1

Filed 1/17/23 P. v. Powell CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. NIKITA POWELL,

Defendant and Appellant. C094553
(Super. Ct. No. 97F07150)

In 1998 , defendant Nikita Powell pled guilty to first degree murder committed during a robbery . The trial court sentenced her to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in state prison . In 2019, defendant petitioned for resentencing under Senate Bill No.
1437 (2017

- 2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) . Following an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied her petition, finding defendant was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless indifferenc e to human life.2

Defendant appeals from that order

. Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the trial cou rt’s finding she acted with reckless indifferenc e to human life. We disagree and affirm the order.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plea and Sentence The factual basis for defendant’s plea was as follows: “[A]round midnight of September 2nd, maybe the early morning hours of September 3rd, 1997, this defendant
and her friend Janet Poole were at an AM/PM market at 47th Avenue and Martin Luther King Boule vard in Sacramento County. And they happened to meet [D.G.], the victim
named in the Information. [¶] At that point, there was some discussion and agreement that they would get into [D.G.]’s truck, that they would exchange sexual favors in return
for dr ugs and perhaps for money. [¶] In the course of activities in the sleeper portion of the cab of [D.G.]’s truck, [defendant] left on two occasions with money given to her by [D.G.] to buy drugs. [¶] Upon her return on the second time, she was followed b y her boyfriend, [codefendant] James Thomas, who was armed with a handgun. Mr. Thomas immediately demanded money from [D.G.] and put the gun up to his head. A struggle
ensued. [¶] Despite the fact that [D.G.] actually tried or said he would give the mo ney to Mr. Thomas, the struggle continued. Mr. Thom a s fell out of the truck and when he regained his feet, he just shot and killed [D.G.]. And [defendant] and Mr. Thomas and the other person, Janet Poole [,] fled at that point. [¶] [Defendant] was arres ted later that day after she had made a phone call and spoke and described these events to a 911 operator and to a Sheriff’s detective.” The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in state prison.3

B. Petition and Hearing In 2019, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6

. 1 Defendant’s petition alleged that she pled guilty to first or second degree
murder because she believed she could be convicted of those of fenses pursuant to the felony

- murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Defendant checked the box stating she could not now be convicted of murder due to the changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. Defendant requested appointment of counsel and checked the boxes stating she was not the actual killer , did not act as an accomplice with the intent to kill , and was neither a major participant in the
crime n or acted with deliberate indifference to human life.
Th e trial court appointed counsel for defendant , found defendant established a prima facie showing under section 1172.6 , and set the matter for an order to show cause hearing (OSC). At the OSC, the trial court ruled the People would carry the burden “to

est ablish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense as the law currently exists.” The court also ruled it would consider the following evidence: “The opinion from the Third District Court of Appeal from March of 1999, both in [defendant]’s case and Mr. Thomas’ case”; the transcript from defendant’s sentencing on August 14, 1998; the January 16, 1998 joint preliminary hearing transcript; the April 21, 1998 transcript from defendant’s plea entry; the transcript from defendant’s motion to withdraw f rom the plea; and defendant’s testimony at Thomas’s trial

. In addition, t he court considered the August 11, 1998 probation report , the transcripts of defendant’s two interviews with the d istrict a ttorney’s office , and Poole’s testimony from Thomas’s tria l

. Defendant’s sister , C . Holmes , defendant’s aunt , T

.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the section by its new numbering.4

Rivera , and Dr. Linda Barnard, an expert in “[i]ntimate partner violence and its effect on
the victim , ” each testified at the OSC.
1. Defendant’s Interviews with the District Attorney’s Office
Afte r pleading guilty to murder, defendant was twice interviewed by the attorney prosecuting Thomas’s case. During her first interview, defendant said she was currently being treated with Haldol and Elavil

. S he was previously diagnosed with paranoid schizoph renia. Defendant said that w hen she is not taking medications, she hears voices. Defendant told the prosecutor that for two or three days before D.G.’s murder, she
and Poole were using crack cocaine and not sleeping. On the night of the murder,
defendant and Poole were going to the store to buy Thomas a beer when they ran into D.G. Defendant knew D.G., who had on prior occasions purchased sex from defendant. That night, defenda nt and Poole agreed they would give D.G. sex in exchange for drugs and money. After both women performed a sex act on D.G. in his truck, D.G. gave defendant a $100 bill and asked her to get change. Defendant left and returned with a “boy” who gave them $80 and a rock of cocaine. D.G., Poole, and defendant smoked the crack cocaine and defendant left to get more. This time, defendant ran into Thomas. She bought more drugs and returned to the truck. Defendant told the prosecutor she did not
tell Thomas where she was going , but he must have followed her because while D.G. and Poole were engaged in another sex act , and she was smoking the crack cocaine, Thomas opened the truck door. Thomas demanded D.G.’s money . As D.G. reached for his wallet, Thomas be gan hitting him with a gun. There was a scuffle, and Thomas fell out
of the truck

. W hen he stood back up, Thomas shot D.G. Defendant told the prosecutor that she and Thomas had a history of robbing her

customers. Defendant claimed she thought Thomas was using a BB gun because “that’s what [they] always used.” She said she tried to pull Thomas out of the truck. Defendant denied planning the robbery. Defendant said she did not learn until after the murder5

where Thomas got the gun . She also said it w as Thomas, with another man’s help, who disposed of the gun.
When defendant returned for a second interview, she indicated she had been withholding information. This time, she told the prosecutor it was her idea to rob D.G.
and told Thomas D.G. had “a lot of money .” When defendant ran into Thomas after leaving the truck to buy drugs, she told Thomas she was going to find a person named “Insane” to rob D.G. Defendant knew Insane had a gun ; she had committed several robberies with Insane prior to that night . Thomas told defendant there was no need to
find Insane ; he would commit the robbery if she could help him get a gun. Thomas then directed defendant where to drive so he could get a gun

. Defendant said she never actually saw the gun, but after Thomas acquired the gun, she said: “ ‘I’m gonna drop you at the field. You can run through the field. By the time I get back in, I will unlock the door. By the time I get back in, then you s hould just be pullin’ up, just coming through.’ ” Defendant told the prosecutor she and Thomas had already committed about 15 similar robberies, where Thomas used a BB gun. About a week earlier, however, Thomas cut one of their victims with a knife

. F ollowing defendant’s plan, Thomas was able to get into the truck where he started hitting D.G. with the gun. Worried the robbery would “be botched,” defendant started “pulling [Thomas] to come on.” Defendant said that after Thomas shot D.G., they

returne d to defendant’s apartment and Thomas blamed the women for the murder. Defendant told the prosecutor it was never the plan to kill D.G.
2. Defendant’s Testimony at Thomas’s Trial Testifying for the prosecution, defendant acknowledged Thomas had been her boyfriend for one year at the time of D.G.’s murder. It was her idea to get Insane and
have him commit the robbery

. Defendant knew from her prior encounters with D.G. that he would have a lot of money with him , and that night he told her he just cas hed his6

paycheck. When defendant told Thomas her plan to recruit Insane , Thomas said he
would rob D.G. himself ; he just need ed a gun. Defendant drove Thomas to another location . Thomas got out of the car, returning
a short time later. Defendant did not see a gun or a knife, but they continued to plan the robbery. They agreed Thomas would go through a field and meet defendant back at D.G.’s truck. Accordingly, 15 minutes after defendant got back to D.G.’s truck, Thomas opened the truck door, pointe d the gun at D.G., and demanded D.G. turn over his wallet. Poole jumped out of the truck and Thomas began to beat D.G. in the head with the
gun, continuing to demand D.G.’s wallet

. While he was being beaten, D.G. said to
Thomas , “I’ll get my damn wallet for you. Hold on.” But Thomas did not give D.G. a chance to get his wallet ; he continued to hit him with the gun. During the altercation, defendant got out of the truck and began “pulling at” Thomas’s pants saying , “come on, let’s get out of the truck.” The scuffle inside the truck continued until D.G. was able to push Thomas out, causing Thomas to lose his balance. Thomas regained his footing, turned around, and shot D.G. Immediately after Thomas shot D.G., defendant a nd Poole got in their car and drove away. Thomas fled the scene on foot. While they were driving to defendant’s home, defendant and Poole saw Thomas; they let him in the car. Once they got back to defendant’s apartment, Thomas started yelling at the wom en saying , they “don’t know how to set up a robbery.” Defendant testified that, at this point, she did not know where the murder weapon was. D efendant, Poole, and Thomas smoked more crack cocaine , after which Poole left, and Thomas and defendant went to bed, but still did not sleep

. The next morning, defendant called her grandmother. Defendant told her grandmother what happened the night before; her grandmother had already seen it on the news. She encouraged defendant to turn herself in. Defendant t ook her advice

.7

3. Poole’s Testimony at Thomas’s Trial Poole testified that on the night of the murder, she saw “a stack of money” in D.G.’s walle t

. She said defendant was in a position to see that same stack of money. Describing the robbery, Poole sa id Thomas came through the truck door, held a gun to D.G.’s head, and said , “this is a mother fuckin’ holdup

. ” Poole asked , “what are you guys doing.” Thomas told her to “shut the fuck up” and elbowed her ; she scrambled out
of the truck. Defendant remai ned inside, “ransacking [ the ] truck, trying to find [D.G.’s ] wallet.” D.G. and Thomas continued to fight. Poole begged Thomas not to hurt or kill
D.G

. She saw D.G. push Thomas out of the truck, causing Thomas to fall to the ground

. Then she saw Thomas stand up and shoot D.G. After Thomas shot D.G., Poole remembers Thomas telling her to get in the car and drive; defendant was with them. Poole got in the driver’s seat, defendant and Thomas sat in the back seat, and Poole drove away. As Poole drove aw ay, she heard defendant tell
Thomas to “ ‘ give [ her ] the gun ’ ” and defendant say, “ ‘I got to get rid of the gun.’ ” Thomas gave defendant the gun. Defendant got out of the car in the middle of the block and ran “through the building.” Poole parked her car in defendant’s garage where it
would not be seen , and defendant me t them in her apartment.
4

. C. Holmes’

s OSC Testimony Defendant’s sister, C. Holmes , testified at the OSC. Holmes was not there the night of the murder

. S he knew nothing about it. S he did, however, know defendant grew up in foster homes and did not grow up in a “stable environment .” Defendant’s mother
was addicted to crack cocain e and gave defendant her “first hit” of crack cocaine when defendant was 12 years old. Holmes remembered that in 1997, defendant had three children and was living in an apartment with Thomas. Defendant was approximately 21 or 22 years old at the time

. Thomas did not have a job. So, as Holmes understood it, Thomas used defendant to support them and their crack cocaine addiction . Thomas forced defendant to engage in8

sex work and to steal. Holmes described seeing Thomas pull defendant down the stairs
of the ir apartment by her hair and men would be waiting at the bottom of the stairs to pay for sex with defendant. Holmes knew Thomas regularly hit defendant

. S he described
Thomas as “ mean ” and “ awful

. ” Holmes assumed defendant stayed with Thomas out of fear, but also because of her drug addiction.
5

. T. Rivera’s OSC Testimony Defendant’s aunt , T. Rivera also testified at the OSC. Rivera confirmed Holmes’s testimony that defendant’s mother was a drug addict and did not raise defendant. Whe n Rivera first met Thomas, defendant had a black eye and bruising on her face and arms. Thomas and defendant denied any abuse, but Rivera was not convinced. Despite their denial, Rivera continued to see evidence of abuse on defendant’s body. Rivera al so heard from other family members that Thomas was abusing defendant. Rivera described “rescuing” defendant from Thomas as an “almost everyday
occurrence.” She also testified that defendant was engaging in sex work , but Thomas was taking the money.
Rivera had taken defendant from Thomas more than 20 times, but defendant always returned. Rivera repeatedly heard Thomas threaten to kill defendant and to hurt
her kids. A day or two before the murder, Rivera remembered seeing Thomas “beating
the hell ou t of” defendant. She insisted defendant leave with her

. D efendant told Rivera ,

“ ‘No, I’ll go with you tomorrow.’ ” When Rivera went to get her the next day, however, Rivera noted the apartment had been cleared of defendant’s belongings. She described the apartment as “ransacked.”
6

. Dr. Linda Barnard’s OSC Testimony Dr. Linda Barnard, an expert in intimate partner violence and its effect on the victim, also testified at the OSC. Dr. Barnard explained that intimate partner violence
could cause a vi ctim to experience “anxiety, depression, and fear because of the domestic violence. And the more pervasive th at violence is, and the more controlling that the9

[ ab ] user is over the victim of that violence, then the less and less that person feels like they have any choices or that they can leave because of fear that’s perpetrated by the person who’s doing the abuse. So characteristically we see, you know, the effect s of that which are trauma, fear, depression, anxiety.” In preparing her report for the OSC, Dr. Barnard reviewed the parties’ briefs, “some of the witness statements and declarations by people who were a witness to the abuse that occurred,” the report of a doctor who previously assess ed defendant, and the probation report . She did not review any police reports and she did not review the transcripts from defendant’s interviews with the district attorney’s office. Her
information relative to the details of Thomas’s abuse came from defendant and her family
members.
In the documents she reviewed , Dr. Barnard saw evidence that defendant suffered from the effects of intimate partner violence. She read multiple accounts of defendant being “extremely afrai d” of Thomas, that he “controlled everything about her.” She opined that defendant probably “felt trapped in her situation,” and afraid it would be
worse if she left. This feeling was consistent with the effects of intimate partner
batter ing

. Dr. Barnard also interviewed defendant twice. She observed defendant had a history of mental health issues, including paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar 2 with depression and anxiety. She noted that a person with mental health issues would be “more vulne rable to the kind of control that someone has in domestic violence

. ” Drug use would exacerbate that vulnerability. This, Dr. Barnard suggested, could be the reason defendant continued to protect Thomas when she was initially questioned by law
enforcement . She described this as a “paradoxical attachment,” wherein the abused person becomes “ unusually attached” to their abuser, an attachment caused by the “cycle
of violence

. ”10

Dr. Barnard also explained that a person who has been involved in a cycle of
do mestic violence may no longer be able to perceive a situation as “pretty dangerous, or potentially lethal.” They would not understand the need to call for help. And, given a hypothetical, Dr. Barnard opined that a victim of domestic violence might rob so meone in order to appease their abuse r to prevent further abuse. The domestic violence victim may not even appreciate the risks associated with using a loaded firearm to commit that robbery. Dr. Barnard believed defendant was just such a victim.
C. T rial Court Ruling After the submission of the evidence noted above and briefing, the trial court denied the petition in a 1 5

- page written ruling. The trial court summarized the evidence
considered

. The trial court also independently reviewed the factors identified in People
v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 ( Clark ) to answer the question of whether defendant was a major participant in the underlying crime
and acted with reckless dis regard for human life. On the question of being a major participant, the court found defendant was the “mastermind behind the armed robbery.” It was defendant’s idea to rob D.G

. at gun point, and she helped Thomas acquire the gun. D efendant was not me rely a bystander,
she was “actively involved in searching for the victim’s wallet.” And, despite making claims that she pulled at Thomas’s clothing while he attacked D.G. , the court found “ no evidence that [defendant] attempted to step between [D.G. and T homas] or ma d e other efforts to intervene.” Additionally , the court found defendant made no effort to help D.G. after Thomas
shot him. Instead, defendant “ left the scene with Poole and Thomas, helped them hide the car, and told them to give her the g un so she could dispose of it.” The court
concluded defendant was “ not a minor actor like a getaway driver, but rather was ‘actively involved in every element of the [ robbery ] and was p hysically present during the entire sequence of criminal activity’ tha t led to the victim’s death.”11

On the question of whether defendant acted with reckless disregard for human life,
the trial court considered many of the same findings already considered to determine defendant was a major participan t : defendant intended for a gun to be used , she helped procure the gun , she actively participated in the robbery , she made no effort to intervene on D.G.’s behalf , she made no effort to provide aid to D.G. after he was sho t , and she helped dispose of the weapon

. The court found it unlikely D.G. was held at gunpoint “for an extended period,”
but also found defendant knew or should have known Thomas was likely to use lethal force in committing the robbery. Relying on evid ence of Thomas’s repeated violence against defendant herself, the court found defendant had “first

- hand knowledge and experience with Thomas’s propensity for violence.” Indeed, on the night of the murder, Thomas “punched and choked [defendant] until she c ould not breathe.” Defendant
nevertheless helped Thomas acquire a loaded gun to use during the robbery, intentionally increasing the likelihood he would use deadly force. Then she stood by and watched as Thomas repeatedly struck D.G. with the loaded gun. She made no attempt, “either before or during the robbery, to minimize the risks of violence inherent in the armed robbery.” In short, the court concluded, defendant’s “familiarity with Thomas’s violence against her” was a relevant factual circumstanc e which, when considered with the other factual circumstances, led the trial court to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she “exhibited reckless indifference to human life.” The court denied her petition accordingly.
II
. DISCUSSION
A. Senate Bil l No. 1437 and the Section 1172.6 Petition Procedure Senate Bill No. 1437 substantially modified the law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder ( People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842

- 843 ( Gentile )) and significantly narrowing the felony

- murder exception to the malice12

requirement for murder

. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707

- 708 ( S trong )

. ) As amended by Senate Bill No. 1437, section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual ’ s participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except under the revised fe lony

- murder rule in section 189, subdivision (e). The latter provision requires the People to prove specific facts relating to the defendant’s individual culpability: The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); the defendant, though not th e actual killer, with the intent to kill assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in a felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to human life, “as
de scribed in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,” the felony

- murder special

- circumstance provision. ( Strong , supra , at p. 708; see Gentile , supra , at pp. 842

- 843.) Senate Bill No. 1437 also authorized, through section 1172.6, an individual
convicted of felon y murder or murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not now be convicted of murder because of the changes in Sena te Bill No. 1437 to the definitions of the crime. (See Strong , supra , 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) As the Supreme Court clarified in People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, and as amendments by Senate Bill No. 775 made explicit, if a section 1172.6 petition con tains all the required information, the court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner if requested. ( Lewis , supra , at pp. 962

- 963; see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (3).) The prosecutor must then file a response to the petition , the petitioner
may file a reply , and the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Where, as here, the petitioner has made the requisite prima facie showing he or she
is entitled to relief under section 1172.6

. T he court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction13

and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing the court may consider evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,” including witness testimony. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the prosecutor may also offer ne w or additional evidence. ( Ibid .; see Gentile , supra , 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853

- 854.) On appeal from an order denying a petition under section 1172.6, we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. ( People v. Richardson (2022)
79 Cal .App.5th 1085, 1090; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 985.) We

“ ‘ “examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence

— that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt .” ’ [Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial judge ’ s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to suppo rt a rational fact
finder ’ s findings beyond a reasonable doubt. ” ( People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298; see Richardson , supra , at p. 1090.) “ ‘ Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from tha t evidence. ’ ” ( People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57; People v. Nieber (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 458, 476.)
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence After the section 1176.2, subdivision (d) hearing, t he trial court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless disregard for human life. Defendant does not dispute she was a major participant in the robbery of D.G. but argues the re is insufficient evidence she acted with reckless indifference to human life. We disagree.14

1

. Legal Principles

“ The scope of our review for substantial evidence is well settled. The test is not whether the People met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] was ineligible for resentencing, but rather ‘ whether any rational trier of fact
could have ’ made the same determination, namely that ‘ [t]he record

. . . disclose[s]

. . . evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of sol id value

— such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [as did the superior court]. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the [order] the existence of every fa ct the [superior court] could reasonably have deduced
from the evidence. [Citation.] “ Conflicts [in the evidence]

. . . subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge

. . . to determine the

. . . truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. ” ’ ” ( People v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663.) “Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective element. [Citation.] As to the sub

jective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor ’ s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
stand ard of conduct that a law

- abiding person would observe in the actor ’ s situation.” ’ [Citations.] ‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish reckless indifference to human life; ‘only knowingly creating a “grave risk of death” ’ satisfies the statutory requirement.” ( In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677.) To determine whether defendant had the requisite mental state, “ [w]e analyze the totality of the circumstances ” in a mann er that largely overlaps with our “ major participant ” discussion. ( Ibid .) As our Supreme Court has15

explained, “ ‘ [a]lthough we state these two requirements separately, they often overlap, ’ ”

“ ‘ for the greater the defendant ’ s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he [or she] acted with reckless indifference to human life. ’ ” ( Clark , supra , 63 Cal.4th at
p. 615.)
Our Supreme Court laid out factors to ascertain whether a participant in a crime
acted with reckless indifference. These fa ctors include: the defendant ’ s knowledge of weapons and the use and number of weapons in the crime; the defendant ’ s presence at the crime and opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; the duration of the felony; the defendant ’ s knowledge of the cohort ’ s likelihood of killing; and the
defendant ’ s efforts to minimize the risk of violence during the felony. ( Clark , supra , 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618

- 622.)
2. Analysis As mentioned above, d efendant challenges only the court’s finding t hat she acted “with reckless indifference to human life.” We conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the finding

. Defendant conceived of and planned the robbery . She selected the victim , accepted Thomas’s offer to commit the robbery , then hel ped Thomas secure a gun to use during the robbery

. Her role as the “mastermind” behind this armed robbery alone makes
it difficult to conclude she did not act with reckless indifference to human life. ( See
Clark , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.) Indeed, in planning the robbery, defendant made no
effort to “minimize the risk of violence ” during the felony

. ( Id. at p. 622.) O n the contrary, she helped Thomas (a person she kn ew to be violent) procure a loaded gun to use during the robbery

. And, given Thomas’s history of violence, defendant knew he might use that gun during the robbery. ( Id. at p. 621.) But defendant did not just plan the robbery, she participated in it

– ransacking D.G.’s truck, looking for his wallet while Thomas beat him with a gun. Given her proximity to the crime, defendant had multiple opportunities to “restrain the crime and16

aid the victim [] ,” she did not. ( In re Scoggin s , supra , 9 Cal.5th at p. 678.) Indeed, even after Thomas shot D.G., defendant did not stop to render aid, she fled the scene with
Thomas and Poole. Then she disposed of the murder weapon. We conclude substantial evidence exists to support the finding defendant acted
with reckless disr egard for human life. The trial court did not err in finding defendant
ine ligible for resentencing. (§§ 189, subd. (e)(3), 117 2.6 , subd. (d).)
C

. Evidence of Intimate Partner Batter y Defendant argues the trial court failed to properly consider evidence of intimate partner battery and its effect on the victim

. Defendant does not argue the court failed to
consider the evidence , or that she was precluded from presenting evidence . Rather, she
contends the court “misapprehend[ed] the purpose of the evidence offered by the
defen [ dant ] at the hearing on the petition.” In other words, the court was required to consider this evidence only to support her defense and was precluded from considering it
as evidence that defendant knew Thomas to be a violent person

. Defendant offers no authority to support her claim and we know of none

. On the contrary, Evidence Code section 1107 , subdivision (a) provides evidence of intimate partner battering “is admissible by either the prosecution or the defense regarding intimate partner battering and its effects, including the nature and effect of physical, emotional, or mental abuse on the beliefs, perceptio ns, or behavior of victims of
domestic violence .” Other than relevance, t he only limitation is the evidence cannot be

“ offered against a criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge. ” ( Ibid. ) Here, the abuser was not on trial and there is no argument the evidence was not relevant. The court simply reached a
different conclusion about the evidence than the defendant wanted.
We find no error.17 III. DISPOSITION The order denying defen dant’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

/S/ RENNER, Acting P.J.

We concur:

/S/
EARL, J.

/S/
HOCH, J. *

* Re tired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.