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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT AND

LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND

ALLIES IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 9 AND 10, 2011

Serial No. 112–32

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Part 1, February 9, 2011 ......................................................................................... 1

Part 2, February 10, 2011 ....................................................................................... 67

WITNESSES 

FEBRUARY 9

The Honorable Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, 

Council on Foreign Relations .............................................................................. 10

The Honorable Lorne Craner, president, International Republican Institute 

(former assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and 

labor) ..................................................................................................................... 17

Robert Satloff, Ph.D., executive director, The Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy ............................................................................................................ 26

FEBRUARY 10

The Honorable James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of 

State ...................................................................................................................... 77

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 9

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statements 

February 9 ............................................................................................................ 4

February 10 .......................................................................................................... 70

The Honorable Elliott Abrams: Prepared statement ............................................ 12

The Honorable Lorne Craner: Prepared statement .............................................. 19

Robert Satloff, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 28

FEBRUARY 10

The Honorable James B. Steinberg: Prepared statement .................................... 79

APPENDIX 

FEBRUARY 9

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 120

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 121

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 123

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: IFES Briefing Paper entitled ‘‘Elections in Egypt: Key 

Challenges for Credible and Competitive Elections’’ ......................................... 124

FEBRUARY 10

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 132

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 133

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 135

Page

IV

The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina: Prepared statement .............................................................. 136

Written responses from the Honorable James B. Steinberg to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen .......................... 137

Written responses from the Honorable James B. Steinberg to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Missouri .............................................................. 155

(1)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT AND LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND 

ALLIES IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST, 

PART 1

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

Having been duly organized, this committee will now proceed to 

our first official hearing of the 112th Congress. After recognizing 

myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each 

for our opening statements, I will recognize the chairman and 

ranking member of our Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

South Asia for 31⁄2 minutes each for their statements. We will then 

proceed directly to hear testimony from our distinguished witnesses, and I would respectfully remind them to keep their statements to no longer than 5 minutes. I am rather ruthless with this 

gavel. After we hear from our witnesses, individual members will 

be recognized for 5 minutes each to question our witnesses. The 

Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

Recent developments in Egypt and Lebanon pose great challenges to U.S. policy, to our interest and to our allies in the Middle 

East. In Lebanon we have witnessed the takeover of the country 

by the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. In Egypt we see destabilization 

of a government which has been a key U.S. ally and partner for 

over 3 decades. In both instances, successive U.S. administrations 

failed to develop and implement a longer term strategy to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the future. 

In both Egypt and Lebanon we have failed to effectively leverage 

U.S. assistance in support of peaceful, pro-democracy forces, and to 

help build strong, accountable, independent, democratic institutions 

as a bulwark against the instability that is now spreading throughout much of the region. Instead of being proactive, we have been 

obsessed with maintaining short-term, personality-based stability, 

stability that was never really all that stable, as the events of recent weeks demonstrate. Successive administrations have repeatedly opposed and obstructed efforts by Members of Congress to require accountability and ensuring Egypt met conditions for its economic assistance. 

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The Mubarak government has been a reliable and valuable ally 

of the United States on security matters, but the relationship must 

extend well beyond Mubarak. It would be short-sighted and potentially dangerous for the United States to base its entire approach 

to another nation on the survival of one individual. 

In the early days of the current unrest the administration failed 

to seize the opportunity to press for reform, to address the demonstrators’ frustrations and prevent chaos and violence. 

On January 25th, the first day of the demonstrations, Secretary 

Clinton stated, ‘‘Our assessment is that the Egyptian Government 

is stable.’’ Vice President Joe Biden, in an interview on January 

27th, said, ‘‘I would not refer to Mubarak as a dictator.’’

According to the Wall Street Journal, National Security Council 

officials admitted in a meeting on January 31 that they did not 

have a contingency plan in place should the Egyptian Government 

collapse. Now the White House is reportedly making matters worse 

by not only reexamining its position on dealing with the Muslim 

Brotherhood, but also stated that a new Egyptian Government 

should ‘‘include a whole host of important non-secular actors.’’ The 

Muslim Brotherhood had nothing to do with driving the protests, 

and they and other extremists must not be allowed to hijack the 

movement toward democracy and freedom in Egypt. 

Turning to Lebanon, we are again confronted by the absence of 

a long-term U.S. strategy. Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah have acted 

relentlessly to undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty and the United 

States has largely adopted a reactive posture seeking to contain the 

advance of these hostile forces. Washington has also persisted in 

continuing to provide assistance to a Lebanese Government in 

which Hezbollah essentially had veto power. This included security 

assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, LAF, despite longstanding concerns over whether such aid could directly or indirectly 

benefit Hezbollah. 

Even now when the Lebanese Government has been overthrown, 

the United States has still failed to indicate that it will cut off assistance to a proxy government for Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. 

There are lessons from the Lebanon debacle which are applicable 

to Egypt. In Lebanon, following the Hariri assassination, elections 

were immediately held under Syrian-inspired electoral law, laying 

the foundation for the political empowerment of Hezbollah. Therefore, shouldn’t the United States insist that constitutional and administrative requirements concerning the electoral process in 

Egypt be revised to ensure that only responsible actors who meet 

certain basic standards participate in Egypt’s future? Such criteria 

should include renouncing violent extremism, upholding the rule of 

law, recognizing and enforcing Egypt’s international commitments, 

including its nonproliferation obligation and its peace agreement 

with the Jewish State of Israel. 

I would greatly appreciate if our witnesses this morning would 

address the following questions in their testimony: Can there be 

stability in Egypt if Mubarak remains in power? Do conditions enable a military control transition process? Would this buy time for 

legitimate opposition forces to organize and for constitutional modifications to take place? There are some who have suggested that 

Egypt could follow a Turkey model. How viable is that comparison? 

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Given that patterns have recently developed in Turkey, could 

Egypt’s adoption of this model lead to possible threats to U.S. interests and allies in the Middle East? Can the legitimate opposition 

assume a leadership role? Can the military transition to the civil 

arena? What changes in the Egyptian Constitution would be necessary to ensure that candidates for public office for political leaders are going to act and govern democratically? What criteria are 

necessary to ensure that radical Islamists are not empowered? 

And beyond Egypt and Lebanon the United States must have 

broader strategic plan for the region so that our interests and our 

allies are protected and destructive regimes in Tehran and Damascus and other extremists are unable to exert their influence over 

people yearning for democracy. 

These questions are particularly relevant as we commemorate 

the centennial of the birth of President Ronald Reagan. During his 

Westminster address Reagan stated, ‘‘Any system is inherently unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimize its leaders. While 

we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not 

hesitate to declare our ultimate objective and to take concrete actions to move toward them. The objective I propose,’’ according to 

Ronald Reagan, ‘‘is quite simple to state: To foster the infrastructure of democracy.’’

We face an emergency in Lebanon and Egypt that could spread 

to the broader Middle East. With cautious determination, we thank 

our esteemed witnesses for appearing before our committee today 

and look forward to their testimony. 

With that, I am pleased to yield to our ranking member, Mr. Berman. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

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Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. This hearing could 

not be more important or timely. The events of the past month 

across the Middle East have come at a head spinning pace. They 

are both exciting and daunting. A new dawn is breaking for the 

people of Egypt. The promise of a democratic transition brings with 

it new opportunities and freedoms. However, with this change 

comes uncertainty for our security and the security of our close 

ally, Israel. We must both ensure that the transition proceeds and 

seek to ensure that our shared interests are not compromised. 

When strongman Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 14th, few 

guessed that the next country to be intoxicated by the Arab world’s 

growing embrace of freedom would be Egypt, the long-time cornerstone of U.S. strategy and peacemaking in the Middle East. We 

had worried about Egypt’s income gap, its illiteracy, its poverty, its 

denial of fundamental human rights. We had debated leadership 

succession issues as President Mubarak’s health faltered, and we 

knew Egyptians, who often seemed to endure the unbearable and 

do so with good humor, have a history of rising up every other generation or so. But we never guessed that the next Egyptian revolution would begin in Tunis. 

The mass demonstrations in Cairo have already produced stunning results: The decision that neither Hosni Mubarak nor his son 

Gamal nor Omar Suleiman will run for President in September. 

They have also instigated talks on the future of Egypt between the 

government and various parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, a moment which has formally been banned from politics in 

Egypt since its founding in 1928. 

Hosni Mubarak has been a friend of the United States, however 

flawed. We didn’t put the Mubarak government in power, but we 

supported it because it pursued regional policies we generally supported. And with our large foreign assistance we incentivized it to 

pursue those policies. 

While we can’t determine Egypt’s future leader, we should use 

our influence to encourage a process of change that is orderly and 

a government whose foreign and security policies support our interests. As this change takes hold, we must keep firmly in mind that 

our goals include an Egypt that supports close relations with the 

United States, supports the welfare of the Egyptian people, democracy, universal human rights, is secular in orientation, and of 

course adheres to the peace treaty with Israel. 

In any transition the military will play a critical role, as it is already doing. That is why I think it is important that our military 

assistance program continue, so as long as, and only if, the military 


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is playing a constructive role in bringing about a democratic transition. Based on their writings, I know there is disagreement among 

the panelists on this issue, and I look forward to the discussion. 

Egypt has long needed a more inclusive government, responsive 

to the desires of its citizens. If a stable democracy is to emerge, 

there must be participation by a wide array of political forces that 

are fully committed to democratic principles. Like many, however, 

I am skeptical about the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy. The Brotherhood wants Egypt to be governed by religious 

law rather than man-made law, a problematic position for a democrat. It has a bloody history and even after it renounced violence 

and endorsed democracy in the 1970s, some of its alumni joined the 

ranks of the world’s most notorious murderers. Included in those 

ranks are Sadat’s assassins and al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri. 

Some Egyptians of impeccable democratic credentials say the 

Brotherhood has changed and that it is now truly democratic in its 

approach. But even if that is true, we shouldn’t fool ourselves. 

Even in the best case scenario where the Brotherhood proves itself 

fully committed to democracy, there is every reason to believe it 

will try to influence the Egyptian Government in ways that undermine U.S. interests and it will make Egypt a regressive and less 

tolerant place. 

Mubarak has already made clear that his presidency will end in 

September and that his son Gamal will not succeed him. It is critical that Egyptians agree as soon as possible on relevant constitutional amendments and laws and a clear and certain timetable for 

their implementation if free and fair elections are to be held in 

September. The less time that the opposition has to prepare for 

elections, the more likely it is that the next President will be determined either by Mubarak’s National Democratic Party or by the 

Muslim Brotherhood, by far the two most organized political forces 

as of now. 

I would like to say a few words about Lebanon, where a handpicked Hezbollah candidate is on the verge of becoming Prime Minister. It is a very troubling example of how democratic development 

can go off the tracks when a party doesn’t respect democratic 

ground rules. Hezbollah’s parliamentary faction is but a political 

front for a cut-throat militia. And more than anything else that has 

put the terrorist group in the political driver’s seat. If you don’t believe me, ask Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader who left Saad 

Hariri’s March 14th Movement and threw his support to Hezbollah. 

It is an all but open secret that he did so in physical fear of 

Hezbollah. 

As Hezbollah gradually assumes control over more of the levers 

of power in Lebanon, we must be both wise and firm in our response. I will be introducing legislation called the Hezbollah AntiTerrorism Act. Following on the Palestinian Anti-Terrorist Act, 

which passed Congress following Hamas’ election to leadership in 

the PA in 2006, my bill will set rigorous requirements for the provision of foreign assistance to Lebanon during periods where 

Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese Government. The goal will be to 

ensure that none of our assistance to Lebanon benefits Hezbollah 

in any way. We certainly want to assist our friends in Lebanon, 

and we will. But we also want to make sure that we don’t inadvertVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ently help our enemies at the same time. My legislation leaves 

ample scope for both. 

I look forward to the testimony of our three witnesses and particularly their views on how the United States can encourage a responsible democratic transition in Egypt on the goals I previously 

laid out, what the chances are that such a transition will occur, 

and what they foresee is the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in 

Egypt during that transition and beyond. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank my good friend for his remarks, and now I will recognize Mr. Chabot for 31⁄2 minutes. He 

is the chairman on the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

South Asia. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chairman. So we can get to the 

witnesses sooner I will not take the full 3 minutes. I will be very 

brief. I want to thank you for holding these very timely hearings 

this morning, and I know we all look forward to hearing from this 

very distinguished panel of witnesses. 

When I was recently appointed chairman of the Middle East and 

South Asia Subcommittee, having served on the subcommittee for 

a number of years, I knew we would be dealing with a host of important issues in a critical part of the world. I don’t know that anyone, however, anticipated that we would be confronted with so 

many developments in the region quite so quickly, not just in 

Egypt and Lebanon, which we will be focusing on in the next 2 

days, but in Tunisia and throughout the broader region. Clearly in 

the case of Egypt we have come to a crossroads. And while we do 

not yet know how the current volatile situation in that nation will 

play out, I think we all realize that we are going to have to reassess our bilateral relationship not only in terms of diplomacy but 

in the area of economic assistance as well. 

The current situation, however, is not limited, as I mentioned before, to Egypt. The widespread protests throughout numerous countries in the region raise broader concerns regarding U.S. foreign 

policy more generally as well as how we administer foreign aid. 

I look forward to being involved in these important discussions 

as we move ahead both here and in the full committee with you, 

Madam Chair, and in the subcommittee, both of which I am sure 

will be quite busy. 

So we can get to the witnesses, as I mentioned before, I am going 

to yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Now I would 

now like to recognize Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member of the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, for 31⁄2 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you and congratulations, Madam Chair. 

In Egypt I fear we are snatching failure from the jaws of success. 

After progressively escalating pressure on President Mubarak, 

after rejecting regime-backed violence against peaceful protests, 

after denouncing the regime’s assault on journalists, after carefully 

positioning the United States on the side of the protesters, the 

Obama administration now appears to be wavering on whether 

America really backs the demands of the Egyptian people or just 

wants to return to stability with a facade of change. 

The contradiction that is forming between the administration’s 

rhetoric and its policy concerns the so-called national dialogue initiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ated by Egypt’s new Vice President, General Omar Suleiman. General Suleiman is a strong, serious, and capable man, but it is still 

unclear whether his job is to lead Egypt’s transition on behalf of 

the Egyptian people or to delay it, sidetrack it, flim-flam it into irrelevance on the part of President Mubarak. 

The major items on the Egyptian reform agenda are well-known: 

An end to restrictions on free speech and free press, an end to restrictions on the formation and operation of political parties, an 

end to the constantly abused emergency law, and an end to structural impediments to free and fair elections. 

What have the Egyptian people seen so far? A dialogue with the 

opposition that excludes major opposition leaders but does include 

regime allies, a proposed committee to report on the reforms that 

the government has no obligation to adopt or even consider, a 

promise to lift the state of emergency when the government considers that it is appropriate, a pledge to liberalize media and communication without any definition of what constitutes liberalization. 

The Secretary of State, to her credit, insists that with regard to 

the General Suleiman-led dialogue ‘‘the people themselves and the 

leaders of various groups within Egyptian society will ultimately 

determine whether it is or is not meeting their needs,’’ she warns. 

‘‘We are going to wait and see,’’ she says, ‘‘how this develops but 

we have been very clear about what we expect.’’ I wish we were 

that clear. 

Respecting Egyptian sovereignty is one thing, maintaining a 

level of ambiguity so thick that ordinary Egyptians cannot discern 

whether or not we are on their side is something else altogether. 

Our national security interests require much greater clarity. The 

people yearn to be free. 

How refreshing is it to see people who are not trampling our flag 

in the streets as they raise theirs? How inspiring is it to see people 

in that part of the world ready to die for their children’s future instead of sending their children off to die? The people yearn to be 

free. We must plant ourselves firmly on their side. 

Until there is evidence that a real transition is underway, with 

the exception of aid for humanitarian needs or with the transition, 

we need to suspend our aid to Egypt. We simply cannot afford to 

be viewed in Egypt as the bank-rollers of repression. The people 

yearn to be free. 

I cannot help but muse if Charlton Heston were to be appointed 

the Special Envoy to Egypt, he would stand there speaking softly 

with a big stick in hand and say to President Mubarak, ‘‘Your people have let you go.’’

Thank you, Madam chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

In the interest of time and since our witnesses are well-known 

in their field, I will refrain from the lengthier bios and will proceed 

immediately to recognize Elliott Abrams, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former deputy national security adviser, for his remarks. 

Elliot will be following by Lorne Craner, president of the International Republican Institute and former assistant secretary of 

state for democracy human Rights and labor. And rounding off our 

10

distinguished panel is Dr. Robert Satloff, who is the executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 

Mr. Abrams, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR 

FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of the 

committee. It is a privilege and an honor to testify at this first Foreign Affairs Committee hearing of the new Congress, and it is a 

pleasure to return to this room where I first testified to this committee 30 years ago under, if I remember right, Chairman Zablocki’s chairmanship, your predecessor here. 

There is enough ground here for about a dozen hearings, but I 

want to try to make six points this morning, and I would ask that 

my full statement be submitted for the record. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection, they all will. Thank 

you. 

Mr. ABRAMS. First, the uprisings we have seen in Tunisia and 

Egypt are exciting proof that the thirst for freedom is indeed universal. The Middle East has lagged behind the rest of the world in 

moving toward democracy. There has been a freedom deficit. 

President Bush was right when he adopted a freedom agenda for 

the Middle East. He asked in 2003, ‘‘Are the peoples of the Middle 

East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions of men and 

women and children condemned by history or culture to live in despotism? Are they alone never to know freedom, never even to have 

a choice in the matter?’’ And he gave the answer, ‘‘Sixty years of 

Western nations excusing and accommodating lack of freedom in 

the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long 

run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.’’

Supporting freedom is our best policy in the Middle East as it is 

in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and everywhere else. Dictators, 

Presidents for life, stolen elections, government-controlled press are 

all a formula for instability. And we can just see in Egypt, after 

30 years of Hosni Mubarak, in fact there is great instability and 

the Muslim Brotherhood is stronger than ever. 

Second point, American policy in the region should accordingly 

favor democracy and countries that are moving toward reform. This 

means one building block for us should be our alliance with Israel, 

the region’s only established democracy. We should value and enhance our relations with countries such as Jordan and Morocco 

where reform efforts are underway. 

It means that warming up to Syria sends exactly the wrong message, that we don’t care about human rights and democracy. We 

don’t even care when a country is very hostile to the United States. 

That we sent an ambassador to Syria at exactly the moment when 

Hezbollah is taking over the Government of Lebanon sends the 

wrong message. We must actively press for democracy, not only in 

Tunisia and Egypt, but in Iran and Syria as well. Democracy promotion cannot be a policy applied to American allies while America’s enemies are forgotten. 

Third, the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and several 

other countries should persuade us once and for all that the linkVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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age argument, that every problem in the Middle East is really tied 

to the Israeli-Palestinian, is false. None of those events had to do 

anything with Israel and the Palestinians. 

Fourth, we should use our assistance program, as you said, 

Madam Chairman, to promote democracy. There is often a disconnect. I think we should make clear to Egypt’s military right now 

that the $1 billion a year they get is not owed to them. Their conduct will determine how much aid they get. 

The late Tom Lantos used to ask, ‘‘What do you think Egypt actually needs, more tanks or more schools?’’ And I think it is a question we need to ask today. If the Egyptian military blocks reform 

and democracy in Egypt, those aid dollars can be better spent in 

countries where the military in supporting progress. 

Fifth point, this aid question applies to Lebanon as well, and I 

would make the same point about our aid to the Lebanese military. 

If they are in fact fighting terrorism and guarding the border with 

Syria, then they should get our help, but if they are not, then that 

aid it seems to me should be suspended. It should be conditional, 

as in Egypt, on the actual performance of the military. 

Finally, how do we support democracy? I urge the committee to 

take a look at the National Endowment for Democracy, for the 

State Department and USAID programs, to the broadcasting that 

we do to see if we can do better and leverage the money that we 

spend more effectively. 

I will stop there, Madam Chairman. We have a number of speakers, and I look forward to your questions, and thank you again for 

inviting me here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Abrams. Now 

we are pleased to recognize Mr. Craner for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LORNE CRANER, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (FORMER 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY, 

HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR) 

Mr. CRANER. Chairman, Congressman Berman, members of the 

committee, thanks for the opportunity to testify today, especially at 

your first hearing. 

As has occurred all too often in the past, the United States today 

stands surprised by foreign revolutions. These events will have consequences for the region and, as I will argue later, further afield. 

Although a single wave of reform is unlikely, the spread of technology means citizens in Arab countries are no longer isolated. 

Most importantly, especially after events in Egypt, the historic center of the Middle East, any popular belief that the Arab regimes 

are too powerful to be overthrown should be ending. 

In the region subtle national differences means events will take 

on uniquely local flavors in each country. That said, we can categorize the region’s nations helps in a way that helps us determine 

which may be the most problematic. Counterintuitively, problematic consequences are less likely in most of the regions monarchies 

than in the republics. Beginning about 15 years ago almost all the 

regions monarchies, mostly young kings who had been educated 

abroad, to one degree or another began to modernize their countries economically and politically. 

A second reason we are less likely to see consequences in monarchies is that they all project greater legitimacy by virtue of their 

hereditary, often tribal lineage. In combination with the nascent 

liberalization, this enables them to deflect economic and political 

complaints to new governing institutions. This is what we are seeing today in Jordan and Kuwait, where the object of protestors’ ire 

is the Prime Minister and the government. 

It will be important for the region’s monarchies to be able to 

show continued progress in opening up their political and economic 

systems. It is worrisome, for example, that some of the Gulf countries has slowed reforms or even backtracked the last few years, 

and of course reforms in Saudi Arabia have been so glacial as to 

make an exception to this rule. 

It is the region’s republics that will be most affected by recent 

events. They are run by men who at best have rigged elections and 

now have decreasingly credible claims to leadership. The fate of 

these leaders is more directly dependent on their performance, 

which for most has been sorely lacking. The leaders have stalled 

economic and political reforms for decades, and we have already 

seen demonstrations in Yemen, a country run not unlike Egypt but 

with less stability and a serious al-Qaeda element. 

Clearly Israel, which had regarded its security threatened more 

by Iran than by countries with which it shared borders, will have 

to recalculate, and our closest ally in the region will require much 

reassurance and support from Washington. 

When I testified last June before this committee, I noted that the 

administration had not yet begun to implement a strategy to adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
18

vance democracy abroad because it had to strategy. Since that time 

the beginnings of a strategy have been rolled out by Secretary Clinton in Krakow and by President Obama at the UNGA meeting. The 

administration is focusing democracy work on supportive civil society organizations working to achieve change from the bottom up, 

and Secretary Clinton deserves great credit for conceiving and then 

enunciating this policy. 

Despite these pronouncements, however, implementation lags. In 

Egypt, for example, the administration had responded to building 

pressure, not with increased support to civil society. Instead, it 

agreed to the Mubarak government demands for signoff on all 

USAID funded democracy assistance, which obviously precluded 

programmatic support to many of the NGOs that represent moderate secular interests committed to reform. This played into a decades-long dynamic that made the United States choose between 

Mubarak and the Brotherhood. 

U.S. democracy assistance to Jordan and Lebanon exhibits many 

of the same failings. IRI and our sister organization, NDI, constantly struggle to convince USAID of the value of assisting Jordan’s fledgling political parties resulting in minimal assistance. In 

Lebanon, even as the United States pulled closer to Syria, our political party programming for March 14th coalition parties, the only 

counterweight to Hezbollah, was cut short. 

Now this failure to cultivate the generation of democratic leaders 

is not new. It was not until the Musharraf regime began to crumble 

in 2007 that the Bush administration scrambled to determine who 

might succeed him and establish relations with Pakistani figures 

they thought would help advance American interests. But this case 

was notable more as an exception. In places like Ukraine, Georgia, 

and Kyrgyzstan the U.S. Government had acidulously cultivated 

democratic successors. 

The Obama administration has already faced this issue in 

Kyrgyzstan last April. As the increasingly authoritarian government crumbled, dissidents outside complained that our Embassy 

had refused to meet them for months or years, and we feared the 

loss of our base at Manas. Realism valuing stability in our relations abroad gained currency after Iraq, but being so closely tied 

to authoritarians does not serve U.S. interests when a repressive 

government fails. As we are learning yet again, when we necessarily have relations with authoritarian governments we must 

plan for the day when they are no longer in power. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Craner follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Craner. Thank you. 

Pleased to yield to Mr. Satloff. For 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT SATLOFF, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. SATLOFF. Madam Chairman, thank you for the opportunity 

today. Yours has been a principled voice in support of democracy 

in Egypt and abroad, and I know that the people in Egypt and 

American interests are better for it. Also, Mr. Berman, I would like 

to congratulate you for your stalwart support for change and reform. I had the privilege of escorting Mr. Berman to the home of 

a prominent dissident in Cairo several years ago, and I know that 

had tremors throughout the regime. And if I may, would like to 

congratulate my hometown neighbor, Mr. Cicilline, on his election 

on joining this committee. 

To note the obvious, the events in Egypt have enormous implications for America’s interests and role in the Middle East. For now 

a sober assessment for the Egyptian situation leads one to conclude 

that it is neither the disaster some fear nor the dawn of a new day 

that some hope. That story is not yet written. We can affect it only 

on the margins; it is of course the Egyptian people’s decision to affect it most of all. 

In its handling of specifics of the Egypt crisis, my assessment is 

that President Obama and his advisers have generally adopted a 

sound approach. This is of course an evolving situation. Still the 

administration recognized early on that it was neither wise nor 

possible for the United States to back regime suppression of democracy protestors and that it did not serve U.S. interests to have its 

relationship with Egypt personalized by identification with an unflagging support for President Mubarak. Instead the administration correctly supported the idea of change and the democratic spirit at the heart of the protests while operating on the basis of the 

not unreasonable assessment that the Egyptian military was and 

perhaps remains the key to resolving a national crisis that pit millions of protesters against an increasingly isolated and stubborn 

President. Hence, the administration’s belief, a rational belief but 

still unproven on the ground, that the military could be the agent 

of positive change. As I said, that change has not yet happened. 

For all the drama of the past 2 weeks, the regime has so far acceded to no major substantive or irrevocable change. Indeed, in 

some areas, the appointment of military men as Vice President and 

Prime Minister without clear and irrevocable decisions on the 

emergency law or other major changes in the Egyptian political 

system, there has been regression. 

Every day that passes in which the military does not definitively 

break from President Mubarak implicates them with the regime, 

which is bad for our interests, and every day that passes without 

that break further erodes an already weakened U.S. regional 

image. If the new leadership does show itself to be serious about 

lifting the emergency law, releasing prisoners and implementing 

constitutional, legal and administrative changes, this may suffice to 

launch Egypt on the path of orderly, peaceful, democratic reform. 

In this context I support the maintenance of U.S. aid and align myself with Mr. Berman’s comment earlier. 

27

However, in my view United States needs to avoid being in the 

worst of possible situations; namely, a situation in which it is perceived to have broken with President Mubarak, which is what most 

of our allies fear is the case. But then to have President Mubarak 

still survive in the face of this only erodes the image of U.S. influence. Neither feared nor respected nor loved is not a healthy situation for American interests. 

As we approach the transitional period, I do believe deep concern 

should be expressed about the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood is not, as some suggest, simply an Egyptian version of the 

March of Dimes—that is, a social welfare organization whose goals 

are fundamentally humanitarian; it is a political organization that 

seeks to reorder Egyptian society in larger Muslim societies in an 

Islamist fashion. The Brotherhood will exploit whatever opportunities it is presented with. It has renounced its most ambiguous goals 

only as a result of regime compulsion, not by free choice. 

Therefore, we should express extreme caution in advocating for 

specific reforms that could advantage the Brotherhood at the expense of non-Islamist political parties. It would run counter to U.S. 

interests for the United States to advocate, for example, in favor 

of constitutional amendments to lift the prohibition of parties based 

on religion. Should Egyptians opt for such a change, that is their 

choice, but it is not in our interest to advance those parties at the 

expense of liberal or anti-Islamist parties. 

Two very specific ideas in the meantime: I urge you to discuss 

with the administration the idea of redirecting an appropriate sum 

to humanitarian and medical assistance to assist the thousands of 

Egyptians that have been hurt, injured, or suffered as a result of 

this oppression of the protests. And second, I hope that the administration is working closely with NDI and IRI on planning for massive engagement during the transition process. 

Madam Chairman, I have a series of telegraphic prescriptions on 

regional issues that are in my written testimony about strengthening partnerships, about promoting sustained efforts of reform, 

about directing the winds of change elsewhere, and they are in the 

testimony for your review. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Satloff follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We will read those. Thank 

you, Dr. Satloff. And thank you to all of our witnesses for excellent 

testimony. 

I would like to yield my 5 minutes of questioning to freshman 

Congresswoman Renee Ellmers of North Carolina. She is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. ELLMERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Dr. Satloff, in your writing today, one of your issues that you 

wrote about is that our U.S. policy toward Iran has only been a tactical success as there so far seems to have been little strategic 

progress in convincing Iran to change its behavior in the nuclear 

file. 

How have these recent events in Egypt, Lebanon, and elsewhere 

throughout the region altered Tehran’s strategic calculus and costbenefit analysis? Please elaborate because we have got to be watching everything, and this is a big concern. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congresswoman, I couldn’t agree with you more. I 

fear that the leaders of Iran are misreading our distraction on 

Egypt and are taking this as a moment of opportunity. I fear that 

they are seeing change in Lebanon, the events in Gaza, a serious 

emergence from isolation, and now the events in Egypt, I fear they 

are reading this as a series of body blows to U.S. interests and that 

they may be feeling that they are on a roll. 

I think we should be very careful to keep our eyes vigilant about 

efforts by Iranians to use fifth columnists against other American 

allies in the gulf and elsewhere, and maybe a reconsideration by 

Iran of the pace of its nuclear program, believing that perhaps we 

are distracted elsewhere. 

Now, on our side we do have assets. The administration, in my 

view, lost a great opportunity with the popular protests in Iran in 

the summer of 2009. And if you compare the Obama administration 

approach the summer of 2009 in Iran and January, 2011, in Egypt, 

there is a stark contrast. I concur with my colleague, Mr. Abrams, 

that we should do our best to blow the winds of change to Tehran 

and Damascus. Far be it from us that we should be more supportive of democracy in countries that have historically been partners with us than historically that have been adversaries. And I 

think there is much we can do to advance that prospect. 

Mrs. ELLMERS. Thank you very much, and I yield back my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to our ranking member, Mr. Berman of California. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I would like, most particularly, because you addressed one issue 

that Congress is appropriately and directly involved in, is this 

whole issue of assistance to Egypt and how to handle it and what 

we should be calling for and what we should be doing and what the 

administration should be doing. My instinctive reaction because of 

wanting to incentivize the military using their authority to make 

this transition happen—and I agree, it is not clear to me that they 

have made that decision—was to be careful about messing around 

with the military assistance right now. Mr. Satloff, you sort of 

came down on that side, Dr. Satloff. 

38

Elliott, you think we should cut off both military and economic 

assistance—or at least the working group statement that you are 

part of said that. Did you include democracy promotion activities 

in that? But I would like to hear the two of you just develop that. 

You generally see this much the same way and disagree on this 

specific issue. I would like to hear more. 

Mr. ABRAMS. My view is that we need to tell the Egyptian military very clearly, Congress needs to tell them very clearly we are 

not going to pay for this suppression of democracy in Egypt. I 

agree, I think the army may not have made up its mind yet, so now 

is the time to signal them, this aid is conditional. 

I would agree with Rob Satloff, I wouldn’t cut it off today. First 

I would send that message that we are watching, and it could be 

cut off any day if you guys do a Tiananmen Square in Cairo, or 

even much less than that, if you make it clear that your goal is to 

maintain Mubarakism without Mubarak. 

Mr. SATLOFF. I would say we are in violent agreement now. 

The United States doesn’t have so many levers. It would seem 

to me a mistake to preemptively deny us leverage at a moment 

when perhaps that leverage could be determinative. I don’t want 

to exaggerate the potential for this to be the case, but why we 

would throw away an arrow before it is absolutely apparent that 

the Egyptian Army has made a choice to suppress and refuse 

change seems to be unwise. 

Mr. BERMAN. And speak to the issue of how directly the administration should address Mubarak leaving office immediately, or how 

would you suggest they handle that issue? Any of you? All of you. 

Mr. SATLOFF. I will offer my view. Once the President, last Tuesday, offered the imagery of him appearing on television 2 hours 

after President Mubarak had said he was going to stay 8 months, 

and the President got on television saying the words ‘‘now,’’ even 

though there was some ambiguity in that statement, the ambiguity 

did not translate into Arabic. And everyone in the Middle East saw 

that Mubarak said 8 months, the President said ‘‘now,’’ and every 

day since then has been a victory for Mubarak. 

It is not as though he needs to resign or leave the country. There 

are alternative constitutional arrangements that President Mubarak could take advantage of. 

Mr. BERMAN. He could delegate his authority. 

Mr. SATLOFF. According to the Egyptian Constitution, he could 

delegate his executive authority to his Vice President, which is a 

major constitutional decision that would send us off on a new path. 

That is what I would hope would be the direction in which we 

head. 

Mr. CRANER. I think on all these issues, whether it is Mubarak 

leaving, what do we need to do with the aid? We need to think 

about what we want to see in the end, what is our goal? And the 

goal is decent elections with, hopefully, moderates coming out very 

well in those elections. Then we need to work our way back and 

say, What is the best way to accomplish that? 

So on the issue of aid, I think that is our largest trump card. I 

don’t think it is time to play it yet. On the issue of military, I 

would agree with Elliott that we need to be very, very clear on 

what we are expecting. 

39

On the issue of Mubarak, I think it is fair to ask if somebody 

who has led the kind of fraudulent elections that we have seen repeatedly over the last 30 years in Egypt is now capable of leading 

an effort for a fair and free election. 

Mr. BERMAN. My time is expired. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Excellent questions, Mr. Berman. 

I am pleased to yield to the chair of the Subcommittee on Africa, 

Global Health, and Human Rights, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Madam Chair. And congratulations again 

on your chairmanship. I look forward to serving with you and 

Ranking Member Berman. 

Let me just begin by saying thank you to the three of you. I have 

known you; you are great leaders on behalf of human rights for 

decades. 

The administration seems to find its voice on human rights and 

democracy, it seems to me, only when events portend radical 

change. A few weeks ago President Obama rolled out the red carpet 

for Chinese President Hu Jintao, a brutal dictator whose rise to 

power was initially enabled or advanced by the murder of hundreds 

of people in Tibet in 1989. Many of us were frustrated and profoundly disappointed. Even the Washington Post editorial said 

‘‘President Obama makes Hu Jintao look good on rights’’ in their 

January 19 editorial. It was a scathing editorial. 

Now that Mubarak is in trouble, this administration is making 

human rights demands—better late than never, but they are making them. Yet in its first year, the Obama administration cut democracy funding for Egypt by more than half. The democracy in 

governance total was $54.8 million in 2008; it dropped to $23.5 million in 2009; and the request for 2011 is $25 million. And the 

NGOs that are not registered, obviously don’t even apply—a break 

with the Bush administration policy. As we all know, human rights 

groups that are not registered are usually the cutting edge in the 

avant-garde in terms of promoting human rights. 

My question is—a day late and a dollar short, I am glad they are 

making statements—but will this lead to a matriculation from bad 

to worse, as we saw with the Shah of Iran? We all know that 

SAVAK was not a good group, his secret police, during the Iranian 

crisis. But now we have something that potentially could be profoundly worse than the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Your thoughts on the Muslim Brotherhood. Are people being 

naive, somehow thinking that the Muslim Brotherhood will be benign and will have a nonviolent approach to politics? 

Secondly, last month, Frank Wolf chaired a hearing on the Coptic Church in response to the violence which killed about 23, we 

think, Coptic Christians; 100 were wounded. My question is, how 

will the Coptic Church, about 10 percent of Egypt’s population, fare 

going forward, especially with the potential ascension of the Muslim Brotherhood? 

And finally, Israel’s profound concerns about the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. I remember when President Bush kept saying we 

want free and fair elections, which brought in Hamas. Fattah was 

40

certainly a corrupt organization and had terrorists in its ranks, but 

it went from bad to worse when there was an election. 

Our fear is, I think on both sides of the aisle, that the Muslim 

Brotherhood’s animosity toward Israel is well documented. Your 

views on that. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. 

A word on the Copts, I would just say I worry a lot about that, 

because as we look through the whole region, the situation of 

Christian communities throughout the region is very bad and worsening. On Copts, we should not glamorize how great the situation 

has been in Egypt. As you know, it has been impossible to build 

churches, to repair churches under Hosni Mubarak. There has been 

a lot of discrimination against Copts in his Egypt. But I think we 

do have to worry, in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood, about 

a more Islamic Egypt being even more discriminatory against 

them. 

On the Muslim Brotherhood takeover, that is something that has 

to worry all of us. And I agree with Rob Satloff that I think conditions that, for example, forbid religious parties are actually potentially quite useful. But I would just say the bulwark that keeps this 

from being Iran is the army, and that is why I worry, as he does. 

Every day that the army is associated with Hosni Mubarak today 

in suppressing these demonstrations diminishes the legitimacy and 

popularity of the army. Every day they are complicit with the police and the thugs, it makes it a lot harder for them to keep the 

revered position they have had in Egypt, and that is a great worry. 

Mr. CRANER. You talked about the elections in the Palestinian 

territories. Some of us would argue it was because elections didn’t 

occur for so long—and they were repeatedly delayed—that the Palestinian Authority had ample opportunity to demonstrate how corrupt and useless it was in terms of delivering services. And that 

only strengthened Hamas. You have to ask yourself if over time, 

if change is delayed in Egypt, if that only makes the Muslim Brotherhood stronger over time. I think that is a fair question to ask. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I am pleased to yield for 5 minutes of questioning to the ranking 

member of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 

Mr. Ackerman of New York. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I think it is more frustrating to see you guys in so much agreement than if you were disagreeing. At least we would be able to 

figure out where to push or not push our own administration. It is 

frustrating to see that they are not moving in the same direction. 

That, to me, makes great common sense with what the entire panel 

seems to be saying. 

We are not going to have a second chance to make a great impression on the people in the street who are at their most vulnerable point right now and probably a lot more malleable as to what 

the United States interests are and what our real intentions are 

here. 

While I am not sure I wholly agree with what Mr. Abrams said 

about sending an ambassador to Syria, not sending an ambassador 

I guess is a message in and of itself, but when you don’t send a 

messenger, how do you send a second message is the question? 

41

We have messengers in Egypt, and one of the messengers that 

we should be using is the military. We have paid a lot of money 

to help in the formation of the virtues that the military seems to 

possess and the restraint that they have apparently been demonstrating in the streets. Should we not be more closely using that 

tie to have a Nixon moment to deliver a message via the military 

to Mr. Mubarak? Should not they be the ones that help impact? Because the longer this thing takes, the worse the position is for the 

United States to influence the opinions in the street. 

My second question is about the Muslim Brotherhood, which I 

think is critical here; how we deal with that and how we help the 

leadership deal with that and the military. It is my view that if you 

over-pesticide your garden, only the weeds are going to survive. 

And that is what we have here as far as looking at who the leaders 

of the opposition are. We have killed all the flowers—he has killed 

all the flowers, I should say, Mubarak—and the Brotherhood is left. 

They are not the March of Dimes—Mr. Satloff is right—neither are 

they the ‘‘march of the benign,’’ but are they the ‘‘march of demons’’? How concerned should we be and how do we get the military to keep up the bulwark of the opposition to him in the formation of any new government? 

Dr. Satloff. 

Mr. SATLOFF. In terms of the military, I think the thrust of your 

comment is correct. The President, and just yesterday Secretary 

Gates, had very laudatory words for the military. What is unclear 

is whether in private our political and military leadership—Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, et cetera—are being as tough in private as they are being complimentary in public. In private, the 

Egyptian military should know very clearly what actions or inactions it takes or doesn’t take would trigger the end of aid that you 

spoke about earlier. I don’t know if that is happening. That is essential. 

In terms of the Muslim Brotherhood, I think we should recognize 

and be vigilant about the danger, not exaggerate the danger. There 

is no inevitability that the Muslim Brotherhood is going to come to 

power in Egypt, and we can’t have a self-fulfilling prophesy here; 

that would be a mistake. There is a huge range of non-Islamist political forces that deserve our assistance and support. And indeed, 

one of the things that we should be pressing for urgently is a 

change in the Egyptian law that prevents our direct assistance to 

so many important nongovernmental organizations in that country. 

Don’t exaggerate, but also don’t be naive. I think that is the right 

approach. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Craner. 

Mr. CRANER. Egypt would not be the first military that was 

starting to lose, as Rob noted, is starting to lose its good reputation 

in a country because it was sticking too close to a dictator. This 

happened in Pakistan where the military, which was the most revered institution in the country, started descending in people’s 

opinions. I think that is something we ought to remind them of. I 

think certainly American assistance is something we ought to remind them of. I am sure the Chinese would be happy to supply 

tanks and aircraft, but they are not American tanks and aircraft 

and tactics. 

42

In terms of the Brotherhood, I would agree with Rob, I am afraid 

to say. I would agree with Rob. We need to stop presenting ourselves with the choice that Mubarak gave us and understand that 

there are people in the middle. This is why I personally do not 

favor quick elections; I think some time is needed to be able to 

work with those folks. But we shouldn’t repeat to ourselves 

Mubarak’s choice. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Burton, chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. Elliott, it is good seeing you again. You and I go 

back all the way to Central America and the problems back there 

in the early eighties during Reagan’s administration, so it is good 

seeing you. 

I would like to broaden the discussion just a little bit. The problems in Egypt seem to be manifesting itself in some of the other 

states, not to the degree that you see in Egypt, but there is concern 

about the Persian Gulf area, the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez 

Canal, and what that means for the United States of America. And 

I am very concerned about that. We are not moving toward energy 

independence. Our dependency on Venezuela and the Middle East 

is even greater now than it has been in the past. We get about 30 

percent of our energy from the Middle East and about 20 percent, 

or thereabouts, from Venezuela. We have got some people that 

don’t like us very much that we are getting our oil from. 

So my concern is what is likely to happen in these other countries, and whether or not there is a possibility that we could see 

a bottling up of the Suez Canal, the Straits of Hormuz, and the 

Persian Gulf, what that means to the United States. If we don’t 

drill here in the ANWR and drill off the Continental Shelf and in 

the Gulf of Mexico and use some of the 300 or 400 years of natural 

gas and coal shale that we have while we are transitioning to these 

other new technologies, windmills and solar and nuclear and so 

forth, what is going to happen in the United States? What is your 

prognostication on whether or not this sort of thing could happen 

over there and how can we deal with that? 

Right now I am sure you all know that there are some rumblings 

going on in the Persian Gulf States, there are some minor rumblings going on in Syria; we have already heard some minor rumblings in Jordan, as well as Egypt. And also we have our good 

friend, Israel, that is right in the middle of all this. And if that 

thing blows up, they are certainly going to defend themselves, 

which could be a catalyst for a major problem. 

So I know this is a very broad question, but I would like to know 

how this affects the United States and our security, both economically and militarily. 

Elliott, why don’t we start with you? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you, Mr. Burton. Thank you for the kind 

words. It is great to see you again. 

So far, the Suez Canal is open for business, and it is certainly 

in the interests of the Egyptian military to keep it open. I think 

if we see any sign of Iranian reactions to this, taking advantage of 

this, it would be timely for America’s military leaders to stop talking about how catastrophic it would be if there were ever a strike 

43

on Iran, and to start saying that if Iran closes the Straits of 

Hormuz, we will open them; we will open them fast, and they will 

pay the price. I think we should make that very, very plain to the 

Iranians. 

I also would just say I agree with you that we have an incredible 

development in shale gas that gives us an opportunity to be independent of Middle Eastern oil, not tomorrow morning, but not 50 

years from now either. To me it seems that we ought to be moving 

as fast as we can to develop that resource and make ourselves energy independent. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Craner. 

Mr. CRANER. The one allied country in the Persian Gulf that I 

think ought to be of some concern is Bahrain, where they have 

rolled back a lot of the openings that they had made, where you 

have got a heavy Shiite population. Obviously, once you get beyond 

that—Qatar, Oman, et cetera, I think are going to be pretty stable. 

And again, it is Iran that I would worry about. I would worry a 

lot about Iran trying to take advantage of all these events far afield 

from where they are. They have got to be happy watching some of 

these newscasts. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Just very briefly, not all rumblings are the same, 

not all rumblings are bad news. I would hope that we would see 

more rumblings in Syria and Iran. It advantages our interests. And 

if we could help propel the winds of change to Damascus and 

Tehran, that would be good. 

Secondly, I do think that the situation in Jordan is different than 

what we have seen in Egypt and Tunisia. The Jordanians—it is a 

serious situation, but I don’t think that it is by any means approaching the crisis point that we saw in Egypt and Tunisia. I 

think in general we have to caution against the concept of dominoes falling from one country to another. It is a very different situation in some of these countries. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Burton. 

I am pleased to yield to our friend from American Samoa, Mr. 

Faleomavaega, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair. Congratulations 

on your attainment of the chairmanship of this committee. I am 

looking forward to working with you and your colleagues on the 

other side of the aisle. 

I do want to thank the gentlemen for their testimonies this 

morning. 

It is quite obvious that there are so many undercurrents and 

crosscurrents now developing as far as the crisis that we are facing 

in Egypt at this time. Some 350 million Arabs live in this part of 

the world. I wanted to know how difficult the problem is now that 

we are confronted with it. 

Would you agree that our general policy toward Egypt has been 

never mind about democracy as long as there is stability? And is 

there a sense of resentment among the Egyptians that say, Oh, 

now the United States wants to look for another Mubarak to continue the policy of stability, more importantly, than that of democracy—as I think our good friend, my colleague from New York, has 

given concern as to whether or not our Government is going to 

44

allow the Egyptian people ultimately to make that decision for 

themselves and to their future. I would like your comments on 

that. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. I think you are right. I think that except for some brief periods—2004, 2005, especially—we have basically been uninterested as a country in democracy in Egypt. We 

have taken—and we have exaggerated, I would also say—the benefits we get from President Mubarak, and there are a lot of Egyptians who I think do resent it. I think we could overcome that resentment if we make it clear right now that we really do hope their 

revolution succeeds. And I think the administration has not been 

clear about that. I think it has been straddling the fence. It is time 

for the United States to make it very clear that we think what is 

going on is really terrific and that we hope for nothing more than 

democracy in Egypt. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Craner. 

Mr. CRANER. I have no question that what you just said is absolutely true. I think we do have a chance to redeem ourselves. I 

think if we look back at our experiences in Chile and in the Philippines under President Reagan, they provide good guides about 

how to move. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Satloff. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Sir, over just the last week, my organization funded a poll in Egypt through the Pechter Middle East polling firm, 

which is the first polling data to come out of Egypt since the crisis. 

One of the findings is this crisis is not anti-American. It is antiMubarak, but it is not anti-American. That is a good sign, and that 

gives us a good foundation on which to move forward. I don’t know 

if it will last, and we do have to make important decisions to ensure that it doesn’t fall backward, but we have a surprisingly 

strong foundation on which to move forward in Egypt. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. For the past 30 years we have given Egypt 

well over $65 billion in assistance, and $36 billion of that went to 

the military to prop up Egypt’s military defense forces. 

Would you agree that if this crisis really comes to a boiling point 

where there is going to be riots and all of that, that the military 

definitely will have to step in and take control of the government? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Sir, I think the military has already stepped in to 

take control of the government. We have two military Vice Presidents and a military Prime Minister and still a military President. 

What we hope for is a military to chart the transition and to take 

irrevocable decisions toward change. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And even if we make threats toward the 

military, saying that we are going to cut off your funding, I am 

quite sure that there are going to be other sources out there that 

are more than willing to compensate for whatever restrictions or 

whatever decisions that we make, and say we are not going to fund 

you, they are going to find other sources. 

So isn’t it ultimately that this is going to be one of the most critical points where the military definitely is going to be the real 

power behind whatever is going to happen in the coming weeks and 

even months as far as Egypt’s future is concerned? 

Mr. ABRAMS. It will. And I think they are in charge right now. 

And even if we grant that they could find the money someplace 

45

else—I am not sure, $1 billion is still a lot of money—but even if 

we grant that, the question is about us more than about them: 

Where do we stand? What do we want our money going for? What 

record will be compiled in this crisis created in Egypt? I think that 

is even more important in a sense. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I think my time is up. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Faleomavaega. 

I now would like to yield 5 minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Mr. Rohrabacher of 

California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. These witnesses have 

been excellent witnesses today. I thank each one of you for sharing 

your expertise and also for your service to our country in the past 

years and the service to the cause of democracy. 

I would like to identify myself with this commitment to democracy as articulated by our witnesses. I do think that we could have 

been giving advice to the regime and to the military and perhaps 

forcing more democratic reform over the years. That certainly is 

important, not just looking forward but looking back. 

However, let me just note where we are today. I find it very disturbing that there is such a contrast between the administration’s 

muffled and restrained response to the brutal repression of demonstrators against the anti-American Mullah regime in Tehran as 

compared—and that is in stark contrast to the embracing of the 

demonstrators against a less than democratic friendly government 

in Egypt. I think that sends exactly the wrong message to many 

people in power. 

This administration’s response to events in Egypt has basically 

been responding to these events with a confused and unreliable 

voice that will have, I believe, serious consequences, long-term consequences for the cause of freedom and stability in this volatile region. And it does a disservice, I might add, to American security 

interests as well. 

President Mubarak has been a force for stability, even though his 

rule has been very imperfect and less than democratic. Improving 

that does not mean making decisions that could well result in the 

empowerment of radical Islamic forces like the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Specifically, President Mubarak reached out to his people and to 

democratic countries throughout the world with an announcement 

that neither he nor his son would run for President and that he 

would work with those to try to ensure free and fair elections. Well, 

giving the moderates and the democratic forces in Egypt 8 months, 

until September, to organize and to participate in a democratic 

process seems to be a responsible strategy and something that we 

should have embraced and worked to make sure that it was indeed 

ensuring free and fair elections. Instead, the Obama administration 

began calling for immediate change, the alternative to President 

Mubarak must be put in place now. 

Well, what would that result in? By immediately installing a new 

government could well mean that we are installing a government 

that has not been elected to anything. And while Mubarak is imVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
46

perfect, the people that we are saying should be installed now 

wouldn’t have any legitimacy in terms of democratic base work for 

their power, especially if those people who end up—because we are 

demanding immediate leaving power of Mubarak now—end up to 

be anti-democratic in their very nature, or so radically Islamic that 

they wouldn’t permit real freedom in their country. 

I would argue that the administration’s actions have been contrary to the long-term interests of democracy and stability in 

Egypt. So I would hope that we would work with the administration, all of us would try to do our part. And I would hope that the 

United States does not in any way compromise our long-term commitment to the Egyptian people that we side with democracy, but 

we need to do this in a responsible way that will not in the long 

term result in less democracy and less freedom. 

You wonder about some of these young women who are marching 

down the streets complaining about Mubarak, whether or not they 

are going to end up with a regime that forces them to wear burqas 

and cover their face and shut up and not be involved in national 

politics, like we have seen in other radical Islamic countries. 

We have been doing more than just throwing Mubarak under the 

bus, we have been throwing him to the wolves. And perhaps the 

future of democracy and freedom in that part of the world will be 

eaten up as well. 

I just went on a rambling rave myself. You have 40 seconds to 

make your comments. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Just a very quick one. I think it is important to distinguish what can be done tomorrow and what can’t. There can’t 

be elections tomorrow, not anything that we would regard as free 

and fair and reasonable ones. They could lift the emergency law tomorrow. After 30 years, it is time. Omar Suleiman said, yes, it 

should be lifted as soon as security conditions permit. He has been 

saying that for 30 years. It is time. 

Mr. CRANER. I think the best judge is whether they are moving 

forward with the kind of conditions that could lead to free and fair 

elections. When the Vice President says his people aren’t ready for 

democracy, that answers the question. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. The gentleman’s 

time has expired. 

I am pleased to yield to Mr. Payne of New Jersey, the ranking 

member on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

As you know, we have a history of supporting dictators. Usually 

our foreign policy has very little to do with the manner that they 

treat their people—the Mobutus in Zaire to the Savimbis in Angola, the F.W. Botha in South Africa. We can go on and on—the 

Shah of Iran; Marcos in the Philippines. 

How do you see us moving in the future? Are we going to, in your 

opinions, still back bad guys that we know they are bad but they 

are okay to us, or are we going to sort of have democracy to try 

to have a process going in those countries where you can have the 

will of the people expressed? How do you see us going in the future? Because this Egypt thing is not over. It is not the Obama administration that fouled up somewhere. This thing, as you know, 

47

goes way back to Britain wanting to block up the Suez Canal back 

in the fifties. So what do you think about our relationship to dictators in the future? 

Mr. CRANER. Obviously, it is important right now to spend a lot 

of time on Egypt. What happens in Egypt is going to have huge 

consequences for the region. But I hope that this experience with 

Egypt, where the conventional wisdom was it was going to be stable—certainly the conventional wisdom was that Tunisia was going 

to be stable—will lead to us look around the world at other countries that we think are important to the United States where we 

are currently muting ourselves on democracy and human rights. It 

doesn’t mean you have to push one or the other; you can have a 

relationship, if you need to, with an authoritarian government. But 

you can’t believe the dissidents and the democrats who we have 

learned time and again will one day inevitably come to power on 

their own, and when they do come to power they are looking 

around and saying, ‘‘America did nothing for us.’’

So whether it is in Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan or China, we need 

to be looking at these countries and thinking about what we are 

doing whenever change may come to those places. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Just to add a specific word about where we might 

ensure our focus in the broader Middle East, events in Egypt have 

obscured our attention from Tunisia, and I think we need to make 

sure that the Tunisian example actually leads to a good outcome. 

It is on a positive path, but it is by no means assured that Tunisia 

will lead to the right endgame. I think we can’t lose focus on that. 

And secondly, sir, I would suggest that in the Palestinian Authority, certainly in the West Bank, it is important that our partner have greater popular legitimacy, in talking about the leadership for the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abass. And there is 

no better way to have popular legitimacy than through the popular 

support of elections. 

And so I think we should consider talking with our friends there 

about ways to enhance their popular legitimacy through elections. 

We don’t want the type of change that we have seen in Egypt and 

Tunisia to be the norm of how change happens in our friendly 

countries. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes, I agree with both my friends here, Mr. Payne. 

I think one of the things we have learned is that the so-called 

‘‘realism’’ that led us to support these dictators is not so realistic 

in the end after all, and a policy of supporting democracy may actually turn out to be more realistic. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, there is a situation going on in Cote d’Ivoire, 

which not much attention of course is being paid to right now, but 

the current President was defeated, everyone agrees he has been 

defeated, but he is refusing to leave. With 16 elections coming up 

and after this year, if this person who lost the election, Gbagbo, remains to stay in, that simply sends a bad message for these 16 

elections coming, and also, it might even have impact on the police 

in the Middle East, 

Let me just ask one last question. Both you, Mr. Abrams, and 

you, Dr. Satloff, have different opinions on the support from your 

Egypt group about military support and assistance continuing. You 

48

both have opposite positions. Could you, in about 15 seconds each, 

tell your position and why? 

Mr. SATLOFF. My position is that we should use whatever leverage we have to try to convince the Egyptian Army to make the 

right decision. Positive conditionality. There is always a time in the 

future that we can cut off aid when it is apparent that the Egyptian military has taken the path solely of repression and suppression of popular protests. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think we actually do agree on that. I wouldn’t cut 

it off today, but I would send a very strong message today to the 

Egyptian military that it is in jeopardy. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. The gentleman’s 

time has expired. 

If I could ask Mr. Royce, before I recognize you, if you could take 

over as chair for me. I have to meet some constituents. And I will 

recognize Mr. Royce, the chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade for 5 minutes of questioning. Thank 

you, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE [presiding]. Mr. Craner, I had an opportunity over the 

weekend to meet with seven Egyptians from Cairo and Alexandria, 

who recently traveled here from Egypt. Here is what they shared 

with me. Their observation was that the Muslim Brotherhood did 

not start this uprising, as they called it. It came from young professionals. But they said that if the Brotherhood gets the upper hand, 

eventually it would be a bloody terror for those who did not subscribe to the fundamentalist approach of the Brotherhood. They 

said if you want to see how this will play out, think of what happened to the Baha’i in Iran; think of what happened to the students and to the young democratic enthusiasts that went to the 

streets against the Shah and then ultimately found themselves in 

prison or shot when the fundamentalist regime came to power. 

They said it is the fate of the guillotine if the revolution goes the 

wrong way afterwards. 

Here was their point: They said the Brotherhood is a group that 

does not believe in pluralism. There is no equality for women; there 

is no equality under their conception of Islam for non-Muslims or 

for Muslims who deviate from their viewpoint. So they say they 

have embraced elections as a means to power, basically. And given 

their past history, in their view, why shouldn’t there be qualifications on candidates that don’t support pluralism? Because otherwise it is going to be a situation where you are going to have one 

free election one time, because they view this group as hell bent 

on this path. So I was going to ask you about that. 

I was going to ask you, should they not be allowed to participate? 

And maybe you could tell us a little bit about the Brotherhood’s 

lack of democratic bona fides. 

Now the other thing that I wanted to ask you about is the effort 

that the United States made some years ago with Hernando de 

Soto. This is the other issue they wanted to share with me, the 

utter corruption in that society. Hernando de Soto, the Peruvian 

economist, went to Egypt in 2004, did a massive study, and found 

that gaining the legal title to a vacant piece of land takes 10 years; 

to open a bakery takes about 500 days. You have 56 government 

49

agencies you have to go through. They were telling me about this 

process in Egypt, you know, 20 bribes to open a small company. 

So they said, ‘‘Look at the consequences of that.’’ Hernando de 

Soto brought that plan forward to the Egyptian Cabinet to unlock 

an amount of capital in Egypt 100 times more—more than that of 

what we give Egypt in support, right? And they have a Minister 

in Egypt that supports a reform to bring transparency to the legal 

system, and this guy was sacked. And as a consequence, as de Soto 

said, hidden forces of the status quo blocked crucial elements of the 

reform. You cannot get reform under the current system. 

And this is something else I wanted to ask you to respond to. In 

the United States, here we have a U.S.-funded study that helps institute crucial legal and institutional reforms that is blocked by the 

government. Do we object, do we protest, do we register a complaint, do we threaten to cut off aid? Do situations like this even 

get the Ambassador’s attention? What do we do about this level of 

corruption in the regime? If you can respond. 

Mr. CRANER. In a place that is so corrupt as Egypt, I don’t think 

a plan like Hernando de Soto’s could move forward. I think it 

would take a different kind of system. Here I would point to Georgia, which under Shevardnadze was one of the most corrupt countries in the former Soviet Union, which is quite a claim. They have 

moved forward dramatically under their new government to end 

corruption. I think when Saakashvili came into power, over 90 percent of the people reported they had had to pay a bribe within the 

previous 3 months. Now it is exactly the opposite. But I don’t think 

in a system like Egypt that on corruption is rotten to the core you 

are going to see any kind of change. There are too many people 

that have their hand in the till under this system. It is changeable, 

as Georgia has shown, but not under this regime. 

I think on the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, you and I faced 

this issue in South Africa almost 20 years ago, about whether certain parties were going to be allowed to run. At that time, the issue 

was whether or not they were committed to nonviolence. I think 

those kind of conditions are very, very fair. It shouldn’t be that people who are against pluralism or are pro-violence are allowed to be 

violent on a Tuesday and stand for election on a Thursday. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I thank you, Mr. Craner. I am going to go to 

Mr. Satloff for any observations on that as well. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Two brief observations about the political system 

and its potential evolution vis-a`-vis the Muslim Brotherhood. There 

is currently a constitutional clause in Egypt that no party based on 

religion is allowed. It will be for the Egyptians to determine whether that gets amended. Should they ask the United States or the 

U.S. Embassy for its advice, I would urge that we should not advocate for changing that fundamental principle. 

Secondly, there is some discussion about the order of elections, 

Presidential, parliamentary, et cetera. It makes much sense that 

there be a Presidential election before there is a new parliamentary 

election. Under the Egyptian Constitution, the chances of a moderate, liberal-minded Presidential victor are far greater than a parliamentary outcome that would lead similarly to that end. 

Mr. ROYCE. I would like to yield to Mr. Berman for a point. 

50

Mr. BERMAN. I would very much agree, except for one issue. Will 

this Parliament that is in place as a result of a manipulated election make the changes that we think are necessary to ensure the 

legalized parties create a process? 

Mr. SATLOFF. I think the short answer is this Parliament will do 

what the political leadership of the country tells it to do. So I 

would not make changing the composition of this Parliament the 

be-all and end-all of Egyptian political reform. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Satloff. 

I would like to go now to Mr. Engle of New York for your questioning. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I would like to ask a question about 

Egypt and also do Lebanon as well, because I wrote the Syria Accountability Act. And one of the things that we used in that act—

I did it with the current chair, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen—we wanted Syria 

to get out of Lebanon. And we know that there has been a lot of 

change and uproar in Lebanon. First of all, the pro-Western government fell, there is a new Prime Minister Designate Mikati. 

I would like to ask anyone who would care to answer, what is 

your assessment of him? Is he qualified for the position? He was 

obviously nominated by Hezbollah, so that makes me worried. So 

I would just like you to answer that. 

I would also like to speak about the Special Tribunal in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah bitterly opposes the Special Tribunal because that is the 

international body investigating the 2005 assassination of former 

Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. It is widely expected that the Special Tribunal will indict some members of Hezbollah. 

And what should the administration do if that happens and the 

Lebanese Government decides to withdraw its material and verbal 

support from the STL? Should we at that point attempt to pick up 

the financial slack? So let me ask that Lebanese question first. 

And then my question on Egypt is: What are the similarities that 

you see between the uprising in Iran and the revolution of 1979 

and this? Many people have said it is very similar, many people 

have said no because of differences. I would like to hear your analyses on it. Anybody who would care to answer either question, I 

would be grateful. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. Engel, I will just start. 

I think that Mr. Mikati is, in the technical sense, qualified to be 

Prime Minister of Lebanon, but as you said, he was put there by 

Hezbollah. This is supposed to be, under their Constitution, a 

Sunni seat, but the Sunni community did not choose him. He is a 

cat’s-paw for Hezbollah. This is, in a sense, a soft coup by 

Hezbollah. And I would argue that if Prime Minister Mikati does 

not support this Special Tribunal for Lebanon, I hope our relations 

with him reflect that. I would, for example, suggest he not be invited to the United States to meet the President, to go to the White 

House, to come up here on the Hill, if that is the position that he 

is taking. 

Just very quickly, I would draw two distinctions between the 

Iran situation and that of Egypt. One, there is no Khomeini. There 

is no great opposition leader that we have to fear, let’s say, on the 

Muslim Brotherhood side; nor is there, unfortunately, a Walesa, a 

Havel, on the democratic side. 

51

The second difference is the army collapsed in Iran, and of course 

it hasn’t collapsed in Egypt. And one of the things that we are all 

saying here today is we don’t want it to collapse. We want it, however, not to try to maintain the old regime forever or people will 

lose faith in it. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. CRANER. I think that was an important point, that there is 

no central religious figure to fear in Egypt. And I think that things 

have not gotten so rotten and so bad in Egypt that you really have 

people accruing to that religious leader or religious party and leaving almost no room for what we used to call moderates in Iran. 

Mr. SATLOFF. First, I think we should remember how fresh and 

new the Egyptian situation is. Less time has passed in Egypt than 

what took Ben Ali to leave in Tunisia, and that was so fast. We 

should not rule out the idea that leaders will emerge, whether it 

is this Google executive, or someone else may emerge to be the face 

of the faceless revolution, and that would be important. 

I do concur with the sentiments that were expressed by Elliott 

on Lebanon, Congressman. I would just add that there are Security 

Council requirements, both regarding the Special Tribunal on Lebanon and regarding security in the south, that the Government of 

Lebanon is required to maintain. And it would be appropriate for 

the United States not to have to act alone, but to act in concert 

with its Security Council partners to see that either this government in Lebanon fulfills its requirements or is censured. And that 

would be a great embarrassment to Lebanon, to the Hezbollahbacked government. 

Mr. ENGEL. I just think, and let me conclude, that the violation 

in Lebanon of the cease-fire in the war with Israel, with all these 

missiles and weapons which were supposed to be not allowed to 

come back in the country, is really alarming and it is something 

we really need to take very seriously. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel. 

I am pleased to yield to the chairman of our Subcommittee on 

the Middle East, Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Crane, you stated in your testimony that as a democratic 

form of government slowly begins to take shape in Iraq, having 

similar political developments in Cairo could have great consequences for the region. Conversely, given the violent birth of and 

halting steps toward democracy in Iraq, chaos or a more repressive 

government in Egypt will discourage and further delay much needed reform in the region. 

Could you elaborate on the implications for our efforts in Iraq of 

the events currently unfolding in Egypt and how will it affect U.S. 

leverage? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And Mr. Craner, if you could put the 

microphone a little closer to your mouth. Thank you. 

Mr. CRANER. I said that, because if you look historically over the 

last 5,000 years, the two centers of learning and intellect in the region have been principally Cairo, but also Baghdad. And so if you 

are a Syrian or an Algerian or a Yemeni, you have traditionally 

looked to or you may have gone to school in the old days in one 

52

of those two places. Today, you may also have gone to the American University in Beirut. But those are the kind of two traditional 

intellectual leader cities and countries in the region. So if you had 

democracy in those two principle pillars for Arab culture, then it 

would be difficult, if you are in another Arab country, to say democracy is not going to work here. 

Alternatively, if things were to go badly in Egypt, you would then 

be in a position in another country to say, is that what they mean 

by democracy? You had all that violence in Iraq and look what happened in Egypt. So the stakes are very, very high in Egypt, I think. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. Abrams, over the past decades, the United States has given 

the Mubarak regime billions of dollars in nonsecurity assistance, 

and such assistance has, unfortunately, not led to significant political or economic reforms, as we all know. How should the executive 

branch and Congress going forward leverage our economic assistance to encourage real reforms? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. Chabot, I think there have been changes in the 

Egyptian economy, and the rich have gotten a lot richer. There are 

now Egyptian billionaires on the Forbes list, but there has not been 

much trickle down and the poor remain desperately poor. 

I would hope that what we would try to do in our economic assistance is, first of all, help those who are poorest. And secondly, 

see if we can encourage the new government that is going to be 

coming in to adopt economic reforms that are not simply about increasing foreign direct investment or getting the stock market to 

rise, but about helping people in the lower middle class, working 

class, and the poorest people. 

One of the problems we have with our aid program in Egypt is 

Egyptians don’t know it exists. Some other countries have built stadiums and things like that that are very visible, but an awful lot 

of Egyptians don’t know that we have given billions of dollars in 

aid to Egypt. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Satloff, I was struck by your comment that you made that 

basically the worst of all worlds for the United States to be in was 

to be neither feared, nor respected, nor loved. I would invite yours, 

and if there is any time left, the other members—how can we avoid 

that hereon? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Generally, the rule in the Middle East is reward 

your friends and punish your adversaries, and it is usually a smart 

policy to follow. The Egyptian case cuts through the middle of it 

because we have a partner who is both friend to us and adversary 

to us in different respects. Clarity here is important. I think, as I 

said earlier, that the longer that there is no visible change at the 

top, the more our influence wanes. 

If I could add just one brief comment, sir, about the economic 

question, I suspect that the leaders of Egypt view it a bit differently. They probably see that all these protestors have cell 

phones, Facebook pages, access to computers; they can’t be so poor. 

And they are probably saying to themselves, my gosh, all that work 

that we did to advance the Egyptian economy only led to popular 

protests, only led to more opposition. I think we should be wary 

elsewhere that leaders will find ways to limit the sort of growth 

53

that led to the popular protest. Egypt has had 5 percent growth for 

years, and this is an outcome that authoritarians will be fearful of 

in the future. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I have 15 seconds, if either one of the 

other gentlemen would like to—okay. I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 

I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to Mr. Meeks of New York, the 

ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And congratulations 

to you, also. 

Let me just say this and throw out a question. I, too, over the 

weekend have had the opportunity to sit down with some young 

people, some who just came back from Egypt who reside in my district, et cetera. And I have got to tell you, I have come away tremendously impressed in all of the conversation that we have been 

having today. 

I have confidence in the Egyptian people. They have gone to the 

streets and said what they want and what they don’t want. They 

clearly want to move into a more free society, something that I 

don’t think anybody could have ever done for them. They did it for 

themselves. And as a result of that, I know we can talk and we 

have our interests, of course, but ultimately they are going to decide their own Constitution. And I think that to the degree that we 

try to say, well, this should be in there or this should not be in 

there, then—it is not anti-American now, but if we try to tell them 

what should or should not happen, just as they are revolting 

against Mubarak, that then I think becomes the danger that we 

have because they are clear. 

Now, one of the things that they were not as clear on when I 

asked them, is who could rise from among them to be a leader, who 

could be the candidate; because clearly there is no clear leader 

within the opposition. And my question to them was then, in all 

of this, in doing a new Constitution, et cetera, it takes individuals 

to sit down, to talk, to negotiate. I referenced our Constitution, our 

men at that time, and hopefully now men and women will be sitting down and talking. 

Have you any idea who is in that group that will be talking to 

help rewrite the Constitution so that whoever comes up, we will 

then have an entree to try to continue the kind of relationship that 

we have had in the past but in a democratic forum? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, yesterday the Egyptian Government 

appointed a panel of constitutional experts—judges, lawyers, et 

cetera—many of whom are very loyal to President Mubarak, some 

have been vocal opponents of the President over the last number 

of years. It is not clear that this group will have popular legitimacy. 

There are other groups that are out there as well. There is a 

group called the Wise Men, public figures, both businessmen and 

civic leaders. There are the leaders of the youth. They have tried 

to organize themselves into an important coalition of leaders. There 

are the traditional parties that the regime has tolerated; they are 

small, they have been around for many years. They don’t have 

54

much popular support. But they do understand the Constitution 

and they do understand Egyptian law. 

There is no coalescing yet, they don’t all agree, except almost all 

of them seem to agree on the idea that the President, either in his 

person or in his authorities, must go. That important, visible, irrevocable change seems to be a common feature of the opposition. 

Mr. CRANER. I think there are leaders out there. You have El 

Baradei, you have Ayman Nour, you have others. There are many 

people whose names are not household words in the United States 

or maybe even in Egypt because of the repression all these years. 

I think what will be important is to note, number one, if you have 

an election soon nobody is going to know those leaders’ names. And 

number two, if the good people in the middle are not able to come 

together to form a coalition and perhaps to come up with a common 

candidate, then you could have things going badly. 

Mr. MEEKS. What—go ahead. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I agree with that, and I think there are people who 

will come to the fore, because like Ayman Nour, who ran against 

Mubarak in 2005, they are known to be opponents of the old regime. 

Mr. MEEKS. And within those groups what are you hearing in regards because when we do talk about U.S. interests I am also concerned about our ally, Israel. Is there any kind of consensus because at least there have been a peace, might have been a cold 

peace, and you talk about the Suez Canal, you talk about—and I 

know that President Netanyahu is concerned. Is there any conversation that you have heard on the ground in regards to Israel? 

Mr. SATLOFF. There is no doubt that the Muslim Brotherhood 

has gone on record as seeking the cancelation of the peace treaty. 

They have opposed it from the beginning, and they will oppose it 

to the very end. Other organizations have publicly said this isn’t 

about Israel. Thankfully this is not about Israel. This is what Elliott said earlier; this is not about America even giving our support. 

This is about their desire for change. 

We have to be vigilant that a situation doesn’t come, that it becomes about Israel and America. And I think we should all be quite 

worried that elements of the regime just last week tried to play the 

Israel card and the Jewish card, putting on Egyptian national television so-called Israeli spies, that evidently were provocateurs in 

the protest, or protestors that admitted to being trained by American Jewish organizations to overthrow Mubarak. This is all obviously poppycock, but it plays to the conspiratorial mindset, which 

many may have, and it is a sign of desperation on the part of the 

regime. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s time has expired. I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to Mr. 

Fortenberry, the vice chair of Africa, Global Health, and Human 

Rights Subcommittee. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 

gentlemen for coming today. I believe it is very important that we 

stand by any people who are pursuing their highest aspirations. 

Now with that said, the doorway to a vibrant and sustainable democracy rests really on two pillars fundamentally. First is an 

inculturated understanding of the dignity and therefore rights of 

55

every person and secondly an understanding of the nature of responsible citizenship as it seeks to uphold the rule of law. Then 

from there flow the institutions of society that give rise to civil capacity and can sustain things like freedom of speech and freedom 

of religion and freedom of assembly and a vibrant democracy with 

free and fair elections. 

The delicate question that is before us is, where is Egypt on that 

spectrum? Because without sufficiently developed institutions the 

danger or probability increases that this situation is exploitable by 

those who would use democracy to undermine it to pursue other 

ends. We had a discussion earlier as to what happened in Gaza. I 

heard your point, Mr. Craner, but at the same time, if you are allowing democracy to be used by those who are going to act antithetically to it, you may end up in a situation which is much worse 

off. 

With that said, again we want to stand by people as they are 

pursuing their highest aspirations, but I think that is the narrow 

issue here. Where is Egypt in terms of civil capacity so that we increase the probability that this type of hopeful and good outcome 

can occur. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Just one brief comment, Mr. Fortenberry, this is 

the measure of a terrible legacy of Hosni Mubarak, who had 30 

years to slowly, steadily build this civic culture and instead built 

a culture of suspicion and suppression and leaves soon, even on his 

own timetable, with having done none of it. Clearly Tunisia is in a better situation. Tunisia, with $8,500 per 

capita income and roughly 85–80 percent literacy. But I guess I 

would say we are who we are. I mean the people of Egypt are rising up and demanding this. And what perhaps we can help advise 

with is the kind of institutional protections that after all our own 

founders put in because they wondered whether we had the civic 

culture to do this yet and they were very mistrustful of majorities. 

So maybe we can help as they think through what a new Constitution would look like. 

Mr. CRANER. In terms of civil capacity, there are many countries 

less developed that have become democratic. And I always use the 

example of Mongolia, quite an isolated place, with not a lot of civil 

capacity, Mali in Africa. The list—I could cite you a long list, but 

in terms of civil capacity——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Are a comparable in terms of——

Mr. CRANER. Much less, much less, what would you call civil capacity in terms of the understanding of the issues you were talking 

about that have been able to come to the fore and become democratic. I think one of the issues in Egypt is from where we sit it 

is going to be hard to slow what is going on in Egypt. I think we 

can help shape it as it moves forward. We can even hasten it moving forward. But at the least we can do is shape it. But I think it 

will be very, very hard for us to slow it. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. One of the problems with analogies and this 

is clear is that perhaps you didn’t have entities as well organized 

as the Muslim Brotherhood is going to reject fundamental aspects 

of what are going to provide the foundation for vibrant democracy 

as we project on it. I think that is where it falls short, but I understand your point. 

56

Mr. CRANER. I would also point you, however, to some of the—

Muslim Brotherhood is unique certainly in Egypt, but there have 

been other countries where there have been well organized entities 

that went into elections and were defeated. And I think here of the 

former communist parties. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I just picked up your language when you said 

hopefully moderates will come out well. Again that points to this 

delicate situation that we are now in and we don’t exactly know 

where we are. 

Mr. CRANER. But we need to get in and shape it and not just be 

passive spectators, which is essentially what we are doing right 

now. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Just one brief analytical distinction. Egyptians are 

generally religiously conservative, but we should not equate that 

with membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, which is an ideological party with political goals. We shouldn’t believe that all Egyptians if they are not liberals they are necessarily Brotherhood 

members. We would fall into their trap. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to my Florida colleague, 

Mr. Deutch, for his questions. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair. Dr. Satloff, you said just 

a couple minutes ago that this is not about Israel or America, this 

is about what is happening in Egypt. But I would like to focus on 

what is happening in Egypt as it relates to the two, particularly 

for people, for Egyptian citizens. If you could discuss the implications on the ground, not just with regard to the border with Egypt, 

but the broader implications should the next government choose to 

abrogate that peace treaty with Israel. What does it means in 

terms of trade, what does it mean in terms of exports and qualifying industrial zones? If you could speak to that so that we have 

a better sense of what the thinking is and how it might play out. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Thank you, Congressman. I think we have gotten 

quite used to the idea of Egypt and Israel linked in peace, even if 

it is a cold peace, and the world in which we live is shaped by that. 

But to take that out and change that is huge. Israel for the last 

30 years has operated on the assumption it didn’t need to deploy 

a single soldier on the Egyptian border. That has opened up huge 

opportunities for Israel. It has enabled them to lower their defense 

spending, enabled them to move elsewhere, take other risks for 

peace. A change such as this, if it convinces the Israelis they have 

to rethink border security with Egypt, if they have to worry that 

the Egyptians are goings to militarize the Sinai, if they have to 

worry that the Gaza border is now going to become free flow for 

weapons with the Egyptian connivance instead of against Egypt’s 

efforts, this changes everything that is possible for peace and security in this region. 

Egypt obviously will lose its American support if it severs its relationship. It will look for other partners, probably more nefarious 

partners than the United States. The Suez Canal becomes subject 

to possible closure or selective opening to various partners. The 

Egyptians, for example, have permitted the Israelis to transit their 

own submarines through the Suez Canal. The idea that in an era 

beyond peace that this would be possible is difficult to imagine. 

57

So there is a longer list, I could go on. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, if could you speak first to the nefarious partners that might be out there should this decision be made and secondly to the specific statement by the Muslim Brotherhood over the 

weekend that they recognize why it is in Egypt’s interest to continue the peace treaty. Do we take them at their word as well? If 

not, again speak to who else might be out there that would be looking for this opportunity? 

Mr. SATLOFF. The statements I have seen by representatives of 

the Muslim Brotherhood are not supportive of the peace treaty. Actually I think the official position is they want the peace treaty to 

be up for a new vote by a new Parliament and a national referendum on whether it should be sustained. 

In terms of more nefarious possible partners for Egypt, well, 

there are plenty of candidates of countries that wouldn’t have our 

conditionality, wouldn’t have our desire for popular, for civic rights. 

Whether they are—they may be friends of ours even, like the 

Saudis and others, but they are not going to have democracy as 

part of their portfolio. And then there are more nefarious characters, whether it is the Chinese, the Venezuelans or other, that 

would come up with $1 billion to pluck the prize of Egypt from us, 

and I think it would be a price for them well spent. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Craner, you are nodding. Other thoughts, if 

you could broaden that discussion. 

Mr. CRANER. I think Rob was very, very comprehensive in his answer to you. I think the other thing Egyptians would have to think 

about as they move that is their own economy. Nobody is going to 

want to invest in an area that looks like a war zone, which that 

may if that happens. 

The second thing the Egyptian military has to think about is 

whatever else you can say about the United States economy versus 

China and all this stuff, we continue to have the world’s best military, and they would have to decide if they wanted to take Iranian 

weapons, Russian weapons, Chinese weapons, and Chinese-Russian 

training and then try to go to war with Israel. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And then finally, Mr. Abrams, if you could just 

speak again to the Muslim Brotherhood and the relationship with 

Hamas, funding for Hamas, those direct ties and our concerns as 

this goes forward. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Hamas is part of the Muslim Brotherhood internationally and the Mubarak regime has always been quite afraid 

of the link between the two. The question would really be about the 

Hamas border with Egypt, which is the Sinai-Gaza border. The 

Egyptian Government has done a mixed job. I mean, if you ask 

Israelis, there are tons of weapons that float in through those tunnels. It is hard to say the Egyptian Government couldn’t have 

stopped more of them had it really been trying to. So it isn’t as if 

we go from a golden age now to an age of trouble. But there is no 

question that one of the questions that the Muslim Brotherhood is 

going to have to answer is what do you want the relationship between the new Government of Egypt and Hamas to be? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

Thank you, Mr. Abrams. 

Mr. Rivera, my Florida colleague, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

58

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. One of my concerns or one of my main concerns in this crisis is the impact on 

U.S. interests vis-a`-vis Israel. I have one question first for Dr. 

Satloff and Secretary Abrams. Obviously the situation in Egypt is 

very much in flux, but regardless of what emerges American interests remain constant. It is imperative that Egypt today and 

throughout any political transition continues to honor its international obligations and play a positive role in the region. Specifically, Egypt must honor its commitment to peace with Israel as enshrined in the Camp David Accords and ensure the integrity of the 

Egyptian-Israel and Egyptian-Gaza borders. 

So for Dr. Satloff, my question, what message should the United 

States be delivering to the parties regarding Egypt’s peace with 

Israel? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Very simply, Congressman, the United States 

should be public and private in saying the type of Egypt that we 

can support is only the type of Egypt that fulfills its international 

commitments, that we cannot support an Egypt that flouts or violates its fundamental international commitments. That applies to 

the military, it applies to economic. This is the foundation of our 

relationship. 

With the Israelis, we need to begin serious security conversations 

now about upgrading the United States-Israel strategic partnership. There are many things that we can do in concert in terms of 

border security, in terms of intelligence, and in terms of other 

items, and it should be seen that we are doing this so that the region understands that we recognize the shock to the Israeli security system and that we can do what we can to help cushion and 

assist the Israelis through the shock. 

Mr. RIVERA. And for Secretary Abrams, over the years the 

United States has sold a great deal of military equipment to Egypt. 

At the same time we are deeply committed to Israel’s qualitative 

military edge, essentially Israel’s ability to defend itself against 

any combination of conventional threats. Part of the calculus in 

providing weapons to Egypt was that it was committed to peace 

with Israel. 

If Egypt’s commitment toward peace with Israel changes, how 

should that affect future decisions about the sale and maintenance 

of weapon systems to the Egyptians? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. Rivera, I think we should be very clear with 

the new Government of Egypt that the building block for us is their 

international obligation, their support of peace in the region, and 

if they move away from that, our aid program is impossible. I think 

that we can do that privately at first, rather than browbeating 

them, but I think we need to make it very, very clear and make 

sure that the Egyptian army understands that it has been obligation to tell the civilians, to persuade the civilians, to talk to the 

new Parliament so that the national debate shows that it is in 

Egypt’s interest, they are not doing this as a favor to us, not doing 

this as a favor to Israel. It is in Egypt’s interest to keep those commitments. 

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Craner, anything to add on either front? 

59

Mr. CRANER. Just that this large assistance package began with 

the Camp David Accords. If the Camp David Accords are no longer 

going to be operative, there is no need for the assistance. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. I yield back the 

remainder of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rivera. Mr. 

Cicilline of Rhode Island is recognized for 5 minutes. Welcome. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and congratulations to you and thank you to the panel for a great presentation. 

A special welcome to Dr. Satloff; it is wonderful to see you. 

I have really two issues that I would ask the panel to address. 

The first is just yesterday in the Providence Journal there was a 

headline, Egypt’s Unrest Raises Oil Prices. And this seems to be 

another example of where our national security interests and our 

ability to wean ourselves from dependence on foreign oil intersect. 

And so my first question is really is there any reason to believe in 

the short term that there will be consequences to the oil supply 

here in this country, knowing that Egypt is not a big producer, but 

that lots of oil is transported. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Cicilline, can I interrupt you for 1 

second? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Certainly. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and we won’t take away 

from your time. Mr. Berman and I have to go to the floor to handle 

the debate. And I will ask Mr. McCaul of Texas to take over the 

chair. And if we could start Mr. Cicilline’s time again. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So in light of this uncertainty in the region in the 

short term, is there likely to be any impact, and then add to that 

that 40 percent of natural gas consumed by Israel comes from 

Egypt, which I know the Muslim Brotherhood has already spoken 

out against, what are the implications in terms of energy? And I 

hope there will be a call to action on behalf of our country to develop a comprehensive energy policy that is serious about investing 

in clean energy and the development and production of renewable 

energy. 

The second area I would like to hear your thoughts on is the 

issue of leadership of the revolution. It seems as if it is really organic and it is really the people of Egypt that are leading this revolution. And I think we have to be careful that even if we could 

identify the emerging leaders we have to walk this tightrope where 

we want to be sure that this is a decision of the Egyptian people, 

and so we can’t be seen to have selected or endorsed new leadership. 

On the other hand, it sounds like investments in democracy promotion would be a useful tool to help fuel that kind of development. 

The question really is, is it too late for this country in terms of our 

playing in that area because they are now in the midst of the revolution, or are there some strategies that can support the emerging 

democratic leadership, whoever that is? 

Mr. ABRAMS. To say a word about energy, Mr. Cicilline, so far no, 

obviously the prices have risen because of uncertainty. But so far 

the Canal is intact and the Egyptian army seems to want to keep 

it that way. 

60

There was a terrorist attack on the gas pipeline to Israel, and it 

is not working right now. It will take several more days to get it 

back online. The Israelis I think need to worry that Egyptian domestic politics may interfere in the medium term with their supplies. They do have supplies offshore and one of the things that has 

happened is it has changed a little bit the debate within Israel 

about the importance of those supplies and the need to get them 

online a lot faster. 

I yield to my colleagues on the question of how we can help this 

democratic transition. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Just a word about energy before that, Congressman, I think that now is the moment when we need to be talking 

very clearly with the Saudis and our Gulf partners about their excess capacity, which is significant and would be quite helpful right 

now to help ensure that oil prices, which is really speculation on 

the sense of fear and uncertainty, that oil prices don’t take a dynamic of their own. Those governments are very angry at the 

United States for their perception that we threw Mubarak under 

the bus, which I think is incorrect, but so be it. We need to have 

a real serious strategic conversation with the Saudis and their 

partners about their use of excess capacity. 

Mr. CRANER. On the question——

Mr. CICILLINE. And Dr. Satloff, on the balance of the question is 

it too late for us to implement some strategies to support emerging 

democratic leadership in Egypt? 

Mr. SATLOFF. I will let my colleague Lorne comment in just a 

moment. I don’t think it is ever too late for us to do what we can. 

And we have great institutions, such as the one Lorne directs and 

others, that have people on the ground that have been working 

quietly for years. Now is the moment really where we should be 

more active and do what we can to help liberals, moderates, antiIslamists capture the political space which is beginning to open for 

them. 

Mr. CRANER. I wish we had more time on this before elections 

occur. The one good thing is that we and other groups, the National 

Democratic Institute included, have been able to have contact with 

folks there for a couple of years, less lately because our budgets 

were cut. So I don’t think it is too late. One of the things I always 

tell folks to address the delicacy issue you are talking about is we 

have to understand it is their country and it is their fight. We cannot be leading them. 

What we can do when we do this kind of work is to talk about 

how coalitions are formed without saying and here is your leader 

or what issues do you need to address without saying these are the 

issues and here are the solutions. One of the interesting things 

that has happened in the last 10 years is that many new democracies are interested in doing this kind of work. So, for example, 

the Tunisians are very interested in having people from Portugal, 

which began its democracy in 1975, and Serbia, which began its democracy in 1998. So it is not so much regarded as an American 

thing anymore when you are bringing in people from all over the 

world. It can be done. We can’t do it passively, we need to get in 

there and start doing it. 

61

The final thing I would say is for the opposition to understand 

what issues it is that the Egyptian people want addressed. I think 

if you go out there and say let’s be more aggressive toward Israel 

or you go out there and say let’s fix this economy, you are going 

to get different reactions. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you very much. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 

minutes. We all support democracy. I think the concern a lot of us 

have is a power vacuum and who is going to fill that void in that 

power vacuum. There is also a great concern I know from other nations in the Middle East of what is going to happen to them and 

what ripple effect could potentially take place across the Middle 

East. Certainly countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen. 

When you look at the history of who is to fill this void I think 

obviously the young intellectual, secular model is what we want, 

but then there is, as we have discussed the Muslim Brotherhood. 

When you look at the history, Mr. Qutb, the literary scholar, 

trained in the United States but then advocating violence. Mr. 

Zawahiri, the number two man to bin Ladin. Those are the elements that we are talking about. That raises great concern to me 

in terms of—I think we know the answer to this question, how it 

is going to play out, but that is a great cautionary concern I think 

that all of us have. 

Dr. Satloff, you talked about Iran as well with the vacuum. So 

I have got a couple more questions. I just want to throw that out 

and see what response or commentaries you had on that. 

Mr. SATLOFF. Congressman, in the current environment no one 

is suggesting that any other institution but the army fill that void. 

Actually our hope is that the army separates itself from the President and then fills the void and then opened up a transition, an 

irrevocable transition. But no responsible person is suggesting to 

hand over the keys of the country to a leaderless, amorphous 

group. Everyone hopes for an institutional change, and that is why 

if this does happen, if the army makes the choice, which it so far 

has been reluctant to do, then we may be on the right path. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Any other comments? Mr. Abrams. 

Mr. ABRAMS. You asked about the ripple effects. I would say 

about that is there have been some good ones in the sense that the 

Governor of Algeria announced that after 19 years the emergency 

law would be ended. The Government of Jordan, the King, announced that he has appointed a new Prime Minister with a mandate for reform. In Yemen the President announces he won’t run 

again. So they are not going have a President for life, which is 

what they feared. 

So to the extent that people can get ahead of the curve this will 

prove to be positive. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Craner. 

Mr. CRANER. I think you are not yet seeing negative effects in 

any of the countries. I noted earlier if you are going to see effects 

it will probably be in the republics, not the monarchies for a variety of reasons. But I think these events drive home the point that 

President Bush made and that Secretary Clinton made in a speech 

62

in UAE and another one in Munich, that not only do they need to 

get ahead of the events, but we need to get ahead of these events. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree with that. Is there something to learn from 

that? When we look the Turkey they have a secular model of government. Do we have—is there any benefit to examine that model 

in terms of applying it to Egypt? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would say it is a mixed model in the sense that 

for years and years it looked like the right model, the AK Party, 

democratic, moderate, but we have seen in the last year real steps 

by the Prime Minister against freedom of the press in Turkey. And 

so I think Turkey now becomes a worrying model for the direction 

of Egypt. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And last question, El Baradei has been, and I was 

at a meeting with him in Vienna. He is a very impressive man and 

he seems to be the type that could be a consensus builder. What 

are your thoughts in terms of him emerging as a potential leader 

in Egypt? 

Mr. SATLOFF. In the polling that we did just last week in Cairo, 

El Baradei came up quite negligible in public opinion support. The 

top ranked person was for better or for worse the current Secretary 

General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, who supports peace but 

isn’t always such a friend of American interests in the broader 

Middle East. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Craner. 

Mr. CRANER. Mr. El Baradei would be a transitional figure at 

best. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend. And welcome. I know it has 

been a long morning, and thank you all for being patient. 

I have two questions. First, Mr. Abrams, to you. You quoted Tom 

Lantos: ‘‘Does Egypt need more tanks or more schools?’’ Obviously 

a rhetorical question. You sound like a liberal Democrat. Thank 

you, in raising the question. But you also bemoaned a little bit the 

fact that other donors have visible projects they can point to, and 

the people can see the assistance is helping and we don’t have so 

much of that. 

The administration in which you served and the Senate in which 

I served actually consciously moved a lot of project-tied aid in 

Egypt to cash transfer because it made the client happier, but we 

paid a political price. I wonder if you want to comment on that in 

terms of in retrospect, did we make a mistake? And moving forward do we need to resist the temptation even though it takes long 

and it is clunky and it requires more people at USAID, but we pay 

a political price every time someone doesn’t see the tangible benefit, in this case of the peace dividend. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I agree and I think it was a mistake to do this. And 

we almost made an even larger mistake. The Mubarak regime has 

been pushing for probably 3 or 4 years now for some—sort of an 

endowment where the aid would be put into a giant pot where you 

and the Congress would lose all control going forward and for a 

while that was a popular proposal. I think it was blocked here on 

the Hill. 

63

But I think what we see now is the error of having been so supportive of the Mubarak government. I would only add the usual 

statement is they were such great allies. Yes and no, you know 

there are Emirati forces fighting alongside us in Afghanistan. 

There are no Egyptian forces. There are others in the Arab world 

who have been much more helpful about bringing peace and democracy to Iraq after the war. President Mubarak was not helpful, and 

of course it is a very cold peace with Israel, under a regime, his 

regime, that propagated, not just anti-Israel, but terrible anti-Semitic feelings in Egypt. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Mr. Craner, you talked about the 

consequences of in a sense the vacuum. When you have an autocratic regime and you don’t allow political space to be created for 

legitimate opposition that is capable of governing, this is what happens. And we aided and abetted that, maybe through circumstances, whatever. I would argue clearly it is also a legacy of 

the Cold War where we saw the world in such stark bipolar terms, 

we kind of lost a lot of stuff in the antithesis. 

But moving forward, it is easier said than done, isn’t it? I mean, 

you have got a friendly allied government, it may be autocratic, 

and here you are, whether it is the Republican Institute or the 

Democratic Institute or the U.S. State Department, mucking 

around with the opposition that they don’t want you mucking 

around with. How do we forge a coherent policy that allows us to 

help create political space, especially when the governing regime 

does not want us to? 

Mr. CRANER. Because with every country, with every government 

there is what I would call an equation of relations with the United 

States. You have an X, Y, Z quotients. If X is the trade relationship, if Y the military relationship, you want to insert another 

quotient called democracy and human rights. And we shouldn’t underestimate the power and how much attention people pay to us. 

And when they understand that the President and the Secretary 

of State highly value a particular quotient in the equation then 

they will pay attention to it. And skilled diplomats are able to use 

that. This is something I saw repeatedly in both the Bush-Baker 

and the Bush-Powell State Departments. Skilled diplomats can do 

both quite easily. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Satloff, did you want to comment? 

Mr. SATLOFF. No, I defer. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh my gosh, I have 50 seconds left. 

Elliot, I hope I see you at the synagogue. Thank you very much. 

You go to the synagogue in my neighborhood. Thank you all very 

much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the Egyptian experience of the past several weeks raises 

a number of questions, a lot of contradictions. But also I don’t know 

that enough has been made out of the generational influence, not 

only in Egypt but throughout the Middle East and North Africa, 

and I think in Egypt 25 or 50 percent of the population is under 

the age of 25. What is different today is that these regimes have 

been very good at repression. And there are now tools of collaboraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.000 HFA PsN: SHIRL
64

tion, of organization that have are available to everybody in the 

world in this Web enabled world, and it is interesting that the 

Egyptian Government shut down the Internet, but so much information was out there before they did it, it essentially drove people 

into the streets, because that level of curiosity had been raised to 

a point where it was uncontrollable. I supposed that is both a good 

thing and a bad thing. 

Mr. Satloff, you had indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood, you 

talk about contradictions, is an ideological party with very specific 

goals. Could you elaborate a little bit? 

Mr. SATLOFF. Yes, Congressman. The Muslim Brotherhood was 

founded and retains its intention to Islamize society, to make Egyptian society first and other Muslim majority countries second, governed under Sharia law, Sharia law being the codified Muslim legal 

code. Now in some places the Muslim Brotherhood has spread. It 

started out in Egypt, it has spread in countries around the world. 

It takes different names in different places, like Hamas in the Palestinian arena, but it retains that ultimate goal. It has a variety 

of means toward that goal. At times it has used direct violence trying to assassinate Presidents and Prime Ministers. At other times 

it uses electoral politics, at other times is uses social welfare efforts 

to promote popularity, but it has never given up the goal. And the 

goal has only been compromised because of actions of the state. 

Namely, the state has repressed, thrown in jail its leaders, and it 

has been forced to give up certain aspects of its goal publicly and 

certain aspects of its means publicly. But I would argue that there 

is no fundamental change in the objective of the Muslim Brotherhood and we should be quite clear eyed about what that goal is, 

and it is very antithetical to our strategic interests and to our 

human rights and democracy interests. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Is it possible to gauge the support for the Muslim 

Brotherhood in Egypt itself amongst the population? Is there a percentage that could be accurately applied relative to support 

amongst the popular——

Mr. SATLOFF. There is a common view among experts that it is 

somewhere about 20 or 30 percent. But none of us really know because the government has set up an electoral system which deprives all options other than supporting the brotherhood or supporting the regime. So we don’t really know what the Brotherhood 

support is. I suspect it is in that ballpark, but it is certainly not 

a majority support among the Egyptian population. Here I just 

want to reaffirm the point I made earlier, we need to make a distinction between religiosity, people who pray and people who ascribe to a political ideology of compelling their compatriots to live 

under Islamic law. That is a very different approach. 

Mr. HIGGINS. It seems like one of the reasons Egypt has historically supported the blockade of Gaza is because they wanted to ensure that Hamas remains Israel’s problem and not their problem, 

which is indicative of a history of fearing, I presume, the Muslim 

Brotherhood which makes up Hamas. 

This power vacuum, where do we suspect this thing is going to—

how is this going to be filled? Anybody? 

65

Mr. ABRAMS. The power vacuum in Cairo of course none of us 

know, and this is a key question as to whether the army can lead 

a steady but real transition to a new democratic system or not. 

I do think one thing about Gaza: Initially the Egyptians wanted 

to have a lot more influence in Gaza and prevent a Hamas takeover. Once Hamas took over, they were very much afraid of a kind 

of infection between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the 

Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, Hamas. And they then began to enforce somewhat, haphazardly, they began to enforce a border. And 

there were some incidents where they arrested Hamas people and 

pushed them back over the border. But Mubarak I think was quite 

afraid of what the Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood cooperation could 

do. 

Mr. HIGGINS. My time is up. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Griffin. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Abrams, my 

understanding is that the movement in Egypt is an organic one for 

the most part and there is potentially a power vacuum there and 

that Egypt historically has done a good job in dealing with some 

of the extreme groups, fringe groups. With all of that in mind, looking forward to the intermediate term, 5 years or so down the road, 

what do you see al-Qaeda trying to do, if anything? And I mention 

this, I know there hasn’t been a lot of discussion of al-Qaeda, but 

clearly some critical people in the al-Qaeda organization have ties 

to Egypt. And then I see this Wall Street Journal editorial, could 

al-Qaeda hijack Egypt’s revolution? And I know it is all sort of 

speculation, but I would like for you to comment on how credible 

that speculation is. It seems to me if we did have incomplete 

knowledge, looking in hindsight, that this was coming and it did 

sort of organically bubble up, if you will, looking forward, what do 

we know about al-Qaeda and their interests? And I would assume 

that there is no question they would have a desire to capitalize and 

exploit this, but there may be structural resource limitations on 

their ability to do that. Do you want to comment on that? I don’t 

know if you’ve seen this article but just on the general premise. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. Griffin, I think it is something we should be 

worrying about because al-Qaeda tends to thrive when there is an 

ungoverned space, Somalia, Yemen, or when the hand that suppresses it is lifted. I am sure they are looking at Egypt and wondering whether the security forces that have been fighting them 

will start being—will start pulling back, and that could happen 

now. It can happen in the medium term if you get new governments of Egypt where it is not so popular to suppress al-Qaeda, 

where the people who are running the country are telling the security forces don’t be so tough or make trouble, I don’t want any incidents. Because if they move back and I am thinking about things 

like guarding their borders or airports and seaports, if they lessen 

or lower their guard against al-Qaeda, we know enough of al-Qaeda 

to know that they are constantly looking around and they will 

move into Egypt. 

So I think it is something to worry about. It is one of the reasons 

that I think it is so important the army not sacrifice its position 

in Egypt to save Hosni Mubarak and get him a few more months, 

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because we will need them to prevent exactly what you are I think 

rightly worried about. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. What I would also be interested in is to hear your 

comment on if al-Qaeda is looking at northern Africa as a whole 

and not just Egypt as a potential opportunity. Are they looking to 

recruit there for their fights elsewhere or do you believe they would 

be looking to infiltrate there and establish themselves? It seems to 

me we have done such a good job, the United States has, in fighting them, particularly in terms of depleting their operational resources that they may not have the ability to do everything that 

they might like to do. Would they be recruiting there for fights in 

Afghanistan and Iraq or would they be trying to move into these 

countries? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think the answer is both. There is now a thing 

called al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and I think we have seen or we 

have seen arrests in Morocco or arrests in Algeria. And they are 

both trying to recruit there and clearly have tried and succeeded 

in some cases in doing terrorist attacks in North Africa. So this is 

very much on their radar screen. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I see that I am about out of time. I have about 30 

seconds, if there is anything you would like to add. 

Mr. SATLOFF. A couple of quick points. One, al-Qaeda has proved 

quite opportunistic. I am sure they are seeing the situation in Tunisia and Egypt as the fall of their enemies, not so much a rise of 

democracy, and this will invite their activity in these countries. 

Secondly, we should note that even such people as the assassin 

of Sadat up at Zamur escaped from jail in Egypt over the last 2 

weeks, and I think we should be quite concerned about the potential for these fringe movements taking hold again. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I want to thank the witnesses for their excellent 

testimony here today. Our members may have additional questions, 

and we ask that our witnesses consider follow-up answers to any 

questions that may be forwarded. Without objection, by unanimous 

consent members will have 5 days to submit questions in writing, 

which the committee will then forward to our witnesses. 

Again, thank you, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

(67)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT AND LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND 

ALLIES IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST, 

PART 2

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. We thank the folks in the audience 

with the yellow T-shirts. They have loved ones or relatives or interested folks about what is going on in Camp Ashraf and the many 

violations against the freedom-loving Iranians there. And we certainly will keep working so that they get the protection they deserve from the Iraqi Government and from our U.S. Government 

as well. So we welcome you today. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, 

for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize the 

chairman and the ranking member of our Subcommittee on Middle 

East and South Asia for 31⁄2 minutes each for their statements. 

We will then hear from our witness Deputy Secretary Steinberg. 

Thank you, sir, for joining us. 

Following Mr. Steinberg’s testimony, we will move to questions 

and answers from members under the 5-minute rule. 

Without objection, the witness’ prepared statement will be made 

a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record subject to length limitations of 

the rules. Thank you very much. So if we could have the clock 

begin now. 

Yesterday, as you know, we heard from a distinguished panel of 

experts and former administration officials on the dramatic transformation that is currently taking place in Cairo, in Beirut, and beyond. There was general agreement on the need for the United 

States to send a clear signal of support to those freedom-loving 

Egyptians who renounce violence, who are committed to democratic 

governance, who respect the security and the sovereignty of all 

Egypt’s neighbors. There were echoes of statements by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from this past weekend that the 

U.S. relationship is not just with one person, but rather with all 

of the Egyptian people as a whole. 

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Former Deputy National Secretary Advisor Elliot Abrams reiterated that Mubarak created the very situation that Israel and the 

United States now fear, and that Mubarak’s statements that he 

will not run in Egypt’s scheduled elections is too late to enable a 

smooth transition. 

America’s role should be to facilitate a post-Mubarak transition 

in order to avert future violence, and restore calm, and guard 

against the use of the transition process by nefarious elements 

such as the Muslim Brotherhood to directly or indirectly undermine 

Egypt’s evolution to a democratic republic. 

There is no evidence that a well-thought-out contingency plan existed in the event that Mubarak’s government became unstable or 

collapsed. The Wall Street Journal reported that Middle East experts at a January 31 meeting asked National Security Council officials, ‘‘Please tell me that you have contingencies in case 

Mubarak’s regime collapses.’’ The National Security Council reportedly admitted there were no such plans. 

A February 2 report by foreignpolicy.com cites a senior administration official telling ABC that the administration was being compelled to change its strategy ‘‘every 12 hours. First it was negotiate 

with the opposition. Then events overtook that. Then it was orderly 

transition. Then it was, you, Mubarak, and your son can’t run, and 

now it is the process has to begin now.’’

Turning to the Muslim Brotherhood, the New York Times reported on February 2 that ‘‘White House staff members made clear 

that they did not rule out engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood as part of an orderly process according to one attendee.’’

Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood must not be on the table. This 

also has implications for U.S. policy toward Lebanon, given statements last year by John Brennan, assistant to the secretary for 

homeland security and counterterrorism, describing Hezbollah’s 

evolution from ‘‘purely a terrorist organization’’ to a militia, to 

what Mr. Brennan refers to as an organization that now has members within the Parliament and the Cabinet. 

Has the State Department evaluated whether Lebanon now 

meets the statutory definition of a state sponsor of terrorism or a 

terrorist strength sanctuary, given Hezbollah control of that government? And what is the administration’s stance on continuing to 

provide assistance to such a Lebanese Government? From Lebanon 

to Egypt, what is the administration’s stance on the Muslim Brotherhood? Beyond the general parameters referenced in Deputy Secretary Steinberg’s written statement that is in our packet, what are 

the specific components and contingencies of the U.S. strategy toward Egypt and for aiding in the transitional process? If a key U.S. 

goal is to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from taking over, and 

the Muslim Brotherhood is well funded, then shouldn’t U.S. policy 

seek to shift economic aid away from the Mubarak government and 

focus it on strengthening responsible, peaceful democratic voices? 

The administration’s initial approach to Egypt was clearly not 

keeping up with the priorities in its first years. While driving increases in the international affairs budget, the administration 

made significant cuts to total bilateral funding for democracy and 

governance programming. USAID even reportedly adopted a policy 

of only funding those organizations officially approved as NGOs by 

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the Mubarak government. Repeated U.S. failure to enforce its own 

conditions and requirements on nonsecurity assistance to Egypt 

has compounded the problem. 

So, Mr. Steinberg, what tangible economic or democratic reforms 

has the Government of Egypt undertaken as a result of the billions 

of dollars that we have provided in nonsecurity assistance throughout the last decades? What have we received in exchange? 

This brings to mind two lessons on the Lebanese debacle that we 

are currently facing. The first is that the elections themselves are 

meaningless unless they are supplemented with democratic institutions. Hezbollah’s ascendance in Lebanon was facilitated by the 

failure of responsible nations to insist on changing a Syrian-dictated electoral law and subsequent regulation prior to holding elections in the aftermath of the 2005 Cedar Revolution. Clearer standards for participation in elections and institutions must be both articulated and implemented to ensure that destructive actors are not 

afforded the opportunity to hijack an incipient democratic process. 

The second lesson is we cannot afford to continue to pursue a 

myopic, personality-based policy that relies on stability over institutional reform. In Lebanon, we had a short-term policy based on 

maintaining stability, and we vested significant political capital 

with both Rafiq Hariri and, in the wake of his assassination and 

ascendance of the pro-Western March 14 bloc, his son Saad Hariri. 

Basing the next round of elections on existing Egyptian law and 

regulations without clear standards for participation and a democratic institutional framework is a recipe for disaster. 

And turning lastly to the role of the Egyptian Army, it has been 

reported that the United States is working behind the scenes to impress upon the Egyptian military the need to protect protestors and 

support a peaceful government transition. And I will be asking you 

questions on the administration’s view on the security assistance to 

Egypt. 

So thank you very much for being here. 

And I am so proud and pleased to turn to my ranking member, 

Mr. Berman of California. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

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Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I am just getting word that probably a lot of people are getting 

that—except possibly the Deputy Secretary of State—that according to NBC News and a number of other sources, including quotes 

from the new Prime Minister of Egypt, that Hosni Mubarak is to 

step down following an all-day meeting of the country’s Supreme 

Military Council. The army said all of the protestors demands 

would be met and a further statement was expected to be made 

later Thursday clarifying the situation. Mubarak was also due to 

address the nation. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. If I can interrupt. We will start your 

time again. 

The Chair would like to remind the audience members that no 

disturbance of the committee proceedings are allowed, and if there 

is no order, we will ask for you to be removed from the room according to House rules. 

Mr. Berman’s time will now begin. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Yesterday I made a fairly detailed opening statement on the rapidly evolving events in Egypt as well as developments in Lebanon. 

Today I would like to focus on just one aspect, the most immediately relevant aspect of the democratic transition in Egypt, and 

that is the issue of when that transition will actually begin. We 

may have just had an answer on that. 

But on February 1, President Obama said that a transition in 

Egypt must be meaningful, peaceful and begin now. At this point, 

however, prior to my reading about this, I felt that we were still 

waiting for that beginning. There have been some important announcements, the decision that neither Hosni Mubarak, Gamal 

Mubarak, nor Omar Suleiman would run for the Presidency in September, but nothing meaningful up until now has actually happened, nothing that could be considered a break with business as 

usual as seen by the Egyptian regime. 

Madam Chairman, the transition needs substance. If current 

Egyptian leaders are reluctant to give it that substance, then the 

administration needs to give it a major push by setting out its own 

timetables and targets. The transition needs to be orderly, to be 

sure, but foremost it actually needs to happen. 

Both the regime and the opposition need to see defining actions 

so that each begins to make what President Obama called the psychological break from the past. Any number of tangible actions 

would serve that purpose, whether it be ending the emergency law, 

the decision by President Mubarak to hand over effective power to 

his Vice President, a decision by the regime to bring credible opposition members into a transition government, clear indications that 

a new Constitution will be written and implemented and will ensure the provision of free and fair elections, the ability of secular 

parties to organize, the presence of monitors, the presence of international observers, and the kind of both print and television freedom that allows all parties and all voices to be heard during that 

kind of a campaign. 

This type of concrete action needs to happen for many reasons, 

but primarily for the benefit of the Egyptian people. The Egyptian 

regime needs to know that it cannot dawdle or simply go through 

74

the motions of democratic change without any intention of genuinely transitioning to democracy. If delay is its tactic, it will reap 

a whirlwind at home, and it will leave Congress little choice but 

to take action. In other words, no slow walking. 

When this crisis broke out, I emphasized that I favored continuing our security assistance program, but the duration of that 

program depended on whether the military played a constructive 

role in the democratic transition. That is still my position. But our 

patience, mine, that of my colleagues, has limits. Given the military’s influence over the regime, a regime that was born in the 

military and whose entire leadership is composed of military men, 

the democratic transition will happen if and only if the military 

plays that constructive role. 

So, Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to see you here. We have 

great respect for what you have been doing in a number of areas, 

but I am hoping when we finish this hearing, we will have a sense 

from you of when you think the democratic transition in Egypt will 

begin—it may have been helped by some of this news—and how we 

know it has begun, and what our administration intends to do to 

make sure that it begins if not now, then very, very soon. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

And I am pleased to yield 31⁄2 minutes to the chairman of our 

Middle East Subcommittee, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for holding these timely and important hearings again today. 

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished guest Secretary 

Steinberg about the situation in the Middle East, which continues 

to unfold even as we speak, as the ranking member indicated, with 

the news on Mubarak today. 

I think it is safe to say that the developments that continue to 

sweep across the Middle East and North Africa really did surprise 

many, but for years analysts had called attention to the ills of the 

region—a lack of respect for even the most basic human rights in 

many instances, like freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and 

fair and free elections—as a potentially dangerous source of discontent, but it was ignored. They pointed to the widespread poverty 

and the aggressive economic policies instituted by dictators who 

were out of touch with the plights of their respective populations. 

They did not, however, predict that one 26-year-old street vendor’s desperate act of defiance would initiate a wave of antiregime 

protests that are shaking the very foundations of the political order 

in the Middle East. Even those countries in which protests have 

not yet erupted look at countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan, 

nervously wondering if they themselves will be next. 

For years we have also been told something else. We have been 

told that the Middle East is a region that is not ready for democracy. Indeed, save a handful of exceptions, the democracy deficit in 

the region had all become but a permanent assumption upon which 

far too much U.S. policy was based. I say ‘‘had’’ because over the 

past weeks, the people of the Middle East by taking to the streets, 

have proclaimed loudly to the leaders and to the world that they 

share the same principles that we cherish. They have told us that 

75

the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness does not stop 

at the water’s edge. 

While these developments are very exciting, there is a dark side, 

which is a cause for concern. The specter of radical Islamist groups 

which exploit every opportunity to seize power is lost on no one. In 

Egypt, for over 30 years President Mubarak has crushed every 

moderate secular political party that could pose a challenge to his 

party, the National Democratic Party. The only movement which 

managed to survive is the Muslim Brotherhood, which, among 

other aspirations, has declared its desire to reconsider Egypt’s 

peace treaty with Israel as well as its desire to impose Sharia law 

on the Egyptian population. 

President Mubarak, however repressive he may have been, was 

a close ally to the United States in the region and was especially 

helpful to us in fighting the global war on terror. In his absence, 

and as Egypt enters a period of transition, we must do all that we 

can to ensure that Egypt emerges from its current crisis with 

strong and democratic institutions of government, institutions that 

will respect the rights of women, uphold past treaties and agreements like those with our ally Israel, and not exploit the pillars of 

democratic governments like elections to assume the power only to 

abolish those very pillars. We must do all we can to help support 

the development of these institutions and to avoid one man, one 

vote, one time. 

Preventing the Muslim Brotherhood from coming to power must 

be a leading priority as we revisit our policy toward Egypt. The 

quiet diplomacy that the United States has been engaging in so far 

may be helpful in dealing with the Mubarak regime, but it does 

nothing to assure the people of Egypt that we sympathize with 

their cause. As one of our witnesses yesterday pointed out, many 

Egyptians are totally unaware of the nonmilitary aid that we have 

given them. 

So again, I commend you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. We obviously want to avoid a situation in which the Egyptian 

population looks at us as having bankrolled President Mubarak 

while completely ignoring them. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And the ranking member, Mr. Ackerman, for 31⁄2 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Until recently, and unlike its Arab neighbors, Lebanon had a 

democratically elected government that should have had a mandate 

to govern, but like all of its regional neighbors except Israel, Lebanon has suffered from a powerful and unaccountable element of 

its society acting above and beyond the law. 

What was different in the Lebanese case was that this unaccountable few didn’t occupy or use the institutions of the state in 

order to coerce, in order to repress, in order to dominate their political opponents. Instead, they just threatened them and then killed 

them. 

No one should forget that before the current crisis, before the insurrection of May 2008, before the Presidential succession crisis 

and the lockout of Parliament, Hezbollah and its Iranian and Syrian allies engaged in a campaign of assassinations against LebaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
76

nese parliamentarians and journalists that began in 2005 with the 

murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. 

Long before the recent backroom coup, Hezbollah set itself above 

the law and outside the reach of the government. Hezbollah has for 

years systematically weakened Lebanon’s Government and continually undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty. It has made Lebanon a 

regional time bomb by deploying more than 40,000 Syrian and Iranian artillery rockets and advanced surface-to-surface missiles all 

aimed at Israel and all in order to shield Iran’s illicit nuclear weapons program. 

Tragically, the people of Lebanon are now hostages. Like the captive nations of Eastern Europe during the Cold War, their hearts 

are free, but their government has colluded with a foreign power 

to put them in chains. 

The United States must continue to advocate for Lebanon’s sovereignty and for the restoration of a legitimate government. We 

must continue to support and sustain the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and keep faith with all of the Lebanese people who want justice for their murdered countrymen and their former Prime Minister. America must continue to insist on the implementation of all 

relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, and we must speak out 

clearly against the flood of illegal and destabilizing Syrian and Iranian arms going into Lebanon. 

And finally, we need to be clear with the Government of Lebanon 

that it bears the burden of demonstrating that it truly serves the 

people of Lebanon, and that it will keep peace inside Lebanon and 

on Lebanon’s borders, and that it is not and will not either be a 

flunky for the ayatollahs in Tehran or for the dictator in Damascus. Until there is clear evidence that Beirut has made these 

choices, I believe we have no other alternative but to suspend all 

of our assistance programs to Lebanon. We have many urgent priorities in the Middle East. Helping Iran, helping Syria, and helping 

Hezbollah maintain a facade of Lebanese independence is not one 

of them. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back the balance. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

The Chair is now pleased to welcome our witness. James B. 

Steinberg is the Deputy Secretary of State, serving as the principal 

deputy to Secretary Clinton. Appointed by President Obama, he 

was confirmed by the Senate on January 28, 2009, and sworn in 

by the Secretary the next day. 

Prior to his appointment in the Obama administration, Mr. 

Steinberg served as the dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of 

Public Affairs and the vice president and director of the foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institute. 

From December 1996 to August 2000, Mr. Steinberg served as 

Deputy National Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton. Mr. 

Steinberg also has held numerous other posts in the State Department and on Capitol Hill. 

Deputy Secretary Steinberg, thank you for attending, and I 

would kindly remind you to keep your oral testimony to no more 

than 5 minutes. And without objection, your written statement will 

be inserted into the record. 

Welcome. 

77

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES B. STEINBERG, 

DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And let me begin 

on behalf of Secretary Clinton to congratulate you on taking the 

gavel here and to express how much we look forward to working 

with you and Ranking Member Berman and all of the members of 

the committee, and express appreciation for holding this timely 

hearing. 

Last month in Doha, Secretary Clinton challenged the leaders of 

the Middle East to give greater voice to their people. As the region 

confronts a potent combination of demographic and technological 

changes, rampant unemployment, and in too many cases the denial 

of universal rights and freedoms, she warned the status quo was 

unsustainable. 

In recent weeks this dynamic has given rise to demonstrations 

across the region and changes in Tunisia, Jordan, and Yemen, and, 

of course, sparked the dramatic developments in Egypt that, along 

with the events in Lebanon, are the focus of today’s hearing. 

In such an environment, it is more important than ever that 

America works both with the people and the governments to democratize and open up political systems, economies, and societies. 

As the Secretary said just a few days ago in Munich, these are her 

words, ‘‘This is not simply a matter of idealism. This is strategic 

necessity.’’

Change will emerge differently in response to different circumstances across the region, but our policies and our partnerships 

are guided by a few consistent principles. We stand for universal 

values, including freedom of association, assembly, and speech. We 

oppose violence as a tool for political coercion, and we have spoken 

out on the need for meaningful change in response to the demands 

of the people. 

American administrations of both parties have been conveying 

this message to Arab leaders publicly and privately for many years, 

and have also sought cooperation on crucial priorities such as counterterrorism, Iran’s nuclear program, and the peace process. But 

these are not mutually exclusive or even contradictory. Recent 

events have reinforced the fact that absent freedom and democratic 

progress, the public support needed to sustain progress on common 

goals cannot be achieved. Changes must come, but we must be 

mindful the transitions can lead to chaos and new forms of intolerance or backslide into authoritarianism. 

We are working wherever we can to ensure that political transitions are deliberate, inclusive and transparent, and we expect all 

who take part to honor certain basic commitments, because, as 

President Obama said in his Cairo speech, elections alone do not 

make true democracy. 

One constant in a changing region is unwavering support for 

Israel’s security. We continue to believe that the best path to longterm security for Israel and the region is the committed pursuit of 

comprehensive peace. By working for orderly transitions, we believe we can help ensure Israel’s long-term security, and we will be 

vigilant against attempts to hijack the legitimate impetus for domestic reform to advance extremism. 

78

Egypt today is undergoing a remarkable transition, and given 

Egypt’s leadership and influence, its peace with Israel, and our 

long-standing partnership, the stakes are high. We have all been 

transfixed by the heroic images from Tahrir Square of young and 

old, rich and poor, Muslim and Christian, gathering to lay claim to 

universal rights enjoyed in democratic societies around the world. 

And as the President has said, Egypt is not going back to the way 

it was. 

We have declared publicly and privately that a peaceful, orderly, 

and prompt transition must begin without delay, and it must make 

immediate, irreversible progress toward free and fair elections. 

We set out key principles to ensure that the transition remains 

peaceful. We made clear our support for human rights, including 

expression, association and assembly, freedom of the press. We 

have condemned violence against peaceful protestors, reporters and 

human rights activists, and we have underlined the need for 

Egypt’s military to remain a force for stability. We are urging 

Egypt’s Government and opposition to engage in serious, inclusive 

negotiations to arrive at a timetable, game plan, and path to constitutional political reforms. And as they do, we will support principles, processes, and institutions, not personalities. The desire for 

an orderly transition may not be a pretext for backsliding and stalling. 

Another vital message we are sending to all who take part in 

Egypt’s political future is the fundamental need to honor Egypt’s 

historic peace treaty with Israel. As Egypt builds democratic institutions after the recent unrest and also contends with the economic 

challenges that helped to cause it, we will continue to extend a 

hand in partnership and friendship to the American people, and we 

will act now, as we have done in the past, to support civil society, 

nongovernmental organizations, democracy groups, and economic 

recovery. As the transition unfolds, we will tailor our support to engage and nurture it. 

In Lebanon, a very different situation is unfolding. Last month 

Hezbollah, backed by Syria, used threats of violence to undermine 

the collapse of the Lebanese Government. We have worked with 

the international community with one voice to urge the next Lebanese Government to support the Special Tribunal, to honor its 

international obligations, and refrain from retribution against 

former officials. 

We intend to judge the next Lebanese Government by its deeds, 

mindful of the circumstances that brought it about. We will be 

watching Prime Minister Mikati to see whether he makes good on 

his public pledge to build a broad-based government that represents all sections of Lebanese society. The Lebanese people deserve better than a false choice between justice for the murder of 

their Prime Minister and stability for their country. 

If I could just conclude, Madam Chairman, by observing, without 

commenting specifically on the recent reports that you have referenced, that what is critical as we see this unfolding dynamic is 

that we remain consistent in our principles and the values of interest that we bring forward, while remaining nimble to adapt to 

emerging circumstances. It is a little bit like having a good game 

plan for the game, but also knowing when to call an audible. And 

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I think that is what we are seeing as we go forward here, a consistent approach that identifies U.S. interests and values, but 

adapts to the circumstances and preserves our long-term interests. 

And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinberg follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so very much, sir. 

And before yielding my time to Congresswoman Buerkle, I wanted to bring to your attention, sir, a problem that we had regarding 

the YouCut debate on the floor yesterday not related to the subject 

of this morning’s hearing. 

But yesterday morning, less than 2 hours before floor consideration, we received a letter from the State Department opposing the 

YouCut proposal to instruct the U.N. to return $179 million to the 

United States because of overpayments we had made to the U.N. 

Tax Equalization Fund, a surplus that the U.N. itself admitted 

that was payable to the United States. 

Your Department’s letter stated for the first time ever that the 

current TEF surplus is now approximately 80 million, so there is 

a discrepancy there. So if it is true, that means the Department of 

State had already given away $100 million owed back to the U.S. 

taxpayers. And we have been asking for this information for the 

past 3 months and have been stonewalled by the State Department. The U.N. cannot redirect this surplus fund without instructions from the United States. 

So I have some questions that I would like to get written responses from you by Thursday, February 17, about how this was 

handled, because the way that this matter was handled raises serious concerns in my mind about the management and the candor of 

the Department of State. So I would appreciate it when my staff 

hands you that letter, if we could get that written response. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I would be happy to provide that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

I am so pleased to yield to Congresswoman Buerkle of New York, 

who serves on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade as the vice chair. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for 

the opportunity this morning to address Mr. Steinberg. 

Mr. Steinberg, thank you for being here this morning. 

Throughout the course of the opening statements, we have heard 

from many of the members talking about the concern that the Muslim Brotherhood will step in if and when President Mubarak steps 

down. And really the key being is this something that the administration is making a priority of, preventing the Muslim Brotherhood 

from stepping in when that void occurs? And then beyond that, if 

it is a priority, what is the strategy of this administration to prevent that from happening? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you very much for the question. 

I think that what we have focused on is some set of principles 

that we apply to what we expect to happen during this transition, 

because as I said, we recognize that these transitions can be difficult, and they can lead to unpredictable results. And so by focusing on those expectations and conditions, the need for an inclusive 

process that respects not only the need for elections, but also the 

institutions that protects the rights of minorities, that makes sure 

that, as things move forward, that individuals of different religions, 

of different perspectives are allowed to be part of the process is 

quite critical. And we want to make sure that the process is not 

hijacked by extremists or those who do not deeply believe in the 

open and tolerant and democratic process that we want. 

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The process itself is one for the Egyptians to decide, but as we 

engage with whatever government emerges there, we will be guided by those principles. 

Ms. BUERKLE. If you could, Mr. Steinberg, can you elaborate a 

little bit on this inclusive process, some of the specifics, the strategy that the administration will put forward? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, I think what is important is that this be 

a process that is driven by the Egyptians themselves. But what we 

made clear to the Government of Egypt is that we expect that the 

full range of voices, not ones that are simply friendly to the government itself, are allowed to participate, and particularly the voices 

of the individuals who have been protesting peacefully on the street 

and are asking for democratic change are brought in and that different voices are heard, that legitimate perspectives from civil society participate in these discussions. The format is one that the 

Egyptian people themselves have to develop. But that is the kind 

of approach that we support. 

Ms. BUERKLE. And if I may just follow up with that. How do you 

anticipate the United States of America being engaged in that process? How do you see that unfolding? Where will you be involved in 

the process? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think our first role has been to support those 

voices, and we have done that through our assistance programs. I 

think that it is important to recognize, as a number of others have 

raised this question, that we have a variety of ways of being involved in supporting civil society voices, and that while there has 

been a focus on some of our assistance programs under the ESF, 

there are other programs through our democracy programs and 

through our Middle East Peace Initiative and metric programs that 

we have other ways of supporting these democratic voices, which 

we have done. 

So we want to support them and give them the capacity to participate effectively, and then we want to make clear in our advocacy with the Egyptian Government that these are voices that need 

to be heard. But I think it is not for the United States to be in the 

meetings themselves. We want this to be a process that is driven 

by the Egyptian people, by the legitimate forces in Egyptian society. 

Ms. BUERKLE. One last question. Do you believe if you follow this 

process that you just outlined for us that that will be sufficient for 

the United States—or to keep the Muslim Brotherhood from stepping in? Is that going to be a sufficient strategy to prevent that 

from happening? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think the key here, as I said in my opening remarks, is to have a clear set of principles which says what we expect and what, from our perspective, is an acceptable outcome for 

a new government moving forward, not just for our interests, although our interests are critical here, but also for the interests of 

the Egyptian people, and then to judge that as events emerge. And 

I think we need to, rather than trying to anticipate potential outcomes, be adaptive enough and responsive enough so we recognize, 

as we say, so we can identify concerns as they emerge, be vigilant, 

and make sure there we flag potentially dangerous emerging 

trends. 

86

And I think that is what we have tried to do here, which is part 

of the reason why we focused on the need for an orderly process, 

to make sure that it is not hijacked by voices which in the name 

of democracy are going to set up an intolerant regime. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. 

I yield back, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Congressman. 

I am pleased to yield to my friend, the ranking member, Mr. Berman of California. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary Steinberg, for your testimony and your 

leadership here. 

I would like to follow up on Ms. Buerkle’s initial question: What 

is the administration’s position regarding the participation of the 

Muslim Brotherhood in the transition and then subsequent governance? I certainly agree that in the end the Egyptian people are 

going to decide this question. 

There is an article in the current Egyptian Constitution requiring that religion be kept out of politics. Turkey has had a similar 

provision in its Constitution. 

Does the administration have a view as to whether Egypt should 

retain that principle in the next phase of its governance? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Mr. Berman, I think what is important is that 

the next government respect the kind of democratic principles that 

we talked about, which is a commitment to democracy, but not just 

for one election, but for all of the fabric of democracy. Open institutions. Open debate. Tolerance of diversity and religious minorities. 

An ability of people to pursue different paths free of harassment. 

A recognition that you have to have a vibrant civil society. 

There are different ways the Constitutions can embody that, different ways in which countries allow religion to play a role in our 

lives. We know, for example, even in our friends and allies in Europe, some have roles for religion in societies. 

So I think you can’t have an absolute rule about exactly how that 

applies, but it is very clear that we need to have—and we will be 

clear in our own mind that allowing this to become a state or a 

government that is intolerant, that does not provide an opportunity 

for the free, full expression of religious rights, of minority rights, 

or freedom for all of the different voices in Egyptian society is very 

important. 

And what is encouraging is if you look at the people who are out 

in Tahrir Square, what you are seeing is exactly that, Christians 

and Muslims, people from different religions and backgrounds and 

different viewpoints on the role of Islam in society. And that is 

what needs to be preserved, and that is something that we feel 

would be important in any Constitution that would be adopted by 

a future government. 

Mr. BERMAN. I have supported the administration’s decision not 

to suspend the assistance program up until now, but I noticed that 

White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs back on January 28 

said the United States will be reviewing our Egypt assistance posture based on events that take place in the coming days. 

87

Is that review ongoing, and what is the nature of that review? 

Under what circumstances would the administration consider suspending aid to Egypt? 

And then just an observation that I would recommend that the 

administration look toward the whole issue of export controls on 

things like tear gas canisters, items that are mostly relevant to the 

suppression of peaceful protestors. I think there would be some 

value in reviewing and perhaps eliminating licenses on those kinds 

of items for the interim period. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Mr. Berman, I think you would expect and we 

do always keep under constant review our assistance programs not 

just for Egypt, but elsewhere. Congressman Ackerman raised concerns about Lebanon, and I want to assure him that we do the 

same there because we have to be able to be responsive to ongoing 

events. And I won’t suggest that there aren’t some circumstances 

where events may arrive where we would have to change our approach, but what we have focused on here as events have been 

emerging in Egypt is how to encourage this transition, how to use 

our influence to try to move the process in a direction that we 

would like to see it go and it meets the needs and wishes of the 

Egyptian people. And I think we have to be prepared to deal with 

events as they emerge, but we don’t want to try to anticipate bad 

outcomes in a way that would make it less likely to achieve. 

Mr. BERMAN. I agree with that. I just in the end don’t want the 

notion of the ensurance of that assistance become a basis for the 

slow walking of the orderly transition. 

One last question. With all of the focus on Egypt, I just want—

I would like you to take one moment to sort of discuss how the situation may be affecting situations outside of Egypt, such as Iran. 

And my specific question is whether the State Department is on 

track to make determinations on their investigations for those violating CISADA, our Iran sanctions legislation, next month. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, as you know, this is an issue that 

I spent a lot of time on. And the Secretary has asked me to put 

a lot of specific attention to make sure that we have a very vigorous implementation of CISADA. We think it has been an enormously helpful tool, and it has had enormous impact in helping us 

to galvanize the international community to take steps to put additional pressure on Iran, and I think we have had enormous success. 

This continues in a comprehensive way to affect Iran, the Iranian 

economy, and also keep in the sense of isolation. 

So we understand the importance of making sure we have full 

enforcement on that. We have an ongoing effort that is looking at 

activities as they emerge, and I continue to pledge to you that we 

will do everything that we need to do both to enforce it, but also 

to use the statute in a broader way to engage with other countries 

to make clear that we need to remain vigilant not only about the 

letter of the law, but also the broader desire to make sure that we 

don’t have companies trying to skirt those provisions. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Now for the next round of questions. Mr. Smith, the chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. SMITH. Madam Chair, thank you very much. 

Mr. Steinberg, welcome to the committee. 

88

You know, he is the administration dictator until his utility and 

usefulness erodes or evaporates or diminishes, and then the administration finds its public voice on human rights and democracy and 

calls on the former friend to get out of town. 

You mentioned, Mr. Steinberg, a moment ago about the consistency of principles, and I frankly have some concerns about that. 

A few weeks ago, President Obama rolled out the red carpet as 

President Hu Jintao came into Washington, a brutal dictator who 

has murdered, tortured, and repressed countless Chinese, Tibetans, 

and Uighurs. The press conference with Hu Jintao was so disturbing—I watched it, and I couldn’t believe my ears—and even the 

Washington Post wrote an editorial on January 19. It said, ‘‘President Obama makes Hu Jintao look good on rights.’’

The President defended his friend, his dictator friend, and said 

the Chinese had a ‘‘different culture,’’ which I found to be an absolute insult to the Chinese people, especially those who are suffering 

in Lao Gai, who are being tortured for demanding their fundamental human rights. 

He also said he had a different political system, as if that was 

a defense, and that is what the Washington Post picked up on. 

Yeah. It is a different system. It is a dictatorship. 

My question is—you know, so I think we need to be very cautious, and I would respectfully submit to you be cautious when you 

talk about consistency and principles. Even Liu Xiaobo is languishing in prison, as we all know, right now. And then something 

was said behind the scenes. But we need public statements, not 

when it is—when that dictatorship is in its final hour, but consistently, and in a very transparent fashion, to let them know that we 

know. 

I read all of the Chinese press after the fact on the People’s 

Daily, at least what was carried there. They called Hu Jintao’s trip 

to Washington a tour de force, that he just took over Washington, 

and we were sitting there enfeebled by the effort that we showed. 

So I am very concerned when you talk about consistency. 

I do have a question about freedom of press and reporters in particular. Reporters Without Borders suggests that as many as 79 

journalists have been attacked in Egypt, 76 detained, 1 has been 

killed. Do we know how high up in the command, whether or not 

the Army, whether or not the military, whether or not Mubarak, 

ordered that, or did it come from the Muslim Brotherhood, or was 

it just an outgrowth of the chaos of the day each day? 

And secondly, I would like to ask about a very disturbing report 

that an American company, Narus, has sold the Egyptian Government what is called deep packet inspection technology, highly advanced technology that allows the purchaser to search the content 

of e-mails as they pass through the Internet routers. The report is 

from an NGO called Free Press, and it is based on information 

Narus itself has revealed about its business. 

Now, there is no way of knowing whether the information the 

Egyptian Government gleaned from its Narus technology enabled 

it to identify, track down, and harass or detain some of the journalists or anybody else in Egypt. 

89

I would like to know what we know about this company. And it 

is part of Boeing. It was recently bought. And what can you tell us 

about Narus and this invasion of privacy on the Internet? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Congressman. 

Obviously we had an extended conversation about China, which 

I would welcome the chance to discuss with you. But I just would 

make one point that in addition to the very public remarks that 

President Obama made, my boss, Secretary Clinton, made an extensive speech the week before President Hu came here in which 

she specifically identified our concerns about Liu Xiaobo and other 

specific dissidents and, I think, gave a very clear and very unequivocal statement about the importance that we attach to human 

rights in China. 

So I certainly appreciate the importance of consistency, and I 

think it is something that we have made a part of our engagement 

with China. 

With respect to the journalists, we have made clear we have 

many priorities that we are focusing on as this transition goes forward. But we have been explicitly very clear about the 

unacceptability about the way the journalists have been treated, 

the harassment, the imprisonment and the like. 

I think it is difficult to know—to answer fully your question 

about who is behind it. What is encouraging, though, is that because of the intervention of us and others, the journalists have 

been released, and it is important that we keep a focus on that because it has been the critical voice that has kept public eyes and 

ears on that. 

On your second question, obviously I am unfamiliar with the 

company that you identified, but I will be happy to see what we 

know about that. 

Mr. SMITH. Could you dig into that and get back to the committee, because it is very important. It goes to the whole issue of 

increasingly that U.S. corporations are enabling dictatorships. We 

saw it in Iran with a German corporation. We have seen it in 

China. We have seen it in Belarus where the Internet was used 

and is used to track down dissidents, to invade their e-mails, find 

out who they are talking to. It is an awful tool of repression, and 

Narus, according to these reports, has been enabling that kind of 

invasion of privacy. 

So thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We would appreciate answers to that. 

Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member of the Middle East Subcommittee. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. 

Good to see you, Mr. Secretary. 

Consistency is important, especially in foreign policy. A foolish 

consistency is something much to be avoided. 

There is a question that keeps asking itself, and some of us are 

asking it, and it demands a real answer. We can agree on the principle of freedom of speech and freedom of communication, and we 

can agree how important it is to democratic and civil societies. But 

when you pose a question, that there is information out there that 

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is in a virus, would you say that that would be welcome in your 

computer if the purpose of the virus was to bring down the system? 

My question is about the Muslim Brotherhood. They are an element of society for sure, and we have principles that all elements 

of societies are welcome, and everybody has a right to freedom of 

religion, and et cetera. 

Now, I believe in treating my neighbor as myself, but that 

doesn’t tell me that I should invite Jeffrey Dahmer to my house for 

dinner. Nothing good will come of that. 

How do you form a government and welcome in as an element 

of it a party that would destroy the government itself and expect 

stability? This is a tough question, and we really have to think 

about it. In being civil and democratic and welcoming, we also have 

to avoid being foolish. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

Obviously, this is an important question, and I will just make 

two observations. Which is, one, some of you know I am a lapsed 

lawyer, but I do remember from my constitutional law that even 

for free speech, there are limits to free speech. And we know we 

can’t cry ‘‘fire’’ in a crowded theater and the like. Even in our own 

system, we recognize that speech has to support civil society and 

be part of that. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Are you saying that the Muslim Brotherhood is 

an exception? 

Mr. STEINBERG. No. What I am saying is that if there were actual acts that were threatening to people, that that would not be 

acceptable. I want to make clear that we don’t think that threatening acts of violence would be an acceptable form of speech. And 

I think that is why we made an important statement about the 

need for lack of violence. 

But even more important, I think what we are focused on and 

you have raised the question is not so much the dialogue that is 

going on now, but what kind of government emerges once this transition takes place. And I think we have had a consistent record in 

saying that there are circumstances in which parties fail to respect 

democracy, fail to be an acceptable participant in government, that 

we could not be supportive of that happening. Obviously a very 

clear case of that is the Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. We 

made our position very clear on that. 

I don’t want to try to anticipate what is going to be the outcome 

of this process of democratization in Egypt, but I do think we will 

bring those same sets of principles together, which is that a government that will have our support is one that respects open society. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. My concern is that we be as wise as we could 

be considering the alternatives. 

Lebanon. What happens if the new Government of Lebanon rejects whatever the results of the tribunal might indicate? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think two points about this, which is, one, we 

attach enormous importance to the continuation of the tribunal, 

and we will do what we can to sustain that effort irrespective of 

what the decisions are of the Lebanese Government. It is our clear 

expectation that whatever government is formed, it meet its interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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national obligations with respect to the tribunal, and that is what 

we will expect to hold them to. I think we——

Mr. ACKERMAN. If Lebanon pulls its financial support for the tribunals, some think it would collapse. Are we considering withholding aid from Lebanon? 

Mr. STEINBERG. As I mentioned earlier in response to Mr. Berman’s question, I think we obviously keep questions of assistance 

under review. Right now we are focusing on trying to encourage all 

of the parties, including the Prime Minister designate, to make 

sure we have an inclusive government that meets its obligations. 

So long as that continues, and at least up until now the tribunal 

has not been undermined, we are continuing our assistance. But 

obviously we will have to keep that under review and look at the 

circumstances as they emerge. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chair for the extension of time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ackerman. 

Great questions. 

So pleased to yield 5 minutes to the chair of the Subcommittee 

on Middle East and South Asia, Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Secretary, I have a number of questions. Some of them have already been talked about to some degree. But clearly we all want 

democracy. We want the people of Egypt to improve their conditions and their freedoms. Our overriding concern is that what we 

all want is going to end up with the folks that we—and I don’t 

think the Egyptians themselves, the vast majority, want to be in 

control—and that is the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamic Jihadists 

or whatever terminology one wants to use. 

They said a lot of things, and they are, I think, trying to portray 

themselves to some degree as being, well, we are more moderate 

now. And could you talk a little bit about Sharia law and what 

they said and what you really think their position is on that with 

respect to Egypt if they would gain control? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think there is a lot of speculation as to what 

their goals or objectives are, and I think I would prefer to leave 

that to the analysts. 

What I would say from the perspective of the policymakers’ point 

of view is that we have to be clear about what anybody joining the 

government would be expected to be committed to, and that commitment is to an open, tolerant society that allows for religious diversity, for differences of opinion; that doesn’t undermine civil society; that supports an open discourse among all elements of society; 

and, rather than trying to anticipate what any particular member 

organization is, that we hold to those principles, and we certainly 

make clear to anybody who is joining a future government must 

commit themselves to those principles, and if they do not, then we 

would be clear about what our position is. 

Mr. CHABOT. Do you know what they are saying about Sharia 

law at this point in time? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I am familiar with their writings, and I think 

what we know is that there are different instances in which Sharia 

law has been used in different societies. Some have been tolerant; 

some have been very intolerant. And what we need to focus on is 

what will protect basic civil liberties, and will this next governVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ment, and if this organization cannot support and subscribe to 

those things, we believe that it would be inconsistent with the very 

efforts that are going on right now. 

Mr. CHABOT. You said some of them tolerant and some of them 

intolerant. Can you give me an example of tolerant Sharia law? 

Mr. STEINBERG. What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that there 

are examples of where in domestic law like Sharia law has been 

a part of societies. But what we are focusing on is what political 

law is and what are the political circumstances under which a government should govern. And that government has to meet these 

basic principles that we are identifying. 

So I think that is what we want to focus on: What are the political rights? What are the opportunities for the society? What are 

the opportunities for citizens to exercise their rights? What are the 

opportunities for religious minorities? 

One of the strengths of Egyptian society is the fact that Christians play such an important role, and that there is a small Jewish 

community there and other religious minorities. So if Sharia law 

means no tolerance for that, then that would not be something that 

we support. 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me ask you this on a different topic. Relative 

to the Turkish model, there are obviously some parallels and some 

differences between Turkey and Egypt, obviously, but in Turkey 

the military plays a particularly important stabilizing historic role 

there. What are the comparisons with that in Egypt, and are there 

differences? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think what has been encouraging, and I think 

it has been a positive aspect of our engagement, is that thus far 

as events have unfolded in Egypt, that the military has respected 

the right for peaceful assembly, and it has not tried to suppress the 

legitimate rights of people to express their views, to assemble and 

the like. And we would hope that in any society, any government 

that emerges in Egypt, that we would have the same commitment 

from the role of the military, which is to support legitimate constitutional human rights. And that is something that we would 

look to in any society to see that as the role of the military. 

Mr. CHABOT. I have only got a short period of time. Let me comment on something that is kind of frustrating to the policymakers 

here in Washington, I am sure to the American people to some degree, and that is with the considerable resources that we have invested in those two countries, Egypt and Turkey, when you do public opinion polls of the people of those countries, the United States 

isn’t particularly well thought of or popular. I don’t know if you 

want to comment on that. I have been told that is because we are 

so close, that they expect more, et cetera, et cetera. Do you have 

any comment on that? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think it is a challenge to us, and I think it is 

an important challenge to us, because I think that it is critical as 

we go forward that we find ways to understand why that is and, 

to the extent that we can be consistent with our own principles and 

values, that we try to do that. 

Now, obviously there may be circumstances in which we are unpopular for things that we believe in, and we will stand up for 

them. But I think if we can do a better job of communicating and 

93

indicating that we do share the aspirations of people all around the 

world for a better life and better opportunity, that that is important, and it has been a major purpose of what Secretary Clinton 

has tried to do with the State Department. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And I would like to recognize Mr. Gregory Meeks of New York 

for the next round of 5 minutes. 

Thank you, Gregory. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Good to see you, Mr. Secretary. 

Let me ask this question. One of the things that I do get concerned about, and I know a lot of my colleagues, et cetera, and I 

talk about the Muslim Brotherhood, et cetera. However, if, in fact, 

we seem too heavy-handed, sometimes it is like the kid, the child; 

you tell them don’t date this person, don’t date that person, and 

they date the person just to spite you at times. I want to make sure 

that we don’t get into that scenario. And I have tremendous faith 

in the Egyptian people from what I have seen thus far. They want 

freedom. They want to make sure that they have democracy, which 

they have been denied for 30 years. 

That being said, what you don’t want to happen is there to be 

a vacuum so that someone like the Brotherhood steps up. And 

what concerns me is with the opposition, and I don’t know what 

leaders can evolve or will evolve because it seems as though they 

are leaderless. And when you begin these negotiations and conversations, you know, there has to be someone that is talking. 

So I was just wondering, and I had asked this question yesterday, who are the leaders that we can expect to emerge, and is there 

anything that you can tell us about them, and can the protesters 

achieve their goals basically without a leader? 

And so and I want to tie that in as quickly as I could to the fact 

that there was a lack of a clear leadership in the Tunisia revolution 

also. And how that is going because I am concerned about this—

going to Tunisia real quickly about the assessments of a security 

situation there. There was some more violence this weekend, a protest, and in your view, what course of action toward holding the 

formal regimes internal security services accountable for past 

abuses would be conducive to a greater political openness without 

contributing to greater destabilization. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Congressman. I think there are—

and we shouldn’t underestimate a lot of important and we well-respected civil society voices in Egypt from the NGOs, from legal professionals and the like who may well form a part of the future 

Egyptian Government. I think it is both difficult to prevent and not 

on a roll to sort of anoint individuals to be the ones. But I do think 

that that is why we so much have focused on urging Egyptian Government to create a process to allow these voices to come together, 

the wise men’s group that is meeting and others, which do include 

a variety of well respected voices in the society, but also to make 

sure that the younger people who are on the streets also have a 

chance to express their views and to have those perspectives heard. 

I think the nature of democratic process is not to try to preselect 

the leaders, but to establish some institutions and processes that 

then will allow for good, free and fair competition elections where 

94

individuals will stand for election, and the Egyptian people will 

pick. And I think we have a real belief that that process can take 

place. And that what needs to happen now is to take the institutional decisions to repeal the emergency law, to take the steps to 

allow for parties to register, for there to be a full debate, and to 

have an election, and to have those very important voices that are 

being heard throughout Egyptian society now, have a chance to put 

their views forward in their candidacy. 

On Tunisia, I would just say that we do think accountability is 

very important. Different societies have different ways of doing it, 

and different conflict situations, that has been done. But I think it 

is something that the interim government is focusing on is to establish an approach to accountability and understanding both of 

what happened during the past regime and during the transition, 

and we would certainly support that. 

Mr. MEEKS. Are we dealing with, Tunisia again, is the administration reviewing Tunisia’s aid package which is currently focused 

on military assistance. And is it more assistance needed by Tunisia 

for democratic institutional building as Tunisia’s new government 

requested technical assistance from the United States for the purpose of supporting the reform agenda? And will the continuation of 

military assistance programs be contingent upon human rights 

benchmarks or other benchmarks? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, clearly on the last, we are under a mandate from you to make sure that it does. And so that would be an 

important part of what we do. More broadly, we have been engaged 

in conversations with the interim government in terms of how we 

can support and help that transition. And I think that is, as I say, 

part of the flexibility and adaptability that we are trying to show 

now is to look for opportunities to support that process going forward. 

Mr. MEEKS. And finally, let me just ask, what level of electoral 

success would you anticipate from the Tunisian Islamic groups, if 

they are allowed to compete in the national elections that they had 

promised within the next 6 months? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, Congressman, we have basic a principle 

that guides us, which is that we will support and encourage governments that meet the basic tests of tolerance, inclusiveness and 

openness. And rather than trying to prejudge what these groups 

will do, we will judge them by their deeds. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. And before yielding 5 minutes to my Florida colleague, Mr. Rivera, I would like, 

without objection, the ranking member to be recognized for an announcement. 

Mr. BERMAN. We have just learned that, and I think on behalf 

of the chair and the entire committee wants to extend our condolences and the condolences of the entire committee to the loved 

ones and friends of Khairy Ramadan Aly. This is a fellow who was 

a U.S. Embassy Cairo staff employee for 18 years. He went missing 

from his home on January 28th and just today has been confirmed 

as dead. And so on behalf of all of us——

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Mr. Berman. It is obviously a tribute 

to the dedicated, locally employed staff and the risks that they 

95

take, and I appreciate that. And on behalf of all of us, we appreciate that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Rivera. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Secretary, thank you 

so much for being here. I am heartened by your testimony regarding the impact of the crisis in Egypt, vis-a`-vis Israel. I am glad you 

agree that irrespective of whatever emerges out of the uncertain 

circumstances in Egypt that U.S. interests remain constant. And 

specifically that Egypt continue to honor its commitment to peace 

with Israel. 

So I am wondering if you can elaborate, and please be as specific 

as possible, as to what exact message the United States is delivering, has been delivering, will be delivering to all the parties regarding Egypt’s commitment to peace with Israel? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I thank you, Congressman. The message has 

been very clear, which is the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt 

is not just in the interest of Israel, it is in the interest of Egypt 

and the region as a whole. And therefore, we would expect any government to honor its international commitments, and to honor a 

treaty that was signed by that government, and to remain committed to it not just in letter but in spirit. 

This is a foundation for Egypt’s future success. The prospect of 

the conflict with Israel would serve no interest of Egypt’s, and it 

would certainly not be consistent with our interests. So I think we 

are very unequivocal about both our own position but also making 

fair that this is not a favor to anybody else. That if Egypt should 

continue it and the reason we would expect Egypt to continue it is 

because it is in Egypt’s interest. 

Mr. RIVERA. Over the years, Mr. Secretary, the United States has 

sold a great deal of military equipment to Egypt, and at the same 

time, we have been deeply committed to Israel’s qualitative military edge, and essentially, Israel’s ability to defend it. And part of 

that calculus in providing weapons to Egypt was that it was committed to peace with Israel. If Egypt’s commitment toward peace 

with Israel changes, how will that effect future decisions about the 

sale and maintenance of weapon systems to the Egyptians? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, any time there would be a dramatic change in circumstances, we would have to take that into account in making our decisions, but I think our focus now on the 

positive message, which is the benefits of engagement that we have 

had with Egypt and the Egyptian military, and therefore would expect them to see the benefits of continuing this and continuing that 

basic process, which has led to this long period of peace between 

Israel and Egypt. 

Mr. RIVERA. Based on your experience and developments that 

you are seeing occurring right now, do you see Egypt continuing to 

play a positive role on issues in general regional stability, for example, opposition to Iran’s nuclear program, standing up to Islamic 

radicalism, et cetera? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I would have every reason to expect that a more 

democratic Egypt would be at least as much committed to those 

principles, because in a democratic society, all the things that you 

have talked about are inimical to a democratic society. And some 

of the kind of intolerance, the support for terrorism and the things 

96

that we would be concerned about are something that a strong and 

vibrant democratic government in Egypt would also share. I think 

that has been our experience. 

If you look around the world, who are our strong partners on all 

of these global challenges? Not just the shared values, but the 

shared interest. When we are dealing with Iran, who are our 

strong partners? Our strong partners in Europe, the democratic societies there. We are working with Japan, we are working with 

Korea. So I think we believe very strongly that in terms of the interests, whether it is sustaining peace in the Middle East, dealing 

with terrorism, dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. That an open 

vibrant Egyptian Government would be very much in sync with 

those views and those perspectives. 

Mr. RIVERA. And up to this moment here today, you see no indications whether that be from any elements of Egyptian society, the 

military or otherwise, civil society, other elements of the government that any of these prospects could change in the negative fashion? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, we have to be vigilant. Obviously, 

we have seen events sometimes not fully predictable. But I think 

what we need to do is encourage and support those forces to reduce 

the chances of those things happening. And our whole strategy is 

to try to do that by engaging in supporting this process to reduce 

the risks that these dangers which you rightfully identify, and 

which we do have to be alert to, don’t emerge. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I yield back the remainder of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. And now I would 

like to yield to another Florida colleague, Congressman Deutch for 

5 minutes of questioning. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to pick up 

where my colleague from Florida left off and broaden from there. 

Starting with the issue of aid, not just to Egypt but aid to Israel 

as well. It gives us a good jumping off point for a broader debate 

that is taking place right now on Capitol Hill, and that has to do 

with foreign aid more generally. 

There are proposals that have been floating around that have 

suggested that State Department and foreign aid requests should 

be lumped in with non security spending and as such, should be 

subject to cuts, reductions anywhere between 10 and 30 percent. 

Given the State Department’s role in Pakistan, and in Afghanistan, 

and in the war on terror, given the national security concerns that 

we have, and further, given the role that foreign aid plays not just 

in the Middle East, not just in helping Israel to ensure that Israel 

has a qualitative military edge, but in the role that foreign aid 

plays in global health and maternal care, children’s health, the role 

that foreign aid plays fighting global hunger. The role of foreign aid 

in fighting narcotraffickers in Latin America and in continuing 

President Bush’s signature achievement in combating AIDS in Africa. 

Reconstruction, counterterrorism. And finally, given some of the 

suggestions that have been made on the Hill to eliminate foreign 

aid altogether, and suggestions from some outside, some prominent 

outside groups that all foreign aid should be on the table, is it apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:43 Jul 14, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\020911\64483.001 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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propriate, do you believe, Mr. Secretary, for us to look to what is 

1 percent or less of the Federal budget in finding ways to balance 

the budget by eliminating foreign assistance altogether? And 

wouldn’t the elimination of foreign aid put our Nation at greater 

risk? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, thank you, Congressman. As you can well 

imagine the Secretary and all of us feel very strongly, and the 

President that this is a critical part of assuring our national interest. Our ability to engage in the world, to support democratic institutions, to build economic opportunity, to deal with the problems 

of health and hunger are all critical questions we asked earlier 

about how the world looks at America. This is part of the positive 

engagement of American that allows us to build friends and to 

have support on our interests and they touch our national interests 

ourselves. If we don’t deal with the problem of global public health, 

those things could come home to us. 

It is having a strong, balanced strategy of smart power of engagement in the world, that has a strong defense, but also supports 

development and diplomacy that allows the United States to pursue its interests over the long term, and to have the kind of partners that we need to move forward. 

We have had important successes in Iraq, we need to sustain 

that. It would be a tragedy right now with all that has been 

achieved and the sacrifice that has taken place not to be able to 

continue the progress they are creating, a good example of a democratic tolerant society in Iraq, which is a very powerful signal 

throughout this region, including to Egypt, to continue to make 

sure that the extremists don’t come back in Afghanistan. 

We know what had happened before and we have a critical issue 

that, again, echoes so much of what you all have been discussing 

this morning about how do we assure that extremism doesn’t come 

back? It is by supporting tolerant, more open political societies and 

good governance and the rule of law. These are the things we do 

with our assistance programs, with our engagement with civil society. They are critically important to our national interests and this 

is, as we think about our long-term future and the role of the 

United States in the world, this is an absolutely indispensable part. 

And so, we do hope that as we understand the fiscal challenges, 

but this is a very small part of the budget, but it is a critically important one for fundamental national security interests of United 

States. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And just again, Mr. Secretary, am I correct that the 

foreign assistance budget is about 1 percent of the overall budget? 

Mr. STEINBERG. That is about right. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And if you could speak to what a cut of 10 to 30 

percent across the board might mean? How would that impact 

American foreign policy? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think it would affect us across the board. It 

would mean that we would not be able to sustain our engagement 

on the civilian side in Iraq because it’s so important that we make 

sure that this transition moves forward, that the reconciliation that 

is taking place through these two elections continues. 

It would affect our ability to support civil society and democracy. 

It would affect our ability to deal with the problems of hunger and 

98

creating sustainable agriculture. It would affect our ability to deal 

with the problem of global public health. It would affect our ability 

to support the kind of work that we need to do around the world 

to build strong institutions. 

And we are, right now, having good opportunities where we are 

engaged. But the opportunities are even greater if we see and 

smartly apply those resources. 

We have an obligation to you to make sure that they are welltargeted, that they are well-conceived, and that they are well-managed. But in return, we think we deliver a benefit, and I think no 

one more articulate than Secretary Gates has made clear about 

how important that is to our national security. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And finally, Mr. Secretary, to those who suggest 

that we ought to eliminate foreign aid all together, I suggest to 

them that they would be putting our Nation at risk. Would you 

agree with that? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think, as I say, it is a critical part of our smart 

power engagement of the world. The three legs of that stool that 

all the present survivors recognized are critical to our national security. And over our history, we go back to the Marshall Plan and 

so many other examples of how we sustained our long-term influence and protected our interest by the wise use of our resources in 

this area. 

Our military cannot protect our national interest alone. We have 

seen that in Iraq, and we see it in Afghanistan. It has to be a balanced effort. And our contribution, the part that goes to the State 

Department and assistance is very small compared to Defense. But 

has a huge multiplier effect, it has a huge positive impact on the 

well-being of the American people. 

Also on the economic side it helps open up economic opportunities. It creates opportunities for American jobs and American exports. That is what our diplomats do every day, advocating for 

American interests, opening markets and the like. So there are 

many ways in which U.S. interests are being protected by this 

rather modest investment. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I yield back, 

Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now following up on my last colleague’s line 

of questioning, putting America in jeopardy, let me just note putting us at a risk at a much greater level than what we are talking 

about is $1.5 trillion worth of deficit spending a year that we have 

to borrow from China. And we cannot maintain that. And if we 

continue to do that, our economy will collapse under a burden of 

debt that we have never experienced before. 

So this is not, Oh boy, we would love to do this, we would love 

to do that. No, there are certain things that we are going have to 

come to grips with and be serious about. And I will tell you, borrowing more money from China in order to give it to other people 

in different countries is not something that I consider to be a positive option. It is crazy, it is insane. 

99

We have been providing aid to Egypt over all of these years. And 

now we have people who seem to be high and mighty about how 

bad Mr. Mubarak is, but have supported this aid program to Egypt 

all of these years. 

It seems to me that American foreign policy is not based on principle, as you have suggested today, it should be or has been, but 

instead it is based on juggling. What can we do for the moment not 

to create a crisis, rather than have a long-term principled policy 

and a policy aimed not at what we can do for the world but what 

is best for the people of the United States of America? And let me 

get to——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, I won’t. I have got a line of questioning 

I would like to ask. I have got a very fine diplomat. Let me just 

note, we have so much juggling going on, that we can’t have someone like yourself answer a straight question about the nature of 

Sharia law. Now, if we can’t do that, how do we expect to have the 

American people and the people of the world understand where we 

draw the line? 

Yeah. We can have people jump up and applaud that Mr. Mubarak is gone, yeah. But what is going to happen 2 years down the 

road when we have an administration in Egypt that puts women 

in jail, much less permitting them to participate in the system, if 

they try to go on the street without wearing a veil? Is that what 

we are going to end up with Mubarak gone? We are trying not to 

end up with that. 

Let me just note that I have been dismayed that for all of these 

years, we have taken an administration in Egypt, which is less 

than democratic, less than honest, we have known that, but we 

have treated them well, and then as soon as—but they have been 

basically a pro-stability and a pro-Western government. And as 

soon as they are vulnerable, we turn on them with a vengeance, 

as compared to an anti democratic regime in Iran when there are 

demonstrators in the streets against them, we have sort of a muffled response. Well, we can’t really go in and side with the demonstrators against this anti-American Mullah regime dictatorship 

in Iran. 

We can’t do that because that would be just too intrusive. But 

in Egypt where you have a friendly regime—as I say, we don’t just 

toss Mubarak, a guy who has tried to be a force for stability, we 

don’t just toss him under the boss, we toss him to the wolves, and 

then we are surprised when the wolves end up eating our lunch. 

Let’s get to some basics here. The administration Mubarak—

President Mubarak offered to say that he would not be a candidate, 

and his son would not be a candidate and he would oversee a basically a caretaker regime until the September elections were held, 

and the people of Egypt were permitted to make their decision as 

to what direction their country should go. What was wrong with 

that? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, let me just briefly comment on 

your first point first, and then I’ll——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. You have 30 seconds. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I understand. 

100

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Pardon me. 

Mr. STEINBERG. But having had it raised, I think our position on 

Sharia law is very clear. And it was illustrated very dramatically 

in the case of a proposal for the institution of Sharia law in Afghanistan, which would have deprived women of their rights and 

which would have been unacceptable to the United States. And we 

made clear to President Karzai in the Afghan Parliament that that 

was unacceptable to us. 

So I don’t think there was any lack of clarity or lack of understanding on our part about where the red lines are and our principals are. So I understand your question, but I want to make clear 

from our perspective that we do understand that point. And we do 

understand——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It did seem that you were dodging the question earlier. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I apologize if I appeared to be dodging, but I 

hope——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. That was a 

good exchange. Thank you for those excellent questions. 

Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for being 

here, Secretary Steinberg. During the Iranian protest 2 years ago, 

Americans saw how the Iranian people used the social media, it is 

no longer in dispute, the effect of the Internet on the Egyptian uprising. And they use Twitter, Facebook, texting, YouTube, to gain 

a following in the country. And exacting admiration in much of the 

world process. 

However, many American people were shocked to know years ago 

that the Iranians were using the social media, you know, to monitor protests and to down opposition leaders and even worse, we 

discovered that companies, as was mentioned by Congressman 

Smith, with the presence in the United States were helping the 

Iranian regime exploit technology and turn innovation into violence. 

So when the Egyptian Government commenced its cyber crackdown, frankly no one was surprised. I don’t think they followed 

that. But it seems that American company is involved in this instance as well. A company in California sold the Egyptian state-run 

Internet provider the technology to monitor the Internet, allowing 

the Egyptian Government to crack down in dissent. And I also understand that the Pakistani Government, a telecom company and 

the Saudi Government’s telecom company have this technology. It 

is no secret, I think, to anyone, that neither has a glowing record 

on human rights. 

I would like to know what the Department is doing to work with 

American companies that are selling their technology and these 

products around the world to ensure that these products are not an 

obstacle to human rights at best or a tool of violence at worst. 

When we sell weapons to other countries, we require an end-use 

monitoring agreement. Do you think that such an agreement to 

make sure that U.S. technology is not abused is in order at all? Is 

that being considered, thank you. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, as I mentioned to Congressman 

Smith, I am not familiar with the specific case, but we will get 

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back to you on that. I think, more generally, one of the things that 

we have tried to do as we work with civil society is both to promote 

openness and to support their access to alternative media when it 

has been deprived. But frankly, also, to help them understand the 

dangers and the risk to them too. And I think it is two sides to the 

coin, and that we have to be alert to the dangers that will be used 

by people for the wrong reasons. 

So part of our educational effort in our work with them is to help 

groups in civil society protect themselves and to take measures to 

be sensitive to these things. 

In terms of the specific technologies, again, without knowing the 

specifics, it is hard to make a general observation, but I think it 

is something we should take under advisement. 

Mr. KEATING. I would ask if there is any discussion along those 

lines, I would like to know myself, and I am sure that many members of the committee would like to know that because, indeed, people are losing their lives based on this technology. And it is not a 

stretch to say it is being used as a weapons by some of these other 

countries, and as such, should be treated that way in end-use monitoring agreements so it would be curious to know anything on 

that. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, do get back to us on that. 

Mr. KEATING. I yield the rest of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection, I would just like to 

yield myself 30 seconds of time to welcome back and congratulate 

and say thank you to a member of our Foreign Affairs family, a 

member of our majority staff, Matt Zweig, who has just returned 

from a year of military service in Kandahar, Afghanistan. So thank 

you, Matt. Good to have you back. 

And with that, I would like to yield 5 minutes of questioning to 

our subcommittee chairman on Europe and Eurasia, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentlelady for yielding, and I appreciate 

you being here, Mr. Steinberg. My big concern is the United States 

first, and our very close ally, Israel in the Middle East, and toward 

that end, it appears to me there is still a great deal of uncertainty 

right now. We are getting all kinds of reports on what is going on 

and nobody knows for sure what is happening. But we do know 

there has been upheaval, not only in Egypt, but in other countries 

over there. And we get about 30 percent of our energy from that 

part of the world. 

And although the decision on exploring for energy here in the 

United States will not rest with the State Department, the State 

Department does have a role to play in deciding where our national 

security interests lie. 

And right now if we have problems over there in the Suez Canal, 

and Egypt is the Suez Canal, or if things get bad over in the Persian Gulf states, or if, and we see some people concerned about 

things in Iraq. If things go awry in Iraq because of Iran, we can 

see our supply of energy diminished dramatically. And I think the 

State Department’s obligation is that they need to start expressing 

that to the administration. The administration has—and we get 

about 30 percent of our energy from the Persian Gulf region. We 

get about 20 percent from Venezuela who is in league with Tehran 

right now. 

102

So there is half of our energy. And we can’t get permits to drill 

in the Gulf now. We can’t drill off the Continental Shelf, we can 

drill in the ANWR. We can’t drill for natural gas. We had T. Boone 

Pickens here the last couple of days talking about that. 

And we have the ability to be energy independent within a decade. There is no question about it. We have more energy in this 

country collectively, including gas and oil, coal shale that can be 

converted into oil, that any place in the world, there is no question 

about it. But we are not moving in that direction, so we are still 

dependent on the Middle East and they have a life and death grip 

on us if everything goes awry. 

And so I would like for you to answer the question, why is it 

there is not more attention being paid by this administration and 

the State Department to the security of this Nation, both economically and militarily, because we are not moving toward energy 

independence? Not only that, but if you talk to the average person 

who is paying $3.50 a gallon for gasoline knowing it is going to go 

to $5 or $6 if things get out of control in a little bit, they are saying, you know, if we have that ability, why don’t we do something 

about it? 

So where is the State Department on this issue? And why isn’t 

the State Department and Secretary Clinton talking to the President about the long-term issue of what happens if things go in the 

wrong direction in that part of the world? 

And make no mistake about it, if you look at history and there 

is a book from 1776 to now, which I hope you read and the people 

at the State Department, you will see upheaval in that part of the 

world is a constant, and our security depends on it. So while we 

are concerned about that area and democracy and everything else, 

why in the world isn’t State and administration talking about moving toward energy independence. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Mr. Chairman, it is a complex issue for the 

whole administration. 

Mr. BURTON. It is not that complex. 

Mr. STEINBERG. In terms of the other parts of the administration 

that are engaged. And I am not the spokesman from that respect, 

but I can talk about some other things. 

Mr. BURTON. Before you go to other things. What I would really 

like for you to do is go back to the State Department and tell them 

to talk to the administration about our national security. We are 

supposed to work with other nations in the world, to bring about 

stability and we use foreign policy and foreign aid to do all that. 

But the number 1 responsibility of government, according to the 

Constitution of the United States, is to protect this country, economically and, militarily. And we are risking that right now, all 

you have to do is look at what is going on not only in Egypt, but 

in other countries in the Middle East. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think if you look at our energy strategy, one, 

the President has indicated the importance of developing domestic 

sources. Two, we have talked about, in addition to oil and gas, 

there are other energy sources like the efforts we are doing to revive nuclear energy. We also are working to diversify so that we 

are not dependent on these dangerous areas. For example, a new 

agreement that we are negotiating with Mexico to have access to 

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activities on the boundary in the Gulf. I was just in Africa and 

looking at opportunities to have access with Ghana, a democracy 

in Africa which has——

Mr. BURTON. I am talking about energy we have here in the 

United States. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. Your time 

has run out. Mr. Burton, I think you have made your point clear 

and we would appreciate it if you would get back to Mr. Burton 

about energy independence and the administration’s plan. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Certainly. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I too want to welcome our guest and thank you for being here. And thank you Mr. 

Secretary for being here. The first question I have is a follow up 

on Mr. Berman’s question, is it the administration’s position that 

with respect to the constitutional provision in the Egyptian Constitution with respect to religious parties that it is possible to repeal that provision, but have a sufficiently—a government which is 

sufficiently tolerant to satisfy you or satisfy the Department that 

it will protect the interest of the Egyptian people and our international interests, or is it the administration’s position that that 

prohibition ought to remain as part of the Egyptian Constitution? 

It sounded as if you weren’t committed or the administration was 

not committed—at least to advocating for the preservation of that. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think we are committed to advocating for the 

principle. I think it would be a bit perilous for us to try to write 

the Constitution in the context they are doing it. There may be 

other formulations that are consistent with that principle, but I 

don’t want to have any ambiguity about the importance of the principle. 

Again, that is why, in our conversation earlier, I mentioned some 

cases where we have advocated very vigorously where that principle was inconsistent with basic values. And so that is what we 

will focus on going forward, is it consistent, that would be a way 

we would judge. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Also, would you tell me, it seems as if there is tremendous concern from everyone that has spoken really to us about 

the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in a future Egyptian Government. And I am just wondering what your impression is with respect to the likelihood of that happening. Interestingly, of course, 

when President Mubarak met, he had met first with them really 

in response to the protest which suggested to those of us from the 

outside that they may have a more significant role in a future government in Egypt than we might have first thought. So what do 

you think is a likely role they would play? And then second, do we 

have strategies or an approach which would help to ensure that 

funding doesn’t go from the Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas moving 

forward? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, we are very focused and we are very vigilant because of the risk that this process become hijacked by extremists, by individualist groups that don’t reflect or respect the 

very principles that we think people are demonstrating for. And we 

are obviously going to have to judge that by what emerges. There 

104

are an infinite number of possibilities that might come forward. 

But what we have to be clear on is that we expect the next Egyptian Government to have and advance the values of openness, tolerance, allowing people to pursue an open life with their human 

rights respected, with diversity respected, particularly on issues 

like religious freedom, on women’s rights, on a right to have freedom of expression, of the press, of assembly. And we will apply 

those criteria with a real recognition from the history that we have 

seen in this region of the dangers that a process which might begin 

with good impulse might not end up that way. 

So I think our challenge right now is rather than trying to say 

specifically now what will happen if it goes wrong, is to focus on 

what we can do to help it go right, and to support that process, and 

to be prepared to deal with it, and be clear that there would be consequences if the outcome is one that is not consistent with our values and our interest. 

But right now, I think what it is critical is for us to talk about 

what we are for. And I think by articulating those principles and 

by identifying what we expect and what we believe is in the interest of the Egyptian people and what we think they are out there 

on the streets for. I think that creates a positive engagement for 

us, not one of—again being vigilant, but not based on the fear of 

the worst, but also an opportunity to achieve this good result. 

Again, we must remain vigilant and have seen this go awry. And 

we will be prepared to both make clear what we are going to do 

and to deal with those circumstances. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And I wanted to say finally, thank 

you for your very articulate testimony with respect to our responsibility to really approach our foreign policy in a very balanced way. 

It is clear to me that it is in the national security interest of our 

country to make the kind of investments that we are making 

around the world, both to avoid greater costs for our failure to become fully engaged. But also to retain our moral authority so that 

we can do the work on behalf of the American people, both in supporting our economy and supporting our security. 

And so I think this question about foreign aid is an important 

one, but it is not simply done to help other nations, but it is really 

done principally to help the United States maintain its position 

internationally and to protect our economy and to protect our national security and I thank you particularly for those comments as 

well. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And now we 

would like to hear from Chairman Ed Royce, the chair of the Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Steinberg, I met with a group of seven Egyptians 

from Cairo and Alexandria who had recently came to the United 

States, many of them young professionals, and I asked them to give 

me their opinions on what needs to be done. I would like to share 

with you sort of their list from the front lines. 

The first observation they made is they shared with me that we 

need strict implementation of international human rights laws in 

this country and that there should be some discussion of this in the 

105

United States. A guarantee of basic freedoms by holding accountable those who violate international human rights laws. 

The second thing they see missing from the discussion is an end 

to all discriminatory acts that are based on ethnicity and sex and 

religion throughout all sectors of society. And most important, some 

kind of discipline for those who violate that prohibition. 

They asked for eradication of all ideologies in the education system because those installed discrimination and hatred among students starting at the preschool level and all the way up to the university level. This is partly because they say the Muslim Brotherhood has gotten control in the educational system and it is using 

it for that purpose. 

The fourth thing, these are the young students that were in the 

streets—they want awareness of the imminent danger of radical religious groups in Egypt, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which, 

to some extent, they say is funded by Iran. And one of the things 

they report is there is walking around money, and food, that has 

been provided by the Iranians, and it is annoying to those that are 

leading the charge to have on the streets a foreign influence, and 

they would like that known. 

They say that this group has already infiltrated the backbone of 

some Egyptian society. They also ask for a reformation to the judicial system, a reformation to a system which currently supports a 

corrupt regime and does not provide justice to the citizens through 

the implementation of the laws. 

They say bribery and corruption are the norm within most of the 

judicial branch and report—the young professionals told me they 

pay as much as 25 bribes in order get a little business going or in 

order to be professionals. We heard it from Hernando de Soto’s report, right? The Finance Minister or former Finance Minister, I 

think it was of Egypt, supported Hernando’s work. Hernando does 

his study, shows how you can unleash all of this potential growth 

in Egypt because you only know who owns 10 percent of the property. Nobody can start a business without doing payoffs. 

So he lays out the reforms and the first thing the government 

does is sack their Minister who supported these reforms. That 

shows us how much has to be done here. So I would just add to 

your talking points when you talk about this, a government that 

respects its people, that is what we want from Egypt. A government that respects its people and isn’t corrupt; let’s add that to our 

talking points about what we want done. I just wanted your opinion about what the students and the young professionals had told 

me. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, I think that is an enormously constructive agenda. I think it is an important one that should be a 

shared agenda of all of us. I think the issues that you have raised 

are issues that should be of concern and that are important to the 

long-term success of Egypt. So if we haven’t been clear enough that 

that is what we hope to see, we will do a better job. But it is one 

of the things. Especially, I want to agree especially with you on the 

point of rule of law and corruption, which is a big concern and it 

is really critical to the future. So thank you for those suggestions. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, there is one other point that they wanted to 

make. They said there are a lot of good voices such as the Council 

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of the Wise, which was formed after January 25th revolution, as 

well as many other voices in Egyptian society that are well-known, 

that are admired by the people and are not part of the Muslim 

Brotherhood. And every one of them was absolutely in terror of 

what might happen if we end up negotiating and help putting the 

Muslim Brotherhood in positions of responsibility because, as they 

shared with me, that is an organization that only exists to take 

power, put in place an Islamic society and then carry out of the 

rest of the agenda, which, as one of them told me, the next thing 

you know we will be at war with Israel if they get control of the 

government. If you talk to young people in the Muslim Brotherhood, that is where they are driving the cadres on the street, that 

is the ideology. 

So can you keep them out of the equation? I know we discussed 

this earlier, but can you do something to help those voices in Egypt 

that are so frightened of that consequence? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think that should be our objective and that is 

what we are trying to do. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. STEINBERG. As I said, we have a program to address this and 

we can and will do more. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. My colleague from New York. It is 

good to see you, Elliot, recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to first of all 

welcome the Secretary. I was here for his remarks and I have 

known him for many years and we are lucky to have him. He does 

a great job. Thank you for the job you are doing. 

As you know, for the past 4 years, I chaired the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee on this committee, and now I am the ranking 

member. And one of the things that has been irking me, and I am 

sure irking you and a lot of us, is that a lot of the South American 

governments are recognizing Palestine. And why it especially irks 

me is that the Palestinians are refusing to sit down with the 

Israelis and negotiate without all these ridiculous preconditions 

which actually shouldn’t be preconditions at all. That is what you 

negotiate about. 

And I look at it, it is rewarding the Palestinians for their intransigence. And I think that is the wrong thing to do, because rather 

than tell them they should go to the negotiating table, it sort of rewards them for not going to the negotiating table. Now we have 

this resolution before the Security Council which condemns Israel 

for the settlements, and makes it seem that the settlements are the 

reason why there is no peace, which I think is a bunch of nonsense. 

I think that if the Palestinians would negotiate with the Israelis 

that the settlement issue, along with other issues would be taken 

care of. 

I would hope that if that happens, the administration would 

strongly and forcefully veto such a resolution as we have in the 

past. And I believe that the administration so far has not yet unequivocally indicated that it would do so. So I would like to ask you 

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is that a fact, and if it is, I would strongly urge the administration 

to veto this resolution of the Security Council if it comes up. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I thank you, Congressman Engel. First just, if I 

comment on your first point about your recognitions we have made 

very clear to a lot of countries, including in the region that you 

talked about that you have had and continue to have responsibility 

for that we think this is counterproductive. I am disappointed 

frankly that we haven’t had more success, but it has been in our 

engagement at the highest levels with each those governments. I, 

myself, have had several of those conversations. And so our position is well-known on that. 

With respect to the Security Council, we have made very clear 

we do not think the Security Council is the right place to engage 

on these issues. I have had some success, at least for the moment, 

in not having that arise there. We will continue to employ the tools 

that we have to make sure that that continues to not happen. And 

we made clear both to the Palestinians and our key partners that 

there are other venues to discuss these issues, but the most important one of which is the one that you identified, which is the only 

way that this is going to be resolved is through engagement between the two parties, and that is our clear consistent position. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Yesterday I asked the two questions to 

our panelists and I want to ask you the same two questions and 

so what your answer is vis-a`-vis what they said to me. And I know 

some of this has been discussed in the past hour or so. But what 

are the differences you see between 1979 Iran revolution and 2011 

Egypt? What are some of the differences that make us hopeful that 

perhaps the results that we saw in Iran wouldn’t happen in Egypt? 

And then, I know that another question I asked yesterday which 

I understand Mr. Ackerman touched upon is what do we do if Lebanon rejects the special tribunal? Mikati—the answer from the 

panelists yesterday from that question of mine is that Mikati 

should be shunned. He should not be invited to the United States, 

he should be told that this is unacceptable, and we should shun 

him. 

As you know, I wrote the Syria Accountability Act, passed in 

2004, and with our now chairman, she and I were on a crusade for 

many years to do this. And now Syria is still doing the same kind 

of nasty things it has always been doing in the region. We now 

have an ambassador there, but I don’t see any positive things from 

their side. I would like to you comment on those three things if you 

could. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you. Both obviously complicated questions, especially the first. I got my start in government working on 

the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979. And so I reflected a lot on that. 

I would simply say, first no two circumstances are identical. But 

also our engagement in Iran prior to the revolution was very different. The revolution of Iran was much more associated with our 

engagement with the prior regime. 

Here I think we are seen as a positive force on the Egyptian side, 

so I think we can have a positive influence and I would be happy 

to go into more detail with you in less than 5 seconds. 

With respect to Lebanon, let me just say that we believe the continuation of the tribunal is essential, we made clear to Mikati in 

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direct conversations that we had through the Embassy that that is 

our expectation. Again, I don’t want to assume the worst now and 

say the precise consequences of it not going forward. But we have 

made clear that is what our expectation is, it is the international 

obligation of any government in Lebanon to meet those obligations. 

And we have made clear to Mr. Mikati that we expect him to do 

so as well. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel. 

I am pleased to recognize Mr. Manzullo, the chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Madam Chair. In the summer of 

2009, many of us in this country were very dismayed over the fact 

that when the demonstrations broke out in Iran in the streets on 

day 1, our President said nothing. On day 2, our President said 

nothing. Finally, on day 3 he said something to the effect that we 

need a continued dialogue with the clerics. That was extraordinarily disappointing. 

When the people started marching in Egypt, it didn’t take the 

President that long to undermine President Mubarak and say he 

has got to go. I would like to know what the basis of the President’s decision making was. At that time, you were Deputy Secretary of State and doing nothing in Iran 11⁄2 years ago. Why didn’t 

he do something? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, I obviously have a different view 

on what took place both in terms of the statements that we made 

in support of the people in the streets in Iran, and the support that 

we have continued to give for that, as well as our continued focus 

on the problem of the depravation of human rights in Iran. 

Mr. MANZULLO. No, I am talking about the response, not the 

focus. Don’t tell me that the people in the streets were supported 

by the U.S. Government because they were not. 

Mr. STEINBERG. We made clear our strong support for them, but 

at the same time——

Mr. MANZULLO. But you didn’t, that is not correct. They were not 

supported. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think we gave the support that the President 

articulated and the Secretary articulated about our strong commitment to their rights to peacefully demonstrate and to assemble, the 

need for the government there to engage with them. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Nothing on the order that was given to the people in Egypt specifically saying that Mubarak has got to go. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, I also do not—on that side, we 

have not used that expression. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Wait a second, wait a second. You are telling me 

that President Obama has not said in one way or the other that 

Mubarak must go? Is that what you are telling this committee? 

Mr. STEINBERG. What the President has said and what the Secretary has said is that change has to come, that a transition has 

to come. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Can you give me a yes or no answer to my question? 

Mr. STEINBERG. We have not used the expression that you identified, sir. 

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Mr. MANZULLO. So you said events must go into action and——

Mr. STEINBERG. Correct. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Everybody in the world understands that President Obama’s position is to push Mubarak out of office. And I am 

just really astonished that you think that that is an amazing statement. So, why didn’t we do anything more in Iran? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, I think our position has been clearly to 

support of the rights of the people to demonstrate. We have made 

clear that we thought that the election was not conducted fairly, 

openly, that we spoke out against the oppression, we spoke out 

against the violence. 

Mr. MANZULLO. It was clearly not enough. I mean, I don’t think 

anybody in this country was interested in Iran turning around, was 

satisfied with the statement of the President of the United States. 

So, what are you going to do now in light of the President’s involvement in Egypt? What happens if demonstrations break out in 

Tehran? What are you going to do now? 

Mr. STEINBERG. We will do as we have done. We have said about 

demonstrations whether they are in Syria or in Iran. 

Mr. MANZULLO. You see, that is the problem, the answer that 

you gave, that you are giving, I know it is well-intended and it is 

obviously factual, but it is weak. And it is the message of weakness 

that gets sent abroad as to what the United States is doing. President Obama and the Secretary of State have been very clear about 

what is going on in Egypt, granted the demonstrations there have 

lasted longer than in Tehran. And either they said directly or inferentially that Mubarak has to leave. And apparently that is going 

on right now. But it was so weak in Iran. Don’t you think that the 

President’s statements go a lot toward formulating public policy 

when people take to the streets such as they did in Tehran? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, I think the President spoke clearly to 

this. But I also think there are other things that we did, and partially using tools that you give us, we have identified members of 

the Iranian Government who are human rights abusers and imposed sanctions on them. We have taken measures to work to appoint a special human rights rapporteur in Iran. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Well, they put three hikers on trial for treason. 

Mr. STEINBERG. As we have made very clear and worked very 

hard, including——

Mr. MANZULLO. Well, nothing is working, so are you going to 

change something in Iran? 

Mr. STEINBERG. We have a very comprehensive strategy in Iran 

which not only deals with the human rights abuses there which are 

substantial, but also the Iranian nuclear program, which has led 

us with the leadership of the Congress working together with us 

to impose the most comprehensive sanctions on Iran that have ever 

been imposed. And have led us to help mobilize the international 

community. And I think the two have gone together because the 

fact of the democratic repression——

Mr. MANZULLO. Well, in my remaining time, I just want to let 

you know how disappointed we were with the President and the 

very weak response to the people demonstrating for democracy in 

the streets of Tehran back in the summer of 2009. 

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank, you Mr. Manzullo. And I very 

much agree with you. Mr. Murphy of Connecticut is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank 

you, Mr. Steinberg, for sticking around with us. I know we are 

jumping all over the map a bit here, but I want to bring us back 

to one of the subjects at hand today. We are obviously continuing 

to monitor the events as they play out today in Egypt. But if what 

we believe is happening is happening today, as you hint at in your 

testimony, one of the stories of success will be the potentially very 

positive role that a secular, independent, well-respected military 

has played in this ongoing transitional process in Egypt. 

And I mention that as a segue to talk about Lebanon. The LAF 

is at a very different point in its military developmental history. 

We still have members of the Armed Forces there communicating 

via cell phones with each other across the Nation. And I want to 

ask you about how the United States continues to play a constructive role in what is really the nascent developmental stages of the 

LAF, and how we make sure that our assistance to the Lebanese 

army continues in the tradition of achieving both our goals and the 

Lebanese military’s goal going forward in that nation? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Congressman. I think you have identified obviously an enormously important issue because we have 

seen the possibility and the prospect of development of a professional LAF that is responsive to a constitutional democratic government as critical to the success of Lebanon and particularly to deal 

with the challenge of Hezbollah and armed groups in that society. 

We want to see a professional civilianly controlled military that 

can exert control over the country on the behalf of a democratic 

government. And we have been encouraged by some of the progress 

that the LAF has made. So we would like to sustain with that, and 

yet we recognize the situation is fluid in Lebanon. And we are very 

vigilant to the possibility that a change in the political circumstances might undermine that objective. 

So we focused on two things, which is one, a very vigorous commitment to end use monitoring to make sure that none of our assistance to the LAF falls into inappropriate hands other than the 

LAF itself. And the record is very strong on that in terms of the 

LAF’s ability to monitor and implement that. 

Also, as we see the political developments move forward, to make 

sure that the independence and the role of the LAF is not compromised and that any implication that that might have for our assistance. 

We would hope that we would see a continuation of the strong 

support for the LAF. It is a critical component of the sovereignty 

and the integrity of the country as long as it is associated with a 

democratic transparent open, a government that is not the products of outside interference. 

Mr. MURPHY. Can you talk a little bit more about benchmarks 

and milestones? How do we moving forward—I understand that 

our military aid there is obviously interdependent with the political 

developments in Lebanon. You talk a little bit about how we make 

sure that the military and the LAF are hitting benchmarks and 

milestones that assure that we are making a wise investment? 

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Mr. STEINBERG. Well, we have a very robust engagement with 

the leadership. I believe it was just 2 or 3 weeks ago that General 

Mattis of CENTCOM was out there meeting with the Lebanese 

leadership. And I think that is that engagement. The training that 

we do with them, the professional development that we do with 

them that allows us to watch their progress, to identify programs 

that continue to help develop their professionalization. And clearly, 

it is linked to the political developments because their ability to do 

this requires the strong support of the political institutions that 

allow them to not only develop their professional capabilities and 

to use this equipment but also to have the mandate to extend their 

authority throughout the country. 

Mr. MURPHY. And just finally, to the Prime Minister designate, 

you talk about, in your testimony, making sure that he makes good 

on his pledge to build an inclusive government. How do we judge 

that inclusiveness? What do we look to as the keys to know whether we have an inclusive government that continues to be a recipient of U.S. economic and military aid? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think we look both to the representativeness of 

that government to make sure that no important constituency in 

the Lebanese society is cut out, particularly obviously a concern 

with the evolution that the Sunni population is appropriately represented. But also to make sure across the political spectrum, that 

we have an inclusive government that includes the March 14th coalition, and it includes the voices that have been the progressive 

voices in Lebanon, and which, I think, it will be something that we 

supported strongly. So we believe that those voices need to be included in any government going forward. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

So pleased to yield 5 minutes to the vice chair on the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Mr. Pence of Indiana. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank you 

for calling this, what turns out to be extraordinarily timely hearing. I always want to make a point, I want to thank the Secretary 

for his service to the country, for his distinguished career, it is an 

honor to you have back before the committee. 

For some reason, this feels a little bit like de ́ja` vu all over again, 

I am sure it does to you, Mr. Secretary, with your long career in 

these matters. And frankly, with word of the potential eminent and 

historic change that could take place in Egypt before the turn of 

the clock today, on that part of the world, this conversation is extremely important. 

I must say, as the ranking member knows, as we partnered together in the summer of 2009 to author a resolution that passed 

this Chamber nearly unanimously and passed the Senate unanimously, my first inclination is to stand with the people, to stand 

with those who are clamoring for basic human rights, for freedoms, 

for more access to the democratic process. And I carry that bias 

into this conversation. 

I support those who continue to call for democratic reforms, I am 

grateful for the State Department and for the administration 

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broadly, expressions of support for an orderly transition and the 

recognition of universal human rights. 

Let me, though, by way of raising an issue to you, let me, 

though, express a word of caution. One of the first things that I 

learned as a member of this committee traveling into that part of 

the world was the enormous importance of Egypt, and to the history of the region, not just at this time, but obviously through the 

millennium. The developments in Egypt are of enormous consequence to U.S. strategic interest, and I would say, most especially, to the interest of what I like to refer to fondly as our most 

cherished ally, Israel. 

And so while I know the folks at the administration has largely 

been and your remarks have largely been on insuring an orderly 

transition, I am concerned about an orderly transition to what, or 

an orderly transition to whom? And specifically, I find my mind 

drifting back to history, and to lessons of history. Edmund Burke, 

famously a member of Parliament, one of the strongest supporters 

of the revolution that took place in the colonies, here in the United 

States, but also one of the harshest critics of what happened in 

France. Edmund Burke warned that different from the American 

Revolution, which was largely born on a reach for democracy and 

a foundation of respect for the rule of law, the French Revolution 

was something different. And he warned of nefarious factions 

which could have opportunity, his words now, ‘‘to become master 

of your assembly and the master of your whole republic.’’

And with the news the CIA Director, I am told just moments ago 

told a public meeting of the House Intelligence Committee that he 

expects President Hosni Mubarak to step down this evening. 

I guess my question to you, Mr. Secretary, very sincerely is 

where is that leading us? Who is that leading us to? I know that 

the new Vice President has expressed and demonstrating a willingness to engage the Muslim Brotherhood in a dialogue, an organization that has largely outlawed in Egypt for decades. But I guess my 

first question is, do you expect President Mubarak to step down, 

does the State Department anticipate that? 

And secondly, what is the effect of that? Where is that leading 

us? And thirdly, can you speak to are we sending a message sufficiently to this transition authority dominated as it is by the military in Egypt, that we expect not only an orderly transition, but 

we expect order at the end of it. We expect, if we are to continue 

that nearly a minimum of $1 billion a year in foreign aid that goes 

directly to Egypt, the military coordination support that we provide, that we expect a successor government to respect the treaties 

and the alliances and the allies and the interests of the United 

States if we are to continue to go forward with that foreign aid and 

with the nature of the alliance that we have had with Egypt. 

So I would love your responses in whatever time the chairman 

will allow. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. 7 seconds. Plenty of time. 

Mr. STEINBERG. ‘‘Yes’’ is probably a good answer. But to the last 

question, the answer is yes. We made clear what we do expect—

and I think that is the way we tried to engage throughout this 

process is to set down a set of principles that we expect the process 

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to embody and the outcome to embody, and that that is what we 

will judge it by. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Pence. 

Mr. Faleomavaega, our colleague from American Samoa. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I do personally want to welcome you before 

the committee. And I also want to express my deepest appreciation 

to the service that you have given to our country. 

And I want to offer my personal welcome to one of our committee 

staffers who have just returned from his tour in the military. I 

wish I had the same reception when I came back from Vietnam, 

Madam Chair. That wasn’t my experience, for those of us who had 

the unfortunate experience of having served in Vietnam. 

Mr. Secretary, I have often heard people say how important the 

Golden Rule is; the Golden Rule, meaning that treat your fellow 

men as you would like to be treated. I have also heard another interpretation of the Golden Rule, and that is, he who has the gold 

makes the rule. 

What I am getting at, Mr. Secretary, for some 30 years now—

and it has been one way of keeping the peace especially and what 

took place historically between Israel and Egypt, and for the 30-

year period we have given well over $65 billion in financial assistance to Egypt, and $36 billion of that went to Egypt’s military defense system. 

I am curious if—and I suspected from what my friend from Indiana has just given his concerns for which I share that same concern with Mr. Pence, but it seems that more and more that it is 

coming out in the current crisis in Egypt is that the military and 

the Muslim Brotherhood seem to be the two main factions that are 

going to have a lot of influence and impact on the future of where 

Egypt is going as far as its future is concerned. 

Now, I have noticed that you have given in your statement that 

has been part of the administration’s policy we want the people of 

Egypt to determine their own future. But would it be correct for 

me to say that in that mix, the military and the Muslim Brotherhood definitely are going to be very important factors in determining Egypt’s future. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, I think what is important is that 

the military play the kind of role we expect the military to play in 

a democratic society, which is to support democratic governance 

and to respect the rights of the people. And I think we have been 

encouraged over the past several weeks that the military has 

played a constructive role. But it is not for the military to make 

the government, it is for the people to make the government, and 

that is what we would expect. And we would expect as we move 

forward with the democratic, inclusive government that the military would be in service of that. 

We have obviously talked a lot today about the Muslim Brotherhood. I can only reiterate the critical view that we have, which is 

that we will look to what government is formed, and we will hold 

it to a set of principles, and we will expect the members of the government to uphold those principles, and we will expect that they 

are responsive to what we believe is the yearnings of the people on 

114

the street. And that is the way we will judge our relationship going 

forward. 

I don’t think we want to be naive, but I think we are hopeful 

that what we have seen is a strong sense that there is elements 

of civil society of the people, the Council of Wise Men and others, 

the people that Congressman Royce talked about, that can form a 

strong, stable, democratic government there, and we need to do everything we can to support them. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I know my time is running, but I just wanted to share another irksome situation as I want with my friend 

from New York. The fact that 350 million people in the Arab community’s future rests on the fact that these two countries, Saudi 

Arabia and Egypt—that if these two countries falter, there is definitely going to be some very serious problems coming out of that. 

I say irksome to the fact that one of the main issues that always 

seems to come into the equation when we talk about the Middle 

East is oil. My sense of irksome is the fact that we have spent almost $1 trillion in getting rid of Saddam Hussein, and expenditures of lives of our own soldiers, and the amount of energy and 

resources, and yet when it came time to divvy up the fortunes, 

some 30 major oil companies that conducted biddings of the contracting and the oil to be extracted from Iraq, to my surprise China 

was the winner of the bidding process. 

Now, correct me if I am wrong on this, but the fact that it was 

our blood, our money, our resources, and supposedly having some 

sense of benefit as well for our country, but as it turned out, China 

was the beneficiary. Am I correct on this? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, there are a number of American 

firms who are there. Exxon for sure, and Shell probably. We have 

worked with them to encourage them to participate. We have 

worked with the Iraqi Government to create the conditions that 

would make this attractive to American firms. 

One of the problems, and it is an ongoing problem with the Iraqi 

Government, is that they haven’t really opened this up to the kind 

of investment that we would like to see. It is a big priority of the 

engagement, and as the new government is formed there, we will 

continue to push this to make it because we think American firms 

have a lot to contribute to the economic and energy future of Iraq. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

I am pleased to yield to Mr. Duncan of South Carolina for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I hope that I have 

more than 30 seconds than you gave me the other day. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Steinberg, for being here. A lot of great 

questions have been asked today, and you all have really delved 

into a lot of the subjects that are concerning for me. So I am just 

going to piggyback on Mr. Burton’s comments earlier about energy 

independence. 

Instability in the Middle East. When I was a young boy, I remember the gas shortages. I remember the crisis that we had in 

Iran. I remember countries around the world where you had revolutionary factions, and you had groups that weren’t friendly to the 

United States step into the void. So it is very concerning to me and 

115

the folks that I represent back in the State of South Carolina that 

we have stability in the Middle East. 

We have a port in Charleston that receives shipments that come 

through the Suez and the Panama, so it is important that for trade 

and economic prosperity in this country that stability in the Suez 

region is maintained, stability in not only the North Africa and 

Middle East, but also East Africa. So there are a lot of different 

things that are concerning here. 

So who steps into the void in this process is interesting. And you 

stated that the administration would adhere to consistent principles regardless of who was in power. And the question I have for 

you, and taken in the light of stability, and taken in the light of 

what our energy independence needs are—and let me just segue to 

that for just a second because you mentioned other sources of energy. 

I think it is imperative that the United States and the administration’s policies look at American emergency independence and 

use American resources that lessen our dependence on foreign 

sources, because we are seeing rising gas prices which affect input 

costs, which affect commodity prices. So it is a huge trickle-down 

effect. 

So let me segue back into is the administration actively working 

to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from being involved in this 

process of new governance in Egypt. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Congressman, I would say that we are actively 

working to make sure that the government that emerges is an inclusive, tolerant, democratic one that respects the rights of women, 

minorities, religious minorities and the like. It is not focused on 

one particular group; it is on all groups. We want the principle of 

anybody participating in a future Egyptian Government to sustain 

those values. And anybody and any group that isn’t consistent with 

that, we would not support their being a part of the government. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So along those lines, what specific steps is the 

State Department or this administration taking along those lines? 

Mr. STEINBERG. That is precisely why we have been so active in 

pushing the Egyptian Government to engage in a prompt, orderly 

transition, because we believe the best chance of getting that tolerant outcome that we want with the kinds of people that Congressman Royce talked about is to move forward with the process and 

to engage with those forces, because those are the forces that can 

come together and create both democracy and stability in Egypt. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Has the administration, in your support for clear 

and consistent principles, stated to Egypt that you would not support the Muslim Brotherhood in any shape, form, or fashion? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, Congressman, I don’t think we single out 

any individual group. We say what we would support, and we 

would not support those who are not consistent with those principles. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I would hope that the State Department policy 

would be to support factions that are friendly to the United States, 

friendly to the United States’ economic interests, and friendly to 

the United States as far as national security interests. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think we feel comfortable, if you look at history, that democratic governments where people really have a 

116

voice, and they get to choose, and they are not intimidated, and 

there is diversity are friendly to the United States. If you look at 

the democracies around the world, almost to a country those are 

our friends. 

So I think that is why we are so committed to moving forward 

with this process, because we do think it achieves exactly what you 

have identified. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And to round out the question-and-answer period, I am so 

pleased to yield as our last interviewer Mr. Griffin for the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, the vice chair of that subcommittee. 

Thank you, Mr. Griffin. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

We had some testimony yesterday regarding the potential for alQaeda to exploit some of the instability in northern Africa, particularly in Egypt, and I just wanted to get your comments on that. 

There was a Wall Street Journal op-ed by Kenneth Pollack on this 

yesterday, and understanding that this may be down the road a 

bit, sort of intermediate term and not immediate, and also understanding that Egypt has a history of doing a pretty good job of 

keeping some of the more extreme elements under control, could 

you comment on whether al-Qaeda is looking to recruit or take advantage of the power vacuum in the region? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Without making a specific reference to that, because I don’t know specifically that they are, but I would have to—

I think we have to be alert to the possibility that they would. I 

think that we know that they are looking for any opportunities to 

advance their agenda in any place that they can find it. And certainly places where there are real vacuums, like we see in Somalia, 

are very dangerous places, which is precisely why we do believe it 

is so important to have this orderly, sustained process, because we 

think it is the best antidote about giving extremists and terrorist 

groups the opportunity to make inroads. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, the article that I was looking at yesterday 

tends to say that this may not be the most likely course, particularly in the short term. But as we know, al-Qaeda has roots even 

at the highest echelons in Egypt. So you don’t know of any specific, 

identifiable antidotes or information that you can share with regard to al-Qaeda in that region? You just identify it as a possibility. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think it is something we have to be alert to. 

Obviously to get into a little more detail, we would probably have 

to do this in a closed session. But I would say the most important 

thing is to be vigilant to it and to take the steps now to not to let 

the circumstances arise, because I feel very confident that the 

voices in the streets in Tahrir Square are not voices that are—

voices that are looking to al-Qaeda as their salvation. So we need 

to make sure that they are the ones that prevail in this situation. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you for that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for your excellent 

testimony. We look forward to getting some of those questions in 

writing from you. And I would especially appreciate your responses 

117

and the Department of State’s responses to the U.N. overpayment 

issue and the refund. 

Thank you so much. And this committee is now adjourned. 

Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

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IFES BRIEFING PAPER, ‘‘ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: KEY CHALLENES FOR CREDIBLE AND

COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS,’’ SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE HOWARD L. BERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


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