In re COH, ERH, JRG, & KBH, MINORS Docket No. 147515. Argued December 10, 2013 (C alendar No. 2). Decided April 22, 2014. The Department of Human Services (DHS ) petitioned the Muskeg on Circuit Court, Family Division, to terminate the parental rights of the mother and two fathers of the minor children COH, ERH, JRG, and KBH, who had been removed from the mother’s home and placed in foster care. At the dispositional hear ing, Lori Scribner, the biological grandmother of three of the children, submitted a letter expressing interest in becoming all four children’s guardian if they were not returned to their mo ther. The court concluded that terminating the mother’s rights was not in the children’s best interests, although it gr anted the petition with respect to the fathers. The following year, th e DHS again petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The mother pleaded no contest to the allegations in the petition, and Scribner moved to be appointed the children’s guardia n under MCL 712.19c and MCR 3.979. The court, William C. Marietti, J., denied Scribner’s motion after considering the best-interest factors from the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq ., and admitted the children to the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI) under MCL 400.203. Scribner requested consent from the MCI superintendent to adopt the children, but the superi ntendent denied it, and the trial court denied Scribner’s motion to reverse the denial. Scribner appealed bot h this decision and the order denying her petition for guardianship. After conso lidating the appeals, the Court of Appeals, T ALBOT , P.J., and M ARKEY and R IORDAN , JJ., reversed the order de nying Scribner’s petition for guardianship in an unpublished opinion per curi am issued June 25, 2013 (Docket Nos. 309161 and 312691) and remanded for the entry of an or der appointing Scribner guardian. The Supreme Court granted the DHS’s a pplication for leave to a ppeal. 495 Mich 870 (2013). In a unanimous opinion by Justice C AVANAGH , the Supreme Court held : The preference created in MCL 722.954a for a child who has been removed from the parental home to be placed with relatives appl ies when the DHS is making its initial placement decision, but it does not apply to a court’s decisi on regarding whether to appoint a guardian for the child under MC L 712A.19c(2). In deciding whethe r to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2), a court must determine whether the guardia nship is in the child’s best interests. In so doing, the court has th e discretion to consider the best-int erest factors from the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.23; the Adoption Code, MCL 710.22(g); or any other factors th at may be relevant under the circumstances of a particular case. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Syllabus Chief Justice: Robert P. Young, Jr. Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Stephen J. Markman Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack David F. Viviano This syllabus constitutes no part of th e opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decision s for the convenience of the reader. Reporter of Decisions: Corbin R. Davis©2014 State of Michigan 1. The Court of Appeals erred by holding that the preference set forth in MCL 722.954a for placing a child with relatives after the initial removal from a parent’s custody applies to a court’s decision under MCL 712A.19c whether to a ppoint a guardian for a child whose parents’ rights have been terminated. MCL 722.954a applie s from the moment a child is removed from his or her parents’ care and th roughout the review process, but there is no indication in the statutory language that the Le gislature intended this preferen ce to apply beyond the time frame identified within MCL 722.954a. Similarly, MCL 712A.19c expressly applies only to instances in which a child remains in placement following the termination of parental rights, which occurs after the DHS makes the initial placement decision regulated by MCL 722.954a. Moreover, MCL 712A.19c(14) expressly provides that MCL 712A.19c, which includes the court’s authority to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2), applies only to cases in which parental rights to the child were terminated, and MCL 712A.19a(7)(c) establishes a separate process for appointing a guardian before parental rights have been te rminated. The fact that MCL 712A.19c(2) refers neither to MCL 722.954a nor to “r elatives” bolsters the conclusi on that the preference for placement with relatives created in MCL 722.954a does not apply outside the period for determining a child’s initial placemen t immediately after removal. 2. MCL 712A.19c(2) provides th at at a review hearing fo r a child who remains in placement after parental rights were terminated, the trial court may appoint a guardian if it determines that doing so is in the child’s best interests. Becau se MCL 712A.19c(2) does not direct a court to apply certain factors or ot herwise limit a court’s method for determining the child’s best interests, a trial court has discreti on to determine the best method for analyzing the child’s best interests by consideri ng the circumstances relevant to the particular case. While the Adoption Code factors set forth in MCL 710.22(g) provide a useful list of considerations that may be relevant to a guardianship decision, neither the language of MCL 712A.19c(2) nor the similarities between a guardianship and an a doption requires a pplication of th e Adoption Code factors to all guardianship pe titions. Depending on the circ umstances, a case may more reasonably lend itself to applicat ion of the Child Custody Act fact ors, some combination of the Adoption Code and Child Custody Ac t factors, or a uni que set of factors de veloped by the trial court for purposes of a particular case.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discreti on by applying the best-interest factors from the Child Custody Act rather than those set fort h in the Adoption Code to decide Scribner’s petition for a guardianship under MCL 712A.19c. The Child Custody Act factors incorporate a comparative analysis, which was a logical method for determining which of the two placement options was in the children’s best interests. The court did not clearly err in its factual findings regarding these factors or in its conclusion that a guardianship with Scribner was not in the children’s best interests under MCL 722.19c(2). Because the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that a preference for placement w ith relatives existed under MCL 712.19c(2) and substituted its judgment for the trial courts’ on que stions of fact regarding the children’s best interests, the Court of Appeals judgment was re versed and the case remanded to that Court for consideration of Scribne r’s appeal of the MCI Superintendent ’s denial of consent to adopt the children. Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to that Court for further proceedings.FILED APRIL 22, 2014

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

In re COH, ERH, JRG, & KBH, Minors.

No. 147515

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

C AVANAGH , J. This case requires us to consider the interplay between MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c. Specifically, we mu st determine whether the pref erence for placement with relatives created by MCL 722.954a is relevant to a court’s consideration of a petition to appoint a guardian und er MCL 712A.19c(2).

Because we conclude that the two statutes apply at different and distinct stages of child protective proceedings, we hold that th ere is no preference for placement with relatives as part of a guardianship determ ination under MCL 712A.19c(2). Accordingly, because the Court of Appeals in this case applied a preference in favor of creating a guardianship with a relative in support of its decision to reverse the trial court, we Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Opinion Chief Justice: Robert P. Young, Jr. Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Stephen J. Markman Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack David F. Viviano2 conclude that the Court of Appeals erred. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals

and remand to that Court to consider issues not previously addressed.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In February 2008, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed COH, ERH, JRG, and KBH from their mother’s care under MCL 712A.2(b). 1 The children were initially placed in two se parate foster homes; however, in October 2008, all of the children were placed in their current foster home, with Ho ly Cross Children’s Services supervising the placement. At the December 12, 2008, review hearing, the DHS expressed it s intent to seek

termination of the mother’s and both fathers’ parental rights, and, in March 2009, the DHS petitioned to terminate all pa rental rights. A dispositiona l hearing occurred in June 2009, and the trial court terminated the father s’ parental rights but did not terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court c oncluded that grounds existed to terminate the mother’s rights, but that term ination of her parental rights was not in the children’s best

interests at that time. One of the exhibits offered during the dispositional hearing was a letter dated June 2, 2009, written to the trial court by appellant Lori Scribner, who is the paternal biological grandmothe r of COH, ERH, and KBH. Scribner requested that the

trial court return the children to the mother and stated th at if the children were not returned to their mother, Scri bner “would like to petition th e court for guardianship and

would like information on how to proceed.” 2

1 JRG does not have the same biologi cal father as COH, ERH, and KBH.

2 Holy Cross’s foster care worker also testified that Scribner first expressed an interest in a guardianship in May 2009.3 In July 2010, the DHS again petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Scribner moved to intervene and to be appoint ed the children’s juve nile guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2) and MCR 3.979. The prosec utor and the mother agreed that the mother would plead no contest to the allegations that she was unable to provide proper care and custody for the children, that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate the mother’s rights, and, if the plea was ac cepted, the prosecutor would agree that the

children not be committed to th e Michigan Children’ s Institute (MCI) until the trial court ruled on Scribner’s guardianship petition. The trial court accepted the mother’s plea

under these conditions. On August 26, 2010, the trial court held a guardianship hearing. At the hearing,

Scribner testified that she had liv ed in Florida since 2005. Scribner also testified that she had frequent contact with the ch ildren before moving to Flor ida, that she traveled to Michigan in the summer of 200 7 to visit the children, and that she continued to have contact with the children after they were removed from the mothe r’s care in February 2008. However, Scribner testifie d that, in her opinion, Holy Cross frustrated her efforts

to contact the children after the children were pl aced in their curre nt foster home in October 2008. Regarding her efforts to have the children placed in her home, Scribner testified that she began the process “a few m onths after” the children were removed from

the mother’s care. Because Scribner was liv ing in a two-bedroom apartment, she also began looking for a larger home to accommoda te the children, but she did not purchase the home until July 20 09 and did not move into the hom e immediately. Scribner also testified that she visited the children in Michig an during the summer of 2010. As part of4 the guardianship decision proce ss, the trial court permitted th e children to visit Scribner in Florida for Thanksgiving and Christmas in 2010. A February 2011 evidentiary heari ng regarding Scribner’s motion for a guardianship included, among other things, testimony from multiple witnesses about the

children’s visits to Florida and the foster parents’ living arrangements and parenting methods, some of which were incompa tible with Holy Cross’s procedures. 3 Ultimately,

the trial court denied Scribne r’s guardianship petition. In making the guardianship decision, the tria l court applied the best-interest factors

from the Child Custod y Act, MCL 722.21 et seq ., and determined that it was in the

children’s best interests to re main with their foster parent s, who had petitioned to adopt the children. Accordingly, the trial court committed the children to the DHS under MCL 400.203 for permanency planning, supe rvision, and care and placement. Scribner requested consent from the MCI supe rintendent to adopt the children, but the superintendent denied the request, finding that adoption by the foster parents was in

the children’s best interests. Scribner f iled a motion with the trial court under MCL 710.45(2), alleging that the s uperintendent’s decision was ar bitrary and capricious. The

trial court denied the motion. Scribner appealed by leave granted in th e Court of Appeals, which reversed the

trial court’s denial of Scribne r’s petition for guardianship. In re COH, ERH, JRG &

3 Testimony established that the foster parent s at times required the children to run laps around the house or consume fish oil and Tabasco sauce as puni shment. The foster father testified that the foster parents discontinue d those discipline methods at Holy Cross’s request.5 KBH, Minors , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 25, 2013 (Docket Nos. 309161 and 312691). The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court “failed to recognize the preference for children to be placed with relatives” and

determined that “had the tria l court recognized this preferen ce and then given [Scribner] the special preference and consideration that she was due as the children’s grandmother, the court would have gr anted the guardianship petition.” Un pub op at 5. The Court of Appeals did not address Scribner’s appeal of th e denial of consent to adopt, finding the issue moot under its disposition of the case. We granted th e DHS’s application for leave to appeal. 495 Mich 870 (2013).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Detroit v Ambassador Bridge Co , 481 Mich 29, 35; 74 8 NW2d 221 (2008). “A court’s factual findings underlying the application of legal issues are reviewed for clear error.” In re

Morris , 491 Mich 81, 97; 81 5 NW2d 62 (2012).

III. ANALYSIS This case involves the removal of juve niles from the care of their biological parents. As explained in In re Rood , 483 Mich 73, 93; 763 NW2d 587 (2009), the overarching goals guiding the juvenile code, MCL 712A.1 et seq ., are established in MCL 712A.1(3): This chapter shall be li berally construed so that each juvenile coming within the court’s jurisdiction receive s the care, guidance, and control, preferably in his or her own home, c onducive to the juvenile’s welfare and the best interest of the state. If a juve nile is removed from the control of his or her parents, the juvenile shall be placed in care as nearly as possible6 equivalent to the care that should have been given to the juvenile by his or her parents. See, also, MCR 3.902(B).

A. LEGAL BACKGROUND Child protective proceedings are generally divided into the adjudicative and the dispositional phases. “The adjudicative phase determines whether the . . . court may exercise jurisdiction over the child,” In re Brock , 442 Mich 101, 10 8; 499 NW2d 752 (1993), and includes “a preliminary hearing at which the court may authorize a petition

for removal of a child from his home, MCL 712A.13a(2),” In re Mason , 486 Mich 142, 154; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). If the court acquires jurisdiction, the dispos itional phase determines what action, if any, will be taken on behalf of the child. In re Brock , 442 Mich at 108. The dispositional phase includes “review hearings to evaluate the child’s and parents’ progress, MCL 712A.19, permanency planning hearings, MCL 712A.19a, and, in some instances, a termination hearing, MCL 712A.19b.” In re Mason , 486 Mich at 154. Additionally, MCL 712A.19c establishes the procedures applicable when a child remains in a placement after termination of parental rights. When a child is removed from a parent’s care during the adjudication phase under MCL 712A.2(b), as in this case, “the court shall order the juvenile placed in the most family-like setting available consistent with the juvenile’s needs.” MCL 712A.13a(12).7 The “agency,” which was the DHS in this case, 4 must complete an initial services plan within 30 days of th e child’s placement. MCL 712A.13a(1 0)(a). As part of the initial services plan, the DHS is required to comply with MCL 722.954a(2), which, at the times relevant to this case, stated: Upon removal , . . . the supervising agency sh all, within 30 days, identify, locate, and consult with relatives to determine placement with a fit and appropriate relative who would meet th e child’s developmental, emotional, and physical needs as an alternative to foster care. [Emphasis added.] [5] The DHS is also required, under former MCL 722.954a(2 ), to meet the following requirements not more than 90 da ys after the child’s removal: (a) Make a placement decision and document in writing the reason for the decision. (b) Provide written notice of the decision and the reasons for the placement decision to . . . each relative who expresses an interest in caring for the child . . . . Finally, former MCL 722.954a(3) provides for review of the DHS’s decision:

4 “Agency” is defined as a public or private organization, institu tion, or facility that is performing the functions under part D of title IV of th e social security act, 42 USC 651 to 669b, or that is responsi ble under court order or co ntractual arrangement for a juvenile’s care and supervis ion. [MCL 712A.13a(1)(a).]

5 The Legislature amende d MCL 722.954a, effective December 14, 2010. 2010 PA 265. Because the trial court decided the issues relevant to the children’s initial placement before December 14, 2010, we an alyze this case under the stat utory provisions in effect when the trial court decided the issues and, as a result, the statutory citations in this opinion may not correspond to the amended version of MCL 722.954a.8 A person who receives a written decisi on described in subsection (2) may request in writing, within 5 days, documentation of the reasons for the decision, and if the person does not ag ree with the placement decision, he or she may request that the child’s attorney review the decision to determine if the decision is in the ch ild’s best interest . If the child’s attorney determines the decision is not in the child’s best interest, within 14 days after the date of the written de cision the attorney shall petition the court that placed the child out of the child’s home for a review hearing. The court shall commence the review hearing not more than 7 days after the date of the attorney’s petition and shall hold the hearing on the record. In this case, Scribner seeks a juvenile guardianship under MCL 712A.19c, which applies during the dispositional phase of ch ild protective proceedings and states in relevant part: (1) [I]f a child re mains in placement following the termination of parental rights to the child, the court shall conduct a review hearing not more than 91 days after th e termination of parental rights and no later than every 91 days after that hearing for the first year following termination of parental rights to the child. If a child remains in a placement for more than 1 year following termination of parental rights to the child, a review hearing shall be held no later than 182 days from the immediately preceding review hearing before the end of the first ye ar and no later than every 182 days from each preceding review hearin g thereafter until the case is dismissed. . . . At a hearing under this section, the court shall review all of the following: (a) The appropriateness of th e permanency planning goal for the child. (b) The appropriateness of the child’s placement. (c) The reasonable efforts bei ng made to place the child for adoption or in other permanent placement in a timely manner. (2) [I]f the court determines that it is in the child’s best interests, the court may appoint a guard ian for the child.

* * *9 (14) This section applies only to a child’s case in which parental rights to the child were

. . . terminated as the resu lt of a proceeding under section 2(b) of this chapter . . . . This sec tion applies as long as the child is subject to the jurisdiction, control, or supervision of the court or of the Michigan children’s institute or other agency. [Emphasis added.]

B. INTERPLAY BETWEEN MC L 722.954a AND MCL 712A.19c When interpreting statutes, “our primary task . . . is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward , 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999) (citations omitted). To acco mplish that task, we begin by examining the language of the statute itself. Id. (citation omitted). “If the la nguage of the statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have inte nded the meaning clearly expressed, and the

statute must be enforced as written.” Id. (citation omitted). The plain language of MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c establishes that the two statutes apply at different stages of child protective proceedings. Specifically, MCL 722.954a(2) provides that “[ u]pon removal” DHS has a duty to “identify, locate, and consult with relatives to determine placemen t with a fit and appropriate relative who would meet the child’s developmental, emo tional, and physical needs” and that duty

must be satisfied “within 30 days” of removal. Accord ingly, MCL 722.954a applies from the moment a child is removed from his or her parents’ care, i.e., before any placement decision is made, and, consequen tly, the requirements of MCL 722.954a are intended to guide the DHS’s in itial placement decision. The preference for placement with relatives is also expressly preserved throughout the review process established in former MCL 722.954a(2) and (3). Specifically, subsection (2)(b) requires the DHS to make an initial placem ent decision within 90 days10 of removal and “[p]rovide written notice of the decision and the reasons for the placement decision to . . . each relative who expresses an interest in caring for the child . . . .” Additionally, subsection (3) perm its a relative who receives notice to request an explanation of the decision and potentially obtain a review hearing if the person does not agree with the placement d ecision. However, the review process is limited to a narrow time period: the request for documentation of the reasons for the placement decision must be made within 5 days of r eceiving the placement decision, the potential petition for a review hearing must be made w ithin 14 days of th e written decision, and the review hearing must be held within 7 days after the petition. MCL 722.954a(3). Thus, there is no indication within the stat utory language of MC L 722.954a that the Legislature intended that the preference for placement with relatives exists beyond the

time frame identified within MCL 722.954a. Similarly, the plain language of MCL 712A.19c expressly limits the statute’s applicability only to inst ances in which “a child remains in placement following the termination of parental rights . . . .” MCL 712A.19c(1) (e mphasis added). Thus, the plain language of MCL 712A.19c estab lishes that the statute only applies after termination of parental rights, which occurs after the DHS makes the initial placement decision regulated by MCL 722.954a. Although when considered in isolation MCL 712A.19c(2) does not expressly state that the court’s authority to appoint a guardian under that subsection is limited to the posttermination stage of child protective proc eedings, we must consider the subsection’s “placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” Sun Valley Foods Co , 460 Mich at 23711 (quotation marks and citation omitted). As established, the subsection immediately preceding subsection (2) expressly limits the statute’s applicability to the posttermination stage. Moreover, subsection (14) expressl y provides that “[t]his section,” meaning section 19c, “applies only to a child’s case in wh ich parental rights to the child were . . .

terminated . . . .” Because the court’s authority to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2) is part of secti on 19c, MCL 712A.19c(14) expre ssly limits its application to the posttermination stage of child protective proceedings. Additionally, MCL 712A.19a establishes the process for appointing a guardian before termination of parental rights. Specif ically, MCL 712A.19a(7) provides that [i]f the agency demonstrates . . . that initiating the termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in th e child’s best interests, or the court does not order the agency to initiate termination of parental rights to the child . . . then the court shall order 1 or more of the following alternative placement plans: * * * (c) . . . [i]f the court determines that it is in the child’s best interests, appoint a guardian for th e child, which guar dianship may continue until the child is emancipated. Because the Legislature enacted separate st atutes that create distinct processes for appointing a guardian before and after termination of parental rights, we must interpret those statutes in a way that avoids rendering either statute surplusage. Whitman v City of

Burton , 493 Mich 303, 311-312; 83 1 NW2d 223 (2013). We conclude that the process12 for appointing a guardian under MCL 712A .19c(2) is only applicable at the posttermination stage of a child protective proceeding. 6 Finally, MCL 712A.19c(2) does not refer to MCL 722.954a, nor does it refer to “relatives,” which bolsters the conclusion that the preference for placement with relatives

created in MCL 722.954a does not apply outside the time period for determining a child’s initial placement immediately after removal a nd, therefore, does not apply to a court’s decision to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2) after parental rights are terminated. Accordingly, a lthough the Court of Appeals ac curately conclu ded that MCL

722.954a creates a stat utory preference for placement with relatives, the plain language of

MCL 722.954a limits th e applicability of the preference to only the initia l stage of the process, i.e., immediately after a child is removed from his or her parents’ care and during the statutory review period established in MCL 722.954a(3). 7 Therefore, we agree

6 The court rules likewise refl ect the fact that the statut ory scheme creates different processes for appointing a guardi anship that apply at different stages of child protective proceedings. Specifically, MCR 3.979(A) states: Appointment of Juvenile Guardian; Process. If the court determines at a posttermination revi ew hearing or a perman ency planning hearing that it is in the child’s best interests, th e court may appoint a juvenile guardian for the child pursuant to MCL 712A.19a or MC L 712A.19c. [Emphasis added.] Thus, MCR 3.979(A) recognizes that a court may appoint a guardian at a posttermination review hearing, which is governed by MC L 712A.19c, or at a permanency planning hearing, which is govern ed by MCL 712A.19a.

7 As noted, the Legislature amended MCL 722. 954a, effective Decemb er 14, 2010. 2010 PA 265. We also note that as part of th e 2010 amendments, the Legislature added MCL 722.954a(5), which expressly requires the DHS to “give specia l consideration and preference to a child’s relative or relatives w ho are willing to care for the child, are fit to do so, and would meet the child’s developmen tal, emotional, and physical needs” and13 with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion in In re AEG & LEG , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued No vember 7, 2013 (Docke t No. 316599), that the plain language of MCL 722.954a “indicates that the Legislature intended the statute to provide procedural requirements where a child is removed pursuant to a child protective proceeding,” but that there “is no indication that [MCL 722.954a] was intended to apply to . . . decisions after termination,” whic h includes a court’s decision regarding a guardianship petition unde r MCL 712A.19c(2).

C. INTERPRETATION OF MCL 712A.19c Having established that MCL 712A.19c applies after termination of parental rights and does not include a prefer ence for creating a guardianship with a relative, we must

now determine what a trial court must do to satisfy MCL 712A.19c(2). The plain language of the statute simply provides that the trial court may appoint a guardian “if the court determines that [a guardianship] is in the child’s best interests[.]” MCL 712A.19c(2). As previously discussed, the trial cour t applied the best-int erest factors from the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.23; 8 however, Scribner argues, and the Court of Appeals requires the DHS to do so “[ b ] efore determining placement of a ch ild” in the DHS’s care. Emphasis added. Accordingly, although we do not expressly apply subsection (5) in this case, we note that our analysis is not inco nsistent with this new statutory language, because subsection (5) expressly applies before the initial placement decision is made.

8 MCL 722.23 states: As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means th e sum total of the following factors to be considered, eval uated, and determined by the court: (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child.14 agreed, that the best-interest factor s in the Adoption Code, MCL 710.22(g), 9 should apply to a guardianship decision under MCL 712A.19c(2). Theref ore, the Court of Appeals

(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any. (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, cl othing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs. (d) The length of time the child ha s lived in a stab le, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. (g) The mental and physical he alth of the parties involved. (h) The home, school, and community record of the child. (i) The reasonable preference of th e child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference. (j) The willingness and ab ility of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and co ntinuing parent-child re lationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents. (k) Domestic violence, regardle ss of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child. ( l ) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute.

9 MCL 710.22(g) states: “Best interests of the adoptee” or “b est interests of the child” means the sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and15 determined by the court to be applied to give the adoptee permanence at the earliest possible date: ( i ) The love, affection, and other em otional ties existing between the adopting individual or individuals a nd the adoptee or, in the case of a hearing under [MCL 710.39], the put ative father and the adoptee. ( ii ) The capacity and disposition of the adopting individual or individuals or, in the case of a hear ing under [MCL 710.39], the putative father to give the adoptee love, affec tion, and guidance, and to educate and create a milieu that fosters the religion, racial identity, an d culture of the adoptee. ( iii ) The capacity and disposition of the adopting individual or individuals or, in the case of a hear ing under [MCL 710.39], the putative father, to provide the ad optee with food, clothing, education, permanence, medical care or other remedial car e recognized and pe rmitted under the laws of this state in place of medi cal care, and other material needs. ( iv ) The length of time the adoptee ha s lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. ( v ) The permanence as a family unit of the proposed adoptive home, or, in the case of a hearing under [M CL 710.39], the home of the putative father. ( vi ) The moral fitness of the adopting individual or individuals or, in the case of a hearing under [MCL 710.39], of the putative father. ( vii ) The mental and physical health of the adopting individual or individuals or, in the case of a hear ing under [MCL 710.39], of the putative father, and of the adoptee. ( viii ) The home, school, and commun ity record of the adoptee. ( ix ) The reasonable preference of the adoptee, if the adoptee is 14 years of age or less and if the court c onsiders the adoptee to be of sufficient age to express a preference. ( x ) The ability and willingness of the adopting individual or individuals to adopt th e adoptee’s siblings.16 concluded that the trial court erred by usin g the Child Custody Ac t factors to compare Scribner and the foster parents. In order to define the prop er method for determining wh ether a guardianship is in the child’s best interest, we must first interpret MCL 712A.1 9c(2). Issues of statutory interpretation are re viewed de novo. Ambassador Bridge Co , 481 Mich at 35. The plain language of MCL 712A.19c(2) does not expressl y require application of any particular set of factors; rather, the statute simply requi res the court to base its decision whether to appoint a guardian on “the ch ild’s best interests.” Beca use MCL 712A.19c(2) does not direct a court to apply certain factors or ot herwise limit a court’s method for determining the child’s best interests, the statute gr ants the court discretion regarding how to

determine what is in the child’s best interests depending on the case-specific

circumstances. See Easton Sch Dist No 4 v Snell , 24 Mich 350, 353 (1 872) (holding that when a statute grants a power “in general te rms,” the statute “leave s the details to the sound discretion” of the entity to whom the power is granted). Because MCL 712A.19c(2) gran ts the trial court discreti on in determining whether a guardianship is in the child’s best interest, a trial court’s decision regarding what factors to consider in making the best-interest de termination is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. “An abuse of di scretion occurs when the tria l court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.” Edry v Adelman , 486 Mich 634, 639; 786 NW2d 567 (2010).

( xi ) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular adoption proceed ing, or to a putative fa ther’s request for child custody.17 A trial court may use its discretion under MCL 712A.19c(2) to determine the best method for analyzing the child’s best interest s by considering the circumstances relevant to the particular case. The Adoption Code factors are a logical decision-making tool when only one party petitions for a guardianship, because th e court need not compare the petitioning party to any other party. Rather, determinin g whether the guard ianship is in the child’s best interests depends solely on whether a guardianshi p with the petitioning party is in the child’s best interests. Moreover, a juvenile guardianship has many characteristics that are similar to an adoptio n. Thus, the Adoption Code factors provide a useful list of considerations that may be re levant to a guardianshi p decision, and trial courts may therefore be led to apply the Ad option Code factors in deciding some, or perhaps many, petitions for guardianship. However, neither the statut ory language of MCL 712A.19c(2) nor the similarities between a guardianship and an adoption require application of the Adoption Code factors to all guardianship petitions, as the Court of Appeals suggest s. Rather, depending on the circumstances, a case may more reasonably lend itself to applic ation of the Child Custody Act factors, some combination of the Adoption Code and Chil d Custody Act factors, or a unique set of factors developed by the tria l court for purposes of a particular case. 10

10 In this regard, we note that the Child Custody Act a nd the Adoption Code factors permit a court to consider “[a]ny other factor considered by the court to be relevant[.]” MCL 722.23( l ); MCL 710.22(g)( xi ). Thus, although MCL 71 2A.19c(2) does not create an overarching preference for creating a guardianship with a relative, the statute nevertheless permits a trial court to consid er familial ties in determining whether the guardianship is in the child’s be st interests. However, we st ress that if a court concludes that familial ties are relevant to the guard ianship decision under MCL 712A.19c(2), the familial relationship is only a factor that must be balanced among all the other relevant factors—it does not give rise to a presumption in favor of creating a guardianship.18 Finally, we must review the trial court’s fi ndings of fact regard ing the best-interest determination, which are subject to the clear-error standard on appeal. See MCR 2.613(C). See, also, In re BKD , 246 Mich App 212, 219; 631 NW2d 353 (2001) (applying the clear-error standard to the tria l court’s findings of fact regarding the bestinterest factors in the Adoption Code). 11 “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ if although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing co urt on the entire eviden ce is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Mason , 486 Mich at 152 (quotation marks, bracket s, and citation omitted). Thus, under the clear-error standard, “a reviewing court should not substitu te its judgment on ques tions of fact unless the factual determination clearly prepond erates in the opposite direction.” Pierron v

Pierron , 486 Mich 81, 85; 782 NW2d 480 (2010 ) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

D. APPLICATION

Because we conclude that MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c ap ply at different stages of child protective proceedings, we conclude that the requirements of MCL 722.954a have no bearing on a trial court’s decision re garding a guardianship petition under MCL 712A.19c. Thus, we conclude th at the Court of Appeals erroneously held that, as a relative of the children, Scribner was entitled to a preference as part of her petition for a guardianship under MCL 712A.19c. 12 However, that conclusion does not

11 Cases in which this Court reviewed the tria l court’s factual findings underlying its bestinterest determination for whet her they were against the grea t weight of the evidence did so under MCL 722.28, whic h does not apply here.

12 Although our grant order di rected the parties to address whether Scribner “was entitled to [a] preference [for placement with relativ es] where her son’s parental rights to the19 necessarily mandate that we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Scribner’s guardianship petition. Rather, we must also consider whether the tr ial court abused its

discretion when it selected the Child Custody Act’s best-interes t factors rather than some

other set of factors to determine whether th e guardianship was in the children’s best interests. Additionally, we must consider whether the trial court clearly erred in its findings of fact regarding the childre n’s best interests under MCL 712A.19c.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its disc retion by applying the bestinterest factors from the Child Custody Act. In this case, the trial court was faced with two placement options for the ch ildren; therefore, logic re quired the trial court to compare the two options in orde r to determine which placemen t was in the children’s best interest. Under these circumstances, such a comparison was necessary because, although both placement options ma y be qualified to meet the child ren’s needs, only one of the placement options can trul y be in the children’s best interests. Because the Child Custody Act factors incorporat e a comparative analysis, a nd because comparison of the two placement options in this case was a l ogical method for dete rmining which option

was in the children’s best intere sts, the trial court’s decision to apply those factors rather than the Adoption Code factors was not an abuse of discretion. 13

children had been terminated,” 495 Mich at 870, that question is dependent on holding that a preference for placement with relatives applies to MC L 712A.19c(2). Because we conclude that no such preference exists, we need not consider the impact of the termination of parental rights on a gra ndparent’s status as a relative under MCL 722.954a(2).

13 Application of the Child Custody Act best -interest factors outside the context of a custody dispute is not a novel approach in th e area of juvenile law. For example, in In re Barlow , 404 Mich 216, 236; 273 NW 2d 35 (1978), we concluded that consideration of20 We likewise conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in its application and findings of fact related to the Child Cust ody Act’s best-interes t factors to decide Scribner’s petition for a guardianship under MC L 712A.19c. The trial court accurately emphasized that “the paramount concern is what is best for the children .” The trial court concluded that the children had developed a strong bond with the foster parents, while only JRG displayed a similar bond with Scri bner. The trial court concluded that the foster parents had demonstrated the capacity to give the children love and guidance whereas Scribner expressed a de sire to do so, but had not de monstrated the ability to do so, given that she had not cared for the childre n for a significant period of time. The trial

court determined that Scribner had a superior financial ability to support the children, but that the foster parents also had sufficient in come to support the ch ildren financially. The

trial court also determined that the children’s stability wi th the foster parents and desirability of maintaining that stability “overwhelming[ ly]” favored denying the guardianship. The trial court acknowledged that Scribner could have provided similar stability given the opportunity, but it would be impr oper to focus on “what may be fair

for” Scribner rather than “the best interests of the children .”

the Child Custody Act factors “f or guidance” was proper in th e context of termination of parental rights and adoption cases. We recognize that In re Barlow was decided before specific best-interest factors were added to the Adoption Code by amendment in 1980 and thus should not be interpreted as condoning the application of different factors in the face of a statutory requiremen t to do otherwise. However, In re Barlow is nevertheless instructive in this case, in which the Legislature has not elected to confine the court’s decision-making process regarding guardianships to a specific list of statutory factors.21 The trial court likewise found the childr en’s school record to be a compelling reason to deny the guardianship. The trial court recognized th at the school district where Scribner lived was highly regarded, but the court noted that the children made “significant progress in their school perform ances” while with the foster parents. Accordingly, the trial court stated, “[h]ow uprooting them and changing schools would serve their best interests is highly quest ionable.” The trial court recognized that significant testimony was devoted to the child ren’s preference and concluded that JRG was agreeable to either outco me, while COH, ERH, and KBH were “decidedly in favor of remaining in their existing placement [with the foster parents] on a permanent basis.” Acknowledging that the children’s preferen ce had already been overridden when they were removed from the care of their biological parents, the trial court determined that it

was not in the children’s best in terest to again ignore their preference, particularly when that preference was for what the trial court determined to be a “stable, loving, secure, and trustworthy home . . . .” Finally, the trial c ourt lamented its conclu sion that neither the foster parents nor Scribner seemed willing to encourage a relationship with the other party. Overall, we are not left with the defin ite and firm conviction that a mistake was made in assessing the facts relevant to the child ren’s best interests and, thus, we conclude

that the trial court’s best-inter est determination was not clearly erroneous. First, the trial court provided an individualized analysis based on the releva nt evidence for each of the applicable factors. Second, the trial court di d not take a one-sided view of the evidence; rather, the court weighed evidence that favo red each placement option and acknowledged that Scribner could likely provide a stable and caring environment for the children if22 given the opportunity. The tr ial court also recognized that its decision to deny the guardianship could appear unf air to Scribner. However, the trial court correctly explained that its focus remained on the children’s best interests, as required by law. See MCL 712A.19c(2). Finally, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial court erred by denying Scribner’s petition for guardianship under MCL 712A.1 9c(2) was largely rooted

in its erroneous conclusion that Scribner was entitled to a preference because of her status as a relative. However, as previously esta blished, the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c. Because ther e is no statutory preference for creating a guardianship with a relative under MCL 712A.19c(2), the entirety of the Court of Appeals’ review of the trial court’s best-interest determination is severely

undercut. Accordingly, we conclude that the Cour t of Appeals erroneously substituted its judgment for the trial court’s judgment on questions of fact . Additionally, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in c oncluding that a guardianship with Scribner was not in the children’s best interests under MCL 722.19c(2).

IV. CONCLUSION We hold that MCL 722.954a creates a pr eference for placement with relatives, but that preference does not apply to a court’ s decision regarding whether to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2). We further ho ld that, in deciding whether to appoint a guardian, a court must dete rmine whether the guardianshi p is in the child’s best interests, and to do so the court may cons ider the best-interest factors from the Child Custody Act, the Adoption Code, or any othe r factors that may be relevant under the circumstances of a particular case.23 Because the Court of Appeals erroneous ly concluded that a preference for placement with relatives exis ts under MCL 712.19c(2) and su bstituted its judgment for the trial court’s on questions of fact regarding the children’s best interests, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and remand to that Court to consider Scribner’s appeal of the MCI Superintendent’s denial of consent to adopt the children.

Michael F. Cavanagh Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack David F. Viviano