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Strategic Studies Institute

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

WAR AND INSURGENCY IN THE 

WESTERN SAHARA

Staff Researcher

May 2013

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ISBN 1-58487-569-0
iii

FOREWORD

As a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, Morocco enjoys a close relationship with 

the United States that has only strengthened in recent 

years. Not only is Morocco considered a stable, liberalizing, and democratizing Arab Muslim country, but 

it has also been an important partner in combating 

terrorism and pursuing peace in the Middle East. It 

receives more U.S. foreign assistance than any other 

country in the Maghreb, and the U.S. Army will 

continue to participate in many activities, including 

major exercises and smaller security-oriented activities, meant to build partner capacity and maintain 

good relations.

Yet, even after decades marked by war, significant military and diplomatic involvement by the 

United States, and long-term intervention by the 

United Nations, no resolution is in sight to Morocco’s conflict with Western Saharan nationalists. This 

monograph, completed in September 2012, demonstrates the history of the dispute—characterized 

by insurgency, regular warfare, intifadas, and the 

longest functional military barrier in the world—

and offers lessons of relevance to military planners 

and policymakers alike.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army 

War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between Military 

and Academia.

vii

SUMMARY

At a crucial crossroads between Africa and Europe, 

the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and the “Arab 

World” and the West, Morocco has long had a special 

place in U.S. diplomacy and strategic planning. Since 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Morocco’s 

importance to the United States has only risen, and 

the more recent uncertainties of the Arab Spring and 

Islamist extremism in Africa have further increased 

the strategic value and operational relevance of the 

Moroccan-American alliance. Yet, one of the pillars 

of the legitimacy of the Moroccan monarchy, its claim 

to Western Sahara, remains a point of violent contention. Since the Spanish withdrawal and subsequent 

occupation of the territory by Morocco in 1975, the 

United States has poured many millions of dollars in 

materiel, training, and intelligence into the Moroccan 

armed forces. But the latter has failed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Polisario Front, the Western Saharan organization whose goal is full independence for 

Western Sahara.

This monograph provides an historical analysis 

of the conflict in Western Sahara, stressing developments of relevance to the U.S. Army and to American and regional strategic interests since Morocco’s 

independence in 1956. Points of emphasis include 

evolving human and physical geography; the role of 

the United States, Algeria, and other outside powers 

in the conflict; and military tactics, operations, and 

strategies. The monograph also analyzes the current 

situation in the region and makes recommendations 

for U.S. policy and military planning.

Host to valuable natural resources and the largest 

functioning military barrier in the world, the Western 
viii

Sahara has seen intifada-style resistance to Moroccan 

occupation since the mid-1990s. Communications and 

coordination between the pro-independence Polisario 

sympathizers in the “liberated” and “occupied” territories and in refugee camps in Algeria—facilitated 

in no small part by the Internet—have also increased, 

especially among the increasingly radicalized Sahrawi 

youth, who appear to have lost faith in the Polisario 

leadership even as they continue to embrace its basic 

anti-Moroccan outlook. In the meantime, terrorist and 

criminal elements threaten to infiltrate the territory 

and the camps in Algeria.

 One cannot understand the Polisario insurgency’s 

socio-cultural roots, military achievements, or the reason why both sides eventually settled on a ceasefire 

without a good grasp of Western Saharan physical 

and human geography, neither of which has remained 

static. In fact, changes in both created the conditions 

for the insurgency and enabled it to develop so successfully. At the same time, Morocco’s slowly-learned 

ability to respond to and alter geographical conditions 

helped bring about the ceasefire of 1991, even though 

Morocco’s actions also made a long-term solution 

more elusive in some ways.

Natural resources have shaped human geography, outside interests, and insurgent movements in 

Western Sahara since the Spanish period, and they 

may influence long-term U.S. interests in the region. 

Morocco’s expansion into Western Sahara did not 

stem from the mineral resources there, but Morocco 

stands to gain from their full exploitation. The desire 

to develop the economic potential offered by Western 

Saharan geography began to grow in earnest after the 

discovery of large phosphate deposits by the Spaniards after World War II. Fishing and the potential for 
ix

oil exploitation have also shaped the development of 

the region and the evolving strategic interests of the 

major players. 

Although complicated questions of ethnicity, history, and cultural traditions make generalizations 

about Sahrawis difficult, a complete picture of the 

conflict entails a good understanding of the origins 

and development of Western Saharan identity, from 

which has emerged one of the world’s youngest but 

most vigorous nationalist movements. The lack of 

agreement on the fundamental question of what constitutes a Sahrawi complicates the efforts of the United Nations (UN) and others to find reliable census 

figures or organize a plebiscite.

The popular appeal of the concept of “Greater 

Morocco” goes far to explain why Rabat has resisted 

outside pressures and refuses to compromise on the 

issue, even after the military and financial costs of 

occupying the territory contributed to considerable 

social unrest. In October 1957, the newly independent Moroccan state officially adopted the ideology of Greater Morocco, and the `Alawi dynasty has 

staked its legitimacy in part on the preservation of its 

“southern provinces,” as it calls Western Sahara. As a 

component of Moroccan national identity, the belief 

that Western Sahara is an integral part of Morocco 

enjoyed widespread domestic support, although 

the human and financial costs of the war against the 

Polisario also has had some negative impact on the 

regime ́s popularity.

Historically, Spanish control over the territory 

rested on a relatively effective system of military occupation and administration, but Spanish military 

authorities failed to grasp how changing geographical 

and social conditions fomented the rise of nationalist 

resistance, especially among younger Sahrawis. Spanish military responses to the rise of Sahrawi nation-
x

alism and unrest among the youth exacerbated the 

growing conflict.

After the Spanish withdrawal from the territory 

in 1975, Morocco waged a brutal military campaign 

against the Polisario, and large numbers of people 

fled to refugee camps, where traditional tribal identities softened and Sahrawi national consciousness 

grew. In the meantime, the Polisario’s early military 

successes against Morocco and its ally, Mauritania, 

defied expectations. The reasons for the Polisario’s 

survival included its access to outside support and 

sanctuaries (mainly Algeria), Moroccan mistakes, and 

Mauritanian weaknesses. Also crucial were the strategic thought of Polisario’s military leadership and the 

tactical skills of its soldiers, their high level of morale, 

and their ability to use geography to their advantage. 

The Mauritanian armed forces disposed of relatively 

few human and materiel resources, withdrawing from 

the war in 1979 after suffering repeated attacks by the 

Polisario, including some deep inside Mauritania. Although they continued to fight, the Moroccan armed 

forces revealed ineffectiveness and operational shortcomings against the guerrilla tactics of the Polisario 

on various occasions.

After the repeated tactical failings of the Moroccan 

armed forces began to gain strategic significance, the 

United States greatly increased its contribution to the 

fight against the Polisario. After the fall of the Shah 

of Iran and the Polisario’s damaging attacks within 

Morocco, Washington wanted to make sure that it did 

not lose another strategic ally in Africa and the Middle 

East. Beginning in 1981, Morocco began construction 

of the largest functional military barrier in the world, 

“the Berm,” a very expensive enterprise that eventually allowed the country to occupy and control about 
xi

80 percent of the Western Sahara. The decision to erect 

the Berm signaled an acknowledgement by Moroccan leaders that decisive defeat of the Polisario was 

not possible; hence, Rabat adopted a strategy of static 

defense. Ten years later, the Berm facilitated the UNbrokered ceasefire, which occurred after both sides, 

thoroughly exhausted, realized that they could not 

achieve decisive victory. Thereafter, the struggle continued in the diplomatic sphere.

In the occupied territory, Morocco spent much 

money on security and economic development, but 

devoted virtually no efforts to winning the hearts and 

minds of the Sahrawi people. It also imported large 

numbers of people from Morocco, in part with the 

hope of thereby foiling the Polisario’s prediction that 

it would win a referendum on the future status of the 

territory. UN envoy James Baker exerted considerable 

efforts trying to reach a settlement, but in the wake of 

Moroccan intransigence and Washington’s unwillingness to pressure Rabat, he resigned in 2003. 

In the meantime, dissatisfaction has grown in 

the refugee camps and the occupied territory, especially among the younger Sahrawis. Many express 

impatience and disappointment with the traditional 

Polisario elites and their failure to make gains on the 

diplomatic front. This dissatisfaction has manifested 

itself in intifada-style protests. Recent kidnappings 

and arrests suggest that terrorist and criminal organizations, some with ties to al-Qaeda, are attempting 

to infiltrate Western Sahara and the refugee camps, 

although Polisario leaders appear to be trying to keep 

them out. Still, such infiltrations may come to threaten 

regional security.

Given the importance of Moroccan stability and 

the threat that increased terrorist activity in the region 
would pose to the United States and Europe, Washington has a strong interest in promoting a solution to the 

Western Sahara problem. In theory, a solution could 

be reached that has something to offer all of the immediately affected parties (Morocco, the Polisario Front, 

and Algeria). But Europe will need to play a leading role in propelling negotiations; the United States 

should consider ways to leverage European countries 

to do so. In the meantime, the United States should 

continue to monitor closely the security situation in 

Western Sahara, which has relevance to current U.S. 

Africa Command (AFRICOM) activities. At the same 

time, the United States should take advantage of the 

relatively Western-friendly, modern outlooks among 

many Polisario leaders and other Sahrawis, who are 

less susceptible to radical Islamist appeals. 

The U.S. Army should use the military history of 

Western Sahara as a source of concrete lessons, in particular with regard to guerrilla tactics and the role of 

fortified walls (the Berm) in counterinsurgency and 

static defense in general. The U.S. Army should also 

learn more about the Moroccan military and prepare 

for the possibility of more joint operations. In addition 

to learning about the Polisario’s tactical, operational, 

and strategic successes and failures, U.S. military 

planners should also take into account the strengths 

and limitations of the Moroccan armed forces and adjust their expectations accordingly.

As the history of the region illustrates, the Western 

Sahara problem defies easy solutions. On the other 

hand, the situation there is not without hope. With 

proper, historically informed policy decisions and appropriate leveraging by the United States, a solutionthat has something to offer all the interested parties 

may well be possible.

xii

1

WAR AND INSURGENCY IN THE 

WESTERN SAHARA

INTRODUCTION

At a crucial crossroads between Africa and Europe, 

the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and the “Arab 

World” and the West, Morocco has long had a special 

place in U.S. diplomacy and strategic planning. Since 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), 

Morocco’s importance to the United States has only 

increased; in 2004, President George W. Bush designated the country as a “major non-NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally,” thereby conferring it 

with various financial and military benefits not otherwise available to non-NATO states. More recently, the 

Moroccan regime has faced new risks to its stability, 

including Arab Spring-related developments and, to 

the south, possible threats from the Sahel region—

which joins North and West Africa and spans historic 

trade and migration routes. These threats have taken 

the form of Islamist terrorism, the drug trade, kidnapping, and other criminal activities.

In the meantime, one of the pillars of the legitimacy of Morocco’s Alawi dynasty, its claim to Western 

Sahara, remains a point of violent contention. Occupied by Morocco after Spain’s withdrawal in 1975, 

the territory saw open war between Western Saharan 

nationalists, supported by Algeria, Libya, and other 

foreign powers, and the Moroccan armed forces until 

the 1991 ceasefire. Since then, Western Sahara has remained divided between “occupied” and “liberated” 

zones, which are separated by the largest functional 

military barrier in the world—sort of a Moroccan 

version of the Bar Lev Line, consisting of sand walls 

and a sophisticated net of sensors, mines, barbed wire, 

and weaponry. 
2

The many millions of dollars in materiel, training, intelligence, and advisors that the United States 

contributed to Morocco’s war in the Western Sahara, 

along with the actions of major American diplomatic 

players in the conflict—from Vernon Walters to James 

Baker to Hillary Clinton—underscore the strategic importance of the region. Indeed, the United States gave 

more economic and military aid to Morocco than to 

any other African country since the end of World War 

II, with the exception of Egypt. Tellingly, between 

1950 and 1983, over 90 percent of U.S. arms deliveries to Morocco occurred during the first 7 years of 

the Western Sahara war.1

 More recently, the territory, 

known to Moroccans as the “southern provinces,” has 

hosted intifada-style protests, violent confrontations, 

continued repression by Moroccan authorities, and 

growing discontent among the younger generation. 

The immense Sahrawi refugee camps just across the 

Algerian border have seen kidnappings and infiltration attempts by al-Qaeda associated organizations.

The Western Sahara conflict merits attention for 

other reasons as well. The territory has valuable natural resources, including phosphates, fishing, and possibly large amounts of oil. The territory also remains a 

major point of contention between Morocco and Algeria, whose cooperation is necessary to combat regional 

security threats but who remain separated by one of 

the longest closed borders in the world. In the sphere 

of international relations, the Western Sahara problem 

involves fundamental issues of self-determination and 

sovereignty. According to former U.S. Senator George 

McGovern, “What ultimately is at stake is the postWorld War II international legal system.”2

This monograph aims to provide an historical 

overview of the Western Sahara and its strategic im-
3

portance, with an emphasis on military matters. As 

will become clear, effective strategic and military decisionmaking about the region entails knowledge of 

relevant political, geographical, cultural, economic, 

and social developments and conditions, as well as 

an understanding of the tactical and operational limitations imposed by these conditions. Although this 

monograph concludes with a set of specific policy and 

military planning recommendations, its main goal is to 

provide an exposition of the Western Sahara problem 

that will help military and political planners formulate 

and carry out policy and operations—whatever the 

strategic goals may be—based on essential historical 

knowledge and reasonable expectations. The history 

of Western Sahara can also provide the U.S. Army with 

learning opportunities about desert counterinsurgency, strategies of static defense, and related tactical and 

operational methods. 

Before beginning that discussion, however, it is 

worth emphasizing the degree to which political 

agendas color much of the existing writing about Morocco and Western Sahara. Although such influences 

are hardly secret, unexpected, or unique to this issue, 

it nonetheless bears remembering that analyses of the 

current situation, whether by government officials, 

academics, or policy think tanks, often serve broader 

attempts to support or undermine the position of the 

Moroccan government on the issue. A 2005 report by 

the Belgian-based European Strategic Intelligence and 

Security Center, for example, portrayed the Polisario 

in highly negative terms. But the report relied heavily 

on the testimony of defectors from the Polisario and 

ignored more nuanced analyses by outside observers. 

Even a Moroccan periodical subsequently described 
4

the report as “remotely controlled” from Rabat.3 In 

a similar example of such contradictions, a U.S. Embassy report and an article based on multiple visits to 

Western Sahara and “dozens of interviews” describe 

separatist sentiment as insignificant; the article’s authors maintain that “the Polisario’s credibility is low” 

and that “the goal of most Sahrawis is widespread 

autonomy” rather than full independence.4

 But recent 

books by experts in the field leave readers with the 

opposite impression, with one book maintaining that 

the recent intifada “has allowed many Western Saharans to express their true beliefs, which is support for 

the cause of independence,” and the other describing 

universal support for independence among Sahrawi 

refugees.5 Clearly, there is no consensus.

The intention here is not to accuse any of the authors cited above of misleading their readers in order to promote political agendas. But policymakers 

should remember that the information found in these 

and other books, articles, and reports, when used selectively, can make a complicated situation seem more 

clear-cut than it really is. Sweeping statements about 

public opinion and major actors, for instance—whether Algeria, U.S. oil companies, or terrorist groups—

merit particular scrutiny. Today, the Internet is replete 

with Web pages about the Western Sahara intended 

for foreign consumption, often in English, Spanish, 

and French, and clearly slanted to particular interests. 

An effective approach to the Western Sahara problem 

will entail, above all, an understanding of its nuances; 

accounts that portray the conflict or its players in black 

and white terms need careful scrutiny.
5

Historical Overview.

The Western Sahara as a distinct territory with its 

own identity grew out of a long history of Spanish involvement in the area. For centuries, Spain had shown 

an interest in northwestern Africa, although along the 

Atlantic coast, Spaniards made little progress beyond 

occasional explorations and other limited activities. 

Nevertheless, at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, 

Spain asserted its right to a large swath of territory 

extending inland from the coast. It based its claim on 

the small Spanish commercial enterprise at Dakhla, 

then called Villa Cisneros, which was an outgrowth 

of facilities established several years earlier to support 

fishing operations from the Canary Islands. 

The territory of Western Sahara (formerly the 

Spanish Sahara), the entirety of which Spain did not 

effectively control until the 1930s, consists of some 

266,000 square kilometers (km) between a long section of the Atlantic coast and modern-day Mauritania, Algeria, and Morocco, although the latter, of 

course, does not recognize any border with Western 

Sahara. The Spanish archipelago of the Canary Islands lies just 100 km off the northern MoroccanWestern Saharan frontier. Unlike much of Greater 

Sahara, Western Sahara is not entirely covered by 

sand. In the north, the Saqiyah al-Hamra has deep 

gullies, and the Guelta Zemmur has large rises and 

many caves. 

Over the years, the geographical characteristics of 

the northern part of Western Sahara have facilitated 

guerrilla attacks against security forces, providing 

cover for insurgent movements and small, scattered 

base areas. Also in the north, the Ouarkziz Mountains 

have provided similar opportunities for hiding. The 
6

coast of the Western Sahara is rough and cliff-lined; 

there are ports at Dakhla, La Guera, and to the west 

of El Aaiún (Laayoune). There is relatively little tradition of fishing among the major Sahrawi groups. Historically, fishermen in the waters off the Saharan coast 

have often come from the Canary Islands. Although 

not as conducive to guerrilla activities, the flat, sparsely populated regions to the south are so vast that they 

have proved difficult for government forces—whether 

French, Spanish, Mauritanian, or Moroccan—to control fully, even with the benefits of airpower.

In 1912, France and Spain agreed upon the borders for their northwestern African possessions. The 

French took Algeria and Mauritania and control of the 

largest portion of the new protectorate of Morocco. 

The Spanish zones of the Moroccan protectorate were 

a relatively small slice of territory along the northern 

coast and what was called “Southern Spanish Morocco,” consisting of the Villa Bens area and known 

as the so-called Tarfaya (or Cape Juby) Strip. Legally 

speaking, the Moroccan protectorate was not a colony, 

because the sultan ostensibly remained in power, with 

France and Spain supposedly administering Morocco 

on the sultan’s behalf. The Spanish Sahara, on the 

other hand, was a full-fledged colony of Spain. Under 

French pressure, Spain occupied the Ifni area to the 

north of Tarfaya in 1934, while the French endeavored 

to connect key areas in southeastern Morocco, western Algeria (Tindouf), and Mauritania (Zouerate). In 

this way, the French could encircle the guerrilla movements that had been causing them trouble.6

After World War II, Spain established the independent entity of Spanish West Africa, which consisted of 

three parts: Ifni, Saqiya al Hamra, and Río de Oro; the 

latter two were often referred to simply as the Spanish 
7

Sahara, or Río de Oro. When Morocco attained independence in 1956, Madrid first hesitated to relinquish 

any of Spanish West Africa. The Moroccan-supported 

Liberation Army (LA), later called the Sahrawi Liberation Army by the Spaniards, began to attack French 

outposts in Algeria and Mauritania, using Spanish 

territory as a safe haven. The Spanish military, lacking sufficient forces and clear instructions from Madrid, at first let guerrilla bands move across Spanish 

territory with surprising freedom, although the Spaniards provided the French with information about 

their movements.7

The LA forces, however, found the French to be 

more than they could handle, and they shifted their 

efforts to the Spanish-controlled north, sparking the 

outbreak of the Ifni War (1957-58). The Spaniards 

fought back hard but eventually withdrew to a defensive parameter around the town of Sidi Ifni. The Spanish adoption of a defensive military strategy stemmed 

in part from the fear of Spanish dictator Francisco 

Franco—remembering his experiences in North Africa 

decades earlier—that Spanish outposts in the interior 

were too vulnerable.8 In the Spanish Sahara, Operation 

HURRICANE, making ample use of paratroopers and 

involving Spanish and French ground, air, and naval 

forces, subsequently cleared the bands. The Spaniards 

then began the task of reestablishing Spanish authority and disarming the nomads who had joined forces 

with the LA.9

In the 1958 Treaty of Angra Cintra, Madrid relinquished the Tarfaya Strip, where Sahrawi nationalism 

would get its start. In fact, many Spanish observers 

portray the handing over of this area, which had a 

relatively sedentary and urban character, as a betrayal 

by Spain of the indigenous residents, and they trace 
8

the origins of Sahrawi nationalism to this act.10 With 

the transfer of the territory, Sahrawis discovered that 

Morocco could be more repressive than the Spaniards 

had been. A founding leader of the early Sahrawi nationalist movement, Mohamed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri, 

moved from the Tarfaya Strip to Smara in Spanish Sahara because he had more freedom of movement there 

than under repressive Moroccan security forces.11

Besides further alienating people in the region, the 

handing over of the Tarfaya Strip to Morocco seemed 

to go against possible Spanish economic interests. The 

territory had offered potential commercial benefits to 

Spain in the form of fishing and oil resources, and it is 

strategically situated directly across from the Canary 

Islands. Furthermore, the area had more in common 

ethnically and culturally with Spanish Sahara (and 

less in common with much of Morocco) than did Ifni. 

Explanations for Spain’s acquiescence to Moroccan 

demands for Tarfaya may include a possible secret 

agreement over the release of Spanish prisoners from 

the Ifni War; pressure from the United States, which 

wanted to bolster the Moroccan monachy; and Moroccan cooperation in cleaning up the LA forces still 

in the Sahara. The Moroccan king distrusted the LA, 

many of whose soldiers had refused to join the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales, or

FAR) founded in May 1956.12

Yet, Madrid had its own reasons for desiring good 

relations with Morocco, regardless of outside pressures and any possible economic benefits to holding 

on to the Tarfaya Strip. The Spanish military withdrawal from Morocco was not going to happen overnight, and the general staff and national government 

in Madrid had an interest in cultivating good relations 

with Spain’s newly independent neighbor across the 
9

Gibraltar Strait. Overall, the relationship between 

the Spanish army and the embryonic FAR evolved 

relatively smoothly during this period, and Spanish 

military personnel stayed for several years during the 

transition. At the time, the Moroccan independence 

party, Istiql, even attempted to assuage Spanish concerns over LA forces in the Western Sahara by stressing the close ties between Spain and Morocco. Ironically, Istiql‘s leadership employed the same language 

of “Spanish-Moroccan brotherhood” that the Franco 

dictatorship had traditionally used for its own, albeit 

very different, purposes.13

The trajectory of Moroccan native Muhammed ben 

Mezzian Bel-Kassem, a friend and colleague in arms 

of Franco who rose to the rank of lieutenant general 

in the Spanish (sic) army, illustrates the ambiguities 

of Madrid’s position most stunningly. Serving as the 

Spanish Captain-General of the Canary Islands in 1956, 

he became a marshal in the Moroccan armed forces 

after Moroccan independence that year. Given the 

proximity of the Canary Islands and its importance as 

a staging area for the impending Ifni War, Bel-Kassem 

thus came uncomfortably close to serving both sides 

in the same conflict. As the Spanish Captain-General 

after Moroccan independence, he did not—for obvious reasons—have open lines of communication with 

the governor of Spanish West Africa or direct responsibility for Ifni. In any case, Bel-Kassem soon made an 

abrupt jump from the Spanish army back to his native 

homeland. Indeed, his participation in the spring of 

1958 as a representative of Morocco in Spain’s handover of the Tarfaya Strip raised more than a few eyebrows among his Spanish former colleagues.14

After the Ifni War and the ceding of the Tarfaya 

Strip, the Madrid government stated unequivocally its 
10

intentions to hold on to the Sidi Ifni enclave and the 

entire Spanish Sahara, designating the two territories 

(along with Equatorial Guinea) as provinces of Spain. 

In fact, Madrid hoped that its recognition of Morocco’s 

right to the southern zone of the protectorate (the Tarfaya Strip) would buy time and assuage Istiql ́s annexationist tendencies. On the other hand, the designation of Ifni and the Sahara as Spanish provinces went 

along with a hard-line diplomatic stance that would 

prove increasingly untenable in an era of decolonization.15 It was followed by a noticeable rise in Spanish 

colonization, investment, and development in the Sahara.16 A decade later, Spain ceded Ifni to Morocco in 

the January 1969 Treaty of Fez. In return, Spain was 

guaranteed special fishing privileges over the next 

decade, although Morocco unilaterally abrogated this 

part of the treaty 3 years later.17

In the meantime, Sahrawi nationalism slowly became a force to be reckoned with. Spain, as the initial 

target of the nationalists’ ire, responded somewhat 

ineptly to the new situation. Spanish authorities eventually moved toward granting more rights and political representation in the Sahara and Madrid, but these 

efforts came half-heartedly and late. In 1967, Spain 

created a new Jama‘a (Djemma), or General Assembly of the Sahara, which was supposed to represent 

Sahrawi interests. In fact, however, its membership 

included many tribal leaders who collaborated with 

Spanish authorities. As a result, the body would have 

little credibility among many Sahrawis, especially the 

younger nationalists.18 The situation foreshadowed 

Morocco‘s practice today of providing large financial 

incentives to collaborators, whose standing in turn diminishes in the ranks of the average Sahrawi. 
11

Spain’s inadequate response to the situation is not 

surprising; after all, under the Franco dictatorship, 

Spain itself lacked many political freedoms, so it is 

difficult to imagine that it would have implemented 

representative government anywhere else. Indeed, 

the ability of authoritarian governments to implement 

meaningful regional autonomy plans is open to question, as critics of Morocco’s latest autonomy proposal 

for Western Sahara have pointed out.19

Although Western Sahara’s days as a Spanish province were clearly numbered, many Spaniards still argue that had the Franco government acted differently, 

it might have prevented Morocco from occupying the 

territory in 1975. In fact, Spanish missteps at various 

levels helped set the stage for the current problems. A 

better understanding by the military high command 

of basic cultural, social, and political realities of indigenous societies would have helped. In particular, 

the Spaniards failed to pay sufficient attention to and 

adequately understand the most numerous and influential tribal confederation, the Rgaybat al-Sharq, and 

ignorant military policies inadvertently insulted and 

alienated many Sahrawis. Moreover, the Spanish persistence in ruling through traditional, older tribal elites 

became increasingly problematic, especially as those 

elites lost credibility among the younger generation.20

Nevertheless, the petitions of the early nationalists were 

relatively moderate.

Demonstrating Spain’s inability to comprehend 

and manage the evolving situation, a poorly attended 

public demonstration sponsored by Spanish agents 

and sheiks from the Jama‘a was overshadowed by 

what would go down in Western Saharan history as 

the “Zamlah massacre” of June 1970, when security 

forces opened fire on a Sahrawi demonstration in El 
12

Aaiún. Even though no Spaniards lost their lives, 

Spanish authorities responded harshly to the Zamlah 

upheaval: the first Sahrawi activist to press publicly 

for independence, Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri, 

“disappeared” while in the custody of the Spanish 

military. The death of Bassiri was not only a tragedy, 

but also counterproductive for Spain. According to 

a leading historian of Western Sahara who was formerly a Spanish army intelligence officer there, Bassiri 

had not been a “revolutionary agitator, but rather a 

peaceful theorist of Arab liberation,” and thus might 

have been brought into the Spanish camp.21

During this period of increasing tension in the Sahara, the Spaniards lacked a coherent national stance 

on the diplomatic stage. While the Spanish representation in the UN publicly revealed willingness to 

compromise, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and office of the presidency sent mixed signals.22 The latter, 

under Franco’s close friend and confidant Admiral 

Luis Carrero Blanco, could at times reveal considerable ignorance and an utter inability to comprehend 

the exigencies of international diplomacy in an age 

of decolonization. When, for example, two Communist delegates in the United Nations (UN) questioned 

Spanish sovereignty over the Canary Islands, Carrero 

Blanco’s hard-line camp responded with accusations 

of a “judeo-communist plot.”23

In the meantime, Morocco had created the Ministry of Mauritanian and Saharan Affairs in 1965, 

charged with working toward the goal of Greater 

Morocco. Although Sahrawi nationalists now view 

Morocco as their primary foe, many logically saw the 

Spanish occupiers as their principal opponents before 

1975. In 1971, El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed founded the 

Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra 
13

y Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO, or Polisario Front), 

which explicitly called for armed struggle. In its very 

early days, the Polisario remained ambiguous about 

its grand strategic goal, and integration with Morocco 

or Mauritania did not appear totally out of the question. With the support of Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania, its forces began to attack Spanish interests, 

beginning with assaults on relatively small military 

outposts. On the international scene, the Polisario succeeded in bringing attention to its cause in the UN and 

elsewhere, but its leadership was slow to recognize 

the threat Morocco posed to its ultimate goal 

of independence.

In 1975, the situation finally came to a head. In 

May, a UN mission to Spanish Sahara encountered 

dramatic manifestations of public support for the 

Polisario and opposition to unification with Morocco 

or Mauritania, and on October 15, it issued a report 

in favor of Sahrawi self-determination. The next day, 

the International Court of Justice in The Hague made 

public its ruling against Morocco’s claim to the territory, although Moroccan King Hassan II interpreted 

it otherwise. On the same day as the ruling, Hassan II 

announced what would become known as the “Green 

March,” in which about 350,000 unarmed people were 

to walk across the border from Morocco into Western Sahara and claim it for the former. (Green is the 

traditional color of Islam). With this announcement, 

the king garnered tremendous domestic support 

from across the political spectrum, and volunteers 

for the march overwhelmed the recruiting offices that 

promptly opened throughout Morocco.

Spanish dictator Franco, in the meantime, was on 

his deathbed and under pressure from the United 

States and France to come to an agreement with Mo-
14

rocco and relinquish the Saharan territory. On October 30, the Moroccan volunteers for the Green March 

converged on Tarfaya, awaiting word from Hassan II 

to move into the Spanish Sahara (soon to be known as 

the Western Sahara or, to Morocco, as the “Southern 

Provinces”). On November 6, the volunteers crossed 

the border. Spanish soldiers received orders not to fire 

on the marchers, and they even assisted the marchers in avoiding landmines, although there was some 

fighting to the east between Moroccans and the Polisario forces who had occupied the recently withdrawn 

Spanish positions. Three days later, after Spain agreed 

to enter into negotiations for relinquishing the Sahara, 

Hassan II announced that the marchers could return 

to Tarfaya. On November 14, representatives from 

Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania signed the Pact of 

Madrid, which divided the territory between the two 

African countries. Franco, in the hospital and having been operated on twice since the Green March 

began, died early in the morning of November 20. 

Spain would formally complete its withdrawal from 

Western Sahara in February 1976.

Although rarely reflected in official Spanish government policies, the Polisario’s cause enjoys a remarkable degree of popular support in Spain today. 

This support, which extends from leftist political activists to conservative military officers, translates into 

tangible benefits—economic and otherwise—for many 

Sahrawis, as we will see. It stems in no small part from 

a collective perception of guilt over the developments 

of 1975 and a belief that Spain could have decisively 

altered the course of events. According to this line of 

reasoning, the previous failure of Spanish colonial 

officials to manage Sahrawi nationalism before it became uncontrollable, combined with the subsequent 
15

inability of hardliners in Madrid to recognize that decolonization was unavoidable, worked to the benefit 

of Hassan II. In other words, had the Spaniards played 

their cards differently, Western Sahara could arguably 

have achieved independence on terms beneficial to 

Spain while also precluding annexation by Morocco 

and Mauritania. Instead, key figures in Madrid, most 

notably Admiral Carrero Blanco, continued to insist 

that Spain would never relinquish the territory. 

A more improbable counterfactual argument, especially popular among conspiracy theorists, maintains that the assassination of Carrero Blanco in late 

1973, followed by Franco’s long illness, left Spain 

without the kind of strong leadership that would have 

prevented the “betrayal” of the Sahrawis to Moroccan, French, U.S., and other outside interests. In fact, 

the United States appears to have pressured Spain on 

the issue and to have contributed, along with a Saudisponsored Strategic Studies group in London, to the 

planning of the Green March. General Vernon Walters, whose connections with the Moroccan monarchy 

went back decades, may have played a particularly 

significant role in the events, which Secretary of State 

Henry Kissinger also deemed important to U.S. interests in the region.24 Kissinger feared a possible rise of 

Communist influence in the region. 

Yet, regardless of any possible outside involvement 

by the United States, France, or anyone else, Spanish 

society was by no means willing to support a war with 

Morocco over the Sahara. Furthermore, it is not likely 

that the Spanish government, under a healthy Franco 

or anyone else, would have employed force to halt 

the Green March, especially when under strong pressure from the United States and elsewhere to avoid 

military conflict with Morocco. Spanish soldiers firing 
16

upon masses of unarmed Moroccans would have provoked international outrage. Spain would also have 

suffered economic and diplomatic reprisals from Arab 

countries and in the Middle East, which had been a 

linchpin of Spanish international relations since 

World War II.

As the Spaniards withdrew, the Polisario occupied 

some of their positions and attacked the Moroccan 

and Mauritanian forces. According to witnesses, the 

Moroccan soldiers acted brutally as they invaded. As 

word spread of widespread murder, rape, and other 

atrocities, Sahrawi civilians, whom the Polisario had 

initially instructed to stay put, began to flee in mass.25

During December 1975 and January 1976, some 40,000 

people fled to refugee camps in the interior of the Sahara. The refugees consisted largely of women, children, and the elderly, as most of the men joined the 

Polisario military force. Moroccan planes subsequently launched air attacks on Sahrawi refugee camps, 

which caused hundreds of deaths, in some cases dropping napalm, white phosphorous, and fragmentation 

bombs. 26 Their intention was to force the refugees to 

return to the areas they had fled, now under Moroccan 

control. Instead, the bombings were counterproductive and, with them, the Moroccans squandered any 

possibility they might have had of winning over the 

Sahrawis. Moreover, the invasion and exodus helped 

break down traditional tribal barriers, facilitating the 

growth of Sahrawi national identity among the refugees now living together in the camps.27

In February 1976, as Spain officially ended its presence in Western Sahara, the Polisario proclaimed the 

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), and its 

forces continued to launch effective guerrilla attacks 

on supply lines and economic and military targets. Se-
17

riously weakened by the war, the Mauritanian government withdrew its forces in 1979 and even recognized 

the SADR, much to the displeasure of Rabat. Not surprisingly, Morocco quickly claimed and annexed the 

area Mauritania had occupied, while the war between 

Morocco and the Polisario Front continued. With military aid from Algeria, Libya, and reportedly Cuba and 

North Korea on occasion, the Polisario Front posed a 

considerable challenge to the Moroccan armed forces 

throughout the war, even though the Moroccans benefited from very large amounts of aid from the United 

States and additional assistance from France, Saudi 

Arabia, and many other countries.28 After adopting 

a defensive military strategy based on the enormous 

defensive barrier lines known as “the Wall” or “the 

Berm,” Morocco succeeded in occupying about 80 

percent of the disputed territory by 1991. But the FAR 

were unable to defeat the Polisario decisively; to do 

so would require invading Algeria, which continues 

to host enormous Sahrawi refugee camps. In 1991, a 

UN-supported ceasefire went into effect.

With the ceasefire, the UN assumed an active role 

in trying to bring about peace, but Morocco’s resistance to a referendum and the Polisario’s goal of complete independence impeded efforts at a resolution. In 

1997, the UN appointed James Baker as special envoy 

for Western Sahara, and his efforts produced the only 

signed agreement between Morocco and Polisario: the 

Houston Agreement of September 1997. Baker continued his efforts to reach a solution until 2003, when 

he resigned in frustration over the intransigence of 

Morocco, which enjoyed considerable support from 

Washington after the terror attacks of 9/11. Since 2005, 

Sahrawi nationalists have employed “intifada” tactics 

in the Moroccan-occupied territories, while increasing 
18

dissatisfaction in the refugee camps around Tindouf, 

Algeria, is clear, especially among the younger generation. As we will see, there is also much fear that the 

influence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 

and other potential sources of instability in the 

Sahel may be spilling over into the refugee camps 

and the Western Sahara.

THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHY

Terrain.

One cannot understand the Polisario insurgency’s 

socio-cultural roots, military achievements, or the reason both sides eventually settled on a ceasefire without a good grasp of Western Saharan physical and 

human geography—neither of which has remained 

static. In fact, changes in both created the conditions 

for the insurgency and enabled it to develop so successfully. At the same time, Morocco’s slowly learned 

ability to respond to and alter geographical conditions 

helped bring about the ceasefire of 1991, even though 

Morocco’s actions also made a long-term solution 

more elusive in some ways.

As we have seen, northern Western Sahara is especially amenable to guerrilla activities, offering ample 

cover and good areas for small bases to those who 

know the terrain well. Yet, the southern portion of the 

territory has also proved difficult for counterinsurgency efforts. Making good use of their knowledge 

of the terrain, insurgents took advantage of the vast 

amount of space and their enemies’ somewhat limited 

resources and unfamiliarity with the environment. 

During the colonial period, when the Spaniards and 

French began to employ air policing, the insurgents 
19

soon learned to avoid aerial detection by operating 

at night. Decades earlier, when the Polisario Front 

became active in the area, nocturnal operations still 

proved effective. During the 1980s, some observers 

believed that Moroccan acquisition of infrared technology would be disastrous for the Polisario. During 

this period, Morocco also installed Westinghouse radar systems and other electronic detection equipment 

from France and the United States, which provided 

Morocco with intelligence. 29

Yet, terrain continued to favor the insurgents, in 

spite of any new technological superiority on the part 

of the Moroccans. Just as air power alone did not do 

the trick for the French and the Spaniards, radar and 

electronic sensors during the 1980s did not make a decisive difference in the Moroccan counterinsurgency 

campaigns against the Polisario: possibly because of 

an inability to buy sufficient infrared technology; poor 

training; or because the devices could not withstand 

high heat or effectively penetrate large-particle haze.

The Moroccan military also lacked enough radar to 

cover all of its remote outposts.30 As these constraints 

and the ineffectiveness of search-and-destroy tactics 

became clear, Morocco limited its focus to the “useful triangle” in the north, formed by the population 

centers of El Aaiún and Smara and the phosphate 

mines at Bukra‘, and then developed the defensive 

strategy of the Berm. Thus, only after adopting a new 

strategy, resting on this sophisticated and expensive 

system of walls, did the technological and materiel 

superiority of the Moroccan forces begin to overcome 

the geographical advantages formerly enjoyed by the 

Polisario forces. Even then, however, the Moroccans 

could only control the insurgency rather than defeat 

it definitively.
20

Natural Resources.

The natural resources in Western Sahara have 

shaped human geography, outside interests, and insurgent movements in several ways. Although it is incorrect to attribute Morocco’s expansion into Western 

Sahara solely to the mineral resources there, Morocco 

clearly stands to gain from their full exploitation. The 

desire to develop the economic potential offered by 

Western Saharan geography began to grow in earnest after the discovery of large phosphate deposits 

by the Spaniards after World War II. Phosphate is a 

limited resource that is crucial to modern industrial 

agriculture, and the global demand for it is growing 

as its price continues to rise. Indeed, phosphate will 

be probably be instrumental for further agricultural 

development in India, sub-Saharan Africa, and many 

other parts of the world.

Madrid placed high hopes in reaping economic 

gains by exploiting the phosphate deposits at Bukra’, 

which were discovered by a Spanish geologist in 1947. 

But it was not until 1972 that extraction and exportation began via the world’s longest conveyor belt, 

stretching well over 100 km to the port of El Aaiún. 

Spanish military officials had recommended the construction of a railroad line instead of the conveyer 

belt, which was divided into sections between 7 and 

11 km each, because they believed the belt would be 

too vulnerable. Predictably enough, in October 1974, 

a Polisario commando unit comprised of seven men 

and assisted by local workers rendered the conveyor 

belt inoperable.31 Resuming operations after the Spanish withdrawal in late-1975, Bukra’ and the conveyor 

belt have been primary objects of both Polisario attacks and Moroccan defensive strategy ever since. 
21

Leading scholars of Western Sahara describe the 

phosphate reserves at Bukra’ as “of an extremely high 

quality,” noting that they are close to the surface. But 

they also write that at first the phosphates cost Morocco more than they were worth, pointing to the expenses incurred guarding the mine and conveyor belt and 

the steep drop in phosphate prices in the late-1970s.32

Some officials at the Bukra’ mine, moreover, depict 

the phosphates there as of poor quality and claim that 

the extraction is not cost-effective for Morocco, implying that the country’s interest in Western Sahara‘s 

phosphate production stems from a political desire 

to demonstrate Morocco’s economic commitment to 

the region.33

Yet, even if this claim was true, there is no question that Morocco, which is already the world’s largest exporter of phosphates, understands well the significance of the substance to the country’s current and 

future economic condition, and the country may be 

earning between $80 and $150 million each year from 

Bukra’ alone. Recent debates about “peak phosphate 

theory” only highlight the future importance of this 

resource on the world stage.34 According to one analysis, U.S. phosphate supplies will run out within the 

next 4 decades, but Morocco has a supply of at least 

300 years, and other predictions about Morocco’s ability to control the world market are even more dramatic. Without phosphate, global food production would 

decrease, contributing to possible famines in poor 

countries. Indeed, the issue has the potential to alter 

current appraisals of American strategic interests in 

the region. Theoretically, the United States and others 

might benefit from Western Saharan independence 

because the market position power in phosphate 

production of Morocco, which may be 85 percent of 
22

the world’s phosphate reserves (including Western 

Sahara), would then decline.35

At present, however, fishing off of the Western Saharan coast probably has more immediate economic 

significance than phosphate production. Fishing has 

brought in millions, possibly billions, of dollars directly and indirectly, the latter through contracts with 

the European Union (EU) and other countries. 36 The 

Polisario has strongly contested Morocco’s right to 

control these waters, at times acting with force against 

fishing boats from Spain and elsewhere that have entered them. Yet, in spite of these actions, the UN’s position on the issue, and the Polisario’s protests, the EU 

made agreements with Morocco over Western Saharan 

waters, even as the United States resisted negotiating 

with Morocco over the waters of the disputed territory.37 In addition, outside fishing concerns reportedly 

bribe Moroccan officials in order to fish off the Saharan coast, resulting in destructive overfishing.38

The perceived potential of another natural resource, hydrocarbons, has attracted attention in Western Sahara since the Spanish period. Morocco, which 

spends heavily on oil imports, has a logical interest 

in any oil that may be there, as do major consuming 

countries worldwide. The United States, for instance, 

has revealed a growing inclination to look to Western 

Africa for oil, as Washington’s willingness to ignore 

the many unpleasant aspects of the regime of another 

former Spanish colony, Equatorial Guinea, attests. 

Although Madrid made deals for oil surveying and 

exploration in the Sahara by foreign companies, these 

agreements failed to yield practical economic benefits, 

and since the Spanish withdrawal, the contentious 

situation has scared away potential investors. On this 

issue, the Polisario has done effective public relations 
23

work, and activists have convinced an American oil 

company to withdraw from an agreement it made 

with Morocco.39 The Atlantic coast also figures into 

Algeria’s geostrategic interests in establishing a 

friendly port there, thereby encircling Morocco. 

Although the establishment of the port is not a primary cause of the various actors’ actions, it has 

served to fuel diplomatic and military alliances with 

the Polisario.

Two other exports from the Western Sahara 

are sand and salt. According to figures proved by 

the pro-Sahrawi organization Committee for the 

Protection of the Natural Resources of the Western Sahara (CSPRON) in 2009, 9.4 million tons of 

sand and 2,200 tons of salt are exported annually 

from the Western Sahara by Morocco.40

Human Geography.

As Zunes and Mundy note, if Western Sahara 

were to gain independence, it would be one of the 

least populated countries in the world. In 2000, the 

UN counted about 86,000 native Western Saharans 

of voting age. If the actual total is more than double 

this figure, Western Sahara still has one of the lowest 

population densities on the planet. The other half, living in “occupied territory” under Moroccan control, 

now constitutes a minority population, as Moroccan settlers and soldiers outnumber the indigenous 

population. Almost one half of the native population has lived as refugees in Algeria since 1976. According to a December 2008 report by Human Rights 

Watch, the camps near Tindouf are home to about 

125,000 people.41
24

Yet, numbers alone do not tell the story. Nomadic traditions mean that common Western and even 

North African conceptions of boundaries, property, 

and government jurisdiction have historically had 

somewhat limited applicability in Western Sahara. 

Moreover, several special characteristics of the indigenous people—whose “national” identity is a recent 

development and a matter of some dispute—bear 

mention. The term Sahrawi as a term for the indigenous people of the Spanish Sahara came into being 

only in the mid-20th century, and some scholars and 

many Moroccans portray Sahrawi identity as a wholly 

artificial invention.42

Complicated questions of ethnicity, history, and 

cultural traditions make generalizations about Sahrawis difficult. Since the colonial period, outside observers have characterized Western Saharan society 

as “tribal”—with the tribes subdivided into fractions, 

subfractions, and families, with complex and sometimes overlapping alliances and rivalries. Sahrawis 

have been categorized in terms of castes, cabilas, 

and tribes, falling under such designations as “Arab 

Hassan” (descendants of the Arabs and warriors); 

“shurafa’” (descendants of the prophet); “Zawaya” 

(people of the Koran, or “scholarly”); “Zenagah” Berbers (“Sanhajah” in Arabic—associated with pastoral 

lifestyles and fishing); or “Tiknah” (assorted tribes 

from Northern Sahara and the Tarfaya region). Such 

categorization, however, implies a neatness and static 

quality to the designations, but the so-called castes 

and tribes and their respective characteristics can 

be dynamic and overlap.43 On the other hand, tribal 

identities and interethnic relationships have undeniably shaped many aspects of Western Saharan history, and their social and political relevance, however 

diminished, persists.
25

Historically, the success or failure of Spanish occupational policies in the region often hinged on the 

understanding by military leaders of local ethnic identities and historical traditions. The relatively smooth 

occupation in 1934 of the Ifni area by Spain stemmed, 

in no small part, from Colonel Osvaldo Capaz’s exceptional understanding of the local leadership, society, and culture. The Ifni region lies to the north of the 

current northern border of Western Sahara. But as Capaz knew well, in spite of their proximity, the peoples 

of Ifni tended to be more sedentary than the nomadic 

peoples of Spanish Sahara, with correspondingly different conceptions of property and jurisdiction, and 

he adjusted his dealings with local leaders accordingly. Conversely, subsequent Spanish military administrators in Western Sahara did not have Capaz’s 

grasp of the tribal and social organizations. Because 

of their lack of knowledge, especially about the most 

important groupings in the territory—the Rgaybat 

confederations—they made policy errors that played 

tangible roles in the weakening of Spanish authority 

and the less-than-ideal circumstances of Spain’s withdrawal from the Sahara 4 decades later.44

The native inhabitants of Western Sahara share 

many similarities with the Arab and Imazighen (Berber) ethnic groups of North Africa, and for many 

Moroccans, differences between themselves and the 

Sahrawis are not sufficient to deprive the latter of a 

Moroccan identity. For example, although nomadism 

traditionally characterized many tribes of the Spanish 

Sahara region, parts of Morocco also have strong nomadic traditions. Modern Sahrawi nationalism, however, emphasizes the linguistic, cultural, and nomadic 

characteristics and traditions that the nationalism believes uniquely unite all Sahrawis and distinguish them 
26

from others—especially Moroccans. At the same time, 

the Polisario negates—and actively suppresses—traditional tribal distinctions and hierarchies within the 

Western Sahara.

As is often the case, language reflects and fosters 

sentiments of national identity. Not only do the Sahrawis favor Hassaniya Arabic over Moroccan Arabic, 

or Darija, but when speaking a European tongue, they 

make a point of favoring Spanish over French, which 

they associate with Morocco. In fact, modern Sahrawi 

national identity also has a Hispanic component stemming from Spanish colonial history and more recent 

ties with Cuba.45 Curiously, Spanish colonization also 

fostered the spread of Hassaniya. After Spain began 

colonizing the Ifni region in 1934, relations between 

Ifni’s Ba Amrani and neighboring peoples increased. 

With time, the use of Hussaniya in Ba Amrani Cabilas, whose native language was the Berber dialect of 

Tassasit, increased markedly.46 Along the same lines, 

today’s second generation “settlers” from Morocco to 

Western Sahara often speak Hassaniya.47

It is clear that language is a fundamental aspect of 

Sahrawi national identity, as reflected in perhaps the 

most useful definition of Sahrawis—“the Hassaniyyahspeaking peoples who claim membership among at 

least one of the social groupings found in and around 

the area now known as Western Sahara.”48 But even 

this definition is not perfect, as its authors write. The 

Moroccan government’s policy of moving people into 

the Sahara—thereby deliberately altering the region’s 

traditional human geography—has further confused 

the matter. Among the Moroccan settlers in Western 

Sahara are many ethnic Sahrawis from southern Morocco. Even when they share the same language and 

social systems as those of the Sahrawis from Western 
27

Sahara, their overall political allegiance or sense of 

national identity may differ. 

Needless to say, this lack of agreement on the fundamental question of what constitutes a Sahrawi only 

further complicates the efforts of the UN and others 

to find reliable census figures or organize a plebiscite, 

and Morocco’s tendency to obfuscate the issue to its 

own advantage does not help. Furthermore, the varying degrees of collaboration between many Sahrawis 

and Moroccan authorities over the years cannot be 

erased, creating paradoxical mixes of political and 

ethnic identities. Should the Polisario ever achieve its 

goal of full independence, the ensuing “settling of accounts” with collaborators will be ugly and may well 

lead to civil war, as Sahrawis who have recognized 

and benefited from Moroccan sovereignty fear.49

Climate, Politics, and Changes in Human 

Geography.

Spain’s attempts to exploit natural resources and 

its policies of economic development, however modest compared with Cold War-era U.S. modernization 

projects, increased the tendency among the traditionally nomadic peoples of the Sahara to adopt more sedentary lifestyles. In the meantime, several droughts 

since the mid-1950s also contributed to a decline in 

the nomadic way of life among Sahrawis. The generally unfavorable climate between 1956 and 1969 led 

to a big drop in the animal population, which helps 

explain why the Polisario military relied so heavily on 

Land Rovers rather than on the traditional Sahrawi 

military use of camels.50

Until the Spanish withdrew in 1975, the consequences of increased sedentariness and economic 
28

development, however limited, were multifold. First, 

the nationalist, anti-Spanish, and then anti-Moroccan ideologies spread faster and easier in places 

with more sedentary populations than among the 

dispersed and ambulant tribes of the desert.51 The 

increased awareness and exploitation of natural resources also stimulated resentment against outsiders 

for profiting while Sahrawis remained at the bottom 

of the economic hierarchy. Moreover, sedentariness 

seems to have brought with it an increased demand 

for consumer goods and growing unhappiness with 

the current situation, just as international anti-colonial 

and pan-Arab rhetoric found more receptive listeners, especially among the younger generation. In the 

meantime, the economic potential of natural resources 

only further attracted the attention of Rabat, where 

Western Sahara already had a prominent place in the 

nationalist vision of “Greater Morocco” and the Alawi 

dynasty’s legitimacy. During the Spanish period, Morocco thus had an interest in stimulating anti-colonial 

resistance among Sahrawis, although such Sahrawi 

nationalist resistance would eventually stand in the 

way of Rabat’s own annexationist objectives over the 

long term. 

IDEOLOGIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

The strength of the ideologies of the principal protagonists of Western Sahara conflict helps explain why 

it has lasted so long. At the time of Moroccan independence, the father of Moroccan nationalism and head 

of the Istiql party Allal al-Fassi published his map 

of “Greater Morocco,” the establishment of which 

became an explicit goal of the Moroccan monarchy. 

Going back to the 11th century, he argued that Mo-
29

rocco’s historical borders encompassed a very large 

portion of northwestern Africa, including significant 

chunks of Algeria and Mali and all of Western Sahara 

and Mauritania, extending southward to the Senegal 

River. In October 1957, the new Moroccan state officially adopted the ideology of Greater Morocco, and 

the `Alawi dynasty staked its legitimacy in part on the 

preservation of its “southern provinces,” as it calls the 

Western Sahara. As a component of Moroccan national identity, the belief that Western Sahara belongs to 

Morocco has enjoyed widespread domestic support. 

The monarchy, subjected at various times to assassination attempts, food riots, and other threats, has not 

shied away from appealing to this aspect of Moroccan 

nationalism, especially in times of crisis. 52

The Polisario Front’s ideology makes similar use 

of the powerful force of nationalism, building upon 

fundamental notions of sovereignty, anti-colonialism, and Sahrawi national identity. As we have seen, 

Sahrawi national identity is largely (if not entirely) a 

modern invention, and Spanish colonialism played a 

key role in the inception and development of nationalism in Western Sahara. Yet, even if it appears artificial 

and lacks deep historical roots, Sahrawi nationalism 

has exhibited remarkable effectiveness as a galvanizing force for the Polisario insurgency. One can argue, 

moreover, that all nationalisms are “artificial” entities 

serving political interests. In any case, the actions of 

Spain, and especially of Morocco beginning in 1975, 

did much to bring the peoples of Western Sahara together in the face of a perceived common threat. As 

refugees together endured bombings by the Moroccan Air Force and other hardships, traditional tribal 

distinctions diminished, fostering perceptions of community and shared identity. 
30

Nevertheless, the Polisario’s achievements resulted 

from far more than the force of Sahrawi national identity alone, invented or otherwise. Along with nationalist sentiments, the organization of the movement and 

its modern socio-cultural outlook also explain its success. The Polisario was founded with a program that 

strongly reflected the influence of the Arab liberation 

movement, exemplified by Egypt’s Nasser, Algeria’s 

Bumedian, and Libya’s Quaddafi. It is not surprising, 

then, that the Polisario’s struggle has been categorized 

as a revolutionary insurgency.53 In the era of the Cold 

War, such a program did not exactly facilitate sympathy for its cause by Western countries. 

Yet, the Polisario leadership learned to downplay 

its initial Socialist and pan-Arab program, even as it 

relied on the support of countries like Algeria and 

Libya. According to one of its historical leaders, the 

Polisario “was always a nationalist movement, not a 

Marxist movement. There were always Marxists in the 

Polisario, but also many other tendencies.”54 Indeed, 

in practical terms, the movement’s most revolutionary 

aspects lie less in Marxist economics than in the cultural front, exemplified by: its rejection of traditional 

tribal affiliations and hierarchies; its prioritization of 

education; abolishment of slavery; and, support for 

women’s rights. Tellingly, the Polisario Front has 

managed to garner some of its strongest outside political and diplomatic support from Spanish conservatives like the strongly pro-American former president 

José María Aznar (1996-2004), who lent more practical 

diplomatic and moral assistance to the Polisario than 

did his Socialist predecessors or successors. The conservative support for the Polisario comes from a complex mix of traditional Spanish paternalist colonial 

ideology, feelings of guilt over the “betrayal” of the 
31

Sahrawis in 1975, and the good relations that sometimes formed among Spanish and Sahrawi comrades 

in arms. In February 1976, when the Polisario proclaimed the SADR, it presented the new state as free, 

independent, sovereign, ruled by a system of national 

democracy, and Islamic. The Polisario‘s spokesman 

described the state as desirous of peace but fighting 

to defend its independence, territorial integrity, and 

natural resources and wealth.55

The Polisario looked to existing Socialist regimes 

of the era when setting up its political organization, 

and it used Vietnamese and Algerian models for its 

military structure.56 Organizationally, the Polisario 

consisted of three wings: the political wing for propaganda and psychological operations; the diplomatic 

wing; and the military wing, initially tasked with undertaking actions against Spanish forces. The principal figure was the Secretary General who was assisted 

by an executive committee of nine members. Those 

nine members were also among the 21 members of the 

executive wing. Three members of the executive wing 

had specific responsibility for “mass organizations,” 

including three social categories: workers, peasants, 

and women. The political bureau members elected 19 

members of the “people’s committees” to serve as the 

“people’s national council.” At the base of the organization, every group of 10 people constitutes a cell, and 

each faction/band (“bando”) had its own military and 

political hierarchy.57

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: 

MILITARY METHODS AND DEVELOPMENTS

In the wake of the Green March and Spain’s announcement that it would withdraw its forces from 

the Sahara, the Polisario’s future looked bleak to many 
32

observers. The U.S. ambassador in Rabat believed that 

the desert terrain would facilitate a relatively smooth 

and rapid counterinsurgency campaign by Morocco, 

and an International Institute for Strategic Studies 

report made similar predictions.58 After all, even the 

Spaniards, who had committed significant policy 

errors and disposed of relatively few resources, had 

managed to maintain a presence in the Sahara for 

nearly a century. Hence, in the eyes of many observers, Morocco should have been able to suppress the 

Sahrawi insurgency fairly easily.

Needless to say, the insurgency proved to be far 

more difficult to put down than anyone expected; a 

quarter of a century later, the conflict remains unresolved. Reasons for the Polisario’s survival include 

its access to outside support and sanctuaries, international diplomacy and public relations, and some luck. 

Nevertheless, developments in the purely military 

sphere go far to explain why the early predictions of 

easy Moroccan success proved so wrong. The strategic 

and tactical thought of the Polisario’s military leadership, the high level of morale and experience of its 

soldiers, and the Sahrawis’ ability to use geography 

to their advantage proved more than a match for their 

opponents. On the other side, the Mauritanian armed 

forces disposed of relatively few human and materiel 

resources, while the ineffectiveness and operational 

shortcomings of Moroccan counterinsurgency (COIN) 

manifested itself on various occasions. 

Long before the Polisario war, the success of Spain’s 

military in the initial conquest and long occupation of 

the Sahara stemmed from various factors, including 

the relatively peaceful nature and isolated situation 

of the first indigenous contacts, the skills and experience of key Spanish military leaders, and the lack of 
33

negative outside interference or sanctuaries. In fact, 

it suited France, as the leading outside power in the 

area, for the tribes of Spanish Sahara to be submitted 

to colonial control. Moreover, the nomadic character 

and low numbers of the indigenous tribes helped keep 

them from posing a significant threat to authorities. 

When troubles arose most notably in the Ifni War, 

they came as much from outside as from within the 

territory: namely, from the newly independent state 

of Morocco. On the battlefield, the Spaniards’ learning curve was steep, and it took considerable efforts to 

overcome Spanish shortcomings in military planning, 

logistics, and command and control issues. Spanish 

COIN was more noteworthy in the ensuing cleanup 

of LA forces in the Sahara. Benefiting from the experience of the successful airborne drops during the Ifni 

War, the Spanish military made extensive and very 

effective use of columns of paratroopers to attack LA 

forces and relieve besieged garrisons in the Sahara. 

Of course, Operation HURRICANE was also a joint 

enterprise, in which the participation of the French 

was crucial. 59

By the time the Spaniards left, Western Sahara had 

changed dramatically, experiencing a significant decline in nomadism, a corresponding growth of urban 

areas, and increased economic development. Thus, 

while the efficacy of Spanish military methods explain, in part, the longevity of Spain’s rule, it is equally 

true that after 1975, the Sahrawis gained the capability 

to mount military and political attacks of a scale and 

sophistication that the Spaniards had rarely, if ever, 

faced. Moreover, Sahrawi nationalism had exploded 

into a formidable force. Thus, while contrasting the 

relative success of Spanish civil affairs and political 

COIN in North Africa with that of its Moroccan coun-
34

terpart may have some value, a contrast between the 

purely military methods of Spanish and Moroccan 

counterinsurgency campaigns is less useful.

The Polisario Front vs. Morocco and Mauritania: 

1975-79.

As Morocco’s FAR moved rapidly across Western 

Sahara after the Green March of November 1975, thousands of Sahrawi men, many with relevant experience 

and training from their service in the Spanish armed 

forces, joined the Polisario Front’s military wing. In 

some cases, moreover, Spanish soldiers may have donated arms and supplies as they departed.60 Polisario 

forces soon took part in a nearly continuous series 

of guerrilla attacks against the FAR, which had employed large motorized columns to occupy positions 

deep into the Sahara by early-February 1976. On February 5, the Moroccans took Tifariti near the northern 

Mauritanian border, and a week later, they occupied 

Guelta to the southwest. Shortly thereafter, a column 

of five FAR battalions moved toward the Mahbes 

in the northeastern corner of the Western Sahara near 

the Moroccan and Algerian borders. Before doing so, 

the Moroccans sought and received assurances from 

Algeria that it would not oppose the occupation 

of Mahbes.61

The Polisario Front’s military forces, known as 

the Sahrawi Popular Liberation Army (Ejército de 

Liberación Popular Sahuraui, or ELPS) responded to 

the FAR’s rapid movements and occupations with 

surprising effectiveness. Beginning in 1976, the military forces benefited from an increase in the depth 

and breadth of their armaments and other supplies, 

which until this point had come solely from Algeria 
35

and Libya. Now they received valuable weaponry 

from North Korea and elsewhere, and by 1978, the 

weapons at their disposal included recoilless artillery, 

14.5 mm ZPU anti-aircraft machine guns, 120 mm 

mortars, multiple rocket launchers, SAM 7 portable 

missile launchers, and rocket-propelled grenades 

(RPGs). They would also acquire T-55 tanks, SAM 6 

missile systems, armored troop carriers, and Soviet 

amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles (BMPs) 

and Soviet armored reconnaissance/surveillance vehicles (BTRs). Weapons mounted on pickup truck 

beds, as seen recently in combat in Libya, boosted the 

Polisario’s offensive power.62

Even with such weaponry, however, the Polisario’s military endeavors would not have met with so 

much success had the ELPS not perfected the tactics of 

desert insurgency, practiced earlier on a smaller scale 

against the Spanish military. To minimize the disadvantage of the lack of cover in the desert, the ELPS 

would create a large buffer zone between themselves 

and the Moroccan positions. From their own positions, they would suddenly attack Moroccan forces 

on the move and then quickly pull back. When the 

ELPS succeeded in dislodging the FAR from strong 

points, the guerrilla bands might temporarily occupy 

them but would then withdraw rapidly in order to 

attack again against other strong points. In this way, 

they subjected the Moroccan positions to continuous 

offensives, and their operational capacity continued 

to improve. Fighting was especially fierce during the 

summers, when the Sahrawis were better adapted 

to the hot climate than were the vast majority of the 

Moroccan soldiers.63
36

By April 1977, the ELPS had downed 18 planes and 

combat helicopters and two cargo planes, and taken 

out some 600 vehicles. According to some casualty figures, the FAR suffered 4,200 deaths, 2,800 wounded, 

and had 96 soldiers taken prisoner, while the Mauritanian forces had 1,600 deaths, 900 wounded, and 16 

soldiers taken prisoner. One explanation for the ratios, 

if correct, may be that the ELPS made it a policy not to 

take prisoners.64

Yet, the Polisario’s military feats, although a significant concern for Morocco, did not bring strategic 

victory, as they succeeded neither in destroying nor 

expelling the FAR. Not only were the Polisario forces 

much smaller than those of their enemies, but they 

were incapable of the kind of operational coordination that fighting the two powers in separate areas 

entailed.65 As we will see, an inability to coordinate 

forces and actions over the large desert theater would 

continue to pose difficulties for both the ELPS and 

its opponents even after Mauritania withdrew from 

the war. In the meantime, it was difficult to discern 

much in Polisario strategic thought beyond the classic 

protracted war strategy. Overall, the Polisario insurgency, although not fitting neatly into the category of 

protracted revolutionary war, reveals the clear influence of Mao, and the victory of the National Liberation Front (FLN) over the French in Algeria was also a 

source of inspiration.66 But ELPS leaders, made aware 

relatively early in the war that their many tactical 

triumphs were not leading to decisive victory, 

looked beyond the usual Maoist platitudes to focus on the peculiarities of their own situation. In 

particular, they took note of the unequal partnership of the countries they faced and made strategic 

adjustments accordingly.67
37

After first simply targeting exposed enemy forces 

wherever it found them, the ELPS leadership soon 

decided to attack its opponents in detail, albeit at a 

strategic rather than a tactical level. Shifting to a more 

reserved posture toward the FAR, the ELPS leaders 

began to direct the brunt of their offensives against 

Mauritania, which was clearly the weaker of their enemies. In this fashion, the Polisario leadership sought 

to compel Mauritania to drop out of the conflict, thereby leaving Morocco in a more vulnerable position.68

The targets of the ELPS would thus be as much 

economic and political as military; instead of simply 

trying to destroy the Mauritanian army, the Polisario aimed to weaken the government so much that it 

would have no choice but to seek peace. Yet, while 

the Polisario’s strategic goals against Mauritania were 

political and economic, it relied almost exclusively on 

military methods to achieve them. At this point in the 

war, the role of diplomacy was relatively small. 

In July 1976, a Polisario band made a 400-km journey to the suburbs of the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, and shelled it. On May 1, 1977, Polisario forces 

launched an audacious attack on the Mauritanian 

mining city of Zouerate. In this case, they went up 

against formidable defenses, including a garrison of 

1,000 soldiers and a wall of more than 60 km. With a 

column of 60 light vehicles and some 300 men, they attacked the European quarter of the city, home to more 

than 700 French technical workers from the mine and 

their families. The attackers not only inflicted numerous casualties on the Mauritanian garrison, but they 

also took six French hostages. Because of resulting security concerns, foreign workers began to leave Mauritania, causing a major interruption of iron mining. 

This interruption, along with attacks on the Zouerate-
38

Nouadhibou railroad, seriously damaged the Mauritanian economy.69 The Polisario followed up in July 

with another attack on Nouakchott, reached via a very 

long detour along the Algerian border so as to avoid 

contact with Mauritanian and Algerian forces. The 

ELPS forces, consisting of 600 men; over 100 vehicles; 

and ample arms, munitions, and supplies; reached 

Nouakchott, but suffered unexpected resistance and 

casualties at the hands of the Mauritanian military. 

More casualties resulted during their subsequent 

withdrawal from Mauritania.70

The Nouakchott operation had several important 

consequences. Above all, it represented another step 

toward the Polisario’s longer-term strategic goal of undermining the Morocco-Mauritania alliance and precipitating regime change in Nouakchott, even though, 

in purely military terms, it largely failed. More immediately, as a result of Mauritania’s protests after the 

attack, Algeria limited somewhat the Polisario’s use 

of Algerian territory as a launching point for future 

offensives. Morocco also became more involved in the 

fighting in Mauritania, as it began to fear for the fate 

of its ally. Another consequence of the Nouakchott operation was the death during the fighting of El-Ouali 

Mustapha Sayed, the prestigious, charismatic Secretary General and the head of the Polisario‘s military 

wing. His death provoked an internal debate within 

the Polisario over the scope of military operations. The 

leadership subsequently decided to further intensify 

the military attacks, while also undertaking a major 

“national” program of political and social mobilization in the refugee camps.71 The Polisario forces also 

experienced the consequences of targeting French interests, most dramatically outside Nouakchott, when 

they ran into recently arrived AML-10 armored ve-
39

hicles from France. Nonetheless, the Polisario would 

continue to attack Zouerate and take French hostages. 

The French responded by becoming more involved in 

the conflict, making use of their military base in Dakar, Senegal. Their intervention continued until June 

1978, when Mauritania’s defeat was clear, and nearly 

all the French technicians had been evacuated.72

As the Polisario’s offensives continued, Mauritania’s problems increased. Although the Mauritanian 

armed forces were relatively small—numbering only 

about 18,000 men during the conflict—for a country of 

its population, the drain of mobilizing so many men 

was considerable. Mauritania received some financial 

assistance from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Ivory 

Coast, but in 1977, the costs of the war consumed 

around 40 percent of the national budget, and in 1978, 

that figure rose to 60 percent. Moreover, the war grew 

increasingly unpopular among the rank-and-file soldiers. For many of the black soldiers in the Mauritanian army, who made up a majority of the soldiers but 

were often regarded disparagingly by other Mauritanians, it was a war between Arabs in which they failed 

to perceive a real stake, while many soldiers of Arab 

and Berber origin did not understand why they had 

to fight an enemy with which they had long enjoyed 

close ties.73 In the officer corps, there was resentment 

of the need to rely on Moroccan (and French) support 

to defend the country, which left Mauritanian commanders feeling insulted and with the sense that their 

authority had been challenged.74

 During 1977, there were various changes in the 

Mauritanian cabinet and military commands, and in 

July 1978, there was a coup d’état in Nouakchott, to be 

followed by more governmental shifts in the months 

that followed. Tellingly, during these events, Mauri-
40

tanian political leaders largely avoided references to 

the Polisario, instead emphasizing their desire to get 

the Moroccans out of their country.75 After a year-long 

ceasefire and then a brief resumption of hostilities, 

the Polisario Front and Mauritania signed a peace 

agreement on August 5, 1979.

In the end, the Polisario’s strategy had worked. 

Not only had the military attacks destabilized the 

Mauritanian state so much that it withdrew from the 

war, but the withdrawal left Morocco more vulnerable. The economic and military drain on Morocco 

was also clear; the FAR had grown from 60,000 men 

in 1975 to double that in 1979, the majority of whom 

were deployed in the Sahara.76 Algeria, against whom 

Morocco had fought and lost a border dispute known 

as the Sand War in 1963, thus had less to worry about 

from its neighbor. Now, without its former Mauritanian ally, the FAR had to defend much more territory. As would soon become clear, moreover, the 

ELPS was in the position to launch attacks within 

Morocco proper. 

The Continued Failure of Moroccan COIN: 1979-80.

After the Polisario-Mauritania peace treaty, Hassan II, whose government perceived Algerian pressure 

behind the negotiations, not only claimed the Western 

Saharan territory formerly occupied by Mauritania, 

but also stated that under no circumstances in the future would his country give up its right to the entire 

Sahara. By the same token, however, he had no intention of going to war with Algeria. The struggle against 

the Polisario had already significantly damaged the 

economy of Morocco. In 1979, military expenses reportedly made up some 40 percent of the state bud-
41

get, although other estimates are lower, and generous 

loans from Saudi Arabia eased the financial burden.77

In this situation, the FAR would prove inadequate to 

the task of suppressing the insurgency. The Polisario, 

in contrast, reached a high point in its effectiveness.

By 1978, the ELPS had more or less assumed the 

form of a conventional army; 2 years later, it probably numbered around 20,000 men, equipped with a 

diverse set of modern armaments and vehicles. With 

them, it could undertake far-reaching operations involving hundreds of vehicles and thousands of men. 

The ELPS soldiers made excellent use of their knowledge of the terrain—along with Soviet-armored BMPs 

and light, Land Rover-type vehicles—to achieve mobility and surprise. In addition to attacking Moroccan 

positions and military columns, the ELPS soldiers also 

targeted supply convoys with frequency, cut power 

supplies, and attacked the mines at Bukra’, halting 

phosphate extraction for 6 months.78

In contrast, the FAR had significant deficiencies. 

Unlike the Sahrawis, soldiers from the Rif, the Atlas Mountains, and Morocco’s towns and cities had 

a hard time adapting to the climate, which could be 

exceedingly hot during the day but then very cold at 

night. Because the logistical lines between Tan-Tan, 

Tarfaya, and El Aaiún were so vulnerable, many Moroccan positions did not receive supplies regularly. 

The FAR commanders displayed scant initiative, and 

some mid-level commands were incapable of undertaking operations at all.79 Military orders came from 

the headquarters of Hassan II, who—after surviving 

assassination attempts in 1971 and 1972—preferred to 

keep tight control over the FAR. The Moroccan army 

made little use of COIN tactics, assuming instead a defensive posture in trenches around population centers 
42

or advanced positions. The FAR shunned attempts to 

seek out the ELPS bands that roamed the desert. These 

deficiencies help explain why the FAR would perform 

so poorly in the late-1970s and early-1980s, in spite of 

its indisputable material advantage.80

Well aware of Morocco’s military weaknesses, 

the Polisario planned a sort of Sahrawi version of the 

Tet Offensive (albeit somewhat more spread out over 

time and probably not directly inspired by Vietnam.) 

The Huari Bumedian Offensive, named after the recently deceased Algerian president, was to be a general, systematic attack on FAR positions and economic 

targets in the Sahara and within Morocco (i.e., not just 

its southern provinces). The offensive aimed to inflict 

significant military and economic damage and undermine the credibility of the Moroccan government 

forces, thereby diminishing the capability and will of 

the country to remain in Western Sahara.81 The offensive also served as a clear signal that Algeria would 

not waver in its support for the Polisario.82

The offensive began on January 1, 1979, and succeeded in bringing the Bukra’ conveyor belt to a halt 

within days. In the middle of the month, there were 

more attacks north of El Aaiún. Then, on January 28, 

Polisario forces struck inside Morocco at Tan-Tan, the 

capital of Tarfaya. On the logistical line between Agadir and El Aaiún, the city hosted an air base and a garrison of several thousand Moroccan soldiers. The attackers managed to occupy the city for 4 hours, during 

which they freed 118 Sahrawi prisoners; took various 

Moroccans captive; and destroyed military installations, gasoline depots, and the electric power plant.83

As the Polisario intended, these offensives had 

serious repercussions in Morocco, where the public 
43

realized after the attack on Tan-Tan that the war was 

not going as well as the government claimed. Indeed, 

after the Polisario’s brief but highly effective occupation of that city, Morocco’s political parties demanded 

a parliamentary meeting to discuss the Sahara issue. 

By early March, the king publicly admitted that the 

situation was not getting better, and he announced 

the formation of a new national council on security 

comprised of a surprisingly wide range of the political 

spectrum. He also reorganized the FAR, replacing its 

commander for the southern provinces.84

Less than 2 weeks later, Polisario forces launched 

fierce attacks on the principal population centers in 

northern Western Sahara, and at the end of the month, 

they occupied Tifariti. In the meantime, they harassed 

the communication lines between Tan-Tan, Tarfaya, 

and El Aaiún so effectively that the latter henceforth 

had to be supplied by sea. After various other tactical 

successes, on August 24, a Polisario column scored a 

major victory against the Moroccan Third Armored 

Division near Leboirat. Caught by surprise, the Moroccans offered relatively little resistance, and many 

abandoned their posts and equipment. They suffered 

over 1,000 casualties and had more than 100 prisoners 

taken, whom the Polisario subsequently displayed—

along with the materiel they had seized—before the 

international press. The division also lost 37 T-54 

tanks in the encounter, and 77 Moroccan soldiers were 

subsequently charged with cowardice or negligence. 

At the strategic level, however, the Polisario failed in 

its objective for southern Morocco of bringing the FAR 

out of their footholds in Wadi al-Dhahab.85

In early-October, a column of over 5,000 men attacked Samara, a Saharan holy city defended by a 

Moroccan garrison of 6,000 soldiers. The attackers 
44

managed to penetrate the defensive parameter and 

free some 700 Sahrawi prisoners before Moroccan air 

attacks with F-1 Mirages forced the Polisario forces to 

withdraw. On their way back to bases in Algeria, the 

Polisario attacked and briefly occupied Mahbes, destroying Moroccan military installations there. In the 

wake of these successes, the Polisario leadership decided to intensify its attacks, including operations in 

Moroccan territory north of the Draa River and east of 

Tarfaya. In short, Morocco’s predicament was becoming serious, and its military leaders believed that they 

would not be able to defeat the Polisario definitively 

without pursuing its forces into Algeria, which was 

not possible. For this reason, Morocco made a major 

strategic shift.86

Recognizing that the FAR could not attain control 

over a large amount of hostile territory, the Moroccans elected to withdraw from the smaller positions 

and fortifications that had not yet fallen to the enemy, 

limiting their forces to areas of Guelta and Bir Nzarán 

and within the so-called useful triangle of Bukra’, Samara and El Aaiún, thereby focusing on a strategically 

important area of a relatively high population density 

and economic value. At the same time, the Moroccans 

formed well-armed and supplied motorized columns 

(“flying columns”) meant for rapid, simultaneous 

operations in the unoccupied territories. The Moroccans also made at least some use of the traditional 

COIN technique of reconcentration, removing the 

Polisario-friendly civilian population from Saac 

in order to separate the insurgents from a source 

of support.87
45

U.S. Responses to Moroccan Military Losses and 

the Limitations of Moroccan Strategy.

As the position of its strategic ally Morocco became more precarious, the United States increased 

its military support. Morocco began to receive much 

larger amounts of foreign aid beginning in 1978, 

when the FAR appeared especially threatened by the 

Sahrawi insurgents. France and the United States supplied much of the materiel, while Saudi Arabia provided generous financing. The French also helped in 

the areas of training and intelligence, drawing from 

their previous experiences in the Sahara. In addition, 

Egypt, Iran under the Shah, Jordan, Libya, Iraq, South 

Africa, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Brazil supplied arms 

to Morocco during the war with the Polisario.88

The Carter administration (1977-80) initially 

placed some restrictions on U.S. arms sales to Rabat, 

but these limitations dissipated after the Polisario’s attacks inside Morocco and the fall of the Shah of Iran 

in 1979, as the White House now perceived a stronger 

need to strengthen its remaining strategic allies in the 

Middle East and Africa. During the Ronald Reagan 

presidency (1981-89), U.S. support for Morocco was 

especially strong. Indeed, the Reagan administration 

made it clear in a number of ways that it saw strategic 

value in aiding Morocco in its war against the Polisario. Joseph Reed, a friend of King Hassan, became the 

only noncareer U.S. ambassador in the Middle East. 

After Polisario forces with heavy armor and sophisticated weaponry inflicted a damaging attack at Galtah 

Zammur and brought down several Moroccan planes 

in October 1981, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Casey personally delivered a request 

for support from King Hassan to Reagan. Numer-
46

ous meetings between U.S. diplomatic, military, and 

intelligence officials followed, including meetings in 

December between King Hassan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Charles Percy. In February, 

Secretary of State Alexander Haig met the Moroccan 

monarch, who met with Reagan the following May. 

Visits to Morocco by Vice President George H. W. 

Bush and then U.S. representative to the UN, Jeanne 

Kirkpatrick, both in September 1983, highlighted the 

continued importance of Morocco to U.S. policy.89

Between 1976 and 1984, the U.S. Government 

spent an average of $1 million per year in training officers in the Moroccan armed forces, including pilots 

and COIN specialists. By 1982, well over 100 U.S. military advisors were in Morocco, and many Moroccans 

received training on U.S. military bases. The U.S. Air 

Force trained Moroccan pilots in missile countermeasures, evasion, and other relevant techniques. In addition, the Moroccans received assistance in finding 

the positions of Polisario-operated SA-6s, although 

the FAR does not appear to have made effective use of 

this intelligence. A group of American advisors was 

also sent to train a battalion-sized unit to carry out 

special operations against Polisario SA-6 positions.90

At least through the early-1980s, however, the tactical and operational failings combined with flawed 

strategies to prevent Moroccan victory. It is likely that 

U.S., French, or other foreign advisors played a role in 

Morocco’s decision to focus on the useful triangle or to 

employ the COIN-focused columns, the formation of 

which coincided with increasing U.S. military aid. The 

recognition of the useful triangle as a strategic center 

of gravity would eventually serve as the starting point 

for the development of a new strategy of static defense, 
47

but overall, the flying columns proved largely ineffective. Indeed, the FAR failed to cleanse the target areas’ 

guerrilla activity, establish dominance over the Polisario forces, or even damage them significantly. Thus, 

the initiative remained with the Polisario. 

At the operational and tactical levels, major shortcomings included the lack of flexibility in the levels 

of command below the king, which had become standard after the failed coups of the early-1970s. When 

a field commander under attack requested air support, he had to go through Rabat. The subsequent delay gave Polisario forces time to carry out raids and 

then withdraw before the power could be brought to 

bear. It is telling that the Royal Gendarmerie, which 

policed the military on the king’s behalf, counted bullets before and after training exercises. Strategically, 

the Moroccans still attempted to hold too much territory. Although the size of the Moroccan army had 

increased dramatically, it could not effectively defend 

and supply as widely as its strategists had hoped, 

and the overextension made tactical weaknesses and 

logistical problems very apparent.91 Thus, the initiative remained with the Polisario. Given the need to 

avoid open war with Algeria and the conditions in 

which it had to fight, the Moroccan armed forces were 

incapable of defeating such a determined enemy as 

the Polisario.

“The Berm”: Success in Defensive Strategy?

After the failure of the attack columns, Morocco adopted a clear-and-hold strategy based on the construction of a series of well-defended barriers, or berms, 

known colloquially as “the Berm,” “the Wall,” or, to 

Polisario sympathizers, “the Wall of Shame.”92 Some 
48

analysts have strongly criticized this approach, noting that the walls have not proved impenetrable and 

that the new strategy of static defense was extremely 

costly and ceded the advantages of surprise, initiative, 

and audacity to the ELPS.93 Indeed, the construction of 

the barriers represented a clear admission by Morocco 

that it had to accept “in the best case a long war of attrition or, in the worst case, total stalemate.”94 On the 

other hand, the barriers basically succeeded in keeping 

the insurgents out of the occupied territory, protected 

key interests, and allowed Morocco to establish civil 

administration in important parts of Western Sahara. 

With the completion of all 1,500 miles of barrier, Morocco would gain control of over 80 percent of Western Sahara, making the project “the largest functional 

military barrier in the world.”95 The wall has also facilitated the influx of thousands of Moroccan settlers 

into former Spanish Sahara.96

The construction of the walls, which began in 1981, 

proceeded in stages, with the final part completed in 

April 1987.97 The early barriers aimed to protect the 

useful triangle area and the Moroccan garrison near 

Algeria from attacks from across the border. This 

meant that Morocco initially renounced control over 

much of the territory, especially in the south (not including the population centers of Dakhla and Aargub 

in the former Spanish bay of Río de Oro, where the 

FAR maintained significant garrisons). In 1983, work 

began on another phase in the Berm construction, 

employing some 30,000 Moroccan soldiers. Here the 

location of the new wall appears to have been largely 

political: by dividing the Sahara right at the corner 

border with Mauritania, Morocco may have endeavored to force the Polisario to tread on Mauritanian soil 

when launching attacks in the south, thereby implicat-
49

ing Mauritania in the conflict. Further Berm construction continued in southward pattern, eventually cutting the Polisario territory off from the Atlantic coast.98

 The walls were constructed in a similar manner 

throughout: first, a bulldozer dug a trench, the sand or 

dirt from which was then used for an embankment of 

two or three meters in height; the walls were protected by mine fields, barbed wire, and electronic sensors, 

with posts scattered along their length and guarded 

by 100,000 to 170,000 soldiers. The soldiers were deployed either in frontal positions or in bases to the 

rear, armed with artillery and from which rapid reaction forces were to emerge if the wall were breached. 

Operationally, regional commanders enjoyed more 

autonomy than before, including the ability to call in 

and receive more timely support. Although relatively 

small penetrations were not difficult, large-scale attacks were more problematic. Once they had detected 

a breach, the FAR could block the entry point and then 

attack the trapped Polisario forces with ground and 

air power.99

To meet manpower requirements, the Moroccan 

government had to periodically authorize special volunteer recruitments and create many new units. Just 

the construction of the sixth wall, for instance, entailed personnel needs of between 10,000 and 15,000 

men and the creation of a mechanized regiment, an 

airborne battalion, six infantry battalions, two artillery groups, a sapper battalion, and a transportation 

battalion. Even long after the declaration of the ceasefire in 1991, the Berm remains the largest minefield in 

the world; since 2006, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has coordinated 

the removal of mines—a task in which both Morocco 

and the Polisario Front have pledged to assist. 100
50

Once completed, the system of berms had a clear 

impact on the ELPS, which saw its room for tactical 

and operational maneuver shrink significantly. The 

combat that did take place was increasingly attritional 

in nature. In September 1983, for example, Polisario 

forces consisting of five mechanized battalions and 

two armored battalions with more than 50 tanks attacked the first wall near Samara along a 50-km front, 

and the ensuing battle acquired a markedly conventional character.101

In the meantime, developments on the diplomatic 

front had consequences on the battlefield. The August 

1983 Treaty of Uxda between Morocco and Libya provoked a strong reaction from Algeria, which strongly 

criticized the “unnatural” nature of the agreement 

between the traditionalist Moroccan monarchy and 

Ghaddafi’s revolutionary regime and quickly became 

the Polisario’s largest supplier of arms. In October 

1984, the ELPS unleashed its “Great Magreb Offensive” against the Berm under construction to the south 

of Saac, employing Soviet BMP-1s armed with Sagger 

antitank missiles. Thereafter, as the Moroccan strategic aim of enclosing most of Western Sahara became 

clear, the ELPS increased its offensive operations. As 

the Moroccans had planned, however, the Polisario 

forces now had to employ the kind of direct, costly, 

and concentrated attacks that they had previously 

sought to avoid. The Moroccans generally preferred 

to respond to Polisario attacks with firepower alone, 

declining to abandon the protection afforded by the 

defensive barriers. Indeed, on the occasions when 

they have done so, the Moroccans suffered heavy 

losses. Foreign military presence continued on both 

sides through the 1980s, including 500 Cuban and 25 

North Korean technical advisors in Polisario training 
51

camps in Tinduf, and French and Israeli advisors with 

Moroccan military forces.102

Although restrictions on its freedom of movement 

grew and the Berm construction continued, the ELPS 

continued to display considerable tactical skills and 

remained capable of causing major problems for Morocco. A particularly bad year for the FAR was 1987, 

during which the FAR suffered at least 16 major attacks by Polisario forces. One of the most damaging, 

carried out in late-February near the border area near 

El Farsi, illustrates typical Polisario tactics against the 

Berm defenses. The immediate area was defended by 

only two small garrisons, manned by 80 and 50 Moroccan soldiers, respectively. The Polisario column 

approached the Berm under the cover of night, avoiding detection by the defenders. In the first phase, two 

mechanized battalions attacked, followed by an assault 

by a tank battalion. This method followed the general 

pattern of such operations: simultaneous attacks, one 

primary and one secondary, against two contiguous, 

mutually supporting defensive positions. The initial 

aim was to fix and hold the Moroccan defensive positions, thereby permitting mechanized and armored elements to break through to the other side of the Berm. 

There they awaited the arrival of the Moroccan rapid 

reaction force, which they ambushed with great effectiveness when it arrived. Another Polisario motorized 

battalion provided logistical support and transported 

captured materiel and prisoners to the rear. In this 

case, the magnitude of the FAR defeat was so great 

that Hassan II solicited a report from the general in 

charge of the southern provinces that evening. The 

report attributed the Moroccan debacle to a failure in 

intelligence, a lack of anti-tank weapons, and weaknesses in the armored intervention detachment.103
52

Even worse tactical defeats for the FAR ensued, 

revealing a recurring failure of commanders to foresee the locations of coming attacks. To make matters 

worse for the FAR, the soldiers in their garrisons frequently appeared to lack a strong fighting spirit. The 

Polisario learned that it could sometimes forgo frontal attacks; infiltrating through unguarded areas and 

then surrounding FAR positions might be all it took 

to make them surrender.104 At the operational level, 

the Polisario launched attacks on different areas of 

the wall simultaneously, thereby diverting the rapid 

reaction forces.105 Moreover, the Moroccan air forces 

sometimes failed to appear during major engagements 

with the ELPS. A fear of Polisario anti-air defenses, 

including the AA SAM 8 (GECKO) missiles, and poor 

ground-air coordination and communications technology probably explains this failing.106 On the other 

hand, Moroccan combat engineers—“the unsung heroes of the war”—worked diligently, and often under 

fire, to construct and maintain the growing system 

of walls, which both sides realized were making a 

gradual but undeniable difference in the war’s overall 

strategic outlook.107

The ELPS continued to undertake some major 

operations each year through 1989, and Morocco attacked Polisario positions in its section of Western 

Sahara in August 1991, breaking a ceasefire that had 

held since the onset of the previous year. But by this 

point, neither side saw a resolution through military 

force as a viable possibility.108 Hence, when the UN 

Secretary General unilaterally declared a ceasefire in 

September, both sides chose to respect it, and the conflict has continued mainly in the diplomatic sphere. 

Many Sahrawis express negative opinions about 

MINURSO—tasked with monitoring the ceasefire and 
53

organizing and conducting a referendum—charging 

that it does little to stop abuses or break free of close 

Moroccan supervision and monitoring of its activities. 

Nonetheless, the ceasefire continues to hold.109

Military Occupation, Intifadas, and Arab Spring, 

1991-2012.

After the ceasefire, Morocco and the Polisario both 

made intense use of diplomatic and international 

public relations endeavors, although, in general, Morocco made scant attempts to win Sahrawi hearts and 

minds.110 The diplomatic and international legal aspects of the Western Sahara issue are not the primary 

focus of this monograph, but it is worth stressing that 

the failure to reach a solution did not result from a 

lack of outside interest in the problem, even if potential key players—especially Washington and Paris—

might be faulted for not applying more pressure on 

Morocco. The UN, most visibly in the figure of envoy 

James Baker, exerted considerable efforts trying to resolve the conflict. In June 2001, the UN Secretary General’s proposed framework agreement, known as the 

Baker Plan, called for elected executive and legislative bodies and much local control in Western Sahara, 

with a referendum on the status of the territory to be 

held within 5 years. After this proposal failed to gain 

sufficient support from the interested parties (Morocco, the Polisario, Mauritania, and Algeria), Baker 

proposed a compromise in January 2003, sometimes 

referred to as Baker Plan II, which was incorporated 

into the Secretary General’s report of May 23, 2003. It 

did not require the consent of the four parties of Baker Plan I and gave voters in a future referendum the 

choice between integration with Morocco, autonomy, 
54

or independence. The Polisario, under pressure from 

Algeria, made the surprising announcement that it 

would support the proposal, but Morocco rejected it. 

In June 2004, Baker resigned, and the Baker Plan has 

not come up in Security Council Resolutions since.111

Morocco’s objections stemmed principally from 

its rejection of the independence option; autonomy 

was as far as it would go. In addition, Rabat wanted 

to negotiate only with Algeria, but the latter insisted 

that it could not substitute for the Sahrawis. The issue of who should vote in any referendum has also 

been a major obstacle to successful negotiations, as the 

different parties interpret census figures and the role 

settlers should play differently, and neither side has 

wanted to risk a referendum it might lose. With Baker 

Plan II, however, the Polisario apparently thought independence was worth the risk, whereas Rabat may 

have feared that it had lost support among the Moroccan settlers, especially those of ethnic Sahrawi background who had moved to the territory in the 1990s. 

The Polisario’s insistence on full independence and 

Morocco’s refusal to consider this option have also remained a significant hindrance. Moreover, Rabat has 

felt less pressure to make concessions since the May 

2003 Casablanca terrorist bombings, which further 

strengthened the post-9/11 strategic alliance between 

the United States and Morocco. In the fall of that year, 

President George W. Bush reportedly reassured King 

Mohammed VI that the United States would not seek 

to impose a solution on the Western Sahara impasse.112

As the diplomacy ran its course, the situation in 

the refugee camps in Algeria and the occupied and 

unoccupied territories of Western Sahara evolved into 

a distinct set of security challenges of relevance not 

only to the immediate players in the region, but also to 
55

the United States and other outside powers. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (ACNUR), there are more than 116,000 Western Saharan 

refugees, and the camps in Algeria are home to 80,000 

people. The situation of the refugees, while not as dire 

as in many of the world’s camps for displaced people, 

remained a major concern even after the ceasefire. According to a 2008 study by ACNUR, the World Food 

Programme, and Médicos del Mundo, malnutrition affected 61 percent of children and 55 percent of women 

in the camps, contributing to high fetal death rates.

There are also problems with the quality and quantity of water available in the camps, which are subject 

to disastrous flooding during periods of high rain.113

The camps also lack adequate supplies of medicine. In 

fact, even after recent kidnappings, Spanish aid workers expressed a desire to remain and help alleviate the 

situation—warning that their absence would contribute to further economic hardship, in turn making the 

camps more vulnerable to radical movements.114

Nonetheless, the situation in the Polisario-run 

camps is far better than that in other refugee camps 

in Africa and elsewhere, generating “unknown levels of human development in the African context,” 

writes an historian who, in other ways, is critical of 

the Polisario.115 The Polisario’s administration of the 

camps, which until the 1991 ceasefire was largely in 

the hands of women because the men were off to war, 

had many successes. Thanks to the extensive system 

of bilingual schools (Arabic and Spanish) and further 

education opportunities made available to Sahrawis 

over the years in Cuba and, to a lesser extent, in Algeria, Libya, Syria, the former Eastern Bloc countries, 

and even Spain, West Germany, and Austria, the educational level of the camps’ residents is very high. 
56

Indeed, underemployment is a major source of dissatisfaction for many of the Sahrawis educated abroad. 

In the field of health care, supplies may be short, but 

knowledge is not. The Tindouf camps have one doctor 

for every 800-1,000 residents, and in the unoccupied 

territory, Polisario-run clinics and military hospitals 

have also provided care to nomads from Mauritania, 

Algeria, and Mali.116

In addition to the UN and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), several other sources of outside 

support help sustain life in the camps. Spain’s Ministry 

of Defense pays pensions for Sahrawi veterans of the 

colonial period’s Tropas Nómadas (Nomadic Troops) 

and Policia Territorial (Territorial Police Force), and 

Spaniards and other Europeans have donated much 

money to Sahrawi causes. Sahrawis who work abroad 

also send funds to family members in the camps. A 

major source of support for Western Saharans is the 

Vacaciones en Paz (Vacation in Peace) program, which 

sponsors 2-month summer visits each year by thousands of Western Saharan children between 8 and 

12 years old to families in Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy and France. The Spaniards in turn often 

visit these children and their families in the camps, 

bringing financial assistance when they come. Since 

1991, a market economy has sprouted in the camps, 

which now host many small businesses such as Internet and telephone cafes (locutorios), hair salons, and 

small shops catering to residents and visitors alike, 

and enterprising Sahrawis have learned to profit by 

importing various goods from abroad. 117 In spite of 

this economic growth, however, some of the camps’ 

younger residents have grown increasingly impatient 

with the situation, some openly expressing a desire to 

go to war again.118
57

Morocco has strongly criticized the Polisario’s 

leadership and management of the camps, sometimes 

describing them as a virtual reign of terror and making good use of the criticism by defectors from the 

Polisario. Even researchers sympathetic to the Polisario note that treatment of dissidents has been harsh, 

especially during the high point of the war with 

Morocco. These researchers write of purges of those 

considered dangerous to the “revolution” and of 

Sahrawis who promote “tribalism.”119 Human Rights 

Watch and representatives of the UN and NGOs, on 

the other hand, have been much less critical, especially of the situation since the ceasefire. According to a 

2008 Human Rights Watch report, “The Polisario effectively marginalizes those who directly challenge its 

leadership or general political orientation, but it does 

not imprison them. It allows residents to criticize its 

day-to-day administration of camp affairs.” If they 

wish to do so, residents of the camps in Algeria may 

also move to Moroccan-controlled Western Saharan 

territory through Mauritania, although “fear and social pressure” keeps them from disclosing their plans 

in advance.120 Some Spanish NGO workers have even 

praised the Polisario for providing security against 

possible extremist infiltration and terrorist threats.121

The principal Sahrawi security forces are the Sahrawi 

National Police, which operate in the camps, and the 

National Gendarmerie, whose jurisdiction includes 

the roads and trails between the camps, nearby Polisario institutions, and the part of Western Sahara not 

occupied by Morocco. The Gendarmerie, with its more 

military structure and jurisdiction over transportation 

routes, is tasked with countering smuggling and—one 

would assume—more recent threats of penetration by 

terrorists and criminal organizations.122
58

In the camps and elsewhere, the social situation of 

Sahrawis today has some peculiar aspects. Cuba has 

sponsored study by thousands of young Sahrawis in 

secondary schools, universities, technical institutes, 

and military academies. Upon their return to Western 

Sahara, many experienced a sort of reverse culture 

shock, wondering how to put their education to use 

in the desert and feeling constrained by many aspects 

of traditional Sahrawi society. Saharan women who 

had studied in Cuba, for example, found themselves 

stereotyped as promiscuous, and people began to joke 

that the male and female cubarauis as a whole constituted a new Saharan tribe with its own identity. Returnees from Cuba figure prominently among the new 

generation of Sahrawi elite, who question the dominance and ways of the traditional Polisario leadership 

without renouncing its cause.123

Since the ceasefire, the Polisario has continued to 

receive criticism for corruption, authoritarianism, and 

repression of dissent.124 Not surprisingly, many of 

these negative reports come from the growing list of 

former Polisario officials—some of whom previously 

held very high positions in the organization—who 

have defected to the Moroccan side since 1975. As 

one would expect, in the sphere of public relations, 

Morocco has done its best to extract the maximum 

possible gain from these cases. On more than a few 

occasions, the principal motives of these people, dismissed as opportunistic traitors by the Polisario, were 

undoubtedly financial; Morocco offered attractive incentives to those Sahrawis who publicly denounced 

the Polisario. In other cases, however, the situation 

was not so clear-cut. Some Sahrawis seem to have 

concluded, albeit reluctantly, that the Polisario’s strategic goal of full independence was no longer realistic, 
59

seeing some sort of autonomy statute as the best they 

could hope for. Others claim that they became turned 

off by the Polisario’s intransigence and unwillingness 

to consider opposing views.125 Some may also see hope 

in King Mohammed VI’s initiatives, however halting 

and incomplete, to begin to address the issue of the 

disappearances and to institute a committee of reconciliation, although there is still good reason to view 

these gestures with some cynicism, as is also the case 

with his Arab Spring-inspired reforms. 

Mohammed VI established the reconciliation committee in 2004 to shed light on the issue of forced disappearances and arbitrary detentions from the period 

of 1956, when Morocco gained independence, through 

1999. After 2 years of work, the committee issued a report with its findings on 742 disappearances, the majority of which were related to the Sahara. According 

to the report, all had ended in death—either in captivity, in clashes with Moroccan forces, or because of excessively violent actions against demonstrations. But 

as Amnesty International reports, the government has 

not published the list of names, and some 500 cases 

involving Sahrawis remain in process.126

 From 1975 on, the anti-nationalist repression of 

the Sahrawis by Moroccan authorities was severe, and 

estimates of the total number of “disappeared” in the 

Western Sahara since the Spanish withdrawal range 

from several hundred to over 1,000. The last great 

wave of disappearances occurred in November 1987, 

coinciding roughly with a visit by a UN technical mission. These large-scale detentions by Moroccan authorities acquired a permanent character; many lasted 

until June 1991, when over 300 of the “disappeared” 

Sahrawis were released. The former detainees have 

spoken of clandestine prisons, harsh conditions, and 
60

physical and psychological abuse while in Moroccan 

custody.127 As of June 2010, there were reportedly 46 

Sahrawi political prisoners in various facilities in Morocco and in the so-called “black prison” of El Aaiún.128

For its part, the Polisario took over 2000 Moroccan prisoners of war beginning in 1976. With the mediation of U.S. Senator Richard Lugar and the International Red Cross, the last 404 Moroccan prisoners were 

released in 2005. Many had been held captive by the 

Polisario since the late-1980s, and they subsequently 

spoke of harsh conditions, abuse, forced labor, and 

being paraded before visiting journalists and Spanish 

tourists by the Polisario. In many cases, Morocco refused to accept the former prisoners upon their release 

because Rabat would not recognize the Polisario. The 

return of these prisoners was thus delayed by years, 

until diplomats from the United States and Argentina 

forcibly repatriated them.129

 The human rights record of Morocco in general is 

not a good one, even outside of Western Sahara. Although the record does not look so bad compared with 

that of other regimes in North Africa and the Middle 

East, it is not a country of ample political freedom—

improvements since the coronation of Mohammed VI 

in 1999, notwithstanding. As Human Rights Watch 

and Amnesty International have noted, the regime 

has traditionally shown no toleration for opposing 

views in three areas: the monarchy, Islam, and the territorial integrity of the kingdom. The latter, of course, 

pertains directly to the Western Sahara question. A 

Freedom House report from 2009 categorized Western 

Sahara to be one of the 21 most repressive societies 

in the world. In a 2010 report, Human Rights Watch 

noted that the Moroccan government’s methods were 

especially harsh in Western Sahara, where Sahrawis 
61

were arrested or imprisoned for peaceful defense of 

self-determination, while politically motivated travel 

restrictions increased.130 The U.S. State Department‘s 

April 2011 report on human rights refers to “arbitrary 

and unlawful killings” by Moroccan government security officials, “unconfirmed reports of politically 

motivated disappearance,” and “credible reports 

that security forces engage in torture, beatings, and 

other mistreatment of detainees,” especially Sahrawi 

separatist activists.131

On the other hand, since the 1990s, the monarchy 

has embarked on a process of gradual but undeniable political democratization, although the country 

still has a long way to go. Concurrently, freedom of 

expression about the monarchy and other subjects in 

Morocco increased during this period, although periodicals that offended the monarchy were eventually 

shut down, some only reemerging very recently as 

online publications.132 The king’s response to the Arab 

Spring, revealing an apparent willingness to consider 

such formerly off-limits topics as the sacred status of 

the monarchy, indicates that further opening is occurring, although it remains to be seen exactly what 

tangible changes the new constitution of July 2011 

will bring. Critics charge that the constitution calls for 

scant meaningful reforms, leaving the king’s privileges and the traditional system of patronage and clientelism largely untouched.133

In the economic sphere, the Moroccan government 

has undeniably made considerable investments in the 

Western Saharan territory it controls. Although it has 

had to spend enormous amounts of money in military 

and security costs and infrastructure, the regime has 

reaped at least some economic gain for its efforts. For 
62

example, fishing is among the most profitable Western Saharan natural resources, as evidenced by the 

sardine canning facilities at El Aaiún, which employ 

more than 1,000 people. Waters off the Western Saharan coast generate more than 60 percent of Morocco’s 

fishing activities and revenues, creating more than 

50,000 jobs. Yet, many Sahrawis complain that they 

have gained little from these investments, which they 

say primarily benefit the Moroccan settlers and people 

with good political connections. Ties between the fishing industry, high military figures, and people near to 

the throne are close.134 In other spheres of commercial 

activity there is a strong perception that Sahrawis—

with the exception of the high-level “defectors”—are 

not benefiting from the economic development taking place. For example, Imazighen (Berbers) from the 

Sus and the Anti-Atlas, who often work as merchants, 

operate many of the cafes, shops, and hotels in the 

Western Sahara. But they keep their permanent homes 

elsewhere, where they often send their income. Unemployment is officially 25 percent in the region, but 

it may, in fact, be twice that.135

This situation illustrates a more general problem, 

which exacerbated the consequences of Morocco’s 

lack of attempts to win hearts and minds in Western 

Sahara, even as the main force of Sahrawi nationalism shifted from the refugee camps to the occupied 

territories during the 1990s.136 Cronyism, a spoils system, and misgovernance do little to foment an entrepreneurial spirit or genuine belief in the legitimacy 

of the Moroccan state, rewarding only good connections and political loyalty. In fact, the roots of recent 

violent confrontations at El Aaiún in November 2010, 

disturbing footage of which has been disseminated on 

YouTube, lay in popular anger over the embezzlement 
63

of land designated for indigenous Sahrawis.137 The 

riots, described in one account as “the most violent 

48 hours witnessed by the Western Sahara” since the 

1991 ceasefire began, predictably led to accusations, 

counteraccusations, and attempts by both sides to 

package favorably images of the bloody fighting for 

the international media and the Internet.138 Moroccan 

authorities reportedly brought into custody about 200 

Sahrawis after the riots, many of whom then faced trial 

in a military court near Rabat. On the other hand, the 

nomination of a new wali of the region within weeks 

of the riots indicates that the monarchy had taken the 

causes of the protests seriously.139

Of course, such complaints about favoritism, corruption, and anti-Sahrawi discrimination are not new. 

During the late-Spanish period, they fueled youthful 

resentment against colonial authorities and their collaborators, and thereafter they contributed to what 

are known as the intifadas of 1999 and 2005. Other 

causes of these generally nonviolent popular protests 

were cultural, such as the belief that Morocco aims to 

eradicate Sahrawi culture, linguistic and otherwise. It 

does not help that soldiers make up about one-third 

of the Moroccan population of Western Sahara, not 

counting the various kinds of police, state security, 

and intelligence personnel.140 In addition to socio-cultural and economic complaints, disappointments on 

the political and diplomatic stage also contributed to 

the intifadas. 

The intifada of late-1999 took place at least in part 

for the benefit of the international community, occurring as it did after the death of Hassan II, when the 

initial weeks after the takeover by his son, Mohammed, seemed to promise democratic reform. The 2005 

intifada occurred in the wake of the growing realiza-
tion by Sahrawis that Polisario diplomacy had not 

managed to persuade the heavy-hitting outside powers (especially the United States) to withdraw their 

customary support for the Moroccan position; receiving little help from Washington for his efforts, Baker 

had resigned in June 2004. Significantly, the popular 

demonstrations apparently occurred, at least in part, 

outside the control of the Polisario leadership, suggesting that young people were rejecting the approach 

of some of the traditional Sahrawi elites. Many leading organizers of the demonstrations, however, had 

reportedly spent long periods in Moroccan prisons.141

Morocco’s harsh response to the 1999 and 2005 intifadas may have exacerbated the situation. The first intifada, which began with dozens of students organizing a sit-in, setting up tents, and occupying a square 

in front of a hotel where many UN personnel stayed, 

provoked a Moroccan reaction of “excessive violence,” 

in the words of a U.S. State Department employee.142

But thereafter, Morocco removed the governor and 

local chief of police, announced elections for a Saharan affairs council, and freed some political prisoners. 

The government’s direction reversed itself, however, 

after the terrorist bombings in Casablanca on May 16, 

2003, when it again clamped down on some Sahrawi 

activists, along with the Islamists who made up the 

primary targets of the crackdown. A low point in the 

Moroccan response to the second intifada occurred 

in October 2005, when security forces publicly beat a 

Sahrawi demonstrator to death, making him the intifada’s first martyr. Predictably, his funeral in January 

2006 was a massive, although silent, demonstration. 

When the activist Aminatou Haidar was then released 

from prison, crowds responded with open demonstrations of support for SADR, with some demonstrators 

64
65

sporting Palestinian-style headscarves in apparent attempts of provocation.143

Several points about the intifadas merit special 

mention. First, some ethnic Sahrawis living in parts of 

Morocco and poor Moroccans in Western Sahara joined 

the demonstrations against the Moroccan authorities 

and the status quo.144 Although the two groups by no 

means constitute a united front, the settlers in Western 

Sahara, along with the Moroccans of Sahrawi ethnicity in nearby areas such as Tarfaya, are not necessarily 

unequivocal supporters of the Moroccan regime and 

the status quo. Indeed, some of the settlers may have 

become so dissatisfied with Rabat with time that they 

came to favor the Polisario’s position.145

Second, the role of technology, especially in the 

second intifada, was striking. The Internet and mobile 

phones have radically changed the playing field. Given 

the forced separation of so many families and friends 

between the refugee camps and on both sides of the 

Berm, it is hardly surprising that Sahrawis learned to 

make good use of the Internet. In ways that foreshadowed the Arab Spring, the Internet and mobile phones 

enabled the coordination of demonstrations and the 

recording of images for political purposes, and their 

role in protests in 2010 and thereafter shows that their 

importance has only increased in the meantime.146

Indeed, some activists have traced the origins of the 

Arab Spring to Western Sahara.147

Since the second intifada, another set of security 

concerns in Western Sahara has arisen. Worrisome 

elements from the Sahel have shown some signs of 

attempting to infiltrate the refugee camps and Western Sahara. These include the drug trade (with links 

to South America) and Islamist terrorist organizations. In 2010, Mali arrested six major drug traffickers 
66

linked to a criminal gang with ties to al-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Malians identified 

the arrestees as “coming from the ranks of the Polisario Front.”148 More recently, in October 2011, an armed 

group kidnapped three European aid workers from 

Sahrawi refugee camps outside of Tindouf, Algeria. 

An AQIM splinter faction eventually claimed responsibility, although the circumstances and authors of the 

kidnappings remain unclear.149 This event came after 

the kidnapping of three Spaniards in November 2009 

in northwest Mauritania, for which AQIM claimed 

responsibility. This abduction reportedly resulted in 

the payment of an enormous ransom by Madrid and 

the freeing of Omar Sid’Ahmed Ould Hamma, also 

known as Omar the Sahrawi, who was reportedly a 

former member of the Polisario hierarchy. Morocco 

has drawn as much attention as possible to these alleged connections between the Polisario and terrorism. The few known instances of cooperation between 

Sahrawis and AQIM apparently stemmed from financial rather than ideological motives.150 But such unnatural alliances can constitute real threats nonetheless, 

and AQIM has shown a willingness to seek help from 

those not necessarily sharing its worldview, such as 

criminal elements active in kidnapping and the drug 

trade. The alleged mercenary work by some Sahrawis 

for Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi during his last 

days, to which Morocco was quick to draw attention, 

probably stemmed mostly from financial motives.

Nevertheless, given the conditions in the massive 

camps and the younger generation’s lack of hope for a 

better future, it would be most surprising if radical Islamist ideology found no converts whatsoever. Some 

Sahrawis have expressed the belief that, were Islamists 

to overthrow Mohammed VI, the new regime in Rabat 
67

would pull Morocco out of Western Sahara.151 This apparently naive view may not have many adherents, 

but if widely believed, it could give the Sahrawis a 

reason to support the religious extremists, although 

this possibility seems remote. In any case, terrorist organizations will undoubtedly try to gain a foothold in 

the Western Sahara if at all possible, as they now do 

in northern Mali. There, three organizations, AQIM, 

the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, 

and Ansar al Din, have combined forces since January 

2012 to attempt to impose an ultra-strict observance of 

Islamic law that runs counter to the region’s traditionally more tolerant and open practices.152

RECOMMENDATIONS

When evaluating the current situation in Western 

Sahara and making decisions about any role the United States could or should play in the conflict, military 

planners and policymakers would do well to keep 

several considerations in mind.

1. At the most basic level, the U.S. Army should 

make better use of the military history of Western Sahara as a source of relevant and concrete knowledge, 

in particular with regard to the role of fortified walls 

(the Berm) in COIN, static defense strategy in general, 

and guerrilla tactics of possible relevance to future 

irregular operations. As we have seen, modern U.S.-

trained and supplied military forces such as the FAR 

can suffer significant tactical and even operationallevel setbacks at the hands of able enemies like the 

Polisario. In an age of rapid dissemination of news 

from the battlefront, tactical successes such as those 

inflicted by the Polisario against the Berm can have 

strategic and grand strategic significance, especially 
68

in the theater of public opinion. Moreover, in a future 

conflict in the area with more direct involvement by 

the United States and more extensive media coverage, 

the overall impact of tactical developments would be 

deeper. Even the authoritarian regime in Rabat, which 

has more control over the dissemination of news than 

a democratic government does, had to overcome political difficulties stemming from tactical defeats at the 

hands of the Polisario.

The tactical and operational aspects of the Polisario 

war and their relationship to strategy, covered previously, still need further study by military historians and 

analysts. Although the Berm-based strategy of static 

defense enabled Morocco to gain control of much of 

Western Sahara, it did not bring with it a decisive defeat of the enemy. Given the likelihood that any future 

U.S. military intervention in this area, as in the Sahel, 

would most likely involve special forces or other nonconventional units, the knowledge of Polisario tactics 

and ways of wars in general could also prove useful, 

as could a better understanding of Morocco and Mauritania’s experiences in combatting them. In addition, 

learning more about the military history of the conflict 

could help military planners gain a better idea of what 

to expect in future desert conflicts, especially of this 

type in this region. The Western Sahara experience reminds us that desert geography can still facilitate successful guerrilla operations, and the U.S. Army should 

make sure it has up-to-date and complete knowledge 

of the physical and human geography of the area at 

its disposal.

2. The U.S. Army should learn more about the Moroccan military and prepare for the possibility of more 

joint operations with it, drawing from the historical 
69

lessons mentioned previously and an in-depth study 

of the FAR today. Given Morocco’s importance for 

current AFRICOM issues, including terrorist threats 

from the Sahel and other potential sources of political instability, it makes sense to focus more on military forces with which the United States may soon 

cooperate more closely. As we have seen, limitations 

imposed from the top have historically hindered 

operational effectiveness, mission command on the 

ground, and air-land cooperation and coordination 

in the Moroccan military. In some cases, there may 

be some hesitation from above to give commanders 

too much leeway with U.S.-supplied new technologies, and training methods and goals will, of course, 

need to be adapted to the Moroccan military culture. 

In the unlikely event that war were to break out again 

involving the Western Sahara, Morocco, and Algeria, 

U.S. military planners will need to take into account 

the skills and limitations of the Moroccan armed 

forces and adjust their expectations accordingly. As 

this monograph has attempted to demonstrate, the 

history of the region also makes clear the importance 

of cultural knowledge and effective civil affairs work, 

intelligence analysis, geographical constraints, and familiarity with classical guerrilla methods in Western 

Sahara—with its specific set of human and physical 

geographical circumstances.

3. At the policy level, the strategic importance of 

Morocco to the United States, long a fundamental tenet of U.S. diplomacy in the region, is likely to increase 

even further, especially given the country’s proximity to the Sahel and ongoing developments stemming 

from the Arab Spring. Yet, the Western Sahara problem and related Moroccan affairs, however vital to the 

legitimacy and stability of the U.S. strategic partner-
70

ship with Rabat, often correspond more directly and 

immediately to Europe than to the United States for 

political, historical, and geographical reasons. In the 

economic sphere, natural resources in the region such 

as hydrocarbons and phosphate may prove important 

to the United States over the long term, but at present, 

gas supplies and security-related issues of terrorism, 

the drug trade, and immigration are of more direct 

concern to Europe. 

Hence, Europe should lead mediation efforts. 

Moreover, some powers, such as France, are likely 

to react badly if the United States acts unilaterally 

to exert pressure on Morocco. Cooperation with the 

French is, moreover, an important part of AFRICOM’s 

activities today. 

Yet, the United States still has a crucial, if somewhat less visible, role to play in resolving the Western Sahara problem. Above all, Washington should 

consider ways in which to leverage European powers, 

especially France and Spain, to take more decisive actions to solve current problems in the region. U.S. military and economic policies and support could be tied 

to concrete efforts by Europe to promote a settlement 

that, in theory, could bring benefits to all the interested parties. If left alone, the situation will probably deteriorate, and a regime change in Morocco might well 

signify strategic disaster for the United States. Hence, 

while it may be most appropriate for European countries to implement directly some of the recommendations that follow, the United States should explore 

ways to encourage the relevant governments to act 

accordingly.

4. The United States should continue to monitor 

closely the security situation in Western Sahara and its 

possible relationship to developments in the Sahel, co-
71

operating with Moroccan intelligence collection agencies but working to curtail their repressive practices. 

As we have seen, the failure by military leaders to 

grasp changing socio-political conditions contributed 

decisively to the decline of colonial authority in the 

decade or so before Spain’s withdrawal. Today, once 

again, the younger generation of Sahrawis is growing 

increasingly dissatisfied with the current situation. 

Pernicious influences from the Sahel, including the 

drug trade, kidnapping, and AQIM, have the potential to constitute a threat in the massive refugee camps 

and among the increasingly restive youth of both 

the Moroccan-controlled and the unoccupied territories.153 Furthermore, effective action against terrorist 

and criminal activity in North Africa entails regional 

cooperation, but Western Sahara remains a source of 

conflict between Morocco and Algeria. Indeed, one of 

the last major closed borders in the world continues to 

separate these two countries.

As the younger generation of Sahrawis loses its patience, some of its members may eventually embrace 

more radical outlooks. Others may be willing to sell 

their geographical familiarity and navigational skills 

in the region to terrorists, drug traffickers, or other 

criminal elements for the right price. Regardless of 

a lack of ideological affinities, some Sahrawis have 

apparently demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with groups working actively against the United 

States and its allies. As long as dissatisfaction with the 

current situation in Western Sahara and the refugee 

camps persists, the potential for cooperation with antiAmerican elements will remain. Economic problems 

affecting Spain and other traditional sources of humanitarian and financial aid, along with rising security threats, may well increase hardships in the camps 
72

and unoccupied territories. Adding to the potential 

sources of future unrest, food prices are expected to 

rise worldwide. 

In spite of the undeniable possibility of terrorist 

connections and other security threats in the region, 

however, it is far from inevitable that Western Sahara 

or the camps will fall to Islamist terrorism. With its 

rational political goals and methods, the Polisario 

leadership has long tried to avoid alienating Western powers, and it shares little, if any, of the worldview of Islamic extremists. The “Islamist wave” that 

has entered Morocco over the last 2 decades largely 

missed Western Sahara, although the movement does 

have numerous adherents among the many Moroccan 

military personnel stationed in the territory.154 There 

seems to have been scant Sahrawi presence among the 

thousands of North Africans who joined the struggle 

of Afghan mujahedin against the Soviet Union, spent 

time in radical Islamist training camps in Afghanistan 

or Pakistan, or joined more recent Jihadist endeavors 

in Iraq. 

One should thus be wary of claims that the traditional political aims of the Polisario are being overtaken by an Islamist wave of future terrorists. Deeply 

rooted, relatively modern attitudes promoted by 

a Polisario leadership that prizes Western support 

are not going to disappear overnight. Moreover, the 

Polisario has apparently increased its security and 

keeps up its guard against terrorist infiltration enough 

to inspire the confidence of foreign humanitarian 

workers, who express a strong desire to remain even 

after the well-publicized kidnappings. Indeed, these 

workers reason that one of the best ways to keep terrorists out is to fight economic and medical hardships 

in the camps.155
73

Admittedly, NGO officials sometimes display a 

naivety about dangers from within the communities 

they are trying to help. By the same token, however, 

defense and security analysts can be prone to generalizing and exaggerating threats, inadvertently leaving 

possible collaborators from within target communities overlooked. Of course, Morocco’s emphasis on 

the vulnerability of the Polisario-controlled camps to 

penetration by terrorist and criminal groups, however 

self-serving, has some plausibility, and an independent Western Sahara might well have a hard time 

keeping down serious security threats. On the other 

hand, the Polisario claims that it combats terrorism 

better than the Moroccan government.156 Hence, while 

the possibility of Islamist terrorist groups taking root 

in Western Sahara exists, there are plenty of elements 

working against the fruition of such a movement there, 

and the United States could conceivably use these elements to its advantage. Indeed, in the admittedly unlikely scenario that an extremist Islamist regime were 

to take over in Rabat, Western Sahara might actually 

serve as one of the few areas in the region where Europeans and Americans could maintain a foothold. 

The Cuban-educated Sahrawis, the so-called 

cubarauis, make up a good portion of Western Sahara’s non-Moroccan elite and are probably least susceptible to Islamist influences. Although it may seem 

counterintuitive for the United States to reach out to 

the products of Marxist education and training, the 

modern-thinking cubarauis should not be dismissed as 

possible allies in attempts to keep terrorist movements 

from infiltrating Western Saharan society. Indeed, the 

Cuban connection may have helped make Sahrawi 

society less amenable to overtures from organizations 

and ideologies of the al-Qaeda variety, helping main-
74

tain the region as a partial bulwark against Islamist 

extremism. Combined with the Polisario’s paradoxical roots in revolutionary Algerian ideology, Soviet 

influence, modern Islam, and its often pro-Western 

diplomatic slant, the cubarauis have helped give Western Sahara a relatively modern outlook. Democratization can, of course, lead to a rise in political parties of 

strong religious orientations, as we have seen in Egypt, 

Tunisia, and elsewhere, and this possibility cannot be 

dismissed outright. Nonetheless, such a development 

appears less likely in Western Sahara. 

5. There is a strong strategic interest in supporting a program of autonomy for Western Sahara, as the 

United States has already affirmed. But efforts must 

be made to ensure that the autonomy is genuine and 

accompanied by tangible improvements in human 

rights and democratization. At this point, full independence, however justifiable from the perspective 

of international law, history, or moral grounds, is not 

a realistic solution. At the most basic level, it would 

weaken the monarchy considerably were Mohammed 

VI to “lose” Western Sahara, upon which the Alawi 

dynasty has long—and with no small amount of success—based its legitimacy. If Islamist extremists were 

to topple the monarchy, the ramifications for the region and for Europe would be severe. The concerns 

of Algeria, which supplies much of southern Europe’s 

natural gas, should be taken into account as well. Ideally, it should be possible to craft a solution that offers 

gains to Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario.

In the area of human rights, the creation of some 

sort of supervisory mechanism, probably through 

MINURSO, would fill a major gap in the effectiveness 
75

of the current UN presence. It would also demonstrate 

that the international community takes the concerns 

of the Sahrawis seriously, possibly limiting the appeal 

of extremists promising more radical solutions. As a 

Spanish policy think tank argued in 2011, cooperation 

between London and Madrid could help overcome 

any French resistance to this idea. 157 The United States 

should consider supporting this proposal as well.

Thus, without going so far as to threaten the 

stability of the Alawi monarchy, the United States 

and Europe should strongly encourage Morocco to 

develop and implement a program of genuine autonomy for Western Sahara. Ensuring France’s cooperation in these endeavors should be a priority. 

Sahrawi skepticism about Rabat’s intentions is well 

grounded; only through genuine reforms, autonomy, 

and a significant reduction in clientelism and corruption does the Moroccan government stand a chance 

of gaining some credibility among the Sahrawis. By 

putting more pressure on Morocco, moreover, the 

United States may gain credibility among the Polisario and Algeria, whose support could be crucial for a 

lasting settlement. 

Admittedly, significant barriers to the successful 

implementation of true autonomy remain. Spain’s 

constitutional structure of autonomous regions, sometimes cited as a possible model for Morocco’s future, 

helped make possible a remarkably peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy after the death of 

General Francisco Franco in 1975. But a West European democracy such as Spain differs considerably from 

Morocco’s authoritarian state. In Spain, moreover, the 

regions with the strongest independence movements, 

Catalonia and the Basque Country, also have very 

healthy and modernized economies, which is defi-
76

nitely not the case for Western Sahara. As noted previously, autonomy statutes in nondemocratic states 

have a bad track record. 

In Morocco, the high levels of corruption and the 

opaqueness of governmental processes and appointments cast serious doubt on whether Sahrawis will 

believe they can get a fair shake in any promised autonomy arrangement. Indeed, developments up to 

this point indicate the opposite. The Spanish policy 

of buying off elites, discussed previously, failed over 

the long term, and there are signs that the Moroccan 

practice of allowing the high-level defectors from the 

Polisario to profit immensely while the financial status 

of the majority remains very low may backfire as well. 

Further, periods of transition and regime change are 

notoriously dangerous for minorities, as the experiences of post-colonial Middle Eastern Jews, Christians 

in Iraq today, and many other cases illustrate. Along 

these lines, among those in the political opposition in 

Morocco, signs of resentment of the Sahrawis and of 

economic development in Western Sahara have surfaced recently.158

On the other hand, the promotion of genuine autonomy for Western Sahara would go well with the 

current U.S. position of supporting Arab Spring-era 

democratization in Libya, Egypt, and elsewhere. Since 

before the Arab Spring, the Moroccan monarchy has 

taken some clear steps in the direction of constitutional reform and democracy, but it still has a long 

way to go, and critics rightly charge that many of the 

changes appear more cosmetic than real. A decisive 

step toward democracy in Morocco might help the 

regime avoid the most radical manifestations of the 

Arab Spring and help convince the Sahrawis that the 

crown’s promises of autonomy are genuine. 
77

At the same time, Sahrawi nationalist leaders are 

much more likely to support an autonomy proposal 

coming from Rabat if they believe the United States 

and Western Europe (especially France) will compel 

Morocco to keep its promises. Along these lines, it 

would serve U.S. interests for Washington, Paris, and 

others to pressure Morocco to address human rights 

issues in Western Sahara and elsewhere more fully. 

A failure to do so will cause the United States to lose 

credibility among Sahrawis—the older generation of 

which long revealed a remarkable faith in the efficacy 

of its diplomatic efforts to win Western sympathies. 

As we have seen, however, this faith has dissipated at 

least somewhat.

6. The United States political and military leaders 

should continue to draw upon the military, diplomatic, and economic ties of Spain and France to the region, 

which are also grounded in history and geography. 

These ties complement the mission of AFRICOM and 

its support of the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism 

Partnership (TSCTP) program, the members of which 

are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and the United States.159

Although no European countries are now members 

of the partnership, existing programs of cooperation 

between European and African militaries may bring 

operational advantages. 

Moreover, even in the current climate of economic 

crisis, European countries are increasing their military involvement in the Sahel. Spain and France, for 

instance, have made it clear that they consider developments in the Sahel to be a significant threat. The 

Spanish general staff has begun studying closer cooperation with France and the United States in the Sahel 
78

area, which it perceives as a source of future troubles 

in Western Sahara.160 Recent kidnappings underscore 

the growing awareness in Spain of a need for further 

involvement in the region. Although the financially 

strapped Spanish military currently lacks materiel 

resources, it can offer relevant experience and intelligence. France has similar experience and intelligence 

in the region, and it also has more influence in Rabat 

today. Tellingly, after the fall of Tunisian and Egyptian leaders, Mohammed VI and leading Moroccan 

security and military advisors traveled to France in 

late-January 2011 for meetings with the French government.161 The French, moreover, will most likely 

make the largest contribution to a coming operation 

in Mali, which is a response to recent terrorist activities in the Sahel.162 Paris will probably not react well if 

Washington takes any unilateral actions in the region, 

and the United States currently depends heavily on 

French experience and intelligence in the Sahel.

Finally, the Polisario should have a place in any 

relevant negotiations, and the Western Sahara issue as 

a whole must be taken into account in any policy decisions pertaining to Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, or 

even developments in the Sahel in general. In theory, 

at least, an agreement with something to offer all of 

the parties is not beyond reach. A failure to find an 

adequate solution to Western Sahara could lead to a 

further destabilizing of the region and of a key U.S. 

ally, Morocco.
79

ENDNOTES

1. Jacob Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario War for Western 

Sahara, 1975-1991,” in Barry Rubin, ed., Conflict and Insurgency in 

the Contemporary Middle East, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 224.

2. George McGovern, “Foreword,” in Stephen Zunes and 

Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010, p. xiv.

3. Cited in Zunes and Mundy, p. 162; Eduardo Soto-Trillo, 

Viaje al abandono. Por qué no permiten al Sáhara ser libre (Journey to 

Abandonment: Why the Sahara Is Not Allowed to be Free), Madrid, 

Spain: Santillana, 2011, p. 95. 

4. Anouar Boukhars and Ali O. Amar, “Trouble in the Western Sahara,” The Journal of Middle East and Africa, Vol. 2, No. 2, 

2011, p. 232. 

5. Zunes and Mundy, p. 160; Pablo San Martín, Western 

Sahara: The Refugee Nation. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press, 

2010, p. 10. 

6. Zunes and Mundy, p. 99.

7. Mariano Fernández-Aceytuno, Ifni y Sáhara. Una encrucijada 

en la historia de España (Ifni and the Sahara: A Crossroads in the History of Spain), Dueñas, Spain: Simancas, 2001, pp. 418-424, 439-441; 

San Martín, Western Sahara, p. 69.

8. Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 438, 551.

9. Ibid., pp. 561-608.

10. José Ramón Diego Aguirre, Guerra en el Sáhara, Madrid, 

Spain: Istmo, 1991, pp. 49-50, 54, 67-68; Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 

189-190, 654-655; Soto-Trillo, pp. 251-254. 

11. Diego Aguirre, p. 55.

12. Carlos Ruiz Miguel, El Sáhara Occidental y España: historia, política y derecho. Análisis crítico de la política exterior española
80

(The Western Sahara and Spain: History, Politics, and Law: A Critical 

Analysis of Spanish Foreign Policy), Madrid, Spain: Dykinson, 1995, 

p. 61. San Martín, Western Sahara, pp. 68, 71.

13. Fernández-Aceytuno, p. 424; Geoffrey Jensen, “The Peculiarities of ‘Spanish Morocco’: Imperial Ideology and Economic 

Development,” Mediterranean Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 

2005, pp. 80-101.

14. Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 441, 621.

15. Ibid., pp. 669-670.

16. Tomás Bárbulo, La historia prohibida del Sáhara Español (The 

Forbidden History of the Spanish Sahara), Barcelona, Spain: Destino, 

2002, p. 41.

17. Ruiz Miguel, pp. 74-75; Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 138, 669. 

18. Zunes and Mundy, p. 95.

19. Anna Khakee, “The Western Saharan autonomy proposal 

and political reform in Morocco,” NOREF Report, June 2011, pp. 

1-12, available from www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/

original/application/a3acc871f1198e8e21bfc68ae75f8f48.pdf.

20. Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 652-654, 563; Diego 

Aguirre, p. 43.

21. Diego Aguirre, p. 63.

22. Ibid., pp. 50-54; Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 667ff.; Ignacio 

Fuente Cobo and Fernando M. Mariño Menéndez, El conflicto 

del Sáhara occidental (The Western Sahara Conflict), Madrid, Spain: 

Ministerio de Defensa, 2006, p. 30.

23. Fernández-Aceytuno, p. 671.

24. Zunes and Mundy, pp. 60-64; Diego Aguirre, pp. 112-118.

25. Bárbulo, pp. 266-282.
81

26. Ibid., pp. 266-286; Fuente Cobo and Mariño 

Menéndez, p. 67.

27. Fuente Cobo and Mariño Menéndez, p. 68.

28. Ibid., pp. 77-78, 112; Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario War,” 

pp. 215, 223.

29. Zunes and Mundy, pp. 8-22, 64-68; Belkace HaceneDjaballah, “Conflict in Western Sahara: A Study of POLISARIO as 

an Insurgency Movement,” Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America, Washington DC, 1985, pp. 45-46.

30. Hacene-Djaballah, pp. 45-46; Zunes and Mundy, p. 22.

31. Fuente Cobo and Mariño Menéndez, p. 27.

32. Zunes and Mundy, p. 35.

33. Yolanda Sobero, Sáhara. Memoria y olvido (The Sahara. Memory and Oblivion), Barcelona, Spain: Ariel, 2010, p. 205; 

Soto-Trillo, p. 205. 

34. Zunes and Mundy, p. 35; Chris Rhodes, “The Achilles 

Heel of Algal Biofuels: Peak Phosphate,” Forbes, February 29,

2012, available from www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2012/02/29/

the-achilles-heel-of-algal-biofuels-peak-phosphate-3/.

35. Charles A. Rarick, Gideon Falk, and Casimir C. Barczyk, “An Element of Concern in North Africa: The Case of 

Morocco’s Phosphate Industry,” Purdue University Calumet, 

January 2, 2011, available from papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.

cfm?abstractid=1734142.

36. Zunes and Mundy, p. xxii.

37. Sobero, pp. 213-214.

38. Soto-Trillo, pp. 233-234.

39. Zunes and Mundy, p. 228; ““Last oil company withdraws 

from Western Sahara,” Afrol News, May 2, 2006, available from 

www.afrol.com/articles/19029.
82

40. Sobero, p. 213.

41. Zunes and Mundy, p. xxi; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in the Western Sahara and in the Tindouf Refugee Camps, 

December 19, 2008, p. 8.

42. For example, Ángela Hernández Moreno, Guerra de banderas en el Sáhara, (War of Flags in the Sahara), Madrid, Spain: Entimema, 2006. Not surprisingly, this book has been translated into 

Arabic and published in Morocco. For a summary of the issue, see 

Zunes and Mundy, pp. 91-95. 

43. Zunes and Mundy, pp. 94-98; Sobero, pp. 87-88, 247-250. 

See also San Martín, Western Sahara, pp. 35-40, and Diego Aguirre, 

pp. 28-38. 

44. Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 79-80, 653-654.

45. Zunes and Mundy, p. 58; Pablo San Martín, “ ́¡Estos 

locos cubarauis! ́: The Hispanisation of Sahrawi society (...after 

Spain),” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol 7, No. 3, September 

2009, pp. 249-263; Soto-Trillo, p. 150.

46. Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 68-70.

47. Soto-Trillo, p. 237.

48. Zunes and Mundy, p. 93.

49. Soto-Trillo, pp. 270, 280.

50. Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 652-653; Diego Aguirre, 

pp. 41-47; Sobero, p. 88; Hacene-Djaballah, pp. 49, 79.

51. Fernández-Aceytuno, p. 654.

52. Ruiz Miguel, pp. 54-55; Zunes and Mundy, pp. 35-40.

53. Hacene-Djaballah, p. 43.

54. Quoted in San Martín, Western Sahara, p. 101.
83

55. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 71; Sobero, 

pp. 62-63.

56. Hernández-Moreno, p. 111; Hacene-Djaballah, p. 202.

57. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, pp. 36-37.

58. Zunes and Mundy, p. 6.

59. Fernández-Aceytuno, pp. 560-561. 

60. Zunes and Mundy, p. 9.

61. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 77.

62. Ibid., 77-78.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 78. The account of a Moroccan doctor who was 

held prisoner by the Polisario for many years describes how, in at 

least one battle, Polisario soldiers customarily shot anyone whom 

they did not deem “useful.” Thomas Hollowell, Allah’s Garden. 

A True Story of a Forgotten War in the Sahara Desert of Morocco, 

Urbana, IL: Tales Press, 2009, pp. 45-48. 

65. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 78.

66. Hacene-Djaballah, p. 43.

67. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 78.

68. Ibid., pp. 78-79.

69. Ibid, p. 79.

70. Ibid., 79-80; Zunes and Mundy, p. 11; Diego Aguirre, 

pp. 160-161. 

71. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, pp. 80-81.

72. Ibid., pp. 80, 82.
84

73. Zunes and Mundy, p. 11; Diego Aguirre, p. 150; Fuente 

Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 82.

74. Hacene-Djaballah, pp. 144-145.

75. Ibid.

76. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 87.

77. Ibid., pp. 86-87; Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario War,” 

p. 223.

78. Diego Aguirre, pp. 221-222; Fuente Cobo and Meriño 

Menéndez, p. 89.

79. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 90.

80. Diego Aguirre, pp. 221-222.

81. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 93.

82. Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario War,” p. 219.

83. Diego Aguirre, p. 223.

84. Ibid., pp. 223-224.

85. Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario War,” p. 219; Diego 

Aguirre, pp. 224-225.

86. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, pp. 95-97.

87. Ibid., p. 100.

88. Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario War,” p. 223.

89. Zunes and Mundy, p. 66.

90. Ibid., pp. 17-20.

91. Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario War,” pp. 219-220.

92. Sobero, p. 58.
85

93. For example, see Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, 

p. 104.

94. Zunes and Mundy, p. 21.

95. Ibid.

96. Sobero, p. 59.

97. Zunes and Mundy, p. 21. Another account writes that construction of the first wall, extending from Draa to the Saac area, 

began in August 1980. Diego Aguirre, p. 230.

98. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, pp. 104-108.

99. Mundy, “The Morocco-Polisario war,” p. 222; Fuente 

Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 108.

100. Zunes and Mundy, pp. 21-22; Fuente Cobo and Meriño 

Menéndez, p. 108; Sobero, pp. 58-59.

101. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 110. 

102. Ibid., pp. 110-112.

103. Ibid., pp. 112-114.

104. Ibid., p. 115. 

105. Zunes and Mundy, pp. 22-23. 

106. Fuente Cobo and Meriño Menéndez, p. 117.

107. Zunes and Mundy, p. 23.

108. Ibid., p. 24.

109. Sobero, pp. 116-121; Zunes and Mundy, p. 149; Soto-Trillo, p. 73. See also Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a 

Stalemate, 2nd Ed., Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2012. Jensen headed 

MINURSO from 1994 to 1998.
86

110. Anna Theofilopoulou, “Morocco’s New Constitution and 

the Western Sahara Conflict—A Missed Opportunity?” Journal of 

North African Studies, 2012, pp. 1-10 (First Article), p. 5.

111. Alexis Arieff, “Western Sahara,” CRS Report for Congress, 

April 5, 2012.

112. Ibid.; Zunes and Mundy, pp. 159, 229-239; Jensen, Western 

Sahara, pp. 6-7, 103.

113. “2012 Regional Operations Profile—North Africa,”

UNHCR, available from www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtxpage?page

=49e4861f6&submit=GO#; Sobero, pp. 67-69. 

114. “Los cooperantes afirman que la situación de los refugiados saharauis es ‘crítica’” (“Aid workers assert that the 

situation of the Saharan refugees is ‘critical’”), El País, August 13, 2012, available from ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2012/08/13/

andalucia/1344874803_831290.html.

115. Alejandro García, Historia del Sáhara. El Mejor y el Peor de 

los Mundos (The History of the Sahara: The Best and Worst of Worlds), 

Madrid, Spain: Libros de la Catarata, 2001, pp. 331-332, cited in 

San Martín, Western Sahara, p. 111.

116. Ibid.; San Martín, Western Sahara, pp. 146-147.

117. Sobero, pp. 64-66; San Martín, Western Sahara, especially 

Chaps 3 and 4.

118. Soto-Trillo, p. 31.

119. San Martín, Western Sahara, p. 121.

120. Cited in Arieff, p. 4, Endnote 10. Also Soto-Trillo, 

pp. 189-191.

121. “Los cooperantes,” El País.

122. San Martín, Western Sahara, pp. 130-132.
87

123. Soto-Trillo, pp. 134, 140, 176; San Martín, “ ́¡Estos locos 

cubarauis! ́”, pp. 249-263.

124. Soto-Trillo records many charges to this effect in his 

travel narrative, which is overall very sympathetic to the Sahrawi 

nationalist cause. For example, see pp. 181, 198, 212-221, 224, 233.

125. Boukhars and Amar, p. 222; Sobero, pp. 108-113; SotoTrillo, pp. 196-207; Zunes and Mundy, p. 157.

126. Sobero, pp. 181-182.

127. Ibid., pp. 175-180; Zunes and Mundy, pp. 145-147.

128. Sobero, p. 174.

129. Ibid., pp. 184-189; Zunes and Mundy, p. 205. 

130. Sobero, pp. 168-170.

131. Quoted in Arieff, pp. 4-5.

132. Moshe Gershovich, “Democratization in Morocco: 

Political Transition of a North African Kingdom,” Policy 

Brief, No. 7, The Middle East Institute, February 2008, p. 7, available from www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/MEI_Morocco_

democratizationpoliticaltransition.pdf; Aida Alami, “Web Offers a Voice to Journalists in Morocco,” The New York Times, 

April 28, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/

middleeast/28iht-M28C-MOROCCO-MEDIA.html.

133. Theofilopoulou, pp. 1-10.

134. Sobero, pp. 193-198.

135. Zunes and Mundy, pp. 157-158.

136. Ibid., p. 140.

137. For two distinct accounts of the causes, course, and outcome of the November 2010 events, see Boukhars and Amar; and, 
88

Jacob Mundy, “Western Sahara’s 48 Hours of Rage,” Middle East 

Report, No. 257, Winter 2010, available from www.merip.org/mer/

mer257/western-saharas-48-hours-rage.

138. Mundy, “Western Sahara’s 48 Hours.” 

139. Boukhars and Amar, p. 231.

140. Zunes and Mundy, p. 158.

141. Sobero, pp. 168-175; Zunes and Mundy, pp. 144, 151-154.

142. Zunes and Mundy, pp. 151-152.

143. Ibid., p. 155.

144. Ibid., pp. 140-141, 152-153.

145. Soto-Trillo, pp. 169, 237-238; Zunes and Mundy, p. 159.

146. Sobero, p. 172; Soto-Trillo, pp. 246, 268.

147. “Arab Spring Started in Western Sahara,” Deutsche 

Welle, June 18, 2012, available from www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,

16033135,00.html.

148. Quoted in J. Peter Pham, “Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons: The Ongoing Evolution of al Queda in the Islamic 

Maghreb,” Orbis, Spring 2011, p. 249. 

149. Arieff, p. 5.

150. Boukhars and Amar, pp. 224-226.

151. Soto-Trillo, p. 142.

152. Fernando Reinares, “Condominio ‘yihadista’ en el norte de Mali” (“Jihadist Condominium in the North of Mali”), 

El Pais, August 11, 2012, available from elpais.com/elpais/2012/07/26

/opinion/1343296013_792031.html.

153. Pham, pp. 240-254.
89

154. Carlos Ruiz Miguel, “Sáhara Occidental 1975-2005: 

Cambio de Variables de un Conflicto Estancado” (“Western Sahara 1975-2005: Change of Variables in a Conflict at a Standstill”), 

ARI N. 40, March 30, 2005 (Report of the Real Instituto Elcano de 

Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos), available from www.

realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_

GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/mediterraneo+y+-

mundo+arabe/ari+40-2005.

155. “Los cooperantes,” El País.

156. Arieff, p. 5.

157. Renata Capella Soler, “Los derechos humanos, ¿un obstáculo para la paz en el Sáhara Occidental?” (“Human rights: an 

obstacle to peace in the Western Sahara?”), ARI N. 47, March 8, 

2011 (Report of Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos), available from www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/

portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/

elcano_es/zonas_es/organismos+internacionales/ari47-2011.

158. Anna Khakee, “The Western Saharan Autonomy Proposal and Political Reform in Morocco,” NOREF Report, June 

2011, available from www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/

original/application/a3acc871f1198e8e21bfc68ae75f8f48.pdf.

159. See www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp.

160. Roberto Benito, “España estudia participar con tropas en 

una misión internacional en Mali” (“Spain Considers Participating with Troops in an International Mission in Mali”), El Mundo, 

July 30, 2012, p. 5.

161. Theofilopoulou, p. 2. 

162. Benito. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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