U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

62–962 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES: WHAT

ARE THEY?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

May 12, 1999

Serial No. 106–75

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

MARK GAGE, Professional Staff Member

MARILYN C. OWEN, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

The Honorable Stephen R. Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large and Special

Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States ................. 8

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Lt. General, USAF (Retired), President, The

Scowcroft Group, Inc.; President, The Forum for International Policy;

Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs .................... 34

Dr. Michael A. McFaul, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford University ......................................................................................................................... 37

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 54

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from

New Jersey ........................................................................................................... 58

Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich .......................................................... 59

Dr. Michael McFaul ................................................................................................. 64

Additional material submitted for the record:

Response to Question submitted to Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich

by Representative Eni F.H. Faleomavaega ........................................................ 78

Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Ambassador-at-Large

Sestanovich by Chairman Benjamin Gilman ..................................................... 80

Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Ambassador-at-Large

Sestanovich by Representative Dan Burton ...................................................... 99

(1)

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES:

WHAT ARE THEY?

Wednesday, May 12, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2172,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The meeting will come to order.

Before we begin our business, we are saddened this morning

about the loss yesterday of our friend Admiral James ‘‘Bud’’ Nance,

Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with

whom we had a great deal to do as we worked with that Committee.

Admiral Nance had a distinguished record of service in the Navy

and in the White House. He made a special mark, however, in his

years of service as a dollar-a-year adviser to Chairman Helms. His

lifelong ties to the chairman, coupled with his intimate knowledge

and appreciation of the workings of the national security apparatus

in the executive branch, made him all the more valuable to the entire legislative branch’s efforts to make a positive contribution to

the development of our Nation’s foreign policy.

Our Capitol Hill family will miss him greatly, and our prayers

are with his wife, Mary Lyda, and his family this morning.

We also want to offer our condolences to Bob King, a longtime

staffer on this Committee, on the loss of his father.

So please join us in a brief moment of silence in memory of Bud

Nance and in condolences to Bob King.

[Moment of silence.]

Chairman GILMAN. Before we begin our hearing this morning, I

note President Yeltsin’s dismissal of Prime Minister Primakov and

his government last night, further evidence of how volatile developments in Russia can be and in our own relations with Russia.

In the 106th Congress, the International Relations Committee

will attempt to conduct a complete review of our relations with

Russia, the impact of Russian foreign policy on United States interests around the world and the success or failure of our programs

for democratic and economic reform in Russia.

The Committee began that process back in March with a hearing

on Russian proliferation of technology related to weapons of mass

destruction. Today we will be seeking to analyze Russian foreign

policy and its objectives and, in so doing, seek to better understand

whether Russian foreign policy is supportive or obstructive of our

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own policy. While some of us today may see Russia as helpful to

us in the diplomacy seeking an end to the conflict in Serbia, many

of us are not certain that we fully understand Russia’s long-term

objectives in the region of the Balkans or in other regions stretching across Europe, the Middle East and Eurasia.

It is obvious, however, that all is not well in the U.S./Russian relationship or in our own American foreign policy toward Russia.

Let me cite some recent news analysis of U.S. policy toward Russia. From the New Republic of March 22nd, an article by Jacob

Heilbrunn says, ‘‘However laudable the intentions, the result of

Clinton’s policies have been disastrous.’’

From the National Journal of April 17th, an extensive article by

Paul Starobin, entitled ‘‘Moscow Mirage’’, states, ‘‘The Clinton Administration sees what it wants to see in Russia rather than what

is really there.’’

From the National Review of October 12th, an op-ed piece by

Dimitri Simes claims, and I quote, ‘‘The Administration has hopelessly botched its Russian policy.’’

I have voiced some strong concerns throughout the past year,

both publicly and in correspondence with our President, over what

we have seen as a highly negative Russian foreign policy. The

President and his Administration have followed a policy toward

Russia that has provided billions of dollars in assistance to its government directly through international financial institutions like

the IMF, through favorable debt reschedulings, through Russian

contracts with the Space Station, and through the grant of a quota

to Russia for launches of American-made satellites.

The Administration’s policy has also included working with Russia to denuclearize Ukraine and the other Soviet successor states

that border on Russia that inherited nuclear weapons. That policy

has also agreed to demands by Russia for revisions in arms agreements and for a growing role for Russia in the NATO alliance.

In 1995 and 1996, our Nation did little, if anything, when the

Russian Government killed thousands of innocent civilians in the

course of a brutal and unsuccessful military operation against separatists in the Russian region of Chechnya, violating its commitments as a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The United States also offered incentives to Russia

to halt its sale of nuclear reactors to Iran.

But what do we today see Russia doing as a result of this favorable American approach to its problems and demands? First, Russian proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction to

Iran and allegations that Russia has violated U.N. sanctions on

Iraq by providing arms and military equipment to Saddam Hussein’s regime;

Second, new Russian arm sales to Syria, a state sponsor of terrorism;

Third, Russian sales of advanced weapons and military technology to Communist China, fueling a growing military threat to

Taiwan and, potentially, to our American Seventh Fleet that is now

deployed in support of democratic governments on the Pacific Rim;

Fourth, Russian entreaties to China and to India to join it in a

strategic triangle of some sort with the apparent goal of undermining American leadership in unspecified ways; and, Fifth, RusVerDate 11-SEP-98 12:52 Apr 10, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 62962.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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sia’s insistence that it be allowed to maintain its military bases in

Independent States like Ukraine and Georgia, forcing such states

to agree to treaties legalizing those bases by simply refusing to

withdraw Russian troops.

Then there is Russian manipulation of ethnic conflicts and energy pipelines in the region of the former Soviet Union in order to

try to maintain Russian dominance over the states of that region

and to make certain future West European dependency on Russiancontrolled energy supplies.

Tomorrow morning our Committee will be holding a hearing on

diplomatic initiatives for Kosovo. We, in our Nation, should be certain we understand what Russia is seeking by its involvement in

the diplomatic solution to the Serbian conflict and by its possible

participation in an international force for the Kosovo region.

We also should not ignore the long-standing allegations of corruption at high levels in the Russian Government or the complaints among Russian democratic activists that that corruption,

the murder of Russian journalists and of the prominent Russian

democrat Galina Starovoitova, the secret trials of environmental

activists, and support of vestiges of the Communist regime, are actually symptoms of a real lack of democracy within Russia.

How can we truly assess Russia’s future role and influence in

Serbia if we fail to consider what influence its potentially growing

presence there might have on the efforts to help democratize Serbia

someday? In fact, we should ask whether Russian diplomacy won’t

simply result in a strengthening of Slobodan Milosevic as a ruler

of Serbia.

This morning we have a small, but quite qualified list of witnesses. First, we will be hearing from the Honorable Steve

Sestanovich, our U.S. Ambassador at Large for the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union.

We welcome you back, Mr. Ambassador.

Our second witness really needs no introduction, and we are very

pleased that he has been able to be with us today, the Honorable

Brent Scowcroft, former adviser to President Bush for National Security Affairs and retired Lieutenant General of the U.S. Air Force.

We welcome you, General Scowcroft.

Finally, Mr. Michael McFaul, Senior Associate at the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace. We welcome Mr. McFaul.

At this time I would like to recognize the Ranking Minority

Member, Mr. Gejdenson, for any opening remarks he might like to

offer. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Listening to your remarks, I am not sure whether we’ve gone back to the old Cold War,

or it is the new political war over foreign policy here in Washington. I frankly felt 6 months ago when I heard the Republicans

were going to make foreign policy the campaign issue for this year,

I thought that the press had gotten its message wrong. But clearly,

by your opening remarks, by the kind of blunders we have seen on

the House floor on the situation in Kosovo, with the Speaker slinking in at the end and voting for the policy and the whip on the floor

breaking arms to defeat the resolution, it is clear it is going to be

very difficult to have a logical and thoughtful dialogue about our

foreign policy.

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It seems to me that Russia is a big problem, and it is also a tremendous opportunity. Sometimes, when I hear these statements, I

get a sense there is a longing for the old Soviet Union so that it

was nice and simple, we could just confront them and hope to defeat them someday. We have defeated them. They are in chaos, and

we have to help find a way out of that chaos, and we are not going

to do it just with polemics, trying to create blame for a situation

that is inherently unstable.

It is a government that has never been a democracy. It is not a

country that had democratic institutions and then lost them for a

period of time. There were never serious democratic institutions in

the Soviet Union. There were none in Russia, and today it is in the

infancy of developing a democracy.

I come to the floor and I see amendments to cut Nunn-Lugar

funds that helped do away with Russian weaponry. We need to find

a way to engage the Russians not simply as the old Cold War

enemy; we have to find a way to work with them, to deal with their

economic and political crisis.

I think there is no question that we are trying to create in some

quarters in this Congress the kind of isolation of Russia that was

created after World War I. I don’t think that is a good move. If we

want to just create a new military adversary, then let’s isolate the

Russians, let’s try to increase their own paranoia, and we will be

back where we started, having missed a great opportunity to reduce the danger in the world.

Are there lots of dangers in Russia? You can be sure of that.

When you look at people who operate nuclear power plants, who

can’t pay their employees for 5 or 6 months at a time, forget about

the fissionable material; the scientists themselves will leave in

order to feed their families.

We have to come up with a dynamic policy in dealing with Russia that encourages their good behavior where they make profits on

legitimate activities like satellite launches, and discourages the

proliferation of technology and personnel who have the knowledge

of creating more proliferation.

We have to work with them to try to build both an economic system that we once fought, going from communism to capitalism, but

we also have to support the development of a political system.

It doesn’t take a political scientist to see what chaos they are in

today. We have to think what consequences our actions will bring

about in Russia, how do we help them get control of dangerous

technologies, get an economy where they can afford to keep their

scientists instead of having scientists work for renegade nations

around the world; and I think we would do a better job of that if

we held hearings that were based on really achieving a policy and

had fewer attacks on the President.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hadn’t intended to make

an opening comment, but I think several observations are in order

after the last statement.

One of the great ironies and observations of congressional politics

is that the minority side is criticizing a Speaker who supported

their President and their position, and that strikes me as awkward.

5

Second at issue, because the word ‘‘Cold War’’ has been raised,

is the policies that are in place having nothing to do with who is

making the policies, having nothing to do with how one side or the

other perceives those policies. But we are in the process at this

very moment of looking at a situation in Kosovo where we may

well be a thwarted United States of America, and conceivably stalemated in such a way that we will have raised the enmity of many

around the world in the developing world, but most poignantly, in

Russia and in China. We are in the process of looking at a ‘‘hot

war’’ that we are not doing as well in as anyone in America would

like and precipitating two new ‘‘Cold Wars.’’

That has nothing to do with any of the issues that this Congress

is talking about in how we approach Russia or China, but simply

to do with the ramifications of the hot war in Kosovo; and we, as

a Congress, have to be very cognizant of that, and the Administration has to be cognizant of it. In fact, it could be that the two new

Cold Wars that are being precipitated in potential may be more

significant than the hot war itself in Kosovo; and these are the

ramifications of the well-intended but perhaps counterproductive

policy for which there is no aspect of partisan observations, simply

an observation of what are the facts in the field.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. I didn’t intend to say anything, but since the discussion has been opened up, I will make a couple of observations, Mr.

Chairman.

At no time would we need bipartisan foreign policy more than we

do now, and I am one of those who profoundly regrets that bipartisanship seems to be a rare exception these days and strident voices

of partisanship are heard in the land.

I agree with my good friend from Iowa that our relations with

Russia and our relations with China are certainly far more important than our relations with Yugoslavia, and I also think it is important to look beyond the daily irrational actions of Mr. Yeltsin

and to ask what happened to U.S./Russian relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Some of us visited the Soviet Union for many years, and then

Russia, and after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was an

enormous amount of goodwill toward the United States. We had a

leadership delegation that visited Russia just a week or two after

the first summit between Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin in the spring

of 1993, and the reception on the Russian side could not have been

more enthusiastic, cordial and hopeful, maybe overly hopeful.

The following year we had another leadership delegation to Moscow. The reception was somewhat less ebullient. The third year it

was not ebullient at all, and the reason, of course, is clear.

We had two examples before us in this century on how to deal

with defeated powers. After the First World War, we acted in a

narrow, myopic, non generous fashion, and we reaped Hitler in the

Second World War.

After the Second World War, with the Marshall Plan, we acted

in a singularly generous, farsighted, intelligent fashion, and we

reaped two generations of peace.

6

When the Third World war ended which, of course, was the end

of the Cold War with the defeat of the Soviet Union and the triumph of the democracies, we had these two examples, and we did

not choose the intelligent second example.

The Russians had tremendous expectations of cooperation and

assistance and help and participation. Yeltsin and his foreign minister were so pro-American that it was almost embarrassing to see

them publicly express their love affair with us, but with the exception of Nunn-Lugar funds, there is very little we did.

Now, I understand corruption in Russia probably as well as anybody here, and I am not suggesting we should have pumped money

into Russia, but we should have provided project aid. We should

have provided specific assistance to groups. The much maligned

George Soros recommended that $4 a month would have provided

adequate retirement for Russian seniors, which would have been a

pittance. He proposed that in a Wall Street Journal article that I

still have in my office, one of the most intelligent suggestions of the

post-Soviet era never acted upon.

I think it is not surprising that a country which was one of the

two superpowers, which was looked up to from the Olympics to

military might across the globe, feels unbelievably frustrated, and

given the very second-quality, second-rate leadership, stumbles

from crisis to crisis.

The China case, Mr. Chairman, is a bit different because I think

in a sense what is happening is China is very salutary for those

in this country—I don’t include myself—who have been very naive

about China. China is showing its true colors as a Communist dictatorship.

The Chinese leadership knows every bit as well as every Member

of this Committee that the bombing of the embassy was by mistake, that the President and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and everybody else apologized. We stand ready

to make financial restitution to the families of the victims, and we

stand ready to bear the cost of rebuilding the embassy once the

time comes.

But what the Chinese Communist leadership has done was to revert back to the most sickening characteristics of a Communist police state, lying through its teeth to its people and whipping up

anti-Western sentiment. This is not a new phenomenon in China.

It goes back to the Boxer Rebellion and way beyond, but I think

it is important for us to sort of get our bearings straight and not

engage in internecine warfare here, but to take a prospective look

at our relations with both China and Russia and try to make the

most of the singularly unstable and somewhat chaotic relationship

and to awaken from our dream of viewing China as a great democratically moving ally; it is anything but that.

China has shown its true colors in the last few days, and that

lesson had to be learned by some of our policy makers, both in and

out of government.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my full

statement be made a part of the record——

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Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Just make a couple of points.

We know that Sergei Stepashin has now been elevated to the

post of prime minister, and I think it bears remembering that he

is one of the chief architects of the Chechen War, which I and

many others roundly criticized, and unfortunately, there were some

within the State Department, and even our Vice President, who

compared it to the civil war in this country, which I think was a

very, very farfetched and misguided perspective to obtain.

As a matter of fact, at that time—and this isn’t a partisan dig,

and I think you know the earlier comments, not by my friend from

California, but by my friend from Connecticut, I think it is very unfortunate to take the chairman’s opening comments, which I think

were very well thought out, and to reduce heartfelt and profound

disagreements about our Kosovo policy and policies vis-a-vis Russia, and to reduce them to petty partisanship, I think does a disservice to honest disagreements.

I think we need to engage in those disagreements where they

manifest themselves, in an unfettered way, knowing that where

possible—and I underscore ‘‘where possible’’—there ought to be a

bipartisanship in our foreign policy. But to do so artificially, I think

sets itself up to a policy that is not sustainable.

I think with our Kosovo policy there are very real problems with

that policy. I find it absolutely staggering and disconcerting that

there was no plan, and apparently there is no plan now for the

820- to 850,000 internally displaced Kosovar-Albanians who languish and potentially are dying, but certainly are at grave risk inside of Kosovo. I know because I have asked from the top, Wesley

Clark on down, what was the plan. If we initiate bombing, where

was the fire wall to protect the Kosovar-Albanians, and there was

no plan, and there is no plan today.

The thought was that Slobodan Milosevic would blink early on.

The idea was to bomb for 2 days, then pause and find a peace. Regrettably, the dictatorship has shown some resiliency and has not

blinked.

I think it is wrong and misguided to criticize the Chairman and

to reduce his comments to petty partisanship, because it is not.

There are real differences.

There are also, as Mr. Leach pointed out, some very profound implications, however unwitting, that could manifest themselves in

the PRC, as well as in Russia. We are now, and we have had hearings on the Helsinki Commission just recently. We are driving a

whole generation of people who haven’t made up their mind yet

about NATO in the West into the hands of the ultranationalists,

and that is very, very grave. I think we need to consider the implications as we go into the year 2000.

Mr. LEACH. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH. I would be happy to yield to my friend.

Mr. LEACH. I apologize for taking the Chair’s time, but just one

observation: There are times that bipartisanship should imply a

greater amount of unity. There are also times when the greatest

reflection in world affairs of a Congress and an American people

working together is to show differences of judgment. When all of

this is over in Kosovo, I think it is going to be extraordinarily

8

healthy that the world is going to see a Congress with a panoply

of judgment.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEACH. It is the gentleman’s time.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I agree that there are lots of people on your side

and on my side who have different views.

I think some of what is happening, though, particularly with the

majority whip, Mr. DeLay, is not about a reflection——

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, could I have my time——

Chairman GILMAN. Gentlemen——

Mr. SMITH. The point—and I don’t know what the exact word

was, something about the Speaker and that he was slinking in and

voting yes. The distinguished Speaker is a totally honorable man.

I know that I was never contacted and told, you must vote this way

or that; it was a vote of conscience.

Mr. Campbell, while I disagreed with his approach, I respected

him enormously that he felt that the War Powers Act was triggered

by this and there ought to be an up-or-down vote on this very important engagement. As we are seeing now, it is enlarging even at

a time when the Russians are indicating Chernomyrdin and others

are trying to perhaps put something together; and perhaps our Ambassador can shed some light on that.

We are enhancing the bombing, and maybe that is part of the

strategy, I don’t know, but I assume goodwill until shown otherwise, and I assume it of all parties.

Chairman GILMAN. I am going to suggest that since our time is

limited today and we have a number of good witnesses waiting to

be heard, we will move on with our testimony.

Ambassador-at-Large Sestanovich, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States, assumed his position in September 1997 and is responsible to coordinate United

States relations with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. Ambassador Sestanovich has served most recently as

Vice President for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace. Previously, he was a Director

of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies.

Before that, he served with our National Security Council and

with the State Department.

Ambassador Sestanovich is an old Hill hand, having worked for

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan some years back. We welcome

Ambassador Sestanovich.

You may put your full statement in the record and abbreviate

your remarks, whichever you deem appropriate. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE STEPHEN

SESTANOVICH, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would

actually like to begin by saying that for Administration witnesses

nothing is more illuminating and helpful than to open a hearing of

this kind with the back-and-forth that I have just been privileged

to hear. The only thing I could think of that would be better would

be if I had the opportunity to ask you questions for the remainder

9

of the hour, and perhaps as a procedural innovation we might

think of that next time.

Mr. Chairman, I have a fuller statement which I would ask to

have put into the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the full statement will be

made part of the record.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss Russian foreign policy and Russian-American relations. Even

before the Kosovo conflict revealed deep disagreement between

Russia and the United States on this defining international problem, Members of this Committee had raised questions, the kind

that you have raised today and others, about the premises of our

approach toward Russia. You have asked where Russian foreign

policy, for that matter Russia itself, is headed.

Today’s headlines about President Yeltsin’s dismissal of Prime

Minister Primakov give rise to further questions, and I am ready

to say a few words about this situation later if you wish.

All these are large and urgent issues on which we need a frank

and open dialogue between the Administration and the Congress.

Our success will depend on the degree to which we can develop a

common perspective, understanding, and strategy; and I hope we

can contribute to that end today.

Mr. Chairman, our dialogue should start with a recognition of

how thoroughly our relations with Russia have been transformed

in the 1990’s, as some of you have noted. The first post-Cold War

decade, which is now almost behind us, has been marked by a pattern of cooperation between Russia and the United States that was

unimaginable before the collapse of Soviet communism. I don’t need

to recite the diplomatic landmarks of this period, but they were all

attended by the closest possible communications and coordination

between Moscow and Washington.

As important as they were, however, the achievements of the

1990’s did not obscure the fact that there are many in Russia who

reject partnership with the West. They have rarely been so vocal

as during the current Kosovo conflict. Some of these critics seem

motivated by frustration at Russia’s weakness. Others display outright hostility toward the United States and democratic capitalism.

Still other opponents of cooperation with the United States seem

guided by narrow economic or bureaucratic interests, and other opposition politicians find foreign policy issues a useful, rhetorical

club with which to beat the government.

I might note that as Russia heads toward parliamentary elections this fall and Presidential elections in 2000, we should expect

to hear more of this kind of rhetoric.

This mix of motives and perspectives, as well as the weak lines

of institutional authority and control, can make it difficult to say

what Russian foreign policy really is. Is it the offensive press

spokesman of the defense ministry who compares NATO to Nazis,

or is it the prudent decision to keep the number of Russian warships off the coast of Yugoslavia to a minimum?

At a time like this, we have to keep our eye on fundamentals,

on the core interests and practical results that we want to advance

in our dealings with Russia.

10

Last fall in Chicago, Secretary Albright stated, ‘‘Our most important priority in dealing with Russia is to protect the safety of the

American people.’’ In this spirit, and recognizing how many aspects

of our relations I am leaving aside, whether it is economic issues

or support for independent media, I propose today to touch on four

security challenges we face and give you a brief assessment of the

progress we are making in addressing them with Russia.

Let me start with nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War

made possible Russian-American agreement on deeper cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals than ever before, and both governments are

committed to negotiating further cuts. Unfortunately, the START

II treaty has become a political football in the Russian parliament.

Despite the lack of progress toward ratification of the treaty, however, we are active on a number of fronts to bring our arsenals into

line with post-Cold War realities. We have had expert consultations

on the shape of a possible START III agreement, which could bring

forces down by as much as 80 percent from Cold War highs.

Russian and U.S. officials have also met to implement the agreement reached last year by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on sharing early warning data on missile launches. We have begun a serious dialogue on the arms control implications of President Clinton’s

directive to explore limited national missile defense.

Mr. Chairman, three-quarters of our assistance dollars to Russia

go to reduce the danger that nuclear and other weapons of mass

destruction will fall into the wrong hands. The expanded threat reduction initiative, if approved by this Congress, will further

strengthen our ability to block proliferation threats emanating

from Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. I

strongly urge you to support this program and to fully fund the Administration’s $1.03 billion assistance request for Eastern Europe

and Eurasia.

Mr. Chairman, Russian-American cooperation on proliferation

problems also has a strong basis in common interest; and let me

say a word about that, because we have taken some important

steps forward recently.

Our Special Ambassador, Bob Gallucci, and the Russian Space

Agency head, Yuri Koptev, have developed a work plan to address

some of our most pressing concerns about missile proliferation. We

have concluded a similar plan to enhance export controls on nuclear technologies. American and Russian experts met last month

to begin implementation of these plans, and we will continue to

make this issue a high priority until we solve it.

Third, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the question of RussianAmerican cooperation on the Kosovo problem. Until the opening of

NATO’s air campaign, our approaches to this matter had been

broadly similar, including joint support of Resolution 1199 in the

U.N. security council last fall. The Russian leaders had also made

clear that they would not support the use of force by NATO, and

when our military action began in March, it produced an outburst

of Russian anger and hyperbole at all levels and across the political

spectrum.

Since this initial rhetorical spasm, however, the Russian Government has adopted a posture different from Communist and nationalist spokesmen in two important ways. First, the government has

11

expressed its determination to stay out of the conflict, providing

neither military equipment nor military intelligence. We have no

information contradicting these statements.

Second, the Russian Government has sought to identify principles that could be the basis for a political settlement of the conflict. In Oslo last month, Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister

Ivanov reached an agreement on all but one of these principles.

Last week in Bonn the G–8 foreign ministers took another step forward and agreed on a full set of principles, including deployment

of a strong and effective international security presence.

Today, a United States team led by Deputy Secretary Strobe

Talbott is in Moscow for further consultations with Foreign Minister Ivanov and Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who

serves as President Yeltsin’s special representative. We welcome

Russia’s movement toward joining the growing international consensus on this conflict, just as we welcome the prospect of Russian

participation in a peace keeping force—and, I might say, participation by other countries as well.

Mr. Chairman, our interest in working with Russia to resolve the

Kosovo crisis is but one example of an ambitious effort to deal cooperatively with problems of European security.

Consider the breakthrough agreement reached at the end of

March on adaptation of the CFE treaty. This hard-won result was

possible because the 30 nations around the negotiating table focused on what they could gain by agreeing rather than on the myriad obstacles in their way. The new agreement now provides an impetus for Russia to withdraw its troops and munitions from

Moldova and to begin drawing down its forces in Georgia. If Russia

will take steps to fulfill commitments it has made, the United

States and others stand ready to help it deal with some of the practical problems that are involved.

Russian-American cooperation extends to other areas, Mr. Chairman; to Nagorno-Karabakh where our diplomats work together; to

Bosnia where our troops serve side by side.

If we are honest, we have to admit that the Kosovo crisis has put

new strains on Russian-American cooperation. Russia’s cooperation

with NATO seems likely to be on hold for the duration of the crisis,

but the framework for this cooperation, the NATO-Russia Founding

Act, remains intact. So do the interests, Russian and American,

that led to its creation in the first place. On this basis of common

interest, we should expect both sides to be making active use of

this framework once the Kosovo crisis is behind us.

Mr. Chairman, I am sometimes asked by Russian journalists

whether the U.S. Government is bothered by the apparent rise of

anti-Americanism in Russia. My answer of course is yes; if it took

hold, anti-Americanism would limit the ability of the Russian Government to pursue our common interests. But let me give you the

second half of my answer as well.

To my mind, anti-Americanism in Russia is less about us and

more about them. It is a tool for attacking Western-style institutions and, above all, attacking democracy itself. Looked at from this

angle, the problem actually seems a little less hopeless, for everything that we know about Russian public opinion suggests that

support for democracy remains strong in that country. As long as

12

it does, support for cooperation with the West, for integration rather than isolation, is likely to remain strong as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions and

those of your colleagues.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sestanovich appears in

the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Ambassador, what are Russia’s foreign policy objectives in

the Balkans?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Their objectives, if we look at what

they say, are to end this conflict. They say that it has to be ended

on a basis that protects the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and

with that we can agree.

They say that they aim at a set of other objectives, like the return of refugees, the end of ethnic cleansing, and with those we can

agree.

We can’t agree on principles that will make it, or on goals that

would make it, impossible for the allies of NATO or for other countries to actually deal effectively with the real problems that face

the Balkans.

If Russian objectives are to solve this problem in Kosovo and instability in the Balkans more generally in a way that is simply

aimed at hampering American policy, then we won’t be able to cooperate; but if it rests on the kinds of principles that their political

leaders have said are the ones that they are pursuing, then we

have a basis to cooperate.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, with all that we have been

doing to try to help Russia directly and through multilateral means

and all that we have done to integrate Russia into international organizations, why do we see so much anti-Americanism among the

population in Russia?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, you raise a complicated question, and I hope that you will put that same question

to Professor McFaul later because he is an especially careful student of it. But let me say that there are both signs of anti-Americanism in Russia that grow out of disagreement over, in the immediate case, the conflict in Kosovo, and that grow out of ideological

motives.

There is still a large body of support for the Communist Party

in Russia, and it is nothing if not anti-American. At the same time,

it is important to see the sources of interest and affinity in Russian

public opinion toward the West.

There was a poll that came out yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that

revealed that 60-plus percent of the Russian population favors closer relations with the West and the United States. One can find

many different trends here. I think we have to take this problem

as we face it day by day.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, will the Administration

stand fast in refusing to increase Russia’s quota for launches of

American-built satellites until the proliferation by Russia of technology related to weapons of mass destruction to Iran has ended?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated in my

statement, our concern about the flow of missile technology and nuclear technology from Russia to Iran is as great as yours, and there

13

is no problem we have been working on more actively over the past

couple of years than this one.

We have recently developed a work plan with the Russian authorities to try to increase control over this flow of technology. If

we are able to succeed at that, it would create a basis for taking

another look at the launch quotas that you described. If we can’t

succeed at it, it will be very hard to do that.

Chairman GILMAN. One last question, Mr. Ambassador.

Russia is in default on its Soviet-era debt, its Treasury debt, its

Finance Ministry bonds, and I believe on its Eurobonds as well. It

is also close to, if not in, default to the IMF. In fact, any new IMF

loans will simply go to pay Russia’s old IMF debts.

In private business that is called check-kiting. Why should we be

supporting any further IMF loans without any new and real economic reforms in Russia and, particularly, given Russia’s fairly

negative foreign policy?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, we should support

further IMF loans to Russia only if Russia is able to do what you

describe, and that is, put together an economic reform program

that creates confidence in the fund that it will be able to use the

money well and repay it. That is why this has been a protracted

negotiation between the Fund over the past several months, between the Fund and Russia to work through the very strict conditionality that the Fund has imposed.

I might note that the agreement that the Fund signed with the

Russian Government, reached with the Russian Government last

month, provides for the disbursement of funds only if the Russian

Government is able to take a number of prior actions, some of

which involve new legislation to accomplish exactly what you described, that is, more effective economic reform.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say that I agree there will be tremendous pressure from

Capitol Hill not to increase the Soviet launches of American satellites. Even though I think we will damage the United States

more in that process than we will the Russians. The less legitimate

business we do with Russia in the kind of economic crisis that exists, aren’t you just then increasing the pressure on them to proliferate? So if they can’t do launching, what can they do—because

that is where we are going to punish them.

We are going to punish them in places where they are doing legitimate business. I would say the Administration needs to stand

up to Congress and go after those sectors where they are involved

in illegal activities, trying to pressure Russia on those.

The problem in Russia is, we all love democracy, but democracy

and economic collapse don’t usually go together, and I think what

you are seeing there, the pressures on the system, are the failure

of their new freedom and economic system to improve the life of the

average Russian. Then the politics play out, the nostalgia for the

old Soviet Union where at least it was stable and at least there

were no bread lines.

14

So I would like you to know—if you do what you say you are

going to have to do, aren’t you really encouraging the Russians to

sell more weapons, to do more proliferation?

Second, I would like to understand the assessments I have heard

on the news, that the feeling is that Yeltsin sacked his prime minister in order to shore up his own position in the upcoming impeachment situation. I would like you to help us understand why

it strengthens Yeltsin to sack his prime minister.

And last, I would like to know, on Russia-Belarus unity, is this

just rhetoric to keep everybody in each country feeling that they

are still part of something bigger, or is there potential that there

would be a joining of Belarus and Russia?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Congressman, I hope it won’t surprise

you to hear that I, from time to time, argue in the discussions that

we have at the State Department that we need to stand up to Congress. So I fully endorse your recommendation there.

Chairman GILMAN. You will have to explain what that means,

Mr. Sestanovich.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I completely agree with you that part

of promoting an economic reform and recovery in Russia on a

sound basis that strengthens democracy involves promoting legitimate business. I completely agree with you there.

Here is where we have a difficulty. It is hard for us to say simply, there is one sector that we say is clean and legitimate, while

there is a dirty sector that goes on unregulated and uncontrolled

by the government.

Our approach has been, while encouraging what contacts we can

have with the defense industry in Russia, in promoting responsible

business practice by them, to urge the Russian Government to get

control of the dirty sector, and we need leverage to do that. The

space launch quota is one element of that leverage, but it is in the

Russian Government’s interest in many other ways to get control

of that dirty sector.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Let me interrupt for one second. The problem

with that theory is the Russian Government can’t collect taxes. It

can’t control these technologies because there is no system of government there, and maybe there is not the will either.

But let me tell you, I would think they would have the will to

collect the taxes so they could pay their pensioners, so they could

do the things they need to. They can’t do it. It seems to me it is

a wonderful theory, but it seems to me also that there is more involved.

I hope you can answer the last two, also.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. The Russian democratic experiment

is never going to succeed if one succumbs to that fatalism. We have

to work with them in order to be able to accomplish some of these

basic functions of government and of responsible international citizenship. I mean, governments have got to be able to control that

kind of flow of technology or else they will not survive.

Russian tax collection, by the way, is up.

We have got to do more, though, than just rely on the commercial incentives that are available to us, even though they are very

important. That is what I mentioned, the expanded threat reduction initiative that we have presented to the Congress. That will

15

help us to prevent the proliferation of Russian expertise by employing 8,000 to 10,000 more Russian scientists. I hope we will have

your support on that.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Belarus?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Quickly on Belarus, Russians themselves will differ on whether there is just talk or anything happening there. It is a relationship about which both sides have very

many reservations, but we watch it closely. Particularly, we watch

it as a possible conduit for the flow of technology that we have been

talking about just now.

As to President Yeltsin’s change of prime ministers, he has—as

you know—an impeachment vote scheduled this week in the Duma.

He is putting another item on the table for them to address, which

is confirmation of the prime minister, and that will force the Duma

to consider which one it is going to go ahead with.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. I certainly would like to probe further this personal

position of yours that you are an advocate of standing up to Congress and the Administration. Let me tell you, as someone who

once worked at the Department of State, I am a very strong advocate of the Department of State, but I am not an advocate of the

foreign policy that is being precipitated at this time by this Department of State. It is very serious, and I would like to read back a

sentence of yours, or two sentences.

You state, ‘‘To my mind anti-Americanism in Russia is less about

us and more about them. It is a tool for attacking Western-style institutions and above all democracy itself.’’ I will tell you if that is

what you are saying in the Department of State, you are

misreading Russia profoundly as the Ambassador in charge of relations with Russia.

What is happening in Russia today is a profound reflection of

Russian history and Russian attitudes toward religion. Everybody

knows that they have a circumstance of identifying with the Serbs

because of the Orthodox church. In addition, in 1941, every Russian believes, the Serbs held up the German army, Operation Barbarossa, and by that 2-week holdup, German tanks froze outside of

Moscow 3 days before Christmas, and that saved Moscow and possibly Leningrad. That is the principal reason the Russians totally

identify with Serbia.

It isn’t escapism, that they are being antidemocratic. They are

profoundly opposed to the foreign policy of the United States of

America.

Now, there is a rationalization for that foreign policy, and there

are also reasons not to support that foreign policy, but this type of

escapist rhetoric of judgment precipitated by the Department of

State and the Congress does not represent the highest traditions

of the U.S. Department of State.

Because at the background of this were certain negotiations at

Ramboulliet led by the United States Department of State in which

an agreement was reached, but also in which threats were precipitated. The Department of State led the movement of suggesting if

Milosevic didn’t agree, we would bomb.

16

Milosevic didn’t agree. To defend the credibility of the United

States, we then bombed.

I consider that to be an exact reversal of historic 20th century

American diplomacy first articulated by Teddy Roosevelt, which

was to speak softly but carry a big stick. This Department of State

took the reverse position. It spoke sharply and then had to rely

upon a stick that is now perhaps becoming one of the greatest

counterproductive policy mistakes of this century.

I want to ask you, do you believe our diplomacy has served us

well? Do you believe that this is just a passing fad that is being

used as escapism in Russia? Or do you think there is the potential

here for a huge, marked difference in relationships between the

United States and Russia based upon the policy that this Department of State has led?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Congressman, I hope you didn’t misunderstand what I meant by that remark about what is involved

in the growth of anti-Americanism in Russia. I didn’t mean to

trivialize it at all or to suggest that it is escapist.

To the contrary, I think it is, in fact, a broader phenomenon and

a deeper one perhaps even than the emotions that you suggest in

tracing a sense of Russian loyalty to Serbia—to Yugoslavia for

standing up to the German invasion in 1941. That is, there is a

deep identity crisis that is being resolved in post-Soviet Russia. It

involves questions like, shall we be democratic or not, are we part

of the West or not; and those are questions with which Russians

are wrestling, have been wrestling before this crisis and will continue to wrestle with after this crisis.

I said, though, that it seems to me there is some reason for confidence in the result because if the issue is ultimately the one that

I described, that is, this kind of identity crisis, what one sees is

rather strong support for a democratic orientation. That gives us,

I think, some reason to think that beyond this particular crisis

there will be grounds for common interests between us and Russia.

I did not in any sense mean to trivialize it, and perhaps this is

just a misunderstanding of the words.

I think there is, of course, a potential for the kind of change that

you describe, that is, a breach between Russia and America, depending on the kind of answers that are given to the questions I

mention—to these questions I have characterized as an identity crisis. Because there is that potential is why we are working on a cooperative relationship with Russia, why we have pursued the integration of Russia into international institutions and have spoken of

democratic Russia as entitled to a large and honorable place in

those institutions.

I don’t have anything to apologize for in pursuing and advocating

those policies, but I think they have to be based on a realistic assessment on what is happening in Russia.

Mr. LEACH. I appreciate that. My time has expired. All I can say

is that you have begged the question. The issue is the ramifications

of Kosovo policy on all of this and the public opinion polling, of

which you have chosen one part to note, is very interesting because

it has shown a remarkable turnaround in Russia altitudes toward

the United States over a two-month period of time, a turnaround

of stunning significance that will have enormously damaging impliVerDate 11-SEP-98 12:52 Apr 10, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 62962.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
17

cations for U.S.–Russian relations and, much more importantly, on

the future of Russia itself.

It appears that this Department of State did not weigh that perhaps as much as it might have as it precipitated certain policies

that appear to be producing very fair results today.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Can I add one comment on that, Mr.

Chairman, if I might?

Of course we took those ramifications into account. Our premise

in our relations with Russia is, first, that we have common interests and we should pursue the kind of integration that I have described;

Second, that where we have disagreements, we can’t paper them

over just because we are afraid the Russians will take it badly. To

the contrary, we have to face up to those disagreements and pursue

policies that are in our interests.

On that basis, we can have a productive relationship with Russia.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Leach.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As we look at Russia today, what we see, it seems to me, Mr.

Ambassador, is an economic basket case and a nuclear superpower

with a deeply wounded national psyche, and that is a rather dangerous and volatile combination.

Now, in planning policy for the post-Yeltsin era, it seems to me

we need to be conscious of the enormous positive developments that

have unfolded in Russia in the last decade. They have a free press.

They travel freely. They have access to Western media. Practically

all of the Russian leadership has recognized the enormous importance of economic cooperation with the West. Even General Lebed

is making statements which indicate that he is beginning to understand that Russian economic development is inextricably intertwined with cooperation in the West. There is a multiplicity of political forces at play ranging from the most irresponsible of the

unreformed Communists, Zhirinovsky, to truly Western-oriented

bona fide democrats, with a small ‘‘D.’’

If you agree with this small framework, I would be grateful if

you would share with us—and I know this has to be very preliminary—your appraisal of the change in prime minister ship that occurred today, the likely role former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin

will continue to play with respect to the Kosovo crisis. Since Secretary Talbott is in Moscow as we speak, and you certainly are in

close touch with him, what is Strobe Talbott’s message to Yeltsin

and the Russian leadership at this critical juncture?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Congressman, let me start with the

last one. The message at this critical juncture is we have an opportunity, if Russia will seize it with us, to forge an international consensus about how to deal with the Kosovo conflict. We have a

strong foundation for that consensus created by the agreement of

the G–8 foreign ministers last week. That was an agreement on

words, and now we have to see whether we actually can extend

that to an agreement on action.

Strobe Talbott’s team in Moscow is looking, in following up on

these meetings during former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s visit

18

to Washington for the G–8 foreign ministers’ meeting, at whether

we can go one level of detail deeper in understanding whether we

really do have or can forge a common approach.

We have no reason to think that Mr. Chernomyrdin’s role will

change. He’s been appointed by the President as a special representative on this issue. He’s not part of the government apparatus in which Members submitted their resignations today and all

of whom are on an acting basis from this day forward. He’s President Yeltsin’s representative. Deputy Secretary Talbott met with

him today and will meet with him probably again tomorrow. We

have no reason to think he will not be one of the sources of—one

of the channels of—communication on this issue.

Of the significance of the change of prime minister ship, it is

rather hard to tell at this stage. We know Mr. Stepashin. We don’t

know whether he will have a mandate to pursue different policies

from Mr. Chernomyrdin. We can look at President Yeltsin’s statement in which he expressed a commitment to accelerate economic

reform. He expresses his dissatisfaction with the pace at which

that had been pursued recently. In addition to expressing some

thanks to Prime Minister Primakov and appreciation for the role

he has played in stabilizing the situation in Russia, he did express

dissatisfaction on this front. We may see some signs that Mr.

Stepashin, if he is confirmed by the Duma, will have a mandate to

work actively in that area, and certainly it is very necessary.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I, too, believe like Mr. Leach—your statement

about anti-Americanism in Russia is less about us and more about

them. It is a tool for attacking Western-style institutions and,

above all, democracy. Looked at from this angle, the problem is actually a little less hopeless. But from my mind, I think it is a little

more hopeless. I say that because whether or not we are liked, liking someone and liking a country collectively may be good on the

short term. Popularity should be fifth on the listing of priorities. I

am concerned there are very few benign dictatorships out there

that, if they move increasingly toward fascism or ultranationalism

or back to communism, which the Duma certainly has indicated

they are capable of doing, at home that means more human rights

abuses in the future and more aggressive foreign policy. So that

makes me more pessimistic, not less. Again, whether or not they

like us or not is less important to me than anything else, especially

those other points.

I do have a few questions. Sergei Stepashin, as I pointed out earlier, one of the main architects of the Chechnyan war obviously

now has been raised to Prime Minister, as we have all noted. What

impact, in your view, will that have realistically on Russian policy?

It may have been a move obviously to divert attention or perhaps

bring down the Duma if they fail in confirming him after three attempts, but what move will that have vis-a-vis Kosovo?

Second, in China, Russian Representative Victor Chernomyrdin

has said there needs to be an unconditional halt to NATO bombing

before anything relative to peace moves forward. What is the Administration’s response to that? Has Ambassador Collins sought to

19

address the domestic audience in Russia on Russian television or

in any other way, or try to give the NATO/U.S. side of things

there? If you could, respond briefly to that.

Finally, in terms of the resolution Mr. Gejdenson offered on the

floor several days ago, was that something that emanated from the

White House or the State Department? To my mind, it was an

after-the-fact confirmation or negation of the policy. Whose idea

was it?It seems to me it was a very high-risk strategy. Frankly,

Ithink ambiguity would have been the more preferable course to

take because many of us had profound misgivings about this policy.

But we were hoping it would end tomorrow, and in no way, shape

or form did any of us want to convey to Milosevic or any of his cronies that the House was so divided. Yet this high-risk strategy was

pursued. Where did that come from?

Mr. GEJDENSON. Would the gentlemen yield? I am sure the Ambassador doesn’t know, and I can tell that you I do know. It came

from language the Senate had passed by, I think, 57 votes a short

time earlier. Frankly, we didn’t believe that it would become a big

political battle with the Whip’s actions on the floor.

Mr. SMITH. Again, I have heard that stated a few times about the

Whip, the Whip and the slinking in of the distinguished Speaker

of the House. Again, you belittle our profound misgivings. I am one

of those who follows this and has followed it ever since the beginning of the war in Slovenia when Croatia was under attack. I remember reporting to Brent Scowcroft and speaking to him and the

NSC people about my visit to Vukovar and Osjek when they were

under siege. So I have a long-standing concern about this. To belittle that is—somehow the Whip is saying, this was the political

vote; it was not. It was a profound disagreement with the Administration and how they were pursuing their policy.

Again, I think you do us a great disservice when you keep saying

that. I hope you would rethink your strategy, because this is not

a political issue. This is an issue of profound differences, and the

outcome—as we are seeing, the miscalculations that have been

made are leading to a disastrous outcome. You keep bringing this

up. My question really wasn’t about the language, it was about the

strategy.

Whose idea was it to go forward with this, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Congressman, I can’t add anything to

what Mr. Gejdenson said, but I can answer the other questions

that you have put.

Ambassador Collins has, in fact, been on TV talking about this

issue and has been interviewed in the newspapers. It is a high priority of ours to make sure that our views are understood by the

Russian people.

I have seen the statement that Mr. Chernomyrdin made in

China, or after his visit to China, proposing that the bombing has

to end first before other issues are addressed. From our point of

view, that is not a realistic way of solving this problem.

Mr. SMITH. I know I am over my time, but the original bombing

strategy called for two days and a pause. I mean, we had an opportunity during Easter celebration—you had the Pope, eight cardinals, a cross-section of religious leaders saying, here is a pause

20

opportunity to try to make peace work. Isn’t this an opportunity

right now?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I think the Yugoslav Government understands very well how to seize that opportunity.

Mr. SMITH. But he doesn’t care—the degrading even of his military. As long as his life and his power stay intact, the concern is

that he will allow others to do the dying. The Kosovar Albanians,

850,000 strong, inside of Kosovo at grave risk, they are my highest

concern, and we are not reaching them.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I am getting beyond my portfolio

here, Congressman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me

to say one word about the other question that the Congressman

raised, which was the significance of the change of the prime minister ship for the Kosovo policy. Our assumption is that President

Yeltsin sets Russia’s direction on this issue.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thought this was a hearing on Russian foreign policy, not on

American policy toward Kosovo. I truly don’t totally understand the

point of my friend from Iowa. I understand why he thinks a policy

that seems to have exacerbated that which it was designed to contain doesn’t make a lot of sense. I don’t understand the Ambassador’s comments that he was not talking about Russian reactions

to American policy in Kosovo, he was talking about a much broader

question of anti-Americanism in Russia.

I guess I want to throw out a different theory that really isn’t

about hostility for Western—it is not really—the anti-Americanism

isn’t necessarily an attack on democracy. It is a feeling probably as

much from what precipitated it—a cumulation of lots of things, but

as much precipitated by what happened in August with, sort of the

bottom falling out, as it is by the Kosovo episode. It is the sum

total of a belief that we tried it their way, and look what we got.

As a witness later today says, we are the size of Denmark economically. Add to that NATO expansion and just a whole accumulation

of things, plus politics.

There is an election coming up, which is, by the way, something

to say, in Russia. There is an election coming up both for the Duma

and for the President, and some anti-American rhetoric now is

probably good politics in the context of that election. I think you

can probably be a democrat, small ‘‘D,’’ and articulate sort of an

anti-American position, and there is nothing much we will be able

to do about this for the next year or so other than pursue sensible

policies. We are still going to get that reaction because domestic

politics in Russia requires it, and we shouldn’t drive ourselves

nuts, because there is not too much we can do about it.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I think the kind of feelings of

marginalization and helplessness that you described maybe are an

important part of what we are seeing now. You are certainly right

that ‘‘small-D’’ democrats in Russia can express anti-American

anger. I would add they do it with considerable unease, because I

think they sense what it is really about—that it is about the sort

21

of broad political choices, the sort of ultimate political choices about

the kind of country they are going to have and not just about policy

issues.

You mentioned this ‘‘we tried it their way’’ sense of frustration

created by last August’s crash.

Mr. BERMAN. Or created by the reforms of 1993 or everything.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Sure. What is interesting is right

after August there was a lot of that talk; ‘‘We tried it their way,

now we will try it our way.’’ You hear that much less now because

there is a kind of realism about what the real possibilities are in

the modern world.

People in Russia across the political spectrum who look hard at

what the real options are for Russia don’t kid themselves about a

third way. There is much less of such talk now than in the early

fall, and I think that is a very positive development.

Mr. BERMAN. One last point, much narrower. Mr. Gejdenson, the

gentlemen from Connecticut, raised the issue on the space

launches, and I just want to praise your answer. It is crazy not to

allow space launches by an entity that is not proliferating, that is

employing a lot of people, that is doing something that is helpful

to us and helpful to American economic interests and Russian interests? In the course of doing that, the idea of leveraging realistic

things, not change—not total tax collections, but some of the things

you mentioned, are they putting monitors in some of these questionable plants? Are they actually going to pass the export control

regime they have now talked about for a year and 3 months? Those

specific kind of things—as part of reaching this—the Russians have

a million people, as I understand it, that are employed in this program. There is some leverage there.

I hope at the end of the day we get to the point where they are

doing some of the things we would like them to do on proliferation

and we are lifting the cap, because that seems to me like the best

possible outcome.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I can’t improve on what you said.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you, Mr. Berman.

Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, I am going to use my time to try to convey a message and ask you maybe to convey it back to the Secretary and to

the President. Normally I would use my time to ask you questions,

but this is a very critical and unusual circumstance.

Let me begin with a moment of background, because you don’t

know me well. I happen to support the President in a large number

of his foreign policy objectives and domestic objectives. For example, on foreign policy, I think he is absolutely right on family planning. I think he is right to reverse the Mexico City policy. I think

he was courageous to reach out to China. I think he was especially

courageous to go to Gaza and to stand up for some rights of people

who don’t have that many people standing up for their rights.

So I don’t speak from the point of view of somebody who is a

committed critic of the President, nor am I known as the most partisan member of my party. I don’t think anybody in this body

would say that. So my advice comes from a heart very worried by

22

what I perceive to be the Administration’s choice—and here I am

afraid you said it, although I think you said it humorously—to

stand up to Congress, rather than to recognize a coequal branch.

Since that is an issue of the most tremendous importance regarding Kosovo, I am going to take my time to speak to it.

When the Speaker of the House failed to quash me, when the

Speaker of House failed to use his power to prevent a vote, he was

criticized by people in the Administration, and it was said to be a

sign of weakness. We heard some of that criticism today that the

Speaker was supposed to stand up to the far right and prevent this

vote from happening.

I am not far right. I am probably the most moderate Republican

in the Congress. Certainly I am in California. What the Speaker

did was to give us the right to vote, and that is not a sign of weakness. It was a respect for the constitutional process. His reluctance

to impose his own will on the membership was, I think, a sign of

tremendous respect.

For example, in the Persian Gulf War it was similar. The Speaker at that time, an honorable man, was Speaker Foley, and the Minority Leader Bob Michel, when I served before, they did not try

to impose their will. They said, this is war and peace, and in war

and peace we are not going to try to establish a party line and

make you walk it.

As to pressure, there was pressure, Ambassador. There was pressure. Talk to Dennis Kucinich about pressure on the Democratic

side. ‘‘I know you might disagree with this war, but for heaven’s

sake stick with the President on this one.’’ That was an argument

that was heard on the floor of the House, and truly it should have

been left to the individuals.

The reason why the vote failed on an evenly divided vote, 213 to

213, was because the President didn’t try. I think that members of

his party tried, and I know for a fact that colleagues on this Committee tried to convince their colleagues. But starting from an attitude that we really only need to tell Congress what we are going

to do, as opposed to we need to get the approval of Congress as a

partner, flawed the outcome. It wasn’t the President’s proposal—I

could have answered Chris Smith’s question—because the President said he didn’t need congressional support—because the Secretary of State said she didn’t need to come to Congress. When I

asked the Secretary of State in open hearing whether there were

hostilities in Kosovo, she refused to answer my question.

Now, there are hostilities. I know the legal consequences of admitting that. But what she should have said is, ‘‘Yes, and we disagree with the War Powers Act for the following reasons.’’ But to

say to a Congressman sitting on this Committee, ‘‘I will not answer

your question as to whether there are hostilities in Kosovo,’’ is to

denigrate the coequal branch of which I am certainly the most

humble and least important Member, but, nevertheless, I am a

Member.

I think that the President hurt his case measurably by sending

this letter to the House floor during the middle of the debate, a letter that was misconstrued by people of good will that the President

was promising he would indeed get a vote from Congress before inVerDate 11-SEP-98 12:52 Apr 10, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 62962.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
23

troducing ground troops. I don’t criticize my friends for misconstruing it because I think it was intended to be misunderstood.

But what it says when you parse it is, and I quote the President,

‘‘I would ask for,’’ (not I would obtain) ‘‘congressional support,’’ (not

congressional approval or vote) ‘‘before introducing U.S. ground

forces into Kosovo into a nonpermissive environment.’’ That doesn’t

mean before introducing U.S. ground troops. That means if you

bomb Yugoslavia enough, what had been a nonpermissive hostile

environment might become a quasi permissive environment.

This reliance upon torturing words was so disappointing when

what our people wanted and the Congress wanted was clear talk,

straight talk. Here it is. We are at war. Here is my case for being

at war. Support me.

If the President had tried, he would have convinced at least one

more Member, and he would have then had the approval for the

bombing. It is a direct consequence of his not trying, in my judgment, that he suffered that blow to what he was attempting. Our

country did not suffer because our constitutional processes worked.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Let me

say——

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Might I just have one word here?

Chairman GILMAN. If you wait just a moment. Let me say to our

Committee we will continue right through the voting. I have asked

one of our Members to go over and come back, and we will continue

with the testimony right through the voting period.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I am sorry, did you want to

respond?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I wanted to say to Congressman

Campbell that he has given me the idea to say I need to clarify

what I meant by ‘‘stand up to the Congress,’’ which is I think something that you would agree with, which is when we have a disagreement, argue it out, say what we think. I will certainly convey,

probably without the full eloquence that you gave to it, your message to Secretary Albright.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome Ambassador Sestanovich to our hearing this

morning. In the real spirit of bipartisanship, I wanted to make a

statement earlier that I do associate myself with the comments

made earlier by the gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos.

As you know, Ambassador, we had such a tremendous high when

the Berlin wall came down, and there was tremendous expectation

on the part of the world to think that now Russia is going to be

part of us, living as a free people without communistic practices.

All this has happened now after the many years that we have

tried.

I wanted to ask you, do you perceive a danger or, at least in the

Administration, a real danger of the failure on the part of the

Western industrialized nations to provide substantive economic assistance to a former nuclear power as is the Soviet Union? There

seems to be a little repetition of what happened. With the failure

24

of the Allies in World War I, we ended up really, really having the

more serious situation of having to deal with a Nazi Germany.

Do you see any real sense of nationalism happening in Russia

that will end up producing another Stalin? I sense that we have

failed on the part of the economic industrialized nations in providing the proper economic assistance to Russia. You had mentioned earlier that 75 percent of our own economic assistance goes

to the nuclear issues and not economic assistance. Can you correct

me on that?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. No, that is what 75 percent of our bilateral assistance to Russia is, in the area of threat reduction, and

I think it is a very good investment. However, you should be aware

that there are many other forms of assistance that the Russian

Government receives from other countries and other institutions.

From international institutions, the Russian Government has received credits on a very large scale. The IMF’s program in Russia

is now the largest single program that it has—its indebtedness or

the credits that it has extended to Russia. The World Bank has

large programs; the EBRD also. Many countries have extended

Eximbank credits, trade credits.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What is the total? What is the bottom-line

dollar value?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I will get some better numbers than

I can give you off the top of my head.

[Ambrassador Sestanovich’s response to this Question appears in

the appendix.]

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Billions? Hundreds of millions?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Tens of billions, surely.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And they are still asking for more.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. It is a long process, and their economic situation is very difficult. It is very difficult above all because—not because the level of assistance has been inadequate, but

because Russian——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am sorry, Mr. Ambassador, but I would

like to yield to my friend from Massachusetts for a question.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think the point that my friend is making—and maybe I am

wrong—but, in the aftermath of World War II, this Nation, I think,

did something that was extraordinary, clearly it was unpopular at

the time, and that was the Marshall Plan. I think what he is suggesting is that this didn’t occur with the demise of the Soviet

Union and the aftermath of the Cold War, and possibly we missed

an opportunity.

I agree with Mr. Berman and Mr. Gejdenson, it just makes no

sense to punish the Soviet Union and punish ourselves and drive

them further into the area of proliferation.

I just have one quick question relating to Kosovo. Several statements have been made that it was—and I just wrote this down—

the original strategy was two days and a bombing pause. I never

heard that, Ambassador. I never heard that from the Administration. I haven’t heard it anywhere. Another claim that was made

was that Milosevic would blink. I never heard anyone from the Administration suggest that. Can you tell me, is—am I accurate in

25

saying that was never a pronouncement of the Administration in

terms of the crisis that we are currently experiencing?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I am with you, Congressman. The 2

days and a pause is a formula that is unknown to me. I hope that

it is not established as retrospective in rewriting the history of this.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am really concerned that we are going to create

facts, as we often do here, by simply repeating them often enough.

I have never heard the Administration stake out that position. If

there is evidence of that, I would like somebody to come forward

and provide that documentation.

I have to leave now because I am in the midst of being on the

floor.

Chairman GILMAN. We will have to recess the hearing until Mr.

Ballenger returns, when will he be taking over the chair.

The Committee stands in recess just for a few minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. BALLENGER. [Presiding.] I am filling in until our leader gets

back—Congressman Cass Ballenger. I am sorry I missed substantially what you said here, and then I was just about listening to

Tom Campbell’s description of his status as far as politics is concerned, and they asked me to go vote real quick and come back so

we can keep this thing going.

But I would like to ask you what has occurred in the paper this

morning, and I think this question leads to it. During his 1992 visit

to China, President Yeltsin stated that Russia should sell China its

most sophisticated weapons and so forth. Since then Russia has

sold China advanced fighter aircraft, quiet-running diesel subs,

guided missile, destroyers armed with advanced Sunburn anti-ship

missiles and so forth. In fact, China now accounts for about 30 to

40 percent of all Russia’s arms exports. One U.S. periodical described this as China’s buying binge in Moscow and called it a message to the U.S. 7th Fleet. Isn’t Russia helping China to challenge

us as far as force projection in the Pacific Rim in the future is concerned?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Congressman Ballenger, you are right

that China has become a big customer for Russian arms exports.

You are also right that we need to look carefully when arms transfers of this kind have the potential to affect regional balances of

power and create dangerous capabilities that threaten our servicemen who are stationed abroad. That is certainly the way in which

we look at this problem.

I might say to you that it is our judgment that Russian transfers

have not, in fact, significantly altered Chinese capabilities vis-a-vis

our own in this region, but it is an important issue to watch closely

because one could imagine transfers that would have that effect.

For that reason, this is an issue that we discussed with the Russians; and were we to see the kind of trends that would have that

threatening potential, it would be a problem for us.

Mr. BALLENGER. A couple more on that line. Is the United States

concerned over Russia’s assistance to India in extending the range

of its missiles and over the new Russian sales of cruise missiles to

India? Did I state that properly? Is the United States concerned

about Russia’s assistance to India to extend the range of its missiles?

26

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Let me say that we are concerned

about transfers, military transfers particularly, of sophisticated

equipment and capabilities from any direction to India because our

effort has been to—in the wake of India and Pakistan’s nuclear

tests—to show that there is an international consensus against the

appearance of new nuclear powers. I am not familiar with the particular case that you are referring to, Congressman.

Mr. BALLENGER. The sale of cruise missiles to India.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Let me see if I could leave it this

way, Congressman. I would be glad to arrange a classified briefing

for you on this subject. My understanding about the most recent

Russian transactions with the Indians in this case is that they involved training and maintenance. Let me look into it further, and

if you would be interested in a classified briefing, we could certainly set that up.

Mr. BALLENGER. In the New York Times, April 27th, 1998, Russia——

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Often classified material.

Mr. BALLENGER. Classified as far as the New York Times is concerned. It said, ‘‘Russia helping India to extend range of its missiles.’’ Obviously sometimes the New York Times gets ahead of the

rest of us around here. I just was curious.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. They are ahead of me on this point,

Congressman, but I would be glad to look into this for you.

We have seen the press reports concerning the transfer of rocket

stages from Russia to India. The transfer of these rocket stages

was permitted by the agreement the United States negotiated with

Russia in July 1993 to resolve a 2-year dispute over Russian plans

to assist India in the indigenous production of cryogenic rockets.

The results of those negotiations were briefed to Congress and

widely reported in the press at the time.

Pursuant to the July 1993 agreement, which was implemented

beginning in September 1994, Russia agreed to limit the cryogenic

engine contract to the transfer of seven complete rocket-stages to

India.

We have no information to indicate the Russia has not been abiding by its agreement. Were we to obtain information to the contrary, we would make our concerns known to senior levels of the

Russian government, and would Urge the GOR to bring its missile

exports in line with its bilateral and multilateral missile nonproliferation commitments.

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me just ask a basic, then. Russia’s ability

to produce cruise missiles of some capabilities, is that fairly common knowledge or not?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Sure. I mean, this is the old joke the

Soviet Union didn’t have a military industrial complex; it was a

military industrial complex, and with capabilities across the spectrum.

Mr. BALLENGER. I am just referring to the paper stories about

India—I mean, China and Russia getting together to veto whatever

is going to go on in Kosovo and telling us to get out immediately.

How seriously do you take that, that basic threat or effort on their

part?

27

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. There is no doubt if there were to be

a U.N. Security Council resolution on Kosovo, it would have to be

accepted by the permanent Member because they all have vetos.

Mr. BALLENGER. Right.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. When you find Russian and Chinese

spokesmen stating positions that are at odds with how we see the

situation and the path toward a solution, it obviously reduces the

likelihood that we are going to have consensus, a workable consensus, in the Security Council.

As I mentioned earlier, Congressman, perhaps it was when you

were out of the room, from our point of view, what Mr.

Chernomyrdin said after his conversations with the Chinese was

unrealistic as a way of dealing with this problem. Proposing a

bombing halt before the crucial issues are resolved is simply not

the path that NATO has proposed or that will actually address this

problem.

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Faleomavaega, you yielded a minute. Would

you like the rest of your time?

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would like to restore my time if there is

any way to.

Mr. BALLENGER. Sure, be happy to.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, Mr. Ambassador, I think the Chairman alluded to earlier

about—as you had indicated—the Security Council. I think my

question is relevant because Russia is a member of the Security

Council. Will that be OK? I am just curious. As you know, the

members of the nuclear club have the absolute veto for the Security

Council wherever or whenever there are crises, especially military

involvements, and all of these are taken into consideration. I have

always been given the impression that if there was a crisis—not

just the Kosovo crisis, let’s just look at Yugoslavia as a whole with

Slovenia and Croatia and Bosnia came into the picture—I have always been under the impression that the Security Council would

be the base organization to which nations like ours and the 19

member nations of NATO would appeal in the United Nations to

resolve this conflict. It is a military conflict. We’ve got a problem

with Milosevic obviously, but then also you have to separate the

good people of Serbia or those of Serbian ancestry. Sometimes we

have a difficult time, having forgotten a little bit about the history,

why there’s such a close affinity between Russia and Serbia. That

has been alluded to earlier, in World War II they were both fighting a common enemy, and that was Nazi Germany. I think I also

understand the fact that Serbia would never want any German to

come to their turf, if you will.

One of the successes as to why Tito was able to control Yugoslavia was because he was not only part Serbian, but I think he

was also part Croatian. But because of that and the strong arm of

Tito, even the mighty Soviet Union couldn’t come in and take over

Yugoslavia like they did Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

My point here, Ambassador, is why wasn’t the Security Council

the controlling organization of this whole crisis in Yugoslavia? Why

NATO? My understanding is that NATO is supposed to be a defense security organization. Here is the point I am making: Ethnic

cleansing, my gosh, there is ethnic cleansing all over the world. I

28

can tell you about the 100,000 Melanesians or West Papua New

Guineans against which the Indonesian Government has been conducting military atrocities, murders, killings, rapes, and all of

this—it is found in West Papua New Guinea.

My point is, does this mean that we are looking into ethnic

cleansing, perhaps having security organizations in Asia, a NATO

in Asia, a NATO in Africa, in the same way that we have a NATO

that is supposed to defend countries in Europe? Because this is

what we are leading into. I just am curious, did the Administration

consult closely with President Yeltsin of Russia when the Yugoslavian crisis came to the front? Not just Kosovo, but the time that

Slovenia and Croatia and Bosnia came into the picture.

Here is the concern that I raise, Mr. Ambassador. When the

North Korean crisis became nuclear, we never bothered consulting

with the South Korean leaders, and they were a little miffed about

that. In the situation with China; we went to China; Japan also felt

a little miffed about consulting with them and expressed their concerns. So now the situation is in Yugoslavia. I was just curious, Mr.

Ambassador, had there been close consultations by the Administration with President Yeltsin way before the Kosovo thing ever came

into being?

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Absolutely, Congressman. Before the

sort of deepening of the Kosovo conflict and crisis, last winter and

spring, we consulted closely with the Russians and worked together

with them to devise a settlement to the war in Bosnia. As I mentioned earlier, our forces served side by side in Bosnia in SFOR

now, and have for, I believe, 3 or 4 years.

The consultations between Russian and American foreign ministries have been close. Our diplomats have participated in the contact group which has dealt with the Kosovo issue. President Yeltsin

and President Clinton have spoken several times since the air campaign began and many times before that on this issue and have

corresponded on the same subject frequently.

We were cosponsors of the U.N. Security Council resolution last

fall. Our diplomats were together at the Rambouillet negotiations.

President Yeltsin, President Clinton issued a statement on Kosovo

at their summit in September in Moscow. So there has been no difficulty in understanding each side.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Did President Yeltsin agree to the provisions of the Rambouillet proposal to President Milosevic? As I understand, some of those provisions were very harsh.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. We did not have full agreement with

the Russians at Rambouillet.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I will try the

next round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome to the Committee. I’ll try not to beat

up on people from the State Department, and I will not raise the

‘‘K’’ word in our discussions today. I believe in the basic goodness

of people and the Russian people, but Russia has changed. The

former Soviet Republic no longer exists because of a flaw in economic policy and political policy. But whatever the reasons, it is

29

important, I feel very strong, that we should have good relations

with Russia, and I think we could do it on a people-to-people basis.

I happen to believe that the leaders of too many governments,

the Russian Government, our government probably and some other

governments, have a lot of flawed leaders, and our systems don’t

always put the best and the brightest there. But in this era in

which television is the medium, the person who gets there is the

person who stands up on top of a tank and gives a speech, even

though he has, maybe, a brain that is pickled by whatever. Or

someone becomes a leader because he gives one speech and makes

one statement in the province—and I will not use the ‘‘K’’ word—

and he becomes the leader of Yugoslavia. That even happens today

and probably in this country.

But still, accepting those premises, my question is who dictates

Russian foreign policy toward the United States? Who dictates Russian foreign policy toward China? Who dictates Western foreign

policy toward Western Europe? And who dictates Russian foreign

policy toward the former Soviet Republics?

Now, and as an adjunct to that, I would like to know who dictates U.S. foreign policy toward Russia? How do you arrive at your

foreign policy conclusions? Now, that is the first question.

Second question, there was a book that was published this year

called ‘‘The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage, Espionage in the

United States during the Stalin Period,’’ and it was based on, as

I am sure the period that an American writer or Russian writer

had access to the KGB files in 1992. These files indicated that

Alger Hiss was guilty, the Rosenbergs were guilty, a member of the

State Department or more than one were spying for the Soviet

Union, and even a Member of Congress from New York State was

spying for the Soviet Union.

My question is, what is the State Department doing to make sure

that you don’t have someone that is spying for Russia today? The

reason I ask that question is, do people in the Russian Government, whoever these people are that are dictating Russian foreign

policy, do they know what our foreign policy is before Members of

Congress? Do they know it because of their espionage, or do they

know it because they are in this hearing room? I don’t think this

is the best place to learn what our foreign policy is going to be, but

I am sure there are people here.

One of my great games that I play in this room is that I try to

pick out who from the country being discussed is here representing

that country. I already picked out about three people here that I

assume are working for the Russian Government. But I won’t put

them on the spot.

But, anyway, if you could answer those questions, I would appreciate it, and hopefully that will——

Mr. SESTANOVICH. I hope there are some Russian diplomats here

and others as well. I would hate to think that they have something

better to do than to listen to our discussions. But I can assure you

that the State Department spends a lot of effort at internal security measures to make sure that the people who work for us are

security-conscious, could carefully control the information that is

available to us that involves national security interests, and that

only the people who should have access to that information do, and

30

that only the people who should be working at the State Department do. But if you are interested in a fuller discussion of that

question, I can arrange for it.

The other question you asked is who dictates Russian foreign policy, and then you added as an aside, who dictates our policy. I

think probably the word that would make it hard to answer that

is ‘‘dictates,’’ because I think both processes are much more diffuse

and pluralist than the word ‘‘dictate’’ would allow.

The letter of the Russian Constitution gives the President the

authority over foreign policy, but he has a lot of people who work

for him. He has a foreign ministry, a defense ministry, an intelligence apparatus, a security council, a personal staff, and all of

those institutions, and people have an influence. In addition, there

is a Parliament that has its prerogatives, not so different from

those in other countries, involving budgetary oversight.

Mr. COOKSEY. Is their level of sophistication greater than this

country or less or——

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Their congressional staffs are not as big. I let

you draw your own conclusions from that.

On the question of where our policy toward Russia, countries of

the former Soviet Union and other countries comes from, it comes

from a rather broad and open process of the same sort, which is

ultimately, under the President of the United States.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Steve.

First, about some of the points that Tom Campbell made earlier,

and some of the things that we have been having to endure from

the media as of late, and just to reaffirm, those of us who are elected by our constituents believe that our Constitution requires that

the Congress play a significant role in determining foreign policy,

especially the involving of the United States of America in a war.

Clearly the founders of our Republic wanted the Congress to be involved in that and did not see that the President of the United

States as an individual had the powers of a king in engaging the

new country or the United States of America in a war.

We had gotten through that, and we spent hundreds of years

under the rule of a king, and that is not what we have now. During

the Cold War we permitted certain leeway and certain centralization of power to happen in the United States of America, and the

Cold War is over. I think this is the process, what we see now, and

some of the friction going on is a process in the shaking out and

the redistribution of that power again after the Cold War.

Now, on to some specifics, and I am sorry I was not here earlier.

I am the Chairman of the Space and Aeronautics Committee, and

I had an important hearing about the implications of Y2K on our

space program and whether or not there will be some major problems. But as the Chairman of that Subcommittee, I have been

deeply involved with the effort to cooperate with our former enemies in Russia who are now our potential friends in the space effort.

Let me ask you this: I was not here to hear you say this, but is

it my understanding that you suggested that Russia is not involved

in proliferating weapons, missiles and other technology?

31

Mr. SESTANOVICH. I don’t think I could have said anything of the

sort, Congressman. What I said is that the flow of missile technology from Russia to other countries and particularly to Iran is

one of our greatest concerns, and something we have spent an immense amount of time and effort trying to get the Russian Government to address and control.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Fine. Because I heard another Member make

a suggestion that you had indicated that.

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Please give me his name, and I will try to

straighten him out.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now as to this situation in the Balkans, from

what I understand, Curt Weldon, when he went there with the delegation of the Members of Congress to negotiate with the members

of the Duma, reached a compromise solution with the members of

the Duma and were about to underscore the importance of that

kind of cooperation when they were informed that they should not

go to Serbia and to Belgrade because Jesse Jackson’s mission had

been a failure and that the prisoners were not going to be released,

and thus they were encouraged by the Administration to abort that

part of their plan which was to go forward together, members of

the Duma and Congress, to Belgrade, receive the prisoners, and announce to the world that there is an option that we have reached

some sort of a potential breakthrough for a peace proposal.

Why did the Administration suggest to Congressman Weldon

that the prisoners were not going to be released and try to discourage him from going to Belgrade?

Mr. SESTANOVICH. I spoke to Congressman Weldon a couple of

times about this question, and I am a little surprised by your recollection of it, and I will tell you why. We had a discussion, he and

I, when he was in Vienna in the middle of his discussions with the

Duma-Congress group that was there, the kind of contact that, by

the way, we think is very positive.

Congressman Weldon said to me that he had been given some

vague statements from someone representing himself as an emissary of President Milosevic indicating that it might be possible to

release prisoners if they visited. But he said he had no intention

of going unless there was a public statement that there would, in

fact, be a release of these prisoners so that he wasn’t subject to the

kind of bait and switch tactics that we have seen used by President

Milosevic sometime in the past. I thought that seemed like a very

good approach.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So your answer is that the Administration

did not discourage Mr. Weldon.

Mr. SESTANOVICH. I thought we left it when we talked was that

his approach of insisting on a public statement that would get

him—would put President Milosevic on the record about an intention to release prisoners seemed like a good protection for him. But

if your question is broader than this as to whether it seemed like

a good idea to get involved in negotiations with President

Milosevic, that did not seem advisable. But on the question of prisoners, Congressman Weldon seemed rather aware of the risks involved in going without firm assurances.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I understand from Mr. Weldon that they had

agreed after negotiations with the Duma that Russians could

32

agree, and the Serbians who were present said that this would

probably be acceptable and were on the telephone in communications with Mr. Milosevic, that instead of having NATO peace keepers as we were demanding, they would accept non-NATO peace

keepers, the United Nations peace keepers, and they would be

armed, and there would be autonomy for Kosovo. Just from a distance, it appears that the Administration is moving toward that position at this moment.

Is this correct? I mean, are we moving toward the point where

we could now accept,—instead of the NATO peace keepers, U.N.

peace keepers as Mr. Weldon negotiated in Vienna?

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Our view and that of the NATO Alliance has

been that the only kind of peace keeping force that will solve the

problem of creating enough confidence for refugees to return is one

that has NATO at its core, and that is an unchanged position.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, we have been watching television in the last

couple of days, and we have seen Mr. Chernomyrdin—I never can

pronounce those Russian names.

Mr. SESTANOVICH. Chernomyrdin.

Mr. BURTON. Yes. Come back from China and say that they and

the Chinese are of one mind that the United States and the NATO

allies should stop the bombing and pull out of Kosovo. Now, with

the upheaval that is taking place with Mr. Yeltsin firing Mr.

Primakov and other members of the Cabinet, one wonders, if there

might be a destabling influence in Russia that could lead to open

hostilities. In other words, the Russians have been long-time allies

of the Serbs. They told us and the Chinese have said you need to

stop bombing and get out of there. They put a Russian trawler out

there in the sea for intelligence purposes, we understand. Now you

have this upheaval there in the hierarchy in Russia. I just would

like to have your opinion as to whether or not you think this could

lead to some direct or more involvement by Russia and possibly

China in the Kosovo issue if we don’t adhere to their wishes.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Congressman, President Yeltsin has

made some very strong statements about the importance of staying

out of this conflict. He has said that there is—and he has given directives to make sure that there is no risk of that—that there is

no provision of military equipment to Yugoslavia which would violate a U.N. embargo, that there is not a provision of military intelligence to the Yugoslavs.

We don’t have any indication that anything is happening other

than what President Yeltsin has said on that, and we certainly

would not want the kind of hostilities that you describe to take

place. So we are mindful of that. They are very mindful of it.

Mr. BURTON. I understand and I know that Yeltsin is concerned

about it, but they are trying to impeach him right now. He has just

fired his foreign minister and other members of the cabinet. You

have got some real hard liners in the Duma over there, and some

of those hard liners, or many of those hard liners, are former Communist Party members who are——

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Current Communist Party?

33

members.

Mr. BURTON. Current Communist Party members, who are very

supportive of Milosevic, and they don’t want us in there; and I just

wondered if we had any intelligence information or information

through the State Department that would lead one to believe that

we might have a problem with Russia and maybe even China, if

something isn’t done to bring about a halt to the problem in

Kosovo.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I can’t speak about China. I can tell

you that the activities of the Russian Government indicate that

they are following the concert directives that President Yeltsin has

spoken of publicly.

Mr. BURTON. So your position is that Yeltsin’s——

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. As to the members of the Duma, they

are not in a position to make decisions of that kind.

Mr. BURTON. Unless they impeach him.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Even then.

Mr. BURTON. Now, let us talk about one other subject, quickly before my time runs out. Have you or other top officials of this Administration ever been presented with credible reports or evidence

that top Russian officials have personally engaged in activities that

would be considered corrupt by our standards? I didn’t know that

was a funny question, but that is OK.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. I think it is fair to say that the ethics

laws and regulations that govern the activities of Russian political

figures and the general practices are a little looser than they are

here.

Mr. BURTON. I have been told that there was a report that State

Department had seen or had been involved in that showed that

there was corruption by top officials in the Russian Government,

and it was not made available or public.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. I thank

the gentleman. We thank the Ambassador for being patient in extending his time for us throughout the vote period. We now proceed

to the next witness.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sestanovich appears in

the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Our next witness is General Scowcroft.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Yes, Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Could I just convey a question to the Ambassador before he leaves. I really would appreciate it.

Chairman GILMAN. All right. We are running late. If you would,

go ahead.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Ambassador, I understand there’s a

Russian company who is in concert with a New York firm that

wants to set up a multi billion dollar nuclear storage facility somewhere in the South Pacific.

Can you check that out for me, Mr. Ambassador, if this is true?

I want to know the name of the Russian company and also want

to find out if this is in accordance with our stated public policies

about Russian companies that go out setting up nuclear storage facilities.

34

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, if you would submit that to

the Committee we will make it part of the record. Thank you very

much.

We now proceed to our second panel, General Scowcroft and Dr.

McFaul. Lieutenant General Scowcroft is President of the Scowcroft Group, an international investment advisory firm, and President of the Forum for International Policy, a nonpartisan, nonprofit

organization providing independent analysis on major foreign policy issues.

General Scowcroft has served as National Security Adviser to

Presidents Ford and Bush, as a Military Assistant to President

Nixon and as Deputy National Security Adviser to Presidents

Nixon and Ford. General Scowcroft has held a broad range of positions during his military career and has subsequently chaired and

served on a number of important policy advisory councils.

We also have with him on this panel Dr. Michael McFaul. Dr.

McFaul is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at

Stanford University and a research fellow at the Hoover Institute.

We welcome our witnesses. We regret it has taken this long to

get to your testimony. We thank you for your patience.

Chairman GILMAN. General Scowcroft, you may proceed. You

may put your full statement in the record and summarize it with

a statement, if you prefer.

STATEMENT OF HON. BRENT SCOWCROFT, LT. GENERAL,

USAF (RETIRED), PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP,

INC., PRESIDENT, THE FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

General SCOWCROFT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is

a great privilege to be here before the Committee on such a complicated and important subject. I do not have a written statement,

but I do have a few preliminary remarks I would like to make.

Without going into the historic roots of Russian foreign policy, let

me make just a few introductory remarks about some of the forces

I think are motivating Russian foreign policy today.

I think there are two principal aspects to Russian foreign policy,

motivating them. Both of them are resulting from the conditions in

which Russia finds itself today. A deplorable economic state and

deteriorating scientific and defense establishment industry is one.

The disappearance of the Soviet Union is another, and finally, deep

humiliation about their fall from great power status to a middling

political power with an economy about the size of the State of Illinois.

The first state, their deplorable economic state affecting their

military and their defense industries, leads to arms sales, technology sales, scientific missions and so on that are certainly affecting us in a number of parts of the world.

My sense is that the primary motivation is economic rather than

political but, in some cases, I don’t think you can rule out a political motive. They are desperate to keep their arms industries going.

They are desperate to keep their scientists employed, and in addiVerDate 11-SEP-98 12:52 Apr 10, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 62962.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
35

tion to that, the control of the state over all of its entities is fairly

loose.

The second part, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, has not

fully been accepted by a number of quarters inside Russia, and

there is a sense that somehow the former parts of the Soviet Union

eventually will in some way rejoin or something and that the vast

raw materials, for example, down in the Caucasus and in central

Asia really, by right, belong to Russia. I think that, in part, motivates some very troublesome aspects of Russian policy in, for example, Georgia, in Azerbaijan, and elsewhere in central Asia.

In addition to that is a third, the sense of humiliation of Russians, of a proud country reduced from its Cold War status to its

present condition. I think that sense of humiliation is leading them

to lash out in many directions, is in itself beginning to breed an

anti-Western sense of nationalism, and I will mention that a little

later.

In the early post-Cold War years, I think the United States in

its policy was very cognizant of this sense of humiliation. We really

reached out to try to avoid saying that the Soviets lost the Cold

War, reached out to make them feel a member of the Western community.

That even went to the extent in 1993 of looking the other way

when a disagreement between Yeltsin and the parliament led to a

shelling of the parliament building when they refused to be dismissed. In 1994, in the tragedy in Chechnya, the Administration

said, initially, that it is an internal matter—quite different from

what we have said subsequently about Kosovo, for example.

We really reached out to try to embrace the Russians, but I think

gradually we have changed. We have not changed our policy. What

we have changed is the execution of the policy. Gradually, we have

turned to a policy either of neglect of Russia or hectoring them on

issues that are of importance to the United States. I think it is further humiliating them and is a primary cause now of the growth

of anti-Western and anti-U.S. nationalism in Russia.

I think this change, again in execution, not in policy, really

began with NATO expansion. NATO is, for the Russians, the living

symbol of their defeat and fall from power. Now, do the Russians

go to bed every night worrying about NATO, wake up every morning cursing NATO? No, of course not, but NATO is still a four letter word for the Russians and will always remain one.

With respect to NATO expansion, all of the prospective new

members of NATO, with the exception of Slovenia, are former

members of the Warsaw Pact or of the Soviet Union itself. I think

the Russians could be excused if they think that all this is happening to them because they are weak and we are taking advantage of that weakness, thus, again, reminding them how they have

changed and deepening their humiliation.

I think almost everything that has happened in the last years,

whether it is this, whether it is the ABM treaty, or proliferation,

has furthered this attitude. To me, the climax of this trend took

place in January this year when the Secretary of State went to

Moscow to meet with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

She said she had a five point agenda: First, the Russian budget

is unrealistic; second, the CFE proposals, that is, conventional force

36

changes, in Europe are unacceptable; third, we deeply resent the

anti-Semitic character of recent Russian remarks. Fourth, the

transfer of missile and nuclear technology to Iran is unacceptable,

and if it continues, we will cutoff quotas for Russian rocket

launches. This seems to me counterproductive and, again, could be

interpreted by Russians as an economic competition seeking to shut

down their rocket industry in favor of ours. Last, we have a problem with the ABM treaty because of rogue nations with missiles,

and we would like to negotiate revisions. If we can’t do that, we

may have to denounce it.

The only thing the Russians have left of great power status is

their nuclear weapons; and the abrogation of the ABM treaty could

jeopardize their ability, especially in their weakened state, to maintain a robust deterrence.

When Ms. Albright was asked the question, well, given this list,

the agenda you have, is it time to return to a policy of containment

of Russia? She said, don’t be ridiculous, our policy is engagement.

I think this is illustrates the problem we face. We are doing things

unconsciously to the Russians that are driving them into

hypernationalism.

It is not our intent, but we need to look at our policies to see if

there are not ways we can engage the Russians, on nonproliferation, for example.

We just beat up on them in Iran. Have we asked them to help

us with North Korea, with Libya, with all of the others ‘‘rogue’’

states? No. Take the ABM treaty. Ronald Reagan said when we develop SDI that we will give it to the Soviet Union. Why not go to

them and say, look, we both face this threat. Why not cooperate in

dealing with it?

I don’t think the Russians are in a position to do anything about

any of these things, they are so weak. It is the attitude and the

perception of us taking advantage of them in that condition which

troubles me.

The final chapter in this saga was the initiation of a bombing

campaign in Kosovo when Primakov was literally in the air flying

to Washington, the ultimate humiliation. Either he came to Washington as if nothing had happened or had to turn around and go

home. While I agree with Congressman Leach’s comments about

Russia and Serbia, I think a lot of their motivation right now is

not a Serbian-Russian love affair so much as it is the Russians

want to be a participant. They want to be included. They don’t

want to be ignored except when we beat up on them.

Ironically, we are now turning to them, imploring them to bail

NATO out of a failed or a faltering military policy. This is an enormous temptation for the Russians, both to deal NATO a blow and

to appear now as a key peace maker, the person or the country

that will solve the problems we face in Kosovo.

So I think, basically, while the Russians are doing a number of

things that we don’t like and we certainly ought to call them to account for it, we are in danger of promoting, by our actions, not by

our policy, a virulent anti-West, anti-U.S. nationalism which we

will come to regret in coming years.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, General Scowcroft.

37

Chairman GILMAN. Dr. McFaul.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL A. MCFAUL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE,

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, STANFORD

UNIVERSITY

Mr. MCFAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a longer statement which I would like to submit to the record and just summarize here.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection the full statement will be

made part of the record. You may go ahead with your summary.

Mr. MCFAUL. Thank you. It is both a pleasure and honor to be

here. In answering your question on what are Russian policy foreign objectives, my answer is it depends on who you ask in Russia.

In making our assessments of Russia’s behavior in the world, I

think it is absolutely critical that we realize that Russia today is

not a totalitarian state dominated by the central community of the

Communist Party, the Soviet Union. That state disappeared in

1991.

Rather, Russia is a democratizing state, a weakly institutionalized democracy with a lot of deficiencies, but a democratizing statement nonetheless. Consequently, Russia’s foreign policy is a product of domestic politics, competitive domestic politics in Russia

today.

That system is highly unstable and highly erratic with poor institutions, unlike our own; but the policies that we see throughout the

world are a product of domestic politics in Russia. It is not too

much unlike the debate I heard here earlier this morning between

you. I heard lots of different foreign policies. Had a Russian walked

in and asked different ones of you, he might have had five or six

different ideas about what American foreign policy is today. I think

we need to remind ourselves that it is precisely the situation you

have in Russia today.

Now, there are a few things that most Russians agree upon.

First, they all recognize that resolving Russia’s economic decline

and internal weakness is a precondition for establishing Russia as

a great international power again today. You cannot be an international actor if your economy is the size of Illinois, no offense to

Illinois; nor can you be a serious international player if you can’t

control your own borders. Everybody recognizes that.

Second, all Russian actors agree that Russia must pursue economic, political, and military integration within the Commonwealth

of Independent States. Russia, quite frankly, wants to continue to

have a sphere of influence in the Commonwealth of Independent

States. There is little disagreement in Russia today about that.

Third, most leaders, not all, but most leaders in Russia believe

that Russia’s nuclear arsenal is the one power attribute that still

accords Russia special status in the international system, just as

General Scowcroft said. As a consequence they do not want to lose

that. That is where it ends, though. That is where the consensus

ends.

After that, on virtually every other major foreign policy issue, I

think there is major disagreement in Russia; and to understand

38

what the policy is, one needs to understand who is up and who is

down in terms of Russian domestic politics.

Let me spell out for you four different camps in Russia which I

think the ebb and flow of them are important to understanding the

conduct of Russian foreign policy.

First, there are what I call the pro-Western idealists. These are

individuals and parties who have a normative commitment to integrating Russia into the Western community of democratic states.

They believe that Russia is best served by becoming an integral

member of the West.

This group includes the liberal reformers that dominated the government in the earlier part of this decade, personified first and

foremost by former Foreign Minister Kozyrev. They dominated in

1992 and 1993. Their power has waned ever since; and today they

are marginal actors in the definition of Russian foreign policy, but

they are still players nonetheless.

The second group is what I call the pro-Western pragmatists.

This group also believes that Russian interests are best served by

Russian integration with the West, but they believe this for material, economic reasons, not for normative reasons. They are not

what I would call democrats with a small ‘‘D’’ necessarily. Rather,

they are economic actors that see a win-win situation in terms of

Russia integrating into the West.

This includes companies like Gazprom, the largest gas company

in the world, oil companies, mineral exporters, high-tech enterprises and large financial organizations. There are also a few important Governors that I would put in this camp, as well as a

whole host of Russian nongovernmental organizations, church

groups, trade unions, student associations, and women organizations that also believe that it is in Russia’s interest to integrate

into the West.

Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is the leading political figure in Russia that I would identify with this camp; and also,

by the way, I would say that the majority of Russian citizens also

were in this camp, although that has changed in the last month.

From 1993 until August 1998 this group dominated the definition

of Russian foreign policy and, depending on the issue, they still

play a very important role in the conduct of Russian foreign affairs

abroad.

Third group I would label—and this might sound a bit like an

oxymoron, but as the anti-Western pragmatist. Like the second

group, this group believes that influence in foreign policy debates

and the definition of foreign policy should be driven first and foremost by Russian interests and not norms, morals, or revolutionary

missions.

However, this group does not believe that integration in the West

is a win-win situation for Russia. Rather, they look to the world to

be a zero-sum game competition between Russia and the West; and

so if America is up, that means Russia is going down.

They look at the world as a unipolar world today, dominated by

the United States; and they want to do everything they can to destroy American hegemony and create what they term a multipolar

world.

39

However, this group are pragmatists. They are well aware of

Russia’s weakness, and so they realize in the short term they need

Western engagement but not necessarily to integrate with the

West, but actually to compete with the West.

In this group I would say that Prime Minister—or I should say

former Prime Minister Primakov, is the leading proponent of this

view. Many nationalist groups I would put in this group as well,

directors of military enterprises, some, but not all, within the ministry of defense, and the Russian intelligence community. From August 1998 until today, literally this morning, this group dominated

the definition of Russian foreign policy.

Then my fourth group, finally, are what I call the anti-Western

ideologies. These folks are passionately anti-Western. They are motivated by norms, ideological beliefs, sometimes ethnic,

civilizational kinds of things; and they promote a kind of foreign

policy that is actually not in Russia’s national interest, at least

from my point of view.

This includes Mr. Zhirinovsky, the head of the Liberal Democratic Party. It includes many, many members of the Russian Communist Party today and even more radical groups on both the left

and the right.

This group gets a lot of attention in the West for the things they

say about foreign policy, but I think it is important to realize that

they have never been in control of foreign policy in Russia and are

unlikely to be in control of Russian foreign policy in the near future.

Let me turn briefly to Kosovo to illustrate how these different

groups have competed for influence and how it influences the conduct of Russian foreign policy.

The initial reaction to Kosovo was dominated by the anti-Western ideologies. If you looked and you saw the camera shots outside

of the American embassy, it was Zhirinovsky out there. It was the

Communists out there, throwing beer cans and talking about Western imperialism. They were in charge; and it seemed for a time, by

the way, that they would push Russian policy in directions that I

think would not have served Russia’s national interest.

However, the second phase of the Russian policy was not dominated by them. Russia did not go to war to help their Serbian

brothers, i.e., norms, ethnic ties, rather than interests. Rather, Mr.

Primakov realized that that was not in Russia’s interests, and the

second phase of Kosovo—Russian policy toward Kosovo was dominated by the anti-Western pragmatists.

They understood that Russia was too weak to do anything in

this; and yet, they were motivated first and foremost to try to

weaken the NATO alliance, to try to split the NATO alliance, and

try to make this a losing proposition for the United States and,

consequently, a winning proposition for Russia.

That group lost control of the policy. When Mr. Yeltsin appointed

former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the pro-Western pragmatists

took over the definition of Russian foreign policy; and after

Primakov’s dismissal this morning—by the way, I would add they

are now firmly in the driver’s seat until at least the next go-around

in terms of the definition of Russia’s policy toward Kosovo.

40

They believe that this is a win-win situation. They welcome the

chance to be on the international stage, and they want to cooperate

in a way with the NATO alliance to find a win-win situation in

Kosovo.

Think about that. In the period of 4 weeks, Russian foreign policy had three different policies on Kosovo. If I had more time, I

could walk you through a whole range of different foreign policy

issues where you would see the exact same fluctuations and tendencies.

There is important lessons here, and I will be brief about what

this means for U.S.-Russia relations. First, it means that we cannot assume some static foreign policy coming out of Russia. On the

contrary, it is a very volatile situation domestically, and that

means that Russian foreign policy is also going to be very volatile.

Now, in the short run I think that is negative and very bad. Who

do you talk to? Who are your partners over there? It is difficult to

know. In the long run, I think that keeps the door open that I

would call the pro-Western pragmatists and even the pro-Western

idealists might win out in Russia.

Today they’re down and out. Today they don’t dominate on most

issues, but it is simply too early to say this game is over. This

game is not over. I am a big fan of the NBA, watching a lot of NBA

games. You turn it on in the second quarter and your team is down

20 points, you are a really foolish person to think that that is going

to be the end of the game.

Right now, I think we are in the second quarter of our relationship. It is a long ways until we know the outcome of Russia’s domestic politics; and we have to keep in mind, therefore, that positive outcomes down the road may be possible.

Finally, let me leave you with one last fact. The very fact that

Russian groups are arguing and competing for interest about foreign policy, to me, is also a positive sign. This is a great, vast improvement over when we just read central Committee directives

about what the Soviet Communist Party believed Soviet national

interest in the world were.

The vigor of their debate and the range of opinions in Russia are

almost as heated and vigorous as the ones you hear in your own

building, and I think that is a positive sign for Russian democracy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. McFaul appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. McFaul.

General Scowcroft, at the height of the Cold War our Nation

found a way to balance Russian and Chinese antagonism to the

benefit of our Nation in the so-called ‘‘Strategic Triangle.’’ How can

we best manage a situation in which Russia and China appear to

work together to undermine America’s ability to project power and

influence in key regions, regions such as the Persian Gulf and the

straits off of Taiwan?

General SCOWCROFT. Mr. Chairman, I think that we need to keep

in mind the benefits of the kind of policy we had in the Cold War.

A rule of thumb for me would be to have better relations with both

the Russians and the Chinese than they can ever have with each

other. They may be tactical allies now, and I believe the Russians

41

are doing things against their fundamental interests—selling weapons and technology to the Chinese.

I doubt the possibilities of a thorough strategic alliance between

the two. There are too many enmities, but they are two big players

in the world. They are two of our primary concerns in this new millennium, and we need to get it straight with both of them and act

with respect to both of them from cold, calculated policy, not emotion.

Chairman GILMAN. I thank you for that response. General, some

historians see Russian foreign policy historically rooted in a desire

to make certain that the Russian state doesn’t disintegrate and,

therefore, inevitably resulting in policies that are meant to insure

the existence of a ‘‘great, united Russia’’ and to make certain that

regions bordering Russia, such as the Baltics and Ukraine, do not

truly break away from Russian control. U.S. policy would prefer

that Russia respect the territorial integrity of its newly independent neighbors, however.

Do you believe that Russian foreign policy toward its neighbors

today is radically different from its previous incarnations under the

czars and the Communists and will refrain once and for all from

seeking to reinstate control over countries such as Ukraine?

General SCOWCROFT. I think the jury is still out. The Russians

are searching for their soul in many respects. I think the historic

arguments between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers in Russia

is, in a way, still going on in modernized form. Who are they, the

Russians are asking themselves, who are they, what are their fundamental interests, and so on.

Historically, Russia has been invaded over and over and over,

and their fundamental security policy has been to build padding

around the Russian heartland to give defensive space, and it has

served them well.

One of the whole problems of Eastern Europe and what we do

about Eastern Europe goes back to that. For the West, it has been

a buffer against the infection of communist Russia. For the Russians it has been a bulwark that invaders would have to penetrate.

I think we ought to do two things: First of all, shore up, to the

extent we can, the independence and the ability to survive of the

former members of the Soviet Union, encourage them to have viable political systems and economic systems and let the Russians

know that we consider them permanently independent. But, do it

in such a way as not to drive Russia into a belief that we are trying

to take advantage of their period of weakness to build a system

around them by which we can throttle them or keep them under

control.

Chairman GILMAN. That is trying to balance a pretty fine line.

General SCOWCROFT. It is a fine line. I don’t think it is past our

ability to do. If we don’t do it we are going to fall off one way or

another, and I think we will live to regret it.

Chairman GILMAN. Dr. McFaul, at our hearing back in July on

U.S.-Russia relations prior to the August economic collapse in Russia, most of our witnesses felt that further IMF loans to Russia

would only buy a little time before the next economic crisis in Russia. In fact, the IMF loan last year subsequently bought only a

month’s respite before the August collapse.

42

What, in your opinion, would be the rationale for providing a further IMF loan to Russia, and what new Russian economic reforms

can you point to that would make Russia eligible for any new IMF

funding?

Mr. MCFAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should say that I am

not an advocate of further IMF funding. I do not see a record of

achievement under the Primakov Government in terms of economic

reform. They have not done elementary things, and so I do not

think it is—you shouldn’t reward inactivity.

Having said that, the one rationale I could see for providing

those funds is simply to avoid making the situation worse, but

what IMF is talking about is simply take one check from one bank

account and putting it in the other. They are not actually talking

about transferring new money, and that would help Russia avoid

further disaster.

Having said that, I think there is a real mystery going on in the

Russian economy and, that is, our dire predictions from July of last

year and after the financial crisis simply have not come true. If you

look at the statistics just released last week, inflation is only 3 percent in April.

They are collecting more taxes last month than they did throughout the whole previous year. We do not have a good understanding

of what is going on there. I suspect it is the state sort of buying

time. I don’t suspect it is fundamental economic reform, but I

should note that we are pretty confused in terms of what is going

on in the economy.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. McFaul.

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say that I do

think that, General Scowcroft and Dr. McFaul, you are both correct. I mean, the most astounding I think I have learned in sitting

on this Committee for 18 years is how much is just personal.

If the President doesn’t visit the country enough, if the Secretary

of State doesn’t go there, if the Vice-president hasn’t been there,

they become obstreperous; and sometimes when you see areas of

the world where we get a little trouble, you find that they at one

point thought they were the center of activity; and now they think

they are on the back road where nobody stops.

Whether they do it consciously or subconsciously, they always get

our attention. I think we do need to pay a lot more positive attention to Russia and not just in these situations of crisis.

I agree in essence with both of you on the satellite launches. But

I guess my question would be, if you agree with my position, that

it is a bad place to put pressure, how do I convince Mr. Berman

that there are good places to create pressure so that we have them

clean up their act on proliferation without damaging their economy

by limiting satellite launches. Frankly, I was one that would like

to see an increase in Russian launches and a decrease in Chinese

launches to make up for that shortfall we will face.

On arms proliferation, the United States sells about half the

arms worldwide. It is a little hard for us to stand up and kind of

vent our moral outrage at Soviet arms sales to keep their defense

industries alive while we participate in a similar practice with

other countries.

43

We think they are better countries, but the economic dynamic is

similar in that it helps bring down the cost of this equipment when

our own military buys it.

We have bipartisan problems in the Congress of the kind of insensitivity you mentioned. We recently had a gratuitous vote, in

my opinion, that simply stated we will deploy an ABM, an antimissile system; and, one, we are not ready to do that.

Two, it was aimed at the North Koreans, who may have a missile

that can reach us; but as you have said, simply ignored what is the

largest number of missiles that could be aimed at the United

States. How do we move forward there? I would like to hear more

about that.

Third, one of our colleagues, Mr. Rohrabacher, continues to suggest that we simply pull out of NATO, that this Cold War is over

and that we no longer need NATO or participate in NATO. So I

would appreciate answers for those.

General SCOWCROFT. Mr. Gejdenson, that is quite a list, but let

me say something quickly on each one.

On the launch quota as leverage, it just seems to me that it is

counterproductive leverage. What we are saying is we are going to

punish your good, honest firms who are doing things right in order

to get at the ones who aren’t.

It seems to me that instead of doing that, we ought to say we

will increase the quotas for these firms to show that we are cognizant of the good and the bad actors.

Now, what we can substitute for it, I don’t know. I have looked

around. It is not easy, but I don’t think you can defend the policy

we have on the basis that we have to do something.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So you would be a very important voice on that

issue in the coming months as Congress presses for the opposite,

to shut off the launches, and I hope you speak out loudly.

General SCOWCROFT. I will be happy to because we have forgotten U.S. interests here. We need places to launch our satellites. We

do not have the capability here, and we are going to fall way behind unless we can solve this problem somehow.

On the ABM treaty, it is a very complicated problem. I really do

think we ought to try to enlist the Russians cooperatively. I think

Michael makes a very good point, they are pretty hopeless now.

They probably can’t do anything even if they tried, but the psychological impact of our making the effort would be good.

We also need to think, in the whole missile business, about the

Chinese and their attitude toward missile defenses and so on.

There is no point in doing something which will create the problems we are trying to avoid.

On arms sales, I don’t disagree with you, but I think we are

thoughtful about our arms sales. It doesn’t always work out, but

the Russians are really not being thoughtful. They will sell to anybody who has the money to pay for it, and unfortunately, that is

mostly the rogue states.

NATO, I think, is still of critical importance to the United States;

and it is less what NATO does than the fact of NATO. It represents

American participation in the security of Europe; and if we have

learned anything in this century, it is that that is critical. We canVerDate 11-SEP-98 12:52 Apr 10, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 62962.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
44

not have a decent relationship, security relationship with Europe

unless we have that kind of umbrella of NATO.

Mr. MCFAUL. Very briefly to go through your list.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Yes, Dr. McFaul.

Mr. MCFAUL. Two seconds. On satellite launchers, of course we

should not punish Khrunichev and Lockheed, by the way, in this.

It simply makes no sense. They are definitely part of what I call

this pro-Western pragmatists. I actually worked at that company

in the early 1990’s, and there is no doubt in my mind that they see

cooperation with the West as in their interest and in our interest.

On the ABM treaty, this is to me is a clear example of where

emotion is trumping interests in Russia, and that to me says we

have an opportunity to work with them, and I think there is lots

of opportunities there. The ministry of defense officials are not as

militantly anti-ABM and anti-ballistic missile defense as some of

the politicians in the Duma.

Finally, on NATO, I would just agree with General Scowcroft and

let us keep the door open all the way to Russia.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Dr. McFaul, could I get you to clarify one of your

points. Was your second category pro-Western pragmatists or protagonists?

Mr. MCFAUL. Pragmatists, excuse me.

Mr. COOKSEY. Do you think I would be correct in my assumption,

feeling, that the leadership of Belarussia would fit into your fourth

category of anti-Western ideologies?

Mr. MCFAUL. Yes, that would be correct.

Mr. COOKSEY. My question about the view is, what is the likelihood of Russia forming a union with Belarussia as part of a greater

Russia, and if so, how would that impact their foreign policy for the

future?

Mr. MCFAUL. If you look at the evolution of that policy, what was

very clear from, say, 1996 to 1998 is that the pragmatist were

blocking it, right. There was a lot of rhetoric about yeah, yeah,

yeah, we all need to get together, but in fact, if you looked at the

policy, it was Russia blocking it because it wasn’t in their economic

interest.

When Mr. Primakov took over, he pushed more for that because

it was seen as some kind of balancing against the United States

which to me also seems absurd, but that is the way they framed

it.

There is a lot of hesitation right now. There is a big debate going

on. I suspect that as we get into the Russian electoral cycle, nobody

is going to want to say I am against this unification; and so you

are going to see a lot of rhetoric about, yes, of course, I am for it.

However, I wouldn’t expect it to happen anytime soon. I suspect

after the election you might see the pragmatists reassert themselves on that policy.

General SCOWCROFT. I wouldn’t disagree with that. I think the

real danger here is, aside from these four groups, that there will

arise because of a heightened spirit of nationalism, resentment at

45

the West and so on, a leader who promises order, who promises he

is going to lead Russia back to a time of greatness; and it is in circumstances like that that they may reach out to Belarussia.

Short of that, I don’t think it will happen, and I don’t see that

on the horizon; but if you look at the crop of Presidential candidates for the year 2000, it doesn’t inspire confidence.

Mr. COOKSEY. General Scowcroft, I was in the Air Force this time

30 years ago, so I am impressed with your affiliation with the Air

Force; but you were part of an Administration or two Administrations that I feel had sophisticated foreign policy and carried it out

very effectively and accomplished their goals and had some overall

strategic foreign policy.

I think that probably one of the problems that the Administration had was that they did not put as much emphasis on domestic

foreign policy, and probably that contributed to losing the election

or either didn’t put emphasis on it or did not laud your successes.

I feel like currently we have an Administration that has put a

lot of emphasis on domestic foreign policy and has a very unsophisticated foreign policy. I am from Louisiana and, a lot of people from

Arkansas think that dealing with Louisiana is foreign policy, but

that is neither here nor there.

My question is, how does this play out in Russia? I think most

of the nations in this day and time that have any semblance of democracy, elect leaders or choose leaders based on domestic policy

and these leaders often are very unsophisticated on foreign policy,

and that becomes a secondary goal or objective, and it creates a lot

of problems between nations.

What are the chances of getting a group of leaders in Russia that

will have this increased sophistication on foreign policy, or do they

have it now?

General SCOWCROFT. I think we are going to have to be patient

about the Russian political system. They don’t know where they

are. They don’t know what they want. All these groups are contending back and forth.

There are also the sophisticated urban areas of Moscow, St. Petersburg, then the rest of the country, which increasingly looks on

Moscow as a hostile state.

All these things may take decades to work themselves out; and

what we need to do is be patient, be firm, patient but helpful where

we can. Economically I agree we can’t help at all right now, but

we ought not to do things that gratuitously give rise to a kind of

a hostile sentiment in the Russians and lead the Russians to say

we don’t belong to the West, we can’t get into NATO, we can’t get

into the EU, the West doesn’t consider us as Western; therefore, we

had better not be, we had better do something else. That is the

danger.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. COOKSEY. One quick question. I have a daughter who went

to Russia some years ago in this people-to-people program. How effective do you think these programs are in developing a better relationship with these?

Is there any way that we can get more people-to-people relationship, because I don’t have a lot of confidence in the politicians in

either country.

46

General SCOWCROFT. We ought to push them wherever we can.

Are they going to make a big difference in the short run? Absolutely not. But I think they certainly do no harm, and they advance

our understanding of them and their’s of us.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I personally

want to welcome General Scowcroft and Dr. McFaul for our Committee hearing this afternoon.

General Scowcroft, I have always been an admirer of your perception and especially of the expertise, tremendous expertise, that

you have in having to serve previous presidents, especially in the

area of security.

You had indicated earlier that NATO, as a security, regional organization, was a must in order to provide stability in Europe,

much to the chagrin, as you well know, of the Russians, because

we know that the original purpose of NATO really was for defense

purposes.

At that time, at the height of the Cold War, we were fighting the

former Soviet Union, Socialist Republics. Now there is no more Soviet Union, and you are advocating that we should still have NATO

for the sake of stability in Europe.

I would like your opinion as to where the Security Council of the

United Nations comes into play? If we are going to have a regional

security organization like NATO-Europe, why wouldn’t we have

one in Asia? Why shouldn’t we have one in Africa?

When you are talking about basic foreign policies involving ethnic cleansing, we have them in Africa, we have serious problems

in the Asia Pacific region—and for the very fundamental humanitarian reasons, I fully support the President’s position on why we

had to go to Kosovo because, for anything else, you remember it’s

the same reason why President Bush went to Somalia.

I want your opinion on this. If you think that NATO’s is that important for Europe, shouldn’t we also have regional security organizations in Asia and other regions of the world?

General SCOWCROFT. No, I don’t think so. I think in this sense

Europe is unique. It has been the cockpit of wars for 100 years. We

have now, I hope, overcome that. If we ever have a really huge crisis again, a world crisis, the people who are going to stand by us

in dealing with it are going to be the Europeans. It is not going

to be India, it is not going to be China, it is not going to be Japan

and so on, wonderful countries though they are.

The core of the kinds of things that we believe in and the core

of the kind of world that we are promoting reside in the Atlantic

community; and we need that kind of solidity.

I am much less concerned about NATO as an instrument to do

anything, as I am about continuing to develop the sense between

Europe and the United States that we are one, that we work together, that we think because that is what is going to make a better world for all of us.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. General Scowcroft, I beg to differ with you

on this issue. When NATO was founded, de Gaulle pulled out. For

47

some 40 years we single-handedly had to defend these European

nations. Where was France?

Now, all of a sudden President Chirac is shining out like a good

example of being one of the brothers of this compact that they were

never a part of, and constantly, France is always on our heels, always disagreeing on policies that we have had even in this current

Administration.

My question, too, where were our European allies when we were

fighting in Vietnam? The South Koreans are the only ones that I

saw when I was there. Are you also suggesting that the Japanese

are not democratic enough to support these same fundamental

principals that we are talking about?

General SCOWCROFT. No, I think you missed my point. My point

is not that we agree on everything with the Europeans. My point

is that we come from the same root principles; and therefore, we

are natural allies. We differ on a number of things. The French

never left the NATO alliance. They left the Integrated Command

System. When the chips are down, the French are there. Anytime

there is a little wiggle room, they will wiggle away.

What I am really saying is that we should not let this group that

did so wonderfully in World War II and in the Cold War dissipate

and have the United States go back to isolationism and Europe go

its own way.

I am not sure European integration is at the point where it will

make it without the kind of stability that the Atlantic alliance

gives it.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My time is up. Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you, Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Two questions, one to

General Scowcroft. Is SDI in our interest? Do you support SDI; and

if so, how do you do it, given ABM? How do you bring it to fruition

given the ABM treaty?

The question to Dr. McFaul, this is the big one, give us your answer on Kosovo.

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I think SDI is in our long-term interests, but I underscore long term. I think we ought to proceed with

a vigorous ‘‘R’’ and ‘‘D’’ program. I don’t think we have the answer

to a system that is deployable at anything like the cost and effectiveness that we really ought to have, but I think we ought to work

on it, and I see no reason we shouldn’t go to the Russians and say

we would like their cooperation. We would develop a system cooperatively and then would provide it to any country that is worried

about a missile attack on its territory. I would transform the program from a unilateral, in-your-face one, which we have now, to

something which can be a defensive weapon for everybody.

Mr. CAMPBELL. To follow a moment, the ABM treaty, if it is interpreted to ban a deployed space-based missile system—I understand that the legal adviser to the State Department in the Reagan

Administration argued that it did not prohibit it—but if you take

the view that it did—do you take the view that it does—and if so,

then we would, I take it, have to amend ABM or go to the Russians

and denounce ABM, a technical term of denounce—I don’t mean

48

criticize it, just say 6 months’ notice we are out of it. Is that correct?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, that is correct, we could. You see, I

think the Russians would be amenable to modifications, assuming

they are part of it—but weapons in space are something else. They

won’t agree to anything where they can’t keep up and which we

could use to deny them a deterrent capability.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Understood. Thanks.

Dr. McFaul, what is the right answer in Kosovo? What should we

do? I know a million experts who told us what we have done

wrong. I have tried to avoid saying that because I never claimed

to have any far-sightedness. The procedures, that is my field, right,

at least I think it is—constitutional, what should have been done

constitutionally; but I don’t know the right answer.

There are terrible human rights abuses. I don’t want to make

Russia our enemy for the rest of my lifetime. What is your answer

right from this point? Not what should have been.

Mr. MCFAUL. Not what should have been done.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Take us from where we are today and move me

forward.

Mr. MCFAUL. I want to make one comment as a social scientist,

and then I will give you my views, which is that if you think about

what I said about Russian foreign policy, I think there is a lot very

similar about American foreign policy.

What is wrong about what is going on today is that we do not

have a shared definition of objectives in foreign policy. Think about

10 years ago—you could say our strategy was containment of Communism, and there might be some people who would disagree; but

most people, both in the Congress and the executive branch, would

agree with that.

Today, we don’t have that shared strategy; and, therefore, we tiptoe into things. People don’t agree on the objectives; and, therefore,

they disagree vehemently about the means.

My own view is that it was right to do something about it, that

we had to do something. You cannot—both for, I think, moralistic

reasons you cannot just sit by and watch genocide in Europe if you

are serious about being a power in Europe—and I think we should

be—but that we have to have the means lined up with the ends.

That is where I think our mistake has been.

Today, of course, because there is not consensus about plying

what I think are the right means to solve this, then I think we

have to go for resolution. We have to do it with the Russians on

board, and I do not see having the Russians being on board so far.

I see it as a win for American foreign policy, not as some slippage

so far, but we cannot allow—we have to now stay to the same objectives that we started from the get-go.

This is not about a marriage contract or some sort—negotiation

is even the wrong word. There is nothing to negotiate about. In my

opinion, there is nothing to negotiate. We have our terms, and until

those terms are met we have to——

Mr. CAMPBELL. Pardon me, international security presence is

what the Ambassador representing the State Department spoke of

earlier, involving Russians and peace keeping. That is part of the

answer. You see it, too, I take it?

49

Mr. MCFAUL. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL. So I am going to say something, and then you tell

me whether it is right or wrong because I was really asking for you

to give a definitive answer which would then be universally accepted by all.

Russian troops along with some NATO presence, maybe not

United States and the UK because of the objection of Milosevic, a

mixed group goes into occupied Kosovo. It is a horribly bombed

country; huge amount of money needed then to rebuild Kosovo. The

bridges that we bombed Monday—will be rebuilt on Monday by you

and me, tax payers. A number of years this force resides there to

keep the Serbians from coming back. Is that the answer that you

see as appropriate?

Mr. MCFAUL. Unfortunately, I do and with one amendment—

that I absolutely believe it has to be that American forces have to

be part of that component; if you don’t do that, then you don’t

achieve your primary objective, which is to get the Kosovars back,

and that is the important words to remember.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you, Mr. Campbell.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. General Scowcroft, earlier today I made an observation, may or may not be valid, but it struck me that from a diplomatic perspective this Administration had breached a century-long

tradition of Teddy Roosevelt about speaking softly but carrying a

big stick. In doing that, they have also breached a shorter-term policy of General Scowcroft’s, and let me explain it.

It strikes me that under the Bush Administration, if there is

anything that was a doctrine—and this is a doctrine that to a degree stems from the President and from his National Security Adviser, yourself, which is very Chicago school, using your terms of

art, very cold and calculating—it was the Powell Doctrine, which

was to carefully describe objectives and then to apply overwhelming force if it need be to carry them out.

It strikes me in Kosovo, which has enormous ramifications both

for Russian policy as well as for NATO, we have struck a rather

deep nail into the Powell Doctrine.

Objectives seem to be a bit fuzzy, but more importantly, we have

decided to not prevail; and instead, we have a doctrine of what appears to me to be punishment, that is, that the policy in place is

very punishing to the Serbs, but may well be a policy not designed

to prevail, which is an extraordinary circumstance in geostrategic

terms, partly because this is a civil war, partly because whether or

not it is a civil war, it is a war, and NATO has now been identified

with this new policy.

One aspect of NATO relates to whether anyone will want to join

if this is the kind of policy that NATO comes to symbolize.

I would like to ask you, as a Chicago school theorist, as well as

a former National Security Adviser, how you assess this policy. Do

you think it is realistic?

General SCOWCROFT. I think NATO is very much at stake in

Kosovo, depending on how it comes out. NATO will not disintegrate

regardless of what happens, but it could erode and cease to be a

cohesive force.

50

However we got to Rambouillet, we did it with the accompaniment of a lot of threats to Milosevic, threats by the Secretary of

State, Secretary of Defense, SACEUR and so on. When a great

power threatens, it has to be prepared to carry out that threat. We

have not always done that in the past, but that is a cardinal rule,

because if you don’t carry it out, then people cease paying attention

to your threats and then you do have to use force.

We operated from that point on with fairly fuzzy objectives. The

Rambouillet objectives were different from those cited as the objectives of the bombing. They were not the same kinds of objectives,

although they should have been identical, and our strategy was

based on hope, rather than cold, calculating analysis. Once you say

you are going to use force, you need to have it sufficient to achieve

your objective.

I don’t think the bombing is punishment. I think it is hope—hope

that we won’t have to get troops on the ground and we don’t have

to get into a dirty ground war, that somehow this immaculate coercion will change Milosevic’s mind.

I don’t think there ever has been a case—I can’t think of a case

where a bombing campaign by itself has changed a foreign leader’s

mind. The Serbs, if they stand for anything, it is their pride and

their ability to take pain and show how tough they are.

So it seems to me that the part of the Powell Doctrine—and I

don’t like that term. I think it is a misnomer—which is essential

is the need to achieve your objectives. You can try it with bombing,

but if bombing doesn’t work in the first 3 days, don’t keep it up

for 6 more months hoping it will.

You have to have something else in your kit bag to say, yes, we

are going to achieve that objective. If this doesn’t do it, then we

will do something, and that is what I think was not done.

Mr. LEACH. I appreciate that, and I would only conclude by saying I have never known a policy that can be, in my judgment, legitimately criticized from two perspectives.

Either we should not have made the threats and not gotten involved; or if we did pursue it, we should have pursued it in a forthcoming way.

General SCOWCROFT. I think it is exactly right.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you, Mr. Leach.

Mr. Faleomavaega, just has one brief question, and then we will

wind up our hearing.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

Gentlemen, we have learned a lot of lessons from Vietnam, and

coming down to the question of using military force in our dealings

with the Russian Government, as my friend from Iowa alluded earlier, it has become known as the Powell Doctrine. If you will, General Scowcroft, carry a big stick and if you are going to use military

force, use it all the way. But it seems that our policy now is that

we have gotten rid of the basic Powell Doctrine, if you will, in the

Gulf War, but now we are using limited use of force and you are

suggesting it is OK to use limited use of force.

We learned our lessons from Vietnam. We bombed the heck out

of those people. In fact, it energized the Vietnamese, whether they

were Communists, pro-democratic or patriots, it energized those

51

people to the point they became nationalists, and I believe that we

are doing the same thing to the Serbian people. Forget Milosevic.

We are doing the same thing to the Serbian people.

I would like to ask the gentlemen, where are we going with this

continued bombing? Do you think we should resort to a more forceful use of force of arms?

General SCOWCROFT. Just very briefly, I am pessimistic about

the ability of negotiations to achieve our objectives—maybe to give

us a fig leaf but not to achieve our objectives. I think the only way

we can achieve our objectives is to prepare for and, if necessary,

use ground forces.

Mr. MCFAUL. I would like to concur with that. I think that is

right. What troubles me is because of the way of our own domestic

politics in this country that we do not have the support either for

the objectives or for the means of achieving those objectives.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. I want to thank our panelists,

and thank our Members. The Committee will submit questions in

writing to the State Department for expeditious response by the official witness at today’s hearing. This hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(53)

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