Gulf War 

Air Power Survey 

Volume IV 

Weapons, Tactics, and Training 

and 

Space Operations 

Washington, D. C. 

1993 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Gulf War Air Power Survey 

p. cm. 

Gulf War Air Power Survey directed by Eliot A. Cohen. 

Includes an unnumbered summary report by Thomas A. Keaney and 

Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 

Contents: v. 1. Planning and Command and Control -- v. 2. Operations and 

Eliot A. Cohen. 

Effects and Effectiveness -- v. 3. Logistics and Support -- v.4. Weapons, Tactics, 

and Training and Space Operations -- v. 5. A Statistical Compendium and Chronology. 

1. Persian Gulf War, 1991--Aerial operations. American. 2. United States. 

Air Force--History--Persian Gulf War, 1991. I. Cohen, Eliot A. 11. Gulf War Air 

Power Survey (Organization : U.S.). 111. United States. Dept. of the Air Force. 

IV. Title: Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report. 

DS79.724.U6G85 1993 

956.7044’248--d~20 93-30601 

CIP 

For sale by the US. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISBN 0-16-042927-7 
Gulf War Air Power Survey 

Staff 

Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director 

Col. Emery M. Kiraly 

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Kelley 

(Retired, USAF) 

Dr. Wayne W. Thompson 

Mr. Ernest D. Cruea 

Maj. Joseph W. Patterson 

Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek 

Lt. Col. Daniel T. Kuehl 

Lt. Col. Robert C. Owen 

Dr. John F. Guilmartin 

Mr. Richard A. Gunkel 

Dr. Thomas C. Hone 

Dr. Alexander S. Cochran 

Mr. Barry D. Watts 

Dr. Thomas A. Keaney 

Executive Director 

Senior Military Advisor 

Senior Historical Advisor 

ANSER Program Manager 

Executive Oficer 

Publishing Manager 

Chiej Statistics 

Chief, Chronology 

ChieJ Weapons, Tactics 

and Training 

Chiej Logistics, Space, 

and Support 

Chiej Command, Control, 

and Organization 

Chiej Strategy and 

Plans 

Chiej Operations and 

Efsects 

Chiej Summary Report 

iii 
Gulf War Air Power Survey 

Review Committee 

Hon. Paul H. Nitze, Chairman 

Diplomat in Residence 

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 

Gen. Michael J. Dugan (USAF, Retired) 

Multiple Sclerosis Society 

Adm. Huntington Hardisty (USN, Retired) 

Center for Naval Analyses 

Dr. Richard H. Kohn 

The University of North Carolina 

at Chapel Hill 

Dr. Bernard Lewis 

Princeton University 

Mr. Andrew W. Marshall 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Mr. Phillip Merrill 

Former Assistant Secretary General 

for Defense Support, NATO 

Dr. Henry Rowen 

Stanford University 

Hon. Ike Skelton 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Gen. Maxwell Thurrnan (USA, Retired) 

Association of the U.S. Army 

Maj. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr. (USAF, Retired) 

Former Assistant Chief of Staff (Studies 

and Analysis) 

Dr. James Q. Wilson 

University of California at Los Angeles 

iv 
Foreword 

From 16 January through 28 February 1991, the United States and 

its allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in 

history, a conflict in which air operations played a preeminent role. 

The Gulf War Air Power Survey was commissioned on 22 August 1991 

to review all aspects of air warfare in the Persian Gulf for use by the 

United States Air Force, but it was not to confine itself to discussion of 

that institution. The Survey has produced reports on planning, the 

conduct of operations, the effects of the air campaign, command and 

control, logistics, air base support, space, weapons and tactics, as well 

as a chronology and a compendium of statistics on the war. It has 

prepared as well a summary report and some shorter papers and assembled an archive composed of paper, microfilm, and electronic records, all of which have been deposited at the Air Force Historical 

Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Survey 

was just that, an attempt to provide a comprehensive and documented 

account of the war. It is not a definitive history: that will await the 

passage of time and the opening of sources (Iraqi records, for example) 

that were not available to Survey researchers. Nor is it a summary of 

lessons learned: other organizations, including many within the Air 

Force have already done that. Rather, the Survey provides an analytical 

and evidentiary point of departure for future studies of the air campaign. 

It concentrates on an analysis of the operational level of war in the belief 

that this level of warfare is at once one of the most difficult to characterize and one of the most important to understand. 

The Survey was directed by Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins 

University’s School of Advanced International Studies and was staffed by 

a mixture of civilian and military analysts, including retired officers from 

the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was divided into task forces, 

most of which were run by civilians working temporarily for the Air 

Force. The work produced by the Survey was examined by a distinguished review committee, that included scholars, retired general officers 

from the Air Force, Navy, and Army, as well as former and current 

senior government officials, Throughout, the Survey strived to conduct 

its research in a spirit of impartiality and scholarly rigor. Its members 

had as their standard the observation of Mr. Franklin D’Olier, chairman 

of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey during and after the 

second World War: “We wanted to burn into everybody’s souls that fact 

that the survey’s responsibility . . . was to ascertain facts and to seek 

truth, eliminating completely any preconceived theories or dogmas.” 

V 
The Survey attempted to create a body of data common to all of the 

reports. Because one group of researchers compiled this core material 

while other task forces were researching and drafting other, more narrowly focused studies, it is possible that discrepancies exist among the 

reports with regard to points of detail. More importantly, authors were 

given discretion, within the bounds of evidence and plausibility, to interpret events as they saw them. In some cases, task forces came to differing conclusions about particular aspects of this war. Such divergences 

of view were expected and even desired: the Survey was intended to 

serve as a point of departure for those who read its reports, and not their 

analytical terminus. 

In the classified version, this volume consists of two reports: 

Weapons, Tactics, and Training, which focuses on Coalition as well as 

Iraqi air forces and Iraqi surface-based air defenses in the Gulf War, and 

Space Operations, which examines the use of space systems, mobilization 

of equipment for space operations, and the role of commercial space 

systems within a military context. However, because the Space report 

contains such an excessive amount of classified detail that the balance 

would be incomprehensible, the report is not published in the unclassified 

volume. 

vi 
Acknowledgments 

The Survey’s members owe a great debt of gratitude to Secretary of 

the Air Force Donald B. Rice, who conceived of the project, provided it 

with resources, and set for it the highest standards of independence and 

objectivity. Many organizations and individuals gave generously of their 

resources and time to support this effort. Various branches and commands of the Air Force were particularly helpful in providing material for 

and, in some cases, personnel to conduct the study. The United States 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aided with this study in different ways, 

including the sharing of data pertaining to the air war. A number of the 

United States’ Coalition partners also made available individuals and 

records that were vital to the Survey’s work. Many participants in the 

war, including senior political officials and officers from all of the Services were willing to speak with the Survey and share their recollections of 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Private students of the Gulf War also 

made available their knowledge of the crisis and conflict. Wherever 

possible and appropriate such assistance has been acknowledged in the 

text. 

The Survey’s independence was its reason for being. Each report is 

the product of the authors who wrote it and does not necessarily represent 

the views of the Review Committee, the Air Force or the Department of 

Defense. 

vii 
Security Review 

The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were 

submitted to the Department of Defense for policy 

and security review. In accordance with this review, certain information has been removed from 

the original text. These areas have been annotated 

as [DELETED]. 

viii 
Gulf War Air Power Survey 

Reports 

Summary Report 

Volume I: 

Volume 11: 

Volume 111: 

Volume IV: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Volume V 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Planning Report 

Command and Control Report 

Operations Report 

Effectiveness Report 

Logistics Report 

Support Report 

Weapons, Tactics, 

and Training Report 

Space Report 

A Statistical Compendium 

Chronology 

ix 

Contents 

Foreword .................................... v 

Acknowledgments ............................... vii 

List of Gulf War Air Power Survey Reports .............. ix 

Part I: Weapons, Tactics, and Training 

Index to Weapons, Tactics, and Training 

Part 11: Space Operations 

Precis of Space Operations 

Glossary 

xi 

Part I 

Weapons, Tactics, and Training 

Part I 

Weapons, Tactics, and Training 

Task Force Chief 

Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Jr. 

Principal Authors 

Mr. Richard J. Blanchfield 

Mr. Paul Bloch 

Mr. Jon Dunham 

Lt. Col. Robert D. Eskridge 

Col. Frank L. Goldstein 

Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Jr. 

Capt. Jeffrey A. Hodgdon 

Col. Daniel W. Jacobowitz 

Lt. Col. Charles P. Marshall 

Col. Mark L. Tarpley 

Principal Contributors 

MSgt. Richard Blair 

Mr. Donald Kellum 

MSgt. Linda Morrison 

Mr. Dewey Nash 

Maj. Theron L. Severance 

Contents 

Report Acknowledgements ......................... xi 

Introduction ................................. xi i i 

1 Iraqi Weapons. Tactics. and Training ................ 1 

2 Aircraft and Weapons .......................... 39 

3 Coalition Tactics . Fundamentals .................. 127 

4 Special Issues .............................. 241 

5 Training ................................. 343 

6 Conclusions .............................. 359 

Appendix 

A Definition of Aerial Missions .................... 365 

B Examples of Psyops Leaflets ..................... 369 

C The Aeronautical Rating ....................... 383 

D Historical USCENTAF Exercises. 1985-1990 ............ 391 

E Desert Shield Exercises ........................ 409 

F Flag Exercises ............................. 421 

G B-52 Training . The Diego Garcia Problem ........... 437 

H Special Operations Forces Training Considrations ........ 441 

I Navy/Marine Corps Desert ShieldlDesert Storm Training ... 443 
Figures 

1 IAADVF Organizational Structure .................. 4 

2 Army Organizational Structure .................... 5 

3 Iraqi Air Defense Command and Control Chart .......... 7 

4 Radar-Guided SAM and EW Radar Coverage ........... 11 

5 Radar-Guided SAM Locations in the Baghdad Area ....... 12 

6 Iraqi SAMs and AAA .......................... 18 

7 Air Defense Fighter Bases and Probable Deployment 

Fields as of December 1991 ................... 23 

8 Larak Island Strike. 14 May 1988 .................. 29 

9 AIM-7M ................................. 112 

10 Semi-Active Homing ......................... 113 

11 AIM-7M Employment ......................... 114 

12 AIM-9M ................................. 115 

13 AIM-120A ................................ 117 

14 Pilot’s HUD with CCIP Aimpoint ................... 128 

15 Dive Delivery Factors ......................... 129 

16 Wide Field-of-View Radar Picture ................. 132 

17 Moving Radar Crosshairs to Update Steering .......... 133 

18 Bombing Scope Presentation ..................... 133 

vi 
19 Level Radar Delivery ......................... 134 

20 Comparative FLIR Field of View .................. 136 

2 1 Laser-Guided Bomb Release ..................... 138 

22 Buddy Bombing ............................ 139 

23 Last Ditch Maneuver ......................... 144 

24 Roller Coaster Maneuver ....................... 145 

25 Slanted "S" Maneuver ......................... 147 

26 Line Abreast .............................. 149 

27 Trail 150 .................................... 

28 Wedge .................................. 151 

29 Perpendicular Attack ......................... 158 

30 Gorilla Package ............................. 164 

31 1-2000 Perforation Limits ....................... 177 

32 "J" Hooking Effect ........................... 

33 Conventional Weapons Enhanced Penetration (CWEP) ..... 181 

34 EC Combat Preparations ....................... 

35 Iraqi Air Defense Command and Control ............. 

36 Iraqi SAM Coverage (16 Nov 90) 

37 H+40 Large-Scale SEAD Strike ................... 

38 Jamming Tactics ............................ 191 

177 

183 

184 

185 

187 

.................. 

vii 
39 Typical Weasel Police Station .................... 193 

40 Tactical Spread ............................. 195 

41 Mudaysis Airfield Attack ....................... 196 

42 MiG-29 Kill ............................... 197 

43 Citgo Flight Sequence No . 1 ..................... 198 

44 Citgo Flight Sequence No . 2 ..................... 

45 Citgo Flight Sequence No . 3 ..................... 

199 

200 

46 Citgo Flight Sequence No . 4 ..................... 201 

47 Desert Storm CAP and AWACS Stations ............... 202 

48 Zerex Flight Sequence No . 1 .................... 214 

49 Zerex Flight Sequence No . 2 .................... 214 

50 Push CAS System ............................ 235 

51 Strikes by Aircraft and Time of Day ................ 272 

52 Scud Functional Flow 

to Launch Positions (Soviet Model) .............. 277 

53 Scud Targets and Launch Sectors .................. 285 

54 Scud CAP Notification Net ...................... 287 

55 Mobile Scud Exposure Time ..................... 289 

56 Comparison of Scud Launch Rates ................. 294 

57 Operational Control of SOF Forces Split Among 

Different Components ...................... 297 

viii 
58 CENTCOM CSAR Procedure ...................... 303 

59 Blood Chit ................................ 305 

60 Leaflet .................................. 308 

61 The Tanker Tracks/Anchors Used on 

Day 1 Desert Storm ........................ 314 

62 Quick Flow Air Refueling Procedures ............... 

63 Supporting the CINC .......................... 321 

64 Training Area 23W and 23E ..................... 

316 

322 

65 Desert Shield CAP and AWACS Conditioning ........... 323 

66 "Nighthawk" Refueling Track .................... 324 

67 Marshalling Area ............................ 325 

68 PSYOP Effort and Relative Effectiveness 

in the Persian Gulf ........................ 336 

69 B-52 Leaflet Operations ........................ 340 

Tables 

1 SAM Order of Battle for Iraq ..................... 10 

2 Antiaircraft Artillery ........................... 16 

3 CombatAircraft ............................. 19 

4 Aircraft Modernization ......................... 20 

5 Iraqi Fighter Aircraft by Capability ................. 21 

ix 
6 TDA Target Information Worksheet ................. 157 

7 F-11 IF and F-117 Level Releases ................. 176 

8 Iraqi Shelter Types by Airfield ................... 211 

9 Close Air Support/Interdiction Sorties by Day .......... 220 

10 TLAM and CALCM Targets: First 24 Hours ............ 251 

11 TLAM Targets: Second 24 Hours .................. 251 

12 Weapons and Sorties Required to Destroy 

a Reinforced Concrete Bridge .................... 260 

13 Bombing Capabilities by Platform ................. 270 

14 Resources Committed to Scud Hunt Operations ......... 288 

15 Israeli Scud Casualties ........................ 332 

16 Flying Training Syllabus for 

F-16 Replacement Training Unit ................ 345 

17 Currencies ................................ 346 

18 Unit Taskings Pre-Desert Shield .................. 347 

19 F-16 Graduated Combat Capability Requirements 

363d TFW ............................. 349 

20 Aircrew Sortie Rates ......................... 352 

X 
Report Acknowledgements 

The Task Force for this report surveyed a mass of highly technical 

material in considerable detail. The experience and professional background of several members was directly relevant to the project, and the 

principal authors reviewed the entire report for completeness, accuracy, 

and objectivity. Authorship was therefore a shared endeavor. The task 

force’s leader, Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Jr., was editor-in-chief and 

primary author of the report. Other principal contributions came from 

Col. Daniel W. Jacobowitz, who as an associate editor wrote, organized, 

and structured this report; retired Navy captain Paul Bloch, who became 

the associate editor to finalize this report and authored chapter one; Col. 

Frank Goldstein, Air Force professional psychologist, who authored 

sections in chapter four; retired Marine Corps Col. Rich Blanchfield, 

who helped to edit final versions and authored a section in chapter four; 

Col. Mark Tarpley, who provided final technical editing and authored 

sections on air refueling, B-52s, and electronic warfare; Lt. Col. Charles Marshall, who provided expertise, research, and inputs for the report 

and authored the chapter on training; Lt. Col. Robert Eskridge, who 

provided expertise, research, and inputs on Iraqi air defenses; Capt. Jeff 

Hodgdon, who provided final technical editing, expertise, research, and 

input and wrote most sections on aircraft, weapons, and tactics; and Mr. 

Jon Dunham, who authored the section on tactical deception. 

MSgt. Richard Blair and MSgt. Linda Morrison were responsible for 

archival research; Mr. Dewey Nash for artwork, with several illustrations prepared by Maj. Randall Marbury. Editors Ms. Anne H. Predzin 

and Mr. Chris Pankow deserve credit for enhancing the quality of the 

report. Finally, Ms. Kathy Glahe was responsible for data input, word 

processing, and administrative support during the entire project, without 

which the timely completion of the report would have been impossible. 

xi 

Introduction 

This report brings together analyses of three crucial determinants of 

an armed force's overall capability: 

0 weapons-the tools used by the soldier, sailor, and airman, 

0 tactics-the ways in which the tools are used to produce desired 

'effects and, 

training-the way in which the individual soldier, sailor, and 

airman acquires the skills required to combine weapons and 

tactics into the operational art of warfare. 

The report focuses on the impact of these three elements on the application of air power projected by the U.S. and Coalition forces in the Gulf 

War. The information and conclusions presented provide background 

essential to a more complete understanding of the facts, principles, and 

precepts developed and discussed in other volumes of this study. 

The research to support this report was drawn from several sources. 

First and foremost, the extensive operational and technical expertise of 

the principal authors and contributors served as a reservoir of knowledge 

and background. Their primary search for information focused on 

intelligence estimates, unit reports, flight data bases, and earlier studies 

pertinent to the task. Additionally, the authors interviewed Gulf War 

participants from the United States and Coalition countries and obtained 

volumes of supporting documents and information now resting within the 

GWAPS archive. Because of time constraints and the ambitious scope of 

the task, some issues and topics within this report are either addressed 

only at the surface or not addressed at all. These issues are usually 

identified as areas for future study. 

To frame ensuing discussions and to establish a basis for comparison, 

the report begins with an overview of weapons, tactics, and training 

within the Iraqi armed forces. Quantitative indices and past performance 

indicated that Iraq possessed a formidable military organization-a battlehardened force that could test the capabilities of any military power 

xiii 
throwin against it. Chapter one looks beyond numbers and Iraqi propaganda to examine the ti111 range of Iraq’s weapon systems and its tactics 

for employing them. The chapter continues by describing Iraqi tactics 

and performance during the Iran-Iraq war and concludes with a discussion of Iraqi actions and responses to Coalition air power during the Gulf 

War. 

Chapter two begins an in-depth look at U.S. and Coalition aircraft 

and weapons used during the Gulf War. To aid the analysis, the 

weapalns and aircraft are grouped by mission: air-to-ground, electronic 

warfare and reconnaissance, and air-to-air. This study of equipment and 

systems yields an understanding of the decided advantage that the 

Coalition forces possessed by virtue of their technological superiority. 

Chapters three and four are a comprehensive examination of the 

tactics employed by U.S. and to a lesser extent Coalition air forces. 

Chaptler three begins by discussing the fundamental aerial employment 

tactics used in the war, with U.S. Air Force tactics as the central focus. 

The chapter then addresses the capabilities required to accomplish representative Gulf War missions ranging from ordnance delivery to air-to-air 

engagements to electronic warfare. To illustrate these capabilities, a 

typical mission and associated planning considerations and special requirements are analyzed in detail. Next, the focus shifts to the tactics 

employed to achieve specific objectives. First is a study of the way in 

which Coalition aircraft attacked the core of Iraqi power. The study 

discusses the opening attacks designed to not only achieve air superiority 

but to strike directly at Iraq’s strategic core, paralyzing the national 

leadership and neutralizing its major offensive threats. This discussion 

is follsowed by a look at Coalition air operations designed to gain and 

maintain air superiority by neutralizing the Iraqi air defense network and 

eliminating the Iraqi air force as a factor in the war. The chapter concludes by examining the tactics used by Coalition air forces to attack 

Iraqi ground and naval forces, with particular emphasis on close air 

suppoirt/battlefield air interdiction missions. 

While chapter three examines the tactics that contributed to the Coalition viictory, chapter four highlights special systems, tactics, and issues 

that made the Gulf War different from previous conflicts. Stealth and 

low-observable technology, which played a key role in the outcome of 

x iv 
Desert Storm, is the initial topic of discussion. Three systems used in 

the Gulf War-the F-117 stealth fighter, the Tomahawk Land Attack 

Missile, and the Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile-are discussed 

in detail. The next section assesses the relative merits of mass bombing 

versus those of precision-guided munitions. The capability to conduct a 

twenty-four hour air war is addressed next. This analysis reveals both 

improved capabilities and remaining significant limitations. The next 

section of the chapter details efforts used to neutralize the threat of Iraqi 

Scud missiles and describes the campaign against Scuds, from the early 

effort to destroy fixed-launch sites and storage facilities to later attempts 

to search out and destroy mobile Scud launchers. Chapter four 

concludes by examining special operations, air refueling, tactical deception, and psychological operations from the airpower perspective. 

The weapons of Desert Storm and the tactics for using them were 

only part of the story. This war, like all of its predecessors, was fought 

by people. For people to succeed in war, they must be well trained in 

the tactics, techniques, and procedures required to use the tools of their 

trade effectively. Chapter five examines training, the means through 

which U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Coalition airmen learned their craft 

and maintained their proficiency. The chapter addresses three essential 

questions: Did the U.S. and Coalition air forces fight the way they had 

been trained? Were some kinds of training more useful than others? 

Were combat skills continually honed in preparing for the war, or did 

they deteriorate during the five months of Desert Shield? The chapter 

begins with a look at the pre-August 1990 training of combat ready 

forces before deployment to Southwest Asia. It then addresses the 

training accomplished during the next five months during Desert Shield. 

The analysis takes into account the conflicting demands of training and 

combat readiness. It concludes by discussing the training initiatives 

advanced and implemented during Desert Storm to modify procedures as 

the war unfolded. Appendices provide further information on aerial 

definitions, psyops leaflets, and basic flight training by the Services; 

recurring exercises designed to maintain combat readiness; and particular 

training problems experienced by aircrews from B-52 units, Special 

Operations Forces, and the Navy and Marine Corps. 

The authors of this report attempted to provide an understandable 

frame of reference for analyzing the air campaign in the Gulf War. The 

xv 
enormity of this task 'was complicated by the highly technical developments of recent decades that produced exceptionally capable weapons 

and systems, which, in many cases, were being employed in combat for 

the first time. These seemingly revolutionary technical advancements 

produced the best equipped, most highly trained air power forces in the 

history of the United States and perhaps the world. It is hoped that the 

ensuing pages will impart to the reader a basic understanding of the 

weapons, tactics, and training responsible for the airpower successes in 

Desert Storm. 

xvi 
1 

Iraqi Weapons, Tactics, And "hhing 

Overall Defense Capabilities 

In the summer of 1990, the Iraqi armed forces looked very impressive 

on paper. Iraq had over a million men in its regular army, fourth largest 

in the world. It had a substantial inventory of reliable, technologically 

sophisticated, relatively modem instruments of war. Its Army had over 

5,000 tanks, 8,000 other armored vehicles, and 3,300 artillery pieces. It 

had a multilayered air defense system and an air force with over 700 

tactical aircraft, including some of the latest Soviet designs such as the 

MIG-29 Fulcrum and SU-25 Frogfoot. Iraq had used chemical weapons 

in the Iran-Iraq War and against the Kurds, and was believed to be developing nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles to deliver them. 

If the Iraqis performed up to the standards of their equipment, they 

had the potential to give any opponent a tough fight. However, the 

impressive numbers and capabilities disguised serious deficiencies. The 

highly centralized command and control system needed to support the 

political structure also acted to stifle the initiative of lower ranking personnel. The few pieces of new equipment overshadowed the fact that 

most of the rest were old and technologically inferior to the best Western 

systems. The large number of personnel under arms hid the fact that 

most were poorly trained conscripts. 

This chapter discusses Iraqi weapons systems and tactics. It is meant 

to support the discussion of Coalition tactics and weapon systems that 

follows. The chapter then describes and analyzes the Iraqi air command 

and control structure, including equipment. Ground-based systems such 

as surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and antiaircraft artillery will be discussed 

first, followed by a discussion of aircraft and related systems. To provide 

some feel for Iraqi ideas on tactical employment, the chapter discusses 

Iraqi performance in the Iran-Iraq War. It concludes with a look at Iraqi 

1 
tactics and behavior in response to the onslaught of the Coalition air 

assault. 

Military and Air Defense Command and Control 

TWO key factors drove the organization of the Iraqi armed forces. 

First, it had to be centralized. As with everything else in the Iraqi Government, supreme military authority rested solely in the hands of Saddam 

Hussein. Though he had no military experience, he assumed the rank of 

Marshal and wore military uniforms to underscore the fact that he was the 

Commander-in-Chief. To reinforce his control of the military, Saddam 

installed relatives and kinsmen in key positions and established a parallel 

reporting system through Ba’ath party officers in the military units.’ 

Survival of the regime was the first priority of the government and the 

armed forces. Iraqi’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors was the 

second factor having an impact on its military equipment and tactics. 

The Israeli attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 caused Iraq to 

disperse and harden its weapons research facilities and concern itself with 

attacks from the west. Similarly, the performance of its forces in the 

eight-year war with Iran had precipitated major developments in its air 

defense and air forces in an attempt to address that threat from the east. 

In effect, Iraq faced a “two front’’ threat. 

At the time of the Gulf War7 the highly centralized military command 

and control systems all led to Saddam Hussein. In order for these systems to operate properly, Saddam needed to receive an immense amount 

of accurate information. Among the systems that provided this information was a mainframe computer installed in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense 

computer center. Information ran up to the Presidential Palace and 

General Headquarters and down to the brigade level and improved Iraq’s 

ability to plan large scale operations.2 The Iraqis purchased the system 

‘Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear, Pantheon Books. 1989, p 26. For a list of 

Saddam Hussein’s associates in the government and military of Iraq see also Appendices 

1 and 2 of Instant Empire by Simon Henderson, Mercury House, 1991. 

2(!WF/wN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, Navy SPEAR, NIC 26605-018-90. 10 Dec 

1990, p 1-5. This document was the source of much of the material in this section. It 

was, in fact, compiled from a variety of sources, including CIA, DIA, Defense Attaches, 

and Army, Navy, and Air Force weapons research facilities. It was a primary source of 

information about Iraq before the Gulf War. 

2 
to correct deficiencies noted during the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi intelligence system was a vital element. 

Iraq’s air defense system was formidable. It was optimized against two 

threat axes, east against Iran, and west against IsraeL3 Since the country’s 

material assets were so widely dispersed, no attempt was made to defend 

them all; instead, defense of the capital was considered foremost! 

The Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces (IAADF) 

shared responsibility for air defense. The Iraqi Army was responsible for 

tactical air defense of the ground force headquarters, maneuver units, and 

logistics facilities. The IAADF was in charge of strategic air defense, 

which included control of Iraqi airspace, defense of key areas, protection 

of important installations and most important of all, protection of Baghdad.” IAADF organizational structure is shown below (Figure 1). Army 

air defense was organized as shown in Figure 2. 

The highly centralized air defense structure relied on extensive, 

redundant connectivity. The Iraqi Air Defense Forces (IADF) headquarters 

was at Rasheed Air Base, near Baghdad. The IADF‘s Air Defense Operations Center assigned air defense priorities, but did not directly control 

operations within the air defense sectors. Each air defense sector had a 

sector operations center (SOC), which controlled and was responsible for 

all air defense within its area. Each soc was supported by several 

intercept operations centers (IOCS). Each IOC was in turn fed by a network of visual and radar reporting posts. In theory, the SOCs made all 

combat engagement decisions for their respective sectors, while the 

3(S/NFiM”) Navy SPEAR Office briefing to GWAPS, 15 May 1992. 

4(S/NFIWN/NC) “Iraq as a Military Adversary (cMF),” Central lntelligence Agency, 

’(SRVFIWN/NC) Iraqi Threat to US. Forces, p 3-7. 

SNlE 2-5-90, &t 1990. 

3 
4 
I 

U I 

5 
respective IOC controlled the use of SAMs or interceptors to carry out the 

engagement. This structure is depicted in Figure 3. 

Utilizing Soviet doctrine, the air defense system was designed around 

KARI,* a computerized Command and Control (C2) system purchased 

from the French. KARI was the spine and nervous system of the Iraqi air 

defense system. When functioning as advertised, KARI combined the 

disparate elements of the air defense system-including early warning 

radars, ground controlled intercept radars, interceptor fighters, surface-toair missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery-into a cohesive system responsive 

to centralized direction. The technical and tactical capabilities of its 

individual system components made this system a potentially serious 

threat to Coalition airpower. 

Initid contracts for KARI were initkted in 1974 and the system became 

operational in 1987. The primary strength of the system was its sophisticated 

and redundant connectivity. The system was centered in Baghdad and 

covered all of Iraq. It was extended into Kuwait after the invasion? 

KARI was to provide rapid communications for air battle diagnosis 

and management. To ensure the survivability of KARI, the Iraqis installed 

multiple hardened communications links. From the Soviets and from 

their own experience in the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis had learned the 

tactical vulnerability of radio transmissions. To offset the vulnerability 

of radio transmissions, the Iraqis connected the nodes of the system with 

a network of buried fiber optic cables. For redundancy, each element of 

KARI was also linked by microwave communications." 

[DELETED] 

8The acronym comes from Iraq spelled backwards in French. 

9(SINFIWNfNC) Iraqi Threat To US. Forces, p 3-15 Also see (SMF) Iraq Ground 

and Air Force Doctrine, Tactics, and Operations (UNF). Defense Intelligence Agency DDB2600-6123-90, Feb 1990, p 115. 

'o(SMFIWN/NC) Iraqi Threat To U.S. Forces, pp 3-15. 3-17. 

6 
Figure 3 

Iraqi Air Defense Command and Control Chart" 

FIGURE DELETED 

"(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 3-16. 

7 
[ DELETED]I3 

[DELETED]I4 [DELETED] IS 

[DELETED]I6 [DELETED]." 

Battle management was done at the SOCs. These nodes had engagement authority and held sufficient information to enable the controllers 

to understand the overall air situation within their sectors. The socs were 

the critical element of the integrated battle management system." [DELETED]. The SOC personnel determined the best systems to engage the 

targets, even the type of intercept or the number of missiles to be fired 

at the intruder. [DELETED] Once decisions were made, they were 

immediately passed to the affected IOCS for ground-controlled intercept 

by manned aircraft, missile or gun engagement." 

Each IOC developed the air situation for its area, using input from as 

many as six radar reporting posts along with voice or data reports from 

observation and command posts. [DELETED]" 

Information, the life blood of the IOCS, came to them from their radar 

reporting posts (RP). [DELETED] Skilled radar operators, crucial to the 

operation of the RPs, had to view tracks and select likely targets.21 

I2(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 3-17. 

I3(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 3-19. 

14(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 3-20. 

I5(S/NF/WN) SPEAR Briefing. 

16(S/NF) Iraqi Ground and Air Force Doctrine, Tactics, and Operations (C/NF), p 1 15. 

17 

"(Cs/NF> Iraqi Groundand Air Forces Doctrine, Tactics, and Operations (WF), p 1 15. 

19(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 3-20. 

20(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 3-22. 

(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 3-20. 

(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, pp 3-22, 3-24. 21 

8 
Another older method of tracking aircraft was also an important part 

of the KARI system. Observation posts (OPs) provided aural and, presumably, visual tracking to the KARI system, filling in voids in radar coverage.22 [DELETED]23 

Although the 10c sub-system was efficient within its design limitations, it was vulnerable to saturation. [DELETED]24 [DELETED] 

In summation, while the KARl system was designed to be operated by 

personnel with roughly the western equivalent of a sixth grade education, 

training for operators at the lower levels was still crucial. The level and 

extent of initial and follow-on training programs for operators was unkn0wn.2~ Also unknown was how much effort the Iraqis invested in live 

ground controlled intercept ((XI) training. [DELETED] Like other 

aspects of the Iraqi defense forces the KARl system looked much better 

on paper than in combat. 

SAM and AAA Systems 

KARl was probably the most advanced aspect of the Iraqi air defense 

system. It was able to integrate the wide variety of air defense weapons 

Iraq had obtained from numerous sources around the world. The variety 

of sources was a weakness in the system. Table 1 lists the Surface-to-Air 

Missile (SAM) Order of Battle for Iraq in December 1990. While the number of launchers (see Table 1) was large, it was not sufficient to protect 

all of Iraq. As a result, Iraq effectively established a point defense system. Figure 4 illustrates SAM and radar coverage. Priority was given to 

the areas critical to the survival of the regime. Figure 5 shows the deployment of SAM systems around Baghdad, the seat of Saddam’s power, 

and the site of the most critical military installations. 

These SAMS were assigned to the Iraqi Air and Air Defense Force 

(IAADF) and were grouped into battalions and regiments to defend priority 

22(S/NF) Iraq Ground and Air Force Doctrine, Tactics, and Operations (CAW), p I 15. 

23(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, pp 3-24 and 3-38, 39. 

“(SMFIWN) CDR Fitzgerald, SPEAR Briefing. and (SMFIWNMC) Iraqi Threat to 

2S(SMFIWNMC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 3-25. 

U.S. Forces, p 3-20. 

9 
Table 1 

SAM Order of Battle For Iraq" 

5Pe Origin Batteries [DELETED] 

SA-2 Soviet 

SA-3 Soviet 

SA-6 Soviet 

SA-8 

SA-9 

Soviet 

Soviet [DELETED] 

SA-13 Soviet 

SA- 1 &' Soviet 

Roland French 

[DELETED] 

areas. A senior air defense officer was charged with coordinating defense 

of the area. [DELETED]?' 

A problem with the Iraqi SAM systems was the mix of older and 

newer equipment. In some cases, the more modern SA-6 system had to 

be withdrawn from the frontline army units it was designed to protect, to 

replace or supplement aging SA-2 or SA-3 missile systems. Table 1 also 

reveals that most of the Iraqi SAM systems were of Soviet origin. This 

meant that the tactical employment, firing doctrine, and crew training 

were heavily influenced by Soviet doctrine. Large numbers of antiaircraft 

artillery (AAA) weapons supported the surface-to-air missile systems in 

certain areas. 

[DELETED] 

26(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p U- I ; GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 3, "Iraqi Order 

of Battle", Page 19. 

27(S/NF) SA-14s. shoulder-fired, infrared homing missiles, and mobile Roland 

systems were not organized into batteries. They were normally employed individually or 

in teams. 

28(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 3-71. 

10 

Figure 5 

Radar-Guided SAM Locations In The Baghdad Area3

I a 

1 
fast moving, maneuverable fighter aircraft. It had a range of twenty 

seven nautical miles and was designed for high-altitude targets.’* The 

SA-3, developed shortly after the SA-2, had a range of fourteen miles and 

was designed to defeat low- to medium-altitude air~raft.’~ 

[DELETED]% [DELETED]35 

SA-6 Gainful 

The SA-6 was developed in the 1960s to protect maneuvering ground 

units. Originally employed by the Iraqis in that capacity, it was withdrawn from frontline units during the Iran-Iraq War to protect key strategic sites. The SA-6 had a range of thirteen miles and was designed to be 

used mainly against very-low- to medium-altitude threats?’ After the 

Iran-Iraq War, many of the SA-6 batteries were returned to their ground 

units, particularly the Republican Guards. 

During Desert Shield, SA-6s were again placed at fixed sites defending airfields, key logistics centers, and command and control positions. 

[DELETED]39 SA-6 systems were also concentrated around Baghdad and 

the H3 areas. [DELETED]@ 

32(S/NF) Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, Vol 11, “Threat Reference Guide and 

Counter Tactics,” U.S. Air Force, 199 I, pp 5-2 to 5- 10. Henceforth referred to as MCM 

3-1, Vol 11. According to this manual, the maximum range is based on a target at 500 

knots. 

”(S/NF) Ibid, pp 5-9 to 5-14. 

34(S/NF) Ibid, p 5-14. 

’5(S/NFAb”/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, pp 3-72, 3-73. 

’6(S/NFA+”/NC) Ibid, p 3-72. 

37(S/NF/N”/NC) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 21 7, “Desert Storm Coalition Aircraft Attrition.” 

38(s/NF) MCM 3-1, VOl 11, pp 5-26 to 5-37. 

39(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to US. Forces, p 3-73. 

@(S/NF/WN/NC) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 204, “Desert Storm Coalition Aircraft Attrition.” 

13 
SA-8 Gecko 

The SA-8 was another tactical SAM designed to protect maneuver 

units. However, most SA-8s had been incorporated into the joint defense 

of strategically important areas, as had the SA-6s. The SA-8 had a 

maximum range of six nautical miles. [DELETEDI4’ 

Roland 

The French Roland was another short-range missile designed to 

protect tactical ground units. It had a range of approximately three and 

one half miles.“ Approximately thirteen Roland I (clear weather) systems and one hundred Roland 11 (all weather) systems had been sold to 

Iraq. By the beginning of the Gulf War, it appeared that most Rolands 

had been incorporated into the strategic air defense system protecting 

high-value target^."^ 

[ DELETEDIM [DELETED] ,45 [DELETED];& [DELETED]. 

SA-9 GaskidSA-I3 Gopher 

As Desert Storm approached, the only mounted systems organic to 

Army Air Defense units apparently were the SA-9 and SA-13s. These 

short-range systems used infrared seekers and could be foiled by flare 

countermeasures. However, fired against an unaware target, they could be 

quite effective. The SA-9 and SA-13s were usually used in conjunction 

with the highly capable ZSU-23/4 AAA weapon system with its Gun Dish 

radar. The ZSU-23/4 was generally considered the most lethal threat to 

low-flying aircraft. [DELETED]!’ 

4’(S/NF) MCM 3-1, vol /I, pp 5-33 to 5-37. 

42(S/NF) Ibid, pp 5-134 to 5-137. 

43(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 3-75. 

M(S/NFAVN/NC) Ibid. 

45(S/NF/WN/NC) GWA~ Statistical Compendium. Table 204, “Desert Storm Coali- 

&(S) Robert F. Dorr, Desert Storm Air War (Motor Book Intl: Osceola, NY, 1991). 

47(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, pp 3-80, 3-81. 

tion Aircraft Attrition.” 

p 48. [DELETED]. 

14 
Man Portable Air Defense SAMS (Man PADS) 

The Iraqis had SA-14s and over 3,000 SA-7s. Both were small, 

shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles used for close-in defense. The SA-7 

(Grail) was believed to be a copy of the U.S. Redeye infrared surface-toair missile. The SA-7 had a range of about two-and-one-half nautical 

miles and had to be fired at the heat created by an aircraft’s exhaust.48 

The SA-14 had a range of about three nautical miles and had an 

improved all-aspect seeker. SA-7s and SA-14s were distributed 

throughout the Iraqi Army and Air Defense Forces. Overall, infrared 

surface-to-air missiles were credited with downing or damaging several 

Coalition air~raft.4~ 

Hawk 

Iraqi forces captured a number of U.S.-made Hawk SAM batteries 

from the Kuwaitis. Hawk was a highly capable missile with excellent 

low-altitude and ECM capabilities. Since the Iraqis proved unable to 

operate the Hawk, it was not a factor in Desert Storm, although there was 

initial concern that it might be used.% 

AntiAircrafC Artillery (AAA) 

Numerically, the most important element of the Iraqi Air Defense 

system was the antiaircraft artillery. Table 2 is a list of the number and 

country of origin of the various AAA weapons. These 7,500 or more AAA 

weapons proved to be the most effective Iraqi antiaircraft systems in both 

the Iran-Iraq War and in Desert Storm. As with other Iraqi air defense 

weapon systems, AAA was deployed to protect the most important strategic locations. A~A systems used with co-located SAM systems presented 

a formidable threat to Coalition aircraft. Some post-war evaluations of 

Iraqi tactics indicated that the purpose of SAMs was not to destroy attacking aircraft as much as to force Coalition aircraft to maneuver into the 

AAA envelope. 

&(S/NF) MCM 3-1, VolIJ, pp 5-79 to 5-80. 

49(S/NFIwN/NC) GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Table 204, “Desert Storm Coali50(S/NFIwN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 3-76. Also see (S/NF) MCM 3-1. Vol 

tion Aircraft Attrition.” 

//, pp 5-106 to 5-111. 

15 
Table 2 

AntiAircraft Artillerys1 

Nomenclature Country of Origin NO 1 FEB 91 

[DELETED] 

Self-Propelled 

57mm. ZSU-57-2 USSR 

30mm, M53/59, M53fl0 Czechoslovakia 

23mm, ZSU-23/4 USSR 

(Subtotal) 

Towed 

130mm, KS-30 

100mm, KS-19 

85mm, KS- 12/12A/18 

57mm, Type 59 

57mm, S-60 

40mm, Bofors L-70 

37mm. Type 55 

37mm. M1939 

35mm, Oerlikon 

23mm. ZU-2312 

20mm, M55 Single 

14.5mm, ZPU-4 

14.5mm. MR-4 

14.5mm. Qpe 56 

14.5mm. ZPU-2 

Total Air Defense 

(Subtotal) 

[DELETED] 

USSR 

USSR 

USSR 

China 

USSR 

Switzerland 

China 

USSR 

Switzerland 

USSR 

Yugoslavia 

USSR 

Romania 

China 

USSR/Bulgaria 

7600 

Most Iraqi AAA fell into two categories: (1) the ZSU-23/2, 23mm 

cannon systems, and 14.5mm heavy machine guns firing contact-fuzed or 

kinetic energy rounds; and (2) larger guns firing rounds with timedelay fuzes. Guns in the first category had high rates of fire, and relatively short effective ranges, and had to achieve a direct hit to inflict 

damage. As a general rule, they were used for barrage fire. Guns in the 

second category fired longer range exploding shells at a slower rate of 

fire. The primary damage mechanism was the collision of the fragments 

from the exploding shells with the aircraft. These larger weapons were 

used mainly in aimed and sector fire. The ZSU-23/4 falls into a separate 

5'(S/NFIWN/NC) Iraqi Threat To US. Forces, p V-I; GWAPS Statistical 

Compendium, Table 3, "Iraqi Order of Battle" p 18. 

16 
category. A self-propelled, four-barrelled system with an integral Gun 

Dish fire control radar, it was capable of delivering a high volume of 

accurate fire against individual high-speed targets?'? 

As with surface-to-air missiles, most of the AAA systems were older 

but were still potentially dangerous. While relatively unsophisticated, 

many of the AAA weapons posed a significant threat by virtue of the 

numbers in which they were employed. AAA batteries were frequently 

located on specially constructed ten-to-thirteen-foot berms for better 

coverage of low-flying aircraft. Many were located on the roofs of 

buildings in cities, notably Baghdad and Kuwait City. AAA batteries in 

important areas like Baghdad were connected with simple command and 

control systems to receive barrage and cease fire orders. They could also 

receive information about impending attacks from early warning radars. 

Figure 6 shows the distribution of infrared SAM and AAA guns in Iraq. 

The numbers tell the story. Even considering the age of the systems, AAA 

remained a threat to Coalition aircraft flying below 15,000 feet. It was 

implicated in the loss of several aircraft during the Gulf War and was 

second only to infrared surface-to-air missiles in suspected downings. 

The Iraqi Air Force 

Another key element of the Iraqi air defense structure was the Iraqi 

Air Force, which had two primary missions. First, to defend Iraq against 

hostile attack, it provided interceptors to the air defense system. Second, 

it performed this strategic role of conducting offensive air operations. 

The Iraqi Air Force was an elite force, with the best personnel available 

and some first-rate equipment, but it had problems reaching its potential. 

Table 3 lists aircraft in the Iraqi Air Force. 

The over 700 plus combat aircraft do not present an accurate measure of 

Iraqi capability vis-a-vis their Coalition counterparts. Table 4 roughly compares Iraqi aircraft with their approximate Coalition equivalents. 

'%e ZSU-23/4 was first used in numbers in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and proved 

highly effective against low-flying jets. 

17 
Figure 6 

Iraqi SAM^ and AAA~ 

53(S) Chart taken from CENTAF briefing to GWAPS Team, Shaw AFB, SC, 9 Mar 1992. The data reflect C

with totals in table 2. 
Table 3 

Combat Aircraft54 

FightemAnterceptors [DELETED] 

MIG-29 Fulcrum 

MIG-25 Foxbat 

MIG-2I/F-7 Fishbed [DELETED] 

MIG-I 7/F-6 Fre~cOlFantan 

Subtotal 

Ground Attack 

SU-25 Frogfoot 

Mirage F-IE 

SU-24 Fencer [DELETED] 

MIG-23 Flogger 

SU-7/20/22 Fitter 

Subtotal 

Total Tactical Combat 728 

As with other branches of the Iraqi armed forces, the Air Force 

consisted of a small number of relatively new aircraft and a larger quantity of older, less capable systems. Of the interceptors, only the MIG-29 

Fulcrum was fourth generation, roughly the technological equivalent of 

the US. F-15. The MIG-25 was third generation and approximately 

equivalent to the U.S. F-4. Of the ground-attack aircraft, the Su-25 

Frogfoot was fourth generation; however, the most highly regarded aircraft was the French Mirage F-1 , a third-generation aircraft introduced in 

the 1970s. The status of the Mirage was due less to the aircraft itself and 

more to the quality of the training and the employment doctrine that 

accompanied it. 

Table 5 lists Iraqi fighter interceptor aircraft according to their 

nighVal1 weather capabilities. 

Less than half (thirty-nine percent) of the Iraqi air defense interceptors were night, all-weather capable. This percentage includes the 

54(S/NF/WN/NC) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 3, “Iraqi Air Order of 

Battle.” Information reflecting numbers as of Jan 1991. 

19 
Table 4 

Aircraft Modernization” 

Iraq [DELETED] Year IOC CdtiOXl [DELETED] or bht ~4~1 

F-15E Mid to MIG-29/Fulcrum 

F-16 Late ‘980s ~~-~~rogfoot 

F-14 

F-443 

F-15C 

F-117 

FIA- 18 

A-6E 

Tornado F3 [DELETED] 

Tornado GRl 

F-11IF 

Mirage 2000 

Mirage F-1 

A-I0 

Jaguar 

SU-22lFitter H/J/K 

SU-24Fencer 

1980 MIG-23/Flogger F/H 

MIG-23/Flogger G 

MIG-25/Foxbat E 

MIG-23rnogger E 

SU-2Witter UD/F 

Mirage F- I E 

1970 ME-2 1/F-7/Fishbed 

1960 SU-7Ritter A 

MIG- 17/Fresco 

S5Michael J. H. Taylor, Jane’s World Combat Aircraji (JANE‘S Information Group, 

Coulsdon: Surrey, UK), 1988. This book describes the latest modifications, on which 

the ordering of this table is based. The priorities on this graph were determined by either 

the aircraft’s initial operational capability (IOC) or the latest update to its weapons system. 

The numbers came from the GWAR Statistical Compendium, Order of Battle Tables, for 

the U.S. Coalition and Iraqi aircraft, and from various other sources for some Coalition 

aircraft. The information reflects numbers as of 1 Jan 1991. 

20 
Table 5 

Iraqi Fighter Aircraft By Capability% 

Night/AU-Weather Capable DayNi Only Capable 

Aircraft [DELETED] Aircraft [DELETED] 

MIG-29 Fulcrum MIG-21 Fishbed 

Mirage F- 1 E MIG-23 Flogger 

MIG-23 Flogger G [DELETED] [DELETED] 

MIG-25 Foxbat 

Note: The number of Floggers listed above differs from that in Table 3 because the 

Iraqis flew their Flogger F/H variant as an attack aircraft instead of in a fightedinterceptor role. 

Mirage F-1EQ aircraft, which normally served in an attack role but could 

have been highly capable in the interceptor role. The Iraqi all-weather 

fighter force was not impressive in terms of its size or hardware capabilities, 

particularly when compared to the over 800 all-weather Coalition fighters. 

At the beginning of the Gulf War, the structure and capabilities of the 

Iraqi Air Force were very much a product of their experiences in the IranIraq War. During that conflict, they had recognized their deficiencies and 

had attempted to rectify them by purchasing new systems. When they 

attempted to destroy the Iranian Air Force on the ground at the start of 

the War, the Iraqi Air Force found that the Iranians had positioned most 

of their aircraft in hardened she1te1-s.~~ One result of this experience was 

that Iraq instituted a massive air base construction and modernization 

program involving twenty-four primary operating bases and thirty 

dispersal fields. These new bases included nearly six-hundred hardened 

aircraft shelters built to defend against a crippling first strike. The Iraqis 

obtained enough state-of-the-art shelters to protect virtually their entire 

tactical air force.58 

56(S/NF/WN/NC) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 3, "Iraqi Air Order of 

57Ephraim Karsh, 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," IISS Adelphi Papers, 

"(S/TW/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Force, p 3-49. 

Battle." 

Spring 1987, p 37. 

21 
In addition to the hardened aircraft shelters, Iraqi airfields themselves 

were constructed to present a major challenge to any attacking force. 

Multiple runways and taxiways stressed for takeoffs and landings meant 

that disabling an airfield would require more than a few runway cuts. In 

addition, the Iraqis invested heavily in rapid runway repair equipment, 

acquiring the latest technologies in graders and quick drying cement. At 

the time of the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqis had a total of 96 airfields, 65 

of which were permanently surfaced. Of the total, over half had a longest 

runway of over 2,440 meters, and seven had longest runways of over 3,659 

meters. Figure 7 shows the location of the major Iraqi air bases and deployment/dispersal fields as of December 1991. 

Iraqi air defense was anchored by approximately 300 mostly 

Soviet-built interceptors, with some French and Chinese aircraft among 

the inventory. Although interceptors were stationed throughout the 

country, the majority were in hardened shelters at airfields in central and 

western Iraq to facilitate the protection of Baghdad.59 

The best aircraft in the inventory was the MIG-29 Fulcrum; it was the 

only Iraqi fighter with a look-down, shoot-down radar. [DELETED] An 

all-weather fighter, the Fulcrum first entered service with Soviet forces 

in 1984. [DELETED]. This highly capable aircraft was significantly 

limited by its small internal fuel load [DELETED]. Able to reach a 

speed of Mach 2.35 and an altitude of 60,000 feet, the aircraft was 

potentially capable of taking on Coalition fighters one-on-one. Aircraft 

strengths included its turn rate, acceleration; rate of climb; all-aspect, 

look-down, shoot-down radar; antiair ordnance, and its electronic 

counter-countermeasures (ECCM) capabi 1 it y. 

(SINFIWNMC) Ibid, pp 3-53 - 3-59. 59 

22 
Figure 7 

Air Defense Fighter Bases and 

Probable Deployment Fields as of December 1991m 

FIGURE DELETED 

[DELETED]?' 

60(S/NFAVN/NC) hid, p 3-50 

61(S/NF) MCM3-1, Vol 11, p 6-18. 

23 
The MIG-25 Foxbat was a third-generation Soviet aircraft capable of 

speeds up to Mach 2.5 and able to carry four air-to-air missiles. It 

became operational in 1966. Designed to intercept high-flying bombers, 

the MIG-25 had little capability against low flyers. The MIG-19 Fresco 

and MIG-21 Fishbed were both day, clear-weather-only fighters. They 

were operational in Vietnam twenty years ago. The F-6 and F-7 were 

Chinese-built versions of the MIG-19 and MIG-21 with Western avionics?’ Their main contribution to an aerial engagement would have been 

to add mass to the Iraqi side. It appears they were planned to be used for 

point defense of strategic sites. 

The quality of the pilots assigned to the Fulcrum and other air defense 

fighters were considered second rate, even by Iraqi standards, since the best 

Iraqi pilots were assigned to the Mirage F-1 s. [DELETED]?3 

Of course, training in a Soviet air-to-air aircraft was much different 

than training in its Western counterpart. Aircraft such as the F/A-18 or 

F-15 are optimized for independent pilot decision making. Soviet air-toair fighter aircraft, on the other hand, were virtually inoperable without 

the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) supporting them. While the 

Soviet system enabled the weapons to work, and work well under optimum conditions, it also fundamentally shaped and ultimately limited their 

capabilities in combat. A full-blown Soviet-style system relied on ground 

control for identifying enemy aircraft, vectoring of friendly aircraft, and 

placing friendly aircraft in position to complete the intercept. In the 

Soviet system, triggering the weapon was the pilot’s most important role. 

Soviet aircraft themselves were not designed for pilot visibility, long 

range, loiter, or independent detection, identification, and tracking of 

enemy aircraft. These were not required or desirable characteristics under 

the tightly centralized Soviet system. All of these deficiencies were 

present in the Iraqi air defense and air force structures. 

Since ground attack was considered the most important mission of the 

Iraqi Air Force, they purchased the French-built (Dassault Aviation) 

Mirage F-1 and considered it to be their most effective aircraft. Although 

having somewhat limited capabilities, the Mirage F-1 was an all-weather 

aircraft that could perform the interceptor or ground attack role. Standard 

6’Frank Chadwick, “Gulf War Fact Book,” 1992. p 49. 

63(SMF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to US. Forces, p 3-63 

24 
armament included two 30-mm DEFA 553 cannon with 135 rounds per 

gun. The maximum practical external combat load was 8,188 pounds 

mounted on various external racks. Possible weapons loads included 

Matra Super 530 air-to-air missiles, Armat antiradar ground-attack 

missiles, the AM 39 Exocet antiship missile, 500-pound bombs, or 

Thomson-Brandt rockets. The Iraqi versions were capable of carrying 

laser-guided weapons such as the AS.30L missile and Matra 400-kilogram 

guided bomb. Maximum speed of the Mirage was Mach 2.2, and its 

service ceiling was 65,600 feet. Combat radius was 265 statute miles 

with maximum internal fuel, a high-low-high mission profile, and fourteen 500-pound bombs. Carrying just one Exocet missile, the aircraft 

could strike at a radius of 435 miles without refueling. In addition, the 

Iraqi Air Force could configure some of its Mirage F-1s to accomplish 

buddy refueling.@ 

[DELETED].@ [DELETED].66 [DELETED]. 

With the F-1, the Iraqis appeared to have acquired more than just an 

aircraft; they were also exposed to the Western attitude towards offensive 

air power. While the F-1 was not among the most modem aircraft, only 

the best Iraqi pilots were selected to fly it. [DELETED].67 

[DELETED] [DELETED] .@ 

As the Gulf War approached, the status of Iraq’s Air Force was very 

much like that of the rest of the Iraqi defense structure. The large 

number of aircraft and some of the pilot training showed potential for a 

formidable force. However, full potential was not realized because of old 

equipment, overall inadequate training, and unrealistic exercises. Once 

the Coalition assembled its force, Iraq was simply not in the same league. 

64Jane’s All the World’s Aircrafr, pp 68-69. 

65(S/NFIWN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 2-1. 

66(s/NF) MCM 3-1, vol 11, p 6-88. 

67(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 3-63. 

68(S/NFIWN) SPEAR Briefing. 

@(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 3-64. 

25 
An understanding of the Iraqi attitude towards tactics and the 

employment of its air force and air defense systems can be gained by 

examining Iraqi behavior against a more equal opponent, Iran in the IranIraq War. This is the subject of the next section. 

Iraqi Tactics 

A study of Iraqi behavior in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 can 

foster a better understanding of the tactical employment of the equipment 

discussed in the previous sections. "bo overall lessons become apparent 

from such a study. First, the Iraqis did poorly early in that conflict, 

learned from their mistakes, and as a result, improved their tactics. 

Second, even the improved tactics employed against the Iranians were not 

good preparation for war with the Coalition. 

While the Iran-Iraq War could hardly be termed an absolute success, 

at its close Iraqi forces, particularly the air forces, had demonstrated 

greatly improved operational and tactical competence. The Iraqi order of 

battle had increased significantly, and maintenance and ancillary services 

had improved. The Iraqi Air Force could often maintain a rate of 150 

sorties per day, and, during the final stages of the war, were known to 

have averaged as many as 240 sorties per day." Iraq had also moved 

away from systems purchased from the Soviet Union to those purchased 

from various Western suppliers. 

It must be understood that even with improved equipment and tactics, 

the Iraqi Air Force and air defense network had an entirely different 

orientation than Western forces. For the Iraqi Air Force, deterrence, not 

offensive combat, was the purpose of existence. During the Iran-Iraq War, 

a primary function of the air forces of both countries was to prevent strategic attacks. This was accomplished not through defensive capabilities, but 

rather by deterrence-by their ability to threaten similar or greater destruction 

on the enemy." An air force built to be a deterrent force behaves quite 

differently than one organized and trained for offensive air superiority. 

"Ephrairn Karsh, p 39. 

"Maj Ronald E. Bergquist, The Role of Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War, (Maxwell 

Am, AL: Air University Press. 1988). p 46. 

26 
The first requirement of a deterrent force is existence; a deterrent air 

force must remain a force in being. The Iraqis did this by hardening 

airfields, sheltering aircraft, building a robust air defense based on means 

other than offensive counter air, and in the extreme, seeking a safe haven 

for aircraft in times of threat. The Iraqi Air Force placed a constant 

command emphasis on preserving aircraft, regardless of the cost to effectiveness. During the Iran-Iraq War, commanders were punished for 

losing aircraft, regardless of the tactical success of the mission?2 

The air-to-air battles in the Iran-Iraq War were described by one 

observer, who said, “In practice, the two Air Forces proved to be equally 

in~ompetent.”~~ Both sides seemed to overestimate the capability of their 

adversary and had an exaggerated fear of radar-guided missiles. Iraqi 

pilots generally avoided air-to-air engagements. Any engagements that 

did occur were noteworthy for their lack of aggressive maneuvering. The 

Iraqis would normally conduct high-speed, maximum range, air-to-air 

missile launches, then break off and return to their airfields.74 

Iraq had conducted the initial attacks of the Iran-Iraq War and, for a 

short period, retained the offensive. But, after gaining what appeared to 

Be Saddam Hussein’s initial goals, Iraq went on the defensive and 

attempted to negotiate for its war aims. Iran responded with its own 

series of offensives against Iraqi p0sitions.7~ 

In an attempt to convince Iran to negotiate, Iraq initiated a strategic 

bombing campaign against Iranian population centers and economic 

targets with an emphasis on Iran’s oil exporting capability. However, to 

minimize aircraft losses, the Iraqis used mostly high-altitude attacks. 

While this was in keeping with their survival doctrine, it resulted in 

reduced effectiveness. Occasionally, the Iraqis demonstrated some innovation. [DELETED]?6 [DELETED]. 

72Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 

73Ephraim Karsh. p 37. 

74(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 3-63. 

7kphraim Karsh, p 37. 

76Cordesman and Wagner, p 209. 

Volume 11: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 1990), p 495. 

27 
During the early phases of the war, the Iraqis never mastered 

combined arms techniques. In conducting battlefield support, they generally used available air power in small packages without coordination with 

other attacks. Similarly, they established free-fire zones for surface-to-air 

missiles and anti-aircraft artillery over important strategic zones such as 

Baghdad because of the difficulty they had coordinating interceptor 

aircraft and ground-based air defense systems. [DELETED].77 

In July 1986, a conference was held and the Iraqi leadership decided 

to build forces that could seize the initiative. The group chose to expand 

the Republican Guards, escalate the strategic war against Iranian oil 

exports, use more poison gas, and prepare military forces capable of 

attacking.78 Key to these changes were efforts to improve Iraq’s air force. 

Aircraft inventories were upgraded with the acquisition of better 

airframes, avionics, and armaments. Fifteen new air bases with aircraft 

shelters and support equipment were built. Reconnaissance capabilities 

were upgraded. Modem Soviet aircraft, such as the SU-22, SU-25, 

MIG-25R and MIG-29, were obtained. 

Apparently spurred on by the French-trained Mirage pilots, tactical 

changes accompanied the upgrading of equipment. On bombing missions 

the Iraqis started to use low-altitude attacks. Precision-guided munitions 

such as laser-guided bombs were used with increased accuracy. 

[DELETED]. 

[DELETED] 

77(SlNF/WNlNC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p 3-52. 

78Cordesman and Wagner, pp 259-260. 

28 
Figure 8 

14 May 1988 Larak Island Strike" 

FIGURE DELETED 

[DELETED] .80 

[DELETED] !' 

(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p D-2. 79 

so(S/NF/WN/NC) Iraqi Threat to U.S. Forces, p D-I. 

8'(S/NFIWN/NC) Ibid, p 3-64. 

29 
A weapon that did not involve tactics was considered instrumental in 

ending the war. This was the Scud missile, used during the so-called 

“War of the Cities.” There were actually two distinct periods; the first 

“War of the Cities,” which involved only aircraft, ended in June 1985. 

The second ”War of the Cities’’ began in February 1988, once again 

started by Iraq. On 27 February, after an initial exchange, Iraq used a 

new weapon, the modified Scud-B called Al-Husayn. The new weapon’s 

salient feature was its ability to reach Tehran; the range had been 

increased to 370 miles.** The second War of the Cities continued until 

20 April 1988. By the end, Iraq had fired perhaps 200 Al-Husayns, 

causing as many as 2,000 civilian ~asualties.8~ Most importantly, for the 

first time Scuds had a measurable political effect on the conduct of a war. 

Overall, the air portion of the Iran-Iraq War was less intense, by an 

order of magnitude in mass, tempo, and tactics, than previous air combat 

in the Middle East. The Iraqi air defense system was a particular 

disappointment.” Despite a large inventory of radars, interceptors, surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft artillery, the Iraqis displayed little 

ability to coordinate these air defense elements into a coherent system. 

Even though faced with a large amount of Iraqi air defense equipment, 

the Iranians penetrated the system virtually at will throughout the war. 

The Iranians normally used the low-level techniques learned from their 

one-time American mentors. Iranian air attacks were more severely 

constrained by logistic difficulties and other internal problems than by the 

effectiveness of the Iraqi air defense network?’ 

‘*Seth Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Iraq’s Al-Husayn Missile Program,” 

83Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, (New York: 

84Cordesman and Wagner, p 457. 

‘%he Iranians had removed many of their best pilots from their air force because 

they had been trained in the Unites States. Also, parts for their U.S. equipment were hard 

to obtain. 

Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990, p 204. 

Routledge, I99 1 ), p 200. 

30 
Air-to-air engagements were virtually nonexistent; neither side had 

anything to gain by risking precious aircraft to deflect an insignificant 

individual attack. In addition, the Iraqi Air Force appeared to be 

underutilized. It claimed to have flown a total of about 400,000 sorties 

during the eight year war. While surge sortie generation rates sometimes 

reached one sortie per day, the wartime average equalled only about one 

sortie per aircraft every three days. 

The tactics employed by the Iraqi Air Defense and Air Force during 

the Iran-Iraq War failed to prepare them for war with the Coalition 

forces. While Iraq dominated the skies for most of the Iran-Iraq War 

and demonstrated a decided improvement after their reforms of 1986, it 

never developed a coherent strategy for employing its air forces or the 

ability to bring the entire force up to the standards displayed by the 

French-trained Mirage pilots. If anything, the Iran-Iraq War may have 

taught the Iraqis the wrong lesson, convincing them that they had capabilities they did not in fact possess. 

Desert Storm 

The strategy and tactics developed for the Iran-Iraq War did not 

prepare Iraq for war with the Coalition. The fury of the Coalition attack 

destroyed not only structures and equipment but also Iraqi assumptions 

about air power. Stealth aircraft and cruise missiles penetrated Baghdad’s 

defenses virtually unscathed. Precision-guided munitions struck targets 

with standards of accuracy not previously experienced by the Iraqis. The 

Coalition’s untested pilots were victorious over the presumably battlehardened Iraqi Air Force. As Coalition air attacks continued, Saddam 

Hussein’s stated hope for a short air war followed by an early entry into 

the real war on the ground faded. Iraqi tactics against the Coalition air 

campaign fell into three areas. First were efforts to counter Coalition air 

by modifying tactics, equipment use, and operational procedures. Second 

were efforts to protect high-value forces and material; and third were 

efforts to move the battle into the public relations arena in hopes of 

fracturing the Coalition or causing it to modify its plan. 

31 
Countering Air Power 

The Coalition’s efforts to blind the Iraqi air defense network were 

very effective. However, the Iraqis developed workarounds, utilized 

undamaged equipment and nodes, and maintained some air defense 

capability. [DELETED]. As discussed earlier, the KAR~ system had a 

capability to expand the responsibilities of various nodes. Iraqi technicians appeared to have been able to develop local networks using this 

expansion capability. They tied the various networks together by stringing combat phone lines and wire between the stations.86 

[DELETED] !’ 

Other inputs to this backup system were from ground observers. It 

appears that they had both phone lines and a simple data reporting system 

at each site. The information system used by observers was very rudimentary. Basically, the observer/operator passed only the information 

they were capable of sending with no special training. As a Coalition air 

raid proceeded inbound, other systems were used to gain additional 

information. Radars associated with the Roland or SA-8 would be 

brought online for short fifteen-second bursts. The intention was apparently to use the radars as height-finders, to determine the altitude of 

inbound aircraft. Antiaircraft artillery sites used this information to set 

the fuzes on their ammunition.88 

Enough information seems to have been gained through these means 

to permit the Iraqis to shoot missile systems at Coalition aircraft with 

little or no illumination by target-tracking radars. There 

is also a possibility that Iraq used optical trackers for some of these 

firings. [DELETED]. 

86(SINFIWN) SPEAR Briefing. 

87(ShJF/WN) Ibid. 

88(SMF/WN) Ibid. 

89(S/NF/WN) Ibid. 

32 
A weakness in the Iraqi air defense system was the apparent lack of 

coordination between AAA sites. The Iraqis appeared unable to organize 

several sites into aimed or barrage fire. While firing was random and 

indiscriminate, there were still enough AAA sites in the Baghdad area to 

make even this random fire dangerous. 

The Iraqis used other techniques to gain tracking information. At 

night, battlefield illumination flares were used to light up an area. With 

this artificial light, attacking aircraft could be tracked either visually or 

with optical trackers. [DELETED].w 

After the war began, the Iraqis used decoys and simulations to deceive 

and foil Coalition attacks. [DELETED]?’ [DELETED].% [DELETED]. 

Another weapon system the Iraqis protected by deception was the 

Scud and its variants. One method they used was to park the missile 

system under a highway viaduct. They could pull the missile out, launch 

it, and then return the transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) to the safety of 

the viaduct in less than five minutes-less time than Coalition aircraft 

needed to target the po~ition?~ 

The Iraqis seemed to believe that U.S. intelligence collection was 

almost perfect. [DELETED].94 [DELETED]?5 [DELETED].% 

The Iraqis used several techniques in an .effort to preserve assets from 

destruction. After the Iraqis realized that their sector operation centers 

were not as impregnable as thought, they removed the equipment from 

w(S/NF/WN) Ibid. 

”Mohammed Heikal, Iflusions of Triumph, (Harper Collins: London, 1991), p 303. 

=(S/NF) MSG 3122002 Dec 90, AFSAC Det 21, Iraq Air Force Issues- Desert Shield. 

93(S/NF/WN) SPEAR Briefing. 

%(S/REL UK) ‘The Gulf War: An Iraqi General Perspective,” Joint Debriefing 

95(S/NF/WN) SPEAR Briefing. 

%(S/REL UK) ‘The Gulf War: An Iraqi Gened Perspective,” p 5. 

Center MFR, 11 Mar 1991, GWAPS Files, CHST 32-2, pp 5, 6. 

33 
the centers to areas thought to be safe from targeting. In some cases, 

ammunition and weapons stocks were moved from known storage areas 

to holes dug in the middle of empty fields for burial or covering with 

nets. In the Kuwait Theater of Operations, tanks were dispersed, but as 

the air strikes continued, more and more Iraqi tanks were camouflaged, 

buried with sandbags, or covered with camouflage nets.97 

While the overall performance of the Iraqi Air Force in air-to-air 

combat was abysmal, certain procedures were noteworthy. Aircrews 

seemed very conscious of electronic warfare, and particularly, of communications security. [DELETED].98 

Although Iraqi pilots sometimes started encounters with decent setups, 

the consistent and overriding tactical pattern evident in debriefs of kills 

by U.S. F-15 pilots indicates a startling lack of situational awareness by 

their Iraqi adversaries. In general, the Iraqi pilots shot down did not react 

to radar lock-ons by Coalition fighters. They attempted very little maneuvering, either offensive or defensive, between the time when the air 

intercept radar locked on to them and the time when they were hit by airto-air missiles (or, in two cases, before running into the ground).w 

There is little evidence that the Iraqis believed they could go head to 

head with the Coalition air forces, either tactically or operationally. As 

in the Iran-Iraq War, their over-arching goal appeared to be the survival 

of their more modem advanced aircraft. [DELETED].’OO Initially, aircraft were ordered stowed in hardened aircraft shelters when not actually 

flying. However, the shelter-busting campaign quickly inflicted unacceptable loss rates. The Iraqis then used two alternatives to preserve the 

aircraft. They moved aircraft away from airfields, in some cases parking 

them in seemingly unsuspected places such as alongside roads, in gullies 

97(S/NF/WN) SPEAR Briefing. 

98(S/NF/WN) Ibid. 

w(S) “33rd TF%’ Air-to-Air Engagements Through 21 Feb 1991.” 

‘OOHeikal, p 304. 

34 
covered with camouflage nets, and in known safe areas such as residential 

neighborhoods. [DELETED]."' During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis had 

flown their most valuable aircraft to northern Iraq beyond the reach of 

Iranian air strikes. Coalition operations from Turkey in this war denied 

them that option. Flying valuable aircraft to another country had to then 

be considered. Iraq decided to take the chance and fly aircraft that could 

avoid the Coalition fighters to Iran. [DELETED].Im 

Having learned their political value during the Iran-Iraq War, the 

Iraqis employed Scud missiles from the very onset of hostilities. Since 

the missiles were not capable of destroying high-value targets, they were 

instead used to attack Coalition cohesion and national will. The most 

obvious Iraqi effort, and probably Iraq's greatest hope, was firing missiles 

at Israel in hopes of drawing an Israeli reaction. If the Iraqis could 

portray the war as an Arab-Israel conflict, it was thought that countries 

not directly threatened by the war such as Egypt or Syria might leave the 

Coalition. There were reports that a group of Egyptian and Syrian soldiers in Saudi Arabia cheered when they heard that Iraq had launched its 

first Scuds against Israel.'03 To address the Scud problem, the United 

States replied with adroit diplomacy and a heavy application of force. 

They concentrated military force to find the Scuds on the firing end and 

to destroy them with Patriot Missiles on the receiving end. Israel was 

persuaded not to retaliate, and Coalition cohesion was maintained. President Mubarak of Egypt went so far as to publicly declare that it was the 

inherent right of every nation to defend itself.Iw 

'"(S/NF/WN) SPEAR Briefing. 

'OZHeikal, p 304. 

Io3lbid, p 13. 

'04bid, p 307. 

35 
In an apparent attempt to attack a Navy ship and produce a large 

number of casualties, the Iraqi Air Force launched two Mirage aircraft 

armed with Exocet missiles towards the Persian Gulf. In this case, the 

Iraqis were not successful. With six sections of combat air patrol aircraft 

in the area to choose from, two Saudi F-15's were vectored for the attack. 

One Saudi F-15 aircraft downed both Mirages. 

In another attempt to attack a Navy ship, Iraq fired two Silkworm 

missiles at the uss Wisconsin. One missile fell into the water, and the 

other was downed by a missile from HMS Cloucester, the Wisconsin's 

British escort. 

The potential threat posed by the Iraqi Air Force never went away. 

Throughout the war, there remained a concern that the Iraqis could launch 

a large-scale air raid at a major U.S. facility. Since they did not sacrifice 

their air force in this manner, some contend they husbanded these assets 

to retain a strategic capability for after the war.'" 

This chapter presented a cursory overview of Iraqi weapons, training, 

and tactics. In the beginning, it stated that Iraq could have been a formidable opponent. Closer examination, however, revealed significant deficiencies in organization, training, and tactics, which rendered the Iraqi 

force vulnerable. Specifically, defense of Iraqi airspace heavily depended 

on the survival and smooth functioning of the KARI system. When Coalition air attacks removed this central pillar, the tactical competence of 

Iraqi aircrews, gunners, and commanders could not overcome the deficiency. In simple terms, the Iraqi integrated air defense system crumbled. 

Developed in a large part to face the Israelis after the Osirak raid of 

1980, and honed against the Iranians in the Eight Year War, Iraqi air 

power was no match for the Coalition force arrayed against it. The 

question that remains is whether the Iraqis realized such a large disparity 

existed, and if they did, what other course of action could they have 

followed? The probable conclusion is that they were simply overwhelmed before they came to realize the disparity fully. Regardless of 

the disparity, the remnants of the Iraqi air defense posed a threat to 

Coalition air power to the bitter end. 

'"(S) CIA Brief to CWAPS. Aug 1992. 

36 
(Above) Iraqi ZSU-23/4 (Below) Iraqi T-54/55 Tank 

37 
38 
2 

Aircraft and Weapons 

The overwhelming tactical dominance demonstrated by Coalition air 

forces in the Gulf War can be attributed in large part to superior equipment. 

Stealth strike platforms, laser-guided bombs, advanced sensors, and 

electronic countermeasures represent but a few areas in which the Coalition 

enjoyed overwhelming advantages over Iraqi forces. This chapter describes 

Coalition equipment, particularly &craft and weapons, and highlights their 

employment in the Gulf War. For convenience, aircraft and weapons are 

grouped according to mission: air-to-ground, electronic warfare and reconnaissance, air-to-air, and special aircraft. Transport and refueling aircraft are 

described in the togistics Report. Aircraft that performed in more than one 

area will be addressed under their primary mission. The chapter concludes 

with a selective discussion of systems available but not used in the Gulf 

War. (See also Appendix A, Definition of Aerial Missions.) 

Air-to-Ground Aircraft Systems 

Air- To-Ground Aircraft 

F-117 Stealth Fighter: the first operational strike 

platform (aircraft) designed from the outset to depend 

on low observability for penetrating enemy defenses. 

It was designed to passively defeat radar detection as 

it penetrates dense threat environments and delivers 

precision munitions from medium altitude at night. 

Target identification and designation is accomplished 

by means of forward-looking infrared (FLIR) and downward-looking 

infrared (DLIR) systems integrated with a laser designator. This singleseat aircraft, with its primary offensive load of two 2,000-pound GBU-27 

laser-guided bombs, proved to be an exceptionally accurate bombing 

platform in Operation Desert Storm. Its unrefueled radius of action with 

a full offensive ordnance load was approximately 550 nautical miles. The 

F-117 achieved initial operational capability in October 1983. The last 

of 59 F-117s were delivered in July 1990. 

39 
Forty-two F-117s flew 1,299 combat sorties in Desert Storm.’ They 

scored 1,664 direct hits with laser-guided bombs (LGBS) without suffering 

battle damage.’ Throughout Desert Storm, the F-117 was the weapon 

system of choice for attacks on hard targets in high-threat areas, 

particularly the heavily defended Baghdad area.3 In the early morning 

hours of 17 January 1991, F-117s initiated attacks on Iraqi leadership, 

command and control installations, and strategic air defense targets, 

notably air defense sector operations centers (Socs). During Desert 

Storm, F-117s recorded 1,788 strikes covering virtually all 12 target 

categories in the Automated Intelligence Installation File (AIF), and participated in the following types of mission^:^ 

Suppression of Enemv Air Defense. In addition to attacking Iraqi 

SKs, interceptor operation centers (Iocs), and the Air Defense 

Operations Center (ADOC), F-117s bombed SAM sites to clear a 

path for B-52 strikes on the Taji industrial complex. They also 

struck SAM sites interfering with F-15 and Scud combat air patrol 

(CAP) missions in eastern and western Iraq? 

Night attacks against high-value targets. The F-117 flew 1,112 

strikes against key leadership, communications, and strategic air 

defense assets; and nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare storage and production facilities! The F-117 also flew 219 strikes 

against hardened aircraft shelters and 120 strikes against bridges? 

‘The 37th TFW, based at Tonopah Test Range Air Field, Nevada, was the only unit 

to operate the F-117. First used operationally during Operation Just Cause, the F-117 

had only recently emerged from the “black” world when Iraq invaded Kuwait. 

’(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 94, “F-117: USAF Sorties by Mission 

Type”; and (!YNF/WN/NC) GWAPS F-I17 Missions Database. 

he F-117’s bombing accuracy minimized the risk of collateral damage in densely 

populated areas, an important consideration. 

4(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

’(S/NF/WN/NC) GWAPS F- 1 17 Missions Database: One hundred and twelve strikes 

were flown against Strategic Air Defense (SAD) targets and forty-nine strikes against 

Surface-to-Air (SAM) targets. 

6(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 185, “Strikes by Master Target List 

Categories.” 

’(U) Ibid. 

40 
Scud hunting. F-117s flew approximately 168 strikes against Scudassociated targets, notably storage and maintenance facilities, production facilities, mket motor and rocket fuel test and production 

facilities, and suspected Scud hide-sites in western Iraq." 

Support of ground forces. El 17s flew approximately 300 sorties 

to support ground forces in the Kuwait theater of operations 

(KTO), attacking Republican Guard headquarters and command 

posts, communications sites, logistics targets, supply chokepoints, 

and bridges? On D+30, F-117s dropped 32 GBU-27 2,000- 

pound bombs on the Iraqi fire trench network facing the 1st 

Marine Division in preparation for Marine breaching 

operations. lo 

Because of the difficulty of flying formation at night without lights, all 

El17 attacks were flown by single aircraft. During air refueling, F-117s 

flew two-ship formations, used air-to-air Tacan and aircraft lights to join 

with the tanker, and reverted to single-ship profiles after refueling. The 

size and hardness of many F-117 targets meant that more than one aircraft 

was required to achieve the desired effect. When this was the case, 

mission planners would plan for simultaneous bomb impacts from as many 

as six different aircraft, with each aircraft flying a separate run-in heading 

and altitude. F-1 17 attacks were delivered from medium altitudes. 

The El 17 can carry the full range of air-to-ground weaponry, but used 

the following ordnance combinations in Desert Storm: two 2,000-pound 

GBU-27s, two 2,000.pound GBU-10s. or any combination of the two." 

*(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid. 

'(S/NF/WN/NC) Analysis of GWAPS F-117 Missions Database for ordnance delivered 

"(S/NF/WN/NC) GWAPS F-I17 Missions Database. 

"(S) USCENTAF Combat Plans Handout, "F-117 Standard Conventional Loads 

between 28.30" to 32" north latitude and 45" to 48.30" east longitude. 

(SCLS)," p 7-2. 

41 
F-111 Aardvark: a twin-engine, tactical aircraft 

with a crew of two-a pilot and a weapons system 

operator (WSO). Designed for long range, heavy 

payloads, and low-altitude penetration in all weather 

conditions using inertial navigation and terrainfollowing radar, the F-1 1 1 is capable of radar bombing 

from all altitudes. 

Two versions of the F-111 were used in the Gulf War: the F-111E 

with analog avionics and the F-lllF with digital avionics. The F-lllF 

has improved turbofan engines and was equipped with the Pave Tack 

infrared target acquisition and laser designation pod; the pod permitted 

precision attacks with laser-guided bombs (LGBS) from all altitudes, day 

or night. The F-lllF is also equipped to deliver the infrared (IR) and 

electro-optical GBU-15, a glide bomb controlled by the wSo by a datalink 

hook-up between the delivery aircraft and the weapon.12* l3 Range and 

logistic considerations dictated smaller than maximum bomb loads in 

Desert Stom.’‘ [DELETED].” 

The F-111 first flew on 20 December 1964 and achieved initial 

operational capability (IW) in 1968. A total of 461 F-Ills were built 

between 1967 and 1976; of these, approximately 325 were in service in 

1991. Salient F-111 contributions to Desert Storm included the following: 

All-weather night attacks against point and area targets to support 

the strategic bombing campaign. F-1 1 1s flew 912 strikes against 

targets such as airfields, aircraft, and support facilities; hardened 

aircraft shelters; command, control, communications and intelligence facilities; bunkers; nuclear, biological, and chemical war- 

‘*(S) The F-11 IF was the only aircraft used in Desert Storm that could deliver the 

GBU-15. The GBU-15 came in two versions, electro-optical for daylight use and infrared 

for night. [DELETED]. 

‘3Desert Score, July 1991, p 37. 

I4As explained above, heavier bomb loads cut into range and fuel margins. 

”(S) USCENTAF Combat Plans Handour, “F-111 Standard Conventional Loads 

[DELETED]. 

(SCLS),” p 10-1. 

42 
fare facilities; bridges; and air defense assets.I6 Many of these 

missions were conducted in adverse weather conditions; sortie 

lengths averaged 3 hours or more. The Pave Tack FLlR system 

proved particularly effective in night attacks with LGBs. 

Support of ground forces. The F-1 1 1F was used for battlefield 

preparation in the KTO; its significant antiarmor missions were 

known as “tank-plinking.” It flew 1,804 antiarmor strikes using 

predominantly 500-pound laser-guided GBU- 12s.’’ 

Scud hunting;. F-I11Fs flew sixty-nine strikes to support antiScud operations, dropping laser-guided bombs on road culverts 

and CBU-89 Gator mines around road culverts suspected of being 

Scud hide-sites.18 

The F-1 11 force committed to Desert Storm flew over 2,881 sorties 

without loss and struck 3,225 targets.” F-lllFs were responsible for 

forty-six percent of the LGB precision strikes in the strategic air 

campaign.20 The relatively long range of the F-111 was a significant 

source of tactical flexibility in the air campaign: Taif-based F-1llFs 

could be used in the KTO without air refueling and could attack targets in 

northern Iraq without exposing the tankers to Iraqi defenses. Incirlikbased F-1 1 1Es added flexibility by attacking targets in northern Iraq, 

thereby releasing other aircraft to concentrate on targets from Baghdad 

south to the KTO. On the last day of the war, two F-1 1 1Fs released 

4,700-pound hard-target-penetrating, laser-guided GBU-28s against the 

16F-IIIFs flew 757 and F-IIIEs flew 155 strikes. 

”(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid. 

‘*(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid. 

?he 64 F-1 1 IFs based at Taif Air Base, Saudia Arabia, flew 2,423 sorties striking 

2,802 targets, and the 26 F-l 1 IEs, based at lncirlik Air Base, Turkey, (part of EUCOMsupported Operation Proven Force) flew 458 sorties striking 423 targets. (U) GWAPS 

Statistical Compendium, Tables 92 and 93, “F-1 I I W-1 I IF USAF Sorties by Mission 

Type,” and Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

”(U) GwAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 183, “Precision-Guided Munition (ffiM) 

Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

(U) GWAPS Statistical 

Compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

43 
North Taji command bunker with apparent success?’ F-1 11Fs also 

destroyed the oil pumping manifold off the Kuwaiti coast with electrooptically guided GBU-15 standoff bombs?2 Iraqi forces were using the 

manifold to pump oil into the Persian Gulf. During Desert Storm, the 

F-111 mission-capable rate rose eight percent above peacetime levels to 

eight-five per~ent.2~ 

F-Ills flew two-aircraft formations as the basic fighting element, 

combined with other elements to form flights of four aircraft. Attack 

formations (packages) against point and area targets varied in size up to 

thirty-two aircraft, and many missions were flown without suppression of 

enemy air defense (SEAD) assets for pr0tection.2~ The aircraft used lowaltitude tactics for the first three days of Desert Storm and released 

mostly precision-guided munitions against airfield complexes. After 

transitioning to medium-altitude tactics, the aircraft flew in large packages, used multiple attack headings, and employed altitude and time differences to avoid midair collisions; attack times were compressed to fifteen 

minutes or less.2s* 26 

Tank-plinking missions were flown at medium altitude. They were 

each armed with four GBU-12s. Tanks, hotter than the surrounding 

terrain immediately after sunset, were found by using the IR Pave Tack 

pod. [DELETED] F7 [DELETED] ?8 [DELETED]. 

The F-lllF carried 2 AIM-9s plus one of the following munition 

loads during Operation Desert Storm: eight to twelve 500-pound 

MK-82s, two to four 2,000-pound MK-84s, two to four 500-pound 

”A description of the GBU-28 deep penetration bomb is discussed under the 

22~~, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Annex T, April 1992, p T-70. 

23Desert Score, p 37. 

24(S/NF/WN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Volume 91-2, Jul 1991, pp 7-2 and 7-9. 

25(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid. 

26Attacking aircraft deconflicted in the target area (i.e., avoided midair collisions and 

weapons effects of other aircraft in the attack group) by maintaining sufficient lateral or 

vertical distances from other attacking aircraft or flying at set time intervals. 

“Special Purpose One-of-a-Kind Munitions” section in this report. 

27(S/NF/WN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 9 1-2, p 7- 1 1. 

28(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid. 

44 
GBU-l2s, two to four 2,000-pound GBU-lOs, two to four 2,000-pound 

GBU-24s, one 4,700 Ib GBU-28, eight cBU-87~~ eight CBU-89 Gators; 

eight to twelve CBU-52s, eight to twelve CBU-58/71s; eight to twelve 

MK-20 Rockeyes; or one to two 2,000-pound GBU- 1 5s.29 

F-15E Strike Eagle: a two-seat, highperformance, supersonic, all-weather, dual-role, 

air-to-air and air-to-surface fighter developed from 

the F-15C air-superiority fighter. Its air-to-air 

weapons are radar-guided missiles, infrared-homing missiles, and a 20-mm gun. In the air-tosurface role, the aircraft carries Low-Altitude 

Navigation and Targeting Infrared (system) for Night (LANTIRN) pods 

along with guided and unguided air-to-ground munitions. [DELETED].30 

During Desert Storm, the F-15E was used for the following missions: 

All-weather night attacks against point and area targets to support 

the strategic bombing campaign. F-15Es flew 595 strikes against 

targets such as airfields, NBC storage facilities, bridges, communications facilities, and ammunition storage area^.^' 

Scud Hunt. F-15Es flew 391 anti-Scud sorties?2 The aircraft 

worked with ‘the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 

used FLlR to find suspected Scuds and launchers in the western 

Scud boxes (see “The Scud Hunt” section in Chapter 4 of this 

report), and launched primarily LGBS against Scud targets. 

Support of ground forces. F-15Es flew 949 strikes and primarily 

delivered GBU-12 LGBS during “tank-plinking” operations against 

armored vehicles in the KT0.33 

29(S) USCEh’TAF Combat Plans Handout, “F-1 1 1 Standard Conventional Loads 

30(S) USCENTAI~ Combat Plans Handout, “F-15E Standard Conventional Loads 

31(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

32(U) Ibid. 

33(U) Ibid. 

(SCLS),” p 10-1. 

(SCLS),” p 9-6. 

45 
The two F-15E squadrons that flew in Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

had attained operational readiness only shortly before deployment. LANTIRN 

operational test and evaluation was not completed and was continued in 

theater. Testing of the targeting pods, which were shipped after 

deployment, was also completed in theater. The targeting pods proved 

valuable for designating targets for UBS, locating targets, and providing 

real-time bomb damage assessment. The Desert Storm Strike Eagle force 

consisted of forty-eight F-15Es based at Al-Kharj, Saudi Arabia. 

F-15Es flew 2,172 sorties, striking 2,124 targets in Iraq and Kuwait 

as part of the air assaults of Operation Desert Storm.34 Average sortie 

length was 3.27 hours. The two squadrons flew 40-60 sorties a night 

with a mission-capable rate of 85.9 percent. The aircraft proved reliable 

and flexible enough to carry out precision attacks, maritime surveillance, 

and close air support. In one case, an F-15E shot down an Iraqi 

helicopter with a GBU-10 laser-guided bomb. Low-level attacks were 

initially flown at approximately 540 knots (Mach 0.85), but later attacks 

were delivered from medium altitude. Two F-15E aircraft were lost 

during combat.35 

Salient F- 15E tactical issues include the following: Initially, aircraft 

used time intervals to deconflict in the target area and flew “pop-up” 

maneuvers against targets such as the H-2 Airfield in Iraq. The first night 

low-altitude ingress and air-interdiction missions had been practiced extensively before Desert Shield. For these missions, terrain-following radar 

(TFR) was set at an altitude of 200 feet. Aircrews flew with the navigation 

mode selected so that their radar altimeter would display current altitude. 

These procedures allowed the aircrews to fly manually at 500 to 1,0oO feet 

above the ground but prepared for 200-foot operation if necessary.% 

Transitioning to medium altitude presented a problem in determining 

accurate weapon biases for unguided ordnance. F-15Es had only six 

34(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Tables 97, “F- 15E: USAF Sorties by Mission 

”Desert Score, p 45. 

36(U) TFR was tied into the avionics and flight control system and flew the aircraft 

at a preset altitude (SCP) when placed in an auto mode. When aircraft flew below this 

preset altitude, a fly-up occurred until acknowledged by the pilot. By setting a SCP at an 

altitude below what was manually flown, aircrews gave themselves this fly-up protection, 

if needed. (SINFNNINC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, p 3-3. 

Type,” and 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

46 
operational laser targeting pods and used buddy lase tactics on many 

medium-altitude missions. F-15E aircrews also used their synthetic aperture radar to identify targets?’ Once the target was identified on radar, the 

wso would transition to the FLIR to find, track, lase the intended target, and 

record bomb damage assessment (BDA). The F-15E carried 500 rounds of 

20-mm ammunition and four AIM-9s plus one of the following optional 

munitions loads during Desert Storm: six to twelve MK-82s, four MK-Us, 

eight GBU-l2s, four GBU-lOs, six CBU-87s, six CBU-89 Gators, six to 

twelve CBU-52s, six to twelve CBU-58/7ls, or six MK-20 Rockeyes?’ 

F-16 Fighting Falcon: a multirole, singleseat fighter. Highly maneuverable, the F-16 has 

both air-to-air and air-to-surface capability. 

[DELETED].39 Newer models of the F-16 are 

equipped with LANTIRN and Global Positioning 

System (GPS) equipment. The first F-16 flight 

was in early 1974 and initial operational capability occurred in 1979. 

Over 3,000 had been ordered or produced at the time of Desert Storm, 

and the F- 16 had been widely exported. 

F-16s flew mostly daytime and some night missions against all types 

of targets. The following lists some of these missions: 

Day visual attacks against point and area targets to support the 

strategic bombing campaign. F-16s flew 2,912 sorties hitting 

targets such as NBC storage facilities, bridges, ammunition storage 

areas, communications facilities, surface-to-air sites, oil refineries, 

Republican Guard headquarters buildings, and airfield facilities.40 

Visual deliveries were the preferred mode of operation with 

nonprecision munitions from medium altitude. 

37[DELETED]. 

38(S) uSCENTAF Combat Phns Handout, “F-15E Standard Conventional Loads 

”(S) USCENTAF Combat Pkans Handout, “F-16 Standard conventional Load (SCk),” 

40(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

(SCW,” p 9-1. 

p 8-1. 

47 
Scud hunting. F-16s flew 421 strikes to support the Scud hunt 

in the eastern Scud kill boxes.41 GPS/LANTIRN-equipped aircraft 

carrying cluster munitions were the optimum configuration for 

anti-Scud operations. 

Support of around forces. Armed with AGM-65 Mavericks and nonprecision munitions, F-16s flew 8,258 strikes against ground forcesP2 

Killer Scouts. F-16s also flew daylight armed reconnaissance 

strikes in kill boxes and coordinated air strikes.“’ Killer Scouts, 

as they were called, provided target type and location updates as 

well as threat status and position information on friendly aircraft. 

The, intent was to locate and identify assigned targets within an 

area of operations and coordinate incoming attacks against the 

targets before they could change position. 

Since more F-16s (248) were deployed to Operation Desert Storm 

than any other U.S. fighter aircraft, they flew the most sorties.44 Most of 

the F-16s were day-only attack aircraft, except for two squadrons 

equipped with LANTIRN navigational pods for flying night attack sorties. 

Also, 12 of the F-16s based in Turkey fired the high-speed antiradiation 

missile (HARM). 

During Desert Storm, the F-16NCs flew 13,087 sorties, striking 

11,698 targets in Iraq and Ku~ait.4~~ 46 Their principal weapons were 

nonprecision bombs and AGM-65 Maverick missiles. The average time 

for each sortie was 3.24 hours:’ and mission-capable rates were high at 

41(U) Ibid. 

42(U) Ibid. 

43F~r command and control of aircraft attacking ground targets, CENTAF had divided 

%ere were 212 F-16s in the CENTCOM AOR and 36 at lncirlik AB, Turkey, as part 

45(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Tables 98, “F-16: USAF and Bahrain Sorties 

*(U) Bahrain also flew 166 F-16 0C-A sorties during Desert Storm. GWAPS 

Statistical Compendium, Table 98. “F-16 USAF and Bahrain Sorties by Mission Type.” 

4’Desert Score, p 48. 

the Kuwait theater into 30- by 30-nautical mile zones, or “kill boxes.” 

of the Proven Force. 

by Mission Type,” and 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

48 
88.8 percent. Eight F-16s were lost during the 7-week war; 3 in combat 

and 5 in noncombat accidents.& 

Salient F-16 tactical issues include the following: During the air 

campaign, F-16s used a two-aircraft formation as the basic fighting 

element. This element combined with other elements to form flights of 

four aircraft. The flights of four then joined other flights, and on one 

occasion, fifty-six F-16s were used in a single strike pa~kage.4~ In the 

early stages of the campaign, large packages were routine, but as air 

supremacy was gained and targeting priorities changed, F-16s flew smaller squadron-size (twenty-four aircraft) packages with better results. Air 

Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Regular Air Force crews flew the 

F-16s in Desert Storm. 

F-16s had an internal 20-mm M61 Vulcan cannon. Some Air 

National Guard F-16As had 30-mm, 4-barrel Gatling cannons. F-16s also 

had six wing pylons for external stores and two tip rails for air-to-air 

missiles. The F-16 carried two AIM-9s and 500 rounds 

of 20-mm armor-piercing incendiary high explosives ammunition plus one 

of the following munitions loads during Operation Desert Storm: four to 

six MK-82s, two MK-84s, four CBU-52/58/71 s, four cBU-87~. four 

CBU-89 Gators, or two to four AGM-65 Maverick?’ 

48(U) GWAW Statistical Compendium, Table 207, “Desert Storm Coalition Aircraft 

490n 19 January, 56 F-16s attacked the Baghdad Nuclear Research Center in the 

SODesert Score, p 48. 

5’(S) USCEWAF Combat Plum Handout, “F-16 Standard Conventional Loads (SCLF),” 

Attrition.” 

largest single raid of the war. Conduct ofthe fersiun Gulf War, p T-65. 

p 8-1. 

49 
B-52 Stratofortress: (nicknamed “BUFF” for Big, 

Ugly, Flying Fellow) a long-range, heavy bomber 

capable of flying at high subsonic speeds at altitudes 

up to 50,000 feet. The B-52 first flew on 15 April 

1952 and attained initial operational capability in June 

1955. Seven hundred and forty-four aircraft were 

produced through October 1962. Numerous modifications had been made to the B-52, including the new 

Offensive Avionics System” and improvements in electronic countermeasures. In all, 41 B-52Gs were modified with improved conventional 

capabilities. The aircraft canies a full range of conventional munitions 

internally and externally along with conventional air-launched cruise 

missiles (CALCMS) for standoff operations. 

As the air campaign evolved, the B-52 force grew to 68 B-52Gs. 

which flew out of Barksdale in Louisiana, Wurtsmith in Michigan, Saudi 

Arabia, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, RAF Fairford in Great Britain, 

and Moron de la Frontera in southern Spain.53 In all, B-52s flew 1,741 

sorties for 15,269 combat hours during Operation Desert Storm.” B-52s 

dropped ordnance on both strategic and tactical targets and were 

important for psychological operations. The following are representative 

examples of B-52 missions in Desert Storm: 

Seven B-52s from Bwksdale AFB, Louisiana, carried CALCMs and 

launched before H-Hour. Aircraft carrying out these round-trip 

sorties flew a total distance of over 14,000 miles and remained 

aloft for over 35 hours-completing the longest combat missions 

in history and the first combat employment of CALCM. In the 

early hours of Desert Storm, the B-52s launched 35 CAWMS 

programmed to attack 8 targets, including military communications sites and power generation/transmission facilities. 

52264 B-52G and B-52H aircraft were refitted with the digital, solid-state Offensive 

Avionics System (OAS) from 1980 to 1986. Desert Score, p 54. 

53SOdeS flown from Wurtsmith AFB, MI. 

”(u) GWAPS Statistical compendium, Table 108, “8-52: USAF Sorties by Mission 

Type.” Also, (S) Maj John Masotti, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm Bomber 

story, Hq SAUDOBX, 18 Sep 91, p 50. 

50 
Night low-level operations against strategic targets continued 

through the third day of Operation Desert Storm. After striking 

the Uwayjah petroleum refineries during the air campaign’s third 

night, a B-52G apparently was hit by a missile or antiaircraft 

artillery, but the aircraft returned safely to its base.5s After the 

third night, all B-52 missions were conducted at high altitude. 

B-52s flew ninety-nine offensive counterair strikes against 

airfields, aircraft on the ground, and airfield-supporting infrastructure, using general-purpose bombs and cluster bomb units.”6 

Thirteen B-52s launched in the opening attack, using mixed loads 

of weapons (UK-lOOOs, CBU-58s, and CBU-~~S).’~ One B-52 

sustained minor damage when it was hit leaving the target area, 

but there were no casualties. 

B-52s flew 303 strikes against strategic targets (industrial 

facilities, command, control, and communications (C3) facilities, 

nuclear/chemical/biological facilities, and short-range ballistic 

missiles); interdiction targets including fixed installations such as 

petroleum, oil and lubricant storage facilities, and railroad^.'^ 

Most raids were conducted at high altitude with weapons employed using radar deliveries. 

B-52~. using a variety of general-purpose bombs and cluster 

munitions, flew 1.1 75 strikes against Republican Guard, armor, and 

mechanized and infantry units in the KT0.”9 The B-52’s large bomb 

load and area coverage rendered it most effective in this role. 

B-52s generally flew in threes and were most useful for attacking 

area targets. Its outstanding characteristic was its ability to fly large 

bomb loads great distances without refueling, freeing tankers for other 

missions. B-52s were not sent into the highest threat areas and were 

always used in conjunction with Wild Weasels and/or CAP aircraft in 

”(S) Masotti, p 30. 

56(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

57 

58(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

59(S/NFA+”/NC) Ibid. 

(S) Masotti, pp 29, 30. 

51 
areas where a significant threat remained. Despite the B-52’s advanced 

age, few of its missions had to be aborted; and its overall mission-capable 

rate averaged 86.2 percent.60 The B-52 flew 1,741 sorties without a 

combat loss. 

As in Vietnam, the effect of B-52s on Iraqi material and morale was 

debated in the absence of definitive evidence. Although B-52s only comprised 3 percent of the total combat aircraft, they dropped 72,000 bombs 

weighing a total of 27,000 tons, which amounted to approximately 30 

percent of all U.S. tonnage dropped!’ .Because of a lack of precision 

capability, bombing was directed at area targets such as chemical storage 

sites, factories, and supply depots in northern Iraq. Raids against the Republican Guards began on Day 1 and continued throughout the campaign. 

The B-52 can carry approximately 70,000 pounds of ordnance internally and 

externally. Defensive armament included 4 50-caliber machine guns, chaff, 

and flares. [DELETED]!2 

A-10 Thunderbolt I1 (Warthog): the first 

Air Force aircraft specifically designed for close 

air support (CAS) of ground forces. Designed 

around the GAU-8 gun, it is intended for use 

against tanks and other armored vehicles.63 The 

A-1 0 has excellent maneuverability and better X survivability in its CAS role than previous aircraft. 

Its weapons delivery system includes a heads-up 

display, a Pave Penny laser tracking pod, and the GAU-8/A Avenger 30- 

mm seven-bane1 Gatling-type cannon. The gun fires inert-depleteduranium armor-piercing projectiles capable of penetrating medium and 

heavy tanks. It can also fire high-explosive ammunition, which is extremely effective against trucks and other soft targets. The GAU-8/A has 

a cyclic rate of fire of 3,900 rounds per minute. 

60(S/NF/WN/RD) History of the Strategic Air Command, Volume I, 1 Jan-31 Dec 

61Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p T-27. 

62(S) uSCEWAF Combat Plans Handout, “0-52 Standard Conventional Loads (SCLs), 

World War 11-era Soviet 11-2 Sturmovik ground-attack aircraft and the more 

90, p 497. 

p 12-1. 

recent SU-25 Frogfoot were designed for a similar mission. 

52 
The A-10 first flew on 10 May 1972 and achieved initial operational 

capability in 1977. Seven hundred and seven production and six 

preproduction aircraft were delivered before production ceased in 1984. 

[DELETED] .64 

Both regular Air Force and Air National Guard units operated A-10s 

in Desert Storm. A total of 132 A-10s and 12 OA-10s deployed to Saudi 

Arabia during Operation Desert Shield. All A-10s were based at King 

Fahd International Airport and used King Kahlid Military City (KKMC) as 

a forward operating location. In addition to its traditional CAS mission, 

the A-10 was used for the following missions in Desert Storm: 

A-10s flew 175 strikes during an offensive counterair (OCA) effort 

focused primarily on destroying electronic warfare and ground 

control intercept sites during the first few days of the air campaign.m 

A-10s flew forty-nine strikes during missions to suppress enemy 

air defenses; sometimes they were teamed with F-4Gs to attack 

fixed SA-U3/6 sites.66 

A-10s flew 3,367 day and night strikes against Iraqi artillery and 

armor units.67 The weapons of choice were AGM-65 Mavericks 

and its internal 30-mm cannon. 

A-10s flew 135 strikes on Scud CAP and anti-Scud armed 

reconnaissance missions.68 

Aircraft designated for CAS and search and rescue (SAR) missions 

were continuously on alert from the beginning of the war. In one 

case, A-10s escorted a Special Operations Forces (SOF) combat 

61(S) uSCEMAF Combat Plans Handout, “A-10 Standard Conventional Loads (S~LS), 

65(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

66(U) Ibid. 

67(U) Ibid. 

68(U) Ibid. 

pp 11-1, 11-2. 

53 
search and rescue helicopter to retrieve a downed F-14 pilot and 

destroyed an Iraqi radio intercept truck searching for the pilot.69 

OA-10s flew 656 missions as dedicated forward air control (FAC) 

assets providing airborne control of CAS aircraft?’ 

The A-10 was used primarily as a day cAs/attack aircraft; it could 

carry a large weapons load and loiter for long periods in the target area. 

Its relatively long loiter time made the A-10 useful for “look and see” 

types of missions such as Scud hunting. But, its slower speed and long 

loiter time over the battlefield also made it susceptible to enemy fire. In 

fact, fifty-one aircraft were damaged during missions in Desert Storm; of 

these, fourteen apparently were damaged in combat.” Ten of the fourteen 

A-10s damaged were returned to action within a day, and all but one flew 

again during the war. Nevertheless, six aircraft were combat lost (four 

A-10s and two OA-10s). 

One of the six A-10 squadrons deployed to the AOR operated 

exclusively at night using the infrared video of the AGM-65D Maverick 

missile as a “poor man’s FLIR”. The Maverick’s infrared seeker became 

a search tool for targets not only for the missile but for other weapons. 

A-10s fired 4,801 Maverick missiles,’2 which was more than 90 percent 

of the Mavericks fired by Air Force aircraft. The 30-mm cannon also 

proved effective against a variety of targets, including two helicopters 

shot down over Kuwait. A-10s were also used extensively early in the 

war for taking out the border early-warning radars to deny as much 

information as possible to the Iraqis. If the Iraqi army had ever moved 

south, the A-10, along with the AV-8 and F/A-18, was considered the 

primary weapon system for stopping that advance. When preparation for 

the ground war began, most A-I0 sorties were directed against Iraqi 

armored and unarmored vehicles. In all, A-10s flew 8,084 sorties, strikConduct of the Persian Gulf War, p T-10. 69 

70(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 129, “OA-10 USAF Sorties by Mission 

71(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 207, “Desert Storm Coalition Aircraft 

72Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p T- 1 1. 

Type.” 

Attrition.” 

54 
ing 6,834 targets; 1,041 sorties were identified as CAS rnis~ions.7~ The 

aircraft averaged 2.37 hours per flight74 and had a mission-capable rate 

of 87.7 percent. 

Salient A-10 tactical issues include the following: Tactical employment tended to be two rather than four aircraft. mo-ship formations 

ingressed at altitudes between 15,000 and 20,000 feet in line-abreast, 

wedge, or trail formation. Some aircraft released their ordnance first to 

allow for greater maneuverability and to regain energy, and then used 

their gun against targets, threats permitting. Almost all two-ship formation tactics flew one flight member to maintain a high, cover position 

while the other released ordnance; then the aircraft reversed r0les.7~ 

The Iraqi army provided a tremendous target array. Pilots acquired 

targets easily, but target identification-discriminating a tank or selfpropelled artillery piece from a truck-proved a constant challenge. When 

engaging an armored or mechanized position, some flights made mediumaltitude gun and/or reconnaissance passes, dropping from 15,OOO feet to 

5,000-8,000 feet to attempt to distinguish revetted trucks from revetted 

armor. Photos, when provided, helped the pilot identify the position of 

his intended target. Some pilots used binoculars to assist in target 

identification; others remarked that the magnification was too little or that 

the plane vibrated excessively. The A-10 pilot almost always visually 

acquired the desired priority target and used either a precision munition 

or area weapon to destroy it.76 

In addition to its GAU-8/A’s 1,170 rounds of 30-mm high-explosive 

or armor-piercing ammunition, the A-10 could use 11 external points for 

carrying most conventional muniti0ns.7~ 

73(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 85, “A-10 USAF Sorties by Mission 

74Desert Score, p 20. 

75(S/NF/WN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, p 6-8. 

76(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 6-9. 

77(S) USCEWAF Combat Plans Handout, “A-I0 Standard conventional Loads (SCLF),’’ 

Type,” and Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

pp 11-1, 11-2. 

55 
AC-l30A/H Spectre. Discussed later in a section entitled, “Special 

Aircraft .’* 

A-6E Intruder: a carrier- and land-based, longrange, subsonic attack aircraft capable of accurate 

weapon delivery during day, night, and all-weather 

conditions. First flown in 1963, the A-6 achieved 

initial operational capability in 1965. All A-6 aircraft 

used by the Navy and Marine Corps in the Gulf War 

were A-6Es with an improved radar and digital avionics. Additionally, all aircraft were equipped with a Target Recognition 

and Acquisition Multisensor (TRAM) System, which gave the aircraft a 

FLIR sensor, a combination laser designatorhange finder, and a laser 

designation receiver. Two Navy A-6 squadrons were also equipped with 

the Systems Weapons Improvement Program (SWIP) upgrade, which in 

addition to bringing all avionics to state-of-the-art, allowed the aircraft to 

fire HARM, Standoff Land-Attack Missile (SLAM), and Maverick missiles. 

A-6s flew 5,619 sorties striking 2,617 targets in Operation Desert 

Storm.78 Their missions included: 

All-weather and night attacks using radar and FLlR deliveries 

against point and area targets to support the strategic bombing 

campaign. A-6’s flew 156 strikes and hit targets such as ammunition storage, oil terminals, C3 facilities, and power plants.79 

A-6s flew 221 strikes on suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) 

missions against SOCS and airfields?’ The SWIP Squadron fired 

HARM missiles to suppress enemy radars and also launched 

tactical air-launched decoys (TALDS) to further confuse Iraqi 

defensive measures. 

78(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Tables 83, “A-6: USN and USMC sorties by 

79(U) GWAPS Statistical compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

“(U) Ibid. 

Mission Type,” and 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

56 
Support of Ground Forces. The A-6 flew 1,610 strikes against 

targets such as bridges, ammo storage areas, railroad yards, and 

Directed by both the Joint Force Air Component Commander 

(JFACC) and the Anti-Surface Unit Warfare Commander (ASUWC) 

of the Naval Battle force, the A-6 flew 183 strikes against naval 

and coastal defense targets such as port facilities, individual ships 

and boats, and Silkworm shore-based antiship missile 

These missions often involved a weapons load of a 1,000-pound 

MK-83 laser-guided bomb and two Rockeyes. 

SWIP A-6s launched the first combat deliveries of the SLAM, and 

seven SLAMS were fired during the Gulf War. 

Before the war, A-6 crews normally trained for low-level (below 

1 ,OOO feet) penetration and attack. After initial low-level strikes encountered intense antiaircraft defenses, most A-6s attacked from above 10.000 

feet and used either a level or a shallow dive delivery. Initial target 

acquisition was accomplished with the radar with a handoff to the FLIR. 

About one-third of the strike missions were radar deliveries when weather, smoke, or haze precluded FLlR acquisition of the target. 

The A-6 carried a wide range of weapon loads in Desert Storm, 

including the following; eight to twelve MK-82s, eight to twelve MK-20 

Rockeye (APAMS), six MK-83's, two to four GBU-lOs, two GBu-16~' or 

two to four MK-84~.8~ 

F/A-l8A/C Hornet: a single-seat, twinengine, high-performance, multimission tactical 

aircraft operated by the U.S. Navy and Marine 

Corps. Its first flight was in 1978 and initial 

operational capability was achieved in 1983. By 

Desert Storm, some 900 F/A-l8s had been delivered to U.S. and international customers. 

"(U) Ibid. 

82(U) Ibid. 

83Conduct of the Persian Curf War, p T-6. 

57 
During the initial hours of Desert Storm, 89 Navy and 72 Marine 

Corps F/A-18s conducted both defense suppression and strike missions 

against Iraqi targets.&4 The Navy Hornets flew 4,449 sorties and the Marine Corps’ F/A-l8s flew 4,936 sorties resulting in a reported combined 

total of 4,551 strikes against targets during Operation Desert St0rm.8~ 

[DELETED] .* 

Twenty-six Canadian CF-18s were deployed from Lahr in Germany 

to the Persian Gulf. The CF-18s conducted their first offensive mission, 

an antiradar sweep of hostile airspace ahead of U.S. attack aircraft, on 24 

January 1991.8’ A majority of their 961 sorties were DCA missions, and 

they also struck targets during the 100-hour ground war.” 

The Hornet performed air-to-air and air-to-surface missions. In its 

air-to-air role, the F/A-18 projected tactical air over land and sea and 

complemented fleet air defense. Its primary attack missions were interdiction, CAS, defense suppression, and attacks against land and seaborne 

targets. The following F/A-18 missions were flown in Desert Storm: 

Hornets flew 157 strikes during SEAD missions.89 Normal 

mission load consisted of two AIM-gs, two AIM-~s, 20-mm 

cannon, and two AGM-88 HARMS. 

F/A-lSs flew 217 strikes on airfields during OCA missions.” 

Typical loads for these missions were two AIM-gs, one AIM-7, 

20-mm cannon, and either five MK-83s or two MK-84s. along 

with a FLIR pod. Typical target attacks were made from a 30- 

‘%he Navy Hornets flew from carriers in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and the 

85(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Tables 89, “FIA-18: USN and USMC Sorties 

%oyal Saudi Air Force Systems Analysis, ‘The Gulf War, A History and Summary 

”Desert Score, p 33. 

“(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 88, “CF-18: Canada Sorties by Mission 

89(u) GWAPS Statistical compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

“(U) Ibid. 

Marine Hornets were based at Shaikh Isa in Bahrain. 

by Mission Type,” and 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

of Events,” p 179. 

Type.” 

58 
degree or greater dive angle beginning at an altitude of 30,000 to 

35,000 feet, with release between 20,000 and 10,000 feet and 

airspeed around 480 to 540 knots?’ 

F-18s also flew 2,129 defensive counterair (DCA) escort sorties.= 

The F/A-l8’s typical load for these missions comprised two AIM9s. one AIM-7, a 2@mm cannon, and, occasionally, a HARM. 

The F/A-18 Hornet dropped more than 17,500 tons of ordnance 

against a variety of targets. Its multimission capability was demonstrated 

on 17 January when a flight of four F/A-l8s encountered two Iraqi 

MIG-21s about 35 miles from their target. The F/A-18s acquired, identified, and destroyed the two MIGS. then shifted to an air-to-ground role and 

dropped their MK-84s. This was the only such incident in the Gulf War. 

During Desert Storm, 3 Marine F/A-I8s were damaged by surface-to-air 

missiles and 1 by antiaircraft artillery; all returned to base and flew again 

within 36 hours. One Navy F/A-18 was lost in combat.93 

The F/A-l8 carried ordnance on nine external stations including two 

wingtip stations for AIM-9 Sidewinders; two outboard wing stations for 

an assortment of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, including AIM-~s, 

AIM-~s, AGM-84 Harpoons, AGM-88 HARMS, and AGM-65 Mavericks; 

two inboard wing stations for external fuel tanks or air-to-ground weapons; two nacelle fuselage stations for either AIM-7s. a Laser Detector 

Tracker Strike Camera, a targeting FLIR, or a navigation FLIR; and a 

center station for a fuel tank or air-to-ground weapons. Air-to-ground 

weaponry included laser-guided GBU-l0/12s, MK-80 series generalpurpose bombs, cluster bombs, and a M61 20-mm six-barrel gun with 

540 rounds of ammunition.% 

9’Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p T-78. 

9%”he U.S. Navy flew 1.436 and Canada 693 defensive counterair sorties. 

(U) GWAM Statistical Compendium, Tables 88, “CF-18: Canada Sorties by Mission 

Type,” and 89, “F/A-18: USN and USMC Sorties by Mission Type.” 

93C0ndwt of the Persian Gulf War, p T-78. 

94~bid. 

59 
AV-8B Harrier: a Marine Corps shorttakeoff and vertical-landing attack aircraft. Its 

attack avionics system uses a nose-mounted anglerate bombing set, which has a TV/laser target 

seeker and tracker, but can not self-designate for 

laser-guided munitions. Eighty-six AV-8Bs were 

deployed to support Operation Desert St01-m.~~ 

They operated from an expeditionary airfield (King Abdul Aziz AB), 

from ships (LHA-1, uss Turuwu and LHA-4, uss Nassau), and from a 

forward-area rearming and refueling point at Tanajib. 

As the Marine Corps’ principal light attack aircraft, Harriers flew 

3,359 sorties, striking 2,585 targets during Operation Desert Storm.% 

They flew 2,421 strikes against Iraq’s Ground Order of Battle and attacked targets such as artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, ammunition 

storage bunkers, convoys, logistic sites, troop locations, and airfield^.^' 

AV-8Bs expended 7,175 MK-20 Rockeyes, 288 MK-83s. 4,167 MK-82s. 

and 83,373 rounds of 25-mm machine-gun amrn~nition.~’ 

During the first two phases of the air war, AV-8Bs generally flew 

medium-altitude profiles between 10,000 to 20,000 feet. They would 

occasionally drop to a lower altitude to locate and engage targets at less 

than 8,000 feet. During the battlefield preparation and ground war phases, AV-8Bs flew at lower altitudes to ensure target acquisition and 

increase weapons effectiveness and accuracy. At these lower altitudes, 

five AV-8Bs were lost to enemy action. 

A-7 Corsair: a U.S. Navy, single-engine, 

single-seat, carrier-based strike aircraft. The A-7 

first flew in 1965 and its initial operational capability was achieved in 1966. When Iraq invaded 

Kuwait, the A-7 was being withdrawn from service; the John F: Kennedy (CV 67) was the only 

”HQMC Brief to SECDEF. APP-A/116@7/JQ/91. 

%(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Tables 86, “AV-8: USMC Sorties by Mission 

97(U) GWAPS Statistical compendium, Table 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

Type,” and 177, “Strikes by AIF Categories.” 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p T-22. 98 

60 
carrier still flying A-7s. During Desert Storm, the Kennedy’s 24 A-7s 

staged attacks from the Red Sea and also guided the first operational 

AGM-84E SLAMS into Iraqi missile storage facilities. A total of 737 A-7 

sorties were flown in Desert Storm.w 

Armament consisted of a M61 Gatling-type cannon with 500 rounds 

(1,OOO rounds maximum) and up to 15,000 pounds of external stores. 

These stores included MK-80 series bombs, laser-guided bombs, AGM-65 

Maverick missiles, AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-88 HARM antiradar 

missiles, and cluster bombs. 

Forward Air Control Aircraft 

OV-10 Bronco: an armed, light observation 

and reconnaissance aircraft with FLIR and laser 

designation capability. The Marine Corps deployed 20 of these aircraft to Southwest Asia. 

While praised by the Marine Division commanders, some delays associated with deploying the 

OV-10 to Southwest Asia occurred since it could 

not refuel in flight or be transported by strategic airlift.Iw Co-located 

with the AV-8Bs at King Abdul Aziz Naval Base, the OV-10s flew 482 

sorties, of which 411 were logged as CAS missions.”’ 

Salient points included a relatively long loiter time at low airspeeds, 

which allowed OV-10s to fly aerial reconnaissance, airborne forward air 

control and tactical air control, armed reconnaissance, helicopter escort, 

and command and control missions. The aircraft also used their FLIR 

sensors to provide laser designation, night observation, and 

reconnaissance. 

w(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 84, “A-7: 

‘O0HQMC Brief to SECDEF, APP-A/I 160-7/JQ/91. 

“‘(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 130, “OV- 10 

USN Sorties by Mission 

Type.” 

USMC Sorties by 

Mission Type.” 

61 
FIA-18D Hornet: a Marine, two-seat, allweather, dayhight attack aircraft. Its mission was 

to attack and destroy surface targets; conduct 

multisensor imagery reconnaissance; provide supporting arms coordination, including air, naval 

gunfire and artillery; and to intercept and engage 

enemy aircraft. 

The Marines deployed twelve F/A-l8D aircraft to Southwest Asia. 

The aircraft were used in tactical-air-coordinator and airborne-forward-aircontrol roles. They flew into target areas ahead of Coalition attacks to 

locate and identify high-value targets during tactical air missions. F/A18s provided almost twenty-four-hour battlefield coverage for CAS 

missions. 

The F/A-I8D flew 557 sorties with a mission-capable rate of 85.9 

percent in Operation Desert Storm. No F/A-l8Ds were lost to enemy fire, 

and only two sustained battle damage. Armament capability was the same 

as for F/A-l8A/C aircraft, and during Desert Storm, F/A-18Ds expended 

2,325 rockets and 27,000 rounds of 20-mm cannon ammunition.IM 

Helicopters 

AH-64A Apache: the U.S. Army's principal 

attack helicopter. It was designed for antiarmor 

operations and for operations under field 

conditions in daytime, nighttime, and adverse 

weather. The Apache's primary armament is the Hellfire modular missile 

system, a laser-homing-guided, antiarmor weapon. It can designate 

targets itself or receive designations from remote sources. Hydra 70, 

2.75-inch folding fin aerial rockets are carried in addition to, or instead 

of, Hellfires. A chin-turret-mounted 30-mm cannon is controlled by a 

sight in the pilot's helmet. The Apache is also equipped with electronic 

systems such as night vision sensors, infrared and radar jamming systems, 

and global positioning system equipment. 

~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~ 

'OZConduct of the Persian Gurf War, p T-81. 

62 
AH-1 Cobra: an attack helicopter designed 

for close-in fire support and antitank missions. 

The initial version, the AH-lG, had a 1966 initial 

operational capability. The Army and Marine 

Corps deployed with 224 Cobras to Southwest Asia.lo3 The Marine Corps 

Cobras flew 1,273 sorties and accumulated 3,014 hours, providing closein fire support, helicopter escort, and antiarmor and armed reconnaissance 

missions.lW The Army conducted daylight armed reconnaissance 

operations and security patrols with tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire 

guided (Tow) missiles, 2.75 inch rockets, and 20-mm guns. 

Coalition Aircrafr 

Tornad~:''~ a two-seat all-weather bomber 

developed by the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Italy and also purchased by Saudi 

Arabia. Its initial operational capability was in 

1982, and seventy-four ground attack versions 

served in the Gulf War.'06 The United Kingdom 

also flew Tornados modified for reconnaissance 

missions. 

The Tornado flew a variety of missions during the war, including the 

following: 

The Tornado initially used its JP233 runway denial weapon, 

which was designed for low-level attacks on airfields in Europe. 

With JP233, Tornados flew level deliveries at extremely low 

altitudes and attacked runways and aircraft parking areas. Fiftythree sorties were flown in the first four days, expending 106 

~~ 

'031bid, p T-13. The Army deployed with 145 and the Marine Corps with 79. 

'04HQMC Brief to SECDEF, APP-l/I 160-7/JQ/91. 

'Ohis ground attack version had different designations according to country. The 

UK version was called GRl, the Saudi version IDS, and the ltalians simply called it 

Tomado. 

'06(S) This total included the UK, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. (S) Desert Shield, 

UScmAF/RASF Combat Plans Handout, Jan 1991, pp 17-4, 17-5. 

63 
JP233s.’”’ Reduced enemy airfield activity negated the need to 

continue delivering JP233 from low-level, and the United Kingdom Tornados switched to medium-altitude tactics to fly above 

the antiaircraft artillery threat. During this timeframe, United 

Kingdom Tornados continued to target airfields using UK 1OOOpound bombs to cut runways. 

With the arrival of Buccaneer aircraft equipped with the Pave 

Spike laser designating pod on day 17 of Desert Storm, Tornados 

dropped laser-guided bombs that were buddy-lased by Buccaneers. Tornados flew 488 strikes against targets such as bridges, 

hardened aircraft shelters, and other elements of air base infrastructure.Iw The arrival of two thermal imaging and laser designating pods in the last ten days of the air war allowed the Tornado to designate targets for its own laser-guided bombs. 

The Tornados also carried air-launched antindiation missiles 

(ALARMS) on SEAD missions; they fired 1 13 ALARMS during the war.’09 

The United Kingdom Tornado ground attack force flew 2,535 sorties 

in Desert Storm, mostly in interdiction roles.“’ Its main weapons were 

JP233 and UK-1000s. The Tornado carried two JP233s, four to eight 

unguided UK 1,000-pound bombs, or two to three UK 1,000-pound 

bombs configured as laser-guided bombs. United Kingdom Tornados 

dropped 106 JP233s and 3,631 unguided bombs along with 1,079 laserguided versions of the UKs 1,000-pound bomb.”’ In addition, RAF 

Reconnaissance Tornados flew 140 sorties. 

“’(S) Operational Research Branch Headquarters RAF Strike Command, “Analysis 

‘08(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 183, “Precision-Guided Munitions 

‘09(S) Operational Research Branch Headquarters RAF Strike Command, p 8. 

of Attack and Reconnaissance Operations During Operation Cranby,” 26 July 91, p 8. 

(PGM) Strikes by AlF Categories.” 

(U) GWAPS Stafistical Compendium, Tables 104, 106, and 107, “Saudi Arabia, 

(S) Operational Research Branch Headquarters Strike Command, pp 7-8. 

110 

Italy and UK Sorties by Mission Type.” 

111 

64 
Buccaneer: a dual-engined bomber originally 

built for the Royal Navy in the late 1950s, but 

transferred to the Royal Air Force with the 

retirement of that Navy’s last conventional carrier. 

Updated in the 1980s with a new avionics suite, 

the aircraft carries a daytime-only Pave Spike laser 

designating pod. When the Tornados transitioned 

to medium-altitude, 12 Buccaneers were brought to the theater to laserdesignate laser-guided bombs on day 17. The Buccaneers flew 226 

sorties in Desert Storm, mostly as buddy laser designators without weapons.’12 After the arrival of the Tornado’s thermal imaging and laser 

designating (TIALD) pod, they flew sixteen missions and designated their 

own weapons. 

Jaguar: an aircraft jointly developed by France 

and the United Kingdom in the late 1960s as a tactical 

support aircraft. In all, 12 United Kingdom and 24 

French Jaguars flew 1,145 sorties striking targets in 

Kuwait and ships in the Persian Gulf. Those sorties 

included 26 reconnaissance mission^."^ 

United Kingdom Jaguars expended 741 UK-10o0 bombs, 387 CBU-87 

cluster bombs, 608 rockets, and 8 BL-755 cluster bombs during the war.114 

Mirage F1: an all-weather intercepter with 

initial operational capability in 1973. It is also 

capable of visual attack missions and has an unrefueled radius of action of 230 nautical miles. One 

variant, the F-lCR, was developed for a reconnaissance role. The Coalition Mirage Fls did not fly in 

the first week of Desert Storm to avoid confusion with Iraq’s F1 s and the 

risk of being shot down by friendly air~raft.”~ The Kuwait and Qatari air 

forces flew 170 ground attack missions, while the French flew 44 reconll2(U) GWAPS Stalktical Compendium, Table 81, ‘Total Sorties by U.S. Ser- 

‘13(U) GWAB Statistical Compendium, Table 101, “Jaguar: UK and France Sorties 

‘14(S) Operational Research Branch Headquarters RAF Strike Command, pp 10-1 1. 

“’Royal Saudi Air Force Systems Analysis, pp 193, 194. 

vicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type.” 

by Mission Type.” 

65 
naissance missions.Il6 The Fls flew only daytime sorties because they 

lacked night capability. 

Air-to-Ground Weapons 

A large selection of air-to-ground weapons were available to 

Coalition forces during the Gulf War. This section begins with a brief 

discussion of the basic characteristics of air-to-ground munitions and then 

describes the weapons used. 

Bombs and Missiles 

A bomb is an explosive filler enclosed in a casing. Bombs are 

generally classified according to the ratio of explosive material to total 

weight. The principal classes are general-purpose (GP), fragmentation, 

and penetration bombs. Approximately 50-percent of the GP bomb's 

weight is explosive material."' These bombs usually weigh between 500 

and 2,000 pounds and produce a combination of blast and fragmentation 

effects."* The most common GP bombs are the MK-80 series weapons. 

Only ten to twenty percent of a fragmentation bomb's weight is explosive 

rnate~ial;"~ the remainder include specially scored cases that break into 

predictably sized pieces. The fragments, which travel at high velocities, 

are the primary cause of damage. Cluster munitions are primarily fragmentation weapons. Penetration bombs have between twenty-five and 

thirty percent explosive filler.Im The casings are designed to penetrate 

hardened targets such as bunkers before the explosives detonate.I2' 

'I6(U) GWAR Statistical Compendium, Tables 90, "F-1: Kuwait and Qatar Sorties 

by Mission Type," and 91, "F-ICR: France Sorties by Mission Type." 

'"Flight Manual, T.O. 1-1 M-34, Aircrew Weapons Delivery Manual, (Non-nuclear), 

15 Feb 86, p 1-4. 

'%he approximately one-half-inch-thick casing creates a fragmentation effect at the 

moment of detonation, and the 50-percent explosive filler causes considerable damage 

from blast effect. 

'"Flight Manual, T.O. I-1M-34, p 14. 

lzo1bid. 

'*'Penetration was achieved by either kinetic energy of the entire projectile (BLU109) or the effects of a shaped-charge (AGM-6%). 

66 
Free-fall bombs have three sections. The bomb body is the casing 

containing the explosive material. The fuze section can be located in the 

nose and/or the rear of the bomb and determines the timing of the 

explosion. The tail section, or fins, determines how the bomb flies 

through the air. Desired weapons effects are achieved by selecting a 

particular combination of bomb body, fuzing, and tail section. 

Bomb ConBgurations 

Bomb bodies vary in size, weight, and thickness of casing. GP 

bombs have a thinner case and more explosive filler than penetrating 

bombs, whereas cluster bombs generally come in dispensers that open to 

release bomblets at predetermined altitudes. The bomb body casing 

(except for cluster munitions) houses the explosive filler. Upon detonation, the high-explosive filler creates an explosive train to achieve the 

desired weapons effect; detonation is triggered by fuzing. 

A fuze initiates bomb detonation at a predetermined time and under 

the desired circumstances. Fuzes are located in the nose or tail of the 

munition, or both. They are armed by one, or a combination, of the 

following methods: 

The arming vane, a small propeller, is rotated by airflow after 

weapon release. A specified number of rotations arms the fuse. 

The arming pin is ejected or withdrawn by a spring action releasing the arming mechanism and allowing the fuze to arm. 

The inertia fuze is armed by abrupt changes in the velocity of the 

bomb caused by the deployment of fins or ballutes. 

The electric fuze is armed by a time-delay circuit powered by a 

thermal battery activated by extraction of the arming lanyard 

upon bomb release. '22 

'"Flight Manual, T.O. I-IM-34. p 2-4. 

67 
FMU-113 Proximity Fuse Being Attached to a MK-82 Bomb. 

Different effects are obtained by mating different bombs to different 

fuzes. A fuze functions in one of the following ways. An impact fuze 

is designed to function on or after impact. Detonation upon impact is 

selected for targets such as supply dumps when the main destructive 

energy desired is blast. For a building, a delayed detonation might be 

selected so the bomb can penetrate several floors before exploding. A 

proximity fuze contains a miniature doppler 'radar set that senses height 

above the ground. When the explosion occurs above the ground, most 

of the destructive effect is caused by the bomb casing fragments. Proximity-fuzed bombs are used against targets such as troops in trenches, 

radars, trucks, and other vehicles. In a timed fuze, the delay is normally 

initiated at bomb release rather than on impact. The timing element is a 

mechanical or electrical device. A hydrostatic fuze is employed in depth 

bombs used for underwater demolition work. The MK-36/40 Destructor 

is a special fuze with a sensor that can be mated to a bomb. It senses the 

presence of metallic objects such as trucks or ships, making it, in effect, 

a mine. These weapons can be used against either land or water targets. 

68 
In Southwest Asia, the MK-36 (500-pound) detonators were used to 

mine the waters in the vicinity of Umn Qasr naval facility. 

The conical fin was the tail section type most often installed on GP 

bombs dropped in Southwest Asia. The conical fin assembly helped 

stabilize the bomb in flight, allowing the bomb to exhibit the best effects 

of low drag and stabilization after release. A conical fin mated with a 

GP bomb results in a low-drag general-purpose bomb. Two types of 

high-drag retarders were used in Desert Storm. The first was the airinflatable retarder tail assembly containing a ballute (combination balloon 

and parachute) device that deployed shortly after bomb release. There 

were two types of ballutes, the BSU-49 mated to a 500-pound MK-82 

bomb, and the BSU-50 mated to a 2,000-pound MK-84 bomb. The 

second type of retarding fin was the Snakeye, which had four metal vanes 

that opened into the windstream to slow the bomb after release. Snakeye 

fins were used by Navy aircraft to deliver mines into the waters around 

Iraqi naval bases. These high-drag retarder tail assemblies were used to 

slow the bomb quickly after a high-speed, low-level release, thereby 

reducing the chance of an aircraft being damaged by its own bomb 

fragments. 

General-Purpose Bombs 

General-purpose bombs were the type of ordnance most frequently 

employed in the Gulf War. According to Iraqi prisoners of war, 

formations of B-52s dropping general-purpose bombs were one of the 

most feared aircraft-weapon combinations of the war.’23 GP bombs 

served as the basic building blocks for many of the other munitions used 

during the Gulf War. GP bombs dropped during the Gulf War were as 

follows: 

12’(S/REL UK) “The Gulf War: An Iraqi General’s Perspective,” Memorandum for 

Record - Joint Debriefing Center, 11 Mar 1991, p 7. 

69 
# Dropped’= Total weight Weight of 

(lb Class) Explosives (Ibs)IU Bomb 

MK-82 500 192 77,653 

MK-83 1 ,000 416 19,018 

MK-84 2,000 945 12,189 

M117 750 386 43,435 

MK-80 Series: developed in the 1950s in response to the need for 

bombs producing less aerodynamic drag. MK-80 series bombs are cylindrical in shape and are equipped with conical fins or retarders for external 

high-speed carriage. They are fitted for both nose and tail fuzes to ensure 

reliability and produce effects of blast, cratering, or fragmentation. The 

MK-80 series of bombs were dropped from literally every fixed-wing 

U.S. Marines assemble tail section to MK-82 Bombs. 

‘”Flight Manual, T.O. I-IM-34, pp 1-13, 1-14, and 1-21. 

‘25Weapons utilization figures throughout this section from (U) GWAPS Statistical 

Compendium, Table 191, “Desert ShieldStorm: Total USAF. USN, and USMC Weapons 

Cost and Utilization (FY 90/91$),” unless otherwise spcifically noted. 

70 
aircraft that supported the ground offensive. The bombs were used against 

a wide variety of targets, including artillery, trucks, bunkers, Scuds, surface-to-air missile sites, antiaircraft artillery sites, early warning radars, and 

supply points. All MK-80 series bombs are similar in construction. 

MK-82: a free-fall, nonguided GP 500-pound bomb. The bomb is 

usually equipped with the mechanical M904 (nose) and M905 (tail) fuzes 

or the radar-proximity FMU-113 air-burst fuze. The MK-82, along with 

the M117, were the primary weapons used by B-52s. Air Force F-16s 

and Marine Corps F/A-l8s and AV-8Bs also dropped MK-82s. 

MK-83: a free-fall, nonguided GP 1,ooO-pound bomb. The bomb can 

be fitted either with mhanial nose and tail fuzes or with a proximity fuze. 

During Desert Storm, this bomb was dropped mainly by Marine aircraft 

conducting close air support/battlefield air interdiction (CAWBAI) missions. 

MK-84: a free-fall, nonguided GP 2,000-pound bomb. Normal fuzes 

are the mechanical M904 (nose) and the M905 (tail). Most of the over 

12,000 MK-84s expended during Desert Storm were dropped by Air 

Force F-ISEs, F-16s and F-l11Fs; less than 1,000 of the total were 

dropped by Marine Corps tactical aircraft. 

M117: a free-fall, unguided, GP 750-pound bomb. Its usual fuzes 

are the mechanical M904 (nose) and M905 (tail), or the mechanical 

FMU-54 (tail). The B-52s dropped virtually all of the MI 17 bombs. 

BLU-l09/B (1-2000): an improved 2,000-pound-class bomb designed 

as a penetrator without a forward fuze well. Its configuration is relatively 

slim, and its skin is much harder than that of the standard MK-84 bomb. 

The skin is a single-piece, forged warhead casing of one-inch, high-grade 

steel. The BLU-l09/J3 was always mated with a laser guidance kit to 

form a laser-guided bomb in Desert Storm. Its usual tail fuze is a 

mechanical-electrical FMU-143. The 1,925-pound bomb has a 550-pound 

tritonal high-explosive blast warhead.126 

1261bid, p 1-20. 

71 
Cluster Bombs 

Cluster bombs, like GP bombs, can feature mix and match components (submunitions, fuzes, etc.) to produce the desired effect. 

CBU-52&8/71: The CBU-52, -58 and -71 all use SUU-30 

dispensers, a metal cylinder divided longitudinally. One-half contains a 

strong back section that provides for forced ejection and sway-bracing. 

The two halves lock together. Four cast aluminum fins are attached at a 

90-degre.e angle to the aft end of the dispenser and are canted 

1.25 degrees to impart spin-stabilized flight. When released from the 

aircraft, the arming wirdanyard initiates the fuze arming and delay cycle. 

At fuze function, the fuze booster ignites and unlocks the forward end of 

the dispenser. Ram air action on the dispenser forces the two halves 

apart, instantaneously dispensing the payload and allowing the bomblets 

to spin-arm and self-dispense. A total of 17,831 were expended during 

the Gulf War. 

CBU-52: loaded with 220 antimaterial, antipersonnel bomb let^.'^^ 

The CBU-52 weighs 785 pounds and can be used with a variety of 

proximity fuzes or the mechanical MK-339 timed fuze. The submunition 

is a 3.5-inch spherical bomblet weighing 2.7 pounds with a 0.65-pound 

high-explosive warhead.lZ8 

CBU-58: loaded with 650 bomb let^."^ These bomblets contain 5- 

gram titanium pellets, making them incendiary and useful against 

flammable targets . 

CBU-71: loaded with 650 bomblets.'" It has two separate kill 

mechanisms, one fragmentation, the other incendiary. Both incorporate a 

time delay fuze, which detonates at random times after impact. 

CBU-72: the 550-pound cluster bomb contains three submunitions 

known as fueVair explosive (FAE). The submunitions weigh approximately 

'"lbid, p 1-75. 

'281bid, p 1-82. 

'291bid, p 1-75. 

"lbid. 

72 
100 pounds and contain 75 pounds of ethylene oxide-with air-burst fuzing 

set for 30 feet.I3’ An aerosol cloud approximately 60 feet in diameter and 

8 feet thick is created and later ignited. The main destructive force of 

FAE was very high overpressure, useful against soft targets. The Marine 

Corps dropped all 254 CBU-72s, primarily from A-~ES, against mine 

fields and personnel in trenches. Some secondary explosions were noted 

when it was used as a mine clearer; however, FAE was primarily useful 

as a psychological weap~n.’~’ 

CBU-78 Gator: a tri-Service weapon featuring anti-vehicle and 

antipersonnel land mines used adjacent to enemy forces to disrupt or deny 

use of selected areas. The 5Wpound CBU-78 contains 45 antitank and 15 

antipersonnel mines. These mines can be detonated by target sensors (magnetic field for antitank and trip line for antipersonnel) or by a disturbanceantidisturbance device. They also have a backup self-destruct time set before 

aircraft launch. The Navy and the Marine Corps dropped 209 CBU-~SS.’~~ 

CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition (CEM): a SUU-65 tactical 

munitions dispenser (TMD) with an optional FZU-39 proximity sensor and 

202 bomblets.’M The bomblet case is made of scored steel designed to 

break into approximately 300 preformed 30-grain fragments for defeating 

light armor and per~onnel.’~’ The U.S. Air Force dropped 10,035 

CBU-S~S.’~ 

CBU-89 Gator Mine: a SUU-64 tactical munitions dispenser with 72 

antitank mines, 22 antipersonnel mines, and an optional FLU-39 proximity 

ser1s0r.l~~ Mine arming begins when the dispenser opens. Mine detonation 

I3’(S) IDA Document 1080, Desert Storm: Fixed Wing BAUCAS operations and 

I3*HQMC Brief to SECDEF, USMC Aircraft and Munitions: Performance in Desert 

133( U) GWAH Statistical Compendium, Tables 189 and 190, “Desert ShieldStorm: 

‘”Flight Manual, TO. I-IM-34, p 1-85. 

I3’lbid, p 1-86. 

‘36(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 188, “Desert ShieldStorm: 

‘37Flight Manual, T.O. 1 - 1 M-34, p 1-86.1. 

Lessons Learned, Jan 1992, p A-5. 

Storm, updated 9 Oct 91. 

USN, and USMC Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 91$).” 

USAF 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 90$).” 

73 
is initiated by target detection, mine disturbance, low battery voltage, and 

a self-destruct time-out. The antitank mine is a magnetic sensing submunition effective against tanks and armored vehicles. The antipersonnel mine 

has a fragmenting case warhead triggered by trip wires. The U.S. Air 

Force employed 1,105 CBU-89s during the Gulf War.138 

MK-20 Rockeye: a free-fall, unguided cluster weapon designed to 

kill tanks and armored vehicles. The system consists of a clamshell 

dispenser, a mechanical MK-339 timed fuze, and 247 dual-purpose armor-piercing shaped-charge bomb let^.'^^ The bomblet weighs 1.32 

pounds and has a 0.4-pound shaped-charge warhead of high explosives, 

which produces up to 250,000 psi at the point of impact, allowing penetration of approximately 7.5 inches of armor."" Rockeye is most efficiently used against area targets requiring penetration to kill. Marines 

used the weapon extensively, dropping 15,828 of the 27,987 total Rockeyes against armor, artillery, and antipersonnel targets. The remainder 

were dropped by Air Force (5,345) and Navy (6,814) air~raft.'~' 

CBU-59 APAM: an antipersonnel, antimaterial weapon developed in the 

1970s as a successor to Rockeye. It uses the same Rockeye dispenser, 

but has 717 smaller BLU-77 bomblets fitted into the case. In addition to 

its armor-piercing effect, it also has antipersonnel fragmentation and 

incendiary features. One hundred and eight-six were delivered during the 

War. 

Laser-Guided Bombs 

With the assistance of build-up guidance kits, general GP bombs are 

turned into laser-guided bombs (LGBS). The kits consist of a computercontrol group (CCG), guidance canards attached to the front of the warhead 

to provide steering commands, and a wing assembly attached to the aft end 

to provide lift. UjBs are maneuverable, free-fall weapons requiring no 

electronic interconnect to the aircraft. They have an internal semiactive 

I3'(lJ) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 188, "Desert ShieldStorm: 

139Flight Manual, T.O. 1-IM-34, p 1-88. 

140fbici, p 1-90. 

I4l(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Tables 188, 189. 190, and 191 "Desert 

ShieldStorm: USAF, USN, uSMC, and Total Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 90/91$)." 

USAF 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 90$)." 

74 
guidance system that detects laser energy and guides the weapon to a target 

illuminated by an external laser source. The designator can be located in 

the delivery aircraft, another aircraft, or a ground source. 

All LGB weapons have a CCG, a warhead (bomb body with fuze), and 

an airfoil group. The computer section transmits directional command 

signals to the appropriate pair(s) of canards. The guidance canards are 

attached to each quadrant of the control unit to change the flightpath of 

the weapon. The canard deflections are always full scale (referred to as 

"bang, bang" guidance).'" 

The LGB flightpath is divided into three phases: ballistic, transition, 

and terminal guidance. During the ballistic phase, the weapon continues 

on the unguided trajectory established by the flightpath of the delivery 

aircraft at the moment of release. In the ballistic phase, the delivery 

attitude takes on additional importance, since maneuverability of the LGB 

is related to the weapon velocity during terminal guidance. Therefore, 

airspeed lost during the ballistic phase equates to a proportional loss of 

maneuverability. The transition phase begins at acquisition. During the 

transition phase, the weapon attempts to align its velocity vector with the 

line-of-sight vector to the target. During terminal guidance, the LGB 

attempts to keep its velocity vector aligned with the instantaneous line-ofsight. At the instant alignment occurs, the reflected laser energy centers 

on the detector and commands the canards to a trail position, which 

causes the weapon to fly ballistically with gravity biasing towards the 

target. 

GBU-10: an MK-84 2,000-pound bomb with an added laser 

guidance package.'" The GBU-I01 mates a BLU-109B weapon with a 

Paveway I1 laser guidance kit. This improved 2,000-pound bomb is used 

against targets requiring deeper penetration. In Operation Desert Storm, 

GBU-lO/lOIs were used extensively by F-15Es and F-11 IFs mainly 

against bridges, Scuds, C31 (command, control, communications, 

intelligence) nodes, and bunkers. Of the 2,637 expended,Ie) over one- 

'"Flight Manual, T.O. I-IM-34, p 1-29. 

'431bid, p 1-25. 

Ie)(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 191, "Desert ShieldDesert Storm: 

Total USAF, USN, and USMC Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 90/91$)." 

75 
third were dropped by F-11 IFs, and the rest by F-1 17s. F-15Es, and Navy 

and Marine Corps aircraft. 

GBU-12: a MK-82 500-pound bomb with an added laser guidance 

package. The GBU-12 was dropped by F-11 lFs, F-ISEs, and A-~s, 

mostly against fixed armor. It was the F-111 F tank-busting weapon of 

choice. Of the 4,493 GBU-12s employed,’45 over half were dropped by 

the F-111F. 

There are two generations of GBU-10/12 LGBs: Paveway I with 

fixed wings and Paveway I1 with folding wings. Paveway I1 models have 

the following improvements: detector optics and housing made of injection-molded plastic to reduce weight and cost; increased detector sensitivity; reduced thermal battery delay after release; increased maximum 

canard deflection; laser coding; folding wings for carriage, and increased 

detector field of view. (Paveway 11’s instantaneous field of view is thirty 

percent greater than that of the Paveway 1’s field of view).’& 

GBU-16: a MK-83 1,000-pound bomb modified with a common 

Paveway I1 laser guidance kit. Virtually all 219 GBU-16s were dropped 

by Navy A-~Es, which had the capability to lase the target themselves 

(self-designation). 147 

GBU-24: either a MK-84 or BLU-109 bomb modified with a Paveway I11 low-level laser-guided bomb kit to add the proportional guidance 

in place of the bang-bang type used in the Paveway 11. Performance 

envelopes for all modes of delivery are improved because the larger 

wings of the GBU-24 increases maneuverability. Paveway 111 also has 

increased seeker sensitivity and a larger field of regard. All of the 1 ,I 81 

GBU-24s were released by F-11 lFs.I4’ 

GBU-27: a BLU-109 bomb with a low-level laser-guidance kit. It 

has a modified GBU-24 seeker head and a smaller GBU- 10 tail assembly 

’45(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid. 

‘&Flight Manual, T.O. I-IM-34, p 1-27. 

‘47(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 191, “Desert ShieldDesert Storm: 

Total USAF, USN, and USMC Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 90/91$).” 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 90$).” 

(u) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 188, “Desert ShieldStorm: USAF 148 

76 
necessary for internal carriage. All 739 GBU-27s expended were dropped 

by F- 1 17~.'~~ 

Cruise Missiles 

BGM-109 Tomahawk: a cruise missile carried by surface ships and 

submarines. It has a range of approximately 700 nautical miles, a weight 

of 3,200 pounds, an attached solid-propellant booster, an air-breathing 

BGM-109 Tomahawk 

land-attack missile 

(TLAM) takes to the air 

after being launched 

from the battleship 

U.S.S. Wisconsin. 

turbofan engine, and a guidance system that navigates by comparing 

stored digital ground images with actual ground points along its flight 

path. The solid-propellant rocket booster propels the missile until the 

small turbofan engine takes over for the cruise portion of the flight. 

Initial guidance is provided by a terrain-contour-matching system. The 

system compares a stored map reference with the actual terrain to determine the missile's position and then inputs course corrections. Final 

guidance is accomplished by digitized scene matching area correlation 

(DSMAC). This system compares views of the ground below the missile 

with digitized pictures in memory and directs appropriate course corrections. Tomahawk is highly survivable because of its small radar crosssection and its ability to fly at extremely low altitudes, making radar 

detection difficult. Infrared detection is also difficult because of the low 

14'(U) Ibid. 

77 
level of heat emitted from its turbofan engine. Two types of Tomahawks 

were used in Desert Storm: the C model, which has a unitary 1,OOOpound high-explosive blast and fragmentation warhead, and the D model, 

which has a cluster warhead containing 166 bomblets for attacking multiple targets.’s0 The Navy fired 298 Tomahawks during Desert St~rm.’~’ 

Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM): a conventional derivative of the air-launched cruise missile (originally designed to 

carry a nuclear warhead), which was developed to give the B-52 standoff 

capability. The small, winged CALCM is powered by a turbofan jet engine 

and has a conventional warhead [DELETED].’52 [DELETED]. It flies 

to targets using an inertial navigation system aided by a Global 

Positioning System (GPS) receiver, and is programmed to fly at constant 

pressure altitude or constant ACL. 

In the early stages of Desert Storm, seven B-52s flew round robin 

missions from Barksdale AFB in Louisiana, to the area of responsibility 

(AOR). These missions were time phased into the Strategic Air Campaign 

and lasted more than 35 hours. no launch areas were established in 

northwest Saudi Arabia beyond the range of Iraq’s early warning and 

ground control intercept radars. From these areas, the B-52s fired 35 

CALCMS.’~~ 

Aircraft Air-to-Ground Missiles 

AGM-62B Walleye: a guided bomb for daytime, clear-weather use 

only. Walleye is used against large targets. It is an electro-optical 

(2,000-pound class) weapon that uses proportional navigation to glide to 

the target. A two-way radio frequency datalink allows the pilot (in the 

release aircraft or another aircraft) to control the weapon by use of a 

small joystick. Wider fins can be attached to increase range for greater 

‘%tanley W. Kandebo, “US. Fires Over twenty-five percent of its Conventional 

Land Attack Tomahawks in First Week of War,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 

28 Jan 91. p 29. 

15’(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 189, “Desert Shield/Storm: USN 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 91$).” 

‘”(9 Maj Karns, “Background Paper on Conventional ALCM in Desert Storm,” Hq 

SAC/WOQ, 13 Feb 92, p 1. 

ls3(S) Ibid, p 2. 

78 
standoff distance. The weapon has a 2,015-pound warhead with a linearly shaped charge.'% Only 133 Walleyes were expended in Desert Storm, 

virtually all of them by the U.S. Navy.15' 

AGM-65 Maverick (WAF): a 500-pound. rocket-propelled air-toground missile. Various modes of guidance can be used in the Maverick 

series. The Air Force has procured four models: the electro-optical 

AGM-65 models A and B and the infrared AGM-65 models D and G. 

The AGM-65A/B/D models have a 125-pound, shaped-charge warhead 

for use against armored vehicles, bunkers, boats, radar vans, and small 

hard targets.'% The AGM-65G uses a larger kinetic-energy penetrator 

and a 3Wpound blast and fragmentation warhead. The AGM-65G is 

effective against unusually shaped targets such as hangars, bridges, and 

ships and against small point targets such as tanks and bunkers. An 

additional force correlate mode allows this missile to strike a specific 

aimpoint that differs from the centroid of the target. (For example, a 

specific aimpoint would be a certain building in an industrial complex). 

A dual field of view capability was added to the infrared versions to 

provide wide fields of view for target acquisition and narrow fields of 

view for improved target identification and increased launch range. The 

infrared seeker expanded the missile launch environment to include night 

and degraded visual conditions. Targets must be acquired by all 

Maverick missiles before launch. All missiles are guided autonomously, 

providing a launch and leave capability. Infrared missiles can also be 

slaved to on-board aircraft sensors. Up to three AGM-65A/B/Ds are 

carried on LAU-88 launchers, whereas only one AGM-65G can be carried 

on a single-rail LAU-117 launcher. A total of 5,255 AGM-65 B/D/G 

Mavericks were fired in Desert Storm; of those, the A-10s fired over 

4,000.15' Mavericks were the primary "tank-plinking" weapons used by 

aircraft without a self-designation precision-guided munitions capability. 

AGM-65E Maverick: a semiactive, laser-guided, solid-rocketpropelled air-to-ground standoff weapon. This missile is similar to the 

'"1990 Weapons File, MSDIXR. p 5-A-2. 

'"(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Tables 189 and 190, "Desert ShieldStorm: 

'%Flight Manual, T.O. I-1M-34, p 1-46. 

157(S/NF/WN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2. Jul 91, p 6-19. 

uSN and USMC Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 91$)." 

79 
Mavericks described above but has a heavy warhead and laser seeker. It 

is a day and night weapon primarily for close air support and homes on 

reflected laser energy. The AGM-65E is a modified AGM-65D, with a 

3Wpound penetrating blast and fragmentation warhead and a cockpitselectable fuze. Only 36 “E model Mavericks were used in Desert 

Storm, all by the Marine C~rps.’~ 

AGM-WE SLAM (Standoff Land-Attack Missile): a multimission 

Harpoon derivative designed for strikes against ships in harbors and highvalue fixed targets. The weapon combines the airframe, turbojet powerplant, and warhead of the Harpoon missile with the imaging infrared 

terminal guidance unit of the AGM-65D Maverick missile, the datalink 

capability of the AGM-62 Walleye glide bomb, and a GPS receiver. After 

launch, midcourse guidance is aided by GPS. Seeker video is transmitted 

to the system operator, who recognizes, acquires, and selects the specific 

aimpoint on the target. The blast and fragmentation penetrating warhead 

has either a proximity or an impact-delay fuze and contains 488 pounds 

of high explosive^.'^^ The Navy dropped all 7 of the AGM-84Es 

expended during Desert Storm.’@’ 

AGM-123A Skipper: a day and night, medium-range, standoff glide 

weapon that is directed to the target by reflected laser energy. The 

AGM-123A was built around an AGM-45 Shrike solid-propellant rocket 

motor, a Paveway I1 seeker and airfoil group, and a MK-83 bomb body. 

The rocket motor doubles the range of current Paveway I1 series munitions. The Navy and the Marine Corps used a total of twelve during 

Desert Storm.’61 

Helicopter Air-to-Ground Missiles 

BGM-71 TOW (”bbe-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided): 

an antitank guided weapon. In 1974, the DOD directed the Marine Corps to 

I5’(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 190, “Desert ShieldStorm: USMC 

‘”Christopher Gant, World Encyclopedia of Modern Air Weapons, 1988, p 287. 

‘@‘(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 189, “Desert ShieldStorm: USN 

I6’(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Tables 189 and 190, “Desert Shield/Storm: 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 91 $).” 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 91$).” 

USN and USMC Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 91$).” 

80 
procure TOWS for helicopters. The shaped-charge warhead, used for armor 

penetration, contains 10 pounds of high explosives. Marine Corps’ Cobras 

and Army helicopters operating from Navy ships fired 293 BGM-71 TOWS 

during Desert Storm; this figure does not include Marine Corps groundlaunched TOWS or TOWS expended from U.S. Army stores.la 

AGM-114 Hellfire (Heliborne-Launched Fire and Forget): an 

antiarmor, air-to-surface weapon. The Hellfire’s semiactive seeker receives and homes in on reflected coded laser energy illuminated by a 

laser designator remote from the missile. Hellfire is not limited to direct 

line-of-sight attack, allowing launch without seeker lock-on, and thereby 

reducing exposure time and increasing survivability of the launch platform. The shaped-charge warhead contained 20 pounds of high explosive~.’~~ U.S. Army aircraft fired all but 189 of the over 3,000 Hellfires 

expended during combat.IW Hellfire was the Army’s biggest killer of 

armored vehicles during Desert Storm. 

Rockets and Guns 

Guns and unguided fin-stabilized rockets were used extensively ‘for 

a wide variety of missions. They were primarily employed by Air Force 

and Marine Corps CAS aircraft and Army and Marine Corps helicopters 

during Desert Storm. 

Rockets: a variety of rockets were used to both mark and destroy 

targets. Virtually all of the approximately 3,000 2.75-inch rockets 

expended by the Air Force were fired by OA-10 aircraft to mark targets. 

The Marine F/A-l8D forward air controllers (Fast FACS) used 2.75-inch 

white phosphorous rockets to mark targets. In addition, Marine AH-1 

Cobras expended almost 4,000 rockets: over half to mark targets and the 

remainder against vehicles and per~0nnel.l~~ 

16*(U) Ibid. 

‘63Gant, p 249. 

Ia(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Tables 189 and 190, “Desert ShieldStorm: 

USN and USMC Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 9lS).” U.S. Army Aviation Center, 

Coordination Draft, Operation Desert ShieWDesert Storm After Action Report, 

22 Nov 91. 

‘65HQMC Brief to SECDEF, APP-A/I 16@7/JQ/91. 

81 
Guns: used to mark and destroy a variety of targets, including 

armored vehicles and trucks. The biggest gun user was the Air Force 

A-10 aircraft. Its GAU-8 Avenger, a 30-mm 7-barre1, Gatling-type 

cannon, featured selectable rates of fire of 2,100 or 4,200 rounds per 

minute and a magazine holding 1,350 rounds. At a slant range of 4,000 

feet, the GAU-WA round has 14 times the kinetic energy of a 20-mm 

projectile fired from a M61 Vulcan cannon.'% A-10s fired almost a 

million rounds of ammunition against all types of targets, especially 

armor and trucks; OA-1 0s fired an additional 16,000 plus rounds of 30- 

mm high explosive incendiary rounds to mark targets.I6' 

AC-130 aircraft used their two 20-mm, single 40-mm, and single 105- 

mm guns to attack a variety of targets in and around the KTO. Marine 

AV-8 Harriers also used guns to conduct strafing missions and to hit 

enemy positions at the Battle of Khafli. AH-1 Cobras were equipped 

with a 20-mm gun, and the AH-64 Apaches were equipped with a 30-mm 

gun. Armed helicopters used guns as close-in fire-support weapons. 

Coalition Munitwns (United Kingdom) 

JP233: a heavy-weight airfield attack and area-denial submunition 

dispenser with 30 concrete-penetrating and 21 5 area-denial bomblets.lm 

The concrete-penetrating bomblets are parachute-retarded and fall to the 

ground in a nearly vertical trajectory. A contact fuze detonates on impact 

to open a hole through which a second charge is fired to penetrate and 

detonate, thus creating a large crater. The area-denial minelets are fitted 

with disturbance fuzes and variable self-destruct fuzes to slow enemy repair 

teams, Tornados used 106 JP233s for runway denial.169 

BL-755: a medium-weight cluster bomb with 147 antitank fragmentation bomb let^.'^^ The dispenser is armed when released and opens 

after a preselected time delay. The ejected bomblets, which detonate on 

impact, have shaped-charge warheads able to penetrate at least 9.84 

'%ant, p 44. 

'67(s) 1DA)hcurnent 1080. p 27. 

'%ant, p I IS. 

'@(S) Operational Research Branch Headquarters Strike Command, p 8. 

I7*Gant, p 11 1. 

82 
inches of armor; they also scatter a cloud of at least 2,000 lethal fragment~.'~' The submunitions are retarded to increase their angle of attack 

at impact and thus their armor penetrating capability. Jaguar aircraft used 

8 BL-755s in strikes against Iraqi ground targets.'" 

UK-1000: a 1,000-pound bomb that can be carried by the 3-52. 

Tornado, Buccaneer, or Jaguar aircraft. It is configured as either a freefall weapon or as a laser-guided bomb. There were 4,372 UK-1000s 

delivered in the free-fall mode and 1,079 as LGBs.'~~ 

CRV-7: a weapon consisting of a pod containing 19 rockets. The 

rockets have a very flat trajectory and were designed to be used against 

naval targets. Carried only by the Jaguar, 32 CRV-7s (608 rockets) were 

used in the war, primarily against surface targets of the Iraqi Navy.'74 

Special Purpose One-of-a-Kind Munitions 

GBU-15: an unpowered, standoff electro-optically or infrared-guided 

glide bomb. The GBU-15 provides the capability for accurate (automatic 

or manual) guided delivery of a MK-84 bomb at increased ranges. The 

weapon is built from modular elements consisting of various 

interchangeable guidance, fuzing, and control systems designed to meet 

specific mission requirements. The GBU-1 5's effective standoff range is 

greater than that of laser-guided munitions, since the GBU-15 does not 

need to have acquired the target before it is released. The weapon is 

remotely controlled by a datalink system, and the weapon systems operator locates the target area and the specific aimpoint by observing the 

video transmitted from the weapon. The weapon's midcourse flight path 

can be adjusted either automatically or manually. Weapon video is either 

electro-optical (TV camera) or infrared, and generated in the nose of the 

weapon. During Desert Storm, all 71 GBU-15 modular glide bombs used 

Ibid, p 1 14. 171 

In(S) Operational Research Branch Headquarters Strike Command, p 11. 

173(S) Ibid, pp 10, 12. See also (SMFIWNIRD) History offhe Strafegic Air 

174(S) Operational Research Branch Headquarters Strike Command, p 11. 

Command, p 251. 

83 
were dropped from F-ll1F aircraft.I7' Most notably, GBU-15s were the 

munitions used for destroying the oil manifolds on the storage tanks to 

stop oil from spilling into the Gulf.'76 

BLU-82: a 15,ooO-pound GP bomb originally designed to clear 

helicopter landing zones in Vietnam. The warhead contains 12,600 pounds 

of GSX sluny and is detonated just above ground level by a 38-inch fuze 

extender. The weapon produces an overpressure of 1 ,OOO pounds per square 

inch.'" Eleven BLU-82s were dropped during Desert Storm, all from 

Special Operations C-130s. The initial drops were intended to test the 

ability of the bomb to clear mines; no reliable bomb damage assessment 

exist on mine-clearing effectiveness. Later, bombs were dropped as much 

for their psychological effect as for their destructive power. 

GBU-28: a special weapon developed for penetrating hardened Iraqi 

command centers located deep underground. The bombs are modified 

Army artillery tubes, weigh 4,637 pounds, and contain 630 pounds of 

high explosives. They are fitted with GBU-27 LGB kits, 14.5 inches in 

diameter and almost 19 feet long.'78 Only two of these weapons were 

dropped in Desert Storm, both by F-1 11Fs. One weapon hit its precise 

aimpoint, and the onboard aircraft video recorder displayed an outpouring 

of smoke from an entrance way approximately 6 seconds after impact. 

MK-77: a napalm canister munition. The Marine Corps dropped all 

of the approximately 500 MK-77s used in the Gulf War.'79 They were 

delivered primarily by the AV-8 Harriers from relatively low altitudes. 

MK-77s were used to ignite the Iraqis oil-filled fire trenches, which were 

part of barriers constructed in southern Kuwait. 

'75(u) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 188, "Desert ShieldStorm: 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 90$)." 

176(s) IDA Document 1080, p 55. 

InGant, p 138 

I7kBU-28/B HTPM Description Briefing Slide, 57 FWW/DT PRO-I I 1. 

"9HQMC, ASL-30, Point Paper, Desert ShieldStorm Expenditures, 16 Jul 92. 

USAF 

84 
Air-To-Ground Issues 

Tactical Bombing Accuracy Issues 

Although laser-guided munitions constituted only 6.7 percent of 

bombs dropped from tactical aircraft during Desert Storm,’80 accurate 

bombing played a pivotal role in the exercise of air power by Coalition 

and particularly US. air forces. The relatively low percentage of precision-guided bombs reflects in part the fact that many of the unguided 

bombs were dropped from “smart” platforms (e.g., aircraft) that were, at 

least in principle, capable of achieving near precision-guided munitions 

accuracy with “dumb” bombs. Both capabilities reflect important advances in both platform and munitions technology, which began in earnest in 

the final stages of the Vietnam War. While those technological advances 

yielded unprecedented tactical capabilities, they also brought tactical and 

technical problems with them. The tactical capabilities are addressed 

elsewhere in this report. Here, we are concerned primarily with the 

factors that limited tactically obtainable accuracy. 

One such factor stems from the fact that technological complexity has 

limited interchangeability. Although most aircraft can release virtually 

all munitions, only certain aircraft can both release and provide terminal 

guidance. Almost all aircraft participating in the Gulf War could drop 

LGBS, but only F-l17s, F-IllFs, A-~s, and a small number of F-15Es 

could laser-designate their own targets. In addition, some munitions were 

developed for particular aircraft. For example, only the F-11lF was 

equipped with the radio frequency datalink needed to control the GBU15, a standoff electro-optical or infrared-guided 2,000-pound bomb; and 

only a limited number of B-52s could carry CALCMs along with the 

rocket-propelled Have Nap. These limitations tied certain aircraft to 

specific roles, which made planning 24-hour operations difficult. 

(S) A total of 219,498 bombs were dropped by USAF, USN, and USMC aircraft, of 

which 9,494 were laser-guided, counting the AGM-I 23 Skipper, AGM-62 Walleye, and 

AGM-84 SLAM as guided bombs rather than missiles. The 6.7 percent figure is obtained 

by excluding the 77,299 bombs dropped by B-52s. Numbers derived from (U) CWAPS 

Staristical Compendium, Table 191, “Desert ShieldStorm: Total USAF, USN and USMC 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY !30/91$),” and (S) Masotti, p 53. 

180 

85 
Smart PlatfordDumb Bomb Vice Dumb PlatfordSmart Bomb 

The appearance of digital electronic navigation, weapons guidance 

systems, and sensors afforded two basic options for improving bombing 

accuracy. One option was to make the weapon itself “smart,” that is, 

capable of accurately guiding itself (autonomous) or of accepting 

precision guidance from the aircraft. The second option was to make the 

aircraft “smart.” In the second case, an aircraft system must be able to 

identify a three-dimensional point in space from which a ballistic “dumb” 

bomb will fall accurately upon the intended target. For either option, 

bombing parameters and tactics were largely determined by the ability of 

the enemy to deny access to the critical point above the earth from which 

a weapon, dumb or smart, might be released to destroy the target. 

Medium- and high-altitude bombing with unguided munitions posed 

problems, even with digital “smart platforms.” First, the visual bombing 

pipper was 2 milliradians wide. At a slant range of 20,000 feet, typical 

for high-angle dive deliveries, the pipper blanked out an area on the 

ground 40 feet across, often hiding the target. To the resulting errors 

must be added bomb dispersion errors. For example, the MK-84 GP 

weapon dispersion was 5-6 milliradians.”’ The result of both of these 

kinds of errors was a worst-case 160-foot miss distance, even if the pilot 

did everything right and the system worked perfectly. Furthermore, 

aircraft systems played a key role in weapon delivery accuracy. For 

example, if the aircraft system altitude had a 200-foot error, the bomb 

could have hit 120 feet from the intended target, under the same circumstances as described above. Using “smart platforms” to deliver “dumb” 

bombs against point targets smaller than the circular error probable 

(CEP)”* may well require redundant targeting.183 Only weapons (e.g., 

cluster bomb units) with footprints larger than the CEP, could expect to 

hit such point targets in one shot, and their explosive effect may not be 

‘%apt John Fyfe, “Medium Altitude Ingress and Attack Considerations,” FWS 

Student Paper, F-16 Class 91 BIF, 15 Aug 1991, p 11. 

“*CEP is defined as the radius of the smallest circle that will include the impact 

points of half of the bombs dropped against a given target. Note that CEP is a measure 

of precision. not accuracy, since the target is not necessarily the center of the circle. 

183Multiple missions would have to be sent to achieve the destruction required, 

increasing risk, resource use. and chances of collateral damage. The Joint Munitions 

Employment Manual lays out mission planning redundancy requirements. 

86 
sufficient or of proper type to achieve the necessary functional destruction 

required for tactical effectiveness. 

During Desert Storm, the effects of these basic sources of inaccuracy 

were magnified by preconflict training. ’Generally speaking, training was 

focused on a NATO Central Region conflict and emphasized low-altitude 

tactics. In addition, weapons systems, aircraft, and munitions had been 

designed to complement this thinking. By contrast, the tactical realities 

of Iraqi defenses in Desert Storm required Coalition aircraft to drop a 

wide variety of “dumb” bombs from medium and high altitudes. The 

Gulf War thus was a useful test case for highlighting the differences 

between low- and medium-altitude bombing accuracy and demonstrated 

a need for a more accurate way to deliver unguided ordnance from 

medium altitude. 

Against point targets, laser-guided bombs offered distinct advantages 

over “dumb” bombs. The most obvious was that the guided bombs could 

correct for ballistic and release errors in flight. Explosive loads could 

also be more accurately tailored for the target, since the planner could 

assume most bombs would strike in the place and manner expected. 

Unlike “dumb” bombs, LGBS released from medium to high altitude were 

highly accurate. But as with pippers, forward-looking infrared (FLIR) 

sensors had design limitations. [DELETED].’w [DELETED]. Weapon 

dispersions were overcome through laser guidance on reflected energy all 

the way to impact, which resulted in better accuracies against point 

targets. Risk, resulting from the aircraft’s need to remain in the target 

area to provide terminal guidance after weapon release, was balanced by 

the likelihood that the target could be destroyed with a single strike. In 

addition, aircraft dropping Paveway I11 LGBS reduced this risk further by 

being able to stand off further from the target while effecting release. 

Desert Storm reconfirmed that LGBs possessed a near single-bomb 

target-destruction capability, an unprecedented if not revolutionary development in aerial warfare. The magnitude of effort to destroy individual 

targets in previous wars illustrates the point. Were they so targeted 

during WW 11, it would have taken 150 B-17 sorties dropping over 

9,0oO bombs to hit a particular building. Twenty-five years later, in 

- 

‘”[DELETED]. 

87 
1967-68, 177 F-105 sorties and 380 tons of bombs were required to 

destroy the Doumer bridge in Hanoi. 

The Gurf War As A Live-Fire OT&EIBS 

The LANTIRN targeting pods procured for the F-l5E, were still 

undergoing OT&E when the Gulf War began. These targeting pods gave 

the F- 15E night, all weather weapons delivery capability, plus self-designation for LGBs. Moreover, when Desert Shield began, the F-15E was not 

yet certified to deliver the full range of air-to-ground ordnance. LANTIRN 

was used operationally on F-15Es in Desert Storm with notable success. 

Undertaking the OT&E process under live-fire conditions signifi-cantly 

accelerated the bureaucratic process and produced results that called for 

further study. 

Avahbility, Exhting Plans, And Standoff Risk 

The characteristics of the munitions available for Desert Storm were 

driven largely by Cold War plans emphasizing threat avoidance. The 

confluence of threat, weather, terrain, and existing technologies drove 

operational planners to procure weapons and aircraft delivery platforms 

designed for low-altitude deliveries. Another response was to move away 

from direct overflight of targets with conventional bombs and move 

towards standoff weapons for increased survivability. Unfortunately, 

these standoff weapons were more expensive and were relatively few in 

number. 

The most readily available munitions, general-purpose (GP) bombs, 

were good low-altitude weapons, but miss distances increased when the 

weapons were released from higher altitudes. Even though these weapons 

could be dropped from high altitude, albeit with decreased accuracy, some 

munitions were designed for only low-altitude delivery. The British 

JP233 runway cratering area-denial munition was a prime example. 

MK-20 Rockeye, an armor-penetrating munition, was another 

example of an excellent low-altitude weapon that was less effective when 

"?'o some extent, all wars in the post-Industrial Revolution era have been used for 

OT&E (Operational Test and Evaluation) purposes. The classic example was the Spanish 

Civil War of 1936-39. 

88 
released from high altitude. Rockeye was fitted only with a timed delay 

fuze, which had to be preset on the ground. Conditions had to be perfect 

for the munition to detonate at the appropriate point in space. If release 

parameters and winds were not true, the ground-set timed fuze had little 

chance of achieving the desired results. The probability that a Rockeye 

clamshell dispenser would open at the appropriate altitude, on the basis 

of a preselected time, was not high. Dispensers opening at other than 

planned altitudes greatly affected bomblet density and‘ decreased the 

probability of a 

The desire to avoid exposing attack aircraft in heavily defended areas 

changed tactics for existing munitions and drove the desire for standoff 

weapons. Early versions of LGBs, notably Paveway I and 11, increased 

accuracy, but did not offer any significant standoff benefit. The desire 

for greater standoff distances led to the development of munitions such 

as the AGM-65 Maverick missile, a launch-and-leave system designed for 

use against armor. This same desire sparked improvements to existing 

weapons. Laser-guided GBU-24s (that is, 2,000-pound Paveway 111 

bombs) were developed with larger fins and proportional, rather than 

“bang-bang”’8’ guidance, to extend their range. The Navy doubled 

Paveway I1 ranges by attaching a rocket motor to an existing MK-83 

body, creating the AGM-123A Skipper. All of these latter weapons were 

used to reduce risk associated with attacking targets in high-threat areas. 

The improved weapons, however, were expensive. In addition, relatively few aircraft could employ them. Cost limited the numbers procured and the assets available for training. While the high cost of these 

‘%is problem was the father of the proximity fuze. Artillery and antiaircraft shells 

relying on timing to ensure detonation at precise altitudes were distinguished mostly by 

their ineffectiveness. For example, range, wind, trajectory, Coriolos effect, pressure 

altitude, and a multiple of other factors, including operator skill, determined success. The 

designers of proximity fuses eliminated this guesswork and operator-induced errors by 

putting a tiny radar set in the shell or bomb. The operator need choose only the optimum 

altitude above the target for maximum blast effect, set the fuze accordingly, and reduce 

the variables to the azimutNrange problem. Higher than desired dud rates with Rockeye 

were reported by A-10 and F-16 pilots during Desert Storm. (SINFIWNNC) Tactical 

Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, pp 4-14. 6-5. 

‘87Proportional guidance moved the aerodynamic control surfaces no more or less 

than required to achieve the desired change in direction. The more primitive “bang-bang” 

guidance briefly moved opposite control surfaces to their limit of travel for each required 

change. 

89 
weapons was offset by the benefits associated with risk avoidance and the 

brobability of a first shot kill, the fact that many of them could be used 

only with certain platforms limited their utility. 

Hard- Tqet-Penetrating Free-Fall Munitions (I-2000) 

Lucrative targets such as C2 bunkers and aircraft shelters were usually 

protected by some form of hardening that had to be penetrated fo cause 

physical destruction. The requirement for a munition capable of 

penetrating such targets led to the development of the BLU-109 (1-2000) 

penetrating 2,000-pound bomb. The BLU-I09 was built with a heavy 

forged steel case designed to reduce break-up and to achieve penetration 

through kinetic energy. Its greater penetrating ability offered increased 

flexibility against a wider variety of targets. An even greater degree of 

flexibility was achieved by mating laser-guided bomb (LGB) kits to 

BLU-109 bomb bodies. Paveway I1 (GBU-10) and Paveway I11 (GBU24 A/B and GBU-27) effectively complemented the BLU-109. 

[DELETED].'88 

[DELETED]. 

Electronidlteconnaissance Systems 

Electronic warfare as displayed in the Gulf War was the product of 

decades of development and exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. 

This effort yielded dramatic results in three often-conflicting areas: the 

destruction of enemy radars; the disruption, through jamming, of enemy 

radar and communications; and surveillance and collection of electronic 

information. The effectiveness of the systems involved in these 

dimensions of warfare can best be gauged by the results of the air 

campaign. The degree to which the Coalition air forces achieved air 

supremacy reflects to a large extent the victories and advantages the 

Coalition forces had over Iraq in electronic warfare. 

The elements of the synergistic electronic warfare effort can be 

simplistically grouped as (1) shooters-those systems that released weapons to destroy the enemy's electronic systems, (2) jammers-those that, 

"'(S) GWAPS Microfilm Reel #23996, Frame #1030. Memorandum for TACYDRA, 

"Dense Penetrating Weapon," 28 Jan 91. 

90 
through electronic pulse and frequency interference, disrupted or neutralized the enemy’s electronic capabilities, and (3) collectors-those systems 

that exploited information about the enemy that could be obtained 

through electronic means. These elements of warfare cause very little 

damage to an enemy’s infrastructure or hardware by themselves, but were 

incalculable force multipliers that increased the survivability of U.S. 

aircraft and rendered enemy forces more vulnerable to attack. 

To amplify this concept, the following text presents a scenario 

involving the electronic warfare support generated and utilized during a 

hypothetical but typical F-111 mission against an Iraqi bunker. The target was selected on the basis of an analysis of intelligence, establishing 

that an Iraqi bunker was operational and actively engaged in command 

and control of Iraqi forces. Iraqi air defense systems posing a threat to 

the attack force are identified. Suppression of these threatening systems 

would have been achieved through escort or standoff jamming. F-4G 

Wild Weasels provided a still greater degree of survivability by firing 

high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMS) to destroy any ground air 

defense radars attempting to detect the incoming F-111 flight. EC-I30H 

Compass Call aircraft would stand by to neutralize Iraqi fighters by 

jamming their controller communications. Should Iraqi fighters approach 

the F-111 s, E-3A AWACS surveillance aircraft would control the intercept 

of the hostile aircraft by U.S. fighters. With the attack mission 

completed, bomb damage assessment could be obtained either 

instantaneously through onboard aircraft video recorders or by RE4C 

photo reconnaissance aircraft. Hence, this relatively small F-111 flight 

on a single mission revolved around the entire spectrum of electronic 

warfare-the collection of intelligence, the offensive jamming of enemy 

radars and communication frequencies, and finally the lethal destruction 

of air defense radars that posed a threat to the mission. Each system 

operated independently but linked through the integrated effort of the air 

campaign. 

91 
Electronidteconnaissance Aircraft 

Shooters 

F-4G Wild Weasel: an aircraft equipped to 

destroy, neutralize, or degrade enemy radar-d 

irected surface-to-air threats. The F-4G Wild 

Weasel aircraft was specially modified to carry the 

AN/APR-47 Radar Attack and Warning System, 

which detects, identifies, and locates pulsed and 

continuous wave radar emitters. Although the 

F-4G could carry virtually every type of air-to-air 

and air-to-surface munition, the preferred SEAD ordnance in the Gulf War 

was the AGM-88 (HARM). 

The U.S. Air Force committed 61 F-4Gs to support Operation Desert 

Storm. Most aircraft operated from Bahrain, and 12 F-4Gs deployed to 

Incirlik, T~rkey."~ The F-4Gs flew 2,683 sorties,'g0 and were used to 

conduct autonomous operations, direct support, and area SEAD missions. 

During autonomous operations, F-4Gs attacked targets in a particular 

geographic area to reduce the enemy air defense threat or roll back the 

air defenses for upcoming Coalition air operations. During direct support 

missions, F-4Gs joined aircraft flying attack missions and suppressed 

enemy air defenses that could pose a threat to the attacking aircraft. On 

area suppression missions, F-4Gs were not tied to a particular attack 

force, but provided suppression of enemy defense support for numerous 

strikes against various targets. The majority of F-4G missions were in 

the direct-support role, and all F-4G missions during Desert Storm required in-flight refueling. 

The F-4G was the weapon system of choice when it came to destroying Iraqi SAM sites.'" Early in the war, the Weasels and jammers flew 

with specific attack packages to ensure maximum survivability. Jammers 

and BQM-74 drones complemented the Weasels by forcing the Iraqi radar 

~ ~ ~~ 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p T-49. 189 

lgO(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 81, 'Total Sorties by U.S. Ser191(S) USCENTAF Electronic Combat (EC) in Desert Shield and Desert Storm After 

vice/Allied Country by Aircraft Type." 

Action Report, Oct 91, p 5-4. 

92 
operators to stay on the air longer, and therefore make the HARM more 

effective. As the war progressed and the perceived threat lessened, the 

Weasel and jammer packages were split to cover more packages and to 

provide a longer on-station time for Wild Weasels and more electronic 

warfare coverage.lW 

The Weasel was also the weapon of choice to provide lethal SEAD 

escort for high-value assets. The Weasel was valued for its ability to 

launch HARMS against mobile and/or specific targets. Weasels were in 

limited supply (as were all electronic warfare assets), so a concerted effort 

was made to maximize their use by piggybacking as many attack packages as possible into a given area at a specific time. [DELETED].’93 Later 

in the war, Weasels were sent into larger areas to cover attack packages 

in the KTO. Weasels would roam in the allotted airspace as “Weasel Police,” and establish a nearly continuous presence so that all aircraft heading into the KTO did so under an electronic warfare umbrella. 

Timely and accurate enemy electronic order-of-battle information was, 

in part, unavailable. Conversely, an overabundance of inaccurate information was available. However, the perceived threat of destruction 

reduced Iraqi propensity to operate their equipment. Indeed, the potential 

threat of physical destruction by antiradiation missiles in general (launched from any platform: E4G, EA-6, A-6, F/A-1 8, and F-16) perhaps 

was the biggest single winning factor in the SEAD campaign, as evidenced 

by the dramatic decrease in emissions after Day 1 of Operation Desert 

storm. 

EA-6B Prowler: a four-seat carrier- or landbased aircraft incorporating comprehensive 

electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment to jam 

enemy radars and communications. It is a modified 

Intruder with an additional AN/ALQ-99 Tactical 

Jamming System. Information on specific enemy 

emitters likely to be encountered is fed into the 

ALQ-99 system by the Tactical EA-6B Mission Planning System before 

‘%e standard Weasel configuration used in Desert Storm for long station times 

193(S) USCENTAF EC After-Action Report, p 5-4. 

was two HARMS and three fuel tanks. 

93 
launch.'" It is equipped to deny the enemy the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. This electronic countermeasure support contributed 

substantially to Coalition effectiveness by denying early warning and 

tracking data to enemy integrated air defense system (IADS) operators and 

by disrupting the firing solutions of enemy antiaircraft weapons. EA-6B 

support was considered essential for every Navy and Marine strike. The 

aircraft also supported Coalition strikes involving aircraft of all types. 

During Desert Storm, 15 Navy EA-6Bs operated from aircraft carriers 

in the Red Sea, and 12 from carriers in the Persian Gulf, while the Marines had 12 EA-6Bs at Shaikh Isa, Bahrain. On the first day of Desert 

Storm, Navy EA-6Bs used jammer pods and HARMS to support attacks on 

airfields in western Iraq while Marine EA-6Bs jammed Iraqi electronic 

warfare/ground controlled intercept (EWIGCI) radars to screen Coalition 

inflight refueling operations along with supporting a large F/A-l8 strike 

on Tallil airfield. Throughout Desert Storm, EA-6B systems jammed 

Iraqi radar systems, and the perceived threat of destruction from EA-6B 

HARMS forced Iraqi radars off the air or into highly ineffective operating 

modes. EA-6Bs flew 1,630 combat sorties with no combat losses.195 

They successfully provided electronic countermeasures jamming and 

launched over 150 HARMS in support of Coalition forces." 

Jammers 

EF-111A Raven: an aircraft equipped to 

provide electronic countermeasures support for 

tactical air forces. The Raven can detect, sort, and 

identify different enemy radars observing an attack 

force and make them ineffective, thereby prevent- x ing interception of the attack force by hostile air 

defenses. The forty-two EF-1 1 1 As are modified 

F- 1 1 1 As. These modifications provide antennas for high-powered jamming transmitters and a processor to detect hostile radar emissions. The 

'"[DELETED] 

I9'(U) GWAH Statistical Compendium, Table 81, "Total Sorties by U.S. Ser- 

'%(S) Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Vol 

VicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type." 

Ill, pp 3-53 - 3-59. 

94 
primary electronic countermeasures unit is the AN/ALQ-99E jamming 

subsystem, which scans across frequency bands under computer or manual control. When threats are identified, appropriate countermeasures are 

initiated, either automatically by computer or with the electronic warfare 

officer’s assistance. 

The EF-111 provided jamming support to Desert Storm tactical forces 

in three ways. In its standoff jammer role, the aircraft orbited outside 

enemy territory, From there, safely out of range of enemy ground-based 

weapons, EF-111 jamming systems screened the routes of friendly attack 

aircraft. In its penetration role, the EF-111 flew along with the attack 

force through critical phases of the mission, providing countermeasures 

as required to protect friendly aircraft from surveillance and acquisition 

radars. The close-in jamming role called for the EF-111 to neutralize 

enemy battlefield acquisition radars while the attack force delivered its 

weapons on enemy targets.’” 

EF-1 I1 s from the 390th Electronic Combat Squadron were based in 

Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield. On 17 January 1991, 

EF-Ills and EA-6Bs played an important role in the initial attacks 

against Iraqi targets, effectively jamming Iraq’s air defense system.198 

EF-111 s used their terrain-following ability to fly low enough to elude 

Iraqi defenses. In fact, the first day of Desert Storm saw some Iraqi 

interceptors launching to search for two Ravens supporting a F-15E attack 

mission. AWACS called bandits airborne, MIG-29s heading towards their 

area, and Mirage F-1s in the area. A single F-1, picked up visually, was 

locked-on to the trailing EF-Ill. This EF-111 countered by slicing down 

to the earth while expending chaff and flares. The F-1 followed, fired a 

missile to no avail, and then flew into the ground.’99 

USAF EF-I 11 A Fact Sheet. 197 

198[DELETED]. Source: (S) Air Force Electronic Warfare Center (AFEWC) 

Operation Desert Storm Electronic Combat (EC) Effectiveness Analysis, Jan 1992, p 10- 

14. 

John M. Dew, “Wall of Eagles, Aerial Engagements and Victories in Operation 199 

Desert Storm.” p 10. 

95 
The 24 EF-1 1 1s flew a total of 1,105 combat sorties in Desert Storm 

with no combat losses and only one noncombat loss during the conflict?OO 

The overall results of the Raven’s performance indicate that it was very 

effective in neutralizing Iraq’s electronic warfare system. Coupled with 

the total electronic warfare capability brought to bear by the Coalition 

forces, the EF-111 was a major contributor to the low allied aircraft loss 

rate and the general breakdown of Iraq’s Integrated Air Defense System. 

An analysis by the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center concluded that 

when EF-111 As were supporting Coalition aircraft, Iraqi abilities to 

detect, track, and pass target information were seriously impaired and in 

some cases completely denied.”’ 

EC-130H Compass Call: a specially modified 

version of the C-130 Hercules. It is used to deny 

the enemy the capability to execute his battlefield 

strategy. Modifications to the aircraft include an 

electronic countermeasures system, air refueling 

capability, and associated navigation and support 

systems. These modifications give the aircraft an 

electronic warfare capability that is used to confuse 

and disrupt the enemy’s command and control communications and thus 

reduce his ability to wage warfare. The system operates in either an 

automatic response or manual mode. The aircraft’s crew includes up to 

thirteen people; four are responsible for aircraft flight and navigation and 

nine operate the electronic warfare mission equipment. Aided by an 

automated system, the nine operators analyze the signal environment and 

ensure that the equipment is operating properly against designated 

targets ?02 

Compass Call aircraft flew 450 sorties in Desert St0rm.2~~ It provided 

24-hour surveillance of Iraqi command, control, and communications for 

44 consecutive days. Compass Call was also effective in disrupting voice 

systems. But because of the scarcity of air-to-air engagements during the 

2oo(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 81, ‘Total Sorties by U.S. 

”‘(S) AFEWC Operation Desert Storm EC Effectiveness Analysis, pp 10- 1 - 10- 15. 

202~~~~ EC-130H Compass Call Fact Sheet. 

’03(U) GWAPS Stahtical Compendium, Table 81, ‘Total Sorties by US. SerServicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type.” 

vicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type.” 

96 
war and Iraqi adherence to emissions control, Compass Call capabilities 

were frequently underutilized. Nonetheless, postmission reporting during 

the war indicated that when present, Compass Call effectively jammedtactical air, antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, battlefield, and 

Collectors 

E-3 Sentry AWACS: a modified Boeing 707 

commercial airframe with a rotating radar dome. 

Its radar system permits surveillance from the 

Earth's surface up into the stratosphere, over land 

or water. The radar has a range of more than 200 

miles for detecting low-flying targets and even 7fc farther for detecting aerospace vehicles flying at 

medium to high altitudes. It can look down to 

detect, identify, and track enemy and friendly low-flying aircraft by 

eliminating ground clutter returns that confused other radar systems. 

Console operators perform surveillance, identification, weapons control, 

battle management, and communications functions. The radar and computer systems on the E-3 Sentry gather and present broad and detailed 

battlefield information. Data are collected as events occur and include 

position and tracking information on enemy aircraft and ships, along with 

location and status of friendly aircraft, naval vessels, and ground troops. 

In its tactical role, the E-3 provides information needed for interdiction, 

reconnaissance, airlift, and close air support for friendly ground forces. 

As an air defense system, the E-3 detects, identifies, and tracks airborne 

enemy forces.?os 

Five E-3s initially were deployed to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, arriving 

on 8 August. An E-3 orbit was established the next day about 110 to 125 

miles from the Kuwaiti and Iraqi borders. During Operation Desert 

Shield, the number of E-3s gradually increased in Riyadh until 11 were 

available by 16 January. On 15 January, three E-3s deployed to Incirlik 

(S) AFEWC Operation Desert Storm EC Effeqtiveness Analysis, pp 9-26, 9-27. 204 

'05USAF E-3A Fact Sheet. 

97 
in Turkey to begin operations in Southeast Turkey, about 120 miles from 

the Iraqi border?06 

At the start of Operation Desert Storm, four U.S. E-3s were airborne 

over Saudi Arabia (three forward, one to the rear) and one U.S. E-3 was 

over southeast Turkey. In addition, a Saudi E-3 was airborne in southern 

Saudi Arabia and was used primarily for communications relay. The 

rearmost U.S. E-3 in Saudi Arabia was primarily used to manage air 

refueling operations. This configuration of airborne E-3s was maintained 

twenty-four hours a day throughout most of Operation Desert Storm. 

E-~s, at times, ovedew Iraq to provide additional radar coverage against 

deep target areas. Combat air patrols by F-I5Cs were established near 

E-3 orbits for protection. 

During Desert Storm, AWACS flew 682 sorties207 and supported all 

daily air-tasking-order activity, including pre- and poststrike air refueling. 

They controlled an average of 2.240 sorties a day and a total of more 

than 90,OOO sorties during the war?% The AWACS detected enemy aircraft, controlled friendly fighters, and provided a long-range air picture 

to theater commanders and other command forces. Throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, AWACS provided this primary air 

picture to the appropriate theater command and control centers through 

voice and electronic datalink hook-ups. The E-3 also operated in conjunction with Marine Corps, Navy, Army, Air Force, and Saudi Arabian 

units to provide an air picture that spanned from the Persian Gulf to the 

Red Sea and provided real-time information to most Coalition command 

centers. This complete theater air picture was passed through a datasharing network with the RC-I35 Rivet Joint, Airborne Battle Command 

and Control Center, Tactical Air Control Center, and Navy E-2s. 

206NATO-owned E-3s were used in the Mediterranean to monitor the flow of aircraft 

towards Southwest Asia and for maritime interception surveillance. They also flew over 

Turkish territory to maintain Turkish sovereignty. 

207The U.S. E-3s flew 379 and Saudi E-3s 303 sorties, respectively. (U) GWAPS 

Statistical Compendium, Table 81, ‘Total Sorties by U.S. ServicdAllied Country by 

Aircraft Type.” 

208Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p T-42. 

98 
E-2C Hawkeye: an all-weather, carrier-based airborne early warning and command and control Navy 

aircraft with a crew of five. Its missions include surface 

surveillance coordination, strike and interceptor control, 

search and rescue guidance, and communications relay. 

Normally, four or five E-2Cs are onboard a carrier, and 

at least one E-2C stays airborne to provide airborne 

early warning, command and control, and 

communications relay functions for a carrier task forceFW 

During Operation Desert Storm, 29 E-2C aircraft were in theater. Of 

the 1,192 sorties scheduled, 1,183 flown were flown for a total of 4,790 

flight hours. The E-2C coordinated communications shifts, provided 

situational awareness to Coalition aircraft, and supplied backup radar 

coverage and control for flights in hostile territory. Integration of E-2C 

and AWACS radar pictures provided superior situational awareness to both 

platforms, but the lack of an over-the-horizon communications suite was 

a distinct disadvantage. Also, the lack of in-flight refueling capability 

limited the E-2C's range and endurance?" 

TR-lLJ-2R: a high-altitude tactical 

reconnaissance aircraft equipped with a variety of 

sensors to provide continuous day or night, allweather, standoff surveillance of a battle area in 

direct support of U.S. and allied ground and air 

forces. Both aircraft are single-engine jets with a 

speed of 430 miles per hour and a range of over 

3,000 miles. The four TR-1s and five U-2s used in Desert Storm flew 

238 reconnaissance sorties from extremely high altitudes, capitalizing on 

the aircraft's ceiling of over 70,000 

mibid, pp T-36 - T-43. 

2101bid. 

'"u-2~ flew 149 and TR-Is 89 sorties, respectively. (U) GWAPS Statistical 

Compendium, Table 81, 'Total Sorties by US. ServicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type." 

99 
RC-l35V/W Rivet Joint: [DELETED]. 

Throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Rivet 

Joint crews collected valuable information about 

enemy forces [DELETED]. [DELETED].212 

RF4C Phantom XI: a multisensor aircraft 

capable of all-weather day and night reconnaissance 

in a high- or low-threat environment. RF-4C combat missions can be flown at altitudes ranging from 

100 feet to 45,000 feet and at speeds exceeding 600 

miles per hour. RF-4Cs use optical, infrared, and 

tactical electronic reconnaissance systems to accomplish their missions. Optical cameras are used generally for daytime, 

low-altitude photography but also produce high-quality imagery at higher 

altitudes. These cameras generate forward-looking and side-looking 

oblique photography, vertical and mapping photography, and horizon-tohorizon panoramic photography. In addition, the RF-4C has special long- 

-range optical photographic systems with focal lengths from 36 to 66 

inches, which provide detailed prints from extended standoff ranges. The 

infrared sensor locates targets under cover or at night by detecting heat 

sources and heat differentials and is especially suited for night reconnaissance tasks in high-threat areas. The result is a continuous map of the area 

beneath the flight path of the aircraft. The tactical electronic reconnaissance system records on tape the identity and location of electronic emitters. This system had datalink equipment, which gives it the capability to 

provide near real-time information to ground ~ites.2’~ 

RF-4Cs deployed to Saudi Arabia during Desert Shield and collected 

intelligence on Iraqi positions near the Saudi Arabian-Iraqi border before 

Desert Storm. During Desert Storm, 18 RF-4s flew 822 sorties conducting 

bomb damage assessment flights:l4 and no RF-4s were lost in combat. Air 

(s) AFEWC Operation Desert Sionn EC Eflecfiveness Analysis, pp 3-10, 3-1 1. 212 

2’3USAF RF-4C Fact Sheet. 

2’4(U) GWAPS Statisfical Compendium, Table 81, ‘Total Sorties by U.S. ServicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type.” 
and ground commanders were frustrated at times by the delay between 

imaging and delivery for interpretation. 

E-8 JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

Radar System): a joint A~~Y-USAF development 

program designed to provide near-real-time, widearea surveillance and deep targeting capability to 

ground and air commanders for indications and 

warning, situation development, and target develop 

ment. The two developmental aircraft, C-135 derivatives, possess an airborne radar, a self-proktion suite, and air-to-ground communications modules. They provide 

information on both moving and fixed targets?I5 JSTARS was able to detect, 

locate, and track high-value targets such as convoys, river crossing sites, 

logistics sites, assembly areas, and retreat routes. It flew forty-two sorties, 

and its performance revalidated the need for a system to locate and track 

moving ground targets across a wide area and to relay this information to 

ground and air commanders quickly. 

S-3B Viking: a carrier-based. fixed-wing, 

multimission aircraft designed to provide the carrier 

battle force with quick-reaction antisubmarine warfare, 

antisurface warfare, surveillance, and attack capability. 

The S-3 design meets the need for an aircraft that can 

(1) cruise at patrol speeds for long periods of time, 

(2) carry a comprehensive set of sensors and weapons, 

(3) takeoff and land on a canier deck, and (4) occupy as little deck and 

hangar space as possible. The Viking can also carry a D-704 refueling 

package that allows it to act as an air refueling tanker.216 

Forty-three S-3 aircraft were in theater and operated from five aircraft 

carriers. They flew 1,674 sorties on a variety of missions in support of 

Operation Desert Storm?l7 S-3s participated in armed scout missions in the 

Red Sea and Persian Gulf and augmented armed surface reconnaissance 

aircraft assigned to strike missions. Viking aircraft also provided in-flight 

2'5Conduct of the Persim Gulf War, pp T-84 - T-87. 

2'6fbid, pp T-109 - T-112. 

217(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 81, "Total Sorties by U.S. ServicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type." 

101 
refueling to Combat Air Patrol aircraft in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf 

along with returning strike aircraft. In addition, they established communication connectivity for strike aircraft going to targets in western and central 

Iraq and the KTO. They provided command and control backup when E-2C 

&craft were unavailable and flew SEAD missions in the KTO during the 

early days of the war?’* 

ElectmddReconnaiance Weapons 

In addition to the previously mentioned aircraft working in the electronic warfare arena, the Coalition used drones to simulate aircraft and 

perform tactical deception. In turn, this deception caused early activation 

of Iraqi radars, which were then targeted by electronic warfare “shooters.” 

This section describes the drones used during Operation Desert Storm and 

the antiradiation missiles used by eleGtronic warfare “shooters” to destroy 

Iraqi su+ce-to-air-missile radar sites. 

Drones 

Drones are produced in the forms of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVS) 

and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). Their missions are to decoy radars, 

conduct reconnaissance, and designate targets. Radar decoys provide 

tactical deception, reconnaissance drones supply battlefield photography, 

and targeting drones illuminate targets for sea-launched attacks by various 

weapon systems. Drones provide an inexpensive and valuable capability 

in terms of reduced losses of aircraft and aircrews and relative acquisition 

costs. At low risk and cost, these unmanned aircraft effectively prepare the 

battlefield for air strikes. 

BQM-74: a drone used to decoy radars during 

the strategic air campaign, create confusion, and 

false targets. The BQM-74 drone flies a programmed mission profile or can be flown manually. Its # radar cross section is adjustable to simulate many 

different types of aircraft, and the drone can be 

given a new mission profile in 7 to 10 da~s.2’~ BQM-74s cost $230,000 

in FY 91 dollars and can be launched from the ground or aircraft. They 

’“Comiuct of the Persian GUF war, pp T- 109 - T- 1 12. 

219XOO’rf, Point Paper on BQM-74 Capabilities and Availability, 29 Aug 90. 

102 
have a nominal 1-hour flight endurance at subsonic speeds ranging from 

300 to 550 knots and altitudes of 500 to 40,000 feet with a maximum 

range of 450 nautical miles?" These unmanned aerial vehicles were used 

for tactical deception and to degrade the ability of Iraqi EW/GCI nets and 

surface-to-air missiles to acquire incoming Coalition aircraft. 

[DELETED].U' [DELETED]. On the first night of Desert Storm, 

drones were launched from just south of the Iraqi border towards Baghdad 

to deceive enemy air defenses and to enhance F-4G Wild Weasel 

targeting?22 As planned, Iraqi air defense nets, gun and missile batteries, 

and radars were activated to deal with the perceived threat. This Iraqi 

reaction served to identify numerous targets for the Weasel HARM 

shooters. HARM success rates were very high, and no allied aircraft were 

lost to Iraqi surface-to-air missile shots during these drone missions?23 

[DELETED] ?24 

TALD: a tactical air-launched decoy (TALD). 

The Navy and the Marine Corps launched 

numerous TALDs during Desert Storm. 

[DELETED].225 [DELETED]. The TALD vehicle 

adds to enemy confusion by flying different 

mission profiles involving variations in speed, 

range, and altitude. TALD is compatible with most Navy aircraft. 

[DELETED] ?26 

Drones are also used in a reconnaissance role. The reconnaissance 

versions have a daylight TV camera with a zoom lens in the nose of the 

drone. Video is transmitted via datalink, with a video cassette recorder 

with inflight replay capability for back-up. These reconnaissance drones 

are parachute recoverable and can potentially be used for panoramic 

photography and real-time infrared coverage. During Desert Storm, the 

2"(S) Briefing Slides on Drone Support for CENTCOM, p 7. 

22'~m, Point Paper on BQM-74, 29 Aug 90. 

2U(S) Briefing Slides on Drone Support for CENTCOM, p 5. 

223~bid. 

224(S) Ibid. 

225(S) System Description and Mission Summary, GWAPS Files Document 43-020. 

226(S) Ibid. 

103 
Navy launched these drones to perform naval gunfire direction and 

gather real-time battle damage assessment information from behind enemy 

lines without risking the lives of airborne or ground-based forward spotter~?~’ In an unusual incident during the ground war, a group of Iraqi 

soldiers tried to surrender to a drone.=’ 

Drones proved to be inexpensive but effective devices during Desert 

Storm. They drew premature activity from enemy radars, which then 

became targets for advance aircraft (shooters) before the main attacking 

force arrived. This tactic helped to open a corridor that allowed penetrating 

bombers to funnel through and attack targets. Also, reconnaissance drones 

provided the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps with real-time battlefield 

information without risking lives. The next section describes antiradiation 

missiles used to destroy Iraqi radars by Coalition aircraft. 

Anti-Radiation Missiles 

During the Gulf War, U.S. forces employed two antiradiation 

missiles-the AGM-45 Shrike and the AGM-88 HARM. These air-toground missiles were designed to detect and destroy surface radars. 

AGM-45 (Shrike) Missile: a completely passive missile that uses 

radiation emitted by a target radar for detection, homing, and detonation. 

Shrike was designed to detect and destroy enemy radar emitters, and was 

first used in 1965. Its 149-pound warhead is specifically designed to 

physically impair the operation of the radar antenna. Fragmentation is the 

primary kill mechani~m?’~ Due to range and employment limitations, 

only seventy-eight Shrikes were employed during Desert Storm; over half 

by the Air Force and the remainder by the Navy and Marine Corps.23o 

‘”(S) The United States Navy in Desert SliieldBtomt, Department of the Navy, 

228“Gulf War Experience Sparks Review of RPV Priorities,” Aviation Week and Space 

229(SfluF) Aircrew Weapons Delivery Manual (non-nuclear) Supplement, T.O. I-IM2%e USAF fired 53, USN 18, and USMC 7, respectively. (u) GWAPS statistical 

Compendium, Tables 188, 189, and 190, “Desert ShieldStorm: USAF, USN and USMC 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 90/91$).” 

15 May 91. p 48. 

Technology, April 22, 1991, p 86. 

34-1, 17 Apr 87. pp 1-87 - 1-91. 

104 
AGM-88 (HARM): a High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) 

designed to detect, guide to, and destroy radar emitters operating throughout a wide range of frequency bands. [DELETED].232 

[DELETED]?33 U.S. aircraft fired 1,961 HARMS in Operation Desert 

Storm?” 

[DELETED]. 

[DELETED].ns 

Alarm: a short-range British antiradiation missile. It uses a 

microprocessor-based, software-controlled broadband, microwave passive 

seeker to guide the missile toward enemy radar emissions. Power is 

supplied by a single two-staged solid-fuel rocket motor. Flight control 

is through aft cruciform moveable fins actuated electrically. The seeker 

ean be programmed before and during flight with appropriate target radar 

characteristics and threat priorities. The seeker switches on shortly after 

release and homes directly on to the highest priority target. Should 

Alarm fail to lock on a target because of transmission shut-down, it 

climbs to an altitude of 40,000 feet and deploys a parachute upon rocket 

motor burnout. The missile can hang on its parachute for several minutes 

awaiting a hostile radar transmission, then dive in on the radar after 

discarding the parachute. It has a high-explosive warhead with a ThornEmi fuze. British Tornados fired 11 3 Alarms during Operation Desert 

Storm.236 

23’(S/NF) Flight Manual Supplement, T.O. I-IM-34-1, p 1-87. 

232(S/NF) Ibid. p 1-94. 

233(S/NF) Ibid, p 1-97. 

234The USAF fired 1,067; the USN 661; and the USMC 233. (u) GWAPS slatistical 

Compendium, Tables 188, 189. and 190, “Desert Shield/Storm: USAF, USN, and USMC 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 90/91$).” 

23s(SMF) Flight Manual Supplement, T.O. I-IM-34-1, pp 1-94, 1-97. 

236(S) Operational Research Branch Headquarters Strike Command, p 8. 

105 
Air-to-Air Weapon Systems 

The Air Force F-15C and Navy F-14 aircraft were the primary air 

superiority fighters used in Desert Storm, although other Coalition aircraft 

achieved air-to-air kills. In all, Coalition fighters killed thirty-seven Iraqi 

aircraft without suffering an aerial combat loss; the F-15C was credited 

with eighty-seven percent of the totar kills. 

F-15C Eagle: a single-seat, all-weather, 

extremely maneuverable fighter designed to gain 

and maintain air superiority in aerial combat. It 

has electronic systems and weaponry to detect, 

acquire, track, and attack enemy aircraft while 

operating in friendly or enemy-controlled airspace. 

The F-15’s main advantage is its versatile 

multimode, pulse-Doppler radar system. The system can track highflying as well as low-flying targets without being confused by ground 

clutter-a true look-down shoot-down capability. The Eagle first flew on 

27 July 1972 and its initial operational capability occurred in 1975. 

Before the Gulf War began, over 1,100 had been delivered to U.S. Air 

Force squadrons, and more than 280 additional aircraft had been delivered 

to or ordered by Israel, Japan and Saudi Arabia. 

Two squadrons, consisting of 24 F- 15Cs from the 1 st Tactical Fighter 

Wing (Langley Am, Virginia), were among the first U.S.-based aircraft 

to deploy to Saudi Arabia on 7 August. A total of 125 F-15Cs eventually 

deployed to Southwest Asia. This force represented about 28 percent of 

the total Air Force inventory.’” The U.S. F-15Cs flew 5,667 offensive 

and defensive counterair missions during Operation Desert Storm, and the 

72 Royal Saudi Air Force F-15s flew 2,080.238 Sortie lengths ranged 

between 4.0 and 9.0 hours, as opposed to the shorter durations flown 

during training exercises. 

As the Air Force’s primary air superiority fighter, the F-15C was 

responsible for manning the high-value airborne asset (HVAA) combat air 

patrols (CAPS) over the mainland and generally for keeping the overland 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p T-57. 237 

238(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 96, “F-15C: USAF and Saudi Arabia 

Sorties by Mission Type.” 

106 
area free of Iraqi aircraft. The Eagles were used extensively for sweep 

and escort missions early in the war when it was assumed the Iraqi Air 

Force would contest Coalition air strikes. When the Iraqi Air Force 

declined the fight, the Eagle was used mostly to protect against a “last 

gasp” attack against the HVAA aircraft. CAPS were also set up over Iraq 

to try and intercept Iraqi aircraft fleeing to Iran. 

F-1 5Cs successfully accomplished these missions by flying two- and 

four-ship formations. Formations included trail, offset trail, and line 

abreast for sweep and force-protection missions. CAPS throughout Iraq 

were supported by AWACS as F-15Cs sorted and identified targets ending 

in pursuit to get within missile parameters for valid shots. 

[DELETED]?39 In all, U.S. F-15Cs shot down thirty-one Iraqi aircraft; 

twenty-three kills were with AIM-7s, and eight kills were with AIM-~s?~ 

F-15Cs did not use their guns for air-to-air kills, but one did accomplish 

a first by shooting an IL-76 Candid with its gun while the Candid 

remained on the gr~und?~’ 

A wide variety of armament could be carried on external weapon 

stations. The number varied depending on whether the aircraft was fitted 

with a conformal fuel tank. During Desert Storm, F-15Cs carried an 

internal M-61A1 20-mm cannon, four AIM-9LA4 Sidewinders, and four 

AIM-7 Sparrow missiles. 

F-14 Tomcat: a two-seat, twin-engine fighter 

with variable-geometry wings. The Tomcat, the U.S. 

Navy’s standard carrier-based fighter, is large, fast, 

heavy and designed around its long-range AIM-54 

Phoenix air-to-air missile and its pulse-Doppler, 

multimode radar. E14s also fly with a Tactical Air 

Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) that incorporates 

optical and infrared cameras allowing the aircraft to 

perform a photo reconnaissance role without degrading its performance 

in other roles. The first flight was on 21 December 1970, and initial 

239(S) USAF Air-to-Air Kill Matrix, Hq TAUDOT (A-Team), 13 Nov 91. 

240(S) GWAPS File CHST 8-6, U.S. Air Force Air-to-Air Missile Results, Quick Look, 

(S) Desert Storm Air-to-Air Engagements, 3 Mar 92, “Air-to-Air Analysis in 

USAFTA WC. 

241 

Desert Storm,” p 32. 

1 07 
operational capability occurred in 1973. During Desert Storm, the F-14 

was still in production, and the U.S. Navy had 699 in service. 

F-14s were deployed aboard five of the six carriers in theater and 

operated from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. They flew fighter 

sweep, CAP, escort, and fleet defense missions during Desert Storm. 

Operations were conducted day and night, at all altitudes, depending on 

the threat and specific mission objectives. On the opening night of the 

war, F-14s joined with F-15s to perform a fighter sweep of Iraq, where 

the Phoenix missile could be employed at its maximum range. Barrier 

CAP missions also were flown to protect Coalition naval forces and Gulf 

Cooperation Gouncil coastlines throughout the war. Later in the conflict, 

F-14s were used to establish and maintain CAPS to intercept Iraqi aircraft 

attempting to flee to Iran. The additiond capability of the '?ARB system 

provided daytime imagery for battle damage assessment, prestrike 

planning, maritime interception operations, and detection of Scud missile 

launch site locations. 

During Operation Desert Storm, 109 F-14s flew 4,005 sorties?" One 

F-14 was lost, only 6 intercepts were flown, and F-14s shot down 1 Iraqi 

heli~opter.2~' 

Armament included an internal 20-mm Vulcan Gatling-type gun with 

675 rounds of ammunition, Phoenix, AIM-7, and AIM-9 air-to-air 

missiles. Up to 8 missiles could be carried on the Tomcat in various 

combinations: 6 AIM-54 Phoenix and 2 AIM-9s; 6 AIM-7s and 2 AIM9s; 2 Phoenix and 3 AIM-7s and 2 AIM-9s; or 4 Phoenix and 2 AIM-7s 

and 2 AIM-9s. 

2421ne majority of missions were as follows: 2,802 DCA, 607 OCA, and 290 

reconnaissance. (U) GWAPS statistical compendium, Table 95, "F-14 USN Sorties by 

Mission Type." 

243Conduct on the Persian Gulf War, pp T-54 and T-55. 

108 
Tornado F3/ADV: a long-range interceptor 

with infrared AIM-9, Skyflash radar missiles, and 

an internal 27-mm gun. [DELETED]?44 

[DELETED] ?45 

Mirage 2000: an air-superiority fighter and 

interceptor with initial operational capability in 

1984. The French deployed twelve Mirage 2000s, 

which flew mainly air defense CAPS along the 

Saudi border. They were armed with IR Magic 

and radar-guided Matra missiles. 

Air-to-Air Weapons 

This section begins with a general description of missile types, 

followed by types of guidance, and ends with aerial missiles used in 

Desert Storm. 

A missile can be either guided or unguided. Unguided missiles 

follow the natural laws of motion to establish a ballistic trajectory. 

Guided missiles can either home to the target or follow a nonhoming 

course. Nonhoming guided missiles are either inertially guided or 

preprogrammed. Homing missiles can be active, semiactive, or passive. 

An active missile carries the radiation, source on board the missile. 

Radiation from the missile is emitted, strikes the target, and is reflected 

back to the missile. The missile then self-guides on this reflected 

244Royal Saudi Air Force Systems Analysis, pp 159, 160. 

245(U) GWAPS StutktiCal Compendium, Table 81, ‘Total Sorties by US. 

ServicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type.” 

I09 
radiation. A passive missile uses radiation originated by the target or by 

some source not a part of the overall weapon system. vpically, this 

radiation is in the infrared (IR) region (Sidewinder) or the visible region 

(EO Maverick), but can also occur in the microwave region (Shrike). A 

semiactive missile has a combination of active and passive characteristics. 

A source (launch aircraft) of radiation is part of the system but is not 

carried in the missile. The source radiates energy to the target, and the 

target reflects the energy back to the missile. The missile senses the 

reflected radiation and homes on it?& 

opes Of Guidance 

Guidance is the means by which a missile steers to a target. For 

ballistic missiles, the guidance occurs before launch in the form of prelaunch attempts to reduce aiming errors. For guided missiles, the guidance occurs after launch. By guiding after launch, the effect of prelaunch 

aiming errors are minimized. Post launch guidance can be done in the 

following ways: 

Lead Pursuit: the launch aircraft directs its velocity vector at an 

angle from the target so that missiles or projectiles launched from any 

point on the course impact on the target if within the range of the 

weapon. 

Deviated Pursuit: the missile tracks the target and produces 

guidance commands to establish a fixed lead angle. When the fixed 

lead angle is zero, deviated pursuit becomes pure pursuit. No Desert 

Storm-vintage missile was designed to fly deviated pursuit. 

Pure Collision: a straight-line course flown by a launch aircraft 

or weapon such that it collides with the target. 

Lead Collision: a straight-line course flown by a launch aircraft 

such that it achieves a single given firing position. The time of flight 

of the weapon is a constant. 

246Flight Manual T.O. I-IU-34, p 4-2.1. 

110 
Command Guidance: the launch aircraft tracks the target with 

one radar and tracks the missile with a second radar. A computer on 

the launch aircraft determines if the missile is on the proper trajectory 

to intercept the target. If it is not, steering commands are generated 

by the computer and transmitted to the missile. 

Beam Rider: the launch aircraft tracks the target with a V-shaped 

beam. The missile flies at the bottom of the V. If the missile moves 

out of the bottom of the V, sensing circuits in the missile cause the 

missile to return to the correct position. As long as the launch aircraft continues to track the target, and the missile continues to ride 

the radar beam, the missile will intercept the target. 

Proportional Navigation: a course flown such that the lead angle 

is changed at a rate proportional to the angular rate of the line of 

sight to the targetY4’ 

2471bid, pp 4-2.1 - 4-5. 

111 
Air-to-Air Missiles 

Figure 9 

AIM-7M 

TAIL FIN 

AIM-7 Sparrow Missile: a supersonic, air-to-air radar-guided missile designed for ejection launch. The missile can intercept and destroy 

targets in adverse weather conditions and does not require visual target 

acquisition. F-ISCs, F-ISEs, F-16s, and F-4Gs can all carry and fire 

AIM-7M missiles. The AIM-7 is a semiactive homing missileza that 

guides on either continuous wave or pulse Doppler. The AIM-7M homes 

on energy radiated by the launching aircraft and reflected by the target 

(Figure 10). Therefore, the target has to be illuminated through-out the 

missile’s time of flight. 

The AIM-7M Sparrow represents a quantum leap in capability over 

older AIM-7s. It has a blast fragmentation warhead, and its solid-propellant 

248A semiactive homing missile had a combination of active and passive characteristics. The source of radiation was part of the system but was not carried in the missile. 

The source (usually at the launch point) radiated energy to the target, which reflected the 

energy back to the missile. The missile sensed the reflected radiation and homed on it. 

112 
Figure 10 

Semi-active Homing 

SEMIACTIVE - RADIATION SOURCE 

CARRIED BY LAUNCH AIRCRAFT /,'. ,,,...-. 

rocket motor provides boost-sustained thr~st.2~~ The major improvement 

is its new digital data processor, which provides the following: 

(1) programmability to meet future threats, (2) simultaneous track of two 

targets within the antenna beamwidth, (3) prediction of line of sight rates 

to make target fades less severe on missile guidance, (4) tracking and 

avoiding of main beam clutter, (5) improved performance against advanced ECM, (6) improved fuze arming sequence, (7) improved lowaltitude performance, and (8) an active fuze?so 

249The three basic air-to-air missile motor types were all-boost, all-sustain. and boostsustain. The all-boost motor typically made the missile accelerate rapidly, causing a high 

peak velocity. The short time of flight (TOF) for a given range caused high missile drag 

and high aerodynamic heating. This motor type was adequate for rear hemisphere, tail 

chase encounters. The all-sustain motor produced slow missile acceleration, resulting in 

less aerodynamic drag and longer flight time, for a given range. Because the motor 

burned for a long period of time, the motor could be used to overcome gravity in a lookup engagement and provided sufficient velocity for maneuvering at high altitude. This 

type of motor was suitable for head-on engagements to high altitude. The boost-sustain 

motor represented an attempt to combine the best features of the all-boost and the allsustain motors. The boost-sustain motor was designed so that the sustain phase of 

propulsion maintained the velocity achieved at the end of boost. 

2SOFlight Manual T.O. I-IM-34, p 4-12. 

'(S) GWAPS File CHST 8-6, pp 4, 5. 

113 
Total AIM-7M Attempts 

Total AIM-7M Kills 

[DELETEDI2” 

[DELETEDlS’ 

67 

23 

The AIM-7M provided lookdowdshoot-down capability in Desert 

Storm, with most of the successful launches hitting targets at low altitude. 

[DELETED]. Beyond visual range (BVR) was authorized in the majority of 

the engagements, and no fratricide problems were encountered?” 

Figure 11 

AIM-7M Employment 

FIGURE DELETED 

Z52[DELETED]. 

253[DELETED]. 

’%(S) GWAPS File CHST 8-6, p 10. 

114 
Figure 12 

AIM-9M 

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL 

SECTION 

I IR DOME 

WARHEAD \ 

AIM3 Sidewinder Missile: a supersonic air-to-air passive-homing 

heat-seeking missile. F-1 ~CS, F- 15Es, F- 1 6s, and F-4Gs can all carry and 

fire AIM-9M missiles. The AIM-9 uses passive homing; that is, it guides 

on infrared radiation generated by a target. Because no guidance is 

required from the launching aircraft, the pilot can take evasive action 

immediately after the missile is launched. Unlike the semiactive radar 

AIM-7, the Sidewinder is a “fire and forget” missile. It does, however, 

require visual target acquisition. The AIM-9 seeker converts infrared 

(heat) energy emitted by the target into electrical signals used to guide the 

missile. The infrared detector is cooled to improve its sensitivity to 

infrared energy. The guidance and control unit incorporates inputs from 

gyroscopic sensors, allowing the missile to “lead” the target and fly what 

115 
is termed a proportional navigation course?5s Fragmentation is the primary kill mechanism for all AIM-9 missiles. 

Desert Storm AIM-9 variants used active optical target detectors to 

command detonation. The fuze functioned on either a direct hit or proximity miss. All variants of the AIM-9 used all-boost, solid-propellant rocket 

motors. The AIM-9M had a more sensitive infrared detector than did older 

models and an all-aspect capability; that is, it could sense a target's infrared 

energy from frontal or lateral quadrants and successfully home. 

[DELETED] ?" 

Total AIM8M Attempts 

Total AIM-9M Kills 

[DELETED]." 

11 

6 

255Proportional navigation was a course flown in such a way that the lead angle 

changed at a rate proportional to the angular rate of the line of sight to the target. This 

extended effective range, since a pure tail chase or pursuit curve trajectory consumed 

more time and energy. 

'"(S) GWAPS File CHST 8-6, p 13. 

'"[DELETED]. 

116 
Figure 13 

AIM-12OA 

F1 N 

WARHEAD 

GUIDANCE 

GRAVITY 

DEVICE ANTENNA (4) 

AIM-120A Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile 

(AMRAAM): a new-generation radar-homing air-to-air missile with a blast 

fragmentation warhead. It has an all-weather, beyond-visual-range capability and serves as a follow-on to the AIM-7 Sparrow missile series. 

The AIM-120A missile is faster, smaller, and lighter than its predecessors 

and has improved capabilities against low-altitude targets. It incorporates 

active radar homing in conjunction with an inertial reference unit. This 

unit and its microcomputer system make the missile less dependent on the 

fire control system than were previous radar missiles, enabling the pilot 

to aim and fire several missiles simultaneously at multiple targets. Like 

the infrared AIM-9, the AIM-1 20A is a “fire and forget” missile; the pilot 

can fire and then perform evasive maneuvers while the missiles guide 

themselves to targets. 

2s8(S) xoom, Paper on AMRAAW-15 Problems in Desert Storm, 26 Feb 91, p 1. 

117 
[DELETED]. 

AIM-54 Phoenix: 

missile[DELETED] ?59 

the U.S. Navy’s long-range fleet air defense 

[DELETED]?60 [DELETED]?6’ No AIM-54s were used in Desert 

Storm. 

Special Aircraft 

AC-l30A/H Spectre Gunship: a modified C-130 

aircraft that first saw action during the final stages of 

the Southeast Asia conflict?62 The aircraft’s primary 

missions are close air support, air interdiction, and 

armed reconnaissance. Other missions include 

perimeter. and point defense, escort, airdrop- and 

extraction-zone support, forward air control, limited 

command and control, and combat search and rescue. 

During Desert Storm, AC-130s flew 104 sorties263 comprising close 

air support, special operations support, and on-call air interdiction 

missions. While supporting the Coalition forces, one AC-130H was shot 

down by an infrared surface-to-air missile during the battle of Khafji. 

AC-130H armament included two 20-mm Vulcan Gatling Guns with 

6,000 rounds capacity and a rate of fire of 2,500 round per minute, a 

259Desert Score, p 393. 

260Gant, p 219. 

26’Desert Score, p 393. 

26%ese heavily armed aircraft had side-firing weapons integrated with sophisticated 

sensors, navigation, and fire control systems to provide surgical firepower or area saturation during extended loiter time, at night, and in adverse weather. Its Sensor suite consisted of a low-light-level television sensor and an infrared sensor. Radar and electronic 

sensors also gave the gunship a method of identifying friendly ground forces and of 

delivering ordnance during adverse weather conditions. Navigational devices included an 

inertial navigation system (INS) and global positioning system (GPS). 

263(U) GWAPS Stofisticof Compendium. Table 81, ‘Total Sorties by U.S. ServicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type.” 

118 
40-mm Bofors cannon with 276 rounds capacity and a rate of fire of 100 

rounds per minute, and a 105-mm Howitzer with 101 rounds capacity and 

a rate of fire 3 to 5 rounds per minute. 

MC-130E Combat Talon: a C-130E Hercules 

modified for special operations. It is equipped with 

aerial refueling equipment, terrain- following radar, an 

inertial navigation system, a high-speed aerial delivery 

system, and the surface-to-air Fulton recovery system. 9% During Desert Storm, the aircraft was used primarily 

for infiltration missions and to resupply special 

operations units on the ground. The special navigation and aerial delivery 

systems were used to locate small drop zones and deliver people and 

equipment. The aircraft also was able to penetrate hostile airspace at low 

altitude, and the crews were specially trained in night and adverse 

weather operations. 

The MC-130E first entered the Air Force inventory in 1966. 

Fourteen of these special aircraft were assigned to the Air Force Special 

Operations Command. Four MC-130 Combat Talons from the 8th 

Special Operations Squadron participated in Desert Storm and flew 

eighty-four sorties?" They conducted psychological operations by flying 

multiple leaflet-drop missions. In addition, MC-130s dropped eleven 

BLU-8UB GP bombs. 

HC-130 Hercules: an extended-range, search 

and recovery version of the C-130 transport 

aircraft. Modifications to the HC-130 include 

updated engines and search and rescue equipment 

for the recovery of aircrews. The HC-130 also 

has advanced direction-finding equipment and an 

air-to-air recovery system. The four HC-l3OP/N 

aircraft flew 107 refueling and support missions for special operations 

helicopters in Desert Storm?65 

2"(U) Ibid. 

*%he air refueling system consisted of air refueling pods on each wing. Each pod 

housed an air refueling hose, low speed drogue. and its associated mechanical and 

hydraulic system. It was used to refuel MH/HH-53, MH-60, and other helicopters. 

119 
Helicopters 

MH-53J Pave Low 111: a redesigned 1950s helicopter with 

upgraded avionics and sensors. Designed for the Marine Corps as a 

heavy-lift logistic support helicopter, the Sikorsky H-53 (fore-runner to 

Pave Low III) was procured in limited numbers by the Air Force starting 

in 1967, and extensively modified for use as a long-range combat 

rescueaircraft?66 The H-53s were progressively modified to MH-53J Pave 

Low I11 standards with the addition of FLIR, high-resolution terrainavoidance radar, improved avionics, and cockpit symbology. By the eve 

of Desert Shield, all Air Force H-53s had been modified to Pave Low I11 

standards, were equipped with flare and chaff dispensers, GPS for precise 

navigation, and 50-caliber machine guns. 

In Desert Storm, the MH-53J proved capable of penetrating deep into 

Iraqi airspace. The Pave Low’s FLIR and terrain-following radar permitted 

safe flight at extremely low altitudes at night. GPS permitted precise 

navigation. Poor visibility and lack of visual cues rendered attempts to fly 

and navigate with only night vision goggles (NVGs) dangerous except under 

optimum conditions267 Of Coalition helicopters, only the MH-53J was able 

to operate consistently on dark, moonless nights. The 13 Pave Lows flew 

282 sortiesm and participated in combat search and rescue operations, 

infiltration, exfiltration, and other important missions into threat areas. The 

MH-53 aircraft opened the war by guiding Apache AH-64s to their targets. 

2%e H-53 had its origins in the Sikorsky HR2S, a reciprocating-engine Marine 

Corps heavy-lift helicopter designed to a 1951 requirement, which entered service in 

1956. The initial Marine Corps version, the CH-S3A. which first flew in 1964, inherited 

many of the basic technologies from the HRZS; specifically, the dynamic rotor head 

components and extruded titanium rotor blade spars. The Air Force combat rescue 

version, the HH-53B/C, entered service in late 1967. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Search and 

Rescue in Southeast Asia (Office of Air Force History; Washington, D. C., 1980). p 70. 

267Lt Col Comer, the MH-53J Squadron Commander, expressed the problem 

succinctly: “As far as flying operations went. we found . . . that we had a real problem 

with visibility. The wind blew the sand around all day in about fifteen to twenty knots 

of wind. It was very light sand and would remain suspended in the air. At night, if there 

was no moon. the suspended sand created a haze that reduced visibility to one mile and 

often less. The terrain was so uniform of surface that it was hard to discern any 

features.” Under these conditions, Comer considered NVGS “almost useless.” Comer. 

History, p 8. 

268(U) GWAPS Statistical Compendium. Table 81, ‘Total Sorties by U.S. 

ServicdAllied Country by Aircraft Type.” 

1 20 
In addition, the MH-53J was used for the first successful combat recovery 

of a downed pilot in Desert Storm. 

MH-60G Pave Hawk: a modified UH-60A 

Blackhawk used for night operations and combat 

search and rescue. The Pave Hawk has several 

special-mission, night, all-weather upgrades. The 

upgrades include an additional 117-gallon internal fuel tank, in-flight 

refueling capability, a dopplerhertial navigation system, electronic map 

display, Pave Low I11 FLlR, satellite communications, and a 600-pound 

capacity external rescue hoist that anchors a “fast-rope” repelling system. 

It is armed with a 12.7-mm machine gun. 

The Pave Hawk entered operational use in September of 1987. In 

Desert Storm, 8 MH-60s flew 284 sorties?@ primarily for combat search 

and rescue and for transporting reconnaissance teams into Kuwait and 

Iraq. 

Aircraft and Weapon Systems Not Employed 

B-1B Lancer 

The B-1B Lancer is a long-range bomber 

originally designed for the nuclear strategic role. 

Lancer joined the Strategic Air Command alert 

force on 1 October 1987. At the time of Desert 

Storm, its conventional capability had not been 

fully developed. 

The B-1B role in Desert Shield and Desert Storm was primarily to 

assume the nuclear alert commitments of B-52 squadrons deployed in the 

war. SAC chose this role for the B-1B because of its munitions 

incompatibilities, crew training focus, relationship to arms control treaties, 

and limitations on its electronic warfare equipment. The significant 

resources available to the Coalition meant that this non-use was never a 

critical factor. 

*@(U) Ibid. 

121 
During Desert Storm, the only conventional munition the B-IB was 

certified to carry was the 500-pound MK-82 air inflatable retard bomb. 

A total of 84 bombs could be carried by each aircraft. Although the B1B could carry a large number of weapons, its accuracy, especially when 

combined with medium- or high-altitude deliveries and the long (1,700- 

foot) narrow shape of its weapon impacts over the ground, limited its 

usefulness against point and area targets?70 A more desirable pattern was 

produced by a cell of B-52 aircraft, which could lay a dense pattern of 

cluster bombs within a rectangle of considerable size. 

The B-1B's extensive and unique preloading requirement compounded the difficulty of using this aircraft. It needed a large facility for 

bomb-rack buildup. Since the facility was not mobile, flying missions 

directly from the CONUS would have taken less time than loading the 

B-1's bomb racks at a forward locati~n?~' [DELETED].2n 

[DELETED] ?73 

A possible B-1B role, launching conventionally armed cruise missiles, 

did not emerge because START guidelines and national policy dictated that 

the B-1B would not be loaded with operational air-launched cruise 

missiles until the cruise-missile-modified B-52s were retired?74 

Another reason for its nonparticipation was that an insufficient 

number of B-1B crews were trained to accomplish conventional bombing 

missions. Focus on the strategic nuclear role of the bomber meant that 

little or no emphasis had been placed on developing crew capability to 

bomb accurately with conventional ordnance. 

In addition to weapon, fuze, and training problems, the B-1B was 

ECM deficient. In its war time configuration, the B-1B was less capable 

of evading enemy threats than the B-52. A protracted problem remained 

in the ECM portion of the AN/ALQ-161 defensive avionics system 

270(S) Bob Byzewski. Point Paper on B-IB Conventional Operations Capability. 

271(S) Ibid. 

272(SMFIWNIRD) Hisrory of the Strategic Air Comtnand, p 292. 

273[DELETED]. 

274(SMFIWNIRD) History of the Strategic Air Command. p 63. 

3 Aug 90. 

122 
designed to detect, identify, and jam enemy radars. A flawed receiver 

design, de’kted during flight testing, prevented the system from meeting 

SAC’S ECM requirements for the 1990~?~’ 

Other B-1B problems existed at the time of Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm. Installation of a fire protection and fuel isolation modifica-tion 

had not been completed?76 Yet to be installed was a stability 

enhancement function to augment the aircraft’s stall inhibitor system and 

expand its flight envelope at low altitude while carrying more weight?n 

B-1Bs also had chronic engine problems. Approximately a year before 

the start of Desert Storm, B-1B flight missions had been cancelled 

because of persistent engine pr0blems.2~’ These dilemmas, along with 

CINCSAC’S decision to place the bombers on Single Integrated Operations 

Plan alert, put a stop to plans for deploying B-1Bs to Southwest Asia. 

The B-IB long-range strategic bomber was not completely ready to 

perform as a conventional bomber in a tactical role in Desert Storm. Its 

problems were too great to overcome before the outbreak of hostilities. 

Further modifications of the B-1B were required before it could have an 

effective role in conventional operations. 

Have Nap 

The AGM-142 Have Nap is a highly effective, precision-guided 

rocket-propelled air-launched missile.279 This 3,000-pound missile has a 

750-pound blast fragmentation warhead?80 [DELETED]?’’ Rafael 

Industries, in Haifa, Israel, designed and built the Have Nap weapon 

system. 

275(S/NF/WN/RD) [bid, p 64. 

276SAcnCMMB Point Paper on the B-IB Ovenving Faring Modification, 1 1 Jun 91. 

2n~~~~~ Point Paper on the B-IB Stall inhibitor System WStability 

278(SMFIWNIRD) History of the Strategic Air Command, p 314. 

279(S) Maj Karns. “Bullet Background Paper on AGM-142 (Have Nap),” Hq 

2801990 Weapons File, p 5-A-10. 

281(S) Maj Karns. “Bullet Background Paper on AGM-142 (Have Nap).” 

Enhancement Function, 12 Apr 90. 

SAC/DOOQ, 11 Feb 92. 

123 
Have Nap, although a very capable weapon system, was not used 

during Desert Storm. It is fair to speculate that it was not used because 

of the policy implications of launching an Israeli-made weapon against 

an Arab country. Though not used during the Gulf War, Have Nap’s 

capabilities and characteristics are worth mentioning. 

Representative targets for Have Nap include power plant 

transformers, generators, and cooling towers; POL refinery cracking/ 

distillation towers; radar or communication site control vanshuildings; 

and research and development facilities.2s4 Upgrades to the Have Nap 

weapon system, still ongoing after Desert Storm, included an imaging 

infrared seeker and an 1-800 penetrating warhead. 

282(S) Ibid. 

283(S) Ibid. 

2s4(S) Ibid. 

1 24 
(Above) AIM-7E Sparrow Missile. (Below) AIM-9L Sidewinder 

Missile, a supersonic air-to-air passive-homing heat-seeking missile. 

125 
1 26 
3 

Coalition Tactics - Fundamentals 

Aerial Employment Tactics 

As noted in Chapter 1, Coalition air forces enjoyed a decided advantage in the quality of aircraft and weapons they brought to the Gulf War. 

The outcome in combat, however, was determined by more than the 

relative capabilities of the equipment of the opposing sides; how that 

equipment was employed ultimately determined the victor. This section 

addresses the basic tactics employed by Coalition air forces during Desert 

Storm. The discussion begins with the point of contact with the enemy 

and works backward, addressing factors required for successful mission 

accomplishment. The first topic is ordnance delivery, including target 

acquisition. Supporting air-to-air missions and electronic warfare considerations, are the second and third topics, followed by en route navigation 

and defensive formations. Next, all of the general planning considerations for any mission are addressed, followed by the special requirements for large-scale, multimission strikes. The section concludes by 

addressing the conduct of an actual mission. 

Placing Bombs on Target 

Many tactical considerations influenced the delivery options selected 

by Operation Desert Storm aircrews. Enemy defenses, type of target, 

available ordnance and other factors drove delivery profiles. Basic delivery maneuvers were level, dive, and loft. Level and dive deliveries are 

flown at both low- and medium-altitudes, whereas loft deliveries are 

generally considered only low-altitude maneuvers.' Each basic delivery 

method incorporates options tailored to mission effectiveness. Level 

'Since aircraft transitioned early on from low to medium altitude, loft deliveries 

were used sparingly for only the first few days of Desert Storm and henceforth will not 

be covered extensively in this section. 

127 
aaacks can be flown using radar, visual, or infrared (IR) sensors; dive attacks 

can be flown using visual or IR sensors; and loft attacks can be flown using 

radar or IR sensors. These next sections describe how aircrews in Desert 

Storm found and delivered bombs on targets. They first address visually 

acquiring targets through dive deliveries, then discuss acquiring targets 

through onboard radar or IR sensors during level deliveries, and finish by 

examining the unprecedented capability of firing a laser beam at a target to 

deliver precision-laser-guided bombs (LGBS). 

Visual attacks m normally conducted by using dive deliveries. During 

visual deliveries, the pilot has to physically see the target and successfully 

maneuver the aircraft to position the pipper in the heads-up display (HUD), 

or optical-sight, on the target at release (see Figure 14). 

Figure 14 

Pilot’s HUD With CCIP Aimpoint 

128 
As seen from the above figure, the pipper is over the target. The pilot 

also has displays of dive angle, airspeed and altitude, along with additional information to cross reference during the attack. 

The various factors involved in placing unguided bombs on targets 

using visual dive deliveries are shown in Figure 15. 

Figure 15 

Dive Delivery Factors 

h Dive Deliverv Dive Delivery 

Unguided Munition 

RELEASE POINT 

VERTICAL 

SEPARATION 

(HEIGHT) 

V - - 

TARGET 

RELEASE POINT 

VERTICAL 

SEPARATION 

(HEIGHT) 

V - - 

TARGET 

With visual deliveries, the pilot basically has two means available to 

release bombs; a system delivery utilizing Continuously Computed Impact 

Point (CCIP) or similar system, and a manual release. CCIP deliveries use 

aircraft system inputs of velocities, dive angle, heading, winds, altitude, 

and weapons information to position the drift-stabilized aiming pipper on 

the HUD. In this delivery, the aircraft is maneuvered in three dimensions 

so that the pilot can view the target through the HUD, stabilize the aircraft 

and release the bomb at the correct point in space for weapons ballistics 

and wind conditions. The aircraft computers continually update the 

pipper and indicate where the bombs will impact on the ground if 

released at a particular moment. When the pilot is ready and the pipper 

129 
is over the target, he pushes the “pickle” button to release the bombs. 

Manual deliveries require the pilot to insert a milliradian pipper setting 

(i.e., angular reference setting) into, the bombsight for the appropriate 

release conditions and weapons load, then fly the aircraft to arrive at the 

point “A” (Figure 15) at the proper dive angle, altitude, and airspeed. 

Since manual deliveries require the pilot to deal simultaneously with 

many variables to hit the target, they are normally considered backup 

options. 

In Desert Storm, most visual attacks were accomplished using highangle dive deliveries. This was done to aid target acquisition, increase 

impact angles, and give pilots usable pipper settings? Of primary 

importance were dive angle, airspeed, and altitude. Constant forward 

pressure on the control stick was necessary to maintain a steep dive 

angle, and airspeed increased and altitude decreased at phenomenal rates. 

As stated above, pilots had to crosscheck all this information while 

maneuvering the aircraft to position the pipper on the target while maintaining predetermined release conditions necessary to put bombs on 

target. Although this sounds easy, it was not. Flying parameters are up 

to the individual skill of the pilot. Pilots try to be wings level in approximately 1G flight at release so that the weapon comes off a stabilized 

platform. Any added G forces negatively bias the weapon in the direction of force. For example, releasing a weapon with the aircraft in a left 

bank will cause the weapon to land short and left of the aimpoint. Other 

factors affect visual releases: enemy threats disturbing pilot 

concentration; pilot’s attention focusing on the pipper rather than on 

flying the aircraft in relation to the target; acquiring the target late, so that 

aiming corrections can not be accomplished; system altitude errors 

causing bombs to hit long or short of targets; or the target size when 

masked by the two-milliradian ~ipper.~ 

*Flying lesser dive angles, depending on weapons, could cause the pipper to be 

depressed beyond the limits of the HUD. Every HUD or optical sight has limitations on 

how far down the pipper can be depressed before remaining at the bottom of the sight. 

This is a mechanical limitation that throws off the pilot’s tracking capability and puts time 

in the sight. Due to this fact, visual level releases were not flown in Desert Storm 

because the resultant depression angles went beyond the capability of all aircraft optical 

systems. 

3For a more in-depth analysis on pipper size at altitude versus ground coverage, see 

the subsection titled “Smart PlatfordDumb Bomb Vice Dumb PlatformlSmart Bomb,” 

under the “Air-to-Ground Issues” section in Chapter 2 of this report. 

130 
Radar Deliveries 

Ordnance could also be delivered by using onboard ground-mapping radars for target acquisition. By using these radars, F-llls, 

F-15Es, B-52s, A-~s, and to a lesser extent F-16s and F/A-l8s, provided the Coalition forces with an all-weather, day and night attack capability. Aircrews could attack by using the radar to acquire the target 

or by using suitable offset aimpoints when targets did not generate 

sufficient reflected energy (i.e., no-show targets). Radar deliveries 

were usually accomplished using level releases. 

Figures 16, 17, and 18 are three photos of a radar scope presentation that demonstrate a technique used to deliver ordnance on targets. 

Figure 16 is a longer range, wide field-of-view display showing prominent geographic features surrounding a radar return from an urban 

center. This return could be used to update the aircraft position en 

route to the target area. Initially, the cursers, the white lines crossing 

in the middle of the screen, were positioned by the aircraft inertial 

navigation system. The weapons system operator (WSO) or bombardier 

(B/N) then moved the cursers to the precise predetermined point on the 

presentation to update his true position. 

Figure 17 shows the next step. The scope presentation was 

downranged‘ and expanded around the cursor intersection to display a 

smaller area with finer details. In this figure, the urban returns separate into individual buildings. Once again, the aircraft position was 

updated by moving the cursers to a known point. 

‘“Downrange” means to decrease the range of the radar. 

131 
Figure 16 

Wide Field-of-View Radar Picture 

Figure 18 shows a final “bombing” scope presentation. Here the 

cursers were moved for final aiming on the target, and gain and antenna 

tilt were adjusted to make the target return as distinct as p~ssible.~ The 

adjustment corrected as much as possible for discrepancies caused by the 

physical features of the radar beam. Using radar to identify the target 

location, the inertial system’s computers then provided steering to the 

proper position in the sky to deliver the ordnance on the target. 

’Gain was adjusted to provide better resolution and tilt was moved up or down to 

produce a complete presentation of returns; this concentration of radar energy on the 

target provided a more accurate bombing “picture.” 

132 
Figure 17 

Moving Radar Crosshairs to Update Steering 

Figure 18 

Bombing 

Presentation 

scope 

133 
Level-flight radar deliveries could be conducted from any altitude. 

The factors involved in a level radar delivery are portrayed in Figure 19. 

The weapons computer considered the effects of the aircraft's altitude and 

speed, the ballistic fall of the particular bomb due to gravity, and winds 

present. 

Figure 19 

Level Radar Delivery 

Level Delivery 

Gravity Bomb* 

ESCAPE 

While radar deliveries from the altitudes used in Desert Storm were not 

as precise as laser-guided bombs, the effects were further enhanced by 

using strings of bombs or cluster weapons. 

Infrared and Laser Deliveries 

The third kind of onboard delivery system used in Desert Storm was 

IR imagery. Infrared system acquisition was normally done in conjunction with laser self-designation, and since IR systems allowed more 

134 
precise crosshair placement, aircrews sometimes used them with unguided 

bombs. Note that laser designation had two functions: to designate the 

desired point of impact for an UiB and to provide more accurate range 

data for unguided, free-fall munitions. This capability permitted both day 

and night operations along with a limited adverse-weather capability. 

The main physical limitation of IR systems was target acquisition 

field-of-view (FOV). Looking for a target with an infrared sensor was 

sometimes described as looking through a soda straw. Without accurate 

target coordinates and updated systems, finding targets with an IR system 

was difficult. At medium altitbde, the FOV was wider than at lower 

altitudes, which helped target acquisition. Figure 20 depicts the two FOVS 

available in the F-11 1F Pave Tack IR system at various altitudes. Narrow FOV reflects a 33- by 44-milliradian display whereas wide FOV 

reflects a 132- by 176-milliradian display! The target in view is a football field. At 500 feet, wide FOV covers only an area of about 25 square 

yards. Ground coverage increases at 10,OOO feet, with narrow FOV covering a little more than a football field in size, and wide FOV covering 

approximately five football fields. This increasing ground coverage at 

higher altitudes was relatively marginal when an aircraft was searching 

for small targets without precise coordinates and accurate systems. The 

best way to find precise aimpoints required photos or accurate sketches 

of the target area. The next section discusses the combining of IR sensors and laser designation to deliver LGBS. 

Laser-Guided Bomb Deliveries 

During Desert Storm, infrared sensors were most often used in 

conjunction with laser designators to deliver laser-guided bombs.7 Two 

methods were used: self-designation and “buddy” designation. Selfdesignation will be discussed first. The placement of the crosshairs of the 

infrared system depended on other systems: the radar in most aircraft, 

6F-IllF Operations Manual for Pave Tack, Ford Aerospace, Feb 81, p 5-9. 

7F-ll IFs, F-117s. A-6s and a handful of F-15Es had self-designation capability in 

Desert Storm. 

135 
Figure 20 

Comparative FLIR Field of Vied 

500 FT. ALTITUDE FLlR IMAGE 

0 50 0 

NARROW FIELD OF VIEW WIDEFIELD OF VIEW 

5.5 X 7.33 YDS. 22 X 29.3 YDS. 

2000 FT. ALTITUDE FLlR IMAGE 

NARROW FIELD OF VIEW 

22 X 29.3 YDS. 

WIDE FIELD OF VIEW 

66 X 117 YDS. 

0,000 FT. ALTITUDE FLlR IMAGE 

NARROW FIELD OF VIEW WIDE FIELD OF VIEW 

110 x 150 YDS. 45ox54oYDs 

136 
and the inertial navigation system in the F-117. Maximizing the 

accuracy of these systems was essential before searching by means of IR 

displays. The F- 1 17’s accurate navigation system normally placed the IR 

crosshairs within the FOV of a target. This allowed the pilot, after 

sufficient target study, to find the target without using other onboard 

systems. In other aircraft, the WSO or B/N updated the inertial system by 

accurately placing his radar crosshairs on the target or an associated 

aimpoint with good quality coordinates. Then he would transition to his 

IR display and search for the target.’ After the target was acquired, the 

aircrew tracked and fired a continuous beam of laser light at the 

appropriate time.” Light from the laser was reflected off the target and 

received ,by the laser-guided bomb’s special seeker, which was tuned to 

the frequency of the laser beam. It was critical that the bomb be released 

into the area (or cone) of energy reflected from the target. Once the 

seeker acquired the reflected laser light, it maneuvered small control 

surfaces to guide the bomb to the target. Figure 21 shows how laserguided bombs were delivered. 

Aircraft without this laser capability could be paired with laser-capable aircraft to double the number of precision weapons available on a 

given mission. In these “buddy” operations, one aircraft or other source 

(e.g., handheld laser designator) directed the laser energy at the target 

while a separate aircraft delivered the weapon. Again, it was critical that 

the delivery aircraft release the weapon so it could see the reflected laser 

energy and guide into the target. The “buddy” operations were most 

often used by the United Kingdom; the British Tornado aircraft dropped 

1,000-pound LGBS and the Buccaneer supplied lasing for guidance. Also, 

Saudi F-5s paired with laser-capable Tornado aircraft, and the U.S. Marine and Navy aircraft fired laser-guided Mavericks and AGM-123 Skipper missiles that received terminal laser guidance from other sources. 

Additionally, buddy lasing was always available as a backup option for 

two or more laser-capable aircraft when one developed maintenance 

problems. Figure 22 depicts the various modes of buddy deliveries. 

%is does not mean that a radar was necessary to find targets by means of 1R 

scopes. However, the radar’s much wider FOV helps the WSO or BM find the general 

target area before going to the narrow FOV’S associated with 1R receivers 

‘hr light is very coherent, which means that it does not disperse as would light 

from an ordinary flashlight. It is also one very precise color (i.e., frequency). 

137 
Figure 21 

her-Guided Bomb Release 

Aircraft Lasing Target & Turn Away 

-& ESCAPE 

\\ LASING ENDS 

LASING AIRCRAFT 

DESIGNATES 

TARGET 

ENERGY A % 

After the transition to medium-altitude operations in Desert Storm, 

aircrews flew mostly high-angle dive and level-flight deliveries. The 

following sections summarize the inherent advantages and disadvantages 

associated with these deliveries. 

As stated earlier, aircrews began medium-altitude dive deliveries by 

proceeding to a predetermined distance from the target and making either 

a tactical turn to place the target 30 to 45 degrees off the nose of the 

138 
Figure 22 

Buddy Bombing 

DELIVERY - AIRCRAFT 

GROUI 

LASING +-- AIRCRAFT 

the aircraft or flying directly to a planned roll-in point. Then the pilot 

accomplished a push-over to the desired dive angle predetermined for 

release. Most of the day visual deliveries flown in Desert Storm were of 

this nature. As with any visual delivery, the biggest limitation was target 

acquisition. The pilot had to see the target to release his ordnance effectively. Another limitation was the propensity for system altitude errors 

associated with a computer release at medium altitude. These limitations 

resulted in less than stellar results against small point targets when aircrews released “dumb” bombs during dive deliveries. Accuracy just was 

not there, and the small sticks of bombs dropped by fighters were not 

enough to cause permanent damage. On the other hand, precision-guided 

munitions released during dive deliveries were very accurate. But during 

Desert Storm, precision-capable aircraft usually flew at night and used the 

more reliable level deliveries. The following lists advantages and disadvantages associated with dive deliveries. 

139 
Advantages at Medium Altitude: 

Aircrews in Desert Storm did not have to worry about safe escape andor fragmentation deconfliction among aircraft. 

Aircraft faced a reduced threat from small arms fire, most AAA, 

and IR missiles. 

Impact angles were very high, since pilots released weapons in 

dives ranging anywhere between 30 to 60 degrees. 

Disadvantages at Medium Altitude: 

The attacker was in the heart of the surface-to-air missile (SAM), 

air interceptor, and radar AAA environment. 

Accuracy was not good against point targets, since aircraft systems and weapons were optimized for low-altitude releases. 

Clear weather was required from the roll-in point to the target. 

The HUD pipper was not precise at medium altitude and could 

completely cover small targets when release occurred above 

15,000 feet.” 

Medium-altitude level attacks flown in Desert Storm were mostly 

radar and laser-guided deliveries. Radar deliveries were best used against 

large area targets to offset associated inaccuracies inherent with “dumb” 

bombs released from long slant ranges. Precision-guided munitions 

changed this targeting process by giving aircrews an accurate capability 

against point targets. The following were advantages and disadvantages 

associated with level attacks. 

“For some aircraft, the center of the HUD pipper was a 2-milliradian dot. At 15,000 

feet, this pipper covered an area 30 feet on the ground, which could be larger than some 

artillery pieces. 

140 
Advantages at Medium Altitude: 

The aircraft were outside AAA real-time zones. 

Standoff weapon range was greater than at low altitude. 

Navigation and target acquisition were easier because of less 

'terrain obscuration and wider field-of-view coverage. 

Penetrating munitions were much more effective, with greater 

impact angles and faster impact velocities. 

Disadvantages at Medium Altitude: 

Tactical surprise was lost due to detection by early warning and 

ground control intercept (GCI) radars, and the aircraft were more 

vulnerable to some enemy defenses, notably surface-to-air missiles. 

Accuracy was reduced for all weapons except precision-guided 

munitions. 

Weather obscuration became more pronounced and took away 

precision-guided munition and visual attack capabilities, leaving 

only radar deliveries, which were far less accurate. 

Aerial Missions (Air-to-Air) 

The most basic air-to-air mission is defensive counter air. Fighters 

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm flew three primary air-to-air missions. 

The first was the sweep, which established air superiority over a 

designated area for a limited time by seeking out and destroying enemy 

aircraft in the air. The most noteworthy use of this tactic in Desert Storm 

was the mission into Iraqi airspace by F-l5Cs and F-14s, which followed 

the initial F-117 strikes in the Baghdad area during the opening minutes 

141 
of the air campaign.” Sweep can be conducted autonomously by using 

onboard fire-control and identification systems. But in an all-aspect 

threat environment, maximum effectiveness was achieved by using all 

available resources to increase capabilities beyond visual range and to 

heighten overall battle situation awareness. These resources included GCI 

and AWACS. The second method was combat air patrol (CAP). Two types 

of CAPS were used during Desert Storm, point and screen or barrier CAP. 

A point CAP protected high-value assets such as airfields, command, 

control, and communication (C3) facilities, storage facilities, and lines of 

communications. A barrier CAP prevented the enemy from reaching an 

asset and was established at some forward point between the enemy and 

that asset. For example, barrier CAPS protected AWACS, Compass Call, 

and other vulnerable air assets, or established a screen well forward of 

airfields or friendly troop concentrations. The third method was escort, 

which was normally used in a force protection role tied to large attack 

packages. Escort could be employed in close proximity when fighters 

were tied to a particular package or asset, or in a detached mode when 

escort fighters were flying close to the assets being pr~tected.’~ 

When a fighter was vectored by AWACS to intercept an inbound 

enemy aircraft, it first searched on its air-to-air radar. When it acquired 

the aircraft, it had to confirm that the aircraft was, in fact, Iraqi. The 

confirmations were made to prevent inadvertent attacks on friendly 

aircraft, which were much more numerous in the skies over Iraq. After 

confirming the target as hostile, the aircrew developed a fire-control 

solution for whatever missile was appropriate. Radar-guided Sparrow 

missiles were usually used for longer range or BVR shots, while the heatseeking Sidewinder was used for targets at closer ranges.I4 

”(S) Master Attack Plan, “First 24 Hours with Changes 1, 2, and 3,” 16 Jan 1991. 

See Chapter 3 section titled “Attacking The Iraqi Air Defense and Air Force.” As the F15C commenced their sweep, the rest of the first wave of F-I17 attacks hit targets in the 

Baghdad area, F-15% attacked fixed Scud installations in northwestern Iraq, and TMMS 

hit targets in Baghdad. The F-15Es egressed and the other friendly forces ahead of the 

sweep were either stealthy or unmanned, giving the sweeping F-15s a clear field of fire. 

”(SINFNNINC) MCM 3-1, Volume 1, “General Planning and Employment 

Considerations,” 4 Jul 1989, pp 2-3, 2-4. 

14For a more detailed analysis of the missiles used in Desert Storm see the “Air-toAir Weapons” section in Chapter 2 of this report. 

142 
Threat From the Ground 

In the threat area, aircrews had to be concerned about enemy 

defensive systems as well as delivering their ordnance. Prior training and 

tactical thought had concentrated on low-level ingress and attack to 

minimize the SAM threat. By the third day of Desert Storm, however, the 

SAM threat was effectively suppressed and the Iraqi air-to-air threat was 

minimal. This left antiaircraft artillery as the primary threat. As a 

consequence, Coalition aircraft normally operated above 10,OOO feet for 

the balance of the war. The ensuing discussion addresses the tactics used 

to deal with and suppress the Iraqi electronic threat-primarily the SAM 

threat-in this tactical environment. 

Tactical aircraft flying into target areas had radar warning receivers 

to help identify threats. These receivers displayed, on small scopes, the 

types and relative positions of enemy threat radars. Most aircraft also 

had self-protection radar jamming capability. When a SAM threat appeared on the radar warning scope, the aircrews would evaluate the threat 

and take appropriate evasive maneuvers. Radar warning receivers provided aircrews with two kinds of warnings: the first indicated that the 

aircraft was being observed or tracked; the second indicated that a missile 

had been launched. 

When a valid launch indication was present, aircrews maneuvered, 

dropped bundles of chaff, and tried to acquire the incoming missile 

visually. [DELETED] l5 [DELETED] .I6 

”[DELETED] 

16(S) MCM 3-1, Volume VI, ‘Tactical Employment - F-111,” 14 Feb 91. p 3-18. 

143 
Figure 23 

FIGURE DELETED 

144 
[DELETED]." 

[DELETED]. 

Figure 24 

FIGURE DELETED 

"(S) Ibid, p 3-23. 

145 
[DELETED]. 

[DELETED]." 

([DELETED]. 

Iraqi Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) was relatively easy to defeat from 

the medium-altitudes at which most Coalition aircraft flew. When 

aircrews observed airbursts or tracers in front of a formation, they simply 

maneuvered to avoid the area. When aircrews observed aimed AAA fire 

or suspected its presence, they jinked away from the site [DELETED]:I9 

[DELETED] 

(S) Ibid, pp 3-24, 3-25. 

(S) Ibid, p 3-25. 

18 

19 

146 
Figure 25 

FIGURE DELETED 

[DELETED]. The key to defeating aimed AAA was to not fly the aircraft 

in a predictable fashion. Conversely, jinking was not effective against 

barrage fire. The best tactic against barrage fire was to penetrate and 

egress as rapidly as possible. 

147 
Navigation 

Accurate navigation was a crucial planning consideration, since the 

success of an attack hinged on precise navigation and timing. Dead 

reckoning, supplemented by positioning determined by onboard systems, 

was the primary means of navigation. Pilots using dead reckoning start 

from a positively identified point and flew preplanned headings, flight 

times, and distances, correcting for winds. The most basic and important 

concept behind dead reckoning was maintaining general situational 

awareness of time and space; knowing the location of the aircraft, the 

target, and the recovery base. 

The most important segment of the route was from the initial point 

(IP) to the target; threats were usually greatest, and navigation and timing 

most crucial. Just as target vulnerability was a prime consideration in 

determining a final attack axis, the choice of IP was of equal importance. 

[DELETED]. Navigational routing also considered safe-passage corridors 

and procedures, the location of friendly troops, and munition restrictions. 

[DELETED]. Planning for IR missions was even more extensive. For 

night missions using IR systems, each navigation turnpoint had to be 

analyzed for IR significance under predicted weather and absolute humidity conditions. [DELETED]. The flight leader was responsible for 

navigation, but all flight members had to familiarize themselves with the 

entire route in order to anticipate turns better, execute tactics better, and 

provide better mutual support for the formation. 

Formations 

Flying combat missions with formations of aircraft was based on teamwork. The basic combat unit employed by tactical fighters was a two-ship 

element. The wingman’s main duty was to fly formation on his leader and 

to support him. A four-ship flight consisted of two mutually supporting 

elements. Formations were one of the planning factors aircrews could 

control. The enemy controlled defenses and target vulnerability. Nature 

was responsible for terrain and meteorology, and higher headquarters established rules of engagement, special instructions, force requirements, and 

munitions. Flight leaders controlled not only the formation but also release 

parameters and (to some degree) the navigational problem. The formation 

148 
selected by the flight leader ideally capitalized on weaknesses in enemy 

defenses and took advantage of weather and terrain. The purpose of any 

tactical formation was to provide an offensive capability while maintaining 

security against enemy defenses. Formations were designed to enter and 

depart the target and engagement areas in a fighting posture and survive. 

The typical basic formations flown by fighter aircrews were as follows: 

Figure 26 

Line Abreast 

Line abreast provided the best lookout and mutual cross coverage for 

two aircraft. The selected spread distance had to be close enough for 

mutual support. If the formation was too close, maneuvering became more 

difficult and a large blind spot existed at the six o’clock position. Conversely, when the spread distance was too great, air threats could sneak in undetected. Generally, 6,000 to 9,000 feet separation provided the best tradeoff 

between maintaining mutual support and difficulties in maintaining formation. 

149 
Trail formations were normally used at night and in bad weather. 

Both aircraft took off as a flight, but were basically on their own after 

flight split-up. Rejoins could occur at a predetermined rendezvous point 

at any time during the flight. 

T 

Figure 27 

Trail 

Wedge 

8-10 NM 

c 

Wedge was a highly maneuverable, two-ship formation. In wedge, 

the wingman positioned himself in a 45- to 70-degree maneuvering cone 

3,000 to 9,0oO feet aft of the leader. This formation was used anytime 

the requirement for hard maneuvering overrode the requirement for 

mutual support. 

150 
Figure 28 

Wedge 

70 

Offensive potenti:: was at times sacrificed for defensive posture as 

flight members relied upon each other for security and mutual support. 

Also, in structuring the formation, the flight leader traded off defensive 

requirements against offensive potential. For example, aircraft size, 

visibility, clouds, or terrain affected separation distances and altitude 

stacking; AWACS support could allow the formation to be less defensive, 

and onboard self-protection weapons (AIM-9, AIM-7, and gun) could 

permit wider lateral separation. Medium-altitude formations were essentially the same as for low-altitude formations. However, the following 

items applied specifically to medium-altitude operations. 

Visibility was better at medium altitude, and this allowed increased lateral separation. Increasing spread distances gave better 

cross coverage, especially of the dangerous six o’clock area. 

Whenever possible, tactical formations were ideally separated 

vertically by 4,000 feet or greater. This afforded better threedimensional lookout and made acquisition more difficult for 

enemy systems. If the sun was a factor, the aircraft closest to the 

sun stacked low, making visual lookout easier for the wingman 

151 
and posing greater difficulties for an enemy aircraft attacking out 

of the sun?’ 

At medium-altitude, aircraft were vulnerable in all three dimensions. Attack from the same altitude was least likely, and constant checking above and below was critical. Navigation was 

easier and ground clearance was not a factor, so aircrews could 

devote more time to providing mutual support. Diligent visual 

search as a means of avoiding surprise attacks and maintaining 

situational awareness was vitally important. 

The flight leader weighed coordination with other forces and wingman experience before determining which formation to use. Formations 

could also change during the mission, depending on conditions. Having 

the basic plan well briefed and firmly in mind helped avoid confusion. 

This was particularly true when large force packages were involved. 

Under certain conditions, large force packages could best take advantage of threat weaknesses by concentrating firepower and by using dedicated electronic combat (EC) assets. A large force employment package, 

typical of Desert Storm, consisted of up to ninety aircraft, preceded by a 

dedicated suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) package of Wild Weasels and EF-111A aircraft. The tactic was to exploit the principles of mass 

and economy of force.*’ Large packages suppressed and overwhelmed defenses while providing greater destructive energy on targets. Coordination 

of EC assets in support of a limited number of large forces was easier than 

employing limited EC assets in support of numerous smaller attack 

packages. Large force packages also needed dedicated CAP for protection 

from enemy fighters. Finally, large force employment packages demanded 

a great deal of coordination, and the time and effort required for 

coordination increased dramatically with the size of the package. 

“TACM 3-3. Volume VI, “Fighter Fundamentals - F-1 1 I,” 1 Aug 1990, p 3-42. 

*‘(S/NF/M”/NC) MCM 3-1, Vol I, pp 1-1, 1-2. The principles of mass and economy of force guide commanders in tailoring forces to achieve objectives. Tactical resources must be sufficiently massed to achieve the objective rather than dispersed unnecessarily. Conversely. a small force assigned a supporting objective can contribute disproportionately to a large combat effort or tie up large enemy forces in support of the main 

objective. The main objective is the paramount consideration in prioritizing for mass and 

economy of force. 

152 
Air Crew Planning 

Planning a tactical mission was a complex process that had to consider multiple factors to ensure success. When organizing a tactical plan, a 

flight leader considered the enemy's total complement of threats and 

balanced his aircraft and crewmember capabilities with desired weapons 

effects. Sometimes this balance was not perfect, but the main goal was 

to max'imize accuracy and survivability. Hauling iron bombs for long 

sortie durations, only to miss the desired objective of total target destruction, was a definition of combat futility. There was no single, best solution to any tactical situation, and pilots developing plans for a given 

situation approached the problem from differing perspectives. The most 

important concepts in developing a tactical plan were building in unpredictability and denying the enemy any intelligence as to where, when, or 

how the attackers would appear. 

Aircrews considered thirteen tactical factors in planning combat 

missions:22 

Air Targeting Order (Am) Mission Objectives 

Enemy Defenses 

Terrain 

Weather and Meteorological Factors 

Target 'I)lpeNulnerability 

Rules of Engagement (ROE)/SpeCial Instructions (SPINS) 

Force Requirements 

Navigation 

Formations 

Munitions 

Release Parameters 

Fuel Considerations 

Command and Control. 

While each factor may appear to be discrete, all interrelated to various 

degrees. Depending on the mission, some were more significant than 

others. The following are generic mission planning considerations related 

to each of the thirteen factors listed above. 

22(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, pp 5-1. 5-2. 

153 
The Air Tasking Order (Am) was a message ordering the mission, 

listing targets and aircraft, and sometimes recommending weapon loads. 

Once aircrews received the ATO, the tactical planning process began. In 

the following sample, the actual ATO message is in bold type with the 

explanation below. 

SAMPLE ~~023 

TASKUNIT/48TFW// 

Tasks the 48 Tactical Fighter Wing 

MSNDAT// 

Mission data// 

TGTLOC// 

Target location// 

REFUEL// 

RefueW 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

AMPN/REMARK IDENTIFIER (S): A W H P 

Remark A read “see tanker spins for air refueling information.” Remark W read “use west wmm 

plan.” Remark H d “coordinate with mission numbers - 0401A. 0403A, 040SA. MA, 

0461W (4F-4G), 0471X (2EF-IIIA). 0241C (4F-ISC).” Remark P read that “mission 040SA was 

the package commander.” 

COMMENTS H2 AFLD// 

The target is H2, an airfield in western Jq. 

Enemy defenses drove tactics and represented a key planning factor. 

This was surely the case during Desert Storm where the enemy threat 

dictated medium-altitude weapons delivery. There were three basic types 

of threats: AAA, SAMs, and aircraft. Each had a variety of tracking 

systems that used radar, infrared, optics, or a combination of the three. 

Although diversified and capable of autonomous operation, the Iraqis had 

the KARI system, which was designed to- coordinate their defenses. The 

threat posed by these systems was the reason why destroying Iraq’s 

integrated air defense system was an early priority of the Coalition air 

campaign. Aviators sought to minimize exposure to high-priority threats, 

”(S) This sample AT0 was taken from an actual AT0 processed on 20 Jan 1991 at 

1555 Zulu time. It can be found in section 18 out of 94. 

154 
be unpredictable, deal with threats through a see-and-avoid concept, and 

use the best available resources to suppress enemy air defenses. 

Minimizing exposure to known threats was done by flying around, over, 

or under the known threat envelopes. Unpredictability was used to limit 

the enemy’s ability to anticipate tactics. Different penetration formations, 

navigational routes, attack axis, delivery parameters, and multiship tactics 

were also used to create confusion. Finally, see-and-avoid procedures and 

the use of radar warning receivers in combination with a “heads out of 

the cockpit” navigation technique increased the chance of proper 

recognition and response to enemy threats. Although radar warning 

receivers aided in detecting and avoiding threats, visual detection was the 

real basis of timely and effective reaction. 

Terrain was a planning consideration that dominated low-altitude 

tactics. In training before the Gulf War, aircrews usually planned to use 

terrain features to counter enemy defenses and as navigational aids to and 

from the target. However. in Desert Storm, the nature of the enemy 

threat dictated that few low-altitude missions were flown. 

Meteomfogy was a crucial factor often overlooked during mission 

planning. During Desert Storm, target acquisition and navigation were 

both adversely affected by poor weather. Aircrews planned for the worst 

anticipated weather conditions and had backup options available when 

real weather differed from forecasted weather. Some weather conditions 

may not have hindered bombing, yet enhanced the enemy’s defenses. For 

example, flight under an overcast was more predictable, established a 

known maximum altitude, and made visual acquisition easier. Weather 

also played a significant role in missions involving use of infrared 

sensing equipment. 

[DELETED]?4 [DELETED].” [DELETED]. 

[DELETED] ?6 [DELETED]. 

“(C) Mission planning for an 1R low-level mission added two hours of preparation 

during the ingress phase and one additional hour for terminal guidance targeting. 

(SINFIWNINC) MCM 3-1. VOI I, p 5-19. 

‘S(S/NF/WNMC) Ibid. p 5-22. 

(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 5-32. 26 

155 
When attacks were made against closely spaced targets, the wind's 

velocity became a factor determining attack direction and in minimizing 

effects of smoke and debris on follow-on strikers. [DELETED]. The 

tactical decision aid (TDA) (see Table 6) was a major advance for this 

specialized aspect of mission planning." Specific route, tactics, and 

target information were input into the TDA computer program, which 

melded the data with the IR emissivity of the target against its background. Trained weather forecasters used this information to predict the 

quality and characteristics of the target in the aircrew cockpit display?' 

The TDA also predicted acquisition and lock-on ranges. Aircrews thus 

knew how hard the target would be to find and when and in what direction to start looking. 

Most targets were most vulnerable to attack from a particular direction, determined by the target's structural weakness, vital components, 

gaps in enemy defenses, terrain, and weather. [DELETED]. Long, 

narrow targets such as runways. bridges, and roads created special targeting problems. An attack along a major axis would miss if azimuth error 

were off slightly, and attacking directly perpendicular with a string of 

bombs could waste bombs because the space between falling bombs 

might coincide with the target, even if the release was otherwise perfect 

(see Figure 29).29 

27TDA uses targethackground contrast, atmospheric transmission, and sensor performance computer models to provide this data for all IR and optical systems. 

28~~~~~~~~) MCM 3-1, VOI I, p 5-34. 

29Strings of bombs are released after aircrews input footage or microseconds spacing 

values into the aircraft's weapon delivery system. Theoretically. these values symmetrically place delivered weapons on the ground with the center of the string over the 

intended aimpoint. 

156 
Table 6 

TDA Target Information WorksheetN 

AU PURPOSE CHECKLIST CAGE OF PAGES 

~~U~~ECTIA~TPIIFVNCT~ONALARE* OPR 

TD A TARGET INFORMATION WORKSHEET 

lo1 ITEM 

IAssipnaparagrsph nurnbef Ioeachitern Drawn ho,ironlallinebe~neachma~or pars~mpl 

TARGETANUPON INFORMATION FOR TACTICAL MCISION AID COM WTATIONS 

The following information is prov.ded by the aircnm of intet people. 

Itshouldbe phoned in. 

Acquisition SensorR)evice: 

Weapon. 

Field of View: Nanow Wide 

hsor TDA: Receiver Range Designator Range Coloceted Range 

Receiver Height- ft Designator Height - 

Aircrah Height (AGLL feet. 

Target LatiLong 

TirneoverTarget - zulu 

Target Elevation -feet MSL 

Target Description. bg. 1-72] 

Target Background: 

Aspectangle- dwreesIO'= head-on. lW)"=tall-on) 

OpermtingCondin Off K)LE EXERClSED 

Poc Phone 

CoIWickup Time 

SunAngleRequired: YES NO 

MWon DabriefTime PI.- (BMglRoorn No.) 

(e.g. Snow, trees, sand, etc.) 

'ATE 

~ ~~ 

30(SMF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 5-35. 

157 
Figure 29 

Perpendicular Attack 

A Perfect Miss 

Target vulnerability was a major tactics determinant. The vulnerability of many targets was determined empirically from controlled tests 

and entered into a Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) equation 

158 
to determine the number of sorties required to inflict a specific level of 

damage on a target.” [DELETED].” [DELETED]. 

Rules of engagement (ROE) were derived from policy considerations 

and tactical restrictions. [DELETED]. ROE were relayed to aircrews in 

the form of specid instructions (SPINS). SPINS were continuously updated 

and briefed before all missions. 

Force Requirements entailed not only parsimony, but prioritization, 

judgment, and planning. Factors such as ingress altitude and routing, 

timing, defense suppression, command and control, availability of electronic countermeasure assets, and delivery tactics determined the best 

attack plan and size of force. Composite attack forces derived synergy 

from the unique capabilities of various aircraft types. [DELETED]. 

Therefore, in planning composite attacks, aircrews had to consider flexibility, strength, and mutual support. The mission commander normally 

did not have control over the composition of his forces, but had to be 

aware of all contingency factors affecting his planning. Knowing what 

assistance was available, when it could come, and where other operations 

would occur spelled the difference between success and failure. Supporting factors included:33 

Aerial refueling 

”JMEM is a useful planning document, but it gives statistical averages and probabilities, not guaranteed solutions. JMEM is basically what the “average” pilot delivering 

“average” ordnance against representative targets may achieve. And, when applying 

lMEh4 statistical data to a tactics problem, aircrews must also consider other factors: the 

status of aircraft systems, the level of aircrew proficiency. and the intensity of enemy 

defenses. For example, JMEM may dictate the use of four laser-guided GBU-24s against 

an aircraft shelter. It does not look at the status of the F-111’s Pave Tack system scheduled to fly this sortie. nor does it know aircrew proficiency or tactical constraints related 

to enemy defenses. MEM is based on past historical evidence and does not conform to 

the complexities involved with aerial combat. 

32(SMFIWNINC) MCM 3-1, Vol 1. p 5-37. 

33 (SINFIWNINC) Ibid, pp 5-38, 5-39. 

159 
ECM-Standoff or escort 

Counter air-CAP, screen, sweep or escort 

Defense suppression-Wild Weasel or other attacks 

Radio relay-frequencies needed to accomplish the mission 

Combat rescue 

Command and control centers-ground, airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC), or AWACS 

Target intelligence-pre- and postattack bomb damage assessment. 

In summary, mission commanders had to consider the roles of all sup 

porting aircraft. Coordination was often intense and lengthy, and secure 

telephone and facsimile capability were invaluable in this respect during 

the Gulf war. Personal interaction was crucial, and having all the players 

together at one location permitted the mission commander to talk directly 

to other experts when formulating his gameplan. Full understanding is 

more likely with personal contact, supporting the teamwork requirement 

during execution of the plan. 

As discussed earlier, accurate navigation to the target was an important part of mission planning. Most aircraft in Desert Storm had some 

sort of onboard inertial navigation computer system, and a few had 

Global Positioning System (GPs) capability. Selection of the proper route 

was also important to avoid enemy defenses and provide for visual reference point backups. 

Combat formations (which were also discussed earlier) varied as the 

war progressed. In most cases throughout Desert Storm, elements joined 

larger force packages to take advantage of threat weaknesses, concentrate 

firepower, and use dedicated EC assets effectively. Operating with a 

larger formation demanded a great deal of coordination. Large, highly 

coordinated packages were most common during the first few days of the 

war. Later, the relatively low Iraqi antiair threat reduced requirements for 

close coordination between attackers, defensive fighters, and EC aircraft. 

160 
The selection of munitions and fuzing were important mission planning factors. Although the AM normally dictated munitions for a given 

mission, the mission commander could request a change when more 

effective ordnance was available. [DELETED]." [DELETED]. Premission planning had to balance all factors. After munitions selection, 

aircrews had to determine release parameters. 

Factors affecting release parameters included target acquisition, 

fuzing, separation, and minimum exposure to hostile fire. Weapons could 

be released in level, loft, or dive profiles. Level and dive deliveries 

forced the aircraft to overfly the target, while loft deliveries offered 

standoff capability. The flight leader's primary goal was to choose 

release parameters and delivery modes that would best achieve desired 

weapons effects on the target set. Assessing threats, targets, and survival 

priorities helped form his choices. Backup plans were needed to account 

for system failures or bad weather conditions. 

Fuel was a basic mission planning consideration. Fuel requirements 

affected aircraft range, loiter time, ingress and egress speeds, enemy 

defense engagement options, and recovery contingencies. Aircrews had 

to plan for potential delays, threat reactions, and responses in case of 

premature external fuel tank jettison or tanker nonavailability. 

The command and control (C') environment affected fighter tactics 

in two ways. First, theater commanders dictated ROE and weapons employment, and their battle staffs exercised control over assigned forces. 

The additional presence of GCI, AWACS, and ABCCC affected the real-time 

control commanders retained over fighter forces. Second, the effective- 

"Carriage and release limits are found in each aircraft's operation manual. Carriage 

limits specify aircraft speed limitations for specific weapons loads, along with bank angles 

and maneuverability restrictions. Release limits tell the aircrew how fast specific weapons 

loads can be released, depending on delivery attitude. 

161 
ness of C2 was crucial to carrying out a mission successfully. C2 includes 

radar monitoring, flight following, threat warning, tanker rendezvous, 

intercept control, target assignment, radio relay, and navigation assistance. 

These traditional Cz services had to be integrated into tactical fighter 

operations. Mission planners had to also consider the effects of communications jamming, ECM, and GCI attrition and have backup plans 

a~ailable.~’ 

None of the planning considerations discussed previously were rigid 

requirements; however, they were guidelines that had to be considered in 

combat mission planning. Tactics changed in response to new threats and 

the need to accomplish the mission safely and effectively-as was evident 

when the intense Iraqi AAA at lower altitudes dictated a move from low 

to medium- and high-altitude tactics. 

All crews had to consider these thirteen planning factors to properly 

plan for a combat mission. Mission Commanders controlling the larger 

attack packages had further considerations to develop, and these will be 

covered next. 

Large-Scale Mission Planning 

Most missions in Desert Storm involved more than one type of 

aircraft. For the large-scale missions, a designated mission commander 

was placed in overall command of the entire strike package. To prepare 

for the mission, he first reviewed the ATO, SPINS/ROE, and weather. In 

addition, he received an intelligence update for the proposed route of 

flight. The mission commander extracted the mission information from 

the ATO. The SPINS/ROE were read to extract the following: general 

information; electronic combat information; overall communication plan; 

CAS coordination; command and control; air campaign instructions; air 

refueling information; and airspace control order information. The 

35(S/NFIWN/NC) MCM 3-1, Vol 1. pp 5-46. 5-47. 

162 
general weather briefing helped to determine routing and target area 

tactics. Intelligence updates were used for route planning. 

From this information, the mission commander developed a basic 

routing plan. He then coordinated with other package members to utilize 

their capabilities best. Since most were at other bases, much of this 

information was passed on secure telephones. Often, for larger packages, 

the mission commander delegated some tasks to subordinate aircraft 

package leaders, who then developed their own routing and target attacks 

on the basis of his general guidance. The mission commander was the 

glue that held the plan together as he gathered information, set priorities, 

and delegated tasks to other flight members. [DELETED]. The mission 

commander then ensured that his total package would not cause conflicts 

in space, time, or altitude, and that adequate force protection was 

provided. Deconfliction was probably the hardest factor to manage, since 

airplanes took off from different bases, utilized different tanker tracks, 

and flew separate routes to the same target. 

The safest way to hit a large target was to overwhelm the enemy 

defense with massive attacks over a short period. In addition to reducing 

exposure to enemy defenses, this action also maximized the accompanying electronic combat aircraft’s ability to suppress these defenses and 

reduced the strain on force-protection air-superiority fighters. As with all 

concentrated attacks, the time of most vulnerability is at the merge 

over the target. 

163 
F-15C 

AA 

F-4G 4 4 

44 

44 F-I11 

F-4G 4 4 

F-I11 

44 

44 

44 

-I- 4 

44 

44 

44 

44 

Figure 30 

Gorilla Package 

Concentrated attacks are like spokes 

on a wheel with the center axle as 

the target. All attacking aircraft fly 

down the spokes and merge at the 

center axle. Since the enemy threat 

is more of a force around a target, 

the possibility of aircraft collisions 

and loss of aircraft due to weapon 

fragmentation over the target increases dramatically with poor mission planning?6 Air superiority 

fighters either maintained assigned 

CAP stations or flew escort missions 

for force protection, although many 

attackers carried air-to-air missiles. 

Ordnance limited aircraft maneuvering and would normally be jettisoned when attacked by enemy 

fighters sp that they could defensively flee, or turn and engage offensively. 

36Weapon fragmentation was only a factor during low-altitude deliveries. 

164 
In addition to the above duties, the mission commander also had the 

following responsibilities: 

Determining go/no-go mission-abort criteria by deciding which 

equipment or support assets were essential to safe mission accompl ish ment . [DELETED]. 

Selecting effective ingress and egress formations for the overall 

package. For example, the mission commander could place the 

“swing” fighters (fighters with an air-to-air as well as a bombdropping capability) in front of the package or rely entirely on 

air-superiority fighters for air defense. In planning the spacing 

of formations, the commander must consider the special needs of 

large formation attacks such as a ”gorilla” package, and projected 

threat reactions. A gorilla package was one way to place a large 

number of aircraft over the target in a short period of time, and 

a typical F-lllF gorilla package is depicted in Figure 30. 

Planning time and effort increased dramatically with the size of 

the package. 

Planning tanker-fighter air-refueling; the flow of fighters on and 

off the tankers, and fuel amounts for the mission. The mission 

commander aimed for efficient, rapid refueling to get the most 

out of each sortie. 

Planning, integration, and execution of coordinated tactics with 

electronic combat assets. 

Ensuring that target area tactics safely inflict the desired results 

and that targeting aircraft deconflict successfully. 

Contingencies affecting the overall force. Anticipating and 

developing possible reactions to abnormal circumstances and 

unforeseen developments. 

The commander was ready to brief and fly the mission, only after he had 

considered all of the above requirements. 

165 
Mission 

During Desert Shield, Coalition forces conducted face-to-face 

briefings on aircraft capabilities, timing requirements, tactics, and support 

requirements. These briefings were vital to an understanding of how the 

various units intended to operate in the Gulf arena. The information exchanges improved everyone’s ability to integrate more effectively into the 

large offensive packages that were common during Desert Storm and 

helped to ameliorate some planning problems, once the war began.37 

The following describes how an actual mission might have been 

planned and flown. This mission was taken from the Muster Attack Plan 

and scheduled for 17452 on 17 January 1991, the first day of the war?’ 

It consisted of twenty-two aircraft with the following assignments: 

4 F-4Gs SEAD 

2 EF-Ills SEAD 

4 F-lllF~ 

4 F- 1 1 1 Fs (MSN CDR) 

4 GR-1s 

4 F-1% Fighter Sweep 

AI FuleJah Radio Relay Station 

Al Jarrah Airfield Facilities 

Al Jarrah Airfield Runways 

The fact that these twenty-two aircraft came from different airfields complicated the already difficult task of mission planning and coordination. 

The first step was the mission commander briefing?9 It began with 

a marshalling plan to bring parked aircraft to the runway. Runway lineup 

through aircraft rejoin after takeoff was then briefed. Next came the 

preattack refueling sequence on the tanker followed by the routing and 

formations to the target. Expected threat reactions were briefed along 

with contingency plans. Electronic combat support aircraft flight tracks 

were shown, and the role of the fighter sweep aircraft was discussed. 

Then, target attack plans were briefed to ensure aircraft deconfliction. 

37(SMF/WNMC) Tactical Analysis Bullelin, Volume 91 -2, Jul 1991. p 9-2. 

38(S) Master Attack Plan, “First 24 Hours,” p 18. 

’%he reader can see the difficulty of organizing, directing, and planning a mission 

from remote locations via telephone. This was done frequently during Desert Storm, but 

compliance and understanding was much better when a mass briefing was held at one 

location. A postmission mass debrief also allowed aircrews to learn what worked or did 

not, so that the same mistakes would not be repeated. 

1 66 
Postattack return routing was discussed along with poststrike refueling. 

After the mission commander’s briefing, flight leaders conducted individual briefs within their elements. 

The flight leader brief detailed the specifics of the upcoming mission. 

Routine procedures, such as taxiing, takeoff, and rejoin procedures were 

briefed as “standard.’* The crux of the briefing focused on target 

attacks. The flight leader addressed tactics, weapons, release parameters, 

safe escape, timing, altitudes, deconfliction, weather, aimpoints, threats, 

and back-up deliveries. Formations selected for the mission were then 

briefed as were flight reactions to known threats along the route and 

gdno-go decisions. Secondary targets were briefed in case the target was 

obscured by weather. These were targets of lesser priority than the 

primary target, but still of sufficient importance to justify commitment of 

the force. Most missions in Desert Storm were of long duration and 

consumed large amounts of aircraft fuel. [DELETED]. Finally, the briefing covered airspace control. When the flight leader briefings were complete, the aircrews walked to their aircraft. 

TdeojJs and Refueling 

Aircrews took off to rendezvous at the appropriate time with the 

tanker supporting their mission. Refueling was particularly critical for the 

F-4G Wild Weasels because of their high fuel consumption rates. 

Ingress 

Once aircraft refueled, the attack package crossed into Iraqi airspace 

and began flying their ingress route to targets. Ingress routes were set up 

to minimize the enemy threat and maximize the chances for a successful 

attack. Timing along the route of flight was also critical. Aircrews had 

to fly over the target at the same time the support aircraft were ready on 

station. [DELETED]. The positioning of the support assets, while 

“‘Standard” items were written down and committed to memory by the aircrews. 

The term “standard” cuts down on briefing time, which gives aircrews more time to do 

more important things such as study their targets. 

167 
flexible, was fairly consistent, especially in the early phases of Desert 

Storm. [DELETED]."' 

Timing through the target area was critical. Low-level attack, 

jamming, and other tactics rehearsed during Desert Shield were used on 

this mission because of the perceived threat. The tactics used by the 

individual types of aircraft on this mission were typical of other Desert 

Storm missions and were as follows: 

The F-15C's coordinated with AWACS 

as well as with the attack mission commander. If 

Iraqi aircraft rose to meet the attack group, the F15s were vectored by AWACS to intercept them. If 

not, F-15s remained in the target area as the attack 

aircraft conducted their mission. Upon completion of the attack, the F15s followed the attack group out of the region, alert for any Iraqi reaction. [DELETED]." 

F-~Gs 

The F-4G Wild Weasels had already 

studied the target area and identified the most 

dangerous SAM sites. As the attack group approached their targets, the F-4Gs positioned themselves to launch HARM missiles. [DELETED]!3 

Their orbits put EF-I 11 s in a position 

to jam the enemy radars, which posed the highest 

threat as determined by premission target area 

study. [DELETED]. 

4'(S/NFIWN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, p 4-23. 

42(S/NFIWN/NC) Ibid, p 2-12. 

(SINFIWNRVC) Ibid, p 9-4. 43 

168 
F-111s 

F-1 I 1Fs were the primary attack aircraft on this mission. To reduce their exposure to 

enemy defense, they coordinated among themselves to ensure a minimum time over target for 

all aircraft. The aircrews attacked the target from 

multiple headings, deconflicting by using time and altitude differences. 

[DELETED]. After the first three days, most attacks were flown at 

medium altitude using level deliveries.4 

GR-1 

The Tornado GR-I was the Royal Air 

Force equivalent of the F-I I I. During the attacks 

of the first four days of Desert Storm, they attacked airfields, such as A1 Jarrah, with JP233. 

This airfield denial weapon cratered the runway 

surface and scattered mines to hamper expeditious repair. Each aircraft 

carried two weapons that required delivery from low altit~de.4~ Tornados 

also made deliveries from medium altitudes on targets other than airfields 

with 1,000-pound bombs. 

Egress and Refueling 

After the last attacker was off target, he transmitted a "clear" call; 

support (SEAD EC) aircraft ceased suppressing the target and also retired 

from the area. Egress to the poststrike refueling point was as important 

as the ingress. Aircrews had also to be aware that the postflight drop in 

adrenalin flow could cause an unjustifiable sense of complacency and 

relaxation and possibly effect safe operations. The crews had to be alert 

to the fact that the mission was not over until the aircraft returned to base 

and the debrief was completed. 

4(SINFIWNlNC) Ibid, p 7-9. 

45After the first few days of operations, the JP233 delivering aircraft were accompanied by other GR-Is releasing 1.000-lb bombs and ALARM antiradiation missiles for ak 

defense suppression. 

169 
Post-flight Debrief and BDA 

The importance of a short, thorough debrief can not be overemphasized. It was vital that threat information, lessons learned, and estimated 

bomb damage assessment be passed to other aircrews and to the planners 

in Riyadh as expeditiously as possible. Later in the war, the value of the 

cockpit-recorded video tapes showing the bomb hits was realized and 

integrated into the bomb damage assessment process. 

This section covered the “generic” tactics and employment of the 

aircraft in the Gulf War. The discussions considered factors that all 

aircraft fighting in Desert Storm had to address. The following sections 

will be more specific and will consider the employment of air power 

against specific target categories. 

Attacking The Core Of Iraqi Power 

Two technological breakthroughs combined to make the application 

of air power in Desert Storm much different than in previous wars. First, 

stealth technology made direct attacks on the most heavily defended 

enemy areas possible without the need for supporting forces and before 

traditional air superiority was attained. Secondly, precision-guided munitions were capable of quickly destroying key targets, a task that required 

many more sorties in previous conflicts. On the basis of these new 

capabilities, a tactical plan was developed to attack a wide range of 

targets in the first few hours. These attacks were designed not only to 

achieve air superiority but also to strike at targets of Iraq’s strategic core 

of power, paralyzing the national leadership and neutralizing major offensive threats such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) and Scud 

missile capabilities. When this initial, overwhelming blow achieved its 

objectives, follow-on attacks against the rest of the core targets could be 

conducted in the face of a greatly reduced threat. 

This section concentrates on the efforts employed to reduce the 

targets of the strategic core. These target sets comprised the real basis 

of Iraqi power and included Iraqi leadership, command, control and 

communications (C3), electrical power sources, oil facilities, NBC capabilities, Scuds, and bridges. The destruction of the target sets was a key 

element of the goal of reducing the Iraqi military threat. The discussion 

focuses on the tactics used in the first hours of the air war, examines the 

close interaction between the efforts to gain air superiority and those 

170 
directed against the strategic core, and concentrates on the synergistic 

effects among the various missions. Then, since so many targets of the 

strategic core were contained in heavily protected buried structures, the 

discussion addresses the tactics used in what was called “bunker busting.’’ 

The discussion ends by describing special tactics and efforts employed 

against each of the strategic core target sets. 

The First Hours 

Initial attacks on Iraq’s strategic core were simultaneous air strikes 

against elements of the entire target base; the intention was to stun the 

enemy’s command structure and ultimately cause a theaterwide paralysis. 

The most important objectives of the initial strikes were to establish air 

superiority and to prevent the Iraqis from using chemical and biological 

weapons. Each mission was designed to successively degrade Iraqi 

capabilities, thus reducing both the offensive threat to Coalition operations and the air defense threat to follow-on missions. 

The Initial PIan 

The overall game plan called for the attack to begin with surprise 

attacks by F-l17s, F-lSEs, and cruise missiles, supported by electronic 

warfare aircraft. The F-1 17s were to attack key nodes of the Iraqi air 

defense system, while Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles (TLAMS) would 

attack the electrical power grid to force Iraq’s air defense system onto 

backup power. Additionally, the forces would attack major elements of 

the national command authority and communications networks to counter 

a possible Iraqi attack on Israel. F-1SEs were to attack the fixed Scud 

sites in the west. These first attacks were to be followed by a wall of F14s and F-15s that would enter Iraq to shoot down any Iraqi fighters 

launched in response to the initial attacks. As the Iraqis shifted to backup 

electrical power and restored their air defense system, they next would be 

overwhelmed with a massive attack on that system. This attack would 

involve drones, jammers, and aircraft equipped with high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMS). It was thought that the numbers involved in 

this suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) attack would overload the 

Iraq’s air defense net. Closely following would be a second attack by 

the F-117s. The Iraqis would thus experience periods of bombs from 

apparently invisible aircraft exploding on targets, alternating with periods 

of seeing waves of aircraft overhead (fighters and drones) that did not 

171 
appear to drop bombs. All this would happen while their main national 

command centers and communications nets were being attacked. The 

strikes were coordinated to cause mass confusion and major disruption in 

the Iraqi air defense system. This would allow other Coalition aircraft to 

execute follow-on attacks with greater safety.” 

Carefully executed deception operations had been conducted to support these initial attacks. During Desert Shield, the Coalition had conditioned the Iraqis to a ‘standard’ air picture through a series of training 

exercises. A conscious effort had been made to accustom the Iraqi radar 

operators and air defense personnel to seeing tankers, AWACS, Rivet Joint, 

and combat air patrols flying in predictable patterns in the general vicinity of the border.47 An “Early Warning (EW) line” had been developed 

connecting points south of which Coalition aircraft flying at that altitude 

would not be acquired by the Iraqi air defense system. 

Desert Storm 

On the night of 17 January, before the first attacks, the Iraqis saw the 

’standard’ air picture on their scopes. All aircraft involved in the initial 

missions completed their marshalling and refueling south of the EW line. 

The first group of aircraft to cross the line were the F-117s, which used 

stealth characteristics to operate in Iraqi airspace without being detected. 

The first major target an F-117 struck was the intercept operations center 

(IW) in southern Iraq at nine minutes before H-hour. The center, a 

primary air defense node in central Iraq, was responsible for directing 

enemy fighters in that region. It was attacked to ease the passage of the 

F-15E/F-111 flight package soon to pass through that region, on their 

way for attacks on western Scud sites around H-2 airfield. It was hoped 

that the attack on the center would prevent information about further 

incursions from being passed on to higher headquarters. 

The second group of aircraft to penetrate Iraqi airspace was Task 

Force Normandy, which combined the navigational ability of Air Force 

“(S) Master Attack Plan, “First 24 Hours,” pp 1-8, and (S) Briefing, CDR Donald 

McSwain. USN, Black Hole Air Campaign Graphics with Post War Annotations, Jan 1991, 

GWAPS Files NA-302. 

47Briefing. “Electronic Combat in Desert ShieldDesert Storm,” Brig Gen Larry 

Henry, CENTAFEC. GWAPS Files - NA-358. Also Intvw, Murray Williamson with Brig 

Gen Henry, GWAPS, Aug 1992. 

172 
MH-53s with the firepower of Army AH-64 Apaches. This attack destroyed two border EW sites twenty-one minutes before H-hour to give 

the F-lSE/EF-lll strike package heading for the Western Scud sites a 

“hole” in the EW coverage. While the attack was successful, the EW 

sites must have issued some warning because the antiaircraft artillery 

batteries in Baghdad began firing immediately before H-Hour. 

To maximize the shock to the rest of Iraq’s air defense system at Hhour, other F-117s attacked eight key air defense centers ranging from the 

National Air Defense Headquarters in Baghdad to selected important 1ms. 

Also, striking’ at core targets in an attempt to prevent a coordinated 

national defense, they attacked the two main national military command 

bunkers and the presidential grounds near Abu Ghurayb. In addition, the 

main telephone exchange and other key communication nodes were 

struck. These attacks were level, medium-altitude deliveries with infrared 

acquisition and GBU-27 penetrating laser-guided bombs. 

Shortly after the F- 1 I7 strikes, fifty-two TLAMs struck their designated 

targets. Approximately one-third were targeted against the electrical 

power grid, since it was believed that the air defense system depended on 

the national electrical grid for most of its power. Disabling it would 

force the air defense system off line for a period.‘“ The remaining TLAMs 

were targeted against core targets: Ba’ath Party Headquarters, the 

Baghdad Presidential Palace, and the Taji surface-to-surface missile (SSM) 

support fa~ility.4~ These attacks were designed to stimulate confusion in 

the national decision-making structure and. to remove a portion of its 

offensive capability. 

Following Task Force Normandy’s preparation, a strike package 

consisting of 22 F-15Es and 3 EF-1 1 1 s struck Western Scud launch 

areas in the vicinity of H-2 airfield. Supported by KC-l35s, this strike 

package formed south of the EW warning line, then headed north. After 

48(S) Interviews with electrical engineers had given the planners a good knowledge 

of specific, critical targets and possible lraqi workarounds to keep the system going. 

Interview, GWAPS Task Force VI personnel with Lt Col Dave Deptula confirmed that the 

Black Hole’s major intention in striking the power plants was to disable the air defense 

system. 

49(S) Master Attack Plan, “First 24 Hours,” p 2. 

173 
final refueling the attack package penetrated Iraqi territory. The F-ISEs 

attacked fixed Scud sites with a combination of free-fall bombs and 

cluster weapons., The EF-111 s provided jamming support for the F-15Es 

during the attack and then exited to provide jamming support for the F11 7s returning from the Baghdad area. 

As the F-117s and F-ISEs exited south, a fighter sweep of twentyfour F-15Cs and F-14s crossed the border into Iraq to reach the areas 

from which the Iraqis were expected to launch fighters in reaction to the 

first Coalition attacks. While the Iraqi reaction was much less than 

expected, these fighters did succeed in downing four enemy aircraft and 

watching one other Iraqi aircraft shoot his wingman down before crashing 

into the ground himself. 

At HA0 minutes, the air campaign moved into its next phase-attacks 

by several massive SEAD packages aimed at the H-3, Kuwait, and 

Baghdad areas. The attacks were timed to occur just as the Iraqis were 

expected to bring their air defense nets back on line after shifting to 

backup electrical power. As the Iraqis reactivated their radars, they were 

expected to detect literally hundreds of contacts, which, it was hoped, 

would overload the KARI system. The tactics for these attacks involved 

drones, jamming aircraft, and Wild Weasel and other HARM-firing aircraft. 

and are discussed in detail in the section titled “Attacking The Iraqi 

Integrated Air Defense System” in this chapter. At about the same time, 

B-52s and Tornado GR-1s attacked the Iraqi Air Force dispersal fields 

utilizing low-level tactics. The Tornados dropped the JP233 munition 

designed especially for runway denial; the munition required a low-level 

delivery to be effective. 

A third wave of F-I17 attacks followed the SEAD strikes and attacks 

on the airfields. This time, more of the targets were in the strategic 

core-mostly leadership and communications related. By this time, also, 

other nonstealthy packages had begun striking at Scud shelters, NBC: 

capabilities, and the communications network. Most of these attacks were 

flown by combined packages of bombers and SEAD aircraft. In a sense, 

the bombers acted as the ’stimulators’ for the SEAD aircraft, the role 

drones had performed in the earlier large-scale SEAD missions. 

The interaction between the tactics chosen for successive strikes was 

critical to the success of the first few hours of the air war. Aircraft 

missions were usually conducted to enable the success of follow-on 

174 
missions. Key also was the employment of overwhelming Coalition 

assets against the whole range of targets, both strategic core and air 

defense. While the Iraqi command and control structure may not have 

been totally paralyzed, the tactics employed by the Coalition certainly 

degraded the Iraqi defensive capabilities to a degree where they could not 

defend themselves against the successively more aggressive Coalition 

attacks. 

Bunker Busting 

A particular problem faced by the Coalition was the need to penetrate 

the hardened bunkers protecting many of the strategic core targets. 

Command and control centers, NBC weapons storage facilities, and 

communications relay equipment were examples of the targets protected 

in this manner. 

The Coalition encountered four classes of bunkers during Desert 

Storm. The first class was basement bunkers, usually located directly 

beneath an existing building. The difficulty with these targets was that 

weapons had to penetrate the buildings in addition to the underground 

bunkers. The buildings themselves created “voids” above the bunkers, 

negating the effects of most penetrating weapons by deflecting the weapons, causing detonations before penetration, or attenuating the effects of 

the blasts. The second class was the earth-covered bunker. These Iraqi 

bunkers typically had approximately twenty feet of earth above reinforced 

concrete.s0 The bunker walls were usually five to ten feet of reinforced 

concrete?” Some Iraqi bunkers were classified as superhardened (i.e., 

nuclear resistant). These superhardened bunkers had sixteen feet of earth 

covering 6.5 feet of reinforced concrete above a five-foot prefabricated 

steel mat?’ The third class was mountain bunkers. Mountain bunkers 

were extended natural caves or tunnels located primarily in northern Iraq. 

They were very difficult to locate, target, and destroy because of their 

depth and camouflage. The fourth bunker class was revetted hardened 

SO(S/NF) GWAPS File, AF/IN Briefing on THREAT (BUNKERS), CHST Folder 16. 

5’(S/NF) Ibid. 

”(S/NF) Ibid. 

175 
aircraft shelters, which will be discussed as a subset of air superiority 

activity in the section titled “Defeating The Iraqi Air Force.” 

The primary tactics of penetrating hardened bunkers evolved around 

the 1-2000 weapon, which was basically an improved 2,000-pound bomb. 

It had a slimmer, harder case than the standard MK-84 general-purpose 

bomb and contained 550 pounds of tritonal high explosive in its blast 

warhead, as opposed to 945 pounds in the MK-84.53 The case was a 

single-piece forging of one-inch high-grade steel. The weapon usually 

was mated with a laser-guided kit to form the GBU-101, GBU-24 A/B, 

or GBU-27. It was delivered by F-117s and F-11 IFs in Operation Desert 

storm. 

Aircraft delivering a penetrating weapon strived to achieve angle and 

impact velocity to result in the deepest penetration. [DELETED]. 

[DELETED]. Smaller impact angles decreased penetration capability. 

Shallow impact angles also contributed to the phenomenon called Jhooking. J-hooking results when a weapon’s movement after impact was 

more lateral than down, diminishing penetration (see Figure 32). 

Table 754 

Level Release 

[DELETED] 

GBU-24 A/B (F-111F) 

GBU-27 (F-117) 

Level Release Horizontal Target 

[DELETED] 

F- 1 17s and F- 1 1 1 Fs used 1-2000 laser-guided weapons against numerous hardened bunkers throughout Desert Storm. F-117s dropped individ53T.0. I-IM-34, Aircrew Weapons Delivery Manual, 15 Feb 1986, pp 1-14, 1-20. 

%WAPS Microfilm, Reel #23996, Frame #I025 (C) and 1026 (S). 

176 
ual weapons, whereas the F-1 I 1Fs dropped bombs in pairs and sometimes 

released their full load of four weapons. Targets had to be selected and 

planned by knowledgeable weapons officers, since it was imperative that 

aircrews received specific aimpoint guidance and coordinates along with 

a correct weapon mix to successfully destroy targets.55 These 1-2000 

weapons devastated most Iraqi hardened targets. 

Figure 31% 

1-2000 Perforation Limits (Thickness of Bunker Roof) 

Earth Overburden, 3’ Angle of Attack 

FIGURE DELETED 

Figure 32 

“J” Hooking Effect 

5s(S/NF/WN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, p 5-8. 

56(S) GWAPS Microfilm, Reel #23996, Frame #1030, Memorandum for TAUDRA. 

Dense Penetrating Weapon, 28 Jan 9 1. 

177 
The Strategic Target Sets 

Most of the targets in the strategic core target sets were attacked by 

using the tactics as discussed previously in this Chapter. Some targets 

were more difficult to attack and required special tactics and weaponeering to destroy them. This section discusses some of the tactics developed for use against the more challenging target sets. 

Leadership. The Leadership target set included targets associated 

with the highest levels of the Iraqi government. Target sets included the 

Baghdad and Abu Ghurayb presidential palaces, the Ba’ath Party Headquarters, and the North Taji command bunker. This target set was almost 

exclusively the domain of the F- 1 17, F- 1 1 lFs, and TLAM. F- 1 17s and F11 1Fs conducted infrared sensor acquisition and laser guided bomb 

delivery against these targets, using penetrating warheads against the 

harder targets and GBU-10s against the softer ones. 

[DELETED].” 

Command, Control, and Communications. The C3 target set included the Iraqi nationwide communications system’s most important elements such as radio relay facilities and satellite ground stations. 

[DELETED]. Penetrating weapons with delayed fuzing were employed 

and successfully fractured the communications links. 

NBC (Nuelem, Biological, and Chemical) 

Nuclear. The Nuclear Research Facility at A1 Tuwaitha was initially 

the only target in the nuclear category. It presented a particular problem 

because of its size. Covering more than a square mile, it contained 

numerous buildings that were possible subtargets. The initial strike 

against this target was a mass attack of F-16s delivering free fall 

ordnance. A1 Tuwaitha also became a target for F- I1 7s and F- I1 1Fs 

using precision-guided ordnance. [DELETED]. Since there was such a 

large collection of point targets, planners checked off targets in the 

complex as they were attacked. 

57(s) CWAPS Files, CHP Folder #14, “Additional Leadership Targets,” 31 Jan 91. 

178 
[DELETED] ?” 

Biological. Probably the most challenging targets faced by the 

Coalition planners were the suspected biological storage sites. The Iraqis 

had been suspected of pursuing a biological weapons program and had 

amassed quantities of toxins in refrigerated bunkers. Initial considerations 

of the danger of releasing these agents into the atmosphere while trying 

to destroy them required conducting experiments on how best to attack 

them. [DELETED].@ [DELETED]!’ 

The method used in Desert Storm was a combination of timing of 

attacks and choosing proper munitions. [DELETED]. 

Chemical. The Iraqi threat to use chemical weapons against the 

Coalition or against Israel caused the A1 Samarra Labs to be struck by 

TLAMS on the first night. The attacks hit chemical production buildings; 

however, the chemical materials were stored in S-shaped or cruciform 

bunkers at several sites. The Iraqis also sought to confuse the issue by 

constructing numerous dummy bunkers. After identification, subsequent 

attacks on these bunkers were carried out with penetrating GBU-24/27 

weapons. 

Bridges. The initial bridge attacks were flown by “smart” aircraft 

using “dumb” bombs. While these tactics achieved some success, the 

results were judged insufficient and, as in Vietnam, laser-guided bombs 

(LGBS) were employed. F-l17s, F-111 Fs, F-l5Es, and A-6s attacked and 

cut designated bridges with U?BS. In addition to these attacks, river 

reconnaissance missions were flown to patrol the waterways and ensure 

that the crossings remained closed. These missions were flown by F-16s 

during the day and F-lllFs at night, and were tasked to attack any 

bridging and crossing activities such as pontoon-building or ferries. 

58(S) GWAH Files, cHP Folder #14, “Emergency War Termination Plan,” 29 Jan 91. 

*9(S) Damage to Iraqi Nuclear Facilities, Hq Air Force Intelligence Agency, 

(SMF) Intvw, Perry Jamison, Rich Davis, and Barry Barlow, Center for Air Force 

25 Jan 91. 

60 

History, with Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, 4 Mar 92, p 32, GWAH NA-303. 

6’(S) Intvw, Kurt Guthe, GWAPS, with Capt. John R. Glock, 2 July 92. 

179 
Not all bombing problems could be solved with readily available 

weapons. Various methods to destroy deeply buried and hardened 

facilities were proposed but were either not fully developed or not 

shipped to theater before the war ended. For example, the GBU-11 was 

a 3,000-pound laser-guided bomb from the Vietnam era; planners 

remembered and attempted to ship it to the theater. The GBU-11 

provided greater explosive blast than a 2,000-pound bomb, creating more 

destruction over a greater range of targets. But, the war ended before the 

weapon could be used. 

[DELETED]. 

Unlike prior examples, the GBU-28 went from idea to operational use 

before the war ended. This weapon was designed to meet the requirement to penetrate very deep hard targets and is discussed extensively 

in the Logistics Report. Two GBU-28s were used on the last day of the 

war against the North Taji Weapons Manufacturing Facility No. 2. 

The attacks on the strategic target sets during Desert Storm added a 

new dimension to aerial warfare. Using new technologies and weapons, 

the Coalition was able to seize the initiative and define the battle beyond 

any Iraqi hope of resistance. As the campaign unfolded, continued tactical innovations neutralized most of the difficult targets and contributed 

significantly to the Coalition’s success. 

180 
Figure 33 

Conventional Weapons Enhanced Penetration (CWEP) 

"Nail Driver" 

FIGURE DELETED 

Attacking The Iraqi Air Defense And Air Force 

The highest priority of Coalition air operations was gaining and 

maintaining air superiority by neutralizing the Iraqi Integrated Air 

Defense System (IADS) and rendering the Iraqi air force ineffective. Iraqi 

forces had to be neutralized before follow-on attacks could be conducted 

with acceptable losses by nonstealthy aircraft. 

This section discusses tactics associated with operations used to gain 

and maintain air superiority. Central to the effort were denying Iraqi 

commanders both the ability to understand what was happening and the 

capability to command and control their forces. To accomplish these 

goals, electronic combat missions would blind early warning sensors, 

disrupt communications, deny ground controlled intercepts, and destroy 

surfaced-based air defenses. Fighter sweep aircraft would engage the 

Iraqi fighters in the air, destroying their airborne defense capability and 

ensuring the success of Coalition fighter bombers. Fighter bombers 

would deny the Iraqi air force the use of their runways and their ability 

to retaliate and defend, ultimately forcing them into hardened shelters. 

Finally, F-1 1 1Fs and F-117s would destroy those impervious shelters, and 

in the process, destroy the offensive capability of the Iraqi Air Force. As 

the shelter busting campaign heightened, Iraqi aircraft attempted to flee 

to Iran, and Coalition forces countered with combat air patrols over Iraq. 

Attacking the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (UDS) 

Six elements of offensive strategy were used to negate the Iraqi IADS. 

Electronic Surveillance aircraft such as the RC-135 and EP-3 were used 

during Desert Shield to determine the nature and extent of the enemy 

threat. Tactical deception masked the intentions of Coalition forces 

181 
during their buildup and training phases. The air campaign began with 

attacks on Iraqi sector operations centers, early warning sites, and 

command and control nodes using stealth and a variety of SEAD aircraft 

along with decoys to provide a false tactical air picture to ground radars. 

Bombing attacks were coordinated with and complemented dedicated 

SEAD mission assets. Later, attack packages were accompanied by dedicated SEAD uircrufi-Wild Weasels, jammers, and HARM-carrying aircraft 

-which responded to mobile and target area threats. In addition, the air 

war in the KTO involved roving bands of dedicated SAM killers and curefully locatedjummers to destroy Iraqi SAM capabilities in the area. In this 

way, air superiority over ground-based air defense was gained and maintained throughout the war. 

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Measures 

The air defense threat faced by the Coalition was formidable, both 

in density and sophistication. A combination of old and new weapons 

coordinated by the computerized KARl control system presented a credible 

threat to Coalition aircraft. The Coalition’s task was to determine the 

extent and nature of this threat. Aircraft such as RC-l35s, TR-IPU-~S, 

and P-3s. flew near the Iraqi-Saudi border, and gathered data. 

[DELETED].64 Another phase of this collection effort involved obtaining 

technical data from the French, who had developed and installed the KARI 

~ystem.6~ These efforts enabled Coalition planners to assess the strengths 

and vulnerabilities of the system more accurately. 

Electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems maintained a constant 

presence. [DELETED].66 Collection aircraft developed an extensive 

picture of the Iraqi IADS. Figure 35 depicts the command and control 

structure of the Iraqi air defense system. 

@(S) Intvw by Dr. Williamson Murray, GWAPS, with Brig Cen Larry Henry, the 

CENTAF Electronic Combat coordinator, Aug 1992. 

65(S) Naval Operational Intelligence Command SPEAR Croup Briefing, GWAPS, 15 

May 1992. 

66[ DELETED] 

182 
Figure 34 

EC Combat Preparations6’ 

Numerous EC Preparation Missions Throughout Desert Shield 

Joint use of EC Assets 

Border Runs for Real Time ELINT Recce 

Built Aircrew Confidence / Timing /Calibrated Systems 

Coordination with AWACS / RIVET JOINT / TACC 

Tactical Deception 

Careful review of Coalition operations during Desert Shield gives a 

sense of the way in which the gradually increasing scale of operations 

was orchestrated to desensitize the Iraqi defenders. Beginning in 

September 1990, the tactical deception operation began. A consistent mix 

67(S) From Briefing Slide “Electronic Combat in Desert ShieldDesert Storm,” by 

Brig Gen Lany Henry describing pre-war EC efforts. 

183 
Figure 35 

Iraqi Air Defense Command and Control 

FIGURE DELETED 

184 
Figure 36 

Iraqi SAM Coverage (16 Nov 90) 

- h d' 

Gulf 

of Coalition aircraft flew the same flight tracks on a regular basis. By 

the night of 17 January, Iraqi radar operators, observing Coalition 

activities, saw a similar pattern. AWACS, Rivet Joint, Combat Air Patrols 

(CAPS), high-value airborne assets (HVAA), and tankers were all in their 

familiar tracks. Most of the attack aircraft remained south out of the 

range of Iraqi radars until it was time to go north and attack targets.68 

The initial attacks by F-117s and TLAM cruise missiles were aimed at 

air defense operations centers and electrical power plants supporting the 

air defense net. The intent was to force activation of emergency electrical 

ahlost Coalition aircraft penetrated Iraqi airspace at low altitude to avoid radar 

detection. 

185 
power, create confusion, and isolate commanders while emergency 

power was being brought on line. Meanwhile, attacking aircraft would 

proceed toward their targets. When the Iraqi air defense system resumed 

operations, it would suddenly have to process hundreds of aircraft. This 

would overload the air defense system.69 

Large Scale SEAD Strikes 

The prewar analysis of the Iraqi air defense structure was used to 

develop the portion of the master attack plan designed to disable the 

IADS. The first two days of the plan provided for twenty-five large-scale 

SEAD attacks. The large SEAD aircraft package directed against the area 

south and west of Baghdad at H-Hour plus forty minutes on the first 

night of the war provides examples of the tactics used during these 

efforts. The attack was a joint effort; Air Force aircraft attacked targets 

south of Baghdad, and Navy aircraft from the Red Sea Battle Force 

attacked targets in the vicinity of AI Taqaddum. 

The aircraft planned for this mission were as follows:7o 

12 

3 

6 

3 

3 

10 

8 

4 

F-4G 

EF-111 

BQM-74 

EA-6B 

F-14 

F/A- I 8 

A-7 

A-6 

SEAD Wild WeaSel/HARM 

Drone Support 

SEAD ECM 

SEAD ECM (Jammer)/HARM 

Escort for EA-6B 

SEADIHARM 

SEADIH A RM 

SEADRALD 

The plan was to approach the target area from numerous directions, 

force a reaction, then destroy the radars. The Air Force and the Navy 

used different tactics based on the types of equipment employed. The 

mission was flown as pictured in Figure 37. 

69(S/NF/wN/NC) Iraqi Threat to US. Forces, Navy SPEAR, Naval Intelligence 

Command, NlC-26605-018-90, Dec 1990, p 3-20. 

7%umbers of aircraft derived from both (S) Master Attack Plan, “First 24 Hours,” 

p 4; and (S/NF/wN/NC) CNA Rpt, “Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Volume VIII: 

C3/Space and Electronic Warfare,” Jun 1992, p 3-8. 

186 
FIGURE DELETED 
In the south, Air Force EF-111s proceeded to their jamming 

positions and established orbits. BQM-74 drones were launched to 

stimulate the IADS?’ As Iraqi target acquisition radars activated, EF-1 11s 

jammed, forcing the Iraqi radars to increase their vulnerability to HARM 

missiles.n Wild Weasels, loaded with HARMS, approached the Iraqi 

radars. Each aircraft was tasked to destroy high-threat mobile SAMS 

within their assigned area of responsibility. [DELETED].’3 [DELETED]. 

Sixty HARMs were fired during the mission.’4 

In the west, EA-6Bs established orbits. A-6s launched tactical air 

launch decoys (TALDS) to cause individual SAM operators to react to the 

air threat.” EA-6Bs jammed, causing increased radar activity, and 

developed a radar environment more conducive to HARMs launched by A7s and F/A-l8s. [DELETED].76 [DELETED]. Navy aircraft fired fiftyone HARMs on this strike.77 

Bomb damage assessment could not be obtained on all radars, but 

ELlNT operators noted a significant reduction in electronic activity.78 

Numerous SEAD missions of the type just described were conducted on 

the first day of the war?9 Although causal relationships cannot be 

definitively established at this time, the Iraqi electronic defenses were 

71(S) “Operation Desert Storm Electronic Combat (EC) Effectiveness Analysis,” Air 

72[DELETED] 

”[DELETED] 

“(S) 52d Fighter Wing Desert Storm - A Success Story, Briefing slides 10 and 12 

75(S/NF/WN/NC) CNA Rpt, Vol VIII, p 3-9. 

76( S) /bid, p B 1. 

77(S) Ibid, p 3-9. 

78(S) “Operation Desert Storm Electronic Combat (EC) Effectiveness Analysis,” 

”(S) Master Attack Plan, “First 24 Hours.” 

Force Electronic Warfare Center, Jan 1992, p 11-3. 

and p 2. 

p 11-9. 

188 
never fully reconstituted. While individual air defense radars continued 

to pose a localized threat, the SEAD missions fractured the backbone of 

centralized control. 

Attacks Against Air Defense Nodes-Command, Control, 

Communications Countermeasures (CCM) 

The primary objective of C3CM is to deny or degrade the ability of 

hostile military commanders to command and control their forces 

effectively.s0 A large portion of the El17 missions on 17 January had 

this objective. 'henty air defense nodes were targeted in the first two 

waves of F- 1 17s. 

The air defense and communications nodes, in hardened bunkers, 

presented challenges in weapons selection and delivery. As described 

previously, Coalition forces encountered four classes of bunkers in Desert 

Storm. The F-1 17 and F-1 1 1F delivered 1-2000 penetrating laser-guided 

bombs, which proved particularly effective against these bunkers. 

Large-scale SEAD attacks and attacks on particular elements of Iraq's 

air defense structure combined to eliminate their ability to operate in a 

coordinated fashion. The remaining air defense challenge became the 

individual SAM and AAA systems. 

Direct and Area Support of Attack Missions 

Individual SAM and AAA threats were dealt with primarily by assigning SEAD and ECM aircraft to attack groups. Jammers and HARMcapable 

aircraft would support attack packages based on analysis of the expected 

threats. Aircrews would communicate with mission commanders before 

80(S/NF) Tactical Air Forces Guide for Integrated Electronic Combat, USAF Tactical 

Air Warfare Center. Oct 1987, p 3-2. 

189 
flight to establish tactics for each particular situation. The positioning of 

jammers and HARM aircraft was critical to protect the flights. 

In the early phases of the war, both the EF-Ill and EA-6B were 

tasked primarily in the direct support role. The EF-111 s, provided target 

area suppression while flying between the threat and the attack force.82 

The EA-~Bs, in general, flew behind their strike groups. 

Navy HARM aircraft flew to preplanned positions, salvoed their 

missiles at known radar locations, and worked in unison with EA-6Bs to 

ascertain the presence of active systems. The EA-6B, although used 

primarily as a jammer, had the ability to fire a maximum of two HARMS. 

NAVCENT policy dictated that Navy attacks not proceed into Iraq or the 

Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) without an accompanying EA-6B.8’ 

w 

8’(s/NF) USCEWAF Electronic Combat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm Afrer 

82(SINFIWNINC) UCU 3-1, Vol 1, p 7-10. 

83CDR William J. Luti, U.S. Navy, “Battle of the Airwaves,” U.S. Naval lnstitute 

Action Report, Oct 1991, p 1-2. 

Proceedings, Jan 1992, p 53. 

190 
Figure 38 

Jamming Tactics 

FIGURE DELETED 

191 
Dedicated ECM Stations-The “Weasel Police” 

As the ground offensive approached, the SAM threat to attack aircraft in 

the KTO, while greatly reduced, was still present in the form of mobile 

SAM batteries. The make-up of Coalition attack missions had also changed 

from large packages to flights of two or four aircraft. To provide EM 

protection for these flights, SEAD aircraft were assigned to orbit positions 

surrounding the KTO. These “Weasel Police” missions are depicted in 

Figure 39.” 

Overall, the Coalition campaign against the Iraqi air defense system 

reduced the threat to Coalition aircraft. 

The combination of JSEAD, packaging, and the aggressive destruction 

campaign against critical C3 nodes contributed greatly to the overall low 

attrition rate and success of the offensive air campaign!’ 

Defeating The Iraqi Air Force 

As discussed in Chapter One, the Iraqi Air Force presented a potential 

threat to Coalition forces. While the quality of its pilots could be 

questioned, its potential could not be overlooked. Fighter sweeps, various 

types of combat air patrols, and attacks on airfields and aircraft on the 

ground, were all used to defeat or neutralize this threat. 

The Fighter Sweep 

In a “fighter sweep,” large numbers of fighter aircraft, operating 

independently, proceed through an area with the intent of overpowering 

any enemy fighters encountered. The most prominent use of this tactic 

occurred just after H-Hour on the first night of the war. lbelve elements 

(twenty-four aircraft) of F-15Cs and F-14s were positioned to cover the 

entire Iraqi border. Their goal was to engage any enemy aircraft launched 

in reaction to the initial attacks. Additionally, the intent was to intimidate 

the Iraqis and cause them to think twice about engaging future 

“(S) 52d Fighter Wing, Desert Storm Brief, GWAPS Files, slides 15 left and 17 right. 

05(SlNF) USCENTAF Electronic Combat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm Afer 

Action Report, p 5-2. 

192 
1% 
Coalition missions. Five Iraqi aircraft were downed in this initial sweep, 

all by F-15s. 

Smaller sweeps flew throughout the initial phases of the war. On 

these smaller missions, the F-15Cs preceded the attack aircraft. The 

objective was to clear the target area before the attack aircraft arrived. 

These sweep tactics were developed to counter an aggressive opponent. 

But, as the war progressed, the Iraqis changed their tactics by engaging 

outbound attackers from the rear. F-15Cs countered by remaining in the 

target area long enough to protect Coalition attackers from Iraqi fighters. 

qpical of these fighter sweeps were the operations of Citgo and 

Penzoil Flights in the early morning hours of the 17th of January 1991.86 

These two flights of four F-15Cs each embarked on an offensive counterair sweep” missions in support of numerous strike packagesE8 The sweep 

became an engagement when AWACS spotted “bandits”” as the flights 

were air-refueling. AWACS directed Penzoil Flight to leave the tanker and 

respond to the bandits. Citgo Flight remained south of the Iraqi border to 

minimize the chances of early-warning-radar detection. Meanwhile, the 

F-15Es were approaching H2 and H3 airfields, and the SEAD aircraft were 

already north of the border. 

The initial formation used by Penzoil Flight was tactical spread, and 

the individual elements divided (see Figure 40). Navigation responsibilities fell to the element lead (number three aircraft), who also left his 

86(S) These aerial combat missions were liberally extracted from “Desert Storm Air 

to Air Engagements, 3 Mar 92.33d Fighter Wing ‘Air to Air Engagements Desert Storm,” 

”Offensive Counter Air (XA) sweep aircraft seek out and destroy or neutralize 

enemy air power in a designated area for a specific time period. 

88(S) The overall air-to-air gameplan called for surprise attacks by F-117s, F-15Es, 

with support by EF-I 1 Is. The F-117 targets included higher headquarters communication 

nodes, and the F-15Es were tasked into the HUH3 area. The main attack package 

followed behind with numerous strategic targets. It was projected that the Iraqis would 

flush their aircraft from alert in response to the loss of communication links with Baghdad, leaving the air superiority F-15Cs poised for attack. 

89Bandits are known enemy aircraft. The term originated from RAF World War I1 

usage. 

pp 1-11. 

194 
formation lights on for visual identification. All other flight members flew 

with their lights off as the aircraft left the tanker northbound. 

t----ti 

Figure 40 

Tactical Spread 

As Penzoil Flight neared Mudaysis airfield, three separate groups of 

aircraft were “painted” on radar. AWACS labeled two of the groups as 

friendlies, the last group was identified as bandits. Penzoil Flight was 

continuing to monitor the groups when a pop-up group appeared at two 

o’clock and forty nautical miles. AWACS replied with a “bogey’m radio call. 

The flight lead handed this contact off to the element lead and went back 

to monitoring the initial bandit group ten to fifteen miles north of Mudaysis 

(see Figure 41). 

The bandits north of Mudaysis turned west to land while still thirty to 

thirty-five miles away from Penzoil Flight. Meanwhile, the element lead 

received a pop-up contact at thirty-five nautical miles?’ AWACS was unable 

to determine hostile, friendly, or unknown status. In fact, due to prevwA bogey is a radadvisual contact with an aircraft whose identity is unknown. 

91[DELETED] 

195 
. Figure41 

Mudaysis Airfield Attack 

ious friendly tracks in the area, AWACS never declared the bandit hostile 

before the shot. Penzoil's element lead continued northbound and locked 

on to the unknown aircraft at thirty nautical miles away. [DELETED].= 

One Penzoil Flight member called possible multiples in the group, 

[DELETED]. The element lead asked AWACS if any friendlies were at this 

altitude and received a negative reply. At this time, the number four aircraft 

turned to the west as the element lead determined the oncoming aircraft to 

be a bandit. [DELETED]. The element lead fired a radar AIM-7M missile 

towards the head-on bandit. The shot parameters were as follows: 

92[DELETED] 

196 
Figure 42 

MIG-29 Kill 

- Bandit 

Alt: 

Heading: [DELETED] 

Shooter 

Alt: 

Speed: [DELETED] 

Heading: 

After firing his missile, the element lead executed a hard turn to the 

east while number four continued his turn to the west northwest. 

[DELETED]. No visual launch was observed from the bandit, and the 

element checked back towards the bandit to observe missile detonation on 

a single aircraft. The element lead rejoined his flight to regain mutual 

support, as the friendly train of F-15Es safely egressed their target below. 

When Penzoil Flight departed the tanker early to commit on targets 

near Mudaysis airfield, Citgo Flight trailed by about 60-65 miles. Citgo 

Flight initially followed at an altitude in the middle to upper 20,oooS. 

Element lead was 20-25 nautical miles in trail offset to the west (see Figure 

43). Citgo Flight viewed Penzoil’s engagement as they flew north towards 

Mudaysis. 

93(S) Aspect angle is the angle between the defender’s longitudinal axis and the line 

of sight to the attacker. The angle is measured from the defender’s 6 o’clock position. 

and the attacker’s heading is irrelevant. 

197 
As Citgo Flight approached to within 40 nautical miles from Mudaysis, 

two groups of suspected enemy aircraft were spotted tracking the F-15Es 

coming off target (see Figure a).% 

Figure 43 

Citgo Flight Sequence No. 1 

Meanwhile, AWACS called bandits launching from 

Mudaysis, twenty-five to thirty nautical miles off Citgo’s nose.% The F15Es were still forty to forty-five nautical miles away, proceeding 

eastbound. The far northern group of bandits had turned back north, and 

then west, away from the F-15Es. taking them out of this engagement (see 

Figure 45). 

%(S) The F-I5Es reported to have taken a single AIM-9M shot on a Fulcrum, but the 

95[DELETED] 

%It appeared that the lraqis were flushing their fighters off at 5-nm intervals. The 

runway lights were still on as Citgo Flight flew through, even though Penzoil Flight had 

already shot down a MIG-29. 

tone was bad and the missile did not guide. 

198 
Figure 44 

Citgo Flight 

Sequence No. 2 

-A I 

b I 

At this point, the Citgo leader locked on to a group 25 nautical miles 

away from Mudaysis. This bandit group was in a left-hand climbing turn 

out of 4,500 feet, vectoring in the direction of Citgo Flight. [DELETED]. 

[DELETED]. 

199 
Figure 45 

Citgo Flight Sequence No. 3 

..... f 

... 4; I 

The flight leader shot a single radar-guided AIM-7M at the Iraqi aircraft 

(see Figure 46).97 The following launch parameters applied: 

97(S) The F-1 did not fly any offensive or defensive maneuvers. This reaction was 

common for Iraqi aircraft during the rest of the Gulf War. 

200 
Figure 46 

Citgo Flight Sequence No. 4 

- Bandit 

Alt: 

speed: [DELETED] Heading: 

Aspect: 

Shooter 

Alt: 

Speed: [DELETED] 

Heading: 

As the missile impacted t..e target, Citgo Flig..t a-served a large 

fireball followed by an even larger fireball as the F-1 hit the ground. At 

this time, Citgo 2 locked on to another bandit group taking off from 

Mudaysis. The bandits flew to the west as Citgo 2 pursued in a tail 

chase. Pursuit stopped as the bandits flew over the SAM ring around H2 

and H3 airfields. AWACS confirmed them as bandits, but the SAM presence forced Citgo Flight to return to its preplanned combat air patrol 

between Mudaysis and H2 airfield. No other engagements occurred 

during this mission, and Citgo Flight egressed behind Penzoil Flight on 

the way back to home station. 

Combat Air Patrol 

Various types of combat air patrols were employed. Defensive patrol 

stations were established along the northern border of Saudi Arabia to 

protect the kingdom and the Coalition forces, as depicted in Figure 47. 

[DELETED]. The Saudi F-15C that shot down two Mirage F-1s on 24 

January was on such a mission. Combat air patrol stations were also 

maintained over the northern Persian Gulf to protect Coalition ships and the 

201 
Arab Gulf states. [DELETED].% Fighter protection was also provided to 

attack missions, called escort or target combat air patrol. High-value airborne asset combat air patrols or high-value unit combat air patrols were 

launched to protect important aircraft that had limited or no means of selfprotection. [DELETED].w 

Figure 47 

Desert Storm CAP and AWACS Stations 

FIGURE DELETED 

98(S) “Desert Storm Reconstruction Report,” Volume 1, Summary, Center for Naval 

w(S) Muster Attack Plan, “First 24 Hours,” pp 1, 4, 6, 10, and 14. 

Analyses, CRM-91-219, Dec 1991, pp 83, 84. 

202 
The Coalition conducted a campaign to destroy the Iraqi Air Force on 

the ground and to neutralize its capability by attacking its airfields. During 

the first three days of the air war, almost all airfields in Iraq were struck. 

The primary targets were the runways, taxiways, ramp space, hangars, and 

munitions areas. 

The Iraqis built airfields with multiple runways and stressed taxiways 

capable of being used as runways. This situation posed significant tactical 

problems (see Tallil Airfield, Iraq Photo). As long as one unbroken length 

of 3,000 feet of concrete remained, the field was, at least in principle, 

capable of supporting air operations. Shutting down an Iraqi airfield completely was clearly a daunting problem. Even if a runway was damaged, the 

Iraqis had first-rate runway repair equipment. 

The following strike package planned for a mission in the Tallil area 

is typical of this type of mission.lm All aircraft were Marine except for the 

British GR-1 s. 

4 

6 

4 

1 

[DELETED] 

4 

4 

2 

4 

2 

EA-6 

F/A- 1 8 

F/A- 1 8 

F/A- 1 8 

GR- 1 (UK) 

FIA- 1 8 

A-6 

F/A- 1 8 

A-6 

F/A- 1 8 

SEAD/ECM 

SEADMARM 

Fighter Sweep 

SEADiTALD 

Tallil Airfield 

Nasiriyah Power Plant 

Tallil Airfield Scud Shelter 

Tallil Airfield Scud Shelter 

Quma Airfield FAC Scud Shelter 

Qurna Airfield FAC Scud Shelter 

All of the elements of a total strike package were present: the tactical airlaunched decoy to stimulate enemy radars, SEAD aircraft to jam radars and 

fire HARM missiles, fighter sweep F/A- 18s to engage enemy fighter aircraft, 

and strike aircraft loaded with weapons to hit their particular targets. 

'O0(S) fbid, p 7. 

203 
The tactical core of this attack was the United Kingdom GR-I Tornados armed with JF233 munitions. [DELETED].'" 

(Left) JP233 damage at Tallil 

Airfield, Iraq. 

(Right) Indicates runway repair 

work at Tailil Airfield. 

"Shelter Busting" 

After the first few days of the war, Iraqi aircraft rarely launched to 

challenge Coalition attacks. When not flying, the Iraqis placed all aircraft in 

shelters to protect them from Coalition bombing. There were three 

~ ~ 

"'(S) Debrief, British Ministry of Defence to GWAPS. May 1992. 

204 
PHOTO DELETED 

Tallil Airfield, built with multiple runways (A1 ,A2) and taxiways capable of be

used as runways (B1 ,B2). Photo includes additional targeting annotations. 
PHOTO DELETED 

Tallil Airfield after air attack. Arrows indicate JP233 damage. 
types of aircraft bunkers. 

[DEL,Ei"ED].lo? 

The Trapezoid shelters [DELETED].'03 

The Tab-Vee, the most common bunker, 

PHOTO DELETED 

'02(S) AFIAIINKT. Paper on Bunker Descriptions, CWAPS Files, CHST Folder 16. 

'03(S) Ibid. 

207 
PHOTO DELETED 

Trapezoid Shelters - Tallil Airfield, Iraq. lop photo depicts trapezoid 

shelter under construction. Bottom photo indicates finished shelter. 

PHOTO DELETED 

208 
The third type of bunker was Yugoslavian. [DELETED]. The Iraqis placed 

their highest priority aircraft in them.’@’ 

These hardened shelters were distributed as indicated in Table 8. 

Sheltered aircraft remained a potential threat. As a force in being, 

presumably being saved for the commencement of ground operations, these 

aircraft still gave Iraq a capability to launch a massive offensive raid. So, 

on the seventh day of Desert Storm, plans were developed to destroy the 

hardened shelters.IM 

These operations became known as “shelter busting,” and were flown 

mainly by F-IllFs, F-117s and F-15Es. Locating the shelters on the airfields was relatively simple. The runways and taxiways acted as pointers 

to the targets [DELETED]. Attacking a large array of shelters was a 

complex process requiring a detailed plan. For a single target, the most 

critical factor was the specific aimpoint or desired mean point of impact. 

[DELETED]. The shelter effectively became a blast containment vessel, 

enhancing the effects of explosion. The fuel in the target aircraft added to 

the force of the blast. On occasion, 2,000-pound doors were blown off and 

thrown 430 feet by the force of these penetrating weapons. 

‘@‘(s) AFININKT Paper on Bunker Descriptions. 

(S) Briefing Slide. “Shelter Busting Forces: Iraqi Exodus to Iran,” GWAPS Files, 105 

CHP folder #14. 

209 
PHOTO DELETED 

Yugoslav Shelters, Shayka Mazhar Airfield -Top photo depicts doublebay drive through shelter under construction. Bottom photo indicates 

single bay drive through shelter. 

PHOTO DELETED 

210 
Table 8 

Iraqi Shelter 'Qpes by Airfield'" 

Meld Name Tab-Vee lkapezoid Yugoslav 

QAYARRAH X 

KLRKUK X 

BALAD 

AL TAQADDUM X 

SHAYKA MAZHAR 

UB AY DAH 

TALLIL X 

JALIBAH X 

SAHIBAH 

H-2 X 

H-3 

AL ASAD 

AL SAHRA 

SADDAM INT'L 

HABB ANlYAH 

TALL AFAR 

TUZ KHURMATU 

KUT AL HAYY 

QALAT SALIH 

AS SALMAN 

WADI AL KHlRR 

MUDAY SIS 

SAMARRA 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

2,000-pound case hardened penetrating laser-guided bombs, were used 

against all aircraft shelters. The 1-2000 was an improved 2,000-pound bomb 

'"(SNF) GWAPS Files, CHP folder #14. 

21 1 
with a slimmer harder case than the standard MK-84 general-purpose bomb. 

The weapons were usually mated with a laser-guided kit to form the 

GBU-10, GBU-24 A/B, or GBU-27, and were dropped by F-1 llFs and F1 17s.'07 

This Tab-Vee Shelter door was blown over 430 feet from the shelter in the 

background. To the left, note the destroyed personnel bunker.'w 

Combat Air Pab-ols East of Baghdad 

As the Coalition "bunker busting" campaign began to take effect, the 

Iraqis moved some aircraft out of the shelters into open fields or populated areas in an attempt to protect them. They also tried to preserve 

their top-line fighters by flying them to Iran. The Coalition responded by 

establishing combat air patrol stations Cindy, Elaine, and Wendy deep in 

Iraq, effectively surrounding Baghdad with the objective of intercepting 

the fleeing aircraft (refer to Figure 47 earlier). These operations included 

tanker support flown over Iraqi territory. [DELETED]. 

"'All 1-2000s dropped in Desert Storm were laser-guided. 

'O80ral interview and photograph provided by DIA. 

212 
During one such mission, Zerex Flight, an element of two F-15Cs. 

shot down four Iraqi aircraft.'@ Zerex Flight was flying barrier patrol 

east of Baghdad when AWACS reported an initial contact 60 nautical miles 

northwest of Zerex's position. Zerex Flight armed its ordnance and located the bandits at ten o'clock 60 nautical miles away. [DELETED]."' 

[DELETED]. The Zerex Flight leader turned his formation into the engagement to cutoff the bandits, who were heading for the border. At 40 

nautical miles, Zerex Flight picked up multiple contacts in close formation. The bandits turned 10- 15 degrees to the left and headed eastbound 

for the border. Zerex Flight turned further to the right to cutoff the 

bandits, and at 35 nautical miles, radar painted multiple returns (see 

Figure 48). 

[DELETED]. 

[DELETED]. 

The flight lead picked up a visual tally on two MIG-21s heading 

eastbound. At the same time, Zerex Four spotted two Frogfoot aircraft 

further north, also heading eastbound. The bandits had apparently split 

into two elements to escape the oncoming F-l5Cs (see Figure 49). The 

wingman fired an infrared AIM-9M missile on the northernmost Frogfoot. 

He then pulled 60 degrees to the right and fired another infrared AIM-9M 

at the second Frogfoot. Both missiles tracked and destroyed their targets. 

At the same time, the flight lead converted on both MIG-21s and fired 

two AIM-9Ms, which destroyed both targets. No defensive reactions or 

countermeasures were observed."' Zerex Flight exited the engagement 

zone to the south. 

The Coalition effort against the Iraqi Air Defense System and air 

force was an unqualified success. The combination of weapons and delivery tactics, particularly laser-guided weapons and SEAD, allowed the 

'0gThese aerial combat missions were liberally extracted from "Desert Storm Air to 

Air Engagements, 3 Mar 1992, 53d Fighter Squadron Air to Air Engagements Desert 

Stom," pp 12-17. 

"'[DELETED] 

"'The Iraqis never reacted to missile smoke or attacks from behind their aircraft. 

The only defense they exhibited was flying at very low altitude. 

213 
Figure 48 

Zerex Flight Sequence No. 1 

FIGURE DELETED 

Figure 49 

Zerex Flight Sequence No. 2 

FIGURE DELETED 

214 
Coalition to gain air superiority and eventually air supremacy. This 

control of the air provided the basis for the successful efforts against 

other targets, and can be seen as a major contributor to the Coalition 

victory in Desert Storm. 

Attacking The Iraqi Ground and Naval Forces 

This section examines the tactics used by Coalition aircrews in attacking Iraqi ground and naval forces. It places particular emphasis on 

Close Air Suppoflattlefield Air Interdiction (CAS~BAI) missions; that is, 

missions flown at the request of the ground commander. Where possible 

it discusses how tactics were adapted to particular situations and how and 

why they may have differed from tactics practiced during prewar training. 

The section pays special attention to the contributions of Air Force and 

Marine Corps fixed-winged aircraft, describes Navy and allied aircraft 

where appropriate, and includes a section on Army and Marine Corps 

attack helicopters. 

To understand air support of ground operations, the reader must 

understand the objectives of the ground offensive and the maneuvers 

employed. Aviation had to be responsive to the priorities of the ground 

commanders. It had to make a direct contribution to the overall ground 

plan of attack (scheme of maneuver). Simply killing people and destroying things was not enough. The Army and Marine Corps ground forces 

were assigned strikingly different missions. The Army, supported by 

British, French, and other Coalition forces, conducted a wide, sweeping, 

high-speed, flanking maneuver. The Marines executed an extensive 

counter-barrier operation against Iraqi fortifications. Interestingly, these 

different missions produced similar priorities for air support. Both Army 

and Marine Corps commanders were far more interested in Iraqi indirect 

fire systems-artillery, free rocket over ground (FROGS) systems, and 

multiple-launch rocket (MLRS) systems-than in direct fire systems such as 

tanks and armor."' 

Air missions in support of the ground forces began on the first day 

of the war and continued until the cease fire. Early air support to the 

"'During GWAPS interviews with both Gen Franks, USA, commander VI1 corps, and 

Gen Boomer, USMC, commander I MEF, they made it clear that they placed a higher 

priority on Iraqi artillery than on tanks. 

215 
ground scheme of maneuver concentrated on isolating the battlefield by 

cutting communications and disrupting or halting resupply. As the time 

for the ground assault approached, priorities shifted to enemy forces 

closer to the front. 

Background 

The Air Tasking Order (AT0)ll3 was employed to control and 

coordinate the flow of air missions. While the AT0 process was necessary to deconflict and coordinate aircraft during the strategic phase of the 

campaign, ground commanders did not perceive the AT0 process, with its 

seventy-two-hour development time, as being responsive to their needs 

during the battlefield preparation and ground assault phases of the war.”4 

To increase the volume of air support available to the ground commander, 

a “push flow” system was implemented. A description of the system and 

how it worked is presented later in this section. 

The “push flow” system produced the desired number of CAS sorties, 

but for a variety of reasons, including the relative lack of enemy 

resistance, little opportunity or need arose for classical, troops-in-contact 

CAS rnis~ions.”~ Other reasons included the speed of the ground advance, 

the extensive night operations, the poor weather, and the presence of 

obscurants (notably, smoke from burning oil wells). All of these reasons 

combined made distinguishing friendly from enemy forces difficult, and 

had the important tactical consequence of rendering CAS missions more 

dangerous to execute. In simple terms, the potential for casualties from 

“friendly fire” was high. 

1’3Additional information on the ATO process can be found in the Command and 

Control Report. 

”4Numerous sources allude to the perceived difficulty the ATO process had in being 

responsive to the tactical ground situation; for examples, see the interview with Lt Gen 

Royal N. Moore, Jr. USMC, “Marine Air: There When Needed,” Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov. 1991, pp 63-64, and (S) Institute for Defense Analysis, “Desert Storm: Fixed 

Wing BAUCAS Operalions and Lessons Learned,” IDA Document 0-1080, Alexandria, VA, 

p 62. 

115JCS Pub 1 Definition: Air action against hostile targets in close proximity to 

friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the tire and 

movement of those forces. In a “classic” case, CAS is air used as a supporting arm 

against targets that are directly effecting ground operations; CAS is support to “troops in 

contact.” lntegration is normally through a specially trained Forward Air Controller (FAC). 

216 
Often, CAS missions were defined as those conducted inside the fire 

support coordination line (FSCL),”~ while those beyond the FSCL were 

considered air interdiction”’ or battlefield air interdiction.”’ 

Even a cursory look at the number of different criteria used to document CAS missions during Desert Storm highlights the problem of 

definitions. The Central Command Air Force commander called missions 

inside the fire support coordination line CAS missions and all others 

outside the line, A1 missions, which deleted BAI as a type of mi~sion.”~ 

The Center for Naval Analyses in its reconstruction of Marine air operations also used the FSCL as a rough divider between CAS and deep air 

support missions.120 The Institute for Defense Analysis took the position 

‘161CS Pub 1 Definition: A line established by the appropriate ground commander 

to ensure coordination of fire that is not under his control but may affect current tactical 

operations. The fire support coordination line is used to coordinate tires of air, ground, 

or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The fire 

support coordination line should follow well defined terrain features. The establishment 

of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air 

commander and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets 

forward of the fire support coordination line without prior coordination with the ground 

force commander, provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on, or to 

the rear of, the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated 

with the appropriate ground force commander. 

“7~~~ Pub 1 Definition: Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay 

the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly 

forces, at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission 

with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. 

‘“HQ AAFCE Manual 80-3, “conventional Offensive Operations Planing Guide,” 

Definition: Air action against hostile surface targets that are in a position to directly affect 

friendly forces and which require joint planning and coordination. While BAI missions 

require coordination in joint planning, they may not require continuous coordination 

during the execution stage. And TAC/TRAM>C Pamphlet, “General Operating Procedures 

for Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (I-SAK)” Definition: Air Interdiction (AI) attacks 

against land force targets that have a near-term effect on the operations or scheme of 

maneuver of friendly forces, but are not in close proximity to friendly forces, are referred 

to as Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI). The primary difference between BAI and the 

remainder of the air interdiction effort is the near-term effect and influence produced 

against the enemy in support of the land component commander’s scheme of maneuver. 

(s) “Concept of Operations for Command and Control of TACAIR in support of 

Land Forces,’’ CENTAFDO, 22 Feb 199 1. 

lZ0(S) Center for Naval Analyses, “Marine Corps Desert Storm Reconstruction 

I I9 

Report Vol IV: Third Marine Aircraft Wing Operations,” Alexandria, VA, p 67. 

217 
that a tactical air strike in the KTO under forward air controller (FAC) 

control was CAS, while one not under FAC control was BAI.”’ Arguments 

over definitions were not simply a sterile exercise in terminology. Definitions were important to the commanders involved because they determined who set the priorities for aviation, who picked the targets, which 

weapon systems were employed, and which tactics were therefore used. 

Battle of Khajji 

Although the battle of Khafji absorbed only a small portion of 

Coalition air assets, it provided the first real challenge to the responsiveness of the CASlBAI capabilities. The battle was important not because of 

the size of the force or the actual battle, but because of what it told 

Coalition forces about the Iraqis. On the evening of 29 January 1991, 

Iraqi forces crossed the border in three places: Ras Al Khafji, Wafrah, 

and Umm Hujul (Observation Post-4). Coalition forces, particularly 

Saudi ground forces in conjunction with the 3d Marine Air Wing and the 

Joint Force Air Component Command, successfully repelled the attacks. 

A wide variety of aviation assets were used at the battle of Khafji; 

unmanned aerial vehicles and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

system to provide near real-time target information, a wide variety of 

platforms for signals intelligence, and AC- 130 Spectre Gunships, AH- 1 

Cobras, A-lOs, AV-~BS, F/A-l8s, B-52s, and F-16s for interdiction, CAS, 

and close-in fire-support missions.’” 

At the request of the Marine Commander, Lieutenant General 

Boomer, and with the approval of Lieutenant General Horner, CENTAF, 

a B-52 strike and two tactical air packages were diverted from Republican 

Guard targets to southern Kuwait where Iraqi armor was moving to 

reinforce the initial Iraqi penetration. The tactics employed, while not 

standard, resulted in a successful attack on approximately one-hundred 

Iraqi armored vehicles. As described in a field report, the effect of the 

B-52 strike was “like turning on a light in a cockroach infested 

apartment.” The B-52 strike sent the vehicles scurrying for survival only 

to find that their movement was awaited by tactical air, eager to “squish 

12’(S) IDA Document 0-1080, p 16. 

‘”(S) MARCENT SitReps, 29 Jan - 2 Feb 1991. 

218 
them like 

see the Operations and Effects report. 

For additional information about the battle of Khafj, 

The purpose of the Coalition ground offensive was to cut lines of 

communications, destroy Republican Guard forces, and liberate Kuwait.'" 

Preparations for the ground offensive moved into the final phase on 22 

February, two days before G-Day, as Coalition forces moved into attack 

positions and the already significant air support being devoted to 

battlefield preparation moved into high gear. Table 9 shows the number 

of CAS/AI and direct support missions flown by Air Force and Marine 

Corps aircraft from 22 February to the cease fire. Figures do not include 

all Coalition missions flown on these days, i.e., CAP, Scud hunting, etc. 

After one-hundred hours of ground war, Iraq capitulated at 0800 on 28 

February 1991. 

123(S) USCLNCCENT, Sitrep, 0121 15Z Feb 91 and TACC notes, dated 30-31 Jan 91, 

'24USCINCCENT OPLAN, Desert Storm, dated I6 Dec 90. 

1900-2100 hours, by TSgt Hosterman. 

219 
Table 9'" 

Close Air SupporUInterdiction Sorties by Day 

Air Force Aircraft 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 

OA-10 21 20 22 22 19 21 4 

A-I0 175 208 216 212 220 207 26 

F- 15E 52 51 60 56 80 56 4 

F- 1 6A/C 305 310 275 312 342 274 8 

F-1 11F 71 62 69 64 59 55 

B-52 51 43 47 47 37 29 

~~ 

Marine Corps Aircraft 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 

A6-E 

ov- 1 0 

EAdB 

AV-8B 

FIA- 18 

32 35 38 35 26 2 1 

16 21 23 24 24 9 1 

16 16 16 16 15 5 2 

136 211 174 152 186 63 0 

192 204 175 135 166 102 4 

Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR)"~ 

Since most CASIBAI missions were flown by Air Force and 

Marine Corps TACAIR, this discussion will begin with those aircraft. The 

'"Sortie data extracted from the (SRVFIWNINC) GWAPS Composite Sorties Data 

Base. Sortie numbers, while generally close, do not always agree with those generated 

for other studies. Variations in numbers appear to result from the use of different source 

documents and the application of different definitions to CASIBAVAI. The numbers, while 

open to possible debate, are relevant because they reflect order of magnitude efforts 

devoted to particular missions. OV-10 sorties were listed as C3 and EA-6B sorties were 

listed as EW. 

'26Except where specifically attributed to another source, the basic information in 

this section, particularly the data on Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft, was extracted 

liberally from (S) IDA Document 0-1080 and (SINFIWNINC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, 

Vol 91-2. 
effective suppression of the Iraqi radar-guided SAM threat made 

antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and infrared SAMS the primary threats. As 

a result, operations at medium altitudes were most survivable, and after 

Day 3 of the war, medium-altitude tactics were used almost exclusively. 

These tactics were a departure from the much exercised low-level 

weapons delivery that had been in vogue throughout the U.S. armed 

forces for many years. Fortunately, in many cases, Desert Shield allowed 

aircrews time to refine their medium-altitude tactics. 

US. Air Force - OA-I0 Forward Air Control 

(Airborne)’” 

The OA-10s were used primarily to acquire X targets from medium altitude (above 10,OOO feet). 

Two-ship employment was preferred for mutual 

support. But, because of the limited number 

(twelve) of OA-10s in theater, usually only one was on station at a time. 

Single aircraft formations increased vulnerability and made low-altitude 

target identification passes dangerous. OA-1 0 crews were left with two 

undesirable options: descend unprotected into the AAA and IR SAM threat 

envelope, or wait for the fighters to arrive to provide cover. When the 

first option was adopted, two OA-10s were lost and a third was seriously 

damaged. Waiting for fighters, the second option, wasted the time of 

attacking aircraft, but was considered the best option in more highly 

defended areas. The OA-10 used the 30-mm gun with high explosive 

incendiary (HEI) ammunition to mark targets. 

U.S. Air Force A-I0 

A-10s usually flew in two-ship formations for 

combat missions. In high-threat areas, A-1 0s were 

sometimes packaged in groups of from four to 

eight aircraft, accompanied by EF-111 and F-4G 

aircraft. The A-10s were used to attack armor, 

X 

artillery, trucks, and other targets. 

‘27The information on OA-10 and A-10 tactics was drawn from (S) IDA Document 

0-1080, pp 25-32 and (SMFIWNINC) Tucricul Analysis Bulletin, Vol91-2, Chapter 6-1. 

22 1 
The preferred munition against armor was the AGM-65 Maverick 

missile. The typical attack profile of an aircraft carrying the electrooptical Maverick (AGM-65B) started with a 30-degree dive from an 

altitude of between from 10,OOO and 15,000 feet; the aircraft then fired 

a single missile at two- to three-nautical miles slant range from the target. 

Approximately 30 percent of the Mavericks shot were the electro-optical 

version. The typical attack profile with the imaging infrared (IIR) 

Maverick (AGM-65D) started at 15,OOO to 20,000 feet with a 20- to 

30-degree dive; a single missile was fired at four- to five-nautical miles 

slant range. The A-10s fired approximately 90 percent of the over 5,000 

Mavericks used during the Gulf War; about half of the Mavericks fired 

were the IIR version. 

The GAU-8, a 30-mm Gatling Gun, was also effective against armor 

when fired from an aircraft in a 45- to 60-degree dive from below 10,OOO 

feet.L28 Aircraft usually fired 150-200 uranium-core armor piercing 

rounds, using one long or two short bursts. The gun fired at a rate of 

2,100 shots per minute; shell velocity was 3,747 feet per second. 

A-1 0 pilots, using medium-altitude release tactics, had difficulty 

hitting armor with MK-20 Rockeyes. To compensate, they selected a 

ripple release mode that released all weapons on one pass against a single 

target. Steeper dive angles generally produced more accurate deliveries, 

but bad weather frequently caused pilots to use shallower dive angles. 

The preferred munition for attacking artillery was a MK-82 fuzed for 

an air burst. The standard tactic was to ripple release all bombs against 

a single target. The normal dive angle was 45- to 60-degrees at 400 

knots. The MK-82 was also used against trucks and other soft-skinned 

vehicles. 

Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs) were also ripple released against a single, 

target. The attack run was normally a 45- to 60-degree dive, with bomb 

release starting at 10,OOO to 12,000 feet. CBUs were used against soft 

targets, vehicles, personnel in the open, and artillery. 

Night CAS was restricted to using freefall munitions delivered parallel 

to the front lines to minimize the possibility of friendly fire casualties. 

128(SfNFIwNfNC) Tacrical Analysis Bidletin, Vol 91-2, p 6-6. 

222 
Maverick attacks were permitted if over two kilometers from friendlies; 

guns when over one kilometer from friendlies. The A-10s were all 

equipped with the PAVE PENNY'29 system, but very few pilots had an 

opportunity to use the system on a CAS mission. The A-10s were also 

limited during night attacks by not having OA-10s available to find 

targets, since they did not operate at night. Most night targets were fixed 

artillery, fixed armor, and moving convoys. The A-10s used the IIR 

Mavericks andor flares to aid in acquiring targets at night. The aircraft 

delivering weapons normally released them while in a shallower dive and 

from lower altitudes than in day attacks because of the reduced 

effectiveness of Iraqi AAA and IR missiles at night. 

US. Marine Corps OV-I0 FAC(A)" 

Usually, the twenty Marine Corps OV-10s 

flew FAC missions inside the FSCL and conducted 

radio relay and visual reconnaissance missions. 

Because of an early combat loss, the OV-10 was 

restricted to flying over friendly territory. With 

the start of the ground war, OV-1 0s maintained twenty-four-hour 

coverage of the battlefield. The OV- 10 also laser-designated targets for 

Marine AV-8s. The OV-lo's night capability was due primarily to its 

FLIR ~ensor.'~' 

'29The AN/ASS-35(V) PAVE PENNY laser receiver/tracker was operational on all the 

A-10 aircraft used in Desert Storm. PAVE PENNY was a day and night target detection set 

used to detect the reflected energy from a laser designator. Used in conjunction with a 

laser designation system (either ground-based or in cooperation aircraft), it can rapidly 

designate specific targets for attack. The system provides accurate steering data on the 

HUD to assist the pilot in delivering unguided or laser-guided weapons. 

'%e information on OV-10 tactics was drawn primarily from (s) IDA Document 

0-1080. pp 32-33, unless otherwise noted. 

l3'0f the 20 Marine OV-10s deployed to Desert Storm, 11 had the AN/AAS-37 FLIR 

nose-mounted in the aircraft. The rotating ball turret mount provided almost full lower 

hemisphere coverage (elevation coverage was from minus 82" to plus 16"). The total 

system weight was about 420 pounds. The FLIR had two fields-of-view: 15 x 20" and (for 

higher-magnification) 5 x 6.7". The real-time IR picture was displayed on a TV monitor 

in the cockpit. The system also included a laser ranger and illuminator for designating 

targets. 

223 
U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B'32 

A total of 86 AV-8B Harriers were deployed 

to Southwest Asia. Land-based AV-8Bs were 

equipped with a 25-mm Gatling gun and carried a 

typical combat bomb load of six MK-82s or four 

MK-83s or six MK-20 Rockeyes. In addition to 

the gun, shipbased Harriers normally carried four MK-82s, or two MK83s. or four MK-20s. To maintain a high sortie rate during the ground 

assault, the aircraft refueled and rearmed at Tanajib, only five minutes 

from the Kuwait border. 

AV-8B pilots delivered primarily MK-82s and Rockeyes using 

medium- to high-altitude dive bombing tactics. They used MK-82s 

against artillery, trucks, and other soft targets and Rockeyes against 

armored and light armored vehicles. Early problems with delivering 

MK-20s were corrected and accuracy improved as the war progressed. 

MK-83s with nose plugs and delayed fuzes were used against bunkers 

and similar hardened targets. Guns were employed mainly to suppress 

low-level point defenses during delivery of other weapons. The AV-8Bs 

also used their guns to strafe targets at the Battle of Khafji. The pilots 

used an inertial navigation system combined with a shallow dive to find 

the assigned target and the heads-up display video to assess battle 

damage. AV-8B tactics are also discussed in the push flow and artillery 

raids portions of this section. 

Target location and control of sorties beyond the FSCL were 

accomplished by a variety of means, chief among them AWACS, ABCCC, 

Fast FAC, Killer Scouts, and Joint STARS. Targets beyond the FSCL 

included assembly areas, road convoys, command posts, artillery, mobile 

rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles (FROGS and Scuds); and 

maneuver forces such as tanks, APCS, and other mechanized equipment. 

13%e information on AV-8B tactics was drawn primarily from (S) IDA Document 

0-1080, pp 33-34. 

224 
US. Air Force F-16 “Killer Scouts’”u 

During Desert Storm F-16 missions included 

day air interdiction, Low-Altitude Navigation and 

Targeting Infrared (system) for Night (LANTIRN) 

operations, armed reconnaissance, and “Killer 

Scouts.” For a variety of reasons an airborne platform was stationed in 

the interdiction area to validate AT0 targets and, when required, to find 

new targets. From sunrise to sunset, GPS-equipped F-16 “Killer Scouts” 

flew this mission. The Scouts patrolled kill boxes and essentially flew 

armed reconnaissance missions. They carried a mix of ordnance to mark 

targets, conduct SEAD, and kill fleeting targets. The Scouts normally 

updated the target location, provided an overall ground situation brief, 

and marked the target before passing it over to incoming attack aircraft. 

U.S. Air Force F-16 Tactics 

The F-16s dropped primarily general-purpose, unguided ordnance by 

using a 30- to 60-degree, high-altitude dive bomb release procedures. 

These medium-altitude deliveries effectively negated the Iraqi AAA and 

IR SAM threats. If SAMs were seen, they could be defeated by a 

combination of flares and evasive maneuvers. But, medium-altitude 

weapon accuracy was less than desired, resulting, at least initially, in 

weapons falling short of the target and unpredictable scatter patterns. 

The two LANTIRN-equipped F-16 squadrons achieved almost as good 

results at night at they did during the day.’M GPS combined with the 

lower delivery altitudes achievable with LANTIRN were responsible for the 

increased bombing accuracy at night. The normal F-16 night package 

was two aircraft, with the wingman flying 1,000 to 2,000 feet above and 

1 to 4 miles behind the lead aircraft. Aircraft flew with lights off and 

used the forward-looking infraredheads-up display (FLIWHUD) to maintain 

13%e information on F-16 tactics was drawn primarily from (s) IDA Document 

0-1080, pp 43-47 and (S/NF/WN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, Chapter 4-1. 

‘?he E16C carried the LANTlRN navigational pod externally either under a wing 

or fuselage. The pod contained a wide field of view FLIR and terrain-following radar, 

together with the associated power supply, pod control computer, and environmental 

system. The FLlR imagery from the pod was displayed on a wide field-of-view holographic heads-up display. The purpose was to allow the pilot to acquire the target and 

deliver unguided munitions at night with accuracy similar to daytime attack. 

225 
position. They usually carried free-fall munitions along with an 

occasional IIR Maverick. "pica1 targets for the LANTIRN-equipped F- 16s 

were bridges, bunkers, armor, and artillery. 

A typical F-16 weapon load was six MK-82s or two MK-84s, or four 

CBUS. In daytime, ordnance was released by using the continuously 

computed impact point system. At night, the F-16s used the FLIR to find 

targets and released weapons at a nominal altitude of 10,OOO to 12,000 

feet while in a 30-degree dive. They used higher altitudes and steeper 

dive angles against the same targets in the daytime. Night attacks were 

considered safer because of Iraqi difficulty in acquiring the aircraft and 

the aircrews' improved ability to see and therefore avoid AAA and IR 

SAMs. 

U.S. Marine Corps F/A-l8D Fast FACS'~' 

The F/A-l8D aircraft flew primarily Fast FAC 

missions in Desert Storm; a significant number of 

these missions were flown at night. They 

conducted visual or tactical reconnaissance of the 

battlefield and reported back to the ground 

commanders almost immediately on sighting major hostile force 

movements or hot spots. Generally, F/A- 1 8Ds performed FAC missions 

for deeper strikes, while OV-10s acted as FACs for CAS missions. All 

F/A-I8D aircraft had a FUR targeting system. The system was designed 

to provide the aircraft with a day, night, and limited adverse weather 

attack capability. It presented the pilot with real-time thermal imagery 

for locating, identifying, and attacking tactical targets. 

Pilots sometimes located daytime targets by using binoculars, marked 

the targets with 5-inch Zuni white phosphorous rockets and passed the 

target locations to a flight of attack aircraft. Battlefield familiarity helped 

F/A-l8Ds perform their FAC missions. At night, pilots used night vision 

goggles, navigation FLIR, digital color moving maps, and some targeting 

FLIRs. Procedures were similar to those employed during the day. 

%he information on F/A-18 tactics was drawn primarily from (S) IDA Document 

0-1080, pp 41-49. 

226 
U.S. Marine Corps FlA-18AK. 

F/A-I 8A/C employed tactics similar to those 

of the AV-8B. Aircraft flew at ingress altitudes as 

high as 30,000 feet and dive angles of 10- to 20- 

degrees until target acquisition. Upon target acquisition, the dive angle steepened to about 45- 

degrees with a recovery altitude of 14,000 feet, later reduced to 12,OOO 

and finally to 10,OOO feet. Reduced enemy capabilities and poor visibility 

were reasons why aircrews flew at lower altitudes as the war progressed. 

The F/A-l8A/Cs favored a mix of MK-80 series bombs and MK-20 

Rockeyes. Marine aircraft dropped a total of 15,828 Rockeyes against 

armor, artillery, and antipersonnel targets.’36 As the war progressed and 

the threat diminished, aircraft flew at lower altitudes, thereby correcting 

Rockeye delivery problems and high dud rates. By the later phases of the 

war, the Marines considered MK-20 a flexible, effective weapon. F/A18A/Cs also fired a few antiarmor Maverick missiles. The typical F/A-I 8 

combat bomb load was a gun plus either six MK-82s, four MK-83s, or 

four MK-20s. Additionally, F/A-l8A/Cs performed SEAD with HARM 

missiles. 

US. Marine Corps ~-6’~’ 

The night, all-weather capabilities of the Marine 

Corps’ A-6Es allowed them to fly 98.8 percent of 

their 850 Gulf War sorties at night. A typical weapon load for the A-6E was 11 MK-82s or MK-20s 

and one laser-guided bomb, usually a GBU-16. 

A-6Es were tasked to attack specific targets or 

targets within a designated Kill box. Normally operating as single aircraft, the A-6E used its radar to navigate and locate and attack fixed 

targets while using its moving target indicator mode to locate and attack 

‘36GWAPS Statistical Compendium , Table 190, “Desert ShieldStorm: USMC 

‘37The information on A-6E tactics was drawn primarily from (S) IDA Document 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 91$).” 

0-1080, pp 49-51. 

227 
moving targets. The A-6E also used its target recognition and attack 

multi~ensor’~~ as an integrated day and night weapon delivery system. 

Normal A-6E ingress and target acquisition was at altitudes between 

25,000 and 30,000 feet. The bombardier/navigator (B/N) used the aircraft 

radar to acquire the target and the boresighted FLIR sensor to bring the 

target into close-up view. Once the target was satisfactorily acquired, the 

B/N lased the target for LGBs. 

U.S. Air Force F-15E‘39 

Both of the F-15E squadrons deployed to 

Southwest Asia were equipped with LANTIRN 

navigational pods, whereas only a handful of 

LANTIRN targeting pods were used during Desert 

w- Storm.“ Aircraft with targeting pods normally 

carried eight GBU-12s when flying armor missions. When only one aircraft had a targeting pod, “buddy lasing” was used, or the aircraft without 

the pod carried free-fall ordnance, such as twelve MK-82s or six CBU87/89s or four MK-84s, or four GBU-10s. Targets included bridges, 

Scuds, C31 nodes, bunkers, and fixed armor. 

Almost all F-15E sorties were flown at night. The LANTIRN system 

allowed aircrews to locate targets at night, hit them with LGBs, and obtain 

real-time bomb damage assessment. Although the F-15Es flew an assortment of missions, about one-third were tank-busting or “tank-plinking” 

sorties. The preferred ordnance for these missions was the GBU-12. 

Most attacks were from medium altitude with weapons release at between 

12,000 and 14,000 feet. Altitudes changed depending on weather and 

threat conditions. 

I3%is system included a forward-looking infrared sensor, a laser designatorhnger 

and a laser receiver. The equipment was contained in a precision stabilized turret mounted under the nose of the aircraft. The system was designed to provide target acquisition 

and guidance capabilities for a wide range of laser-guided weapons. 

13%e information on F-1% tactics was drawn primarily from (S) IDA Docwnent 

0-1080, pp 51-53 and (S/NF/WN/NC) Tucticul Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, Chapter 3-1. 

‘%e,AN/AAQ-14 targeting pod contained a stabilization system, wide and narrow 

field-of-view nIR, laser designatorlranger, automatic multimode tracker, automatic 

infrared Maverick missile hand-off system, environmental control unit, pod control 

computer, and power supply. 

228 
US. Air Force F-111 F"' 

As with F-l5Es, F-1 1 1 Fs were used to conduct a 

variety of missions, mostly at night. The missions, 

after the first few days of the war, were conducted 

primarily from medium altitude. The principal targets 

were bridges, bunkers, armor, and artillery. The 

weapons of choice were LGBs, and the F-1 1 1 F was the only aircraft to 

employ the GBU-15 glide bomb. This munition destroyed the oil storage 

tank manifolds, halting the flow of oil into the Gulf. Typical combat 

munitions loads for the F-111F were eight CBUS or twelve MK-82s or 

four MK-Ms, or four GBUs. For tank-plinking missions, the weapon of 

choice was again the GBU-12. In addition to the GBU-15, F-1 llFs were 

the only aircraft to drop GBU-24s and GBU-28s. 

All F-11 1F squadrons were equipped with the infrared Pave Tack 

system,14* which employed FLIR target acquisition sensors and laser 

de~ignatiodranging.'~~ The Pave Tack sensor had full lower hemisphere 

coverage, giving the aircrew nearly total freedom in choosing flight paths. 

Once tracking was initiated, the target was lased for laser-guided 

munitions. The Pave Tack computer also aided in delivery computations 

for unguided munitions. The F-1llF used its onboard virtual image 

display (VID) to show radar, FLIR, and weapons data, which was normally 

recorded for postmission bomb damage assessment.'eZ 

I4'The information on F-1 1 1F tactics was drawn primarily from (S) IDA Document 

0-1080, pp 53-56 and (SMFIWNINC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol91-2, Chapter 7-1. 

I4%he F-1 1 1F carried a large, 1,300-pound Pave Tack pod under the fuselage aft of 

the nose gear. The pod was in two major sections. The fixed-base section contained the 

aircraft interface unit. computer, power supplies, cooling system, the CRT interface, and 

the video-tape recorder, which recorded the crew's video display and provided bomb 

damage assessment. The rotating head section contained the FLIR, laser, and range 

receiver, and allowed full lower hemisphere coverage. 

'43The FLlR and the laser were boresighted. The stabilized FLlR imagery provided 

a wide field-of-view (176 x 132 mrad) display for target acquisition and had a narrow 

field-of-view (44 x 33 mrad) with 3-power magnilication for target identification and 

tracking. 

'?'he aircraft capable of recording bomb impact points (F-11 lF, F-15E, and F-117 

units) kept and distributed their own bomb damage assessment within and between the 

units. 

229 
Other Aircraft and Systems 

In addition to the platforms discussed above, Navy and Coalition 

TACAIR and other aviation platforms directly and indirectly supported the 

ground effort. Navy and Coalition TACAIR flew only approximately fifty 

CAS/BAI missions in support of the ground offensive. There is no indication that the weapons or the tactics used by these aircrews differed in any 

significant respect from those just described. The tactics used by the 

Navy against maritime targets will be discussed later in this section. Air 

Force B-52s flew tactical missions in support of the Battlefield Preparation Phase of the war. Electronic warfare, tanker, command and control, 

reconnaissance, and other specialized aircraft also supported the ground 

offensive. Additionally, unmanned aerial vehicles and both Army and 

Marine Corps attack helicopters played significant roles. 

B-52s 

B-52s flew 1,741 missions and dropped 27,000 

tons of munitions, which amounted to 30 percent of 

the overall Gulf War tonnage. The bomber’s longrange capability was demonstrated on the third day of 

the war when 7 B-52s launched from Wurtsmith AFB 

in Michigan, bombed Republican Guard targets in the 

KTO, and landed in the theater.145 

B-52s attacked mostly large area targets, dropping unguided generalpurpose and cluster bombs from above 30,000 feet. Targets included 

“dug in” armored units, suspected Scud storage and production facilities, 

and troop concentrations. However, their main effort (37 percent of all 

B-52 sorties flown) was against the Republican Guard.’* 

B-52 support must be measured not just in terms of direct hits or 

physical damage but also in terms of the psychological effects it 

produced. Recognizing the impact of these bombing missions, General 

Schwarzkopf directed the B-52s to focus on the Republican Guard. The 

(S/NF/WN/RD) History of the Strategic Air Comrnand, p 252. 145 

‘*(S/NF/WN/RD) Ibid, p 253. 

230 
result was a three-ship formation of bombers striking troops in the KTO 

every three hours, twenty-four-hours a day.'47 

[DELETED] 

B-52s conducted four distinct missions during the Gulf War: 

attacking strategic fixed targets, Scud hunting, attacking Iraqi Army and 

Republican Guard targets, and supporting breaching operations.'" 

[DELEl'ED].'m [DELETED]. 

To prepare the battlefield for the ground assault, B-52s dropped dualfuzed MK-82s designed to break up barriers, berms, and obstacles such 

as multistrand concertina wire. Near the end of the war, B-52s dropped 

CBU-87s on Iraqi tank and vehicle columns along the highways leading 

north out of K~wait.'~' 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 

The employment of UAVS during Desert Storm was the first time U.S. 

forces used them in combat. There were three UAV systems: the Pioneer, 

the Pointer, and the Exdrone. UAVs were operated by the Army, Navy 

and Marine Corps. The real-time battlefield surveillance and detection 

capabilities of the UAVS directly enhanced the targeting of both fixed and 

mobile targets and affected the employment of CAS/BAI and close-in-fire 

support (CIFS) assets. 

'471ntvw with Capt Rich Clew and Capt Jim Wright, B-52 Planners for USCENTAF 

'48(S/NF/#"/RD) /bid, pp 265-268. 

'49(S/NF) Maj John Masotti, "Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm Bomber 

Strategic Forces, conducted on 1-2 Sep 92. 

Stof)'," Hq SAOOBX, 18 Sep 1991, pp 32, 33. 

lSO[~~~~~~~ 

'"(S) IDA Document 0-1080, p 57. 

23 1 
U.S. Marine Corps AH-I J/T/W 

- The Marine Corps deployed seventy-nine AH-Is 

to Southwest Asia. Typical AH-I missions included 

antiarmor, close-in fire support, armed reconnaissance, 

and helicopter escort. Poor weather, blowing smoke, and the rapid 

advance of the ground forces all combined to make classic “troops in 

contact” CAS difficult and unnecessary in most cases. But, on those 

occasions when troops in contact did need support, the Cobra gunships 

used extraordinary tactics and techniques to provide it. Marine AH-ls, 

in coordination with other Coalition aircraft, also played a significant role 

in repulsing the numerous Iraqi incursions into Saudi Arabia (Khafji) 

during the period 29 January to 2 February 1992. 

The First Marine Division used the AH- 1 s en masse; they used them 

in conjunction with light armored vehicles and occasionally AV-8Bs as 

an additional maneuver element, called Task Force C~nningham.’~~ 

On G+2, AH-1s and a UH-1 supported Task Force Ripper in the 

battle with the Iraqi 3d Armored Division. The UH-IN with FL~R and a 

laser designator capability led two divisions of Cobras through smoke and 

under power lines to attack Iraqi forces facing the Marines. The Huey 

designated targets for the Cobras’ Hellfire missiles. On another occasion, 

Cobras worked with light armored vehicles to thwart an Iraqi mechanized 

infantry brigade counterattack against the 1 st Marine Division’s command 

post.’53 During Desert Shield, Marine AH-1 Ws fired Hellfire missiles 

with targeting and laser spotting assistance from Army OH-58Ds. 

Although successfully exercised before the war, there is no evidence the 

tactic was actually employed during Desert Storm. This nonuse was 

probably due to a scarcity of OH-58Ds.IS4 

‘521ntvw with Maj Gen J. M. Myatt, USMC, ‘The 1st Marine Division in the Attack,” 

Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov. 1991, pp 71-75. Gen Myatt organized his assets into 

Task Forces. 

Is31bid. 

‘”U.S. Army Aviation Center, Coordinating Draft, Operation Desert ShieWStonn 

Afer Action Report, 22 Nov 1991, p 9. 

232 
Army Attack Helicopters 

The Anny deployed approximately 145 AH-1 Cobras, 130 OH-58D 

Kiowa Warriors, and 277 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters to Southwest 

Asia.155 They carried out armed reconnaissance, antiarmor, and helicopter 

escort missions. Additionally, the Army made extensive use of massed 

attack helicopters as integrated maneuver elements,lM and conducted large 

armed reconnaissance missions jointly with U.S. Air Force CAS and 

support aircraft. Army attack helicopters worked with uSAF A-lOs, 

F-16s, EF-1 I Is, Compass Call, Wild Weasels, and J-STARS.’57 Army 

attack helicopters conducted numerous long-range missions into Iraq, 

some out to approximately 100 miles.158 Most of these missions were 

joint Army-Air Force undertakings involving tactics never previously 

practiced. When Army helicopters needed TACAIR, they would typically 

request it through the AWACS onguard freq~ency.’~~ Army attack 

helicopters, especially Apaches, regularly scouted and screened for ground 

forces. Major General Griffith, CG 1 st Armored Division, reflected the 

attitude of the Army commanders when he said, “I don’t want another 

minute to go by without Apaches out in front of this division.”Im The 

Army was able to employ the Apaches in this role because of the unique 

capabilities of the aircraft, the scheme of maneuver of the Coalition 

ground forces, and the disposition of the Iraqis. 

“Push flow” 

In support of the land components, CENTAF initiated a push flow 

system of TACAIR to generate large numbers of sorties in a target-rich 

environment. The system called for aircraft to launch in accordance with 

a time schedule to achieve an advertized CAS sortie flow rate per hour. 

%S. Army Aviation Center, Draft Report, Army Aviation in Desert ShieldStorm, 

Ft Rucker, AL, 8 Jun 1992. Figures on number of attack helicopters in theater from pp 

42. 210, 39, respectively. It should be noted that figures do not appear to agree with 

summary chart on p 26. 

‘”lbid, p 34. 

157~bid, 35. 

1581bid. pp 34, 12. 

’591bid, p 35. 

1601bid, p 206. 

233 
Sorties without an appropriate CAS target were normally directed to the 

ABCCC for an A1 mission. In all cases, the objective was to keep aircraft 

moving through the system to provide land component commanders with 

a ready supply of air support. A tactical air control center (TACC) log 

entry sums up the thinking behind establishment of the push flow system. 

“When asked, What air is where? Answer, There is a continuous flow 

of anything you want anywhere you want it.”16’ 

US. Marine Corps Push CAS’“ 

The Marine Corps adapted the push CAS system to ensure adequate 

air support to Marine ground forces. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing began 

surge operations using the system on 22 February, two days before the 

start of the ground assault. The push CAS system called for aircraft to 

launch according to a specific schedule, but without a specific mission or 

target. Aircraft checked in with the Marine tactical air command center 

and the tactical air operations center and were then passed to the direct 

air support center. After checking in with the direct air support center, 

they preceded to the “main stack” to fill requests for CAS missions. 

Figure 50 illustrates the locations of the various holding points, orbits, 

and aircraft operating areas referred to in the description of the push CAS 

system. If the aircraft were not used for a CAS mission within a specified 

period of time (seven and one-half minutes during the day and fifteen 

minutes at night), they were handed off to the direct airborne support 

center for further handoff to a Fast FAC for deep air support (DAS). The 

goals of the procedures were to maintain control and continue to “push” 

aircraft to missions. 

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) air was used 

primarily beyond the FSCL. JFACC air would contact the Marine tactical 

air operations center for deconfliction and would then be sent to one of 

two JFACc stacks. Navy aircraft were sent to the East stack and Air 

Force aircraft were sent to the West stack. JFACC aircraft contacted the 

l6’(S) “concept of Operations for Command and Control of TACAIR in support of 

Land Forces,” CENTAFIW, 22 Feb 1% 1. 

162Tush CAS” procedures were promulgated in 3d MAW msg 201630 Feb 1991, 

“Coordinating Instructions for Third MAW Air Control Procedures for Operation Desert 

Storm.” The description of how the Marine Corps implemented the “Push CAS” system 

is from the (S) CNA Rpt, Vol JV, Third Marine Aircraft Wing Operations.” 

234 
Figure 50 

Push CAS System 

[DELETED] 

0 

airborne direct air support center en route to their assigned stacks and 

were handed off to a Fast FAC. To ensure that the system was understood 

by all concerned, messages were sent, liaison visits were held, briefings 

were conducted, and the plan was first flown on 12 February. The plan 

called for surge operations to begin approximately two days before 

G-Day. 

East and West CAP stations were manned continuously by electronic 

warfare assets. These aircraft were available to conduct electronic 

support measures, jam surveillance and counterbattery radars, jam early 

warning and SAM radars, and fire HARMS. OV- 10s provided twenty-fourhour coverage of three positions. They were used for TAC(A)/FAC(A) 

missions. F/A-l8Ds were used exclusively in a Fast FAc role. During 

daylight, these aircraft flew two Fast FAC orbits continuously. At night, 

the intent was to provide one Fast FAC for thirty minutes out of each 

hour. Plans called for A-6Es to be used exclusively at night in the 

CAs/DAS/armed reconnaissance role. F/A- I8NCs and AV-8Bs also 

flowed through this push CiS system, beginning when the ground forces 

moved into their attack PO mans. . ' 

235 
Artillery Raids’” 

Artillery raids, also termed combined arms raids by the Marines, were 

conducted throughout Desert Storm. During the initial phases of the war, 

Command General, First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) directed a 

target priority list of artillery, armor and armored vehicles, and personnel. 

The rationale behind this prioritization of targets was that the Iraqi 

artillery had the ability to mass fire and deliver chemical weapons that 

could seriously endanger Marines during breaching operations. General 

Boomer was so concerned about Marine aviators engaging in too much 

tank-plinking that he made a personal visit to the squadrons to explain the 

importance he placed on stripping away the Iraqi artillery. 

As initially employed by the 1 st Marine Division, artillery raids were 

intended to promote deception, keep the Iraqis off balance, and test Iraqi 

responses. The raids were designed to provoke a reaction among Iraqi 

forces and then hammer them when they came out of their fortified 

positions or returned fire. Iraqi artillery had greater range than Army and 

Marine Corps artillery. Additionally, Marine Corps and Army counterbattery radars could provide coverage out to forty kilometers; again, beyond the range of Army and Marine Corps artillery. Combined, these 

factors meant that ultimately most counterfire attacks were conducted by 

aircraft. The almost immediate availability of air provided by the push 

CAS or push flow system made aerial attack of targets easy to arrange. 

Marine EA-6Bs supported counterfire operations by jamming Iraqi 

counterbattery radars. Marines learned that the enemy quickly returned 

fire if fired upon; they also learned that Iraqi artillery fire was woefully 

inaccurate. Buoyed by this knowledge, Marine artillery moved forward 

and fired. Counterbattery radars, Fast FACs, and attack aircraft all waited 

until the Iraqis returned fire, then located the Iraqi artillery and attacked. 

Enemy prisoner of war reports indicated that the certainty of counterfire 

was so pervasive that Iraqi cannoneers frequently pulled their lanyard 

once and then “ran like hell” to get to protected positions before the “iron 

*63Most of the information on Combined Arms or Artillery Raids was gathered from 

Marine Corps Research Center, Research Paper #92-0007, “Fire SuppodCoordination 

During Desert Storm.” 

236 
rain” began. When the ground assault began, I MEF target priorities 

began to shift, and the nature of the artillery raids changed; but the tactics 

used to conduct counterfire operations remained basically the same. 

Maritime Operations: Attacking the Iraqi Navy 

At the beginning of the war, the Iraqi Navy had approximately 178 

vessels, 13 of which could fire surface-to-surface STyx or Exocet missiles. They also had 5 sets of equipment to fire the Silkworm missile, a 

coastal defense weapon. The Silkworms were of particular concern to the 

amphibious forces as preparations continued for a possible amphibious 

assault. Neutralizing the Silkworm threat came under the purview of two 

commanders; CENTAF, in his capacity as the Joint Forces Air Component 

Commander, and NAVCENT, who considered defeating the Iraqi’s Silkworm threat an element of Battle Force defense. 

The JFACC. through his Strategic Planning Cell, set up a Naval target 

category. Targets included naval bases, port facilities, and Silkworm 

sites; it grew to include twenty-one targets. These targets were scheduled 

in the ATO, and the tactics used to attack them were similar to those used 

on other ground targets. 

On the maritime side, the Anti-Surface Unit Warfare Commander 

(ASUWC) of the Composite Warfare Commander structure was the officer 

charged with defending the Battle Group against surface threats. 

Normally, his role was defensive in nature-conducting search programs 

to identify possible threats, then requesting the Strike Warfare 

Commander to conduct an attack to destroy or neutralize the threat. 

Beginning 21 January 1991, the ASUWC in the Gulf developed a new, 

more aggressive tactic. Instead of using patrol aircraft, he used armed 

attack aircraft to conduct armed surface reconnaissance (ASR) missions, 

and their task was to immediately attack any surface vessel identified as 

Iraqi. A surface ship in the Northern Gulf was in charge of the effort and 

was assisted by either a P-3 Orion or a British Nimrod patrol aircraft. 

The A-6 Intruders were the aircraft most often used in this armed 

surface reconnaissance role, although F/A-I 8s were also used. The 

normal weapons load for an A-6E mission was one GBU-I2 laser-guided 

bomb and two MK-20 Rockeyes. This load could be brought back to the 

carriers if not delivered, and weapon deliveries were normally from level 

flight. Since there was a reduced AAA threat at sea, the aircraft worked 

237 
at lower altitudes. Silkworm missile sites were also attacked by armed 

surface reconnaissance aircraft. If a Silkworm site became active, the 

ASUWC would divert the aircraft to strike. In this way, the Silkworm 

sites, targets of a fleeting nature, could be struck in a timely manner. 

Helicopters armed with rockets and missiles were also employed in 

the antisurface unit effort. Some U.S. Army aviation units operated from 

Navy frigates. They patrolled, watched for Iraqi vessels, provided bomb 

damage assessment, and raided offshore oil platforms. The British Lynx 

helicopter, firing the Sea Skua missile, was also successful in attacking 

Iraqi shipping. The joint-combined efforts of U.S. Army, Navy, and 

Marine Corps helicopters, Navy TACAIR, and British ships and helicopters 

accounted for 143 Iraqi vessels either sunk or damaged.'" 

Observations 

It is worth noting that even during the Gulf War when the Coalition 

enjoyed air superiority, the enemy threat had an appreciable effect on airto-ground tactics. On one hand, attack aircraft were able to use a 

medium- to high-level weapons delivery because there was literally no 

air-to-air threat, and the SEAD campaign had been so successful it had 

virtually neutralized all of Iraq's radar-controlled SAMs. On the other 

hand, barrage AAA and IR SAMs caused major problems when aircraft 

descended below approximately 10,OOO feet during daylight hours. The 

selection of medium-altitude tactics to minimize the Iraqi threat caused 

Coalition aircraft to sacrifice some target recognition and identification 

capabilities and adversely impacted conventional weapons delivery 

accuracies.'65 

lMArniy Aviation in Desert ShieldlStorm, pp 83-85. 

'65Multiple sources including, USN Interviews of USAF Desert Storm Vets, "A Study 

of Night Attack Experiences During Desert Storm,'' Naval Air Systems Command, 

Washington, DC, p 11. 

238 
The unrehearsed B-5uU.S. Air Force TACAJR strikes in support of 

Coalition forces at Khafji, and the joint impromptu U.S. Army attack 

helicopter and Air Force TACAIR armed, long-range, reconnaissance 

missions are just two examples of a phenomenon that was quite common 

during Desert Storm. Many of the successful tactics employed were 

improvised; they happened spontaneously, almost by accident. The 

success of these kinds of tactics are a direct result of a mutual confidence 

often evident among, and within, the different U.S. Services during 

Desert Storm. In many cases the success of Coalition forces can be 

compared with that of a championship-caliber athletic team. The participants demonstrated great anticipation; a knowledge of, and confidence 

in, the skills of others; and a feel for how their particular capability fit 

into the larger whole. 

239 

4 

Special Issues 

Low Observables and Stealth 

A Stealth aircraft has to be stealthy in six disciplines: radar, infrared, 

visual. acoustic, smoke and contrail. If you don’t do that, you flunk the 

course.’ 

Ben Rich 

Director, Advanced Development Products Division 

Lockhesd Aircraft Company 

This section deals with two related concepts, low observability and 

stealth. Both terms are technical descriptions of specified tactical 

capabilities. Both terms are also used to describe engineering disciplines 

aimed at suppressing detection signatures? that is, reducing emissions 

from a given platform or vehicle that might be used to detect and attack 

it. Low observability as an engineering discipline involves the systematic 

suppression of the detection signatures in various emission spectra, 

including, but not limited to, radar, Stealth technology focuses 

specifically on radar emissions. Suppression of the radar signature is the 

essential technical characteristic of a stealth platform or delivery system. 

It is also the tactical essence of low observability. Tactically, low 

observability is the ability to penetrate enemy territory and strike directly 

at the heart of enemy power without having to suppress enemy air defenses in advance. A stealth platform is one whose radar signature has been 

sufficiently suppressed to render enemy radars ineffective against it. 

Three platforms used by U.S. forces in the Gulf War satisfied the tactical 

definition of low observability: the F-117 piloted stealth attack aircraft 

‘Bill Sweetman, Stealth Bomber: Invisible Warplane, Black Budget (Osceola, 

Wisconsin: 1989), p 101. 

*We will use the term signature in the technical sense to mean the distinctive 

observable return of a given platform in a given spectrum, e.g., visual, aural, infrared, or 

radar. For an informed, reasonably nontechnical discussion, see Bill Sweetman, Stealth 

Bomber, Chapter 4, “Under the Skin,” pp 84-1 19. 

24 1 
and two autonomously guided long-range precision-guided munitions, the 

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and the Conventional Air 

Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM). 

Three points must be made: First, there is no such thing as an 

invisible airplane, in the radar spectrum or in any other. Signatures can 

be suppressed; they cannot be eliminated. Second, and even more basic, 

technology cannot be divorced from tactics. Stupid tactics can negate 

seemingly overwhelming technological advantages, while intelligent 

tactics applied in a timely and decisive manner can overcome seemingly 

crippling technological deficiencies. Third, low observability can be 

achieved either tactically or technologically. 

Detection Spectra Characteristics 

Of all active means of detecting aircraft in flight, radar has the 

longest range and is least affected by weather and atmospheric conditions. 

For this reason, passive suppression of radar signature is the essence of 

stealth technology: if the radar signature cannot be suppressed, there is 

little point in trying to suppress the other means, with the partial exception of the visual. Camouflage paint offers important, if limited, advantages in suppressing visual and infrared signatures. Infrared systems rank 

after radar in effective range and vulnerability to atmospheric interference. Infrared systems derive considerable tactical importance from the 

fact that anything that moves, shoots, or emits radiation-in short, any 

military system-produces heat. This makes passive detection feasible, 

and the overwhelming majority of military infrared detectors, sensors, and 

terminal homing systems are passive? Detection by light in the visual 

spectrum is, generally speaking, shorter ranged than infrared detection and 

more affected by atmospheric interference? The principal advantage of 

detection by visual light is the accuracy, resolution, and flexibility of the 

human eye and the speed with which visual inputs can be incorporated 

%'tat is they emit no energy, in contrast to active systems, such as radar, which do. 

Some of the earliest operational infrared systems were active, combining a viewing device 

with an infrared illuminator, as with the World War I1 sniper scope and similar devices 

attached to tanks. Improvements in the sensitivity of viewing devices have largely 

eliminated the need for illumination. 

%his generalization summarizes a complex set of relationships, and there are 

exceptions to it. Fog, for example, is more easily penetrated by visual light than by 

infrared radiation. 

242 
into the individual tactical decision-making process. Exhaust smoke and 

contrails are special visual signatures that permit detection at exceptionally long distances. Aural energy is the shortest ranged and least precise 

detection spectrum. Sound alone does not provide information sufficiently accurate to aim antiaircraft missiles or guns, but it can alert defenders 

that something is overhead and give an idea of direction of flight, speed, 

and perhaps identity. Finally, intercepted radio and radar transmissions 

can be used to locate aerial platforms with considerable accuracy at 

ranges limited only by the strength of the signal. 

F-I17 Strengths 

The “Black Jet,” as it is called by its pilots, represented the single 

greatest technological advance fielded in Desert Storm. The tactical 

effectiveness of the F-117 rested on four pillars: the extremely low radar 

signature of the aircraft; the capabilities of the mission planning 

computer, nicknamed El~ira;~ the effectiveness of the GBU-27 and the 

infrared target acquisition and laser designator system; and the skill and 

training level of the pilots. The first and most critical of these was the 

low radar signature, and it is fair to say that the F-117 was safe from 

detection by all tactically relevant Iraqi threat radars. It is possible that 

the odd Iraqi radar operator detected a brief perturbation on his scope as 

an F-117 passed through his radar coverage. Such perturbations, however 

would have been brief in duration, difficult to detect, and next to impossible to exploit tactically. The relevant datum is that the F-117’s radar 

signature has been selectively tailored to provide the greatest protection 

against systems representing the greatest threat; that is to say, “shooter” 

systems-surface-to-air and air-to-air missile acquisition, guidance, and 

control radars and antiaircraft artillery fire control radars. 

In fact, the evidence suggests that the F-117 was detected rarely, if at all, 

and certainly not by “shooter” systems within their engagement 

envelopes. The aircraft’s record of 1,299 sorties without damage argues 

persuasively that the F-117 was not detected by Iraqi radars in any 

tactically useful manner. 

%he nickname was inspired by a vampire-like female comic book character, Elvira, 

%I1 Sweetman and James Goodall, Lockheed F-117: Operation and Development 

Mistress of the Night. 

of the Stealth Fighter (Osceola, Wisconsin: 1990), pp 58-60. 

243 
The primary supporting element and the second pillar of the F-117’s 

tactical effectiveness is Elvira, the mission planning computer. 

[DELETED]. As an F-117 pilot on the GWAPS staff put it, “We walk in 

the shadows and Elvira finds the dark corners for us.” 

In addition to the F-117’s low radar signature and Elvira’s flight path 

optimization, Gulf War planners and tacticians used the presence of 

additional aircraft providing radar targets in the same general airspace to 

further reduce the possibility of detection. This enhancement to low 

observability was partly technological, partly physiological, and partly 

psychological. Quoting a former commander of the F-117’s parent unit, 

the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing, “The F-117 is not an invisible airplane, 

but it gets a lot closer to being invisible when people on radar scopes are 

occupied with seeing lots of other, more observable, aircraft on the 

scopes.’” This phenomenon reflects the limits of radar technology at the 

interface between scope display and human operator. Most current-generation radars, particularly airborne radars, have computer-generated 

displays that “clean up” the scope by removing clutter and false returns 

from the visual scope display through various analytical algorithms. The 

algorithms are highly effective in increasing display clarity, but they tend 

to eliminate precisely the kinds of weak and ambiguous returns a stealthy 

platform produces. Bypassing the computer-generated display and reverting to raw return would increase the chances of painting a low observable 

target such as the F-117 on the scope, but would also reintroduce clutter 

and increase the number of false returns. 

Those connected with the F-117 program were well aware of the 

above phenomena because of their extensive experience on the Tonopah 

ranges well before Desert Shield. Nevertheless, pre-deployment tactical 

concepts envisioned Black Jets operating autonomously.* The idea of 

using the F-117s as part of an integrated attack plan emerged early in 

Desert Shield, primarily as a means of enhancing total force effectiveness. 

Black Jets were assigned the most heavily defended targets because they 

were least vulnerable to detection. The F-117 did not depend on 

Brig Gen Anthony Tolin, oral intvw with John F. Guilmartin, Nellis AFB, NV, 30 

Jan 1992. Then Col Tolin handed over command of the 371h to his replacement, Col A1 

Whitley, on 15 Aug 1990. He then served briefly as F-117 liaison with Headquarters 

TAC before proceeding to Riyadh, where he served in the “Black Hole” planning cell 

under Brig Gen Buster Glosson. 

I 

STolin intvw, p 10. 

244 
electronic warfare suppart to penetrate Iraqi defenses-to the contrary, on 

several occasions, friendly jamming posed a threat to F-117s by 

stimulating Iraqi barrage fire-but planners were aware that the presence 

of multiple targets in hostile airspace would give the Black Jets an extra 

margin of safety. [DELETED].9 [DELETED]. 

An important component of the F-117’s stealthiness is its low visual 

signature. Low observable technology was in its infancy when the F-117 

design concept gelled in 1975.’’ The result was an aircraft which was, 

and is, essentially a bomb dropper. The F-117 has the normal maneuverability one would expect from a fighter aircraft of its size, weight, and 

planform,” but cockpit visibility is poor and the F-117 would be 

extremely vulnerable to a visually aimed gun attack in air-to-air combat. 

The obvious solution is to attack under cover of darkness, a logical 

choice, since the F-117 is just as vulnerable to optical-tracking antiaircraft 

artillery or surface-to-air missiles as any other aircraft . . . if the gunners 

can see it. The F-117’s black RAM (radar absorptive material) and faceted 

design serve to reduce visual signature as well as radar signature, and the 

Black Jet is extremely hard to acquire visually in the dark.’* 

The third pillar of the F-117’s tactical effectiveness in the Gulf War 

was its offensive ordnance suite. The suite had two main components. 

9(S) Information from Maj Robert Eskridge. Maj Eskridge, an F-I17 pilot, was a 

Black Hole mission planner and flew seven F-117 missions during Desert Storm. 

“Before 1975, Lockheed Aircraft Company engineers had used state-of-the-art computer analysis to design a small piloted aircraft that could, quoting F-117 Program 

Manager Paul Martin, ‘‘traverse the same threat field as an SR-71, but at a speed and 

altitude that would permit accurate weapons delivery.” On the basis of these tests, Ben 

Rich, Director of Lockheed’s Advanced Development Projects Division-the so-called 

Skunk Works-received company approval to submit an unsolicited bid to the Air Force 

to build two flight test vehicles to demonstrate the feasibility of a stealth fighter. The 

proposal was funded in mid-1976 under the code name Have Blue. Have Blue produced 

two sub-scale prototypes of what was to become the F-117; Sweetman, “Lifting the 

Curtain,” p 159. 

“Planform is defined as the shape of an aircraft’s lifting surfaces when viewed from 

above. Deep delta planforms similar to that of the F-117 exhibit a sharp rise in induced 

drag, that is, drag produced attendant to lift, in high-g maneuvering flight. In lay terms, 

they slow down rapidly when they turn hard. 

‘20bviously, all aircraft are more difficult to see under low light conditions, but 

normal aircraft have a multitude of curved and angled reflective surfaces that pick up and 

reflect even small amounts of light, facilitating visual detection. 

245 
First was the GBU-27, a Paveway I11 laser guidance kit mated to a 

BLU-109/I-2000 bomb body with the tail fins shortened slightly to fit the 

F-117's bomb bay.I3 The second component was the combined FLIWDLIR 

(forward looking infrareadownward looking infrared) imaging system 

with an integral laser de~ignator.'~ The FLIWDLIR system, peculiar to the 

F-117, provides 360 degree coverage beneath the aircraft and has an 

excellent cockpit display and high-quality video. In combination with the 

F-117's ability to safely attack from medium-altitudes, this suite 

consistently yielded high accuracy. The ability to achieve this accuracy 

in a high-threat environment was unprecedented. 

The fourth pillar comprised the high standards of morale, motivation, 

and training of 37th Tactical Fighter Wing pilots, a matter of relevance 

here, since it was expressed operationally in terms of bombing accuracy. 

It is revealing as well that the 37th produced a particularly complete and 

historically useful cockpit video record of its attacks." 

Ironically, the faith of senior commanders and staff members in the 

Black Jet's accuracy had been compromised by press coverage of its first 

and only previous combat employment, in Operation Just Cause. In that 

operation, two F-117s had been tasked to drop bombs about fifty meters 

from a Panamanian Defense Force Barracks as a diversion. The pilots 

dropped as ordered and achieved hits close to the barracks. In the 

aftermath of the operation, an enterprising reporter obtained a quote from 

a DOD official implying that the bombs were to have been dropped 

precisely fifty meters from the barracks. He then visited Panama, 

measured the distance from the craters to the barracks, obtained a value 

greater than fifty meters, and filed a widely published story implying that 

'3Sweetman and Goodall, pp 58-60. 

I41bid. 

"Comment by Capt Edward Wolfe, USAF, 11 Aug 1992, supported by authors' 

observation. An ordnance effects engineer formerly assigned to the USAF Weapons Test 

Laboratory, Eglin AFB, FL, and assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency at time of 

writing, Wolfe compiled as comprehensive a record of cockpit attack video footage as 

possible so he could undertake a systematic comparison of bombing results observed and 

claimed against specific categories of targets, notably hardened shelters and bunkers. The 

37th videos were significantly more complete and better processed than those from other 

units. 

246 
the F-117 was inaccurate.I6 This helped to produce an interesting 

divergence in confidence in the Black Jet’s essential systems in the 

prelude to Desert Storm. F-117 pilots were utterly confident of their 

ability to place their bombs precisely on their designated mean points of 

impact, but the fighter’s stealthiness remained an unproven quality to 

them.I7 Conversely, as one ascended the chain of command-bear in mind 

that the F- 1 17 had only recently come out of the “black” world-there was 

increasing faith in the aircraft’s stealthiness and increasing skepticism of 

its bombing accuracy.” 

F-117 Limitations 

If acquired visually, like all aircraft the F-117 would have been 

subject to visual air-to-air interception. Simply put, its best defense 

against aerial interception was its ability to defeat both radar and visual 

acquisition. This meant, in practical terms, that it is best employed at 

night. [DELETED]. 

F-117 in Desert Storm 

Operating exclusively at night, the F-117 penetrated the densest and 

most sophisticated Iraqi air defenses with impunity. Its success was 

primarily a product of its inherent stealthiness, but smart tactics increased 

the tactical advantage. Most Black Jet strikes were flown after the Iraqi 

air defense net had been seriously degraded, but it is well to remember 

that F-117s initiated attacks on those defenses when they were still 

operating at something at least theoretically approaching full capability. 

Stealth comprised half of the F-117’s tactical effectiveness; the second 

half of the effectiveness equation was offensive capability. Simply put, 

a platform that could drop 2,000-pound bombs precisely on selected 

targets, an inherent product of being able to drop from medium altitudes 

in straight and level flight, was an enormous asset to Coalition planners. 

More than any single platform, the Black Jet made Desert Storm 

fundamentally different tactically from previous air campaigns. 

‘bichael R. Gordon, “Stealth’s Panama Mission Reported Marred by Error,’’ New 

”Gen Tolin reports F-117 pilots suiting up for the first night’s attacks over Baghdad 

‘‘hid, pp 13-14. 

York Times, National edition, Wednesday, April 4, 1989, p B5. 

saying “I sure hope this stealth s- works!” under their breath; Tolin intvw, p 12. 

247 
TL4M and CALCM Strengths 

The Navy Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and the Air Force 

Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) had their genesis in 

the early 1970s as an early military exploitation of miniaturized 

microchip-based guidance and navigation systems. TLAM uses terrain 

contour mapping (Tercom) radar to update the inertial guidance and 

navigation systems supplemented by terminal updates from digitized 

scene matching area correlation (DSMAC).I9 CALCM uses global 

positioning system (GPS) for both en route navigation and terminal 

accuracy. TLAM and CALCM differ from earlier air-breathing cruise missiles in three important respects: accuracy, reliability, and size. Both 

missiles are extremely accurate, although CALCM’S accuracy depends on 

the accuracy of the GPS coordinates. Given terrain suitable for DSMAC 

updates within a reasonable distance of the target, TLAM can be expected 

to strike within tens of feet of the selected point of impact?’ CAWM is 

not terrain dependent and has an accuracy of a similar order.*’ Note, 

however, that accuracy depends on the precise accuracy of the target 

coordinates, whereas DSMAC updates do not. Both TLAM and CALCM 

displayed remarkable reliability in light of their con-siderable complexity; 

this was almost entirely attributable to the inherent reliability of 

microchip circuitry. The diminutive sizes of the missiles are in part a 

product of the extreme compactness of microchip avionics and in part a 

product of the efficiency of the small, high-performance turbojet engines 

that power them. The engines are designed for an extremely short service 

life and can hence be made considerably lighter than would be possible 

otherwise. 

The abilities of both missiles to penetrate enemy defenses are functions of their extremely small radar and visual signatures and low cruising 

altitudes. They fly almost entirely below ground-based radar coverage, 

‘Vercom develops terrain profiles using a radar altimeter; DSMAC views an area of 

land beneath the missile, digitizes the picture, and compares it with a similarly digitized 

picture of the same terrain stored in memory to determine the missile’s precise position. 

2%is accuracy is primarily due to the precision of the inertial navigation systems, 

but even the best inertial systems have a certain amount of “drift”; that is, the indicated 

position departs from the actual position as a function of time. Tercom and terminal 

DSMAC updates ensure accuracy by re-zeroing the inertial system. 

(S) Maj Karns, “Bullet Background Paper on Conventional ALCM in Desert Storm,” 

Hq SAC/DOOQ. 3 Mar 92. p 1. 

21 

248 
and while they are potentially vulnerable to detection from above by 

airborne doppler radars, their radar signatures are sufficiently small to 

counter known active and semiactive radar homing air-to-air missiles. 

They are extremely difficult to acquire visually, which protects them from 

a gun attack by an intercepting fighter, and their small infrared signatures 

render them essentially immune to infrared homing missiles. Finally, 

their engines are relatively quiet. With low aural and visual signatures, 

particularly from the front, TLAM and CALCM strike with little warning. 

The basic TLAM C warhead is a 1,000-pound high-explosive 

“Bullpup” warhead, effective against light structures and general-purpose 

buildings of mixed concrete and steel construction.?2 It is not adequate 

for attacks on hardened targets. In addition to the normal horizontal 

attack profile, TLAM has a pop-up attack mode in which the missile dives 

into the target. One TLAM variant is fitted with a cluster munition dispenser for attacks on “soft” targets such as aircraft and vehicles in the 

open. 

The CALCM’S terminal effects reflect the missile’s role as a conventional suppressive munition designed to support penetration of enemy defenses by piloted bombers. The CALCM’S high explosive fragmentation 

warhead is designed to attack soft targets?3 Nevertheless, CALCM was 

apparently effective in Desert Storm against electrical generator switching 

facilities and exposed communications relay fa~ilities.2~ In contrast to 

TLAM, generalizations concerning CALCM effectiveness in Desert Storm 

must be treated with caution in light of the small number fired. 

During Desert Storm, 282 TLAMs were launched, attained cruise 

flight, and proceeded toward their targets. Of these, 226 were timed for 

22David A. Fulghum. “Secret Carbon-Fiber Warheads Blinded Iraqi Defenses,” 

23(S) CENTCOM/13 Msg 28 I950 Jun 9 I. 

’“S) Maj Karns, p 2. 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 27 Apr 1992, pp 18-19. 

249 
daylight impact and 56 were timed to hit at night?5 [DELETED]?6 35 

CALCMS were successfully launched.27 [DELETED]. 

Tables 10 and 11 summarize CALCM and TLAM targeting in the 

critical first 48 hours of Desert Storm. The 137 TLAMs and CALCMs fired 

in the first 24 hours were more or less evenly distributed among “strategic” targets with indirect or limited tactical value: twenty-four missiles 

attacked leadership targets and 54 missiles attacked strategic targets with 

no tactical value (that is, chemical and oil facilities). Forty-two missiles 

attacked targets associated with electrical power generation; while not 

tactical in the normal sense, these targets were selected in part to interfere 

with enemy tactical communications. Seventeen missiles attacked command and control targets with direct tactical relevance. These strikes 

encompassed no less than 79 percent of night TLAM firings. 

TLAM and CALCM Limitations 

[DELETED]?’ [DELETED]. 

TLAM and CALCM in Desert Storm 

TLAM and CALCM were capable of precision daylight strikes in areas 

denied to piloted platforms by the density of Iraqi defenses, particularly 

radar-guided surface-to-air missiles, and were the only Coalition weapons 

with this capability. TLAM effectively complemented the F-I17 by 

keeping pressure on the most heavily defended areas by 

25There were 298 attempts to fire; (S/NF/WN/NC) GWAPS Statistical Compendium, 

Table 202, “Desert ShieldStorm: USN Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY 91$).” 

(SMF) Of the firing attempts, 9 missiles failed to launch and 6 failed in boost phase; 

(SMF) May 1991 briefing on Tomahawk Enyloymenf and Effectiveness During Desert 

Storm, by Cmdr Roy Balaconis from JCS/J-3. 

26(S/NF) Cmdr Balaconis Briefing. 

27GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table 188, “Desert ShieldDesert Storm: USAF 

Weapons Cost and Utilization (FY W).” 

CDR Steve Froggett, USN (Ret), ”Tomahawk in the Desert,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings, Jan 1992, p 12. 

28 

250 
Table 10 

TLAM and CALCM Targets: First 24 Hoursz9 

Nature Type of Missiles 

Day or Night of Targets Fired 

electrical TLAM 

Night leadership TLAM 

chemical TLAM 

electrical 

c2 

electrical 

Daylight chemical 

leadership 

oil 

CALCM 

CALCM 

TLAM 

TLAM 

TLAM 

TLAM 

Table 11 

TLAM Targets: Second 24 Hoursm 

Nature Type of Missiles 

Day or Night of Targets Fired 

leadership 

oil 

Daylight electric 

air defense 

electrical 

TLAM 

TLAM 

TLAM 

TLAM 

restrikes (may not have gone) 

29(S) Muster Atruck Plan, “First 24 Hours,’’ 16 Jan 1991, for numbers of CALCMs 

m(S) Ibid. 

assigned against specific target sets. 

25 1 
day. In terms of terminal effects, the “LAM C was highly effective against 

soft structures, mixed-construction buildings, and nonhardened command 

and control facilities. Air defense-associated communications facilities 

were particularly suitable targets. The reader is urged to consult the 

appropriate sections of the Effects and Effectiveness report for a 

comprehensive overview, but it is fair to say that daylight TLAM strikes 

in the Baghdad area helped maintain the tempo of offensive air 

operations, particularly during the first 48 hours of the air campaign. 

Only speculative conclusions can be drawn concerning the psychological 

impact of TLAM strikes as the campaign wore on; however, the 

unheralded detonation of warheads at night and the eerie spectacle of 

small vehicles homing on targets with seemingly human intelligence must 

have had an impa~t.~’ 

Precision Attack Versus Mass Bombing 

Desert Storm witnessed a fundamental change in the tactical and 

technological means of causing a given amount of destruction to a 

specific target. Previously, the requisite level of destruction could be 

increased by increasing the mass of bombs dropped, by improving the 

inherent accuracy of the bombing platform, or both. In Desert Storm, the 

availability of precision-guided air-to-surface munitions, particularly laserguided bombs (LGBS), caused a fundamental rethinking of the means of 

achieving the destruction goal. The following pages address how and 

why that change took place. The discussion concentrates on bombs in the 

narrow sense. While there is an overlap in tactical function between 

precision-guided bombs and certain air-to-ground missiles, notably the 

AGM-65 Maverick, bombs were-and are-far less costly, both in cost per 

round and in cost per unit of destructive energy expended?* The air-to31The only available direct evidence of this conclusion is in press reports based on 

eyewitness observations by reporters in Baghdad in the initial stages of the air campaign. 

A British correspondent, from his room in the A1 Rasheed Hotel. observed a Tomahawk 

fly down the street below him, turn the corner, and strike the Communications Ministry 

building at the end of the next block. His story reflected a positive and surprised reaction 

to the missile’s technological sophistication; National Public Radio broadcast. 

32A rough comparison of numbers and cost of munitions dropped or tired in the Gulf 

War by U.S. forces by category (Ha USAFLCS, Combat Support Division and 1990 

Weapons File; pp 585-89) yields the results tabulated below. The AGM-62B Walleye 

free fall EOGB is included in the guided-bomb totals and the powered AGM-I23A Skipper 

and AGM-84B SLAM are in the air-to-surface missile totals. The AGM-I14 Hellfire and 

252 
ground missiles fall into a category distinct from aerial bombs in terms of 

complexity, cost, and delivery tactics, and are therefore excluded from the 

following analysis. In light of the Gulf War’s nature, the analysis deals 

almost entirely with attacks on ground targets and focuses on the relative 

merits of mass (or pattern bombing) and precision-meaning precisionguided-bombing. The section addresses many of the same tactical issues 

as found in the next section, “Twenty-Four-Hour Air War,” but from a 

different perspective, and should be read in conjunction with it. 

In the early days of aerial warfare, bomb-aiming systems were 

limited by the visual acuity of the human eye, the ballistic and aerodynamic characteristics of the and the ability-or inability-to 

predict accurately the density and movement of the air through which the 

bombs fell. As long as these conditions applied, the primary substitute 

for accuracy in achieving target destruction was to increase the number 

of weapons dropped, to increase their individual size, or to increase the 

explosive yield of the bomb filler. Efforts were made to increase 

accuracy by maximizing the effectiveness of eyeball-controlled release, 

but these invariably ran up against the fundamental limits of visual acuity 

mentioned above. The classic attempt was the Norden bombsight of 

World War 11, a tactical linchpin of the U.S. Army Air Forces precision 

strategic bombardment campaign. This sight effectively integrated the 

bombardier’s eye and the aircraft as the two travelled together in a threedimensional medium, seeking the precise point in time and space from 

which bombs released at a given forward velocity would hit the target 

under the prevailing atmospheric conditions. Although highly accurate 

for its day, it was not capable of precision bombing as we now 

the BGM-71 TOW helicopter-fired missiles are included in the air to surface missile 

totals: 

Unguided Bombs Number Dropped Total Cost 

MK-82/83/84, M-117, UK-1000, 

CBU-52/72/78/87/89. MK-20 209,940 $431,960,550.00 

GBU-I WI 2/15/16/24/27/28, AGM-62B 9,473 $307,592,641 .OO 

Guided Bombs 

Air-@Surface Missiles 

AGM-123A. AGM-fMB, AGM-65, 

AGM-I 14, BGM-71 5,647 $550,797.084.00 

3%’he ballistic and aerodynamic characteristics of free-fall bombs affect accuracy in 

two ways: First, some shapes and combinations of shape and mass are inherently more 

accurate than others. Second, variations between bombs in shape and mass produce 

variations in trajectory. 

253 
understand the term. In addition, as with all optical bombsights, the 

Norden was of limited value at night. 

The enormous tactical advantages of being able to bomb in darkness 

and through meteorological obscuration-the fundamental impediments to 

visual aiming-were apparent from the beginning of aerial ~arfare.~ 

Celestial navigation could be used to determine aircraft position above an 

undercast and was effective at night, but never approached the levels of 

accuracy necessary for blind bombing. This spurred attempts to develop 

methods of locating targets by electronic means. The Germans used 

directional radio beams to mark attack axes and bomb release points 

during the Battle of Britain; their methods, while sufficiently accurate for 

attacks on city-sized targets, proved vulnerable to electronic 

countermea~ures.~~ The Royal Air Force, followed by the U.S. Army Air 

Forces, applied aerial radar to blind bombing after 1942.” Success was 

initially limited, but by the end of the war, blind bombing from mediumaltitude under ideal conditions could approach visual bombing in 

ac~uracy.9~ 

Bombing from low altitude was recognized as an effective solution 

to the accuracy problem from the beginning, but as long as visual aiming 

was necessary, the tactical disadvantages generally out-weighed the gain 

in accuracy. Low-altitude visual attacks against defended targets were 

and are inherently dangerous. If visibility is good enough for the pilot 

%is impetus was felt most strongly in Europe, where the weather is cloudy and 

the nights long for most of the year. Limiting bombing to daylight gives the enemy 

automatic sanctuary about half the time, and adverse weather adds to the effect. 

Similarly, clouds and rain are less of a detriment to repair and restoration of bomb 

damage than a heavy overcast is to bombing. 

3?he British “bent” the beams by transmitting on the same frequency with the 

appropriate direction and power. 

36The Army Air Forces in World War 11. Vol 11, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, Aug 

1942 to Dec 1943, 7 Vols (Chicago, 1L: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp 

660-90,720. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. 

37The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol Ill, Europe: Argument to VE Day, Jan 

1944 to May 1945 (Washington D.C., Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp 19-20,667. 

See also USSBS, Oil Division Final Report, p 4 of Figure 7. In attacks on three selected 

oil plants, 8th AF bombers dropping visually put 26.8 percent of their bombs within the 

plant area. RAF Bomber Command attacks dropping on parts designated by radar-equipped 

path finders achieved 15.8 percent. 

254 
or bombardier to see the target, it is good enough for defending gunners 

to see and engage the attacking aircraft. Under some circumstances, the 

gain was felt to justify the risk-the Ploesti raid of August 1943 is a 

classic example-but losses were almost always high.38 Low-altitude night 

attack provided a solution in principle, but not in practice. While 

darkness provided concealment from visually aimed defensive systems, 

flying into obstacles or the ground was a major problem, and target 

acquisition was difficult to impossible. Only the advent of capable 

terrain-avoidancdterrain-following radar in the mid- 1 960s made possible 

the exploitation of the inherent accuracy of low-altitude bombing by 

night. The developments and relationships in question are discussed 

further in the next section, "lbenty-Four-Hour Air War." Here, it is 

sufficient to say that low-altitude bombing achieves accuracy by reducing 

the time and distance from release point to target. 

The problem of achieving precision accuracy from all altitudes was 

solved, in principle, by the transistor revolution, which made possible the 

development of electro-optically guided bombs (EOGBS) and laser- guided 

bombs in the late 1960s. Previously, two basic methods existed for 

increasing the likelihood of target destruction. The first was to build 

larger aircraft capable of carrying heavier loads. The second was to send 

out greater numbers of aircraft. Within the radius of destruction produced 

by a large aircraft carrying a large bomb load, planners could determine 

statistical expectations of destroying various kinds of targets. The method 

was particularly appropriate for large fixed targets. It was virtually 

useless against moving targets such as ships or tanks, since the density of 

bomb strikes within the circular error probable (CEP) of the bombing 

platform was insufficient to ensure effective destr~ction.~~ Moreover, if 

military targets were located in urban areas, collateral damage to surrounding facilities and civilian life could be considerable. In WW 11, 

both sides considered the responsibility for such collateral damage to lie 

with the national owner of the target, since the collocation of target and 

urban area were his responsibility. The attacking air force was required 

to ensure only that bombing was not indiscriminate, wantonly without 

38The Army Air Forces in World War 11, Vol 11, pp 477-83. An analogous example 

in naval warfare is the use of dive and torpedo bombers against warships in World War 

11; again, losses were almost always high. 

39The Army Air Forces in World War 11, Vol 111, p 192. 

255 
aim or military purpose.@ During the Vietnam War, however, this willingness to accept and inflict collateral damage came increasingly under 

challenge and has remained so since, on political if not on legal grounds. 

This factor should be borne in mind, in considering the relative merits of 

precision and mass bombardment. 

Once technologies capable of precisely guiding bombs to a point 

analogous to the designated mean point of impact (DMPI) became 

available, moving point targets could be destroyed with a single weapon. 

That, however, did not eliminate the tactical value of platforms carrying 

large numbers of unguided weapons. Notable among these in Desert 

Storm was the B-52, although the F-l 1 I, A-6, and F-15E performed the 

same role on occasion, and the F/A-l8 and F-16 dropped dumb bombs 

almost exclusively. The analysis presented here will focus on the B-52, 

since it is, by virtue of its large bomb load and lack of a LGB designator 

capability, the limiting case. As did its ancestors, the B-17, B-24, and 

Lancaster, the B-52 in a conventional bombing role in Desert Storm 

depended on releasing a large number of bombs into a defined circle to 

produce statistically predictable levels of destruction. The B-52’s vulnerability and resultant exposure of a large crew to enemy defensive systems 

were the principal drawbacks; the large tonnage of bombs it carried was 

the primary benefit. That benefit came into play in situations in which 

precision was not the most efficient, most effective, cheapest, lowest risk, 

or most humane method of achieving the desired tactical objective. In 

short, some targets in some situations were more effectively and 

efficiently attacked in the old fashioned way: through mass and statistical 

inevitability. 

One such target in the Gulf War was the Taji weapons manufacturing complex north of Baghdad. Described in the Strategic Air 

Command History of the Gulf War as a “classic strategic target,” the Taji 

complex sprawled over several square miles and contained multiple 

complexes and facilities. In assessing the nature of this target and the 

appropriate tactics to use in attacking it, the USCENTAF Commander 

stated: 

%. Hays Parks. “Air War and the Law of War,” The Air Force Law Review, 

Vol 32, No. 1, p 55. 

256 
We wanted to attack Taji [with fighters] but its size and defenses just 

didn't justify the exposure of airplanes carrying one or two bombs, 

because they'd take out only one or two buildings, so we had to send 

the B-52s against it. 

In fact, B-52 pattern bombing proved effective (see Taji weapons 

manufacturing complex photo^).^' From 10 to 27 February, B-52Gs 

attacked the complex with sixty-eight sorties, carrying nearly three thousand 

bombs, and inflicted widespread and severe damage on the complex." 

By contrast, numerous targets in Iraq demanded precision weapons, 

although they were statistically vulnerable to destruction by mass 

bombing. This was due to the limited resources available for operational 

reasons and/or to the desire to limit collateral damage to civilians or 

nonmilitary infrastructure. In principle, individual Iraqi Defense Ministry 

buildings scattered throughout Baghdad could have been attacked with 

mass drops of gravity bombs from a variety of platforms, including the 

B-52. That option was rejected for straight-forward reasons: the large 

number of sorties required to accomplish the desired levels of destruction 

to individual buildings; the increased risk to the weapons delivery system; 

the high collateral damage caused by bombs that, while statistically on 

target (that is within the CEP), would miss the precise aimpoint; and the 

inability to achieve the strategic paralysis inflicted on the Iraqi command 

and control infrastructure by the near simultaneous detonation of highexplosive ordnance on critical nodes in the Iraqi system. These 

considerations drove planners toward choosing almost exclusively 

precision weapons to attack the targets in question. 

The systematic attack on the bridges in Iraq is another example of 

how the choice of weapon systems impacted operational decisions. The 

challenge was to deliver a weapon to a point where its detonation would 

collapse enough of the bridge to render it impassable. Again, this could 

be determined by statistically analyzing the predicted effects of the bomb 

blast and factoring in the probability that the aircraft would deliver the 

munition or munitions to the desired point on the bridge. 

41(S) Checkmate INTEL Target Files, CIT Folder #101, Taji Suspect BW Facility. 

42(S) Bomb damage assessment indicated that nearly complete reconstruction would 

be required to reach to prewar levels of production; (S/NF/WN/RD) History of the 

Strategic Air Command, Vol I, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1990, pp 260, 275. 

257 
PHOTO DELETED 

(Top) Taji weapons manufacturing complex, 8 September 1990. 

(Bottom) Tali complex after 8-52Gs attacked the complex with 68 sorties, 

and carrying nearly 3,000 bombs. 

PHOTO DELETED 

258 
The Air Force has long recognized a multiplicity of solutions in 

choosing among available weapons for specific targets. Based on many 

years of quantified weapons testing data, the Joint Munitions 

Effectiveness Manual is the foundation upon which predicted weapons 

effects are compared with desired damage levels to guide operations 

planners in selecting from available weapons, delivery platforms, delivery 

tactics, and other relevant parameters. The result is an empirical, 

statistical methodology that allows the planner to match specific aircraft 

and weapons to designated targets to produce the desired level of damage 

with the fewest resources and the least risk to aircraft and aircrew. The 

JMEM provides a range of answers to the question, what bomb on what 

airplane is best suited for a particular target? 

Examination of a representative target illustrates this point. The 

target-to-weapon match is not intuitively obvious, yet produces clear 

results. The illustration involves the requirement to severely damage a 

bridge by dropping any span, with the goal of rendering it impassable for 

an extended time. The bridge in question was assumed to be a reinforcedconcrete deck bridge with five spans, each 75 feet long and 22 feet wide. 

JMEM data and standard U.S. Air Force weaponeering procedures used in 

Desert Storm yield an array of choices. The performances of the 

following weapon-aircraft combinations are compared: an F-1 1 1F 

delivering precision electro-optical GBU-15 2,000-pound bombs; an F-16 

carrying MK-84 2,000-pound bombs; and a B-52 loaded with MK-82 500- 

pound bombs. While each alternative had a theoretical capability of 

severely damaging the bridge in question, the F- I I 1 F/GBU-15 

combination was clearly the best for the mission (see Table 12). 

Analysis of attacks on bridges during the war indicates that not all 

precision weapons were effective against these targets. [DELETED]. The 

same hard penetrating munitions with fuzing delays caused the bomb to 

explode well beneath the surface of the bridges with little damage to 

259 
Table 12 

Weapons and Sorties Required 

to Destroy a Reinforced Concrete Bridge43 

Target Description: Steel plate girder, reinforced concrete deck, deck-type 

highway bridge with five spans. 

Criterion: Drop any span 

Weapon System Alternatives: 

1. F-Il1F W/ GBU-15 

Fuze: Set for impact 

Delivery Tactic: [DELETED] 

Single-Sortie Probability of Damage:" High 

Sorties Required for Probability of Damage of 0.7: one 

2. F-16A Wl MK-84 

Fuze: Set for impact 

Delivery Tactic: 2,000 feet, [DELETED], High Stress Conditions4' 

Single-Sortie Probability of Damage -Low 

Sorties Required for Probability of Damage of 0.7:Greater than one 

3. B-52G Wl MK-82 

Fuze: Set for impact 

Delivery Tactic: [DELETED) 

Single-Sortie Probability of Damage: Very low 

Sorties Required: Much greater than one 

43(C) Results derived from paper provided by Air Force Intelligence Support Agency, 

Directorate of Targets, Subject: Bridge Weaponeering Problem, 18 Sep 1992. 

&(C) Single-Sortie Probability of Damage is the mathematical probability that the 

platform in question, dropping the weapon or weapons indicated, will achieve the level 

of damage desired on a single pass. 

45That is, the single-sortie probability of damage is adjusted to account for the high 

aircrew stress anticipated when using the delivery tactics indicated in a hostile 

environment. 

260 
the structure.46 Conversely, when the appropriate bomb-fuzing 

combinations were used, laser-guided bombs proved highly effective. 

The same comment applies to electro-optically guided bombs dropped by 

French Jaguars and laser-guided bombs dropped by Royal Air Force 

GR-1 s using buddy laser designation from Buccaneers!’ 

The advantages and limitations of the Smart Plane/Dumb Bomb 

concept are embodied in the F-16 weapons delivery system. The heart 

of the visual bombing system in the F-16 (and several other fighter 

aircraft) is the continuously computed impact point (alp). The fire 

control computer receives spatial data from onboard systems and 

instruments, including radar, INS, and air data computer, combines the 

data with the known ballistic characteristics of the weapon selected for 

delivery, and calculates the predicted impact of the weapon, should it be 

released at that instant. A pipper, displaying the predicted impact point, 

appears on the heads-up-display (HUD). The pilot maneuvers the aircraft 

to superimpose target and pipper and releases his weapons. From this 

point the “smart” airplane can do nothing more to influence the impact 

point of the “dumb” bombs. The impact point is determined by the 

ballistics of the weapon, wind, altitude, and other uncontrollable 

variables. Pilots of smart airplanes, such as the F-16, F/A-18 and E15E, 

increase accuracy by placing their aircraft in the best possible positions 

to release the weapons. The CCIP and fire control computer systems are 

designed to eliminate as much error as possible before weapons release. 

Chapter 3 of this report contains a description of the process, and 

Figure 15 graphically illustrates the impact of the uncontrollable variables 

affecting dumb bombs released from smart airplanes. 

The value of mass bombing from large, high-capacity bombing 

platforms is the confluence of physical destruction and psychological 

effects that these weapons produce. These effects contrast sharply with 

those of precision weapons bombing. Within the radius of the circular 

error probable, no target is certain to be hit, but all targets are liable to 

be hit by precision weapons. An individual soldier observing the 

destruction of high-value targets by precision-guided munitions could 

survive, and even keep himself combat capable, by staying away from 

(S/NF/WN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, Jul 1991, pp 7-1 I, 7-12. 46 

47Carole A. Shifron, “Britain’s Gulf Role Highlights Value of Flexible Tactics, New 

Technology,” Aviation Weekfy and Space Technology, 22 Apr 1991, pp 104-107. 

26 1 
valuable equipment likely to be targeted. In Desert Storm, Coalition 

psychological operations reinforced this obvious conclusion by dropping 

leaflets specifically warning Iraqi soldiers to stay away from heavy 

equipment. 

Large maneuvering units in the field were excellent targets for mass 

bombing. Maneuvering units remained effective until the individual 

members decided that cohesion was no longer desirable, worthwhile, or 

possible. A huge number of precision sorties, at overall greater risk and 

expense, would have been needed to break the cohesion of the soldiers 

if the technique had been to strike only high-value targets within the 

defined area. In fact, logistics and risk factors were actually greater for 

precision weapons, since repeated attacks would have been necessary 

until a large number of armored weapons, artillery, and combat vehicles 

were destroyed, and also until the effective means of feeding and 

otherwise supplying the remaining troops were eliminated. How many 

precision sorties this would have taken is problematical, but certainly a 

large number. The expense of the precision weapons, the fuel for the 

multitudes of small aircraft, the feeding of the pilots, maintenance 

personnel, and replacement spares for the aircraft would have been 

considerable. Once the Iraqi soldiers realized the nature of the attack, 

they could have made themselves fundamentally immune from personal 

harm by distancing themselves from observable military targets. This 

would have, at least potentially, maintained unit cohesion, requiring 

ground assault to eliminate the unit as a threat. There is some evidence 

that Iraqi soldiers and units responded in this way!* 

The evidence suggests that the Iraqis were used to defending their 

positions without using mobile armor and that they expected ground 

assaults by light infantry, as they had faced in the Iran-Iraq War.49 The 

evidence further suggests that ground assault, Iranian-style, would not in 

itself have been sufficient to produce the sudden collapse that 

characterized the ground phase of Desert Storm. Precisely why front line 

Iraqi troops surrendered quickly and in large numbers remains a matter 

for speculation. The fact remains, however, that these units were 

repeatedly hit by B-52s, and the statistical randomness of the bombing, 

combined with its inherent massiveness, is very likely the answer. As 

%) 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, JDC Report W52, 11 Mar 1991. 

49[DELETED] 

262 
indicated earlier, uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of statistical 

attack. The evidence suggests that in the Gulf War, the physiological 

results of surviving near misses by 500-pound bombs went beyond the 

merely unpleasant and affected an Iraqi’s basic will to fight and his 

expectation of 

The use of precision-guided munitions can be inappropriate or 

impossible against some types of targets. The classic example is a large 

mobile military unit, in which precise location and identification of 

individual targets is impossible or impractical. It would be possible to 

cripple an armored unit by destroying each of its vehicles individually 

with precision-guided munitions. This tactic of attrition by precision 

munitions would, however, take many sorties, much time, and considerable quantities of relatively expensive precision weapons. In the 

Gulf War, this technique could not be effectively undertaken by smart 

planes-dumb bombs combinations, such as the F-16, from medium- or 

high-altitudes; the bombing systems were not sufficiently accurate and the 

bomb loads were too small to make up the difference. In short, some 

targets are appropriate for the statistically oriented JMEM approach. The 

following paragraphs explain why in some detail. 

The destruction of some units by precision weapons would have 

required an enormous and costly effort, especially when the same units 

could be functionally destroyed by relatively dumb airplanes dropping 

dumb bombs. Destruction of a unit’s tanks one by one would be 

unnecessary if the unit as a whole, and particularly its moral cohesion, 

could be broken by massive bombardment. Experience dating back to 

WW I1 has demonstrated that high-level bombing of armored units is 

unlikely to destroy tanks; chance alone produces a few hits close enough 

to destroy individual tanks. However, an armored unit is functional only 

as a cohesive unit, not as a collection of individual tanks, and incessant 

aerial pounding can break a unit without destroying all, or even a 

majority, of its parts. The real limit is the ability of the troops to absorb 

the pounding, since individual decisions to cease fire will eventually 

render the unit useless tactically. Soldiers may desert (leave their unit 

and go home), defect (present themselves as prisoners), or, if unable to 

leave the killing ground, desert in place, that is, consciously or 

unconsciously cease to be a functioning member of the unit. Backing up 

50(S) Intelligence Information Report #2 340 2494 91. 

263 
the aerial bombardment by specific suggestions through psychological 

operations radio, leaflets, and loudspeakers can speed up the process if 

the bombardment is perceived as personally threatening by the members 

of the unit. The minimum accuracy is therefore defined as a perceivable 

credible strike distance that maintains individual fear at a high pitch. 

This distance does not necessarily coincide with the location of the unit. 

Should an attacker be known for having an inexhaustible supply of 

aircraft and bombs, the effect and the effective psychological distance 

will be increased. Should the personal motivations of those in the 

targeted unit be low, the perceived credible distance can grow to the point 

that the circular error probable desired becomes the range of human 

hearing of the detonating bombs. Even bombs that miss all units will be 

assumed by members of each unit to be hitting someone else, and if 

severed communications ensure they can not compare notes, total misses 

will add to the overall effect. Iraqi prisoners were very specific about 

the effect the bombing of other units within earshot had on their combat 

capability and morale. Although the Iraqis were rarely able to 

differentiate between the systems bombing them, they were always 

impressed by the results. They also confirmed the importance of random 

bombing in inducing helplessness and surrender among enemy troops 

before launching a ground assault. 

Although the A-10 was able to create the same anxiety as more 

random systems, it generally functioned as a precision weapon by firing 

its GAU-8 gun and Maverick missiles at tanks. According to Iraqi 

prisoner reports, the principle source of anxiety produced by A-10s was 

the aircraft's sustained loitering capability. As long as the A-10 was in 

the target area, everything within eyesight was subject to attack. Given 

their great accuracy, the psychological effects of the A-10s were: the 

enemy did not know which target would be attacked, and the aircraft 

seemed omnipresent?' Any soldier could suddenly become the target; if 

he were unfortunate enough to attract the attention of the omnipresent 

weapon, death seemed certain. The only alternative was defection, and 

many took it. The lack of any effective air defense gave rise to complete 

hopelessness, which magnified the effect?2 

sl[DELETED] 

s2[ DELETED] 

264 
Randomness and helplessness combined to achieve the same effect. 

The B-52s used both 500-pound iron bombs and cluster bomb units. One 

prisoner, apparently a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, stated that Coalition 

bombing had been “the worst thing he had ever experienced in a combat” 

and went on to assert that the B-52s were particularly bad. 

[DELETED]?3 [DELETED]. Effects were uneven; the Republican 

Guard apparently remained cohesive to the bitter end, but there can be 

little doubt as to the overall adverse effect of B-52 area bombing on the 

Iraqi ground forces. 

[DELETED].% [DELETED]. These reported effects were anticipated 

and are validated by the reported experience of communist recipients of 

B-52 Arc Light strikes in the Vietnam War. A particularly eloquent 

account by a senior National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) cadre 

described the effects of a B-52 attack in the following terms: 

. . . it seemed, as I strained to press myself into the bunker floor, that 

I had been caught in the Apocalypse. The terror was complete. One 

lost control of bodily functions as the mind screamed incomprehensible 

orders to get out.” 

The same source stated that, 

for all the privations and hardships, nothing the guerrillas had to endure 

compared with the stark terrorization of the B-52 

bombardments . . . translated into an experience of undiluted psychological terror, into which we were plunged, day in, day out for years 

on end.% 

Warned by foreign radio stations that bombing would occur, Iraqi 

troops did not anticipate the ferocity of the attack. The prisoner cited 

above described the attacks as so continuous that the troops were rarely 

53(S) JDC Rpt #0052. 

”[DELETED] 

5%uong Nhu Tang with David Chanoff and Doan.Van Toai, A Vietcong Memoir 

(Vantage Books: New York, 19861, p 168. 

=lbid, pp 167-70. Tmong describes the effect of a 8-52 strike on a visiting Soviet 

delegation: “When it was over, no one had been hurt, but the entire delegation had 

sustained considerable damage to its dignity, uncontrollable trembling and wet pants from 

the all-too-obvious signs of inner convulsions.” 

265 
able to sleep for more than two hours at a time. The bombers eventually 

did not have to hit within his area to produce an effect because 

vibrations and sound travel great distances in the desert. The “horrified” 

men would quiver in fear as units far away were hit. He specifically 

stated that the sound effects spawned suspense and the fear that their unit 

would be next?’ Again, the randomness appears to have contributed to 

the effect. This same deserter clearly remembered and obeyed the 

Coalition leaflets’ exhortation to move away from heavy equipment, as 

did his compatriots. 

In conclusion, the experience of Coalition and U.S. air forces in 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm indicates that bombs delivered by 

precision guidance to a specific point and bombs delivered en masse to 

inflict statistically predicted damage had complementary roles. On one 

hand, precision-guided bombs were particularly suited for bombing highvalue, dense targets, particularly where dispersion and consequent 

collateral damage had to be tightly controlled. The least expensive and 

most commonly used precision-guided bombs were LGBS. On the other 

hand, dumb bombs were particularly suited for mass bombing of targets 

when goals included widespread damage and demoralized enemy troops. 

A number of platforms executed mass bombing effectively, but the B-52, 

with its 38,250-pound maximum bomb load and the ability to deliver it 

from high altitude, was considered the optimum performer.58 Also, the 

B-52 used cheap, nonprecision bombs and was able to deliver them 

effectively with the help of accurate navigation and near-real-time 

electronic surveillance. 

Twenty-Four-Hour Air War 

From the dawn of aerial warfare, military airmen appreciated the 

tactical advantages that would accrue from being able to penetrate enemy 

defenses under cover of clouds and darkness. They also sought to exploit 

the advantages of increasing pressure on an enemy by bringing air power 

to bear around the clock. The practical obstacles to achieving those 

goals, however, were formidable, and until recently, the notion of applying airpower unconstrained by weather and time of day was an unattainable ideal. Cursory analysis of the Gulf War suggests that the old limita57[DELETED] 

58(S) USCENTAF Combat Plans Handout, B-52 Standard Conventional Loads (ScLs). 

266 
tions no longer apply. A higher proportion of Coalition aerial platforms 

could deliver ordnance accurately at night than in any previous conflict, 

and the tempo of air operations varied little between daylight and darkness. Under certain circumstances, Coalition air power was able to strike 

more powerful blows at night than by day; the obvious example is the 

use of F-117s in the Baghdad area, where heavy defenses prevented 

overflights by manned platforms in daylight. Closer examination, 

however, suggests that the ability of Coalition air forces to strike Iraqi 

targets around the clock was simply a function of improved technical 

capabilities. This 24-hour coverage depended on an array of complex and 

connected variables including human factors, the capabilities of Iraqi 

defensive systems, and the bombing accuracy of specific systems. 

The ability to mount all weather air operations around the clock 

depends on several discrete but tactically related capabilities: First, and 

most basic, is the ability to fly in clouds and at night, a reality since the 

development of effective flight instruments and piloting techniques in the 

1920s and 1930s. Second is the ability to navigate accurately and locate 

targets at night and through clouds, smoke, and haze with sufficient 

precision to deliver ordnance. Airborne radar was used for this purpose 

with limited success in the latter stages of World War I1 (see the 

Chapter 4 section titled “Precision Attack Versus Mass Bombing”). 

Offset radar bombing, the ability to bomb a designated point by reference 

to the radar return of a presurveyed natural feature or cultural object some 

distance from the target, came of age in the 1950s, but bombers were 

unable to penetrate enemy defenses safely in darkness or adverse weather 

at altitudes low enough to defeat ground-based radar-controlled antiaircraft defenses. High-altitude bombing was sufficiently accurate only for 

area targets. 

The ability to bomb accurately at night and in adverse weather 

demonstrated in Desert Storm emerged from two developments of the 

mid-1960s: The first was the emergence of ground mapping and terrainavoidance radars that made low-altitude penetration of radar-controlled, 

ground-based enemy defenses tactically feasible. That capability was first 

fielded operationally in the A-6A in the autumn of 1965,59 and the 

F-1 11A demonstrated the same capability in the Linebacker I1 offensive 

in late 1972. These aircraft could penetrate below enemy radar and put 

’%rank Uhlig. Jr., ed., Vietnam: The Naval Story, (Annapolis, MD; 1987), p 27. 

267 
bombs on target.60 The tactical nub of the matter was that the A-6 and 

F-111 were able to penetrate at night, at altitudes which were low 

enough, generally below 1,OOO feet above ground level, to keep them 

masked by terrain enough of the time to defeat enemy radars. The 

second development, night viewing devices capable of discerning point 

targets-individual buildings, vehicles, and installations-appeared at about 

the same time!’ These devices were first used operationally on sidefiring gunships, notably the AC-130, first tested in combat in early 

1968.6’ The AC-130 could place rounds within feet of its target and 

proved highly effective in missions where accuracy counted and loiter 

time was at a premium. However, the AC-I30 carried only a limited 

ordnance load and required a relatively permissive operating environment 

(see the Chapter 4 section titled “Special Operations Forces and Air 

Power”). The pivotal development was the coupling of night viewing 

devices, notably forward-looking infrared (FLIR), with designators for 

laser-guided bombs. Previously, accuracy in night bombing could only 

be achieved in low-altitude attacks. Now, genuine precision-the ability 

to hit point targets-can be achieved at night from any altitude so long as 

the target can be observed on FLIR and the laser designator brought to 

bear. 

The FLlR and laser designator were combined earlier to provide 

precision-guided bombing capability in the Pave Spike system; a strap-on 

pod mounted on the F-4E during the final stages of the Vietnam War.63 

Pave Spike was the ancestor of the Pave Tack system used in the Gulf 

War on the F-111F. Pave Nail was a parallel development used on 

OV-10 forward air control aircraft to designate targets for tactical 

60(C) C~CPACFLT Analysis Staff Study 2-71, “Analysis of A-6A Radar Bombing 

Accuracy,” 15 July 1971: [DELETED] 

“The first of these was the starlight scope used as a gunsight on the side-firing 

AC-47 gunship, used in combat in February of 1965. The AC-47. armed with 7.62-mm 

machine guns, was followed by the cannon-armed AC-130, first tested in combat in 

February of 1968, which used FL~R (forward-looking infrared) and LuTV (low light level 

television) for the same purpose. The definitive version, the AC-l30H, was armed with 

20-rnm cannon, 40-mm cannon, and a 105-mm howitzer. Jack S. Ballard, Development 

and Employment of Fixed-Wing Gunships, 1962-1972 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 

Force History, 1982), p 28. 

621bid, pp 77-93. 

63Marcelle Knack, Encyclopedia of U.S. Air force Aircraji and Missiles, Vol I, Post 

World War 11 Fighters - 1945-1973 (Office of Air Force History, 1978), pp 281-282. 

268 
fighters. OV-10s were used successfully in this manner in the final 

stages of the Vietnam War, but in insufficient numbers to realize the full 

tactical potential of the system. By contrast, a relatively high percentage 

of the tactical aircraft deployed in Desert Shield possessed an autonomous 

FLIR-laser designator capability, notably the F- 1 17, F- 1 1 1 F, and A-6E. 

In addition, some F-16s and all F-15Es deployed in Desert Shield were 

fitted with AN/AAQ-13 low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared 

(system) for night (LAJWIRN) pods, though only a handful of F-15Es were 

fitted with the AN/AAQ-14 designator pod." The AGM-65D Maverick 

imaging infrared homing missile was used at night to find targets and 

could be fired by most U.S. tactical fighter and attack aircraft. Table 13 

summarizes the day and night, all-weather capabilities and limitations of 

the more important Coalition systems. 

Coalition Capabilities 

Beyond a doubt, the most significant weapons at the disposal of 

Coalition air forces for extending the reach of airpower around the clock 

were the precision-guided missiles (PGMs), which could be used at night. 

By far the most important of these in terms of tons delivered were 

laser-guided bombs (LGBS) dropped from manned platforms; Air Force 

aircraft dropped the lion's share. The aircraft included, but were not 

limited to, the F-IllF, F-l5E, F-117, and A-6E. Although these 

platforms could attack in daylight as well as at night, Coalition planners 

chose to exploit their night capability. The imaging-infrared (In) 

homing AGM-65 Maverick missile, fired mainly by A-10s plus a few 

from F-l6s, was also useful in extending the reach of airpower into the 

hours of darkness, although much less so than LGBS in combination with 

FLIR. A few GBU- I5 infrared-guided bombs were also dropped at night; 

however, the potential of this weapon was limited by the facts that only 

the F-11 IF was equipped with the requisite datalink for guidance and few 

crews had trained with it. 

Through its ability to attack heavily defended areas at night, the 

F-117 made a major contribution to overcoming the iron rule of the 

clock. B-52s made a major contribution through their ability to drop 

640nly two F-16 squadrons were LArmRN-equipped. Only the half dozen target 

designator pods available were rotated among F-15Es. 

269 
Table 13 

Bombing Capabilities by Platform 

Visual Bombing: LCB Self- Air-to-Air Day Night Radar Designation Swing Role Comments 

F-117 FLIR/DLIR X 

F-111F X Pave Tack X X 

F-111E X 

A-6E X TRAM 

X 

X X 

F-16c x LANTIRN- x 

equipped 

aircraft 

GR-1 X X 

B-52 

A-10 X X 

FIA-18 X 

TLAM 

X 

X 

X 

Night. limited bomb load 

(2 x 2.000 Ib); exmmely 

accunte bombing platform. 

lnrge bomb load for tactical 

nircmft; air-to-air missiles for 

defense only. 

Liuge bomb load for tactical 

aircraft; air-to-air missiles for 

defense only; analog avionics. 

Large bomb load for tactical 

aircraft; multi-role capability 

(e.g., SEAD with HARMS); logisticdy constrained (few LGBS 

aboard ship). 

Large bomb load for a tactical 

aircraft; aircraft FLlR designator 

pods in theater; new 

aircraft-crews accomplished 

familiarization in theater. 

LANTIRN pods available for 

only two squadrons. 

Qualified for JP233 runway 

denial munition; effective only 

with low-altitude delivery. 

Exceptionally large bomb load; 

unsuitable for point wets. 

Precision accuracy with 30-mm 

GAU-8 cannon; limited night 

capability with IIR AGM-65. 

X Highly capable air-to-air aircraft. 

Day and night precision 

capability; unmned; limited 

numbers avail-able; TLAM c 

suitable only for point targets. 

270 
large tonnages of bombs in all weather, day or night, but only after air 

superiority was achieved. Although the B-52s had no LGB guidance 

capability, they dropped bombs on large area targets and Iraqi forces in 

the field and added significantly to the total weight of ordnance delivered. 

B-52s, and to a lesser extent F-1 11 s, A-~s, and El 6s, dropping “dumb” 

bombs by day and night, effectively complemented precision bombing 

(see the Chapter 4 section titled “Precision Attack Versus Mass 

Bombing”). The F-16 is an extremely accurate low-altitude bombing 

platform by day and, with LANTIRN navigation pods installed, by night. 

It did not, however, have a designation capability for LGBS and was 

markedly less accurate when visual bombing from medium altitudes. The 

relative weights of day and night attacks delivered by these platforms are 

reflected in Figure 5 1. 

Autonomously-guided cruise missiles also made an important and 

distinctive contribution to twenty-four hour operations: these were almost 

entirely Navy TLAMs, although a few CALCMs were fired in the first 

twenty-four hours of the air campaign. Both TLAM and CALCM are insensitive to time of day, and TLAMs were used extensively in night attacks 

on strategic targets during the first forty-eight hours of the air campaign. 

TLAM’S biggest contribution to twenty-four-hour air operations, however, 

was in striking targets in the heavily defended Baghdad area during 

daylight. Extremely accurate, and with no pilot at risk, TLAM was the 

ideal weapon for maintaining pressure on heavily defended areas by day. 

Although many Coalition platforms were more or less equally suited 

for day and night operations, manning limitations forced individual units 

into either day or night operations (see Figure 51). The greater weight 

of F-16 strikes in daylight hours primarily reflects the number of units 

committed to daylight operations rather than equipment limitations. In 

simple terms, a unit must have a very high crew ratio and must be 

overmanned in both operations support and maintenance to conduct 

twenty-four-hour operations; this was a luxury which few if any Coalition 

units enjoyed. 

Inspection of Figure 51 reveals a number of significant tactical 

considerations. The perceptible drop in sorties on targets during twilight 

hours reflects two phenomena: The first is poor visibility for visual 

ordnance delivery at twilight, that is, within about thirty minutes of sunrise and sunset. The difficulty of acquiring and attacking targets under 

27 1 
1600 > 

1400 

S 

r 

Figure 51 

Strikes by Aircraft and Time of Day 

\ 

Night 

24 HO

800 

1 

source: Missions Database 

zz 23 

24 
low-sun-angle and dim-light conditions is one of the most enduring 

realities of aerial combat. The second is the shift in the infrared contrast 

gradient after sunrise and sunset, a factor that was particularly significant 

in the KTO where vehicles and equipment were major target sets. Sand 

warms and cools more quickly than metal; hence, the contrast between 

the two was greatest shortly after evening twilight when the sand had 

cooled and the heat-soaked metal of vehicles and equipment was still hot. 

The difference gradually diminishes throughout the night and reverses 

shortly after sunrise, reaching a transient condition of equality when the 

sun has warmed the sand to the same temperature as the metal!’ 

Tactical Result3 

While there were distinct limitations in the ability of Coalition 

airpower to bring pressure to bear on Iraqi forces regardless of time of 

day or meteorological conditions, those limitations were much less 

restrictive than in previous conflicts. In all previous conflicts, there was 

a marked tradeoff between accuracy and time of day, and the vast 

majority of accurate bombing attacks took place in daylight. That 

generalization held true through the end of the Vietnam War, although 

with somewhat less force than for Korea and World War 11. In the Gulf 

War, LGBs delivered with FLIR designators evened the balance, and 

reversed it to a degree, since the infrared sensors with their ability to 

penetrate haze, enjoyed an appreciable advantage over optical systems.% 

In summation, Coalition forces could attack the vast majority of 

targets under prevailing conditions most of the time. There were, 

however, significant limitations on twenty-four-hour, all-weather 

operations. The most important of these was the need for relatively clear 

visibility to deliver UBS, day or night. Weather was thus a constraining 

factor and had an adverse effect on F-117 operations in particular. TLAM 

helped to pick up the slack with daylight attacks in the most heavily 

defended areas but was not effective against hardened targets. F-11 lFs, 

A-~s, and F-lSEs, though unable to penetrate the heaviest Iraqi defenses 

with the same impunity as the F- 1 17, were able to bomb by radar; these 

“See, for example, Maverick Operations Supplement: IR Maverick (Hughes Aircraft 

%ate, however, that optical systems can penetrate mist and fog better than infrared 

Company: 1 Jul 1988). “1R Predictions,” pp 1.5-1.6. 

systems. 

273 
aircraft thus had a genuine all-weather capability and were capable of 

considerable accuracy at low altitudes. This advantage was somewhat 

degraded by the decision to reduce the effectiveness of Iraqi antiaircraft 

artillery, optically aimed by day and barrage fired by night, by attacking 

from medium altitudes. The F- 1 I 1 E was also able to radar bomb but had 

analog avionics and was thus less accurate at medium altitudes than the 

other aircraft mentioned. Intelligent tactics and scheduling compensated, 

in part, for the limitations of individual systems. Black Hole schedulers, 

for example, learned to schedule F-117 sorties around the poor ceilings 

and visibility associated with frontal weather passages and to attack 

targets suitable for radar deliveries with F-Ills, F-15Es, A-~s, and, on 

occasion, B-52s when weather in the target area was p0or.6~ 

Although impossible to quantify, the next most serious constraint on 

twenty-four-hour operations was aircrew fatigue. Although not a natural 

routine, entire squadrons could be put on a night schedule operationally. 

Because essential administrative functions had to be accomplished in 

daytime, aircrews flying outside the normal duty hours almost inevitably 

faced a heavier fatigue toll than their daylight-tasked equivalents. To this 

must be added the psychological toll of routinely penetrating enemy 

defenses, a toll that sooner or later found expression in physiological 

form. To cite a relevant example, a competent observer characterized 

F-117 pilots-a group explicitly trained for night operations-as “tired” by 

the end of Desert Storm.68 To make matters worse, the key mission 

planners and analysts in tactical wings and squadrons in Desert Storm 

were almost all operational aircrew members who had to fly to maintain 

~urrency.6~ 

The Scud Hunt 

The anti-Scud campaign was conducted in two overlapping but 

tactically distinct phases. The first phase was part of the Master Attack 

Plan and was directed against fixed launchers, support facilities, and 

storage areas. Since this phase was an integral part of the strategic air 

67See the Eflects and Eflecriveness Report. 

68Tolin intvw, p 14. 

@37th TFW tactical mission planning was largely accomplished by weapons and 

tactics officers who stayed up to do the work after flying their nocturnal missions, 

information supplied by Maj Robert Eskridge. 

274 
campaign, it is not discussed in detail here. The second phase, termed 

the Scud Hunt, was triggered by Scuds being fired at Israel and Saudi 

Arabia from mobile launchers. The second phase was thus aimed at 

locating and destroying Iraq’s mobile launch assets. 

The first Scud hunt sorties were launched during the night of 

18 January with the diversion of three AC-130H gunships.” During the 

following two nights, three more AC-I30 sorties were committed to 

anti-Scud armed reconnai~sance.~’ Then, on the night of the 21st, an 

AC-130 engaging a possible a Scud site drew an SA-7 launch and was 

taken under fire by 23-mm and 37-mm antiaircraft artillery. After 

evading the Iraqi fire, the AC-130 was diverted to another possible Scud 

site. En route, it was engaged by early-warning radar followed by an 

SA-8 launch. The crew narrowly evaded the missile but over stressed the 

aircraft.’* The following night, the launch of an AC-130 against mobile 

Scud targets in western Iraq, marked the last use of AC-130s in the Scud 

Hunt. 

The Scud Hunt proper got under way as the AC-130 commitment 

ended and continued until the cessation of hostilitie~.’~ The effort 

absorbed a significant proportion of strike assets in theater: about twentyfive percent of F-lSEs, seven percent of A-IOs, twenty-five percent of 

LANTIRN-equipped F-16s, and eight percent of F-11 1Fs were dedicated to 

the Scud hunt; E117s, B-52s, Navy A-6Es and F/A-l8s, and Royal Air 

7%e crews encountered low clouds in the search area and termed their efforts “zero 

percent effective.” (S) “AC-130 Gunship Desert Storm Mission Summary,” atch, to 

I6SOS/CC Itr to the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 14 May 1992, subj: 

“AC-130 Desert Storm Information.” 

71(S) Ibid. One sortie was diverted on the 19th. Two were launched with the 

assigned mission of anti-Scud armed reconnaissance on the 20th; these claimed two Squat 

EyelFlat Face radars and several associated vans destroyed. 

72 The aircraft was returned to duty only after extensive maintenance in Germany. 

’3(S) The 20 January start date correlates with the first entry in the so-called Scud 

Chasing Log maintained by The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) under CENTAF 

Headquarters; (SINFIWN) Christie and Barlow, Desert Storm Scud Campaign, Apr 1992. 

Appendix C, “Scud Chasing Log.” (S) This Table lists 255 separate Scud-related events, 

defined as a reported activity involving an aircraft involved in anti-Scud operations, 

between 20 January and 27 February. 

275 
Force GR-1 Tornados were used on occasion as well.’4 The tactical 

essence of the Scud Hunt was to place strike aircraft in orbit over known 

launch areas poised to attack mobile Scud sites as soon as they could be 

detected and located. Detection, location, and the direction of strike 

aircraft toward their targets were undertaken by a variety of 

reconnaissance, intelligence, and command and control platforms. 

The objectives of the Scud Hunt were to locate, attack, and destroy 

mobile Scud launchers and associated support equipment and, 

secondarily, to suppress launch activity. The Scud Hunt is of historical 

interest as the first air campaign against a mobile ballistic missile force.75 

It is of tactical and operational interest, since it is unlikely to be the last 

such ~ampaign.’~ The Scud Hunt pressed to the limit Coalition strike, 

intelligence, and command and control systems, as well as aircrew skills 

and the powers of innovation and adaptation of Coalition staffs, planners, 

and commanders. 

Background 

The technical characteristics and tactical capabilities of Iraqi mobile 

ballistic missile systems were well known to U.S. and Coalition 

intelligence analysts before the Gulf War (see Figure 52). It was 

apparent to Coalition commanders that the possession by Iraq of 

741n a postwar press briefing, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen Merrill McPeak 

stated that anti-Scud operations absorbed three times the resources anticipated; “Scud 

Chase” press briefing, 15 Mar 1991, quoted in (SINFIWN) Christie and Barlow, Scud 

Campaign, p D-4. 

750peration CROSSBOW, the air campaign against German V weapons mounted by 

the U.S. Amy Air Forces and Royal Air force in WWII, offers strong parallels to the 

Scud Hunt in terms of training, intelligence organization, and the role of political factors 

in the allocation of resources. The parallel breaks down tactically, since no attempt was 

made to target mobile V-2 launchers; observation by Capt Edward O’Connell, WAF, DIA 

Targeting Officer. See The Army Air Forces in World War 11, Vol 111. Ch 4, 

(S/NF/WN)Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign, p 1. Secretary of Defense 

Richard Cheney made the comment, “Mobile missile hunting was difficult and costly; we 

will need to do better.” 

“CROSSBOW.” Pp 84-106 and 525-46. 

76 

276 
Figure 52 

Scud Functional Flow to Launch Positions (Soviet Model) 

FIGURE DELETED 

277 
significant numbers of Al Husayn (also called Al Hussein), and perhaps 

A1 Abbas ballistic missiles, posed major problems for the Coalition.n 

These problems were compounded by the possible use of chemical or 

biological warheads. The primary concern was that Scud attacks against 

Israel might prompt Israeli intervention and split the Coalition. This 

overriding concern gave the Scud Hunt its tactical priority.” 

During the war, neither chemical nor biological warheads were used, 

and the Scud did not pose a militarily significant threat to Coalition 

f0rces.7~ The relatively small high-explosive warhead and 1,500 to 2,000- 

meter circular error probable (CEP)~ of the A1 Husayn reduced the missile 

to a psychological and harassment weapon!’ 

Scope and Concept of Operatwns 

The Scud Hunt campaign had three main components: First, U.S. 

Army Patriot missiles defended selected point targets in Saudi Arabia and 

later, Israel. Second, Coalition air forces located, identified, and 

neutralized or destroyed Scud missiles, mobile launchers, support 

77(S/NF/WN) Ibid, pp I-lO,I-11. Al Husayn and A1 Abbas were Iraqi modifications 

of the Soviet Scud B, which in crude terms doubled the range of the original by extending 

the fuel tankage and halving the weight of the warhead. 

“(C) In August 1990 contingency planning for an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia 

CWCCENT expressed concern over the prospect of “chemical and perhaps biological 

warheads threatening cities, airfields, ports, and troops” and emphasized the importance 

of suppressing Scud attacks quickly once hostilities began; he was also concerned about 

the use of Scud attacks on Israel as a means of splitting the Coalition. During the war, 

42 Scuds were fired at Israel and 45 at Saudi Arabia; 1 landed in Qatar, 

(S/TVF/WN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Canipaign, pp 1-14 - 1-17. 

79(S) Cf: Desert Storm Scud Missile Working Group Conference, Working Group 111 

(Tactics) Summary (Washington, D.C., 28-30 May, 1991). p 2, henceforth Scud 

Conference Group 111 Summary. 

%. Seth Caras and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Iraq’s Al-Husayn Missile 

Programme.” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review (May 1990), pp 204-248, 206. 

“For the psychological effects of the Scud threat on Coalition military personnel, 

see J. R. Galle-Tess. Usage Et Limite de la Notion de Stress de Combat a L‘Experience 

de la Guerre du Golfe, a paper presented at the Gulf War International Symposium and 

World Psychiatric Association Meeting, Paris, 27 Jan 1992. Galle-Tess reports several 

instances of French aircrew members whose psychological reaction to the Scud threat led 

to their being relieved of flying duty. 

278 
vehicles, and support facilities. Finally, Special Operations Forces (sOF), 

including British Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) 

and U.S. Army Special Forces, were deployed into Iraq. 

Destroying Scud research and development centers, command and 

control installations, production and storage facilities, and fixed launch 

sites amounted to only a small part of the total effort after the first few 

days of the campaign. Since the fixed Scud launchers were not used:' 

and since attacks on these sites were tactically no different from attacks 

on any fixed installation, they are of no concern here. 

The ability-or inability-of Coalition air forces to find and destroy 

mobile launchers and support systems was the key to attaining the 

objectives of the Scud hunt. The terminal effects of available ordnance 

were not a limiting factor, since bombs in the MK-80 series and cluster 

munitions of various kinds were more than adequate to destroy the 

soft-skinned targets associated with mobile Scud operations.83 Accuracy 

was not a problem either, because if the target could be seen, Uj~s 

(laser-guided bombs) had more than the requisite accuracy. When the 

target could not be seen visually or on infrared cockpit imagery, 

platforms with a radar bombing capability, notably the B-52, F-15E, 

A-6E, and F-111 E/F, could in principle attack with sufficient accuracy to 

destroy mobile Scud targets. 

There were three critical tactical challenges in the anti-Scud 

campaign. The first was the ability to detect Scud launches in timely 

fashion. The second was the ability of aircrews, using onboard visual, 

radar, and infrared aircraft systems, to spot mobile Scud launchers, 

vehicles, and support systems associated with mobile launch operations. 

The third was the ability to place ordnance on the targets once detected. 

Of these challenges, detection had to be met first, since there could be no 

strikes without detection. The ability of Coalition systems to detect the 

signatures of the various components of the mobile Scud system was thus 

a key to a successful Scud hunt. 

'*(S) 27 Jan INKS Briefing. As of 27 January, there was no conclusive evidence that 

83(S) Scud Conference Group 111 Summary, p 8. 

the estimated 30 fixed launchers had been used. 

279 
Scud System Tactical Characteristics 

[DELETEDIM. [DELETEDIES 

[DELETED]. The Iraqis, made little or no use of radio communications for controlling Scud operations. [DELETED]. Iraq 

apparently exercised command and control via encrypted communications 

over secure land lines and, possibly, c0uriers.8~ Consequently, 

underground communications cables believed to be associated with 

mobile missile operations-specifically, fiber optic cables-were identified 

as potential targets of the Scud hunt. [DELETED].” [DELETED]. 

Vehicles associated with mobile Scud operations were readily 

identifiable on imagery . . . if they could be seen. The qualification is 

critical because the Iraqis were adept at hiding mobile launchers and 

associated vehicles. [DELETED]. 

The signature of the Scud missile itself was the principal means of 

launch detection. [DELETED].w Defense Support Program (DSP) 

satellites, successfully detected all eighty-eight Scud launches?’ DSP 

M(S/NFNN) Christie and barlow, Scud Campaign, p 1-7, para. 2 b. 

85[DELETED] 

“(S) 193d Special Operations Group, JULLS Long Report No. 41 843-33473 (00004); 

193d Special Operations Group (Air National Guard) GWAPS interviews, 20-21 Jan 1992. 

87(S) INKS briefing. 

88(S/NF) USASOC Histoty, Army Special Operations in Operations Desert 

ShieWDesert Storm, atch. to ltr., Richard W. Stewart, Command Historian, to HQ, 

USSOCOM, attn. Dr. Partin, MacDill AFB, FL, subj: “Review of Historical Monograph on 

Desert ShieWDesert Storm,” 22 April 1991 (henceforth USASOC History), p 45. 

[DELETED] 

89(S/NFMrN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign, Summary p 12. 

w(S/NF/WN) Ibid, p 1-1 1. 

9’(S) Defense Science Board Final Report on “Lessons karned During Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm,’’ (8 Jan 1992), p 65; two of the 88 missiles launched 

failed in flight and did not reach their target areas. 

280 
coordinates delineated Scud launch areas.92 Strike 

crews did visually observe some Scud launches, but could not attack 

because they had no way to determine the precise location of the 

launches, particularly at night?3 [DELETED]?4 

For tactical purposes, the most important visual, radar, and infrared 

signatures of the mobile Scud system were those of its component 

vehicles. The most characteristic and important of these was the 

eight-wheeled Soviet-built MAZ-543 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). 

[DELETED]?’ [DELETED].” [DELETED]. The Iraqis also fielded a 

number of locally constructed mobile-erector-launchers (MELS), launch 

rails on a flatbed truck in essence, to supplement the MAZ-543s. While 

these vehicles lacked the MAZ-543’s superior mobility, they were 

probably capable of off-road operations. Post-war analysis indicated that 

Scud launches took place near paved highways. This would have been 

consistent with movement from hide locations97 and with the use of MELs. 

[DELETED] ?’ 

All of the Scud vehicles were easily camouflaged and difficult to 

detect visually from the air, All had large radar signatures plus 

prominent infrared signatures when their primary propulsion systems, 

auxiliary power units, generators, and heaters or air-conditioning units 

were operating. The signatures, however, could be readily imitated by 

decoys with varying degrees of fidelity, depending on the expense and 

attention to detail put into the decoy. [DELETED]. 

w[DELETED] 

93(S) This would not have been true in the unlikely event that the launch took place 

within the field of vision of the strike aircraft’s targeting radar or infrared systems, which 

did not happen. 

%(S) [DELETED] 

95(S/NF/WN) Ibid, pp 1-2. 6, 1 I. 

%(S/NF/WN) Ibid, pp 1-5.14. 

97(S) Defense Science Board Final Report, p 65. 

98( S) [DELETED] 

28 1 
The evidence suggests that tactical deception played a major role in 

Iraqi mobile Scud operations. [DELETED].w [DELETED].'OO 

[DELETED]. 

[DELETED]"' Postwar intelligence suggests that the estimated 

number of missiles was somewhat high, the estimated number of TELs 

and MELS was somewhat low, and predictions of tactics and 

organizational structure were inaccurate.lm [DELETED]. 

[DELETED].'03 [DELETED].'O1 [DELETED].'o5 

[DELETED].'06 [DELETED].'07 [DELETED].'OB 

In assessing the effectiveness of Iraqi tactical deception and the 

formidable problems facing Coalition airmen in attempting to locate 

mobile Scud systems, an important caveat must be made. Whether they 

w(S) [DELETED] 

'O0(S/NF) [DELETED] 

"'As quoted in oPLAN Desert Storm dated 16 Dec 1990, cited in 

(S/NF/WN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign, 1-10. The improvised MELs used 

Scania tractor transports as the prime mover. There was a wide band of uncertainty in 

estimates of numbers of missiles on hand, re (S) INKS briefing, which estimates that the 

Iraqis possessed 30 mobile launchers and 350-950 missiles on the date indicated. The DIA 

estimate was a total of 36. 

'02(S/NF/WN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign, p 1-13. 

'03(S) Comments provided by DlA analysts. 

'04(S) [DELETED] 

'OsFOrward air controllers used this technique successfully in the Vietnam War, but 

flew specialized observation aircraft with more spacious cockpits, many of them 

two-seaters such as the OV-2 and OV-10. The side windows could be opened on many 

of these aircraft to avoid optical distortion from looking though the canopy, and the 

operating altitudes were generally considerably lower. 

'06(S/NF/WN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign. p 1-15. 

'07(S/NF) The tests were conducted at the Fort Campbell, KY, reservation and from 

Nellis AFB. NV, on the Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona; information from [DELETED], 

who was involved in TOUTED GLEEM as a DIA targeting officer. See also (S/NF) TOUTED 

GLEEM: F-15; F-16 LANTlRN Adaptive Video. 

'08(S) Information from Capt Jeff Hodgdon. Captain Hodgdon participated in 

TOUTED GLEEM as an F-111F weapons system operator. 

282 
were effective or not, the Iraqis obviously feared detection, particularly 

in daylight. Eighty-one percent or seventy-one of all Scud launches were 

in darkness,10g and the few daylight launches occurred shortly after dawn. 

Specifically, launches took place between twenty minutes after dusk and 

one hour after dawn, and the great majority were launched between 2130 

and 0345 Baghdad time."' The most likely explanation for the 

concentration of launch activity at night is that the Iraqi's were attempting 

to prevent Coalition Scud combat air patrol pilots from obtaining a visual 

fix on the launch location and attacking before the mobile launcher could 

move. 

TacticaI Execution 

When the Scud offensive began, Coalition air forces were faced with 

the daunting prospect of searching virtually the entire western and 

southeastern quadrants of Iraq for mobile launchers and associated 

equipment.'" This situation changed for the better with the discovery, 

made during the first days of the air war,'" that Scuds were being fired 

to their maximum range of just over 600 kilometers, a pattern followed 

throughout the campaign. On the basis of this observation plus historical 

knowledge of previous launch sites and the known target areas-Haifa, Tel 

Aviv, Riyadh, and Dhahran-it was possible to define the launch areas 

with considerable acc~racy."~ (See Figure 53.) The intelligence 

community had plotted the locations of presurveyed Scud launch points 

in southeastern Iraq on the basis of a search of historical imagery 

'09(S) Defense Science Board Final Report, p 65. The source does not specify, but 

"darkness" in this context probably means between evening nautical twilight (by 

definition, when the horizon can no longer be seen) and morning nautical twilight. 

"'(S) As of 27 January, 68 percent of all launches had occurred in the 2130 to 0345 

window, (S) LNKS briefing. 

'"(SMF) DIA analysts had isolated likely mobile Scud launch areas on the basis of 

LANDSAT imagery and terrain analysis in advance of the air campaign, re (S/NF/WN) DIA 

Desert Storm Adaptive Planning Target Material. OPAREA India (ADTM 1-91). information 

cutoff date 7 Feb 1991, but air campaign planners were not aware of this. 

'I2(S) Precisely when the connection was made is unclear, but Checkmate team 

members are in agreement that it was during the first few days of the air war. The 27 Jan 

INKS briefing treats this as an established fact. 

'13(S) Defense Science Board Final Report, p 66; and (SMFIWN) Christie and 

Barlow, Scud Campaign, p 1-18. 

283 
augmented by new imagery and HUMIN during Desert Shield, and these 

locations generally coincided with the Scud basket^."^ 

The Iraqi practice of launching only at maximum range can be 

accounted for by two complementary hypotheses, one technical and one 

tactical. The technical hypothesis is that launching at maximum range 

burns propellants to depletion and thus avoids aerodynamic instability 

resulting from center-of-gravity shifts on reentry that lead to tumbling and 

breakup of the missile body. The tactical hypothesis is that the Iraqis 

were preregistering and calibrating their launchers and missiles to the 

same (maximum range) settings on each launch. This procedure would 

save time by minimizing prelaunch adjustments after the missile was 

rolled into firing position, and also improve speed and efficiency 

(SINFIN") Christie and Barlow. Scud Campaign, p 1-12; a similar comlation 114 

was made for launch baskets in western Iraq after the initiation of hostilities. 

284 
Figure 53 

Scud Targets and Launch Sectors 

FIGURE DELETED 

through standardized procedures.11s The second hypothesis agrees with 

the notion that the Iraqis were concerned about risking detection by 

staying at a firing site too long. If that were the case, the adoption of 

"shoot and scoot" tactics to preserve mobile launch assets would logically 

follow. While neither hypothesis is provable in any rigorous sense, both 

fit what was known about Iraqi objectives and patterns of operations. 

While many anti-scud tactics were considered, maintaining standing 

Scud combat air patrols (CAPS) over the launch baskets on a twenty-fourhour basis was favored. Night CAPS were maintained by F-15Es equipped 

with synthetic aperture radar and LANTIRN targeting pods in the western 

"'(S) This hypothesis emerged within the CHECKMATE cell charged with monitoring 

Scud issues, (S) INKS briefing. 

285 
launch area and by F-16s equipped with LANTlRN and Global Position System (GPS) in the eastern area (or "box").116 The F-16s, and occasionally 

the F-15Es in the western area, worked in conjunction with JSTARS. A-10s 

were used for daylight armed reconnaissance in both areas. Scud CAPS 

were supplemented by preplanned strikes against fixed targets. 

During the Scud Hunt Campaign, formations of F- 15Es patrolled the 

western box and F-16 formations patrolled the eastern box at night, using 

LANTIRN for reconnaissance of their assigned areas. If they did not locate 

targets during patrol, they attacked targets provided by intelligence. If no 

targets were available from intelligence, the patrols expended ordnance 

on preplanned Scud-related targets before retuning to base."' Daylight 

Scud CAPS were flown by ten A-10s assigned to A1 Jouf. These aircraft 

conducted daylight road reconnaissance in pairs, and the pilots used 

binoculars to assist their visual search. Both day and night Scud CAP aircraft normally flew at 12,000-15,000 feet to remain above effective 

antiaircraft artillery fire."' A-10 pilots used infrared imagery from 

Maverick seeker heads to augment their visual searches. [DELETED]. 

Those directing the Scud Hunt were well aware of the importance of 

suppressive efforts and issued their orders ac~ordingly.''~ An idea of the 

range of weapons and tactics used and the ebb and flow of daily Scud 

hunting activity can be gained from Table 14. 

[DELETED] 

1160nly one squadron of F-16s had GPS; they were the only Coalition tactical fighters 

"'(S/NF/WN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign, p 111-6. 

"'(S/NF/WN) /bid, p 111-7. 

'19(S) E.g.. usCENTAF/W to 4 TFWKC message 040900Z Feb 91, directing F-15E 

crews on Scud CAP to maintain their patrol until relieved, even if they had expended all 

their ordnance. 

so equipped. 

286 
Figure 54 

Scud CAP Notification Net 

FIGURE DELETED 

[DELEl'ED].Im Linking these disparate scud-hunt detection, 

communications, and tactical assets into a near-real-time command and 

control network was a remarkable achievement. The significance of that 

achievement, however, must be qualified when put in tactical context. 

The mobility of the Scud system and the brief warning time its various 

signatures afforded provided minimal engagement time, even when 

everything worked perfectly. It should be noted, however, that warning 

times improved significantly as the campaign progressed. 

'm(S/NF/WN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign, p 11-25. 

287 
Table 14 

Resources Committed to Scud Hunt Operations 

27 January 199112' 

Western Area 

Mission 

~tegory Resources Ordnance Targets 

Scud CAP F-15E CBU- As provided by intelliNight Only on round alert GBU- gence or targets of 

on %cud CAP, opportunity. 

Afllled A-10 AGMReconnaissance sorties, 2 on CB UDaytime Only station at a time 30-mm 

cannon 

&planned F-11 IF GBUMissions 

BJ2G CB UA-6E not stated 

Supplemental F- 1 17 GBUmissions 

Intelligence provided launch locations and 

targets of opportunity. 

Large culverts and other 

potential hide sites. 

Storage and support 

facilities; H-I and H-2 

airfields. 

Selected launch locations, 

storage and support facilities; 

Hardened sites at H- I, 

H-2, and H-3 airfields. 

Eastern Area 

Mission 

category ReSOUrCeS Ordnance Targets 

Scud CAP F-16C CBU- As provided by intelliNight Only on ground alert gence and JSTARS or 

on Scud CAP, targets of opportunity. 

Supplemental B-52G as available not stated As provided by Intelmissions ligence or JSTARS. 

FIA-18 as available not stated Via ATWFRAG order. 

'*'Developed from (SINFA") Christie and Barlow, Scud Cumpuign, Table 111-1, 

p 111-3. 

288 
FIGURE DELETED 
[DELETED].'" [DELETED].'" [DELETED] 

[DELETED].'= 

The difficulties of locating and attacking individual mobile Scud 

targets eventually drove tactical planners to an increased emphasis on 

suppressive tactics, which included dedicated B-52s armed with CBU-58s, 

(cluster munitions), making preemptive strikes in the Scud boxes from 19 

February through the end of hostilities.'26 The B-52s arrived on station 

with CBU-58s and dropped them at intervals during their time on station. 

Dropped from high altitude, the high-explosive and fragmentation effects 

of the bomblets scattered over a wide area, putting thin-skinned mobile 

Scud vehicles and fueled missiles at risk. The B-52s freed five Scud CAP 

F-15Es for other targets and were deemed to have done the same suppressive job equally well. 

Tactical Egectiveness 

[DELETED]. The ability, or inability, of Scud-associated vehicles to 

move freely from staging areas to hide sites and back was a key determinant of tactical effectiveness. Those responsible for developing the ATO 

~~~~ 

"'(SMFWN) Ibid, Fig. 11-6, p 11-32. 

123(S/NF) USASOC History, pp 46-48. 

'"(SMFWN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign, pp 11-27, 28. 

12S(S/NFWN) fbid, pp 111-12, 111-13. An F-15E entry cited that the anecdotal 

evidence alluded to above involves an unplanned radio contact between a Scud CAP 

aircrew and an individual on the ground with a British accent who directed a successful 

strike. 

'%(S) 26 Feb 91 memo, subj: "B-52 Scud Hunter Mission,'' identified as probably 

written by Black Hole operative Cpt James Hawkins, Checkmate File 19-7. The CaU-58 

submunition is a baseball-sized high explosivdfragmentation bomblet fuzed for instantaneous detonation. 

127(SMF/WN) Christie and Barlow. Scud Campaign, p 111-6. 

'"(S) Defense Science Board Final Reporl. Fig. 2.6-4, p 72. 

290 
were well aware of this. They approached the problem by targeting 

potential hide sites such as culverts, overpasses, and bridges, whether 

Scud movement was observed around them or not-an idea developed 

within the Checkmate staff in coordination with DIA.’~ These targets 

were attacked by a variety of aircraft, including F-1 11Fs and F-I 17s. and 

involved the use of denial ordnance to inhibit free movement in and 

around suspected staging and launch areas. CBU-89/B GATOR, a cluster 

munition combining magnetically-fuzed antitank submunitions and tripwire-fuzed antipersonnel submunitions, was used extensively for this 

purpose. GATOR would seem to have been ideal for limiting and delaying 

Scud movement in and around hide sites and staging areas, although 

conclusions concerning effectiveness remain an area of speculation, 

barring access to Iraqi records.’” Similarly, the targeting of culverts, 

overpasses, and bridges capable of sheltering Scud-associated vehicles 

may have had some suppressive effect. The simple presence of Scud CAP 

aircraft overhead may have had suppressive effect as well, a supposition 

discussed later in the chapter. 

[DELETED].’31 [DELETED].’32 [DELETED]. 

Scud hunting tactics were ineffective if measured in terms of 

numbers of Scud-associated vehicles confirmed destroyed. Cockpit 

imagery and reports by SOF ground forces hold open the possibility that 

some mobile launchers were destroyed, but this cannot be confirmed. 

Assertions by denigrators of the air campaign that no mobile launchers 

at all were destroyed are equally ~nprovab1e.l~~ [DELETED].134 On 

129(S) This took place on or about 23 January; information from, DIA. 

‘”(SINFNN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign, p Ill-10, cite several “informal 

documents” to that effect, albeit without naming them. The CBU-89 is a free-fall cluster 

weapon consisting of the SUU-64/B dispenser containing 72 BLU-9VB antitank and 22 

BLU-92IB antipersonnel submunitions. The BLU-91IB is a 4.31 pound antitank mine 

with a mass focused warhead fuzed with a magnetic sensor; the BLU-92B is a 3.75-pound 

antipersonnel mine with a fragmentation warhead triggered by tripwires. 

‘3’(S/NF/WN) Ibid, Appendix C. 

‘32(S/NF/WN) Ibid, pp 111-15-17. 

‘33See. for example, Mark Crispin Miller, “Operation Desert Sham,” The New York 

Times, 24 Jun 1992. See also “Claims of Scud Destruction Unverified,” Washington Post. 

25 Jun 1992, p 5. 

29 1 
balance, the evidence suggests that few mobile launchers were destroyed 

by Allied air power. 

It seems unlikely that Iraqi mobile Scud operations remained 

unaffected. [DELETED]. The scud-hunt no doubt discouraged road 

movement by Scud units. It is worth noting in this regard that both the 

total number of Scuds launched and the weekly launch rates were 

significantly lower than one would expect on the basis of equivalent data 

from the “War of the Cities” phase of the Iran-Iraq War. [DELETED].13S 

Crossing the physically clear but analytically fuzzy line between 

destruction and suppression, analysis of Iraqi tactical behavior suggests 

considerable respect for Coalition Scud hunting capability. The most 

revealing datum in this respect is the Iraqi unwillingness to launch in 

daylight, and if the Iraqis were unwilling to launch at all in daylight, it 

seems unlikely that they felt able to do so with impunity at night. 

Although the two cannot be cleanly separated, it seems clear that the 

destructive and suppressive effects of anti-Scud tactics combined to 

significantly reduce the launch rate. This conclusion is supported by the 

fact that the weekly launch rate was some thirty-four percent lower than 

in the War of the Cities phase of the Iran-Iraq War, during which the 

Iranians made no attempt to strike or suppress Scud launch activity. This 

was true despite the probability that the Iraqis had some thirty percent 

more missiles to expend than in the earlier conflict.136 Figure 56 depicts 

a comparison of Scud launch rates in the War of the Cities with those in 

Desert Storm. These data suggest that anti-Scud operations reduced the 

‘”(S) The classic example involves the release of cockpit video footage in the course 

of a Riyadh press briefing, which was billed as showing a mobile Scud launcher being 

destroyed. In fact, the vehicle in question was probably a fuel truck. 

‘”(9 Point Paper, “BDA-Desert Storm, Operator’s Look,” briefed to Checkmate as 

of 29 Jan o900 Baghdad time, CBDA Folder 13-1. In addition a “monumental” secondary 

explosion was noted following a B-52 strike on the Rumaylaw ammunition storage site 

on the morning of 28 Jan, re. Pentagon Operations Directorate 2823302 Jan 91 msg, p 2. 

This may or may not have been Scud related. 

136(S/NF/WN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Cunipuign, esp. Fig IV-2, pp IV-10-11. 

292 
number of Iraqi launches by something on the order of fifty percent.’” 

The counter argument can be made that the slope of the two curves is 

remarkably similar, suggesting that the initial drop in firings and 

subsequent recovery was attributable mainly to internal logistic or 

operational factors. This argument bears closer examination. The most 

likely reason for the sharp drop in launches after the first two weeks in 

either case was the depletion of forward stockpiles of missiles, warheads, 

and fuel. According to this hypothesis, the “trough” in the launch curves 

represents a period of replenishment and the up turn at the end represents 

the expenditure of stocks moved forward during the period of reduced 

activity. In principle, the forward displacement of missiles, warheads and 

fuel would have been vulnerable to air interdiction. The difference in 

gross launch rates between the two cases is therefore, in principle at least, 

partly attributable to the difficulty of moving under the watchful eye of 

air power. 

lbo other considerations support the notion that anti-Scud operations 

significantly affected mobile Scud operations. First, the Iraqi ability to 

coordinate Scud launches appears to have declined as the campaign wore 

on. While forty of the first forty-two Scuds fired were launched in 

salvos, no less than twenty-seven of the last thirty137(S) This estimate is based on several assumptions concerning the capabilities of 

the Iraqi mobile missile force in the absence of a suppressive effort: first, that it could 

have equalled the average weekly launch rates achieved during the War of the Cities with 

the same number of missiles on hand. Second, that thirty percent more launches could 

have been achieved had thirty percent more missiles been available. The above analysis 

is based on weekly averages. Close examination of launch patterns on an hour by hour 

basis correlated with air activity might well produce a somewhat different picture. 

293 
Figure 56 

Comparison of Scud Launch Rates 

FIGURE DELETED 

nine were launched se~arately.’~~ This may be attributable to a change 

in Iraqi tactics, but on balance this seems unlikely. Second, launches 

against King Khalid Military City (KKMC) did not begin until 

14 February, some four weeks after the start of the Scud Hunt. These 

firings came from a new launch area immediately north of Baghdad, 

138(S) Defense Science Board Final Report, p 70; there were 13 multiple launches 

with salvo launch times totalling 15 seconds or less; 4 of these included launches from 

more than one Scud box. 

294 
much closer to presumed missile stockpiles than the others, and better 

served by road. Since the Iraqis surely accorded Israeli targets higher 

priority than Saudi targets, and since Riyadh was presumably a more 

lucrative target politically and psychologically than KKMC, this shift in 

effort is suggestive. The notion that the change in targeting was forced 

on the Iraqis by tactical considerations rather than voluntarily adopted for 

policy reasons is supported by a comparison of targets struck in the first 

and last twelve days of the Scud campaign. Of the fifty Scuds fired 

during the initial twelve day “spike,” no less than twenty-seven, or fiftyfour percent, fell on Israel. It is all but certain that the bulk of these 

missiles were in forward staging areas when the air war started. Note, 

too, that twenty of the fifty were fired before the Scud Hunt proper 

began. Of the twenty-eight fired in the final twelve days, nine, or thirtytwo percent fell on both Israeli and KKMC targets.’39 

Conclusions 

The salient conclusion is that U.S. and Coalition air forces found it 

extremely difficult to locate, find, and destroy mobile Scud targets. The 

absence of unequivocal evidence concerning the number and nature of 

targets destroyed strengthens this conclusion: a timely, accurate, and 

reiterative bomb damage assessment process is an essential part of any 

successful air campaign, and the assessment did not exist. Conversely, 

several considerations suggest that the campaign placed significant tactical 

and operational constraints on Iraqi mobile Scud operations. First, the 

reluctance of the Iraqis to fire during daylight provides clear, if indirect, 

evidence that mobile Scud forces were unable to operate with impunity in 

daylight. Second, the markedly lower numbers and rates of Scud launches 

in the Gulf War in comparison with those in the War of the Cities strongly 

implies that an inhibiting factor constrained mobile Scud operations. The 

only such factor evident is air power. The same point applies to the shift 

in firings from Israeli to Saudi targets toward the end of the Scud 

campaign. While the estimates of numbers of missiles and launchers 

available on which this point is based are soft, the point holds across the 

spectrum of estimates.’@ The implication is that the effects of air power 

multiplied the impact of whatever logistical constraints were at work. 

139(S/NFA%”) Christie and Barlow, Scud Cunipaign, Fig. I, p 8. 

“(S) For numbers of Scuds available and fired, see Report of the United Nations 

Special Commission Special Mission to Iraq, Annex C, 27-30 Jan 1992. [DELETED] 

295 
Special Operations Forces And Air Power 

This section discusses the weapons and tactics used by Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) in support of the Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

air campaign. Special Operations Forces began arriving in Saudi Arabia 

10-12 August. SOF employed by the Commander-in-Chief, US Central 

Command (CINCCENT), included Army, Navy, and Air Force units. 

Missions performed included Coalition Warfare Support, Psychological 

Operations (PSYOP), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Direct Action, 

Combined Special Reconnaissance, Civil Affairs, and Military Reconstruction in Kuwait."' These missions are addressed in turn. 

Command Relationships 

Command relationships were fragmented and complicated and, in 

some cases, had a negative impact on tactical effectiveness. With certain 

exceptions, SOF, including the Joint Special Operations Task Force 

(JSOTF), were under the command of ClNCCENT and under the operational 

control of Special Operations Command, Central Command (SOCCENT). 

Civil Affairs units remained under the operational control of the Army 

Component (ARCENT), while AC-130 Spectre gunships and EC-130 

Volant Solo PSYOP aircraft were under the operational control of the Air 

Force Component (CENTAF). Additionally, sea-air-land (SEAL) platoons 

and Special Boat Detachments were under the operational control of the 

Naval Component (NAVCENT) (see Figure 57). 

Relationships established between Central Command (CENTCOM), 

SOCCENT, CENTAF, and Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), 

serve to illustrate the problems associated with command and control of 

SOF air assets. Shortly after arrival in theater, Commander SOCCENT set 

about consolidating his air assets at King Fahd International Airport. 

14'(S) USS~COM Command Brief, prepared by USSOCOM/SOJ3, 1992. It is important 

to note that each SOF mission had an air component. 

296 
Figure 57 

operational cim-01 of SOF FOITCS 

Split Among Different Components 

CINCCENT 

5=l 

(U) Shows how OPCON of SOF forces was split among different components. 
However, the acting CENTAF Commander, Major General Thomas Olson, 

retained operational control of the AC-130s and EC-130s. He agreed, 

however, to relocate them to King Fahd International Airport. Thus, the 

Commander of 1st Special Operations Wing worked for both SOCCENT 

and CENTAF. He reported directly to Colonel Johnson at SOCCENT, but 

did not have the final say in all operational matters, especially those 

involving AC-I 30 and EC-130 missions.142 

Also in theater was the 39th Special Operations Wing from RheinMain Air Base. The 39th Special Operations Wing Commander reported 

to Commander SOCEUR, while SOCCENT maintained tactical control. 

European Command would not release forces to another theater 

c~mmander-in-chief.'~~ 

Coalition Warfkre Support 

In August, Central Command recognized the need to integrate the 

multinational forces, each using different equipment and procedures, into 

a coherent operational plan. The capabilities possessed by special 

operations personnel made them an ideal choice to support such an effort. 

Army Special Forces, Navy SEALS, and Air Force Special Operations 

Combat Control Teams performed a wide range of missions. Teams from 

these missions trained members of the multinational forces in close air 

support and Naval gunfire spotting procedures. They also provided 

CINCCENT with information on multinational force locations and activities. 

Other nonspecial operations forces, such as the Marine Corps' Air and 

Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies, performed similar functions. Without 

these teams, it would have been difficult for Coalition forces to receive 

U.S. fire support or to coordinate tactical air operations with U.S. and other 

Allied air forces. SOF teams trained Kuwaitis, Saudis, Egyptians, and 

Syrians and supported the Kuwaiti resistance. The success of the program 

was first evidenced at the Battle of Khafji, where U.S. air and naval gunfire 

supported Coalition ground forces. CINCCENT characterized this effort as 

"one of the most vital missions SOF performed during the war." 

'42(S) AFSW unpublished history of Desert ShieldDesert Storm, 1992, p 3. 

'"(S) Ibid. 

298 
Psychological Operatwns 

As the crisis in the Gulf unfolded, the need for a psychological 

operations campaign became apparent.144 Language qualified and 

regionally and culturally oriented, PSYOP personnel were specifically 

organized, trained, and equipped for such operations. By the end of 

October, a combined cell had been formed with representatives from the 

12 January 1991, everything was in place to begin the psychological 

operations campaign. Actually, the PSYOP machinery had been in place 

since 30 August 1990, but permission to implement the plan was granted 

only after a 5 December personal message from General Schwarzkopf to 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Kingdom.'45 B Y 

EC-130 Volant Solo is the only airborne PSYOP platform in the U.S. 

inventory. As an Air National Guard asset, the Volant Solo operation 

presented unique unit and personnel rotation policies. Active duty 

participation was based on prefiled volunteer statements and not on 

mobilization.'46 The National Guard Bureau specified thirty day 

rotations of personnel, since thirty days is the maximum volunteer period. 

Many guardsmen returned for three or four rotations. 

During Desert Shield, the flight orbits of broadcasting aircraft were 

moved progressively closer to the Iraq/Kuwait border. The first Volant 

Solo broadcast was on Thanksgiving Day, 22 November 1990, when they 

began rebroadcasting Voice Of America service. [DELETED]. 

'&(S) JCS issued deployment orders to CINCSOC directing movement of the 193d SOG 

'"Before October. Saudi representatives were very concerned about using psyop for 

"?93d Special Operations Group. After Action Rpt and Intvws. Harrisburg, PA, 

(a one-of-a-kind PSYOP asset). 

fear they would provoke an Iraqi invasion. 

Jan 1992. 

299 
Combat Search and Rescue 

The recovery of downed U.S. aircrews has traditionally enjoyed a 

high priority in wartime.'*' Doctrinally, combat rescue was the responsibility of the Joint Force Commander. Each component commander was 

responsible for planning and conducting CSAR in support of his own 

operations. CSAR was a Service responsibility.148 The Special Operations 

CSAR responsibilities were no greater than that of any other Service or 

functional component. 

The crisis in the Gulf confronted the Air Force with a dilemma. The 

Air Force had recently reestablished the Air Rescue Service (ARS), but 

without helicopters capable of penetrating a high-threat en~ironment.'~~ 

In the aftermath of the failed April 1980 Iranian rescue operation, most 

CSAR aircraft, the HC-130s and HH/CH-53s, had assumed special operations roles. The most capable ARS helicopter, the MH-60 Pave Hawk, 

was available only in small numbers and was considered capable only for 

a medium-threat environment. None of the Services possessed forces 

trained and equipped solely to conduct classic combat rescue missions. 

In Desert Storm, SOF aviation assets were the only forces with the requisite capabilities to penetrate enemy territory, recover a downed pilot, and 

egress safely.15o Special Operations Forces, however, are equipped and 

trained for night missions. A 24-hour on-call search and rescue mission 

could put Special Operations Forces in enemy territory during daylight 

hours-a circumstance they are taught to avoid. 

The above problems notwithstanding, and with a campaign plan that 

called for the use of hundreds of aircraft flying thousands of sorties 

around the clock, a strategy had to be created and forces positioned for 

'47Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, the principal CSAR force in Vietnam. 

was disbanded in 1983, and its components and equipment were absorbed by Special 

Operations Forces @OF). Air Rescue Service was (relconstituted in 1989, but was not 

combat ready and was not equipped with helicopters capable of penetrating a high-threat 

environment. 

Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue. 

'491n 1989. the 41st Rescue Weather Reconnaissance Wing was realigned under the 

'%e only SOF aviation assets configured to penetrate enemy airspace were the U.S. 

Military Airlift Command and renamed the Air Rescue Service. 

Air Force MH-53 and MH-60, and the U.S. Army CH-47 and UH-60. 

300 
accomplishing CSAR. CINCCENT tasked the mission to SOCCENT, who in 

turn designated Air Force Special Operations Command, Central Command, to be the single manager for all CSAR aviation.'" CENTCOM Arm~,'~* Navy, and Air Force aircraft were responsible for on-call CSAR for 

Kuwait and Iraq, south of 33 degrees, 30 minutes north latitude. The 

area north of 30 degrees, 30 minutes north latitude was covered by 

EUCOM forces in Turkey. By the time Desert Storm began, aircraft 

supporting CSAR missions were located at five bases in Saudi Arabia and 

at two in Turkey. 

A CSAR plan was developed and a joint rescue coordination center 

(JRCC) was established within the Tactical Air Coordination Center 

(TACC). Once established, Special Operations personnel and aircraft were 

on 24-hour CSAR alert for over eight months. The mission continued into 

the postwar period. 

Air Force Special Tactics personnel conducted CSAR exercises and 

provided communications, escape, and evasion training to aircrews. They 

also helped develop and implement weapons, survival, first aid, and 

medical training for Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 

personneI.Is3 

CSAR Procedures 

Central Command's CSAR guidelines required reasonable confirmation of a downed aircrewman's survival and location before a CSAR 

'"AFSOCCENT provided mission guidance to AFSOF assets at Ratha, Ar'Ar. and Al 

Jouf and to the Army's 3/160 assets at King Khalid Military City. All assets responded 

to the Joint Recovery Coordination Cell (JRCC) at Riyadh, and final mission approval 

rested with SOCCENT. U.S. Army Special Ops CMD, Historical Monograph on Desert 

ShieldStorm, 1992, p 4-5. 

I52The Army 3d Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, working 

with Air Force Special Operations, developed procedures and techniques for conducting 

CSAR. Using these techniques, Army SOF aviators rescued one F-16 pilot. The Army 

flew MH-47 (Chinook) and MH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. 

153(SMF) Air Force Special Tactics personnel were augmented by Air Force Survival 

instructors (SOCCENT E&E After Action Rpt. 5 Mar 1991). 

30 1 
mission launch.’” First Special Operations Wing personnel visited each 

flying wing and briefed aircrews on CSAR procedures, and detailed 

information on SOF capabilities and requirement^.'^^ The CSAR system 

was set-up so that once a crewman ejected and reached the ground, 

fighters, would be diverted to the designated area. The JRCC, then alerted 

AFSOCCENT to execute the mission (see Figure 58). Due to dense enemy 

concentrations on the battlefield and Iraqi use of radio direction-finding 

equipment, downed pilots were frequently captured immediately after 

parachuting to the ground. As a result, only seven CSAR missions were 

launched, resulting in three saves. 

The first save, January 21, was a daylight recovery’% of a Navy F-14 

pilot (Lieutenant Devon Jones) downed deep in Iraq by antiaircraft fire. 

The E-3 AWACS directed two A-10s to the area of the downed pilot, over 

160 miles inside Iraq. Meanwhile, a MH-53 Pave Low helicopter 

‘%Some aircrews found fault with Central Command’s CSAR procedure requiring 

confirmation of a survivor before a mission launch. The following are comments by 

Lt Col Trumbull, 550 TFT’S, interviewed 17 Jun 91. ‘The other thing 1 think was missing 

was SAR (search and rescue). Our DO and his backseater were on the ground for three 

and one-half days in western Iraq. Nobody’d go in and pick them up, and they eventually 

became prisoners of war. The advertised special operations guys that came down to talk 

to us before the war said, ‘no sweat, we’ll come get you anywhere you are.’ That from 

my perspective, was a big lie. When I’ve got guys on the ground for three and one-half 

days and they don’t go pick them up, we basically decided at that point that if anybody 

went down, you were on your own. Nobody was going to come get you.” Lt Col 

Trumbull refers to the Eberly and Griffith shoot down. Poor communication prevented 

contact, location authentication, and recovery efforts. The officers were captured when 

they walked into a border guard post. Three recovery attempts were made before their 

Capture. 

‘”(S) Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Desert Storm After Action 

Rpt, 1991, p 9-10. 

‘%OF CSAR preferred to operate in darkness, the time when they were most likely 

to survive. 

302 
Figure 58 

CENTCOM CSAR Procedure 

was launched. As the helicopter arrived in the rescue area, the A-10s destroyed an Iraqi radio-intercept truck closing in on the downed pilot. 

lbo Special Tactic Paramedics, part of the MH-53 helicopter crew, 

assisted the downed pilot to the helicopter and conducted a preliminary 

physical examination. 

Other'rescue missions did not go as smoothly. On 27 February 1991, 

AWACS received a call of a downed F-16 pilot in hostile territory (Iraq) 

and reported the data to the JRCC. [DELETED].'57 [DELETED]. The 

Army directed a UH-60 Blackhawk to refuel, pick up a flight surgeon, 

rendezvous with two armed AH-64 ApacheIs8 attack helicopters, and 

attempt a rescue. The pilot's exact location was unknown. The plan was 

lS7(S) Intvw, Capt Greg Eanes. USAF, Chief, Escape and Evasion, SOCCENT during 

"%he UH-60 Blackhawk and the two AH-64 Apache helicopters were from the 

Desert Storm, Sep 1992. 

1Olst Airborne Division. 

303 
to get the rescue helicopter to the general area of the downed pilot and 

attempt to establish radio contact. As the three helicopters entered the 

area of the downed pilot,159 they came under heavy Iraqi fire. All three 

helicopters began evasive maneuvers, but the rescue helicopter was shot 

down.'@' Both escort helicopters sustained damage, but were able to 

return to home base.161 

Escape and Evasion 

As the Executive Agent for Aircrew Escape and Evasion, SOCCENT 

was tasked with developing and executing an escape and evasion plan.16* 

In response, SOCCENT developed a contingency Blood Chit (see 

Figure 59) that could be photocopied and passed out to aircrews and 

special operators as needed. It was also recommended that a contingency 

fund be established to pay indigenous persons for assisting downed 

American pilots and crews. One Coalition member used a Blood Chit 

in his successful evasion to freedom. Fortunately, Blood Chits did not 

have to be used in great numbers. [DELETED]. 

159The pilot was captured by Iraqi soldiers. He was repatriated on 6 Mar 1991. 

'@'Five crew members died in the crash; the three survivors were captured by Iraqi 

Intvw, Lt Col Joseph Hampton, USAF, Commander, Joint Rescue Control Center 

I6*(s) Capt Greg Eanes. USAF. SOCCENT 12/E&E officer Evasion and Escape Rpt 1991. 

soldiers. They were repatriated on 6 Mar 1991. 

during Desert Storm, Sep 1992. 

161 

304 
Figure 59 

Blood Chit 

305 
Direct Action 

On the evening of 16 January 1991, a MH-53J Pave Low 111 

helicopter crossed into Iraqi airspace leading a flight of Army AH-64 

Apache attack helicopters. The Apaches attacked Iraqi radar sites with 

Hellfire missiles to suppress radar defenses in advance of the initial 

Coalition strikes. At the same time, special operations teams placed radar 

beacons along the northern Saudi Arabian border to aid Coalition aircraft 

in confirming their position when entering and leaving Iraq.'63 

Special operations fixed-wing aircraft also performed direct action 

missions. The MC-130E Combat Talon dropped 15,000-pound BLU-82 

bombs. Five complex missions involving AWACS, electronic jamming, air 

defense suppression, and support aircraft were executed. Eleven BLU-82s 

were dropped on nine different Iraqi positions, including Faylaka Island. 

The weapon's enormous blast effect was exploited to demoralize Iraqi 

forces. The Commander of the 8th Special Operations Squadron proposed the use of BLU-82s as a mine-clearing and psychological weapon. 

The proposal was forwarded to CINCCENT, who was interested in using 

the bomb to clear mine fields. The depot at Hill AFB quickly shipped 18 

BLU-82s to King Fahd Airport. The Iraqi air defense threat dictated drop 

altitudes between 16,000 and 21,000 feet.Ia In addition, more than one 

was dropped at a time to increase the psychological impact and to take 

advantage of tactical surprise. As a final precaution, each of the drop 

aircraft formations included EF-111 Ravens, F-4G Wild Weasels. and 

EC- 130 Compass Call aircraft. '65 

Eleven BLU-82s were dropped, mostly against minefields and troop 

concentrations. 

While the effectiveness of the munitions in clearing mines and other 

obstacles has not been determined, the BLU-82s were very effective 

against enemy troops, Even bunkered troops were severely affected by 

the blast from these massive bombs. Debriefings from captured troops 

AFSOC Desert Storm After Action Rpt. 

la@) Air Force Special Ops CMD Paper: BLU-82 Operations in Desert Storm, 

lG(S) Ibid, p 3. 

May 92, p 2. 

306 
from the vicinity of the BLU-82 missions provided testaments to the 

effectiveness of this weapon.'& 

No bombs were dropped after G-day. Upon cessation of hostilities, the 

seven unexploded BLU-82s in country were destroyed by Explosive Ordnance Dispose1 per~onnel.'~' 

Special operations AC-130 Spectre gunships were also involved in 

direct action missions. These aircraft, first used in combat missions in 

Vietnam, were equipped to operate in a low-threat environment. Between 

18 and 21 January, AC-130s were diverted from their usual missions to 

look for mobile Scud targets.'68 On 21 January, an AC-130 crew detected 

launch indications on their Radar Warning Receiver. The crew evaded 

the missile attacks but overstressed the aircraft. A second AC-I 30 on the 

Scud hunt was also threatened by a number of SAM sites. Both crews 

were confronted with well-organized and coordinated Iraqi attacks, 

demonstrating a high degree of command and control. [DELETED].'@ 

AC-130s were effective in supporting ground forces in Kuwait and in 

suppressing the Iraqi incursion into Khafji, Saudi Arabia, where a gunship 

was lost. 

Special Reconnaissance 

SOCCENT used teams for combined special reconnaissance during 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. These missions satisfied a wide range 

of requirements, from reconnaissance along the Kuwaiti coast to support 

of conventional tactical operations deep inside Iraq. SEAL units operated 

in shallow water close to shore. SEAL operations, which took place over 

several weeks, resulted in intelligence gathering and contributed to tactila(S) SOCCENT, 1991 Command History Desert ShieldDesert Storm. 

I6'Before Desert ShieldStorm, no testing had been conducted with the BLU-82 for 

mine clearing or desert warfare, a shortcoming that impacted desert use. Unfortunately. 

after the war, no tests were conducted with the unexploded bombs, which were eventually 

destroyed. 

Ia(S) 16th SOS Desert Storm Mission Summary Report, 1991. 

'@(S) Ibid, p 3-4. 

307 
cal deception operations. A PSYOP sea- and air-delivered leaflet operation 

also supported this deception effort (see Figure 60).I7O 

Figure 60 

Leaflet 

Army special forces performed reconnaissance missions in support of 

XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps. Rotary wing aircraft, specifically 

MH-53J and UH-60 special operations penetrator helicopters, conducted 

long-range infiltrations and exfiltrations into central and western Iraq. 

These missions provided commanders with essential information such as 

trafficability analysis (the ability of the ground to withstand traffic) and 

other details that could not be acquired by any other means.171 

l7baflets were placed in bottles that were allowed to drift onto Kuwaiti beaches. 

Iraqi military personnel gathered the leaflets and made inferences. Intvw, Commander 

4th Psychological Operations Group, Feb 1992. 

'71Anny 5th, 3d and 10th Special Forces Groups were inserted behind Iraqi lines to 

provide eye-on-target intelligence. Assistance was provided by Air Force, Navy, and 

4/17th Cavalry. U.S. Army Special Operations CMD, Historical Monograph. 

308 
Civil Affairs’” 

Civil Affairs (CA) units played an important role throughout 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Their missions included 

emergency support to the civilian sector, assessing the availability of host 

nation support, and assisting in the control, care, and movement of dislocated civilians and EPWS. The units made use of sOF and Military Airlift 

Command air assets in carrying out their missions. Special tactics personnel spent a great deal of time setting up contracts for water, fuel, and 

other airfield critical items. They had little training in this area, and it 

took them away from their primary duties. Civil Affairs units, however, 

were specifically trained in developing host nation interface and support 

agreements. Earlier deployment of CA units would have freed-up special 

tactics personnel and would have helped major airfields reach an operational status sooner. 

Kuwaiti Militmy Reconstruction 

In October of 1990, the State Department directed Civil Affairs planners to assist the Kuwaiti government in planning and executing a reconstruction effort.173 One of the first tasks involved restoration of the 

International Airport.174 Initial work was begun by Air Force Special 

Tactics units, which were later supplemented by regular Military Airlift 

Command combat control units. 

Special Tactics Groups 

The Air Force Special Tactics Group was activated on 1 October 

1987 in response to the need for integrated positive control and management of aviation and for on-scene casualty treatment and staging.”’ 

Previously, these functions had been performed either by different units 

or, in some cases, not at all. Under certain circumstances, such an informal arrangement was adequate. This was not true during special 

1721ntvw, Sgt Maj Eric Patterson, USSOCOM, Crisis Action Team, 1992. 

I73The Kuwait Task Force (KTF), in cooperation with others, accomplished a significant reconstruction effort. Civil Affairs In The Persian Gulf War, A Symposium, USA 

JFKSWCS. Ft Bmgg, NC, Oct 1991, pp 270-271. 

174(S) U.S. Army Special Ops CMD, Historical Monograph. 

(S) Special Order GA 170, Hq MAC, 28 Sep 1987. 175 

309 
operations, however, where close coordination was a necessity and 

fragmented and inefficient operations had to be a~0ided.I~~ 

Wartime Tasking 

During Desert Storm, Special Tactics combat air traffic controllers 

operated the three forward operating locations (FOLS) while the Pararescue 

Jumpers were flying as medical crewmen aboard Air Force MH-53s and 

MH-ms, and Army CH-47s and UH-60s. 

At Al Jouf and Ar'Ar airfields, along the Saudi Arabia-Iraq border, 

Special Tactics combat air traffic controllers recovered and refueled 

hundreds of aircraft and operated the primary emergency divert airfields 

for battle-damaged or minimum-fuel aircraft returning from combat 

sorties in Iraq. Al Jouf also became the main operating base for A-10s 

in the northern region. 

On 22 January 1991, a Special Tactics combat air traffic controller 

was a member of a special team infiltrated to within fifteen kilometers of 

Baghdad on a classified mission. His knowledge of close air support and 

communications procedures provided the team ' with a reasonable 

assurance that they would receive support if needed. The team was 

successful in cutting many lines of communications from Baghdad to 

outlying areas. As a result of the team's success and the contributions of 

the Special Tactics combat air traffic controller, the special operations 

unit requested four more Special Tactics personnel to conduct other 

clandestine missions. 

During Desert Storm, Special Tactics personnel functioned as 

frontline combat medics, flew aeromedical evacuation missions in support 

of the Coalition forces, and provided other medical support. They assisted in planning and executing Joint Task Force Charlie; a medical contingency plan designed to provide initial medical support at Kuwait City 

International Airport."' 

~~ 

'76Briefing. Bernie Oder, Special Tactics (USAFSOC), 4 Jun 1992. 

'77Kuwait City International Airport was to act as a casualty collection point, triage, 

and air evacuation station. 

310 
Summary 

During Desert Storm, SOF played a unique and important role. SOF 

operated in all environments4n land, on and under the sea, and in the 

air-as part of the combined arms team. SOF teams remained behind 

enemy lines and conducted special reconnaissance. They also supported 

theater deception plans, performed combat search and rescue, and conducted direct action missions. SOF contributed significantly to Coalition 

warfare and the reconstruction of the Kuwaiti Military and public infrastructure. 

In support of Desert Storm, U.S. Special Operations units were part of the 

largest special operations force in history. Many of the missions performed 

during Desert Shield and Desert Storm were identified in prewar plans; 

others, including the CSAR mission, were worked out during the crisis. 

SOF was able to provide the CINC with capabilities and options that 

effectively multiplied the military force available. Previous training and 

funding provided SOF with the flexibility to perform CSAR, Direct Action, 

Reconnaissance, and other missions with the same assets on very short 

notice. 

Air Refueling 

Air refueling was critical to the success of Desert Storm-not only the 

air refueling needed to deploy Coalition forces, but also air refueling for 

complex tactical operations. For example, during the opening hours of 

Desert Storm, seven B-52s launched from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and 

flew the world’s longest combat mission. The mission lasted over thirtyfive hours and culminated with the launch of thirty-five conventional airlaunched cruise missiles (CALCMS). The B-52s had to be air refueled five 

times, requiring support from a mix of thirty-eight KC-135 and nineteen 

KC-10 tanker sorties.’79 

Since World War 11, the United States has invested heavily in air 

refueling aircraft. These include the Air Force KC-135s and KC-lOs, the 

Navy KA-~s, and the Marine KC-130s. If considered a separate air force, 

178ussoco~. Posture Statement, Jun 1992, p 2. 

‘”(S) Hq Strategic Air Command, “Black” Weapon, Covert Mission: The Conventional ALCM, Desert Shield and Desert Storm 1986-1991, 29 May 1992. 

31 1 
all of these refueling aircraft combined, a total of 813,Iw would rank as 

the world's seventeenth largest force.'" 

All the Services procured air refueling systems to support their 

unique tactics and requirements. However, only Air Force tankers routinely planned and operated refueling missions supporting all Services in 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm.'" These tankers refueled 4,820 Navy/ 

Marine sorties, offloading 167,705,600 pounds of fuel, or about 13.5 

percent of all fuel 0ffl0aded.l~~ 

The scope of air refueling in the Gulf War was enormous and could 

only have been accomplished by the United States with the U.S. Air 

Force in the lead role, for no other air force in the world has so totally 

integrated air refueling into its operational concepts.'" The operational 

tactics employed by the U.S. tanker force during the Gulf War evolved 

from those of the Vietnam war and matured, through exercise and 

planning, into a layered spread of airborne aircraft that stretched the 

entire length of the front. As the air war successes became apparent, 

KC-135s and KC-10s even orbited in Iraqi airspace. 

Tracks And Anchors 

Desert Shield deployment air refuelings built what can be described 

as a bridge across the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The tanker tactics 

required to support the Air Campaign Plan were of a different nature, but 

responded to the same basic questions: How much gas do you want? 

Where do you want to start? Where should you be when finished? The 

driving force behind the tactics employed was the diversity of the fighter 

IwAt the time of Desert Storm, the USAF had 635 KC-135A. QE, R, and 59 KC-10 

in active, reserve, and National Guard; the U.S. Navy had 59 KA-6D. and the Marine 

Corps had 60 KC-130. Data were compiled through the assistance of Hq USAF, Hq US 

Marine Corps, and Chief of Naval Operations staff. 

18'(S) Based upon data from 480th Air Intelligence Group comparing the world's 

air forces fixed wing aircraft. 

''*Helicopter refuelings are accomplished by Marine Corps KC-130s and some 

versions of USAF HC-130s and MC-130s 

Ia3(S) Desert ShieldDesert Storm Tanker Assessment, pp 2-6 - 2-13. 

'"(S) The USAF possesses the world's largest tanker fleet. 694 aircraft. Source: 

480th Air Intelligence Group. 

312 
packages used in the air campaign. Aircraft came from different locations and had different fuel burn rates and different offload requirements. 

What they had in common was the need to air refuel in the same area and 

end very nearly at the same time over approximately the same geographic 

area. This requirement drove the development of tanker anchor orbit 

areas, which involved several tankers stacked vertically at 500-foot 

intervals so that they could refuel many aircraft simultaneously. The 

orbits were designed to meet the fuel demands of the fighter force and, 

equally important, to provide enough booms to refuel an entire package 

at the end of its mission within a short time. 

Not all aircraft could benefit from the orbit concept. Some aircraft 

such as the B-52, E-3A, and RC- 135 required many thousands of pounds 

of fuel. They needed long, straight tracks, usually along the most direct 

flight path required to get the aircraft to its target. These tracks did not 

have tankers stacked as did the anchor orbits. Rather, they often had two 

or three tankers in formation available to refuel a multiship bomber cell 

requiring over 200,000 pounds of fuel. The maze of requirements spread 

tankers across the battle area right to the forward edge of U.S.-controlled 

airspace. Figure 61 depicts the planned tanker anchors and tracks available on Day 1 of the air campaign. 

Boom Versus Drogue 

Differences between the U.S. Services complicated refueling 

operations. The KA-6D and KC-130 were equipped with drogues designed to mate with the probes on Navy and Marine aircraft.ls5 For long 

duration missions such as trans-Atlantic deployments, offload requirements dictated the use of U.S. Air Force tankers, which have the capability to refuel with either a boom or a drogue. With the KC-135, however, 

the decision as to which aircraft were going to be air refueled 

"%e Air Force standardized on flying boom systems in the 1950s and 1960s. 

largely because of the enormous oftloads required by strategic bombers, frequently 

exceeding 100,OOO ,pounds per bomber. The Navy, constrained by the need for systems 

capable of carrier operations, standardized on the lighter probe and drogue systems. 

313 
Figure 61 

The Tanker lkacks/Anchors Used on Day 1 Desert Storm186 

FIGURE DELETED 

had to be made on the ground, since the KC-135's boom can only be 

converted to a drogue on the ground. Essentially, the KC-135 can refuel 

probe- or boom-equipped aircraft, but not both on the same mission. The 

KC-I0 possesses both a boom and a drogue and can use them 

sequentially on the same mission. While this is more efficient, it also 

commits the aircraft with the largest capacity to a specific area and 

mission that might be better filled by the more numerous KC-135s. The 

tanker planner had to match fuel and boom and drogue requirements with 

available tankers. 

The KC-10 refueling basket was considered superior to that on the 

KC-135. Navy and Marine pilots found refueling more difficult with the 

'86(S/NF/WN/RD) History of the Strutcgic Air Command. Vol I, p 366. 

187Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress. WD, Apr 1992. 

pp T-90 - T-91. 

314 
harder basket and shorter hose on the KC-135. They preferred the softer 

basket and longer hose on the KC-10. The unforgiving characteristics of 

the KC-1 35 basket has produced a noticeably higher number of damaged 

probes on Navy and Marine aircraft. 

AT0 Process 

Air refueling is unique among air operations in that tanker tactics 

depend on the requirements of receiver aircraft. The ATO process that 

mated tankers and receivers in the Gulf War is discussed in the Command 

(UUI Control Report of this study. Difficulties with the ATO process arose 

after the first-phase (48-hours) of the war. Planners had several months 

to plan the first-phase operations but only 24-hours to plan each succeeding operation. After the War, Brigadier General Caruana commented, 

“One of the problems that we had here is that the tankers are always 

assumed in any operation.”’88 The important point was that tanker tactics 

were developed and exercised to be rapidly responsive and flexible. 

These tactics addressed two elements most critical to the tanker mission, 

the amount of fuel and number of booms and drogues available. 

The limit most frequently addressed concerning fighter refueling was 

the number of booms. The requirement to have all members of a flight 

ready at about the same time required groups of tankers flying orbits 

stacked at 500-foot intervals. This tactic responded to a limitation on the 

number of fighters that can be refueled in a given period. If insufficient 

tankers are available for the operation, it is boom limited. [DELETED]. 

This desire to push fighter flights through the air refueling anchors 

quickly demanded large numbers of airborne refueling booms during peak 

operations. 

The need to expedite the flow of fighter aircraft through the air 

refueling anchors led to the development of a new tactic. The procedure 

was called Quick Flow (see Figure 62). As one fighter was being refueled, the fighter next in a refueling sequence maintained an “on deck” 

position, flying right wing formation with the fighter on the boom rather 

than the normal more distant tanker observation position. When the first 

fighter on the refueling boom was finished, it moved to the tanker’s left 

“‘(S) Intvw. Strategic Air Command Oral History with Brig Gen Patrick P. Caruana, 

USCENTAF STRATFOR. conducted 13 Mar 1991. page 12 of transcript. 

315 
wing and the “ondeck” receiver slid left into position with the boom. 

Because no fore and aft movements were necessary for the “on-deck‘’ 

fighter to move into position, it was a much faster procedure. This 

procedure enabled fighters with similar refueling airspeeds (A-10s could 

not refuel with F-15s for example) to expedite their passage through the 

air refueling anchor^."^ 

Figure 62 

Quick Flow Air Refueling Procedures 

auiw FLOW 

AIR REFUELING 

PROCEDURES 

auicx FLOW #I 

lS9Tanker Tactics in Southwest Asia, 17 Air Division (P) Pamphlet 3-1, 10 Nov 

1990, pp 3-6 - 3-7. 

316 
Crowded Skies 

The sheer number of aircraft involved in air refueling operations 

created a serious problem, prompting the remark that “ . . . the biggest 

danger was that we would have a mid-air collision somewhere up there 

in that very congested, confusing arrangement of tracks.”lgO This sentiment was echoed by a working group at the Desert Storm Tactics Conference: ‘Tanker operations were the most dangerous part of the mission 

(excluding the IP-to-target runs).”191 

A major challenge was the last minute changes to tanker requirements. This problem was solved, in part, by the addition of a tanker 

liaison (usually a KC-135 navigator) on the AWACS as part of the Airborne Command Element. The tanker liaison helped coordinate and 

deconflict tanker sorties, had the authority to move tankers as mission 

requirements dictated, and became an indispensable problem 

He was able to identify which tanker was most readily available and 

capable of making last minute flight changes or of meeting new requests 

without disrupting scheduled flows of receivers to other tanker aircraft.193 

Cross Border Operations 

A major problem regarding tanker tactics revolved around tanker 

operations over the Iraqi and Kuwaiti land mass. Regulations that prescribed basic tanker tactics failed to adequately address the special considerations involved in planning and conducting air refueling operations 

over enemy territory. During the Gulf War, tankers orbited for up to four 

hours over enemy territory. The major difficulty for the tanker force was 

the dearth of published tactics on threat avoidance and how to respond to 

them if encountered.194 

lgOIntvw, Strategic Air Command Oral History, Lt Col Ken Mills, 1703 AREFW, 

191(SMF/N”/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, p 7-6. 

IpL Capt Robert Littrell, USAF, “E-3 Desert Storm Air Refueling Operations,” Fighter 

Weapons Review, Vol 40, Summer 1992, pp 21-22. 

1931ntvw, Strategic Air Command Oral History with Maj Scott Hente, Maj John 

Heinz, Lt Col Jim Philips, and Lt Col Jim Schroder, STRATFOR Tanker Planners, conducted 11 Mar 91. 

King Khalid. Saudi Arabia, conducted 19 Mar 1991. 

‘%]bid. 

317 
Summary 

The air refueling tanker was a major contributor to the Coalition's 

air effort; air refueling was a critical element in U.S. force projection. 

Twelve different varieties of tanker aircraft from the Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine Corps and from the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Saudi 

Arabia supported the Coalition air effort. USAF tank-ers alone flew over 

34,000 sorties, performed over 85,000 refuelings, and offloaded over 1.2 

billion pounds of fuel.Ig5 Tactics were developed and utilized to put the 

gas where the fighters, bombers, and other receivers needed it. As 

requirements changed, tankers were diverted to where they were needed. 

The use of Quick Flow procedures shortened the time that fighters spent 

in the refueling anchors. These tactics were a critical component in the 

success of the air campaign. It is clear that the Air Campaign of Desert 

Storm could not have been accomplished without the contribution of the 

Coalition's air refueling force. 

Tactical Deception 

Both sides used tactical deception during Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm. Coalition forces employed deception to mask the timing of initial 

air attacks and to confuse the Iraqis as to the final axis of the ground 

attacks. Each of the Services embarked on deception plans contributing to 

the overall Central Command deception plan.'% Air power contributed 

greatly to the overall success of these Coalition efforts. The Iraqis used 

tactical deception in the form of decoys, movement, and obscurants to 

make Coalition targeting and bomb damage assessment difficult. 

'"(S) I,)esert ShieldDesert Storm Tanker Assessment, pp 1-1 - 1-3. 

'%Deception is a psychological action that may or may not be part of a greater 

psychological operation. 

318 
Coalition Deception 

Central Command's deception plan was built around four goals: 

mislead the Iraqi military staff as to Central Command's force composition, intentions, capabilities, and timing; encourage Iraq to misallocate 

resources moving into Kuwait; achieve and maintain a tactical advantage 

during the battle; and minimize attrition of friendly forces.200 

To accomplish the Gulf War deception plan, CENTAF was charged 

with supporting operations that would: condition Iraqi commanders to 

conclude that Coalition forces believed Kuwait to be the center of gravity; 

condition Allied air forces to fly a tempo of operations similar to what 

Iraq would see on the night of the real attack; develop a plan for masking 

the launch and movement of mission aircraft (air refuelers, etc.); exploit 

situations where repeated tactics created conditioned responses; and shut 

down Iraqi reconnaissance assets, thereby allowing Coalition ground 

forces to move unobserved?" These supporting operations efforts can be 

summed as follows: 

The Iraqi command structure was being conditioned not to react to a set 

of stimuli that were orchestrated to get just the sort of non-reaction 

required to keep allied aircraft losses to a minimum during the first 

critical hours of the war.'"* 

Air Force Mission 

CENTAF contributed to Central Command's tactical deception objectives by allowing the Iraqis to see the type of training that portrayed 

Kuwait as the center of gravity. CENTAF placed air refueling tracks so 

that Iraqi electronic intelligence saw tracks in northeastern Saudi Arabia. 

The tracks flown in the west were placed far enough south so that they 

fell outside Iraq's radar coverage (see Figure 63). [DELETED] (see Figure 64). Over time, the picture painted was of a ground frontal assault 

into Kuwait supported by close air support aircraft. Since Iraq's preconception was a Coalition frontal assault into Kuwait, as evidenced by the 

placement of troops in the KTO, the deception plan sought to maintain 

~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ 

'O0(s) AF/XOOU Briefing, USAF Tactical Deception Program. 

"'(S) Ibid. 

'02(S) Maj William Holway, Tactical Deception in the Gulf War. 1 Jun 1992. 

319 
that Iraqi perception?03 while continuing to mask the time and axis of the 

Army attack. 

CAP and AWACS Coverage. Combat Air Patrols and AWACS radar 

surveillance were conducted from the onset of Desert Shield (see Figure 65). Central Command planners, recognizing that Iraqi early-warning 

(EW) technicians would pick up any sudden increase in flight activity, 

surged the number of CAP and AWACS flights periodically to deemphasize 

actual increases in air activity as Desert Storm approached. 

Nighthawk Scheduling. [DELETED] CENTAF developed a refueling 

track called “Nighthawk” (see Figure 66). This track positioned F-117s 

nearer the border and gave pilots time to familiarize themselves with the 

area and it provided refueling practice; CENTAF also tasked other, 

aircraft to refuel on the Nighthawk track?@’ In fact, the Nighthawk track 

was used on the first night while other Coalition forces marshalled just 

outside the range of Iraqi EW (see Figure 67). 

AT0 Planning. One of the most detailed and intensive parts of the 

overall deception plan was the increase in flying patterns established by 

the ATO. The plan slowly built up the number of aircraft in the air with 

surges occurring one night a week. [DELETED]. Additionally, major 

m3(S) Ibid. 

204[DELETED] 

320 
321 
322 
323 
Figure 66 

“Nighthawk” Refueling Track 

exercises such as Initial Hack and Imminent Thunder were designed to 

test Central Commands’s ability to wage war, and began during this 

324 
0; 

w 

N 

(n 
designated surge period. By mid-December, surge activity began to align 

itself with Central Command's plans, and for months before the first 

Coalition attack, CENTAF showed the Iraqis a high-activity flight profile. 

The objective was to condition the Iraqis not to be overly alarmed by 

high activity on the first night of Desert Storm.205 

Decoy drones compounded Iraqi confusion on the first night. The 

objectives were to bewilder the Iraqi Air.Defense System, lure threat 

radars to emit earlier and longer for easier SEAD targeting, and induce the 

Iraqis to waste some missiles. All drones were shot on the first two days 

of the war.2o6 

The integrated deception plan wove a pattern of activity that the 

Iraqis were inclined to believe. This conditioning enabled the Allied air 

forces to strike the Iraqi air defense system unexpectedly and eventually 

to commence the ground war on a scale and direction to which the Iraqis 

had no ability to respond. 

Coalition forces also employed unit-level tactical deception. . 

[DELETED] ?OS 

[DELETED] ?09 

Air Force Support for the Ground Offensive 

Coalition aircraft flew a variety of missions in support of the ground 

offensive. Many missions were flown specifically to support the 

deception plans of ground units. Central Command required that major 

"'(S) Maj Holway. 

206(S) Ibid. 

207(s) AFlXOOU Briefing, USAF Tactical Deception Program. 

208(S) Early jamming times and ingress route of attack axis were continually varied 

209(S) Intvw, MSgt Mike Callin. crew member of the Volant Solo, 193d Special 

to further deceive the Iraqis. 

Operations Group, Harrisburg International Airport, PA, 21-22 Jan 1992. 

326 
ground units not “show their hand” by shifting forces west of King 

Khalid Military City before Iraq was blinded. After the start of the air 

war, the 18th Airborne Corps began its shift west. With Iraq’s reconnaissance capability destroyed or incapacitated, Coalition forces moved 

unseen. 

In its wake, the XVIII Airborne Corps left a large deception cell in 

Saudi Arabia. Unit positions were left intact, and the deception cell was 

equipped with electronic deception gear and inflatable decoy 

equipment?” 

The Marines utilized Task Force Troy to aid in their deception plans. 

Task Force Troy built mock artillery pieces, utilized dummy tanks, faked 

helicopter missions into and out of areas, and continued false radio 

transmissions to deceive Iraqi intelligence units. In addition, the Marines 

ran diversionary combined-arms raids into Kuwait supported by air units. 

The Navy contributed to deception by conducting exercises to pin Iraqi 

troops into defensive positions on the beaches. Navy SEALS conducted 

raids, minesweepers prepared waterways, amphibious ships practiced 

landings, 16-inch guns conducted shore bombardment, and aircraft were 

tasked onto targets near the likely beaches. Although the Marine Corps 

did not conduct an amphibious landing in the Gulf War, amphibious 

forces greatly aided in the deception program. Reports indicate anywhere 

from two to ten divisions of Iraqi troops were kept in the “fire sack” of 

Kuwait due to Naval activities in the KTO. None of these operations 

would have been as easy had the air not been controlled by Coalition 

forces. Air power played a leading role in strategic and tactical deception 

efforts. 

Iraqi Deception 

Iraqi forces also used tactical deception as part of their campaign 

against Coalition forces. Their support for such activities was limited by 

several factors. They did not have the reconnaissance assets nor did they 

have the extensive variety of early-warning equipment as the Coalition 

forces. The Iraqis did however have one important advantage; they had 

been on the receiving end of Western intelligence products during the 

Iran-Iraq war and knew approximately how good our equipment was. 

2’oArmy Aviation in Desert ShielVDesert Stonn, US Army Aviation Center, Ft 

Rucker, AL. 36362, 8 Jun 1992, p 14. 

327 
They also knew many of the Coalition weaknesses, and they planned 

accordingly?" 

[DELETED]. 

[DELETED].'" 

[DELETED] ?I3 [DELETED]. 

After the start of the air campaign, it was apparent that communications between many Iraqi units had been interrupted. Therefore, much 

of the tactical deception at the unit level was probably accomplished independently by the local commander. 

The Iraqis attempted to use smoke to achieve both strategic and 

tactical success. They applied these measures throughout the KTO and at 

installations within Iraq to conceal battlefield operations and targets. 

Besides smoke generators and smoke pots, the Iraqis set a number of 

different objects ablaze to create clouds of smoke; the objects included 

oil filled pits, spills along pipelines, oil drums, and tires. Some Iraqi 

efforts may have been prompted by media coverage reporting that 

Coalition pilots were reluctant to bomb "cloud covered'' targets.214 The 

effects of smoke were twofold: as a denial measure, it obscured targets 

and prevented complete bomb damage assessment; as a deception 

measure, it created the appearance of previous damage, possibly where 

no attacks had occurred. 

The Iraqis used smoke as a denial and deception tactic at a number 

of sites. The use of smoke generally followed the Coalition's targeting 

'"lraq had been able to buy a constant flow of Western weapons, parts, and supplies 

since 1970. The West willingly shared National Asset products with some of the Gulf 

States. Near the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was buying French Satellite data. 

Additionally, Iraq was a prime user of Soviet Bloc sources, training, technology, and 

intelligence. Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis, 1987. Also found 

in Cordesman, Anthony, and Wagner, Abraham, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol11, The 

Iran-Iraq War. 

'I2(s) Msg from UTAlS Ramstein AB GEIIINONIP 1904502 Dec 1990. 

'I3@) Ibid. 

'I4(S) This tactic was indeed effective, since cloud cover did impede Coalition 

bombing with precision-guided weapons. 

328 
priorities. In response to increased Coalition targeting of bridges, smoke 

from fires set near bridges was used to obscure the structure or give the 

false impression of bomb damage. At one target site at least ten smoke 

generators produced clouds of white smoke, concealing portions of the 

facility. One Iraqi deception tactic used was black smoke seen emanating 

from an oilhire fire at an ammunition plant that in reality was 

undamaged ?” 

[DELETED]. 

On a more strategic level, the Iraqis utilized deception tactics in 

employing their Scud missiles. 

[DELETED] ?I6 

In conclusion, both sides used tactical deception tactics to their 

advantage. Iraq’s crude methods of smoke, concealment, decoys, and 

camouflage aimed at hindering Coalition targeting and bomb damage 

assessment efforts. On the other hand, Coalition deception practices were 

completely integrated into overall operations that paralyzed Iraq’s ability 

to conduct warfare. 

Psychological Operations and Air Power 

Both Iraqi and Coalition forces conducted psychological operations 

(PSYOP) during Desert ShieldlDesert Storm. psYoP covers a wide spectrum 

of tactical and strategic political and military operations. This section 

focuses on psychological operations that directly involved air power. 

It was generally acknowledged that the effectiveness of psychological operations was notoriously difficult to judge. By most measures, 

Iraq’s tactical PSYOP against Coalition forces was ineffective. Its strategic 

campaign, however, met with some limited success. There was also 

evidence that U.S. PSYOP had a positive effect on the outcome of the war. 

The United States used a wide variety of air assets in its tactical PSYOP 

efforts, including MC- 130, HC- 130, and EC- 130 Volant Solo aircraft plus 

“’(S) Iraqi Smoke Denial and Deception Measures, D&D [decoy and deception] 

2’6(S/NF/WN) Christie and Barlow, Scud Campaign, p 1-1 8. 

Digest 91-03, 21 Feb 1991 AFININLD. 

329 
B-52s, F-16s, Marine F/A-l8s, and Navy A-6s. U.S. PSYOP efforts 

included dropping 29 million leaflets, coordinating PSYOP missions with 

tactical air operations, and countering Iraqi PSYOP efforts. 

The aims of U.S. PSYOPS were to reduce the morale and combat 

efficiency of enemy troops and create disaffection within their ranks and 

to convince enemy, friendly, and neutral nations and forces to take actions favorable to the Unites States and its allies. 

Recent conflicts have seen increasingly close integration of PSYOP 

with combat operations. For example, the 1982 Falklands War, conflicts 

in Afghanistan, Africa, South and Central America, and U.S. interventions in Grenada and Panama all had important PSYOP dimensions. PSYOP 

was also a critical part of terrorist operations during the 70s and was part 

of the Iraqi plan when Saddam implicitly threatened terrorist activities 

before to the Gulf War?17 

Iraqi PSYOP 

Any analysis of PSYOP must be within the context of the conflict it 

was intended to support. In this case, PSYOP was triggered by the 

2 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The overall Iraqi PSYOP strategy 

appears to have been to prevent western intervention, deter Coalition air 

activity, and once air action started, to limit its effectiveness?" 

Iraqi PSYOP flowed from the Ministry of Culture and Information 

under the strict supervision of the Ba'ath Party, the Revolutionary 

Command Council, and Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi propaganda system 

was modeled on the Soviet system and was similar in its essentials to that 

of most other totalitarian countries. The Iraqi PSYOP campaign 

emphasized religious symbolism, Arab nationalism, and praise of Saddam 

Hussein. The themes reflected Iraqi culture and A basic 

217Saddam's gathering of terrorists in Baghdad, in early Sep 1990, was a clear 

message to the Coalition not to start any military action against Iraq. The threat was 

convincing on the basis of past Middle East terrorist activity. Its effect was-felt mostly 

by the air travel community, both domestic and international. 

z18USSOCOM Post Operational Analysis of Iraq PSYOP, unpublished, 1992, p 15. 

2'91bid, p 16. 

330 
fallacy of Iraqi PSYOP planning was its focus on the characteristics of the 

sender, rather than on the nature of the receiver. 

The apparent initial objectives of the Iraqi PSYOP campaign were to 

rationalize the invasion of Kuwait, gain the support of the Arab masses, 

discourage nations from participating in the U.N. embargo, and 

discourage or hinder military attacks on Iraq. To these, an additional 

objective, rationalizing incorporation of Kuwait as a permanent province 

of Iraq, was added later. 

Iraq placed few restrictions on the means available to achieve a 

PSYOP desired goal. In many cases, documentation was simply manufactured. Furthermore, the Iraqi campaigns did not follow western logic. 

For example, Iraqi PSYOP criticized the Coalition bombing as being 

inaccurate one day and stressed the destruction wrought by highly accurate Coalition bombing the next. The reported accuracy of Coalition 

bombing varied, depending on how it could best enhance the Iraqi 

propaganda campaign?m 

Strategically, Saddam met with some early successes. He used Scud 

missiles to attack Israel and Saudi Arabia. As political and psychological 

weapons, Scuds were useful in diverting Coalition attention and military 

effort away from the main battlefield. The threat of chemical warheads 

added to the seriousness of the threat.22’ While the impact of the Scuds 

was militarily negligible, they did produce emotional and psychological 

effects (see Table 15).222 

2poIraq placed military resources around civilian schools, mosques etc., to protect the 

resources, create civilian casualties, and neutralize Coalition air attacks. Much of the 

civilian damage shown by Iraq was probably attributable to spent antiaircraft projectiles. 

”‘Lt Gen Charles A Homer, Oral History Intvw, by Jamison, Davis, and Barlow. 

“I don’t think any of us, first of all, estimated the political impact of the Scud, the terror 

induced,” 4 Mar 1992. 

222Lt Col Z Solomon, “Psychological Effects of the Gulf War on High Risk Sectors 

of the Israeli Population.” Presented at the Gulf War International Symposium and World 

Psychiatric Association meeting, 27 Jan 1992. ‘The Scud attacks put an incredible 

amount of pressure on the Israeli population.” Tactically, Israelis are prepared to respond 

to military attack. “Our people and our flight crews were very frustrated just sitting and 

waiting. However, when the Patriots arrived, even though most knew that their effects 

might be marginal at best, it was an uplifting experience for the people.” 

33 1 
Table 15 

Israeli Scud Casualties 

Indirect Casualties Direct Casualties 

To Missile Impact 

Death 2 

lnjured 232 

Death: Heart Attack 4 

(Gas Mask Use) Suffocation 7 

Injured: (Running or 

Driving for cover) Accidents 40 

(Atropine Injuries) Atropine 230 

(Hospitalized) Acute Anxiety 544 

Total 234 

~~ 

Total 825 

A total of 1,059 Israeli casualti s were attributed to Scud attacks. The 

disparity between the small number killed by Scuds and the enormous 

Coalition effort devoted to anti-Scud operations highlights the importance 

of the psychological effects. The number of self-inflicted atropine casualties speak for itself. The Scud attacks induced fear among the Israeli and 

Saudi populations and threatened the integrity of the Coalition. They 

combined a limited military technology with a politically effective targeting policy. In addition to their psychological effects, the Scud attacks 

diverted significant military resources to the difficult and militarily unrewarding task of Scud hunting. Coalition Scud hunting efforts, together 

with Patriots, helped the Israelis maintain their policy of restraint. 

Patriots had a calming affect on both the Israeli and Saudi p~blic.’’~ A 

tactical military response thus blunted a psychological weapon aimed at 

the heart of the Coalition. (See “the Scud Hunt” section in this chapter 

for additional information.) 

Although Iraqi efforts to use western television for propaganda 

generally failed, they may have had some effect in the Arab world. 

Saddam’s attempt to generate international goodwill through personal 

332 
appearances with hostages was an example of badly misreading a target 

audience. Another example of Iraq’s poor use of western television was 

its attempt to portray an industrial target struck by Coalition air power as 

a “Baby Milk Factory” (with signs and workers’ jacket logos 

conveniently printed in English). These efforts were quickly dismissed 

as crude propaganda by all except the most gullible or antiwestern, but 

they appear to have had some internal success?B 

The staged televised appearance of downed Coalition pilots also 

proved counterproductive. Instead of inducing the Coalition partners to 

acquiesce to Iraqi policy goals, they alienated a worldwide audience 

appalled by the battered, physical condition of the captives and their 

orchestrated, mechanical admissions of guilt. It was obvious that the 

pilots had been tortured. The resultant backlash produced more, not less, 

support for the Coalition. This Iraqi propaganda initiative was aimed at 

U.S. public opinion. The evidence suggests that the campaign was designed to mimic tactics used, with some effect, by North Vietnam during 

the Southeast Asia confli~t?~’ Iraqi propagandists apparently thought that 

presenting live interviews with captured Coalition pilots would stimulate 

the U.S. public to call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The response 

to the broadcast came swiftly. All western governments, the public, and 

the media severely condemned the broadcast, and the use of the downed 

pilots in this manner?26 The worldwide condemnation was so 

overwhelming that the broadcasts, which began on 20 January, ended on 

24 January. 

Saddam’s PSYOP efforts included radio broadcasts to U.S. troops in 

the field by “Baghdad Betty,” reminiscent of those by “Tokyo Rose” 

during World War 11. Intended to lower U.S. troop morale, Betty’s 

messages frequently proved comical as she warned American servicemen 

that their wives back home were sleeping with “famous movie stars” like 

2241n the Diary of an Iraqi Soldier, written during the air and land attacks in Kuwait 

from Jan 17-Feb 26, 1991, the anonymous author reacted with renewed resolve and anger 

to news of the Coalition bombing of the “Dairy Factory,’’ indicating that the Baby Milk 

Factory propaganda was used to motivate Iraqi troops. 

225USSOCOM Post Op Analysis of Iraqi psyOP, pp 35-36. 

226Such use of prisoners is forbidden by the laws of warfare. The failure of the Iraqi 

plan was partially engineered by the prisoners. LT Zaun, for example, augmented the 

battering of his face and exaggerated his behavior to inform the world the Iraqis were 

maltreating him. 

333 
Tom Cruise, Arnold Schwanenegger, and the cartoon character Bart 

Simpson .227 

Iraq also used PSYOP leaflets. Their effects on the military forces of 

the Coalition were minimal. However, the same leaflets were received 

in a more positive way by some segments of the civilian populations in 

Coalition and Arab Nations. Some key themes of the Iraqi leaflet campaign were:228 

The war was really about access to oil. 

The U.S. was using the air war as an excuse for imperialism. 

The U.S. was propping up a corrupt government in Kuwait. (See 

Appendix B for examples of Iraqi PSYOP leaflets and hand bills.) 

The Iraqi leaflet campaign targeted the populations of Great Britain, 

Germany, France, Australia, Canada, the United States, and the Arab 

Nations of the Coalition with varying degrees of success. It was hoped, 

that like Vietnam, the home population would turn on their own military 

forces, viewing Coalition aviators as baby killers, milk factory destroyers, 

etc. 

While Iraqi strategic propaganda found a receptive audience in some 

quarters, neither public opinion nor the world media were moved as the 

Iraqi president had hoped. Although antiwar demonstrations took place 

in the United States and certain European Coalition countries, they failed 

to draw significant popular support. To the contrary, public support for 

Coalition troops deployed to the Persian Gulf remained strong throughout 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

The main failure of Iraqi propaganda was its lack of credibility. The 

propaganda was generally far below the level of sophistication of the 

targeted audiences. Politically aware segments of the population, even 

2271qi Baghdad Betty was monitored by both USlS and the ANG 193d “Volant 

Solo.” Troops were able to listen to Baghdad Betty broadcasts from Kuwait. 

2281raq’s PSYOP War: Targeting the Arab world, United States Army Intelligence 

Agency and United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, October 1990. 

334 
those who might be inclined to be antiwar, were in general turned off by 

the crude Iraqi attempts to manipulate their beliefs. 

United States and Coalition PSYOP Planning Phase 

The Air Force had no psYoP doctrine despite its role in planned Joint 

PSYOP Operations. As a consequence, the planning process was guided 

by Army doctrine, which called for the conduct of “Psywar” in support 

of U.S. forces in combat. The in combat distinction had later repercussions, Early in Desert Shield, at the request of Central Command’s 

Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief of Special Operations 

Command provided a PSYOP planning cell. The cell produced a list of 

sixty-four strategic PsYoP/International Information proposals for interagency review. The theater psYOP plan, Burning Hawk, was approved 

by the Commander-in-Chief of the Special Operations Command on 20 

September 1990. From this point on, the PSYOP approval system began 

to display significant weaknesses?29 

Personnel were not familiar with operational charters and lacked an 

understanding of the differences between clandestine and covert 

activities?30 [DELETED]?31 

Operational Phase 

In contrast to Saddam’s ineffective PsYOP efforts, Coalition PSYOP 

did have some effect on Iraqi soldiers. The Coalition employed four 

primary PSYOP methods: radio transmission, loudspeaker broadcasts, 

leaflet dissemination, and enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations.232 

According to information produced by U.S. Special Operations Command 

(see Figure 68), different types of operations produced different levels of 

effe~tiveness.2~~ 

229~ntvw, USSOCOM PSYOP Planning cell, CINCCENT, 1992. 

2301bid. 

231(S) Msg, USCWCCENTKCCC to CJCS Washington, DC. DTG0513002 Dec 1990. 

232usSocOM Post Operational Analysis of psYoP, p 4-4. 

233~bid, 4-5. 

335 
Figure 

BYOP Effort and Relative Effectiveness in the Persian Gulf 

, 

29 Million leaflets dropped in theater 

17+ hours per day of radio transmitting 

19.5 hours per day aerial broadcasting 

Over 73,000 Iraq 

Impact on surren 

type of effort 

EXPOSURE & EFFECTIVENESS PERCENTAGES 

LEAFLETS @&gQ LOUDSPEAKERS 

YO Exposed to PSYOP 98 58 34 

YO Believed PSYOP Msg 88 46 18 

‘10 Influenced to act 70 34 16 

234(S) Based on interrogations of Iraqi EPWS accomplished by members of the 13th 

PSYOP Battalion (Reserve) (EPW), Ft. Snelling. MN. The 13th PSYOP BN is a one-of-a kind 

unit designed for quality assurance. It does not produce PSYOP; rather, it analyzes and 

evaluates the PSYOP produced by other units to determine effectiveness and credibility. 

336 
It is extremely difficult to measure the overall effectiveness of PSYOP 

and even more difficult to measure the effectiveness of separate tactical 

PSYOP efforts. For example, many Iraqi EPWs appear to have been influenced by leaflets but made the final decision to surrender only when 

exposed to a loudspeaker team?35 Others reported being influenced by 

a Volant Solo radio broadcast but made the final decision only after being 

exposed to a leaflet, hearing reports of effective bombing, being within 

earshot of a BLU-82, or hearing a favorable report on how EPws were 

being treated. In contrast to Iraqi PSYOP, Coalition PSYOP focused on the 

intended audience and was conducted in concert with overwhelming air 

and ground campaigns. Of the large number of EPWs, the proportion 

attributable to PSYOP, as opposed to direct military action, is unknown in 

the final analysis. 

The four sets of operations-radio transmission, loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet drops, and the actions taken by EPW teams-began at two 

different times.236 The Coalition’s tactical leaflet and radio activities were 

initiated in January 1991 to coincide with the start of the air campaign. 

The loudspeaker and EPW actions began in February with the start of the 

ground campaign. The following sections explain the major operations. 

Radio Transmissions 

In the Persian Gulf Theater of Operations, six broadcast platforms 

were established and used: aerial platforms (EC-130 Volant Solo aircraft) 

and ground radio stations. The Volant Solo aircraft were available in 

August; however, their use was put on hold until late November. Volant 

Solo was first used on Thanksgiving Day, 22 November, when the 

aircraft broadcasted the Voice of America (VOA) service in Arabic to 

areas VOA could not reach. Volant Solo operations had the positive effect 

of establishing an airborne platform as a credible broadcaster. 

Loudspeaker Broadcasts 

PSYOP loudspeaker operations were accomplished by two- or threeperson teams directly supporting forward combat units. Teams normally 

consisted of one or two noncommissioned officers and an interpreter or 

235(S) Ibid. 

236USSOCOM Post Operational Analysis of PSYOP. 

337 
communications specialist. Loudspeaker teams broadcasted prepared 

messages. Occasionally a team would ad lib a broadcast if the pressures 

of the moment demanded and if the language skill and initiative of the 

team permitted. Feedback from some EPWS indicated that, while “leaflets 

and radio showed us how to surrender, loudspeaker teams told us 

where .*’237 

The U.S. Marines of Task Force Shepard employed Army PSYOP 

loudspeaker and air power in a unique counterbattery tactic. Task Force 

Shepard was tasked to screen the front of the 1st Marine Division. A 

PSYOP loudspeaker team was assigned to each company.238 The loudspeaker teams would drive along the border playing audio tapes simulating the sounds of tanks and light armored vehicles. These tactics elicited 

responses from Iraqi radar and artillery. Marine F/A-l8 Fast FACS would 

spot the fire and call in Coalition TACAIR to conduct counterbattery fire. 

The ploy worked ten times. The Marines were also able to draw fire 

with “Rap” and “Country Western” music. Surrender tapes and rock and 

roll music did not draw fire?39 

Leaflet Drops 

Leaflets and other forms of printed PSYOP proved especially effective 

in terms of audience penetration. Of the targeted audience-300,000-plus 

Iraqi troops-calculations based on EPW interviews suggest that approximately 98 percent read or were otherwise exposed to the 29 million 

leaflets dropped in the theater.2“ Most EPWS were found clutching 

leaflets in their hands or hiding them somewhere in their uniforms?41 

The leaflets, language was simple and straightforward. They incorporated 

2371bi4 4-5. 

23%e Marines used P~YOP loudspeakers at company level and the Army used 

loudspeakers at Brigade level. 

2391ntvw, Lt Col Clifford Myers, uSMC, Commander, Task Force Shepard, 1992. Lt 

Col Myers acknowledged that the mYoP/air counterbattery fire was different, but effective. He further states that EPWS coming into his area reported that their officers and 

NCOS walked the line, shooting anyone attempting to surrender after a bombinghroadcast 

episode. 

’“Based on interrogations of Iraqi EPWS accomplished by members of the 13th 

PSYOP Battalion (Reserve) (EPW), Ft. Snelling, MN. 

241513th Military Intelligence Brigade (Forward), 4th CAG CA Group 2d MARDIV. 

338 
visual appeals for an audience that seemed to respond psychologically and 

emotionally to a visual medium. Weather conditions characterized by 

low humidity and generally moderate winds translated into good air drops 

and low loss through scattering and deterioration. These attributes 

combined with generally effective theme choice, audience vulnerabilities, 

and effective Coalition military action resulted in large numbers of 

surrenders. 

Examples of leaflets distributed during operations in the Gulf are 

included in Appendix B. The first set in this appendix shows Iraqi PSYOP 

leaflets, and the second set shows copies of Coalition PSYOP leaflets. 

B-52 ba&t Operations 

An important precept at work in the radio and leaflet operations was 

operant conditioning, using fixed, positive reinforcement. Tactical 

psyopers announced to certain Iraqi ground units that they were to be 

b0mbed.2~’ That specific unit was then attacked. The repeated cycles of 

announcement-and-execution helped persuade the audience that the message and delivery means were credible and that surrender was a viable 

alternative to a useless death. 

In late January 1991, the 4th PSYOP Group asked if the Air Force 

would support a campaign to tell the Iraqis when they were going to be 

bombed and by what aircraft. A plan was’ presented and approved to 

incorporate PSYOP with B-52 strikes along the front lines. The Concept 

of Operation for such missions outlined a plan to print and disseminate 

leaflets to specific Iraqi units. The leaflets, together with radio broadcasts, would specify which Iraqi unit or units would be hit the next day 

(see Figure 69). The following day, CENTAF would bomb the specified 

unit with three B-52s. This would be followed with another day of 

leaflets indicating that the same unit would be bombed again and that 

surviving Iraqi soIdiers should defect or desert. The next day, CENTAF 

would bomb the same unit. CENTAF continued to support this effort. By 

the start of the ground war, as many as eight B-52s were dedicated to 

these missions, and the U.S. Army EYOP commander was effectively 

influencing the employment of strategic PSYOP forces.243 

’“(s) Intvw, CENTAF PSYOP Liaison Officer, After Action Rpt, 1992. 

243Maj Jack Summe, CENTAF PSYOP Liaison Officer, memo, 1992. 

339 
Figure 69 

B-52 Leaflet Operations 

Above: 

Translation: 

'Desert Storm IS coming to your area Flee lmmediateiyl' 

Below 

Translation: 

"'Saddam's Army intends using your cily as a protective barrier to hide behind. 

Saddam doesn't care about you or your family. But the Joint Forces do not wish to hurt 

340 
EPW Operations 

EPW team operations proceeded sequentially and logically from the 

other operations and provided pretesting and post-testing of PSYOP materials for future missions?44 During surrenders, loudspeaker and EPW teams 

helped to counteract the degraded command and control among thousands 

of Iraqi forces, while at the same time, providing a locus for humanitarian 

assistance ?45 

Intelligence sources interviewed EPWS from six different Iraqi Army 

and Republican Guard Divisions who provided similar stories on the 

combined impact of the air campaign and psychological operations?& 

no EPW stated that, 

Their own tanks had become the enemy of their soldiers because high flying aircraft could destroy them without warning, even at night. 

Others in the same units stated that 

Their desertion rates skyrocketed and the air campaign left their troops 

weak and demoralized, the A- I0 was the aircraft that destroyed most of 

the equipment, the B-52s induced the greatest fear and the leaflets that 

announced the impending B-52 strikes prompted desertions. 

Additionally, the non-stop air strikes made it impossible for Iraqi 

commanders to stop the flow of soldiers away from their units.247 

261UsSOCOM Post Operational Analysis of PSYOP, p 4-9. 

2451bid, p 4-10. 

2%e 513th Military Intelligence Brigade (FWD) is trained for EPW interrogations 

and uses a variety of methods to validate EPW responses. The findings of the 513th have 

been independently verified by the 13th PSYOP EPW Company and released by the Joint 

Staff Information Service Center. Marines of the 4th CAG, CA Group, 2d MARDIV also 

report similar findings. 

247(S) U.S. Army Special Ops Cmd, Historical Monograph, p 81. 

34 1 
An Iraqi unit, which surrendered to the Marines weeks before the start of 

the ground war, indicated that leaflets told them how to surrender. Most 

of the surrendering troops had leaflets on their person.’@ 

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Coalition forces conducted 

combined psychological operations. These psychological operations in 

concert with overwhelming military force proved to be a successful 

partnership. 

*@Intvw, Lt Col James Zumualt, 4th CAG CA Grp 2d MARDN. Sep 1992. 

342 
5 

An air force’s aircraft and weapons may enjoy technical superiority, 

and it may have developed superior tactics, but if the personnel flying 

those aircraft are not proficient in executing the tactics, the air force will 

still be the loser. This chapter addresses training, the means by which 

tactical proficiency is developed. It asks three basic questions: first, did 

the U.S. air forces and those of our Coalition Allies train the way they 

fought? Secondly, were any particular kinds of training more or less 

useful? Finally, were combat skills honed or degraded during Desert 

Shield preparations for the war? 

These questions will be addressed in the three sections. The first 

addresses training conducted before the war, considered in light of its 

significance to Desert Storm. Both the training of the individual and the 

training of units are considered. The second section addresses training 

accomplished during Desert Shield. This section pays particular attention 

to data reflecting on the competing demands of training and combat readiness. It also studies training development and the exercises set up to 

prepare for the war. The third section looks at training lessons learned 

during Desert Storm. The focus is on tactics developed and trained for, but 

proved unsuitable in the war. The topics presented in these three sections 

are expanded where necessary in the appropriate appendices to the Report. 

Maintaining the Combat Edge in Peacetime 

In terms of training, the U.S. air forces that deployed during Desert 

Shield were considered combat ready and able to engage the Iraqis had 

they crossed the border into Saudi Arabia. This state of readiness reflected 

a DOD commitment of resources to a peacetime training regimen for a 

variety of global contingencies. Training efforts in theater further refined 

this training regimen. Preparing aviators for combat was at the heart of 

this commitment, and it is a complex evolution. Developing combat 

readiness in the aviator proceeds in stages, beginning with undergraduate 

flight training (pilot or navigator), moving through initial weapon system 

343 
qualification, and concluding with continuation training of the aviator as a 

member of a mission-qualified, combat-ready aircrew. 

The most demanding training environment experienced during the 

typical aviator’s career is undergraduate pilot or navigator training. During 

this period, basic flying skills are taught at a rapid pace, challenging the 

individual both mentally and physically. Officer students are evaluated on 

their ability to master complex tasks in a demanding environment under 

time constraints and psychological pressure. Those able to complete the 

undergraduate flight training programs demonstrate the essential personal 

traits necessary to continue to the next building block in the training experience. All U.S. services conduct separate pilot training (and 

navigator/flight officer training) to meet their specific requirements. Ap 

pendix C provides a summary of the training accomplished. 

Before assignment to an operational squadron, the aircrew pilot 

undergoes specialized training and completes an initial qualification 

course in an aircraft type relevant ta the squadron’s overall mission. 

Acquiring flying skills, system$ knowledge, and general tactics in the 

assigned aircraft are the main objectives of this phase of training. Instructors with considerable operational experience in the specific aircraft 

type supervise and, in many cases, conduct the training. Tactics training 

is guided by appropriate regulations: Multi-Command Manual 3-1 series 

for the Air Force, and appropriate Naval Aviation Training and Operations Procedures Standardization publications and tactical manuals for the 

Navy and Marines. The initial qualification training provides pilots with 

the basic knowledge and skills required to become qualified within the 

operational unit. Representative costs and course length for the Air Force 

F-16 replacement training program is given below in Table 16. The 

figure makes two points, one explicitly and one implicitly. First, training 

in combat aircraft is intense and expensive. Second, it covers a wide 

range of mission capabilities. 

Following assignment to an operational squadron, but before achieving 

fully qualified status within the unit, the newly assigned aircrew undergoes 

local-area orientation, theater indoctrination, and unit-specific tactics. 

Combat-ready status is achieved upon completion of the mission 

qualification training. In all U.S. Air Force operational units, the pilots 

must maintain currencies as dictated by the Air Force regulation 51-50. 

Table 17 lists the number of days that can elapse before an aircrew’s 

344 
currency status for a specific flight event becomes invalid. These currencies required continuation training during Desert Shield. 

Table 16l 

Flying Training Syllabus For F-16 Replacement Training Unit 

Flight lkaining Sorties Hours' 

Transition 

Instruments 

Advanced Handling 

Intercepts 

Basic Fighter Maneuvers 

Air Combat Maneuvers 

Surface Attack 

Surface Attack Tactical 

Night Transition 

Night Surface Attack 

Tankers (included in "*" phases) 

6 

*4 

I 

5 

13 

3 

13 

5 

*1 

*1 

(4) 

8.3 

6.0 

I .3 

7.7 

13.3 

3.0 

18.4 

6.5 

2.0 

2.0 

52 68.2 

Training Days I13 

Academics 239.5 hours 

Simulators 38.5 hours 

Cost (FT 91 dollars) $1,012,310 

'Course data provided by WCR David Millsmith from Hq Air Combat Command, 29 

%actical Air Command syllabus F-16 COBOO PUM, Oct 1990. 

Jun 1992. 

345 
Table 17 

Currencies3 

Event Experienced Inexperienced 

Demanding Sortie 

Landing 

Night Landing 

ACBT (air combat training) 

Low Altitude Operations 

Weapons Delivery 

Night Weapons Delivery 

Air Refueling 

Formation Takeoff 

Formation Landing 

Precision Approach 

30 

45 

30 

60 

60 

90 

6 

180 

90 

90 

45 

21 

30 

15 

45 

45 

60 

30 

180 

60 

60 

30 

Particular squadron training requirements, beyond those common to 

all Air Force units, are driven by the tasking of the individual unit. All 

units are required to maintain proficiency in operations characteristic of 

those they could expect in their assigned operating region. Table 18 

details pre-Gulf War theater tasking for all Air Force flying units that 

participated in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. It also identifies those 

units that participated in Green Flag 90-4, the last major joint, Air Forcesponsored, electronic warfare exercise before Desert Shield! A salient 

fact to emerge from the data is that all units fighting during Desert Storm 

also had to train for commitment in Europe (USAFE), with the sole 

exception of the three F-16 squadrons of the 363d Tactical Fighter Wing 

stationed at Shaw Am, South Carolina. 

3Maj Stan Hill, CENTAF/XOOTT briefing, “Fighter Training in Desert Shield.” The 

numbers represent the maximum number of days allowed between completion of the 

required events. In other words, an experienced pilot must complete a demanding sortie 

at least every thirty days. 

Green Flag exercises were conducted by the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing at Nellis 

AFB, NV, and differ from Red Flag exercises only in that their primary emphasis is 

electronic warfare. Green Flag 90-4 was in progress when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 Aug 

1991, and is thus of direct relevance. 

4 

346 
Table 18 

Unit Taskings Pre-Desert Shield’ 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

Individual units develop their training programs from theater requirements 

and relevant directives of their parent Major Command. Routine training to 

maintain combat proficiency encompasses a wide range of missions and 

weapons delivery options. Using the F-16 as an example, Table 19 gives the 

numbers of sorties and desired tactical capabilities for an F-16 pilot in the 

363d Tactical Fighter Wing. The key concept here was that of graduated 

levels of combat capability, a management tool establishing standards of 

performance in various maneuvers and weapon delivery tactics. The tool 

provides higher headquarters with a measure of a unit’s level of readiness and 

suitability for a given tactical scenario. Table 19 provides a representative Air 

Force example of how this concept is applied. The other services use equivalent methods to maintain the desired level of combat readiness. The underlying point is that these methods work. 

5(S) The numbers of units deployed and the command relationships came from: 

USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002, USCINCEUR OPLAN 4102, USCINCPAC OPLAN 5027, and Green mag 

90-4 After Action Report. 

347 
Command regulations further quantify and define the required proficiencies. 

With regard to Table 19, an aircrew “qualified” for an event maintains a higher 

level of proficiency than one who is “familiar.” In many cases, “familiar” means 

that a requirement has been met without regard to accuracy or proficiency. The 

goal is to spread the practice of these events throughout the training cycle so 

aircrews do not lose overall proficiency. The qualification criterion for dropping 

or firing ordnance is either an actual weapon release or a simulated weapon 

release within realistic launch parameters. This simulated release is then validated 

by film recorders in either the training munition or the cockpit.6 Using these 

requirements, squadrons can plan training programs to keep all aircrews proficient 

in the areas required for combat readiness. 

Although they share a core of basic requisites and common procedures, 

flight skills required in each area of the world vary. In Europe, with its peculiar 

weather conditions, low-altitude flying is stressed. Areas without prominent 

terrain features for threat evasion and navigation necessitate unique tactics. 

Individual aircrew readiness is skewed towards the theater for which the unit is 

tasked for deployment. In addition to individual aircrew readiness, squadrons 

train regularly with other units and participate in exercises designed to maintain 

the readiness of the squadron’s capability to deploy and fight (see Appendix F, 

“Flag Exercises”). 

61bid, pp 19-21. 

348 
Table 19 

F-16 Graduated Combat Capability Requirements, 363d TFW 

Minimum Training Required Per Pilot Every Six Months' 

sorties 

Air-to-Surface 

Air-to- Air 

Air-to-Air Night 

Advance Handling 

Other 

30 

17 

1 

I1 

- 

Events 

Radar Laydown 

VSD (visual system delivery) 

VLB (visual level bomb) 

Loft 

High Angle Dive Bomb 

LLLD (low level low drag) 

LRDT (long range dive toss) 

Dive Bomb 

Low-Angle Dive Bomb 

Low-Angle Strafe 

Maverick 

Surface Attack wkAC 

Low-Altitude Tactical Navigation 

Combined Force Training 

Medium-Altitude Tactics 

Intercepts Daymight 

Air-to-Air Refueling 

Joint Maritime Operations 

Familiar 

Familiar 

Familiar 

Familiar 

Qualified 

Familiar 

Familiar 

Familiar 

Qualified 

Familiar 

Qualified 

2 

8 

- 

1 2/- 

3 

- 

The Red Flag series of tactical training exercises conducted at Nellis AFB, 

Nevada, was the most noteworthy exercise for U.S. and Coalition aircrews and 

one of the predominant factors in the success of Desert Storm. Red Flag 

'363d Fighter Wing MSG 1110402 Dec 91, F-16 Graduated Combat Capability Program. 

349 
affected more tactical aircrew members who flew in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm than any other single tactics training program.8 Moreover, tactical, 

realistic composite force training lessons learned during Red Flag exercises were 

generally considered by Air Force commanders to have had a strong positive 

effect on Air Force performance, a view mirrored by the Coalition partners? 

Red Flag exercises challenged units, aircrews, and support personnel to implement and evaluate their readiness planning. A more detailed examination of 

both the history of Red Flag and the typical training provided there are found 

in Appendix F, “Flag Exercises.” 

In summary, training to maintain combat readiness in peacetime is a complex 

problem. Stringent requirements often prepare the squadrons for combat in a 

particular area of the world. However, well trained personnel can be flexible: 

routine, ongoing training provided a solid basis for Desert Shield; training during 

Desert Shield prepared the Coalition air forces for war. This training is the 

subject of the next section. 

Training In Desert Shield 

The units initially deployed to Saudi Arabia soon found conflicts between 

normal proficiency training requirements and preparation for the immediate war 

at hand. The training programs established during peacetime to quantify the 

minimum levels of training appropriate for mission readiness (i.e., AFR 51-50 

requirements) remained in effect during Desert Shield. As discussed in the 

previous section, the regulations institutionalized unit training requirements and 

formed mission objectives for scheduled sorties. However, in the initial days, 

the Coalition feared that Iraq might continue its push south. It was thus necessary that training strike a balance between preparing for immediate invasion of 

Saudi Arabia and maintaining proficiency. Crews required to stay on alert, 

however, would shortly become noncurrent in essential skills and maneuvers, 

necessitating additional training programs to retrain them. 

In the early stages of Desert Shield, units prepared for an Iraqi attack into 

Saudi Arabia with an expected thrust towards the eastern oil fields, the “D-Day” 

‘Intvw, Gen Robert D. Russ, TAC Attack Department of the Air Force, TAC 

SP 127-1 Volume 31, issue 3, Mar 1991. 

’Extracted from discussions with personnel from Hq AAFCE on 30 Apr 1992. Content 

of discussions was the substance of the AAFCE TLP Gulf War Conference Report, 

AFOOAT/S-O78/92. 

350 
plan. Training for this attack anticipated the use of air power in close air 

support and air interdiction roles, which would include limited strategic attacks 

towards Baghdad. On one hand, to be prepared for combat, aircraft had to be 

fueled with weapons loaded and readied for launch. On the other hand, the 

aircraft were needed for combat training, which would subject the aircraft to risk 

and require additional maintenance. Flight training thus inevitably degraded 

readiness over the short term. 

The 35th Tactical Fighter Wing, an F-4G “Wild Weasel” unit, provides a 

representative example of this problem. The primary mission of the unit was 

destroying and suppressing surface-to-air missile systems. After arrival in the 

Gulf, the unit maintained alert with the appropriate external tanks and ordnance 

to accomplish the SEAD mission. Aircrews, however, expressed the need for 

air-to-air training in light of the anticipated Iraqi threat. To prepare aircraft for 

this training, safety considerations dictated that live ordnance had to be downloaded and the external tank configuration changed, an obvious compromise to 

mission preparedness. The solution was to keep the majority of unit aircraft on 

alert and configured for the primary SEAD mission and reconfigure six aircraft 

for air-to-air combat training.” 

Soon after arrival in theater, it became apparent that crews would lose 

proficiency if training programs were not reinstated. In response, CENTAF 

initiated a Coalition staff to define and set training priorities and arrange host 

nation training facilities. Responsibilities for the development and execution 

of unit training remained with the commanders of service components, but 

CENTAF maintained the responsibility for developing the operational concept 

and plans for overall training. CENTAF’S priorities were (1) maintain deterrent 

and defensive posture, (2) practice mission profiles that would be expected 

during combat operations, and (3) be ready to respond to an Iraqi invasion of 

Saudi Arabia.” Units accomplished as much ground training as possible and 

requested waivers of other training requirements (such as emergency procedure 

simulator training), when necessary. 

Flight training depended upon air space and weapon ranges and required host 

nation support. Gradually, Saudi Arabia made national bombing ranges 

available for military use, which was to include low-altitude training routes 

(S/NF) Charles L Starr, “Special Study History of the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing 10 

(Provisional) Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,’’ 14 Apr 1992, p 113. 

‘I Maj Hill. 

35 I 
despite intense competition for existing training airspace. Training was 

additionally affected by unfamiliar meteorological conditions, notably, blowing 

sand and dust;12 austere living and working conditions; extreme heat from 

August through October; and a lack of practice training. It is important to 

realize that preparedness is a complex problem, especially in a forward deployed 

location. Commanders developed programs to maintain proficiency and 

emphasize the tactics anticipated for the Saudflraq theater. Minimum sortie 

rates were established to ensure minimum combat capability (see Table 20). 

Table 20 

Aircrew Sortie Rated3 

Aircraft Weekly Monthly 

A-10 

EF-111 

F-4G 

F-15 

F- 15E 

F-16 

F-111 

F-117 

RF-4 

7 

2 8 

3 11-13+ 

3 11 

2-3+ 11-13+ 

2 7 

2+ 9 

3 12 

AVERAGE 25 10 

Training accomplished during Desert Shield fell into three broad categories: 

desert acclimatization, local-area orientation, and mission preparation. Initial 

training of U.S. and Coalition air forces deployed to Saudi Arabia, and later to 

Turkey, began with local-area orientation and training designed to familiarize the 

aircrews with flying conditions peculiar to Southwest Asia. Problems such as 

haze and sand posed particular difficulties for helicopter crews, for whom lowaltitude night operations posed severe' hazard^.'^ 

"Lt Col Richard Comer, LJSAF, Commander, MH-53J Squadron History of Desert 

I3Maj Hill. 

'4Lt CO~ Comer. 

ShieWDesert Storm-20 SOS, undated. 

352 
Aircrews arriving in Saudi Arabia needed to adjust to local flying 

conditions and be integrated into the theater planning. Who managed air space 

control? What navigation aids were available? Landscape in urban areas is 

surrounded by diffused light at night, but what about the desert? Only CENTAF 

forces did not regularly train within the theater. Previously, the problem had 

been compounded by the limited number of in-theater exercises such as Bright 

Star, and these were limited in scope and involvement. 

Desert Acclimatization 

Table 18 illustrates the lack of dedicated training for Southwest Asia. The 

Wild Weasels stationed in the desert at George AFB commented, 

Probably one of the biggest things we learned was how to fly in this 

desert-which is different than the desert at George. There are different 

weather considerations, visibility considerations. The effects of heat have 

modified the way we fly the airplane. Something as mundane as not 

being able to turn some of our sensors on [radar, etc.] while on the 

ground has caused us to train in a new way." 

Lastly, civilian aviation requirements competed with military aviation requirements by restricting low-altitude training, and the Saudi range restrictions 

(maximum altitude 15,000 feet MSL) compromised training realism.I6 But, 

since aircrews were on the verge of war, they needed to know how well 

everything was going to work and develop tactics to compensate for shortfalls. 

As the size and diversity of deployed Coalition air forces continued to 

grow, airspace and military training areas became saturated. Additional military 

operating areas were negotiated for use as air-to- ground training ranges, which 

were important so that aircrews could maintain weapons delivery proficiency and 

check aircraft release systems. Efforts were made to ensure that all crews had 

expended live munitions and thoroughly understood safe escape and weapons 

effects before Desert Storm. Hq USCENTAFRSAF exercises provided a vehicle 

for multinational composite force training and basic proficiency for crews with 

alert commitments. 

'5(S/NF) starr. 

'%%is problem also existed in the continental United States, where civilian aviation 

competes for utilization of all air and ground ranges. Only ranges in restricted airspace 

such as the Red Flag ranges were conducive to medium-altitude tactics. 

353 
In September, CENTAF instituted weekly package training exercises to 

promote interoperability and integrated training. The objectives of these exercises were to familiarize pilots and controllers with local terrain and meteorological 

conditions in possible combat areas and to demonstiate to Coalition land forces 

that air support could be used safely close to their positions. 

Exercises increased in size and complexity as Desert Shield progressed. 

Exercise emphasis shifted early from supporting the defensive D-Day plan to 

supporting the evolving offensive air campaign plan, with deception playing 

a major role. Exercise Imminent Thunder, conducted in November 1990, 

promoted joint and combined training and interoperability. It included an 

amphibious operation and considerable air play. The training focus had moved 

from a defensive reaction to an Iraqi attack, and finally to an offensive scenario that included the liberation of Kuwait. The objectives for the air forces 

included exercising a D-Day alert package and the command and control 

process for close air support, air interdiction, and offensive counterair in a 

coordinated manner. Imminent Thunder involved over 2,300 total sorties, 

including 1,300 close air support missions. 

At the same time, the overall planning focus was changing. The “Black 

Hole” strategic planning cell in Riyadh was developing an offensive plan in 

accordance with Central Command’s desire that the first phase of war against 

Iraq be composed entirely of air attacks on Iraq and Kuwait. As this plan was 

fleshed out and targets identified, training was modified to prepare for the 

offensive air war. 

With the new focus on the central area of Iraq, a study of the dense 

antiaircraft artillery concentrations in Iraq’s air defense network prompted 

some units to emphasize training for medium-altitude (5,OOO-25,OOO feet) 

ingress and attacks. Training missions took on new emphasis; some tactics, 

others timing and coordination, and others dress rehearsals of actual missions. 

Exercises tested the pracedures for these new offensive plans. The Tanker/Air Space Control Exercise, for example, manned all the AWACS orbits, then 

cycled a large number of fighters through air refueling from a tanker in a short 

time. Similarly, the Border Air Refueling and Intercept Exercise developed air 

combat readiness and increased fighter/ AWACS proficiency. As 17 January 

approached, these exercises also served to lull the Iraqis into a false sense of 

354 
security because they became accustomed to seeing a periodic high level of 

night operation^.'^ The deception would serve well on the first night of the war. 

This section focused on the mainstream air training conducted in Saudi 

Arabia. Appendix E to this Report presents a compilation of all Desert Shield 

exercises. All airpower forces brought particular capabilities to Desert Storm. 

Discussions of their training are available in the following appendices: B-52s, 

Appendix G; SOF, Appendix H; and NavyMarine Corps, Appendix I. 

Desert Storm Training Lessons Learned 

Desert Storm provided the crucible for testing the previous training of 

Coalition units. The intent of the exercises during Desert Shield had been to 

prepare units for the anticipated conflict but, as with all wars, the conflict did 

not develop exactly as expected. As the war progressed, shortcomings in 

training were noted, procedures corrected, and lessons passed to other units. 

Perhaps the most crucial question in the initial stage of the war was whether to continue to fly low-the focus of most Desert Shield and preconflict training-or to move to medium altitudes in the face of Iraqi antiaircraft artillery. 

During Desert Shield, some units analyzed the Iraqi opposition and transitioned 

to medium-altitude ingress and attacks. Others, however, continued training at 

low level. The argument was summed up by a Royal Air Force Jaguar pilot at 

a postconflict NATO tactics symposium. 

The major decision that we had to make was which tactics to employ, 

low-level or high-level. The arguments in favor of employing low-level 

tactics included the following; the aircraft itself and its weapons system 

have been optimized for low-level operations; our weapons stocks consisted predominantly of cluster and retarded bombs which could only be 

delivered from low-level; and the pilots have been specifically trained 

over the years to operate in the low-level regime and this was where we 

initially thought we would be the most comfortable and indeed the most 

effective. We were therefore leaning towards the opinion that you should 

‘fight the way you train’ and that we should stay at low-level. This was 

in fact the way that we planned and the way that we intended to execute 

our pre-planned ‘D’ day targets, should they have been.tasked.” 

I7(S) Large border exercises were frequently scheduled for Wednesday nights, and 

‘*Extracted from discussions with personnel from Hq AAFCE on 30 Apr 1992. 

the air campaign started on a Wednesday night. 

355 
Some units did “fight the way they trained.” In the early days of the war, 

B-52s, F-11 Is, EF-11 Is, RAF Tornados, and some Navy units conducted their 

attacks from low level. However, the intensity of the antiaircraft artillery encountered and the inability of the Iraqi Air Force, along with the reduction of the surface-to-air missile threat due to Coalition suppression of enemy air defenses, convinced these units to conduct operations at medium-altitude. This tactics change, 

for which training had not been emphasized, led to other problems. 

For example, the issue of F-16 weapons employment caused difficulties 

during the initial days of the war. A postconflict analysis states, 

Initial mission effectiveness, in terms of “bombs off on first pass,” was 

less than desired. There are multiple reasons why this happened, to 

include the confusion of the first days of combat, and the defensive 

maneuvers required for survival. However, another reason was the low 

knowledge level of medium- and high-altitude delivery constraints. Due 

to the previous low-altitude training emphasis or lack of medium-altitude 

releases, few pilots were exposed to some of the associated problems, such 

as extremely high crosswinds and high G releases due to delay cues. It 

should be noted that even though there was a training deficiency, the 

learning curve was steep.” 

It is important to note that aircrew training quickly overcame the problems. 

[DELETED] ?’ 

Other errors affecting impact points could be caused by early or late bomb 

release due to target anticipation, aircraft buffeting due to winds, or cross wind 

errors. The bottom line was, the farther away from the target a nonguided 

munition is released, the more uncertainty as to its exact impact. 

[DELETED] [DELETED]. 

[DELETED] 

‘9(SINFMrN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol 91-2, Jul 1991, p 4-13. 

20(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 4- 13. 

*‘(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid. 

356 
[DELETED]. 

Problems were not limited to those of the Coalition: As U.S. F-15Es exited 

Iraqi airspace after attacking Scud-associated targets in Northwest Iraq on the first 

night of the air war, they observed a MIG-29 pilot shoot down his wingman, and 

then fly into the gro~nd.2~ 

Peacetime preparation has always been an optimization between cost and 

value gained. Training involves munitions, aircraft, aircrews and support 

personnel, training ranges, and airspace. Air-to-air training in particular requires large amounts of airspace, since maneuvers in both the horizontal and 

vertical planes are involved. Frequently, air traffic control puts restrictions on 

the airspace boundaries, forcing training engagements to be flat and artificial. 

Air-to-ground units having difficulty scheduling weapons delivery ranges and 

the associated airspace can only practice high-altitude weapons deliveries with 

advanced coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration. The A-1 0 

Wing Weapons Officer at King Fahd Airport reported the following problems 

due to peacetime practices: 

Restrictions on chaff and flare usage in the United Kingdom meant that the 

chaff and flare systems of the jets were rarely fully used prior to deployment. The squadron’s jets required much trouble shooting of their chaff 

and flare dispensing systems while preparing for combat. During the war, 

it became apparent that pilots were unsure or unaware of procedures for 

rehoming the Triple Ejector Rack (m) after bombs were unloaded during 

Integrated Combat Turns. Rehoming the TER is a maintenance function 

which could have been avoided, had we not just simulated reloading weapons during peacetime exercises. These are just two examples of problems 

22(S/NFAVN/NC) Ibid, F-16 working group, pp 4-14 - 4-15. (Although both 

techniques were identified as training habit patterns, they are not limited to flying 

aircraft.) 

23(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid. The same incident was described in Aviation Week and 

Space Technology, 18 Feb 1991. It said that an Iraqi MIG-29 shot down his partner aircraft, 

then crashed in an early Desert Storm mission. [DELETED] 

357 
caused by a lack of usage of weapon systems during our training prior to 

deployment for Desert Shield.tz 

In conclusion, the story of training for Desert Storm was a success story, 

one that began long before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Training adjustments 

made in Desert Shield convincingly demonstrated the inherent flexibility that 

training conferred. The force that defeated Iraq was decades in the making and 

emphasized realistic, combat-oriented training from the beginning. Realistic 

training was stressed as a constant theme through the development of not only 

the individual but also the Coalition force. The factors and practices enabling 

the development of this force, and training of the aircrews that flew missions, 

prepared them for this war. Red Flag was a constant theme mentioned by pilots 

and aircrews as instrumental in their training. Desert Shield training took this 

common ground as a building block for the evolving air campaign. For example, newer tactics grew out of a recognition that aircrews needed to release 

weapons at medium- to high-altitude, and Desert Shield training exercises 

provided opportunities to sharpen that skill. 

Aircrews did not come to the Arabian Peninsula during Desert Shield to 

train for a war; they came prepared to fight a war. This was the result of 

years of U.S. air training effort as well as the recurring overseas exercise 

deployments to the Southwest Asia region. The investment in training over 

the decades between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War reaped dividends in 

terms of U.S. lives saved in combat, a truly meaningful measure of merit. The 

training of the personnel had indeed matched the quality of the weapons 

systems and tactics, and the combination of the three overwhelmed the enemy. 

24Report given by Captain Meir, Wing Weapons Officer, A-10, King Fahd Airport, 

to AAFCE Gulf War Conference. Note that this was as much a maintenance and peacetime 

procedures problem as a training problem. Source: HQ AAFCE TLP Gulf war Conference 

Report. 

358 
6 

Conclusions 

Addressed within the operational and strategic context established by 

the other reports in the Survey, the preceding discussion suggests a 

number of conclusions. The most obvious is that the weapons, tactics, 

and training brought to bear in aerial combat played a major role in 

establishing the tempo, driving the conduct, and determining the outcome 

of the Gulf War. 

Iraqi Capabilities 

Saddam Hussein's forces clearly had the capacity to inflict considerably greater losses on Coalition forces than they did. Iraq's air 

force, while outnumbered and outclassed, nevertheless possessed significant numbers of capable systems, notably the Mirage F-1 and the 

MIG-29. If aggressively and competently used, these aircraft could have 

caused serious problems for the Coalition. Iraq also possessed significant 

numbers of highly capable SAMS, backed by a large antiaircraft artillery 

force, all linked to capable early-warning radars through the KARI air defense system. While the system lacked the capacity to counter the full 

weight of Coalition air power, it could, if operated as advertised, have 

enabled Iraqi commanders to coordinate defensive efforts far more effectively than they did. It is important to note that not all Iraqi forces 

displayed a lack of tactical skill and initiative; the Scud mobile missile 

force is an obvious case in point. 

Coalition attacks on command and control targets reduced the Iraqi 

air defenses almost immediately to uncoordinated local efforts. An 

analysis of the effectiveness of the suppression of enemy air defense 

(SEAD) missions on radar-directed defensive systems shows a clear correlation between high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) shots, and the 

reduction in Iraqi radar emissions. Also, HARM use led to a rapid and 

dramatic decline in guided, as opposed to unguided, firings of Iraqi radar 

359 
missiles and in Coalition aircraft losses to radar missiles.' At the same 

time, Iraqi SAM and antiaircraft artillery gunners did not exhibit any great 

degree of cleverness or initiative. In the absence of Iraqi records, the 

lackluster performance supported by EPW interviews suggests deficiencies 

in leadership, training, or both, but the sharp decline in radar missile 

effectiveness-a decline not noted in infrared missile or antiaircraft artillery effectiveness- testifies positively as to the effectiveness of Coalition 

tactics? 

One Iraqi tactical success story was the handling of the Scud mobile 

missile force. The Iraqi mobile missile force exhibited impressive 

competence in camouflage, concealment, and communications security. 

Although a definitive assessment is not possible, it is apparent that at a 

minimum, the Iraqis were able to employ, and at the same time largely 

preserve, their mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile capability 

despite a major commitment of U.S. and Coalition resources to the 

anti-Scud campaign. 

Weapons Systems 

Among U.S. and Coalition aerial weapons systems, the outstanding 

successes were the F-117 stealth fighter, the Tomahawk cruise missile, 

laser-guided bombs (LGBS) used in combination with night-capable target 

acquisition and designator systems, and the HARM. The F-117 and 

Tomahawk, both examples of sophisticated, highly complex and expensive weapons systems, performed as advertised, demonstrating unprecedented tactical capabilities with important operational and strategic ramifications. These two systems enabled U.S. air power to penetrate a dense 

and sophisticated air defense net and attack directly at the heart of enemy 

power without preliminary suppressive attacks and without aircrew losses. 

The combination of LGBS and night-capable target acquisition and designator systems deprived Iraqi forces the cover of darkness to a degree 

unprecedented in aerial warfare. There were, however, significant 

limitations to the Coalition's ability to exploit this capability; most 

Coalition aircraft were unable to both drop and guide LGBs, and a very 

'(SMFIWNMC) For more information see the Effects and Effectiveness report. 

'Losses and Damage inflicted by radar SMs drop precipitously, but once Coalition 

aircraft abandoned low altitude tactics on day three, losses and damage inflicted Py 1R 

SAMs and AAA remain essentially constant. 

360 
high proportion of LGBs were dropped by a relatively small number of 

platforms, specifically, F-IllFs, F-117s, F-ISEs, and A-6Es. As did the 

F-117 and Tomahawk, HARM performed as advertised, making a major 

contribution to the SEAD effort. 

The heavy Air Force investment in aerial refueling platforms, with 

a strength of 694 tankers, was another success st01-y.~ Air refueling gave 

U.S. and Coalition air power enormous tactical flexibility, and Air Force 

tankers supported Coalition, Navy, and to a lesser extent Marine as well 

as Air Force sorties. The KC- 10 and the KC-1 35R made disproportionate 

contributions to the refueling effort, the former because of its large fuel 

offload and ability to reconfigure from flying boom to probe and drogue 

configuration in flight and the latter because of the increased tactical 

flexibility bestowed by its highly fuel-efficient turbofan engines. 

Although Marine, Navy, and Royal Air Force tankers also made significant contributions, they were responsible for a considerably smaller share 

of refueling sorties and pounds of fuel transferred than were Air Force 

tankers. Since the vast majority of U.S. and Coalition tactical platforms 

had relatively short combat radiuses, air refueling became a tactical 

necessity. Among major Coalition strike platforms, only B-52s 

conducting operations from Saudi Arabia could strike targets anywhere 

in Iraq without air refueling. F-1 1 1 s and A-6s could strike some targets 

in Iraq and the KTO without air refueling, and forward-based A-10s and 

AV-8s generally operated without tanker support; as a practical reality all 

other strikes required air refueling! All F-117 sorties were air refueled, 

and F-4G “Wild Weasels” with their fuel-inefficient 5-79 engines were 

particularly dependent on tanker support. 

Weapon systems were not devoid of deficiencies. Perhaps the most 

dramatic was the inability of Coalition aircraft to acquire and attack Iraqi 

3(S) The USAF tanker fleet consisted of 59 KC-10s and 635 KC-135s. including 269 

KC-1 35Rs; information from Air Force Air Staff, Mobility Forcedxorm, Maj Collins, 

16 Dec 1992, Air Force Association Almanac for 1991. Of these, 29 KC-10s and 193 

KC-135s (65 of them KC-I35Rs), were deployed in the AOR at the peak of the Desert 

Storm and another 17 KC-10s and 69 KC-135s (26 of them KC-I35Rs), were operating 

in direct support from outside the AOR. For more information on the USAF Tanker Fleet, 

see the (SNFIWNNC) Logistics report. 

4(S) The above statement summarizes a complex set of relationships and ignores the 

fact that aerial refueling was used as much for operational flexibility as for simple range 

extension. 

36 1 
mobile missile systems using onboard sensors with any degree of 

consistency. The switch from low- to medium-altitude bombing 

deliveries highlighted tactics and training problems and exposed hardware 

and software deficiencies. Neither DOD nor the Air Force had adequately 

anticipated the need for a conventional deep-penetrating “bunker-busting” 

munition like the GBU-28. 

Combat search and rescue in Desert Storm had significant problems. 

The Air Force MH-53J was the only Coalition combat rescue platform 

capable of operating in a high-threat environment. But the crews, though 

well trained in their primary special operations mission, were not trained 

in combat search and rescue tactics. Equally important, the one MH-53J 

squadron in theater had a primary special operations mission. 

Additionally, command and control relationships were complex, not 

clearly defined, and contributed to the loss of an Army CH-47 committed 

to a rescue mission. 

Flexibility was a dominant tactical characteristic of U.S. air power 

in Desert Storm. Though not all the Coalition air forces possessed 

equivalent hardware resources and most were not as thoroughly trained 

in large composite force tactics-the Royal Air Force was an 

exception-coalition air forces did share this advantage in flexibility to 

varying degrees. Examples of this inherent tactical flexibility, a product 

of hard, realistic training and a tactical culture which demands and 

rewards initiative, are imbedded in the preceding chapters of this report. 

Here, two examples will suffice: the first was the ability of U.S. aircrews 

to improvise refuelings and find their way to their targets despite 

unforecasted adverse weather and other unplanned obstacles? The second 

was the successful use of B-52 bombing to create psychological effects 

on Iraqi forces. Procedures for the bombings were devised and 

implemented by relatively junior SAC officers in Saudi Arabia in 

response to Central Command’s desire to place the Republican Guards 

and other Iraqi ground forces under constant pressure. 

’(S) Comment by Col Bobby Bufkin, USAF, Commander of Red Flag, to Dr. John 

Guilmartin, GWAPS, 30 Jan 1992. As Red Flag commander, Col Bufkin had dealt with 

elements of all the major participating Coalition air forces in an intense training 

environment and was familiar with their equipment and training methods. 

362 
Electronic warfare played a larger role in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm than in any previous conflict. U.S. air forces dominated in this 

arena. The United States fielded a wider array of specialized electronic 

warfare platforms than any other nation could have done and applied 

them to good effect in a tactically coordinated manner. The success of 

the SEAD campaign was largely a reflection of the ability of the Coalition 

to dominate the electromagnetic high ground. The Constant Source 

network for collecting and disseminating information about enemy 

electronic threats made important contributions to this struggle and 

represents a significant success story in its own right. 

The SEAD campaign itself represents a tactical success of 

considerable magnitude. The successful tactical integration of a wide 

range of diverse assets, including EF-111 and EA-6 jammers and F-4G 

Wild Weasels, provides a prime example of the flexibility already noted. 

Training 

It is axiomatic that superior weapons systems can be rendered 

ineffective by poor or poorly executed tactics. It is equally axiomatic that 

hard, realistic training is the bedrock requirement for the development of 

sound tactics and for good tactical execution. The accuracy of both of these 

observations was richly demonstrated in the Gulf War, positively by 

Coalition forces and negatively by Iraqi forces. The negative case is most 

apparent in the utter lack of tactical success achieved by the Iraqis with 

aircraft well up to world standards-the MIG-29 and Mirage F-1-and the 

mediocre results they obtained with excellent surface-to-air missile and gun 

systems, notably the Roland, SA-6, SA-8, and ZSU 23-4.6 Paradoxically, 

the positive case is harder to make because the high training standards of 

Coalition and-particularly-U.S. air forces made the tactically difficult look 

easy. In short, the intensive, realistic, combat-oriented training paid off. 

%he argument that overwhelming numbers of generally superior Coalition aircraft 

denied the Iraqi Air Force the chance to demonstrate its tactical capabilities does not hold 

up historically. Two examples from World War I1 make the point: In 1939, the Polish 

Air Force, surprised, outnumbered, and flying obsolete aircraft, outscored the Luftwaffe 

in air-to-air kills. The number of highly trained Japanese pilots were depleted in 1942-43 

and by 1945 were faced by overwhelming numbers of U.S. aircraft, almost all of them 

technically superior. The Japanese did, however, field a small number of state-of-the-art 

fighters in the final months of the war, and in the hands of some of the few surviving 

capable pilots, these achieved dramatic, if isolated, successes. 

363 
The millions of dollars and thousands of hours spent to support training, 

especially in a series of exercises such as Red Flag conducted at Nellis AFB 

in Nevada, the National Military Training Center at Fort Irwin in California, 

the Marine Corps training areas at Twentynine Palms in California and at 

Yuma in Arizona, the Navy ranges at NAS Fallon in Nevada, and in a host 

of other exercises throughout the world, proved their worth. 

While planes were being readied pilots were briefed 

for the first daylight attack. 

364 
Appendix A 

Definition of Aerial Missions 

Definitions of Tactical Air Missions and Tasks Flown in Operation 

Desert Storm' 

Counter Air: missions conducted to attain and maintain a specified 

degree of air superiority by destroying, neutralizing, or disrupting enemy 

air power. Counter air involves both offensive and defensive operations 

as well as the suppression of enemy air defenses. The ultimate goal is 

total air superiority. 

Offensive Counter Air (WAk missions normally conducted throughout enemy airspace and designed to destroy or neutralize enemy air 

power close to the source. This may be accomplished through an airto-air engagement or an air-to-surface attack of an enemy airfield and 

its facilities. Friendly forces have the initiative to conduct OCA at a 

time and place of their choice. 

Defensive Counter Air (DCA) missions operations normally conducted 

over friendly territory in reaction to enemy initiative. There are two 

types of active air defense: area defense and point defense. 

1. Area defense is more flexible but requires a high degree of 

discipline and coordination to avoid missing an inbound enemy. 

The air component commander (ACC) is normally designated the 

area air defense commander. His assets include antiaircraft 

weapons systems of the land component commander and the 

naval component commander as well as his fighter units. 

2. Point defense protects high-value assets and key points along 

lines of communications. 

'(SINFIWNRVC) Abstracted from MCM 3-1, Volume 1, Tactical Employment, 4 Jul 

89, pp 2-1 thm 2-4. 

365 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD): missions conducted to 

increase the survival and effectiveness of friendly operations. SEAD assets 

seek out and destroy or disrupt enemy surface-to-air defenses or integrated air defense systems (IADS). 

Air Interdiction (AI): missions to delay, divert, disrupt, or destroy 

the enemy’s military potential. Once identified and prioritized by component commanders and approved by the joint force commander, all air 

interdiction targets are included in missions executed by the ACC. 

Close Air Support (CAS): missions requested by a ground commander 

for support of friendly forces. Because of the proximity of friendlies, 

each CAS mission requires detailed coordination and integration with the 

organic fire and movement of friendly troops. 

Tactical Surveillance and Reconnaissance: missions to provide commanders with timely information before and during tactical operations. 

Surveillance and reconnaissance have four applications: prediction of 

enemy intent, reporting enemy status, threat warning, and targeting. 

Specialized tasks: actions that enhance the execution and successful 

completion of the above missions. Tactical air forces perform the following specialized tasks: 

1. Electronic Combat (EQ actions undertaken to control selected 

parts of the electromagnetic spectrum in support of strategic and 

tactical operations. EC strategy employs electronic warfare; elements of command, control, and communications countermeasures 

(C3CM); and SEAD to exploit weaknesses in an enemy’s ability to 

wage war and to apply force against his offensive, defensive, and 

supporting capabilities. The purpose is to enhance the ability of 

U.S. war fighting systems to achieve military objectives. 

2. Special Operations: [DELETED]. 

3. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR): missions or operations 

conducted to support the rescue of downed combat aircrews. 

These actions preserve and return to duty critical combat resources, deny the enemy a possible source of intelligence, and contribute to morale and motivation of combat aircrews. 

366 
Methods of Empbyment 

A single tactical mission may require several employment methods 

and a variety of considerations. For example, OCA may include several 

methods of employment during one composite force operation. Detailed 

operating considerations differ among types of aircraft; broad categories 

are presented below: 

1. Sweep. Sweep aircraft establish air superiority in a designated 

area for a specified time period by seeking out and destroying enemy 

aircraft in the air. Autonomous sweep operations may be conducted 

by using only on-board fire-control and identification systems. However, in today’s all-aspect threat arena, maximum effectiveness is 

realized by using ground-controlled intercept (GCI), airborne warning 

and control systems (AWACSS), and other sources of real-time intelligence to increase ability to employ beyond visual range (BVR) and to 

heighten overall battle situation awareness. 

2. Combat Air Patrol (CAP). Two types of CAP are point CAP and 

screen or barrier CAP (BARCAP). Point CAP falls under the concept of 

active air defense-protecting high-value assets (i.e., airfields; command, 

control and communications facilities; storage facilities; or lines of 

communication). BARCAP, or screen, is used to prevent the enemy from 

reaching an asset and is established at some forward point between the 

enemy and that asset. For example, BARCAP is used to protect AWACS 

and Compass Call, or may be used to establish a screen well forward 

of an airfield or friendly troop concentration. 

3. Escort. Escort is normally used to protect a composite force operation. It may take the form of close escort-when fighters fly in close 

proximity to attack force or other asset; or it may be performed as 

detached escort-when escort fighters do not fly close to the asset being 

protected . 

4. Air-to-Surface Attacks Against Swcified Targets. Attacks against 

specified targets may be conducted either in AI, OCA, or CAS. The 

types of targets and the threat will normally dictate the choice of weapons. The possibility of mission diverts (AI to CAS, for example) makes 

it mandatory for aircrews to be totally familiar with the effects of the 

weapons carried aboard their aircraft. 

367 
5. Air-to-Surface Attacks Using Suecialized Weapons. Weapons 

requiring detailed employment planning (i.e., precision-guided munitions) may be employed to accomplish a variety of missions. 

6. Armed Reconnaissance. Armed reconnaissance locates and destroys 

targets of opportunity. 

368 
Appendix B 

Coalition PSYOPS Leaflets and Handbills 

Above: 

Translation: 

Below: 

"'Iraqi citizens, Saddam's militan/ has placed your lives in danger. The Coalition 

Forces are coming. We will be striking this area soon. We do not wish to ham innocent 

citizens. Evacuate this area immediately and head north. Civilian areas in Baghdad will 

not be targeted. Flee immediatelyl' 

'Desert Storm is coming to your area. Flee lmmediatelyl' 

369 
Below: 

'The United States abides oy the rules of the Geneva Convention. Ceasing fire will 

provide you the followina: 

- Humane Treatment 

- Food and Water 

- Medical Treatment 

- Shelter 

- Return to your homes after hostilitles ' 

37n 
Above: 

'TOO LATEl' 'The PSYOP compoign told soldiers to leave their vehicles te 

ovoid iniuw ... it moved what President flush sold obout not I, 

fighting the lraqi people.. . 

-A Senior /rod Office! 

Below: 

'This location is subject to bombardment. Escape now and save yourselves.' FRONT 

37 1 
Irm'a growing air force.. .? 

Firat. Saddu qavc away the Shat-Al-Arab. ud Roy... Ee'8 giving them TOW fir 

Force! A better alternative would ba to to Saudi Arabia. hdio FOUr 

intentions to aeek rcfuqe vith your Arab brotherr, CWO U a .Bingh PI-.- 

have landin9 geu down and a11 light# oa, Jettlron all ordla8aa .Id M off 

targeting emitters, fly at 250-390 hots per bou. -You all k ~llond to 

return home to help rebuild your bo#ld. 

372 
€L€ 
I 1 

Above: 

'Leave your equipment or defend 

it and diel' 

'The choice is younl' 

Left: 

This locotion will be shelled. Leave your 

equipment ond Save yourselves. 

'Worningl 

Worning!' 

'The PSYOP effort was focused on breoking 

the lroqi will to resist, and on increasing the 

feors of the lroqi soldiers. while pointing out 

fhot the Coolition was opposed not to the 

lroqi people. but only to Iraqi's notional policy. * 

cnndrcl d h Mn Gulf war, *n lrnlrn uoporl b 

D.parhnml d D.hnr. IPPl 

374 
Above: 

'Cease resistance. You are cut off' 

Below: 

'Use the following procedure to cease resistance: 

Remove magazine from your weapon. 

Place weapon over your lefi shoulder with the muzzle down. 

Place your hands over your head and proceed slowly. 

Wave a white cloth to signal your peaceful intent or hold up this leaflet. 

All armies of the Multi-National Forces understand that this pass shows your honorable commitment to peace.' 

375 
Above: 

'Saddam is against Peace. Save Iraq. Stop Saddam. No more war, Peace Now. Save Iraq 

Iraq is against Soddam ' 

Below: 

"'Iraqi people. Peace. Saddam is the cause of the war and its sorrows. He mud be 

stopped. Join with your brothers and demonstrate rejection of Saddam's brutal policies 

There will be no peace with Saddam.' 

376 
Iraqi PSYOP Leaflets and Handbills 

~~ ~ 

LIBERTY' STADIUM CRIES FOR 

HELP BECAUSE OFYOUR 

AGGRESSION AND KILLING 

CIVILIANS, INNOCENT KIDS , MOTHERS AND OLDS. 

377 
DEAR SOLDIERS : 

YOUR COMMANDERS HAVE SAID THAT THE WAR W11.1, TAKE 

THEY CORRECT 3 AND CONVINCED YOU THAT LOSES WlLL B

GROUND COMBAT WE ASSURE THAT THEY WdT BE. CeRRE
I 
(U) “Our holy things, our land, and our honor are in safe hands. ” 

US troops cavorting with alcohol and women in Saudi Arabia, while King 

Fahd expresses his approval. Note Star of David around neck of US 

soldier. 

Alif Ba’ (Baghdad) 

380 
'9 

Mr Bush's hobby: increasing the budnec ~- 

381 
382 
Appendix C 

The Aeronautical Rating 

It would be difficult to understand how airpower was applied in the 

Gulf War without understanding the significance of the military 

aeronautical rating and-directly to the point at hand-without understanding the training required to achieve that rating. The role in Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm of rated aircrew members-that is, pilots, weapons system operators (WSOS), electronic warfare officers (EWOS), navigators or 

other Service equivalents-was pivotal. The basis of that importance was 

aviation training. The aeronautical rating thus represents a common core 

of professional skill and knowledge that was brought to bear tactically in 

the Gulf War. This appendix will provide the reader with a sense of that 

core in a brief discussion of undergraduate flight training. 

The aeronautical rating was regarded differently by the various air 

forces with which we are concerned, but the reader should bear in mind 

that the common core of professional and technical skills and knowledge 

that the aeronautical rating represents was more basic and important. 

Simply put, the Coalition air forces shared an international language of 

airpower, one acquired as an essential part of military aviation training. At 

the most basic level that language is English, the international language of 

aviation. Pilots trained to fly, according to the ICAO (International Commercial Aviation Organization) standards that govern international air 

traffic, must speak English to function within the system.’ Outside of 

China and the nations of the former Soviet bloc, the vast majority of 

military aviation training worldwide is conducted in English. 

International Civil Aviation Organization, International Standards, Recommended 

Practices and Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Aeronautical Telecommunications, 

Annex 10, Vol. 11 (Communication Procedures), 4th ed (April 1985), chap 5 

“Aeronautical Mobile Service”: para 5.2.1.1.2 under para 5.2.1 .I “Language to be used” 

reads as follows: “Recommendation-Pending the development and adoption of a more 

suitable form of speech for universal use in aeronautical radiotelephony communications, 

the English language should be available, on request from any aircraft station unable to 

comply with 5.2.1.1.1 [stating that in general air to ground communications should be 

conducted in the language of the station on the ground] at all stations on the ground 

serving designated airports and routes used by international services.” 

1 

383 
The hard core of this common heritage is reflected in close relations 

and shared professional standards among the U.S. air forces and those of 

the English-speaking nations of the British Commonwealth. Standards of 

training and airmanship are high in all of these forces, and pilots 

routinely exchange assignments among them with minimal friction. A 

U.S. Air Force or Navy fighter pilot or weapons system operator 

experiences no more difficulty settling into a Royal Air Force, Canadian 

Air Force, or Royal Australian Air Force squadron than in moving to a 

new squadron within his own Service. Significantly, the Royal Saudi Air 

Force was able to interface far more easily and quickly with its Coalition 

counterparts than were the Saudi naval or ground forces. The proximate 

cause was that all Saudi pilots speak English, but the common language 

went beyond the spoken idiom: the Royal Saudi Air Force prides itself 

on having taken the best of each, in training, philosophy, and equipment, 

from the U.S. Air Force and the Royal Air Force.' 

Basic Flying Training 

The following discussion focuses on undergraduate pilot training, but 

the same basic points apply to the training of all rated officers. The U.S. 

military pilots who flew in Desert ShieWDesert Storm were enrolled in 

pilot training through a number of mediums. All were volunteers. 

Almost without exception, Air Force, NavyMarine, and Army officer 

pilots were college graduates when they entered flight training. Army 

warrant officer pilots tended to be educated beyond the high school level. 

All were required to pass a stringent flight physical emphasizing eye sight 

(vision correctable to 20/20 or better was required), good general health, 

and a stable psychological makeup. Other screening mechanisms included administration of the AFOQT (Air Force Officer Qualifying Test) or the 

Navy or Army equivalent, Service academy graduation, and recommendations by ROTC officials. 

The paths through undergraduate pilot training to operational flying 

assignments of the pilots who flew in Desert Storm are summarized in the 

three figures below. All US. military undergraduate pilot training 

programs are based on a combination of rigorous classroom instruction, 

dual flight instruction, and solo flight practice. The Air Force and 

NavyMarine programs last approximately a year. The Army undergraduate helicopter program is somewhat shorter. 

'Comment to Lt Col Mark Tarpley, USAF, by a senior RSAF officer. 

384 
U.S. Air Force Pilot Training 

(Note: The Parentheses indicate the USAF organization at time of Desert Storm) 

385 
U.S. Army Pilot Training 

386 
U.S. Navy Pilot Training 

387 
Salient differences between the Air Force and Navy programs 

include the Navy's use of a turboprop rather than a jet trainer for the 

initial stage of undergraduate pilot training and the fact that the Navy 

separates its pilot trainees into specialist communities prior to award of 

the aeronautical rating. A USAF Undergraduate Flight Training Table is 

included to give an idea of program content, time spent, flying hours 

required, and cost using Air Force undergraduate pilot training as an 

example. Navy figures are broadly similar. 

USAF Undergraduate Flight Trainin$ 

Ground Phase: 17 days $4300 

Academics 56.0 hours 

___ 

T-37 'hining: 90 days $s3m 

Academics 

Flying 

Simulators 

84.5 hours 

80.9 hours 62 Sorties 

27.3 hours 

T-38 'hining: 120 days $162,000 

Academics 

Flying 

Simulators 

8 1 .S hours 

109.8 hours 86 sorties 

29.6 hours 

All Air Force pilots are instrument qualified when they receive their 

aeronautical rating. Air Force helicopter pilots receive their initial flight 

instruction in helicopters within the Army training system and are 

assigned to helicopter units until they receive fixed-wing transition 

training, normally at the Captain to Major point in their careers. As with 

the Air Force, all Navy pilots are commissioned officers and instrument 

'Headquarters, Air Training Command, Director of Operations provided these figures 

to the authors via facsimile transmission on 29 Jun 1992. 

388 
qualified. Navy helicopter pilots receive their initial flight training in 

fixed-wing aircraft and are trained entirely by the Navy. 

Marine Corps aviators receive their basic flight instruction within the 

Navy training system. The training and tactical philosophies of the 

aviation branches of the Navy and Marine Corps closely parallel one 

another, though the Marines emphasize direct support of troops in 

contact. As with the Air Force and Navy, Marine officer aviators rotate 

between flying and staff assignments. All Marine officers are line 

officers; support functions such as logistics and medical are provided by 

the Navy. Rated Marine aviators are commissioned officers. 

The U.S. Army approach to aviation differs from those of the Air 

Force and Navy. This approach reflects the reality that Army aviation units 

support the operations of maneuver divisions and corps and fall directly 

under the appropriate ground unit commander. A11 Army pilots receive 

their initial training in helicopters, and the vast majority are assigned to 

helicopter units. In contrast to the Air Force and Navy, Army pilots do not 

receive an instrument rating as part of their initial pilot training. The Army 

has no requirement for aerial navigators, although enlisted and warrant 

officer reconnaissance systems operators perform similar functions. The 

bulk of Army pilots are warrant officers, specialist aviators who spend 

almost all of their careers in the cockpit and cannot command. Officer 

pilots rotate into and out of flying assignments in much the same way as 

their Air Force or Navy counterparts. 

389 
390 
Appendix D 

Historical USCENTAF Exercises 1985 - 1990 

Date Name 

Jul-Aug 85 

Jul-Aug 85 

Apr-May 86 

Jul-Aug 87 

Jul-Aug 87 

Jd-Aug 87 

Sep-Dec 89 

Oct-Nov 89 

Oct-Nov 89 

Bright Star 85 

Inferno Creek 85* 

Accurate Test 86 

Bright Star 87 

Shadow Hawk 87* 

Inferno Creek 87* 

Bright Star 90 

Shadow Hawk 90* 

Inferno Creek 90* 

* Part of overall Bright Star Exercise 

Exercise Bright Star 85 

1. Exercise Description: Bright Star 85 (BS-85) was a JCScoordinated, USCENTCOM-scheduled joindcombined Field Training 

Exercise conducted during 13 July - 31 August 1985. 

[DELETED] .' 

2. Exercise Objectives:2 

a. Conduct joindcombined interdiction, close air support, and counterair operations. 

'(S) USCENTAF Exercise Bright Star 85 After Action Report, 31 Oct 1985, 

*(S) Ibid. 

p 1-1. 

39 1 
b. Integrate U.S. and Egyptian air defense forces. 

c. Conduct electronic warfare (EW) operations against 

Soviet-built air defense systems. 

d. Exercise jointhegional communications connectivity. 

3. Participating Forces and Units:3 

Force ._._II__ 

8 x F-4G 

8 x F-4E 

2 x E-3 

2 x EC-130 

10 x C-130 

3 x B-52 

4 x KC-135 

Unit 

37th Tactical Fighter Wing 

347th Tactical Fighter Wing 

552d Air Warning and Control Wing 

7th Airborne C2 Squadron 

Military Airlift Command 

28th Bombardment Wing 

126th Air Refueling Wing 

4. Sequence of Events4 

Deployment 

Employment 

Redeployment 

13 July - 2 August 1985 

3 - 10 August 1985 

10 - 31 August 1985 

5. Major Milestones and Ac~omplishments:~ 

a. Despite the usual flight clearance problems at the outset, the 

flying operations were the most extensive and productive 

exercised in SWA to date. Missions under the control of 

AWACS and ABCCC included low-level navigation, airfield at3(S) Ibid, p 1-2. 

(S) Ibid, p 1-3. 

'(S) Ibid, Attch 2. 

4 

392 
tacks, airfield defense, interdiction, close air support (CAS), 

dissimilar air combat training (DACT), attacks against a simulated carrier battle group, a live firepower demonstration, air 

refueling, intratheater airlift, and tactical and strategic airdrops 

of troops and equipment. 

b. The combination of AWACS and ABCCC proved invaluable in 

the safe, organized, and effective execution of the wide variety 

of missions. Egyptian participation on both of these aircraft 

significantly enhanced the Egyptian Air Force’s air defense 

command and control throughout the exercise. 

c. F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft were deployed to SWA for the first 

time and demonstrated their value as an extremely effective 

defense suppression asset. [DELETED]. 

d. The increased quantity and quality of CAS (compared to Bright 

Star 83) provided to USARCENT and the Egyptian ground 

forces caused the Egyptians to initiate a concerted effort to 

improve their own CAS training program. 

e. The use of multiple drop zones and airfields throughout the 

exercise area provided realistic challenges to the airlift 

aircrews as well as the Combat Control Teams (CC~S) and the 

Airlift Control Center (ALCC). 

f. The integration of bomber and tanker forces into CENTAF air 

operations was excellent. 

6. Lessons Learned (Relearned)? 

a. Initial command and control of early arriving forces was a 

problem because the forces arrived before bare base facilities 

on the airfields were prepared to receive them. Consequently, 

personnel were billeted in civilian hotels with no communications links to the airbase. Future deployments should include 

communications equipment to establish links between person6(S) Ibid. 

393 
nel billeted in civilian hotels and the Tactical Air Control 

Center for emergencies andor changes in the flying schedule. 

b. U.S. Liaison Officers in the Egyptian Air Operations Center, 

Cairo Approach Control, Cairo West Tower, and at the 

American Embassy performed a crucial role in coordinating a 

myriad of activities essential for smooth air and ground operations throughout the exercise. 

c. Although the opportunities for electronic combat (EC) training 

were excellent, U.S. personnel were denied access to Egyptian 

surface-to-air missile and ground-controlled intercept sites. 

Denying access to these sites prevented both U.S. and Egyptian 

air defense personnel from receiving valuable EC training, 

which should be given higher priority in future exercise planning. 

d. The installation of a mobile ground-controlled approach (GCA) 

facility at Cairo West was highly successful and helped U.S. 

and Egyptian air traffic controllers provide positive control to 

more than 2,000 sorties. As the only air traffic control radar 

control facility in Egypt, the GCA provided safe separation to 

both arriving and departing aircraft. 

Exercise Inferno Creek 85 

1. Exercise Description: Inferno Creek 85 (IC-85) was a JCSdirected, CENTCOM-scheduled jointkombined Field Training Exercise conducted from 31 July 1985 to 24 August 

1985.[DELEl'ED] .' 

2. Exercise Objectivd' 

a. Maximize regional involvement in pursuit of improved security 

and defense capabilities. 

'(s) USCENTCOM Bright Star 85 After Action Report, 24 Mar 1986, p 2-6. 

(S) USCENTAF Exercise Inferno Creek 85 After Action Report, 2 Dec 8 

1985, p 1-1. 

394 
b. Conduct jointkombined air operations with the SOAF and U.S. 

Navy. 

c. Exercise portions of real-world contingency plans that center 

on air defense activities in the region. 

d. Demonstrate rapid deployment and sustainment activities in a 

bare base environment. 

3. Participating Forces and Unk9 

Force Unit 

8 x F-15 

2 x E-3 

2 x KC-10 

1st Tactical Fighter Wing 

552d Air Warning and Control Wing 

2d Bombardment Wing 

4. Sequence of Events:" 

Deployment 

Employment 

Redeployment 

31 July - 1 I August 1985 

12 - 18 August 1985 

20 - 24 August 1985 

5. Major Milestones and Accomplishments:" 

a. Employment operations consisted of three phases, as follows: 

(1) Attacks against a Carrier Battle Group. KC-10s refueled 

fighters from both sides. 

(2) Fleet defense 

(3) Defending airbases 

~~ ~ 

'(S) Ibid, p 1-2. 

"(S) Ibid, p 1-3. 

"(S) Ibid. 

395 
6. Lessons Learned (or Relearned):I2 

a. There was no combined operations center to control and 

coordinate flying operations; future exercises should establish 

such a center with unit representatives available during periods 

of intensive flying operations. 

b. As in previous exercises, the training environment was 

excellent. This, along with the professionalism and flying 

expertise of host aircrews, offered an outstanding training 

experience for deployed units. 

Exercise Accurate Test 86 

1. Exercise Description: Accurate Test 86 (AT-86) was a JCSdirected, CENTCOM-scheduled jointkombined Field Training 

Exercise conducted in Oman during 17 April to 8 May 1986. 

[DELETED].I3 

2. Exercise objective^:'^ 

a. Develop a strategic deployment/redeploymnt plan to optimize 

available airlift resources. 

b. Demonstrate strategic deployment capabilities and combat 

readiness of selected CENTAF forces. 

c. Conduct combined air defense operations with the SOAF. 

d. Exercise long-haul joint communications among Thumrait, the 

U.S. Embassy in Muscat, and Headquarters CENTCOM and 

CENTAF in the United States. 

e. Exercise sustainment under field conditions in a desert 

environment using minimum combat and communications 

support. 

I2(S) Ibid, Annex A. 

I3(S) uSCENTAF Exercise Accurate Test 86 EXORD, 31 Jan 1986, p 1. 

(S) Ibid, p v. 14 

396 
3. Participating Forces and Units:I5 

Force Unit 

12 x F-16 

2 x E-3 

1 x RC-135 (Rivet Joint) 

388th Tactical Fighter Wing 

552d Air Warning and Control 

55th Strategic Reconnaissance 

Wing 

4. Sequence of Events:I6 

Deployment 17 - 26 April 1986 

Employment 

Redeployment 

25 April - 2 May 1986 

2 - 8 May 1986 

5. Major Milestones and Accomplishments:" 

a. This was the first deployment of F-16 and RC-135 to area. 

b. The exercise again demonstrated that AWACS could operate 

effectively from a bare base location. [DELETED]. 

c. The combined CENTAF, Strategic Air Command (SAC), and 

SOAF flying missions provided excellent training for the 

aircrews, as had previous exercises in Oman. 

d. [DELETED]. The E-3 had the unique opportunity to control 

day VFR (no radar) fighters in an offensive role. 

(S) Ibid, p vi. 

(S) Ibid, p 5. 

(S) USCENTAF Exercise Accurate Test 86 After Action Report, 31 Jul 

I5 

16 

17 

1986, pp 1-4, 1-8. 

397 
6. Lessons Learned (or Relearned):” 

a. The SOAF, once again, stated its desire for air refueling by U.S. 

KC-10s or KC-135s. The SOAF did not understand why the 

U.S. Navy provided air refueling to them during Beacon Flash 

exercises while the Air Force would not without a foreign 

military sales case. 

b. The number of F-16 engine problems (3 compressor stalls and 

1 stallktagnation) was significantly higher than normal, given 

the sortie rates and numbers of aircraft involved. Fuels at 

Thumrait Air Base were tested and found to be of high quality, 

and foreign object damage was ruled out as a possible cause. 

Exercise Bright Star 87” 

1. Exercise Description: Bright Star 87 (BS-87) was a. JCSdirected, CENTCOM-scheduled, jointkombined Field Training 

Exercise. [DELETED]. 

2. Exercise Objectives:” 

a. Conduct jointkombined interdiction, close air support, and 

counterair operations with Egyptian armed forces and the U.S. 

Navy, Marines, and Army Central Command. 

b. Conduct Electronic Warfare (EW) operations against Sovietdesigned air defense systems. 

c. Exercise combindjoint integrated air defense command, 

control, and communications with host nation air defense forces. 

d. Exercise joint regional communications connectivity. 

18(S) Ibid, Section 2. 

(s) USCENTAF Exercise Bright Star 87 EXORD, I Jun 1987, p iv. 19 

20(S) Ibid, p 1-2. 

398 
e. Exercise sustainment, under field conditions, in a Southwest 

Asia (SWA) environment. 

3. Participating Forces and Units:" 

Force Unit 

8 x F-15 

8 x F-4G 

5 x B-52 

4 x KC-135 

2 x E-3 

2 x EC-130 

5 x C-130 

1st Tactical Fighter Wing 

37th Tactical Fighter Wing 

5th Bomb Wing 

190th Air Refueling Group 

552d Air Warning and Control Wing 

41 st Electronic Combat Squadron 

314th Tactical Airlift Wing 

4. Sequence of Events:22 

Deployment 

Employment 

1 July - 12 August 1987 

12 - 20 August 1987 

Redeployment 20 August - 6 September 1987 

5. Major Milestones and Accornpli~hrnents:~~ 

a. Ninety-two percent of the CENTAF scheduled sorties were 

flown, and ninety-nine percent of the sorties flown were 

effective, resulting in the most productive combined training 

exercise in SWA to date. Missions under the control of AWACS 

included low-level navigation, airfield attack, airfield defense, 

interdiction, dissimilar air combat training (DAD), attacks 

against a U.S. Navy Surface Action Group, a live firepower 

demonstration, air refueling, and tactical and strategic airdrops 

of troops and equipment. 

"(S) Ibid, p A-I. 

"(s) [bid, p v. 

23(S) USCENTAF Exercise Bright Star 87 After Action Report, 30 Oct 1987, 

pp 1-3, 1-5. 

399 
b. This was the second’ time for the F-4G in SWA, and its 

performance demonstrated its value as a defense suppression 

asset. The training opportunities provided by attacks on Sovietbuilt air defense sites were invaluable. In addition, F-4G 

operations in conjunction with Egyptian F-16s and Marine 

F-18s provided valuable interdiction and joint maritime training 

in a realistic environment. 

c. Electronic combat training was outstanding. [DELETED]. 

d. Airlift forces received valuable training in that many tons of 

cargo and approximately 450 troops were either airdropped or 

airlanded. 

6. Lessons Learned (or Relearned):24 

a. Coordination of air operations with the Egyptian Air Defense 

Command is a slow and cumbersome process and caused some 

mission cancellations and delays until the Tactical Air Control 

Center personnel understood the EAF coordination process and 

Egyptian personnel understood the Bright Star concept of 

operations. 

b. Conduct of air operations and training with the host nation 

would be greatly facilitated if knowledgeable Liaison Officers 

were provided at the Tactical Air Control Center to assist in 

coordinating flight clearances, training, use of ranges, and many 

other areas that must be relearned by both U.S. and host nation 

units during each exercise. 

Exercise Shadow Hawk 87 

1. Exercise Description: Shadow Hawk 87 (SH-87) was a 

jointkombined exercise designed to increase regional involvement 

24(S) Ibid, Attch 2. 

400 
in pursuit of improved security and defense. The exercise was 

conducted in conjunction with Bright Star 87. [DELETED]F5 

2. Exercise Objectives:26 

a. Integrate Jordanian and U.S. planning efforts to improve 

combined employment of both air forces. 

b. Conduct combined tactical air operations to include offensive 

counterair, interdiction, and close air support. 

c. Plan and execute combined airlift operations of WAF personnel 

and equipment. 

d. Exercise joint regional communications connectivity. 

3. [DELETED] 

4. Sequence of Events:27 

Deployment 

Employment 

Redeployment 

15 - 23 July 1987 

24 - 30 July 1987 

31 July - 3 August 1987 

5. Major Milestones and Accomplishments2' 

a. A total of thirty-six Jordanians received orientation flights; 

fourteen in the F-16 and twenty-two in the E-3. 

b. The Rapidly Deployable Integrated Command and Control 

(RADIC) system was deployed to Jordan for the first time. 

RADIC is a lightweight system that provides the E-3 AWACS air 

picture to air defense staffs for use in air employment opera- 

"(s) USCENTAF Exercise Bright Star 87, 1 Jun 1987, p 1. 

26(S) USCENTAF Exercise Shadow Hawk 87 After Action Report, 1 Sep 

1987, p 1-2. 

27 

28 

(S) Ibid, p 1-2. 

(S) Ibid, pp 1-3, 1-4. 

40 1 
tions. The Jordanians were impressed with RADIC and wanted 

it back during future exercises. 

c. The F-16s provided opposition air for the RJAF F-1 s, and, once 

again, the RJAF aircrews demonstrated a high level of proficiency in all aspects of air operations. 

6. Lessons Learned (or Relearned):29 

a. CENTAF headquarters was formed as a part of the combined 

joint headquarters, but the air war was prosecuted from the Air 

Defense Operations Center (Am) at another location. As a 

result, CENTAF was not able to effectively interface with their 

Jordanian counterparts and had little control of the air war. 

One lesson learned was that future exercises should consider deployment of a Tactical Air Control Center and collocation of 

CENTAF with the RJAF ADOC. 

b. The RADIC was not operational during three of the six exercise 

employment days due to a lack of spare parts and inadequate 

time for system setup and checkout. The recommendation 

followed that future exercises should include earlier deployment 

of RADIC and more spares to ensure that it is fully operational 

for the entire exercise period. 

c. Problems were encountered with distribution of the Air Tasking 

Order (ATO). The plan was to distribute the ATO via host nation 

facsimile systems, but the ATOs were transmitted at too low a 

priority and U.S. personnel did not know where the facsimile 

systems were located. Future exercises were recommended to 

continue with the facsimile system for ATO distribution. 

Exercise Bright Star 90 

1. Exercise Description: Bright Star 90 (BS-90) was a JCS-directed, CENTCOM-scheduled, jointlcombined Field Training Exercise. [DELETED].30 

29(~) ]bid, Section 2. 

30(s) USCENTAF Bright Star 90 Exercise Plan, 31 Jul 1989. p ii. 

402 
2. Exercise Objecti~es:~' 

a. Conduct jointkombined counterair and EW air operations 

with U.S. Navy, Marine, and Army forces and the Egyptian 

armed forces (EAF). 

b. Conduct EW operations against Soviet-made Egyptian air 

defense systems. 

c. Exercise joint regional communications connectivity. 

d. Exercise sustainment under field conditions in a SWA environment, using minimum combat and support equipment. 

3. Exercise Forces:32 

Force Unit 

8 x F-15 

7 x F-4G 

4 x EF-111 

2 x EC-130 

3 x KC-135 

2 x B-52 

2 x E-3 

5 x C-130 

1 st Tactical Fighter Wing 

35th Tactical Fighter Wing 

366th Tactical Fighter Wing 

41 st Electronic Combat Squadron 

340th Air Refueling Wing 

379th Bombardment Wing 

552d Air Warning and Control Wing 

Military Airlift Command 

4. Sequence of Events:33 

Deployment 

Employment 

Redeployment 

15 September - 9 November 1989 

11 - 16 November 1989 

17 November - 12 December 1989 

(S) Ibid, p 1-2. 31 

32 (S) hid, p A-1-1. 

33(S) Ibid, p ii. 

403 
5. Major Milestones and Accomplishments:” 

a. Bright Star 90 continued emphasis on EW operating in an 

environment that included Soviet-made air defense systems. 

b. EF-111 aircraft participated for the first time, and integrated 

employment operations were flown using the capabilities of 

both the EF- 1 11 and the F-4G Wild Weasel. 

c. EC-130 (Compass Call) aircraft participated for the first time. 

Communications jamming parameters were restricted by the 

host nation, and this degraded training effectiveness for both 

U.S. and Egyptian forces, an unfortunate but necessary precaution. 

d. AWACS proved invaluable in the safe, organized, and effective 

execution of a wide variety of missions. Egyptian participation on board AWACS enhanced combined air defense operations throughout the exercise. 

e. EW training was also excellent. F-4Gs employed self-protection countermeasures by integrating flying tactics with chaff 

dispensers and electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods against 

Egyptian air defense radars, resulting in a realistic wartime 

environment. B-52s conducted active ECM against the Egyptian threat systems and also received excellent training. 

f. Airlift forces airdropped or airlanded over 450 personnel and 

many tons of cargo. A combined airdrop by 18 Egyptian and 

U.S. C-130s demonstrated a high level of aircrew proficiency. 

6. Lessons Learned (or Relear~~ed):~’ 

a. As in previous exercises, the coordination and integration of 

flying activities continued to be a problem. [DELETED]. 

34(s) Information taken from USCENTAF inputs to the joint universal lessons 

learned system (JULLS) for Exercise Bright Star 90. USCENTAF Exercise data 

files, and unit after action reports on file in the 9th Combat Plans Squadron at 

Shaw AFB, SC. 

35(S) Ibid. 

404 
b. After the startup coordination problems were resolved, 

integration with the EAF went better than in previous Bright 

Star exercises. Perhaps the most significant "lesson learned" 

for CENTAF was an awareness of the EAF coordination process 

and the need to make sure that exercise scenarios include time 

to smooth out disconnects during initial air operations. 

Exercise Shadow Hawk 90 

1. Exercise Description: Shadow Hawk 90 (SH-90) was a 

jointlcombined exercise designed to increase regional security and 

defense capabilities. The exercise was conducted in conjunction 

with Bright Star 90. [DELETED].36 

2. Exercise Objectives?' 

a. Conduct combinedjoint training of staff officers in preparing, 

planning, and executing joint operations. 

b. Plan and conduct combinedjoint training operations related 

to tactical air operations and tactical airlift. 

c. Exercise communications and air defense systems in an electronic warfare (EW) environment. 

d. Conduct training in crisis resupply operations. 

3. Participating Forces and Units:38 

Force Unit 

12 x F-4 

6 x F-16 

2 x E-3 

3 x C-141 

122d Tactical Fighter Wing (ANG) 

363d Tactical Fighter Wing 

552d Air Warning and Control Wing 

438th Military Airlift Wing 

"(S) USARCENT Joint Task Force Alpha Shadow Hawk 90,31 Aug 1990, 

37(S) Ibid. 

38(S) Ibid. 

P 1- 

405 
4. Sequence of Events:39 

Deployment 

Employment 

Redeployment 

17 September - 29 October 1989 

29 October - 3 November 1989 

3 - 15 November 1989 

5. Major Milestones and Accomplishments:@ 

a. A mix of tactical, AWACS, and airlift sorties were flown to 

include counterair and interdiction by F-16s along with two 

airborne assaults of Jordanian personnel and equipment by the 

airlift forces. 

b. Four days of scenario activities: two days of offensive action 

by the Jafr-based F-16s and RlAF E5s aided by AWACS, and two 

days of defensive activities with opposition provided by RTAF 

F- 1 s and F-5s. AWACS was netted with Jordanian ground radar 

sites for a combined air defense system. 

c. Electronic combat was exercised with F-16s. [DELETED]. 

6. Lessons Learned (or Relearned):4’ 

a. Pilots reported that the opportunity to work together was a 

valuable experience and trained them to accomplish their 

mission better. 

b. Although the AWACS successfully controlled all required 

air-to-air events, the exercise would have gone more smoothly 

had AWACS deployed earlier and had the exercise familiarization 

(FAM) period included two FAM days instead of one. 

39(S) Ibid. 

%ENTAF inputs to JULLS, USCENTAF Exercise data files, and unit After 

Action Reports. 

4’Ibid. 

406 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Exercise Inferno Creek 90 

Exercise Description: Inferno Creek 90 (IC-90) was a JCSdirected, CENTCOM-scheduled jointkombined Field Training 

Exercise conducted from 24 October to 18 November 1989. This 

exercise was conducted in conjunction with Bright Star 90. 

[DELETED] ."* 

Exercise Obje~tives:~~ 

a. Conduct and evaluate combined operations. 

b. Integrate 0mardU.S. combined planning. 

c. Enhance integrated air/ground close air support (CAS) 

operations. 

d. Maximize use of prepositioned assets. 

Participating Forces and Units? 

Force unit 

6 x F-16 

2 x E-3 

363d Tactical Fighter Wing 

552d Air Warning and Control Wing 

Sequence of Events? 

Deployment 

Employment 

Redeploy me nt 

24 October - 2 November 1989 

3 - 8 November 1989 

10 November - 12 December 1989 

42(S) USCENTAF Joint Task Force Charlie Inferno Creek 90 Exercise plan, 

43(S) Ibid, p iv. 

44(S) Ibid, p A-1-1. 

45(S) Ibid, p v. 

1 May 1987, p 1. 

407 
5. Major Milestones and Accomplishments:* 

a. The return of the AWACS with the RADIC System significantly 

improved airfield defense capability and provided valuable 

training benefits to both CENTAF and SOAF air defense controllers 

and staff officers. 

b. The airfield attack and airfield defense scenarios offered highquality training. 

6. Lessons Learned (or Relearned): 

a. The Inferno CreeWAccurate Test exercises provide highquality 

training. [DELETED].'" 

46CENTAF inputs to JULLS, CENTAF Exercise data files, and unit After 

Action Reports. 

411bid. 

408 
Appendix E 

Initial Hack 

Air-to-Air 

Desert Shield Exercises' 

Unique and Recurring Training Exercises 

Fish Barrel - 

CAS 8 Al 

Composite Force 

Air Defense (weekly) 

Border AAR 8 Intercept 

Fish Barrel - 

1 AUG 

Desert ---r Force A AAKA- 

-~ - 

SAWCSAR - 

TankedAirspace Control I 

AT0 Generation Live Fly - 

Desert ---r Force A AAKA- 

-.~ 

SAWCSAR - 

TankedAirspace Control I 

AT0 Generation Live Fly - 

'All information was extracted from a MFR written by Lt Col Robert S Coombs, 

uSCENTAF, Desert Shield Training and Exercises, 20 Mar 1991. 

409 
Exercise Initial Hack 24 - 26 Ckt 1990 

Objectives: 

Increase operations tempo, C3, two carrier sirnultaneous operations, 

jointkombined planning, and tanker operations in multiple, simultaneous refueling tracks. 

Expose participants to conditions duplicating actual scenarios, 

continuous operations, and aidground staff operations. 

Concept of Operations: 

Exercise tanker and receiver flows to planned orbits and tracks; 

simultaneous interdiction, close air support (CAS), and air-to-air 

operations [DELETED] fly EC-130 (ABCCC) sorties as required; 

conduct forty-eight hour continuous operations with an airspace 

control plan. 

[DELETED]. 

Highlights: 

Number of Sorties Flown 

Fighter Tanker Air-to-Air AWACS Total 

282 88 48 13 43 1 

Participants were WAF, Navy, RSAF, RAF, CAF. 

410 
Exercise Imminent Thunder 15 - 20 NOV 1990 

CENTCOM Objectives: 

Jointkombined training and interoperability of friendly forces, 

enhance coordination and communication capabilities, improve 

jointlcombined air operations, enhance Naval surface operations, 

exercise combined link-up and reinforcement operations, conduct 

amphibious operations, and conduct carrier battlegroup operations 

in support of amphibious operations. 

CENTAFMAF Objectives: 

Exercise D-Day alert interdiction package; execute mission 

commander’s operations order; exercise CAS C3 process and conduct CAS/offensive counterair (OCA)/air interdiction (AI) missions 

in a coordinated manner; support amphibious operations; and 

coordinate search and rescue/combat search and rescue (SAIUCSAR). 

Concept of Operations: 

Phase 1 

Offensive Air Operations: 

Perform alert notice and simulate aircrafthew generation; simulate 

D-Day. [DELETED]. 

CASIAI 

Exercise the Tactical Air Control System (TACS) Cz in a limited 

jamming environment, integrate CASkill zones, and fly integrated 

AC-130/A-10 night antiarmor operations. [DELETED]. 

Phases 2 through 5 

Amphibious Operations, Reinforcement, Redeployment 

41 1 
Establish amphibious operating area and support Navy and Marine 

operations; missions included DCA (ground alert), CAS, air-to-air 

CAPS, and air refueling. 

SARJCSAR 

SOCCENT/CENTAF exercised Helos and A-10s with two preplanned 

pick ups and an immediate launch. [DELETED]. 

Highlights: 

Phase 1 

A total of 2,300 sorties were flown, with thirty composite force 

packages and 1,300 CAS sorties. D-Day (dress rehearsal) involved: 

twelve composite force packages, 273 sorties, and six airfield attacks. 

The mission commander operations order was exercised. 

Phases 2 through 5 

A total of 550 sorties were flown, with CAmavy AOA support: 88 

USAF and FAF CAS sorties and 35 tanker sorties. 

Exercise Desert Force 5-7Dec1990 

Objectives: 

Conduct two carrier simultaneous operations, coordinate command 

and control, airspace management plans, CSAR, and tanker and receiver flows to planned orbit and tracks. 

. Fly composite force integrated training with Coalition forces. 

412 
Concept of Operations: 

Fly a dress rehearsal of actual D-Day [DELETED]. 

Highlights: 

A total of 430 sorties were flown by the following Coalition forces: 

USAF, FAF, CAF, RSAF, USN, and RAF. 

Air-To-Air Tkaining Exercises East 17 - 19 Dec 1990 

West 22 - 23 Dec 1990 

Objectives: 

Practice air combat maneuvering (ACM) and improve AWACS Weapons Director (WD) proficiency. 

Exercise High Value Airborne Asset (HVAA) protection and F-1 dissimilar air combat training. 

Concept of Operations: 

East: ACM-two versus two aircraft [DELETED]. 

West: ACM-two versus two and two versus four aircraft [DELETED]. 

413 
Highlights: 

More than 200 sorties were flown with the following participants: 

HVAA: 

AWACS Tankers 

Compass Call ABCCC 

Blue Air: 

USAF-F- 1 5, RSAF-F- 15 

RAF-Tornado F-3 FAF-M-2OOO 

Red Air: 

USAF-F-16, CAFXF- 1 8 

USMC-F/A- 1 8 IAF-Tornado 

KAF-F-1 

Exercise Fish Barrel 7-9Jan1991 

Objectives: 

Evaluate the Cz procedures. [DELETED]. Exercise procedures for 

attacking armor both in day and night, and practice CAS sortie 

distribution. 

Concept of Operations: 

Perform CAS and A1 using friendly ground forces; incorporate Night 

Canon training. Fly dedicated AWACS/ opposing air; concentrate 

package training [DELETED]. 

414 
Highlights: 

There were 360 daytime and 216 nightime CAS/AI sorties flown with 

the following participants: 

CAS/AI Training 

USAF 

USN 

USMC 

USA 

KAF 

RSAF 

RAF 

FAF 

A-10, OA-10, AC-130, F-16, F-15E, F-111F 

A-6 

FIA-18, AV-8B, A-6 

AH-64,OH-58D, AH-1 

A-4 

F-5 

Jaguar 

Jaguar 

Package Training 

USAF 

CAF CF- 1 8 

F-16, F-4G, B-52, F-l5E, F-15, EF-111, F-1llF 

RAF Tornado F-3, GR-1 

RSAF F-15, Tornado 

FAF Jaguar, M-2000, F-1CR 

Navy Package Training 

USN 

USAF EF-111, F-4G 

A-6E, A-7, F-18, F-14, EA-6B. KA-6D 

RSAF Tornado IDS 

RAF Tornado GR-1 

Joint SAWCSAR Exercise 

Objectives: 

Exercise assets and C3. 

Concept of Operations: 

11 Jan 1991 

Conduct three rescue missions (2 SAR and 1 CSAR), two night and 

one day extraction, and operate C3 through AWACS to the Joint 

Rescue Coordination Center. 

415 
Highlightx 

The participants were: RSAF-Bell-212, USN-HH-60, and sOCCENTMH-53, MH-60. 

'IBnkerIAirspce Control Exercise 6, 13 Jan 1991 

Objectives: 

Fly tankers at D-Day-level sortie requirements, utilize AWACS for 

tanker control, and test air traffic control procedures in saturated 

airspace conditions. 

Concept of Operations: 

Fly the maximum number of tankers and fighters for short periods 

of time, activate air refueling tracks not used during training, and 

man all AWACS orbits. 

Highlights: 

The participants and number of refueling tracks were: 

6 Jan 13 Jan 

Tankers 57 72 

Receivers 105 136 

Air Refueling Tracks 19 20 

AT0 Generation Exercise 12, 16 Jan 1991 

Objectives: 

Exercise full AT0 cycle. 

41 6 
Concept of Operations: 

0 Strictly a "paper" exercise that started with initial planning and target 

nomination in the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell to the 

production and distribution of the D+2 AT0 in the AT0 Division. 

Highlights: 

Both days were required to smooth out the process, and difficulties were 

experienced processing the ATO into the Computer Assisted Force Management System. 

Recurring lhining and Exercises 

Air Defense Exercise Weekly Nov/Dec 1990 

Objectives: 

Exercise C3, practice detection, identification, and reaction. 

Concept of Operations: 

Scheduled every week [DELETED]. 

Highlights: 

There were 178 sorties over 14 vulnerability periods. The participants 

were: 

Fakers 

USMC FIA-18, A-6, AV-8B 

USAF 

USN A-6, A-7 

F-l5E, EF-111, F-lllF, F4G, F-16 

RAF Tornado GR-1 

FAF Jaguar 

417 
Defensive Counterair 

USAF F-15 

USMC F/A- 1 8 

USN F-14 

RSAF F-15, Tornado ADV 

RAF Tornado F-3 

CAF CF-18 

Package Raining Weekly Sep I990 - Jan 1991 

Objectives: 

0 Promote interoperability of friendly forces, conduct integrated 

training, and exercise actual operations and procedures, planning, 

tactics, and C3. 

Concept of Operations: 

0 Enhance unit training programs by formally establishing two days a 

week (afternoon and night) for flights, designate mission commanders for each package. 

Highlights: 

Over 4,000 sorties were estimated flown, and all aspects of the integrated 

air campaign were exercised. 

CAWAl Raining Weekly Sep 1990 - Jan 1 991 

Objectives: 

Exercise elements of TACS that support CAS and A1 missions, i.e., 

fighters, WOC, TACdCombat Ops, CAS Director, and ABCCC, ASOC, 

TACP, AFAC, GTAC, ANGLCO [Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (USMC)] Team. 

Develop and exercise C2 procedures; familiarize pilots and controllers with terrain, landmarks, and meteorological conditions. 

[DELETED]. 

41 8 
Concept of Operations: 

Fly CAS with different controlling agencies. [DELETED]. 

The priorities were: CAS-support controllers with field exercises; 

Al-target areas near anticipated war Operations. 

Highlights: 

A maximum of 110 sorties per day with the following participants: 

CAS 

USAF 

USA AH-64, AH-1, OH-58 

USMC AV-8B, F/A-18 

A-10, OA-10, F-16, AC-130, (2-130 

FAF Jaguar 

AI 

USAF A-10, F-16, ABCCC 

USMC AV-8B, FIA-18, A-6 

USN A-6 

RSAF F-5 

KAF A4 

FAF Jaguar 

RAF Jaguar 

Night canon: Weekly Dec 1990 - Jan 1991 

Objectives: 

Develop best tactics, C2 methods, and BDA capability using tasked 

mission aircraft; and practice airspace deconfliction. 

Concept of Operations: 

Conduct night antiarmor attacks. 

Highlights 

A maximum of 48 sorties were flown at night. 

419 
Border Air Refueling Daily 17 Dec 1990 - 9 Jan 1991 

and Intercept Exercise 

Objectives: 

Demonstrate air combat readinesdcapability, reduce predictability, 

and increase fighter/AWACS proficiency. 

Concept of Operations: 

0 Give Iraq a look, increase border presence (visible). 

0 [DELETED]. 

Highlights: 

Sorties averaged 24 to 32 per day. 

420 
Appendix F 

Flag Exercises 

Red Flag 

Red Flag had its roots in Vietnam. Spurred in part by relatively low 

exchange rates against North Vietnamese MIGs, Air Force officials 

returned to the institutional memory that roughly ninety percent of the 

aircrew losses occurred within the first ten combat sorties. Military 

leaders believed that combat losses could be reduced if aircrews were 

“seasoned” in a controlled environment similar to combat. Several proposals were made that optimized the mix of units participating against 

associated costs. In 1975 General Dixon, Commander of Tactical Air 

Command, declared that the first Red Flag exercise would provide the 

highest sense of realism in an enemy threat environment that peacetime 

training could offer. 

Lessons learned from Vietnam became the guiding light for Red Flag 

exercises. This exercise is not a forum for checking out new people or 

developing new tactics but rather for evaluating approved tactics, gaining 

confidence in flight skills, and learning to orchestrate the efforts of a 

composite force. Safety is a paramount consideration for the 10 sorties 

that each aircrew flies. The tempo of realism increases gradually 

throughout these 10 days. Tactical Air Command’s goal for Red Flag 

participation is once every 15-18 months per aircrew. The exercise lasts 

approximately 6 weeks and is subdivided into 3 two-week periods. Units 

rotate crews in for each two-week period to allow maximum participation. 

Red Flag is scheduled approximately 3 times a year and costs roughly 

$1.5 million per exercise, excluding costs for infrastructure support and 

range. The overall exercise objective is to provide a safe, simulated 

combat environment that allows participants to employ composite force 

tactics against strategic and tactical targets defended by a challenging, 

integrated air defense system. The following tables identify statistics 

about all flag exercises from their inception to the Gulf War. 

42 1 
Flag Exercises' 

Year Red Green Maple Sorties Hours #Aircrews 

1975 

1976 

1977 

1978 

1979 

1980 

1981 

1982 

1983 

I984 

I985 

1986 

1987 

1988 

1989 

1990 

1 

9 

10 

9 

7 

3 

3 

3 

3 

4 

3 

3 

4 

3 

4 

3 

I 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

552 

9535 

16596 

19350 

1 9440 

10185 

17878 

15753 

16043 

19781 

22561 

16678 

20095 

16641 

19135 

14522 

67 1 

I5363 

27645 

32164 

33930 

17718 

3022 

25821 

27033 

34248 

40893 

30734 

37252 

28630 

34530 

25489 

Flag Exercises* (continued) 

Coalition Participants in Red Flag Exercises3 

unknown 

2827 

6975 

6958 

9240 

6084 

7982 

6758 

6334 

7167 

8440 

6309 

643 1 

4434 

4816 

4465 

Year: 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 

Britain X x x x x x x x x x x x x x 

Canada x x x x x x x x x x x x x 

Egypt X X 

France xx xx x xx 

Italy X 

Saudi Arabia 

'414 CTS FAX, Fiscal Year Summary, 19 Mar 1992. 

*lbid. 

3Capt Vic Wager, HQ ACCIM)TS Database, 16 Sep 1992. 
Flag Exercises4 (continued) 

Canada Egypt France Britain Italy Saudi Arabia 

CF-5 F-16 Jaguar Buccaneer C- 130 F-5E 

CF-147 F-5E C-160 C- 130K Tornado 

CC-30 F- 1 Jaguar 

CF- 1 8 c-130 Harrier 

CF- 1 04 Tornado 

CH- 136 Vulcan 

C-130R 

F-106 

F-4M 

vc-I0 

Victor 

Flag Exercises’ (continued) 

Other Foreign Participants in Red Flag Exercises 

Year: 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 

Australia 

Belgium 

Denmark 

Germany 

Greece 

Israel 

Jordan 

Korea 

Netherlands 

Norway 

Singapore 

Thailand 

Turkey 

X X X 

X X 

X 

X xxx X X 

X X 

X 

X X X 

xx X 

xx X 

X 

xx X 

X 

X 

X X 

X X 

X 

xx 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X X 

X 

4414 CTS FAX, Fiscal Year Summary, 19 Mar 1992. 

51bid. 

423 
Red Flag exercises require a geographical space large enough to 

accommodate large composite force packages: interdiction sorties that 

may stretch tens of miles enroute to targets; air defense fighter tactics that 

may at times begin intercepts beyond visual range (30-50 nm) and take 

another 20 miles horizontally and 30,000 feet vertically to complete their 

engagement; several hundred aircraft without supersonic restrictions; 

air-to-ground targets (airbases, bridges, tanks, etc.) the same size and 

composition as wartime targets; and an airbase that can handle the launch, 

recovery, and emergency landings of all the airplanes. The enormity of 

the task and requirements for the training environment pointed toward 

federal land in the Nevada desert, depicted on the following map. 

Each scenario pits a blue force, whose objective is to attack red 

interdiction and close air support targets, against a red force whose objective is to defend its resources. The mock war is controlled by range 

procedures, participant training objectives, a red force cadre that exercises 

control of the intensity and tempo of air combat consistent with training 

objectives, and range safety personnel. The Nellis AFB “aggressors” are 

the cadre of red fighters, that emulate enemy fighter tactics. Other air defense fighter units that are evaluating their combat air patrol (CAP) and air 

base defense tactics augment the aggressors. Ground-based area and 

point defenses form the other half of the enemy integrated air defense 

system (IADS). Manned and unmanned threat emitters run by civilian 

contractors and the Red Flag staff simulate Soviet-style ground threats 

such as the SA-2, 3.4, 6, 8 and ZSU 23-4, providing realistic acquisition, 

track, and launch indications to blue force aircraft. The underlying Red 

Flag objective is to train the blue forces by creating an environment in 

which blue forces have to be vigilant and execute tactics that ensure 

mission success while minimizing simulated losses.6 The following table 

listing red force units from Green Flag 90-4 was conducted August 1990, 

and is typical of all flag exercises. 

%OMTAC Exercise Plan 8oi Red Flag, 1 Feb 1992. Additional information on 

generd Red Flag overview provided by HQ USAFfiOFC and ACUDOXET. 

424 
425 
Blue forces constitute the largest group of participants during Flag 

exercises and are composed primarily of fighter forces. Over the years 

increasingly more participants have come from Strategic Air Command 

(SAC), Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Navy, the Marines, the 

Army, and the foreign nations. The following table listing blue force 

participants from Green Flag 90-4 is representative of the types and 

quantities of aircraft in each flag exercise. 

Summary of Red Forces in Green Flag 90-4' 

Unit Aircraft Home Base Number of Flight Houn 

(Number) Sorties 

56 'ITW F-16 (8) MacDill AFB. n AD-21 3 

57 FWW F-16 (6) Nellis AFB, Nv AD-281 

58 'TTW F-16 (6) Luke AFB, A2 AD-94 

388 TFw F-16 (6) Hill AFB, UT AD-63 

VMFA-235 FIA-18 (6) MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI AD-54 

41 ECS EC-130H (1) Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ C3CM-8 

RlTF KC-135 (3) March AFB, CA AAR-46 

Total 759 

414.1 

388.8 

153.2 

137.4 

62.5 

44.5 

200.8 

lJO1.3 

'USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center Green Flag 90-4 Final Reporr, Nov 1990. p 1-9. 

426 
Summary of Blue Forces in Green Flag 90-48 

Unit Aircraft QpelNumber Flight 

Number Home Base of Sorties Hours 

36 TFW 

422 TES 

32 TFS 

33 TFW 

121 TFW 

27 TFW 

366 TFW* 

388 TFW 

VMFA-235 

VMAQ-4 

67 TRW 

52 TFW 

35 TFW 

4443 TEG 

43 ECS 

41 ECS 

42 ECS 

390 ECS 

552 AWACW 

55 SRW 

42 BMW 

379 BMW 

416 BMW 

RITF 

63 MAW 

3171435 TAW 

*Core Unit 

F-15 (8) 

F-15 (2) 

F-15 (8) 

F-15 (10) 

A-7D (6) 

F-IlID (8) 

F-111A (6) 

F-16 (10) 

F/A- 18 

EAdA (3) 

RF-4C (6) 

F-4G/F- 16 (4) 

F-4G (10) 

F-4G (3) 

EC-130H (2) 

EC- 130H (2) 

EF-111 (3) 

EF-Ill (3) 

E-3 (2) 

RC-13s (2) 

B-52G (2) 

B-52G (2) 

B-52G (2) 

KC-135 (7) 

C-141 (3) 

C-130 (4) 

Bitburg AB, GE AD- 183 

Nellis AFB, NV AD-7 

Soesterburg AB, NL AD-69 

Rickenbacker ANGB, OH AI-114 

Eglin AFB. FL AD-366 

Cannon AFB, NM AI-146 

Mt Home AFB, ID AI-50 

Hill AFB, UT AI-304 

MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI SEAD-101 

NAS Whidbey Island, WA SEAD-25 

Spangdahlem AB GE SEAD-90 

Bergstrom AFB, TX RECCE- 177 

George AFB, CA SEAD- 183 

George AFB, CA SEAD- 18 

Sembach AB GE C3CM- 15 

Davis-Monthan AFB. AZ C3CM-37 

RAF Upper Heyford UK EW, C3CM-79 

Mt. Home AFB, ID 

Tinker AFB, OK c3-49 

Offutt AFB, NE C3I-30 

LOflng AFB, ME AI-41 

Wurtsmith AFB. MI A1-44 

GfiffiSS AFB, NY A1-33 

March AFB, CA AAR-153 

EW, C3CM-90 

Norton AFB, CA 25 

Pope AFB, NC 25 

Total 2,454 

274.5 

6.8 

101.6 

599.5 

126.2 

191.0 

58.9 

467.5 

150.9 

37.6 

345.1 

156.3 

272.4 

26.7 

35.4 

97.2 

142. I 

151.7 

179.1 

2 10.3 

2 17.9 

180.9 

176.0 

644.0 

57.1 

53.4 

4960.1 

'lbid, p-13. 

427 
Well in advance of any Flag exercise, objectives are defined and a 

scenario is written. Planning staffs and mission directors are assigned by 

the numbered Air Forces to orchestrate the efforts of everyone 

participating. Units, with agreement from their higher headquarters, 

volunteer, based on their training requirements, availability, and funds 

remaining. The complex logistical problems are worked out during 

various predeployment conferences and form a basis for contingency 

deployment planning. 

Specific flag training begins several months in advance of the 

deployment. Squadron weapons and training officers develop specific 

unit training requirements and a plan to meet the objectives. Aircrews 

are identified based on their needs, availability, experience, and squadron 

positions (flight lead, instructor, etc.). Ground training is a mixture of 

self-paced and class academics covering three main categories: flight/ 

weapons safety and range orientation, equipment, and tactics. If the unit 

objective is the live drop of a particular kind of ordnance, detailed ground 

academics provide a thorough refresher about the weapon, flight 

restrictions, preflight, delivery parameters, and safe escape. Other equipment items covered will be electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods, radar, 

Have Quick, LANTIRN or other lasing devices, and survival equipment, to 

name a few. The unit weapons shop develops a number of weapons 

delivery tactics consistent with training objectives and the flag scenario. 

Tactics discussions are a refresher of unit tactics and an overview of other 

unit procedures and tactics, including the enemy’s. Emphasis is placed 

on flying the flag crews together to the maximum extent possible, and 

special flying programs were initiated to ensure each participant is fully 

qualified and proficient in all aspects of his mission. 

Planning staffs normally deploy to Nellis several days in advance of 

the exercise participants. Their function is to review the scenario and act 

as a higher headquarters planning staff. Academics may or may not be 

given to the mission directors and their planning staffs, depending on their 

requests. All aircraft arrive on a Saturday, and maintenance prepares for 

operations on Monday. Sunday the aircrews receive ground academics and 

are given their first Air Tasking Order (ATO). As mentioned earlier, the 

two-week exercises gradually increase in complexity and tempo. An 

example of a typical training schedule and scenario follow^.^ 

9440th TFT6, Red Hag 92-2, After Action Rpt. 

428 
'Qpical Schedule 

TO\F&;CIC 1 YES YES YES YES YES 

- 

/c RED FLAG BLUE TRAINING SCENARIO 

92-2, Period 2 

DAY 2 I DAY 3 I DAY 4 

@ 

u.ll ISJ-W I DAY 1 1 

DAY I I I I 

Wounded Bird YES YES YES YES YES 

Safe Passage YES YES YES YES YES 

EXERCISE 

DrOCedureS - Medium Alt NO NO YES OPTION OPTION 

Tactics 

Low -Ail 

Step Down * 500 300** 300** 300** 300** 

*See SPINS for additional restrictions 

I I I 

** Scc SPINS, Chaptcr 4. Paragraph 6g(l)(h); 

RFKC approval below 3po'(min 100) 

RATIO 

I 

Sec SPINS for additional restrictions I I 

DAY I I 

1 DAY 6 I DAY 7 

BVR 

CRITERIA 

** See SPINS, Chapter 4, Paragraph 6g(l)(h); 

DAY 8 I DAY 9 1 DAY 10 

I I 

I 

Air - t 0-,A ir 

RATIO 

NIGHT 

TOT BLOCK 

8V8 8V8 8V8 8V8 8V8 

4v4 4v4 4v4 4v4 4v4 - 

- 

Step Down * I 

w 

0 

lL 

1 

D 

A 

Y 

I I I I 

OCA Intial Sweep - NCTR 

and/or 

AWACS declaring 

Hostile OCA Against Flow - 

FAM 

DAY 

NCTR or AWACS 

FAM YES YES 

DAY 

FAM YES YES 

DAY 

FAM YES YES 

DAY 

FAM NO YES 

DAY 

FAM 

500' 500' 300 

DAY 5 

8V8 - 

4v4 

YES 

YES 

OPTION 

300** 

OCA Initial Sweep - NCTR & AWACs Declaring Hostile OCA Against Flow - 

NCTR or AWACs Declaring Hostile & Lack of Mode 1, Mode 4. BVR 

CRITERIA 

429 
Typical Schedule-continued 

The first missions are flown for range orientation. A mission commander is assigned for the day’s operations; he integrates the efforts of 

package commanders who plan and coordinate each of three successive 

waves. Package commanders are responsible for coordinating and deconflicting the tactics for their “gorilla” packages. Additionally they discuss 

air and SAM defense tactics with their air and EW support. All the elements of a composite force, including the launch sequence, refueling, 

formations, and ingress and egress, are practiced in a benign environment. 

430 
The ATO is disseminated to all units. Flight leads identify which 

packages they are assigned along with their targets and support assets. 

The mission commander holds a meeting of all flight leads to discuss 

tactics and a general game plan. Flight leads discuss the best way their 

aircraft can support the mission. After the meeting, flight leads get 

together with the aircrews of their flight and tasks are delegated. For the 

F-16, assuming a flight of four aircraft, the lead and number three aircraft 

may determine target area tactics and deconflict with other flights in the 

area. The number two aircraft may be assigned to plan the route and 

number four to get the intelligence assessment and weapons data. The 

details of subordinating tasks are left to flight lead discretion. Every area 

of the mission, which includes mission data, ground procedures, departure, refueling, ingress, target area, egress, and landing, is planned. 

After the mission has been planned in detail, a mass briefing with all 

participants is held to brief the overall operations. These details include 

the day's objectives, weatherhotice to airmen (NoTAMS)/timehack (synchronized time check), intel scenario, red force operating instructions and 

special instructions, blue force operations, and safety. Immediately after 

the mass brief, participants go to individual flight briefs where the details 

of flight operations are enumerated. Every aspect of the mission and areas 

of potential impact are discussed. 

Probably the greatest learning tool available at Red Flag is the ability 

to accurately reconstruct the mission. Every training situation can be 

broken into three components: planning, execution, and evaluation. 

Participants learn in each of the three phases, and because the process is 

experiential rather than intellectual, events can be measured and remembered. The Red Flag facility is an excellent environment for all stages. 

During the planning stage, all participants have the opportunity to interact 

and exchange information. It becomes more than rote memory; it becomes an application of the aggregate of learning experiences of the 

forces throughout the years. The addition of foreign participants and 

sister Services has broadened the learning environment, enabling the 

Coalition to fight as a single air force. 

The actual mission can be monitored from select briefing rooms 

using the Red Flag Measurement Debriefing System (RFMDS). The RFMDS 

is an advanced training system that records and displays the activities and 

results of simulated tactical air combat missions flown on the Nellis range 

complex. The aircraft flying with the RFMDS pods allow Red Flag mis43 1 
sions to be monitored live and replayed for postmission analysis. Each 

aircraft is monitored electronically, and a computer-enhanced display 

provides real-time depiction of the battle, across the full spectrum of 

operations for the entire Red Flag training area. Commanders, planning 

staffs, and crews who are not flying can monitor the battle as it unfolds 

in the Red Flag facility. 

The day's operations are debriefed in a similar manner. After landing, crews debrief and record results and significant lessons or factors 

affecting their package. Pertinent information for the flight includes 

conduct of the flight, strengths and weaknesses of the tactics, and hits and 

misses of the weapons. Shots taken or observations about other members 

of the gorilla are recorded and passed to the mission commander. He 

debriefs all members of the package using the RFMDS to illustrate valuable points, areas of contention, or positive learning situations. After the 

mission commanders (both Blue and Red) have debriefed, a final mass 

debrief is held to discuss lessons learned, the conduct of the day's operations, and safety factors. Finally, aircrews pick up the ATO for the next 

day and begin planning. 

The RFMDS provides feedback and is an important learning tool available on the Nellis ranges. The following examples depict a sample RFMDS 

mission with high-activity (aircraft graphic) and low-activity (triangle) 

aircraft tracks. When tracking in high-activity mode, the RMDS can depict 

an aircraft in time and three-dimensional space, provide performance data 

on that aircraft, and show positional relationships with other high-activity 

aircraft, surface threats, or ground targets. An aircraft must be equipped 

with an Aircraft Instrumentation Subsystem (AIS) for tracking as high activity. The RFMDS is designed to permit low-altitude tracking of aircraft in 

specified operating areas. The system depicts low-activity aircraft in time 

and two-dimensional space. The aircraft must be transmitting its scheduled 

identification, friend or foe (IFF) Mode III squawk to be tracked as low 

activity. The major limitations of the system are that a maximum of thirtysix high-activity aircraft can be displayed at one time, and most C-130 and 

all C-141 aircraft lack interface capability for high-activity tracking. An 

example of a RFMDS highnow activity display is provided. 

The RMDS can also display the event time and type of weapons delivery: air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air. Aircraft weapons 

432 
FMDS High/Low Activity and RFMDS Simulation Results 

433 
systems must interface directly with the AIS to be displayed, and the aircraft 

must be tracking in the high-activity mode. For air-to-air and surface-to-air 

weapons, the system can also identify the targeted aircraft if that aircraft is 

tracking in the high-activity mode (see following Figures for air-teair and 

surface-to-air RFMDS depictions). Several major limitations degrade mission 

reconstruction; although the system knows who is shooting whom, the 

fly-out of air-to- air missiles is not determined; the system is not interfaced 

with the high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) and therefore does not 

know what it was targeted against; and the system can not display shots on 

low-activity tracked targets. 

The RFMDS can simulate the results of the employment of many air-to-air, 

air-to-surface, and surface-to-air weapons. Results of the simulation can 

include graphic depiction of the fly-out, probability of kill, kill or miss, and 

reasons for miss. To achieve a weapons delivery simulation, the RFMDS must 

record the delivery event and for air-to-air and surface- to-air weapons 

identify the targeted aircraft. Four major limitations of weapons simulations 

are: a) they are only simulations and not actual, b) the AGM-65 and 

AGM-88 are not available, c) simulations are not affected by ECM and chaff, 

and d) high-fidelity simulations are only available for selected targets and 

aircraft. 

The Red Flag building contains six separate consoles for aircrew 

feedback. Each console permits independent monitoring of the live mission or replay of a previously recorded mission on three independent 

monitors. Four of the consoles provide large dual-screen displays for 

utilization by large groups. Two consoles can record one display on 

standard 3/4-inch tape for replay on a separate video cassette player. Each 

console has a color printer for printing a snapshot of the mission. 

Aircrews may schedule the use of a console for individual mission debrief/analysis or request recording of the mission on videotape for documentation and later review at home station. 

An additional resource available to the aircrew for debrief is the Television 

Ordnance Scoring System (TOSS), a precision electronic camera and 

computer measurement system. Cameras record the impact of munitions, 

and computers measure the impact points that can be displayed as videos or 

graphics with measured results. Not all targets on the Nellis ranges are 

instrumented. 

434 
RFMDS Shot Pairing, Centroid View 

and WMDS Shot Pairing, Pilot View 

~ .L- . , f 0, 

435 
RFMDS Shot Pairing, Threat Boresight View 

and RFMDS Point Target 

0066-0701-0707 1 

"t 

1 842 : 30 : 23 76 

1-1 

436 
Appendix G 

B-52 'JhinineThe Diego Garcia Problem 

Between 9 August and 16 August 1990, Strategic Air Command 

(SAC) deployed twenty B-52s to Diego Garcia, a small island in the Indian 

Ocean. Diego Garcia became the first bomber operations base supporting 

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in Desert Shield. It has a tropical 

climate, a factor that posed many training problems in the ensuing months. 

[DELETED]. Crews and maintainers were experienced at 

conventional operations from deployed locations but lacked specific 

expertise in Southwest Asia (SWA), since the bulk of their previous 

training focused on a conventional war in Europe.' This necessitated a 

training program to expose the crews to SWA tactics. The program had 

to be conducted on a remote tropical island over 3,000 nautical miles 

from the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. 

The forces deployed to Diego Garcia were faced with a training task 

unique to Desert Shield. To train for the developing conflict properly 

required access to the Arabian Peninsula and integration into the U.S. Air 

Force, Central Command (USCENTAF) Desert Shield airspace management 

system. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, allowed B-52 training on 20 

August 1990. These late August missions provided opportunities for 

aircrews to gain a basic orientation of the terrain characteristics and regional 

communication procedures, including communicating with the AWACS.' 

[DELETED]. 

The training program that evolved on Diego Garcia involved a low 

number of sorties per month, mandated by the long duration of the 

missions and the scarcity of the resources at the remote base. To maxi- 

- 

'(S/NF/WN/RD) HisIory of the Strategic Air Command, Vol I, (1 Jan - 31 Dec 

1990). Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command Offutt AFB, NE, 

pp 93- 194. 

*(S/NF/WNIRD) Ibid, p 21 1. 

437 
mize efficiency, mission profiles and routes were developed to provide 

navigation and packaged fighter operations. [DELETED].3 

Gradually, adequate training profiles were developed, coordinated 

with CENTAF, and flown. Two distinct training profiles soon emerged, 

one over the Arabian Peninsula and the other to a local island. Peninsula 

missions provided the most realistic combat training and combined the 

following: night water augmentation takeoff (water augmentation for 

increased engine thrust procedures were unique to the B-52G), cell departure, emission control procedures, secure and AWACS communications 

procedures, heavyweight air refueling, low-level training, timing control, 

bombing, multiple axis of attack, ECM training, and limited pilot 

instrument approach training. This robust profile offered training 

opportunities to all pilot, navigator, and electronic crew positions. 

The island profile was much shorter in duration and provided 

training for events that required more frequency or were simply 

unavailable on the peninsula. The island training profile featured cell 

take-off, departure and join-up, simulated bombing runs, ECM procedures, 

and pilot proficiency items such as touch and go landings! 

The formalization of this effort developed into an Initial Mission 

Qualification Training (IMQT) program. [DELETED]. With this formalized training program, the commander was able to monitor the wing’s 

training program and its combat readiness5 

The bomber force at Diego Garcia quickly amassed a sizable number 

of flying hours, and sustaining the fleet required the establishment of an 

Intermediate Level Maintenance Center (ILMC) at Andersen AFB, Guam. 

[DELETED] ? [DELETED]. 

3(SMFIWN/RD) Ibid, pp 212-214. 

4(S> Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, “The Bomber Story,” p 27. 

(S) Ibid, p 26, 5 

@NFIWN/RD) History of the Strategic Air Command, p 458. 

7(SMFIWN/RD) Ibid, p 215. 

438 
The training program produced effective crew preparation under 

extreme geographical constraints. But General Chain, SAC Commander 

in Chief, expressed a desire to increase the frequency of training missions 

into the Arabian Peninsula for Diego-based crews. In November 1090, 

the SAC Director of Operations directed that the tempo of training be 

increased into the peninsula for each bomber crew. This new emphasis 

generated a fresh look at the realism and efficiency of training programs. 

[DELETED]. The resultant training enhancements resulted from diligent 

efforts to arrange and refine more challenging training profiles.* 

The challenge of training for a war 3,000 miles away in a geographical setting that was a complete opposite from the operating base 

represented a unique training experience. [DELETED]. By December 

and early January, the increases in frequency and realism were paying off 

just as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw began to approach. On 15 

January 1991, in response to STRATFOR (Director of SAC operation under 

CENTAF) guidance, all training missions were stopped. Training had 

ceased; the time for war had come.’ 

The effectiveness of the training program for the B-52 crews 

certainly was limited by many circumstances. The outcomes of their 

missions can be analyzed for months to come with varying results. However, this much may be said: when surveyed by Hq SAC with the 

question “Did the SAC training program prepare you for combat?’, 

eighty percent of the B-52 aircrew members responded yes.” This, 

combined with the fact that no B-52s were lost in the war as a result of 

combat, reflects that the difficult training problems were resolved and 

proved successful to the effective employment of the B-52. 

Training for CONUS SAC B-52 Crews 

Hq SAC and the 15th Air Force recognized early on that because of 

forward basing constraints, the training for the CONUS B-52 units would 

be difficult. In October 1990, the 15th Air Force proposed a series of 

exercises so that B-52 crews could simulate the situations they would 

(S/NF/WN/RD) Ibid, pp 233-234. 

9(S/NF/WNIRD) Ibid, pp 234-235. 

“(S) HQ Strategic Air Command, Postwar Bomber Training Conference, 25-26 Apr 

8 

1991, After Action Rpt. Extracted from briefing slide used during the conference. 

439 
likely encounter in combat missions in a war against Iraq. Through a 

revision of the Red Flag schedule for SAC units, Desert Warrior was 

developed. Desert Warrior was aimed at giving the crews exposure to the 

CENTAF AT0 procedures and tactics. [DELETED]. 

[DELETED]. 

Some significant benefits were derived from this exercise series. 

Eight Air Force units participated in the exercise and also flew in Desert 

Storm. They described Desert Warrior as a crash course that helped 

familiarize them with tactics that were used in Southwest Asia. However, 

all participants recognized this as a stopgap measure that did not replace 

the training taking place in-theater. [DELETED].'' 

"(SINFIWNIRD) History of the Strategic Air Command, pp 236-237. 

440 
Appendix H 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) Training 

Considerations 

Before Desert Shield, SOF trained exclusively to conduct clandestine 

special operations missions under cover of darkness. For the helicopter 

crews this required extremely low-altitude penetrations of enemy airspace, 

landings, and egress, all completely blacked out. The prolonged 

deployment made it difficult to maintain currency in primary aircrew 

skills, a problem applying to both MH-53J and MC-130 crews. To 

compound the problem, they were tasked with the Combat Search and 

Rescue (CSAR) role in which they were not trained.' Both aircraft depend 

on terrain-following radar for low-altitude penetration, and crews quickly 

found that the fine sand characteristic of the Arabian peninsula was 

partially transparent to their radars, leading to less than anticipated obstacle clearance.2 Poor visibility caused by the extremely find sand, kept 

suspended in the air by relatively light winds, was a particular problem 

for helicopter crews.3 This phenomenon was responsible for the loss of 

several U.S. Army helicopters at night during Desert Shield, prompting 

the imposition of minimum altitude and illumination restrictions. The 

MH-53J-equipped 20th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) was the only 

helicopter unit exempted from these restrictions due to their FLIR, radar, 

and hover coupler capability." Night landings were, by far, the most 

demanding event and required the development of specialized techniques 

'Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, the Air Force component responsible for 

CSAR, was disestablished in 1983 and its component units either disbanded or absorbed 

by SOC and its first-line equipment (notably the MH-53Js and HC-I 30 tankers) transferred 

to SOF. Air Rescue Service was reestablished in 1989 but had no combat-capable, longrange helicopter units during Desert ShieldDesert Storm. 

2(S) Intvw, J. Guilmartin and Col F. Goldstein, GWAPS, of Lt Col Richard Comer, 

WAF, commander of the MH-53J-equipped 20th Special Operations Squadron, 1 Sep 

1992. 

3(S) Lt Col Comer, History of Desert Shielmesert Storm, p 8. 

4(~) Intvw, Lt C~I Comer. 

441 
techniques included the use of small chemical lights as hover points, use 

of the MH-53's infrared searchlight, and making fully coupled approache~.~ For daylight CSAR missions, helicopter crews recognized the need for 

close escort, and A-10 support was provided. Escort tactics relearned 

from Vietnam proved effective.6 

Fixed-wing SOF crews were generally well prepared for the war. 

They suffered the same problems associated with poor visibility from 

blowing sand. There were initial problems acquiring munitions and Saudi 

training range support for the AC- 130 gunships. Ranges and equipment 

for high-speed airdrops had to be resolved for MC-130 Combat Talon 

crews to maintain proficiency. Initially, few Talon crews were qualified 

to drop the BLU-82 bomb. Overall, Air Force SOF credited good training 

with helping to keep losses low, a point on which the 20th SOS commander was particularly emphatic.' 

(S) Lt Col Comer, History of Desert ShieldDesert Storm, pp 8-9. The problem was 

5 

particularly acute on moonless nights. 

%tvw, Guilmartin and Goldstein, GWAPS, of Col George Gray. 

'(s) Intvw, Lt COI Comer. 

442 
Appendix I 

NavyMarine Corps Desert Shield 

Desert Storm Training 

U.S. Navy 

Navy training for air units occurs at various levels but revolves 

around the basic unit of the carrier air wing and its attendant aircraft 

carrier deployment cycle. The training accomplished by the various units 

in preparation for the Gulf War thus varied according to their assignments 

as the Desert Shield and Desert Storm scenario unfolded. This section 

will discuss that training. It begins with an overview of the norma1 

training done by a squadron and a wing preparing for a deployment. The 

various differences in the predeployment preparation of the eight carrier 

air wings that operated in Desert Shield and in Desert Storm will next be 

developed. Finally, in-theater training for Desert Storm will be discussed. 

Squadron and Carrier Air Wing Training 

A Navy carrier air wing contains all of the elements that allow it to 

accomplish almost any application of air power in the pursuit of national 

interests. Assigned to a particular aircraft carrier, it normally consists of 

nine squadrons with a mix of different aircraft. The generic air wing 

consists of two squadrons of F-14 fighters, two squadrons of F/A-18 

strike fighters, and one squadron each of A-6E long-range attack aircraft; 

and EA-6B electronic countermeasure aircraft, S3 antisubmarine aircraft, 

E-2 airborne early warning aircraft, and SH3 or SH60 antisubmarine 

helicopters. Training revolved about a cycle consisting of time at home 

stations, on predeployment work-up, and on deployments to overseas 

locations for six to eight months’ duration. 

While in the United States, all aircraft of a particular type were 

based at the same naval air station. Here they accomplished squadron 

training supported by their local functional wing commander. Individual 

aircrews and squadrons had to maintain proficiency in a program called 

Liberty Elite. This program assigned requirements that aircrews must 

complete to maintain readiness in their aircraft types. The qualifications 

443 
of each aircrew member and the squadron overall were continuously 

updated. The Liberty Elite data were reported on the SORTS system, and 

if a squadron failed to meet these Liberty Elite goals, it had to report in 

at reduced readiness status.’ 

Each home station has facilities nearby to accommodate the training 

for that particular aircraft. These facilities include operating areas for airto-air training, bombing ranges, low-level training routes, overwater 

scored mining ranges, and a radar bombing scoring unit that can evaluate 

simulated radar bomb drops. 

Though the squadron is supported at its home station by the local 

functional wing commander, its operational commander remains its carrier 

air wing commander. Approximately six months before a scheduled 

deployment of their aircraft carrier, all the squadrons of the carrier air 

wing go to Naval Air Station (NAS), Fallon, to begin preparing for the 

upcoming cruise. Supported by Fallon’s Naval Strike Warfare Center 

(“Strike U”), the wing goes through a series of exercises designed to 

build proficiency as an air wing. Multiple squadron events such as air 

combat, air-to-air refueling, and intercept training along with large-scale 

bombing strikes are accomplished. The final exercise is a large-scale 

operation in support of a simulated scenario that the wing might expect 

to encounter on its upcoming deployment. Air wings deploying to the 

Mediterranean theater used a different scenario than those going to the 

western Pacific or Indian Ocean. The Mediterranean scenario exercises 

involved the full range of possible threats-“enemy” aggressor aircraft, 

modem surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft artillery-and targets that 

were as realistic as possible, such as simulated airfields. Real ordnance 

was delivered, and the planning procedures for the strikes were prepared 

by one of the wing mission planning teams. Besides the air wing deployment to Fallon, F- 14 and F/A- 18 squadrons deployed there for a week of 

intense air combat maneuvering (ACM) training, called the Fleet Fighter 

ACM Readiness Program and Strike Fighter Readiness Program. 

After completing the Fallon detachment, the air carrier wing joined its 

parent aircraft carrier and continued predeployment training. This was 

normally in three phases: carrier refresher training, wherein the squadrons 

‘(S) For more information on the SORTS ratings, see the Center for Naval Analyses 

(CNA), Desert Storm Reconstruction Rpt, Vol XIII, Training, pp 3-10 - 3-16. 

444 
return to the procedures of operating off the ship; basic exercises; and 

advanced exercises. The exercises conducted from the carrier ran the 

gamut of possible fleet operations such as large-scale strikes ashore 

involving all squadrons, strikes against other naval forces, practice nuclear 

contingency missions, support for amphibious operations, and defense of 

the battle group from large-scale enemy raids. Qpes of operations range 

from cyclic operations of twelve hours operatingkwelve hours off to flex 

deck operations in which the carrier operates for twenty-four hours a day 

for several days. The last portion of the advanced exercise period was the 

Operational Readiness Exercise, the “final exam” for the air wing and the 

battle group team. Deployment followed shortly thereafter. 

Desert Storm Preparations 

The carrier deployment figure below shows the schedule of the 

carrier battle groups that participated in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

uss John E Kennedy, USS Sarutoga, and uSS Midway had relatively long 

periods in the theater, while USS Roosevelt, USS Ranger, and uSS America 

arrived just at the commencement of hostilities. 

Carrier Deployment and Southwest Asia (SWA) In-Chop Timelines* 

SWA theater 

445 
Workup Cycles for CONUS Desert Storm Carrier Battle Groups3 

D-10 D-19 D.0 DEPLOY 

I I (uoMHJ,I I 

lQmw 

ma 

OVERHAUL 0 0 0 IuImaA 

CVW 17 

The workup cycles Figure above portrays the training cycles for the 

five camers that deployed from the U.S. to participate in Desert Storm. 

3(S) Ibid. 

446 
It shows that four of the five had completed their air wing detachments 

at Fallon prior to the invasion of Kuwait. The scenarios presented at 

Fallon consisted of two major assignments from the National Command 

Authority. In the first, the wing had to conduct a one-time strike on the 

“enemy” country to demonstrate U.S. power, basically a Libya-style 

operation. The second scenario presented the wing with two days (and 

nights) to achieve damage against certain targets in the country. The 

intent of the second exercise was to conduct a campaign, gain control of 

the air by defeating the Air Force and Air Defense Net, and finally to 

conduct operations against designated targets. In most cases low-level 

ingress and attack tactics were employed! Only one air wing aboard the 

uSS America was able to tailor its Fallon deployment towards the Kuwait 

scenario. Its detachment focused more on close air support, special 

warfare operations, and combat search and rescue than did prewar air 

wing Fallon operation^.^ [DELETED].6 

Training in Theater 

The three carriers that deployed to Southwest Asia early in Desert 

Shield participated in a series of exercises and training evolutions that 

were in many ways like the advanced exercises of their training cycles. 

The Major Desert Shield Exercise table displays the types and frequency 

of those exercises.‘ 

41nt~W, RADM Mike Luecke, OPNAV 73, Aug 1992. 

’(s) CNA Rpt, Vol XIII, p 1-2. 

6(S) Ibid, p A-5. 

7(S) Ibid, p 3-2. 
Air Wing Fallon Detachments for Desert Storm Battle Groups 

FIGURE DELETED 

448 
Major Desert Shield Exercises 

FIGURE DELETED 

In the theater, training conducted by the carriers in the Red Sea (USS 

John E Kennedy, uSS Saratoga) differed from that conducted by the 

USS Midway in the North Arabian Sea. The Red Sea carriers conducted 

most of their exercises in Saudi Arabia and thus dealt much more closely 

with the JFACC. They became very accustomed to working with the AT0 

process. As the Master Attack Plan developed, they conducted “mirror 

image” strikes towards the Iraqi border that included joint tasking 

evolutions.’ The uSS Midway, on the other hand, conducted most of its 

operations in the Gulf of Oman because of sensitivities about operating 

in the Persian Gulf.’ 

‘Debrief, CDR Smith, Navy Black Hole Representative, GWAPS files. 

Intvw, Capt James Burin, Commander, Carrier Air Wing Five, Aug 1992. 9 

449 
CVW-5 Training Program 

IRAN 

SA UDI 

CVW Training Areas graphics is a graphic from a brief by the 

Commander of Carrier Air Wing Five detailing his Desert Shield 

training.” These exercises included: support for an amphibious 

operation in Saudi Arabia (Imminent Thunder); a Beacon Flash exercise 

with the Omanis, which included strikes ashore and air-to-air combat; and 

Defensive Air Combat Maneuvering training with A1 Dhafra of the 

United Arab Emirates (against Mirage 2000) and Qatar (against F-1s). 

Except for a short period when supporting Imminent Thunder, the uss 

Midway operated mostly in the Gulf of Oman, where it also conducted 

“Briefing slides “Carrier Air Wing Five Desert ShieldDesert Storm” received from 

Capt Burin, Aug 1992, GWAPS files. 

450 
mirror image strikes. The Commander of the Air Wing on the USS 

Midway fully expected that he would conduct his operations from the 

Gulf of Oman should hostilities occur." As such, the uss Midway never 

developed the rapport with the Joint Force Air Component Commander 

and the ATO process that the Red Sea carriers did. 

As the on-station carriers participated in these exercises, 

COMUSNAVCENT and his subordinate commanders published their training 

objectives. The carriers that were preparing to deploy were able to tailor 

their predeployment exercises to the situation expected in Desert Storm; 

based in some respects on these training objectives. A Southwest Asia 

scenario was used for the advanced phase battle group exercise for uss 

John E Kennedy, USS Ranger, USS Roosevelt, and USS America." 

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) conducted the reconstruction 

program for the Navy's effort in Desert Storm. Their study of training 

identified numerous issues for further consideration. These issues were 

broken into two types, those that were not normally considered in training 

syllabi before Desert Storm and those that were. 

The training issues in the weapons, tactics, and training arena that 

were not normally covered or stressed by training syllabi included: 

AT0 process; 

Joint theater-wide connectivity; 

[DELETED] 

Air Force tanking of strike packages; 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

"Intvw, Capt Burin. 

12 (S) CNA Rpt, VOI XIII, p 2-4. 

45 1 
High-altitude weapons delivery; and 

[DELETED]. 

CNA concluded that although these issues arose in a unique scenario, they 

might be relevant to future conflicts. 

The training issues that they identified as normally covered in training 

syllabi included: 

Force and aircraft training in rules of engagement (ROE); 

[DELETED] 

Carrier operations. 

U.S. Marine Corps 

Before 2 August 1990, individual Marine Corps aircrew training 

centered on Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 

(NATOPS) and Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual qualifications. Much 

of the aviation training was not geographically oriented. While Marine units 

routinely trained for conditions such as cold weather, mountain and desert 

terrain, and shipboard operations, the training was not always aimed at a 

particular country or region. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait changed the status 

quo and served to focus portions of Marine Corps aviation training on 

Southwest Asia. 

Beginning on 2 August, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics 

Squadron One (MAWS-1). based at MCAS Yuma, Arizona, took the lead 

in orienting Marine aviation to a possible war against Iraq. Between 

2 August and 5 September 1990, forty instructors from MAWS-1 traveled 

and briefed Marine Corps units on Iraqi military capabilities, equipment, 

tactics, and lessons learned from the Iran-Iraq war. Included in these discussions were recommendations on how to employ Marine aviation assets 

against the anticipated Iraqi threat. At the same time, twenty-three 

13(S) hid, p 1-3. 

452 
MAWS-1 instructors were augmenting aviation and Marine Air Command 

and Control System units already in SWA. During this time, MAWS-1 

developed the Southwest Asia Integrated Contingency Training package. 

From 1 October to 5 November 1990, 26 squadrons (136 fixed-wing 

and 54 rotary-wing aircraft), a Hawk battery, a Stinger battery, and a Direct 

Air Suppott Squadron underwent customized instruction tailored to individual 

readiness levels. Included in the instruction were an academic syllabus, 

individual work-ups, and a series of integrated exercises incorporating the 

requirements to operate in the Southwest Asia enviromnt. 

A second package was conducted 26 November to 19 December 1990, 

with an additional fourteen squadrons being trained. On 20 December, 

MAWS-1, Detachment A, with forty-four personnel ashore and twenty-six 

doat, was formed to support the Marines in Southwest Asia. When the 

war started, MAWS-1 had seventy instructors in SWA supporting the 

1 st Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, 1 st and 2nd Marine Divisions 

and 3d Marine Aircraft Wing ashore, and the 4th and 5th Marine 

Expeditionary Brigades afloat. 

453 
454 
1st Armored Division 233 

1st Marine Division 41, 232, 236, 

338 

A-4 415,419 

A-6 56, 57, 76, 85, 93, 131, 135, 

179, 186, 188, 203, 227, 237, 256, 

268, 271, 273, 274, 330, 361, 415, 

417,419 

A-7 60.61, 186, 188,415,417 

A-10 20, 52-55,79, 82, 89, 123, 218, 

220-223.233. 264, 269, 270, 275, 

286, 288. 302, 303, 3 10, 3 1 6, 342, 

352, 357, 358, 361, 411, 412, 415, 

419,442 

393,410,414,418,419 

ABCCC 160, 161, 224, 234,392, 

Abu Ghurayb 173, 178 

AC-130 82, 118, 218, 268, 275, 296, 

298, 307,411,415,419,442 

Accurate Test 391, 396, 397, 408 

ACM 413,444 

ADOC 40,402 

AFR 350 

AFSOC 298, 301, 302, 306 

AGL 78 

AFEWC 95-97, 100 

AGM-45 61, 80, 104 

AGM-62B 78, 252, 253 

AGM-65 48, 49, 53, 59, 61, 79, 89, 

222, 252, 253, 269, 270,434 

AGM-84 59, 85 

AGM-84E 61, 80 

AGM-88 58, 59,61,92, 104, 105, 

434 

AGM-114 81, 253 

AGM-123A 80, 89, 252, 253 

AH-1 63, 81, 82, 218, 232, 233, 415, 

419 

AH-64 82, 173, 233, 303, 306,415, 

419 

60-64 

117, 151 

109,115-117,151 

AIF 40, 43, 45-48, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 

AIM-7 58, 59, 107, 108, 112, 115, 

AIM-9 44, 47,49, 58, 59, 107, 108, 

AIM-54 107, 108, 118 

AIM-120A 117 

air campaign 31, 43, 49-51, 53, 78, 

90, 91, 102, 141, 154, 162, 172, 

174, 182, 192, 252, 271, 275, 276, 

283, 291, 295, 296, 312, 313, 318, 

328, 337, 342, 354, 355, 358,418 

air combat maneuvers 345 

air defense 1-3, 6, 7, 9-11, 14-17, 19, 

22-24, 26-28, 30-33, 36, 40, 43, 44, 

56, 58. 91, 92, 94-97, 103, 109, 

118, 141, 152, 154, 165, 169, 

192, 213, 247,251, 252, 264, 306, 

326,354. 359, 360, 365,366, 367, 

408,417,421,424,447 

171-175. 181,'182, 184-186, 189, 

392-396, 398, 400, 401, 402-406, 

air defense exercise 417 

air division 3 I6 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Center 

95,96, 188 

Air Force Reserve 49 

Air Force Special Operations 

Command 119, 301, 302 

air interdiction 71, 118, 215, 217, 

225, 293, 351, 354, 366,411 

Air National Guard 49, 53, 280, 299 

air order of battle 19, 21 

air power 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 36, 85, 

296, 318, 327, 329, 333, 338, 351, 

air refueling 41, 43, 96, 98, 101, 119, 

349, 354, 361, 392, 393, 398, 399, 

403, 412, 416, 420, 438, 444 

170, 194, 266-268, 292, 293, 295, 

359-362, 365, 443 

154, 162, 311, 312, 315-319, 346, 

Air Staff 361 

air superiority 26, 106, 141, 164, 170, 

171, 175, 181, 182, 194, 238, 271, 

365, 367 

air supremacy 49, 90, 215 

air tasking order 154, 216, 402, 428 

air to surface missile 253 

Air Training Command 388 

air-to-air missile 27, 107, 113, 117, 

243 

455 
air-to-surface missile 252, 253 

airborne early warning 99,443 

Airborne Warning and Control System 

45 

airfields 13, 22, 27, 34. 42, 45, 51, 

56.58,60,63,64,94, 142, 166, 

169, 174, 192, 194, 201,203, 209, 

278,288,309, 310, 367,393,444 

airspace control order 162 

A1 Abbas 278 

Al Asad 211 

A1 Dhafra 450 

A1 Hussein 278 

A1 Jarrah 166, 169 

A1 Taqaddum 186, 211 

AlTuwaitha 178 

ALARM 105, 169 

AMRAAM 117 

Andersen AFB, Guam 438 

ANG 334,405 

ANGLCO 418 

anti-aircraft artillery 6, 28, 146 

anti-radiation missiles 104, 171 

antiaircraft artillery 1, 10, 15, 16, 30, 

32, 51, 59.64.71, 97, 142, 173, 

221, 243, 245, 274, 275, 286, 

354-356, 359, 360,444 

antiradiation missiles 64, 91, 93, 102, 

Apache 62, 82, 120, 173, 233, 303, 

Arc Light 265 

ARCENT 2% 

area of responsibility 78, 188 

ARM 67, 72, 216 

Army Air Forces 253-255, 276 

artillery 1, 6, 10, 15, 16, 28, 30, 32, 

51, 53, 55, 59, 60, 62, 64, 71, 74, 

84, 89,97, 140, 142, 146, 173, 215, 

243, 245, 262, 274, 275, 286, 327, 

104, 169 

306 

221-224, 226, 227, 229, 236, 237, 

338, 354-356, 359, 360, 444 

artillery raids 224, 236, 237 

assumptions 3 1, 293 

AT0 153, 154, 160, 162, 216, 225, 

237, 288, 290, 315, 320,402,416, 

417,428,431,432,440,449,451 

Australia 334,423 

AV-8 54, 60, 82, 84, 223, 361 

AV-8B 60, 61, 71, 218, 220, 224, 

227,232,235,415,417,419 

142, 151, 160, 161, 168, 172, 185, 

233,302, 303, 306, 317,320, 354, 

367, 392, 393, 397, 399,401,404, 

438 

AWACS 11,45,91,95,97-99, 107, 

194-196, 198, 201, 202, 213, 224, 

406, 408, 410, 413-416, 420, 437, 

B-IB 121-123 

B-17 87, 256 

B-24 256 

B-52 11.40, 50-52, 69, 71, 78, 83. 

85. 121. 122, 131, 174, 218, 220, 

230, 231, 239, 256, 257, 259, 262, 

265,266, 269, 270, 271,274, 275, 

279,290,292,311, 313,330, 339, 

341, 342, 355, 356, 361, 362, 392, 

399,403,404,415,437,439 

Baby Milk Factory 333 

bad weather 150, 161. 222 

Baghdad Betty 333, 334 

Baghdad nuclear research center 49 

Bahrain 48,58,92, 94 

Balad 211 

BARCAP 367 

Barksdale AFB, LA 50, 78, 311 

battle damage 40, 62, 104, 108, 224 

Battle of Khafji 82, 118, 218, 219, 

battlefield air interdiction 71, 215, 

BDA 47, 170, 292,419 

Beacon Elash 398,450 

Belgium 423 

Ben Rich 241, 245 

beyond visual range 114, 141, 367, 

BAI 71, 73, 215-218, 220, 230, 231 

224,298 

217 

424 

BGM-71 81, 253 

BGM-I09 77 

biological weapons 171, 179 

BL-755 65, 83 

Black Hole 172, 173, 244, 245, 274, 

290,354,449 

blood chit 304, 305 

BLU-82 84, 119, 306, 307, 337,442 

BLU-109 66,71,76,90, 246 

BLU-l09/B 71 

456 
Boeing707 97 

bomb damage assessment 46,47, 84, 

91, 100, 160, 170. 188, 228, 229, 

238, 257,295,318, 328,329 

Boomer, Walter 215, 218,236 

breaching 41, 231, 236 

bridges 40, 41, 43. 45, 47, 57, 64, 75, 

79, 156, 170, 179, 226, 228, 229, 

257,259, 291, 329,424 

364,452 

BQM-74 92, 102, 103, 186, 188 

briefed 152, 159, 166, 167,292, 302, 

briefing 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 25, 

32-35, 84, 103, 162, 166, 167, 172, 

175, 182, 183, 188, 209, 235, 249, 

250, 276, 279, 280, 282, 283, 285, 

292,310, 319, 326. 346,431,439, 

450 

Bright Star 353, 391, 393, 394, 

Buccaneer 64,65, 83, 137, 261,423 

buddy lasing 137, 228 

Bulgaria 16 

bunker busting 171, 175, 212 

Burning Hawk 335 

BVR 114, 142,367 

BW 257 

C3 51, 56, 142, 170, 178, 186, 192, 

220,410,411,415,417,418,427 

C3CM 189, 366,426,427 

C31 75,228,427 

398-402,404,405,407 

C-130 84,96, 118, 119, 392, 399, 

403,404,419,423,427,432 

C-141 405,427,432 

CA 309, 338, 342, 343,426,427 

Cairo West 394 

Canada 58, 59, 318, 334,422,423 

Canadian Air Force 384 

CAP 11,40,51, 53. 108, 142, 152, 

CAF 410,413-415,418 

CALCM 50,78, 242, 248-25 1,27 1 

160, 164, 202, 219, 235, 286-288, 

290, 291, 320, 367,424 

carrier 56, 58, 60, 61, 65, 93, 94, 99, 

101, 107, 108. 237, 313, 393, 395, 

410-412, 443-447, 449, 450-452 

446 

carrier battle group 393, 395, 445, 

Caruana, Patrick P. 315 

CAS 52-55, 58, 61, 62, 71, 73, 81, 

162, 215-220, 222, 223, 226, 

230-236, 366, 367, 393,407, 410, 

411,412,414,415,418,419 

casualties 30, 36, 51, 216, 222, 331, 

332 

228,231, 253, 288, 290,291 

CBU 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 65, 72-74, 

CBU-52 49, 72, 253 

CBU-58 45,47,72,290 

CBU-59 74 

CEIU-71 72 

CBU-72 72 

CBU-78 73 

CBU-87 65.73, 228 

CBU-89 43, 45, 47. 49, 73, 291 

CCIP 128. 129, 261 

CEM 73 

CENTAF 11, 18,48, 172, 182, 217, 

21 8, 233, 234, 237, 275, 296, 298, 

319,320, 326, 339, 340, 346, 351, 

353, 354, 393, 396, 397, 399, 402, 

405,406,408,411,412,438,439, 

440 

CENTCOM 48, 103, 249, 296,301, 

303, 394, 396, 398,402,407,411 

Center for Naval Analyses 94, 202, 

217,444,451 

center of gravity 3 19 

Central Command 217, 296, 298, 

301, 302, 318-320, 326, 335, 354, 

362,398,437 

Central Intelligence Agency 2, 3, 36 

CEP 86, 255, 257, 278 

Chain, General 439 

chain 247 

Checkmate 257, 283, 285,290-292 

chemical 1, 40, 42, 51, 52, 170, 171, 

178, 179, 236, 250, 251, 278, 331, 

442 

CF-18 58, 59, 414,415, 418, 423 

chemical warfare 40,42 

chemical weapons 1, 179, 236 

chemicalhiological 5 1 

Cheney, Richard 276 

Chief of Naval Operations 312 

Chief of Staff 276 

China 16, 383 

457 
CIFS 231 

CINCCENT 278,296,298,301,306, 

335 

civil affairs 296. 309 

CJCS 335 

close air support 46, 52, 71, 80, 97, 

118, 215, 220, 298, 310, 319, 351, 

354, 366,391, 393, 398,401,407, 

410,424,447 

close-in fire support 63, 232 

cluster bombs 59, 61, 65, 67, 72, 

122,230 

CNA 94, 186. 188, 234,444,445, 

447,451,452 

coalition 1, 2. 6, 13-15, 17, 20-22, 

25, 26, 31-36, 39, 49, 54, 62, 63, 

65, 66, 82, 85, 87, 90, 92, 94, 96, 

118, 120, 121, 127, 131, 142, 146, 

154, 166, 171, 172, 174, 175, 

203,204, 212, 213, 215, 218, 219, 

230, 232, 233, 238, 239, 247, 250, 

278, 279, 282, 283, 286, 292, 295, 

296, 298, 304, 306, 3 10, 3 1 1, 

98,99, 102, 103, 104, 106-108, 

179-183, 185, 189, 192, 194, 201, 

262, 265-267, 269, 271, 273, 276, 

318-320, 326-335, 337-339, 343, 

349, 350-364, 369, 383, 384, 412, 

413,422,431 

Cobras 63, 81, 82, 218, 232, 233 

Cold War 88 

combat air patrol 36, 40, 102, 142, 

combat search and rescue 54. I1 8, 

201, 202, 212, 283, 367,424 

120, 121, 296, 299, 300, 311, 362, 

366, 411, 441,447 

combat support 166, 252 

combined effects munition 73 

command and control 1,2,6,7, 13, 

17, 40, 48, 61, 91, 96, 98, 99, 102, 

182, 184. 189, 217, 230, 234, 250, 

252, 257, 276, 279, 280, 287, 296, 

307, 315, 342, 354, 359, 362, 393, 

401,412,453 

countermeasures 189 

118, 153, 159, 160-162, 175, 181, 

command, control, communications 

communications security 34, 360 

Compass Call 91, 96,97, 142, 233, 

306,367,404,414 

computers 129, 132, 434 

COMTAC 424 

Congress 314 

Constant Source 362 

continental United States 353 

contingency plan 166, 310,395 

conventional air launched cruise 

counterair 51, 53, 59, 106, 354, 391, 

crew ratio 271 

crisis action team 309 

critical items 309 

Crossbow 276 

CS 48, 227, 235 

missile 242, 248 

398,401,403,406,411,418 

CRV-7 83 

CSAR 296,300-303, 311, 366,411, 

412,415,441,442 

CWEP 181 

Czechoslovakia 16 

D-Day 350, 354,411-413, 416 

D-day plan 354 

D&D 329 

DACT 393, 399 

DAS 234,235 

DCA 48,58, 59, 108, 365,412 

deception 33, 102, 103, 172, 181, 

183, 236, 282, 308, 311, 318-320, 

326-329, 354, 355 

deep air support 217, 234 

Defense Intelligence Agency 6, 246 

Defense Science Board 280, 28 1, 

Defense Support Program 280 

Denmark 423 

deployment planning 428 

Deptula, David 173 

Desert Shield 13, 33, 46, 50, 53, 63, 

283, 290,294 

70, 73-76, 78-81, 84, 85, 88, 92, 

95, 97, 98, 100, 104, 105, 120, 121, 

123, 141, 166, 168, 172, 181, 183, 

190, 192, 221, 227, 231,232, 233, 

238, 244, 249, 250, 266, 269, 280, 

284,296, 298, 299, 301,307,309, 

311, 312, 318, 320, 327, 329, 334, 

354,355, 358, 362, 383,384,409, 

335, 343, 345-347, 350, 351, 352, 

458 
437, 438, 441-443, 445, 447, 449, 

450 

Desert ShieldStorm 70, 73, 74, 76, 

78-81, 84, 85, 104, 105, 227, 232, 

233,238, 249, 301, 307 

Desert Storm 12-15, 31, 39-51, 53, 

54, 56-62, 64, 65, 69, 71, 73, 75, 

76, 78-81, 84, 85, 87-89, 92-110, 

114, 116-124, 127, 128, 130, 134, 

135, 138, 139-142, 152, 154, 155, 

160, 162, 166-170, 172, 175, 176, 

179, 180, 183, 186, 188-190, 192, 

194, 202, 209,212,213,215-217, 

219, 223, 225, 226, 228, 231, 232, 

234, 236, 238, 239, 243,245, 

267, 274, 275, 278, 280, 282, 283, 

292,296, 298, 300-304, 306, 307, 

326,327, 329, 334, 343, 346, 349, 

247-250, 252, 256,259, 262, 266, 

309, 310-312, 314, 317, 318, 320, 

350, 351-353, 355, 357, 358, 361, 

362, 365, 383-385,438, 440-446, 

448,450,451 

Desert Warrior 440 

desertion rates 342 

desired mean point of impact 209 

Dhahran 283 

DIA 2. 212,276, 282, 283, 291 

Diego Garcia 50, 437, 438 

Direct Air Support Center 234, 235 

Dixon 421 

DLIR 39, 246, 270 

DMPl 256 

doctrine 6, 8- 1 1, 19, 27, 300, 335 

DOD 44,81, 246, 314, 343, 361 

DOT 107, 140 

drones 92, 102-104, 171, 174, 186, 

188, 326 

DSP 280 

E-2 98,443 

E-3 97, 98, 302, 317, 392, 395, 397, 

399,401,403.405,407,427 

EA-6 93, 203, 363 

E-8 101 

EC-130 296, 298, 299, 306, 329, 337, 

392, 399,403,404,410 

ECM 15, 93, 113, 122, 123, 160, 

161, 186, 189, 192, 203,404,428, 

434,438 

ECS 426,427 

EF-111 95, 96, 166, 168, 172-174, 

186, 188, 190, 194, 221,233, 306, 

352, 356, 363,403,404,415,417, 

427 

Eglin AFB, FL 246,427 

Egypt 35, 299, 394,422,423 

Egyptian 35. 392-394, 398,400,403, 

404 

electric 67, 251 

electrical power 170, 171, 173, 174, 

Electronic Combat Squadron 95, 399, 

electronic warfare 34, 39, 53, 90, 91, 

188,230, 235, 245, 346, 362, 366, 

383, 392, 398,405 

185.250 

403 

93-96, 102, 121, 127, 171, 186, 

ELlNT 182, 188 

Elvira 243, 244 

enemy prisoner of war 236, 335 

engineer 246 

EOGB 252 

Eskridge, Robert 245, 274 

EUCOM 43, 301 

Europe 63, 254, 296, 346, 348,437 

European Command 298 

EW 11, 94, 103, 172, 173, 220, 320, 

Exercise Fish Barrel 414 

exercises 25, 106, 172, 301, 324, 

392, 398,403-405.427, 430 

327, 343, 346, 348-350, 353-355, 

357, 358, 364, 391, 396-398, 402, 

404,405, 408, 409, 413,417,419, 

421-424, 426, 428, 439, 444, 445, 

447,449-451,453 

Exocet 25, 36, 237 

exploitation 90, 248, 255 

F-4 19, 405 

F-4G 20, 53, 91-93, 103, 112, 115, 

166-168. 186, 221, 306, 351, 352, 

361, 363, 392, 393, 399,400,403, 

404,415,417,427 

F-5 137, 406, 415, 419 

F-6 19, 24 

F-7 19, 20, 24 

F-15 19, 24, 34, 36, 40, 106, 108, 

117, 141, 166, 168, 171, 194, 282, 

459 
316, 352, 395, 399, 403, 414, 415, 

418,427 

F-15E 20, 45-47, 71, 75, 76, 85, 88, 

95, 112, 115, 131, 135, 141, 171- 

173, 174, 179, 194, 197, 198, 209, 

220, 228, 229, 261. 269, 270. 

352, 357, 360,415,417 

115, 131, 178, 179, 218, 225, 226, 

233, 256, 259, 261, 263, 269, 271, 

275, 282, 286, 301, 303, 330, 

398,401, 402, 405-407, 41 4, 41 5, 

417,419,423,426,427,431 

273-275, 279, 285, 286, 288, 290, 

F-16 20, 47-49, 71, 86, 89, 93, 112, 

344-347, 349, 352, 356, 357, 397, 

F-105 88 

F-Ill 42-45, 91, 131, 143, 152, 159, 

169, 256, 268, 271, 274, 352, 356, 

361 

F-117 39-41. 76, 77, 85, 135, 137, 

141, 171-174, 176, 178, 179, 181, 

185, 189, 194, 209, 212, 229, 241, 

274,275, 288, 291, 320, 352, 360, 

361 

FAC 54, 203, 2 I6,2 18, 223, 224, 

226, 234, 235, 349 

facsimile 160, 388, 402 

FAE 72,73 

FAHD 53,296,298, 306,357,358 

fax 422,423 

Federal Aviation Administration 357 

fiber optic 6, 280 

field training exercise 391, 394, 396, 

398,402,407 

fire support coordination line 217 

fleet defense 108, 395 

FLIR 39,43,45, 47, 54, 56-59, 61, 

87, 120, 121, 136, 223, 225, 226, 

228, 229, 232, 246, 268-270, 273, 

441 

243-247, 250, 267, 269, 270, 273, 

FAF 412-415,417,419 

FOLs 310 

forward air control 54, 61, 118, 221, 

268 

FOV 135, 137 

France 65, 66, 318, 334,422, 423 

Franks, General 215 

fratricide 114 

friendly fire 216, 222 

FSCL 217. 223, 224, 234 

G-Day 219,235, 307 

GAU-8 

GBU-I0 41. 45, 46, 47, 57, 59, 75, 

52, 55, 82, 222, 264, 270 

76,90, 178, 212, 228,253 

GBU-12 43-45,47, 76, 228, 229, 237 

GBU-15 42,44,45, 83-85, 229, 259, 

260,269 

GBU-16 57,76,227 

GBU-24 45, 76, 89.90, 159, 176, 

179,229 

176,212,243,246 

361 

GBU-27 39,41, 76, 77, 84, 90, 173, 

GBU-28 43,44,45, 84, 180, 229, 

GCI 9,94. 103, 141. 142, 161, 367 

George AFB, CA 353,427 

Germany 58, 63, 275, 334,423 

Global Positioning System 47,78, 

118. 160, 248 

Clock. John R. 179 

Glosson, Buster 244 

Gorilla Package 164, 165 

GPS 47,48,78, 80, 118, 120, 160, 

169.203, 204, 225, 248, 286 

270, 276,415,417 

Great Britain 50, 334 

Greece 423 

Green 346, 347,422,424,426,427 

Green Flag 346, 347,424,426,427 

Grenada 330 

Griffith, Maj Gen 233, 302 

ground control intercept 53, 78, 141 

ground forces 41, 43, 45, 48, 52, 57, 

291, 298, 307, 319, 362, 384, 393, 

414 

GR-1 166, 169, 174,203,204,261, 

97, 118, 215, 218, 232-235, 265, 

ground order of battle 60 

Guam 438 

Gulf of Oman 449-451 

H-1 288 

H-2 46, 172, 173, 211, 288 

H-3 174, 211, 288 

HARM 48, 56, 59, 61, 92, 93, 

190,203, 227, 262, 359, 360,434 

103-105, 168, 174, 182, 186, 188, 

Harpoon 59, 80 

460 
HAS 42, 47, 52, 60, 65, 71, 72, 74, 

76-80, 82, 85, 97, 100, 105, 106, 

110, 112, 117, 119, 121, 123, 128, 

249.256, 259, 263, 273, 300, 306, 

311, 312, 315, 348, 353, 357, 389, 

431,434,437,444 

Have Nap 85, 123, 124 

Have Quick 428 

Hawk 15. 121, 300, 335, 391,400, 

401,405,453 

Hawkins, James 290 

HC-130 119, 300, 312, 329,441 

helicopter 46, 54, 61-63, 80, 81, 82, 

84, 108, 119, 120, 215, 230, 232, 

306,308, 312, 327, 352, 384, 388, 

Hellfire 62, 81, 232, 252, 306 

Henry, Larry 172, 182, 183 

Hente, Scott 317 

Hill AFB, UT 306,426,427 

HMS Gloucester 36 

Homer, Charles A. 179, 218, 331 

Hornet 57-59, 62 

hostages 333 

HTPM 84 

human intelligence 252 

HUMINT 284 

HVAA 106, 107, 185,413; 414 

129, 130, 241-243, 245, 246, 248, 

233, 238, 239, 253, 300, 301-304, 

389,441 -443 

1-2000 

246 

IAADF 3,4,9 

IADS 24.94, 181, 182, 186, 188, 

366,424 

IAF 414 

ICAO 383 

IFF 432 

Imminent Thunder 324,354,41 I, 

Incirlik 43, 48, 92, 97 

inertial navigation system 78, 118, 

infantry 51, 232, 262 

Inferno Creek 391, 394, 407, 408 

infrared 10, 14, 15, 17, 39, 42, 45, 

71, 90, 176, 177, 189, 211, 

1L-76 107 

450 

119, 121, 131, 137, 224 

54, 62, 77, 79, 80, 83-85, 87, 100, 

103, 107, 109, 110, 115-118, 124, 

127, 134, 135, 154, 155, 173, 178, 

213, 221, 222, 225, 228, 229, 

279,281,286, 360,442 

421 

241-243, 246, 249, 268, 269, 273, 

infrastructure 51, 64, 91. 257, 311, 

Initial Hack 324, 410 

INS 118, 261 

integrated air defense system 24, 36, 

94,96, 154, 174, 181,421,424 

Intelligence and Threat Analysis 

Center 334 

intelligence information report 263 

interdiction 46, 51, 58, 64, 71, 97, 

118, 215, 217, 218, 220, 225, 293, 

406,410,411,424 

351,354, 366, 391, 393,398-401, 

interoperability 354, 41 1, 41 8 

IOC 3, 6, 8, 9, 20, 42, 172 

IR 42,44, 109, 110, 127, 128, 134, 

135, 137, 140, 148. 155, 156, 221, 

223,225, 226, 238, 273, 360 

Iran 1-3, 6, 13, 15, 21, 26, 27, 30, 

31, 34. 35, 107, 108, 181, 209, 212, 

262, 265, 292, 327, 328,452 

27, 30, 31, 34, 35, 262, 265, 292, 

327, 328,452 

Iraqi air force 17, 21, 24-27, 31, 34, 

36, 107, 174, 175, 181, 192, 203, 

356, 364 

Iran-Iraq War 1, 3, 6, 13, 15, 21, 26, 

Iraqi army 3, 15, 54, 55, 231, 342 

Iraqi deception 327, 329 

Iraqi navy 83, 237 

Iraqi pilots 24, 25, 27, 34 

Israel 3, 35, 106, 123, 171, 179, 275, 

278,295, 331,423 

Italy 63, 64, 422, 423 

Jaguar 20, 65, 83, 355,415,417, 

419,423 

Japan 106 

JCS 216,217, 250, 299, 300,391, 

394, 396, 398,402,407 

JFACC 57, 234,237,449 

JMEM 158, 159, 259, 263 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 299 

Joint Force Air Component 

J-3 250 

Commander 57, 234,451 

46 1 
Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 

158, 259 

Joint Rescue Coordination Center 

301,415 

Joint Staff 342 

Joint Task Force 310, 405, 407 

Joint Task Force Charlie 310, 407 

Jordan 401,423 

JSEAD 192 

JSOTF 296 

JSTARS 101, 286,288 

Just Cause 40, 246 

KAF 414,415,419 

Kari 6, 9, 32, 36, 154, 174, 182, 359 

Kams 78, 123,248, 249 

JRCC 301-303 

KA-~s 311 

KC-I0 311, 312, 314, 315,361, 395, 

398 

392,398, 399,403,426,427 

KC-135 173, 311, 312-315, 317. 361, 

KC-135R 361 

Khafji 82, 118, 218, 219, 224, 232, 

kill box 48, 225. 227 

killer scouts 48, 224, 225 

King Abdul Aziz Naval Base 60, 61 

King Fahd International Airport 53, 

296, 298 

King Khalid 294, 301, 317, 327 

Kirkuk 211 

KTO 41, 43, 45, 51, 82, 93, 102, 

239, 298,307 

182, 190, 192, 218, 230,231, 273, 

319, 327, 328, 361 

Kuwait 6, 17, 22, 34, 40, 41, 46, 48, 

54, 60,65,66,84, 121, 174, 190, 

218,219, 224, 231, 296, 299, 301, 

307.309, 310, 319, 327, 330, 331, 

333,334, 346, 354, 358,447,452 

Kuwait theater of operations 34.41, 

190 

Kuwaiti 44. 97, 298, 307-309, 3 11, 

317,437 

LANDSAT 283 

Langley AFB, VA 106 

LANTIRN 45-48, 88, 225, 226, 228, 

269-271, 275, 282. 285. 286, 428 

Larak Island 29 

laser guided bomb 178 

leadership 28, 40, 170, 174, 178, 250, 

leaflet drops 337, 338 

leaflets 262, 264, 266,308, 330, 334, 

LGB 43, 75, 84,90, 135, 256, 270, 

Liberty Elite 443, 444 

Libya 447 

Linebacker I1 267 

lines of communication 367 

logistics 3. 13, 39, 41, 101, 180, 262, 

361,389 

LOTS 244 

loudspeaker operations 337 

low observables 241 

Luftwaffe 364 

Lynx 238 

MAC 309,426 

Magic 109 

maintenance personnel 262 

MAP 77, 100, 121,424,425 

MARCENT 218 

March AFB, CA 426,427 

MARDIV 338, 342 

Marine Corps 56-58, 60, 61, 63, 71, 

73, 76, 80, 81. 84, 98, 103, 104, 

120, 215, 217, 219, 220, 223, 224, 

226, 227, 230, 231, 232, 234, 236, 

238, 298. 312, 318, 327, 355, 364, 

389,443,452 

Marine Expeditionary Force 236,453 

marines 62, 70, 74, 94, 215, 227, 

251,360 

337-339, 342, 343, 369, 377 

27 1 

M-117 70, 71, 253 

232, 236, 327, 338, 342-344, 389, 

398,426,453 

236, 252, 253, 256, 257, 261, 262, 

266,267,271,291, 317,431,432 

master attack plan 141, 166, 172, 

173. 186, 188. 202, 25 1,274,449 

master target list 40 

Maverick 48,49, 53, 54, 56, 59, 61, 

MASS 24,30, 152, 166, 172, 178, 

79, 80, 89, 110, 137, 222, 223, 

226-228, 252, 264, 269, 273, 286, 

349 

MC-130 119,312, 329,441,442 

MC-130E 119. 306 

462 
MCM 13-15, 23, 25, 142, 143, 152, 

155, 156, 159, 161, 190, 365 

McPeak. Merrill 276 

McSwain, Donald 172 

medical 301,310, 389 

medical support 310 

MEF 215, 236, 237 

meteorology 148, 155 

MH-53 120. 173,300, 302, 303, 310, 

416,442 

Mig-17 19, 20 

Mig-19 24 

Mig-21 19-21, 24 

Mig-23 19-21 

Mig-25 19-21, 24 

Mig-29 I, 19-22, 28, 197, 198, 357, 

Military Airlift Command 300, 309, 

Ministry of Defense 2 

Mirage 2000 20, 109,450 

Mirage F-l 19, 20, 24, 359, 363 

missile 1, 6, 8-10, 14, 15, 17, 24, 25, 

MH-60 119. 121, 300,301, 310,416 

359, 363 

392,403,426 

27, 28, 30-36, 45, 48-51, 54, 56, 

57, 59. 61-64, 66, 71, 77-81, 85, 

89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 102-105, 

107-113, 115-117, 118. 122, 123, 

125, 137, 140-142, 143, 164, 168, 

169, 170, 171, 173, 185, 188, 190, 

224,227, 228, 232, 237, 238, 242, 

275, 276,278, 280, 282,284, 290, 

292, 293, 295, 306, 307, 311, 326, 

329.331, 332, 351, 356, 359, 360, 

361, 363, 394,434,444 

224, 227,237, 253 

196-198, 201, 203, 213, 222. 223, 

243, 245. 248-253, 264, 268-271, 

MK-20 45, 47, 57, 60, 74, 88, 222, 

MK-36 68, 69 

MK-3W40 68 

MK-77 84 

MK-82 68-71, 76, 122, 222, 253, 

259.260 

2 12, 259, 260 

MK-84 69-71, 75, 76, 83, 86, 176, 

MLRS 215 

mobility 281, 287, 361 

mobilization 299 

Moore, Royal N. 216 

moving target indicator 227 

Mubarak, President 35 

munition 28, 31, 39. 43, 44. 45, 

47-51, 55, 60, 64. 66, 67, 69, 73. 

79, 80, 82-90,92, 121, 122, 135, 

139-141, 148. 153, 158, 160, 161, 

170, 174, 179, 203, 204,222, 225, 

226, 229, 249, 230, 242, 252, 257, 

259,261,263,270,279, 290. 291, 

306,348,353, 356, 357, 361, 367, 

434,442 

Nassau 60 

National Guard Bureau 299 

NATO 87,98, 355 

naval 57, 61, 62, 69, 83, 94, 97, 104, 

108, 182, 186, 190, 202,215-217, 

232, 237, 238, 250. 255, 267, 296, 

298,312, 327. 344, 365, 384,411, 

418,443,444,445,451,452 

NAVCENT 190, 237,296 

navigation 42, 45, 46, 59. 78, 86, 96, 

137, 141, 148, 152, 153, 155, 160, 

161, 194, 224, 225, 226, 248, 254, 

266,269, 271, 348, 349, 353, 383, 

392,399,438 

Navy 2, 3. 36, 56-60, 65, 69, 73, 74, 

111, 116, 118, 119-121, 127, 131, 

76, 78-81, 83, 89, 94, 98, 99, 103, 

104, 106-108, 118, 137, 186, 188, 

190,215, 230, 231, 234,237, 238, 

248,271, 275, 296, 298, 301, 302, 

308,311-315, 318, 327, 330, 344, 

355, 356, 361, 364, 384, 387-389, 

395, 398, 399,403,410,412,415, 

426,443,449,451 

NBC 45,47, 170, 174, 175, 178 

Nellis AFB, NV 244, 282, 346, 349, 

Netherlands 423 

network 3, 6, 26, 30, 32, 41, 98, 174, 

287, 354, 362 

New York Times 247, 291 

Night Canon 414,419 

Nighthawk track 320 

North Vietnam 333 

North Vietnamese 421 

Norton AFB, CA 427 

Norway 423 

364,424,426-428,43 I, 432,434 

463 
nuclear I, 2, 40, 42, 49, 51, 66, 78, 

104, 121. 122. 170, 175, 178, 179, 

445 

nuclear reactor 2 

nuclear weapons 1 

nuclear, biological, and chemical 40, 

42, 178 

415,419 

OA-10 53, 54, 81, 82, 220, 221, 223, 

OAS 50 

OCA 48,53,58, 108, 194,365, 367, 

41 1 

offensive 17, 25-27, 34, 39, 50, 51, 

53.58.71.91, 106, 149, 151, 166, 

170, 171. 173, 181, 192, 194, 200, 

209,215, 217,219,230,245, 247, 

252,267. 283, 326, 354,365, 366, 

397,401.406,411 

offensive counter air 27, 194, 365 

Office of the Secretary of the Air 

Force 275 

oil 27, 28, 44, 47, 51, 56, 84, 170, 

216, 229, 238, 250, 251, 254, 328, 

329,334, 350 

Oman 396, 397, 407, 449-451 

operational control 296-298 

Operations Directorate 292 

operations order 411, 412 

operations staff 312 

OPLAN 219,282, 347 

OPLAN Desert Storm 282 

opposing air 414 

order of battle 9, 10, 16. 19-21, 26, 

60 

OV-10 61, 220, 223, 226, 235, 268, 

269,282 

PA 299, 326 

package training 354,414,415,418 

Panama 246,247, 330 

Patriot 35,278 

Pave Hawk 121, 300 

Pave Low 120, 121, 302, 306 

Pave Penny 52,223 

Pave Spike 64, 65, 268 

Pave Tack 42-44. 135, 159,229,268, 

Persian Gulf 36. 44, 49, 52, 54, 

270 

57-60, 62, 65,92, 94, 98, 101, 102, 

106, 108, 201, 309, 314,334, 336. 

337,449 

PGM 43.64, 269 

Phoenix 107, 108, 118 

planners 41, 88. 161. 170, 173, 

178-180, 182, 231, 244, 245, 247, 

255, 257, 259, 269, 274, 276, 283, 

290.309,315,317,320 

planning 85, 86, 93. 108, 127, 142, 

148, 153-156, 159-162, 164-166, 

217,237,243,244, 274, 278, 283, 

300,309, 310, 312, 317, 320,331. 

335, 350, 353, 354, 367, 394, 401, 

405,407, 410,417,418,428,431, 

432,444 

POL 124 

Pope AFB, NC 427 

population 27, 331, 334 

Post 15. 88, 110, 170, 172, 218, 232, 

268, 281, 291, 302. 330, 333, 335, 

337, 342 

president 35, 334 

presidential palace 2, 173 

prisoner of war 236, 335 

propaganda 330-334 

Proven Force 43,48 

psychological operations 50, 11 9, 

262, 264, 296, 299, 308, 318, 329, 

342,343 

PSYOP 296,299.308, 329-331, 

333-340,342,369,377 

push CAS 234236 

Qasr 69 

Qatar 66, 278,450 

Quick Flow 315, 316, 318 

racks 25, 122 

RADIC 401,402,408 

RAF 50,64, 65, 194, 254, 356,410, 

RAFFairford 50 

Rafha 301 

ranger 223. 228 

readiness 46, 343, 347, 348, 350, 

413-415,417-419.427 

RC-135 98, 181, 182,313,397,427 

351, 354, 396. 420, 438, 443-445, 

452,453 

reconnaissance 28, 39, 48, 53, 55, 

61-66, 90-92. 97, 99-104, 107, 108, 

118, 121, 179, 182, 223, 225, 226, 

464 
230. 232, 233, 235, 237, 238, 239, 

275.276, 286, 288,2%, 300, 307, 

308, 311, 319.327, 366, 368, 389, 

397 

Reconnaissance Wing 300 

recovery 119, 121, 148. 161,227, 

Red Flag 346,349. 350,353, 358, 

293,300-302,424,441 

362, 364,421-424,428,431,432, 

434,440 

Red Sea 58.61,94,98, 101, 102, 

108, 186.449.451 

refuel 61. 119, 154, 303, 313, 314, 

316.320 

refueling 25, 39, 41, 43, 51, 60, 92, 

94.96.98.99. 101, 102, 119, 121, 

154, 159, 162, 165-167, 169, 172, 

173, 194, 311, 312. 313-320, 324, 

346,349, 354, 361, 392,393, 398, 

399,403,410,412,416,420,430, 

431,438,444 

regulararmy I 

reliability 248 

Republican Guard 41, 47, 51. 218, 

219,230, 231, 265,342 

Rescue Coordination Center 301, 41 5 

research and development 124, 279 

resupply 119, 216, 405 

RF-4C 91. 10,427 

Rhein-Main Air Base 298 

Rivet Joint 98, 100, 172, 185, 397 

WAF 401,402,406 

Rockeye 57, 74, 88, 89, 227 

ROE 153, 159, 161, 162,452 

Roland 10. 14, 32,363 

Romania 16 

Royal Air Force 65, 169, 254, 261, 

Royal Saudi Air Force 58, 65, 106, 

RPV 104 

275.276, 355, 361, 362,384 

109,384 

RSAF 353. 384, 410,411,413-416, 

418.419 

rules of engagement 148, 153, 159, 

452 

Russ 350 

s-3 101 

SA-2 10. 11. 13, 53,424 

SA-2/3 53 

SA-3 10, 11, 13 

SA-6 10, 11, 13, 363 

SA-7 15.275 

SA-8 

SA-9 10, 14 

SA-13 10, 14 

SA-14 10, 15 

10, 14, 32. 275, 363 

SAC 50,78, 121, 123, 231.248, 362, 

Saddam Hussein 2. 9, 27, 31, 211, 

397,426,437,439,440 

278, 330-333, 335, 359 

SAM 1, 6, 9-12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 40, 

92, 140. 142, 143, 154, 168, 182, 

185, 188, 189. 192, 201, 221, 225, 

226,235, 238, 307,359,360,430 

SAR 53. 302,411,412, 415 

satellite communications I21 

Saudi Air Force 58, 65, 106, 109, 

384 

Saudi Arabia 35, 46, 50, 53, 63, 64, 

78.95.97.98. 100, 106, 201, 232, 

275, 278, 296, 299, 301, 307, 3 10, 

355, 361, 362, 422, 423, 437, 449, 

450 

SBS 279 

Schwartzeneggar, Arnold 334 

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman 230, 299 

Scud 30, 33, 35, 40, 41, 43, 45, 48, 

53, 54,71,75, 108, 141, 170-174, 

203, 219, 224, 228, 230, 231, 274, 

332, 357, 359, 360 

317-319, 327, 331, 343, 350-353, 

275-288, 290-295.307, 329, 331, 

Scud B 278 

Scud baskets 284 

Scud box 294 

Scud CAP 53,286-288, 290. 291 

Scud hunt 45,48, 274-276, 278-280, 

286, 288, 294, 295, 307, 332 

SEAD 44, 56,58,64,92,93, 102, 

152, 166, 169, 171. 174, 182, 

227,238,270, 326, 351, 359, 360, 

362,363, 365, 366,427 

Scud-B 30 

186-189, 192, 194,203, 213, 225, 

SEAL 296,307 

search and rescue 53, 54, 99, 

118-121. 296, 299, 300, 302, 311, 

362, 366.41 1,441,447 

465 
SECDEF 60, 61, 63, 73,82 

Secretary of Defense 276 

sector operations center 3 

security 34, 63, 149, 151, 354, 360, 

Shadow Hawk 391,400,401,405 

Sharp 245,293, 360 

Shaw AFB, SC 11, 18, 346,404 

shelter busting 181, 204, 209 

signals intelligence 21 8 

SILKWORM 36,57, 237,238 

SITREP 219 

Skipper 80,85,89, 137, 252 

SLAM 56,57, 80, 85, 252 

Smith,CDR 449 

smoke 57. 84, 156, 213, 216.232, 

snakeye 69 

SNlE 3 

SOC 3, 8, 441 

SOCCENT 296, 298, 301, 303, 304, 

394,401,405 

241,243, 267, 328, 329 

SOAF 395-398,408 

307,412,416 

309, 3 1 I, 355,441, 442 

SOF 53, 279, 291, 296-298, 300-302, 

software 105, 361 

SOG 299 

sortie generation 31 

sortie length 46 

sortie rate 224 

SORTS 444 

SOS 307, 352,441,442 

Southeast Asia 118, 120, 333 

Spain 50 

Spangdahlem AFB, Germany 427 

spareparts 402 

SPEAR 2, 3, 8, 9, 25, 32-35, 182, 

1 86 

special forces 279, 298, 308 

special instructions 148, 153, 159, 

special operations 53, 84, 118, 119, 

43 1 

268, 279, 280, 296. 298-302, 

306-308, 3 10, 3 1 1, 326, 335, 362, 

366,441 

296,301, 302, 335 

Command 296. 301 

Special Operations Command 119, 

Special Operations Command, Central 

special operations forces 53. 268, 

Special Operations Group 280, 299, 

Special Operations Squadron 119, 

Spectre gunship 118,218, 296, 307 

SPINS 153. 154, 159, 162 

SPOT 149, 279, 338 

SRW 427 

SSM 173 

279.296, 300,441 

326 

306,441 

Star 353, 391, 393,394, 398-402, 

404,405,407 

State Department 309 

stealth 31, 39, 170, 172, 182, 

stealthy 141. 241, 244 

strategic air campaign 43, 78, 102, 

Strategic Air Command 52, 83, 

315,317, 397,426,437-440 

strategic air defense 3, 14, 40 

strategic level 329 

strategy 31, 96, 181, 300, 330, 366 

STRATFOR 3 15, 3 17,439 

su-20 20 

SU-22 20, 28 

SU-24 19, 20 

SU-25 

241-243, 245, 247, 360 

275 

121-123, 230, 256, 257, 311, 314, 

1, 19, 20, 28, 52 

suppression of enemy air defenses 

356,365 

surface-to-air missile 9, 10. 15, 71, 

103, 118, 140,351, 356, 363, 394 

surge 31, 234, 235, 326 

sustainment 395.396, 399,403 

SWA 392, 393, 399,400,403,437, 

Switzerland 16 

Syria 35 

Syrian 35 

TAC 90, 107, 177, 217, 235, 244, 

350 

TACAIR 217, 220, 230, 233, 234, 

238, 239, 338 

TACC 219, 234, 275, 301,418 

TACP 418 

TACS 411, 418 

SUU-30 72 

445,453 

466 
Tactical Air Command 234, 345,421 

Tactical Air Control Center 98, 234, 

Tactical Air Control System 41 1 

Tactical Air Operations Center 234 

Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod 

System 107 

Tactical Air Warfare Center 189, 426 

tactical aircraft 1, 42, 57, 71, 85, 143, 

220,269, 270 

tactical control 298 

tactical deception 102, 103, 181, 183, 

Tactical Fighter Wing 106, 154, 244, 

246, 346. 347, 351, 392, 395, 397, 

399,403,405, 407 

Taji 40,44, 173, 178, 180, 256-258 

TALD 103, 186, 203 

Tallil 94, 203-206, 208, 211 

Tanajib 60, 224 

tankers 43, 51, 165, 172, 185, 

275,394,400,402 

282, 308, 318, 319, 326-329 

312-315. 317, 318. 345, 361, 414, 

416,441 

84,93, 21 5, 224, 242,255, 263, 

264, 327, 338, 342, 351,424 

tanks 1, 34, 44, 52, 59, 60, 74, 79, 

target list 40 

TARPS 107, 108 

Task Force Normandy 172, 173 

Task Force Troy 327 

TEL 33,281, 283 

TER 357 

TFS 427 

TFW 34,40, 274, 286, 349,426,427 

Thumrait 396,398 

TlALD 65 

time over target 169 

Tinker AFB, OK 427 

TLAM 77, 141, 171, 173, 178, 179, 

TLAM C 249, 252, 270 

TMD 73 

Tokyo Rose 333 

Tolin, Anthony 244,247,274 

Tomahawk 77, 171, 242, 248-250, 

Tonopah Airfiedld, NV 40,244 

Tornado 414 

Touted Gleem 282 

185,242, 248-252, 270, 271, 273 

252,360 

TR 99, 182 

TR-I 99, 182 

TR-Is 99 

TRAMX 217 

TRAM 56, 270 

transporter-erector-launcher 33, 281 

Turkey 35, 43, 48, 92, 98, 301, 352, 

423 

Turkish 98 

U.N. 331 

U.S. Air Force 13, 73, 74, 92, 106, 

107, 221. 225, 228, 229. 233, 239, 

259,268, 300, 312, 313,344, 384, 

385,437 

437 

239, 253, 254, 276, 278, 279, 300, 

301, 308, 309, 340, 342, 386, 389, 

441 

U.S. Air Force, Central Command 

U.S. Army 62, 81, 232, 233, 238, 

U.S. Central Command 437 

U.S. Marine Corps 223, 224, 226, 

227,232, 234, 312,452 

U.S. Navy 57, 59, 60, 79, 107, 108, 

118, 190. 312, 387, 395, 398, 399, 

403,443 

335 

UAV 231 

U.S. Special operations Command 

U-2s 99, 182 

UK 20, 33, 51, 63-65, 69, 83, 203, 

253,427 

UK-1000 65, 83, 253 

United Arab Emirates 450 

United Kingdom 63-65, 82, 137, 204, 

299, 318, 357 

United Nations 295 

United Nations Special Commission 

Upper Heyford 427 

US Army 327 

US Central Command 296 

USAFE 346 

USCENTAF 41,42,45,47,49,52, 

53, 55, 63, 92, 93, 190, 192, 231, 

256,266, 286, 315, 353, 391, 394, 

396-399, 401, 402, 404, 406, 407, 

409,437 

295 

USCENTCOM 391, 394,437 

467 
USCINCCENT 219, 335, 347 Yugoslavia 16 

USMC 56, 58-61, 70, 73-76. 79-81, ZSU-23/2 16 

85, 104. 105.215, 216, 227. 232, ZSU-23/4 14, 16, 17, 37 

338,414,415,417,418,419 

USN 56, 58, 59. 61, 70, 73-76, 

78-81. 85, 104, 105, 108, 172, 238, 

249, 250, 413, 415. 416-419 

USS America 445,447,451 

USS Kennedy 60,61,445,449,451 

USS Midway 445, 449-451 

USS Ranger 445,451 

USS Saratoga 445.449 

USSTarawa 60 

USSBS 254 

USSOCOM 280, 2%. 309,311,330, 

USSR 16 

Vietnam 24, 52. 84, 85, 179. 180, 

333,335, 337, 342 

VC-I0 423 

256, 265, 267, 268, 269, 273, 282, 

300,307, 312, 333,334,358,421, 

442 

VII Corps 215, 308 

VOA 337 

Voice of America 299, 337 

Volant Solo 2%. 299, 326, 329, 334, 

Walleye 78, 80, 85,252 

War of the cities 30, 292, 293, 295 

Washington 120, 238, 254, 268, 278, 

291,335 

Washington Post 291 

weaponeering 178, 259,260 

Weasel Police 93, 192. 193 

weather 14, 19, 21, 22, 24,42,43, 

45, 56, 57, 62, 63, 65, 78, 88, 99, 

100, 106. 112, 117, 118, 119, 121, 

155. 156, 161, 162, 167. 216, 222, 

269,271, 273,274,300,339, 348, 

353, 362,431,452 

337 

131. 135. 140. 141, 148-150, 153, 

226-228, 232, 242, 254, 266, 267, 

Whitley, Al 244 

Wisconsin 36. 77, 241. 243 

WOC 418 

World WW I1 52, 194. 242, 253-255, 

267,268.273.276, 311, 333, 364 

Wurtsmith AFB. MI 50, 230,427 

XVIn Airborne Corps 308,327 

468 
Part I1 

Space Operations 

Part I1 

Space Operations 

Task Force Chief 

Mr. Richard A. Gunkel 

Principal Authors 

Maj. Teresa R. Clark 

Mr. Richard A. Gunkel 

Mr. Lawrence L. Lausten 

Capt. Barbara A. Phillips 

Lt. Col. Mitchell P. Slate 

Principal Contributors 

Lt. Col. Stephen P. Hoffhines 

Mr. Andrew G. Landrus 

Capt. Thomas R. McCabe 

Col. Eugene O’Neil 

Report Acknowledgements 

The survey and analysis of the performance of space systems were 

assigned to the Logistics, Support, and Space Task Force directed by 

Mr. Richard A. Gunkel. Maj. Theresa R. Clark and Lt. Col. 

Mitchell P. Slate of HQ USAF/XO managed the research and writing of 

the Space study. Capt. Barbara A. Phillips was key to the research 

and writing of chapters six and seven. Mr. Lawrence R. Lausten 

wrote chapters four and five. Colonel Slate and Major Clark wrote 

the remaining chapters. Ms. CeCe French managed keyboarding 

manuscripts; she was keeper of the files and able administrator. 

This task force also produced an annex that covered the role and 

performance of National Systems during Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm. The research and writing of this annex was sponsored by the 

National Reconnaissance Office and accomplished by Mr. Andrew G. 

Landrus. Col. Eugene O’Neill and Lt. Col. Stephen P. Hoffhines 

served as NRO managers. Colonel Slate served as the integrator and 

technical editor of both volumes. 

... 

111 

Precis of the Space Report 

As all reports of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, the report on 

Space Operations has been submitted to a security and policy review 

board for general publication. Not surprisingly, the bulk of information 

in this area could not be released without compromising national 

security. Accordingly, the following is a precis of the report compiled 

by this task force. 

The purpose of the Space study was to comprehensively survey the 

space systems used during the Gulf War. Of five major themes in this 

report, this task force first examined planning and trainingjor the use 

of space systems, including space awareness among American forces sent 

to the Gulf, within the context of a subtheme common to many Survey 

volumes: the importance of the five and a half months of Desert Shield. 

From the outset, Central Command planners and the space community built space linkages to warfighters. Many annexes to Operations 

Plan 1002-90 prepared for the U.S. Commander in Chief, Central Command, drew on space systems; ample documentation exists, for example, 

in procedures for establishing satellite communications links. On the 

other hand, weaknesses in other areas were difficult to fit into prewar 

training scenarios as well as exercises, such as bomb damage assessment 

and other intelligence functions. It was therefore no surprise that the 

degree of planning and training for the use of space correlates closely 

with the results. With respect to those areas where space capabilities 

had not yet been fully integrated with warfighting doctrine and tactics, 

Coalition forces derived maximum advantage from experience during the 

five and a half months of Desert Shield to familiarize themselves and 

train with space capabilities. 

The second issue to emerge from the Space study was space mobilization, which included the mobilization of ground "user" equipment to 

the Persian Gulf and also maintenance of spacecraft in orbit and the 

launching of new systems. In some cases, the space capability was 

immediately available because the receiver equipment was already in 

place and the satellite system was functioning in its peacetime (or wartime) role, as in the case of F-16s equipped with Global Positioning 

V 
System receivers. The rate at which space capabilities were mobilized 

depended on a number of factors: the availability and heft of ground 

equipment and satellites, launch windows, and processing action required 

to launch a spacecraft into orbit; the time required to check out a newly 

launched satellite; the time required to reposition satellites for better 

coverage of the theater; and, finally, the coordination of placing trained 

personnel. 

The third issue concerns the determinants of the military utility of 

space systems. This issue involved the contribution of space systems to 

communications, navigation, weather, imaging, and intelligence. In 

some cases it was necessary to cross functional boundaries and depart 

from the pure "space story.'' The detection of Scuds by the Defense 

Support Program, for example, warranted a discussion of Coalition 

success in destroying mobile targets. Nevertheless, the true value of 

space support must be measured in terms of concrete warfighting results. 

The fourth theme deals with the command and control of space 

systems, highlighting the difficulty of a complex and in some respects 

highly guarded space community that had oriented its support toward 

more "strategic" customers such as the National Command Authority and 

various intelligence agencies. In the Gulf War, this set of space 

providers was thrust into a tactical environment that demanded timeresponsive, geographically oriented, and widest-dissemination support. 

Many of the key intelligence-related assets, however, were not controlled 

by the theater commander. 

The fifth and final theme covers the role of commercial space 

systems and receiver equipment. Some commercial satellite systems, 

such as LANDSAT and INTELSAT, were passed on to the Coalition military 

establishment. The procurement and use of "channels" by commercial 

satellite systems also augmented the needed communications capacity. 

Conversely, some military systems, such as the Global Positioning System were shared with commercial customers, while Coalition forces were 

able to procure commercial receivers to augment the military ground 

equipment. This theme was also important in examining Iraqi access to 

space support. Coalition members cooperated to deny Iraq access to 

commercial satellite imagery products by halting the flow of SPOT images 

vi 
from France. At the same time, Iraq "used" Cable News Network (CNN) 

worldwide coverage to some advantage. 

Several issues that created an impact during the research and analysis of this study deserve mention. Research did not focus on the providers of space support but rather on the "space product" itself and its 

operational impact. Researchers, therefore, relied on primary data 

generated in the theater, where they faced a number of obstacles. In 

many cases, the users were not familiar with space capabilities. For 

example, how communications satellites influenced combat operations 

was not documented because what was said over the phone in hundreds 

of thousands of conversations was not recorded and not documented. 

Many users, moreover, were not aware that they were talking via satellite. 

' 

vii 

Glossary 

AAA 

AAAM 

AADC 

AAI 

AAV 

AAR 

AASLT Div 

AB 

ABCCC 

ABDR 

ABF 

ABFDS 

Abn Corps 

AC 

ACA 

ACAS 

ACC 

ACCS 

ACE 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Advanced Air-to-Air Missile 

Area Air Defense Commander 

Air-to-Air Interrogator Set 

Amphibious Assault Vehicle 

After Action Report 

Air Assault Division (US) 

Air Base 

Airborne Battlefield Command and 

Control Center 

Aircraft Battle Damage Repair 

Advanced Bomb Family 

Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery System 

Airborne Corps (US) 

Active Component 

Airspace Control Authority or 

Airlift Clearance Authorities 

Air Combat Assessment Summary 

Air Component Commander or 

Airspace Coordination Center or 

Arab Cooperation Council 

Airborne Command and Control 

Squadron 

Airborne Command Element (USAF) 

or 

Aviation Combat Element (USMC) or 

Air Combat Element (NATO) or 

Armored Combat Earthmover (US 

Air Combat Maneuvers 

Army) 

ACM 
ACO 

ACR 

ACV 

AD 

ADA 

A/DACG 

ADOC 

ADX 

AECC 

Aegis 

AELT 

AES 

AEW 

AFB 

AFCOMAC 

AFDIGS 

AFEIWC 

AFGWC 

AFHRA 

AFLC 

AFLIF 

AFLMC 

AFMSS 

AFR 

Airspace Coordination Order or 

Airspace Control Order 

Armored Cavalry Regiment 

Armored Combat Vehicle (US Army) 

or 

Air Cushion Vehicle (USN) 

Air Division 

Air Defense Artillery 

ArrivalDeparture Airfield Control 

Group 

Air Defense Operations Center 

Air Defense Exercise 

Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center 

Ship based long-range air defense 

system. 

Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team 

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron 

Airborne Early Warning 

Air Force Base 

Air Force Combat Ammunition Center 

Air Force Digital Graphics System 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Center 

Air Force Global Weather Center 

Air Force Historical Research Agency 

Air Force Logistics Command 

Air Force Logistics Information File 

Air Force Logistics Management 

Center 

Air Force Mission Support System 

Air Force Reserve 
AFSC 

AFSOC 

AFSOUTH 

AFWMPRT 

AGE 

AGL 

A1 

AIF 

AIR 

AIWS 

ALARM 

ALC 

ALCC 

ALCE 

ALCM 

ALMSNSCD 

ALO 

AM1 

AMRAAM 

AMU 

ANG 

ANGLCO 

A0 

AOB 

AOR 

APC 

Air Force Systems Command or 

Air Force Specialty Code 

Air Force Special Operations Command 

Allied Forces, South (NATO) 

Air Force Wartime Manpower and 

Personnel Readiness Team 

Aerospace Ground Equipment 

Above Ground Level 

Air Interdiction 

Automated Installation File 

Air Inflatable Retarder 

Advanced Interdiction Weapons System 

Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile 

Air Logistics Center 

Airlift Control Center 

Airlift Control Element 

Air-Launched Cruise Missile 

Airlift Mission Schedule 

Air Liaison Officer 

Aeronautical Mil i tare Italiana 

Advanced Med i u m-Range Ai r-to- Air 

Missile 

Aircraft Maintenance Unit 

Air National Guard 

Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison 

Company (USMC) 

Area of Operation 

Air Order of Battle 

Area of Responsibility 

Armored Personnel Carrier 
APCC 

APOD 

APS 

ARBS 

ARC 

ARCENT 

AREFS 

ARM 

ARNG 

ARS 

ARW 

ASARS 

AS D( PA) 

ASD( SO-LIC) 

ASM 

ASMA 

ASOC 

ASUWC 

ATACMS 

ATAF 

ATC 

ATGM 

AT0 

ATTG 

Aerial Port Control Center 

Aerial Port of Debarkation 

Afloat Prepositioning Ship 

Angle Rate Bombing Set (USMC) 

Air Reserve Components 

U.S. Army Forces, Central Command 

Air Refueling Squadron 

Antiradiation Missiles 

U.S. Army National Guard 

Air Rescue Service 

Air Rescue Wing 

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar 

System 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public 

Affairs) 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special 

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) 

Air-to-Surface Missile 

Air Staff Management Aide (UK and 

Air Support Operations Center 

(ArmyAJSAF) 

Ant i-to-Surface Unit Warfare 

Commander (USN) 

Army Tactical Missile System 

Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO) 

Air Training Command (USAF) 

Anti-Tank Guided Munition 

Iraq) 

Air Tasking Order 

Automated Tactical Target Graphic 
AUTODIN 

AVCAL 

AVLB 

Avn Bde 

AWACS 

AWN 

AWS 

BAAF 

BAI 

BARCAP 

BAS 

BBBG 

BCE 

BDA 

Bde 

BDU 

BE or BEN 

BEEF 

BLT 

BMP 

BMS 

BMW 

B/N 

BND 

BTG 

BVR 

BW 

Automatic Digital Network 

Aviation Coordinated Allowance List 

(USN) 

Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge 

Aviation Brigade (US) 

Airborne Warning and Control System 

Automated Weather Network 

Airborne Warning System 

Bahrain Amiri Air Force 

Battlefield Air Interdiction 

Barrier Combat Air Patrol 

Basic Allowance for Subsistence 

Battleship Battle Group 

Battlefield Coordination Element 

Bomb Damage Assessment 

Brigade (US) 

Battle Dress Uniform 

Basic Encyclopedia (number) 

Base Engineer Emergency Force 

Battalion Landing Team (USMC) 

Soviet armored personnel carrier 

Bombardment Squadron 

Bombardment Wing 

BombardiedNavi gator 

German Federal Intelligence Service 

Basic Target Graphic 

Beyond Visual Range 

Biological Warfare 
Deploy men t Day 

Command, Control, and 

Communications 

Command, Control, Communications 

Countermeasures 

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Intelligence 

Coordination, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence 

Center 

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Computers 

Civil Affairs 

Consolidated Air Defense Order of 

Battle 

Canadian Air Force 

Computer Aided Force Management 

System 

Center for Anti-Fratricide Technology 

Conventional Air Launched Cruise 

Missile 

Core Automated Maintenance System 

Combat Air Patrol 

Close Air Support or 

Combat Ammunition System 

Close Air Support Summary 

Crisis Action Team 

C-Day 

c3 

C3CM 

C31 

C3IC 

c4 

CA 

CADOB 

CAF 

CAFMS 

CAFT 

CALCM 

CAMS 

CAP 

CAS 

CASSUM 

CAT 

CB 

CBU 

CBW 

CCD 

Chemicalh3iological 

Cluster Bomb Unit 

Chemicalh3iological Weapons 

Camouflage, Concealment and 

Deception 
CCIP 

CCRC 

CEM 

CEMIRT 

CENTAF 

CENTCOM 

CEP 

CES 

CEV 

CFT 

CI 

CIA 

CIFS 

CINC 

CINCCENT 

CINCMAC 

CINCSPACE 

CINCTRANS 

CINCTRANSCOM 

CJCS 

CMMS 

Continuously Computed Impact Point 

Combined Control and Reporting 

Center 

Combined Effects Munition 

Civil Engineering Maintenance, 

Inspection, Repair, and Training 

U.S. Air Force, Central Command 

U.S. Central Command 

Circular Error Probable 

Civil Engineering Squadron 

Combat Engineer Vehicle 

Conformal Fuel Tank 

Civilian Internees 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Close-In Fire Support (USMC) 

Commander-in-Chief 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central 

Command 

Commander-in-Chief, Military Airlift 

Command 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Space 

Command 

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 

Transportation 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. 

Transportation Command 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Congressionally Mandated Mobility 

Study 

CNN Cable News Network 
COCOM 

COMALF 

COMA0 

COMMZ 

COMPES 

COMSEC 

COMTAC 

COMUSCENTAF 

COMUSCENTCOM 

CNA 

CNO 

COMINT 

COMSAT 

CONUS 

COSCOM 

CPX 

CRAF 

CRC 

cs 

CSAR 

CSG 

css 

CSSA 

CT 

CTJTF 

CVBG 

Combatant Command (Command 

Authority) 

Commander, Airlift Forces 

Composite Air Operation 

Communications Zone 

Contingency Operations Mobility 

Planning and Execution System 

Communications Security 

Commander of Tactical Air Command 

Commander, U.S. Air Force, Central 

Command 

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

Center for Naval Analysis 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Communications Intelligence 

Communications Satellite 

Continental United States 

Corps Support Command (US Army) 

Command Post Exercise 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

Control and Reporting Center 

Combat Support 

Combat Search and Rescue 

Contingency Support Graphic 

Combat Service Support 

CENTAF Supply Support Agency or 

Combat Service Support Area 

Counterterrorism 

Counterterrorism Joint Task Force 

Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (USN) 
Chemical Warfare 

Conventional Weapons Enhanced 

Penetration 

cw 

CWEP 

CWP 

D&D 

DACT 

DARPA 

DAS 

DASC 

DCA 

DCI 

D-Day 

DDN 

DF 

DFR/ME 

DFSC 

DFSP 

DIA 

DIS 

DISA 

Div 

DLA 

DLIR 

DMA 

DMDC 

DMI 

Contingency Weather Package 

Decoy and Deception 

Dissimilar Aerial Combat Tactics 

Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency 

Deep Air Support (USMC) 

Direct Air Support Center (USMC) 

Defense Communications Agency 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Unnamed day on which an operations 

begins 

Defense Data Network 

Direction Fired or 

Direction Finding 

Defense Fuel Region, Middle East 

Defense Fuel Supply Center 

Defense Fuel Supply Point 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Daily Intelligence Summary 

Defense Information Systems Agency 

Division 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Downward Looking Infrared 

Defense Mapping Agency 

Defense Manpower Data Center 

Directorate of Military Intelligence 

(Israel, Iraq, Egypt) 
DMSP 

DMPI 

DNA 

DOC 

DOD 

DOE 

DOPMA 

DOS 

DOT 

DOWSR 

DPA 

DPG 

DSB 

DSCS 

DSFU 

DSMAC 

DSP 

EAC 

ECM 

ECS 

EDS 

EDT 

ELINT 

EMIS 

Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program 

Desired Mean Point of Impact 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Designed Operational Capability 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Defense Officer Personnel Management 

Act 

Department of State 

Department of Transportation 

Directorate of Weather for Strategic 

Reconnaissance 

Defense Production Act 

Defense Planning Guidance 

Defense Science Board 

Defense Satellite Communication 

System 

Desert Storm Forecast Unit 

Digitized Scene Mapping and 

Correlation 

Defense Support Program 

Echelon Above Corps or 

Eastern Area Command 

Electronic Countermeasures 

Electronic Combat Squadron 

European Distribution System 

Eastern Daylight Time 

Electronic Intelligence 

Electro-Magnetic Isotope Separation 
EOB 

EOD 

EOGB 

EOTDAS 

EPW 

ESA 

EST 

Em 

EUCOM 

EW 

EWO 

EWWS 

FAC 

FAE 

FAF 

FAPES 

FEBA 

FEWS 

FHTV 

FID 

FLIR 

FLOGEN 

FLOT 

FMC 

FMF 

FMS 

Electronic Order of Battle 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

Electro-Optically Guided Bomb 

Electro-Optical Tactical Decision Aid 

Software 

Enemy Prisoner of War 

European Space Agency 

Eastern Standard Time 

European Tanker Task Force 

European Command 

Electronic Warfare 

Electronic Warfare Officer 

Electronic Warfare Warning System or 

Set 

Forward Air Control 

Fuel Air Explosive 

French Air Force 

Force Augmentation Planning and 

Execution System 

Forward Edge of the Battle Area 

Follow-on Early Warning System 

Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles 

Foreign Internal Defense 

Forward-Looking Infrared 

Flow Generation computer model 

Forward Line of Own Troops 

Fully Mission Capable 

Fleet Marine Force 

Foreign Military Sales 
FMSE 

FMTV 

FNOC 

FOL 

FORSCOM 

FOSK 

FOV 

FROG 

FSCL 

FSS 

m 

G-Day 

GAO 

GC 

GCC 

GCI 

GCU 

GDSS 

GENA 

GHQ 

GLO 

GMT 

GNA 

GOB 

GOK 

Gosc 

Fuels Management Support Equipment 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 

Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center 

(USN) 

Forward Operating Location 

U.S. Army Forces Command 

Follow-on Spares Kits 

Field of View 

Free Rocket Over Ground 

Fire Support Coordination Line 

Fast Sealift Support 

Field Training Exercise 

Day the ground war began 

General Accounting Office 

Geneva Convention 

Gulf Cooperation Committee 

Ground Control Intercept 

Guidance and Control Unit 

Global Decision Support System 

Ground Air Navigation Aids radar 

(U.K./Saudi) 

General Headquarters (usually theater 

level) 

Ground Liaison Officer 

Greenwich Mean Time 

Goldwater-Nichols DOD 

Reorganization Act 

Ground Order of Battle 

Government of Kuwait 

General Officer Steering Committee 
GP 

GPS 

H-Hour 

HA 

HARM 

HAB 

HAS 

HEMTI' 

HET 

HF 

HIDACZ 

HMMWV 

HNS 

HTPM 

HUD 

HUMINT 

HVAA 

I&W 

IAADF 

IADF 

IADS 

IAEC 

IAF 

ICAO 

General Purpose bomb 

Global Positioning System or Satellite 

Specific time at which operations 

commence 

Heavy Armor 

High Speed Antiradiation Missile 

Hardened Aircraft Bunker 

Hardened Aircraft Shelter 

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical 

Truck 

Heavy Equipment Transporter 

High Frequency 

High Density Airspace Control Zone 

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle 

Host-nation Support 

Hard Target Penetrator Munitions 

Heads-Up Display 

Human Resources Intelligence 

High Value Airborne Assets 

Indications and Warnings 

Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces 

Iraqi Air Defense Forces 

Integrated Air Defense System 

International Atomic Energy 

Commission 

Italian Air Force 

International Commercial Aviation 

Organization 
ICRC 

IDF 

IFF 

IFR 

IFV 

IIR 

ILM 

ILMC 

IMA 

IMET 

IMINT 

IMQT 

INS 

IOC 

IOT&E 

IP 

IPDS 

IR 

IRR 

ISW 

ITAC 

ITF 

IZAF 

J- 1 

International Committee of the Red 

Cross 

Israel Defense Force 

Identification Friend or Foe 

Instrument Flight Reference 

Infantry Fighting Vehicle 

Intelligence Information Report or 

Imaging Infrared 

Intermediate-Level Maintenance 

Intermediate-Level Maintenance Center 

Individual Mobilization Augmentee 

International Military Education and 

Trai n i ng 

Imagery Intelligence 

Initial Mission Qualification Training 

Inertial Navigation System 

Intercept Operations Center or 

Integrated Operations Center 

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 

Initial Point 

Inland Petroleum Distribution System 

(US Army) 

Infrared 

Individual Ready Reserve 

Integrated Strike Warfare 

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center 

(US Army) 

Intelligence Task Force (DIA) 

Iraqi Air Force 

Manpower & Personnel Directorate 

(Joint) 
5-2 

5-3 

5-4 

J-5 

5-6 

5-7 

J-8 

JAAT 

JAG 

JAIC 

Jaguar 

JAMPS 

JCEOI 

JCMEC 

JCS 

JCSE 

JDOP 

JDS 

JFACC 

JFC 

JFC-E 

JFC-N 

Intelligence Directorate (Joint) 

Operations Directorate (Joint) 

Logistics Directorate (Joint) 

Strategic Plans & Policy Directorate 

(Joint) 

Command, Control & Communications 

Systems Directorate (Joint) 

Operational Plans & Interoperability 

Directorate (Joint) 

Force Structure Resource & 

Assessment Directorate (Joint) 

Joint Air Attack Team 

Judge Advocate General 

Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee 

Land-based ground attack aircraft 

Joint Automated Message Program 

Joint Communications Electronics 

Operations Instructions 

Joint Captured Material Exploitation 

Center 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Communications Support Element 

Joint U.S./Saudi Directorate of 

Planning 

Joint Deployment System 

Joint Force Air Component 

Commander. 

Joint Forces Commander 

Joint Forces Command East 

Joint Forces Command North 
JFLCC Joint Forces Land Component 

Commander 

JFMCC 

JFSOCC 

JIB 

JIC 

JIPC 

JIST 

JMCC 

JMEM 

JOPES 

JPEC 

JPTS 

JRC 

JRCC 

JS 

JSCP 

JSEAD 

JSIPS 

JSOTF 

JSPS 

JSTARS 

JTACMS 

JTCB 

Joint Forces Maritime Component 

Commander 

Joint Forces Special Operations 

Component Commander 

Joint Information Bureau 

Joint Intelligence Center 

Joint Imagery Production Center 

Joint Intelligence Survey Team 

Joint Movement Control Center 

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 

Joint Operations Planning and 

Execution System 

Joint Planning and Execution 

Community 

Jet Propellant Thermally Stable 

Joint Reconnaissance Center 

Joint Rescue Coordination Center 

Joint Staff 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

Joint Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defenses 

Joint Service Imagery Processing 

System 

Joint Special Operations Task Force 

Joint Strategic Planning System 

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System (E-8) 

Joint Tactical Missile System 

Joint Target Coordination Board 
Joint Task Force 

Joint Task Force Middle East 

Joint Tactical Information Distribution 

System 

Joint Tactics, Techniques and 

Procedures 

Joint Uniform Lessons Learned 

Kuwaiti Air Force 

Kuwait Civil Affairs Task Force 

Kilohertz 

King Khalid Military City 

Killed In Action 

JTF 

JTFME 

JTIDS 

J?Tp 

JULL 

KAF 

KCATF 

KHZ 

KKMC 

KIA 

KTO 

LAMPS 

LANDSAT 

LANTCOM 

LANTIRN 

LAV 

LCAC 

LCC 

LDGP 

LENSCE 

LG 

LGB 

LGGAIR 

LIATE 

Kuwait Theater of Operations 

Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System 

(USN) 

Land Satellite, NASAJNOAA Satellite 

Program 

Atlantic Command 

Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting 

Infrared System for Night 

Light Armored Vehicle 

Air Cushioned Landing Craft 

Land Component Commander 

Low Drag General Purpose bomb 

Limited Enemy Situation/Correlation 

Equipment 

Logistics 

Laser Guided Bomb 

Logistics Airlift 

LANTIRIN Intermediate Automatic 

Test Equipment 
LOC 

LOS 

LOTS 

LRC 

LRI 

LVS 

MAC 

MACCS 

MACG 

MAG 

MAGTF 

MAIRS 

MAJCOMS 

MAP 

MARCENT 

MARDIV 

MASF 

MASS 

MAW 

MCI 

MCM 

MEB 

Mech Div 

MEF 

MEL 

Lines of Communication 

Line of Sight 

Logistics Over the Shore 

Logistics Readiness Center (USAF) 

Long Range International 

Logistics Vehicle System 

Military Airlift Command 

Marine Air Command and Control 

System 

Marine Air Control Group 

Marine Airlift Group 

Marine Air Ground Task Force 

Military Airlift Integrated Reporting 

System 

Major Commands 

Master Attack Plan 

U.S. Marine Corps, Central Command 

Marine Division 

Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility 

MICAP Asset Sourcing System 

Marine Aircraft Wing 

Ministry of Culture and Information 

Mine Countermeasures or 

Multi-Command Manual 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

Mechanized Infantry Division 

Marine Expeditionary Force 

Mobile Erector-Launcher used for 

mobile missiles 

(Iraq) 
METS 

METSAT 

MEU 

MHE 

MIA 

MIF 

MICAP 

MILCON 

MILS ATCOM 

MILSTAR 

MI0 

MIPE 

MIS 

MISREP 

MLRS 

MLV 

MOBREP 

MOD 

MODA 

MOPP 

MPES 

MPF 

MPS 

MRE 

Mobile Electronic Test Set 

Meteorological Satellite 

Marine Expeditionary Unit 

Materiel Handling Equipment 

Missing In Action 

Maritime Interdiction Force 

Mission Critical Parts or 

Mission Capable or 

Mission Capability Limiting 

Military Construction 

Military Satellite Communications 

Military Strategic and Tactical Relay 

System 

Maritime Intercept Operations 

Mobile Intelligence Processing Element 

Military Intelligence Study 

Mission Report 

Multiple Launch Rocket System 

Memory Loader Verifier 

Manpower Mobilization and Accession 

Status Report 

Ministry of Defense 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation 

(Saudi Arabia) 

Mission Oriented Protective Posture 

Medical Planning and Execution 

System 

Maritime Prepositioning Force 

Maritime Prepositioning Ships 

Meals Ready to Eat 
MRR 

MRS 

MSC 

MSE 

MSI 

MSK 

MTACC 

MTI 

MTL 

MTMC 

NAC 

NALE 

NATO 

NAVCENT 

NAVEUR 

NAVSTAR 

NBC 

NCA 

NCTR 

NDRF 

NDS 

NF or NOFORN 

NGB 

NGFS 

NIE 

NMAC 

NMCS 

Minimum Risk Route 

Mobility Requirements Study 

Military Sealift Command 

Mobile Subscriber Equipment 

Multi-Spectral Imagery 

Mission Support Kits 

Marine Tactical Air Command Center 

Moving Target Indicator 

Master Target List 

Military Traffic Management Command 

Northern Area Command 

Naval Amphibious Liaison Element 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

U.S. Navy, Central Command 

Naval Forces, Europe 

Navigational Satellite Timing and 

Ranging 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

National Command Authorities 

Noncooperative Target Recognition 

National Defense Reserve Fleet 

NPIC Data Systems 

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals 

National Guard Bureau 

Naval Gunfire Support 

National Intelligence Estimate 

Near Mid-Air Collision 

Not Mission Capable Supplies 
NMCM 

NMIC 

NMIST 

NOAA 

NOB 

NODDS 

NPIC 

NSA 

NSC 

NTC 

NVG 

O&M 

OAS 

OASD/(DR&E) 

OASD/(SOLIC) 

OB 

OCA 

OCP 

OICC 

OP 

OPAIR 

OPCON 

OPDS 

Not Mission Capable Maintenance 

National Military Intelligence Center 

National Military Intelligence Support 

Teams 

National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

Naval Order of Battle 

Naval Oceanographic Data 

Dissemination System 

National Photo Interpretation Center 

National Security Agency 

National Security Council 

Night Targeting Cell (in GAT) 

Night Vision Goggles 

Operations and Maintenance 

Offensive Avionics System 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Defense Research & 

Engineering) 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Special OperationsLow 

Intensity Conflict) 

Order of Battle 

Offensive Counter Air 

Observation Command Post 

Operational Intelligence Crisis Center 

Observation Post 

Opposing Air 

Operational Control 

Offshore Petroleum Distribution System 

(USN) 
OPEC 

OPLAN 

OPORD 

OPSEC 

OSD 

OSI 

OSP 

PACOM 

PA 

PA0 

PCITF 

PGM 

PIN 

PLO 

PLS 

PLV 

PMC 

PMEL 

PMT 

PNVS 

POG 

POL 

POMCUS 

POW 

PREP0 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries 

Operation Plan 

Operation Order 

Operational Security 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Office of Special Investigations 

(USAF) 

Operational Support Package 

Pacific Command 

Public Affairs 

Public Affairs Officer 

Positive Combat Identification Task 

Force 

Precision Guided Munitions 

Primary Identification Number 

Palestine Liberation Organization 

Pallet i zed Loading S y s tem 

Program Loader Verifier 

Partially Mission Capable 

Precision Measurement Equipment 

Laboratory 

Pastoral Ministry Team 

Pilot Night Vision System 

Psychological Operations Group 

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants 

Pre-positioning of Material Configured 

to Unit Sets 

Prisoner of War 

Pre-posi tioned 
PSYOP 

PSYOPS 

PTAS 

QEAF 

QRCT 

R&D 

R&M 

RADIC 

RAF 

RAFVR 

RAM 

RC 

RCAF 

RCC 

RDAF 

RDF 

RDIT 

RDJTF 

Red Horse 

REMIS 

RFI 

RFMD 

RGFC 

Psychological Operation 

Psychological Operations 

Provisional Tactical Airlift Squadron 

Qatari Emiri Air Force 

Quick Reaction Communications 

Terminal 

Research and Development 

Reliability and Maintainability 

Rapidly Deployable Integrated 

Command and Control system 

Royal Air Force (U.K.) 

Royal Air Force Voluntary Reserve 

Radar Absorptive Material 

Reserve Component 

Royal Canadian Air Force 

Rescue Coordination Center or 

Revolutionary Command Council (Iraq) 

Royal Dutch Air Force 

Rapid Deployment Force or 

Radio Direction Finding 

Rapid Deployment Imagery Terminal 

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 

Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy 

Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer 

Reliability and Maintainability 

Information System 

Request for Information 

RED FLAG Measurement Debriefing 

Republican Guard Force Command 

(Iraq) 

RIBS Readiness in Base Services 
RJAF 

RLT 

RO/RO 

ROE 

ROTHR 

RPV 

RRF 

RSADF 

RSAF 

RSLF 

RTNEPH 

RW 

RWR 

S&TI 

SA 

SAAF 

SAC 

SAG 

SAM 

SAMAREC 

SANG 

SAR 

SAS 

SATCOM 

SBS 

SBSS 

Royal Jordanian Air Force 

Regimental Landing Team (USMC) 

Roll On/Roll Off 

Rules of Engagement 

Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar 

Remotely Piloted Vehicle 

Ready Reserve Force or 

Ready Reserve Fleet 

Royal Saudi Air Defense Force 

Royal Saudi Air Force 

Royal Saudi Land Force 

Real-Time Nephanalysis 

Reconnaissance Wing 

Radar Warning Receiver 

Scientific and Technical Intelligence 

Selective Availability 

Saudi Arabian Armed Forces 

Strategic Air Command 

Saudi Arabian Government or 

Surface Action Group (USN) 

Surface-to-Air Missile 

Saudi Arabian Marketing and Refining 

Company 

Saudi Arabian National Guard 

Search and Rescue 

Special Air Service (U.K.) 

Satellite Communications 

Special Boat Service (U.K.) 

Standard Base Supply System 
SCUD 

SCI 

SCIF 

SEAD 

SEAL 

SECDEF 

SFG 

SFW 

SHAPE 

SHF 

SIDS 

SIGINT 

SINCGARS 

SIOP 

SITREP 

SLAM 

SLAR 

SLOC 

SMESA 

SNIE 

SOAF 

SOC 

SOCCENT 

Soviet surface-to-surface missile 

Sensitive Compartmented Information 

Sensitive Compartmented Information 

Facility 

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 

Sea Air Land 

Secretary of Defense 

Special Forces Group 

Sensor Fuzed Weapon 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, 

Europe 

Super High Frequency 

Secondary Imagery Dissemination 

System 

Signals Intelligence 

Single Channel Ground/Airborne Radio 

Subsystem 

Single Integrated Operations Plan 

Situation Report 

Standoff Land Attack Missile 

Side-Looking Airborne Radar 

Sea Lines of Communications 

Special Middle East Shipping 

Agreement 

Special National Intelligence Estimate 

Sultanate of Oman Air Force 

Sector Operations Center (Air Defense) 

or 

Special Operations Command 

Special Operations Command, Central 

Command 
SOCOM 

SOF 

SOFA 

SOG 

sos 

sow 

SPACC 

SPEAR 

SPINS 

SPOT 

SRBM 

SRP 

SRW 

SSA 

SSM 

STAMP 

STGP 

STON 

STPJ 

STRAPP 

STRATFOR 

STU 

SURVIAC 

Special Operations Command 

Special Operations Forces 

Status of Forces Agreement 

Special Operations Group 

Special Operations Squadron 

Special Operations Wing 

U.S. SPACECOM Space Control 

Center 

Strike Projection Evaluation and AntiAir Warfare Research (USN) 

Special Instructions 

French Satellite Probatoire 

d’observation de la Terre 

Short-range Ballistic Missile 

Sealift Readiness Program 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing 

Selective Service Act 

Surface-to-Surface Missile 

Standard Air Munitions Package 

Special Tactics Group (USAF) 

Short Ton (2,000 pounds or 0.9 metric 

tons) 

Special Tactic Paramedics (USAF) 

Standard Tank, Rack, Adapter, and 

Pylon Package 

Strategic Forces Advisors 

Secure Telephone Unit 

Survivability and Vulnerability 

Information Analysis Center 

SWA Southwest Asia 
SYERS 

TAC 

TACAIR 

TACC 

TACON 

TACP 

TACS 

TACSAT 

TADIL 

TAF 

TAG 

TAIRCW 

TALD 

TALO 

TANKREP 

TAW 

TARCAP 

TARPS 

TAW 

TAWC 

TBM 

TCN 

TDA 

TEL 

TEMPER 

TER 

Senior Year Electro-Optical 

Reconnaissance System 

Tactical Air Command 

Tactical Air 

Tactical Air Control Center 

Tactical Control 

Tactical Air Control Party 

Tactical Air Control System 

Tactical Satellite 

Tactical Digital Information Link or 

Tactical Data Interface Link 

Tactical Aircraft Forces 

Tactical Airlift Group 

Tactical Air Control Wing 

Tactical Air-Launched Decoy 

Theater Airlift Liaison Officer 

Tank Killer Report 

Tactical Air Operations Center (USMC) 

Target Combat Air Patrol 

Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod 

System 

Tactical Airlift Wing 

Tactical Air Warfare Center 

Tactical Ballistic Missile 

Transportation Control Number 

Tactical Decision Aid 

Transporter-Erector-Launcher 

Tent Expendable Modular Personnel 

Triple Ejector Rack 
TERCOM 

TFS 

TFW 

TIALD 

TIARA 

TIBS 

TIROS 

TIS 

TLAM 

TMD 

TO 

TO&E 

TOAF 

TOT 

TPFDD 

TPFDL 

TR 

TRADE 

TRAM 

TRANSCOM 

TRAP 

TRG 

TrF 

rn 

Terrain Contour Matching 

Tactical Fighter Squadron 

Tactical Fighter Wing 

Thermal Imaging and Laser 

Designating 

Tactical Intelligence and Related 

Activities 

Tactical Information Broadcast System 

(USAF) 

Television and Infrared Observation 

Satellites 

Tactical Intelligence Squadron 

Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile 

Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense 

Technical Order 

Table of Organization and Equipment 

Tactical Operations Area Forecast 

Time Over Target 

Time-Phased Force Deployment Data 

Time-Phased Force Deployment List 

Theater Reserves 

Training and Doctrine Command (US 

Target Recognition and Acquisition 

Multisensor (USN) 

U.S. Transportation Command 

Tanks, Racks, Adapters, and Pylons 

Tactical Reconnaissance Group 

Tanker Task Force 

Tactical Target Mate ri a1 

Army 1 
TrP 

UAE 

UAEAF 

UAV 

UAWS 

UCMJ 

UHF 

UK 

ULN 

UMMIPS 

UN 

UND 

UNSC 

USACE 

USAF 

USAFE 

USAFR 

USAR 

USC 

USCENTCOM 

USCG 

USCINCCENT 

USCINCCENT 

USDAO 

USEUCOM 

USG 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

United Arab Emirates 

United Arab Emirates Air Force 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

USAREUR Automated Weather System 

Uniform Code of Military Justice 

Ultra High Frequency 

United Kingdom 

Unit Line Number 

Uniform Military Management and 

Movement Indicator System 

United Nations 

Urgency of Need Designator 

United Nations Security Council 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

United States Air Force 

US. Air Force Europe 

United States Air Force Reserve 

U.S. Army Reserve 

United States Code 

Central Command 

U. S. Coast Guard 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central 

Command 

U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central 

Command 

U.S. Defense Attache Office 

U.S. European Command 

United States Government 
USIA 

USMC 

USN 

USNAVCENT 

USNR 

USPACCOM 

USSOCOM 

USSOUTHCOM 

USSPACECOM 

USTRANSCOM 

UTC 

UTE 

VA 

VCJCS 

VFR 

WAM 

WATCHCON 

WCDC 

WFOV 

WHNS 

WIA 

WIN 

WN or WNINTEL 

WOC 

WRM 

WRSK 

wso 

U.S. Information Agency 

U.S. Marine Corps 

U.S. Navy 

U.S. Navy, U.S. Central Command 

U.S. Navy Reserve 

U.S. Pacific Command 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

U.S. Southern Command 

U.S. Space Command 

U.S. Transportation Command 

Unit Type Code 

Utilization Rate 

Department of Veteran’s Affairs 

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Visual Flight Reference 

Wide Area Mine 

Watch Condition 

War Crimes Documentation Center 

Wide Field of View 

Wartime Host-Nation Support 

Wounded in Action 

Worldwide Military Command and 

Control System Intercomputer Network 

Warning Notice: Intelligence Sources 

and Methods Involved 

Wing Operations Center 

War Reserve Material 

War Readiness Spares Kits 

Weapons System Operator 
WWIMS 

WWMCCS 

WXG 

Worldwide Indicators and Monitoring 

System 

Worldwide Military Command and 

Control System 

Weather Group