (four launchers and eight missiles per site) were being 

built in Cuba when the crisis unfolded. The Central Intelligence Agency estimated that these weapons each carried a 

three to five-megaton warhead that was several hundred 

times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. The Skean 

could reach out to 2,200 nautical miles and impact within two 

miles of its intended target. Hence, from Cuba, the Soviets 

could devastate any city or military site as far north as 

Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. Fortunately, none of these weapons reached Cuba. However, even 

as Kennedy announced establishment of the quarantine, the 

Soviet freighter Poltava, with launch rings for the SS-5 

stowed on her deck, and perhaps missiles in her holds, was en 

route to the island. Khrushchev might have been less willing 

to compromise if his deception was discovered after these lethal weapons had become operational. 
Several days later, a detachment from Marine Composite 

Reconnaissance Squadron 2 

joined VF'P-62 at Jacksonville. 

Meanwhile, the president 

assembled in Washington a 

group of defense, intelligence, 

and diplomatic officials, and 

other trusted advisors to assist him in handling the crisis. The Executive Committee 

of the National Security Council, or EXCOM, included 

Rusk, McNamara, McCone, 

Bundy, General Taylor, Robert 

Kennedy, former Secretary of 

State Dean Acheson, and Vice 

President Lyndon B. Johnson, 

as well as other specialists. 

This high-powered group discussed the various options 

and recommended certain 

courses of action, but President Kennedy made the key 

decisions. 

The president weighed 

three options regarding the 

U.S. response to Krushcheds opening gambit. The 

first option was military: 

launch air actions against 

Cuba, as embodied in OPLAN 

3 12. There was a great likelihood that these operations 

would be followed by the amphibious and airborne landings laid out in OPLAN 3 16. 

The second option suggested 

the combined use of military 

pressure and diplomatic negotiation, compelling the Soviets to remove their offensive 

missiles from the island. The 

third choice was a different 

combination of force and negotiation, with more emphasis 

on inducing the Soviets to 

withdraw their weapons in exBased in Cuba, Soviet SS-4 Sandal MRBMs could hit targets in the southern and eastern regions of the U.S., while the even more fearsome SS-5 Skean IRBMs could strike 

sites in most of North America and northern South America. 

change for U.S. concessions. 

After some debate, all members of the EXCOM agreed on 

one point: the Soviet Union 

must withdraw its offensive 

missiles from Cuba. 

Feeling Khrushchev had 

willfully deceived them over 

the missiles, the president 

and most of his advisors immediately rejected the third 

option. The military action 

had several adherents, particularly McCone, Acheson, 

and Taylor. But, Rusk, Bundy, 

and several others feared that 

the air strikes would cause a 

large number of civilian and 

Soviet casualties. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, General Taylor was the 

sole military officer present. 

This former Army Chief of 

Staff and Special Military 

Representative of the President was highly regarded by 

Kennedy. Taylor did not press 

for the military option, as 

some of the chiefs of staff 

might have had they been present. In any case, the majority of the EXCOM members 

were cautious about launching combat operations. No one 

could predict how the Soviets 

or the Cubans would react. At 

this stage, however, the group 

did not rule out a military response. There was consensus 

that the second option held 

the most promise - that the 

United States use military 
pressure, short of outright 

hostilities, to force Khrushchev to back down. 

As the EXCOM analyzed 

the pros and cons of various 

actions, new intelligence 

reached them that raised the 

anxiety level. The U-2 missions flown on 17 October revealed construction activity in 

an area, just west of Havana, 

that ~hoto intemreters soon 

ideniified as a launching site LC LC-U9-8639 

for Soviet SS-5 Skean IRBMs. 

These weapons were more accurate and powerfd than the In the diplomatic arena, on 

SS-4 and had twice the range. 18 October, the president met 

The following day, NPIC con- with Ambassador Dobrynin 

firmed that the Soviets had and Soviet Foreign Minister 

two IRBM and six MRBM Andrei Gromyko. Kennedy resites under construction. peated the warnings he made 

NAH. Cuba Ow. 1962 

On 18 October, the president met with 

Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin 

and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 

Gromyko (center) at the White House. 

Kennedy was in possession of photos 

revealing the construction of Soviet ballistic missile sites in Cuba, but he was 

not yet ready to confront Gromyko with 

this evidence. Gromyko, however, assured Kennedy that no offensive weapons had been or would be placed in 

Cuba, prompting the president to later 

refer to the Soviet minister as "that lying 

bastard." 

in September. Gromyko assured the president that the 

Soviet Union had not and 

would not introduce offensive 

weapons into Cuba. Both 

men, however, knew the 

truth. Kennedy did not confront the foreign minister, but 

after the meeting referred to 

Gromyko as "that lying bastard." 

Lts. Gerald L. Coffee and Arthur R. Day, 

two VFP-62 naval aviators, discuss aerial photographic operations as RAdm. 

Joseph M. Carson, Commander Fleet 

Air, Jacksonville, Florida, listens. Because of its skilled personnel, excellent 

planes, and advanced cameras, military 

leaders considered the squadron firstrate. 
U.S. Forces Converge as the 

W hether the president 

ordered air, am- 

~hibious. or airborne 

attacks against duba, global 

measures against the Soviet 

Union, nonhostile activities, 

or a combination of actions, 

U.S. naval forces would be 

vital. Consequently, the Navy 

reorganized its command 

team. On 17 October, CNO 

directed Admiral Dennison to 

put Vice Admiral Alfred G. 

"Corky" Ward in charge of the 

Second Fleet. Dennison also 

ordered Vice Admiral Horacio 

Rivero, Jr., to fill Ward's 

former billet as Commander 

Amphibious Forces, Atlantic 

Fleet. Dennison, who not only 

commanded the unified Atlantic Command but its naval 

component, the U.S. Atlantic 

Fleet, also continued to 

deploy ship and aircraft units 

into the Atlantic and the 

Caribbean. 

Enterprise, with Carrier Air 

Group 6 embarked, sortied 

from Norfolk on 19 October. 

Navy spokesmen stated that 

she sailed to escape the effects of approaching Hurricane Ella, but the press was 

skeptical because no other 

ships left port at the same 

time. Enterprise stood out for 

the waters north of the 

Bahamas. Over the next three 

days, radar picket destroyers 

William R. Rush (DDR 7141, 

Hawkins (DDR 873), and 

Fiske (DDR 842) left Mayport, 

Florida, to join the carrier as 

escorts. 

On 20 October, the Navy 

formed Task Force 135, which 

was composed of the 

Enterprise and Independence 

task groups, an underway 

replenishment group, shorebased Fleet Air Wing 11, and 

Marine Aircraft Group 32 stationed at NS Roosevelt Roads. 

That same day Dennison ordered the A3J heavy attack 

aircraft of Carrier Air Group 6 

to remain ashore. To replace 

them, twenty Marine A4D 

Skyhawks from Marine Attack Squadron 225 flew out to 

the Task Force 135 carriers. 

The latter aircraft, light attack jets, were better suited to 

close air support strikes than 

the A3Js. Commander Second 

Fleet also deployed alerted 

squadrons from two carrier 

air groups in the Jacksonville 

area. 

To help deter Khrushchev 

from launching a surprise attack on the United States, or 

if that failed, to unleash 

nuclear devastation on the 

Soviet Union, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff alerted American 

strategic forces. These included SAC bombers and 

ICBMs of the Air Force and 

the ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) of the Navy. 

By mid-October, six of the 

Navy's new Polaris submarines, based at Holy Loch, 

Scotland, had deployed to 

their battle stations deep 

under the sea. Abraham Lincoln (SSBN 6021, in upkeep 

at Holy Loch, and two other 

submarines that had just completed shakedown cruises 

were also prepared on short 

notice to add their firepower 

to the nuclear equation. 

Other units of the Air Force 

and the Army based 

throughout the continental 

United States moved toward 

their staging areas and 

prepared to fulfill the roles assigned them in contingency 

plans. Several aircraft wings 

of the Air Force's TAC flew to 

Tyndall, McCoy, and Homestead Air Force Bases in 

Florida. The Air Defense Command also moved F-104 interceptors to Key West. The 

Army placed in readiness for 

immediate deployment the 

82nd and 10lst Airborne 

Divisions. The 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions prepared for 

action, and the 1st Armored 

Division's Task Force Charlie 

started moving to its embarkation point, Savannah, Georgia. The Army also ordered 

Hawk missile battalions and 

antiaircraft automatic weapons battalions to southern 

Florida to defend air bases 

there. 

Marine Corps units also 

"USS Proteus," watercolor by George 

Gray. A submarine tender provides 

alongside support to a Polaris fleet ballistic missile submarine at Holv Loch. 

Scotland. 

Navy Art Collection #470 
Crisis Unfolds 

prepared to implement the 

Cuba contingency plans. On 

the East Coast, I1 Marine Expeditionary Force, under command of Major General 

Frederick L. Weiseman, got 

ready to embark in the ships 

of Amphibious Group 4. This 

force included four BLTs and 

armored and antitank support units of the 2nd Marine 

Division and Marine Aircraft 

Group 26. On the West Coast, 

the Marine Corps ordered the 

activation of the Fifth Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade. Composed of four battalions from 

the 1st Marine Division, this 

brigade would embark in the 

ships of Amphibious Group 3 

which would then transit the 

Panama Canal into the Caribbean Sea. Additional Marine 

aviation and support units 

As they steam toward the Caribbean hot 

spot, the destroyer English (DD 696) 

takes on fuel from the aircraft carrier Independence (CVA 62). By this method of 

resupply, called underway replenishment, smaller ships of the fleet were 

able to remain on station throughout the 

crisis. Tankers also fueled ships at sea. 

readied themselves for Cuban 

operations. 

To prepare for an invasion 

of Cuba, if that became necessary, the services held a num- 
ber of landing exercises in 

Florida. In conjunction with 

Army and Marine units, the 

Navy practiced putting forces 

ashore in Cuba. In one instance, Marines and Army infantrymen came ashore at 

Hollywood Beach near Fort 

Lauderdale. The men had 

trouble moving inland because surprised beachgoers 

thronged the area. 

On 20 October, the president and the EXCOM faced a 

complex problem. The group 

wanted to prevent further 

shipment of offensive 

weapons into Cuba, isolate 

Castro from Soviet military 

and economic support, and 

persuade Khrushchev to 

reverse his earlier decision to 

base missiles on the island. 

As so often in modern international crises, sea power 

provided a solution-a naval 

blockade. The Navy's submarines, surface warships, 

and patrol aircraft could execute that mission without 

firing a shot. Moreover, no 

government's permission was 

required to deploy a powerful 

U.S. fleet into the Atlantic or 

the Caribbean to establish a 

naval cordon around the island of Cuba. 

That same day, the president ordered the Navy to stop 

and search any ship 

suspected of transporting offensive weapons into Cuba. 

On the recommendation of his 

advisors, however, he labeled 

the operation a "quarantine," 

because a blockade is an act 

of war in international law. 

Kennedy directed the State 

Department to inform 

America's closest allies of the 

recent events. In addition, he 

stated his intention to address the American people 

two days hence about the blossoming international crisis. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

also met that day and established several guidelines for 

the quarantine. The chiefs 

directed Admiral Dennison to 

position his ships in an arc 

500 nautical miles north and 

east of Cape Maisi, the 

eastern-most point of land in 

Cuba. This deployment would 

keep naval vessels beyond the 

range of the MiG fighters and 

11-28 bombers in Cuba. Admiral Ward codenamed this 

line "Walnut." 

As these decisions were 

made, Destroyer Squadron 

16, based at Mayport, canceled all leave and alerted 

sailors to return to their 

ships. Over the next three 

days, Bigelow (DD 942), William. C. Lawe (DD 763), McCaffery (DD 860), and Forrest 

Royal (DD 872) left port for 

their stations on the "Walnut" 

line. Cruisers, other 

destroyers, and support ships 

sailed from the naval bases at 

Norfolk; Charleston, South 

Carolina; and Newport, 

Rhode Island. 

On the 2 lst, Admiral 

Anderson briefed the EXCOM 

on his operational concept for 

the quarantine. He explained 

in great detail how U.S. warships would locate, signal, 

and if necessary use force 

against suspect ships refusing 

inspection. To improve communication, he had dispatched Russian linguists to 

the quarantine force. As the 

meeting closed, the president 

gave CNO his charge: 'Well, 

Admiral it looks as though 

this is up to the Navy." Anderson responded, "Mr. President, the Navy will not let 

you down." 

That evening, Admiral 

Dennison issued Operation 

Order 45-62 establishing the 

Quarantine Force as Task 

Force 136, under the direct 

control of Admiral Ward. This 

RAdm. Edward J. O'Donnell, commander of the naval base at Guantanamo, briefs Chief of Naval Operations 

Adm. George W. Anderson on the defensive strengths and weaknesses of his 

Navy-Marine garrison. 
Marlne PFC Wilbur Martln sets up a TPS 

21 air searah radar atop "Suicide Ridge" 

on the perimeter at Guantanamo Bay, 

Cuba. 

force included many of the 

destroyers and cruisers that 

had put to sea during the previous days, as well as the 

Essa ASW group, and a logistic force of two oilers, an ammunition ship, and two 

destroyers. 

As war clouds gathered, Admiral Dennison took action to 

strengthen Naval Base, Guantanamo, perched on a vulLC Gwgrapny and Map Division 

A map of the Caribbean Basin in the early 1960s. The quarantine lines were both located east of the Bahamas and north of Puerto 

Rico, in the upper center of the map. The carrier task force (Task Force 135) operated in the waters around Jamaica. 
nerable few acres of land near 

the southeastern tip of Cuba. 

The U.S. Navy had operated 

from "GITMO" since acquiring the former coaling station 

from Spain in 1898. The garrison consisted of a relatively 

small force of three Marine 

rifle companies, backed by 

limited artillery and air support. Navy bluejackets 

ashore, organized into additional rifle companies after 

the Bay of Pigs, supported the 

main line of resistance. 

Seabees from Naval Mobile 

Construction Battalions 4 and 

7 manned perimeter positions 

and served 81 mm mortars, 

and at least forty Cubans 

from the base work force 

volunteered to serve as 

"second man" on police 

patrols of the facility. Still, 

the defenders of Guantanamo, 

commanded by Rear Admiral 

Edward J. O'Donnell, would 

be hard pressed to hold the 

base if Castro sent strong 

ground forces against it. 

Brigadier General William 

R. Collins, USMC, had arrived on 20 October to take 

LC PRP LC-U9-8762 #lo 

Top: Marine infantry from one of the two 

battalion landing teams airlifted by Air 

Force C-135 transports to Leeward Point 

air facility prepare to reinforce other Marines and sailors manning the perimeter 

at Guantanamo. Middle: Navy nurses, on 

the staff of Guantanamo Naval Hospital, 

shared the dangers of service at this 

American outpost on the southern end 

of Cuba. Bottom: On 22 October, U.S. naval patrol planes operating over the 

broad Atlantic from their air facility in 

the Azores discovered the rendezvous 

of a Soviet Zulu-class submarine and 

the tanker Terek. 

USN 1068403 
NHC S-OD-A Collection 

charge, under O'Donnell, of 

the ground forces at Guantanamo. The next day, Air 

Force Military Air Transport 

Service planes reinforced the 

base with Marine BLT 211. On 

the 22nd, Amphibious 

Squadron 8 put another 

Marine contingent, BLT 212, 

ashore. The amphibious ships 

immediately left for 

Morehead City, North 

Carolina, to embark another 

Marine infantry battalion. 

Subsequent reinforcement 

would bring in another BLT 

and Battery C of the 3rd 

Marine Light Anti-Aircraft 

Missile Battalion equipped 

with Hawk missiles. Tragically, an Air Force (2-135 

transport delivering ammunition to the base crashed, killing the crew. The airlift also 

brought in Navy medical 

teams to augment the base 

hospital staff. That staff included ten members of the 

Navy Nurse Corps-led by 

Commander Dorothy EatonA Navy bluejacket helps Guantanamo dependents disembark from USNS Upshur 

at Norfolk, Virginia. In one day, 22 October, four Navy ships evacuated the 2,400 

dependents from the threatened base in 

Cuba. 

who soon were the only 

American women on the base. 

As the Marine and Navy 

combatants came ashore, 

civilian dependents headed in 

the other direction. Male 

hospital patients, women, and 

children moved to the base air 

facility and the piers for 

transportation to Norfolk. 

Seaplane tender Duxbury Bay 

(AVP 38), tank landing ship 

Desoto County (LST 1171), 

stores ship Hyades (AF 28), 

and transport USNS Upshur 

embarked the majority of 

evacuees from Guantanamo. 

By 1630 on the evening of 22 

October, all four ships had 

cleared the harbor. 

Meanwhile, Admiral Dennison ordered all attack submarines in the Atlantic Fleet 

to load for wartime operations 

and to disperse to waters 

north of Charleston. In Washington, Admiral Anderson 

asked the Canadian, British, 

and several Latin American 

navies for help locating Soviet 

ships and submarines in the 

Atlantic. 

Also on that momentous 

day, the Navy forwarded to 

Washington worrisome information. Navy patrol planes 

flying from Lajes in the 

Azores spotted the Soviet 

tanker Terek refueling a Zuluclass submarine in nearby 

waters. 

At an EXCOM meeting that 

day, the CIA informed the 
United States and overseas. 

SAC also fueled and readied 

for launching over 100 

in Cuba as false statements. 

Of great portent, he announced that the U.S. govern

As other U.S. sea, air, and 

ground forces increased their 

readiness for war, the nuclearpowered carrier Enterprise 

(CVAN 65) and the fully armed 

AD-6 Skyraiders of her Attack 

Squadron 65 prepared to 

launch strikes against targets 

in Cuba. 
The Crisis Approaches a Climax 

forces. On the 23rd, at 

Khrushchev's direction. Soviet Defense Minister ~odion 

Malinovsky put all Soviet 

forces in a higher state of 

alert and postponed the release from service of Strategic 

Rocket Force personnel and 

submarine crewmen. Castro 

placed his regular military 

and naval forces on the highest level of alert and called 

out the militia, which converged on Guantanamo. Calming one U.S. concern, Soviet 

forces in East Germany, the 

Mediterranean, and the Far 

East made no visible preparations for operations against 

the NATO nations and America's Asian allies. 

The president's address also 

raised the alarm in Latin 

American capitals. On the 

23rd, representatives of the 

Organization of American 

States (OAS), composed of the 

United States and twenty 

Latin American countries, 

gathered in Washington to 

chart a course of action. Secretary Rusk personally led the 

U.S. delegation. He asked the 

organization to support a 

quarantine of Cuba and to 

join the United States in demanding the removal of Soviet strategic missiles from 

the island. In a series of 

short, pointed statements, the 

other representatives strongly 

endorsed the proposed U.S. actions. The final vote was 19 to 

0 in favor of the U.S. proposiA Royal Canadian Air Force Argus patrol plane and a U.S. Navy P2v ~eptune ovemy 

the vast Atlantic Ocean in search of Soviet warships and merchantmen. The invohfement of Canadian air and surface units in 

to the successful resolution of the Cuban 

tion, with the Uruguayans abstaining due only to a lack of 

instructions from their government. The seat for Cuba's representative was empty 

This vote of the OAS, rarely 

unified on any issue, reflected 

the seriousness with which 

the member nations viewed 

the external threat to the 

Western Hemisphere. The 

Kennedy administration was 

surprised but pleased by the 

organization's vote. Khrushchev was dismayed. He 

thought that long-standing 

anti-American feeling in some 

Latin American countries 

would prevent concerted OAS 

action. In fact, Argentina, the 

Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Venezuela even ofthe ~tlantic patrol effort was instrumen 

I Missile Crisis. 

fered to provide naval forces 

for the quarantine, and another six nations volunte 

use of their airfields and 

ports. 

Canadian armed force 

with some British units 

tached, also joined in th 

fense of the hemisphere. 

Royal Canadian Air Force 

(RCAF) elements of the North 

American Air Defense Command went to the Canadian 

equivalent of Defense Con 

tion 3 on 24 October. 

Additionally, this alert level 

mandated the establishment 

of an antisubmarine patrol 

barrier in the Atlantic. or-. 

mally, that line would have extended from Greenland to 

Iceland and then to the 
United Kingdom-the socalled "GIUK Gap." The concentration of U.S. naval forces 

in southern waters during October 1962, however, left too 

few units available to set up a 

GIUK barrier. As a result, Admiral Taylor, Commander 

Anti-Submarine Forces, Atlantic Fleet, established a patrol 

line further south in the Atlantic. This line covered the 

600 miles of ocean between 

Cape Race on Newfoundland 

to an area 300 miles northwest of the Azores. A force of 

ten U.S. and two British submarines, HMS Alderney and 

HMS Astute, the latter boats 

under Canadian control, 

helped form that barrier. 

Overhead were U.S. Navy 

P2V Neptunes and RCAF' Argus patrol aircraft. Because of 

their greater range, the Canadian aircraft overflew the far 

end of the line. At any one 

time, three of the Canadian 

planes were on station conducting missions, twenty 

hours long, from takeoff to 

landing. 

Later in the crisis, Canadian Rear Admiral Kenneth 

Dyer agreed to Admiral Taylor's request that Argus patrol 

planes take over the Quonset 

Point Patrol east of Rhode Island so American planes 

Willard Keith (DD 775) cuts through the 

waters of the Atlantic during 1962. This 

sleek combatant, commissioned during 

World War II, was typical of the Allen M. 

Sumner-class destroyers that did yeoman service on the quarantine line off 

Cuba. 
could deploy to the ASW barrier or to Key West. In addition, Royal Canadian Navy 

escort ships released American forces from their surveillance of the George's Bank 

area. 

On the evening of 23 October, President Kennedy announced that the quarantine 

of Cuba would begin at 1000 

EDT on 24 October. International shipping was advised to 

avoid the waters around 

Cuba. Later communications 

established how "unidentified 

submerged submarines" were 

to operate in the "general vicinity of Cuba." 'Ib be regarded as nonthreatening, 

once U.S. warships dropped 

harmless sound signals, undersea vessels were to surface 

and head due east. 

'I% monitor submarine movements and the flow of merchant shipping to and from 

Cuba, Admiral Dennison established a Quarantine Plot 

in his Norfolk headquarters. 

Information contained in situation summaries kept the 

Pentagon and the task force 

commanders apprised of the 

location of various suspect 

vessels. 

To carry out the quarantine 

the Navy assembled east of 

Cuba under Task Force 136, a 

formidable armada of an ASW 

carrier, two cruisers, 22 destroyers, and two guided missile frigates. This included 

the Newport-based Destroyer 

Squadron 24, one of the 

Willard Keith: Destroyer on the Quarantine Line 

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, 20 or more ges remains of her earlier antisubmarine 

U.S. Navy destroyers served on the two quaran- weapons suite, but two new fmed Hedgehog 

tine lines, 'Walnut" and "Chestnut," as part of projectors have been installed on both sides of 

Task Group 136.1. Of these ships, 14 were either gun mount 52. The ship also carries a pair of 

Allen M. Sumner (DD 692) or Gearing (DD 710)- Mark 32 lightweight, triple-tube antisubmarine 

class destroyers. weapons placed between the stacks (hidden in 

Both classes were built as part of the 2,200- this photo by the support for the starboard 3- 

ton destroyer program of 1942. The ships were inch gun) which replaced the old quintuple bank 

capable of 32 knots. They originally carried six of 21-inch tubes. 

dual-purpose, 5-inch guns, 10 21-inch torpedo The destroyer's fire controls include a Mark 37 

tubes, two stern racks and six side launchers for gun director with a Mark 25 antenna dish for 

depth charges, and 12 40mm and 11 20mm an- the 5-inch guns, Mark 56 and 63 directors for 

tiaircraft guns. The only substantial difference the 3-inch guns, and a Mark 105 antisubmarine 

between the two destroyer types was the greater warfare director. Willard Keith operates an SPSlength of the Gearing class, which allowed them 6 air search radar and an SPS-10 surface search 

increased fuel storage and, therefore, greater radar. Her sonar is an improved SQS-4 of the 

range. SQS-29/32 series. 

Ships of these two classes formed the core of During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Willard 

the Navy's destroyer force during the decade Keith steamed in Destroyer Squadron 22. She 

after World War 11. The Navy continued to im- deployed on quarantine line 'Walnut" on 24 Ocprove these vessels throughout their service life. tober as an escort to the fleet flagship, heavy 

Willard Keith (DD 7751, pictured here in early cruiser Newport News (CA 148). Under the com1962, displays the changes made during the mand of Commander Claude L. Tyler, Willard 

1950s. She retains all of her 5-inch guns, but six Keith served on quarantine duty until 15 Novemmore-modern, 3-inch, rapid-fire guns have ber 1962. Tyler and his crew received the Armed 

replaced her 20mm and 40mm antiaircraft guns. Forces Expeditionary Medal for their service 

Only one stern rack of fast-sinking depth char- during the crisis. 
Navy's most modern ASW 

units and composed of Blandy 

(DD 943), Barry (DD 933), 

Keppler (DD 765), and 

Charles S. Sperry (DD 697). 

In late October, there were 

at least five Soviet submarines of the Foxtrot class operating in the Atlantic. 

Supporting these warships 

were the tanker Terek, a refrigerator ship, and the intelligence trawler Shkval. 

Because Soviet submarines 

constituted the greatest 

threat to the U.S. Atlantic 

Fleet, Admiral Anderson ordered that their activities be 

closely monitored. Furthermore, U.S. naval units would 

be prepared to sink the Soviet 

ships on command from 

higher authority. 

The day after the president's speech, in the Atlantic 

and bound for Cuba were 26 

Soviet and Eastern Bloc merchant and passenger ships, including 18 Soviet freighters. 

The freighter Leninsky Komsomol was already well inside 

the quarantine line. The ship 

carried as many as thirteen 11- 

28 Beagle bombers crated and 

on deck. American intelligence determined that another seven ships probably 

carried military cargo. The 

large hatch and spacious hold 

of one of these vessels, Poltava, made her ideally suited 

to transporting missiles below 

decks. Photographs taken by 

patrol aircraft also discovered 

that the ship carried as deck 

cargo strange rings mounted 

on trucks. Intelligence specialists soon decided that these 

objects were support rings for 

the SS-5 IRBM. 

Admiral Anderson ordered 

the heavy cruiser Newport 

News (CA 148) and two destroyers to intercept the merchantman and to prepare to 

stop and board her precisely 

at 1000 on the 24th, if so directed. CNO signaled the 

same instructions to the 

guided missile cruiser Canberra (CAG 2), then steaming 

to intercept Kimovsk, another 

suspected weapons carrier. 

By the afternoon of 24 October, information obtained 

from Navy patrol ships and 

aircraft, and other intelligence sources, made it clear 

that 16 of the Soviet ships in 

the Atlantic were dead in the 

water or had come about and 

were steaming for home. Although the operation was less 

than eight hours old, Anderson could report that most of 

the Soviet ships would not 

cross the Navy's quarantine 

line. 

Not all Soviet ships had 

turned back, however. The 

tanker Bucharest, obviously 

carrying no weapons, pressed 

on toward Cuba. As directed 

by the Pentagon, Admiral 

Ward positioned destroyers to 

intercept her. President 

Kennedy, concluding that 

Khrushchev wanted to avoid 

a confrontation on the line, 

however, directed the Navy to 

shadow the ship but not stop 

her. Eventually, Bucharest 

identified herself to the destroyer Gearing and slowed 

down so the Americans could 

visually inspect and photograph her. The Soviet vessel 

was then allowed to proceed 

to Cuba. 

Of a more serious nature, 

on the afternoon of the 24th, 

fleet antisubmarine units detected a Soviet submarine, 

which they labeled contact C18,400 miles north of Puerto 

Rico and inside the quarantine line. 

The day witnessed another 

dramatic development. Air 

Force General Thomas S. 

Power, commander of SAC, 

put his forces on Defense Condition 2, one step short of general, global war. One out of 

every eight B-52s went on airborne alert, and all ICBMs 

were put on-line. Because 

SAC headquarters sent out 

the alert messages in the 

clear, Soviet officials knew immediately of the U.S. action. 

Since Power did not clear the 

order with the Department of 

Defense, however, Washington did not know he had 

taken this step. 7henty years 

after the crisis, Secretary of 

Defense McNamara and National Security Advisor Bundy 

claimed that they were unaware of the heightened SAC 

alert. 

International tension 

mounted on 25 October as 

U.S. and Soviet representatives came to grips in 

the United Nations. Soviet 

Ambassador Valerian Zorin 

challenged U.S. Ambassador 

Adlai Stevenson to present 

evidence of Soviet offensive 

missiles in Cuba. The usually 

restrained Stevenson responded, "Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the 

USSR has placed and is placing medium and intermediate- 
range missiles and sites in 

Cuba? Yes or no-don't wait 

for the translation-yes or 

no!" When Zorin promised an 

answer sometime later, 

Stevenson shot back that he 

was prepared to "wait for my 

answer until hell freezes 

over." The U.S. representative 

then displayed to a hushed 

Security Council enlarged photos of the Soviet installations 

in Cuba. The evidence of 

Soviet activity, and, deception, 

was clear to the assembled 

diplomats. 

Meanwhile, on the quarantine line, HUK Task Group 

83.2 (Task Group Alfa), 

formed around ASW carrier 

Randolph (CVS 15) and seven 

destroyers, had located another Soviet submarine. This 

one, designated C-19, was 150 

miles outside the exclusionary 

zone and although submerged, was heading east. 

Ships and aircraft from the 

task group maintained contact with the submarine to 

make sure she kept on an outbound course. 

That evening, the EXCOM 

decided to stop and search 

one of the merchantmen making for Cuba to demonstrate 

American resolve. They selected the Lebanese-flagged 

freighter Marucla, contracted 

to carry Soviet goods to Cuba. 

Because U.S. intelligence specialists knew that the Soviet 

government did not move 

weapons in Western or neutral ships, the EXCOM felt 

this boarding was unlikely to 

be resisted. Planes from Essex 

located the ship, while destroyers John R. Pierce (DD 

753) and Joseph I? Kennedy, 

Jr, (DD 850) closed her position. 

At 0650 the following morning, 26 October, Kennedy 

asked Marucla to heave to, 

which she did. A boarding 

party of four U.S. naval officers and one signalman from 

the crews of the two destroyers was welcomed aboard by 

the merchantman's captain. 

The American sailors reviewed the ship's manifests 

and inspected the cargo. Finding no contraband onboard, 

the U.S. command allowed 

Marucla to continue her passage to Cuba. More importantly, the point was made 

that the United States 

intended to enforce the 

quarantine. 

Also that day, American 

ships and patrol planes 

picked up two Soviet submarines on their radars. ASW 

Task Group Alfa located one, 

labeled (2-20, well inside the 

USN 711187 

A boat bearing a boarding party makes its way from the destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. (DD 850), named for the president's 

older brother killed in World War II, to the Lebanese freighter Marucla. The Kennedy administration chose to board and search 

this merchantman on 26 October as a demonstration to Moscow that any ship en route to Cuba was subject to inspection by the 

quarantine force. 
Navy Photoreconnaissance Mission 

Soon after U-2 high-flying aircraft brought officer, Commander Bob Koch, also known as 

back the startling information that Khrushchev "Daddy Photo," supervised the development and 

intended to install offensive missiles in Cuba, initial interpretation of the pictures and later 

the president's chief advisors called for more dispatched them to Washington. 

detailed intelligence of Soviet and Cuban forces Still in his plane, Ecker was ordered to 

and activities on the island. At Washington's proceed immediately to the nation's capital. 

direction, Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Com- Flying at Mach .8, the F8U-1P soon arrived at 

mander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, or- Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington. A 

dered the deployment to Naval Air Station, Key helicopter then whisked him to the Pentagon 

West, Florida, of six planes from the Navy's where, still in his flight suit but relieved of his 

Light Photographic Squadron WP) 62, nick- side arm, he was taken in secret to a high 

named "Fightin' Photo." Commander William B. security area. To the surprise of the Navy comEcker, a combat veteran of World War 11, led the mander, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman 

unit, which consisted of over 500 officers and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Admiral 

men and 26 F8U-1P Crusader photoreconnais- George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, 

sance planes. Two-plane sections of the appeared and ushered him into the JCS meeting 

squadron normally served on each of the Atlan- room, the "tank." 

tic Command's five attack aircraft carriers. Ecker apologized for being sweaty and smelly, 

Shortly after the squadron's 19 October ar- which prompted General Curtis LeMay, the 

rival at Key West, situated less than 100 miles gruff Air Force Chief of Staff, to interject, "God 

from Cuba, Ecker received orders to initiate low- damn it, you've been flying an airplane now 

level photoreconnaissance missions over the is- haven't you? You ought to sweat and smell. Sit 

land. Crusaders piloted by Ecker and five other down." 

naval aviators took off from the naval facililty on Thereafter, Ecker described to the assembled 

the 23rd for the first mission. Flying in three, chiefs his firsthand impressions of the site he 

two-plane "loose deuce" sections, the detachment and Wilhemy had overflown. He observed that 

traversed the treacherous Florida Strait in ten the Cubans apparently had not fired at his 

minutes and entered Cuban airspace. Ecker and planes and that there was a mass of equipment, 

his wingman, Lieutenant Bruce Wilhemy, quick- much of it camouflaged, at the site. Ecker recomly checked to make sure their navigation was ac- mended that they wait for the film to get more 

curate and headed for the targets assigned them. information. 

Approaching the site at 350 knots and 400 feet The intelligence return from this and suboff the ground, the pilots switched on their sequent VFP-62 missions over Cuba proved vital 

cameras. In less than 30 seconds, the jets to U.S. decision makers. The president and his 

streaked over the target area, their onboard advisors received timely information on the locaequipment recorded the scene below, and they tion, installation status, and later the removal of 

banked for home. missiles and bombers from the island. In recogniThe aerial photographic mission, however, tion of the squadron's stellar performance during 

was far from over. Instead of landing at Key the crisis, President John F. Kennedy personally 

West, the six aircraft set down further north at presented Ecker with the Navy Unit Commendathe squadron's permanent base, Naval Air Sta- tion. In addition, Ecker, along with 11 other 

tion, Cecil Field, Florida, near Jacksonville. The VFP-62 pilots and four attached Marine Corps 

pilots surrendered their film to waiting aviators, received the Distinguished Flying 

photographer's mates who rushed it to nearby Cross for their flights over Cuba. 

facilities for processing. The squadron executive 
NAH, Cuba Ops. 1962 

Navy photographer's mates of VFP-62 remove film from the cameras of an FEU1 P Crusader aerial reconnaissance 

plane that has just returned from a mission over Cuba. In a matter of hours, the 

film will be processed, evaluated by 

skilled photo interpreters, and whisked 

to Washington, D.C., for the use of military and civilian analysts. 
quarantine line just southeast 

of the Bahamas, but headed 

to the northeast. The other, 

designated C-21, was picked 

up east of Jamaica by a carrier in Task Force 135. Admiral Ward deployed the carrier 

force to the shallow waters 

south of Jamaica where it was 

especially difficult for the Soviet sub to break contact with 

her pursuers. The fleet commander also reinforced this 

force with another five destroyers. 

As the units of Task Forces 

135 and 136 tightened their 

surface and air patrols at sea, 

other naval units carried out 

the hazardous low-level reconnaissance flights over Cuba. 

VFP-62 flew its first missions 

over the island the day after 

the president's address to the 

nation. Flying at tree-top 

level at 350 knots, the Crusader jets and their pilots captured on film detailed 

information on the Soviet missile installations. Ground 

crewmen at NAS Cecil Field 

used stencils depicting a fat 

Castro and a dead chicken to 

paint a photo mission "victory" on every returning 

plane. (The chicken was inspired by accounts of Castro's 

slaughtering and cooking the 

birds in his New York hotel 

room during an earlier visit to 

the United Nations.) The first 

words out of the mouths of returning naval aviators often 

were, "Chalk up another 

chicken!" 

An especially successful 

VFP-62 mission occurred on 

25 October, when squadron 

aircraft confirmed the presence in Cuba of Soviet FROG 

(Free Rocket Over Ground) 

tactical rockets. Although 

only short-range weapons, the 

FROGs would pose a threat to 

any American amphibious invasion force. Even though the 

FROGs could carry a nuclear 

warhead, their existence on 

the island did not raise undue 

concern at the time in 

Washington. 

The Navy also helped prepare Air Force units for lowlevel aerial photographic 

missions. The Air Force had 

tactical reconnaissance units 

in TAC, but their personnel 

needed specialized training in 

such low-level missions and 

instruction in use of the 

Navy's state-of-the-art 

cameras. 

The atmosphere was even 

more charged in Washington 

that day. John Scali, the State 

Department correspondent for 

ABC News, met with Alexandr Fomin, the chief officer 

of Soviet intelligence (KGB) 

in the United States. Fomin 

asked Scali to relay a message to the latter's "contact" 

(understood to be Secretary 

Rusk) at the department. The 

message was a Soviet proposal to withdraw the offensive missiles from Cuba in 

NAH. VFPBP 

Cdr. William B. Ecker, Commanding Officer of VFP-62, congratulates Capt. John I. 

Hudson, USMCR, for "chalking up another chicken" after a successful photo flight. 

Hudson was one of four Marine pilots of Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 2 assigned to the Navy squadron. Behind the pilots is an FEU-1 P stenciled with a 

likeness of Castro and a number of chickens, each of which depicts a successful aerial reconnaissance mission over Cuba. 
exchange for President Kennedy's promise not to invade 

Cuba. As expected, Scali 

passed on the information. 

Other developments that 

day were not so positive and 

indeed seemed ominous. 

Counterintelligence agents of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation warned the White 

House that the Soviets were 

burning documents at their 

embassy in Washington and 

their UN enclave on Long Island. The burning of diplomatic and other secret papers 

often, in the past, meant war 

was imminent. 

Around 1800 EDT, 

President Kennedy received a 

message from Premier 

Khrushchev. The Soviet 

leader proposed in a lengthy 

statement that his government would withdraw the offensive missiles and destroy 

their launch sites in Cuba if 

the United States would lift 

the blockade and agree not to 

invade the island. This message, of course, was similar to 

the one Scali received. 

The EXCOM was unsure 

how to interpret these two 

communications. Even 

though Khrushchev appeared 

willing to negotiate, the Soviets continued working on the 

missile sites in Cuba. Was the 

message another deception? 

The president and his chief 

advisors kept the message to 

themselves and awaited further developments. 

The US.-Soviet confrontation at sea came to a head on 

27 October when the tanker 

Groznyy, carrying ammonia, 

approached the quarantine 

line. Washington feared that 

Moscow intended to test the 

quarantine with this ship, 

which Navy patrol planes had 

picked up the previous day 

but then lost track of. Responding to a Navy request 

for assistance, SAC assigned 

Air Force RB-47 aircraft to 

the seaborne search effort and 

deployed them to the naval 

station on Bermuda. On the 

morning of the 27th) one of 

the RB-47s crashed on takeoff, killing the four-man crew, 

but one of the other planes 

spotted Groznyy north of the 

Virgin Islands and heading 

for Cuba. After radioing the location of the tanker, the RB47 made simulated bombing 

runs on the ship to stop herto no avail. Groznyy also 

failed to respond when a 

Navy destroyer, vectored to 

the tanker, signaled her to 

stop. 

The tension rose when Admiral Dennison ordered U.S. 

ships on the scene to load 

their five-inch guns with live 

ammunition. CINCLANT 

soon ordered the destroyers to 

clear their guns by firing 

them into the sea away from 

the tanker. This fire, along 

with a few star shell illumination rounds close aboard the 

tanker, persuaded the Soviet 

captain to stop. Soon after he 

radioed Moscow for instructions, his ship put about and 

left the quarantine zone. 

Not only was tension high 

at sea during this episode but 

in Washington. Both Admiral 

Anderson and Secretary 

McNamara monitored the incident from the Navy's Flag 

Plot command center in the 

Pentagon. Dennison radioed 

for additional instructions after ordering his destroyers to 

load their weapons. Before 

the CNO responded, 

McNamara asked him, 'What 

happens if Groznyy does not 

stop?" Anderson replied that 

the quarantine instructions 

plainly stated that if a ship 

continued to proceed after the 

proper warnings, the U.S. 

warships would stop her by 

shooting away the vessel's 

rudder. McNamara heatedly 

informed Anderson that the 

Navy would take no such action against Soviet ships without his and the president's 

authorization. After almost a 

week of high tension, nerves 

were taut all around. 

A climax to the crisis approached on the morning of 

Saturday, 27 October, when 

the EXCOM met to consider 

the president's response to 

Khrushchev's communication. 

McCone and Lundahl opened 

the meeting with a sobering 

report that all of the MRBM 

sites were now operational, 

that work continued at a furious pace at the IRBM sites, 

and that the 11-28s were being 

assembled. Still, there was 

consensus that a positive reply to Krushchev's letter was 

the best course of action. 

Then, a second message 

from Khrushchev arrived that 

cast a shadow over the EXCOM. This time, the mercurial Soviet leader demanded 

that U.S. missiles be withdrawn from Turkey in exchange for similar Soviet 

action with regard to Cuba. 
Some EXCOM members felt 

that Khrushchev might be losing control of the Kremlin, or 

that the hard-liners wanted 

more concessions from 

Kennedy. 

Soon after receipt of the second troubling message, more 

bad news arrived at the 

White House. The Air Force 

informed the president that a 

U-2 on a routine air sampling 

mission accidently flew over 

northeastern Siberia. The Soviets immediately scrambled 

fighter aircraft to intercept 

the reconnaissance plane. The 

American pilot and his plane 

escaped, but the incident further heightened tensions in 

Moscow and Washington. 

The morning continued to 

go badly. Over eastern Cuba, 

a SAM battery shot down an 

Air Force U-2, killing the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson. 

This seemed to signal another 

change in Soviet policy. Another report stated that 

Cubans had fired on the 

low-level photo missions that 

day. 

With these developments as 

a backdrop, that afternoon 

the Joint Chiefs proposed that 

not later than Monday, 29 October, the United States initiate air strikes against Cuba. 

Then, seven days later, the 

U.S. armed forces would invade the island by air and 

sea. 

With the prospect of conflict 

increasing dramatically, Kennedy decided to respond to 

Khrushchev's first communication, the more reasonable of 

the two. At the president's request, his brother Robert met 

with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin late that evening. The 

attorney general informed Dobrynin that the United States 

government would accept 

Khrushchev's offer to remove 

the missiles from Cuba and in 

return would make a public 

pledge not to invade Cuba. 

Robert Kennedy emphasized 

that if the Soviet government 

agreed to the American proposal, it must do so quickly, 

otherwise the United States 

would be compelled to remove 

the missiles by force. He also 

mentioned that for some time 

the president had been considering the withdrawal of the 

U.S. IRBMs from Turkey and 

that this would occur in the 

near future. The attorney general made it clear, however, 

that the removal of the missiles in Turkey was not public 

information, and if the Soviets violated this "secret" 

agreement, the entire deal 

was off. In short, President 

Kennedy was suggesting that 

the United States was making its final offer to settle the 

crisis. 

That same day, correspondent John Scali had his second meeting with KGB offlcer 

Fomin. Scali accused Fomin 

of a "stinking double cross," 

stalling for time, and playing 

him for a fool. The Soviet insisted that the offer he had 

transmitted was legitimate 

and that he would contact 

Moscow directly. According to 

one historian of the crisis, 

Scali's outburst helped convince Khrushchev that the 

Americans would not brook 

further delay or posturing. 

Capping the day's events 

and indicating the gravity of 

the situation, the ships of 

Task Group Alfa closed in on 

a Soviet submarine (contact C19) first located on the 26th. 

To signal the undersea vessel 

that American naval forces 

were aware of her presence, 

sailors on the destroyer Cony 

dropped five hand grenades 

over the side. The sound from 

these exploding grenades 

could be easily picked up by 

the submarine's sonar. Three 

hours later, the Foxtrot-class 

boat surfaced and identified 

herself as the Soviet naval 

vessel Korablx (Ship X). Escorted by several U.S. warships, the submarine 

proceeded at slow speed on an 

easterly heading into the open 

Atlantic. 

As the sun rose on Sunday, 

28 October, the armed might 

of the United States was prepared for all likely contingencies. Polaris submarines and 

SAC bombers and ICBMs 

stood ready to incinerate the 

Soviet Union if its leaders 

launched a direct attack on 

the United States. U.S. Atlantic Fleet carrier, surface, and 

attack submarine forces, with 

Canadian naval units in support, were deployed in 

strength in the Atlantic and 

Caribbean. Air Force, Navy, 

and Marine Corps tactical 

fighter and attack squadrons 

remained on alert at bases in 

the southern United States. 

Army airborne, infantry, and 

armored divisions, as well as 

Marine Corps landing forces, 

awaited an order to start the 

invasion of Cuba. Although 
the president temporarily suspended U-2 flights over the island after Anderson's loss, 

Navy and Air Force reconnaissance aircraft, with heavily 

armed fighters flying in support off the Cuban coast, continued to execute low-level 

photo missions. 

Also at full alert were Soviet and Cuban forces on the 

island. In addition to the 

MRBM, IRBM, and SAM batteries, the Soviets had ready 

for battle in Cuba four regimental combat groups 

equipped with tanks, armored 

personnel carriers, antitank 

missiles, and Luna (FROG) 

tactical rockets. Unknown to 

U.S. intelligence, tactical nuclear warheads for the Lunas 

had been stockpiled in Cuba. 

The Soviet military commander in Cuba was authorized to use the short-range 

weapons to defeat an arnphibious invasion by American 

forces. In addition to the Soviet units, the Cubans fielded 

a regular force of 75,000, a reserve force of 100,000, and a 

militia of 100,000. 

As official Washington anxiously waited, shortly after 

0900 EDT on 28 October, a 

message started coming in 

from Moscow. Even though 

the communication arrived in 

several parts, the opening 

paragraphs made it clear that 

Khrushchev had accepted the 

president's proposal. The Soviets would withdraw their 

missiles from Cuba. The likelihood of war, either a global 

nuclear conflagration or a devastating Caribbean conflict, 

was greatly diminished. 

Photographed by an American P2V Neptune, probably from VP-5, Soviet Foxtrotclass submarine 911 heads due east into 

the Atlantic. For 35 hours, the submerged F 911 tried to evade detection by 

U.S. forces. Destroyer Charles I? Cecil 

(DDR 835) and patrol planes never lost 

contact with the submarine, however, finally forcing the Soviet boat to surface 

for a battery recharge. 
Enforcing the Settlement 

This photo of an MRBM site at San Cristobal taken on 27 October by a Navy Crusader, from an altitude of about 500 feet, clearly 

shows that the missile battery is operational. The Cuban Missile Crisis reached a climax that day. 

T he crisis had passed 

and the world soon 

breathed easier, but the 

international confrontation 

would not end until both sides 

carried out their ends of the 

agreement. And, until the end 

of October, Washington was 

not certain that the Soviets 

would do so. Low-level reconnaissance revealed that while 

some missile erectors were 

taken from the launch pads, 

the construction and 

camouflaging of support 

facilities and equipment 

proceeded. In addition, Soviet 

technicians continued to uncrate and assemble more of 

the 11-28 bombers, which 

Washington considered offensive weapons. 

The situation remained 

tense at sea. On 29 October, 

Charles E! Cecil (DDR 835) located and stayed on top of a 

submerged Soviet submarine 

(contact C-20), despite the 

best efforts of the boat to 

evade her pursuer. Finally, 

after enduring thirty-five 

hours of constant surveillance 

with active sonar, the Foxtrotclass boat surfaced and 

proceeded due east. Patrol 

aircraft shadowed and 

photographed the vessel, identified as Soviet submarine 

F 911. 

Another boat (contact C-18), 

trailed by Keppler, surfaced 

on 30 October. The submarine's crew had painted out 

the numbers on her sail, but 

naval intelligence still was 

able to identify the unit as 

F 945. Because the submarine 

did not submerge again once 

free of the quarantine area, 

the normal practice, the 

Americans concluded that the 

vessel had suffered a serious 

mechanical failure. Thus, as 

the boat shaped a northeasterly course on the surface, 

U.S. naval vessels and 

aircraft had ample opportunity to photograph and observe their maritime 

opponent. 

Another problem that 

developed was Castro's displeasure over the Soviet 

retrenchment and opposition 

to the terms of the U.S.-Soviet 

understanding. Castro stated 
that agreements between the 

U.S. and the Soviet Union did 

not apply to Cuba. He 

threatened to shoot down any 

U.S. reconnaissance aircraft 

spotted over the island. 

Moreover, in contrast to the 

Soviets, the Cubans would not 

allow on-site inspection of the 

missile sites in their country 

by a neutral party. The most 

Castro would agree to was a 

30 October visit to Havana by 

U Thant, Secretary General of 

the United Nations. 

As Washington analyzed 

the Soviet and Cuban reactions to the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding, naval 

forces maintained their vigil 

in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. U.S. and Canadian 

units continued to monitor 

the broad expanse of the Atlantic. On 31 October, the 

destroyer escort Calcaterra 

(DER 390) took over from 

Mills (DER 383) the shadowing 

of Soviet tanker Terek. In addition, to lower the number of 

ships needed at sea, Admhal 

Dennison ordered the fleet to 

move the quarantine line 

closer to Cuba. During 30-31 

October, Task Force 136 took 

up positions on the new line, 

codenamed "Chestnut," that 

ran northwest from Puerto 

Rico along the Atlantic side of 

the Bahamas. An antisubmarine HUK group operated 

about 150 miles northeast of 

the center of this new line. 

Finally, on 1 November, 

American intelligence gained 

indications that the Soviets 

and the Cubans would adhere 

to the terms of the KennedyKhrushchev understanding. 

Aerial photographs resulting 

from that day's low-level 

reconnaissance missions over 

the island revealed an 

astonishing number of changes. Overnight, the Soviets 

had removed many of the missiles and erectors, crated their 

launching stands, and even 

begun the destruction of the 

launch pads. Clearly, the 

Soviets were complying with 

the Kennedy-Khrushchev 

agreement. Furthermore, 

despite Castro's hostile 

rhetoric, his forces did not fire 

on the Navy, Marine, and Air 

Force photoreconnaissance 

planes. 

While these developments 

were encouraging, 

Washington considered it essential, given Khrushchev's 

earlier duplicity, to verlfy the 

removal of Soviet offensive 

weapons from Cuba. In fact, it 

was vital that the United 

States be confident that all 

missiles, Beagle bombers, 

and other systems were 

withdrawn. Moreover, potentially dangerous Soviet submarines still prowled the 

waters near the quarantine 

line and in the Atlantic and 

had to be closely watched. In 

this effort, which lasted 

through the end of November, 

the U.S. Navy was a prominent 

player. 

Khrushchev's representatives at the United 

Navy, Marine, and Air Force avlators discuss their low-level reconnaissance mi* 

sions over Cuba, reflecting the multiservice nature of operations during the missile 

crisis. Pictured left to right: Lt. Col. Joseph O'Grady, commander of the Air Force's 

29th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron; Cdr. William B. Ecker, who led the Navy's 

VFP-62; and Capt. John I. Hudson of Marine Reconnaissance Composite Squadron 2. 

Behind them is the nose of an Air Force RF-101 Voodoo and the forward section of a 

Navy FBU-1 P Crusader. 
Nations reported that the 

Soviets had deployed 42 

MRBMs to the island but that 

establishment of the U.S. 

quarantine had stopped the 

delivery of any IRBMs. With 

regard to verifying the dismantling of the weapon systems and their withdrawal by 

sea, the diplomats stated that 

Soviet authorities would assist the U.S. surveillance effort. In short order, the 

Soviets supplied a list of ships 

carrying the missiles from 

Cuba and their departure 

dates. Furthermore, the 

Soviets promised to carry the 

missiles as deck cargo and 

allow U.S. Navy ships and 

aircraft to move in close for accurate observation. The U.S. 

State Department then informed the Soviets of selected 

"alongside" points where U.S. 

Navy ships would inspect the 

outgoing Soviet freighters. 

Beginning in early NovemNAH. Cuba Om. 1962 

ber, Navy, Marine, and Air 

Force low-level reconnaissance planes flew numerous 

missions over the Cuban 

launch sites, roads to the 

coast, and major ports. These 

flights clearly recorded the 

movement of the MRBMs and 

related equipment to the 

ports and the loading of 

Soviet merchantmen. 

On 5 November, the first 

Soviet ships sailed from 

Mariel, and during the 

remainder of the week, 

another seven Soviet ships 

carrying missiles did the 

same. While several vessels 

did not depart when U.S. officials were told they would, 

there was no way for the 

Soviets to evade the 

"alongside" inspection force. 

U.S. naval surface and air 

units observed each of the 

missile-carrying ships closely. 

The Navy monitored the ships 

not only on their passage 

through the quarantine area 

but in the Mediterranean and 

even the Black Sea. Admiral 

Anderson wanted to make 

sure he could tell the 

president that all the missiles 

were "back in Russia." 

Most Soviet merchant ship 

captains cooperated with the 

surveillance and inspection 

regime, but some tested the 

system. For example, the 

master of freighter Bratsk 

tried unsuccessfully to avoid 

the alongside inspection area. 

In another instance, the 

master of the freighter Volgoles refused several requests 

to remove tarpaulins covering 

missiles stowed on his deck 

when U.S. destroyer Vesole 

(DDR 878) came alongside. 

Vesole's commanding officer, 

Soviet freighter Bratsk, photographed 

near the Bahamas by Lt. Kelsey Goodman from his HSS-2 helicopter of 

Wasp's Helicopter Anti-Submarine 

Squadron 3, carries military vehicles 

and covered missiles aft of the lifeboats. 
An Air Force RF-101 Voodoo, whose 

shadow can be seen at the bottom of 

this aerial photo, overflies a Soviet 

freighter, probably Fin'k Kurchatovk, in 

Casilda Port, Cuba, on 6 November 

1962. Seen on her deck are six tarpaulincovered missiles. By such means, U.S. 

intelligence verified the removal of Soviet offensive weapons from the island. 

USN 711204 

As a Navy P2V Neptune armed with general purpose bombs overflies the scene, U.S. 

destroyer Vesole steams alongside the Soviet freighter Volgoles to get a close look at 

her deck cargo. Only after U.S. authorities contacted Soviet representatives at the 

UN did the master of this freighter have his crewmen remove the tarpaulins to reveal 

dismantled mi?-ilnel, ' . ,'&Pi 
A P2V Neptune of Patrol Squadron 18 and another U.S. plane fly past the starboard 

quarter of Soviet freighter Okhotsk in December 1962. Visible on deck are crates 

containing the fuselages of 11-28 Beagle bombers being returned to the Soviet Union 

from Cuba. 

Soviet captain sounded a 

warning horn. Biddle maintained her position to finish 

the task. The Soviet captain 

protested by loudspeaker. The 

destroyer's captain, Com- 

"- mander Paul Roth, responded 4' . 

,% Xf4C' . . ..4e,"~ .. through a Russian-speaking officer by inviting the Soviet 

to lunch. The latter replied 

that unfortunately he had 

other plans. 

Not every interception was 

a tense affair, however. Later 

in the operation, a helicopter 

from Wasp (CVS 18) intercepted the Soviet ship 

Captain Richard S. White 111, 

immediately dispatched a 

message reporting this 

development through the 

naval command structure. It 

soon reached the United Nations, where Soviet representatives suggested that 

after a short period of time 

the destroyer captain again 

contact Volgoles. When Vesole 

next signaled the Soviet ship, 

her crewmen promptly uncovered the missiles. 

In another incident, guided 

missile destroyer Biddle 

(DDG 5) steamed so close to 

Leninsky Komsomol to 

photograph the ship that the 

Destroyers of the multinational quarantine force (Task Force 137) sortie from 

Trinidad, West Indies, on 12 November. 

Pictured left to right: Venezuelan ARV TZulia (D 21), USS Mulllnix (DD 944), Argentine ARA Rosales (D 22) and ARA 

Espora (D 21), and Venezuelan ARV 

Nueva Esparta (D 11 ). 

44 USN 1063366 
Alapayevsk. Although listed 

by the Soviets as a missile carrier, Alapayevsk carried only 

support vehicles on deck. Nonsailors, probably missile technicians, were on the deck 

sunning themselves. Crewmen of the American aircraft 

exchanged pleasantries with 

the Soviets and one officer 

even lowered a line to which 

was fastened his Navy tie 

clasp. In return, the Soviets 

sent up a bottle of vodka. 

The arrival of additional 

naval forces in the quarantine 

area made it even less likely 

if" - # 

Capt. Rodderick 0. Middleton, Chief of 

Staff to Commander Carrier Division 4, 

holds the bottle of vodka he received 

from the crew of Soviet freighter A/& 

payevsk. Standing with him (left to right) 

are Lt. John H. Slough, a Russian language interpreter; LCdr. Thermon L. 

Ray, copilot of the HSS-2, to their rear; 

and Cdr. John M. Wondergem, pilot of 

the helo and Commanding Officer of 

Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 3. 

that Soviet merchantmen 

could avoid close inspection. 

Beginning on 12 November, a 

multinational destroyer force, 

designated Task Force 137, 

operated out of the U.S. Navy 

base at Trinidad. As an expression of solidarity among 

the nations of the Western 

Hemisphere, the Argentine 

destroyers ARA Rosales and 

ARA Espora and the 

Venezuelan ships ARV Zulia 

and ARV Nueva Esparta 

steamed in company with 

U.S. destroyer Mullinix (DD 

944). Completing one mission 

before the end of the quarantine, the task force patrolled 

the eastern Caribbean looking 
Lajesbased U.S. Navy 

patrol planes tracked the 

Soviet tug Pamir as she rendezvoused with the disabled 

sub F 945, the latter already 

under watch by U.S. 

destroyer Keppler. Pamir 

crowded Keppler, trying to 

keep the American ship away 

from the submarine. After 

several evasive maneuvers by 

Keppler, Pamir's captain gave 

up his fruitless effort. Keppler 

stayed within 2,500 yards of 

the crippled Soviet sub. 

Not only such occurrences 

at sea but differing interpretations of the Soviet-American 

understanding had the potential to destabilize the situation. For instance, the Soviets 

initially balked at categorizing their 11-28 bombers as offensive weapons and their 

special representative to the 

out of Cuba and control 

Castro, or risk reheating the 

confrontation. The Soviets 

soon agreed to remove the 

bombers as well as the 

missiles. 

For several weeks after 15 

November, when President 

Kennedy ended regular lowlevel reconnaissance missions 

over Cuba, U.S. photographic 

planes periodically overflew 

the embarkation ports. In this 

way, U.S. leaders ensured 

that the Soviets lived up to 

their agreement and removed 

the bombers. 

Following the agreement to 

withdraw the 11-28s, the crisis 

wound down quickly. On 20 

November, President 

Kennedy announced an immediate end to the quanrantine. 

Admiral Dennison ordered his 

Atlantic Fleet ships to return 

over. 

Holding up his end of the 

agreement with Khrushchev, 

Kennedy disavowed any intention to invade Cuba and drew 

down U.S. forces deployed to 

the southern United States in 

readiness to attack the island. 

The president also relaxed the 

alert posture of the Polaris 

and SAC strategic deterrence 

forces. In April 1963, Kennedy completed the "secret" 

part of the agreement and 

withdrew American IRBMs 

from both Turkey and Italy. 

By then, the missiles were not 

needed because the Navy had 

committed several Polaris submarines to support NATO 

partners. The Navy could provide a local nuclear shield for 

America's allies from politically neutral international 

waters. 
Conclusion 

T he Cuban Missile Crisis 

of 1962 was a classic 

demonstration of the 

importance of naval forces in 

the modern international 

security environment. The 

Navy's ballistic missile submarine fleet, and the Air 

Force's land-based ballistic 

missile and bomber units, possessed overwhelming power 

for destruction. Not only were 

the Polaris submarines virtually invisible and invulnerable as they awaited 

launch orders under many 

fathoms of ocean water, but 

they could maneuver close to 

the enemy homeland before 

unleashing their terrible 

weapons. The existence and 

readiness of this strategic arsenal clearly helped President 

Kennedy dissuade the Soviets 

from brandishing their much 

weaker nuclear sword. 

The strength and versatility 

of Admiral Dennison's Atlantic Fleet also lessened the 

chance that Khrushchev 

would mount a conventional 

challenge at sea. U.S. aircraft 

carriers, attack submarines, 

cruisers, destroyers, frigates, 

and shore-based patrol 

squadrons so dominated the 

waters of the Atlantic and the 

Caribbean that Soviet surface 

warships remained in their 

home waters. Furthermore, 

American and Canadian ASW 

forces kept Soviet submarines, the only real 

under Admiral Dennison, the 

unified Commander in Chief, 

U.S. Atlantic Command, were 

clearly superior to Soviet and 

Cuban conventional forces in 

the Caribbean, and this fact 

undoubtedly influenced 

decision making in Moscow 

and Havana. Navy carriers 

loaded with fighter and attack 

aircraft, cruisers and 

destroyers bristling with 8- 

inch and 5-inch guns, and amphibious ships crowded with 

Marines and their weapons 

stood ready to bring war to 

the Cuban littoral. Reinforced 

by Navy ships and Air Force 

transport aircraft, Marine 

units already ashore at Guantanamo were prepared to support any invasion. And, no 

more than a few hundred 

miles away in southern 

Florida and other staging 

areas in the American South, 

Army airborne, infantry, and 

armor divisions and Air Force 

air defense and tactical combat wings were poised. 

The president found U.S. 

naval forces valuable not only 

for deterring nuclear or conventional conflict, but for enabling him to manage a crisis 

without resorting to aggression. The fleet's presence on 

the seaward approaches to 

Cuba allowed him to place the 

onus of any military escalation on Khrushchev. Kennedy 

did not need the permission of 

any multinational organization or single nation to deploy 

these forces. The strength and 

effectiveness of the U.S. naval 

quarantine, however, made it 

militarily and politically acceptable for member states of 

the OAS to join the effort. 

NA 428-N-10652218 

seaborne threat in 1962, * 

: under - such close surveillance - 

that hostile action on their Adm. Robert L. Dennison awards Lt. (jg) William L. Taylor, a VFP-62 pilot, the Distinpart would have been guished Flying Cross for his execution of low-level reconnaissance flights over 

suicidal. Cuba. Taylor and his comrades in the Navy's aviation squadrons demonstrated great 

bravery and professional skill in their missions, which were critical to the successful In addition, the U.S. forces resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. 
Freedom of the sea also allowed Canadian and British 

naval units to take part in the 

surveillance effort without 

negotiating a political agreement. Moreover, the fleet was 

able to remain on station-lndependence operated for 54 

days at sea-because of continuous replenishment by 

naval logistic ships. This 

capability made it possible for 

the president to mount and 

maintain the de facto blockade of Cuba. 

Intelligence collection, including that done by the 

Navy, proved to be another 

vital resource for the president 

in his management of the 

Cuban Missile Crisis. Satellites and U-2 aircraft helped 

assure Kennedy that the 

United States had a decided 

edge over the Soviet Union in 

terms of nuclear weapons. 

CIA and Air Force U-2s unmasked Khrushchev's ploy to 

establish Cuba as a launching 

pad for medium and intermediate-range missiles and 

bombers. Low-level reconnaissance planes, especially the 

Navy's first-rate mits, supplied the EXCOM with 

critical intelligence on Soviet 

and Cuban combat forces and 

defenses on the island. They 

also monitored the dismantling, transportation to ports, 

and loading onto merchantmen of the worrisome 

MRBMs and Il-28 bombers. 

Finally, Navy long-range 

patrol squadrons and surface 

ships enabled Washington to 

verify Soviet compliance with 

the terms of the KennedyKhrushchev understanding 

that resolved this most terrifying crisis of the Cold War. 

The president and the nation were grateful for the 

Navy's contribution to the 

peaceful resolution of the 

Cuban Missile Crisis. The 

sailors and aircrewmen of 

over 250 warships, aviation 

squadrons, and support units 

earned the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. As Admiral Anderson promised, the 

Navy did not let the president 

down. 

Acknowledgements 

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of several groups and individuals who 

aided in the preparation of this work. The 

staffs of the Prints and Photographs Division 

and the Map and Geography Division, both of 

the Library of Congress, and the National Archives Still Picture Branch provided critical 

materials for the project. I am especially grateful to Dr. Dean C. Allard, Director of Naval 

History; Captain Clete Wise, USN, Deputy Director; and Dr. William S. Dudley, Senior Historian, for their continued support of this 

project. The series editor, Dr. Edward J. 

Marolda, provided immeasurable assistance 

and support in preparing this first volume of a 

new series. My thanks also go to Professor 

Betty Miller Unterberger of the Secretary of 

the Navy's Advisory Committee; Commander 

Joseph F. Bouchard, USN; Captain William B. 

Ecker, USN (Ret.); Sean Maloney; Dino A. 

Brugioni; and Beatriz Betancourt Hardy for 

their comments and advice. My coworkers in 

the Naval Historical Center also provided tremendous assistance in their various specialties, including Sandra K. Russell, editor, 

Charles C. Cooney, art director, and Joan A. 

Frasher, typesetter, Naval Aviation News 

Branch; Chuck Haberlein and Ed Finney, 

Photo Section; Gina Akers, John L. Hodges, 

Kathleen M. Lloyd and Mike Walker, Operational Archives; John C. Reilly, Jr., and Doreen 

T. German, Ships' History Branch; Ella Nargele, Information Security Specialist; Glenn E. 

Helm, Navy Department Library; John 

Barnett, Navy Art Collection Branch; and 

Steven D. Hill, Naval Aviation History 

Branch. 

The advice, information, and comments offered by my colleagues in the Contemporary 

History Branch-Jeffrey G. Barlow, Robert J. 

Cressman, Richard A. Russell, Robert J. 

Schneller, and Gary E. Weir-were of inestimable value. Most importantly, I want to thank 

my wife, Ruth, herself a historian. Despite the 

proximity of our wedding date, she generously 

reviewed and commented on the early drafts, 

substantially improving and clarifying the 

author's sometimes arcane account. 
About the Author 

Curtis A. Utz is currently a historian in the 

Naval Historical Center's Contemporary History Branch. He graduated from the University of Maryland where he earned a Bachelor 

of Arts degree in history in 1984. He served as 

a historical interpretation technician with the 

National Park Service and an intern at the 

Srnithsonian's National Air and Space 

Museum. In 1989, he completed a Master of 

Arts degree in history at the University of 

Maryland. Mr. Utz has worked as a free-lance 

military historian and researcher. The 

Maryland Historian has published his works. 

Behind Mr. Utz is the destroyer Barry (DD 

933), a ship on permanent display at the 

Washington Navy Yard and a veteran of 

Cuban Missile Crisis operations. 

Suggested Readings 

Abel, Elie. The Missile Crisis. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966. 

Brugioni, Dino A. Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Random House, 

1991. 

Garthoff, Raymond L. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington: Brookings Institute, 1987. 

'The Cuban Missile Crisis: Oral History." Naval History, Winter 1992. 

Young, Maj. John M. When the Russians Blinked: The U.S. Maritime Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis. 

Washington: History and Museum Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991.