WASHINGTON 

METROPOLITAN 

AREA TRANSIT 

AUTHORITY

Actions Needed to 

Strengthen Capital 

Planning and Track 

Preventive 

Maintenance Program

Report to Congressional Requesters

January 2019

GAO-19-202

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-19-202, a report to 

congressional requesters

January 2019

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 

TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Actions Needed to Strengthen Capital Planning and

Track Preventive Maintenance Program

What GAO Found

From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (WMATA) spent almost $6 billion on a variety of capital assets, with the 

largest share spent on improving its rail and bus fleet (see figure). Over this 

period, WMATA’s capital spending was, on average, about $845 million annually. 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Capital Expenditures by Asset Category, in 

Current Dollar Values, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2017

WMATA’s new capital planning process could address some weaknesses it

identified in the prior process. WMATA established a framework for quantitatively

prioritizing capital needs (investments to a group of related assets) over a 10-

year period. However, WMATA has not established documented policies and 

procedures for implementing the new process, such as those for selecting

specific projects for funding in its annual capital budget. WMATA is currently 

using its new capital planning process to make fiscal year 2020 investment 

decisions. WMATA has proposed a fiscal year 2020 capital budget of $1.4 billion.

Without documented policies and procedures for implementing the new planning 

process, WMATA’s stakeholders do not have reasonable assurance that 

WMATA is following a sound process for making investment decisions.

WMATA has made significant progress toward its track preventive maintenance 

program’s goals, which are to reduce both track-defect and electrical-fire 

incidents by 50 percent in fiscal year 2019 compared with 2017. In fiscal year 

2018, WMATA met its goal for reducing track defect incidents and reduced

electrical fire incidents by 20 percent. However, in designing the program,

WMATA did not fully assess risks. For example, WMATA did not quantitatively 

assess the impact of track defects or electrical fires on its ability to provide 

service, nor did it consider other risks such as non-electrical track fires, which

represent about 30 percent of all fires on the system, or other factors, such as 

resources or track time. Without a comprehensive risk assessment, WMATA

lacks reasonable assurance that the program is designed to address risks

affecting the safety of the rail system or other risks that could hinder the new

View GAO program’s success. -19-202. For more information, 

contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or 

goldsteinm@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Safety incidents in recent years on 

WMATA’s rail system have raised

questions about its processes for

performing critical maintenance and 

replacing capital assets. WMATA 

initiated a new preventive maintenance 

program for its rail track in 2017, and is 

currently implementing a new capital 

planning process.

GAO was asked to examine issues 

related to WMATA’s capital funding 

and maintenance practices. This report

examines: (1) how WMATA spent its 

capital funds from fiscal years 2011 

through 2017, (2) how WMATA’s new 

capital planning process addresses 

weaknesses it identified in the prior 

process, and (3) WMATA’s progress 

toward its track preventive

maintenance program’s goals and how

the program aligns with leading

program management practices. GAO 

analyzed WMATA’s financial and 

program information, interviewed

officials of WMATA, the Federal Transit 

Administration, and five transit 

agencies selected for similarities to 

WMATA. GAO compared WMATA’s 

capital planning process and track

maintenance program with leading

practices.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations,

including that WMATA establish 

documented policies and procedures 

for the new capital planning process 

and conduct a comprehensive risk 

assessment for the track preventive

maintenance program. WMATA 

described actions planned or underway 

to address GAO’s recommendations. 

GAO believes the recommendations 

should be fully implemented, as 

discussed in the report.
Page i GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Letter 1

Background 6

WMATA Has Focused Recent Capital Expenditures on Its Vehicle 

Fleet and Expects Future Expenditures to Increase to Meet 

State-of-Good-Repair Needs 13

WMATA’s New Capital Planning Process Could Address Some 

Previous Weaknesses WMATA Identified, but the Process 

Does Not Have Documented Policies and Procedures and Has 

Other Weaknesses 20

WMATA Reported Significant Progress toward Goals, but the 

Track Preventive Maintenance Program Does Not Fully Align 

with Leading Practices 29

Conclusions 37

Recommendations for Executive Action 38

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39

Appendix I Objectives, Scope and Methodology 44

Appendix II Comments from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 50

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 55

Tables

Table 1: Description of the Six Initiatives within Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Track Preventive 

Maintenance Program 10

Table 2: Data Sources Utilized by GAO to Analyze WMATA’s 

Capital Spending 45

Figures

Figure 1: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Capital 

Funding by Jurisdiction, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2017, 

with Simplified Rail System Map 7

Figure 2: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Capital 

Expenditures by Asset Category, in Current Dollar 

Values, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2017 14

Contents
Page ii GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Figure 3: Photograph of a 7000-series Railcar 15

Figure 4: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Total 

Capital Expenditures from Fiscal Years 2011 through 

2017 17

Figure 5: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Track 

Defect and Electrical Fire Incidents, Fiscal Years 2017 

and 2018, Projected Fiscal Year 2019 Target 30

Figure 6: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s 

Reported Progress for Completing the System-Wide 

Pass of Its Track Preventive Maintenance Initiatives, as 

of July 2018 32

Abbreviations

COSO Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway

Commission

FTA Federal Transit Administration

MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

PRIIA Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008

WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

January 31, 2019

Congressional Requesters

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) is one of 

the largest transit operators in the nation, providing service for nearly 1-

million rail and bus passenger trips each day, making it critical to the 

National Capital Area’s transportation infrastructure.1 In recent years 

there have been questions about the safety of WMATA’s rail transit 

system and whether it has effective processes in place to replace assets 

and perform critical maintenance. For example, the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that WMATA had ineffective 

inspection and maintenance practices that contributed to a January 2015 

smoke incident near L’Enfant Plaza station that resulted in one fatality 

and 91 injuries.2 After investigations by the NTSB and the Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA), among other actions, the FTA assumed direct 

safety oversight of WMATA in October 2015. To address safety concerns 

and recommendations from NTSB and FTA, WMATA conducted 

SafeTrack, which was a large rehabilitation project that made emergency 

repairs to WMATA’s track infrastructure between June 2016 and June 

2017.3 At the conclusion of SafeTrack, WMATA implemented its new 

track preventive maintenance program designed to better ensure the 

long-term reliability of its infrastructure and to prevent the need for 

another SafeTrack.

In addition to its efforts to improve safety, WMATA has also had a 

growing maintenance backlog. In November 2016, WMATA reported that 

it had about $17.4 billion in state-of-good-repair needs, up from the $7.6 

 1

Federal Transit Administration, National Transit Database: Service Data and Operating 

Expenses Time-Series By Mode, 2017. 

2

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating certain accidents 

associated with various modes of transportation such as railroad, highway, marine, 

pipeline, and aviation. NTSB, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority L’Enfant 

Plaza Station Electrical Arcing and Smoke Accident, NTSB/RAR-16/01 NTSB (Jan. 12, 

2015).

3

For more information see: GAO, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority: 

Improved Planning of Future Rehabilitation Projects Could Prevent Limitations Identified 

with SafeTrack, GAO-17-348 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2017). 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

billion it reported in February 2010.4 In 2018, the District of Columbia, the 

state of Maryland, and the Commonwealth of Virginia each enacted 

legislation that is expected to provide about $500 million combined 

annually in additional funding to WMATA for capital purposes, a sum that 

may help address this backlog. This funding is in addition to the $340 

million contributed on average annually by state and local jurisdictions for 

capital purposes from fiscal years 2011 through 2017, and almost $460 

million received annually on average as grants from the federal 

government for capital expenses over that period.5 WMATA is currently 

developing a new capital planning process to improve its capital 

investment decision-making and to address weaknesses WMATA 

identified in its prior capital planning process.

You asked that we review WMATA’s capital funding and maintenance 

practices. This report examines:

1. How WMATA expended its capital funding from fiscal years 2011 

through 2017;

6

2. How WMATA’s new capital planning process addresses weaknesses 

it identified in the previous process, and

3. WMATA’s progress toward its track preventive maintenance program 

goals and how the program aligns with leading program management 

practices.

To assess WMATA’s capital spending from fiscal years 2011 through 

2017, we reviewed WMATA’s annual budgets, fourth-quarter and yearend financial reports, budget reconciliation reports, comprehensive 

annual financial reports, FTA grant awards, and other documents 

 4

FTA defines “state of good repair” as “the condition in which a capital asset is able to 

operate at a full level of performance.” 49 C.F.R. § 625.5. In February 2010, WMATA 

estimated $7.6 billion worth of “state of good performance” needs. State of good 

performance was a term used by WMATA beginning around 2008 to describe projects that 

maintain and replace assets on a lifecycle basis and that promote safety and reliability, 

and preserve service levels. FTA defined the term “state of good repair” in 2016. Since the 

two terms are conceptually similar, we use state of good repair as a common term to refer 

to across the time period covered in this report. WMATA made both the November 2016 

estimate and the February 2010 estimate to cover a 10-year time period.

5

For the purposes of this report, fiscal year refers to WMATA’s fiscal year from July 1st 

through June 30th unless specified otherwise.

6

For the purposes of this report, “capital funds” and “capital funding” refer to the funding 

WMATA receives from various sources that it allocates toward capital investments.
Page 3 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

provided by WMATA and FTA.7 We selected fiscal year 2011 because it 

was the first year in which WMATA received federal funding authorized by 

the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA), 

and we selected fiscal year 2017 because it was the most recent year 

that capital expenditure data were available at the time of our review.8 We 

also interviewed officials from WMATA and FTA to identify how WMATA 

budgets and spends its capital funds. To identify categories of capital 

spending, we collected information from WMATA’s fourth-quarter reports 

and year-end financial reports that were presented to WMATA’s board of 

directors and classified capital expenditures according to spending 

categories included in WMATA’s annual capital budgets and fourthquarter financial reports. To identify annual capital funding received by 

WMATA from fiscal years 2011 through 2017, we analyzed the 

information provided by FTA on federal funding provided to WMATA and 

reviewed financial reports from WMATA. We determined that these data 

had some limitations but were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 

review. An external audit report of WMATA financial information for fiscal 

year 2016 noted a material weakness with WMATA’s process for 

accounting acquisition costs of capital assets. Specifically, there were 

inconsistencies between WMATA’s general ledger and sub-ledger, which 

are used to record acquisition costs, depreciation, and other financial 

information related to capital assets. As a result, additional steps were 

required to reconcile the difference between the two sources and could 

have resulted in a material error. However, after interviewing WMATA 

officials about the weakness and assessing the available financial 

information, we determined that the data we used were sufficiently 

reliable for our purpose of showing general trends of capital 

expenditures.9

 7

For purposes of this report, “capital spending” and “capital expenditures” refer to funds 

that WMATA expended on capital projects. In particular, we use WMATA’s definition of 

expended funds, which is “the actual expenses paid or accrued to date in the current fiscal 

year.” See WMATA, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Fiscal Year 2015 

Financials: Quarterly Financial Report, FY2015-Q4, April-June 2015.

8

PRIIA, enacted in 2008, authorized $1.5 billion to WMATA, available in increments over 

10 years, or until expended, for capital improvements and preventive maintenance. These 

funds are appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation who is authorized to make 

grants to WMATA. Pub. L. No. 110-432, Div. B., § 601, 122 Stat. 4907, 4968 (Oct. 16, 

2008). The first appropriation for this program was in fiscal year 2010, though WMATA did 

not receive the funds until fiscal year 2011.

9

A material weakness is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, in internal control 

such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the entity’s 

financial statements will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis. 
Page 4 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

To assess WMATA’s new capital planning process, we reviewed WMATA 

documentation, including its two most recent Capital Needs Inventory 

reports prepared in 2010 and 2016. We also reviewed available WMATA 

documentation on the new planning process, including guidance 

documents on how WMATA intends to initiate capital projects, and 

interviewed WMATA officials about capital planning and development of 

the new capital planning process. Further, we compared WMATA’s new 

capital planning process to leading practices identified in GAO’s 

Executive Guide on capital decision-making,10 leading practices for 

rehabilitating and replacing capital assets contained in the Transit 

Cooperative Research Program Report 157,11 and project management 

principles from the Project Management Institute, Inc.12 In addition, we 

interviewed officials from five peer transit agencies that are similar to 

WMATA to obtain information from them on how they conduct capital 

planning. We selected these agencies based on a number of factors, 

including those that were comparable to WMATA in terms of transit route 

miles, system use, and capital spending. The transit agencies we 

selected were: (1) Bay Area Rapid Transit; (2) Chicago Transit Authority; 

(3) Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority; (4) Metropolitan Atlanta 

Rapid Transit Authority; and (5) Southeastern Pennsylvania 

Transportation Authority. The results of these interviews are not 

generalizable.

To assess WMATA’s track preventive maintenance program, we 

reviewed WMATA documentation about the program, interviewed 

WMATA officials, and analyzed track defect and wayside electrical fire 

 10GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making, GAO/AIMD-99-32 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1998). For purposes of this report we refer to this document as 

the Executive Guide.

11Transit Cooperative Research Program, State of Good Repair: Prioritizing the 

Rehabilitation and Replacement of Existing Capital Assets and Evaluating the Implications 

for Transit, Report 157 (Washington, D.C.: 2012). The Transit Cooperative Research 

Program serves as a forum for transit agencies to research issues of common concern to 

the transit industry. It is sponsored by FTA. 

12Project Management Institute, Inc., A Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge, PMBOK® Guide, Sixth Edition (2017). The Project Management Institute is a 

not-for-profit association that provides global standards for, among other things, project 

and program management. These standards are utilized worldwide and provide guidance 

on how to manage various aspects of projects, programs, and portfolios.
Page 5 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

data provided by WMATA from fiscal years 2016 through 2018.13 We 

interviewed WMATA officials about their procedures for collecting and 

analyzing these data. To assess the accuracy of these data, we also

performed independent tests that included verifying WMATA’s final tally of 

track-defect and fire incidents and verifying there were no extended 

periods of time in which data were missing. We determined the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We also interviewed 

officials from the American Public Transportation Association and the 

American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association to 

discuss best maintenance practices in the transit industry.14 We then 

compared WMATA’s track preventive maintenance program to leading 

program management practices identified by the Project Management 

Institute, Inc.15 and internal control standards related to risk assessment 

published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 

Treadway Commission (COSO) and followed by WMATA.16 A more 

detailed summary of our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.

We conducted our work from November 2017 to January 2019 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 13WMATA only had detailed track defect and electrical fire incident data available for fiscal 

years 2016 through 2018. WMATA categorizes electrical fires as fires caused by 

insulators, track components, and cables. Wayside electrical fires occur when one of 

these categories of fire occurs on the track wayside. In general, the track wayside refers to 

the space along the track enclosed by boundaries such as roadway fences and tunnel 

walls.

14The American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association was formed in 

1997 as the result of a merger of three previous rail and engineering organizations. Its 

mission is to develop and advance technical and practical knowledge and recommend 

practices for the design, construction, and maintenance of railway infrastructure.

15Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management - Fourth 

Edition (2017)®.

16Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, Internal ControlIntegrated Framework (New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 

2013). Internal control involves the plans, methods, policies, and procedures that an entity 

uses to fulfill its mission. COSO guidance has been adopted as the generally accepted 

framework for internal control and is recognized as the standard against which 

organizations can measure the effectiveness of their systems of internal control.
Page 6 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

WMATA was created in 1967 through an interstate compact—matching 

legislation passed by the District of Columbia, state of Maryland, and 

Commonwealth of Virginia, and then ratified by Congress—to plan, 

develop, finance, and operate a regional transportation system in the 

National Capital area.17 A board of eight voting directors and eight 

alternate directors governs WMATA. The directors are appointed by the 

District of Columbia, Virginia, Maryland, and the federal government, with 

each appointing two voting and two alternate directors.18 WMATA 

operates six rail lines—the Red, Orange, Blue, Green, Yellow, and Silver 

Lines—connecting various locations within the District of Columbia, 

Maryland, and Virginia.19 WMATA’s rail system has 118 linear miles of 

guideway: 51 miles of subway, 58 miles at ground level, and 9 miles on 

aerial structures.

WMATA’s capital investments are funded through multiple sources.20

These include a combination of grants it receives from the federal 

 17Interstate compacts are legal agreements between two or more states that are designed 

to resolve problems or concerns that transcend state lines. Such compacts enable states 

to act jointly and collectively to devise solutions for matters that are beyond the authority 

of an individual state but which are not within the immediate purview of the federal 

government. In addition to the District of Columbia, the Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Zone also includes the following local jurisdictions: Prince George’s County and 

Montgomery County, Maryland (and political subdivisions of the state of Maryland within 

those counties), as well as Arlington County, Fairfax County, and Loudoun County, 

Virginia (and political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of Virginia within those counties), 

and the Virginia cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, and Falls Church.

18Specifically, Virginia’s directors are appointed by the Northern Virginia Transportation 

Commission; Maryland’s directors are appointed by the Washington Suburban Transit 

Commission; and the District of Columbia’s directors are appointed by the Council of the 

District of Columbia. Federal directors are appointed by the Secretary of the U.S. 

Department of Transportation. 

19Although WMATA is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Silver Line, 

the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority is responsible for its construction, which is 

funded jointly by the Airports Authority along with grants and contributions from federal, 

state, and local governments. Phase 1 of the Silver Line opened in 2014, and Metropolitan 

Washington Airports Authority officials expects that Phase 2 of its construction will be 

completed by fiscal year 2020. 

20The capital budget covers expenses that will lead to a future benefit beyond the current 

fiscal year, and include such things as vehicle replacement and rehabilitation. WMATA 

also has an operating budget, which is funded primarily by the fares it collects and 

contributions it receives from states and local jurisdictions in which it operates. The 

operating budget covers expenses such as labor needed to operate the rail and bus 

systems. In fiscal year 2019, WMATA’s approved operating budget is $1.8 billion. 

Background
Page 7 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

government, along with matching funds and other contributions it receives 

from the states and local jurisdictions in which it operates (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Capital Funding by Jurisdiction, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2017, 

with Simplified Rail System Map

Note: Capital funding from Virginia and Maryland represents funding from those states as well as 

funding from the cities and counties within those states through which WMATA operates.

From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, WMATA received about $5.8 billion 

in capital funding.21 Over half of this funding came from the federal 

government ($3.2 billion), and state and local jurisdictions provided 41 

percent ($2.4 billion). WMATA also took on about $230 million in longterm debt to finance its capital program during this time period.22 The 

 21For the purposes of this report, all dollar amounts are nominal or current dollar prices 

and are not adjusted for general price level changes over time. 

22We excluded a short-term line of credit of $150 million that WMATA obtained in fiscal 

year 2017 and was largely repaid in fiscal year 2018. 
Page 8 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

federal funding included grant awards,23 in addition to annual 

appropriations authorized under PRIIA.24 In 2008, PRIIA authorized $1.5 

billion to WMATA, available in increments over 10 years beginning in 

fiscal year 2009, or until expended, for capital improvements and 

preventive maintenance.25 PRIIA funding and certain federal grants 

require state or local jurisdictions to provide matching funds. Additionally, 

a large portion of funding from state and local jurisdictions is governed by 

capital-funding agreements, which are periodically negotiated between 

WMATA and the states and localities. From fiscal years 2011 through 

2017, state and local jurisdictions contributed on average about $340 

million annually to WMATA, generally for capital purposes. The annual 

capital contributions from the jurisdictions are expected to more than 

double as a result of the recent legislation enacted by the District of 

Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia in 2018.26 In addition, WMATA officials 

told us that it will have the ability to further leverage this dedicated funding 

and issue debt to finance its capital projects.

WMATA has several steps in its capital planning process. These include 

developing the following:

• Capital Needs Inventory. WMATA periodically identifies its capital 

investment needs in this inventory. WMATA issued a Capital Needs 

Inventory in February 2010 and another in November 2016, each 

covering a 10-year period.27 According to WMATA, Capital Needs 

 23Federal grants awarded to WMATA included Urbanized Area Formula Grants (49 U.S.C. 

§ 5307), Fixed Guideway Capital Investment Grants (49 U.S.C. § 5309), and State of 

Good Repair Grants (49 U.S.C. § 5337), among others. From fiscal years 2011 through 

2017, the awards to WMATA for these particular grants amounted to approximately $1.94 

billion.

24Pub. L. No. 110-432, Div. B., § 601, 122 Stat. 4907, 4968 (Oct. 16, 2008). These funds 

are appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation who is authorized to make grants to 

WMATA.

25The first appropriation for this program was in fiscal year 2010, though WMATA did not 

receive the funds until fiscal year 2011.

26The Maryland legislation provides $167 million annually and the District of Columbia 

legislation provides $178.5 million annually. The Virginia legislation does not specify the 

total amount of annual funding, but specifies the sources of that funding which WMATA 

estimates will provide about $154 million annually. See 65 D.C. Reg. 004285 (Apr. 13, 

2018); 2018 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 351 (LexisNexis); 2018 Va. Adv. Legis. 

Serv. 856 (LexisNexis).

27WMATA’s 2010 Capital Needs Inventory covered fiscal years 2011 through 2020, while 

WMATA’s 2016 Capital Needs Inventory covers calendar years 2017 through 2026.
Page 9 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Inventories help inform the annual capital budget and capital 

improvement program.

• Annual Capital Budget. Each year, WMATA prepares an annual 

capital budget, which identifies projects WMATA plans to undertake in 

the next fiscal year. WMATA’s fiscal year 2019 annual capital budget 

was approved by the board of directors at $1.3 billion.

• Six-Year Capital Improvement Program. Within WMATA’s annual 

capital budget, WMATA includes a Six-Year Capital Improvement 

Program identifying capital projects WMATA plans to implement over 

a 6-year period. WMATA’s most recent Six-Year Capital Improvement 

Program (covering the fiscal year 2019—2024 period) was approved 

by the board of directors at $8.5 billion.

According to WMATA officials, WMATA is currently implementing a new 

capital planning process through which it will develop its fiscal year 2020 

Capital Budget and fiscal year 2020-2025 Six-Year Capital Improvement 

Program. WMATA adopts and implements the capital budget by June 30 

for the new fiscal year, which begins on July 1. The fiscal year 2020 

Capital Budget is scheduled to be adopted and implemented by June 30, 

2019. Among other things, the goals and objectives of this new capital 

planning process are to

• construct an objective, data-driven, and risk-based approach to 

estimate major rehabilitation and capital asset replacement needs;

• build a capital investment prioritization methodology aligned with 

WMATA’s strategic goals and grounded in asset inventory and 

condition assessments; and

• develop a process that will support the construction and ongoing 

stewardship of its Transit Asset Management Plan. The latter is 

discussed in more detail below.

WMATA has also recently undertaken efforts to address issues related to 

the condition and maintenance of its track. After SafeTrack concluded in 

June 2017, WMATA implemented what officials describe as its first track 

preventive maintenance program designed to incorporate industry-wide 

best practices related to track maintenance, in order to improve the rail 

system’s long-term safety and reliability.28 The new program commenced 

 28Prior to developing this program WMATA did not have a program that incorporated 

generally accepted best industry practices, and their new program is designed to correct 

this.
Page 10 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

in June 2017, and WMATA’s board reduced late-night service to allow for 

longer maintenance work hours.

To make the best use of the extra maintenance hours, WMATA focused 

its new program on six separate initiatives that together would address 

what WMATA viewed as its two most pressing track maintenance 

concerns—electrical fires caused by cable and insulator defects along the 

track wayside, and defects to the track itself, including unsecured rail 

fasteners and worn track switches (see table 1). These initiatives are 

planned to cover the entire transit system and will take various amounts 

of time to complete.

Table 1: Description of the Six Initiatives within Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Track Preventive 

Maintenance Program

Initiative Description Primary Purpose Estimated Time to Complete 

Pass of Entire Rail System

Cable “Meggering” Helps prevent track fires by identifying and 

replacing electric cables that no longer adequately 

insulate electric current.

Reduce wayside electrical 

fire incidents

4 years

Stray Current 

Testing

Helps prevent track fires by identifying components 

within the return circuita that do not provide 

sufficient electrical isolation and allow stray currents 

to escape.

Reduce wayside electrical 

fire incidents

5 years

Track Bed Cleaning Removes fire hazards from the track bed, such as 

debris and water, which can spawn combustion 

during electrical arcing incidents.b This initiative is 

also meant to improve the quality of the stray 

current testing initiative by cleaning the tracks in 

advance. 

Reduce wayside electrical 

fire incidents

To be determinedc

Switch Maintenance Helps ensure the proper functioning of rail 

switches, frogs,d and interlockings, which are parts 

of the railroad where tracks can cross each other or 

change to direct trains along different routes.

Reduce track defect 

incidents

5 years

Torqueing Tightens the nuts and bolts that hold rail fasteners 

in place on direct fixation track. Direct fixation track 

is the standard method of construction for track in 

tunnels and elevated sections where the track is 

directly anchored to concrete rail ties as opposed to 

wooden crossties.

Reduce track defect 

incidents

1 year

Tamping Helps ensure the proper horizontal and vertical 

alignment of ballasted track. Ballasted track is 

fastened to wooden cross ties and lies on top of a 

gravel bed. It normally appears outside of tunnels in 

the open-air.

Reduce track defect 

incidents

2 years

Source: GAO analysis of WMATA information and interviews with officials. | GAO-19-202.

a

The return circuit carries electrical current from the running rails back to the traction power 

substation.
Page 11 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

b

According to an FTA report, electrical arcing occurs when high voltage current leaks from a power 

cable and flows along track component surfaces contaminated with carbon dust, rust particles, dirt, 

and grime, to find a path to the ground.

c

The Track Bed Cleaning initiative is initially focused on the Red Line, as it is the oldest line, and 

according to officials, has the most debris and water intrusion. WMATA estimates a full sweep of the 

Red Line will take one year and plans on extending this initiative to its other rail lines beginning in 

fiscal year 2019.

d

A frog is a track structure used at the intersection of two running rails to provide support for wheels 

and passageways for their flanges, thus permitting wheels on either rail to cross the other.

FTA also plays a role in WMATA activities by providing and directing the 

use of federal funds, overseeing safety, and requiring transit asset 

management. FTA provides grants that support capital investment in 

public transportation, consistent with locally developed transportation 

plans, and has provided such funding to WMATA as noted above.

Additionally, though states play a role in safety oversight of rail transit 

systems through state safety oversight programs, FTA also has the 

authority to conduct various safety oversight activities such as inspections 

and investigations.29 Furthermore, FTA has the authority to assume 

temporary, direct safety oversight of a rail transit system if it finds the 

state safety oversight program is inadequate, among other things. After 

FTA conducted a safety management inspection and issued a safety 

directive with 91 required actions, it found WMATA’s state safetyoversight program to be inadequate and assumed direct safety-oversight 

of WMATA in October 2015. Finally, FTA is responsible for assisting 

public transportation systems to achieve and maintain their infrastructure, 

equipment, and vehicles in a state of good repair. Specifically, in July 

2016, FTA issued regulations establishing a National Transit Asset 

Management System.30 Applicable transit agencies31 were required to 

have an initial transit asset management plan completed by October 1, 

2018.32 For “tier I providers,” such as WMATA,33 this plan is to contain 

 29See 49 U.S.C. § 5329.

30The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) required this 

rulemaking. Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 20019,126 Stat. 405, 707 (July 6, 2012) (codified at 49 

U.S.C. § 5326). A transit asset management system is ‘‘a strategic and systematic 

process of operating, maintaining, and improving public transportation capital assets 

effectively throughout the life cycle of such assets.’’ 49 U.S.C. § 5326(a)(3).

31Recipients and subrecipients of federal financial assistance under Chapter 53 of the 

United States Code that own, operate, or manage capital assets used for providing public 

transportation are required to have transit asset management plans.

3249 C.F.R. § 625.31(a).
Page 12 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

nine elements, including an inventory of the number and type of capital 

assets, and a condition assessment of those inventoried assets for which 

a provider has direct capital responsibility.34 WMATA completed its 

Transit Asset Management plan, dated October 1, 2018. This plan 

outlines WMATA’s policy, approach, and targeted actions to improve its 

asset management practices over the next 4 years.

 33A tier I provider is a recipient that owns, operates, or manages either (1) one hundred 

and one or more vehicles in revenue service during peak regular service across all fixed 

route modes or in any one non-fixed route mode, or (2) rail transit. 49 C.F.R. § 625.5.

34In addition to the two items noted above, the other Transit Asset Management Plan 

elements for tier I providers are: (1) a description of analytical processes or decisionsupport tools that a provider uses to estimate capital investment needs over time and 

develop its investment prioritization; (2) a provider’s project-based prioritization of 

investments, developed in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 625.33; (3) a provider’s Transit 

Asset Management and state of good repair policy; (4) a provider’s Transit Asset 

Management plan implementation strategy; (5) a description of key Transit Asset 

Management activities that a provider intends to engage in over the Transit Asset 

Management plan horizon period; (6) a summary or list of the resources, including 

personnel, that a provider needs to develop and carry out the Transit Asset Management 

plan; and (7) an outline of how a provider will monitor, update, and evaluate, as needed, 

its Transit Asset Management plan and related business practices, to ensure the 

continuous improvement of its Transit Asset Management practices. 49 C.F.R. § 

625.25(b).
Page 13 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

WMATA expends its capital funds on a variety of capital assets as part of 

its capital budget and Capital Improvement Program.35 From fiscal year 

2011 through 2017, WMATA expended approximately $5.9 billion on 

capital investments. Of this amount, WMATA expended the largest 

portion on assets related to the replacement, rehabilitation, and 

maintenance of its revenue vehicles (railcars, buses, and vans) and 

lesser amounts on other categories of assets, as discussed below and 

shown in figure 2.

 35WMATA identifies capital expenditures as those funds that are expended either to 

procure or construct fixed assets, or to improve and extend the useful life of an existing 

asset.

WMATA Has Focused 

Recent Capital 

Expenditures on Its 

Vehicle Fleet and 

Expects Future 

Expenditures to

Increase to Meet 

State-of-Good-Repair 

Needs

Since Fiscal Year 2011, 

WMATA Has Expended 

the Largest Share of Its 

Capital Funds on 

Replacing and Maintaining 

Its Rail and Bus Fleets
Page 14 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Figure 2: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Capital Expenditures by Asset Category, in Current Dollar Values, 

Fiscal Years 2011 through 2017

• Rail and Bus Vehicle Fleet: WMATA expended approximately $2.16 

billion (36 percent) of the total $5.9 billion on projects related to its rail 

and bus fleet from fiscal years 2011 through 2017. The $2.16 billion 

included approximately $1.1 billion (51 percent) on replacing, 

expanding, and rehabilitating its rail fleet and approximately $956 

million (44 percent) on its bus fleet.36 According to WMATA, it initiated 

its railcar replacement program in 2005 to increase capacity and 

reduce maintenance costs. In addition, a June 2009 Red Line collision 

of two trains near Fort Totten resulted in nine deaths and led the 

NTSB to recommend that WMATA retire and replace all 1000 series 

 36Approximately $95 million (4 percent) was also expended on replacing MetroAccess 

vehicles. WMATA operates a paratransit service (MetroAccess) that provides van service

to individuals with disabilities.
Page 15 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

railcars.37 From fiscal year 2011 through 2017, WMATA expended 

almost $656 million on replacing these and other railcars and 

expanding its overall fleet. This effort includes WMATA’s planned 

purchase of a total of 748 new 7000-series railcars (see fig. 3). 

Approximately $530 million was expended on replacing vehicles from 

fiscal years 2015 through 2017. For example, in fiscal year 2017 

WMATA accepted delivery of about 50 percent (364 railcars) of its 

planned purchase of 748, 7000-series railcars. WMATA expects to 

complete its current railcar replacement program by fiscal year 2024, 

with an estimated total program cost of about $1.7 billion.38

Figure 3: Photograph of a 7000-series Railcar

• Fixed Rail Infrastructure: WMATA expended about $1.23 billion of the 

total $5.9 billion (21 percent) to maintain its fixed-rail infrastructure. Of 

this $1.23 billion, WMATA expended about $650 million (53 percent) 

on rail infrastructure and rehabilitation projects and $573 million (47 

percent) on improvements to its track and structures (e.g., bridges 

 37National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Authority Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station, Washington, D.C., June 22, 

2009. (Washington, D.C.: 2010).

38According to WMATA, its railcar replacement program also includes the planning and 

acquisition of new 8000-series railcars. 
Page 16 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

and tunnels). According to WMATA, the rail infrastructure and 

rehabilitation projects began in 2009 and were the first comprehensive 

rehabilitation of WMATA’s rail infrastructure in its history. Typical 

projects included rehabilitating WMATA’s water drainage pumps and 

tunnel ventilation, fire, and communications systems, among other 

things. WMATA work related to track and structures involved the 

maintenance and rehabilitation of the steel rail that guides railcars, the 

cross ties and fasteners that hold the rail in place, the third rail that 

provides power to trains, and the bridges and tunnels the track runs 

on or through. The share of WMATA’s total capital expenditures going 

to track and structures increased from about $80 million in fiscal year 

2016 to $158 million in fiscal year 2017. This expenditure was 

primarily to implement SafeTrack.

• Maintenance Facilities and Equipment: WMATA expended 

approximately $1.1 billion of the total $5.9 billion (19 percent) on 

assets related to maintenance facilities and equipment, which include 

rail yards, bus garages, and equipment used to rehabilitate and 

maintain WMATA’s track and vehicle fleet. For example, from fiscal 

years 2011 through 2017 WMATA expended approximately $75 

million in constructing the Cinder Bed Road bus maintenance facility 

in Lorton, Virginia.

• Passenger and Other Facilities: WMATA expended about $814 million 

of the total $5.9 billion (14 percent) on passenger, business, and 

security support facilities. Such facilities include rail and bus stations, 

police facilities, and elevator and escalator rehabilitation.

• Business Systems and Project Management Support: WMATA also 

expended about $628 million of the total $5.9 billion (11 percent) on 

assets related to operations and business support software and 

equipment.

From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, WMATA frequently over-estimated 

in its annual budgets the annual amount of capital investments it could 

implement (see fig.4). Out of the approximately $7.5 billion that WMATA 

budgeted for capital investments over this period, it expended 

approximately $5.9 billion (80 percent). WMATA’s ability to fully expend 

its capital budget has varied from year to year. Specifically, WMATA

expended about 65 percent ($700 million) of its $1.1 billion capital budget 

in fiscal year 2015, compared with 85 percent ($1.1 billion) of its $1.2 

billion capital budget in fiscal year 2016. In fiscal year 2017, WMATA 

Prior to Fiscal Year 2017, 

WMATA Did Not Fully 

Expend Its Total Annual 

Capital Budget but 

Expects to Increase 

Expenditures to Address 

Repairs
Page 17 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

expended nearly 100 percent of its $1.18 billion capital budget.39 WMATA 

attributed the increased expenditures to intensified efforts to address 

deferred maintenance, primarily through the SafeTrack initiative and an 

increased delivery and acceptance rate for the new 7000-series railcars, 

among other things. The total amount expended in fiscal year 2017 to 

replace the older railcars with new vehicles totaled about $335 million.

Figure 4: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Total Capital 

Expenditures from Fiscal Years 2011 through 2017

According to WMATA, there are a number of reasons why it has not fully 

expended its capital budget in any given year:

• Contracting and Scheduling Issues: WMATA officials stated that there 

were contract and scheduling delays in the implementation of planned 

 39In November 2016 and April 2017, WMATA amended and increased its approved 

budget of $950 million by $150 million and $75 million, respectively, to include funding for 

the SafeTrack program, the replacement of additional railcars, and for other purposes.
Page 18 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

capital projects. For example, WMATA officials said contracts were 

sometimes not executed during the fiscal year in which funds were 

originally budgeted for the work, and in other instances contract work 

was not carried out according to schedule and expenditures were 

delayed.

• Changing Priorities: WMATA officials stated that in some instances, 

the reevaluation and reprioritization of contracted projects affected 

WMATA’s ability to expend its capital budget. In such cases, new 

capital needs were sometimes identified and prioritized over other 

needs, which caused delays in work schedules and potential financial 

claims by contractors due to delays. For example, WMATA stated that 

in fiscal year 2011 the initiation of the Red Line rehabilitation program 

was delayed as a result of the prioritization of the safety needs in 

response to the 2009 Fort Totten accident.

• Federal Reimbursement Restrictions: WMATA officials cited FTA 

restrictions on its reimbursement of federal funds between fiscal years 

2014 and 2015 as a reason for its inability to expend budgeted capital 

funds in those years.40 In a financial management oversight review 

completed by FTA in 2014, FTA found material weaknesses and 

significant deficiencies in WMATA’s financial management controls, 

policies, and procedures regarding its receipt of federal grant funds. 

Based on these preliminary findings, FTA restricted WMATA’s ability 

to automatically access federal grant reimbursements until WMATA 

undertook corrective actions. During these years, WMATA reported its 

management slowed expenditures on targeted capital projects due to 

concerns over reimbursement of grants. By October 2017, after 

WMATA implemented an action plan to improve its financial controls, 

FTA reinstated WMATA’s ability to automatically receive all awarded 

federal funds on a regular schedule.41

 40Federal Transit Administration, Financial Management Oversight Review: Full Scope 

Systems Review of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Washington, 

D.C.: June 2014).

41In December 2016, FTA informed WMATA that the necessary corrective actions had 

been implemented and WMATA had made sufficient progress in resolving certain issues 

brought up in the financial management oversight review. As a result, FTA reinstated 

WMATA’s ability to automatically receive funds on a regular schedule for grants awarded 

after July 1, 2015. By October 2017, FTA removed such restrictions for the remaining 

grants, those awarded before July 1, 2015. For more information regarding the steps 

taken by WMATA to address financial management recommendations, see GAO, 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority: Steps Taken to Address Financial 

Management and Safety Recommendations, but Financial Management Internal Controls 

Need Strengthening, GAO-15-640R (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2015).
Page 19 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

• Unpredictable Funding: WMATA officials stated that unpredictable 

funding affected the level of its capital expenditures from year to year. 

Since WMATA had multi-year capital projects with multi-year 

procurements, according to WMATA officials, uncertainty with regard 

to how much capital funding would be received on an annual basis 

affected the implementation of projects.

• Inadequate Capital Planning Process: WMATA attributed some of its 

inability to expend budgeted capital funds to the absence of a uniform 

and efficient capital planning process. According to WMATA, it lacked 

formal procedures to initiate projects and newer projects often 

experienced delays in implementation, which delayed expenditures on 

these projects. Later in this report, we discuss WMATA’s efforts to 

develop a new capital planning process.

Although WMATA expended more of its capital budget in fiscal year 2017 

than it had in prior years, it estimated that capital spending will need to 

increase even more to address state-of-good-repair needs. In 2016, 

WMATA projected that its state-of-good-repair needs amounted to about 

$17.4 billion from 2017 through 2026. This level is almost $10 billion more 

than WMATA estimated for its state-of-good-repair needs from 2011 

through 2020 in its February 2010 Capital Needs Inventory. WMATA 

officials attributed the increase to a capital planning process insufficient to 

identify capital needs and an increase in cost of needs that were 

previously unmet. In addition, WMATA officials said the quality and 

quantity of asset data had improved over time. To address its state-ofgood-repair needs, in November 2016 WMATA estimated that it will need 

to expend about $1.74 billion annually on capital expenditures from 2017 

through 2026.42 This is more than twice the $845 million average annual 

capital expenditures from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2017.

 42We did not independently verify WMATA’s state-of-good-repair estimate or the annual 

spending that might be needed to address this estimate. However, other reports have 

discussed the magnitude of WMATA’s state-of-good-repair needs. See, for example, 

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, Technical Panel Final Report on Metro

(Washington, D.C.: April 2017) and Ray LaHood, correspondence to the Honorable 

Terence R. McAuliffe, Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia (Oct. 23, 2017). See also Ray 

LaHood, Review of Operating, Governance and Financial Conditions at the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Dec. 5, 2017).
Page 20 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

WMATA’s new capital planning process could address some of the 

weaknesses it identified in the previous process, such as better 

distinguishing capital needs (investments in groups of related assets) 

from capital projects (investments in specific assets).43 However, WMATA 

has not

• established documented policies and procedures to guide the 

process;

• developed performance measures to assess capital projects and the 

capital planning process; and

• developed a plan to obtain complete information about the inventory 

and condition of WMATA assets.

These remaining weaknesses could hinder sound capital investment 

decisions.

WMATA’s new capital planning process could facilitate better 

identification of capital investment needs. Leading practices for capital 

planning, among other things, call for an organization to conduct a 

comprehensive assessment of its needs to meet its mission.44 WMATA 

uses the Capital Needs Inventory to assess its capital needs over a 10-

year period across its various assets and help identify specific projects to 

include on subsequent capital improvement programs. In November 

2016, WMATA issued its most recent Capital Needs Inventory, covering 

calendar year 2017 through 2026, and reported there were weaknesses 

and limitations in the process used to prepare the previous Capital Needs 

Inventory, issued in 2010. Those weaknesses and the actions WMATA 

has taken to address them include the following:

• Distinguishing capital needs from capital projects. WMATA reported in 

2016 that the 2010 Capital Needs Inventory was primarily a list of 

 43WMATA defines capital need as a request to rehabilitate, replace, or add a group of 

assets to the WMATA system. Each capital need consists of a group of similar or 

interdependent assets. WMATA defines capital projects as the planning, acquisition, 

construction, replacement, or rehabilitation of a capital asset.

44GAO/AIMD-99-32.

WMATA’s New 

Capital Planning 

Process Could 

Address Some 

Previous 

Weaknesses WMATA 

Identified, but the 

Process Does Not 

Have Documented 

Policies and 

Procedures and Has 

Other Weaknesses

WMATA’s New Capital 

Planning Process Could 

Facilitate Better 

Identification of Capital 

Investment Needs
Page 21 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

proposed projects and did not provide proper attention to evaluating 

WMATA’s overall asset needs and the readiness of projects for 

programming in the capital improvement program. WMATA has taken 

actions to potentially address this weakness. In April 2016, WMATA 

issued a policy/instruction document that established policies and 

procedures for preparing capital needs inventories. This document 

defined the process for capital needs identification and established a 

framework evaluating and prioritizing capital investment needs. 

Among other things, this framework requires that WMATA 

departments develop capital needs justification packages and that 

these packages be reviewed by the Capital Program Advisory 

Committee for completeness and accuracy before being forwarded for 

further review.45 The guidance also requires that WMATA’s strategic 

objectives be considered when identifying and prioritizing capital 

projects.

• Qualitative rather than quantitative prioritization of needs. In 2016, 

WMATA reported that the prioritization of capital needs in the 2010 

Capital Needs Inventory was primarily based on qualitative 

assessments by management rather than being driven by quantitative 

information and condition assessments. According to WMATA, the 

2010 Capital Needs Inventory was largely based on the professional 

judgment of staff in consideration of WMATA’s strategic goals but was 

not data-driven. WMATA has taken actions to address this weakness 

by issuing a policy that requires WMATA’s senior management 

serving on the Capital Program Advisory Committee to use a more 

quantitative-based capital prioritization formula in preparing the 

Capital Needs Inventory.46 For example, the November 2016 Capital 

Needs Inventory used a quantitative approach to rank and prioritize 

capital needs. This approach included the use of four criteria—asset 

condition, safety and security, service delivery, and ridership impact—

to numerically score capital needs and WMATA then used a risk-

 45WMATA’s Capital Program Advisory Committee is an interdepartmental committee that 

crafts, stewards, and updates the capital prioritization formula, which is an analytical 

methodology for prioritizing capital investment needs. Among other things, this committee 

annually solicits information about capital investment needs, develops guidance and 

reporting tools for investment needs submissions, and reviews capital needs justification 

packages.

46According to WMATA, the capital prioritization formula is based on FTA’s Transit 

Economic Requirements Model-Lite, which is a data-based analytical methodology for 

prioritizing capital investment needs over a 10-year horizon. 
Page 22 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

based weighting approach to combine these criteria into a single 

overall prioritization score.

While WMATA has addressed some weaknesses it identified in its prior 

planning, it has not established documented policies and procedures to 

guide the annual capital planning process, or developed measures to 

assess capital project and program performance and a plan to obtain 

complete information on its assets and their physical condition.

Although WMATA established policies and procedures for prioritizing 

capital needs—that is, investments in groups of related assets—for the 

2016 Capital Needs Inventory, it has not established documented policies 

and procedures for the new capital planning process, including how 

WMATA will rank and select individual projects to address those needs 

through its annual capital budgets and Six-Year Capital Improvement 

Program. For example, through its Capital Needs Inventory WMATA 

stated it needed to invest $17.4 billion over a 10-year period to address 

its state-of-good-repair needs, including replacing vehicles, rehabilitating 

stations, and investing in other types of assets. WMATA uses the annual 

capital budget and Six-Year Capital Improvement Program to identify the 

specific projects to be funded to meet the 10-year investment needs. 

However, because WMATA has not established documented policies and 

procedures for the new capital planning process, it has not yet identified 

the specific methodologies to rank and select projects for funding on an 

annual basis.

According to WMATA officials, the legacy annual capital planning process 

was based on implementing the list of projects that resulted from its 2010 

Capital Needs Inventory and WMATA did not have a documented capital 

planning process that it followed on an annual basis. WMATA officials told 

us that the legacy capital planning process was “ad hoc” in nature, in part 

because WMATA was reacting to emergencies. For example, because 

WMATA needed to address the NTSB recommendation to replace the 

1000-series railcars and address FTA safety directives after the 2015 

smoke incident at the L’Enfant Plaza Station, it did not adhere to a formal 

annual-planning process.

WMATA Has Not Yet 

Established Documented 

Policies and Procedures, 

or Developed 

Performance Measures 

and Complete Asset 

Inventory Information

Policies and Procedures to 

Guide the New Capital 

Planning Process
Page 23 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

The COSO internal control standards point out the importance of 

organizations documenting their processes to facilitate retention and 

sharing of organizational knowledge.47 Leading practices contained in the 

Executive Guide also recommend that organizations have defined 

processes for ranking and selecting projects for capital funding. In 

addition, the Executive Guide noted that organizations find it beneficial to 

rank projects because the number of requested projects often exceeds 

available funding.48

Officials from all five of the peer transit agencies we spoke with told us 

they had or planned to develop documented processes for making capital 

investment decisions. For example, officials from four of the five peer 

transit agencies we spoke with said they use a project scoring and 

ranking system in their capital planning process, and officials from the fifth 

agency told us it plans to develop such a system. Officials from one 

agency provided us with its project evaluation and scoring system that 

assigns scores using eight selection criteria that are tied to the agency’s 

strategic business plan and state priorities. The selection criteria include 

such things as system preservation, safety, and cost-effectiveness. 

Officials from another agency told us they use an analytical tool to score 

projects and that every project (new or existing) gets re-scored annually.

As a result of WMATA not having documented policies and procedures 

for its capital planning process, it is unclear how important parts of the 

process will work and the basis for WMATA’s investment decisions. 

WMATA has outlined some high-level policies for the capital planning 

process and prepared limited guidance for certain parts of the process. 

For example, WMATA officials told us that its recently issued Transit 

Asset Management Plan contains asset management policies that 

address the ranking and selecting of capital projects. Although the Transit 

Asset Management Plan discusses the process for estimating and 

prioritizing capital needs and, which are precursors of projects, the plan

does not specifically address how projects would be selected for annual 

capital budgets and the capital improvement program. In addition, 

WMATA developed limited guidance for staff to use in developing new 

capital projects. Under this guidance, capital funds could be provided to 

evaluate, plan, and develop projects. While this guidance may be useful 

 47COSO, Internal Control-Integrated Framework (New York: American Institute of Certified 

Public Accountants, 2013).

48GAO/AIMD-99-32
Page 24 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

for developing projects, it does not establish the policies and procedures 

WMATA will follow to decide which projects will be funded through the 

annual capital budget and the capital improvement program.

Further, the documentation prepared by WMATA to date does not 

establish policies and procedures for the entire capital planning process 

and how decisions will be made throughout the process. WMATA 

reported in its fiscal year 2019 annual budget that it had created a capital 

program manual that identifies the roles, responsibilities, processes, and 

calendars of events to inform the fiscal year 2020 capital program.

WMATA officials told us that the previous Director of the Capital Planning 

and Program Management Department had included this information in 

the draft budget proposal when these documents were being developed. 

However, WMATA officials told us that these documents were not 

completed, and that the information was mistakenly not removed from the 

budget before the previous director of the department left the agency.49

WMATA officials told us they plan to formalize policies, procedures, and 

manuals for the fiscal year 2021–2026 capital-investment program cycle. 

The current leadership of the Capital Planning and Program Management 

Department told us that given the time-constraints facing WMATA in the 

current fiscal year 2020 planning cycle, WMATA decided not to formally 

document the new capital planning process until after WMATA has had a

chance to test it through the current planning cycle to see how it works. 

According to the official, the department’s leadership has instructed staff 

to document steps taken in implementing the new process so that

WMATA will have the opportunity to learn from the new process and 

make necessary changes before developing formal, written procedures 

that will guide future planning cycles.

Although delaying formal development of policies and procedures may 

provide an opportunity to learn from the process while implementing it, it 

does not provide the guidance necessary now as WMATA uses its new 

capital planning process to develop the fiscal year 2020 capital program. 

In particular, because WMATA has not established policies and 

procedures for ranking and selecting projects, WMATA does not have a 

framework or clear criteria for programming projects in the annual capital 

budget for fiscal year 2020. WMATA has proposed a fiscal year 2020 

 49According to WMATA officials, the WMATA board of directors was made aware that 

these documents did not exist.
Page 25 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

capital budget of $1.4 billion. In addition, WMATA’s plan to document 

steps taken in implementing the new process as it is occurring does not 

provide reasonable assurance that WMATA is making decisions using a 

consistent process to direct investments toward WMATA’s highest priority 

needs. A consistent process is all the more important to ensure that 

WMATA does not continue to use an ad-hoc process for capital 

investment decisions, as it did in its legacy process. WMATA’s annual 

capital spending is anticipated to increase substantially over the fiscal 

year 2020-2025 period, as WMATA expects to be programing the 

additional $500 million annually for capital purposes committed by the

District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. Without a documented 

planning process that includes procedures for ranking and selecting 

projects for funding in the fiscal year 2020 capital budget, WMATA’s

stakeholders lack reasonable assurance that WMATA’s capital 

investment decisions will be made using a sound and transparent 

process.

WMATA has also not developed performance measures to assess capital 

projects and the capital planning process. Leading practices from the 

Executive Guide suggest that one way to determine if a capital 

investment achieved the benefits that were intended when it was selected 

is to evaluate its performance using measures that reflect a variety of 

outcomes and perspectives. By looking at a mixture of measures, such as 

financial improvement and customer satisfaction, managers can assess 

performance based on a comprehensive view of the needs and objectives 

of the organization. Leading organizations we studied in preparing the 

Executive Guide, such as private sector companies, use financial and 

non-financial criteria for success that are tied to organizational goals and 

objectives. According to the Executive Guide, project-specific 

performance measures are then used to develop unit performance 

measures and goals, which are ultimately used to determine how well an 

organization is meeting its goals and objectives.

WMATA officials told us they have not developed performance measures 

for assessing the performance of individual projects or the capital 

planning process as a whole. One WMATA official told us that WMATA 

would like to evaluate results of the new capital planning process to 

determine whether organizational goals have been met. The official 

suggested that WMATA would work with a consultant to demonstrate a 

linkage between capital planning goals and WMATA’s organizational 

goals. However, the official did not indicate when this step would occur or 

provide additional information. Moreover, it is unclear whether the 

official’s intentions for this effort would result in measures for assessing 

Performance Measures to 

Assess Capital Projects and 

the Capital Planning Process
Page 26 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

individual projects as well as the overall capital planning process. By 

developing measures, WMATA will be better positioned to assess 

whether specific capital investments met their intended outcomes or if the 

capital planning process itself is helping WMATA achieve its strategic 

goals and objectives and effectively using taxpayer funds.

WMATA also does not have a complete inventory or physical condition 

assessments of its assets. Leading practices for good capital decisionmaking call for organizations to conduct a comprehensive assessment of 

their needs and identify the organization’s capabilities to meet these 

needs.50 This process includes taking an inventory of assets and their 

condition and assessing where there are gaps in meeting organizational 

needs. The Transit Cooperative Research Program has also identified 

asset inventory and condition assessments as the first step in determining 

what asset rehabilitations and replacements are needed as transit 

providers address their state-of-good-repair requirements.51 Asset 

inventories and condition assessments provide critical information for 

capital-investment decision making.

WMATA has initiated various efforts to obtain better information about its 

assets and their condition. These efforts have included:

• Transit Asset Inventory and Condition Assessment Project. In 2016, 

WMATA began this project to provide a physical inventory of WMATA 

assets and their condition, in part to comply with FTA’s Transit Asset 

Management regulations. According to WMATA, this project was to be 

the cornerstone in ensuring a complete, consistent, accurate, and 

centralized repository of relevant asset-related data. However, 

WMATA officials said that the project primarily focused on obtaining 

an inventory and condition assessment of WMATA facilities and 

equipment. A February 2018 WMATA memo to senior management 

stated that even when the project was completed, WMATA would still 

lack a robust database of track, guideway, infrastructure (e.g., tunnels 

and bridges), systems, and communication assets—elements that the 

November 2016 Capital Needs Inventory noted were the largest gaps 

in the asset information used to support capital needs forecasting. 

According to WMATA, this project produced inventory and condition 

 50GAO/AIMD-99-32.

51Transit Cooperative Research Program Report 157, State of Good Repair: Prioritizing 

the Rehabilitation and Replacement of Existing Capital Assets and Evaluating the 

Implications for Transit (2012). 

Information on Asset 

Inventories and Physical 

Condition Assessments
Page 27 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

assessments for about 30 percent of WMATA’s asset base. As of 

October 2018, WMATA considered the project complete since it 

provided information to help prepare WMATA’s completed Transit 

Asset Management Plan, dated October 1, 2018. WMATA officials 

noted that they will continue to develop their asset inventories and 

condition assessments through its new Enterprise Asset Management 

Program, described below.

• Enterprise Asset Management Program. In December 2017, WMATA 

began development of an Enterprise Asset Management Program. 

According to WMATA, this program is an effort to institutionalize asset 

management practices that are aligned with industry best practices to 

provide, among other things, high quality asset data for informed 

decision-making, including for capital planning. Expected program 

tasks include updating asset records and improving and consolidating 

asset inventories in WMATA’s asset system of record (called

Maximo).

WMATA’s efforts to develop more complete asset inventory and condition 

assessments are not complete. Among other things, WMATA 

documentation on the Enterprise Asset Management Program cited 

“inattention, poor standardization, and organizational silos” as factors that 

have resulted in WMATA having multiple sets of asset records in various 

states of accuracy and usefulness. The Enterprise Asset Management 

Program, according to WMATA, is an effort to help address this situation 

and improve asset data quality, including inventory and condition 

assessments.

Although WMATA is developing a new Enterprise Asset Management 

Program, it has yet to develop a plan for obtaining a complete inventory 

or physical condition assessments of its assets. The Project Management 

Institute’s Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, 

PMBOK® Guide52 describes the elements of good project management 

and their importance in achieving organizational goals. Among these 

elements are:

• Having a project charter that formally authorizes a project, that 

commits resources to the activity, and that provides a direct link to 

organizational strategic objectives;

 52Project Management Institute, Inc., A Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge, PMBOK® Guide, Sixth Edition (2017).
Page 28 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

• Preparing a project plan to define the basis of the project’s work and 

how the work will be performed; and

• Establishing a monitoring and control process to track, review, and 

report overall progress in meeting the plan’s objectives.

WMATA has prepared draft documents that describe how it will 

implement the Enterprise Asset Management Program and that contain 

some elements of good project management. For example, in January 

2018 WMATA circulated a proposed charter that once approved would 

authorize the Enterprise Asset Management program, identify needed 

resources, and link to WMATA’s strategic goals. As of October 2018, this 

proposed charter had not yet been finalized. Draft program documents 

also indicate there would be a monitoring and control process that would 

establish regular reporting to internal stakeholders to assess program 

accomplishments and progress implementing the program.

While WMATA has developed a proposed charter and a monitoring and 

control process for its Enterprise Asset Management Program, it has not 

established a plan for collecting asset inventory and condition

assessment information. The draft program charter includes general tasks 

for updating asset records and improving and consolidating asset 

inventory data in Maximo. However, a plan would provide more specific 

details for how the work would be completed, such as the information to 

be collected on different assets, how and when this information would be 

consolidated into Maximo, milestones for completing the work, or how the 

effort would be funded. Without a plan to obtain asset inventory and 

condition assessment information WMATA will continue to lack critical 

information needed for good capital planning and sound investment 

decision-making.
Page 29 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

WMATA has reported significant progress toward its goals of reducing 

track defects and fire incidents, but still faces several challenges with 

implementing its track preventive maintenance program. WMATA defines 

an incident as any unplanned event that disrupts rail revenue service. 

According to WMATA officials, within the track preventive maintenance 

program WMATA seeks to reduce incidents specifically caused by 

electrical wayside fires and track defects each by 50 percent from fiscal 

year 2017 to fiscal year 2019. WMATA reported that in fiscal year 2018 it 

had met its goal for track defect incidents but not for electrical wayside 

fires. According to officials, track defect incidents—which include 

incidents caused by defective fasteners, switches, and “ballast”53—were 

reduced by 50 percent from a total of 778 in fiscal year 2017 to 387 in 

fiscal year 2018. Electrical-wayside-fire incidents—including incidents 

caused by cable and insulator fires—went down 20 percent from a total of 

55 in fiscal year 2017 to 44 in fiscal year 2018 (see fig.5).

 53“Ballast” is granular material placed in the track bed to support and restrain track, and 

provide drainage.

WMATA Reported 

Significant Progress 

toward Goals, but the 

Track Preventive 

Maintenance 

Program Does Not 

Fully Align with 

Leading Practices

WMATA Has Reduced 

Both Track Defect 

Incidents and Electrical 

Fires but Faces 

Challenges Implementing 

Its Track Preventive 

Maintenance Program
Page 30 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Figure 5: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Track Defect and 

Electrical Fire Incidents, Fiscal Years 2017 and 2018, Projected Fiscal Year 2019 

Target

Although WMATA has reduced both track defect incidents and electrical 

fires, the track preventive maintenance program is not intended to 

address the full range of all defects and track fires that may occur on the 

system. WMATA officials told us that the track preventive maintenance 

program specifically seeks to reduce electrical-wayside-fire incidents, 

which are a specific sub-set of overall track fires, and does not include 

non-electrical fires or smoke incidents, such as the ones caused by 

railcars or debris. WMATA captures and publicly reports the non-electrical 

fires as part of its quarterly Metro Performance Report, but according to 

WMATA officials, these fires are not specifically addressed through the

track preventive maintenance program. While electrical fires decreased in 

fiscal year 2018, non-electrical fires did not change, as WMATA reported 

23 non-electrical fires for both fiscal years 2017 and 2018. Additionally 

the track preventive maintenance program addresses a certain sub-set of 

track defect incidents such as those caused by loose fasteners and 

defective switches. According to WMATA, these track defect incidents 

can be addressed through its track geometry, torqueing, and switch 

maintenance initiatives. WMATA addresses other types of track defects, 

such as rail breaks and third-rail defects, through its capital program. 

However, according to WMATA, track defects attributable to the capital 
Page 31 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

program are still included as part of the overall goal to reduce all track 

defect incidents by 50 percent by fiscal year 2019.

WMATA established goals for completing each of the six track preventive 

maintenance initiatives within a certain time period and reported that in 

fiscal year 2018 it was on-track to meet or exceed those goals for four of 

the initiatives. For example, in implementing its “cable meggering”

initiative, WMATA established a goal to inspect and replace electric 

cables across its entire rail system within 4 years. According to WMATA, 

it met its target for fiscal year 2018 by completing 25 percent of the entire 

system in that year. In addition to cable meggering, WMATA also met its 

annual targets for the switch maintenance, track bed cleaning, and stray 

current-testing initiatives. As for the two initiatives behind schedule, the 

torqueing initiative was 70 percent complete and the tamping initiative 

stood at 90 percent for the 2018 target (see table 2). Officials told us they 

have developed various ways to improve efficiency with these initiatives. 

For instance, WMATA improved the productivity of its switch maintenance 

initiative by separating the work to inspect the switches from the follow-up 

repair work to grind and weld them. These activities had previously been 

conducted by the same team.

54

 54Switch maintenance requires the grinding and welding of frogs and interlockings. 

Grinding is a process that removes irregularities from track surfaces.
Page 32 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Figure 6: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Reported Progress for Completing the System-Wide Pass of Its 

Track Preventive Maintenance Initiatives, as of July 2018

a

The Track Bed Cleaning initiative is initially focused on the Red Line, as it is the oldest line with the 

most debris and water intrusion. WMATA estimates a full sweep of the Red Line will take one year 

and plans on extending this initiative to its other rail lines beginning in fiscal year 2019.

However, WMATA faces challenges in implementing the track preventive 

maintenance program moving forward. WMATA officials described track 

preventive maintenance as a necessary operation that must be 

continuously performed and balanced in conjunction with regular train 

operations that provide service to their customers. According to WMATA 

officials, executing this new program requires regular refinements to 

ensure it continues to progress toward its desired outcomes. Among the 

implementation challenges identified by WMATA officials were the 

following:

• Securing Sufficient Track Time. WMATA officials told us that getting 

adequate time to perform track maintenance is difficult because it 

requires reducing the number of hours in which WMATA provides 

service to customers. Consequently, increased maintenance hours 

can result in lost revenue. Officials from the peer transit agencies we 

interviewed stated that the tension between conducting maintenance 

and providing service is common in the transit industry. According to 

WMATA officials, prior to SafeTrack, windows for performing track 

maintenance were not sufficient to complete all necessary work, 
Page 33 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

partially because of this need to balance maintenance hours and 

service hours. To address this issue, WMATA increased its weekly 

overnight work hours from 33 hours to 39 hours during SafeTrack. 

After SafeTrack was complete, WMATA extended weekly overnight 

work hours again to a total of 41 hours.55 However, maintaining these 

extended overnight work hours past fiscal year 2019 requires 

approval from WMATA’s board of directors. As a result, the long-term 

viability of WMATA’s track preventive maintenance program is 

partially dependent on the board’s decision to balance the competing 

demands for service hours and maintenance time.

• Work Time Productivity. To maintain extended track-maintenance 

hours into succeeding years, it will be important for WMATA to 

demonstrate the new program’s productivity. According to WMATA 

officials, making the most productive use of the extended working 

hours is a challenge, but it will be necessary to justify the extended 

maintenance windows. WMATA officials told us that only a portion of 

overnight work hours yields productive maintenance time. For 

example, once a line ceases operations, it takes an additional hour for 

all trains to reach their final destination, and another hour after that to 

safely turn off all power running to the track and then establish a work 

zone. Once maintenance work is completed, additional time must be 

allotted for restoring power and allowing trains to move back into 

position. Because of these requirements, a five-hour work window 

may only yield two hours of productive work time (called “wrench 

time”). For this reason, WMATA began tracking its wrench time at the 

beginning of fiscal year 2018. As of June 2018, WMATA reported that 

average wrench time had increased from about 2.0 hours per day in 

July 2017 to 2.37 hours.

• Resource Constraints. According to WMATA officials, having sufficient 

people with the necessary skills and experience to perform track 

maintenance work is a significant challenge. For instance, expanded 

maintenance windows have increased WMATA’s workforce 

requirements. As a result, WMATA has used contractors to assist with 

its stray-current testing and track bed cleaning initiatives. In another 

example, WMATA’s torqueing initiative is particularly resource 

intensive as the entire rail system contains 135 miles of “direct 

fixation” track, where the torqueing work is being done, and over 

 55A portion of these hours yield actual maintenance time since a portion of the outage time 

is also needed to allow trains to vacate tracks, shut down electrical power, and safely 

establish work zones.
Page 34 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

504,000 fasteners to check and tighten as necessary.56 According to 

WMATA officials, bolts and fasteners are torqued during their initial 

installment and then again 90 days afterward as part of the initial 

capital expenditure. After that, any subsequent torqueing is executed 

as part of the new track preventive maintenance program. WMATA 

stated that the torqueing initiative seeks to torque all 135 miles of 

direct fixation track annually. WMATA officials said the torqueing 

initiative is a mix of contractor and in-house staff, with contractors 

supplementing WMATA forces as needed.

WMATA’s track preventive maintenance program has followed certain 

leading program management practices such as establishing key 

performance metrics and monitoring progress toward them. Leading 

practices recommend that organizations establish performance baselines 

for their programs and communicate performance metrics to key 

stakeholders.57 For instance, as previously noted, WMATA established a 

measureable program goal to reduce track-defect and electrical-waysidefire incidents by 50 percent within 2 years, and WMATA also established 

time periods to complete its system-wide preventive maintenance 

initiatives. In addition, WMATA’s Rail Services Department—which 

manages the track preventive maintenance program—among other 

things, holds a monthly “RailSTAT” meeting in which the teams leading 

the preventive maintenance initiatives report their progress toward these 

goals to WMATA’s management.

However, WMATA’s program does not fully align with other applicable 

internal-control standards or leading program-management practices. 

Specifically, COSO internal control standards and leading practices 

identified by the Project Management Institute’s The Standard for 

Program Management stresses the importance of identifying and 

assessing program risks and developing a program management plan.

 56“Direct fixation” track primarily appears in tunnels and on bridges where the track is 

directly anchored to concrete rail ties. Miles referred to here are tracks going in both 

directions, which are known as “directional route miles.” Directional route miles measure 

the route path with regard to both directions of service.

57Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management - Fourth 

Edition (2017). 

WMATA’s Track Preventive 

Maintenance Program 

Does Not Fully Align with 

Leading Program 

Management Practices
Page 35 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Regarding risk assessments:

• COSO recommends that organizations identify risks to the 

achievement of its objectives and analyze risks as a basis for 

determining how the risks should be managed. Furthermore, the risk 

identification is to be comprehensive.58

• The Standard for Program Management also recommends that when 

identifying risks, the assessments be both qualitative and quantitative 

in nature.59

Regarding program management plans:

• The Standard for Program Management recommends that 

organizations develop program management plans that align with 

organizational goals and objectives. This includes aligning the 

program management plan with the organization’s overall strategic 

plan. Elements of the plan are to provide a roadmap that identifies 

such things as milestones and decision points to guide program 

activities.60

In developing the track preventive maintenance program, WMATA did not 

fully identify or quantitatively assess risks associated with the program. 

WMATA officials told us that in developing the track preventive 

maintenance program they used their professional judgment to identify 

track-defect and fire incidents as the most significant risks that they 

needed to address through the program. However, WMATA’s risk 

identification was not comprehensive in nature, as it only considered two 

technical aspects of track maintenance: electrical fires and track defects. 

As previously mentioned, non-electrical fires—which were not included in 

the scope of the program or risk assessment—did not change from fiscal 

year 2017 through 2018 and represent approximately 30 percent of all 

fires on the system over those years. Although WMATA officials told us in 

designing the program they reviewed track-related incident data from 

2016, they did not quantitatively analyze the impact of these incidents on 

service or safety. In addition, WMATA did not consider broader strategic 

risks to its program, such as the availability of a program’s funding and 

 58Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, Internal ControlIntegrated Framework (New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 

2013).

59Project Management Institute, Inc. (2017).

60Project Management Institute, Inc. (2017).
Page 36 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

stakeholders’ support for the continuation of the program.61 Specifically, 

while WMATA has identified several challenges with implementing the 

program—such as securing sufficient track time, demonstrating work time 

productivity, and overcoming resource constraints—none of these factors, 

or potential mitigations, were documented in a risk assessment in 

developing the program.

WMATA has also not prepared a program management plan for the track 

preventive maintenance program. Although WMATA has identified 

program goals, officials told us that WMATA has not formally documented 

the overall structure of the program or how it would be implemented. 

Instead, the officials said the presentations they provide to WMATA’s 

board of directors, along with their ongoing staff and executive team 

meetings, regarding the track preventive maintenance program cover the 

relevant information needed for running the program. While providing 

such information to the WMATA board of directors provides some 

accountability for the program, these presentations do not represent a 

formal program management plan that links with WMATA’s strategic plan 

or that identifies milestones and decision points necessary to guide the 

program. As we previously reported, WMATA did not develop a project 

management plan before starting its SafeTrack work, and due to this 

omission and other issues, we found that WMATA lacked assurance that 

the approach taken with SafeTrack was the most effective way to identify 

and address safety issues.62 Furthermore, as this is the first time WMATA 

has implemented a track preventive maintenance program, a program 

management plan could help formally establish the program, provide 

strategic guidance for this new program by providing accountability for 

both internal and external stakeholders, and ensure that program goals 

are met. A program management plan could also provide practical 

benefits, such as helping ensure that WMATA’s extended overnight work 

hours are efficiently implemented and that sufficient resources are 

devoted to the program.

 61WMATA’s Rail Services Department developed a business plan in which some of the 

offices within the department identified general risks to their activities. However, the 

information provided did not identify risks specific to the track preventive maintenance 

program.

62GAO, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority: Improved Planning of Future 

Rehabilitation Projects Could Prevent Limitations Identified with SafeTrack, GAO-17-348 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2017).
Page 37 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Without the strategic direction provided by a comprehensive risk 

assessment and a formal program management plan, WMATA lacks a 

documented vision for how the track preventive maintenance program 

should be structured and implemented in order to meet the agency’s 

strategic goals and improve track safety. Specifically, without a risk 

assessment that uses quantitative and qualitative data to assess risks—

such as data for all fires on the system and qualitative risks such as 

securing sufficient time for maintenance—WMATA lacks assurance that 

the program is comprehensively designed to address risks affecting the 

safety of the rail system or other risks that could hinder the program’s 

success. Moreover, a program management plan that draws on 

information from a comprehensive risk assessment would provide 

WMATA officials with the assurance that they are prepared to respond to 

current and future challenges that could threaten the long-term viability of 

the program.

Finally, although WMATA developed the track preventive maintenance 

program to prevent the need for another emergency repair project like 

SafeTrack, without a formal program management plan, the WMATA 

employees charged with managing and implementing the program lack 

an important document to guide their decision-making to meet that 

objective and the agency’s overall strategic objectives. Developing a 

program management plan would outline the specific requirements to 

successfully implement the program, including necessary track time,

expected productivity of program initiatives, and required resources.

Furthermore, it would provide WMATA’s board of directors with 

confidence that the program has a clear roadmap with milestones and 

decision points as the board considers maintaining the extended 

overnight work hours necessary to implement the program.

WMATA’s rail and bus systems provide nearly a million passenger trips 

each day, and those passengers rely on WMATA for safe and reliable 

public transportation in the nation’s capital and the surrounding areas.

The federal, state, and local jurisdictions that fund WMATA expect 

WMATA to wisely use taxpayer funds to ensure the system is safe and 

reliable. WMATA can better meet these expectations by establishing 

documented policies and procedures that outline how the new capital 

planning process will work and the basis of investment decisions. In 

addition, developing measures to assess the performance of individual 

projects and the capital planning process would provide greater 

assurance to WMATA’s funding partners that its investment decisions 

result in a measurable improvement in operating performance, reliability, 

Conclusions
Page 38 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

or other metrics. Furthermore, WMATA’s recent efforts to establish an 

Enterprise Asset Management Program, once finalized, could help 

WMATA develop a more complete inventory of its assets and collect 

critical information on their condition—both of which are consistent with 

sound capital planning. However, without a plan that provides specific 

details for obtaining this information, WMATA will continue to lack the 

critical asset information necessary to make lasting improvements in its 

capital planning process and make sound capital-investment decisions.

Similarly, track preventive maintenance plays a critical role as WMATA 

works to reduce the track defects and fires that have endangered safety 

and service reliability. WMATA could better demonstrate the direction of 

the track preventive maintenance program and how it can improve track 

safety by more comprehensively assessing the technical and broader 

risks facing the program and by developing a formal plan that provides 

greater assurance WMATA is prepared to address challenges that could 

threaten the long-term viability of the program. Both actions would help 

WMATA better focus the program on critical maintenance needs and 

demonstrate its value to WMATA’s board of directors and other 

stakeholders as WMATA endeavors to provide safe, reliable, and quality 

service to its riders.

We are making the following five recommendations to WMATA.

• The General Manager of WMATA should establish documented 

policies and procedures for the new capital planning process. These 

policies and procedures should include methodologies for ranking and 

selecting capital projects for funding in WMATA’s fiscal year 2020 

capital budget and fiscal years 2020-2025 Capital Improvement 

Program and for future planning cycles. (Recommendation 1)

• The General Manager of WMATA should develop performance 

measures to be used for assessing capital investments and the capital 

planning process to determine if the investments and planning 

process have achieved their planned goals and objectives. 

(Recommendation 2)

• The General Manager of WMATA should develop a plan for obtaining 

complete information regarding WMATA’s asset inventory and 

physical condition assessments, including assets related to track and 

structures. (Recommendation 3)

• The General Manager of WMATA should conduct a comprehensive 

risk assessment of the track preventive maintenance program that 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 39 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

includes both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of relevant 

program risks. In addition to considering technical program risks, 

WMATA should also consider broader program risks, such as the 

availability of funding for the program and stakeholders’ support. 

(Recommendation 4)

• The General Manager of WMATA should prepare a formal program

management plan for the track preventive maintenance program that 

aligns with WMATA’s strategic plan, addresses how the program is 

linked to overall strategic goals and objectives, and includes program 

milestones and decision points. (Recommendation 5)

We provided a draft of this report to WMATA and the Department of 

Transportation for review and comment. WMATA provided written 

comments, which are reprinted in appendix II, and technical comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate in the report. The Department of 

Transportation provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.

WMATA concurred in part, or with the intent of four of the 

recommendations, and disagreed with a fifth. Specifically, regarding the

first recommendation, which is

• that WMATA establish documented policies and procedures for 

the new capital planning process, and

• that the policies and procedures include methodologies for 

ranking and selecting capital projects for the fiscal year 2020 

capital budget and fiscal year 2020—2025 capital-improvement 

program.

WMATA stated that it agreed with the recommendation, in part. WMATA 

said it will continue its efforts to finalize and document policies and 

procedures for the capital planning process for fiscal year 2021 and 

beyond. WMATA noted that it already has in place numerous planning 

tools, such as the 2016 Capital Needs Inventory assessment, which 

helped inform the fiscal year 2020 capital planning process. According to 

WMATA, it is currently reviewing policies, procedures, training materials, 

and other documents for the fiscal year 2020 planning process, and those 

documents will be updated and formalized through final documentation in 

fiscal year 2021. WMATA noted that it anticipates that many of the 

elements we recommend regarding the capital planning process will be 

part of the process documented in fiscal year 2021. For example, 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 40 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

WMATA expects that additional automation, decision-making, 

governance, and reporting capabilities, will be part of the process that will 

be documented for fiscal year 2021. However, while WMATA has tools 

available to inform the capital planning process, it has not prepared 

documented policies and procedures for this process in fiscal year 2020.

As we reported, without documented policies and procedures, including 

those for ranking and selecting projects for the fiscal year 2020 capital 

budget, WMATA’s stakeholders do not have reasonable assurance that 

capital investment decisions are made using a sound and transparent 

process. Taking action now to establish methodologies for ranking and 

selecting projects for the fiscal year 2020 capital budget would provide 

WMATA with an opportunity to improve upon those methodologies for the 

fiscal year 2021 capital planning process to better ensure investments are 

directed to WMATA’s highest priority needs. As such, we continue to 

believe this recommendation is valid and that WMATA should fully 

implement it.

Regarding the second recommendation that WMATA develop 

performance measures for assessing capital investments and the capital 

planning process, WMATA stated that it agreed with the intent of the 

recommendation. WMATA also stated that it has developed such 

measures through compliance with federal requirements, including the

FTA’s performance-based planning requirements and the requirement

under MAP-21 that tier I transit providers, such as WMATA, establish 

state-of-good-repair targets that are linked to the capital program.

WMATA noted these targets are set forth in its Transit Asset 

Management Plan. Although WMATA’s October 2018 Transit Asset 

Management plan includes some broad performance measures and 

targets for the state-of-good-repair for its various asset classes, as we 

reported, WMATA has not developed performance measures to assess

individual capital projects or the capital planning process itself, as 

suggested by leading practices in the Executive Guide. As discussed in 

the report, such measures are important to determine if capital 

investments have achieved their expected benefits and if they have

achieved organizational goals. Leading practices also indicate that by 

using a mixture of measures managers can assess performance based 

on a comprehensive view of the needs and objectives of an organization.

These needs and objectives can go beyond just the state-of-good-repair

to include such things as measures for assessing projects that would 

improve service reliability, expand capacity, or achieve financial 

objectives. We continue to believe that fully implementing this 

recommendation would help ensure that capital investments meet their 
Page 41 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

intended outcomes and that the capital planning process helps WMATA 

achieve its strategic goals and objectives.

Regarding the third recommendation that WMATA develop a plan for 

obtaining complete information about asset inventories and condition 

assessments, WMATA stated that it agreed with the intent of the 

recommendation and that its 2018 Transit Asset Management Plan 

outlines plans for continuing its asset inventory update. WMATA also said

that it is working to ensure it has a complete asset inventory that

addresses legacy information and that includes accurate, up-to-date 

condition assessments. As we reported, the Enterprise Asset 

Management Program—the program that WMATA told us it plans to use 

to continue development of asset inventories and condition 

assessments—includes some elements of good project management, but

it also lacks an established plan for collecting asset inventory and 

condition assessment information. Without a plan to obtain asset

inventory and condition assessment information WMATA will continue to 

lack critical information needed for good capital planning and sound 

investment decision-making. Thus, we continue to believe that this

recommendation is valid and that WMATA should fully implement it. 

Regarding the fourth recommendation that WMATA conduct a

comprehensive risk assessment of the track preventive maintenance 

program that includes both quantitative and qualitative assessment of 

relevant program risks, WMATA stated that it agreed with the intent of the 

recommendation and is putting in place a new process that will address it.

Specifically, WMATA stated it is in the process of developing a new

Reliability Centered Maintenance process that will include a 

comprehensive risk assessment of track infrastructure that includes 

consideration of broader risks such as costs, funding, and track access. 

According to WMATA, the new process is an engineering framework that

will define the maintenance regimen, including preventive maintenance,

and improve safety, reliability, and cost-effectiveness. During our review, 

WMATA officials did not discuss the Reliability Centered Maintenance 

process in detail or provide documentation that allowed us to evaluate

how this process might interface with the current track preventive 

maintenance program. As a result, we were not able to evaluate how it

might address identification and assessment of risks associated with track

preventive maintenance. As we reported, going forward track preventive 

maintenance will play a critical role as WMATA works to reduce track 

defects and fires. We will review WMATA’s actions to conduct a 

comprehensive risk assessment as part of our routine recommendation 

follow-up process.
Page 42 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Regarding the fifth recommendation that WMATA prepare a formal 

program management plan for the track preventive maintenance 

program, WMATA stated that it disagreed with the recommendation.

WMATA noted that specific technical details of the track preventive 

maintenance program are evolving as it better understands the most 

effective maintenance regime through implementation of the Reliability 

Centered Maintenance process. WMATA stated that it believes the 

framework of Reliability Centered Maintenance is better suited to the 

ongoing mission of physical asset management than traditional project 

and program management tools. According to WMATA, the purpose of 

Reliability Centered Maintenance is to ensure that all efforts are focused 

on the safety, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of assets through their 

lifecycle, which is more relevant and applicable to WMATA’s strategic 

plan than any individual preventive maintenance program. As stated 

above, WMATA did not provide details about Reliability Centered 

Maintenance during our review so we are not able to evaluate this 

process in relation to the track preventive maintenance program. We will 

review WMATA’s actions related to implementation of the Reliability 

Centered Maintenance process as part of our routine recommendation 

follow-up process. We continue to believe this recommendation is valid 

and that WMATA should fully implement it.

We will send copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the 

Federal Transit Administration, and the General Manager of WMATA. In 

addition, we will make copies available to others upon request, and the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III.

Mark L. Goldstein

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Page 43 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

List of Requesters

The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer

House Majority Leader

House of Representatives

The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin

United States Senate

The Honorable Tim Kaine

United States Senate

The Honorable Chris Van Hollen

United States Senate

The Honorable Mark R. Warner

United States Senate

The Honorable Don Beyer

House of Representatives

The Honorable Anthony Brown

House of Representatives

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly

House of Representatives

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jamie Raskin

House of Representatives

The Honorable John Sarbanes

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

This report examines: (1) How WMATA expended its capital funding from 

fiscal years 2011 through 2017; (2) How WMATA’s new capital planning 

process addresses weaknesses it identified in the previous process; and 

(3) WMATA’s progress toward its track preventive maintenance goals and 

how the program aligns with leading program management practices.

For each of our objectives we reviewed pertinent federal statutes and 

regulations as well as WMATA and FTA policies and documents. We also 

selected a non-generalizable sample of five similar U.S. transit agencies 

based on similarity to WMATA in transit route mileage, system use, 

capital spending, system age, and rail fleet age. We also factored 

geographical diversity into our selection process. We then interviewed the 

officials from these selected transit agencies using a standard set of 

questions to learn how they utilize their capital funds, conduct capital 

planning, and oversee maintenance; and then we compared their 

processes to WMATA. Transit route mileage, system use, capital 

spending, and rail fleet age were measured using data from FTA’s 

National Transit Database. We measured system age according to data 

available within the American Public Transportation Association’s 2017 

Public Transportation Fact Book, and geographical diversity was 

determined through data available from the U.S. Census Bureau. The 

transit agencies we selected were: (1) Bay Area Rapid Transit, Oakland, 

California; (2) Chicago Transit Authority, Chicago, Illinois; (3) 

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Boston, Massachusetts; (4) 

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, Atlanta, Georgia; and (5) 

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania.

To assess WMATA’s capital spending from 2011 through 2017, we 

interviewed knowledgeable officials from WMATA and FTA and also 

reviewed WMATA annual budgets, fourth-quarter and year-end financial 

reports, budget reconciliation reports, comprehensive annual financial 

reports, and FTA grant awards. We selected fiscal year 2011 because it 

was the first year in which WMATA received federal funding authorized by 

the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA), 

and we selected fiscal year 2017 because it was the most recent year 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

Page 45 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

that capital expenditure data were available at the time of our review.1 By 

analyzing this information we determined that the following sources 

provided the most comprehensive and reliable available data on each of 

the following topics for our report (see table 3):

Table 2: Data Sources Utilized by GAO to Analyze WMATA’s Capital Spending 

Report Topic Data source

WMATA’s annual capital budgets and spending information WMATA’s fourth-quarter and year-end financial reports

WMATA’s annual capital funding from the federal government FTA’s Transit Award Management System (TRAMS) grant award 

information

WMATA’s annual capital funding provided by Maryland, Virginia, 

the District of Columbia, and the other local jurisdictions within 

WMATA’s transit zone

WMATA’s budget reconciliation reports

WMATA’s short- and long-term debt used to finance certain 

expenses

WMATA’s comprehensive annual financial reportsa

Source: GAO analysis of WMATA information. | GAO-19-202.

a

Along with reviewing the comprehensive annual financial reports, we also provided WMATA with a 

questionnaire to help gather this information.

We collected the aforementioned data, analyzed them to identify errors or 

other anomalies, and interviewed officials to determine how the data are 

compiled and checked for accuracy. We determined that these data had 

some limitations, as an external audit report of WMATA financial 

information for fiscal year 2016 noted a material weakness with WMATA’s 

process for accounting acquisition costs of capital assets. Specifically, 

there were inconsistencies between WMATA’s general ledger and subledger, which are used to record acquisition costs, depreciation, and other 

financial information related to capital assets. As a result, additional steps 

were required to reconcile the differences between the two sources and 

could have resulted in a material error. However, after interviewing 

WMATA officials about the weakness and assessing the available 

financial information, we determined that the data we used were 

 1

PRIIA, enacted in 2008, authorized $1.5 billion to WMATA, available in increments over 

10 years, or until expended, for capital improvements and preventive maintenance. These 

funds are appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation who is authorized to make 

grants to WMATA. Pub. L. No. 110-432, Div. B., § 601, 122 Stat. 4907, 4968 (Oct. 16, 

2008).The first appropriation for this program was in fiscal year 2010, though WMATA did 

not receive the funds until fiscal year 2011. Fiscal year 2018 spending information was not 

available at the time of our audit work. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

Page 46 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

sufficiently reliable for our purpose of showing general trends of capital 

expenditures.2

Our analysis sought to depict how WMATA allocates and expends funds 

according to major asset categories within its capital-improvement plan. 

However, these asset categories only remained consistent from 2011 

through 2015, and were revised during 2016 and 2017. However, we 

determined that each asset category consisted of Capital Improvement 

Projects that were each assigned a number. These projects and their 

corresponding numbers remained in existence from fiscal year 2011 

through 2017, even though the asset categories were updated in fiscal 

year 2016. Tracking by Capital Improvement Project number provided a 

means to report consistently through that time period. Therefore, we used 

the asset categories from fiscal years 2011 through 2015 as our base 

reporting categories. These categories consisted of: (1) Vehicles/Vehicle 

Parts, (2) Rail System Infrastructure Rehabilitation, (3) Maintenance 

Facilities, (4) Systems and Technology, (5) Track and Structures, (6) 

Passenger Facilities, (7) Maintenance Equipment, (8) Other Facilities, 

and (9) Project Management and Support. We consolidated WMATA’s 

nine asset categories into five asset categories in order to represent 

broader categories of investment: Rail and Bus Vehicle Fleet 

(Vehicle/Vehicle Parts), Fixed Rail Infrastructure (Rail System 

Infrastructure and Track and Structures), Maintenance Facilities and 

Equipment (Maintenance Facilities and Maintenance Equipment), 

Passenger and Other Facilities (Passenger Facilities and Other 

Facilities), and Business Systems and Project Management Support 

(Systems and Technology and Project Management and Support). We 

then reviewed WMATA’s fiscal year 2016 Fourth Quarter Report, fiscal 

year 2017 Fourth Quarter Report, and fiscal year 2017 Budget 

Reconciliation Report to match each project number from those two years 

to their corresponding category from fiscal year 2011 through 2015.

To assess WMATA’s new capital planning process and how it addresses 

weaknesses WMATA identified in the previous process, we interviewed 

WMATA officials about their capital planning process and reviewed 

WMATA documentation related to the capital planning process. This 

included Capital Needs Inventories, WMATA’s policy for preparation of 

the 2010 and 2016 Capital Needs Inventories, annual capital budgets—to 

 2

A material weakness is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, in internal control 

such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the entity’s 

financial statements will not be prevented or detected and corrected on a timely basis. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

Page 47 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

include capital improvement programs, and guidance documents issued 

by WMATA related to submitting projects for inclusion in the annual 

capital budget. We also reviewed the fiscal year 2018 business plan for 

WMATA’s Capital Planning and Program Management Department. We 

also interviewed officials from the Metropolitan Washington Council of 

Governments, the American Public Transportation Association, and FTA 

to discuss WMATA’s capital planning and budgeting processes. 

Furthermore, we compared WMATA’s capital planning practices to 

leading practices identified in GAO’s Executive Guide.

3 The Executive 

Guide was used since it identifies leading practices for capital decisionmaking that are applicable to a wide variety of organizations, both public 

and private. For example, the Executive Guide developed leading capital 

planning practices by (1) identifying government and private sector 

organizations recognized for outstanding capital decision-making 

practices and (2) identifying and describing the leading capital decisionmaking practices implemented by these organizations. To identify leading 

practices for capital planning, we also reviewed Transit Cooperative 

Research Program Report 157.4 This report developed a framework for 

transit agencies to use when prioritizing the rehabilitation and 

replacement of capital assets and discusses leading practices in how to 

do this. We also identified project management principles from the Project 

Management Institute, Inc.5 Finally, we discussed capital planning with 

the peer transit agencies and prepared a summary of various aspects of 

capital planning in these agencies.

To examine progress toward goals in WMATA’s track preventive 

maintenance program and how the program compares with leading 

 3

GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making, GAO/AIMD-99-32 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1998)

4

Transit Cooperative Research Program, State of Good Repair: Prioritizing the 

Rehabilitation and Replacement of Existing Capital Assets and Evaluating the Implications 

for Transit, Report 157 (Washington, D.C.: 2012). The Transit Cooperative Research 

Program was established in 1992 and serves as a forum for transit agencies to research 

issues of common concern to the transit industry. The Transit Cooperative Research 

Program is sponsored by FTA and undertakes research and other technical activities in 

response to the needs of transit service providers and issues synthesis of transit practice 

and other reports to end users.

5

Project Management Institute, Inc., A Guide to the Program Management Body of

Knowledge, PMBOK® Guide, Sixth Edition (2017). The Project Management Institute is a 

not-for-profit association that provides global standards for, among other things, project 

and program management. These standards are utilized worldwide and provide guidance 

on how to manage various aspects of projects, programs, and portfolios.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

Page 48 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

program management practices, we reviewed WMATA documentation 

about the program, interviewed WMATA officials, and analyzed trackdefect data and electrical-wayside-fire data provided by WMATA for fiscal 

years 2016 through 2018—which were the only years detailed track 

defect and electrical fire incident data were available. In order to 

determine whether the data provided were sufficiently reliable, we 

checked the data for errors, conducted interviews with knowledgeable 

officials to learn their procedures for collecting and analyzing the data, 

and performed independent tests that included verifying WMATA’s final 

tally of track defect and fire incidents and verifying there were no 

extended periods of time where data was missing. We also provided a set 

of data reliability questions to determine whether procedures were 

sufficient. After performing these steps we determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.

In our interviews with WMATA, officials also described what goals they 

had created for the track preventive maintenance program, their progress 

in meeting those goals, and provided documentation to demonstrate their 

progress, which we reviewed. We also interviewed officials from the 

American Public Transportation Association and the American Railway 

Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association about best 

maintenance practices in the transit industry. We then compared 

WMATA’s track preventive maintenance program to leading program 

management practices identified by the Project Management Institute, 

Inc.’s The Standard for Program Management6 and internal control 

standards published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 

the Treadway Commission (COSO).7 The Project Management Institute’s, 

standards are utilized worldwide and provide guidance on how to manage 

various aspects of projects, programs, and portfolios. In particular, The 

Standard for Program Management provides guidance that is generally 

 6

Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management - Fourth 

Edition (2017)®.

7

Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway commission, Internal ControlIntegrated Framework (New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 

2013). Internal control involves the plans, methods, policies, and procedures that an entity 

uses to fulfill its mission. COSO guidance has been adopted as the generally accepted 

framework for internal control and is recognized as the standard against which 

organizations can measure the effectiveness of their systems of internal control.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

Page 49 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

recognized to support good program-management practices for most 

programs, most of the time.8

We conducted our work from November 2017 to January 2019 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 8

Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management, Fourth 

Edition (2017)®, 2.
Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Page 50 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Page 51 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Page 52 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Page 53 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appendix II: Comments from the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Page 54 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 55 GAO-19-202 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Mark Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Matt Barranca (Assistant 

Director), Richard Jorgenson (Analyst in Charge), Melissa Bodeau, Lacey 

Coppage, Cory Gerlach, Erin Guinn-Villareal, Kirsten Lauber, Joshua 

Ormond, and Patrick Tierney made significant contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(102443)
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