34720 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 14, 2011 / Notices 

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892, 

(Virtual Meeting). 

Contact Person: Dianne Hardy, PhD, 

Scientific Review Officer, Center for 

Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 6175, 

MSC 7892, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–435– 

1154, dianne.hardy@nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: AIDS and Related 

Research Integrated Review Group, 

Behavioral and Social Science Approaches to 

Preventing HIV/AIDS Study Section. 

Date: July 14–15, 2011. 

Time: 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: Westin Seattle Hotel, 1900 5th 

Avenue, Seattle, WA 98101. 

Contact Person: Jose H Guerrier, PhD, 

Scientific Review Officer, Center for 

Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5222, 

MSC 7852, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–435– 

1137, guerriej@csr.nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: Center for Scientific 

Review Special Emphasis Panel, Fellowship: 

Genes, Genomes, and Genetics. 

Date: July 14–15, 2011. 

Time: 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications 

Place: Hotel Nikko San Francisco, 222 

Mason Street, San Francisco, CA 94102. 

Contact Person: Michael A Marino, PhD, 

Scientific Review Officer, Center for 

Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 2216, 

MSC 7890, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 435– 

0601, marinomi@csr.nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: Center for Scientific 

Review Special Emphasis Panel, Small 

Business: Respiratory Sciences. 

Date: July 14–15, 2011. 

Time: 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 

Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892, 

(Virtual Meeting). 

Contact Person: Ghenima Dirami, PhD, 

Scientific Review Officer, Center for 

Scientific Review, National Institutes of 

Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 4122, 

MSC 7814, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–594– 

1321, diramig@csr.nih.gov. 

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance 

Program Nos. 93.306, Comparative Medicine; 

93.333, Clinical Research, 93.306, 93.333, 

93.337, 93.393–93.396, 93.837–93.844, 

93.846–93.878, 93.892, 93.893, National 

Institutes of Health, HHS.) 

Dated: June 8, 2011. 

Jennifer S. Spaeth, 

Director, Office of Federal Advisory 

Committee Policy. 

[FR Doc. 2011–14688 Filed 6–13–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4140–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

National Institutes of Health 

National Institute on Aging; Notice of 

Closed Meeting 

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 

amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is 

hereby given of the following meeting. 

The meeting will be closed to the 

public in accordance with the 

provisions set forth in sections 

552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., 

as amended. The grant applications and 

the discussions could disclose 

confidential trade secrets or commercial 

property such as patentable material, 

and personal information concerning 

individuals associated with the grant 

applications, the disclosure of which 

would constitute a clearly unwarranted 

invasion of personal privacy. 

Name of Committee: National Institute on 

Aging Special Emphasis Panel, Skeletal 

Indicators, Health and Aging. 

Date: July 7, 2011. 

Time: 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institute on Aging, 

Gateway Building, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue, 

Suite 2C212, Bethesda, MD 20892. 

(Telephone Conference Call) 

Contact Person: Rebecca J. Ferrell, PhD, 

Scientific Review Officer, National Institute 

on Aging, Gateway Building Rm. 2C212, 7201 

Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20892, 

301–402–7703, ferrellrj@mail.nih.gov. 

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance 

Program Nos. 93.866, Aging Research, 

National Institutes of Health, HHS.) 

Dated: June 8, 2011. 

Jennifer S. Spaeth, 

Director, Office of Federal Advisory 

Committee Policy. 

[FR Doc. 2011–14687 Filed 6–13–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4140–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

National Institutes of Health 

National Institute on Aging; Notice of 

Closed Meetings 

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 

amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is 

hereby given of the following meetings. 

The meetings will be closed to the 

public in accordance with the 

provisions set forth in sections 

552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., 

as amended. The grant applications and 

the discussions could disclose 

confidential trade secrets or commercial 

property such as patentable material, 

and personal information concerning 

individuals associated with the grant 

applications, the disclosure of which 

would constitute a clearly unwarranted 

invasion of personal privacy. 

Name of Committee: National Institute on 

Aging Special Emphasis Panel, 

Frontotemporal Dementia. 

Date: July 26, 2011. 

Time: 12 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institute on Aging, 

Gateway Building, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue, 

Suite 2C212, Bethesda, MD 20892, 

(Telephone Conference Call). 

Contact Person: William Cruce, PhD, 

Scientific Review Officer, National Institute 

on Aging, Scientific Review Branch, Gateway 

Building 2C–212, 7201 Wisconsin Ave., 

Bethesda, MD 20814, 301–402–7704, 

crucew@nia.nih.gov. 

Name of Committee: National Institute on 

Aging Special Emphasis Panel, Antecedent 

Biomarkers For AD. 

Date: July 28, 2011. 

Time: 1 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. 

Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 

applications. 

Place: National Institute on Aging, 

Gateway Building, 7201 Wisconsin Avenue, 

Suite 2C212, Bethesda, MD 20892, 

(Telephone Conference Call). 

Contact Person: William Cruce, PhD, 

Scientific Review Officer, National Institute 

on Aging, Scientific Review Branch, Gateway 

Building 2C–212, 7201 Wisconsin Ave., 

Bethesda, MD 20814, 301–402–7704, 

crucew@nia.nih.gov. 

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance 

Program Nos. 93.866, Aging Research, 

National Institutes of Health, HHS) 

Dated: June 8, 2011. 

Jennifer S. Spaeth, 

Director, Office of Federal Advisory 

Committee Policy. 

[FR Doc. 2011–14685 Filed 6–13–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4140–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

[Docket No. DHS–2009–0026] 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards Personnel Surety Program 

AGENCY: National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, DHS. 

ACTION: Response to comments received 

during 30-day comment period: New 

information collection request 1670– 

NEW. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS or the Department), 

National Protection and Programs 

Directorate (NPPD), Office of 

Infrastructure Protection (IP), 

Infrastructure Security Compliance 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 14, 2011 / Notices 34721 

1 Individual high-risk facilities may classify 

particular contractors or categories of contractors 

either as ‘‘facility personnel’’ or as ‘‘visitors.’’ This 

determination should be a facility-specific 

determination, and should be based on facility 

security, operational requirements, and business 

practices. 

Division (ISCD) has submitted an 

information collection request (ICR) to 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review and clearance in 

accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA). The 

information collection is a new 

information collection. A 60-day public 

notice for comments was previously 

published in the Federal Register on 

June 10, 2009, at 74 FR 27555. A 30-day 

public notice for comments was 

published in the Federal Register on 

April 13, 2010, at 75 FR 18850. In the 

30-day notice the Department 

responded to comments received during 

the 60-day comment period. This notice 

responds to comments received during 

the 30-day notice. This process is 

conducted in accordance with 5 CFR 

1320.8. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: A copy of the 

ICR, with applicable supporting 

documentation, may be obtained 

through the Federal Rulemaking Portal 

at http://www.regulations.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Program Description 

The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS), 6 CFR Part 27, 

require high-risk chemical facilities to 

submit information to the Federal 

government about facility personnel 

and, as appropriate, unescorted visitors 

with access to restricted areas or critical 

assets at those facilities. As part of the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program this 

information will be vetted by the 

Federal government against the Terrorist 

Screening Database (TSDB) to identify 

known or suspected terrorists (KSTs). 

The TSDB is the Federal government’s 

consolidated and integrated terrorist 

watchlist of known and suspected 

terrorists, maintained by the Department 

of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s (FBI) Terrorist Screening 

Center (TSC). For more information on 

the TSDB, see DOJ/FBI—019 Terrorist 

Screening Records System, 72 FR 47073 

(August 22, 2007). 

High-risk chemical facilities must also 

perform three other types of background 

checks in order to comply with CFATS’ 

Personnel Surety Risk-Based 

Performance Standard 12 (RBPS–12). 

See 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii): Highrisk chemical facilities must ‘‘perform 

appropriate background checks * * * 

including (i) Measures designed to 

verify and validate identity; (ii) 

Measures designed to check criminal 

history; [and] (iii) Measures designed to 

verify and validate legal authorization to 

work.’’ These three other types of 

background checks are not the subjects 

of this notice, nor are they subjects of 

the underlying ICR or of the 30- or 60- 

day notices preceding this notice. The 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program is not 

intended to halt, hinder, or replace 

these three other types of background 

checks, nor is it intended to halt, 

hinder, or replace high-risk chemical 

facilities’ performance of background 

checks which are currently required for 

employment or access to secure areas of 

those facilities. 

Background 

On October 4, 2006, the President 

signed the DHS Appropriations Act of 

2007 (the Act), Public Law 109–295. 

Section 550 of the Act (Section 550) 

provides DHS with the authority to 

regulate the security of high-risk 

chemical facilities. DHS has 

promulgated regulations implementing 

Section 550, the Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards, 6 CFR Part 27. 

Section 550 requires that DHS 

establish Risk Based Performance 

Standards (RBPS) as part of CFATS. 

RBPS–12 (6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv)) 

requires that regulated chemical 

facilities implement ‘‘measures 

designed to identify people with 

terrorist ties.’’ The ability to identify 

individuals with terrorist ties is an 

inherently governmental function and 

requires the use of information held in 

government-maintained databases, 

which are unavailable to high-risk 

chemical facilities. Therefore, DHS is 

implementing the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program, which will allow 

chemical facilities to comply with 

RBPS–12 by implementing ‘‘measures 

designed to identify people with 

terrorist ties.’’ 

DHS has submitted the proposed 

information collection for the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program to OMB for 

review and clearance in accordance 

with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995. 

Overview of CFATS Personnel Surety 

Process 

The CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

will work with the DHS Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) to 

identify individuals who have terrorist 

ties by vetting information submitted by 

each high-risk chemical facility against 

the TSDB. 

High-risk chemical facilities or their 

designees will submit the information 

of: (1) Facility personnel who have or 

are seeking access, either unescorted or 

otherwise, to restricted areas or critical 

assets; and (2) unescorted visitors who 

have or are seeking access to restricted 

areas or critical assets. These persons, 

about whom high-risk chemical 

facilities and facilities’ designees will 

submit information to DHS, are referred 

to in this notice as ‘‘affected 

individuals.’’ 1

Information will be submitted to 

NPPD through the Chemical Security 

Assessment Tool (CSAT), the online 

data collection portal for CFATS. The 

high-risk chemical facility or its 

designees will submit the information of 

affected individuals to DHS through 

CSAT. The submitters of this 

information (‘‘Submitters’’) for each 

high-risk chemical facility will also 

affirm, to the best of their knowledge, 

that the information is: (1) True, correct, 

and complete; and (2) collected and 

submitted in compliance with the 

facility’s Site Security Plan (SSP) or 

Alternative Security Program (ASP), as 

reviewed and authorized and/or 

approved in accordance with 6 CFR 

27.245. The Submitter(s) of each highrisk chemical facility will also affirm 

that, in accordance with their Site 

Security Plans, notice required by the 

Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, has 

been given to affected individuals before 

their information is submitted to DHS. 

DHS will send a verification of receipt 

(previously referred to as a ‘‘verification 

of submission’’ in the 60-day and 30-day 

notices) to the submitter(s) of each highrisk chemical facility when a high-risk 

chemical facility: (1) Submits 

information about an affected individual 

for the first time; (2) submits additional, 

updated, or corrected information about 

an affected individual; and/or (3) 

notifies DHS that an affected individual 

no longer has or is seeking access to that 

facility’s restricted areas or critical 

assets. 

Upon receipt of each affected 

individual’s information in CSAT, 

NPPD will send a copy of the 

information to TSA. Within TSA, the 

Office of Transportation Threat 

Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) 

conducts vetting against the TSDB for 

several DHS programs. TTAC will 

compare the information of affected 

individuals collected by DHS (via 

CSAT) to information in the TSDB. 

TTAC will forward potential matches to 

the TSC, which will make a final 

determination of whether an 

individual’s information is identified as 

a match to a record in the TSDB. 

In the event that an affected 

individual’s information is confirmed to 

match a record in the TSDB (which DHS 

refers to as a ‘‘match to the TSDB,’’ or 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
34722 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 14, 2011 / Notices 

simply as a ‘‘match’’), the TSC will 

notify NPPD and the appropriate 

Federal law enforcement agency for 

coordination, investigative action, and/ 

or response, as appropriate. NPPD will 

not routinely provide vetting results to 

high-risk chemical facilities nor will it 

provide results to an affected individual 

whose information has been submitted 

by a high-risk chemical facility. As 

warranted, high-risk chemical facilities 

may be contacted by DHS or Federal law 

enforcement agencies as part of law 

enforcement investigation activity. 

Information Collected 

DHS may collect the following 

information about affected individuals: 

• Full name; 

• Aliases; 

• Date of birth; 

• Place of birth; 

• Gender; 

• Citizenship; 

• Passport information; 

• Visa information; 

• Alien registration number; 

• DHS Redress Number (if available). 

For purposes of clarifying the exact 

data points which will be routinely 

collected as part of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, the 

Department offers the following data 

clarification to the public. Under this 

information collection, the Department 

will require that high-risk chemical 

facilities submit the following 

information about affected individuals 

that are U.S. Citizens and Lawful 

Permanent Residents, for vetting against 

the TSDB: 

a. Full name; 

b. Date of birth; and 

c. Citizenship or Gender. 

The Department will require that 

high-risk chemical facilities submit the 

following information about affected 

individuals that are Non-U.S. Persons, 

for vetting against the TSDB: 

a. Full name; 

b. Date of birth; 

c. Citizenship; and 

d. Passport information and/or alien 

registration number. 

To reduce the likelihood of false 

positives in matching against the TSDB, 

high-risk chemical facilities may also 

(optionally) submit the following 

information about affected individuals: 

a. Aliases; 

b. Gender (for Non-U.S. persons); 

c. Place of birth; and 

d. DHS Redress Number. 

In lieu of conducting new TSDB 

vetting of an affected individual, DHS 

may collect information to verify that an 

affected individual is currently enrolled 

in a DHS program that also requires a 

TSDB check equivalent to the TSDB 

vetting performed as part of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program. For purposes 

of clarifying the exact data points which 

will be routinely collected as part of the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program, the 

Department offers the following data 

clarification to the public. To verify 

enrollment in a DHS screening program, 

the high-risk chemical facility must 

submit the affected individual’s: 

a. Full Name; 

b. Date of Birth; and 

c. Program-specific information or 

credential information, such as unique 

number, or issuing entity (e.g., State for 

Commercial Driver’s License with an 

Hazardous Materials Endorsement). 

When verifying enrollment in a DHS 

screening program, the high-risk 

chemical facility may also (optionally) 

submit the affected individual’s: 

a. Aliases; 

b. Place of birth; 

c. Gender; 

d. Citizenship; and 

e. DHS Redress Number. 

If high-risk chemical facilities find it 

administratively easier to submit to DHS 

the routine vetting information of an 

affected individual, even if the affected 

individual has been previously vetted, 

facilities may do so. In that case, DHS 

will vet affected individuals against the 

TSDB, and will not seek to verify an 

affected individual’s enrollment in 

TWIC, HME, NEXUS, SENTRI or FAST. 

DHS will collect information that 

identifies the high-risk chemical facility 

or facilities, to which the affected 

individual has or is seeking access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

DHS may contact a high-risk chemical 

facility to request additional 

information (e.g., visa information) 

pertaining to particular individuals in 

order to clarify suspected data errors or 

resolve potential matches (e.g., in 

situations where an affected individual 

has a common name). Such requests 

will not imply, and should not be 

construed to indicate, that an 

individual’s information has been 

confirmed as a match to a TSDB record. 

In the event that a confirmed match 

is identified as part of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, DHS may 

obtain references to and/or information 

from other government law enforcement 

and intelligence databases, or other 

relevant databases that may contain 

terrorism information. 

DHS may collect information 

necessary to assist in tracking 

submissions and transmission of 

records, including electronic 

verification that DHS has received a 

particular record. 

DHS may also collect information 

about points of contact at each high-risk 

chemical facility, and which points of 

contact the Department or Federal law 

enforcement personnel may contact 

with follow-up questions. A request for 

additional information from DHS does 

not imply, and should not be construed 

to indicate, that an individual is known 

or suspected to be associated with 

terrorism. 

DHS may also collect information 

provided by individuals or high-risk 

chemical facilities in support of any 

redress requests or any adjudications 

initiated under CFATS. 

DHS may request information 

pertaining to affected individuals, 

previously provided to DHS by high-risk 

chemical facilities, in order to confirm 

the accuracy of that information, or to 

conduct data accuracy reviews and 

audits as part of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. 

DHS will also collect administrative 

or programmatic information (e.g., 

affirmations or certifications of 

compliance, extension requests, brief 

surveys for process improvement, etc.) 

necessary to manage the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program. 

The Department will also collect 

information that will allow high-risk 

chemical facilities to manage their data 

submissions. Specifically, the 

Department will make available to highrisk chemical facilities two blank data 

fields. These blank data fields may be 

used by a high-risk chemical facility to 

assign each record of an affected 

individual a unique designation or 

number that is meaningful to the highrisk chemical facility. Collecting this 

information will enable a high-risk 

chemical facility to manage the 

electronic records it submits into CSAT. 

Entering this information into CSAT 

will be completely voluntary, and is 

intended solely to enable high-risk 

chemical facilities to search through, 

sort, and manage the electronic records 

they submit into. 

Responses to Comments Received 

During the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program ICR 30-Day Comment Period 

The Department received 20 

comments in response to the 30-day 

notice for comment. Comments were 

received from eight private sector 

companies; nine associations; one 

training council; one union; and one 

council composed of chemical industry 

trade associations. Many of the 

comments were in response to the 

questions posed by the Department in 

the 30-day notice for comments. The 

Department first addresses comments 

responding to questions posed in the 30- 

day notice, and then responds to 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 14, 2011 / Notices 34723 

unsolicited comments received in 

response to the 30-day notice. 

(A) On Behalf of OMB, DHS Solicited 

Comments That Evaluate Whether the 

Proposed Collection of Information Is 

Necessary for the Proper Performance of 

the Functions of the Agency, Including 

Whether the Information Will Have 

Practical Utility 

Comment: The Department received 

several comments addressing whether 

the proposed collection of information 

had any practical utility. One 

commenter suggested that the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program does not 

provide owners or operators of regulated 

facilities with a value-added tool to 

screen potential personnel, contractors, 

and visitors or to identify potential 

security risks. Another commenter 

suggested that the proposed program is 

a one-way process that provides 

information to the Department on 

personnel with access to restricted 

areas, without any feedback provided to 

the owners or operators of regulated 

facilities on their personnel. In contrast, 

one commenter stated that, ‘‘[i]n the 

context of CFATS requirements for 

personal surety and protecting the 

nation’s chemical infrastructure, the 

consolidated and integrated terrorist 

watchlist, even with [its] limitations 

* * * is likely the best check for 

potential terrorists by DHS compared to 

other methods and information.’’ 

Response: The CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program is necessary for the 

proper performance of the functions of 

the Department, including protecting 

chemical facilities and the nation from 

terrorist attacks. DHS will perform this 

responsibility by identifying individuals 

with terrorist ties that have or are 

seeking access to restricted areas or 

critical assets at high-risk chemical 

facilities. The CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program also has practical utility— 

enabling the Federal government to take 

appropriate follow-up action if it 

determines that known or suspected 

terrorists have or seek access to 

restricted areas or critical assets at highrisk chemical facilities. 

Comment: One commenter stated that 

the information collection and vetting 

processes described in the 30-day notice 

appeared to be an attempt to shift 

responsibility from the government to 

the private sector. The commenter 

suggested that the 30-day notice read as 

though facilities will assist the Federal 

government in the performance of antiterrorism duties. 

Response: High-risk chemical 

facilities will submit information 

pertaining to affected individuals to 

DHS as part of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. In the preamble to the 

CFATS Interim Final Rule (IFR), DHS 

stated that background checks 

identifying individuals with terrorist 

ties, required by 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv), 

can only be achieved by conducting 

vetting against the TSDB. See 72 FR 

17709 (Apr. 9, 2007). Determining 

whether individuals’ information 

matches a record in the TSDB 

necessarily includes checks of data sets 

that are not commercially available. The 

design of the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program will allow high-risk chemical 

facilities to comply with 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12)(iv) by submitting 

information necessary for DHS to 

conduct vetting against the TSDB. 

Comment: DHS received comments 

regarding individuals who have 

previously undergone TSDB vetting 

equivalent to CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program TSDB vetting, and who have 

been subsequently issued and currently 

maintain active, valid credentials or 

endorsements (e.g., Transportation 

Worker Identification Credentials) as a 

result of that previous vetting. 

Commenters stated that the 

Department’s collection of information 

from facilities about these affected 

individuals: (1) Serves no security 

purpose; (2) means that the Department 

is not granting TSDB vetting reciprocity 

between its own programs; and (3) is 

redundant, particularly in situations 

where commenters believe that other 

DHS credentialing programs have more 

stringent vetting criteria than CFATS. 

Several commenters requested 

clarification on which Federal 

credentialing programs the Department 

will recognize as conducting TSDB 

checks equivalent to CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program TSDB checks. 

Response: The 30-day notice 

reiterated the Department’s position, 

first outlined in the preamble to the IFR, 

that DHS supports the sharing and reuse 

of vetting results. See 72 FR 17709 (Apr. 

9, 2007). An affected individual will not 

need to undergo additional vetting as 

part of the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program if he/she has successfully 

undergone TSDB vetting, and possesses 

a valid credential or endorsement, as 

part of the Department’s Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 

program, Hazardous Materials 

Endorsement (HME) program, NEXUS 

program, Secure Electronic Network for 

Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) 

program, or Free and Secure Trade 

(FAST) program. DHS must collect a 

limited amount of information for that 

affected individual, however, to 

determine that the affected individual is 

currently enrolled in an above-listed 

DHS program. This information is 

necessary (1) To verify that the affected 

individual is currently enrolled in the 

DHS program, and (2) to enable DHS to 

access both the original enrollment data 

and the TSDB vetting results already in 

the possession of the Department, when 

necessary. The following information is 

necessary to verify an affected 

individual’s enrollment in a DHS 

program: 

TWIC HME NEXUS SENTRI FAST 

Name .......................... Required ................... Required ................... Required ................... Required ................... Required. 

Date of Birth ............... Required ................... Required ................... Required ................... Required ................... Required. 

Unique Credential Information.—TWIC Serial Number: Required.

—Expiration Date: 

Required. 

—Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) 

Issuing State(s): 

Required.

—CDL Number: Required. 

—Expiration Date: 

Required. 

—PASS Number: Required.

—Expiration Date: 

Required. 

—PASS Number: Required.

—Expiration Date: 

Required. 

—PASS Number: Required. 

—Expiration Date: 

Required. 

If DHS cannot confirm an affected 

individual’s current enrollment in one 

of the previously mentioned programs, 

or if previous vetting results cannot be 

verified, DHS will either: (1) Notify the 

high-risk chemical facility that the 

Department could not verify that the 

affected individual is currently enrolled 

in a DHS program; and/or (2) vet the 

affected individual against the TSDB. 

When a high-risk chemical facility is 

notified that the Department could not 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
34724 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 14, 2011 / Notices 

verify that the affected individual is 

currently enrolled in a DHS program, 

the high-risk chemical facility must 

either: (1) Submit additional 

information, which corrects or updates 

the previous information to verify 

enrollment; or (2) provide sufficient 

information for the Department to 

conduct vetting of the affected 

individual against the TSDB. Such 

notifications from DHS will not imply, 

and should not be construed to indicate, 

that an individual has been confirmed 

as a match to the TSDB. 

If high-risk chemical facilities find it 

administratively easier to submit 

information about affected individuals 

for vetting against the TSDB (rather than 

leveraging previous vetting against the 

TSDB), high-risk chemical facilities may 

do so. In that case, DHS will vet affected 

individuals against the TSDB, and will 

not seek to verify an affected 

individual’s enrollment in TWIC, HME, 

NEXUS, SENTRI, or FAST. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the Department was not 

following recently-issued White House 

recommendations to promote 

comparability and reciprocity across 

credentialing and screening programs. 

One commenter specifically referred to 

Recommendation 16 of the Surface 

Transportation Security Priority 

Assessment, which recommends that 

the Federal government ‘‘Create a more 

efficient Federal credentialing system by 

reducing credentialing redundancy, 

leveraging existing investments, and 

implementing the principle of ‘enroll 

once, use many’ to reuse the 

information of individuals applying for 

multiple access privileges.’’ See The 

White House (March 2010), http:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 

rss_viewer/STSA.pdf. 

Response: The design of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program aligns with 

the recommendations of the Surface 

Transportation Security Priority 

Assessment. 

In discussions with high-risk 

chemical facilities, DHS has discovered 

that the concept of ‘‘enroll once, use 

many’’ may have been misinterpreted by 

commenters as meaning that an 

individual should only need to submit 

information to DHS once, and that DHS 

should never collect information from 

that individual again. DHS, however, 

defines the ‘‘enroll once, use many’’ 

concept as the ability to reuse 

previously-submitted program 

enrollment information and/or vetting 

results, upon collection of sufficient 

information to confirm an individual’s 

prior enrollment in a DHS program or 

prior vetting results. High-risk chemical 

facilities will have to submit affected 

individuals’ personal data to DHS as 

part of the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program in order for DHS to reuse 

previously-submitted enrollment 

information and previous vetting 

results. The CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program will require only the minimum 

information necessary to verify affected 

individuals’ enrollments in the TWIC, 

HME, NEXUS, SENTRI, and FAST 

programs. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that it may be reasonable for 

DHS to require chemical facilities to 

perform visual inspections of TWICs 

and other existing credentials, but that 

requiring chemical facilities to submit 

data pertaining to affected individuals 

possessing such other credentials would 

not serve any legitimate security 

purpose. Further, one commenter stated 

that facilities not regulated under the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act 

(MTSA) should not be expected to 

obtain ‘‘readers’’ for TWIC credentials. 

Response: As previously discussed, 

DHS will collect information about 

affected individuals who are currently 

enrolled in certain DHS programs with 

equivalent TSDB vetting to verify that 

each affected individual is currently 

enrolled in the TWIC, HME, NEXUS, 

SENTRI, and/or FAST programs. 

DHS agrees that there is no 

expectation or requirement that nonMTSA facilities be equipped with TWIC 

readers. DHS also emphasizes that 

TWICs are not required for persons 

accessing facilities regulated by CFATS. 

High-risk chemical facilities may, 

however, choose to leverage TWIC 

credentials as part of the identity, legal 

authorization to work, and criminal 

history background checks they perform 

as part of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii). 

The precise manners in which high-risk 

chemical facilities could leverage TWIC 

credentials as part of identity, legal 

authorization to work, and criminal 

history background checks could vary 

from facility to facility, and should be 

described in individual facilities’ SSPs. 

The precise manners in which facilities 

could leverage TWIC credentials as part 

of these other background checks are 

beyond the scope of this Paperwork 

Reduction Act response to comments. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the Department should 

accept vetting results from other Federal 

agencies, namely the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

(ATF), which conduct vetting against 

the TSDB. Commenters suggested that 

without this accommodation, the 

Department would impose unreasonable 

burdens on a segment of the community 

regulated by more than one Federal 

agency without any corollary 

enhancement to security. 

Response: ATF conducts point-intime vetting against the TSDB, which 

means that ATF’s checks are conducted 

at only specified times, not on a 

recurrent basis. Recurrent vetting is a 

DHS best practice, and compares an 

affected individual’s information against 

new and/or updated TSDB records as 

new and/or updated records become 

available. 

(B) On Behalf of OMB, DHS Solicited 

Comments Which Evaluate the 

Accuracy of the Department’s Estimate 

of the Burden of the Proposed Collection 

of Information, Including the Validity of 

the Methodology and Assumptions Used 

Comment: The Department received 

comments which supported the 

proposed CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program information submission 

schedule, published in the Federal 

Register on April 13, 2010, at 75 FR 

18853, as part of the Department’s 30- 

day notice. The Department also 

received comments raising the point 

that the proposed schedule would create 

situations in which an affected 

individual’s name will be submitted to 

DHS after he/she no longer has access 

to a high-risk chemical facility. Several 

commenters highlighted this issue by 

pointing out that commercial delivery 

companies may not always send the 

same driver to a high-risk chemical 

facility. 

Response: Based in part on 

commenters’ concerns, DHS will revise 

the proposed information submission 

schedule previously published in the 

30-day notice. The revised schedule will 

be published in the Federal Register 

and/or disseminated to high-risk 

chemical facilities individually, and 

will align with the RBPS Metric 12.1 for 

‘‘new/prospective employees [facility 

personnel] & unescorted visitors.’’ (See 

Table 17 in the May 2009 Risk Based 

Performance Standards Guidance, 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/

chemsec_cfats_riskbased_performance_

standards.pdf.) Specifically, the revised 

schedule will require high-risk chemical 

facilities to submit the information of 

new affected individuals prior to access 

to restricted areas or critical assets. The 

Department is considering whether to 

establish that high-risk chemical 

facilities be required to submit the 

information at least 48 hours prior to 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. The Department may, on a case 

by case basis, allow for variances from 

the schedule. 

In response to the comments received 

about commercial delivery drivers, DHS 

reminds the public that RBPS–12 


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2The estimate of 3,189,600 affected individuals is 

derived from [(354,000 affected individuals x 10)— 

354,400 affected individuals] 

applies only to facility personnel with 

access to a high-risk chemical facility’s 

restricted areas or critical assets, and to 

unescorted visitors with access to a 

high-risk chemical facility’s restricted 

areas or critical assets. Situations that 

require visitors to generally access a 

high-risk chemical facility will not 

result in submission of information for 

vetting under the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program if the visitors do not 

have access to restricted areas or critical 

assets, or if the visitors are escorted 

through restricted areas and critical 

assets. If commercial delivery drivers 

visiting high-risk chemical facilities are 

escorted, or if they do not have access 

to restricted areas or critical assets in 

the first place, then they will not be 

affected individuals and will not be 

vetted under the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. 

If a high-risk chemical facility opts to 

allow visitors (e.g., commercial truck 

drivers) unescorted access to its 

restricted areas or critical assets, the 

visitors will be considered affected 

individuals and the facility will be 

required to both (1) Perform background 

checks on the unescorted visitors as 

required under 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)– 

(iii), and (2) submit information 

pertaining to those visitors to the 

Department to identify individuals with 

terrorist ties. The Department recognizes 

that this may, or may not, necessitate 

changes in business operations of highrisk chemical facilities. 

Comment: Many commenters 

suggested the Department did not 

accurately estimate the burden to highrisk chemical facilities because it 

underestimated the affected population. 

The commenters suggested a total 

population of 10,000,000 affected 

individuals, rather than the 

Department’s estimate of 1,063,200 

affected individuals. Using the 

Department’s estimated time per 

respondent of 0.59 hours, commenters 

estimated 6,000,000 burden hours. The 

majority of commenters used an average 

hourly rate of $20.00. Commenters 

estimated that total annual cost of the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

would be $120,000,000. 

Response: DHS disagrees with several 

of the commenters’ assumptions that 

resulted in the $120,000,000 estimate. 

First, commenters suggested that the 

ICR estimate of 1,063,200 total 

respondents (i.e., affected individuals) 

did not account for agricultural retail or 

distribution facilities that cannot isolate 

restricted areas or critical assets to a 

limited number of employees or visitors. 

In the CFATS Regulatory Assessment 

the Department approximated 

compliance costs through the use of 

model facility categories. See CFATS 

Regulatory Assessment, section 5.1 

(Apr. 1, 2007), http:// 

www.regulations.gov/ 

#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2006-0073- 

0116. Model facility categories were 

created using four variables: (1) To 

which of the four risk-based tiers a 

covered facility is assigned; (2) whether 

a covered facility is ‘‘enclosed’’ (inside 

a building) or ‘‘open’’ (not inside a 

building); (3) the size of a covered 

facility (large or small); and (4) whether 

the chemicals at a covered facility are at 

risk of theft or diversion for subsequent 

use as weapons or weapons 

components. These variables provided 

the Department with 16 variations for 

which different estimates could be 

approximated. See CFATS Regulatory 

Assessment at 23, table 15 (Apr. 1, 

2007). Several of the variations of these 

model facility categories, notably Tier 4 

Groups A, B, and C, do account for 

agricultural retail or distribution 

facilities that cannot isolate restricted 

areas or critical assets to a limited 

number of employees or visitors. 

Therefore, the Department believes that 

the information collection does 

reasonably account for agricultural retail 

or distribution facilities that cannot 

isolate restricted areas or critical assets 

to a limited number of facility personnel 

or unescorted visitors. 

Second, some commenters assumed 

that the Department failed to account for 

respondents at facilities that would be 

required to submit Top-Screen 

consequence assessments to DHS if the 

‘‘indefinite time extension’’ issued by 

the Department on January 9, 2008 is 

lifted. The Department disagrees with 

the commenters because the total 

respondent estimate used by the 

Department was derived from the 

CFATS Regulatory Assessment, which 

was published (on April 1, 2007) prior 

to the ‘‘indefinite time extension’’ 

(issued on January 9, 2008). The CFATS 

Regulatory Assessment assumed the 

inclusion of these facilities when 

estimating the population of individuals 

affected by Personnel Surety costs. 

The third assumption that 

commenters used to support an 

estimated total number of 10,000,000 

affected individuals was that the 

Department should include the 

population of individuals working at 

approximately 3,200 MTSA-regulated 

facilities in its estimate of the 

population of affected individuals. The 

Department is precluded from including 

any population in the total number of 

respondents explicitly excluded from 

regulation under CFATS. MTSA 

facilities are excluded from regulation 

under CFATS by Section 550. 

Commenters also suggested that many 

high-risk facilities in the retail segment 

could see large numbers of visitors (i.e., 

customers) entering facilities during 

peak retail times of the year. The 

commenters suggested that depending 

on how the Department defines 

‘‘unescorted visitor,’’ the total annual 

number of respondents could be an 

order of magnitude greater than the 

354,400 figure estimated by the agency. 

Commenters did not specify any order 

of magnitude, so the Department 

assumed that commenters were 

suggesting that during peak times of the 

year the Department should estimate an 

increase of one order of magnitude (i.e., 

3,189,600 affected individuals) above 

the Department’s current annual 

population estimate.2 The Department 

does not believe that high-risk chemical 

facilities in the retail segment will opt 

to conduct the other background checks 

required under 6 CFR 27.230(a)12(i)– 

(iii) on these individuals due to the cost 

and burden that would place on the 

high-risk chemical facility. Hence, highrisk chemical facilities in the retail 

segment will likely ensure, through 

their access controls, that customers 

will not become affected individuals. 

Therefore, the Department has chosen 

not to modify the total number of 

respondents based upon peak retail 

times of the year. 

The Department has concluded that 

the comments which estimated that the 

total annual cost on the regulated 

community of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program would be $120,000,000 

were based on inaccurate assumptions. 

Comment: One commenter stated that 

it conducted a study of twelve industry 

members and subsequently concluded 

the Department had significantly 

underestimated the burden on the 

industry. 

Response: The Department requested 

from the commenter, and was 

subsequently provided, the survey data 

underlying the study referenced in the 

commenter’s response. The survey 

requested information and specific 

numeric data from 34 facilities (owned 

and operated by 12 industry members). 

The facilities ranged from a small 

research facility to several large 

facilities. The Department concluded 

that an increase in the estimated 

number of respondents was justified, 

based on the survey data received. 

The Department has concluded that 

the type of facilities surveyed generally 

aligned with Group A facilities 

(described in section 5.1 of the CFATS 


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3The average hourly wage rate previously used 

by the Department in the 30-day and 60-day notices 

was $84. This average hourly wage rate was based 

upon the hourly wage rate estimate for Site Security 

Officers (SSO) contained in section 6.3.1 of the 

CFATS Regulatory Assessment, adjusted to account 

for passage of time since publication of the 

Regulatory Assessment. See CFATS Regulatory 

Assessment (Apr. 1, 2007), http:// 

www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2006-0073-0116. 

Regulatory Assessment). Based on the 

survey, and based on a brief description 

of facilities responding to the survey, 

the Department increased, for the 

purposes of this ICR, the estimate of 

Group A facilities by an order of 

magnitude thus matching the results of 

the survey. 

In reviewing the comments, as well as 

the survey data provided, the 

Department identified a minor 

computational error when calculating 

the total annual number of respondents 

in the 60-day and 30-day notices. 

Specifically, the Department in the 30- 

day and 60-day notices improperly 

assumed that total number of 

respondents as 1,063,200 affected 

individuals over a three-year period. 

Rather in the CFATS Regulatory 

Assessment the Department had 

assumed the total population of 

individuals to be screened at 1,063,200 

with an additional annual turnover that 

resulted in an additional 177,290 

respondents during the second and 

third years. Therefore, in the 60-day and 

30-day notices the Department should 

have estimated a total number of 

respondents over three years as 

1,417,780 resulting in 472,593 annual 

number of respondents. 

In accounting for this minor 

computational error, and for the 

increase of Group A facilities by an 

order of magnitude, the Department has 

revised its average total annual number 

of respondents from 354,400 to 

1,303,700. As a consequence, the 

estimated time per respondent (i.e., total 

burden hours/number of respondents) 

was revised from 0.59 hours to 0.54 

hours. 

Comment: Three of the four 

commenters that analyzed the estimated 

costs outlined in the 30-day notice 

suggested an appropriate wage rate of 

$20 per hour while the fourth 

commenter suggested the wage rate 

would range between $20 and $40 per 

hour. 

Response: Based upon the 

commenters’ suggestions, the 

Department has modified the wage rate. 

Since comments on the appropriate 

wage rate ranged from $20 to $40 per 

hour, we picked the midpoint of $30 for 

our hourly wage rate. To account for the 

cost of employee benefits such as paid 

leave, insurance, retirement, etc., we 

multiplied the base wage rate of $30 by 

1.4 to arrive at a fully loaded wage rate 

of $42 per hour.3 The updated analysis 

and costs submitted to OMB as part of 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

ICR are reflected at the conclusion of 

this notice. 

Comment: Many commenters 

suggested that the Department did not 

accurately estimate the burden because 

the estimate was limited to those 

activities listed in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1). 

Commenters suggested that such a limit 

does not account for unnecessary 

investigations, or for justified or 

unjustified adverse employment 

decisions that could result from a 

person’s possibly unjustified presence 

on the TSDB. One commenter expressed 

concern that the Department’s estimate 

did not account for the burden on 

affected individuals whose information 

matches that of records in the TSDB, but 

who are not in fact terrorists. 

Response: The activities which the 

Department must account for when 

estimating the burden of an ICR are 

limited in scope to those activities listed 

in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1). Specifically, 5 

CFR 1320.3(b)(1) requires the 

Department to estimate the total time, 

effort, or financial resources expended 

by persons to generate, maintain, retain, 

disclose, or provide information to or 

for a Federal agency. The potential 

burden described by the commenters is 

not related to the burden high-risk 

chemical facilities incur in collecting 

and submitting the information of 

affected individuals to DHS, nor is it 

within the scope of the activities listed 

in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1). 

(C) On Behalf of OMB, DHS Solicited 

Comments To Enhance the Quality, 

Utility, and Clarity of the Information 

To Be Collected 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that requiring covered facilities to 

collect, submit and maintain affected 

individuals’ information creates a 

situation subject to data entry errors and 

presents a significant challenge to 

maintain current information. 

Response: The Department has made 

an effort to create a user-friendly Web 

tool (in CSAT) that will reduce data 

entry errors. Hence, the Department 

believes that Submitters of high-risk 

chemical facilities will be able to affirm 

that, to the best of their knowledge, 

information submitted to DHS as part of 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is 

true, correct, and complete. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that it would be inappropriate to require 

facilities to submit affected individuals’ 

information to DHS. The commenter 

suggested that requiring covered 

facilities to collect, verify, submit, and 

maintain this information creates an 

increased legal liability for covered 

facilities that have to accurately and 

timely collect, verify, submit, maintain 

and protect this sensitive information. 

Response: DHS presumes that 

chemical facilities, as employers, have 

access to basic biographical information 

(such as names, dates of birth, genders, 

and citizenships) of many facility 

personnel and visitors. 

As part of RBPS–12, each high-risk 

chemical facility is also required to 

conduct background checks to verify the 

identity, legal authorization to work, 

and criminal history of affected 

individuals. Many high-risk chemical 

facilities are collecting, verifying, and 

properly maintaining information 

necessary for these other verifications 

already. This already-collected 

information should include many, if not 

most of the necessary data elements 

required for submission to DHS to 

complete the check for an individual’s 

ties to terrorism. 

Comment: A few commenters stated 

that high risk chemical facilities are 

rarely in a legal position to guarantee 

the truth, correctness or completeness of 

information related to contractors, 

vendors, truck drivers or any other nonemployees. Requiring signed documents 

by company officials will not ensure 

that information from parties outside of 

their legal control is true, correct, and 

complete. One commenter expressed 

concern that company or facility 

representatives are not experts in 

determining the validity of 

identification, and the affirmation 

statements the Department will require 

each Submitter to affirm should be 

modified to be ‘‘the same information 

presented by the affected individual.’’ 

Response: Each Submitter will be 

expected to affirm, to the best of his/her 

knowledge, that the information he/she 

submits to DHS on behalf of a high-risk 

chemical facility for vetting against the 

TSDB is true, correct, and complete. In 

the event that a high-risk chemical 

facility submits incorrect information 

through no fault of its own, the 

Department will expect the high-risk 

chemical facility to update the 

information in accordance with the 

proposed submission schedule. Steps 

that high-risk chemical facilities might 

take to validate personal information 

collected as part of identity, legal 

authorization to work, or criminal 

history checks are beyond the scope of 

this notice and are beyond the scope of 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

ICR. 


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Comment: The Department received 

comments requesting clarity as to 

whether covered facilities should 

submit names of emergency personnel 

who would qualify as affected 

individuals. One commenter noted a 

CFATS Frequently Asked Question 

(FAQ) which indicated that fire 

department personnel would not be 

required to undergo background checks. 

Response: The Department expects 

high-risk chemical facilities to submit 

the information of affected individuals 

in accordance with the submission 

schedule to be published or 

disseminated by the Department. For 

purposes of RBPS–12, the Department 

affirms that certain populations are not 

affected individuals. Specifically: 

(1) Federal officials that gain unescorted 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets as part of the performance of their 

official duties are not affected 

individuals; (2) law enforcement 

officials at the state or local level that 

gain unescorted access to restricted 

areas or critical assets as part of the 

performance of their official duties are 

not affected individuals; and 

(3) emergency responders at the state or 

local level that gain unescorted access to 

restricted areas or critical assets during 

emergency situations are not affected 

individuals. This aligns with the 

population assumptions for the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program embedded 

within the Regulatory Assessment. 

The Department has updated FAQ 

1368 (see http://csat-help.dhs.gov), and 

appreciates the comment which brought 

the FAQ to the Department’s attention. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the Department is requesting 

information beyond what is required to 

identify people with terrorist ties when 

collecting work phone numbers and 

work email addresses. The commenter 

also suggested that collecting additional 

information for auditing purposes is 

beyond the scope of CFATS. 

Response: DHS no longer plans to 

routinely collect affected individuals’ 

work phone numbers and work email 

addresses. The Department disagrees, 

however, that collection of information 

for auditing purposes is beyond the 

scope of CFATS. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the burden would be 

difficult to estimate unless the 

Department provided definitions for 

such terms as ‘‘contractor’’ and 

‘‘vendor.’’ 

Response: Individual high-risk 

facilities may classify particular 

contractors or vendors, or categories of 

contractors or vendors, either as 

‘‘facility personnel’’ or as ‘‘visitors.’’ 

This determination should be a facilityspecific determination, and should be 

based on facility security, operational 

requirements, and business practices. 

The Department’s estimates regarding 

the information collection burden of the 

Personnel Surety Program reflect this 

approach. 

Comment: One commenter was not 

aware of any facility that currently 

maintains, in an easily accessible or 

transferrable format, the information 

required for submission discussed in the 

ICR. 

Response: The Department believes 

that the information necessary to 

identify individuals with terrorist ties is 

already in the possession of many highrisk chemical facilities, due to the other 

background checks already performed 

by those facilities. The burden outlined 

in this ICR accounts for the fact that 

some facilities do not possess this 

information, and that others do not 

possess this information in easily 

accessible or transferrable formats. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that various flaws in the TSDB and 

various flaws in the Federal 

government’s watchlisting protocols 

need to be addressed in order to make 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

viable and fair. 

Response: As indicated in the CFATS 

IFR, the Department has determined 

that a TSDB check is necessary for the 

purpose of protecting restricted areas 

and critical assets of high-risk chemical 

facilities from persons who may have 

ties to terrorism. See 72 FR 17708 

(Apr. 9, 2007). The TSDB is the Federal 

government’s integrated and 

consolidated terrorist watchlist and is 

the appropriate database to use to 

identify individuals with terrorist ties. 

Discussions regarding TSDB flaws and 

the Federal government’s watchlisting 

protocols are beyond the scope of this 

notice. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

clarity about the Department’s reference 

that it may ‘‘collect information on 

affected individuals as necessary to 

enable it to provide redress.’’ Another 

commenter expressed concern that the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

design does not set up a uniform, 

thorough system that gives workers full 

appeals or waiver procedures. Several 

commenters expressed concern about 

how the Department would provide 

meaningful redress under the design of 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 

Response: An ICR is not the 

appropriate vehicle for the Department 

to use to address privacy and redress 

issues related to the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. The Department will 

publish a Privacy Impact Assessment 

(PIA) about the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program, to be made available on the 

Department’s Web page at http://www.

dhs.gov/privacy and http://www.dhs.

gov/chemicalsecurity. The Department 

will also publish a System of Records 

Notice (SORN) for the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program, and a Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking proposing to take 

certain Privacy Act exemptions for the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

System of Records. 

(D) On Behalf of OMB, DHS Solicited 

Comments Regarding the Minimization 

of the Burden of Information Collection 

on Those Who Are To Respond, 

Including Tthrough the Use of 

Aappropriate Automated, Electronic, 

Mechanical, or Other Technological 

Collection Techniques or Other Forms of 

Information Technology (e.g., Permitting 

Electronic Submissions of Responses) 

Comment: Three commenters 

suggested that the Department should 

allow private third parties to submit 

information of individuals to DHS on 

behalf of chemical facilities. 

Specifically, these commenters 

suggested that if private third parties 

could directly submit information, 

substantial burden could be eliminated 

for high-risk chemical facilities. Another 

commenter suggested that the 

Department should provide a means 

through which non-employees would be 

able to directly provide their 

information to the Department. 

Response: As part of the Personnel 

Surety Program, DHS will also allow 

facilities to designate third party 

individuals as Submitters. Designated 

individuals will be able to submit TSDB 

screening information to DHS on behalf 

of the facilities that designate them as 

Submitters. 

Comment: Commenters suggested that 

the ICR places undue burdens and costs 

on businesses that operate multiple 

regulated facilities where redundant 

information submissions would be 

required for a given individual who 

visits multiple sites. 

Response: The Department has taken 

steps to minimize the potential for an 

affected individual’s information to be 

submitted multiple times. Further, in 

the event that an affected individual’s 

information is submitted to the 

Department multiple times, only one 

record will be transmitted to TSA to be 

vetted against the TSDB. 

The primary step the Department has 

taken to minimize the potential for an 

affected individual’s information to be 

submitted multiple times is ensuring 

that companies with many high-risk 

chemical facilities have flexibility to 

consolidate CSAT user roles. 

Specifically, CSAT will provide 


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4See footnote 1. 5See footnote 1. 

companies the flexibility either to 

consolidate their user roles to allow a 

single Submitter for many facilities, or 

to elect for each facility to 

independently submit information to 

the Department. Each company may 

implement the best strategy for itself. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that requiring facilities to 

update and correct information about 

affected individuals will neither 

‘‘increase the accuracy of data 

collected,’’ nor ‘‘decrease the probability 

of incorrect matches’’ against the TSDB. 

The commenters further suggested that 

updating and correcting information 

will significantly increase the 

administrative burden on companies 

required to provide the information and 

will also increase the likelihood that 

data may be incomplete and/or 

inaccurate. 

Response: The Department is 

confident that matching correct and 

accurate information against records in 

the TSDB increases the accuracy of the 

vetting process. The use of inaccurate or 

false data prevents DHS from accurately 

screening individuals with or seeking 

access to high-risk chemical facilities for 

ties to terrorism. 

Comment: Several commenters 

requested that the Department eliminate 

the requirement that facilities notify the 

Department when an affected individual 

no longer has access to a facility’s 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

Response: For the duration that an 

affected individual has or is seeking 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets at high-risk chemical facilities, 

DHS will compare the affected 

individual’s information against new 

and/or updated TSDB records. When 

the Department is made aware that an 

individual no longer has or is seeking 

access, that individual’s information 

will no longer be vetted against the 

TSDB. Therefore, the Department will 

not eliminate the requirement that 

facilities must notify the Department 

when an affected individual no longer 

has or is seeking access to a facility’s 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

(E) DHS Solicited Comments That 

Respond to the Department’s 

Interpretation of the Population 

Affected by RBPS–12’s Background 

Check Requirement 

Comment: Some commenters 

acknowledged the plain reading of 

CFATS, describing what categories of 

individuals are affected individuals for 

purposes of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program, while expressing their 

dissatisfaction that the Department was 

not pursuing rulemaking to modify the 

text of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12). The majority 

of commenters, however, reiterated 

comments submitted during the 60-day 

comment period expressing 

disagreement with the definition of 

affected individuals. Commenters 

described the definition as a ‘‘new’’ 

CFATS requirement for escorted facility 

personnel and inconsistent with 

congressional intent, regulatory 

language contained in CFATS, guidance 

DHS has issued on RBPS satisfaction 

(available at http://www.dhs.gov/

xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cfats_risk

based_performance_standards.pdf), and 

with other regulatory programs designed 

to enhance the security of the nation’s 

critical infrastructure. For example, 

some commenters mentioned that the 

U.S. Coast Guard permits individuals 

without TWICs to access the secure 

areas of MTSA-regulated facilities so 

long as those individuals are escorted. 

Commenters requested additional 

information as to why the Department 

has seemingly crafted new categories of 

affected individuals in the context of 

CFATS. 

Response: The text of 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12) identifies who should 

appropriately undergo background 

checks as part of CFATS. The 

population of individuals who must be 

vetted under 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) is the 

same as described in both the 60-day 

and 30-day notices: (1) Facility 

personnel who have or are seeking 

access (unescorted or otherwise) to 

restricted areas or critical assets, and 

(2) unescorted visitors who have or are 

seeking access to restricted areas or 

critical assets.4 In this response to 

comments, however, the Department 

has clarified that certain populations are 

not affected individuals. Specifically: 

(1) Federal officials that gain unescorted 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets as part of the performance of their 

official duties are not affected 

individuals; (2) law enforcement 

officials at the State or local level that 

gain unescorted access to restricted 

areas or critical assets as part of the 

performance of their official duties are 

not affected individuals; and 

(3) emergency responders at the state or 

local level that gain unescorted access to 

restricted areas or critical assets during 

emergency situations are not affected 

individuals. 

Comment: Some commenters 

suggested that the Department is 

selecting only one possible 

interpretation of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12). 

Specifically, commenters suggested that 

a plain English interpretation of the text, 

‘‘* * * appropriate background checks 

on and ensure appropriate credentials 

* * *’’ could mean that sometimes it is 

appropriate not to conduct background 

checks on individuals with access to 

restricted areas or critical assets at highrisk chemical facilities. 

Response: DHS disagrees with the 

commenters’ interpretation of 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12). That section of CFATS 

requires that high-risk chemical 

facilities perform identity checks, 

criminal history checks, legal 

authorization to work checks, and 

terrorist ties checks on both (1) Facility 

personnel with access (unescorted or 

otherwise) to restricted areas or critical 

assets, and (2) unescorted visitors with 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets.5

Comment: One commenter 

representing farmer-owned cooperatives 

explained that it is common for farmers 

to be unescorted in or near critical 

assets or restricted areas of high-risk 

chemical facilities when picking up 

products sold by or available from those 

facilities. The commenter stated that 

such a farmer would be seen at various 

times by various people throughout 

such facilities. The commenter 

requested clarity as to whether or not 

such a farmer would be an affected 

individual. 

Response: The Department 

emphasizes that each high-risk chemical 

facility has the ability to tailor its SSP 

to meet its unique business and security 

needs, including the ability to tailor 

access control procedures for restricted 

areas and critical assets. Each high-risk 

chemical facility will need to consider 

its unique security concerns when 

determining which individuals will be 

afforded access to restricted areas or 

critical assets. If a farmer-owned 

cooperative, determined by the 

Department to be a high-risk chemical 

facility, decided to establish access 

controls such that an unescorted 

individual had access to restricted areas 

and critical assets within the high-risk 

chemical facility, then that unescorted 

individual’s information would need to 

be submitted to the Department. 

Comment: A few commenters 

requested clarity from the Department 

as to whether or not the scope of RBPS– 

12 extended beyond the physical 

perimeter of the high-risk chemical 

facility and potentially impacted 

individuals with access to networked 

computer systems. 

Response: If a networked computer 

system is listed as a restricted area or 

critical asset in an approved SSP, then 

individuals with access to that 

networked computer system would be 


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affected individuals for purposes of 

RBPS–12. 

(F) DHS Solicited Comments Which 

Respond to the Statement That a 

Federal Law Enforcement Agency May, 

if Appropriate, Contact the High-Risk 

Chemical Facility as a Part of a Law 

Enforcement Investigation Into Terrorist 

Ties of Facility Personnel 

Comment: The Department received 

several comments suggesting that 

Federal law enforcement agencies 

should not be hindered in their 

investigatory or anti-terrorism 

responsibilities. Most commenters 

believe, however, that both high-risk 

chemical facilities and individuals 

being vetted against the TSDB should, 

on a routine basis, be notified of TSDB 

vetting results. 

Response: It is the policy of the U.S. 

Government to neither confirm nor deny 

an individual’s status in the TSDB. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the policy of not 

routinely notifying high-risk chemical 

facilities of vetting results is 

inconsistent with other Federal security 

vetting programs. One commenter stated 

that another Federal background check 

program provides notice to the facility 

and the individual when an individual 

has or has not cleared a background 

check. The commenter further stated 

that, ‘‘[t]his notice does not reveal to the 

employer facts that led the agency to 

disqualify the employee, but it does 

allow the employer the opportunity to 

immediately, if appropriate, remove the 

employee from work functions that 

would allow the individual to [perform 

sensitive work functions].’’ 

Response: Providing a vetting result 

back to the facility or the individual 

being vetted would conflict with the 

U.S. Government policy to neither 

confirm nor deny an individual’s status 

in the TSDB. 

Comment: Several commenters 

requested additional information about 

the process and procedures the Federal 

Government would follow in the event 

that a known or suspected terrorist is 

identified who has or seeks access to 

restricted areas or critical assets at a 

high-risk chemical facility. 

Response: DHS will not routinely 

notify high-risk chemical facilities of 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

vetting results. DHS will coordinate 

with Federal law enforcement entities to 

monitor and/or prevent situations in 

which known or suspected terrorists 

have access to high-risk chemical 

facilities. The precise manners in which 

DHS or Federal law enforcement entities 

could contact high-risk chemical 

facilities following vetting are beyond 

the scope of this notice. 

Comment: One commenter 

recommended that the Department 

collect information on all employees 

who have CFATS-related adverse 

employment decisions, and make this 

information (not including personal 

identifiers) publically available. 

Response: DHS will not collect 

information on employment decisions 

as part of the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program. 

(G) Respond to the Department’s 

Intention To Collect Information That 

Identifies the High-risk Chemical 

Facilities, Restricted Areas and Critical 

Assets to Which Each Affected 

Individual Has Access 

Comment: One commenter supported 

the Department’s intention to collect 

information that identifies the high-risk 

chemical facilities to which each 

affected individual has access. Most 

commenters generally objected, 

however, to the Department’s intention 

to collect information that identifies the 

high-risk chemical facilities to which 

each affected individual has access. One 

commenter expressed concern that the 

ICR indicated that the Department was 

collecting information about specific 

restricted areas or critical assets within 

each facility. 

Response: As part of the Personnel 

Surety Program the Department does not 

intend to collect information that 

identifies the specific restricted areas 

and critical assets within high-risk 

chemical facilities to which each 

affected individual has or is seeking 

access. 

Comment: A common objection made 

by commenters was that the Department 

was creating a tool to track individuals’ 

movement from site to site, resulting in 

a program which far exceeds the 

Department’s stated goal of identifying 

individuals that have ties to terrorism. 

Response: DHS has no intention to 

and will not track the movement of 

affected individuals between and among 

high-risk chemical facilities. The 

Department will only require a high-risk 

chemical facility to submit information 

about an affected individual to the 

Department (through CSAT) for the 

purpose of identifying individuals with 

terrorist ties once. A high-risk chemical 

facility will not need to submit to DHS 

information about a single affected 

individual each time that affected 

individual accesses restricted areas or 

critical assets. 

As mentioned previously in this 

notice, in accordance with the proposed 

submission schedule, high-risk 

chemical facilities will also be required 

to submit updated or corrected 

information about each affected 

individual, and to notify DHS when an 

affected individual no longer has or is 

seeking access to that facility’s restricted 

areas or critical assets. 

Although the Department will not 

track the movement of affected 

individuals between and among highrisk chemical facilities, the Department 

will associate an affected individual 

with the high-risk chemical facility (or 

facilities) for which the high-risk 

chemical facility Submitter providing 

that affected individual’s information 

into CSAT is responsible. In the event 

that a Submitter enters information into 

CSAT on behalf of more than one 

facility, by default the Department will 

associate the affected individual with all 

of the facilities for which the Submitter 

is responsible. A Submitter may, 

however, modify the lists of facilities 

with which particular affected 

individuals are associated. The 

Department may contact the designated 

points of contact for particular high-risk 

chemical facilities for several reasons, 

including to identify exactly at which 

high-risk chemical facilities particular 

affected individuals have access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

Comment: Commenters objected to 

the Department’s intention to collect 

information that identifies high-risk 

chemical facilities because commenters 

claimed that this would cause the 

Department to run the risk of amassing 

so much information that the 

information collected will be 

meaningless. 

Response: The Department disagrees. 

DHS requires a minimum amount of 

information to perform checks to 

determine if affected individuals have 

ties to terrorism, and to identify the 

facilities to which affected individuals 

have access. DHS requires this 

information in order to carry out the 

terrorist ties checks required by CFATS. 

DHS is confident that that it can 

effectively collect and maintain this 

information, as appropriate. 

Comment: A few commenters 

reported that during a meeting between 

DHS and the Chemical Sector 

Coordinating Council on April 28, 2010, 

the Department stated its intention to 

collect information that identifies the 

high-risk chemical facilities, restricted 

areas, and critical assets to which each 

affected individual has access, and that 

it would use this information to conduct 

analysis and investigations. 

Response: DHS met with the 

Chemical Sector Coordinating Council 

on April 28, 2010, and reiterated the 

Department’s intention to collect 

information that identifies the high-risk 


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chemical facilities to which each 

affected individual has access. The 

Department clarified that in the event 

that a match to a record in the TSDB is 

identified, the Department would be 

able to quickly identify the specific 

chemicals of interest (COI) the match 

may have access to and the contact 

information of the appropriate person at 

the chemical facility. This information 

may prove useful in determining an 

appropriate Federal, state, or local 

response in the event that one is 

necessary. The Department emphasizes 

that there will be no ‘‘tracking’’ of 

affected individuals, nor will DHS 

collect information on specific restricted 

areas or critical assets to which an 

affected individual has or is seeking 

access, as part of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the Department should 

reach out to the facility contact that 

submitted an individual’s information 

to determine specifics about the 

individual’s site access when 

circumstances warrant. 

Response: DHS will collect 

information about facility points of 

contact in case follow-up is necessary. 

(H) DHS Solicited Comments Which 

Respond to the Department’s Intention 

to Seek an Exception to the Notice 

Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3). 

Comment: The Department received 

only a few comments in response to this 

question. None of these comments 

supported the Department’s intention to 

seek an exception to the notice 

requirement under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3). 

Response: The Department carefully 

reviewed the comments, but disagrees 

that an exception to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act (PRA) requirement, as 

contained in 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3), that 

requires information collections to 

provide certain reasonable notices, will 

pose a risk to privacy. Therefore, the 

Department will request from OMB an 

exception for the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program to the PRA requirement, 

as contained in 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3), 

which requires Federal agencies to 

confirm that their information 

collections provide certain reasonable 

notices to affected individuals. If this 

exception is granted, DHS will be 

relieved of the potential obligation to 

require high-risk chemical facilities to 

collect signatures or other positive 

affirmations of these notices from 

affected individuals. Whether or not this 

exception is granted, DHS will still 

require high-risk facilities to affirm that, 

in accordance with their Site Security 

Plans, notice required by the Privacy 

Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, has been 

given to affected individuals before their 

information is submitted to DHS. 

The Department’s request for an 

exception to the requirement under 5 

CFR 1320.8(b)(3) would not exempt 

high-risk chemical facilities from having 

to adhere to applicable Federal, state, 

local, or tribal laws, or to regulations or 

policies pertaining to the privacy of 

facility personnel and the privacy of 

unescorted visitors. 

(I) DHS Also Received Unsolicited 

Comments in Response to the 30-day 

Notice Related to the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program outlined in the ICR 

exceeds the Department’s statutory 

authority, because the proposed CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program design 

conflicts with Section 550. Commenters 

suggested that the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program’s design eliminates a 

high-risk facility’s flexibility to achieve 

compliance with RBPS–12. Specifically, 

the commenters suggested that the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

design precludes a facility from 

satisfying RBPS–12 by leveraging 

measures other than the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program to identify 

ties to terrorism, which commenters 

assert is a possible violation of Section 

550. 

Response: The CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program will not exceed the 

Department’s statutory authority, nor 

will it violate or conflict with Section 

550. DHS will provide and approve 

sufficient alternative methods for 

facility satisfaction of the terrorism ties 

background check portion of RBPS–12. 

Specifically, the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program will provide several 

options to high-risk chemical facilities, 

including the following options: 

Facilities can restrict the numbers and 

types of persons whom they allow to 

access their restricted areas and critical 

assets, thus limiting the number of 

persons who will need to be vetted 

against the TSDB. Facilities additionally 

have wide latitude in how they define 

their restricted areas and critical assets 

in their SSPs, and thus are able to limit 

or control the numbers and types of 

persons requiring TSDB screening. 

Facilities can choose to escort visitors to 

restricted areas and critical assets in lieu 

of performing the background checks 

required by RBPS–12 on them. Facilities 

can also submit different biographic 

information to DHS through CSAT for 

affected individuals holding TWIC, 

HME, NEXUS, SENTRI, or FAST 

credentials than for affected individuals 

not holding such credentials. 

Comment: Many commenters 

suggested that this ICR is improper 

because it makes changes to CFATS and 

results in de facto rulemaking. 

Specifically, commenters suggested that 

four elements of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program are changes to CFATS 

prescribing specific protocols for 

administering background checks that 

take a categorically different approach 

than all other TSDB background check 

programs currently administered in the 

United States. Those elements were: (1) 

The Department’s plan to conduct 

‘‘recurrent vetting’’ of affected 

individuals, thus requiring facilities to 

notify the Department when a person no 

longer has access to restricted areas or 

critical assets; (2) the Department’s 

intention to require facilities to submit 

updates on an approved schedule 

whenever an affected individual’s 

information has changed; (3) the 

possibility that the Department would 

not recognize TSDB vetting results 

completed by other Federal programs as 

satisfying RBPS–12’s terrorist ties check 

requirement; and (4) the Department’s 

intention to link each affected 

individual to particular high-risk 

chemical facilities. 

Response: The ICR, and the associated 

60-day and 30-day notices, do not make 

changes to CFATS. The ICR and 

associated notices provide descriptions 

of the nature of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program’s information collection, 

categories of respondents, estimated 

burden, and costs. The PRA requires the 

Department to provide sufficient detail 

about how the Department would 

collect information under the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program to enable the 

public to provide comment on that 

information collection. 

Comment: Many commenters 

suggested that the Department did not 

properly account for Executive Order 

12866 in issuing the 60- and 30-day 

notices preceding this notice. Among 

other things, Executive Order 12866 

directs agencies to assess the effects of 

Federal regulatory actions on state, 

local, and tribal governments, and the 

private sector, and to provide qualitative 

and quantitative assessments of the 

anticipated costs and benefits of Federal 

mandates resulting in annual 

expenditures of $100,000,000 or more, 

including the costs and benefits to state, 

local, and tribal governments, and the 

private sector. Commenters suggested 

that the Department carefully consider 

whether the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program ICR qualifies as a significant 

rulemaking such that it is subject to 

various requirements of Executive Order 

12866. 


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Response: The Department disagrees 

that this information collection alone 

will generate expenditures in excess of 

$100,000,000. The Department also 

disagrees that this information 

collection constitutes rulemaking. When 

the Department published CFATS, 

however, it did consider CFATS to be a 

significant rulemaking. Therefore, in 

compliance with the requirements of 

Executive Order 12866, the Department 

outlined in the CFATS Regulatory 

Assessment the assumptions it used to 

estimate the costs of CFATS, which 

included the Department’s estimates 

related to Personnel Surety in section 

6.3.10 of the CFATS Regulatory 

Assessment. 

Comment: A few commenters 

suggested that this information 

collection will have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities, which requires 

the Department to conduct a Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis in accordance with 

the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA). 

Response: The RFA mandates that an 

agency conduct an analysis when an 

agency is required to publish a notice of 

proposed rulemaking, not when 

soliciting comments in preparation of 

submitting an ICR to OMB for review 

and clearance in accordance with the 

PRA. See 5 U.S.C. 603(a). The 

Department concluded in the preamble 

to the IFR that because Congress 

authorized DHS to proceed in 

promulgating CFATS without the 

traditional notice-and-comment 

required by the Administrative 

Procedure Act, the Department was not 

required to prepare an Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) under the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act. See 72 FR 

17722 (Apr. 9, 2007). Even so, the 

Department did consider the impacts of 

CFATS on small entities. Specifically, 

the CFATS Regulatory Assessment 

contains the Department’s analysis of 

the impacts of CFATS on small entities. 

After consideration of the percentage of 

small entities that may have to comply 

with the risk-based performance 

standards (which include background 

checks under the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program) required by CFATS and 

the compliance costs explained in the 

CFATS Regulatory Assessment, the 

Department determined that CFATS 

may have a significant economic impact 

on a substantial number of small 

entities. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

that the Department remove 

administrative roadblocks that either 

complicate the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program or prohibit measures that 

would simplify and enhance the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program. Specifically, 

the commenter requested that the 

Department allow employees to apply 

for TWICs, if their individual jobs 

require them to have access to restricted 

areas or critical assets at high-risk 

chemical facilities. The commentor 

suggested that there is no language in 

MTSA that expressly prohibits the use 

of TWICs at non-maritime facilities. 

Response: TWIC’s authorizing statute, 

the Maritime Transportation Security 

Act of 2002 (MTSA), as amended, 46 

U.S.C. 70101 et seq., explicitly applies 

‘‘transportation security card’’ 

requirements to: ‘‘individual[s] allowed 

unescorted access to secure area[s] 

designated in * * * [maritime] vessel or 

[maritime] facility security plan[s]’’ 

(70105(b)(2)(A)); certain MTSA license 

and permit holders (70105(b)(2)(B)); 

maritime vessel pilots (70105(b)(2)(C)); 

maritime towing vessel personnel 

(70105(b)(2)(D)); individuals with access 

to certain protected maritime security 

information (70105(b)(2)(E)); and certain 

other individuals (70105(b)(2)(F)–(G)). 

Further, individuals are eligible to 

receive a TWIC unless, among other 

criteria, they have committed certain 

‘‘disqualifying criminal offense[s],’’ or 

do not meet certain ‘‘immigration status 

requirements.’’ 49 CFR 1572.5(a)(1)–(2). 

The CFATS authorizing statute, 

however, applies to ‘‘chemical facilities 

that * * * present high levels of 

security risk.’’ Department of Homeland 

Security Appropriations Act of 2007, 

Pub. L. 109–295, 550 (Oct. 4, 2006). 

CFATS ‘‘does not apply to facilities 

regulated pursuant to the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act of 2002.’’ 6 

CFR 27.110(b). CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program screening requirements apply 

only to high-risk chemical facilities’ 

‘‘personnel, and as appropriate * * * 

unescorted visitors with access to 

restricted areas or critical assets.’’ 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12). Individuals are not 

eligible for TWICs solely because they 

have access to high-risk chemical 

facilities covered by CFATS. 

Accordingly, the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program is not duplicative with 

the TWIC program in terms of type of 

facilities covered or program objectives. 

High-risk chemical facilities may, 

however, choose to leverage TWIC 

credentials as part of the identity, legal 

authorization to work, and criminal 

history background checks they perform 

under CFATS. See 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii). The precise 

manners in which high-risk chemical 

facilities could leverage TWIC 

credentials as part of identity, legal 

authorization to work, and criminal 

history background checks could vary 

from facility to facility, and should be 

described in individual facilities’ SSPs. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that collecting sufficient 

information to conduct the background 

checks required by RBPS–12 might 

cause high-risk chemical facilities to 

violate State privacy laws and/or the 

Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 

1681 et seq. 

Response: The Department does not 

agree that participation in the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program will cause 

high-risk chemical facilities to violate 

the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Similarly, 

the Department does not agree that 

participation in the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program will cause high-risk 

chemical facilities to violate State law. 

High-risk chemical facilities may 

conduct the identity, legal authorization 

to work, and criminal history 

background checks required by 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii) in a variety of 

ways. Although identity, legal 

authorization to work, and criminal 

history background checks are not the 

subject of this notice, the Department 

believes that high-risk chemical 

facilities can structure and carry out 

these background checks in compliance 

with all applicable Federal and state 

laws, including the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act and state privacy laws. 

Comment: One commenter stated that 

screening databases and watchlists 

should be publicly accessible to allow 

for efficient and consistent background 

checks. The commenter stated that other 

U.S. and partner nation agencies share 

this information in the public domain, 

which allows for regulated entities to 

engage third-party vendors to facilitate 

background screening. The commenter 

cited specifically Office of Foreign 

Assets Control watch lists, which are 

available to the public. 

Response: The Department does not 

agree that the TSDB should be publicly 

available. The TSDB is the U.S. 

government’s consolidated and 

integrated terrorist watchlist, used to 

identify known or suspected terrorists, 

containing sensitive information not 

appropriate for public consumption. 

The TSDB remains an effective tool in 

the government’s counterterrorism 

efforts because its contents are not 

disclosed. For example, if it was 

revealed who was in the TSDB, terrorist 

organizations would be able to 

circumvent the purpose of the terrorist 

watchlist by determining in advance 

which of their members are likely to be 

questioned or detained. 

Comment: One commenter stated that 

there is no central database that covered 

entities could query to validate that an 

already-existing background screening 

may be on file with the Department. 


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Response: DHS agrees that there is 

currently no central database that allows 

the public to determine that an 

individual has already undergone 

screening by the Department. 

Comment: One commenter was 

troubled by the information pertaining 

to RBPS–12 contained in Appendix C of 

the May 2009 Risk-Based Performance 

Standards Guidance (http://www.dhs.

gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cfats_risk

based_performance_standards.pdf), 

because the commenter believes that 

certain types of measures, procedures, 

policies, and plans mentioned in 

Appendix C are not appropriate for 

determining if chemical facility 

personnel are terrorist threats. 

Response: The Department expects 

high-risk chemical facilities to 

implement appropriate security 

measures to conduct identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

background checks. These security 

measures can vary from facility to 

facility commensurate with facilityspecific risks, security issues, and 

business practices. The guidance 

referenced by the commenter (see pages 

180 to 186 of the Risk-Based 

Performance Standards Guidance), and 

other guidance addressing identity, 

criminal history, and legal authorization 

to work background checks, however, is 

not guidance addressing compliance 

with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv), and as 

such is not the subject of this notice, nor 

is it the subject of the underlying ICR or 

of the 30- or 60-day notices preceding 

this notice. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

that the Department clarify what appeal 

or waiver options an affected individual 

has if his/her employer takes an adverse 

employment action against him/her 

based on RBPS–12 background checks 

or based on information received or 

obtained under the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. The commenter also 

requested that the Department prevent 

high-risk chemical facilities from using 

personal information collected from 

affected individuals as part of RBPS–12 

for purposes other than conducting the 

background checks required by RBPS– 

12. 

Response: High risk chemical 

facilities’ employment actions are not 

regulated by CFATS. 

The ICR the Department will submit 

to OMB, this notice, the 60-day notice, 

and the 30-day notice address the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program, not 

the identity, legal authorization to work, 

and criminal history background checks 

required by 6 CFR 230(a)(12)(i)–(iii). 

Discussion of information collected as 

part of those other three background 

checks, or employment decisions based 

on them, is beyond the scope of this 

notice. 

Conclusion 

As mentioned in the summary section 

of this notice, DHS has submitted an 

ICR to OMB for review and clearance in 

accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995. This notice 

responds to comments received during 

the 30-day notice. 

Prior to implementation of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, the 

Department will also publish a Privacy 

Impact Assessment (PIA) about the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program, 

available on the Department’s Web page 

at http://www.dhs.gov/privacy and 

http://www.dhs.gov/chemicalsecurity. 

The Department will also publish a 

System of Records Notice (SORN) for 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, 

and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

proposing to take certain Privacy Act 

exemptions for the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program System of Records. 

The Department will also publish a 

notice, and/or send notice to high-risk 

chemical facilities individually, stating 

that the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program has been implemented. In that 

notice, the Department will include 

description of how the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program will be 

implemented, as well as the information 

submission schedule high-risk chemical 

facilities will be required to follow. The 

notice will also describe how a high-risk 

chemical facility can request a variance 

from the submission schedule. 

Analysis 

Agency: Department of Homeland 

Security, National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, Office of 

Infrastructure Protection, Infrastructure 

Security Compliance Division. 

Title: CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program. 

Form: DHS Form 11000–29. 

OMB Number: 1670–NEW. 

Frequency: As required by a DHSapproved schedule. 

Affected Public: High-risk chemical 

facilities as defined in 6 CFR Part 27, 

high-risk chemical facility personnel, 

and as appropriate, unescorted visitors 

with access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. 

Number of Respondents: 1,303,700 

individuals. 

Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.54 

hours (32.4 minutes). 

Total Burden Hours: 707,200 annual 

burden hours. 

Total Burden Cost (capital/startup): 

$0.00. 

Total Burden Cost (operating/ 

maintaining): $29,704,000. 

Signed: June 6, 2011. 

David Epperson, 

Chief Information Officer, National Protection 

and Programs Directorate, Department of 

Homeland Security. 

[FR Doc. 2011–14382 Filed 6–13–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–9–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Office of the Secretary 

[Docket No. DHS–2011–0032] 

Privacy Act of 1974; Department of 

Homeland Security/National Protection 

and Programs Directorate—002 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards Personnel Surety Program 

System of Records 

AGENCY: Privacy Office, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of Privacy Act system of 

records. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of 

Homeland Security proposes to 

establish a new system of records notice 

titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland 

Security/National Protection and 

Programs Directorate—002 Chemical 

Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 

Personnel Surety Program System of 

Records.’’ This new system of records 

collects information on individuals,— 

facility personnel and unescorted 

visitors—who have or are seeking access 

to restricted areas and critical assets at 

high risk chemical facilities and 

compares this information to the 

Terrorist Screening Database, the 

terrorist watchlist maintained by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Terrorist Screening Center. The 

Department of Homeland Security is 

issuing a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking concurrently with this 

system of records elsewhere in the 

Federal Register to exempt portions of 

the system of records from one or more 

provisions of the Privacy Act because of 

criminal, civil, and administrative 

enforcement requirements. This newly 

established system of records will be 

included in the Department of 

Homeland Security’s inventory of 

record systems. 

DATES: Submit comments on or before 

July 14, 2011. This system will be 

effective July 14, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by docket number [DHS– 

2011–0032] by one of the following 

methods: 

• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 


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