UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ MICHAEL S. FREEMAN, II, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; U. S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III; XAVIER BECERRA, Defendants - Appellees. No. 23-1133 (D.C. No. 1:22-CV -01161-CNS-NRN) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , BALDOCK , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff Michael S. Freeman, II, proceeding pro se , appeals from a district court order dismissing his Third Amended Complaint against Raytheon Technologies Corporation (“Raytheon”), th e United States Department of Defense (“DOD”) and its

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 2, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 12 Secretary Lloyd J. Austin, III, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the United States Depart ment of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and its Secretary Xavier Becerra. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 1
BACKGROUND 2
I. In February 2021, almost a year into the COVID-19 pandemic, Collins Aerospace hired Mr. Freeman as a schedule analyst manager. Collins Aerospace is a subsidiary of defendant Rayt heon, a frequent DOD contract or. Later that year, the President issued an ex ecutive order instructing all federa l agencies to in sert a clause into new government contr acts requiring the contracting company to comply with COVID-19 guidance issued by the federal government. Around that time, Collins Aerospace implemented a policy promulga ted by Raytheon requi ring all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 or appl y for an exemption (“Covid Policy”).

1 Appellant’s Petition for Initia l En Banc Review was transmit ted to all non-recused judges of the court who are in regular active service. No judge requested that the court be polled on the Appellant’s request fo r initial en banc review. As a result, Appellant’s petiti on is denied. The Ho norable Timothy M. Tymkovich did not participate in the court’ s consideration of A ppellant’s petition.
2 The following facts are taken from the well-pleaded allegations in Mr. Freeman’s complaint. See Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc. , 861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017) (“In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all well-pleaded facts , as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true, and the court must liberally construe th e pleadings and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” (Internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 23 Under the Covid Policy, exempt employees did not have to be vaccinated but were subject to other requirement s. Unvaccinated employees had to work primarily from home, test weekly for the vi rus, provide a negative test within 72 hours of working onsite, and wear a mask while working ons ite. Vaccinated employees were not subject to these requirements. In December 2021, pursuant to a prelim inary injunction issued by a federal court, DOD instructed its contracting officers not to enforce any COVID-19 clauses that had been inserted into government contracts. Collin s Aerospace, however, retained the Covid Policy. Mr. Freeman has Beta Thalassemia, a genetic blood disorder that causes anemia like symptoms and increases his ri sk profile with resp ect to the COVID-19 vaccine. Because of this condition, he opt ed against the vaccine and requested and received an exemption. He refused to comply with th e Covid Policy requirements for unvaccinated employees, howev er, because he believed th e policy was ineffectual and discriminatory towards unvaccinate d employees. Mr. Freeman made this complaint to the Coll ins Aerospace Human Resources depa rtment to no avail. And in January 2022, Collins Aerospace fired him fo r his refusal to comply with the Covid Policy. Mr. Freeman subse quently filed a complaint w ith the EEOC complaining of discrimination but withdrew the comp laint before the EEOC completed its investigation. Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 34 II.
A. In May 2022 Mr. Freeman filed this ac tion against Raytheon, DOD, HHS, and the EEOC as well as the secr etaries of both DOD and HHS in their official capacities. He did not name Collins Aerospace as a defe ndant. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the district court or dered Mr. Freeman to amend hi s complaint to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Mr. Freeman proceeded to amend his complaint several times. Before this court is the district cour t’s order dismissing Mr. Freeman’s Third Amended Complaint with prejudice. 3 The complaint asserted thirteen claims for relief stemming from Mr. Freeman’s term ination from Collins Aerospace. Several claims were abandoned in the district cour t and are not at issue on appeal. The claims that Mr. Freeman argues were errone ously dismissed can be categorized into three groups: (1) employment discriminati on claims brought under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (claims 1 and 2); (2) cons titutional claims for violations of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments (claims 5-7); and (3) claims under the Nuremberg Code and various federal regulations (claim s 9, 11, and 13). 4

3 Throughout this order, we refer to the Third Amended Co mplaint as simply the complaint.
4 It is not clear which claims are assert ed against which defendants. But given the more fundamental defici encies in Mr. Freeman’s co mplaint, this lack of specificity does not a ffect our analysis. Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 45 All defendants filed motions to dismiss. Raytheon, in addition to seeking dismissal under Rule 8, argued the employ ment discrimination claims failed under Rule 12(b)(6) because Raythe on was never Mr. Freeman’s employer and could not be held liable for the actions of its subs idiary, Collins Aerosp ace. The federal defendants sought dismissal of all claims under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing lack of jurisdiction under the theory of sove reign immunity and further argued the constitutional claims failed for l ack of governmental action. On March 23, 2023, the district c ourt, adopting the recommendation of a magistrate judge, dismissed Mr. Freeman’s complaint. Although Mr. Freeman had brought his employment claims under Title VII and 42 U. S.C. § 1981, which do not cover disability and genetic informati on discrimination, the court treated Mr. Freeman’s employment discrimination clai ms as if they had been asserted under the appropriate federal statutes. 5 The court concluded, however, that Mr. Freeman failed to state a claim against Raytheon because his employer was Collins Aerospace, and Mr. Freeman had failed to allege fact s that would justify piercing the corporate veil. The court held the employment disc rimination claims against DOD were barred by sovereign immunity for the same re ason—because DOD was not Mr. Freeman’s employer.

5 In the “Claims For Relief” section of the complaint, Mr. Freeman alleges violations of Title VII and § 1981. Scattered throughout the complaint, however, are references to the Americans With Disab ilities Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. The complaint did not reference the Rehabilitation Act. Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 56 The claims against the EEOC were based on the agency’s retroactive ratification of COVID-19 policies that Mr. Freeman views as ineffectual and discriminatory. And the claims against HHS were based on that agency’s issuance of allegedly flawed guidance that led to the promulgation of the discriminatory policies responsible for Mr. Freeman’s termina tion. The district court dismissed Mr. Freeman’s claims against those agen cies for lack of jurisdiction, holding Mr. Freeman had failed to cite any caselaw that would support a waiver of sovereign immunity under the theories of liabil ity set forth in the complaint. The district court dismissed Mr. Fr eeman’s First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment claims for failure to allege government action under Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert , 49 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1995), explaining that the federal government cannot be held liable for the conduct of a private actor. The court reiterated that Mr. Freeman was not a government employee and noted that, by his own admission, the COVID-19 contractual provision that had been inserted into government contracts was not operable at the time of his termination. Finally, the court dismissed Mr. Freeman’s claims under the Nuremberg Code and various federal regulations on the grounds the provisions did not provide for a private right of action. The district court entered fina l judgment on March 24, 2023.
B. On April 5, 2023, Mr. Freeman filed a motion to set aside or vacate the judgment under Rule 60(a) and (b), which the court construed as also seeking reconsideration under Rule 59(e). In that motion, Mr. Freeman requested leave to Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 67 file a fourth amended complaint and soug ht recusal of the ma gistrate judge and district court judge unde r 28 U.S.C. § 455. On April 21, Mr. Freeman filed a noti ce of appeal challenging the district court’s March 23 order dismissing his comp laint and entering final judgment. On June 28, the district court issu ed an order denying Mr. Freeman’s post-judgment motion in its entirety. Mr. Freeman did not amend his notice of appeal or file a separate notice of appeal as to the June 28 order.
DISCUSSION
I. A. Standard of Review The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over much of Mr. Freeman’s complaint based on sovereign immunity becau se the federal defendants were not his employer and because many of his claims cite provisions that do not provide a private right of action. We revi ew those conclusions de novo. See Radil v. Sanborn Western Camps, Inc. , 384 F.3d 1220, 1224 ( 10th Cir. 2004) (“We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matt er jurisdiction de no vo.”). Mr. Freeman “bears the burden of establishi ng [subject matter] jurisdicti on as a threshold matter.” Id. To the extent the defe ndants attack the factual basis for subject matter jurisdiction, including whether they were Mr. Freeman’s employer, “the court does not presume the truthfulness of factua l allegations in the complaint.” Id. We also review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Brokers’ Choice , 861 F.3d at 1104. To survive a motion to dismiss Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 78 under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must cont ain enough allegations of fact, taken as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Khalik v. United Air
Lines , 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (i nternal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plead ed factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs , 633 F.3d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 2011) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “we accept the well-pleaded facts alleged as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life
Ins. Co. , 63 F.4th 1264, 1275 (10t h Cir. 2023). But we n eed not accept “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action that are s upported by mere conclusory
statements.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation ma rks omitted). “An allegation is conclusory where it states an inference without statin g the underlying facts or is devoid of any factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As a pro se litigant, Mr. Freeman is en titled to a liberal construction of his pleadings. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But he must still comply with the same rules as ot her litigants, and we do not act as his “attorney in construc ting arguments and searching the record.” Id.
B. Dismissal of Discriminati on Claims Against Raytheon To survive Raytheon’s motion to dismis s, Mr. Freeman needed to allege sufficient facts to allow an inference that Raytheon was his employer or otherwise Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 89 responsible for the actions of Collins Aerospace. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc. , 162 F.3d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a prima facie case under Title VII requires an employee/employer relationship); Frank v. U.S. West, Inc. , 3 F.3d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Whether Defendant wa s Plaintiffs’ employer depends upon whether Defendant is liable for the acts of its subsidiary.”). We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the complain t fails in this regard. We expand on its reasoning, however, to address Mr. Freem an’s arguments under the single-employer theory. The district court dismissed the claims against Raytheon because it concluded the complaint failed to allege facts that would justify pi ercing the corporate veil.
See R. vol. 3 at 194 (holding the complain t “fail[ed] to show that Defendant Raytheon used Collins Aerospace to perpetua te a fraud or wrong that would permit Plaintiff to pierce the corporat e veil”). We agree with the district court’ s analysis as far as it went. Piercing the corporate ve il requires facts from which to infer Collins Aerospace “was used to defeat public convenience, or to justify or protect wrong, fraud or crime.” Boughton v. Cotter Corp. , 65 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The comp laint does not allege such facts. Nor does it allege facts relevant to whether Collins Aerospace was Raytheon’s alter ego or indeed facts relevant to any theory that would justify piercing the corporate veil. See Boughton , 65 F.3d at 836 (listing factors rele vant to piercing-the-corporate-veil analysis). The district c ourt was therefore correct in rejecting the veil-piercing theory of liability. Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 910 But Mr. Freeman’s theory ag ainst Raytheon is slightly different. His argument focuses on the single-empl oyer theory of liability, which does not depend on a showing of fraud. The single-employer th eory allows a “pla intiff who is the employee of one entity to hold another entity liable by arguing that the two entities effectively constitute a single employer.” Knitter v. Corvias Mil. Living, LLC , 758 F.3d 1214, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (interna l quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). In general, ”[t]he doctrine of limited liability creates a strong presumption that a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employ ees, and the courts have found otherwise only in ex traordinary circumstances.” Frank , 3 F.3d at 1362. One of those circumstances is where th e plaintiff’s immedi ate employer and its parent corporation are integrated to an extent they should be considered a single employer for purposes of fede ral discrimination law. See Lockard , 162 F.3d at 1069-70 (explaining the single-employer te st). To succeed under this theory, Mr. Freeman would have to s how “sufficient indicia of an interrelationship” between Collins Aerospace and Raytheon to justify his belief that Raytheon was jointly responsible for the acts of his immediate employer. Id. at 1070. Put another way, Raytheon must have exer cised a degree of contro l over Collins Aerospace “exceed[ing] that normally exercised by a parent corporation.” Id. at 1071 n.2. In considering this question, c ourts look to the following f actors: “interrelation of operations, centralized control of labor relations, common management, and common ownership or fina ncial control.” Id. at 1069. Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 1011 The complaint does not allege facts to indicate interrelat ed operations or common management between Raytheon and Collins Aerospace. See Frank , 3 F.3d at 1362-63 (providing the following exampl es of facts suggesting interrelated operations: the parent keeping its subsid iary’s books, issuing it s paychecks, paying its bills, and sharing its em ployees, headquarters, and o ffice space). The complaint does include allegations of common owners hip, but that, “standing alone, can never be sufficient to establis h parent liability.” Lockard , 162 F.3d at 1071 (internal quotation marks omitted). Most importantly, the complain t is devoid of facts releva nt to the most critical factor—centralized control of labor relations. See Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs , 312 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002) (observing that c ourts generally consider control of labor relations “to be the most important” factor); see also Lockard , 162 F.3d at 1070 (“The key factor of this four-part test is . . . whether the putative employer has centralized control of labor re lations.”). Centrali zed control of labor relations means the “par ent must control the day-to-day employment decisions of the subsidiary.” Lockard , 162 F.3d at 1070 (internal quota tion marks omitted). Several factors inform whether a parent controls a subsidiary’s labor relations, including whether the “parent kept [the] subsidiary’s books, issued its paychecks, and paid its bills;” whether the “parent and subsidiary had common employees , shared services, equipment, employees and office space;” and whether the “parent controlled [the] subsidiary’s payroll a nd benefit program.” Id. (citing Frank , 3 F.3d at 1363). Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 1112 The complaint does not allege fact s showing that Raytheon exercised day-to-day control over Collin s Aerospace. Instead , the allegations focus exclusively on a single policy related to the COVID-19 pandemic. We ac cept as true that Raytheon promulgated the Covid Policy. But that is not en ough to infer it exercised day-to-day control over Collin s Aerospace. We have speci fically cautioned that “[a] parent’s broad general policy statements regarding employmen t matters are not enough to” show centralized c ontrol of labor relations. Frank , 3 F.3d at 1363. “The critical question is, what entity made th e final decisions regarding employment

matters related to the person claiming discrimination ?” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (emphasis added). In this case, that entity was Collins Aerospace. As Mr. Freeman alleges in his complaint, he was hired by Collins Aerospace. When he determined that the Covid Policy was discriminatory against unvaccinate d employees, he took his complaints to the human resources departme nt at Collins Ae rospace. And when he refused to comply with the Covid Policy, his employ ment was terminated by Collins Aerospace. Raytheon may have pr omulgated the policy and provided the digital platform for employees to record their v accination status, but there is no allegation from which to infer it had any right to fire Mr. Fr eeman or any other employee of Collins Aerospace. See Bristol , 312 F.3d at 1219 (explaining th at “[m]ost important to control over the terms and c onditions of an employment re lationship is the right to terminate it”). To the cont rary, what can be inferred from the complaint is that Raytheon was no longer obligated to enfo rce any vaccine manda te that may have Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 1213 been added to its defense contracts. Because Mr. Freeman has not alleged facts leading to the plausible inference that Raytheon and Collins Aerospace constituted a single employer, his employment discrimi nation claims agains t Raytheon fail.
C. Dismissal of Claims A gainst the Federal Government Mr. Freeman’s claims against DOD are brought under the joint-employer theory of liability. He argues DOD and Raytheon we re joint employers because Raytheon operated as a defense contractor. The distri ct court dismissed this claim outright, and it was right to do so. Sove reign immunity does not bar employment discrimination claims agains t the federal government wher e the federal government is the employer. See Lindstrom v. United States , 510 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Title VII waiver of s overeign immunity set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d)). But here the federal govern ment did not employ Mr. Freem an, and this would be so even if Raytheon and Collin s Aerospace could be consid ered a single employer, a theory we just rejected. Under the joint-employer theory, two sepa rate entities may be considered joint employers “if they share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.” Knitter , 758 F.3d at 1226 (int ernal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 1226-27 (explaining difference s between the single-employer and joint-employer tests). DOD might be consider ed a joint employer under this test if it exercised “significant contro l over [Mr. Freeman].” Id. at 1226. In determining whether an entity exercised significant c ontrol, courts cons ider many factors, including “the ability to promulgate work rules and assignments , and set conditions Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 1314 of employment, including compensation, be nefits and hours; day- to-day supervision of employees, including employee discipli ne; and control of employee records, including payroll, insuran ce, taxes and the like.” Id. (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Most importantly, however , as with the single-employer test, we ask whether DOD had the right to term inate the employment relationship. See id. at 1228 (emphasizing preeminence of the right to terminate). There is nothing in the complaint to indicate DOD had the right to fi re Mr. Freeman or anyone else working at Raytheon or Collins Aerospace. Moreove r, aside from the allegations about the unenforced contractual provision inserted into some defens e contracts, the complaint includes no facts relevant to the significant-c ontrol analysis. In short there is nothing from which to draw a reasonable inferenc e that DOD was Mr. Freeman’s employer. The employment discriminati on claims against the federa l government were properly dismissed.
D. Dismissal of the Constitutional Claims Mr. Freeman claims that being forced to abide by the discriminatory Covid Policy under threat of termination violat ed his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. These claims fail be cause Mr. Freeman has not alleged facts from which to infer Collins Aero space was a government actor. See Gallaher , 49 F.3d at 1446-47 (explaining the “esse ntial dichotomy” between governmental action, which is subject to constitutional scrutiny, a nd “private conduct, which however discriminatory or wrongful,” is not). Several princi ples underlie the constitutional distinction between governme nt action and private conduct, including Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 1415 the desire to avoid holding the govern ment responsible fo r conduct beyond its control. See id. at 1447. That is precisely what Mr. Freeman seeks to do here in claiming the Covid Policy was im plemented and enforced at the behest of the federal government. Not so. Even if the government initially required that contracting employees be vaccinated, it did not promulgate the specifi c policy at issue, and in any event, it had expressly withdrawn its own vaccination mandate by the time Mr. Freeman was fired. Co llins Aerospace opted to reta in its Covid Policy, but Mr. Freeman cannot hold the government liable for the deci sion of a private employer to enforce its ow n employment policies. As the federal defendants correctly ar gue, “the fact that a private entity contracts with the government or receives governmental funds or other kinds of governmental assistance does not automatically transform th e conduct of that entity into state action.” Gallagher , 49 F.3d at 1448. Mr. Freeman claims Raytheon, and by extension Collins Aerospace, had a fina ncial incentive to comply with the government’s COVID-19 policies. That is not enough to transfor m those entities into government actors. See Gilmore v. Salt Lake Cmty. Action Program , 710 F.2d 632, 636 (10th Cir. 1983) (recognizi ng that “governmental fundi ng and regulation of an ostensibly private organizati on, in the absence of other factors, is insufficient to establish governmental action.”); see also Hurst v. McDonough , No. 21-2068, 2022 WL 1090913, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 20 22) (holding the Depart ment of Veterans Affairs was not a joint employer of fede ral contractor employee for purposes of Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 1516 Title VII) (unpublished) (cited for its persuasive value un der Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A)) Finally, even if Collins Aerospace coul d be considered a government actor, that does not automatically convert its termination of Mr. Freeman into government action. See Gilmore , 710 F.2d at 638 (recognizing “that not al l actions by state actors are state action”). Governme nt action requires, at a minimum, “a showing that the deprivation was in some sense attri butable to a governme ntal decision.” Id. Here the government affirmatively stated it would not enforce its vaccina tion mandate against government contractors. And there are no allegations indicating a government agent participated in any way in the decision to fire Mr. Freeman. Because the complaint fails to allege that Collins Aerospace was a government actor and that its termination of Mr. Freeman constituted gove rnmental action, the distri ct court was correct in dismissing the cons titutional claims.
E. Dismissal of Claims Under the Nint h Amendment, the Nuremberg Code, and 16 C.F.R. 1028.116 Mr. Freeman argues the defendants’ c onduct violated rights stemming from a combination of the Ninth Amendment and the Nuremberg Code and federal regulations governing informed consent. But he has cited no authority supporting this novel theory of liability. To the contrary, courts ha ve held the Ninth Amendment does not create a private right of action. See, e.g., Strandberg v. City of Helena , 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding “the nint h amendment has never been recognized as independently securing any constitutional right”). And Mr. Freeman Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 1617 has not identified any statute creating a private right of act ion for violations of the Nuremberg Code or 16 C.F.R. § 1028.116, which sets forth regulations governing informed consent in human research. See generally McKenzie v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. , 761 F.3d 1149, 1157 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining the Supreme Court “will rarely recognize an implied privat e cause of action arising from a mere regulation”). The district court di d not err in dismissing these claims. 6 F. Challenges to the District Court’s June 28, 2023, Order We lack jurisdiction to address Mr . Freeman’s arguments concerning the district court’s order denyi ng his post-judgment motion because he did not file a separate, or amend his existing, notice of appeal to challenge that order.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Matney v. Barrick Go ld of N. Am. , 80 F.4th 1136, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2023).
CONCLUSION The judgment of the distri ct court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge

6 For the same reason, the district court was correct in dismissing Mr. Freeman’s Thirteenth Claim for Relief , which cites various federal regulations implementing the Ethics in Government Act. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101, et seq . These regulations do not create a pr ivate right of action. Id. , § 2635.106(c). Appellate Case: 23-1133 Document: 010111042103 Date Filed: 05/02/2024 Page: 17