In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310

P.H. GLATFELTER CO.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant/Cross‐Appellee,

v.

WINDWARD PROSPECTS LTD.,

Defendant‐Appellee/Cross‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin, Green Bay Division.

No. 15‐MC‐46 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 19, 2017 — DECIDED JANUARY 31, 2017

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. These three appeals arise out of a dis‐

covery dispute between P.H. Glatfelter Co., a paper manufac‐

turer, and Windward Prospects Ltd., an English company on

which Glatfelter served a non‐party subpoena. Two of the ap‐

peals are taken by Glatfelter from the district court’s orders

denying both Glatfelter’s motion to compel responses to its

subpoena and Glatfelter’s motion for reconsideration. The

third appeal, which we treat as a cross‐appeal, was taken by
2 Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310

Windward to seek an award of fees and costs under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37. For the reasons that follow, we dis‐

miss all three appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

The present appeals are ancillary to an ongoing multi‐

party effort to clean up polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in

the bed of the Lower Fox River in northeastern Wisconsin. See

generally United States v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 768 F.3d 662, 665–

67 (7th Cir. 2014); NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768

F.3d 682, 686–89 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. NCR Corp., 688

F.3d 833, 835–36 (7th Cir. 2012). From the mid‐1950s through

the 1970s, several paper mills and a coating plant discharged

wastewater containing PCBs into the Lower Fox River. By

1979, when the EPA banned PCB use, approximately 250,000

pounds of PCBs had been released into the river bed. Begin‐

ning in the 1990s, the EPA and the Wisconsin Department of

Natural Resources began investigating the contamination to

develop a cleanup plan under the Comprehensive Environ‐

mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA). The EPA’s final plan, adopted in 2002, proposed a

cleanup proceeding in stages through a combination of

dredging and capping at various sites.  

The remediation cost for the Lower Fox River is estimated

to be approximately $700 million. See, e.g., P.H. Glatfelter Co.,

768 F.3d at 667. Under CERCLA, the obligation to pay for the

cleanup falls on the parties responsible for creating the haz‐

ard, and potentially responsible parties (PRPs) may be liable

for the full costs of remediation. Paper manufacturers NCR

Corporation and Appvion, Inc. were named by the EPA as

PRPs and have funded the ongoing cleanup. Other companies
Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310 3

with a potential role in the discharge of PCBs, including Glat‐

felter, also were named as PRPs and agreed to perform reme‐

dial work.  

In late 2007, the EPA issued a unilateral administrative or‐

der directing the PRPs to begin remedial work in the last four

operable units of the Lower Fox River. NCR and Appvion un‐

dertook many of those remedial efforts. They then sued other

PRPs, including Glatfelter, in the Eastern District of Wiscon‐

sin, seeking to recover the cleanup costs and to require other

PRPs to pay for future remedial work.1 The district court ini‐

tially ruled on summary judgment that NCR and Appvion

were not entitled to any equitable contribution from the other

paper mills involved. In 2014, we reversed and remanded the

cost recovery action back to the district court. See NCR Corp.,

768 F.3d at 687, 689–90, 713. That action remains pending,

with Appvion seeking recovery against Glatfelter and other

PRPs for the Lower Fox River cleanup costs Appvion has in‐

curred, in addition to subrogation and declaratory relief.

                                                 

1 As we observed in NCR Corp., 768 F.3d at 692:  

Appvion finds itself in a materially different position

from NCR when it comes to the choice between cost re‐

covery and contribution. In fact, it appears to be in an un‐

usual, possibly unique, position among parties incurring

costs under CERCLA: it was initially identified as a PRP

by the government and paid response costs in that capac‐

ity, but later it was held to fall outside of CERCLA’s stat‐

utory grounds for liability. It is now on the hook for re‐

sponse costs only as NCR’s indemnitor pursuant to an

agreement signed when the companies split up. It is seek‐

ing the costs of response it paid directly while it was re‐

garded as a PRP.
4 Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310

Windward is an English entity allegedly conducting Ap‐

pvion’s defense of CERCLA claims and managing Appvion’s

responsibility for the Lower Fox River cleanup operations.

Windward ratified the commencement of the cost recovery

action by Appvion and has stated that Windward will be

bound by the result. To defend against Appvion in the cost

recovery action, Glatfelter sought discovery relating to Ap‐

pvion’s costs from both Appvion and Windward. Glatfelter

contends that identifying those costs (and any potential off‐

sets from insurance, settlements, or indemnification pay‐

ments) depends on understanding how funds changed hands

between Appvion and its insurers or indemnitors, including

Windward.

Glatfelter first attempted to obtain discovery from Wind‐

ward through Appvion, which refused to accept service on

Windward’s behalf. Glatfelter next sent a copy of its discovery

request by certified mail to Windward’s counsel at his home

office in New Hampshire. He returned the envelope uno‐

pened. Glatfelter then filed a motion to compel responses to

its discovery requests in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The

district court denied the motion, ruling that Windward’s rati‐

fication of Appvion’s action did not, on its own, give Glatfelter

an independent right to seek discovery from the former under

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 or 34, but that there are

other ways to obtain discovery from non‐parties.

Glatfelter next issued a subpoena to Windward at its attor‐

ney’s New Hampshire address. Windward’s counsel in‐

formed Glatfelter that Windward would not be making any

production because it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States federal courts. Windward also objected to the
Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310 5

subpoena to the extent that it sought documents or infor‐

mation available from another more convenient, less burden‐

some, or less expensive source (i.e., Appvion).

Glatfelter then instituted this ancillary proceeding in the

District of Massachusetts,2 seeking to compel Windward to re‐

spond to the subpoena. Glatfelter also simultaneously moved

under Rule 45(f) to transfer the case to the Eastern District of

Wisconsin, where the costrecovery action was pending before

Judge Griesbach, who had presided over the case since it was

first filed. Following a hearing, the magistrate judge in Mas‐

sachusetts ordered a transfer to the Eastern District of Wis‐

consin, and the ancillary action was docketed before Judge

Griesbach. After receiving additional arguments and evi‐

dence, he denied the motion to compel, concluding that the

court lacked personal jurisdiction over Windward and that

Glatfelter had not established which documents it sought that

were not already subject to production by Appvion. Glatfelter

filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court

also denied.  

Glatfelter appealed the district court’s denial of its mo‐

tions, and Windward filed a third appeal regarding fees,

which we treated as a cross‐appeal. In our order dated July

25, 2016, we directed that Windward’s cross‐appeal be taken

with the other appeals, and instructed the parties to address

all jurisdictional issues in their briefs.

                                                 

2 Rule 45(d)(2)(B) provides that “the serving party may move the court

for the district where compliance is required for an order compelling pro‐

duction” and “the order [to compel production] must protect a person

who is neither a party nor a party’s officer from significant expense result‐

ing from compliance.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i)‐(ii).
6 Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310

On January 17, 2017, two days before oral argument was

scheduled in this case, Glatfelter notified this Court of a pro‐

posed consent decree among NCR, Appvion, the United

States, and the state of Wisconsin that had been submitted to

the district court. If approved and entered, the proposed de‐

cree would potentially resolve Appvion’s claims against Glat‐

felter in the cost recovery action that gave rise to these ancil‐

lary proceedings.

II. Discussion

“The initial inquiry in any appeal is whether the court to

which the appeal has been taken has jurisdiction to entertain

the appeal.” Sik Gaek, Inc. v. Harris, 789 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir.

2015) (citation omitted). The federal courts of appeal have ju‐

risdiction over all final decisions of the federal district courts.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision is one that “ends the liti‐

gation on the merits, leaving nothing for the [district] court to

do but execute the judgment.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United

States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989) (citation omitted). The general

rule is that pretrial discovery orders, such as those at issue

here, are not final in terms of winding up the underlying law‐

suit. See Sik Gaek, Inc., 789 F.3d at 799. An exception exists,

however, under the collateral order doctrine, where an order

“conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, resolve[s]

an important issue completely separate from the merits of the

action, and [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a fi‐

nal judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468

(1978) (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977);

United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978)).  

Glatfelter emphasizes that this ancillary discovery issue

has been conclusively decided by the district court’s two or‐

ders and is collateral to the underlying cost recovery suit, and
Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310 7

that this appeal is, for all practical purposes, Glatfelter’s only

chance to obtain discovery from Windward, a non‐party to

the main action. See, e.g., Carter Prods., Inc. v. Eversharp, Inc.,

360 F.2d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 1966) (finding jurisdiction over an

appeal from the Illinois district court’s denial of a motion to

compel deposition testimony of non‐party to underlying Cal‐

ifornia litigation, because, “[f]or all practical purposes[,] ...

this appeal [is appellants’] only opportunity for review of the

district court’s order denying access to the information”).  

Thus, Glatfelter contends, the collateral order doctrine ought

to apply.

The problem for Glatfelter is that this ancillary action was

transferred from the District of Massachusetts to the Eastern

District of Wisconsin prior to this appeal. In our Circuit, we

have recognized the appealability of pretrial discovery orders

only where they were issued by a district court in an ancillary

proceeding and said district court was not within the jurisdic‐

tion of the circuit court having appellate jurisdiction to review

the final adjudication of the main action. See,e.g., Sik Gaek, Inc.,

789 F.3d at 799 (“Here, the district court order denying sanc‐

tions was issued in a jurisdiction not that of the main proceed‐

ing. Consequently, appellants cannot obtain effective review

of the order as part of an appeal of a final adjudication of the

main action ....”); see also id. (citing cases); Hernly v. United

States, 832 F.2d 980, 981 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987) (“This court has

previously decided that it has jurisdiction. The order ap‐

pealed from was deemed final because it was entered in a dif‐

ferent district court from where the main action is pending.”)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the

ancillary action (this discovery dispute) is in the same district

court where the main action (the cost recovery action) is cur‐

rently pending, Glatfelter could obtain review of the denial of
8 Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310

its motions to compel and for reconsideration on appeal from

the final judgment in the main action.

We have not yet ruled directly on whether one may appeal

an order in an ancillary action entered in a district court lo‐

cated in the same circuit as the district court handling the

main action. However, other circuits that have considered the

issue have held such orders interlocutory and not immedi‐

ately appealable. See, e.g., Barrick Grp., Inc. v. Mosse, 849 F.2d

70, 73 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Under these circumstances, a circuit

court can consider any appeal on discovery issues at the same

time as the appeal from the judgment in the underlying ac‐

tion. This approach avoids piecemeal proceedings, strength‐

ens the rule of finality and provides ultimately for the effec‐

tive review of all issues.”); Hooker v. Cont’l Life Ins. Co., 965

F.2d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 1992) (focusing on whether the appeal‐

ing party “has any means, other than an immediate appeal, to

obtain appellate review,” and concluding that “[b]ecause the

same circuit court will have jurisdiction to review both the

discovery order and the final adjudication ..., appellate re‐

view of the order denying discovery will not be foreclosed by

delaying review until a final adjudication of the entire ac‐

tion”); In re Subpoena Served on Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 813

F.2d 1473, 1475–80 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissing, sua sponte, ap‐

peal of an order quashing a non‐party subpoena for want of

appellate jurisdiction because court could review the order

with appeal from final adjudication of main action).

Glatfelter nonetheless points to decisions by the Eleventh

and Federal Circuits that it claims support its position: that an

order denying a motion to compel may still be appealable,

even if entered by a district court located within the same cir‐

cuit as the court presiding over the main action. See Ariel v.
Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310 9

Jones, 693 F.2d 1058, 1059 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (con‐

cluding that appellate jurisdiction existed over Southern Dis‐

trict of Florida order quashing subpoena issued in connection

with main action pending in Middle District of Florida); Heat

& Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1020–22

(Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that appellate jurisdiction existed

with respect to Northern District of West Virginia order grant‐

ing a motion to quash a non‐party subpoena in connection

with a main action pending in the Northern District of Cali‐

fornia). Glatfelter thus contends that there is a circuit split

here that ought to be resolved in its favor.  

To cut to the chase, however, even setting aside the appar‐

ent limitations of these two cases,3 there certainly is no circuit

                                                 

3

For example, the circuit decisions on which Ariel relied all involved

situations where the two district courts at issue were in different circuits.

See Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 615 F.2d 595 (3d Cir.

1980) (finding appellate jurisdiction over denial of motion to compel dis‐

covery from non‐party in Third Circuit where main action was pending in

Fifth Circuit); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg‐Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.

1967) (same for denial of motion to compel discovery in Second Circuit

where main action was pending in Seventh Circuit); Gladrow v. Weisz, 354

F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1965) (same for appeal of order requiring discovery of

non‐party in Fifth Circuit where main action was pending before board of

patent interferences of United States Patent Office); Horizons Titanium

Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1961) (same for order granting

motion to quash subpoena in First Circuit where main action was pending

in D.C. Circuit). Additionally, the treatise to which Ariel cited in support

of its analysis has since been updated to include language reflecting that

“[t]his exception has itself now been limited to situations in which the two

districts are in different circuits.” 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT AND ARTHUR

R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2006 (3d ed. 2016).

As for the Federal Circuit case, in Hester, a patent owner sought dis‐

covery in the Northern District of West Virginia from a non‐party who

allegedly had infringed the patent at issue in a litigation pending before
10 Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310

split or authority in favor of Glatfelter’s position on the issue

of whether a discovery order in an ancillary proceeding is im‐

mediately appealable when entered by the very same district

court that is presiding over the main action. Cf. In re Subpoena

Served on Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 813 F.2d at 1474–75

(contrasting “a nonappealable interlocutory order issued by

the district court having jurisdiction over the main action”

with “an interlocutory order issued by a district court of a dif‐

ferent circuit from the district court where the case was

                                                 

the Northern District of California. 785 F.2d at 1020–21. The Northern Dis‐

trict of West Virginia quashed the subpoena, and the patent owner ap‐

pealed to the Federal Circuit, which concluded that, because the California

district court lacked jurisdiction over the non‐party infringer, the patent

owner could not challenge the West Virginia district court’s decision on

appeal from the California district court’s final judgment, and the collat‐

eral order doctrine applied.  The Federal Circuit then considered whether

its result should have been different because it was the same appellate

court that would have jurisdiction over an appeal on the merits from the

California district court. See id. at 1021. The court of appeals observed that,

prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, the order by the West Virginia

district court would have been appealable to the Fourth Circuit, and be‐

cause such an order would have been appealable as a final disposition of

the only proceeding in the ancillary court:

[W]e are satisfied that it does not matter that the Federal

Circuit is the same appellate court that would possess ju‐

risdiction over an appeal from the California district

court’s final action on the merits. The California court has

no jurisdiction over Hester, a nonparty to the main in‐

fringement action, and Heat & Control has no other

means of effectively obtaining review than by appealing

the West Virginia court’s order, necessarily to this court.

Thus, the West Virginia court’s order is appealable, and

this court possesses jurisdiction to hear it.

Id. at 1021–22.
Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310 11

filed”). Indeed, the Federal Circuit in Hester specifically ob‐

served that “[i]f the district court granting Hester’s motion to

quash were the same court in which the main action is being

litigated, [appellant] could seek review, as an error of the

court, when and if it appeals from the final judgment.” 785

F.2d at 1021.

Glatfelter protests that we should nonetheless find juris‐

diction over its appeals because the only reason this ancillary

action, which was commenced in a district court in another

circuit, is now in the same court as the main action, is that

Glatfelter moved for transfer under Rule 45(f). Rule 45(f),

which Glatfelter emphasizes was only recently promulgated

in 2013,4 provides:

When the court where compliance is required

did not issue the subpoena, it may transfer a

motion under this rule to the issuing court if the

person subject to the subpoena consents or if the

court finds exceptional circumstances.... To en‐

force its order, the issuing court may transfer

the order to the court where the motion was

made.

                                                 

4 Windward pushes back on this characterization of Rule 45(f), noting

that transfer is hardly a novel concept and was available long before 2013.

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (change‐of‐venue provision). Windward explains

the Rule 45(f) transfer provision as one that was included because the new

Rule 45 requires a motion to compel to be brought in the court of compli‐

ance, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B), not in the issuing court (presiding over

the main action). Thus, Glatfelter would previously have had the option

of bringing its motion to compel in the Eastern District of Wisconsin,

where no immediate appeal would be available; according to Windward,

the “new” Rule 45(f) does not change that principle.
12 Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f).5 Glatfelter emphasizes that the purpose of

this rule is to efficiently consolidate motions before a single

judge presiding over complex litigation. A holding that we

lack appellate jurisdiction over its appeals would, according

to Glatfelter, put parties in the position of either being forced

to litigate a motion to compel before a district judge who has

had no contact with the underlying case, or forfeiting appel‐

late review if the motion were to be denied. Glatfelter relat‐

edly claims that the Rules Advisory Committee could not

have intended that litigants lose access to immediate appeal

upon transfer into the circuit of the main action under Rule

45(f).  

Glatfelter has it backwards. By allowing for transfers, Rule

45(f) allows for consolidation of motions in a single appropri‐

ate court, thereby avoiding piecemeal litigation in multiple

fora as well as piecemeal appeals. See, e.g., United States v.

Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974) (noting the “strong congres‐

sional policy against piecemeal reviews, and against obstruct‐

ing or impeding an ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocu‐

tory appeals”); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325

(1940) (“Since the right to a judgment from more than one

court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of

justice, Congress from the very beginning has, by forbidding

piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical pur‐

poses is a single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judi‐

cial administration.”). Glatfelter is correct that this discovery

dispute is ancillary and does not require consideration with

the underlying main action. However, as the Supreme Court

                                                 

5 Windward opposed Glatfelter’s transfer motion, contending that

even if jurisdiction existed over Windward, this matter lacks the “excep‐

tional circumstances” required by Rule 45(f) as a predicate to transfer.  
Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310 13

explained in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100

(2009), the collateral order doctrine “must never be allowed to

swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single ap‐

peal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Id.

at 106 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Glatfelter complains that “a final disposition of a discov‐

ery dispute would, at most, be unreviewable and, at best,

would have to await a plenary appeal from a merits judg‐

ment.” Yet the availability of plenary appeal from a final judg‐

ment is precisely why discovery orders like these are interloc‐

utory and not immediately appealable. Our Circuit has con‐

sistently underscored that “what is critical is whether the

party unsuccessfully seeking the subpoena has any other

means of obtaining review.” Carter Prods., 360 F.2d at 872. It is

only then that we should “extricate appellants from the cul‐

de‐sac in which the district court’s order leaves them.” Id.

Here, Glatfelter has a clear road forward. It may not be Glat‐

felter’s preferred route, but, “[t]hat a ruling may burden liti‐

gants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate

reversal of a final district court judgment has never sufficed.”

Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107 (citation, alteration, and inter‐

nal quotation marks omitted). As the denials of Glatfelter’s

motions would be reviewable on appeal from a final judg‐

ment, we dismiss these appeals for lack of jurisdiction.6  

Windward submitted in its briefs and at oral argument

that it would voluntarily dismiss its cross‐appeal if we found

that we lack jurisdiction over Glatfelter’s appeals. Windward’s

(likely premature) cross‐appeal is thus also dismissed.  

                                                 

6

Because we lack jurisdiction in the first place, the potential effect of

the proposed consent decree on this action is moot.
14 Nos. 15‐3847, 16‐1197, & 16‐1310

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this case in its en‐

tirety for lack of jurisdiction.