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THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, ISRAEL AND THE

PEACE PROCESS: WHAT’S NEXT?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 8, 2014

Serial No. 113–146

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D., vice president for research, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ............................................................................................ 10

Mr. James Prince, co-founder and president, The Democracy Council ............... 25

The Honorable Robert Wexler, president, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace (former Member of Congress) .................................................... 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................... 13

Mr. James Prince: Prepared statement ................................................................. 28

The Honorable Robert Wexler: Prepared statement ............................................. 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 67

(1)

THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, ISRAEL AND 

THE PEACE PROCESS: WHAT’S NEXT? 

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:47 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other 

members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from 

our witnesses. 

And, without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will 

be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Last July, Secretary Kerry, together with negotiators from Israel 

and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, PLO, announced that 

the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations had restarted. 

Here we are now, 9 months later, and what do we have? We have 

a peace process that fell apart, yielding no positive results, leaving 

both parties with an even greater distrust of one another. 

In fact, the legacy of this failed round of talks could be that it 

ended up causing more harm than good, as it seemed to have 

moved Fatah and Hamas closer to reconciliation while Abu Mazen 

continues his push for de facto recognition at the U.N., both of 

which will have serious repercussions for U.S. policy toward the 

Palestinians. 

There are laws on the books that prohibit U.S. assistance to any 

U.N. Agency that accepts a nonexisting state of Palestine amongst 

its ranks. And though the administration continues to seek a waiver in order to give the funding, I will continue to do everything in 

my power to ensure that it does not get this authority. 

And then there is the Palestinian Anti-Terror Act, a bill that I 

authored that eventually became law that prohibits U.S. assistance 

to a Palestinian Government that would have Hamas—any members of Hamas amongst its ranks. 

2

Should reconciliation happen and Hamas become a part of the 

Palestinian Government, I fully expect Secretary Kerry and the administration to enforce the letter of the law. 

I don’t doubt Secretary Kerry’s earnestness in wanting a mutually beneficial deal between the parties. I share that earnestness. 

I don’t think anyone in this subcommittee would disagree. 

But from the beginning, I questioned the prioritization of this endeavor in light of so many other pressing matters in the Middle 

East and the North African region. To say that this task was one 

better suited for Sisyphus would be an understatement, forever 

pulling that rock up the hill. 

Secretary Kerry’s faith that Abu Mazen and the PLO could sit 

down with Israel this time and somehow come to the table with a 

new-found desire to actually achieve peace with Israel was misplaced. 

The P.A. and Abu Mazen have shown time and time again that 

it is a corrupt entity, incapable of governing the territories, unwilling to see a two-state solution in which two Nations could exist 

side by side in peace. 

And so one has to question the amount of time, effort, and resources spent chasing the unobtainable, at least under the present 

conditions, when there is one of the worst humanitarian disasters 

in recent history occurring in Syria, transition to democracy impediments in Egypt, and Iran continues its support for terrorism 

worldwide and its nuclear ambition have not waned. 

Over 150,000 people in Syria have been killed while millions 

have fled to neighboring countries or have been internally displaced, and the administration’s policies, undefined and indecisive, 

have failed to adequately address this issue. 

According to the State Department’s recently released global terrorism report, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are on the rise and becoming more aggressive in places like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and 

North Africa. 

Iran continues to be the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism, actively targeting Israeli and U.S. interests, increasing its 

presence in our own hemisphere and Africa, and, of course, it is 

still propping up the Assad regime in Syria, all of this while the 

administration continues to negotiate with the regime in Tehran 

over its nuclear ambitions, even though State’s own assessment is 

that Iran continues to refuse to prove its nuclear program is indeed 

for peaceful purposes. 

And these are just a few of the fires that need to be put out in 

the Middle East and North Africa region. Yet, the failed peace 

talks have managed to fan the flames. 

The signed reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas 

signifies that Abu Mazen is more interested in making peace with 

terrorists than it is with Israel, but it reveals who Abu Mazen really is. He is a man who has never been a true partner for peace, 

but, rather, an obstacle toward peace. 

Abu Mazen is a man more interested in taking U.S. taxpayer 

money and using it to pay salaries of convicted Palestinian terrorists with Israeli and American blood on their hands than he is in 

running an effective government that could lay the foundation for 

an independent state. 

3

Abu Mazen is a man who is corrupt and uses cronyism to maintain his position as the head of the PLO and the P.A. and fears losing that control and, thus, will never make the hard decisions for 

the benefit of the Palestinian people at his expense. 

This hearing is important to understand how and why this latest 

attempt at peace between Israelis and Palestinians failed and allows us to take a closer look at the real obstacles to peace in order 

to better formulate U.S. policies as it relates to the P.A. 

And I am now very pleased to yield to my ranking member and 

good friend, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thanks to our witnesses for being here today. 

It is a special honor for me to welcome Congressman and former 

chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, Robert Wexler, back to this 

committee. I will have more to say about him in a couple of minutes. 

Earlier this week marked Yom Ha’atzmaut, the 66th anniversary 

of the independence of the State of Israel. Since her independence 

in 1948, Israel has defended herself on every single one of her borders. 

Despite facing continued, even existential, security threats, Israel 

has become a vibrant democracy, one that, unlike so many of 

Israel’s neighbors, respects human rights and religious minorities, 

all while an innovative, high-tech economy flourishes. 

We must acknowledge that the Palestinian Authority under 

President Abbas has made tremendous strides in working to build 

state institutions and establish security forces that have dramatically reduced violence in the West Bank. The United States Congress has committed a great deal of resources to strengthening the 

Palestinian Authority, to the tune of $400 million per year. 

At the outset of peace talks last August, Secretary Kerry worked with the international community on a $4-billion economic package 

that would help jump-start the Palestinian economy, because we all 

know that a stable state starts with a strong, thriving economy 

that provides greater opportunity and prosperity for the Palestinian people. 

For the past 9 months, the world watched as Secretary of State 

Kerry and his team worked feverishly to restart direct negotiations 

between Israel and the Palestinians. 

Now the April 29th deadline has come and gone without any 

agreed-upon framework or extension of talks, which leads to the 

obvious question: What happens next? What role should the United 

States play going forward? And what are the consequences if Fatah 

reconciles with Hamas? 

We hope to see progress in the talks. We hope to see two States 

or two peoples arising out of direct negotiations and without the 

imposition of any third-party plans. 

But we cannot expect Israel to continue to negotiate with a partner who has chosen to reconcile with a terrorist organization that 

refuses even to recognize Israel’s right to exist, one that targets innocent Israeli civilians with rockets and suicide attacks. 

President Abbas claims that any interim government will abide 

by the same principles the PLO adheres to, which have been stipulated by the international community: Renouncement of violence, 

4

recognition of Israel’s right to exist, and the acceptance of all previous diplomatic agreements. 

Let’s be clear. Israel will not negotiate with any Palestinian Government that is backed by Hamas terrorists and refuses to accept 

the Quartet Principles. 

Any government that includes Hamas terrorists will not receive 

U.S. assistance. The law is clear. And this Congress will not allow 

U.S. Funding to flow to any government that includes terrorist 

members of Hamas. 

I hope this message has been received in Ramallah because, like 

so many of my colleagues here, I believe in U.S. assistance to the 

Palestinians. 

If we want to see a thriving, stable state for all Palestinians, economic support and foreign investment is the best way to promote 

peace and stability. 

Why would President Abbas jeopardize the world’s support by 

partnering with terrorists? It is easy to sit back and say we have 

seen this before. As we know, there have been similar failed reconciliation attempts in 2007, 2011, 2012. 

But the damage the Palestinians do in trying to unify with a terrorist group is that the Palestinians aren’t using their time to build 

their institutions and to prepare their people for peace and for the 

recognition of the State of Israel. 

Aid dollars are needed for all of those things, whether it is for 

security, institution-building, education, or economic growth. 

So the bigger question is: What is Abbas doing to really make a 

Palestinian state viable? What is he doing to make a Palestinian 

state that can be stable? 

Instead of unifying with a terrorist organization, why not take a 

very positive and concrete step? Condemn violent acts of incitement. 

He can also prevent incitement and prepare for peace by taking 

a small, but very significant, step: Put Israel on the map, his map. 

Official Palestinian Government maps must show Israel. 

That will communicate to the Palestinian people that Israel is 

here to stay and that those who envision a Palestinian state, as 

they put it, from the river to the sea, whether they are members 

of Hamas or whether they are anti-Israel members of BDS groups, 

do not support a two-state solution, a Jewish and a Palestinian 

state. By changing the maps, President Abbas can show that he is 

committed to peace even while they are not. 

Now, we know the only path to a peaceful two-state solution is 

through negotiations between both parties. Unilateral actions will 

never achieve this goal. I hope that there is still space for negotiations to continue without this unity deal. 

And so, as Abbas stands at this very critical juncture, I urge him 

to choose the real partner in peace. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much for that opening statement. 

I now would like to yield to our members for their opening statement. 

And we will start with Mr. Chabot, subcommittee chairman. 

Thank you. 

5

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Unfortunately, I have another hearing that I have to attend here 

shortly. So I will read the testimony of all the panel members here 

following the hearing. 

But I did want to come over to personally recognize and acknowledge the presence of our former colleague, Congressman Wexler, 

who served this institution so honorably for so many years. 

And we actually served not only on Foreign Affairs Committee 

together, but, also, Judiciary Committee, and we participated in 

such things as the impeachment of a President. We were on opposite sides on that one. 

Mr. WEXLER. On everything. 

Mr. CHABOT. Well, on everything. I stand corrected. 

Although we were two of the co-founders of the Congressional 

Taiwan caucus. So we generally agreed on issues with respect to 

Taiwan. 

And I remember a number of codels that we were involved in and 

did, I believe, good work in various parts of the world. 

We went to The Hague together when Israel was under such attack around the world for trying to defend itself in building a security fence in some areas, walled in other areas. And they were getting much criticism, and we were there speaking out on their behalf. 

I remember meeting with President Mubarak in his office when 

he was still in power in Egypt, and we were urging him to hold 

free and open and fair elections. And perhaps, had he followed our 

advice back there, he would find himself under different circumstances today. 

But, in any event, I appreciated his service to this institution, 

and we appreciate his good work on behalf of this Nation at this 

point in his capacity. 

And we welcome you back. 

And thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I just wanted to also welcome the panelists here. And just to take 

this in a little bit different direction, if you look at public polling, 

both the Palestinians and the Israelis in equal numbers, 70, 80 

percent, believe in a two-state solution. 

But, at the same time, by those same percentages, they don’t 

think that a two-state solution is possible; so, what you have is a 

context of disbelief. 

And, you know, unilateralism, one side taking a move, doesn’t 

move us closer to any kind of solution. What you need is mutual 

steps here. 

What could the Israelis do to demonstrate to the Palestinians 

that they believe that the West Bank, or most of it, should be part 

of their state? Well, don’t build outside of the blocks. 

You know, the blocks represent about 8 percent of the West 

Bank. You would be saying to the Palestinians, ‘‘We are only going 

to build in the area that we think should be our state, not the area 

that should be your state.’’

6

If a parallel move is made on the Palestinian side, what could 

the Palestinians do? As my colleague Ted Deutch had said, put 

Israel on a map. 

You know, if you ask the Palestinian leaders why Israel isn’t on 

a map, they say they don’t know what the borders are. Well, you 

know what they want them to be. 

So, you know, there is no Web site, there is no textbook, that 

talks about, you know, the existence of Israel in a two-state scenario. 

The other is, as Ted also said, stop the incitement, you know, 

stop treating Palestinians that kill Israelis as martyrs. This creates 

a cycle of violence that transcends generations. 

You know, in my tradition, in the peace process in Northern Ireland, you know, both sides that had committed themselves for 30 

years to violence, on the Catholic side and the Protestant side—before they were admitted to the negotiating table, both sides had to 

renounce violence. Both sides had to participate in the destruction 

of their arms to demonstrate that they were truly committed to a 

peaceful coexistence. 

And I think what we have to accept here is that you can do all 

kinds of negotiations. You can try to bring the leaders together to 

push them in a direction that they don’t want to be. But a settlement to this long-standing issue has to come from within. It is not 

going to come from without. 

And, you know, the two sides—you know, the United States can 

push Israel, push the Palestinians, together, but both have to come 

to the conclusion that, you know, their disdain for each other historically is not nearly as important as their love for their own children and the future of a two-state solution between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 

With that, I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And if the subcommittee would indulge me for just a minute, Mr. 

Rohrabacher, I am going to turn to Mr. Deutch, who is going to 

say—I would like for him to say a few words about Mr. Wexler. 

And I know you have some other commitments. 

And I do as well, but I know that Mr. DeSantis is going to take 

over for me. We have got a meeting with the Syrian opposition 

group. 

So Mr. Deutch is recognized, Mr. DeSantis and then——

Mr. DEUTCH. I am sorry that we both need to head off to other 

commitments. And, as our witnesses know, we will pay close attention to the testimony today both as you deliver it and written. 

I just wanted to take a moment to welcome my friend and my 

former congressman, Robert Wexler, back to this committee on 

which he so ably served for so many years. 

It is Congressman Wexler’s commitment to these issues, his expertise about these issues, his deep passion not just for what happens in Washington, but for the constituents that he represented 

that I now have the good fortune to represent—it is all of these 

things that made him a tremendous Member of this body. 

And the way that he forged relationships with members on both 

sides of the aisle, as we have already seen here today, is a high 

7

bar that he set that I have spent the past number of years trying 

to reach. 

So it is wonderful to have you have here. You are doing great 

work, Robert, in your current capacity at the S. Daniel Abraham 

Center. I wanted to thank you for all that you have done while you 

were here, all the great work that you continue to do. It is an 

honor for us to have you here. 

And I also wanted to acknowledge Danny Abraham, who is also 

here, who is a World War II veteran, a great American entrepreneur, and someone who has dedicated so much of his life to 

making peace as well. 

Robert, it is a pleasure to welcome you back. 

Danny, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back to you. 

Mr. DESANTIS [presiding]. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. I would like to associate myself with the 

remarks that were just given us about our former colleague and 

friend. 

I have been following this, as many Americans have, the possibility of having peace in the Middle East for, well, almost my whole 

life now. I was born in 1947, and I guess Israel was born in 1948. 

I do not believe that this is a problem where—at least it isn’t 

anymore—where you have two sides that are unwilling to try to 

reach out to one another. 

What we have is Israel in the last 20 years has given up territory, has reached out, has, in fact, given up the West Bank and has 

permitted a total of the Gaza Strip to go under the jurisdiction of 

the Palestinians. 

And I see that, in the last 20 years, 30 years, we have seen Israel 

give up a lot and I haven’t seen the Palestinians give up anything. 

What have they given up in the last 20 years? 

The only thing that stands today between peace in the Middle 

East, as far as I can see—and I will be anxious to hear your reaction to this—the only real thing that stands between peace is a Palestinian willingness to say, ‘‘We don’t have the right to return to 

the pre-1967 borders. Thus, we do recognize Israel has a right to 

exist as a separate state and we will have the two-state solution.’’

But every time I ask a Palestinian—and I have lots of Palestinian friends—‘‘Well, that means that you agree that this right of 

return doesn’t exist. Because if you say the right of return, you are 

saying Israel doesn’t have a right to exist as an Israeli—as a Jewish state. Right?’’

And so they never will say that. To me, that is the only thing 

that is a roadblock. The Israelis have already made concessions. 

What concessions have the Palestinians made? They are not even 

willing to make that. 

I am for peace. I really am. I am not—I don’t think of myself as 

someone in favor of Israel over the Palestinians. No. They are both 

groups of people who deserve to have their own country and deserve to live in peace. 

But I would hope that, as we go through the testimony today, 

that we get to the heart of the matter. And I believe that that is 

8

the heart of the matter: The Palestinians have to agree that Israel 

will be able to exist and they haven’t honestly done that yet. 

Please feel free to contradict that in your testimony. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

As we will soon hear from our witnesses, Secretary of State 

Kerry’s efforts to broker a peace agreement between the Israelis 

and Palestinians took place in the context of great regional turmoil. 

History will determine whether or not the efforts were worth the 

effort. 

Our challenge in the present, however, is to assess what policies 

we can pursue now that will help move the prospects for peace forward and, perhaps, more immediate, what policies will help ensure 

that the region is not moved backwards. 

Much has been said lately of the decisions Israel must consider, 

particularly regarding borders, the security arrangements in the 

Jordan Valley, and prisoner releases. I believe the focus is my outlook. 

Dr. Schanzer, I hope you will take the time today to elaborate 

on your prepared testimony on the need for Palestinians to focus, 

in your words, on good governance, economic reform, and institution-building. 

Finally, I would like to touch briefly on the recent comments of 

Secretary Kerry and his reference to the specter of apartheid relative to the conflict. 

As the Secretary later noted, he wished he would have used a 

different word. I appreciate his quick retraction and his candor. 

While Israel, like any society, is not perfect, one need only look 

at the Arab members of the Knesset, or Salim Joubran, an ArabIsraeli judge sitting on the Supreme Court, to know that the term 

‘‘apartheid’’ does not apply here. 

The State of Israel grants full rights and security to its Arab citizens living within Israel. Full enfranchisement, full employment, 

full housing, and full participation in the political process are a staple of Israeli democracy. 

But, more important, though unintended, the use of the word 

‘‘apartheid’’ gives support to those who seek to delegitimize Israel 

and those who promote divestment and sanctions against Israel. I 

hope that we can count on the Secretary and others to avoid such 

linkage in the future. 

I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Gentleman yields back. 

The Chair recognizes himself for 1 minute. 

I want to thank the witnesses for coming. This is a very important issue and near and dear to many of our hearts. 

It seems to me, especially with the unity government now with 

Hamas and Fatah, that the single biggest obstacle—and I will echo 

my colleague from California—to having a peace in this region has 

been a refusal to the Arabs in the region to recognize Israel as a 

Jewish state. 

9

There have been multiple opportunities where you could have 

had a Palestinian state. The original U.N. Partition plan in the late 

1940s, that was way more generous to the Arab population than to 

the Israelis. The Israelis accepted it. The Arabs fought it. 

And, of course, we have had multiple conflicts since then. There 

have been multiple opportunities for there to be a true two-state 

solution where Israel is existing as a Jewish state. 

And so, until that changes, I don’t see how we are going to be 

able to have a resolution of this in a way that benefits Israel’s security, and I do not think that we can continue in good faith to be 

sending U.S. taxpayer dollars over to the Palestinians if they are 

allied with Hamas. 

I mean, Hamas—forget about recognizing Israel. I mean, they 

want to destroy Israel. They are not even bashful about their support of terrorism. And so I don’t see how this is something that 

could be viewed as a positive step. 

And I think we need to act in the Congress—good behavior can 

be rewarded, but I think you got to penalize bad behavior. 

And I will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 

chairman and ranking member of the committee for calling an important hearing. 

To our witnesses, thank you very much. 

And to Congressman Wexler, it is great to see you again. Thank 

you for being here. 

Gentlemen, I will be brief. I think my colleagues have framed the 

debate about as well as you possibly can. Just to add my voice to 

it, I look forward to your testimony. I look forward to the opportunity for us to ask you some questions. 

I myself am particularly interested, to the extent that you can 

speculate, as to Abbas’s decision as—to approach Hamas and the 

decision to reconcile, what the—prospects for a true reconciliation 

there actually are and what that means in the immediate term as 

that process continues to unfold for U.S. policy in the region. 

So thank you very much again and look forward for your testimony. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Gentleman yields back. And the Chair will now 

recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Vargas. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

the opportunity. 

I, too, would like to welcome the witnesses. 

What I would say is that Israel has done more than any nation 

should have to do to try to achieve peace. They have given up their 

land. They have released terrorists. They have done everything 

they could to try to achieve peace, and the Palestinians have done 

nothing. 

One thing I would correct for the record, I think it says Israel 

was born in 1948. That is modern Israel. Remember, Israel has 

been around since, you know, 1200 B.C. So Israel has been around 

for a very, very long time. Hope we recall that. 

Again, I look forward to the testimony. Thank you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Want to thank the gentleman. 

10

So I am pleased now to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for 

coming. Welcome back. 

First, Dr. Jonathan Schanzer is vice president of research for the 

Foundation of Defense of Democracies. Prior to this, Dr. Schanzer 

served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of 

Treasury, where he took part in designating numerous terrorism 

financiers. So welcome. 

We also have with us Mr. James Prince, who is co-founder and 

president of the Democracy Council. Prior to this, Mr. Prince was 

at PricewaterhouseCoopers, where he was engaged in the Middle 

East, including through an investigation of corruption at the Palestine Investment Bank. 

Mr. Prince was also a senior professional staff member for this 

committee and helped to establish a Public Policy Institute at a 

university in northern Iraq. 

Welcome, Mr. Prince. 

And last, but certainly not least, we welcome back Mr. Robert 

Wexler, a former member of the Florida delegation, who is now 

president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. 

During his time in Congress and now at the center, Mr. Wexler 

has traveled extensively in the Middle East and was also chair of 

the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and served on the Middle East Subcommittee as well. 

So, welcome, Congressman Wexler. 

Mr. DESANTIS. At this point, I will recognize Dr. Schanzer. You 

guys have 5 minutes for opening statements. 

And you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHANZER, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. SCHANZER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished members of this committee, on behalf of the Foundation for 

Defense of Democracies, I thank you for the opportunity to discuss 

the recent U.S. efforts to broker peace between the Palestinians 

and Israelis. 

I highlight four major issues of concern today. 

The first is the timing of the recent initiative, particularly from 

Israel’s perspective. The existential threat posed by Iran’s nuclear 

program, coupled with the very serious concerns over the White 

House’s recent decision to offer sanctions relief for a mere pause in 

that program, has cast a pall over every other Israeli strategic decision right now. 

Of course, this threat should not stop America from pursuing 

peace, nor does it let the Israelis off the hook on its commitments 

for peacemaking. But I believe it was unrealistic to ask the Israelis 

to make meaningful security compromises until this crisis passes. 

For that matter, it may have been unrealistic to expect the Palestinians to deliver while so many of their influential Sunni allies 

also express misgivings about Washington’s judgment. They, too, 

are consumed with fear of an Iranian nuclear program. 

The second area of concern is Palestinian governance. For too 

long, Washington has turned a blind eye to the corrupt and ossified 

nature of the Palestinian Authority. Given the P.A.’s 20-year track 

11

record of mishandling public funds, we might as well light a $600-

million bonfire each year. 

Should our assistance to the Palestinian Authority continue—and 

there are some good arguments for this—it must be performancebased. To be clear, this approach is both pro-Palestinian and propeace. 

Corruption erodes the public’s trust in government, and that undermines whatever deal may be reached. Conversely, a government 

that commands the respect of its people will earn the public’s confidence to negotiate a viable solution to this conflict. 

A good first step would be a plan for the departure of Mahmoud 

Abbas. At the age of 80, he is now 9 years into a 4-year Presidential term. 

Leader for life of the Fatah faction and the PLO, Abbas crushes 

political opposition and silences criticism of his leadership by arresting journalists and even Facebook users. In other words, he is 

an autocrat. 

Why our peacemakers pinned their hopes on his leadership is 

still unclear to me. If we want change, it is time for new leadership. 

The third area of concern is the recent reconciliation agreement 

between the Fatah faction and Hamas. Admittedly, these two factions have tried and failed several times in the past to cement a 

unity deal. 

There is good reason to be skeptical again. But if Hamas does 

join either the P.A. or the PLO, it is a sign that Islamist terror is 

officially welcome. 

The fact that Abbas sees Hamas as even a possible partner 

raises troubling questions about the trajectory of the Palestinian 

nationalists’ movement today. 

Of course, a unity deal could also cause a complete rupture in 

U.S.- Palestinian ties. The inclusion in the Palestinian Authority of 

Hamas, a designated terrorist organization, is obviously a legal 

trigger for a full cut in funding. 

Similarly, the inclusion of Hamas in the PLO might prompt a redesignation of the PLO as a terrorist organization, and that could 

lead to asset freezes at home and abroad. 

On another note on Hamas, if we are serious about weakening 

this group, then pressure must be placed on two U.S. allies, Turkey 

and Qatar. They are among the terrorist factions’ top financial and 

political sponsors. 

How they remain allies of the United States while supporting 

terrorist groups—and there are others beyond Hamas—might actually be a good topic for future hearings. 

Finally, I am troubled about the U.S. Government’s apparent 

lack of readiness to confront the so-called Palestine 194 campaign. 

The Palestinians have renewed their initiative at the United Nations for recognition. Never mind that the campaign is designed to 

spurn the U.S.-led peace process and isolate the Israelis through 

diplomatic lawfare. 

Our laws stipulate a cut in funding to any agency that accepts 

the PLO. This was the case of UNESCO in 2011. Will Palestinian 

unilateralism prompt us to cut funding to a host of multilateral organizations? 

12

If this is not our preferred outcome, should we not have a strategy to prevent this? If it is our preferred outcome, the process 

should not be predicated upon Mahmoud Abbas’s diplomatic maneuvers. 

In my written testimony, I note that the PLO subsidiary, the 

Palestine National Fund, could be funding these unilateral efforts. 

Some U.S. tax dollars may be allocated to the PNF through the 

P.A., and this could be a worthy investigation. 

On behalf of FDD, I thank you again for inviting me to testify 

today. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Dr. Schanzer. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer follows:]

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Mr. DESANTIS. And the Chair now recognizes Mr. Prince for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES PRINCE, CO-FOUNDER AND 

PRESIDENT, THE DEMOCRACY COUNCIL 

Mr. PRINCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking member. 

Despite the essential conditions for peace existing on both sides, 

as distinguished members of this subcommittee noted, in Secretary 

Kerry’s Herculean efforts, the diplomatic effort has failed again. 

I will confine my comments to the Palestinian side of this equation. It is not meant to ignore or diminish the unique and tremendous hardships posed by the occupation, but, rather, to discuss the 

imperative of dealing with the internal dynamics and the corruption inherent in the Palestinian Authority. 

Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the U.S. 

has vacillated in its attention to internal Palestinian politics. Criticism of the P.A. leadership was often perceived as a distraction or 

detrimental to the peace process. The immediate need of support 

in peace negotiation often pushed issues of fostering good governance, civil society to a second tier. 

Taking risks necessary to achieve peace and enhance the quality 

of life in Palestine requires leaders with not only the courage, but, 

also, a political mandate that will support such risk-taking. 

Even within Mr. Abbas’s inner circle, there is a consensus that 

Mr. Abbas does not feel he has the political mandate to take such 

risks, and he is not strong enough to support any negotiated agreement that he negotiates. 

The Abbas P.A. has become a single-party police state ruled by 

Presidential decree. Debate and criticism is not tolerated. Corruption and nepotism has washed away much of the goodwill and legitimacy conferred onto the regime after Abbas succeeded Arafat. 

The absence of national elections following the expiration of the 

Presidential term in 2009 further degrades the legitimacy of the 

P.A. in the eyes of its own constituents. 

Abbas is likely to retire in advance of the next election. This will 

signal an abrupt end to the Arafat era and older generation. 

Infighting within the Fatah Central Committee has so far precluded emergence of a consensus legacy candidate. Polls indicate 

the Fatah would still win over 40 percent of the vote, with Hamas 

receiving upwards of 12 percent. 

The most remarkable indicator that should be noted is that 34 

percent of the eligible voters in the West Bank and Gaza are undecided or just don’t agree with any of the current leadership. 

Allegations of corruption and mismanagement have plagued the 

P.A. since its inception. In 1999, I helped manage an investigation 

into the Palestinian International Bank. 

We presented Yasser Arafat with massive evidence of fraud, mismanagement, and illegalities. We suggested to him that he take 

the report and pass it over to the appropriate law enforcement officials. 

He replied, in very characteristic candor, ‘‘Why? The Palestinian 

people trust me more than they trust the Palestinian Authority or 

any institution.’’ President Abbas has taken this rule by Presidential decree to a whole other level. 

26

The so-called Fayyadism and a focus on institution-building not 

only reduced corruption, but, importantly, stimulated government 

collections, in spite of a decrease in gross domestic product. 

For the first time during Salam Fayyad’s previous tenure as finance minister, the Palestinian budget received applause. 

I participated in a worldwide investigation that brought back over $700 billion into the Treasury and helped eliminate much of 

the pervasive smuggling and corruption. However, this very intermittent, positive trend ended following the 2006 election. 

The international response was to wall off the Ramallah from the 

Gaza Strip. The temporary international mechanism followed by 

the Pegasus system not only channeled cash assistance and succeeded in stabilizing the P.A., but it reinvigorated an Imperial 

presidency that Abbas has continued to this day. 

Except for select ministries and agencies, such as the Palestinian 

Monetary Authority and Ministry of Education, few government offices operate to international standards. The Palestinian Investment Fund is one of the most controversial tools used by Abbas to 

wield influence and direct favors. 

As previous testimony to the subcommittee indicates, beginning 

in 2007, the PIF has operated largely as an extension of the presidency, directed by the chairman and CEO of the fund, who happens also to be deputy prime minister. 

In violation of its own charter, the PIF often directly competes 

against the local businesses and has a way of garnering favors with 

the leadership. 

In my written testimony, I talk about the Hamas and Fatah reconciliation and the challenges it posed. U.S. Law regarding cutting 

off assistance to a government that includes Hamas and the Quartet Principles for recognition are clear. Without workarounds, this 

drastic measure should only be deployed as a last resort. 

I would like to skip to some of the suggestions for USG programming that I included in my written testimony. They include avoiding large economic projects controlled by the Authority, gearing 

more toward small business in the West Bank and Gaza, with an 

emphasis on underserved communities. 

We should devote additional funding for rule-of-law programming. We need to dedicate additional resources to fostering independent life, political party development, independent candidate 

training, and independent need, as to avoid some of the missteps 

done by USAID and other international organizations in preparation for the 2006 elections. 

U.S. Government assistance should also include evidence of institutional reform, such as a participatory election law that precludes 

candidates that advocate violence, civil service and pension reform, 

adding an office of Vice President, and allowing the P.A. ministers 

the ability to appoint their own deputies and department heads 

without Presidential interference. 

The Palestinian Authority remains the best vehicle by which to 

bring about durable peace in the region. However, lacking a political mandate from its own constituency, the P.A. leadership will be 

unable and unwilling to make the difficult decisions needed to 

move from the status quo. 

Thank you again for this opportunity. 

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Mr. DESANTIS. Thank the gentleman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prince follows:]

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Mr. DESANTIS. And the Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Wexler. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, PRESIDENT, S. DANIEL ABRAHAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST 

PEACE (FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS) 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Schneider, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the honor 

of allowing me to testify before a committee I truly cherish and in 

the company of several dear friends who I respect enormously. 

Although 9 months have passed and negotiations between Israel 

and the Palestinians have stalled, what was true at the start of the 

talks is even truer today: Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians remain in both sides’ respective strategic interests. 

For the Palestinians, there was and still is only one reality: The 

route to an independent state runs through a negotiated agreement 

with Israel. Neither seeking admission to international institutions 

nor threatening to dismantle the Palestinian Authority can achieve 

the dignity and justice Palestinians deserve in a state of their own. 

For Israel, there was and still is only one reality: To secure its 

future as a Jewish and Democratic state, a viable independent and, 

yes, demilitarized Palestinian state must be realized. 

So what do we do now? First, it is too soon to judge the nature 

of the reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas. There, 

in fact, have been similar reconciliation agreements attempts in the 

past that were never implemented. 

On Hamas, there is no debate. Hamas is a terrorist organization, 

no ifs, no ands, no buts. We need to appreciate, however, that the 

differences between Fatah and Hamas are as great as the differences between Israel and the Palestinians. 

Israel’s actual response to the reconciliation agreement is instructive. Prime Minister Netanyahu is no dove, but he has been 

careful to suspend the talks with the Palestinians and not cancel 

them outright. 

And on Tuesday, Israel walked back from threats to impose sanctions on the Palestinian Authority. The Prime Minister knows that 

Israel is most secure when it is working in cooperation with Palestinian security forces. 

Just this week, Palestinian forces uncovered and arrested four 

members of a terror cell in the West Bank that was plotting to attack Israelis. 

Should Congress move now to defund the Palestinian Authority 

in response to the reconciliation agreement? 

When I was in your shoes, I would have been quick to make a 

strong political statement condemning a new Palestinian Government that might include terrorists. 

However, if Congress defunds the Palestinian Authority and the 

P.A. cannot pay its security forces and other bills, we hand a victory to Hamas. 

A stated purpose of the reconciliation agreement is to conduct an 

election, a desperately needed election, in the Palestinian territories. 

39

Should the Palestinians, in fact, return to the ballot box, we 

must bolster those Palestinians who renounce violence and recognize Israel’s right to exist. 

Cutting off U.S. funds now will depress the Palestinian economy, 

increase unemployment, and clearly advantage the objectives of the 

extremists. How does that help us? How does that help Israel? 

We already have sufficient laws that prevent funding of terrorist 

organizations. Let those laws serve their purpose. This is not the 

time for hasty action. 

In the immediate future, we should encourage the two sides to 

continue to deescalate the fraught situation and keep the window 

for a two-state solution open. 

Moreover, all is not lost. Progress was, in fact, achieved on the 

core issues of borders and refugees during the recent negotiations. 

Additionally, for the first time, the Arab League modernized the 

Arab Peace Initiative to accept the principle of land swaps, which 

would allow Israel to retain the major settlement blocs adjacent to 

the 1967 lines. 

And after working with more than 150 experts at the Pentagon, 

General John Allen presented an extraordinary security package 

that, in a two-state outcome, would include measures to make 

Israel’s eastern border as strong as any border in the world. 

President Obama and Secretary Kerry deserve credit for initiating a credible process. It is now up to the two sides to build on 

what was achieved over the past year or that progress will slip 

away. 

Pope John Paul said there were two possible solutions to the 

Arab-Israeli conflict, the realistic and the miraculous. The realistic 

would involve divine intervention. The miraculous, a voluntary 

agreement between the parties. 

It is America’s duty to keep pushing for the miraculous. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank the gentleman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

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Mr. DESANTIS. And we will begin the questioning. 

We’ll go to the gentleman from California. Mr. Rohrabacher is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I like that, the miraculous. That is good. 

All these things, like the progress that you mentioned, Bob, when 

the border swaps were approved, this is all just short term. They 

are meaningless unless there is this long-term recognition of the 

basic principle that is necessary to have peace. 

And that is for the Palestinians to say, ‘‘Yes. Israel will exist.’’ 

We are spending $400 million a year subsidizing the Palestinians 

over decades while they are being intransigent the whole time. 

And, again, I am not sitting here rooting that the Palestinians 

come out losers in all of this. I think the winners are going to be 

Palestinians and Israelis living side by side and respecting each 

other’s rights in a two-state solution. 

But do you really think the United States—if there are only—if 

all we are seeing is short-term gains that don’t mean anything unless you have that long-term understanding, we can’t do that forever, can we? 

Yes, Bob. 

Mr. WEXLER. I am not the spokesman of the Palestinian Authority. But, in 1988, the Palestinian Authority recognized Israel’s right 

to exist. If they didn’t, you wouldn’t be voting to send money to the 

Palestinian Authority. That was a condition of American engagement with the Palestinian Authority. 

So what we have here—I mean, your point, though, is well taken, 

I think, in a different respect. And that is: Should the Palestinians, 

in the context of the current negotiations, recognize Israel as a 

Jewish state, as a state in the context of mutuality of recognition? 

And the answer is absolutely ‘‘yes.’’

But we have to be fair, with all due respect. What is President 

Abbas’s negotiation position on borders? His position is that he will 

and does recognize the State of Israel within the 1967 lines. 

And, in fact, in the last round of negotiations under President 

Bush and—yet again, he offered a plan which gave Israel, of 

course, all of the 67 Israel plus roughly 2 percent of the West 

Bank. 

So while you and I may not think that sufficiently incorporates 

enough of the settlement blocs into the State of Israel in terms of 

their internationally recognized borders, it is not fair to say that 

President Abbas has not recognized Israel’s right to exist. He has. 

The question is: Will he also deny, in effect, or give up the right 

of return? And that needs to be done in the context of a full agreement. 

And, in fairness—in fairness to him, he had an interview not too 

long ago. President Abbas was born in Safed—in the Israeli holy 

city, the Jewish holy city, of Safed. 

And he was asked, ‘‘Do you to expect to go back to Safed? And, 

if you do, under what terms?’’ And he said, ‘‘Yes. I hope to go back. 

But I know I’ll go back as a tourist. I’m not going back to my 

home.’’

Now, the next day, there were all kinds of protests and the Palestinian Authority calling him a traitor. 

43

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. And those people who were doing that 

were not in favor of peace with Israel. 

The point is the right of return is a recognition of the right of 

Israel to exist. And until that right of return, that concept, ‘‘Well, 

yes. We will have an agreement and then we will have 3 million 

or 4 million more of our people come within those borders’’—that 

is not a recognition of Israel. 

And, again, I am hoping that someday you can have a Palestine 

and an Israel living side by side. And when they do say ‘‘a Jewish 

state of Israel,’’ let’s remember that all throughout the Middle 

East, you have got the Islamic state of so-and-so. 

And that doesn’t mean their rights of minorities aren’t going to 

be protected in Israel. We all know that. When Israel says it is the 

Israeli—it is going to be a Jewish state, they are going to respect 

the rights of Muslims and respect the rights of Christians as well. 

We know that. 

But, again, my time is—of questions, I’ve got 30 seconds left. Go 

to the other panelists. 

Am I just off base in saying, until they say the right of return 

is gone, that they really have not recognized Israel? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Look, I would just add this, Congressman Rohrabacher. 

I think, actually, one of the biggest challenges we have right now 

is through the UNRWA program, the United Nations program that 

is designed to help Palestinian refugees. 

What they have effectively done is they have perpetuated the refugee program. They have continued this so-called right of return 

challenge that we continue to face on the Palestinian side. 

In other words, what you had after 1948 was a situation where 

there were 800,000 refugees. Today, thanks to the laws in place by 

UNRWA, there are more than 5 million. 

Now, how is it that over the years these refugees have grown in 

number? This is an impossible number to assimilate. And so this 

is part of the problem that needs to be solved. 

I should note that there is legislation that has been slowly winding its way through the Senate and, I think, also in the House, if 

I am not mistaken, that looks at redefining what a Palestinian refugee is. 

It is no longer—it should no longer be okay to have the descendents of refugees, in other words, the children, the grandchildren, 

the great-grandchildren. That is how you get to 5 million. And 

those people should not have refugee status. They need to relinquish that. 

And only the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, the PLO, 

can only—I think that that is the only message that can come from 

them, and that is how this is going to begin to change. Until then, 

you are going to have this tinderbox that you described. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful for having today’s hearing. 

I want to welcome our colleague, Bob Wexler, back. 

44

I share the concerns expressed by my colleagues as well as by 

supporters of both Israel and the Palestinian people. 

Over the recent breakdown in the 9-month-old talks, which have 

been brokered by the United States, it is disappointing to see the 

dissolution—or seeming dissolution of this latest effort to achieve 

progress and a peaceful resolution of a long-standing conflict. 

Achieving a two-state solution is in the best interests of both the 

Israeli and Palestinian peoples and it is central to U.S. efforts to 

restore stability in the region. 

While there has been no shortage of finger-pointing, it appears 

the collective actions of both sides perhaps contributed to the erosion of any immediate chance to extend the talks further. 

Some characterize the Palestinian Authority’s resumption of activities to exceed the 15 multilateral treaties and conventions, 

which it had initially agreed to suspend in the midst of the peace 

talks, and then to announce a unity agreement with Hamas, designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, and, as 

Mr. Wexler said, no ifs, ands, or buts about it, and its refusal to 

recognize Israel’s legitimacy clearly undermine the chance for real 

progress at least for now. 

On the other side, some point to Israel’s delay of the forced release of Palestinian prisoners, the final group of 104 who Israel 

agreed to release in exchange for Palestine suspending its international recognition efforts and Israel’s continued settlement activities, as also undercutting the process. 

Knowing how such actions from both sides would be negatively 

perceived by the other, I am going to be very curious as to the panel’s views on whether the U.S. did all it could to manage the process. 

And I have a full statement I put into the record. With unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. DESANTIS. It will be so put in the record. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you. 

And I would like to give the opportunity to the panel on that last 

question. 

Not for the purpose of finger-pointing or blame, but what could 

have, should have, the United States done differently or in addition 

or more of or less of that might have made a difference? 

Dr. Schanzer. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Thank you, Congressman Connolly. 

I think that there is a lot of finger-pointing that is going on right 

now, and I think you are right to try to stay away from that. 

I think it is instructive to look at the United States and its strategy and peacemaking. And I included this in my written remarks 

as well as my spoken remarks. 

I think that the Iran issue casts a pall over the entire Middle 

East right now. It is the number one challenge. And I think that—

but I should even note that it is not the only challenge. You have 

got a civil war in Syria. You have got a very unstable Egypt. You 

have got Arab Spring issues. 

There are only so many issues that we can solve. And I say that 

as the United States appears to be retreating from the Middle 

East, not looking to engage even more. And so how we decided that 

45

we would be able to take on all of these issues and do them successfully is still very unclear to me. 

My approach would have been to be somewhat more modest with 

the objectives, to have a quiet approach to diplomacy, not to set a 

9-month window with an expiration date at the end, you know, 

first proclaiming that you are going to end the conflict, well, then, 

you know, have to downgrade and start to talk about having a 

framework agreement. 

I think it was all ill-advised. I think we bit off more than we 

could chew. I think that, if we do get back into the business of 

peacemaking, I think it needs to be done more quietly. And I suspect, by the way, it is happening right now anyway. 

And, in the process, as Mr. Prince and I both discussed in our 

testimonies, there needs to be a focus on the change in leadership 

inside the Palestinian Authority for a more legitimate government. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I couldn’t agree with you more, everything you 

said. 

Congressman Wexler, did you want to comment? 

Mr. WEXLER. Yes, please. 

First, I will agree, there is no reason to go back and assign 

blame. One of the things that I think Secretary Kerry, though, did 

right was that he effectively kept the talks secret for a great period 

of time, and I think that assisted both sides. 

But there is a misnomer here that needs to be recognized. Secretary Kerry, President Obama didn’t drag anybody to a peace 

table. The Israelis and the Palestinians both wanted to be there 

from the beginning. For separate reasons, it was in their interests. 

And then we became, obviously, the facilitator. 

But let me take up on a point that the two gentlemen raised, and 

that is a change of Palestinian leadership. Well, in order to have 

a change that I think all of us would be comfortable with, you need 

to have a democratic process, and we need to be pragmatic about 

how a democratic process comes about in the context of the Palestinian Authority or the Palestinian territories. 

In order to hold it in the West Bank, you need Fatah to agree. 

In order to hold it in Gaza, you need Hamas to agree. In order to 

hold it in East Jerusalem, you need the Israelis to agree. 

Well, how are you going to get Fatah and Hamas to agree to an 

election unless you have a reconciliation, understanding of some 

sort? 

So we just need to be honest amongst ourselves. If we are going 

to demand a change in leadership—and we certainly want that 

leadership change to be democratic—then we need to understand 

there needs to be some accommodation with groups that we label 

as a terrorist. Otherwise, you are not going to have an election. 

So we at least need to be honest with ourselves. And the Israelis 

have to agree to have it in East Jerusalem, along with the two Palestinian sides. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would just indulge Mr. 

Prince an opportunity to respond. My questioning is over. And I 

thank both the chairman and my friend——

Mr. DESANTIS. Gentleman will have 1 minute to respond. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

46

Mr. PRINCE. Thank you, Congressman Connolly. 

I would agree with both the previous comments. One, there 

needs to be a democratic process, there needs to be elections. And, 

two, I think we did bite off more than we can chew in the recent 

go-around. 

The basic points of a departure in a deal is that both sides feel 

a benefit and really want to reach the end of a deal. I would argue 

that President Abbas, from the start of 9 months ago, was not—

was more interested in the process than he was a final status 

agreement. 

I do believe there were modest steps that could have been taken, 

could have been agreed upon, that would have pushed both sides 

together, but President Abbas did not believe from the very beginning that he had the right or ability to reach a final status agreement. And, therefore, the gamesmanship—not to mention the 

Israeli side—the gamesmanship continued on. 

There needs to be, as Congressman Wexler mentioned, some sort 

of democratic process to restore some sort of unity, cohesion within 

the Palestinian community. Right now, it is dysfunctional. 

And I don’t believe any Palestinian leader that would emerge 

from the Fatah leadership will be brave enough, either from a security standpoint or a political standpoint, to reach a final status 

agreement. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank the gentleman. Time has expired. 

The Chair will recognize himself for 5 minutes. 

You know, in terms of this recognizing Israel, I mean, it is crucial. Yes. I acknowledge they are willing to recognize some geographic entity called Israel. 

But if you don’t recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, 

then we are not in a situation where you are going to have a longterm peaceful resolution. 

I mean, the whole purpose of Israel being a refuge is that it 

would be a Jewish state. And they have consistently refused to recognize that. 

And I will give some of the witnesses a chance. I don’t know if 

that represents the broad view of the Palestinian Arabs in the 

area. 

I certainly believe that most people in Gaza do not believe Israel 

has a right to exist as a Jewish state. But that has been the biggest roadblock. 

There have been opportunities to have an Arab state throughout 

history. It seems like the desire to not have a Jewish state always 

trumped the desire to have a Palestinian state, and I don’t see evidence that we have gotten beyond that. 

So let me ask you, Congressman Wexler. You talked about you 

would not move to defund it because, you know, you acknowledge 

Hamas as a terrorist group, but you are just not sure how this is 

going to shake out. It is true in the past there have been kind of 

attempts at unity that have fizzled. 

So at what point would you be willing to pull the trigger and say 

that we shouldn’t be rewarding this type of behavior with Hamas? 

Mr. WEXLER. If Hamas, in fact, joins a unity government and 

Hamas has not in the context of that government accepted the 

three principles adopted by the Quartet—recognize Israel’s right to 

47

exist, renounce violence, and incorporate all of the aggrieved understandings between the sides—then the law is clear. There will not 

be funding. 

But at this point——

Mr. DESANTIS. But that recognition—you would not require that 

to be recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, just recognizing——

Mr. WEXLER. No. There is no requirement to recognize Israel as 

a Jewish state in any type of understanding that has previously existed between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 

We need to be, again, honest amongst ourselves. When you say 

‘‘recognize Israel as a Jewish state,’’ do I recognize Israel as a Jewish state? Of course, I do. It is the Jewish state. Israel is the Jewish state. 

But where is that state? What makes it a Jewish state? It is a 

Jewish state because it is a majority made up of Jewish residents. 

Well, is that state the 1967 lines incorporating the settlement 

blocs, incorporating the settlements, or is it the 67 lines plus the 

West Bank and Gaza? 

So we need to be honest. When you talk about recognizing Israel 

as a Jewish state, which I am all in favor of—don’t get me wrong—

it is not so simple on the other side. 

And I think we ought to take a look at the language of the Arab 

Peace Initiative, which is quite forthcoming. While it doesn’t say 

Israel is a Jewish state and it doesn’t talk directly about the right 

of return, what it says is the right of return will have an agreedupon resolution. 

Every Arab country in the world has put that forward. When 

they say ‘‘agreed-upon resolution,’’ that means Israel must agree. 

Well, they know Israel will never agree to take back 5 million refugees or even 800,000 refugees. So there has been movement. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And let me go to Dr. Schanzer. 

What is your view? I mean, do you think, one, that moving to 

defund the aid, if this unity movement continues? And do you think 

people in Congress should be conditioning tax dollars? 

I mean, should we demand that there be a recognition that Israel 

has a right to exist as a Jewish state, given that that seems to be 

a precondition certainly for Prime Minister Netanyahu and I know 

many of us in this body. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Look, I would say that the difference between a Jewish state and 

just a state that deserves to exist—in my mind, there is really no 

difference. 

And my problem has always been with the Palestinian Nationalist movement, that it has been more based on destruction of the 

State of Israel than the creation of something, i.e., a Palestinian 

state. 

We know more about what they don’t like and how angry they 

are than about what it is that they want to create. And so that has 

been my approach to this problem all along. 

Would it help if the Palestinians acknowledged that and put the 

Israelis’ minds at ease? Absolutely. Should it be one of our preconditions? Look, I will leave that to you. 

48

But let me just answer to one thing that Congressman Wexler 

said. The idea of acknowledging a technocratic government that includes figures approved by Hamas is a slippery slope. 

The idea that you could allow the technocratic government to 

take place just because you want to see elections happen, that is 

basically acknowledging Hamas and it is opening the door to allow 

Hamas to come in as a legitimate player in the next elections, 

which is something that we have to avoid at all costs. 

Mr. PRINCE. I would definitely agree that the distinction between 

recognition of a Jewish state and recognizing the existence and the 

independence of the State of Israel is very nuanced and something 

that I think shouldn’t preclude the United States from enforcing 

the law right now. 

Privately, Palestinians do—and including in Gaza, they do talk 

of the right of return. As Congressman Wexler says, it is sort of 

pie in the sky to say that Israel is going to accept millions of refugees. And they also talk about Israel as a Jewish state in Gaza 

City as well as Ramallah. 

What they don’t say so is publicly. The leadership—and the Palestinian papers released a few years ago by Al Jazeera also reinforced this concept. 

We are talking about the Palestinian community as a unified 

group, and that doesn’t exist today. The right of return and recognizing Israel, I would argue, is a non-issue privately. No Palestinian leadership worth its salt on any side really says that those 

issues still exist today. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. My time is expired. So I 

thank you for that. 

And the Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, 

Mr. Schneider, 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Again, thank you to the witnesses for being here. 

Congressman Wexler, with all due respect, I think Israel was 

created as a Jewish state. We celebrated the 66th anniversary of 

its creation this past Monday. 

It had its foundation on November 29th, 1947, in U.N. Resolution 

181, a Jewish state and an Arab state. The Jews accepted that. The 

Arabs did not. And that is the battle that is being fought today. 

So I think the question really is: When will the Palestinians not 

recognize, but accept, that Israel is a Jewish state and accept that 

the right of return is a non-starter, as was discussed? 

I think it is also important to emphasize that, as you said, Dr. 

Schanzer, any P.A. reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas that 

includes a Hamas, that doesn’t recognize the Quartet conditions, 

the three conditions as you noted, is unacceptable and cannot continue to have U.S. support. 

But the purpose of this meeting is really about what is next. It 

was in the title. And I would like to focus on what is next. 

A year ago—exactly a year ago Salaam Fayyad stepped down as 

Prime Minister. For many years, I think the conversations in this 

committee, around the country, were that the future prospects for 

a Palestinian state depended on the aspirations of Fayyad of building the institutions. He is no longer there. He was forced out. 

49

Hamdallah was put in replacement for Fayyad. We don’t hear 

about him at all. 

What does the future of a Palestinian Authority, Palestinian 

Government, look like without people committed to building the institutions? And who might there be that would build those institutions? Dr. Schanzer? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Thank you, Congressman Schneider. 

I would just concur that we have a real problem, that the exit 

of the Fayyad—look it, in many ways, this was the deflation of the 

Palestinian Nationalist project, at least one that had a direction 

and a vision. 

The defeat of Fayyad was a victory for the corruption and the ossified approach to government that Mr. Abbas has embraced over 

these years. 

Rami Hamdallah, the new Prime Minister, is a neophyte and 

really does not serve in that role of checks and balances against the 

presidency, which was always the intended role of the Prime Minister, was to check that absolute power over the Palestinian presidency. 

And on top of that, what we have is a very troubling development where the new Deputy Prime Minister, Mohammed Mustafa, 

who also happens to be the head of the PIF, has become a very 

powerful guy. You see this centralization of power again, and that 

is the concern. 

The other concern is that there is just no political space for new 

parties, new figures, to emerge. And so you have this monopoly 

over power without even allowing for new voices to come onto the 

scene, to debate, to get into that clash of ideas that is so necessary 

for democratic reform. 

And so we have got a real problem on our hands, and I have to 

say that American policy has reinforced this, that we continue to 

look at Mr. Abbas as the only one who can deliver and, therefore, 

continue to give him whatever he needs. And so it has compounded 

these problems over time. 

When Abbas goes, there is no plan for what happens next. There 

is no leadership. There is no succession. It is going to be a vacuum, 

and it will be on our heads for failing to have planned for that moment. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Prince, I will turn to you, but let me just 

interject. 

Dr. Schanzer talked about Mr. Mustafa rising, and I think that 

was somewhat predictable. Mustafa was the first choice, but I 

think, because of his engagement with PIF, he was not palatable, 

if you will. So Hamdallah kind of fills the titular role, but Mustafa 

has the power. 

Now we are looking forward. Abbas is 79 years old. There needs 

to be some commitment from the Israelis to move toward peace. 

They are going to have a partner on the other side who will be 

there for a long term. What are the prospects? 

And, Mr. Prince, Congressman Wexler, I would like both of your 

comments. 

Mr. PRINCE. Well, first of all, as members of the committee 

noted, there is a significant constituency that remains for peace in 

both West Bank and Gaza. 

50

The problem is they are not currently represented. With Abbas 

leaving office prior to the next election, there will be a significant 

vacuum. There will be infighting and there will be debate between 

the older generation and the newer generation. 

The question is whether the newer generation, as Dr. Schanzer 

mentioned, has the political space to actually represent themselves 

and be part of the process. 

I believe that that is something that we should start preparing 

for now. If we don’t, there will be a resumption of not only infighting, but probably some of the violence that happened in 2007 in 

Gaza will definitely go to the West Bank. 

There is not going to be an L—PLO, Tunisian—they call them 

the Abus—that are going to run the Palestinian Authority in the 

next time around. To be a partner for peace, we need to look to this 

peace constituency and the vast population. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I may give Congressman Wexler a minute. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Yep. 

Mr. WEXLER. Very quickly, another aspect of what Secretary 

Kerry, of course, was attempting to do is, while economics are not 

a replacement for political achievements, a very important part of 

his diplomatic initiative was attracting investment to the West 

Bank. 

And, in fact, extraordinary commitments were made mostly by 

American but, also, by some European companies to engage in the 

West Bank. 

If you go to Ramallah today, if you go to Jenin today, if you go 

to other population centers today in the West Bank, they are by 

and large far more law abiding, peaceful, and successful than they 

were, say, 10 years ago. 

What I think needs to happen in the future—Israel, thankfully, 

has had some extraordinary energy finds. Those energy finds, particularly in certain areas, ought to be talked about in terms of 

sharing with the Palestinians. 

You are going to need to build a port, an air facility to allow 

transport in and out of an emerging Palestinian economy. 

But these things are very difficult to do when the Palestinians 

don’t have their own government in effect to exercise the authority 

to do it. 

And if I may just respond to Mr. Schneider, respectfully, I would 

be careful when referring to the U.N. Partition Plan in support of 

Israel as a Jewish state. 

Again, you consider Israel a Jewish state. I consider Israel a 

Jewish state. But the Jewish state of Israel that was created in the 

United National Partition Plan in terms of the boundaries is not 

a boundaries plan that Israel would accept today, and you wouldn’t 

and I wouldn’t. 

So we have to be careful in terms of—I would respectfully suggest, when we are talking about what is a Jewish state, it is not 

so simple. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I appreciate that. 

But when David Ben Gurion declared independence on May 14, 

he declared the Jewish state of Israel. 

Mr. WEXLER. Yes. 

51

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It has stayed that. It will remain that. And any 

negotiated peace between the Palestinians must assure that. 

Mr. WEXLER. I agree. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank each of you for your testimony. 

Mr. Schanzer, I want to go to you. I saw, I guess, reaction to Mr. 

Wexler’s response just in your face. So I will give you a few minutes to respond. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Sure. Thank you, Congressman Meadows. 

Look it, I would just say this to Congressman Wexler. The idea 

of ensuring continued financial assistance or financial incentives to 

the Palestinian Authority right now is putting the cart before the 

horse. 

Without the reform that is necessary, the $4 billion that the 

United States promised the Palestinians, should an agreement be 

struck, would have been wasted. 

In many ways, this was actually a helpful step by not allowing 

the peace process to go through before the reform process could 

take place. It would have been a sinkhole. 

We have seen what has happened before where hundreds of millions, in fact, billions, of dollars have been plowed into the Palestinian Authority over the last 20 years. 

Since 1994, we have provided billions of dollars. The Europeans 

have provided billions of dollars. The Arab Gulf States have provided billions of dollars. 

And we do not see a Palestinian Authority that is in much better 

shape today to perform the tasks of governance in a way that they 

would be respected in the Palestinian Authority or internationally. 

And so, again, this underscores the same problem that I have 

been focusing on here at this subcommittee, at the committee level 

as well, that there is a huge problem of legitimacy, a huge problem 

of corruption, inside the Palestinian Authority that must be tackled 

if we are going to be able to move forward. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Let me go a little bit further, because 

I just returned from the region and three things concern me greatly. 

One, we continue to spend money. And it is a complex situation. 

Everybody knows that. If it was easy, it would have been solved 

long ago. 

However, I went into a terror tunnel that had just been constructed with moneys that we probably sent to folks in Gaza. A 

mile and a half long, concrete floors, concrete walls, concrete ceilings, communication, rail, lights. 

And, yet, here we are talking about economic development and, 

yet, this mile-and-a-half-long tunnel, probably built with American 

taxpayers’ moneys, with the sole purpose of coming up in the middle of a field so they could abduct Jewish settlers at a—not settlers—Jewish folks in a kibbutz troubled me. 

At what point do we say enough is enough? 

52

Mr. SCHANZER. Well, Congressman Meadows, I would just add 

this. The money has been cut off largely to the Palestinian territory 

of Gaza. We have done a pretty good job of bottling that up. 

There are some things—and, actually, Mr. Prince can speak to 

this—where there is money that has been going through to the 

power plant inside the Gaza Strip that is coming from the Palestinian Authority, which, of course, we fund. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Right. 

Mr. SCHANZER. And so there are some millions of dollars that are 

still leaking through. There is also the pressure that is placed on 

the Israelis to ensure that the cement and other goods get through 

to the Gaza Strip and, if it doesn’t, then, of course, the Israelis get 

blamed for humanitarian——

Mr. MEADOWS. But therein is the thing. It is meant that we are 

getting there and it is being built in tunnels to come back at the 

very people who are providing it. 

Mr. SCHANZER. That is right. That is right. 

But I would actually just add one more thought, and that is that 

the top sponsors of Hamas right now are two U.S. allies. And this 

needs to be addressed. 

You have Qatar and Turkey. They are now the two top sponsors 

and financiers of the Hamas organization. These are not allies any 

longer if this is what they are doing, and we have yet to address 

that. I think it is a serious problem. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, Mr. Prince, you would agree we need to address that in terms of Qatar and Turkey? 

Mr. PRINCE. I agree. I think Qatar is one of the most pressing 

issues today. I happened to be in Gaza when the Royal Family visited some time ago. 

With the change in relationship with the Egyptian Government, 

Qatar remains—to a lesser extent, the Iranian money—Qatar remains the largest financier of society in Gaza. 

I would—just to go back to the question of tunnels and economic 

developments—or assistance, cutting off U.S. assistance leads people to increased dependency. We have the humanitarian issue, and 

we end up spending money in many different ways indirectly. 

The question of the large economic development program proposed by Secretary Kerry, I don’t believe, as Dr. Schanzer said, 

would have a positive impact on Palestinian society. 

From an economic development standpoint, I spent years going 

through almost every commercial enterprise in West Bank and 

Gaza. The region can’t absorb that amount of money. 

Large infrastructure projects, like Congressman Wexler mentioned, look nice. They help the leadership. But they are not filtering down to providing durable jobs to local Palestinians. 

And until we focus on that, we are not going to solve the problem. So the question of assistance is not cutting it off, but doing 

it smarter. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. And my time is expired. 

So I would ask for the record if you would respond in writing in 

terms of what can we do about the incitement that is going on each 

and every day within that group. Because it is hard to get a negotiated deal when you are adding fuel to the fire, so to speak. 

I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

53

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Vargas, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for the opportunity to speak. 

I want to thank the witnesses. 

And, in particular, I want to thank Congressman Wexler. Thank 

you for being here. And, in particular, I would like to thank you 

for the quote of Pope Francis. 

I am a former Jesuit myself in an ocean that the realistic is the 

divine intervention. I like that. It is probably true. The miraculous 

would be the voluntary agreement. 

And you have been somewhat of a stickler here for details; so, 

I am going to be a little bit of a stickler with you, if you don’t mind. 

You have been using the date 1967 and 67 interchangeably. It 

is not. Israel is one of the few nations where both of those dates 

make sense. You can talk about the Israel of 1967, and you can 

talk about the Israel of 67. The Israel of 67 is much, much, much 

larger. Remember, it was a country in 67. So you do have to be 

careful when you use it. 

I hear the President and others talking about the 67 lines. Well, 

the 67 lines would really tick off the neighbors because that would 

be a very, very large Israel today, the Northern Kingdom and the 

Southern Kingdom. 

But, anyway, all of that aside, I do want to talk about this within 

the context of Iran because, you know, to me, it almost seems trite 

that we are arguing about this. 

The reality is that Israel can take care of itself and, interestingly, Israel can also secure the Palestinians. One of the things 

that people don’t talk about, but—you know, a lot of the Palestinians have it pretty darn good because Israel supports them. 

You don’t think that they would need to be protected from their 

neighbors, just ask Syrians, you know, ‘‘How do you do out there 

by yourself?’’ You know, it is a pretty mean neighborhood. 

So we are trying to get to a peace. And you say it is in the interest of both, but it almost seems trite within the context of this existential threat that Iran poses to Israel and, ultimately, the threat 

it poses to ourselves. 

Would you comment on that, Congressman, in particular. 

Mr. WEXLER. The threat of a nuclear-armed Iran is in and of 

itself, in my humble estimation, the most important endeavor that 

we must seek to defang, to defeat. 

And while, yes, in any sense of reality, an Israeli Prime Minister, 

as would an American President, in the context of a region must 

consider all of these facts. 

But we have been very careful—when I say ‘‘we,’’ I think most 

of us on the American side that hold Israel’s security very dear—

we have been very careful never to mix the two. 

The fact of the matter is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the resolution of that conflict is in the interest of both the Israelis and the 

Palestinians and on the merits of the conflict itself. 

Because if we have learned anything from the Arab Spring, it 

should be that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the cause of all 

of the root of evil in the region. It is one distinct set of cirVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 Jun 24, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\050814\87838 SHIRL
54

cumstances that respectfully should be handled on its own based 

on its own merits. 

Now, in reality, an Israeli Prime Minister certainly will consider 

the range of options in terms of what progress or non-progress is 

made with Iran. Clearly, that is the case. 

And, unfortunately, it seems we were unable to make great 

progress on the Israel-Palestinian front prior to the culmination or 

the non-culmination of the talks with Iran. 

But I think it would be a mistake if we joined the two together, 

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear program, in 

a way in which both had to be dealt with in some type of simultaneous or comparable way. I don’t think that would benefit either 

the Israelis or the Palestinians. 

Mr. VARGAS. Dr. Schanzer? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Thank you. 

I would just respond in this way, that the United States has had 

the ability to impose its will on the Israelis and Palestinians only 

at times when it has been able to demonstrate strength. 

I think about the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and how, at 

that point, the United States looked invincible. And it was at that 

point also that the Arab states, the Palestinians and Israelis, got 

in line and began to work through this—what is now known as the 

Oslo Process. 

We have a problem now that we look weaker than we have in 

recent memory. We do not appear to be able to have our way, 

which, really, when you think about the Iraq war, you think about 

Afghanistan, the war on terror, we have not enforced our own red 

lines in Syria. We can’t seem to be able to solve this Iranian problem. We have a credibility problem right now. We need some wins. 

My sincere belief is that, if we begin to take care of some of these 

problems—look it, whether it is the Iran problem, whether it is the 

Syria problem, whether it is bringing some order back to the Arab 

world after the Arab Spring, whatever it is, if we begin to do that, 

I believe it will become that much easier to start to get the Palestinians and Israelis to take this peace process seriously. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. 

Mr. Prince, I apologize. My time has expired, but I was going to 

go to you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. 

Let me start with the money that we have invested in the Palestinian Authority since 1988, roughly $5 billion. Last year approximately $500 million was given to the Palestinian Authority in the 

name of peace, is what I like to think, you know. 

The people back home don’t want us sending any money overseas, especially in this economic crisis that we are having here. 

Yet, in this room, a couple—about a month ago, in this very 

room, sitting right where you guys are, there was a gentleman 

talking about Resolution 21 and 23 in the Palestinian Authority 

loosely knit government laws that pays criminals that have created 

55

crimes of terrorism against Americans and Israeli citizens that are 

sitting in Israeli prisons. 

The larger the act of terrorism, the larger the stipend they get. 

I think the average was $3,600. I have heard rumors of up to 

$10,000 a month when the average income in that area is around 

$5,000. 

So we put in a resolution that says all funding to the Palestinian 

Authority gets cut until they remove Resolution 21 and 23. 

Starting with you, Dr. Schanzer, I would like to hear your 

thoughts, and Mr. Prince, and Congressman Wexler. What effect 

would that have? 

Mr. SCHANZER. The cutting of funding? 

Mr. YOHO. To stop it. 

If we are giving this money in the name of peace and they are 

promoting terrorism—you know, if you steal a loaf of bread, you go 

to prison. But if you commit a crime of terrorism and kill somebody, you go to prison and get a check. 

And I think that is just reprehensible, that the American taxpayers are flipping the bill. And I know it goes into a fungible pot 

and they say, ‘‘We are not using your money.’’ I don’t buy it. If you 

want our money, you need to stop promoting that kind of activity. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Congressman Yoho, you are absolutely correct. 

Here is the problem. And, I mean, there are a couple of problems 

here. 

Number one, what Mr. Abbas has done is he has actually delivered on peace. In other words, he brought an end to the Intifada 

in 2005. From 2000 to 2005, there was violence raging everywhere, 

and he was the leader. 

After Yasser Arafat died, he was able to bring all of those different militias under the control of the Palestinian Authority. He, 

you know, made sure to disarm them. 

And so, in that sense, the Israelis are much happier with his 

leadership and—as are we, I think, you know, generally speaking. 

The problem is that, even though he has brought an end to the 

violence, he has maintained a culture of violence, nevertheless. And 

so that means paying off the terrorists who are in jail. It means 

the incitement that we see in mosque sermons and on television. 

And so there is a baseline of hatred that Mahmoud Abbas has 

maintained and we have, to a certain extent, underwritten this. 

The problem now moving forward is what do you do about it. 

You know, if we zero out Palestinian funding, then here is the 

big problem. You are going to have someone else come in and they 

are going to be worse. 

More than likely, you are going to see the Saudis, the Iranians, 

the Qataris, the Turks. They are all going to come in and they are 

not even going to hold the Palestinians to account at all. 

The important thing from my perspective, if we are going to keep 

the funding going, we need to make sure that we have tighter controls. We need to demand performance. And, in my opinion, we 

have just simply failed to do so. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Prince. 

Mr. PRINCE. I would definitely agree. The issue of prisoners is extremely dicey. Mahmoud Abbas has basically guaranteed security 

56

through the old-time-mafia type of way of delivering brown bags of 

cash to people, and that includes families of political prisoners. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. We have read about those. 

Mr. PRINCE. And that has continued today. At least Arafat demanded something in return. Mahmoud Abbas, usually it is just to 

support acquiescence to his leadership. 

The wholesale cutoff, as Dr. Schanzer said, presents a wide variety of problems. It is diminished leverage. It leaves a void. 

The degree of dependency right now on international assistance 

doesn’t really allow for a wholesale cutoff because aid agencies or 

extremists groups will come in to serve them. 

I would argue, though, that there are a significant amount of 

conditions we should be putting on aid so that it is not fungible. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. I think get rid of Resolution 21 and 23 and 

we will get along fine. But until you stop promoting terrorism, I 

don’t see how you are going to get peace. 

And, you know, you had touched on something else—and I think 

you are right on—is we see a weakened America and we see an 

emboldened other part of the world, and they are stepping up. 

And what effect do you think the Iran negotiations over the nuclear weapons and—right where we are at right now—what effect 

does that have on the security of the Israel and Palestinian area? 

Go ahead, Congressman Wexler. You haven’t had a chance. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. YOHO. I am sorry. My time is expired. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Go ahead and take 30 seconds. 

Mr. WEXLER. Well, first, I would agree that no American taxpayer’s money should be going to fund terrorist families directly or 

indirectly, and any way in which you can go about to prevent that 

is an admirable attempt. 

But I would also respectfully suggest you vote for this—I don’t 

want to mischaracterize you. You say you vote for this because you 

are about achieving peace. 

Well, I would suggest it really should be more than just peace 

at this point. It should be peace and, when not peace, at least security. 

And we need to be realistic that there are forces within the Palestinian society that, in fact, support violence in a very overt way 

and there are those that oppose it in an overt way. 

And those that oppose it are not necessarily Boy Scouts and they 

are not necessarily people you and I would vote for, but they oppose violence. And that is what President Abbas has done. 

And so, when given the choice of the two teams that unfortunately we have at this point, if there becomes a third team or a 

fourth, then let’s go for it. 

But now we have got the Hamas team, and there is nothing good 

about that team. And then you got the Fatah team, which has all 

kinds of warts and all sorts of problems, but they oppose violence. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. 

Meng, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you to our speakers for being here and to Congressman Wexler. It is an honor to hear from all of you. 

57

While we are on the topic of aid, I am just curious. How much—

are the Palestinian people aware of the aid that the United States 

gives them and how much do we give them? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Congresswoman Meng, they are very aware. And 

they are also very aware of how little of it trickles down to them, 

and that is ultimately, I think, one of the greatest challenges that 

we face. 

So here you have a Palestinian leadership that has brought in this $5 billion that we have heard about throughout the afternoon. 

There has been a significant investment on the part of the Europeans, Arab states, et cetera, and it has been a sinkhole. 

The middle class has not found a way to benefit from it. The 

lower class has been kept in refugee camps and in squalor. 

And so the problem is creating a system whereby these funds can 

actually find their way to the right people. And under this leadership—and Congressman Wexler mentioned that the Fatah faction 

has warts. That is an understatement. 

In other words, as long as the Fatah faction holds sway, they are 

going to withhold these funds. They are going to prevent these 

funds from reaching the middle and lower classes. 

And that, in turn, perpetuates conflict. That is something that 

needs to stop. And, again, that is all about leadership. It is about 

preparing for that next generation of Palestinian leaders. 

We should be making sure that they have the oxygen, the ability 

now, to present their ideas, and that is something that we have 

failed to deliver on for the Palestinian people. 

And it is for that reason that, despite the billions of dollars that 

we have provided to the Palestinians, they still resent us. They 

think that we are on the side of Abbas. 

Mr. PRINCE. If I may, Congresswoman Meng, I agree wholeheartedly. Every Palestinian is aware of the assistance provided by 

the United States, whether it is direct, indirect, through the United 

Nations or any other agency. 

The question of whether it is viewed positively—and that is 

something that you can trace back from the inception of the P.A., 

that the general population has viewed these assistance programs 

less and less positively since the time of Arafat. 

If you go back to the 2006 elections in which Hamas emerged victoriously, there was a USAID program to announce new projects 

very close—during the campaign period close to the elections. 

It was a relatively thinly veiled attempt to inform the voters of 

the value of the assistance and the relationship with the United 

States. You could track the polls when those programs were announced, the decrease in support for Mahmoud Abbas and old-time 

Fatah. 

The belief is that our assistance programs on security, environmental and health are central, critical, useful. Our assistance on 

democracy and governance and economic development has largely 

been siphoned off or used to support the powers that be and have 

not filtered down to the local population. 

Mr. WEXLER. If I may? 

Mr. DESANTIS. Sure. 

Mr. WEXLER. Secretary Kerry’s approach, the diplomatic effort 

that he just led, was a multifaceted approach. He took on the politVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:01 Jun 24, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\050814\87838 SHIRL
58

ical issues, he took on the diplomatic-related political issues, he 

took on the economic issues, and he took on civil society often in 

partnership with our European allies. 

And under ideal circumstances, you address every aspect of Palestinian Authority simultaneously to build the kind of society that 

we have been talking about. The problem is, at least for the time 

being, that has broken down. 

So the question is: How can you salvage as much positive results 

as humanly possible? And the reality is, unfortunately, that Hamas 

plays a role within Gaza that is completely unacceptable to us, to 

the Europeans and, of course, to the Israelis and, in many respects, 

unacceptable to President Abbas himself. 

So the question is: How do we devise a strategy where we get 

to the point—the type of accountability that these gentlemen rightfully are highlighting? And, unfortunately, it is very difficult to do 

in a non-democratic atmosphere. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you. 

What steps has President Abbas taken over the past 9 months 

to prepare the Palestinian people for peace? And is there—how 

much support is there amongst these people for a peace deal? 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentlewoman’s time is expired. 

I know we just called the vote. So I am going to recognize——

Ms. MENG. We are not coming back? 

Mr. DESANTIS. No. No. No. We are going to continue. But I want 

to make sure. I don’t think that we will reconvene after the votes. 

So I will recognize the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Cotton, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. Dr. Schanzer, I noticed that you were 

shaking your head in apparent disagreement with Mr. Wexler’s 

comments on Secretary Kerry’s actions. 

Do you care to elaborate on your head-shaking? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Apparently, I have been somewhat expressive 

this afternoon. 

Thank you, Congressman Cotton. 

Look it, this is where I would disagree. I don’t believe that Secretary Kerry’s approach was multifaceted. I think that Secretary 

Kerry, while I believe that he was absolutely earnest in his attempts at peacemaking, fell into a familiar trap. 

I recently wrote a book where I went around and I interviewed 

former peacemakers, from Dennis Ross, to Aaron David Miller, to 

Elliott Abrams, and they all basically said the same thing. And I 

believe we saw a reprise of that with Secretary Kerry, and that is 

the emphasis of the transaction over the transformation. 

What do I mean by that? We continue to aim for that handshake 

on the White House lawn. Right? You think about these grand—

you know, maybe winning that Nobel Prize, redrawing the map. 

And in the process, you don’t get down to that less-than-sexy approach of state-building on the Palestinian side. 

We continue to ignore the fact that these are basically autocrats, 

that these are kleptocrats. And, look it, if you really think that this 

was a multifaceted approach, ask yourself: Why was it that we 

didn’t talk about preparing for new elections? Why was it that we 

didn’t talk about preparing for the exit of Mahmoud Abbas, who is 

now so many years past the end of his term? 

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I mean, we pinned our hopes on one guy who had already passed 

his expiration date. That is not about reform. It is not about statebuilding. 

And so we ignored the transformation again in order to get that 

transaction done. We need to learn how to walk and chew gum, 

and I don’t believe that this administration did that this time 

around. 

Mr. WEXLER. If I may. 

Mr. COTTON. Yes, you may. 

Mr. WEXLER. Secretary Kerry didn’t talk about a full-fledged 

election because, in order to have a full-fledged election in the Palestinian territories, you need to have Hamas’s agreement and we 

don’t deal, rightfully so, with Hamas. 

Now, we could redo—or attempt to try to redo what was done. 

And I do not say this in a critical fashion toward President Bush. 

But President Abbas came to President Bush the first time 

around and said, ‘‘Should I include Hamas in the election?’’ And 

President Bush, for all the right reasons—I am not criticizing—

said, ‘‘Yeah. Go out and beat them. That is the best way to get this 

scenario in order.’’

Well, lo and behold, probably because the people felt Fatah was 

corrupt and a whole lot of misdirection on politics and so forth, 

Hamas beat Fatah. 

But to criticize the United States for not pushing an election in 

the Palestinian Authority when half of the Palestinian territory is 

controlled by a terrorist organization I think is somewhat 

duplicitous. 

Mr. COTTON. Mr. Wexler, we didn’t have the opportunity to overlap. I know your record on these issues. That was long and distinguished. 

Can we talk briefly about more fundamental matters? It seems 

to me, as I have observed for years, first as a civilian, then a soldier, and now a Member of Congress, the fundamental problem is 

Palestinian rejectionism. 

Why is it that Mr. Abbas and Palestinian leadership can’t recognize Israel as a Jewish state, in your opinion? Why can’t they give 

up the right to return? 

You know, you have a much longer professional experience with 

these matters and have dealt directly with many of the people involved. I would appreciate your perspective. 

Mr. WEXLER. What we have here is nothing less than two competing historical narratives—two peoples, two competing historical 

narratives. And, unfortunately, the manner in which the Palestinian side thus far—the Arab side, to a large degree, for many decades, essentially viewed this as a zero-sum game. ‘‘If we recognize 

the Jewish national peoples’ historical narrative, then our side 

somehow gets slighted.’’

And until that is overcome, Prime Minister Netanyahu was right. 

We are not going to have full peace. That is why it is so important, 

I believe, for the Palestinians to recognize Israel in the context of 

being a Jewish state. But we also need to be fair. 

If you are going to do that, you have got to tell them where the 

borders are. Where is the border? Where are the lines of that state? 

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And we also need to be fair to Prime Minister Netanyahu. He 

has not asked for recognition of a Jewish state as a precondition. 

He has said that it should be a part of the complexity of a comprehensive agreement. 

And, in that context, if you have a resolution on Jerusalem, if 

you have a resolution on borders, I am actually confident that the 

Palestinians, in theory, might be closer to accepting that position. 

Mr. COTTON. Yeah. I mean, the fight over narratives goes back 

beyond just where we are today. I mean, it was treated as great 

news that Mr. Abbas recognized the Holocaust to have existed and 

you still have temple denialism as well. 

A lot of the issues you raise, though, Yasser Arafat had a chance 

to accept in 2000, did he not, and he declined it to Bill Clinton and 

Bill Clinton said that he had made Bill Clinton a failure? 

Mr. WEXLER. You are right. 

Mr. COTTON. I regret that I am. Thank you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The votes have been called, but we do have time. So I will recognize my colleague from Florida, Ms. Frankel, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And, first, I want to say welcome to my former colleague in the 

state legislature and distinguished member of this committee, Mr. 

Wexler, and recognize also that I have an extraordinary constituent 

in the audience today who is a dear friend, a remarkable patriot 

who served us during World War II. He is a great American entrepreneur and an unyielding advocate for Israel for Peace. 

Danny Abraham, welcome to you. 

Two days ago some of our colleagues here—we went to the floor. 

We celebrated Israel’s 66th Independence Day, its birthday, praised 

the relationship of the United States and Israel. 

And we also noted that the day prior Israelis commemorated Memorial Day to pay tribute to the 24,000-plus Israeli men, women, 

and children who have lost their lives to the war on terror. 

And, you know, we have been to Israel. We know it is beautiful. 

It is modern and people live good lives, but Israel has never really 

known real long-lasting peace. There has been intermittent wars, 

periods of terrorism and so forth. 

So there have been a lot of questions and answers today. I will 

leave you with a real softball question because sometimes we just 

talk to ourselves. 

And for myself and, I know, everyone on the panel, we are true 

believers in the importance of Israel as our ally and best friend in 

the Middle East. But I am going to give you each an opportunity 

to answer the question for the American public. 

Why is it so important for Israel to reach a peace agreement with 

the Palestinians? Why is it important for our country, for the world 

and, of course, it goes without saying, for Israel? 

Mr. WEXLER. I will be happy to start. 

Quickly, if you are a Zionist and you believe in the Zionist 

dream, then Israel needs to figure out a way to separate from the 

4- to 5 million Palestinians that live on the West Bank and Gaza. 

If Israel is to remain a Jewish and democratic state—a secure 

Jewish and democratic state, it has got to figure out a way to separate from the Palestinian people. 

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And the only way to separate, ultimately, that ensures Israel’s 

security is a viable Palestinian state, demilitarized Palestinian 

state, that is independent and can go on its own. 

And in terms of the Palestinians, which is not the purpose of 

your question, though, for those of us who are Zionists, we must 

be very careful to recognize also that the Palestinian people have 

their legitimate rights and also have a historical narrative. And to 

not do so, I believe, in many ways, morally and ethically, is not 

consistent with Zionism. 

Mr. PRINCE. I would agree with Congressman Wexler’s eloquent 

presentation of why we need to solve this problem, but we do have 

to take into account that negotiations don’t occur in a vacuum. 

The equation has to include the Palestinian people, not only their 

national aspirations, not only the aspirations of the Palestinians in 

the diaspora and around the world, but also in the West Bank and 

Gaza. 

If you walk into a coffee shop anywhere in the West Bank or in 

Gaza, Palestinians will talk about national aspirations, but then 

they will spend 30 minutes talking about how their day-to-day life 

and the troubles, feeding their family, getting a job, getting the 

sewage out of their house, getting medical treatments, getting antibiotics, getting adequate care, sending their kids abroad for college. 

If there is one thing that the Arab Spring has taught us is that 

we cannot support dictators in the absence of popular support. 

And the Palestinian people did not support this negotiation, not 

that there wasn’t a constituency for peace, but they wanted to 

clean up their house first and show that there is benefits of peace 

to the community at large before reaching a final status agreement. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I will keep my response short. 

I think, look it, Israel promotes American principles and interests in the Middle East. It must have the peace and security that 

it needs in order to do so. That is in our interest as well as theirs. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentlewoman. 

And I thank the witnesses. I really appreciate your time, and 

your comments and testimony are very well received by the members. So thank you so much. 

And this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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