THE JOINT STAFF 

 

The Terminal Conference: July–August 1945 

The Terminal Conference (also known as the Potsdam Conference) marked the final meeting of 

the Allied leaders during World War II. Held in Potsdam, Germany, from July 17 to August 2, 

1945, the conference was notable for several reasons. First, Germany had unconditionally 

surrendered on May 8, allowing the Allies to devote the majority of Terminal’s planning to the 

war against Japan. Second, two members of the original Big Three would not attend the 

conference in its entirety. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had passed away on April 12, and his 

role at the meeting was filled by his successor Harry S. Truman. Winston S. Churchill, the 

British prime minister, was only present for the first part of the conference; he was replaced on 

July 26 by the newly elected Clement R. Attlee. Of the original Big Three leaders, only Soviet 

premier Joseph Stalin attended all of the meetings at Potsdam. 

Focusing almost exclusively on the Pacific campaign, the Allied leaders and the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) discussed numerous topics related to the war against Japan. 

Primary among these was the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date; this 

was the overall objective in the Asian theater. Two other items deliberated at length during 

Potsdam were the role of British participation in the Pacific war and US Navy and Army Air 

Force operations against Japan. Although the war in Europe had officially ended, the postwar 

situation there still received attention at the conference. For instance, the disposal of war matériel 

in Germany and Austria and the internationalization of the Danube River were the subject of 

reports and memorandums by the CCS prepared for the meetings. 
Terminal was one in a series of high-level conferences held by the US and British leaders 

in Washington, DC; Casablanca; Quebec; Cairo; Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to formulate 

the Allied grand strategy. At the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet leader 

Stalin was also in attendance and played an important role. Reports, memorandums, position 

papers, and maps were prepared by the CCS for the conferences, and minutes were taken at the 

accompanying CCS meetings. Taken together, these documents address virtually every policy 

and strategy issue of the war, from troop deployments, to debates about the location and timing 

of key Allied offensives, to discussions about postwar occupation boundaries. Thus, they record 

the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as an indispensable primary source on the 

planning and conduct of World War II. 

Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 

1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as 

eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at 

the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public. 

In addition to Terminal, the other conferences are available as eBooks in Mobi, ePub, and 

PDF formats: 

Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), December 24, 1941–January 14, 1942: ISBN 

978-0-16-093887-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093886-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093888-7 (PDF) 

Post-Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), January 23–May 19, 1942: ISBN 978-0-

16-093890-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093889-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093891-7 (PDF) 

Casablanca Conference (Morocco), January 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093893-1 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093892-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093894-8 (PDF) 
Trident Conference (Washington, DC), May 12–25, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093879-5 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093878-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093880-1 (PDF) 

Quadrant Conference (Quebec City, Canada), August 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-

093882-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093881-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093883-2 (PDF) 

Sextant Conference (Cairo, Egypt), Eureka Conference (Tehran, Iran), and the Second 

Cairo Conference (Egypt), November 22–December 7, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093885-6 (Mobi); 

ISBN 978-0-16-093884-9 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093926-6 (PDF) 

Octagon Conference (Quebec City, Canada), September 12–16, 1944: ISBN 978-0-16-

093925-9 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093927-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093928-0 (PDF) 

Argonaut Conference (Malta and Yalta, Soviet Union), January 30–February 11, 1945: 

ISBN 978-0-16-093930-3 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093929-7 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093924-2 

(PDF) 

David B. Crist, PhD 

Director for Joint History 
T E R M I NA L CO N F E R E N C E 

July 1945 

PAPERS 

AND 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE 

OFFICE, U. 5. SECRETARY 

OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1945 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. 

462125 Staff Conversations with Portugal . . . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

462126 Staff Conversations with Portugal . . . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

64313 Estimate of the Enemy Situation (as of 6 July 1945) . . . (Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee) 

67916 Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships . . . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

67917 British Troopship Employment in U.S.Trans-Atlantic Programs, First Half of 1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

67918 Employment of Captured Enemy Ocean-Going Passenger 

Shipping and British Troopship Employment in U.S.TransAtlantic Programs in the First Half of 1946 . . . . . . (Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

67919 Employment of Captured Enemy Ocean-Going Passenger 

Shipping and British Troopship Employment in U.S.TransAtlantic Programs in the First Half of 1946 . . . . . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

706111 Disposal of Enemy War Mathiel in Germany and Austria 

(Report by the Combined Administrative Committee) 

706114 Disposal of Enemy War Mathiel in Germany and Austria 

TERMINAL (Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

842 French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan 

(Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

PAGE 

1 

5 

7 

45 

49 

51 

53 

55 

63 

67 

i 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. 

84211 French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

84212 French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

866 Future of Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean 

(Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

86611 Future of Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean . . ' (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

86612 Future of Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean . . (Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

877 Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

87711 Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

877/2 Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies . . . . . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

87714 Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

87715 Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

PAGE 

71 

73 

75 

77 

79 

81 

85 

87 

89 

95 

ii 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

aao Agenda for the Next United States-British Staff Conference 

(Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

101 

88011 Agenda for the Next United States-British Staff Conference 

(Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

105 

Agenda for Military Staff Conferences . . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

107 

Size of Military Staffs for TERMINAL . . . . . . .. , 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

113 

Development of Operationsinthe Pacific . . . . . . . 117 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

Agenda for Military Staff Conferences . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

109 

Chiefs of Staff) 

88016 Size of Military Staffs for TERMINAL . . . . . . . , 

(Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

115 

Chiefs of Staff) 

aaop Agenda for the Forthcoming Conference . . . . . . . (Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 111 

aaoia Planning Date for the End of Organized Resistance by Japan 121 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

a8019 Program and Procedure for the Conference . . . . . . 123 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

iii 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

880/lO Program and Procedure for the Conference . . . . . . 127 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

884 Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War 129 

(Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

88411 Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War 131 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

88412 Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War 133 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

889 British Contribution to the Final Phase of the War Against 

Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 

(Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff) 

88911 British Participation in the War Against Japan . . . . 139 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

88912 British Participation in the War Against Japan . . . . 141 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff). 

88913 British Participation in the War Against Japan . . . . 145 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

890 Control and Command in the War Against Japan . . . . 147 

(Memorandum by the Representatives of the British 

Chiefsof Staff) 

89011 Control and Command in the War Against Japan . . . . 153 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

89012 Control and Command in the War Against Japan .... 157 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

89013 Command in Indo-China ............ 159 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

891 Combined Chiefs of Staff Machinery After the War with 

Japan ................... 161 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

89111 Combined Chiefs of Staff Machinery After the War with 

Japan ................... 165 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

892 Progress Report on Operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command .................. 167 

(Report by the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Southeast Asia) 

89212 Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia 175 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

893 General Progress Report on Recent Operations in the Pacific 181 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

89311 Progress Report on Operations in China, April 1944 through 

June 1945 .................. 191 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

894 Report on Army Air Operations in the War Against Japan 205 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

a95 Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in 

Far Eastern Operations ............. 217 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff) 

89511 Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in 

Far Eastern Operations ............. 223 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

89512 Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in 

Far Eastern Operations ............. 225 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

896 Internationalizationof theDanubeRiver ....... 227 

(Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff) 

89611 Internationalizationof theDanubeRiver ....... 233 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff) 

a97 Provision of Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of 

Allied Governments ............... 235 

(Report by the Combined Military Transportation 

Committee in consultation with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board) 

Provision of Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of 

Allied Governments ............... 243 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

900/3 Report to the President and Prime Minister ...... 247 

(Note by the Secretaries) 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 193d Meeting .................. 269 

Program and Procedure for the Conference 

Estimate of the Enemy Situation 

Progress Reports on Operations in the Pacific and Southeast 

Asia Command 

Development of Operations in the Pacific 

Report on Army Air Operations in the War Against Japan 

C.C.S. 194th Meeting .................. 273 

British Participation in the War Against Japan 

C.C.S. 195th Meeting .................. 279 

French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan 

Staff Conversations with Portugal 

Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Area 

Control and Command in the War Against Japan 

C.C.S. 196th Meeting .................. 285 

Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in 

Far Eastern Operations 

Combined Chiefs of Staff Machinery After the War with Japan 

Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War 

Planning Date for the End of Organized Resistance by Japan 

Appointment of Colonel Douglas to Allied Commission in Italy 

vii 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 197th Meeting .................. 291 

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia 

Disposal of Enemy War Matkriel in Germany and Austria 

C.C.S. 198th Meeting .................. 295 

Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies 

British Troopship Employment in the U.S. Trans-Atlantic Programs, First Half of 1946 

Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships 

C.C.S. 199th Meeting .................. 299 

Employment of Captured Enemy Ocean-Going Passenger Shipping and British Troopship Employment in US. TransAtlantic Programs in the First Half of 1946 

Provision of Personnel Ships for the Requirements of Allied 

Governments 

Command in French Indo-China 

Report to the President and Prime Minister 

Control of Allied Naval Units other than US. at Present Under 

Command of Seventh US.Fleet 

C.C.S. 200th Meeting .................. 303 

200th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

viii 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF TERMINAL 

PLENARY MEETING 

PAGE 

Plenary Meeting between the United States and Great Britain . . . 307 

Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies 

Provision of Supplies and Equipment to Great Britain 

Equipment and Supplies for Forces of Occupation other than 

American 

United Kingdom Import Program 

British Participation in the War Against Japan 

ix 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF TERMINAL 

TRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETING 

PAGE 

Tripartite Military Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 

Intentions and Plans of the U.S.S.R. with Reference to the 

Japanese 

Japanese Lines of Communication with Manchuria 

Strength and Distribution of the Japanese Forces 

Employment of US. Troops Redeployed from the European 

Theater 

Operations of the US. Naval Forces in the War Against Japan 

Operations of the U.S. Army Air Forces in the War Against 

Japan 

Operations to Increase Movement of Supplies into China 

Operations to Maintain a Line of Communicationsvia the North 

Pacific 

Operations in Southeast Asia 

X 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

US.-U.S.S.R. CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PAGE 

Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and of the Soviet 

Union ...................... 325 

Establishment of Radio Stations for Transmitting Weather 

Data 

US.-U.S.S.R. Zones of Naval and Air Operations in the Sea of 

Japan 

US.-U.S.S.R. Zones of Air Operations in Korea and Manchuria 

Establishment of Liaison Groups between the American and 

Soviet Commanders in the Far East 

Emergency Port and Airfield Facilities 

Line of Communications from Kyushu to Vladivostok 

Weekly Report of Operations 

INDEX ................ .... 339 

xi 
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C.C.S. 462125 

C.C.S. 462/26 

STAFF CONVERSATIONS WITH PORTUGAL 

References: 

CCS 195th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 17 

C.C.S. 462/25, a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, dated 

16 July 1945, and C.C.S. 462/26, a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, 

dated 18 July, were considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 195th 

Meeting (18 July). The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the letter to the 

Department of State and Foreign Office in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 462/25, as 

amended by C.C.S. 462/26. 
16 July 1945 

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C.C.S. 462/25 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

STAFF CONVERSATIONS WITH PORTUGAL 

Reference: 

CCS 462 Series 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The report by the Combined Administrative Committee in consultation 

with the Combined Staff Planners in C.C.S. 462/19* on the report of the 

Anglo-American Military Mission (C.C.S. 462/15*) relative to proposals for 

Portuguese participation in Allied operations for the recapture of Timor was 

submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 3 January 1945. This report 

recommended that a letter be dispatched to the Department of State and 

Foreign Office setting forth the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

on the staff conversations with the Portuguese. Action on C.C.S. 462/19 has 

been deferred at the request of the British Chiefs of Staff. As a result the 

Department of State and Foreign Office have not as yet been advised of the 

conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the staff conferences held with 

the Portuguese although these conversations were held some nine months 

ago. The Department of State is pressing the United States Chiefs of Staff 

for information regarding the details of the plan for Portuguese participation 

in any operations directed toward liberation of Timor. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff understand that the British Chiefs of 

Staff’s delay in acting on C.C.S. 462/19 is due to lack of information from 

Australia on that country’s ability to provide accommodations for the Portuguese contingent. The end of the war in Europe makes out of date the draft 

letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office contained in Appendix 

“A” of C.C.S. 462/19 in two particulars. The United States Chiefs of Staff 

have therefore revised the letter to the Department of State and Foreign 

Office contained in Appendix “A” to C.C.S. 462/19 along broader lines. It is 

recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the enclosed letter 

to the Department of State and Foreign Office. In view of the urgency of the 

matter, the United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate prompt consideration of this paper by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

Not published herein. 

2 
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ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT 

LETTER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICE 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff on 2 September 1944 appointed an AngloAmerican Military Mission to enter into conversations with Portuguese military 

authorities to discuss Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations 

as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have arrived at the following conclusions on 

the report of this mission:­

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to 

expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement with the Portuguese military authorities as to the direct use of 

Portuguese forces, they have recognized the possibility of such use and 

agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in 

staff conversations in Lisbon. 

b. As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental 

combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 

400 native troops), the larger force is acceptable and can be trained in the 

theater. 

c. The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the 

small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, 

mechanics, and radio specialists. 

d. There is no objection from the military viewpoint to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis 

for transfer is an action to be taken on a governmental level. 

e. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in accepting Portuguese participation 

do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese 

Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use 

Portuguese troops in any other area. 

f. Military operations against Portuguese Timor must for the present 

await the completion of operations against higher priority Japanese-held 

objectives. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will notify the Portuguese military 

3 
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authorities of impending operations against Portuguese Timor in time for 

them to prepare their troops for participation therein. Details as to the 

assembly, shipment, training, and equipping of the Portuguese force will 

be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the appropriate time. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the disclosure of 

any of the above information to the Portuguese if the Department of State or 

Foreign Office deem it necessary in diplomatic conversations. The participation 

of Portuguese forces in the liberation of Portuguese Timor is considered of 

little importance in the war against Japan. 

4 
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C.C.S. 462/26 18 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

STAFF CONVERSATIONS WITH PORTUGAL 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We have considered the memorandum (C.C.S. 462/25) by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff and are in general agreement with the draft letter to 

the Department of State and Foreign Office attached as the Enclosure thereto. 

2. We propose, however, two minor amendments as follows:­

a. In subparagraph b. of the proposed letter, it is stated that “the 

larger force is acceptable and can be trained in the theater.” The situation 

in this respect is that the Australian authorities have informed us that 

they cannot accept any Portuguese force. An inquiry has now been addressed to the Commander in Chief, Ceylon, asking him whether he can 

accept the Portuguese and, if so, the size of force he can accommodate, 

pointing out that we prefer the larger force. 

No reply has yet been received. We cannot, therefore, be certain 

which of the two forces we can accept or where the training area will be. 

We, therefore, propose that subparagraph b. of the draft letter should 

read as follows:­

“As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both 

including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more 

acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area.” 

b. We suggest that the last sentence of the draft letter may be interpreted as failing to give due weight to the political desirability of Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor. 

We propose that the sentence should read:­

“The participation of Portuguese forces in the liberation of Portuguese Timor is considered of little military importance in the war 

against Japan.” 

5 
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3. Subject to the above amendments, we recommend that the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff approve the despatch of the letter to the Department of State 

and the Foreign Office as proposed in C.C.S. 462/25. 

6 
SECRET 

C.C.S. 64313 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 

(asof 6 July 1945) 

References: 

CCS 880, paragraph 1 (1) 

CCS 193d Meeting, Item 2 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of C.C.S. 64313 in their 193d 

Meeting (16 July). 

7 
SECRET 

C.C.S. 64313 8 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 

(asof 6 July 1945) 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosed report prepared by the Combined Intelligence Committee 

in reference to paragraph 1 (1) of C.C.S. 880 as directed by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff is submitted for consideration. 

A. 3. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

8 
SECRET 

INDEX TO C.C.S.643/3 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 

(asof 6 July 1945) 

PAGE 

The Problem 

1. To Estimate the Japanese Situation and Intentions 

Summary 

2. Over-All Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. Economic Situation . . . . . ... . .. ....... 

4. Armed Forces 

a. Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

b. Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 

c. Naval . . , . . . . , , . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 

5. Defense of Japan., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6. Korea, Manchuria, and North China . . . . . . . . . . 

7. Central and South China and Formosa . . . . . . . 

8. Southern Areas............... ................ 

9. Pacific Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 

10. Political Situation , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Conclusions 

11. Probable Military Strategy . . , . . . . . . . . . 

12. Probable Political Strategy . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . 

13. Possibility of Surrender . . . . . ..... ..... 

.....,........ 12 

.............. 13 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 

. . , . , . . . . . . . 15 

. . . , . , . . . . . . . 15 

.. .......... 16 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 

... .......... 16 

. . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

. . . . . . . . . . . . 18 

....... .. 18 

Appendix “A”-Economic Situation 

1. General . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 

2. Transportation 

a. Shipping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 

b. Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 

c. Roads . . . ... ...... .. . . . .... 21 

9 

12 
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PAGE 

3. Industry 

a. General ..................... 

b. Shipbuilding ................. 

c. Armaments ................. 

d. Aircraft ..................... 

e. Electronics .................. 

f. Steel ........................ 

g. Aluminum .............................................. 

.................... 21 

...................... 22 

...................... 22 

...................... 22 

...................... 22 

...................... 23 

23 

h. Non-ferrous Metals ....................................... 23 

i. Chemicals and Fertilizer ................................... 23 

4. Petroleum Products 

a. Aviation Fuel ............................................ 23 

b. Lubricating Oils ......................................... 24 

c. Other Petroleum Products ................................. 24 

5. Coal ...................................................... 24 

6. Food ....................................................... 24 

7. Manpower .................................................. 25 

8. Civilian Supply ............................................. 25 

9. Regional Economic Administration ........................... 25 

Appendiz “F’-Armed Forces 

Ground Forces 

1. Japanese ................................................... 27 

2. Puppets .................................................... 27 

3. National Volunteer Army .................................... 27 

Air Forces 

4. Aircraft Strength 

a. General ................................................. 28 

b. Production .............................................. 29 

c. Wastage ................................................. 29 

d. Future Combat Aircraft Strength .......................... 29 

e. Trainers ................................................. 29 

10 
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PAGE 

5. Deployment ................................................ 29 

6. Capabilities ................................................ 30 

Naval Forces 

7. Strength 30 

MapJapanese Armed Forces-Ground .......................... 32 

Appendix “C-Capabilities and Intentions for the Defense of Japan 

Proper 

1. Present Strength and Dispositions 

a. Ground ................................................ 33 

b. Air ..................................................... 33 

c. Naval .................................................... 33 

2. Capabilities ................................................ 33 

3. Intentions ................................................. 34 

Appendix “D”-Military Situation, Capabilities, and Intentionsin Korea, 

Manchuria, and North China ...................... 36 

Appendix “E”-Military Situation, Capabilities. and Intentions in Central and South China and Formosa ............... 37 

Appendix “F-Situation. Capabilities. and Intentions in the Southern 

Areas ............................................ 38 

Appendix “G-Situation in the Pacific Islands ....................... 40 

Appendix “H”-Political Situation 

1. General Situation ........................................... 41 

2. Internal Political Situation ................................... 41 

3. Foreign.Policy .............................................. 42 

4. Possibility of Surrender...................................... 43 

11 
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ENCLOSURE 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 

(as of 6 July 1945) 

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To estimate the Japanese situation and intentions. 

SUMMARY 

2. Over-All Situation. Recent advances in the western Pacific, culminating 

in the capture of Okinawa, provide the Allies with bases from which effective 

air attacks can be directed against all important areas under Japanese control. Furthermore, the Allies are now in possession of potential forward bases 

for an invasion of the Japanese home islands, Korea, or the central China coast. 

Air bases in the interior of China are being recaptured and may be more fully 

utilized. In addition, increasing Soviet forces in the Maritime Provinces and 

along the Amur River threaten Manchuria and the areas bordering the 

Japan Sea. 

On the continent the Japanese are now forced to depend upon inadequate and vulnerable land communications. Japan’s seaborne communications with all areas south of the Yangtze River have been practically severed. 

Sea traffic between Japan proper and ports from Shanghai northward to 

southern Korea is limited to hazardous runs along the Korean and North 

China coasts. Even the relatively short shipping routes across the Sea of 

Japan and the Tsushima Straits are increasingly menaced by Allied mining, 

aerial, and submarine activities. 

The southern areas are not only cut off from the home islands, but the 

Japanese find it increasingly difficult to maintain communications between the 

various territories in the south which are still in their possession. 

Sea and air operations have virtually destroyed the capability of the 

Japanese naval and air forces for other than suicide operations against our 

forces. Blockade, and air attacks on productive capacity and concentrated 

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reserves of matkriel, are seriously impairing remaining Japanese defensive 

capabilities. The incendiary bombing attack of Japanese cities has had a profound psychological and economic effect on the Japanese. The complete 

destruction of major areas in all of the important war production centers is 

placing a tremendous strain upon residual economy, substituting appreciably 

for the lack of high combat expenditures and producing a chaotic condition 

in administration and control, which will greatly accelerate the effects of 

subsequent all-out attacks upon transportation. On the other hand, stocks 

of ammunition and ammunition production facilities still require intensive and 

extremely heavy attacks to produce any shortage significant to the interests 

of invasion and occupation. 

3. Economic Situation. (Appendix “A”). The Japanese economic position 

has deteriorated greatly. The resources of the Outer Zone are no longer available. Transportation between the complementary parts of the Inner Zone* 

(food and raw materials from North China, Manchuria, and Korea in return 

for finished products of the islands of Japan) has been seriously curtailed 

during the last few months, owing to the shortage of shipping (now only 

1,300,000gross registered tons of operable ships over 1,000tons), Allied submarine and mining activities, and aerial bombardment. Thus, heavy industry 

in Japan is currently able to produce only at rates far below the capacity of 

existing plant facilities. For example, although peak production of steel in 

the islands of Japan has never exceeded 6,000,000 metric tons, current production is only at the rate of 3,500,000tons. Production of aluminum, chemicals, 

and fertilizers is also hampered by the transportation difficulties. 

Increasingly heavy air attacks, supplementing continued and intensified 

blockade, are seriously reducing Japan’s residual production. The output of 

end products has been substantially lowered. Recent aircraft production is 

estimated at 1,200-1,500combat planes monthly, as compared with a peak 

production of 2,300reached late in 1944.The Japanese are so short of aviation 

fuel that orthodox air operations of a sustained nature in any significant 

force are improbable, although sufficient gasoline will be available to meet 

their capabilities for all-out suicide attacks. The electronics industry is not 

able to provide the armed forces with adequate supplies of radar or of radio 

and sound equipment. On the other hand, reserves of ordnance, other than 

heavier types of equipment, are believed to be large. 

Manpower is not in general a limiting factor on either Japanese production or the size of her army. Bombing of industrial facilities in urban 

areas has led to workers being released to agriculture. 

” Japan proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, and Karafuto (Sakhalin) . 

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There is increasing evidence of Japanese concern with regard to the 

food situation in Japan proper. Only slight decreases in over-all food supplies 

are, however, anticipated during 1945,although urban dwellers may be seriously affected by disturbances in distribution and losses of stocks resulting 

from air attacks. More acute is the shortage of consumer goods, the supply of 

which has been inadequate and which has been aggravated by the current 

bombings. Partly with an eye to an impending disruption of transport, the 

Japanese have set up eight regional administrations, each possessing sweeping 

powers to perform as well as possible in case of emergency. 

4. Armed Forces. (Appendix “B”). 

a. Ground. The ground component of the Japanese armed forces remains 

Japan’s greatest military asset. There are at present some 110infantry and 

four armored divisions in the Japanese Army with a total strength of about 

4,600,000men. They are disposed as shown in the map attached to Appendix 

“B.” This force will probably be increased by about 30 divisions by the end 

of the year; some of these new units may be in existence at present. About 

1,000,000 men, however, are now for all practical purposes isolated from 

the Japanese Inner Zone. The remainder, some 95 divisions (over 4,000,000 

men), will be disposed in the main Japanese islands, Korea, Manchuria, 

and in China north of the Yangtze. 

In addition to their regular ground forces, the Japanese have some 

300,000 Manchurian and 900,000Chinese puppet troops of questionable 

combat value, but capable of guarding lines of communications and performing service duties. Some defections among the Chinese puppets will 

occur as operations progress. There will probably be a considerable reduction in their strength by the end of 1945. 

b. Air. Until September 1944,the Japanese air forces steadily increased 

in size. Since that time they have suffered a substantial reduction in 

strength. The total strength of combat aircraft assigned to both tactical 

and training units has been reduced from 8,200 as of 1 September 1944 to 

about 5,000as of late June 1945.Thus the availability of combat aircraft 

has been already lowered during this period by about 40 percent. As a 

result of the greatly expanded Allied air action against Japan, the Japanese 

aircraft industry, as well as airfield installations, supplies, and repair facilities will suffer greatly during the next few months. 

The Japanese believe their maximum air capability to be in the employment of suicide tactics, directed primarily against ships. Currently the Japanese High Command is doing everything possible to improve the training, 

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planning, and accomplishment of suicide air missions. Apparently they 

have decided to sacrifice future air potential in favor of maximum employment of all available aircraft and pilots to meet any actual invasion. Great 

numbers of trainer-type aircraft are being equipped for suicide missions and 

pilot trainees are being assigned to suicide units. 

The current trend of deployment, which we expect will continue, indicates that the Japanese will in the near future have over 90 percent of their 

entire air strength concentrated in the main Japanese islands, Korea, 

Manchuria, and North China. 

c. Naval. The Japanese Navy has been reduced in size to about the 

equivalent of one small and unbalanced task force. With the exception of 

two damaged cruisers, one destroyer, and some submarines in the Singapore 

area, remaining battleships, carriers, and cruisers appear to be immobilized 

in home waters. Their main capability and probable employment hereafter 

will be in suicide attacks by a small task force, and harassing and suicide 

operations by small surface craft and submarine attacks. Extensive mine 

fields probably exist in the vicinity of important harbors and other strategic 

areas around the homeland. 

5. Defense of Japan. (Appendix “C).The defense of the main islands of 

Japan is receiving and will continue to receive the primary attention of 

the Japanese. 

We estimate that by late 1945 there will be available in the Japanese 

home islands and their outposts in the Ryukyus, Izu-Bonins, and Kuriles more 

than 35 active divisions and 14 depot divisions, which, plus army troops, will 

total over 2,000,000 men. The Japanese also will continue development of the 

“National Volunteer Army” and may form combat home defense units to 

supplement their regular armed forces. Fanatical resistance will be offered in 

the defense of any of the home islands. The Japanese would commit all ground 

forces they could sustain in action in the defense of Kyushu and that part of 

Honshu which includes the Kanto Plain, Nagoya, and Osaka areas, while 

considerably weaker defense would be expected in other parts of Honshu, 

Shikoku, and Hokkaido for both logistical and strategical reasons. 

We believe that in the defense of any one of the main Japanese islands, 

except possibly Hokkaido, the Japanese would commit against us, primarily 

in suicide operations, all available aircraft, either in tactical or training units. 

Such attacks would be continued to the limit of their capability without regard 

for conservation of air strength for any possible later need. 

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Remaining Japanese naval units would be also sacrificed to the limit 

of their capability in the all-out effort to repel our invasion of any one of the 

main Japanese islands. 

6. Korea, Manchuria, and North China. (Appendix “D). The Japanese 

ground forces in this area now total over 1,200,000 men (24 active divisions and 

5 depot divisions). In anticipation of a possible Soviet entry into the war, these 

forces will be further increased by withdrawals from Central and South China, 

and we believe they might have about 1,500,000 men, including more than 40 

divisions, in this area by the end of the year. In so far as they are able to do so, 

the Japanese are preparing for an independent defense of Manchuria, Korea, 

and North China, and it is unlikely that any substantial reinforcements or 

supplies will be sent hereafter to this area from Japan proper. We believe that in 

the event of war with the U.S.S.R., opposition to the Soviets would be left 

primarily to the Japanese ground forces and that Japan would continue to 

commit the great bulk of its air strength against us in defense of the home 

islands. 

7. Central and South China and Formosa. (Appendix “E). The Japanese 

now have about 650,000 men (20 divisions) in Central and South China and 

another 190,000 men (5 divisions) in Formosa. However, the rapid advance 

of Allied forces in the Pacific, the interdiction of Japan’s shipping routes, 

apprehension regarding the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war, and the growing 

threat of Allied invasion of the east China Coast are forcing the Japanese 

to shift strength in China northward. We believe that the Japanese are prepared, if circumstances necessitate, to abandon all holdings in China south of 

the Yellow River, leaving a force of about 125,000, including four divisions in 

the Canton-Hong Kong area, and a force of 160,000, including six divisions in 

the Shanghai-Nanking area to deny them to the Allies. Japanese forces in 

Formosa are cut off and will remain substantially unchanged in numbers. 

8. Southern Areas. (Appendix “F). The Japanese in the southern areas 

(over 600,000 men) have been cut off from the home islands and will receive 

no further reinforcement or supply. We believe that they will form a perimeter 

of defense running generally through southeast Burma, Thailand, Malaya, 

Sumatra,Java, Borneo, and French Indo-China. Island areas outside this perimeter will be defended by local garrisons. Redistribution of forces within the 

area will be difficult owing to Allied action and to the very limited transportation facilities. No offensive capability exists, but defense will be determined on 

the part of local ground forces, using the resources initially available to them. 

9. Pacific Islands. (Appendix “G). Japanese ground forces cut off in the 

Pacific islands (the Mandates, Solomons, Bismarcks, New Guinea, and the 

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Philippines), amounting to about 300,000 men, have no offensive capabilities, 

but will hold out to the maximum extent of their ability. 

10. Political Situation. (Appendix “H”).The political situation in Japan 

is dominated by the progressive deterioration of the military situation. The 

Japanese Diet has now practically legislated itself out of existence and the 

Government has assumed sweeping powers that enable it to rule by decree. 

The Government thus hopes to be in a position to act without fear of major 

opposition, whether it should determine to continue the war to the bitter end 

or to seek peace. 

The Japanese still find unconditional surrender unacceptable, but they 

are becoming increasingly desirous of a compromise. Fully aware of the growing weakness of Japan’s position, her leaders will make desperate attempts 

to keep the Soviet Union at least neutral, to sow civil strife in China, and to 

win the support of conquered peoples. In their present dilemma they are playing for time in the hope that Allied war weariness, jealousies, and conflicts of 

aims, or some “miracle,” will present a method of extricating them from their 

admitted critical situation. 

CONCLUSIONS 

11. Probable Military Strategy. The primary preoccupation of the Japanese 

High Command at present is the defense of the home islands, especially Kyushu 

and Honshu. For this defense they may dispose by the end of 1945 more than 

35 active divisions plus 14 depot divisions, which, with army troops, will total 

over 2,000,000 men. Except possibly in the case of Hokkaido, all available aircraft will be employed in the defense of the home islands, mainly in suicide 

operations. Their air effort might amount initially to 400-500 sorties of combattype aircraft and 200-300 sorties of trainer-type aircraft during any 24-hour 

period; this effort will, however, decline rapidly. Similarly all remaining naval 

units will be employed in suicide operations in defense of the homeland. 

The secondary preoccupation of the Japanese is to build up their forces 

in Manchuria, Korea, and North China against the Soviet threat. There they 

might dispose up to 40 divisions, totalling about 1,500,000 men, by December 

of this year. Reinforcements will come from Central and South China. They 

are unlikely to make a strong air effort in defense of Manchuria at the expense of the defense of Japan. If circumstances require it, the Japanese are 

prepared to abandon all of China south of the general line Tungkuan-KaifengNanking-Hangchow, except for the Canton-Hong Kong pocket, which they will 

hold with a strong garrison. 

17 
All other areas will be regarded as of minor importance only. They will 

not be reinforced from the Inner Zone, but their garrisons will be ordered to 

resist to the last in order to contain Allied forces which might otherwise be 

used against Japan, and in order to deny to the Allies strategic materials and 

bases in their areas. Strategy in these outlying areas will, therefore, be designed to keep Japanese forces in being rather than to defend particular 

objectives to the last or to undertake more than, at the most, local counteroffensives. 

12. Probable Political Strategy. In general, Japan will use all political 

means for avoiding complete defeat or unconditional surrender. During the 

next few months the future political strategy of the Government will exhibit 

the following aims: To, 

a. Continue and even increase its attempts to secure complete political 

unity within the Empire, possibly through personal rule, real or apparent,

of the Emperor. 

b. Attempt to foster a belief among Japan’s enemies that the war will 

prove costly and long drawn out if the United Nations insist on fighting 

until the complete conquest of Japan. 

c. Make desperate efforts to persuade the U.S.S.R. to continue her neutrality, if necessary by offering important territorial or other concessions, 

while at the same time making every effort to sow discord between the 

Americans and British on one side and the Russians on the other. As the 

situation deteriorates still further, Japan may even make a serious attempt 

to use the U.S.S.R. as a mediator in ending the war. 

d. Put out intermittent peace feelers, in an effort to bring the war to 

an acceptable end, to weaken the determination of the United Nations to 

fight to the bitter end, or to create inter-Allied dissension. 

e. Take all possible advantage of estranged relations between the Communists and Kuomintang factions in China. 

13. Possibility of Surrender. The Japanese ruling groups are aware of the 

desperate military situation and are increasingly desirous of a compromise 

peace, but still find unconditional surrender unacceptable. The basic policy 

of the present government is to fight as long and as desperately as possible 

in the hope of avoiding complete defeat and of acquiring a better bargaining 

position in a negotiated peace. Japanese leaders are now playing for time in 

the hope that Allied war weariness, Allied disunity, or some “miracle,” will present an opportunity to arrange a compromise peace. 

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We believe that a considerable portion of the Japanese population now 

consider absolute military defeat to be probable. The increasing effects of sea 

blockade and cumulative devastation wrought by strategic bombing, which 

has already rendered millions homeless and has destroyed from 25 to 50 percent 

of the built-up area of Japan’s most important cities, should make this realization increasingly general. An entry of the Soviet Union into the war would 

finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat. Although 

individual Japanese willingly sacrifice themselves in the service of the nation, 

we doubt that the nation as a whole is predisposed toward national suicide. 

Rather, the Japanese as a nation have a strong concept of national survival, 

regardless of the fate of individuals. They would probably prefer national 

survival, even through surrender, to virtual extinction. 

The Japanese believe, however, that unconditional surrender would be 

the equivalent of national extinction. There are as yet no indications that the 

Japanese are ready to accept such terms. The ideas of foreign occupation of 

the Japanese homeland, foreign custody of the person of the Emperor, and the 

loss of prestige entailed by the acceptance of “unconditional surrender” are 

most revolting to the Japanese. To avoid these conditions, if possible, and, in 

any event, to insure survival of the institution of the Emperor, the Japanese 

might well be willing to withdraw from all the territory they have seized on 

the Asiatic continent and in the southern Pacific, and even to agree to the 

independence of Korea and to the practical disarmament of their military 

forces. 

A conditional surrender by the Japanese Government along the lines 

stated above might be offered by them at any time from now until the time of 

the complete destruction of all Japanese power of resistance. 

Since the Japanese Army is the principal repository of the Japanese 

military tradition it follows that the army leaders must, with a sufficient 

degree of unanimity, acknowledge defeat before Japan can be induced to 

surrender. “his might be brought about either by the defeat of the main 

Japanese armies in the Inner Zone or through a desire on the part of the army 

leaders to salvage something from the wreck with a view to maintaining military tradition. For a surrender to be acceptable to the Japanese Army, it would 

be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it would not entail discrediting warrior tradition and that it would permit the ultimate resurgence 

of a military Japan. 

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APPENDIX “A” 

ECONOMIC SITUATION 

1. General. The Japanese economic position has deteriorated considerably 

during the past year. Important raw materials from the southern areas, such 

as non-ferrous metals, high grade iron ore, bauxite, oil, and rubber are no 

longer available. The severe cut in the size of the Japanese merchant marine, 

rail transportation difficulties on the continent, and continuing direct attacks 

against Japanese industrial facilities and urban areas by United States bombers 

have reduced the war potential of the Inner Zone substantially below the 

levels of a year ago. 

The Inner Zone itself is no longer an economic entity. The hazards to 

enemy shipping in the Sea of Japan, particularly in the Tsushima and Korean 

Straits area by Allied air and submarine attacks and the mining of the coastal 

waters has seriously disrupted movements of essential supplies across this 

last remaining lifeline between Japan proper and the continent. The shortage 

of minesweepers and escorts for convoys further restricts the use of these remaining shipping lanes and causes additional deterioration of the Japanese 

economic situation. 

2. Transportation. 

a. Shipping. Deterioration of the Japanese shipping position begun in 

1943 and accelerated during 1944 continues to be one of the principal 

factors affecting Japan’s industrial effort. Heavy losses already sustained 

by Japan’s merchant fleet, as well as current Allied naval and air operations 

against the remainder of this fleet, prevent Japan from utilizing to the full 

extent even the resources of the Inner Zone in spite of fairly short hauls 

and less vulnerable routes. Despite capture of some 700,000 tons of foreign 

ships and an increased 1944rate of shipbuilding,Japan’spre-war merchant 

tonnage of some 6,000,000 tons* of steel ships of 1,000tons and over has 

been reduced to an estimated operable 1,300,000tons including a large tonnage of tankers. There are, in addition, a large number of smaller ships 

available. The need for the convoy system and the mining of the coastal 

waters further limits the efficient employment of the reduced shipping 

which is available. 

The present major demands on Japanese shipping are for the movement 

of coal, pig iron, iron ore, aluminous shale, salt, and foodstuffs from the 

* Figures are in gross registered tons. 

Appendix “A” 

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continent; coal, lumber, and pulp from Karafuto; coal and other commodities between points in Japan proper; commodities between points on the 

continent; and troops and military supplies throughout the area. 

b. Railroads. The railways in Japan, supplemented by coastal shipping, 

are currently capable of carrying the essential industrial and military 

freight. Air attacks to date probably have not seriously impaired rail operations. 

The system of rail lines, however, is relatively vulnerable to attack 

by air. Steep grades and numerous tunnels, bridges, and retaining walls 

are characteristic features of all the lines. Vulnerable bottlenecks exist at 

the rail tunnel between Honshu and Kyushu and the rail ferries connecting Honshu with Hokkaido and with Shikoku. 

The decline in their merchant fleet has forced the Japanese to rely, 

for the major portion of their imports of continental materials, upon the 

railways leading from North China and Manchuria to the Korean ports 

facing Japan. Because of the limited capacity of those lines and of operating 

difficulties which have been encountered, the Japanese have been able to 

import much less of those materials than have been available at the points 

of production. 

c. Roads. The road systems of Japan and of other Inner Zone areas are 

not very highly developed and consist of a few trunk gravel-surfaced roads 

connecting the main cities and a number of rather poorly constructed and 

maintained connecting roads. Long distance truck transport is of little 

importance,and trucks have been used mainly for local distribution. There 

is a shortage of trucks, fuel, servicing facilities, and repair parts. 

3. Industry. 

a. General. Because of the shortage of merchant shipping and the interdiction of transport routes, the islands of Japan are being cut off from the 

continental areas. The continental areas and the islands of Japan are economically complementary to each other, the former supplying Japan with 

raw materials and food, and the latter supplying the continent with finished 

products. Raw materials are being accumulated on the continent for which 

t.here is insufficient processing capacity, while Japanese processing equipment is becoming increasingly idle as stock piles decrease. Lowered war 

production in the Inner Zone as a whole has resulted. 

The Japanese have received assistance from t.he Germans in the 

form of techniques, devices, and weapons, the employment of which might 

have a bearing on the war in the Pacific. Among the most important items 

Appendix “A” 

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are electronics, ordnance, rockets, guided missiles, submarines, aircraft, and 

jet propulsion. Japanese capability to utilize this assistance effectively, however, is limited. 

b. Shipbuilding. We believe that the rate of construction of merchant 

ships of 1,000 gross registered tons and over, which reached an average of 

100,000 tons per month in 1944 has declined in recent months to about 

75,000 tons and will decline progressively from now on. 

c. Armaments. 

(1) Ordnance. We estimate that the manufacture of weapons in the 

Inner Zone for ground troops had produced large reserves of light 

weapons by 1July 1945. Reserves of divisional weapons will be sufficient 

to equip more than 30 new divisions, except for modern field artillery. 

Additional reserves of 1,000,000 rifles, 10,000 light machine guns, and 

2,000 anti-tank guns are believed to be available. No appreciable reserve 

of tanks or of certain important heavy artillery weapons is believed to 

exist. 

(2) Ammunition. We believe that the Japanese have accumulated in 

the islands of Japan a substantial stock of small arms ammunition. 

There are indications, however, that artillery ammunition is in tight 

supply and that practice ammunition has been curtailed. Recently there 

has been emphasis on anti-aircraft ammunition production at the expense of other types. 

Depending on the number of divisions involved and the severity of 

the fighting, the Japanese have adequate supplies of ground ammunition to resist invasion for many months. 

d. Aircraft. Aircraft production has declined from a peak of about 2,300 

planes per month as of the end of 1944 to a recent production of 1,200 to 

1,500 aircraft per month. Bombing of aircraft assembly and engine plants 

and the subsidiary industries accounts for much of the decline, but an 

important temporary contributing factor was the dispersal of plants in 

the early part of 1945. As a result of dispersal, it is unlikely that production 

can be reduced much below its present rate by precision attacks on the 

factories alone. Attacks on industrial areas and transportation will have 

a considerable indirect effect on the aircraft industry, however, and it is 

possible that four or five months of such attacks will reduce Japanese aircraft production to about 1,000 planes a month. 

e. Electronics. The Japanese electronics industry is not able to provide 

the armed forces with adequate supplies of radar, or of radio and sonic 

equipment, despite the high priority given the industry. 

Appendix “A” 

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f. Steel. The islands of Japan have plant facilities for producing over 

10,000,000tons of steel ingots annually, but neither before nor during the 

war has production exceeded 6,000,000 metric tons. Imports of iron ore have 

been declining progressively since early in the war and coal imports have 

been declining since at least the beginning of 1944.Domestic production 

of iron ore in Japan is estimated, at a maximum, at one million tons per 

year of iron content. An additional 2,500,000tons of iron content are available on the continent. Some of it is being sent to Japan as pig iron and steel, 

but little is currently being shipped as iron ore. Scrap iron and scrap steel, 

domestic iron ore, and estimated imports are sufficient to support an annual 

steel production of not more than 3,500,000tons. There are probably no 

shortages of ferro-alloys at this reduced rate of production. Inadequate 

supplies of steel are believed already to have curtailed the production of 

armaments. As Japan is thought to have no substantial stocks of crude or 

rolled steel, further decline in steel production would be reflected in additional curtailment in armament output, in shipbuilding, and in railroad 

and industrial maintenance. 

g. Aluminum. The aluminum industry in the home islands is almost 

wholly dependent on imports of aluminous ores from the continent. We 

believe that there is no substantial stock pile of such ores in Japan. Plant 

capacity of the home islands is estimated at about 150,000metric tons annually although production during the fiscal year beginning 1 April 1944 

probably did not exceed 130,000tons. Current production is estimated at 

about 75,000tons annually. In addition, about 35,000tons are now being 

produced in Korea and Manchuria, some of which is shipped to Japan. This 

is enough aluminum for production of airplanes at about or slightly above 

present rates. The blockade will eventually affect Japan’s ability to import 

aluminum, but in view of the small tonnage involved, and the high priority 

given to shipments, it will be some time before this factor makes itself felt. 

h. Non-Ferrous Metals. It is unlikely that supplies of copper, lead, zinc, 

and other metals will constitute critically limiting factors in the reduced 

Japanese economy. 

i. Chemicals and Fertilizers. The home islands’production of major basic 

chemicals and fertilizers, alkalis (soda ash, caustic soda), phosphates, sulphate of ammonia, nitric and sulphuric acids, is hampered by shortages of 

salt (imported from North China and Manchuria), coal, other raw materials, and power. 

4. Petroleum Products. 

a. Aviation Fuel. The Japanese are believed to be short of aviation fuel. 

Inner Zone stocks are now estimated at about 1,350,000barrels, and Inner 

Appendix “A’ 

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Zone production of aviation gasoline and alcohol available for aircraft use 

(measured in terms of gasoline equipment) is about 125,000barrels a month. 

With such small amounts of fuel available, the Japanese air forces have been 

forced to reduce consumption to far below their 1944 monthly average, estimated at about 600,000 barrels. Training and transport operations are 

already considerably affected by the shortage. We believe that aviation 

fuel will be the limiting factor in orthodox but not in suicide combat operations. Combat efficiency will be lowered by inadequacy in training and shortages at individual bases may interfere more and more frequently with the 

execution of planned operations. 

b. Lubricating Oils. There is a shortage of lubricating oils produced 

from petroleum. As a result, substitutes have been used, apparently on an 

increasing scale. In particular, castor oil has been used in aircraft engines, 

with some loss in efficiency. 

c. Other Petroleum Products. Japan’s stocks of fuel and diesel oil are 

believed to be sufficient to last for not more than a year at estimated consumption rates. 

5. Coal. Production in Japan has been declining for some time and at 

present may not exceed 40,000,000 metric tons annually as compared with a 

wartime peak of 50,000,000 tons. We estimate that during the year ending 31 

March 1945 Japan imported from the continent and Karafuto about 5,000,000 

tons. As a result of shipping shortages, imports of coal during the year ending 

31 March 1946 may not exceed 2,500,000 tons. The coal shortage, particularly 

in suitable coking coals, is affecting production in basic war industries. 

6. Food. Japan normally produces roughly 85 percent of her food supply. 

The bulk of the Japanese diet is provided by the staple ration. This ration, 

supplied originally in rice and currently by a combination of rice and rice 

substitutes (other grains and potatoes) ,requires annually some 11,000,000net 

metric tons, after deduction of seed, milling loss, and non-food use. Japan’s 

1944 rice crop and 1945 winter grain crop, both somewhat below normal, are expected to supply roughly 9,000,000 tons net, in edible form, after deduction of 

waste and non-food uses. Domestic potato production and imports of Korean 

rice and Manchurian cereals will probably be sufficient to supply the balance of 

the staple requirement until the rice harvest beginning in November 1945. If 

not, the Japanese can draw upon their rice stock pile, estimated roughly at 

2,000,000 tons. A shortage of foodstuffs is being experienced in the urban areas 

due mainly to distribution difficulties and the probability that government 

stocks and hoarded supplies have been partially destroyed by air raids. 

Appendix “A” 

24 
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The staple ration is deficient in proteins and protective elements, which 

are supplied in the Japanese diet by fish, soy beans, and vegetables. The fish 

catch has been reduced possibly by 50 percent since 1939, thereby increasing 

the importance in the diet of the protein supplied by soy beans. (Supply of 

soy beans, approximately 70 percent of which are imported from Manchuria 

and Korea, is believed to have been maintained at or above pre-war levels.) 

Supplies of vegetables have probably continued close to pre-war levels. However, inefficient distribution causes recurring shortages of supplementary food 

in urban areas. 

7. Manpower. There has long been a shortage of technicians and skilled 

workers in Japan, but manpower is not, in general, a limiting factor on either 

Japanese production or the size of the armed forces. Induction of additional 

men into the armed forces during 1945 will be offset partly by normal additions 

to the labor forces and by further employment of women and children and 

partly by a decrease in the demand for industrial labor as a result of the decline in industrial activity. In fact, industrial workers in bombed-out urban 

areas are being released to agriculture. 

8. Civilian Supply. Lack of raw materials since early in the war has severely 

curtailed civilian supplies, particularly of clothing. The position has steadily 

deteriorated throughout the war. Recently, because of the impossibility of obtaining appreciable supplies of cotton, wool, and materials for synthetic fibers 

from the continent, and the effect of bombing of the industrial centers and of 

communications, the situation has become greatly aggravated. The supply of 

consumer goods is entirely inadequate to meet the needs of the population, particularly now, when so many have been bombed out of their homes and have 

presumably lost their belongings. Owing in part to the consumer goods shortage, there is an increasing threat of inflation. 

9. Regional Economic Administration. A regional administration of Japan 

was set up in mid-June by the “Extraordinary War Measures Bill” which provided, in the case of an emergency, for the delegation of unlimited powers to 

Superintendents-General of eight regional administrations. Coupled with this 

new administrative structure, the Army, the Navy, the banks, and the large 

Japanese business concerns set up corresponding administrative districts. The 

Japanese administration has for decades been centralized in Tokyo. The present regional decentralization is occasioned not only by the fear that the transportation and communication links within Japan may be destroyed, but also 

that Tokyo, the nerve center, may be made completely ineffective. The Japanese are endeavoring to make these regions as self-sufficient as possible. A 

broad survey of the population and the average rice crop of each district shows 

Appendix “A” 

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that only one district has a large surplus, two are very seriously deficient and 

the remaining five are borderline cases. Though simple equipment for resistance forces may be stocked or manufactured in the districts, complex war 

materials cannot be produced in each of these regions adequately for a long 

period of defense. 

Appendix “A” 

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APPENDIX “B” 

ARMED FORCES 

GROUND FORCES (See attached map.) 

1. Japanese. The ground strength of the Japanese armed forces remains 

formidable. Including air and naval ground elements as well as the Army, it 

totals some 4,600,000 men. We believe there are some 110infantry and 4armored 

divisions in the Japanese Army; 30 or more additional divisions will have been 

formed by the end of the year, of which about half will have been formed by 

conversion of existing units. Some of these may be in existence now. 

Japanese ground strength in or able to be withdrawn into the Inner 

Zone now amounts to some 3,300,000 men, including approximately 60 divisions. By the end of the year ground strength in the Inner Zone may amount to 

over 4,000,000 men, including up to 95 divisions. 

The firepower of Japanese ground units is less than that of comparable 

Allied units, and in general their equipment is not up to Allied standards. The 

Japanese ground forces are particularly deficient in heavy weapons, motor 

transport, and armor (only four armored divisions have been identified). They 

are generally well trained, but there have been some instances of troops being 

committed to combat before the completion of their basic training. Such troops 

and relatively untrained service personnel are normally employed in combat in the latter stages of losing campaigns, as on Okinawa. The morale 

of the ground forces remains high, but some deterioration from previous standards is evident. 

2. Puppets. In addition to the above, the Japanese maintain some 300,000 

Manchurian and 900,000 Chinese puppet troops of doubtful quality and loyalty. 

They are used primarily to guard communications and perform service duties, 

and to lesser extent in combat against the Chinese. Their effectiveness will be 

considerably reduced as the Japanese withdraw from large areas of China. 

3. National Volunteer Army. The Japanese are exerting strenuous efforts 

to create an effective home guard in anticipation of invasion. Below is listed 

the available manpower of military age (17-44)in Japan proper by military 

districts. Logistical difficulties and the purpose of their employment would 

preclude the use of any substantial numbers outside their own areas. 

Appendix “B” 

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Available Manpower (17-44) 

Northern (Hokkaido) 

Northeastern 

Eastern 

East Central 

Central (Kinki) 

West Central (Chugoku) 

Shikoku 

Western (Kyushu) 

493,000 

927,400 

3,265,800 

1,260,700 

2,059,400 

772,400 

408,500 

1,409,100 

10,596,300 

Of these some 8,800,000 are thought to be physically fit according to 

Japanese standards and could be made available for military service. We believe that as much as 40 percent of this total (3,520,000) are reservists. In 

areas under attack elements of the National Volunteer Army would be called 

out for guard and labor purposes and eventually for combat to the extent of 

their limited capabilities. A reserve of more than 1,000,000 rifles is believed to 

be available for this purpose. 

AIR FORCES 

4. Aircraft Strength. 

a. General. Until September 1944, the Japanese air forces steadily increased in size. Since then they have suffered heavy losses, and their combat 

aircraft strength has been reduced 40 percent, as appears from the following 

table : 

1September 1944 (Beginning of air attacks on the 

Philippines) 

18 March 1945 

(Ryukyus Campaign) 

26 June 1945 

Tactical Training 

Units Units Total 

6,200 2,000 8,200 

4,300 2,200 6,500 

3,800 1,200 5,000 

Except for planes undergoing repairs or modification in depots or in transit 

to units, the Japanese have no reserves behind their present unit strength 

of 5,000 combat aircraft. 

Appendix “B” 

28 
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b. Production. The Japanese aircraft industry has been heavily damaged 

by VLR and carrier attacks. Factories which once accounted for 45 percent 

of aircraft assembly and 70 percent of aircraft engine production have been 

virtually destroyed. Nevertheless, by dispersing their facilities, the Japanese have been able to maintain production during the past few months at 

a rate ranging between 1,250 and 1,500 combat planes a month. There is 

still a number of large factories producing both airframes and engines, and 

attacks on these plants should further reduce production. However, new 

plants replacing bombed-out factories will be so widely dispersed that substantial recovery over a long period of time cannot be prevented by precision 

attacks on factories alone. Attacks on urban industrial areas and transportation facilities will have a considerable indirect effect on future aircraft 

production, and it is possible that four or five months of such attacks will 

reduce Japan’s aircraft production to about 1,000 planes a month. 

c. Wastage. Since 1September 1944, Japanese combat and non-combat 

losses have averaged more than 2,300 planes a month. This figure includes 

heavy losses on the ground in the Philippines and in the large-scale suicide 

attacks of the Ryukyus campaign. Recently the Japanese have been able 

to limit their losses on the ground by improved dispersal facilities and by 

flying reconnaissance planes, bombers, and occasionally even fighters away 

from Allied strikes. Moreover, now that Okinawa is secured, the scale of 

suicide attacks in this area will probably decline. In these circumstances it 

is probable that Japanese losses in the next few months will be below the 

monthly average given above. 

d. Future Combat Aircraft Strength. Taking all factors into consideration, we believe that Japanese combat air strength will continue to decline, 

and in the absence of an invasion would not exceed 3,000 on 1January 1946. 

Thereafter production will probably shrink. 

e. Trainers. In addition to combat aircraft, the Japanese now possess 

about 6,000 trainers, many of which have been specially equipped for suicide 

attacks. Trainer production is not large, and Allied attacks on training 

fields during the next few months should bring about a substantial reduction in trainer strength. 

5. Deployment. Since the beginning of the Ryukyus campaign, air strength 

has been moved to Japan and Korea from other areas, and this trend probably 

will continue. In the near future over 90 percent of the Japanese air forces will 

be concentrated in the main Japanese islands, Korea, Manchuria, and North 

China. Japanese combat aircraft strength in all other areas will steadily 

deteriorate as a result of attrition or withdrawals and the lack of replacements. 

Appendix ‘73” 

29 
6. Capabilities. The capability of the Japanese air forces to operate effectively against us in either defensive or offensive warfare carried out along 

orthodox lines has been very greatly reduced. The Japanese themselves appreciate this fact and have concentrated their attention upon suicide tactics as 

the most successful method of attack with the planes and pilots at their disposal. While they will continue some training and tactical operations along orthodox lines, such orthodox employment will be intended primarily to supplement 

and facilitate suicide missions. Currently,the Japanese High Command is doing 

everything possible to improve the training, planning, and accomplishment 

of suicide air missions. 

The Japanese apparently have decided to sacrifice future air potential 

in favor of maximum employment of all available aircraft and pilots, whether 

in training or tactical units, against Allied invasion of the home islands. 

Great numbers of trainer-type aircraft are being equipped for suicide missions 

and pilot trainees are being assigned to suicide units. 

Allocation of aviation gasoline for training purposes has been drastically 

reduced, and there is accumulating evidence of an actual shortage of aviation 

gasoline. However, except for distributional difficulties, it seems probable that 

the Japanese air forces will be able to conserve sufficient gasoline for a shortlived all-out air effort against the initial invasion of the home islands. 

The Japanese are believed capable of developing a jet-propelled plane 

which could operate as an orthodox fighter or bomber, but not in sufficient 

quantity to be of serious consequence. They are attempting to develop a variety 

of jet-driven suicide devices, however, and the Baka, a small rocket-driven, 

pilot-controlled aircraft launched from a medium bomber, has already made its 

appearance. The Baka has not been employed in sufficient numbers to permit 

an appraisal of its effectiveness, but its further development, the use of the 

German V-1 with a suicide pilot, and the appearance of other jet-driven 

suicide devices are possibilities. 

NAVAL FORCES 

7. Strength. As a result of th losses sustained during three and one-half 

years of war, Japanese naval strength has been reduced to virtual impotency 

in the face of Allied naval power. In addition Japan possesses no capability for 

any substantial recovery. 

Appendix “B” 

30 
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The present strength of the Japanese Navy is believed not to exceed:­

2 Battleships 4 Heavy cruisers 

2 Battleship-Aircraft carriers 2 Light cruisers 

4 Aircraft carriers (large) 42 Destroyers 

3 Aircraft carriers (small) 57 Submarines 

2 Aircraft carriers (escort) 

All of this strength is in home waters with the exception of two damaged 

heavy cruisers and a very small number of destroyers and submarines in 

southern areas. 

The naval force listed above would appear to have considerable potential, 

but its capabilities are weakened by the following factors: (1) the limited 

sphere of operations permits the more effective use of aircraft from land bases 

rather than from carriers, and the carriers become a net liability to protect; 

(2) two damaged heavy cruisers are in the Singapore area and their ability to 

return to Japan proper is most problematical; (3) there is a serious lack of 

escorts due to the shortage of heavy destroyers (1,600-2,300 tons) and the relative ineffectiveness of the more numerous smaller destroyers (1,000 tons) ; 

(4) most major enemy naval bases are within range of Allied land or carrierbased aircraft which might possibly force naval units based therein to seek 

refuge in the Sea of Japan. While the Japanese possess an appreciable number 

of submarines, their threat to Allied naval forces cannot be considered serious 

in view of their ineffectiveness during the past. 

The Japanese are primarily engaged in the construction of small ships, 

such as destroyers, submarines, escort craft, midget submarines, one-man 

torpedoes, suicide and small combatant surface craft. 

We believe that when Allied positions in the Ryukyus are consolidated, 

Japanese lines of communications from Japan proper to all outside areas 

except those to the continent across the Sea of Japan will be severed. Japanese 

destroyers, minesweepers, and other small escort craft will concentrate on the 

task of protecting shipping on these remaining lifelines to the continent. However, they are already inadequate for this purpose, and this shortage will become 

more acute in the face of increasing Allied mining, air, and submarine attacks. 

This situation would be further aggravated should the U.S.S.R. enter the war. 

The main offensive capability and the most likely employment of the 

Japanese Navy from now on will be in suicide attacks by a small task force, 

harassing and suicide operations by smaller surface craft and submarine 

attacks. Extensive mine fields probably exist in the vicinity of harbors and other 

strategic areas around the homeland. 

Appendix “B” 

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX “B” 

MAP OF WESTERN PACIFIC AREA 

JAPANESE ARMED FORCES-GROUND 

18 June 1945 

Annex to Appendix “B” 

32 
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APPENDIX “c” 

CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS 

FOR THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN PROPER 

1. Present Strength and Dispositions. 

a. Ground. Present Japanese ground strength in the home islands and 

their island outposts (Ryukyus, Izus, Kuriles, and Karafuto) is estimated 

at 1,600,000men, including some 21 active and 14 depot divisions. Additional 

divisions are probably in the process of formation, and some of these may 

already be in existence. 

By the end of 1945 this strength could be built up to over 2,000,000 

men, including more than 35 active divisions and 14 depot divisions. The 

increase would result largely from the mobilization of local manpower, 

since substantial reinforcement from the continent will not be feasible. 

b. Air. At present there are approximately 5,000 combat aircraft assigned 

to tactical and training units, and of this number about 4,000 are located 

in Japan proper and Korea. In addition to these combat aircraft the Japanese have about 6,000 trainer-type aircraft. Although large numbers of these 

trainers are based outside of Japan proper, it is possible that within a short 

time several thousand will be equipped for carrying bombs and made available for suicide operations in the defense of the home islands. 

c. Naval. Practically all of the remaining Japanese naval forces, as set 

forth in Appendix “B,” are now located and will continue to be based in 

home waters. 

2. Capabilities. Japan’s ability to defend the home islands against amphibious assault has been seriously impaired by the virtual neutralization of her 

navy, the deterioration of her air forces, the disruption of her communications 

with the continent and southern areas, and the heavy bomb damage suffered 

by her industrial facilities. She is incapable of remedying these conditions, 

which will progressively worsen. She retains, however, the advantages of an air 

force suicidally dangerous while it lasts, formidable ground forces, peculiarly 

difficult terrain, and a fanatically loyal population. 

Japanese naval forces in home waters will have only the capability of 

harassing and suicide attacks mainly by small surface craft and submarines. 

Extensive mine fields probably exist in the vicinity of important harbors and 

in other strategic areas around the homeland. 

Appendix “C” 

33 
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Prior to the time when landing operations are undertaken against any 

part of Japan proper, local and adjacent airfields should be largely neutralized 

and the effectiveness of enemy air operations from nearby bases should be 

considerably reduced by our pre-invasion air attacks. However, a very large 

number of airfields will be within easy range and one-way suicide sorties could 

be flown against us directly from distant bases. We believe that low serviceability and other factors would probably prevent the enemy from launching 

against Allied invasion forces more than 400 to 500 sorties of combat-type 

aircraft and 200 to 300 sorties of trainer-type aircraft during any 24-hour 

period. Such an all-out effort could not be maintained, but recurring attacks 

of this nature may be expected on a progressively decreasing scale, following 

intervals of recuperation. The employment of Baka bombs will be limited by 

their dependence upon suitable launching aircraft and orthodox air cover. 

This threat might be greatly increased if the Japanese devise a satisfactory 

ground-launching device for this type of weapon. Favored by the proximity 

of hills and land masses, the maximum air capability of the Japanese would 

be mass suicide operations at night or under conditions of poor visibility. The 

Japanese air forces will have very low capabilities in opposing Allied air operations and they will not be able to give effective direct support to Japanese 

ground troops. 

Against an invasion of Kyushu or Honshu, the Japanese ground forces 

would exert maximum resistance. Various factors would limit the number of 

divisions which could be sustained in simultaneousfront-line action in any one 

area to 20 or less. An invasion of Shikoku or Hokkaido would elicit a considerably weaker reaction since these areas are less vital strategically, and also 

because of the logistical difficulties inherent in an attempt to reinforce and 

supply over water in the face of overwhelming air and naval superiority. 

3. Intentions. Preparation to resist invasion of the home islands is Japan’s 

overriding strategic purpose. In the time remaining every effort will be made 

to improve coastal defenses in threatened areas, to build up defensive forces, 

and to develop such auxiliary services as the National Volunteer Army. Efforts 

to effect administrative decentralization will also be pressed, so that any 

isolated area may be able to carry on with the greatest possible degree of selfsufficiency. Psychological preparation for invasion will also be stressed. 

The principal concentrations of defensive ground strength will probably 

be in the Kyushu, Nagoya-Hamamatsu, and Kanto Plain areas. 

The Japanese would defend tenaciously their remaining island outposts. 

Against any invasion of the home islands, with the possible exception of 

Appendix “C” 

34 
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Hokkaido,they would commit all available air and naval strength. The Japanese 

would commit all ground forces that could be sustained in action in the defense of Kyushu and that part of Honshu which includes the Kanto Plain, 

Nagoya, and Osaka areas. Considerably weaker defense would be encountered 

in other parts of Honshu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido because of logistical and 

strategical reasons. 

Appendix “C” 

35 
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APPENDIX “D” 

MILITARY SITUATION, CAPABILITIES, AND INTENTIONS IN KOREA, 

MANCHURIA, AND NORTH CHINA 

Present Japanese ground strength in Manchuria, Korea, and North 

China is estimated at 1,200,000 men, including some 24 active and 5 depot 

divisions. This strength is disposed as shown in the map attached to Appendix 

“B.” Until early in 1944 the Japanese maintained intact their forces in Manchuria (the Kwantung Army). Since then, however, they have withdrawn 

most of the original divisions of that army, replacing them with newly formed 

units. Increasing apprehension of Soviet entry into the war is now causing 

them to reinforce this area from Central and South China, and by the end of 

the year their strength in North China, Manchuria, and Korea may increase to 

1,500,000 men, including more than 40 divisions. Since substantial support 

from Japan proper can no longer be expected, the area will be organized for 

independent defense. We anticipate that strong concentrations will be maintained in eastern Manchuria to threaten Vladivostok, in central Manchuria 

and in North China to meet possible Soviet attacks from the northwest, and 

in Korea to guard against amphibious invasion and as a reserve. 

At the present time the Japanese have based in Korea 550 combat aircraft and in Manchuria and North China about 400 combat aircraft. We believe, 

however, that air strength in Korea is and will continue to be mainly concerned with the defense against Allied forces in the Pacific. If, at some later 

date, the U.S.S.R. should enter the war, we believe that the Japanese would 

continue to commit the bulk of their air strength for the defense of Japan 

proper and southern Korea, leaving opposition to the U.S.S.R. primarily to 

their ground forces. 

Appendix “D” 

36 
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APPENDIX “E” 

MILITARY SITUATION, CAPABILITIES, AND INTENTIONS 

IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH CHINA AND FORMOSA 

The Japanese now have about 650,000 men, including 20 divisions, in 

Central and South China, and another 190,000 men, including five divisions, 

in Formosa. Formosa is already cut off; Japanese strength there will remain 

unchanged. On the continent, however, Japanese strength is being redisposed 

northward and eastward as a result of increasing apprehension of Soviet entry 

mto the war and of Allied landings from the East China Sea. We believe some 

10 divisions will be so redisposed. It is probable that the coast between Ningpo 

and the Shantung Peninsula will be reinforced, and that a strategic reserve 

of some six divisions will be maintained in the Nanking area to meet an amphibious attack or to move north in the event of Soviet entry into the war. We 

anticipate that, until either of these events occurs, the Japanese will endeavor 

to keep open the line of the Hankow-Canton railway, and that, when forced to 

abandon it, they will leave some 125,000 men, including four divisions, to hold 

the Canton-Hong Kong area as long as possible. 

If circumstances require it, the Japanese are prepared to abandon all 

of China south of the general line Tungkuan-Kaifeng-Nanking-Hangchow, 

except for the Canton-Hong Kong pocket. 

Hereafter the Japanese will offer very little air and only negligible 

naval opposition in any of these areas. 

Appendix “E” 

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APPENDIX “F” 

SITUATION, CAPABILITIES, AND INTENTIONS 

IN THE SOUTHERN AREAS 

The southern areas are cut off from Japan and soon will be incapable of 

sigmficant mutual support. The air and naval strength remaining there is 

strategically negligible. The defense of each area therefore depends upon 

local ground forces and locally available supplies and reserve stocks. 

The present disposition of Japanese ground strength in the southern 

areas is estimated to be as follows:-

Northern Indo-China 

Southern Indo-China 

Burma-Thailand 

Andamans-Nicobars 

Malaya 

Sumatra 

Java 

Borneo 

Celebes, Halmahera, Dutch New 

Guinea, Banda Sea area 

Northeastern New Guinea 

TOTAL 

75,000 

35,000 

105,000 

20,000 

55,000 

75,000 

40,000 

35,000 

150,000 

15,000 

605,000 

Units in these areas are already generally below strength. Areas east of the 

Celebes are generally inadequately supplied with munitions and rations. To the 

west of these areas there are stocks of munitions and rations, and there are 

some facilities for manufacturing small arms and ammunition. Shipping and 

rail facilities will be inadequate to distribute to best advantage the supplies 

that exist. 

The Japanese are endeavoring to redispose their strength within the 

southern areas in order to reinforce the Malaya Peninsula, the Tenasserim 

Coast, and Thailand. They will be restricted in their accomplishment of 

significant redispositions because of Allied action and lack of adequate 

transportation. 

Appendix “F” 

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Japanese air capabilities in the southern areas are limited to reconnaissance, weak interception, and small-scale suicide attacks. The natal 

forces remaining there can accomplish no more than nuisance attacks. Ground 

force capabilities are limited to a predominantly static defense of occupied 

localities. The Japanese will, however, defend such areas with determination, 

in order to inflict attrition, contain Allied forces and deny them to the Allies. 

Resistance in the South is unlikely to cease as long as resistance continues 

in the North. 

Appendix “F’ 

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APPENDIX “G 

SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 

Some 270,000 Japanese troops are now isolated in the Pacific islands, 

as follows:-

Bismarcks -Solomons 80,000 

Japanese Mandates 100,000 

Bonins 20,000 

Philippines 70,000 

No element of these forces has any capability other than that for a 

desperate, last-ditch defense of the area it occupies. 

AgDendix “G’ 

40 
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APPENDIX “H” 

POLITICAL SITUATION 

1. General Situation. The political situation in Japan is dominated by the 

progressive deterioration of the military situation, particularly in the last 

few months. Japan’s political isolation resulting from the collapse of Germany, 

the loss of Okinawa, and the great and growing destruction in Japan proper 

by air attacks, have convinced the Japanese by and large that victory for them 

is impossible. Consequently the present Government’s internal and external 

policy can only be one of desperate defense. To some this may mean a fight to 

obtain the best possible terms in a negotiated peace; to others it expresses a 

natural instinct to fight on regardless of the consequences. The theme of internal policy is national unity, and in its name further drastic measures have 

recently been taken to make the Central Government as far as possible 

thoroughly representative of the whole nation, to strengthen its powers even 

further, and thence, as‘it were, to devolve upon local authority an unprecedented degree of administrative power for dealing with emergency conditions. 

2. Internal Political Situation. The real government of Japan is the invisible 

one, and we do not know what shifts of power have taken place behind the 

scene. It must be assumed, however, that main, effective control still lies 

essentially with military elements, if only because the army remains Japan’s 

greatest asset. 

With this important reservation it should be noted that positions in 

the visible Cabinet are held less and less by known military extremists, and 

progressively more by representatives of the Court, big business, conservative 

bureaucracy and moderate army and navy leadership. The Suzuki Cabinet 

is typical in this respect and in its effort to maintain popularity by close identification with the Throne and by inclusion of members of diverse political 

groups. Undoubtedly such a government is less unpopular than overt military 

dictatorship; undoubtedly also the government is of a kind which might be 

expected to entertain ideas of a compromise peace, although very likely on a 

basis which would make no appeal at all to Japan’s enemies. To some degree 

its views might be made to prevail on the military extremists outside the 

Government, against whom the powers conferred on the Government by the 

“Emergency Wartime Measures Law” could be used, but the invisible government referred to above must be expected to have its say before any decision 

is taken. In this connection the appointment of a strong Home Minister with 

a number of assistants possessing a reputation for ruthlessness indicates 

Appendix “H” 

41 
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intention on part of the Government to keep the internal situation firmly 

in hand. 

Whatever views the Suzuki Government or individual members of it 

may hold about the possibilities of compromise, there can be no doubt that 

the Government is doing everythingto ensure a desperate defense of the homeland, if no other way out of the crisis shows itself. Recent indications are the 

continued emphasis on the organization of the National Volunteer Army and 

the really radical effort towards decentralization of authority. The latter by 

giving unprecedented powers to specially constituted local authorities, provides against administrative breakdowns should Tokyo, the administrative 

capital of a hitherto strongly centralized country, be overrun by an invading 

force or communications between one part of the country and another be cut. 

Decentralization provides also against a transport and supplies breakdown by 

contemplating a great degree of local self-sufficiency in food and munitions. 

The Government has taken to itself other practically unlimited powers over 

manpower and property and this program is calculated, no doubt, not only to 

raise fighting efficiency to its maximum but also to impress Japan’s enemies 

with the likely cost of an invasion of the home islands. 

3. Foreign Policy. Undoubtedly the chief aims of Japanese foreign policy 

are to keep the Soviets out of the war and to drive a wedge between the western 

Allies and the U.S.S.R. This is attested by the extremely friendly tone of the 

Japanese press and radio towards the U.S.S.R. The latter nevertheless continues 

to be a source of anxiety and foreboding. 

The re-appointment of Togo, former Ambassador to Moscow and reputedly friendly to the U.S.S.R., to the post of Foreign Minister which he held 

at the time of Pearl Harbor suggests, however, that despite realistic appraisal 

of the meaning of Soviet denunciation on 5 April 1945 of the Russo-Japanese 

neutrality pact, Japan still hopes to propitiate the U.S.S.R. The abandonment 

of former Foreign Minister Shigemitsu in favor of Togo might be held to 

mean the abandonment of any real hope of a compromise peace with the 

United States and Britain, but this presumption perhaps goes too far. 

Other aspects of Japanese policy are to keep alive KuomintangCommunist discord in China, and if possible to precipitate a civil war. 

At the same time the Japanese are making strenuous efforts to keep 

their puppet regimes in Southeast Asia, Manchuria, and Nanking under control and otherwise to secure greater cooperation from Japan’s subject peoples. 

Propaganda about the erstwhile Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity scheme has 

Appendix “H” 

42 
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quietly subsided and is in abeyance, with some tacit admissions that the 

schemehas failed for the present. Despite Japanese promises of “independence” 

and various political concessions there is unrest in all Japanese-controlled 

areas, and the Japanese may well be obliged to increase their repressive 

measures. 

During the next few months the future political strategy of the Government will exhibit the following aims:­

a. Continue and even increase its attempts to secure complete political 

unity within the Empire, possibly through personal rule, real or apparent, 

by the Emperor. 

b. Attempt to foster a belief among Japan’s enemies that the war will 

prove costly and long drawn out if the United Nations insist on fighting 

until the complete conquest of Japan. 

c. Make desperate efforts to persuade the U.S.S.R. to continue her 

neutrality, if necessary by offering important territorial or other concessions, while at the same time making every effort to sow discord between 

the Americans and British on one side and the Russians on the other. 

As the situation deteriorates still further, Japan may even make a serious 

attempt to use the U.S.S.R.as a mediator in ending the war. 

d. Put out intermittent peace feelers, in an effort to bring the war to 

an acceptable end, to weaken the determination of the United Nations to 

fight to the bitter end, or to create inter-Allied dissension. 

e. Take all possible advantage of estranged relations between the Communists and the Kuomintang factions in China. 

4. Possibility of Surrender. The Japanese ruling groups are aware of the 

desperate military situation and are increasingly desirous of a compromise 

peace,but still find “unconditionalsurrender” unacceptable. Indeed the formal 

acceptance of “unconditional surrender” by Japanese constituted authority 

must be deemed basically unlikely, since the term probably implies to the 

Japanese mind the overthrow of the Emperor and the position of the Imperial 

House, the extinction of the Japanese traditions and of the Japanese way of 

life, and the abolition of the Japanese constitution. 

These fundamental psychological objections to formal “unconditional 

surrender”as interpreted by the Japanese are so strong that not even blockade 

and strategic bombing on the present scale are likely to bring it about. The 

basic policy of the present Government is to fight as long and as desperately 

as possible to avoid complete defeat and in order to acquire a better bargaining 

Appendix “H” 

43 
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position in a negotiated peace. Japanese leaders are now playing for time in the 

hope that Allied war weariness, Allied disunity, or some “miracle” will present 

an opportunity to avoid final defeat and arrange a compromise peace. 

As regards the Japanese people as a whole, we believe that a considerable 

portion of them now consider absolute defeat to be probable. The increasing 

effects of sea blockade and cumulative devastation wrought by strategic 

bombing should make this realization increasingly general. An entry of the 

Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat. Although individual Japanese willingly sacrifice 

themselves in the service of the nation, we doubt that the nation as a whole is 

predisposed toward national suicide. Rather, the Japanese as a nation have a 

strong concept of national survival, regardless of the fate of individuals. When 

confronted with the absolute impossibility of avoiding complete defeat, they 

would probably prefer national survival, even through surrender, to virtual 

extinction. 

The Japanese believe, however, that unconditional surrender would be 

the equivalent of national extinction. There are as yet no indications that the 

Japanese are ready to accept such terms. The ideas of foreign occupation of 

the Japanese homeland, foreign custody of the person of the Emperor, and the 

loss of prestige entailed by the acceptance of “unconditional surrender” are 

most revolting to the Japanese. To avoid these conditions, if possible, and, in 

any event, to insure survival of the institution of the Emperor, the Japanese 

might well be willing to withdraw from all the territory they have seized on 

the Asiatic continent and in the southern Pacific, and even to agree to the 

independence of Korea and to the practical disarmament of their military 

forces. 

A conditional surrender by the Japanese Government along the lines 

stated above might be offered by them at any time from now until the time of 

the complete destruction of all Japanese power of resistance. 

Since the Japanese Army is the principal repository of the Japanese 

military tradition it follows that the army leaders must, with a sufficient 

degree of unanimity, acknowledge defeat before Japan can be induced to 

surrender. This might be brought about either by the defeat of the main 

Japanese armies in the Inner Zone or through a desire on the part of the army 

leaders to salvage something from the wreck with a view to maintaining 

military tradition. For a surrender to be acceptable to the Japanese Army, it 

would be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it would not entail 

discrediting warrior tradition and that it would permit the ultimate resurgence of a military Japan. 

Appendix “H” 

44 
TOP SECREl 

C.C.S. 679/6 

C.C.S. 67917 

C.C.S. 67918 

C.C.S. 679/9 

EMPLOYMENT OF CAPTURED ENEMY OCEAN-GOING PASSENGER 

SHIPPING AND BRITISH TROOPSHIP EMPLOYMENT IN US. TRANSATLANTIC PROGRAMS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1946 

References: 

CCS 198th Meeting, Items 3 & 4 

CCS 199th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 20 

C.C.S. 679/6 (18 July 1945) and C.C.S. 67917 (19 July) circulated memoranda by the United States Chiefs of Staff. C.C.S. 679/8 (22 July), the reply 

of the British Chiefs of Staff and C.C.S. 679/9 (23 July), the United States 

Chiefs of Staff proposed modifications thereof, were considered by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in their 199th Meeting (23 July). 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in C.C.S. 67916 

for United States employment up to 31 December 1945. 

b. Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would allocate to 

the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for 

the movement of Canadians. 

c. Directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, to submit by 15 September 1945 a report, on the lines of C.C.S. 679/1, of 

the combined requirements and combined resources (including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946, the study to cover 

the recommendation in paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 679/7 and the employment during the first half of 1946 of the seven ships listed in C.C.S. 

679/6. 

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C.C.S. 67916 18 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DISPOSITION OF CAPTURED GERMAN PASSENGER SHIPS 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have indicated in papers of the C.C.S. 

679 series an urgent need for 39,000 troop spaces in captured enemy shipping 

to supplement the trooplift available for carrying out redeployment plans. 

2. Since the publication of C.C.S. 679/1,* U.S.requirements for trooplift 

in the Pacific have materially increased. Deficits now are serious. 

3. Drastic action has been taken to augment United States resources by 

conversion of cargo ships, increasing air-lift, and curtailing withdrawals of 

US.troops from Europe. In spite of every possible adjustment in United States 

resources, the trooplift situation in the Pacific will remain serious during the 

last half of this year. 

4. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (CSAB) has had the matter 

of distribution of captured German shipping under discussion for several 

weeks. Certain agreements as to manning and operation have been reached, 

but the United States view that the seven vessels under consideration should be 

allocated for the carriage of U.S. troops during the current emergency period 

has been opposed on the British side of the CSAB pending decision by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

5. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that in order to meet 

emergency requirements for the movement of U.S.troops necessary for forthcoming operations, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree to the allocation for 

United States purposes, so long as an emergency exists, of the following seven 

vessels: 

Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, 

Potsdam, Pretoria and Milwaukee. 

* Not published herein. 

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6. Arrangements as to manning, operation, repair and conversion can be 

determined by the CSAB, and it is understood that the agreement proposed 

in paragraph 5 above in no way prejudices ultimate disposition of these vessels. 

47 

19 July 1945 

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C.C.S.67917 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BRITISH TROOPSHIP EMPLOYMENT IN US.TRANS-ATLANTIC 

PROGRAMS, FIRST HALF OF 1946 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Sta# 

1. In C.C.S. 67911 the following offer of trans-Atlantic lift was made:­

“For the six months following VE-Day the Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth and the Aquitania will be retained on service in the North Atlantic, 

and this westbound capacity will be placed at the disposal of the United 

States authorities. This offer is subject to a proviso that fifty (50) berths 

should be reserved in each sailing if required by the British authorities.” 

This assistance has been estimated at equivalent to 50,000 spaces per 

month. 

2. Subsequent to the publication of C.C.S. 67911, the United States 

has taken the following steps in an attempt to expedite redeployment to 

meet accelerated target dates for the main operations against Japan and for 

repatriation :­

a. Increased the monthly target of the Air Transport Command for 

trans-Atlantic lift from 15,000 to 50,000. 

b. Authorized the conversion of 100Victory ships to carry 1,500 personnel 

each. 

c. Authorized the modification of 206 cargo vessels, formerly fitted for 

350 personnel each, to an increased capacity of 550 personnel each. 

d. Authorized the overloading of Victory and Liberty ships by 30 percent 

of capacity in the Atlantic. 

3. Although the measures listed in paragraph 2 above have greatly improved our ability to meet revised redeployment build-up of strategic reserve 

and repatriation schedules, a serious deficit in personnel shipping does exist. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff have recommended modification of 74 of the 

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100 Victory ships mentioned in paragraph 2 so that they will be suitable for 

trans-Pacific operation and for direct redeployment from Europe to the Pacific. 

It is contemplated that all captured enemy troopships, with the exception of 

the Eu~opa,that can be placed in service, will be diverted to the Pacific. Even 

these expedients will not enable the United States to meet Pacific troop movement requirements and there will exist by the end of 1945 a backlog of between 

250,000 and 300,000 for Pacific movements. The removal of the 74 Victorys from 

trans-Atlantic service will retard the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe 

and will reduce the availability of cargo shipping in the Atlantic by about 

25 sailings per month. 

4. At ARGONAUT it was considered desirable that the United States and 

British convert 200 cargo ships to troop carriers on a combined basis.* Up to 

the present time there has been no indication of British action with respect to 

converting a share of the cargo vessels. 

5. In C.C.S. 679/1 British requirements for the movement of troops from 

Europe to Canada were shown to be 195,600 during the first six months after 

VE-day. Space was provided for 133,800, leaving a deficit of approximately 

62,000 over a six-month period. The total British requirement for repatriation 

of Canadians is not known to the United States Chiefs of Staff; however, it is 

noted that five weeks’ lift of the three British vessels allocated for United States 

trans-Atlantic troop movements would overcome the first six months’ deficit. 

6. The three large British passenger liners are vastly more efficient from 

a trooplift point of view in the North Atlantic service than in any other service. 

Their continued employment in this service for the repatriation of Canadian 

and U.S.forces will cause the greatest benefit to accrue to combined troop 

moving needs. 

7. In order to avoid the possibility of still further invasion of United States 

cargo shipping resources to the detriment of combined trans-Atlantic cargo 

programs, it is recommended that the British trooplift represented by the two 

Queens and the Aquitania should be retained in the trans-Atlantic service 

during an additional six months for the build-up of strategic reserves in the 

United States and the repatriation on a combined basis of Canadian and U.S. 

forces. 

ARGONAUT Conference book, page 63. 

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C.C.S.679/8 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

EMPLOYMENT OF CAPTURED ENEMY OCEAN-GOING PASSENGER 

SHIPPING AND BRITISH TROOPSHIP EMPLOYMENT IN U.S. 

TRANS-ATLANTIC PROGRAMS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1946 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals put forward 

by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 679/6 and 679/7, and consider 

that these proposals, the arguments in support of them and the possible effect 

on combined requirements for movement of personnel are so closely linked 

that they should be taken together. 

2. The British Chiefs of Staff have taken note of the steps taken by the 

United States to meet revised schedules for redeployment, build-up of strategic 

reserve and repatriation, and of the net effect of these on Pacific movements, 

viz.,a backlog of between 250,000 and 300,000 at the end of 1945. 

3. The British Chiefs of Staff will, of course, do everything possible to assist 

in the movement of United States forces, particularly those destined for the 

Pacific, but they wish to make it clear that the personnel shipping resources 

allotted to them in C.C.S. 679/1 fell far short of meeting British requirements 

for redeployment and repatriation, which had to be severely cut. 

4. Further, they wish to point out that a preliminary examination of the 

estimated British requirements for the first half of 1946 indicates that the 

total British trooplift will suffice to lift only about two men out of every three, 

even if the current programme is achieved without a backlog at the end of 

the year. 

5. In view of the serious position of United States movement to the Pacific, 

the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to agree that the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in C.C.S. 679/6 for 

United States employment up to 31st December 1945. In return, they ask that 

the United States Chiefs of Staff allocate to them a lift of 16,000 during the rest 

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of 1945 for movement of the Canadians, many of whom have been absent from 

their homes for a very long time. The Canadian Government are pressing us 

very strongly in this matter. 

6. The British Chiefs of Staff further suggest that a combined study on the 

lines of C.C.S. 679/1 of the combined requirements and combined resources 

(including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946 should be completed by mid-September if possible. The study would cover the recommendation in C.C.S. 679/7 and also the employment during the first half of 1946 of 

the seven ships to which reference is made in C.C.S. 679/6. 

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C.C.S.679/9 23 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

EMPLOYMENT OF CAPTURED ENEMY OCEAN-GOING PASSENGER 

SHIPPING AND BRITISH TROOPSHIP EMPLOYMENT IN U.S. 

TRANS-ATLANTIC PROGRAMS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1946 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The United States Chiefs of Staff agree with the provisions of C.C.S. 

6'79/8except for the date of 31 December 1945 given in paragraph 5 as terminating the use by the United States of the six of the seven captured German 

ships destined for the Pacific. 

After moving these ships great distances to the Pacific we shall be 

fortunate to obtain one trip from them before the 31 December date. By then 

our deployment will not have ended and the main operation will yet have to 

be undertaken. It would be uneconomical to remove this shipping from the 

Pacific after just one run. When ships may be withdrawn from the Pacific, 

less adaptable shipping such as the converted Victory ships should be first 

transferred back to the Atlantic. The lift of these ships of course will be included in the proposed review of personnel shipping to be completed by midSeptember. 

Accordingly, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that paragraphs 5 and 6 of C.C.S. 679/8 be modified as indicated in the Enclosure. 

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ENCLOSURE 

5. In view of the serious position of United States movement to the Pacific, 

the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to agree that the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in C.C.S. 679/6 for 

-to the United States employment up to 31st December 1945 for employment as 

follows: the Europa until 31 December 1945; and the Caribia, Patria, Vulcania, 

Potsdam, Pretoria and Milwaukee until 30 June 1946. In return, they ask that 

the United States Chiefs of Staff allocate to them a lift of 16,000 during the rest 

of 1945 for movement of the Canadians, many of whom have been absent from 

their homes for a very long time. The Canadian Government are pressing us 

very strongly in this matter. 

6. The British Chiefs of Staff further suggest that a combined study on 

the lines of C.C.S. 679/1 of the combined requirements and combined resources 

(including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946 should be completed by mid-September if possible. The study would cover the recommendation in C.C.S. 679/7 and also the employment during the first half of 1946 of 

the seven ships to which reference is made in C.C.S. 679/6. subject to the 

provisions of paragraph 5 above. 

Words underlined are proposed additions. 

Words italicized are proposed deletions. 

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C.C.S. 706/11 

C.C.S. 706/14 (TERMINAL) 

DISPOSAL OF ENEMY WAR MATRRIEL IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 

Reference: 

CCS 197th Meeting, Item 3 

C.C.S. 706/11 (28 June 1945) circulated a report by the Combined Administrative Committee. C.C.S. 706/14 (TERMINAL) (17 July) circulated a 

memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff proposing certain amendments to Appendices “A” and “B” to C.C.S. 706/11. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 197th Meeting (20 July) approved 

Appendices “A” and “B” to C.C.S. 706/11, as amended in C.C.S. 706/14 

(TERMINAL). 

55 
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C.C.S. 706/11 28 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DISPOSAL OF ENEMY WAR MATGRIEL IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 

Report by the Combined Administrative Committee 

THE PROBLEM 

1. As a matter of priority to draft a reply to SCAF 447 (Appendix “D,” page 

61), in which the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF) 

requests authority to:­

a. Fill London Munitions Assignment Board requirements from war 

material in Germany and Austria. 

b. Render surplus enemy warlike equipment unserviceable and dispose 

of it as scrap. 

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

2. See Appendix “C” (page 60). 

DISCUSSION 

3. Informal discussions are taking place on governmental levels as to the 

disposal of enemy equipment. It has been indicated informally that some 

nations desire the distribution of enemy war matbriel among the United 

Nations, and are directly opposed to widespread destruction of German warlike 

equipment. 

4. Because it appears that there will be considerable delay prior to the 

formulation of an intergovernmental policy on this subject, it appears necessary to make available a means by which enemy war matkriel, captured or 

surrendered, which might be used profitably in the war against Japan, could 

be obtained immediately by those nations now actively engaged in the Japanese 

war. 

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CONCLUSIONS 

5. Until a policy of disposal, agreed upon by the nations represented on the 

European Advisory Commission, has become effective, the London Munitions 

Assignment Board should be empowered to assign captured or surrendered 

enemy matkriel in the hands of forces under United States or British command 

in Germany and Austria to the forces of those nations employed in furtherance 

of the agreed strategy in the war against Japan. 

6. Because of the imminent dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionary Force, instructions relative to the destruction of enemy mathriel 

surplus to the needs of the military forces and those of the London Munitions 

Assignment Board are a matter for consideration by the respective United 

States and British Chiefs of Staff rather than the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

7. That the message in Appendix “A” be dispatched to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Mediterranean. 

8. That the message in Appendix “B” be dispatched to the London Munitions Assignment Board. 

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APPENDIX “A” 

DRAFT 

MESSAGE TO SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN 

This is answer to SCAF 447 repeated this date to SACMED. The London 

Munitions Assignment Board is being empowered to assign captured or surrendered enemy matkriel in the hands of forces under United States or British 

command in Germany and Austria to thk forces of those nations employed in 

furtherance of the agreed strategy in the war against Japan. The treatment of enemy matkriel surplus to needs of the military commanders and those 

required to fill London Munitions Assignment Board requirements will be the 

subject of instructions by the respective Chiefs of Staff to the United States 

and British zone commanders after the dissolution of SHAEF. 

Appendix “A’ 

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APPENDIX “Bj 

DRAFT 

MESSAGE TO THE LONDON MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT BOARD 

Until a policy of disposal is agreed upon by the nations represented on 

the European Advisory Commission and implemented, the London Munitions 

Assignment Board is empowered to assign captured or surrendered enemy 

matkriel in the hands of forces under United States or British command in 

Germany and Austria to the forces of those nations who will employ such 

equipment in furtherance of the agreed strategy in the war against Japan. 

Appendix “B” 

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APPENDIX “C’ 

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

1. FACS 159-FAN 507 authorized the destruction of captured enemy war 

mathriel in Germany and Austria, which was surplus to the requirements of 

the Supreme Command and the London Munitions Assignment Board, such 

authority to remain in force until cessation of hostilities or until superseded 

by a later directive (page 4 of C.C.S. 200/5* as amended by C.C.S. 200/6*). 

2. Present handling of captured and surrendered war matkriel in Germany 

and Austria is based on FACS 149-FAN 500 (page 3 of C.C.S. 706/7*) and 

FACS 109-FAN 453 (page 3 of C.C.S. 706/2*) by which surplus enemy war 

mathriel is being safeguarded, inventoried, and pooled as the property of the 

United Nations pending multipartite agreement as to disposal by the governments represented on the European Advisory Commission. 

3. SCAEF states in SCAF 447 (Appendix “D”) that long-term guarding 

and maintenance of warlike equipment constitutes a heavy burden on occupational forces and is considered impracticable particularly in view of the redeployment program. 

4. The military advisor, European Advisory Commission, writing on behalf 

of the Joint Advisors, US.Delegation, European Advisory Commission (EAC), 

states that it is doubted whether EAC will be in position to consider question 

of disposal of enemy matkriel in the near future. 

5. In C.C.S. 706/7,* the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that if, at the time 

of the defeat of Germany, there was no prospect of a speedy agreement on 

policies for the disposal of enemy war mathriel, action should be taken to seek 

the agreement on a governmental level of the authorities of the nations represented on the EAC for the immediate disposal of war mathriel in Germany and 

Austria required for the war against Japan. 

Not published herein. 

Appendix “C” 

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APPENDIX “D’ 

From: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force 

To : Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Nr : FWD 24508 SCAF 447 11 June 1945 

FACS 159 authorized the destruction of enemy war material captured 

in Germany and Austria which was surplus to the requirements of the Supreme 

Command and London Munitions Assignment Board, such authority to remain 

in force until cessation of hostilities or until superseded by a later directive. 

Present policy is accordingly based on FACS 149 and FACS 109 by which 

surplus enemy war material in Germany and Austria is being safeguarded, 

inventoried, and pooled as the property of the United Nations pending multipartite agreement as to disposal, between the governments represented in the 

European Advisory Commission. 

Long-term guarding and maintenance of warlike equipment constitutes 

heavy burden on occupational forces particularly in view of redeployment program and is considered impracticable. Unless early issue of new directive is 

to be made request authority to:-

A. Fill London Munitions Assignment Board requirements from war 

material in Germany and Austria. 

B. Render surplus enemy warlike equipment unserviceable and dispose 

as scrap. 

CM-IN-10543 (11Jun 45) 

Appendix “D” 

61 

SKRET 

C.C.S.706/14 (TERMINAL) 17 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DISPOSAL OF ENEMY WAR MATkRIEL IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 

Reference: 

CCS 706/11 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff approve Appendices “A” and “B” to C.C.S. 706/11 as amended herein. 

63 
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APPENDIX “A” 

DRAFT MESSAGE 

MESSAGE TO SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

FROM THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, 

BRITISH FORCES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY 

FROM THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 

UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER 

FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE AND SUPREME ALLIED 

COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN 

This is answer to SCAF 447 repeated this date to SACMED. The London 

Munitions Assignment Board is being empowered to assign captured or surrendered enemy matkriel except that of non-German origin in the hands 

of forces under U.S. or British command in Germany and Austria to the 

forces of those nations employed in furtherance of the agreed strategy in 

the war against Japan. In the absence of agreement in the Control Council, 

-the The treatment of enemy mathiel surplus to needs of the military commanders and those required to fill London Munitions Assignment Board requirements 

will be the subject of further instructions by the respective Chiefs of Staff to 

the United Statesand British zone commanders after the dissolution of SHAEF. 

Meanwhile no destruction of such matkriel beyond that required for public 

and military security should take place. 

Words underscored are proposed additions. 

Words italicized are proposed deletions. 

Appendix “A’ 

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APPENDIX “B” 

DRAFT 

MESSAGE TO THE LONDON MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT BOARD 

Until a policy of disposal is agreed upon by the nations represented on 

the European Advisory Commission and implemented, the London Munitions 

Assignment Board is empowered to assign captured or surrendered enemy 

matkriel except that of non-German origin in the hands of forces under U.S. 

or British command in Germany and Austria to the forces of those nations 

who will employ such equipment in furtherance of the agreed strategy in 

the war against Japan. 

Words underscored are proposed additlons. 

Appendix “B” 

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C.C.S. 842 

C.C.S. 84211 

C.C.S. 84212 

FRENCH AND DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN THEWAR AGAINST JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 195th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 15 

In C.C.S. 842 (25 April 1945) the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff proposed a general over-all policy with regard to French and Dutch 

participation in the war against Japan and recommended that a memorandum 

be forwarded to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

In C.C.S. 842/1 (10 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed in 

principle that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might now state a general overall policy and recommended that the policy as set forth in C.C.S. 84211 be 

accepted. 

In C.C.S. 842/2 (18 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff circulated a 

revised memorandum for the French and Netherlands Representatives to be 

considered in lieu of the Enclosure to C.C.S. 842/1. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 195th Meeting (18 July) approved 

the memorandum in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 84212 and directed the Secretaries 

to forward it separately to the French and Netherlands Representatives. 

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C.C.S. 842 25 April 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FRENCH AND DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

References: 

C.C.S. 644 Series 

C.C.S. 702 Series 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The French and Dutch Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

have, on many occasions, made clear the wish of their governments to participate to the maximum extent possible in the war in the Far East. The Combined 

Chiefs of Staff have not, however, so far been able to meet these wishes to the 

full, nor in the near future will they be able to do so. 

2. However, while it is obviously impossible for the French or Dutch to 

participate in the war in the Far East to the extent they desire, we believe it 

should now be recognized that these two nations, both of whom have large 

interests in the Far East, should participate in the war against Japan, to the 

extent which may be possible, and particularly in those operations aimed at the 

liberation of their own territories. This could be achieved by the employment 

in such operations of token forces, technical experts, and members of the civil 

administration. 

3. In order to give effect to this policy we feel that the French and Dutch 

should be kept more generally informed of the intentions of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff with regard to any operations which may affect their national 

interests in the Far East. 

4. The British Chiefs of Staff believe therefore that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff might now, with advantage, agree on a general over-all policy with 

regard to French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan. Specific 

requests from either of these nations could then be judged and answered in 

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the light of this agreed policy. Such a policy the British Chiefs of Staff consider 

might be stated as follows:­

a. Whilst it is at present impossible for the French or the Dutch to play 

a major part in Far Eastern operations, the French/Dutch desire to use 

their forces on the largest practical scale for the liberation of their own territories is recognized. 

b. For the present their participation must be limited to the employment 

of token forces, technical experts, and members of the civil administration. 

c. In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake 

to keep the French/Dutch generally informed of their intentions in respect 

of any operations that may affect French/Dutch national interests in the 

Far East. Discussions would thus be facilitated on French/Dutch participation in the light of available Allied resources and shipping. 

5. If these principles are acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff 

we would see certain advantages in informing the French and Dutch Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff accordingly. It would then be clear 

to them that the Combined Chiefs of Staff appreciate the very natural desire of 

the two governments concerned to participate to the maximum extent possible 

in the war against Japan. Such a communication might also assist in limiting 

their specific proposals with regard to their participation to those which were 

likely to prove possible of implementation. 

6. To sum up, therefore, we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Should:­

a. Accept the principles contained in paragraph 4 above. 

b. Despatch the attached memorandum (Enclosure) to the French and 

Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

7. We understand that the British Foreign Secretary is addressing the 

United States Secretary of State on this subject in a similar vein. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT 

LETTER TO THE FRENCH AND NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE 

TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been giving earnest consideration to 

the question of French (the Netherlands) participation in the war against 

Japan and have instructed us to inform you that they fully recognize the 

French (Netherlands) desire to use their forces on the largest practical scale 

for the liberation of their own territories. 

2. It will be appreciated however that the extent of French (the Netherlands) participation in any such operations must for the present be limited 

in character owing to the many and heavy other commitments on Allied 

shoulders and the consequent strain on Allied resources. In the view of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff it will for the present only be possible to make 

provision for token forces, technical experts, and members of the civil 

administration. 

3. However, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have instructed us to inform you 

that:­

a. Within the limits of the Allied available resources and having regard 

to their other commitments, they will do all in their power to facilitate the 

participation of French (the Netherlands) forces in the liberation of French 

(the Netherlands) territories in the Far East. 

b. In order to facilitate discussion as to the best method of arranging 

for the above French (Netherlands) participation, they further undertake 

to keep you generally informed of their intentions in respect of any operations that may affect French (the Netherlands) national interests in the 

Far East. 

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C.C.S. 84211 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FRENCH AND DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN THE 

WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff 

1. The United States Ohiefs of Staff have considered the proposals put 

forward by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 842 and 

agree in principle that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might now state a general 

over-all policy with regard to French and Dutch participation in the war against 

Japan. They consider that such a policy should be stated as follows:­

a. While it is at present impossible for French or Netherlands armed 

forces to play a major part in Far Eastern operations, the desire of the 

French/Dutch to join with us in the war against Japan and the possible 

provision of such assistance in the struggle in the Pacific which may be 

synchronized with operations already planned or under way will be taken 

into account by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. No French or Netherlands 

forces will be accepted for operations unless it has been previously agreed 

that complete control of such forces will be vested in the commander in 

chief concerned and their actual employment will be determined by him 

solely on military grounds. The actual use of any force must depend solely 

on military considerations. 

b. In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake 

to give the French/Netherlands representatives timely information of 

their intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect 

French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft letter in the 

Enclosure to C.C.S. 842should be amended accordingly. 

3. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Sta:­

a. Accept the policy stated in paragraph 1 above. 

b. Dispatch the attached memorandum (Enclosure) to the 

French/Netherlands representatives. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT 

MEMORANDUM TO THE FRENCH AND NETHERLANDS 

REPRESENTATIVESTO THE COMBINEDCHIEFS OF STAFF 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to the question 

of French/Netherlands participation in the war against Japan and wish to inform you of their views which are as follows:­

a. While it is at present impossible for French or Netherlands armed 

forces to play a major part in Far Eastern operations, the desire of the 

FrenchIDutch to join with us in the war against Japan and the possible 

provision of such assistance in the struggle in the Pacific which may be 

synchronized with operations already planned or under way will be taken 

into account by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. No French or Netherlands 

forces will be accepted for operations unless it has been previously agreed 

that complete control of such forceswill be vested in the commander in chief 

concerned and their actual employment will be determined by him solely 

on military grounds. The actual use of any force must depend solely on 

military considerations. 

b. In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake 

to give the French/Netherlands representatives timely information of 

their intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect 

French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East. 

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C.C.S.84212 18 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FRENCH AND DUTCH PARTICIPATION 

IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff forward the enclosed memorandum to the French and Netherlands 

Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in lieu of the memorandum in 

the Enclosure to C.C.S. 84211. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT 

MEMORANDUM TO THE FRENCH AND NETHERLANDS 

REPRESENTATIVES TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to the question of 

French/Netherlands participation in the war against Japan and wish to inform 

you of their views which are as follows:­

a. While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties 

for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be 

synchronized with operations will be taken into account by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under 

the complete control of the commander in chief concerned. 

b. In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake 

to give the French/Netherlands representatives timely information of 

their intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect 

French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East. 

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C.C.S. 866 

C.C.S. 866/1 

C.C.S. 866/2 

FUTURE OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN 

C.C.S. 866 (25 May 1945) circulated a memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff presenting the views of the British Chiefs of 

Staff on the subject of the future of Allied Force Headquarters. 

In C.C.S. 866/1 (7 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff stated their 

general agreement with the views set forth in C.C.S. 866 and recommended a 

message (Enclosure) for dispatch to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. 

In C.C.S. 866/2 (12 July) the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff stated that the British Chiefs of Staff agree to the dispatch of the message in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 866/1 subject to the amendment of paragraph 2. 

By informal action on 20 July the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the 

recommendation in C.C.S. 866/1 as am.ended by C.C.S. 866/2. The message 

to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, was dispatched as FAN 601. 

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C.C.S. 866 25 May 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FUTURE OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff do not believe that the time has yet come 

when definite instructions on the subject of the future of Allied Force Headquarters can be given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied 

Commander, Mediterranean. They would like however to acquaint the United 

States Chiefs of Staff of their present views on the matter. 

2. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that the appointment of the 

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, should not be terminated until 

the Quadripartite Commission in Vienna has taken over control of Austria 

and the situation in each zone and on the lines of communication is firmly in 

hand. When this condition is fulfilled they believe that a small combined United 

States-British headquarters will be required to replace Allied Force Headquarters in Italy until:­

a. The Allied Commission in Italy has been dissolved, and, 

b. Allied Military Government in Bolzano and the Allied commitment 

in Venezia Giulia have ceased. 

3. The British Chiefs of Staff would be glad to know if the United States 

Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the considerations set out above. 

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C.C.S. 866/1 7 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FUTURE OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with views 

set forth in C.C.S. 866, but note that since C.C.S. 866 was written, the question 

of combined command in Austria has been discussed in the C.C.S. 481 series.* 

2. With termination of operations and redeployment of United States and 

British forces from the Mediterranean Theater, it should be possible to reduce 

progressively the size of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). In this regard 

the United States Chiefs of Staff believe that Field Marshal Alexander should be 

directed to restrict AFHQ activities to essentially Allied matters and to reduce 

his headquarters as the number of troops in the theater and commitments 

diminish. It does not appear possible at this time, in view @f commitments 

mentioned in paragraphs 2 a. and 2 b. of C.C.S. 866, to determine the future 

of AFHQ, but it is suggested that the situation might be reviewed about 1 

September 1945. 

3. In light of the foregoing it is recommended that the attached message 

(Enclosure) be dispatched to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean 

(SACMED). 

Not published herein. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT 

MESSAGE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN 

1. In view of Allied commitments in Mediterranean area, it is impossible 

at this time to determine when Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) might be 

dissolved as a combined command. However, Combined Chiefs of Staff desire 

that activities of AFHQ be restricted to essentially Allied matters and as troops 

are redeployed and other commitments diminish AFHQ be progressively reduced in size. 

2. Request recommendations on 1September as to future of AFHQ. 
TOP SECRET 

C.C.S.866/2 12 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

FUTURE OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Stan 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have informed us that they have given further consideration to the question of the dissolution of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and subsequent organization. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and the Commanders-in-Chief Middle East have sent 

the British Chiefs of Staff their comments on the original proposals, and when 

these have been considered the British Chiefs of Staff will put forward further 

draft proposals for the consideration of the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

2. In the meanwhile, they agree to the dispatch of the message in the 

Enclosure to C.C.S. 866/1, amended as follows:-

Delete paragraph 2 and substitute: 

“Direction for future of AFHQ by the Combined Chiefs of Staff will 

be sent you after TERMINAL.” 

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C.C.S. 877 

C.C.S. 87711 

C.C.S. 87712 

C.C.S. 87714 

C.C.S. 87715 

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES 

References: 

CCS 198th Meeting, Item 2 

Plenary Meeting between the United States and Great Britain 

CCS 90013, sections I, 11,& I11 

In C.C.S. 877 (14 June 1945) the United States Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the statement of basic 

objectives, strategy, and policies as set forth therein. 

In C.C.S. 87711 (30 June) the British Chiefs of Staff proposed certain 

amendments to C.C.S. 877. 

In C.C.S. 87712 (10 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff presented 

their views on the amendments proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

In C.C.S. 87714 (20 July) the British Chiefs of Staff recommended that 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff adopt the basic objectives, strategy, and policies 

as amended in the Enclosure thereto. 

C.C.S. 877/5 (21 July) presented further views of the United States 

Chiefs of Staff with regard to the amendments proposed by the British Chiefs 

of Staff and recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the 

statement contained in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 87714 as amended in the 

Enclosure to C.C.S. 87715. 

During discussion among the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 198th 

Meeting (21 July) it was brought out that nothing further could be done in 

the matter until a decision had been reached on a higher level. 

The President and Prime Minister in their Plenary Meeting with the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff on 24 July resolved the points of divergence. The 

agreed statement of basic objectives, strategy, and policies is contained in 

C.C.S. 90013. 

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C.C.S. 877 14 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The agreed summary of broad principles regarding the prosecution of 

the war, set forth in C.C.S. 776/3,* was based upon the agreed concept that 

Germany was the principal enemy. The unconditional surrender of Germany, 

and the vital importance of rapidly reorienting strength so that the maximum 

‘possible effort may now be brought to bear against Japan, make it desirable 

that this summary of broad principles be revised in consonance with the 

changed situation. Acceptance now of these principles will establish appropriate emphasis on the war against Japan, while taking cognizance of the 

changed situation in the European Theater. Accordingly, the United States 

Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the 

following statements of basic objectives, strategy, and policies. 

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

1. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible 

date the unconditional surrender of Japan. 

11. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF 

THE WAR 

2. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, 

military control of Germany and Austria. 

3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible 

date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by 

establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and 

destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives 

in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations 

* ARGONAUT Conference book, page 157. 

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against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute 

to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required. 

111. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND POLICIES FOR THE PROSECUTION 

OF THE WAR 

4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the 

prosecution of the war:­

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western 

Hemisphere and the British Isles. 

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas with 

first priority given to those forces in combat areas. 

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. 

5. In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision of 

forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be 

given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the 

over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the 

prosecution of the war. 

The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are 

the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will 

be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished 

at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which 

hazard the success of, or 6elay, these main operations. 

6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in 

the execution of the over-all strategic concept:­

a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such 

aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in 

connection therewith. 

b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. 

c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can 

fulfill an active and effective role in the present war. Within the limits of 

our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to 

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employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful 

accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the 

liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United 

Nations to prosecute the present war. 

d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to 

liberate enemy-occupied areas. 

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C.C.S. a7711 30 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES 

References: 

ccs a77 

CCS 82415 

CCS 746110 & 746124 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to propose three amendments to 

the memorandum put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 877). 

2. First, at the end of paragraph 4 a. they would like to change the words 

“British Isles” to read “British Commonwealth.” As at present phrased, the 

wording would not safeguard Imperial requirements, e.g., for India and 

Australia. 

3. Second, for the reasons already given in paragraph 5, C.C.S. 824/4,* the 

British Chiefs of Staff would still prefer to delete the words “or delay” in the 

last line of paragraph 5. 

4. Third, the British Chiefs of Staff point out that since discussions regarding the formula for priorities began, the cargo shipping review has been completed and formal approval to it should be given shortly. This review will cover 

all present foreseen requirements, but it remains to safeguard approved military operations against additional civil requirements not now covered in the 

cargo shipping review. For this reason, therefore, the British Chiefs of Staff 

would like to suggest that a paragraph should be added to the memorandum 

by the United States Chiefs of Staff as follows:­

“7. The above formulae relate to cargo shipping, only in so far as 

additional requirements arise. Schedules of proposed military and civil 

Not published herein. 

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allocations for the period 1July 1945to 30 June 1946have been agreed by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 746/24”). The combined shipping authorities have given assurances (C.C.S. 746/10* *) that no civil allocations 

additional to the above, which might prejudice approved operational requirements, will be accepted without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff.” 

5. Subject to the above remarks the British Chiefs of Staff are in full 

agreement with the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

(C.C.S. 877), and would not propose to submit any separate formula on priorities. If the United States Chiefs of Staff feel able to accept the amendments 

proposed above, the British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff should adopt the formula in C.C.S. 877, as amended by this paper, 

at once and incorporate it in the final report of the TERMINAL Conference. 

Not published herein. 

* * ARGONAUT conference book, page 54. 

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10 July 1945 

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C.C.S. 87712 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BASIC OBJECTIVES. STRATEGY, AND POLICIES 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

1. With reference to the amendment proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff 

to paragraph 4 a,, “Basic Undertakings and Policies for the Prosecution of the 

War,” of C.C.S. 877, the United States Chiefs of Staff had not proposed to 

change the wording of this paragraph, even though it does not fit the present 

situation. Now that the point has been raised, however, it is considered that 

the paragraph should recognize that, at this stage in the war, there is no 

longer any particular connection between “security” and “war-making 

capacity” in so far as the completion of the war against Japan is concerned. 

They agree to the inclusion of the term “British Commonwealth” in the statement in so far as “security” is concerned, even though the entire Commonwealth is not at war with Japan. 

2. It is the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that with the end of 

the war with Germany, justification does not exist for expanding the basic 

undertaking concerning “war-making capacity” which has been agreed during 

the period of a two-front war. Rather, now that our entire productive capacity 

is no longer being devoted to an all-out war, the wording should clearly restrict 

to this war the commitment in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

3. Since the British Chiefs of Staff do not wish to continue the original 

wording, the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that paragraph 4 a. of the 

statement proposed in C.C.S. 877 should be deleted, the following substituted 

therefor, and paragraphs 4 b. and c. re-lettered accordingly:­

“4. a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British 

Commonwealth. 

b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the U.S.and the British 

Isles in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of this war.” 

4. As to the proposal to delete the words “or delay” from the sentence, 

“NO other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, 

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these main operations.”, such deletion would make it meaningless in so far 

as establishing a priority for operations is concerned. The United States 

Chiefs of Staff see reasons for inclusion of the phrase and see no reason even 

for considering its deletion unless the British Chiefs of Staff intend to propose 

an operation which might delay the main operations. 

5. As to the proposal that a paragraph be added relating to cargo shipping, 

the intent of the memorandum proposed by C.C.S. 877 was to establish broad 

principles for the prosecution of the war. The United States Chiefs of Staff 

believe that interpretation of these principles to apply to specific cases should 

be considered as separate matters. The statements of broad policy contained 

in C.C.S. 877 will serve as guides to resolve problems in allocation of forces and 

resources. However, after meeting requirements for the supreme operations 

against Japan,there may remain matters of logistical and operational priorities 

which will require resolution by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will have 

to be considered on their merits as they arise. It is therefore suggested that 

priorities for cargo shipping be excluded from the statement of basic policies 

and remain under consideration in the C.C.S. 746 series. 

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C.C.S. 87714 20 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We have considered the latest proposals of the United States Chiefs of 

Staff in C.C.S. 87712. In the attached schedule we have set out in one column 

the document as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, together with 

the amendments which we should like to see introduced. In the right-hand 

column we set out our comments. 

2. The document, as far as paragraph 6, covers presently known military 

requirements. Against the possibility that additional military requirements 

may emerge which might conflict with presently accepted civil shipping programmes, it is considered desirable to add a further paragraph in the terms 

set out in paragraph 7. 

3. We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff adopt the basic objectives, strategy, and policies as amended in the attached, and incorporate them 

in the final report of the TERMINAL Conference. 

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ENCLOSURE 

Memorandum by United States Chiefs 

of Staffwith Proposed Amendments by 

British Chiefs of Staff 

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

1. In conjunction with other Allies 

to bring about at the earliest possible 

date the unconditional surrender of 

Japan. 

11. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE 

WAR 

2. In cooperation with other Allies 

to establish and maintain, as necessary, 

military control of Germany and 

Austria. 

3. In cooperation with other Allies 

to bring about at the earliest possible 

date the defeat of Japan by: lowering 

Japanese ability and will to resist by 

establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment. 

and destroying Japanese air and naval 

strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as 

the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than 

the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing 

absolute military control of Japan; and 

liberating Japanese occupied territory 

if required. 

Comments by British Chiefs of 

Staff 

We fully agree that the first 

priority should be given to the 

main operations against the Japanese Islands. 

We trust, however, that 

other operations in the Outer Zone, 

which will achieve the secondary 

object of evicting the Japanese 

from all occupied territories, wil! 

receive the fullest possible consideration. 

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Memorandum by United States Chiefs 

of Staff with Proposed Amendments by 

British Chiefs of Staff 

111. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND 

POLICIES FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR 

4. The following basic undertakings 

are considered fundamental to the 

prosecution of the war:­

a. Maintain the security of the 

Western Hemisphere and the British 

Commonwealth. 

b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British 

Isles in so far as it is connected with 

the prosecution of this war. 

a. Maintain the securitv and war­ " 

making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth 

as necessary for the fulfillment of the 

strategic concept. 

b. c. Support the war-making capacxy of our forces, in all areas, with 

first priority given to those forces in 

or destined for combat areas. 

c. d. Maintain vital overseas lines 

of communication. 

Words underscored are proposed additions. 

Words italicized are proposed deletions. 

Comments by British Chiefs of 

Staff 

The wording of paragraph 

4 b. as proposed by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff does not 

allow for the maintenance of the 

war-making capacity of such countries as Canada, India or Australia, 

all of which are making an important contribution towards the 

prosecution of the war. Warmaking capacity cannot be confined solely to that required for the 

defeat of Japan since it is also 

necessary to meet the requirements 

for military control of Germany 

and Austria as stated in the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war. 

If first priority is given only 

to the support of the war-making 

capacity of forces in the combat 

areas, this might lead to the withholding of priority from the forces 

destined to relieve or support them. 

For example, the forces in India 

are required for maintaining the 

forces in active operations an6 providing reinforcements. As is known 

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Memorandum by United States Chiefs 

of Staff with Proposed Amendments by 

British Chiefs of Staff 

5. In order to attain the over-all 

objective, first priority in the provision 

of forces and resources of the United 

States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater 

to the Pacific and Far East, willbe given 

to meeting requirementsof tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all 

strategic concept and to the basic 

undertakings fundamental to the 

prosecution of the war. 

The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith 

are the supreme operations in the war 

against Japan; forces and resources 

will be allocated on the required scale 

to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. 

No other operations will be undertaken 

which hazard the success of, or delay, 

these main operations. 

6. The following additional tasks 

will be undertaken in order to assist 

in the execution of the over-all strategic concept: 

a. Encourage Russian entry into 

the war against Japan. Provide such 

92 

Comments by British Chiefs of 

Staff 

many installations supporting the 

operations in Southeast Asia Command are outside those areas which 

can strictly be termed combat 

areas. Unless these requirements 

are recognised, the war-making 

capacity of forces in combat areas 

will be jeopardised. 
TOP SECRET 

Memorandum by United States Chiefs 

of Staffwith Proposed Amendments by 

British Chiefs of Staff 

aid to her war-making capacity as may 

be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. 

b. Undertake such measures as may 

be necessary and practicable in order 

to aid the war effort of China as an 

effective ally against Japan. 

c. Provide assistance to such of the 

forces of liberated areas as can fulfill 

an active and effective role in the 

present war. or are required to maintain world order in the interests of the 

war effort. Within the limits of our 

available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to 

employ this assistance in the present 

war. Having regard to the successful 

accomplishment of basic undertakings, 

to provide such supplies to the liberated 

areas as will effectively contribute to 

the capacity of the United Nations to 

prosecute the present war. 

d. In cooperation with other Allies 

conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas. 

7. Cargo Shipping 

Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the 

position to be sufficiently manageable 

to provide for the maximum effort in 

the prosecution of the war against 

Japan, for the maintenance of the warWords underscored are proposed additions. 

Words italicized are proposed deletions. 

Comments by British Chiefs of 

Staff 

The present wording would 

appear to limit this assistance 

strictly to those forces which can 

take part in the war against Japan. 

We feel,however, that the necessity 

for the maintenance of world order, 

particularly in Europe, must be 

recognised. Having brought about 

the liberation of Europe, it would 

be illogical to allow unrest to occur 

owing to lack of forces in the liberated areas to keep order. 

The last sentence of paragraph 6 c. is unnecessary as it is 

now dealt with in paragraph 7 

below. 

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Memorandum by United States Chiefs Comments by British Chiefs of 

of Staff with Proposed Amendments by Staff 

British Chiefs of Staff 

making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western 

Hemisphere, for an additional amount 

for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, and for 

supplies to liberated areas. Should further military demands arise for maintaining the maximum war effort which 

would brine about a substantial conflict 

ated areas, the shipping-situation will 

be examined by the two Governments at time in the licht of chanced 

conditions. 

Words underscored are proposed additions. 

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C.C.S. 87715 21 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES 

Reference: 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff having considered the proposals 

concerning the “Basic Objectives, Strategy and Policies” made by the British 

Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 87714, wish to make their position clear. They consider 

that the basic undertakings should be confined to broad statements concerning the military conduct of the war. As a result of the changed circumstances 

arising from the defeat of Germany and the practical capability of the British 

Commonwealth to support its own forces in the field, they are operating on 

the basis that approval of the issue to allied governments of lend-lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment will be limited to that which 

is to be used in the war against Japan and which will not be used for any other 

purpose. They do not propose to subscribe to any statements which deviate 

from this principle. They consider that occupation forces are not a subject 

for combined military commitments. Matters relating to post-war armies are 

also not susceptible to combined military commitments. Any arrangements 

which the British wish to make on these subjects are beyond the purview of 

the United States Chiefs of Staff and should be taken up on the governmental 

level. 

2. Considering in detail the proposed changes, the United States Chiefs 

of Staff have understood that throughout the entire period of the two-front 

war the combined commitment limited to supporting the war-making capacity of the British Isles has been satisfactory to the British Chiefs of Staff. In 

light of the limited information available to the United States Chiefs of Staff, 

it appears that the war effort of the British Commonwealth in the future is 

going to be less than that generated over the period when the commitment as 

previously worded was satisfactory; also certain portions of this war-making 

capacity will be devoted to other than the war effort against Japan. Since it 

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is realized that certain parts of the British Commonwealth will make a contribution to the war against Japan there is no objection to a statement which 

confines the combined military commitment to matters clearly connected with 

the prosecution of the war against Japan. Therefore the United States Chiefs 

of Staff propose to substitute in their paragraph I11 4 b. the words “British 

Commonwealth” for “British Isles” and substitute “the war against Japan” 

for “this war.” 

3. The change proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 c. to 

include forces “destined for combat areas” is acceptable if rephrased to indicate clearly that it applies only to forces specifically designated for employment in combat areas against Japan. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose 

that the subparagraph 4 c. read in part “. ..those forces in or designated for 

employment in combat areas in the war against Japan.” The proposal contained in paragraph I11 6 c. that the United States make a military commitment to support forces engaged in other than the prosecution of the war 

against Japan is unacceptable for reasons indicated in the first paragraph of 

this memorandum. 

4. The proposal to strike out the last sentence of paragraph I11 6 c. is 

acceptable. However, the United States Chiefs of Staff are willing to retain it 

in view of the fact they do not accept the inclusion in the basic undertakings 

of paragraph 7 proposed by the British. 

5. The proposed paragraph 7 is beyond the purview of the United States 

Chiefs of Staff. They are not in a position to make military commitments on 

the reconstructionand rehabilitation of the United Kingdom or on the matter 

of supplies for liberated Allies. Furthermore, the inclusion of terms concerning a specific resource such as cargo shipping in the basic undertakings is 

unacceptable. The purpose of the basic undertakings includes provision of a 

guide to the operating agencies for the allocation and the determination of 

priorities concerning all resources, not only cargo shipping, but forces and 

munitions of war. The United States Chiefs of Staff, however, will accept the 

inclusion in the final report to the President and Prime Minister, but not in 

the basic undertakings of a statement concerning cargo shipping which is 

limited to matters within their purview. The statement proposed by the British 

Chiefs of Staff changed as indicated below is acceptable to the United States 

Chiefs of Staff :-

CARGO SHIPPING 

“Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the 

position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort 

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in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the 

war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the 

Western Hemisphere, insofar as it is connected with the prosecution of 

the war against Japan, and for an additional amount for the reconstruction 

and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, and for supplies to liberated 

areas civilian requirements. Should further military demands arise for 

maintaining the maximum war effort which would bring about a substantial 

conflict arise with British rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, and supplies to liberated areas, the shipping situation will be examined a matter for 

examination by the two Governments at -the time ­and in the light of

changed conditions." 

6. For purposes of ready reference the statement of policy concerning 

strategy and basic undertakings is included in the Enclosure using the redraft 

of the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 877/4 and with the changes indicated 

above shown by italicizing and underlining. 

7. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the statement in the Enclosure. 

Words underscored are proposed additions. 

Words italicized are proposed deletions. 

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ENCLOSURE 

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

1. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible 

date the unconditional surrender of Japan. 

11. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE 

WAR 

2. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, 

military control of Germany and Austria. 

3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible 

date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by 

establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, 

and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will 

contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; 

and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required. 

111. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND POLICIES FOR THE PROSECUTION OF 

THE WAR 

4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the 

prosecution of the war:­

a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British 

Commonwealth. 

b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the 

British Commonwealth in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of 

the war against Japan. 

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity ofthe Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of 

the strategic concept. 

Words underscored are proposed additions. 

Words italicized are proposed deletions. 

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c. b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with 

firsrpriority given to those forces in or designated destined for employment 

in-combat areas in the war against Japan. 

d. c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. -

5. In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision 

of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theatre to the Pacific and Far East, will be 

given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the overall strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamenltal to the prosecution of the war. 

The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are 

the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will 

be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished 

at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which 

hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations. 

6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in 

the execution of the over-all strategic concept:­

a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such 

aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. 

b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. 

c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill 

an active and effective role in the present war or are required to maintain 

world OTdeT in the interests of the war eflort. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ 

this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated 

areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to 

prosecute the war against Japan. 

d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to 

liberate enemy-occupied areas. 

Words underscored are proposed additions 

Words italicized are proposed deletions. 

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7. CARGO SHIPPING 

The proposal by the British Chiefs of Staff is not acceptable. 

Words italicized are proposed deletions. 

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C.C.S. 880 

C.C.S. 880/1 

C.C.S. 880/2 

C.C.S. 880/5 

C.C.S. 880/7 

AGENDA FOR THE NEXT 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE 

In C.C.S. 880 (15 June 1945) the British Chiefs of Staff proposed a tentative outline agenda for the forthcoming Staff Conference. 

In C.C.S. 880/1 (25 June) the British Chiefs of Staff suggested a 

further item for the agenda proposed in C.C.S. 880. 

In C.C.S. 880/2 (27 June) the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to 

the tentative outline agenda and expressed certain views regarding items (6) 

and (7) thereof. 

In C.C.S. 880/5 (29 June) the British Chiefs of Staff replied to the 

Views expressed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in paragraphs 2, 3,and 4 

of C.C.S. 880/2. 

In C.C.S. 880/7 (6 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested an 

additional item for the tentative outline agenda (C.C.S. 880). 

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C.C.S. 880 15 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AGENDA FOR THE NEXT 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff put forward the following tentative outline 

agenda for the next United States - British Staff Conference:­

(1) Progress reports on operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia 

Command (SEAC). 

(2) Estimate of Japanese situation. 

(3) Development of operations in the Pacific. 

(4) British participation in the war against Japan. 

(5) Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command. 

(6) Control and command of the war against Japan. 

(7) Russian participation in the war against Japan. 

(8) French, Dutch, and Portuguese participation in the war against 

Japan. 

(9) Planning date for the end of the war against Japan. 

(10) Over-all priorities. 

2. As to the preparation of papers, the British Chiefs of Staff assume that 

the United States Chiefs of Staff would deal with items 3, 7, 8, and 9. They 

themselves would be prepared to table papers on items 4, 5, and 6, and will 

probably wish to comment on C.C.S. 877* under item 10. They suggest that 

the Combined Intelligence Committee should be asked to prepare a report on 

item 2. 

Page 82. 

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3. The British Chiefs of Staff would be glad to have the reactions of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff to the above which is, of course, purely provisional 

at this stage. 

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C.C.S.880/1 25 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AGENDA FOR THE NEXT 

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have now one further item to add to the 

tentative outline agenda proposed in C.C.S. 880. They suggest that the following item be added: 

(11) Combined Chiefs of Staff Machinery after the war with Japan. 

2. The British Chiefs of Staff would submit a paper on this item as a basis 

for discussion. 

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C.C.S. 88012 27 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AGENDA FOR MILITARY STAFF CONFERENCES 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree to the tentative outline agenda 

for the next United States-British Staff Conference proposed by the British 

Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 880 and C.C.S. 880/1,and to the proposed scheme for 

the preparation of papers in connection therewith. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff assume that the question of control 

and command in the war against Japan concerns the reorganization of command in the Southwest Pacific Area now under discussion by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 852 Series* and in C.C.S. 878.* The United States 

Chiefs of Staff believe it would be desirable to resolve this matter before the 

forthcoming conference if at all practicable. 

3. As to the matter of Russian participation in the war against Japan, 

there is a question as to whether discussion of this on a combined basis will 

be necessary, and, in any event, the United States Chiefs of Staff will not be 

prepared to take up the matter until after conclusion of any conversations 

with the Russians. 

4. It is suggested that in so far as practicable the papers on each side 

be presented for consideration of the other prior to the conferences. 

* Not published herein. See CCS 890 series, page 141. 

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C.C.S. 880/5 29 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AGENDA FOR MILITARY STAFF CONFERENCES 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We communicated the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff, as set 

out in C.C.S. 880/2, to the British Chiefs of Staff. 

2. With regard to paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 880/2, the British Chiefs of Staff 

say that their paper on the control and command of the war against Japan 

will include proposals for the reorganization of command in the Southwest 

Pacific. 

3. With regard to paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 880/2, the British Chiefs of Staff 

agree that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should defer discussion of this problem until after the conclusion of any conversations with the Russians. 

4. With regard to paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 880/2, the British Chiefs of Staff 

agree that papers should be exchanged in advance of the conference so far as 

practicable. They doubt, however, whether under present circumstances they 

will be able to present their papers on British participation in the war against 

Japan (item 4) and control and command of the war against Japan (item 6) 

more than a few days before TERMINAL. The directive to the Supreme Allied 

Commander, Southeast Asia Command (item 5) will depend upon the outcome 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussion on British participation in the war 

against Japan (item 4) and cannot therefore be tabled in advance. 

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C.C.S. 8801'7 6 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AGENDA FOR FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend the addition to the agenda 

proposed in C.C.S. 880 and 880/1 of the following item, which they will prepare and present:­

(12) Report on air operations in the war against Japan. 

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C.C.S. 880/3 

C.C.S. SSO/S 

SIZE OF MILITARY STAFFS FOR TERMINAL 

In C.C.S. 880/3 (28 June 1945) the United States Chiefs of Staff expressed their views with regard to the size of military staffs at TERMINAL. 

The reply from the British Chiefs of Staff was circulated as C.C.S. S80/6 (30 

June). 

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C.C.S. 88013 28 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SIZE OF MILITARY STAFFS FOR TERMINAL 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. With reference to the memorandum by the Representatives of the 

British Chiefs of Staff of 25 June,* it is the opinion of the United States Chiefs 

of Staff that large military staffs should not be taken to TERMINAL and that 

detailed discussions which will involve the need for a large staff on the order 

of OCTAGON and ARGONAUT should not be engaged in at that place. The 

United States Chiefs of Staff have not proposed to take with them more than 

very small staffs. Their understanding of the agenda proposed to date is such 

that they believe it should be handled quickly and easily without need for any 

large accompanying staff at the meeting. It is their view that in general subjects involving detailed studies and consideration should be handled within 

the normal mechanism of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

2. In case the understanding the British Chiefs of Staff have of the discussions to be engaged in is such as to require a considerable staff, the United 

States Chiefs of Staff would like to be informed on this matter in order that 

they may consider it further. 

*Not published herein. 

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C.C.S. 880/6 30 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SIZE OF MILITARY STAFFS FOR TERMINAL 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff 

We communicated the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding the size of the military staffs for TERMZNAL as set out in C.C.S. 880/3 

to the British Chiefs of Staff who replied saying that they agreed that large 

military staffs would not be required at TERMZNAL. The order of the staffs 

which they have in mind to take is approximately as follows:­

a. Each chief of staff will have with him, in addition to his personal 

staff, four or five staff officers. 

b. In addition the secretariat will take with it enough personnel to provide for the normal administrative running of the conference. 

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C.C.S. 880/4 

DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

References: 

CCS 880, paragraph 1 (3) 

CCS 193d Meeting, Item 4 

C.C.S. 880/4, a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (29 

June 1945), was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 193d Meeting 

(16 July). 

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C.C.S. 88014 29 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. In conformity with the over-all objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, the United States Chiefs 

of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for the main effort 

in the Pacific :­

a. From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines 

to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create 

a situation favorable to: 

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese 

capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further 

intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a 

tactical condition favorable to: 

c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the 

Tokyo Plain. 

2. We have curtailed our projected expansion in the Ryukyus by deferring 

indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima. Using the resources 

originally provided for Miyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly 

be brought to bear against Japan and the risk of becoming involved in operations which might delay the seizure of southern Kyushu is avoided. 

3. In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we 

have directed:­

a. The invasion of Kyushu, target date 1November 1945. 

b. The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control of sea communications to and in the Western Pacific as are required 

for the accomplishment of the over-all objective. 

c. The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such 

operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective. 

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d. The seizure of Balikpapan, target date 1 July 1945. 

e. The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective. 

4. Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent to the 

invasion of Kyushu is continuing on the basis of meeting a target date of 1 

March 1946 for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain. This planning is premised on 

the belief that defeat of the enemy’s armed forces in the Japanese homeland is 

a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main 

Japanese islands. We recognize the possibility also that our success in the 

main islands may not obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further 

developments. 

5. We are keeping under continuing review the possibility of capitalizing 

at small cost, without delaying the supreme operations, upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the China Theater. 

6. We have directed the preparation of plans for the following:­

a. Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports. 

6.Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational 

purposes in order to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances 

such as a sudden enemy collapse or surrender. 

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C.C.S. 880/8 

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE BY JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 880, paragraph 1 (9) 

CCS 196th Meeting, Item 5 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 19 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 880/8 (7July 1945) in 

their 196th Meeting (19 July) and agreed that for the purpose of planning 

production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of 

organized resistance by Japan be 15November 1946; that this date be adjusted 

periodically to conform to the course of the war. 

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C.C.S. 88018 7 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE BY JAPAN 

(Forthe purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower) 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

With reference to item (9), “Planning date for the end of the war against 

Japan,” of the proposed agenda for United States-British military staff conferences (C.C.S. 880), the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend agreement 

to the following:­

a. That for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of 

manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan 

be 15 November 1946; that this date be adjusted periodically to conform 

to the course of the war. 

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff desire to avoid use of the term “end 

of the war” in the sense proposed in the agenda, in view of the fact that 

certain United States laws, which should remain in effect during the period 

of occupation of Japan, will automatically lapse at stated periods after “the 

end of the war.” 

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C.C.S. 880/9 

C.C.S. 880/lO 

PROGRAMANDPROCEDUREFORTHECONFERENCE 

Reference: 

CCS 193d Meeting, Item 1 

In C.C.S. 880/9 (15 July 1945) the British Chiefs of Staff suggested a 

program and procedure for the conference. 

In C.C.S. 880/10 (16 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted 

the program subject to certain outlined provisions. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 193d Meeting (16 July) approved 

C.C.S. 880/10. 

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C.C.S. 88019 15 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRAM AND PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We suggest that in accordance with the procedure we have adopted at 

previous conferences, the United States and British Chiefs of Staff should 

hold their domestic meetings in the morning and the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should meet in the afternoon at 1430. 

2. We suggest also that we should aim to work to the attached programme. 

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ENCLOSURE 

PROGRAMME FOR TERMINAL 

1st Meeting 1. PROGRAMME AND PROCEDURE FOR THE 

(Monday, 16th) CONFERENCE 

2. ESTIMATE OF THE JAPANESE SITUATION 

3. PROGRESS REPORTS ON OPERATIONS IN 

PACIFIC AND SEAC 

4. DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONS IN THE 

PACIFIC 

5. REPORT ON AIR OPERATIONS IN THE WAR 

AGAINST JAPAN 

2nd Meeting 1. BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR 

(Tuesday, 17th) AGAINST JAPAN 

2. CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR 

AGAINST JAPAN 

3rd Meeting 1. BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND 

(Wednesday, 18th) POLICIES 

2. FRENCH, DUTCH, AND PORTUGUESE PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

4th Meeting 1. DIRECTIVE TO SACSEA 

(Thursday, 19th) 2. RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION 

3. RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS 

4. PLANNING DATE FOR END OF WAR AGAINST 

JAPAN 

5. C.C.S. MACHINERY AFTER THE END OF WAR 

AGAINST JAPAN 

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C.C.S. 880/10 16 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRAM AND PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

1. The program suggested by C.C.S. 880/9 is satisfactory, subject to such 

rearrangement of subjects as may later appear desirable, except that:­

a. No dates should be specified for the meetings, as such cannot be 

determined at this time. 

b. Whether discussion of Russian participation will prove appropriate 

or necessary remains to be determined. This item has been left on the agenda 

pending firm determination in light of later developments. 

c. It is presumed that item 3 of the 4th Meeting, as listed in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 880/9 refers to the subject matter of C.C.S. 884/2 and that 

the title of this item should be the sme as the title of that paper, “Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War.” 

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C.C.S. 884 

C.C.S. 88411 

C.C.S. 88412 

INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING 

THE JAPANESE WAR 

References: 

CCS 196th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 18 

In C.C.S. 884 (22 June 1945) the British Chiefs of Staff suggested that 

their policy for imparting information to the Russians be coordinated with 

the policy of the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

In C.C.S. 88411 (8 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff stated that 

they did not consider the matter an appropriate one for combined agreement. 

In C.C.S. 88412 (15 July) the British Chiefs of Staff suggested that the 

matter be discussed further at TERMINAL. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the C.C.S. 884 series in their 

196th Meeting (19 July) and agreed to the conclusions recorded in item 4 of 

that meeting. 

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C.C.S. 884 22 June 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING 

THE JAPANESE WAR 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Stag 

1. The Head of the British Military Mission in Moscow, General Gammell, 

has asked the British Chiefs of Staff to inform him, in the event of Russia 

declaring war on Japan, what information he should pass to the Russians on 

Japanese dispositions and estimated intentions, and on British dispositions 

and operational plans. 

2. The British Chiefs of Staff feel that it is desirable for the policy adopted 

by them in imparting information to the Russians on these subjects to be 

coordinated with the policy of the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

3. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that General Gammell and General 

Deane should be empowered to hand over information on Japanese dispositions 

and intentions, and also on Allied dispositions only if it is asked for, and then 

only on a basis of reciprocity. The British Chiefs of Staff as agents of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff would provide General Gammell with the necessary 

information on Southeast Asia Command, and they assume that the United 

States Chiefs of Staff would provide General Deane with information about 

the Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and China Theatres. Coordination between 

General Gammell and General Deane would however be necessary in order 

to ensure that information is passed on American forces in a theatre under 

the operational control of the British Chiefs of Staff, and vice versa. 

4. So far as Allied intentions in all theatres are concerned, the British 

Chiefs of Staff consider that information should be passed to the Russians 

only on the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on each occasion. 

5. We should be glad to have the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff 

on this matter. 

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C.C.S. 88411 8 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING 

THE JAPANESE WAR 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals of the 

British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 884 concerning the information which should 

be given to the Russians on intelligence, dispositions, and plans in the war 

against Japan. 

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider this matter is not an appropriate one for combined agreement. However, they will not, without prior 

agreement of the appropriate British authorities, pass to the Russians any 

information on dispositions or operational plans of Allied forces in areas of 

British strategic responsibility or any information that has been obtained from 

a British source. 

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C.C.S. 88412 15 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING 

THE JAPANESE WAR 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the reply by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 88411) to their memorandum (C.C.S. 884) 

concerning the information which should be given to the Russians if they 

enter the war against Japan. 

2. The British Chiefs of Staff cannot agree that this is an inappropriate 

matter for combined agreement. 

3. Hitherto throughout the war against Germany, it has been customary, 

although not obligatory, for the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to 

consult together as to the measure and means of our dealings with the Russians. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that on the whole this policy has 

been wise and profitable, and they see no reason, now that Germany has been 

defeated and Russia is not yet at war with Japan, to depart from it. They are 

not aware that it has aroused resentment on the part of the Russians, who 

nevertheless must have been aware of our joint collaboration. 

4. If the British and American staffs now take an independent and quite 

possibly divergent line as regards passing information to the Russians, it seems 

possible that the Russians will be tempted to play one of us off against the other. 

5. For the above reasons the British Chiefs of Staff would be grateful for 

an opportunity of discussing this matter further with the United States Chiefs 

of Staff at TERMINAL. 

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C.C.S. 889 

C.C.S. 88911 

C.C.S. 88912 

C.C.S. 88913 

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 194th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 10 

C.C.S. 889 (6 July 1945) circulated the proposal by the British Chiefs 

of Staff for the British contribution to the final phase of the war against Japan. 

The reply of the United States Chiefs of Staff was circulated as C.C.S. 

88911 (17 July). 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 889 and C.C.S. 88911 

in their 194th Meeting (17 July). Their conclusions are recorded in item 2 of 

that meeting. 

In C.C.S. 889/2 (18 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff circulated 

for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff extracts of a message 

from General MacArthur concerning British participation in the war against 

Japan. 

In C.C.S. 889/3 (21 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff circulated 

information for the Combined Chiefs of Staff in connection with item 2 b. of the 

conclusions reached on this subject in their 194th Meeting. 

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C.C.S. 889 6 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE FINAL PHASE 

OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 452 Series 

CCS 619 Series 

CCS 691 Series 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We have been instructed to present the attached memorandum on the 

British contribution to the final phase of the war against Japan, which the 

British Chiefs of Staff have prepared for discussion at the next conference. 

2. The views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments on the proposals formulated have been requested but have not yet been received. 

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ENCLOSURE 

BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE FINAL PHASE 

OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Stag 

1. It has been agreed that the over-all objective for the war against Japan is 

to force the unconditional surrender of the Japanese by:­

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and 

air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese naval and air strength. 

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan. 

2. It is agreed that the invasion of Japan is the supreme operation of the 

war. The prospect of the recapture of Singapore in November 1945, together 

with the opening of the Malacca Straits,enables us to offer, in addition to the 

British Pacific Fleet and the very long range (VLR) bomber force, a British, 

Dominion, and Indian land force to take part in this invasion. Owing to limitations of shipping, however, such a project will only absorb a part of the forces 

at present deployed in Southeast Asia Command. We have therefore planned 

that British forces should continue operations in the Outer Zone as far as 

limitations of other resources allow. 

3. We propose, therefore, that British participation in the final phase of 

the war against Japan should take the following form:­

a. The British Pacific Fleet as at present planned 

b. A VLR bomber force of 10 squadrons increasing to 20 squadrons at 

a later date when more airfields become available. 

c. A British Commonwealth force to participate in CORONET under 

American command, of three to five divisions, all to be carried in-British 

shipping and provided with the necessary assault lift. This force would be 

supported by the East Indies Fleet, augmented by the British Pacific Fleet 

as necessary, and by a tactical air component of some 15 squadrons. The 

exact size, composition, and role of this force can only be determined by 

consultation between British and United States staffs in the light of United 

States operational plans, the target date of CORONET, and its relation to 

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the date of the capture of Singapore. Our preliminary investigations show 

that it might take one of the following forms:­

( i ) A force of one or possibly two divisions in the assault together

with two or three divisions in the build-up, administratively largely 

self-supporting. 

( ii ) A force of three divisions in the assault and immediate followup and one or possibly two divisions in the build-up, relying, to a considerable degree, on American administrative assistance. 

(iii) A force of up to five divisions in the build-up administratively 

largely self-supporting. We should naturally prefer a course which 

allowed us to take part in the assault. 

d. Operations in the Outer Zone to maintain pressure against the Japanese across the Burma-Siam frontier. In addition, plans for operations 

against Siam, for the establishment of bridgeheads in Java or Sumatra, 

and for the recapture of Hong Kong will be studied. A decision will be 

made at a later date as to whether, and if so when, any of these operations 

will be undertaken. 

4. We therefore propose that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve 

the British contribution to the final phase of the war against Japan, as set out 

in this memorandum. 

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C.C.S. 889/1 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Sta# 

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous agreement to 

the proposals in subparagraphs 3 a. and b. of C.C.S. 889. In connection with 

the latter proposal it should be noted that there is little prospect that airfield 

space for more than ten squadrons of a British very long range (VLR) bomber 

force will become available at least before 1December 1945. 

2. As to paragraph 3 c., the United States Chiefs of Staff agree in principle 

to the participation in the final phase of the war against Japan of a British 

Commonwealth land force, subject to satisfactory resolution of operational 

problems by Commander in Chief, U.S.Army Forces, Pacific, and Commander 

in Chief, U.S.Pacific Fleet, and to the clarification of certain factors which the 

United States Chiefs of Staff believe will be controlling. Their views on some 

of these factors follow:­

a. It is essential that a firm commitment be received as to dates of 

availability and composition of forces in order to plan for their participation 

in the final effort and to effect adjustments of the United States redeployment program. It is not practicable to plan on using forces whose availability is contingent upon their release following the conclusion of a 

separate major operation. Hence it appears these forces cannot at present be 

planned for use earlier than the build-up phase of CORONET. 

b. The difficulties incident to the employment of Indian troops (language complications and the necessity for prior acclimatization) make it 

doubtful that the Indian division can be effectively employed. 

c. Arrangements have already been made with the Canadian Government to organize and equip along United States lines one Canadian division, 

to operate as a part of a United States corps. 

d. It is noted that agreement of the Dominions concerned has not yet 

been obtained. 

e. A solution must be found to the complicated logistical problems 

involved. 

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f. The forces should be concentrated in the Pacific or in the United States 

well in advance of the date scheduled for their participation in the campaign. 

g. The question of the provision of assault lift requires clarification. 

h. It is considered impracticable to superimpose upon the already adequate US.tactical air forces a small British tactical air force, since this 

would overload prospective airfields and introduce complications resulting 

from additional aircraft types. 

i. The effect of the proposals upon continued operations in the Southeast 

Asia Command requires further examination. 

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C.C.S. 88912 18 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Stag 

The following extracts of a message from General MacArthur to the War 

Department under date of 9 July 1945 concerning British participation in the 

war against Japan are furnished for the information of the British Chiefs 

of Staff :-

The scope of the British proposal for participation in CORONET 

presents problems not heretofore encountered when the Canadian and 

French contingents were considered. 

These problems must be viewed in their proper perspective as they 

relate to the specific operation in contemplation unless complexity, particularly as applies to logistics, and lack of homogeneity of forces destroy combat effectiveness or require a delay in target date. 

This operation, as at present visualized, is confined to narrow limits. 

There will be no opportunity to assign separate sectors of responsibility 

along national lines. 

The assault is to be made into heavily defended areas and calls for 

the closest coordination of air, naval, and ground forces, and within the 

ground forces themselves. Acceptance of the British in the assault with the 

differences in organization, composition, equipment, training procedures, 

and doctrines will complicate command, operations, and logistic support. 

Redeployment geared to the support of homogeneous forces and now well 

advanced, would have to undergo a large-scale readjustment, particularly 

taking into consideration a parallel line of British logistic channels, including separate bases, storage, issuance and maintenance facilities, and 

personnel therefor. 

British forces participating in operations against Singapore in 

November could not be prepared for the assault phase in CORONET.It is 

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considered doubtful that these forces could participate even in the followup. Certainly, to utilize considerable numbers of troops without adequate 

opportunity on the part of higher commanders of this area to exercise command functions prior to their use would be a most dangerous expedient. 

Moreover, it would be entirely unsatisfactory to have the availability 

of troops scheduled for CORONET dependent in any way upon their release from another campaign. Availability of these troops as well as all 

others committed must be certain for a fixed date. 

The following general plan is suggested as being one which will obviate the full impact of the objectionable features indicated above. 

This plan takes into consideration previous communications relating 

to the use of Australian forces as well as Canadian forces. 

A. Limit British Empire participation to one corps of three divisions; 

one British, one Canadian, and one Australian. 

B. Re-equip British division and corps troops and Australian division 

with American equipment, logistic support to be provided by the United 

States on the same scale as provided for our troops. 

C. The Australian division to be either the 7th or 9th Division, now 

concentrated in the Borneo-Morotai area. 

D. British division and corps troops to be concentratedby 1st December in the Borneo-Morotai area or, as an alternate, in the United States, 

if these units can be equipped there. 

E. Amphibiously train one British division and one Canadian division 

prior to arrival in concentration area. The Australian division is already 

amphibiously trained. 

F. Lift this corps on assault shipping to be provided by the British 

to arrivein the objective area about Y plus 10. It will there be used as the 

AF’PAC assault reserve afloat. Canadian division to be lifted directly 

from the United States, Australian division from the Borneo-Morotai 

area, and British division and corps troops from either area depending 

on where it is concentrated. 

G. Fight this corps as an integral corps within a United States Army. 

Utilize divisions separately within American corps if the exigencies of 

the situation so demand. 

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I doubt the advisability of employing troops of native origin in this 

complex operation where homogeneity of language within the corps is 

required. 

Likewise, there is a question of the advisability of utilizing troops of 

tropical origin in a temperate zone without an extended period of acclimatization. Hence, the acceptance of Indian troops is not concurred in. The 

British division should be Anglo-Saxon. 

The foregoing comments are equally applicable to Allied air components, aggravated by the difficulties of integrating relatively small air 

forces in tactical operations under the restrictions imposed by a comparatively limited air deployment potential. There are ample American air forces 

in or projected for this area to support all troops in CORONET operation. 

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C.C.S. 88913 21 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Sta# 

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz welcome the visit of a British 

corps commander and accompanying officers. General MacArthur suggests 

that they should arrive at an early date, and if practicable by 1August. 

It is suggested that further matters connected with this visit be handled 

on an operational basis between the British Joint Staff Mission and the operating agencies concerned of the War and Navy Departments. 

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C.C.S. 890 

C.C.S. 890/1 

C.C.S. 890/2 

CONTROL AND COMM ND IN THE W R AGAINST JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 195th Meeting, Items 4 & 5 

CCS 199th Meeting, Item 6 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 8 

In C.C.S. 890 (9 July 1945) the British Chiefs of Staff presented their 

views on command and control in the war against Japan. 

In C.C.S. 890/1 (17 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff replied to 

C.C.S. 890. 

In C.C.S. 890/2 (18 July) the British Chiefs of Staff commented on 

C.C.S. 890/1. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 195th Meeting (18 July) considered 

C.C.S. 890/2. Their conclusions with regard to paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of C.C.S. 

890/2 are recorded in item 4 of that meeting, and their conclusions with regard to paragraphs 5 and 6 are recorded in item 5. 

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C.C.S. 890 9 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Stag 

1. We have been instructed to present the attached memorandum on command and control in the war against Japan which the British Chiefs of Staff 

have prepared for discussion at the next conference. 

2. The views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments on the proposals formulated have been requested but have not yet been received. 

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ENCLOSURE 

CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. In considering the proposals made by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

on the transfer of command in the Southwest Pacific Area, we have reviewed 

the whole question of command and control in the war against Japan under 

the following headings:-

I. Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) and Southwest Pacific Area 

(SWPA) 

(a) Boundaries of command 

(b) Chain of command 

(c) Date of transfer 

11. Higher Strategic Control of the War against Japan 

I. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND AND SOUTHWEST PACIFlC AREA 

2. We agree with the United States Chiefs of Staff that there should shortly 

be some alteration in the responsibility for SWPA. In our view, the transfer 

of this responsibility will involve alterations in the boundaries of the Supreme 

Allied Commander, Southeast Asia's (SACSEA) command. We make the following proposals :-

BOUNDARIES OF COMMAND 

3. SACSEA's boundaries should be extended as follows:-

Beginning at the junction of the Sino-Burmese frontier and the SinoIndo-China frontier, along the frontier between Indo-China and China to 

the coast; thence down the coast of Indo-China to a point 15 degrees N; 

thence through the Balabac Strait along the 1939 boundary line between 

the Philippines and Borneo to latitude 05 degrees N; thence eastward to 

05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence southwestward to 02 degrees S, 123 degrees E; thence southeastward to 08 degrees S, 125 degrees E; thence southwestward to 18 degrees s, 110 degrees E. 

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The main difference from the proposal so far made to us by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff is the inclusion of Indo-China, as well as Siam, in SEAC. 

This we consider important so that there may be unity of control of the major 

operations in this area when they develop and of previous subversive and paramilitary operations. 

This line of demarcation would add Borneo, Java, and the Celebes to 

SEAC. 

4. Boundaries of Australian command should now be defined as follows:­

05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence to 05 degrees N, 130 degrees E;thence 

south to the Equator; thence to the International Date Line. 

The main difference between this line of demarcation and that proposed 

by the United States Chiefs of Staff is that all Australian mandated territories 

are now included in the area. This is naturally the desire of the Australian 

Government, with which we are in sympathy. It would, of course, be possible 

for United States forces to make use of the facilities in Manus and Guadalcanal. 

CHAIN OF COMMAND 

5. We propose that the chain of command and responsibility should then 

be as follows:­

a. SEAC -no change. 

b. Australian command-in this area there should be an Australian 

commander under the Australian Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff 

should be the link between the Australian and Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

DATE OF TRANSFER 

6. In our view SACSEA may not be ready to assume his additional responsibilities until after the recapture of Singapore. We, therefore, propose that, 

subject to further examination with the United States Chiefs of Staff, the 

transfer of command should take place shortly after that time. This need not 

preclude the gradual turnover in the meantime of bases, ports, or airfields by 

agreement between the Australians and General MacArthur. 

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11. HIGHER STRATEGIC CONTROL IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

7. The present arrangements for the higher strategic control in the war 

against Japan are:­

a. SEAC (C.C.S. 319/5*) : 

Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the British Chiefs of Staff 

acting as their agents. 

b. Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas: 

In these areas the Combined Chiefs of Staff exercise jurisdiction over 

grand strategic policy and over the allocation of forces and war materials 

but the United States Chiefs of Staff are responsible for all matters appertaining to operational strategy. 

8. We feel that the time has now come when we should take upon ourselves 

a greater share of the burden of strategic decisions which will be required before 

Japan is defeated. Although our contribution in the Pacific must always 

remain small in comparison with that of the United States, it is natural that our 

interest and concern should grow as more of our forces begin to be deployed 

in the Pacific area. Moreover, when the Straits of Malacca have been opened, 

there will no longer be the same natural geographical division between SEAC 

and the Pacific. All operations in the war against the Japanese would then 

form one strategic concept. 

9. We therefore propose for consideration that the control of the different 

theatres in the war against Japan should now be organised as follows:­

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over 

strategic policy and the proper coordination of the Allied efforts in all 

theatres engaged against the Japanese. 

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff acting as agents of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations in the Pacific Ocean area and China. 

c. The British Chiefs of Staff acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations 

in SEAC and SWPA. 

d. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over allocation 

of forces and war materials as between all theatres engaged against the 

Japanese. 

*QUADRANT Conference book, page 260. 

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17 July 1945 

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C.C.S. 890/1 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

With reference to the proposed boundaries for the extension of command 

of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, suggested by the British 

Chiefs of Staff, the United States Chiefs of Staff have no objection from the 

military viewpoint to the inclusion of Indo-China south of latitude 15 degrees N. 

in the new area. This, however, is a matter primarily for decision by the 

Generalissimo and a shift does not appear practicable until such time as his 

agreement is obtained. Until that time it appears operations can go forward 

on the present basis. 

As to the boundaries of the Australian command, this is a matter on 

which the solution worked out between the British and Australian Chiefs of 

Staff should be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

On the matter of the northern boundary of the area, the United States 

Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the necessity for retaining control by the United States 

of the Admiralty Islands for the reasons set forth in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 

852/1.* 

The proposal to extend the British sphere of responsibility east of the 

present boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area does not appear necessary or 

desirable until United States activities are cleared from the area, at which 

time the transfer should be effected. Aside from United States military resources in the area which must continue to be rolled up under United States 

military control, there are no military objectives or problems in the area except Ocean and Nauru Islands. At such time as British forces are prepared to 

recapture these islands, the United States will offer no objection. 

The objective of the United States Chiefs of Staff in proposing the transfer has been to release United States resources and commanders from the 

*Not published herein. 

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responsibility for containing and mopping up the Japanese forces in the area 

in order that they might concentrate on the main effort. Hence they have 

proposed 15 August as the date of turnover. Their objective would not be 

achieved by delaying the turnover until such time as Admiral Mountbatten 

is in position to advance through the Malacca Straits. Furthermore, it does 

not appear that retention of the area under United States responsibility until 

the end of the year will result in any activity additional to that which would 

occur if the area passed to Admiral Mountbatten on 15 August. The forces employed in the area are already primarily Australian. It is possible that if the 

British Chiefs of Staff do not desire to take over the area shortly, the Australian 

Chiefs of Staff might be able to do so with subsequent adjustment with Admiral 

Mountbatten within the British Empire. 

In summary, with regard to the matter of the Southeast Asia Command 

and the Southwest Pacific Area, the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that 

the immediate action should be to pass to the British Chiefs of Staff as of 15 

August or very shortly thereafter the area with boundaries as outlined in C.C.S. 

852~1. 

Concerning the matter of higher strategic control in the war against 

Japan, the thought of the United States Chiefs of Staff is that the role of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff in the European war cannot appropriately be applied to the Pacific war. In the Pacific war there exist two clearly delineated 

areas that, commanded by Admiral Mountbatten with the extensions proposed 

in the foregoing paragraphs, constitute an area of British Empire responsibility 

associated with the Portuguese, the Dutch, and perhaps eventually the French. 

The initial operational interest of the United States in this area has now 

greatly decreased. The Pacific area is devoted to the main effort, is organized 

under a command and control set-up peculiar to the United States, and has 

forces and resources overwhelmingly United States unless the Chinese, and 

possibly Russian, contribution is considered. Any change in the present control 

system which would involve added complications and more cumbersome procedures is unacceptable. 

It appears that the interest of the United States in Admiral Mountbatten’s expanded theater now includes little more than sufficient review of 

operations to determine their impact on Allied operations and from the standpoint of lend-lease requirements, that they are adjusted to the main effort, and 

that they do not have an unduly adverse effect on the supply line to China 

through India and Burma. In line with this thought the British Chiefs of Staff 

may wish to consider some readjustment of the status of the Southeast Asia 

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Command under the Combined Chiefs of Staff, perhaps along the line of the 

present status of the Pacific Theater. 

In summary, the United States Chiefs of Staff believe that increased 

participation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Pacific Theater is impracticable. 

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C.C.S. 890/2 18 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the memorandum by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 890/1) on Control and Command in the 

War against Japan. They have the following comments to make. 

2. They fully understand that it will ultimately be necessary to obtain 

the agreement of the Generalissimo to the inclusion of Indo-China in Southeast Asia Command. They are anxious, however, that the United States Chiefs 

of Staff should support them in recommending to the President and the Prime 

Minister that they should press the Generalissimo to agree to this transfer. 

They suggest, therefore, that a recommendation to this effect should be included in the final report of the TERMINAL Conference. 

3. The British Chiefs of Staff note that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

consider it necessary to retain control of the Admiralty Islands. They, therefore, withdraw their proposal for the inclusion of these islands in the Australian command. They also agree not to press for the eastward extension of 

the present boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area until United States activities are cleared from the area. They note that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

would offer no objection to British operations against Ocean and Nauru Islands. 

4. The British Chiefs of Staff realize the advantages of an early transfer of 

the Southwest Pacific Area but are up against two difficulties. The first is the 

fact that Admiral Mountbatten is now fully engaged on planning further operations. The assumption of further responsibilities at this particular stage must 

inevitably embarrass him. Secondly, we have no idea what degree of assistance 

the United States Chiefs of Staff are at present providing to the Borneo operations nor when those operations are due to be completed. On present information, therefore, we cannot assess the commitment we should be undertaking 

if we agree to the transfer on any particular date. We should like, therefore, to 

discuss this further with the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

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5. On the question of the higher strategic control of the war against Japan, 

the British Chiefs of Staff wish to reiterate and amplify their view that they 

should now be given a larger share of control of strategy on the lines suggested 

in C.C.S. 890. They desire to bring to the notice of the United States Chiefs of 

Staff the following particular considerations:­

a. The United States and Great Britain are the two major powers allied 

against Japan, and thus jointly responsible for the prosecution of the war. 

It is most desirable that they should consult freely on all matters of major 

strategic importancerelating to the conduct of the war. 

b. The British Chiefs of Staff have an inescapable responsibility to 

advise His Majesty’s Government on the use to which British forces are put 

in all theatres of war. 

c. Although the United States are of course providing the major share, 

the war against Japan, like that against Germany, is being fought with 

pooled United States and British resources, particularly shipping. It is 

right, therefore, that the British should have full understanding and knowledge of the proposed methods of applying these resources. 

6. The British Chiefs of Staff wish to make it clear that the full extent 

of what they are asking is that they should be consulted on major strategic 

policy. They have no intention of suggesting interference with the operational 

control now accorded to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in whom they 

have the utmost confidence. 

The British Chiefs of Staff ask, therefore, that the United States Chiefs 

of Staff should reconsider their attitude on this question. 

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C.C.S. 890/3 

COMMAND IN INDO-CHINA 

References: 

CCS 195th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 199th Meeting, Item 4 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 14 

In C.C.S. 890/3 (22 July 1945) the British Chiefs of Staff presented their 

views on the reorganization of command in Indo-China. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 199th Meeting (23 July) approved 

the recommendation in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 890/3subject to the amendment 

of the statement therein as indicated in paragraph 14,C.C.S. 900/3. 

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C.C.S. 890/3 22 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMMAND IN INDO-CHINA 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We agree that as a first step in reorganising command in Indo-China, 

there is advantage in dividing the country into two, leaving the northern portion in China Theatre and allotting the southern portion to Southeast Asia 

Command. This organisation of command should be subject to review in the 

light of the development of operations in that area. 

2. We have examined the run of communications in Indo-China and suggest that the most satisfactory dividing line would be latitude 16”N. 

3. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should include in their final report to the Prime Minister and President, a statement 

on the following lines:­

“We consider it important that there shall be unity of control of 

major operations in the Indo-China-Siam area when they develop and of 

previous subversive and para-military operations. As the first step in 

securing this un,ity of control, we are agreed that the best arrangement 

would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16” 

North in Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would continue 

General Wedemeyer’s control of that part of Indo-China which covers the 

flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral 

Mountbatten to prepare the ground in the southern half of Indo-China 

where any initial operations by him would develop. 

“We recommend that the President and the Prime Minister should 

approach the Generalissimo to secure his agreement to this arrangement.” 

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C.C.S. 891 

C.C.S. 891/1 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MACHINERY 

AFTER THE WAR WITH JAPAN 

Reference: 

CCS 196th Meeting, Item 3 

C.C.S. 891 (15 July 1945) and C.C.S. 891/1 (19 July) circulated memoranda by the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff 

respectively. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of C.C.S. 891 and C.C.S. 891/1 

in their 196th Meeting (19 July). 

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C.C.S. 891 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MACHINERY 

AFTER THE WAR WITH JAPAN 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Stag 

1. We should like at TERMINAL to discuss with our United States colleagues the question of the continuation of machinery for combined United 

States/British collaboration in the military sphere after the defeat of Japan. 

2. Since 1941 the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and its associated committees has worked smoothly and effectively. For the reasons 

which follow, we consider that it would be a retrograde step to allow this 

machinery to fall into disuse merely because Germany and Japan have been 

defeated and there are no supreme allied commanders to receive the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

3. As we see it, the world, all too unfortunately, is likely to remain in a 

troubled state for many years to come. Major problems will constantly arise 

affecting both American and British interests. In many cases these interests 

may well be closely identified, and in many cases also they will have important 

military implications. 

4. For these reasons we consider that some machinery for the continuation 

of joint and combined United States/British collaboration is desirable. For example, it may be to the great advantage both of the United States and ourselves 

that some machinery should exist for the mutual exchange of information. 

Some measure of uniformity in the design of weapons and in training may

also be mutually beneficial. 

5. It is not our intention in this paper to attempt to fashion the form or 

the structure of the machinery which may be found necessary for the above 

purpose after hostilities have ended. All that we suggest at this stage is that we 

should now recommend to our respective governments that they should approve the maintenance of the framework of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

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organization after the war with Japan, and the principle of consultation on 

matters of mutual interest. 

6. We do not think that the maintenance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

machinery after the end of hostilities need in any way cut across or impinge 

upon the Military Staff Committee of the World Security Organization. There 

is plenty of room and work for both. 

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C.C.S. 891/1 19 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MACHINERY 

AFTER THE WAR WITH JAPAN 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff 

With reference to C.C.S. 891, the political relationship of the United 

States with other nations in the period followingthis war is not yet sufficiently 

defined to permit the United States Chiefs of Staff to discuss at this date the 

post-war relationships between the respective military staffs. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff will bring up for consideration the 

problem of the most effective military machinery to be used from now forward and prior to the end of the Japanese war. 

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C.C.S. 892 

PROGRESS REPORT 

ON OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

References: 

CCS 880, paragraph 1 (1) 

CCS 193d Meeting, Item 3 

The Combined Chiefs of St& took note of C.C.S.892 (15 July 1945) in 

their 193d Meeting (16 July). 

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CCS 892 15 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRESS REPORT 

ON OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosed report by the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 

is circulated for information. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

PROGRESS REPORT 

ON OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

PART I 

CURRENT OPERATIONS 

1. NAVAL 

a. Enemy. Two damaged cruisers and one destroyer constitute the only 

major Japanese forces. Few motor torpedo boats and submarines may be 

available to them. It is believed Japanese naval forces have no major offensive capabilities though there is a possibility of suicide attacks by small 

boats and one-man submarines. 

b. Own Forces. Japanese cruiser of Nachi class was sunk in recent action 

by destroyers and recent naval air operations in southern Malaya were 

successful in obtaining good photo cover of ZIPPER areas. Sweeps and 

operations are being carried out continuously in the Andaman Sea. Submarine patrols have been maintained in the Malacca Straits and have 

inflicted steady losses on Japanese coastal shipping. Between 1January 1945 

and 15 June 1945 at least 176 merchant vessels totalling 11,400 tons have 

been destroyed by naval forces, in addition to 15landing craft and 17 minor 

war vessels. 

2. GROUND FORCES 

a. Enemy. Japanese troops remaining in Burma west of the Sittang 

River are in two main groups excepting a few small bodies of disorganised 

stragglers. One group of 4/5000 in the central Pegu Yomas and foothills 

northwest of Pegu is slowly moving to cross the road and railway between 

Yaunglebin and Pyu while a second group of approximately 1/2000 in the 

hills east of Prome is splitting into small groups to cross the road and railway between Myohla and Toungoo and between Toungoo and Pyu. East of 

the Sittang River the 56th Division has withdrawn from the Kalaw area 

to Kemapyu and southeast of Toungoo apparently to relieve the 15th Division on the Mawchi road while the latter pulls back to Papun. Total enemy 

troops in the Mawchi road-Kemapyu area are approximately 4,000. The 

Sittang line in the Mokpalin area is held by the 18th and 53d Divisions 

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and a number of non-divisional units with an estimated total strength of 

10,500. There are estimated to be 10,000 enemy troops in the immediate 

Moulmein area but without offensive capabilities while there are a further 

13,000 troops east of the Sittang between Papun and Moulmein who are 

also without offensive capabilities and who are in the process of regrouping 

and reorganisation. 

b. Own Troops. 

( i ) All operations in Burma are now under control in Twelfth Army

with headquarters in Rangoon whose task is to destroy all enemy west 

of the Sittang River. The Twelfth Army assumed operational responsibility for the North Combat Area Command on 1July and it is expected 

that Chinese forces will complete withdrawal from this area by 15 July. 

( ii) The 82d Division is responsible for the Arakan in the Taungup 

area. 

(iii) On the Irrawaddy River axis operating into the Pegu Yomas are 

268th Indian Infantry Brigade responsible for area Allanmyo Schwedaung exclusive and 20th Indian Division with 22d East African Brigade 

under command responsible for area Schwedaung Yandoon-Taukkyan 

inclusive. 

(iv) The 6th Brigade of 2d Division is responsible for the defence of 

the Rangoon area. 

(v ) On the Mandalay-Rangoon road and railway axis 19th Indian 

Division under IV Corps is responsible for area from north of Pyjnmana 

to Pyu exclusive patrolling north of Toungoo and pushing east on the 

Toungoo-Mawchiroad where it is now at MS (milestone) 25" with little 

opposition. It will maintain pressure on this axis throughout the monsoon. The 17th Indian Division under IV Corps is responsible for PyuDaik-U area inclusive. It has one brigade in Walew area which will 

establish base at Taunggyi and patrol north, south and east. Patrols 

will not go further east than Loilem nor south than Loikaw. Patrols 

have entered Heho in which area there is now slight opposition. Many 

broken bridges on this road hinder operations. The 7th Division under 

IV Corps responsible for the Pegu area has just relieved 5th Division 

which is concentrating in Mingaladon area for rest and reorganisation 

before ZIPPER. It will be necessary to relieve further divisions to prepare 

for ZIPPER during the monsoon. 

* See Map facing page 174. 

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(vi) There has been considerable rain in south Burma which greatly 

hinders operations by rendering Chaungs unfordable, cairying away 

bridges and flooding level ground. Operations have been undertaken 

waist deep in mud and water and areas have been reported under ten 

feet of water in the Sittang area. Movement off roads is virtually impossible for wheels in these conditions thus sometimes necessitating 

infantry attacking prepared positions without artillery support. In 

flooded areas even movement on tracks has sometimes been restricted to 

a rate of 1,000 yards per hour. 

3. AIR 

a. Enemy. Enemy air activity has been negligible since July 1944. 

Present estimated enemy strength of operational aircraft including reconnaissance type planes in Thailand, French Indo-China, Sumatra, and 

Malaya is 275. 

b. Own Forces. 

( i ) Support of ground troops is being provided by a composite tactical group consisting of two light bomber squadrons, six single-engine 

fighter/ground attack (short range) squadrons, five single-engine 

fighter/general reconnaissance (long range) squadrons, one air jungle 

rescue and one single-engine fighter/fighter-reconnaissance (short 

range) squadron. 

(ii) Strategic operations are being carried out by four heavy bomber 

squadrons based in the Calcutta area. 

(iii) Special duty operations by one special duty squadron, one misemployed heavy bomber squadron and two misemployed general reconnaissance squadrons are being carried out in Siam and Malaya. 

(iv) Eight transport squadrons are engaged in air supply operating

mainly from all-weather airfields in Chittagong, Akyab and Kyaukpyu 

areas. 

( v) Seven all-weather fields including one to heavy bomber standard 

are being constructed in the Rangoon area to support future operations 

with target date of 15 August. 

(vi) In the Cocos Islands one heavy-bomber squadron is expected to 

be operational by 15 July and one more by 31 July. It is intended to 

phase in two more heavy-bomber squadrons by 10 September and 1 

October respectively. A flight of Mosquitoes photo-reconnaissance 34 is 

now based on Cocos. 

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PART I1 

4. a. Enemy. Jap troops in Burma are believed to have no offensive capabilities. Estimated that troops in Mokpalin and in Moulmein will hold 

present positions until forced out by our offensive action. Retreat from 

Moulmein will probably be toward Bangkok. Jap reinforcements coming 

into Malaya are expected to be spread evenly throughout the country 

although there are indications that they are paying particular attention 

to the defences of southern Malaya. Jap combatant strength in Malaya and 

the Kra Isthmus will probably rise to the equivalent of two and one-half 

divisions by September in addition to approximately 40,000 non-divisional 

troops. 

b. Own Forces. 

( i ) Navy. Naval strikes will continue during the period before 

ZIPPER and shipping sweeps will be maintained. 

(ii) Army. No operations are contemplated east of the Sittang River 

until after the monsoon except along the Toungoo-Mawchi and ThaziTaunggyi roads. Activities will be confined to destroying Japs remaining 

west of the Sittang River. Preparations are in hand for ZIPPER. Part 

of the forces will be mounted from Burma. 

(iii) Air. Strategic bombing policy has following priorities: enemy 

shipping, Banpong-Singapore railway, Bangkok-Pegu railway. Arrangements are in hand for the co-ordination of strategic bombing, mining 

and anti-shipping operations with the Southwest Pacific Area and China 

Theatre. 

PART I11 

ADMINISTRATIVE 

5. Current Tasks. Chief among the current administrative tasks other than 

the mounting of further operations are the reconstruction of the lines of 

communication within Burma, the preparation of an advanced base in the 

Rangoon area, and the rehabilitation of the irrigation system of the country. 

Subsidiary tasks are the preparation of Trincomalee to support naval operations and of the COCOSIslands as a staging base for aircraft in transit to the 

Pacific and as a heavy bomber base to support coming operations. 

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6. Burma Lines of Communication. After 1October 1945 apart from 100 

tons/day of civil affairs stores being flown from Imphal into the remote 

districts of North Burma and 300 tons/day of bulk petrol, oil and lubricants 

(POL) being moved by pipeline and inland water transportation (IWT) from 

Manipur road to Myingyan in central Burma all stores required in Burma will 

be imported through Rangoon. The development of lies of communication 

northwards from Rangoon is therefore a primary task. 

7. Rail and Inland Water Transport Line of Communication. There are two 

rail routes north from Rangoon, one to Prome and the other via Toungoo to 

Mandalay. In view of the extensive demolitions on the latter route the former 

has been given first priority for reconstruction. Stores will be transshipped at 

Prome, the remainder of the journey being made by IWT up the Irrawaddy 

River to Myingyan and Mandalay. There are still several breaks in the Rangoon-Prome line and until these are repaired the best combination of rail and 

road is being used. The present capacity of the Rangoon-Prome route is 250 

tons/day. It is planned to reach the target of 600 tons/day by 15 August. 

Thereafter this figure will be increased monthly. The rail line of communication to Mandalay via Toungoo is planned to be opened by the end of 1945. In 

addition to the Prome-Myingyan service IWT is already in operation between 

Rangoon and Pegu and is the main artery of supply for troops based on the 

Pegu area. Present capacity of this route is 100 tons/day. 

8. Road Line of Communication. Of the two main roads leading northwards 

priority is being given to development of the Rangoon to Mandalay route via 

Pegu, Toungoo, and Thazi. However, in view of the fact that the road north of 

Pegu is likely to be breached for short periods during the monsoon, it is not 

planned to use this road for regular maintenance convoys until after the 

monsoon. 

9. Burma Oil Fields. A complete reconnaissance of the Burma oil fields has 

been carried out. A production of up to 4,000 barrels daily of crude oil could 

be achieved within three months but due to the demolition of refining facilities 

the production of this crude oil involves the waste of valuable residues and 

isonly being employed to the extent dictated by difficulties of supply from other 

sources. This situation will persist until adequate refining facilities can be 

provided. This would take too long for it to be of value to military operations 

against Japan and will not, therefore, be undertaken as a military responsibility. 

The oil companies concerned are in agreement with this policy in so far as it 

affects their interests. 

10. Rangoon Base. Limited facilities are being provided for light naval forces. 

Base installations, hospitals, and reserves are being provided to maintain a 

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force of five equivalent divisions together with corps army base and line of 

communication troops and air forces. Stocks are to be 30 days reserves plus 

15 days working stock. These should be in place by 1 November 1945. An airbase is being constructed to provide the following:­

a. North of line Pegu-Henzada two all-weather fighter-bomber, three 

all-weather transport fields. 

b. South of line Pegu-Henzada by 15 August three all-weather fighter, 

three all-weather medium bomber, one all-weather heavy bomber fields 

with subsequent addition by 31 December of two fine-weather medium 

bomber, two fine-weather heavy bomber fields and the conversion of the 

previous three all-weather fighter fields to medium bomber standard. 

The development of Rangoon port is proceeding satisfactorily. The target 

capacity of 6000 tons/day of dry stores and 1500 tons/day of bulk POL should 

be achieved in August. At present 4500 tons/day of dry stores are being 

cleared through the port. Four million gallons of bulk POL tankage will be in 

operation by mid-July. 

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C.C.S. 892/2 

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTHEAST ASIA 

References: 

CCS 197th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 200th Meeting 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 13 

In C.C.S. 892/1 (20 July 1945) the British Chiefs of Staff presented a 

proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 197th Meeting (20 July) approved 

C.C.S. 892/1 as amended during discussion. The agreed directive was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 892/2. 

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C.C.S. 89212 20 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the attached directive to the 

Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia* at their 197th Meeting, 20 July 

1945, with the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff would take steps 

to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch governments to the proposed command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast 

Asia. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

* The Appendix as published herein is revised to conform with the boundary description as finally 

approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and included in their report to the President and 

Prime Minister. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT 

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTHEAST ASIA 

1. Your primary task is the opening of the Straits of Malacca at the earliest 

possible moment. It is also intended that British Commonwealth land forces 

should take part in the main operations against Japan which have been agreed 

as the supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in 

the Outer Zone to the extent that forces and resources permit. 

BOUNDARIES OF COMMAND 

2. The Eastern boundary of your command will be extended to include 

Borneo, Java, and the Celebes. 

Full details of this extension are contained in the Appendix (page 179). 

3. Further information will be sent to you regarding Indo-China. 

4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon 

as practicable after the 15th August, 1945. You will report to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake 

this additional responsibility. 

5. From that date, such Dominion and Dutch forces as may be operating 

in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue 

to be based on Australia. 

6. The area to the east of your new boundary will be an Australian command under the British Chiefs of Staff. 

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN MAIN OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN 

7. It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force 

of from three to five divisions and, if possible, a small tactical air force should 

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take part in the main operations against Japan in the spring of 1946. Units of 

the East Indies Fleet may also take part. Certain important factors relating 

to this are still under examination. 

8. You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with 

the assault lift for two divisions. The exact composition of this force and its 

role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between 

Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur and the British force commanders, and 

will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

9. The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations 

against Japan must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below. 

OPERATIONS IN THE OUTER ZONE 

10. Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given 

above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations 

designed to :­

a. Complete the liberation of Malaya. 

b. Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the Burma-Siam frontier. 

c. Capture the key areas of Siam. 

d. Establish bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course. 

11. You will submit a programme of operations to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so. 

DEVELOPMENT OF BASES 

12. You will develop Singapore and such other bases as you may require to 

the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese. 

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APPENDIX 

EASTERN BOUNDARY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16" north; thence to intersect 

at 7"40' north latitude 116" east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along 

the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05" north longitude 

127" east; thence southwestward to 02" south 123" east; thence southeastward 

to 08" south 125" east; thence southwestward to 18" south 110" east. 

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C.C.S. 893 

GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS 

IN THE PACIFIC 

References: 

CCS 880,paragraph 1 (1) 

CCS 193d Meeting, Item 3 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of C.C.S. 893 (15 July 1945) 

in their 193d Meeting (16 July). 

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C.C.S. 893 16 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS 

IN THE PACIFIC 

References: 

C.C.S. 880 

C.C.S. 880/2 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The enclosed general progress report on recent operations in the Pacific 

is presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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ENCLOSURE 

GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS 

IN THE PACIFIC 

PROGRESS OF TWENTIETH AIR FORCE; CENTRAL PACIFIC, 

AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

1 FEBRUARY 1945-1 JULY 1945 

1. Appendices “A” and “B” (pages 187 and 189) contain a graphic presentation of the Pacific situation on 1 July 1945 as compared with the situation 

on 1 February 1945. 

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 

2. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, will submit a separate 

report on this subject (C.C.S. 894). 

CENTRAL PACIFIC 

3. Operations in the Central Pacific have consisted principally of the capture, occupation, and development of Iwo Jima in the Bonins and of Okinawa 

and adjacent islands in the Ryukyus, and in preparing bases throughout the 

area for the support of further operations. 

4. The seizure of Iwo Jima was preceded by carrier strikes on the TokyoYokohama area, the first against the Japanese mainland. On 19 February, 

after extensive surface and air bombardment, Marine amphibious troops landed 

on Iwo Jima. Enemy opposition was bitter and the island was not completely 

secured until 16 March. Strong naval surface and air forces provided support 

throughout the operation. 

5. Between 26 and 29 March United States troops occupied islands of the 

Kerama Group, southwest of Okinawa. After nine days of intensive surface 

and air bombardment, troops of the Tenth Army, including Marine amphibious 

troops, landed on Okinawa on 1 April. The northern tip of the island was 

reached by the 24th, but in the south enemy opposition was extremely stubborn. Organized enemy resistance did not cease until 21 June. Naval forces 

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gave support throughout the protracted operation, fighting off almost daily 

enemy bombing and suicide attacks, from which we suffered considerable losses. 

On the morning of 7 April a Japanese force, en route to attack our surface 

forces off Okinawa, was intercepted by our carrier aircraft about 50 miles 

southwest of Kyushu, and the battleship Yamato, a light cruiser of the Agano 

class, and another light cruiser or destroyer-leader, and several destroyers 

were sunk. Our carrier forces, assisted by a carrier force of the British Pacific 

Fleet, provided air support for our troops and struck at targets ranging from 

the Sakishima Islands in the south to Tokyo in the north. During the operation several islands of the Okinawa group were occupied. Capture of other 

islands of the group continued through June. 

6. Almost continuous air patrols from Okinawa and Iwo Jima bases are 

now maintained over southern Kyushu, the Yellow Sea, and southern Honshu. 

The Central Pacific air forces, Army, Navy, and Marine continued to attack 

enemy installations and shipping in the Bonins and Carolines and are inflicting heavy losses on enemy installations, aircraft, and shipping. 

7. The submarine campaign in the Western Pacific has been prosecuted 

with vigor and extended into the Sea of Japan. The results have been most 

gratifying as considerable toll continues to be taken of the greatly reduced 

Japanese shipping and naval vessels. 

NORTH PACIFIC 

8. Operations in the North Pacific have consisted of periodic air attacks 

on the northern Kuriles, of surface ship raids into the Sea of Okhotsk, and 

bombardments of Paramushiro and Matsuwa Islands. A task group of cruisers 

and destroyers of the North Pacific Force recently intercepted and destroyed 

a Japanese convoy in a sweep through the Okhotsk Sea. 

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

9. The Philippine Islands campaign has reached a climax with the successful execution of the following:­

a. The bitterly fought Luzon campaign which began 9 January 1945 is 

approaching completion. Amphibious landings on southern Bataan and 

coordinated amphibious-parachute operations on Corregidor in mid-February gave us control of Manila Bay. Continued pressure in all directions up 

to the present eliminated most of the resistance on Luzon. 

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b. The Visayan group is under our control as a result of numerous operations beginning with the landing on the south coast of Panay on 18March, 

followed by successive landings on Cebu, Negros, et cetera. 

c. The successful landing at Zamboanga, Mindanao on 10 March followed by landings in the southern part of the island on 17 April and the 

north coast on 10 May in conjunction with subsequent operations on Mindanao has cut the enemy into three groups. These isolated Japanese groups 

are being rapidly reduced. Simultaneous with this operation islands in 

the Sulu Archipelago were secured in April. 

d. Port and air facilities were secured on Palawan in February. 

10. Allied forces, mostly Australian, made amphibious landings on Borneo 

as follows:­

a. Tarakan Island was assaulted 1 May, initial objectives being secured 

by 19 May and the remaining enemy forced to the hills in the northeastern 

part of the island. Organized resistance ceased on 23 May 1945. 

b. Initial landings were made at Brunei Bay on 10 June; the air strips 

at Brunei town and Labuan Island were secured two days later; Labuan 

Island was completely cleared by 15 June and a greater part of the Brunei 

Bay objective has been secured. 

c. A third force landed on 1July at Balikpapan against initial light opposition. Enemy resistance stiffened somewhat as the beachhead was expanded but the Australians in this area apparently are making rapid 

progress toward their objective in the Balikpapan-Manggar area. 

11. Allied forces continue to reduce and contain by-passed enemy garrisons 

in New Guinea, the Bismarcks, and the Solomons. 

12. Army, Navy, and Marine air units in conjunction with naval surface 

units have conducted intensive preparatory and participating bombardment 

in cooperation with the amphibious operations described above. 

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APPENDIX “A” 

REVIEW OF PACIFIC SITUATION 

1 JULY 1945 

Appendix “A” 

SECRET 

APPENDIX “B” 

REVIEW OF PACIFIC SITUATION 

1 FEBRUARY 1945 

Appendix “B” 
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C.C.S. 89311 

PROGRESSREPORT ON OPERATIONS IN CHINA, 

APRIL 1944THROUGH JUNE 1945 

Reference: 

CCS 193d Meeting, Item 3 

C.C.S. 893/1 (19July 1945) circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff a report by the United States Chiefs of Staff containing 

General Wedemeyer’sestimate of the situation in China. 

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C.C.S. 893/1 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROGRESS REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN CHINA, 

APRIL 1944 THROUGH JUNE 1945 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

In April and May of 1944 the Japanese completed their control of the 

Pinhan Railroad,thus connectingtheir forcesin the Yellow River and Tungting 

Lake areas. At the same time they launched a drive south from Tungting 

Lake, overrunning the principal Fourteenth Air Force bases in southeast 

China. In November this force was joined by forces advancing along the West 

River from Canton and shortly afterwards Nanning was captured and a 

junction made with the Japanese in French Indo-China. China was cut from 

every angle and the Japanese controlled all of the main lines of communication 

except in southwest China. 

During this period the Fourteenth Air Force, in spite of its loss of important bases, continued to support the Chinese. Air superiority was maintained in China and Japanese lines of communication, supply dumps, and 

troop concentrations were constantly harassed. Japanese shipping off the 

China Coast was watched closely and all profitable targets attacked. During 

1944,631,000 tons of Japanese shipping were sunk. 

During the period of 15 June 1944 to 17 January 1945 the XX Bomber 

Command flew twenty-three missions against strategic targets from bases in 

the China Theater. Efforts were directed primarily against harbor and dock 

areas,steel works, aircraft factories,railroad installations, and supply storage 

areas. Nine missions were flown against targets in Japan proper, five against 

Manchuria, three against China, and six against Formosa. 

Operationsin the China Theater are uniquely dependent upon supply by 

air. During the month of November 1944,39,000tons were air transported into 

the theater but by January 1945 air deliveries had increased to 47,000tons as 

a result of increased numbers of aircraft in use and the acquisition of facilities 

North Burma and in June 57,750tons were air delivered. With the future 

aircraft augmentation of the Air Transport Command to a total of some 825 

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transport aircraft as now planned, it is estimated that approximately 106,000 

tons per month will be flown into China by next May. 

To utilize most effectively the meager United States supplies that reach 

China,it was decided to concentrate United Statestraining and equipment on 

a relatively small group of selected Chinese units. This program, referred to as 

the Chinese Army Program, is now well underway, and some 550,000 Chinese 

troops are presently being equipped with United States weapons and trained 

in United States techniques. 

This program includes 39 divisions organized into 13 armies and four 

field armies which are being trained and equipped by the United States. Included in this total are the five Chinese divisions which were formerly in the 

Chinese Army in India (CAI). Additionally United States instructional personnel is being attached to other armies but no U.S. supply or equipment is at 

present planned for them. 

The China Theater has two bomber,four flghter,and four miscellaneous 

groupsin the United StatesFourteenth Air Force; one bomber and two fighter 

groups in the Chinese American Composite Wing; and two bomber and two 

fighter groups in the Chinese Air Force. It is intended to transfer the Tenth 

Air Force from India to China before the end of the year, placing both the 

Tenth and the Fourteenth Air Forces under the present Headquarters, U.S. 

Army Air Forces, India-Burma Theater, which will also be transferred. 

General Wedemeyer’s estimate of the situation in China is attached 

(Appendix “A”). 

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APPENDIX “A” 

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 

By the Commanding General, US.Forces, China Theater 

1. Mission: From the United States point of view the mission of the China 

Theater isto divert, contain, and destroy maximum Jap forces and to increase 

the military effectiveness of the Chinese Army. 

2. Situation and possible lines of action:­

a. Enemy. The enemy is strengthening his forces and position in Manchuria and North China against the Russian threat, and in Shanghai and 

the coastal area north of Shanghai against the United States Pacific threat. 

On the central and south China fronts he continues his deliberate withdrawal northward from the Liuchow (109’16’ - 24”18’), Kweilin (110” 

08‘- 25”20’), Hengyang (112”35’- 26”56’) corridor, but will fight strong 

delaying actions. In the Canton,Hong Kong, Kukong area he has approximately 100,000 troops, with indications of northward movement from the 

area, especially down the Kan River. The withdrawal from the Luichow 

Peninsula continues by land and sea.Although it is not clear that he intends 

to completely evacuate the peninsula, he has greately weakened his forces 

there. All Jap forces south of the French Indo-China border are now considered isolated from the north with the exception of minor evacuations by 

boat and/or plane. 

b. Supply. Line of communications supply situation governs the maximum Jap forces that the Chinese can contain and destroy. It is the determining factor in the speed of operations to follow the Jap withdrawal 

in Central and South China and to take advantage of the opportunities 

thus afforded. Present operations by Chinese units are ahead of schedule 

and have required an earlier forward displacement of supplies than was 

originally anticipated. The resulting drain on supplies, particularly petrol, 

oil, and lubricants (POL),which is a major item in Hump tonnage, must be 

compensated. This,plus the requirement for the air force in China, makes 

the seizure of a port and additional air routes into China a major requirement. The securing of a major port in the Canton-Hong Kong area and an 

intermediate port at Fort Bayard on the Luichow Peninsula fulfills this 

requirement. Additional tonnage may be realized by opening an Air Transport Command (ATC) route from the Philippines to air terminals in the 

Appendix “A” 

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Nanning-Liuchow-Tanchuk (llO"33' - 23"24) area, or in the LuichowPeninsula area, when it issecured. Present estimates predict from the air route a 

small gain of about 3,000 tons per month after the first month of operation 

with Luichow Town as base, and from 5,000 tons in mid-September to 

16,000 tons in November from Fort Bayard port. Thus, commencing 

with November, tonnage from these sources will be sufficient to commit 

approximately five more divisions than was originally planned. The Fort 

Bayard area should be captured and exploited immediately and the possibilities of the air route thoroughly explored. 

c. Relative Strength. Enemy troops are superior to the Chinese in training, equipment, organization for battle, and experience. Consequently, the 

Chinese ground troops must be committed only where they can enjoy local 

superiority.Only the five Chinese Army in India (CAI) divisions are rated as 

excellent and ready for combat. Commencing with mid-July the Alpha 

divisions begin to complete their 13 weeks training program. By 1September 18divisions, including the five CAI divisions, will be ready for combat. 

Two more will be ready by 1 November. Not until the presently estimated 

requirement of a total of 34 divisions are equipped, supplied, and trained can 

the Chinese afford to attack northeastwards against the Yangtze River 

corridor into the main strength of the Jap forces. To create such a Chinese 

capability and support such an effort requires the backing of a major port. 

The port area with the necessary capacity is the Canton-Hong Kong area. 

It is estimated these ports can be captured by the forces allotted to operation CARBONADO with the support of the China Theater air forces. The 

first Chinese main effort should be to capture the Canton-Hong Kong area. 

d. Time and Space. The only forces immediately available to interfere 

with the Jap withdrawal from the Liuchow-Kweilin-Hengyang corridor are 

the air, clandestine, and non-Alpha divisions in the area. If Fort Bayard 

is secured by 15 August, it will be possible to augment the flow of supplies 

to CARBONADO forces, and permit a diversion of Hump supplies to the 

Paoching area to permit the ground forces there to operate against the 

Hengyang and the Kan River corridors without waiting for the capture of 

the Canton-Hong Kong port. This will permit a major interdiction of Jap 

lines of communication to the Jap Canton-Hong Kong garrison, or will disrupt their withdrawal in event Japanese decide earlier to evacuate in 

preference to isolation. 

e. Enemy Capabilities. 

(1) Against the first part of the China Theater mission, the Japanese 

can : 

(a) Withdraw forces from the Shanghai area to the Jap homeland and Ryukyu Islands. 

Appendix "A" 

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(b) Withdrawal north of the Yangtze River some of or all of 

their Canton-Hong Kong area forces for further withdrawal from 

China. 

(2) Against the second part of the mission the enemy can by stubborn 

defense of ports delay the program of training and equipping the 

Chinese forces. 

f. Own Lines of Action. 

(1) To capture the ports of Canton-Hong Kong at the earliest date 

possible with a view to subsequent large-scale operations against the 

Japanese main body behind the Yangtze River. In the meantime, to 

utilize air and clandestine forces and such ground forces as supplies and 

the training program permit in operations to harass, divert, and maintain pressure of Jap forces throughout China. 

(2) To contain the Canton-Hong Kong Japs, and strike northeastward against the main body of Japanese in China along and north of the 

Yangtze River. 

3. Analysis of Possible Lines of Action. Should course (1) be adopted, the 

enemy might move some of his Shanghai area troops from China. China 

Theater would be unable to prevent this. However, there are at present no 

indicationsthat he will do this and each week he waits will make it more difficult due to the paucity of his shipping and its increasing vulnerability to the 

air and sea operations of United States Pacific forces. If the enemy embarks 

on a withdrawal northward of some of his Canton-Hong Kong forces, they will 

become subject to air and clandestine attacks initially and to ground force 

attackscommencing aboutNovember.Canton-Hong Kong area would be easier 

to capture. A complete evacuation of the Canton-HongKong area would subject 

all the moving troops to air and guerrilla attacks and expedite our entry into 

the ports. It would, however, permit a large number of Japs to escape north of 

the Yangtze River. This would not be a serious loss if by then the Jap could 

not evacuatehisforcesfromChina to Japan. Should the enemy decide to defend 

the China portsto the lastin the German manner, his forces will automatically 

be contained in China, and it becomes imperative that we capture CantonHong Kong ports and proceed according to plan. 

Should we adopt course (2) and move northwards prior to the capture

of a major port,it is unlikely that our move would hold in China any Shanghai 

area forcesthe Japs decided to move. Our strength would be insufficient. The 

training program and preparation for major Chinese offensives would be 

delayed due to lack of a major port. 

Appendix “A” 

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4. Comparison of Own Lines of Action. The degree to which China Theater 

can divert, contain, and destroy Jap forces in China is dependent on the speed 

with which the capabilities of the Chinese forces can be developed to the required strength. Similarly the speed of the development of Chinese troops is 

dependent on the expeditious augmentation of supplies and of facilities. This 

requires ports. 

Therefore, course (1) appears the best one to adopt as it best accomplishes the first part of our mission and concurrently achieves the greatest 

degree of progress on the second part of the mission. 

5. Decision. To capture and develop the port area of Canton-Hong Kong at 

earliest date possible with a view to subsequent operations against the Jap 

forces in the Yangtze River-Shanghai area. The plan is:­

a. To maintain pressure on the enemy. 

b. To capture Fort Bayard. 

c. To secure the Nanning-Liuchow-Kweilin-Tanchukarea, develop the 

airfields and prepare the area as a base for future operations against the 

Canton-Hong Kong port area. 

d. To capture the Canton-Hong Kong area. 

Appendix “A” 

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APPENDIX “B” 

GROUND SITUATION CHINA THEATER 1 APRIL 1944 

SHOWING U.S. AIRFIELDS 

THAT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY OVERRUN BY JAPANESE DRIVES 

Appendix “B” 

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APPENDIX “C” 

LINE SHOWING MAXIMUM TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY JAPANESE IN 

SOUTH CHINA DURING 1944-1945 INCLUDING MAJOR US. AIRFIELDS 

LOST TO THE JAPANESE 

Appendix “C” 

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APPENDIX “D” 

GROUND SITUATION CHINA 6 JUNE 1945 

SHOWING MAJOR U.S. AIRFIELDS HELD BY JAPANESE AND CHINESE 

Appendix “D” 

203 

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C.C.S. 894 

REPORT ON ARMY AIR OPERATIONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 88017 

CCS 193d Meeting, Item 5 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of C.C.S. 894 (16 July 1945) in 

their 193d Meeting (16 July). 

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C.C.S. 894 16 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

REPORT ON ARMY AIR OPERATIONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Reference: 

C.C.S. 88017 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

The enclosed report by the United States Chiefs of Staff on Army air 

operations in the war against Japan is presented for consideration by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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ENCLOSURE 

PART I 

STRATEGIC BOMBING OPERATIONS 

The mission of strategic bombardment against Japan is substantially 

the same as was the objective of our Allied air forces operating against Germany. This mission is to achieve the earliest possible progressive destruction 

and dislocation of the Japanese military, industrial, and economic systems, and 

to undermine the morale of the Japanese people to the point where their 

capacity for war is decisively weakened. It is our conviction that a relatively 

speedy and economical accomplishment of this mission is well within our 

capabilities. 

There are peculiar and complex problems involved. Perhaps the most 

troublesome of these, at the outset, was the problem of distances. Distances 

were great and range limitations dominated much of our early thinking about 

Pacific operations. For example, the distance from the Hawaiian Islands to 

Guam is 3,815 statute miles, from Guam to Tokyo, 1,500 statute miles, and 

from Manila to Tokyo, 2,150 statute miles. Fortunately for us, the Japanese 

counted much too heavily on our inability to cope with this situation. Whether 

they banked on our conducting a prolonged island-to-island offensive or felt 

secure in the possession of their air defense, is not relevant here. The fact is, 

we caught them unprepared. 

We had other problems-the problem of perfecting our B-29; the problem of weather. We knew that bombing weather over Japan was worse than 

over Europe; we did not know how -much worse. We found out quickly enough

and adapted our techniques accordingly. The North Pacific monsoon area is 

bad-not bad enough to stop us. As for the B-29-4 has turned out to be a 

superior airplane. 

On the credit side of the ledger we had a number of basic factors to 

consider. The compactness of Japan’s industry had been one of her initial 

advantages. Where Germany’s industry had been spread over the greater 

part of her territory in 25 or 30 complexes, Japan’s is concentrated in three 

great centers and two smaller ones. Where much of Germany’s industry had 

been buried far in the interior, Japan has, so to speak, no interior. She has not, 

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to any appreciable extent, had a chance to go underground. And it is too late 

now to move lock, stock, and barrel over to the Asiatic mainland. 

We know, of course, that Japan has built up considerable stock piles of 

raw materials. She has hoarded petroleum from the Indies, rubber and tin 

from the Indies and Malaya, lead, tungsten, and zinc from Burma, nickel from 

the Celebes, bauxite from the Indies and Malaya. But this torrent of supplies 

has been cut to a trickle by our Navy and our Far Eastern Air Forces who now 

dominate the shipping lanes of the China seas. The attrition we have forced 

on the Japanese merchant fleet has also seriously cut into the flow of iron 

ore, copper, aluminous shale, magnesium and other vital materials from the 

Manchuria-North China area. Increasingly, from now on, Japan will have 

to fight this war with resources on hand. And we know from our intelligence 

that as a result of strategic bombardment, these resources are dwindling by 

the day. 

Japan’s industry is far more vulnerable to air attack than Germany’s 

had been. Approximately 47 percent of her priority war industries are concentrated in her six major cities-Tokyo, Kawasaki, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, and 

Yokohama. An equivalent percentage had been spread over 25 cities of the 

Reich. Naturally, distribution of industrial labor force runs along the same 

lines. Berlin had 6 percent of Germany’s industrial workers; Tokyo had 14 

percent. In Hamburg there had been under 6,000 people to the square mile; 

in Osaka over 45,000.In Tokyo’s unbelievably supersaturated Asakusa ward, 

there had been-and we use the past tense advisedly-over 130,000 people to 

the square mile. Today there is hardly a building left in Asakusa. To sum up, 

20 Japanese cities contain 22 percent of the total population, 53 percent of all 

numbered targets, 69 percent of all key targets, and 74 percent of all priority 

targets. 

Further, it should be borne in mind that much of Japan’s industry is 

extremely backward-almost feudal-in character. A formidable proportion 

of it is conducted on a contracting and subcontracting basis. Statistics of 

the immediate post-war years show that plants employing five or more persons 

totaled 15,000apiece in Tokyo and Osaka, 5,000in Nagoya, and that the great 

bulk of these employed less than thirty workers. These feeder plants are 

scattered throughout all but the most restricted of residential sections and 

housed, for the most part, in highly inflammable structures. 

Early in March, therefore, we decided to launch a series of low level 

incendiary night attacks against Japanese urban areas. We knew this meant 

an increased bomb load, greater bombing accuracy, less intense winds at 

bombing altitude, better radar returns, less strain on the airplane and 

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equipment. What we had not expected was the comparative ineffectiveness of 

Japanese anti-aircraft at altitudes ranging from 10,000 to as low as 5,000 feet. 

Results have been immensely gratifying. By the end of June we had 

completely burned out-leveled to ashes-more than 115 square miles of 

highly industrialized urban areas, all of them containing high priority targets. 

In a single mission against Tokyo, the following strategic damage was accomplished. Two petroleum plants destroyed, one damaged. One shipbuilding 

yard destroyed, two damaged. Eleven civilian production factories destroyed, 

five damaged. Eight storage plants damaged. Two freight yards destroyed, 

six other transportation facilities damaged. Two public utilities destroyed, 

seven damaged. More than 50 percent of the built-up area of Tokyo, 26 percent 

of Osaka, 22 percent of Nagoya, 51 percent of Kobe, 44 percent of Yokohama, no 

longer exist. What this means in terms of economic dislocation need hardly 

be enlarged on. We intend to keep on hitting specific priority targets in these 

cities, but we no longer regard them as functioning industrial units. Millions 

of skilled workers have not only been rendered homeless and temporarily 

useless, but are today forced to subsist in conditions approaching chaos. With 

these major cities well on the road to extinction, we have been able to continue 

the strategic effort by directing missions to smaller, but nevertheless important 

industrial communities. Of these, Nagasaki, Kagoshima, Yokkaichi, Toyohashi, 

Fukuoka, and Shizuoka have been respectively 11,41,50,52,20, and 66 percent 

destroyed. 

Our successes on night incendiary missions have not prevented us from 

varying our tactics and techniques. We have repeatedly thrown Japanese 

defenses off balance by dispersing elements of our striking force, by alternating 

day and night attacks, coming in at different altitudes, attacking in a variety of 

formations, with or without fighter escort. And we have carried on our sustained 

campaign of precision bombing against high priority targets, notably the 

Japanese aircraft industry. 

Nineteen of the thirty-odd aircraft frame and engine plants in the 

Japanese home islands have been attacked by B-29’s to date. At least six of 

these have been so severely damaged that production has ceased. We shall 

not enter into assessments of damage to individual factories. But taking the 

most conservative intelligence estimates, we may safely conclude that strategic 

bombardment has cut Japan’s potential aircraft production for the first six 

months of this year by 6,400 airplanes. Add to this the attrition losses that our 

Army and Navy squadrons have inflicted on the Japanese air force, and the 

handwriting on the wall becomes legible indeed. Japan lost some 40 percent 

of her air strength in the Philippine campaign alone. Her monthly production of aircraft, which was an estimated 2,350 last December, declined to 

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approximately 1,100in May. The results of our June attacks have not yet been 

finally appraised. 

The Japanese air force remains a threat to our surface forces, largely 

by the employment of suicide aircraft, but unless there is some unusual development and production, our air offensive will not be subject to serious interference. Their anti-aircraft defense has improved, but it is most unlikely 

that they will ever be able to attain the concentration or accuracy of German 

flak. 

In consequence, our loss rate has been relatively light. During the first 

quarter of 1945, 35 aircraft were lost out of every 1,000 that were airborne. 

During the second quarter, this figure dropped to 15 aircraft out of every 1,000 

airborne. Decreases in rates have occurred in losses due both to enemy action 

and operational factors. Some of these decreases are due, of course, to our 

acquisition of emergency landing fields on Iwo Jima. 

The performance of the B-29 has been a source of deep satisfaction to 

us. Its bomb load has been about four times as great as that of the United 

States heavy bombers in Europe. During their first operational year-through 

June, that is-our B-29’s have dropped more than 100,000 tons of bombs of all 

types. By the end of this year, we expect to deliver that figure every month. 

By April of next year, our plans call for 177,000 tons monthly, which will be 

the greater part of the 243,000 tons per month that will be dropped on Japan 

by the entire Army Air Forces. At this moment we have 854 B-29’s deployed in 

the Marianas. These include the 150 that had previously been operating out of 

China and India. By March of next year, we expect our B-29 force to be at full 

strength-nearly 2,000 aircraft divided equally between the Marianas and the 

Ryukyus. The problem of deploying this number of B-29’s in the Ryukyus 

is not simple. In fact, it will be one of the outstanding feats of this war in the 

development of air bases and the unloading of supplies which will have to be 

done mostly over the beaches. Airdromes are being built on Okinawa, within 

350 miles of the Japanese homeland, which means that construction and unloading will be subject to enemy air attack. In addition to the B-29’s in the 

Ryukyus, the tactical air force will be there, in turn involving a logistical problem of major proportions. For airdrome and base construction in the Ryukyus, 

it will require more engineers than were employed for that purpose in England. 

The development of Okinawa where most of these forces must be based due to 

the landmass required is an island approximately 68 miles long and varying 

from around ten miles to three miles in width. This island had practically 

no development. Docks are being constructed to get the required tonnage unloaded. Before an airfield can be started roads must be built to the sites. Our 

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forces will require approximately 23 airfields; the difficulties are obvious. 

We are pushing our resources to the limit to accomplish this development, 

even so it will be near the end of the year before our forces are deployed. 

The build-up will be gradual; as a field is contructed it will be occupied by our 

fighters and bombers which only then may join in the fight against the Japanese homeland. This is not an easy job but it will be done. 

In the employment of these forces in the Ryukyus supplementing the 

present forces in the Marianas, we expect to achieve the disruption of the 

Japanese military, industrial, and economic systems. We are already well 

advanced in the destruction of the aircraft industry and will continue to 

destroy aircraft factories and will maintain Japanese aircraft production below 

the attrition to assure the impotence of the Japanese air force. We will 

also continue the over-all attack on Japanese industry through incendiary 

attacks on her urban industrial areas. The weather, as stated before, is one 

of the major factors affecting future operations. On days when visual bombing 

is possible we will attack specific targets in the Japanese industrial system. 

These attacks will be directed against the aircraft industry, arsenals, storage, 

oil. In connection with the arsenals, we intend to knock out, first, Japan’s 

principal producer of anti-aircraft weapons, upon which she will have to place 

steadily increasing reliance for defense as the Japanese air force becomes 

more impotent. In order to take full advantage of the incendiary attacks on 

urban industrial areas and visual attacks on precision targets, we expect 

to completely disrupt the Japanese transportation system. We estimate that 

this can be done with our forces available in the month prior to the invasion of 

Japan. Japan, in fact, will become a nation without cities, with her transportation disrupted and will have tremendous difficulty in holding her people together for continued resistance to our terms of unconditional surrender. 

PART I1 

TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS 

In our progress westward toward Japan, we moved by “island hopping”­

primary objective of this strategy was to advance our network of airbases 

deeper and deeper into the Japanese perimeter. We did this also to secure our 

own communications by isolating and neutralizing Japanese strongpoints, 

and to provide ourselves with forward bases where we could accumulate supplies and assemble forces for our next move. From the standpoint of tactical 

air operations, our ordinary procedure was the same as in the land campaigns 

in Europe. 

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Circumstances, of course, varied as the size of the island battlefields, and 

their location, varied. At Leyte, we went ashore for the first time beyond the 

effective cover of our land-based air power. Thanks to the valiant work of the 

Navy’s carrier-based planes, we made the landing good, and were able to 

establish our airfields. This was not done cheaply. Naval vessels cannot operate 

within range of still effective land-based air power without taking losses. In 

this case, strategic considerations outweighed this tactical consideration; and 

we took the calculated risk. 

A similar situation confronted us at Okinawa, and we were obliged to 

take shipping losses. Considerations of strategy here again outweighed tactical 

considerations. However, the success of this difficult campaign, which has 

brought the Japanese home islands within operational range of our light and 

medium air components, is of such importance as to far more than repay its 

cost to us. 

Of the many Pacific tactical air operations, we think the most striking 

example of the effective use of tactical air power, in cooperation with ground 

troops and the Navy, to achieve decisive results at a minimum cost in lives and 

matkriel was the work of the Far Eastern Air Forces in the Lingayen-Central 

Luzon campaign. 

The job assigned to the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces involved the 

destruction of enemy air, sea, and land forces. It can be summarized as 

follows:­

1. Destruction of enemy air strength by: 

a. Destruction of aircraft. 

b. Neutralization of enemy installations throughout the Southwest 

Pacific Area. 

2. Protection of amphibious forces. 

3. Denial of movement of hostile reserves and reinforcements by sea. 

4. Support of ground troops by: 

a. Destruction of lines of communication. 

b. Destruction of enemy installations and concentrations. 

During the latter part of December the Japanese had built up their air 

strength in Luzon to an estimated peak of about 532 operational aircraft on 4 

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January. Between 5 January and 15 January the bulk of that air strength was 

broken, and by 24 January it had been reduced to practically nothing-an 

estimated 34 planes. 

At the same time we had been directing heavy air attacks at targets 

in Formosa, in the Netherlands East Indies, and points in the Philippines other 

than on Luzon. These attacks were made to destroy enemy bases and concentrations, thus preventing the reinforcement of the dwindling Japanese air 

force in Luzon, and to protect our own operations. Attacks against these 

targets were particularly heavy during the first six days of January and were 

continued steadily except for a period of bad weather around the 13th. The 

widespread effectiveness of these attacks was shown by a marked reduction of 

enemy air strength throughout the Southwest Pacific Area. Counting the 

enemy’s heavy Luzon iosses, his over-all air strength in the whole area was cut 

to less thar. half-from a peak of about 1,243 aircraft to about 500 by the end 

of the month. Most of the 500 were based on Formosa where they could offer 

no effective opposition to our Philippine ground operations. In the course of 

the month we had dropped 6,825 tons of bombs and expended more than five 

and a half million rounds of ammunition. 

Throughout this period we had been prepared to deal with Japanese 

attempts to bring reinforcements to Luzon. Probably because the Japanese 

recognized that such attempts could not succeed, they made none of any 

consequence. 

The task of protecting the amphibious forces was assigned jointly to 

the Navy and to the Far East Air Forces. Our losses were 46 vessels damaged 

or sunk. The principal tactics used by the enemy was suicide bombing. All 

but four of the successful attacks were of this type. While ineffective, in the 

sense of never seriously jeopardizing the success of any of our amphibious 

operations, the suicide tactic was a constant and destructive nuisance. Neither 

fighter cover nor anti-aircraft fire was able to prevent attacks. The only technique so far found successful is the destruction of the enemy’s airbases. We 

directed heavy strikes against the Luzon airfields on 6, 7, and 8 January, with 

the result that there was only one day (the 12th) following 8 January when 

more than one suicide attack was successful. The total Japanese effort was 42 

such attacks, the last on the 18th. This reflects the progress made in knocking 

out the enemy’s airfields and destroying his air force. 

The landings at Lingayen Gulf took place on 9 January 1945. The Far 

Eastern Air Force cooperated with the ground forces by the tactical bombing and strafing of lines of communication and vehicles, and of military 

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installations and concentrations. The effectivenessof the attacks is indicated by 

the following quotation from an Intelligence Summary: “The Fifth Air Force 

announced on 16 January that, since 25 December, its units had destroyed 79 

locomotives (50 percent of pre-war total), 466 railroad cars (25 percent of prewar total), 486 motor trucks, and 67 staff cars.” 

The damage done to the enemy was so great that, on 19 January, the 

Commanding General, Sixth Army, recommended to the Commanding General, 

Fifth Air Force, that, in the future, attacks against the bridges be limited to 

those specifically requested, and that attacks on rolling stock be limited to 

trains in motion. The destruction of lines of communication had, in fact, 

gone so far that it was no longer a question of crippling the Japanese defense 

effort, but of impeding our own advance. We had flown a total of 3,713 sorties 

and dropped 2,634 tons of bombs on these targets. Specific pinpoint targetsthe Calumpit, Plaridel, Baliuag, and Calaug bridges and the closing of the 

highway through Belete Pass-had been hit promptly with precision. The 

work of the attack and medium bombers and bomb-carrying fighters responsible for the destruction of the bridges was particularly good. 

While this was going on behind the possible Japanese defensive positions, 

the job of direct cooperation with our fast moving ground columns was under 

way. Heavies, medium and fighter bombers were blasting out the road blocks 

and Jap strong points directly ahead of our spearheads driving south. Almost 

two thousand sorties were flown and 1,530 tons of bombs dropped on military 

installations and concentrations. 

A comparison of losses with results achieved indicates the outstanding 

success of the operation. A total of 447 aircraft of all types were lost from all 

causes. Four hundred eighty-six Army Air Force officers and enlisted men were 

killed or missing during the month of January. By that time the enemy air 

force had been totally destroyed, all major resistance had been overcome. Except 

for the difficult but strategically unimportant mopping-up operations, the 

Philippines were again ours as the result of the cooperation between our three 

services-naval, ground, and air. 

Our greatest problem of tactical air operations is, however, yet to come. 

Now that we are established in the Ryukyus, we have the herculean task before 

us of developing ports, roads, and airdromes sufficient to accommodate 50 

groups of aircraft by 1November. This amounts to approximately 3,000 aircraft operating off of 23 airfields. The distance from our bases in the Ryukyus 

to the target area in Kyushu further complicates the problem of effective coordination with the assault forces. It is approximately 400 miles to the target 

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areas in the southern portion of Kyushu and some 550 miles to the northern 

part of Kyushu over which distance it will be necessary to conduct tactical 

air operations on an unprecedented scale. 

Once we have attained a foothold on the Japanese homeland, we will 

be faced again with the necessity of securing airfield sites as early as possible 

to establish the necessary air support of our ground forces ashore. In the objective area, there are estimated to be some nine airfield sites on which it is planned 

to eventually deploy up to 40 groups of approximately 2,400 aircraft. To achieve 

this planned build-up of air, it will be essential to move the full force of our 

engineering effort to the objective area as early as possible and operate under 

the similar difficult conditions which are being experienced now in the 

Ryukyus. Once firmly established in Kyushu our tactical air operations will 

assume the familiar pattern of destroying the remnants of the Japanese air 

force, isolation of the battlefield areas and direct coordination with the ground 

forces in overcoming enemy resistance. 

The Kyushu operation will have for its objective the rapid seizure of an 

area in southern Kyushu sufficient for establishment of overpowering landbased air forces to cover the final decisive thrust into the industrial heart of 

Japan. When the operation is completed we will face a situation similar to 

that experienced in Europe after the Rhine break-through. There will be 

an overlapping of operating spheres of strategical and tactical air forces. By 

that time, profitable targets in the Japanese mainland will have become 

scarce and strategic functions will necessarily merge with the tactical. Our aircraft heretofore operating over great distances will then be operating against 

targets considerably closer to their bases which will permit optimum employment of all aircraft. With the merging of the strategical and tactical functions, 

the coordination of operations will become increasingly necessary as never 

before. With a tactical air force of some 2,400 aircraft operating “wheels down, 

bucket brigade” backed up by 1,300 B-29’s of the Strategic Air Force located 

in the Marianas 1,600 miles away and from the Ryukyus 1,000 miles away, 

the full destructive power of the air force will be brought against the remaining 

elements of the Japanese war machine. 

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C.C.S. 895 

C.C.S. 895/1 

C.C.S. 895/2 

PARTICIPATION OF TWO FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS 

IN FAR EASTERN OPERATIONS 

References: 

CCS 194th Meeting 

CCS 196th Meeting, Item 2 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 16 

In C.C.S. 895 (16 July 1945) the United States Chiefs of Staff requested 

the comments of the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the employment of two 

French colonial infantry divisions in Far Eastern operations. 

C.C.S. 895/1 (18July) circulated comments by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

In C.C.S. 895/2 (19 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed a 

revised memorandum to be forwarded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the 

Chief of the French Military Mission to the United States in lieu of Enclosure 

“B” to C.C.S. 895. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 196th Meeting (19 July) approved 

the memorandum in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 895/2. 

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C.C.S. 895 16 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PARTICIPATION OF TWO FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS 

IN FAR EASTERN OPERATIONS 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff 

There are attached (Enclosure “A”) a memorandum in which the French 

propose to place a French corps of two infantry divisions under American command in the Pacific war and (Enclosure “B”) a reply proposed by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff. Since the British Chiefs of Staff may have views as to 

the areas in which these French troops should be employed, though perhaps 

not under United States command, their comment or concurrence is requested. 

General MacArthur proposes, if the French corps is assigned to him, to use it 

in the main effort against Japan in late spring of 1946. 

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ENCLOSURE “A” 

Rkpublique Francaise 

MISSION MILITAIRE FRANCAISE 

AUX ETATS-UNIS 

Washington 9, D. C. 

No. 432/EM May 29, 1945 

MEMORANDUM FOR: General George C. Marshall 

Chief of Staff, US. Army 

SUBJECT: French participation in Far Eastern operations 

During conversations between President Truman and Mr. Bidault, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Provisional Government, on the one 

hand, and President Truman, General Marshall and General Juin on the other, 

the principle of a French participation in the war against Japan was viewed 

favorably. 

Following these conversations, the French Government puts at the entire disposal of the American command, for operations in the Far East, an 

army corps comprising two divisions,besides corps-supporting and service units. 

This army corps should include:­

1) The 9th Colonial Infantry Division, already well trained, having

taken a brilliant part in the French and German campaigns. 

In order to be able to operate in the Pacific war zone, this division 

would only require certain transfers of personnel (replacement by volunteers of men unfit for overseas duty). 

The above will be ready to be shipped by the end of June. 

It seems advisable that the 9th Division receive its equipment in the 

theater of operations. 

2) The 1st Colonial Infantry Division of the Far East, planned several 

months ago. This division, whose colored troops will be replaced by trained 

Enclosure “A” 

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European volunteers, from the French 1st Army, will be ready by the end 

of July, provided it receives its equipment on time. 

It is to be expected that the latter unit, in view of the previous training of its personnel, will be ready for combat duty a month after receipt of 

its equipment. 

To save time, immediate delivery of its equipment is therefore 

suggested. 

In case the above is delivered only in the theater of operations, a 

corresponding delay would be needed by the 1st Division, from the time of 

receipt of its equipment, to participate in actual combat. 

3) Supporting units and services of the army corps would also be ready

by the end of July. Details of its equipping will have to be worked out in 

accord with the American command. 

This army corps being put at the entire disposal of the American command, it seems logical to the French General Staff to give its units an organization similar to that of corresponding American units in the Far East. 

It is therefore requested, in regard to divisions as well as to supporting 

army corps units and services, that the types of units to be organized, be 

exactly defined. 

It is finally suggested, in order to facilitate further negotiations, that 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, be authorized to deal 

directly with the French command in what concerns details of the matters herewith referred to. 

/s/ A. M. Brosin de Saint Didier 

Enclosure “A” 

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ENCLOSURE “B” 

DRAFT 

Memorandum for the Chief of the French Military Mission to the United States 

1. With reference to your memorandum of 29 May 1945 addressed to the 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the United States Chiefs of Staff accept in principle 

that portion of your proposal whereby the French Government puts at the 

entire disposal of the American command a FTench army corps of two infantry 

divisions, with corps-supporting and service units on the US. scale, for operations in the war against Japan. This acceptance in principle is with the understanding that the agreement on this matter with the French Government will 

include the following provisions:­

a. This French corps will be, both during the period of hostilities and in 

the post-hostilities readjustment period until released by the United States, 

subject to the complete command and control of the United States command in the same manner as a U.S. army corps. 

b. Movement of the corps from France will be contingent upon the 

French corps having, in the opinion of the United States command, a combat 

efficiency based on United States standards. 

c. Assurance that adequate trained replacements will be provided by the 

French Government as necessary. 

d. Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North 

African and Metropolitan Rearmament Programs. 

e. The implementation of this agreement including matters such as 

accompanying supporting and service units, provisions for equipment, and 

the planning and timing for the movement and employment of the corps 

will be in accordance with plans and arrangements to be determined by the 

United States military authorities who will deal directly with the French 

military authorities. 

2. Pressing requirements for operations in the Pacific during the coming 

months make certain that it will not be possible to move this corps from France 

for at least several months after the dates you suggest, and it appears unlikely 

that this corps will be committed to operations prior to the spring of 1946. 

Enclosure “B” 

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3. The United States Chiefs of Staff will advise you further in this matter 

subsequent to the conclusion of a governmental agreement. 

Enclosure “B” 

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C.C.S. 895/1 18 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PARTICIPATION OF TWO FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS 

IN FAR EASTERN OPERATIONS 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We have examined the proposals by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

for the employment of two French colonial infantry divisions in Far Eastern 

operations, as set out in C.C.S. 895. 

2. In the light of the discussion at C.C.S. 194th Meeting held on 17 July 

1945,we suggest it would be preferable for the two French divisions to be employed in due course in French Indo-China. 

3. The question of under whose command this force would operate would, 

we suggest, be decided in the light of the situation at the time. 

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C.C.S. 89512 19 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PARTICIPATION OF TWO FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS 

IN FAR EASTERN OPERATIONS 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefsof Staff 

The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the comments of the 

British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 895/1 as to the employment of the two French 

divisions and recommend that the enclosed memorandum be forwarded by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Chief of the French Military Mission to the 

United States in lieu of Enclosure “B” to C.C.S. 895. 

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ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF THE FRENCH 

MILITARY MISSION IN THE UNITED STATES 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff accept in principle your offer of a French 

corps of two infantry divisions to serve in the Pacific war on the understanding 

that:­

a. Whether the corps will serve under U.S.or British command and the 

area in which it will operate will be determined later. 

b. Final acceptance of the corps will involve an agreement with the 

government concerned on basic matters including command, combat 

efficiency, replacements, and logistical support. 

c. Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North 

African and Metropolitan Rearmament Program. 

d. The time of movement will be in accordance with the priority of the 

operations in which it is to be used. Pressing shipping and other requirements for operations in the Pacific make certain that the corps cannot be 

moved from France for at least several months. Whether used in the main 

effort or in the South China Sea area, it will not be possible to commit it to 

operations prior to the spring of 1946. 

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C.C.S. 896 

C.C.S. 896/1 

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE DANUBE RIVER 

By informal action on 24 July 1945 the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the dispatch of the letter in Enclosure “A” to C.C.S. 896 to the Department of State and the Foreign Office. 

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C.C.S. 896 21 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE DANUBE RIVER 

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 

1. The free efficient use of such rivers as the Rhine, the Weser, the Elbe, and 

the Danube in the supply of the armies of occupation and in maintaining the 

bare needs of the civilian populations under their control is essential in view 

of the limited means of transportation available to fulfill their task. 

2. Adequate machinery in the formation of the Rhine Navigation Agency 

under the Allied Control Council in Germany, and the active measures presently under way to clear the river of obstruction, scheduled for completion in the 

United States and British zones by 1 September and in the French zone by 

15 October, promise to meet the basic needs served by the Rhine. Russia has 

now no representative on that agency because it has no supply interest. However, politically, it might be expedient to consider favorably a request from 

Russia for such membership. 

3. The Weser and the Elbe while important in the restoration of the German 

economy are not so vital to the fulfillment of immediate supply needs of the 

occupying armies. 

4. The Danube, however, though largely clear of obstructions and open to 

use, cannot fulfill its proper role as a transportation artery in the supply of 

the armies of occupation and of the populations under their control, unless 

a Danube Navigation Agency similar to that set up for the Rhine is 

organized promptly. The need for action is stated in SCAF 471, 3 July 

1945,(Enclosure “B”). 

5. There are certain embarrassments to the formation of such an agency. 

Local Russian commanders have no authority to act. The river lies both in 

Germany and Austria and its regulation therefore involves the Allied Control 

Councils of both countries. The request does not include French membership 

although politically they are necessarily eligible and no vital disadvantage 

should result from their inclusion. A Russian protest to representation of the 

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British and the French on the ground that they have no frontage on the river 

may lead to their request for membership on the Rhine Navigation Agency. 

6. The opportunity for the creation of a Danube Navigation Agency will 

probably never be more favorable than at this conference attended by the heads 

of state and their foreign ministers to whom the Chiefs of Staff may now so 

effectively appeal for assistance. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff forward the enclosed letter (Enclosure “A”) to the Department of 

State and to the Foreign Office. 

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EN C L 0 S U R E A” 

DRAFT 

LETTER TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE 

The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, on 3 July 1945, 

urged the consideration at TERMINAL of internationalization of the Danube. 

While recognizing the necessity to re-establish at the earliest practicable date 

the international character of the Danube waterway to meet the over-all question of navigation of the Danube and the rights of all states having interest, 

he emphasizes the immediate need of an interim Danube Navigation Agency 

composed of U.S.,U.K., and U.S.S.R.representatives, set up in a manner 

similar to that followed in the creation of the present Rhine Navigation Agency 

to meet the current problems of supplying the armies of occupation in Austria 

and the populations dependent upon them. 

There are certain difficulties to the creation of such an interim agency. 

Local Russian commanders lack authority to discuss questions involving navigation of the river within the Russian zone. The river flows through both Germany and Austria thus involving the two Allied Control Councils of Germany 

and Austria. These councils include the French. The Rhine Agency has no 

Russian membership. The SCAEF proposal does not include a French representative for the Danube Agency. It is evident that politically all four nations 

must be eligible to membership on such an agency. It is equally apparent that 

in the creation of a Danube Navigation Agency there should be but one national 

representative for each of the four allied nations mutually acceptable to the 

Allied Control Councils of both Germany and Austria. 

It is believed that the opportunity presented by this conference to come 

to an agreement with the Russian Government creating an interim Danube 

Navigation Agency should be seized in order to meet the immediate military 

needs and responsibilities of our armies of occupation in their own supply and 

that of the civilian population under their control. It is accordingly recommended that the necessary action be taken to consummate this purpose at 

TERMINAL. 

Enclosure “A” 

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ENCLOSURE “B” 

From : Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces 

To: Combined Chiefs of Staff 

SCAF 471 

3 July 1945 

Prior to the official date of surrender of the German Armed Forces the 

officer in command of the Combined German-Hungarian Navies moved all 

craft on the Danube into the U.S.area. Affidavits have been secured to the 

effect that all craft were within our area prior to this time. 

The Russians have contended that certain ships did not arrive until 

after the official date and have placed demands through the U.S. Third Army 

that certain of this shipping be returned to the Russian zone. 

They have been advised that restitution of such property is a matter 

now under consideration by the governments. 

However, we have offered to enter into local agreements for the use of 

this shipping to our mutual benefit. Russian commanders contacted had no 

authority to discuss questions which involved large-scale navigation of the 

river within the Russian zone. 

The situation is further complicated in that much of the shipping now 

under our control formerly belonged to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and other 

nations. The over-all questions of navigation of the Danube and the rights of 

these various allied nations therefore requires clarification. 

It is recommended that policy in this connection should be directed toward the re-establishment of the international character of the Danube waterway and that as an initial step there should be set up at the earliest possible 

date an interim Danube Navigation Agency similar to the Rhine Navigation 

Agency. 

The initial membership would consist of U.S.,U.K., and U.S.S.R. representation and to be expanded to include as soon as expedient representation 

from all other nations interested in Danube navigation with a view to the 

eventual re-establishment of a permanent International Danube Authority. 

Enclosure “B” 

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Immediate questions requiring early decision are the policy for return 

of Yugoslav and Czechoslovakian as well as Soviet shipping and establishment 

of agreementsfor mutual use of available equipment in order to restore navigation on the river as well as relative priorities. 

The urgency of this international problem would suggest, if appropriate, 

its inclusion in the agenda for the forthcoming Big Three Conference. 

CM-IN-2876 (4 Jul 45) 

Enclosure “B” 

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C.C.S. 896/1 24 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE DANUBE RIVER 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the memorandum by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff in which they recommend that the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff should forward a letter (Enclosure “A” to C.C.S. 896) to the 

Department of State and the Foreign Omce. 

2. The British Chiefs of Staff concur in the despatch of this letter as 

proposed. 

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CONFIDENTIAL 

C.C.S. 897 

C.C.S. 897/1 

PROVISION OF PERSONNEL SHIPPING FOR THE REQUIREMENTS 

OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS 

References: 

CCS 199th Meeting, Item 3 

CCS 900/3, paragraph 22 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 199th Meeting (23 July) approved 

the memorandum in Enclosure “A’ to C.C.S. 897, subject to amendments agreed 

in discussion. The amended memorandum as approved and forwarded to the 

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board was subsequently circulated as 

C.C.S. 897/1. 

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C.C.S. 897 21 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROVISION OF PERSONNEL SHIPPING FOR THE REQUIREMENTS 

OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS 

Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee 

(On its own initiative, in consultation with 

the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board) 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To ensure the efficient coordination of the demands for personnel shipping submitted by Allied governments, other than British and American military movements, and to provide a machinery for dealing with essential personnel movements other than those already approved. 

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

2. See Enclosure “B.” 

DISCUSSION 

3. See Enclosure “C.” 

CONCLUSIONS 

4. It is concluded that: 

The following procedure will ensure the efficient coordination of all 

those Allied demands:­

a. The current procedure for handling the United States and United 

Kingdom personnel shipping for military requirements will be continued. 

This procedure will permit on an operational basis the opportune use of 

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such shipping on return voyages, or legs of such voyages, to move passengers of any of the Allied governments. 

b. All requirements of the Allied governments for the movement of 

passengers, whether military or civilian, involving definite additional commitments of shipping, whether on a short- or long-term basis, should be submitted to the United Maritime Authority (UMA) in terms of the shipping 

space required. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board should confer 

with the Combined Chiefs of .Staff as to practicability of meeting such requirements. On military requests of the other Allied governments the decision will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

c. As regards the movement of civilians for which provision is not made 

under a. and b. above, the matter may be referred to the appropriate agencies of the United Kingdom and United States to decide whether passenger 

vessels should be withdrawn at the expense of the military effort. Ships, if 

so allocated, would operate under the control of the United Maritime 

Authority on the basis of the “Agreement on Principles” but would be 

retained in the common pool and assigned for particular voyage employment 

as might be decided from time to time. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

5. a. That the foregoing conclusions be approved by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. 

b. That the letter in Enclosure “A” be forwarded to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. 

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ENCLOSURE “A” 

DRAFT 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been studying the problem of providing passenger carrying shipping to meet the urgent demands for the 

essential military operations in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and 

for the provision of such shipping of this type to meet other requirements as 

can be made available without adversely affecting military operations. 

2. The available passenger space is insufficient to meet all the urgent requirements of the United Nations, and coordination of demands is, therefore, 

essential in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency as 

well as to ensure the fullest consideration being given to all claimants. 

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, agreed that in accordance 

with the “Agreement on Principles,” dated 5 August 1944,contained in the 

UMA report, October, 1944,the following procedure in respect of the submission 

of demands should be adopted by all the Allied nations:­

a. The current procedure for handling the United States and United 

Kingdom personnel shipping for military requirements will be continued. 

This procedure will permit on an operational basis the opportune use of such 

shipping on return voyages, or legs of such voyages, to move passengers of 

any of the Allied governments. 

b. All requirements of the Allied governments for the movement of 

passengers, whether military or civilian, involving definite additional commitments of shipping, whether on a short- or long-term basis, should be 

submitted to the United Maritime Authority in terms of the shipping space 

required. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board should confer with 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to practicability of meeting such requirements. On military requests of the other Allied governments the decision 

will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

c. As regards the movement of civilians for which provision is not made 

under a. and b. above, the matter may be referred to the appropriate agencies of the United Kingdom and United States to decide whether passenger 

vessels should be withdrawn at the expense of the military effort. Ships, 

Enclosure “A” 

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if so allocated, would operate under the control of the United Maritime 

Authority on the basis of the “Agreement on Principles” but would be 

retained in the common pool and assigned for particular voyage employment 

as might be decided from time to time. 

4. Vital demands for shipping should therefore be submitted to the United 

Maritime Authority for consideration. 

5. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board is requested to transmit 

the foregoing statement of policy to the United Maritime Executive Board in 

Washington and London. 

Enclosure “A’ 

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ENCLOSURE “B” 

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

1. The tonnage of the Allied Nations under the control of the United 

Maritime Authority (UMA) is administered in accordance with the “Agreement of Principles,” dated 5 August 1944.As regards cargo, this agreement 

and the procedures of the UMA provide fully for the requirements of the contracting governments to be taken into account in the disposition of available 

tonnage. This report deals only with the sea transport of personnel. 

2. The “Agreement on Principles” contains the following provision in 

Article 7 (c) :­

“. . . In order to meet the special case of military requirements those 

ships which have been taken up under agreements made by United States 

Government and/or United Kingdom Government with the other governments having authority for those ships for use as troopships, hospital ships, 

and for other purposes in the service of the armed forces, shall remain on 

charter as at present to the War Shipping Administration (WSA) and/or 

the Ministry of War Transport (MWT), as the case may be, under arrangements to be agreed between the governments severally concerned. (Any

further ships required for such purposes shall be dealt with in a like 

manner.) 

“The fact that these ships are assigned to military requirements shall 

not prejudice the right of the governments concerned to discuss with the 

central authority the measures to be taken to provide . . . shipping for their 

essential requirements within the scope of paragraph 1 of the Agreement.” 

3. As regards personnel ships suitable for long sea voyage employment, 

estimates of military needs indicate the necessity for every suitable vessel 

being under the direct control (by time charter) of the WSA or the MWT. me 

estimates of available trooplift as submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

are based on the assumption that all the Allied passenger ships at present in 

service, or recovered as a result of liberation or capture, will be under the direct 

control of the Combined (Anglo-American) shipping authorities. On the other 

hand, it has always been recognized that there might be requests for the movement of military and civilian personnel sponsored by other Allied governments. 

The last paragraph of Article 7 (c) as above, expressly reserves “the right of 

the governments concerned to discuss with the central authority the measures 

to be taken to provide shipping for their essential requirements,” and was 

Enclosure “B” 

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CONFIDENTIAL 

inserted at the request of the other Allies to provide for this expectation. 

These requirements might include:­

a. Movement of military personnel of the forces under the control of 

these governments, or repatriation of prisoners of war, or 

b. Movement of civilian passengers of high priority (including essential 

civilian personnel in colonial territories), displaced persons, etc. 

Enclosure “B” 

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ENCLOSURE “C” 

DISCUSSION 

1. The procedure of the UMA for the allocation of shipping to contracting 

governments depends upon the assumption that there are appropriate authorities to approve and sponsor the requirements of those governments for shipping space. As regards cargo, this is provided for by arrangements already in 

force. As regards other Allied personnel movements, however, there is at present 

no authority responsible for guiding the UMA on questions of priority, and in 

this class of shipping, owing to the acute shortage, it is clear that some guidance 

will be necessary. 

2. The available personnel lift is not adequate to meet all the urgent 

requirements of the United Nations. Coordination of demands is, therefore, 

indispensable in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency. 

In any case, it is presumed that the appropriate chiefs of staff or theater 

commander would be concerned with any substantial movement of personnel. 

Once it is determined that a particular government has personnel movements 

of an approved character to carry out, it would be in accordance with the procedure of the UMA to allocate ships or space to that government for the approved movements. It should be noted that under existing conditions the 

combined shipping authorities are bound to advise that such arrangements 

can not be made on any substantial scale at present without affecting existing 

plans for military moves. 

Enclosure “C” 

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C.C.S. 89711 24 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROVISION OF PERSONNEL SHIPPING FOR THE REQUIREMENTS 

OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 199th Meeting amended and 

approved the memorandum in Enclosure “A” to C.C.S.897. The memorandum 

as forwarded to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board is enclosed for 

information. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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CONFIDENTIAL 

ENCLOSURE 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been studying the problem of providing passenger carrying shipping to meet the urgent demands for the essential military operations in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for the 

provision of such shipping of this type to meet other requirements as can be 

made available without adversely affecting military operations. 

2. The available passenger space is insufficient to meet all the urgent 

requirements of the United Nations, and coordination of demands is, therefore, 

essential in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency as 

well as to ensure the fullest consideration being given to all claimants. 

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, agreed that in accordance 

with the “Agreement on Principles,” dated 5 August 1944, contained in the 

UMA report, October, 1944,the following procedure in respect of the submission 

of demands should be adopted by all the Allied nations:­

a. The current procedure for handling the United States and United 

Kingdom personnel shipping for military requirements will be continued. 

This procedure will permit on an operational basis the opportune use of 

such shipping on return voyages, or legs of such voyages, to move passengers of any of the Allied governments. 

b. All requirements of the Allied governments for the movement of 

passengers, whether military or civilian, involving definite additional commitments of shipping, whether on a short- or long-term basis, should be 

submitted to the United Maritime Authority in terms of the shipping space 

required. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board should confer with the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff as to practicability of meeting such requirements. 

On military requests of the other Allied governments the decision will rest 

with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

c. When a satisfactory arrangement in regard to the movement of civilians cannot be made under a. and b. above, the matter may be referred to 

the appropriate authorities of the United Kingdom and United States to 

decide whether passenger vessels should be withdrawn at the expense of 

the military effort. Ships, if so allocated, would operate under the control 

of the United Maritime Authority on the basis of the “Agreement on 

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CONFIDENTIAL 

Principles” but would be retained in the common pool and assigned for 

particular voyage employment as might be decided from time to time. 

4. Vital demands for shipping should, therefore, be submitted to the United 

Maritime Authority for consideration. 

5. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board is requested to transmit the 

foregoing policy to the United Maritime Executive Board in Washington and 

London. 

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C.C.S. 900/3 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

References: 

CCS 199th Meeting, Item 5 

Plenary Meeting between the U. S. and Great Britain 

C.C.S. 900 (21 July 1945) circulated a draft of the final report to the 

President and Prime Minister embodying only the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff so far agreed to. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 199th Meeting (23 July) approved 

the draft report in C.C.S. 900 as amended in discussion. 

In C.C.S. 900/1 (23 July) the United States Chiefs of Staff recommended 

a revised Appendix “C” for substitution in lieu of Appendix “C” to C.C.S. 900. 

C.C.S. 900/2 (23 July) circulated for consideration of the President and 

Prime Minister a draft of the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which 

included the agreed conclusions in C.C.S. 900 and the revised Appendix “C” in 

C.C.S. 900/1. Appendix “A” thereto presented the views of the United States 

Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff respectively on matters on which 

agreement had not yet been reached.* 

In their Plenary Meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 24 July 

the President and Prime Minister approved the final report as agreed during 

the discussion. 

The final report, as approved by the President and Prime Minister, was 

subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 900/3. 

For convenience of reference, Appendix “A” to C.C.S. 900/2 is reproduced on page 266, 

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C.C.S. 900/3 24 July 1945 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosed final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as approved 

by the President and Prime Minister is circulated for information. 

A. J. McFARLAND, 

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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ENCLOSURE 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF 

THE AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THE “TERMINAL,” CONFERENCE 

1. The agreed summary of conclusions reached at the TERMINAL Conference is submitted herewith. 

1. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE 

2. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible 

date the unconditional surrender of Japan. 

11. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE 

WAR 

3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible 

date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by 

establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, 

and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such 

operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will 

contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; 

and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required. 

4. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, 

military control of Germany and Austria. 

111. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND POLICIES FOR THE PROSECUTION OF 

THE WAR 

5. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the 

prosecution of the war:­

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of 

the strategic concept. 

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with 

first priority given to those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan. 

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c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. 

6. In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision 

of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be 

given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the overall strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war. 

The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are 

the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be 

allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at 

the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which 

hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations. 

7. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in 

the execution of the over-all strategic concept:­

a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such 

aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in 

connection therewith. 

b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. 

c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill 

an active and effective role in the present war in accordance with the overall strategic concept. Within the limits of our available resources assist 

co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the 

present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic 

undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war 

against Japan. 

d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to 

liberate enemy-occupied areas. 

IV. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

Strategic Direction of the War 

8. We have discussed the strategic direction of the war against Japan and 

have agreed as follows:­

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a. The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain 

in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of 

Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions. 

c. The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of 

Staff on matters of general strategy on the understanding that in the event 

of disagreement the final decision on the action to be taken will lie with the 

United States Chiefs of Staff. 

d. In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot 

commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c. above, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to 

the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as 

will permit them to make timely rearrangements. 

e. Tn the event the U.S.S.R. enters the war against Japan, the strategy 

to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned. 

Operations in the Pacific 

9. We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff in Appendix “A,” 

10. We have considered the scope and nature of British participation in 

operations in the Pacific area. Our conclusions are as follows:­

a. The British Pacific Fleet will participate as at present planned. 

b. A British very long range bomber force of 10 squadrons, increasing to 

20 squadrons when more airfields become available, will participate. There 

is little prospect that airfield space for more than 10 squadrons of this 

force will become available before 1 December 1945 at the earliest. 

c. We have agreed in principle that a Commonwealth land force and, if 

possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the final phase of the 

war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of operational and 

other problems. In addition, some units of the British East Indies Fleet may 

also take part. 

11. In connection with paragraph 10 c. above, we have agreed that the 

appropriate British commanders and staff should visit Admiral Nimitz and 

General MacArthur and draw up with them a plan for submission to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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Operations in Southeast Asia Command 

12. We have discussed the instructions that should be issued to the Supreme 

Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, and have agreed upon the terms of the 

directive in Appendix “B.” 

Reallocation of Areas and Command in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast 

Asia Areas 

13. We have agreed in principle that that part of the Southwest Pacific 

Area lying south of the boundary described in Appendix “C” should pass from 

United States to British command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of 

Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, 

and Dutch Governments to these proposals and to investigate and report the 

earliest practicable date on which the transfer can be effected. 

14. We consider it desirable that initially Admiral Mountbatten control 

operations undertaken in southern Indo-China since these are more closely 

related to those of Southeast Asia Command than to those of the China 

Theater. We are agreed that the best arrangement would be to include that 

portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16” north in Southeast Asia 

Command. This arrangement would continue General Wedemeyer’s control 

of that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground 

in the southern half of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would 

develop. 

We recommend that an approach to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek be 

made by our two governments to secure his agreement to this arrangement. 

At a later date it may prove to be desirable to place all or part of the 

remainder of Indo-China within the sphere of operations of the Southeast 

Asia Command. 

French and Dutch Participation in the War 

15. We have considered the arrangements which can be made for French 

and Dutch participation in the war against Japan and our conclusions are as 

follows:­

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a. While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties 

for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which 

may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account. The use 

of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or 

Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of 

the commander in chief concerned. 

b. The French/Netherlands representatives will be given timely information of our intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect 

French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East. 

16. We have considered an offer by the French of a French corps of two 

infantry divisions to serve in the Pacific war and have agreed on the following 

reply :­

“a. Whether the corps will serve under US.or British command and 

the area in which it will operate will be determined later. 

“b. Final acceptance of the corps will involve an agreement with the 

government concerned on basic matters including command, combat efficiency, replacements, and logistical support. 

“c. Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North 

African and Metropolitan Rearmament Programs. 

“d. The time of movement will be in accordance with the priority of the 

operations in which it is to be used. Pressing shipping and other requirements for operations in the Pacific make certain that the corps cannot be 

moved from France for at least several months. Whether used in the main 

effort or in the South China Sea area, it will not be possible to commit it to 

operations prior to the spring of 1946.” 

Portuguese Participation in the War 

17. We have examined a report by an Anglo-American Military Mission 

which discussed with the Portuguese military authorities Portuguese proposals 

for participation in such operations as may eventually be conducted to expel 

the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. We have informed the State Department 

and the Foreign Office of our views, which are set out in Appendix “D.” 

Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War 

18. We have discussed the policy to be followed by the British and the 

United States Chiefs of Staff in passing to the Russians information and intelligence concerning the Japanese war and have agreed as follows:­

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a. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the 

Russians such operational information and intelligence regarding the theaters in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and without bargaining. 

b. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together 

before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other than 

operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party’s sources without 

their consent. 

Planning Date for the End of Organized Resistance by Japan 

19. We recommend that for the purpose of planning production and the 

allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance 

by Japan be 15 November 1946 and that this date be adjusted periodically to 

conform to the course of the war. 

V. MISCELLANEOUS 

Personnel Shipping 

20. We have considered the employment of certain captured enemy oceangoing passenger shipping and have agreed that the total lift of the EUROPA, 

CARIBIA, VULCANIA, PATRIA, POTSDAM, PRETORIA, and MILWAUKEE 

should be allocated for United States employment up to 31 December 1945. We 

have taken note that the United States Chiefs of Staff will allocate to the 

United Kingdom a lift of 16,000during the remainder of 1945 for the movement 

of Canadians. 

21. We have directed the completion by 15 September 1945 of a study of the 

combined requirements and combined resources, including captured enemy 

trooplift, for the first half of 1946. 

Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments 

22. We have considered the best means of insuring the efficient coordination 

of the demands for personnel shipping submitted by Allied governments, other 

than British and American military movements, and of providing a machinery 

for dealing with essential personnel movements other than those already 

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approved. We have forwarded to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board the 

memorandum contained in Appendix “E.” 

Cargo Shipping 

23. Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the 

position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the 

prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making 

capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere 

in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, for 

an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United 

Kingdom, for supplies to liberated areas, and for essential programs of the 

Western Hemisphere. 

Should substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter 

for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed 

conditions. 

255 
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APPENDIX “A” 

PLANS AND OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

(See paragraph 9 of the Report) 

1. In conformity with the over-all objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, the United States Chiefs 

of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for the main effort in 

the Pacific:­

a. From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines to 

intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a 

situation favorable to: 

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese 

capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further 

intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to: 

c. The decisive invasion of Honshu. 

2. We have curtailed our projected expansion in the Ryukyus by deferring 

indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima. Using the resources 

originally provided for Miyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development 

of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly be 

brought to bear against Japan and the risk of becoming involved in operations 

which might delay the seizure of Kyushu is avoided. 

3. In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we have 

directed :­

a. The invasion of Kyushu. 

b. The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control 

of sea communications to and in the western Pacific as are required for the 

accomplishment of the over-all objective. 

c. The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such 

operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective. 

d. The seizure of Balikpapan. (This operation is now approaching successful completion.) 

e. The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective. 

Appendix “A” 

256 
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4. Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent ,tothe 

invasion of Kyushu are continuing on the basis of meeting the target date for 

the invasion of Honshu. This planning is premised on the belief that defeat 

of the enemy’s armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to 

unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum 

prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands. 

We recognize the possibility also that our success in the main islands may not 

obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to 

steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further developments. 

5. We are keeping under continuing review the possibility of capitalizing 

at small cost upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the 

China Theater, without delaying the supreme operations. 

6. We have directed the preparation of plans for the following:­

a. Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports. 

b. Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes in order to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances 

such as a sudden enemy collapse or surrender. 

Appendix “A” 

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APPENDIX “B” 

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTHEAST ASIA 

(See paragraph 12 of the Report) 

The following directive has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff on the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff will obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed 

reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast 

Asia. 

1. Your primary task is the opening of the Straits of Malacca at the earliest 

possible moment. It is also intended that British Commonwealth land forces 

should take part in the main operations against Japan which have been agreed 

as the supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in 

the Outer Zone to the extent that forces and resources permit. 

2. The eastern boundary of your command will be extended to include 

Borneo, Java, and the Celebes. 

Full details of this extension are contained in the Annex hereto. 

3. Further information will be sent to you regarding Indo-China. 

4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon 

as practicable after 15 August 1945. You will report to the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake this additional responsibility. 

5. From that date, such Dominion and Dutch forces as may be operating 

in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue 

to be based on Australia. 

6. The area to the east of your new boundary will be an Australian command under the British Chiefs of Staff. 

7. It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force 

of from three to five divisions, and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should 

take part in the main operations against Japan in the spring of 1946. Units 

Appendix “B” 

258 
TOP SECRET 

of the British East Indies Fleet may also take part. Certain important factors 

relating to this are still under examination. 

8. You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with 

the assault lift for two divisions. The exact composition of this force and its 

role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between 

Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur, and the British force commanders, and 

will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

9. The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations 

against Japan must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below. 

10. Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given 

above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations 

designed to :­

a. Complete the liberation of Malaya. 

b. Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the Burma-Siam frontier. 

c. Capture the key areas of Siam. 

d. Establish bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course. 

11. You will submit a program of operations to the British Chiefs of Staff 

as soon as you are in a position to do so. 

12. You will develop Singapore and such other bases as you may require to 

the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese. 

Appendix “B” 

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX "B" 

EASTERN BOUNDARY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(See paragraph 2 of Appendix "B") 

Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16" north; thence to intersect 

at 7O40'north latitude 116" east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 

1939boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05"north longitude 127" east; 

thence southwestwardto 02" south 123"east; thence southeastwardto 08"south 

125"east; thence southwestward to 18" south 110" east. 

Annex to Appendix "B" 

260 
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APPENDIX "C" 

BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND US. AREAS OF COMMAND 

IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

(See paragraph 13 of the Report) 

Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16"north; thence to intersect 

at 7"40' north latitude 116" east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 

1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05" north longitude 127" 

east; thence east to 05" north 130" east; thence south to the equator; thence 

east to 140" east; thence generally southeast to 02"20' south 146" east; thence 

east to 02"20' south 159" east; thence south. 

Appendix "C" 

261 
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APPENDIX “D” 

(See paragraph 17 of the Report) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have communicated to the Department of 

State and the Foreign Office the following views on Portuguese participation 

in the war against Japan:­

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel 

the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement 

with the Portuguese military authorities as to the direct use of Portuguese 

forces, they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that 

plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon. 

b. As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental 

combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 

400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps 

are being taken to allocate a suitable training area. 

c. The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the 

small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, 

mechanics, and radio specialists. 

d. There is no objection from the military viewpoint,to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis for 

transfer is an action to be taken on a governmental level. 

e. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in accepting Portuguese participation 

do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese 

Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use 

Portuguese troops in any other area. 

f. Military operations against Portuguese Timor must for the present 

await the completion of operations against higher priority Japanese-held 

objectives. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will notify the Portuguese military 

authorities of impending operations against Portuguese Timor in time for 

them to prepare their troops for participation therein. Details as to the 

assembly, shipment, training, and equipping of the Portuguese force will 

be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the appropriate time. 

They have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office that 

they have no objection to the disclosure of any of the above information to the 

Appendix “D” 

262 
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Portuguese if the Department of State or Foreign Office deem it necessary in 

diplomatic conversations. The participation of Portuguese forces in the liberation of Portuguese Timor is considered of little military importance in the 

war against Japan. 

Appendix “D’ 

263 
CONFIDENTIAL 

APPENDIX “E” 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

(See paragraph 22 of the Report) 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been studying the problem of providing passenger carrying shipping to meet the urgent demands for the essential military operations in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for 

the provision of such shipping of this type to meet other requirements as can 

be made available without adversely affecting military operations. 

2. The available passenger space is insufficient to meet all the urgent requirements of the United Nations, and coordination of demands is, therefore, 

essential in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency as 

well as to ensure the fullest consideration being given to all claimants. 

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, agreed that in accordance 

with the “Agreement on Principles,” dated 5 August 1944,contained in the 

United Maritime Authority’s report, October, 1944,the following procedure 

in respect of the submission of demands should be adopted by all the Allied 

nations :­

a. The current procedure for handling the United States and United 

Kingdom personnel shipping for military requirements will be continued. 

This procedure will permit on an operational basis the opportune use of 

such shipping on return voyages, or legs of such voyages, to move passengers of any of the Allied governments. 

b. All requirements of the Allied governments for the movement of passengers, whether military of civilian, involving definite additional commitments of shipping, whether on a short- or long-term basis, should be 

submitted to the United Maritime Authority in terms of the shipping space 

required. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board should confer with 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to practicability of meeting such requirements. On military requests of the other Allied governments the decision 

will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

c. When a satisfactory arrangement in regard to the movement of 

civilians cannot be made under a. and b. above, the matter may be referred 

to the appropriate authorities of the United Kingdom and United States, 

to decide whether passenger vessels should be withdrawn at the expense of 

the military effort. Ships, if so allocated, would operate under the control 

Appendix “E” 

264 
CONFIDENTIAL 

of the United Maritime Authority on the basis of the “Agreement on Principles” but would be retained in the common pool and assigned for particular 

voyage employment as might be decided from time to time. 

4. Vital demands for shipping should, therefore, be submitted to the United 

Maritime Authority for consideration. 

5. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board is requested to transmit 

the foregoing policy to the United Maritime Executive Board in Washington 

and London. 

Appendix “E” 

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APPENDIX “A” TO C.C.S. 90012 

111. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND POLICIES FOR THE PROSECUTION 

OF THE WAR 

U.S. Proposals 

4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the 

prosecution of the war :­

a. Maintain the security of the 

Western Hemisphere and the British 

Commonwealth. 

b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the 

British Commonwealth in so far as 

it is connected with the prosecution 

of the war against Japan. 

c. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with 

first priority given to those forces in 

or designated for employment in 

combat areas in the war against 

Japan. 

d. Maintain vital overseas lines 

of communication. 

5. In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision of 

forces and resources of the United 

States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater 

to the Pacific and Far East, will be 

given to meeting requirements of tasks 

necessary to the execution of the overall strategic concept and to the basic 

undertakings fund ament a1 to the 

prosecution of the war. 

British Proposals 

Delete a. and 6.and substitute:­

a. Maintain the security 

and war-making capacity of the 

Western Hemisphere and the 

British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the 

strategic concept. 

Delete c. and substitute the 

following as b:­

b. Support the war-making 

capacity of our forces in all 

areas, with first priority given 

to those forces in or destined 

for combat areas. 

Appendix “A” to C.C.S. 900/2

266 
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US.Proposals 

The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are 

the supreme operations in the war 

against Japan; forces and resources will 

be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished 

at the earliest practicable date. No other 

operations will be undertaken which 

hazard the success of, or delay, these 

main operations. 

6. The following additional tasks 

will be undertaken in order to assist in 

the execution of the over-all strategic 

concept :­

a. Encourage Russian entry into 

the war against Japan. Provide such 

aid to her war-making capacity as 

may be necessary and practicable in 

connection therewith. 

b. Undertake such measures as 

may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of China 

as an effective ally against Japan. 

c. Provide assistance to such of 

the forces of liberated areas as can 

fulfill an active and effective role in 

the present war. Within the limits 

of our available resources assist cobelligerents to the extent they are 

able to employ this assistance in the 

present war. Having regard to the 

successful accomplishment of basic 

undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will 

effectively contribute to the capacity 

of the United Nations to prosecute 

the war against Japan. 

British Proposals 

Add at the end of the first 

sentence: “or are required to maintain world order in the interests 

of the war effort.” 

Delete the last sentence of 

6 c. because this is dealt with in 

paragraph 7 below. 

Appendix “A’ to C.C.S. 900/2

267 
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US.Proposals 

d. In cooperation with other 

Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied 

areas. 

7. The inclusion under Basic Undertakings of terms concerning a specific resource such as cargo shipping is 

undesirable. 

It is agreeable, however, to include in the text of the report the following paragraph :-

CARGO SHIPPING 

Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the 

position to be sufficiently manageable 

to provide for the maximum effort in 

the prosecution of the war against 

Japan, for the maintenance of the warmaking capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western 

Hemisphere, in so far as it is connected 

with the prosecution of the war against 

Japan, and for an additional amount 

for civilian requirements. Should a substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination 

by the two governments at the time and 

in the light of changed conditions. 

268 

British Proposals 

7. Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently 

manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of 

the war against Japan, for the 

maintenance of the war-making 

capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western 

Hemisphere in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the 

war against Japan, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the 

United Kingdom, for supplies to 

liberated areas and for essential 

programmes of the Western 

Hemisphere. 

Should substantial conflict 

arise, the shipping situation will be 

a matter for examination by the 

two governments at the time and 

in the light of changed conditions. 

Appendix “A” to C.C.S. 900/2 
TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

OF THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 
TOP SECRET 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 193d Meeting 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN THE CONFERENCEROOM 

AT 25 RINGSTRASSE, BABELSBERG, GERMANY,

ON MONDAY, 16 JULY 1945, AT 1430.

PRESENT 

United States 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General of the Army 

H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General B. B. Somervell,USA 

Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Maj. Gen. L. Norstad, USA 

Captain A. S. McDill, USN 

Captain H. R. Oster, USN 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Lt. Gen. Sir Gordon N. Macready 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Maj. Gen. L. C. Hollis 

SECRETARIAT 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain C. J. Moore, USN 

Lt. Col. T. Haddon 

269 
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1. PROGRAM AND PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE 

(C.C.S. 880/9 and 880/10) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 880/10. 

2. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 

(C.C.S. 643/3) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to the last sentence on page 10 of the paper* 

where the survival of the institution of the Emperor was mentioned. He asked 

whether the United States Chiefs of Staff had given any thought to the question of the interpretation of the term “unconditional surrender.” From the 

military point of view it seemed to the British Chiefs of Staff that there might 

be some advantage in trying to explain this term to the Japanese in a manner 

which would ensure that the war was not unduly prolonged in outlying areas. 

If, for instance, an interpretation could be found and communicated to the 

Japanese which did not involve the dissolution of the Imperial institution, the 

Emperor would be in a position to order the cease-fire in outlying areas whereas, 

if the dynasty were destroyed, the outlying garrisons might continue to fight 

for many months or years. If an interpretation on these lines could be found 

an opportune moment to make it clear to the Japanese might be shortly after 

a Russian entry into the war. 

THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF explained that considerable 

thought had been given to this subject on the political level. One suggestion 

was that some form of agreed ultimatum might be issued at the correct psychological moment, for example, on Russian entry into the war, the idea being 

to explain what the term “unconditional surrender” did not mean rather than 

what it did mean. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that as the matter was clearly a political 

one primarily, it would be very useful if the Prime Minister put forward to 

the President his views and suggestions as to how the term “unconditional 

surrender” might be explained to the Japanese. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of the estimate of the enemy situation in C.C.S. 643/3 

b. Invited the British Chiefs of Staff to consider the possibility of asking 

the Prime Minister to raise with the President the matter of unconditional surrender of Japan. 

Page 19, paragraph 2. 

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3. PROGRESS REPORTS ON OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND 

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

(C.C.S. 892 and 893) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the only area not dealt with in these two 

reports was the China Theater. The British Chiefs of Staff would welcome a 

report of progress in this theater. 

GENERAL MARSHALL described certain features of the operations in 

the China Theater, particularly as to the effectiveness of Chinese troops when 

properly equipped. He further stated that a report of operations in the China 

Theater would be prepared and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note:­

a. Of the progress report on operations in the Pacific and Southeast 

Asia Command in C.C.S. 892 and C.C.S. 893. 

b. That the United States Chiefs of Staff would submit later a report 

on operations in China. 

4. DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

(C.C.S. 880/4) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the memorandum on the development of operations in the 

Pacific in C.C.S. 880/4. 

5. REPORT ON ARMY AIR OPERATIONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 894) 

GENERAL ARNOLD commented in detail on certain aspects of the 

report. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of the report on Army air operations in the war against Japan 

in C.C.S. 894, and of General Arnold’s explanatory remarks. 

271 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 194th Meeting 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN THE CONFERENCEROOM 

AT 25 RINGSTRASSE, BABELSBERG, GERMANY,

ON TUESDAY, 17JULY 1945, AT 1430.

PRESENT 

United States 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General of the Army 

H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN Lt. Gen. Sir Gordon N. Macready 

Maj. Gen. L. Norstad, USA Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Captain A. S. McDill, USN Maj. Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Captain H. R. Oster, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain C. J. Moore, USN 

Lt. Col. T. Haddon 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE C.C.S. 1930 MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the 193d Meeting and approved the detailed 

report of the meeting subject to any later minor amendments. 

2. BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 889 and 88911) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to a memorandum by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff containing their views on the proposals of the British Chiefs 

of Staff concerning British participation in the war against Japan. He said 

that the British Chiefs of Staff were very pleased to see that the United States 

Chiefs of Staff agreed in principle to the participation in the final phase of 

the war against Japan of a British Commonwealth land force, subject to the 

resolution of certain operational problems with the Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Army Forces, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, US. Pacific Fleet, and to the 

clarification of certain factors with which he then proposed to deal. 

Considering each of the subparagraphs of paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 88911, 

SIR ALAN BROOKE made the following points:­

a. The land forces which were being offered would not be involved in 

operationsin Southeast Asia prior to CORONET. The force envisaged contained one Australian division which was now completing operation in 

Borneo; one New Zealand division which was reforming in Italy; a British 

division which had been already withdrawn from the fighting in Southeast 

Asia, and an Indian division probably from Italy. This Indian division had 

operated in conjunction with Allied troops in Italy for some time and had, 

on one occasion, been under command of General Clark. It was considered 

a first-class division, and he thought that the difficulties incident to its 

employment and due to language complications would not prove insurmountable. The division had already been acclimatized. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE, continuing, said these forces might be used as 

three divisions in the initial assault with a follow-up of two divisions a good 

deal later on. This delay was necessitated by shipping limitations. The 

British Chiefs of Staff would very much like to participate in the assault 

as opposed to taking part only in the follow-up. The administrative factors 

could perhaps be discussed with General MacArthur. 

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b. This question had been dealt with in a. above and Sir Alan Brooke 

hoped that it would be found possible to overcome any difficulties in this 

connection. 

c. When the question of British participation in the final assault had 

first been considered, the inclusion of Canadian forces had been envisaged. 

It had since been learned, however, that a Canadian division had been accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff, to be equipped with American 

equipment, with a view to operating under American command. Although 

the British Chiefs of Staff would like to include a Canadian element in the 

Empire forces, it was not desired to upset these plans and he therefore 

suggested that the matter might be left open to discussion. The Canadian 

division might be used in a follow-up role. Detailed discussions on this 

matter could be carried out with General MacArthur. 

d. It was hoped that answers would be received from the Dominions concerned in the near future. 

e. It was entirely agreed that the inclusion of a British force in the final 

phase of the war against Japan would lead to complicated logistical problems. These problems could be considered in detail with commanders on 

the spot. 

f. The question of where the forces should be concentrated prior to the 

operation would have to be carefully considered. The Australian division 

was at present well placed and it should be found possible to concentrate 

one or two additional divisions in a suitable area. This also could be discussed in detail with the force commanders. 

g. It had always been the intention of the British Chiefs of Staff to 

provide, from British resources, sufficient assault lift for two divisions. 

The provision of certain close-support craft, was, however, likely to be most 

difficult owing to the distances involved. 

h. SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that while it was realized that there 

would be adequate United States tactical air forces available, he very much 

hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff would consider the inclusion 

of a small tactical air force consisting of about 15 squadrons (about 250 

aircraft in all). He made this request as he felt that the Commonwealth 

forces would like to have supporting them some of their own tactical 

reconnaissance and fighter-bomber units. The forces he had in mind should 

not cause complications as they would be Mustangs similar to those operated by United States forces. 

275 
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GENERAL ARNOLD undertook to investigate the possibility of the 

inclusion of a force as indicated by Sir Charles Portal, and asked to be supplied with the necessary details to carry out this investigation. 

i. SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the effect of these proposals upon continued operations in the Southeast Asia Command would be to limit the 

capacity to undertake amphibious operations, as the proposals would necessitate the use of landing craft. It was proposed to submit to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff a directive to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, 

for land operations across the Thailand-Burmese frontier and small amphibious operations to Sumatra and Java with the object of establishing 

small bridgeheads on those islands which could be developed later as the 

opportunity arose. The provision of shipping and assault craft was the 

limiting factor. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained further that in approaching this problem it had been the aim of the British Chiefs of Staff to produce the 

maximum effort against Japan, continuing meanwhile such operations in 

Southeast Asia Command as could be conducted without detracting from 

the effort against Japan. The limiting factors affecting the British proposals were the provision of shipping and administrative troops. Hence 

three alternative suggestions had been included in C.C.S. 889. 

As the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the proposals in principle, it was suggested that a force commander and his staff 

(of the nature of a corps commander and staff) should be appointed and 

sent out to discuss details with General MacArthur and to draw up concrete 

proposals for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the dispatch of a corps commander 

and staff to the Pacific was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff 

and General MacArthur would be informed accordingly. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then read extracts from a dispatch from General 

MacArthur on the subject of the participation of a Commonwealth force in 

the final phase of the war against Japan.* He undertook to make available 

to the British Chiefs of Staff suitable extracts from the dispatch. 

GENERAL HULL said that tentative proposals had been made by the 

Australian Government to the United States Chiefs of Staff for the inclusion 

C.C.S. aawz 

276 
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of an Australian force in the operation against Japan and for the inclusion 

of a small token force in Southeast Asia Command under Admiral Mountbatten. The proposal had merely expressed the desire of the Australian Government to participate in these operations and no details had as yet been 

discussed. 

ADMIRAL KING said that there were two factors concerning the employment of Australian forces with which he presumed the British Chiefs of 

Staff were familiar. The first was that the Australian military establishment 

was being reduced to approximately three divisions. The second was the question of the possible return to New Zealand of the New Zealand division 

concerned. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that while it had at one time been suggested 

that the New Zealand division should be returned to New Zealand, it had subsequently been agreed that the division consisting of two brigades would be 

available for operations in Southeast Asia Command. Arrangements had been 

made to send replacements to Italy and it would therefore not be necessary for 

the New Zealand division to return to New Zealand for rehabilitation. The 

views of the New Zealand Government on the present proposal had, however, 

not yet been received. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff fully recognized 

that the participation of British troops in the final phase of the war against 

Japan would lead to certain complications and he expressed sincere gratitude 

on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff for the way in which the proposal had 

been received by the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

welcomed the proposals and would be pleased to make room for the employment of British forces, within the limitations of shipping and logistic support. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed in principle to the participation of a British Commonwealth 

land force in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the 

satisfactory resolution of operational problems and to the clarification of certain factors which the United States Chiefs of Staff believe 

will be controlling. 

b. Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should send out appropriate 

commanders and staff to visit General MacArthur and Admiral 

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Nimitz and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would keep the United 

States Chiefs of Staff informed of the reactions of the Dominions to 

the proposals. 

d. Took note that; the United States Chiefs of Staff would take up with 

the appropriate theater commanders the possibility of establishing 

a small British tactical air force in support of the proposed Commonwealth land force. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 195th Meeting 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN THE CONFERENCEROOM 

AT 25 RINCSTRASSE, BABELSBERC, GERMANY,

ON WEDNESDAY, 18 JULY1945, AT 1430. 

PRESENT 

United States 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General of the Army 

H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General B. B. Somervell,USA Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull. USA General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr.,USN Lt. Gen. Sir Gordon N. Macready 

Maj. Gen. L. Norstad, USA Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Captain H. R. Oster, USN Maj. Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Captain A. S. McDill, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain C. J. Moore, USN 

Lt. Col. T. Haddon 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE C.C.S. 194TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the C.C.S. 194th Meeting and approved 

the detailed report of the meeting subject to the substitution in the 

first paragraph on page 3 of the words “dispatch of a corps commander 

and staff to the Pacific” for “above” and subject to any later minor 

amendments. 

2. FRENCH AND DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST 

JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 842,84211, and 84212) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to C.C.S. 84212 and directed 

the Secretaries to forward it separately to the French and Netherlands 

Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

3. STAFF CONVERSATIONS WITH PORTUGAL 

(C.C.S. 462125 and 462126) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office in the 

Enclosure to C.C.S. 462125, as amended in C.C.S. 462126. 

4. SOUTHEAST ASIA AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA 

(C.C.S. 89012) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of C.C.S. 

89012. 

In regard to paragraph 2, GENERAL MARSHALL asked the British 

Chiefs of Staff if they would express their reaction to dividing Indo-China into 

two parts, leaving the northern part in the China Theater. 

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that the line dividing Indo-China 

would be dependent to some extent on contemplated operations through 

Thailand. 

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ADMIRAL KING stated that the division of Indo-China along the latitude of 15 degrees north was an arbitrary division and might be changed to 

suit contemplated operational requirements. 

The British Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that they should like to 

study the question of the dividing line before making any proposals in regard 

to the matter. 

The proposals contained in paragraph 3 were accepted by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff without discussion. 

In the discussion of paragraph 4, SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that 

the British Chiefs of Staff were in doubt as to the commitment which they 

would be undertaking if they agreed to the transfer on a particular date. They 

did not know when the operations in Borneo were scheduled to be completed 

nor what sort of liability they would be accepting in the form of maintenance 

and support for those operations. 

In reply, GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the United States Chiefs of 

Staff reply to the questionnaire which the British Chiefs of Staff had submitted 

(C.C.S. 852 and 852/1) ,* and described the extent to which the United States 

Chiefs of Staff were proposing to support operations in the new British command. He said that most of the US. troops had been withdrawing from the area 

of the proposed new British command and that no further operations were 

scheduled in Borneo. He added that in any event there would be no question 

of “leaving the Borneo operations in the lurch.” 

GENERAL MARSHALL then went on to point out that it would be a great 

advantage to the United States Chiefs of Staff if the transfer of the area to 

Admiral Mountbatten could take place at an early date. General MacArthur is 

fully occupied with operations to the northward and it would be a considerable 

benefit to him if he could be relieved of these responsibilities as soon as possible. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Admiral Mountbatten also was fully 

occupied in his present and contemplated operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command, and since General MacArthur was familiar with and is dealing with 

the Australians at the present, it might be best to continue that procedure until 

Admiral Mountbatten was in a better position to undertake these new responsibilities. 

The British Chiefs of Staff agreed that it was desirable to effect a transfer of command in the Southwest Pacific Area at an early date, but considered 

* Not published herein. 

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that it would be necessary for them to study the matter before a definite time 

could be agreed upon. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that as Admiral Mountbatten was 

about to visit General MacArthur in Manila, that he and General MacArthur 

might discuss the timing of the transfer of command. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed in principle that that part of the present Southwest Pacific 

Area lying south of the boundary proposed in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 

852/1,* should pass from United States to British command as soon 

as possible. 

b. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would investigate and report 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the earliest possible date on which the 

transfer of the above area could be effected. 

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would consider where the 

dividing line might lie in the event that approximately half of French 

Indo-China should be included in the new British command. 

(At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session.) 

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 

(Paragraphs 5 and 6, C.C.S. 890/2) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he wished to explain the point of view 

of the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

He pointed out that the general concept of operations in the Pacific had 

been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that the control of operational strategy lay with the United States Chiefs of Staff. He recognized that 

in the past the British Chiefs of Staff had not had all the information that they 

wanted and assured them that this would be remedied in the future. He felt, 

however, that the operational strategy in the Pacific must remain the responsibility of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He explained the extensive difficulties in the conduct of the strategy of the Pacific arising from the great distances involved and the enormous land, sea, and air forces employed. He said 

that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that they could not, in addition to 

See paragraph 13, CCS 900/3. 

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these problems, shoulder the burden of debating the “pros” and “cons” of 

operational strategy with the British Chiefs of Staff. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff would be glad to give the British Chiefs 

of Staff timely information of US.plans and intentions and to hear their 

comments. But they felt bound to retain freedom to decide ultimately what 

should be done. If then the British Chiefs of Staff felt that they could not 

commit British troops to the operations decided upon, then they would of 

course be at liberty to withdraw British forces from those operations; but he 

desired to make it clear that if this were done, it would be necessary for the 

United States Chiefs of Staff to be given ample warning of British intentions 

so that plans of United States Chiefs of Staff could be adjusted accordingly. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had felt that 

they had been rather left out of the picture but confirmed that the British 

Chiefs of Staff entirely supported the strategy which the United States Chiefs 

of Staff had so far developed. For the future, they hoped that they would be 

consulted on the further development of strategy but had no wish to suggest 

that they should interfere in any way with the operational strategy. 

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM asked if the British Chiefs of Staff would be 

consulted in regard to the strategy that would be adopted in the event of the 

Russians coming into the war. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the strategy to be adopted in these circumstances would be considered on a tripartite basis. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would consult with the British Chiefs of Staff, of course, but must reserve the final 

decision to themselves. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the event of any disagreement, the 

British Chiefs of Staff would certainly be given the opportunity of convincing 

the United States Chiefs of Staff that they were wrong. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that with respect to the strategic control of the war against 

Japan:­

a. The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain 

in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff. 
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b. The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of 

Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and 

intentions. 

c. The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of 

Staff on matters of general strategy, on the understanding that in 

the event of disagreement, the final decision on the action to be taken 

will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

d. In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot 

commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c. above, the British Chiefs of 

Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice 

of their decision as will permit them to make timely rearrangements. 

e. In the event the U.S.S.R. enters the war against Japan, the strategy 

to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 196th Meeting 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTES OF MEETINGHELDIN THE CONFERENCEROOM 

AT 25 RINCSTRASSE, BABELSBERC, GERMANY,

ON THURSDAY, 19 JULY1945, AT 1430. 

PRESENT 

United States 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General of the Army 

H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General B. B. Somervell,USA Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Maj. Gen. L. Norstad, USA Maj. Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Captain H. R. Oster, USN 

Captain A. S.McDill, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain C. J. Moore, USN 

Lt. Col. T. Haddon 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE C.C.S. 195TH MEETING, 18 

JULY 1945 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved the conclusions of the C.C.S. 195th Meeting subject to the 

following amendments: 

(1) Change item 4 a. to read: 

“Agreed in principle that that part of the present Southwest 

Pacific Area lying south of the boundary proposed in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 852/1, should pass from United States to 

British command as soon as possible.” 

(2) Change item 5 e. to read as follows: 

“In the event the U.S.S.R. enters the war against Japan, the 

strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties 

concerned.” 

b. Approved the detailed report of the meeting subject to later minor 

amendments. 

2. PARTICIPATION OF TWO FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS IN FAR EASTERN OPERATIONS 

(C.C.S. 895, 895/1, and 895/2) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the reply to the Chief of the French Military Mission in the 

United States in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 895/2. 

3. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MACHINERY AFTER THE WAR WITH 

JAPAN 

(C.C.S.891 and 891/1) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered 

the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 891/1. The 

British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to discuss the matter or to take note of 

the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff as the latter desired. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were 

not in a position to discuss at this date the post-war relationship between the 

respective military staffs. 

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ADMIRAL KING said that the second paragraph of C.C.S. 891/1 was 

meant to refer to the procedure envisaged in the changed conclusion under 

5 e. of the minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 195th Meeting. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note of C.C.S. 891 and 891/1. 

4. INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE 

WAR 

(C.C.S. 884, 88411, and 88412) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that it was 

desirable that the policy adopted in imparting information concerning the 

Japanese war to the Russians should be coordinated with the policy of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had 

considered the matter raised in the memorandum by the British Chiefs of 

Staff and had come to the following conclusion:­

a. The United States Chiefs of Staff desired to retain freedom of action 

regarding the passing of purely operational information and intelligence 

to the Russians. 

b. On matters of information and intelligence which were not purely 

operational, the United States Chiefs of Staff would agree not to pass such 

information to the Russians without consulting the British Chiefs of Staff. 

c. As regards information and intelligence from purely British sources, 

this would not be passed without permission of the British Chiefs of Staff. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that there was considerable technical information which had been developed by joint effort, and he asked whether this 

information would be handled the same as operational information. 

ADMIRAL KING said that information on technical equipment was not 

included in purely operational information. Operational information or intelligence included information on such matters as weather and the composition and disposition of enemy forces. The technical information referred to by 

Sir Charles Portal would not, therefore, be handled under a. above. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was the policy of the United States 

Chiefs of Staff to pass purely operational information and intelligence freely 

to the Russians and not to withhold it for bargaining purposes. If such information contributed to the efficiency of the Russian armies or aided in the 

prosecution of the war the United States Chiefs felt that it should be given to 

the Russians regardless of whether or not the Russians reciprocated. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this policy would be agreeable to the 

British Chiefs of Staff as they felt that it would be better for the British and 

United States Chiefs of Staff to pursue the same policy in this matter since 

both countries have military missions in Moscow. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed: 

a. Operational Information and Intelligence 

That the U.S.and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the Russians 

such operational information and intelligence regarding the theatres 

in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and 

without bargaining. 

b. Information and Intelligence Other than Operational 

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together 

before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other 

than operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information 

or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party's 

sources without their consent. 

5. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE BY 

JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 880/8) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that for the purpose of planning production and the allocation 

of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by 

Japan be 15 November 1946; that this date be adjusted periodically to 

conform to the course of the war. 

6. APPOINTMENT OF COLONEL DOUGLAS TO ALLIED COMMISSION 

IN ITALY 

FIELD MARSHAL WILSON reported that he had attended that afternoon a meeting between the US.Secretaryof War, the U.S. Assistant Secretary 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 199th Meeting 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN THE CONFERENCE ROOM 

AT 25 RINGSTRASSE, BABELSBERG, GERMANY,

ON MONDAY, 23 JULY 1945,AT 1130.

PRESENT 

United States 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General of the Army 

H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Maj. Gen. L. Norstad, USA 

Rear Adm. H. A. Flanigan, USN 

Captain A. S. McDill, USN 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Lt. Gen. Sir Gordon N. Macready 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

Maj. Gen. N. G. Holmes 

Maj. Gen. L. C. Hollis 

SECRETARIAT 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Captain C. J. Moore, USN 

Lt. Col. T. Haddon 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 198TH MEETING OF THE 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, 21 JULY 1945 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions of the 198th Meeting and approved the detailed 

report, subject to any later minor amendments. 

2. EMPLOYMENT OF CAPTURED ENEMY OCEAN-GOING PASSENGER 

SHIPPING AND BRITISH TROOPSHIP EMPLOYMENT IN U.S. 

TRANS-ATLANTIC PROGRAMS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1946 

(C.C.S. 67916,6791'7,67918,and 67919) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered 

C.C.S. 67919 and regretted that the amendments proposed by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff were not acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff. It appeared 

to be the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that if the seven captured 

German ships were moved to the Pacific they would be unable to make more 

than one trip before the 31st of December, 1945. If then, as a result of the 

review of the combined requirements and combined resources for the first 

half of 1946,it was decided that these seven captured ships should no longer be 

allocated to the United States, their initial assignment to the Pacific in 1945 

would prove uneconomical. He said he appreciated the point of view of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out, however, that the very fact that these 

ships had been moved to the Pacific would be a strong argument for retaining 

them there. This argument would be weighed with all the other arguments 

when it came to the combined review which the British Chiefs of Staff had 

proposed in paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 67918. To exclude these ships from the review 

at this stage seemed to the British Chiefs of Staff to be wrong. 

ADMIRAL KING proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept 

C.C.S. 67918, provided that the combined study on the lines suggested by the 

British Chiefs of Staff be undertaken as a firm commitment to be completed 

by mid-September. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in C.C.S. 

67916 for United States employment up to 31 December 1945. 

b. Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would allocate to 

the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for 

the movement of Canadians. 

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c. Directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, to submit 

by 15 September 1945 a report, on the lines of C.C.S. 679/1, of the 

combined requirements and combined resources (including captured 

enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946, the study to cover the 

recommendation in paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 679/7 and the employment 

during the first half of 1946 of the seven ships listed in C.C.S. 679/6. 

3. PROVISION OF PERSONNEL SHIPS FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF 

ALLIED GOVERNMENTS 

(C.C.S. 897) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the memorandum in Enclosure “A” to C.C.S. 897, subject to 

amendments agreed in discussion, and directed that it be dispatched 

to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. 

4. COMMAND IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 

(C.C.S. 890/3) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the recommendation in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 890/3, and directed that the statement contained in that paragraph, as amended in 

discussion, be included in their final report to the President and Prime 

Minister. 

5. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 900) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 900, as amended in discussion. 

6. CONTROL OF ALLIED NAVAL UNITS OTHER THAN U.S. AT 

PRESENT UNDER COMMAND OF SEVENTH US. FLEET 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note that upon the dissolution of the U.S. Seventh Fleet pursuant 

to the reallocation of areas and change in command in the Southwest 

Pacific, as proposed in C.C.S. 890/1, it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet to release to British control 

those Allied naval units other than US.at present incorporated in the 

US. Seventh Fleet. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 200th Meeting 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF MEETINGHELDIN THE CONFERENCEROOM 

AT 25 RINGSTRASSE, BABELSBERG, GERMANY,

ON TUESDAY, 24 JULY 1945, AT 1730.

PRESENT 

United States 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General of the Army 

H. H. Arnold, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

ALSO PRESENT 

General B. B. Somervell, USA Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten 

Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Maj. Gen. L. Norstad, USA Lt. Gen. Sir Gordon N. Macready 

Captain A. S.McDill, USN 

Captain H. R. Oster, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Maj. Gen. L. C. Hollis 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones 

Lt. Col. G. Mallaby 

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1. 200TH MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note that this was their 200th Meeting. 

2. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would 

like to extend a welcome to Admiral Mountbatten and take this opportunity 

of congratulating him personally on the conclusion of his great campaign 

in Burma. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN thanked the United States Chiefs of Staff 

and then proceeded to give an account of past, present, and future operations 

in his command. 

In recounting the broad tale of events in Southeast Asia from the 

SEXTANT Conference in 1943 to the capture of Rangoon in May, 1945,he emphasized two points of importance:­

a. Air transport was the lifeblood of all operations in his command. They 

had saved the day when things looked black in the spring of 1944 and had 

enabled him to complete successfully the great overland campaign to recapture Burma which had previously been thought impracticable. The 

Dakota was far and away the best transport aircraft for his purposes. 

b. The tremendous steps in the reduction of casualties made possible 

by preventive medicine. 

In describing the current situation in Burma, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that:­

a. He had some 56,000Japs still to destroy. At the moment seven divisions were employed on the job, three of which would soon be withdrawn 

to take part in forthcoming operations. Considerable fighting was still 

going on. 

b. He had a big problem in getting supplies through to the native population in the face of one of the worst monsoons in history. He was being 

forced to use some air transport for this as well as for the maintenance 

of the troops. 

c. His air transport squadrons were some 20 percent under strength. 

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As regards future operations, the Supreme Commander paid tribute to 

the immense effort being put forward by the India Command to organize India 

as a base for these operations which were the largest that had ever been undertaken from the country. He drew a picture of the problem of mounting operation ZIPPER; the vast distances over which the forces would have to converge 

on the objective; the fact that they would have to rely on carrier-borne air 

support for the landing; and the degree of opposition they were likely to meet. 

Risks were involved but these were calculated risks which he was prepared to 

accept. 

Finally, he paid tribute to the morale of the troops and the high degree 

of inter-Allied cooperation that had been built up in the past two years. This 

spirit, he felt, would carry the command through forthcoming operations in 

spite of the disappointments inevitably involved in the acceptance of a second 

priority in the war as a whole. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE then invited the United States Chiefs of Staff to put 

any questions they would like to Admiral Mountbatten, observing that the 

British Chiefs of Staff would have the opportunity at subsequent discussions 

in London. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that it might be possible to use more 

submarines to prevent the infiltration into Malaya of further Japanese 

reinforcements. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that no specific demand for further 

submarines for this purpose had been made from the theater and that within 

reason there was no limitation on the number that might be employed. There 

were, however, very few worthwhile targets left in the area. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that he felt that the present distribution of submarines, balanced as it was to meet the various tasks to be carried 

out, was satisfactory. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked the Supreme Commander how soon he 

thought he would be able to take over the new command, explaining that the 

United States Chiefs of Staff were very anxious to relieve United States 

commanders in the Pacific of their responsibilities for the area at the earliest 

possible moment. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that he had not expected to be called 

upon to assume these new responsibilities until MAILFIST had been 

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completed. He would like a little further time to consider the idea of taking 

them on earlier, but assured the United States Chiefs of Staff that he would do 

his best to meet them. When assured by General Marshall that the forces now 

in the area would be left there, he said that this certainly made things easier. 

It appeared that the problem would be merely a matter of assuming the higher 

direction of operations in the area. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked what Admiral Mountbatten thought of 

the idea of splitting French Indo-China into two and placing the southern half, 

south of 16"N, in the Southeast Asia Command. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that he had just heard of the proposition and that his first reactions were favorable. He would have liked some 

latitude in the actual northern limit of the area in case his operations were to 

develop either to the north or to the south of the degree of latitude suggested,

but did not feel very strongly on the point. He thought the French might 

find the proposition a little less agreeable. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained the background to the French offer 

of two French divisions for operations in the war against Japan, and said that 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff were agreed that the best place to employ these 

divisions would probably be in French Indo-China. One of these two divisions 

had had battle experience and had done well. Both were composed of white 

men and the French proposal specifically provided that they would arrive 

with corps-supporting and service units. He asked Admiral Mountbatten's 

opinion asto the acceptance of these two divisions in Southeast Asia Command. 

They could not be moved out for several months and it would probably be the 

late spring of 1946 before he could expect to get them. 

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that, subject to the views of the British 

Chiefs of Staff,he would certainly welcome these two French divisions provided 

they came with a proper proportion of service and supporting units. The obvious place to employ them would be in French Indo-China where he would 

be relieved of the necessity of dealing with a problem which could be satisfactorily handled only by Frenchmen. 

GENERAL HULL said that General MacArthur had drawn up a list of 

the supporting and service units which these two divisions would require if 

they came out to the Pacific, and this list has been communicated to the French. 

He undertook to provide Admiral Mountbatten with this list. 

306 
MINUTES OF THE 

PLENARY MEETING 

(BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN) 

These Minutes were transcribed from notes taken by 

the United States Secretaries, Combined Chiefs of Sta#. 
TOP SECRET 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF THE PLENARY MEETINGBETWEENTHE UNITEDSTATES 

AND GREAT BRITAIN,HELDAT 2 KAISERSTRASSE, BABELSBERG, GERMANY,

ON TUESDAY, 24 JULY 1945, AT 1130.

PRESENT 

United States 

The President 

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King 

General of the Army 

H. H. Arnold 

General B. B. Somervell 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Lord Leathers •

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke •

Marshal of the Royal Air Force •

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock 

SECRETARIAT 

Major Gen. L. C. Hollis •

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland •

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones •

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FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 900/2) 

THE MEETING had before them C.C.S. 900/2, the draft of the final 

report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister 

on the results of the TERMINAL Conference. 

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER proceeded to examine 

the report paragraph by paragraph. 

With respect to paragraph 4, ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that there 

was a divergence of opinion on two or three points in connection with the basic 

undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war and that the respec�

tive views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff were set out in 

Appendix “A.” 

Appendix “A,” paragraph 4. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed 

to include the following:�

“a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British 

Commonwealth. 

“b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the 

British Commonwealth in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of 

the war against Japan.” 

THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF on the other hand wished to combine 

these two paragraphs into the following:�

“Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western 

Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment 

of the strategic concept.” 

The view of the United States Chiefs of Staff was that the basic commit�

ment in this respect should be confined to the maintenance of war-making 

capacity in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against 

Japan, whereas the British Chiefs of Staff felt that it should be extended to 

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include the occupation of Germany and Austria, as provided in the strategic 

concept. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he supported the British Chiefs of 

Staff and suggested that the holding down of Germany and Austria was cer�

tainly a very vital matter. He felt therefore that this commitment should be 

embraced in this particular section of the basic undertakings. 

He called attention to the extent to which the British industrial effort 

had been interwoven with that of the United States by reason of agreements 

reached earlier in the war and his own discussions with President Roosevelt 

at Quebec. As a result of these agreements many British units were equipped 

with US.equipment and no provision had been made to replace this equip�

ment from British sources. To make such provision would take time and he 

hoped very much that the President would be able to make it possible for 

him to pass smoothly from this position of dependence on the United States 

to one in which British forces could be independent. He feared that a rigid 

interpretation of an undertaking to maintain the British war-making capacity 

only in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against 

Japan, would place him in great difficulties. He hoped also that the rules 

applied to the supply of lend-lease equipment would not be held to limit British 

sovereign rights over British equipment. He must be free to give British 

equipment, for example, to the Belgians, if His Majesty’s Government felt that 

this was desirable, and he hoped that this would not result in the drying up 

of equivalent supplies from the United States. 

THE PRESIDENT explained that he was handicapped in his approach 

to this matter by the latest renewal of the Lend-Lease Act. As Vice President, 

he had worked out its clauses together with Senator George, who had explained 

to the Congress that the Act was intended to be a weapon of war only. The 

President was now striving to give to the Act the broadest interpretation 

possible and he had no intention of causing the British any embarrassment In 

the matter of furnishing supplies to the British troops or the maintenance 

thereof. However, he must ask the Prime Minister to be patient as he wished to 

avoid any embarrassment with Congress over the interpretation of the Act 

and it might be necessary for him to ask for additional legislation in order 

to clear the matter up. 

With respect to the basic undertaking under discussion, THE PRESIDENT said that he thought that the holding down of Germany and Austria was 

quite definitely a part of war. After all, we were technically still at war with 

Germany and Austria. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said in view of the foregoing that the United 

States Chiefs of Staff accepted the paragraph proposed by the British Chiefs 

of Staff. 

THE PRESIDENT agreed. 

Appendix “A,” paragraph 4 c. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could not see very much difference 

between the two subparagraphs proposed. He suggested that the proposal of 

the United States Chiefs of Staff should be accepted. 

THE PRESIDENT agreed. 

Appendix “A,” first sentence of paragraph 6 c. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were 

anxious to add a clause at the end of the first sentence of this paragraph 

which would extend the combined liability to provide assistance not only to 

such of the forces of the liberated areas as could fulfill an active and effective 

role in the present war but also to such of those forces as were “required to 

maintain world order in the interests of the war effort.” In his view, therefore, 

the issue before the meeting was whether or not the United States was prepared 

to undertake a commitment to equip and supply forces of occupation other 

than American. 

THE PRIME MINISTER asked what the British Chiefs of Staff had in 

mind in proposing this clause. 

FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE instanced the Belgian and Dutch forces 

and ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that such French divisions as were 

not going to the Far East would also fall into this category. 

In the light of this explanation, THE PRIME MINISTER felt that the 

point had already been covered under paragraphs 4a.and b. above, where it had 

already been agreed that occupational forces should be included in that partic�

ular basic undertaking. 

It was agreed that the point would be adequately covered if the words 

“in accordance with the over-all strategic concept,” were added to the first 

sentence of paragraph 6 c, in lieu of the clause proposed by the British Chiefs 

of Staff. 

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Appendix “A,” paragraph 7. 

At this point Lord Leathers entered the meeting 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he attached great importance to the 

United Kingdom import program and would not wish to see it lose its status 

in a document of this nature. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he was not quite clear how far he could 

accept liability for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom 

under existing United States law. Therefore, if this paragraph were intended 

to indicate any such liability his acceptance of it would have to be on the 

understanding that the necessary authority did exist. 

ADMIRAL KING and GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United 

States Chiefs of Staff felt that the matter contained in this paragraph was out 

of place among the basic undertakings. GENERAL MARSHALL drew atten�

tion to paragraphs 20,21, and 22 at the end of the report and pointed out that 

there was no more reason for including cargo shipping among the basic under�

takings than the similar matters dealt with in these paragraphs. He suggested 

that this paragraph should also be placed at the end of the report under the 

heading “Miscellaneous.” 

LORD LEATHERS pointed out that the inclusion of the United King�

dom import program had been implicit in the basic undertakings at previous 

conferences. In consonance with the changed situation, a major change was 

now being made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. As shipping 

requirements for military and civilian needs were closely interlocked, his 

view was that the United Kingdom import program would be more properly 

associated with military requirements if it were linked to them in the basic 

undertakings. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he did not consider that any great 

change had been made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. He still 

felt that the matter would be more appropriately placed at the end of the 

report under the heading “Miscellaneous.” 

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether this would result in the 

sweeping aside of the United Kingdom import program. 

THE PRESIDENT said the Prime Minister could take his word for it 

that the United Kingdom import program would not suffer from this change. 

He suggested that General Marshall’s proposal be accepted and the paragraph 

incorporated at the end of the report. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that on this undertaking he would cer�

tainly agree that the paragraph should be included at the end of the report. 

Appendix “A,” last sentence of paragraph 6 c. 

LORD LEATHERS suggested that as it had now been agreed that para�

graph 7 should be removed from the basic undertakings and placed at the end 

of the report, the last sentence of paragraph 6c. would more properly be deleted. 

However, if it were held that this sentence merely referred to supplies and 

not to shipping, he thought it might remain. 

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the last 

sentence of paragraph 6 c. should stand. 

THE PRIME MINISTER referred to paragraph 8 d. of the report in which 

it had been agreed that “In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide 

that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United 

States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as would permit 

them to make timely rearrangements.” THE PRIME MINISTER said that he 

hoped it would not be thought the British Chiefs of Staff would wish to take 

advantage of this arrangement. What was good enough for the United States 

would certainly be good enough for the British. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff did not 

expect the British Chiefs of Staff to invoke this paragraph and GENERAL 

MARSHALL explained that it had been put in at his suggestion. After 

OLYMPIC for example, if the British Chiefs of Staff did not agree with the 

action proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, they would, under this 

paragraph, be free to take such action as they thought tit. The paragraph was 

a result of an attempt on his part to cover both sides. 

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked the United States Chiefs of Staff for 

their explanation and the spirit in which this provision had been made. 

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER accepted and approved 

the report as amended in the above discussion and directed the copies of the 

revised version be submitted to them for signature. (The report in its approved 

form was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 900/3.) 

312 
MINUTES OF THE 

TRIPARTITE 

MILITARY MEETING 

These Minutes were transcribed from notes taken by

the United States Secretaries, Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
TOP SECREl 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF THE TRIPARTITE MILITARYMEETINGHELDIN CECILIENHOFPALACE, 

BABELSBERG, GERMANY, ON TUESDAY, 24 JULY1945,AT 1430. 

PRESENT 

United States 

Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General of the Army 

H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Maj. Gen. L. Norstad, USA 

Maj. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

British 

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

Field Marshal Sir H. M. Wilson 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

U.S.S.R. 

Army General Antonov 

Chief of Staff, Red Army 

Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov 

Peoples Commissariat for the Navy 

Marshal of Aviation Fallalev 

Chief of Soviet Air Staff 

Lt. Gen. Slavin 

Assistant to the Chief of Staff,Red Army 

SECRETARIAT 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Captain C. J. Moore, USN 

Lt. Col. G. Mallaby 

INTERPRETERS 

Major Hill Lunghi 

Major Evsekov 

Lieutenant Joseph Chase, USNR 

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GENERAL OF THE ARMY ANTONOV asked Fleet Admiral Leahy to 

preside at this, the first tripartite meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at TERMINAL. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was glad to accept the duties of presiding 

officer at this session. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY then asked that General Antonov outline the intentions and plans of the U.S.S.R. with reference to the Japanese. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that Soviet troops were now being concentrated in the Far East and would be ready to commence operations in the last 

half of August. The actual date. however, would depend upon the result of 

conferences with Chinese representatives which had not yet been completed. 

The objective of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East was the destruction of the Japanese troops in Manchuria and the occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula. After 

the defeat of Japan in combination with the Allied armies it was the Russian 

intention to withdraw their troops from Manchuria. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the present time the Japanese have 

in Manchuria approximately 20 infantry divisions, two tank divisions, and a 

sufficient number of depot divisions, separate brigades and separate battalions 

to bring the total Japanese forces up to a strength of approximately 30 divisions. In addition to these there were approximately 20 divisions of Manchurian troops, making an aggregate of approximately 50 divisions in all on 

the Russian front. 

If the Russian operations were to be successful it was important to 

prevent the Japanese from strengthening their Manchurian front by reinforcements from China and the Japanese Islands. It was estimated that the 

Japanese might bring for this purpose 10 divisions from China and 7 from 

the Japanese Islands. If, therefore, the U.S.S.R.was to be able to carry out 

its operations successfully it was necessary to prevent any such reinforcement. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said he wished to call attention to the fact that 

there was only a single railroad line connecting central Russia with the Far 

East; the effect of this was to limit rail movements of all kinds and effectively 

prevent any rapid movement of troops. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY then asked General Marshall to outline the situation 

of the Japanese with respect to ground troops. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that it is estimated that the Japanese have 

at present approximately 1,800,000 Japanese troops in Japan proper; there 

are approximately 500,000 troops in Kyushu and a fairly large garrison in the 

Ryukyus outside of Okinawa. The Japanese garrison in Formosa has recently 

been increased to about 260,000 men. 

In the Philippines there are now about 12,000 to 14,000 Japanese survivors collected in the mountains of northern Luzon for the final death struggle. 

In Mindanao there are about 20,000 troops scattered throughout the central 

plateau, all of the coastline positions having now been lost. In the remainder 

of the Philippines there are approximately 25,000 troops who are widely 

scattered. 

There are, throughout the Pacific islands, isolated garrisons who are 

under constant surveillance and periodic bombing and whose presence cause 

no inconvenience to United States forces. There are a considerable number of 

isolated Japanese troops in Borneo, in New Guinea and the Celebes, in Bougainville in the Solomons group and in the Bismarck Archipelago. The Japanese 

troops in the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago are confronted by the 

Australians, who are also taking care of a considerable force in the north 

central part of New Guinea. All of these island garrisons are suffering from 

gradual exhaustion of their military supplies. In New Guinea they are suffering, in addition, from malaria and other tropical diseases. The remaining 

garrisons in Java and Sumatra have been reduced by movements to the Malay 

Peninsula. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff estimate that there are about a million 

Japanese in China. At the present time the most noticeable movements of 

Japanese troops have been towards Kyushu. In the last three months two 

divisions from Manchuria had been identified there and it is understood that 

these divisions have left in Manchuria the cadres for two additional divisions. 

Two divisions have recently been moved from Korea to the Japanese homeland. 

One of these is composed of depot troops and the composition of the other is 

unknown. In the recent past deceptive measures instituted by US. forces 

have resulted in the concentration of Japanese troops in the Kuriles north of 

Hokkaido. It is known now, however, that the Japanese are moving troops out 

of the Kuriles and a division of these troops has recently been identified in 

Kyushu. 

U.S. troops now have firm control of Okinawa where they are busy 

improving harbors and developing numerous airfields. It is expected that in 

addition to the naval and Marine Corps planes now on Okinawa that General 

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MacArthur’s air force will have 2,000 planes there before the end of the summer. On Luzon strenuous efforts are being made to develop the necessary base 

facilities for incoming troops. Because of harbor destruction and the sinking 

of 500 ships in Manila Bay this has been a difficult task but satisfactory progress is being made. 

With reference to General Antonov’s remark regarding the severing 

of Japanese communications with Manchuria, GENERAL MARSHALL said it 

is the present understanding the Japanese communications have been seriously interfered with by U.S. submarine action in the Sea of Japan, and 

by the continued laying of submarine mines by B-29’s at the western entrance 

of the Inland Sea near Shiminoseki and the blockade of such harbors on the 

west coast of Honshu as Niigata. 

The ferry service between Japan and Fusan and shipping in the Yellow 

Sea has been terminated. Ferry service to Fusan has been moved to the ports 

further north in Korea. Mine laying by 8-29’s has extended north along the 

Korean coast from Fusan to Ginzan. Mines have also been laid in the Inland 

Sea in the Bungo Channel and in the Bay of Tokyo. Naval air action has 

extended to northern Honshu and Hokkaido and numerous coastal ports have 

been attacked by naval aircraft and by direct bombardment. In recent months 

aircraft based in the Philippines have reduced the normal traffic from ports 

as far south as Indo-China to Japan from forty convoys a day to none whatever at the present time. By these various actions the Japanese have been compelled to stop all operations at sea except minor operations in the Sea of Japan 

and coastal lugger traffic in the Java Sea and along the coasts of Malaysia. As 

a result of increased naval action and mining by super-bombers, there is little 

likelihood of any Japanese troop movements between Japan and Manchuria. 

By September or October we expect it to be impossible for the Japanese to 

move any cargo over this route. It is believed that Japanese operational shipping of one thousand tons and over has been reduced from seven or eight 

million tons at the beginning of the war to 1% million tons at the present time. 

In referring to General Antonov’s remarks relating to the movement of 

Japanese reinforcements from China to Manchuria, GENERAL MARSHALL 

said that the general movement of Japanese troops in China indicates a withdrawal from the south. Garrisons in Indo-China and to the southward have 

been cut off by Chinese forces. It appears that the Japanese are establishing 

a fortress garrison of about 150,000 men for the defense of Hong Kong and 

Canton. A similar garrison is being established in Shanghai, including Chusan 

Island. An inland fortress garrison is being established in Hankow. Our 

evidence indicates that in spite of their efforts to withdraw their forces to the 

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northward, the continued air attacks on the single-track railroad and sabotage 

by Chinese guerrillas will prevent the Japanese from moving more than a 

trickle of troops to the north. Not only is the rail route interrupted, but the 

rolling stock is in bad condition. They are, therefore, dependent largely on 

water transportation. In the course of time the Japanese could move troops 

from North China to Manchuria through the Peking-Kalgan and the Tientsin 

regions. 

The redeployment of troops from the European Theater to the Pacific 

is now well underway. The first troops have reached Manila. Our first requirement is for engineering and similar troops to restore the harbors and prepare 

cantonments. Six divisions from Germany with the attached corps and army 

troops are now in the United States. They will be moved from the west coast 

of the United States as rapidly as shipping is available. 

In the Pacific at the present time the principal difficulty is to find ground 

room for troops and aircraft we wish to deploy there. The early requirement 

for engineering troops in the Philippines is thus apparent. 

The divisions already in the Pacific have largely been withdrawn from 

combat and are now being reconditioned and trained for the next operation. 

The next most important difficulty in the Pacific is the provision of shipping. By the improvement of harbors, by decreasing the turnaround of our 

vessels and by making all possible air transport available we hope to overcome 

the shipping shortage. 

In closing, GENERAL MARSHALL said that attacks upon Japan from 

the air and the sea are now proceeding in tremendous volume, but the intensity 

of these attacks would increase each week. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he would briefly supplement General 

Marshall’s remarks. He said that since Yalta the United States Navy had 

participated in the complete conquest of the Philippine Islands. Commencing 

in April the conquest of Okinawa and adjacent islands had been accomplished, 

and bases for land, sea, and air forces were being developed preparatory to the 

next move against the Japanese homeland. In addition to the Okinawa operation, carrier task forces had attacked air and naval bases in Japan proper. 

Recently the Third Fleet, under Admiral Halsey, had bombarded the Tokyo 

area and northern Honshu and Hokkaido. Commencing with the Ryukyus 

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campaign a part of the British Fleet had operated as a task force of the US. 

naval forces. The Japanese navy is now only one-third of its maximum strength 

and most of the remaining units are of questionable military value, except perhaps for suicide purposes. Naval reconnaissance aircraft now range to the 

Shantung Peninsula, Korea and the Sea of Japan. Our submarines are operating against the sea communications between Japan and Korea, in Japanese 

home waters and in the Sea of Japan. We have developed naval bases in Guam 

and Saipan, in the Marianas group,and are now developing a base in Okinawa. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he would furnish some additional details 

regarding the matters discussed by General Marshall. The limited land areas 

in the Pacific Theater make it impossible to utilize at present all of the large 

number of airplanes which had been used in the European Theater. When 

commencing the air campaign against Japan proper we were limited in operations by the airfields we could develop in the Marianas. From these islands 

the B-29’s performance enabled us to carry out attacks against the Japanese 

industrial areas in Honshu. During the first part of the campaign Japanese 

air opposition, as well as anti-aircraft fire, was intense. Navigation problems 

were most difficult. The weather through which we had to fly had an effect 

on the ability of the plane crews to carry the maximum weight in bombs. With 

the increase in the strength of our attacks the opposition by the enemy decreased. After the capture of Iwo Jima we were able to base fighter planes there 

which were able to accompany the B-29’s on their attacks on Japanese Islands. 

Not long after the employment of long-range accompanying fighters was initiated the Japanese Air Force assumed a condition of impotency and we have 

records of many instances when B-29’s reached their objectives without encountering any enemy air opposition. We have learned more about Japanese 

weather and this and experience gained enabled us to add 30 percent to the 

bomb load of our B-29’s. With fields established on Okinawa B-24’s will be able 

to operate to the north of Port Arthur and B-29’s to a range of 200 miles north 

of Harbin. We will be able to carry maximum bomb loads against Japanese 

industries and lines of communication in Manchuria. The B-29’s operating 

from Okinawa will carry a bomb load of 20,000 pounds. The difficulty of operating air units from Okinawa will be appreciated when it is realized that the 

island is only 80 miles long and that only 48 miles of its length can be used for 

airfields. This usable part of the island is only six or seven miles wide at the 

widest part. We expect to operate between 2,000 and 3,500 planes from the 

fields we are building there. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the exact proportion of Japanese industry 

now operating in Manchuria was not known but it was estimated to be about 

twenty percent. 

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He said that the Japanese Air Forces now have some 5,000 planes, a 

larger number than they have ever had before, but their air force is at its 

weakest point operationally. 

The 5,000 planes referred to above include all types of planes-operational and non-operational-reconnaissance, photographic and combat. Of 

these the Japanese have set aside about 1,200 for suicide operations. These 

are now concentrated largely in northern Honshu where the crews are being 

given special training in suicide technique against airplanesboth on the ground 

and in the air and against ships-warships as well as cargo ships unloading at 

our ports such as Okinawa. 

The Japanese have lost many of their best air leaders-most of their 

experienced pilots and large numbers of their maintenance crews. They are 

also very short of gasoline and oil. As a result, Army and Navy planes operating 

over Hokkaido, Honshu, and the Ryukyus rarely encounter more than 70 or 

80 planes. 

GENERAL ANTONOV asked General Marshall if he thought it would be 

possible for the Japanese to move large forces from Japan to Manchuria and 

from China to Manchuria. 

In reply, GENERAL MARSHALL said that he believed no troops could 

be moved from Japan to Manchuria. He thought the Japanese would be unable 

to move a large number of troops from China to Manchuria by rail but, given 

time, they could increase their forces in Manchuria from Central China via 

the Peking-Kalgan route or via Tientsin. The rail line south of Shantung is 

susceptible to air attack and sabotage. For this reason it would be a slow 

process to move large numbers of troops over this route. 

General Wedemeyer, the United States Commander in China, has 1,000 

planes of the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces under his command to operate 

against this railroad. 

Continuing,GENERAL MARSHALL said that at the present time 100,000 

tons of supplies a month are being moved into China by air over the mountains and via the old Burma Road. Over this route heavy movements of 

Chinese troops have been made from Burma to China. The movement of 

troops and supplies to China has been undertaken in order to have ready by 

August, 15 Chinese divisions of 10,000men each equipped with American arms, 

trained by American officers and enlisted men, and directed under American 

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guidance. He said he mentioned this movement of troops and their equipment 

from Burma since these movements had prevented an increase in the gasoline 

supply to China. As the equipping of these divisions is completed and the 

operations to be undertaken succeed, a greatly increased gasoline supply will 

be available which will enable heavy attacks to be made on the railroad to 

North China. 

Chinese troops in August will attack Fort Bayard, a port on the China 

Sea north of Hainan and south of Canton. This port is within 150 milesof the 

area from which the American-trained Chinese troops will advance on Canton 

and Hong Kong. It had been estimated that one Liberty ship in Fort Bayard 

was the equivalent of three or four in Calcutta; one transport plane in Fort 

Bayard was the equivalent of ten or more in Burma, and 20,000 men in Fort 

Bayard was the equivalent of 150,000 in Burma. All of these advantages would 

be reflected in the air operations against the railroad in China. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Chinese troops had given a good 

account of themselves in Burma and their effectiveness was encouraging beyond expectations. He thought that with heavy air support the Chinese troops 

would operate with considerable success against a Japanese withdrawal to 

the northward. 

With support of the Chinese forces by ship rather than through Burma 

he thought that the air forces would be able to completely destroy the Chinese 

railroad, and although the railroad could be attacked from Okinawa it would 

not be a profitable target for aircraft based there. 

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if the United States would operate against 

the Kuriles in order to open the line of communications to Siberia. He said 

that they had some strength in Kamchatka and would like to assist with some 

forces, and that he considered opening this sea route to be most important. 

He also asked if it would be possible for the United States forces to operate 

against the shores of Korea in coordination with the Russian forces which 

would be making an offensive against the peninsula. 

ADMIRAL KING said that it would not be possible to operate against the 

Kuriles and that he saw no reason why a line of communications could not 

be maintained through the Kuriles as the passages were wide and deep. In 

reply to the question in regard to operations against Korea, GENERAL 

MARSHALL said that such amphibious operations had not been contemplated, 

and particularly not in the near future. To undertake amphibious operations 

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against Korea would seriously expose our shipping to Japanese suicide attack 

by air and surface vessels until we had completely destroyed enemy air strength 

in southern Korea and until certain portions of the Japanese homeland had 

been brought completely under our control. To stage such an operation would 

require a great number of assault ships which would be engaged in three 

landings on Kyushu. There were no additional assault ships which would 

permit a landing in Korea. With only a small amphibious force landings could 

be made on the China coast south of Shanghai which would be of great 

assistance to General Wedemeyer. He realized the importance of Korea to 

the Russian operations but said that the possibility of an attack on Korea 

would have to be determined after the landings on Kyushu. He thought that 

Korea could be controlled from airfields that would be established in Kyushu. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he hoped and expected that after the Kyushu 

operation we would have such control over the waters of Japan and Korea that 

we could establish a line of sea communications through those waters to 

Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that we had already severed the line 

of communications between Korea and the main islands of Japan. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had with him some questions which 

he would leave with General Antonov to be answered at his convenience since 

he did not think that he would be prepared to give the answers at the present 

time. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he would like to call the attention of the 

Russian Chiefs of Staff to the conversation that took place at Yalta regarding 

La Perousse Strait, the control of which, we understood, would be undertaken 

by the Russians by capturing the southern end of Sakhalin Island at as early 

a time as the Russian Chiefs of Staff thought practicable. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the first task facing the Russians would 

be the destruction of the Japanese troops in Manchuria. Because of the distance 

of Sakhalin,additional troop movements would be required in order to complete 

its capture in time to be of value in opening La Perousse Strait. Therefore, 

the attack on southern Sakhalin would be undertaken as a second offensive. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then gave General Antonov a book explaining 

the experiences of our forces in fighting the Japanese which he thought might 

be of value to him. He also gave him an estimate of the situation in the Far 

East. 

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GENERAL ANTONOV said that he was grateful for the very valuable 

information which General Marshall had given him and said that it would 

be truly exploited. 

In regard to operations in Southeast Asia under Admiral Mountbatten, 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the reconquest of Burma had recently been 

completed but that some Japanese still remained in Burma where they had 

been cut off by the advance on Rangoon. These Japanese had been making an 

attempt to join other enemy forces in Siam and five hundred of them had 

been killed in the last two days. Operations in Burma were being interfered 

with by the monsoon which was still continuing. When the weather clears, 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Admiral Mountbatten would continue on towards Siam. In Burma there were the remnants of nine enemy divisions facing 

the British and behind these remnants was one division in Siam and four in 

Indo-China. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that they were preparing for an operation to 

secure Malaya and Singapore and to open the Straits of Malacca. The opening 

of these straits would shorten the line of communications for the support of 

British forces operating in the Pacific Theater against the main islands of 

Japan. 

In Malaya there were little more than two divisions of Japanese troops 

which were being reinforced from Java and Sumatra. 

Plans were being prepared for a small expeditionary force to cooperate 

with the United States forces in the attack on Japan. The limiting factor for 

operations in this area was shipping. 

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that only remnants of the Japanese 

Fleet in the Southeast Asia area remained and that within the last two months 

the two efficient Japanese cruisers had been sunk. Only two damaged ones 

remained in Singapore. The British East Indies Fleet was unrestricted in its 

movements except in the very narrow parts of Malacca Strait. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British and United States air 

forces in Southeast Asia maintained complete supremacy over the Japanese 

air forces in that area. His estimate of the strength of enemy air forces in 

Burma, Siam,Malaya, Sumatra, and Indo-China on 15 July was 260 operating 

aircraft plus 150training units. He said he considered any substantial increase 

in air strength most unlikely and that Admiral Mountbatten had ample aircraft for his future operations. 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY asked General Antonov if he desired to ask the 

British Chiefs of Staff any questions, to which GENERAL ANTONOV replied 

that he did not. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said, however, that he would require some time 

to consider the questions which had been presented to him by General Marshall 

and that when he was prepared he would like to arrange another meeting. He 

said he was very grateful for the information that had been furnished him by 

the United States and the British Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed the appreciation of both the United States 

and the British Chiefs of Staff for the information given to them by the Russian 

Chiefs of Staff. 

323 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING 

OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OF 

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION 

These minutes were transcribed fromnotes 

taken by the United States Secretaries. 
TOP SECRET 

TERMINAL CONFERENCE 

MINUTESOF THE MEETINGOF THE CHIEFS OF STAFFOF THE UNITEDSTATES 

AND OF THE SOVIET UNION HELDIN CECILIENHOF PALACE, BABELSBERG, GERMANY, 

ON THURSDAY, 26 JULY1945, AT 1500. 

PRESENT 

United States 

General of the Army 

G. C. Marshall, USA 

Fleet Admiral E. J. King, USN 

General of the Army 

H. H. Arnold, USA 

Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull, USA 

Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Maj. Gen. L. Norstad, USA 

Maj. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Rear Adm. M. B. Gardner, USN 

Rear Adm. J. B. Maples, USN 

Captain A. S.McDill, USN 

U.S.S.R. 

Army General Antonov 

Chief of Staff, Red Army 

Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov 

Peoples Commissariat for the Navy 

Marshal of Aviation Fallalev 

Chief of the Soviet Air Staff 

Lt. General Slavin 

Assistant to the Chiefs of Staff, 

Red Army 

Admiral Kucherov 

SECRETARIAT 

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland, USA 

Captain C. J. Moore, USN 

INTERPRETERS 

Major Evsekov 

Lieutenant Joseph Chase, USNR 

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GENERAL ANTONOV asked General Marshall if he would preside at 

the meeting. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated the honor but under 

the circumstances he suggested General Antonov preside and he hoped that 

he would accept. 

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if General Marshall had had an opportunity to become acquainted with the answers to the five questions General 

Marshall had given him at the meeting on 24 July (See Annex to these minutes). He said that Generalissimo Stalin had handed the written answers to 

President Truman yesterday at eleven o’clock a.m. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was sorry that he had not seen the 

answers which had been prepared by General Antonov. 

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the first question as 

follows:-

The Soviet Command agrees to establish in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk radio stations for transmitting weather data in accordance with the 

request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 23 July 1945. 

The Soviet Command is ready to accept and use the radio stations and 

equipment proposed in that letter for the above purpose. 

As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the stations, 

we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a great deal 

of experience in working with American radio stations. 

In addition to these two stations we shall increase the network of local 

stations in order to give better information on weather. 

When the reading of the answer to the first question was completed, 

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if he should proceed to read the answers to the 

remaining questions. GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the United States 

Chiefs of Staff would prefer to discuss the answer to each question as it was 

read. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were disappointed that American personnel was not acceptable for liaison purposes at 

the central weather stations, since they felt that it would increase the efficiency 

of the Russian effort as well as our own. He thought, therefore, that we should 

326 
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request reconsideration of this point. If American personnel were used, he said 

that it was the intention to have 18 officers and 42 enlisted men at Khabarovsk 

and 9 officers and 24 enlisted men at Petropavlovsk. He had a memorandum 

relating to the details of equipment and personnel which he thought the 

Russian High Command should have for use in connection with the reconsideration requested. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that Russian personnel had had experience 

in the use of the equipment and in the communication procedure in the vicinity of Sevastopol and Odessa as well as near Murmansk. The proposal to use 

Russian personnel had been made because it had been considered that the 

operation of these stations would then be more simple. However, if the United 

States Chiefs of Staff insisted on American personnel at these stations, there 

would be no objection to employing them. 

ADMIRAL KING then gave General Antonov the memorandum he had 

previously mentioned. 

GENERAL ANTONOV pointed out t.hat he had not received an answer 

as to whether the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on the use of American 

personnel. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would 

prefer to use American personnel and pointed out that the major service 

rendered by this personnel would be to US. naval forces and to the strategic 

air forces. Fbr this reason he thought that American personnel would be more 

satisfactory. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the first question could then be considered solved and American liaison personnel would be employed at the stations under discussion. 

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the second question as 

follows:-

Separate zones of naval and air operations are to be set up for the 

United States and the U.S.S.R. in the Sea of Japan. The boundary between 

these zones will be along the lines connecting Cape Boltina on the coast of 

Korea to point 40" north 135" east to point 45" 45' north 140" east thence 

along the parallel 45" 45' north to the line connecting Cape Crillon (Kondo) 

(on the southern tip of southern Sakhalin) with Cape Soya Missaki (Soyasaki) (on the northern tip of Hokkaido) . 

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The U.S.S.R. naval and air forces will operate north of this line. United 

States naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This line 

shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine craft 

and for aviation. 

Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line may 

be subject to change. 

United States naval and air operations north of this boundary line 

and Soviet naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be 

subject to coordination. 

In the Sea of Okhotsk there shall be a zone of mutual operations for 

the naval and air forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Operations in the Okhotsk Sea will take place in accordance with mutual 

agreements. 

In the Bering Sea there shall be a zone of mutual operations of OUT 

Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation bounded 

on the north, east and south by a line going from Cape Dezhnev to Diomede 

Island and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the 

U.S.S.R. and the United States to parallel 51" 30' north and thence through 

50" 35' north 157" east; thence to 49" 50' north 156" 20' east and thence 

along the parallel 49" 50' north to the Fourth Kurile Strait. 

The remainder of the Bering Sea as well as bordering regions of the 

Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the United States Fleet. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the line of demarcation for sea and air 

operations in the Sea of Japan was acceptable. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he desired to confirm the proposed conditions 

in the Sea of Okhotsk. He said he understood that this sea would be free for 

operations of both the United States Navy and the Navy of the Soviet Union 

and that coordination would be arranged through mutual understanding and 

cooperation. He asked also if the area to the north of the red line shown on 

the chart prepared by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, and described in the answer 

to the second question, was subject to joint control by the United States and 

the Soviet Navies, in the same manner as in the Sea of Okhotsk. 

Admiral King's understanding was confirmed by Admiral Kuznetsov. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with this understanding, the proposals 

by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable. 

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GENERAL ANTONOV repeated that the areas as set forth in answer 

to the second question were for both sea and air operations, and there was 

agreement on this answer. 

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the third question as 

follows:-

The boundary line between operational zones of the United States 

and Soviet air forces in Korea and Manchuria shall be as follows: Cape 

Boltina, Changchun, Liaoyuan, Kailu, Chihfeng, Peking, Tatung and thence 

along the southern boundary of Inner Mongolia. 

United States aviation will operate south of this line including all 

the above-named points. U.S.S.R. aviation will operate north of this line. 

Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. United 

States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of 

this line must be coordinated. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said he would like to call attention to the fact 

that the boundary line as proposed by the Russian Chiefs of Staff would deprive 

the United States air forces of certain railroad centers and lines of communication north of the line as targets unless each individual mission were arranged 

for separately. He asked if the United States air forces could send missions 

north of the boundary line within 24 hours after application had been made to 

the local Russian authorities. He thought that if his understanding as to local 

coordination was correct, the desired operations of the United States air forces 

could be worked out satisfactorily. He called the attention of the Russian 

Chiefs of Staff to the range of the heavy bombers, medium bombers, and light 

bombers, as indicated on a map which he presented, and pointed out where 

the United States bombing effort could be made effective to the north of the 

boundary line. 

AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the boundary line suggested by 

the Russian Chiefs of Staff was to the northward of the principal railroad 

junctions. These junctions would therefore be available to attack by the United 

States air forces. If it became necessary to attack targets to the north of the 

line, reliable communications would permit arrangements to be made within 

24 hours. Since, however, the communication might not always be reliable, 

this question might involve some difficulties. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with the understanding that if the 

means of communication for coordinating attacks north of the boundary line 

were too slow, the question of its position would be discussed again, the 

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proposals made by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable. However, he 

said, there was an additional matter he would like to raise in regard to both the 

second and third questions previously discussed. This concerned the fight of 

individual reconnaissance aircraft, and he asked that the Russian Chiefs of 

Staff comment on this point. 

AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that it was considered that as a 

general rule, the boundary proposed should apply to reconnaissance aircraft 

as well as to bombing flights. When necessary to fly reconnaissance airoraft 

beyond the boundary line, the flight should be coordinated through the liaison 

officers. 

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the fourth question as 

follows:-

The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with military operations 

of the Soviet Union against Japan, to establish liaison groups between the 

American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish this 

liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet liaison groups with General 

MacArthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition, in Washington, to have a 

Soviet Military Mission. 

American liaison groups will be located with the Soviet High Commander in the Far East, Marshal Vassilievski, in Khabarovsk; and with the 

commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yemashev, in Vladivostok. 

The Soviet Command is ready to accept the radio-teletype equipment 

for installation at the indicated points. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposal of the Russian Chiefs of 

Staff appeared entirely acceptable, but he wished to ask if it was the intention 

that the liaison groups to be provided should make it possible for immediate 

coordination of operations. He asked if operations in the Sea of Okhotsk, for 

example, or in any other special area, would normally be referred to Washington and Moscow, or whether the necessary decisions would be made in the field 

with the minimum delay. 

GENERAL ANTONOV replied that Marshal Vassilievski is the commander in chief of all forces of the Soviet Union in t,he Far East. Marshal 

Vassilievski had authority to solve all questions of local coordination which 

were included in the tasks assigned him by the High Command of the Soviet 

Union. He said that similarly Admiral Yemashev is the commander in chief 

of all Russian naval forces in the Pacific. He said that these two officers would 

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be able to solve the questions of coordination of action within the limits of the 

questions and answers which were being discussed here. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the statement of General Antonov 

made the answer to the fourth question entirely acceptable. 

GENERAL ANTONOV then referred back to the third answer and asked 

if the question of liaison was tiow clear. 

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that his question had concerned the 

employment of reconnaissance aircraft and that he considered the question of 

liaison as provided for in the fourth answer entirely satisfactory. He said, 

moreover, that as the operations proceeded he hoped that there would develop 

such an intimacy in liaison that we would find later that the commanders in 

the field would develop an even greater intimacy. This would of course depeqd 

on them. 

GENERAL ANTONOV read the answer to the fifth question as follows:-

The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and airfields for ships and 

planes in need of repairs and to make available, as far as possible, repair 

facilities and medical assistance to the personnel of the above-mentioned 

ships and planes. 

For this purpose we can designate:­

a. Naval ports: 

In the Japanese Sea, Port Nahodka (America Strait); in the 

Okhotsk and Bearing Sea regions-Nikolaevsk, on the Amur, and 

Petropavlovsk, on Kamchatka. 

b. Airfields: 

In the region of Vladivostok, in the region of Alexandrovsk on 

Sakhalin Island and in the region of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposals of the Russian Chiefs 

of Staff were entirely acceptable. 

GENERAL ARNOLD asked if the matter of identification of aircraft 

at the Russian airbases which would be available to United States aircraft 

would be handled as a local matter. He said that sometimes a plane was so 

331 
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disabled that it was necessary to come into a landing Aeld from any direction, 

identifying itself by radio signal only. 

AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the names of melds, methods of 

approach, corridors and other details would be furnished and that the requirements of the aircraft and personnel upon landing would be provided. He said 

that a disabled aircraft, after making a certain signal, could land from any 

direction without other formality. Aircraft crews should be instructed, however, not to fly over such ports as Vladivostok, because of the danger of being 

fired upon by anti-aircraft batteries. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that his inquiry was in regard to 

whether arrangements of this nature would be made locally, to which Air 

Marshal Fallalev replied that the principle was being established here, and 

that the details would be determined on the spot by the commanders in the 

fleld. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he now considered that the five questions given himby General Marshall on 24 July had been answered. He wished, 

however, to make an additional statement in regard to them. He said that he 

considered that all of the arrangements provided for under the five questions 

would come into being on the entry of Russia into the war against Japan. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked if it would be possible to get the communication equipment discussed in the first question into Siberia before that 

date, or if it would be necessary to wait until after Russia had entered the war. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that preliminary arrangements for the 

liaison wireless stations could be made beforehand, and that agreements could 

be reached with reference to each particular question raised. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the meeting on 24 July, Admiral 

King had pointed out that after the seizure of Kyushu communications might 

be opened from Kyushu to Vladivostok. This line of communications was very 

important, since the Straits of Tsushima could be used throughout the year, 

whereas the route through the Kuriles and through La Perousse Strait was 

closed during part of the year by ice. He asked General Marshall when the 

invasion of Kyushu would take place and when the opening of the sea route 

from the south could be expected. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the occupation of Kyushu depended 

on three factors. The first was the movement of troops from Europe. This was 

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being done as rapidly as possible, and engineering troops were being moved 

first in order to prepare the way for the full application of air power. The movement involved two oceans and one continent, and although we could not be 

certain of carrying out the entire movement on schedule, and were now somewhat behind on both personnel and cargo, he hoped that all difficulties would 

be overcome. The second factor was the movement of large amounts of supplies from the Solomons, New Guinea, and Halmahera, north to the Philippines and Okinawa, to be loaded on assault ships for the tremendous amphibious effort against Kyushu. The third factor was the recent withdrawal of our 

divisions engaged in the Philippines and Okinawa from heavy fighting, and 

the problem of rehabilitation and training for the next operation. 

Finally, he said, the weather conditions in the area made landings in 

September and early October too hazardous to undertake, although this was 

not a controlling factor as to date. At the present time he expected the landing on Kyushu to take place the last part of October. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said further that the assault on Japan by naval 

and air forces which would extend also to Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula 

would be continued and increased. By these means he anticipated that by 

the time of the landing on Kyushu we will have destroyed Japanese oil, other 

material production, and communications, and will have virtually destroyed 

the Japanese air force. He said that Admiral King has added that the Japanese Navy would be destroyed as well. He said that all plans for the operation 

against Kyushu were complete, shippingwas being assembled, the construction 

of bases was proceeding at top speed, and the operations of the United States 

Fleet and all air forces would proceed with increased vigor from now on. He 

thought, however, that the Tsushima Strait could not be opened before the 

end of October. The difficulties of opening Tsushima Strait would involve 

the sweeping of the passage for mines. The most serious threat to these operations would be from Japanese suicide planes which had caused us so much 

difficulty in previous operations. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be much pleased if the route 

to Vladivostok via Tsushima Strait could be opened in October since by that 

time communications through the Kuriles and La Perousse Strait would be 

closed by ice. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood and appreciated the 

urgent necessity to the Russian Chiefs of Staff of opening the southern route 

and said that we would do all in our power to clear the straits as early as 

possible. General Marshall said that Admiral King had pointed out that the 

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operationsto open Tsushima Strait could not take place until after the landing 

in Kyushu and until after our air forces were established in northwestern 

Kyushu. It would be necessary, of course, for our minesweepers to have adequate air cover during their operations in clearing the straits of mines. The 

time required to establish the necessary airfields would depend to a large degree 

on Japanese resistance in Kyushu and the straits might not be opened until the 

middle of December or about six weeks after the first landing on Kyushu. He 

pointed out that we would make every effort to expedite the operation for the 

benefit of our forces as well as for the benefit to the Russians. He wanted to 

make this point clear since he desired to avoid any misunderstanding as to our 

capabilities in clearing Tsushima Strait for traffic to Vladivostok. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then read a memorandum which he said related to this discussion and which gave the progress, from partial reports, 

covering the last ten days of naval and air action against Japan. 

GENERAL ANTONOV expressed his appreciation for the information 

contained in the memorandum read by General Marshall. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were 

prepared to furnish to the Russian Chiefs of Staff, until operations against 

Japan were commenced by the Soviet Union, a weekly report of operations 

similar to that contained in the memorandum, through General Deane or his 

naval associate. Thereafter, reports of such operations would be furnished 

through the commanders in the field. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be glad to receive this information and asked if there were any other questions to be considered at this 

meeting. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that directions had been given to furnish 

the Russian Chiefs of Staff with copies of the minutes of this meeting in order 

to provide a means of determining if there was a mutual understanding of the 

conversations which had taken place. In the absence of comment by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, it would be assumed that the record was a correct basis 

for understanding and guidance. 

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would examine the minutes and if 

he had any comment he would inform the United States Chiefs of Staff thereof. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was planned that he, Admiral King 

and General Arnold would leave for the United States tomorrow. Admiral 

Leahy would remain until the conference was completed. He said that the 

principal assistants of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Cooke, General Hull and 

General Norstad would remain at the conference to handle any matters that 

might arise. He said that if he, Admiral King and General Arnold leave tomorrow as planned, he desired to take this occasion to express for the United 

States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the opportunity afforded to discuss 

these important matters with the Russian Chiefs of Staff. He was gratified 

that they had been able to reach decisions so satisfactory to all. 

GENERAL ANTONOV also expressed his pleasure and satisfaction over 

the results of the conference and said that he hoped that his close contact with 

General Marshall would be continued in the future so that all questions that 

might arise might be settled promptly. He then gave General Marshall a map 

showing the areas which had been considered in the discussion. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he regretted that through a misunderstanding the United States Chiefs of Staff had not received the answers to the 

five questions and were, therefore, not well prepared for the afternoon’s discussion. He thanked General Antonov for his patience in reading the answers 

which he had presented. 

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ANNEX 

First Question -Has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish United States weather liaison groups 

in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk as presented to Generalissimo Stalin by 

President Truman on 23 July 1945? 

Second Question -United States naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. United States submarine 

forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan, south 

and east of a line established by connecting the following points: Coast of 

Korea at latitude 38" north, thence to latitude 40"north longitude 135" east, 

thence to latitude 45"45' north longitude 140" east, thence along the parallel 

of latitude 45"45' north. This boundary will be subject to later change as 

the situation may require. United States submarine operations north and 

west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary 

will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of naval operations? 

Third Question -United States air forces will operate without restriction south and east of the following line: Cape Lopatka, west to point at 

latitude 51"lO' north longitude 147" east, thence to point at latitude 

45"45'north longitude 144" 20' east, thence to point at latitude 45"45' north 

longitude 139"30' east, thence to point at latitude 41"20' north longitude 

133"20' east, thence westward to Seishin, Korea, thence north to railroad at 

Korean border, thence westward along railroad to Yungki and Changchun, 

thence along the river to Liaoyuan, Kailu and Chihfeng, thence along the 

railroad through Tolun, Paochang, Wanchuan, Tatung, Fengchan, Tsining 

to Kweisui, thence northwest to the border of Outer Mongolia. This boundary 

will be subject to later change as the situation may require. United States 

air operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south 

and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet 

General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air 

operations? 

Fourth Question-Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison 

as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 

July 1945? 

Annex 

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FifthQuestion -It is assumed that, after D-day, Soviet or United States 

air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or 

United States ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, 

it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where 

maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government designate 

such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition 

signals, corridors of approach and exit for general use in any emergency, landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared to take corresponding 

action in the case of Soviet aircraft. 

Annex 

337 

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INDEX 

A 

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS 

Control of the Admiralty Islands, 153, 

157 

AGENDA FOR "TERMINAL" 

CONFERENCE 

102, 105, 107, 109, 111 

Program and procedure for the conference, 124, 127, 270 

AIR OPERATIONS 

Admiral Mountbatten's statements regarding air transport operations in 

the Southeast Asia Command, 304 

Boundary line between operational 

zones of the US.and Soviet air forces 

in Korea and Manchuria, 329 

Concentration of Japanese industrial 

targets. 207 

Efforts to sever the Japanese line of 

communications between Japan proper and Manchuria, 316 

Establishment of liaison groups between 

the American and Soviet commanders 

in the Far East for coordination of 

air operations. 330 

General Arnold's statements regarding 

Army air operations against Japan and her lines of communication in 

Manchuria, 318 

Over-all strategic concept for the prose­ cution of the war, 249 

Planned deployment for tactical and 

strategic air operations against the 

JaDanese mainland. 215 

Rate- of Hump tonnage delivery to 

China, 192 

Report on Army air operations in the 

war against Japan, 206 

Sir Charles Portal's statement regarding strength of the Japanese air 

forces in Southeast Asia, 322 

Tactical air operations in the war 

against Japan, 211 

?I.%and U.S.S.R. Zoncs of naval and air 

operations in the Sea of Japan, 327 

U.S.concept of strategy and operations for the main effort in the Pacific, 118 

AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND 

Rate of Hump tonnage delivery to 

China, 192 

AIRBASES (See Bases) 

AIRCRAFT 

Aircraft production in Japan, 22, 29 

AIRFIELDS (See Bases) 

AIR LIFT 

U.S. action to augment trooplift situation in redeployment of forces from 

Europe to the Pacific, 46 

ALEXANDROVSK, SIBERIA 

Selection of ports and airflelds for 

emergency purposes, 331 

ALLIED COMMISSION IN ITALY 

Appointment of Colonel Douglas to the 

Allied Commission in Italy, 288 

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, 

MEDITERRANEAN 

Arrangements for restricting the activities of Allied Force Headquarters,

Mediterranean, 77, 79 

ANDAMAN ISLANDS 

Japanese situation, capabilities and intentions in the southern areas, 38 

ANTONOV, ARMY GENERAL 

Statements with reference to: 

Adjournment of conference, 335 

Boundary line between operational 

zones of the US. and Soviet air 

forces in Korea and Manchuria, 329 

Liaison groups between the American 

and Soviet commanders in the Far 

East, 330 

Line of communications from Kyushu 

to Vladivostok, 332 

Note: Italic numerals reler to pages in minutes of meetlng. 

Phln type numerals:refer to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

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INDEX 

ANTONOV, ARMY GENERAL (Cont’dJ 

Operations against the Kuriles and 

Korea, 320 

Operations to control La Perousse 

Strait, 322 

Radio stations in Petropavlovsk

and Khabarovsk for transmitting

weather data, 326 

Russian intentions and plans for the 

war against Japan, 314 

Selection of emergency ports and airfields. 331 

Strength of the Japanese force ill 

Manchuria and on the Russian 

front, 314 

US. and U.S.S.R. zones for naval and 

air operations in the Sea of Japan, 

327 

Weekly report of operations for the 

Russian Chiefs of Staff, 334 

ARNOLD, GENERAL H. H. 

Statements with reference to: 

Army air operations against Japan and her lines of communication in 

Manchuria, 318 

Boundary line between operational 

zones of the US. and Soviet air 

forces in Korea and Manchuria, 329 

Estimate on the strength of the Japanese air force, 319 

Possibility of including a British tactical air force in operations against

Japan prover, 276 

Seleition of emergency ports and airfields, 332 

ASIA, SOUTHEAST (See Southeast Asia) 

ATLANTIC 

Employment of British passenger liners 

in the North Atlantic, 50 

AUSTRALIA 

Australian participation in operations 

on Borneo, 185 

CCS discussion regarding employment

of Australian forces in the operation

against Japan, 277 

CCS note that British Chiefs of Staff 

will obtain agreement of Australian, 

New Zealand and Dutch Governments 

to proposed reallocation of areas and 

command set-up in Southwest Paciffc 

and SEAC, 293 

Control and command in the war 

against Japan, 148, 153, 151,282 

General MacArthur’s comments regarding British participation in the assault against Japan proper, 141 

AUSTRIA 

Assignment of enemy war materiel in 

Germany and Austria, 56, 64, 293 

B 

B-29 

Effectiveness of B-29 operations in the 

war against Japan, 210 

BALIKPAPAN (See Borneo) 

BANDA SEA 

Japanese situation, capabilities and intentions in the southern areas, 38 

BASES 

Construction of airbases in Cocos 

Islands, 112 

Construction of airfields in SEAC, 113 

Planned deployment of tactical and 

strategic air operations against the 

Javanese mainland. 215 

Seleition of emergency ports and airfields, 331 

Theater commander’s decision with regard to strategic course of action in 

the China Theater, 191 

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS 

Statement of basic undertakings and 

policies for the prosecution of the 

war, 82, 249, 310 

Note: Itallc numerails refer to paws in mlnutes of meeting. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.8. Papers. 

340 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

BERING SEA 

Bering Sea shall be a zone of mutual 

operations of the US.and Soviet Navy

and air units, 328 

Selection of emergency ports and airfields in the Bering Sea area, 331 

BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 

Allied operations against by-passed 

enemy garrisons, 185 

General Marshall's statement regarding

Japanese garrisons in the Pacific 

islands, 315 

Japanese situation in the Bismarcks, 

16, 40 

BLOCKADE 

Efforts to sever the Japanese line of 

communications between Japan prop­ er and the China Coast. 315 

Over-all strategic concept'for the prosecution of the war, 249 

US.concept of strategy and operations

for the main effort in the Pacific, 118 

BONIN ISLANDS 

Japanese situation in the Bonins, 40 

Report on air operations from Okinawa 

and Iwo Jima bases. 184 

Report on operations for the capture of 

Iwo Jim&and Okinawa, 183 

US.concept of strategy and operations

for the main effort in the Pacific, 118, 

251, 256 

BORNEO 

Genrral Marihall's statrmenl recarding

isolarrd Japanese garrisons in the 

Paciflc islands. 315 

Japanese situation, capabilities and intentions in the southern areas, 17, 38 

Report on operations in Borneo, 185 

Target date for the seizure of Balikpapan, 119 

US.concept of strategy and operations

for the main effort in the Pacific, 118, 

256 

BOUGAINVILLE 

General Marshall's statement regarding

isolated Japanese garrisons in the 

Pacific islands, 315 

BOUNDARIES 

Boundary line between operational zones of the US.and Soviet air forces 

in Korea and Manchuria, 329 

CCS agreement on change in command 

in the Southwest Pacific area, 282 

CCS note that British Chiefs of Staff 

will obtain agreement of Australian, 

New Zealand and Dutch Governments 

to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest 

Pacific and SEAC, 293 

command arrangements in Indo-China, 

160, 301 

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 176, 252, 258, 

292 

Reallucation of arras and command in 

the Snutliu'est Pacific and Suutheast 

Asia areas, 252,281 

US. and U.S.S.R. zones of naval and air 

operations in the Sea of Japan, 327 

BROOKE, FIELD MARSHAL SIR ALAN 

Statements with reference to: 

Allocation of seven captured German 

passenger ships for U.S. employment in the Pacific, 300 

British land forces for operation

CORONET.274 

British participation in the war against Japan, 274 

Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery

after the war with Jaoan. .. 286

Date of transfer of command in the 

Southwest Pacific, 281 

Employment of the New Zealand division in Southeast Asia, 277 

Operations in Southeast Asia and 

plans for participating in the operations against Japan proper, 322 

policy for imparting information to 

the Russians concerning the Japa­ nese war, 287 

Shipping and assault craft, a limiting

factor in amphibious operations

arrainst Sumatra and Java. 276 

Strategic direction in the war against

Japan, 283 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pager In minutes of meetlng. 

Plaln type numerals refer te pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

341 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

BROOKE, FIELD MARSHAL SIR ALAN 

(Cont‘dl 

Survival of the institution of the Em­ neror. 270 

U.S. equipping of forces of occupation

other than American, 310 

BRUNEI BAY (See Borneo) 

BURMA 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statement re­ garding enemy strength inBurma, 304 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statements re­ garding operations in the Southeast 

Asia Command, 304 

British contribution to the final phase

of the war against Japan, 131 

Construction of airfields in SEAC. 111 

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 176, 252, 258, 

292 ..-

Enemy capabilities in Southeast Asia, 

16% 172 

Japanese situation, capabilities and intentions in the southern areas. 16, 38 

Progress report on operations in the 

Southeast Asia Command, 169 

Rate of Hump tonnage delivery to 

China, 192 

Rehabilitation of oil fields in Burma. 173 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding

operations in Southeast Asia and 

plans for participating in the operations against Japan proper, 322 

Transportation facilities in Burma, 113 

C 

CANADA 

Allocation of US.trooplift for the repatriation of 16,000 Canadians during 

1945, 254, 300 

Arrangements for one Canadian division to operate as part of a US.corps, 

139, 141, 275 

General MacArthur’s comments regarding British participation in the assault against Japan proper, 141 

CANTON 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

Japanese establishing fortress garri­ sons for defense of strategic points in 

China, 316 

CANTON-HONG KONG AREA 

Securing a major port on the China 

Coast, 194 

Theater commander’s decision with re­ gard to strategic course of action in 

the China Theater, 197 

CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT 

Assignment of enemy war materiel in 

Germany and Austria, 56, 64, 293 

CAPTURED ENEMY SHIPPING 

Use of captured German passenger ships

for movement of US. troops in the 

Pacific, 46, 51, 53, 254, 300 

CARIBIA, MS 

Employment in the Pacific, 46,254,300 

CAROLINE ISLANDS 

Report on air operations from Okinawa 

and Iwo Jima bases, 184 

CASUALTIES 

Air casualties in the Philippine cam­ paign, 214 

CELEBES ISLAND 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

isolated Japanese garrisons in the 

Pacific islands, 315 

Japanese situation, capabilities, and intentions in the southern areas, 38 

CHINA 

Basic undertakings and policies for the 

prosecution of the war, 249, 310 

General Marshall’s statements regarding: 

Effectiveness of Chinese troops, 271 

Note: Italle numerals refer to pages In minutes of meetlng. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. Papers. 

342 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

CHINA fcont‘dl 

Effectiveness of Chinese troops and 

their planned operations against

the Dort of Fort Bavard, 320 

Estimated strength if the Japanese

forces, 315 

Movement of Japanese reinforcements 

from China to Manchuria, 316, 319 

Movement of supplies to China, 320 

Japanese foreign policy in China, 18, 41 

Japanese military situation, capabilities,

and intentions in China, 15, 36 

Progress report on operations in China,

April 1944 through June 1945, 192 

Rate of Hump tonnage delivery to 

china, 192 

Relative strengths of Japanese and 

Chinese trooDs in China. 194 

Theater commander’s decision with regard to strategic course of action in 

the China Theater, 197 

Theater commander’s estimate of: 

Enemy capabilities in China, 195 

Enemy situation in China, 193 

Training and equipping Chinese forces, 

193 

COCOS ISLANDS 

Construction of airbase in the COCOS 

Islands, 171, 172 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Continuation of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff machinery after the war with 

Japan, 162, 165, 286 

COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT 

BOARD 

Provision of personnel shipping for the 

requirements of Allied governments,

236, 243, 254, 301 

COMMAND 

Admiral King’s statement regarding relationship between US. and U.K.in 

the strategic direction of the war, 312 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statement regarding assumption of the new command in the Southwest Pacific, 305 

CCS agree to recommend that the President and Prime Minister approach

the Generalissimo to secure his agreement to the division of Indo-China 

between the China Theater and 

SEAC, 160, 301 

CCS agreement on change in command 

in the Southwest Pacific Area, 282 

CCS agreement on control and command in the war against Japan, 283 

Command arrangements in Indo-China, 

160, 301 

Dissolution of the U.S.Seventh Fleet, 301 

General MacArthur’s comments regarding British participation in the assault against Japan proper, 141 

Reallocation of areas and command in 

the Southwest Pacific and Southeast 

Asia areas, 252. 280 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding

date of transfer of command in the 

Southwest Pacific, 281 

Strategic direction in the war against

Japan, 151, 153, 158, 250, 280, 282 

The Prime Minister’s statement regarding strategic direction of the war, 312 

”CORONET” 

British contribution to the final phase

of the war against Japan, 136, 139,141, 

251, 274 

CUNNINGHAM, ADMIRAL OF THE 

FLEET SIR ANDREW B. 

Statements with reference to: 

Division of Indo-China along the latitude of 15 degrees north, 280 

Equipping of forces of occupation other than American, 310 

Paucity of submarine targets in 

SEAC, 305 

Remnants of the Japanese Fleet in 

Southeast Asia, 322 

Strategic direction in the war against

Japan, 282 

D 

DANUBE RIVER 

Internationalization of the Danube 

River, 228, 233 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

DECEPTION 

General Marshall's statement regarding effect of deception measures to 

cause Japanese concentration in the 

Kuriles, 315 

DECISIONS 

WIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS 

Future of Allied Force Headquarters,

Mediterranean, 11, I9 

BRITISH PARTICIPATION 

CCS agreed in principle on the participation of a British Commonwealth 

land force in the flnal phase of the war against Japan, 277 

CCS agreed that British commanders 

and staff shall visit General MacArthur and Adm. Nimitz and draw up 

a plan for submission to the CCS, 277 

CCS took note that possibility of establishing a small British tactical air 

force in support of the proposed Commonwealth land force would be 

studied, 278 

CAPTURED EQUIPMENT 

CCS approve arrangements for the disposal of enemy war materiel in Germany and Austria, 293 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CCS took note of British and U.S. 

memoranda regarding CCS machinery after the war with Japan, 287 

COMMAND 

CCS agree to recommend that the President and Prime Minister approach

the Generalissimo to secure his agreement to the division of Indo-China 

between the China Theater and SEAC, 

160. 301 

CCS agreement on control and com­ mand in the war against Japan, 283 

Control of Allied naval units other than 

US. at present under command of 

Seventh US.Fleet, 301 

DANUBE RIVER 

Internationalization of the Danube 

River, 228, 233 

FRENCH AND DUTCH PARTICIPATION 

CCS approved memorandum to the 

French and Netherlands representatives to the CCS regarding their participation in the war against Japan,

280 

CCS approved a reply to the Chief of 

the French Military Mission in the 

US. regarding the participation of 

two French colonial infantry divisions 

in Far Eastern operations, 286 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

CCS took note of a US.memorandum on the development of operations in 

the Pacific, 271 

PORTUGUESE PARTICIPATION 

CCS approve letter to Department of 

State and Foreign Omce with regard

to Portuguese participation in operations against Timor, 280 

REPORTS 

CCS took note of C.I.C. report on the es­ timate of the enemy sltuation, 270 

CCS took note of progress reports on operations in the Pacific and Southeast 

Asia Command, 271 

CCS took note of report on Army air 

operations in the war against Japan,

271 

Report to the President and Prime Minister, 301, 308 

SHIPPING 

CCS anurove nrocedure for allocation 

CCS decision regarding employment of 

captured enemy ocean-going passenger shipping and British troopship

employment in US. trans-Atlantic 

programs during first half of 1946, 300 

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND 

CCS agreement on change in command 

in the Southwest Pacific Area, 282 

CCS approve the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast 

Asia, 293 

CCS note that British Chiefs of Staff 

will obtain agreement of Australian, 

New Zealand and Dutch Governments 

to the proposed reallocation of areas and command setup in Southwest Paciflc Area, 282 

Note: Italic numerah refer to Pages' In minuter 01 mcctlng. 

Phtn type numerals reler to pages In C.C.S. Pa~ers. 

344 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

DECISIONS fcont’dl 

SURRENDER 

Agreed planning date for the end of 

organized resistance by Japan, 288 

CCS invite the British Chiefs of Staffto 

seek the opinion of the Prime Minister 

in the matter of unconditional sur­ render of Japan, 270 

“TERMINAL” CONFERENCE 

CCS approve the program and proced­ ure for the conference, 270 

U.S.S.R. 

Boundarv line between oDerational zones of the US. and Soviet‘air forces 

in Korea and Manchuria, 329 

CCS decision regarding information for 

the Russians concerning the Japanese war. 288 

Estabiishing radio stations in Petropdvlovsk and Khabarovsk for transmitting weather data, 326 

Establishment of liaison groups between 

the American and Soviet commanders 

in the Far East, 330 

Selection of ports and airfields for ships

and planes for emergency purposes, 

331 

Separate zones of naval and air operations to be set up for the U.S. and 

U.S.S.R. in the Sea of Japan, 327 

DOMINIONS 

British forces available for the invasion 

of Japan, 137, 251 

DOUGLAS, COLONEL J. H. 

Appointment of Colonel Douglas to the 

Allied Commission in Italy, 288 

E 

ELECTRONICS (See Production) 

EQUIPPING OF FORCES 

Basic undertakings and policies for the 

prosecution of the war, 249,309 

The Prime Minister’s statement regarding need for US. assistance in equipping British forces, 309 

Use of lend-lease for equipping occupational and post-war armies, 95 

EUROPA, SS 

Employment of captured German passenger ships in the PacifIc, 46,254,300 

F 

FALLALEV, MARSHAL OF AVIATION 

Statements with reference to: 

Boundary line between operational zones of the US. and Soviet air 

forces in Korea and Manchuria, 329 

Selection of ports and airfields for 

emergency docking and landing 

purposes, 332 

FAR EAST 

Establishment of liaison groups between 

the American and Soviet commanders 

in the Far East, 330 

General Antonov’s statement regarding

Russian intentions and plans for the war against Japan, 314 

Policy regarding French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan,

73, 252,280 

FAR EAST AIR FORCES 

Tactical air operations in the war against Japan, 211 

FOOD SUPPLY 

Economic situation in Japan, 13, 24 

FORCES, ALLIED 

Admiral King’s statement regarding

employment of Australian forces in 

the operation against Japan, 277 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statement re­ garding employment of two French 

divisions in Indo-China, 306 

Disposition of Allied forces in Southeast 

Asia. 110 

Equipping and employment of two 

French colonial infantry divisions in 

Far Eastern operations, 218. 223. 225. 

253, 286 

Note: Italle numerals refer to pages in minutes of meetlng. 

Phin type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. Paperr. 

345 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

FORCES, ALLIED /cant'& 

General MacArthur's comments regarding British participation in the assault against Japan proper, 141 

General Marshall's statement regarding employment of two French divisions for operations in the war 

against Jaoan. 306 

Participation of a British Commonwealth force in the final phase of the 

war against Japan, 137, 251, 277 

Relative strengths of Japanese and 

Chinese troons in China. 195 

Sir Alan Brooie's statement regarding

the British land forces for operation

CORONET, 274 

Size of Portuguese forces acceptable for 

training and operations in Timor, 5 

FORCES, ENEMY 

Admiral Cunningham's statement regarding remnants of the Japanese

Fleet in Southeast Asia, 322 

Admiral Mountbatten's statement regarding enemy strength in Burma, 304 

Capabilities of the Japanese air forces, 

30, 39 

Capabilities of the Japanese Navy, 12,31 

Effectiveness of the Japanese air forces, 

210 

Enemy capabilities in Southeast Asia, 

169, 172 

General Antonov's statement regarding

strength of the Japanese forces in 

Manchuria and on the Russian front, 

314 

General Arnold's statement regarding

estimate of the strength of the Japanese air force, 319 

General Marshall's statement regarding

the estimated strength of the Japanese forces, 315 

Map showing disposition of the Japanese ground forces, 32 

Strength of the Japanese ArmedForces: 

Air, 14, 28 

Ground, 14, 21, 33 

National Volunteer Army, 28 

Naval, 15, 30 

FORCES, NAVAL 

Admiral King's statement regarding

naval operations against Japan and 

the development of bases in the Pacific, 317 

FORMOSA 

General Marshall's statement regarding

the estimated strength of the Japanese forces, 315 

Japanese military situation, capabilities

and intentions in, 15, 31 

FORT BAYARD 

General Marshall's statement regarding

effectiveness of Chinese troops and 

their planned operations against the 

port of Fort Bayard, 320 

Securing a major port on the China 

Coast, 194 

Theater commander's decision with regard to his strategic course of action 

in the China Theater, 197 

FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE 

Progress report on operations in China, 

April 1944 through June 1945, 192 

FRANCE 

Admiral Mountbatten's statement regarding employment of two French 

divisions in Indo-China, 306 

Equipping and employment of two 

French colonial infantry divisions in 

Far Eastern operations, 218, 223, 225, 

253.286 

""" 

Policy regarding French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan,

73, 252, 280 

G 

GERMANY 

Assignment of enemy war materiel in 

Germany and Austria, 56, 64, 293 

Use of captured German passenger ships for movement of US.troops in 

the Pacilic, 46, 52, 53, 254, 300 

GUAM 

Admiral King's statement regarding

naval operations against Japan and 

the development of bases in the Pacific, 317 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages In mutes of meeting. 

p~pintype nnmera~1mrer to pages in c.c.8. ~apea. 

346 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

H 

HALMAHERA 

Japanese situation, capabilities and intentions in the southern areas, 16, 38 

HONG KONG 

British contribution to the 5nal phase

of the war against Japan, 136,139,141,

178, 250, 274 

General Marshall’s statement regarding Japanese establishing fortress garrisons for defense of strategic points in China, 326 

HONSHU 

(See also Japan) 

Report on air operations from Okinawa 

and Iwo Jima bases, 184 

US. concept of strategy and operations for the main effort in the Paciflc, 118. 

250, 256 

HULL, LT. GEN. J. E. 

Statements with reference to: 

Inclusion of an Australian force in 

the operations against Japan, 276 

List of the supporting and service 

units required by the two French 

divisions to be employed in the Far 

East, 306 

I 

INDIA 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statements regarding operations in the Southeast 

Asia Command, 304 

British forces available tor the invasion 

of Jauan. .I 137

INDO-CHINA 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statement regarding employment of two French 

divisions in Indo-China, 306 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statement regarding division of French IndoChina. 306 

CCS agree to recommend that the President and Prime Minister approach the Generalissimoto secure his agreement to the division of Indo-China 

between the China Theater and SEAC, 

160, 301 

CCS agreement on change in command 

in the Southwest Paciflc Area, 282 

Command arrangements in Indo-China,

160, 301 

Equipping and employment of two 

French colonial infantry divisions in 

Far Eastern operations, 218, 223, 225, 

253, 286 

General Marshall’s statement regarding dividine Indo-China between the 

China ?heater and SEAC, 280, 306--

Japanese situation, capabilities, and intentions in the southern areas, 16, 38 

INLAND SEA 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

US.submarine action to sever Japanese communications in the Sea of 

Japan: and B-29 mine-laying near 

Shimonoseki and Niigata, 316 

ITALY 

Appointment of Colonel Douglas to the 

Allied Commission in Italy, 288 

Arrangements for restricting the activities of Allied Force HeadquaPters, Mediterranean, 77, 79 

IWO JlMA (See Bonin Islands) 

J 

JAPAN 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statement regarding enemy strength in Burma, 304 

Aircraft Droduction in JaDan. 22. 29 

British contribution to tie flnal’phase

of the war against Japan, 136, 139, 

141, 250, 274 

British forces available for the invasion 

of Japan, 137, 251 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pl~nin Wnutes of meellln. 

Plain t,pe nllmeW rere* to pages in C.C.S. Paper*. 

347 
?id 

TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

JAPAN (Cont'dj 

CCS agreement on the participation of 

a British Commonwealth land force 

in the final phase of the war against

Japan, 277 

CCS invite the British Chiefs of Staff 

to seek the opinion of the Prime Minister in the matter of unconditional 

surrender of Japan, 270 

Capabilities of the Japanese Air Forces, 

30, 33 

Capabilities of the Japanese Navy, 12, 

31, 33 

Concentration of Japanese industrial 

targets, 207 

Economic situation in Japan, 20 

Effectiveness of Japanese air forces, 210 

Efforts to sever the Japanese line of 

communications between Japan prop­ er and the China Coast, 315 

Enemy capabilities in Southeast Asia, 

189~172 ---,

Estimate of the enemy situation (6July 

1945). 8. 12. 270 

Generai Ant0nov.s statement regarding

strength of the Japanese force in 

Manchuria and on the Russian front, 

"_- General Arnold's statement reeardine 

estimate of the strength of thz Japaz nese air force, 319 

General Marshall's statement regarding

the estimated strenath of the Jaua­ nese forces, 315 

Japanese foreign policy, 18. 41 

Japanese military situation in: 

Central and South China and Formosa, 15, 37 

Korea, Manchuria and North China, 

13. 36 

Paciflc islands, 16,40 

Southern areas, 16, 38 

Map showing disposition of the Japa­ nese ground forces, 32 

Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war, 249 

Planned deployment of tactical and 

strategic air operations against the 

Japanese mainland, 214 

Planning date for the end of organized

resistance by Japan, 122, 254, 288 

Political situation in Japan, 17, 41 

Possibility of Japanese surrender, 43 

Preparation of plans for occupation of 

Japan proper, 119 

Probable military strategy of Japan, 17 

Relative strengths of Japanese and 

Chinese troops in China, 195 

Report on Army air operations in the war against Japan, 206 

Sir Alan Brooke's statement regarding

survival of the institution of the Emperor, 270 

Strength of the Japanese armed forces: 

Air.I 14. ,~ 28

Ground, 27, 33 

National Volunteer Army, 28 

Naval, 15, 30 

Tactical air operations in the war aaainst Jauan. 211 

Target date-for the invasion of the 

Tokyo Plain, 119 

Theater commander's estimate of the enemv CaDabilities in China. 195 

US.concept of strategy and operations

for the main effort in the Pacific, 118, 

256 

JAPAN, SEA OF 

Discussion regarding selection of emer­ gency ports and airfields in the North 

Pacific, 331 

Discussion regarding separate US.-

U.S.S.R.zones of naval and air operations in the Sea of Japan, 327 

General Marshall's statement regarding

US.submarine action to sever Japa­ nese communications in the Sea of 

Japan, 316 

JAVA 

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander. Southeast Asia, 176, 252, 258, 

292 

General Marshall's statement reeardine 

isolated Japanese garrisons "in the 

Pacific islands, 315 

Japanese situation, capabilities, and intentions in the southern areas, 17, 38 

K 

KHABAROVSK, SIBERIA 

Establishing radio stations in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk for transmitting weather data, 326 

KlKAl JlMA (see Ryukyu Islands) 

348 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

KING, FLEET ADMIRAL E. J. 

Statements with refefence to: 

Combined study on shipping resources 

and reauirements. 300 

Division of Indo-China along the latitude 15 degrees north, 281 

Employment of Australian forces in 

the operation against Japan, 277 

Establishing radio stations in Siberia 

for transmitting weather data, 326 

Naval operations against Japan and 

the development of bases in the 

Pacific, 317 

Operations against the Kuriles and 

Korea, 320 

Operations to control La Perousse 

Strait, 321 

Policy for imparting information to 

the Russians concerning the Japanese war, 287 

Relationship between the US. and 

U.K.in the strategic direction of 

the war, 312 

Separate US-U.S.S.R. zones for naval 

and air operations in the Sea of 

Japan, 327 

KOREA 

Boundary line between operational 

zones of the US.and Soviet air forces 

in Korea and Manchuria, 329 

Japanese military situation, capabilities

and intentions in Korea, 15, 36 

Tripartite discussion regarding operations against the Kuriles and Korea, 

320 

KURILE ISLANDS 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

effect of deception measures to cause 

Japanese concentrations in the Kuriles. 315 

Line of communications from Kyushu 

to Vladivostok, 332 

Operations against the Kuriles and 

Korea. 320 

Report on operations in the North Pacific area, 184 

KUZNETSOV, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET 

Statement with regard to separate US.-

U.S.S.R. zones for naval and air operations in the Sea of Japan, 328 

KYUSHU (see also Japan) 

Line of communications from Kyushu 

to Vladivostok, 332 

Report on air operations from Okinawa 

and Iwo Jima bases, 184 

US.concept of strategy and operations

for the main effort in the Pacific, 118, 

250, 256 

L 

LABUAN ISLAND 

Report on operations in Borneo, 185 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding

shipping and assault craft, a limiting

factor in amphibious operations

against Sumatra and Java, 276 

LA PEROUSSE STRAIT 

Line of communications from Kyushu 

to Vladivostok, 332 

Operations to control La Perousse Strait, 

321 

LEAHY, FLEET ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. 

Statements with reference to: 

Equipping of forces of occupation

other than American, 310 

Explanation of differences of opinion

which exist regarding the agreed

“Basic Undertakings,” 308 

Views of the Prime Minister on explaining to the Japanese the term 

”unconditional surrender,” 270 

LEATHERS, LORD 

Statement with regard to inclusion of 

the United Kingdom import program in the agreed “Basic Undertakings,”

311 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pager In minutes of meeting. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages in C.C.S. Papers. 

349 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

LEND-LEASE 

The President’s statement regarding

furnishing supplies to the British 

troops, 309 

The Prime Minister’s statement regarding need for U.S. assistance in equipping British forces, 309 

Use of lend-lease for equipping occupational and post-war armies, 95 

LIAISON 

Establishment of liaison groups between 

the American and Soviet commanders 

in the Far East, 330 

LIAOTUNG PENINSULA 

General Antonov’s statement regarding

Russian intentions and plans for the 

war against Japan, 314 

LINES OF COMMUNICATION 

Hump tonnage delivered to China, 192 

Line of communications from Kyushu 

to Vladivostok. 332 

Preparation of plans for keeping open 

a sea route to Russian Pacific ports, 174 _*_. 

Transportation facilities in Burma, 113 

Tripartite discussions regarding operations against the Kuriles and Korea, 

320 

Securing a major port on the China 

coast, 194 

LOGISTICS 

General MacArthur’s comments with 

reference to logistical problems involved in British participation in the 

assault against Japan proper, 141 

LONDON MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT 

BOARD 

Assignment of enemy war materiel in 

Germany and Austria, 56, 64,293 

LUZON (See Philippine Islands) 

M 

MacARTHUR, GENERAL DOUGLAS 

Comments regarding British participation in the assault against Japan 

proper, 141 

MALACCA, STRAIT OF 

British contribution to the Anal phase

of the war against Japan, 137 

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 116,252,258, 

292 

MALAY PENINSULA 

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 176,252,258, 

292 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

isolated Japanese garrisons in the 

Paciflc islands, 315 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

employment of submarines in SEAC 

to prevent infiltration of Japs into 

Malaya, 305 

Japanese situation, capabilities and intentions in the southern areas, 16, 38 

Progress report on operations in the 

Southeast Asia Command, 168 

MANCHURIA 

Boundary line between operational 

zones of the US.and Soviet air forces 

in Korea and Manchuria, 329 

Estimate of the enemy situation in 

Manchuria, 194 

General Antonov’s statement regarding

Russian intentions and plans for the 

war against Jauan. 314 

GeneralAntonov’s statement regarding

strength of the Japanese forces in 

Manchuria, 314 

General Marshall’s statements regarding movement of Japanese reinforcements from China to Manchuria, 316, 

319 

Japanese foreign policy, 41 

Japanese military situation, capabilities

and intentions in Manchuria, 15,36 

Note: ltalio numerals refer to pages in mlnutes of meeting. 

Plah type numerals rerer to pages in C.C.S. papers. 

350 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

MANDATED ISLANDS 

Japanese situation in the Japanese

Mandated Islands, 16,40 

MANPOWER 

Manpower situation in Japan, 13, 25 

MAPS 

Burma area, facing page 114 

Disposition of the Japanese ground

forces, 32 

Ground situation, China, 6 June 1945, 

showing major US. airfields held by

Japanese and Chinese, 203 

Ground situation, China Theater, 1 

April 1944, showing US.airfields that 

were subsequently overrun by Japanese drives, 199 

Line showing maximum territory occupied py Japanese in South China 

during 1944-1945 including major

US.airfields lost to the Japanese, 201 

Review of Pacific situation, 1 February

1945, 189 

Review of Pacific situation, 1 July 1945, 

181 

MARIANA ISLANDS 

Admiral King’s statement regarding naval operations against Japan and 

the development of bases in the 

Pacific, 317 

U.S. concept of strategy and operations

for the main effort in the Pacific, 118, 

250, 256 

MARSHALL, GENERAL OF THE 

ARMY G. C. 

Statements with reference to: 

Adjournment of the conference, 335 

Australian, New Zealand and Dutch 

approval to the proposed reallocation of areas and command setup in 

the Southwest Pacific Area, 292 

Boundary line between operational 

zones of the US. and Soviet air 

forces in Korea and Manchuria, 

329 

British proposals for participation in 

the war against Japan, 277 

Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery

after the war with Japan, 286 

Dividing Indo-China into two parts

to be included in the China Theater 

and SEAC, 280, 306 

Effect of deception measures to cause 

Japanese concentrations in the 

Kuriles, 31 5 

Effectiveness of Chinese troops and 

their planned operations against

the port of Fort Bayard, 271, 320 

Emergency ports and airfields in 

Siberia and the North Pacific, 331 

Employment of submarines in SEAC 

to prevent infiltration of Japs intn 

Malaya, 305 

Employment of two French divisions 

for operations in the war against

Japan, 306 

Estimated strength of the Japanese

forces, 31 4 

Extent to which the US. Chiefs of 

Staff were proposing to support

operations in the new British command. 281 

Isolated Japanese garrisons in the 

Pacific islands, 315 

Japanese establishing fortress garrisons for defense of strategic

points in China, 316 

Liaison groups between the American 

and Soviet commanders in the Far 

East, 329 

Line of communications from Kyushu

to Vladivostok, 332 

Movement of Japanese reinforcements from China to Manchuria, 

316, 319 

Movement of supplies to China, 319 

Offering US. Chiefs’ congratulations 

to Admiral Mountbatten on the 

conclusion of his campaign in 

Burma, 304 

Operations against the Kuriles and 

Korea, 320 

Policy for imparting information to 

the Russians concerning the Japanese war. 288 

Progress in redeploying US. troops

from the European Theater to the 

Pacific, 317 

Radio stations in Petropavlovsk

and Khabarovsk for transmitting

weather data, 326 

Separate US.-U.S.S.R. zones for naval 

and air operations in the Sea of 

Japan, 327 

Note: ltille numerals refer to pages In minutes of meetlng. 

Plain type numerals refer to pages In C.C.S. Papem. 

351 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

MARSHALL, GENERAL OF THE 

ARMY G. C. (Cont'dl 

Shortages of shipping in the Pacific, 

31 7 

Strategic direction in the war against

Jauan, 282 

Transfer of command in the Southwest Pacific, 281, 305 

US.submarine action to sever Japanese communications in the Sea of 

Japan and B-29 mine-laying near 

Shimonoseki and Niigata, 316 

US. position of control in Okinawa, 

315 

Visit of a British corps commander 

and staff to the Pacific. 276 

Weekly report of operations for the 

Russian Chiefs of Staff, 334 

MATSUWA ISLANDS 

Report on operations in the North 

Pacific area, 184 

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER 

Arrangements for restricting the activities of Allied Force Headquarters,

Mediterranean, 77, I9 

METEOROLOGY 

Establishing radio stations in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk for transmitting weather data, 326 

General Arnold's statements regarding

effect of weather on Army air operations against Japan and her lines of

communication to Manchuria, 318 

MILWAUKEE, MS 

Employment of captured German passenger ships for movement of US. 

troops in the Pacific, 46, 51,300 

MINDANAO (See Philippine Islands) 

MIYAK0 JlMA (See Ryukyu Islands) 

MOUNTBATTEN, ADMIRAL 

LORD LOUIS 

Statements with reference to: 

Assumption of the new command in 

the Southwest Pacific, 306 

Division of French Indo-China, 306 

Enemy strength in Burma, 304 

Employment of two French divisions 

in Indo-China, 306 

Operations in the Southeast Asia 

Command, 304 

N 

NAURU ISLANDS 

Operations against Nauru Islands, 153 

NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral King's statement regarding

naval operations against Japan and 

the development of bases in the 

Pacific, 317 

Line of communications from Kyushu 

to Vladivostok, 332 

Separate US.-U.S.S.R. zones for naval 

and air operations in the Sea of 

Japan, 327 

NETHERLANDS 

British to obtain agreement to the proposed reallocation of areas and command in Southwest Pacific and SEAC, 

293 

Policy regarding French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan,

13, 252, 280 

NEW GUINEA 

Allied onerations aaainst bv-Dassed ._ enemy garrisons, 185 

General Marshall's statement regarding

isolated Japanese garrisons in the 

PaciAc islands, 315 

Japanese situation, capabilities and intentions in the southern areas, 16, 38 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages in minutes of meeting. 

Plain tme numerals refer to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

352 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

NEW ZEALAND 

British to obtain agreement on proposed

reallocation of areas and command in 

Southwest Paciflc and SEAC, 293 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding

the employment of New Zealand division in Southeast Asia, 277 

NICOBAR ISLANDS 

Japanese situation, capabilities and intCntiOnS in the southern areas, 38 

0 

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 

Basic undertakings and policies for the 

prosecution of the war, 249, 310 

Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war, 249 

Preparation of plans for occupation of 

Japan proper, 119 

OKHOTSK SEA 

Selection of emergency ports and airfields, 331 

Separate US.-U.S.S.R. zones for naval 

and air operations, 327 

OKINAWA (See Ryukyu Islands) 

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE, 

249 

OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT, 

249 

P 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statement regarding assumption of the new com­ mand in the Southwest Pacific, 305 

Control and command in the war against Japan, 148, 153, 157, 282 

General progress report on recent operations in the Paciflc, 182 

Reallocation of areas and command in 

the Southwest Paciflc and Southeast 

Asia areas, 252, 280 

Report on operations for the capture of 

Iwo Jima and Okinawa, 183 

Report on operations in the North 

Paciflc area.I 184

~~~ 

Report on operations in the Philippine

Islands, 184 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding

date of transfer of command in the 

Southwest Paciflc, 281 

Strategy and plans for operations in 

the Pacific, 118, 250, 256 

US.Seventh Fleet, 301 

PARAMUSHIRU ISLANDS 

Report on operations in the North 

Paciflc, 184 

PATRIA, MS 

Employment of captured German passenger ships for movement of U.S. 

troops in the Pacific, 46, 51, 54, 254, 

300 

PETROLEUM 

Petroleum situation in Japan, 23 

Rehabilitation of oilfields in Burma, 113 

PETROPAVLOVSK, SIBERIA 

Establishing radio stations for transmitting weather data, 326 

Selection of emergency ports and airfields, 331 

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

Air casualties in the Philippine cam­ paign, 214 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

the estimated strength of the Japa­ nese forces in the Philippines, 315 

Japanese situation in the Philippines, 

40 

Report on operations in the Philippine

Islands, 184 

Tactical air operations in the war against Japan, 212 

U.S. concept of strategy and operations

for the main effort in the Paciflc, 118, 

250, 256 

Note: Itallf numems refer to pages In minuter of meeting. 

Plain type numemu refer to pages in C.C.S. papers. 

353 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

PLANNING 

Planning date for the end of organlzed

resistance by Japan, 122, 254, 288 

Preparation of plans for keeping open 

sea route to Russian Pacific ports, 119 

Preparation of plans for occupation of 

Japan proper, 119 

Visit of a British corps commander and 

accompanying omcers with General 

MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, 145, 

251, 276 

PORTAL, SIR CHARLES F. A. 

Statements in reference to: 

Employment of a British tactical air 

force in operations against Japan 

proper, 275 

Policy for imparting information to 

the Russians concerning the Japanese war, 287 

SACSEA’S assumption of command in 

the Southwest Pacific, 281 

Strength of the Japanese air forces 

in Southeast Asia, 322 

PORTS 

Planned operations against the port

of Fort BaYard. 320 

Selection of emergency ports and airfields in Siberia and the North PacifIc, 

331 

Securing a major port on the China 

Coast, 194 

PORTUGAL 

Portuguese participation in operations 

to expel the Japanese from Timor, 3, 

5. 253, 280 

POST-WAR 

Use of lend-lease for equipping occupa­ tional and post-war armles. 95, 309 

POTSDAM, SS 

Employment of captured German passenger ships for movement of U.S. 

troops in the PacifIc, 46, 51. 53. 254, 

300 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Reconstruction and rehabilitation of 

the United Kingdom, 311 

Supplies for British forces, 310 

PRETORIA, SS 

Employment of captured German passenger ships for movement of U.S. 

troops in the PacifIc, 46,300 

PRIORITIES 

Priorities for cargo shipping, 85, 88 

PRIME MINISTER OF THE 

UNITED KINGDOM 

Strategic direction of the war, 312 

U.S. assistance in equipping British 

forces, 309 

United Kingdom import program, 311 

PRODUCTION 

Agreed planning date for the end of 

organized resistance by Japan. 288 

Aircraft production in Japan, 22, 29 

Armament production in Japan, 22 

Basic undertakings and policies for the 

prosecution of the war, 249, 309 

Industrial situation in Japan, 13, 21 

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 

Psychological effect of bombing Japanese cities, 13 

Q 

QUEENS 

Employment of British passenger liners 

in the North Atlantic, 50 

R 

RAILROADS (See Transportation) 

RAW MATERIALS 

Economic situation in Japan, 23 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

REDEPLOYMENT 

Basic undertakings and policies for the 

prosecution of the war, 249, 310 

Employment of British passenger liners 

in the North Atlantic, 50 

Employment of captured German passenger ships for movement of US. 

troops in the Pacific, 46, 300 

General Marshall’s statement regarding 

progress in redeploying US.- troops

from the European Theater to the 

Pacific, 317 

US. efforts to assist trooplift situation 

in redeployment of forces from 

Europe to the Pacific, 46, 49 

RELEASE OF INFORMATION 

Policy for the release of information 

to the Russians concerning the Japa­ nese war, 130, 131, 133, 253, 287 

REPORTS 

Estimate of the enemy situation, 8 

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific. 182 

Progress report on opkrations in China, 

April 1944 through June 1945, 192 

Progress report on operations in the 

Southeast Asia Command, 168 

Report on Army air operations in the war against Japan, 206 

To the President and Prime Minister, 

248 

Weekly report of operations for the 

Russian Chiefs of Staff,334 

RYUKYU ISLANDS 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

the estimated strength of the Japa­ nese forces. 31 5 

Gencral Marshall’s statement regarding

the US. position of rontrol ln OKinawa, 315 

Reuort on air ouerations from Okinawa 

and Iwo Jima-bases. 184 

Report on operations’for the capture of 

Okinawa, 183 

US. concept of strategy and operations for the main effort in the Pacific, 118, 

250, 256 

S 

SAIPAN 

Admiral King’s statement regarding

naval operations against Japan and 

the development of bases in the 

Pacific, 31 7 

SAKHALIN ISLAND 

Operations to control La Perousse 

Strait, 321 

SEVENTH US. FLEET 

Change in command of elements of 

the US.Seventh Fleet, 301 

SHANGHAI 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

Japanese establishing fortress garrisons for defense of strategic points

in China, 31 6 

SHIPPING 

Allocation of US.trooplift for the re­ patriation of 16,000 Canadians during

1945, 254, 300 

Authorized overloading of Victory and 

Liberty shim, 49 

Combined shipping resources and re­ quirement study to be completed by 

15 September 1945, 254, 300 

Employment of British passenger liners 

in the North Atlantic, 50 

Employment of captured German passenger ships for movement of U.S. 

troops in the Pacific, 46, 300 

Estimate of the cargo shipping situation, 

255 

General Marshall’s statement regarding

shortages of shipping in the Pacific, 

317 

Lord Leathers’ statement regarding inclusion of the United Kingdom import 

program in the “Basic Undertakings,”

311 

Priorities for cargo shiDDing. 85, 88 

Provision of personnel shipping for the 

requirements of Allied governments,

236, 243, 254, 301 

Note: Itallc numerals refer to pages in minuter of meeting. 

mtn type mrer to paes 10 C.C.S. P~WPS. 

355 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

SHIPPING (Cont'd) 

Shiuuine uosition in Jauan. 20 

The Prime Minister's statement regarding the United Kingdom import program, 322 

SlAM (See Thailand) 

SINGAPORE 

British contribution to the flnal phase

of the war against Japan, 137,177,251, 

274 

Directive to the Supreme Aliied Commander, Southeast Asia, 176,252,258, 

292 

SOLOMON ISLANDS 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Admiral Cunningham's statement re­ garding remnants of the Japanese

Fleet in Southeast Asia. 322 

Admiral Cunningham's statement regarding the paucity of submarine 

targets in SEAC, 305 

Control and command in the war 

against Jauan. 148.. 153.. 157. 282 

Directive to 'the' Supreme Aliied Commander, Southeast Asia, 110, 252, 258. 

292 

Disposition of Allied forces in Southeast 

Asia, 170 

Enemy capabilities in Southeast Asia,

169, 172 

General Marshall's statement regarding

employment of submarines in SEAC 

to prevent inflltration of Japs into 

Malaya, 305 

Japanese foreign policy, 18, 41 

Progress report on operations in SEAC, 

169 

Reallocation of areas and command in 

the Southwest Paciflc and Southeast 

Asia areas, 252, 280 

Sir Alan Brooke's statement regarding

operations in Southeast Asia and 

plans for participating in the operations against Japan proper, 322 

Sir Charles Portal's statement regarding strength of Japanese air forces 

in Southeast Asia, 322 

STRATEGY 

Admiral King's statement regarding relationship between the U.S. and U.K. 

in the strategic direction of the war,

322 

Basic undertakings and policies for the 

prosecution of the war, 249, 309 

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 116, 252, 258 

General Antonov's statement regarding

Russian intentions and plans for the war against Japan, 324 

Over-all objective in the prosecution of 

the war, 249 

Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war. 249 

Strategic direction in the war against

Japan, 151, 153, 158,250,280, 282 

The Prime Minister's statement regarding strategic direction of the war, 322 

Theater commander's decision with regard to strategic course of action in 

the China Theater, 197 

US.concept of strategy and operations

for the main effort in the Pacific, 118, 

250, 256 

SUBMARINE WARFARE 

Admiral Cunningham's statement regarding the paucity of submarine 

targets in SEAC, 305 

Admiral King's statement regarding

naval operations against Japan and 

the development of bases in the 

Paciflc, 327 

General Marshall's statement regarding

employment of submarines in SEAC 

to prevent infiltration of Japs into 

Malaya, 305 

General Marshall's statements re­ garding US. submarine action to sever Japanese communications in 

the Sea of Japan and B-29 minelaying near Shimonoseki and Niigata,

31 6 

Report on submarine campaign in the 

Western Paciflc, 184 

Note: Italic numerals refer to pages in mlnutes 01 meeting. 

Plah type numerals reler to pages In C.C.S. Papers. 

356 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

SUMATRA 

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 252, 259 

General Marshall’s statement regardlng isolated Japanese garrisons in the 

PaciAc islands, 325 

Japanese situation, capabilities, and intentions in the southern areas, 16, 38 

SURRENDER 

CCS invite the British Chiefs of Staff 

to seek the opinion of the Prime Minister in the matter of unconditional 

surrender of Japan, 270 

Possibility of Japanese surrender, 43 

Sir Alan Brooke’s statement regarding survival of the institution of the Emperor, 270 

T 

TARAKAN ISLAND 

Report on operations in Borneo, 185 

TARGET DATE 

Planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan, 122, 254, 288 

Target date for the invasion of the 

Tokyo Plain, 119 

Target date for the seizure of Balikpapan, 119 

TENTH AIR FORCE 

Progress report on operations in China, 

April 1944 through June 1945, 193 

“TERMINAL” CONFERENCE 

Agenda for the conference, 102, 105, 

107, 109. 111 

Program and procedure for the conference, 124, 127, 270 

Size of military staffs for TERMINAL, 

114. 115 

Statements regarding adjournment of 

the conference, 335 

Note: Itallc numerals refer to page 

Plain type numcras refer to 

357 

THAILAND 

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 176, 252, 258, 

292 

Japanese situation, capabilities, and intentions in the southern areas, 16, 38 

Progress report on operations in the 

Southeast Asia Command, 169 

TIMOR 

Portuguese participation in operations 

to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor, 3, 5, 253, 280 

TOKYO PLAIN (See Japan) 

TRAINING 

Training and equipping Chinese forces, 

193 

Size of Portuguese forces acceptable for 

training and operations in Tlmor, 5 

TRANSPORTATION 

Admiral Mountbatten’s statements regarding operations in the Southeast 

Asia Command, 304 

Internationalization of the Danube 

River, 228 

Transportation facilities in Burma, 173 

Transportation Position in Japan, 20 

TRINCOMALEE 

Preparation of base for support of naval 

operations in SEAC. 173 

TROOPSHIPS (See Shipping) 

TSUSHIMA, STRAIT OF 

Line of communications from Kyushu 

to Vladivostok, 332 

XX BOMBER COMMAND 

Progress report on operations in China, 

April 1944 through June 1945, 191 

In mlnutcs of meetlng. 

pages In C.C.S. Papers. 
TOP SECRET 

INDEX 

U 

U.S.S.R. 

Basic undertakings and policies for the 

prosecution of the war, 249,309 

Boundary line between operational 

zones of the US.and Soviet air forces 

in Korea and Manchuria, 329 

Japanese foreign policy, 18, 41 

Liaison groups between the American 

and Soviet commanders in the Far 

l?:art , 3.70 ... 

Policy for the release of information to 

the Russians concerning the Japanese 

war. 130. 131. 133.. 253.. 287 

Preparation of plans for keeping open 

sea route to Russian Pacific ports, 119 

Radio stations in Petropavlovsk and 

Khabarovsk for transmitting weather 

data, 326 

Selection of emergency ports and airfields, 331 

Separate U.S.-U.S.S.R. zones for naval 

and air owrations in the Sea of 

Japan, 327 

UNITED KINGDOM 

British contribution to the anal phase

of the war against Japan, 136,139,141, 

111,251,274 

British forces available for the invasion 

of Japan, 131,251 

General MacArthur’s comments regarding British participation in the assault against Japan proper, 141 

The President’s statement regarding

reconstruction and rehabilitation of 

the United Kingdom, 312 

The Prime Minister’s statement regarding United Kingdom import program,

311 

Visit of a British corps commander and 

accompanying omcers with General 

MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, 145,

251, 276 

UNITED MARITIME AUTHORITY 

Provision of personnel shipping for the 

requirements of Allied governments,

236, 243, 254, 301 

V 

VLADIVOSTOK, SIBERIA 

Line of communications from Kyushu

to Vladivostok, 332 

Selection of emergency ports and airfields. 331 

VULCANIA, MS 

Use of captured German passenger

ships for movement of US. troops in 

the Pacific, 46, 300 

W 

WEATHER (See Meteorology) 

WILSON, FIELD MARSHAL SIR H. M. 

Field Marshal Wilson’s statement regarding the appointment of Colonel 

Douglas as Chief Commissioner to the 

Allied Commission in Italy, 288 

Y 

YELLOW SEA 

Efforts to sever the Japanese line of 

communications between Japan 

proper and the China Coast, 325 

Report on air operations from Okinawa 

and Iwo Jima bases, 184 

Z 

“ZIPPER” 

Progress report on operations in the 

Southeast Asia Command, 169 

Note: IhUf numerals nfer to pages In &Utes of meeting. 

Plain type nomerala refer to pages in C.C.S. Papers. 

358