BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

__________________________________________ ) Motions and Application of ) ) AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. ) HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. ) Docket DOT-OST-2010-0018 ) in the matter of 2010 U.S.-Haneda ) Combination Services Allocation Proceeding ) __________________________________________)

ANSWER OF HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. TO PETITION OF DELTA AIR LINES, INC. FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 2014-12-19

Communications with respect to this document should be addressed to: Mark B. Dunkerley President & Chief Executive Officer Peter Ingram Executive Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer Hoyt H. Zia Senior Vice President, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. P.O. Box 30008 Honolulu, HI 96820-0008 J. Parker Erkmann Jonathan B. Hill Geoff Rapoport Cooley LLP 1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 842-7800 (202) 842-7899 (fax) perkmann@cooley.com jhill@cooley.com grapoport@cooley.com Counsel for Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.

January 2, 2015BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

__________________________________________ ) Motions and Application of ) ) AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. ) HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. ) Docket DOT-OST-2010-0018 ) in the matter of 2010 U.S.-Haneda ) Combination Services Allocation Proceeding ) __________________________________________)

ANSWER OF HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. TO PETITION OF DELTA AIR LINES, INC. FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 2014-12-19 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (“Hawaiian”) files th is answer in oppositi on to the Petition of Delta Air Lines, Inc. (“Delta”) fo r Reconsideration of Order 2014-12-9. 1 Contrary to the assertions in Delta’s misguided pleading, the Department of Transportation (“DOT” or the “Department”) has the authority to determine whet her the public interest requires reallocation of a limited, valuable air service righ t, provided the Department gives the holder of that air service right notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Order 2014-12-9 (the “Initiating Order”) does precisely that. The Delta Petition asserts the myopic view that “the [Initiatin g] Order subjects the Seattle-Haneda frequencies to reexamination on the basis of single-season” ‘Seattle-Haneda

1 Petition of Delta Air Lines, Inc. (“Delta”) for Reconsideration of Order 2014-12-9, DOT-OST2010-0018 (Dec. 22, 2014) (the “Delta Petition”).DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 2 of 16
service cutbacks.’” 2 Delta’s cry of “wolf” is only part of the story. DOT’s Initiating Order succinctly provides objective and sound reasons for conducti ng this proceeding, including “Delta’s extensive winter-season Seattle-Haneda service cutbacks” as well as “the submissions of American and Hawaiian.” 3 Hawaiian’s submission catalogued Delta’s repeated failures to live up to the commitments it made in the record in two prior cases. 4 In light of this record, DOT had no choice but to reopen the proceeding to both protect the pub lic interest and to ensure the highest and best use of the extremely scar ce operating rights to and from Haneda. Over the last four years, Delta has failed to fulfill numerous promises to serve Tokyo International Airport (“Haneda”) fr om both Detroit and later Seattle. 5 In fact, the chasm between all Delta’s prior service proposals and its operational performance ca ll Delta’s credib ility in this proceeding into question. Given Delta’s abysmal Haneda service record, it is perfectly appropriate, and within DOT’s authority and res ponsibility, to hold this proceeding to consider whether Delta is simply not willing to provide the air transpor tation authorized by DOT Order
2013-2-4 6 and whether another carrier might offer a se rvice that provides gr eater public interest benefits.

2 Delta Petition at 5 (emphasis in original).
3 Initiating Order at 5.
4 See Hawaiian Airlines’ Motion to Reopen Order 2013-2-4 and Answer to Motion and Application of American Ai rlines, DOT-OST-2010-0018, (Oct . 9, 2014), at 4-5 (“Hawaiian Motion”).

5 Hawaiian Motion at 4-5.
6 DOT Order 2013-2-4 (the “S eattle Allocation Order”)DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 3 of 16
I. The Department Has the Authority to Rea llocate the Seattle Frequency Even if Delta Technically Complies with the Dormancy Condition. Delta’s argument that it is in compliance w ith the terms of the Seattle Allocation Order and therefore entitled to “indefini te” use of the Seattle-Haneda frequency is simply incorrect. 7 The Seattle Allocation Order premises Delta’s right to use of the Seattle-Haneda frequency not only on the satisfaction of the dormancy condi tion but on Delta’s continuing “to hold the necessary underlying authority to se rve the markets authorized. . . .” 8 The Department has put that underlying authority at issu e in this proceeding. If th e Department determines, after providing Delta notice and an opportunity for a h earing, that Delta’s Seattle-Haneda authority should be revoked, Delta will no longer satisfy th e conditions of the Seattle Allocation Order. The Department has the implied authority to re voke Delta’s Seattle-Ha neda frequency. It is axiomatic that the DOT has authority to allocate frequencies on limited entry routes. 9 Indeed, as Delta itself has observed, the U.S.-Haneda rout es are limited entry routes that require the Department to conduct an allocation proceeding. 10 While Congress may not have expressly

7 Delta Petition at 1-2.
8 Seattle Allocation Order at 6 (“The slot pair alloca tion will remain in effect indefinitely, provided that th e holder continues to hold th e necessary underlying authority to serve the markets authorized; and provided further that the slot pair will become dormant and will revert automatically to the Department if it is not used for a period of 90 days (once inaugurated)”). 9 See Brazil Combination Frequency Allocation Proceeding, DOT-OST-2008-0307; U.S.-China Combination and All-Cargo Allocation Pr oceeding, DOT-OST-2006-25275; U.S.-Colombia Combination Service Case, DOT-OST-00-7104.
10 See Application Supplement of Delta Air Lines, Inc., DOT-OST-2010-0018 (Aug. 27, 2012), at 2 (“The unique bilateral compromise that wa s reached on Haneda requires the Department to conduct this proceeding.”).DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 4 of 16 directed the procedures for al locating, modifying and revoking this Haneda authority, the Supreme Court has stated a nd therefore directed in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council that the power of an administrative ag ency can be implied from the broader Congressional mandate: The power of an administra tive agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulat ion of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.... [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issu e, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permi ssible construction of the statute.... [A] court may not substitute its own constr uction ... for a reasona ble interpretation made by the administrator. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). “For Congress, by se nding its statute to the relevant agency for implementation, has delegated to that agency th e function of choosing between implicit statutory options.” 11 Contrary to Delta’s assertions, the Depart ment is not writing on a blank slate, as Congress has required the Departme nt to oversee foreign route aw ards and the determination as to how and when such economic au thority can and should be revoked. The Department has been delegated a broa d public interest mandate to regulate and promote competition and international air transportation. 12 Within that mandate is the authority to determine whether air carriers should be gr anted the economic authority, as evidenced by a certificate. 13 Congress also directed when the De partment can amend, modify, suspend or revoke this economic authority:

11 Air North America v. DOT, 937 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991) (determining that the Department had the authority to revoke the certificate of a dormant air carrier).
12 See,e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a); 40101(e); 40105.
13 See 49 U.S.C. § 41101, et seq

.DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 5 of 16 (e) Continuing Requirements. - (1) To hold a certificate i ssued under section 41102 of this title, an air carrier must continue to be fit, willing , and able to provide the transportation authorized by the certificate and to comply with this part and regulations of the Secretary. (2) After notice and an opportunity for a hearing , the Secretary shall amend, modify, suspend, or revoke any part of a certificate issued under section 41102 of this title if the Secretary finds that the air carrier – (A) is not fit, willing , and able to provide the tr ansportation authorized by the certificate and to comply with this pa rt and regulations of the Secretary. . . . 14 In the grant of authority to se rve the Haneda-Seattle market, th e DOT conditions Delta’s use of the Seattle-Haneda frequency on the maintenanc e of its underlying econo mic authority. Delta has an obligation to “continue to be fit, willing and able to provide the transportation authorized,” 15 meaning to maintain that authority Delta must demonstrate a willingness to operate the authorized frequency. If not, Congres s has authorized the Department to revoke the authority. In the absence of specific Congressional direction for allocating Haneda slot pairs, the Department can rely on a reasonab le interpretation that Congress has given. And it is entirely reasonable for the Department to revoke econom ic authority as long as it offers Delta the opportunity for a hearing, 16 which the Department has done expr essly in the Ini tiating Order, to determine whether Delta is fit, willing and able to provide Seattl e-Haneda service.

14 See 49 U.S.C. § 41110(e)(emphasis added).
15 Id.

16 Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 367 U.S. 316, 329 (1961) (“the Board may reconsider an effective certificate at any time if it affords the certifi cated carrier notice and hearing prior to decision”).DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 6 of 16
A. Delta Has Demonstrated That It Is No t Willing To Use Its Allocated Haneda Authority. Delta’s cynical assertion that its technical “compliance” w ith the dormancy condition of the Seattle Allocation Order entitl es it to indefinite use the Ha neda-Seattle frequency misses the forest for the trees. 17 Delta’s winter season cutbacks are ju st the latest indignity that it has heaped upon the Department’s Haneda policy. 18 The Department has been more than generous to Delta in all proceedings in this docket, gran ting Delta two of the four frequencies from Detroit and Los Angeles and then allowing Delta to tran sfer its Detroit service to Seattle over the objections of Hawaiian and other competitors. Delta’s use of its second Haneda frequency, first from Detroit and later from Seattle, demonstrates that it is not willing to provide the authorized trans portation. Indeed, the record is rife with examples of Delta making promises of robust Haneda service that the Department relied upon but were not kept. As depi cted in Exhibit HA-1, in the first Haneda allocation proceeding, Delta proposed to fly between Haneda and Detroit daily with a B747 aircraft with a capacity of
403 seats. 19 Notably, Delta flew the proposed B747 for a mere 37 days before it stopped flying the aircraft on the route. After 81 days of of fering no Detroit-Haneda service whatsoever, Delta finally resumed operations but only with the smaller B777. 20 This change of aircraft required Delta to overcome a number of logistical hurdl es, including locating unused aircraft, positioning

17 Delta Petition at 2.
18 See Hawaiian Motion at 1.
19 See Exhibit HA-1.
20 Id.DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 7 of 16
maintenance materials at the new station and sc heduling pilots to fly to Haneda who were qualified to operate the new aircra ft. The readiness with which Delta jettisoned its initial service proposal suggests that Delta kn ew its initial Detro it service was impractical before even commencing the Haneda-Detroit service. But the indignities did not stop there. Delta only operated 314 of the promised 730 annual operations. 21 As a result, Delta’s capacity in the market was only 26 percent of the promised capacity. 22 In making the Detroit award, th e Department relied upon Delta’s representations, only to see Delt a walk away from them after only 37 days. While Delta will argue that the service break was caused by the 2011 tsunami, Hawaiian was so committed to its Haneda service that it maintain ed its schedule through that difficu lt time. Both the Department and the competing carriers had every reason to expect that Delta would stand behind its representations. Nevertheless, Delta sought (and received) a waiver of the dormancy condition before ultimately requesting that the Department allow it to move the Detroit frequency to Seattle. 23 Delta’s performance in Seattle has been no better than the Detroit fiasco. Delta again promised more than it could, or was willing to, de liver. Delta originally promised it would serve

21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Motion of Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2010 U.S.-Haneda Combination Services Proceeding , DOTOST-2010-0018 (June 3, 2011) (requesting waiver of dormancy condition until June 1, 2012); Notice of Action Taken, DOT-OST-2010-0018) (issued June 29, 2011) (granting Delta’s request); Motion of Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2010 U.S.-Haneda Combination Services Proceeding , DOT-OST-2010-0018 (July 30, 2011), at 1.DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 8 of 16 Seattle with an A330 with 298 seats; it has se rved Seattle with a B767 with only 208 seats. 24 Instead of year-round service, as Delta had prom ised, Delta unilaterally decided to make the Seattle service seasonal, resul ting in a total of 248 days w ithout roundtrip SEA-HND service through the winter scheduling season. 25 All told Delta has offered just 32 percent of the promised seats

. 26 Delta’s modus operandi, of promising whatever is needed to obtain the authority and then doing what it wants, extends to its second Hane da gateway in Los Angeles. Delta’s HND-LAX service, granted in the original proceeding, has only been offered at 51 percent of the promised capacity. 27 Far from the isolated incident of a single scheduling season, it appears that Delta has undertaken a sustained, cynical a nd studied campaign to deprive other U.S. carri ers that are willing to use these valuable air service rights. It appears that Delta’s strategy is not to offer competitive U.S.-Haneda service itself but to keep the air service rights away from Hawaiian and other competitors. This slot warehousing ha s the benefit (to Delta and not the public) of

24 Exhibit HA-1. In the initial Haneda allocat ion proceeding, Delta proposed to serve Seattle with an A330-300 with 294 seats. See Application of Delta Air Lines, Inc., DOT-OST-2010- 0018 (Feb. 16, 2010), at 3. In its ap plication to transfer its Detroit authority to Seattle, Delta proposed to use a B767 with 225 seats and suggested that it would upgauge to a B777 (269 seats) or B747 (376 seats) “[a]s demand for the new serv ice builds”. Application Supplement of Delta Air Lines, Inc., DOT-OST-2010-0018 (Aug. 27, 2012), at 5.
25 See Exhibit HA-1.
26 Id.
27 Id.DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 9 of 16 preventing the diversion of passenge rs from Delta’s hub at Narita. 28 Given Delta’s remarkable underutilization of these valuable rights over a sustained period, the Department had no choice but to issue the Initiating Order to consider reallocating the Seattle- Haneda frequency. Indeed, the Initiating Order was necessary to fulfill the Department’s statutory obligation to promote competition. The Congressional dire ction in that regard is unequivocal; the Department shall place “maximum reliance on competitive market forces and on actual and potential competition” in promoting an efficient air traffic system. 29 By warehousing valuable slots frequencies to limit competition with its Narita operations, Delta has engaged in conduct that the Department has deemed anticompetitive in other markets. 30 Whatever Delta’s motivation for attempting to retain the Haneda-Seattle frequency, Delta has proven steadfastly unwilling to use it. I ndeed, the sharp discrepancies between Delta’s service proposals and its performance suggest that its prior su bmissions in this proceeding have been disingenuous. The Department simply ca nnot allow Delta to cynically manipulate the Department’s processes for its own commercial advantage. Accordingl y, where a carrier is unwilling or unable to provide transportation authori zed, the Department is within its authority to

28 Indeed, in arguing for more Haneda author ity, Delta has forthri ghtly argued that the Department should keep these valuable resources away from the alliance partners of United and American to maintain competitive balance. See, e.g., Consolidated Answer of Delta Air Lines, Inc., DOT-OST-2010-0018 (Oct. 17, 2014), at 12.

29 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6).

30 See, e.g., Notice of Petition and Waiver of the Terms of the Order Limiting Scheduled Operations at LaGuardia Air port, Grant of Petition with Conditions, 75 Fed. Reg. 26322, 26334 (May 4, 2010).DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 10 of 16 institute proceedings and has a duty under its ma ndate to promote competition and the public interest to revoke the right to provide such transportation.
B. The Seattle Allocation Order Provides Fo r Reallocation Of The Seattle-Haneda Frequency. Contrary to Delta’s contention, the Seattle Allocation Order reserv es authority for the Department to revoke the Seattle frequency af ter providing Delta notice and opportunity for a hearing. Delta’s bald assertion that the Seattle Allocation Orde r “cannot be read to reserve by implication authority to revoke the ‘indefinite’ allocation” 31 relies on an apparent misreading of that order. As Delta points out, the Seattle Allo cation Order sets forth two conditions. Violation of the second condition (the dor mancy condition) results in the automatic return of the Seattle frequency to the Department. 32 With respect to the first condition requiring Delta to maintain the underlying authority to serve the markets author ized, the Department, of necessity, has the authority to determine whether that condition ha s been met, provided Delta receives notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Delta’s assertion suggests that DOT is pow erless to rectify a carrier’s complete failure to live up to its publi c commitments. That premise cannot be accepted either under the statute, the Admi nistrative Procedure Act or comm on sense. In structuring the Seattle Allocation Order in the way it did, th e Department provided two methods for revoking

31 Delta Petition at 2.
32 Seattle Allocation Order at 6 (“The slot pair allocation will re main in effect indefinitely, provided that the holder con tinues to hold the necessary unde rlying authority to serve the markets authorized; and provided further th at the slot pair will become dormant and will revert automatically to the Department if it is not used for a period of 90 days (once inaugurated)”) (emphasis added).DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 11 of 16 the authority, one requiring an opportunity for a hearing and one that would occur by operation of law. The principle that the Departme nt can alter or revoke economic authority of an air carrier after providing notice and an opportunity for a hear ing is well established. In a case cited in the Delta Petition, the United States Supreme Court considered a decision of the DOT’s predecessor agency the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) to amend the certificate of public convenience and necessity of Delta. 33 While petitions for reconsideration of a prior allocati on of rights were pending, the CAB took action the effect of which “was to bar certain flights Delta was then operating.” 34 The Supreme Court considered the CAB’ s statutory authority and concluded “the Board may reconsider an effective certificate at any time if it affords the certificated carrier notice and hearing prior to decision.” 35 The power to revoke economi c authority after notice and an opportunity for a hearing has been upheld by the federal courts of appeal both before and after deregulation. 36 Accordingly, contrary to Delta’s cont ention, the Seattle Allocation Order can and should be understood as providing a procedure for the Department to review its initial allocation of the authority.

33 Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B. , 367 U.S. 316, 317 (1961).
34 Id. at 320.
35 Id. at 329.
36 Oceanair of Florida, Inc. v. DOT, 876 F.2d 1560, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding that exercising the authority to re voke a certificate requi res notice and opportunity for a hearing); Western Airlines, Inc. v. CAB , 495 F.2d 145, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“It seems unreasonable that Congress intended to give the Board power to gran t certificate rights, but to deny it any authority to modify them to meet the changing demands of commerce and the national defense.”).DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 12 of 16 This result makes perfect sense. The De partment has a broad mandate to promote competition and maximize the public benefit in th e allocation of economic authority. The fact that Delta, for whatever reason, wants to reta in the relevant author ity does not answer the question of DOT’s authority. Under the statute, Delta must also demonstrate that it is willing actually to provide the authorized transportati on. It simply cannot be the case that the Department is permanently foreclosed from r eevaluating whether its prior decisions achieve these goals, provided it offers the holder of the limited rights the procedural protections contemplated by Congress in granting the authority. Under the Delta’s contrary interpretation, it would have the Department believe that Delta is entitled to retain th e Seattle-Haneda frequency until th e end of time merely by running the smallest possible aircraft b ack and forth one week out of ev ery three months, a strategy Delta is trying out this winter. Whether the reservation of the right to reevaluate is explicit or implicit, there is no possibility that De lta’s interpretation is the one the Department intended when it issued the Seattle Allocation Order.
II. The Initiating Order Is Not Arbitrary and Capricious. Delta’s protest that the Initiating Order is arbitrary and capricious because the Department failed to treat Delta the same as ot her carriers does not hold water. First, Delta’s protest is premature, as the Initiating Order only sets up a procedure for considering the possibility of reallocating the Seattle-Haneda fre quencies. Because the Department is providing Delta with notice and the opportunity for a hearin g, Delta can present any concerns it may have about the Department’s contemplated action. Sec ond, Delta’s assertion that the reexamination isDOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 13 of 16 based on cancellations during a “singl e-season” is factually incorrect. 37 Delta’s underperformance at Haneda is longstanding and well documented. 38 Third, Delta’s argument that is has been treated differently also is inco rrect. Delta compares its current circumstances to American’s performance in the Brazil market. That comparison is misplaced. Brazil is a different country with a different bilateral that presents different aviation policy considerations. The reason the Department commenced these pr oceedings is because there are only 4 daily Haneda frequencies for which there are more applicants than fre quencies, whereas the Department’s notice in the Brazil proceeding states that the number of Brazil frequencies exceed demand. 39 Moreover, the Department issued the Initiating Order only after American and Hawaiian filed motions seeking reallocation of the au thority. Lastly, in all of the Haneda orders, all of those awarded frequencies have been subj ect to identical provis ions, including Hawaiian which has consistently met and exceeded the prom ises made in its application for Honolulu to Haneda service.
III. Delta’s Purported “Firm Plans” to Use the Seattle-Haneda Frequency Should Not Prevent Reallocation. Delta’s purported plans to fly the Seattle- Haneda route during the summer season do not obviate the need for this proceeding. The De lta Petition places misguided reliance on the

37 Delta Petition at 5.

38 See Part I.A, supra. 39 See Notice Inviting Applications (served Feb. 15, 2014), at 2 (a nnouncing the availability of additional frequencies in 2013 and 2014 and noting: “In addition, there are currently 24 U.S.- Brazil combination frequencies av ailable for allocation to U.S. carriers for operations beginning immediately”). While the availability of Braz il frequencies may have fluctuated over time, the Delta Answer points to Ameri can’s 2013 scheduling practices. See Delta Answer at 8.DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 14 of 16 Department’s policy of not reallocating frequenc ies when a carrier has “firm plans” to use them. 40 Again, Delta appears to have deliberately missed the reason the Department started this proceeding – Delta’s prior promises in this proceeding have not been fulfilled and now its statements lack credibility. 41 In light of Delta’s unilateral de cision to convert the Seattle service to seasonal, the Department i ssued the Initiating Or der to determine whether another proposal might provide greater public intere st benefits. Implicit in the requi rement that plans be firm is that plans be credible. To be sure, the security of route provided by administrative finality is one important value that the Department should consid er before reallocation of a limited frequency. However, administrative finality, a be nefit to a particular carrier, is not the only value that must be considered. Ultimately, DOT must determine whether the service actually provided lives up to the public benefit that Delta promised to win the frequencies in the first place.
IV. The Department Considered And Rejected The Need To Amend The Dormancy Condition. Delta’s assertion that the Department committe d legal error by failing to discuss Delta’s proposal to consider modifying the dormancy condition is fundamentally wrong on several levels. 42 First, Delta did not affirmatively make this proposal; Hawaiian made the proposal. 43

40 Delta Petition at 6.
41 See Exhibit HA-1.
42 Delta Petition at 7 (citing Consolidated Answer of Delta Air Li nes, Inc., DOT-OST-2010- 0018 (Oct. 17, 2014), at 7) (the “D elta Answer”) (“Delta proposed that if the Department is concerned that the dormancy c ondition is now insufficient, the Department could consider amending that condition.”).
43 Hawaiian Motion at 4-5 (“The Department S hould Reopen the [Seattle Allocation] Order and Modify its Dormancy Condition.”).DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 15 of 16 Instead, Delta argued against it: “[w]hile the Department could amend the dormancy conditions applicable to U.S.-Haneda slot holders, it ha s not and should not propose such a change. . . .” 44 Second, the Department did consider the proposal to modify the dormancy condition. The Department concluded that it has “adequate m eans to address our pub lic interest concerns without interfering with our long-settled dormancy language.” 45 Those means include this proceeding. Third, the case cited by Delta for the propositi on that its alternative must be considered because Delta must be afforded “security of route” actually supports the Department’s position. 46 As discussed above, 47 the Supreme Court’s Delta decision holds that the Department’s predecessor agency may revoke or modify an air carrier’s economic author ity, provided there is notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 48 Without question, that sta ndard has been satisfied in these circumstances.

44 Delta Answer at 7.
45 Initiating Order at 6 n.20 (addressing proposal to modify dormancy condition that “Hawaiian suggested”).
46 Delta Petition at 6.
47 See Part I.B, supra. 48 Delta , 367 U.S. at 329.DOT-OST-2010-0018 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration Page 16 of 16
Conclusion Because the Department has provided Delta with notice and an opportunity for a hearing, the Department is well within its authority to determine which application for the available Haneda slot will provide the greate st public interest benefits. Respectfully submitted, /s/ J. Parker Erkmann J. Parker Erkmann Jonathan B. Hill Geoff Rapoport Cooley LLP 1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 842-7800 (202) 842-7899 (fax) perkmann@cooley.com jhill@cooley.com grapoport@cooley.com Counsel for Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.

# EXHIBIT HA-1 Docket OST-2010-0018

### DELTA’S PROMISES AND PROPOSALS FOR HANEDA MEAN NOTHING

Delta HND Proposal Exhibit HA-1 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

What Delta Said /1 What Delta Did 1. DTW Aircraft Size Annual Flights Annual Seats Cumulative Days Without Nonstop Service

2. LAX Aircraft Size Annual Flights Annual Seats Cumulative Days Without Nonstop Service

3. SEA Aircraft Size Annual Flights Annual Seats Cumulative Days Without Nonstop Service B747 (403 Seats) 730 294,190

0

B747 (403 Seats) 730 294,190

0

A330-300 (298 Seats) 730 217,540

0 Only 37 Days with B747. /2 Only 314 annual operated /3 75,674 or only 26% of seats proposed /3
319 from Service Start Date to Suspension Date

Only 35 Days with B747. /4 Only 722 annual operated /5 150,176 or only 51% of seats proposed /5
90 from Service Start Date to April 2015

B767 (208 Seats) Only 336 annual operated /5 70,170 or only 32% of seats proposed /5
248 from Service Start Date to April 2015

1/ 2010 Original Proposal: Application of Delta Ai r Lines, Inc, Docket OST- 2010-0018, F ebruary 16, 2010. 2/ The remainder with smaller aircraft. 76 Days with B777, 157 Days with A330 3/ Final 12 Months of Nonstop Service – YE Sept. 2012 4/ The remainder with smaller aircraft. B747 Feb. – Mar ‘11, B 777 Jun.-Oct ‘11, A330 Oct. ‘11-Ma r. ‘13 and B767 (208 Seats) sinc e Mar. ’13 5/ 12 Months Ended April 2015. Sources: Innovata Schedule Data and Application of Delt a Air Lines, Inc, Docket OST-2010-0018, February 16, 2010.CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Answ er of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. To Petition for Reconsideration was served this 2 nd day of January 2015 via email transmission on the following:

howard.kass@aa.com francis.heil@aa.com abigail.donovan@aa.com robert.wirick@aa.com charles.hunnicutt@thompsonhine.com patricia.snyder@thompsonhine.com sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com chris.walker@delta.com seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com dan.weiss@united.com thomas.bolling@united.com steve.morrissey@united.com lhalloway@crowell.com gmurphy@crowell.com robert.finamore@dot.gov brett.kruger@dot.gov paul.gretch@dot.gov todd.homan@dot.gov brian.hedberg@dot.gov john.s.duncan@faa.gov englets@state.gov finstonma@state.gov cristinasa@state.gov glindsey@lawa.org info@airlineinfo.com

/s/ J. Parker Erkmann J. Parker Erkmann