### the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 22-2621 G.G. and D EANNA R OSE , Plaintiff s-Appellants ,

v. S ALESFORCE

. COM , I NC ., Defendant -Appellee

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

. No. 1:20

- cv - 02335 — Andrea R. Wood , Judge

.

____________________ On Petition for Rehearing En Banc or Panel Rehearing

____________________ D ECIDED October 18, 2023

____________________
Before S YKES , Chief Judge , E ASTERBROOK , R OVNER , B RENNAN , S CUDDER , S T

. E VE , K IRSCH , J ACKSON -A KIWUMI , L EE , and P RYOR , Circuit Judges

. P ER C URIAM

. On consideration of defendant

- appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc or panel rehearing, filed on August 17, 2023, all judges on the panel have voted to deny panel2 No. 22-2621 rehearing. A judge in regular active service called for a vote
on the petition for rehear ing en banc, and a majority in active service voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc. Judges Brennan, Scudder, St. Eve, and Kirsch voted to grant the petition for rehearing en banc. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing en banc or panel reheari ng by defendant

- appellee is DENIED

.No. 22-2621 3

S CUDDER , Circuit Judge , joined by S T

. E VE , Ci r cuit Judge , dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc

. While I agree with the panel’s narrow holding that G.G. stated a claim against Salesforce for participation liability un der 18 U.S.C. § 1595, I am troubled by the overbroad and un necessary language in the panel opinion, which risks being read to offer answers to questions not presented in this case. Article III’s Case or Controversy requirement limits fed eral courts to the resolution of concrete disputes between ad verse parties. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 559– 61 (1992). When our decisions exceed that limitation — when we reason with overbreadth

— we risk the issuance of
a dvisory opinions. See Muskrat v. United States , 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911); see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez , 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021). The majority opinion leaves me with that worry. The opinion clearly explains Backpage’s notorious sex trafficking op erations, the widespread awareness of those op erations, and the scope of Salesforce’s assistance

— which, on the facts alleged in G.G.’s complaint, could only be under stood as furthering those affairs. See Slip Op. at 3

– 6. The panel majority is also righ t to conclude that § 1595 does not require victim

- specific knowledge. Had the opinion stopped there, nobody would be reading this dissent. But in too many places the opinion goes further and suggests without qualification that § 1595 participant lia bilit y could attach to anyone in a “continuous business rela tionship” with a sex trafficking operation like Backpage. See Slip Op. at 17

– 18, 25, 28, 36

– 37. It also suggests that knowledge can be inferred from the bare allegation that a de fendant “repeatedly consulted” with a trafficker about its4 No. 22-2621 business without a link to the illegal activity. See Slip Op. at 17. Better to leave tomorrow’s difficult questions about the scope of § 1595 for tomorrow’s cases. To put the point more directly, everyone reading the majority opinion ought to dis tinguish between the court’s holding and key reasoning and the broader unwarranted commentary suggesting that § 1595 participant liability may apply in expansive ways to more or dinary business relationships. In my respectful view, our full court missed an opportunity to come together to preserve the panel’s essential and sound reasoning and to leave everything else for another day.