97-214

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 No. 97-214

 ________________

MALTA PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT )

A AND 14, )

 )

 Petitioners, )

 ) O P I N I O N

 v. ) A N D

 ) O R D E R

THE MONTANA SEVENTEENTH )

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, )

PHILLIPS COUNTY, MONTANA, )

JUDGE JOHN WARNER, PRESIDING, )

 )

 Respondent. )

 ________________

 The Malta Public School District A and 14 (School District), by counsel, has 

filed

its application requesting that this Court issue a writ of supervisory control and 

order in

the underlying case entitled Malta Public School District A and 14, Plaintiff v. 

United

States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, a Maryland corporation, and the Phillips County

Insurance, Defendant, Cause No. DV-96-049, requiring the District Court to impanel 

one

jury to hear both portions of the bifurcated case without any delay between trial of 

the

bifurcated parts. The School District's request for this Court's intervention 

results from

the District Court's April 15, 1997 Order denying the School District's motion to 

impanel

one jury to hear both bifurcated claims, without delay between trial of each claim.

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On December 24, 1995, fire damaged the Junior and Senior High School in Malta,

Montana. Having purchased an insurance policy from United States Fidelity & Guaranty

Company (USF&G) covering real and personal property, including the Malta Junior and

Senior High School, the School District contacted USF&G to receive payment under the

policy to finance rebuilding the school. The parties disputed the amounts available 

under

the insurance policy and consequently, in May 1996, the School District filed suit 

against

USF&G alleging breach of insurance contract.

 On March 14, 1997, the District Court heard oral argument regarding numerous

motions raised by the parties. After the hearing, the District Court ruled on these

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motions in its March 24, 1997 Order. Specifically, the District Court granted the 

School

District leave to file an amended complaint raising a claim under the Montana Unfair

Trade Practices Act, 33-18-242, MCA. Additionally, pursuant to USF&G's motion,

the District Court bifurcated the breach of contract and bad faith claims. On April 

15,

1997, the District Court denied the School District's motion to try the bifurcated 

case

before the same jury and to begin the bad faith trial immediately after the breach of

contract trial. In response to the April 15, 1997 Order, the School District filed 

this

application for writ of supervisory control. 

 DISCUSSION

 The School District argues that this Court should accept jurisdiction over 

this

application for writ of supervisory control. The School District contends that 

supervisory

control is necessary in this case because the District Court's April 15, 1997 Order

"constitutes such a mistake of law so as to cause gross injustice to the Malta School

District such that there is no remedy or appeal or relief that can be obtained or 

granted.

. .." USF&G responds that the School District's application for writ of supervisory

control should be denied. USF&G argues that the District Court, in its April 15, 

1997

Order, did not make a mistake of law, but rather properly exercised its broad 

discretion

to order that the bifurcated claims be tried at separate times to separate juries.

 In Plumb v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Court (Mont. 1996), 927 P.2d 1011, 53 St.Rep.

1187, we clarified the standard for our exercising supervisory control under Article 

VII,

Section 2(2), of the Montana Constitution and under Rule 17, M.R.App.P. Citing State

ex rel. Whiteside v. Dist. Court (1900), 24 Mont. 539, 63 P. 395, we stated that, 

without

trying to define its particular functions, supervisory control enables this Court 

"to control

the course of litigation in the inferior courts where those courts are proceeding 

within

their jurisdiction, but by a mistake of law, or willful disregard of it, are doing a 

gross

injustice, and there is no appeal, or the remedy by appeal is inadequate." Plumb, 

927

P.2d at 1014. 

 Having reviewed the relevant portions of the record and the briefs submitted 

in

support of and in opposition to the School District's application, we conclude on 

the facts

here that the School District has no adequate remedy by appeal from the District 

Court's

order. Therefore, supervisory control is proper in this case. Accordingly, we 

accept

jurisdiction to review the substantive issues raised in this case by writ of 

supervisory

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control.

 While the School District does not challenge the District Court's March 24, 

1997

Order bifurcating the breach of contract and bad faith claims, the School District 

does

argue that the District Court, in its April 15, 1997 Order, abused its discretion by

denying the School District's motion to try both bifurcated claims before the same 

jury

and to begin the bad faith trial immediately after the breach of contract trial. 

Specifically, the School District argues that by impaneling two separate juries and

planning to allow approximately sixty days to lapse between the trial of both 

claims, the

District Court has "severely prejudiced" the School District by denying the School

District "a speedy remedy, tantamount to a denial of justice." Furthermore, the 

School

District contends that there is no adequate remedy by appeal from having to try this 

case

twice.

 Relying on Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co. (1980), 85 F.R.D. 654, the School

District asserts that the breach of contract and bad faith claims are "inextricably

intertwined and related factual matters" and should not be separated for 

consideration by

two different juries. Furthermore, the School District contends that "putting the 

Malta

School District through two lengthy trials, with the same witnesses, to two totally

separate jury panels, would do great violence to judicial economy, would be totally 

unfair

and prejudicial to the Malta School District, would confuse rather than clarify the 

issues,

and great inconvenience would accrue to Malta Schools. . .." Rather, the School 

District

suggests that if both issues were tried before one jury, the bad faith claim would 

only

require one to two days to complete, if immediately tried after the conclusion of the

breach of contract claim, and would thereby avoid any unfairness or prejudice to the

School District.

 USF&G responds that the School District's argument that separate trials before

separate juries will be non-economical and inconvenient is unpersuasive. Rather, 

USF&G

argues that interests involving economy and convenience "must yield to the right to 

a fair

and impartial trial to all litigants." USF&G contends that to require an immediate 

second

trial before the same jury defeats the bifurcation objective to eliminate any 

prejudice to

USF&G. Accordingly, USF&G asserts that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion by ordering that each claim be tried at separate times to separate 

juries. 

Consequently, USF&G argues that this Court should deny the School District's

application for writ of supervisory control.

 In its March 24, 1997 Order, the District Court granted the School District's

motion to amend its complaint to raise a claim under the Montana Unfair Trade 

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Practices

Act and also granted USF&G's motion to bifurcate this bad faith claim from the 

original

breach of contract claim as authorized by 33-18-242, MCA. Subsequently, in its 

April

15, 1997 Order, the District Court denied the School District's motion to try both

bifurcated claims before the same jury and to begin the bad faith trial immediately 

after

the breach of contract trial. Section 33-18-242, MCA states in pertinent part:

 (1) An insured or a third-party claimant has an independent cause

 of action against an insurer for actual damages caused by the insurer's

 violation of subsection (1), (4), (5), (6), (9), or (13) of 33-18-201

 [prohibiting unfair claim settlement practices].

 . . ..

 (6)(a)An insured may file an action under this section, together with

 any other cause of action the insured has against the insurer. Actions may

 be bifurcated for trial where justice so requires.

While 33-18-242(6)(a), MCA, authorizes bifurcation of actions for trial, it 

provides no

guidance as to when bifurcation is proper, nor does the statute address the issue 

here--i.e.

if the actions are bifurcated, should or may the cases be tried to different juries. 

Consequently, we look to Rule 42(b), M.R.Civ.P., for guidance. See Britton v.

Farmers Ins. Group (1986), 221 Mont. 67, 721 P.2d 303. Rule 42(b), M.R.Civ.P.,

provides:

 The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a

 separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim,

 or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,

 counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.

 Under Rule 42(b), M.R.Civ.P., the decision as to whether to bifurcate a trial 

is

a matter left to the "broad discretion" of the district court. State ex rel. 

McGinnis v.

Dist. Court (Mont. 1983), 673 P.2d 1207, 1208. In State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Dist.

Court of Eighth Jud. Dist. (1985), 217 Mont. 106, 703 P.2d 148, we explained that 

Rule

42(b), M.R.Civ.P., is worded differently than Rule 42(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., because the

federal rule includes additional grounds for granting a separate trial and includes a

provision for the inviolate right of trial by jury. Fitzgerald, 703 P.2d at 155. 

However,

we held that despite the lack of a provision for the right of trial by jury in 

Montana's

rule, "there should be no difference in result under the Montana rule when an order 

for

separate trial is considered [because] Art. II, Section 26, 1972 Montana Constitution

provides that 'the right of trial by jury is secured to all and shall remain 

inviolate.'" 

Fitzgerald, 703 P.2d at 155. 

 While we have previously addressed the issue of presenting for decision 

bifurcated

issues to one jury seriatim, we have not considered the issue of presenting for 

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decision

bifurcated issues to separate juries. See Fitzgerald, 703 P.2d 148; Britton, 721 

P.2d 303. 

Consequently, we conclude that it is appropriate that we adopt the rule set forth in 

Martin

concerning bifurcation of issues under one case and presentation of those issues to

separate juries:

 A decision whether to use the same or separate juries must be made,

 therefore, on an individual case basis. It must be considered whether the

 issues are intertwined or are distinct; then (if distinct), the interests of

 judicial economy, fairness to the parties, clarity of the issues, and

 convenience must also be weighed. 

Martin, 85 F.R.D. at 659-60. Under this analysis, the first factor to be considered 

is

whether the issues in a case are intertwined or distinct. If the issues are 

intertwined,

bifurcation of those issues under Rule 42(b), M.R.Civ.P., whether for decision by one

jury seriatim or by separate juries, would result in extended and needless 

litigation, and,

therefore, would constitute an abuse of discretion by the district court. See 

Fitzgerald,

703 P.2d at 156; Martin, 85 F.R.D. at 659-60. Consequently, only if the issues are

distinct is bifurcation proper under Rule 42(b), M.R.Civ.P. See Fitzgerald, 703 

P.2d at

156. However, to next determine whether presentation of the bifurcated issues to

separate juries is proper, the second set of factors set forth in Martin must be 

weighed--

i.e., the interests of judicial economy, fairness to the parties, clarity of the 

issues, and

convenience. See Martin, 85 F.R.D. at 659-60.

 Here, it is conceded that bifurcation of the breach of contract and bad faith 

claims

is appropriate. Therefore, we will not address the issue of whether the issues are

intertwined or distinct. However, the issue remains whether the District Court 

abused

its discretion by ordering that each bifurcated claim be tried before a separate 

jury. As

discussed above, we must weigh certain factors--the interests of judicial economy,

fairness to the parties, clarity of the issues, and convenience--to resolve this 

issue. See

Martin, 85 F.R.D. at 659-60. The School District points out that if one jury hears 

both

bifurcated claims, the bad faith claim should only take one to two days to finish if

immediately tried after the conclusion of the breach of contract claim. In 

contrast, the

School District suggests that to try the bad faith claim to a separate jury would 

require

a much longer period of time because the second jury must be educated on the 

underlying

contract claim to understand the bad faith claim. In other words, the parties would 

have

to relitigate the entire case with virtually the same evidence and with virtually 

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the same

witnesses who would be put to the inconvenience and hardship of a second trial.

 Based upon the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that the 

District

Court abused its discretion by denying the School District's motion for the District 

Court

to impanel one jury to hear both portions of the bifurcated case without any delay

between trial of the bifurcated parts. Upon consideration of the second set of 

factors

under Martin, we conclude that none of the factors support a decision requiring two

separate juries. As the School District points out, only by trying the bad faith 

claim

immediately after the breach of contract claim to the same jury will the parties 

avoid

relitigating the entire matter. Such a result would further the interests of 

judicial

economy, ensure fairness to the parties, maintain clarity of the issues and provide

convenience to both the court and the parties. 

 The Dissent concludes that supervisory control is not proper in this case 

because

the first part of the Plumb two-part test for exercising supervisory control is not 

met. 

While we agree with the Dissent that the question before us involves a discretionary

ruling rather than a "mistake of law," we disagree that this ruling will not result 

in a

gross injustice. In Plumb, after concluding that the district court was proceeding 

based

on a mistake of law by allowing the Defendant to blame an unnamed third party for the

Plaintiff's injuries, we concentrated on the inadequacy of any remedy by appeal to 

explain

our exercise of supervisory control. We explained that supervisory control was 

proper

because the district court's mistake would cause a gross injustice to occur:

 [T]he course of discovery will be affected, the cost of preparation and trial

 will be affected, settlement by the parties will be rendered more difficult,

 and the value of any verdict will be questionable, meaning additional time

 and expense for a resolution of the issue by appeal and the inevitable

 subsequent litigation. Therefore, we conclude that any remedy available to

 the Plumbs by appeal is inadequate, and that the denial of a speedy remedy

 by supervisory control would be a denial of justice.

 Similarly here, the District Court's discretionary ruling denying the School

District's motion to try both bifurcated claims to one jury seriatim will result in 

a gross

injustice which cannot be remedied on appeal. That is, by requiring that the 

bifurcated

claims be tried to separate juries at separate times, the District Court is denying 

the

School District a speedy remedy. Plainly, this Court's refusal to exercise 

supervisory

control would force the School District to appeal this issue after trial of both 

bifurcated

claims--i.e. after prejudice to the School District has occurred and for which no 

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adequate

remedy by appeal exists. Consequently, we consider supervisory control proper in 

this

case.

 Additionally, we disagree with the Dissent's assertions that by accepting

supervisory control over discretionary rulings, such as the one at issue, "we simply 

invite

a flood of applications for supervisory control over purely discretionary decisions 

by trial

courts." We have previously exercised supervisory control over cases involving

discretionary rulings, such as those discretionary rulings pertaining to discovery 

issues. 

See e.g., Burlington Northern v. Dist. Court (1989), 239 Mont. 207, 779 P.2d 885;

Kuiper v. Dist. Court (1981), 193 Mont. 452, 632 P.2d 694 (Kuiper I); Jaap v. Dist.

Court (1981), 191 Mont. 319, 623 P.2d 1389. Our exercise of supervisory control over

this case, as well as previous cases involving discretionary rulings, in no way 

obligates

us to accept jurisdiction over all cases involving discretionary rulings. Rather, 

"[i]n

matters involving supervisory control, this Court has followed the practice of 

proceeding

on a case-by-case basis though we are careful not to substitute the power of 

supervisory

control for an appeal. Plumb, 927 P.2d at 1015 (quoting State ex rel. Deere & Co. v.

Dist. Court (1986), 224 Mont. 384, 399, 730 P.2d 396, 406). 

 Furthermore, despite the Dissent's assertions to the contrary, our conclusion 

that

the District Court abused its discretion by denying the School District's motion to 

try both

bifurcated claims before the same jury is based upon our consideration of the 

totality of

the Martin standard. As stated in Martin:

 While economy and convenience may properly be considered in the

 decision to bifurcate, neither is the ultimate objective. "A paramount

 consideration at all times in the administration of justice is a fair and

 impartial trial to all litigants. Considerations of economy of time, money

 and convenience of witnesses must yield thereto."

Martin, 85 F.R.D. at 658. As the Dissent points out, the District Court decided to 

try

the bifurcated claims at separate times to separate juries based on its "sensitivity 

to the

potential prejudice faced by the Defendants in trying both components of the case to 

the

same jury. [Emphasis added.]" Yet, the District Court failed to further articulate 

what

prejudice USF&G potentially faces. Rather, in an effort to avoid any potential 

prejudice

against USF&G, the District Court instead created actual prejudice against the School

District and thereby abused its discretion. 

 That is, as discussed previously, to try the bad faith claim to a separate 

jury would

necessarily require educating the second jury about the underlying breach of contract

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claim. To do this, the School District must relitigate and USF&G must again defend 

the

entire case using essentially the same witnesses and the same evidence. 

Effectively, the

District Court's decision prejudices both parties. Consequently, only by trying the 

bad

faith claim immediately after the breach of contract claim to the same jury will the 

parties

avoid relitigating the entire case. Furthermore, because the breach of contract and 

bad

faith claims remain bifurcated, USF&G will continue to enjoy protection from any

potential prejudice associated with the bad faith claim. Only this course of action 

will

further the interests of judicial economy, ensure fairness to the parties, maintain 

clarity

of the issues and provide convenience to both the court and the parties. And, only 

this

course of action will insure a "fair and impartial trial to all litigants."

 Accordingly, in the underlying case, Malta Public School District A and 14,

Plaintiff v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, a Maryland corporation, and

the Phillips County Insurance, Defendant, Cause No. DV-96-049, the District Court 

shall

impanel one jury to hear both bifurcated claims seriatim. The trial of the breach of

contract claim shall commence as scheduled and the trial of the bad faith claim shall

follow immediately thereafter.

 DATED this 2nd day of June, 1997.

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

Justice Karla M. Gray dissenting.

 I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion and order. It is my view 

that, in

accepting supervisory control over the District Court, we are departing from the 

standard

for supervisory control we so recently clarified in Plumb and inappropriately 

intruding

into the District Court's decisions regarding trial administration, decisions best 

left to the

court nearest to--and most familiar with--the case. In addition, even assuming the

propriety of supervisory control here, I would conclude that the District Court did 

not

abuse its discretion in denying the School District's motion to try the breach of 

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contract

and UTPA claims to the same jury seriatim. 

 As the Court observes, the Plumb standard for supervisory control allows us to

step into matters at the trial level where trial courts "by a mistake of law, or 

willful

disregard of it, are doing a gross injustice, and there is no appeal, or the remedy 

by

appeal is inadequate." This is clearly a two-part test, requiring that a gross 

injustice be

occurring via a legal mistake or disregard of the law and that there is no--or only 

an

inadequate--remedy by appeal. In my opinion, the question before us does not involve

a "mistake of law;" indeed, the Court concedes as much. Nor, in my view, is there a 

resulting gross injustice. Therefore, the first part of the Plumb test for 

exercising

supervisory control is not met.

 No one suggests that the District Court's decision at issue here is a purely 

legal

question or that the District Court disregarded the law in making its decision to 

have the

case tried to two separate juries. Rather, it is clear that this is a decision 

within the trial

court's broad discretion in controlling matters relating to trial administration. 

Since

discretionary trial court rulings encompass " 'the power of choice among several 

courses

of action, each of which is considered permissible' " (Steer, Inc. v. Department of

Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 475, 803 P.2d 601, 603-04), it is my view that

discretionary rulings do not properly come within the Plumb standard. 

 In addition, even if an abuse of discretion constituted a "mistake of law" of 

the

type envisioned in Plumb, it is simply not the case that every abuse of discretion 

results

in a "gross injustice" requiring immediate review by this Court. It is my view 

that, in

accepting such matters on supervisory control, we are unnecessarily intruding into 

the

trial courts' domain. Furthermore, in doing so, we simply invite a flood of 

applications

for supervisory control over purely discretionary decisions by trial courts. In 

fairness to

the litigants who are before us in ever-increasing numbers of appeals, and to our 

ability

to manage that appellate caseload well from both timeliness and quality 

perspectives, we

can ill afford to exponentially expand the number of original jurisdiction 

proceedings

requiring our attention. 

 Moreover, while I do not disagree with the Martin standard, it is my view 

that,

in applying that standard, the Court does not establish an abuse of the District 

Court's

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discretion, but merely substitutes its own discretion for that of the District 

Court. Martin

is clear that considerations of economy of time and convenience of witnesses must 

yield

to the " 'paramount consideration . . . [of] a fair and impartial trial to all 

litigants.' "

Martin, 85 F.R.D. at 658. In this regard, the District Court assessed both partiesþ

interests and premised its order denying the School District's motion to try both the

breach of contract and UTPA actions to the same jury specifically on its 

"sensitivity to

the potential prejudice faced by the Defendants in trying both components of the 

case to

the same jury." In other words, the District Court weighed the potential for 

prejudice

to the substance of the defendantþs case against the inconvenience to the School 

District

and exercised its discretion in favor of the defendant. This Court converts the 

School

Districtþs mere inconvenience into actual prejudice and weighs it more heavily than 

the

defendantþs potential substantive prejudice. The Court then determines that the 

District

Court--the court most familiar with the case--abused its discretion merely because 

trying

the UTPA claim to a different jury would take more time and inconvenience witnesses

for the School District. I cannot agree.

 In addition, the record reflects that the breach of contract case is 

scheduled for trial

this month and that the UTPA claim, only amended into the School District's complaint

several months ago, is far from ready for trial. In any event, the District Court's 

order

of April 15, 1997, makes it clear that the court's calendar will not accommodate 

trial of

the UTPA claim immediately following the breach of contract claim. Thus, it appears

that the Court's conclusion that the trial on the UTPA claim must be to the same 

jury and

must follow immediately after the trial on the breach of contract claim will result 

in a

delay in trying the breach of contract claim. The Court does not address these 

matters

and it escapes me how the School District's interests in resolving its underlying 

claim

and recovering the insurance proceeds for which it bargained--whatever the jury may

determine them to be--are advanced by such a result. 

 In summary, I disagree that this case meets our recently clarified test for 

accepting

a case on supervisory control. That test apparently exists no more. In addition, I

disagree that any abuse of discretion has been established under Martin. I would 

deny

the School District's application for a writ of supervisory control.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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