UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4623

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

COREY A. MOORE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District 

Judge. (8:10-cr-00648-AW-1)

Argued: January 26, 2012 Decided: April 24, 2012

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Keenan 

wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson joined. 

Judge Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Jonathan Biran, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Brian Keith McDaniel, BRIAN 

K. MCDANIEL & ASSOCIATES, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. 

ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Mara Zusman 

Greenberg, Assistant United States Attorney, Jonathan Lenzner, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

In this interlocutory appeal filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

3731, the government challenges the district court’s order 

granting Corey A. Moore’s motion to suppress certain evidence 

seized during a search of his home. The district court 

concluded, among other things, that the warrant authorizing the 

search was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the 

officers could not have relied on the warrant in good faith. We 

reverse the district court’s order based on our conclusion that, 

as a matter of law, the good faith exception to the exclusionary 

rule established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), 

is applicable in the present case. 

I.

On September 25, 2010, a police officer employed by the 

City of Takoma Park, Maryland, observed Corey Moore walking on a 

public street. The officer suspected that Moore had committed 

an alcohol-related violation because he was carrying a bottle 

while walking. When the officer attempted to confront Moore, he 

fled. In the pursuit that followed, both the officer and a 

bystander witnessed Moore throw a large object into a dumpster. 

Moore later was apprehended and taken into custody. 

When police officers searched the dumpster, they located 

only one item that resembled the object thrown by Moore. This 
3

item was a package that was found to contain more than one-half 

kilogram of cocaine having an estimated “street” value of 

$10,000.00. 

Two days later, Takoma Park police officers responded to a 

report of an attempted burglary at a residence located at 118 

Sherman Avenue (the residence). A citizen had reported hearing 

a “thumping noise” outside the residence, and had observed two 

men run from the driveway of the home. The residence was 

located on the same block in which the officer first encountered 

Moore. 

After arriving at the scene, the officers inspected the 

residence and saw a broken window in the basement. The officers 

contacted the owner of the residence, who informed them that he 

rented the basement of the residence to Corey Moore. The 

homeowner also informed the officers that Moore’s BMW automobile 

was parked in front of the residence. 

The officers performed a “protective sweep” of the basement 

of the residence, but found no one there. Detective Charles 

Hoetzel of the Takoma Park Police Department determined that a 

grey BMW located across the street from the residence was 

registered in Moore’s name. 

Hoetzel provided the above information in an affidavit he 

submitted to obtain a search warrant for the basement of the 

residence, except that the affidavit did not mention that the 
4

officers had conducted a protective sweep of the basement. A 

Maryland circuit court judge issued the search warrant, 

concluding that there was probable cause to believe that 

narcotics, firearms, and evidence of drug trafficking would be 

located in the basement of the residence. When Takoma Park 

police officers executed the search warrant, they found 2.8 

kilograms of phencyclidine (PCP), $44,780 in cash, and several 

firearms. 

A federal grand jury returned a four-count indictment 

against Moore. The indictment charged Moore with: (1) 

possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a 

detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

841(a)(1); (2) possession with intent to distribute one kilogram 

or more of PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3)

possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (4) being a felon 

in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1). 

Moore filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from 

his residence, arguing that the search warrant did not establish 

probable cause for the search because the warrant did not 

contain any information to support an inference that contraband 

would be found at the residence. Moore further argued that the 

Leon good faith exception was not applicable because the 
5

officers allegedly were aware that probable cause had not been 

established. 

Moore also requested a hearing pursuant to Franks v. 

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to challenge the veracity of the 

information contained in the warrant. He based his request for 

a Franks hearing on the fact that Hoetzel had omitted from the 

affidavit the information that two days after arresting Moore, 

police officers had entered the basement of the residence and 

conducted a protective sweep of the premises, during which no 

contraband had been observed. Moore argued that this omission 

was material, and effectively would have negated both a finding 

of probable cause and the availability of the Leon good faith 

exception. 

The district court concluded that Moore’s argument 

regarding this omission was merely speculative and, therefore, 

that Moore had not met his burden of establishing the need for a 

Franks hearing. However, the district court granted Moore’s 

motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of his home 

on the ground that the search warrant was not supported by 

probable cause. The district court further held that the Leon

good faith exception was inapplicable, because the warrant was 

so deficient that the officers could not have relied on it in 

good faith. 
6

The government filed a motion for reconsideration, which 

the district court denied. This appeal followed. 

II.

The government argues that the affidavit at issue 

established probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime 

would be found in Moore’s home. The government contends that a 

nexus between Moore’s criminal activity and his residence was 

established, because the affidavit included evidence that Moore 

had possessed large quantities of cocaine in close proximity to 

his residence two days before the officers obtained the warrant. 

Additionally, the government asserts that, irrespective whether 

the affidavit for the search warrant established probable cause, 

the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is 

applicable. 

In response, Moore argues that the district court correctly 

granted the motion to suppress, because the affidavit failed to 

establish probable cause to search the residence based on 

Moore’s earlier possession of cocaine away from his home. 

According to Moore, his possession of cocaine, without more,

failed to create the necessary nexus between his criminal 

activity and his residence. In addition, Moore contends that 

the Leon good faith exception is inapplicable because the 

affidavit was so lacking in probable cause that the officers 
7

could not reasonably have relied upon it, and because the 

officers misled the issuing judge by omitting material facts 

from the affidavit. We disagree with the result advocated by 

Moore.

In an appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo, and 

the court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v. 

Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 553 (4th Cir. 2007). When, as here, no 

facts are in dispute, the applicability of the Leon good faith 

exception presents a question of law that we review de novo. 

United States v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509, 520 (4th Cir. 2004). 

In determining whether a search warrant is supported by 

probable cause, a judicial officer must consider “the facts and 

circumstances as a whole and make a common sense determination 

[] whether ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or 

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” 

United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 480, 481 (4th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). A 

reviewing court accords great deference to a judicial officer’s 

determination of probable cause. United States v. Clyburn, 24 

F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). 

We long have held that “the nexus between the place to be 

searched and the items to be seized may be established by the 

nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would 
8

likely keep such evidence.” United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 

727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988). Thus, when factually supported, a 

sufficient nexus between a defendant’s residence and criminal 

activity may be established even when the affidavit in support 

of the search warrant does not contain factual information 

directly linking the items sought to that residence. United 

States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2005). 

Accordingly, we have declined to require direct evidence that 

drugs are located in a residence when other facts and 

circumstances sufficiently establish probable cause for the 

search. Id. at 214. 

Based on the present record, however, we need not determine 

whether the search warrant for Moore’s home was supported by 

probable cause. Instead, as permitted under Leon, we proceed 

directly to consider the issue whether the officers could have 

relied in good faith upon the issued search warrant. See Leon, 

468 U.S. at 925; United States v. Andrews, 577 F.3d 231, 235 

(4th Cir. 2009) (exercising discretion to proceed to good faith 

exception); United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 

1994) (same). 

Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment 

generally is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. 

See Andrews, 577 F.3d at 235 (citing United States v. Calandra, 

414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974)). However, in its decision in Leon, 
9

the Supreme Court has instructed that a court should not 

suppress “the fruits of a search conducted under authority of a 

warrant, even a ‘subsequently invalidated’ warrant, unless ‘a 

reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search 

was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.’” United 

States v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 317 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23)). Thus, under this good faith 

exception, “evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant 

issued by a neutral magistrate does not need to be excluded if 

the officer’s reliance on the warrant was ‘objectively 

reasonable.’” United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 461 (4th 

Cir. 2004) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). 

An officer’s reliance on a warrant does not qualify as 

being “objectively reasonable,” requiring that the seized 

evidence be excluded in the following circumstances: (1) when 

the affiant based the application for a search warrant on false 

information that was supplied either knowingly or recklessly; 

(2) when the judicial officer wholly abandoned his role as a 

neutral decisionmaker and served simply as a ‘rubber stamp’ for 

the police officers; (3) when the affidavit supporting the 

search warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that 

official belief in its existence was objectively unreasonable; 

and (4) when the search warrant was so facially deficient that 

the police officers could not reasonably have believed that the 
10

warrant was valid. United States v. Wellman, 663 F.3d 224, 228-

29 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 

467 (4th Cir. 2011)). 

In conducting this Leon analysis, we will assume, without 

deciding, that the information contained in the affidavit was 

insufficient to establish probable cause, and instead consider 

whether the police officers’ reliance on the search warrant was 

objectively reasonable. See Wellman, 663 F.3d at 228. Moore 

argues, in effect, that the present affidavit falls under the 

third Leon exclusion.1 Upon our review, we conclude that the 

affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that 

the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively 

unreasonable. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.

The affidavit stated that Moore had possessed a substantial 

amount of cocaine, worth an estimated $10,000, on the same block 

where the residence was located. The affidavit also recited 

that Moore’s landlord verified that Moore lived in the basement 

of the residence. The affidavit further stated that the police 

 1 Although Moore also contends that the Maryland judge 

issuing the search warrant acted as a “rubber stamp” for the 

Takoma Park officers, the record does not provide any basis to 

support a conclusion that the Maryland judge abandoned his role 

as a neutral and detached decisionmaker. Because the basis of 

Moore’s argument in this regard is that the search warrant 

application contained grossly insufficient information, we 

analyze his contention under the third Leon exclusion. See

Wellman, 663 F.3d at 229 (citing Doyle, 650 F.3d at 470). 
11

had determined that a grey BMW parked across the street from the 

residence was registered in Moore’s name. In addition, 

Detective Hoetzel stated in the affidavit that “based upon his 

training, experience, and participation in narcotics 

investigations” during his seven-year tenure with the City of 

Takoma Park Police Department, that drug traffickers tend to 

hide contraband, firearms, and evidence of drug transactions “in 

a secure location,” to which they can obtain “ready access.” 

We conclude that these statements in the affidavit provided 

sufficient indicia of probable cause to meet the requirements of 

the Leon good faith exception. In particular, Moore’s 

possession of a large amount of cocaine in close proximity to 

his residence, combined with Detective Hoetzel’s stated 

experience that drug traffickers tend to keep contraband and 

other evidence of drug transactions in a secure place to which 

they retain ready access, established a plausible nexus between 

the place to be searched and the presence of contraband items 

related to the distribution of narcotics. 

We observe that the Supreme Court recently rejected a 

similar challenge to a search warrant when the supporting 

affidavits contained information of a suspect’s residence, of 

his gang membership, and that he committed an assault with a 

firearm at a separate location. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 

S. Ct. 1235, 1242-43 (2012). The warrant was challenged as 
12

lacking any facts to support probable cause to search the 

suspect’s residence for any firearms and evidence of gang 

membership. Id. at 1242, 1246. Although the affidavits 

contained no facts directly linking firearms or evidence of gang 

activity to the residence, the Court held that the officers 

could have reasonably relied upon the warrant to search for such 

items. Id. at 1246-49. The holding in Messerschmidt further 

supports our conclusion that, in the present case, the affidavit 

provided a sufficient nexus between the place to be searched and 

criminal activity alleged to meet the requirements of the Leon

good faith exception. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

evidence seized in the search of Moore’s residence should not 

have been suppressed, because the officers’ reliance on the 

warrant was objectively reasonable. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922; 

Perez, 393 F.3d at 461.

Our conclusion is not altered by Moore’s argument quoting 

from our decision in United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th 

Cir. 1993), in which we stated that “residential searches have 

been upheld only where some information links the criminal 

activity to the defendant’s residence.” Id. at 1583 (citing 

Williams, 974 F.2d at 481-82). In Lalor, we were careful to 

explain that the affidavit in that case had not established any 

relationship between the area where the defendant allegedly 

conducted drug transactions and the location of the defendant’s 
13

home. Id. at 1583. Importantly, we observed that the record 

did not show the distance between the searched premises and the 

location of the defendant’s drug activity, and we stated that 

this distance could have been significant because “the 

magistrate might have been able to draw an inference from the 

proximity of the drug sales to Lalor’s residence.” Id. 

In contrast to the affidavit at issue in Lalor, the 

affidavit before us conclusively established the close proximity 

of the place where the defendant’s criminal activity occurred to 

the premises to be searched. Moreover, in Lalor, we ultimately 

held that despite the absence of a demonstrated nexus between 

the location to be searched and the defendant’s criminal 

activity, the Leon good faith exception still was applicable. 

996 F.2d at 1583. Thus, the decision in Lalor not only fails to 

aid Moore’s position, but provides significant support to our 

conclusion that the officers executing the search warrant of 

Moore’s residence could have relied in good faith upon that

warrant.

Moore argues, nevertheless, that the good faith exception 

of Leon is inapplicable because Hoetzel omitted from the 

affidavit any reference to the officers’ protective sweep of 

Moore’s residence after the report of the attempted burglary. 

We note that, in making this argument, Moore does not challenge 

the district court’s denial of a Franks hearing, but instead 
14

argues that the good faith exception is inapplicable because the 

judge issuing the search warrant was “misled regarding the 

information in the possession of law enforcement which would 

have militated against the probable cause finding.”2 

Although we disagree with the conclusion Moore advances, we 

likewise are troubled that Hoetzel’s affidavit omitted the fact 

that Takoma Park police officers earlier had entered the 

basement of the residence to conduct a protective sweep. The 

government has offered no justification why discussion of the 

protective sweep was omitted from the affidavit, while all other 

aspects of the officers’ response were described in detail. 

Nevertheless, on this record, we cannot conclude that Moore’s 

challenge to the application of the Leon good faith exception is 

meritorious. 

When a warrant is challenged on the theory that an officer 

omitted material facts in an affidavit, either intending to 

mislead the magistrate or in reckless disregard whether the 

omission rendered the affidavit misleading, the defendant must 

show: (1) that the officer deliberately or recklessly omitted 

the information at issue; and (2) that the inclusion of this 

information would have been material to the probable cause 

 2 Moore does not argue in any part of this appeal that the 

district court erred in denying his motion for a Franks hearing. 

In fact, Moore does not even refer to a Franks hearing in his 

brief filed with this Court. 
15

determination. See United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 301 

(4th Cir. 1990); see also Andrews, 577 F.3d at 238-39 

(conducting this inquiry on issue whether the Leon good faith 

exception applied when officer omitted information from a search 

warrant application). We agree with the district court that, 

although information about the protective sweep would have been 

helpful to the judge reviewing the search warrant application, 

Moore’s argument that the information was deliberately omitted 

rests on total speculation. 

Moore also has failed to show that inclusion of this 

information would have been material to the probable cause 

determination. A protective sweep is justified when a 

reasonably prudent officer would be warranted “in believing that 

the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to 

those on the . . . scene.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 

(1990). Because the officers had received a report of an 

attempted burglary at the residence and had observed a broken 

basement window at that location, the officers were justified in 

thinking that the basement could have harbored a person who 

posed a danger to nearby residents. And, as the district court 

succinctly stated, “if [a protective sweep is] done properly, 

it’s just a cursory look, not a search but a sweep just to see 

who is there.” 
16

We have no basis to conclude, nor does Moore argue, that 

the officers conducted an impermissible search of the basement 

of the residence in the guise of a protective sweep. Moreover, 

we cannot conclude from the present record that if the affidavit 

had contained the information that the officers conducted a 

protective sweep, and that no contraband was observed in plain 

view at that time, this additional information would have been 

material to the probable cause determination. Therefore, we 

hold that Moore has failed to establish a basis for excluding 

application of the Leon good faith exception. See Andrews, 577 

F.3d at 239. Accordingly, because we conclude that the 

affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 

render official belief in its existence objectively 

unreasonable, we hold that the Leon good faith exception is 

applicable and the district court erred in granting Moore’s 

motion to suppress.

III.

For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s order 

granting the motion to suppress, and we remand the case to the 

district court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED 
17

GREGORY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I.

A police officer saw Moore, an African-American male, 

walking along the sidewalk of an affluent, suburban neighborhood 

and approached him because he appeared to be carrying a 

container that the officer suspected to be alcohol. After Moore 

fled in response to the officer’s signal to approach, the 

officer gave chase. Moore discarded the container into a 

dumpster. Although the officer found drugs in the dumpster, the 

bag with the drugs inside bore no resemblance to a bottle of 

alcohol.

Two days later while investigating an unrelated break-in, 

police learned that Moore was renting a basement apartment of a 

home near the area where he was seen walking. They then sought 

and obtained a search warrant for Moore’s basement residence. 

The sole basis for seeking the warrant to search his home was 

the fact that a few days earlier, Moore had possessed drugs near 

that location. In fact, before encountering Moore on the 

sidewalk on the day of his arrest, the police had no information 

or observation relating to Moore possessing or distributing 

drugs in his neighborhood or any place for that matter. Equally 

troubling, the police never told the magistrate that they had 

already entered Moore’s apartment and not seen any evidence of 

drug possession or trafficking. In fact, in detailing the 
18

police response to the unrelated break-in in the affidavit, 

Detective Hoetzel affirmatively omitted that police entered the 

basement residence and did not see any contraband or indication

of narcotics trafficking. Yet my dear colleagues find that the 

defective warrant, lacking any indicia of probable cause and 

issued under these misleading circumstances, is entitled to the 

protection of the “good faith” exception under United States v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). I respectfully submit that this is 

wrong.

II.

The district court correctly concluded that the affidavit 

supporting the request for the search warrant of Moore’s 

residence did not include sufficient evidence to establish that 

Moore was involved in the drug trade or that it was probable 

that evidence of narcotics trafficking would be found in his 

apartment.

“To establish probable cause that evidence of a crime is 

located in a particular place, an affiant must establish a 

connection between the evidence of a crime and the place to be 

searched.” United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th 

Cir. 1988). In every case where this Court has found a 

sufficient nexus between a defendant’s criminal conduct and his 

residence, the affidavit supporting the warrant had at least 
19

some factual assertion or allowable inference linking the items 

sought to the defendant’s residence. And where this Court has 

declined to require specific evidence of the existence of drugs 

in a residence, it is only where other facts sufficiently 

established probable cause for the search. United States v. 

Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 214 (4th Cir. 2005) (“We decline to 

require specific evidence of the existence of drugs in a 

residence where other facts sufficiently establish probable 

cause for the search.”) (emphasis added).

Here, there was virtually no investigation of Moore or 

assertion in the affidavit which supported the conclusion that 

probable cause for the warrant existed. As the district court 

aptly noted and in stark contrast to the investigatory facts 

included in facially sufficient affidavits, there was nothing in 

the affidavit in this case to support a permissible inference 

that Moore was in fact a drug dealer and that the tools of that 

trade would be found in his home. The affidavit did not include 

any information evidencing Moore’s selling narcotics to 

cooperating witnesses or informants, any surveillance by law 

enforcement of any illegal or suspicious activity on the part of 

Moore in the days or weeks leading up to his initial encounter 

with law enforcement, any reference to Title III wiretap 

recordings evidencing drug activity on the part of Moore, any 

reference to the prior criminal history of Moore, any tip 
20

information from a reliable confidential source alleging Moore’s 

participation in drug trafficking, or any other information 

except the assertion that Moore had discarded one half kilogram 

of powder cocaine two days prior to the request. The sole fact 

that Moore possessed narcotics on a nearby street cannot 

establish probable cause that evidence of narcotics trafficking

would be found in his home.

The district court was correct in finding that the normal 

indicia of investigative fruit were absent and that the 

affidavit was lacking in probable cause to believe that any 

contraband would be present in Moore’s residence.

III.

The only remaining issue is whether the “good faith” 

exception under Leon applies. Under the good faith exception, 

evidence obtained from an invalid search warrant will not be 

suppressed if the officer’s reliance on the warrant was 

“objectively reasonable.” United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 

461 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). Leon

identifies four circumstances in which an officer’s reliance on 

a warrant would not qualify as “objectively reasonable:” (1) 

when the magistrate judge in issuing a warrant was misled by 

information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or 

would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of 
21

the truth; (2) when the magistrate has acted as a rubber stamp 

for the officer and so wholly abandoned his detached and neutral 

judicial role; (3) when a supporting affidavit is so lacking in 

indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 

existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when a warrant is so 

facially deficient in failing to particularize the place to be 

searched or the things to be seized that the executing officers 

cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Id.

The district court did not err in holding that the good 

faith exception is unavailable here. The combination of the 

first and third circumstances identified by Leon –- that the 

judge was misled by information in the affidavit and that the 

supporting affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable 

cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 

unreasonable,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 –- compels the application 

of the exclusionary rule in this case. As detailed above, this 

affidavit fell far short of providing probable cause for a 

search warrant as it was devoid of any basis from which the 

magistrate could infer that evidence of drug activity would be 

found in the basement residence. Moreover, contrary to the 

majority’s contention, ante at 15, the fact that officers 

previously entered the residence, performed a protective sweep, 

and observed no contraband, is absolutely material to the 

reviewing judge’s probable cause determination when, as here, 
22

the officers’ response to the attempted break-in was described 

in detail in the affidavit –- suggesting this was not merely a 

negligent omission -- and nothing approaching the information 

necessary for probable cause is provided in the affidavit.

The Leon Court crafted the good faith exception to avoid a 

deterrent effect on “objectively reasonable law enforcement 

activity.” Id. at 919. This is not a case of “objectively 

reasonable law enforcement activity.” Not only did Detective 

Hoetzel fail to provide information of any kind that would in 

itself have provided probable cause, he affirmatively omitted 

the fact that law enforcement had previously entered the 

basement residence and did not see any illegal contraband in the 

location. The omission of this prior entrance in the recounting 

of the attempted break-in in the affidavit is not only 

misleading, it also suggests that the officer’s reliance on the 

resulting warrant was not reasonable. Clearly, this does not 

support a finding of good faith.

IV.

The right to privacy in one’s home is a most important 

interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. The majority’s 

application of the good faith exception to this warrant ratifies 

police use of insufficient and misleading affidavits to justify 
23

searching someone’s home. For the reasons set forth above, I 

respectfully dissent.