THE JOINT STAFF 

 

The Octagon Conference: September 1944 

The Octagon Conference (also called the Second Quebec Conference) occurred from September 

12 to 16, 1944, in Quebec City, Canada. The primary attendees were President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston S. Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

(CCS). Canadian prime minister Mackenzie King served as host for the conference but did not 

attend significant meetings. In addition to papers and meeting minutes from the Octagon 

Conference, this collection also includes minutes from the CCS meetings in London in June 

1944. 

 At these meetings, the participants discussed a multitude of issues related to the 

invasion of France, including the progress of Operation Neptune, the cross-Channel portion of 

Operation Overlord; the use of Mulberry harbors (portable artificial harbors off the Normandy 

coast that served as temporary ports for Allied shipping after D-Day); and Operation Dragoon, 

the invasion of southern France. For the Pacific theater, the extent of British participation in the 

war against Japan was deliberated. One key discussion centered around the Burma campaign, 

including Operation Dracula, the airborne and amphibious attack on Rangoon. Perhaps the most 

far-reaching exchange, however, concerned the allocation of postwar occupation zones in 

Germany. 

 Octagon was one in a series of high-level conferences held by the US and British 

leaders in Washington, DC; Casablanca; Quebec; Cairo; Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to 

formulate the Allied grand strategy. At the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet 

leader Joseph Stalin was also in attendance and played an important role. Reports, 

memorandums, position papers, and maps were prepared by the CCS for the conferences, and 
minutes were taken at the accompanying CCS meetings. Taken together, these documents 

address virtually every policy and strategy issue of the war, from troop deployments, to debates 

about the location and timing of key Allied offensives, to discussions about postwar occupation 

boundaries. Thus, they record the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as an 

indispensable primary source on the planning and conduct of World War II. 

Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 

1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as 

eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at 

the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public. 

In addition to Octagon, the other conferences are available as eBooks in Mobi, ePub, and 

PDF formats: 

Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), December 24, 1941–January 14, 1942: ISBN 

978-0-16-093887-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093886-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093888-7 (PDF) 

Post-Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), January 23–May 19, 1942: ISBN 978-0-

16-093890-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093889-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093891-7 (PDF) 

Casablanca Conference (Morocco), January 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093893-1 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093892-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093894-8 (PDF) 

Trident Conference (Washington, DC), May 12–25, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093879-5 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093878-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093880-1 (PDF) 

Quadrant Conference (Quebec City, Canada), August 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-

093882-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093881-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093883-2 (PDF) 
Sextant Conference (Cairo, Egypt), Eureka Conference (Tehran, Iran), and the Second 

Cairo Conference (Egypt), November 22–December 7, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093885-6 (Mobi); 

ISBN 978-0-16-093884-9 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093926-6 (PDF) 

Argonaut Conference (Malta and Yalta, Soviet Union), January 30–February 11, 1945: 

ISBN 978-0-16-093930-3 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093929-7 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093924-2 

(PDF) 

Terminal Conference (Potsdam, Germany), July 17–August 2, 1945: ISBN 978-0-16-

093923-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093931-0 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093932-7 (PDF) 

David B. Crist, PhD 

Director for Joint History 
OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

Septernber 1944 

PAPERS 

AND 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

AND 

MINUTES OF COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MEETINGS IN LONDON, JUNE 1944 

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE 

OFFICE, US. SECRETARY 

OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1944 
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SCAF 78 

FACS 78 

MEDCOS 

181 

NAF 774 

OCTAGONIN-9 

SCAF 79 

FACS 79 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MESSAGES 

PAGE 

Progress of Operations Report, Supreme Commander, 

Allied Expeditionmy Force ........... 3 

Combined Chiefs of Staff reply to SCAF 78 ..... 9 

Progress of Operations Report, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean ............ 11 

Progress of Operations Report, Supreme AUied Commander, Mediterranean ............ 17 

Progress of Operations Report, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia ............ 21 

Publicity on MULBERRY ........... 27 

Publicity on MULBERRY ........... 29 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

320127 Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany ..... 31 

(Memorandum by the Combined Chiefsof Staff) 

41718 Operations for the Defeat of Japan 1944-45 ...... 33 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

41719 Over-all Objective in the War Against Japan ...... 37 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

452126 British Participation in the War Against Japan ..... 39 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

452127 British Participation in the War Against Japan ..... 41 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

452129 Allocation of the Two Remaining Combat Cargo Groups and 

the Two Remaining Air Commando Groups ...... 43 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

452131 Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia 

Command ................... 45 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

52016 Control of Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe Following the 

Establishment of Allied Forces on the Continent .... 49 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

61813 Machinery for Coordination of United States-Soviet-British 

Military Effort ................. 53 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Stafl) 

.. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

618/4 Machinery for Coordination of United States-Soviet-British 

Military Effort ................. 56 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

643/1 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Pacific-Far East (as of 

8 September 1944) ............... 59 

(Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee) 

65417 Program for the OCTAGON Conference ....... 77 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

65418 Basic Policies for the OCTAGON Conference ...... 79 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

660/1 Prospects of a German Collapse or Surrender (asof 8September 1944) ................... 81 

(Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee) 

674 Assumption of Command of DRAGOON Forces by Supreme 

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force ....... 91 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

674/1 Assumption of Command of DRAGOON Forces by Supreme 

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force ....... 95 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

675 Priorities for Personnel Shipping Subsequent to Termination 

of Hostilities in Europe .............. 97 

(Memorandurn by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

675/1 A Combined Memorandum on Troop Movements, Covering 

the Period October 1944 to March 1945 ........ 99 

(Report by U.S. and British Military Services) 

... 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

675/2 Combined Personnel Movement Problem Arising During the 

First Year After the Defeat of Germany . . . . . . . 103 

(Memorandum by US.Transportation, British Movement and Combined Shipping Authorities) 

676 General Progress Report on Recent Operations in the Pacific 109 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Stag) 

677 Future Operations in the Mediterranean . . . . . . . 117 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Stag) 

677/1 Future Operations in the Mediterranean . . . . . . , 119 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

678 Planning Date for the End of the War Against Japan . . . 123 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff) 

678/1 Planning Date for the End of the War Against Japan . . . 125 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

679 Redeploynient of Forces after the End of the War in Europe 127 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Stag) 

680/2 Report to the President and Prime Minister . . . . . . 129 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

681/2 Communication of the Results of OCTAGON Conference to 

Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek . . . 141 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

682 Operation HIGHBALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Staff) 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

684 RANKIN Planning in the Mediterranean Theater . . . . 149 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Stag) 

687 Release of Amphibious Craft from OVERLORD to Other 

Theaters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 

(Memorandum tythe United States Chiefsof Staff) 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

LONDON CONFERENCE, June 1944 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 162d Meeting (London) .............. 155 

Progress of Operation NEPTUNE 

Campaign in Italy 

C.C.S. 163d Meeting (Middlesex) ............. 159 

Operations in Europe 

Operations in the Pacific and the Far East 

Record of Discussion 

C.C.S. 164th Meeting (London) .............. 165 

Operations to Assist OVERLORD 

Operations 

C.C.S. 165th Meeting (London) 

Operations 

War in the Pacific 

C.C.S. 166t.h Meeting (London) 

Progress of OVERLORD 

French Resistance Groups 

War in the Pacific 

.............. 177 

.............. 181 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

Control of the United States Twentieth Air Force 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 172d Meeting .................. 189 

Chairmanship of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Personnel Shipping 

Agenda and Hour of Meeting 

Situation Report from SCAEF 

Situation Report from the Mediterranean 

Combined Intelligence Report on the Situation in Europe 

Command of DRAGOON Forces 

Machinery for Coordination of United States-Soviet-British 

Military Effort 

Zones of Occupation in Germany 

Control of Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe 

C.C.S. 173d Meeting .................. 201 

Approval of the Minutes of the 172d Meeting of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff 

Control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe 

Machinery for Coordination of United States-Soviet-British 

Military Effort 

Report on the Enemy Situation in the Pacific 

General Progress Report on Recent Operations in the Pacific 

Strategy for the Defeat of Japan 

Basic Policies for the OCTAGON Conference 

Future Operations in the Mediterranean 

Next Meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 174th Meeting .................. 207 

Approval of the Minutes of the 173d -Meetingof the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff 

Control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe 

British Participation in the Pacific 

Future Operations in Southeast Asia 

Planning Date for the End of the War Against Japan 

Operations of the Twentieth Air Force 

Communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang 

Kai-shek 

Next Meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff 

C.C.S. 175th Meeting .................. 223 

Approval of the Minutes of the 174th Meeting of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Communication of the Results of OCTAGON 

Redeployment of Forces after the End of the War in Europe 

Combined Personnel Movement Problem Arising the First Year 

after the Defeat of Germany 

Operation HIGHBALL 

Release to the Press of Information on MULBERRY 

Possible Statement to be made to the Press by the President and 

Prime Minister 

Progress of the Campaign in the Pacific 

Hour of Next Meeting 

viii 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 176th Meeting . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 231 

Approval of the Minutes of the 175th Meeting of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff 

RANKIN Planning in the Mediterranean Theater 

Release of Amphibious Craft from OVERLORD to other Theaters 

Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany 

Situation in China 

Communiqu6 for Release to the Press 

Concluding Remarks 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF OCTAGON PLENARY MEETINGS 

First Plenary Meeting .............. 

Review of the Strategic Situation of the United Nations 

a. DRAGOON 

b. Campaign in Italy 

c. Campaign in Burma 

British Participation in the War Against Japan 

Treatmentof Germany 

Second Plenary Meeting ............. 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

a. Operations in Italy 

b. Over-all Objective for the War Against Japan 

PAGE 

. . 235 

. . 243 

c. Redeployment of Forces after the End of the War in 

Europe 

d. Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany 

e. Directive to Supreme AUied Commander, Southeast Asia 

Location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in 

Germany 

Communication of the Results of OCTAGON Conference to 

Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 

Release of Information on MULBERRY 

OCTAGON Communiqu6 

INDEX ....................... 253 

X 
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PROGRESS REPORTS ON OPERATION “OVERLORD,” 

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 

SCAF 78 

MEDCOS 181 

NAF 774 

OCTAGON-IN-9 

At the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 654/4) the Supreme 

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Mediterranean and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia submitted 

brief reports for consideration at OCTAGON giving the progress of operations 

in their theaters and their intentions for the near future. 

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PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS REPORT, SUPREME COMMANDER, 

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

References: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 680/2, Paragraph 8 

The report from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 

was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172d Meeting and the 

proposals therein were approved. The reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

was dispatched as FACS 78. 

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PRIORITY 

From : Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward on 

Continent 

To: War Department 

Quebec, Canada (Relayed from WAR as number 28393)

CG,European Theater of Opeations, Rear Echelon, London, England 

Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main 

Nr : FWD 14376 SCAF 78 9 September 1944 

Progress of the battles on the Continent has been thoroughly covered 

in my daily and periodic reports. Consequently I am transmitting a brief 

outline only of the present situation together with a more complete statement 

of my intentions in response to the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

contained in reference cable (WX 26682 7 September 1944). 

PART I 

SITUATION AS OF 9TH SEPTEMBER 1944. 

Today, on D plus 95,almost the whole of northern France has been 

liberated as have substantial parts of Belgium. Our forces have entered Holland and are close to the German Frontier at more than one point. In Brittany 

only the Channel Islands, Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire hold out, and on the 

channel coast only Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais. The hostile occupation in 

force of the Dutch Islands at the mouth of the Schelde is certain to delay the 

utilization of Antwerp as a port and thus will vitally influence the full development of our strategy. 

In the south of France the Seventh Army in its rapid advance to the 

north has already reached Besancon and will shortly join forces with the 

central group of armies. 

Enemy resistance, which has shown signs of collapse during the past 

few weeks,is stiffening somewhat as we approach the German Frontier. Nevertheless my belief is that the only way he can effectively oppose our advance 

into Germany will be by reinforcing his retreating forces by divisions from 

Germany and other fronts and manning the more important sectors of the 

Siegfried Line with those forces. It is doubtful whether he can do this in time 

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and in sufficient strength but, were he to succeed, he will be likely to concentrate on blocking the two mah approaches to Germany, i.e., by way of the 

Ruhr and the Saar. Of these he will probably regard the approach to the Ruhr 

as the more important, but in any event he will employ his forces to oppose a 

deep penetration. 

Naval operatwns have in general proceeded according to plan, and 

attempts by the enemy to interfere with our sea lines of communications have 

been countered effectively. Consequently our losses due to enemy action have 

been light. However, the unexpected small losses in the assault were largely 

counterbalancedby the effects of a northeasterly gale in June and by the longer 

shipping turn-round time than had been anticipated. The scale of enemy 

minelaying and his use of new types of mines have strained our minesweeping 

resources to the utmost. These factors and systematic demolitions have retarded the development of ports. 

Air operations have also proceeded as planned. The POINTBLANK 

program has been and is being pressed very successfully. Current priorities 

being as follows: Oil, production of aircraft parts, armored fighting vehicle 

parts industries, automobile plants. 

The advance of the ground forces have largely removed the flying 

bomb and rocket threats and necessity for substantial air effort against 

CROSSBOW. 

PART 11 

INTENTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. 

General. 

My intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German 

armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. I consider our best opportunity 

of defeating the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar confident that he will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The first operation is one to break the Siegfried 

Line and seize crossings over the mine. In doing this the main effort will be on 

the left. Then we will prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into 

Germany. The immediate missions assigned the army groups are set forth 

below. 

Northern Group of Armies. 

Antwerp having been seized, the northern group of armies and that 

part of the central group of armies operating northwest of the Ardennes will 

breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and seize the Ruhr. 

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The First Allied Airborne Army supports the northern group of armies 

in the attainment of first objectives. An operation to seize the crossings over 

the Rhine and in the area Arnhem-Nijmegen has been twice postponed on 

account of weather and only awaits favorable weather conditions. Plans for 

other airborne operations in support of both groups of armies have been prepared. 

Central Group of Armies, 

The central group of armies less that portion operating northwest 

of the Ardennes will: 

a. Capture Brest. 

b. Protect the southern flank of the Allied Expeditionary Force. 

c. Occupy the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Saar and then 

seize Frankfurt. This operation is to start as soon as possible in order to 

forestall the enemy in this sector but troops of the central group of armies 

operating against the Ruhr northwest of the Ardennes must first be 

adequately supported. 

d. Take advantage of any opportunity to destroy enemy forces withdrawing from southwest and southern France. 

The ports of Lorient, St. Nazaire, Nantes and the area of Quiberon 

Bay are no longer essential for maintenance of United States forces. Central 

group of armies have therefore been instructed that it is unnecessary to reduce 

St. Nazaire and Lorient by force of arms and that the German garrisons 

isolated in these areas may for the present merely be contained. 

Link up with DRAGOON Forces. 

Recommendations have been transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff that operational control of DRAGOON Forces will pass to this headquarters on the 15th September 1944. At present the DRAGOON Forces have 

been directed on the area Dijon-Besancon-Vesoul in preparation for further 

advance on Mulhouse and Strassburg. 

Future intentions. 

Once we have the Ruhr and the Saar, we have a strangle hold on two 

of Germany’s main industrial areas, and will have largely destroyed her capacity to wage war whatever course events may take. During the advance to the 

Ruhr and the Saar we will be opening the deep water ports of Le Have and 

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Antwerp or Rotterdam which are essential to sustain a power thrust deep into 

Germany. I wish to retain freedom of action to strike in any direction so far 

as the logistical situation permits. At the moment and until we have developed 

the channel ports and the rail lines therefrom,our supply situation is stretched 

to the breaking point, and from this standpoint the advance across the Siegfried Line involves a gamble which I am prepared to take in order to take full 

advantage of the present disorganized state of the German armies in the west. 

The possibilities for further advance, depending on the situation at the 

time, are : 

a. The Ruhr via Hanover on Hamburg or Berlin. 

b. Frankfurt via Leipzig or Magdeburg on Berlin. 

c. A combination of both. 

Secondary operations such as the occupation of the NuremburgMunich area will depend on the logistical situation at the time. 

The stage at which TALISMAN conditions will obtain cannot be forecast. Operation TALISMAN will be conducted as an extension of the military 

operations in progress when and if TALISMAN conditions arise. The necessary 

instructions to all concerned for the disarmament of the enemy forces, the 

occupation of specific targets in the Allied spheres and for the care and repatriation of prisoners of war are ready for issue and some are being issued. 

Logistical developments. 

Lines of communications are strained to keep up with present advances, and every effort is being made to develop railroads and ports to support 

rapid exploitation. Our main requirement is deep water ports east of the Seine. 

Brest and Le Havre will probably be opened initially for the central group of 

armies and Low Countries port initially for the northern group of armies. 

When the full capacity of rail lines operation from the original lodgement 

area to Paris, the Valenciennes coal field and north Belgium has been developed, considerably augmented forces can be supported in the advance into 

Germany. Air supply and special supply arrangements are being utilized to 

the maximum to support our rapid advance. 

Operation other than OVERLORD Operation against the Channel 

Islands. 

A force formed from sources outside the OVERLORD troop basis and 

consisting of 1 infantry brigade, reinforced, is being held in readiness in the 

United Kingdom to occupy the Channel Islands in the event of surrender by 

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the garrison. Steps are being taken to induce surrender by means of psychological warfare, and I do not intend to take the Islands by force of arms. 

OperationintoNorway. 

In the event the enemy withdraws from Norway or surrenders I propose to send to Norway an Allied force of the order of 1British division and 

1 United States regimental combat team, together with certain Norwegian 

troops. 

Operation POINTBLANK. 

Strategic air forces will continue POINTBLANK operations to a successful conclusion. Priorities may change from time to time in accordance 

with the situation. 

End 

OCTAGON-IN-11 (10sept 44) 

a 
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PRIORITY 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

12 September 1944 

Supreme Headquarters 

Allied Expeditionary Force 

Forward Echelon, France 

War Department 

Washington, D. C. 

Number OCTAGON 16 

TOPSEC to SHAEF France for Eisenhower, FACS 78 from the Combined 

Chiefsof Staff. 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the proposals set out in SCAF 78. 

2. In transmitting this approval, the Combined Chiefs of Staff draw your 

attention: ­

a. To the advantages of the northern line of approach into 

Germany, as opposed to the southern. They note with satisfaction 

that you appear to be of the same mind. 

b, To the necessity for opening up the northwest ports, and 

particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before the bad weather sets in. 

End 

OCTAGON-OUT-16 (12sept 44) 18422 

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MEDCOS 181 

NAI? 774 

PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS REPORT, SUPREME ALLIED 

COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN 

References: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 173d Meeting, Item 8 

CCS 680/2, Paragraphs 11-13 

Reports from the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean were considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172d and 173d Meetings. The 

agreed reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff is shown in Enclosure “B’ to 

C.C.S. 677/1. 

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY 

From : AFHQ 

To : British Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Staff Mission for United States Joint Chiefs of Staff 

SHAEF 

Nr : FX 91375, MEDCOS 181, 2 September 1944 

Following is a review of the situation in the Mediterranean Theatre. 

I. OPERATION “DRAGOON.” 

1. Thanks to the skill with which it was mounted and carried 

through by all three services Operation DRAGOON has been an outstanding 

success. Once ashore the skill of the commanders combined with the determination and speed of manoeuvre of all forces coupled with effective assistance from 

the French Forces of the Interior have produced a situation in which the whole 

of southeastern France east of the Rhone and south of Lyons as far east as 

Nice is under the control of the Allied armies. Some 50,000 prisoners have 

been captured and very heavy losses have been inflicted on the enemy though 

some 1% divisions have escaped to the north after having suffered heavy losses 

in men and material. The capture ahead of schedule of the ports of Toulon and 

Marseilles coupled with our unexpected success in securing control of the 

Port de Bouc practically undamaged have resulted in a situation in which by 

the middle of September the ports of Southern France will be able to handle 

any foreseeable demands which may be placed upon them. Subsequently the 

logistical bottleneck will be the capacity of the railway leading north through 

the Rhone Valley, but thanks to the speed of our advance and the consequent 

reduction in the expected scale of demolitions, Seventh Army expect to be able 

to maintain a force of one armoured division and four infantry divisions north 

of Lyons by 15th September at earliest. By 1st October it is estimated that a 

double line of railway will be working as far as Lyons which wiU by that date 

place the supply facilities for Allied armies operating in southeastern France 

on a satisfactory basis. A preliminary estimate, taking into account facilities 

offered by the useof the Rhone Canal,some 10,000 tons per day might be delivered in the Lyons area from that date. The general tactical plan of Commander 

Seventh Army which I have approved is that after the capture of Lyons the 

general grouping of his forceswill be that the French Armee “B”will undertake 

the protection of the right flank facing the Franco-Italian frontier and will 

operate east of the Rhone with an axis of advance Bourg-Besancon. In the 

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execution of its security mission along the Franco-Italian frontier it will be 

assisted by the United States Divisional Airborne Division, and First Special 

Service Farce. At the same time the VI American Corps will be regrouped so 

as to operate west of the Rhone on the line Autun-Dijon-Langres with the 

object of making contact with the American Third Army. I would propose 

that at this stage of the operations the command of the forces in France should 

be transferred to General Eisenhower. While the forces at present employed 

under the command of the Seventh Army might not appear to be of sufficient 

magnitude to warrant the formation of 6th Army Group, I consider that in 

view of the length of communications the very heavy responsibilities for port 

maintenance and civil affairs and matters connected with the French resistance movement together with the possibility that forces from the right wing 

of American armies already in France might either be placed under its command or maintained from Mediterranean ports, it is desirable that the 6th 

Army Group should take over command of southern France. Anticipating that 

this will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff I am sending General 

Devers to consider plans with General Eisenhower. As regards administration, 

I have sent a planning representative to SHAEF to discuss the time when 

SHAEF should assume administrative responsibility. I would suggest that 

this matter be left for final settlement between SHAEF and my Headquarters. 

As regards the large areas in France west of the Rhone, I consider that no 

military action is required to deal with such small German forces as are still 

in this area and which are being rapidly rounded up by the French Forces of 

the Interior, and I feel that any divergence of regular troops would be a waste 

of effort. 

2. Air, 

I have recently discussed with General Eaker and General Spaatz 

proposals for the disposition of United States tactical air forces between Italy 

and southern France which have my full approval and which are now being 

discussed with General Eisenhower. Their general effect would be that continued offensive operations in the autumn and winter by the Allied armies in 

Italy would continue to receive very powerful air support from United States 

Army Air Force fighter-bombers as well as by medium bombers. The detailed 

deployment and distribution of the tactical air forces cannot and need not be 

decided until we see the outcome of the present offensive in the Po Valley. 

Meanwhile I am satisfied that that offensive as well as the operations in the 

DRAGOON area are receiving most adequate and effective support. At the 

same time certain administrative measures such as holding up the shipping to 

France of aviation engineers and steel planking have been taken to facilitate 

any redeployment of the tactical air forces that may be decided upon. 
TOP SECRET 

11. ITALY. 

In the Italian Theatre the enemy now has a total of some 26 divisions 

which are estimated to be the equivalent of some 16 to 17. As a result of the 

deterioration in the situation in northern France the Germans have withdrawn 

two Panzer Grenadier Divisions from this theatre which have now been identified in central France. On the other hand the success of our cover plans which 

have been designed to make the enemy think that one of our objects was to 

secure Genoa and the Ligurian Coast together with the enemy’s fear that the 

landings in southern France might be the prelude to an invasion of Italy from 

the west, have resulted in the enemy disposing some five divisions, including 

three Italian divisions to meet this threat. As a result his forces holding the 

Gothic Line have been considerably weakened, and until the last few days 

the enemy did not apparently appreciate the threat to his left flank. He has, 

however, now realised to some extent the seriousness of this threat and has 

moved two divisions into the line northwest of Pesaro and further movements 

to this flank may well be expected. With the reduction in the number of divisions available to him consequent upon the decision to launch Operation 

DRAGOON, General Alexander changed the plan for the major offensive in 

Italy, which was to be launched at the end of August. Whereas in the original 

plan the main blow was to be launched on the general axis Florence-Bologna 

with the object of breaking the enemy’s centre and pinning the eastern portion 

of his forces back against the sea, the new plan is to launch the main blow 

along the Adriatic Coast north of Ancona where the Apennines present the 

least obstacle to movement. This main offensive was started on 26th August 

and is being conducted by the Eighth Army with a force of nine divisions. Good 

progress is being made and considerable penetration of the Gothic Line have 

been made on a front extending some 20 miles westwards from Pesaro. As soon 

as the enemy starts to move reserves to this area, General Alexander plans to 

start a second offensive to be launched by the Fifth U.S. Army which now commands the XI11 British Corps northeast of Florence in the direction of Bologna. 

I have every hope that as a result of these two offensives the Allied armies 

will secure control of the line Padua-Verona-Brescia within a few weeks and 

thus secure the destruction of Kesselring’s Army by preventing its withdrawal 

through the Alpine passes. To complete this task it will be necessary to have 

available the full resources now at General Alexander’s disposal. Further the 

limited communication facilities which are available to the enemy in northern 

Italy point to the fact that the use of the air will be a major factor in completing his destruction and facilitating our advance. There will therefore be 

ample scope for the employment of medium bomber forces throughout the 

whole operation and it is also to be noted that if medium bombers are established in the Florence-Ancona area, heavy and sustained attacks can be 

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delivered by such air forces well into Austria. In view of the developments which 

are daily occurring in the general war situation it does not appear to me possible to undertake any further definite commitments. Should, however, the war 

be further prolonged and the enemy endeavour to withdraw from Greece and 

the Balkans with the object of holding a line from Trieste through Zagreb and 

Belgrade to Turnu Severin and the Transylvanian Mountains, the best course 

would be to regroup our forces and to move northeastwards with the object of 

securing control of the Ljubljana Gap. Such an operation would require the 

maximum co-operation with Tito’s forces and the occupation of the port of 

Trieste. Amphibious resources in this theatre are not available to mount a seaborne attack on Trieste this year and consequently unless German resistance 

collapses it is unlikely that another major offensive could be mounted until the 

spring of 1945. Concurrently with an advance northeastwards it will be well 

to clear the enemy completely from northwestern Italy and this should be completed as rapidly as possible with the minimum forces required to establish 

control and law and order. Provided that demolitions through the Maritime 

Alps are not too severe it might well be possible to establish land communication with the forces in France. 

111. BALKANS. 

1. All information goes to show that the enemy is faced with an 

increasingly difficult situation throughout the Balkans and the Islands of the 

Aegean. This situation is likely to be further accentuated by the situation 

in Roumania and the probable defection of Bulgaria. Though it is estimated 

that a proportion of the troops are suitable from the training and equipment 

point of view for use elsewhere, there is little evidence at the moment that any 

substantial withdrawal is taking place. However, I anticipate that the Germans 

now faced with the necessity of finding some reserves in the Balkan area will be 

forced to regroup and make available four or five divisions if they are to hold 

either the Bulgarian frontier or the Zagreb-Belgrade line later. 

2. Balkan Air Farce. 

Since its formation, the Balkan Air Force has been successful 

in maintaining pressure against the enemy forces in Yugoslavia and Albania 

and inflicting continuing losses upon him. On 1st September as a result of 

consultations with Marshal Tito a concentrated attack on enemy communications in the Balkans began with the object of further embarrassing him and 

preventing the regrouping of forces. This operation has the code name RATWEEK and appears suitably timed. Stimulation of Partisan activity in Greece 

and Albania is also in hand. 

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3. Greece. 

Arrangerner i are in han in the event c German withdrawal 

or surrender for the rapid occupation of Athens with its ports and airfields 

with a view of ensuring order and stability and the commencement of relief 

measures. 

4. RANKIN T.” 

I wish to draw the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to 

the unsatisfactory situation in which I am placed with regard to the policy 

to be pursued in the event of a German collapse. If prompt and effective action 

is to be taken it is essential that I should receive immediate direction as to the 

extent of my commitmentsin regard to occupational forces and as to the formation which I am permitted to employ to carry out the tasks assigned to me. 

T.O.O.0221302 

End 

CM-IN-4369 (6 Sept 44) 00412 

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URGENT 

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy 

To : War Department 

Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, US Army, France 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, 

London, England 

Nr : FX 93838 NAF 774 8 September 1944 

The general situation in this theatre has already been reported to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff in MEDCOS 181. The following is an amplification of 

this telegram, taking into account the developments which have occurred since 

it was written. 

I. OPERATION “DRAGOON.” 

This is developing most satisfactorily. All arrangements for transfer 

of control to SHAEF are in hand and I have nothing further to add. 

11. ITALY. 

I am confident from the progress of General Alexander’s offensive 

from 26th August until the present date that the enemy will be driven completely from the Gothic Line. On the other hand, he is fighting very hard behind 

its eastern sector and I am not yet in a position to guarantee that this offensive 

will achieve decisive results. Considering, however, that the enemy has been 

forced to engage the bulk of his reserves to meet the thrust of the Eighth Army, 

I feel confident that as a result of the second offensive to be launched very soon 

by the Fifth Army the destruction of Kesselring’s Army may yet be achieved. 

Should Kesselring’s Army be so hammered that it is unable to carry 

out an orderly withdrawal, I consider that with our great superiority in armour 

there is every chance of achieving really decisive results similar to those which 

have been secured in France. On the other hand, if he has time and opportunity 

to carry out a coordinated demolition programme, and particularly if bad 

weather should restrict the movement of armoured vehicles off the roads and 

limit operations of the air force as it may well do, then he may well be able to 

withdraw a considerable proportion of his forces intact and we may find them 

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facing us behind the Po. Bearing in mind however that he is unlikely to have 

sufficient troops to hold the Po indefinitely, the course of operations would 

probably be a gradual withdrawal behind the line of the Alps and the Piave. 

To sum up, it appears therefore that operations will develop in one 

of two ways: 

a. Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be 

possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass, leaving a small 

force to clear up northwest Italy, or, 

b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, 

in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear 

the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in 

the Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until 

spring of 1945. 

111. THE BALKANS. 

Up to date information goes to show that the enemy is engaged in 

a large scale withdrawal from the Aegean Islands and from southern Greece 

with the object of finding mobile forces to hold the Bulgarian frontier and 

Yugoslavia. 

At the same tie, I anticipate that the enemy will retain static garrisons at important points and airfields with the object of preventing unopposed entry into the Balkans. 

It would appear however that owing to the rapid advance of the 

Russian Army to Turnu Severin, and according to latest reports, the success 

of air and Partisan attacks on his Balkan communications (mentioned as 

RATWEEK in part I11of MEDCOS 181) it seems to be probable that the enemy 

will be unable to achieve his purpose, nor will he be able to withdraw any substantial forces to assist him in his battles in Italy or in Central Europe. 

I therefore consider that we can anticipate a situation in which 

the bulk of the German forces south of a line Trieste-Ljubljana-Zagreband the 

Danube is immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are exhausted 

in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be liquidated by 

Partisan or Russian forces. 

As long as the battle in Italy continues, I have no forces to employ 

in the Balkans except: 

a. The small force consisting of two paratroop brigades and an improvised brigade group from Alexandria which is being held ready to 

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occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of 

relief and the establishment of law and order and the Greek Government 

in the first of the countries which is likely to be liberated, and, 

b. The small land forces Adriatic which are being actively used primarily for commando type operations. 

Further, to intensify the enemy's difficulties in the Aegean, a force 

of four carriers with cruisers and destroyers is now on its way under the command of Admiral Troubridge to the Aegean to carry out attacks on all enemy 

seabornemovement. 

End 

MEDCOS 181 is CM-IN-4369 (6 Sept 44) 

CM-IN-7313 (9 SPt 44) 00172 

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OCTAGON-IN-9 

PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS REPORT, SUPREME ALLIED 

COMMANDER, SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Reference: 

CCS 174th Meeting, Item 4 

The report from the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia was 

noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 174th Meeting. 

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From: Southeast Asia Command, Kandy, Ceylon 

To: War Department 

Quebec,Canada (Relayed from WAR as No. 28363) 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, 

London, England 

Nr : 266 8 September 1944 

Reference WARX 26742. TOP SECRET for Combined Chiefs of Staff 

information British Chiefs of Staff cite 273. 

PART I 

PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS. 

1. 11th Army Group. 

a. XV Ind. Corps. Operations in Arakan largely confined to active 

and offensive patrolling much hampered by monsoon conditions and 

thick jungle. No major changes in dispositions, though units of 81st 

(WA) Division have been moved to counter possible Japanese threat 

to our Chittagong-Dehazari line of communications from the MoytheLabawa area. 

b. XXXIII Ind. Corps. 

(1) Enemy. No reports yet of any strong Japanese defensive 

position capable of holding up our advance for any appreciable 

period either in the Dabaw Valley or on the Tiddim Road. In the 

former there are reports of small numbers of Japanese at Yazagyo 

and Yedok, and on the Tiddim Road there may be an attempt to 

hold us up in the area just north of Tonnang. The Japanese on the 

Chindwin and Tiddim front show every sign of complete disorganization and lack of coordinated control. There are signs, however, 

of an attempt to gather together the remnants of 15th and 31st 

Divisions east of the Chindwin. 

(2) Own troops. Operations to clear the enemy from west of 

the Chindwin have proceeded satisfactorily and there are now no 

enemy on this side of the river north of Sittaung. The latter was 

occupied by our troops on 4th September and active patrolling is 

taking place northwards and southwards on the west bank of the 

Chindwin down the Tiddim Road, has progressed speedily and has 

now reached MS 114,48 miles north of Tiddim. 

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Japanese opposition has not been strong and the rate of 

progress has been largely dictated by the state of the road. 

In the Rabaw Valley, our rate of advance has been satisfactory though hampered by swollen streams. Leading troops have 

now reached a point approximately half way between Memu and 

Kalemyo, without encountering any serious opposition. 

2. Northern Combat Area Command and Yunnan force. 

a. 36th Division has reached Pinbaw in the Mogaung-Katha railway corridor. Patrols have entered Hopin without encountering enemy 

resistance. 29th Brigade has reached Pinbaw. 72nd Brigade is based 

in the area of Namana. 

b. On the Myitkyina-Bhamo Road Chinese forces have reached 

Kazu. Patrols are operating five miles south of Kazu without making 

enemy contact. It is reported that there are no Japanese troops north 

of Nalong. 

c. The Japanese are withdrawing from the Hopin area, and a 

Prisoner of War report gave Mawhun as the next area of strong 

resistance in the Hopin-Indaw corridor. There are indications of a 

build-up along the Katha-Shwebo-Bhamo line. 

d. Present directive to Northern Combat Area Command remains 

to secure the Myitkyina-Mogaung area. In pursuance of this directive 

the line Pinbaw-Kazu has been occupied. 

e. Offensive operations by Yunnan force are in progress in the 

areas of Tengchung, Lungling and Sungshan. 

3. Air. 

Allied air forces have now gained almost complete air superiority 

in this theater. The following air activities are now in progress: 

a. A strategic air offensive against enemy lines of communication 

and supply bases by bombers and long range fighters. These operations include the bombing of the Burman-Siam railway, and minelaying in the main rivers and harbours of Burma. 

b. Direct support by Third Tactical Air Force of our land forces 

pursuing the enemy towards the river Chindwin and Tiddim, and 

XV Corps in the Arakan. 

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c. Direct support by Tenth U.S.Army Air Force of the Northern 

Combat Area Command Forces advancing from Mogaung and Myitkyina, and of the Chinese forces west of the Salween. 

d. Transport of troops and supplies to forward areas. 

PART II 

IMMEDIATE INTENTIONS. 

4. Enemy Situation in Burma. 

a. Ground. Japanese have at present nine divisions in Burma and 

10th division expected shortly. Three divisions on the Chindwin and 

two in north Burma are estimated as 30 percent to 40 percent effective, 

two in northeast Burma probably 60 percent effective, remaining two 

in Arakan 100 percent effective. Continued arrival of replacements 

at recent rates would enable Japanese forces to be brought up to 80 

percent effectiveness by end of year. 

Present indications Japanese may try and carry out offensives 

in Arakan and Salween early in dry season, probably with primary 

object of causing diversion and thus gaining time to reform their 

forces. 

b. Air. Current first line strength in SEAC is estimated at 450 aircraft with 165in Burma-Siam/South Fic of which 70 (all fighters) are 

in Burma. By the end of the monsoon there may be a totalof 410first 

line aircraft in SEAC of which Burma-Siam/South F’ic would have an 

estimated 200 (of which half are fighters). 

5. Intentions. 

a. The intention is to take advantage of the enemy disorganization 

by pressing as far as possible down the Tiddim Road and the Kabaw 

Valley and if opportunity offers to secure Kalewa and Kalemyo. 

The Japanese are unlikely to resist us in strength north of the 

areas Yazagyo (in the Kabaw Valley) and Tonzang (at Milestone 133 

on the Tiddim Road), but may do so there or further south. It is too 

early to say whether they will. If they do not the present operations 

should result in the capture of Kalemyo by about mid-November. 

If,on the other hand, they do, then an airborne operation will be 

necessary. Conditions in the Kabaw Valley prohibit movement of 

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medium artillery and tanks until the roads are sufficiently dry, and 

Mawlaik must be secured in due course to remove any threat from that 

area. Having secured Kalemyo the intervening ground is of such a 

difficult nature that there may be some delay before we can capture 

Kalewa. Preparations must therefore be continued for an airborne 

operation. 

b. In the Arakan, 3rd SS Brigade will be used to carry out minor 

amphibious operationsto threaten the enemy line of communications 

and possibly divert his strength from the Kaladan Valley. 3rd SS 

Brigade would be released from these operations as necessary for 

DRACULA. 

c. In northeast Burma I intend to continue operations to secure 

the Mogaung-Myitkyina area. 

d. Air operations on existing scale will continue with intention to 

harass enemy land and water lines of communication and continue 

tactical support of land forces. 

End 

OCTAGON-IN-9 (10 Sept 44) 19202 

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SCAF 79 

FACS 79 

PUBLICITY ON “MULBERRY” 

References: 

CCS 175th Meeting, Item 7 

2d Plenary Meeting, Item 4 

On 15 September 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 175th Meeting considered a request from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary 

Force for instructions as to the release to the press of stories regarding MUBERRY. The agreed reply was dispatched as FACS 79. 

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From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward on 

Continent 

To : War Department 

Quebec, Canada (Relayed from WAR as No. 29208) 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, 

London, England 

Nr : FWD 14565 SCAF 79 11 September 1944 

Consider time is approaching when there would be no objection on 

the part of this headquarters to the release of MULBERRY stories to the press, 

but we are aware there may be security implications affecting other theaters, 

and we shall not release unless so instructed by you. 

No evidence that details construction,operation or capacity have been 

compromised and all steps have been taken to continue to safeguard security. 

End 

OCTAGON-IN-62 (12 Sept 44) 22572 

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PRIORITY 

From: OCTAGON 

To : War Department 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, 

London, England 

Nr : OCTAGON 41 FACS 79 16 September 1944 

With reference to SCAF 79 the Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed 

that security implications affecting other theaters preclude the release of information on MULBERRY. 

End 

NOTE: SCAF 79 is CM-IN-11043 (12 Sept 44) CC/S 

CM-IN-15405 (17 Sept 44) 00352 

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C.C.S. 320127 

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

References: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 9 

CCS 176th Meeting, Item 4 

2d Plenary Meeting, Item 1k. 

CCS 68012, Paragraph 33 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 176th Meeting considered C.C.S. 

320/26, a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, and approved 

the proposals therein subject to minor amendments agreed upon during discussion. The amended paper as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

was circulated as C.C.S. 320127. 

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16 September 1944 

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C.C.S. 320127 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Stag 

Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable 

from a military point of view by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

For disarmament,policing and preservation of order: 

The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany 

west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area 

allocated to the Soviet Government. 

The forces of the United States under a United StatesCommander will 

occupy Germany east of the Rhine,south of the line Koblenz-northern border 

of Hessen-Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government. 

Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary 

staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander 

of the American Zone. 

American area to have in addition access through the western and 

northwestern seaports and passage through the British controlled area. 

Accurate delineation of the aboveoutlinedBritish and American areas 

of control can be made at a later date. 

32 
-- 

US CONTROL OF ERLMEN 

AND I)rpENERHAVEN I 

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OPERATIONSFOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 1944-45 

References: 

CCS 173d Meeting, Item 6 

CCS 175th Meeting, Item 9 

2d Plenary Meeting, Item 1e. 

CCS 680/2, Paragraph 22 

On 13 September 1944 in their 173d Meeting the Combined Chiefs of 

Staffaccepted the schedule of operations in C.C.S. 417/8 asa basis for planning. 

However, certain of the target dates having been overtaken by events, the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to omit the schedule from the report to the 

President and Prime Minister. 

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C.C.S. 41718 9 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 1944-45 

References: 

a. CCS 417 Series 

b. CCS 426 Series 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows: 

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by: 

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea 

and air blockade, conducting intensive air bombardment and destroying Japanese air and naval strength. 

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan. 

2. Pursuant to the above, the United States Chiefs of Staff have evolved 

a course of action for planning purposes. The schedule of major operations 

comprising this course of action follows: 

Target Date 

15 October 1944 

15 November 1944 

20 December 1944 

1 March 1945 

or 

20 February 1945 

Objective 

Talaud 

Sarangani Bay 

Leyte-Surigao Area 

Formosa-Amoy Area 

Luzon 

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If the Formosa operation is undertaken, the following operations have 

been approved for planning purposes: 

April 1945 

May 1945 

March to June 1945 

October 1945 

December 1945 

Bonins 

Ryukyus 

China coast 

(Foochow-Wenchow Area) 

Southern Kyushu 

Tokyo Plain 

A course of action to follow the Luzon operation,if undertaken, is under 

study. 

3. It is believed that operations should be devised to accomplish the 

defeat of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end plans will retain 

flexibility and provision will be made to take full advantage of favorable developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner of 

short cuts. It is proposed to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of naval 

and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly land 

campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against enemy shipping will be 

continued. Very long range bomber operations against Japan proper will be 

continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established 

in the Marianas and from bases to be seized in the future. The air forces in 

China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and 

will also provide the maximum practicable support for the campaign in the 

Pacific. 

4. It is agreed that every effort should be made to bring the U.S.S.R. into 

the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date and planning for such 

contingency is continuing. 

5. The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on British participation 

in the war against Japan and operations in the Southeast Asia Command are 

contained in C.C.S. 452/21 and C.C.S. 452/25. 

6. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff note the foregoing. 

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C.C.S. 417/9 

OVER-ALLOBJECTIVE IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

References: 

2d Plenary Meeting, Item 1 d. 

CCS 680/2, Paragraph 21 

C.C.S.417/9 circulated the restatement of the “over-all objective in the 

war against Japan” as accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff,11September 

1944,by informal action. This acceptance was subject to the agreements recorded in C.C.S. 417/5,reaffirming the existing agreements (C.C.S.426/1, 

paragraphs 4 and 10) relative to the priority of Operations OVERLORD and 

DRAGOON and the existing agreements relative to the effect on the over-all 

objective of extension of operations in the Pacific. 

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C.C.S. 41719 11 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff,by informal action, have accepted the following restatement of the over-all objective in the war against Japan (in 

substitution for that contained in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 417/2),subject to the 

agreements recorded in C.C.S. 417/5 as to the assurances requested by the 

British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 41714: 

“To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by: 

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing 

sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and 

destroying Japanese air and naval strength. 

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of 

Japan.” 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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C.C.S. 452/26 

C.C.S. 452127 

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 174th Meeting, Item 3 

1st Plenary Meeting 

CCS 68012, Paragraph 25 

In C.C.S. 452118, dated 15 August 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff put 

forward their views with regard to the employment of the British Fleet in the 

war against Japan. The United States Chiefs of Staff replied on 8 September 

(C.C.S. 452/25), accepting the British proposal for the formation of a British 

Empire task force under a British commander to operate in the Southwest 

Pacific Theater under General MacArthur’s supreme command. 

In C.C.S. 452126, presented at OCTAGON on 11 September, the British 

Chiefs of Staff requested the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding the employment of the British Fleet in the main operations against Japan. 

The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff were expressed in C.C.S. 452/27. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 174th Meeting, considered the 

subject of British participation in the war against Japan and their agreements 

are recorded in the report to the President and Prime Minister (C.C.S. 680/2, 

paragraph 25). 

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C.C.S. 452126 11September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Stao 

1. We have seen the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 

452125 concerning British participation in the Pacific in the war against Japan, 

and we note that no mention is made of the employment of the British Fleet 

in the main operations against Japan, for which we expressed a preference in 

C.C.S. 452118. 

2. In view of the important political considerations involved, we request 

a formal expression of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on our 

first preference-namely, the employment of the Fleet in the main operations 

against Japan. 

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C.C.S. 452127 13 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The United States Chiefs of StafT would welcome a British naval task 

force in the Pacific to participate in the main operations against Japan. They 

consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of 

the advance in the Southwest Pacific. They wume that such a force would 

be balanced and self-supporting. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff repeat their acceptance of the British 

proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific. It is 

realized that the time of formation of such a force depends to a considerable 

extent on the end of the war in Europe as well as on DRACULA and on the 

requirements of projected operations in the Southwest Pacific. 

41 
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C.C.S. 452/29 

ALLOCATION OF THE TWO REMAINING COMBAT CARGO 

GROUPS AND THE TWO REMAINING AIR COMMANDO GROUPS 

Reference: 

CCS 174th Meeting, Item 4 

On 14 September 1944 (C.C.S. 452/29) the United States Chiefs of Staff 

informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff with regard to the allocation of the two 

remaining combat cargo groups and the two remaining air commando groups. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 174th Meeting took cognizance of 

the statement contained in C.C.S. 452/29 during their discussion of Item 4. 

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C.C.S. 452/29 14 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLOCATION OF THE TWO REMAINING COMBAT CARGO 

GROUPS AND THE TWO REMAINING AIR COMMANDO GROUPS 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Stag 

The United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed to allocate one combat 

cargo group and one air commando group to the China-Burma-India Theater 

in order to assure adequate resources for Admiral Mountbatten to clear and secure the land line to China. The remaining combat cargo group and air commando group have been allocated to the Southwest Pacific in an effort to fill at 

least part of the deficiency in resources for operations in that area. 

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C.C.S. 452/31 

DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, 

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

References: 

CCS 174th Meeting, Item 4 

2d Plenary Meeting, Item 1g. 

CCS 680/2, Paragraph 28 

On 13 September 1944 a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

(C.C.S. 452/28) proposed a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command for future operations in Southeast Asia. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 174th Meeting, Item 4, amended 

and approved the directive which was then circulated as C.C.S. 452/30. 

During discussion in the Second Plenary Meeting, C.C.S. 452/30 was further amended. The directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia 

Command, as amended and approved by the President and Prime Minister, 

was circulated as C.C.S. 452/31 

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C.C.S. 452/31 22 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, 

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Note by the Secretaries 

The directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, as approved by the President and Prime Minister, is attached hereto 

for information. 

A. J. McFAFtLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, 

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

1. Your object is the destruction or expulsion of all Japanese forces in 

Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including 

the air staging post at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications. 

2. The following are approved operations:­

a. The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the 

air route, and the attainment of overland communications with China. 

b. Operation DRACULA. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the 

effective discharge of the task under paragraph 2 a and to the execution of 

Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 

15th March. 

3. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you 

will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without 

prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945. 

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C.C.S. 520/6 14 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE 

FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ALLIED FORCES 

ON THE CONTINENT 

References: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 10 

CCS 173d Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 174th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 680/2, Paragraph 7 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 174th Meeting approved the directive in C.C.S. 520/4 as amended by C.C.S. 520/5,and the directive as approved 

(Enclosure) was dispatched to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and 

the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, by 

the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and the Commanding General, United States 

Army Air Forces, for action and furnished to the Supreme Commander, Allied 

Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, for 

information. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T.CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE 

DIRECTIVE 

Subject: Control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe 

To : Deputy Chief of the Air Staff 

Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe 

From: Chief of the Air Staff 

Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that executive responsibility 

for the control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe shall be vested in the 

Chief of the Air Staff,RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army

Air Forces, jointly. 

2. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, 

United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, are designated as representatives 

of the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States 

Army Air Forces, respectively, for the purpose of providing control and local 

coordination through consultation. 

3. The over-all mission of the strategic air forces is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic 

systems and the direct support of land and naval forces. 

4. Under this general mission you are to direct your attacks, subject to 

the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility, against the systems of objectives and in the order of priority now established by the Supreme Commander, 

Allied Expeditionary Force. When you decide that changes in objectives or 

priorities are necessary, you will issue the necessary directives and inform the 

Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army 

Air Forces. 

5. Objectives other than those covered in paragraph 4 above will be attacked in accordance with the following: 

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a. Counter air force action. As the result of air action against the 

production, maintenance and operation facilities of the German Air Forces 

(G.A.F.),its fighting effectiveness has now been substantially reduced. At 

the same time our combined air strength has been vastly increased. In 

these circumstances we are no longer justified in regarding the G.A.F. and 

its supporting industry as a primary objective for attack. Our major effort 

must now be focused directly upon the vital sources of Germany’s war 

economy. To this end policing attacks against the G.A.F. are to be adjusted 

so as to maintain tactical conditions which will permit of the maximum 

impact upon the primary objectives. No fixed priority is, therefore, assigned to policing attacks against the G.A.F. The intensity of such attacks 

will be regulated by the tactical situation existing. 

b. Direct support. The direct support of land and naval operations remains a continuing commitment upon your forces. Upon call from the 

supreme commanders concerned either for assistance in the battle or to 

take advantage of related opportunities, you will meet their requirements 

promptly. 

c. Important industrial areas. When weather or tactical conditions are 

unsuitable for operations against specific primary objectives attacks should 

be delivered upon important industrial areas by both Bomber Command 

RAF and USStAFE (using blind bombing technique as necessary). 

d. S.O.E. operations. All SOE/OSS operations undertaken by units 

of RAF Bomber Command and United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe 

will be in accordance with the requirements of the Supreme Allied Commanders, who will issue the requisite orders from time to time, under existing procedure. 

e. Attacks in support of the Russian armies. Attacks in support of operations by the Russian armies should be delivered as prescribed from time 

to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

f. Fleeting targets. There may be certain other targets of great but 

fleetingimportance�orthe attack of which all necessary plans and preparations should be made. Of these an example would be the important units 

of the German Fleet in harbor or at sea. 

6. You are responsible that the operations of the strategic air forces are 

coordinated with the operations of the tactical air forces in the theaters. 

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C.C.S. 618/3 

C.C.S. 618/4 

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATESSOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT 

References: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 8 

CCS 173d Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 680/2, Paragraphs 17-20 

On 12 September 1944 (C.C.S. 618/3) the British Chiefs of Staff presented 

for consideration at OCTAGON certain proposals to effect close liaison between 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff on strategic and 

operational matters in Europe. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172d Meeting approved the recommendations of the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 618/3 and instructed the 

Secretaries to draft for approval a message to the Heads of the United States 

and British Military Missions in Moscow. 

The proposed messages were circulated as C.C.S. 618/4 and approved by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 173d Meeting. 

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12 September 1944 

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C.C.S. 618/3 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATESSOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT 

References: 

a. CCS 129th Meeting,Item 3 

b. CCS 618 Series 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Stag 

THEPROBLEM 

1. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agree that it is necessary 

to create additional machinery through which the military efforts of the 

United Nations forces on the European fronts may be coordinated. The form 

of this machinery is considered below. 

FACTS BEARlNG ON THE PROBLEM 

2. Close liaison is needed between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the 

Soviet General Staff on matters of strategy and military policy in Europe. It 

will, moreover, be highly desirable to open discussions with the U.S.S.R.on the 

war against Japan as early as politically practicable. 

3. In June 1944 Marshal Stalin raised the question of improving the 

machinery for coordinating the military efforts of the Allies, and in July, 

Marshal Vassilievsky informed General Deane that the Soviet General Staff 

were interested in the matter and would like to know the proposals of the 

Chiefs of Staff in this respect. 

4. As agreed at SEXTANT, the creation of any form of United Chiefs of 

Staff Committee would be unacceptable. 

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DISCUSSION 

5. We consider the necessary liaison between the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff and the Soviet General Staff would be achieved by the creation of a 

Combined British, United States and Soviet Committee in Moscow, provided 

that it is clearly understood that this Committee:­

(a) Is purely consultative and advisory and has no power to make 

decisions without reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Russian 

General Staff respectively. 

(b) Deals solely with strategic and operational matters and does not 

impinge upon the work that is at present being done by the European 

Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc. 

6. On the Russian side there has been reluctance in the past to discuss 

matters of any importance with the British and United States Missions, owing 

to the fact that the latter have usually to deal with officials of no authoritative 

standing. This difficulty should be overcome in the future provided that the 

Russian representative on the Committee is a senior member of the Russian 

General Staff. The Heads of the United States and British Missions already 

represent their own Chiefs of Staff and so might well serve as members of the 

Committee. Their rank should be similar to that of the Russian Member. 

CONCLUSION 

7. We conclude: 

(a) That it would be to the advantage of the United Nations war effort 

to set up a Combined Military Committee in Moscow as a consultative and 

advisory body dealing only with strategic and operational matters. 

(b) That the Committee should consist of senior representatives of the 

Russian General Staff and the British and United States Chiefs of Staff. 

RECOMMENDATION 

8. We recommend that the Heads of the British and American Missions 

in Moscow be instructed to approach the Soviet General Staff with the proposal 

to establish a Combined Committee in Moscow. 

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C.C.S. 618/4 12 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATESSOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT 

Note by the Secretaries 

In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 

the C.C.S. 172d Meeting, the Secretaries propose that the British Chiefs of 

Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff send the messages attached hereto as 

Enclosures “A” and “B” to Generals Burrows and Deane respectively. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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EN C LOS U R E “A” 

MESSAGE FROM THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TO GENERAL BURROWS 

1. It is desired that you propose to the Soviet General Staff that a tripartite Military Committee be set up in Moscow consisting of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the United States Chiefs of Staff, and of 

the British Chiefs of Staff. The idea of the British Chiefs of Staff is that this 

Committee would deal with strategical and operational matters, but you should 

make it clear :­

a. That it will be purely consultative and advisory and will have no 

power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff 

and the Russian General Staff. 

b. It must not impinge upon the work that is at present being done by 

the European Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc. 

2. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that formation of this Committee 

should assist in eliminating the delays now existent in dealings between the 

Russians and the U.S.and British Military Missions. A cardinal point in the 

proposal, however, is that the Russian representative on the Committee should 

be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the U.S.and British sides 

the Heads of the present Missions would represent the United States and 

British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible to his own Chiefs 

of Staff. 

3. In view of the approach of the Russian, U.S.and British forces toward 

each other, you should initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff in 

order that the Committee may begin to function in the near future. 

Enclosure “A” 

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ENCLOSURE “B> 

MESSAGE FROM THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TO GENERAL DEANE 

1. It is desired that you propose to the Soviet General Staff that a tripartite Military Committee be set up in Moscow consisting of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the United States Chiefs of Staff, and of 

the British Chiefs of Staff.The idea of the United States Chiefs of Staff is that 

this Committee would deal with strategical and operational matters, but you 

should make it clear:­

a.That it will be purely consultative and advisory and will have no 

power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff 

and the Russian General Staff. 

b. It must not impinge upon the work that is at present being done 

by the European Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that formation of this Committee should assist in eliminatingthe delays now existent in dealings between 

the Russians and the U.S. and British Military Missions. A cardinal point in 

the proposal, however, is that the Russian representative on the Committee 

should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the U.S.and 

British sides the Heads of the present Missions would represent the United 

States and British Chiefs of Staff respectively,each being responsible to his own 

Chiefs of Staff. 

3. In view of the approach of the Russian, U.S.and British forces toward 

each other, you should initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff 

in order that the Committee may begin to function in the near future. 

Enclosure “B” 

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C.C.S. 643/1 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, PACIFIC-FAR EAST 

(asof 8 September 1944) 

Reference: 

CCS 173d Meeting, Item 4 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 173d Meeting took note of the report by the Combined Intelligence Committee (C.C.S. 643/1). 

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C.C.S. 643/1 9 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, PACIFIC-FAR EAST 

(as of 8 September 1944) 

References: 

a. CCS 506/2 

b. CCS 643 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 f of the Enclosure to 

C.C.S. 506/2, as amended by “Decision Amending C.C.S. 506/2,” dated 9 June 

1944,directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to prepare estimates of 

the enemy situation in the Pacific and Far East and European Theater, and 

keep such estimates up to date. It was further directed that these estimates, 

with subsequent amendments when necessary, should be circulated to the 

Combined Csiefs of Staff for information. 

2. The estimate of the enemy situation in the European Theater is contained in C.C.S. 660/1. 

3. The enclosed report of the Combined Intelligence Committee, an estimate of the enemy situation in the Pacific and Far East, is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITLJATION, PACIFIC-FAR EAST 

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To estimate the enemy situation and intentions in the Pacific and 

Far East. 

SUMMARY 

2. Political and psychological. (See Appendix “A.”) Japan has sought to 

enlist the support of her most populous conquered areas by powerful propaganda and by grants of specious independence. For the present, Japan desires 

to avoid war with the U.S.S.R.in order to be free to direct all her energy against 

her enemies. 

As a result of their fundamental beliefs, the morale of the Japanese populace, and especially of the armed forces, has remained relatively high, but a 

continuing series of sharp defeats will tend further to confuse and bewilder 

the Japanese. Such defeats, combined with a collapse of Germany, might conceivably cause a reshuffling of the ruling clique followed by an attempt to secure 

a negotiated peace. Japanese propaganda has already shifted from self-assured 

offensive to defensive. 

3. Economic factors. (See Appendix “B.”) Production of high-priority 

armament items such as aircraft may continue to expand for some time, even 

though the rapid growth of Japan’s basic industry has been levelling off since 

the beginning of 1944. Further substantial growth of the Japanese steel and 

other basic industries is believed impossible in the light of the present Japanese 

shipping position. Shipping is now barely adequate to sustain current production rates in the basic industries, and sinkings exceed launchings. The largest 

and most essential economic commitment for shipping is within the Inner 

Zone.“ Japan is continuing to develop raw material sources in the Inner Zone 

:k Japan Proper,Korea, Manchuria,North China,Formosa, and Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin). 

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in an attempt to achieve self-sufficiency there, but is unlikely to achieve this 

goal. She is particularly dependent on the Outer Zone for oil. Inner Zone production and stockpiles of fuel oil are at best estimated as sufficient for about 

nine months but may be much less. In other essential raw materials not available in sufficient quantity in the Inner Zone, Japan is believed to have stockpiles 

to carry her for longer periods. 

Japan’s civilian supply position is stringent but not yet critical with 

respect to food and is generally bad and deteriorating with respect to other 

commodities, e.g., clothing. 

4. Military factors. (See Appendix “C.”)Realizing that the war potential 

of her enemies is increasing much more rapidly than her own, Japan has been 

compelled to adopt the strategic defensive. She hopes that tenacious resistance 

along successive lines of defense may eventually result in war weariness and 

possible division among the United Nations, which would enable her to conclude 

a satisfactory peace. In the past year her air force has deteriorated in quality 

of personnel and has operated less aggressively; her navy has suffered serious 

losses; only her ground forces have maintained their strength and fighting 

qualities. 

Although Japan will continue to use caution in the employment of her 

air power and especially her battle fleet, we believe, nevertheless, that Japan 

now intends to make vigorous efforts to resist any Allied penetration of her 

inner defense line Japan-Formosa-Lmon-Mindanao.Her ground forces will 

offer maximum resistance at all points with little regard for losses; her air 

power will be committed to a scale of defense proportionate to the strategic 

importance of each area, and her battle fleet will attack should local circumstances develop which seem to offer opportunity for an effective blow. 

In the Bonins, at Palau, and at Halmahera local Japanese ground forces 

will resist to the maximum extent of their capabilities,but without strong naval 

and air support. 

5. Intentions in specific areas. (See Appendix “D.”) 

a. Japan Proper. As the war draws nearer to Japan we may expect to 

find an increasingly large percentage of her naval and air forces based 

nearby and all home defenses considerably strengthened. 

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b. Northern Pacific. Japan will continue her present policy of gradually 

strengthening her garrisons and other defenses in the Kuriles and Japanese Sakhalin. 

c. Manchuria. In view of the Soviet threat, Japan is unlikely to release 

any appreciable ground forces from Manchuria unless they can be quickly 

restored. She will continue to maintain a strong defensive position there, 

but is unlikely to undertake any offensive action unless she becomes convinced that the U.S.S.R.is about to enter the war against her. 

d. China. We believe that the Japanese axe now conducting operations 

with the intentions of neutralizing Allied air forces in China and also of 

establishing overland communication from Manchuria to south China. 

Japan hopes, by such moves, to improve her strategic position in central 

and south China. 

e. Burma. The Japanese will continue to attempt to deny the Allies 

a land route to China and to maintain their position in Burma as an anchor 

for their western perimeter defenses. They will only undertake limited 

offensive action for the purpose of breaking up Allied operations. 

f. Malaya-Sumatra. Although this area is of great importance to the 

Japanese,both for its own resources and as a barrier on the approaches to 

the South China Sea from the west and south, we anticipate no substantial 

reinforcement of it until a major threat is more clearly apparent. 

g. East Indies. We believe that Japan will maintain her hold on the 

East Indies as long as possible, even though her sea communications should 

be severed. 

h. Formosa-Luzon-Mindanuo. The Japanese are busily engaged in 

strenuous efforts to reinforce this line. They will resist fiercely any penetration of this line, particularly the Luzon-Formosa area. They will accelerate the rate of reinforcement should the Allies occupy the western Carolines. 

i. Central Pacific. In the Bonins, at Palau, and at Halmahera local 

Japanese ground forces will resist to the maximum extent of their capabilities, but without strong naval and air support. 

6. A detailed estimate of enemy order of battle and deployment will be 

available as Annex “A” when required. 

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APPENDIX “A” 

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 

1. External politics. 

a. General. Japan has propounded two powerful propaganda themes: 

“Asia for the Asiatics” and “The Co-Prosperity Sphere;” and has adopted 

such relations with neighboring peoples as she believes will contribute to 

the fulfillment of her plans. Following are the steps which have been taken, 

but they represent changes in form rather than in substance. 

(1) Relations with China. Japan has recognized the “independence” 

of China, as represented by the Nanking puppet government, and has 

sought to enlist Chinese nationalism in support of that regime by surrendering to it various foreign concessions, notably those at Shanghai. 

(2) Relations with subject peoples. Japan has granted “independence” to Burma and the Philippines, seeking to enlist the relatively developed nationalism of those countries in her favor; she has hinted that 

other occupied areas (e.g., Java) may receive similar grants of “independence;” and she has rewarded Thailand for cooperation by the cession of certain neighboring territory to which Thailand had some pretensions. 

b. Relations with the U.S.S.R. There exists between Japan and the 

U.S.S.R.a basic conflict of interest. Japan’s concept of strategic security 

cannot be satisfied without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. 

For the present, however, Japan desires to avoid war with the U.S.S.R.in 

order to be free to direct all her efforts against her enemies. 

c. Relations with the Axis. Japan’s connection with the Axis is a matter 

of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany 

only insofar as she believes that such coordination will contribute to the 

realization of her basic aims. 

2. Psychology and morale. The Japanese, traditionally, are an intensely 

nationalistic and close bit family whose broad characteristics are a toughness 

of fiber and a fatalistic singleness of purpose. They have been taught that they 

are of divine origin, that the Emperor is directly descended from the godfounder of the nation and that the Japanese are divinely and infallibly guided 

towards the establishmentof a new world order. The Japanese soldier is taught 

Appendix “A” 

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to give blind obedience and to regard death in the service of the Emperor as an 

honor. He is told that he is invincible and that to show weakness or to surrender 

is to accept disgrace. 

As a result of these teachings, the morale of the Japanese populace, and 

especially of the armed forces, has remained high, but the unfavorable course 

of the war has caused some disillusionment. Moreover, since much of popular 

morale is based upon the theory of invincibility, a series of sharp defeats, as 

they are brought home to them, will tend further to confuse and bewilder the 

people as a whole. 

Real power in Japan rests in the hands of small groups of leaders capable 

of exploiting the position of the Emperor. The collapse of Germany will have a 

tremendously depressing effect upon such leaders. This, combined with ever 

increasing United Nations pressure and approach to the homeland, might 

conceivably bring about a reshuffle of the ruling cliques followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace. 

Official propaganda on the home front has lost its self-assured tone and 

determination to fight for existence is replacing exaltation in Victory. The potential of the United Nations is admitted to be high, and the government has 

announced its intention to prepare for the defense of the homeland. Japanese 

withdrawals are admitted. It is implied that the Japanese have finished winning independence for other Asiatic countries and now must prepare to defend 

their own islands from frontal attack. The government is also preparing the 

Japanese people for more serious German reverses in Europe. 

Appendix “A” 

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APPENDIX “B” 

ECONOMIC FACTORS 

1. General. Though Japan may still be able to increase production of certain high priority armament items, e.g. aircraft, the expansion of her basic 

industry, which had ceased by the end of 1943, almost certainly cannot be resumed during this war. Lack of shipping is the most important limiting factor 

on the expansion of basic industry. Japan still depends on the Outer Zone for 

certain essential raw materials, especially oil. The Japanese have partially 

succeeded in reducing this dependence by stockpiling materials in the Inner 

Zone where nearly allJapanese industry is concentrated. The stockpiling program has fallen short because of lack of shipping. 

2. Shipping,Japan’s shipping position is her mast critical weakness and 

is deteriorating rapidly. We estimate that Japan now has much less shipping 

than she needs to carry out military commitments and at the same time to 

utilize her industrial capacity to the full. This condition will grow progressively 

worse. We believe, however, that Japan will not voluntarily abandon any strategic outpost because of a shipping stringency alone, but will accept a curtailment in her basic over-all industrial production by reducing the import of raw 

materials. Should the sinking rate increase, as it has increased in recent 

months, the Japanese would be forced to accept this import reduction proportionately sooner. Sufficient shipping should be available, if necessary, by diversion from trade, for essential troop movements. 

We estimate that Japan will be unable to build more than 800,000 

gross tons of steel merchant vessels in 1944, which is far behind the rate required to replace losses, and that her ship repair facilities are heavily overburdened. Great emphasis has been placed on wooden shipbuilding, but this 

program is not believed to be progressing as well as planned and could not, in 

any event,offset the discrepancy between losses and construction of steel ships. 

Japan’s shipping position would be relatively easier were she cut off from the 

Outer Zone. 

3. Petroleum and other raw materials. In general, Japan’s industrial machine is dependent upon raw materials which must come from outside Japan 

Proper and thus the continuance of supply depends upon transportation. The 

most essential raw material contribution from the Outer Zone is oil. Other 

critical materials which Japan obtains from the Outer Zone include nickel, 

Appendix “B” 

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chrome, iron ore, manganese, lead, copper, zinc, bauxite and phosphates. Her 

dependence on the Outer Zone for these materials is however less than in the 

case of oil either because of the existence of relatively large stockpiles or the 

possibility in some cases of increasing Inner Zone supplies or of substituting 

other materials, 

Among petroleum products, Japan’s position is weakest in fuel oil. Inner 

Zone production and stocks are believed smcient for about nine months and 

estimated present over-all production roughly balances consumption at the 

present calculated scale. Furthermore, about 75 percent of production is in the 

East Indies. Japan is developing new synthetic facilities in the Inner Zone, 

but present fuel oil output there would, we estimate, operate her naval fleet 

and merchant marine at less than one-third their present rate of activity, if 

stocks are not drawn upon. In aviation gasoline, Japan is similarly dependent 

upon the East Indies, 80 percent coming from there, but stocks, chiefly in the 

Inner Zone, are believed sufficient for somewhat more than a year at the present 

rate of consumption. 

Japan’s tanker fleet has been reduced far below the minimum tonnage 

required to move fuel oil and aviation gas out of the East Indies to all consumption centers, and the deficit has been only partially offset by diversion 

of dry cargo vessels to oil-carrying. We believe that Japan will continue this 

diversion at the expense of other cargoes in order to keep the oil line full and 

moving. 

Although about 20 percent of Japan’s iron ore is now derived from Outer 

Zone areas, we believe that Inner Zone production, most of which is outside 

Japan Proper, could fill all essential needs. Nearly all of Japan’s coal supply 

is in the Inner Zone, but more than 50 percent of it lies outside of Japan Proper. 

Thus iron ore and coal constitute the greatest burden of Japanese shipping. 

Japan is almost completely dependent on north China and Manchuria for 

coking coal since the supplies available to her elsewhere are generally of too 

poor quality to make high grade coke without the admixture of the coal from 

north China. 

Stockpiles of bauxite and the possibility of producing alumina from inferior ores in the Inner Zone reduce Japan’s dependence on bauxite supplies 

from Bintan Island (Malaya) and Indochina. Though Japan’s copper stockpile is relatively small, she produces more than half her requirements at home. 

The lead stockpile, supplemented by Inner Zone production, would last at least 

a year. Japan’s zinc position is more stringent; the Inner Zone produces not 

Appendix “B” 

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more than two-thirds of Japan’s requirements and stocks are believed to be 

low. 

Japan’s major source of nickel is Celebes and if this source were cut off 

her position would be difficult. A conservative use pattern probably has been 

observed, however, and we believe that the full effects would not be felt in less 

than a year. The first results of a sharp reduction in use of nickel would be 

impairment of the quality of war material. 

In chromium and manganese, Japan’s position is believed to be somewhat better. For both, Inner Zone production, plus stocks is believed sufficient 

for more than a year’s consumption. The Philippines are the major source 

of both, contributing a large portion of new chromium and nearly.40 percent 

of the new manganese. 

The comparative dependence of Japan on specific Outer Zone areas is in 

the following order : 

Sumatra: 

Borneo : 

Philippine Islands: 

Celebes: 

Bintan Island : 

Fuel oil and aviation gasoline. 

Fuel oil. 

Chrome, manganese, copper. 

Nickel. 

Bauxite. 

4. Industry. Japanese industrial production expanded generally up to the 

beginning of 1944, when it levelled off because of basically restrictive factors 

(e.g.,lack of shipping) which the Japanese are not expected to overcome during 

this war. However, production of certain high priority finished products, such 

as aircraft, continues to increase. Japan will attempt to increase the production 

of such instruments as fire control gear, radar, and other types of precision 

electrical equipment, but because of technical and organizational difficulties, 

we believe that she will not be able to accomplish any great expansion in this 

field. There is still a slight cushion in consumer and civilian goods which can 

be sacrificed in all out efforts to increase the production of military armaments. 

Japanese industry is almost wholly concentrated in Inner Zone areas (southern 

Hokkaido, central Honshu, northern Kyushu, northern Korea, southern Manchuria and Formosa) . Finished munitions production is heavily concentrated 

in Honshu, although Manchurian industry, with help from Japan Proper, 

largely supports the Japanese Army in Manchuria. 

Appendix “B” 

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5. Food. The 1944 rice consumption in the Inner Zone is higher than anticipated because of reduced wheat and barley crops. For this and other reasons, 

we now believe that Japanese rice reserves are uncomfortably low and that 

Japan must next year depend upon shipments from Indochina and Thailand 

for an essential portion of rice supplies. Food rations can be reduced without 

causing actual starvation or serious political consequences, but any reduction 

will result in decreased industrial efficiency and further deterioration of public 

health. 

Appendix “B” 

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APPENDIX ’%” 

MILITARY FACTORS 

1. General. The rapid build-up and advance of Allied forces in the Central 

and South Pacific have brought home to Japan the realization that she must 

prepare to meet steadily increasing Allied strength. In addition, Japan’s relations with the U.S.S.R.are uneasy because of the ever present fear that one day 

that country may join the forces arrayed against her. Forced to accept the 

strategic defensive, Japan is attempting to consolidate and make secure her 

greatly expanded empire. She is developing successive defense lines to hold off 

her enemies in the hope that they, wearied by the war in Europe and perhaps 

divided among themselves, will attack her ineffectively or compromise to her 

advantage. 

2. Air forces. The Japanese Air Force finds itself totally unable to match 

the constantly growing strength of our opposing air forces and is irrevocably 

committed to a strategic defensive role. Strictly offensive operations have 

become progressively more limited in scope and less frequent. Meanwhile, the 

highest priority is being given to aircraft production, and latest estimates 

suggest that at least 1200 combat aircraft are now being produced each month. 

A strenuous effort is being made to overcome qualitative inferiority by better 

protective armament, greater fire power, self-sealing fuel tanks, and engines 

of increased power. Already there has been a marked improvement in the quality of Japanese fighter aircraft. All available indications show that the combat efficiency of the Japanese Air Force is at present suffering seriously from a 

shortage of fully trained and experienced pilots and crews. Currently expanded 

facilities for individual and group training are being completed, but in periods 

of high attrition the Japanese will find it difficult to provide replacement of 

effectively trained personnel. We believe that a combination of difficulties will 

make it impossible for Japan’s air forces to improve materially their present 

qualitative inferiority so long as continued and heavy pressure is brought 

against her. 

Although the Allies will probably meet increasingly strong numerical 

air resistance as they attack successive lines of defense, the scale and duration 

encountered at each point of attack is likely to be conditioned by Japan’s intention to preserve air strength for the final defense of those areas which she considers vital to the defense of the homeland and its critical supply lines. 

Appendix “C” 

70 
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3. Naval forces. Japan’snaval strength is inadequate for the defense of her 

outer perimeter. She is only able to concentrate portions of her fleet at a few 

strategicbases to parry thrusts at key points of her defense line. Allied strength 

is denying the Japanese Fleet the use of all but a small part of the Paciflc Ocean. 

With her present relatively small operational fleet, Japan does not dare risk 

possible heavy attrition by launching any major offensives. Although she is 

striving to increase her fleet strength by new units, the appearance of such new 

ships has been so rare as to suggest difficulties in the outfitting of such forces. 

We believe that Japan is primarily engaged in building small escort vessels 

to counter the heavy toll of merchant ships taken by our submarines. 

We believe that in the future the Japanese will deploy their fleet so as 

to be able better to meet readily the next estimated Allied blow. With their fleet 

concentrated in the Celebes Sea the Japanese had hoped to counter vigorously 

Allied thrusts at the Philippines. Subsequent to the battle of the eastern 

Philippines the main elements of the fleet were obliged to retire for reequipping 

and reorganization. As a result of the threat to the Bonins and the homeland, 

developed by our advance to the Marianas, the Japanese are likely to dispose 

their heavy surface units along the Kyushu-Formosa line. However, the fuel 

oil situation, the shipping stringency and Allied air power will have a bearing 

on ultimate fleet deployment. 

While the Japanese Fleet suffered a heavy loss of aircraft and some carrier units in the recent battle of the eastern Philippines, Japan still retains a 

battle fleet of considerable power. Despite recent actions we believe that while 

the Japanese High Command will be cautious in the use of their battle fleet, 

they will continue to make vigorous efforts to oppose any Allied penetrations 

of the line Japan-Formosa-Luzon-Mindanao.The main considerations governing the strength, disposition, and employment of Japanese naval units 

opposing our advance are: local control of the air,strength of Allied forces, 

and the time factor. If, at any time, the Japanese should gain local control of 

the air, which is unlikely, we must expect heavy attacks upon our units by 

task forces composed of carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc. Lacking such air 

control or strong land-based air cover, the Japanese would use some carriers to 

attempt attacks on our flanks, and also light task forces might attempt night 

surface torpedo attacks. We can expect the Japanese to be cautious in all-out 

attacks on a vastly superior force, such attacks only materializing if local control of the air has been established. The element of timing will be affected by 

the rapidity with which the High Command reaches the conclusion that an 

actual occupation is threatened. In any event, our carriers will be the primary 

Appendix “C” 

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target for enemy aircraft, with our transports as secondary. Our transports 

will be the primary target for enemy surface forces, with our own striking forces 

as secondary. 

4. Ground forces.Japan’s greatest armed strength lies in her large, fairly 

equipped and very well trained army. Because of the nature of the war in the 

Pacific to date, the United Nations have been unable to inflict any serious attrition on the over-all strength of the Japanese ground forces, which are as strong 

or stronger than in 1941. 

At the present time the Japanese army ground forces total approximately 3,500,000 men. These troops are organized into about 85 divisions plus 

many independent units and garrisons, which have been so deployed that 

Japan now maintains a strong strategically defensive position. In addition, 

Japan has organized in Manchuria and China puppet units totaling approximately 300,000 and 400,000 men respectively. The strongest concentrations of 

forces are in Japan Proper, Manchuria and China. Since United Nations forces 

have begun to threaten seriously Japan’s position in the Central and Southwestern Pacific areas, Japan has accelerated her preparations for the defense 

of the vital East Indies and has reinforced her southern forces, particularly in 

the Philippines area. 

The formation of puppet units has been general throughout Japanese 

occupied territory, but only on a large scale in Manchuria and China. Puppet 

troops in other areas have been formed primarily for purposes of political propaganda, and their military value to Japan has been negligible. The actual 

value of the Manchurian and Chinese puppet troops to Japan cannot be accurately assessed. They are only lightly equipped and, although some have been 

used in combat against the Chinese, the majority of them have had relatively 

Iittle training. They are at present being used mainly as garrison units and 

for the maintenance of order in Japanese occupied territory. Because their loyalty is doubtful, it is unlikely that the Japanese would use them in a major 

engagement against well trained and equipped troops. 

We believe that Japan intends to maintain generally the present strategic disposition of her ground forces after further substantial reinforcement 

of Formosa and the Philippines. 

Appendix “C” 

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APPENDIX “D” 

MILITARY INTENTIONS IN SPECIFIC AREAS 

1. Japan Proper.As the war draws nearer to Japan, we may expect to And 

an increasingly large percentage of Japan’s heavy naval forces based in contiguous waters to protect the home islands and the essential transport routes 

between the home islands and the rest of the Inner Zone. Similarly, a large 

percentage of Japan’s total combat aircraft,particularly fighters, will be kept 

at bases in the homeland to protect against bombing of the concentrations of 

Japanese armaments production there. Also the formation of new divisions 

will be expedited and Japanese home defensesstrengthened. 

2. Northern Pacific. In view of the American position in the Aleutian 

Islands and the possibility of eventual Allied air and naval action from Soviet 

bases in Kamchatka and Soviet Sakhalin, Japan will continue her present 

policy of strengthening her defenses in the Kuriles and Japanese Sakhalin. 

3. Manchuria. Japan has built up in Manchuria a large and highly developed army. It is largely sustained by Manchurian agricultural and industrial 

production, which is developing more rapidly than any other section of the 

Japanese Empire. The purpose of this army is to provide a force of sufficient 

strength to protect Manchuria from any Soviet threat and also to provide a 

striking force powerful enough to attack Siberia and the Maritime Provinces 

should Japan consider the latter course to be necessary. The Japanese High 

Command has abandoned hope of any German victory. Japan must appreciate 

that following peace with Germany, Soviet milltary capabilities in the Far 

East will increase progressively and, in fact, the initiative along the Manchurian border will eventually pass to the U.S.S.R.In view of the Soviet threat, 

Japan is unlikely to release any appreciable forces from Manchuria unless they 

can be quickly restored. She will continue to maintain a strong defensive position there, but is unlikely to undertake any offensive action unless she becomes 

convinced that the U.S.S.R.is about to enter the war against her. 

4. China. Allied air action from China is increasingly menacing Japan’s 

present economic and defensive position, and the Japanese are taking stronger 

counter measures by the occupation and neutralization of some of the more 

accessible Allied bases. 

Appendix “D” 

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The Japanese have now completed military operations between the 

Yangtze and Yellow Rivers and are in process of consolidating their position 

in this newly captured territory while reconstructing the railroad line linking 

Hankow with Peking. The primary objective of current operations south of the 

Yangtze is to deny to the Allies air bases in southeastern China. In order to accomplish this we believe that they intend to occupy the railway line between 

Hengyang and Kweilin and also eventually to establish overland communications between their forces in central and south China by occupation of the 

railroad line between Hengyang and Canton. 

The Japanese have the capability of successfully carrying out these intentions. Whether or not they will commit sufficient forces for the final completion of such operations may however be influenced by the rapidly increasing 

threat from the Pacific. We believe that the Japanese do not intend to weaken 

the ground forces they now have based in China unless in due course some of 

these divisions are urgently required for the defense of Japan Proper or Formosa. 

5. Burma. The main object of Japanese operations in Burma will be to 

contain large Allied forces in terrain favorable to the Japanese and to prevent 

the reopening of the land route to China. The Japanese will, when possible, 

continue to undertake limited offensive action designed to break up Allied 

offensive preparations and to divert as large a part as possible of the forces of 

the Southeast Asia Command. 

6. Malaya-Sumatra. This area is of great importance to the Japanese, both 

for its own resources and as a barrier on the approaches to the South China 

Sea from the west and south. The Japanese, however, presumably consider 

their present strength there adequate to meet any threat likely to arise during 1944. In view of their preoccupation with more immediate threats to Japan 

Proper, Formosa, and the Philippines from the Pacific and by air from China, 

as well as the potential threat from Siberia, we anticipate no substantial reinforcement of Malaya-Sumatra until a threat to that area is more clearly 

apparent, and then only as may be warranted by the then existing over-all 

situation. 

7. East Indies. We believe that Japan will not in any circumstances voluntarily relinquish her hold upon the East Indies, but will continue to maintain 

in the area the strong ground forces which already have been deployed for 

their defense. Although the Japanese in due time will appreciate that their 

Appendix “D” 

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sea communications to the Indies may be severed, they will consider the continued denial of the area to the United Nations forces as of such strategic 

importance as to warrant the sacrifice of forces stationed there. 

8. Formosa-Luxon-Mindao. Currently the Japanese are engaged in 

strenuous efforts to reinforce and build up ground, air and naval defenses in 

these areas. Allied attack upon any part of the line will be fiercely resisted by 

all forces immediately available, the scale and intensity of such resistance 

progressively increasing from the southern to the northern part of this strong 

eastern defense to the vital line of sea communications with the East Indies. 

Although Allied occupation of Mindanao would greatly increase the threat to 

Japan’s position, the occupation of Luzon would make the passage of shipping 

through the South China Sea highly precarious, while the capture of Formosa 

would substantially sever all sea communications to the south and in addition 

offer a strong base for direct assault upon Japan Proper. We believe that the 

Japanese intend to have deployed in the immediate future all forces which 

they consider can be spared for the defense of the southern Philippines, whereas land and air strength in Luzon and Formosa will continue to build up at 

an accelerated rate should the Allies occupy the Palaus. 

9. Central Pacific. In the Bonins, at Palau, and at Halmahera local Japanese 

ground forces will resist to the maximum extent of their capabilities,but without strong naval and air support. The scale of naval resistance will be governed 

by the number of their own land-based aircraft immediately available, the 

strength and dispositions of our own forces, and the time at which they determine that further occupation is threatened. 

Appendix “D” 

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C.C.S. 65417 12 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRAM FOR THE “OCTAGON” CONFERENCE 

Reference: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 3 

Note by the Secretaries 

In their 172d Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the following program for the OCTAGON Conference: 

I. Tuesday, 12th September 

a. Control of Strategic Bomber Force. 

b. Zones of occupation -provision of forces. 

c. Machinery for Inter-Allied coordination in Moscow. 

d. Situation report from SHAEF and SACMED. 

e. C.I.C. report on the enemy situation in Europe. 

f. General Eisenhower’s future plan of campaign. 

g. General Wilson’s plan of campaign. 

11. Wednesday,13th September 

h. Prospect of redeployment of forces from European Theater for war 

against Japan. 

i. C.I.C. report on enemy situation in the Pacific. 

j. Situation report on the Pacific and from SACSEA. 

k. Strategy for the defeat of Japan. 

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111. Thursday, 14th September 

1. British participation in the Pacific in the war against Japan. 

m. Future operations in Southeast Asia. 

N.Friday,15th September 

n. Continuation of discussion of items listed in I11 above. 

0.Further consideration of the redeployment of forces from the European Theater for the war against Japan. 

p. Possible Russian participation the war against Japan. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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C.C.S. 654/8 

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE “OCTAGON” CONFERENCE 

References: 

CCS 173d Meeting, Item 7 

CCS 680/2 

By action taken informally and in their 171st Meeting, the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff,by 8 September 1944, had approved all of the “Basic Policies for 

the OCTAGON Conference” with the exception of paragraph 6 (i) . Two proposals for the wording of paragraph 6 (i) were presented for consideration at 

OCTAGON on 12 September (C.C.S. 654/8). 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 173d Meeting accepted the wording proposed during the discussion. The agreed basic policies for the OCTAGON 

Conference are included in C.C.S. 680/2. 

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C.C.S. 654/8 12 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE “OCTAGON” CONFERENCE 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on all the basic policies for 

inclusion in the final OCTAGON report to the President and the Prime Minister, with one exception. 

2. This exception is as follows: 

a. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the following as paragraph 

6 (i) of C.C.S. 654: 

“Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and 

Far East as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other inescapable commitments, as soon as the German situation allows.” 

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff have proposed that this paragraph 

should read as follows: 

“Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and 

Far East, as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other agreed 

commitments,as soon as the German situation allows.” 

3. The decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this wording is requested. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T.CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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C.C.S. 660/1 

PROSPECTS OF A GERMAN COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER 

(as of 8 September 1944) 

Reference: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 6 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172d Meeting took note of the 

report by the Combined Intelligence Committee (C.C.S. 660/1). 

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C.C.S. 660/1 9 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROSPECTS OF A GERMAN COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER 

(asof 8 September 1944) 

References: 

a. CCS 660 

b. CCS 506/2 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 f of the Enclosure to C.C.S. 

506/2, as amended by “Decision Amending C.C.S. 506/2,” dated 9 June 1944, 

directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to prepare estimates of the 

enemy situation in the Pacific and Far East and European Theater, and keep 

such estimates up to date. It was further directed that these estimates, with 

subsequent amendments when necessary, should be circulated to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff for information. 

2. The estimate of the enemy situation in the Pacific and the Far East is 

contained in C.C.S. 643/1. 

3. The enclosed report of the Combined Intelligence Committee, an estimate of the enemy situation in the European Theater, is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

PROSPECTSOF A GERMAN COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER 

(asof 8 September 1944) 

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To review the principal factors bearing on German surrender or the collapse of German resistance and to estimate the form which such an event is 

likely to take and the time when it is likely to occur. 

DISCUSSION 

2. See Appendix. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 

3. The German strategic situation has deteriorated to such a degree that 

no recovery is now possible. In addition to the disintegration of the German 

frontin the West, the crumbling of the German position in the Balkans, and the 

penetration of German defenses in Italy, the general decline in Germany’s war 

potential brought about mainly by Allied bombing and by German losses of 

manpower has contributed largely to this situation. 

4. The present German Government, or any Nazi successor, is unlikely to 

surrender. Control by the Party appears strong enough to prevent governmental overthrow or internal disintegration prior to an extensive collapse of 

military resistance. 

5. Although causes for collapse are undoubtedly present, the lack of visible 

symptoms indicates that German national life is still mobilized behind the war 

effort. This support is not likely to break down untilthe finalmilitary debacle 

has reached its final stage. 

6. The collapse will probably take the form of piecemeal surrenders by field 

commanders, who will be influenced both by the tactical pressure on them and 

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by their individual appreciationof the hopeless strategic situation, and possibly 

by their disagreement with the policy of the Central Government. 

7. Unmistakable signsof the imminence of collapse are unlikely to be apparent until the end of resistanceis close at hand, but collapse, once begun, is likely 

to spread rapidly. We consider that organized resistance under the effective 

control of the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) is 

unlikely to continuebeyond 1December 1944, and that it may end even sooner. 

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APPENDIX 

1. Strategic Situation 

Q. Ground. Prior to the opening of the summer offensives, German 

strategy had as its primary goal the crushing of any Allied attempt to establish a front in western Europe. In order to accomplish this, Germany was 

prepared to yield ground elsewhere under pressure in the hope that, after 

defeating Allied operations in the West, she might be able to retrieve such 

situations as had worsened in the meantime. 

This strategy failed to produce the desired results. In France the German fronthas virtuallyceased to exist. Since the break through in Normandy, the Germans have been unable tohold any line and the Allies are advancing against very light resistance to the German Frontier. In Italy, the 

German defenses based on the Gothic position have been penetrated. In the 

Balkans, the whole German position is crumbling. In the East, although the 

Germans have, at the moment, an organized front between the Russian 

and the German Frontier, they cannot be confident of holding their present 

line in Poland against a renewal of the Russian offensive. 

The aimof German strategy must be to prolong the war and to prevent, 

for as long as possible, the invasion of the Reich itself; but the speed of recent 

events has taken Gennany completely by surprise and has left her without 

the resources and apparently without any coordinated plan to meet her radically altered strategic position. 

Sound military strategy would long ago have seemed to dictate territorial retrenchment in order to concentrate additional forces in the decisive 

areas. This, however, would have involved grave political dangers, the very 

weakness of Germany’sposition making it imperative for her to disguise the 

true state of affairs as long as possible, not only from her enemies, but from 

the wavering satellites and neutrals, the restive populations in occupied 

territories, and her own people. 

We believe that Hitler may now have realized that his only hope of 

using some of his troops, now in outlying parts of Europe, for the prolongation of the war and the defense of the Reich, lies in withdrawing them immediately. There is evidence that this process has already started from the 

most outlying areas. Even so,he has waited too long. During September he 

might be able to make available for the defense of the West Wall, in addition 

to the divisionshe isable to extricatefromFrance, the equivalent of 10-15full 

divisions from elsewhere, excluding the Eastern Front. These would include 

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some ten low category divisions at present forming in Germany,but they are 

generally under strength,inadequately trained, short of artillery, and fitted 

only for static defense, and are considered equivalent to about five fullstrength divisions. We are also unable to exclude the possibility that some 

divisions might even be transferred from the Eastern to the Western Front. 

Any divisions which Germany can make available will be sent to the West so 

long as this front presents the most immediate threat. However, if these 

transfers do take place, they will not be sufficient to hold the Allied attack 

in the West. 

b. Air. The offensive strength of the German Air Force has declined 

to negligible proportions. In view of Germany’s increasing shortage of oil 

and air crews no revival of effort on an intensive or sustained scale is possible. 

In order to provide for the defense of vital strategic objectives in the 

Reich against Allied bombing operations, the Germans have already found 

it necessary to curtail drastically air support of their military operations on 

all fronts and the air defense of occupied territories. Nevertheless, the German Air Force is unable to prevent heavy and systematic destruction of high 

priority objectives by Allied bombing attacks, nor will it be able to prevent 

the invasion of the Reich or exert any important influence on the final outcome of that invasion. Although some temporary increase in fighter 

strength may be achieved by the avoidance of combat, the shortages of fuel 

and of trained pilots probably preclude any substantial improvement in defensive capabilities. 

Jet propelled aircraft have now appeared operationally in relatively 

small numbers. Although this may necessitate some slight revision of Allied 

air tactics, it is highly unlikely that a sufficient number of this type will become operational before the end of the war to change substantially the present over-all ineffectivenessof the German Air Force. 

c. Sea. The German operations against Allied shipping and against 

Allied supply lines to the Continent have degenerated into harassing activities owing principally to the success of Allied anti-submarine measures 

and, to some extent, to the impotence of the German Air Force. 

The enemy still disposes of a large U-boat fleet and is now constructing 

improved types. An increase of activity may be expected in the autumn. 

When these new types become operational, it is likely that these operations 

may temporarily meet with more success than has been the case for some 

months past. Operations will, however, be seriously hampered by the loss of 

bases in the Biscay and consequently by the disadvantages of being forced to 

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use Norwegian ports. Such operations are, therefore, unlikely to achieve a 

sufficient degree of successto exert any important influence on the course of 

the war. 

The German surfaceforcesmay still be able to delay further deterioration of the situation in the Baltic, where all the major unitsexcept the TIRPIT2 are now concentrated, but it is very unlikely that they will be able to 

influence appreciably developments in any other theater. No forces remain 

in areas south of the Straits of Dover. 

New technical developmentsin U-boat equipment and in such weapons 

as torpedoes, bombs and mines may, as in the past, prove of material value 

to the enemy. The operation of “Small Battle Units,” comprising one-man 

torpedoes, explosive motor boats, and such weapons, may be intensified. It 

is very unlikely, however, that the enemy willbe able by these means to exert any important influence on the course of the war. 

d. Manpower. Lack of combat-fit manpower constitutes one of the most 

critical over-all weaknesses in the German situation. The number of physically fit young men remaining in the entire German population is already 

substantiallyless than the minimum requirementsof the armed forces. German losses in manpower have already been enormous. These can no longer 

be replaced nor can the fighting effectiveness of her combat units be maintained in the face of this heavy attrition. Mobilization of the civilian labor 

forces is already virtually complete and the importation of more foreign 

workers is not now possible on any substantial scale and would increase the 

already grave potential source of danger they represent. Announced German 

measures for “full mobilization” of the home front therefore cannot have 

any substantial effect in alleviating the manpower crisis. 

e. Political and Psychological Factors. The strongest elements in the 

German strategic situation are the political and psychological forces which 

maintain the German will to resist in spite of the overwhelming pressure 

exerted by the adverse military situation. Nazi controls governing every 

aspect of Gem life continue to be outwardly effective. As a result of the 

attempted coup d‘&zt of 20 July, Nazi control hasbeen further extended into the Wehrmacht. Undoubtedly, the extent of the plot, which came to light 

on 20 July after brewing for months, indicates serious discontent in the 

armed forces, especially in the officer corps. This discontent is being kept in 

check only at the expense of further weakening the fighting power of the 

army through the replacement of disaffected officers by Nazi officers of less 

ability and experience. 

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The attitude of the civilian population continues to oscillate between 

apathy and hopes for a negotiated peace. The complete Party control of the 

home front, in any case, renders the likelihood of purely civilian revolt extremely remote. 

f. Economic. There is evidence that the Allied attacks on Germany’s 

oil production, stocks, etc., are now confronting her with disaster. This is 

the most serious shortage of material with which Germany is at present 

faced, and seriously reduces her capacity to deal with the catastrophic developments in her strategic situation. Other shortages, especially in ferroalloys,will become increasingly acute. 

The German war economy is now clearly unable to meet Germany’s 

military requirements. Shortage of tanks, military vehicles, and even ammunition is now seriously affecting operations on the fighting fronts. Losses 

in equipment have been enormous and cannot possibly be replaced. 

The civilian supply position, although increasingly tight, is unlikely 

directly to cause military difficulties or to precipitate a civil revolt. Lack of 

civilian goods may cause some political difficulties and may reduce labor 

efficiency. 

g. Occupied and Satellite Countries. The satellite states are increasingly concerned to save themselves from the effects of a German defeat. 

Rumania has already proclaimed her surrender and declared war on Germany. Bulgaria has asked for an axmistice and is reported to have declared 

war on Germany. Finland has accepted Soviet conditions for the opening of 

armistice negotiations and claims to have received Germany’s agreement to 

the withdrawal of German forces from her territory. Hungary still remains 

in the war because she is unwilling to restore to Rumania the ceded territories in Transylvania and because she fears the U. S. S. R. 

The Germansare reported to be already withdrawing from Finland,but 

it is unlikely that more than one-half of the total force can be withdrawn 

sufficientlyrapid to be effective as reinforcements. German withdrawal 

fromsouthern Greece and the Aegean Islands may have begun already. The 

only area from which German withdrawal is unlikely is Norway which now 

provides the only bases from which German U-boats can hope to operate in 

the Atlantic. 

h. Relations with Neutrals. The remaining European neutrals may be 

expected to cling to their neutrality; they will nevertheless give greater 

assistance to the United States and Great Britain at Germany’s expense 

despite the apprehensions of some of these neutrals over the increase of 

Soviet influence on the Continent. As her position deteriorates, Germany 

will get less and less economic aid from the neutrals. 

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i. Gemnan Hopes. For many months the only bases for German hopes 

of avoiding unconditional surrender have been the possibility of division 

among the United Nations, the possibility of new weapons that would affect 

fundamentally the course of the war, and the possibility of war weariness 

or discouragement in one or more of the United Nations. At present the 

relations of the three major United Nations are more harmonious than ever. 

Secret weapons cannot, of course, be evaluated precisely in advance,but the 

overwhelming weight of scientific and military conjecture holds that the 

Germans are not likely to produce a new weapon that can fundamentally 

alter the course of the war. The Allied advance in the West has already occupied or cut off all the main areas from which ground-launched flying bombs 

or long-range rockets can be operated against England and has thus destroyed German hopes of influencing the course of the war by the use of these 

weapons. War weariness among the United Nations can scarcely be expected 

to become critical at a time when their military progress is more rapid than 

in any former period. Thus, the virtual hopelessness of the German situation 

is driven home more forcefully week by week as the hope of being able to 

prolong the war recedes. 

2. Explanation of Continued German Resistance. 

The preceding paragraphs indicate that the factors which should produce a collapse or surrender are already present in the German situation. 

Continued German resistance is chiefly due to the fanatical determination of 

the Nazi Party leaders to fight to the end and to their possession of the necessary political and psychological control within Germany. This determination is 

based on the doctrine held by the Nazis that Germany surrendered too quickly 

in 1918; their fear for their own safety; a fanatical belief in their own capabilities which prevents them from accurately appraising the situation; and the 

lack of any alternative to continued resistance which would seem to offer opportunities for a later revival of their power. It is possible that preparations are 

being perfected to maintain, even after defeat, an underground organization. 

The failure of the coup d’ktat of 20 July has given the Party still more complete 

control of both the home front and the Wehrmacht. The civilian population 

alone has neither the courage nor the capacity to risk revolt, even if it is beginning to appreciate the hopelessness of continued resistance. In the Army, 

discipline remains reasonably firm although the confidence of the rank and 

file is being undermined by the shortage of men, munitions, motor transport, 

and liquid fuels and by the inescapable contrast between German and Allied 

artillery and air power. Therefore although the strategic situation indicates 

certain defeat, German resistance is likely to continue beyond the time when 

any rational objectives within the immediate or distant future seems to be 

served by doing so. 

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3. Symptoms of German Collapse OT Surrender. 

There are still no certain indications that German groups are acting as 

though collapse or surrender is imminent. Despite the plot of 20 July and the 

fact that the promotion of SS officers had a bad effect on the morale of officers 

of the Army proper, there is no evidence that the officer corps or the rank and 

file of the Army has been generally and seriously demoralized. Although surrenders are occurring more readily than formerly,large scale mutinies or desertions have not yet developed. In certain areas German soldiers continue to 

fight tenaciously but elsewhere they have lost the will to resist and only discipline prevents a complete collapse of morale. On the home front, strikes and 

demonstrations have apparently not yet assumed dangerousproportions. Serious peace feelers have not been put forth by the Germans, but the satellite 

states, which might be expected to break away from a defeated Germany before 

final collapse, have already begun to do so. 

4. Form of Surrender. 

Since it is unlikely that the present German Government or any Nazi 

successor will surrender, the end of German resistance is most likely to come 

through a series of piecemeal surrenders by German armed forces in the field. 

Individual commanders who find themselves in difficult situations will be influenced to surrender by their own appraisal of the general strategic situation 

and possibly by their disagreement with the policy of the Central Government. 

Once the tendency toward piecemeal surrender gathers momentum, elements 

of the Wehrmacht which have retreated into Germany under arms may even 

carry out the actual final expulsion of the Nazi regime. But this possibility 

cannot be envisaged until one or more of the main fighting fronts has collapsed. 

5. Time of Surrender. 

We believe that organized German resistance under the effective control 

of the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrrnacht) isunlikely to 

continue beyond 1December 1944. In reaching this conclusion we consider the 

collapse of the German front in the West, the rapid deteriorationof the position 

in the East, especially in the Balkans, the impotence of the German Air Force, 

and increasing shortages of oil and weapons of war which will have become 

most critical by that date. The military situation therefore is ripe for a collapse. 

It is impossible to forecast the date at which this collapse might begin, but once 

begun it is likely to spread rapidly. We therefore believe that organized resistance may end even sooner than 1December. 

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C.C.S. 674 

C.C.S. 674/1 

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND OF “DRAGOON” FORCES BY 

SUPREME COMMANDER. ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

References: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 7 

CCS 680/2,Paragraphs 14- 16 

A message from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 

SCAF 77,proposing certain recommendations relative to the assumption of 

command of DRAGOON forces, was circulated in C.C.S. 674 on 11 September 

1944. 

The recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the message contained in C.C.S. 674/1 be dispatched was approved by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in their 172d Meeting. 

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C.C.S. 674 11 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND OF “DRAGOON” FORCES BY 

SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

References: 

a. CCS 304/12 

b. CCS 145th Meeting, Item 3 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosed message (SCAF 77) from the Supreme Commander, 

Allied Expeditionary Force is submitted for consideration by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward on 

Continent 

To: Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Nr: FWD 14276 SCAF 77 9 September 1944 

1. Following are my recommendations relative to assumption of command 

of DRAGOON forces. 

2. It is estimated that by 15September the DRAGOON forces will be located 

in strength in the Dijon area, that Seventh Army Headquarters will be north 

of Lyons and that an advance echelon of General Devers’ Army Group Headquarters will be near Lyons. At that time, therefore, operational control should 

pass to me and I will transmit operational directives direct to General Devers 

with copies to SACMED and the Commanding General, Seventh Army. 

3. Coincident with my taking operational control of the DRAGOON forces, 

the Commanding General, Ninth Air Force will assume operational control of 

the XI1 Tactical Air Command of 1st Fighter Group and auxiliary units which 

is actually with the Seventh Army. The Ninth Air Force will augment the XI1 

Tactical Air Command as now constituted as necessary in order to support the 

Army Group adequately. The Twelfth Air Force in support of the Allied Armies 

in Italy will continue to support the DRAGOON forces until the Ninth Air Force 

can assume this responsibility. 

Subsequently when General Devers’ Army Group comprises the French 

Army and at least 1 United States Army and provided the Twelfth Air Force 

can be spared from Italy, it should be transferred to DRAGOON. Alternately 

should existing conditions in Italy make such a transfer undesirable, in the 

opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Twelfth Air Force will furnish a 

command and staff echelon to General Devers’ Army Group for the necessary 

coordination of air operations and for complete air liaison with SHAEF. Under 

this alternative it may be that we shall have to obtain at least 1more fighterbomber group from the Twelfth Air Force. 

4. The exact date when administrative control should pass to me cannot be 

stated at the present time. Logistical support and maintenance for the 

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DRAGOON forces should continue from the Mediterranean Theater so long 

as United States supplies are in excess of reserves needed for other United 

States units in that theater. Thereafter maintenance may continue through 

southern France ports or be shipped to other routes if the latter prove more 

advantageous. Close coordination with the Mediterranean Command will be 

essential while resources are being shipped through the ports of southern 

France, whether from the United States or from North Africa or a combination 

of the two. I recommend that the terminating date of this responsibility be 

arranged by mutual agreement between Generals Wilson and Devers. 

5. It is suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive to General 

Wilson and me regarding my assumption of command of the DRAGOON forces 

be based upon the recommendations presented in the foregoing paragraphs. 

End 

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C.C.S. 67411 12 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND OF “DRAGOON” FORCES BY 

SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following message 

be sent to SCAEF and SACMED at once: 

“Effective 15 September SCAEF will assume command of DRAGOON 

forces according to plan recommended in SCAF 77.” 

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C.C.S. 675 

C.C.S. 675/1 

C.C.S. 675/2 

COMBINED PERSONNEL MOVEMENT PROBLEM ARISING 

DURING THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY 

References: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 175th Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 679 

On 12 September 1944, C.C.S. 675 circulated a memorandum in which 

the British Chiefs of Staff recommended that an examination be made of the 

scope of the movement problems involved immediately before and following 

the termination of hostilities in Europe and the availability of the shipping 

resources with which to meet the requirements. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172d Meeting invited General 

Somervell to confer with Lord Leathers on this matter. As a result of this invitation a report prepared by the Representatives of United States and British 

Military Services in conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities was 

circulated as C.C.S. 675/1 (13 September 1944). 

An additional report, from General Somervell and Lord Leathers, was 

circulated on 15 September (C.C.S. 675/2) and was noted by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in their 175th Meeting. 

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C.C.S. 675 12 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PRIORITIES FOR PERSONNEL SHIPPING 

SUBSEQUENT TO TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES IN EUROPE 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Stag 

1. It is clear that the global personnel movement problems which will arise 

immediately before and following on the termination of hostilities in Europe will 

be of considerable magnitude and complexity, and that decisions will be necessary as to the priorities to be afforded to the various movements involved. 

2. In order that consideration may be given to this matter, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff instruct the representatives of the 

United States Service Departments and the British Service Departments to 

undertake immediately, in conjunction with the appropriate shipping authorities, an examination of the scope of the movement problems involved and of 

the availability of shipping resources with which to meet the requirements. 

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C.C.S. 675/1 13 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

A COMBINED MEMORANDUM ON TROOP MOVEMENTS, 

COVERING THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1944 TO MARCH 1945 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Representatives of United States and British military services in 

conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities submit the attached report 

of the examination of troop shipping requirements suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172d Meeting of 12September. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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COMBINED MEMORANDUM ON TROOP MOVEMENTS 

COVERING THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1944 TO MARCH 1945 

A. Assumptions. 

1. The state of war in Europe is such that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

agree: 

a, That it is feasible to release British troops from Europe for Operation 

DRACULA. 

b. No further U.S.troops need be transported to European theaters. 

2. If the decision with regard to the two conditions in 1above is not made 

by 1 October the necessary transfer of British forces to India cannot be accomplished in time to execute the operation before the monsoon. 

B.Statement of the Problem. 

1. The problem therefore is to determine the effect of employment of troop 

shipping for DRACULA on US.and British deployments subsequent to the 

defeat of Germany. 

C. Facts Bearing on the Problem. 

1. The build-up of a British task force in India for DRACULA involves the 

movement of six British divisions or 370,000 personnel from Europe to India 

prior to 1 March 1945. 

2. It is estimated that this movement will during its peak period involve 

virtually the entire British trooping lift. 

3. This requirement will limit British assistance to the United States in 

the Atlantic to a trooplift of about 25,000 per month from November 1944 to 

April 1945 by leaving only the two Queens on this run, However in the event 

of any unforeseen diffculties in meeting the DRACULA program it might prove 

necessary to withdraw one or both of the Queens from the Atlantic service. 

4. A further effect will be the withdrawal of all British ocean-going troopships now employed in cross-Channel movements. This amounts to a capacity 

of 25-30,000troop spaces for combined cross-Channel troop movements. It is 

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estimated that British cross-Channel troop movements can be accomplished 

in other type vessels. The scale of US.cross-Channel troop movements cannot 

be determined but should be relatively light in proportion to total U.S.withdrawals from the Continent, To the extent required such movement must be 

accomplished in U.S.shipping. 

5. The DRACULA movement of British troops absorbs the full capacity 

of Indian ports with the exception of such U.S.troops as can be received 

through the port of Calcutta. India has stated that they can disembark two 

“General” class ships off Calcutta simultaneously by the use of Indian Ocean 

shipping. 

D. Discussion. 

1. Eflect on British movement up to approximately mid-March 1945. 

a. After 30 September it will not be possible to carry out any normal 

trooping from the United Kingdom to theaters abroad other than any replacements included in the DRACULA program. Allowance has been made 

for 4,500 a month between Canada and the United Kingdom. 

b. No non-operational movement can take place except those which 

might be capable of being effected in ships returning empty from operational voyages. 

c. No troop ships could be spared for conversion to other tasks, viz: fleet 

train, hospital ships, etc. 

d. It will only be possible to carry out movement already planned between theaters abroad, mainly reinforcements from West and East Africa 

to India and New Zealanders to Italy which are small in relation to the total 

fleet and for which shipping is being positioned. Internal movement in the 

Mediterranean will be reduced to a local lift of some 15,000. 

2. Effect on U.S.movements up to approximately end of March 1945. 

a. US.shipping schedules for redeployment have included the movement of 70,000 U.S.troops per month from Europe to the United States in 

British ships. Under this assumption the strength of U.S.forces in Europe 

will be: 

1 Oct 44 2,760,000 

1 Apr 45 1,535,000 

6 months Withdrawals 

from Europe 1,225,000 

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b. The reduction of British assistance in the Atlantic to 25,000troops 

monthly would result inthe following European position: 

1 Oct 44 2,760,000 

1 Apr 45 1,805,000 

6 months withdrawals 

from Europe 955,000 

In other words a reduction in the rate of return of US.troops from 

the European Theater will be required amounting to 270,000 in six months. 

c. Troop movements to Pacific theaters in accordance with redeployment plans tentatively set up, but now under review, would be possible. 

E. Conclusion. 

1. Until the strategic requirements for the furtherance of the war against 

Japan subsequent to the defeat of Germany have been determined and until 

shipping priorities have been established as between operational and nonuperational moves, it is not possible to present more detailed shipping implications during and after the period 1October 1944 to 1April 1945. 

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C.C.S. 67512 15 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMBINED PERSONNEL MOVEMENT PROBLEM ARISING DURING THE 

FIRST YEAR AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure has been presented by Lord Leathers and General 

Somervell. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

MEMORANDUM BY THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION, BRITISH MOVEMENT, 

AND COMBINED SHIPPING AUTHORITIES 

1, The attached Appendix “A” indicates the magnitude of the combined 

personnel movements which may be required during the first year after the 

defeat of Germany (assumed at 1 Oct. 1944) on the basis of tentative redeployment plans. 

2. The attached Appendix “B” indicates the probable combined resources 

estimated to be available during the period under consideration. 

3. Owing to changes in plans under way and in prospect a precise analysis 

of this problem cannot be made until the entire matter has been studied by 

combined agencies based on decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 

strategy and priorities. 

4. It is therefore recommended that the Combined Administrative Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Staff Planners, the Combined 

Military Transportation Committee, and the combined shipping authorities, 

study and report on this problem in the light of decisions to be made by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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APPENDIX “A” 

ANALYSIS OF THE COMBINED PERSONNEL MOVEMENT PROBLEM 

Subsequent to a 1 October Defeat of Germany 

and for 1 year thereafter 

1. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 

a. Replacements (reinforcements) for forces 

already engaged in the war against Japan 

on 1 October. 

b. Build-up from U.S.for war against Japan. 

c. Redeployment for war against Japan. 

d. Additional replacements (reinforcements) 

to support increased strength due to b 

and/or c. 

e. Replacements or readjustments in garrisons, of non-operational areas. 

f. Rotational programs for forces engaged in 

the war against Japan. 

g. Intra-Area movement accomplished by 

retained ships. 

Subtotal 

British u.s. 

(a) 693,000 

826,000 

1,052,000 804,000 

385,000 213,000 

265,000 10,000 

150,000 280,000 

250,000 768,000 

2,102,000 3,594,000 

2. DEMOBILIZATION AND REPATRIATION WITHOUT REPLACEMENT 

a. British and U.S.Forces. 678,000 1,720,000(b) 

b. Dominion, Colonial and other personnel. 251,000 28,000 

Subtotal 929,000 1,748,000 

Appendix “A” 

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3. PRISONERS OF WAR 

a. Allied prisoners of war. 

b. Enemy prisoners of war. 

British 

53,000 

466,000 

Subtotal 519,000 

4. TOTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 

THE SERVICES (c) 3,550,000 

u.s. 

102,000 

243,000 

345,000 

5,687,000 

Notes: 

(a) This figure is included under other headings in item 1. 

(b) To the extent that the defeat of Germany is delayed beyond 1October 1944 this figure will be increased. 

(c) To this requirement must be added an unknown number for essential civilian movements. 

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APPENDIX “B” 

TOTAL AVAILABILITY OF PERSONNEL SHIPPING BY CATEGORIES 

(as of 1 Oct 1944) 

British U.S. 

No. of No. of 

CATEGORIES Ships Capacity Ships Capacitu 

1. OCEAN GOING 84 302,000 220 492,000 

2. LIMITED CAPABILITY 

(a) Indian Ocean type 31 48,000 - ­

(b) Miscellaneous -6 ~ 6,000 -

45 ­35,000 

Subtotal -

37 54.000 -45 35,000 

TOTAL TROOPSHIP LIFT 121 356,000 265 527,000 

Notes: 

British U.S. 

1. Estimated lift on 1 October 1945, 

after allowing for additions and 

losses based on current C.C.S. rates 376,000 708,000 

2. Additional trooplift may be realized by use of cargo ships temporarily 

fitted to carry a few hundred troops each. 

3. An indeterminable lift may be obtained from captured enemy vessels. 

4. Lift of LSI’sand APA’sis not included in above inventories but advantage 

will be taken of their lift whenever operational schedules permit. 

5. Lift in U.S. Navy vessels as estimated and included in the above table 

for normal troop movement is subject to wide variation dependent upon 

possible utilization of Navy troopships for operational requirements. 

6. No British cross-Channeltype of shipping is included nor has any allowance been made for possible conversions for the naval fleet train or hospital ships. 

Appendix “B” 

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C.C.S. 676 

GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS 

IN THE PACIFIC 

Reference: 

CCS 173d Meeting,Item 5 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 173d Meeting took note of the 

progressreport by the United StatesChiefs of Staff on recent operationsin the 

Pacific (C.C.S. 676). 

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C.C.S. 676 12 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS 

IN THE PACIFIC 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The enclosure, compiled from reports of the area commanders in the 

Pacific,is presented for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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ENCLOSURE 

GENERAL PROGRESSREPORTON RECENT OPERATIONS 

IN THEPACIFIC 

PROGRESS OF PACIFIC AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

15NOVEMBER 1943-15SEPTEMBER 1944 

North Paciflc 

1. Operationsin the North Pacific have been limited to periodic air raids 

and surface ship bombardment of Paramushiru and Shimushu and other 

islands in the northern Kuriles. Concurrently the establishment of bases to 

support future operations in the North Pacific is being carried to completion. 

Central Pacific 

2. In furtherance of the approved strategic concept of the war against 

Japan, the amphibious forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas, supported tactically 

and strategically by combatant units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, have successively occupied principal objectives in the Gilbert, Marshall and Marianas 

Islands. 

3. The Gilbert Islands operations were initiated on 17 November 1943,and 

resulted in the occupation of Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama. Tarawa was well 

defended. In particular the beach defenses were extensive and difficult to 

overcome. 

4. The Marshall Islands operations were initiated the 31st of January and 

resulted in the occupation of Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls. This was followed 

by the occupation in mid-February of Eniwetok. 

5. Operationsfor the seizure of Saipun were initiated on the 15th of June. 

Thiswasfollowed by the occupation of Tinian and Guam in late July. 

6. Thenext operation scheduledin this area isthe occupationof the Palaus. 

The target date is 15September 1944. 

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7. From bases established in the Marshalls and Gilberts continuous air 

raids have been conducted against isolated Japanese held islands. Particular 

attention has been given to neutralization of Truk. These operations have 

been coordinated with similar operations conducted from bases in the Southwest Pacific. 

8. During the operations for the occupation of the Marianas strong units 

of the JapaneseFleet were engaged by air action from our carriersin the Philippine Seas. Severe damage was inflicted on the Japanese in this engagement. 

9. The submarine campaign in the Western Pacific has been prosecuted 

with vigor and the results attained have been most gratifying. Heavy toll has 

been taken of Japanese shipping as well as of escorting forces. 

10. The occupation of the Marianas has presented the opportunity for 

development of bases for VLR bombers for operations against Japan Proper. 

Preparations for conducting these operations are underway with all speed. 

South Pacific 

11. Operationsin the South Pacific have been principally harassing operations against the isolated Japanese garrisons by air forces. The Royal New 

Zealand Air Force participated in combat missions with U.S.Army and Navy 

air units from bases in the South Pacific. The South Pacific area is being 

progressively “rolled-up.’’Bases developed in that area are currently being 

used for rehabilitation of troops for further operationsin the Western Pacific. 

The naval base at Espiritu Santo has proved very useful in repairing battle 

damage. Repairs have been successfully accomplished on all classes of ships. 

12. On 15 February,the 3rd New Zealand Division (lessone brigade) seized 

Green Island. 

Southwest Pacific 

13. A U.S.task force landed in the Aruwe area of New Britain on 15December 1943 and terminated organized enemy resistance on 16 January 1944. 

14. One U.S.marine division, supported by Allied air and naval forces, 

landed in the Gloucester area on 26 December 1943and succeeded in capturing 

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the airfields by 30 December. Japanese killed were 3,686 as against our losses 

of 326.As a result of the Arawe and Cape Gloucester operations, western New 

Britain was secured by the middle of March. 

15, Preceded by heavy naval and air bombardment, a successful, unopposed 

landing was made near Saidor on 2 January 1944.The airstrip was captured 

and ready for landing of transport aircraft by 7 January. Commencing 16 

January, the remainder of the U.S.division employed reinforced the original 

landing. In expanding the beachhead, only weak resistance was encountered. 

16. One US.cavalry division,supported by naval and air force units, made 

initial landings in the Admiralty Islands on 29 February 1944.The landing 

was made in Hayne Harbor, Los Negros Island, against little resistance and 

Momote airdrome was seized on D-day. Several enemy counterattacks were 

repulsed resulting in large Japanese casualties and by 23 March enemy forces 

on Los Negros were completely surrounded.Adjacent islandsin the group were 

reduced and occupied and by the middle of April complete control of the 

Admiralty Islands had been obtained. 

17. Two independent task forces, under the command of the Sixth Army, 

made simultaneous landings at Aitape and Hollandiu on 22 April 1944.Landings were preceded by heavy naval bombardment and air strafing attacks. 

a. The Hollandia Task Force made landings in the Humboldt Buy and 

Tanahmerah Bay areas respectively and formed a pincers movement in 

attacking the three airstrips. Only slight enemy resistance was encountered 

and by 1May control of the area had been definitely established. 

b. The Aitape Task Force established landings against practically no 

opposition and the airdrome was reported operational by 25 April. 

c. The element of surprise played an important part in the success of 

both operations resulting in an estimated 54,000troops to the eastward 

being cut off. 

18. A U.S.task force, supported by air and naval forces, made unopposed 

landingson WakdeIsland and near Arum on 17May 1944. All enemy resistance 

on Wakde was overcome by 18 May. The Arara perimeter was extended between the Tementoe River and the Tor River on 17May with increasingenemy 

resistance west of the Tor River. Strong enemy attacks failed to penetrate 

the perimeter and were repulsed. The task force perimeter was extended and 

by 3 July included the Mufin airdrome. Casualties suffered by the Japanese 

are 3,650killed and 70 prisoners. Active patrolling is continuing. 

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19. On 27 May 1944 one U.S. infantry division, with the support of air and 

naval forces, made landings in the Biak Island areas and encountered little 

opposition initially. Enemy strength developed on 5 June and the Mokmer 

airstrip was crossed on 7 June under artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. 

Artillery fire prevented work on the Mokmer airdrome until 11June and the 

enemy launched several unsuccessful counterattacks in an effort to regain 

the field. Boroke, Sorido and Mokmer dromes were entirely cleared of enemy 

artillery and small arms fire by 22 June. General patrolling and mopping up 

operations continue. 

20. One US.regimental combat team, closely supported by air and naval 

forces, landed unopposed near the Kamiri drome on Noemfoor Island on 2 July 

1944. On 3 July and 4 July three U.S.parachute battalions were dropped on 

the Kamiri strip, assisting the infantry. By 6 July enemy resistance had been 

overcome and the Kamiri, Koransoren and Number dromes were firmly held. 

21. A U.S. infantry task force made an unopposed landing near Cape 

Opmarai in the Cape Sansapor area on 30 July 1944. No opposition other than 

patrol skirmishes has been encountered and active patrolling continues. Japanese dead for the period 30 July to 10August numbered 92. 

22. Air operations conducted in the Southwest Pacific Area have been 

especially effective in neutralizing Japanese forces and enabling the Allies 

to conduct further offensive actions aimed at gaining complete control. In all 

advances, their mission in each case called for securing airfields and other 

bases from which to conduct further operations. Air supremacy has been 

achieved to such an extent that only in isolated instances are the Japanese 

offering any determined air resistance. 

23. Australian land force activity in the Southwest Pacific Area consisted 

primarily of participation in the Finschhafen and Kaiapit-Dumpu operations 

and the occupation of the Madang-Sepik River coast line. The 9th Australian 

Division captured Finschhafen on 2 October 1943 and drove the remaining 

Jap troops to Satelberg. Satelberg fell on 29 November. Elements of the 9th 

Australian Division, utilizing armor to great advantage, then advanced up 

Huon Peninsula coast line to contact U.S. Saidor Task Force at Yaut River, 

southeast of Saidm to complete occupation of Huon Peninsula on 10 February. 

Simultaneously, the 7th Australian Division was deployed into the Ramu 

Valley to reinforce independent Australian units and to stop the threatened 

Jap drive overland through the Ramu-Markham Valley from Madung. The 11th 

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Australian Division relieved the 7th Australian Division 8 January and continued the Australian advance to a final juncture with U.S. troops near Yalua 

on 13 April. Subsequently,U.S.troops were withdrawn and the Australian units 

continued pressure on the Jap forces which withdrew up the New Guinea coast 

toward Wewak. By 6 June Australian troops had reached Hansa Bay and are 

now in contact along the Sepik River. 

During this period, the RAAF carried on continued attacks from the 

Darwin area. Australian fighter units attached to U.S.task forces were used 

in each of the landings along the New Guinea coast as the initial occupation 

forces with their light P-40’s. 

They operated in the advance airdromes before the airdromes were 

suitable for the operation of U.S.units equipped with heavier aircraft. 

The Netherlands East Indies Air Forces operating in the Southwest 

Pacific Area consists of the 18th Medium Bomber Squadron and the 120th 

Fighter Squadron.Elements of these forces participated in daily bombing and 

strafingstrikesagainst enemy shippingand installationsintheAroe-TanimbarKai and Timor areas. 

24. Future operationsin this area will advance our forcesinto the southern 

an$ central Philippines via Morotai, Talaud, Sarangani and the Leyte-Samar 

area, with a target date of 20 December for Leyte-Samar. 

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C.C.S. 677 

C.C.S. 677/J 

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN “HE MEDITERRANEAN 

References: 

NAF 774 

MEDCOS 181 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 173d Meeting, Item 8 

2d Plenary Meeting, 

Item 1 a, b, and c. 

In C.C.S. 677, dated 12 September 1944, the United States Chiefs of 

Staff present their views with regard to General Wilson’s progress report as 

submitted in NAF 774 and MEDCOS 181. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered these views in their 172d 

Meeting. Draft messages to inform the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean of the agreed conclusions on this matter were proposed respectively 

by the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, Enclosures “A” and “B” to 

C.C.S. 677/1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 173d Meeting approved 

the dispatch of the message in Enclosure “B” to C.C.S. 677/1. 

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C.C.S. 677 12 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff 

The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard to General 

Wilson’s progress report as submitted in NAF 774 and MEDCOS 181 are as 

follows: 

Part or all of the Fifth Army should be transferred to France, if it 

can be used effectively in the attack on Germany. The timing of the transfer and the route, whether overland or by sea, is dependent on the progress 

and outcome of the present offensive in Italy. 

If General Eisenhower indicates that he does not require a part or all 

of the U.S.forces now in Italy, they should then be utilized to clear the 

Germans from Italy and to assist British forces in operations to the northeastward toward Vienna. 

The transfer of part or all of the Twelfth Air Force to France should 

be dependent on the progress and outcome of the present offensive in Italy, 

and more particularly on the disposition of the Fifth Army. The Fifteenth 

Air Force can best perform its mission by remaining at its Foggia bases. 

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C.C.S. 67711 13 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Reference: 

CCS 172d Meeting, Item 5 c. 

Memorandum by the United States ChiefsofStaff 

The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the draft message 

to General Wilson proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff (Enclosure “A”) in 

connection with item 5 c, C.C.S. 172d Meeting, and recommend that the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatch the message attached 8s Enclosure “B” to 

SACMED in lieu of Enclosure “A.” 

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ENCLOSURE “A” 

DRAFT 

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL WILSON PROPOSED BY THE BRITISH 

CHIEFS OF STAFF PURSUANT TO ITEM 5 c, C.C.S. 172d MEETING 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of your NAF 774 this morning. 

2. The following decisions are sent for your information and guidance in 

future planning: 

(a) There will be no withdrawals from the Fifth U.S.Army, at any rate 

until the success of General Alexander’s operations is ensured. 

(b) For the capture of the Istrian Peninsula you may count on having 

the amphibious lift now in the Mediterranean. You should prepare 

plans for carrying out this operation as soon as possible. You should 

submit this plan to Combined Chiefs of Staff at the earliest date, 

and, in any event, not later than 15th October. 

Enclosure “A” 

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E NC L 0 sU R E “B” 

DRAFT 

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL WILSON PROPOSED BY THE UNITED 

STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF IN CONNECTION WITH ITEM 5 c, 

C.C.S. 172d MEETING 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of your NAF 774 this morning. 

2. The following decisions are sent for your information and guidance in 

future planning: 

(a) There will be no withdrawals of major units from the Fifth U.S. 

Army until the outcome of the present Italian offensive is known. 

(b) For planning the capture of the Istrian Peninsula you may count on 

having the amphibious lift now in the Mediterranean. You should 

submit this plan to Combined Chiefs of Staff at the earliest date, 

and,in any event, not later than 10th October. 

Enclosure “B” 

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C.C.S. 678 

C.C.S. 67811 

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 174th Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 680/2,Paragraphs 31 and 32 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 174th Meeting considered C.C.S. 

678 and agreed to make certain recommendations to the President and Prime 

Minister. 

The recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as approved by the 

President and Prime Minister were subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 678/1. 

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C.C.S. 678 13 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the British Chiefsof Stag 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff feel that it is important that the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff should agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of 

the war against Japan. The following planning must be related to an estimated 

date for the end of the war against Japan:­

a. The redeployment of forces against Japan. 

b. The planning of production. 

c. The allocation of manpower. 

2. The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that, in order to make due 

allowance for contingencies, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should accept as a 

planning date two years after the defeat of Germany. 

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C.C.S. 67811 19 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Note by the Secretaries 

The President and Prime Minister approved the recommendation of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff that the date for the end of the war against Japan, 

for planning production and for allocation of manpower, should be set at 18 

months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to 

conform to the course of the war. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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C.C.S. 679 

REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AFTER THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE 

References: 

CCS 175th Meeting, Item 4 

2d Plenary Meeting, Item 1 j. 

C.C.S. 679, dated 14 September 1944, circulated a memorandum by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 174th 

Meeting amended and approved C.C.S. 679 which is published herein as 

amended. 

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C.C.S. 679 14 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AFTER THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE 

Reference: 

CCS 675 Series 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Sta# 

1. We consider that the whole redeployment problem, including repatriation, after the end of the war in Europe needs combined study which cannot 

be completed at this conference. This study appears to be required in order to 

assure the optimum use of the resources involved including personnel and 

cargo shipping and to make certain that forces required for operations against 

Japan will reach the theater of war at the earliest date. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have prepared tentative plans for 

redeployment which are available to the United States members of the combined agencies concerned. Presumably the British members of these agencies 

have similar information available. 

3. The United StatesChiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Administrative Committee in collaboration with the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Shipping Authorities and Combined Staff Planners 

study and report on the problem. Questions requiring decision before completion of the study will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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C.C.S. 680/2 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

References: 

CCS 175th Meeting, Item 2 

2d Plenary Meeting, Item 1 

C.C.S. 680, the first draft report to the President and Prime Minister, was 

amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 175th Meeting. 

The amended report was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 680/1. 

In the Second Plenary Meeting with the President and Prime Minister 

certain amendments to C.C.S. 680/1 were agreed upon. "he final report as 

approved by the President and Prime Minister was circulated as C.C.S. 680/2. 

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C.C.S. 680/2 16 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

Note by the Secretaries 

The final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the OCTAGON 

Conference as approved by the President and Prime Minister is enclosed. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

OF THE AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED 

BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AT THE “OCTAGON” CONFERENCE 

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at OCTAGON Conference is submitted herewith:-

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the 

earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. 

11. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE 

WAR 

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the 

earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany. 

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to 

maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose 

of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which 

her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effectof any such extension on the 

over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

before action is taken. 

5. Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers 

and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great 

Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender 

of Japan. 

111. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC 

CONCEPT 

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic 

concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against 

our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping 

with the changing situation: 

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a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western 

Hemisphere and the British Isles. 

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas. 

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. 

d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications. 

e. Continue the offensive against Germany. 

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid 

the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces. 

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for 

operations against Japan. 

h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them 

to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within 

the limits of our available resources, to assist other co-belligerents to the 

extent they are able effectively to employ this assistance against the enemy 

Powers in the present war. 

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far 

East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or 

inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows. 

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of 

Japan. 

IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

DEFEAT OF GERMANY 

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE 

7. Prior to the launching of OVERLORD an ai~plan was developed by the 

Supreme Commander in preparation for and in support of OVERLORD, and 

in April 1944, control of the air operations out of England of all the air forces 

involved, including the Strategic Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command, 

passed to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. We have now 

decided that the special conditions which made it desirable that the Supreme 

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force should control all forces operating 

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out of the United Kingdom no longer carry their original force. We have therefore agreed that the control of the Strategic Bomber Force in Europe shall 

be exercised by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force and the 

Cornmanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe acting 

jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, 

United States Amy Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. A directive (C.C.S. 520/6) has accordingly been issued to the 

Deputy Chief of the Air StafT, RAF and the Commanding General, United 

States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. 

OPERATIONS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE 

8. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has reported

(SCAF78) on the course of operations in France and the Low Countries and 

has given us a review of his future intentions. 

9. The Supreme Commander’s broad intention is to press on with all 

speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. 

He considers his best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the West lies in 

striking at the Ruhs and Saar since he is convinced that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential 

areas. The Supreme Commander’s first operation will be to break the Siegfried 

Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this his main effort will be 

on the left. He will then prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust 

into Germany. 

10. We have approved General Eisenhower’s proposals and drawn his attention (FACS 78) : 

a. To the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany, as 

opposed to the southern, and, 

b, To the necessity for the opening up of the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam before bad weather sets in. 

OPERATIONS IN ITALY 

11. We have examined a report by General Wilson (NAF 774) on operations 

within his theater. In so far as the battle in Italy is concerned he considers 

that operations will develop in one of two ways: 

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a. Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be 

possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap (and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass) leaving a small 

force to clear up northwest Italy, or, 

b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal; 

in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear 

the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in the 

Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until spring of 

1945. 

12. We have agreed: 

a. That no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alxander’s present offensive is known; 

71. That the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United States 

Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results of General 

Alexander’s present offensive and of a German withdrawal in northern 

Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower. 

c. To inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use in the 

Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean he 

should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as 

possible, and not later than 10th October. We have instructed the Supreme 

Allied Commander accordingly (FAN 415). 

OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 

13. General Wilson considers that a situation can be anticipated in which 

the bulk of the German forces south of a line, Trieste-Ljubljana-Zagreband 

the Danube, will be immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are 

exhausted, in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be 

liquidated by Partisans or the Russian forces. We have noted that as long as the 

battle in Italy continuesthere will be no forces available in the Mediterranean 

to employ in the Balkans except: 

a. The small force of two British brigades from Egypt which is being 

held ready to occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of relief and establishment of law and order and the Greek 

Government. 

b. The small land forces in the Adriatic which are being actively used 

primarily for commando type operations. 

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COMMAND OF “DRAGOON” FORCES 

14. Command of the DRAGOON forces operating from southern France 

has been transferred as from the 15th September to the Supreme Commander, 

Allied Expeditionary Force (FACS 76). 

15. Adjustments of the ground and air forces on which the decision of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff will be required are dependent on the development of 

the campaign in Italy. 

16. Logistic support for the DRAGOON forces will for the present continue 

to be supplied from the Mediterranean area. 

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT 

17. Some two months ago Marshal Stalin in conversation with the US. 

Ambassador in Moscow suggested that improvement should be made in the 

system of military coordination between the U.S.S.R., US. and the United 

Kingdom. 

18. We have examined the possibility of improving the coordination with 

the U.S.S.R. and have instructed the heads of the U.S. and British Military 

Missions in Moscow to initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff 

with a view to the setting up in Moscow of a Tripartite Military Committee 

consisting of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff,of the United 

States Chiefs of Staff and of the British Chiefs of Staff. 

19. We have instructed them to make it clear that this Committee will be 

purely consultative and advisory, with no power to make decisions without 

reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff and the Russian General Staff and 

further, that it must be military in its character and not impinge upon the 

work at present being done by the European Advisory Commission such as 

civil affairs, etcetera. 

20. In our instructions we have stressed that to eliminate the delays now 

existent in dealings between the Russians and the United States and British 

Military Missions, it is essential that the Russian representative on the Committee should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the United 

States and British sides the heads of the present missions would represent the 

United States and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible 

to his own Chiefs of Staff. 

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THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

21. We have agreed that the over-all objective in the war against Japan 

should be expressed as follows: 

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by: 

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and 

air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength. 

b. Ultimately invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of 

Japan. 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AREA 

22. We believe that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat 

of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end our plans should retain 

flexibility, and provision should be made to take full advantage of possible 

developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner 

of short cuts. We propose to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of 

naval and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly 

land campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against the enemy ships will 

be continued. Very long range bomber operations against Japan Proper will be 

continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established 

in the Marianas and from those to be seized in the future. The air forces in 

China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and 

will also provide the maximum practical support for the campaign in the 

Pacific. 

23. Pursuant to the above, the operations in the Pacific Theater are being 

conducted to effect the reconquest of the Philippines and the opening of a 

seaway to China. 

24. We have noted that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, 

will require the allocation of resources. In planning production these requirementswill be borne in mind. 

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BRITISH EMPIRE PARTICIPATION IN THE PACIFIC 

25. We have agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main 

operations against Japan in the Pacific, with the understanding that this 

Fleet will be balanced and self-supporting. The method of the employment of 

the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific will be decided from 

time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances. 

26. We have invited the British Chiefs of Staff to put forward, as a basis 

for planning, an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air 

Force will be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan. 

27. Canadian participation is accepted in principle. 

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

28. We have agreed that our object in Southeast Asia is the recapture of 

all Burma at the earliest date, it being understood that operations to achieve 

this object must not prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to 

China, including the air staging base at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications. 

29. We have approved the following operations: ­

a. Stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air 

route and the attainment of overland communications with China; 

b. Operation DRACULA. 

We attach the greatest importance to the discharge of the task under paragraph 29 a and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon 

in 1945 and with a target date of 15 March. If DRACULA has tobe postponed 

until after the monsoon of 1945, it is our intention to exploit Operation 

CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the 

execution of Operation DRACULA in November, 1945. Our directive to the 

Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia is attached. (See Annex) 

REDEPLOYMENT AFTER THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE 

30. We consider that the whole problem of the redeployment of forces 

after the end of the war in Europe, including repatriation, needs combined 

study in order to assure the optimum use of the resources involved, including 

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personnel and cargo shipping, and to make certain that the forces required 

for operations against Japan will reach the theater of war at the earliest date. 

We have accordingly instructed the combined staffs in consultation with the 

combined shipping authorities to study and report on this problem, submitting 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff such questions as may require decision before 

completion of the study. 

DURATION OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

31. We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate a planning date for 

the end of the war against Japan. This date is necessary for the purpose of 

planning production and the allocation of manpower. 

32. We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against 

Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be 

adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war. 

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

33. Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the 

following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet 

Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

34. For disarmament, policing and preservation of order: 

a. The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany 

west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz 

following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the 

area allocated to the Soviet Government. 

b. The forces of the United States under a United States Commander 

will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz-northern 

border of Hessen-Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet 

Government. 

c. Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary 

staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of 

the American Zone. 

d. American area to have in addition access through the western and 

northwestern seaports and passage through the British controlled area. 

e. Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American 

areas of control can be made at a later date. 

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ANNEX 

DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, 

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

1. Your object is the destruction or expulsion of all Japanese forces in 

Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including 

the air stagingpost at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications. 

2. The following are approved operations:­

a. The stages of Operation CAPZTAL necessary to the security of the 

air route, and the attainment of overland communications with China. 

b. Operation DRACULA. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the 

effective discharge of the task under paragraph 2 a and to the execution of 

Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15th 

March. 

3. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you 

will continue to exploit Operation CAPZTAL as far as may be possible without 

prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945. 

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C.C.S. 681/2 

COMMUNICATION OF THE RESULTS OF “OCTAGON” CONFERENCE TO 

MARSHAL STALIN AND GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK 

References: 

CCS 174th Meeting, Item 7 

CCS 175th Meeting, Item 3 

2d Plenary Meeting, Item 3 

C.C.S. 681 and C.C.S. 681/1 circulated proposed draft messages to 

Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek respectively. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 175th Meeting amended and approved the proposed messages and submitted them as C.C.S. 681/2 to the President and Prime Minister, who in their Second Plenary Meeting approved the 

terms of the communications as set forth therein. 

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C.C.S. 681/2 15 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMMUNICATION OF THE RESULTS OF “OCTAGON” CONFERENCE TO 

MARSHAL STALIN AND GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the enclosed draft telegrams to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of 

the OCTAGON Conference. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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EN CL 0 S U R E “A” 

September, 1944 

To: Alusna, Moscow 

From: Naval Aide to the President 

My immediately following message is top secret. It should be seen only 

by Alusna, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then 

requested to deliver it to the British Ambassador. If possible it should then be 

delivered by the British and American Ambassadors jointly to Marshal Stalin. 

Message should be carefully paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt 

and delivery. 

September, 1944 

To : Alusna. Moscow 

Top secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. 

1. In our Conference at Quebec just concluded we have arrived at the following decisions as to military operations. 

Operations in Northwest Europe 

2. It is our intention to press on with all speed to destroy the German 

armed forces and penetrate into the heart of Germany. The best opportunity 

to defeat the enemy in the West lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since it 

is there that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces 

in the defense of these essential areas. The northern line of approach clearly 

has advantages over the southern and it is essential that we should open up 

the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather 

sets in. Our main effort will therefore be on the left. 

Enclosure “A” 

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Operations in Italy 

3. As a result of our present operations in Italy, 

(a) Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be 

possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards 

the Ljubljana Gap; or, 

(b) Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, 

in which event we may have to be content with clearing the Lombardy Plains this year, 

Our future action depends on the progress of the battle. Plans are being 

prepared for an amphibious operation on the Istrian Peninsula to be carried 

out if the situation so demands. 

Operations in the Balkans 

4. Operations of our air forces and commando type operations will continue. 

Operations against Japan 

5. We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against 

the Japanese in all theaters, with the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese homeland. 

6. Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific Theater after the 

collapse of Germany were agreed upon. 

Enclosure “A” 

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EN C LO S U R E “B” 

From: Agwar 

To : Commanding General, US. Army Forces in China-Burma-India, 

Forward echelon -Chungking, China 

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President 

My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only 

by General Stilwell, a decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador who is 

then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible it should 

be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. 

Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery. 

From: Agwar 

To: Commanding General, US. Army Forces in China-Burma-India, 

Forward echelon -Chungking, China 

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President 

Top secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. 

We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany 

so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and remurces against 

Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in 

Southeast Asia. 

First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward 

the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To this end we 

have devised courses of action and are taking Vigorous steps to expedite the 

redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of 

Germany. 

Enclosure “B” 

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Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral 

Mountbatten in north Burma to provide additional security for intermediate 

air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather 

to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between 

India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation 

of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, 

as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. All 

these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, 

and by adequate air supply. Small scale amphibious operations on the Arakan 

Coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our 

success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result 

in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Led0 

Road with accompanyingpipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your 

forces. 

Third: Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to prepare a 

large scale amphibiousoperation in the Bay of Bengal to be undertaken as soon 

as developments in the European Theater will allow the necessary resources 

to be made available. 

Fourth: We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive 

against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, including the opening of a seaway into China. 

Enclosure “B” 

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C.C.S. 682 

OPERATION “HIGHBALL” 

Reference: 

CCS 175thMeeting, Item 6 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 175th Meeting took note of the 

statement contained in C.C.S. 682. 

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C.C.S. 682 15 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATION “HIGHBALL” 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

The American Chiefs of Staff are asked to take note that Operation 

HIGHBALL will be available in the Eastern Theatre at the end of November, 

1944. 

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C.C.S. 684 

“RANKIN” PLANNING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

Reference: 

CCS 176th Meeting, Item 2 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 176th Meeting approved the 

directive to General Wilson contained in C.C.S. 684. 

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C.C.S. 684 15 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF’ 

“RANKIN” PLANNING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staf 

1. We have noted the request from General Wilson in his telegram 

(MEDCOS 181) for a firm directive on his responsibilties for RANKIN in the 

Mediterranean. 

2. We ask that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to the immediate 

dispatch of the enclosed message to General Wilson. 

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ENCLOSURE 

From: A.M.S.S.O. 

To : A.F.H.Q. 

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff, 

Reference MEDCOS 153and 181. 

1. Your planning for RANKIN in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations 

should proceed on the following basis. 

Areas of Occupation 

2. You should plan to seize immediate control of countries in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations as follows:­

(a) Austria with four divisions and small tactical air force. Instructions 

have already been issued in FAN 410 and FAN 411. 

(b) Greece with approximately a division of British troops and small 

air forces. Instructions have already been issued in FAN 409. 

(c) The Dodecanese with approximately 2,400 men. 

(d) Venezia Giuilia with approximately one division. 

3. It is not intended that you should station forces in Yugoslavia or Albania 

beyond guards which may be required in connection with distribution of supplies. No immediate action by you will be required in Hungary or Roumania. 

4. It is not the present intention to send any British troops to Bulgaria. 

5. It is intended in due course to offer British naval assistance in the administration of the Danube and in particular in the clearance of mines. On no 

account however will any British naval forces enter the Danube except after 

prior agreement with the Russians. 

Availability of Forces 

6. In estimating what forces are available for the above operations, you 

should bear the following considerations in mind: 

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(a) As stated in COSMED 127, United States forces will be withdrawn 

as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities. 

(b) It will probably be the policy to withdraw Dominion forces as early 

as possible after the defeat of Germany for repatriation at an early date. 

Pending repatriation they should not be employed on occupational duties 

in Austria, Greece or Dodecanese or for internal security duties in Middle 

East until after discussion with Dominion Governments, which is being 

initiated forthwith. 

(c) The four British Indian divisions in your command will be withdrawn as early as possible and should not be used for RANKIN operations. 

(d) French and Italian divisions will not be used. 

(e) The internal security commitment in the Middle East after the 

defeat of Germany will require three divisions from forces at present in the 

Mediterranean and Middle East. 

7. After making allowance for the above considerations, we calculate that 

you should have sufficient forces to meet the commitments in paragraph 2 

above and still retain a small reserve for contingencies. 

8. All the above applies to RANKIN only, i.e., the immediate seizure of control in enemy and enemy occupied territories. Direction upon the final occupation of Europe after the establishment of control will be issued later. 

Ends 

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C.C.S. 687 

RELEASE OF AMPHIBIOUS CRAPT FROM 

“OVERLORD” TO OTHER THEATERS 

Reference: 

CCS 176th Meeting, Item 3 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 176th Meeting approved the dispatch of themessage contained in C.C.S. 687. 

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C.C.S.687 16 September 1944 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

RELEASE OF AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT FROM 

“OVERLORD”TO OTHER THEATERS 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the dispatch of the following 

message to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force: 

Accelerated operations in the Pacific and prospective plans for 

SEAC require earliest practicable withdrawal of amphibious craft especially LST’s from European Theater. Having due regard for your requirements for build-up until adequate port facilities become available and 

considering limitation on the use of these craft in the near future due 

to weather, Combined Chiefs of Staff desire you review the situation carefully with the object of early release of amphibious craft from OVERLORD. 

Early report in this matter is desired. 

154 
MINUTES OF 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MEETINGS HELD IN LONDON, 

JUNE 1944 
TOP SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 162d Meeting 

MINUTES OF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCEROOM“A” 

WARCABINET OFFICE,LONDON, ENGLAND

ON SATURDAY, 10 JUNE 1944, AT 1130.

PRESENT 

United States British 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Marshal of the Royai Air Force 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Major Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

155 
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CURRENT OPERATIONS 

First a brief discussion took place on the progress of Operation NEPTUNE 

to date. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE outlined briefly the progress of land operationsand 

included reference to Allied build-up and construction of artificial harbors, 

and to enemy build-up, including panzer divisions, lack of Tiger or Panther 

tanks, and enemy capacity for counterattack. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM then reviewed briefly the naval situation 

with particular reference to enemy submarinesand destroyers. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred briefly to Allied air activity, to the 

lack of action by enemy bombers, the enemy build-up of fighters in the battle 

area, the evident signs of confusion in the enemy air formations, and the probable difficulty the German Air Force would find in supporting the counterattack, with possible resulting delay in that counterattack. 

As a result of questions by General Marshall a short discussion then 

took place on the subject of the enemy counterattacks to be expected. 

The discussion then turned to the Italian campaign. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE made a brief appreciation of the fighting value of 

the enemy forces in Italy, of the action likely to be expected of them, and the 

strength considered necessary to hold the Pisa-Rimini line. He referred to 

enemy anxiety regarding amphibious operations on their western flank which 

the operation being staged from Corsica against Elba would be likely to foster. 

GENERAL MARSHALL drew from the known location of the five German divisions still untouched in Italy the conclusion that there were no enemy 

formations on the Pisa-Rimini line, and no other enemy line across Italy. 

A very brief discussion then took place on the Balkans including movements of Tito and the raid on his headquarters; effective Allied air action 

against Germans in Yugoslavia; the air supply to Partisans in Yugoslavia; the 

thinning out of German air forces in the Adriatic for France; a possible change 

in German policy in the Balkans as a result of the Russian threat, the Italian 

156 
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fiasco, and now the opening of the Second Front; the big salient that the 

Balkans now presented, and possibilities of enemy withdrawal from the Dodecanese and the Balkans. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred briefly to the Hitler mentality as tending 

possibly to force the Germans to hold on until too late as they had done at 

Stalingrad,in Tunisia, on the Dnieper bend, and in Italy. 

A short discussion then took place on the likely direction of forthcoming 

Russian offensives. 

Turning to the Southeast Asia Command SIR ALAN BROOKE referred 

briefly to the need to open the Imphal Kohima Road, to the problem of maintaining Myitkyina as well as Imphal by air, and to the effect of these operations 

on the Hump. 

GENERAL MARSHALL mentioned the deep concern in the United 

States at the reaction of the Generalissimo to the recent Japanese advance in 

central China. He referred to the recent cut by 1500-tons per month of the 

Hump traffic to Fourteenth Air Force, and of the transport lift of the additional 

bomber group; also to a request, which had been disapproved, that stores collected at Chengtu for B-29 operations should be allocated to the Fourteenth 

Air Force. 

GENERAL MARSHALL referred briefly to recent operations in New 

Guinea, to the decision to build an airbase at Biak instead of Hollandia, and 

to Japanese reinforcements of Mindanao, the Palaus and Halmahera. 

ADMIRAL KING spoke briefly concerning the operations about to commence in the Marianas, of the probable acceleration by a week or a fortnight of 

the Palau operations, the recent directive for redeployment in the South 

Pacific, of the consideration given to action by escort carriers against Japan, 

harassing operations from the Kuriles, Japanese shipping losses and loss of 

amphibious possibilities. 

GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING then outlined briefly the 

manpower difficulties with which United States Chiefs of Staff were faced. 

General Marshall referred particularly to replacements and to the new policy 

by which divisions at the front were being kept at full strength throughout 

operations with resultant increase in morale and in the length of the periods 

possible for units to operate without relief. 

157 
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A brief reference was then made by General Marshall to statements 

called for by the President regarding Operation NEPTUNE. 

Future movements and meetings of the Chiefs of Staff were then discussed and the British Chiefs of Staff accepted an invitation to lunch at 

Stanwell Place on the next day, June llth, to be followed by a further meeting 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 163d Meeting 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN THE CONFERENCE 

ROOMOF STANWELL PLACE, STANWELL, MIDDLESEX, ENGLAND

ON SUNDAY, 11JUNE 1944, AT 1415.

PRESENT 

United States 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

159 
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1. OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 

The meeting began with a statement of the progress of Operation 

NEPTUNE by Brigadier General F. H. Smith, Jr., USA, of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL drew attention to the extent to which the 

enemy build-up was behind schedule. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE then made a brief appreciation of future possibilities in Italy with particular reference to the immediate tasks to be undertaken 

and the tasks that would face the forces in Italy on arrival at the Pisa-Rimini 

line. He referred to General Alexander’s forecast of 15 July as the date likely 

for that line to be reached; to the planning that had been going on for amphibious operations against the south of France with target date 15 August. 

He then considered briefly the possible progress by that date of Operation 

NEPTUNE; the kind of amphibious operation most likely to fit in with Operation NEPTUNE; and the difficulty of staging another amphibious operation 

from the United Kingdom. 

In answer to a question by General Marshall he outlined the formations 

likely to be available for future operations in Italy. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM then spoke briefly of the naval forces 

of the enemy in the Mediterranean and the Baltic, and of the effect that Allied 

capture of the Brest Peninsula would have on enemy submarinesin the Bay of 

Biscay and on reduction of the time at sea of Atlantic convoys. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then spoke of the air situation in Europe and of 

enemy first-line air strength as reduced by the bombing offensive. He made a 

brief appreciation of the capacity of the German Air Force to stand up to 

intensive fighting over a period; also of the steady decline in efficiency of the 

Germanbomber force, and the likelihood that it could no longer make an effective contribution. He mentioned the immediate enemy reaction to the attacks 

that had been made on his synthetic oil plants and refineries and the prospect 

of good results when bomber effort could be diverted to renew such attacks. 

He then discussed briefly the air situation in the Mediterranean; the 

employment of the Mediterranean air forces once the Pisa-Rimini line had been 

reached; the importance of remaining flexible, of keeping options open, and at 

the same time of maintaining a threat to southern France. 

160 
TOP SECRET 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL also suggested that the possibilities should be 

examined of an advance northeast via Istria should Russian progress make 

this attractive. Such an operation might cut off the whole of southeast Europe 

from the Germans. 

Discussion then ensued as to the likely effect of Russian successes, either 

in the north resulting in the fall of Finland, or in the center. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then spoke regarding the Mediterranean. He 

referred to the desirability of mounting from the Mediterranean the projected 

amphibious operation to help NEPTUNE in order to permit use of existing 

administrative facilities; the probability that Operation ANVIL would be too 

slow to assist greatly Operation NEPTUNE; the importance of advancing as 

much as possible the target date of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean; the importance of making preparations now for an amphibious 

operation, leaving until later the decision as to which operation should be 

undertaken; the resources in landing craft that might be spared from NEPTUNE for the operation; the relative desirability of operations against Marseilles or Cette. 

A short discussion then ensued as to the length of time necessary to 

make available the additional shipping,service troops, et cetera, that would be 

required for such an operation. 

ADMIRAL KING stressed the importance of forcing the enemy to hold 

the Pisa-Rimini line in strength; asked what the enemy would do if they withdrew from that line; stressed the dependence on Russian operations of an advance northeast to Istria; the value of the Pyrenees as left flank protection to 

an advance from Cette on Bordeaux; the desirability of reserving for the 

present the decision as to the amphibious operation to be undertaken; and 

finally the importance of capturing Le Havre. 

A brief discussion then ensued as to an appropriate telegram to be sent 

to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean and Supreme Commander, 

Allied Expeditionary Force. 

GENERAL MARSHALL proceeded to outline the great possibilities of 

extensive airborne operations in connection with Operation NEPTUNE, and 

the big transport lift likely to be available within the next three months. He 

161 
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stressed the importance of bold decisions and a fresh approach to this problem, particularly if Russian fighting should go as anticipated. A short discussion followed. 

GENERAL ARNOLD confirmed the future availability of aircraft and 

the considerable transport lift that would be made available by temporary 

diversion of heavy bombers. 

He drew attention to the importance of studying the best uses that could 

be made of the 28,000 aircraft now available for operations in Europe. 

The United States Assistant Chiefs of Staff were then called in to discuss 

what craft might be made available from NEPTUNE resources to increase the 

assault lift in the Mediterranean to three divisions. The time necessary to 

make available from the United States the additional resources required in 

the Mediterranean for an amphibious operation was also discussed. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. That there would be an amphibious operation to be mounted from 

the Mediterranean with target date 25 July. 

b. That this operation would be of approximately three-division assault 

lift. 

c. That the objective for the operation would be determined later. 

d. That plans for the following alternate objectives should be prepared: 

(1) Cette. 

(2) Istria. 

(3) Bay of Biscay with particular attention to the mouth of the 

Loire and Bordeaux. 

SACMED to be responsible for the coordination of the planning for 

(1) and (2) and SCAEF for (3). 

e. That planning representatives should be instructed to examine with 

SHAEF the possibility of release from Operation NEPTUNE by 

1 July 1944 of 15 combat loaders (APA’s, XAP’s LSI(L)’s) and 

24 LST’s for use in the proposed operation. 

162 
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f. To invite General Ismay to prepare and circulate for consideration 

an appropriate telegram to SACMED and SCAEF. 

2. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST 

At the request of Admiral King, SIR ALAN BROOKE then outlined 

briefly the possible alternative ways in which the British might assist United 

States forces in the defeat of Japan. In doing so, he explained that British 

views on this subject were still unsettled. He gave a brief forecast of availability of naval, land and air forces, with particular reference to the difficulty 

of timing in view of the acceleration of operations by United States forces in 

the Pacific. He mentioned the need to replace long-service men now serving 

in the East and the intention to reorganize units on a lighter basis as recommended in the Lethbridge Report. He referred to studies in progress as to 

the possibilities of Australia as a base, and to the task that would continue 

in Southeast Asia Command of keeping the air supply route open to China. 

ADMIRAL KING then referred to the great logistic difficulties in the 

Pacific and said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were anxious for an 

outline of British ideas as to how they might best assist United States forces 

in the war against Japan, in order to be able to examine to what degree the 

United States could lend a hand. 

At the request of General Marshall, discussion then turned again to the 

Southeast Asia Command and covered the following points: The extent to 

which British troops in Southeast Asia Command were locked up in operations 

in Burma; the problem of holding Myitkyina; the great importance to the 

Formosa operations of an effective Fourteenth Air Force and of an additional 

lift to get Chinese ground forces operating effectively in China against the 

Japanese, the danger of an indefinite postponement to the ultimate defeat of 

Japan if the Japanese should withdraw from the Philippines, et cetera, and 

concentrate on effective action in China; the fact that the Japanese could, 

by threatening Assam, force us to fight there; and that air superiority in 

Burma, excepting for transport aircraft, was relatively of little value compared 

with other theaters. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then referred to the drastic changes that had 

been effected as a result of stepping up the tempo of operations in the Pacific. 

This, added to Japanese shipping losses and the Marianas operations, which 

promised to be a surprise, would face the Japanese with a real dilemma by 

November 1944. 

163 
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A brief discussion then ensued as to the possibilities of British assistance 

should Mindanao be captured by the United States forces in November 1944, 

or Formosa in December 1944;the possibilities of an operation from the Indian 

Ocean, possibly airborne, to take Rangoon and Bangkok; finally, as to the 

need for an early decision as to whether British assistance to the United 

States in the war against Japan should be based on India, or on Australia 

operating from the Southeast on the left flank of the United States forces. 

3. RECORD OF DISCUSSION 

After consideration the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that the 

minutes of their present meetings in London should contain only an outline 

of their discussion. 

164 
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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 164th Meeting 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCEROOM “A’ 

WARCABINETOFFICE, LONDON, ENGLAND

ON TUESDAY, 13JUNE 1944, AT 1130.

PRESENT 

United States British 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

General H. H. Amold, USA Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Major Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

165 
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1. OPERATIONS TO ASSIST “OVERLORD” 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered two memoranda from Supreme 

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (Annexes “A” and “B’ to these 

minutes). It was made clear during the discussion that while the 17thAirborne 

Division could be made available from the United States so far as logistic considerations were concerned, it was being counted upon by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force for Operation OVERLORD and, as far 

as could be seen, could not be spared for an operation from the Mediterranean. 

It was deemed possible, however, for SHAEF to spare sufficient transport aircraft to bring the airborne lift available for such an operation up to a full 

division. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed at some length the alternative 

objectives possible for the amphibious operation to be mounted from the 

Mediterranean. They considered in this connection the possibility of employing long range penetration groups, similar to those used in the Burma campaign, to foster and support the underground movement in France. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then considered the draft telegram to 

SACMED and SCAEF prepared by General Ismay, and amended it in several 

particulars. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the telegram to SACMED and SCAEF as amended during the 

discussion (See Annex “C” to these minutes), and directed that it be 

dispatched subject to the approval which the British Chiefs of Staff 

undertook to obtain from the Prime Minister. 

2. OPERATIONS 

An account of the first CROSSBOW attack was given by SIR CHARLES 

PORTAL. General satisfaction was expressed at the lack of success that had 

attended the introduction of this new weapon. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL also referred to the encouraging results of the 

attack on the synthetic oil plants at Gelsenkirchen. 

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ADMIRAL KING gave a brief account of the very good beginning of the 

operation against the Marianas by United States forces in the Pacific. 

3. FUTURE MEETINGS 

After discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to meet at 1430on Wednesday, 14June 1944,at the War Cabinet 

Offices,London. 

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ANNEX “A” 

SHAEF/17101/1/Pians (A) 12th June, 1944 

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS 

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

MEMORANDUM 

RELEASE OF SHIPPING AND CRAFT FROM OPERATION 

“NEPTUNE” 

1. The possibility has been examined of releasing a proportion of the shipping and craft allotted to NEPTUNE for use in an amphibious operation to be 

mounted from the Mediterranean. 

COMBAT LOADERS 

2. Examination shows that it should be possible to release six APA’s, three 

XAP’s and up to six LSI(L)’s forthwith, provided the six LSI(L)’sare replaced 

by equivalent personnel shipping in order to maintain the planned rate of 

build-Up. 

LST 

3. We are informed that the release of twenty-four LST’s in time to sail 

from United Kingdom by 1st July, 1944,isessential to the operation, and that if 

possible thirty-six should be released. If these craft are to sail on 1st July, 1944, 

they would have to be released by us at least one week earlier to allow for refit. 

While, on the original planning figures, it would have been possible to 

release thirty-six LST’sby 13th July (D plus 37), none of these could have been 

released earlier if the planned build-up was to be maintained. 

Annex “A” 

168 
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However,losses so far have been considerably below estimates. The losses 

up to 11th June we:-

LST : 3 sunk; 18 damaged; Total 21 

On our original estimate, losses by this date would have been:-

LST : 30 sunk; 55 damaged; Total 85 

Accordingly, we are at least twenty-seven LST’s better off than we expected to 

be by 11th June. Therefore, provided that there is no increase in the rate of 

lossesabove the planning figures,we will be able to release twenty-four LST’s in 

time to enable them to sail by 1st July. 

In fairness to this Headquarters and to those planning operations in 

the Mediterranean, however, it must be pointed out that the possible effects 

of a spell of bad weather, increased enemy naval activity in the Channel, an 

increased tempo in air attacks, or a combination of all of these may militate 

against a firm commitment. 

OTHERCRAFT 

4. The possibility of supplying other types of craft to the Mediterranean 

has also been considered:­

a. LCT(R) It is considered that out of the total of thirty-six LCT (R)’s 

available the nine US.,with or without three additional 

British LCT(R)’s, could be made available for the Mediterranean forthwith. 

b. LCI(L) Lossesof LCI(L)’s up to 11thJune are nine sunk and thirtyfive damaged, compared with the planning figure of thirtyone sunk and fifty-onedamaged. Therefore, unless the rate 

of losses considerably increases, twenty-four could be released by 1stJuly. 

c. AKA The ACHERNAR could be available for release by 1st July. 

d. HQ Ship One British HQ ship could be released by 1st July. 

e. LSD Three LSD’s are at present being employed in NEPTUNE 

for the return of damaged craft from the beaches and their 

distribution to repair bases. There is already one LSD in the 

Annex “A” 

169 
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Mediterranean and it is understood that an additional one 

is required. It is considered that one LSD could be released 

from NEPTUNE by 1st July. 

f. Fighter Direction Tenders (LST).There are at present three Fighter 

Direction Tenders in NEPTUNE. One could be released by 

1st July. 

AIRBORNE FORCES 

5. All airborne forces at present available are considered absolutely essential for NEPTUNE,and the additionalU.S.airborne division due from the U.S.A. 

in early August or late July is equally important. There will be a continuous 

demand during the progress of the operation for airborne forces to help forward 

the advance, and large airborne operations are now being planned. 

Air lift is already a limiting factor in NEPTUNE operations. It will not 

be possible to spare any lift for the Mediterranean. 

CONCLUSIONS 

6. It can be concluded that:­

a. The following force could be made available from NEPTUNE forces 

in time to take part in the operation:­

6 APA’s 

3 XPS 

6 LSI (L) ’s (If replaced by equivalent personnel shipping) 

24 LSTs 

24 LCI(L)’s 

12 LCT(R)’s 

1 AKA (ACHERNAR) 

1 HQ Ship 

1LSD 

1 Fighter Direction Tender (LST) 

71. The above availability is subject to the proviso that there is no serious 

increase inlosses in NEPTUNE ships and craft. 

c. No airborne forces or air lift at present allocated to NEPTUNE can 

be made available for the Mediterranean. 

Annex “A’ 

170 
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ANNEX “B” 

12th June. 1944 

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS 

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

MEMORANDUM 

THE EMPLOYMENT OF MEDITERRANEAN FORCES 

IN AID OF “NEPTUNE” 

1. The object of this paper is to determine the best use which might be made 

of the available forces in the Mediterranean to assist NEPTUNE. 

2. Our aim must be to deploy the maximum number of Mediterranean 

forces, both land forces and tactical air forces, against the enemy as early as 

possible and ensure that they have the opportunity to fight the enemy throughout the summer. 

3. There are three courses open to us:­

a. To use the available Mediterranean forces to reinforce the NEPTUNE 

build-up through northwest France; or, 

b. To carry out, with Mediterranean forces, an amphibious operation 

against the west coast of France; or, 

c. To carry out ANVIL or some similar operation in the Mediterranean. 

REINFORCEMENT OF LODGEMENT AREA 

4. Our planners estimate that the port and beach capacities in northwest 

France limit the rate of build-up to that at present planned. These estimates 

are probably pessimistic but, even so, it should still be possible to fill any additional port and beach capacity by bringing in additional divisions staging in 

the United Kingdom or by accelerating the build-up direct from the United 

States. 

Annex “B” 

171 
TOP SECRET 

5. The possibility of seizing additional beaches or ports in the north or 

northwest of France has been examined, but we believe that there are no areas 

in which even a two-divisional assault could be made with any prospect of 

success. 

AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST COAST OF FRANCE 

6. The possibility of carrying out an amphibious operation against the 

west coast of France has been examined,and we are convinced that there is no 

operation which is likely to offer any prospect of success. The only operation 

which merits serious consideration is the seizure of Bordeaux. Bordeaux, however, lies some fifty miles up the River Gironde which would require some ten 

days’minesweeping to clear. There are only two practicable beaches for a landing, each of which would take one brigade in the assault. These are on either 

side of the estuary,are heavily defended and the northern beach is fully exposed 

to the Atlantic swell. Air cover would have to be given by carrier-borne aircraft. 

Even with the assistance of airborne forces, our opinion is that the rate of buildup would be too slow to prevent our forces being overwhelmed,except under unusually favorable conditions approximating those of RANKIN. These we do not 

expect. 

7. If, of course, the southwest of France were evacuated and Bordeaux fell 

into our hands, divisions from the Mediterranean could be moved into the NEPTUNE battle area through Bordeaux. This evacuation, however, is not likely to 

take place until we threaten German communications with southwest France, 

which will probably not be earlier than, say, 1st October, 1944. 

ANVIL 

8. There remains ANVIL or some similar operation against the south coast 

of France. 

9. The advantages of ANVIL are that the available forces in the Mediterranean, both land forces and tactical air forces, can be deployed much earlier against the enemy than by adopting any other course. Moreover, the operation will be in closest proximity to the present location of these forces and 

maximum use can thus be made of the existing land and air bases. A landing 

in southern France will be closer to OVERLORD and likely to have more 

direct effect in containing enemy forces away from OVERLORD than other 

operations in the Mediterranean. The base established for the ANVIL forces 

Annex “B” 

172 
TOP SECRET 

in southern France will eventually be available for reinforcing OVERLORD 

when the Germans withdraw from southern France. After the capture of 

Marseilles it will not be necessary for some time, if at all, to open Bordeaux 

for the support of operations. 

CONCLUSION 

10. It is concluded, therefore, that ANVIL or some similar operation against 

the south of France should be mounted at the earliest possible date and 

certainly not later than August lOth-l5th, on the assumption that sufficient 

forces can be made available to make the operation effective. 

Annex “B” 

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ANNEX “C” 

DRAFT TELEGRAM 

Following from Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Wilson and General 

Eisenhower. 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the relationship of Operation OVERLORD to operations in the Mediterranean in the light of the success 

of DIADEM and the progress of OVERLORD. Their views are as follows. 

2. The overriding necessity is to apply to the enemy, at the earliest possible 

moment, all our forces in the manner best calculated to assist in the success of 

OVERLORD. 

3. The destruction of the German armed forces in Italy south of the PisaRimini line must be completed. There should be no withdrawal from the battle 

of any Allied forces that are necessary for this purpose. 

4. When the Pisa-Rimini line has been reached, there will be three possible 

courses of action open to us:­

a. An amphibious operation against south of France; 

b. An amphibious operationagainst western France; 

c. An amphibiousoperationat the head of the Adriatic. 

5. The final choice from among the three courses in the preceding paragraph cannot be made at this moment. Which will pay us best depends on several factors, at present unknown, e.g.:­

a. The progress of OVERLORD with the forces now assigned; 

b. The direction and degree of success of the forthcoming Russian offensive; 

c. The German reactions to a and b above. 

The one factor common to all three courses of action is an amphibious 

operation, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that preparations 

should go forward forthwith on the greatest scale for which resources can be 

made available and at the earliest date. 

Annex “C” 

174 
TOP SECRET 

6. As to the scale of preparations, the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider 

that greater resources than at present contemplated should be allocated to 

these operations. They have in mind a three-divisional assault to be made up 

from landing craft already in or detailed for the Mediterranean, such craft as 

General Eisenhower can release without prejudice to OVERLORD and such 

additional assistance as could be provided from the United States. The Combined Chiefs of Staff also propose that a total lift for at least a full airborne 

division should be provided. 

7. As to the date of the amphibious operation, the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff consider that the 15th August is too late and that we should aim at being 

ready to launch the operation by the 25th July, always provided that this does 

not limit the completion of the operation south of the Pisa-Rimini line. 

8. As to the choice of an actual plan, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would 

observe that they are not inclined to favor a landing in the Marseilles area 

because of the strength of the coast defenses and the unprofitable line of advance up the Rhone Valley. It seems to them that the operation in France most 

likely to help OVERLORD would be either an initial landing at Cette designed 

to lead to the early capture of Bordeaux and the support of the guerrillas in 

the south of France, or a direct descent on the west coast of France, the object 

of the latter being either to open some port through which a direct build-up 

from the U.S.A. could be achieved or if wcessary to afford direct support to the 

OVERLORD forces if they are not making suficient progress. 

9. It is evident that the planning and preparation of the above operations 

must begin forthwith, as they will require the closest coordination between 

AFHQ and SHAEF who are requested to submit their comments as a matter of 

urgency after mutual consultation. 

Annex “C” 

175 
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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 165th Meeting 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCEROOM “A” 

WARCABINET OFFICE,LONDON, ENGLAND

ON WEDNESDAY, 14 JUNE 1944, AT 1430.

PRESENT 

United States 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Major Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

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1. OPERATIONS 

The Meeting began with the reading by ADMIRAL KING of a dispatch 

which indicated a continuation of the promising start made in the Marianas 

operations. 

A brief discussion then ensued on the progress in OVERLORD, which 

covered the following points:-

The success reported from French resistance groups; 

The piecemeal deployment of four enemy panzer divisions; 

The possibilities of an early enemy counterattack; 

The lack of appreciation by the enemy of the importance of artificial 

harbors and the likelihood of a change in the enemy strategical concept 

as soon as the importance of these harbors was realized; 

The great demolition work in progress in Cherbourg. 

The advantages and disadvantages of a Quiberon Bay operation were 

then considered briefly and reference was made to Brest. 

2. WAR IN THE PACIFIC 

The discussion then turned to the war in the Pacific. SIR ALAN BROOKE 

referred to the brief summary that had been given by the British Chiefs of Staff 

at a previous meeting, and asked for the views of the United States Chiefs of 

Staff as to the ways in which British forces could be of maximum assistance to 

the United States forces in the defeat of Japan. 

ADMIRAL KING gave a brief appreciation of the present extension of 

Japanese forces on their outer perimeter and of the importance of continuing 

the threats necessary to keep the enemy so extended. 

A general discussion ensued which covered the following points:-

The possibilities of speeding up operations and gaining surprise by bypassing the Philippines and the Palaus and making straight for Formosa; 

The importance of exploiting Allied superiority on the sea and in the 

air and avoiding, where possible, engagement with enemy main forces 

on land; 

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The value of Borneo, both for its oil and the denial of that oil to the 

enemy, and for its air bases; 

The value of Amboina as a fleet base; 

The concentration of Japanese forces in the area Mindanao-CelebesHalmahera; 

The possibilities of seizing Tanimbar by air action and the examination 

of this subject now being made; 

The advantages and disadvantages of attacking Java with its good communications and its present small enemy garrison; 

The positional value of Sourabaya for the British Fleet; 

The possibility, through a direct advance on Formosa, of isolating many 

important Japanese garrisons, achieving surprise, assaulting Formosa 

while it is yet weak, and bringing about a major fleet action; 

The capabilities, from the standpoint of the diversion and containing 

of enemy forces, of a British task force based on Amboina or Sourabaya; 

The importance of making full use of the 10 to 1Allied superiority expected to be achieved; 

The importance,in fighting the Japanese, of doing the unexpected. 

Base facilities were considered at some length, including the facilities 

of Indian ports. Other points considered were: the fact that India, including 

Ceylon, had no base that would take a battleship, whereas Brisbane and Sydney both can; the need of a British naval force for the facilities of bases such as 

Brisbane and Sydney, and the remoteness of Sydney; the likelihood that, after 

seizure of the Palaus, U.S.naval forces in the Pacific would not be dependent 

on Australia and might thus leave Brisbane and Sydney to a great extent available for a British task force. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM outlined the British naval force that 

should be available towards the end of 1944. A short discussion took place as 

to the possibilities of operations in the Bay of Bengal, where it appeared that 

a small fleet should suffice as there was no major task for a main fleet to undertake. 

During consideration of the British forces likely to be available to take 

part in the war in the Southwest Pacific, it was pointed out that, in the initial 

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stages, British naval forces would expect to work under General MacArthur 

with Australian and New Zealand land and air forces. British forces in the 

Southwest Pacific would be built up from elsewhere as they became available. 

It would be for consideration whether any air forces could be released from 

Southeast Asia Command. 

Full consideration was given to the question of whether or not it would 

be possible, in view of the acceleration of the United States operations in the 

Pacific, for British forces to arrive in time to be of real value to the United 

States operations envisaged. This included consideration of the importance of 

flexibility and of so placing the British effort that it would not be separated 

from United States effort,so that British assistance might be called in as and 

when found necessary. 

Other items included in the afternoon’s discussion were:-

The value of action by the Fourteenth Air Force to any attack on 

Formosa; 

The fact that the United States air strength in China, including the 100 

B-29’s now assembled there, had reached its peak; 

The importance of Formosa as a base for the operations of B-29’s against 

the Japanese mainland; 

The lack of recuperative power of Japanese air factories in comparison 

with those of Germany; 

The possibility of by-passing Formosa and going direct to Kyushu; 

The advantages of an operation direct to Kyushu from the standpint 

of surprise, of the difficulty to the Japanese concentrating a large force 

across the mountains, and of the command of the Tsu Shima Channel 

that would be gained; 

The possible necessity for going to Formosa in order to get supplies into 

China and the undesirability of either U.S.or British forces engaging 

Japanese land forces in China; 

The possibilities of a carrier-bornestrike against the mainland of Japan, 

the great effect on enemy shippingto be expected from such a strike, and 

the indifferent air defense likely to be put up. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 166th Meeting 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN CONFERENCEROOM “A” 

WARCABINET OFFICE,LONDON, ENGLAND

ON THURSDAY, 15 JUNE1944,AT 1530. 

United States 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

PRESENT 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Pownal 

(for part of the meeting) 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C.Hollis 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA 

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1. PROGRESS OF “OVERLORD” 

The meeting began with a short discussion on the progress of Operation 

OVERLORD to date with particular reference to the fighting at Carentan, 

future operations in the Cherbourg Peninsula, the successful engagement in 

the Villers Bocage area; piecemeal engagement hitherto of enemy reinforcements as they have become available without signs of serious counterattack; 

the guerrilla action of the French resistance groups. 

2. FRENCH RESISTANCE GROUPS 

GENERAL MARSHALL then gave an account of a somewhat difficult 

interview with General Bethouart, French Chief of Staff for National Defense, 

from which he had just come. 

A brief discussion took place on the difficulties of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force with regard to the control of French resistance groups owing to the restrictions that appeared to have been placed 

by General De Gaulle on the carrying out by General Koenig of the arrangements previously agreed upon. General Marshall read a memorandum which 

had been handed to him by General Bethouart. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to the dispatch of this memorandum to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force with a suitable covering note requesting his recommendations as to the action, if any, he 

might deem desirable by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (See Annex) 

3. WAR IN THE PACIFIC 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had given 

instructions this morning to their Planners to commence work on the paper 

that it had been agreed yesterday should be produced for the United States 

Chiefs of Staff on the subject. He explained that as soon as the paper was 

ready it would be put to the Prime Minister for his approval and then forwarded to the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

4. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave a brief appreciation of the existing situation 

in Southeast Asia Command. 

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A discussion ensued which included the following:-

The importance of clearing up the fighting in the Kohima-Imphal area 

as soon as possible and releasing the transport aircraft now employed 

there; 

The establishment of a defensive position in the area Mogaung-Myitkyina and the holding of this position both during the monsoon and 

after; 

The allocation of combat cargo groups and air commando groups to 

Southeast Asia Command. In this connection it was made quite clear 

by the United States Chiefs of Staff they had decided not to allocate any 

further combat groups or air commando groups until definite plans 

for their employment and maintenance had been established. 

Discussion continued with respect to:-

The strength of the forces needed to hold Myitkyina (it appeared that a 

minimum of one fresh division during the monsoon and a minimum 

total of four divisions after the monsoon would be necessary to defend 

the area Mogaung-Myitkyina against the Japanese, who would have 

superior communications) ; 

The possibilities of the effective cutting of Japanese rail communications 

in Burma once Myitkyina is established; 

The importance of remembering the main issue, which was the maximum possible flow of supplies to China; 

The likelihood that the Japanese would realize this issue and direct 

their strategy against Myitkyina; the maintenance of the Myitkyina 

troops; the good fighting put up by the Ramgarrh Chinese troops; the 

importance to the Chinese operations of the United States commando 

group and the steps being taken to replace them; the Japanese ability 

to live on the country; 

The great improvement effected in the lines of communication, the lift 

over which promised to be trebled by November 1944,and which would 

then be ample for requirements; 

The importance of pipeline projects already in progress; 

The possibilities of airborne operations against Rangoon, the need for 

extra troops from outside as well as naval resources and airborne lift 

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if such operations were to be undertaken, and the impracticability of 

staging such operations in time for them to have any appreciable effect 

on the operation now being planned in the Pacific; 

The importance of concentrating as far as possible on protecting the 

line of communications to Assam, holding the Mogaung-Myitkyina area 

and maintaining the air lift to China; and of concentrating all other 

available British effort on the operation in the Southwest Pacific discussed at the 165th Meeting, should this line of action be agreed upon; 

Estimates of the possible air lift to China; 

Difficulties of the monsoon period; 

The possible influence on the situation in Burma of the success of the 

operations envisaged in the Pacific in the autumn of 1944; 

The desirability of calling upon Southeast Asia Command for an outline 

plan for an airborne operation for the capture of Rangoon and upon 

General Stilwell for the plan of operations of the Tenth and Fourteenth 

Air Forces. 

A brief discussion took place on the different plans for amphibious operations which had been considered in the Southeast Asia Command. 

In conclusion SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the policy in Burma at 

present seemed quite clear. First the Kohima-Imphal Road must be cleared, 

the capture of Myitkyina must be completed and a defensive position established and held in the area Mogaung-Myitkyina -the main object of all operations being the attainment of the maximum possible flow of suppliesintoChina. 

5. CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred to the proposal put forward by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 501/4 for the control of the Twentieth 

Air Force. He said that the question had been under consideration by the 

British Chiefs of Staff with particular reference to the question of coordination. It had been thought that it would be desirable for the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff to retain control of this force with General Arnold in actual command, 

for two reasons: firstly, because strategic direction of the Twentieth Air Force 

would affect its logistic support which in turn would affect the Southeast 

Asia Command; secondly, because it was hoped later that British air forces 

would also play a part. 

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The British Chiefs of Staff had decided that the directive proposed by 

the United States Chiefs of Staff to the Twentieth Air Force could be accepted 

with certain provisos which Sir Charles Portal then read. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

in C.C.S. 501/4subject to the following provisos: 

a. That if the Twentieth Air Force should be increased to more than four 

groups in China-Burma-India the British Chiefs of Staff will be consulted because of administrative problems involved. 

b. That, if the Royal Air Force should take part in the operations of the 

Twentieth Air Force, the British Chiefs of Staff will be given a share 

in the strategic control, General Arnold remaining in command and 

functioning in a role similar to that of Sir Charles Portal in connection with the Combined Bomber Offensive. 

c. That, if operations should be undertaken by the Twentieth Air Force 

against objectives in the Southeast Asia Command, the Supreme 

Allied Commander of that theater will be consulted. 

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ANNEX 

From: Combined Chiefs of Staff 

To: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force 

Memorandum from Lt. General Bethouart, French Chief of Staff of 

National Defense, to General Marshall,Chiefof Staff,UnitedstatesAmy. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff will be glad of your comments on the points 

raised in paragraphs I1and I11of the attached memorandum, and your recommendations as to the action, if any, that is required of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

In connection with paragraph 111,General Bethouart stated to General 

Marshall orally that he was deeply concerned over the procurement of equipment. 

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff: 

H. REDMAN, 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

Combined Secretariat. 

15TH JUNE I944 

Annex 

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London, June 14,1944. 

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, 

Chief of Staff, United States Army. 

I -French participation to the ANVIL operation. 

A French participation to the ANVIL operation has been settled with 

General Maitland-Wilson. 

Most of the French units involved in this operation are, at the present 

time, fighting in Italy. Their withdrawal at the appropriate moment has been 

foreseen. 

It is asked whether the arrangements made are stillvalid now, and under 

which conditions the French divisions will be withdrawn from the Italian front. 

II -Participation to the battle of the “French Forces of the Interior.” 

The French Forces of the Interior are, from now on, taking part to the 

battle, carrying out sabotage and guerrillas. 

Such actions have been launched at the Allies’ demand. It is requested: 

1. That any action concerning the French Forces of the Interior should 

be taken through General Koenig, who has the necessary powers for 

this purpose. 

The fact that several Allied authorities are now dealing with these 

forces might cause errors and losses, as it already happened, if these 

authorities do not pass through the same French channels. 

2. That General Koenig could receive all the support and the necessary 

means for providing arms, ammunitions, food, as well as the corresponding air force for transporting them. 

The action of the guerrillas, that has been launched at the Allies’ demand, cannot be left without support, otherwise these groups would 

be annihilated or massacred by the enemy. 

Their abandonment or even an insufficient support from the Allies 

would cause a deep resentment. 

Annex 

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III -Enlistment of young French people. 

The advance in French territory is going to liberate young Frenchmen 

whose enlistment in the army has been foreseen by the government. 

It is necessary that all Frenchmen whether they have participated or 

not to the armed resistance movements be cleared and screened in order that 

good ones join the army and constitute officered and disciplined units. 

This is the best way to avoid disorder and to ensure the strongest support to the Allied military action. 

A French military command and a territorial organization have been 

foreseen for this purpose. They will have to be set up again as soon as possible. 

They would be under General Koenig’s command. 

Lieutenant General Marie-Me BETHOUAFLT, 

Chef #&at-Major de la Defense National. 

Annex 

188 
OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

OF THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 
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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 172d Meeting 

OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN THE MAIN CONFERENCEROOM, 

CHATEAUFRONTENAC HOTEL,ON 12 SEPTEMBER 1944, AT 1200.

United States 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell,USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

PRESENT 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Rear Adm. L. D. McCormick, USN Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Major Gen. T. T. Handy, USA Air Marshal Sir William Welsh 

Major Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA Major Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Major Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would be 

glad if Sir Alan Brooke would take the Chair at the forthcoming series of 

meetings. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE thanked Admiral Leahy for this proposal which he 

would be glad to accept. 

2. PERSONNEL SHIPPING 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the problem of the use of personnel shipping after the defeat of Germany should be examined during the 

Conference. There would be heavy calls for personnel shipping both for the 

transfer of U.S.troops other than occupational troops from Europe to the United 

Statesor the Pacific, as well as for the reorientation of British forces to the Far 

East. In addition the New Zealand and South African divisions and certain 

Canadian forces now in Europe would have to be returned to their homelands. 

He suggested that the experts should be instructed to examine this problem to 

see how best it could be met. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could see no objection to this review but 

it would be impossible to reach any decisions during the Conference. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, in agreeing with Admiral Leahy, said that he 

felt that the scope of the problem should be examined. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL stated that he had only one shipping expert 

at present at OCTAGON but agreed with a proposal made by Sir Alan Brooke 

that he should discuss this matter with Lord Leathers. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:--

Invited General Somervell to confer with Lord Leathers on this matter. 

3. AGENDA AND HOUR OF MEETING 

At the suggestion of Admiral Leahy 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to meet daily from 1000 to 1300. 

b. Approved the program for the Conference as set out in C.C.S. 65416, 

subject to the transfer of the items for Saturday, 16 September, to 

Tuesday, 12 September. (Approved program subsequently circulated 

as C.C.S. 65411.) 

4. SITUATION REPORT FROM SCAEF 

(SCAF 78) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, while agreeing in general with General 

Eisenhower’s appreciation (SCAF’ 78), the British Chiefs of Staff felt that sufficient emphasis had not been laid on two points: firstly, the importance of 

securing sea communications and the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, and 

secondly, the importance of a strong attack being launched on the northern 

flank.General Eisenhower in his telegram had spoken of three possible routes 

of advance into Germany. In his (Sir Alan Brooke’s) view the most important 

was the northern route of attack which should be strengthened as much as 

possible, the remaining two routes being retained as alternatives. The most 

energetic efforts should be made to secure and open the port of Antwerp as a 

valuable base for future operations on the northern flank. In order to open the 

sea approaches to Antwerp, it seemed desirable to stage an airborne operation 

to capture the islands at the mouth of the Schelde. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in view of the apparent massing of 

German forces on the Sands guarding the port of Antwerp, and the lack of 

cover which existed on the ground,it appeared that a more profitable operation 

would be the bombing of enemy positions rather than an airborne operation. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt that bombing alone would not achieve the required results and occupying forces would have to be introduced. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE presented a draft reply to SCAF 78 approving General Eisenhower’s proposals and pointing out the advantages of the northern 

line of approach into Germany asopposed to the southern and the necessity for 

opening up the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam. 

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After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the dispatch to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force of the draft telegram proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

(Subsequently dispatched as FACS 78). 

5. SITUATION REPORT FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(MEDCOS 181 and NAF 774) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY presented a statement of the Views of the United 

States Chiefs of Staff with reference to the future role of the Fifth Army and 

of the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces (C.C.S. 677). 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that a message had just been received from 

the US. Military Attach6 in Switzerland to the effect that a German withdrawal of forces in northern Italy had already begun. If this was so, it would 

seem that, of the two situations envisaged by General Wilson in Part I1 of 

NAF 774, situation “a” would be ruled out unless the Allied armies could drive 

ahead with great speed, and situation “b” would exist, that is, there would be 

no possibility of another major offensive till the spring. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that as he visualized it, if the Allied armies 

could break through to the Plains the enemy forces remaining in northwest 

Italy would be badly placed. A threat to Verona would cut off these forces and 

might result in their retirement to the westward and later the retirement of 

the German forces in northeast Italy back to the Alps. It was to be hoped that 

a large number of these eastern forces could be broken up. The attack by the 

Fifth Army was planned to take place on 13 September and a successful 

advance north of Florence might well result in driving the enemy forces back 

to the Po and Piave. 

The indicationswere that the enemy was attempting to withdraw forces 

from Greece and Yugoslavia, though there was some doubt whether he could 

succeed in getting them out through bad lines of communications threatened 

by the Bulgarians,Marshal Tito’sarmy and the Greeks. The enemy might, however, get some forces out and it appeared that he was likely to endeavor to 

hold a line running through Yugoslavia. In such an event the enemy might be 

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reduced to covering the Ljubljana Gap and endeavoring to hold a line through 

Yugoslavia and Istria. In these circumstances any withdrawal of forces from 

the Fifth Army would be most regrettable. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was not the intention to weaken 

the Fifth Army at the present time. 

Continuing, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the forces to be maintained 

in Italy might later be limited by logistics and terrain. He saw, however, great 

advantages in a right swing at Trieste and an advance from there to Vienna. 

However, if German resistance was strong, he did not visualize the possibility 

of our forces getting through to Vienna during the winter. Even so, the seizure 

of the Ishian Peninsula would be valuable as a base for the spring campaign 

or as a base from which our forces could be introduced into Austria in the event 

of Germany crumbling. It had not only a military value but also political value 

in view of the Russian advances in the Balkans. 

In view of the possibility of amphibious thrusts on the Istrian Peninsula 

Sir Alan Brooke asked the United States Chiefs of Staff their intention with 

regard to the U.S. landing craft now operating in support of DRAGOON. 

ADMIRAL KING said that these craft were earmarked for other operations but no orders had been issued for their withdrawal. He too had in mind 

the possibility of amphibious operations in Istria. Naval forces on the other 

hand were in course of withdrawal for rehabilitation. 

Unless a decision to mount an amphibious operation were taken soon 

the landing craft would lie idle, though required for operations in other parts 

of the world, for instance, against Rangoon. 

In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIR ALAN BROOKE said 

that General Wilson was planning now for an amphibious operation and the 

picture should be much clearer in a short time, particularly if the German 

forces withdrew from north Italy. 

There was general agreement that a decision with regard to the launching of an amphibious operation should be made by 15 October. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if operations in the Alps were undertaken in winter there was available the PLOUGH Force now in south France 

and the necessary sleds are obtainable. 

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Referring to the Views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the future 

role of the Fifth Army, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt that primary 

emphasis should be laid on the securing of a victory in Italy. As he saw it, the 

possible withdrawal of units of the Fifth Army to France would be dependent 

on the successful outcome of the campaign in Italy. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked if it was Sir Charles Portal's thought that 

these forces should be retained in Italy if General Eisenhower was in need of 

them in France. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that it was a question of shortterm as opposed to long-term advantages. The important point as he saw it 

was to prevent the German troops getting away in north Italy if it could be 

avoided. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said it was not the intention to withdraw troops from 

the Fifth Army unless the German troops withdrew. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would point out that the withdrawal of forces from an army had a greater effect on that army than the 

actual number of formationswithdrawn, since such withdrawals had a discouraging effect on the morale of the command and of the army itself. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY re-emphasized that the United States proposal was 

contingent on the destruction or withdrawal of a large part of the German 

Army. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that there was no intention in the mind of 

the United States Chiefs of Staff to effect the withdrawal of forces from Italy 

at the present time. 

ADMIRAL KING confirmed that an option on the U.S. landing craft 

now in the Mediterranean could be retained provided a decision was reached by 

15 October. 

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL MARSHALL conArmed that while there was no intention of moving major units of the Fifth 

Army at the present time, smallindividual units (i.e., the Japanese battalion) 

might be withdrawn. 

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After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed that no forces should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known. 

b. Agreed that the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United 

States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results 

of General Alexander’s present offensive and of a German withdrawal 

in northern Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower. 

c. Agreed to inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use 

in the Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean, he should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff as soon as possible, and not later than 15 October; and took 

note that the British Chiefs of Staff would prepare a suitable message 

for consideration. 

6. COMBINED INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN 

EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 660/1) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the estimate contained in C.C.S. 660/l. 

7. COMMAND OF “DRAGOON” FORCES 

(C.C.S. 674) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY presented a draft telegram to General Eisenhower 

approving his proposals in SCAF 77 (C.C.S. 674/1). 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL drew attention to a telegram (FX 28818) from 

General Wilson to General Devers, inquiring as to how soon General Devers’ 

communications with General Eisenhower would be sufficient to permit General Eisenhower to assume command. 

It was generally agreed that this matter must be left to the commanders 

concerned and that General Eisenhower’s proposal to assume command of 

DRAGOON forces on 15 September would have taken account of this factor. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that while General Eisenhower had been 

anxious that General Devers should set up his headquarters and be able to 

take over the lines of communications, logistic problems and civil affairs, 

he also wished General Patch to continue in charge of the present battle. 

Undoubtedly additional U.S. troops would be transferred at a later date to 

General Patch from the center group of armies and further American divisions would join him through the port of Marseilles. At that time the 6th Army 

Group could be conveniently split, General Patch assuming command of the 

United States forces and the French forces forming an army of their own. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there was one point he would like to make. 

He hoped the setting up of a large headquarters by General Devers would not 

unduly deplete General Clark’s staff organization. 

GENERAL MARSHALL reassured Sir Alan Brooke on this point. Geileral 

Devers’ staff had been formed for some time in Corsica and General Clark’s 

forces would not be affected. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to dispatch to General Eisenhower and General Wilson the 

message proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 674/1. 

(Subsequently dispatched as FACS 76 and FAN 413, respectively.) 

At this point the Combined Chiefs ofStag recessed until 1430. 

8. MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIETBRITISH MILITARY EFFORT 

(C.C.S. 618/3) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the proposals for improvement of 

liaison with the Soviets originated from a suggestion put to Mr. Harriman by 

Marshal Stalin some two months ago. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the U.S.Planners had examined the previous 

British proposal (C.C.S. 618/2) and were of the opinion that while there were 

advantages in the establishment of a combined committee at Moscow, this 

would not expedite rapid coordination of operations in the field which would 

require separate liaison arrangements. 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed the value of improved liaison with the 

Russians. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he felt Marshal Stalin's offer should be 

dropped. In Moscow there were already United States and British missions and 

all that was required was that the Russians should appoint a suitable highranking officer. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt the proposal to exchange missions between field commanders would not work. It would not be right for the 

Russian High Command to be represented at a field headquarters. All our own 

plans would flow back to Moscow and we, in turn, would gain nothing. A committee in Moscow would be a better arrangement if, indeed, the Russians could 

be induced to appoint a really responsible high-ranking officer. Missions in 

the field, he felt, would be useless and even dangerous. 

ADMIRAL KING said he felt that liaison between field commanders 

might follow from the achievement of successful cooperation in Moscow. 

After further discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved the recommendations of the British Chiefs of Staff in 

C.C.S. 61813. 

b. Instructed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a message to the Heads of the United States and British Military Missions 

in Moscow based on C.C.S. 618/3. 

9. ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Prime Minister and the President might be invited to give consideration to the outstanding problem of the 

zones to be occupied by United States and British forces in Germany and to 

give instructions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed. He had already mentioned this matter to the 

President but would do so again. He would take the line that in view of the 

political aspects of the problem, guidance from the heads of State was 

necessary. 

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In reply to a question by SirJohn Dill, ADMIRAL LEAHY said that from 

a United States point of view there were, he felt, no military considerations. 

There was, however, the problem of transportation and supply of United States 

troops if they went into the southern zone. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that from the British point of view there 

were very considerable military implications involved and there were strong 

reasons why, militarily, the British Chiefs of Staff would want to occupy the 

northwest zone. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that the utilization of United States troops 

for occupation was politically difficult and in factwould be politically impossible 

with regard to France, Italy, and southern Europe. Whereas the occupation of 

Germany could be justified, that of France would meet with enormous 

difficulty. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said there was, of course,no question of occupying France. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he felt it would be easier for the United States 

to occupy the southwest zone if it could be arranged that the evacuation of 

American troops and supplies for the occupational troops could be undertaken 

through north German ports. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed that the question of zones of occupation in Germany had such 

serious political implications that they were unable to make any 

recommendation without guidance from their respective governments. 

b. Decided to report in this sense to the President and Prime Minister 

and, in doing so, to invite tlieir attention to the need for an early 

decision on this matter. 

10. CONTROL OF STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 520/3) 

GENERAL ARNOLD, during consideration of the British memorandum 

in C.C.S. 520/3, asked why the present method of control was stated to be unsatisfactory as a long-term arrangement. 

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SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that in the opening stages of OVERLORD the present system of controlhad been necessary and effective. However, 

with the move of General Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Tedder to France, 

they were divorced from General Spaatz’ headquarters and from the Air Ministry, and strategic control by General Eisenhower became almost a formality. 

Air Marshal Tedder had only a small air staff and the large staffs of the Air 

Ministry, Bomber Command and the U.S.Strategic Air Force in Europe had, 

of necessity, to exercise control over the actual strategic bombing operations. 

GENERAL ARNOLD asked why large stas were necessary to control 

strategic bombing. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that full knowledge of all available 

enemy intelligenceand adequate and rapid methods of interpreting the results 

of bombing attacks were essential to the effective control of strategic bombing. 

In addition, it was essential to keep in close touch with the degree of enemy air 

opposition to be expected. 

GENERAL ARNOLD asked why no mention was made of communications in the priority of targets. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that communications had largely become 

targets for medium and fighter bombers rather than strategic forces. The 

proposed directive on priorities was, of course, susceptible to alteration by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staf�or at the request of General Eisenhower. In fact, the 

priority list set forth was, he understood, that now enforced by General Eisenhower himself. 

GENERAL ARNOLD asked what would occur if General Spaatz and the 

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff should disagree with regard to the control of the 

strategic bombing forces. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that in this unlikely eventuality 

they would refer respectively to General Arnold and himself who, if they could 

not give a ruling, would refer the matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

for decision. 

With regard to the declaration of an emergency by a supreme commander, SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that this same procedure had been 

in force for approximately a year in the Mediterranean where it had worked 

satisfactorily. An emergency could be declared either for offense or for defense. 

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GENERAL ARNOLD said he was particularly interested in the full 

utilization of the strategic bombing force since the United States had in the 

United Kingdom 2970 heavy bombers and in the Mediterranean 1512 heavy 

bombers, making a total of 4482.Of these, 2980 were operational and each aircraft had two crews available and therefore could be used every day. Was the 

proposed chain of command the best setup to obtain the maximum use from 

this very large force? 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he felt that it was. The Supreme Commander’s role in the chain of command, which had been valuable in the first 

phases of OVERLORD was, in his opinion, no longer useful and better results 

would be obtained from the proposed command arrangements. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY questioned the proposed directive with regard to the 

right of a commander in the field to get from the strategic air forces the air 

support which he requested. This, he felt, was essential. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the system was exactly the same as 

had been used in the Mediterranean where the Supreme Commander had 

declared an emergency on only one occasion. This, as he remembered, was on 

the fifth day of the battle at Salerno. The declaration of an emergency by a 

supreme commander was in effect a direct order from the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff for the use of the strategic air forces as directed by the supreme commander. He said he could guarantee on the British side that the supreme commanders would always get what they needed when they needed it. The use of 

the emergency procedure should be regarded only as “the big stick” which 

could be used but probably would never have to be. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested an alternative arrangement whereby 

a small assignment of strategic air might be made to supreme commanders, 

the remainder being controlled as suggested in the British paper. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that this was a possible solution. He 

felt, however, that in a real emergency the supreme commander must have all 

the bombers that he needed. Divided control might result in the supreme commander’s allotment not being fully used on all occasions. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to consider this matter further at their meeting the following 

morning. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 173d Meeting 

OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETING HELDIN THE

MAINCONFERENCE ROOM,CHATEAU FRONTENAC HOTEL, 

ON 13 SEPTEMBER1944, AT 1430. 

PRESENT 

United States 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Rear Ah. L. D. McCormick, USN Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Major Gen. T. T. Handy, USA Air Marshal Sir William Welsh 

Major Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA Major Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Major Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 1720 MEETING OF THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

GENERAL MARSHALL drew attention to his statement recorded in the 

penultimate paragraph on page 3 of the minutes. He requested that this should 

be amended to read: 

“. ..the PLOUGH Force now in south France and the necessary sleds 

are obtainable.” 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the 172d Meeting. The detailed record 

was amended as proposed by General Marshall and approved subject 

to later minor amendments. 

2. CONTROL OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 520/4) 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he had not had time fully to study the 

proposed directive. It appeared, however, to be acceptable except with regard 

to certain small details. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 520/4 at their meeting to be held on the 

following day. 

3. MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF US.-SOVIET-BRITISH 

MILITARY EFFORT 

(C.C.S. 618/4) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to the dispatch of the messages in Enclosures “A” and “B” to 

C.C.S. 618/4 to Generals Burrows and Deane respectively. 

4. REPORT ON THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC 

(C.C.S. 643/1) 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the report by the Combined Intelligence Committee on the 

enemy situation in the PaciAc-Far East (C.C.S. 643/1). 

5. GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS IN THE 

PACIFIC 

(C.C.S. 676) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the progress report by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

on recent operations in the Pacific (C.C.S. 676). 

6. STRATEGY FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 417/8) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the course of action for planning purposes outlined by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 417/8. There was, however, one point he would 

like to make. In addition to the operations outlined in the paper there would, 

of course, be certain British operations which the British Chiefs of Staff had 

not yet had an opportunity to put forward. For instance, the British Fleet 

participating in the Pacific operations, the British Task Force in the Southwest Pacific and Operation DRACULA. In making provision, therefore, for the 

U.S. operations it should be borne in mind that there would also be certain 

British operations, the forces for which will require allocation of certain items 

of equipment for which provision should be made and a margin of requirements 

allowed. 

SIR JOHN DILL explained that supplies would be required for British 

forces for the war against Japan which could not yet be requested since the 

operations were not yet fully approved. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he quite appreciated the points made by 

Sir Alan Brooke, but he was not clear how they could be incorporated in the 

existing paper. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that all that was required was that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that certain British operations against 

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Japan were not included in the program outlined in C.C.S. 41718 and that 

requirements with regard to provision of equipment and the logistic support 

of these forces would be put forward at a later date. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Accepted the proposals in C.C.S. 41718 as a basis for planning. 

b. Took note that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, 

would require the allocation of resources and that in planning production therefor these requirements should be borne in mind. 

c. Took note that the size of the British forces to be employed against 

Japan would be notified as soon as possible. 

7. BASIC POLICIES FOR THE “OCTAGON” CONFERENCE 

(C.C.S. 65418) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it seemed to him that the U.S.and British 

proposals as to the wording of paragraph 6 i of C.C.S.654 were very similar. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British wording “inescapable 

commitments”was aimed to cover such points as the return of Dominion forces 

to their homelands which was a commitment which could not be avoided. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the two proposals should be incorporated and that the wording should read: “having regard to other agreed 

and/or inescapable commitments.” 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this proposal was entirely acceptable. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the following wording for paragraph 6 i of C.C.S.654: 

“Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far 

East, as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other agreed 

and/or inescapable commitments, as soon as the German situation 

allows.’’ 

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8. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(C.C.S. 677/1) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that with regard to paragraph 2 b of the 

U.S.draft of the mesage to General Wilson, it was felt that the wording “for 

planning the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” was more appropriate than 

“for the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” since the operation was not yet 

approved and might, in fact, never take place. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the words “major units” in 

paragraph 1a had been inserted at his suggestion to cover such possible withdrawals as that of the Japanese battalion which he had mentioned the previous 

day. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that in the US. draft the date on which 

General Wilson was to submit his plan had been altered to 10 October. Since 

a decision had to be reached by the 15th it would be safer to call for the report 

on the 10th. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the US.draft was acceptable to the 

British Chiefs of Staff. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to dispatch to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean 

the draft message in Enclosure “B” to C.C.S. 677/1. 

(Subsequently dispatched as FAN 415.) 

9. NEXT MEETING, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to meet at 1000 on Thursday, 14 September, and to permit 

photographs to be taken at that time. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 174th Meeting 

OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN THE 

MAINCONFERENCE ROOM,CHATEAU FRONTENAC HOTEL, 

ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1944, AT 1000. 

PRESENT 

United States British 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell,USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Adm. L. D. McCormick, USN 

Major Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Major Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Major Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir William Welsh 

Major Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 1730 MEETING OF THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the 173d Meeting. The detailed record of 

the meeting was approved, subject to later minor amendments. 

2. CONTROL OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 520/4) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the directive in C.C.S. 520/4 as amended in C.C.S. 520/5. 

(Amended directive circulated as C.C.S. 520/6.) 

3. BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE PACIFIC 

(C.C.S. 452/26 and 452/27) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were disturbed 

by the statement of the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 452/27 with 

regard to British participation in the war against Japan. He realized that this 

paper had been written before the Plenary session on the previous day. He 

felt that it did not entirely coincide with the proposal put forward at that 

conference and accepted by the President. For political reasons it was essential 

that the British Fleet should take part in the main operations against Japan. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked if Sir Alan Brooke’s point would be met by the 

elimination of the words, “They consider that the initial use of such a force 

should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific.” It 

might be that the British Fleet would be used initially in the Bay of Bengal 

and thereafter as required by the existing situation. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the main fleet would not be 

required in the Bay of Bengal since there were already more British forces 

there than required. He agreed to the deletion proposed by Admiral Leahy. 

ADMIRAL KING also agreed to the deletion of these words which he felt 

were not relevant to the general case. 

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Continuing, SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM asked the U.S.views as to 

the meaning of the term “balanced forces” in the final sentence of paragraph 1 

of C.C.S. 452/27. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had in mind a force 

of some 4 battleships, 5 to 6 large carriers, 20 light fleet carriers and CVE’s and 

the appropriate number of cruisers and destroyers. This he would regard as a 

balanced force. 

ADMIRAL KING stressed that it was essential for these forces to be 

self-supporting. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that if these forces had their fleet 

train, they could operate unassisted for several months provided they had 

the necessary rear bases -probably in Australia. The provision of bases would 

be a matter for agreement. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the practicability of employing these forces 

would be a matter for discussion from time to time. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he did not feel that the question for discussion was the practicability of employment but rather the matter of where they 

should be employed from time to time. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM referred to the Prime Minister’s statement that he wished the British Fleet to take part in the main operationsin the 

Pacific. Decision with regard to this was necessary since many preliminary 

preparations had to be made. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should put 

forward proposals with regard to the employment of the British Fleet. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the British wish was that they 

should be employed in the Central Pacific. 

ADMIRAL KING said that at the Plenary meeting no specific reference 

to the Central Pacific had been made. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the emphasis had been laid on the use of 

the British Fleet in the main effort against Japan. 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY said that as he saw it the main effort was at present 

from New Guinea to the Philippines and it would later move to the northward. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he was in no position now to commit himself 

as to where the British Fleet could be employed. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the 

original offer made by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 452/18, paragraph 9, 

which read: 

“It is our desire in accordance with His Majesty’s Government’s 

policy, that this fleet should play its full part at the earliest possible moment 

in the main operations against Japan wherever the greatest naval strength 

is required.” 

When the British Chiefs of Staff spoke of the main operations against Japan 

they did not intend to confine this meaning to Japan itself geographically but 

meant rather that the fleet should take part in the main operations within 

the theater of war wherever they might be taking place. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM stressed that the British Chiefs of Staff 

did not wish the British Fleet merely to take part in mopping up operations in 

areas falling into our hands. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt that the actual operations in which 

the British Fleet would take part would have to be decided in the future. It 

might well be that the fleet would be required for the conquest of Singapore, 

which he would regard as a major operation. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then considered paragraph 2 of 

C.C.S. 452/27 referring to the use of a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the Prime Minister had offered the 

British Fleet for use in the main operations against Japan. By implication 

this paragraph accepted a naval task force for the Southwest Pacific, and was 

therefore contrary to the intention he had expressed. 

ADMIRAL KING said that it was of course essential to have sufficient 

forces for the war against Japan. He was not, however, prepared to accept a 

British Fleet which he could not employ or support. In principle he wished 

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to accept the British Fleet in the Pacific but it would be entirely unacceptable 

for the British Main Fleet to be employed for political reasons in the Pacific 

and thus necessitate withdrawal of some of the United States Fleet. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL reminded Admiral King that the Prime Minister had suggested that certain of the newer British capital ships should be 

substituted for certain of the older US. ships. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that as he understood it the Prime 

Minister and President were in agreement that it was essential for British 

forces to take a leading part in the main operations against Japan. 

ADMIRAL KING said that it was not his recollection that the President 

had agreed to this. He could not accept that a view expressed by the Prime 

Minister should be regarded as a directive to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the Prime Minister felt it essential 

that it should be placed on record that he wished the British Fleet to play a 

major role in the operations against Japan. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, as he remembered it, the offer was no 

sooner made than accepted by the President. 

ADMIRAL KING asked for specific British proposals. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred once more to the offer made in C.C.S. 

452118 which he had had previously quoted. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could see no objection whatever to this 

proposal. He could not say exactly where the fleet could be employed at this 

moment but there would be ample opportunity for its use provided it was 

self-supporting. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the question of the British proposal for the 

use the main fleet would have to be referred to the President before it could 

be accepted. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that if Admiral King saw any objections to this 

proposal he should take the matter up himself with the President. It might not 

be wise to use the term “main fleet.” 

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SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the British Fleet had been 

offered by the Prime Minister and the President had accepted it. He was prepared to agree to the deletion of the word “main” from paragraph 1 of 

C.C.S. 452127. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the Prime Minister had also referred to the 

use of British air power in the Pacific. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that a definite answer with regard to British 

air help in the war against Japan could not be given now. The amount which 

could be absorbed would depend on the development of suitable facilities. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was, of course, impossible to be 

definite at the moment since the forces available would depend on the length 

of the war with Germany. What he would ask for was air facilities available 

in the bases in the Pacific so that the British could play their part. He would 

put forward a proposal for consideration. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the best method would be a statement 

of numbers of aircraft and dates at which they would be available. 

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that this would be preferable. 

Referring to paragraph 2 of C.C.S.452127, SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed 

out that this paragraph dealt with the formation of a British Empire task 

force which was the second alternative put forward by the British Chiefs of 

Staff if for any reason the support of the British Fleet in the main operations 

could not be accepted. Since this support had been accepted there would be no 

British naval forces available for the task force and British land forces could 

only arrive at a later date. He suggested therefore that this paragraph should 

be deleted. 

ADMIRAL KING asked if it was intended to use the British Fleet only 

in the main operations and to make no contribution to a task force in the 

Southwest Pacific. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said there were certain objections to forming a 

British Empire task force under General MacArthur’s command at the present 

time. This had been proposed by General Blarney but if it were carried out 

between now and Februav of next year it would cause considerable difficulties 

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from the point of view of land forces since the grouping of formations and the 

sequence of their movement had already been scheduled in accordance with 

future operations. The position would be different after March. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that since British land forces would not be 

available until after Operation DRACULA it would be of no particular value to 

form a British task force now. The British Fleet could of course play a part 

in operations in the Southwest Pacific if they were required. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM confirmed that there would be no objection to the British Fleet working from time to time under General MacArthur’s 

command. 

GENERAL MARSHALL requested that, in order to safeguard his 

position with regard to the immediate formation of a task force, paragraph 2 

of C.C.S. 452/27 be deleted. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed. General MacArthur’s plans had already 

been made and since no British land contribution could at present be made 

there was no object in retaining this paragraph. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific. 

b. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that this 

fleet would be balanced and self-supporting. 

c. Agreed that the method of the employment of the British Fleet in 

these main operations in the Pacific would be decided from time to 

time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances. 

d. Took note that in the light of a above, the British Chiefs of Staff 

withdraw their alternative proposal to form a British Empire task 

force in the Southwest Pacific. 

e. Invited the Chief of the Air Staff to put forward, for planning purposes, a paper containing an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air Force would be prepared to make in the main 

operations against Japan. 

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4. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

(C.C.S. 452128 and 452/29) 

(OCTAGON-IN-9) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the situation report of the Supreme 

Allied Commander, Southeast Asia (OCTAGON-IN-9 of 8 September) should 

be noted. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE then suggested that before considering the draft 

directive to Admiral Mountbatten contained in C.C.S. 452128, he should briefly 

outline the British views with regard to future operations in Burma. It was 

the British intention to endeavor to carry out operations aimed at liquidating 

the Burma commitment as soon as possible. This commitment was a heavy 

one,particularly with regard to casualties from sickness and the large numbers 

of men required in view of the long and tenuous lines of communication. For 

instance, an ordinary division amounted to some 40,000 men, whereas one 

particular division in Southeast Asia required approximately 90,000. The reconquest of Burma would also eliminate the commitments for the protection 

of the northeast frontier of India and the air route to China. 

With these objects in view, operations against Rangoon had been examined. A seaborne amphibious operation was extremely difficult due to the 

fact that Rangoon lay some way up a river and the surrounding terrain was 

extremely marshy. An airborne assault had therefore been considered. By the 

use of airborne forces it was thought that the airfields to the north of Rangoon 

could be seized and that formations could then be flown in. These formations 

would seize the area to the north of Rangoon, then open up the river communications through Rangoon, block the Pegu route and then eliminate the 

Japanese in Burma by operations both from the south and from the north. 

If this could be achieved we should be in far better position. Forces could be 

released from the theater and the protection of India would be simplified. 

To sum up, we should eliminate the Burma commitment, secure the air 

route to China, and possibly at a later date a land route, and obtain jumpingoff places for further operations against Bangkok or to the Kra Peninsula and 

from there to Singapore. 

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Admiral Mountbatten had prepared a plan. This, however, had entailed 

removing forces from north Burma, which was felt to be unacceptable. The 

possibility therefore of obtaining forces from Europe had been examined. It 

was estimated that a decision to remove these forces would have to be taken 

by the first of October and that they would include the 6th Airborne Division, 

the 52nd Division, and the 3rd Division, from northwest Europe and three 

Indian divisions from Italy. There were certain difficulties with regard to this 

plan. The Indian troops who had been fighting for five years would have to 

be taken home and given three weeks’ leave. This would take some time since 

many of them lived in extremely inaccessible parts of India, entailing in some 

cases a journey of a month each way to their homes. Further, India’s capacity 

to absorb personnel was limited and had been estimated at 50,000 a month, 

though it was believed that this could, in certain instances, be raised to 80,000 

a month. If forces were brought to India, it was estimated that two months 

must elapse between their arrival and the period when they would be ready 

to start. Every effort was being made to try and cut the tie factor in this 

jig-saw puzzle, but there was no doubt that the moves ought to begin in October 

if the 15th of March was taken as the date for Operation DRACULA. It might 

be possible to postpone this date until the 1st of April, the limiting factor 

being the weather conditions in April rendering the airdromes north of Rangoon unserviceable. 

Another possibility might be to undertake the operation with fewer 

forces. However, if the operation was launched and Japanese resistance was 

extremely strong, we should find ourselves in a difficult position since the 

nearest reserves would be in northwest Europe or Italy. It was felt therefore 

that if the operation was to be undertaken it must be undertaken with an 

adequate margin of strength. Operations in Europe did not permit of reaching a decision at the present time with regard to the removal of the necessary 

forces,i.e.,three divisions from Italy and three divisions from northwest Europe. 

Further,there was the question of the administrative troops which would be required, particularly signal and movement personnel. These were of the utmost 

importance to the 21st Army Group and to General Alexander if his army 

advanced towards the Po. The situation was such therefore that we could 

not at present gamble by removing these troops. Every effort was being made 

to reduce the estimated time from the removal of the troops from Europe till the 

launching of the operation in order that a decision could be postponed and yet 

the operation be undertaken in the spring. Such a decision with regard to withdrawal of troops from Europe might be possible in a month’s time. There were 

also the complications of the regulations now being instituted with regard 

to conditions of service for the war against Japan, the giving of leave before 

troops who had been fightingfor many years were sent to a new theater, and the 

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question of the release of men who had over five years of war service. Every 

conceivable effort was being made to find the necessary forces to carry out 

DRACULA in the spring. If it were carried out, then Admiral Mountbatten’s 

advance in the north would be limited,whereas if the operation was postponed 

till November, he could fight his way much further south. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the air transport side of the problem 

was all-important. At present Admiral Mountbatten had 448 transport aircraft, and required 1200 for the Rangoon operation. Only 190 of the additional 

752 required could be found from British sources, and these only from operations in Europe. The remainder would have to be provided by the United 

States either from Europe or from elsewhere if they were available. 

At present Admiral Mountbatten had two combat cargo groups and 

wished to obtain the third combat cargo group by the 15th of October in order 

to undertake Operation CAPITAL. Further, he also required the ground echelon 

of the second group by that date. If Operation DRACULA were undertaken, 

he would require the fourth combat cargo group by mid-January and the 

ground echelon of the third at the same time. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that even if the fourth combat cargo group 

were made available to Admiral Mountbatten, he would not have enough aircraft for Operation DRACULA, and it would be necessary to divert further 

air forces to assist him. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he noticed in C.C.S. 452129 that the 

United States Chiefs of Staff were allocating the fourth combat cargo group 

to the Southwest Pacific. He asked that if Operation DRACULA was approved, 

the effect of this proposal should be examined. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that this fourth combat cargo group 

was required for the Philippine operations, but it might be possible to send 

it back for the peak period of the DRACULA operation if the timings fitted. 

B-24 aircraft might also be used. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said it was hoped by then to have a suitable 

staging point. 

There was general agreement that the provision of the necessary aircraft 

would depend on the conclusion of hostilities in Europe. 

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GENERAL ARNOLD said that if hostilities in Europe had terminated, 

there would be 2200 U.S.transport aircraft which would become available. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he felt that the ground echelons for these 

aircraft would probably have to be taken out of Europe by December. 

GENERAL ARNOLD felt that the date might be postponed since a large 

part of the ground echelons could be flown out in the aircraft. The ground 

echelon for the second combat cargo group was already on its way to Southeast 

Asia, and the ground echelon for the third combat cargo group could sail as 

soon as shipping was available. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then examined the draft directive 

to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in C.C.S. 452/28. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY put forward certain amendments proposed by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff. These included provision in paragraph 1 and 

paragraph 2 a for the opening of land communications With China. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this was an important factor, and was 

necessary in order to introduce wheeled transport into China. It might be 

possible to take the short northern route though this was tortuous and difficult. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that in the last month 23,000 tons of stores had 

been flown into China but in view of the lack of motor transport certain of these 

were lying on the airfields and could not be distributed. 

Referring to C.C.S. 452/29, SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that the whole feasibility of Operation 

DRACULA was dependent upon the provision of the necessary aircraft and, 

further, of the possibility of the transfer of the fourth combat cargo group 

from operations against the Philippines for a short period at the peak load 

of Operation DRACULA. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of the progress report on operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command contained in OCTAGON-IN-9. 

b. Approved the directive in C.C.S. 452/28 as amended during discussion. 

(Amended directive circulated as C.C.S. 452/30.) 

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c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff were making every effort 

to overcome the problems involved in moving the necessary resources 

from Europe for DRACULA so that the operation can be carried out 

before the 1945 monsoon. 

d. Recognized that the ability to carry out Operation DRACULA would 

depend very largely on the provision of transport aircraft, and took 

note: 

(1) That the ground echelon of the second combat cargo group was 

already on its way to the Southeast Asia Command. 

(2) That the United States Chiefs of Staff had already assigned the 

third combat cargo group to Southeast Asia and that it would 

go out as soon as shipping was available. 

(3) That the possibility of assigning to Southeast Asia Command 

the fourth combat cargo group and the remaining transport 

aircraft required would depend on the progress of operations in 

Europe and in the Pacific, and that, on the whole, the prospects 

of making the necessary provision seemed good. 

5. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 678) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the memorandum by the British Chiefs of 

Staff dealing with the proposed date for the end of the war against Japan was 

acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff with certain amendments. It 

was felt that paragraph 1a should be eliminated, since it was hoped that the 

redeployment of forces against Japan would not take two years. The United 

States Chiefs of Staff also felt that 18 months was a more appropriate time 

factor than two years. A further sentence should be added to paragraph 2, to 

read: “This date will be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of 

the war.” 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that for demobilization purposes the United 

States Army were using a time factor of one year. This,of course, would not 

affect the decision with regard to the date of 18 months after the termination 

of hostilities with Germany for planning for production. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

“Agreed to recommend that the date for the end of the war against 

Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower should 

be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted 

periodically to conform to the course of the war.” 

6. OPERATIONS OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 

GENERAL ARNOLD made the following statement with regard to operations of the Twentieth Air Force: 

“The Twentieth Air Force is designed around and includes all B-29 airplanes. 

“The B-29 airplane, which is the basis of the Twentieth Air Force, is a 

very long range, fast, heavily armed precision day bomber. At maximum 

combat loading its gross weight is 140,000pounds at which weight it operates 

up to 30,000-feet altitudes at a top speed of 370 miles per hour and cruises 

at 220 miles per hour. During a normal combat mission it burns 450 gallons 

per hour and at high speed consumes up to 700 gallons per hour. The airplane is operated by a crew of 11 men. A notable feature is the airplane 

pressurization which results in providing inside pressure equivalent to altitudes of about 8,000 feet when the airplane is actually at 30,000feet. The most 

notable feature, however, is probably the central fire control features whereby three centrally located gunners handle, with precision, twelve 50-caliber 

machine guns and one 20 mm. cannon,all remotely controlled. In spite of its 

weight, this airplane can be operated from 8500-foot runways at maximum 

gross loadings and from 7500-foot runways when loaded to 135,000 pounds. 

“The Twentieth Air Force operates directly under the United States 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is commanded by the Commanding General, Army 

Air Forces, who acts as the executive agent of the United States Joint Chiefs 

of Staff in implementing their directive for the employment of very long 

range bomber forces. 

“Theater commanders in which elements of the Twentieth Air Force are 

based are responsible for logistic support and defense of Twentieth Air 

Force bases. 

“At this time the major units of the Twentieth Air Force are the XX, 

XXI and XXII Bomber Commands. Each of these Bomber Commands, as a 

matter of fact, is a complete self-sustaining very long range air force. 

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“The XX Bomber Command is now based in the Southeast Asia Command in the area just west of Calcutta and operates principally from bases 

in the vicinity of Chengtu,China, against targets in Japan and Manchuria. 

It comprises four groups and had in the theater on September llth, 155 

B-29’s,of which 120are unit equipment aircraft. 

“The XXIBomber Command consists of three wings of four groups each 

with a total unit equipment strength of 360 B-29 aircraft. Its headquarters, 

ground echelons and service units, are now moving to the Marianas. All 12 

groups will complete their training and move to bases in the Marianas as 

bases become available. 

“The XXII Bomber Command, consisting of two 4-group wings, was 

activated on August 15th and ground echelons will be available for movement to bases in Formosa or Luzon as quickly as they can be made available. 

The first air echelons of the XXII Bomber Command will be ready to move 

in March 1945. 

“The logistic requirements of the XX Bomber Command operating out 

of China were extremely heavy, and provision of the necessary gasoline had 

presented a major problem. It had, in fact, been necessary to divert some 

20 B-29’sto use in the role of tankers; these were now being relieved by B-24 

tankers which were now en route.” 

GENERAL ARNOLD then outlined with the aid of a map the targets 

that were being brought within range of B-29’s operating from the various 

bases either now available or which it was hoped would shortly be available. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of General Arnold’s statement with respect to 

the Twentieth Air Force. 

7. COMMUNICATIONS TO MARSHAL STALIN AND 

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should 

prepare for submission to the President and Prime Minister draft communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek dealing with 

the broad results of the Conference. This had been done on previous occasions. 

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It was generally agreed that, with regard to the communication to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, details of Operation DRACULA should not be 

entered into and that some broad statement should be used to the effect that 

amphibious operations against Lower Burma would be undertaken at the earliest possible date. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Directed the Secretaries to draft suitable messages to Marshal Stalin 

and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of OCTAGON. 

8. NEXT MEETING, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to meet at 1030 Friday, 15 September. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 175th Meeting 

OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

MIIWTES OF MEETINGHELDIN THE MAINCONFERENCEROOM, 

CHATEAUFRONTENAC HOTEL,ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1944,AT 1000.

PRESENT 

United States British 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

General H. H. Arnold, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt.Gen. B. B. Somervell,USA 

Vice Adm. R. Willson, USN 

Rear Ah. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Rear Ah. L. D. McCormick, USN 

Major Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Major Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Major Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir William Welsh 

Major Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brig.Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge,RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 174TH MEETING OF THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend an alteration to the conclusion of Item 5 of the minutes. It was suggested 

that this should read: 

“Agreed to recommend that for planning production and for allocation 

of manpower the date for the end of the war against Japan. . . .” 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this proposal was entirely acceptable. 

Continuing, ADMIRAL LEAHY said there was one other alteration 

which should be made in the Anal sentence to General Arnold’s statement in 

Item 6. The number of B-29’s which had been diverted to tankers should read 

20 and not 40. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that on page 7 of the minutes his statement, as to the date on which the ground echelons for the aircraft from Europe 

for use in the war against Japan would have to be taken out, should read “by” 

December and not “in”December. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to amend the conclusion to Item 5 of C.C.S. 174th Meeting to 

read as follows: “Agreed to recommend that the date for the end of 

the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation 

of manpower should be set at 18months after the defeat of Germany; 

this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the 

WW.” 

b. Approved the conclusions of the 174th Meeting as amended above. 

The detailed record of the meeting was approved subject to the 

amendments agreed during discussion and to later minor amendments. 

2. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 680) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed and accepted certain 

amendmentsto the report. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as 

amended in discussion. 

(Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 680/1.) 

3. COMMUNICATION OF THE RESULTS OF “OCTAGON” 

(C.C.S. 681; 681/1) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested the insertion in the draft letter to Marshal 

Stalin in C.C.S. 681 of a final paragraph (paragraph 6) to read: 

“Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific Theater after 

the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.” 

SIR ALAN BROOKE accepted this amendment. 

With reference to the two draft messages to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek in C.C.S. 681/1, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that on balance he preferred 

the shorter draft in Enclosure “B.” 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had certain deletions to suggest to the longer draft in Enclosure “A” which he would 

like to put forward. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY read out these suggestions. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that these amendments were acceptable. 

Continuing, ADMIRAL LEAHY proposed that a new sentence should be 

added to the draft in Enclosure “A” to read as follows: 

“We have agreed on future operations to intensify the offensive 

against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, including the opening of a 

seaway into China.” 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this amendment was acceptable. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Subject to the amendments agreed in discussion, approved draft messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek reporting 

the results of the OCTAGON Conference. 

(Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 681/2.) 

4. REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AFTER THE END OF THE WAR IN 

EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 679) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the recommendation of the United 

States Chiefs of Staff contained in C.C.S. 679 was acceptable. He would like 

the words “the combined shipping authorities” inserted after the words “Combined Military Transportation Committee” in paragraph 3. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY accepted this amendment. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 679 subject to insertion in the third line of paragraph 

3 of the words “combined shipping authorities” after the word “Committee.” 

5. COMBINED PERSONNEL MOVEMENT PROBLEM ARISING THE 

FIRST YEAR AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY 

(C.C.S. 67512) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum 

by Lord Leathers and General Somervell indicating the magnitude of the 

combined shipping movements which might be required during the first year 

after the defeat of Germany. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Lord Leathers had explained to him that 

the paper was designed merely to show the magnitude of the problem rather 

than to give entirely accurate figures. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL confirmed that this was the case. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of C.C.S. 675/2. 

6. OPERATION “HIGHBALL” 

(C.C.S. 682) 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL and SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM gave a 

description of Operation HIGHBALL. They undertook to send the United States 

a film on this operation. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note: 

a. That Operation HIGHBALL would be available in the Eastern 

Theater at the end of November 1944. 

b. That the British Chiefs of Staff would send an informational film 

and technical data to the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

7. RELEASE TO THE PRESS OF INFORMATION ON “MULBERRY” 

(SCAF 79) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it had been suggested that information 

with regard to MULBERRY should be released to the press. General Eisenhower was not, however, prepared to make such a release unless he was instructed to do so by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL KING said that base facilities in the Pacific were limited and 

it might well be that MULBERRY would be required in that theater, in which 

case it would be obviously disadvantageous if the Japanese were informed as 

as to their potentialities. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed with Admiral King that if there 

was any chance of using them in the Pacific it was far Wiser to release nothing 

to the press on MULBERRY for the present. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in view of the potentialities of MULBERRY for the war against Japan he agreed that security on these should be 

retained. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that security implications affecting other theaters precluded the 

release of information on MULBERRY. 

8. POSSIBLE STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE PRESS BY THE 

PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that there might be advantages in 

a statement being made, possibly by the President and Prime Minister, to the 

effect that the only difficulty encountered at the Conference was the problem 

of providing employment for all the Allied forces who were eager to participate 

in the war against Japan. The difficulty had arisen as a result of the keenness 

of the competition to employ the maximum possible forces for the defeat of 

Japan. This was a fact and issued to the press should help to undermine Japanese morale. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note that General Ismay would prepare a suitable statement for 

consideration. 

9. PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN IN THE PACIFIC 

ADMIRAL KING outlined the extremely successful operations recently 

undertaken by Admiral Halsey’s Task Force 38 and the Fifth Air Force against 

the Japanese in the Leyte area, where some 500 Japanese aircraft had been 

destroyed. In view of the success of these operations it had been decided, after 

consultation with Admiral Nimitz and General MarArthur, to advance the 

date of subsequently planned operations by about two months. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that the success of recent operations, particularly against the Japanese air, and the decision to advance the 

dates for future operations would have a decisive effect on what the Japanese 

could do in Burma. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the Japanese Air Force was no 

longer fighting with the will to win. The pilots lacked determination and 

even in the Philippines it seemed that the Japanese Air Force had neither the 

will nor the wherewithal to act offensively. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of Admiral King’sremarks on the progress of the 

campaign in the Pacific. 

10. HOUR OF NEXT MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.+-

Agreed tentatively to meet at 1000 on Saturday, 16 September. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 176th Meeting 

OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETINGHELDIN THE 

MAINCONFERENCE ROOM,CHATEAU FRONTENAC HOTEL, 

ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1944, AT 1100. 

PRESENT 

United States 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Fbyal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Rear Adm. L. D. McCormick,USN Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild,USA Air Marshal Sir William Welsh 

Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, USA Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brigadier Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 175TH MEETING OF THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the 175th Meeting. The detailed record of 

the meeting was also approved subject to later minor amendments. 

2. “RANKIN” PLANNING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

(C.C.S. 684) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 684 (The directive to General Wilson was dispatched as 

FAN 418). 

3. RELEASE OF AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT FROM “OVERLORD” TO OTHER 

THEATERS 

(C.C.S. 687) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 687 (The message to SCAEF was dispatched as FACS 

81). 

4. ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

(C.C.S. 320/26) 

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that any naval disarmament 

measures for U.S.controlled ports should be under the US.naval member of 

the Central Control Commission. 

ADMIRAL KING agreed with this proposal. American control of the 

port of Bremen would have to include American control of a suitable area for 

disembarkation and staging. 

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM agreed. He suggested that the American area 

should also include Bremerhaven, some 40 or 50 miles down the river. Bremerhaven was, he understood, the port where large ships had to berth. 

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GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the US.troops would probably also 

have to be supplied through the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. It might 

well be desirable to set up an Inter-Allied Navigation Commission to control 

the mine. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the Combined Administrative 

Committee might be instructed to work out the logistic details involved in the 

decision taken with regard to zones and the consequent maintenance of U.S. 

and British forces in the zones. 

Certain minor amendments were then proposed to the statement of 

policy contained in C.C.S. 320/26. These were accepted. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved the proposals in C.C.S. 320/26, subject to the minor amendments agreed in discussion. (The amended paper, as approved by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, circulated as C.C.S. 320/27.) 

b. Agreed that any naval disarmament measures for Bremen and Bremerhaven would be under the US.Naval Commander of the Central 

Control Commission. 

c. Agreed to refer C.C.S. 320/27 to the Combined Administrative Committee for examination of the logistics problems involved. 

5. SITUATION IN CHINA 

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the 

contents of a telegram recently received from General Stilwell. The Japanese 

were advancing on Kweilin, if indeed they had not already captured it and 

were therefore only 460 miles from Kunming, the China end of the air route. 

Further, no Chinese replacements were being provided for the Salween forces 

and the Generalissimo was threatening to withdraw these forces altogether 

if the Led0 forces did not advance to Bhamo. The Generalissimo had not yet 

agreed to place all Chinese forces under the direct control of General Stilwell 

which he had been pressed to do for some two months. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 

the contents of a telegram which had been sent to Chiang Kai-shek by the 

President urging early and vigorous action. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of a telegram read to the meeting by General Marshall, which 

the President had sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, stressing the 

need for action to remedy the situation in China in general and on the 

Salween front in particular. 

6. COMMUNIQU& FOR RELEASE TO THE PRESS 

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

might wish to propose to the President and Prime Minister a paragraph dealing 

with the military points of the Conference for incorporation in the Anal press 

release. He presented a draft for consideration. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the text of a short note containing suggestions as to the military substance of any communiquk that the President and the Prime 

Minister might wish to issue to the Press on OCTAGON. 

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 

SIR ALAN BROOKE, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, said he 

would like to express warm appreciationto the United States Chiefs of Staff for 

their helpful cooperation in reaching agreement on the problems which had 

been before them. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY, in expressing thanks to Sir Alan Brooke, said that 

the United States Chiefs of Staff were most grateful for the helpful attitude 

of the British Chiefs of Staff in overcoming the minor difficulties which had 

initially existed. 

234 
MINUTES OF 

PLENARY MEETINGS 

The Minutes of the PLENARY Meetings, as transcribed herein, are from notes taken by the 

United States Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
TOP SECRET 

OCTAGONCONFERENCE 

M~UTES OF FIRST PLENARY MEETING HELDAT THE CITADEL, QUEBEC,

ON WEDNESDAY, 13 SEPTEMBER 1944, AT 1145.

United States 

The President 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

PRESENT 

British 

The PrimeMinister 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General SirHastings L. Ismay 

Major General R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brigadier Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

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THE PRIME MINISTER, at the President’s request, opened the discussion. He said that since SEXTANT the affairs of the United Nations had taken 

a revolutionary turn for the good. Everything we had touched had turned to 

gold, and during the last seven weeks there had been an unbroken run of rnilitary successes. The manner in which the situation had developed since the 

Teheran Conference gave the impression of remarkable design and precision 

of execution. First there had been the Anzio landing, and then, on the same 

day as the launching of the great Operation OVERLORD, we had captured 

Rome, which had seemed the most perfect timing, He wished to congratulate 

the United States Chiefs of Staff on the success of DRAGOON, which had produced the most gratifying results. It was already probable that eight or nine 

thousand prisoners had been captured, and the south and western parts of 

France were now being systematicallycleared of the enemy. He was firmly convinced that future historians would give a great account of the period since 

Teheran. 

THE PRESIDENT said that no little of the credit for the conception of 

DRAGOON should be attributed to Marshal Stalin. It was close to being his 

suggestion rather than ours. 

THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said that he was glad to be able to 

record that, although the British Empire had now entered the sixth year of the 

war it was still keeping its end up with an over-all population, including the 

overseas Dominions and Colonies, of only 70,000,000 white people. The British 

Empire effort in Europe, counted in terms of divisions in the field, was about 

equal to that of the United States. Thiswas as it should be. He was proud that 

the British Empire could claim equal partnership with their great ally, the 

United States,whom he regarded as the greatest military power in the world. 

The British Empire effort had now reached its peak, whereas that of their ally 

was ever-increasing. There was complete confidence in General Eisenhower 

and his relations with General Montgomery were of the best, as were those 

between General Montgomery and General Bradley. The part played by General W. B. Smith in directing and cementing the staffs was of the highest order. 

The control of operations in France was in capable hands. An efficient integrated American-British staff machine had been built up, and the battle was 

being brilliantly exploited. 

Turning to Italy, THE PRIME MINISTER said that General Alexander 

had resumed the offensive at the end of August. Since then the Eighth Army 

had suffered about 8,000 and the Fifth Army about 1,000 casualties. The Fifth 

Army had hitherto not been so heavily engaged,but they were expected to make 

a thrust that very day. The British have a great stake in Italy. The army in 

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this theater was the largest representative British Empire Army in existence. 

There were in all sixteen British Empire divisions, consisting of eight British, 

two Canadian, one New Zealand, one South African and four British Indian 

divisions. He, the Prime Minister, had been anxious lest General Alexander 

might be shorn of certain essentials for the vigorous prosecution of his campaign. He now understood that the Combined Chiefs of StafT had agreed that 

there should be no withdrawals from General Alexander’s Army until either 

Kesselring’s Army had been beaten, or was on the run out of Italy. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said there was no thought of withdrawing any 

forces until the outcome of General Alexander’s present operations was known. 

THE PRIME MINISTER emphasized that if the Germans were run out 

of Italy we should have to look for fresh fields and pastures new. It would never 

do for our armies to remain idle. He had always been attracted by a righthanded movement, with the purpose of giving Germany a stab in the armpit. 

Our objective should be Vienna. If German resistance collapsed, we should, of 

course, be able to reach Vienna more quickly and more easily. If not, to assist 

this movement, he had given considerable thought to an operation for the 

capture of Istria, which would include the occupation of Trieste and Fiume. 

He had been relieved to learn that the United States Chiefs of Staff were willing 

to leave in the Mediterranean certain LST’s now engaged in DRAGOON, to 

provide an amphibious lift for the Adriatic operation, if this was found desirable and necessary. An added reason for this right-handed movement was the 

rapid encroachment of the Russians into the Balkans and the consequent 

dangerous spread of Russian influence in this area. He preferred to get into 

Vienna before the Russians did as he did not know what Russia’s policy would 

be after she took it. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then reviewed the campaign in Burma. This 

had been on a considerable scale. 250,000 men had been engaged, and the 

fighting for Imphal and Kohima had been extremely bitter. General Stilwell 

was to be congratulated on his brilliant operation, resulting in the capture of 

Myitkyina. There had been 40,000 battle casualties and 288,000 sick of which 

latter, happily, the great proportion recovered and returned to duty. As a 

result of this campaign, the air line to China had been kept open and India 

rendered secure from attack. It was estimated that the Japanese had lost 

100,000 men in this, the largest land engagement of Japanese forces. 

In spite of these successes, it was, however, most undesirable that the 

fightingin the jungles of Burma should go on indefinitely. For this reason, the 

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British Chiefs of Staff had put forward Plan DRACULA, which would be preceded by Plan CAPITAL Phase I and as much as was necessary of Phase 11. 

Difficulties were being experienced in making available the necessary forces 

and transporting them to the Southeast Asia Theater in time to carry out 

DRACULA before the monsoon of 1945. The present situation in Europe, 

favorable as it was, did not permit a decision being taken now to withdraw 

forces.What was wanted was to keep an option open for aslong as possible, and 

every effort was being directed to this end. 

There were certain elements inimical to Anglo-American good relations 

which were putting it about that Great Britain would take no share in the 

war against Japan once Germany had been defeated. Far from shirking this 

task, the British Empire was eager to play the greatest possible part. They had 

every reason for doing so. Japan was as much the bitter enemy of the British 

Empire as of the United States. British territory had been captured in battle 

and grievious losses had been suffered. The offer he, the Prime Minister, now 

wished to make, was for the British Main Fleet to take part in the main operations against Japan under United States Supreme Command. 

THE PRESIDENT said that the offer was accepted on the largest possible scale. 

THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said there would be available a 

powerful and well-balanced force, including, it was hoped, at the end of next 

year, their newest 15-inch battleship. A fleet train of ample proportions had 

been built up, which would render the fleet independent for a considerable time 

of shore base resources. He said that the placing of a British fleet in the Central Pacific would not prevent a detachment being made to work with General 

MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific if this was desired. This would include 

air forces. There was, of course, no intention to interfere in any way with General MacArthur’s command. 

As a further contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Royal Air 

Force would like to take a part in the heavy bombardment of Japan. A bomber 

force of 1500 planes could be made available for this purpose and would like 

a proportionate share with the four or five thousand American planes in 

striking at the heart of the enemy. As regards land forces, when Germany had 

been beaten, it would probably be possible to move six divisions from the European Theater to the East, to be followed perhaps by a further six at a later 

date. In Burma there were 15divisions which might ultimately be drawn upon. 

He had always advocated an advance across the Bay of Bengal and operations 

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to recover Singapore, the loss of which had been a grievious and shameful 

blow to British prestige which must be avenged. It would not be good enough 

for Singapore to be returned to us at the peace table. We should recover it in 

battle. These operations would not debar the employment of small British 

Empire components with United States forces in the Pacific. 

Therewas nothing cast ironin these ideas. First we should do DRACULA, 

and then survey the situation. If a better plan could be evolved, it should certainly not be ruled out in advance. Our key-word should be to engage the 

largest number of our own forces against the largest number of the enemy 

at the earliest possible moment. 

THE PRESIDENT thanked the Prime Minister for his lucid and comprehensive review of the situation. It was a matter of profound satisfaction 

that at each succeeding conference between the American and British representativesthere had been ever-increasingsolidarity of outlook and identity of 

basic thought. Added to this there had always been an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship. Our fortunes had prospered but it was still not quite possible to forecast the date of the end of the war with Germany. 

It seemed clear that the Germans were withdrawing from the Balkans 

and appeared likely that in Italy they would retire to the line of the Alps. The 

Russians were on the edge of Hungary. The Germans had shown themselves 

good at staging withdrawals and had been able to save large numbers of personnel although much material had been lost. If the battle went well with 

General Alexander, we should reach the Piave reasonably soon. All forces in 

Italy should be engaged to the maximum intensity. 

In the west it seemed probable that the Germans would retire behind 

the Rhine. In his view the “West Wall” was the right bank of the Rhine which 

would present a formidable obstacle. He thought we should plan to force the 

barrier of the Rhine and then consider the situation. We should have to turn 

the line either from the east or from the west. For this purpose our plans 

must be flexible. The Germans could not yet be counted out and one more 

big battle would have to be fought. The operations in the East would to some 

extent depend on how the situation developed in Europe. He agreed that we 

should not remain in Burma any longer than it was necessary to clean up the 

Japanese in that theater. The American plan was to regain the Philippines and 

to dominate the mainland of Japan from the Philippines or Formosa and from 

bridgeheads which would be seized in China. If forces could be established on 

the mainland of China, China could be saved. American experience had been 

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that the “end run”method paid a handsome dividend. Rabaul was an example 

of this by-passing technique which had been employed with considerable success at small cost of life. Would it not be equally possible to by-pass Singapore 

by seizing an area to the north or east of it, for example, Bankok? Singapore 

may be very strong and he was opposed to going up against strong positions. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the seizure of localities such 

as Penang and the Kra Isthmus or Moulmein should be studied. As far as Singapore was concerned he did not favor the by-passing method. There would 

undoubtedly be a large force of Japanese in the Malay Peninsula and it would 

help the American operations in the Pacific if we could bring these forces to 

action and destroy them in addition to achieving the great prize of the recapture of Singapore. If Formosa were captured, would the Japanese garrisons 

to the south be completely cut off? 

ADMIRAL KING replied that these garrisons would be strangulated 

and must ultimately perish. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that all these projects were being examined and would be put in order. No decision could be taken until after 

Rangoon had been captured. It should not be overlooked that Marshal Stalin 

had volunteered a solemn undertaking at Teheran that Russia would enter 

the war against Japan the day that Hitler was beaten. There was no reason 

to doubt that Stalin would be as good as his word. The Russians undoubtedly 

had great ambitions in the East. If Hitler was beaten, say, by January, and 

Japan was confronted with the three most powerful nations in the world, they 

would undoubtedly have cause for reflection as to whether they could continue the fight. 

THE PRESIDENT referred to the almost fanatical Japanese tenacity. 

In Saipan not only the soldiers but also the civilians had committed suicide 

rather than be taken. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he hoped to have available between 

600 and 800 heavy bombers for operations against the mainland of Japan. 

These could be supplemented by a considerable number of medium bomber 

squadrons. 

THE PRIME MINISTER asked about the employment to be made of 

the British Fleet. 

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THE PRESIDENT said his thought was to use it in any way possible. 

ADMIRAL KING said that a paper on this subject had been prepared 

for reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The question was being actively 

studied. 

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if it would not be better to employ the 

new British ships in place of battle-worn vessels of the United States. 

ADMIRAL KING replied that speaking for himself, he could only say 

that the matter was under examination. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the offer had been made and asked 

if it was accepted. 

THE PRESIDENT replied in the affirmative. 

THE PRIME MINISTER enquired whether an undertaking could be 

given for the British Air Force to participate in the main operations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he and General Arnold were trying 

to see how best to fit in the maximum number of aircraft for these operations. 

It was not so long ago that we were crying out for airplanes -now we had a 

surplus. He suggested that if the British were heavily engaged in Southeast 

Asia and in Malaya they would require a large proportion of their air forces 

for these operations. Was there a distinction between these latter opeations 

and the operations envisaged by Sir Charles Portal for heavy bombardment 

of Japan? 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL replied that there was a distinction. "he Lancaster bomber, if refuelled in the air, had a range nearly approaching that of 

the B-29. Without refuelling in the air these aircraft had a range of 800 or 

900 miles. 

THE PRESIDENT observed that there were certain groups in the 

United States, and he had no doubt that similar groups existed in Great 

Britain, who evinced a kindly attitude towards the Germans. Their theory 

was that evil could be eradicated from the German make-up and the nation 

could be rejuvenated by kindness. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that such sentiments would hardly be 

tolerated in Great Britain. The British people would demand a strong policy 

against the Germans. The German working man should be allowed sufficient 

food for his bare need, and work, but no more. The more virulent elements 

such as the Gestapo and the young fanatics should be deported to work in 

rehabilitating the devastated areas of Europe. Plans for the partition of Germany were now in the course of preparation but no final decisions had been 

taken. 

In conclusion, THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was clear that a 

very great measure of agreement existed between the American and British 

Staffs. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that this was so. He did not foresee any insuperable difficulties inreaching agreement on all points at issue. 

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OCTAGON CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF SECONLI PENARY MEETING,

HELDAT THE CITADEL,QUEBEC,ON 

SATURDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER 1944, AT 12 NOON.

PRESENT 

United States 

The President 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

The Prime Minister 

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Major Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brigadier Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

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1. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

At the request of the President, ADMIRAL LEAHY read out the report 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister (C.C.S. 

680/1)paragraph by paragraph. A number of amendments were proposed and 

agreed to. These are incorporated in the final report (C.C.S. 680/2). 

In addition to the agreed amendments, comments on the report were 

made as follows: 

OPERATIONS IN ITALY 

a. Paragraph 11. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the alternative developments 

in the operations in Italy postulated by General Wilson were rather too 

rigid. There might be many shades between the rout of General Kesselring’s 

forces and the ability of the Germans to effect an orderly withdrawal. Paragraphs 11 a and b would present a better balanced estimate if paragraph 

11 b was amended to read “b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting 

an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not at present seem possible 

that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Unless the 

enemy’s resistance is markedly reduced, difficult terrain and severe weather 

in the Alps during the winter would prevent another major offensive until 

spring 1945.” 

b. Paragraph 12. 

THE PRIME MINISTER asked that the precise implication of the 

statement “that no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the 

outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known” might be made 

perfectly clear. For example, it would be quite unacceptable if paragraph 

12 a was intended to cover an offensive only as far, say, as the Rimini Line. 

He assumed that the offensive contemplated would include domination of 

the Valley of the Po. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was his understanding that General 

Alexander’s present offensive included invasion of the Valley of the Po. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed. 

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c. Paragraph 12 c. 

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his appreciation to Admiral King 

for his offer to provide an amphibious lift for possible operations against 

the Istrian Peninsula. 

ADMIRAL KING said that after taking part in operations in the 

Adriatic, these landing craft would be required to proceed to the Southeast 

Asia Theater for DRACULA. It was thereforeof the greatest importance that 

General Wilson should submit his plan for the Istrian operation and a decision be taken not later than 15 October. He pointed out that there were 

certain other craft now in the Mediterranean which were urgently required 

for the Pacific. 

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that it was of the utmost importance 

that the matter be settled promptly. 

GENERAL LAYCOCK confirmed that the additional craft referred to 

by Admiral King would not be wanted for the Istrian operation. 

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

d. Paragraph 21. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought it quite possible that a heavy, 

sustained and ever-increasingair bombardment of theJapanese citiesmight 

cause Japan to capitulate. People could stand heavy bombardment only so 

long as they could hope that sooner or later it would come to some endurable 

end. There could be no such hope for Japan and all they could look forward 

to was the prospect of anever-increasingweight of explosive on their centers 

of population. 

e. Paragraph 23. 

With reference to the term “the opening of a seaway to China,” THE 

PRIME MINISTER said that he assumed this meant the seaway from the 

United States. He did not contemplate a sea route being opened from the 

south, for example, through the Sunda Strait. 

ADMIRAL KING agreed with the Prime Minister’s interpretation on 

this point. 

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f. Paragraph 26. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Canadian Government was 

anxious for some assurance in principle that their forces would participate 

in the main operations against Japan. The Canadian Government would 

prefer that their forces should operate in the more northerly parts of the 

Pacific, as their troops were unused to tropical conditions. 

It was agreed that a paragraph accepting Canadian participation in 

principle should be inserted in the report. (See paragraph 27) 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the necessity for securing suitable bases for all the forces that would be operating in the Pacific might require employment of Canadian forces in the tropics. 

g. The discussion then turned to the operations in Southeast Asia, with 

particular reference to Operations CAPITAL and DRACULA. As regards 

CAPITAL, THE PRIME MINISTER said that, while he accepted the obligation of securing the air route and attaining overland communications 

with China, any tendency to overinsure in this operation would have the 

effect of ruling out DRACULA, which he and the British Chiefs of Staff were 

particularly set on carrying out before the monsoon of 1945. 

h. At this point THE PRIME MINISTER read out a note on the provision of forces for DRACULA (see Annex I) in amplification of which he 

made certain suggestionsabout the timing of the movements of forces from 

the United States. If the United States authorities could see their way to 

assisting the operations in Burma with one or two divisions it would be better to move two divisions from the later schedules of the United States 

Army transportation to Europe than to take two divisions from General 

Montgomery’s Army which was now actually fighting. This would bring 

additional troops more rapidly into action against the Japanese without 

withdrawing any of those already fighting in Germany. He did not ask for 

a decision on these proposals there and then but asked if the United States 

Chiefs of Staff would examine his suggestion. 

GENERAL MARSHALL undertook to examine the Prime Minister’s 

proposals. He said, however, that there was only one light division available 

and this had been reorganized and allocated to the European Theater at 

the special request of General Eisenhower. Every division in the United 

States was already allocated either to General Eisenhower or to the Pacific. 

The last divisions for the European Theater of Operations were scheduled 

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to sail either the last week in January or the first week in February. The 

only way of providing United States divisions for Burma was by taking 

them from approved allocations. In this connection he said General Stilwell 

was desirous of having an American division assigned him;in fact,he wanted 

two if he could get them. 

i. Continuing, General Marshall said that he had recently learned of 

an impression that the increase in the requirements for DRACULA had 

been brought about by pressure from United States authorities. After a 

thorough inquiry he had found that this impression was groundless. No 

United States authorities had advocated any such increase. 

At the President‘s request, GENERAL MARSHALL outlined certain 

developments with regard to the Chinese forces. The Generalissimo contemplated withdrawing the “Y’ Force across the Salween unless General 

Stilwell advanced on Bhamo with the Led0 Force. No replacements had 

been provided for the Salween Force, which had now dwindled to 14,000men. 

A note had been sent by the President to the Generalissimo pointing out 

the consequences of the proposed action and stating that the Generalissimo 

must accept full responsibility therefor. 

REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AFTER THE END OF THE WAR IN 

EUROPE 

3. Paragraph 30. 

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that our shipping situation 

would be greatly eased after the defeat of Germany by the cessation of the 

convoys. Lord Leathers had said that we should be able to get an additional 

lift of between 40 and 50 percent. The ships would be faster on passage with 

a much quicker turn-round at the terminal ports. 

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

k. ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed 

on a provisional demarkation of zones of occupation in Germany. The details and implications would be required to be worked out by the experts. 

[An addition to the report which covered this matter (C.C.S. 320/27) was 

read out and agreed.] 

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ANNEX I: DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

1. Admiral Mountbatten’s directive was agreed, subject to certain minor 

amendments. 

THE CONFERENCE:-

Instructed the Secretaries to revise the report in the light of the 

amendments approved by the President and Prime Minister and to 

circulate it as an approved document. 

2. LOCATION OF THE CENTRAL TRIPARTITE CONTROL 

COMMISSION IN GERMANY 

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether any suggestions had been put ,forward for the location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany. 

Was this to be in Berlin or elsewhere? 

MR. EDEN said that this question was under examination by the European Advisory Commission. From the administrative point of view Berlin 

seemed to be the best place. 

3. COMMUNICATION OF THE RESULTS OF “OCTAGON” CONFERENCE TO MARSHAL STALIN AND GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAISHEK 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would like to add to the communication to Marshal Stalin a word on the political dangers of divergencies between 

Russia and the Western Allies in respect of Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia. 

THE PRESIDENT said that as the communication was purely military 

in character and purported to give the results of the OCTAGON Conference, 

he thought it would be better if political matters were omitted. 

THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER approved the terms of the 

communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as 

set out in Enclosures “A” and “B”respectively of C.C.S. 681/2. 

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4. RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON “MULBERRY” 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it had been suggested to him that 

the time had now come when information could be released to the press about 

MULBERRY. The development of the artificial harbors had been largely a 

British enterprise and he would naturally have liked to let the public know 

about them as soon as the information could safely be released. He had now 

been informed, however, that Admiral King thought that the release of information about MULBERRY might be helpful to the Japanese and might not 

permit full advantage being taken of these inventions in the war against Japan. 

The Prime Minister said he fully accepted Admiral King’s view and there 

would consequently be no release of information to the public about MULBERRY at present. 

5. “OCTAGON” COMMUNIQUE 

THE CONFERENCE:--

Agreed on the terms of a communiqu6 to be issued to the Press that same 

afternoon (see Annex 11). 

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ANNEX I 

NOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER 

OF DEFENCE, DATED 16TH SEPTEMBER 1944 

1. His Majesty’s Government are in full accord with the directive to Admiral Mountbatten which makes him responsible for executing the stages of 

Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China. Having regard however to the 

immense losses by sickness (288,000in six months} which have attended the 

Burma campaign this year, they are most anxious to limit this class of operation, the burden of which falls almost wholly upon the Imperial armies, to the 

minimum necessary to achieve the aforesaid indispensable object. For this 

purpose they are resolved to strain every nerve to bring on the Operation 

DRACULA by March 15, asby cutting the Japanese communicationsthe enemy 

will be forced to divide their forces. Decisive results may be obtained in a battle 

north of Rangoon, and the pursuit by light forces from the north may be continued without serious cost. 

2. It is essential to provide five or six divisions for DRACULA. The 6th Airborne Division from England and a British-Indian division from Italy will 

start at the earliest moment irrespective of the state of the European war. It 

will not however be possible to withdraw any further forces from Europe before 

the end of organized and coherent German resistance. Admiral Mountbatten 

hopes by certain adjustments of his reserve divisions to withdraw two or even 

three divisions from the forces now facing the Japanese on the Burma front, 

for use in DRACULA. It would be of very great assistance to His Majesty’s 

Government if the United States could place at their disposal for Operation 

DRACULA two United States light or ordinary divisions. Whether these divisions should come into action on the northern Burma front or whether they 

should go straight to the Operation DRACULA is a matter for study in time 

and logistics, observing that we have six months in hand before DRACULA 

D-day. 

Annex I 

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3. If such a provision were made, we should feel certain of being able to 

achieve DRACULA in time to limit the wastage to the British Imperial armies 

in the north and to clean up the Burma situation before the next monsoon. 

The destruction of the Japanese in Burma would liberate a considerable army, 

which could immediately attack Japanese objectives across the Bay of Bengal 

at whatever point or points may be considered to be most beneficial to the common cause and most likely to lead to the rapid wearing-down of Japanese 

troops and above all air forces. 

4. If on the other hand we are not able to carry out Operation DRACULA, 

His Majesty’s Government would feel they had been exposed to unnecessary 

sacrifices through persisting in operations ravaged by disease, and also their 

whole further deployment from India and Burma against the Japanese in the 

Malay Peninsula, et cetera, will be set back until 1946. Thus the averting of a 

double disaster depends upon the certainty that we can execute DRACULA 

by March 15 and, having regard to the very heavy losses we have sustained 

and are liable to sustain, we feel fully entitled to ask for a measure of United 

States assistance. 

Annex I 

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ANNEX XI 

COMMUNIQUE TO THE PRESS 

The President and the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

held a series of meetings during which they discussed all aspects of the war 

against Germany and Japan. In a very short space of time they reached decisions on all points both with regard to the completion of the war in Europe, 

now approaching its iinal stages, and the destruction of the barbarians of the 

Pacific. 

The most serious difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been 

confronted has been to find room and opportunity for marshalling against 

Japan the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy. 

Annex I1 

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INDEX 

A 

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS 

General progress report on recent opera­ tions in the Pacific, 113 

AEGEAN (See aZso Mediterranean Theater) 

Enemy situation in the BaJkans, 15,18 

Naval forces to attack enemy seaborne 

movement in Aegean, 19 

AGENDA FOR "OCTAGON" 

Program for the OCTAGON Conference, 

77,191 

AIR FORCES (See Forces, Air) 

AIR OPERATIONS 

IN CHINA 

Air forces in China to support Chinese ground forces and campaign

in the Pacific, 35 

IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 

Deterioration of German strategic situation, 85 

General Marshall's statement regard­ ing extensive airborne operations in connection with Operation NEPTUNE, 161 

Over-all mission of the strategic air 

forces in Europe, 50 

Sir Charles Portal's statement regarding air activity in Operation

NEPTUNE, 156, 160 

SOE/OSS operations by units of RAF 

Bomber Command and US. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, 51 

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATJCR 

Strategic air force attacks in support of Russian operations, 51 

IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN ARElLs 

CCS discussion regarding progress of 

the campaign in the PaclAc, 228 

General Arnold's statements in reference to: 

Japanese Air Force's lack of determination and will to win, 228 

Operations of the Twentieth Air 

Force, 219 

General progress report on recent 

operations In the Pacific. ~.109

~~~ 

Over-all objective in the war against

Japan, 38, 136 

Prime Minister's statement regarding effect of sustained air bombardment on Japanese cities, 245 

AIR ROUTES 

(See also Lines of Communicatlon) 

Directive to SupremeAllied Commander,

Southeast Asia Command for operations in Burma, 47, 137, 139 

AIR SUPPLY (See Lines of communication) 

AIRCRAFT 

General Arnold's statement regarding

number of US.heavy bombers in the 

European and Mediterranean Theaters, 200 

RAF contribution in the main opera­ tions against Japan, 212 

Sir Charles Portal's statements in reference to: 

British heavy bombers to be available 

for operations against the mainland of Japan, 240, 241 

Range of Lancaster bombers, 241 

Transport aircraft and combat cargo 

groups for Operations CAPITAL and 

DRACULA, 216, 217 

AIRCRAFT ALLOCATIONS 

Allocation of the two remaining combat cargo groups and air commando 

groups, 43 

London Conference discussion regarding aUocation of combat cargo and 

air commando groups to SEAC, 183 

ALBANIA 

RANKIN planning in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 151 

AITAPE, NEW GUINEA 

General progress report on recent opera­ tions in the Pacific, 113 

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INDEX 

ALLOCATIONS 

(See aZ80 Aircraft Allocations) 

CCS decision regarding inclusion of 

British requirements in production planning for operations against Japan, 204 

Sir Alan Brooke's statement reeardinr 

allocation to B~IIISIIoe requiFemenis for PaciAc operations, 203 

ALPS 

General Marshall's statement regarding availability of PLOUGH Force for 

operation in Alps, 193 

AMBOINA ISLAND 

London Conference discussion regard­ ing strategy in the Pacific Far-East, 

179 

AMOY, CHINA 

Schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34, 136 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 

Admiral King's statement regarding

amphibious operations in Istria and 

availability of landing craft, 193, 194 

CCS agreement that decision to mount 

an amphibious operation in Istria be 

made by 15 October, 193, 195 

Capture of the Istrian Peninsula, 121 

General Marshall's statement regarding projected amphibious operation from 

the Mediterranean to assist NEPTUNE. 161 

SACMED~Sproposal for future strategy

in Italy, 14, 18, 133 

SACSEA's strategy for operations in 

Burma in the near future, 24 

SHAEF memo regarding employment of 

Mediterranean forces in support of 

NEPTUNE, 171 

Sir Alan Brooke's statement regarding prowbed strategy for the Mediterranean Theater, 192 

ANTWERP 

CCS approve reply to SCAEF's report on 

intentions in the near future, 192 

Progress report on Operation OVERLORD, 4, 9 

SCAEF's intentions for the near future,

5, 9, 133 

Sir Alan Brooke's statement regarding situation report from BCAEF and op­ eration to capture islands at mouth 

of the Schelde, 191 

"#NVIL" (See "DRAGOON") 

APAMAMA ISLAND 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Pacific, 111 

ARAKAN COAST 

Progress report of operations in SEAC, 

22 

ARNOLD, GENERAL H. H. 

Statements in reference to: 

Availability of transport aircraft, 162 

British participation in the PacifIc,212 

Control of strategic bomber forces in 

Europe, 198 

Future operations in Southeast Asia, 

216 

Japanese Air Force's lack of determination and will to win, 228 

Number of US. heavy bombers in the 

European and Mediterranean Theater, 200 

Operations of the Twentieth Air 

Force, 219 

ARTIFICIAL HARBORS 

CCS decision regardlng release to the 

Press of information on MULBERRY, 

--. 777

Importance of artificial harbors, 178 

Prime Minister's statement regarding release to the Press of information 

on MULBERRY. 249 

Release of MULBERRY stories to the 

Press, 28, 29, 227,249 

AUSTRALIA 

Base facilities for U.S. and British 

naval forces in the PacifAc, 279 

Sir Alan Brooke's statements regarding British asslstance in the defeat of 

Japan, 163, 178,182 

Note: Itallc numerpIs refer to pages in minute6 of meeting. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. Papers. 

254 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

AUSTRIA 

Employment of US.,French, Indian and 

Italian forces for RANKfN Operation in Mediterranean Theater, 152 

RANKIN planning in the Mediterranean Theater, 151 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding

thrust to Vienna, 237 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding proposed strategy for the Mediterranean Theater, I92 

B 

B-24 AIRCRAFT 

Employment of B-24 aircraft in the 

role of tankers, 220 

Employment of in Operation DRACULA, 

216 

8-29 AIRCRAFT 

General Marshall’s statement regarding Japanese advance in central China 

and B-29 stores at Chengtu. 157 

Operation of Twentieth Air Force, 219 

VLR bomber operations against Japan

Proper, 35 

BALKAN AIR FORCE 

Enemy situation in the Balkans, 15,18 

BALKANS 

Admiral King’s statement regarding amphibious operations in Istria and 

availability of landing craft, 193, 194 

Deterioration of German strategic situation, 85 

Enemy situation in the Balkans, 15, 18 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept, 134 

Forces available for employment in the 

Balkans, 18, 134 

London Conference discussion regard­ ing Operatiom In the Balkans. 156 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding

encroachment of the Russians inta 

the Balkans, 237 

SACMED’s proposal for future strategy

in Italy, 14, 18, 133 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statements in reierence to: 

Hitler’s strategy in the Balkans, 157 

Proposed strategy for the Mediterranean Theater, 192 

BALTIC SEA 

Sir Andrew Cunningham’s statement 

regarding enemy naval forces in the 

Baltic and Mediterranean, 160 

BANGKOK 

CCS discussion regarding future opera­ tions in Southeast Asia, 214 

BAY OF BENGAL 

CCS discussion regarding British par­ ticipation in the Pacific, 208 

BAY OF BISCAY 

London Conference decision that plans be prepared for alternate objectives in the Mediterranean Theater, 162, 

166,174 

BlAK ISLAND 

General Marshall’s remarks regarding

air base at Biak, 257 

General progress report on recent op­ erations in the Pacific, 114 

BONIN ISLANDS 

Japanese intentions in Bonins, 63, 75 

Schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 35, 136 

BORNEO ISLAND 

London Conference discussion regard­ ing strategy in the Pacific-Far East, 

I79 

BOULOGNE, FRANCE 

Progress report on Operation OVERLORD, 4, 9 

Note: lac numems refer to pages in minntes or meeting.

Plain type numerals refer to w~esin C.C.S. papers. 

255 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

BRADLEY, GENERAL OMAR N. 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding

role of the British Empire in the war 

and emciency of American-British 

staff machine, 236 

BREMEN, GERMANY 

Naval disarmament measures for U.S. 

controlled ports, 232,233 

BREMERHAVEN, GERMANY 

Naval disarmament measures for US. 

controlled ports, 232, 233 

BREST, FRANCE 

Development of lines of communicatlon 

for OVERLORD, I, 9 

SCAEF’S intentions for the near future, 

6, 9, 133 

BRITTANY, FRANCE 

Progress report on Operation OVERLORD, 4, 9 

BROOKE, FIELD MARSHAL SIR ALAN 

Statements in reference to: 

Allocations for British requirements in Pacffic operations, 203 

Amphibious operations from Mediterranean Theater, 160 

British assistance in the defeat of Japan, 163, 178, 182 

British participation inthe Paciflc, 208 

Casualties from sickness inBurma,214

Command of DRAGOON forces, 196 

Concluding remarks regarding OCTAGON conference. 234 

Depletion of General Clark’s staft organization on change of command, 

DRAGOON fOrCeS,i96 

Enemy situation in Italy, 156 

Future operations in Southeaat Asia, 

214 

Hitler’s strategy in the Balkans, 157 

Machinery for coordination of U.8.-

Soviet-British military effort, 196 

Operations in Burma.. 157.. 182 

Personnel shipping problem following

defeat of Germany. 190 

Progress of Operation NEPTUNE, 156 

Proposed strategy for the Mediterranean Theater, 292 

Release of information on MULBERRY,227 

Situation report from SCAEF; and 

operation to capture islands at 

mouth of the Sehelde, 191 

Strategic policy in Burma, 184 

Wording for paragraph 6 (i) , “Basic 

Policies for the OCTAGON Conference,” 204 

Zones of occupation in Germany, 197 

BUILD-UP 

Sir Alan Brooke‘s statement regarding 

progress of Operation NEPTUNE, 156 

BULGARIA 

Deterioration of German strategic situation. a8 

RANKiN planning in the Mediterranean Theater, 150 

BURMA (See also Southeast Asia) 

CCS discussion regarding future opera­ tions in Southeast Asia, 214 

Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command for op­ erations in Burma, 41, 131, 139, 217 

Japanese intentions in Burma, 63, 74 

Japanese situation in Burma, 22, 24 

London Conference discussion re: 

Strategy in Burma, 183 

Strategy in the Pacific-Far East, 163 

Note by the PrimeMinister andMinister 

of Defence regarding future operations in Burma and provision of 

forces. 250 

President‘s review of strategic situation 

of the United Nations, 239 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding campaign in Burma, 237 

Progress report of operations in SEAC, 22 

Reorientation of forces from Europe for 

operations in southeast Asia, 215,218 

SACSEAs strategy for operations in 

Burma in the near future, 24 

256 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

BURMA ICoat’di 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks in reference 

to: 

Casualties from siclmess In Burma, 

214 

Operations in Burma, 157,183 

Strategic plfcy in Burma, 184 

Statement with regard to Operation

HIGHBALL, 14.3 

c 

CCS DECISIONS (See Decisions) 

CALAIS, FRANCE 

Progress report on Operation OVERLORD, 4, 9 

CANADA 

British Empire participation in the Pacific, 137. 246 

“CAPITAL” 

CCS discussion regarding future operations in southeast Asia. 214 

Directive to Supreme Allied Commander. Southeast Asia Command for operations in Burma, 41, 137. 139, 217 

Note by the Prime Minister andM1ntster 

of Defence in regard to future operations in Burma and provfr;lon of 

forces, 250 

Prime Minister’s statements in reference to: 

CamDaign in Burma, 237 

Obliiations in China and desire to 

carry out operatlons kfore the 

monsoon of 1345, 246 

TramWrt aircraft and combat caxeo 

groups for Operations CAPITAL -aG 

DRACTJLA, 216, 218 

CASUALTIES 

In Burma..214 

Prime Mjnister’s statements in reference to: 

Brltlsh stake in Italy, 236 

Campaign in Burma, 237 

CELEBES ISLAND 

London Conference discussion regarding strategy in the Pacific-Far-East, 

179 

CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION 

Naval disarmament measures for US. 

controlled ports. 232,233 

Plenarg Meeting statements regarding

locatlon o! the CentralTripartite Cuntrol Commission in aermany. 248 

CENTRAL PACIFIC (See Paciflc. Central) 

CETTE, FRANCE 

London Conference decision that plans

be prepared for alteraate objectives in the Mediterranean Theater, 162, 

166.174 

CEYLON 

Base faclIities for U.8. and Britlah 

naval forces in the Pacifle, 179 

CHANNEL ISLANDS 

Operation against the Channel Islands, 

7. 9 

CHIANG KAI-SHEK, GENERALISSIMO 

Communication of the results of OCTAGON Conference, 145. 220, 225, 248 

CHINA (See also Southeast his) 

Air forces in China to support Chinese 

ground forces and campaign in the 

Pacific. 35 

Approved operations in Southeast Asia, 

137 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 132 

Communication of results of OCTAGON 

Conference to Generaliuimo Chiang

Kai-shek, 145, 220, 225, 248 

DirectiFe to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command for operations in Burma, 41, 131, 139 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

CHINA ICont’dJ 

General Marshall’s statements in reference to: 

Japanese advance in central China 

and 8-29 stores at Chengtu, 157 

Situation in China, 233, 247 

Japanese intentions in China, 63,n 

London Conference discwion regarding

strategy in the Paclflc-Far East, 163 

Prime hlinister’s statement regarding obligation in China and desire to carry out operation before monsoon of 

1845, 246 

Schedule of major Operations for defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34, 136 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statements regarding British assistance in the defeat of JaDan. 163. 178. 182 

ViR bomber o.&rations against Japan Proper to be continued, 35 

CIVIL AFFAIRS 

Arrangements for occupation in Greece 

in event of German withdrawal, 16,134 

COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S.S.R. 

ccs instructions to Generals mane and 

Burrows for negotiation of a Tripartite Military Committee in Moscow, 

56. 135, 202 

Machinery for coordination of U.6.-

Soviet-British military effort, 54, 196 

COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

Cont.rol of strategic bomber forces in 

Europe, 49, 132 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept, 132 

Over-aU mission of the strategic air 

forces in Europe. 50 

SCAEF report on ‘air operations from 

the United Kingdom, 5, 8 

COMBINED BRITISH-US-SOVIET 

COMMIllEE 

CCS instructions to Generals Deane and 

Burrows for negotlation of a mpar­ tite Military Committee in MOSCOW, 

56, 135, 202 

Machinery for coordination of U.S.-

Soviet-British military effort, 54 

COMMAND 

“DRAGOON” FORCES 

Assumption of command of DRAGOON forces by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary

Force. ga. 96. 1S5. 195 

Transfer of operational control of 

DRAGOON forces, 6, 13 

STRATEQIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE 

CCS approve directive for control of 

strategic bomber forces in Europe,

208 

Control of strategic bomber forces in 

Europe, 49, 132, 198 

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 

London Conference decision regard­ ing control of the U.S.Twentieth 

Air Force, 185 

Sir Charles Portal’s remark regard­ ing control of the U.S. Twentieth 

Air Force, 184 

“CROSSBOW“ 

Prospects of Germany introducing new 

secret weapon, 89 

Report on effort agahut CROSSBOW, 5 

Sir Charles Portal’s remarks regarding

CROSSBOW attacks, 166 

CUNNINGHAM, ADM. SIR ANDREW B. 

Statements in reference to: 

British naval forces available in the 

Paclflc toward end of 1944,179 

British participation in the Paclflc,208 

Enemy naval forces in the Baltic and 

Mediterranean, 160 

Naval disarmament measures for U.S. 

controlled ports, 232 

Naval situation in Operation NEPTUNE. 156 

Reiease’to the Press of information 

on MULBERRY, 227 

D 

DATES (See Target Dates) 

DECEPTION 

Disposition of enemy strength in Italy,

14 

Note: ItaUe numerms rtter Lo pages In mlnnter of meetlne.

mah type numema refer to pages In c.c.8. Pam 

258 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

DECISIONS 

CANADA 

Plenary decision to accept, in principle, Canada’s participatlon in war 

against Japan, 246 

COMMAND 

Command of DRAGOON forces, 196 

COORDINATION WITH U.S.S.R 

Machinery for coordination with 

U.S.S.R. in the military effort, 197, 

202 

EUROPEAN THEATER 

CCS approve reply to WAEF’s report on intentions in near future,

192 

CCS note CIC report on the sltuation 

in Europe, I95 

FORCES 

CCS note that British will announce size of British forces to be employed against Japan, 204 

Withdrawal of forces from Mediterranean, 195, 205 

GERMANY 

CAdC directed to make examhation 

of the logistics problems involved 

in approved allocation of zones of 

occupation in Germany. 233 

Disarmament measures for Bremen 

and Bremerhaven, 233 

Plenary Meeting agreement that details for the allocation of zones of 

occupation in Germany be worked 

out by the experts, 247 

Zones of occupation in Germany, 198, 

233 

‘‘HIGHBALL’’ 

CCS take note of British statement 

regarding Operation HIGHBALL, 

227 

JAPAN (See also Pacific Ocean Areas) 

CCS agreed planning date for end of 

war against Japan, 219 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAlT 

CCS approve dispatch of message to 

SCAEF regarding release of amphibious craft from OVERLORD 

to other theaters, 232 

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

CCS agree that decision for mounting an amphibious operation in 

Istria be made by 15October,193,195 

London Conference decision to mount 

a 3-divisional lift amphibious assault from the Mediterranean, target date 25 July, 162 

London Conference decision that 

plans be prepared for alternate objectives in the MediterraneanTheater, 162, 166, 174 

“OCTAGON 

CCS approve final report to President 

and Prime Minister (C.C.S. 680/1),

225 

Messages for dispatch to Stalin and 

Chlang Kai-Shek, 221, 226 

Presldent and Prime Minister approve final report, 244 

Press statement for OCTAGON Conference, 228,234, 249, 252 

Program for OCTAGON Conference, 

191 

Wording for paragraph 6 (i), “Basic 

Policies for the OCTAGON Conference,” 204 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

CCS acceptance, for planning purposes, of schedule of operations for 

defeat of Japan, 204 

Enemy situation in Pacific, 202 

General progress report on recent 

operations in the Pacific, 203 

Participation of the British Fleet in 

the main operations against Japan

in the Paciflc, 213 

PRODUCTION 

CCS decision regarding production

planning to include British re­ quirements for operations against

Japan, 204 

“RANKIN” 

Directive to General Wilson for RANKIN planning in Mediterranean 

Theater, 232 

REDEPLOYMENT 

CCS approve proposal for study on 

redeployment of forces after the 

end of the war in Europe, 226 

CCS take note of General Somer­

“ell and Lord Leathers~ reuort ~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~.~~~ on

~ 

the combined personnel movement 

problem arising the first year after 

the defeat of Germany, 227 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

CCS take note of SACSEA’s report on operations (OCTAGON-IN-9), 217 

Note: Itallc numerals nier to pagas in minutes or meetin& 

Plain bpe numetals refer to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

259 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

DECISIONS (Cont'dl 

CCS approve directive for operations

in SEAC, 217 

Plenary Meeting agreement to amend 

and approve the directive to SACSEA, 248 

STRATEGIC AIR FORCE 

CCS approve directive for control of 

strategic bomber forces in Europe,

208 

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 

CCS take note of General Arnold's 

statements regarding Twentieth Air 

Force, 220 

London Conference decislon regarding control of the Twentieth Air 

Force, 185 

DEMOBILIZATION 

Combined personnel movement problems arising during the first year after the defeat of Germany, 103 

"DIADEM" (See Italy) 

DILL, FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN 

Sir John ill's statement regarding allocation of British requirements for 

Pacific operations, 203 

DIRECTIVES 

To Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, 46, 137, 139,217 

For control of strategic bomber forces 

in Europe, 49, 208 

DISARMAMENT 

Naval disarmament measures for U.S. 

controlled ports, 232, 233 

Plans for Operation TALISMAN, 7 

DODECANESE ISLANDS 

Employment of US., French, Indian 

and Italian forces for RANKIN Opera­ tion in Mediterranean Theater, 152 

London Conference discussion regarding operations in Balkans, 156 

RANKZN planning in the Mediterranean Theater, 150 

"DRACULA" 

Approved operations in Southeast Asia, 

12'1

-1. 

CCS dlscusslon regardlng future operations in Southeast Asia, 214 

Combhed memorandum on troop movements. coverlng the period October 

1944 to March 1945, 99 

Directive to SupremeAllied Commander,

Southeast Asia Command for opera­ tions in Burma, 46, 137, 139, 217 

Prlme Mfntster's statements in reference to: 

Campaign in Burma, 237 

Obligation in China and desire to 

carry out operation before the monsoon of 1945, 246 

Provision of forces for DRACULA, 

246.250 

Reorientation of forces from Europe for 

operations in Southeast Asia,215.218 

Strategy for operations in Burma the 

near future. 24 

Transport aircraft and combat cargo 

groups for Operations CAPITAL and 

DRACULA, 216, 217 

"DRAGOON" 

Assumption of command of DRAGOON 

forces by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 92, 95, 135, 

195 

General Marshall's statements in reference to: 

General Devers' staff organization,

196 

Mounting the projected amphibious operation from the Mediterranean 

to assist NEPTUNE, 161 

General tactical plan of Commander,

Seventh Army, 12 

London Conference decision to mount 

a 3-divisional lift amphibious assault 

from the Mediterranean, target date 

25 July, 162 

President's statement attributing credit 

for conception of DRAGOON Operation to Marshal Stalin, 236 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

“DRAGOON” (Cont’d) 

Prime Minister’s opening statement, reviewing the successes of the Allied 

Nations, 236 

FTogress report on Operation DRAGOON and operations in Mediterranean Theater, 12, 17 

Report on advance of the Seventh 

&my, 4 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statements in reference to: 

Amphibious operations from Mediterranean Theater, 160 

Depletion of General Clark’s staff organization on change of command,

DRAGOON forces, 196 

SHAEF memoranda in reference to: 

Employment of Mediterranean forces 

in Support Of NEPTUNE, 172 

Release of airborne forces from Op­ eration NEPTUNE, 170 

Release of shipping and craft from 

Operation NEPTUNE, 168 

Transfer of overationnl control of DRAGOON forces, 6, 13 

E 

EAST INDIES 

Japanese intentions in East Indies, 63, I4 

EDEN, ANTHONY 

Statement regarding location of the 

Central Tripartite Control Commissfon in Germany, 248 

EIGHTH ARMY 

Plans for major offensive in Italy, 14, 17, 

133 

EISENHOWER, GENERAL D. D. 

Rime Minister’s statement regarding

role of the British Empire in the war 

and emciency of American-British 

staE machine; 236 

ENEMY SITUATION 

GERMANY 

CCS note CIC report on the situation 

In Europe, 195 

Enemy situation In the Balkans, 15.18 

Oeneral Marshall’s remarks regard­ ing enemy formations on the PisaRlmini Une. 156 

Prospects of a German collapse or 

surrender (asof 8 Sept 19441,82 

SCAEF report on enemy resistance in 

European Theater, 4 

Su Alan Brooke’s remarks in reference to: 

Enemy situation In Italy, 156 

Progress of Operation NEPTUNE, 

156 

JAPAN 

CCS take note of CIC report on 

enemv situation in Pacmc. 202 

Estlmaie of the enemy situation,

PaclfIc-Far East (asof 8 Sept 1944). 

60 

ENIWETOK 

See Marshall Islands 

EUROPEAN THEATER 

ccs: 

Approve reply to SCAEF’s report on 

intentions in near future. I92 

Note CIC report on the situation in 

Europe, 195 

Control of strategic bomber forces in 

Europe, 50, 132,198,208 

Execution of over-all strategic concept,

132 

General Arnold’s statement regarding number of US. heavy bombers in 

European and Mediterranean Theaters, 200 

General ~~ ~ Marshall’s ~~~~~ ~~~~ ~ statements reearding operation to captire islanas at 

mouth of the Schelde, 191 

President’s review of the strategic situation of the United Nations. 239 

Progress report on Operation OVERLORD, 4.9 

WAEF rebrt, on: 

Air operations from the U.K.,5, 8 

Enemy resistance In European Theater. 4 

Note: It* numerds ltfer to pages in mhutcs of meeting. 

Plain type nomerds rtfer to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

261 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

EUROPEAN THEATER fCont’dl 

Naval operations in Operation OVERLORD, 5 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statements in reference to: 

Progress of Operation NEPTUNE, 156 

Situation report from SCAEF, and 

operation to capture islands at 

mouth of the Schelde, 191 

Sir Andrew Cunningham’s review of 

naval situation in Operation NEPTUNE, I56 

Sir Andrew Cunningham’s statement 

regarding enemy naval forces in the 

Baltic and Mediterranean, 160 

Strategic air lorce attacks in support of Russian operation, 51 

F 

FAR EAST 

Estimate of enemy situation, PaciftcFar East (asof 8 Sept 19441, 60 

London Conference dlscussion regard­ ing strategy in Pacific-Far East, 163, 

178, 179 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statements regarding British assistance in the defeat of 

Japan. 163, 178. 182 

Statement with regard to Operation

HIGHBALL, 148 

FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE 

Employment of the Fifth Amy, Twelfth 

and Fifteenth Air Forces, 118, 121, 134 

FIFTH ARMY 

CCS discussion regarding withdrawal of 

forces from Italy, 193, 194 

Employment of the FifthArmy, Twelfth 

and Fifteenth Air Forces, 118, 120, 134 

General Marshall’s statement regarding withdrawal of Fifth Army from Italy,

193, 194 

Plans for major offensive in Italy. 14, 17 

193 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding

proposed strategy for Mediterranean 

Theater, 192 

FINLAND 

Deterioration of &rman strategic situation, 88 

FINSCHHAFEN, NEW GUINEA 

General progress report on recent op­ erations in the Paciffc, 114 

FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE 

General Marshall’s statement regard­ ing availability of PLOUGH Force for 

operation in the Alps, 193 

FORCES 

COMMAND OF 

Assumption of command of DRAGOON for= by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary

Force. 92. 95. 135. 195 

Transfer or operational control of 

DRAGOON forces, 6, 13 

IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 

Admiral Leahy’s statement regarding 

use of US. troops for occupation of France, 198 

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

Availability of forces, RANRZN Operation in Mediterranean Theater, 

151 

CCS decision regarding withdrawal 

of US. units from Mediterranean 

and planning for capture of Istrian 

Peninsula, 205 

Employment of U.S.. French, Indian 

and Italian forces for RANKZN Operation in Mediterranean Theater, 

152 

Forces available for employment in 

the Balkans, 18, 134 

Qeneral Marshall‘s statements regarding withdrawal of US. units 

from Mediterranean. 193, 194, 205, 

237 

London Conference decision to mount 

a 3-divisional lift amphibious assault from Mediterranean; target date 25 July. 162 

Prime Minister’s statement regard­ ing British stake In Italy, 236 

SHAEFmemo regarding employment

of Mediterranean forces in support of NEPTUNE, 171 

Nota: Itnlk nllmuaJs refer to pages in minutes of meeting.

Plain type llumerals refer to pages in C.C.S. PBWerL 

262 
Air forces in China to support Chinese ground forces and campalgn 

in the PaclAc, 35 

Allocation of the two remaw comTOP SECRET 

INDEX 

FORCES fCont’d) 

IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

CCS decision regarding participation of British Fleet in main operations

against Japan in the Paclflc, 213 

CCS discussion regarding British 

participation in Pacific, 208 

Contribution of the RAF in main 

operations against Japan, 213 

Plenary decision to accept, in principle, Canada’s participation in the 

war against Japan, 248 

President‘s acceptance of Prime Minister’s offer for British participation in the war against Jauan. 238 

Prime Minister’s Statement regarding British participation in the war 

against Japan, 238 

81r Alan Brooke’s Statements regard­ ing British assistance in defeat of 

Japan, 163, 178, 182 

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

General Marshall’s statements In reference to: 

Provision of U.S. forces for opera­ tions in Burma, 246 

Situation in China, 233, 247 

London Conference discussion re 

strategy in Burma, 183 

Note by Prime Minister and Minister 

of Defence in regard to future op­ erations in Burma and provision of forces,250 

Prime Minister’s statements in reference to: 

Campaign in Burma, 237 

Provision of forces for DRACULA, 

246, 250 

Reorientation of forces from Europe for operations in Southeast Asia, 

215,,218 

Transoort aircraft and combat, ......-. eargo groups for Operations CAPITAL and DRACULA, 216, 217 

REDEPLOYMENT OF 

CCS approve proposal for study on 

redeployment of forces after the 

end of the war in Europe, 226 

FORCES, AIR 

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Tactical air force operations from 

the Medlterranean Theater, 13 

IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

British Empire participation in the 

Pacmc, 137 

General Marshall’s statement regarding employment of British Air 

Force in the Paclfic. 241 

Prime Minister’s statement regard­ ing Brltlsh forces to be available 

for employment in the Pacific, 238, 

241 

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Air forces ~ in~ China to suDmrt ~ ~~~~ 

~ ~ 

Chi­ .~~~ 

nese ground forces and campalgn

in the PaclAc, 35 

Allocation of the two remaw combat cargo groups and two remaining air comando groups, 44 

London Conference discussion regarding allocation of combat cargo 

groups and air commando groups 

to SEAC, 183 

JAPANESE 

Military factors governlng Japanese 

strategy, 70 

FORCES, AIRBORNE 

SCAEF’s intentions for the near future, 

6,9, 133 

SHAEF’s memo regarding release of airborne forces from Operation NEPTUNE, 170 

FORCES, GROUND 

Military factors governing Japanese 

strategy, I2 

FORCES, NAVAL 

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Naval forces to ataek enemy seaborne movement in the Aegean, 19 

IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

British Empire participation in the 

Pacific, 137 

British participation in the war 

against Japan, 40,41 

Factors governing Japanese strategy,

71 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding British forces to be available for 

employment in the Pacific, 238 

Sir Andrew Cunningham‘s statement 

re British naval forces available in 

the Pacific toward end of 1944,179 

Note: Itam nmems refer ta pages In minnfls of meetinn. 

plain type aumer& refer to pages In c.c.8. Papem. 

263 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

FORMOSA 

Admiral King's statement regarding strangulation of Japanese forces to 

the south, it Formosa were captured,

240 

Forces to be employed against Japan,

203 

Japanese intentions in Formosa. 63, '75 

London Conference diScussion regarding strategy in the Paciflc-Far East, 

163, 178, 179 

schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34, 136 

FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE 

London Conference discussion regard­ ing strategy in the Paclflc-Far East, 

180 

FRANCE 

Admiral Leahy's statement regarding 

use of US.troops for occupation of 

France, 193 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strateeic conceut. 131 

CCS discusion regarhing withdrawal of 

the Fifth Army from Italy, 193 

Deterioration of German strategic Situation, 85 

Employment of the Fifth Army. Twelfth 

and Fiiteenth Air Forces, 118.121. 134 

Employment of the French Forces of 

the Interior, 182, 187 

Employment of the French Forces of 

the Interior in Operation DRAGOON, 

12~~ 

Employment of US., French, Indian and 

Italian forces for RANKIN Operation,

in Mediterranean Theater, 152 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept, 132 

Progress report on Operation DRAGOON 

and operations in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 12, 17 

Progress report on Operation OVERLORD,4,9 

Report on advance of the Seventh Army, 

4 

FRANKFURT, GERMANY 

SCAEF's intentions for the near future, 

9, 133 

G 

GERMANY 

Allocation of U.S. and U.K.zones of 

occupation in Germany, 32, 198, 197, 

198,232,233 

Baslc undertakings in support of overall strategic concept. 131 

CCS discussion in regard to naval disarmament measures for U.8. controlled Ports, 232 

Deterioration of German strategic situation, 85 

Estimate of German strategy, 85 

Fighting effectiveness of German Air 

Force. 51 

General Somervell's statement regarding Inter-Allied Navigation Commission to control the Rhine, 233 

Over-all mission of the strategic air 

forces in Euroue. 50 

Over-all objectiie'in the war against the Axis, 131 

Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war, 151, 132 

Plans for Operation TALISMAN, 7 

Plenary Meeting agreement that details for the allocation of zones of 

Occupation in Germany be worked out 

by the experts, 247 

Plenary Meeting statements regarding location of the Central Tripartite Con- ' 

tml Commission in Germany, 248 

Political and psychological factors in 

the German situation. 87. 89 

Prospects of a ~erman&lapse or surrender (as of 8 Sept 1944), 83 

Prospects of Oermany introducing new 

secret weanon. a9 

SCAEF's intekio&~forthe near future, 

5, 9, 133 

SCAEF report on enemy resistance in 

European Theater, 4 

Sir Alan Brooke's remarks regarding Hitler's strategy in the Balkans, 156 

Statements of Prime Minister and hesident re treatment of Germany, 241 

Symptoms of German collapse or surrender, 90 

GILBERT ISLANDS 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Paclflc, 111 

Note: ItaUe numerals nIer to Pages in minntas 01 meetmg.

Plaln gpe numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. ~apem. 

264 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

GREECE 

Employment of U.S., French, Indian and 

Italian forces for RANKIN Operation in Mediterranean Theater, 152 

Enemy situation in the Balkans. 15,18 

Forces available for employment in the 

Balkans, 15, 134 

Occupation of Greece in event of German withdrawal, 16,134 

RANKIN planning in the MediteRanan 

Theater, 150 

GREEN ISLAND 

Oeneral progress report on recent operations in the Pacific, 112 

H 

HALMAHERA ISLAND 

Japanese intentions in Halmahera, 82, 

15 

"HIGHBALL" 

Statement with regard to Operation

HIGHBALL, 148, 227 

HOLLAND (See Netherlands) 

HOLLANDIA, NEW GUINEA 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Pacific, 113 

HUMP TONNAGE 

General Marshall's remarks regarding

Japanese advance in central China 

and B-29 stores at Chengtu, 157 

London Conference discussion regard­ ing strategy in Burma, 183 

Sir Alan Brooke's remarks in reference 

to: 

Overations in Burma, 157,182

Strategic policy in Burma, 184 

HUNGARY 

RANKIN planning in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 151 

I 

IMPHAL 

Sir Alan Brooke's remarks in reference 

to: 

Operations in Burma, 157,182 

Strategic polley in ~urma,184 

INDIA 

Base facilltles for US.and British naval 

forces in the Pacific, 279 

Combined memorandum on troop movements covering the period October 

1944to March 1945,100 

Employment of US.,French, Indian and 

Italian forces for RANKIN Operation in Mediterranean Theater, 152 

INTELLIGENCE 

Estimate of the enemy situation, PaciflC-Far Est (aSOf 8 Sept 19443,60,202 

Morale of Japanese populace, 61, 64 

F'rospects of a German collapse or surrender (as of8 Sept 1944),82,195 

INTER-ALLIED NAVIGATION 

COMMISSION 

General Somervell's statement regard­ ing Inter-Allied Navigation Commission to control the Rhine, 233 

ISMAY, SIR HASTINGS 

Statement for the Press regarding OcTAGON Conference, 228, 234 

ISTRIAN PENINSULA 

Admiral King's statement regarding amphibious operations in Istria and 

availability of landing craft, 193, 194 

Capture of the Istrian Peninsula, 121 

CCS agree that decision to mounting an 

amphibious operation in Istria be 

made by 15 October, 193, 195 

CCE discussion regarding future opera­ tions in the Mediterranean and capture of the Istrian Peninsula, 205 

London Conference decision that plans be prepared for alternate objectives

In the Mediterranean Theater, 162 

166,174 

Note: ~talicnumwds rarer to pages In minutes oi meetlng. 

Plain eps numrds refer to pages In C.C.S. Pap%% 

265 
2.77 

TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

ISTRIAN PENINSULA (Cont’d) 

Plenary Meeting discussion regarding

amphibious craft for Istrian Penlnsula operation, 245 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding 

strategy in the Mediterranean Theater. ..., -.. 

sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding proposed strategy for the Mediterranean Theater. 192 

Sir Charles Portal’s remarks regarding 

an advance northeast via Istria, 162 

ITALY 

Admiral King‘s remarks regarding op­ erations in Italy, 161 

Basic undertakings in Support Of overall strategic concept, 131 

Deterioration of Qerman strategic situation, 85 

Disposition of enemy strength in Italy, 

14 

Employment of the Fifth Army, Twelfth 

and Fifteenth Air Farces, 118, 121,134 

Employment of US.,French, Indian and 

Italian forces for RANKIN Operation

in Mediterranean Theater, 152 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept, 131 

Qeneral Marshall’s remarks in reference to: 

Enemy formations on the Pisa-Riminiline, 156 

Present strategic situation in Italy, 

192 

Plans for major offensive in Italy, 14.11,

133 

Plenary Meeting conclusion regarding invasion of the valley of the Po, 244 

President’s revlew of the sfrateglc Situation of the United Nations, 239 

Prime Minister’s statements in reference to: 

British stake in Italy, 236 

Strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 237 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks in referenee 

to: 

Amphiblous operations from Mediterranean Theater, 160 

Enemy situation in Italy, 156 

Proposed strategy for the Mediterranean Theater. 192 

Withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean, 193,194,237 

J 

JAPAN 

Admiral King’s remarks regarding op­ erations in the Pacifle, 157, 167, 178 

Allocation of resources for British op­ erations against Japan, 136 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept. ~~ 131

British Empire participation in the Paciflc. 40. 41, 131 

CCS discussion regarding strategy for 

the defeat of Japan, 203 

Estimate of the enemy situation. Pacific-Far East (asof 8 Sept 1944), 60 

Japanese intentions, 63.73 

Japanese production and shipping, 61, 

66. 61, 68 

Japanese situation in Burma, 22. 24 

Japanese strategy, 62 

Military factors governing Japanese 

strategy, 10, 11, 72 

Morale of Japanese populace, 61, 64 

Naval and air superiority to be exploit­ ed, wherever possible, to avoid commitment to costly land campaign, 35,

136 

Over-all objective in the war against

the Axis, 131 

Over-all objective in the war against

Japan. 38, 136 

Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war, 131 

Planning date for the end of the war 

against Japan, 125, 138 

Plenary decision to accept, in principle, Canada’s participation in the war 

against Japan, 246 

Political and psychological factors in 

Japanese propaganda, 64 

Presidents' ~~~~~~~ accentance of Prime Minister’s offer far British particlpatlon in 

the war against Japan, 238 

President’s statement regarding Japanese tenacity, 240 

Note: Itam numew nfn to pages in mlnutes of meeting. 

plain type numemi nfer to pages ln c.c.5. Pzpcrs. 

266 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

JAPAN tcont‘dl 

Prlme Minister’s statements in reference to: 

British participation in the war 

against Japan, 237 

Effect of sustained air bombardment 

on Japanese cities, 245 

Schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34. 136, 203 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks regarding

British assistance in the defeat of 

Japan, 163, 178, 182 

Unremitting submarine warfare against

Japanese shipping to be continued, 35, 

136 

JAVA 

London Conference discussion regarding strategy in the Pacific-Far East, 

179 

K 

KALEMYO, BURMA 

Strategy for operations in Burma in the 

near future, 24 

KALEWA, BURMA 

Strategy for operations in Burma in the 

near future, 24 

KING, ADMIRAL E. J. 

Statements in reference to: 

Amphibious operations in Istria and 

availability of landing craft, 193,194 

British participation in the Pacific,

208 

Logistic dlfffcultiesin the Pacific, 163 

Machinery for coordination of USSoviet-British military effort, 196 

Naval disarmament measures for 

U.S. controlled ports, 232 

Operations in Italy; and the bnportance of capturing Le Havre, 161 

Operations in the Paciflc,157,167,178 

Progress of the campaign in the Pacific. 228 

Release to the Press of information 

on MULBERRY,227 

Strangulation of Japanese forces to 

the south, if Formosa were captured, 240 

Wording for paragaph 6 (i), “Basic 

Policies for the OCTAGON Conference,” 204 

Zones of occupation in Germany, 198 

KRA ISTHMUS 

CCS discussion regarding future operations in Southeast Asia, 214 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding 

strategy in the Pacific and an operation against Singapore, 238 

KURllES 

Admiral King’s remarks regarding operations in the Pacific. .., 157.167. 178

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific, 111 

Japanese intentions in the Kuriles, 63, 

73 

KWAJALEIN ATOLLS 

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific, 111 

KYUSHU ISLAND, JAPAN 

London Conference discussion regarding strategy in the Pacific-Far East,

180 

Schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 35, 136 

L 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT 

For capture of the Istrian Peninsula,

121, 193, 194, 195, 245 

Message to SCAEF with regard to release of amphibious craft from OVERLORD to other theaters, 154,232 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding 

strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 237 

SHAEF memo regarding release of shipping and craft from Operation NEPTUNE, 168 

NOW: ltallc numerals refer to pages in minutes or meeting. 

Plain tme numerals refer to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

267 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

LEAHY, ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. 

Statements with reference to: 

British participation in the PaClflC, 

208 

Control of strategic bomber forces in 

Europe, 200 

Future operations in the Mediterranean and capture of the Istrian 

Peninsula, 205 

Future operations in southeast Asia, 

214 

Machinery for coordination of 0.8.-

Soviet-British military effort, 197 

Planning date for end of war against

Japan, 218 

Strategy for the defeat of Japan, 203 

Withdrawal of the Fifth Army from 

Italy. 194 

Wording for paragraph 6 (1) "BBS~C 

Policies for the OCTAGON Conference," 204 

LE HAVRE, FRANCE 

Admiral King's remarks regarding the 

imoortance of capturing Le Havre, 161 

Deveiopment of lines of iommunicatlon 

for OVERLORD, 7, 9 

Proeress reuort on ODeratIon OVERL~RD,4, S 

SCAEF's intentions for the near future, 

5, 9, 133 

LEIPZIG, GERMANY 

SCAEF's intentions for the near future, 

'7, 9, 133 

LEYTE, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

Schedule of major operations for defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34,136 

LIAISON 

CCS discussion regarding machinery for coordination of U.S.-SovietBritish military effort, 196 

LINES OF COMMUNICATION 

Approved operations in Southeast Asia,

131 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 131 

Development of lines of communication 

for OVERLORD, 7, 9 

London Conference discussion regard­ im stratew in Burma. 184 

Plen-iry Meeting discussion regarding opening of a seaway to China, 245 

ReDort on Oueration DRAGOON and 

ciperations iithe Mediterranean Theater. .....,12__ Sir Alan Brooke's remarks regarding

British assistance in the defeat of 

Japan, 163 178, 182 

UUBUANA GAP 

SACMED'S proposal for future strategy

in Italy, 15, 18, 134 

LOGISTICS 

Admiral King's remarks regarding logistic difficulties in the Paclflc, 163 

CCS agree that CAdC be directed to 

make examination of the logistics

problem involved in approved allocation of zones of occupation in Germany,233 

CCS decision regarding production

planning to include British requirements for operations against Japan, -I7nA

Development of lines of communication 

for OVERLORD, I,9 

General Arnold's statements regarding operations of the Twentieth Aii Force, 

219 

LONDON CONFERENCE 

ARTIFICIAL HARBORS,178 

CHINA 

General Marshall's remarks regard­ ing Japanese advance in central 

China and B-29 stores at Chengtu, 

157 

FORCES 

General Marshall's remarks regarding emploment of the French 

Forces of the Interior, 182,187 

Sir Andrew Cunningham's statements in reference to: 

British naval forces available in 

the Pacific toward end of 1944, 

179 

Enemy naval forces in the Baltic 

and Mediterranean, 160 

268 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

LONDON CONFERENCE (Coned) 

MANPOWER 

London Conference discussion regarding U.S. manpower ditffculties. 

157 

OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN THEATER 

Admiral King’s remarks regard&

the importance of capturing Le 

Havre, 161 

oeneral Marshall’s remark6 regarding extensive airborne operations

in wnnection with Operation NEPTUNE, 161 

Progress in Operation OVERLORD,

160. 178. 182 

Sir Aim Brooke’s remarks regarding 

progress of Operation NEPTUNE, 

155 

Sir Andrew Cunningham’s review of 

naval situation in Operation NEPTUNE, 156 

Sir Charles Portal’s remarks in refer­ ence to: 

Air activity in Operation NEPTUNE, 156, 160 

CROSSBOW attacks, 166 

OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN 

THEATER 

Admiral King’s remarks regarding

operations in Italy, 161 

Decision to mount a 3-dlvlaional Uft 

amphibious assault from the Mediterranean; target date 25 July, 162 

Decision that plans be prepared for 

alternate objectives in the Mediterranean Theater, 162, 166, 174 

Discussion regarding operations in 

the Balkans, 156 

mneral Marshall’s remarks in refer­ ence to: 

Enemv formations on the PisaRimiini line, 156 

Mounting the projected amphibious operation from the Mediter­ ranean to assist NEPTUNE, 161 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remaks in refer­ ence to: 

Amphibious operations from Mediteiranean Theater, 160 

Enemy situation in Italy, 156 

Hitler’s strategy in Balkans, 157 

Sir Charles Portal’s remark6 regarding an advance northeast via 1stria, 161 

OPERATIONS IN TEE PACIFIC OCEAN 

AREAS 

Admiral King’s remarks in reference 

to: 

Operations in the Paciflc, 157,167 

178 

Logistic ditffculties in the Pacific, 

163 

Base facilities for US. and British 

naval forces in the Pacific, 179 

Discussion regarding strategy in the 

Pacific-Far East, 163, 178,179 

General Marshall’s remarks in reference to: 

Air base at Biak, 157 

Stepping up the tempo of operations in the Paciiic. 163 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks regarding

British assistance in the defeat of 

Japan, 163, 178, 182 

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks regarding

operations in Burma, 157,183 

TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 

Discussion regarding allocation of 

combat cargo and air commando 

groups to SEAC, 183 

General Arnold’s remarks regarding

availability of transport aircraft,

162 

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 

Control of the U.S. Twentieth Air 

Force, 184 

LOS NEGROS ISLAND 

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific. 113 

LOSS RATE 

Admiral King’s remarks rrgnrding operations in the Paciflc. 157, 167, 178 

Japanese production and shipping, 61, 

66. 61. 68 

SCAEF ‘report on naval operations in 

Operation OVERLORD, 5 

LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

Japanese intentions in Luzon, 63, 75 

Schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34, 136 

Note: Italic nomln refer to pages in minutes ol meeting.

Plain tw numeral4 refer to pager in C.C.S. papers. 

269 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

LYONS, FRANCE 

General tactical plan of Commander,

Seventh ~rmy,12 

M 

MAGDEBURG, GERMANY 

SCAEF’s intentions for the near future, 

7, 9, 133 

MAJURO ATOLLS 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Pacific, 111 

MAKIN ISLAND 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Pacific, 111 

MALAY PENINSULA 

Japanese intentions in Malaya, 63, 74 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding 

strategy in the Pacific and an operation against Singapore, 238 

MANCHURIA 

Japanese intentions in Manchuria,63,73 

MANPOWER 

Deterioration of German strategic situation, 85 

London Conference discussion regard­ ina U.S. mamower difEculties. 157 

Planning date for the end of the war 

against Japan, 125, 138, 218 

MAPS 

Allocation of zones of occupation in 

Germany. . opwsite .. PaEe 32

Progress report on operations in the 

PacYlc. opposite page 116 

MARIANAS 

Admlral King‘s remarks regarding OPerations in the Pacific, 157,167 178 

General progress report on recent op­ erations in the Pacific. 111 

VLR bomber operations against Japan

Proper to be continued, 35 

MARSEILLES, FRANCE 

Progress report on Operatlon DRAGOON 

and operations In the Medlterranean 

Theater, 12, 17 

MARSHALL, GENERAL G. C. 

Statements in reference to: 

Air base at Biak, 157 

Allocation of zones of occupation in 

Germany, 233 

Availability of PLOUGH Force for 

operation in the Alps, 193 

British participation in the Pacific, 212 

Command of DRAGOON forces, 196 

Control of strategic bomber forces in 

Europe, 200 

Employment of British Air Forces in 

the Paciac, 241 

Employment of the French Forces of 

the Interior. 182, 187 

Enemy formations on the Pisa-Rimini 

line, 156 

Extensive airborne operations in connection with Operation NEPTUNE, 

161 

Future operations in Southeast Asia,

216 

General Devers’stafforganization, 196 

Japanese advance in central China 

and B-29 stores at Chengtu, 157 

Mounting the projected amphibious operation from the Mediterranean 

to assist NEPTUNE, 161 

Operation to capture islands at mouth 

of the Schelde, 191 

Planning date for the end of the war 

against Japan, 228 

Present strategic situation in Italy. 192 

Progress of the campaign in the Pacifie, 228 

Provision of U.S.forces for operations in Burma, 246 

Situation in China, 233, 247 

Stepping up the tempo of operations

in the Pacific, 163 

Withdrawal of US. units from the 

Mediterranean, 193, 194, 205, 237 

MARSHALL ISLANDS 

General progress report on recent op­ erations in the Pacific, 111 

Note: It& numeral3 refer to pabea in minutes of mcethg. 

plrin typa nurneni~refer to pages in C.C.S. Papern. 

270 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

Admiral King’s statement regarding amphibious operations in Istria and 

availability of landing craft, 193, 194 

Availability of forces, RANKZN Opera­ tion in the Mediterranean Theater, 

151 

Capture of the Istrian Peninsula, 121, 

193, 194, 205 

Disposition of enemy strength in Italy,

14 

Employment of US.,French, Indian 

and Italian forces forRANKZN Opera­ tion in Mediterranean Theater, 152 

Execution of the over-all strategic concept, 133 

Forces available for employment in the 

Balkans, 15, 134 

Future operations in the Mediterranean, 

118.119 

General Arnold’s statement regarding

number of US.heavy bombers in the 

European and Mediterranean Theaters, 200 

General Marshall’s statements in reference to: 

Availability of PLOUGH Force for 

operation in the Alps, 193 

Enemy formations on the Pisa-Rimini line. 156 

Mounting the projected amphibious operation from the Mediterranean 

to assist NEPTUNE, 161 

Present strategic situation in Italy, 

192 

London Conference decision to mount a 

3-divisional lift amphibious assault 

from the Mediterranean; target date 

25 July, 162 

London Conference decision that plans be prepared for alternate objectives in the Mediterranean Theater, 162, 

166,174 

Naval forces to attaclt enemy seaborne 

movement in the Aegean, 19 

Plans for major offensive in Italy, 14, 17, 

133 

Prime Minister’s statements in reference to: 

British stake in Italy, 236 

Strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 237 

Successes of the Allied Nations, 236 

Progress report on Operation DRAGOON and operations in the Mediterranean Theater, 12, 17 

RANKZN planning in the Mediterranean Theater. 150. 232 

SACMED~Sproposil for future strategy

in Italy, 14, 17, 133 

SHAEF memo regarding the employment of Mediterranean forces in support of NEPTUNE, 171 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks in reference 

to: 

Amphibious operations from Mediterranean Theater, 160 

Enemy situation in Italy, 156 

Propxed strategy for the Mediterranean Theater, 192 

Tactical air force operations from the 

Mediterranean Theater, 13 

Withdrawal of U.S. forces from the 

Mediterranean, 193, 194, 205, 237 

MESSAGES TO MARSHAL STALIN AND 

THE GENERALISSIMO, 142, 220, 225, 248 

MIDDLE EAST 

Employment of US.,French, Indian and 

Italian forces for RANKZN Operation in Mediterranean Theater. 152 

Forces available for employment in the 

Balkans, 18, 134 

MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

CCS discussion regarding:

Naval disarmament measures for US. 

controlled ports in Germany, 232,233 

ZOneS of occupation in Germany, 197 

General Somervell’s statement regard­ ing Inter-Allied Navigation CommisSiOn to control the Rhine, 233 

MINDANAO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

Japanese intentions in Mindanao, 63, 75 

London Conference discussion regard­ ing strategy in the Pacific-Far East, 

179 

MOGAUNG, BURMA 

Operations in Burma in the near future,

24 

MONTGOMERY, GEN. SIR BERNARD L. 

Prime Minister’s statement regardlng role of the British Empire in the war 

and efficiency of American-British 

stafl machine, 236 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pa6cs in mlnutes of meetin6. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

271 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

MORALE 

CCS discussion regarding withdrawal of 

the Fifth Army from Italy, 294 

Political and psychological factors in 

the German situation, 87, 89 

MOULMEIN, BURMA 

Prime Minister's statement regarding 

strategy in the Pacific and an operation against Singapore, 240 

"MULBERRY" (See Artificial Harbors) 

MYITKYINA, BURMA 

Directive to SupremeAllied Commander,

Southeast Asia Command for operations in Burma, 47, 137, 139 

London Conference discussion regarding strategy in Burma, 183 

Operations in Burma in the near future, 

24 

Sir Alan Brooke's remarks in reference 

to: 

Operations in Burma, 157, I83 

Strategic policy in Burma, 184 

N 

NAVAL FORCES (See Forces, Naval) 

"NEPTUNE" (See "OVERLORD") 

NETHERLANDS 

Progress report on Operation OVERLORD 4, 9 

NEUTRAL COUNTRIES 

Deterioration of German strategic situation, 85 

NEW BRITAIN 

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific, 112 

NOEMFOOR ISLAND 

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific, 114 

NORTHERN COMBAT AREA 

COMMAND 

Progress report of operations in SEAC. 

23 

NORWAY 

Operation into Norway, 8 

0 

O.S.S. 

SOE/OSS operations undertaken by

units of RAF Bomber Command and 

U.S.Strategic Air Forces in Europe, 51 

"OCTAGON" CONFERENCE 

Basic policies for the OCTAQON Conference, 80 

Communication of the results of OCTAGON Conference to Marshal Stalin, 

and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 

142,248 

Concluding remarks regarding OCTAGON Conference,234 

Program for the OCTAGON Conference, 

17 

Report to the President and Prime Minister. 130. 224 

Statement .for the Press regarding OCTAGON Conference, 228, 234, 249, 252 

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

Over-all objective in the war against

the Axis, 131 

Over-all objective in the war against

Japan, 38, 136 

"OVERLORD" 

Command of DRAGOON forces, 92, 95, 

135,195 

General Marshall's remarks in reference to: 

Employment of the French Forces of 

the Interior, 182, 187 

Extensive airborne operations in connection with Operation NEPTUNE, 

161 

Operation to capture islands at 

mouth of the Schelde. 191 

Note: IMo nomeraln refer to pages in minnh of meetinn. 

Plain type nlllnenls rtfer to pages in C.C.8. Papers. 

272 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

“OVERLORD” (Cont’d) 

Operation against the Channel Islands, 

7 

Prime Minister‘s opening statement reviewing the successes of the Allied 

Nations, 236 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding

role of the British Empire in the war 

and emciency of American-British 

staff machine, 236 

Progress in Operation OVERLORD, 160, 

178, 182 

Progress report on Operation OVERLORD (9 SeDt 1944). 4. 9 

Release of amphibious craft from OYERLORD to other theaters, 154, 232 

SCAEFs intentions for the near future, 

5, 9, 132, 191 

SCAEF’s report on naval operations in 

Operation OVERLORD, 5 

SHAEF memoranda in reference to: 

Employment of Mediterranean forces 

in support of NEPTUNE, 171 

Release of airborne forces from Oper­ ation NEPTUNE, 170 

Release of shipping and craft from 

Operation NEPTUNE, 168 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks in reference 

to: 

Progress of Operation NEPTUNE, 156 

Situation report from SCAEF, and 

operation to capture Islands at 

mouth of the Schelde, 191 

Sir Andrew Cunningham’s review of 

naval situation in Operation NEPTUNE, 156 

Sir Charles Portal’s remarks regarding air activity in Operation NEPTUNE, 

156, 160 

P 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

Admiral King’s remarks in reference to: 

Logistic dmculties in the Pacific, 163 

Operations in the Pacific, 157,167,178 

Strangulation of Japanese forces to 

the south, if Formosa were cap­ tured, 240 

Air forces in China to support Chinese 

ground forces and campaign ln the 

Pacific, 35 

Base facilities for US.and British naval 

forces available in the Pacific toward 

end of 1944, 179 

British Empire partlcipatlon in the 

Pacific, 137 

British participation in the Pacific, 208, 

212, 238 

CCS accept, for plannlng purposes,

schedule of operations for defeat of 

Japan, 204 

CCS discussion regarding progress of 

the campaign in the Pacific, 228 

CCS discussion regardlng strategy for 

the defeat of Japan, 203 

Contribution of the RAF in the main 

operations against Japan, 213 

Employment of Brltish Air Force in the 

Pacific, 241 

Estimate of the enemy situation, PacificFar East (as of 8 Sept 1944), 60, 202 

General Arnold’s statement regarding

Japanese Air Force’s lack of determination and will to win, 228 

General Marshall’s remarks in reference to: 

Air base at Biak, 157 

Stepping up the tempo of operations in the Pacific. 163 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Pacific, 110, 203 

London Conference declsion regarding control of the Twentieth Air Force, 

185 

London Conference discussion regard­ ing strategy in the Pacific-Far East, 

163, 178, 179 

Naval and air superiority to be exploited, wherever possible, to avoid 

commitment to costly land campaign, 

35, 136 

Over-all objective In the war against

Japan, 38, 136 

President’s review of the strategic situation of the United Nations, 239 

Prime Minister’s statements in reference to: 

British forces to be available for 

employment in the Pacific, 238, 241 

Russian entry into the war against

Japan, 240 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statements in reference to: 

Allocation of British requirements

for PaciAc operations, 203 

British assistance in the defeat of 

Japan, 163, 178, 182 

Note: itam nnmerds refer to paw in minutes of meeting. 

PLlh type nnmerals refer to pages In C.C.S. papers. 

273 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS (Cont'dl 

Sir Andrew Cunningham's statement 

regarding British naval forces available in the Pacific toward end of 1944, 

179 

Sir Charles Portal's statement regarding Brltish heavy bombers to be available for operations against the mainland of Japan, 240, '241 

Submarine warfare against Japanese

shipping, 35, 136 

PACIFIC, CENTRAL 

Japanese intentions in Central Pacific, 

63, 75 

Progress report on recent operations in, 

111 

PACIFIC, NORTH 

Japanese intentions in North Pacific, 

63, 13 

Progress report on recent operations in 

the Pacific, 111 

PACIFIC, SOUTH 

Progress report on recent operations in 

the Pacific, 112 

PACIFIC, SOUTHWEST 

Allocation of the two remaining combat 

cargo groups and the two remaining

commando groups, 44 

British participation in the war against

Japan, 40,41,208 

Progress report on recent operations in 

the Pacific, 112 

PALAU ISLANDS 

Admiral King's remarks regarding operations in the Pacific, 157, 167, 178 

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific, 111 

Japanese intentions in the Palaus, 63, 75 

PARAMUSHIRU 

Oeneral progress report on recent operations in the Pacific, 111 

PETROLEUM 

Japanese production and shipping, 62, 

66, 67, 68 

PHILIPPINES 

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific, 112 

Japanese Air Force's lack of determination and will to win, 228 

London Conference discussion regarding strategy in the Pactffc-Far East, 

178 

Schedule of major operatlons for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34, 136 

Ransport aircraft and combat cargo 

groups, 217, 218 

PIPELINES 

London Conference discusion regarding 

strategy in Burma, 283 

PLANNING 

Allocation of resources for British operations against JaDan. 131 

Alternate objective; in' the Mediterranean Theater, 162, 166, 174 

Capture of the Istrian Peninsula, 121 

Logistics problems involved in approved

allocation of zones of occupation in 

Germany. 233 

Planning date for the end of the war 

against Japan, 124, 138, 218 

RANKIN planning in the Mediterranean Theater, 150 

Redeployment of forces after the end 

of the war in Europe, 124, 131 

PO VALLEY 

Plenary Meeting conclusion regarding

invasion of the valley of the Po, 244 

"POINTBLANK" 

SCAEF report on air operations from 

the U.K., 5, 8 

POLAND 

Deterioration Of German strategic Situation, 85 

Note: Italc numerag refer to ages in mlnutes of meeting. 

PhW tm numerals refer to Pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

274 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

PORT DE BOUC, FRANCE 

Progress report on Operation DRAGOON and operations in the Mediterranean Theater, 12, 17 

PORT FACILITIES 

Base facilities for U.S.and British naval 

forces in the Pacific, 179 

Development of lines of communication 

for OVERLORD, I, 9 

PORTAL, SIR CHARLES 

Statements in reference to: 

Advance northeast via Istria, 161 

Air activity in Operation NEPTUNE, 

156, 160 

British heavy bombers to be available 

for operations against the mainland 

of Japan, 240, 241 

British participation in the Pacific,210 

Command of DRAGOON forces, 195 

Control of strategic bomber forces in 

EuroDe, 199 

Control of the US. Twentieth Air 

Force, 184 

CROSSBOW attacks. 166 

Future operations Southeast Asia, 

216 

Machinery for coordination of US.-

Soviet-British military effort, 197 

Range of Lancaster bombers, 241 

Withdrawal of the Fifth Army from 

Italy, 194 

Zones of occupation in Germany, 198 

POST HOSTILITIES 

Planning date for the end of the war 

against Japan, 125, 138 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Report to the President and Prime 

Minister, 131,224,244 

Statements in reference to: 

Brltlsh participation in the war 

against Japan, 238 

Credit for conception of DRAGOON 

Operation, 236 

Japanese tenacity, 240 

Location of the Central Tripartite

Control Commission in Germany,

248 

Strategic situation of the United Nations, 239 

Treatment of Germany, 241 

PRESS RELEASE 

Information on MULBERRY, 227,249 

Statement for the Press regarding OCTAGON Conference, 228, 234, 249, 252 

PRIME MINISTER OF THE 

UNITED KINGDOM 

Report to the President and Prime 

Minister, 131,224, 244 

Statements in reference to: 

British participation in the war 

against Japan, 237, 238, 241 

British stake in Italy, 236 

Campaign in Burma, 237 

Deployment of forces after the end 

of the war in EuroDe. 247 

Effect of sustained air 'bombardment 

on Japanese cities, 245 

Encroachment of the Russians into 

the Balkans, 237 

Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in regard to future 

operations in Burma and provision of forces, 250 

Obligation in China and desire to 

carry out Operation DRACULA before the monsoon of 1945, 246 

Provision of forces for DRACULA, 246 

250 

Release of information on MULBERRY to the Press, 249 

Role of the British Empire in the war 

and efficiency of American-British 

staff machine, 236 

Russian entry into the war against

Japan, 240 

Strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 237 

Strategy in the Pacific and an operation against Singapore, 238 

Successes of the Allied Nations, 236 

Treatment of Germany, 241 

Note: ItaUc nnmemls refer to paws in mhnm of meeting. 

Phln type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. papers. 

275 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

PRIORITY 

Basic policies for the OCTAGON Conference, 80 

Combined personnel movement pmblems arising during the Arst year after 

the defeat of Germany, 103 

Memorandum on trmp movements, covering the period October 1944 to 

March 1945, 99 

Over-all mission of the strategic air 

forces in Europe, 50 

Priorities for personnel shipping subsequent to termination of hostilities 

in Europe, 98 

PRISONERS OF WAR 

Progress report on Operation DRAGOON 

and operations in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 12 

PRODUCTION 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 132 

British operations against Japan will 

require planning for the allocation of 

resources, 131. 203 

Deterioration oi German strategic situation, 88 

Japanese production and shipping. 61, 

66. ~~, 67. I 68

Planning date for the end of the war 

against Japan, 125, 138, 228 

PROGRESS REPORTS 

CCS discussion regarding progress of 

the campaign in the Paciflc, 228 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Pacific, 110,203 

Progress report on Operation DRAGOON 

and operations in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 12, 17 

Progress report on Operation OVERLORD, 4, 9, 191 

Progress report of operations in SEAC. 

22 

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 

Operation against the Channel Islands, 

7 

Political and psychological factors In 

German situation, 87, 89 

Political and psychologid factors in 

Japanese propaganda, 64 

Statement for the press re OCTAGON 

Conference, 228, 234 

R 

RANGOON, BURMA 

CCS discussion regarding future opera­ tions in Southeast Asia. 224 

London Conference discussion regard­ ing strategy in Burma, 183 

"RANKIN" 

Availability of forces. RANKIN Opera­ tion in the Mediterranean Theater, 

151 

Employment of US.,French, Indian 

and Italian forces for RANKIN Operation in Mediterranean Theater, 152 

RANKIN planning in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 150 

"RATWEEK" 

Enemy situation in the Balkans, 15, 18 

REDEPLOYMENT 

Availability of personnel shipping, 107 

Basic policies for the OCTAGON Conference, 80 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strateaic concept. 132 

Combined personnel movement prob­ lems arisihg during the first year after the defeat of Germany, 103, 226 

General Marshall's statement regarding provision of US.forces for Operations

in Burma, 246 

Memorandum on troop movements, covering the period October 1944 to 

March 1945, 99 

Planning date for the end of the war 

against Japan, 125, 137 

Prime Minister's statements in reference to: 

Camuaian in Burma. 237 

Deplbyment of fore& after the end 

of the war in Europe, 247 

Provision of force8 for DRACULA, 

246. ,~ 250

Priorities for personnel shipping subsequent to termination of hostilities 

in Europe, 98 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

REDEPLOYMENT (Cont’d) 

Reorientation of forces from Europe for 

operations in Southeast Asia, 215, 218 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks regarding

personnel shipplng problem following defeat of Germany, 190 

Study on redeployment of forces after 

the end of the war in Europe, 128, 131, 

226 

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION 

Arrangements lor occupatlon in Greece 

in event of German withdrawal. 16. 

134 

Forces available for employment in 

the Ballrans, 16, 134 

REPATRIATION 

Combined personnel movement prob­ lems arising during the first year

after the defeat of Germany, 103 

Plans for operation TALISMAN, I 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks regarding

shipping problem following defeat of 

Germany, 190 

Study on redeplment of forces after 

the end of the war in Europe, 128,131 

RESISTANCE GROUPS 

General Marshall‘s remarks re employment of the French Forces of the Interior, 182, 187 

ROTTERDAM, HOLLAND 

SCAEF’s intentions for the near future, 

6, 9, 133, 191 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding situation report from SCAEF; and op­ eration to capture islands at mouth of 

the Schelde. 191 

RUHR 

SCAEF’s intentions for the near future, 

5, 9, 133 

RUMANIA 

Deterioration of Cterman strategic situation, 88 

RANKZN planning in the Mediterranean Theater, 151 

RUSSIA (see U.S.S.R.) 

RYUKYU ISLANDS 

Schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 35, 136 

S 

SAAR 

BCAEF’s intentions for the near future, 

5, 9, 133 

SAKHALIN ISLAND 

Japanese intentions in Sakhalin, 63, 73 

SARANGANI BAY, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

Schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34, 136 

SATELLITE COUNTRIES 

Deterioration of German strategic situation, 88 

SECRET WEAPONS 

Prospects of Germany introducing new 

secret weapon. 89 

SEVENTH ARMY 

Command Of DRAGOON forces, 93, 95, 

135 

Progress report on Operation DRAGOON 

and operations in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 12, 17 

Report on advance of the Seventh Army,

4 

SHIMUSHU 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Pacific, 111 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

SHIPPING 

Japanese production and shipping, 61, 

66, 67,68 

Submarine warfare against Japanese

shipping, 35, 136 

SHIPPING, PERSONNEL 

Availability of personnel shipping, 107 

Combined personnel movement problems arising during the flrst year after 

the defeat of Germany, 103,226 

Memorandum on troop movements, covering the period October 1944 to 

March 1945,99 

Priorities for. personnel shipping subsequent to termination of hostilities 

in Europe, 98 

Sir Alan Brooke‘s remarks reearding personnel shipping problem fciiowini 

defeat of Germany, 190 

Study on redeployment of forces after 

the end of the war in Europe, 128,137 

SIEGFRIED LINE 

SCAEF’s intentions for the near future, 

5,9, 133 

SINGAPORE 

British participation in the Pacific, 208 

Future operations from Southeast Asia, 

214 

Prime Minister’s statement regarding 

strategy in the Pacific and an opera­ tion against Singapore, 238 

SIXTH ARMY 

General progress report on recent opera­ tions in the Pacitlc. 113 

SMITH, GENERAL W.B. 

Prime Minister‘s statement regarding role of the British Empire in the war 

and emciency of American-British 

staff machine, 236 

SOMERVELL, GENERAL 8. B. 

General Somervell’s statement regardIng Inter-AllleciNavigation Coimission to control the Rhme. 233 

SOURABAYA, JAVA 

London Conference discussion regarding strategy In the Pacific-Far East, 

179 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Allocation of the two remalning combat 

cargo groups and alr commando 

groups, 44 

CCS discussion regarding future operations in Southeast Asia, 214 

CCS take note of Brim statement regarding Operatlon HIGHBALL, 227 

Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command for 

operations in Burma, 46, 137,139,217, 

248 

London Conference discussion in reference to: 

Allocation of combat cargo and air 

commando groups to SEAC, 183 

Strategy in Burma, 183 

Strategy in the PacU3.c-Far East, 163, 

178, 179 

Prlme Minister’s statements in reference to: 

Campaign in Burma, 237 

Obligation in China and desire to 

carry out Operation DRACULA before the momn of 1945, 246 

Progress report of operations in SEAC, 

22 

Reorientation of forces from Europe for 

operations in Southeast Asia, 215, 218 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks in reference 

to: 

Operations in Burma. 157,183 

Strategic policy in Burma, 184 

Strategy for operations in Burma in 

the near future, 24 

Transwrt aircraft and combat cargo 

groups for Operations CAPITAL and 

DRACULA, 216,217 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE 

SOE/IXS operations undertaken by

units of RAF Bomber Command and 

U.S.Strategic Air Forces in Europe, 51 

Note: Italic numerals refer to Paages in tninntes of meetinn. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. papers. 

278 
~ .. . .~ ~ 

nean, ii8, 119 

General Marshall’s statement regard: ing availability of PLOUGH Force 

for oueratlon in the Alus. 193 

TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

STALIN, MARSHAL 

Communication of the results of OCTAGON Conference to Marshal Stalin 

and aeneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek,

142,220, 225, 248 

President’s statement attributing credit 

for conception of DRAGOON Opera­ tion to Marshal Stalin, 236 

STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE 

Control of strategic bomber forces in 

Europe, 50,132,198,208 

Over-all mission of the strategic air 

forces in Europe, 50 

STRATEGY 

BASIC POLICIES 

Basic policies for the OCTAGON 

Conference, 80 

Basic undertakings in support of 

over-all strategic concept, 131 

Execution of the over-all strategic 

concept, 132 

Over-all objective in the war against

the Axis, 131 

Over-all strategic concept for the 

prosecution of the war, 131, 132 

IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 

Estimate of German strategy, 85 

Operation against the Channel Islands. 7 

Operation into Norway, 8 

Over-all mission of the strategic air 

forces in Eurom. 50 

SCAEF’S intentions for the near future, 5,9,133 

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

CCS decision to dispatch message to 

SACMED regarding withdrawal of 

US.units in Mediterranean, 205 

CCS discussion regarding future OPerations in the Mediterranean, 205 

Capture of the Istrian Peninsula, 121, 

205 

Future

~ ....~ ~ onerations in the Mediterranean, ii8, 119 

General Marshall’s statement regard: ing availability of PLOUGH Force 

for oueratlon in the Alus. 193 

Generai tactical plan of Commander,

Seventh Army, 12 

Naval forces to attack enemy seaborne movement in the Aegean, 19 

Plans for major offensive in Italy, 14, 

17, 133 

Plenary Meeting conclusion regard­ ing invasion of the valley of the 

Po, 244 

Prime Minister’s statement regard­ ing strategy in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 236 

SACMED’s proposal for future strategy in Italy, 14, 17, 133 

Sir Alan Brooke’s remarks in reference to: 

Hitler’s strategy in the Balkans,

157 

Proposed strategy for the Mediterranean Theater, 192 

IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

Admiral King’s statement regarding strangulation of Japanese forces 

to the south, if Formosa were cap­ tured, 240 

ccs acceptance, for planning purposes, of schedule of operations for 

defeat of Japan, 204 

CCS discussion regarding strategy for the defeat of Japan, 203 

Japanese intentions, 63,73 

Japanese strategy, 62 

London Conference discussion regarding strategy in the Pacmc-Far 

East, 163, 178, 179 

Naval and air superiority to be exploited wherever possible, to avoid 

commitment to costly land campaign, 35, 136 

Over-all objective in the war against

Japan, 38,136 

Prime Minister’s statement regard­ ing strategy in the Pacific and an 

operation against Singapore, 238 

Strategy of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45,34, 136 

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

CCS discussion regarding future op­ erations in Southeast Asia, 214 

Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command 

for operations in Burma, 46,137,139 

London Conference discussion regarding strategy in Burma, 183 

Note: Itaic numeral. refer to pages in minutes of meeting.

Plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. papers. 

279 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

STRATEGY (Cont'd) 

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Cont'd) 

prime Minister's statement regarding obligation in China and desire 

to carry out Operation DRACULA 

before the monsoon of 1945, 246 

Sir Alan Brooke's remarks regard­ inc strategic policy in Burma. 284 

Strategy for operations in Burma in 

the near future, 24 

SUMATRA 

Japanese intentions in Sumatra, 63, 74 

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED 

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

Memoranda in reference to: 

Employment of Mediterranean forces 

in support of NEPTUNE, 171 

Release- of airborne forces from oper­ ation NEPTUNE, 170 

Release of shipping and craft from 

Ooeration ~1 NEPTUNE. 168

Progress report on Opeiation OVERLORD, 4, 9 

Transfer of operational control of DRAGOON forces, 6, 13 

SURRENDER 

Plans for Operation TALISMAN, 7 

Prospects of a German collapse or surrender (as of 8 Sept 19441, 90 

T 

''TALISMAN' 

Plans for Operation TALISMAN, 7 

TANIMBAR 

London Conference discussion regarding strategy in the Pacific-Far East, 

179 

TARAWA ISLAND 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Pacific. 111 

TARGET DATES 

CCS discussion regarding progress of 

the campaign in the PaciRc, 228 

General Marshall's remark regarding

stepping up the tempo of operations in the Paclflc, 163 

London Conference decision to mount 

a 3-divisional lift amphibious assault 

from the Mediterranean: target date 

25 July, 162 

Planning date for the end of the war 

against Japan. 125, 138 

Schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34, 136, 203 

TARGETS 

Over-all mkion of the strategic air 

forces in Europe, 50 

TOKYO 

Schedule of major operations for the 

defeat of Japan, 1944-45, 34, 136 

TOULON 

Progress report on Operation DRAGOON 

and operations in the Mediterranean 

Theater, 12, 17 

TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 

Allocation of the two remaining combat 

cargo groups and the two remaining air commando groups, 44 

General Arnold's remarks regarding availability of transport aircraft, 162 

London COnference discussion regard­ ing allocation of wmbat cargo and 

air commando groups to SEAC, 182 

TRIESTE, ITALY 

SACMED's proposal for future strategy in Italy, 15, 17, 134 

Sir Alan Brooke's statement recrardincr 

proposed strategy for the Me&terraz 

nean Theater, 293 

Note: Italic namcrals refer to pages in minutes of mtlng. 

Plain me numerals Mer to pats in C.C.S. Pawrs. 

280 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

TROOP MOVEMENTS 

Combined personnel movement problems arising during the first year after the defeat of Qermany, 109 

Memorandum on troop movements, covering the period October 1944 to 

March 1945.99 

Priorities for personnel shipping subsequent to termination of hastillties 

in Europe, 98 

TRUK 

General progress report on recent op­ erations in the PMc, 112 

TWELFTH AIR FORCE 

Command of DRAGOON forces, 93, 95, 

135 

Employment of the Fifth Army, Twelfth 

and Fifteenth Air Forces, 118,121,134 

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 

Control of the U.S. Twentieth Air Force,

184 

General Arnold‘s statements regarding operations of the US.Twentieth Air 

Force, 219 

U 

U-BOAT WARFARE 

Deterioration of German strategic situation, 86 

General progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Pacific,112 

Sir Andrew Cunningham’s remarks regarding enemy naval forces in the 

Baltic and Mediterranean, 160 

Sir Andrew Cunningham’s review of 

naval situation in Operation NEPTUNE, 156 

Submarine warfare against Japanese

shipping. 35, 136 

U.S.S.R. 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 132 

Communicationof the results of OCTAGON Conference to Marshal Stalln 

and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,

142,220,225,248 

Entry of Russia into the war agalnst

Japan, 35 

Machinery for coordination of US.-

Soviet-British military effort, 54, 56, 

135,196,197,202 

Over-all objective in the war against the Axis, 131 

Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war, 131 

Prime Minister’s statements in reference to: 

Encroachment of the Russians into 

the Balkans 237 

Russian entry into the war against

Japan, 240 

Strategic air force attacks in support of Russian operation, 51 

UNITED KINGDOM 

Allocation of resources for British oper­ ations against Japan, 137 

Allocation of U.S. and U.K. zones of 

occupation in Germany, 32, 138 

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept, 131 

British participation in the war against

Japan, 40,41,137,208,212 

CCS decision regarding participation of 

the British Fleet in the main opera­ tions against Japan in the Pacific, 2f3 

Contribution of the RAF in the main 

operations against Japan, 213, 238 

Machinery for coordination of US.-

Soviet-British military effort, 56, 196, 

197 

V 

VENEZIA GIUILIA, ITALY 

RANKIN planning in the Mediterranean Theater, 151 

Noh: Iwic nomerala refer to page8 in mlnutes of meeting. 

Plain type nnmualr refer to pages fn C.C.S. Paners. 

281 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

VERY LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 

VLR bomber operations against Japan

Proper to be continued, 35 

VIENNA, AUSTRIA 

Prime Mlnlster's statement regarding 

strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 237 

Sir Alan Brooke's statement regardlng proposed strategy for the Mediterranean Theater, 193 

w 

WAKDE ISLAND 

Qeneral progress report on recent oper­ ations in the Paclflc. 113 

Y 

YUGOSLAVIA 

London Conference discussion regard­ ing operutions in the Balkans, 156 

RANKIN planning in the Mediterranean Theater, 151 

YUNNAN FORCE 

Progress report of operations in SEAC,

23 

Z 

ZONES OF OCCUPATION 

Allocation of U.S. and U.K. zones of 

occupation in Germany, 32, 138, 197, 

198,232,233 

CCS agree that CAdC be directed to 

make examination of the logistics problems involved in approved allocations of zones of occupation in 

(fernany, 233 

Plenary Meeting agreement that details 

for the allocation of zones of occupatlon in Germany be worked out by the 

experts, 247 

Note: ItnUc numerals refer to mgee In minotes of mtetw. 

Plain tm numerals refer ta wes In C.C.S. Papera. 

282