### The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 1


### *The Honorable James M. Burns, Senior United States District Judge for the District o f Oregon, sitting by designation. ---------------- No. 95-3694

--------------- Vickie Fogie, Joan Leonard, and * Angela Adams, on behalf of themselves * and all others similarly situated, * * Plaintiffs/Appellees, * * v. * Appeal from the United State s District Court * for the District of Minnesota. THORN Americas, Inc. (formerly known * as Rent-A-Center, Inc.) a Kansas * corporation, and THORN EMI North * America Holdings, Inc., a Delaware * Corporation, * * Defendants/Appellants. *

--------------- Submitted: April 8, 1996 Filed: September 6, 1996

--------------- Before McMILLIAN and FAGG, Circuit Judges and BURNS*, District Judge.

--------------- BURNS, Senior District Judge. Appellants THORN Americas, Inc. and THORN EMI North America Hol dings, Inc. appea l the district court * s order granting summary judgment for the 1 plaintiff class and permanently enjoining appellants from entering int o usurio us “rent-to-own” consumer credit sales contracts. We hav e jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We affirm.

### The plaintiff class did not assert any claim against appellants based on immediate sales of 2 

### goods for cash.
We use the definition of “cost of lease services” employed in RAC’s form contracts rather than 3 

### the definition employed by the district court. I. BACKGROUND Appellant THORN Americas, Inc. opera tes a chain of stores that offer

a variety of household goods for sale or lease. Appellant THORN EMI Nort h Amer ica Holdings, Inc. owns all of the stock of THORN Americas, Inc

. Appellants operate their stores under the business name “Rent-A-Center” an d

are collectively called “RAC” in this opinion. Appellees are individual members of a certified class who entered into rent-to-own transactions wit h RAC on or after August 1, 1990. RAC lease s household goods to its customers for a weekly or monthly rental term. At the end of the initial weekly or monthly rental period, the customer may renew the agreement for another term. The lease may be renewed at the end of each rental term. Full pa yment of the rental fee is required at the beginning of each term. RAC uses a standard form contract for each renewable lease agre ement. RAC entered into thousands of such contracts wit h members of the plaintiff class. The renewable lease agreements between RAC and the members of the pla intiff class are known interchangeably as “the rental purchas e contracts” or “the rent-to-own contracts”. The standard rental purchase contract allows a class member t o acquire ownership of an item by renewing the lease for a specified number of consecutive rental periods. In the standard form contract, this method of acquiring title is called “renewing the agree ment to ownership”. Items may also b e purchased for cash on an immediate sale basis. However, the 2
vast majority, if not all of RAC’s business is conducted through renta l purchase contracts. The cash p rice of an item is set at 55% of the total payment s necessary to purchase the item by renewing the agreement to ownership. Th e cash price of an item is prominently displayed o n the item and is included in the standard form rental purchase contract. The difference between the total payments needed for renewal to ownership and the cash price is calle d the “cost of lease services”. The rental purchase contracts state th e 3 cost of lease services amount.

### 3 Appellees have successfully contended that the difference betwe en the

cas h price and the total of payments to acquire title by renewing th e agr eement to ownership, i.e. the amount known as the cost of leas e services, is actually entirely interest. Based on that central contention , the cl ass members brought this action alleging that the rent-to-ow n

co ntracts violated several state and federal statutes, including th e Minnesota Consumer Credit Sales Act (CCSA), Minn. Stat. §§ 325G.15-.16, th e Minnesota General Usury Statute, Minn. Stat. §§ 334.01-.03; and the federa l Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization statute (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The distr ict court certified two questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1. Are rent-to-own contracts consume r

credit sales under Minn. Stat. § 325G.15? 2. Does the usury statute, Minn. Stat. § 334.01, apply to rent-to-own contracts? On June 24, 1994, the Minnesota Supr eme Court issued its opinions in Miller v. Colortyme, Inc. , 518 N.W. 2d 544 (Minn. 1994) and Fogie v. Rent

A-Center, Inc. , 518 N.W. 2d 544 (Minn. 1994). The Court answered bot h certified questions in the affirmative. The plaintiff class then brought its motion for partial summar y judgment seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On September 28, 1995 , the district court issued its order enjoining appellants from entering int o credit sales transactions within the State of Minnesota which bear interes t in excess of the maximum rate permitted under Mi nnesota law. The district court * s order also declared the rental purchase contracts to be consumer credit sales contracts subject to the Minnesota General Usury Statute. It declared that the ren tal purchase contracts constitute “unlawful debt” as defi ned under RICO. Finally, the district court declared the renta l purchase contracts void ab initio and set forth a formula and procedure fo r determining money damages.
II. Scope of Review We must resolve issues relating to t he jurisdiction of this court at the outset. We have jurisdiction to review the district court * s issuance

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of the injunction under 28 U.S.C. §

### 5

1292(a)(1) which provides for appeal of interlocutory orders granting or refusing to grant inj unctions. Our jurisdiction under section 1292(a)(1) als o extends to the remainder of the appealed order to the extent th e injunction is “interdependent with” the remainder of the appealed order. In re Federal Skywalk Cases , 680 F.2d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Union Nat. Bank of Little R ock v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n , 860 F.2d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 1988). Under this standard, we hav e jurisdiction to review all portions of the order that are dependent on the resolution of the iss ues necessarily resolved in reviewing the injunction order. Union Nat. Bank v. Federal Nat. Mortg. A ss’n , 860 F.2d at 852. In other word s, in addition to the injunction order, we may review othe r issu es only if they are “inextricably bound up” with the injunction

. Marathon Oil Co. v. United States , 807 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1986), cert

. denied , 480 U.S. 940 (1987). We need not undertake a review of issue s whose resolution is not necessary to effectively review the injunction

. Mille L acs Band of Chippewa Indians v. State of Minn. , 48 F.3d 373, 37 5 (8th Cir. 1995). We must determine the extent to whic h each issue RAC has appealed is relevant to, or interdependent with, or inextricably bound up with th e injunctive relief granted in this case. First, the propriety of the summary judgment in favor of th e plaintiff class on its usury claim is properly before us on appeal, becaus e the district court’s determination that the rent al purchase agreements are usurious is the very basis of the injunction. Second, the issue s surrounding the time- price doctrine and appellants’ constitutional claims

are properly before us because the district court’s rejection of thes e defenses was a necessary predicate to entry of the injunction. The remaining issues are more problematic. RAC asks us to revi ew the district court’s finding that the rental purchase agreements satisfy the “unlawful debt” element of RICO. The district c ourt retained jurisdiction to make determinations on the remaining elements of the RICO claim. In th e interest of avoiding piecemeal appeals, it would be appropriate to review the RICO claim in its entirety after a final judgment has been rendered. Gard ner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. , 437 U.S. 478, 480, 98 S.Ct

.

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2451, 2453 (1978). F urthermore, it is not necessary to determine whether the rental purchase contracts satisfy the “unlawful debt” element

### 7

of th e RICO claim in order to effectively review the injunction order

. Accord ingly, we decline to exercise jurisdiction to review this ruling

. Mille L acs Band , 48 F.3d at 375; Union Nat. Bank v. Federal Nat. Mortg

. Ass’n , 860 F.2d at 852; Marathon Oil Co. v. United States , 807 F.2d at 764

. For the same reasons, we decline to review the district court’s order establishing the formula for calculating money damages and the procedure by which class members are to assert claims for money damages. Th e distri ct court retained jurisdiction to determine damages in this case

. It is appropriate to avoid piecemeal appeals by deferring review of these issue s until final money judgments have been entered. Gardner v . Wes tinghouse Broadcasting Co. , 437 U.S. at 480, 98 S.Ct. at 2453. I n addition, we do not f ind it necessary to resolve these issues in order to effectively review the injunctive relief granted here. Issues regarding the proper method for calculating damages are not inextricably bound up with the injunction issued here. Mille Lacs Band , 48 F.3d at 375; Union Nat. Bank v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n , 860 F.2d at 852; Marathon Oil Co.

v. United States , 807 F.2d at 764. III. Standards of Review We review

a grant of summary judgment de novo . Hardin v. Hussmann Corp. , 45 F.3d 262, 2 64 (8th Cir. 1995). We will affirm if the evidence, wh en viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party , demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and th e moving party is entit led to judgment as a matter of law. Id. ; Bashara v. Black Hills Corp. , 26 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1994). Our r eview of the grant or denial of a permanent injunction i s confined to the determination of whether the district court abused it s discretion. International Ass * n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. So o Line R. Co. , 850 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied , 48 9 U.S. 1 010, 109 S.Ct. 1118 (1989). Abuse of discretion occurs if th e dis trict court reaches its conclusion by applying erroneous lega l principles or relying on clearly erroneous factual findings. Id. , 850 F.2 d at 374; United States v. Yacoubian , 24 F.3d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1995).

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IV. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment on Usury Claim The district court held that RAC’s rent to own contracts are us urious as a matter of law. Under the state general usury statute, four elements must be proven to establish a violation: 1) a lo an of money or forbearance of debt; 2) an agreement between the parties that the principal shall be repayable absolutely; 3) the exaction of a great er amount of interest than is allowed by law, and 4) the presence of an int ention to evade the law at the inception of the transaction. Miller v. Colortyme , 518 N.W. 2d 544, 549-50 (Minn. 1994); Citizen’s National Bank of Willmar v. Taylor , 368 N.W

. 2d 913, 918 (Minn. 1985). 1. Constitutional Challenges The district court held that, under Minnesota law as set forth i n Miller v. Colortyme a nd Fogie v. Rent-A-Center , the first two elements of
usury are satisfied by operation of the CCSA and the general usury statute

. 518 N.W. 2d at 549; 518 N.W.2d 544. RAC argues that, by applying the CCSA and the usury statute to it’s rental purchase tr ansactions in this manner, the district court violated RAC’s constitutional rights. First, RAC contends the Miller interpretation renders the CCSA an d the us ury statute unconstitutionally vague, depriving RAC of the “fai r notice” r equired by the Due Process Clause. RAC also contends that th e district court retroactively applied the Miller decision in violation of the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. We reject both contentions.

a. Vagueness The Supreme Court enunciated standards for evaluating claims o f vagueness in Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972). First, the prohibitions of a statute must be define d clearly enough that a person of ordinary intelligence has a reasonabl e opportunity to know w hat is prohibited. Second, the statute must provide stan dards that are clear enough that those charged with applying th e statute are not required to make basic policy de cisions on a subjective or arbitrary basis. Id

. These standards are not to be applied mechanically. Crimina l enactments are to be examined under a stricter vagueness test whil e

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economic regulation is subject to a more tolerant

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examin ation. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates , Inc. , 455 U.S. 489, 4 98-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 (1982). We reject RAC’s conten tion that the strict test applicable to criminal statutes govern s here. T he statutes implicated in this case are primarily economi c regulations which cov er a narrow subject area and regulate the conduct of bus iness enterprises. The punitive aspects of the usury statute impos e only civil penalties. Under Village of Hoffman , we conclude that th e broader, more tolerant test of vagueness is required here. 455 U.S. a t 498-99, 102 S.Ct. at 1193. Apply ing these standards, we hold that the Miller decision of th e Minnesota Supreme Court does not render the CCSA or the general usur y statute unconstitutionally vague. The CCSA defines “Sale of Goods” i n terms t hat clearly encompass terminable leases including RAC’s renta l purchase agreements. Minn. Stat. 325G.15 subd. 5. The CCSA incorporates this definition of “Sale of Goods” into its defi nition of “Consumer Credit Sales”. Minn. Stat. 325G.15 subd. 2. Any lease that constitutes a
consumer credit sale under the CCSA is deemed a sale for all purposes

. Minn. Stat. 325G.16 subd. 4. RAC contends that their rental purchase agreements, thoug h statutorily defined a s “sales”, cannot be “consumer credit sales” because the seller does not extend credit and the buyer does not incur debt. This construction is unten able because it would render section 325G.15 subd. 5 entirely meaningless and unnecessary. Moreover, the terms of RAC’s rental purchase agreements provide for buyers to acquire possession of goods whil e deferring payment over time. These are the essential attributes of a n ordinary credit sale. It is clear that the legislature intended for CCSA consumer protections governing ordinary credit s ales to also govern rental purchase agreements having the same essential attributes. Accordingly, th e constr uction proposed by RAC would render subdivision 5 meaningless an d would also frustrate the legislative intent and hinder the consume r protection objectives of the statute. Th ese statutory provisions give sufficient notice to those engage d in the rent-to-own industry that their rental purchase contracts fal l within the CCSA and are subject to usury laws. They also provide standard s

### 11

by which the courts c an apply the statutes without engaging in subjective or arbitrary policy m aking decisions. Accordingly, the statutes pass the vagueness

### We assume without de ciding that the third critical element, that the statute be a criminal or penal 4 

### law, is satisfied in this case.

12 test enunciated in Grayed v. City of Rockford and Village of Hoffma n Estates

. b. Retroactive Application of Miller v. Colortyme Two elements are necessary for a statute to be ex post facto i n viola tion of the Constitution : it must apply to events that occurre d 4 before its enactment; and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it

. Miller v. Florida , 48 2 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451 (1987); Weaver

v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 (1981). The CCSA, the RPAA , and the general usury statute existed in their present form when th e parties entered into the rental purchase contracts at issue in this case. Accordi ngly, the statutes themselves are not subject to ex post fact o analysis. A judici al decision which meets both elements also violates the e x post facto clause and cannot be applied retroactively. Bouie v. City of Colum bia , 378 U.S. 347, 353-54; 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1702-1703 (1964). Thi s occurs when a judicia l decision unforeseeably enlarges a statute to cover conduct that was not offensive before the judici al pronouncement. Id . If the judicial construc tion is “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue” it violate s the ex post facto cla use and must not be given retroactive effect. Bouie

v. City of Columbia , 378 U.S. at 354, 84 S.Ct. at 1703. RAC contends the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v . Colortyme changed the substantive elements of a usury claim by making it unnecessary for plain tiffs to prove the first two elements, the extension of credi t and the absolute obligation to repay it. In RAC’s view, th e Miller dec ision acts as an ex post facto law and must not be applie d retroactively. The Miller decision did not change the elements of a usury claim

. It is a judicial inte rpretation of the statutory scheme that existed long before the present contracts were made. The judicial construction i n Miller is not “unexpected or indefensible by reference to” the statutory

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framework already in place. On the contrary, th e judicial construction of tho se statutes is reasonable and foreseeable, gives full meaning to th e statutory language, operates in the

### The general usury statute permits a maximum interest rate of six percent per annum unless the rate 5 

### is contracted for in writing, in which case a rate of eight percent may be charged. Minn. Stat. § 334.01.

14 manner clearly intended by the legislature, and furthers the consume r prot ection objectives of the statutes. In addition, Miller does no t overrule any prior contrary ruling of the Minnesota Supreme Court upo n which RAC might justifiably have relied. In sho rt, Miller did not change existing law- it simply stated a

rea sonable and correct interpretation of the law which differs from th e erroneous view RAC had chosen to follow. For the reasons stated above, RAC’s constitutional challenges to the Mille r v. Colortyme decision must be rejected. The district court wa s correct in ruling in accordance with Miller , that the first two elements of the usury claim in this case are established by operation of the CCSA and the usury statute. 2. Factual Challenges RAC co ntends the plaintiff class failed to carry its burden o f proving the third and fourth elements of their usury claim: exaction o f interest at an illegal rate and the intent to ev ade the usury law when the contract was made. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to RAC. Bashara v. Black Hills Corp. , 26 F.3d at 823.

a. Amount of Interest Charged The plaintiff class urged the district court to find that th e difference between the total payments needed to purchase an item b y renewing the contract to ownership and the cash price was entirel y interest. It cannot be disputed that this amoun t, described in the rental purchase agreements as the “cost of lease services”, is 82% of the cas h price in each contract. Adjusting this figure for the duration of th e vario us contracts among the plaintiff class members produces annua l percentage rates ranging between 46% for the lon gest contract and 746% for the shortest. Obviously, these rates far exceed the legal limit under the usury statute, Minn. Stat. § 334.01. 5 RAC conte nds that the cost of lease services cannot be entirel y

### 15

inte rest because it includes the value of services such as delivery , maintenance, repair, and contract options. If t he case had gone to trial, RAC intended to present evidence to show the value of these additional

### We bel ieve the RPAA requires full disclosure of the service charges associated with a renta l 6 

### purchase contract. Minn. Stat. § 325F.86-.87. However, compliance w ith the RPAA is not the issue. Itemization of charges is relevant to the us ury analysis only if it tends to prove or disprove that “cost of lease services” is truly a service charge rather than interest.

16 services. The district court found no evidence that the members of th e plaintiff class agreed to pay for any additional services. The court also found that , even if the “cost of lease services” figure included bot h interest and the value of additional services, no reasonable fact finder

cou ld conclude that the portion attributable to the value of additiona l

serv ices was great enough so that the interest portion was below th e statutory usury rate. A close review of the record discloses that th e district court was correct in both findings. It is proper to exclude from the interest calculation “a certai n sum, agreed to be paid the lender for services and expenses in connection with the loan” if the charge is reasonable and bona fide. Hobart v. Michaud , 219 N.W. 878, 879 (Minn. 1928); Daley v. Minnesota Loan and Inv. Co. , 45 N.W. 1100, 1101 (Minn. 1890). However, if the fee is not related to any separate expenses but is compensation for the use of the money loaned, it must be considered interest. Vanderweyst v. First State Bank of Benson , 425 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn.), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 943 (1988). RAC conte nds the plaintiff class members agreed to pay the value of additional services because they each agreed to the general “cost of lease services” term in the written contracts. RAC’s expert claimed that th e value of each of the following services should be excluded from th e interest calculation: delivery, maintenance, repair and replacement. RAC contends it is not re quired to itemize the additional services covered by the term “cost of lease services”. 6 The undis puted evidence shows that the parties contemplated each of the services identifi ed by RAC’s expert would be provided without charge. In the express written terms of each of the cont racts, the delivery charge indicated is “$0.00". In its published advertis ements, RAC announced that delivery, repair, service, set up, and “loaners” were free services. We

### 17

are convinced that no fact finder could view this evidence and reasonably conclude that the plaintiff

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class members knowingly agreed to pay for these services as “cost of lease services”. RAC’s expert also identified certain “contract options” includi ng the right to continue renting; the right to stop renting; and, the right t o obtain ownership over time by the two methods described in the contracts. RAC contends the value of these “options” should be excluded from “cost of lease services” in calculating the interest charged by RAC. The Minnesota Supreme Court, after fully considering the ver y contracts at issue here, including the rights described now by RAC a s “options”, ruled that these contracts are consum er credit sales contracts. Fogie v. Rent-A-Center , 518 N.W. 2d at 544. Describing the contract’ s terms as “options” do es not change its nature. These so-called “options” are simply the rights enjoyed by any consumer credit sale purchaser. The compensation paid for the right to acquire ownership by paying the purchas e pri ce over time in a consumer credit sale is interest. Likewise, th e compen sation collected by the seller for the risks associated wit h collecting the purchase price over time is interest. Simply calling the rights and risks associated with credit sales “options” does not entitle the seller to additional compensation in excess of the usury rate. Accordingly, by process of elimination, we must conclude that th e “cost of lease services” term in the rental purchase contracts is interest

. To the extent the value of any additional service or option is included,

we agree w ith the district court that no fact finder could reasonabl y conclude such value is sufficient to reduce the 46% to 746% range of annua l percentage rates charged by RAC to a nonusurious level. The di strict court properly found that the third element of th e usury claim has been established.

b. Intent RAC conte nds that summary judgment is improer because the plaintiff class failed to prove the fourth element, intent to evade the usury law. “Intent” for the purposes of usury law consists in the intent to take more interest than allowed by law; it is not necessary that the person taking the int erest knows he is violating the usury law. Trapp v. Hancuh , 53 0 N.W.2d 879, 885 (Minn. 1995); Citizen’s Nat. Bank of Willmar v. Taylor ,

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368 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 1985). If the eviden ce shows a direct contract whereby the lender exacts excessive

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interest, the intent to evade the law is presumed. Fred G. Clark Co. v. E.C. Warner Co. , 247 N.W.225, 239 (Minn. 1933). In this case the contracts provide for RAC to exact interest i n

excess of th e usury rate and there is no claim by RAC that it did no t intend to collect less money than is stated in the contracts. Accordingly , as a matter of law, R AC had the requisite intent under the usury statute. Miller v. Colortyme , 518 N.W.2d at 550. RAC contends that it should be relie ved of the presumption of intent because it reasonably relied in good faith on the existing law. Washingto n Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Stillwater v. Baker , 374 N.W. 2d 786, 78 8 (Minn. Ap p. 1985). We reject this argument for the same reasons w e rejected RAC’s constitutional challenges. RAC’s reliance on a strained an d

erron eous construction of the statutory scheme is not the kind of goo d faith reliance that brings this exception into play. 3. Time-Price Doctrine RAC contends that the plaintiff clas s is not entitled to judgment as

a matter of law because their rental purchase contracts fall within th e time-price doctrine. This doctrine was based on the central premise that there can be no usury without a loan or forbearance of money and that the sale of p roperty in a time-price transaction involves no loan. Dunn v . Midland Loan Finance Corporation , 289 N.W. 411, 413 (Minn. 1939); St. Paul Bank for Cooperatives v. Ohman , 402 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Minn. 1987). Th e time-price doctrine was judicially created and is not an exception to usur y law, but recognizes transactions which are outsi de the scope of usury law. St. Paul Bank v. Ohman , 402 N.W.2d at 238. RAC’s argument is foreclosed by the rulings of the Minnesota Supreme Court. In Fogie v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. , the Court ruled in no uncertain terms that the usury statute, Minn. Stat. § 334.01 applies to rent-to-own contracts. 518 N.W.2d at 544. Accordingly, RAC cannot now argue that its rental purchase agreements are transactions which fall outside the scope of the usury law. Fu rthermore, the loan or forbearance element of usury, missi ng in time-price transactions, is satisfied in rental purchas e agreements by operation of statute. Miller v. C olortyme, Inc. , 518 N.W.2d at 549. In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been

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unwilling to expand the time-price doctrine unless justified by economic needs and social attitudes making the protections of the usury statut e unnecessary. Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Company , 219 N.W.2d 641, 647 (Minn

. 1974). We find no such justification here. “We are bound to apply state law as we are able to discern it fro m the rulings of the state’s courts.” Boner v. Em inence R-1 School Dist. 55 F.3d 1339, 1341 (8th Cir. 1995), quoting Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co. , 99 4 F.2d 1295, 1310 (8th Cir. 1993). Under the applicable state case law, it is clear that RAC’s rental purchase contracts do not fall within the timeprice doctrine and are subject to the usury statute. B. Injunction Order We revie w the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction fo r

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Green Acres Enterprises, Inc. , 86 F.3d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1996); Soo Line R. Co

. , 850 F.2d at 374. Abuse of d iscretion occurs if the district court reaches its conclusion b y applying erroneous legal principles or relying on clearly erroneous factua l findings. Id. The Eigth Circuit balances four factors to determine whethe r injunctive relief is warranted: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; ( 2) the state of balance between this harm and the harm to b e suffered b y the nonmoving party if the injunction is granted; (3) th e probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L System s, Inc. , 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)(en banc). The standard is the same for a permanen t injunction except tha t the movant must show actual success on the merits. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alas ka , 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987). The district court did not make explici t findings with respect to these fou r factors. However, by prevailing on its usury claim th e plaintiff class has demonstrated that the four factors of this tes t overwhelmingly militate in favor of an injunction. As demonstrated in this opinion, the plaintiff class has shown actual success on the merits. In addition, public inte rest overwhelmingly favors enjoining these contr acts. The public policy of Minnesota is revealed in its consumer protecti on statutory scheme including the usury statute, the

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CCSA and the RPAA. The actions enjoined here violate the letter and spiri t of this statutory sch eme and are clearly against the public interest. To balance against this, the only

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harm to RAC is the loss of the usurious portion of its income. RAC contends that the plaintiff clas s has failed to show irreparable injury because the district court has established a formula for calculatin g money damages. However, this formula only compensates for past damages an d onl y reaches class members who have been identified. Estimating futur e losses of similarly situated individuals if RAC continues its practices is virtually impossible, as is identifying those potential victims of their practices. Giving due weight to each of the four factors, we are satisfie d that there has been no abuse of discretion by the district court.
V. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the district court’s order granting summary judgmen t for the plaintiff class and enjoining RAC from entering int o usurious credit sales transactions is AFFIRMED.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.