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i 

87–617 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–85] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 12, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 12, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Navy ................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 12, 2014 ................................................................................... 51 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Amos, GEN James F. USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps ...................... 9 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan, USN, Chief of Naval Operations ............................... 6 

Mabus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy .............................................................. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Amos, Gen James F. ......................................................................................... 125 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan ................................................................................ 91 

Mabus, Hon. Ray .............................................................................................. 60 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 55 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 57 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Charts from Admiral Greenert ........................................................................ 147 

Letter to Ms. Speier from Acting Under Secretary of Defense ..................... 149 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 153 

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 153 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 154 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 154 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 158 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 164 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 164 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 161 

Mr. Kline ........................................................................................................... 160 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 158 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 157 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 161 

Mrs. Walorski ................................................................................................... 165 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 157 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE NAVY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 12, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

I want to thank you all for joining us here today as we consider 

the fiscal year 2015 budget request for the Department of the 

Navy. I appreciate our witnesses’ testimony and their support of 

our naval forces. 

Joining us today are the Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the 

Navy; Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations; and 

General James Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Our naval forces are the best in the world. They provide our Nation with an incredible ability to project power and strength and 

strengthen the U.S. presence around the world. Unfortunately, the 

largest threat to our naval forces is one of our own making. Defense cuts continue to have a debilitating effect on our ability to deploy naval forces in sufficient capacity to meet our Nation’s defense 

strategy and the needs of our military commanders. For the Navy, 

this budget outcome means decommissioning an aircraft carrier. 

Just last week Admiral Locklear, Commander of the U.S. Pacific 

Command, indicated that the Navy cannot meet the global demand 

for aircraft carriers, yet the budget request includes no funding for 

refueling and overhaul, forcing the Navy to decommission the USS 

George Washington which has over 25 years of hull life remaining. 

The budget outcome also means cutting force structure. Despite 

the repeated requirement for a minimum 306-ship Navy, the budget request funds a 283-ship Navy. Secretary Mabus, you have characterized our defense strategy as inherently a maritime strategy, 

yet the administration has also outlined significant reductions in 

our submarine forces, amphibs [amphibious assault ships], and 

cruisers. 

Finally, this budget outcome means cutting end strength. A reduction to 175,000 marines would significantly strain the force and 

reduce dwell time. It also means that the Marines have to be all 

in, to deter or defeat aggression in just one region of the world. 
2 

These drastic nonsensical cuts should stir immense debate. Is 

this the Navy that the Americans want? This assumes more than 

just increased risk, as Secretary Hagel stated last week. The security environment and need for naval forces have not abated, yet 

this is a fundamental piecemeal dismantling of the world’s greatest 

Navy. 

Now, I am not pointing the fingers at you. We are the ones that 

voted for these cuts, some of us, and the budget deal that was arrived at by our House Budget Committee, the Senate Budget Committee, voted on and signed by the President in December, actually 

set a 2-year budget number. So I don’t even know why we are 

going through this actually this year because the number is already set and this I guess just gives us talking points to debate 

about. But the budget is fixed by law for this year and the appropriators already have their numbers and they are already moving 

forward and the Senate has said that they are not even going to 

address a budget issue this year. 

But it is good to plan and think out ahead and look forward to 

the future, and I really appreciate you being here today. I think it 

is important that we have a good debate about this, that the American people understand how much we have cut defense the last 

couple of years and what the numbers look like going forward for 

the next several years. 

I think it is putting us in great jeopardy and I am going to plan 

on doing everything I can within my power to reverse this dangerous trajectory. I will do that by leaving, probably, get out of the 

way and let somebody else carry on the fight. As I have told people, 

I am not planning on leaving the fight, I am just leaving Congress. 

Anyway, thank you very much for being here with us today. We 

look forward to your testimonies. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome our witnesses as well. I appreciate your collective service to our country. 

It has been great working with all of you. I think you do a fabulous 

job to make sure that the men and women under your command 

are well served, and I appreciate all of your work in that regard. 

The good news is we do still have the most powerful, capable 

Navy and Marine Corps in the world. Your ability to project presence around the world, the size of your force, is unmatched, and, 

you know, we cannot forget that and the importance of that and 

the strength and capability that we have. 

However, the chairman correctly laid out the challenges that the 

future will bring. Because in the first place, the United States has 

a lot more obligations globally than any other country in the world. 

We are, just to give one example, the guarantors of peace for South 

Korea and Japan. We are a significant deterrent to what North 

Korea would otherwise do. That doesn’t come cheap, and the Navy 

and Marine Corps are critical, critical piece of that deterrent. 
3 

If we are going to be able to maintain that capability, we are 

going to have to make some very, very tough choices going forward. 

And you know as bad as the fiscal year 2015 budget is for a lot 

of the cuts that have been proposed, it is going forward beyond that 

that I think is the real challenge. 

Now, I will say one thing, Mr. Chairman. Yes, the fiscal year 

2015 top number is set, but we have to figure out how we spend 

that money. The Pentagon, the DOD [Department of Defense] and 

the President have presented their initial budget request and it is 

our job to figure out is that the best way to spend that top line 

number. We will have that debate and undoubtedly make some 

changes. 

But going forward, when you look at 2016 and beyond, if sequestration kicks in, I think these two gentlemen before us and their 

services are an excellent example of just how troublesome that is. 

You know, the Marine Corps has been shrunk down to 182,000. If 

we face sequestration, that number is going to have to go even 

lower than that. 

In the Navy, you know we are consistently concerned about the 

fact that we are well under the number of ships that the requirements say we should have. We are currently building 2 Virginiaclass submarines a year, 2 destroyers a year, I forget, 2/3 LCSs [littoral combat ships] a year, and we are trying to maintain an 11- 

aircraft carrier Navy. 

Virtually none of that is going to be possible if sequestration 

kicks in 2016. I don’t see how we can maintain 11 aircraft carriers 

at that budget. I don’t think we will be able to build the number 

of ships that we have projected to build, and that significantly reduces our presence and there are enormous challenges if we have 

to do that. 

Now, that is not to say that savings cannot be found in the defense budget. Certainly it can; we saw a significant increase in the 

spending, though as I believe the Navy will point out, a lot of that 

increase did not go to the Navy during the course of our wars in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

But we saw those increases and efficiencies can be found, and 

about 3 years ago, the Department of Defense sat down and looked 

out at the next 10 years and said what should our strategy build 

be? And they built that strategy, and they built in some reductions 

in expected spending. Those reductions were around $500 billion. 

But now with sequestration and CRs [continuing resolutions], those 

numbers, the size of those cuts become much, much more significant. 

But I will close just with two things. Number one, as we go into 

fiscal year 2015 and we look at some of the cuts that have been 

proposed, I think most prominent with this group is the proposal 

to take 11 cruisers out of service to retrofit them for a certain period of time, if we are not going to do those things that are proposed in the 2015 budget because of the reality that the chairman 

points out, we have a top line number, then it is incumbent upon 

our committee to say what we would cut instead. It is not enough 

to just rail against reductions in the Guard or rail against setting 

aside those 11 cruisers or getting rid of the A–10s and some of the 
4 

other decisions that we have made. We have to propose alternatives for 2015. 

But the second, I think more important point, is going forward. 

The impact on our national security and the impact on our industrial base of sequestration for national defense will be significant. 

There will be a lot of jobs lost if we don’t change it. Well, how do 

we change it? Really there is some combination of three things we 

need to do. We need to turn off sequestration which is devastating 

the discretionary portion of the budget. Defense is over half the discretionary portion of the budget. That is the primary place that we 

found cuts both in the Budget Control Act and in the budget agreement that was reached in December. 

So we have to deal with sequestration and/or we have to increase 

revenues somehow or reduce the amount of money that we spend 

on mandatory programs. Now, I will grant you that I think everybody here would have some different combination of how they do 

those three things, but if you refuse to do any of those three things, 

if we leave sequestration in place, if we don’t find more revenue, 

if we don’t find reductions in mandatory spending, then the 2015 

budget is going to be looked back on as the high-water mark of 

what we have accomplished in national security. As much as we 

are bemoaning the reality of it today, if those changes that I just 

mentioned don’t get made in 2016 and 2017, we are going to look 

back on this as the good old days. 

So these are some tough choices that we have to make, and figure out. Like I said, we can disagree about how to do it, how much 

revenue to raise or not, how much to reduce mandatory spending 

or not, what to do about sequestration, but if we let current law 

stand, our national security picture and particularly in the very, 

very important area of the Navy and the Marine Corps and the forward presence that they bring will be significantly shrunk from 

what it is today. 

So we have some tough decisions to make and you gentlemen do 

as well. I look forward to your testimony, questions, and then trying to figure out the best way to make those difficult decisions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Mabus, thank you for your service, for your leadership 

in these very difficult times. I look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Congressman Smith, members of this committee, first I want to 

thank you for your support of the Department of the Navy, of our 

sailors, our marines, our civilians, and our families. 

General Amos, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Admiral 

Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations and I couldn’t be prouder to 

represent those courageous and faithful sailors, marines, and civilians. These men and women serve their Nation around the world 

with skill and with dedication no matter what hardships they face, 

no matter how far from home and family they are. 
5 

The architects of our Constitution recognized the inherent value 

of the United States Navy and Marine Corps, and this Article I, 

Section 8, which is on a plaque in this hearing room, gave Congress 

the responsibility to ‘‘provide and maintain a Navy,’’ because our 

Founding Fathers knew that the Nation needed a naval force to operate continuously in war and in peace. 

Over two centuries ago the United States had a crucial role in 

the world. Today that role is exponentially greater. Whether facing 

high-end combat or asymmetrical threats or humanitarian needs, 

America’s maritime forces are ready and present on day one of any 

crisis, for any eventuality. 

In today’s dynamic security environment, naval assets are more 

critical than ever. In military terms, they provide presence, presence worldwide. They reassure our partners that we are there and 

remind potential adversaries that we are never far away. This 

presence provides immediate and capable options for the Commander in Chief when a crisis develops anywhere in the world. 

In the past year, our naval forces have operated globally from 

across the Pacific to the continuing combat in Afghanistan and 

from the Gulf of Guinea to the Arctic Circle. The 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance and the newly released QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] are both maritime in focus, as you pointed out, Mr. 

Chairman, and require presence of naval forces around the world. 

Four key factors make that global presence and global action possible. These four factors—people, platforms, power, and partnerships—have been my priorities during my tenure as Secretary and 

they have to continue to receive our focus looking ahead. In our fiscally constrained times we have used these priorities to help balance between the readiness of the force, our capabilities, and our 

capacity. 

Our people are our biggest advantage and we must ensure that 

they continue to get the tools they need to do their jobs. In compensation, we have increased sea pay to make sure those sailors 

and marines deployed aboard ship are appropriately recognized. 

However, this budget also seeks to control the growth of military 

compensation and benefits which threatens to impact all the other 

parts of our budget. If this isn’t addressed, as the CNO [Chief of 

Naval Operations] puts it, the quality of work for our sailors and 

marines will almost certainly decline. 

Shipbuilding and our platforms remain key elements of our maritime power and a focus of this committee. The number of ships, 

submarines, and aircraft in our fleets is what gives us the capacity 

to provide that global presence. While we have the most advanced 

platforms in the world, quantity has a quality all its own and I 

think it is important to understand how we got to our current fleet 

size. 

On September 11, 2001, our fleet stood at 316 ships. By 2008, 

after one of the great military buildups in American history, that 

number had dropped to 278 ships. In the 4 years before I took office as Secretary, the Navy put 19 ships under contract. Since I 

took office in May of 2009, we have put 60 ships under contract. 

And by the end of this decade our plan will return the fleet to 300 

ships. We are continuing our initiatives to spend smarter and more 

efficiently, which are driving down costs through things like com-
6 

petition, multiyear buys, and just driving hard bargains for taxpayer dollars. 

Power, energy, is a national security issue and central to our 

naval forces and our ability to provide that presence. Dramatic 

price increases for fuel threatens to degrade our operations and 

training and could impact how many platforms we can acquire. 

Having more varied stably priced American produced sources of energy makes us better warfighters. From sail to coal to oil to nuclear 

and now to alternative fuels, the Navy has led in energy innovation. 

Since the end of World War II, U.S. naval forces have protected 

the global commons to maintain the foundations of the world’s 

economy. In today’s complex environment, partnerships with other 

nations, evidenced by interoperability, by exercises and operations, 

continue to increase in importance. The Navy and Marine Corps, 

by their very nature and by that forward presence, are naturally 

suited to develop these relationships, particularly in the innovative 

small footprint ways that are required. 

With the fiscal 2015 budget submission, we are seeking within 

the fiscal constraints imposed to provide our Navy and Marine 

Corps with the equipment, the training, and the tools needed to 

carry out the missions the Nation needs and expects from them. 

There are never any permanent homecomings for sailors and marines. In peacetime, wartime and all the time, they remain forward 

deployed, providing presence and providing whatever is needed by 

our Nation. This has been true for 238 years and it is our task to 

make sure it remains true now and into the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus can be found in the 

Appendix on page 60.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral Greenert, there is a quote that is perfect for a Navy 

hearing. Anyone can hold the helm under smooth seas, but it is a 

testimony to your leadership the way you have handled the helm 

in very rocky seas. Thank you. I appreciate what you are doing. I 

look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN GREENERT, USN, CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, sir. That is very kind when you 

are talking to a submariner as well, but I will take it aboard. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished 

members of the committee, first, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 

thank you for 22 years of exceptional support that you have given 

the men and women of our Navy. Your efforts, sir, have really 

helped ensure the preeminence of American seapower. You are always thanking us for our service. So, Mr. Chairman, your sailors 

and Navy salute you and Patricia for your service. And we would 

all give you a standing ovation but this table, we are all crumpled 

in here and the table would come over and it would be very disruptive so we will keep decorum up, if that is okay with you. 

I am honored to represent 633,000 sailors, Navy civilians, and 

their families, especially the 50,000 sailors deployed and operating 
7 

forward around the globe today. The dedication and resilience of 

our people continue to amaze me, and the citizens of this Nation 

can take great pride in their daily contributions. Those are their 

sons and their daughters in the places around the world that 

count. 

I am pleased to testify this morning beside Secretary Mabus and 

General Amos. Your Navy-Marine Corps team is united in fulfilling 

our longstanding mandate to be where it matters, when it matters, 

and to be ready to respond to crises to ensure the stability that undermines this global economy. 

General Amos has been a great shipmate. Our respective services’ synergy of efforts has never been better and Secretary Mabus 

has provided Jim and I the vision, the guidance, and the judiciousness that we need to build the finest Navy and Marine Corps that 

this Nation is willing to afford. 

Forward presence is our mandate. We operate forward to give 

the President the options to deal promptly with contingencies. As 

we conclude over a decade of wars and bring our ground forces 

home from extended stability operations, your naval forces will remain on watch. 

This chartlet that I gave each of you in front of you shows today’s 

global distribution of deployed ships as well as our bases and our 

places that support them. In the block in the lower left it will also 

tell you how long it will take if we are not there to get from respective ports and areas in the United States. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 147.] 

Admiral GREENERT. Now, our efforts are focused in the Asia-Pacific, I think you can see that and the Arabian Gulf, but we provide 

presence and we respond as needed in other theaters as well. With 

this forward presence over the last year we were able to influence 

and shape the decisions of leaders in the Arabian Gulf, Northeast 

Asia, and the Levant. 

We patrolled off the shores of Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan to 

protect American interests and induce regional leaders to make the 

right choices. We relieved suffering and provided assistance along 

with our Marine Corps brothers and sisters and recovery in the 

Philippines in the wake of a devastating typhoon. Our presence dissuades aggression and it dissuades coercion against our allies and 

friends in the East and the South China Seas. We kept piracy at 

bay in the Horn of Africa. And we continued to support operations 

in Afghanistan while taking the fight to insurgents, terrorists, and 

their supporting networks across the Middle East and Africa with 

our expeditionary forces and supporting our special operations 

forces. 

The 2014 budget will enable an acceptable forward presence. It 

is acceptable, but through the remainder of the year we will be able 

to restore a lot of our fleet training and our maintenance and our 

operations and we will recover a substantial part of that 2013 

backlog that we talked about quite a bit in this room. 

The President’s 2015 budget submission enables us to continue 

to execute these missions, but we are going to face some high risks 

in specific missions articulated in the Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Our fiscal guidance through this Future Year Defense Plan is 
8 

about halfway between the Budget Control Act caps and our PresBud 14 [President’s budget for fiscal year 2014] plan. It is a net 

decrease of still $31 billion when you compare it with Pres-Bud 14. 

So to prepare our program within these constraints, I set the following priorities and Secretary Mabus supported me. 

Number one, we have to provide the sea-based strategic deterrent; two, forward presence; three, the capability and the capacity 

to win decisively; number four, the readiness to support the above; 

five, that we maintain and bring in asymmetric capabilities and 

maintain a technological edge; and, number six, to sustain a relevant industrial base. 

Now using these priorities, we built a balanced portfolio of capabilities within the fiscal guidance that we were provided. We continue to maximize our presence in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle 

East using innovative combinations of rotational, forward based rotational forces, forward basing and forward stationed forces. We 

still face shortfalls in support ashore and a backlog in facilities 

maintenance that erode the ability of our bases to support the fleet. 

We have slowed modernization in areas that are central to remain ahead of or keep pace with, technologically advanced adversaries. Consequently, we face higher risk if confronted with a hightech adversary or if we attempt to conduct more than one multiphased major contingency simultaneously. 

Mr. Chairman, as I testified before you in September, I am troubled by the prospect of reverting to the Budget Control Act revised 

caps in 2016. That would lead to a Navy that is just too small and 

it is lacking the advanced capabilities needed to execute the missions that the Nation expects of the Navy. We would be unable to 

execute at least 4 of the 10 primary missions that are laid out very 

clearly in the Defense Strategic Guidance in the Quadrennial Defense Review. 

If you look at the back of the chartlet that I showed you that has 

got the ships on the front, you will see that our ability to respond 

to contingencies is dramatically reduced in this future scenario of 

being retained at budget control caps. It limits our options and it 

limits the Nation’s decision space and we would be compelled to inactivate an aircraft carrier and an air wing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 148.] 

Admiral GREENERT. Further, our modernization and our recapitalization would be dramatically reduced and that threatens readiness and our industrial base. If we revert to the Budget Control 

Act caps year by year it will leave our country less prepared to deal 

with crises, our allies’ trust will wane, and our enemies will be less 

inclined to be dissuaded or to be deterred. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I am on board with the efforts to get the fiscal 

house in order. I look forward to working with the committee to 

find solutions that enable us to sustain readiness while building an 

affordable but a relevant future force. This force has to be able to 

address a range of threats, address contingencies and high consequence events that could impact our core interests. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and I thank you and 

the committee for your continued support and I look forward to 

your questions. 
9 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in the 

Appendix on page 91.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I got to spend a couple 

nights on a submarine under the Arctic ice cap. That was a great 

experience. A lot of times when we travel we get to shake a few 

hands and say ‘‘hi’’ to a few troops and then move on and probably 

never see them again. But after 2 days, we kind of bonded. You 

know, we could play games and watch movies and eat together, 

and it was interesting. 

And then I went to Virginia a few years ago when we did the— 

welcomed the USS California into the fleet, and I was able to show 

my wife this is where we ate, this is where we played cards, this 

is where I slept. You know, she couldn’t believe I slept in a space 

that small. It was a great, great experience. 

I want to especially recognize General Amos, the 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, in his last posture hearing before 

our committee. I made the mistake yesterday when we were talking, saying this is your last hearing. Because he says, oh, you 

know, let’s not be pushing him out before he is done. He has got 

a lot of work to do before he leaves. But this is his last posture 

hearing. 

And, few will ever know the full burden of command, and the 

general has shouldered it admirably. He has been faced with difficult issues and equally difficult decisions. All the while he has 

kept our men and women in uniform in the forefront of his decisionmaking and has continued to be a tireless advocate for them. 

The committee appreciates his honesty, his candor, and his counsel, 

and I think our Nation is better having had the privilege of his 

military service. 

He told me when he got this job that he would not be a part of 

hollowing out the Marine Corps. And so the way they have handled 

the cuts is they have kept them a fighting force. They are not going 

to be spread out and try to have to pull together when they are 

needed, and I think that has been very, very important. 

General Amos, I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF 

THE MARINE CORPS 

General AMOS. Thank you, Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member 

Smith, and members of the committee. 

Again I am pleased to appear before you to speak on behalf of 

the Marine Corps. And Chairman, I echo my colleague Jon Greenert’s strong comments and appreciation for your leadership. 

I suspect that every service chief that has sat at this desk, and 

we have certainly sat with all of them over the last 3 to 4 years, 

feels that you love their service the most, and that is a unique ability of leadership to get them to believe that, because your Marine 

Corps feels like you care for us more than you care for anybody else 

when in fact I know that you care for all of us equally the same. 

So thank you for your leadership, Chairman, and this committee 

and Congress and the United States of America will sorely miss 

you when you retire later this year. 

Since our founding in 1775, marines have answered the Nation’s 

call, faithfully protecting the American people while maintaining a 
10 

world-class standard of military excellence. Nothing has changed, 

we continue to do the same even as we meet here today. Yet we 

find ourselves at a strategic inflection point in history. After 12 

years of war we are drawing down our forces in Afghanistan, resetting our institution, and reawakening the soul of the United States 

Marine Corps. 

Today we are challenged by fiscal uncertainty that threatens 

both our capacity and capabilities, forcing us to sacrifice our longterm health for near-term readiness. As I have testified before this 

committee many times, despite these challenges I remain committed to fielding the most capable and ready Marine Corps the 

Nation is willing to pay for. 

Our greatest asset is the individual marine, the young man and 

woman who wears my cloth. Our unique role as America’s premier 

crisis response force is grounded in the legendary character and 

warfighting ethos of our people. As we reset and prepare for future 

battles, all marines are rededicating themselves to those attributes 

that carried marines across the wheat fields and into the German 

machine guns at Belleau Wood in March of 1918. 

Those attributes that enabled raw combat-inexperienced young 

marines to courageously succeed against a determined enemy at 

America’s first offensive campaign in the Pacific, the attack at Guadalcanal by the 1st Marine Division in August of 1942, and lastly 

those timeless strengths of character and gut courage that enabled 

marines to carry the day in an Iraqi town called Fallujah and 

against a determined enemy in the Taliban strongholds of Marja 

and Sangin. 

Your corps is rededicating itself to the timeless attributes of persistent discipline, faithful obedience to orders and instruction, concerned and engaged leadership, and strict adherence to standards. 

These ironclad imperatives have defined our corps for 238 years. 

They will serve us well in the decades to come. 

As we gather here today some 30,000 marines are forward deployed around the world promoting peace, protecting our Nation’s 

interests, and securing our defense. But we don’t do this alone. Our 

partnership with the Navy provides America an unmatched naval 

expeditionary capability. 

Our relationship with the United States Navy is symbiotic. My 

relationship with Admiral Jon Greenert is unprecedented. This is 

why I share CNO’s concerns about the impacts associated with a 

marked paucity of shipbuilding funds. 

America’s engagement throughout the future security environment of the next two decades will be undoubtedly naval in character. To be forward engaged and to be present when it matters 

most means we need capital ships and those ships need to be loaded with United States Marines. Expeditionary naval forces are 

America’s insurance policy. We are a hedge against uncertainty in 

an unpredictable world. 

The Navy and Marine Corps team provides power projection from 

the sea, responding immediately to crises when success is measured in hours, not in days. From super typhoon that tragically 

struck the Philippines late last year to the rescue of American citizens in South Sudan over Christmas, your forward deployed naval 
11 

† Admiral Samuel Locklear was the PACOM Commander who testified. 

forces were there. We carried the day for the United States of 

America. 

As the joint force draws down and we conclude combat operations 

in Afghanistan, some argue that we are done with conflict. My view 

is different. The world will remain a dangerous place. There will 

be no peace dividend for America nor will there be a shortage of 

work for its United States Marines. Ladies and gentlemen, we will 

not do less with less, we will do the same with less. 

In closing, you have my promise that we will only ask for what 

we need. We will continue to prioritize and make the hard decisions before coming to Congress. 

And once again I thank the committee and specifically your leadership, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the 

Appendix on page 125.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

As I stated in my opening remarks, I am concerned about our 

aircraft carrier force structure. If a nuclear refueling of the George 

Washington is not supported, our carriers will be reduced from 11 

to 10. 

Last year when Admiral Greenert,† PACOM [United States Pacific Command] Commander, testified before the committee, he 

commented about the problem. There was a flare-up in Korea at 

the time and he said usually when that happens he sends a carrier 

out and that has a calming effect. He said he didn’t have a carrier 

to send, he said then I would send a B–2. That also has a calming 

effect. We didn’t have a B–2 to send, he says then I send some F– 

22s, and we didn’t have any F–22s to send. 

I think I mentioned yesterday, I think the main purpose of our 

military is to prevent war, to keep from having to go to war, to be 

a strong deterrent. If that is not possible, and that generally comes 

when we are weakened or perceived by potential adversaries that 

we are weakened and they sense an opportunity, then we have to 

sometimes engage in war and then your responsibility is to win 

those wars as quickly as possible and return as many of our people 

home safely as possible. 

Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, last week Admiral Locklear 

testified again before our committee and he stated that we have insufficient carriers to meet the global demand. He was questioned— 

I enjoyed the discussion between him and Mr. Smith—about the 

need for the carriers and the forward presence. 

Do you concur that the demand signal for aircraft carriers is 

more than what the Navy can currently fulfill? 

Secretary MABUS. The demand signal from combat commanders 

for carriers and for all our types of ships is more than we can currently fulfill and we want to keep the 11th carrier and its associated air wing very much. What we have done in this budget is 

move that decision to fiscal year 2016 so that there is time to debate it, to take a close look at what would be the realities if we 

did decommission this. 
12 

First, there is a law that says we must maintain 11 carriers. But, 

secondly, CNO, Admiral Locklear have all discussed the impact of 

only having 10 carriers in the fleet. 

Your deployments, which are already long and getting longer, 

would get longer still. The stress would increase on our force. The 

presence that we need for those carriers would be impacted. The 

industrial base that builds and maintains our carriers would be 

very negatively affected. The ability to maintain the carriers that 

we had because of the increased usage of the ones that remained 

would also be called into question. 

So, it would have some very serious consequences, to have to retire this carrier. To keep it over the 5 years starting in fiscal year 

2016, is a $7 billion additional bill, and there are very few places 

that you can find $7 billion in any budget. And so, if we go back 

to the sequester level, that would be one of the options we would 

almost certainly have to put on the table because of the large cost 

and because of the decline in the amount of money that was available. 

Admiral GREENERT. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Locklear has been 

clear since he took the watch in the Pacific Command what he 

needs for aircraft carriers, and he said I need two there full-time, 

and then about 3 months a year to 4 months a year I actually need 

a third, and he times that based on the events out there. 

Admiral Locklear, the Department of Defense gives him an assignment, it is called the global employment of the force, and within it, provides aspirations if you will or key principles that each of 

our combatant commanders have to meet on behalf of the Secretary 

of Defense and really the Nation. And also he has operational 

plans, he is responsible for four of the seven treaties that we have 

out there and the sustainment. 

So he has been pretty clear on what he needs, and it is I think 

we call it 2.3. And if you take into account on the back of the sheet 

for a reminder, for us to meet what the combatant commanders request, we need a Navy of 450 ships, Mr. Chairman. So what we do 

is we adjudicate the distribution of forces, as the Secretary alluded 

to, based on the Navy that we have, where we are, and distribute 

them accordingly. 

The Asia-Pacific is important and we are rebalancing toward it. 

If you go from 11 to 10 carriers you exacerbate that, what is already a very difficult problem, to the point where one of our tasks, 

a primary missions in the Defense Strategic Guidance, is to deter, 

and defeat if necessary, and the deterrence factor goes down dramatically when you have gaps. And it is a risk that we assume and 

I worry about. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Amos, the proposed Future Years Defense Program would reduce the Marine Corps to 175,000. What 

are the consequences of this reduced force structure in meeting 

your steady state rotational and major contingency operation 

requirements? 

General AMOS. Chairman, the Marine Corps, just a couple attributes to that 175K [175,000] force. First it is one I would describe as a moderate risk force, moderate risk in that, that force 

would be made up of 21 Marine infantry battalions which is the 

centerpiece around which everything else is built in the United 
13 

States Marine Corps. The numbers of squadrons and everything 

else are all a function of the number of battalions. 

The large-scale contingency operation that might be required of 

our Nation, the pacing of that size operation would require about 

20 Marine infantry battalions. So what this means is your Marine 

Corps would be all in. And we built it so the Marine Corps’ readiness would be up, they would be fully manned, fully trained, fully 

equipped as you talked about in your statement, but we would be 

all in. And just like World War II and Korea, we would come home 

when the war is over. 

So there is risk involved with that because there is other places 

around the world where things might well be happening and that 

will require a presence of marines. This is going to require a Presidential recall of our Reserves, 39,600 marines, and they would provide the shock absorber that would provide not only combat replacements for that 175K force, those 20 infantry battalions, but 

they would also provide the ability to do limited operations elsewhere around the world. 

So there is a combat power buildup. There is a sense of the units 

that remain back home will be less ready, even though we are 

going very hard to keep them ready. So it will be longer for them 

to get there. And eventually when you start running out of marines 

in a major theater war, you are going to go from boot camp to battlefield. So there is moderate risk in that force, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a lot of talk with this budget 

that we received from the President about assuming additional 

risk. I think it is important for the American people to understand 

what we are talking about in additional risk is lives. And that is 

a big concern, because as I said earlier, it invites aggression and 

then we have to go to war, and that has been our history for many, 

many years now. I would like to see us avoid that. 

We always draw down after the war, but we are still at war and 

we are drawing down. So we not only don’t have a peace dividend, 

we are drawing down while we have troops still serving, risking 

their lives every day. So you have been dealt a very hard hand. I 

commend you for the job you are doing. I wish it weren’t so. Not 

the job you are doing, I wish you didn’t have the hand that you are 

playing. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just continuing, first of all I want to recognize General Amos’ 

service as well in his last posture hearing, and it has been great 

working with you. You and your office have been terrific to me and 

my office, kept us informed, and you certainly do a great job for 

the men and women who serve under you. So we appreciate your 

service and hope you enjoy your retirement when it comes. 

You mentioned 175,000 marines. What does that look like if we 

get the full 8 years of sequestration that are currently on the 

books? How large of a Marine Corps could you maintain in that 

scenario? 

General AMOS. Congressman, that is 175. When we built that 

force, we started just before, almost a year ago to today, and we 

actually looked forward expecting sequestration would be signed in 

March of this past year. And so that force of 175,000 with 21 infan-
14 

try battalions and the appropriate rest of the combat support, combat service support, is a fully sequestered force. So that force will 

maintain itself out into the future. 

Where we begin to run into trouble, because I moved to maintain 

near-term readiness now of those deployed units and the ones that 

are about to deploy, and trying to keep the readiness of the 

deployable units up, I have reached into other accounts in O&M 

[Operations and Maintenance] within my authorities and pulled 

money out, facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization, 

range modernization. I canceled 17 programs. So I pulled out and 

pulled that money in to maintain the readiness. 

I will be able to do that for another probably 2 years, but the 

36th Commandant will reach a point probably 2 years from now 

where he is going to have to take a look at that readiness level and 

say I am going to have to lower that so that I can get back into 

these facilities that I can’t ignore, my training ranges that I can’t 

ignore, and the modernization that I am going to have to do eventually. Otherwise we will end up with an old Marine Corps that is 

out of date. 

Mr. SMITH. So the same size force, but it would be less ready, 

less prepared to fight. 

General AMOS. Sir, it will be less ready in about 2017 and beyond. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Admiral Greenert, you mentioned the COCOM [combatant command] requests for ships and if they were all met there would be 

a 450-ship Navy. Our requirements I think, put the Navy at this 

point at around 300, I forget what the exact number is for the requirements at this time. 

Admiral GREENERT. 306, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. 306. 

Admiral GREENERT. 306. 

Mr. SMITH. So can you perhaps explain for the committee’s benefit the difference between requirements and COCOM requests? I 

mean, as my 10-year-old son says, it never hurts to ask. So you 

know, the COCOMs do make a lot of those requests. But obviously 

there is a difference between that and requirements. Could you explain that difference a little bit? 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. Again, as you alluded, the combatant commanders, first of all they have a tasking given by the Department, it is called a global employment of the force, and it tells 

them what they are supposed to accomplish in their theater of operations. It is fairly—it is broad enough for them to determine that. 

They boil that down to presence, theater security cooperation and 

security, and they deliver to the Department of Defense through 

the services here is what I need from you. 

We take those down to the Joint Staff and we work through it, 

well, here is what we have. Here is the need in the world I live 

in. Here is the Navy I have. Here is the request. And we reconcile 

it. We adjudicate it. That adjudication is done at the Joint Staff, 

signed by the Secretary of Defense. We distribute the forces in a 

document called the Global Force Management Allocation Plan. We 

allocate the forces globally. So, simply put, that is the process that 

we use, and that is my demand signal for the year. 
15 

Mr. SMITH. But how reflective do you think it is that the amount 

of requests that come in from the combatant commanders, like they 

are making all these requests and we are not meeting them. How 

big of a problem is that? How do you sort of balance what is sort 

of what would be nice to have versus need to have based on a 

COCOM request? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, you have to look at what is it for, to 

your point, I think. What is the Department’s priorities? Is this for 

warfighting? Is this for theater security cooperation? Is it an exercise? What is the deal on that? And that is reconciled. This takes 

a year, Mr. Smith. 

And so, we grind through all of that. It is supposed to be a request of capability. So if you say, well, I need this ship, and as Jim 

Amos and I work on it, you say you need an amphibious ship. Well, 

I got an idea. How about this support ship that we think can do 

the same thing? This sort of brokering goes on—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Admiral GREENERT [continuing]. Through the year. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Secretary Mabus, a couple of issues. You mentioned you are 

building up to get to a 300-ship Navy. Number one, what year 

would that be projected to happen. Number two, if sequestration 

kicks in as planned, what does that do to that plan? What number 

do you wind up with? 

Secretary MABUS. We would get to a 300-ship Navy by the end 

of this decade under the current plan and would keep it going forward. The effect of sequestration is on the back of the CNO’s 

chartlet here. We would be unable to procure—well, the carrier 

would certainly be at issue, three destroyers, one submarine, four 

support ships and one forward staging base that we are currently 

planning to build—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Secretary MABUS. We could not build at those levels. Now, one 

of the perverse things that happens with sequestration is that as 

we take ships out, things like destroyers or submarines, we are 

taking them out of multiyear contracts and so we are breaking 

multiyear contracts which raises the cost of the individual ships so 

we get fewer and they cost more. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time to the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Vice Chairman Thornberry, Secretary 

Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General Amos. It is always a pleasure to see you all and thank you for your service to our country. 

Gentlemen, I know you have all had the opportunity to visit 

south Mississippi and see firsthand the world-class warships that 

are built right in my district. I know we all have a healthy respect 

for the capabilities these ships bring to our men and women serving in the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps. I believe many of you 

would agree that the world is not getting safer but is becoming 

more dangerous and that we need more ships, not less ships. So 

with that let’s jump right in. 
16 

General Amos, do you support the requirement for a 12th ship 

of the LPD–17 class and would you please explain the capability 

that vessel would add to the Marine Corps mission? 

General AMOS. Congressman, the capabilities are significant. 

That is a wonderful ship. Admiral Greenert and I just commissioned the USS Somerset, LPD–25, just about 2 weeks ago in Philadelphia. So it is a wonderful ship and it is being built with a very 

high degree of quality. 

I would love to have the 12th ship. We would love to have the 

12th ship. Quite frankly, there is little to no money in the budget 

to be able to do this, which goes back to my original statement, my 

opening statement on we need capital ships. The Navy needs that. 

But there is no money, Congressman, to do this, to buy this 12th 

ship. 

The 12th ship, if money was allocated, would allow us some decision space as we look towards just exactly what is going to replace 

those LSDs [landing ship, dock], those 12 LSD 41–49-class ships 

that we have which are nearing the ends of their service life. So 

would we love it? Yes, we absolutely would, but there is no money 

in the budget to pay for it. 

Mr. PALAZZO. So the Marines clearly want and need a 12th LPD 

[landing platform/dock] and the LPD maintains the critical industrial base hot for rolling right into procuring the next amphibious 

ships based on the LPD hull form. 

And experience in shipbuilding has shown that new programs 

are always more expensive than desired and always take more 

time than planned, and I think it is vital that we support maintaining the current program that is building these ships and receiving excellent marks from the operational commanders and delivering a vital capability to our Marine Corps. 

And so, General Amos, you mentioned the LSD ships and that 

we are thinking about constructing them based on the existing 

LPD–17-class hull form. Can you elaborate on that and why that 

is important? 

General AMOS. Congressman, there is what we call an analysis 

of alternatives which is underway right now. The CNO Jon 

Greenert, Admiral Greenert commissioned that some time ago. And 

they are looking for all the different possibilities. We do this for everything. We do this for vehicles, we do this for airplanes. So we 

examine what are the art of the possible things that might be out 

there, some of which may be commercial-off-the-shelf, some of 

which may be developmental. But so, what is it that is out there 

that could fit the needs of the requirement, meet the needs. And 

that is what we are doing right now. 

So that has not been complete yet. There is seven or eight variables out there that are potential solution sets to the LSD and we 

are looking at that right now, Congressman. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Admiral Greenert, do you have anything to add to 

the questions that I have proposed to the general? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, sir, there is requirement and we have 

a requirement for 38 amphibious ships for joint forcible entry. I 

stand behind it. The Marine Corps has established it, we established it together. Thirty-three we say we should endeavor for as 

an affordable solution, 33 gray hull amphibious ships. 
17 

But today, in the world that we live in, the world that the Navy 

and Marine Corps lives in and the future, we probably need 50. If 

we want to do everything that we are asked to do, and it is not 

just the COCOMs ask, it is we look out around the world, we could 

probably use 50 amphibious ships. But we don’t have that. So there 

is a requirement; there is want, I want the ship; and then there 

is the reality that I have. So if we were to take the shipbuilding 

plan and do this, sir, I would on balance, what I have with the resources of the Navy. 

Now, if I may be so bold, in the past we have taken, as Jim said, 

we are building an amphibious ship to replace the LSD and we 

want to get that thing going and we want that thing to be affordable. So if there is a feasibility of taking seed money and looking 

at what can we do to help the industry, to help designers, we have 

done this with the Virginia class and it got us down—it saved us 

$200 million per copy we estimate on the Virginia class. If there 

is a way to do something like that, I think that is feasible. So you 

didn’t ask for that, but thank you, sir. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, thank you, and thank you for your testimony. 

And General Amos, you are going to be sorely missed. 

And, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to each of 

you gentlemen for your service to our country. 

Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, we were talking earlier 

about the desire to reach 300 ships by the end of the decade. Do 

you think the current mix of ships is correct, especially with the 

truncation of the LCS program and how that impacts the fleet design? I know on the handout here you actually say in parenthesis 

‘‘Mix matters. Insufficient small surface combatants.’’ 

How does this concern about the number of ships affect what you 

think the mix should be among the ships we do have or will be able 

to have by the end of the decade? 

Secretary MABUS. Congressman, you are absolutely correct. It 

has got to be the right mix of ships and not just sheer numbers. 

But first I think we need to be very precise on the LCS. What 

the Secretary of Defense has said is that we need the small surface 

combatants, that we need to grow the fleet, that we need what has 

been noted that we need, 52 of the small surface combatants. 

What he has tasked me and Navy to do is to take a look at the 

LCS program and at the requirements, what should a ship like this 

do, how survivable should it be, what sort of armament should it 

have, this sort of thing, and report back in time for the 2016 budget. And all we have been told to do is to not engage in contract negotiations past 32 ships. We only have 24 under contract now, so 

we will continue to build the LCS. 

One of the things that he called out very specifically that we 

should look at, one is continue to build the LCS; two is build a 

modified LCS; and three is build a different design ship. He also 

tasked me as part of that look how much would any of these alternatives cost and how long would it take to get to the fleet because 

we do need these ships very quickly. 
18 

And so, this look at the requirements, at what the ship is meant 

to do, does it meet the requirements, is what we have done on 

every single type of ship that the Navy has built. We are about to 

start in fiscal year 2016 the fourth flight of the DDG–51 [guided 

missile destroyer]. We are going to start fairly soon after that with 

the fourth flight of the Virginia-class submarine. So requirements 

change. Technology improves and we change. And so, that is what 

I have been directed to do, that is what we are doing at Navy on 

the LCS. 

So in terms of numbers of ships and in terms of mix of ships, the 

Secretary of Defense has said that we need to have these small 

surface combatants, and what we are doing now is what is the best 

way to meet that need, and continuing to build the LCS or a modified LCS is certainly an option pending the results of this review. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. 

Admiral, let me ask you this, because my time is running out. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for that answer, and that was very 

helpful. 

Would you please discuss with us the risk and cost savings associated with any further slippage that might occur in the Ohio-class 

replacement submarine? I know there is a question about whether 

the Navy can fulfill STRATCOM’s [U.S. Strategic Command] continuous at-sea deterrence requirements in future years. Can that 

be done at the current schedule, and if these replacement submarines are further delayed, what can you share with us about 

meeting that concern with STRATCOM—— 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. First of all, thanks for all that you 

have done for your Navy. I understand you are getting near some 

of your last hearings as well, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral GREENERT. It has been great working with you. To the 

point, your question. The Ohio-class submarine today has already 

had its life extended. They are on a retirement track that, by the 

way, we still need to be sure they can technically support the retirement track they are on. So, the Ohio replacement, which we 

have already moved 2 years to the right, number one, it is aligned 

with our ally, the U.K., so we are building this thing in commensurate with them building their submarine. The missile compartment 

is common. But number two, we have to get the first Ohio replacement in construction by 2021, so that it is complete by 2029 and 

ready to go on patrol. 

So we have quite a bit of tight schedule there, and so my point 

would be, there is no slack in here. And the mission is sea-based 

nuclear—excuse me—strategic deterrence, and for us, that is number one. It is a national mission, and we have to fulfill it, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and yes, I 

would be the first to agree that the budgets are critical to a strong 

military, but I also would like to say that integrity in each of the 

services is also critical to a strong military. 
19 

That brings me to this. General Amos, I have become friends 

with Major James Weirick, United States Marine Corps, who I believe, sincerely believe, is a man of integrity. That brings me to 

four questions that I do not think you will have time to answer 

today that I would ask the chairman and ask that these answers 

be written and submitted back to the committee so that each member of the committee can analyze the responses. 

The first question would be, who brought to your attention the 

email Major Weirick sent to Peter Delorier on the 21st of September of 2013? The second question would be, who decided to 

issue the protective order taken out against Major Weirick? And 

since you were named in the protective order, did you fear Major 

Weirick at any point? That would be another question. 

Your job is to stand up for your marines. That said, was your civilian attorney, Robert Hogue, ever reprimanded for his slanderous 

comments comparing Major Weirick to the Navy Yard shooter? Mr. 

Hogue made these comments in the press both before and after 

Major Weirick had been found by a Navy behavioral health provider as fit for duty and posing no threat. And Mr. Hogue made 

those comments about an outstanding Marine officer. I want to 

know, again, in writing, did you reprimand him, because I did not 

see it in the press. 

In a February the 17th interview with NPR [National Public 

Radio], you stated, and I quote, ‘‘I have never ever said that I 

wanted them crushed and kicked out,’’ talking about the marines 

in the urination case. 

When speaking about the marines involved with this video, however, General Waldhauser gave sworn testimony that you did in 

fact say that you wanted them crushed. I am asking you today, and 

you can put it in the writing, are you saying that General Waldhauser lied under oath? 

The fourth question that, again, I look forward to your written 

responses, during the same NPR interview, you stated, certainly, 

none of them have been crushed or thrown out of the Marine 

Corps. 

General Amos, how many of them were not allowed to continue 

to serve in the corps? My information says that the number is 

seven out of nine marines. Would you please verify that what you 

said in the NPR article interview was that none had been crushed. 

Then, lastly, ‘‘Tarnished Brass,’’ a 27 February 2014 article in 

Foreign Policy Magazine, poses this question. And sir, I would 

rather not be reading this, but it has been put into print, and it 

all goes back to Captain James Clement and to Major James 

Weirick. The article says, and I quote, ‘‘The top Marine Corps general is’’—under—‘‘is unpopular with his troops, damaged on Capitol 

Hill, and under investigation in the Pentagon. Can he really still 

lead?’’ This, again, I would ask you to submit in writing to the committee. 

Sir, when I look at what has happened both in the James Clement situation and having talked to Major Weirick on numerous occasions over the past 5 months, it is disappointing that the integrity of this marine, and I would include Captain James Clement as 

well, have had to take the attacks that have come out of the office, 
20 

whether it is you or people around you, that they have done everything they could to destroy two—the integrity of two marines. 

And Mr. Chairman, with that—I have got 43 seconds left—I 

would ask that these questions that I have asked publicly here in 

the committee today, that with your help, sir, and the ranking 

member’s help, that we get a response back, if possible, within the 

next 6 weeks to these questions because, in my humble opinion, it 

is important. I have heard from too many marines, sir, both Active 

Duty and retired, that they are concerned about the integrity of the 

United States Marine Corps, so, sir, I ask you please to put in written form answers to these questions. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you want to take any time now to 

respond, or would you prefer to do it in writing? 

General AMOS. I will do it in writing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 153.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And to all of you, thank you so much for being here, for your extraordinary service. 

And General Amos, best of wishes to you as you move on, not 

quite yet, but in the future. 

We had a hearing last week with Secretary Hagel and General 

Dempsey looking at the QDR but also how trying to face some really tough decisions that you obviously are very aware that we have, 

whether it is readiness and how we move forward with personnel 

issues and a host of other ones, and I wonder if you could share 

was, of the decisions that are coming forward and where you think 

we are today and the likelihood of the committee pushing back on 

some of the tough decisions that you have ahead, where do you see 

that, those key issues that you want to be sure that we take a very 

hard look at and not necessarily respond in what we think would 

be the better situation for our constituents, for our communities? 

Is there an area that you choose to point out that you see as a 

problem area? 

Admiral Greenert. 

Admiral GREENERT. Ma’am, I would request we look very closely 

and weigh all the options and read closely our intentions on compensation reform. It is fairly comprehensive, extensive; it is just 

not one issue. I don’t think it is a one-issue topic. And I think it 

is our sense that under the circumstances that we are in fiscally, 

the longstanding good support and good will of this Congress for 

our military and those members, and in the world I live in, the 

other things that they need, any money coming from compensation 

reform to the Navy—and Secretary Mabus supports me in this— 

is going right back to things that support our sailors: their quality 

of life and their quality of work, barracks, peers training, manning, 

all of these things, these are the things that they tell us, they tell 

myself and my senior enlisted that this is what, the things that 

bug them that could make their career better, that we do a balance 

of that and to think through that and not pick the thing apart. 
21 

It is my opinion that we have an opportunity here to sort of address and do this debate in this sort of node, if you will, or knee 

in the curb, however you want to look at it, inflection point of our 

service and of our budget. 

Thank you, ma’am. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Secretary Mabus, I wasn’t sure if you wanted to respond. 

Secretary MABUS. I would echo exactly what the CNO said. 

But I would also say, to go back to what the unique characteristic that the Navy and Marine Corps give this country, and 

that is presence, the ability to be forward deployed, the ability to 

have the right number and the right mix of ships forward, the ability to maintain those ships, the ability to have trained crews on 

those ships, and so keeping that presence and also taking a little 

history in mind that the Navy got significantly smaller in the last 

decade and that we are beginning to come up now to meet this new 

maritime strategy. So that presence that gives our Nation options, 

we—CNO, Commandant, and I—are working very hard to protect 

that presence, but not just presence but presence with the right 

kinds of ships, presence with the trained people, sailors and marines, on those ships, to give those options to this country. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. So that is also keeping faith with our promise 

to our sailors and to their families as well, that that balance is correct, and I think that is going to be the tough decisions, one of 

them, that we face. I think the other one, certainly for the services, 

all of them, but I am wondering about the Navy and the Marines 

in terms of BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] and whether 

you think there is excess capacity that we can be looking at. 

I guess one other question I would like to ask is just about how 

we are dealing with toxic leadership, which I know has been of 

great concern to all of you, and whether the training, the ability 

to go back and sort of reassess where we are in that area to keep 

the integrity of the services also, very clear. 

Secretary MABUS. I would like to comment very briefly on that. 

We, uniquely, in terms of leadership, when we relieve somebody, 

we announce it. We announce why we are doing it, and it is one 

of the things that we focus on. The Commandant has talked about 

the reawakening efforts that he is making and a lot of the other 

efforts that he is making and has made across the Marine Corps. 

CNO, likewise. 

I was at the Naval War College in Newport and made a talk to 

those students and to about 700 of our officers about ethics, but 

having said all that, no ethics classes in the world, if you don’t 

know it is wrong to steal, if you don’t know it is wrong to take a 

bribe, if you don’t know it is wrong to cheat, you missed something 

from your mother. And what we can do is set up systems to make 

sure that we catch you, that we hold people accountable, and I 

think that we have done a pretty good job in that. And again, when 

we find somebody that has not met those high standards, we are 

public about it when we relieve them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
22 

General Amos, I wish there was more we could offer you than 

thank you, but we offer that to you. You have done a great job. You 

have shown courage, not just on the battlefield but on the political 

field. You have always fought for your Marine Corps and your marines, and we owe you a debt of gratitude. Thank you so much for 

that service. 

Admiral, Mr. Secretary, I have just enormous personal respect 

for both of you. I know you love your Navy. I know you are fighting 

for your Navy. I believe that some of the decisions we are arguing 

about today were not your decisions. I am not going to ask you to 

comment on that, but I will ask you this, please don’t take my criticisms to the two of you. They are to the people who ultimately 

made these decisions. 

As we look, we hear a lot about these cuts, and one of the things that we don’t talk about is the fact that there was $778 billion of 

cuts that took place long before sequestration reared its ugly head. 

I asked last week for Secretary Hagel to present us with a single 

time that the administration appeared before this committee or 

communicated to us and said those $778 billion were too much. So 

far I am holding in my hand all those responses. It is all I expect 

to get. 

The second thing is I heard this discussion about our combatant 

commanders, kind of suggesting that maybe these guys just came 

in with these wish lists. We have had seven combatant commanders testify before this committee. Their testimony is what we 

use for our posture hearings, what we use to base this budget on. 

They are our gold standard. I asked Admiral Locklear, do you fluff 

these requirements, or are they the requirements we had? He said, 

I can assure you they are not fluffed; they are what we need. 

Mr. Secretary, one of the things that frightens me are the facts 

that in 2007, before this administration came into office, the reality 

is we met 90 percent of the combatant commanders’ requirements. 

This year, we will only meet 43 percent. And what is our response? 

Not more ships but paper ships. When we talk about a 30-year 

shipbuilding plan, one of the things we ignore is this: We will build 

half the ships today that that 30-year shipbuilding plan had in it 

10 years ago. Next year, we will build half the ships that the 30- 

year plan had in it 10 years ago. And even if we took the shipbuilding plan, there is a $6 billion deficit per year in getting to the number of ships that we need in there, and they are just paper ships. 

The second thing, Mr. Secretary, I look at is this. You have 

issued, and you were kind enough to notify us, we are going to 

change the counting rules of how we count the ships. I don’t know 

if this has gone into effect. I don’t know when it goes into effect, 

but here is the fact: 60 seconds before this new rule goes into effect, the Navy will have officially 283 ships. The moment it goes 

into effect, 60 seconds later, we will have 293 ships. They are paper 

ships. Not one of those things in that shipbuilding plan or this 

change in counting help meet a single one of those requirements 

for our combatant commanders. 

And then the chairman asked about the carrier, and there is a 

huge disconnect between the rhetoric we are hearing and the actions that are being taken. We say we are not going to reduce our 

carriers down from 11 to 10, but the reality is this: $243 million 
23 

this committee put in to do the planning for a year to get ready 

for that refueling; we are taking it out. If you wanted to reduce our 

carriers from 11 to 10, you would take it out. If you wanted to 

leave them in and to delay the decision, you would leave the money 

in. Four hundred fifty million dollars of materials that we need to 

buy for next year to get ready, that is not even in the President’s 

budget. It is taken out. If you wanted to keep 11 carriers, we would 

leave it in. If you wanted to take them out, you would take that 

money out. 

And then in the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], we have 

removed the carrier from the FYDP. It was in last year’s FYDP. 

It is not in this year’s. So, reality, Mr. Secretary, what we are really doing is we have made the decision to go back from 11 to 10. 

We are just waiting until maybe after November or something to 

announce it, but you have taken all the steps with the actions to 

take it out. 

Here are my two quick questions for you. One is this: Why didn’t 

the President, if he was going to keep 11 carriers, include that in 

the budget that he submitted, which is $115 billion above the sequestration numbers in the Budget Control Act? And then the second thing is, do you have any historical data that suggests if we 

make that decision next year and put all that money back in, that 

you could possibly meet the timelines that would be required after 

you have lost 2 years to make sure we don’t go down from 11 to 

10 carriers? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. The decision that we brought forward 

on the carrier was to move—was to give us another year’s decision 

space. And one of things we looked at very closely, because we are 

heel-to-toe in these carriers, is, can we meet the timelines? If the 

decision is made next year, in fiscal year 2016, we have exactly the 

amount of time, the correct amount of time, to get the George 

Washington out and to put the next carrier in with the materials, 

with the supplies, with everything. So that was one of the things 

we looked at very carefully before we made the decision to defer 

this for 1 year. And we have been given guidance to prepare, as 

we are looking at the fiscal year 2016 budget, to prepare with the 

carrier in that budget. That is at least the initial guidance. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a series of questions first for General Amos on the dwell time question and the 

numbers in the Marine Corps. As I understand it, your desired 

number is one 185.5, and the number you are getting is 175. Is 

that about right? 

General AMOS. Congressman, the number that our Nation needs 

its Marines Corps to be is 186.8. 

Mr. LARSEN. 186.8. 

General AMOS. And that will be a roughly a 1:3—in fact, it will 

be a 1:3 dwell. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. So, the question—so, that is about—the 175 

is about a 6.2 percent decrease from 186.8, but the dwell time 

though then drops from 1:3 to 1:2, which is about a 33 percent decrease in dwell time. Can you briefly explain to me that jump? 
24 

General AMOS. Yes, sir. It is capacity. It is simply the numbers 

of battalions and units we have to do what we call steady state operations, and that is those units that are forward deployed in the 

Pacific. They are rotating units. Those are those units that are 

aboard ship on Marine Expeditionary Units, Amphibious Ready 

Groups. Those are the units that are in Afghanistan. Those are the 

units—although they will be coming out; that should take care of 

itself here soon. It is those marines that are in the Special Purpose 

MAGTF, Marine Air-Ground Task Force, that is in Moro ́n right 

now. 

So those steady state requirements drive us at a 175K force to 

a dwell of 1:2. If we go to combat, it is 1:0. It is, you just go and 

you come back, so that is what it is. In a 186K force, we have 

enough elasticity and capacity where we can go on a deployment 

for 6 months and then come home for 18 months, and then go for 

6 months and come home for 18 months. It is just a function of capacity, Congressman. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. I think I understand it better. Thanks. 

Admiral Greenert, I might have missed it, although I was here, 

but you mentioned that the sequestration would lead to a high risk 

to specific missions, and I didn’t quite—then you jumped to another 

part of your testimony. You might have jumped back to what those 

specific missions were that were going to be subject to high risk. 

I have a question for Secretary Mabus, so don’t take the 3.18 to 

answer this. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yeah, I understand. Thank you, sir. 

Deter and defeat aggression, that is the—with the retirement of 

the carrier, the deterrence force, that means presence. What do I 

have presence? What do I need to deter? And in defeat, one—conduct one, one MCO [major combat operation], if you will, for that, 

so that was the first mission. 

The second one is project power in an anti-access area of denial, 

and that is keeping—if we don’t keep pace with the high-technology 

capabilities we are bringing in, and we have to face a high-technology adversary—of an advanced adversary, then that risk continues to grow as we go through the FYDP. 

Mr. LARSEN. Those are the two main ones. Yeah. Thanks. 

And Secretary Mabus, we know that over the last couple of 

weeks, because the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

mission in the Baltics has shifted to us for this quarter, we have 

increased the number of airplanes there by four, I think four additional F–16s to do air patrols on the Air Force side. I was curious 

if over the last several weeks, if the U.S. Navy, as part of its NATO 

mission or as part of a U.S. mission, has been asked to increase 

or maintain any presence in the Mediterranean or near the Black 

Sea to assure allies in the region. 

Secretary MABUS. One of the things that we endeavor to do is to 

have that presence there all the time, not just at the right place 

at the right time, but the right place all the time. And I think that 

this is one of those examples of where we do have the right presence at the—all the time, whether—regardless of the region. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Is there anything specifically that you can 

point out? 
25 

Secretary MABUS. We have a DDG in the Black Sea now, a longplanned exercise that we have—that we do every year. The Marines have a force called the Black Sea Rotational Force that we 

go in, exercise with our allies, with our friends, with our NATO 

members there, and we are continuing to do that, forward deployed 

all the time now, as we have in the past. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Thank you. 

And then, with the time I have left, I will yield back, but just 

momentarily just to put in a plug: I appreciate the Navy and Marine Corps’ investment in electronic warfare. Obviously, it is close 

to home, but just while it has fallen upon U.S. Navy to provide the 

air attack capability for electronic warfare, so that continued investment on the electronic warfare side to go along with platforms 

is pretty key and it is something we will be exploring with the 

other services as well. So I appreciate that and yield back. Thank 

you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would like to thank each of you for being here today, particularly General Amos. We appreciate your association with South 

Carolina. I am very grateful that I represented Parris Island, and 

I saw firsthand your success in training young marines and giving 

opportunity. I am also grateful that my late father-in-law and late 

brother-in-law were proud marines, so we associate with you and 

wish you well in the future. 

And Admiral Greenert, I am very grateful I have a son under 

your command, so it is personal. We are very proud of his service. 

And Admiral, what is the status of the Navy contribution to the 

National Mission Forces, Combat Mission Forces and Cyber Protection Forces of the U.S. Cyber Command, which is to be located at 

Fort Gordon, Georgia? 

Admiral GREENERT. We were tasked, and it started in fiscal year 

2012 actually, to stand up a series of task force. And what these 

are, these are groups of around 40 cyber warriors who have specific 

skills to enter networks, if you will, to be able to rummage around 

to look for the right stuff, and as necessary, I will just say, provide 

effects, and we are stood up. We are on track. In fact, we are ahead 

of track to stand up those, I think all told, 16 teams, and we provide those around the world to combatant commanders. 

Mr. WILSON. And I have visited the facility, and you would be 

proud to see in the midst of an Army complex, Navy personnel 

looking very ‘‘strack.’’ 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir, including civilians. This is very 

joint and interagency. 

Mr. WILSON. And so important for the security of our country. 

Secretary Mabus and General Amos, I am very concerned about 

the unintended consequences of the decision to raise the minimum 

wage for Federal contractors. This has an extraordinary potential 

to destroy jobs, totally unintended, and these—it is quality of life. 

And as chairman of Military Personnel, it concerns me, and that 

is that employees of chain restaurants on military installations— 

it could be Subway, Taco Bell, Burger King—that they could be 

subject to this regulation, which would make the businesses non-
26 

profitable. They would close. People would lose their jobs. And the 

services provided for quality of life could be eliminated. I hope that 

you are looking into this so that this can be avoided. 

Additionally, we have other services, such as barbershops, that 

won’t be able to provide the services that are necessary. Additionally, another benefit that has been so positive for military families 

are little kiosks, where you have small tiny businesses where persons operate, and this is perfect for military dependents and 

spouses. All of these are at risk. 

And Secretary, are you aware of this, and what is being done? 

Secretary MABUS. Congressman, the benefits that you have laid 

out, the quality of life, we are very aware of this, and we are very 

cognizant that these things remain for marines, for sailors, for 

their families. 

However, as you know, there is very conflicting and imperfect 

evidence as to which way this goes, and so we will continue to 

watch it, but in terms of making sure that the quality of life for 

everyone, our sailors, our marines, their families, and the people 

who work on those bases, we are going to keep an eye on that, and 

we will make whatever recommendations are appropriate. 

Mr. WILSON. And to me it is really very clear, and that is, where 

you have a wage differential on-post/off-post, and then you have to 

raise prices on-post, I know something about our military and their 

families; they are very bright. They will shop off-post, and it would 

be a spiral out of control, closing these businesses, destroying 

entry-level jobs. Additionally, it would create a circumstance where 

you would have a wage differential on-post/off-post, and it would be 

not sustainable. And so the way to address that is to close the onpost facilities, again affecting military families, and I just see this 

as just—and it couldn’t possibly have been an intended consequence. 

The unintended consequences, really catastrophic to jobs and to 

quality of life for our military, and I hope you look into this right 

away. It is—because the contracts are going to be negotiated soon. 

There have already been some closures and planned closures at 

strategic locations around the world. Thank you very much. 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. I appreciate you all’s service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Secretary Mabus. 

And General Greenert, I am always very proud to say our former 

commander, Naval Forces, Marianas and Guam. 

And General Amos, I do appreciate all your service and your continued commitment to the realignment of marines and to a robust 

Navy presence on Guam. 

And I think this year’s budget does show a clear commitment on 

your part to our rebalance strategy. 

General Amos, can you comment on the progress that we have 

made in the last year regarding the realignment of marines from 

Okinawa to Guam. Can you comment on the significance of the 

Governor of Okinawa signing the landfill permit and how important is it to remove the restrictions on Government of Japan’s 
27 

funds in this year’s defense authorization bill. What impact do 

those restrictions have on our partnership with Japan? 

General AMOS. Congresswoman, first of all, we remain, as I said 

last year, bullish on this move to Guam. We are planning on it 

happening. We need it to happen to aid in our redistribution of the 

forces in the Pacific. We sit today at about a little over 22,000 marines west of the International Date Line. As you recall, Secretary 

Panetta’s goal was 22.5. Now, they are not all in the right spot, 

though. We have got more on Okinawa than we need, and we will 

eventually go down to 11,500 in accordance with an agreement between Japan and us; 4,700 of those will—roughly 5,000 will go to 

Guam. We are still planning on that. 

Two construction projects are under way right now, the underground utilities that go out to the North Ramp of Andersen Air 

Force base, and there is a maintenance facility that is being built 

there. We have in 2015 a hangar to be built at the North Ramp. 

So those are all things that are unencumbered by the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] specific language on restrictions. 

So we are planning on doing this. As you know, the environmental—the supplemental environmental impact statement should 

be complete, scheduled to be complete towards the end of this year. 

That means by early 2015, next year, this time by next year, we 

should have a record of decision, and when that happens then, that 

then allows the—assuming that it goes the way we hope it goes, 

that allows then the planning for the construction of the training 

ranges and the living cantonment and the building cantonment and 

our headquarters. So, we are actually doing well. 

There is money in the budget all the way out till 2020 and beyond to do this, but you are absolutely right. The NDAA is pretty 

strident with regards to not spending money until we have a comprehensive plan for Okinawa, Guam, the realignment in the Pacific 

and Hawaii, so we are going to need some help to try to break free 

some of that, those restrictions with Congress, to allow us to spend 

some of the money that is already in our budget and that is in Japan’s budget to be able to build the facilities we need on Guam in 

an iterative fashion. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. And we will continue to work on that. 

The next question I have is for Admiral Greenert. At a hearing 

last week, Admiral Locklear indicated that it was very important 

for there to be a robust depot-level ship repair capability with a dry 

dock on Guam. Now, I think we can all agree with that assessment. 

Admiral, can you elaborate on why that specific capability is important to the Navy and our readiness overall in the Western Pacific. We have spent many, many years building up a specialized 

workforce on Guam, and I would hate to see that capability decline 

and for the MSC [Military Sealift Command] ships to be going to 

foreign countries for repair when we do have the capability on 

Guam. 

Admiral GREENERT. Ma’am, Guam is very important to me, to 

Admiral Locklear, to Admiral Harris, our commander of the Pacific 

Fleet. It is strategic. I agree with Admiral Locklear’s assessment. 

I want to and I will do what I can to move this ship repair contract, get going, get back up to speed. I am with you. We have got 
28 

to get workers working. I don’t want to go back, you know, all the 

way to the U.S. It is a long way back there to do ship repair, and 

I agree, we ought to have a dry dock facility there as soon as feasible. We have got to get old Big Blue up and certified or whatever 

it takes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Or to be sending these ships to foreign countries, 

Singapore and other areas. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I think we should be repairing in a U.S. facility. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen. And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And gentleman, thank you for being here, and I sincerely appreciate each of your long distinguished careers and service to our 

country. We are a better country for all of your service. 

Secretary Mabus, I am sincere about that. You and I disagree on 

something of some import to me anyway, and so don’t let that disagreement distract from my appreciation for your service. 

Two thousand nine, when you and the President launched this 

greening of the Navy effort, we had dramatically different circumstances than we have right now. In your written testimony, 

you are still committed to that, so I don’t anticipate changing your 

mind with my eloquence, but I would like to point out that we are 

different. All three of you talked about how difficult the budget circumstances we find ourselves in, sequestration, cutting spending, 

top line budgets, numbers have been going down. All of that is different from 2009. 

On the supply side, the security side, dramatic increases of oil 

production during that timeframe, unanticipated, quite frankly, 

2009, but that is now the reality that our domestic production is 

going up, and so, from a national security standpoint, pursuing 

fuels that might fit that gap if couldn’t get at anything else might 

make some sense, but clearly, biofuels are not in that category. 

In your written testimony, you announced that you signed a contract with four different contractors to provide 160 million gallons 

per year of bio jet fuel at $4 a gallon, which is at or near the commercial cost. Can you tell us when that will be delivered, and can 

you tell us, does that amortize all of the investment that the Department of Defense, Ag [Agriculture] Department, and Energy Department have paid, and why do you think that effort will be any 

more successful than, say, Solyndra or any other efforts that the 

administration has made at juicing this market? 

Secretary MABUS. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you 

about this, and you may—we may have more things in common 

than you think. The reason we are doing this is so that we won’t 

have to cut ships. The reason we are doing this is so we won’t have 

to cut training or steaming or flight hours. And I am really happy 

that oil and gas production has gone up in the United States, as 

virtually all Americans are, but even if we produce all the oil or 

the petroleum that we could possibly use—and the military would 

go to the front of the line no matter what. 
29 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. 

Secretary MABUS. Oil is a global commodity, and it is traded globally. We have been presented in Navy with $2 billion in 

unbudgeted, unanticipated fuel bills in fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 

2012, the most recent complete numbers that we have. What we 

are looking for is some competition for petroleum. What we are 

looking for, to go along—you and I have the same notion. If you replace one thing with another, it has got to be a drop-in fuel, and 

it has got to be competitively priced. And as you pointed out, that 

160 million gallons of both aviation and also marine diesel will 

come online in 2016. That moneys, those moneys and those gallons 

coming to the fleet will give us the ability to mitigate some of those 

price spikes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Secretary MABUS. Some of that security premium that oil traders 

talk about. You don’t have to look any further than the last couple 

of weeks when—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Just a second. Let me—— 

Secretary MABUS [continuing]. Price of oil goes up. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. Cut you off with that, but I do want 

to get to one other point that we do agree on. 

You mentioned that for every dollar increase in the price of a gal- lon—of a barrel of oil, that it costs you $30 million. Would you provide the committee that computation for how that works? 

Secretary MABUS. Sure. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 153.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. And then the remaining time, General Amos, I 

need to get you on the hook for bragging on the Marine Corps for 

their audit that they recently got, and also, I would like a head nod 

from the other gentleman about continued commitment to getting 

the Department of Defense books in an auditable condition before 

2017. 

And I hope, Secretary, I have your commitment to that as well 

as Admiral Greenert, but I would like for General Amos to talk 

about his Marine Corps efforts in that regard. 

General AMOS. Congressman, thank you. It was painful, took 

longer than we hoped. It was actually a fiscal year 2012 audit that 

I just reported out, as you are aware, just here late this past fall, 

but we are the first service that have gone through it, so we were 

breaking trail, so to speak, on it. I am very proud of it. We are involved right now in the next year’s audit, and so we are back into 

it again, but I am proud of the effort because it was—when you 

track—can you imagine trying to track every single dollar that goes 

from operations maintenance, training, ammunition procurement, 

so thanks, thanks for the kind words. 

You do have my word that now that we have done it once and 

we know it is possible, we are going to continue to do it because 

this actually gives us visibility inside the corps to be able to figure 

out where the money is going. And we are—and we can track it 

now. We have mechanisms that we track where our money is going 

and how it is being spent. 

So thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. 
30 

Secretary, real quickly. 

Secretary MABUS. As a former State auditor, you and I sure 

agree on this, and number one, the Navy is on track to meet its 

audit requirements. And you and I can go back and forth in private 

on some of these technical things, but we are on track to do that. 

And the Marines, as marines do, are leading, as always. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. 

General Amos, I just want to let you know that wounded warrior 

from Ellington, Connecticut, Corporal Caron, appreciated your good 

wishes when I saw you at the shipbuilding breakfast. And again, 

I want to thank you for your interest in his amazing recovery and 

your great career. 

And also, as similarly asserted by Mr. Conaway and the 

auditability reform committee, kudos to the Marines for getting us 

to that point. I mean, this is something that is a must now, obviously, with all the budget challenges that we are talking about. We 

have to see how the money is being spent, so congratulations on 

that great achievement. 

Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, there is strong bipartisan support for getting a 300-ship Navy. Again, I want to just follow up some of the comments earlier that during your tenure, as 

your testimony points out, you have put 60 ships under contract. 

I have been around here long enough to know that we were not 

even close to that pace in the preceding 4 years, and again, I think 

that is something people have to be mindful of. Your commitment 

to getting us there is based on real results. It is not a talking point 

for you. You are getting it done, and I think, you know, people need 

to remember that as we sort of discuss the challenges that face us. 

What I would like to spend a minute with you with is a question 

that came up with Secretary Hagel last week, and you started this 

discussion by saying that, again, all the reasons why we have to 

get SSBN [ballistic missile nuclear submarine] online on time is 

proceeding smartly, but the fact is, is that we are going to hit a 

point where we have got to start paying for building them, and the 

impact on that 300-ship Navy is going to be quite dramatic. And 

as you point out the other day, a national conversation really has 

to take place here. For 70 percent of the triad, the Navy’s budget 

can’t be treated as a one-third commitment in terms of the security 

requirement. So, again, I was wondering how we get that to the 

next level so that we sort of move it out of the realm of just sort 

of pundit talk. 

Secretary MABUS. Well, first, thank you so much for what you 

said. We are on track with the Ohio-class replacement, as Admiral 

Greenert said. We are on track with the engineering, with the R&D 

[research and development] that is going on now. We are on track 

to do the advance procurement. We are on track to begin building, 

and we are on track in terms of the Common Missile Compartment 

with our British allies, but as you rightly pointed out, when we are 

building Ohio-class replacement submarines, it will take up at 

least a third every year of the Navy’s normal shipbuilding budget. 

We are the most survivable part of the nuclear triad, of the nuclear 
31 

deterrence, and it—as I said and as you just said, there needs to 

be a decision, after a full debate and full conversation, on that 

shouldn’t be the trade because it will have a dramatic and not good 

impact on all of our other shipbuilding programs, including our attack submarine programs, which is one of the places we have a 

very large technological tactical edge right now and into the future. 

So, I think that just making people aware of the start numbers 

of what will happen to the rest of the fleet if this entire shipbuilding for the Ohio-class replacement is taken out of normal Navy 

shipbuilding, number one, it is a national program, but number 

two, we also don’t replace these things very often at all. They last 

for decades, and the ships that we are building now, the boats for 

the Ohio-class replacement, will last into the 2080s, and so we 

ought to view it through that lens, and we ought to have that conversation. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Admiral, did you want to—— 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, sir, the year of reckoning is 2021, it is right around the corner, and that is about a $9 billion to $10 billion—it is the procurement of the first boat. It is high, but they are 

always high in the first. That does a lot of R&D, as you well know. 

Two years go by where we don’t procure as we build the first, and 

then we build one, and then it is every year, it is about $6 billion 

in those years’ dollars. As the Secretary said, that is about a half 

and maybe just a little less than half of the budget. It will clobber 

the budget, and our priority, of course, is sea-based strategic deterrent, but it is also the undersea domain. That is right behind it. 

So where do we get the money? Submarines, destroyers, P–8s, they 

are all contributors to the undersea domain; so sir, we need relief 

is what we need from this burden. 

Mr. COURTNEY. In the defense bill this year, we can start working on some language to start really making this, again, more than 

just a talking point in the hallway. You know, if we care about a 

300-ship Navy, we have got to deal with it. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, thank you 

again for joining us today and thank you for your service to our 

Nation. 

General Amos, thank you for 44 years of service to our Nation 

as a marine, and thanks so much for your leadership. You have led 

our marines through 13 years of conflict, and we appreciate that. 

Please thank Bonnie, too, for the great job she has done in supporting our marines and their families. Thank you. Thank you. 

I am going to begin, Admiral Greenert, with you to look at where 

we are, from a Navy perspective, concerning our L-class ships. 

And General Amos, I also want you to be part of this discussion. 

We are looking at the next generation replacing the LSD. 

General Amos, you spoke very eloquently and passionately about 

saying that the LPD 17 hull form is the way to go for a variety 

of reasons, and in answering Mr. Palazzo’s question, you laid out 

a lot of those, but I do want to get your perspective on, from both 

you gentleman, about why you believe the LPD 17 hull form or 
32 

that class of ships is the best way going forward to meet the Marine Corps’ needs and to make sure, too, that we have a platform 

that is functional and is in the fleet in a timely manner. 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, I will start, sir. If it is the most cost 

feasible for the capability, I am very sensitive. Jim Amos is my customer, so I have to understand that. We need to bring the Marines 

the capability they need. We already have the infrastructure in 

place to repair it, to maintain it, to train people to it, to buy stuff 

that goes in it, you know, from air conditioners to diesels, you 

name it, you know what I am saying, to weapons systems, so that 

would be very nice if that moved in there very eloquently and we 

could afford it. 

So I turn to, as I was kind of talking to Mr. Palazzo earlier, if 

we could get a transitional piece, you know, a seed money or something—we did this with the Virginia class—hey, that might work, 

and we have done it before. So, anyway, it is all of those that 

makes it—and you know what, that is a pretty successful class 

now. 

Secretary MABUS. And just to follow up just for 1 second. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

Secretary MABUS. LPD 17, the first in that class had—as the 

first of the class, had some issues. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Right. 

Secretary MABUS. And it got a lot of press, a lot of press. Are we 

going down the right road? Are we doing the right thing here in 

the Navy? The last two LPDs, 24 and 25, have had no starred 

cards, no major defects during their sea trials. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Secretary Mabus. 

General Amos. 

General AMOS. Congressman, the hull form issue is simply simplifying the acquisition process and the developmental costs of any 

kind of platform. It just makes—you know, that is one that makes 

sense. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

General AMOS. Developing something brand new costs more 

money than we think, takes longer than we think, and it is fraught 

with more danger than we think. Doesn’t mean we can’t develop, 

doesn’t mean we shouldn’t, you know, but that is really the hull 

form of that class ship, which has been so, so successful at this 

point to the point of everybody else. 

And I am going to step a little bit out of my lane here, but I tell 

you what, the truth of the matter is, everything—when you start 

talking United States Navy and capital investments, they cost a lot 

of money. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yeah. 

General AMOS. This is not like buying a Humvee for $250,000. 

This is buying a ship for $2.3 billion or buying an Ohio-class replacement submarine that is going to consume his entire—the bulk 

of his entire shipbuilding plan for when it finally comes in. 

The truth is, is that my personal opinion, we are out of balance 

in the budget. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

General AMOS. Not so much Congress but within our Department 

of Defense. The Department of the Navy in the Navy shipbuilding 
33 

program needs more money. This is not a proportional solution set 

because the ships are expensive, and they are, they are capital investments, and by the way, they will last for 40-plus years. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask this. I want to lead right from your 

answer to a broader question. Where we are proposing to go with 

our Navy and as a component of that, our amphibious ships, look 

at the world we are in today, being more dangerous with more 

need to be able to project power to respond to humanitarian needs 

and the overall effort that this Nation needs to place, if we don’t 

have a Navy that has those 11 aircraft carriers, that has the next 

generation L class ship, that has the SSBN(X), two questions: Will 

our men and women that we ask to go in harm’s way, will they be 

put at greater risk, i.e., will more of them be killed on the battlefield? And will there be an increased possibility that if we are in 

a conflict, that we would lose that conflict? And I would like each 

of you gentleman to answer that, and you can quickly do it yes or 

no. 

Admiral GREENERT. I will answer the second one first. Yes, we 

have risk in our ability to take on an advanced adversary, as I 

spoke to, and I am concerned about that. But in your first question, 

my job is to make sure that our people that go forward have the 

finest equipment and they are organized, trained, and equipped, 

and so, for me, I would always come to Secretary Mabus and say, 

Boss, our budget has to have the right readiness. I cannot send forward—I will get smaller to be good and to make sure that they are 

good and that they are safe. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary Mabus. 

Secretary MABUS. I will just echo what the CNO said. We are 

over time, but we will make sure that people that go in harm’s 

way, and that is what we are trying to do with the budget, have 

the right equipment but also the right training, the right things 

they need all the across the board. We should never go into a fair 

fight. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Gotcha. 

General AMOS. Congressman, the few of the ships—fewer numbers of ships, less capable they are, means the longer it takes to 

build up combat power when it is needed, not if it is needed but 

when it is needed. The longer it takes to build combat power puts 

our young men and women at risk. It is a complementary equation. 

Mr. WITTMAN. All right, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Peters. 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service. 

I would—I want to talk a little bit about energy as well. Specifically, I have a question about specifically how it affects the rebalance. But the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to energy security and efficiency through goal setting in its program initiatives, 

that the stated strategy is to—is that energy security is critical to 

mission success and that energy efficiency minimizes operational 

risks while saving time, money, and lives, and I want to say I 

thank you for that. 
34 

Specifically, at MCAS [Marine Corps Air Station] Miramar, I 

know that you are doing some methane power generators, solar 

panels, working on a microgrid, interested to see how the microgrid 

work comes out when it is completed. And what I want to ask, 

though, and this is a little bit broader than biofuels, which I have 

raised in past, is in the context of the rebalance to the Pacific, how 

does that affect Navy energy security? And you have got that huge 

expansive region and the geographically fragmented energy infrastructure. Now we want to emphasize our presence there. How 

does the Navy intend to ensure that it can meet operational energy 

requirements to carry out its missions and reduce fuelling 

vulnerabilities in that region? 

Secretary MABUS. Well, you just gave the best rationale for what 

we are doing. Number one is energy efficiency so that we don’t 

have to have as much energy, and we are doing stuff ranging from 

things like voyage planning to hull coatings to stern flaps to changing the light bulbs in ships, all of which save pretty significant 

amounts of energy on board that ship. 

We are looking, as you pointed out at Miramar, we are looking 

at alternative energy. If you look at some of the places across the 

Pacific, at Guam, at Hawaii, at Japan, at Diego Garcia, where we— 

all of which, where we have significant infrastructure, very high 

energy rates there. So if we can move to a renewable energy, a 

lower cost so that we don’t have to have that vulnerability of shipping oil and gas to some of those places, that will also help in that 

energy security. 

Mr. PETERS. Is that affecting acquisition and procurement? 

Secretary MABUS. We are well on our way to the 50 percent alternative fuels for Navy, both ashore and afloat. 

Mr. PETERS. Okay. 

Secretary MABUS. And so, in that sense, yes, it is, but it is, in 

many ways, the new normal. That is what we are going after and, 

on the other side of the coin, for far more efficiency in whatever 

we do. 

Mr. PETERS. Admiral. 

Admiral GREENERT. We are—maybe I can quantify a little bit. 

The Secretary eloquently laid it all out. In sailor terms, you know, 

when a Hornet pilot takes off from the carrier, the first thing they 

do is say, Good, I am in the air. The second one is, Okay, where 

is the tanker? And in a more efficient Hornet engine, that is less 

other Hornets—these are strike fighters—that we have to use to be 

tankers. So, I mean, that is real warfighting eventually, so 5, 6, 7 

percent, that is other aircraft that we put back into the flight. 

The Secretary mentioned stern flap. That will get you 5 days, additional days at sea that you don’t have to look for an oiler. That 

is the unique part of being a sailor, where am I getting food, because you ain’t going to fish for it. It is going to run out. And then 

secondly, we have an engine that will get us 10 days, so it becomes 

real stuff pretty soon. 

Mr. PETERS. Well, I want to commend the Navy and the Marines 

for thinking about both insulation and fuel in terms of alternatives 

and security. It is heartening, and I think it is smart in this budget 

context, too. Also, Admiral, I did want to thank you on the recent 

visit to San Diego that you made, and you are welcome back any-
35 

time. I think you were the one who coined the term ‘‘solar vortex,’’ 

which we have gotten a lot of mileage out of. I appreciate that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mabus, you brought up earlier one of my primary concerns, which is that as we cancel multiyear contracts, we pay more 

per item and get fewer of them, and it is recognizing budget constraints. I am concerned that, you know, some of the decisions we 

are being forced to make are pennywise and pound foolish, as we 

would say. 

And that brings me to the MH–60, and Admiral Greenert, I understand that you are considering reducing the purchase by 29 aircraft, if I am correct with that. And my question is, what is the cost 

of terminating that procurement versus the cost of actually continuing to purchase the 29 helicopters, and what type of negative 

impact do you expect with the reduction in the equipment? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, sir, if we get a good outcome on the 

aircraft carrier, I need to continue because I need the helicopters 

for the air wing. We would continue purchasing at least another 

year on that. So I will just state that up front. 

But I will have to get you the precise numbers on shutdown. But 

I am pretty sure it is about the same to shut down and terminate 

and—those costs as it does—because it struck me when I remember talking to my guys about it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 154.] 

Mr. SCOTT. And that is what we have seen as well, but I would 

appreciate those numbers. And it just doesn’t make sense to me 

that we would pay the same thing to terminate a contract as we 

could get the 29 additional aircraft for, even if we—if we didn’t 

have a need for them, certainly we have allies out there that would 

need them. 

General Amos, thank you for your service. As you know, I have 

had the opportunity to do a Wounded Warrior hunt with several 

marines, and they wanted me to make sure that I spoke up for a 

couple of things, one being the A–10, and they sure would like to 

have a .45 instead of a 9-millimeter. 

But with that said, the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] fly out of Robins Air Force Base. We are very 

proud of them. The Air Force has proposed to recapitalize them, 

which would give you more information—more accurate information and, hopefully, improve that battle management platform. 

If you could just speak to the benefit to the Marines of that 

JSTARS battle management platform, I would appreciate it. 

General AMOS. Congressman, first of all, I would like the .45 instead of a 9-millimeter, too, but that is for another budget at another time. 

But it has been—it is a combat-proven platform, back to the 

JSTARS battle management airplane you are talking about. It has 

done well in combat. It served us well all through the march up 
36 

to Baghdad, going all the way north and then settling in that area 

afterwards when we came back in. 

So it has been a battle-tested platform. It gives us the situational 

awareness while we are on the ground of what it is seeing in the 

air, a moving target indicator and a few other things that is very 

critical to us. So it is a battle-tested program. 

I can’t speak to programmatic decisions being made by the Air 

Force. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is struggling with the 

budget exactly the same way we are while we are trying to all figure out how we can pay our bills to provide the best combat readiness our Nation needs. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, thank you. And the beauty of the JSTARS, obviously, is that the radar can see such a large area and it is a big 

world out there. 

Gentlemen, Secretary Mabus, thank you for your service. 

With that, I yield the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Kilmer. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to each of you for being here and for your service. 

Before I ask a question, I actually just wanted to lob a comment. 

We are hearing a good amount of interest from folks in my neck 

of the woods around reauthorization of overtime payments for Navy 

civilians who are working on the forward deployed carrier in Japan 

and I was hoping that the Navy would be supportive of that reauthorization. 

For questions, let me start with Admiral Greenert. 

Can you talk about how much risk we are assuming by not fully 

funding the expected amount of depot-level work for our vessels. 

And, you know, what is the expected amount of savings that will 

result out of that decision? And is there a reasonable expectation 

that we can pay for the costs of implementing that decision in the 

out-years? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, the definition ‘‘fully fund’’—there is the 

request, and then we would be our comptroller and—working with 

NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command] to—there are a number 

of programs—you are probably aware of many of them—we have 

in place to improve the efficiency of each of our depots. So we ask 

them, ‘‘How is your program going? What is your goal for the 

year?’’ 

We apply that to their budget request and that becomes, if you 

will, the lesser funding. So we might fund the 97 percent or whatever that number turns out to be. I know the rolled-up number, but 

each depot is different. 

If we don’t get that right, that is man-days that aren’t—the work 

that doesn’t get done, because we thought it would take 2,500 mandays. It takes 2,650. So there is a little bit of risk in that. And you 

got to come back around the next budget cycle and fix it, and we 

have had to do that. 

But, sir, you know, we have to—we got to be efficient with the 

taxpayers’ dollars and be good stewards. So we—and they have 

really responded. The depots have responded. They are much more 

efficient. 
37 

Mr. KILMER. Are there specific alternatives that the committee 

ought to consider to fully fund that depot-level maintenance to protect the investment that we are making in our naval—in our maritime vessels? 

Admiral GREENERT. I wouldn’t suggest it. What I mean by that 

is we—I think you had asked us to sit down and say, ‘‘What have 

you assumed in those efficiencies, if you will, such that we would 

like’’—I commit to you that what we have presented and Secretary 

Mabus has approved on my behalf is fairly closely scrubbed, sir. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you. 

Secretary Mabus, the committee is currently undergoing a 

multiyear effort to review acquisition systems and I wanted to hear 

from you about what you see as the biggest challenges to the Department of Navy in terms of shipbuilding and in terms of nonmajor defense acquisition programs. 

Are there specific considerations that we should be mindful of 

when considering the requirements of the Navy and of the Marine 

Corps? And, I guess, in short, what can Congress do to help? 

Secretary MABUS. Well, the first part of that question, we have 

been getting, I think, all our acquisition programs well under control, shipbuilding, the aircraft programs that we control. We have 

done it by competition. We have done it by multiyears. We have 

done it by block buys. We have done it by using some pretty basic 

business strategies. 

But going forward from that, we are also looking—and I think 

that, as you take this look—as Congress takes this look—we are 

looking, for example, at service contracts. We spend about $40 billion a year on service contracts. 

And what we have undertaken—and we are absolutely confident 

that we can do it—is we are going to take 10 percent of that, about 

$4 billion a year, $19 billion over the FYDP, out of service contracting without really having that much of an impact on what we 

get. 

And that is just by being able to follow money from the time it 

is appropriated all the way through to the time it comes out as a 

good or service that we get. 

So I would ask you to not just look at the major acquisition programs, not just look at—look at how we and everybody is structured. Look at where the growth has been. Look at what the benefit is that you get from that growth. 

And, as General Amos, who I have had the pleasure to serve 

with now for almost 4 years, said, we build very expensive things 

in the Navy, but they also amortize pretty well. We just retired Enterprise after almost 52 years of service. 

So if you break it down on that standpoint, you are getting a lot 

for your money. But it is a big, big upfront cost, and I think you 

should look at the service that those platforms give you. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER [presiding]. Thank you. 

Mr. Bridenstine is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to ask Admiral Greenert—I have an interest in 

specifically the Growler. As a Navy pilot, I have been deployed on 
38 

aircraft carriers. And the EA–6B Prowler would become a national 

asset as soon as we got into theater. It would depart. We would 

lose it as an organic asset to the aircraft carrier, to the air wing. 

And I know right now we are slated to have five Growlers in 

each squadron on an—or in an air wing. And I was wondering— 

there is a concern I also have about not just not having enough assets, but also a concern about the risk that is injected when we 

take the F–18 off production, given the F–35 has had some risks. 

My question is this. I saw that you put out a recent unfunded 

priority for additional Growlers following the release of the budget 

and I was just wondering if you would talk about that priority and 

the unfunded piece of it. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. What we have done is I submitted— 

in consultation with Secretary Mabus, I submitted, in responding 

to the chairman’s request to the chairman and the Secretary of Defense for their look, an unfunded requirements list. Yes. I put the 

Growlers on there. 

The issues became—you articulated some of it—when you look at 

requirements, we are at minimum requirements, as we know it. 

However, I look to the future. And, to your point, electronic warfare, electronic attack, is critical. It gets us joint assured access. I 

see a growing need, number one. 

Number two, there are a few studies going on looking at a joint 

requirement. Well, that is us. We are the provider. So my view 

was, for hedge and for risk reduction, I thought it would be appropriate to describe what I view as a need—a future need and potential requirement. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Secretary Mabus. 

Secretary MABUS. We are the prime service now to do electronic 

attack, as you pointed out. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Yes, sir. 

Secretary MABUS. And for that reason and for what the CNO 

said, we are five planes in a squadron today. Looking out in the 

future, we don’t think electronic attack is going to get any smaller. 

We are also very mindful of the industrial base. And if we buy 

the Growlers that we have in the budget, that line will continue 

through 2016. And I know that we are working on things like foreign military sales, things like that, to keep that line in business. 

But to the CNO’s point, today we have the minimum numbers 

in each squadron. Looking out to the future and to what electronic 

attack may or will become, it is an insurance policy. It is a hedge. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Sure. 

Admiral Greenert and Secretary Mabus, what is the role of lowcost autonomous surface vessels in the fleet of the future? What 

steps is the Navy taking now to build autonomous surface vessels? 

Admiral GREENERT. I see them for—you can use them for security, for sure. You know, they would be surveillance if you go in a 

harbor. We have done that already, by the way. 

But this summer we will be demonstrating autonomous unmanned surface vehicles for mine warfare where they go out and 

actually tow a sensor. We have it in the 5th Fleet arena, the Arabian Gulf. And so I see that as a future—a pretty important element. 
39 

I would like to move ahead to we will develop a swarm concept 

of operations. We do a lot of counter-swarm. I want to flip this. I 

want to do some swarm. And we have the technology and the 

means. Now we have to put our efforts to it. That is my view. 

Secretary MABUS. We are the only service that does unmanned 

above the sea, on the sea, and under the sea, and surface unmanned autonomous surface vehicles have to be a part of that future fleet. 

And the one example that the CNO used, you are seeing that 

with the—particularly with the littoral combat ship, sending out 

autonomous surface—unmanned surface vehicles to hunt mines, to 

keep sailors out of the minefield, and to be way more efficient in 

hunting mines than we do today. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Rhode Island is recognized. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Admiral and General, I want to thank you for appearing before us today. And, of course, we appreciate the benefit 

of your testimony. 

General, since this is your last posture hearing before the committee, I just want to express especially my appreciation for your 

service. I have enjoyed getting to know you and working with you 

in your position as Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I wish 

you well in the next chapter of your life. Thank you, General. 

Gentlemen, making predictions is obviously a dangerous business 

to be in, but I certainly think that one point that we can all agree 

on is, as we look out into the future, there is going to be an everincreasing reliance on key enabling technologies. 

Some are more obvious, like the tactical information networks 

that make possible many advanced warfighting concepts, including 

cyber. 

Others are more nascent, such as the contributions of future aerial platforms, like UCLASS [Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike], or future technologies, such as directed energy 

or rail guns, advanced hypersonics, persistent unmanned surface 

and undersea vehicles, as we were just discussing a moment ago, 

next-generation EW [electronic warfare] and radars and future 

ships, such as the Zumwalt. 

Admiral, if I could start with you, I would appreciate your 

thoughts on what those investments, particularly in directed energy and rail guns, mean to the future of the fleet. 

And the other question I would like to get to, hopefully, time permitting, is: With the construction rate proposed in the Navy’s 30- 

year shipbuilding plan, the nuclear attack submarine inventory 

will slowly decline to 43 SSNs in 2028. Assuming the global 

COCOM demand remains fairly steady, how will the Navy compensate for the projected shortfall of attack submarines and, in 

particular, for undersea payload capacity as the SSGNs [guided 

missile nuclear submarines] age out? 

Admiral GREENERT. The directed energy, we are going to do a 

demonstration this summer. In fact, we are down to final certification. 
40 

We will load a directed-energy weapon laser on the Ponce, which 

is our afloat forward staging base. It is an LPD. It is an amphibious ship. We have sized it. We have looked at it. We have already 

demonstrated this particular, if you will, laser gun—laser weapon 

system. 

What—the value of it is its persistence. It costs under a dollar 

for one round, if you will, laser round. We have already proven it 

against a drone and against a small craft. 

So the deal is I want to get it out there and take a look at it 

and see how does it perform in that sort of harsh environment, and 

then we adjust. 

Imagine you have a laser. You don’t have to have as much ammunition on board and all that brings that. So then you want to 

miniaturize it. You have to have the power system to be able to 

produce the power repetitively. 

But I think we can overcome on that. We are on a track for that. 

And then you raise the energy level that it can deliver, and we are 

on track to do that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And I applaud the work that the Navy is doing 

in that respect. I have met many times with Admiral Klunder at 

ONR [Office of Naval Research] and I am very familiar with that 

weapon system on the Ponce and will be following that closely. 

Admiral GREENERT. Secondly, I will comment on the rail gun. 

We have these vessels called joint high-speed vessels. They are 

catamarans. And we have the ability to put the power system in 

and put a rail gun mounted on the back. And in the summer of 

2016—late summer, probably—we want to take that to sea and 

demonstrate it and see how can the rail gun perform. 

The issue with rail gun is the barrel. That high energy that is 

generated through there can tend to melt the barrel. So we have 

to get the right barrel and do that right. We are working that and 

the engineers tell me, ‘‘No. We can do this.’’ And, secondly, you 

have to generate the power for that electromotive force. So those 

are two right up front there. 

The future in submarines—we have a few things up our sleeve 

to help get through what we call this trough that you alluded to. 

One, we will look at deployment lengths. They are 6 months now. 

Maybe extend a few, and we would pick and choose those. 

Two, the maintenance, the time they are off service, can we bring 

them—you know, can we be more efficient in our maintenance or 

kind of move that around differently. 

And then we will look at where are our submarines forward deployed, where are they stationed, put another way. As you know, 

we are moving one SSN to Guam here in this budget request. 

So if we continue to do that, we will work on the trough, as you 

say. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

With time permitting, we have obviously invested billions of dollars to ensure that our aircraft carriers can project power anywhere 

on the globe. 

It is critical that we continue to make the investments to ensure 

that we are leveraging our carriers’ impressive capabilities to the 

maximum extent possible. 
41 

How do you envision Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance 

and Strike enhancing the carrier air wing? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, as a minimum, it will—the very minimum, it will provide a fueling capability, but that is not its primary purpose. 

That returns, as I was mentioning earlier, Super Hornets— 

joint—excuse me—strike fighters right to the air wing. So immediately the air wing is better. They will be an integral part. But 

they can do refueling, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. So they will go out and surveil. 

Our requirements are you have to have a payload. So we can 

mount all kind of surveillance on there. And then it has to bring 

a weapon with it. 

Then I am convinced industry will evolve this thing so that its 

observability will get lower and lower. And then you are talking 

about going into increasingly denied environments. 

So, frankly, it will become a platform with payloads, just like the 

Super Hornet and like the Joint Strike Fighter B, in the—my view, 

in the carrier of the future—air wing of the future. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Byrne, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate you 

being here today. I am sorry you are having to sit so long through 

this process, but we do appreciate it. It is helpful to us. 

Mr. Secretary, I would like to talk to you about my favorite topic, 

the littoral combat ship. I have read the memo that the Secretary 

of Defense sent you on 24 February in which he tells you, in essence, build it out to 32 ships, pause, and over the next year he 

would like for you to consider three options and come back to him 

with your recommendations based upon those options. 

The options are for the procurement of a capable and lethal small 

surface combatant, and his three options are a new design, an existing ship design including an LCS, and a modified LCS. I would 

like to take you through those three options, if I could. 

Are you aware of an existing ship design that would meet the 

definition of a capable and lethal small surface combatant other 

than an LCS? 

Secretary MABUS. The rest of that requirement is that I have to 

look at cost—because we have got to get enough of these ships— 

and I have to look at when they could be delivered to the fleet. 

So if you add those two requirements to it, I do not know of another design. But that is part of this look, Congressman, is to see 

if there is another design out there that could meet those requirements. 

Mr. BYRNE. Yes, sir. I understand you have some work to do, but 

I am just trying to get what you know today. 

So let’s go to the second option, which is designing a new ship. 

Given your goal to have a 300-ship fleet by 2020, which is 5 fiscal 

years from now, and the cost, as you mentioned before, what would 

be the timeline for developing a new ship—a new ship design altogether? And what would the cost be for that? 
42 

Secretary MABUS. The normal timeline—and the CNO and I have 

both talked about this—the normal timeline of a blank sheet of 

paper to introduction in the fleet is about a decade, about 10 years. 

And I don’t have any idea about what the cost would be at this 

time. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, we have gotten the cost for the LCSs down to about $350 million a ship now. Is that right? 

Secretary MABUS. That is correct. 

Mr. BYRNE. Could you produce a new ship for anywhere near $350 million over the time horizon that you are looking at by 2020 

for a 300-ship fleet? 

Secretary MABUS. The LCS is the only ship that we are currently 

producing anywhere close to that cost, any warship. And, again, 

that is the purpose of this look, is to see. 

But I am very proud of how much the cost has been driven down, 

working with our partners in industry. Because, as you know, the 

first ships of the LCS, of both versions, cost more than $750 million 

and now we have gotten that down to $350 million, more or less— 

and perhaps a little less—going forward. 

That is very hard to do, and it has been a real effort, but it has 

been a real partnership between Navy and industry to do that. 

And so we will certainly, as the Secretary directed, look to see 

what a cost would be on continuing to build the LCS, on building 

a variant of the LCS, or a completely new design. And he has explicitly instructed me to look at cost and delivery as well. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, when I look at the LCS, I am reminded of my 

favorite boxer of all time, Muhammad Ali. Now, he didn’t win his 

fights by sitting there and just taking punches. He always said 

that he liked to float like a butterfly and sting like a bee. 

It seems to me, when I look at the LCS and what it was designed 

to do, it is a Muhammad Ali. It floats like a butterfly, a very fast 

butterfly, as you know, and stings like a bee. 

Isn’t that what you are looking for? 

Secretary MABUS. Well, as you know, both the CNO and I are 

proponents of the LCS. We believe that we need this ship in the 

fleet and appreciate very much the fact that we are going to continue to build these through the FYDP to get to 32. And, as you 

said, the only pause here is a pause in contract negotiations on 

ships past 32. So that is several years from now. 

And I think that, very frankly, it is a good idea to take a look 

at capabilities, to take a look at requirements, to take a look at 

how ships meet these, because we do that on a very routine basis. 

We do it—as I have pointed out earlier, on the DDG–51, we are 

about to start Flight 3, which is actually the fourth flight of this 

destroyer. We are moving to Flight 4 of the Virginia-class submarine. 

We tend to—we don’t tend to—we actually do look at every different ship type as technology changes, as requirements change, as 

missions change. 

And the beauty of the LCS or a ship like the LCS is it is modular 

so that you don’t have to build a new hull, you don’t have to build 

a new ship. As technology improves, as technology changes, as requirements change, you simply change out the modules. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 
43 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Speier, is recognized. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And thank you to each of our great leaders who are at the witness table. 

My first question is to General Amos. 

First of all, congratulations on your clean audit, the first service 

to have one. That is good news, I think, for all of us. 

I want to ask you, though, about a letter that—or a request made 

by Secretary Hagel last May in which he ordered all of the services 

to look at their positions of trust—soldiers who are in positions of 

trust for any previous criminal or unethical behavior. 

The Army disqualified 588 as sexual assault counselors, recruiters, or drill sergeants after discovering that they had records of either sexual assault, child abuse, or drunk driving. 

The Marine Corps has disqualified no one, zero, and I find that 

remarkable, particularly since every other service has had at least 

a few. 

I have sent a letter today to the Secretary asking that he ask the 

services to go back and take a relook because you can’t have 588 

in one and zero in another of the services, particularly when the 

Marine Corps has, you know, had some problems in the past. 

Can you respond to that? 

General AMOS. Congresswoman, I would be happy to. Thanks for 

the opportunity. 

The two communities that we call, that you have described as 

those that we need to pay particular attention to when it comes to 

dealing with sexual assault and the victims of sexual assault, are 

our recruiters. That is where it begins for us. 

And recruiting—I think you know this from seeing them out in 

California. Our recruiting is a primo job for our marines. And so 

we go through—in that community, we go through a recruiter 

screening team. We go through their records. We do a Federal law 

enforcement screening on every one of them. They are screened by 

their commanding officers. 

So the recruiters, that part of that community, is screened more 

so than, I think, any other—I think I can say this—any other service’s recruiting team. 

Ms. SPEIER. General, I don’t want to interrupt you necessarily, 

but I have got a very short amount of time and I have another 

question to ask. 

So are you going to take another look, is the question I asked, 

because it just seems a great disparity that there is not one soldier 

who was in a position of trust that did not meet that review and 

be recognized as not being appropriately placed. 

General AMOS. Congresswoman, I will do that. You have my 

word, and I will get back to you on this. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 154.] 

General AMOS. Just a comment on our sexual assault team, I 

mean, our civilians and our marines. They go through an enormous 

screening before they even are eligible to even be considered for 

employment, I mean, background checks and everything. 
44 

So the fact that we have had none is not necessarily an indication that we haven’t looked. We have actually taken—— 

Mr. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. I am sorry, but I do want to 

get one more question in. I have a minute and 45 seconds. 

All right. Admiral Greenert, thank you for arranging for the opportunity for both Congressman Garamendi and myself to visit the 

USS Coronado when it was in Cartagena. It was a very edifying 

experience. 

I have been critical of the LCS. I still have great concerns. But 

I must tell you one of my biggest concerns right now is that, you 

know, in private conversations with some on the ship—and I will 

say that your commander there did an outstanding job. He was an 

incredible cheerleader, loves the ship. 

But in some private conversations I had with others on the ship, 

the electronics on the ship are not working. And my concern is 

that, when the warranty is out, General Dynamics is going to start 

charging us and they have never presented us with a ship that was 

fully functional to begin with and we should not be paying for that. 

So that is number one. 

Number two, one of the criticisms is that you can’t see out of the 

side of the ship. And he said, ‘‘Well, we probably won’t be able to 

get that fixed until it goes into dry dock. That is 2 years away.’’ 

I mean, I think that is a big problem. 

They left Cartagena, went through the Panama Canal. And what 

happened? The ship got scraped on the side of the Panama Canal. 

So we have got a problem here, and I am wondering what you are 

going to do about those two issues. 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, the first one we are reasonably aware 

of, the electronics piece. There are a couple of things, number one, 

how well does it intercept signals, process it, and use it to be functional; number two, the internal electronics. And when we ordered 

the ship, we wanted to address that after delivery. 

But it is a valid comment. We will look into it. And I want to 

make sure I understand specifically, when we say ‘‘electronics,’’ 

what it is. So I got that, and we will take a look at that. 

The second one, it is a paradigm, to say the least, to ask people 

not to be able to go out on a bridge, a wing wall. The other folks 

are doing reasonably well on that. 

But we are revisiting that aspect of it, you know, the ability to, 

if you will, see around rather than just saying check out the cameras or rig up rearview mirrors. 

So what we are going to do about that is we are going to go back 

in and say what is the basis of this and how do we continue to do 

it. 

Ms. SPEIER. I thank the gentleman. My time has expired. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. 

The gentlelady from Illinois is recognized. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Amos, I join my colleagues in expressing my admiration 

for your service. My daddy was a Marine NCO [non-commissioned 

officer] in World War II for just a few years and was an Army officer for about 16 years. And I think his greatest regret, despite his 

pride in my service, was that I was not ever a marine. So, hopefully, he is impressed, now that I get to talk to the Commandant. 
45 

I do have a question that pertains to where we are moving forward, back with the dwell time issues and the reset of marines as 

you are drawing down the Active Duty force and how that reset is 

going to go with the Marine Reserves. 

Specifically, how sustainable is this 1:2 dwell time? I mean, this 

is a pretty intense pace that you are going to be putting people on. 

And is that sustainable 5 years? Two years? Are we going to be relooking at this? And are the Reserves doing the same thing? 

General AMOS. The Reserves, Congresswoman, as you know, are 

a little bit more mature. They have already finished at least one 

enlistment in the fleet. They already, for the most part, have had 

one tour as an officer out in the fleet Marine force. 

So they are a little bit more mature. We are going to maintain 

them on a 1:5, which is the standard Reserve-Guard ratio of deployment to dwell. So there is no intents in use to change that. 

We are, though, going to capitalize on their experience and try 

to draw them in as often as we can. We are making plans—in fact, 

we just upped—in the 2015 budget, upped the Reserves budget by 

a significant amount of money just so that we can bring them into 

our unit deployment. It is good for them. It is good for us. So we 

are going to continue to use them. We are not going to wear their 

dwell out. 

Inside of us, we are a young service. We are the youngest, not 

age-wise, like 2381⁄2 years, but we are the youngest of all the services. Sixty-two percent of the Marine Corps are on their very first 

enlistment. You know, I have got almost 20,000 teenagers in the 

Marine Corps. 

So when I travel around—and the sergeant major and I, we visit 

marines in Afghanistan. They are deployed. And the only questions 

we get is not, ‘‘Hey, sir, I am too tired. This is too hard.’’ I get the 

question, ‘‘Sir, when am I going to get to deploy again? Now that 

we are coming out of Afghanistan, where are we going to go next?’’ 

So we are a young force. They signed up to deploy. So the pressure on the 1:2 dwell—I mean, I am not naive—will be on what we 

call the career force, and that is 27 percent of the Marine Corps. 

The bulk of the Marine Corps comes in and leaves and does not 

retire, but the career force stays on. That is the captains, the lieutenants, the master sergeants, the gunnery sergeants. And it will 

be harder on them. 

The decision to go to 1:2 dwell was simply a function of budget. 

It is a function of you have a Marine Corps to respond to today’s 

crisis with today’s force today, not a month from now, but today. 

And the only way we can do that is pull money into readiness, 

keep the units fully manned, fully trained, and fully equipped so 

that they can deploy and be ready. And to do that, to shrink the 

force down, it results in a 1:2. 

I am actually pretty optimistic. I am not getting any—of course, 

we are not in it yet, but we have been in a 1:2 dwell, actually, for 

probably the last 6 to 7 years. 

So I am optimistic that our Marine Corps is going to be able to 

sustain itself at this. Is it ideal? Absolutely not. America needs a 

Marine Corps of 186,800, which is a 1:3 dwell. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. It is certainly a heavy load that we are asking 

your marines to shoulder going well into the future, and I just 
46 

want you to know that there are many of us here who certainly appreciate that burden that you are carrying for our Nation. 

I want to talk, also, about equipment. You talked about the 

equipment and, specifically, the return of the vehicles from Afghanistan and looking forward with the JLTVs [Joint Light Tactical Vehicles] and we are going to slow down the procurement of the 

JLTVs along with the Army slowing down the procurement, but 

you are going to try to increase the number of up-armored 

Humvees to make up the difference. 

And, again, you know, ideally, looking forward, how does that 

balance come out? And does that also affect the Reserves—the 

equipment in the Reserves as well? 

General AMOS. We haven’t sorted out yet with the Reserves the 

JLTV. We are still in the program of record for it. We are the lead 

service into it in that we get the vehicles first. 

We are teamed up with the Army. We get 5,500 vehicles. We slid 

it to the right one year just because of budgetary issues. We are 

still going to get that. 

What we have done, though, inside what we call the ground vehicle strategy in the Marine Corps, because of money, we have had 

to look and ask ourselves the question, ‘‘What is good enough?’’ 

And we had 20-plus-thousand Humvees. A bunch of them are 

new. They were the ones that we got in 2006–2008. We are going 

to refurbish those—probably about 13,000 of those. JLTVs will fit 

in there. We are going to put more MRAPs [mine-resistant ambush 

protected vehicles] back in the inventory than we had originally 

planned. 

So it is a balance right now between modernization, paying our 

bills, and being able to be a ready force. We are trying to cut Solomon’s baby in a variety of different ways, but, hopefully, we are 

doing it the right way. It is a balance. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. 

The chairman recognizes himself for some questions. 

First, let me say sons out, guns out. That is right. My sleeves are 

actually rolled right now under my suit. You can’t tell. But I think 

that is the best decision the Marine Corps has made in a long time. 

Commandant, let me say thanks to you and Bonnie for your 

time, for your service. It is not always easy to reconcile warfare 

with, let’s say, the political class. It is tough. And you have had to 

do that, I think, during the last couple of years simply because of 

the ideology that has been in place. It is hard to reconcile combat 

and the elite political class. 

I mean, that is a fine line to walk, and I want to thank you both 

for doing it and for your—just your time and effort and your love 

for the Marine Corps and your marines. You love your marines. We 

can tell that. We can see it. So thank you. 

And I think this will be the last time that you are sitting down 

there, and you are probably like, ‘‘Thank God.’’ But thank you very 

much. Thanks for what you have done, for your service, and for 

your love of the Marine Corps and this country and your marines. 

So thank you. 
47 

General AMOS. Thank you, sir. You know this better than most 

sitting in this room. So thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. And to Bonnie. Is she here right now? 

General AMOS. Sir, she is not. She is afraid to come in here. 

Mr. HUNTER. All right. Same here. Well, thanks to her too. Yes. 

She has probably gone through a lot more than you have because 

she doesn’t get to come out here and talk about it. 

So let me say first—I guess the question is: Now that you have 

taken—the Marine Corps has taken on the role of responding to 

the Benghazi-like attacks. The Marine Corps stepped up and said, 

‘‘Hey, we are going to take this on.’’ Right? And you have done 

that. You have a unit in Spain. You are doing special-purpose 

MAGTFs [Marine Air-Ground Task Force]. You are responding to 

that. So you have now stepped up. 

So I guess the question is: Does your budget request match what 

you are now responsible for? Because if it happens again, the Marine Corps is on the hook because you have stepped up and said, 

‘‘We are going to make sure it doesn’t happen again.’’ So are we 

able to make it not happen again, basically? 

General AMOS. Congressman, thank you. 

We have budgeted for that special-purpose MAGTF we currently 

have in Moro ́n, Spain, and right now that works out of Africa. You 

are well aware of its success stories and its relevance. 

We have also budgeted for a second one in another area of operations. So we actually have two in our budget in the FYDP. We 

planned for that. So the answer is yes. And that is just in recognition of the future security environment. 

Ideally, what Admiral Greenert and I would like to do is put 

those rascals on ships and, when we get ships, we will. But for the 

time being, we are going to put them in the areas of operations for 

the combatant commanders so that they can be relevant. 

Mr. HUNTER. So when do you make the transition from landbased to amphibs? Because that is what you just said, basically. 

Right? ‘‘We want to put them on amphibs and’’—— 

General AMOS. Exactly. What I am saying is, ideally, in a perfect 

world, what we would like to do is put them on—for instance, we 

are looking on the west coast of Africa right now. 

It is hard to find a base that will—a country that will allow us 

to operate out of there. A ship of some kind, afloat forward staging 

base—some type of ship, an amphib, would be perfect for that area. 

And Admiral Greenert and the Secretary and I are working on that 

right now. 

So that would be an indication or example of transition to that. 

But we are probably down the road, quite honestly, with the number of amphibs we have. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Commandant. 

Admiral Greenert, a question about the dual-mode Brimstone 

missile. 

We have been talking about swarming boats. That is the Hellfireish missile that has radar and IR [infrared]. So I have seen a video 

where you have a bunch of swarming boats and it takes out a 

whole bunch of them. 

And you can launch it off ships. You can launch it off UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. The British have done all the R&D. It is 
48 

a package deal. And you are very interested in this. I understand 

that. 

I just want to know how—how is that going? Are we going to actually do it? Are we going to employ it? Are we going to use it? 

Admiral GREENERT. As I sit here in front of you, I can’t tell you, 

yes, we are. As I sit here in front of you, I will tell you, this summer—earlier I was talking about we are going to do a swarm demonstration, we swarm and, at the same time, look at counterswarm. 

During that, next comes the lethality, what kind of guns, what 

kind of missiles, what kind of sensors are we going to put on these. 

So I guess I would say stay tuned. We will keep you informed 

where we want to go with that. I think we need to—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you like the missile? 

Admiral GREENERT. Come again, sir? 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you like the missile? 

Admiral GREENERT. I do like the missile. 

The question is: How do you integrate it? How does it perform? 

How do I buy it? And if I need to—I don’t want to say ‘‘get 

around’’—how do I get it through the system so it isn’t another one 

of these—you know the deal—program of record, long-term thing? 

We need this thing out there soon, if we need it. 

Mr. HUNTER. So because they have already done the investment, 

the Brits—they have already done the investment and it is a nonR&D product that is actually packaged and ready to go, Secretary 

Mabus, is there a fast track for something like this, where the 

Navy says, ‘‘Hey, it is good to go. There is no R&D. We just want 

it’’? 

Secretary MABUS. There are fast tracks for urgent needs like 

this. And whether it is this missile or some alternative, we are already moving to meet the swarming things. We have got some 

money in this budget to put the Longbow missile in the surface 

warfare component of the LCS. 

So, yes. The short answer is yes, there are. But a little bit longer 

answer is you have got to do what the CNO said first and show 

that we can integrate it, that we can use it, that it can do the job 

as advertised. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you all. 

And I just want to say in the end, I mean—you know, the Army 

is going to knock me for this, but probably in the next 15, 20 years, 

the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are going to be out there 

front and center. 

Everybody—the last two or three SecDefs [Secretaries of Defense] have said we are not going to get in a big land war again, 

it is all going to be pushing out, trying to reach out and touch people. And you all are going to be front and center. I know you have 

got a lot of planning to do. 

You have got the F–35s. You have got UCLASS. You have to be 

able to put everything together. You have got to be able to see it. 

And it is going to change the way that we fight. With everything 

networked, it is very complex and very complicated. 

And I wish you luck. We are here to help, and anything that we 

can do, let us know, because you have your work cut out for you. 
49 

And I want to say thanks for your service. General Amos, congratulations, sir, on a beautiful career and congratulations on getting out relatively unscathed. 

And, with that, I would like to yield to the gentlelady from California, Ms. Shea-Porter—or from New Hampshire. I am sorry. I get 

those confused. They are both on the coast though. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I would say they are both on water. It works. 

So thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

And congratulations to you, General, and thank you for your 

service. 

My question here is for the Secretary. You said in your testimony 

that maintaining undersea dominance is vital to the U.S. Navy, 

and we continue to fund the Virginia-class subs each year. 

Now, I have the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in my district, and 

you know how famous they are for the great work they do. And 

they meet all of the challenges, including the sequester last year, 

which had an impact. But they have been on the job and their 

record is absolutely wonderful. 

So my question is very simple: In considering a future BRAC— 

and you know what the Congress had to say about that—but in 

considering a future BRAC, is the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in 

that equation at all? I believe their work is essential. And my question is: Do you and does the Navy? 

Secretary MABUS. I am going to leave out whether—because we 

haven’t been authorized to do a BRAC. And so I don’t know what 

would be looked at. 

But I will say that all our naval shipyards, including Portsmouth, do incredibly good work. They do the work that we have to 

have to keep not only our submarines, but all our ships at sea, 

maintained at the highest state of readiness. They do so under 

sometimes difficult conditions. And so we value them very, very 

much. We value the workers. 

And I think that one of the things—when we were first forced 

to furlough last year, one of the things that Navy exempted from 

furlough was the shipyard workers, to make sure that we—or most 

of the shipyard workers—to make sure that we kept them on the 

job because we couldn’t make up that time if they were not there. 

And I think that that speaks to the value and the importance 

that we put on them, not that we value any of our civilians less, 

but just that their work is so time-sensitive and, if you lose a 

month or a few days, there is no place to make it up. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Right. And, as you know, they almost did go 

through the full furlough, but that was changed, fortunately. 

But my concern is that, as we look forward and we recognize 

there is dangers around the world and that is the reason that we 

continue to make the Virginia-class subs, we have to also make 

sure that we have the quality workers and that we have the facilities. And this is a public yard, as you know, that is open 24/7 and 

has been there, and saltwater runs in the veins New England. 

So I just wanted to ask that question. I appreciate that you 

couldn’t really answer that at this moment, but I just wanted that 

for the record. 
50 

Secretary MABUS. Well, and I will add that, in previous BRACs, 

the Navy and Marine Corps have taken out a lot of unused capacity. Now, I do think that DOD-wide we should take another look 

at what we have. 

But the Navy and Marine Corps, because of previous BRACs— 

and I was Governor of Mississippi during a BRAC when one of our 

bases was targeted. And so I know exactly what you are going 

through. But I think that the quality of work and the necessity of 

work of all these shipyards speaks for themselves. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Right. Well, we barely survived that round of 

BRAC, as you know. And when you see the work that they are 

doing and recognize how essential it is for national security, you 

know, I hope that will get the full measure of consideration. 

Thank you very much. 

And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

And if there are no more questions, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 12, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 12, 2014 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 12, 2014 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 12, 2014 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES 

General AMOS. I recall hearing about Major Weirick’s 21 Sept 2013 email briefly 

from someone on my staff, but I do not remember the full context, nor the circumstances when I first read it. [See page 19.] 

General AMOS. Major Weirick’s Battalion Commanding Officer issued a lawful 

military protective order as a result of the email. Commanders may issue a military 

protective order to safeguard discipline and good order in his or her unit. [See page 

19.] 

General AMOS. No, I do not fear Major Weirick. [See page 19.] 

General AMOS. No. Mr. Hogue has not been reprimanded. [See page 19.] 

General AMOS. Inasmuch as this matter is under review by the DOD Inspector 

General, I will not comment further. [See page 19.] 

General AMOS. Of the nine Marines held accountable for their actions in this matter, seven enlisted and two officers, only one, a Captain, was separated involuntarily 

after an administrative board found substandard performance on his behalf. This officer received an honorable discharge. This separation action, taken by the Secretary 

of the Navy, was determined subsequent to the NPR interview. No others involved 

were separated involuntarily as a result of performance or misconduct. One other 

officer accepted non-judicial punishment and remains on active duty. Four of the 

seven enlisted Marines were medically retired. One of the seven enlisted Marines 

remains on active duty; another served out his enlistment and separated from the 

Marine Corps. The last of the seven enlisted Marines died in a later training accident. [See page 19.] 

General AMOS. Editorial criticism is a part of being a service chief and making 

difficult decisions. 

During my service as Commandant, the Marine Corps has faced a number of challenges that we have worked diligently to address and to answer in support of our 

national security. Marines completed our mission in Iraq after 7 hard years of fighting there. We have waged a counter insurgency campaign in Afghanistan, while simultaneously helping train and assist Afghan National Security Forces. 

While thousands of Marines operated in Afghanistan, the Marine Corps continued 

to provide the best trained and equipped Marines ready to respond to global uncertainty around the globe. All of this being done during a period of fiscal uncertainty, 

marked by significantly reduced budgets, a substantial drawdown of force structure, 

and a civilian workforce furlough . . . all done during a time of war. This is unprecedented. The Marine Corps has faced these challenges head on and has performed 

well in every effort. [See page 19.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Secretary MABUS. On average, the DON uses 30 million barrels (bbls) of oil per year. Therefore, a $1 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil effectively results in a 

$30 million annual bill to the Department. Department of Defense fuel purchases 

are made by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy Working Capital Fund. In FY11, the DON budgeted for fuel costs at $127.26/bbl. When the standard price increased on June 1, 2011 to $165.90/bbl, DON actually paid $38.64/bbl more than 

budgeted for four months of the fiscal year. Thus, the additional DON FY11 fuel 

costs were just over $500M. Similarly, in FY12, DON budgeted for fuel costs at $131.04/bbl. This price was 

set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) Comptroller in November 2010. However, the price of petroleum 

increased between November 2010 and October 2011, resulting in DLA Energy adjusting the price to $165.90/bbl to ensure solvency of its Working Capital Fund. The 

price of fuel was adjusted three more times that year with the total fuel costs exceeding the initial DON budgeted amount by approximately $500M. In recent years, 

DON has covered its additional fuel costs through reprogramming funding from 

other defense accounts. 

From FY11–FY13, the Services received an unfunded bill of $3.2B. If OSD had 

not reprogrammed $2B in FY12 and FY13, the Services would have seen a $5.2B 
154 

increase to their fuel costs. Unfunded fuel bills in the year of execution significantly 

impact training, operations, and ultimately, national security. [See page 29.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

General AMOS. Please see the attached response from OSD. The Marine Corps 

continues to work in coordination with OSD on this issue. [See page 43.] 

[The response referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 149.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Admiral GREENERT. A final decision on maintaining or terminating the MH–60R 

multi-year procurement (MYP) contract has been deferred to FY16. Our proposed 

FY15 budget fully funds the MYP in FY15 with advance procurement (AP) for the 

29 MH–60R aircraft (and full procurement of 8 MH–60S aircraft). If the Navy returns to BCA levels in FY16, the subsequent fiscal constraints would challenge our 

ability to procure the 29 aircraft. MH–60R procurement would be aligned to force 

structure reductions. This scenario may cause MH–60R MYP contract termination 

which could cause contract termination costs and reduce rotary wing capacity for 

Navy. 

We have not determined the exact costs and fees associated with a cancellation. 

Cancellation fees would be calculated in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. Any cancellation decision and notification would occur after the FY16 budget is approved by Congress. 

The cost to procure 29 MH–60R aircraft is estimated at $760 million; the exact 

amount will be based on the FY15 appropriation. Both MYP contracts (MH–60R and 

MH–60S) require FY15 AP funding in order to maintain multi-year aircraft pricing 

for FY15. Navy will continue to work with Congress and our industry partners on 

a resolution for the FY16 budget submission. [See page 35.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 12, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. We’ve had many lessons learned from contracting actions during 

contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. 

What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but 

to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, 

and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. How are you incorporating lessons learned from contingency contracting in 

Iraq and Afghanistan into the professional military education of your military and 

civilian personnel? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral GREENERT. In conjunction with the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff and other Military Services, the Department of the 

Navy (DON) is actively engaged in efforts to institutionalize Operational Contract 

Support (OCS) through a variety of initiatives in the areas of education, training, 

joint exercises, doctrine, and service-level policies; incorporating lessons learned 

from exercises and current operations. The Navy is an active member of the DOD 

OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board, which provides oversight for all ongoing and planned OCS related initiatives across the Department. 

While the DON is in the initial stages of fully developing its OCS capability, funding for OCS initiatives will continue to face resourcing challenges and fiscal risk in 

light of the Department’s overall limited resources. 

Mr. MCKEON. We’ve had many lessons learned from contracting actions during 

contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. 

What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but 

to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, 

and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. How are you incorporating lessons learned from contingency contracting in 

Iraq and Afghanistan into the professional military education of your military and 

civilian personnel? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps is actively engaged with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff and other Military Services in efforts to institutionalize Operational Contract Support (OCS). The Department of Defense (DOD) 

FY14–17 OCS Action Plan, currently in staffing, identifies specific actions the Marine Corps is taking to close the remaining OCS capability gaps. The Marine Corps 

has taken on a bigger role in OCS implementation within DOD, and has been designated as an associate member of the DOD OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB), which provides oversight for all OCS related initiatives across 

DOD. 

The Marine Corps is making great progress by incorporating lessons learned from 

exercises and current operations to institutionalize OCS across the Corps. Through 

a variety of OCS initiatives in the areas of training and education, organization, 

doctrine and service level policy, the Marine Corps is defining OCS within its 

unique warfighting mission. 

The Marine Corps OCS initiatives include: employment of an OCS cell within the 

Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Logistics Staff to support contract planning and contractor integration for Operation Enduring Freedom; developed OCS 

specific training scenarios to incorporate into Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX) for 

deploying forces; establishing OCS focused billets within our Marine Expeditionary 

Forces as well as the Marine Corps Service Component Command assigned in support of the Combatant Commanders; drafting policy on OCS responsibilities at the 

various levels of operation and support within the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps 

is committed to establishing OCS capability to support current and future contingency missions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. General Amos, as the war in Afghanistan dies down, what is your 

long-term plan for the wounded warrior regiment? 
158 

General AMOS. Keeping Faith with Marines, Sailors and their families remains 

one of my top priorities. You have my commitment that, the Marine Corps, through 

the Wounded Warrior Regiment (WWR), will continue recovery care in times of war 

and in peacetime. We recognize that recovery care must be enduring in view of 

issues resulting from the current decade of war, including, catastrophic injures requiring acute care, traumatic brain injury, and complex psychological health problems. These problems are not solved by short-term care and require continuing services. 

The Marine Corps’ post-2014 strategy and our reduced presence in Afghanistan 

will result in fewer combat casualties; however, currently 50 percent of the WWR’s 

Marines are ill or injured outside of a combat zone. While we will ensure our capabilities remain at 100 percent, the WWR is weighing options to streamline its global 

presence while preserving flexibility to ramp-up capabilities if requirements emerge. 

Viable options to right size WWR’s global presence may include converting peripheral detachments to liaison teams with Recovery Care Coordinator capacity. The 

concentration of care would be provided at five ‘‘Recovery Centers of Excellence’’: 

Camp Pendleton, Naval Medical Center San Diego, Walter Reed National Military 

Medical Center, Camp Lejeune, and San Antonio Military Medical Center. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Where have you had to accept risk in your research and development initiatives? Which R&D initiatives have you protected as core to your future 

needs? 

Admiral GREENERT. Some risk was accepted in PB–15 in programs such as Next 

Generation Jammer (NGJ), F/A–18 improvements, and Unmanned Carrier 

Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS). 

Navy continues to invest in the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP)—keeping our 

top priority program on track. Navy has budgeted $1.2 billion in FY 2015 for ORP. 

FY 2015 research and development will focus on the propulsion plant, missile compartment development, and platform development technologies like the propulsor, 

electric actuation, maneuvering/ship control, and signatures. In support of longstanding bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom these funds also provide for 

joint development of missile launch technologies. To meet the cost targets for the 

program, the Department also continues design for affordability. 

To protect Navy’s future needs, R&D in other programs received modest or no reductions in PB–15 including: Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), Science and 

Technology (S&T), Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), P–8, and AEGIS Combat System. 

Several key programs received additional RDT&E funding in PB–15. These include Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW), Railgun, MQ–4 Triton, and 

E–2D Advanced Hawkeye. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. I would like to understand how the budget supports equipping the 

Navy to address ISR requirements in the Asia-Pacific region. As you know, the Pacific area is incredibly expansive making it a challenge for military planning. What 

kind of technologies is the Navy investing in to support the Pacific-focused military 

strategy? I am especially interested in how unmanned systems like the MQ–4C Triton can help meet the unique challenges of this region. 

Secretary MABUS. The expansiveness of the Pacific area does present unique challenges in both time and distance. The Navy is developing and investing in technologies and capabilities to deliver scalable, persistent, and networked Intelligence, 

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) providing battle space awareness across the full range of maritime missions. The Navy will provide the 

warfighter with the right sensor, on the right platform, at the right place and time, 

for the right effects. MQ–4C Triton leverages reach and persistence and when integrated with manned platforms holds potential adversaries at risk earlier and over 

longer periods of time. In its primary role, MQ–4C Triton is intended for operational 

and tactical users such as the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander, Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary Strike Group, and Surface Action Group by providing intelligence preparation of the environment and a persistent source of information to maintain the Common Operational and Tactical Picture of the maritime 

battle space. The 360-degree Field of Regard sensor suite on MQ–4C Triton includes: Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) maritime radar which is an AESA 

radar with search, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Inverse Synthetic Aperture 
159 

Radar (ISAR) modes; Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensor; Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver; and Electronic Support Measures (ESM). 

Ms. BORDALLO. I understand that there has been an active debate within the 

Navy regarding the role of the UCLASS program and what missions it will fulfill. 

It seems some argue that the Navy needs additional ISR assets as soon as possible 

and basing these on an aircraft carrier could provide a number of benefits. On the 

other side, are those suggesting that the most effective way to utilize aircraft carriers and project power into the future is by developing a robust, survivable or 

‘‘stealthy’’ platform that is capable of operating in contested airspace. What do you 

think and why? Although I appreciate the need for additional ISR, I worry that 

those requirements could be filled by other means and developing another unmanned system that can’t operate in an A2/AD environment is short-sighted. 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy remains committed to the Unmanned Carrier 

Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program, which will provide 

a carrier-based UAS to extend the ISR and precision strike reach of the air wing 

in a contested environment. UCLASS operational requirements were approved by 

the CNO on 5 April 2013 and have remained constant. They were subsequently validated by the JROC to align with the DOD’s comprehensive capability. These requirements delineate the need for CVN based ISR&T to meet today’s operational 

needs and future operations in contested environments. The in-depth and comprehensive discussions you reference centered not on the operational requirement, 

but on the Government’s desire to define to the industry base the need to ensure 

the system procured today had the required future capability to achieve contested 

operational requirements. It was less a debate and more of an analysis to understand the balance between cost, schedule, technology, and industrial base manufacturing capability. The resulting UCLASS acquisition strategy leverages industry’s 

ability to deliver within 4–5 years from contract award, a capable and survivable 

air vehicle within the $150M cost per orbit requirement, while preserving the ability 

to incrementally increase Air Vehicle (AV) capability in the future to match evolving 

threats. The in-depth analysis referenced herein will result in a UCLASS system 

that includes CVN based ISR &T along with precision strike with robust survivability capable of operating in denied environments. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I would like to understand how the budget supports equipping the 

Navy to address ISR requirements in the Asia-Pacific region. As you know, the Pacific area is incredibly expansive making it a challenge for military planning. What 

kind of technologies is the Navy investing in to support the Pacific-focused military 

strategy? I am especially interested in how unmanned systems like the MQ–4C Triton can help meet the unique challenges of this region. 

Admiral GREENERT. The expansiveness of the Pacific area does present unique 

challenges in both time and distance. The Navy is developing and investing in technologies and capabilities to deliver scalable, persistent, and networked Intelligence, 

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) providing battle space awareness across the full range of maritime missions. MQ–4C Triton provides reach and 

persistence, and when integrated with manned platforms, holds potential adversaries at risk earlier and over longer periods of time. In its primary role, MQ–4C 

Triton is intended for operational and tactical users such as the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander, Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary Strike Group, 

and Surface Action Group by providing intelligence preparation of the environment 

and a persistent source of information to maintain the Common Operational and 

Tactical Picture of the maritime battle space. The 360-degree Field of Regard sensor 

suite on MQ–4C Triton includes: Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) maritime 

radar which is an active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with search, 

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) 

modes; Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensor; Automatic Identification System 

(AIS) receiver; and Electronic Support Measures (ESM). 

Ms. BORDALLO. I understand that there has been an active debate within the 

Navy regarding the role of the UCLASS program and what missions it will fulfill. 

It seems some argue that the Navy needs additional ISR assets as soon as possible 

and basing these on an aircraft carrier could provide a number of benefits. On the 

other side, are those suggesting that the most effective way to utilize aircraft carriers and project power into the future is by developing a robust, survivable or 

‘‘stealthy’’ platform that is capable of operating in contested airspace. What do you 

think and why? Although I appreciate the need for additional ISR, I worry that 

those requirements could be filled by other means and developing another unmanned system that can’t operate in an A2/AD environment is short-sighted. 

Admiral GREENERT. The UCLASS operational requirements that I approved on 5 

April 2013 have remained constant and have been validated by the JROC to align 

with the DOD’s comprehensive capability. These requirements delineate the need 
160 

for CVN based ISR&T to meet today’s operational needs and future operations in 

contested environments. At EOC (within 4–5 years of air vehicle segment contract 

award), the UCLASS acquisition strategy will deliver a CVN-based ISR&T system 

within the affordability KPP cost guidelines ($150M per orbit) while allowing for 

growth capability to match evolving threats. The resultant UCLASS system will include CVN-based ISR &T, precision strike, and robust survivability for operating in 

denied environments. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE 

Mr. KLINE. What is the plan for upgrading the 36 legacy H–1 engines that are 

installed in the updated H–1 aircraft, the AH–1Z and UH–1Y? If there is a plan, 

what avenues are being explored to fund this initiative and how can Congress help 

complete the upgrade of these aircraft in order to have a fleet of H–1s with the 

same engine? If there is not a plan, why not? 

General AMOS. The 36 AH–1Z aircraft, equipped with legacy T700–401 engines, 

are logistically supported and will continue to be as long as the engines remain in 

our inventory. This issue has been officially considered for funding by Headquarters 

Marine Corps during the creation of POM–14, POM–15, and POM–16 budgets as 

well as the Naval Aviation Enterprise Fleet Readiness Initiative for POM–16. Due 

to competing priorities in this fiscally constrained environment, the engine upgrade 

has thus far remained unfunded. However, we included this as a candidate for funding on the Marine Corps’ Unfunded Requirements (UFR) submission and the President’s Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative (OGSI) in the FY15 President’s 

Budget submission. Additional funding associated with the OGSI will be used this 

year to upgrade these 36 AH–1Z aircraft. 

In the long term, the Marine Corps plans to buy T700–401C engines to replace 

these legacy engines. Upgrading these engines—to the T700–401C—is a priority, 

and we continue to explore all avenues of funding for this initiative. 

Mr. KLINE. In addition to constraints being imposed on the end-strength of the 

force, constraints have also been imposed on capabilities; what are your top priorities for capabilities or resources in order to maintain the Marine Corps as the Nation’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness? How has this been affected by the recent 

budgetary constraints? 

General AMOS. In order to continue to execute the missions assigned the Marine 

Corps in both the Defense Strategic Guidance and execute our Title X responsibilities the Marine Corps must maintain a focus on capabilities that provide readily 

available scalable forces. We will retain a forward and ready posture that enables 

immediate crisis response. If required, this initial response force has the ability to 

composite with other forward forces to provide additional capability as needed to 

satisfy Geographic Combatant Commander requirements. We must be prepared as 

individuals and as a force to move rapidly, operate immediately, adapt to conditions 

and succeed in dispersed and austere environments. The key resources that provide 

us these capabilities are amphibious ships coupled with programs such as ACV, 

F35B, and the next generation of connectors. All of these will allow us to execute 

future amphibious operations from crisis response to forcible entry at the times and 

places of our choosing. Programs such as JLTV and G/ATOR will replace outdated 

legacy systems and allow Marines to be successful on the 21st century battlefield. 

Budgetary pressures continue to cause the Marine Corps to take a careful approach 

to balancing near term readiness with long term investments in capabilities. 

Planned reductions in FY16 and beyond would cause equipment modernization and 

many procurement programs to suffer cuts or elimination to protect the investments 

in the major acquisition programs detailed above. 

Mr. KLINE. Please explain the tradeoffs made when designing the force and your 

opinion of how this will affect both the Marine Corps and national security in the 

short term and long term 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps is designed as a forward-deployed force, immediately available for crisis response. It will be a ready force, involved with theater 

security activities, reassuring our partners and allies and deterring potential adversaries. In order to prioritize these emerging demands in a fiscally constrained environment, we accepted risk in Major Combat Operations and stability operations. 

The redesigned Marine Corps made tradeoffs in some high end capabilities, like 

armor and artillery, in order to concentrate on our role as America’s expeditionary 

force in readiness. 

In the short term, our focus on readiness ensures that 20 of our 21 battalions will 

be adequately trained and ready for a major war. However, should major war occur, 

we will be all in until the war is over. We will have very little left for crises that 
161 

could occur in other parts of the world. To meet presence demands, our force will 

maintain a high operational tempo at 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio which will increase risk by stressing training requirements and straining our career force. 

The long term impacts depend in large part on resourcing levels. A return to sequestration in FY16 with a 175k force would equate to high risk. At this lowered 

resource level, our units that deploy to combat would not be as well trained, and 

would be slower arriving. This means that it will take longer to achieve our objectives, and the human cost will be higher. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. As you are well aware, the Army’s Common Remotely Operated 

Weapon Station, or CROWS, is under full-materials release, with more than 11,000 

systems in service. I am sure you are aware that the CROWS system would allow 

Marines to engage the enemy from inside the relative safety of an armored vehicle; 

using a joystick and a computer screen, benefiting from the inherent advantages of 

a state of the art sensor system that would allow them to engage the enemy in all 

conditions. General, one would assume that a system such as CROWS, with a proven capacity to protect troops, a combat proven legacy, and a significant fielding investment already made by the Army, would be very attractive to the Marine Corps. 

Even more so now that the Navy has already adopted this system. General, can you 

tell this committee about the Marine Corps’ current thinking regarding procurement 

of this system? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) assessed the Commonly Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS) Remote Weapons Station 

(RWS) on a HMMWV in 2010 in Camp Lejeune. While the assessment indicated 

there were some gains in terms of operator protection, accuracy and nighttime visibility, the Marines using the system reported degradation in their situational 

awareness and a loss of field of view. MCWL performed technology investigations 

to address these challenges, however no formal requirements resulted from their efforts. MCWL later transferred the RWS systems to the Office of Naval Research for 

use on their Gunslinger Packages for Advanced Convoy Security (GunPACS) on our 

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements (MTVRs). 

There have been no further requirements generated by our Marines in the operating forces to procure a remote weapons system, of which CROWS is one example. 

We have made provisions within future requirements for Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) to integrate a remote weapons 

system. Further, government sponsored technology demonstrations and evaluations 

have been conducted to better understand RWS performance. Platform specific requirements are currently under review. Future research and development will explore means to mitigate Situational Awareness degradation and effectively integrate 

RWS technology into our military vehicles. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. Please provide the calculations that support the statement that a $1 increase in the price of a barrel of oil costs the Navy $30,000,000 in increased 

fuel costs. 

Secretary MABUS. On average, the DON uses 30 million barrels (bbls) of oil per year. Therefore, a $1 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil effectively results in a 

$30 million annual bill to the Department. Department of Defense fuel purchases 

are made by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy Working Capital Fund. In FY11, the DON budgeted for fuel costs at $127.26/bbl. When the standard price increased on June 1, 2011 to $165.90/bbl, DON actually paid $38.64/bbl more than 

budgeted for four months of the fiscal year. Thus, the additional DON FY11 fuel 

costs were just over $500M. Similarly, in FY12, DON budgeted for fuel costs at $131.04/bbl. This price was 

set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) Comptroller in November 2010. However, the price of petroleum 

increased between November 2010 and October 2011, resulting in DLA Energy adjusting the price to $165.90/bbl to ensure solvency of its Working Capital Fund. The 

price of fuel was adjusted three more times that year with the total fuel costs exceeding the initial DON budgeted amount by approximately $500M. In recent years, 

DON has covered its additional fuel costs through reprogramming funding from 

other defense accounts. 

From FY11–FY13, the Services received an unfunded bill of $3.2B. If OSD had 

not reprogrammed $2B in FY12 and FY13, the Services would have seen a $5.2B 
162 

increase to their fuel costs. Unfunded fuel bills in the year of execution significantly 

impact training, operations, and ultimately, national security. 

Mr. CONAWAY. What is the Navy’s total cost for fuel annually? And, how much 

fuel does the Navy purchase annually? 

Secretary MABUS. According to our financial records, the Department of the Navy 

(DON) purchased a total of 30,052,000 barrels of oil for worldwide missions in FY 

2012. Further, an additional 8,422,000 barrels were procured for overseas contingency operations (OCO), bringing the total number of barrels of oil purchased that 

year to 38,474,000. Under normal operations, DON typically uses about 30 million 

barrels a year. 

FY 2012 was a particularly volatile year in the oil markets. That year the Services were budgeted a standard price of refined product of $131.04 per barrel. As a 

result of upward price movements and market volatility, the actual price paid by 

the Services for refined product was $145.18 per barrel. This left a balance of $14.14 

per barrel the Department had to accommodate in FY 2012 and resulted in unfunded bill of more than $500 million in the year of execution. Thus, the total cost 

for fuel in FY 2012 was $5,585,655,320. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Of this total cost, what percentage does foreign oil account for annually? 

Secretary MABUS. DLA Energy does not track the sources of crude oil, except to 

ensure that crude oil does not come from prohibited sources (Iran, Sudan, and North 

Korea). As oil is a fungible product, once it enters the refinery stream and fuel distribution network, there is no meaningful way to know where the refined product 

came from. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Of this percentage, how much foreign oil is purchased when the 

Navy refuels in foreign ports? 

Secretary MABUS. DLA Energy does not track the sources of crude oil, except to 

ensure that crude oil does not come from prohibited sources (Iran, Sudan, and North 

Korea). As oil is a fungible product, once it enters the refinery stream and fuel distribution network, there is no meaningful way to know where the refined product 

came from. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Won’t the Navy be reliant on some percentage of foreign oil by necessity of operating in forward theaters where it must refuel in foreign ports? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, refueling in foreign ports is done by fuel provided in that 

foreign port. And increasingly, more alternative fuels are entering the foreign distribution networks. Moreover, competitively price alternative fuels, foreign or domestic, provide greater flexibility and imply greater cost stability as a result. 

Mr. CONAWAY. When the Navy purchases oil in the U.S., how do you know, or 

distinguish, what oil is from North America and what is foreign imported from overseas? 

Secretary MABUS. At the point of purchase by DLA Energy, it is unknown whether oil originates from the United States, elsewhere in North America, or from another foreign country. DLA Energy does not track the source of crude oil, except to 

ensure that crude oil does not come from prohibited sources. 

Mr. CONAWAY. When refueling in foreign ports, what percentage of annual foreign 

oil purchases are conducted with the SEACARD program that secures a predetermined price negotiated and contracted by the Defense Logistics Agency? 

Secretary MABUS. Of the nearly 1.3 billion gallons of fuel the Navy purchases annually, SEACARD purchases made in calendar year (CY) 2013 amounted to 8.67 

million gallons, and were almost entirely for Marine Gas Oil (MGO). MGO is a commercial substitute that is approved for use as an alternative when the Navy’s preferred marine fuel, F–76, is not available. The remainder of SEACARD purchases 

in CY13 were sourced from the bulk fuel programs, which also negotiates and contracts either an annual or three-year fuel procurement. 

Compared to the bulk fuels purchase program annual requirements for the Western Pacific and Atlantic/European/Mediterranean programs in 2013, the SEACARD 

purchase amounts represent approximately 2.8% of the total F–76 overseas requirements. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Do you anticipate transporting U.S.-produced biofuels to foreign 

ports in order to reduce our dependence on foreign oil? 

Secretary MABUS. DLA Energy does not track the sources of crude oil, except to 

ensure that crude oil does not come from prohibited sources (Iran, Sudan, and North 

Korea). As oil is a fungible product, once it enters the refinery stream and fuel distribution network, there is no meaningful way to know where the refined product 

came from. 

In all likelihood, the majority of fuels acquired in foreign ports come from foreign 

sources. And increasingly, more alternative fuels are entering the foreign distribu-
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tion networks. Moreover, competitively price alternative fuels, foreign or domestic, 

provide greater flexibility and imply greater cost stability as a result. 

Mr. CONAWAY. In previous testimony, you mentioned that transporting conventional fuel into Afghanistan has cost lives—if biofuels replace conventional fuels, 

will the U.S. no longer have to use convoys to transport biofuels to theaters of war? 

Secretary MABUS. Alternative fuels are intended to be drop-in replacements that 

function in a manner identical to the petroleum that they displace. Alternative fuels 

increase the fuel supply base and give our forward deployed troops additional fuel 

flexibility. Reducing the reliance on fuel convoys to transport fuel into theater, the 

USMC has introduced a number of renewable energy technologies such as solarpowered battery chargers, tent liners, LED lighting, and renewable power generators that reduce fuel requirements while maintaining or enhancing capabilities. In 

Afghanistan, these technologies were made available to all battalions operating in 

theater, resulting in lower fuel consumption and reducing demands to transport fuel 

into theater. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Do you foresee a time where the U.S. and our ally and partner 

in North America cannot produce oil? 

Secretary MABUS. In order to serve the national interest the DON must have secured access to reliable sources of energy to train for and execute its missions. Planning for a future where that energy source remains tied to a single commodity and 

all its attendant risks is not in the best interest of either the DON or the Nation 

that it serves. 

Oil is a finite resource. It would be imprudent to rely on that single commodity, 

riding its price shocks and supply constraints until the very last drop, before seeking alternative sources. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Does it make sense to stand up an entirely new industry when we 

already have one that efficiently and effectively provides for our energy needs right 

now and according to experts will be able to do so far into the future? 

Secretary MABUS. While the oil market has been able to supply fuel to the DON, 

the problem of at what cost still remains. In FY11 and FY12 the DOD saw an unfunded bill in the year of execution of $3 billion due to sharp price movements and 

volatile markets. In FY13, oil price shocks and volatility would have resulted in an 

additional $1 billion unfunded bill had it not been for the reprogramming of DOD 

funds. This unpredictable global commodity has direct and negative impacts on 

training, readiness, and national security. 

It is irresponsible and in direct conflict to our national security to not pursue alternative fuels. As major consumers of liquid fuel, the United States as a whole and 

the DOD in particular would greatly benefit from a competitive, domestic renewable 

fuels industry capable of broadening the commodity supply base and ultimately 

helping to ease the impacts of volatility oil markets. Further, oil is a finite resource 

and to rely solely on this one resource until the day it runs out is once again at 

direct odds with our Nation’s security. 

Mr. CONAWAY. In preparation for the Great Green Fleet in 2016, how much 

money do you expect to spend on biofuels? 

Secretary MABUS. The DON will only purchase biofuels at a price cost competitive 

to petroleum-based fuel. The integration of competitively priced drop-in biofuel with 

petroleum-based fuels marks the start of the ‘‘new normal,’’ where drop-in biofuels 

will be fully incorporated into logistics and operations. One early indicator of the 

price that DON can expect to pay in 2016 is the average price of the DPA Title III 

alternative fuel companies. They have committed to provide more than 100 million 

gallons per year with production starting in 2016 at an average price point of less 

than $3.36/gallon. For comparison, DLA Energy’s standard fuel price is $3.73/gallon. 

Competitively priced drop-in biofuel is on track to begin entering DOD’s distribution 

system in 2015 and will provide greater flexibility and financial stability to DOD 

fuel costs. These fuels also provide the ability to offset the $1B fuel cost adjustments 

that have occurred several times in recent years. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How much was the DPA biofuel purchase that you mentioned in 

your written testimony? 

Secretary MABUS. To date, no biofuel purchases have been made through the 

DPA. Beginning in 2016, the DPA companies will be producing biofuel at commercial scale. Based upon their commitments, the DPA companies stand to: 

• produce more than 100 million gallons per year of drop-in, military compatible 

fuels; 

• at a weighted average price of less than $3.36 per gallon; and 

• with at least 50% lower lifecycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than that of 

conventional fuel. 
164 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. The events at Forward Operating Base Delhi from July 24 to August 10, 2012 and the related referral of Major Jason Brezler to a Board of Inquiry 

are the subject of criminal investigations by the Justice Department and the military, and civil investigations by the Department of Defense and Marine Corps inspectors general. Is it premature to separate Major Brezler, a current or prospective 

witness in these investigations, from the Marines at this time? 

General AMOS. Board of Inquiry procedures are designed to provide officers full 

and fair hearings when there is reason to believe they have not maintained required 

standards of performance or conduct and may therefore be separated for cause. 

These administrative separation proceedings are independent of the investigations 

by the Justice Department and the military and civil investigations by the Department of Defense and Marine Corps Inspectors General. Regardless of whether Major 

Brezler is ultimately separated from the Marine Corps, he may serve as a witness 

in these investigations. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Were the reported statements of the Marines’ Office of Legislative 

Affairs to the House Armed Services Committee staff circa October 30, 2013 that 

Major Jason Brezler (1) sent classified information from home, (2) waited six weeks 

to self-report a possible spillage of classified information, (3) destroyed evidence, (4) 

had his computer confiscated, (5) had 107 classified documents his computer, all of 

which were (6) clearly marked as such, accurate based on information available to 

the Marines at that time? Are they supported by sworn testimony at Major Brezler’s 

December 17–19 Board of Inquiry? 

General AMOS. Yes, the reported statements reflected the most accurate information available to the Marine Corps at the time. Boards of Inquiry receive extensive 

review of both the legal and the factual sufficiency of the proceedings. Evidence at 

a Board of Inquiry, which is an administrative proceeding, can include documentary 

evidence, sworn testimony, sworn and unsworn statements of the respondent, and 

other forms of evidence. At this stage of review, it is not possible to determine the 

precise format of the evidence that led the Board of Inquiry to its findings and recommendations. Further, because Major Brezler’s Board of Inquiry is still under review, it would be inappropriate to comment on the proceedings at this point. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. I understand that the Navy is considering ending its buy of the highly praised MH–60R helicopter after this year’s buy—which would leave the Navy 

with 29 aircraft short of its requirement and would break the current H–60 multiyear procurement. What is the termination liability of such a move and what are 

the effects this will have on the price of the Army UH–60M aircraft for next year 

if the multi-year is broken? I understand the necessities of your budget crunch, but 

will this have a negative effect on the Navy’s operational capability being short this 

many aircraft? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral GREENERT. A final decision on maintaining or terminating the MH–60R multi-year procurement (MYP) contract has been deferred to 

FY16. Our proposed FY15 budget fully funds the MYP in FY15 with advance procurement (AP) for the 29 MH–60R aircraft (and full procurement of 8 MH–60S aircraft). If the Navy returns to BCA levels in FY16, the subsequent fiscal constraints 

would challenge our ability to procure the 29 aircraft. MH–60R procurement would 

be aligned to force structure reductions. This scenario may cause MH–60R MYP 

contract termination which could cause contract termination costs and reduce rotary 

wing capacity for Navy. 

We have not determined the exact costs and fees or effects on Army UH–60M associated with a cancellation. Cancellation fees would be calculated in accordance 

with Federal Acquisition Regulations. Any cancellation decision and notification 

would occur after the FY16 budget is approved by Congress. 

The cost to procure 29 MH–60R aircraft is estimated at $760 million; the exact 

amount will be based on the FY15 appropriation. Both MYP contracts (MH–60R and 

MH–60S) require FY15 AP funding in order to maintain multi-year aircraft pricing 

for FY15. Navy will continue to work with Congress and our industry partners on 

a resolution for the FY16 budget submission. 

Mr. BROOKS. I saw that the President’s Budget cut 29 MH–60R helicopters from 

the planned procurement. I wonder how this will negatively impact the Department, 

the warfighter, and, ultimately, the taxpayer. Won’t the USG, specifically the Department of the Navy, be faced with termination liability? Won’t breaking the multiyear cost close to the amount of the deleted 29 helicopters? 
165 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral GREENERT. A final decision on maintaining or terminating the MH–60R multi-year procurement (MYP) contract has been deferred to 

FY16. Our proposed FY15 budget fully funds the MYP in FY15 with advance procurement (AP) for the 29 MH–60R aircraft (and full procurement of 8 MH–60S aircraft). If the Navy returns to BCA levels in FY16, the subsequent fiscal constraints 

would challenge our ability to procure the 29 aircraft. MH–60R procurement would 

be aligned to force structure reductions. This scenario may cause MH–60R MYP 

contract termination which could cause contract termination costs and reduce rotary 

wing capacity for Navy. 

We have not determined the exact costs and fees associated with a cancellation. 

Cancellation fees would be calculated in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. Any cancellation decision and notification would occur after the FY16 budget is approved by Congress. 

The cost to procure 29 MH–60R aircraft is estimated at $760 million; the exact 

amount will be based on the FY15 appropriation. Both MYP contracts (MH–60R and 

MH–60S) require FY15 AP funding in order to maintain multi-year aircraft pricing 

for FY15. Navy will continue to work with Congress and our industry partners on 

a resolution for the FY16 budget submission. 

Mr. BROOKS. I understand that the Navy is considering ending its buy of the highly praised MH–60R helicopter after this year’s buy—which would leave the Navy 

with 29 aircraft short of its requirement and would break the current H–60 multiyear procurement. What is the termination liability of such a move and what are 

the effects this will have on the price of the Army UH–60M aircraft for next year 

if the multi-year is broken? I understand the necessities of your budget crunch, but 

will this have a negative effect on the Navy’s operational capability being short this 

many aircraft? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps’ procurement of aviation assets is planned and 

programmed in close coordination with the Department of the Navy (DON). The 

DON allocates a portion of their total obligation authority (TOA) to Marine Aviation, 

and as such, Marine Corps aircraft are procured with Navy ‘‘Blue’’ dollars. 

The Fiscal Year 2015 budget provides Marine Aviation with the best balance of 

requirements within the constraints of the Bipartisan Budget Agreement. We have 

a vested interest in Naval Aviation, but the Marine Corps’ aviation portfolio does 

not include MH–60R aircraft. We defer to the Navy, as they continue to evaluate 

this issue as part of their Program Objective Memorandum for FY16 (POM–16) 

budget submission. 

Mr. BROOKS. I saw that the President’s Budget cut 29 MH–60R helicopters from 

the planned procurement. I wonder how this will negatively impact the Department, 

the warfighter, and, ultimately, the taxpayer. Won’t the USG, specifically the Department of the Navy, be faced with termination liability? Won’t breaking the multiyear cost close to the amount of the deleted 29 helicopters? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps’ procurement of aviation assets is planned and 

programmed in close coordination with the Department of the Navy (DON). The 

DON allocates a portion of their total obligation authority (TOA) to Marine Aviation, 

and as such, Marine Corps aircraft are procured with Navy ‘‘Blue’’ dollars. 

The Fiscal Year 2015 budget provides Marine Aviation with the best balance of 

requirements within the constraints of the Bipartisan Budget Agreement. We have 

a vested interest in Naval Aviation, but the Marine Corps’ aviation portfolio does 

not include MH–60R aircraft. We defer to the Navy, as they continue to evaluate 

this issue as part of their Program Objective Memorandum for FY16 (POM–16) 

budget submission. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI 

Mrs. WALORSKI. In a December 2012 Proceedings article entitled ‘‘Imminent Domain,’’ you wrote that, ‘‘Future conflicts will be won in a new arena—that of the 

electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. We must merge, then master those 

realms.’’ Can you give this committee an update on the progress the Navy has made 

on its goal of improved electromagnetic decision-making across the fleet, given the 

vast array of threats we face today? 

Admiral GREENERT. We have emphasized electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) decision-making across the Fleet and have continued to invest in EMS-related programs. As I indicated in my article, our focus on the spectrum is underpinned by 

the convergence of the EMS and Cyberspace. They are inter-dependent components 

vital to modern warfare and are necessary for the delivery of integrated fires. As 

information becomes so intertwined with the transmission medium (light in a fiber 
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optic cable, terrestrial radio waves, or satellite links), our ability to leverage the 

EMS in its entirety and counter the adversary’s use of it becomes a critical element 

of any Navy operation. 

We continue to integrate elements of cyberspace operations into the Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP), preparing deployable units and strike groups to respond to the inherent challenges of operating in a contested electromagnetic and 

cyber environment. We placed focused effort toward initiatives being employed during fleet exercises with allies to assess, validate, refine, and deploy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures that instill resiliency in a Command and Control Denied or 

Degraded Environment (C2D2E). Navy is focusing on updating and generating 

EMS-related decision making, doctrine, and operating concepts with a focus on 

force-level operations in denied environments. 

In addition to these Fleet initiatives, we continue to make significant progress in 

capability development. These efforts include investments in Research and Development (R&D), Science and Technology (S&T), and concept development in an effort 

to rapidly field advanced EMS decision-making technologies into existing programs 

of record. Focused investments by the Navy in EMS capabilities are also contributing to the Joint fight, including efforts to improve our electromagnetic situational 

awareness and command and control (C2) tools. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. In an era of declining defense budgets, how do we adequately invest for the future so that we are able to stay ahead of the emerging EW threat 

abroad? 

Admiral GREENERT. I have made it a priority to continue investing in Navy EW 

programs at or above previous funding levels given the proliferation and sophistication of global EW threats. 

Science and technology (S&T) initiatives on the part of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and others are critical to the success of our future EW capabilities. 

ONR is investing in the integration of EW, cyber, and communications systems to 

address EW threats in an integrated fashion with other systems that operate in and 

through the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). We are transitioning these S&T efforts to the development of systems and programs with a common architecture, multiple functions, and with cross-platform (ship, aircraft, submarine) applications. 

New programs are being designed with agility and flexibility across the EMS 

‘‘built in.’’ EMS agility is critical to both protecting Navy forces from detection and 

denying potential adversaries’ access to the EMS in contested environments. Our investments enhance our spectrum agility by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in 

potential adversaries’ position in and use of the EMS. Given the rate at which global 

EW threats are growing in sophistication and proliferating, current and future investments in programs and systems that use the EMS will be emphasized in order 

to maintain the overall efficacy of Navy integrated combat systems. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I am pleased to hear that naval aviation is taking initial steps 

to analyze the feasibility of integrating the Dual Mode Brimstone (DMB) missile on 

the F/A–18 Super Hornet. We’re aware of the small boat threat and always interested in hearing about ways to save money by leveraging existing technologies like 

the DMB. The missile reportedly would be helpful in defeating high speed maneuvering targets like swarming small boats and vehicles with its integrated semi-active laser and active radar seeker. I understand that the missile is fully developed 

and has been used extensively by UK Royal Air Force Tornado fighters in combat 

operations over Afghanistan and Libya with extraordinary accuracy and low collateral damage because of DMB’s high-quality seeker. 

It is my further understanding that the missile was successfully integrated on an 

MQ–9 Reaper aircraft and hit target vehicles traveling in excess of 70 miles per 

hour at the Naval Air Station in China Lake, California in January of this year. 

According to reports, the missiles are extremely accurate and are available now to 

help fill naval aviation requirements from both F/A–18 Super Hornets and Helicopters. 

If the initial integration feasibility assessments are positive, do you see value in 

expanding those activities in the coming fiscal year(s)? 

Admiral GREENERT. If the initial integration feasibility assessments are positive, 

the Department of the Navy (DON) will examine DMB specific attributes versus the 

Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II) program. The F/A–18 E/F Hornet roadmap already includes funding for the SDB II weapon system. SDB II is an allweather, moving target, standoff (40+ nautical mile) glide weapon that prosecutes 

wheeled, tracked, and maritime moving targets which is also a capability that DMB 

advertises. SDB II’s IOC on the F/A–18 E/F is scheduled for FY19. SDB II’s advantages over DMB are: it has a tri-mode seeker; is data-link capable; and a significantly greater maximum range. SDB II is a non-forward firing weapon. Should the 
167 

Fleet requirement for a new forward firing, air-to-ground weapon on the F/A–18 E/ 

F and the MH–60 change, DMB may compete in the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC) approved and validated Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) program. 

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