AFRICA CENTER SPECIAL REPORT

Envisioning a Stable 

South Sudan

Africa Center Special Report No. 4

May 2018

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Washington, D.C.

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Special Report No. 4

May 2018

Table of Contents

Introduction..................................................................................................1

Three Trajectories Facing South Sudan ....................................................3

By Luka Kuol

Taming the Dominant Gun Class in South Sudan....................................9

By Majak D’Agoôt

Security Sector Stabilization: A Prerequisite for

Political Stability in South Sudan ...........................................................17

By Remember Miamingi

Blurring the Lines: Ethnicity, Governance, and

Stability in South Sudan............................................................................25

By Lauren Hutton

Durable Stability in South Sudan: What Are the Prerequisites?.........31

By Phillip Kasaija Apuuli

Confronting the Challenges of South Sudan’s Security Sector: 

A Practitioner’s Perspective......................................................................39

By Kuol Deim Kuol

The Rule of Law and the Role of Customary Courts in

Stabilizing South Sudan ............................................................................47

By Godfrey Musila

Navigating the Competing Interests of Regional Actors

in South Sudan............................................................................................53

By Luka Kuol

Context and the Limits of International Engagement in

Realizing Durable Stability in South Sudan ...........................................65

By Lauren Hutton

1

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Introduction

The internal conflict and resulting humanitarian crisis embroiling South Sudan since 

December 2013 have exposed the country’s fragility. A weak national identity, ethnically 

based violence, a legacy of violent conflict resolution, personalized and patronage-based 

politics, weak institutional checks on the abuse of power, and the absence of encompassing 

leadership, among other factors, all pose obstacles to peacebuilding. Addressing these 

drivers of instability in South Sudan requires fundamental changes in South Sudan’s 

governance structure, security sector institutions, state-society relationships, and 

accountability mechanisms. 

With regional and international diplomacy rightly focused on negotiating an immediate 

end to hostilities, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies has asked a selection of South 

Sudanese and international scholars, security practitioners, and civil society leaders 

to share their visions of the strategic actions South Sudan must take if it is to make a 

transition from its current state of dissimilation to a more stable reality. These visions, 

taken individually and collectively, are intended to help sketch out some of the priorities 

and prerequisites for transforming today’s highly fragmented security landscape in South 

Sudan to one in which its citizens are safe in their own country and are protected from 

external threats.

The contributors to this project include:

◆ Majak D’Agoôt

◆ Phillip Kasaija Apuuli

◆ Lauren Hutton

◆ Kuol Diem Kuol

◆ Luka Kuol

◆ Remember Miamingi

◆ Godfrey Musila

Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Director of Research 

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Three Trajectories Facing South Sudan

By Luka Kuol

The status quo in South Sudan is unsustainable. South Sudan must undertake fundamental 

reforms if it is to avoid a descent into a Hobbesian state of lawlessness and rule by the strong.

South Sudan is arguably the most fragile state in the world. Lacking an institutional 

legacy at its creation in 2011, political, security, economic, and social indicators have all 

deteriorated with the ongoing civil conflict.1 As state legitimacy has eroded, the number 

of armed factions and tribal militias has increased rapidly, now exceeding 40 such groups.

One consequence of the prolonged conflict 

is that South Sudan is now one of the main 

exporters of refugees in the world with 

nearly 2.5 million people seeking exodus 

in neighboring countries and another 

1.85 million internally displaced. Nearly 

7 million people (60 percent of the precrisis population) face famine and severe 

food insecurity. The economy has almost 

collapsed with annual inflation fluctuating 

between 100 to 150 percent. Conflicts 

within and between communities have 

led to social fracturing and the erosion of 

“The erosion of the 

government’s presence in 

rural South Sudan and its 

retreat to Juba has prompted 

some observers to argue 

that South Sudan has been 

reduced to a city-state.”

A South Sudanese soldier in Leer, South Sudan. (Photo: UNMISS)
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

social cohesion, the very assets that served southerners well in their long struggle against 

Arab-Islamist hegemony from governments in Khartoum. The retreat into ethnic cocoons 

that threatens national unity is due, in part, to the dynamics of the conflict but also to the 

refusal by ruling elites to embrace diversity and devolution of decision-making power 

and resources from the center.

The fledgling state of South Sudan now faces three possible trajectories.

Scenario 1: Status Quo

The first scenario is characterized by the numerous and serious challenges currently 

creating instability:

◆ Continuing insurgency in which no single party to the conflict can impose its will 

militarily

◆ Ethnically motivated violence

◆ A man-made famine caused by the conflict and the collapse of food and economic 

production accompanied by mass displacement within and outside of South 

Sudan’s borders

◆ Human rights violations, including war crimes and crimes against humanity

◆ State incapacity caused by the disintegration of state institutions with security 

institutions not only unable to discharge what constitutes the state’s primary 

mandate of securing limb and property but also standing out as a key source of 

violence and instability

Amid the numerous challenges detailed above, the erosion of the government’s presence 

in rural South Sudan and its retreat to Juba, the capital city, has prompted some observers 

to argue that South Sudan has been reduced to a city-state. This retreat has created large 

ungoverned spaces (that were already challenged by South Sudan’s expansive geography) in 

which insurgents, militia, and what remains of the South Sudanese military clash repeatedly 

while preying on and victimizing civilians wantonly, primarily on an ethnic basis.

Yet, this “national conflict” overlays a cornucopia of preexisting conflicts within, between, 

and among communities over resources, including land, pasture, water, and cattle. 

Moreover, conflicts related to “cultural practices,” such as honor killings, often result in 

intergenerational blood feuds that add additional layers of complexity to the conflict.

This devastating account of the challenges that confront stabilization and peace efforts 

paint an undoubtedly bleak and dreary picture of what the future holds for the people of 

South Sudan. The bad news is that it could get worse.
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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Scenario 2: The Hobbesian State

The second scenario represents a state of permanent anarchy in which life is nastier, 

shorter, and even more brutish than it has been for an overwhelming majority of South 

Sudanese up to the present. It would be characterized by the:

◆ Degeneration of the status quo into chaos, anarchy, lawlessness, or ochlocracy. 

This would be accompanied by the continued factionalization of political and 

ethnic groups. Survival would be entirely dependent on strength of arms. Weaker 

communities would be forced to flee or be eliminated.

◆ Inability to pay the salaries of state functionaries, judges, and other bodies of 

arbitration resulting in a total shutdown of government.

◆ Prospect of regional powers intervening militarily in favor of one or several 

factions increasing the intensity, scope, and longevity of violence. This would 

render war intractable.

◆ Disintegration of economic conditions making trade, capital transfers, and 

infrastructural maintenance unviable. As a result, militia and other security 

personnel would increase their extortionist activities.

Democratic Republic 

of Congo

91,351

Central African Republic

2,395

Sudan

765,243

Ethiopia

440,147 Internally Displaced

1,740,000

Uganda

1,061,771

Kenya

114,199

Total 

Population 

Displaced:

4,215,106

South Sudan Population Movement since 2013

Data from UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Updated 

May 2018
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

In essence, under this scenario, the territory of what is currently South Sudan would revert 

to a stateless entity. There would be a period of massive death as famine and conflict 

ravaged the remaining population, which would exist on a much smaller scale and on a 

subsistence basis. The vast ungoverned space would also pose a regional security vacuum, 

potentially inviting proxy conflicts by regional actors seeking to exploit South Sudan’s 

resources while creating a buffer against instability on their borders.

Scenario 3: Pathways to Stability

A third scenario presents a South Sudanese society in which citizens enjoy physical 

security, can meet their basic material needs, and relate with others from within and 

outside their own communities in coexistence. Realizing this vision will entail concerted 

and multifaceted efforts to address the challenges detailed above.

Key among the conditions necessary for the 

stabilization efforts to work is a conducive 

environment. The Agreement on the Resolution 

of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 

(ARCSS), signed in August 2015, provides 

a framework and minimum conditions for 

silencing the guns and working toward 

sustainable peace and stability. As the conditions 

under which the ARCSS was concluded have 

deteriorated considerably, the revitalization of 

the ARCSS is a critical initial step for renewing 

the commitments of the parties and creating 

“A realization that the 

situation for nearly 

all communities has 

declined since 2015 and 

can degrade still further 

should provide an 

impetus to reboot these 

commitments.”

Internally displaced people shelter at a UN peacekeeping base in South Sudan. (Photo: European Civil Protection and 

Humanitarian Aid Operations)
7

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

the conditions for stabilization efforts to commence. This revitalization dialogue should 

be open to all political entities currently active in South Sudan. A realization that the 

situation for nearly all communities has declined since 2015 and can degrade still further 

should provide an impetus to reboot these commitments.

Given the many tragic events that have unfolded since 2013, as a confidence-building 

measure, the deployment of the 4,000-strong Regional Protection Force (RPF) constitutes 

an integral part of this effort. The size of this force may indeed need to be enlarged 

considering the challenges created by the expanded scope of the conflict. This temporary 

outsourcing of security services is one of the elements that can create a conducive security 

environment enabling other aspects of the stabilization process to proceed.

Stabilization efforts will also require strategic direction at the national level. Given that 

the Kiir-led government lacks legitimacy due to the non-implementation of the ARCSS, 

the installation of an encompassing, public-spirited political authority for a period of time 

to lead stabilization efforts and to lay the groundwork for democratic elections is critical. 

Various options may be contemplated here including: an international transitional 

administration,2 an African Union-led transitional administration,3 or a caretaker 

transitional administration led by South Sudanese technocrats.4 These arrangements 

should be accompanied by a negotiated exit strategy for the current political leaders.5

In view of capacity gaps and lack of trust in sections of the South Sudanese political 

class, a hybrid arrangement composed of untainted South Sudanese technocrats and 

African Union-United Nations nominees may be the preferred pathway for managing the 

transition in South Sudan.

Efforts to redesign and transform security sector institutions in South Sudan should draw 

on the experiences of Liberia (inviting foreign security forces to manage the security sector 

while local security sector institutions are built up) and Burundi (ethnic-based quotas in 

the security forces).

Although most reform efforts in the security sector have a political dimension, there 

is a tendency in Africa to regard such reforms as purely technical endeavors, and this 

complicates implementation. Scrupulous attention to the political aspects, including 

the participation of political parties and other actors in the future transformation of the 

security sector, is central to ensuring sustainable stability.6

Conclusions

The current situation in South Sudan is rapidly degenerating into a Hobbesian state of 

nature, and options for rescuing its sovereignty are eroding every day. To reorient the 
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

country toward a pathway that leads to a united and peaceful South Sudan, it is proposed 

that stakeholders prioritize revitalizing and injecting new life into the ARCSS coupled 

with the completion of the deployment of the RPF. Doing so can create a more conducive 

security environment for stabilizing South Sudan. Parallel efforts should continue focusing 

on saving lives, restoring livelihoods, as well as restoring confidence and nurturing 

social cohesion. The establishment of effective and accountable security institutions and 

formation of a national army is a long-term exercise that requires a thorough and cautious 

approach. The measures outlined above help create the time and space to undertake this 

process so that it will have the opportunity to gain traction.

Dr. Luka Kuol is Professor of Practice at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. He previously 

served as Minister of Presidential Affairs for the Government of Southern Sudan and as National 

Minister of Cabinet Affairs for the Republic of Sudan. He has also worked as a senior economist for 

the World Bank in Southern Sudan.

Notes

1 “State Fragility Index, 2018,” Fund for Peace Web site.

2 Kate Almquist Knopf, “Ending South Sudan’s Civil War,” Council Special Report No. 77 (Washington 

DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2016).

3 Mahmood Mamdani, “Who’s to Blame in South Sudan?” Boston Review, June 28, 2016.

4 Majak D’Agoôt and Remember Miamingi, “In South Sudan, Genocide Looms,” PaanLuel Wël (blog), 

November 1, 2016.

5 Knopf, 26.

6 Nicole Ball, “Lessons from Burundi’s Security Sector Reform Process,” Africa Security Brief No. 29 

(Washington DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2014).
9

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Taming the Dominant Gun Class in

South Sudan

By Majak D’Agoôt

A “gun class”—the fusion of security leaders with political power, class, and ethnicity—is at 

the heart of the predatory governance system that has taken root in South Sudan. Changing this 

trajectory will require redefining the roles of political and security actors.

Stunted Political Development

Like many post-independence African countries in the early stages of state formation, 

South Sudan’s military, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), plays a larger than 

normal role in the polity. Indeed, even though militaries have tended to recede into the 

background as democratic evolution gathered pace, there are countries where “military 

aristocracies” dominate public life. In their prime, these self-styled reformists are always 

driven by a particular penchant for social change, but there often exists a gulf between 

their sloganeering and practice.

Unlike previous eras marked by ideological differences, contemporary coup plotters and 

insurgents in Africa tend to create a close-knit governing elite whose main aim is to share 

rents and power. However, the type of leadership that emerges from such an agenda 

shapes the structure of these insurgent movements. This, in turn, influences the trajectory 

of any subsequent government that emerges.

Fighters in Leer, South Sudan. (Photo: UNMISS)
10

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

In South Sudan, the dominance of the SPLA, which won independence at the edge of 

a sword in 2011, has precluded the building of effective institutions. What caused this 

dismal failure? The lack of commitment to reforming the military, intelligence, and law 

enforcement agencies has caused stagnation and quick atrophy at an embryonic phase of 

state formation. Instead, the SPLA has morphed into a degenerative gun-toting aristocracy 

that straddles the sociocultural, political, and economic spheres like a colossus.

Historical Evolution of the Gun Class in South Sudan

South Sudan’s proclivity for violence 

and conflict and its inability to acquire 

institutional depth is broad and deep. In part, 

this is attributed to age-old militarization of 

all facets of life and society stretching back 

to slavery and colonialism. Self-interested 

elites have held sway because of the utility 

of violence. In the past, native servicemen 

provided military clout to the extractive 

colonial enterprise and plunder. Afterward, 

similar arrangements were utilized by the 

indigenes to purge the homeland from foreign 

occupation—particularly from Sudanese 

Jalaba colonialism.1

The formation of the dominant gun class in South Sudan traces its origin to war and slavery 

when, in 1821, Mohammad Ali Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt, conquered Sudan with the chief 

objective of capturing slaves to provide manpower for the Vice Regal Army.2 Following 

decades of Anglo-Egyptian rule, Sudan gained independence on January 1, 1956. However, 

indifference to pleas from inhabitants of Sudan’s southern regions for greater autonomy 

from northern dominance bred dissent. This culminated in a mutiny of the Sudanese 

Equatoria Corps of the military in Torit in the months leading up to independence, 

effectively launching the first civil war. The Anya-Nya Movement and subsequent revolts 

transformed this externally driven, mercenary-like service into a resistance. In 1972, a 

semiautonomous administration for southern Sudan was created following the signing of 

the Addis Ababa Agreement. However, the effendiya (the noble class of mainly ethnocentric 

political elites), whom the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) later described in 

its 1983 manifesto as the “bourgeoisified southern elites,” dominated post-1972 politics. 

Alongside this burgeoning political class, former rebels began to occupy senior positions 

in government and to control the economic levers of society. They became aware of their 

shared interests as another tier of privileged social class.

“The dominance of 

the SPLA, which won 

independence at the edge 

of a sword in 2011, has 

precluded the building 

of effective institutions. 

What caused this dismal 

failure?”
11

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Eventually, the coalition of 

educated elites and the guntoting insurgents displaced the 

traditional chiefdom class that 

formed part of the previous AngloEgyptian colonial administration. 

Tacit class struggle between the 

chiefdom class, the effendiya, 

and former insurgents continued. 

This explains why the SPLM was 

initially impervious to demands 

for legitimate political and 

administrative structures, and 

this curtailed the development of 

institutions outside the military 

and liberation movement.

With the resumption of the civil 

war in 1983, the nascent civilian 

and traditional institutions of 

public administration established 

in the semiautonomous South 

disintegrated or were ignored. As 

the war wore on and areas in the 

South were liberated, the military 

would dominate the administration, consequently paving the way for the gun class to 

flourish and to dominate the post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) political order.

Upon his ascension to power, following the death 

of John Garang in a helicopter crash on July 30, 

2005, Salva Kiir abandoned the plan developed 

by Garang to decouple the SPLA from the SPLM 

and place the former under civilian control. 

Kiir’s “Big Tent” policy, by which militias were 

granted amnesties and integrated into the SPLA, 

halted these plans and undermined reform 

efforts. All the while, the narrow ruling clique 

retained control. As a result, a top-heavy security 

sector lacking in diversity evolved. John Garang.

Egypt 1805

Acquisition under Muhammad Ali until 1840

Ruled during Greek campaign

Lost in 1841

Acquisition until 1880

Egypt and Sudan in 1914

Campaign with year

Egypt and Muhammad Ali Dynasty

1805 - 1914

0 (km) 1000

Konya

Damascus

Alexandria

Aswan

1820-’22

Khartoum Al Fashir

Fashoda

Lado

Wadelai

Kismayo

Harar

Berbera

Ta’izz

Massawa

Medina

Diriya

1818, ‘38

1813

1831

1824-’30

1874

Cairo

Mecca

The reach of Muhammad Ali Pasha’s Dynasty, 1805–1914.
12

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

Instrumentalization of Violence

In South Sudan, social mobility depends fundamentally on five key endowments: guns, 

wealth, religion, education, and tribe, which often exist in a recursive feedback loop. 

The rise of ethnocentric elites had much to do with the education they had acquired 

previously. Local prophets with certain messianic claims, such as the 19th-century Nuer 

prophet Ngundeng Bong, used the power of religion to mobilize. All of these elite groups 

have used firearms to boost their power. As such, access to firearms and wealth have been 

critical multipliers for enhancing privileged social status.

Warlords built parallel networks of prebendalism, by which they feel they have the right 

to access public revenues for their private interest. Public jobs and financial rents were 

allocated to supporters as a form of patronage. Political power and appropriation of 

public resources were strictly determined on the basis of patrimonial linkages and some 

allegiance to the leader. Upward social mobility depended all the while on control of the 

instruments of coercion. The monopoly of the means of compulsion, consequently, became 

the single most critical factor in acquiring power and accessing means of consumption.

The abundance of conscripts from one’s tribe 

or clan, as well as a modicum of external 

support, which was linked to access to guns, 

gave solid assurances to any particular leader 

that he would prevail. Ethnicity became a 

formidable tool for consolidating patrimonial 

loyalties. Literary advantage and reliance 

on witchcraft and local deities gave certain 

warlords an edge. Under these circumstances, 

a new set of organizational skills, management 

capacities, value systems, and public ethos 

emerged. Unsurprisingly, the sanctity of the state’s monopoly of the legitimate means of 

violence became distorted with the emergence of the gun class in all its variants. While 

the independence of South Sudan from Sudan has severed traditional forms of foreign 

hegemony by the Jalaba mercantilist class in the North, the fundamental condition of 

domination by an ethnically mobilized military class still exists.

Even if the state remains a trophy for contestations, the artificiality of the South Sudanese 

state is manifest, as its judicial, legislative, and administrative capacities have been 

hollowed out. Space for independent voices such as civil society has shrunk considerably 

and a combination of corruption, violence, and ethnic mobilization have placed the 

country on a staircase to the abyss. In the vacuum created—but also as a deliberate effort of 

“The sanctity of the 

state’s monopoly of 

the legitimate means of 

violence became distorted 

with the emergence of 

the gun class in all its 

variants.”
13

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

warlords to shore up sectarian strength—community vigilantes have emerged to achieve 

a kind of collective security for designated segments of the population.3 Furthermore, the 

lucrative war economy of South Sudan has encouraged new rebels and cartel networks to 

contest an extractive domain in the marketplace.

The lack of political will to reform the security sector and eliminate the wicked problem 

of the dominance of the gun class remains the main stumbling block to the state-building 

process in South Sudan. To date, “to think of various security institutions [in South Sudan] 

as subordinate appendages to the state is fundamentally to misunderstand South Sudan 

and South Sudanese society.”4 South Sudan is an atypical case of a military taking hostage 

of a country. Furthermore, it is inching toward a country without a state.5 Therefore, 

mounting security sector reform initiatives in the face of a seemingly entrenched gun 

class that dabbles in politics organized around ethnicity is a daunting task akin to hunting 

a python in the mud.

Possible Exit Scenarios

New organizational norms and doctrines are generated when there is political will. 

Repeated social adversity early in life can program a defensive phenotype in organisms 

which accentuates vulnerability to disease later in life. The gun class draws from these 

biological and cognitive residues of a violent legacy that now asphyxiates reforms.6

To demilitarize South Sudanese society and curb the reigning gun class, therefore, 

presupposes the existence of a civil space, popular rule, and restoration of the rule of 

law. These prescriptions must transcend the security sector if the monopoly of legitimate 

means of coercion is to meaningfully revert to the state.

There are multiple ways of squaring the circle, however. In Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, 

and Mozambique, colonial armies disengaged ignominiously and were replaced by a 

dominant insurgent group or a coalition of insurgents. In Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad, 

oppressive militaries and security apparatuses were disbanded when former rebels took 

power. In post-Apartheid South Africa, new security sector institutions were reconstituted 

from among protagonists. More recently in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Somalia, 

new security sectors have been built from scratch with significant external support. The 

question remains whether any of these models can be relevant to South Sudan.

Disarming the Rebels

Giving war a chance may allow one side in the conflict to impose its will. The victory of 

the MPLA in Angola against UNITA led to the disbanding of the latter with a few fighters 
14

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

being integrated on the victor’s terms. This final outcome brought into the military not 

only UNITA ex-combatants but also MPLA reservists and militias. It also involved a 

massive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. This scenario is 

quite unlikely in South Sudan considering the SPLA’s inadequate capacity to wage a long 

and effective counterinsurgency to defeat an expanding array of rebel factions. Even if 

possible, it would still perpetuate gun class dominance.

Disbanding the SPLA

A new security architecture for South Sudan may only be possible if guns either fall silent 

or violence is reduced significantly. For example, overhauling security sector institutions 

in Uganda in 1986, Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1991, and Rwanda in 1994, followed the 

overthrow of dictatorships and the radical transformation of the state. Like in the 

preceding scenario, there are inherent risks with this approach, which would require 

interim security arrangements in order to avert the possibility of the country sliding into 

anarchy. Since South Sudanese rebels have not demonstrated the capacity to defeat the 

SPLA, and the likelihood of the parties agreeing to the disbandment of their armies to 

allow for the formation of new security institutions is remote, this scenario is unlikely. If, 

through a peace settlement, the rebels opt to voluntarily disarm or disband in exchange 

for certain political gains—including renunciation of violence by all parties, a democratic 

transition, and radical reforms in the security sector—a new security sector design may 

take root. However, this is also unlikely given the inherent gun class mentality within 

the armed opposition.

Reengineering the State-Security Sector Relationship

The security arrangements detailed in the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the 

Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) speak to the creation of inclusive and representative 

security institutions shared mainly among the warring parties (akin to the South African 

model). If there had been stronger political will in 2016 when Riek Machar rejoined the 

government in Juba, these arrangements may have worked because there were fewer 

parties to the conflict at that time. However, the slant toward zero-sum bargaining 

caused the collapse of the ceasefire in July 2016. Likewise, the creation of the Transitional 

Government of National Unity (TGoNU) under the ARCSS unlocked new scenarios 

for security sector transformation by creating opportunities for interparty cooperation. 

However, the collapse of ARCSS puts the country in a transition trap by legitimizing the 

permanency of the temporary.
15

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Thus, an interim arrangement—be it a government of technocrats, a hybrid government 

of technocrats and respected politicians, or a coalition of political adversaries based on a 

stringent selection criteria—must detach the function of rebuilding the security sector to a 

neutral body for a period of at least 2 years. This implies complete disengagement of the 

current leadership in the government and opposition from control over the security sector. 

This understanding can be reached in a roundtable conference of all the stakeholders in 

which the warring parties relinquish this core function voluntarily to an independent body 

comprising distinguished national experts and practitioners and under the governance 

and oversight of the Commission for Peace and Security of the African Union (AU). In the 

interim, a special police task force, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and the 

Regional Protection Force can cater to urgent public security needs and maintenance of 

law and order. Once the institutions of a functioning and accountable security sector are 

established, this responsibility can revert to the South Sudanese state.

This option is the only viable scenario for 

creating new, accountable security sector 

institutions in South Sudan. Left to their own 

devices, leading actors in deeply divided South 

Sudan will fashion a loyal security sector that 

serves the political interests of these leaders. 

Moreover, genuine change requires political 

will, which is in even shorter supply under the 

current circumstances. This scenario would 

follow models of state revival and rebuilding 

elsewhere in Africa—such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Côte d’Ivoire. As 

in other cases, this option would have to be buttressed by significant United Nations 

backstopping and involvement—especially in the areas of DDR and civilian disarmament. 

Adequate guarantees pertaining to safeguarding the territorial integrity of South Sudan 

from possible external aggression and territorial ambitions of the neighbors must also be 

clearly spelled out.

Conclusion

In South Sudan, Band-Aid approaches such as integration and reintegration of various 

armed groups without a clear political roadmap for the country and in the absence of 

political will have turned out to be catastrophic. A clean break is therefore needed. In 

order to restore the state’s capacity to provide security, reconstructing the security sector 

so that it is accountable to a civilian democratic government and totally purged of the 

metastasizing cancer of political violence is necessary. This will require the expansion 

of the mandate and operationalization of a special body of experts—such as a Strategic 

“The collapse of ARCSS 

puts the country in 

a transition trap 

by legitimizing the 

permanency of the 

temporary.”
16

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

Defence and Security Board partially provided for in the ARCSS—to design and 

implement a new security architecture. To this end, the AU will have to be empowered 

by the United Nations Security Council to undertake this function for a limited number 

of years. However, countries that have clear and expressed geopolitical interests in South 

Sudan’s conflict will have to be excluded from this endeavor lest their rivalries and clash 

of interests scuttle it.

Majak D’Agoôt is an independent analyst for the Changing Horizon Institute for Strategic 

Policy Analysis (CHI-SPA). He previously served in the Intelligence and Defence Departments of 

the governments of Sudan and of South Sudan, respectively.

Notes

1 Jalaba refers to extractive, mercantilism practiced by the Sudanese Arabs.

2 John O. Udal, The Nile in Darkness: A Flawed Unity, 1863–1899 (Norwich: Michael Russell (Publishing) 

Ltd, 2005), 208.

3 Koos Malan, Politocracy: An Assessment of the Coercive Logic of the Territorial State and Ideas around a 

Response to it, trans. Johan Scott (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2012).

4 Jeremy Astill-Brown, “South Sudan’s Slide into Conflict: Revisiting the Past and Reassessing 

Partnerships,” Chatham House (December 2014), 9.

5 Daniel C. Bach, “Inching towards a country without a state: prebendalism, violence and state betrayal in 

Nigeria,” in Big African States, eds. Christopher Clapham, Jeffrey Herbst, and Greg Mills (Johannesburg: 

Wits University Press, 2006), 63-96.

6 Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart and Joanna Tochman Campbell, “You Don’t Forget Your Roots: The Influence 

of CEO Social Class Background on Strategic Risk Taking,” Academy of Management Journal 58, No. 6 

(2015), 1614-1636.
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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Security Sector Stabilization: A

Prerequisite for Political Stability in

South Sudan

By Remember Miamingi

Introduction

Decades of conflicts in South Sudan have eroded the separation of roles and mandates 

between the political class and security actors, leading to a deliberate and disastrous 

convergence. One of the results of this entanglement is that security agencies have become 

central to politics, as have politicians in military and security matters. As a result, the 

successful courting and building of patronage-based relationships with the security 

agencies are crucial to surviving and thriving as a politician in South Sudan.

One main outcome of these interactions between politicians and security sector actors 

is the politicization of the security sector and the militarization of politics. The losers, 

unfortunately, are not the actors, politicians, or military men and women, but rather South 

Sudan’s citizens and the state institutions, structures, and systems that can be adjudged to 

be too deformed for reform. The security sector’s core structures and oversight bodies are 

too weak to deliver on mandates.

Members of the South Sudan presidential guard. (Photo: Steve Evans)
18

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

The upshot of this unhealthy relationship between security and politics is a mutually 

reinforcing and perpetually political instability in the security sector. Paradoxically, while 

the security sector has become the main driver of insecurity and political instability, the 

political class thrives by nurturing and managing this insecurity and instability.

This mutually “beneficial” relationship creates 

a vested interest in the status quo, bringing 

into question the willingness and ability 

of local actors to stabilize and reform the 

security sector. This unwillingness to reform 

puts into question the viability of short-term, 

conventional security sector reform (SSR) 

initiatives to address the perennial security and 

political instability in South Sudan. Similarly, 

in light of the complex nature of the security 

challenges facing the country—created in part 

by the blurred lines between security and 

political sectors—a short- to medium-term 

focus on security sector stabilization (SSS) is 

warranted instead.

The Prerequisites for Security Sector Reforms

Reforming the security sector of any society 

presupposes the existence of some sort of structures, 

institutions, and personnel responsible for providing 

and managing public and state security. Such a security 

system should entail functions of accountability and 

oversight, defense, intelligence, and security services, 

integrated border management, police, justice, private 

security and military companies, and civil society, 

constituting a holistic system.1

When these structures, institutions, and personnel 

are rendered unable or unwilling to deliver, by dint 

of structural or nonstructural challenges, then the 

need for reform is apparent. Comparing the image of 

a professional, affordable, and accountable security 

system with what exists in South Sudan leads to the 

unavoidable conclusion that what subsists in South 

“Paradoxically, while 

the security sector 

has become the main 

driver of insecurity and 

political instability, the 

political class thrives by 

nurturing and managing 

this insecurity and 

instability.”

(Photo: BBC World Service)
19

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Sudan merely approximates a so-called security sector. Instead, all the country has are 

men and women with guns, able and willing to kill and destroy.

The weakness of institutions and the ethnoregional character of political mobilization 

and its attendant exclusionary impulses is such that even though bearing the tag of 

national forces, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other security services 

are loosely organized into different militia and proxy forces, with mutating alliances, 

whose allegiances are to different ethnic militia lords and politicians. Since security is 

often defined narrowly to equate to regime security, the security sector exists primarily to 

protect and project the interests of key patrons or certain ethnic groups. Therefore, even 

when conditions are right and the time opportune, to speak of SSR in such a context is 

overly ambitious.

Security Sector Stabilization and Immediate Priorities

In an environment such as the one described above, the immediate priority for South Sudan 

should be to create conditions necessary for security stability to enable the peace process 

to take root. This, in turn, lays the foundation for SSR, reconstruction, and development. 

This is the focus of SSS. According to the UK Stabilisation Unit:

Security sector stabilisation seeks to enable essential and minimum security and 

justice and in doing so protect and promote a legitimate political authority and 

prepare the foundations for transition to longer-term security sector reform.2

The main emphasis of SSS is on ending or preventing the resurgence of violent conflict, 

thereby creating a climate where people feel reasonably safe. It is characterized by the 

cultivation of nonviolent politics and the enabling of citizens to engage in basic economic 

activity across the country. This is what is possible in the South Sudan context for the next 

3 years.

Another factor that recommends the SSS approach for South Sudan is SSS’ flexibility and 

adaptability. To succeed, SSR must meet certain criteria:

◆ Political will from political and security leaders

◆ A comprehensive undertaking of institutional reforms

◆ Strong national leadership

◆ A process that should be nationally owned

◆ Space for a national dialogue

◆ A framework of democratic accountability
20

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

For its part, SSS dispenses with some of the elements integral to SSR. For instance, it need 

not be comprehensive but, rather, can be focused just on security actors—such as the 

armed forces and the police service—that are most critical to reducing the resurgence of 

violence. Furthermore, it can be led by an external actor, thereby reducing or eliminating 

internal rivalry between local parties. Ownership of the process could be sequenced with 

the eventual aim of a full transformation to a nationally led and owned SSR process.

For these reasons and considerations, it is advisable that, instead of SSR, emphasis should 

be on stabilization of the security situation as a short-term measure. In an environment 

such as the one in South Sudan—with turbulent politics, persistent political violence, and 

weak organizational and institutional capacity—stabilization of security is apt. In this 

way, the goal is to attain at least a minimum level of security, promote and protect some 

form of legitimate political authority, and lay a foundation for a transition to SSR in the 

medium to long term.

Security Sector Reform in South Sudan: The Journey So Far

With few peaceful interludes, South 

Sudan has been at war since 1955. It is 

not surprising the economy in the south 

effectively became a war economy as 

society grew progressively militarized 

and the security sector became the 

most active and lucrative sector. Ethnic 

rivalries fueled ethnic factionalism and 

led to proliferation of armed groups, most 

of which were excluded from the peace 

talks that led to the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement (CPA) between the Sudan 

People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 

and the Government of Sudan.

“The goal is to attain at least a minimum level of security, 

promote and protect some form of legitimate political 

authority, and lay a foundation for a transition to SSR in the 

medium to long term.”

Members of the Arrow Boys militia in Western Equatoria. 

(Photo: Guy D.)
21

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

These armed groups became a major destabilizing force in post-CPA Southern Sudan. 

Afraid that these militias might jeopardize the independence referendum, the Government 

of Southern Sudan granted amnesty to and then “integrated” into the SPLA thousands of 

irregular combatants from different militia groups. As a consequence, the SPLA became 

bloated, costly to maintain, and unprofessional. Any semblance of its character as a 

national army disappeared.

Even though international SSR actors knew that anything less than disbanding the 

SPLA and building a new national army from scratch would not amount to much, they 

proceeded anyway, investing resources in SSR, motivated by fears that the proliferation 

of militias constituted a new source of insecurity. In the end, because of factors internal 

and external to the SPLA, SSR failed to achieve its primary goals. For this reason, it was 

easy for the SPLA to splinter into factions when the political conflict within the SPLM 

spread to the Army. It is conceivable that a reformed, more coherent national army 

could have held together even as political leaders differed over Kiir’s handling of South 

Sudan’s succession.

The December 2013 civil war further fractured the SPLA along its historical fault lines—

ethnoregional and patrimonial. The war stripped the SPLA of any national colors it 

might have maintained during the days of liberation. The brief interlude of peace in 2015 

presented a second chance to reform, even disband the SPLA and to build a new national 

army. A combination of factors—the slow constitution of the Transitional Government 

of National Unity, persistent violence including the targeting of civilians in Juba in July 

of 2016, and uneven implementation of the Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in the 

Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS)—meant that little progress was made in relation to 

building the foundation for security sector reforms.

What Should Security Sector Stabilization Look Like?

It is no longer tenable to build a national security architecture for South Sudan on the 

existing security infrastructure. The history of the country, the less than impressive 

reputation of the current security sector, and the ethnicization of interactions between 

security actors and local political structures make a strong a case for building a new 

national security force from a clean slate. The starting point for security stabilization in 

South Sudan must be rebuilding, not replenishing or patching up, the security sector. To 

rebuild a new security sector the slate must be wiped clean.

A Multinational Security Stabilization Force (MSSF) needs to be established in its place 

by the African Union with the support of the United Nations and broader international 

community. Three-quarters of the cost of the MSSF should be borne by the South Sudan 
22

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

national budget, and the remaining through multilateral facilities. The mandate of the 

MSSF should be focused on core security services—armed forces and police services. 

In the event of a serious internal or external security challenge to the performance or 

the mandate of the MSSF, bilateral support—akin to the intervention by Britain in Sierra 

Leone in 2000, or France’s deployment to Mali in 2012, or the Force Intervention Brigade 

(from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 

2013—will be required. Such an offensive surge capability should be factored into the 

mandate of the MSSF. This mandate should not extend into rebuilding a new national 

security force, however.

South Sudanese policymakers, supported through 

bilateral arrangements, should be responsible for 

planning and implementing a new national security 

architecture. Planning, designing, recruiting, and 

training a new national security sector must be 

nationally led and owned but robustly supported 

through bilateral arrangements. Once established, 

transfer of core security functions from the MSSF to the new national security services 

should be phased in starting with the nationalization of the overall chain of command and 

gradual handover of national security to the new national security services.

Key Challenges Facing Security Stabilization in South 

Sudan

Any effort to stabilize the security situation in South Sudan must contend with the 

following key challenges:

◆ There is an absence of legitimate political authority. In addition to serving as a 

driver of instability and an impediment to building an inclusive national identity, 

the absence of a legitimate political authority inhibits setting a strategic direction 

and making the difficult decisions to advance the transformation of a security 

sector.

◆ There is no distinction between the SPLA and the governing party, SPLM. The 

implication of these blurred roles is that every political challenge is a security 

challenge and every security challenge is a political one. As a result, security 

stabilization interventions must be both technical and political.

◆ There is no common and integrated concept of security risk. Without a clear 

and rich understanding of what constitutes a national threat, building a national 

security sector that is coherent, legitimate, effective, and affordable will continue 

to be elusive. As a result, there will be no security architecture and strategy.

“To rebuild a new 

security sector the 

slate must be wiped 

clean.”
23

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

◆ There is no effective oversight and accountability. Instead of civilian oversight 

of the military, there is in fact a military oversight of civilian institutions. This 

puts the security actors above the law and accountability. The culture of impunity 

presents a challenge for stabilization efforts.

◆ There exist multidimensional security threats. The security environment in South 

Sudan is complex, fluid, and fraught with internal and external risks. Internally, 

the proliferation of arms and the multiplication of armed actors as the war has 

spread has created multiple risks for stabilization efforts. The country has an 

overabundance of arms and ammunition in private hands. In addition, there is an 

engulfing lawlessness that has to be factored into these efforts.

◆ South Sudan is in a hostile neighborhood. Neighboring states implicated in South 

Sudan’s conflict can further complicate the security situation by incentivizing 

spoilers. So far, some regional actors have not demonstrated that they are 

interested in and committed to security stabilization in South Sudan. Yet, the 

future of stabilization efforts is partly dependent on the course of action they take.

Strategies for Ensuring Security Stabilization in South 

Sudan

Security sector reform is untenable without a fundamental change in the sociopolitical 

circumstances of the country. Therefore, security sector interventions must be realistic 

and sequential. In South Sudan, the first step should be security stabilization, which 

entails reducing violence, minimizing lawlessness, and enhancing public security and 

safety. Once this is established, a transition to security sector reform is more viable. To 

address the security deficit, local and international actors should consider the following 

interventions.

Make a policy shift from SSR to security stabilization. There is no doubt that the aim 

of a security sector intervention should be reforms. However, in an environment that is 

politically messy, fraught with challenges, and potentially nonpermissive of SSR, basic 

and immediate security needs cannot wait. Security stabilization is needed to reduce 

violence and enhance public safety in the short term. To do this, all political actors must 

be neutralized by demobilizing and disarming all the armed groups, including the SPLA. 

Once the MSSF is operational, its immediate priority must be the demobilization of all 

armed groups. The MSSF will have the overall mandate for the provision of security.

Deploy the MSSF to provide interim security. The neutralization of all armed actors 

including the SPLA should be preceded by the deployment of the MSSF to provide 

and manage the country’s security needs. MSSF personnel can be sourced through the 

transformation of the Regional Protection Force. Additional members can be drawn from 

components of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
24

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

Conduct a strategic security review and facilitate the development of a national security 

strategy. National actors with bilateral support should operationalize relevant provisions 

of the ARCSS and facilitate the development of a security architecture and national 

security strategy for South Sudan that provides for human security as its centerpiece. 

Once security threats are eliminated, reform efforts should aim to create an inclusive, 

professional, capable, transparent, and accountable national security sector.

Set up an inclusive national security commission. This commission will have the mandate 

to oversee recruitment of the new national army of South Sudan, ensure that the army is 

representative of the country’s diversity at all levels, and continue to monitor and report 

on progress to the legislature.

Conclusion

Since the current security actors carry blame for the current state of affairs, stabilization 

must include demobilizing and dismantling the existing security infrastructure and 

militias. A new national armed force must be built from the ground up. This process 

should include a national conversation around security strategy and must ensure there is 

effective oversight.

Dr. Remember Miamingi is a scholar with the South Sudan Human Rights Observatory.

Notes

1 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “Security System Reform and 

Governance,” DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2005).

2 UK Stabilisation Unit, “Security Sector Stabilisation,” Stabilisation Issues Note (March 2014), 5.
25

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Blurring the Lines: Ethnicity, 

Governance, and Stability in South

Sudan

By Lauren Hutton

When South Sudan achieved independence in 2011, the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Army/ Movement (SPLA/M) and its leader, Salva Kiir Mayardit, took control of a 

system of governance that transcended the lines between the formal and informal sectors, 

military and civilian elites, government and nongovernment actors, as well as licit and 

illicit sources of revenue. Instead of laws, rules, regulations, and rights, South Sudan is 

governed through complex personal and familial ties with an uncertain fluidity. A military 

aristocracy was established that maintains its strength through patrimony made possible 

via resource capture.1 The SPLA/M was legitimized as liberators, and warlord-style rebel 

leaders were elevated to the top of a ruling class characterized by ethnicity.

The lack of legitimate political processes, combined with a monetarized and militarized 

system of governance, meant that any stability was always going to remain vulnerable to 

the competing demands of those able to use violence to project political power.2 When the 

existing governance fractures opened in December 2013, they manifested and continue 

to manifest as ethnic violence. This review of ethnicity and governance in South Sudan 

explores potential intervention strategies for international actors seeking to engage in 

stabilization activities in this conflict-affected state.

A herd of cows on the road to Bor, South Sudan. (Photo: BBC World Service)
26

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

Ethnicity and Class

Instrumentalizing ethnicity for political 

gain often occurs in contexts where 

powerful actors see more relevance and 

efficacy in mobilizing along ethnic lines 

than along social classes. This is often 

related to the lack of desire of the ruling 

class for systemic change and the preference 

of elites—at various levels of society—for 

maintaining ethnically determined systems 

of production and consumption. As such, 

ethnicity should be understood as a political 

identity founded in social structures and 

reproduced by the institutions of the state.

Under the colonial state, South Sudanese were subjects divided into chiefdoms with a 

fusion of legislative, executive, and judicial powers conferred from the colonial state to the 

ethnic fiefdoms.3 The colonial administration used a form of ethnic federalism, aligning 

cultural and political boundaries, to manage native populations, not dissimilar to the 

approaches of Ethiopia and Nigeria today. Systems of ethnic federalism align identity 

and territorial divides creating options for more local autonomy while still leaving room 

for manipulation by the central state.

Under an independent Sudan, the dual legacy of the colonial state was reproduced in the 

Arab-African divide creating an ethnically diverse but unified opposition to the racialized 

state. However, internal tensions within the liberation movement were easily exploited, 

and Khartoum could deracialize the conflict and split the opposition into an ethnically 

fragmented array of armed actors, some of which were co-opted.

Independent South Sudan quickly began to mirror the class structure of Sudan with a 

small group of military elites exerting power through violence and patronage reliant on 

extended familial and ethnic ties. The depth of these ties is evident in the fluidity with 

which actors move across the state-nonstate and government-community boundaries.

Ethnicity and Rights

For actors at local levels, there is a continuous process of negotiating for rights awarded 

as privilege from the military elites. Since the colonial state, chiefs have played an 

important role as representatives of the community able to interface with the state. 

A Mundari fisherman in Terekeka, Central Equatoria State. 

(Photo: UK Department for International Development)
27

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Importantly, this role was based on a denial of rights within an authoritarian system of 

governance with limited local power choices to affect access to resources and privileges. 

For citizens, relying on ethnically defined leadership is often more practical than looking 

for nonethnic institutions, especially when considering access to justice, security, and 

markets. When the state institutions fail to provide equity and predictability in their 

administration of rights, local institutions cross the “formal” and “traditional” dialectic, 

and laws and governance emerge.

Ethnicity and Identity

In African societies, identity is often created through both ethnic and market-based systems, 

with deep linkages between the two due to the nature of patronage.4 When looking at 

ethnicity as well as wealth transfers, one can understand the central roles that property 

and the ability to bestow “gifts,” particularly through bride wealth and dowry, play in 

maintaining the current governance system. While displacement and forced asset-stripping 

cause the seemingly never-ending humanitarian crises, these tactics provide visible 

evidence of the ways in which wealth is being continually consumed and transferred.

By independence, the SPLA had already become the primary space for resource 

accumulation, and wealth spread from the SPLA commanders through their kinship 

networks, most often through cattle and marriage. Instead of being a genuine national 

liberation movement, the SPLA turned into an agent of plunder, pillage, and destructive 

conquest. Operating more as an occupying force than a liberation movement or national 

army, the SPLA traditionally relied on local commanders—“business men of war”—able 

to coerce and co-opt local institutions for administration, taxation, and recruitment.5

Ethnicity and Governance: Emerging Recommendations

There are four main recommendations that emerge from situating ethnicity within a 

resource governance lens.

Human rights are central to state-citizen interaction. A core issue for any stabilization 

agenda is how to orient interventions to strengthen the human rights framework at local 

and national levels. The protection and advancement of human rights provide a bulwark 

against state excesses while also providing a means for citizens to claim social goods 

through lobbying, advocacy, and litigation. However, the current power dynamics require 

more than just adherence to rule of law or an independent judiciary. Meaningful change 

must come from fundamental changes in how the state and citizens interact. Technocratic 

institution and capacity-building approaches will need to interface with very complicated 

power dynamics at local and national levels.
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

Resources are important in order to delink ethnicity from governance. Thinking of South 

Sudan through ethnic and market-based identities opens avenues for delinking ethnicity 

from governance, as the military elites are created and sustained through productive 

relations and not merely through social identity. With this lens, there is the opportunity 

to explore linkages between production and ethnicity and the institutions that reinforce 

and/or resist the replication of those identities.

The functionality of local institutions is 

essential. For many parts of South Sudan 

today, the state has not just penetrated the rural 

frontier but has through forced displacement 

and asset-stripping, tried to lay waste to the 

relative power of those home spaces. It is a war 

of domination run by a core inside the SPLA 

and the ruling party who enforce politicized 

ethnicity through violence and weaken law and 

order.6 While the state is pursuing a strategy of 

militarized and ethnic dominance, there is a need to focus on the resilience, resistance, 

and innovation happening at the level of local institutions.7 The focus should not be on 

ethnicity or ethnic representation, but rather on the functionality of local institutions to 

protect rights and resources and, importantly, how these institutions operate across and 

within the state-nonstate boundary.

The functionality of decentralization of access cannot be overemphasized. Ethnic 

dominance is enabled by a lack of functional decentralization tied to the territorial 

organization of the state and its administrative units. No matter the number of states, the 

division of South Sudan into administrative state units is a product of power and diversity. 

However, the essential geography and livelihoods of South Sudan mean that there can 

never be containment of diversity in ethnic fiefdoms, but rather that internal organization 

should seek ways to optimize interactions between peoples while also maintaining and 

harnessing local autonomy needs. This is what could be called a focus not on the lines on 

the map, but rather on physical decentralization and functional intercommunal linkages. 

Douglas Johnson notes that federalism will only thrive under hospitable conditions 

because it is a system of governance and not a political system.8 With the current political 

system based on militarization, monetarization, and turbulence, a federal system could 

just mean the difference between being ruled by one tyrant or by several petty tyrants.

The focus should not be on how many states or where the lines are, but rather on how to 

make economically and politically viable communities that able to operate across ethnic 

boundaries. National identity and new cooperative norms will emerge from functional 

“There is a need to 

focus on the resilience, 

resistance, and 

innovation happening 

at the level of local 

institutions.”
29

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

interactions between people and meaningful platforms for engagement. Centralization 

and the dominance of elite ethnic networks are enabled by the limited options that people 

have for most of their interactions. Even before the 2013 crisis, not all state capitals had 

banks, so people could not save money or access credit through the formal system. In the 

current conflict, market access has been extremely restricted to select groups.

Decentralization must physically expand the range of choices people have on the ground 

to step back from the patronage-based economic networks that operate within ethnically 

defined units. Indeed, many South Sudanese assert that the most obvious impediment to 

national cohesion is exclusion from the national platform, especially exclusion along ethnic 

lines.9 Formalizing terms of trade, regulating market behavior, and expanding access to 

credit, particularly in the form of cattle banks, could begin to dilute the importance of 

patrimony and ethnicity for access. In illicit and informal economies profit is generated 

and contained in closed networks that are often ethnically determined.

Conclusion

Stabilization may require delinking politics from ethnicity, but the foundation of the 

relationship between politics and ethnicity lies in the way in which the dominant ruling 

class has used the awarding of resources and rights to shape these dynamics. This is partly 

due to the closing of delineating spaces between the institutions of the home and state, but 

also due to the way in which resource accumulation limits nonviolent and de-ethnicized 

politics. The relevance of ethnicity in this conflict cannot be minimized without addressing 

the material systems that have enabled a form of ethnic extremism to take root. The state 

A cattle auction in Lankien, South Sudan (Photo: Aimee Brown/Oxfam)
30

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

project is in crisis in South Sudan. Either the violent ethnic extremism that has become 

symbolic of the ruling regime continues its path of domination and destruction, or the 

frustrations of the excluded can find harmony with moderates on the other side to build 

a country based on mutual respect, rights, and regulations. Such platforms of cooperation 

could prove critical.

Lauren Hutton is an independent political analyst and strategic communications consultant.

Notes

1 Clemence Pinaud, “South Sudan: Civil war, predation and the making of a military aristocracy,” African 

Affairs 113, no. 451 (2014), 192-211.

2 Alex de Waal, “When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan,” 

African Affairs 113, no. 452 (2014), 347-369.

3 Cherry Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship, Community and State

(Suffolk: James Currey, 2013).

4 Mahmood Mamdani, “Political identity, citizenship and ethnicity in post-colonial Africa,” Working 

Paper presented at the World Bank Arusha Conference “New Frontiers of Social Policy: Development in 

a Globalizing World,” in Arusha, Tanzania, December 12-15, 2005.

5 Peter Adwok Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View (Kampala: Fountain 

Publishers, 1997), 51.

6 Madut Kon, “Institutional Development, Governance, and Ethnic Politics in South Sudan,” Journal of 

Global Economics 3, no. 2 (2015), 147.

7 Sharon E. Hutchinson and Naomi R. Pendle, “Violence, legitimacy, and prophecy: Nuer struggles with 

uncertainty in South Sudan,” American Ethnologist 42, no. 3 (2015), 415-430.

8 Douglas H. Johnson, “Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought,” RVI Research 

Paper No. 1 (London/Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2014).

9 See Jok Madut Jok, “Diversity, Unity, and Nation Building in South Sudan,” Special Report No. 287 

(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011).
31

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Durable Stability in South Sudan: 

What Are the Prerequisites?

By Phillip Kasaija Apuuli

The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 

(ARCSS) identifies security sector reform (SSR) as one of the most crucial issues that need 

to be addressed if South Sudan is to attain peace. The prioritization given to SSR in the 

ARCSS is illustrated by the fact that it comes immediately after the provisions relating 

to the establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU). As a 

building block to SSR, the ARCSS mandates a Strategic Defence and Security Review 

(SDSR) to be undertaken by a multistakeholder Strategic Defence and Security Review 

Board (SDSRB).1 The SDSR process should generate a comprehensive SSR framework, 

which when implemented, will radically transform the security sector in South Sudan.

Generals of South Sudan’s army celebrate during official Independence Day ceremonies. (Photo: Steve Evans)
32

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

Due to the instability in the TGoNU, including the resumption of armed conflict in 

July 2016 and repeated breaches of ceasefire agreements, the actors mandated to lead 

the process of developing a reform blueprint have not made meaningful progress. The 

questions that arise, therefore, are: What will it take to realize substantive reforms that 

result in stability? How should challenges that bedeviled past reform efforts inform the 

SDSR and SSR in general?

To institute a process through which an able, 

effective, and accountable security sector 

can be built to engender lasting stability in 

South Sudan, one must grapple with a range 

of challenges associated with the political 

environment in which the proposed SDSR 

would unfold. SSR refers to the provision of state and human security within a framework 

of democratic governance.2 It institutionalizes the purpose, roles, and responsibilities 

of security sector actors vis-à-vis civilian authorities and citizens within a sovereign 

democratic state. Put simply, SSR is a process that aims to structure a state’s security 

services in a way that best meets the security needs of citizens and the state.

The end of the Cold War resulted in a critical shift in the thinking about the military’s role 

in developing countries. In many of the post-Cold War intrastate conflicts, the security 

forces have been the main source of insecurity. Thus, the thinking holds, if the security 

forces are “managed, monitored, and held accountable,” they will cease to be a source 

of insecurity.3 This conclusion is particularly relevant in South Sudan, where previous 

failures to reform the security sector are at the heart of the most recent chaos.4

Lessons from Past Proposals and Initiatives to Reform the 

Security Sector

Under the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement (CPA), the South 

Sudan security forces—consisting of the 

military, police, wildlife services, prisons, 

and intelligence—were supposed to be 

restructured, while the numerous militias that 

existed during the civil war in Sudan would 

be demobilized.5 However, the restructuring 

and demobilization did not happen. This was, 

in part, because President Salva Kiir adopted 

a “Big Tent” policy that integrated political 

“What will it take to 

realize substantive reforms 

that result in stability?”

(Photo: Al Jazeera English)
33

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

opponents into the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). At the core of this policy was 

the notion that facilitating access of key belligerents to social status and material benefits 

in exchange for political acquiescence would create greater stability.6

While this policy bought the country a modicum of peace and political stability in the 

interwar period (2005-2013), it came at a high price. It squandered an opportunity for 

reform and weakened force cohesion and professionalism. The continuing divisions 

between the different elements of the security sector subsequently contributed to the 

outbreak of civil war following the political crisis within the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Movement (SPLM) party in December 2013. Rewarding rebel leaders created an endless 

cycle of rebellion by incentivizing the spoilers of peace. It was often the case that, when 

inadequately catered to by amnesty deals, groups would splinter, creating a new pool of 

armed actors to be accommodated.

At the time of attaining independence in 2011, South Sudan’s security sector was bloated. 

The integration of the different militias (also called the Other Armed Groups or OAGs) 

into the SPLA ballooned force numbers to an estimated 207,000 combatants.7 This measure 

distorted the SPLA’s force structure, with a large number of generals. It also ballooned the 

defense budget, with estimates placing the proportion of the defense budget at 50 percent 

of national revenues. Military expenditures left the new government unable to invest in 

social and development programs, which further complicated the security situation. The 

2008 White Paper on Defence, which aimed to restructure the SPLA into a professional 

force subordinate to civilian authority, was derailed by successive outbreaks of violence, 

notably in Jonglei in 2012 and the civil war in 2013.

Under the CPA’s Disarmament, Demobilization, 

and Reintegration program (CPA-DDR), both 

the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA were 

to be downsized by 90,000 personnel each.8

However, by the time the United Nationssponsored CPA-DDR closed in December 2011, 

“not much had been achieved.”9 The CPA-DDR 

fell far short of its targets because neither party 

was prepared to reduce force numbers when 

conflict still loomed large.

Another DDR initiative was launched by the National DDR Council, following the 

January 2011 independence referendum. This program aimed at increasing livelihood 

opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return and facilitating the release, 

return, and reintegration of children associated with belligerents (usually as fighters, 

“OEstimates place 

the proportion of the 

defense budget at 50 

percent of national 

revenues.”
34

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

porters, and cleaners). Overall, 150,000 persons (80,000 from SPLA and 70,000 from 

OAGs) were earmarked to undergo DDR. However, by March 2013, when the initiative 

was halted, it was estimated that only 12,525 soldiers had been demobilized, with 5,000 of 

these being reintegrated.10

The projected cost of the National DDR Council initiative was $1.2 billion and the 

government had committed to cover 64 percent.11 By the time the initiative was stopped, 

it was not clear how much the government had actually contributed. Donors had spent 

$50 million on the process.12 The African Union Commission of Inquiry found that the 

initiative failed to gain traction mainly because “the government was not committed to 

it.”13 The government’s lack of enthusiasm was for two reasons, namely: the deterioration 

of the security environment on the border with Sudan, and the austerity measures owing 

to the oil production shutdown in 2012.14

Related initiatives contemplated at the time but which were affected by the outbreak of 

violence in 2013, included the:

◆ National Military Pension Fund (under which all members of the SPLA would 

receive a pension based on their contribution since January 9, 2005)

◆ National Freedom Gratuity Fund (providing army generals who were not 

processed through the DDR program to receive a one-off “golden handshake” in 

recognition of their contribution)

◆ Transformation Strategy and Programme 2012-2017 (developed with technical 

support from the UK’s Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation 

(SSDDT) project, which aimed to transform the SPLA’s officer corps. It developed 

job descriptions for senior SPLA officers and commenced work on sectoral 

command structures)15

The Strategic Defence and Security Review

The SDSR envisioned in the ARCSS was supposed to lay the groundwork for reform 

of the security sector in South Sudan through the establishment of a security sector 

transformation framework. The SDSR was to be conducted by multistakeholder entities 

grouped under the SDSRB consisting of: four persons each from the warring parties—

SPLM-In Government (SPLM-IG) and SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO); two from former 

detainees; two from opposition political parties; and one each from faith-based leaders, 

the opposition in the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), independents in the NLA, 

eminent personalities, academia, women, youth, and civil society organizations.

The wide spectrum of representation in the SDSRB was aimed at ensuring local ownership 

of the process. The main outcome of the SDSR would be a Security Sector Transformation 
35

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Framework that would result in the unification of command of the different armed groups 

in South Sudan into the National Defence Forces of South Sudan (NDFSS). In terms of 

timelines, the ARCSS stipulated that the SDSR should be completed within 280 days. 

Activities to be undertaken during this period included:

◆ Comprehensive needs assessment of the military to inform the formulation of the 

security and defense policies of the country

◆ Assessment of the military and nonmilitary security challenges (internal and 

external) facing the country

◆ Clarification of the responsibilities of different security sector bodies and agencies 

including the management and oversight of the security sector

◆ Identification of the mission, vision, and specific role of the national army

◆ Outline of the program and doctrine for NDFSS unification and modernization

Taken together, these activities constituted the security sector transformation framework. 

The timelines for the conduct of SDSR were not respected because of the delayed return 

to Juba of SPLM-IO leadership after the signing of the ARCSS and the resumption of 

fighting in Juba in July 2016 which saw the expulsion of SPLM-IO, the main cosigner to 

the ARCSS.

Challenges to Reforming the Security Sector

Beyond the ongoing conflict, there 

are several challenges that SSR efforts 

would need to overcome in order to gain 

traction. First, the near total absence of 

the rule of law and the resultant lack of 

confidence in security institutions poses 

multiple challenges for disarmament 

efforts. The failure of past SSR efforts 

is due, in part, to cyclical violence that 

make it difficult for armed elements 

to believe they can be safe without 

their guns. Due to the militarization of 

public life, bearing arms in South Sudan 

secures goods and gives voice. Arms are a pathway to assert local influence and garner 

access to wealth and prestige.16 It is telling that the Chairman of the Joint Monitoring and 

Evaluation Commission (JMEC), Festus Mogae, has decried the prevailing view among 

armed parties that SSR is “a threat to be resisted.”17 Under the prevailing conditions, it is 

extremely difficult to expect belligerents to trust any action that denies them what they see 

Festus Mogae (Photo: UNMISS)
36

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

as a source of security and livelihood. Thus, winning the confidence and trust of armed 

groups that all will be well when they hand over their guns—a prerequisite for effective 

SSR—must be addressed by the SDSR process.

Second, reform of the security sector requires military structures to be accountable to 

civilians. In South Sudan, to say that the security forces are under civilian authority is an 

aberration. The distinction between civilian and military authority has never existed. Most 

political elites with any influence on security policy have a background in the military. 

The ruling SPLM has not been so much a political party with a military wing as the SPLA 

has been a military force with a political party. Long term stability in South Sudan is 

dependent on decoupling politics and the military.

In addition, civil society and the media, 

which would normally provide oversight 

of the security sector, are weak, hamstrung 

by the application of laws that restrict their 

activities. The sense of entitlement among 

certain SPLM members—the idea that those 

who fought for liberation are entitled to rule 

undisturbed or “deserve the first bite of the 

cherry”—serves to delegitimize voices of 

accountability and to silence citizens.

Lastly, the continuation of the armed conflict and the proliferation of armed groups not 

only makes it difficult to conduct a comprehensive strategic security review but also 

deepens the DDR challenge to be surmounted post-conflict. In addition to the SPLA-IO, 

there are now at least two dozen armed formations active in South Sudan as the conflict 

has spread from the original theaters to other parts of the country post-July 2016.

The resignation and declaration of rebellion against the government of several high 

ranking military officers such as the SPLA Deputy Chief of General Staff for Logistics, the 

SPLA Head of Military Courts, the SPLA Director of Military Justice, the SPLA Logistics 

Support Brigade Commander, as well as former Chief of General Staff Paul Malong, signal 

further factionalization that will need to be overcome.

Priorities for Moving Forward

It is understood that a cessation of hostilities and some measure of political will is required 

before genuine reform of the security sector can be initiated in South Sudan. Recognizing 

this, the government of South Sudan and its opponents, with the help of all well-meaning 

“The continuation of the 

armed conflict and the 

proliferation of armed 

groups deepens the DDR 

challenge to be surmounted 

post-conflict.”
37

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

people and entities, should prioritize building on some of the promising elements for 

reforming the security sector captured in the ARCSS.

Review the previous DDR and SSR initiatives to identify the reasons why they were 

ineffective. This will inform the current SDSR initiative so that it can be a success.

Rejuvenate the SDSRB that is tasked with conducting the SDSR. This will require 

revisiting the selection of board members so that it is seen as legitimate, capable, and 

representative of the diversity of stakeholders whose interests must be considered. 

Similarly, a new timeframe and clear budgetary support must be identified so that the 

SDSRB can launch into its review as soon as the opportunity arises.

Phillip Kasaija Apuuli is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Makerere University in 

Kampala, Uganda.

Notes

1 See Chapter II, Part 6, Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 

August 17, 2015.

2 Tahani Mustafa, “Insecurity through Security Sector Reform,” Ethnopolitics Papers 5, no. 36 (2015), 2.

3 Sarah Detzner, “Modern post-conflict security sector reform in Africa: patterns of success and failure,” 

African Security Review 26, no. 2 (2017), 118.

4 Alex de Waal, “What went wrong,” The Cipher Brief, August 3, 2016.

5 See Annexure I: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and 

Appendices, The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between The Government of the Republic of The 

Sudan and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, December 31, 

2004.

6 Richard Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond,” HSBA Working 

Paper No. 23 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 10.

7 Keith Krause, “Reforming the security sector and rule of law: the hidden transcripts of local resistance,” 

in Peacebuilding in Crisis: Rethinking paradigms and practices of transnational cooperation, eds. Tobias Debiel, 

Thomas Held, and Ulrich Schneckener (London: Routledge, 2016), 163.

8 African Union, “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan” (Addis 

Ababa: AU, 2015), para. 200.

9 Ibid., para. 201.

10 Ibid., para. 204.

11 Jairo Munive, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in South Sudan: The Limits of 

Conventional Peace and Security Templates,” DIIS Report No. 7 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 

International Studies, 2013), 30.

12 Krause, 163.

13 African Union, para. 206.

14 Munive, 30.
38

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

15 African Union, paras. 208-209.

16 Matthew LeRiche, “Security Sector Reform in South Sudan and prospects for peace,” Centre for 

Security Governance, June 3, 2015.

17 Festus G. Mogae, “Opening Statement as Delivered by H.E. Festus G. Mogae, Chairperson of JMEC,” 

(speech delivered during the Plenary Meeting of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, 

Juba, South Sudan, January, 12, 2016), 6.
39

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Confronting the Challenges of

South Sudan’s Security Sector: A

Practitioner’s Perspective

By Kuol Deim Kuol

Countries emerging from conflict confront numerous challenges relating to the reform 

of their security sectors. Some countries succeed in addressing those challenges, are able 

to reform their security sector gradually, and achieve peace and stability for their people 

as a consequence. Other countries fail to do so, at times contributing to the recurrence of 

conflict. South Sudan falls into the second category of countries. Following the signing of 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the parties failed to live up to their 

commitments, which included reducing the size of their militaries. It was not surprising, 

therefore, that the failure to carry out meaningful reforms of the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Army (SPLA) in the post-CPA period had some bearing on the eruption of the crisis in 

December 2013.

South Sudanese police recruits at training academy. (Photo: UN/Paul Banks)
40

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

It is reassuring that there is continuing recognition among South Sudanese and the 

international community that reforming the security sector is essential for peace and 

stability. It is for this reason that special attention was paid to the issue of the security 

sector in the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 

(ARCSS) between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GOSS), the SPLM/AIn Opposition (SPLA/M-IO), and other actors.

The State of the Security Sector and the Imperative for 

Reform

In South Sudan, the components of the uniformed security sector include the:

◆ Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (the military of South Sudan)

◆ National Security Service (NSS) (the intelligence organization)

◆ South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS)

◆ National Prisons Service of South Sudan (NPSSS)

◆ South Sudan National Wildlife Service (SSNWS)

◆ South Sudan National Civil Defence Service (SSCDS) or fire brigade (all of which 

are armed)

All the components of the security sector, SPLA-affiliated militia, and rebels have been 

accused by both local and international human rights groups of committing crimes and 

serious human rights violations during the conflict. Violations and crimes committed 

include the use of rape as a weapon of war, the killing of innocent people on the basis 

of ethnicity, the recruitment of children, the forced displacement of populations, and 

looting. Political leaders and senior military leaders in the SPLA—which has acquired 

the reputation of a tribal army dominated by ethnic Dinka—also stand accused of land 

grabbing and ethnic cleansing.

One of the enduring characteristics of the SPLA is its close relationship with the Sudan 

People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), of which it was the armed wing during the war 

of liberation. Today, it is commanded by some of the officers that dabble as politicians 

while politicians tend to maintain militia loyal to them. The relationship between the 

SPLA and the SPLM party is deep and structural, in part because the President of South 

Sudan is both the commander in chief of the military and the chair of the SPLM party. 

Moreover, many officers are politically active. Politicians tend to have their own militias 

or command loyalty from sections of the Army. This has resulted in the militarization of 

public and political life in South Sudan, with deadly results.
41

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

The other uniformed forces—police, wildlife, fire brigade, as well as the NSS—have over 

the years drawn heavily from the SPLA or become, according to some, its “dumping 

ground.” For this reason, they suffer from the same structural, administrative, and 

managerial problems as the SPLA. As the current conflict illustrates, the separation 

between the SPLA and the other uniformed forces is in name only. Personnel from wildlife 

and fire brigade have fought alongside the SPLA.

While the SSNPS is accused of serious human rights violations, including the detention of 

innocent people, looting, and corruption, the NSS has a reputation of being the “political 

police” of the President. It has been linked to the persecution of the media, civil society, 

and academics, as well as to arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances. In 

addition, the NSS is alleged to have participated in illegal renditions of regime opponents 

from neighboring states. The intelligence organization has also become “a parallel army” 

equipped with tanks, heavy artillery pieces, and multiple rocket launchers. The remaining 

three security sector organizations are also accused of various unprofessional acts in the 

areas of their mandate.

The rampant unprofessional behavior of uniformed personnel is partly responsible for the 

drive within many communities in South Sudan to acquire small arms and light machine 

guns for their protection. Some of these arms are reportedly acquired from members of 

the security forces. These arms fuel intercommunity conflicts, including cattle rustling 

and revenge killing of innocent people. In short, reforming the security sector will be 

starting from a very low baseline and demands immediate attention in order to restore 

normalcy and stability in South Sudan.

Recommendations

Conduct a comprehensive strategic review of the security sector. None of the six security 

organizations has ever conducted this kind of review. The Strategic Defence Sector 

Review (SDSR) mandated by the ARCSS relates only to the defense component of 

national security. At the start of the armed conflict in December 2013, estimates placed the 

SPLA budget at 50 percent of national expenditures, of which 80 percent was reportedly 

allocated to salaries. One of the primary objectives of a strategic review is to determine 

force strength and to align this with the resources and security threats for which each 

“The rampant unprofessional behavior of uniformed 

personnel is partly responsible for the drive within many 

communities in South Sudan to acquire small arms and light 

machine guns for their protection.”
42

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

entity is responsible. Rightsizing the SPLA would free up resources for allocation to other 

security components or social services.

The review of all players in the security 

sector should take place simultaneously. 

However, there is scope to combine the 

SPLA review with that of the fire brigade 

and wildlife because these services are illdeveloped and their members are often 

called up into combat roles within the SPLA. 

To ensure a high caliber and even-handed 

review, international technical and financial 

support for this process is critical. Moreover, 

attention must be given to implementing the 

recommendations generated from the review. 

This may seem obvious, however, in the past, 

reform measures agreed upon at the highest level have often gone unimplemented. A 

good example is the Objective Force 2017 and the Transformation Programme 2012-2017, 

which sought to transform and develop the SPLA in a 5-year time frame.

Convene a national conference for the professionalization of the six security sector 

organizations. The proposed national conference should be attended by, but not limited 

to, the representatives of the political parties and civil society groups. One of the primary 

objectives of the conference is to generate consensus among political and military leaders 

as well as the public to professionalize all the security organizations. Professionalization 

will entail severing ties that exist between sections of the political class and the components 

of the security sector. This should facilitate the demilitarization of public life and the 

establishment of effective mechanisms for civilian control and accountability. Those 

programs will aim at making the security organizations independent from the ruling 

class. The institution of effective civilian oversight over the security forces is essential for 

their professionalism.

A disciplined and highly professional security officer corps must stand ready to carry out 

the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state. The 

organizations must be politically neutral and recognized by all social groups of the society. 

The government and the political class as a whole must promote professionalism of all 

six security organizations so that they operate independently and cultivate an apolitical 

posture. In turn, the government and political players must commit to forbear—backed 

by criminal and other sanctions—from interfering in the security sector with the aim of 

serving partisan interests. Norms should be established to achieve these ends.

“A disciplined and highly 

professional security 

officer corps must stand 

ready to carry out the 

wishes of any civilian 

group which secures 

legitimate authority 

within the state.”
43

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Reintegrate belligerents into the security organizations. It is recognized that the civil 

war in South Sudan has reduced the national security organizations into ethnically based 

forces. For their part, rebel groups have also largely recruited on ethnic lines. Disarmament, 

demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of surplus fighters should be conducted as part 

of a jointly agreed DDR program that implements SDSR objectives. Policymakers should 

draw from failed DDR programs of the past—the post-CPA and 2012 DDR programs—

which failed due to lack of political will. The reluctance to disarm and demobilize during 

the immediate post-CPA period was in part informed by fear of an attack from Sudan to 

reverse or stall the transition.

In terms of benchmarks, these reforms must:

◆ Lead to the creation of a truly national army, police, and intelligence organization

◆ Provide for the requirement that all security agencies recruit from all ethnic groups 

on an equitable basis, including consideration of ethnic quotas

◆ Establish training as one of the top priorities of the reform agenda

Focus on the institutional development of 

security sector organizations. This includes 

continuous training of the personnel in 

uniform and human resource development 

of the civilian component. The SPLA should 

focus on the preparation of defense capability 

and the effective conduct of military 

operations. Preparing defense capability 

includes: recruitment of suitable people, 

training of both individuals and collective 

units; ordering, receiving, operating and 

maintaining military equipment; establishing 

information and communication channels; 

and generation and application of operational 

doctrine. Executing military operations means 

building on this range of tasks.

The central function of a defense ministry should be to make, monitor, and review 

defense policy.1 Through the generation and implementation of defense policy, the 

defense ministry can be the central enabling institution for providing policy direction on 

defense matters. Currently, there is no national security strategy for South Sudan, making 

it difficult for any security organization to work out clear policy. The SPLA White Paper 

on Defence of June 2008, which was never made public, set out broad objectives to be 

“The Ministry of Cabinet 

Affairs should take the 

lead in the development 

of the national security 

strategy of South Sudan 

in order to ensure it 

encompasses all of 

the country’s security 

challenges.”
44

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

achieved by the Southern Sudan Ministry of Defence during the transitional period (2005-

2011). The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs should take the lead in the development of the 

national security strategy of South Sudan in order to ensure it encompasses all of the 

country’s security challenges. In addition to a national security strategy, sectoral policies 

setting out the ways and means for achieving set objectives will also need to be developed.

Strengthen the oversight of the security organizations. Oversight is needed in order to 

reduce abuses of security offices. Mechanisms of oversight are allegedly established in the 

Constitution of South Sudan and sectoral laws pertaining to each organization. Broadly, 

there are two types of oversight systems. Internal oversight systems of the security sector, 

for example, comprise the Army Inspector General and the Internal Auditing Section. 

External oversight mechanisms include parliament and the judiciary.

Parliamentary committees should be empowered to scrutinize budgets, policies, and 

operations. In the performance of their duties, they should be able to access classified 

information that is otherwise unavailable to the public. Civil society should be empowered 

to hold the security sector to account. Civilian involvement may lend credibility to the 

process, make decisions more legitimate politically and socially, and generate a sense of 

ownership among stakeholders. Currently, some of the existing oversight mechanisms 

listed are very weak and will require review and strengthening.

Conclusion

In the past, reforms of the security sector have been doomed by a lack of political 

will. One of the consequences of this failure is that the sector remains one of the 

main destabilizing forces in the country. The proposals made in this review could 

contribute to the creation of a capable, accountable, and effective security sector. 

However, reforms are unlikely to take root in the prevailing political, economic, social, 

and institutional environment. Broader institutional reforms are necessary to build 

the foundation for and foster the deepening of the rule of law while strengthening 

democratic institutions. Additional reforms to circumscribe and limit the powers of the 

political branches (executive and legislative), empower the periphery, expand human 

rights protection, and facilitate democratic expression are imperative as is the need to 

combat the entrenched culture of impunity.

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Kuol Deim Kuol was an active lieutenant general in the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Army until 2013. He led the Jonglei disarmament campaign launched by President Kiir in 2012.
45

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Notes

1 Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville, eds., Managing Defence in a Democracy (Oxford: Routledge, 

2000).

47

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

The Rule of Law and the Role of

Customary Courts in Stabilizing South

Sudan

By Godfrey Musila

South Sudan’s descent into civil war in 2013, 2 years after independence, has devastated 

families, communities, and institutions—including judicial institutions. Already fragile 

following decades of war against Khartoum, state institutions had yet to penetrate 

throughout the territory, and many were still in the process of formation. Areas that 

lay beyond the reach of the state were nevertheless not ungoverned. Traditional chiefs 

and the rich tapestry of tribal norms and rules they applied to resolve disputes have 

played an invaluable role in holding communities together, much as they had during 

the decades of North-South fighting in the Sudanese Civil War, despite the multiple 

challenges they faced.

A traditional court in Warrap, South Sudan. (Photo: UNDP South Sudan/Brian Sokol)
48

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

The new state of South Sudan has struggled with the militarization of private and public 

life, impunity, and personalized rule. As a consequence, constitutionalism and the rule 

of law—twin pillars of a state governed by law—have suffered. How, then, can the rule 

of law help establish stability in South Sudan? In particular, what role does the judiciary, 

including customary courts that constitute the lower rungs of the formal justice system, 

contribute to this enterprise?

Of Gun Culture and Absence of Rule of Law

Commentators have lamented the larger-than-normal role of the military in an ostensibly 

democratic, civilian-governed South Sudan. This state of affairs characterizes the low level 

of rule of law that persists in South Sudan. Rule of law connotes a state in which all, without 

exception, are subject to the law, the law and other institutions are allowed to function, 

and conflicts are mediated in terms of established rules and procedure. South Sudan has 

had a rule of law problem since its birth. This has been characterized by personalization 

of power, weak institutions including the judiciary which is subservient to the executive, 

a culture of violence, a lack of trust in institutions, and a pervasive military influence on 

public life, including on the administration of justice and resolution of disputes.

In its seminal 2013 report on the South Sudanese 

judiciary, the International Commission of Jurists 

decried the apparent weakness of the rule of law 

in South Sudan. It illustrated this finding with the 

case of an SPLA general who, faced with a lawsuit 

at the High Court in Juba, “paid the judge a visit” 

in the company of armed men and demanded to 

know when the judgment would be ready. While 

this constitutes an extreme case of intimidation 

of a judicial officer, it is symptomatic of other 

actions that compromise the independence of the 

judiciary. Equally, the capacity limitations of the 

formal judiciary—insufficient number of judges, 

limited number of courts over a vast territory, and poor working conditions for judicial 

officers—restrict the reach of legal institutions in the new state.

The jurisdiction of customary courts, established under the Local Government Act of 2009, 

are limited in law to “customary disputes.” In practice, however, they hear and determine 

a wide range of cases that include theft, assault, rape, and homicide primarily because 

the customary courts are often “the only game in town” or litigants prefer them to formal 

statutory courts. Records suggest that an overwhelming number of cases that reach the 

“Records suggest that 

an overwhelming 

number of cases that 

reach the courts ... 

are decided by the 

underrated yet critical 

customary courts 

staffed by chiefs.”
49

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

courts—between 55 and 90 percent—are decided by the underrated yet critical customary 

courts staffed by chiefs. These courts, thus, fill a major gap in the provision of arbitral services 

left by formal justice, and are critical to security in rural areas and towns in South Sudan.

The Challenges and Resilience of Customary Courts

In spite of the role customary courts play in the delivery of justice and provision of security 

for citizens, this vital institution has faced strains due to the extended periods of war. This 

has included intimidation by the military that controlled liberated areas as well as the 

weakening of the authority of community leaders in the eyes of returning exiles whose 

views of tradition have been transformed by their lived experiences.

Customary courts in South Sudan are also constrained by being placed within the local 

government bureaucracy, which is widely recognized as ineffective and provides little 

support. Chiefs sometimes find it difficult to enforce their decisions and have, on occasion, 

been threatened with physical violence.1 Traditional leaders are also hamstrung in terms 

of larger conflicts between communities relating to access to pastures and water.

The proliferation of arms within the general population in South Sudan adds another 

layer of difficulty.2 In the absence of a reliable police presence in rural areas, customary 

courts headed by chiefs must at times rely on the SPLA to step into law-and-order roles to 

provide security and to enforce customary court decisions. Too often, however, the SPLA 

does not fill this role but instead acts with impunity, leaving citizens without recourse 

when they suffer violations. This undermines respect for the law, further complicating the 

work of chiefs and compounding the insecurity prevailing in rural areas.

While customary courts remain inadequate in many ways, in their absence, lawlessness 

would reign in large swaths of the territory. In fact, the critical role that traditional 

institutions play in the delivery of arbitral services during the current conflict has 

been recognized by the United Nations, which has set up elected “conflict resolution 

committees” in camps for internally displaced people.

Despite these challenges, the customary courts have made important contributions to 

initiatives strengthening stability in South Sudan. For example, during the last years of 

the civil war with Khartoum, the convening of a peace conference by community leaders 

at Wunliet between communities of the western bank of the Nile and their eastern bank 

“The customary courts have made important contributions to 

initiatives strengthening stability in South Sudan.”
50

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

counterparts—with the participation of armed actors and facilitation of the Council 

of Churches—pacified the feuding communities. It simultaneously united southern 

antagonists, thereby accelerating the peace process between the Khartoum regime and 

southern Sudan. Moreover, violence that engulfed Jonglei State in 2012 was quelled 

through a mix of co-option (the “Big Tent” policy) and the convening of a Wunliet-like 

peace process involving several communities. As preference for traditional forums by 

large sections of the population is, in part, due to the reverence with which elders and 

customs are still viewed, empowering them would reap dividends for the rule of law at 

the national level as well.

State Building and Rule of Law Interventions

Other than training for the small number of judges, magistrates, and prosecutors who 

were in place during the post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement period, the justice sector 

suffers from an acute shortage of judicial officers and prosecutors. Moreover, the first 

major hire of new judges in 2013 came too close to the start of this civil war and has not 

significantly improved service delivery. The justice sector also lacks infrastructure, with 

the few facilities that exist concentrated in Juba.

In the post-independence era, support directed at customary courts took the form of 

training by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and other partners. Anecdotal 

evidence suggests that these interventions may not have had a discernible impact due to 

a multitude of structural factors including low levels of literacy, customary practices that 

may discriminate against women and youth, heterogeneity in terms of customary norms 

practiced by different communities in a diverse South Sudan, and chronic insecurity.

The United Nations Development Programme’s effort to document and harmonize 

customary laws has proceeded at a slow pace, is of narrow scope, and was interrupted 

by the 2013 conflict.3 The link and referral of cases between customary courts and the 

limited number of magistrate courts (in each county) that should exercise a supervisory 

role over the former is problematic. Circuit courts (High Court) introduced on a trial basis 

by the Chief Justice in two regions ameliorated the delivery of judicial services but were 

not funded adequately.

The inadequate support for customary courts mirrors the neglect of local and state 

governments in relation to national government institutions. This has had multiple effects, 

including increasing the potency of local conflicts, missed opportunities to build a culture 

of the rule of law from the grassroots, and leaving the periphery mostly ungoverned by 

law. This has also entrenched the use of force and insecurity as citizens resort to violence 

to “resolve” their disputes.
51

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Recommendations

The rule of law is integral to the future stability of South Sudan. While the rule of law will 

be shaped by the broader political context in South Sudan, spreading the reach of informal 

courts into the country’s ungoverned spaces will be a vital component of any stability 

scenario. Priorities in this regard include the following.

Expand access to a month-long basic legal training for 1,500 paralegals to advise and 

guide the customary court chiefs on legal matters. In addition to strengthening the 

legal grounding of these courts, expanding the use of paralegals would create more 

opportunities for the participation of women and youth, making them more representative 

of the communities that they serve.

Develop a national framework (harmonization law) based on the constitution, human 

rights, and criminal laws. This would create uniformity in terms of how customary courts 

operate and provide opportunities for the sharing of experiences among customary law 

panels from different parts of the country.

The national framework must delink customary courts from the underfunded third 

tier of government—local government—and bring them within the fold of the national 

judiciary. This would respond to the marginalization of customary courts, affirm their 

critical role in the delivery of justice and security for citizens, enhance oversight over them 

by judges and magistrates, and build their capacity by providing resources, including 

token remuneration for adjudicators.

As part of a broader judicial reform effort, customary courts must be strengthened with 

greater support from local police who can enforce compliance with decisions. This will 

require recruiting, training, and deploying more police to provide security to customary 

law panels and to facilitate the implementation of their decisions.

Improve coordination and referral procedures between formal courts and customary 

courts. This calls for the expansion of registries in formal courts to make provision for 

filing, documentation, and transfer of cases between courts upon a review of the facts by 

a magistrate, judge, or registrar. The registration of community leaders involved with 

customary courts would facilitate regulation, training, remuneration, record-keeping, 

and sanctioning as required.

Dr. Godfrey Musila is an expert on international law and justice. He has served as a research fellow 

at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and commissioner on the United Nations Commission on 

Human Rights in South Sudan.
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

Notes

1 David K. Deng, “Challenge of Accountability: An Assessment of Dispute Resolution Processes in Rural 

South Sudan” (Juba: South Sudan Law Society, 2012), 32-33.

2 Ibid.

3 Tiernan Mennen, “Study on the Harmonization of Customary Laws and the National Legal System in 

South Sudan” (Juba: United Nations Development Programme, 2016).
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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Navigating the Competing Interests of

Regional Actors in South Sudan

By Luka Kuol

Regional considerations have always played a prominent role in South Sudan’s security 

landscape. Indeed, the country was born from a regional fissure between what are today 

Sudan and South Sudan. This schism has been subsequently shaped and influenced to 

varying degrees by all of South Sudan’s neighbors. These dynamics have continued with 

the country’s descent into civil conflict in December 2013. These influences have had both 

exacerbating and stabilizing effects, adding another layer of complexity to the political 

calculations of any peacebuilding efforts in the region. Understanding and navigating 

these regional dynamics, on both a bilateral and multilateral level, is part and parcel of 

achieving durable stability in South Sudan.

The Politics of IGAD

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) role in South Sudan dates 

back to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was negotiated under its 

auspices. IGAD also played a critical mediation role in the negotiation of the Agreement 

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni at the signing of the Agreement on the 

Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), August 26, 2015. (Photo: UN/Isaac Gideon)
54

Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), the blueprint for the 

resolution of the crisis in South Sudan that carries international support. IGAD was also 

mandated by the African Union (AU), with the support of the Troika countries (Britain, 

Norway, and the United States) and the broader international community, to lead the 

implementation of the ARCSS through the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission.

Despite this ongoing engagement, IGAD has so far been unable to elicit required conduct 

from the warring parties in South Sudan. Moreover, competing regional interests have 

exacerbated the current crisis, adding to its complexity. The predicaments of violent 

conflict, social fracturing, and economic turmoil faced by South Sudan since the signing of 

the ARCSS in 2015 could have been ameliorated if the region and international community 

acted in greater unison.

Indeed, the ARCSS provides the necessary basis for addressing the root causes of the 

crisis. However, IGAD and the international community’s failure to develop a common 

approach for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Agreement, inhibited a robust 

response when many initial violations of the Agreement were not undone. The absence of 

a commonly agreed carrot-and-stick approach by the region and international community 

have allowed the violators, particularly the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) to get 

away with breaches that undermine the ARCSS. Lack of a credible response means that 

repetitive and ineffective threats are ignored by the GOSS. Inaction in the face of these 

breaches as well as unabated violations of human rights seem to have convinced the 

parties to the Agreement that regional organizations are ineffectual, impotent, and mere 

“paper tigers.” Part of the problem are regional actors’ conflicting economic, political, and 

security interests in South Sudan.

Economic Interests

The economic interests of South Sudan’s neighbors constitute a key prism through which 

to view not only these neighbors’ evolving roles in South Sudan but also the jockeying 

for alliances by parties to the conflict. South Sudan attracted both small and big investors 

into various sectors of its economy from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt. The 

subsequent engagements by these countries were generally informed by their desire to 

protect their investing nationals, although the intensity of such interests has varied from 

country to country.

In relation to oil, South Sudan’s ability to continue exporting a commodity that constitutes 

98 percent of national revenues has depended on maintaining good relations with Sudan, 

which presents Sudan a key lever in its relations with its southern neighbor. The secession 

of South Sudan from Sudan resulted in the loss of more than 70 percent of oil revenue for 
55

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Khartoum. In an effort to compensate for the loss in oil revenue, the Government of Sudan 

levies exorbitant oil transportation tariffs, processing, and transit fees for exporting South 

Sudan’s crude through its pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. Sudan draws 

roughly $24 per barrel exported. This has amounted to approximately half of South 

Sudan’s total oil revenue for the period since 2015.

The high cost of transport of its crude had necessitated South Sudan to search for 

solutions in the immediate post-independence period. The options included building a 

new pipeline, either through Kenya to the Indian Ocean, or through Ethiopia to Djibouti’s 

or Eritrea’s Red Sea ports. However, during the negotiations of the ARCSS, the GOSS 

effectively used the choice of the alternative pipeline to influence the positions of some 

IGAD states. Although the feasibility study indicated that the pipeline to the Red Sea 

through Ethiopia and Djibouti would be the best option, the GOSS reportedly indicated 

instead its preference for the Kenyan option.

Given Sudan’s dependence on revenue from its pipeline, it necessarily benefits from 

situations in which instability renders South Sudan unable to pursue building an 

alternative pipeline, and it is likely that its posture toward the parties to the conflict in the 

South has been influenced by such calculations.

Besides oil politics, the politics around the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 

Dam (GERD) became another important factor as South Sudan’s civil war progressed. 

To contextualize these dynamics, it is important to note that the Nile Waters Agreement 

signed in 1929 between Egypt and Britain granted Egypt an unprecedented monopoly in 

the management and use of the water of the Nile River, despite the fact that 97 percent of 

the water flowing into the Nile originates outside Egypt’s territory. The Blue Nile, which 

originates in the Ethiopian highlands, contributes 85 percent of the overall flow of the 

Nile. The rest originates from rivers and lakes in the riparian states that fall south of South 

Sudan (Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya).

In 1956, Egypt concluded a bilateral treaty with Sudan to “cede” 18.5 billion cubic meters per 

annum, which allowed Sudan to develop hydro energy and an irrigation scheme in Gezira 

State for growing cotton and other crops. Since then, Egypt has opposed claims by the other 

riparian states, asserting “historical rights” over the Nile waters on which it depends for all 

its domestic, agricultural, and industrial use. With population pressure mounting, however, 

“During the negotiations of the ARCSS, the GOSS effectively 

used the choice of the alternative pipeline to influence the 

positions of some IGAD states.”
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

these riparian states have increasingly sought ways to exploit the Nile’s upstream as well as 

other water bodies in its catchment area for electricity and irrigation.

When Ethiopia and the other riparian states adopted the Agreement on the Nile River Basin 

Cooperative Framework (CFA) in 2010, Egypt and Sudan were the only holdouts.1 The 

CFA establishes the framework for use and conservation of the Nile waters and has been 

signed by Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The construction 

of Ethiopia’s GERD, which will hold 62 billion cubic meters of water, angered Egypt. It 

reportedly threatened Ethiopia with war if Nile flows are disrupted, and has lobbied the 

other CFA signatories not to ratify the treaty.

As the dispute over the GERD continued, the 

GOSS, with alleged facilitation from Uganda, 

strengthened its diplomatic relations with 

Egypt with the aim of weakening Sudan and 

Ethiopia’s influence in South Sudan. In 2017, it 

was alleged that Egypt, which cooperates with 

the GOSS on water projects in South Sudan, 

not only provided funding but also supplied 

military goods and services to the GOSS 

through Uganda. Although Egypt and South 

Sudan do not share a border, the former’s 

concern over sustainable access to Nile waters 

informs its interest in South Sudan, which 

occupies 45 percent of the Nile Basin.

Egypt was said to be keen to revive discussion of the Jonglei Canal with South Sudan 

in the post-CPA period. Originally designed to increase water flow into the Nile by 

diverting water from the expansive Sudd wetlands through which the White Nile flows, 

the Canal financed by Cairo had been left incomplete in 1983 when civil war broke out 

between Sudan and its southern semiautonomous region. In addition to Egypt’s reported 

acquisition of rights in South Sudan’s Sudd, the cultivation of closer ties with and support 

for President Kiir’s military campaign alarmed Addis Ababa.

Rumors that circulated around this time to the effect that Juba had agreed, at the urging 

of Cairo, to host Eritrea-based Ethiopian rebels were never confirmed. However, Addis’ 

move to jointly commit with Juba to cooperate on security, including a pledge not to host 

actors hostile to their respective governments, lends credence to these rumors. In early 

2018, it emerged that Egypt had signed an agreement to establish a military base in Eritrea.

“Although Egypt and 

South Sudan do not share 

a border, the former’s 

concern over sustainable 

access to Nile waters 

informs its interest in 

South Sudan, which 

occupies 45 percent of the 

Nile Basin.”
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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

There are various ways, therefore, 

that Nile politics have been injected 

into the conflict in South Sudan as 

Juba seeks to fund its war effort. The 

effect is to prolong the war by giving 

the GOSS a lifeline and rendering 

Juba less willing to compromise on 

implementation of the ARCSS.2

For its part, Kenya’s economic 

interests lie largely in the banking 

sector and air transport industries. 

Kenyan nationals also constituted a 

key part of the budding hospitality 

industry in addition to running small 

businesses. With the sharp economic 

contraction in South Sudan following 

the onset of the conflict in 2013, Kenyan economic interests were badly affected. Some 

banks closed while Jetlink Express, one of three Kenyan airlines originally operating in 

South Sudan, had to fold because of its reported inability to move $2 million out of South 

Sudan following the oil export freeze in 2012.3 Some Kenyan traders left the country at the 

onset of the war following a spate of killings that targeted foreigners.

While it initially played an active role in the negotiation of the ARCSS and the release of 

key SPLM leaders detained in December 2013, Kenya subsequently aligned itself with 

President Kiir and lost its leverage as an honest broker, which it had gained as the host 

of many South Sudanese leaders and their families. In 2016, Kenya lent $60 million to 

cash-strapped South Sudan.4 It subsequently arrested and handed over several SPLM-IO 

leaders to Juba in 2017 following the dismissal of the Kenyan former commander of the 

United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

Political Interests

South Sudan’s independence was granted reluctantly by Khartoum. This is wholly 

understandable considering that South Sudan’s secession occasioned the loss of a quarter 

of Sudan’s territory and three-quarters of its export earnings amounting to approximately 

$13 billion at the time of independence.5 Soon after the partition, Sudan was forced to 

issue a new currency as the economy struggled with the permanent loss of more than a 

third of its revenue.

Presidents Kenyatta of Kenya and Kiir of South Sudan. (Photo: 

UNMISS)
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

The fear that Khartoum could attempt to reverse southern independence would frame 

relations not only between the two erstwhile enemies but also between the West and 

both neighbors. Sudan was also thought to have infiltrated the first post-independence 

government in South Sudan with the aim of keeping tabs on developments there if not 

also to weaken the newly independent state. In 2012, relations worsened, prompting 

South Sudan’s military to invade disputed oil fields located in Heglig.6 Khartoum’s 

courting of key opposition figures after the civil war broke out in 2013 attests to its desire 

to influence events in Juba. Paradoxically, despite these events, Khartoum had strong 

economic incentives to desire peaceful relations with Juba. During the civil war in South 

Sudan, Khartoum has carefully calibrated its dealings with southern leaders, separately 

hosting President Kiir, Machar, and other southern leaders.

As a longstanding political ally of President 

Kiir, Uganda threw its weight behind Kiir 

and continues to support the status quo in 

Juba. Over the course of the conflict, President 

Museveni has invested considerable financial 

and human resources in keeping President 

Kiir in power following the military intervention that stopped the advance of rebels on 

Juba in 2014. President Museveni has attempted to bring disaffected SPLA/M members 

back into the fold, and to rally them behind Kiir and the GOSS’ national dialogue initiative. 

Museveni’s presence at the launch of Kiir’s national dialogue initiative and call for early 

elections in South Sudan reinforced his clear preference for Kiir in his contest with Machar.

Given Museveni’s standing in the region, his support for Kiir has clothed the increasingly 

beleaguered regime with a measure of regional legitimacy in addition to providing a 

vital resupply line for the SPLA. No regional leader holds greater sway over Juba than 

Museveni, who appears keen to maintain his influence. The unprecedented influx of over 

1 million refugees into Uganda does not appear to change the dynamics of this “special” 

relationship between Kampala and Juba. It is still unclear whether voices from within the 

Ugandan government and civil society could cause President Museveni to alter his stance 

and to adopt a more people-centered approach to the conflict in South Sudan.

Justice and Accountability

Another defining issue that frames how regional actors approach the South Sudan conflict 

is justice and accountability for the atrocities committed since 2013. The United Nations 

Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan has identified 40 South Sudanese officials as 

complicit in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Nonetheless, in a regional context of 

animosity against international justice, the conflict in South Sudan reignites controversial 

“No regional leader holds 

greater sway over Juba 

than Museveni.”
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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

debates around peace and justice. In fact, the geography of international justice in Africa 

now seems to overlap neatly with the physical map of the Greater Horn of Africa.

While Ethiopia mounted genocide trials against members of the former socialist Derg 

regime in the 1990s, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central 

African Republic, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda have been or are currently the 

subject of attention by international tribunals. The solidarity of African leaders generated 

by the indictments by the International Criminal Court of President al Bashir and President 

Kenyatta whipped up anti-accountability emotions and galvanized leaders to oppose the 

Court. These sentiments appear to have seeped into the accountability debate on South 

Sudan as some regional delegations are said to have expressed decidedly anti-justice 

views during the negotiation of the ARCSS.

The unprecedented decision by the AU to establish the Commission of Inquiry on 

South Sudan in 2013 to probe human rights violations and crimes committed during the 

civil war is the second attempt by the continental body to pursue justice for victims of 

war crimes in Africa after the trial of former Chadian President Hissène Habré in the 

Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal. Subsequently, the ARCSS adopted the AU’s 

recommendation on the establishment of a hybrid court to prosecute perpetrators of 

international crimes. In line with its mandated role, the AU presented a Memorandum 

of Understanding to the GOSS for the establishment of the hybrid court in 2017, though 

the GOSS has yet to sign it. While it is too early to predict its fate, a regional posture 

that privileges peace over justice, favors immunity for senior government officials before 

international tribunals, and shields indicted leaders, does not augur well for justice in 

South Sudan.

Security and Territorial Interests

Security and territorial interests of IGAD member states have played a critical role in 

exacerbating the conflict in South Sudan. For the most part, Ethiopia, unlike other IGAD 

members has provided objective and neutral stewardship of the peace talks that produced 

the ARCSS. However, the rapprochement between Cairo and Juba and particularly the 

alleged Egyptian funding and provision of military supplies to Juba in exchange for 

support of Cairo’s opposition to the construction of the GERD by Ethiopia complicated 

“Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 

the Central African Republic, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and 

Uganda have been or are currently the subject of attention by 

international tribunals.”
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

relations between Addis and Juba. In response to reported Egyptian démarches toward 

South Sudan and in an attempt to improve its relations with the latter, Ethiopia signed 

a security agreement in which both countries committed not to host rebels or groups 

opposed to their respective governments. It was rumored that potential support through 

South Sudan for Eritrea-based Ethiopian rebels informed Ethiopia’s move, although a 

follow-up agreement on the same subject made no reference to hosting opposition groups.

Addis plays host to many South Sudanese leaders who fled the country. This constitutes 

political leverage that Addis could use to influence the political direction in Juba. While 

this is unlikely in the short term, Ethiopia might pursue regime change in South Sudan if 

it feels that Juba’s ties with Cairo undermine Ethiopia’s security and economic interests.

Unlike South Sudan, Sudan elected to side with 

Ethiopia on the GERD, a development that led to 

improved diplomatic relations between the two 

countries. The agreement between Addis and 

Khartoum to form joint security forces for the 

protection of the dam will not only strengthen the 

Ethiopian position against its historical rival Eritrea 

but may also be responsible for the deterioration of 

relations between Sudan and Egypt. In late 2017, 

Sudan concluded an agreement with Turkey to 

rebuild an Ottoman-era port and military base, even 

as Egypt moved to conclude a similar agreement 

with Eritrea, which fought an acrimonious war 

with Ethiopia over disputed territory.

Egypt, which has close ties to both the United States and Russia, may feel emboldened 

in its efforts to stop any changes to its water flow from the Nile, as well as in its stance 

with regard to its disputed territory with Sudan. Egypt’s membership of the United 

Nations Security Council (UNSC) during this period could also be significant, not only 

for its own national interests but also for Juba. It is possible that Juba could expect to 

count on Cairo’s vote and support in the UNSC before which the South Sudan situation 

remains a live issue.

For its part, Sudan has strategic security interests in South Sudan and is the IGAD member 

with the most leverage over South Sudan. Among these interests are the disputed territory 

of Abyei and the hosting of refugees from South Sudan. In addition to Juba’s alleged 

support for SPLM-North, a rebel movement opposed to Sudanese rule in the Blue Nile and 

South Khordofan States, the rapprochement between Cairo and Juba angered Khartoum. 

“The conflict in 

South Sudan is 

festering because of 

the narrow interests 

of regional players 

and the international 

community’s inability 

to take firm action.”
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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

President al Bashir, in an unprecedented move, announced publicly that Sudan could 

intervene militarily in South Sudan to stop the humanitarian crisis and end civil war. It 

also airlifted Riek Machar from the Ngaramba Forest in the DRC following the July 2016 

hostilities in Juba, and may have toyed with the idea of supporting militarily both Riek 

Machar and Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, who is said to spend time in Khartoum following his 

resignation from the TGoNU and formation of a rebel movement.

Sudan is the only neighboring country that may be pursuing an agenda of regime change 

in Juba by supporting or threatening to support military activities of the various South 

Sudanese rebels. Although Sudan may have calculated that keeping the South Sudanese 

parties to the ARCSS on tenterhooks is a smart thing to do, it faces a real dilemma: support 

the collapse and disintegration of South Sudan or play a more positive role by using its 

leverage over the South Sudanese rebels to embrace and revive the ARCSS. South Sudan’s 

lack of an alternative conduit for its oil means that Sudan’s pipeline revenues are unlikely 

to be threatened either way.

Sudan has succeeded in exerting efforts to normalize relations with all IGAD states with the 

exception of Uganda, which lent support to the SPLA during the civil war. Khartoum, in 

turn, threw its weight behind Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army. Importantly, Sudan 

has improved its relations with the European Union after having been identified as one 

of three countries that could help stem the wave of African migrants traveling illegally to 

Europe. Further, following a period of cautious rapprochement marked by a relaxation of 

sanctions, the United States lifted sanctions in late 2017, though others, including Sudan’s 

listing as a state sponsor of terrorism, remain in place. For the United States, Sudan is a 

recognized strategic partner in the fight against terrorism in North Africa.

Sudan shares the longest border with South Sudan with most parts remaining disputed or 

unsettled. The final status of Abyei, in particular, remains a dagger in Sudan-South Sudan 

relations. A weak and embattled South Sudan allows Khartoum to reinforce and take 

advantage of the status quo in Abyei. It also allows Khartoum to extract commitments 

cheaply from Juba in terms of discontinuing military support for rebels in Sudan’s Blue 

Nile and South Khordofan States.

Prospects for Peace in South Sudan

The national interests of regional actors have complicated the conflict in South Sudan through 

the provision of financial, military, and unwavering diplomatic support to belligerents or 

indifference in the face of a worsening humanitarian situation. Regional support also comes 

in the form of the sidelining of Riek Machar as well as the arrest and rendition to South 

Sudan of opposition leaders. The conflict in South Sudan is festering because of the narrow 
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

interests of regional players and the international community’s inability to take firm action 

on a range of issues including an arms embargo and targeted sanctions.

The United States has called for the UNSC to impose further sanctions and an arms embargo 

on South Sudan. This comes in the wake of a worsening situation marked by mounting 

numbers of those displaced currently standing at 4 million (including 2 million refugees), 

restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and unabated gross human rights 

abuses. Although the UNSC may continue to be divided over South Sudan, the early signs 

of a shift in U.S. policy toward South Sudan may provide opportunity for building a unified 

and common position within IGAD on the peace agreement and the fate of the TGoNU.

If the current status of negative peace continues, South Sudan risks becoming a theater 

of regional proxy wars as most of its neighbors favor the status quo that advances their 

national interests. As the ARCSS has failed to deliver peace and stability since its conclusion 

in 2015, the efficacy of IGAD’s role in the resolution of the conflict is increasingly being 

called into question. Within this context, revitalizing the ARCSS will require:

◆ IGAD and the AU to unreservedly condemn the unacceptable status quo in South 

Sudan.

◆ IGAD and the AU to demand the immediate incorporation of the ARCSS into the 

transitional constitution once an agreement to renew the ARCSS is reached.

◆ IGAD, the AU, and the international community to denounce Juba’s plan to hold 

elections in 2018. Under current conditions, elections are unlikely to produce a 

legitimate government and can only perpetuate instability.

◆ IGAD and the AU to ensure that Juba abides by the agreed timelines on the 

establishment of the hybrid court. The Chairperson of the AU Secretariat should 

commence the process of recruiting judges and the prosecutor of the hybrid court.

Finally, if the parties to the ARCSS fail to agree on the revitalization of the ARCSS or are 

unable to implement the revitalized ARCSS, IGAD and the AU should commit to act 

speedily to find modalities for generating a legitimate government for South Sudan at the 

end of the TGoNU. This could include an AU/UN-supported government of technocrats 

to lay the foundations for free and fair elections within an agreed timeframe. Elections 

must be preceded by the creation of necessary conditions for the return of refugees and 

internally displaced people.

Dr. Luka Kuol is Professor of Practice at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. He previously 

served as Minister of Presidential Affairs for the Government of Southern Sudan and as National 

Minister of Cabinet Affairs for the Republic of Sudan. He has also worked as a senior economist for 

the World Bank in Southern Sudan.
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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Notes

1 “Egypt in Charm Offensive – Seeks Revision of Nile Treaty to Safeguard Water Source,” East African, 

August 21, 2017.

2 See “South Sudan war gives impetus to Egypt’s Nile Basin policy,” Messenger Africa, January 16, 2017.

3 Paul Wafula, “Budget airline Jetlink stops operations citing money scarcity,” Daily Monitor, November 

16, 2012.

4 Joe Baraka, “Kenya to lend billions of shillings to struggling South Sudan,” ZIPO, September 17, 2016.

5 Ian Timberlake, “Lost oil billions leave Sudan’s economy reeling,” Agence France-Presse, February 26, 

2012.

6 Nicasius Achu Check and Thabani Mdlongwa, “The Heglig Oli Conflict: An Exercise of Sovereignty or 

an Act of Aggression?” AISA Policy Brief No. 78 (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2012).

65

Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

Context and the Limits of

International Engagement in Realizing

Durable Stability in South Sudan

By Lauren Hutton

International actors should actively work toward resetting the levers of structural power within the 

political economy so that a less violent South Sudan is possible.

With more than 4 million South Sudanese people displaced since December 2013, recovery 

from the current war requires a significant reset of the systems and structures through 

which safety and security are provided. The government security apparatus and opposition 

forces have used collective punishment, forced displacement, and asset-stripping as part 

of the war effort. Large-scale recruitment efforts (including of children), the mobilization 

of ethnic militias, a multiplicity of conflict actors, and easy access to weapons transfers 

have characterized a conflict in which ceasefires have been meaningless. The legitimacy of 

the government and its security services rest on overcoming the extreme levels of violence 

that have been enacted against the population and establishing substantive controls on 

the use of force. However, there are significant reasons why international support of a 

large-scale reform of the security sector is unlikely to achieve this.

Plenary meeting of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) on March 15, 2017. (Photo: UNMISS/

Isaac Billy)
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies Special Report No. 4

There are two impediments to reforming the security sector: the nature of South Sudan’s 

political economy, which produces violence, and the limits of international interventions 

to devise a coherent, long-term approach and commitment to implement a holistic 

security sector reform (SSR) process. These two challenges, combined with the continued 

state of war, mean that, in the short term, any approach to reform can, at best, only lay 

the foundations for future programming while enabling a decrease in the daily use of 

violence. Interventions should therefore prioritize functional changes in the structure of 

the political economy to create an enabling environment for a sustainable reform agenda.

On Change

Before addressing the obstacles to reform, some consideration should be given to the 

notion of reform. The downward trajectory that South Sudan has been on is the product 

of reinforcing layers of political, social, and economic pressures embedded within deeply 

contested regional politics. Strategic shocks that could have reversed this trajectory have 

been largely insignificant and have not generated the positive change that was assumed 

possible. Independence provided an opportunity for a nationally unified security service 

and governance agenda. Yet, not even the significant change of creating a new country 

was sufficient to bind the divergent interests and alter the hardened core of a liberation 

movement that struggles to be more than an ethnic militia. The 2012 oil shutdown and 

consequent austerity did little to slow the pillaging of the state.

The 2013 constitutional crises that 

preceded the outbreak of civil war 

merely shored up the strength of the 

executive and ended lip service to 

legislative and judicial authority. The 

ruling regime has been adept at using 

challenges to its power to reinforce 

its overall strategic goals of ethnicbased domination. The inability of 

international actors to appreciate the 

resilience of these power structures resulted in the production of rather underwhelming 

approaches to changing the situation on the ground. To call the regime in Juba weak is a 

misnomer. There is an alarming degree of resilience in the Kiir-led state despite the depth 

of crisis in the state formation process and the fundamental imbalances that lie at its core.

There is a lack of imagination in terms of how to significantly alter the overall strategic 

decline, and international intervention is perhaps ill-suited to the task in any case. Overall, 

there is seemingly a lack of convergence of energies to create a structural disruption 

“International actors may 

best help, then, by focusing on 

laying the tracks that will, one 

day, steer the security forces 

and their political taskmasters 

in a different direction.”
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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

significant enough to produce an incentive for change on the part of the government. 

International actors may best help, then, by focusing on laying the tracks that will, one 

day, steer the security forces and their political taskmasters in a different direction.

This is a call for practical programming that takes a realistic approach as to what is 

achievable in South Sudan with the level of effort the international community is willing 

to expend. International actors should do more than just develop alternative ideas that 

could, one day, become politically possible. They should actively work toward resetting 

the levers of structural power within the political economy so that a less violent South 

Sudan is not only politically possible but inevitable.

Understanding the Context

The international approach to SSR before 2013 used an idealized conception of state and 

society as the basis for policy priorities. As part of the state building project, prepackaged 

interventions were rolled out, with the aim of building the state’s capacity to perform core 

functions with little understanding of the political economy of South Sudan.

The current environment and changed 

donor context means that efforts to reform 

the security sector in the short term must 

be based on more realistic assessments 

of what is possible before engaging with 

ambitious intervention-driven agendas. 

This means placing political engagement 

ahead of technical solutions and looking for 

more creative programming solutions while 

accepting that the security sector is a core 

component of an ethnically biased, predatory 

state whose legitimacy rests on coercion.

The South Sudanese state represents a convergence of patronage, ethnicity, and criminality. 

Resetting these relationships is a multigenerational endeavor. Until this patronage-based 

governance model is reformed, it would be naïve to assume that increased access to and 

diversity in governance will result in manifestly different governance. Additionally, the 

“Big Tent” approach to governance works only so far as the kleptocracy can afford it.

For many in South Sudan, violence is a realistic livelihood option, and the security 

sector—both in state and nonstate form—exists as an extension of, and probably the core 

viable part of, their political economy. Before there was the Sudan People’s Liberation 

“Efforts to reform the 

security sector in the short 

term must be based on 

more realistic assessments 

of what is possible before 

engaging with ambitious 

intervention-driven 

agendas.”
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Movement/Army (SPLM/A), an oil economy, or an independent state, there were selfdefense, cattle-raiding, and mutually exclusive ethnic hierarchies. The organizational unit 

of an independent state has been laid upon a history of fear and violence which sits atop 

a sprawling geography that is as illogical for a nation-state as it is harsh.

State-building and nationhood will always be weak panaceas for the challenges of 

geography, history, and culture that South Sudan presents. Institutional presence, 

territorial reach, and increased capacity of the state apparatus cannot overcome the 

limited track record of state-provided security and the state-aligned forces. Both preand post-independence, these forces have 

operated more as invading and occupying 

forces than as security providers for citizens. 

The civil war has further shattered the illusion 

of state-provided security, and any mediumterm strategy needs to recognize that local 

communities will continue to seek security 

through their own means.

One should be careful not to define the state 

and community in South Sudan in opposing 

terms. There is a spectrum of state-society 

relations in South Sudan mostly due to the 

ethnic, historical, and geographic fault lines 

that define the nature of the state. Dealing 

with patterns of state formation and the challenges being produced by these cleavages 

requires a reconsideration of local power relations and processes of institutionalization. 

Local power relations establish who gets what in terms of rights and resources. Institutions 

emerge as power relations manifest in the systems and processes of governance.

Trying to build institutions without significantly engaging the local power relations will 

always be a flawed approach. Yet, dealing with local power relations requires a nuance, 

presence, and patience that few in the international community would be able to entertain. 

Instead of solely focusing on national institutional support, there is room to consider more 

carefully how local leadership can be supported to negotiate deals with the state that lead 

to the realization of rights and protections.

Similarly, within the political realm, the need for reform within the ruling SPLM remains 

a core issue. However, the success of this reform, particularly dealing with succession 

tensions, relies on the existence of a nonmilitarized political institution at local levels. 

There is a high degree of political consciousness among South Sudanese, but this is not 

“The lack of functional 

political institutions 

outside militarized 

and ethnic hierarchies 

prevents the emergence 

of a political class that 

manifests its power in 

nonviolent, nonethnic 

ways.”
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being translated into institutions able to govern in line with the aspirations of a rightsrespecting, decentralized, service-delivering, and economic-growth-driven agenda. The 

lack of functional political institutions outside militarized and ethnic hierarchies prevents 

the emergence of a political class that manifests its power in nonviolent, nonethnic ways 

and articulates a governance agenda.

Accepting the Limitations of International Actors

Creating long-term change means resetting the interaction between the state and society. 

This requires international actors to engage not only with national-level processes, but 

also to consider what building safety from the bottom-up looks like and what external 

engagement with building resilience in social capital is. International actors also need to 

consider how international support often constrains local leaders rather than allowing 

them the space to develop their own agendas and to use resources embedded in 

local relationships to enhance institutional resilience. There are many points at which 

international actors influence local power relations, and yet, these varied interventions 

are not linked in any meaningful way. To generate meaningful change, the international 

community should adopt a holistic and comprehensive strategy for the effort in South 

Sudan. In an ideal world, the donor community, United Nations agencies, and myriad of 

profit and nonprofit external actors would create a common platform around which their 

efforts would coalesce. As this is unlikely to occur, programming will remain piecemeal 

and fail to maximize effectiveness.

The international community does not always have the ability, interest, or incentives to 

functionally cooperate and coordinate toward a widely agreed-upon goal. In South Sudan, 

international actors have also had difficulty attracting and retaining quality expatriate 

staff for South Sudan, and any intervention planning should consider the impact of shortterm rotations and lack of experienced staff. Intervention objectives need to be balanced 

against the realities of global politics where levels of funding for South Sudan are unlikely 

to ever again reach into the billions of dollars, and assistance fatigue accompanies a deep 

sense of failure to achieve meaningful results.

This reality forces international actors to carefully consider, with less money and attracting 

fewer experienced staff, what alternative paths toward a more peaceful future will look 

“International actors need to adopt a more systemic 

understanding of South Sudan to be able to see their overall 

violence reduction goals not simply in terms of formal, 

technocratic, national-level processes.”
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like. South Sudan is a confounding intervention context, and the impact of the civil war 

has been so extreme that any considerations of stability need to be cognizant of the extreme 

levels of need and the level of effort (in personnel and money) that will be required just to 

meet and maintain minimum humanitarian standards. Reforming the security sector and 

other efforts aimed at stabilizing the country must be embedded in these realities.

International actors need to adopt a more systemic understanding of South Sudan 

to be able to see their overall violence reduction goals not simply in terms of formal, 

technocratic, national-level processes. While there is undoubtedly a need for the 

national-level interventions, such as through the Strategic Defence and Security Review 

(SDSR) proposed in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of 

South Sudan, such efforts need to be complemented by a range of local-level initiatives 

on security as well as other issues. By tying progress and funding to donor-driven 

benchmarks, national programming is ill-suited to the realities of environments where 

improvements may be slow and uneven. Such benchmarks also fail to engage with 

the complexity of a context in which militarization is often the only chance of survival 

for citizens. A singular focus on national and formal institutional interventions means 

that external actors are failing to change the risk-benefit calculation of violence at the 

subnational level for individuals and communities.

Looking for Alternative Approaches

A truly bottom-up approach to address 

security needs to be holistic in its design 

and long term in its intentions. Avoiding the 

single-track focus of either national- or locallevel support can only happen with some 

form of strategic coherence. There is a need 

for multitrack approaches that work at both the national and local levels with a unifying 

theory of change set within a generational time frame. The challenge for international 

actors is to program in a unified manner at national and local levels simultaneously so 

that the fundamental long-term drivers of conflict are addressed.

Given that the above is unlikely to happen, we need to throw away the handbooks on 

SSR and begin to look at what spaces exist in the current context to be able to work 

toward some form of political economy that is less likely to produce violence. The SDSR 

will develop good documents and plans that may have buy-in from some elites (and 

will also create some spoilers), but even the best laid plans at the national level need 

to be supported by functional changes in the lived experiences of individuals who turn 

too easily toward violence. We need to work toward changing the decision-making 

“We need to throw away 

the handbooks on SSR.”
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Envisioning a Stable South Sudan

parameters of individuals and communities and toward programming that does not 

overstate the capacity of international partners to generate change. Interventions should 

internalize the dualities of South Sudan—urban-rural, state-nonstate, traditional-formal, 

etc.—and begin to rework the complex relations that have resulted in an ethnically biased 

and deeply militarized core ruling structure. Some features of such an approach would 

be the following.

Begin working on area-specific reconstruction plans that integrate conflict mitigation 

with livelihood support. There are too many differences between geographic areas 

to have a national or regional reconstruction agenda. International actors can start 

working with local reformers in selected areas to deal with the impact of the war and 

to lay the foundations for civilians to return. No national or community disarmament, 

demobilization, or reintegration (DDR) initiative can be successful without alternative 

livelihood strategies. Local assets—especially cattle and livestock ownership—have 

been dramatically affected, and all aspects of the market system have been disrupted, 

access restricted, and ethnically biased. Functional relationships need to be rebuilt and 

functional decentralization—to overcome marginalization—can only occur through 

changing the patterns of production and wealth accumulation. With transformation in 

mind, actors should adopt systemic approaches to communities with programing focused 

on changing the functional components of the political economy—security, production, 

wealth, and knowledge.

Engage with other armed groups to understand their grievances and interests. Such 

engagement could lead to the development of local solutions to some of the conflicts but, 

importantly, could also increase accountability for future integration or demobilization 

plans. As the opposition has become a fragmented and disjointed set of actors, any 

national initiatives will not be able to address unique grievances. Without international 

engagement on resolving local conflicts, elites can strike deals that are primarily concerned 

with integration into the state apparatus—as was the case for the “Big Tent” policy—and 

not with enhancing the quality of governance.

Re-evaluate how to provide human rights training and mentoring. Despite the fact that the 

international community has provided many different streams of human rights training 

to the security forces, there has been little reflection on which courses are most effective, 

what the impact of human rights training has been on individual behavior, and how best 

to start institutionalizing a culture within the Army and every individual that rejects the 

uncontrolled and inhumane use of force. Education should include a significant focus on 

providing psychosocial support to current soldiers and fighters so that, one day, when 

demobilization becomes an option, people will be more accepting of a civilian life and 

move beyond the extremes of violence that they have perpetrated and witnessed.
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Revisit support to rule of law with a focus on prisons and courts. These institutions have 

been stripped of their budgetary support and have lost staff, leadership, and relevance in 

the national discourse. In 2017, judges and magistrates went on strike over poor working 

conditions. Moreover, detention facilities around the country have witnessed the starvation 

of detainees. The mere provision of food and medication to prisoners would be a big win 

for basic human rights in South Sudan. To enhance access to justice and, by extension, 

reducing violence, future justice efforts have to be embedded in local institutions—be 

they state or traditional.

Re-imagine support to local actors in relation to local power relations and the potential for 

the institutionalization of nonmilitarized governance practices. From trader associations, 

market regulators, cattle keepers, and women’s groups to churches, traditional courts, 

and chiefs, there are so many avenues for support to institutions that predate the state and 

continue to fulfill political purposes. International support to these actors has come in a 

variety of forms with little reflection of who, what, and why—never mind linking support 

to the volumes of academic research on these topics.

Conclusion

While reforming the security sector is essential to overall violence reduction efforts, 

South Sudan’s political environment favors militarization over governance. External 

interventions should not make the same mistake and should seek to promote an improved 

governance strategy that, at its core, is concerned with the basic welfare and rights of all 

South Sudanese. This requires international actors to be acutely aware of the spaces in 

which traction can be gained to explore future reform opportunities. The focus should be 

on enacting change in the baseline of extreme vulnerability to begin to alter the overall 

conflict dynamics. This means engaging with how structural power is manifesting in 

the political economy and resetting the relations and practices that enable that power to 

continually manifest as violence. While there are significant impediments to reforming 

the security sector, there are many spaces and opportunities for international actors to 

work toward those goals.

Lauren Hutton is an independent political analyst and strategic communications consultant.

Kate Almquist Knopf, Director

National Defense University

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

+1 202-685-7300

www.africacenter.org

Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Director of Research

sieglej@ndu.edu

+1 202-685-6808

Special Reports

ISSN 2164-4047

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies is an academic institution established by the U.S. Department of Defense as an objective

forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas. The Africa Security Brief series presents research and

analysis with the aim of advancing understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Africa Center.