IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs September 8, 2021

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOSEPH GRIGGS

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. 18-CR-168 J. Weber McCraw, Judge

No. W2020-01686-CCA-R3-CD

A Hardeman County jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph Griggs, of aggravated rape, and 

the trial court sentenced him to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. 

On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction 

and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record 

and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Bo Burk, District Public Defender; Shana McCoy Johnson, Assistant District Public 

Defender, Somerville, Tennessee; and Matthew C. Edwards, Bolivar, Tennessee, for the 

appellant, Joseph Griggs.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Assistant 

Attorney General; Mark E. Davidson, District Attorney General; and Joe L. VanDyke, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts 

This case arises from the Defendant’s rape of the victim, his thirteen-year-old 

cousin, in the bedroom of her aunt’s house. Based on this conduct, a Hardeman County 

grand jury indicted the Defendant for aggravated rape. 

A. Trial

The following evidence was presented at the Defendant’s trial: The victim testified 

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that she was fifteen years old at the time of trial on September 9, 2019. In March of 2018, 

over the victim’s spring break week, the victim went to stay with her aunt, who was hosting 

approximately fifteen of her relatives, including her cousin, the Defendant. The Defendant,

whom she identified in the courtroom, was present at her aunt’s house every night of the 

victim’s stay. The victim testified that, one night, the Defendant raped her while she had 

been sleeping. The victim awoke to find the Defendant on top of her, following which he 

pulled her pants down and put his penis inside her vagina. The Defendant also penetrated 

her vagina with his fingers. The victim said that “it hurt” but that she did not scream 

because she was scared. 

While the Defendant remained in the bedroom, the victim sent a text message to her 

best friend, D.R.1, describing what had happened and asking her to call the police. The 

police responded to the residence, and the victim was taken to the hospital. The victim 

testified that the rape caused her to bleed and that blood ran down her leg. 

On cross-examination, the victim testified that there were other people in the 

bedroom when the rape occurred: the Defendant’s kids and their cousins, whom the victim 

listed by name. The victim recalled that the other girls in the room were sleeping on the 

bed but that she was sleeping on the floor with the boys. The victim’s siblings were in the 

house but not asleep in the same room as her. 

On redirect-examination, the victim testified that she called the police, as did D.R.,

at the victim’s request. The victim testified that she did not say anything while on the line 

with the emergency dispatcher and that the Defendant was still in the room at the time. 

The victim remained on the line, silent, for about a minute and then hung up. She clarified 

that the Defendant was standing at the foot of the bed but that the phone was concealed by 

the bedcover. She testified that he left the room when the police arrived at the residence.

On recross-examination, the victim stated that she had the covers pulled up over her 

head while the Defendant raped her. After the incident, the victim remained under the 

covers while the Defendant talked to her. The other males in the room at that time were 

children. The victim testified that she was “positive” that the person raping her was not 

one of the male children in the room. She agreed that she had the covers pulled over her 

head when the Defendant pulled her pants down. 

On redirect-examination, the victim testified that she did not see the Defendant 

while he was raping her but saw him when he left the room. 

D.R. testified that she was a friend of the victim’s and received a text message from 

the victim in March 2018 asking her to call for help because the victim had been raped. 

With help from her relatives, D.R. called the police and provided an address given to her 

 

1

It is the policy of this court to refer to minors by their initials.
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by the victim.

Investigator Chris Burkeen testified that he was employed by the Bolivar Police 

Department and was dispatched to a residence regarding a report of the rape in this case. 

There had been a “9-1-1 hang up” call from that address, as well as the call from the third 

party. Investigator Burkeen testified that he arrived at the residence around 2 a.m. and had 

to “knock hard” at the residence to get a response. The homeowner, Tracey Wright, 

answered the door with the victim standing behind her. Investigator Burkeen asked the 

victim if she had called the police, and she replied that she had. He asked the victim if she 

was alright, and the victim “collapsed, fainted.” Investigator Burkeen called for an 

ambulance, and the victim began to “come back” as the ambulance was arriving. 

Investigator Burkeen accompanied the victim in the ambulance to the hospital. The 

victim’s father arrived at the hospital, and then Investigator Burkeen questioned the victim 

about what had happened to her; she told him that the Defendant had “done this to her.” 

Investigator Burkeen collected the victim’s clothes as evidence, and a rape kit was 

performed on her.

Investigator Burkeen ascertained that the Defendant had existing arrest warrants in 

Fayette County, so Investigator Burkeen requested that county officers apprehend and 

detain the Defendant. Investigator Burkeen then interviewed the Defendant at the Fayette 

County Sheriff’s Department, which was audio and video recorded. Investigator Burkeen 

was assisted in the interview by Investigator Futrell. The recording was played aloud for 

the jury. A copy of the recording is not included in the record on appeal.

On cross-examination, Investigator Burkeen testified that there were more than 

twelve people inside Ms. Wright’s residence when he arrived; some were asleep and some 

were awake. He went into the bedroom where the victim stated the rape had happened and 

there were four to five small children in there, and the same number in the other rooms. 

Investigator Burkeen did not observe any blood on the victim during his time at the 

residence.

Mary Cole, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner at Jackson General Hospital, testified 

that she treated the victim on March 21, 2018, who had arrived at the hospital at 5:34 a.m. 

Ms. Cole described the victim as “trembling” with “some tenseness” and “generally quiet.” 

The victim complained that her vagina was hurting and stated that she had been vaginally 

assaulted by the Defendant putting his fingers and penis in her vagina. The victim reported 

that this incident was her first sexual contact. Ms. Cole performed a physical examination 

of the victim and stated that there were obvious injuries to her vagina. The victim was 

experiencing “significant” vaginal pain during the examination. Ms. Cole described the 

victim’s vagina as “swollen” and “irregular,” and her exam of the victim revealed some 

bleeding. She stated that the victim’s vaginal tissue was torn and that she observed three 

or four “distinct” scratches to the area. The victim described it as being painful to urinate, 

which was consistent with the observed injuries. 
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The Defendant testified that he was at his mother’s house on March 20, 2018, during 

the evening and that he left around 11 p.m. to visit his father in Bolivar. The next morning, 

he heard about the victim’s rape and that she had accused him. The Defendant denied 

raping the victim.

On cross-examination, the Defendant denied telling police that he had engaged in 

sexual intercourse with the victim. He testified that he was shaken up during the interview 

and did not intend to say they had engaged in a sexual act. He explained that, “if [he] 

would have had sex with her it would have been consensual,” which is what he was 

attempting to explain during the interview. 

Based upon the evidence presented at trial to the jury, the jury convicted the 

Defendant of aggravated rape. At the sentencing hearing, the presentence report was 

admitted as an exhibit. No further evidence was presented. The trial court stated that it 

had considered the evidence presented at trial and at sentencing, the nature and 

characteristics of the Defendant’s conduct, the relevant enhancement and mitigating 

factors, and the Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and treatment. The trial court stated 

that aggravated rape was a Class A felony with a sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-five 

years with no possibility of probation or an alternative sentence. The sentence was to be 

served at 100% as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501. 

The trial court applied two enhancement factors: first, that the victim’s age made 

her particularly vulnerable, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114(4) (2020), 

and second, that the offense was committed to gratify the Defendant’s desire for pleasure 

or excitement, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114(7) (2020). In light of 

these factors, the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years. It is from this judgment 

that the Defendant now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction and that the trial court erred when it imposed an enhanced sentence within the 

applicable range. 

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. 

He contends that there was insufficient proof that he was person raping the victim because 

she had the covers pulled over her head and was raped in a room where multiple other 

people slept. He further contends that the State did not prove the element of “bodily 

injury.” The State responds that the victim explicitly identified the Defendant as her rapist 

and that the proof is sufficient to sustain his conviction for rape and to support the element 

of bodily injury. We agree with the State.
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When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this court’s standard 

of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 

“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); 

see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing 

State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 276 (Tenn. 2002)). This rule applies to findings of guilt 

based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and 

circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1999) (citing State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). In the 

absence of direct evidence, a criminal offense may be established exclusively by 

circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 1973). “The jury 

decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn 

from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and 

inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury.’” State v. Rice, 184 

S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 

1958)). “The standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence] ‘is the same whether the 

conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 

2009)). 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or 

reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 

Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the 

evidence. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Liakas v. State, 286 

S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956)). “Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the 

weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the 

evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 

1997). “‘A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony 

of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.’” 

State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 

474, 476 (Tenn. 1973)). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and 

the jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given 

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523, 

527 (Tenn. 1963)). This court must afford the State the “‘strongest legitimate view of the 
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evidence’” contained in the record, as well as “‘all reasonable and legitimate inferences’” 

that may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d at 775 (quoting State v. Smith, 

24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant removes 

the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal 

defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain 

a guilty verdict. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000).

Relevant to the Defendant’s argument that there was insufficient proof that he was 

the rapist, the evidence presented and viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was 

that the Defendant entered the room in which the victim was sleeping, got on top of her, 

and penetrated her vagina with his penis and fingers. The victim saw him leaving the 

bedroom after the rape; she later told law enforcement that he was the rapist, and she 

identified him in the courtroom as the perpetrator. The victim called police, had a friend 

call police, and was taken from her aunt’s house by ambulance to a hospital where the 

treating physician saw that she suffered vaginal injuries consistent with a rape. This was 

sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the Defendant committed the 

rape. 

Aggravated rape, found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-502, requires 

proof of, as charged here, “unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant . . . 

accompanied by any of the following circumstances: . . . bodily injury to the victim.” 

T.C.A. § 39-13-502(a)(2) (2018). The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the 

State was that the victim awoke to find the Defendant on top of her and then he pulled her 

pants down. He inserted his penis, as well as his fingers, into her vagina. A physical 

examination of the victim revealed the presence of signs of traumatic penetration, including 

tearing and swelling, and her examiner, Ms. Cole, testified that the victim was obviously 

in pain following the rape. This is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty of aggravated rape accompanied 

by bodily injury. 

Embedded in his sufficiency argument, the Defendant also contends that the 

indictment listed the element of “a person less than thirteen (13) of age,” which he asserts 

is not an element of aggravated rape, and the inclusion of which he contends was 

inflammatory and misleading to the jury. We agree with the State’s argument that the 

Defendant has waived this issue for failure to raise it during trial or at the motion for new 

trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). The Defendant is not entitled to 

relief on this issue.

B. Sentencing

The Defendant also contends that the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence 

greater than the minimum within the applicable range. The State replies that the trial court 
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properly sentenced the Defendant to a within-range sentence and that it did not abuse its 

discretion in doing so. We agree with the State.

“[S]entences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range are to 

be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” 

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). A finding of abuse of discretion “‘reflects that 

the trial court’s logic and reasoning was improper when viewed in light of the factual 

circumstances and relevant legal principles involved in a particular case.’” State v. Shaffer, 

45 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn. 

1999)). To find an abuse of discretion, the record must be void of any substantial evidence 

that would support the trial court’s decision. Id. at 554-55; State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 

285, 286 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The 

reviewing court should uphold the sentence “so long as it is within the appropriate range 

and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes 

and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10. So long as the trial court 

sentences within the appropriate range and properly applies the purposes and principles of 

the Sentencing Act, its decision will be granted a presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 

707. 

Although the trial court should consider enhancement and mitigating factors, the 

statutory enhancement factors are advisory only. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114; see 

also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 701; State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2008). Our 

supreme court has stated that “a trial court’s weighing of various mitigating and 

enhancement factors [is] left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 

345. In other words, “the trial court is free to select any sentence within the applicable 

range so long as the length of the sentence is ‘consistent with the purposes and principles 

of [the Sentencing Act].’” Id. at 343 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d)). Appellate 

courts are “bound by a trial court’s decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so 

long as it is imposed in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out in 

sections -102 and -103 of the Sentencing Act.” Id. at 346.

The trial court must consider: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the 

sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and 

arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal 

conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on the mitigating 

and enhancement factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-113 and -

114; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to 

sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; and (7) any statement the defendant 

made on the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing. See T.C.A. § 40-35-210 (2014); 

State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

At sentencing, the trial court applied two enhancement factors, factor (4), related to 

the victim’s young age, and factor (7), based on the fact that the Defendant committed this 
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offense for his own sexual pleasure. T.C.A. § 40-35-114(4), (7) (2020). The evidence at 

trial showed that the thirteen-year-old victim was staying at her relative’s house for spring 

break with a large group of relatives, in the care of an adult relative who owned the home. 

It appears that the Defendant used his access to the home to also access the victim and then 

rape her in her sleep. See State v. Kissinger, 922 S.W.2d 482, 490 (Tenn. 1996) (stating 

that factor (7) “applies anytime an offender commits an applicable offense to gratify the 

offender’s desire for any pleasure or any excitement.) Based on this evidence, we conclude 

that the Defendant has not established that the trial court abused its discretion by enhancing 

his sentence within the applicable range. The Defendant is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

_________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE