LAMs-2698 Revised

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C\G~4 REPORT COLECTION

REPRODUCTION $&QF%

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY

OF THEUNIVERSITYOF CALIFORNIAo LOSALAMOS NEW MEXICO

HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR THE LOS ALAMOS

CRITICAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY

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LEGAL NOTICE

ThiEIreportwas preparedas an accountofGcivernment sponsoredwork. NeithertheUnitedStates,northe

Commission,noranypersonactingon behalfoftheCommission:

A. Makesanywarrantyorrepresentation, expressed

or implied,withrespectotheaccuracy,completeness,or

usefulnessoftheinformationcontainedinthisreport,or

thattheuseofanyinformation, apparatus,method,or process disclosedinthisreportmay notinfringeprivately

ownedrights;or

B. Assumes any liabilities withrespecttotheuse

of,or fordamagesresultingfrom theuseofanyinformation,apparatus,method,or processdisclosedinthisreport.

As usedintheabove,“personactingonbehalfof the

Commission”includesany employeeor contractorofthe

Commission,oremployeeofsuchcontractor,totheextent

thatsuch employeeor contractoroftheCommission,or

employeeof such contractorprepares,disseminates,or

providesaccessto,any informationpursuantto hisemploymentorcontractwiththeCommission,orhisemployment withsuchcontractor.

PrintedinUSA. Price$2.00. Availablefrom the

OfficeofTechnicalServices

U. S.DepartmentofCommerce

Washington25,D. C.
LAMS-2698Revised

CRITICALITYSTUDIES

TID-4500(18thEd.)

IDS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORA~RY

OF THE UNIVERSITYOF CALIFORNIA LOS ALAMOS NEW MEXICO

REPORT WRITTEN April1962

REPORT DISTRIBUTED November6,1962

HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR THE LOS ALAMOS

CRITICAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY

by

W. U. Gser

P. G. Koontz

J.D. Orndoff

H. C. Paxton

‘L ContractW-7405-ENG.36 withtheU. S.AtomicEnergyCommission

I

1

ABSTRACT

The safety of Pajarito critical assembly operations

depends upon remote contr’ol and upon good practice as

defined by operating regulations and experimental plans.

Distance, in some cases supplemented by shielding, would

protect personnel against an extreme accident generating

1019 fissions.

Background

The Los Alamos critical assembly facility now consists

of three independent assembly buildings (called “Kivas”)

which are operated remotely from three separate but grouped

control rooms 1/4 mile from two Kivas (Nos. 1 and 2) and

somewhat closer to the third. Kiva No. 1 was first used in

1947. Shortly thereafter, a universal machine called

“Topsy” was constructed to investigate enriched uranium

metal cores in a thick normal uranium reflector. Later this

machine was adapted to a nickel reflector and other cores.

As the weapon program expanded and weapon design became

more sophisticated, the critical assemblies group was called

on to make measurements to: 1) aid in the design of experimental nuclear explosive devices, 2) establish nuclearly

safe procedures for handling, storing, and transporting

weapons, and 3) provide neutron physics parameters necessary

for the calculation of weapons systems. The work load soon

became more than could be handled by one assembly building

5
and Kiva No. 2 was constructed in 1950 along with the present

main laboratory building where the control rooms are located.

Effort continued to be categorized as above with direct

weapon work of prime concern. Weapons were designed so

close to limits that detailed experiments were required to

certify that all phases of loading and handling were safe.

The nuclear safety category was expanded to include safety

of active material processing and fabrication operations

both locally and AEC-wide. The reactor physics research

program was broadened to include basic information on

fissile and nonfissile materials of interest to weapon and

reactor development, particularly in the derivation of

consistent parameters for use in multigroup machine

calculations.

In 1955 the Rover reactor category was added and has

become a dominant field although weapon and nuclear safety

responsibilities and other reactor interests are still

active. Demands of the Rover program led to construction

of Kiva 3, in which preliminary assembly studies commenced

during February 1961.

Critical assembly machines are frequently relocated

to improve operating efficiency when program emphasis is

changed.

6
Description of Facility

Location

The Los Alamos critical facility is located at TA-18

(Pajarito Site), which is about two miles from the nearest

residential area, and about four-tenths mile from the

,

closest technical area (see Figure 1) . It is in a normally

arid canyon, and some natural shielding is afforded by

surrounding canyon walls (Figures 2 and 3) .

General Features of Kivas

The Kivas are of reinforced concrete and masonry block

construction . Each has a traveling crane in the main

assembly room. Gas-fired furnaces are used for heating

and forced-draft ventilation is provided. Each has provision for storage of active material in a separately

locked area, with storage divisions calculated to be

nuclearly safe by a factor of two when completely flooded.

All outside doors (except to furnace rooms) lock with a key

which has limited distribution.

In accordance with operating procedures, a system of

five separate radiation level detectors is permanently

installed and serves the roles of scram actuators and

operational instrumentation. Compressed air is furnished

from a common source. Hydraulic supplies are tailored to

individual needs.
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All major nuclear assembly operations, such as the

bringing together of the halves of Honeycomb, are designed

to be fail-safe. Thus with the loss of electric power,

the assembly reverts to a safe, far subcritical condition.

Typical Critical Assemblies

Kiva 1 (Figure 4)

In practice, machines in this Kiva run at “zero

power” --perhaps 100 watts maximum. The building

itself affords only light shielding. Distance of

about 1000 feet to the nearest occupied building is

a primary safety feature.

Critical assembly machines in Kiva 1 are:

1. Honeycomb: (Figure 5) Honeycomb is a

. versatile machine for mocking up relatively

large critical systems and provides when

assembled a 6 ft. cubic matrix of 3“ x 3“

X 6’ aluminum tubes for supporting reactor

materials . It is being used presently for

mockups of Rover reactors. Scrams retract

about one-half of the assembly and withdraw

safety rods generally worth *2$.

11
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13
2. Zepo B: This is the zero power, nuclearly

precise, mockup of Kiwi-B. Originally designed

‘to simulate Kiwi-I, then adapted to Dumbo, it

will accommodate other mockups of the Kiwi-B

series and Phoebus. A scram signal drops the

core out of the reflector and inserts boral

sheets into the reflector. The boral alone is

worth 1.20$.

3. Mars: Constructed for mockups of the

Kiwi-A reactor, this machine is being adapted

to U-graphite systems diluted by hydrogenous

materials and Be. Scrams drop one portion of

the assembly and raise another part.

4. Comet: (Figure 6) Comet is a simple

assembly machine for a variety of tests including

“quick and dirty” reactivity checks frequently

required for the weapons program. Comet is

presently in use in the determination of

critical conditions for Pu cylinders diluted

with various other metals. As with Planet,

the primary scram drops the portion of the

assembly carried on the lift.

14
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15

—
Kiva 2 (Figure 7)

At present the main difference from Kiva 1 is that

Hydro, located outside the building adjacent to the Kiva

is run at about 5 kilowatts power for periods

hour . (This is usually done during off-hours

exposure of personnel.) The 1100 feet to the

like one

to minimize

nearest

occupied building is its primary safety feature.

Critical assembly machines in Kiva 2 are:

1. Jezebel(l) : (Figure 8) Jezebel is the unreflected, U

233 metal, spherical assembly used for

reactor physics investigations. The original Pu

components are available for remounting when the

U233

program is completed. An essentially portable

machine, Jezebel was first installed in Kiva 1.

The scram action is separation of the sphere into

three nearly equal portions.

2. Flat Top: (Figure 9) Flat Top is a thick

normal-uranium-reflected assembly with a choice of

Oy, u

233

, or Pu metal cores. It is used for

fundamental reactor physics studies. Scrams retract

two quadrants of the thick reflector.

3. Cavity Assembly: (Figure 10) The Cavity

Reactor is a one meter diameter by one meter

long cylindrical cavity surrounded by one-half

16
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17
Figure 8. Jezebel in Kiva 2

18
Figure 9. Flat top
Figure 10. Cavity assembly

20
meter thick D20. Loading for the unperturbed

system is a few roils of enriched uranium foil

lining the cavity. The assembly is used for

reactor physics studies, and investigating

possible Rover or test reactor applications.

A scram signal drops the lower reflector plug

and core, introduces a 3$ Cd rod into the

reflector, and initiates draining of D20 from

the annular reflector tank.

4. Hydro: (Figure 11) Hydro is an enriched

uranium metal core assembly cooled and

partially reflected with water, capable of

operation up to *5 KW. It is set up outside

Kiva 2 and is used as a neutron source for a

thermal column or for detector studies. Formerly it drove a uranium exponential column.

For scrams, the assembly drops from its upper

reflector, the polyethylene control block

(0.3$) retracts, and the lateral water

reflector drains.

5. Tank: This assembly consists of a tank

70” diameter by 54” high for use in checking

nuclear safety of single or multiple units

when flooded. This facility is required pri21
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marily for tests of weapon components. The

primary scram drains the tank.

6. Planet: The Planet assembly machine is a

duplicate of Comet in Kiva 1. For the “Thor”

assembly (Pu in thick Th) on this machine, the

primary scram dropped a reflector cylinder

carrying about 1/3 of the core and a secondary

scram raised part of the reflector.

Kiva 3 (Figure 12)

This is the only Kiva with self shielding, having

18 inch thick walls and ceiling. Distance to the

nearest occupied building is 560 feet. Construction

is such that reasonable containment is expected in

case of a relatively severe excursion. The one

entrance into the main room is designed as a tunnel

so that radiation scattering to the outside will be

minimized, and orientation is such that it points

away from the most frequently occupied areas.

The environmental chamber, designed to cool to

-85°F and heat to 700°F, is a major feature of this

building. (Temperature is the only controlled parameter. ) Its purpose is to subject critical assemblies

to other than ambient temperatures, at which most

previous experiments have been done. No interaction

(other than sluggish temperature control) is expected

23
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24
with controls or other features of contained assemblies. The planned temperature range is sufficient

to provide information that is sensitive to neutron

temperature models without being so extreme as to

introduce operational problems. Auxiliary equipment

for this is housed in a masonry block section of the

building. This chamber is semi-automatic, so that

during critical operations, operators will be

required only at the control room.

Apart from the temporary operation of Godiva II

prior to its retirement, Kiva 3 has been used for

preassembly and checkouts of Kiwi-B-lA, Kiwi-B-2A,

and Kiwi-B-4. This operation, illustrated by

Figure 13, will be duplicated for other Rover test

reactors. In addition, “Supercomet,” a versatile,

heavy duty version of Planet or Comet, will be

installed for general critical assembly work.

25
Figure 13. Kiwi-B reactor in Kiva 3

26
Description of Experimental Procedures

LASL remotely controlled critical assembly facilities

have been operated satisfactorily for nearly twelve years.

During this period many hundreds of critical configurations have been established without radiation accidents

to personnel. In addition to the influence of favorable

facilities and conscientious personnel, this success is

partially attributable to operational procedures that have

been established, refined, and formalized. Experiments are

controlled by a set of comprehensive operating regulations.

In addition, each separate experiment must be described

by an experimental plan in which any special features,

not covered by the general operating regulations, are

spelled out. Experimental Plans must be approved by an

●

N-2 Nuclear Safety Committee, the Group

Division Leader. Operating Regulations

below and an illustrative experimental

in the Appendix (page 65ff).

Leader , and the

are included

plan is ‘given

27
Operating Regulations for the

Remote Control Laboratories at Pajarito

I-A Introduction

The “Operating Regulations” for experiments with

fissile materials by the critical assemblies group at

Pajarito have been revised to adapt to changes in program

and to incorporate results of nearly fifteen years experience.

This new set of rules, which supersedes an informal document,

does not represent any major change in basic philosophy

or safety criteria, but, in addition to the provision

for the storing of active material not installed in a

machine, more consideration is given to the different

types of machines which have grown out of an expanded

and a more varied program.

Although the basic philosophy has been and continues

to be that “Regulations alone cannot guarantee safety,

but must be supplemented by the vigilance of the individuals performing such experiment,” nevertheless, some

rules of procedure and limitations of operations are

necessary for the safe operation of critical experiments

by a group of individuals. It is to be hoped that a set

of rules, coupled with the carefulness and vigilance of

the individuals, will prevent serious accidents with

experiments which, at best, are hazardous. Such rules

should not be so stringent that they unduly restrict

progress or the investigation of a new idea. As in the

28

●
past, it is believed that the control of personnel hazard

is of paramount importance, and that, if haste contributes

to the hazard, the consideration of safety shall take

precedence over that of saving time. It is also the aim

of these regulations to protect valuable fission materials

and to maintain continuity of operations in the Kiva areas.

In rewriting these regulations, many sentences and paragraphs have been taken unmodified from the first set of

rules .

I-B Facilities and General Practice

These “Operating Regulations” apply to any experiment

which is performed at one of the remote control laboratories , known as Kivas, at Pajarito Site. The Kivas,

which are located at some distance from the main laboratory building in which the corresponding control rooms

are placed, as shown in Figure 2, are surrounded by

fences to keep personnel at a safe distance from the Kivas

during the remote control operation. All remote controls

and indicators, including closed circuit TV receiver% are

mounted in the control room.

Access to the Kiva areas is regulated by the Safety

Plans 1, 2, and 3 as defined in Section II-A. These areas

usually contain active material in addition to that which

is directly involved in a particular experiment. Section

II-B will treat briefly the general consideration for

storage of the active material in the Kivas and the vault.

29
Certain features of operations with fissile materials

in the Kivas have become standard practice. The procedure

for each type of experiment is established by an approved

Experimental Plan (see Section 11-C.1). In all such

operations, hand assembly of fissile materials is limited

to demonstrably safe units. Where safe limits for hand

assembly are to be exceeded, the ultimate reactive configuration is divided into two or more subunits, each

safe for hand assembly, and these subunits brought together by means of a remotely controlled machine. If a

preselected neutron level is exceeded at any one of two

or more neutron safety monitors, the machine is automatically disassembled or “scrammed.”

I-C Criteria for Regulations ——

The choice of operating regulations is guided by the

following considerations: 1) For personnel protection,

the important periods are when a Kiva safety area is

accessible, particularly during hand-stacking operations.

At such times, it must be guaranteed that the reactivity

margin is not only below delayed critical but also is

large with respect to such influences as measurement uncertainties and incidental tamping effects. Precautions

under these conditions should be the equivalent of those

observed in plants for processing and fabricating fissile

materials . 2) Obviously, a higher degree of property

30

— .-
risk must be accepted for remote operation (with the Kiva

area vacated) . During such a period precautions are

rehired to guard against inadvertent entry into the

prompt critical region, where a damaging reaction may

occur, and against a highly radiating system that cannot

be disassembled remotely. These precautions depend upon

proper machine characteristics and properly interpreted

guiding measurements, instead of the generous safety

margin that is provided by ordinary nuclear safety standards .

To convert these general ideas into specific rules,

it is necessary to introduce readily measurable numbers

that can serve as safety criteria. In the reactivity

region below delayed critical, “central source” neutron

multiplication (2, 3) is the practical primary safety

index, with the convenient property that reciprocal multiplication becomes zero at delayed critical. For example,

in progressing toward an unknown configuration of active

material from one known to be safe, the safety of the

stage to be entered is judged by preceding multiplication

measurements . Conservative extrapolation of a plot of

31
reciprocal multiplication against the parameter controlling reactivity (i.e., mass of fissile material,

tamper thickness, separation of subunits) establishes

safe limits for each increase of reactivity.

For spherical fast neutron systems, a central source

multiplication of 10 corresponds to %75% of the critical

mass , and a multiplication of 100 to z97-1/2% of critical. Where these values of multiplication or the fractions of critical mass appear as general safety criteria,

reactivity limits equivalent to those for spherical

fast neutron systems are implied.

In the region between delayed critical and prompt

critical, the convenient safety index is the period of

exponential rise of neutron level (i.e. , the “positive

period”) . From the known relationship between positive

period and reactivity level (as Ak in cents above delayed

critical) for several fissionable materials, as deter-

(4, 5)

mined by Keepin and Wimett 9 the margin from prompt

critical is established for any measured period.

Simple rules stated in terms of the safety indices

can define safe ranges for various normal types of

operation . The regulations, as formulated, are not

intended to cover all conceivable aspects of an inherently flexible program, and, for circumstances outside their

.

32
scope, the “Experimental Plan” serves as the vehicle for

authorization of special operations.

In practice, it must be recognized that errors in

interpretation of measurements, or malfunctioning of

assembly machines, can offset the value of these regulations. This possibility can be minimized by requiring

that observations be evaluated for consistency with

knowledge that has been accumulated on similar systems.

This requirement, of course, places great dependence

upon the experience of personnel. As stated before,

regulations alone cannot guarantee safety, but must be

supplemented by the vigilance of the individuals performing each experiment.

I-D Nuclear Safety Committee

An “N-2 Nuclear Safety Committee,” appointed by

the Group Leader, shall serve in an advisory capacity

with regard to any matter which concerns the nuclear

safety of an operation. In addition to reviewing each

experimental plan, this committee, on its own initiative,

will scrutinize the safety of current practice as well

as consider any complaint or suggestion from any member

of the group.

II-A Definitions of Safety Plans 1, 2, and 3

The three Safety Plans 1, 2, and 3, for Kiva operation shall be retained but with new meanings. The 3-

position selector switch will be a locked-type switch

33
and the positions cannot be changed without the use of

the key, which shall be called the “Control Key.” Only

one such “Control Key” shall be in use, and all duplicate keys

All three

different

shall be locked in the Group Leaders’ files.

control rooms shall have similar switches but

keys. The redefined meanings of the plans are

as follows:

Plan 1

This plan shall be used when the Kiva is not in

use or when work that requires no power on any

machine is proceeding in the Kiva. Under this plan:

1. There is no power on any machine.

2. The gates are open. (If closed, the gates

will automatically open on change to Plan 1.)

3. The red warning blinker and rotating beacon

lights are off. (Special lights such as those

on Hydro may be on.)

4. The Security Inspectors are free to lock

the Kiva doors according to their regular

schedule, if it is obvious that no group is

working in the Kiva. (Special instructions

apply if the lights on Hydro or other special

machines are blinking.)

5. A green panel light, illuminating a “1,”

shall be visible in the control room.

34
Plan 2

This plan indicates preparation for operating

a machine by remote control, the control of access

to a Kiva area after machine operation, or “local

operation” of a machine in the Kiva area. Under

this plan:

1. No power is applied directly to a machine,

and hence no machine can be operated from the

control room. Power can be applied to those

machines equipped with “Local Controls” by use

of the “Control Key” in the lock switch on the

“Local Controls” panel located in the Kiva.

2. The gates can be closed at the gate by a

push button, and can be opened at the gate

the “Control Key.”

3. The red warning blinker lights at the

gates are on. The rotating beacon lights

(located at the gate and in the Kiva area)

are off.

4. An amber panel light, illuminating a

shall be visible in the control room.

Plan 3

This plan is for remote operation of a machine

in the Kiva. The “Control Key” cannot be removed

while the switch is in this position. Under this

plan:

35
1. Power is applied to the desired machine

through a “Machine Selector” switch after the

“Plan Selector” switch is in Plan 3 position.

This permits the machine to be operated remotely from the control room, but it cannot

be operated from the local control board in

the Kiva. The purpose of the machine selector

switch is to prevent operation of more than one

machine at a time in a given Kiva.

2. The gates are closed by a push button at

the gate, but cannot be opened at the gate

since the “Control Key” cannot be removed from

the Plan Selector lock while in the Plan 3

position. The gates shall be interlocked

with the “scram” system, so that the machines

cannot be reset unless the gates are closed.

3. The red blinker lights at the gate, and

the rotating beacon lights at the gate and in

the Kiva area, are “on” in the Plan 3 position.

The warning horns are turned on for 5-10 seconds

whenever the plan selector switch is turned to

the Plan 3 position.

4. A red panel light, illuminating a “3,”

shall be visible in the control room.

II-B ‘Storage of Active Materials

Usually each Kiva will contain some active material

36
which is not involved in the. experiment at hand and is not

installed in another machine. In order to reduce the

danger of a criticality accident with such material, a

lockable area is provided in each Kiva exclusively for

storage of fissionable material. Moderating material%

in particular, will be excluded from this area. She 1f

spacings with allowed limits of active material per

cubicle are chosen to be consistent with the regulations

for storage given in TID-7016, Revision I, and in reference (6). For example, special metal clips conveniently

limit the quantity of thin Oy foil per storage cubicle.

Storage shelves in the vault have also been divided into

standard-volume cubicles with an allowable limit in kilograms per cubicle, the limit depending upon the kind of

material. The N-2 representative in charge of special

materials has the responsibility for checking the Kivas

and vault to see that the storage regulations, including

those detailed in experimental plans, are followed in

practice.

II-C Or~anization Regulations

1. Each new experiment involving active material

must be reviewed by the Group Leader of N-2. Unless

it is established that the quantity of active material

37
cannot be greater than three-fourths of a critical

mass under forseeable conditions, the experiment

shall be covered by an “Experimental Plan” which

shall be approved by the Chairman of the N-2 Safety

Committee, by the Group Leader of N-2, and by the

N-Division Leader.

2. Each experiment requiring an Experimental Plan

shall be performed at one of the remote control

laboratories (Kivas).

3. Each operating crew that performs the experiments shall be appointed by the Group Leader, and

shall consist of a crew chief who is experienced in

Pajarito methods of operation and at least one other

competent person. The chief shall be responsible

for all aspects of the crew’s operation and shall

regard personnel safety to be of paramount importance.

If any crew member is dissatisfied with the safety

of procedures, the operations shall be halted until

all are convinced that the operations can be continued without risk.

4. Entrance to a Kiva for any operation on an

assembly of active material shall be made by at

least two persons, one of whom is the crew chief.

If a person is required in the control room at the

same time, a third person shall be assigned to

the crew.

38
II-D Equipment Regulations

1. Radiation and counting equipment to be used at

each Kiva assembly shall include:

a. At least two long-geometry neutron counters (or their equivalent), one with an audible

register. Scalers shall be available in both

the Kiva and the control room.

b. An ionization chamber with a linear amplifier (or an equivalent system) for automatically

recording in the control room the neutron flux

level in the Kiva.

c. At least two “radiation monitors” or “scram

monitors” for automatic disassembly of any

remotely controlled machine at the desired

preset neutron flux level. Normally, three

such units shall be used.

d. Portable radiation survey meters (both

neutron and gamma) shall be available.

1) Y and a in each Kiva

2) y, n, and a in the control room area

2. All remate assembly machines and controls shall

be designed so that equipment or power failure shall

result in a safe configuration. Control switches

for assembly mechanisms shall be of the “dead-man”

type. Since the design specifications will vary

with the amount of reactivity involved in a

39
particular type of experiment it will be convenient

to classify the machines into three types according

to the limit of operation.

Class I - Limit of Operation to be a Multiplication of w1OO This group of machines must have:

a. At least one major disassembly mechanism

which can be triggered (or scrammed) manually,

and automatically by the radiation monitors.

The disassembly process shall produce a

monotonically decreasing reactivity at a rate

which exceeds that of assembly, and shall

result in a configuration with a multiplication

(M) less than 10. Assembly steps shall be interlocked as described below so that a definite

sequence must be followed. Assembly rates

shall be limited so that the rate of decrease

of reciprocal multiplication cannot exceed

.005 unit per second when the multiplication is

greater than 10. Figure14 shows some representative values of l/M plotted against the

width of a central gap for several different

assemblies taken at random. These values,

normalized to close at l/M - .01, do not all

represent “central source” multiplications ,

but they may be helpful in establishing rates
.10

,09

.08

.07

.06

bM

.05

,04

,03

.02

.01

CENTRAL GAP, inches

Figure 14. Dependence of reciprocal

multiplication upon width of

central gap in various assemblies.

41
of travel of rams used in assembling majorpieces of active material.

b. Adjustable positive stops so that the

multiplication may be measured as a function

of closure distance if only large increments

of material are available.

c. Indicators in the control room to give

the position of the major movable part that

completes the assembly.

Class II - Delayed Critical with Limit of

Reactivity Corresponding to a Positive Period not

Shorter than N1O Seconds This type of machine must

have:

a. At least two major disassembly mechanisms

(of which one may be a set of safety rods) both

of which can be triggered manually, or automatically by the radiation monitors. The

disassembly process shall produce a decreasing

reactivity at a rate which exceeds that of

assembly, and shall result in a configuration

with a multiplication of less than 10. At

least one of the devices shall reduce the

reactivity 100 cents or more in 1 second. The

position of the major component that completes

the assembly shall be shown by an indicator in

the control room except on those machines, such

42
as Jezebel, in which excess reactivity is

●

restricted in that the major components are

not subject to change. Assembly rate of the

major parts shall be limited so that reactivity cannot be added more rapidly than 5 cents

per second when the multiplication is greater

than 100.

b. One or more vernier control rods which

will permit the reactivity to be changed in a

continuous manner. Their overall value should

be 50 cents or more. Their rate of travel shall

be limited so that the reactivity cannot increase more than 5 cents per second. The

position of the control rods shall be given

at all times by indicators in the control room.

The control rods shall be interlocked as

described in a later paragraph.

Class III - This group will include machines

intended for special purposes, such as Godiva II

which was designed as a pulsed neutron source. In

general they must include the basic design features

of Class 11 but careful consideration in the Experimental Plan must be given to their special use.

3. Systems of interlocks and sequence of operation

from the control room:

43
a. To reset the machine for operation, as indicated by a light on the control panel, the following

conditions must be met to satisfy the interlocks in

the scram circuit:

a-1. In the Kiva

a-1.l Air pressure must be on if air cylinders

are used for operation of the safety rods or

disassembly mechanism. The “scram” system

shall be interlocked so that the machine will

scram and cannot be reset if the air pressure

drops below some specified value.

a-1.2 A “scram button,” interlocked with all

machines in the Kiva and equipped with a reset,

shall be located near the personnel door of

each Kiva.

a-2. In the Control Room

a-2.l Plan selector switch must be set on Plan

3 in order to apply power to the desired

machine. In this position the gates are interlocked with the scram circuit and must be closed

to reset the machine.

a-2.2

a-2.3

a-2.4

sition

Linear amplifier must be on.

Scram monitors must be on and reset.

The machine must be disassembled to poof minimum reactivity, as indicated by an

44

— .—
appropriate light or lights.

a-2.5 “Control rods,” if provided,

must be in positions of minimum reactivity as indicated by appropriate

lights .

a-2.6 “Safety rods,” if provided,

must be in positions of minimum

reactivity , as indicated by appropriate lights.

b. Operation of the machine, after being reset

must proceed in the following sequence as provided by interlocks.

b-1 . “Safety rods,” if provided, must be

moved to position of maximum reactivity

which will be indicated by appropriate

lights .

b-2 . Power is now applied through proper

interlocks so that the machine can be

assembled. After complete assembly of the

major parts to a maximum reactivity as

*

indicated by a red limit light, the “control

rod, “ if provided, can be moved to bring

the reactivity to the

the major disassembly

45

desired level. If

mechanism or the
safety rods are moved so as to open the

limit switch, the machine must be reset ‘

before further use.

b-3 . The machine will disassemble, either

when a scram button is pushed, or by a

signal from the scram monitors.

b-4 . For “Local Operation” on Plan 2,

all interlocks shall be identical to

those on Plan 3 except that the “gates

scram interlock” shall be by-passed.

b-5 . On Plan 2, all limit lights shall

indicate the proper position of all

movable parts, but all control switches

shall be locked out and inactive.

4. New machines:

a. Plans for the design of new machines shall

be discussed with the N-2 Nuclear Safety Committee before construction of the machine. More

general discussions within the group are also

encouraged.

b. Reliability of operation of each new system

shall be established by a series of successful

dry runs before any active material is used, in

order to insure proper behavior of the interlocks , scrams, etc.

46
II-E Operating Procedure

10 Preparation for operation:

a. Neutron sources - Standard procedure requires the use of a neutron source in all

assemblies for both local and remote operation.

Exceptions to this rule must be specified in

the Experimental Plan. Source strength and

neutron counting equipment and techniques

normally should be interrelated to give multiplication values within a statistical precision

of ~5%o In the case of Pu, the normal spontaneous-fission source is frequently adequate.

b. During operation periods, Plan 2, 3,

entrance to the Kiva area shall be controlled

by the crew chief.

shall be locked in

The “Control Key,” (which

the control room safe during

non-operating periods) must be used to change

the “Plan Selector Switch” to plan 2 for “Local

Operation” at the Kiva, or to Plan 3 for “Remote

Operation” at the control room. A crew member

must be in the control room at all times when

on Plan 3, and if the control room area is to

be vacated on Plan 2, the key must remain in

the possession of a crew member or be locked

in the safe.

47
c. Before operation, the Kiva area shall be

cleared of personnel and the gates closed

(selector switch on Plan 2 or 3). Tests shall

be made to assure proper performance of the

safety monitor systems (at least two independent

monitors shall be functioning properly, although

three shall normally be used) and of the manually actuated scrams. Since the level at which

these monitors will trip is adjustable, the crew

chief is responsible for setting them to respond

to the lowest level consistent with the power

at which the machine will be operated. The

rotating beacon lights and the warning audio

signal, which come on when power is applied to

a machine on Plan 3, can be checked with the

test button in the Kiva.

2. Local operation:

a. No assembly step may proceed in the presence

of personnel unless there is clear evidence that

the multiplication will not exceed 10. This may

be inferred for any assembly that is clearly

covered by the Nuclear Safety Guide, TID-7016

Rev. 1. Where such coverage is uncertain,

multiplications must be measured and interpreted

consistently with Sec IC, “Criteria for Regulations.”

48
b. Any hand assembly of an unknown configuration shall be monitored by means of an audible

counter responding to the influence of a neutron

source within the system. Each step of reactivity increase shall be limited so that l/M is

reduced by no more than a factor of two.

3. Remote operation - Class I machine:

a. Class I machines, which have no vernier

control rods and no safety rods, have a limit

of multiplication of ~100.

b. All assembly procedures shall be monitored

by two or more counters which are sensitive to

the influence of a neutron source placed in the

system. If the “central source” multiplication

is greater than 10, remote assembly from the

control room must be used with the “scram

monitors” and linear amplifiers connected into

the “scram” circuit.

c. A plot of l/M vs the parameter controlling

reactivity, such as the amount of active material,

shall serve as a guide to the incremental increases in reactivity of an experimental assembly.

In bringing the subunits (for a new configuration,

or after any appreciable change in stacking) together for the first time by remote control, a

49
step-wise procedure shall be used for the first

two points on such a l/M curve. This step-wise

procedure shall consist of stopping the assembly

at a known separation distance long enough to

observe the response of the counters, the procedure being repeated as the separation distance

is gradually decreased to zero, as long as the

counters indicate such closure is safe. The

above indicates a minimum requirement - more

elaborate precautions shall be observed if

closure is questionable. A plot of l/M for

these first two points will then serve as a

guide for adding the next increment of reactivity. Steps shall be limited so that l/M is

reduced by no more than a factor of two at each

step. If incremental amounts of material are

large, a second plot of l/M against another

variable, such as a step-wise variation in the

distance between the two pieces, may be necessary

to determine whether or not the second piece can

be safely added.

l/H vs width of a

Figure 14.

d. Any major change in the stacking of active

material or moderator shall be treated as a new

assembly and must start with a stacking which is

Some representative values of

central gap are given in

.

50

— .—
known to be safe.

4. Remote operation - Class II machines:

a. Class 11 machines, which have appropriate

safety devices and vernier reactivity control

rods, and which are designed to operate at

delayed critical, normally have a reactivity

limit which corresponds to a positive period

of N1O seconds. If reliability has been demonstrated at longer periods, and data at shorter

periods are important, the positive periods may

be decreased to *5 seconds by consent of the

group leader. For periods shorter than 5 seconds,

procedures and limits must be detailed in an

experimental plan.

b. An initial approach to delayed critical

shall be guided by a graph of l/M vs the parameter controlling reactivity, with step changes

in reactivity limited so that l/M is reduced by

no more than a factor of two in one step. This

guide shall be followed until the reactivity is

such that the control rod can be used to bring

the assembly to delayed critical. Disassembly

of the major parts shall result in a multiplication of 10 or less. Subsequent approaches to

delayed critical, after the initial adjustment

of reactivity has been made, should require only

51
the reassembly of the major parts and the use

of the control rod, all of which can be done

by remote control methods.

c. If an experiment requires step-wise changes

in reactivity when the reactivity lies in the

range of multiplication greater than 100 to

delayed critical, such changes shall be less

than 50 cents (or its equivalent value in

A(l/M), or less than the range of the vernier

control rod. The equivalence between cents

and A(l/M) varies considerably for different

types of assemblies. Some representative

values are:

Configuration Machine A(l/M)/100#

bare U235 Godiva 0.007

bare PU239 Jezebel 0.0025

bare U233 Jezebel

u’35 in thick UTOPSY 0.009

~239 in thickU Popsy 0.003

~(surface)/100#

m

c

.0243

.0069

.0106

.0242

.010

d. For an unknown system progressing above delayed critical, measured positive periods and

their relationship to reactivity in cents (relative to delayed critical), as given by Keepin

and Wimett, serve as our best guide toward

approaching shorter periods.

52
5. Remote operation - Class III machine: Since

these machines are special cases of Class I or II,

the initial approach to delayed critical and the

determination of Ak for long positive periods shall

normally be the same as 4 b, c, and d. Special

operational features of this class of machine (such

as Godiva bursts) and their limits of operation shall

be detailed in their experimental plan.

6. Adjustments of machines during Plan 3: Occasionally it may be necessary for personnel to be in

the Kiva while on Plan 3 in order to observe or to

adjust the motion of a part such as a control rod,

after the machine has initially been tested and

placed in operation. Such operations are potentially

dangerous, and shall be performed only by personnel

thoroughly familiar with that particular machine, and

only after taking definite precautions to insure that

the multiplication cannot exceed 10. For example,

such precautions might include the removal of active

material, or the insertion of a mechanical stop that

would prevent the assembly of the major units of

active material.

II-F. Film Badges and Health Radiation Monitors

Regulations for radiation control appear in the H-1

booklet “Radiation Monitoring at Pajarito” and in LA-1835,

the “Monitoring Handbook,” but the following rules for

53
procedure should be specifically noted.

1. All persons entering the Kiva areas, or

handling sources or any sizable amounts of active

material, must wear standard film badges.

2. Neutron sources shall be swipe tested for

leakage immediately before removal from or return

to the source storage room. A health monitor shall

be asked to investigate any evidence of leakage.

3.

233

Before each day’s operation with Pu or U ,

enclosing surfaces shall be swipe tested, and any

evidence of leakage shall be brought to the immediate attention of a health monitor.

4. Health monitors, stationed at Pajarito, will

be available to give advice regarding radiation

levels and tolerance doses. Their presence with

the crew should be requested whenever there is

significant

notified of

may require

in addition

iS high.

risk of exposure. They should be

any change in crew schedule. They

personnel to wear pocket dosimeters

to film badges if the radiation level

5. In case of a radiation accident, plans for

investigation at the Kiva areas must be made in

cooperation with the health monitors.

/

54

,
A considerable

Accidents

amount of experimental and theoretical

information is now available on the behavior of a variety

of systems at high reactivities. LASL work(7) on Godiva

through prompt critical predicts behavior of those fast

neutron, metal systems where expansion due to heating is

the primary mechanism for terminating an excursion. Borax(8) ,

Spert(g) , Kewb(lO) , and Triga(ll) are characteristic of

solution or fluid systems where bubbling, boiling, and

density change are the responsible quenching agents.

Another class of system, whose behavior may be anomalous,

consists of those in which active material is not closely

coupled thermally to other materials of the core. An

235 example is the U foil loaded assembly with which this

facility will be much concerned. Here there may be no

major mechanism to stop the reaction until the fuel foils

are vaporized.

In general, a highly supercritical system will react

uncontrollably until the energy release is sufficient to

overcome excess reactivity through: 1) overall effects

which contribute promptly to negative temperature coefficient of reactivity such as expansion, change in neutron

temperature, or doppler broadening; 2) perturbation of

fuel geometry by boiling or gas evolution: or finally

55
3) mechanical disruption resulting in separation of components . It is assumed that scram mechanisms may play little

part in limiting excursions at high reactivities. The

amount of energy released will depend upon the amount of

excess reactivity achieved and consequently, on the rate

of adding reactivity. In the case of systems where spontaneous fission or T-n processes do not result in significant neutron levels, it is possible to reach high excess

reactivities without rapid assembly rates. (For this

reason, no assembly is operated without an adequate

neutron source.) Since mechanism 3) can overcome any

quantity of excess reactivity, it is always the limiting

case in an extreme accident where 1) and 2) are not

sufficient to counteract the available excess reactivity.

The situation may be very severe when the e-folding time

of power becomes comparable to or less than the time required for materials to move significant distances at shock

velocities. This catastrophic type of event should be

extremely improbable with reasonable care in the design

and operation of critical systems with respect to the

limitation of available excess reactivity.

56
Since machinery and humans are fallible, it is unreasonable to ignore the possibility of a severe excursion,

regardless of the probability. One is forced to consider

the consequences of the limiting case where enough energy

is generated to mechanically perturb the critical geometry.

Accidental excursions that have occurred generally have

been- -1017 fissions or less. It is justifiable to exclude

from consideration accidents in large systems where the

reaction is multiple or continues over a long period of

time. Yields greater than 10 18 fissions have been obtained

in these cases. In Borax I, 3 x 10 18 fissions resulted in

destruction of’ the reactor. Calculations at LASL (12) have

19 predicted 10 fissions (-0.1 MW hr.) as the maximum

accident in Kiwi-A resulting from

reactor with water. UCRL(13) has

as a limiting excursion in a

$35

where termination is accomplished

suddenly filling the

19 arrived at 10 fissions

foil graphite assembly

by ,vaporization of the

foils . It is assumed here that 10 19 fissions is an

extreme upper limit for an accident.

As Kiva 3 wall shielding plus distance was designed

to be at least as effective as isolation by 1/4 mile, and

personnel are at that distance from the other operating

Kivas, accident consequences will be discussed using this

as the equivalent distance without shielding.

57
Measurements with Godiva show that 10 19 fissions

from this type of system would give a total neutron and

gamma dose of *5 rem at 1/4 mile. These data are from

Kiva 2 where the building gives some attenuation, although

it is of ordinary construction and not designed to provide

shielding. (Calculations give -7 rem for fast neutrons

19 alone ’from a point source of 10 fissions in air at

1/4 mile.) This example with an unreflected fast neutron

assembly is more extreme than would be encountered with

typical heavily reflected reactor systems.

More appropriate for judging contamination problems

are the excellent data now available on gammas from fission

products(14$ 15). (It is known that total energy is

approximately equal for prompt and delayed gammas.)

Figure15 (from reference 14) shows the time distribution

of delayed gamma energy from fission fragments. Integration

of this curve for the first 1000 seconds gives the distribution in Table I for 1019 fissions.

58
3

2

10-’

5

2

5

2

{0-5

5

2

10-6

1111! T’+UIMk-lCHEMICAL DATA AFTER

PERKINS AND KING n

, I I 1 1 1 11 1 1 1

I I I 4

3xfo-’

40-’

5

2

{0-2

5

2

fo-3

5

2

{0-4

5

2

{0-5

5

2

d

12 51020 5omo Kxlo Io,ooo 50*OUI

Figure

TIME AFTER FISSION (WC)

15. Time distribution of delayed gamma

energy from fission fragments (from

reference 14)

59
Table 1

Delayed Gamma Yield and Dose for 10

19 Fissions

y-energy

time, increment r at

sec in 1.018 mev 1/4 mile

o-1 3.0 0.024

1-2 2.5 0.020

2-5 4.8 0.039

5-1o 4.0 0.033

10-20 4.5 0.037

20-50 6.0 0.049

50-100 5.0 0.041

100-1000 12.6 0.102

42.4 0.345

Doses were computed using 400 yards as the attenuation

distance and 2 x 109 Mev/cm2 for 1 r. Examination of

Table I shows that 70% of the dose obtained in 1000

seconds occurs in the first 100 seconds. There is little

additional contribution after 1000 seconds.

This simple point-source delayed-gamma-dose consideration is complicated by the possibility of air-borne

contamination and fallout. Consequences of the latter

have been estimated by computing the extreme case of all

60
fission fragments from a 10 19 fission excursion deposited

uniformly over a 1/4 mile radius circle. The dose at the

center of this circle 3 feet from the ground is %11 r

for the first 1000 seconds.

least an order of magnitude

any likely fallout pattern.

This number should be

higher than obtainable

at

from

In the case of air-borne contamination, inhalation

of fissionable material probably constitutes a greater

hazard than inhalation of the short-lived fission products ,

233 especially in the case of U or Pu. Whereas,

in the case of gamma and neutron dose from the prompt

reaction and resultant fission fragments, isolation

provides almost

from inhalation

The probability

Pu, however, is

complete protection, there is a hazard

for an excursion which vaporizes fuel.

233 or of high yield accidents with U

very small. The spontaneous fission

source present in Pu makes it impossible to reach high

reactivities with slow assembly rates. Also, foil

loadings,which may have no significant quenching mechanism

other than vaporization, are not contemplated with these

materials. Their inhalation hazard can be discounted

only on the basis of probability.

61
Hazard Evaluation

Normal operation of the Pajarito facility does not

involve radiation levels that are hazardous to operating

personnel or adjacent installations. No processes or

operations are contemplated which might result in radioactive waste or the spread of contaminated material.

Potential hazards are those associated with the accidental

achievement of highly supercritical geometries and their

resultant uncontrollable behavior. Two factors are

b

major contributors to safety in the case of such radiation

accidents: 1) the degree of isolation achieved by shielding and distance; and 2) the relatively small inventory

of fission fragments as compared to research and power

reactors.

In the previous section the most extreme cases have

been considered. It was shown that accidents in which

the energy liberated is sufficient to completely destroy

an assembly result in relatively minor radiation exposures . Since most of the dose is accumulated in the

first 100 seconds there is little basis for an elaborate

disaster plan for evacuating the site rapidly. It iS

felt that in any credible radiation accident, distance

from the main laboratory building adequately isolates

personnel from consequences. Remoteness appears to give

62
adequate protection to other laboratory areas and

private property. The arid nature of this region minimizes the chance of any local contamination reaching

public water sources. (Note the acceptable location of

contamination dumps in Figure 1 .)

It is presented that the Pajarito facility, with

safeguards provided by procedural control, does not

constitute a significant hazard.

63

APPENDIX

TYPICAL EXPERIMENTAL PLAN

65

TYPICAL EXPERIMENTAL PLAN

Critical Mass Measurement of U-233, Pu-239, and a Composite

a Phase Pu-Oy Assembly in the Flat Top Thick Tu Geometry

Type of experiment: Delayed critical - remote control - no

positive periods less than 10 seconds

Personnel: Chief - Safety

Assembly machine: Flat top

Starting date:

Discussion’of experiment

Material is now on hand for critical mass measurements

of U-233 5-phase Pu and a composite a phase Pu-Oy system in

the 19” OD Tu on Flat Top.

The

A.

B.

c.

D.

following measurements are to be made:

Critical mass

Ratio of cross sections (25, 28, etc.) in the

U-233 and 5-Pu at various radii in core and

tamper

Foil activation (Au-In, etc.) in the U-233 - 6-Pu

at various radii

Central mass radiochemistry (28) ny(28)nf(28)n 2n 9

and perhaps others

67
E. Rossi-a (U-233-PU)

While this material is available an attempt will be made

to correlate the above information with previous measurements on other machines at Pajarito.

Description of assembly machine and materials

A. Assembly machine - Since a description of the

assembly characteristics of Flat Top have not been reported

in previous experimental plans a brief account is given

here.

Figure A-1 is a schematic of the major components of

the assembly machine. It consists of a 19” OD Tu tamper

in a spherical geometry which will accommodate cores of

fissionable material of various sizes. These cores “sit”

on a cylindrical pedestal of Tu.

Tu shells of appropriate sizes are used to adapt the

different sized spheres of fissionable material to the

pedestal.

The tamper is divided into three main parts:

1. A stationary hemisphere which contains a 1“

glory hole and three Tu control rods (E, F,

and G) . Rods F and G have a 6“ stroke and

E has a 4-1/4” stroke. Read-out of position

to hundredths of an inch is available at

the control room. Rod F is twice the

68
GLORY HOLE

STATIONARY /

. -----

●

/

BLOCK ~ BLOCK /

/w-/\

HORIZONTAL CROSS-SECTION

C.R. VOIDS Tu ADAPTERS

GLORY

HOLE

CORE SUPPORT

VERTICAL CROSS-SECTION

Figure A-1. Flat top schematic

69
diameter of the other two. Rod F is worth

about 20#/in. and E and G about 5#/in. They

require about one minute to travel full

displacement.

2. S~fety Block “A” - There are two “safetY

blocks” on this machine. These are quarter

spheres mounted on a radial track and

hydraulically actuated. “A” moves only from

full out to in or vice versa with no provision for intermediate positioning. It

travels at 1/3 inch/see and has a displacement of 6“.

3. Safety Block “B” - A quarter sphere, hydraulically operated, which may be positioned at

any point on its traverse with read-out of

position to tenths of an inch (6” stroke).

This block runs in to the 3/4” point at

one inch/3 sec rate and automatically slows

down to one inch/15 sec.

By careful adjustment, these components can

be made to fit together with a crack of the

order of 0.002”. This spacing is very reproducible as long as the pedestal containing

the fissionable material is not disturbed.

70
However, when it is necessary to change

components on the pedestal, some care must

be exercised to reproduce its position in

the cavity of the stationary tamper element

.

since the fit of the tamper components is

affected by this adjustment.

Operational procedure:

1. Reset - The machine must be in the following condition to be reset;

a. Pedestal in central cavity

b. Rods “out”

c. Safety blocks “out”

2. Assembly - The following sequence must be

observed;

a. Block A to “in”

b. Block B to “in”

c. At this time any or all of the control

rods may

3. Disassembly

a. Auto-run

rods and

Upon “B”

block is

be moved to any position

out - This operation starts

“B” block out simultaneously.

reaching “out” position, “A”

then sequentially moved to

its out position. This is the normal

71
method of disassembly and is preferred

to the more violent method of “scramming”

which can cause shifting of components

in the glory hole.

b. Scram - Simultaneous withdrawal of both

blocks and rod run out.

(1)

(2)

(3)

“A” block - withdrawal rate of

8.3 in./sec for 1st inch.

“B” block - withdrawal rate of

6.7 in./sec with graded slow down.

Rods withdrawn at assembly rate

(one inch/10 see).

4. Power failure

a. I,A?,and ‘t~? blocks “scram” due to

pressure in the accumulator of the

hydraulic supply line.

B. Materials - Figures A-2 and A-3 are sketches of

the core materials for each assembly. Suitable glory hole

pieces are available for positioning chambers and foils at

1/2” or 1/4” radial increments.

Procedure for approach to critical

Until the critical mass of the Pu and 233 is established,

some care must be exercised in assembly due to the small mass

increment between delayed and prompt critical (-20 gms center

72
GLORY HOLE MASS ADJUSTMENT

\ PLUGS

CORE

\

\ #ORE SUPPORT

(Tu)

R ~u= 1.797 “

R& 1.709”

(COATED)

(COATED)

(0.005” Ni COAT ON Pu-233 PARTS)

Figure A-2. Pu - U-233 core assembly

73
a-Pu INSIDE CORE

(SOLID)

ADJUSTMENT

SHELL

oy OR Tu

OUTER CORE

(SPLIT)

CORE SUPPORT

‘PEDESTAL (1%)

Figure A-3. Composite core

74
mass) . Careful alignment of parts, and observation of

assembly characteristics have been made to insure reproducibility of operations. Due to the high y activity of

the U-233, handling operations of this material must be

minimized.

A. The following procedure will be observed for the

U-233 and 5-Pu assemblies:

1. Replace fissionable material with Al for

an unmultiplied geometry with a Po-Be

neutron source at the center of the assembly.

Here Al is used rather than Tu because Tu

parts were not available and the thick tamper

did not require use of Tu.

2. A l/M vs mass curve will be plotted as each

fissionable mass increment is added. Multiplication will be determined as the “B”

block is closed. The effect of closing the

last 1/2 inch will be controlled by means

of positive stops, and the results appended

to this experimental plan. A point for rods

‘?out’?and ~~in” will be taken to evaluate rod

effectiveness with each mass addition.

B. For the composite a phase Pu-Oy assembly.

1. Replace a-Pu and thick Oy with Al. Thin Oy

75
shell with ‘l%.

2. Follow procedure

TYPICAL EXPERIMENTAL PLAN

Submitted by:

Approved by:

of step 2 above.

David M. Barton, N-2 “

Philip G! Koontzj N-%

Nuclear Safety Committee

John D. orndoff

Alt. Group Leader, N-2

/’f?2dL . \

+

. E. Schre

N-Division

76
REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES

1.

2.

3.

40

5.

6.

7.

8.

G. A. Jarvis, G. A. Linenberger, J. D. Orndoff,

H. C. Paxton, “Two Plutonium-Metal Critical Assemblies,”

Nuclear Sci. and Eng. 8, 525-531 (1960).

F. F. Hart and E. C. Mallary, “Practical Aspects of

Pajarito Neutron Multiplication Measurements,” LA-1604,

Sept. 1953.

For use as a safety criterion, neutron multiplication

is obtained as follows. With a neutron source centered

in the active material or its most reactive component,

the multiplication is the ratio of long counter (or

equivalent) response to the system with active material

present to that with a mockup material (usually natural

uranium or air) substituting for the active material.

G. R. Keepin and T. F. Wimett, “Reactor Kinetic

Functions: A New Evaluation,” Nucleonics, Vol. 16,

Part 2, p. 86, Oct. 1958.

G. R. Keepin’ (in preparation), “Reactor Kinetics Handbook .“

“Operating Manual for the Transfer and Storage of

Special Nuclear Material,” - Group ADP-SF.

G. E. Hansen, LASL Report LA-1441, “Burst Characteristics Associated with the Slow Assembly of Fissionable

Materials,” July 1952;

T. F. Wimett, LASL Report LA-2029, “Time Behavior of

Godiva through Prompt Critical,” April 1957;

W. R. Stratton, T. H. Colvin, R. B. Lazarus, Paper

431, 1958 Geneva Conference, “Analysis of Prompt

Excursions in Simple Systems and Idealized Fast

Reactors;”

W. R. Stratton, Pergamon Press (1960), Progress in

Nuclear Energy, Series IV, Vol. 3, p. 163-205, “A

Review of Criticality Accidents.”

J. R. Dietrich and D. C. Layman, Argonne National

Laboratory Report, ANL-5211, “Transient and Steady

State Characteristics of a Boiling Reactor;”

J. R. Dietrich, Argonne National Laboratory Report,

ANL-5323, “Experimental Investigation of the Self77
Limitation of Power During Reactivity Transients in

a Subcooled, Water-Moderated Reactor.”

9. W. E. Nyer and S. G. Forbes, Paper 2428, 1958 Geneva

Conference, “Spert I Reactor Safety Studies.”

10. M. E. Remley, et al, Paper 1079, 1958 Geneva Conference,

“Experimental Studies on the Kinetic Behavior of Water

Boiler Type Reactors.”

11. Richard S. Stone, General Atomic Report, GA-721,

“Triga Transient Experiments: Step Reactivity

Insertions to 2 Dollars.”

12. W. R. Stratton, “Summary: H20 Flooding of Core,”

Rough Draft N-2-1325.

13. 0. Kolar, et al, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory Report,

COVA-320, “Puppy Hazard Report.”

14. Maienschein, Peele, Love, Zobel, UN Paper 670 (1958).

15. Belles, Ballou, Nuclear Science and Engineering, ~,

156-185 (1959). .

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