Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 9 , 2022

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 21

- 00170

- CV

RUBEN O. JIMENEZ , Appellant

V.
VALERIE ANN VILLANUEVA , Appellee

On Appeal from the 280th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Cou rt Ca u se No. 2020

- 70798

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appel lee Valerie Ann Villan ueva filed an application for a protective order against appellant Ruben O. J i menez. After holding a hearing on the application, the trial court signed a protective order prohibiting J i mene z from contacting
V illanueva

. Jimenez appeal s the protect ive order and ar g u es that (1) the trial court deprived him of his due process rights during the hearing on Villanueva ’ s application , and (2) the evidence was leg ally and factually insufficient t o sup p ort2

the trial court ’ s findings . For the re as ons below, we affirm.

B ACKGROUND Villanueva filed an application for a protective order in November 2020

. In
the application, Villan ueva state d that she and Jimenez previously were involved in a dating rela t ionship and that, after their relation ship en ded, Jimenez engaged in a pattern of harassing and threat en ing behavior. Specifically, Villanueva stated that
Jimenez continued to call her and send her text messages and, on several occasions, arrived at her h ome unannounced

. On one of these occasions
, Vil lanueva said Jimenez threatened her with a gun.
The trial court held a hearing on Villanueva ’ s application in December 2020. Villanueva testified at the hearing a nd offered evidence to support her co ntent i ons , including text messages and a survei ll an ce video from her M ichigan residence.
J imenez was not represented by counsel at the hearing but offered a statement refuting Villanueva ’ s allegations.
On December 29, 2020, the trial court signed a pro tecti v e order prohibiting
Jime ne z from co mmu nicat in g with or engaging in conduct directed towards
V illanueva . The order states that it is effective for the duration of Jimenez ’ s life

. The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law approxi matel y one

m onth later.

Jime nez filed a motion fo r new trial through counsel raising his due

- process and evidentiary

- sufficiency challenges . The trial c ourt signed an order denying
Jimenez ’ s motion for new trial. Jim enez filed a notice of appeal

. A NAL YSIS

I n two issues, J imenez contends that (1) he was dep rived of hi s du e process rights during the hearing on Villanue va ’ s application fo r a protective order, and3

(2) th e evidence is legally and factually insufficient to suppor t the findings required to wa rrant a protective or der. We begin with Jimenez ’ s secon d issue
b ec ause, if su ccessful, it would provide J imenez with the greatest relief. See GB Tubulars, Inc. v. Union Gas Operating Co. , 527 S.W.3d 563, 567 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. den ied).

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. St andard of Review and Governin g Law
When reviewing a t rial court ’ s findings for legal and factual sufficiency, we apply the same standards th at we apply in reviewing jury findings. See Teel v. Shifflett , 309 S.W.3d 597, 603 ( T ex. App.

— Housto n [14 th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). To examine the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding an d indulge every
reasonable inference that would support it. City of Kell e r v. Wilson , 16 8 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Te x. 2005). We credi t fa vorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder
could do so and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could

not do so

. Id . at 827. We must determine whether the evidence at tria l wou ld
enable reasonabl e an d fair

- minded people to find th e facts a t issue. Id . The trial

co urt, as the factfinder, is the only judge of witness credibility and the weight to give to testimony. Id . at 819. When reviewing a challenge to the factual suff i ciency of the evidence, we examine the entire record, cons idering t he evidence in favor of and contrary to the challenged finding. In re A.C. , 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). After considering the entire record, we set aside the judgment only if t he ev i dence is so weak, or th e fi nding is so against the great w eight and p r eponderance of th e evidence, that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Teel , 309 S.W.3d at 603. “ We will not substitute our judgment f or that of the trial court merely because we migh t4

rea c h a different conclusio n. ” Coffman v. Melton , 448 S.W.3d 68, 7 1 (T ex . App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
Before a trial court may issue a protective order, it must make findings that family violence (1) has occurred
, an d (2) is likely t o occ u r again in the future. Tex

. Fam. Code A n n. § 85. 001(b); s ee also C of fman , 448 S.W.3d at 72 . The Texas
Fa mily Code defines “ family violence ” as: [A] n act by a member of a family or household again st another member of the family or household that is in ten d ed to result in physica l ha rm , bodily injury, assault, or sexual as sa ult or tha t is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but does not include defens iv e measures to pr otect oneself [.]

Tex. Fam. Cod e A nn. § 71.004(1). “ Family violence ” a lso in cludes “ dating
violence
, ” which is defined as an act , other than a defensive measure, that:
(1) is committed against a victim or applicant for a protective order : (A) with whom th e actor h as or has had a dating relatio nsh ip;

. . . [and] (2) is intende d to res ult in ph ysical harm , bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the victim or applicant in fear of imminent physical harm , bodily injury, assault, or s e xual assault.

Id . § § 71 .00 4(3), 71.0021(a). Given the reme d ial natur e of the Family Code ’s protective order provisions, courts broadly construe the m to effectuate the Code ’ s preventative purp oses. Rodriguez v. Doe , 614 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Tex

. App.

— H ousto n [14th Dist.] 202 0, n o pet.). In cases involving protecti ve orders against family violence, evidence that a person has engaged in abu sive conduct in the past permits an inference that th e person will continue this behavior in the future.
Co ff man , 4 48 S. W .3d at 72

.5

Ge ne ral ly, the duration of a protective or der may not exceed two years. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85. 025(a). However, the trial court may issue a p rotective order for a longer period of time if the court finds that the responde nt “ comm it ted

an ac t constituti ng a felony offense involving family violence against the applicant

. . . , regardless of whether t he person has been charged with or convicted of the
offense. ” Id . § 85.025(a

- 1)(1). If the trial court renders a protective or der fo r a
p e riod of more than tw o years, it must include in its order a finding described by section 85.025( a

- 1). Id . § 85.001(d); Jovel v. Blanco , No. 14

- 20

- 00638

- CV, 2022 WL 220251, at * 4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 25, 2022, no pet. ) (mem.

o p. ).

B. E viden c e and the Trial C o urt ’ s Findings

Test ifying at the hearing, Villanueva said she and Jimenez were in a n “ off
and o n ” dating relationship for over eight years

. According to Villanueva, Jimenez

“ assault[ed] or threaten[ed] ” her while they were together . Ad mitted into evide nc e duri ng th i s portion of Vil l anueva ’ s testi mony was the statement she included with
her prot ective order application. Elabor ating on the incidents that occurred during
their relationshi p , Villanueva ’ s statement says Jim enez previou sly h ad “ pushed, pulle d, shove d, scr at ched, kick ed, s tomped and h it [her] with his hand. He pulled [her] hair. He threw and hit [her] with objects. He force d and tried to force [her]
to have sex with him. ”

Villanueva ’ s statement also detail s a pattern of har assment and threa ts that began after the end of her re lation ship with Jimenez, including:

• Jim enez making “ harassing phone calls and [sending] messages from different phone numbers. ” According to Villan ueva, Jim enez “ created different phone numbers ” to c on tact her since she had blo ck ed his origi nal phone number

.

• Ji m enez s end ing “ several har assing messages to [Villanueva ’ s]6 boyfriend from the same phone numbers. ”

• Jim enez a rriving at Villanue va ’ s home un announced several times. On at least one of these o ccasions
, Villanue va state d that Jimenez

“ demande d [she] meet wit h h im ” and threatened to knock on her door while her children were asleep. Villanueva said that w hen she ste pped out of her house to meet Jimenez, he “ pulled o ut his gun and press ed it again st [her] ribcage ” and she “ f eared that h e was goi ng to sh oot
a nd kill ” h er.

• Jim enez s talking Vil lanueva and r epeatedly parking in fron t of her home. Summing up Jimenez ’ s conduct after the end of thei r re lationship, V i llanue va ’ s
statement concludes that : [Jimenez] refuses to beli ev e that the r elationsh ip is o v er. His b ehavi or towards me has been escalating since I ended the relationship with him. He is unstable and unpredictable. He has threatened to kill me. I believe that he is capable of carrying o ut his threats. H e stalks a nd spies on me. He i s jealou s and controlli ng. He owns a gun. He ha s made me afraid for my safety and well

- being. I believe that the violence will c ontinue if a protective order is not granted.

Also admitted into evidence w ere approximately 30 pages o f text messa ges ;

acco rding to Vill anueva, th ese were messages she had received from Jimenez or phone numbers she believed Jimenez w as using. Most of the messages are from
Jime nez to Villanueva and range from hi m berat ing her fo r not answering h i s phone calls
, to tell in g her that he mi sses her , to making vulgar s exual comments

. Jimene z also sent Villanueva pictures of them tog ether and pictures of cl othing, including u nderw ear. In her responses to Jimenez, Villanu eva told him t o stop contacting her.

In her t e stimo ny, Vil lanueva st ated that she works as a flight attendant and
maintains residences in Texas and Michigan. Villanue va said her neigh bors and

roommates have told her Jime nez was going to these residences to look f or her.7

Admitted i nt o evidence was a su r ve illance vi deo taken o n October 17, 2020
, by
one of Vil lan ueva ’ s Michigan neighbors. The video shows a gray vehicle pull up and park in the street in fron t of Villanueva ’ s home. A man sits in the vehicle f or a fe w m inutes before wal k ing up to the front of Villanue v a ’ s home. Shortly thereafter, the man runs back to his veh icle and reverses away from Villanue va ’ s house.

Villanueva stated that she believe s the person in the video was Jimenez and
that h e reversed o ut o f the neighborhoo d “ [i]n an attempt t o avoid the surv eillanc e ”
cameras. Villanueva said she had not told Jimenez her Michigan address and, on the day this incident was recorded, a vulgar sexual note was left o n the door of her
home. Vi llanueva said s he r eco g ni zed the not e ’ s handwriting as b el onging to
Jime nez. V illanueva also believed that the car in the video belonged to Jimenez.
Villanueva said she was “ alarm[ed] ” that Jim enez “ traveled 1 6 hours or more to
leave a note on [her] door ” and testified tha t there were othe r incidents in whic h h e ha s arri ved at her home unannounced

. In his statement to the trial court, Jimenez denied Vil lanueva ’ s accusations

an d said
, “ she ’ s the one that has been driving by my house. ” Jime nez al so denied sending many of the text messages to Villanueva. J im e n ez denied that he was the

person in the su rveillance video

. In its protective order signed December 29, 2020, the trial court found that family violence (1) ha d occurred
, and (2) w as likely occur in the future. The trial

court ’ s ord er also state s:
The C o urt finds ther e are reasonable grounds t o believe [Villanueva] is a victim of STALKING by [Jimenez]. The Court finds [Jimenez] has committed an act constituting a FELO NY offense involving family violence to [ Vill anue va].

T he trial court ’s prote ctive or d er p rohibi ts J imenez from contacting Villanueva for8

Jimenez ’s lifetime.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court re iterates its
fin dings on family violence. With respect to the felony offe nse, the t ri al court ’ s findings an d conclu s ions state :
5. The Court finds that [Jimenez] has committed an act constituting a FE LONY offense involving famil y violence to [ Villanueva].
6. The C o urt finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that [ Vil l anueva ] is the victim of Stalk ing and [ Jimenez] h as e ngaged in conduct towards [V i llan ueva] as describe d in Texas Penal Code Section 42.072 (Stalking), 42.07 (Har assment), and Chapter 7A of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
C. Analysis
On appeal, Jime nez challe nges whether legally and factual l y sufficie nt

e vidence supports th e trial court ’ s family violence findings as well as its finding regarding the predicate f

elony offense necessary to grant a protective order lasting longer than two years. We conc lud e these f indings are supported by suffi c ient
evide nce.
1. Family Vi olence
As outlined above, “family violence ” includes (1) acts “ in tended to result in physical harm
, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault
, ” and (2) threats that

“ reasonably place the [ap p licant] in fear of immin ent ph ysical h a rm, bodily inj ury, assault, or sexual assault

. ” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 71.00 4 , 71.0021(a).
With respect to the trial court ’ s finding that family violence had occurred,
Villanueva ’ s statement asserted that, whi l e she and Jim enez were i n a re lationsh i p , Ji menez pus hed her, hit her, k icked her, threw objects at her, and forced her to
h ave sex with him. This evidence is legally sufficient to support the challenged finding. See City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 823 , 8 2 7 ; see also, e.g.
, Williams v.9

Bow les
, No. 01

- 13

- 0001 7

- CV , 2014 WL 586236, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( victim ’ s testimony sufficient to support finding that family violence had occurred). Villan ueva ’ s stat e men t on this point
als o constitute s factua l ly suffici ent evidence, particularly since no evidence was
offere d to refute her assertions. See In re A.C. , 560 S.W.3d at 631 ; Teel , 309
S.W.3d at 603.
With respect to the trial court ’ s finding that family vio len c e is likely to occur in the fu tu re, Vi l lanueva te stif ied and of

fered evidenc e showing that
, after their relationship ended , Jimenez (1) continued to contact her with repeated phone calls and text messages, despite Vil lanueva telling him not t o contact her ; (2) arrive d
unannounced at he r homes s everal tim es ; (3) left a vulga r sexual message on the
door of her Michigan home ; and (4) threaten ed Villanueva with a gun. The surveillance video taken by one of Villan ueva ’ s neighbors also shows a vehicle parkin g i n front of Villanu eva ’ s home
, a man wal k ing up to the front door and shortly thereafter running back to the car, and the vehicle reversing out of the neighbo rhood. Villanueva testified that she believe s this person was Jimenez and that, whe n he walk ed up t o her house, he left a vulgar sexual n o te on her door

. This evidence, considered in the li ght most favorable to the challenged finding, is legally sufficient to support the trial court ’ s conclusion that family violence is likely to occur in the future

. S ee City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 823, 8 27

. Jimene z re futed these statements at the hearing and denied sending the text messages to Villan ueva and leaving a note at her Michigan residence. But the trial court, as the factfinder , was the only judge of t he w itness es ’ credibility and the weight to assig n th eir testimony. See id . at 819. We will not re visit its resolution
of this con f

licting evidence on appeal. See Coffman , 448 S.W.3d at 7 1

. In light of the record as a whole, the trial court ’ s finding t hat family violence is likely to10

occur i n t he future is not against the great weight and pre ponderance of the
evidence. Tee l , 309 S.W.3d at 603.

2. Felony Offense
In its protective order, the trial court found that there were “ reasonable grounds to believe [ Vil l anueva] is a victim of STALK ING by [ Jim en ez] ” and t ha t Jimenez “ ha s committed an act constituting a FELONY offense involving family
violence to [ Villanueva]. ” These findings were reiterated in the trial court ’ s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I n relevant part, a person co mmits th e o ffense of st alking if:
[T]he person, on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct that is directed specifically at another person, kn owingly engages in conduct that: (1) con stitu tes an offense under Section 42. 07, or t hat the actor k nows or reasonably should know the other person will regard as threatening: ( A) bodily injury or death for the other person;

. . . [or]

* * * ( C) that an offense will be committed against the other per son ’ s property; (2) causes the other person

. . . to be p la ce d in fear of bodily injury or death or in fear that an offense will be committed against the other person ’ s property, or to feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, torm ented, embarrasse d
, or off ende d; and (3) would cause a reason able per s on to: ( A) fe ar bodily in

ju ry or death for himself or herself; .

. .
* * * (C) fear that an offense will be committed against the person ’ s property; or ( D) feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented
, embarrasse d
, or offended

.11

Tex. Penal Cod e Ann. § 42 .072(a). Se ction 42.07 refers to the offense of
harassment. See id . § 42.07. Under this section, a person commits the of fense of
harassment if, “ with inte nt to harass, annoy, alarm, abu se , torment, or embarrass another, ” th e person engages in the fol low ing:
(1) initi at es communication and in the course of the communication makes a comment, request, suggestion, o r p roposal that is obscene; (2) threatens, in a mann er reasonably likely to alarm the pe rson rece iv ing the th reat, to inflict bodily injury o n the pe rso n or to c o mm it a felony against the person ;

* * * (4 ) causes the telephone o f another to ring repeatedly or makes repeated telepho ne communications anonymously or in a manner reasonably lik ely to ha rass, annoy, alarm , abuse, torment, embarrass
, or of fen d another ; [ or]

* * * (7) sends repeated electronic comm unications in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass
, o r offend another [.]

Id . § 42.07(a). St alking is a third

- deg ree felony. Id . § 42.072(b).

Her e, leg all y and fact ua lly sufficient evidence support th e trial court ’ s finding that Jim enez committed the felony offense of stalking

. See id . §§ 42.07,
42.072.

As detailed ab ove, the evidence a t th e hearing showed that , after his relationship with Villanue va e n ded , Jimen ez continu ed to repeatedly call and se nd text messages to Vill anueva despite her asking him to stop contacting her. See id

. § 42.07(a)( 4), (7)

. Jimenez ’ s text messages range from h i m berat i ng Villanuev a for not answering his phone calls
, t o tel ling Villa n u eva that he misses her , to making vulgar s exual comments

. Based on this evidence , t he trial court could
conclude that this course of continued conduct was “ reasonably likely to ha rass,12

ann oy, alarm, a buse, torme nt, embarrass
, or offend ” Villan ueva. See id

. §§ 42 .0 7 (a)(4), (7) , 42.072 ( a)(2), (a) (3)(D).

Villanueva also testified that Jimenez would park in front of her residences

un an n ounced . On one of thes e occasions
, Villanueva s aid Jimen ez threatened her with a gun. O n anot her incident re co rded on a neighbor ’ s su rveillance camera, Villan ueva said Jimenez parked in front of her Michigan home and left a sexual message on her front door. This eviden ce also supports the conclusion that
Jime nez engaged in a course of cond uct “ reasonab ly likely t o harass, annoy, alarm,

a buse, torme nt, embarrass
, or offend ” Villanueva. See id . §§ 42.07 (a)( 1 ), ( 2 ) , 42.072 ( a)

. The only evidence offered to refute these al legations was J imenez ’ s testimo ny at the hearing denying that he repeate dly tex ted Vi ll anueva or left a note at her Michigan home. The resolution of this evidentiary conflict was within the
factfinder ’ s province an d we decline to revisit that determinatio n on appeal. See City of Kelle r , 168 S.W .3d at 819. Based on our review of the reco rd, the tri al

court ’ s finding that J imenez e ngag ed in the felony of fense of stalking is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.

We overrule Jimenez ’ s se cond issue.

II. Due Process Citing the Tex as Constitution , Jimenez argues in his first is sue that th e t rial court deprived him o f his due process rights and the ability to participate in a fair
trial. Speci fically, Jimen ez contends he “ had no opportunity to c ross exami ne wi tness es, provide his ow n t estimony, exclude hearsay and other question able
eviden ce presented by Villanueva or offer his o wn evidence that he wi she d the trial court to consider without being interrupted and shut down by the trial court. ”13

T he Texas Constit ution provides that “ [ n]o citizen of this S tate shal l be deprived of life, liber ty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner
disen franchised, except by the due course of the law of the la nd. ” Tex. Const. art. 1, § 19. The Texa s C onstitution thus gua rantees to l itigan t s the right to be heard at a meaningful tim e and in a meaning ful manner. See Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at
H ouston v. Than , 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995); Reynoso v. Dibs US, In c. , 541 S.W.3d 331, 339 (Tex . App.

— Ho uston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet .). The

o p portunity to be heard and present evidence generally m ust amo unt to more than a

cu rs ory opportunity to cross

- examin e the other party ’ s witnesses. Ford v.
Harbour , No. 14

- 07

- 00832

- CV , 2009 WL 679 6 72, at *5 (Tex. Ap p.

— Houston [14th D ist.] Mar. 17 , 200 9, no p et.) (mem. op.).
These rights are not un limited
, ho wever, a nd the trial court has discretion to
maintain control in the court room, to expedite the trial, and to prevent what it
considers a wa ste of time. Dow Ch em. Co. v. Francis , 46 S.W.3d 2 37, 2 40

- 41 ( Tex. 20 01) (per curiam)

. Moreover, the tr ial court s hould “ e x ercise reasonable
control over the mode and order o f examining witnesses and presenting evidence ” so as to make those procedures effective for determin ing the truth, to avoid wasting time, a nd to prot ect witnesses from harassment or und ue embarras sment

. Tex. R. Evid. 611(a). Accordingly, w e measure what process is due to a litigant under a

“ fl exible standard ” that depends on “ the practical requirements of the
circum stances. ” Mosley v. Tex. H e alth & H uman Servs. Comm ’ n , 593 S.W.3d 250, 265 (Tex. 2019).
Moreover, even though Jimenez represented himself pro se at the hearing on
Vi llanue va ’ s application
, pro se litigants ar e hel d t o the same standards as a licensed attorney and must c omply with all applicable laws and rules o f proced ure. C anton

- Ca rter v. Baylor Coll. o f Med. , 271 S.W.3d 928, 930 (Tex. App.

— Houston14

[14th Dist.] 2008, n o pet.). To do otherwise would give pro se litigants an unfair
advanta ge over those litigants r eprese nt ed by an atto rney. Id

. Here , t he reco rd does not s upport the conclus ion that the trial cou rt deprived Jimenez of his due process rights during the hearing on Villanueva ’ s application for a protective order.

First , Jimen ez complains that th e trial cou rt “ s ummar ily denied ” his objection s to th e exhibits o ffered by V i llanuev a.

W hen Villanueva offered her statement into evidence, Jimenez objected and said, “ [t]hat ’ s a false statement. ” The trial court informed Jimenez tha t his

statement was not a “ lega l objectio n. ” When Villanueva next offered into evide nce the s ur veillanc e video and the text messages from Jimenez, the trial court aske d
Jimenez if he had “ a legal objection ” to the exhibits. For both exhibits, Jimenez
sai d he did not know how t o object because h e did “ not know the legal terms. ” Instead of showing a deprivation of due process or due course of law, th ese exchanges show that the trial court notified Jimenez that his objection was
deficient and aff

irmatively provided him with the opportuni ty to obje ct to evidence
before it was adm i tted

. As a result, t h ese exc hanges do not evidence a deprivation
of Jimenez ’ s rights to due process o r due course of law

. S e cond, Ji menez conte nds the trial court “ basically cut off all of [his] attempts to def

end himsel f and cross

- examine ” Vill anueva. Specifically, w hile
J imenez cross

- examined Villanu eva, the t rial court prohibit ed Jimene z from (1) asking V i llanueva to produc e additi onal eviden ce, (2) providing a handwriting demonstration, and (3) asking Villa nueva to “ remove [his] name so it s hows a
number ” i n the referenc ed text messages. In each in stance, the trial court informe d
Jimenez that his questions were improper attempts at c ross

- examination. The
Rules of Evidence e xpressly provide a mechanis m th ro ugh which parties may15

p reserve a cl aim that the trial court erron eously exclud ed evidence, but Jime ne z failed to utilize it

. See Tex. R . E vid. 103(a)(2) (offer of pro of). Therefore, the propriety of the trial court ’ s ruling has not been pre served for rev iew. PNS Stores
, Inc. v. Munguia , 484 S. W.3d 503, 511 (Tex. App.

— Houst on [14 th Dist.] 2 016, no pet.). This un preserved issue cannot constitute adequate grounds to argue Jimenez was deprived of due process or due cours e of law.
Third, Jimenez argues that the tria l court “ cut him off ” while he was giving
his statement about the allegations at issue. However, the t rial court only “ cut off ”
Jimenez ’ s statement after he b egan discu ssing th e “ one time ” he went to Michig an in 2016 to watch a game with hi s family. By l imiting this line of testimony (which
was immaterial to the i ssues before the trial court), the tr ial c ourt was exercising a
reasonable limitation on the proceedings. S ee Tex. R. Evid. 61 1(a). Further, there
was no offer o f proof which adequately pre serv ed this issue for appeal. Tex. R. Evid. 103(a )(2) ; PNS Store s , Inc. , 484 S.W.3d at 511

. Finally, Ji menez asserts that the trial court prevented him fro m offering
exhibits into evidence. When Jimenez referenced these exhibits (specifically, more

text me ss ages and a separate surveillance video), the tri al court asked Ji menez if he
had submitted those e xh ibits into evidence in accordance with the court ’ s ru les.
Jimenez s aid he did not. Agai n, Jimenez failed to utilize the procedure set forth in
the Texas R ules of Evidence to preserve this issue for ap p e llate review. Se e Tex.
R . E vid. 103(a)(2) ; PNS Stores , Inc. , 484 S.W.3d at 511

. T his unpreserved issue

cannot constitute adequate grounds to argue J imenez was deprived of due process or due cours e of law

. In sum , we conc lude that Jimene z has not met his burden on appeal to sho w that he was denied the right to be heard concerning Villanueva ’ s contention s at a16

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner

. We therefore overrule Jimenez ’ s first issue.

C O NCLUS ION

We affirm the trial court ’ s Dece mber 29, 2020 protec tive order

.

/s/ Me a gan Hass a n Justice

Pa n el consist s of Justice s Jewell, Z i mmerer, and Hassan.