U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

30–572 2018

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–98] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

THE FISCAL YEAR 2019 NATIONAL 

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 12, 2018 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

JIMMY PANETTA, California 

JEN STEWART, Staff Director 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

JUSTIN LYNCH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ............... 7 

Mattis, Hon. James N., Secretary of Defense, United States Department 

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr. ............................................................................ 110 

Mattis, Hon. James N. ..................................................................................... 86 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 84 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 83 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter to the Secretary of Defense from the World Professional Association for Transgender Health ........................................................................ 125 

Letter to the Secretary of Defense from the American Medical Association ................................................................................................................. 126 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 130 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 129 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 129 

(1) 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2019 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 12, 2018. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee 

is pleased to welcome back the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the administration’s fiscal year 2019 budget request for the Department of Defense. We 

are also pleased to have the Comptroller available to answer any 

questions. 

We meet under rather different circumstances than last year. 

Congress and the administration have worked together to provide 

to the military the resources they need to begin to reverse the erosion of our military strength. There is agreement on the funding 

levels for defense for fiscal year 2019. We know how much we have 

to work with. 

The challenge, as we work through the details, is that some of 

the consequences of years of cuts and neglect are becoming more 

apparent. A study published this weekend by Military Times found 

that aviation mishaps have risen about 40 percent since the Budget 

Control Act took effect. The alarming number of aviation accidents 

in just the past three and a half weeks reveals how deep the damage goes, and the magnitude of the task of repairing and rebuilding 

our capabilities. 

Meanwhile, as events in Syria remind us, the world does not 

slow down and wait on us to rebuild. 

This committee has had a number of hearings and briefings this 

year to examine more closely the challenges we face, from readiness to space and cyber. We have studied what adversaries are 

doing. We have heard from combatant commanders, service chiefs, 

and outside experts. 

The issue today is how well the administration’s budget request 

meets our national security needs under the parameters set in the 

Bipartisan Budget Act. We also want to examine how this budget 

request implements the new National Defense Strategy, about 

which the Secretary testified in February. 
2 

I am committed to working with the Department to achieve reforms that enable our military to be more agile and more efficient 

in facing the threats which confront us. The challenges are great, 

but if Congress and the Department work together, we can ensure 

that the military has what it needs to meet those challenges. 

I would yield to the ranking member for any comments he would 

like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 83.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Secretary 

Mattis, General Dunford, Comptroller Norquist. We appreciate you 

being here, and we appreciate your leadership in the Pentagon. 

And the chairman, I think, is quite correct in that it is better this 

year that we have a budget for 2018. We have the framework of 

an agreement for 2019, going forward. And certainly, some degree 

of predictability is going to be enormously helpful. 

And without question, we have a readiness crisis within the military. The chairman has cited a number of the examples of that. We 

are better now than we were a year or two ago, but still a long way 

to go to make up for 15 years of war and, frankly, for spending 

money in other places and not on readiness. 

So, as we look at the 2018–2019 budget, one of my top priorities 

is to make sure that that money goes to make sure that our force 

is ready, that we address that problem, because there will be other 

needs, there will be other pressures. I hope we don’t give in to 

those, I hope we remember that the troops should come first. Having them ready for the fights that they are saying they need to be 

ready for is our number one priority, going forward. 

I will also point out that, while 2018 to 2019 are great, I hope 

you are also planning for a lean future, because we are looking at 

an over $1 trillion deficit this year. We just cut taxes by almost $2 

trillion, increased spending by somewhere in the neighborhood of 

$500 billion in the face of a now nearly $22 trillion debt. 

So, going forward in the next decade, certainly for the country as 

a whole, but for your purposes, for the military, understanding our 

fiscal restraints and dealing with them is going to be a critically 

important part of making sure that our military is ready to do 

what it can do. So we do need to get the budget under control. 

On a couple other matters, just quickly, in North Korea I just 

want to emphasize that we should find a peaceful solution. It is a 

very, very difficult situation. But going to war on the Korean Peninsula would have catastrophic consequences. So I hope that we 

figure out a way to contain and control the very real threat of 

North Korea, but at the same time prevent going to war. 

The last two things I will say is, one, on Syria, it is a very, very 

difficult situation. You know, two Presidents have struggled with 

how to deal with it. I am not going to pretend I have an easy answer. But until we have a more long-term strategy, until we have 

some idea of where we are going in Syria and the Middle East, it 

seems unwise to me to start launching missiles. We need to know 
3 

where that is going, what the purpose of it is, before we take that 

act. 

I think it is also worth pointing out it is hard to find a legal justification for that military strike in Syria, absent congressional approval. So, whatever you decide to do, I would hope that you would 

include the legislative branch. 

And then, lastly, we have heard a lot—and I agree with this— 

that we have shifted our focus in the last few years. We are now 

back into an era of great power struggles because of what Russia 

and China are doing, and how aggressive they are in pushing their 

agendas and their ideas across the world. And I agree with that. 

I just hope that we don’t see a great power struggle as simply 

an excuse for another arms race, and that we understand that a 

great power struggle involves all the elements of our government: 

diplomacy; I think, most critically, allies, finding partners in the 

world to advance our agenda and thwart those aspects of the Russia and Chinese agenda that are against the interests, not just of 

the United States, but I think of the world. So we work with partners, and we use diplomacy, and we use development, that we don’t 

simply use the excuse of the rise of Russia and China to build more 

and more weapons. 

There has to be a much more comprehensive approach, if we are 

going to be successful in creating a peaceful and prosperous world, 

which certainly is in our best interests, but it is in the best interests of the entire world, as a whole. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 84.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary and Chairman, welcome. Without 

objection, any written statements you would like to make will be 

made part of our record. 

And Mr. Secretary, you are recognized for any comments you 

would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MATTIS, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. 

I do appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2019. I am joined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, who will discuss military factors, and the Department’s Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David Norquist, who is superintending the first full financial audit in most of our lifetimes, since it is the first of the Department of Defense history. 

I am now in my second year as Secretary of Defense. And with 

your help we have made steady progress during the past 14 

months. In January, the Department published a 2018 National 

Defense Strategy to which I testified previously. It is the first in 

a decade. 

Framed within President Trump’s National Security Strategy, 

our National Defense Strategy provides clear direction for America’s military to restore its competitive edge in an era of re-emerging, long-term, great power competition. 
4 

The Department next released the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, 

which calls for America’s military to provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, one that is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century 

threats, and to reassure our allies. 

In South Asia and Afghanistan, uncertainty in the region has 

been replaced by the certainty of President Trump’s South Asia 

strategy. Concurrently, in the Middle East, we have dramatically 

reduced ISIS’s [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s] physical caliphate, using a coordinated, whole-of-government approach that works 

by, with, and through our allies and partners to crush ISIS’s claim 

of invincibility, and deny them a geographic haven from which to 

plot murder. 

Last month, thanks to the bipartisan support and political courage of Congress, President Trump signed an omnibus spending bill 

that funds the government for the remainder of the fiscal year. 

This law, along with the 2-year budget agreement passed as part 

of February’s Bipartisan Budget Act, finally freed us from the inefficient and damaging continuing resolution funding process, and is 

now providing the predictable and sufficient funding needed to continue implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy. 

Our fiscal year 2019 budget requests the resources necessary to 

fulfill the Department’s enduring mission to provide the combatcredible forces needed to deter war and, if deterrence fail, to win 

in the event of conflict. These forces reinforce America’s traditional 

tools of diplomacy, ensuring that the President and our diplomats 

negotiate from a position of strength. 

To restore our Nation’s competitive military edge, the fiscal year 

2019 budget funds our National Defense Strategy’s three overarching lines of effort: first, to build a more lethal force; second, to 

strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships; 

and third, to reform the Department’s business practices for better 

performance and affordability. 

Our first line of effort is to build a more lethal force. All our Department’s policies, expenditures, and training must contribute to 

the lethality of our military. We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s thinking, yesterday’s weapons, 

or yesterday’s equipment. As President Washington said during his 

first State of the Union Address, ‘‘To be prepared for war is one of 

the most effectual means of preserving peace.’’ And today, ladies 

and gentlemen, our lethal military arm will enhance our diplomats’ 

persuasiveness. 

The paradox of war is that an adversary will always move 

against any perceived weakness. So we cannot adopt a single preclusive form of warfare. We must be able to fight across the entire 

spectrum of combat. The Nation must field sufficient, capable 

forces to deter conflict. And if deterrence fails, we must win. 

Following this logic, we must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent so these weapons are never used, and a decisive conventional 

force that can also wage irregular warfare. Preserving the full 

range of our Nation’s deterrent options requires the recapitalization of our Cold War legacy nuclear deterrent forces, as initiated 

during the previous administration. Modernizing the Nation’s nuclear deterrent delivery systems, including our nuclear command 
5 

and control, is the Department’s top priority, and these programs 

are fully funded in the fiscal year 2019 budget. 

The fiscal year 2019 budget also funds enhancements to the U.S. 

missile defense capabilities to defend the homeland, our deployed 

forces, allies, and partners against an increasingly complex ballistic 

missile threat. In accordance with the soon-to-be-released 2018 

Missile Defense Review, this budget request continued robust support for missile defense capability and capacity to keep pace with 

the advancing threats. 

The proposed budget will modestly increase end strength of the 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to restore readiness, 

adding 25,900 to the Active and Reserve Force. The budget will 

also continue to invest in the military’s most important assets, its 

warfighters, with a 2.6 percent military pay increase. 

The 2019 budget continues increased procurement of preferred 

and advanced munitions, a necessity due to ongoing operations in 

the Middle East, and the need for war reserves. 

Ten combat ships and eight support ships are funded, arresting 

the downward trajectory of our Navy’s size and lethality. We will 

continue production of 77 F–35 and 24 F–18 aircraft, evaluating 

the performance of both to determine the most appropriate mix, 

moving forward. 

This budget request funds systems to enhance communications 

and resiliency in space, addressing overhead persistent infrared capabilities; positioning, navigation, and timing; plus space launch 

systems. 

Our 2018 National Defense Strategy also prioritizes investing in 

technological innovation to increase lethality. Cyber advanced computing, big-data analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, miniaturization, additive manufacturing, directed energy, and 

hypersonics are the very technologies that we need to fight and win 

wars of the future. 

Every investment in the strategy-driven fiscal year 2019 budget 

is designed to contribute to the lethality of our military and ensuring that subsequent Secretaries of Defense inherit a military force 

that is fit for its time. Those seeking to threaten America’s experiment in democracy should know if you challenge us, it will be your 

longest and worst day. 

Our 2018 National Defense Strategy’s second line of effort is to 

strengthen traditional alliances, while building new partnerships. 

In the past, I had the privilege of fighting many times in defense 

of the United States, but I never fought in a solely American formation. It was always alongside foreign troops. 

Easier said than done. Winston Churchill noted that the only 

thing harder than fighting with allies is fighting without them. 

History proves that we are stronger when we stand united with 

others. And accordingly, our military will be designed, trained, and 

ready to fight alongside allies. 

Working by, with, and through allies and partners who carry 

their fair share remains a source of strength of the United States. 

Since the costly victory in World War II, Americans have carried 

a disproportionate share of the global defense burden, while others 

recovered. Today the growing economic strength of allies and partners has enabled them to step up, as demonstrated by the 74 na-
6 

tions and international organizations participating in the Defeat 

ISIS campaign, and again in the 41 nations standing shoulder-toshoulder in NATO’s [North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. 

To date, 15 NATO allies are also increasing their defense budget 

as a share of the gross domestic product, giving credence to the 

value of democracies standing together. Further, our Pacific partners are strengthening their defenses. 

Our third line of effort is the urgent reform of the Department’s 

business practices to provide both solvency and security. We will 

continue to establish a culture of performance where results and 

accountability matter on every expenditure to gain full benefit from 

every single taxpayer dollar spent on defense. 

We are committed to exercising the utmost degree of financial 

stewardship and budget discipline within the Department. In this 

regard, this year we will deliver our Department’s first full financial audit in history. We will find the problems and take swift action to correct our deficiencies, thereby earning the trust of Congress and the American people. 

I am confident we have the right leaders in place to make meaningful reform a reality: Pat Shanahan, as Deputy Secretary of Defense; Jay Gibson, as Chief Management Officer; Ellen Lord, as our 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; Michael Griffin, as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; Bob Daigle, as Director of Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation; and David Norquist, as the Department’s Comptroller/ 

Chief Financial Officer. Each brings the intellect and the energy 

and the experience required to implement and sustain meaningful 

reform, ensuring the Department provides performance and affordability for the American taxpayer. 

The Department is transitioning to a culture of performance and 

affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. We will 

prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent 

modular upgrades. With your continued critical support, we will 

shed outdated management and acquisition processes, while adopting American industry’s best practices. Our management structure 

and processes are not engraved in stone, they are a means to an 

end. If current structures inhibit our pursuit of lethality, I have directed service secretaries and agency heads to consolidate, eliminate, or restructure to achieve their mission. 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy three primary lines of effort—building a more lethal force, strengthening our traditional alliances and building new partnerships, and reforming the Department’s business practices for performance and affordability—will 

restore our competitive military advantage, ensuring we are prepared to fight across the full spectrum of combat, now and into the 

future. 

I want to thank this committee for your strong spirit of bipartisan collaboration. While our trajectory is going in the right direction, our work has just begun. This is a year of opportunity and 

a chance to continue to work together, building on a strong start 

as we turn the 2018 National Defense Strategy into action. 

The points I need to emphasize in today’s hearing is that this 

budget, which is designed to execute the National Defense Strat-
7 

egy, is building a more lethal force by restoring current and future 

readiness, modernizing our nuclear deterrent forces and their command and control systems, building for the future by improving our 

military’s technological competitive edge, and reforming the Department’s business processes to establish a culture of performance 

and affordability to ensure security and solvency. This strategy is 

the guidepost for all our actions, including this year’s strategy-driven budget request, driving meaningful reform to establish an enduring culture of performance, affordability, and agility. 

I cannot appear before you without expressing my gratitude to 

the men and women of the Department of Defense. They are the 

ones that must ultimately turn the National Defense Strategy into 

action. Every day more than 2 million service members and nearly 

1 million civilians do their duty, honoring previous generations of 

veterans and civil servants who have sacrificed for their country. 

It is my privilege to serve alongside them, and I thank them for 

their tireless efforts and unyielding standards in defense of our Nation. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mattis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 86.] 

Secretary MATTIS. General Dunford is prepared to discuss the 

military dimensions of our budget request. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Dunford. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DUNFORD. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to join Secretary Mattis and Under Secretary Norquist 

here today. It is an honor to represent your men and women in uniform. And while we all recognize the challenges that the chairman 

outlined and the ranking member outlined in their opening remarks, I want to begin by assuring you that the U.S. military has 

a competitive advantage over any potential adversary today. I am 

confident we can defend the homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and prevail in any conflict. 

But as I testified last summer, after years of sustained operational commitments, budgetary instability, and advances by our 

adversaries, our competitive advantage has eroded, and our readiness has been degraded. Driven by the National Defense Strategy 

that the Secretary outlined, and building on the fiscal year 2017 

and 2018 appropriations, the fiscal year 2019 budget submission 

supports rebuilding the lethal and ready joint force that the Nation 

needs. 

Our defense strategy recognizes the central challenge to U.S. 

prosperity and security is the re-emergence of long-term strategic 

competition by revisionist powers. With Russia and China as the 

priority, we also have to meet the challenges of North Korea, Iran, 

and violent extremist organizations. 

China and Russia continue to invest across the full range of nuclear, cyber, space, and conventional capabilities. Both states are 

focused on limiting our ability to project power and undermine the 

credibility of our alliances. They are also increasingly adept at ad-
8 

vancing their interests through coercive, competitive activity below 

the threshold of armed conflict. 

North Korea has been on a relentless pursuit to develop their nuclear and missile capability. They have been clear that these capabilities are intended to threaten the United States and our allies 

in the region. 

Iran continues to spread malign influence and create instability 

across the Middle East. And while we have made a great deal of 

progress over the past year, we are still grappling with the challenges of violent extremism, including ISIS, al-Qaida, and associated movements. 

Defending our homeland, our allies, and advancing our interests 

in the context of these and many other challenges requires us to 

maintain a balanced inventory of ready, lethal, and flexible forces 

that are relevant across the range of military operations. Fortunately, with your support, we have begun to arrest the erosion of 

our competitive advantage, and we are on the path to developing 

the force we need to meet our current and future challenges. 

This year’s budget builds on the readiness recovery that we started in 2017, and reinforces our effort to develop the capabilities we 

need, both today and tomorrow. 

In requesting your support for this year’s budget submission, I, 

and all the senior leaders in the Department, are making a commitment to you that we will make every dollar count. We will fully 

support the auditing initiative led by Secretary Norquist, and we 

will maintain an ongoing dialogue with you on our progress toward 

addressing our current readiness challenges in building the capabilities we will need tomorrow. 

To restore our competitive advantage and assure our men and 

women never find themselves in a fair fight, the U.S. military requires sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding. The funding 

in this budget is sufficient. I look forward to working with Congress to make it sustained and predictable. 

Thank you again for your support and the opportunity to appear 

before you today. 

[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in the 

Appendix on page 110.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Norquist, my understanding is you did not 

have an oral statement. Is that correct? 

Mr. NORQUIST. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, a lot of members want to ask questions. Let me 

just pose one question for you. I made reference to the study that 

came out this weekend that showed a 40 percent increase in aviation mishaps since the Budget Control Act took effect. And yet, 

over the past 3 weeks there have been some criticism about the 

amount in the omnibus funding bill, which Congress passed and 

the President signed. 

I think it is important for this committee and for the country to 

hear from you about the significance of the funding bill that was 

passed and the 2-year agreement that most of us voted for in February to raise the Budget Control Act. How does that affect the 

men and women who serve our Nation, and our national security? 
9 

Secretary MATTIS. Chairman, thank you. I believe that this committee is probably keenly aware of the readiness challenges we 

have faced. And for—ever since I got into this job, you have been 

part of the solution. All of you have been part of the solution. 

Right now we cannot repair our way out of the situation we are 

in. We are actually going to have to buy, in some cases, the capabilities that we have simply worn out and had to set aside that 

can’t even be repaired, whether it be aircraft or squadrons do not 

have enough; or it be ships that cannot go back to sea on time because when we open them up, long overdue for their maintenance 

period, we find things wrong inside that lengthen their time in the 

shipyard. 

When you put all this together, this is why you can have young 

officers getting promoted to major, for example, that have not had 

the same flight hours that you have expected during your tenure 

on this committee, that a lieutenant or captain would have had. 

They have not had the opportunity because we have not funded for 

it, the aircraft are not available, the spare parts and the maintainers have not been there. 

This is not pointing a finger at anyone in particular; it is where 

we are at, and we deal with it. I will let the historians deal with 

how did we get here. But with your help, we are now going to be 

able to come out from underneath this and put our readiness back 

to where you expect it to be when you put out billions of taxpayer 

dollars for various parts of the military, yet when we put it all together, due to the continuing resolutions, it did not have the kind 

of budget support it needed for a balanced force. 

The bottom line is we can spend every dollar. The audit is going 

to find problems, Chairman, and we will correct those problems. 

But we will be working with you, and we are keenly aware that 

we have got to deliver a more ready force, objectively, quantitatively, a more ready force that we can lay out to you. It is absolutely necessary, what you have given us. Now it is up to us to 

spend every dollar where you expect it to be spent. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Dunford, do you want to add anything 

to the effects of this budget agreement? 

General DUNFORD. The only thing I would say, Chairman Thornberry, is it is an agreement that allows us to balance both the 

needs of today and tomorrow. 

And to emphasize the Secretary’s point, I think we used to look 

at operations and maintenance money as associated with readiness, 

and then modernization money as associated with the future. And 

to the Secretary’s point, I really do believe today there is a distinction without a difference when you talk about readiness and modernization. We actually have to modernize the force in order for us 

to be ready against the challenges that are outlined in the National 

Defense Strategy. 

And I think, as a result of the 15 years of erosion, I don’t think 

we can collectively think about these as discreet tasks. In other 

words, today is tomorrow, and the investments that we make in 

maintaining a competitive advantage in the context of the National 

Defense Strategy are the same ones we need to make sure our 

squadrons, our battalions, our brigades are up and running today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
10 

Ranking Member. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I—on the budget, just out of curiosity, I wonder what your 

response is. For fiscal year 2019, the agreement that we reached 

that the chairman just alluded to, I believe had a—if you count the 

DOE [Department of Energy] portion of what we do in this committee—$647 billion. That is not counting OCO [overseas contingency operations] in there, and its $716 billion. 

The budget cap number for 2020 is, I believe, $567 billion. So it 

would be, gosh, about an $80 billion cut in what we did in fiscal 

year 2019. Are you planning on having to absorb that cut, or are 

you hoping that there will be some way to avoid the Budget Control Act come 2020 and 2021? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, we will lay out the requirement for 2020 

and 2021. However, our internal reforms, we are looking to accrue 

savings there. 

At the same time, we are going to have to have a budget fit for 

its time, and I can’t tell you what the threat specifically will be. 

I can tell you we are trying to put ourselves in a position to have 

a shock absorber, where we can take those threats on board, maintain budget predictability that includes requests from us. 

But for right now, I would just suggest that, in light of the percent of the GDP [gross domestic product] we are putting out for 

military security, for defense, America can afford survival, and our 

job is to make certain what we bring to you is only what is required. And that is—I don’t want to lock myself into the future, 

since I don’t have—— 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry, but if I may interpret that, basically what 

you are saying is you believe that if we go back to the budget caps 

in 2020 and 2021, we will be putting the country at risk, and you 

do not accept that number, and you are not planning on that number. 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I owe you my best advice—— 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. No, I just want your honest opinion, so—— 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. I mean I would love to see the budget 

go down. In the world that we are looking at out there, I don’t 

think that is going to be the case. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. Well, you don’t think that that would put us 

in a position to provide for the national security, if the budget went 

back to the cap numbers in fiscal year 2020 and 2021. 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, that—and the problem with that, of course, is 

the debt and deficit that I talked about. And I would just say, from 

my colleagues, that, you know, whatever disagreements we may 

have on exactly what the number for the defense budget should be, 

we are headed towards an enormous problem, unless we can continue to borrow north of $1 trillion every year, basically forever. 

So there are some big-picture budget things that we need to deal 

with, even if we disagree on the exact number for the defense 

budget, going forward. It is going to create—we are going to be 

right back in the uncertainty about a year from now if we don’t 

come up with some comprehensive approach to our budget challenge. 
11 

Last thing I will say is, you know, I think, given the budget that 

we face, we have to try to find ways to save money as much as possible. And we have had this discussion before. I just want to put 

it on the record. I don’t think we need to spend $1.2 trillion on 

modernizing our nuclear weapons. We certainly need to modernize 

them. 

But again, I will emphasize—I have said this before in hearings—China has 275 nuclear weapons, that is it. We have 15, 20 

times as many. They have set up a deterrence, a very, very credible 

deterrence, because a lot of people don’t know, but nuclear weapons 

these days are, I think, roughly 1,000 times more powerful than 

the one that dropped on Hiroshima. 

We ought to be able to come up with a nuclear deterrence strategy that costs us a lot less money. And also, if there are fewer nuclear weapons out there, not just on our side, granted, but on all 

sides, there is less risk of stumbling into a nuclear war. 

So I am deeply concerned about the nuclear modification plan, 

both in terms of what it really does for our national security, the 

risks it places for a nuclear conflict, and also just for the budget, 

because I am—I will say this. I am 100 percent with the chairman 

on the readiness crisis and the way you described it. We are not 

providing the equipment or the training for our troops that we 

should right now to make sure that they are ready. I want to find 

money wherever I can to make sure that we are. And that is one 

big area that I am going to be looking at. 

If it is okay, I will just—you know, you can send me your comments for the record. I want to let other people get in, but I just 

wanted to put that on the record. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. As all members were notified, we are going to 

pick up the questioning today where we left off when the Secretary 

was with us in February. And so, Mr. Lamborn is recognized. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

you both for your service to our country. 

So for either or both of you, everyone knows that Russia is in violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. Do 

you expect the Russians to return any time soon to full and 

verifiable compliance with that treaty? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right now, Congressman, we have very modest expectations that they would return to compliance as a result. 

In the Nuclear Posture Review we are looking for a way, at the 

lowest possible cost, to checkmate them and make it in their best 

interest to return to compliance. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General Dunford, do you have anything to add to 

that? 

General DUNFORD. All I would say, Congressman, is that one of 

the things we are doing in this budget that we have submitted is 

there is research and development for non-compliant weapons that 

is allowed by the treaty, and that is in the budget for fiscal year 

2019. So we are not only looking for operational concepts and ways 

to deal with the Russian violation, but we are also at least posturing ourselves to develop weapons, should they be required. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And I think we should stress the point that, even 

as we stay in the treaty—although I am skeptical that they are 
12 

going to come back into compliance, and we are kind of unilaterally 

tying our hands behind our back—we are legitimately allowed to 

do research for non-compliant systems. Is that not correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. That is correct, and we are doing that. It is 

in the budget, Congressman. We—as we modernize this nuclear deterrent, our effort will also be matched at State Department by 

movement on arms control and non-proliferation. There are two 

thrusts to our nuclear strategy. 

And so, as a result, we have got to do something that would 

make it in Russia’s best interest to return to compliance, and that 

is why those funds have been requested. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I am glad they are being requested. And 

how important is it to have additional options in our nuclear stockpile to address possible threats in the future? 

Secretary MATTIS. In order to keep a deterrent fit for its time, 

it has got to be one that adjusts to any changes that we see an adversary or potential adversary making. And in this case you will 

notice that there are several adaptations. One of them is to return 

possibly the nuclear cruise missiles to the Navy ships. We had 

them there before. A second one is to put a small number of lowyield weapons onboard Navy submarines, ballistic missile submarines. This is because we have uncovered—and Russia has been 

rather out front with the idea that they could escalate to de-escalate. 

What that means is you use a low-yield nuclear weapon in a conventional war to compel surrender, basically. And our point is to 

say you can’t do that, we are going to have a low-yield weapon, we 

are not confronted only by using a high yield, which they believe 

we would not do. In order to make certain that the deterrent 

works, they must know that we don’t have a choice only between 

surrender or suicide. So that is why we are doing these kind of adaptations to stay fit for our time. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I am really glad to hear that because, as we go 

into the budget, some folks may argue that having additional options is destabilizing. We all want as much stability as possible 

when it comes to these powerful weapons. 

So it is your belief that it is stabilizing to have more options. Is 

that not correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. The entire point of that nuclear modernization 

is to maintain a nuclear deterrent that stabilizes and deters any 

use of the weapon. Then that is why we have looked at the research and development as authorized under the treaty, for one. It 

is why we are looking at the low-yield weapon, as well. It actually 

raises the deterrent effect of what we have, and actually reduces 

the chance of nuclear war. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you so much. I appreciate what you do for 

our country. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I appreciate the gentleman keeping all questions and answers within 5 minutes. Let me encourage everybody 

to do that, so—because—so we can get to as many people as possible. 

Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes. 
13 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

both witnesses. 

I appreciate the remarks regarding passage of the omnibus on 

March 21st. Again, Secretary Mattis, you noted the fact that it was 

a bipartisan effort. I think it is important to note that, not only 

was it bipartisan, but neither caucus by itself was able to deliver 

the votes to actually pass it by itself. So it truly took a coalition 

of people who, again, I think have heeded your repeated testimony 

over the last 2 or 3 years about the harm that the sequestration 

caps were causing, in terms of readiness and other issues. 

So again, you were a big part of the external effort to get us to 

that point and, obviously, to create a 2-year horizon with the bipartisan budget agreement. 

Secretary Mattis, on page 3 of your testimony it states that the 

2018 National Defense Strategy provides clear strategic direction 

for America’s military to reclaim an era of strategic purpose, which 

is, I think, a very, you know—has a, you know, high aspirational 

goal for our country, to get sort of a clear picture that budgets are 

tied to a stable strategy. 

Unfortunately, you know, just the events of the last 2 weeks, you 

know, we have comments coming out of the White House that—regarding Syria, which I think really are sort of disconnected to that 

goal. On March 28 the President was giving a speech on infrastructure where he—again, without any prompting—talked about wanting to leave Syria ‘‘very soon.’’ Again, when the Pentagon was 

asked about that, they referred the media to the White House to 

get an explanation. 

On April 3rd, at a joint appearance with the presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, again he doubled down, saying that 

they want to get out, that the U.S. wants to get out. On the 4th, 

said it would be within a few months, and then on April 7th we 

had, obviously, the chemical attack, which, again, resulted in a gyration of comments coming out of the White House, talking about 

missile attacks. 

And then, yesterday morning, Russia vows to shoot down any 

and all missiles fired at Syria. ‘‘Get ready, Russia, because they 

will be coming nice and new and smart.’’ 

Again, in terms of, you know, trying to align those messages with 

a clear, strategic direction for our country, I am not asking you to 

answer any questions about operational decisions that you are considering right now, but what is the policy of the Department of Defense regarding—and strategy regarding the Assad regime, its future, and the Syrian civil war? Or is there a strategy? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. Well—and thank you for your comments about my role in the bipartisan omnibus, sir. But I would 

tell you that without this committee’s bipartisanship that you have 

right in this room, I think my comments would have been whistling 

in the dark. I think it was the example you set. On Syria, sir—both 

the last administration and this one made very clear that our role 

in Syria is the defeat of ISIS. We are not going to engage in the 

civil war, itself. 

Now, you can look back to a year ago, when we did fire missiles 

into Syria, unrelated to ISIS. And that was, of course, the use of 

chemical weapons. And some things are simply inexcusable, beyond 
14 

the pale, and in the worst interest of not just the Chemical Weapons Convention, but of civilization itself. 

And so the recognition of that means at times you are going to 

see contrary impulses. You saw President Obama try to deal with 

those chemical weapons when he was in, and enlisting the Russians, who now it shows were complicit in Syria retaining those 

weapons, Assad retaining them. And the only reason Assad is still 

in power is because of the Russians’ regrettable vetoes in the U.N. 

[United Nations}, and the Russian and Iranian military. 

So how do we deal with this very complex situation? First of all, 

we are committed to ending that war through the Geneva process 

and a U.N.-orchestrated effort. It has been unfulfilled because, 

again, Russia has continually blocked the efforts. But that doesn’t 

mean we give up. We work with the international community, the 

United Nations, to get the Geneva process underway, and make 

certain that we don’t allow this war to go on. 

I have seen refugees from Asia to Europe, Kosovo to Africa. I 

have never seen refugees as traumatized as coming out of Syria. 

It has got to end, and our strategy remains the same as a year ago. 

It is to drive this to a U.N.-brokered peace, but at the same time 

keep our foot on the neck of ISIS until we suffocate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary Mattis, 

General Dunford, Mr. Norquist. Thanks so much for joining us, and 

thanks for your service. 

Secretary Mattis, I want to begin by going to your words in your 

statement when you talked about the downward trajectory of our 

Navy inventory and of Navy lethality. In response to that last year, 

this committee authorized $26.2 billion and 13 warships. I think 

many of us were bitterly disappointed when the appropriators cut 

that number to $23.7 billion and 10 warships. 

And I know that our effort now this year is to be to continue the 

path of rebuilding the readiness and capability within our Navy. 

And obviously, the Navy-Marine Corps team needs that on the mission, going forward. 

In your testimony you state, ‘‘The fleet will continue to grow to 

meet capabilities needed in the future and maintain an industrial 

base healthy enough to adapt and evolve in a dynamic environment.’’ 

I am still concerned, though. As you saw last year, we authorized 

$26 billion, essentially; appropriated $24 billion, essentially. This 

year the fiscal year 2019 request was for $21 billion for shipbuilding. And I expected more because we had lifted the caps last year. 

So I thought there may be, as you talked about, a response to that 

downward trajectory. 

Mr. Secretary, let me ask this. If, given the resources, does our 

military have the need for additional submarines? Do we have a 

more efficient and effective way to purchase aircraft carriers? And 

could we build amphibious ships for our Marines on a more costeffective timeline? 

Secretary MATTIS. We—sir, we always need more submarines, we 

always need more ships. And in a perfect world, I would have—I 
15 

would tell you right now that I would have a 350-ship Navy. But 

I have to deal with where the ball lies, not where I want it to be. 

I think that, as you looked at the tradeoffs and the balance as 

we tried to go forward with current capability, with the future capability, with the growing challenges in space and cyberspace that 

have got to be accommodated, we probably did very well on shipbuilding. 

Now, can we get more affordable aircraft carriers? We not only 

can, we will. You will not see another one that goes through what 

you all experienced as you went down to Norfolk and saw that 

beautiful ship. But it is too late, it is over budget, and there are 

ways to prevent that in the future. 

So we are going to make better use of the dollars, and make a 

more affordable Navy. There are some strategic decisions to be 

made about how we do that to include what we do in cyberspace 

and space so each ship is more capable. But also, I would just tell 

you that this is part of an integrated force, and nobody can integrate their forces in the world better than we can right now. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to 

talk a little bit about the Ready Reserve Force. 

It is projected that our Ready Reserve Force would carry over 90 

percent of readiness lift, if called upon. And our Ready Reserve 

Force today, 46 ships averages 43 years old. In fact, we maintain 

some of the only steam plants left in the world onboard ships. They 

are essentially floating Smithsonian Institute displays. 

Some have speculated that, in a conflict, the limiting factors are 

going to be sealift. General Dunford, I know you had talked a little 

bit about that, about where we are with that. What steps is the Department pursuing to address this—what I believe is a strategic deficiency? 

Secretary MATTIS. I want to take that for the record, sir. I have 

met with the commander of Military Sealift Command. 

It—there is a way to make some of the ships more capable right 

now: simply modernize them at relatively cheap price. And we are 

also going to have to buy certain types of ships in the future. I believe that, right now, we have got a pretty good plan for it, the 

prioritization of it. 

And what does the Army really need to bring? You know, the 

Army is trying to adapt, as well, and that has significant impact 

on what is the requirement. And I want to make certain I get the 

requirement right, so I don’t come in and tell you that I built something I didn’t need, and 5 years from now I need to beach it. 

I will get back to you with something on that, sir. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thanks, Secretary Mattis. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to you 

both, I appreciate your being here before us. 

I too would like to focus on Syria. The chemical weapons attack 

against innocent civilians in Syria over the weekend is but the latest tragic atrocity in that country. 
16 

Secretary Mattis, you referenced a refugee crisis. Human Rights 

Watch has reported at least 86 verified chemical weapons attacks 

there. So we know what a terrible situation exists there. 

But in response to the most recent attack, the President has signaled that the administration is reviewing possible military action. 

There are compelling uncertainties surrounding renewed strikes in 

Syria. Just to name a few: how these actions fit into a broader 

Syria strategy, which you have tried to address in some form; the 

nature of the support from the international partners who share 

our condemnation of Assad’s atrocities; and how any renewed action in Syria, particularly should it escalate into a broader conflict, 

would impact our ability to engage in other areas of concern 

around the world, not the least of which also—what it might require of us in that part of the world, as well, in Syria. 

So these concerns are not de minimis or passing. And I hope that 

you would agree that it is clearly time for Congress to review existing authorizations for use of military force, and to engage in the 

considered debate these times require. But as we speak, the administration is reviewing possible military courses of action. So I appreciate the timing of your appearance here today. 

So, as you are considering possible steps forward, military actions you might take, what do you hope to achieve by any military 

action that the administration might eventually decide to take? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, I don’t want to get—as you 

will understand—into the details of a potential decision by the 

Commander in Chief, due to this latest attack, which is absolutely 

inexcusable. There have been a number of these attacks. In many 

cases, you know, we don’t have troops, we are not engaged on—in 

the ground—on the ground there, so I cannot tell you that we had 

evidence, even though we certainly had a lot of media and social 

media indicators that either chlorine or sarin were used. 

As far as our current situation, if, like last time, we decide we 

have to take military action in regard to this chemical weapons attack, then like last time we will be reporting to Congress, just as 

we did when we fired a little over a year ago, slightly over a year 

ago. 

As far as the counter-violent extremist, counter-ISIS—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. So let me go back to this. So before taking any action, you would report to Congress as to the nature of what that 

action might be? 

Secretary MATTIS. I will speak only to the fact that we will report 

to Congress, we will keep open lines of communication. There will 

be notification to leadership, of course, prior to the attack. But we 

will give a full report to the Congress itself, probably as rapidly as 

possible. 

On the counter-violent—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. And so I—let’s just stick with this. 

Secretary MATTIS. Okay. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I would also then like to know, would you take action absent support from our allies? I know that the administration 

is engaged in talks with France and the U.K. [United Kingdom]. 

Would you seek to have them involved in any action we might 

take? 
17 

Secretary MATTIS. As you know, ma’am, or Congresswoman, 

our—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. Would that be a pre-condition, I should say. 

Secretary MATTIS. Our strategy is to engage by, with, and 

through allies in all things we do. I do not want to discuss the current situation, because I owe confidentiality to our allies, due to the 

sensitive nature of military operations and the need to keep those 

secret. But I think you will find nothing inconsistent with your 

view in what we are doing, without going into any details. 

On the—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. And what worries you most about any military action we might take, given the highly complex landscape in Syria, 

the many, many actors that are engaged there? 

Secretary MATTIS. There is a tactical concern, ma’am, that innocent people—we don’t add any civilian deaths, and do everything 

humanly possible to avoid that. We are trying to stop the murder 

of innocent people. 

But on a strategic level, it is how do we keep this from escalating 

out of control, if you get my drift on that. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I get your drift. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Secretary MATTIS. Okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, thank you so much for your years of dedicated service to the United States. 

Secretary Mattis, you mentioned that—in previous testimony 

today that we don’t have confirmation yet whether or not there was 

a chemical attack. Don’t we reasonably have enough evidence to— 

certainly to believe that there was an attack, and the fact that they 

didn’t—the Russians and the Syrian Assad government did not 

grant immediate access, I believe, that was requested? Could you 

speak to that? 

Secretary MATTIS. I can, Congressman. I believe there was a 

chemical attack, and we are looking for the actual evidence. The 

OPCW—that is the organization for the Chemical Weapons Convention—we are trying to get those inspectors in, probably within 

the week. 

You know the challenges we face, where Russia has six times in 

the U.N. rejected and made certain that we could not get investigators in. We will not know from this investigating team that goes 

in, if we get them in, if the regime will let them in, we will not 

know who did it. They can only say that they found evidence or did 

not. And as each day goes by, as you know, it is a non-persistent 

gas, so it becomes more and more difficult to confirm it. 

So that is where we are at right now, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay, thank you. Just a question on the light attack aircraft. 

Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, the Air Force is currently 

testing light attack—a light attack aircraft that may be acquired 

by the Department for use as a cost-effective way to provide close 

air support of counterinsurgency, armed reconnaissance, and other 

combat operations in a more—when in a more permissive threat 

environment. 
18 

The—I think an F–22 was recently used to attack a Taliban drug lab. I think that is $70,000 an hour, in terms of the operational 

cost. And a light attack aircraft, I think, is approximately about 

$1,000, in terms of its operational cost an hour. 

I wonder if you could speak to having them in our inventory, as 

we are, again, in a low-threat environment, where we don’t have 

air-to-air threat, where we have a limited ground-to-air threat. And 

the—and also be able to sell those, in terms of foreign military 

sales, to our allies that can’t afford an F–35 aircraft, and that—to 

foster a better military-to-military relationship with many of our 

allies. Could you speak to that, please? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir, Congressman. You hit on all the right 

points, sir. We are looking for affordability. And where we don’t 

need an aircraft that costs 17-, 20-, $70,000 per flight hour, we 

need to look at it as a way to deliver readiness and combat capability on an affordable basis. And we are looking at it. 

As you know, the Chief of Staff Air Force personally flew in one 

to check it out. And I think you hit on all the right points there 

about why we are looking at this, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the role I play is to identify the 

capability that the force needs. What you have described is the capability that we need, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force I 

know is committed to delivering that low-end capability at the most 

cost-effective way possible, and that is really why these trials are 

ongoing, 

So we support his attempt to get that capability at the best cost 

we can, meeting the criteria you outlined. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Right. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for your 

service. 

Mr. Secretary, approximately how many transgender troops are 

currently deployed? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not know, Congresswoman. 

Ms. SPEIER. Could you provide that to us, subsequently? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think I can. I will give you the best data I 

can come up with on it, yes. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you believe that the currently serving transgender troops are weakening readiness or reducing lethality? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, on this one I submitted my 

recommendation and put it out publicly, my recommendation to the 

President. It is a highly charged issue from some people’s perspective, and it is under litigation right now. So out of respect for the 

courts, I will just tell you the current policy stays in effect, the last 

administration’s policy, as directed by the courts. And I have submitted to the President what I think is the best military advice. 

Ms. SPEIER. So, Mr. Secretary, I want to introduce you to Staff 

Sergeant Logan Ireland. He was a noncommissioned Officer of the 

Quarter when he was deployed to Afghanistan. He is also 

transgender. Do you believe that currently serving transgender 

troops like Staff Sergeant Ireland are a burden to our military? 
19 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, I think that, as we look at 

the enlistment standards, I gave a recommendation that troops, patriotic Americans who do not have gender dysphoria, should be allowed to serve. I do not—did not recommend that we change the 

clear standards that apply to all in that regard, or make a special 

group. And I would prefer to leave the courts to their action at this 

point, and then see where they stand at the end of it, and then look 

at what I have recommended to the President when I can answer 

you more fully. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, Mr. Secretary, you rolled out this new policy, 

and now you are basically saying, ‘‘I am not prepared to defend it.’’ 

Secretary MATTIS. Oh, I am prepared to defend it, ma’am. But 

out of respect for the courts, I do not intrude into something that— 

it would be inappropriate for me to say something that would 

somehow impact in a court case that is going on. I think this is a 

rather standard situation, once the courts engage. 

Ms. SPEIER. Were there any nongovernmental individuals or organizations involved in the formulation of the recommendations by 

the DOD [Department of Defense] to the President? 

Secretary MATTIS. It was the best military advice I could draw 

up from civilian overseers and military personnel, both officer and 

senior enlisted. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record letters from medical groups refuting 

the conclusions of the DOD report on military service by transgender individuals in which they say no medically valid reasons 

exist to exclude. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, whatever letters the gentlelady would like to enter into the record may be included. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 125.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, a Military Times article this week revealed that 

the Defense Manpower Data Center failed to report the number of 

combat troops deployed in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan last quarter. That website was also stripped of deployment data from previous quarters. 

I am very concerned about that. I think that there is no combat 

advantage to obfuscating the number of U.S. service members that 

were in these countries 3 months ago. And furthermore, the American public has a right to know. 

Do you intend to restore that information to the website? 

Secretary MATTIS. I will look at it, Congresswoman. As you 

know, we keep the Congress fully informed, right down to every 

week we can update you on exactly the numbers in each case. And 

we do maintain some degree of confidentiality over the number of 

troops engaged against enemies in the field. So I will have to look 

at it. But we will not, of course, ever keep that—those numbers 

away from Members of Congress for your oversight. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, I know, but this has been an ongoing website 

that has provided this information to the public, and all of a sudden the last quarter it is not posted and they have sweeped away 

all the data for previous quarters. 
20 

So it would suggest to, I think, the public and to Members of this 

Congress, that you are no longer going to make that information 

available. And I think the public has a right to know. 

Secretary MATTIS. I see. When I come in, ma’am, I don’t come in 

intending to hide things. But I would just ask what would you do 

if you thought the enemy could take advantage of that kind of data, 

seeing trends at certain times of the year, and what they can expect in the future. 

But I will certainly look at it. I share your conviction that the 

American people should know everything that doesn’t give the 

enemy an advantage—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

want to certainly commend you and your leadership, all of you, to 

make sure that our force is ready, capable, and able, and deployable. And so I appreciate the policies that—and the positions that 

you are advancing. 

I would like to ask—bring up the topic of base security, as it relates to rogue and careless drones. What many people don’t realize 

is that, under title 18, to interdict a drone, it is very—it is illegal 

to do that, because they are used as an aircraft or a protected computer. 

And in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] of 2017 

and 2018, as you know, we did give DOD some new authorities to 

go after them, which I certainly applaud. But they are limited to 

certain areas like nuclear deterrence, missile defense, air defense, 

assistance in protecting the President and the Vice President. 

So I am wondering and I am concerned about other DOD facilities and, you know, specifically a couple of things in Missouri 

makes me think of Mobility Command, it makes me think of also 

training bases and the potential danger or threat with a rogue 

drone on those missions. So I was wondering how is the Department of Defense interpreting the authorities provided by the fiscal 

year 2018 NDAA, and should this authority be expanded to all 

DOD mission sets, or perhaps to other specific missions like mobility and training that aren’t currently included? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I will start, and maybe the 

Secretary will add something. 

The Secretary, when the legislation was passed, brought together 

all the service chiefs and leadership to look at this issue, both from 

a material solution perspective, as well as from an authorities perspective. And he made it pretty clear that if we have a threat to 

our forces, to our bases, that we had the authorization—so we have 

interpreted it as we have the authorization to protect our people. 

There are still some gaps in our material solutions to be able to 

do that. I am satisfied that, particularly for our sensitive sites, we 

have addressed that. But we perhaps haven’t produced the equipment in the volume that we would want to see to be able to protect 

all of our facilities, and so forth. 

But I have been in a room a couple of times with the Secretary, 

and I feel like our leadership has interpreted the law to mean that 

we can protect our bases and protect our people. 
21 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So you said there are some gaps, though? Would 

you like to see those addressed in the next NDAA? 

General DUNFORD. We are addressing now the material solution 

gaps. In other words, making sure we have the right amount of 

equipment out there in the hands of our people across all of our 

bases and stations. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That is great. 

Secretary MATTIS. We also have authority gaps, though. Congresswoman, you are exactly right about the threat. We see what 

they are doing overseas, we know what is coming to a place near 

us, back here. We do need more authorities, and we will outline 

what those should look like, because you indicate that we can protect our nuclear sites. That is accurate. But we have a lot of other 

sensitive situations that are basically left outside the authority. 

So we owe to you what we think that authority should look like, 

and make our case. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great. Thank you for that. 

And the National Defense Strategy—rightfully so—highlighted 

the long-term strategic competition with China as one of the central challenges to national security. As you know, China is very focused, they have multiple lanes of effort, from espionage to the 

military effort to counterintelligence to propaganda arm, et cetera. 

And there are multiple lines of efforts in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy, the Joint Staff, across services and the 

combatant commands that look at these issues. 

Who is the focal point for such coordination across policy, across 

the services, across the commands? 

Secretary MATTIS. Inside DOD, it would be the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy. However, there is a broader issue here, a defend the Nation, a holistic, and that falls under Secretary Nielsen 

of Homeland Defense. And in that case, we have confronted a number of vulnerabilities that have not been fully addressed, and we 

are putting together the interagency effort to outline the holistic 

approach to that defense. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. I know we only have 28 seconds, but 

China, as you know, is beyond just the Indo-Pacific in their influence and their goals. Their activities are present in Africa, Europe, 

Latin America, et cetera. What efforts are you aware of being taken 

by each of the combatant commands in the different AORs [areas 

of responsibility] to counter the China challenge? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman we have—in the time remaining—we have a global campaign plan for China. Each one of 

the combatant commanders addresses China in the context of that 

global command—global campaign plan. 

Admiral Harris, as the Pacific Command, is the coordinating authority for that global campaign plan. But each one of the combatant commanders has supporting plans in their respective areas of 

responsibility that address specifically Chinese activity and capability in their areas. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Could I have a copy of that, or maybe be briefed 

on that? 

General DUNFORD. I—we will make sure you get briefed on that, 

Congresswoman. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 
22 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that everyone on 

the panel today is very concerned about what happened in Niger 

with the four soldiers that were killed there. And what I want to 

ask you today are about the risks that we are accepting by responding to crises or incidents on the continent of Africa, and wondered if you could comment on those risks. And can we respond to 

multiple threats around the world, particularly when you look at 

Africa and how large that footprint is, under our current defense 

budget restraints that we have? 

Secretary MATTIS. Representative, you hit on a key point for why 

our second line of effort—three lines of effort, the second one is 

building allies and partnerships. What we want to do is address 

those kinds of issues, whether it be in the Pacific or in Africa Command, in Europe, by, with, and through our allies. 

So when we go in—let’s just take Africa for an example. I actually looked at how many troops we are going to invest against how 

many—in this case, African—troops are we going to then be training or bringing in to the fight. And it looks like an investment 

chart right out of corporate America: one American equals how 

many trained and ready troops who can defend their own country. 

So our goal is to turn this to the right people, that is the people 

who—whose country it is. And that is the way we go about it. We 

don’t try to take on the full mission, we do a needs assessment of 

that specific country. In the case of the Sahel area—and you know 

Boko Haram and the threat that is there—in that case the French 

are leading the effort in—as the leading nation. And African nations are gathered around France, and we support France and the 

African nations. 

So you can see how we are doing this by, with, and through our 

allies, so we don’t carry the burden. 

Mr. VEASEY. When you—if we were to cut the State Department 

budget—and, of course, they work on things like governance that 

are, you know, very key, in my opinion, and in the opinion of many 

others, on making sure that these countries know how to govern 

themselves accordingly, so we don’t have to spend as much militarily—if we cut back on those particular efforts, how much more 

money would we need to be able to invest, and how much more risk 

would we need to take on the continent of Africa under those sort 

of restraints? 

I would imagine you would need more U.S. military power to be 

able to address—again, just because of the expanse of the continent. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, just to follow up on what the 

Secretary is saying—and I think this is where you were going with 

your question—you know, we have approximately 1,000 forces in 

West Africa. The French have over 4,000, and we are working with 

some 20- to 30,000 partners on the ground. So the requirement is 

for somewhere north of 30,000 forces to actually do the job, and our 

investment is only 1,000. 

So if your question is what would it take if we were doing it by 

ourselves, you know, it would take on a large order of magnitude 

greater than what we are investing right now. That is what by, 

with, and through really means, is a small U.S. footprint leverag-
23 

ing local capability to actually do the work that needs to be done 

to address terrorism, extremism in the region. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I worked very, very closely with 

my counterpart at State. It was Secretary Tillerson, as you know. 

I am now working with Secretary Sullivan, the Deputy Secretary, 

as nominee Pompeo goes through his hearing today. 

But I can assure you that, for example, when we have a small 

amount of development money given us through this committee, we 

meet with State, we align State and Defense development monies 

so there is an integrated effort. So everything we do is done to enable our diplomats to speak with more authority and to reinforce 

the foreign policy of the administration largely put together by 

State Department. 

So they have the lead, we reinforce, and it has been a good team, 

sir, all the way through. 

Mr. VEASEY. For the continent, though, is the best strategy governance or military right now? Like, what would help those countries in Africa? Is it more of a governance issue? 

Secretary MATTIS. Most of the challenges they face, Congressman, are not militarily solvable. It needs better governance. It 

needs diplomacy. It needs development. And we are working with 

State Department in support of those efforts. 

But it is—you are—I know what you are driving at, and I agree 

with you, that it is a diplomatically led effort. 

Mr. VEASEY. All right, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good afternoon—good morning here. 

First question, General Mattis, Secretary Mattis, you have a 

joint program office with the Coast Guard and the Navy right now 

for icebreakers. There is no joint strategy on icebreakers. Coast 

Guard has their own Arctic strategy and the Navy has their own 

Arctic strategy, and I was wondering if it had entered your mind 

to combine those into a joint Arctic strategy. 

Secretary MATTIS. We work, as you know, very closely. I don’t 

hold a meeting with the chairman and the four-stars without the 

Commandant of the Coast Guard in the room. So we intend to stay 

collaborative. We have different authorities, different missions, but 

they need to be integrated in the Arctic. 

Certainly we have not prioritized the Arctic right now, due to the 

other situations from Korea and Syria, the situation vis-a-vis Russia, South China Sea. But—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Would Russia be a reason—— 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. I take no issue with—— 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. To increase—wouldn’t Russia be—— 

Secretary MATTIS. Pardon? 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. A reason to increase our presence in 

the Arctic? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think what we increase there is what we 

would look at, what type of forces. 

Clearly, search and rescue in the Arctic is a high priority. Environmental protection is. Some of these things are not fit—are not 

best done by the U.S. military. But I would have no problem sup-
24 

porting Department of Homeland Security Coast Guard efforts in 

the Arctic. We work closely together on every other part, from the 

Caribbean to the Persian Gulf. So it is—I am sure it is an area we 

will work together. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Last question. The funding request 

from everything for the MSP, the Ready Reserve Fleet, basically 

the logistics train that you would use to go to war, you didn’t request full funding for the MSP ships. That is the Maritime Security 

Program they—you requested the old funding, which is over $3.5 

million, versus $5 million a ship. 

General McDew is now working on, for the first time, ever, looking at if we take casualties with our ships, as they load our gear— 

and I remember when I deployed in 2004 we loaded a RORO [rollon/roll-off] in San Diego with all of our gear, and then flew over 

to Kuwait, and fell in on our stuff. If you don’t have the gear, you 

can’t go to war. You might have the people there, and you might 

have the first stage, but you won’t be able to continue that. 

Our Ready Reserve Fleet is falling apart, it is done. It is a 

steam-engine-powered fleet, which is ridiculous. The MSP is going 

to be underfunded now. You might see people dropping out of that. 

So what are your thoughts and your—the grand strategy of aligning the effectiveness and the killing end of the military with the 

guys that are going to make it work, which is being able to get the 

gear there to sustain a battle? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. Projecting power, Congressman, you 

are quite right, that is a key area of concern, and we are trying 

to prioritize inside many demands on the budget. But I have met 

with the Military Sealift Command commander, and we are going 

to come up with a way to get out of the situation we have inherited. It is going to have to be prioritized. 

I think that the mobility requirements study that comes in later 

this year—I would say probably by October, maybe November—is 

going to actually have a part of it that focuses right on what is the 

problem, not in general terms. What is the specific problem? What 

needs to be moved? What capability do we need? And how do we 

go forward? 

The problem has not been sufficiently defined yet. We see all the 

symptoms of the problem. We need to really get it right before we 

start spending, you know, hundreds of millions of dollars on this. 

Mr. HUNTER. I can’t even tell when my voice is good enough for 

both. 

North Korea boost phase shoot-down. The same system would 

work in Kuwait, shooting down boost phase out of Iran to Western 

Europe or to Southeast Europe. You would have the same system, 

roughly the same geography and trajectories. So just—can you give 

us an update on how, instead of waiting until the missile is coming 

down out of space at us, we are shooting at it, how we are doing 

on shooting it as it is low and slow and going up into the air? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, we are looking at left of launch, 

prior to launch, and we are looking at boost phase. I would prefer 

to do that in private with you, give you that brief, because of the 

current nature of the threat. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 
25 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service, and particularly 

in this very difficult period of time. 

In response to Ms. Tsongas’s questions, you dealt with a lot of 

the issues of Syria. And I want to pick up one additional one: the 

horrific use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime has prompted 

the President to threaten military action. 

My question, Secretary Mattis, is very specific: What is the legal 

authority, the precise legal authority, of the United States Government to engage in military action in response to the chemical 

weapons use by the Assad regime? 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe that authority is under article 2. We 

have forces in the field, as you know, in Syria. And the use of 

chemical weapons in Syria is not something that we should assume 

that, well, because he didn’t use them on us this time, he wouldn’t 

use them on us next time. 

So for right now, I will have the lawyers get back to you with 

the broader issue. I am aware of where your question goes, sir, but 

I would just tell you that, you know, that we have got to look at 

the use of chemical weapons, whether it be in Salisbury, England, 

or in Syria, as something that is inexcusable and that has got to 

be addressed. 

And as Russia—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So, if I might—— 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. Prevents the United Nations from 

dealing with it, we can sit acquiescent, or we can do something 

about it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So you do not believe you need further congressional authority to respond to the chemical weapons attack with 

military kinetic action? 

Secretary MATTIS. Under article 2, sir, the President has the 

right to employ the military. There are war powers resolutions or 

other actions that could—or legislative actions that cause us to 

come to you, as you know, with reports. But at the same time, I 

think we have the authority to deal with this. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are you prepared to deliver to this committee 

the precise legal authority in writing that you are referring to? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, sir, again, protection of our forces, I 

don’t think we have to wait until they are under chemical attack, 

when the weapons are used in the same theater we are operating 

in. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I understand that. But I am awaiting a legal 

document from the Department of Defense specifying the exact authority and circumstances that cause you to use that protection of 

forces. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. I will provide it. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, I appreciate that. And I 

think it is necessary. Obviously, there would be a debate about 

this. 

The—in your testimony you indicated that there is some $12 billion for missile defense, that that is an imminent threat to the 
26 

United States. There is also, a week ago—actually, 2 weeks ago, 

from the Department of Homeland Security, an imminent threat 

from Russia hacking into critical infrastructure systems in the 

United States. 

What is the Department of Defense doing to defend against those 

kinds of attacks that could easily lead to a shutdown of the grid, 

or some other critical infrastructure, thereby bringing physical, as 

well as social and economic harm to the United States? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, as you know, we have a fair amount of 

money that is given to our Cyber Command for cyberspace operations. And we have a number of mission teams. But these are primarily, Congressman, focused on our own defense of the Department of Defense and offense against an adversary. 

For the defend the Nation mission that comes under the Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary Nielsen, we are in close 

contact with her. We have the only capability to try and defend, 

whether it be an electrical grid, a financial system, something like 

that. 

And I think that right now we need to get a lot stronger in the 

defense of our critical infrastructure, all aspects of it. And I realize 

that some of that could come under the Department of Defense, 

which is going to take congressional initiative and action in order 

to balance the constitutional safeguards for our citizens with the 

reality that we have got to be able to protect them. 

And this is an area that needs a lot of work, I will be the first 

to admit it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. If I might just—in a hearing that Ms. Stefanik 

had yesterday it became very, very clear that the coordination between the Department of Homeland Security and Department of 

Defense is lacking. I appreciate your attention to it. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to follow up on that a little bit. And I know, 

Secretary Mattis, in the National Defense Strategy you discussed 

the need to be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable. We are spending an increasing amount of time on gray 

zone conflicts. 

Obviously, if we have evidence that somebody used a chemical 

weapon, that is a line that we can see. We know we want a predictable response to that, so that that doesn’t happen again. But with 

gray zone conflicts, that line sometimes doesn’t seem to exist. 

And so, Chairman Dunford, as we talk about these gray zones, 

can you discuss the implications of the potential for future—proxy 

war might not be the right term, but certainly could work there. 

And is this going to be the way in the future that our adversaries 

challenge our resolve, as a country, both to operate on behalf of 

ourselves and our allies? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think the answer to the end 

of the question is yes, it is what we see, particularly with nations 

that we have a competitive advantage in the conventional space. 

They realize they can’t take us on conventionally, so they find another way. 
27 

To put a finer point on gray zone, I would describe that as political influence, economic coercion, use of cyber, use of information 

operations, and then military posture. So there is a military dimension to it, but it is clearly a broader problem than just a military 

dimension. 

As we think about it in the military strategy, we think the competition that is taking place in that gray zone is really the competition for our allies and partners. So we believe that the critical 

thing that they are trying to do in the gray zone, in the military 

space, is undermine the credibility of our alliances and partnerships, which, as the Secretary outlined, is an important line of effort in the National Defense Strategy. 

So what is critical for us to do is overcome in information space, 

overcome in cyber capabilities, and then our military posture, the 

erosion of that relationship that we have with our allies. The 

broader government piece is, in fact what we are going to see, and 

that is going to require the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Defense Department all to come together to be competitive in what you described as the gray zone. 

And as I mentioned, it really does have a political and economic 

and military and an informational aspect. 

Mr. SCOTT. And so, if I could follow up, it is going to take an allof-government approach on the homeland defense side of the gray 

zone conflicts. What authorities do you have to take offensive action in the gray zone? 

General DUNFORD. I think, Congressman, what you get at is a 

really important point, and that is that we have traditionally—and 

we do today—distinguished between peace and war. And so the activities and the authorities that we have in place on a day-to-day 

basis reflect the fact that we are at peace. 

And our adversaries don’t actually have the same restraints. So 

what they are doing on a day-to-day basis looks more like moving 

towards war than being in peace. And so, from a cyber perspective 

and information operations perspective, we are reviewing, and we 

do review—we are reviewing that issue, and we do believe that we 

are limited in the activities that we can perform on a day-to-day 

basis, and the authorities that we have to allow us to be competitive. 

Mr. SCOTT. This is something that I know, as a Member of Congress, we are going to need help from people that understand these 

definitions and operations significantly better than I do, and I look 

forward to your help with the authorities and other things that you 

need to not only defend the homeland, but to take action against 

those who are taking these actions against us. 

General Mattis, as—I mentioned the strategic predictability and 

operational unpredictability, as outlined in the National Defense 

Strategy. Can you briefly describe what this means for troop rotations and overseas assignments and training? 

Secretary MATTIS. I can, Congressman. What we will do is make 

certain our allies know that we are reliable and we can break 

through to them, we can get to them, and stand with them at the 

time of need. We will do it by making certain that keeping the 

maintenance of the equipment, the training of the troops, and the 

family—wear and tear on the families is all kept in balance. 
28 

The way you do this is we ensure that preparation for great 

power competition drives us, not simply a rotation schedule that allows me to tell you 3 years from now which aircraft carrier will be 

where in the world. That is a great way to run a shipping line. It 

is no way to run a navy. 

So during the time when they would be authorized to deploy, directed to deploy, they may not deploy out of home waters. They 

may stay there, operating an aircraft carrier down off San Diego, 

operating with the Army at Fort Irwin, overhead cover, this sort 

of thing, as we keep our joint force ready. 

And then, when we send them out, it may be for a shorter deployment. It will be three carriers in the South China Sea today, 

and then 2 weeks from now there is only one there, and two of 

them are in the Indian Ocean. They will be home at the end of a 

90-day deployment. They will not have spent 8 months at sea, and 

we are going to have a force more ready to surge and deal with the 

high-end warfare, as a result, without breaking the families, the 

maintenance cycles, or reducing—we will actually enhance the 

training time. 

Does that give you a—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. Appreciation for it? 

Mr. SCOTT. Gentlemen, thank you for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

You know, the President has indicated recently his intention to 

launch U.S. military attacks against Syria. Article 1 of the Constitution gives Congress the sole power to declare war. Congress 

has not done so against the Syrian Government. 

Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires the President to 

consult with Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces into 

situations of hostilities. 

Section 2 of the War Powers Resolution clarifies the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief, and article 

2, which you referenced, Secretary Mattis, to introduce forces into 

hostilities only pursuant to, one, a declaration of war; two, specific 

statutory authorization; or three, a national emergency created by 

an attack upon the U.S., its territories, possessions, or Armed 

Forces. 

Syria has not declared war against the U.S. or threatened the 

U.S. The launch of 59 missiles against Syria by Trump last year 

was illegal, and did not meet any of those criteria in the War Powers Resolution. 

The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, which was signed 

into law by President Trump, states that none of the funds made 

available by this Act may be used with respect to Syria, in contravention of the War Powers Resolution, including for the introduction of U.S. armed military forces into hostilities in Syria. 

My question is, will the President uphold the Constitution, the 

War Powers Resolution, and comply with the law that he signed by 

obtaining authorization from Congress before launching U.S. military attacks against Syria? 
29 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, we have not yet made any 

decision to launch military attacks into Syria. I think that when 

you look back at President Obama sending the U.S. troops into 

Syria at the time he did, he also had to deal with this type of situation, because we are going after a named terrorist group that was 

not actually named in the AUMF [authorization for use of military 

force] that put them in. 

This is a complex area, I will be the first to admit. 

Ms. GABBARD. It is simple, however, what the Constitution requires. So while you are correct in saying the President has not yet 

made a decision, my question is will he abide by the Constitution 

and comply with the law? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, I believe that the President will carry out 

his duties under the Constitution to protect the country. 

Ms. GABBARD. What would the objective of an attack on Syria be, 

and how does that serve the interests of the American people? 

Secretary MATTIS. I don’t want to talk about a specific attack 

that is not yet in the offing, knowing that these are decisions—this 

would be pre-decisional. Again, the President has not made that 

decision. 

However, looking at the chemical warfare convention, I think it 

is in the—by far, in the best interest of civilization—certainly in 

the best interest of America—that that convention be obeyed by the 

nations that have signed it. And what has happened in Salisbury, 

England, and now has happened in Syria again shows that this is 

not an idle concern. 

Ms. GABBARD. So if the decision is made, as you have stated publicly, you are laying—are all the options on the table for the President? If the decision is made to launch a military attack against 

Syria, Russia has already responded, saying that they would respond to our U.S. strike. As this action is considered, can you justify for the American people how going to war with Russia over 

Syria serves the interests of the American people? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, Congresswoman, I can’t answer that question. I am not ready to speculate that that would happen. 

Ms. GABBARD. Would you not say that it is a highly likely occurrence, given what Russia has stated directly, that they will respond? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, Congresswoman, I would not. And there 

is a lot of ways to respond to the violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention diplomatically, economically, militarily—— 

Ms. GABBARD. Sure. 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. That, taken in total, would represent, I think, what we have to do in this world if we are going 

to turn it over in accordance with international norms and international law. 

Ms. GABBARD. One last question. The 2001 AUMF is the authorization with which our U.S. forces are in Syria. Today, while ISIS— 

there has been much progress made in the counter-ISIS campaign, 

and they are close to being defeated in Syria, al-Qaida has grown 

stronger. 

Brett McGurk stated just over a year ago that al-Nusra is now 

al-Qaida’s largest formal affiliate in history. So al-Qaida has grown 

stronger in Syria. 
30 

Secretary MATTIS. Mm-hmm. 

Ms. GABBARD. Why is this, and why have our U.S. policies not 

gone after al-Qaida in Syria? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, our policy is in Syria, which is a very 

complex battlespace, Congresswoman, that where they are located 

right now we do not want to go up and do another part of Syria. 

We are doing this by, with, and through our partner forces. They 

do not have the capability to move into that region. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlelady is expired. 

Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Now, Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, by way of background, I was one of some of our House Armed Services Committee 

members who, in 2011, voted against the Budget Control Act and 

its sequestration provisions that disproportionately cut national defense spending and so badly damaged America’s national security. 

Now to the current date. Per the Congressional Budget Office, we face an $804 billion deficit this year, $12.5 trillion in total deficits 

over the next decade, and a total $33.8 trillion gross Federal debt 

by 2028. Proverbs 22:7 warns us that, ‘‘The borrower is the slave 

of the lender.’’ 

Similarly, I would submit America’s debt slowly but surely gives 

our creditors power over America. For emphasis, China, a geopolitical rival and perhaps a foe, is America’s largest foreign creditor, at $1.2 trillion. 

Here is our problem: If America’s creditors simply stop loaning 

America more money, something they have every right to do, our 

Federal Government is immediately, the next day, insolvent, and 

faces an immediate $800 billion shortfall. If this $800 billion shortfall is prorated equally across our $1.3 trillion discretionary budget, 

that translates into a devastating $400 billion cut to national defense, immediately. 

In 2011, when America’s gross Federal debt was much less, at approximately $15 trillion, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Mike Mullen testified in this very same room that ‘‘The most 

significant threat to our national security is our debt.’’ 

Similarly, in 2017, when America’s gross Federal debt was 

roughly $20 trillion, you, Secretary Mattis, confirmed at your Senate hearing that ‘‘The greatest threat to our national security is our 

own Federal debt.’’ 

In the time that remains, will you please help the American people understand why you believe America’s out-of-control deficit and 

exploding debt are threats to America’s national security? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, Congressman, I think any nation that 

can’t keep its fiscal house in order eventually cannot maintain its 

military power. Hence the connection to the Department of Defense 

that concerns me so much. It is also why we put solvency and security as watchwords at the Pentagon, because we need solvency 

first. 

So we are aligned with you. The situation I face is a worsening 

security situation in the world. So then, even with that thesis I just 

mentioned, I come in asking for an awful lot of money. 

The point I would make is in 1985 we spent 5.7 percent of our 

GDP on national defense. It was in the 35, 36 percentile during 
31 

World War II. But 1985 was not a war year for us, and we were 

spending 5.7. What we are asking for in 2019 is 3.1 percent. So we 

believe America can afford survival, and I recognize the competing 

and very tough decisions on domestic spending, on health care, on 

defense, and I can only tell you that we will spend every dollar as 

wisely as we can. 

I don’t have stress, Congressman, I create it. If I find someone 

who is getting artful with the money you have given us, that person will have to leave our ranks as we try to buy the time, securitywise, for you to put the fiscal situation back under proper order. 

Mr. BROOKS. General Dunford, do you share that concern about 

our accumulated deficits and total debt at some point becoming or 

currently being a national security threat? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Congressman. That really gets to my 

opening statement, that—what I said was we needed sufficient resources at Department of Defense; we also needed that to be sustainable and predictable. And clearly, on the path we are on, the 

sustainability and the predictability is at risk. 

Mr. BROOKS. On an entirely different subject matter, Secretary 

Mattis, do you believe that people who are illegally in the United 

States should be allowed to take military service opportunities 

from American citizens and lawful immigrants? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am not quite sure—sir, very bluntly, we need 

every qualified patriot we can get our hands on, but we do not support illegal activity in our recruiting. So I know at times we have 

had an awful lot of immigrant—legal immigrants, children of those 

families join at a much higher rate than we do with native-born, 

believe it or not. So we would like to see the immigration system 

fixed, so that we have legal immigrants coming into the country, 

because we recruit very well from them. They are overrepresented, 

sir, in our ranks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, and 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, earlier you said in response to a colleague’s question, you said we have not made any decision to launch attacks in 

Syria. Yesterday at 6:57 a.m. the President tweeted, ‘‘Russia vows 

to shoot down any and all missiles fired at Syria. Get ready, Russia, because they will be coming. Nice and new’’—and he put in 

quotes—‘‘smart!’’ 

Can you resolve the disconnect between the answer that you 

gave and the commitment that the President made yesterday? 

Secretary MATTIS. Today our President—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I don’t know if your microphone is on. 

Secretary MATTIS. Today our President did say that he has not 

made a decision. And I will tell you that we are meeting—when I 

leave here I go to a meeting where the National Security Council 

will be meeting on this. And we will take forward the various options to the President and the—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. When the President of the United States 

says—— 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. Intelligence assessment. 
32 

Mr. O’ROURKE [continuing]. ‘‘These missiles will be coming,’’ the 

President of the United States of America says, ‘‘These missiles 

will be coming,’’ that sounds to me and to the rest of the world like 

a decision. 

In the answer to another question that was asked for the legal 

justification to fire missiles into Syria in response to these chemical 

weapons attacks, you said that we have troops in the field and we 

are not going to wait for them to be attacked before we take action. 

If we did not have U.S. service members in Syria, would you have 

the legal authorization to launch attacks in Syria in response to 

these chemical weapons attacks? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, Congressman, I am going to have to have 

my lawyer start taking these questions. I look for the legitimate 

protection of the American people and their interests. I am the Secretary of Defense. And I did not pick up a law degree on my way 

to the job. So I need to get some people to give me, I think, the 

specific answers to your question. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. We have talked today about North 

Korea, about Syria, about ISIS, about Russia, about China, but we 

have not talked about the threat that the country of Mexico poses 

to us. 

The President also announced recently that—these are his 

words—‘‘We are sending the United States military to secure our 

border with Mexico.’’ Could you share with me what that will cost, 

what the mission is, how long it will last, since the President 

vowed to keep U.S. service members there until his wall is completed? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, I—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. And then I have a follow-up question for that. 

Secretary MATTIS. I cannot tell you the cost yet, sir. I am in close 

contact, daily contact, with Secretary Nielsen. We are in support of 

Department of Homeland Security, Customs Border Enforcement 

personnel, and right now I have got about 800 deployed under the 

governors’ authority. We are paying for them out of the title 32 

funds that the Congress has allocated. 

I believe I will get around—a request for around 700 more in the 

second tranche. Those will mostly be helicopters and observation 

type forces. These forces will not involve themselves with the migrants themselves, or have any law enforcement duties. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Related question. Can any part of your budget be 

used to construct a wall, a fence, fortifications along the U.S.-Mexico border? 

Secretary MATTIS. Probably the part where, if I need to wall off 

or, excuse me, put a fence along a bombing range that is right next 

to the border, this is a safety consideration. I don’t care who they 

are, they are human beings, I don’t want them wandering into a 

bombing range that was active. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. In 1997 then-President Clinton sent the United 

States military to the border. A United States Marine shot and 

killed an 18-year-old U.S. citizen named Esequiel Hernandez. The 

tragedy for the Hernandez family, the tragedy for that Marine who 

was put in a position for which he was not trained should be something from which we learn. 
33 

I think this is a grave mistake on the part of this country. And 

I would also, given everything else that we are talking about, all 

of our other challenges and threats and priorities around the world, 

I have to think that you also see, Mr. Secretary, the opportunity 

cost of sending the United States military to the U.S.-Mexico border at a time that it has never been more secure, more safe, where 

we have record low northbound apprehensions, the lowest numbers 

since 1971. 

The community, El Paso, Texas, that I represent, conjoined with 

Ciudad Juarez forming the largest binational community in this 

hemisphere, is also one of the safest cities in the United States of 

America. I think this is a gross waste of taxpayer resources. I think 

this is a wasted opportunity, in terms of what those service members could be doing. And I think it sets the stage for another tragedy if we do not carefully manage this. And I would urge you to 

advise the President to withdraw this commitment. We do not need 

another ill-defined, ill-planned mission for the United States military. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

our panel today for their service and everything else. It has been 

a tough budget year. I was one of the ones that voted for the omnibus, I am one of the ones that—I cannot stand the Budget Control 

Act, and one of the big supporters behind the audit. I think that 

is extremely important, so that we don’t waste money, and get the 

most cost efficiency. 

I want to switch gears a little bit. And Mr. Secretary, you talked 

about allies. And I want to talk about F–35s. Ever since I have 

been in Congress it has been about the cost, the problems with the 

F–35s. And I think we have come a long ways correcting a lot of 

the problems that we had with them. I am all onboard and everything else, but it is not cheap. 

And now we are talking—well, Canada dropped out of the buy 

for that, and there is some of us on this committee and the Foreign 

Affairs Committee that are concerned about Turkey and its behavior as an ally, and whether we should sell or continue to have Turkey as one of the recipients of the F–35. 

If for some reason they drop out of that program, or we prevent 

them from buying that, is that going to significantly increase the 

costs of something which is extremely important to our future, and 

obviously the conversation today, the budget that we are trying to 

do something about? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, we right now look at the F–35 

as a program that we have got to drive down the costs on, and that 

is both the purchase cost but it is also the flight-hour cost, the sustainment cost, the cost of spare parts. So we have a full-court press 

on this, working with the contractor in order to drive it down. 

We do have other allies around the world that are considering increasing the number of F–35s they buy, and right now I can’t tell 

you that it is going to be equal, you know, if some drop and others 

go in to pick it up. But I will tell you that our focus on driving 

down costs and getting rid of excess costs is ongoing. We have had 

some success already since we got in. And between Ellen Lord and 
34 

my deputy, Pat Shanahan, I have got two very capable people of 

going after this with the contractor and getting the best value on 

this aircraft. 

It is revolutionary. I realize how great it is, but it has got to be 

affordable. 

Mr. COOK. General Dunford, were you going to comment on that 

at all, or—— 

General DUNFORD. No. The only thing I can tell you, Congressman, we would have to get back to you, the specific implications. 

Obviously, foreign military sales help hold down the cost, but I 

don’t have the data on what the implications would be for Turkey. 

So we owe you an answer on that. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. COOK. Okay. The last thing I just wanted to address said 

NATO, number of us are on the NATO parliament, and we are concerned about our allies. We have some very good allies, in terms 

of meeting their commitment, and there are some that were about 

half in and half out. Do you have any suggestions on how we can 

gently pressure our allies to meet their commitments on this? 

Secretary MATTIS. And you used the right word, Congressman, 

‘‘commitments.’’ Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, the NATO 

Treaty, said every nation will provide enough for their own defense 

and the defense of fellow alliance members. 

Article 5, of course, where we stand together in the face—a 

threat against one is a threat against all, and the message that 

President Trump directed me to take to NATO a year ago when I 

first returned to that headquarters, having been—served there as 

a NATO Supreme Commander, was you cannot expect me to go in 

front of the Congress and say we need American parents to care 

more about the freedom of their children than they care about the 

freedom of their children. 

We have 15 nations that are on the right track to meet their 

Wales commitment, a pledge they made. And we want national 

plans. And thanks to Secretary General Stoltenberg, Secretary 

General of NATO, former prime minister of Norway, he is pushing 

very hard that each nation come to the summit this year with a 

national plan showing how they are going to get at 2 percent of 

gross domestic product committed to defense. 

We do not have them all there, and the pressure continues. And 

the President, in his usual blunt style, has made it very clear that 

this is where we are going. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Secretary Mattis, one of our concerns here, obviously, is Russia. 

And I am following up on my fellow Marine’s comments on NATO. 

One of the focuses that we have had is on the EDI, the European 

Defense Initiative. 

Last year’s NDAA we asked for a report about what would be— 

actually, we put a report in the NDAA asking specifically what 

kind of resources, tooling, locations—in general, to give us more information so we can actually come up with a good EDI this coming 
35 

NDAA. That has not arrived yet, and we are about to go back into 

the NDAA again. 

So I am just wondering, when is that report going to come out? 

You know, we want to be helpful, we want to make sure that we 

are giving you guys everything you need. But we need that type 

of information to actually properly size the budget for EDI. 

Secretary. 

Secretary MATTIS. I regret that you don’t have it yet. I need to 

go back and look at it, sir. There is over 1,700 reports I am due 

every year to you all, and I confess that we at times have been late 

on a few. 

Chairman, do you have anything on EDI? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, you know, I am not sure about 

that specific report, although, you know, I have looked at the details of the $6.5 billion that are in this year’s submission. And 

broadly speaking, it addresses the infrastructure, and we can share 

with you the specific locations. It addresses the increased exercise 

program as a result of rotational forces that increased. And it is increasing the pre-position equipment was the third piece. 

So those are the three pieces that make up the $6.5 billion, and 

I think we have a very clear sight picture exactly how that is allocated. 

We will take back the requirement to report, which, like the Secretary, I am not following a specific report, but I can assure you 

I am following the specific way we plan to spend the European Defense Initiative, and we do have a detailed plan to lay out. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Well, thank you, General. You know, for us it 

would be great that we could compare the two to make sure that 

we are rightsizing everything that is going on. 

And just to continue on that kind of vein of thought, are we— 

and we could have two separate questions on this, but are you in 

favor of increasing our forces and adding more pre-position equipment or, more specifically, putting new basing locations in NATO 

with U.S. forces? 

General, you can start. 

General DUNFORD. Yes. Did you say, Congressman, specifically in 

NATO? 

Mr. GALLEGO. In NATO territory, yes. 

General DUNFORD. We do not have plans at this time to increase. 

We have, with your help over the last 3 years, increased to the 

level that we believe is sustainable—— 

Mr. GALLEGO. General—— 

General DUNFORD [continuing]. And appropriate. 

Mr. GALLEGO [continuing]. I understand that. Would you be in 

favor of that? Should we give you the right budget? Would you be 

in favor of, you know, putting more positioned U.S. military personnel in NATO territory? 

General DUNFORD. You know, I will be honest with you, Congressman. Right now, you know, the Secretary has laid out the National Defense Strategy, we pretty much know what the forces that 

will be available over the next several years are, and we believe, 

to meet the—our requirements for assurance and deterrence, we 

have the right U.S. composition in place right now, and realizing 
36 

that that is going to be in the context of the other 28 members of 

NATO. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. From some of the RAND studies that I have 

read and been involved with, what I have seen is that there is a 

clear picture that I have been told that we have a math problem 

in the Eastern European theater, specifically when dealing with 

Russia and Russian armaments. Do we—you know, do you agree 

with some of these studies, in terms of our math problem and how 

we could fix that? 

Secretary MATTIS. The math problem is accurate, sir. However, 

there is more to the power of NATO alliance than simply the number of American tanks, as you understand. 

Mr. GALLEGO. But—— 

Secretary MATTIS. So what we are trying to do is make certain 

the American military is there in an—support of the NATO alliance. 

But at the same time, everyone has got to step up for this thing. 

And right now I think we could always rotate more forces in during 

a period of heightened tensions. But overall, I think we have got 

it about right right now, and we are working with the NATO partners to get their forces up on the step, as well. 

Mr. GALLEGO. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 

you all for being here today. I appreciate it. 

We have witnessed Russia tampering in our elections and that 

of our allies. And in open testimony, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] have 

talked about Russia undermining our defenses and our foreign policies. 

It has been reported that Russia is trying to undermine our energy investments in Europe. Our science committee has detailed 

how Russia has done this. In a declassified report from CIA in 1983 

that detailed Russia’s active measures concerning nuclear modernization, missile defense, and the report stated—and I quote— 

one report stated, ‘‘Their campaign covers a whole spectrum of activities, from overt efforts to create a fear of nuclear war to covert 

measures including forgeries and disinformation.’’ 

And so my question is, do you believe that Russia is carrying out 

these types of active measures today? What are we doing to counter 

them? And are the agencies involved able to coordinate well in 

those efforts? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think that, as you look at the National Defense Strategy, Congressman—and this is something that President 

Trump personally approved, I talked with him about it before I 

signed it—and you see Russia now registers as a strategic competitor. 

We didn’t want that, we were all trying to make a partnership 

of sorts with Russia after the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 

1990s, early 2000s. I can remember Russian marines training at 

Camp Lejeune with U.S. Marines for U.N. peacekeeping operations. 

That is in the dim past now, sir, as we watch what they have done, 

from Georgia to Crimea, from the Ukraine to Syria. 
37 

And so, when you look at the gray zone issues that were brought 

up by a Member earlier, this is where Russia is putting a lot of effort. The deniable—they think deniable—efforts that they believe 

they can undermine our belief in democratic processes, elections, as 

you mentioned, undermine us financially. 

As you know, they have a declining economy, a worsening demographic. And until they wake up to the fact that they have a lot 

more to gain by working with Europe, by working with NATO, by 

being a responsible nation in the U.N., we are going to have to deal 

with them in all areas as a strategic competitor. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So are you comfortable with how we may be 

countering their efforts? 

Secretary MATTIS. We are doing better. I will never be comfortable with our security. I will always be looking for ways to improve. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Do you feel like the agencies have the ability to 

coordinate the efforts to counter what is taking place? 

I mean I think you have highlighted very well what is taking 

place. But how are we countering that? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. We have—I believe we do have the ability, I think we have the focus. There is a lot going on right now, 

but I don’t think I would—I wouldn’t tell you we are where we 

need to be, but I know we are going in the right direction. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. 

General Dunford, do you have anything to add to that, or—— 

General DUNFORD. No, Congressman. You know, we spoke earlier, as the Secretary said, about the gray zone. And that is the 

threat we face. 

The one thing that comes to mind as you were asking about are 

we postured where we need to be, you know, we are in an environment, particularly in cyber, where offensive operations are going to 

outpace defensive operations. And so that is one of the areas that 

I think is really being looked at by the experts right now at 

CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] and Department of Homeland 

Security and so forth is what is the right organizational construct, 

and what is the right level of activity every day, so we can have 

the momentum and the offense. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, I appreciate that response. 

Just a quick question for Mr. Norquist—I think you have been 

eagerly awaiting a question. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. WENSTRUP. As we go through the audit, do you anticipate 

that this will lead to DOD to be able to redirect funds into other 

areas, as we discover where we are spending money and how we 

are spending money? 

Mr. NORQUIST. So I appreciate the question. The—there are 

three benefits we are going to see from the audit. The first and 

foremost is better data, which will feed better decision making. The 

second is the transparency and accountability that goes with it. 

And the third—and I think it is the third where you are going to 

see that the savings is—how it helps drive reform. 

And so, as the Secretary mentioned in his opening statement, 

that crosses a number of offices in the Department, but their abil-
38 

ity to drive reform benefits from the accuracy of the underlying 

business data. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you very much, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Norquist, thank you very 

much for being here. 

Secretary Mattis, last October before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee you stated that, ‘‘It is in our national security interest 

to remain in the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action],’’ or 

Iran nuclear deal. Do you still believe that remaining in the 

JCPOA is within U.S. national security interests? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think it needs to be fixed, Congressman. 

Mr. MOULTON. I am asking if it remains in our interest to stay 

within the deal, in our national security interest. 

Secretary MATTIS. If it is fixed, yes, sir. 

Mr. MOULTON. But not without it being fixed? What do you intend to recommend to President Trump, approaching the May 12th 

sanctions deadline? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. We are working on what needs to be 

fixed in it. We are also working with our allies, in very close consultation with our European allies on this. There are three areas— 

I owe—this is not an area, because it is pre-decisional, but I want 

to go into detail here. But if those three areas are addressed, then 

it perhaps can be saved. 

Mr. MOULTON. And otherwise, you think we should pull out? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am not willing to say that until I see how 

much of it can be saved. 

I mean this is not a—I think it is not an easily binary situation—— 

Mr. MOULTON. And yet the decision—— 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. Depending on our success—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Right, but Mr. Secretary, the decision is—— 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. With the European allies. If we 

can fix most of it, will that make it sufficient? I don’t know right 

now. 

Mr. MOULTON. The problem, Mr. Secretary, is the decision to 

stay in or pull out is ultimately a binary decision. 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, your deputy, General Paul Selva, 

testified last July that, based on the evidence that has been presented to the intelligence community, it appears that Iran is in 

compliance with the rules that were laid out in the JCPOA. And 

since that time, the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] 

has continued to affirm Iran’s compliance. 

In your assessment, and in the assessment of the intelligence 

community, is Iran still in compliance with the terms of the deal? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I will caveat my statement by 

saying I haven’t seen a recent report. I am not aware of any violations. 

Mr. MOULTON. What does the Joint Staff plan to recommend to 

the President about staying in the Iran nuclear deal? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, Congressman, I can’t share that with you 

right now. I mean I think, from my perspective, we want to make 
39 

sure that all of Iran’s malign activity is addressed: nuclear activity, 

cyber activity, missile activity, maritime threats. 

And so we have a framework right now that addresses the nuclear piece. It has been deemed to be unsatisfactory. What we need 

to come out of is a diplomatic and a legal framework within which 

to manage the nuclear threat that Iran poses. 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, how do you expect North Korea to 

believe that we will adhere to a deal if we are so willing to pull 

out of a deal that the United States of America signed with Iran 

on the same subject? 

General DUNFORD. Well, I understand your question, Congressman, but it certainly won’t be up to me to decide whether we pull 

out of the deal or not. That is ultimately going to be a political decision. 

Mr. MOULTON. I understand, Mr. Chairman. What I am asking 

you is how do we expect North Korea to believe in a deal, if we 

are so willing to pull out of our previous—our immediate past nuclear deal? 

General DUNFORD. No, I understand it, and I am not trying to 

be argumentative. But you are speculating that we will pull out, 

and then you are asking me to determine what the action would 

be of North Korea. 

Mr. MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

General DUNFORD. I can’t do that. 

Mr. MOULTON. All right, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, we discussed before the advent of artificial intelligence [AI] and its implications for our military, and you brought 

it up in your opening testimony. China has made a clear commitment to meet U.S. capability in artificial intelligence by 2020, and 

then exceed it by 2030. 

Who owns U.S. research and development in artificial intelligence, bureaucratically? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right now it is our new Under Secretary of 

Research and Engineering, Michael Griffin. And I would tell you 

that we are looking at a joint office where we would concentrate 

all of the DOD’s efforts, since we have a number of AI efforts underway right now. We are looking at pulling them all together. 

Mr. MOULTON. So, Mr. Secretary, is it just within the DOD? Is 

there any government-wide effort on artificial intelligence, or is it 

just—is the owner essentially the Department of Defense? 

Secretary MATTIS. I can only speak to my portfolio, and I will get 

back to you with the broader—answering the broader question. But 

in terms of the defense of America, obviously I am primary. I know 

that also the CIA works on this issue. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Secretary, a quick question on Syria. When 

I served under you in Iraq, you made it very clear what our mission was. In fact, you made it clear what we had to accomplish before we came home. 

What do the troops in Syria, the over 2,000 Americans risking 

their lives every day, have to accomplish in Syria before they can 

come home? 
40 

Secretary MATTIS. I think both administrations, the last one and 

the current one, said we are going to take ISIS down so they do 

not have a physical caliphate and they are shattered, in terms of 

an aura of invincibility that attracts funding and recruiting. 

So that remains the same at this time, Congressman. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Secretary, General, Mr. Norquist, it is good to 

see all of you again, and thank you for your service to our country. 

We talked about a lot of different parts of the world today, but 

I would like to shift a little bit, if I could, to our own neighborhood, 

the Western Hemisphere. It is very important to all of us, I know 

it is to you. We will have a congressional delegation—I will be a 

part of it—going to Peru this weekend for the Summit of [the] 

Americas. 

And Mr. Secretary, I know you believe very strongly in soft 

power. But as you well know, soft power alone can’t get the job 

done. 

It is no secret that SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] is 

significantly underresourced to meet the combatant commander’s 

requirements. And in his list of requirements, Admiral Tidd has expressed a necessity of a littoral combat ship [LCS] in his theater 

because he believes that small surface combatants are ideal for several missions, including combating drug trafficking, partnershipbuilding, and providing support for special forces. Currently the 

Coast Guard is the only service providing maritime security in that 

region. 

I also believe, in order to meet our requirements and provide the 

necessary support to effectively perform our missions, it is imperative the Navy play an active role in SOUTHCOM. 

Understanding that we need to invest in our capabilities across 

the globe, what would be your solution to get the most capability 

for low cost in the SOUTHCOM region? And specifically within 

that, how can we provide additional necessary resources to 

SOUTHCOM like the LCS that are ideally situated for the mission 

requirements in that region? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. It has been a prioritization issue. You 

are laying it out quite accurately, as has the commander, Admiral 

Tidd. 

We are looking at the mix of Coast Guard cutters and LCS right 

now. As you know, we also have Coast Guard cutters elsewhere in 

the world. Would those missions be best carried out by the Coast 

Guard or by Navy LCS, shifting more, for example, cutters into the 

Caribbean, into the Latin America area? Or do we want to put 

some of the LCSs into that region? We are looking at this issue as 

we speak. The chairman owes me some feedback here in the next 

couple of weeks as we try to sort out the right mix, based on the 

mission. 

Is it primarily law enforcement? Do they need to have people 

with badges, which would mean Coast Guard cutters? We are going 

to have to shift and go to the Department of Homeland Security. 

Or is it LCSs because of the nature of an evolving threat? We don’t 
41 

have the answer yet, sir, but we are working it. We will have it 

sorted out very soon. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, thank you. General, did you want to respond 

to that? 

General DUNFORD. The one I can tell you, Congressman, in the 

National Defense Strategy the Secretary has directed me to do 

something called dynamic force employment. And what that really 

means is, in those areas where we don’t have sufficient forces to 

be forward-posture engaged on a day-to-day basis, to find ways to 

use the force in a different way to support the combatant commanders. 

And so that is exactly how we anticipate filling some of the gaps 

down in the U.S. Southern Command. 

Mr. BYRNE. My conversations with leaders from some of those 

countries, they actually are seeking that presence, sometimes only 

for the symbolic nature of it. But symbols are important; you know 

that better than I do. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I—there is—I don’t think either the Secretary or I would disagree with the desire to increase 

our presence down in the United States Southern Command. 

I think, as you understand, one of the challenges we have right 

now is our Navy ships—I mean one example I use, I went to visit 

the USS Barry about 18 months ago, and those sailors had been 

underway 70 percent of the time the previous 12 months. So we 

really do have a requirements resources mismatch here that, again, 

we will be growing a force over time. 

And Congressman Wittman has left, but he spoke about the size 

of the Navy, and if we—we are about 55 ships or more short of the 

study that Congressman Wittman identified. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I am a strong supporter—a member of that 

subcommittee—of rebuilding the fleet. I was a strong supporter before, but now that my daughter is engaged to a young Navy officer 

who deployed yesterday, I am in the Navy now, and I want to 

make sure that we do everything we possibly can to resource you 

in the appropriate ways so that you can carry out this important 

mission, and at the same time protect those men and women that 

are wearing our uniform. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, Mr. Norquist, thank you for being here. 

And of course, thank you for your service. 

Mr. Secretary, in your statement you speak to the fact that the 

United States remains the world’s preeminent maritime power, and 

I, of course, agree with you. You do say that the 2019 budget provides to fund 10 combat ships and 8 support ships. What is the 

combat ships that you envision being funded, the 10 combat ships? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, there will be two submarines; those are 

Virginia class, Congresswoman; three Aegis destroyers—these are 

the DDG–51s that you see often in Pearl Harbor and out in the Pacific. There will be a littoral combat ship. There is going to be two 

of the John Lewis-class replenishment oilers. They are critical for 

keeping the fleet at sea, and not having to come into port. In the 
42 

event of hostilities, we don’t want them coming into ports, we want 

to keep them outside the ports. 

We have also got an expeditionary sea-based ship that is funded 

that is a Lewis [B.] Puller class. And we have also got the advance 

procurement for another Ford-class aircraft carrier, and advance 

procurement for the Columbia class. These are the replacement nuclear missile submarines. 

Ms. HANABUSA. The reason I ask is for the period of time that 

I have sat on this committee I have always felt that somehow we 

have had a disconnect in the sense that, instead of purchasing 

based on some kind of future needs, we almost set our policy by 

acquisition. 

In other words, what we buy then sort of sets what we are going 

to do. 

For the time I have been here, DDG–51s were supposed to sort 

of be discontinued. The Zumwalt, the DDG–1000, was the ultimate 

ship. Then, of course, the LCSs were preferred. Then they kind of 

fell from the grace and now they are back again. This is a—I am 

not quite sure how we make these kinds of decisions. 

Of course I don’t want you to touch the Virginia class, for obvious 

reasons, and that is, of course, Pearl Harbor. So you keep on the 

Virginia class. I think those are great. 

But it is something that bothers me in how we acquire, especially 

with your statement today about the fact that we want a more affordable Navy. 

So I understand that we have to be affordable. That is why we 

have Mr. Norquist here. But I want to be sure that we are not sort 

of short-changing and defining what our future is going to look 

like, because these ships are going to be around for a very long 

time, and they are going to define how we fight, General. 

So please, can you explain to me how we come up with these decisions, in what is the preferred and not preferred and back to 

being preferred again? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, you bring up very valid 

points. We need to rationalize what we are doing, and yet we are 

doing that at a time of dramatic change in information technology, 

in certain data handling, in hypersonic weapons, things that are 

going to fundamentally change the character of the war that we 

might fight, or deter, if we are successful in deterrence. 

So innovation has now become something that we have got to unleash in a much more focused way, and we have got to have outputs from our innovative efforts that keep us from building a ship 

that, 5 years later, you say, well, that class doesn’t look so good, 

after all. 

So it is challenging. I don’t think anyone set out to put us on the 

track that you just explained, I think, very accurately. But that is 

the situation that you and I confront in our responsibilities, and I 

am going to have to come back and convince you that we have now 

figured out what is the requirement, based on the threat, and what 

can we afford to do about it in a sustainable way. 

And that is where we are going right now. I have got the right 

people onboard, as of about January 5th, and we will get this figured out. I can guarantee you that. But it is a very dynamic world, 
43 

and navies are at the cutting edge of this. And so they take a lot 

of hits. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Yes, Mr. Secretary, that is my point. I do not 

want to hear again that we are battling today’s war with last—the 

last war’s equipment. And then our men and women in uniform are 

the ones that are in jeopardy. And I know I don’t need to tell either 

you or the general that, but I think we need a great understanding 

of what we are doing before we engage in all of this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, gentlemen, for 

your testimony and your service. 

As you have all mentioned today, we just partnered with you and 

the President in order to provide a desperately needed funding 

boost for our troops to deal with the readiness crisis and the erosion of our competitive edge. 

But with less and less of our society serving in the military and 

being veterans, there is a bit of a sometimes civil-military disconnect, and we go back to our constituents in translating this, and 

having them understand how critical this is. 

This testimony you have today is so important, and I really hope 

that it breaks through the news cycle and the noise that is often 

seen on TV when people are at the dinner table every night. 

I am going to take a little bit of a different approach, as normal. 

Secretary Mattis, you have a way with words. So could you, in 

just the next little bit of time, not answer to me, but in layman’s 

terms to my constituents, the American people, about what has 

happened with readiness and the erosion of our capabilities, and 

why it is so important that we all are partnering in order to give 

our troops everything they need? 

And also, for those who have a patriotic urge, why it would be 

important for them to join those ranks. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, what happened over these 

years was we were engaged in a form of warfare, irregular warfare, 

that consumed much of our focus and—as it should have—but perhaps distracted us from other things going on in the world. 

The result has been that we have got troops who are very, very 

good at what they do, but they are not trained for higher-end warfare to the degree that we want them trained for that. We have got 

ships that have not received the maintenance they needed, we have 

gone through a period when understandable hopes for a lower level 

of expenditure for defense issues guided us. 

And the end result of the war and of the rapid change in the 

world and the changes especially among several countries that 

have decided not to play by the international rules now puts us in 

a position that almost every generation of Americans have had to 

face, that if we are going to keep this experiment alive that we call 

America, we are going to have to once again fund our military at 

a higher level. 

The—what we owe you is the reality of how we see it, and we 

should be able to defend it. For example, readiness today does not 

necessarily equate to readiness 5 years from now in a time of rapid 

change. So we need to define the problems to a very keen level of 

detail, and then bring to you the solutions. And we will open it up; 
44 

if someone has got a better idea, I am wide open to it. But we can 

afford survival, we are not paying an inordinate percent of our 

GDP right now, and I don’t want to pay one cent more than necessary. 

But we must pay what is necessary. And if we do not, if we do 

not do this, if we decide we are going to save money and underfund 

the military and costs there, the cost of a war basically is magnified many times beyond what the cost of peace is, even as expensive as the bill I have brought you here today. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Secretary Mattis. Also, the American 

people are not the only people listening. Our enemies, the mullahs, 

the thugs, the dictators are all listening today, listening to you to 

hear if they can identify some weaknesses or vulnerabilities. So I 

also want to give you the opportunity to speak to them, that if they 

were to choose to take us on, it would be an awful mistake that 

would come at a high, high price. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, if that were to happen, if they were to 

make that mistake, Congresswoman, they would regret it. We 

would hit it with overwhelming force. And we would triumph. That 

is not our intent. Our intent is that our diplomats be engaged and 

we solve things the way rational nations should. 

But we have readiness issues. They would not in any way stop 

us from dominating. I think the chairman would probably be good 

to make a few comments on this, ma’am. 

General DUNFORD. The thing I would say to our adversaries, 

Congresswoman McSally, is that they shouldn’t confuse our willingness in a democracy to speak about readiness challenges as a 

sign of weakness. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Amen. 

General DUNFORD. And as I mentioned in my opening comments—and I speak with a high degree of confidence about this— 

you know, we can protect the homeland and our way of life today. 

We can meet our alliance commitments. And we have a competitive 

advantage over any potential adversary out there today. 

The reason why we have this discussion and debate, and the reason why it is so important is we are not only focused on today, we 

are focused on tomorrow, as well. And because of the last 15 or 16 

years, both of wars in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, as well as fiscal 

instability, the competitive advantage that we have historically had 

has eroded. It is not gone. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

General DUNFORD. It has eroded. And the thing, speaking to both 

constituencies, both the folks back home, as well as our adversaries, we never want to send our men and women in a fair fight. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

General DUNFORD. And the whole dialogue that we are having 

today, it is all about making sure when we send our men and 

women in harm’s way, we do so and we make sure they are not 

in a fair fight. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Rosen. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here, and for your thoughtful testimony today. 
45 

I just want to bring up that last week we lost one of our own 

at Nellis Air Force Base, a Thunderbird pilot, Major Stephen Del 

Bagno. It was a great loss to us, and I really appreciate that you 

are going to look into these accidents with our aircraft that have 

been going on. We know what it is related to, and I don’t want to 

belabor that, but I want to honor his service and thank you for 

looking into that. 

What I really want to talk about is a little bit Nevada-specific— 

actually, the whole world specific. We have a lot of challenges 

ahead of us: people that are our adversaries, with the President’s 

tweets about sending bombs, with Russia and North Korea having 

nuclear weapons. 

Can you tell me—you put out a Nuclear Posture Review, so can 

you tell me—you said geopolitical challenges may dictate how we 

are going to respond or have a possible return to nuclear testing? 

We have a Nevada test site. Can you tell me, is there any circumstance at all that we would return to above-ground nuclear 

testing within the United States of America? 

Secretary MATTIS. I cannot imagine one, Congresswoman. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. People in my State have been worried 

about that. 

I want to talk a little bit about below-ground testing. We do continue to do that. So can you tell me what kind of nuclear explosive 

testing that we may consider doing in the future? And how do we 

make sure these detonations are safe? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, there I would like to come 

back to you in private. 

Ms. ROSEN. Okay. 

Secretary MATTIS. I will tell you that we—our primary effort 

right now is to use very advanced computer modeling that removes 

the need to do much of what you—if you read the history books—— 

Ms. ROSEN. Right. 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. We did back in the 1950s and 

1960s. But in terms of any below-ground, let me come back to you 

in a classified form—— 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. 

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. For you. That should not be misinterpreted by anyone that that means that this is in the offing. 

That is not what I am indicating. 

Ms. ROSEN. No, thank you, I appreciate it. It is a great concern 

to many Nevadans. 

And so I also want to turn, then, to our influence operations and 

cyber activities. We talked a little bit about DOD over artificial intelligence. But really, as these traditional methods of warfare—especially cyberattacks—they don’t fall under traditional means. So 

really, who is going to be the lead in this area, and how do we respond to attacks in every area? Everyone seems like they are going 

out, they are doing their thing, but where do we have that confluence? 

Secretary MATTIS. Inside the Department of Defense, Congresswoman, we have U.S. Cyber Command, and they are responsible 

for defending our networks and attacking the adversary’s. We also 

have NSA and Cyber Command, National Security [Agency] and 

Cyber Command, connected. 
46 

We are going to—per the congressional guidance, we are going to 

separate those two, but keep them in a synergistic role together. 

And we need to figure this out. And once we have it figured out, 

we will come back to the Congress. But there will be most of America’s offense and defensive capability. 

Ms. ROSEN. And then, speaking again to security challenges, 

when you do do this and we move to the cloud, what are the cloud’s 

implications—if we do public and private partnerships, if we move 

to the cloud, who is going to own some of that proprietary information? What if some of those private businesses go out of business? 

Who holds the keys to the kingdom on the private side, and as 

it relates to our military readiness in the future, as things do move 

forward and we may drop certain technologies in favor of others? 

Secretary MATTIS. The movement to the cloud, Congresswoman, 

is to enhance the availability of the information among us. Right 

now we have to also quickly advance our security. 

We have over 400 different basic data centers that we have to 

protect. And we have watched very closely what CIA got, in terms 

of security and service from their movement to the cloud. It is a 

fair and open competition for anyone who wants to—it is only 2 

years. If you have read something about 10 years in the press, that 

is not the case at all. So it will be a full and open competition, not 

sole source, by the way, to make certain we don’t fall into just one. 

And I am very confident that we can get a 2-year horizon on 

the—on anyone bidding on it to know with certainty they will not 

be folding. And we will just make certain that their performance 

tells us where we go in the future. 

We just know what we are doing right now has to change, 

ma’am. 

Ms. ROSEN. Perfect. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Knight. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join with Congresswoman Rosen in saying that our country mourns Major Del 

Bagno. He came from my district, and we appreciate his service. 

There are certain things that have been said, Mr. Secretary. The 

speed of relevance, I think, is one of the things that you used, and 

I appreciate it very much. It is how quickly can we get a platform 

to our military is the most important issue of defending a nation. 

So I believe the audit is very important. But taking that information and taking it to the next level might mean saving money, but 

it also might be identifying how we are getting that platform to the 

military faster. 

Do you believe that the audit is going to prove out not only that 

maybe we are—we can have some savings, but we can also have 

some new issues that we can get those platforms moving faster? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I have no doubt that the data 

we get from the audit is going to be acted on, whether it be by the 

Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, CAPE [Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation], the ones who really look and 

give me an independent view of the progress or lack of progress of 

certain high-cost weapons systems, this sort of thing. The data 

itself is going to open opportunities. It is data that has never been 

displayed before. 
47 

And you will also be able to review it, so it is good in the sense 

of oversight by the Congress. You will have either more confidence 

or more questions for me when I come up here next, sir. 

Mr. KNIGHT. And in the NDAA 2017 we did a reorg [reorganization] of acquisition, technology, and logistics. And in that we have 

developmental test and evaluation. We want to make sure that developmental test and evaluation is at the forefront of what we are 

doing today, especially when it comes to aerospace and things that 

we are trying to move to the next technology step. 

I would like to take this in the realm of hypersonics. Hypersonics, we have been doing in America for 65 years, but we have 

been taking great leaps in advancements over the last decade or so. 

And I think other countries have, too. Having an open society, it 

is easy to steal information and data from us. 

But that being said, hypersonics and developmental test and 

evaluation is extremely important. If we can reach out and touch 

the enemy before they can touch us, it is an advantage that everyone wants to have. 

So I would like to have your commitment, Mr. Secretary, that developmental test and evaluation is going to stay at the top of our 

kind of priority list when we are talking about advancements of 

technology. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, you are reading our mind in 

DOD. Under Secretary for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin, 

formerly NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration], 

formerly Lincoln Lab. This is his number one priority. What we 

have to do is get something that DT&E [Developmental Test and 

Evaluation] can test and evaluate, and our goal is to put something 

in the air, not have another study or something like this. 

So it is focused, it is going forward, it is our number one priority 

of those innovative technologies, not to the exclusion of artificial intelligence, certainly, which will probably contribute, or machine 

learning, this sort of thing, but it is number one on Mike Griffin’s 

list of things to do, and we have got the right man there by experience and force of personality to take it forward. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, sir. 

And General Dunford, the budget we have passed, I think the 

number one concern is always our troops, from any standpoint. But 

it is the perishable skills, also. It is the time in the cockpit, it is 

the time of sailing, it is the time of doing ground exercises with our 

Marines and our soldiers. 

That, to me, is the part that this budget is now pushing back on, 

and we are saying that we are going to advance those perishable 

skills. Or maybe not advance, but increase the amount of time that 

we have training. Is that a good assessment? 

General DUNFORD. It is, Congressman. And what this will do, it 

will give us the resources necessary to train. It will backfill the 

holes in equipment that would allow us to improve the capabilities 

of individuals. But combined with the budget is the Secretary’s direction also to redo how we are allocating forces to have more time 

at home station to make sure that those high-end skills you discussed are actually developed. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 
48 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McEachin. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mattis, as you know, discriminatory barriers have historically prevented many patriotic Americans from serving in our 

military. Whenever we have allowed new groups to serve or serve 

in new ways, voices have been raised in protest. 

In the years before President Truman integrated the military, 

many argued that the armed services shouldn’t be used for ‘‘social 

experiments,’’ and raised fears about the effects of such a change 

would have on readiness and cohesion. And we have heard similar 

arguments more recently, arguments for banning gay and lesbian 

Americans from serving openly, or for keeping women out of combat roles. 

In retrospect, I think history has shown that those arguments 

are wrong. Time and time again, those who have fought against 

discriminatory barriers have been vindicated, and the military has 

benefitted from access to an even broader pool of talented potential 

service members. Yet today we are hearing the same kind of rhetoric regarding transgender people. 

Mr. Secretary, I have read your memo to the President, and I 

know it lays out a sincere professional judgment. I recognize that 

you do not recommend a blanket policy, but the arguments I hear 

in favor of the current ban are the same as the arguments that 

were made in favor of clearly discriminatory policies in the past. 

In light of the historical evidence from racial integration to repeal of ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’’ to the participation of women in 

combat roles, can you please explain why this time is different? 

Why are transgender people different? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, as you know, these cases are 

under litigation, so there is a limit to how much I can say. That 

is why I hung on the web what the policy recommendation was to 

the Commander in Chief. 

I would just tell you that that report was endorsed by the President as my best military advice for how we keep the military focused on its lethality. We welcome those who meet the high standards of the military. I think that without gender dysphoria it 

means we are not making a special category of people who medically perhaps would not have been allowed in with any of the 

other—any other condition. 

And I think right now the current policy remains in effect, because it is under court order to. 

So I will see where the—basically, where the courts come out. 

But I don’t want to say more than I have already put out publicly 

to make very clear what data we used, so that they knew there was 

some—that it was not what I would call standard rhetoric in there. 

That was looked at very carefully. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I have to note it is just ironic to me that I note that your decision not to comment on matters 

of the part of the judicial process stand in complete contrast to 

your boss’s habit of always commenting, seemingly, on matters of— 

subject to the judicial process. 

But let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary. If the President had not 

suggested that there be a ban on transgender troops, would you 

have ever initiated that memo in the first instance? 
49 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, when I came in I went in front of the Senate, and they asked me where I stood on a number of issues, and 

I said, ‘‘Let me make it clear. I am here to solve problems in the 

defense of the country. I don’t come in with a pre-formed agenda.’’ 

In this case it was not the President who brought the problem 

to my attention, it was service chiefs who asked me questions, how 

do we deal, and they laid out a number of issues. And I said, ‘‘Well, 

what is the policy?’’ And they did not have a policy. So I said, ‘‘Let’s 

study it.’’ 

And then that is what triggered what you eventually read from 

me, sir. It became a recommendation to the President because he 

asked for it, but it already—we were engaged on studying this to 

figure out how to employ the policy I inherited. And you can see 

where I ended up on that. I was unable to answer those questions. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Mr. Secretary, in the little bit of time that we 

have remaining I am going to shift gears on you. 

Last year’s NDAA made it our national policy to achieve a 355- 

ship battle force as soon as practicable. I understand that the annual long-range plan for construction of Navy vessels has us reaching that goal some time in 2048. Yet I have read statements of both 

news articles and HASC [House Armed Services Committee] testimony that a 355-ship battle force is achievable potentially as soon 

as the 2030s. 

Can you please explain to me how the fiscal year 2019 budget 

request meets the ‘‘as soon as practicable’’ standard when it comes 

to Navy ships? 

Secretary MATTIS. I can, Congressman. This is the balancing act, 

the prioritization that you expect from us. I have got a number of 

competing demands. I am absolutely supportive of where we need 

the Navy to go. 

But when you read 2048, Congressman, I think you and I have 

to keep a certain sanguine view of the people that brought that up 

and say, ‘‘Okay, I understand what you are saying. That is on the 

current trajectory.’’ The Congress is the one that raises armies and 

sustains navies. Part of this is the choice of Congress and what 

level of funding do they wish to push forward on this. Part of it 

is me bringing forward the absolute requirement at any one point 

in time. 

So it is not on automatic pilot, and both of us in our responsibilities have an impact on where we go and how fast we get there. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. DesJarlais. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, you touched on this briefly a moment ago, but I 

think it is worth revisiting, due to its importance. 

When we spoke at this hearing last year on the topic of hypersonic weapon development, you indicated that you were not happy 

that—where we were or where we needed to be. And thanks in 

large part to your efforts during your time as Secretary of Defense, 

we have seen a major shift in focus and support towards hypersonics. 

My State of Tennessee has a vested interest in this issue, with 

all the work that is done at Arnold Air Force Base in Tullahoma. 
50 

What concerns me, though, is the aging infrastructure and significant investments required across the range and test center enterprise. 

And as you are aware, both class of hypersonic weapons systems 

have significant and strenuous test capability requirements, but 

because we minimally addressed the long-term needs of hypersonic 

development in the past, places like Arnold, Holloman, Edwards 

Air Force Base face enormous challenges to maintaining and improving existing systems. 

If we aren’t prioritizing our test and evaluation facilities, then in 

a sense we are really putting the cart before the horse. And I think 

you agree and share these concerns and sense of urgency. But what 

would you suggest? How do we work together to address this problem and prioritize the challenges faced by our testing centers? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, Congressman, you are hitting on what I 

found was what we call the limiting factor, frankly. It wasn’t just 

our organization, it was that we were not set up to embrace the 

required—have the facilities that would embrace the whole challenge of hypersonics. 

So in the budget we have addressed this, to a degree. But we are 

going to have to have a complete program, support program, for 

this. This is going to be a major effort. 

Comptroller, do you have anything additional on it? 

Mr. NORQUIST. Not at this time. 

Secretary MATTIS. All right, yes. So just rest assured, sir, that 

we know where we want to go, and this is one of the key building 

blocks to getting us there. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. One final question for both you and the 

chairman. 

Earlier this year Mr. Putin announced that Russia had developed 

a series of new types of strategic offensive arms. Do you agree that 

Russia should honor the terms of the treaty, and agree to limit 

those new arms under New START [Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty]? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I believe they should. However, I will tell 

you that what he brought up in that video, if that is the one you 

are referring to, Congressman, I studied it closely and talked to 

people on my staff who know these issues very, very well. Nothing 

that President Putin said that day in his, I think, election hearing 

changed my strategic calculus one bit. I wish him a good arms race 

with himself. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Yes. General, did you have anything to add? 

General DUNFORD. I see it the same way, Congressman. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. I just want to thank you all for your service. We 

so appreciate you. And thanks for being here today. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, this has already been 

touched on, but I want to—I think it is so important that I need 

to do the same. 

When this country was started, debating the possibility of African Americans, women, and lesbians and gays serving in the military, the same doubts, the same reports and questions were posed: 
51 

How would it impact unit cohesion and effectiveness? Would it negatively impact the morale of the military? The military would lose 

its effectiveness. It would put our readiness at risk, especially 

when this Nation started talking about allowing women into the 

military and, most recently, opening combat positions to service 

women. Discussions evolved around the impacts of pregnancy and 

the rise in the number of sexual assault and harassments due to 

so-called more women serving. 

This Nation’s military is as powerful and effective today because 

of the sacrifice and the service of all its members, who proactively 

volunteer, something this President does not know and even went 

to great lengths to not serve. It is frustrating to me that we have 

not learned our lessons from the past, and we are here again, discussing the same unwarranted concerns and implementing discriminatory policies in the military. 

And as someone who has served in the Marine Corps, a brother 

who has served in the Marine Corps, many nephews—half of my 

nephews have served in the military—many of who have gone to 

Afghanistan and Iraq, I find this extremely troubling and upsetting. 

Transgender individuals are already serving in the military. And 

not once during any hearing did I hear military leaders citing 

transgender service members as a threat to our military readiness. 

So Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, I hope our military 

will focus on getting the most capable and qualified individuals to 

defend our Nation, regardless of the race, gender, and sexual orientation. 

Now I will move on to my question. 

Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, there are many officials 

who believe diplomacy and negotiations are pointless, and force is 

the only way forward. Looking back at the past two decades and 

what the men and women of this Nation have had to endure as a 

result of multiple bloody wars, what would be your words of caution to those who are more willing to rush and engage in regime 

change? 

Secretary MATTIS. I will just tell you, Congressman, that in over 

14 months in the most sensitive meetings in the White House, at 

Foggy Bottom, State Department, Langley, and around the world 

with our commanders and allies, I have never found this thesis 

proposed, that negotiations and diplomacy are pointless. 

As you can see with what we have going on right now with North 

Korea, where we have a summit meeting coming up, the whole 

point all along was to drive this to a negotiated resolution that I 

am—obviously, we can’t see the future, but we are all cautiously 

optimistic we may be on the right path for the denuclearization of 

the Korean Peninsula 

In Syria we are driving toward the Geneva process, and that 

again is the diplomatic outcome. 

So we have not seen this sort of approach, and I would reject it 

if I saw it. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. 

General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I guess just to reinforce the 

point you are making, there is no challenge that I can think of that 
52 

we are dealing with right now that isn’t—that doesn’t have the 

lead of the State Department, and it is not primarily a diplomatic 

or an economic issue. 

There is a military dimension to our challenge in Afghanistan, 

there is a military dimension to our challenge in Syria, Iraq, Libya. 

You can name the crises that we are dealing with right now. But 

in no case, in no case was the Department of Defense actually in 

the lead in a final—in achieving a final political solution, which is 

the end state of all of those endeavors. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you very much. I think some of the tweets 

that come out of this administration sometimes speak to a different 

tone and are contradictory to what you just stated today. But really, really appreciate you. I think many of us in this country are so 

grateful that both of you are—or two of you of this administration 

are there. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, Secretary Mattis, thank you, and General Dunford 

and Mr. Norquist, thank you all for being here. 

Second, I noticed in your chart on the back the percent of defense 

to GDP, and I couldn’t help but notice there is 3.1 percent now. 

You go back to World War II and it was 35.5 percent. The Korean 

War, which—I am assuming the 1950 period—was 11.3 percent, I 

think. But I think that underscores your point about the cost of 

war is much more expensive than the cost of a military that is capable being able to prevent war. And I don’t want to go back there. 

So I thank you for that chart, Secretary Mattis. I think that is very 

important for people to understand. 

I want to also commend you and the President on the team that 

you have assembled for our national defense. I think that is so important. We start with you, we have got our Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

all the members are—your secretaries of your services, all three 

are very, very impressive, very well knowledged, and very capable 

people. Our Deputy Secretary of Defense, Shanahan, what a phenomenal guy who brings so much to the table. 

And so I just want to thank you and the President for bringing 

a team of that level of talent that is solving our Nation’s problems. 

Now I want to get into—this is for both you and Chairman 

Dunford. We do not—and the American people certainly do not— 

want to see U.S. troops deployed indefinitely in an open-ended conflict in Syria. However, as the previous administration learned 

with Iraq, a hasty withdrawal of U.S. military personnel and security assistance can have very negative consequences, especially if 

they are on a timeline that is timeline-only driven. 

I—unfortunately or fortunately, whatever the case may be—was 

there in 2009 during the drawdown, and got to see firsthand the 

effects as a battalion commander on the ground of going from 

[Camp] Taji being 17,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, 

and civilians, to going to probably 1,500 when I left, and even 

lower. 

So under what conditions would it be prudent for the U.S. to 

withdraw or remove our forces from Syria? What are we using as 
53 

a catalyst to say we have achieved this objective, and this is when 

it will happen? 

Secretary MATTIS. Basically, Congressman, we want to make certain that ISIS has been driven to its knees, you know, that they 

are no longer a concentrated threat with a geographic ground that 

they can use as a safe haven. I think we are well on the way there. 

As you can see right now, we have, due to the Turkey incursion, 

had a distracted partner force, and that has thrown us off in the 

last couple of weeks. But we are on the right track right now. 

The second point would be what was brought up earlier, and that 

is the diplomatic outcome, that we get Geneva underway. That— 

the U.N. special envoy, Staffan de Mistura, has got that responsibility. And so you have got the military security piece on the 

ground, which we are achieving, and then we are going to have to 

see the diplomats, the U.N. step up to address the political outcome. But that is where I see us going, sir. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And that is good to hear, 

because it needs to be objective-driven, not time-driven. And I really appreciate that. And I know you guys—like I said, I commented 

on the team, because I know we will make the right decision. 

Doesn’t the State Department fund its stabilization activity—also 

alleviate strain on Syria’s neighbors, like Israel and Jordan, that 

must deal immediately with the instability on the borders? 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. KELLY. And then the final question I kind of just want to 

talk to both of you about is kind of a question, but kind of a comment. 

Our State Partnership Programs with the National Guards, the 

50 National Guards, 54 States and territories that we have, those 

things are extremely effective, if we use. And I just encourage both 

General Dunford and you, Secretary Mattis, to do all we can to 

make sure we help our State Department with using those things. 

Sometimes they can do things that U.S. DOD or we, as a nation, 

can’t do. But those at State and individual territories sometimes 

have a little more leverage to work with State to get us to some 

objectives. And if you have a comment on that—if you don’t, I will 

yield back. 

Secretary MATTIS. I think just that we are aligned with you. I 

think that, again, by, with, and through allies, plus there is the 

person-to-person connection between, you know, the guys from Tennessee and the guys from a country, or the guys from Montana and 

the guys from, you know, wherever they are serving. And when you 

start connecting like that, you get a more enduring, deeper relationship. And that has a lot to do with stability in the world and 

building trust, sir. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. And you take care 

of my Mississippi Rifles, which are deploying to CENTCOM [U.S. 

Central Command] next year. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Suozzi. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your good and effective service. 

Secretary Mattis, I admire you for so many reasons, one of which 

is your candor. And I just want to bring up two issues that are 
54 

incongruous with your leadership, one of which was brought up by 

Congresswoman Tsongas earlier today about the Defense Manpower Data Center scrubbing data regarding troop levels in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Syria. And you addressed that earlier. I just want 

to bring up that. You know, it just doesn’t make any sense that we 

would not share that information. 

And I had written a letter to you back in January about the special inspector general’s report on Afghan reconstruction, which is a 

report that has been issued for some time now. And it always had 

information regarding population and district control. And that information was originally listed as classified. In response to my letter, I was told that the decision to classify the data was an oversight by NATO Resolute Support. 

So I just want to point these two things out that—you know, we 

are watching these things, and it doesn’t make sense in the context 

of your leadership. 

I have been digging in on the issue of Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

I read the book by Husain Haqqani about Magnificent Delusions. 

I read Steven Coll’s book recently. I have been talking to Pakistani 

officials, certainly American officials as well, as to what is going on. 

And Pakistan claims that they have reduced the violence in their 

own country dramatically over the past several years, that they are 

starting to repopulate the ungoverned areas, and that they are 

starting to build a border fence along their border with Afghanistan, and that by 2022 they are going to have some substantial 

piece of it done. 

They are claiming that they need to see the same thing happen 

from the other side, from the Afghani side, to try and prevent this 

porous border from—people escaping from Afghanistan, going into 

Pakistan, finding a safe harbor, and then coming back into Afghanistan when they want to. 

Is there any discussion about border security from the Afghani 

side regarding this porous border? It is—I understand from reading 

and talking to people and having visited Afghanistan how difficult 

that is to do, and how expensive it would be to do. But it seems 

like it is a legitimate concern that if they are going to be doing it 

on the Pakistani side, we need to figure out how the Afghanis can 

be doing it on the Afghani side, as well. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think I can answer that question. A few years ago we had a—what we call the trilateral border 

standard operating procedure between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

And we, of course, served as the honest broker. 

For the last couple years what we have been trying to do is develop an effective bilateral border standard operating procedure between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And you have been a student of 

Pakistan, so you followed the fits and starts in their relationship, 

even over the last 2 or 3 years. 

So the short answer is both nations are looking at this issue, but 

not yet effectively have they looked at it in a bilateral way that allows them to make the compromises necessary to actually put in 

place effective border control. And I think you understand that the 

historical disagreement just about where Pakistan begins and ends 

and where Afghanistan begins and ends is at the root of the prob-
55 

lem of establishing its bilateral SOP [standard operating procedure]. 

There is a process that—the encouraging thing is there is a process between senior leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan, both political leaders and military leaders, to work through this issue. That 

didn’t exist 18 or 24 months ago. So there has been some progress 

in that regard and I can tell you—I think you visited as well—this 

is one of the things that General Nicholson certainly works very 

closely with both the Afghans and the Pakistanis to move forward. 

But again, the short answer is are there detailed plans that will 

be reconciled between Afghanistan and Pakistan? No. Is there a 

process in place right now to address the concerns of both Pakistan 

and Afghanistan, and develop a way ahead? Yes. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So what can we do to facilitate that in the context 

of the tensions that are existing between our country and Pakistan 

right now? 

General DUNFORD. Well, that is a great question, because, you 

know, as you know, we have talked a lot about the military dimension of problems here today, and at the end of the day what is 

going to be necessary to have peace and stability in Afghanistan is 

going to be to have a good relationship with their neighbor, Pakistan. 

And I think this issue is going to be—have to be addressed in 

the context of reconciliation, and in the context of developing an effective relationship between the two countries. 

What can we do? That is what our State Department partners 

have to do, and it certainly—that is something General Nicholson 

is doing at the mil-to-mil relationship, as well. As you know, the 

Pakistani Army plays an outsized role in Pakistan. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Yes. 

General DUNFORD. And so our military-to-military engagement is 

very important to be a foundational element of our diplomatic efforts. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So again, I want to thank you very much. I want to 

continue to try and encourage the whole-of-government approach 

that we hear about all the time. I see the military has a very clear 

strategy in Afghanistan. I am concerned that the rest of the wholeof-government is more like a list of things that we do, as opposed 

to an overall strategy. 

But I yield back my time. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Norquist, I don’t have a question for you. But since the Marines are getting all the attention I just want to say we appreciate 

you being here. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, the President, as you know, has endorsed the need to revise the Committee 

on Foreign Investment in the United States [CFIUS] in general, 

and particularly the FIRRMA [Foreign Investment Risk Review 

Modernization Act] legislation in particular. Can you offer any concrete examples of why this legislation and this broader effort is important to the Department? 
56 

And, in other words, what are the long-term consequences if 

China is allowed to continue to acquire our advanced technologies 

through investment and joint ventures? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, there are technologies we do 

not want to—for defense, for security reasons—to see in Chinese 

hands, American technologies, American businesses. 

We have got to bring CFIUS up to date. I think you saw on the 

5G effort here some weeks ago that we moved swiftly, even in advance of what the process requires, in order to make certain that 

we did not naively watch a business linkup that was not in our 

best interest. But that was a one-shot effort. We need to look at 

the entire penetration of our society and what we need to protect, 

and CFIUS is a key part of this. 

Every democratic nation right now, by the way, that we deal 

with, from Germany to Australia, from Canada to the United Kingdom, they are all working this issue. And so this is not unique to 

us, but it is certainly one of our responsibilities. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. And Australia in particular has 

been at the leading edge, in terms of trying to figure out how to 

deal with this level of influence. 

And I don’t know, Mr. Chairman, if you had anything to add to 

that. 

General DUNFORD. The only thing I would say, Congressman, I 

mean, you zero in on—I would just say if someone asked me what 

are our competitive advantages, first and foremost, of course, is the 

quality of our people. But second is the technological edge that we 

have historically enjoyed over the past 20 or 30 years. 

And this is nothing more and nothing less than putting at risk 

our ability to remain a technological edge over our potential adversaries. And the lifting of intellectual property in the manner in 

which China is doing that is actually undermining our ability to 

maintain a technological competitive advantage. 

Secretary MATTIS. We are going to have to improve on the investment risk review process. That would be the specific area where 

the Congress could take some steps, and we would be happy to 

work with you alongside Commerce Department and Treasury Department in order to come up with the specific things we need to 

do to protect what we absolutely must hold on to. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I appreciate that. In a related question, Mr. 

Secretary, should DOD permit equipment manufactured and maintained by companies linked to the Chinese military and intelligence 

services, like Huawei or ZTE, to be part of its supply chain? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not think that is wise. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. And in particular, should it be servicing key 

military installations in the United States or abroad, companies 

like that? 

Secretary MATTIS. No. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. And are you comfortable with the—that the Department has the tools it needs to deal with the so-called white labeling problem, whereby a company like Huawei sells its equipment to a third party who simply rebrands it? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think this is an area of needed attention to 

include saying we will not deal with white labels. We need to 

have—we need to know who we are buying from, Congressman. 
57 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

And Mr. Chairman, I don’t know if you have any similar concerns related to companies like Huawei or ZTE being part of a military supply chain. 

General DUNFORD. I have the same concerns, both here and 

abroad. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. And quickly, with what remains of 

my time, we have seen multiple instances in the past year where 

the services have sought to be more guarded in their transparency 

and accessibility to the media, even at the unclassified level, particularly in guidance issued by the Navy and Air Force leadership. 

Now, as someone who is new to politics and often spends a lot 

of time dealing with the media, part of that is understandable. But 

I think transparency is needed now, more than ever. And I just 

was wondering, Mr. Secretary, is this media engagement posture 

downstream of guidance that was given to DOD at large issued by 

you or your staff? 

Secretary MATTIS. That was issued by me. However, I said I 

want more engagement with the media. I want you to give your 

name. I don’t want to read that somebody speaking on the condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak. I have 

yet to tell anyone they are not authorized to speak. So if they are 

not willing to say they know about the issue and give their name, 

that would concern me. If they are giving background, they should 

just be a defense official giving background information authorized 

to give it. 

What I don’t want is pre-decisional information or classified information or any information about upcoming military movements 

or operations, which is the normal ‘‘loose lips sink ships’’ kind of 

restriction. Pre-decisional, we do not close the President’s decisionmaking maneuver space by saying things before the President has 

made a decision. But otherwise, I want more engagement with the 

military. 

And I don’t want to see a—an increase opaqueness about what 

we are doing. We are already remote enough from the American 

people by our size and by our continued focus overseas. We need 

to be more engaged here at home. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to Secretary Mattis 

and General Dunford, thank you for your extraordinary service. I 

wanted to just associate myself very briefly with my colleagues who 

have made supportive comments regarding our transgender troops. 

I think the way we handle this issue certainly reflects our values, 

and it is an important one. 

I also wanted to just ask you for a moment about the authorization for the use of military force, or AUMF. As you know, the 

Armed Services Committee, unlike what most people think, doesn’t 

take up this matter. It really aligns with Foreign Affairs. But to 

the extent that it would be helpful or hurtful for that dialogue, that 

debate to take place, could you respond in some ways? 

Perhaps you are agnostic to it, but on the other hand I am wondering where you would err on the side of trying to move forward 

with that. 
58 

I think the concern is really around what kind of a comprehensive response we would have. It is not just that we would strike 

at this horrible time of attacks on the people, but where are we 

going with that, and what kind of language in an AUMF might be 

helpful to making certain that we are moving in a direction that 

perhaps doesn’t repeat some of our mistakes of the past. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, I believe that what we have 

right now in terms of AUMF is sufficient legal authority. 

Now, why do I say that? Because I can show you where al-Qaida 

that becomes al-Qaida in Iraq that becomes ISIS—I can show a 

continued thread all the way through. So, when you are up against 

an adversary, like we see with al-Nusra—al-Qaida in Syria that 

has changed its name yet again—we are up against groups that 

change their names very, very rapidly. 

So as we look at our legal structures, they have got to adapt to 

the reality of that enemy, in terms of associated movements. Now 

I have no reservations about reporting to you. We just found another one that we have got to go after, you know, the folks found 

they are ready to attack us, an ally, our embassy, whatever. So we 

would have to make certain that timelines were not addressed, 

other than in reporting requirements, and whatever you say on 

that we would be right back in here on time saying number of 

troops, operations, scope, and concept. 

I think geography, you would have to be very careful, because 

this adversary, as you know, uses every border because they think 

we respect the border and so they can get over the border and continue what they are doing. We cannot have an AUMF that would 

not take that into account, something which I—is one of the reasons we look at AUMF 2001 and 2003 as being sufficient. 

We also don’t want to go for a new one and then find all of our 

detainee authority has now dissipated, we have got to start over in 

courts of law to try and protect ourselves from people that we have 

in our custody today. 

And so, if you keep the association, if you watch the timelines 

and say we are not going to put—you know, you have the power 

of the purse every year, so you really have the timeline authority 

now. And if we keep the geography, the borderlines, from inhibiting 

our operations and yet you oversee us so you are comfortable with 

what we are doing, then I think that is what we are looking for. 

But the spirit of Congress saying you are with us, would be very 

helpful. We think we have that right now with AUMFs. I understand and respect those who think that they are not sufficient. 

Mrs. DAVIS. General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. You know, Congresswoman, I think I could 

only reinforce what the Secretary said. As I sit here thinking about 

the threat, and we are dealing with threats that are transregional 

threats, they don’t—as the Secretary identified, they don’t respect 

borders. And the time that some of these conflicts take is not predictable. 

And so what I would, I guess, ask for, regardless of the specific 

form, is I think there is three things that is—from a military perspective, you want to have. One is the full-throated support of the 

American people, you know, through the Congress. You would want 

to have a framework that was flexible enough to address the geo-
59 

graphical and time issues that the Secretary spoke about and that 

would allow you to actually be effective, from a military perspective. Those are—that is the criteria. And whatever form that takes 

politically I would support. But you would have to deliver those 

four things to us. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I think I may have been hearing something slightly different coming from you, but I think I heard that 

on a positive way there is—could be something possibly that at 

least is broad enough and yet specific enough, I guess, those two 

things that are important. 

And helpful? Not helpful? Helpful if it is done right? And not so 

politicized. Is that—would sum up—okay, thank you. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gaetz. 

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

your service. 

While I fear it came at too high a price, I am very glad that we 

are giving you the resources and the tools to go and fight and win 

when necessary, and to ensure that you are supporting our diplomatic efforts appropriately. 

Chairman Dunford, you had made mention in your testimony 

that you saw Iran’s malign influence extending through the Middle 

East, and I wanted to make sure that that wasn’t an exclusive reference, and that we weren’t merely viewing Iran as a regional 

hegemon, but as a potential global threat, as well. 

General DUNFORD. No, Congressman. I think it is fair to say that 

they are a potential global threat, and there is certainly some evidence of Hezbollah, as an example, in South America. But today we 

view that largely as a threat in the Middle East. 

I mean where we see Iran’s malign influence manifest most is in 

places like Syria and places like Yemen and places like Lebanon 

and Iraq. 

Mr. GAETZ. Yes, and I am very interested in that nexus, wherein 

the Hezbollah activities in Latin America could be served to financing the operations that we are having to combat in the CENTCOM 

AOR [area of responsibility]. 

Can you speak to this budget request’s treatment of the Iranianbacked Hezbollah threat in Latin America? Because in prior briefings with other DOD officials there has been an appropriate focus 

on the CENTCOM AOR and on what we see going on on the Korean Peninsula, but I want to make sure that that threat you have 

just identified is well resourced in our strategy—— 

General DUNFORD. Sure. And Congressman, to the theme, one of 

the themes that we have had today is that not all the problems can 

be solved in a military dimension. And when I look at transregional 

groups like Hezbollah, there is really three things they need to survive. You know, they need the people, the fighters; they need the 

resources; and then they have got a narrative, the message. That 

is what allows extremists to survive. 

And so, we can deal with the physical manifestation of Hezbollah 

in places like Syria or Yemen. We are not currently dealing with 

them right now, except in the diplomatic, economic space. But it is 
60 

going to take a whole-of-government approach to deal with an organization like Hezbollah, particularly that operates transregionally. 

Mr. GAETZ. How does this budget request that we are evaluating 

at this hearing service that threat from the DOD standpoint? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, I don’t—I can’t—I will get back to you, 

Congressman, and see if there is a specific way to do that, other 

than the fact that we are increasing our overall capabilities in the 

U.S. military to deal with whatever threat we have to deal with. 

Mr. GAETZ. Yes, and I am most interested in determining whether or not we are engaged in an adequate train-and-equip mission, 

whether we are engaging in the right, you know, human activities 

from a DOD standpoint, because it is a difficult environment. 

So, Secretary Mattis—— 

General DUNFORD. Okay, I better understand your question. I 

would say right now that supporting the independence and sovereignty of Iraq is one way to deal with malign influence in—Iranian malign influence in the region. Our support for the Lebanese 

Armed Forces is another way we deal with Iranian malign influence in the region—— 

Mr. GAETZ. I speak specifically to the SOUTHCOM AOR, dealing 

with the threat there. 

General DUNFORD. Yes—— 

Mr. GAETZ. So that is something we certainly can work on. And 

I am eager to see how the enhanced resources will be able to be 

directed to that threat that we face here, in our backyard. 

Secretary Mattis, I fear that when we look 50 years out we will 

not win wars with our near-peer adversaries based on our airframes alone, that we will require the most technically capable munitions and missiles and bombs in the world to be able to win. Can 

you speak to this budget request’s treatment of our research and 

development assets and our goals to ensure that we are getting a 

good bang for the buck, but that we also have a diverse research 

and development mission underway? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. Up at Picatinny Arsenal and various 

other locations we are looking at advanced munitions, everything 

from rifle bullets to bombs to precision missiles. 

We have a newly energized, innovative effort, as you know, because we have received more money for innovation. I forget the 

specific addition, but it is significant, I will tell you. And in there 

is the necessity for identifying those kind of weapons, and not just 

hypersonics now, but the kind that allow us to go to the next level. 

Where will you find them? One of the primary efforts right now 

is in missile defense, for example. How do we take out missiles 

from the air, and do it a lot more cheaply than very expensive 

interceptor kill vehicles? We have got to find a cheaper way to do 

this against a growing threat. We don’t want to break the budget 

all on missile defense, for example. So that would be one. 

We also have a number of naval weapons, from directed energy 

and others that we are putting money into, so that those are at the 

cutting edge and we are in the lead on those weapons systems if 

we have to employ them. 

So we can give you a more detailed lay-down of the various ordnance that we are looking at. Some of them are novel enough, they 
61 

are not high explosive, they are that different. But we can give you 

a more wholesome readout, if you are interested in that. 

Mr. GAETZ. Yes. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today, and especially Secretary Mattis and General Dunford. Thank you for your 

service to the Nation. 

So we have this morning discussed the atrocities in Syria, we 

have touched on the controversy surrounding our southern border 

and the threats posed by North Korea at some point during these 

hearings. But one recurring issue that really is not defined by geographic location is malicious actors in cyberspace. 

Mr. Secretary or General Dunford, how should the Department 

of Defense be imposing higher costs on our adversaries who violate 

norms of state behavior using cyber means, particularly when those 

actions don’t rise to the level of armed conflict? How does your 

budget request address the tradeoffs between building capacity and 

capability to counter these threats, and what metrics will we use 

to know if we get the balance right, going forward? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, this is a growing area. If we 

look at it 10 years ago, we wouldn’t even be having this conversation. This is a dynamic threat that has grown. 

We do have a 7 percent increase in the budget for our cyber efforts, and you are aware that the Congress has directed us to look 

at separating Cyber Command and NSA without losing the synergy 

of those two organizations, as we expand not only the defense of 

our DOD networks and the offense capability, but also what we call 

DTN, defend the Nation, which is led by Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen 

at DHS [Department of Homeland Security]. But we at DOD have 

the bulk of the capability for this. 

So what we are doing about it is we are creating offensive plans. 

I won’t go into detail about them, but you can imagine what they 

look like. We also are increasing our defenses internally. 

The challenge is when we go to the defend the Nation effort, we 

are going to have to have agreements and authorities on what 

DOD does inside our own country, because while we may have a 

lot of the capability, generally speaking we have concentrated, you 

know, obviously, outside the Nation. That has been our responsibility. 

So we have got to gather right now a cyber strategy in support 

of DHS that is in Secretary Nielsen’s hand, and she has that available. That is only the first step, I might add. We are going to have 

to refine it for this when she gets done defining the problems we 

didn’t address in what we submitted to her. And we will keep 

working it forward on the DTN effort. 

Internally, we will be going to the cloud. We have a fair and open 

competition going on, and we have examined what CIA achieved in 

terms of availability of data and using data, but also security of 

their systems. And it is very impressive. 

So those are just a couple of things we are doing right now, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Well, I am going to be following this 

very closely. I think it is important that we do impose costs on 
62 

those nations that are using cyber tools and, again, doing things 

that don’t rise to the level of armed conflict, but we need to have 

a strong offense here to deter them, I believe. 

Secretary, the fiscal year 2019 budget request includes more 

than—more RDT&E [research, development, test, and evaluation] 

funding, particularly for prototyping. So I know we touched on 

some of these this morning, but I will again raise this. 

So what advances can we expect to see from this increase in 

prototyping, in terms of bringing technologies into the field that leverage prior investments or recent commercial technical advancements? 

And how does the RDT&E portion of the fiscal year 2019 budget 

request reflect investments in technical advancements to both enhance current military capabilities and also invest in emerging 

ideas like quantum computing, robotics, and hypersonics to build 

a foundation for future warfighting capabilities? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. Congressman, Secretary Carter, my 

predecessor, set up DIUx [Defense Innovation Unit–Experimental] 

out in Silicon Valley for a reason, and we have embraced it and actually strengthened it. 

We are looking to prioritize these various efforts due to the Congress that broke our acquisition, technology, and logistics undersecretariat into two parts. One is acquisition and sustainment, the 

other is research and engineering. We have brought in varsity-level 

players there, and defense test and evaluation, and we are going 

to move things into production, prototyping. We are not going to 

have more papers, we are going to move on hypersonics, move on 

AI. 

What do I mean by move? Joint program officers, not a bunch of 

different organizations all feeling their way forward. 

And you just listed in the list you gave me—just in the question, 

you just listed exactly where we are going. And we can give you 

a brief on this, sir, but I have got a varsity-level player in—as the 

Under Secretary of Research and Engineering with NASA background, DOD background, Lincoln Labs. He has really got what he 

needs, in terms of experience, to drive this forward, not for theory, 

not for experiments, but putting something out for test and moving 

it into a capability. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, we sure look forward to seeing the results 

of that work. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Cheney. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, all three 

of you, for being here today. I am proud that, as we meet today, 

we have taken the first steps in providing the resources necessary 

to begin the rebuild. I think that there are many of us who were 

very frustrated and opposed a lot of the domestic spending in the 

omnibus, but made the decision that our own dysfunction here as 

an entity, as a Congress, shouldn’t be—the cost of that shouldn’t 

be borne by our men and women in uniform and their families. And 

so we will continue certainly to help fight to make sure we get 

those resources necessary in the out-years, as well. 
63 

Mr. Secretary, I have a Syria question for you. We lost significant credibility and deterrence capability when we failed to enforce 

the red line with respect to Assad’s use of chemical weapons in 

2013. Could you talk about how we get that back? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman Cheney, I think the first 

point about red lines is you don’t draw them unless you intend to 

live up to them. And we don’t always even have to draw them, and 

we can speak with our actions. And you saw us do that just slightly 

over a year ago, when the Syrian Government, with either Russian 

complicity or incompetence, carried out a sarin gas attack, and we 

took out 17 percent of their air force as a caution to them that that 

was unwise. 

I am not sure they have learned their lesson, but I think in this 

case actions speak louder than words. There are times to draw a 

red line, and there is times to leave some ambiguity and speak 

with your actions. And I think that is what we are doing right now 

to address the question you brought up. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I think, obviously, 

the concern is that we won’t be able to be an effective deterrence 

against the future use of chemical weapons, for example, if we fail 

to take action once again. 

With respect to North Korea, we have seen historically, time and 

time again, as we have discussed, the North Koreans follow the 

same game plan, where they create a crisis, come to the table, offer 

concessions, pocket benefits that we give them, and then continue 

down the path of developing their weapons. 

I saw on both Chairman Dunford and Secretary Mattis’s testimony, I think, the phrase ‘‘cautious optimism’’ about where we are. 

I wonder, Secretary Mattis, first, if you could talk about how we 

are going to guard against a situation where the North Koreans do 

exactly that again. 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. As you know, Congresswoman, right 

now or today nominee Pompeo is going through his hearing for confirmation over on the Senate side. And I will tell you that in talking with him, he has studied all those past occasions of negotiation 

failed, of documents signed and then not carried through. And I 

think we have someone who will, with the consent of the Senate, 

be in position to guide us in a very mature way to not walk into 

the same trap again. 

Ms. CHENEY. And then, Chairman Dunford, could you address 

the issue of the notion that there is significant risk involved, as we 

have also discussed, as you have testified before, with the potential 

for having to take military action on the Korean Peninsula? 

I am concerned that we have not seen the same level of focus and 

attention and reporting, frankly, about the risk involved in a nuclear-armed North Korea, and the risk involved with—you know, 

even if we creep into a policy of deterrence here, instead of complete and verifiable elimination of their nuclear capability, would 

you please address the risks of a nuclear-armed North Korea? 

General DUNFORD. Sure, Congresswoman Cheney. I think, first 

and foremost, I just want to add a point to the earlier question, 

which is nothing has changed in the military dimension of the diplomatic and economic pressure campaign. So one of the lessons in 

the past, I think, we have made adjustments on our military pos-
64 

ture where we have changed things that we were doing. We have 

made no changes in that regard. 

And with regard to a nuclear North Korea, I think there is two 

issues. There is a capability piece and then there is a capacity 

piece. And at some point the capabilities that can be developed can 

overcome our defenses, or the numbers of missiles that North 

Korea can overcome our defenses. 

So today I think I can say with confidence that we can defend 

against the capability that North Korea has today, the specific capabilities, and the numbers of missiles that they can field that can 

reach the United States. We could never deal with—we could never 

create a defense against a growing serial production missile capability by the North Koreans. So the North Koreans would be able 

to hold us at risk, were they to go into serial production with the 

numbers of missiles that would exceed our ability to defend. 

And again, the equation can never be you can never afford to defend your way out of something that—if people are serious about 

building offensive capability. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. I have additional questions, but will 

have to—I have to yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, you have answered questions that have taken us around the world. I would like 

to come back home regarding the National Guard deployment to 

our southern border at the direction of the President. 

In 2012 there was a GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] report, and this report was conducted at the direction of Congress. And I think it was motivated by—in large part, by the number of National Guard deployments by various administrations, but 

more recently at that time by President Bush’s administration’s decision to deploy, I think, 4,000 to 6,000 guardsmen for almost 2 

years at the cost of close to $2 billion. 

And the GAO report found that—and they were concerned with 

a lack of a comprehensive, long-term strategy for the southern border. In fact—and I will read—in the report it said, ‘‘DOD officials 

expressed concerns about the absence of a comprehensive strategy 

for southwest border security, and the resulting challenges to identify and plan a DOD role. DHS officials expressed concerns that 

DOD’s border assistance is ad hoc, and that DOD has other operational requirements.’’ 

And in light of the President’s public comment, where he suggested that the National Guard would be deployed until such time 

that a wall is built, I have concerns, and could you please address 

what comprehensive, long-term strategy is either present or in development to frame the National Guard’s involvement on the southern border? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I read that 2012 report a little 

over a year ago, when I was getting ready for the job here, and 

took it on board as I thought my way through what has come up 

more recently. 

I think the priority that President Trump has placed on the 

southern border and Secretary Nielsen’s—what she has put together for a comprehensive plan is sound. Now, I have not read all 

of it, I have read enough of it to know what I needed to do to put 
65 

these 4,000—up to 4,000 down there until the first of October in 

a non-law-enforcement, no contact with the migrants, position to 

support DHS. They are under the Governor’s command and control. 

Mr. BROWN. If I could just jump in, though, Mr. Secretary, I 

mean, I am assuming that what you just said was probably what 

was in place when President Obama and President Bush asked the 

Guard—directed the Guard to go to the border. The GAO found 

that there was not a comprehensive strategy. 

So I guess my question is, is there a comprehensive strategy that 

clearly defines the role of the DOD, the National Guard in these 

operations, an operation that may be a very long time in this scenario? 

Secretary MATTIS. What we have going on right now, sir, is to 

back up the Department of Homeland Security, the Customs and 

Border Patrol troops who are down—or Guards who are down are 

not troops. The Guards who are down there, this is the time of year 

when you will see generally an uptick. This is an anticipatory backing up so that the Customs and Border Patrol can put more troops 

in the field. 

As far as the larger issue on the strategy, that is rightly under 

Department of Homeland Security, and you would have to—— 

Mr. BROWN. Well, I am going to—let me just jump back in here, 

Mr. Secretary, because the GAO report looked at both the DHS and 

DOD. 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. 

Mr. BROWN. DHS said it is ad hoc. DOD said, we are concerned 

because there needs to be a comprehensive, long-term strategy that 

outlines the role. This is a potential—a deployment that may potentially last for years, given the statement of the Commander in 

Chief that their presence may be there until such time that a wall 

is built. 

So again, I mean, you may not have time to fully answer the 

question today, and I will follow up with a correspondence to your 

office, but I would like to have a little bit more detail about a comprehensive, long-term strategy for a DOD role to support DHS. Because I assume that you do that in partnership with the DHS, but 

they are not going to do it in a vacuum. 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. But right now, Congressman, this is not 

a long-term deployment— the President says if the wall gets built, 

that is one thing. Does Secretary Nielsen—does she need this reinforcement? That is a second point. It is to buy time. It is under the 

defense support to civil authority’s authority, and we have limited 

it, both in numbers, and we have limited it in location. She has 

given us priority areas, sectors they are called, where they are 

working. 

So this is a short-term—this is not a long-term strategy. This is 

a buying-time effort. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Mac Thornberry, for your 

diligence covering the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, and thank you for your extraordinary success in rebuilding the American military. 
66 

The spectrum of our current world threats are becoming increasingly challenging, from terrorism in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and 

Africa to the radicalism of Iran and North Korea and the competition with Russia and China, our military has more broader focus 

than ever before. 

As the Readiness Subcommittee chair, I am particularly grateful 

as a military dad who has had four sons serve in Iraq under your 

leadership—and Egypt and Afghanistan—I appreciate the challenges our Department of Defense faces, and I would like to thank 

you both for your service and commitment to our country as you 

manage all the key issues I have identified. 

Additionally, as a veteran myself and a military parent, I would 

like to thank all of you for your support of the budget agreement 

that finally puts our military on the path to addressing readiness 

shortfalls. 

And for each of you, a—I am really very supportive of President 

Trump’s initiatives to provide funding for the European Deterrence 

Initiative. I believe that this funding goes a long way in deterring 

Putin’s increasingly aggressive activities in the region. 

One concern I have is—with the EDI, is our ability to transport 

troops and supporting resources across Europe. Are there ongoing 

efforts within European Command to improve mobility throughout 

the region? 

As to infrastructure, and additionally as to border crossings, do 

you share the concern that I have, if something happens in Europe, 

that we may not be able to effectively respond in time? 

And is this a readiness concern? For each of you. 

Secretary MATTIS. It is a readiness concern for the U.S. military, 

but for all of NATO’s military. Right now you can drive hazardous 

cargo from southern Italy all the way to Finland faster than we can 

move some of our troops across some of those borders, due to different bridge capacities, authorities, legal restrictions, this sort of 

thing. 

In one area that we have found we can work with the European 

Union on security in Europe, they are working on what is called 

military mobility across their borders. And that is underway right 

now. It is called PESCO [Permanent Structured Cooperation]. It 

is—the acronym for it. And NATO is working closely with the European Union to remove the very obstacles that are inhibiting our 

movement of forces. 

Mr. WILSON. And General, did you have a—about the infrastructure? What is the status of improving infrastructure? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, that is one of the three elements of the EDI for this year, is infrastructure. It is infrastructure, pre-position equipment, and exercises. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I want to thank both of you. And Mr. Secretary, as the co-chairman of the European Union Caucus, I am 

certainly going to relay your information immediately, and thank 

them for their efforts to provide particularly expedited border 

crossing. 

And additionally for General Dunford, we have heard that the 

force is strained, as services continue to do more with less. What 

is your assessment of the current state of force? What is the great-
67 

est strain on the joint force? And how is it being mitigated? What 

is your assessment of the military risk? 

General DUNFORD. Sure, Congressman. First, I will start with 

the people. I think we are recruiting and retaining high-quality 

people. 

And then I will go to the operational tempo, which is causing us 

to be away more than we would like. And we talked about rebuilding some of our capabilities, so we need to do that. 

And then the third element that it—I would point out is material 

readiness, which this budget really is designed to address and build 

on the efforts of 2017 and 2018 to get after some of those material 

shortfalls, readiness challenges that we spoke about. 

Mr. WILSON. And as—I am really grateful—recruiting extraordinary people. I want to show you, as I previously represented Parris 

Island. And to see the young people serving there, it was just 

heartwarming. And now I continue to represent Fort Jackson, 

where I—Secretary Mattis, you would be so grateful to see these 

new recruits coming in, and how much that means to our country. 

And General, a final question, and that is could you provide an 

unclassified characterization of the annual Chairman’s Risk Assessment to Congress, discuss the strategic risk and military risk, 

and what is your assessment of each? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I would like to do what I did 

last year, is to come in in a closed session with all the Members 

and outline the risk assessment. 

We asked for your permission to delay it this year, and I appreciate the opportunity to do that. And the reason is that I finished 

it in January, but the Secretary wrote a new National Defense 

Strategy, and so the risk assessment that I will come back to you 

with in the fall is going to be specifically benchmarked against the 

National Defense Strategy the Secretary has published, as well as 

the revised National Military Strategy. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you. And your service to our country is 

reassuring. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Panetta. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, all three of you, thank you very much for your time, 

for waiting out until you get to the last few questioners. So thank 

you very much. 

Secretary Mattis, I just wanted to direct your attention to one of 

your quotes in last year’s NDAA fiscal year 2018: ‘‘It is appropriate 

for the combatant commands to incorporate drivers of instability 

that impact the security environment and their areas into their 

planning.’’ You also say, ‘‘I agree that the effects of a changing climate, such as increased maritime access to the Arctic, rising sea 

levels, desertification, among others impact our security situation.’’ 

Next, Chairman Dunford, you then give a quote saying, ‘‘It is a 

question, once again, of being forward deployed, forward engaged, 

and be in a position to respond to the kinds of natural disasters 

that I think we see as a second or third-order effect of climate 

change.’’ 

Then subsequent to that there are a number of other quotes— 

the one from Defense Secretary Gates, ODNI [Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence], and so forth. And all that leads up to the 
68 

sense of Congress quote, which says that it is a sense of Congress 

that ‘‘climate change is a direct threat to the national security of 

the United States and is impacting stability in areas of the world, 

both where the United States Armed Forces are operating today, 

and where strategic implications for future conflict exist.’’ 

Presidents Bush and Obama, in their National Defense Strategies, recognized climate change as a threat to our national security. 

But unfortunately, this National Defense Strategy under President 

Trump did not. 

A couple questions to you. One, do you agree that—with that 

sense of Congress in last year’s NDAA? Would you like to see the 

same sense in this year’s NDAA? And if so, why wasn’t it addressed in our National Defense Strategy? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I can take that one, Congressman. I 

think that when you see us dealing by, with, and through allies, 

you recognize the local nature of much of what happens in the 

world that eventually impacts America. 

So what we do is we go in and we sometimes call it ‘‘take three 

cups of tea.’’ We start by listening when we go in. We don’t go in 

and start solving their problems. We want to go and listen to what 

they have got going on. We look at security issues to include the— 

what I would call the physical environment. I mean that is part of 

it, and why are people going hungry and turning to violent extremists as the only solution, this sort of thing. And we have seen this— 

that very thing happen. 

So we do not sense that we are somehow, by going—by talking 

about the root causes, that we are unable to deal with the local 

conditions as we engage with each of these countries. 

I wanted to trim it down and get everyone focused on three 

things I think 5 to 7 years from now that are still going to be focused on, and that is a lethal force so our adversaries take note; 

by, with, and through allies, build more partnerships, don’t just 

take the traditional ones, build more; and then, of course, the business practices. 

That second one is all about dealing with the real world as it exists, and standing with our allies. So I—if I would put in all the 

root causes, I would have made it a pretty long document, sir. 

Mr. PANETTA. General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, my position, as I articulated 

earlier, hasn’t changed. And actually, the military role is dealing 

with the effects, the outcome of natural disasters. That is still 

something we have the capability to do, and we use that, we use 

our support and humanitarian disaster relief to foster those relationships that the Secretary just spoke about. 

Mr. PANETTA. Great. And gentlemen, would you agree that we 

should be addressing that in the upcoming NDAA, this issue, with 

the same intent, same sense about climate change and how it affects our national security? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, when we look at what the outcome is, 

what we have to deal with, the origins of it, I think, are largely 

issues that are dealt with through diplomacy. 

We need to have foreign policy guided by diplomats and buttressed, backed up, supported by militaries. And militaries need to 

stay focused in their lane. That doesn’t mean we can’t address 
69 

these situations, the outcomes. But I think that the—it is best addressed by the USAID, Agency for International Development people, the State Department, the ones who actually set our foreign 

policy there, so we are working for a purpose, and that purpose is 

established by the President or the State Department. 

Mr. PANETTA. Okay, thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, we are proud of what you do. I was here for your 

opening statements, and in the meantime I have gone to two hearings, fixed three amendments, and did a fundraiser, and you are 

still sitting here. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BISHOP. So obviously, your training in the military has given 

you patience and stamina matched only by Chairman Thornberry, 

as well. So thank you for that. 

Look, I have a quick question. If this has already been asked and 

answered, you can stop me at any time. 

But in light of the National Defense Strategy, what is DOD doing 

differently to counter the destabilizing activities of Iran in that region? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, we are looking at Iran very holistically right now, and we are looking at the nuclear weapons program. As you know, the JCPOA is being reviewed. We are looking 

at their counter-maritime effort, where our 5th Fleet, U.S. fleet, actually draws together nations from—between 25 and 35 nations to 

do counter-mine exercises. So we send a—it is not just a naval message, it is also a diplomatic message that don’t try this, nations 

from all around the world are going to show up and sweep the 

mines if you try to do it. 

We are working with our partners in the area to counter their 

terrorist activities, and those go from Yemen and Syria, their militia there in Lebanon, to Bahrain and the mischief they are up to 

there. 

We are also addressing their cyber efforts, working with other 

partners in the region to make them more resistant. And we are 

dealing with the missile program through foreign military sales 

and integration of our allies in the region and their ballistic missile 

defense capability. 

Mr. BISHOP. Close to that, I mean, one of the problems Iran is 

doing is their illicit sales of advanced conventional weapons to their 

partners. What are we doing specifically to try and counter those 

illegal transfers? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right. You are absolutely right, Congressman. 

And out here at Bolling Air Force Base—I invite you all to come 

out and see it—is a display that is laying out the debris and the 

evidence of the advanced weapons that Iran is shipping out to 

other countries. They are a threat, obviously, to Europe. They are 

a threat to Saudi Arabia, being fired out of Yemen right now. They 

are a threat to Israel, they are a threat to our forces in the area, 

and our partners. 

So we are exposing this out here at Bolling. We have had over 

70 nations, ambassadors either to the United Nations or to Washington, their defense attache ́s come out and look at it, and we are 
70 

going to continue to display everything that we can show the world, 

as far as what kind of murderous intent they are up to in that region. 

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate those are great answers. One of the 

things that you did very well is coming up with a coalition to fight 

ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. Do we have that same commitment, 

or do we—or why do we not have that same commitment in trying 

to confront the Iranian destabilizing efforts in the region? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I think over the years there 

have been efforts to try to guide Iran back to a more responsible 

stance. Those have been probably unavailing, if we were to sum it 

up in one word. 

But, as a result, with ISIS we were all focused on destroying it. 

I think there was a lot of effort over the years to see if Iran would 

want to cease being, at least in terms of its leadership, a revolutionary cause and join the responsible nations. From all indications, they have declined that option. 

And so we are probably going to have to deal with them in terms 

of diplomatic and economic and security issues that are going to 

have to be addressed. 

Mr. BISHOP. Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you for your service 

and for your answers. I appreciate it. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Murphy. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It looks like I am the 

last woman standing on this side. But thank you all for being here 

today, and for your patience. 

You know, as you know, the National Defense Strategy concludes 

that the inter-state strategic competition is—not terrorism—is the 

main, primary concern in the U.S.—in U.S. national security. And 

while I agree the Department must focus more on countering the 

growing threats from Russia and China, I represent a district in 

Central Florida that was significantly impacted by terrorism. 

In June 2016, a gunman who swore allegiance to ISIS walked 

into a Pulse nightclub in Orlando, and killed and wounded over 

100 people. It was the deadliest terrorist attack in the United 

States since September 11th. Unfortunately, the Pulse nightclub 

shooting serves as a tragic reminder that the violence—that violence motivated by ideological extremism is an enduring threat to 

our security at home and abroad. 

How do you think the Department should posture itself to continue to be able to protect the homeland against imminent threats 

from terrorism, while also addressing this transition to an interstate, strategic competition in the long term? 

Secretary MATTIS. You are hitting at the very heart of what we 

had to balance as we changed to a dynamic threat envelope, as we 

saw it expanding in the great power competition. 

What we decided was we had to have a problem statement. The 

problem statement is, Congresswoman, that we are going to have 

to maintain an effective and safe nuclear deterrent so those weapons are never used, a decisive conventional force that has irregular 

warfare capability. And therein lies the capability that goes to the 

heart of your concern. Because if we don’t go after this adversary 

overseas, if we give them safe havens, allow them to recruit, allow 
71 

them to raise funds, then we are going to see it in your district and 

more here at home. We do this by, with, and through allies. 

For example, every week the chairman reports to me how many 

American troops do we have in the Sahel, where the French have 

4,000. We are supporting them as they help the African nations 

fight Boko Haram and this sort of thing, which is an al-Qaida affiliate. 

We are going to continue with that sort of by, with, and through 

our allies, whether it be in the Philippines or in Afghanistan, 

around the world, as we keep this adversary off balance. We recognize that violent extremists haven’t suddenly decided to become responsible actors and cease their murder. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Thank you. And, you know, to that end, when you 

talk about by, with, and through, there is a huge component of that 

that requires diplomacy and the role of diplomats. And you just 

said, just a few questions back, that you believe diplomats should 

handle diplomacy buttressed by military capabilities. 

You are often quoted having said that if you don’t fund the State 

Department more fully, then you will need to buy more ammunition, ultimately. And the more that we put into the State Department’s diplomacy, hopefully the less we will have to put into our 

military budget. And yet we have seen a significant increase in defense funding at the same time as a dramatic attrition in the State 

Department. 

What policies do you think Congress should pursue to prevent 

the dissipation of American soft power, as well as sort of the erosion of this concept that diplomats can lead with a military that 

supports when they are so sorely underfunded? 

Secretary MATTIS. Ma’am, I am probably the wrong person to 

talk with about that, because I just don’t have any visibility or— 

I don’t deal with that issue. I have got a pretty full portfolio, as 

you understand. 

However, I will tell you that my first stop in every foreign country I go into is our ambassador, often—right now it has been a 

charge ́ d’affaires. And these foreign service officers that I see out 

there, the ambassadors and the foreign service officers of 10, 15, 

20 years experience filling these leadership positions, they are 

clearly at the top of their game, they are varsity players. And I 

think right now we are very well represented. 

Now, that is not to address the details of your question. I just 

don’t feel confident to do so in an authoritative way. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Well, I agree with you, that the career civil servants that are on the front lines in our embassies are very qualified. 

I think my concern a bit, too, is that some of the leadership 

changes over at the State Department, as well as resources. As you 

know—— 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes. 

Mrs. MURPHY [continuing]. Resources enable organizations to 

move forward. And so it—while you don’t have purview over that, 

certainly, as you have stated, it has a significant impact on your 

mission and how you carry out your mission. 

Let me just move to one other thing before I run out of time. You 

know, earlier this year my colleagues and I were really shocked to 

learn that Dr. Victor Cha was removed from consideration as am-
72 

bassador to South Korea after he shared his objection to the bloody 

nose strategy against North Korea with administration officials. I 

felt Dr. Cha was [an] extremely qualified candidate for this position, and it is unimaginable that the Trump administration removed Dr. Cha from consideration because of his opposition to such 

a strike. 

Secretary Mattis, earlier this year you identified North Korea as 

an international threat and said, you know, ‘‘Our response to this 

threat remains diplomacy-led, backed up with military options 

available to ensure that our diplomats are understood to be speaking from a position of strength.’’ 

As you know, the administration still hasn’t appointed a U.S. 

ambassador to South Korea, and we are over 16 months into this 

Presidency. How does the lack of an ambassador to South Korea 

complicate our bilateral security relationship with the Republic of 

Korea [ROK], particularly at a time when war with North Korea 

remains a dangerous possibility? 

Secretary MATTIS. I have not seen that yet, Congresswoman. I 

have been to Korea, as you know, and our charge ́ there seems to 

have it—you know, he is connected to everyone, he has full access—as you know, the ROK is a uniquely willing and capable ally, 

too. So it is probably a lot to do with their willingness to deal with 

him. 

But I would tell you, too, that you see the summit that is coming 

up now, based on the pressure campaign. As President Moon of the 

Republic of Korea put it, he believes the pressure campaign is what 

has brought North Korea to the table. And so we are now seeing 

a degree of willingness to engage—again, only cautious optimism, 

but the diplomacy is clearly in the lead. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Great. Thank you, Secretary Mattis and Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Secretary, in your opening comments you stated about the importance of our allies. And I want to thank you for 

your work to both assure our allies and to work closely with our 

allies. 

I chaired the Air and Land Subcommittee, and I also have the— 

I am the head of the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary 

Assembly. And I can tell you that your leadership, as I am certain 

you are aware, makes a big difference with respect to our allies, 

both your professionalism, your history, your prior work. 

I have two questions for you about the F–35, and with respect 

to our allies. Last night I had dinner with the Minister of Defense 

from the Netherlands at the—with the ambassador. And they 

spoke, again, very highly of the time that they had spent with you. 

Thank you for the attention that you—with all the things that you 

have, the attention that you do give our allies, because you do give 

them those assurances. 

We spoke about the F–35 and our allied partners, our NATO 

partners, more specifically, who are participating in that. 

We shared the concern about—as we go to the next phase of the 

F–35 on dual-capable aircraft, that we need our allies to participate 

in the F–35 program fully, so that our NATO mission, maintaining 

NATO as a nuclear mission, is realized. 
73 

We are all concerned about the Belgians’ upcoming decision, and 

I wanted you to speak for a moment about the importance of our 

allied partners, especially on the dual-capable aircraft side, because 

we don’t want that mission to diminish at all. 

And then, also, if you could speak about the issue with Turkey 

and the Russian air missile defense system—of course being another F–35 partner—I think we are all concerned about what we 

should be doing, perhaps more, to try to diminish the military cooperation between Turkey and Russia, and ensure that the United 

States has a strong partnership with Turkey on a military basis. 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, on the dual-capable aircraft in 

Europe, NATO is a nuclear-armed military alliance, and that 

means that NATO nations have got to be—they have to have in 

their inventory dual-capable aircraft that are capable of carrying 

the nuclear weapons, because the deterrent only works if it can be 

employed. And hopefully never to be employed, but the need is for 

dual-capable aircraft. The F–35 will be dual-capable, hence why we 

support allowing our allies to buy that superb aircraft. 

So it is necessary. And I think, by and large, it is fully embraced, 

this mission is fully embraced. The Nuclear Posture Review, when 

I brought it forward at a Brussels ministerial, Congressman, was 

fully accepted. I didn’t run into any pushback, I think partly because we took them onboard early and allowed them to have reviews of it and give input for it, knowing the leadership role the 

Americans have, but it is an alliance of democratic partners. 

On Turkey and Russia—— 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Secretary, before you get to Turkey, 

I just—I do hope that you underscore with our allies the importance of their participation in the F–35 to maintain that dual-capable mission, because I think there may be some misunderstanding 

as to the—their options of participating in that mission, separate 

from the F–35. And I think we are—we have it fairly clear that it 

both affects ours and their participation. 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, thank you. And I am on my way to Brussels in a month. I will make certain I do that in person. I appreciate that. 

On Turkey purchasing the Russian missile defense system, Turkey is a NATO ally. Once we bring a system like that in, we know 

right away it is incompatible with the rest of the NATO defenses, 

by its very nature. 

Furthermore, there are two NATO nations that provide missile 

defense to Turkey now using NATO-approved systems, two other 

nations. 

So now what you are talking about doing is putting into the 

same area incompatible missile defense systems, and this is hardly 

something that is in NATO’s best interest. So we do not recommend it. We have been engaging with Turkey on this to include 

providing them foreign military sales options that would permit 

them to have NATO-compatible systems. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your 

service and for your attendance today. 
74 

General Mattis, I look forward to receiving the two reports that 

we called for last year in the NDAA on space reform. 

But as you know, we—from our previous conversation, you are 

acutely aware that we find ourselves now in a situation where our 

two primary strategic competitors, Russia and China, have become 

our peers in space, and our—and in fact, challenging our superiority in that warfighting domain. 

As you also know, this committee and this House called for the 

establishment of a space corps to more aggressively pursue that 

problem. And last month the President announced his support for 

a space force. 

Now my question. While we are still waiting on those reports, do 

you have a viable alternative to the space force the President has 

called for, and that this committee has called for? 

Secretary MATTIS. So we have to define this problem, not just the 

space focus of a force, but also from acquisition to employment, 

from coordination to innovation for future, all those things that go 

with it. 

If a space force is the right thing to do, I have no reservations 

about it. But I don’t want to stand up in DOD, which is an enormous bureaucracy and has many sub-bureaucracies, another bureaucracy, as if that will be the solution. 

If it is the solution, then we will go there. But I believe right now 

what we are looking at is a warfighting domain. And when I look 

at the Pacific domain, or I look at the cyber domain, I look for combatant commanders of those. I don’t set up a Pacific army in the 

sense—a new military force. It draws from all the joint force. 

So I am open on this. I will tell you I did not recognize the degree of the problem when I went through confirmation. And what 

you and your colleague have done have brought it to our attention. 

It is a primary focus of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Pat 

Shanahan, my deputy, and we are going to solve this to your satisfaction. 

I don’t know right now what all that solution looks like, but we 

are not waiting, either. As we break out the pieces, we are solving 

each one of them, and we will sort this out. It is not an ideological 

opposition here, but when we have got an Army, Navy, Air Force, 

Marine Corps now, putting them together in the joint force is challenging and makes us the best in the world, and we are good at 

it. 

Do we want to set up another force—and we have to make certain it solves the problem before we put out the money for an entirely new military, from recruiting to training, and everything 

else. Might be the right thing to do, though. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. And I have—I share your confidence in Deputy Secretary Shanahan. We think he is the right guy to pursue 

this. 

General Dunford, in your professional military judgment, can you 

tell us—explain to us why you believe that we need a lower-yield 

submarine launch ballistic missile when we already have a loweryield gravity bomb? 

General DUNFORD. I can do that, Congressman. Deterrence really 

is all about making sure the adversary knows that you have a credible response that is going to impose a cost that is greater than 
75 

whatever they do. And while we might like to reduce our nuclear 

capabilities, the fact is that Russia specifically has grown those 

over time. 

They have thousands of what we would call nonstrategic nuclear 

weapons. They have a mind that, maybe if they used those nonstrategic nuclear weapons, we are at the point where we would 

have to either risk the homeland or we would concede that they 

have escalated to the point where they achieved their political objectives. 

In my judgment, the Nuclear Posture Review and the recommendation to have a low-yield—the option increases our deterrence vis-a-vis Russia, because it convinces them that we do have 

credible, capable responses. No matter what they do, they are going 

to be met with a credible, capable response, and there is no circumstances under which they will do something where the cost 

that they will pay won’t be greater than whatever they hope to 

gain. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Well, General, we also continue to hear calls 

to de-alert our ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and give 

up our responsiveness of the nuclear forces. Do you believe that 

would be a wise path for us to pursue? 

General DUNFORD. I don’t, Congressman. And that particular 

issue—as you know, you follow it well—it has been looked at in 

several posture reviews. In fact, the determination has been made 

that it is actually more stabilizing to leave them on alert so that 

that is where they are, so that if you—because in a crisis, if you 

then alerted them, you would by definition perhaps create unstable 

conditions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you both. Thank you all for your service. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

On August 21st of 2017 many of us championed and welcomed 

this administration’s change in strategy and focus to win in Afghanistan and create a safe and secure Afghanistan. 

General Dunford, last summer in your fiscal year 2018 posture 

testimony you stated, ‘‘In Afghanistan fiscal year 2018 investments 

will reinforce improvements in the Afghan national defense and security forces.’’ Today you stated, ‘‘We are working toward a sustainable approach to stabilizing the Afghan Government and denying 

terrorists sanctuary.’’ 

General Votel recently testified before this committee in February, and he assessed, ‘‘The ANSF [Afghan National Security 

Forces] does not have the ability to prevent the insurgency from 

maintaining a rural presence, and occasionally threatening a population center or critical ground lines of communication.’’ Supporting 

this, the latest SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction] report stated in the most recent assessment that 

the Afghan Government’s control of districts is lowest, while the 

insurgency’s control is the highest, since December of 2015. 

General Dunford, we would expect to see the Afghan Government’s control increase, while the insurgencies’ control decrease. 
76 

When do you see the ANSF turning the corner against the insurgents and other terrorists? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks for that question. I was 

just in Afghanistan, I spent 5 days there about 3 weeks ago. We 

visited all of our positions and spent time with General Nicholson 

to talk about, in detail, how he was implementing a South Asia 

strategy, and specifically the military dimension of the South Asia 

strategy that Secretary Mattis directed. 

A couple of challenges we have had. Number one, we have suffered significant Afghan casualties. Number two, the cooperation 

across the Afghan police, Afghan Army, intelligence organizations 

hasn’t been quite what it has—what it needed to be. And number 

three, they were short capabilities: aviation capability, intelligence 

capability, surface fires capability. 

What we have done, I believe, is taken a look exactly at what the 

Afghans need to gain momentum and retain momentum against 

the adversary. Our advisors are the right advisors. They are carefully hand-selected, with previous combat experience. So they are 

the right people to be providing advice. They are at the right level. 

You remember before they were up at the corps level, a general 

officer level, and they now have the capability to go down to the 

tactical level. That is significant for two reasons. One is it enhances 

the leadership development of the Afghan forces, but more importantly it helps deliver our fires at the right time and the right 

place, and helps them to learn how to deliver their fires at the 

right time and the right place. 

And the other thing I was encouraged about by my visit was that 

the cross—what we call cross-pillar coordination—that is the police, 

the army, and the security forces—many demonstrations of that in 

January and February and March this year. I just would tell you 

that we just now are about 6, 7 weeks into this new organizational 

construct, and I would expect to see different results this summer. 

And I will close, knowing that we are short of time, by just saying this: We are not doing—you know, the people would say we are 

just doing more of the same. I would argue that, until 2013, we did 

the fighting. From 2013, when at a peak, we had about 140,000 

forces. We focused for the next 3 years on decreasing our forces to 

the point we only had 8,000 forces in 2017. 

This is going to be the first season where we have had a fully 

resourced plan to support the Afghans in conducting counterinsurgency operations inside of Afghanistan. By no means is the military 

dimension of the problem sufficient to achieve strategic success, but 

I do believe right now that the military dimension—the problem 

has been adequately addressed. 

I am confident that we have the right organizational construct, 

we have the right people, and we have the right capabilities in 

place to address the specific issues that we identified in doing a 

failure analysis over the last few years. We drew from those lessons learned the specific issues that had to be addressed when we 

deployed the force for 2018. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay, thank you. With the less than a minute that 

I have left, again, Secretary Mattis, many of us support this administration’s new approach. We have, since August 21st of 2017. But 

we have heard far too little from the Pentagon about the success 
77 

of that strategy. The American people deserve to know that we are 

turning the corner, we are making progress. 

What can we do—what can you do to better inform the American 

people that we are making progress in the months to come to show 

them that we are doing everything that we can to win in Afghanistan? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I register your point loud and 

clear. We owe that kind of explanation to the American people. I 

think what we need to do is deliver results, as well. And as the results come with this new organization, now that we have a strategy, not just to leave, but to actually win, and we are at a position 

now to actually give the kind of progress reports that you are looking for. 

But it is a good point. I have not looked at it. Let me look at it. 

Okay? And—— 

Mr. BANKS. My—— 

Secretary MATTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. BANKS [continuing]. Time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hice. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, each of 

you, for being here this afternoon, and for your service. 

Secretary Mattis, in your written statement you said that modernizing the Nation’s nuclear deterrent delivery systems, including 

our nuclear command and control, is the Department’s top priority. 

And General Dunford, you similarly said that the nuclear modernization is the highest priority mission of the joint force, and 

there is no margin remaining in the modernization schedule, and 

we must deliver these critical nuclear modernization programs on 

the established timelines. 

So just to elaborate a little bit, both of you, why do you think 

the nuclear programs are the top priority? 

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, these weapons, if they are used, 

bring a tragedy beyond anyone’s ability to explain it. There is—we 

have got to maintain the prohibition on these weapons. It is costly, 

it is a lot less costly than if there was a slip into a nuclear war, 

sir. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. General Dunford. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, as the Secretary has made 

clear to us that deterring a nuclear war is job one inside the Department of Defense, and to deter nuclear war we have to have 

credible capabilities. The adversary has to know—again, back to 

the—that we would respond in a way that would impose a cost 

much greater than whatever they would do. If they struck us, they 

would be met with overwhelming force. 

We have had a successful deterrent framework in place to deter 

nuclear war for decades. Unfortunately, we stopped making investments in our nuclear enterprise back in the 1990s. We should have 

started modernizing back then, in the late 1990s. 

As we have seen, as much as we might like to emphasize nuclear 

weapons, our adversaries have, in fact, modernized nuclear weapons, and they have created a capable, modern nuclear enterprise. 

And with regard to the Russians, they have certainly opened that 

up, and have a lot—large number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, 

as well as nuclear weapons. 
78 

So I think, at the end of the day, it does reflect a relatively small 

percentage of the Department of Defense. When you look at job 

one, deter nuclear weapons, the force that we have and the command and control systems we have to have in place have to be 

credible enough to make sure the adversary knows that we do have 

the ability to respond and set the same deterrent framework that 

has been in place for decades. 

Mr. HICE. So I am assuming from that answer that you would 

agree with General Hyten from STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command], his statement that we need to go faster on our nuclear modernization programs. 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely. And I think that the good thing 

is now we have the Nuclear Posture Review roadmap laid out. In 

fact, just on one element of it, nuclear command and control, I am 

responsible to come back to the Secretary very soon on nuclear 

command and control to make recommendations how we implement the modernization element of that. 

And of course, as you know, in this year’s budget, in 2019, we 

have made investments across the entire triad as a result—and it 

is all analytically based in that Nuclear Posture Review. 

Mr. HICE. General Mattis, you would agree with that, as well? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do, sir, and I appreciate the 25 percent budget increase that Congress provided for—this would all just be 

words, if you hadn’t provided the resources. Thank you. 

Mr. HICE. Well taken. Let me ask my final question. Do—and 

really, Secretary Mattis, this is for you. Do you think that de-alerting our nuclear forces is a good idea? 

Secretary MATTIS. I cannot find any positive aspect of it, sir. As 

you know, the weapons, the ICBMs are targeted into the open waters. We have reduced any sense that they are on hair-trigger alert, 

as well, because we don’t have to use them or lose them. It is not 

that sort of an issue. 

What we want is a deterrent. In other words, someone who 

wants to attack us would have to take them all out. That cannot 

be done with 1 or 10 or even 100 nuclear weapons. And that sobers 

anyone who thinks they are going to take us on. 

So the ICBM force, the submarines, the bombers, it is the right 

way to keep the deterrence intact. 

Mr. HICE. So to ask a similar question a little different way, are 

you worried that having parts of our nuclear forces on alert is dangerous? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, sir. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much, and I appreciate you all being 

here, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we have been joined by some good 

citizens from the Amarillo, Texas, Chamber of Commerce, whom I 

stood up about 45 minutes ago. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. At least a couple of them are involved in helping 

provide our nuclear deterrence. On behalf of them and all of us, I 

want to thank you both for being here for 4 hours and answering 

our questions, and for your service to the country. 

The hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 12, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 12, 2018 

(83) 

Opening Statement ofHon. William M. "Mac" Thornberry 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

HEARING ON 

The Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Budget Request 

from the Department of Defense 

April12, 2018 

The committee is pleased to welcome back the Secretary of Defense and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the Administration's fiscal 

year 2019 budget request for the Department of Defense. 

We meet under rather different circumstances than last year. Congress and 

the Administration have worked together to provide to the military the 

resources they need to begin to reverse the erosion of our military 

strength. There is agreement on the funding levels for defense for FY 

'19. We know how much we have to work with. 

The challenge as we work through the details is that some of the 

consequences of the years of cuts and neglect are becoming more apparent. A 

study published this weekend by Military Times found that aviation mishaps 

have risen about 40 percent since the Budget Control Act took effect. 

The alanning number of aviation accidents just in the past 3 Y2 weeks reveals 

how deep the damage goes and magnitude of the task of repairing and 

rebuilding our capabilities. Meanwhile, as events in Syria remind us, the 

world does not slow down and wait for us to rebuild. 

This committee has held a number of hearings and briefings this year to 

examine more closely the challenges we face, from readiness to space and 

cyber. We have studied what are adversaries are doing. We have heard from 

combatant commanders, service chiefs, and outside experts. The issue today 

is how well the Administration's budget meets our national security needs 

under the parameters set in the Bipartisan Budget Act. We also want to 

examine how this budget request implements the new National Defense 

Strategy about which the Secretary testified in February. 

I am committed to working with the Department to achieve refonns that 

enable our military to be more agile and more efficient in facing the threats 

which confront us. The challenges are great, but if Congress and the 

Department work together, we can ensure that the military has what it needs 

to meet them. 
84 

House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith 

Opening Statement 

Full Committee Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense 

Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense 

April12, 2018 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome Secretary Mattis and General 

Dunford, and I thank them for testifying today. Their views are fundamental 

to our evaluation of the President's budget request and its correlation with the 

National Defense Strategy (the NDS). 

The President's budget request for fiscal year 2019 matches the 

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (the BBA) in providing $716 billion for 

national defense. Approximately $686.1 billion of that request is designated 

for the Department of Defense to sustain operations, restore readiness, and 

invest in future capabilities. That is a significant amount, and we have a duty 

to manage our country's resources responsibly in fielding an effective military 

force. As I have said many times, we must invest wisely in national security, 

and we must be realistic when it comes to resourcing strategic objectives. 

Given the current security environment, an increase in defense spending is 

justifiable, but we clearly need to find new ways to realize savings within the 

defense budget. 

In doing so, we will need to make tough budgetary choices. When you 

combine the defense budget with all of the other government programs that 

the public wants funded, there simply isn't enough money to go around. We 

need to raise revenues, and we need to scrutinize tradeoffs within the defense 

budget for potential savings. I am particularly interested to know the 

opportunity costs associated with the $1.2 trillion plan for the nuclear 

weapons enterprise. 

We also need to be mindful of how we aim to achieve strategic 

priorities. The NOS establishes numerous defense objectives to address 

challenges to the international rules-based order posed by Russia, China, 

North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations, such as ISIS and al 

Qaeda. Thus, it provides the foundation for this year's defense budget request. 

In introducing the NDS, however, Secretary Mattis acknowledged that 

"national security is much more than just defense." We must embrace wholeof-government approaches to securing objectives and to meeting future 

challenges, as those challenges will surely continue to require us to attend 

holistically to the political, economic, and social conditions that nurture them. 

Secretary Mattis also indicated that fiscal certainty will be necessary 

for implementing the NDS and for building and maintaining a capable force. 

Long-term planning requires a comprehensive and reliably funded long-term 
85 

budget. Congress should begin by eliminating sequestration and by lifting the 

spending caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 20 II to provide relief to 

both the defense and nondefense discretionary accounts, because empowering 

defense priorities alone is insufficient. The nondefense discretionary accounts 

should be funded to the extent the BBA allows, because important federal 

spending priorities, including homeland security, law enforcement, 

emergency preparedness and response capacities, veterans' services, and 

foreib'll assistance programs require sufficient budgetary support. We also 

need to reinvest in sound infrastructure, research and innovation, education, 

health care, public safety, housing, the workforce, small businesses and many 

other facets of enduring national strength. 

Despite the Secretary's recognition that national security is a broadly 

defined concept, 1 am concerned that we may be tilting toward overreliance 

on defense funding and military capability as means for effecting national 

policy. It seems that the Department of Defense is being tasked with either 

performing or supplementing the performance of more and more key 

diplomatic, development, and law enforcement roles that traditionally are 

performed by civilian government agencies. The commitment of military 

resources to reinforce the southern border serves as a case in point. When you 

combine this trend with the Administration's willingness to deprive the 

nondefense elements of the federal government of necessary funding to 

perform important national security functions, I worry that the broader 

definition of national security isn't widely accepted. I am interested in 

Secretary Mattis' thoughts on how we might maintain balance within the 

broader National Security Strategy and allow the Department of Defense to 

focus on its core responsibilities. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to receiving our witnesses' 

testimony. 
86 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JIM MATTIS 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

THURSDAY, APRIL 12,2018 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee; 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the President's budget request for 

Fiscal Year 2019. I am joined by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, and the 

Department's Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David Norquist. 

I am now in my second year as Secretary of Defense. With your help, we have made 

steady progress during the past 14 months. 

In January, the Department published the 2018 National Defense Strategy- the first 

national defense strategy in a decade. Framed within President Trump's National 

Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy provides clear direction for 

America's military to restore its competitive edge in an era of reemerging long-term 

strategic competition. The Department next released the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 

which calls for America's military to provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

deterrent that is "modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to 

deter 21 81 century threats and reassure allies." 

In South Asia and Afghanistan, uncertainty in the region has been replaced by the 

certainty of the Administration's South Asia Strategy. Concurrently in the Middle East, 

we have dramatically reduced ISIS' physical caliphate, using a coordinated, whole-ofgovernment approach that works "by, with, and through" our allies and partners to crush 

ISIS' claim of invincibility and deny them a geographic haven from which to plot murder. 

Last month, thanks to the bipartisan support and political courage of Congress, President 

Trump signed an omnibus spending bill that funds the government for the remainder of 

the fiscal year. This law- along with the two-year budget agreement passed as part of 

February's Bipartisan Budget Act- finally freed us from the inefficient and damaging 

continuing resolution in 2018, providing the funding needed to start implementing the 

2018 National Defense Strategy. 
87 

We in the Department of Defense (DoD) are grateful to the American people for their 

sacrifices on behalf of military readiness and for the priority given the military at a time 

when numerous competing demands must be met by our government We recognize 

and embrace our responsibility to gain full value from every taxpayer dollar spent on 

defense. As such, every decision we make will focus on lethality and affordability as we 

rebuild readiness and provide the combat capabilities required for our Nation's security. 

I want to thank this committee for your strong spirit of bipartisan collaboration. We 

continue to implement the range of reform initiatives directed by the 2017 National 

Defense Authorization Act For example, your establishment of Under Secretaries for 

Research and Engineering and for Acquisition and Sustainment is already paying 

dividends in current and future readiness. This change-and others called for by 

Congress in its oversight role-sets the right course and we are aggressively 

implementing them. 

While our trajectory is going in the right direction, our work has just begun. This is a year 

of opportunity and a chance to build on a strong start as we turn the 2018 National 

Defense Strategy into action. Continuing our close collaboration will address our 

security challenges, thereby enhancing the protection of our way of life. Initiatives such 

as codifying reform efforts to further streamline the defense acquisition process and 

employing feedback loops to reduce the number of Congressionally-mandated annual 

reports are areas that need our combined attention. 

STRATEGY-DRIVEN BUDGET 

The DoD's Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 budget is the second complete budget request from 

President Trump's administration. This budget will provide the resources necessary to 

fulfill DoD's requirements to meet the National Security Strategy's four vital national 

interests: 

• Protect the American people, the Homeland, and the American way of life, 

• Promote American prosperity, 

• Preserve peace through strength, and 

• Advance American influence. 

2 
88 

The DoD FY 2019 base budget requests the resources necessary to fulfill the 

Department's enduring mission to provide the combat-credible military forces needed to 

deter war and, if deterrence fails, win in the event of conflict. Our armed forces reinforce 

America's traditional tools of diplomacy, ensuring that the President and our diplomats 

negotiate from a position of strength. 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy provides clear strategic direction for America's 

military to reclaim an era of strategic purpose. Although the Department continues to 

prosecute the campaign against terrorists, long-term strategic competition - not terrorism 

- is now the primary focus of U.S. national security. 

Nations as different as China and Russia have chosen to be strategic competitors as 

they seek to create a world consistent with their authoritarian models and pursue veto 

power over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. Rogue regimes 

like North Korea and Iran persist in taking outlaw actions that undermine and threaten 

regional and global stability. Additionally and despite our successes against ISIS's 

physical caliphate, violent extremist organizations continue to sow hatred, incite violence, 

and murder innocents. 

Due to our open, multi-cultural, democratic society and strengthening economy-more 

than any other nation-America can expand the competitive space, challenging our 

competitors where we possess advantages and they lack depth. In order to restore our 

competitive military edge, the FY19 budget funds our defense strategy's three 

overarching lines of effort to: 

• build a more lethal force, 

• strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships, and 

• reform the Department's business practices for performance and affordability. 

Build a More Lethal Force 

The Department's policies, expenditures, and training must contribute to the lethality of 

our military. We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's 

thinking, weapons, or equipment. As General Washington said during his first State of 

3 
89 

the Union address, "to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of 

preserving peace," and a lethal military arm will enhance our diplomat's persuasiveness. 

The paradox of war is that an adversary will move against any perceived weakness, so 

we cannot adopt a single, preclusive form of warfare. Rather, we must be able to fight 

across the entire spectrum of combat. This means the size and composition of our force 

matters, and the Nation must field sufficient, capable forces to deter conflict. If 

deterrence fails, we must win. In today's environment we are determined to maintain a 

credible nuclear deterrent so these weapons are never used, and a decisive 

conventional force that includes irregular warfare capability. 

Our military remains capable, but our competitive edge has eroded in every domain of 

warfare- air, land, sea, space, and cyber. The combination of rapidly changing 

technology, the negative impact on military readiness resulting from the longest 

continuous period of combat in our Nation's history, and a prolonged period of 

unpredictable and insufficient funding, created an overstretched and under-resourced 

military. The FY 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations and FY 2018 Omnibus 

Appropriation provided the funding needed to address immediate readiness shortfalls 

and accelerate modernization programs in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive 

advantage. As indicated below in Figure 1, America can afford survival. The FY 2019 

strategy-based budget is affordable and will continue to enhance U.S. military 

capabilities, but the budget can only be fully effective if passed on time, not later than 

October 1st. 

il"k ' ',, t-1 l>>•+ j")''' \·j ,,+t· l·f·'·)·++ ,.~ j, !•1»<)«-1•1"' l-i'-) ~ "'+< 

1:940 1$45- 1:5$0 1$'$$ 1000 1005 1:970, 1975 11U!W 

-oaoo:utlay$ 

't·•·f•,·)A 1·)-l l•l•) '+ f+• t \<+t·i t ~·)•{•V•t "1'1•{ 

19${1 19'95 2000 2005 2010- :2015 20:20 

Figure 1. Defense outlays as a percentage of gross domestic product (FY 1940- FY 2023) 

4 
90 

The National Defense Strategy prioritizes major power competition and, in particular, 

reversing the erosion of U.S. military advantage in relation to China and Russia. The FY 

2019 budget request invests in key capabilities to implement the National Defense 

Strategy through: 

• modernization of nuclear deterrence forces and nuclear command, control and 

communications (NC3) capabilities; 

• additional missile defense capabilities; 

• modest increases in end strength for Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; 

• a 2.6% military pay raise; 

• continuing increased procurement of certain preferred and advanced munitions; 

• acquisition of 10 combat ships and 8 support ships; 

• continued production of F-35 and F/A-18 aircraft; 

• increasing funds to enhance communications and resiliency in space, and; 

• investment in technological innovation to increase lethality, including research into 

advanced autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and hypersonics. 

As noted earlier, one of the key elements of the 2018 National Defense Strategy is to 

ensure America's military provides a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that is 

fit for our time. 

The global situation is sobering. Russia is modernizing its full range of nuclear systems 

while espousing a theory of nuclear escalation in military conflict China, too, is 

modernizing and expanding its already considerable nuclear forces, pursuing entirely 

new capabilities. China is also modernizing its conventional military forces to a degree 

that will challenge U.S. military superiority. While recent events have given rise to a 

sense of positive movement, North Korea's nuclear provocations threaten regional and 

global peace and have garnered universal condemnation by the United Nations. Iran's 

nuclear ambitions also remain an unresolved concern. Globally, nuclear terrorism 

remains a tangible threat 

The recently completed 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the findings of previous 

reviews that the nuclear triad-comprised of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

bomber aircraft, and nuclear-armed submarines-is the most strategically sound means 

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of nuclear deterrence. Given the range of potential adversaries, their capabilities and 

strategic objectives, the review calls for a nuclear deterrent fit for its time-a tailored and 

diverse set of nuclear deterrent capabilities that provides a flexible, tailored approach to 

deterring one or more potential adversaries. 

Deterrence exists in the mind of an adversary. Given today's complex security 

environment and the dynamics of deterrence, our Nuclear Posture Review introduces 

two supplemental nuclear capabilities to strengthen our deterrent stance. Both 

capabilities deny any adversary the confidence that limited nuclear use can provide an 

advantage. 

First is the near-term modification of a small number of existing submarine-launched 

ballistic missile warheads to reduce their yield. From submarines this provides a 

survivable capability to credibly hold at risk heavily-defended targets, which an adversary 

might believe could be successfully defended against current air-delivered nuclear 

weapons. This is consistent with the New START Treaty and does not increase the 

number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. It counters any misconception on 

the part of Russia that they could escalate a conventional war through the use of a low 

yield weapon and we could only respond with a high yield weapon, which they calculate 

we would not do. In terms of deterrence, this submarine-launched low yield weapon 

gives us an option other than surrender or suicide, thus strengthening our deterrence to 

adversary use of nuclear weapons. 

Second is the pursuit of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. This is not a new or 

novel capability. The U.S. had these weapons for decades before dismantling them after 

the Cold War. If we subsequently choose to go into full production, this INF Treatycompliant capability will close a capability gap. Currently this effort is meant to 

incentivize Russia to return to compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty. 

These capabilities do not lower the nuclear threshold. Rather, by convincing adversaries 

that even limited use of nuclear weapons will be more costly than they can tolerate, it 

raises that threshold. 

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Preserving this range of options requires the recapitalization of our Cold War legacy 

nuclear deterrent forces as initiated during the previous Administration. Modernizing 

the Nation's nuclear deterrent delivery systems, including our nuclear command and 

control, is the Department's top priority, and these programs are fully funded in the FY 

2019 budget. Most of the Nation's nuclear deterrence delivery systems, built in the 

1980's or earlier, reach the end of their service life between 2025 and 2035, with all 

currently-fielded systems extended well beyond their original service lives. Replacement 

programs are underway to ensure there are no gaps in capability when the legacy 

systems age out. 

Investments include the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent system; COLUMBIA-class 

ballistic missile submarine; Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile service life 

extension program; B-21 Raider strategic bomber; replacing the air-launched cruise 

missile with the Long-Range Standoff weapon; and B61 Mod 12 life extension program 

to consolidate four legacy 861 variants into a single variant for carriage on heavy 

bombers and dual-capable aircraft. 

Our modernization estimates align with a recent Congressional Budget Office report that 

estimated $1.2 trillion to (1) modernize and (2) operate our nuclear deterrent forces over 

30 years when combined with the costs incurred by the Department of Energy to develop 

and sustain the warheads. However, the cost of our nuclear modernization program is 

significantly less than the cost of failing to deter war by underinvesting in these 

capabilities. 

Nuclear deterrent forces, along with our conventional forces and other instruments of 

national power, help deter aggression and preserve peace. Our goal is to convince 

adversaries they have nothing to gain and everything to lose from the use of nuclear 

weapons. I note again that our deterrent stance does not lower the nuclear threshold, 

and it remains U.S. policy to consider employing nuclear weapons only in extreme 

circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners. 

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the mutually reinforcing role of nuclear 

deterrence in a complex and dynamic security environment and continued U.S. 

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commitment to non-proliferation, counter-nuclear terrorism, and arms control. The 

United States remains committed to its global leadership role to reduce the number of 

nuclear weapons, and to fulfill existing treaty and arms control obligations, including the 

New START Treaty. While Russia and U.S. both met their agreed New START strategic 

weapons reduction requirement on time, Moscow has violated the Intermediate Nuclear 

Forces (IN F) Treaty over the past several years. While our intent is to bring Russia back 

into compliance, the duration of Russia's INF violation illustrates the challenging 

environment for progress in arms control efforts and undermines U.S. confidence in 

Russia as a reliable treaty partner. 

The FY 2019 budget funds enhancements to U.S. missile defense capabilities to 

defend the homeland, deployed forces, allies, and partners against an increasingly 

complex ballistic missile threat. In accordance with the soon-to-be-released 2018 Missile 

Defense Review, this budget requests continued robust support for missile defense 

capacity and capability to keep pace with advancing threats. The budget includes $12.9 

billion for missile defense, including $9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency. The 

Department will develop an additional missile field in Alaska and increase the number of 

operational deployed Ground-Based Interceptors to 64 missiles as early as FY 2023. 

While our efforts remain focused on increasing interceptor capacity in Alaska, the 

Department has completed environmental impact studies for four possible ballistic 

missile defense sites on the East Coast should the Iranian ICBM threat materialize. 

The FY 2019 request will continue development of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle to 

address the evolving threat along with development of a 2nd I 3'd-stage booster 

selectable capability to expand battlespace for ground-based interceptor engagements 

for homeland defense. The budget also uses available technology to improve existing 

sensors, battle management, fire control, and kill vehicle capabilities to include a LongRange Discrimination Radar in Alaska, a Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii, and an 

additional Medium Range Discrimination Radar in the Pacific. 

For regional missile defense capabilities, the FY 2019 budget request supports improved 

missile defense capability on the Korean peninsula; provides funding for development of 

advanced missile defense technologies to counter future threats; supports the Aegis 

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Ashore site in Romania and deployment of a second site in Poland as part of NATO's 

Ballistic Missile Defense architecture; increases BMD capability and capacity of the 

Aegis fleet; integrates SM-3 Block IIA into the Aegis weapon system; provides funding 

for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) development efforts and software 

upgrades; and continues support for Israeli Cooperative BMD Programs, including the 

Iron Dome system to defeat short-range missiles and rockets, and co-development/coproduction of the David's Sling Weapon System and Arrow-3 System. 

Modest increases in end strength for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps 

are critical to restoring readiness. DoD's FY 2019 budget funds a total end strength 

increase of 25,900 as depicted in figures 2 (Active Force) and 3 (Reserve Force) below. 

Army 476.0 487.5 +11.5 

Navy 327.9 335.4 +7.5 

Air Force 325.1 329.1 +4.0 

Marine Corps 185.0 186.1 +1.1 

Figure 2. Active Component End Strength (in thousands) *FY 2018 reflects the PB request 

Army Reserve 199.0 199.5 +0.5 

Navy Reserve 59.0 59.1 +0.1 

Air Force Reserve 69.8 70.0 +0.2 

Marine Corps Reserve 38.5 38.5 

Army National Guard 343.0 343.5 +0.5 

Air National Guard 106.6 107.1 +0.5 

Figure 3. Reserve Component End Strength (in thousands) *FY 2018 reflects the PB request 

Our joint culture remains one of our military's greatest strengths, and a force multiplier on 

the battlefield. Each service's manpower needs remain unique to their specific missions. 

For example, the Army will continue to rebuild manpower readiness with a new 

"Sustainable Readiness" force generation model, making greater use of Reserve forces, 

updating the force structure model, and providing greater home station training against a 

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broad range of threats. The Navy will ensure Sailors with the right skills are assigned to 

the most appropriate jobs, using the increase in end strength to reduce identified gaps in 

critical manning areas. The Marine Corps will implement a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio for 

active duty forces, providing more recovery time between deployments and for home 

station training. The Air Force is closing gaps in aircrew and skilled maintenance 

personnel, targeting their increased personnel to get more planes in the air. 

Increasing lethality requires us to change our approach to talent management. We must 

reinvigorate our military education and training, and hone our civilian workforce's 

expertise. The creativity and talent of the Department is our deepest wellspring of 

strength and warrants greater investment. The FY 2019 budget will continue to invest in 

the military's most important asset-its warfighters-with a 2.6% military pay increase. 

This pay raise and the increase in manpower will improve readiness and lethality by 

reducing personnel tempo and retaining skillsets like cyber, electronic warfare, and 

special operations. With changes to our forces' posture, we will prioritize for warfighting 

readiness in major combat, making us more strategically predictable and reliable for our 

allies but operationally unpredictable to any adversary. 

The U.S. Military's predominant mission is to be prepared to fight and win our Nation's 

wars. No human endeavor is more demanding physically, mentally, and emotionally 

than the life and death struggle of battle. High standards for military service are 

designed to ensure our military remains the most professional and lethal force in the 

world. While not everyone in the military sees combat, every Soldier, Sailor, Airman and 

Marine must be physically and mentally qualified and prepared to endure the hardship of 

war, for the U.S. military to carry out its demanding missions. 

Acknowledging that infantry units take over 80% of combat casualties, the Department's 

Close Combat Lethality Task Force is integrating human factors and technology to 

ensure our forces retain their hard won superiority in battle. We will expose troops to as 

many simulated tactical and ethical challenges possible before they see combat, 

ensuring that their first time in combat doesn't feel like their first time in combat. The 

Task Force will also provide recommendations regarding the fundamentals of 

performance, including physical fitness and nutrition standards. The end result is to 

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ensure that U.S. close quarters battle is conducted in a way that ferociously destroys the 

enemy's spirit and brings back as many as possible in top physical and mental shape. 

To ensure the most lethal and effective fighting force in the world, the Department 

maintains high mental, physical, and behavioral standards. These necessarily high 

standards mean that 71% of young Americans (ages 17-24) are ineligible to join the 

military without a waiver. The Department's detailed 44-page report thoroughly explains 

why and under what circumstances transgender persons without gender dysphoria can 

serve, and why transgender persons with gender dysphoria cannot, except in limited 

circumstances. I'm confident that my recommendation to the President is in the best 

interests of the military and is consistent with the Constitution. The report also explains 

why transgender persons who entered under the prior administration's policy will be 

retained. The Department will continue to comply with the court orders that require the 

accession and retention of transgender persons until this issue is fully resolved, and I 

must remain careful with my comments on this matter while it is in active litigation. 

Continued increased procurement of preferred and advanced munitions is 

necessary due to ongoing operations in the Middle East and the need for war reserves. 

Specifically, the DoD has expended a significant number of munitions, primarily to defeat 

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Many preferred munitions are precision-guided, 

low-collateral damage munitions, used by all Services and by U.S. allies. Addressing the 

Department's need to maintain critical munition inventories, the FY 2017 and FY 2018 

funds you provided have strengthened the Department's lethal posture, enabling our 

industrial base to increase production capacities. The FY 2019 budget provides $4.4 

billion to continue to procure munitions at maximum production capacity, lowering the 

price for each unit and ensuring greater buying power for those munitions as we rebuild 

our war reserve. 

The United States remains the world's preeminent maritime power. During peacetime 

and in times of conflict, Sailors and Marines are deployed at sea, enabling forces to 

arrive sooner and remain longer, while bringing everything they need with them. These 

forces reassure allies and temper adversaries' designs. The U.S. Constitution vests 

Congress with the authority to "provide and maintain a Navy," and the FY 2019 budget 

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provides $23.7 billion to fund 10 combat ships and 8 support ships. These funds 

arrest the downward trajectory of the Navy's size and lethality. Consistent with the 

National Defense Strategy, the Fleet will continue to grow to meet capabilities needed in 

the future and to maintain an industrial base healthy enough to adapt and evolve in a 

dynamic environment. The FY 2019 budget provides for a deployable battle force of 280 

ships growing to 355, supporting the requirements to respond to persistent and emerging 

threats. We are also increasing near-term capacity by investing in service life extension 

programs for six guided missile cruisers (adding five years of service life) and one Los 

Angeles-class submarine (extending service life by 11 years). We are committed to 

expanding the Navy while making it fit for operations in the face of future threats. 

Along with shipbuilding, the FY 2019 budget prioritizes capabilities to enhance air and 

sea power through the continued production of F-35 and F/A-18 aircraft. The F-35 

program is developing, producing, and fielding three variants of the F-35 to support the 

needs of the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The budget requests 77 F-35s 

and 24 additional F/A-18 Super Hornets in FY 2019, increasing the readiness of the 

Navy's fighter fleet and relieving pressure on its aging, legacy F/A-18A-D aircraft. It 

remains imperative that our air fleet deliver performance, afford ability, and capability. 

The F-35 aircraft is performing well, but the contractor is not delivering the affordability 

that keeps solvency and security as our guideposts. We are working with the contractor 

to reduce the costs associated with purchasing and sustaining the F-35. We will 

evaluate the performance of both F-35s and F/A-18s to determine the most appropriate 

mix of aircraft as we move forward. 

The FY 2019 budget request provides $9.3 billion for space and space-based systems 

to enhance communications and resiliency in space, addressing needs for overhead 

persistent infrared capabilities; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); and space 

launch systems. The Department will sustain existing systems, while developing followon capabilities to support operations in a contested space environment. 

The Air Force will continue the production of space-based infrared systems (SBIRS) and 

advanced extremely high frequency space vehicles currently in production to meet 

military satellite communication needs. Facing rising threats to our space capabilities, 

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however, the FY 2019 budget request transitioned the SBIRS space vehicles 7 and 8 

procurements to the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared effort in order to field 

rapidly a more survivable system by the mid-2020s. The Air Force will incorporate a 

technology refresh of the sensor to assure missile warning capabilities equal to or 

greater than today's SBIRS, taking advantage of sensor technology improvements. 

The FY 2019 budget request supports resiliency improvements in the PNT mission, 

incorporating military protection capability into the next generation global positioning 

system (GPS) Ill constellation. This enhancement assures PNT capabilities in contested 

environments and funds improvements to the GPS ground segment to improve antijamming and secure access of military GPS signals. 

Successful implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy includes investing in 

technological innovation to increase lethality. Rapid technological change includes 

developments in advanced computing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, 

autonomy, robotics, miniaturization, additive manufacturing, directed energy, and 

hypersonics-the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win wars of 

the future. Ultimately, these technologies will change the character of war, a reality 

embraced by DoD. 

The Department's FY 2019 Science and Technology (S&T) program invests in and 

develops capabilities that advance the technological superiority of the U.S. military to 

counter new and emerging threats. The Congressionally-directed split of my office's 

Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) into two portfolios 

(Acquisitions and Sustainment, and Research and Engineering) has enabled a stronger 

focus on urgently needed innovation, aligned with our defense strategy. 

The FY 2019 budget request for science and technology is $13.7 billion, focusing on 

innovation to advance DoD's military dominance for the 21st century. Highlights include: 

a robust basic research program of $2.3 billion; funding the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency budget of $3.4 billion to develop technologies for revolutionary, highpayoff military capabilities; and continuing to leverage commercial research and 

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development to provide leading edge capabilities to the Department while encouraging 

emerging non-traditional technology companies to focus on DoD-specific problems. 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes cyberspace as an increasingly 

contested warfighting domain, where malevolent cyber incidents and attacks present 

significant risks to national security. Long-term strategic competitors like Russia, China, 

North Korea, and Iran are using increasingly aggressive methods and levels of 

sophistication to conduct malicious activities. The challenge facing the Department is 

equally applicable to public and private networks across the United States, networks that 

are already held at risk. 

In terms of cyber as a contested domain, the Department of Defense has two broad 

portfolios: First is DoD's requirement to defend its networks, weapons, infrastructure, and 

information while providing integrated offensive cyber capabilities as options if needed. 

Second is our responsibility to Defend the Nation, which we perform by defending 

forward against significant cyber threats, and by supporting the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) which has the lead responsibility for integrating various governmental 

roles, missions, and responsibilities. Because DoD has offensive and defensive cyber 

capabilities in U.S. Cyber Command (Title 10) and the National Security Agency (Title 

50) on a scale and scope not available through other agencies and departments, we 

have a responsibility to the President and the Secretary of DHS for effectively aligning 

our capabilities to support cyber deterrence and responses to malicious cyber actions as 

part of a whole of government approach. Further, protection of our Nation's economy is 

fundamental to protecting our open society's way of life and ultimately to maintaining our 

military power. There are critical sectors (e.g., energy/electricity, finance, 

communications) vulnerable to disruption which must be reflected in our Nation's 

strategy and DoD's role. 

The FY 2019 budget provides $8.6 billion to build and maintain offensive and defensive 

capabilities for cyberspace operations. This funding also provides the resources needed 

to organize, train, and equip the 133 Cyber Mission Force teams whose purpose it is to 

perform DoD's cyber missions. This budget further provides the resources to elevate 

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U.S. Cyber Command to a 4-star level command as required by the 2017 NOAA, to 

ensure DoD's organization accounts for the new threats facing our Nation. 

Across manpower, research, procurement, operations and maintenance, and 

construction-every investment in the FY 2019 budget is designed to contribute to the 

lethality of our military as we adapt the size and composition of our force to address the 

current international situation while adjusting our stance to account for an evolving 

future. The enduring departmental theme is derived from our National Defense Strategy 

and Congressional intent: that we field forces sufficient and capable of deterring conflict 

or dominating the battlefield if we must fight and win. This year's budget reinforces a 

message to those seeking to threaten America's experiment in democracy: if you 

challenge us, it will be your longest and worst day. 

Strengthen Traditional Alliances while Building New Partnerships 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy's second line of effort is to strengthen traditional 

alliances while building new partnerships. 

In the past, I had the privilege of fighting many times in defense of the United States, but 

I never fought in a solely American formation; it was always alongside foreign troops. 

Easier said than done. Winston Churchill noted that the only thing harder than fighting 

with allies is fighting without them. History proves that we are stronger when we stand 

united with others. Accordingly, our military will be designed, trained, and ready to fight 

alongside allies. 

Acknowledging the lessons of World War II, the Greatest Generation invested in this 

approach to security, and our Nation's resulting prosperity helped much of the world 

develop. Working by, with, and through allies who carry their fair share remains a source 

of strength for the U.S. Since the costly victory in World War II, Americans have carried 

a disproportionate share of the global defense burden while others recovered. 

Today, the growing economic strength of allies and partners has enabled them to step 

up, as demonstrated by the 74 nations and international organizations participating in the 

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Defeat-ISIS campaign, and again in the 41 nations standing shoulder-to-shoulder in 

NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. 15 NATO allies are also increasing 

their defense budgets as a share of gross domestic product, giving credence to the value 

of democracies standing together. Our Pacific partners are also doing so. 

To strengthen and work jointly with more allies, our organizations, processes, and 

procedures will be ally friendly. The Department will do more than just listen to other 

nations' ideas-we will be willing to be persuaded by our partners, recognizing that not 

all good ideas come from the country with the most aircraft carriers. This line of effort 

will bolster an extended network of like-minded nations capable of promptly and 

prudently meeting the challenges of our time. 

The FY 2019 budget prioritizes investment where it is needed today and tomorrow. In 

the Middle East, we will work with responsive governments to ensure a more stable and 

secure region that denies safe haven to terrorists; is not dominated by any power hostile 

to the United States; and that contributes to stable global energy markets and secure 

trade routes. The $69 billion requested for the Overseas Contingency Operations 

account maintains our regional presence to protect the homeland, allies, and partners 

from terrorist threats. The budget request supports U.S. forces in Afghanistan as part of 

the Administration's South Asia Strategy; continues operations to prevent the resurgence 

of ISIS; and continues our security partnership with Iraqi Security Forces to support 

Iraq's long-term stability and independence. 

NATO remains our key security alliance. The Overseas Contingency Operations request 

also provides $6.5 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). Established in 

2015, the EDI supports a strong and free Europe, reaffirms America's commitment to the 

security and territorial commitment of NATO member states, and enhances activities in 

Eastern Europe to deter Russian aggression such as we have observed in Georgia and 

Crimea/Ukraine. This initiative also increases bilateral and multilateral exercises and 

training with allies and partners to ensure our deterrent stance is built on a strong, joint 

military capability. 

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A free and open Indo-Pacific region provides prosperity and security for all. We will 

continue to strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked 

security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring 

free access to common domains. With key countries in the region, we will bring together 

bilateral and multilateral security relationships to preserve the free and open international 

system. 

In our own hemisphere, the Canadian-American North American Air Defense Command 

is a long-standing, allied effort to protect both our nations. We maintain mature relations 

with both Canadian and Mexican militaries with a high degree of quiet collaboration. 

Further South we work jointly with Latin American nations on counter-narcotics and other 

operations and training efforts. 

Our efforts in Africa are largely focused on assisting nations facing violent terrorists to 

develop their own capability to provide internal security and mutual support against 

insurgents and terror groups. Ethical use of force is inherent in all training we provide. 

Reform the Department's Business Practices for Performance and Affordability 

As we take proactive steps to ensure our military is ready to fight today and in the future, 

we must urgently reform the business practices of the Department to provide both 

solvency and security. We will continue to establish a culture of performance where 

results and accountability matter on every expenditure, thereby gaining full benefit 

from every single taxpayer dollar spent on defense. We also have a commitment to 

exercise the utmost degree of financial stewardship and budget discipline within the 

Department, and we will deliver our Department's full financial audit this year. We also 

have the right leaders in place to make meaningful reform a reality: Pat Shanahan as 

Deputy Secretary of Defense; Jay Gibson as Chief Management Officer; Ellen Lord as 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Sustainment; Michael Griffin as 

Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; Bob Daigle as Director of 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and David Norquist as the Department's 

Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer. Each brings the intellect and energy required to 

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implement and sustain meaningful reform, ensuring the Department provides 

performance and affordability for the American taxpayer. 

The Department began a consolidated financial statement audit in FY 2018. For the 

first time, the Department will complete an independent and full audit across its 

business processes and systems, as required by law. A financial statement audit is 

comprehensive, occurs annually, and covers more than just financial management. 

During a financial statement audit, an independent public accounting firm or the DoD 

Office of Inspector General examines the Department's books and records. Financial 

statement audits give management independent validation and feedback on the 

effectiveness of each reporting entity's business systems and internal processes and 

controls. The financial statement audit helps drive enterprise-wide improvements to 

standardize our business processes and improve the quality of our data. Audits also 

ensure Department leaders have visibility over the counts, locations, and conditions of 

DoD property to inform current readiness and inform future programming, budgeting, and 

investment decisions. While we fully expect to find deficiencies, we will take swift action 

to correct them, thereby earning the trust of Congress and the American people. 

Remediating audit findings is at the center of our financial improvement strategy. The 

Department owes accountability to the American people. The taxpayers deserve a level 

of confidence that the Department's financial statements present a true and accurate 

picture of its financial condition and operations. Transparency, accountability, and 

business process reform are some of the benefits the Department will receive from the 

financial statement audit even before achieving a positive opinion. 

The Department is transitioning to a culture of performance and affordability that 

operates at the speed of relevance. We will prioritize speed of delivery, continuous 

adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades. With your continued, critical support, we will 

shed outdated management and acquisition processes while adopting American 

industries' best practices. Our management structure and processes are not engraved 

in stone. They are a means to an end-empowering the warfighter with the knowledge, 

equipment, and support needed to fight and win. If current structures inhibit our pursuit 

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of lethality, I have directed Service Secretaries and Agency Heads to consolidate, 

eliminate, or restructure to achieve the mission. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Shanahan has established the Reform Management Group 

(RMG), which relies on cross-functional teams to drive efficiency by using shared, 

centralized services throughout the Department with the goal of making each area 

maximally effective and improving our performance. The RMG's central goal is to 

leverage best practices, centers of excellence, and private sector sources to benchmark 

and best align business operations. Improved performance in the Department's business 

operations leads to a more effective force, and savings will be reinvested to increase 

lethality. 

Initial Reform Teams are focused on evaluating operations in the following areas: 

• Information Technology, 

• Healthcare, 

• Real Property, 

• Human Resources, 

• Financial Management, 

• Contracted Services and Goods, 

• Logistics and Supply Chain, 

• Community Services, and 

• Testing and Evaluation. 

Goals and performance metrics are crucial to measuring the benefit-to-cost and value 

generated as business processes are optimized. Key to this reform effort is generating 

relevant, accurate, and timely data. Displaying this data will ensure that all decision 

makers have access to the best information on a real-time basis. As reform efforts are 

underway, the longer-term objective is to institutionalize the behavior of continuous 

improvement throughout the culture of the Department. 

As the Department implements reform initiatives that reduce the operating costs of 

institutional activities, those resources will be reallocated to readiness, modernization, 

and recapitalization. The Department is ensuring that the savings associated with better 

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business practices from previous Presidents' Budgets are implemented fully, including 

streamlining major headquarters activities and eliminating redundancy. This effort 

includes a systemic review of past Inspector Generals' findings to ensure remedial action 

has been fully implemented. 

There are several efforts currently underway to improve the Department's ability to 

acquire and field products and services that provide for significant increases in mission 

capability and operational support in the most cost effective and schedule efficient 

manner possible. 

A Defense Acquisition System that facilitates speed and agility in support of mission 

accomplishment is key. The Department is engaging with the independent advisory 

panel on streamlining and codifying acquisition regulations established by section 809 of 

the FY 2016 NOAA and amended by section 863 of the FY 2017 NOAA. This effort also 

includes potential recommendations for new statutes as well as amendments or repeal of 

existing statutes. 

The Department looks forward to working with the Congress to provide the right 

capabilities to the warfighters when needed and at an affordable cost. A Defense 

Acquisition System that facilitates speed and agility in support of the aforementioned 

objective is key in this regard. 

Current Issues Update 

Aviation Mishaps I Deaths: Recent aviation mishaps across each of the Services are 

tragic and troubling, with 133 service members killed over a five year period. In the last 

three weeks alone, 16 service members have been killed. I am concerned that these 

recent mishaps represent lagging indicators, a tragic manifestation of readiness that has 

degraded during 17 years of war and made worse by budget cuts and fiscal instability. 

The two-year Bipartisan Budget Act and 2018 Omnibus appropriation will begin restoring 

the flight hours, equipment, and manpower needed to regain readiness, but it took us 

years to get to this point and measurable improvements will take time. 

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Border Security Support: In support of the Department of Homeland Security, and as 

directed by the President, I have authorized use of up to 4,000 National Guardsmen in 

Title 32 duty status. They will be assigned supporting roles requested by DHS along our 

southern border region under the command of their respective governors. Current 

requested support is for aviation, surveillance, intelligence analysis, and planning 

support in priority sectors. I anticipate additional requests for construction and logistical 

support. National Guard personnel will not perform law enforcement duties or interact 

with migrants. Previously employed Title 10 forces (approximately 195) conducting 

ongoing counter-narcotics support missions remain under U.S. Northern Command's 

controL 

Cancellation of Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 

Recapitalization and Space-Based Infrared Systems: The Air Force has proposed 

replacing JSTARS- the aircraft that performs battle management, command and 

control, and ground moving target sensing- with a network of sensors, fusing 

information from space, air, ground, and sea sensors. In a contested environment with 

integrated air defenses, the currently planned JSTARS replacement would be unable to 

get close enough to the fight to accomplish its mission, leaving our forces potentially 

blind to enemy activity. These functions must be adapted if they are to survive in the 

changed threat environment. We will move swiftly to Advanced Battle Management and 

Surveillance, and the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared procurements, 

rapidly fielding capabilities with more survivability. 

Niger Incident and Loss of Four Soldiers: This incident and contributing factors have 

been extensively investigated by U.S. Africa Command. The Chairman ofthe Joint 

Chiefs has added his review, and I expect my review and endorsement to be completed 

shortly. We will then brief the families and Congressional leadership followed by a public 

release. 

Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act CCAATSA): President Trump 

signed CAATSA into law on August 2, 2017, imposing new sanctions to counter 

aggressive actions from Iran, Russia, and North Korea. I look forward to working with 

Congress to address the national security implications created by this act. It is important 

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for us to have a flexible waiver authority, otherwise we prevent ourselves from acting in 

our own best interest and place an undue burden on our allies or partners. 

Transition to the Cloud: DoD must remain on the cutting edge of advanced computing 

capabilities to support warfighting and lethality. Our cloud initiative simplifies the ability 

to provide enterprise-wide access to information and improves security to safeguard 

critical information. Despite what you have heard in the media, the contract is not a sole 

source contract. The initial 2-year contract will follow a fair and open competition with the 

ultimate decision made based on performance and affordability. We are pursuing this 

path to ensure cloud providers are competitive and responsive to DoD needs. 

CONCLUSION 

Again, thank you for your bipartisan support and strong spirit of collaboration between 

this committee and our Department. 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy's three primary lines of effort-building a more 

lethal force, strengthening traditional alliances while building new partnerships, 

and reforming the Department's business practices for performance and 

affordability-will restore our competitive military advantage, ensuring we are prepared 

to fight across the full spectrum of combat now and into the future. 

Department of Defense readiness degraded over the course of many years. It will take 

continued budgetary stability to rebuild the readiness and increase the lethality required 

to expand the American military's competitive space. Now that we have a strategydriven budget, the FY 2019 budget request needs a timely appropriation enacted before 

October 181 to be fully effective. 

This budget request requires each and every one of us in the Department to be good 

stewards of every taxpayer dollar spent on defense. This budget also holds me 

accountable to the men and women of the Department of Defense, for they are the ones 

that must ultimately turn the 2018 National Defense Strategy into action. Every day, 

more than two million Service members and nearly one million civilians do their duty, 

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honoring previous generations of veterans and civil servants who have sacrificed for their 

country. I am reminded every day of the privilege I have to serve alongside them, and I 

thank them for their tireless efforts and unyielding standards in defense of our Nation. 

### 

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James N. Mattis 

Secretary of Defense 

James N. Mattis became the 26th Secretary of Def(mse on January 20, 2017. 

A native of Richland, Washington, Secretary Mattis enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve at 

the age of 18. After graduating from Central Washington University in 1971, he was 

commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps. 

During his more than four decades in uniform, Secretary Mattis commanded Marines at all levels, 

from an infantry rifle platoon to a Marine Expeditionary Force. He led an infantry battalion in Iraq 

in 1991, an expeditionary brigade in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terror attack in 2001, a Marine 

Division in the initial attack and subsequent stability operations in Iraq in 2003, and led all U.S. 

Marine Forces in the Middle East as Commander, l Marine Expeditionary Force and U.S. Marine 

Forces Central Command. 

During his non-combat assignments, Secretary Mattis served as Senior Military Assistant to the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense; as Director, Marine Corps Manpower Plans & Policy; as 

Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and as Executive Secretary 

to the Secretary of Defense. 

As a joint force commander, Secretary Mattis commanded U.S. Joint Forces Command, NATO's 

Supreme Allied Command for Transformation, and U.S. Central Command. At U.S. Central 

Command, he directed military operations of more than 200,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Coast 

Guardsmen, Marines and allied forces across the Middle East. 

Following his retirement from the U.S. Marine Corps in 2013, Secretary Mattis served as the 

Davies Family Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stan lord University, 

specializing in the study of leadership, national security, strategy, innovation, and the effective use 

of military force. In 2016, he co-edited the book, Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our 

Military. 
110 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

STATEMENT OF 

GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC 

19TH CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET HEARING 

APRIL 12, 2018 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

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Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of this 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to join Secretary Mattis in appearing 

before you today. It is an honor to represent the men and women of the Joint 

Force. 

Today, the United States Armed Forces have a competitive advantage over any 

potential adversary. We are capable of meeting all the requirements associated 

with defending the homeland and our way of life. And we can meet every one of 

our alliance commitments. I am confident we can prevail in any armed conflict. 

That said, one of my greatest concerns as Chairman is the erosion of our 

competitive advantage over time. 

Last summer, I testified that after years of sustained operational commitments, 

budgetary instability, and advances by our adversaries, our competitive 

advantage was eroding. I assessed that, without sustained, sufficient, and 

predictable funding, within five years the U.S. military would lose its advantage 

in projecting power-the basis for how we defend the homeland, advance U.S. 

interests, and meet our alliance commitments. 

I estimated that arresting the erosion of our competitive advantage required 

real budget growth of at least three percent above inflation across the FYDP, 

and restoring it would cost more. This figure represented the minimum 

investment necessary to rebuild readiness and modernize key warfighting 

systems while continuing to meet operational requirements. 

Driven by the National Defense Strategy, the FY19 Budget Request builds on 

the FY17 and FY18 budgets and supports rebuilding the U.S. military into the 

lethal and ready Joint Force the nation needs. However, we cannot reverse a 

decade-plus of erosion in one fiscal year. The Joint Force must continue to 

receive sufficient, sustained, and predictable funding for the foreseeable future 

to restore our competitive advantage and ensure we never send our sons and 

daughters into a fair fight. 

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Strategic Environment 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes that "The central challenge to 

U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic 

competition by ... revisionist powers." The Joint Force must face this long-term 

threat while still managing the immediate challenges posed by rogue regimes 

and terrorists. With China and Russia as the priority, we continue to use North 

Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations to inform our planning, force 

design, force development, and risk assessments. 

Our adversaries, particularly China and Russia, continue to modernize and 

invest in concepts and capabilities specifically designed to counter our 

advantages, and they are intent on outpacing us. As noted in the National 

Defense Strategy, we are in a fierce competition to maximize the benefits of 

emerging technologies including hypersonics, artificial intelligence, directed 

energy, and biotechnology-as these developments fundamentally change the 

character of war. China and Russia are also increasingly active and adept at 

what we call 'competition short of armed conflict'-integrating economic 

coercion, political influence, criminal activity, military posturing, 

unconventional warfare, and information and cyber operations. Through these 

activities, they seek to coerce opponents, advance their interests, and create 

strategic advantages without triggering a conventional armed response. 

China intends to become a global military power and is currently building the 

capability to do so. Militarily, China seeks to limit our access and undermine 

our important alliances in the Indo-Pacific. While modernizing their nuclear 

enterprise, China is also developing a full range of air, maritime, space, and 

cyber capabilities. Their continued militarization of the South and East China 

Seas accompanies expanding sovereignty claims that have no basis in 

international law. They leverage diplomatic and economic influence through the 

Belt and Road Initiative, and China's military interests have followed these 

initiatives into the Indian Ocean, South Asia and beyond. And while we 

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continue to seek Chinese cooperation on a number of fronts, especially with 

respect to North Korea, their projection of a state-controlled, 'strong-rule-theweak' global order is incompatible with U.S. interests and a rules-based 

international order. 

Russia also continues to modernize and invest across the full range of military 

capability, including new aircraft, submarines, armor, counter-space, and air 

defense systems, while also modernizing conventional and nuclear strike 

capabilities. These investments and activities are specifically designed to limit 

our power projection capability and undermine the credibility of U.S. alliances, 

especially NATO. 

While modernizing and preparing for long-term strategic competition and 

potential armed conflict with these revisionist powers, the Joint Force must 

also manage the ongoing challenges of rogue regimes. 

Although I remain cautiously optimistic about the potential for talks in the 

near future, North Korea's reckless pursuit of nuclear and missile capability is 

perhaps the most immediate threat to the security of the United States and our 

Allies. In 2017, North Korea conducted an unprecedented 17 ballistic missile 

test events, two of which overflew our treaty Ally, Japan. Last year also saw 

North Korea's first successful tests of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBMs) capable of ranging the continental United States-and they tested a 

nuclear device that they claim can be delivered by ICBM. I have testified to 

Congress several times in recent months about Pyongyang's accelerated 

capability development and the threats this poses to US interests, to Allies in 

the Pacific, and to the homeland. 

Iran also continues to project malign influence and threaten freedom of 

navigation in the Middle East. They are also modernizing their space, cyber, 

missile, and conventional maritime capabilities which pose a direct threat to 

our Allies and our interests in the region. 

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We continue to grapple with the challenge of violent extremism, including ISIS, 

a resurgent al Qaida, and associated movements. Our strategy remains focused 

on cutting the flow of finances, foreign fighters, and their disruptive narrative, 

while working by, with, and through local partners to sustain pressure on their 

networks, disrupt attacks, and dismantle their capabilities. 

Defending our homeland, our Allies, and our interests in the near-term while 

restoring our competitive advantage and building lethality, will require a 

focused and sustained effort over many years. 

Where We Are Today 

Fortunately, with your support, we have begun to arrest the erosion of our 

competitive advantage. The additional appropriation in FY17 supported 

immediate investments in readiness-including increases to end strength, 

funding for critical training, initial restoration of ammunition stocks, and 

continued modernization of critical systems. 

PB18 builds on the readiness recovery started in FY17 and begins to balance 

the program. It allows the Department to meet operational requirements, begin 

rebuilding mid- and long-term readiness, and restoring warfighting capability 

and capacity. 

While we are grateful for the FY18 appropriation, we spent the first six months 

of FY18 with FY17 funding levels. The flexibility provided in recent legislation 

enables the Department to execute these resources responsibly., This includes 

easing the 80/20 rule that requires the Department to obligate no more than 

20% of a one-year appropriation in the last two months of the fiscal year, and 

raising the Below Threshold Reprogramming amounts. Though these measures 

help the Department effectively utilize FY18 funds, I remain resolute that 

sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding is required in FY19 and beyond 

to restore our competitive military advantage. 

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The Department's FY19 budget funds ongoing operations, builds on FY18 

readiness improvements, and supports the National Defense Strategy by 

investing in modernization for high-end competition against near-peer 

adversaries. These investments are a necessary step in building the lethal, 

resilient, agile, and ready Joint Force directed by the NDS. 

Operations. Our first budget priority is to provide our deployed servicemembers 

the resources they need to effectively accomplish their missions--whether in 

active contingencies, deterring adversaries, assuring Allies, or building partner 

capacity. 

PB 19 supports deterrence and assurance operations around the world. In the 

Pacific theater, this budget accelerates substantial construction projects to 

improve infrastructure and bolster our ability to project power in the region. It 

allows prepositioning of critical munitions, increased intelligence activity, and 

increased rotational troop presence. PB 19 also improves missile defense by 

funding 20 additional Ground Based Interceptors, with redesigned kill vehicles, 

to be deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska across the FYDP. To deter Russian 

aggression, this budget fully funds the European Deterrence Initiative 

increasing the number and quality of exercises with our NATO Allies, deploying 

key U.S.-based enablers, and modernizing prepositioned stocks. It also 

recapitalizes the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System, enhancing our 

ability to detect Russian submarines. 

This budget provides $69 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), 

the bulk of which funds operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. In 

Afghanistan, we are working toward a sustainable approach to stabilizing the 

Afghan government and denying terrorist sanctuary. In Iraq and Syria, we 

remain committed to eliminating the remnants of ISIS and setting the 

conditions for the stabilization effort. 

The FY19 funding for ongoing operations not only ensures our deployed 

servicemembers have what they need to execute missions in Iraq, Syria, and 

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Afghanistan, but also makes conflict less likely by assuring Allies and deterring 

aggression in key strategic theaters. 

Readiness. PB19 builds on the readiness gains in PB18 by adding end strength 

and increasing capacity and training to extend our readiness focus to the midand long-term. 

PB 19 adds end strength to each of the services, allowing them to fill gaps in 

existing combat formations, address critical shortfalls in aviation maintenance, 

and increase manning in cyber and information warfare. The Air Force will 

address pilot shortages by adding two new training squadrons, enabling the 

production of 125 additional new pilots per year starting in FY19. PB19 focuses 

funding on readiness for ground combat and flight hour programs, funding 

most programs to near-maximum executable levels. 

PB 19 also increases available capacity and training for all of the Services by 

funding key readiness accounts at maximum executable levels. The Navy funds 

service life extensions for six cruisers as well as infrastructure, spares, and 

ship depot maintenance. The Navy and Marine Corps improve aircraft 

readiness by funding aviation spare and repair parts and depot-level 

maintenance. The Air Force upgrades training ranges and funds weapons 

system sustainment. The Army will create a sixteenth Armored Brigade Combat 

Team while accelerating fielding of four Security Force Assistance Brigades. 

This budget also adds necessary capacity in air defense, mobile rocket artillery, 

and operational command and control in Europe. Finally, PB19 funds 

munitions inventory levels sufficient to meet multiple demands across theaters. 

What We Must Do Going Forward 

For decades, the United States held a competitive advantage through the 

unparalleled, unchallenged development of capabilities our Services brought to 

bear. Today, however, our adversaries' rapid fielding of advanced capabilities 

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combined with funding constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act, which 

have forced the Services to defer critical modernization, have resulted in the 

erosion of our competitive advantage. The restoration of our competitive 

advantage will require a joint approach to concept and capability development, 

coupled with sustained and predictable budgets beyond FY19. 

PB19 begins to address this erosion through targeted investments that develop 

the lethal, agile, and innovative Joint Force demanded by the threats of 2025 

and beyond. 

The Joint Force must maintain the comprehensive readiness to address any 

potential threat across the spectrum of conflict, now and in the future. To 

enhance the lethality of the current force, we are modernizing key units and 

platforms, while implementing more flexible and dynamic ways to employ the 

force-ensuring our ability to project power. Our emphasis in doing so is on 

enhancing the survivability and maneuverability of existing platforms while 

rapidly leveraging emerging technologies. While the Service Chiefs have briefed 

you on specific actions to increase the lethality of their individual Services, let 

me offer a few important examples where PB 19 will enhance the lethality of the 

joint aspects of our Armed Forces. 

Nuclear. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is essential to 

defending the homeland. In accordance with the recently published Nuclear 

Posture Review, we will invest $24 billion in FY19 to sustain and recapitalize 

the nuclear enterprise. This is a significant step in a 23-year modernization 

program to recapitalize the entire enterprise--including all three legs of our 

strategic triad, our non-strategic nuclear forces, and command and control. 

Initial delivery of modernized bombers and dual capable aircraft (F -35) is slated 

for the mid-2020s, initial operating capability of modernized ground-based 

missiles will be achieved in 2029, and the first modernized ballistic missile 

submarine will be operational in 2031. This is the highest priority mission of 

the Joint Force and there is no margin remaining in the modernization 

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schedule. We must deliver these critical nuclear modernization programs on 

the established timelines. 

Space. Space is now a contested domain. This budget builds on FY18 

investments to address increasing threats to critical space systems with a focus 

on space resiliency and mission assurance. It accelerates procurement of the 

next generation of space-based infrared systems to field a modernized, resilient 

space-based missile warning capability. Other investments focus on resilient 

systems for navigation, communications, and situational awareness. Given 

rapid advances in our adversaries' capabilities, the space domain will require 

continuous investment in future years. 

Cyberspace. FY19 investments in cyber capabilities continue to prioritize 

defense of DoD information networks, while improving offensive and defensive 

operations, building Cyber Mission Forces, and maturing command and 

control. 

Electronic Warfare (EW). Competition in the electromagnetic spectrum has 

increased substantially. In order to maintain the ability of the Joint Force to 

project power, we are investing in offensive and defensive systems, while 

exploring new concepts to maximize the effectiveness of our multi-domain EW 

capabilities. 

Missile Defense. To keep pace with the rapidly fielding of new capabilities 

and increased quantities of ballistic and cruise missiles we are modernizing our 

missile defense capabilities in 2019. In addition to increasing the number of 

Ground Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, this budget will invest in the 

procurement of additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and SM-3 

interceptors. 

In addition to investing in capabilities to increase the lethality of the force, the 

Department is developing concepts to maximize the effectiveness and agility of 

the force we have today. For example, the National Defense Strategy directs the 

Joint Force to "introduce unpredictability to adversary decision-makers" 

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through Dynamic Force Employment. Dynamic Force Employment allows us to 

develop a wide range of proactive, scalable options and quickly deploy forces for 

emerging requirements while maintaining readiness to respond to 

contingencies. 

PB19 continues investment in cutting edge capabilities that extend the 

advantages of our current capabilities. For example, we continue to refine 

stealth and strike technologies such as the B-21 next generation bomber. 

However, the rapidly changing technological environment demands that we 

innovate by fielding and incorporating new concepts and capabilities with 

increased speed. PB19 will see increased investments in technologies such as 

hypersonics, artificial intelligence, directed energy, and biotechnology. 

Across the Joint Force, PB 19 starts, accelerates, or continues funding for 

critical modernization efforts. As our adversaries continue to advance, our 

future concept and capability development is critical to maintaining our 

competitive advantage in all domains. These programs will require years of 

sustained funding to deliver material results, but they are all vital to ensuring 

the future force is capable of defending the homeland and advancing U.S. 

interests in the competitive security environment to come. 

Conclusion 

To achieve the National Defense Strategy, the Joint Force requires sustained, 

sufficient, and predictable funding. The funding levels in the recent Bipartisan 

Budget Agreement are sufficient, providing the first years of real growth 

required to begin reversing the degradation of our competitive advantage over 

the last decade. I look forward to working with Congress to make this funding 

sustained and predictable over the coming years so we can fully restore our 

competitive military advantage. 

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PB 19 represents a significant investment in the lethal Joint Force that the 

United States will need to prevail in future conflicts. We are committed to the 

responsible, disciplined, and transparent use of that investment. With your 

continued help and commitment, we will ensure we never send America's sons 

and daughters into a fair fight. 

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General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. is the 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

nation's highest-ranking military officer, and the principal military advisor to the 

President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Counci I. 

Prior to becoming Chairman on October 1, 2015, General Dunford served as the 36th 

Commandant of the Marine Corps. He previously served as the Assistant Commandant of 

the Marine Corps from 2010 to 2012 and was Commander, International Security 

Assistance Force and United States Forces-Afghanistan from February 2013 to August 

2014. 

A native of Boston, Massachusetts, General Dunford graduated from Saint Michael's 

College and was commissioned in 1977. He has served as an infantry officer at all levels, 

to include command of 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, and command of the 5th Marine 

Regiment during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. 

General Dunford also served as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine 

Division, Marine Corps Director of Operations, and Marine Corps Deputy Commandant 

for Plans, Policies and Operations. He commanded l Marine Expeditionary Force and 

served as the Commander, Marine Forces U.S. Central Command. 

His Joint assignments include duty as the Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of the Global and Multilateral Affairs Division (J-5), and Vice 

Director for Operations on the Joint Staff(J-3). 

A graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger School, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, 

and the U.S. Army War College, General Dunford also earned master's degrees in 

Govemment from Georgetown University and in International Relations from the Fletcher 

School of Law and Diplomacy. 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 12, 2018 

(125) 

www.wpath.org 

wpath@wpath.org 

phone: 1+(847) 752-5328 

fax: 1+(224) 633-2166 

1061 E Main Street Ste 300 

East Dundee, IL 60118 

STAFF 

Executive Director 

Sue O'Sullivan 

sue@wpath.org 

Executive Director of Global 

Education & Development 

Donna Kelly 

donna@wpath.org 

Associate Director 

Blaine Vella 

blaine@wpath.org 

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 

President 

Gall Knudson. MD, FRCPC 

PresidentMEiect 

Vin Tangpricha, MD, PhD 

Secretary 

Randi Ettner, PhD 

Treasurer 

Walter Pierre Bouman, MD, PhD 

Past-President 

Jamison Green, PhD 

BOARD OF DIRECTORS 

Tamara Adnan, JD 

Tone Marie Hansen 

Dan Karastc, MD 

Baudewijntje Kreukels, PhD 

Katherine Rachlin, PhD 

Loren Schechter, MD 

Sam Winter, PhD 

Ex-Officio 

Lin Fraser, EdD 

Student Representative 

Luke Allen, MA 

EPATH Representative 

Griet De Cuypere. MD 

AprilS, 2018 

Honorable James N. Mattis 

Secretary 

Department of Defense 

1000 Defense Pentagon 

Washington, DC 20301-1000 

Dear Secretary Mattis: 

On behalf of the World Professional Association of Transgender Health 

(WPATH), we are writing to express alarm concerning the new policy 

President Trump has initiated based on your recommendations. This 

policy is at odds with all scientific and clinical evidence regarding gender 

dysphoria. 

WPATH is a multi-disciplinary international professional educational 

organization that maintains the Standards of Care for the treatment of 

transgender individuals and is widely recognized as the "gold standard" 

for transgender care throughout the world. Gender dysphoria is a 

treatable condition that in no way limits the ability of individuals to serve 

in the military or undermines morale and/or readiness. Nor does it entail 

"tremendous medical costs." 

Absent any medical basis for a transgender military ban, and 

mischaracterizing the extensive body of research, this exclusionary ban is 

blatantly discriminatory and demeans the brave individuals who serve in 

our military. We stand with the American Medical Association, the 

American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association 

and the Surgeons General in opposing this ban and the stigma it casts 

over all transgender individuals. 

Sincerely, 

Gail Knudson, MD, FRCPC 

President, WPATH 
126 

April3, 2018 

The Honorable James N. Mattis 

Secretary 

Department of Defense 

I 000 Defense Pentagon 

Washington, DC 20301-1000 

Dear Secretary Mattis: 

JAMES L. MADARA, MD 

On behalf of the physician and medical student members of the American Medical Association (AMA), I 

am writing to express our concern about the new policy recently approved by President Trump imposing 

limits on transgender individuals serving in the military. This new policy, based on recommendations 

you made in Febmary to President Trump, states that "transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of 

gender dysphoria-individuals who the policies state may require substantial medical treattnent, including 

medications and surgery-are disqualified from military service except under certain limited 

circumstances" (Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland 

Security Regarding Military Service by Transgendcr Individuals, March 23, 20 18). 

We believe there is no medically valid reason-including a diagnosis of gender dysphoria-to exclude 

transgcnder individuals from military service. Transgcndcr individuals have served, and continue to 

serve, our country with honor, and we believe they should be allowed to continue so. We share th~ 

the 

Defense Department's 

the wide body research on the effectiveness oftransgender medical care. This research, 

demonstrating that medical care for gender dysphoria is effective, was the rationale for the AMA 's 

adoption of policy by our !louse of Delegates in 2015, that there is no medically valid reason to exclude 

transgender individuals from military service. 

The AMA also supports public and private health insurance coverage for treatment of gender dysphoria as 

recommended by the patient's physician. We support the finding of the RAND study conducted for the 

Department of Defense on the impact oftransgender individuals in the military that the financial cost is 

negligible and a rounding error in the defense budget. It should not be used as a reason to deny patriotic 

Americans an opportunity to serve their country. We should be honoring their service. 

Sincerely, 

James L. Madara, MD 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 12, 2018 

(129) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. You mentioned that you now recognize that when considering space 

as a warfighting domain, we should also be looking at it in the full spectrum of ‘‘acquisition to employment, from coordination to innovation for the future, and all the 

things that go with it’’. Given our immediate issues with great power competition 

against Russia and China, do we have the luxury of waiting for the DSD’s final report in August or are there steps that Congress should be taking prior to the report? 

Secretary MATTIS. I appreciate Congress’s continued focus and attention on the 

Department’s approach to the space domain. I do not believe that Congress needs 

to take any additional actions at this time. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is fully 

engaged in his review of the organizational and management structure of the national security space components of the Department of Defense, as required by Section 1601(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, and will 

provide recommendations back to Congress by August 1, 2018. While the Deputy’s 

review is still underway, the Department is not sitting still. The Department is acting on the guidance laid out in the President’s recent National Strategy for Space 

and the 2018 National Defense Strategy to convert strategy into immediate, nearterm, and long-term action. The Department specifically is harmonizing its space activities to ensure U.S. leadership, preeminence, and freedom of action in space for 

decades to come. The Air Force is reorganizing its Space and Missile Center in response to the Deputy’s focus on accelerating the speed of space acquisition. The Fiscal Year 2019 President’s Budget request, which included approximately $13 billion 

for Defense space programs, constitutes over a 9 percent increase above last year’s 

request. The President’s Budget request also included more than $65 billion across 

the Future Years Defense Plan, reflecting a 14 percent growth above the previous 

five-year planning period. Our words and actions, backed by the increased funding 

requests, will amplify the mission assurance of the Department’s space-based capabilities against the growing threats from our competitors and adversaries. It will 

also leverage commercial innovation and our international partnerships to accelerate development and deployment of new capabilities, strengthen lethality and 

readiness of the total force, and enhance the nation’s overall deterrence and 

warfighting power. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. Media reports indicate that U.S. and North Korean officials have discussed ‘‘denuclearization’’ in the buildup to a summit between President Trump and 

Kim Jong Un. While this news is encouraging, it’s also unclear, because we hope 

‘‘denuclearization’’ means that the North Koreans will give up their nuclear weapons 

in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, while the North Koreans seem to think ‘‘denuclearization’’ means they’d give up their weapons if we abandoned our defense relationship with South Korea. I understand that these details pertain to ongoing negotiations, but I think it’s important for this to be public: What does the President 

mean and envision when he says denuclearization? Does he understand that his definition and expectations likely diverge greatly from the North Koreans’? 

Secretary MATTIS. Denuclearization means the complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear weapons programs and existing nuclear and delivery programs. 

Ms. SPEIER. Media reports indicate that U.S. and North Korean officials have discussed ‘‘denuclearization’’ in the buildup to a summit between President Trump and 

Kim Jong Un. While this news is encouraging, it’s also unclear, because we hope 

‘‘denuclearization’’ means that the North Koreans will give up their nuclear weapons 

in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, while the North Koreans seem to think ‘‘denuclearization’’ means they’d give up their weapons if we abandoned our defense relationship with South Korea. I understand that these details pertain to ongoing negotiations, but I think it’s important for this to be public: What does the President 

mean and envision when he says denuclearization? Does he understand that his definition and expectations likely diverge greatly from the North Koreans’? 
130 

General DUNFORD. I defer to the administration to characterize the President’s remarks. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Mrs. HARTZLER. The FY18 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Senate report included language directing the Department ‘‘to ensure that appropriate training on religious liberty is conducted at all levels of command on the requirements 

of the law. . . .’’ The specific committee recommendation was ‘‘to develop curriculum 

and implement training concerning religious liberty in accordance with the law.’’ 

Has DOD, in conjunction with each of the services, developed ‘‘a comprehensive 

training program’’ for commanders, chaplains, and judge advocates? How has DOD 

implemented this recommendation? Please provide an update on DOD’s, and each 

of the branches, ‘‘intentional strategy for developing and implementing a comprehensive training program on religious liberty issues for military leadership and 

commanders.’’ 

Senator Ernst Religious Liberty Report Language FY18 S. 1519, National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 Bill: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS115s1519pcs/pdf/BILLS-115s1519pcs.pdf Report: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 

CRPT-115srpt125/pdf/CRPT-115srpt125.pdf 

Secretary MATTIS. The training will assist the military services in ensuring that 

the right to the free exercise of religion of all service members, as well as the right 

to exercise no religion at all, is protected. Each chaplain corps integrates religious 

freedom training into its training for chaplains on the broader topics of facilitation 

of religious ministry and religious accommodation for all faith groups. This training 

occurs at the basic and advanced course at each of the service chaplain schools. 

Judge advocates from each of the services receive religious accommodation and expression training at their basic courses, mid-career courses, and senior leader 

courses. Additionally, commanders receive religious accommodation and expression 

training at pre-command courses, and receive advice from their judge advocates and 

chaplains throughout the course of their commands. Religious liberty training in 

each of the services is continually refined to address the free exercise in the context 

of military service. 

Æ