NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

KELDRICK JAMAL BLACK, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0110

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-000305-002

The Honorable John R. Ditsworth, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Kathryn L. Petroff

Counsel for Appellant

Keldrick Jamal Black, Florence

Appellant
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 This is an appeal under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) 

and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). Counsel for defendant 

Keldrick Jamal Black has advised the court that, after searching the entire 

record, she has found no arguable question of law and asks this court to 

conduct an Anders review of the record. Black was given the opportunity to 

file a supplemental brief pro se, and has done so. This court has reviewed 

the record and has found no reversible error. Accordingly, Black’s

convictions and resulting sentences are affirmed.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Black was charged by Indictment with first degree murder, a 

Class 1 dangerous felony (Count 1); armed robbery, a Class 2 dangerous 

felony (Count 2); two counts of kidnapping, Class 2 dangerous felonies 

(Counts 3 and 4); aggravated assault, a Class 3 dangerous felony (Count 5) 

and misconduct involving weapons, a Class 4 felony (Count 6). These 

charges arose from a December 2011 shooting. In September 2013, Black 

pled guilty to Count 6 and trial proceeded on Counts 1 through 5. The State 

made various pre-trial filings, including allegations of aggravating 

circumstances, historical prior felony convictions and commission of the 

offenses while on release.

¶3 Black moved to sever trial of a co-defendant’s case, which the

superior court granted. Pursuant to State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 

P.2d 951 (1969), Black also requested an evidentiary hearing, challenging 

the anticipated testimony of three eyewitnesses who identified Black as the 

shooter. After that evidentiary hearing, the superior court found the pre-

 

1 This court views the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict, and resolve[s] all reasonable inference against the defendant.” State 

v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 588–89, 951 P.2d 454, 463–64 (1997) (citation 

omitted). 
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

3

trial procedures were not unduly suggestive and that three witnesses could 

testify at trial that Black was the shooter.

¶4 At trial, the State presented testimony from more than 20

witnesses, including eyewitnesses and expert testimony, as well as 

surveillance video and exhibits. The evidence showed that the victim, G.P.,

was shot and killed outside a club after his necklace was taken from him.

2

After the shooting, two males forced their way into the car of E.L. and S.R. 

and made them drive to a location some distance from the club. When the 

males left the car, E.L. and S.R. returned to the club and were interviewed 

by the police. E.L. identified Black from a photo-lineup as one of the men 

who forced his way into the car. E.L. also identified Black as the shooter 

during her trial testimony. S.R., when given an identical photo-lineup

shortly after the shooting, put her initials next to Black’s photo and another 

photo; she was not able to identify Black in open court but identified a 

picture of him taken after his arrest as being one of the individuals who 

forced his way into the car. V.C., during a one-on-one identification shortly 

after the shooting, identified Black as being one of the shooters and 

identified Black in open court. 

¶5 Police officers testified that, hours after the shooting, a vehicle 

was pulled over and three of the six occupants matched descriptions of the 

shooting suspects. The police performed gunshot residue tests on all three 

suspects, which detected particles “indicative of gunshot residue.” All three 

suspects were taken into custody for questioning. 

¶6 During trial, the defense sought to elicit from T.W. testimony 

that Black’s former co-defendant, Robert Baker, had admitted to shooting 

G.P. The superior court ruled Baker’s proffered testimony that he had 

“snatched” a man’s chain and then shot him was admissible as a statement 

against penal interest, and T.W., a witness who overheard the statement,

testified to that statement. See Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(2015).

3 Relying on 

Arizona Rule of Evidence (Rule) 806, the State then sought to introduce 

rebuttal testimony that Baker told Detective Weiss in an interview that 

Black had the gun after arguing with the victim. Over Black’s objection, 

Baker’s statements to the detective were admitted to impeach the credibility 

of Baker’s prior statement to T.W. pursuant to Rule 806. The superior court 

 

2 Initials are used to protect the victims’ and witness’ privacy. See State v. 

Maldonado, 206 Ariz. 339, 341 n.1 ¶ 2, 78 P.3d 1060, 1062 n.1 (App. 2003).

3 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. 
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

4

gave limiting instructions regarding this testimony, both immediately after 

the testimony and in final jury instructions. 

¶7 After the close of the State’s case, Black moved for a judgment 

of acquittal, which the superior court denied. The defense video expert,

Bryan Neumeister, testified about the surveillance video of the shooting 

and enhancements he performed on the video. The State called Brewster

Rolland-Keith as a rebuttal expert. Rolland-Keith testified that 

Neumeister’s enhancement of the surveillance video can create “ghosts”

that were not present in the original video.

¶8 After final jury instructions and closing arguments, the jury 

deliberated and found Black guilty as charged. The jury also found the 

aggravating circumstances of dangerousness, use of a gun, presence of an 

accomplice and commission of the crime while on release on Counts 1 

through 5. The jury found the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain

on Counts 1, 2 and 5 and threatened physical injury on Counts 2 and 5. The 

jury also found Count 6, to which Black had pled guilty, was committed 

while on release. 

¶9 Before sentencing, Black unsuccessfully moved for a new 

trial, claiming he was denied a fair trial when the superior court admitted 

Baker’s statements to Detective Weiss. The superior court found that Black 

had two historical felony convictions. The superior court then sentenced 

Black to a term of life in prison without the possibility of release for 25 

calendar years on Count 1. The superior court sentenced Black to 

aggravated terms of 30 years of imprisonment on Count 2, 17.75 years on 

each Count 3 and 4, 13.25 years on Count 5, and 12 years on Count 6, with 

all sentences to be served concurrently. Black properly was given 763 days

of presentence incarceration credit.

¶10 This court has jurisdiction over Black’s timely appeal 

pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona 

Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 This court has reviewed and considered counsel’s brief and 

appellant’s pro se supplemental brief, and has searched the entire record 

for reversible error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537 ¶ 30, 2 P.3d 89, 96 

(App. 1999). Searching the record and briefs reveals no reversible error. The 

record shows that Black was represented by counsel at all stages of the 

proceedings and that counsel was present at all critical stages. The evidence 
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

5

admitted at trial constitutes substantial evidence supporting Black’s 

convictions. From the record, all proceedings were conducted in 

compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The sentences 

imposed are within the statutory limits and permissible ranges. 

¶12 Black raises several arguments in his pro se supplemental 

brief in support of his argument that the superior court erred in denying his 

motion for a new trial. This court reviews the denial of a motion for new 

trial for an abuse of discretion and discusses Black’s arguments in turn. See 

State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 287, 908 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1996).

I. The Superior Court Did Not Violate Black’s Confrontation Clause 

Rights.

¶13 Black argues that his right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses was violated when the superior court admitted Baker’s 

statements to Detective Weiss. Although a ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this court reviews 

Confrontation Clause issues de novo. See State v. Bronson, 204 Ariz. 321, 324 

¶ 14, 63 P.3d 1058, 1061 (App. 2003). 

¶14 At trial, Black sought to introduce, through T.W., Baker’s

statements that Baker “snatched” the chain and shot the victim. In response,

the State took the position that “[i]f the defense elicits any statements from 

any of these folks under the prior inconsistent – or statements against penal 

interest, Your Honor, they should be prepared that the State is allowed to 

present evidence of other statements that they have made pursuant to Rule 

806” and specified which statements the State would then seek to introduce.

Noting the State’s position, the superior court observed to defense counsel, 

“[s]o you’re at your peril. And the choice is yours.” 

¶15 Notwithstanding this exchange, defense counsel elected to 

elicit the testimony from T.W. Pursuant to Rule 806, the State then 

introduced Baker’s statements to Detective Weiss that he had seen Black 

with the gun after the shooting. When a hearsay statement is admitted in 

evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be attacked “by any evidence that 

would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a 

witness. The court may admit evidence of the declarant’s inconsistent 

statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or whether the 

declarant had the opportunity to explain or deny it.” Ariz. R. Evid. 806. 

“The express purpose of Rule 806 is to allow a party to attack the 

‘credibility’ of the hearsay declarant.” State v. Huerstel, 206 Ariz. 93, 104 ¶ 

42, 75 P.3d 698, 709 (2003) (citation omitted). Black argues the admission of 
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

6

Baker’s statements violated his right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses. 

¶16 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution “protects the right to a fair trial by requiring that the defendant 

have an opportunity to confront any witness who testifies against him.” 

Huerstel, 206 Ariz. at 102 ¶ 29, 75 P.3d at 707 (citation omitted). The 

Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for 

purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford 

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). To satisfy the Confrontation Clause, 

the superior court “must instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for 

which [non-testifying codefendant’s] statement is introduced.” Huerstel, 

206 Ariz. at 104 ¶ 42, 75 P.3d at 709. 

¶17 After admitting Detective Weiss’ rebuttal testimony, the 

superior court gave a limiting instruction informing the jurors “[t]his 

evidence has been admitted only for the limited purpose of determining the 

credibility of the statements made by Mr. Baker” to T.W. and that the jurors 

“may only use that evidence and consider that evidence for that limited 

purpose of determining his credibility, not for any other purpose.” The 

court gave a similar admonition in final instructions, stating the jury could 

only “consider Robert Baker’s statements to Detective ... Weiss for the very 

limited purpose to determine the credibility of Robert Baker’s prior hearsay 

statement to [T.W.], and not as evidence of Keldrick Black’s guilt.” Black 

has not argued that these limiting instructions were inadequate and the jury

is presumed to have followed the instructions. Elliott v. Landon, 89 Ariz. 355, 

357, 362 P.2d 733, 735 (1961). Moreover, given the limited purpose for which 

the rebuttal testimony was admitted and the limiting instructions given, 

there was no error in admitting this evidence. See State v. Ruggiero, 211 Ariz. 

262, 266–67 ¶¶ 17–21, 120 P.3d 690, 694–95 (App. 2005) (finding admission 

of rebuttal testimony for limited use was authorized under Rule 806).

¶18 Black also argues the superior court failed to properly assess 

the admissibility of Baker’s statements under Rule 403. This court will 

reverse such a ruling only for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Roscoe, 184 

Ariz. 484, 493, 910 P.2d 635, 644 (1992). Although Baker’s statements 

implicated Black as the shooter, the superior court heard argument on the 

admissibility of the statements and put defense counsel on notice of the 

consequences. Moreover, because Black has shown no error, the court need 

not further address whether the ruling constituted fundamental error 

resulting in prejudice. See State v. Alvarez, 213 Ariz. 467, 473 ¶ 20, 143 P.3d 

668, 674 (App. 2006) (“Finding no error in the court’s evidentiary ruling, we 

need not address whether any alleged error was fundamental and 
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

7

prejudicial.”); State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 568 ¶ 23, 115 P.3d 601, 608 

(2005) (similar). 

¶19 Finally, Black argues he should have been able to admit 

several of Baker’s other statements to show that Baker was unreliable, 

biased or to complete the story. This court reviews such rulings on the 

admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 

325, 334 ¶ 38, 185 P.3d 111, 120 (2008). When the superior court precluded 

defense counsel from eliciting Baker’s statements, it found Baker’s 

statements to T.W. “were hearsay statements that were brought in under 

[Rule] 804.3” and that there was no exception to the rule against hearsay 

that would allow the admission of any of the additional statements to 

Detective Weiss. On appeal, Black has not shown such an exception and, 

accordingly, has not shown error. See Boggs, 218 Ariz. at 334 ¶ 38, 185 P.3d 

at 120.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Improperly Limit Black’s Defense. 

¶20 Black argues the superior court improperly limited his 

defense in several ways. Black argues the preclusion of Neumeister’s 

testimony of the movement and number of figures in the surveillance video 

was error, an issue this court reviews for an abuse of discretion. See Boggs, 

218 Ariz. at 334 ¶ 38, 185 P.3d at 120. As applicable here, the test for 

preclusion of expert testimony “is whether the subject of inquiry is one of 

such common knowledge that people of ordinary education could reach a 

conclusion as intelligently as the witness . . . .” State v. Owens, 112 Ariz. 223, 

227, 540 P.2d 695, 699 (1975). 

¶21 During a pre-trial hearing, Neumeister testified that he did 

not use anything other than his eyes to track the movement of objects within 

the surveillance video. Neumeister also testified he never visited the crime 

scene and never looked at any crime scene photographs to note available 

light at the scene at the time of the shooting. As a result, Neumeister 

provided no specialized knowledge on the lighting conditions at the time 

of the shooting. Accordingly, the superior court ruled that Neumeister 

could not tell jurors what he saw on the video nor testify whether certain 

objects were shadows or bodies. Neumeister was allowed, however, to 

testify about how he enhanced the video and defense counsel was allowed 

to direct the jurors’ attention to specific locations as the video was being 

played. Black has not shown how the court abused its discretion in this 

ruling. 
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

8

¶22 Black also argues the superior court erred in not allowing 

Neumeister to testify in surrebuttal. “Because trial courts must be able to 

limit the presentation of witnesses and other evidence on collateral issues, 

only rarely will a trial court abuse its discretion in denying surrebuttal.” 

State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 79–80 ¶ 82, 280 P.3d 604, 623–24 (2012). Here, 

Black requested surrebuttal after the State’s expert testified he saw two 

figures as opposed to a single figure and a shadow; the superior court did 

not allow Neumeister to testify in surrebuttal. However, the court noted 

“factually that additional foundation was laid for this opinion by [the 

State’s] expert and that testimony was that he was able to show that the 

quote ‘shadow’ blocks out the light source and that’s something Mr. 

Neumeister never made the connection with.” Black fails to address how 

Neumeister would have gained the knowledge required under Rule 702 to 

provide that opinion when he failed to do so during the pretrial hearing. 

Accordingly, Black has not shown that the superior court abused its 

discretion in precluding Neumeister from providing surrebuttal testimony. 

III. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Admitting Certain Evidence. 

¶23 Black argues the superior court erred in admitting various 

evidence. This court reviews the superior court’s rulings on the admission 

of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Boggs, 218 Ariz. at 334 ¶ 38, 185 

P.3d at 120.

A. Photo-Lineup. 

¶24 Black argues the photo-lineup that was admitted into 

evidence was unduly suggestive. “[A] lineup does not require individuals 

of absolute identical dress, size and physical characteristics.” State v.

Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 383, 453 P.2d 951, 954 (1969). Here, at a pretrial 

evidentiary hearing, the superior court reviewed the interviews and 

evidence presented and found the identification procedures were not 

unduly suggestive. The court noted that the photo-lineups were not unduly 

suggestive on their own, all photos presented males who looked similar to 

Black and the officers read from the standard identification card when 

presenting the photos to S.R. and E.L. Black has not shown that this ruling 

was erroneous. 

B. Handgun And Necklace Evidence. 

¶25 Black challenges the admission into evidence of two 

handguns, which had been excluded as the murder weapon, claiming the 

evidence was not relevant and was unfairly prejudicial. No timely objection 

was made at trial, meaning this court’s review on appeal is limited to 
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

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fundamental error. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 21.3(c); State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 

561, 567 ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). “Accordingly, [Black] ‘bears the 

burden to establish that “(1) error exists, (2) the error is fundamental, and 

(3) the error caused him prejudice.”’” State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490, 493 ¶ 11, 

297 P.3d 182, 185 (App. 2013) (citations omitted). One gun was found in 

Black’s vehicle and the other was found at a residence the police searched 

that was connected to Black based on the State’s case. Black has not shown 

that the superior court erred in admitting this evidence under Rule 403 or 

how any error caused him prejudice. See Boggs, 218 Ariz. at 334 ¶ 38, 185 

P.3d at 120.

¶26 Black also argues that, over his objection, a necklace allegedly 

belonging to G.P. was admitted into evidence, even though there was 

insufficient chain of custody, identification and authentication for the 

necklace. During trial, E.L. testified that she went directly back to the club 

after the two males exited her car. The police processed her car that same 

day and E.L. then had the car cleaned the next day. After the car was 

cleaned, E.L. discovered the necklace in the back seat. E.L. returned the 

necklace to the victim’s family, who confirmed that it was G.P.’s necklace. 

The next day, the family gave the necklace to the police. A detective 

impounded the necklace. When admitted at trial, there was no indication 

the condition of the necklace (which is a non-fungible item) was materially 

different than on the night of the shooting. Given this evidence, Black has 

not shown that the superior court erred in admitting the necklace into 

evidence. See Boggs, 218 Ariz. at 334 ¶ 38, 185 P.3d at 120.

C. Inconsistent Evidence.

¶27 Black argues that inconsistent testimony and other evidence 

undermines his convictions. “[I]nconsistencies in witness testimony go not 

to the admissibility of testimony, but rather to the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence, which are issues 

for the jury to resolve.” State v. Rivera, 210 Ariz. 188, 192 ¶ 20, 109 P.3d 83, 

87 (2005). Here, the jury resolved any alleged inconsistencies in the 

evidence, as was its prerogative, see Rivera, 210 Ariz. at 192 ¶ 20, 109 P.3d at 

87, yet found Black guilty as charged. Black has not shown error on this 

basis. 

IV. Sufficiency Of The Evidence. 

¶28 Black argues there was insufficient evidence to show that he 

committed the crimes and there was no direct physical evidence tying him 

to the shooting. This court will not reverse a defendant’s conviction for 
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

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insufficiency of the evidence unless there is no substantial evidence to 

support the jury’s verdict. See State v. Scott, 187 Ariz. 474, 477, 930 P.2d 551, 

554 (App. 1996). Here, among other evidence, along with bullet casings 

found at the scene, three witnesses identified Black as the shooter who got 

into the car of E.L. and S.R. Moreover, Black was found to have residue 

“indicative” of gunshot residue on his hands. On this record, there is 

substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. See Scott, 187 Ariz. at 

477, 930 P.2d at 554.

V. Black Has Not Shown Juror 24 Could Not Render A Fair And 

Impartial Verdict. 

¶29 Black argues that the fact that the judge presided over a trial 

where Juror 24 had been the victim was improper. Black also argues that 

because Juror 24 was the victim of an aggravated assault, which was similar 

to one of the charges here, Juror 24 could not have been fair and impartial. 

Because Black did not object to Juror 24 serving on the jury, review is 

limited to fundamental error. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 21.3(c).

¶30 During voir dire, Juror 24 admitted he was the victim of a 

crime where the same superior court judge presided over the trial. The 

court asked “[a]nd you believe you could still be fair and impartial?” and 

Juror 24 replied, “[o]h, yes.” A court must dismiss a juror for cause when 

“there is reasonable ground to believe that a juror cannot render a fair and 

impartial verdict.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b); State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 

390, 814 P.2d 333, 347 (1991). However, if the juror assures the court that he 

or she can be fair and impartial, the juror need not be excused. State v. 

Reasoner, 154 Ariz. 377, 384, 742 P.2d 1363, 1370 (App. 1987). Black has not 

offered any evidence that Juror 24 could not be fair and impartial and, 

accordingly, has failed to establish error, let alone fundamental error. See 

State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005).

Moreover, although Black lists juror misconduct generally in his pro se 

supplemental brief, he makes no particular argument regarding any alleged 

juror misconduct and, from the record, this court can find none.

VI. Black Has Not Shown Prosecutorial Misconduct.

¶31 A claim of prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal only if 

“(1) misconduct is indeed present and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that 

the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying 

defendant a fair trial.” State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 459 ¶ 145, 94 P.3d 1119, 

1154 (2004) (citation omitted). Black argues that because S.R. was unable to 

identify him in open court, the prosecutor should not have stated during 
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

11

closing arguments that S.R. identified him. However, S.R. did identify Black 

in the photo-lineup by putting her initials next to his picture. S.R. also 

identified the picture of Black taken after his arrest as being the person who

got in the car the night of the shooting. Black further argues several other

instances of alleged misconduct, none of which rise to the level of 

misconduct. On this record, Black has not shown that the prosecutor 

engaged in misconduct or that any alleged misconduct could have affected 

the jury’s verdict. See Moody, 208 Ariz. at 459 ¶ 145, 94 P.3d at 1154.

VII. The Other Issues Black Seeks To Raise Do Not Warrant A New 

Trial.

¶32 In his pro se supplemental brief, Black attempts to raise 

several other issues that he argues warrant a new trial. Black contends the 

lack of a pretrial settlement conference was unfair. However, “a criminal 

defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain” and, thus, the lack of 

a pretrial settlement conference was not error. State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 

413 ¶ 14, 10 P.3d 1193, 1200 (App. 2000) (citations omitted). 

¶33 Black also argues malicious prosecution, misidentification 

and defamation of character. Black fails to support these arguments with 

any specificity and the record does not support these arguments. Black also 

argues ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a claim that can only be raised

in post-conviction proceedings, not on direct appeal. State ex rel. Thomas v. 

Rayes, 214 Ariz. 411, 415 ¶ 20, 153 P.3d 1040, 1044 (2007). None of the issues 

Black raises show the superior court erred in denying his motion for new 

trial. See State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 287, 908 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1996).
STATE v. BLACK

Decision of the Court

12

CONCLUSION

¶34 This court has read and considered counsel’s brief and Black’s 

pro se supplemental brief, and has searched the record provided for 

reversible error and has found none. State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 300, 451 

P.2d 878, 881 (1969); State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537 ¶ 30, 2 P.3d 89, 96 (App. 

1999). Accordingly, Black’s convictions and resulting sentences are 

affirmed. 

¶35 Upon the filing of this decision, defense counsel is directed to 

inform Black of the status of his appeal and of his future options. Defense 

counsel has no further obligations unless, upon review, counsel identifies 

an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by 

petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85, 684 P.2d 154, 

156–57 (1984). Black shall have 30 days from the date of this decision to 

proceed, if he desires, with a pro se motion for reconsideration or petition 

for review.