U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

33–420 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

DOE MODERNIZATION: LEGISLATION ADDRESSING 

DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS OF ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY 

TECHNOLOGIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 22, 2018 

Serial No. 115–132 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

Chairman 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Vice Chairman 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILL FLORES, Texas 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

Ranking Member 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KURT SCHRADER, Oregon 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III, Massachusetts 

TONY CA ́ RDENAS, California 

RAUL RUIZ, California 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

Vice Chairman 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILL FLORES, Texas 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio) 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

Ranking Member 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KURT SCHRADER, Oregon 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III, Massachusetts 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey (ex 

officio) 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of Oregon, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of 

New Jersey, opening statement .......................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

WITNESSES

Brent Park, Ph.D., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Proliferation, 

National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy ................ 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 176 

Edward G. McGinnis, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy ................................................................................ 19 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 189 

Jeffrey S. Merrifield, Partner, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP, and 

Senior Advisor, ClearPath Action ....................................................................... 52 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 202 

Melissa C. Mann, President, URENCO USA, Inc., and Member, United States 

Nuclear Industry Council .................................................................................... 62 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 64 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 206 

James Nicholas Irvin, Director, Research and Development, Strategy, Advanced Nuclear, and Crosscutting Technology, Southern Company, and 

Member, Advanced Reactor Working Group, Nuclear Energy Institute ......... 74 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 76 

Edwin Lyman, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of 

Concerned Scientists ............................................................................................ 92 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 94 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

H.R. 1320, the Nuclear Utilization of Keynote Energy Act, submitted by 

Mr. Upton ............................................................................................................. 126 

Discussion Draft, a Bill to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, submitted 

by Mr. Upton ........................................................................................................ 146 

Discussion Draft, the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act, submitted 

by Mr. Upton ........................................................................................................ 154 

Discussion Draft, a Report on Pilot Program for Micro-Reactors, submitted 

by Mr. Upton ........................................................................................................ 159 

Issue Brief of March 2018, ‘‘US Nuclear-Power Leadership and the Chinese 

and Russian Challenge,’’ by Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr., Atlantic Council, 

submitted by Mr. Upton ...................................................................................... 164 

Letter of May 21, 2018, from John Hopkins, Chairman and Chief Executive 

Officer, NuScale Power, LLC, to Mr. Upton and Mr. Rush, submitted by 

Mr. Shimkus ......................................................................................................... 171 

Page

IV 

Speech, ‘‘The Nuclear Power Plant in Astrava, Belarus,’’ by Mr. Shimkus, 

submitted by Mr. Shimkus .................................................................................. 172 

(1) 

DOE MODERNIZATION: LEGISLATION ADDRESSING DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION, 

AND COMPETITIVENESS OF ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Upton, Barton, Shimkus, 

Latta, Harper, McKinley, Kinzinger, Griffith, Johnson, Long, 

Bucshon, Flores, Mullin, Hudson, Walberg, Duncan, Walden (ex 

officio), Rush, McNerney, Peters, Green, Doyle, Castor, Welch, 

Tonko, Loebsack, Schrader, Kennedy, and Pallone (ex officio). 

Staff present: Mike Bloomquist, Staff Director; Samantha Bopp, 

Staff Assistant; Daniel Butler, Staff Assistant; Kelly Collins, Legislative Clerk, Energy/Environment; Margaret Tucker Fogarty, Staff 

Assistant; Adam Fromm, Director of Outreach and Coalitions; Jordan Haverly, Policy Coordinator, Environment; Milly Lothian, 

Press Assistant and Digital Coordinator; Mary Martin, Chief Counsel, Energy/Environment; Drew McDowell, Executive Assistant; 

Brandon Mooney, Deputy Chief Counsel, Energy; Mark Ratner, 

Policy Coordinator; Peter Spencer, Senior Professional Staff Member, Energy; Austin Stonebraker, Press Assistant; Hamlin Wade, 

Special Advisor for External Affairs; Everett Winnick, Director of 

Information Technology; Andy Zach, Senior Professional Staff 

Member, Environment; Priscilla Barbour, Minority Energy Fellow; 

Jeff Carroll, Minority Staff Director; Rick Kessler, Minority Senior 

Advisor and Staff Director, Energy and Environment; John Marshall, Minority Policy Coordinator; Alexander Ratner, Minority Policy Analyst; Andrew Souvall, Minority Director of Communications, 

Member Services, and Outreach; Tuley Wright, Minority Energy 

and Environment Policy Advisor; and C.J. Young, Minority Press 

Secretary. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. UPTON. Good morning, everybody. Sorry I am a few minutes 

late. Good morning. And welcome to our hearing to discuss four 

2 

very important legislative proposals to address and advance our 

Nation’s nuclear energy policy. 

You know, as we have heard throughout Congress, our Nation’s 

international nuclear leadership is eroding. Last week, a report by 

Bloomberg New Energy Finance found that nearly a quarter of our 

Nation’s fleet of nuclear power reactors are at risk of early closure 

in the next couple of years. 

These 24 at-risk reactors total over 6 percent of the total electricity generated in the U.S., about how much electricity is consumed in Michigan and Illinois combined. And if we are going to 

get serious about an all-of-the-above energy strategy and the value 

of a diverse, clean energy portfolio, the implications of this threat 

cannot be ignored. 

The decision to close a nuclear power plant is irreversible. We 

know that. Reactors cannot be re-licensed to produce power once 

they cease operation. And if the projected retirement of nuclear energy is realized, the fleet’s significant loss will lead to a ripple effect throughout the nuclear supply chain. 

Fuel cycle facilities that underpin both commercial and national 

security needs lose critical capacity. And technology services that 

provide world-class simulation to modernize and maximize nuclear 

safety will look to other global markets that have growth potential. 

The next generation of nuclear engineering and scientists would 

dry up as educational institutions can no longer continue to support the necessary facilities and programs. International leaders in 

the nuclear field made clear, made clear to this subcommittee a 

couple months ago that these cumulative repercussions will weaken our national security standing and, if it continues, would require a generation of sustained Federal commitment to rebuild. 

I don’t cede that the outcome is inevitable. The thoughtful proposals that we are going to examine today provide directed solutions to address these multifaceted challenges. 

H.R. 1320, sponsored by Representatives Kinzinger and Doyle, 

brings budgetary discipline to the NRC and improves transparency 

and predictability for civilian nuclear companies. Under current 

statutory requirements, the NRC recovers about 90 percent of its 

total budget from NRC licensees. As a result, my Southwest Michigan ratepayers help fund the NRC to regulate, license, and oversee 

the commercial nuclear industry. The Kinzinger-Doyle bill also lays 

out basic expectations that align with the NRC’s established tradition of adhering to the organization’s Principles of Good Regulation. 

Congressman Johnson’s discussion draft discusses the global 

competitive challenges for the nuclear supplier community. When 

provided a level playing field, I am confident American know-how 

and technological leadership is the best in the world. However, nuclear companies backed by foreign governments, which don’t necessarily share our values, artificially subsidize our competition. The 

motivation behind these actions is clear. Mr. Johnson’s bill will improve the ability of our companies to compete, and win, in international markets. 

Imagine designing a new car that is cheaper, safer, and gets triple the fuel mileage from anything that we see on the road today, 

but when the vehicle is ready to hit the road, there is just no gas 

to fill up the tank. Nuclear innovators face just that challenge. 

3 

Advanced nuclear technologies offer a wealth of promising benefits. However, for these designs to become reality, a certain amount 

of advanced nuclear fuel must be available for the first movers. 

Congressman Flores’ legislation helps address this obstacle by directing DOE to undertake specific actions to provide what is known 

as high-assay low-enriched uranium. The time to begin addressing 

this problem is now in order to have the advanced fuel available 

when it is needed. 

The fourth bill, bipartisan legislation from Congressmen Hudson, 

Peters, Wilson, and Norcross, directs the Secretary of Energy to 

identify the key components for a pilot program that could capture 

the energy security benefits of future nuclear technologies to support critical national security infrastructure. 

This morning we are going to hear from the Department Energy 

on the first panel, including the Office of Nuclear Energy and 

NNSA. We are also going to hear several expert perspectives on the 

second panel. 

I look forward to that discussion, and at this point would yield 

to the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Rush from Illinois. 

[The proposed legislation appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON

Good morning and welcome to our hearing to discuss four important legislative 

proposals to address and advance our Nation’s nuclear energy policy. 

As we have heard throughout Congress, our Nation’s international nuclear leadership is eroding. Just last week, a report by Bloomberg New Energy Finance found 

that nearly a quarter of our Nation’s fleet of nuclear power reactors are at risk of 

early closure in the next few years. 

These 24 at-risk reactors total over 6 percent of the total electricity generated in 

the United States, about how much electricity is consumed in Michigan and Illinois 

combined. If we are serious about an all-of-the-above energy strategy and the value 

of a diverse, clean energy portfolio, the implications of this threat cannot be ignored. 

The decision to close a nuclear power plant is irreversible. Reactors cannot be relicensed to produce power once they cease operation. If the projected retirement of 

nuclear energy is realized, the fleet’s significant loss will lead to a ripple effect 

throughout the nuclear supply chain. 

Fuel cycle facilities, that underpin both commercial and national security needs, 

lose critical capacity. Technology services that provide world-class simulation to 

maximize nuclear safety will look to other global markets that have growth potential. The next generation of nuclear engineering and scientists would dry up as educational institutions can no longer continue to support the necessary facilities and 

programs. International leaders in the nuclear field made clear to this subcommittee 

in February, these cumulative repercussions will weaken our national security 

standing and, if it continues, would require a generation of sustained Federal commitment to rebuild. 

But I do not yet cede that outcome as inevitable. The thoughtful proposals we will 

examine today provide directed solutions to address these multifaceted challenges. 

H.R. 1320, sponsored by Representatives Kinzinger and Doyle, brings budgetary 

discipline to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and improves transparency 

and predictability for civilian nuclear companies. Under current statutory requirements, the NRC recovers about 90 percent of its total budget from NRC licensees. 

As a result, my Southwestern Michigan ratepayers help fund NRC to regulate, license, and oversee the commercial nuclear industry. The Kinzinger-Doyle bill also 

lays out basic expectations that align with NRC’s established tradition of adhering 

to the organization’s Principles of Good Regulation. 

Congressman Johnson’s discussion draft addresses the global competitive challenges for the nuclear supplier community. When provided a level playing field, I 

am confident American know-how and technological leadership is the best in the 

4 

world. However, nuclear companies backed by foreign governments, which don’t necessarily share our American values, artificially subsidize our competition. The motivation behind these actions is clear. Our adversaries seek to establish 50-year, or 

longer, geostrategic relationships. Mr. Johnson’s bill will improve the ability of our 

companies to compete, and win, in international markets. 

Imagine designing a new car that is cheaper, safer, and gets triple the fuel mileage from anything we see on the road today. But when the vehicle is ready to hit 

the road, there is no gas to fill up the tank. Nuclear innovators face just that challenge. 

Advanced nuclear technologies offer a wealth of promising benefits. However, for 

these designs to become reality, a certain amount of advanced nuclear fuel must be 

available for the first movers. Congressman Flores’ legislation helps address this obstacle by directing DOE to undertake specific actions to provide what is known as 

high-assay low-enriched uranium. The time to begin addressing this problem is now 

in order to have the advanced fuel available when needed. 

The fourth bill, the bipartisan legislation from Congressmen Hudson, Peters, Wilson, and Norcross, directs the Secretary of Energy to identify the key components 

for a pilot program that could capture the energy security benefits of future nuclear 

technologies to support critical national security infrastructure. 

This morning we will here from the Department of Energy on the first panel, including from the office of Nuclear Energy and the NNSA. We will also hear several 

expert perspectives on the second panel. I look forward to the discussion and working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to advance these important bipartisan bills. 

I look forward to the feedback the two panels of expert witnesses will provide this 

morning, as well as working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to advance 

these important bipartisan bills. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Mr. RUSH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank 

you so much for holding this important hearing today on legislation 

addressing the development, regulation, and competitiveness of advanced nuclear technologies. 

As I have said many times before, Mr. Chairman, I subscribe to 

an all-of-the-above energy portfolio, even as we move towards a low 

carbon energy economy. I have also stated on many occasions that 

I believe nuclear energy must play a vital role as a source of safe, 

reliable, low carbon power that can help us meet the energy and 

environmental needs of the 21st Century. 

I look forward to working with the majority as we proceed 

through regular order. And I believe that we may be able to come 

to a strong, bipartisan agreement on most, if not all of these bills. 

Today, Mr. Chairman, I support the discussion draft offered by 

Mr. Flores of Texas which would simply direct the Secretary of Energy to establish a program to support the availability of highassay low-enriched uranium, or HA–LEU, for commercial use. We 

have learned that there are several companies looking to design 

and license advanced nuclear reactor technologies utilizing uranium-235 isotopes enriched at levels greater than 5 percent and 

less than 20 percent. Some of these companies identified significant 

challenges associated with assessing HA–LEU. 

And I believe Mr. Flores’ discussion draft will address some of 

these concerns and make HA–LEU more accessible with the right 

safeguards. Also, I support, Mr. Chairman, that the discussion 

draft offered by a group of bipartisan Members, including two from 

this subcommittee, Mr. Hudson of North Carolina, and Mr. Peters 

of California. This bill would require the Secretary of Energy to deVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:51 Jan 04, 2019 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 I:\115THCONGRESS\115X132DOENUCLEARLEGPDFSAVED\115X132DOENUCLEARPDF
5 

velop a report on a pilot program to site, construct, and operate 

microreactors at critical national security locations. 

Mr. Chairman, I am also inclined to support some of the objectives of H.R. 1320, which will amend the NRC fee recovery process 

associated with the advanced reactor regulatory framework, while 

also limiting internal funds available for corporate support costs 

and capping fees on operating reactors. 

However, Mr. Chairman, I do have some concerns regarding the 

bill’s provisions essentially repealing licensing assistance to foreign 

governments. Also want to better understand verification of repealing requirements for mandatory hearing while also implementing 

specific time lines to review environmental impact statements and 

how these changes might impact public input. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I also look forward to engaging today’s 

witnesses on the discussion draft sponsored by Mr. Johnson of 

Ohio. This bill would, among other things, revise DOE’s review of 

Part 810 process by expediting procedures for transferring civilian 

nuclear technology, including to foreign powers. Mr. Chairman, this 

proposal comes against the background of the current administration’s decision to renege on the U.S. commitment in the Iran deal 

while also moving forward on potential talks with North Korea’s 

volatile dictator on denuclearization issues. 

So I look forward to hearing today’s distinguished panel on both 

the timing and the necessity of this legislation, as well as identifying possible unintended consequences. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rush follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing today on 

legislation addressing the development, regulation, and competitiveness of advanced 

nuclear technologies. 

Mr. Chairman, as I have stated many times before, I subscribe to an all-of-theabove energy portfolio, even as we move towards a low-carbon energy economy. 

I have also stated on many occasions that I believe nuclear energy must play a 

vital role as a source of safe, reliable, low-carbon power that can help us meet both 

the energy and environmental needs of the 21st Century. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with the majority as we proceed through 

regular order and I believe we may be able to come to a strong bipartisan agreement 

on most, if not all of those bills. 

Today, I support the discussion draft, authored by Rep. Flores of Texas, which 

would simply direct the Secretary of Energy to establish a program to support the 

availability of high-assay low-enriched uranium, or HA–LEU, for commercial use. 

We have learned that there are several companies looking to design and license 

advanced nuclear reactor technologies utilizing uranium-235 isotopes enriched at 

levels greater than 5 percent and less than 20 percent. 

Some of these companies identified significant challenges associated with accessing HA–LEU and I believe Mr. Flores’ discussion draft would address some of these 

concerns and make HA–LEU more accessible with the right safeguards. 

I also support the discussion draft authored by a group of bipartisan Members, 

including two from this subcommittee, Mr. Hudson of North Carolina and Mr. 

Peters of California. 

This bill would require the Secretary of Energy to develop a report on a pilot program to site, construct, and operate microreactors at critical national security locations. 

Mr. Chairman, I am also inclined to support some of the objectives of HR 1320, 

which would amend the NRC’s fee recovery process associated with the advanced 

6 

reactor regulatory framework, while also limiting the total funds available for corporate support costs, and capping fees on operating reactors. 

However, I have some concerns regarding the bills’ provision potentially repealing 

licensing restrictions to foreign governments. 

I also want to better understand the implications of repealing requirements for 

mandatory hearings, while also implementing specific timelines to review final environmental impact statements and how that might impact public input. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I also look forward to engaging today’s witnesses on the 

discussion draft sponsored by Mr. Johnson of Ohio. 

This bill would, among other things, revise DOE’s review of the Part 810 process 

by expediting procedures for transferring civilian nuclear technology, including to 

foreign powers. 

Mr. Chairman, this proposal comes against the backdrop of the current administration’s decision to renege on the U.S. commitment in the Iran Deal, while also 

moving forward on potential talks with North Korea’s volatile dictator on 

denuclearization issues. 

So, I look forward to engaging today’s distinguished panelists on both the timing 

and necessity of this legislation, as well as identifying possible unintended consequences. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with that I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. UPTON. The Chair recognizes for an opening statement the 

chair of the full committee, the gentleman from Oregon. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON 

Mr. WALDEN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding 

this hearing. This really represents an important component of our 

Department of Energy effort at modernization. 

The bills we will examine today provide key ingredients to enhance a core national security and energy security mission for the 

Department, and of the Nation: promoting the safe and peaceful 

use of nuclear technology. It is really important. 

Congress first authorized the commercial application of atomic 

energy in 1954, when it declared the, and I quote, ‘‘development, 

use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote 

world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of 

living, and strengthen free competition in private enterprise.’’ That 

policy remains as relevant today and as important as ever. 

By any measure, atomic energy has already brought tremendous 

benefits to the Nation; it has provided a baseload, emissions-free 

source of electricity that has powered homes and industry over the 

last half a century. It has provided an infrastructure for our national and international security, from the technologies and fuels 

for our nuclear navy to the safety and security for civilian nuclear 

power the world over. 

However, as everyone on this panel knows well, a confluence of 

factors—abundant natural gas, power market designs, economic 

and regulatory burdens—have inhibited the Nation’s nuclear energy over the past decade. The challenge confronting policymakers 

is how to preserve the beneficial use of atomic energy for future 

generations. Thoughtful, targeted legislative proposals today I 

think are a really good start. 

The bipartisan bill from Representatives Kinzinger and Doyle establishes reasonable and predictable time frames for regulatory decisions so companies like Oregon-based Nuscale Power can develop 

business plans to commercialize new nuclear technologies, while 

also protecting future consumers from high regulatory costs. 

7 

The many regulatory requirements imposed by the Federal Government on special nuclear material are understandable due to the 

risk associated with unsecured radioactive sources, but this presents barriers to new market entrants, too. Congressman Flores’ 

discussion draft will spur innovation by providing a solution to advanced nuclear fuel needs. 

And the bipartisan discussion draft from E&C members Hudson 

and Peters and two members of the Armed Services Committee, 

Congressmen Wilson and Norcross, will help identify specific national security applications to capture the benefits of transformational nuclear reactor designs. For example, Idaho National 

Laboratory’s remote location and critical defense programs may be 

an ideal location to construct and operate a resilient nuclear reactor. 

And lastly, Congressman Johnson’s discussion draft will help reduce barriers to competition facing our domestic manufacturing, 

vendors, and nuclear service companies. This is a critical conversation for this subcommittee and one we must not shy away from. 

This morning’s witnesses bring both extensive experience in public service and business acumen. And we thank you both for being 

here. 

I want to welcome Dr. Brent Park, the recently confirmed Deputy 

Administrator for Defense Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear 

Security Administration. Dr. Park is responsible for critical national security programs that keep America safe. Dr. Park is joined 

on the first panel by Ed McGinnis from DOE’s Office of Nuclear 

Energy. So we appreciate your being here. 

And the second panel this morning includes Melissa Mann, the 

president of URENCO, USA. URENCO is the only domestically located, NRC-licensed facility to enrich uranium for commercial use. 

Ms. Mann brings a wealth of insight to this discussion on behalf 

of the U.S. nuclear supply chain industry. 

And Southern Nuclear has assumed the leadership mantle on behalf of utilities to assess and develop advanced nuclear reactor designs. Nick Irvin leads those efforts for Southern Company and offers a hands-on testimonial of the rigorous process underway across 

the country to seek regulatory approval for promising first-of-itskind technologies. 

I also want to welcome back Jeff Merrifield, who has testified in 

this room many times, going back to his tenure as an NRC Commissioner. He is now practicing law with a focus on advanced nuclear reactors and strategic counsel to energy companies. Jeff provides an abundance of experience to inform today’s discussions. 

There remains tremendous promise for America’s nuclear technology. And we can ensure that promise through legislative reforms reflective of our committee priorities to put consumers first, 

advance innovation, protect national security, and spur competition. I believe the four bills today align with those priorities. 

So I look forward to and thank our Members on both sides of the 

aisle for coming together for these initiatives. And I would be remiss if I didn’t also thank the committee, and especially Mr. Shimkus, for the effort to get a permanent and interim nuclear waste 

storage facility up and running. He and I won the pool on the vote 

count in the House. We both independently predicted 340 votes 

8 

would be achieved, and that was the number. Now we just need, 

you know, 100 in the Senate. Maybe 98 would do. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, we remain committed to moving 

forward on this energy front. And I return the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN

Today’s Energy Subcommittee legislative hearing represents an important component of our DOE modernization efforts. 

The bills we will examine provide key ingredients to enhance a core national security and energy security mission of the Department, and of the Nation: promoting 

the safe and peaceful use of nuclear technology. 

When Congress first authorized the commercial application of atomic energy in 

1954, it declared: the ‘‘development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the 

standard of living, and strengthen free competition in private enterprise.’’ 

That policy remains as relevant today and as important as ever. 

By any measure, atomic energy has already brought tremendous benefits to the 

Nation; it has provided a baseload, emissions-free source of electricity that has powered homes and industry over the past half-century. It has provided an infrastructure for our national and international security—from the technologies and fuels for 

our nuclear navy to the safety and security for civilian nuclear power. 

However, as everybody on this panel knows well, a confluence of factors—abundant natural gas, power market designs, economic and regulatory burdens- have inhibited the Nation’s nuclear industry over the past decade. 

The challenge confronting policymakers is how to preserve the beneficial use of 

atomic energy for future generations. Today’s thoughtful, targeted legislative proposals are a good start. 

The bipartisan bill from Representatives Kinzinger and Doyle establishes reasonable and predictable timeframes for regulatory decisions so companies like Oregonbased Nuscale Power can develop business plans to commercialize new nuclear technologies, while also protecting future consumers from unnecessarily high regulatory 

costs. 

The many regulatory requirements imposed by the Federal Government on special 

nuclear material are understandable due to the risk associated with unsecure radioactive sources, but these regulations present barriers to new market entrants. Congressman Flores’ discussion draft will spur innovation by providing a solution to advanced nuclear fuel needs. 

The bipartisan discussion draft from committee members Hudson and Peters and 

two members of the Armed Services Committee, Congressmen Wilson andNorcross, 

will help identify specific national security applications to capture the benefits of 

transformational nuclear reactor designs. For example, Idaho National Laboratory’s 

remote location and critical defense programs may be an ideal location to construct 

and operate a resilient nuclear reactor. 

And lastly, Congressman Johnson’s discussion draft will help reduce barriers to 

competition facing our domestic manufacturing, vendors, and nuclear service companies. This is a critical conversation for this subcommittee, and one we must not shy 

away from. 

This morning’s witnesses bring both extensive experience in public service and 

business acumen. 

I welcome Dr. Brent Park, the recently confirmed Deputy Administrator for Defense Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Dr. Park 

is responsible for overseeing critical national security programs that keep America 

safe. Dr. Park is joined on the first panel by Ed McGinnis from DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy. 

The second panel this morning includes Melissa Mann, the president of Urenco, 

USA. Urenco is the only domestically located, NRC-licensed facility to enrich uranium for commercial use. Ms. Mann brings a wealth of insight to this discussion 

on behalf of the U.S. nuclear supply chain industry. 

Southern Nuclear has assumed the leadership mantle on behalf of utilities to assess and develop advanced nuclear reactor designs. Nick Irvin leads those efforts for 

Southern Company and offers a hands-on testimonial of the rigorous process underway across the country to seek regulatory approval for promising first-of-a-kind 

technologies. 

9 

I also welcome back Jeff Merrifield, who has testified in this room many times 

going back to his tenure as an NRC Commissioner. He is now practicing law with 

a focus on advanced nuclear reactors and strategic counsel to energy companies. Jeff 

provides an abundance of experience to inform today’s discussion. 

There remains tremendous promise for American nuclear technology; and we can 

ensure that promise through legislative reforms, reflective of our committee priorities to put consumers first, advance innovation, protect national security, and spur 

competition. The four bills today align with those priorities. 

I appreciate the bipartisan leadership from Members on this topic and look forward to moving these important bills forward. 

Mr. UPTON. The Chair would recognize the ranking member of 

the full committee, Mr. Pallone, for an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today’s hearing will examine four bills addressing a range of topics relating to advanced nuclear energy technology. H.R. 1320, the 

Nuclear Utilization of Keynote Energy Act, introduced by Representatives Kinzinger and Doyle, builds upon a discussion draft 

that this subcommittee reviewed in 2016. 

H.R. 1320 makes several major changes to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s budgeting process and fee structure. The bill 

caps corporate support costs at the Commission and puts a ceiling 

on the fee charged to each nuclear reactor. I appreciate the financial strain the nuclear industry is facing and the carbon free energy 

it provides, however, I am concerned that these budgetary changes 

could arbitrarily limit the resources the NRC needs and adversely 

affect its ability to do its job. 

I also have questions about Section 7 of the bill which sets up 

an expedited time line for review of nuclear reactors at the NRC. 

The bill provides 24 months to complete a draft environmental impact statement and 42 months to complete the technical review 

process. Inflexible deadlines could jeopardize the environmental 

and safety review process for more complex applications. 

And I am also concerned with the provision in the section that 

requires NRC issue a construction permit to a nuclear facility even 

if an entity has filed a formal request for a hearing objecting to the 

project. Stakeholders should have the chance to voice their concerns publicly before a project permit is issued. 

But despite my issues with those sections of the bill, I am supportive of setting a deadline for the NRC to finish its decommissioning rulemaking and removing advanced nuclear reactor work at 

NRC from the fee recovery requirement. I look forward to work 

with my colleagues on this bill as we move forward in the process. 

The committee will also review a discussion draft from Representative Johnson that makes changes to the process by which 

the Secretary of Energy authorizes the transfer of unclassified nuclear energy technology and assistance to foreign countries. This is 

known as the Part 810 process. I appreciate that this process must 

function well for the U.S. to remain competitive in the commercial 

nuclear space, but the bill establishes a 30-day time frame for the 

Secretary to approve the transfer of certain low proliferation risk 

10 

nuclear technologies to countries that are not nuclear weapon 

states. 

Unfortunately, President Trump has put us on the path to upend 

the current dynamic of nuclear weapons proliferation across the 

globe. The President has walked away from the Iran deal. And now 

Saudi Arabia has said that if Iran restarts its nuclear program 

Saudi Arabia will itself pursue building nuclear weapons. And I am 

uncomfortable with expediting the review process of Part 810 at a 

time when there is so much global uncertainty on nuclear proliferation. This is not the right time to address this issue. 

Next, the committee will consider a discussion draft from Representative Flores to accelerate the availability of high-assay lowenriched uranium. This is the fuel needed for most advanced nuclear reactor designs. It is not commercially available today. In 

order to ensure the fuel is available for advanced reactors once 

they are licensed and ready to begin producing electricity, the Federal Government will need to coordinate efforts within agencies 

and with the commercial nuclear sector. This is a worthy effort, 

and I look forward to working with the majority on this proposal. 

And last, we have a discussion draft that directs the Departments of Energy and Defense to develop a report evaluating the resiliency benefits of siting microreactors at critical DOE and DoD infrastructure sites. I believe this report will provide the committee 

with valuable information, and commend Representatives Peters 

and Hudson, as well as my New Jersey colleague, Representative 

Norcross, for taking up this important issue. 

But finally, I want to thank, I do want to thank Priscilla 

Barbour, who has provided invaluable support over the last year as 

an energy fellow on the minority committee staff. Priscilla is finishing her fellowship tomorrow, and I wish her well on her future 

endeavors. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR. 

Today’s hearing will examine four bills addressing a range of topics relating to 

advanced nuclear energy technologies. 

H.R. 1320, the Nuclear Utilization of Keynote Energy Act, introduced by Representatives Kinzinger and Doyle, builds upon a discussion draft that this subcommittee reviewed in 2016. H.R. 1320 makes several major changes to the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) budgeting process and fee structure. The bill caps 

corporate support costs at the Commission and puts a ceiling on the fee charged to 

each nuclear reactor. I appreciate the financial strain the nuclear industry is facing 

and the carbon-free energy it provides. However, I am concerned that these budgetary changes could arbitrarily limit the resources the NRC needs and adversely affect its ability to do its job. 

I also have questions about section 7 of the bill, which sets up an expedited 

timeline for review of nuclear reactors at the NRC. The bill provides 24 months to 

complete a draft environmental impact statement and 42 months to complete the 

technical review process. Inflexible deadlines could jeopardize the environmental 

and safety review process for more complex applications. I am also concerned with 

a provision in this section that requires NRC to issue a construction permit for a 

nuclear facility even if an entity has filed a formal request for a hearing objecting 

to the project. Stakeholders should have the chance to voice their concerns publicly 

before a project permit is issued. 

Despite my issues with those sections of the bill, I am supportive of setting a 

deadline for the NRC to finish its decommissioning rulemaking and removing advanced nuclear reactor work at NRC from the fee recovery requirement. I look forward to working with my colleagues on this bill as we move forward in the process. 

11 

The committee will also review a discussion draft from Rep. Johnson that makes 

changes to the process by which the Secretary of Energy authorizes the transfer of 

unclassified nuclear energy technology and assistance to foreign countries. This is 

known as the Part 810 process. I appreciate that this process must function well 

for the U.S. to remain competitive in the commercial nuclear space. But, the bill 

establishes a 30-day time frame for the Secretary to approve the transfer of certain 

‘‘low proliferation risk’’ nuclear technologies to countries that are not nuclear weapons states. 

Unfortunately, President Trump has put us on the path to upend the current dynamic of nuclear weapons proliferation across the globe. The President has walked 

away from the Iran deal, and now Saudi Arabia has said that if Iran restarts its 

nuclear program, Saudi Arabia will itself pursue building nuclear weapons. I am uncomfortable with expediting the review process for Part 810 at a time when there 

is so much global uncertainty on nuclear proliferation. This is not the right time 

to address this issue. 

Next, the committee will consider a discussion draft from Rep. Flores to accelerate 

the availability of high-assay low-enriched uranium. This is the fuel needed for most 

advanced nuclear reactor designs. It is not commercially available today. In order 

to ensure the fuel is available for advanced reactors once they are licensed and 

ready to begin producing electricity, the Federal Government will need to coordinate 

efforts within agencies, and with the commercial nuclear sector. This is a worthy 

effort, and I look forward to working with the majority on this proposal. 

Last, we have a discussion draft that directs the Departments of Energy and Defense to develop a report evaluating the resiliency benefits of siting microreactors 

at critical DOE and DOD infrastructure sites. I believe this report will provide the 

committee with valuable information, and commend Representatives Peters and 

Hudson, as well as my New Jersey colleague, Rep. Norcross for taking up this important issue. 

Finally, I want to thank Priscilla Barbour, who has provided invaluable support 

over the last year as an energy fellow on the minority committee staff. Priscilla is 

finishing her fellowship tomorrow. 

Mr. PALLONE. And then I would like to yield my minute to Mr. 

Doyle. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Pallone. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. I appreciate the opportunity 

to discuss nuclear energy, which is a critical component of our Nation’s energy portfolio. 

Nuclear energy provides nearly 40 percent of Pennsylvania’s electricity, and employs thousands of skilled workers in Pennsylvania. 

This carbon-free, reliable baseload power is also an important factor in meeting our climate goals, which is why it is necessary to 

work collaboratively to address the issues confronting the nuclear 

industry. 

I want to thank my colleague, Congressman Adam Kinzinger, for 

his leadership introducing H.R. 1320, the NUKE Act. This bipartisan legislation would take important steps to modernize the 

NRC’s fee structure, study new opportunities for additional regulatory certainty, and look to future reforms that will ensure the 

NRC can continue to effectively protect public health and safety. 

I would note that this legislation was originally entitled the 

NUKEPA Act, so I appreciate that the name has evolved so that 

it no longer poses a threat to the State of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Chairman, with that, I thank you and yield back. 

Mr. UPTON. The gentleman’s time has expired. We are now ready 

to start our distinguished panel’s testimony. We welcome Brent 

Park, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the NNSA; and Ed McGinnis, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for the Office of Nuclear Energy at DOE. 

12 

So, welcome to both. And each, thank you for submitting your 

testimony in advance. It will be made part of the record in its entirety. And we would like you to spend 5 minutes each, no longer 

than that, to discuss the summary, at which point we will go to 

questions. 

Dr. Park, we will welcome you first. 

STATEMENTS OF BRENT PARK, PH.D., DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND EDWARD G. MCGINNIS, PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY, 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

STATEMENT OF BRENT PARK 

Dr. PARK. Good morning, Chairman Upton, Ranking Member 

Rush, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to provide views on behalf of the Department of Energy’s 

National Nuclear Security Administration on the proposed pieces of 

legislation. I appreciate the ongoing bipartisan efforts to address 

our Nation’s energy challenges. 

First I would like to discuss the potential for DOE to establish 

a program to support the availability of high-assay low-enriched 

uranium, so-called HA–LEU. NNSA fully agrees with the committee that availability of HA–LEU is important, and recognizes 

the need that industry has expressed for researching and developing HA–LEU fuels. 

Enriched uranium is required at various levels of enrichment 

and forms for national security and nonproliferation missions, as 

well as an equalizer for production. Since the United States no 

longer has a uranium enrichment capability for these missions, the 

Nation relies on inventory of highly enriched uranium material 

that is unblended to meet the enriched uranium requirements identified above. However, our supply is finite, and at present irreplaceable. Moreover, our current stores of HA–LEU will run out in the 

early 2040s. 

To meet industry needs, NNSA will evaluate any specific requests from industry for this material alongside NNSA’s ongoing 

needs for enriched uranium for defense and nondefense purposes. 

NNSA supports the language in the bill regarding the development of a transportation package for HA–LEU, and exploring options to establish a domestic HA–LEU enrichment and production 

capability. NNSA strongly supports such an enrichment capability 

which we believe is essential in assuring a long-term supply of HA– 

LEU to meet the needs of the commercial industry, research reactors, and medical isotope products. 

A second bill with NNSA components for discussion today pertains to DOE’s authority under 10 C.F.R. Part 810 to regulate exports of U.S. civil nuclear technology and assistance for peaceful 

purposes. Overall, this draft legislation will deliver useful and 

practical improvements of the regulatory process that is important 

to the Nation’s security and economic prosperity. 

We appreciate the opportunity to come before you today as well 

as continue the discussion with your staff on any issues that may 

13 

arise. The Department seeks to ensure the highest nonproliferation 

standards are applied globally in such a way as to facilitate U.S. 

exports. The burgeoning international nuclear energy market provides a significant commercial opportunity for the U.S. nuclear industry, and the export of U.S. nuclear technology plays a large part 

in making sure U.S. industry remains an active player in this market. 

In response to feedback from the U.S. industry and other stakeholders, we have taken a number of steps to simplify and update 

the Part 810 regulation, and have implemented significant improvements in the process for reviewing export applications. In addition to the Department’s recent implementation of the e810 electronic application system, the committee’s legislation will further 

streamline the review process in general, while maintaining strong 

nonproliferation controls on U.S. nuclear technology. 

We agree that this legislation will empower the Secretary of Energy to authorize technology and systems exports in a more expeditious manner. I look forward to additional discussion with the committee. 

In our view, this legislation will reduce processing times for applications involving certain reactor technologies and destinations 

that present a low risk of nuclear proliferation, and will provide 

the Department with flexibility to recommend the Secretary to delegate some application approvals to a lower level. 

Another advantage the bill provides is the requirement for DOE 

offices to review Part 810 applications at the same time that they 

are being reviewed by the interagency whether they are performing 

these reviews expressly. We are happy to report that the Department has already begun this process, and we are confident this is 

yet another step in the right direction. 

NNSA recognizes that the effective implementation of our mission is to strengthen our strong partnerships with industry. NNSA 

needs these strong energy partners to resolve the critical national 

security issues that we face. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. And 

I, with my staff, look forward to future discussions of this draft bill. 

I stand ready to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Park follows:] 

14 


Statement of Dr. Brent Park 

Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

National Nuclear Security Administration 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Energy 

U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce 

May 22,2018 

Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Rush, and Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to 

appear before you on behalf of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA). Today, I will provide general and technical comments on two bills. 

The first pertains to the potential for DOE to establish and catTy out a program to support the 

availability of high assay low-enriched uranium (!lA-LEU) for commercial use and other 

purposes. The second pertains to DOE's authority under 10 CFR Part 810 to authorize civil 

nuclear trade, helping to ensure that nuclear technologies and assistance exported from the 

United States will be used only for peaceful purposes. Although the Administration has not 

taken an official position on the bills, the Department appreciates the Committee's interest in 

these topics. 

NNSA's Role in Uranium Management 

Uranium Management for Defense and Non-Defense Uses 

The Department is preparing an Excess Uranium Management Plan addressing management of 

its uranium inventory that is excess and not dedicated to national security missions. This 

Department-wide effort is being coordinated by DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy and is expected 

to be released in the coming months. In addition, NNSA produces a biannual report to Congress, 

the Unencumbered Enriched Uranium Management Plan Through 2065, that includes plans for 

managing tritium and enriched uranium resources to meet national security and defense 

requirements. 

Uranium Requirements 

As stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, we live in an evolving international security 

environment that is more complex and demanding than any since the end of the Cold War, 

necessitating a national commitment to maintain modern and effective nuclear forces and 

infrastructure. To remain effective, recapitalizing our Cold War legacy nuclear forces is critical. 

NNSA's enduring missions remain vital to the national security of the United States: maintaining 

the safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the 

threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and providing nuclear 

propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines. NNSA requires a 

reliable supply of strategic materials, including enriched uranium, to accomplish its missions. 

1 
15 


For NNSA, enriched uranium is required at various levels of enrichment and forms for national 

security and nonproliferation missions, as well as medical isotope production. Today, the United 

Stales no longer has a uranium enrichment capability for these missions. The Nation relics on an 

inventory of highly enriched uranium (HEU) material that is downblended to meet the enriched 

uranium requirements listed above; however, that supply is finite and, at present, irreplaceable. 

Additionally, the United States requires enriched uranium for defense missions to be free from 

domestic peaceful use restrictions and from foreign peaceful usc obligations. 

To support NNSA's nonproliferation mission of minimizing or eliminating the use ofHEU in 

civilian application, NNSA provides HA-LEU for use in research reactors and medical isotope 

production, internationally and domestically. The !lA-LEU we provide is used in the production 

of molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), a life-saving medical isotope used in thousands of patient 

procedures daily in the United States. 

NNSA continues to refine its projections on the finite supply of l-IEU to ensure adequate supply 

for Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors. NNSA has 

sufficient inventory to support tritium production through 2038, research reactors and isotope 

production through the early 2040s, and naval reactors through the 2050s. 

NNSA's Office ofDefense'Programs is working to reestablish a Domestic Uranium Enrichment 

(DUE) capability in time to supply LEU for tritium production. In December of2016, NNSA 

approved the mission need for this capability and an analysis of alternatives is currently 

underway. NNSA is considering options to include aHA-LEU capability as it works to 

reestablish its DUE capability. 

The Department agrees with the Committee's concern regarding the availability ofHA-LEU 

fuels and recognizes industry's need for HA-LEU fuels in support of advanced nuclear 

technologies. The Department will evaluate any specific requests from industry for this material 

alongside its ongoing needs for enriched uranium for research reactor fuel and medical isotope 

production and its national defense needs for tritium production and naval propulsion. 

Draft Discussion Legislation on Establishing a Program to Support Availability of HA-LEU 

for Commercial Use 

This draft legislation would require the Secretary of Energy to establish and carry out a program 

to support the availability ofHA-LEU for commercial use. The Department would be required 

to work with industry to design and have transportation packages certified by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission by January I, 2023. 

It would require the Department to report on the uranium inventory that could be used for 

commercial purposes, conduct a biannual survey of stakeholders to estimate the quantity of HALEU necessary for commercial use, and conduct an analysis to determine options available to the 

Secretary to procure HA-LEU. 

The legislation as written may be redundant to existing requirements and efforts underway. 

Allowing a Consortium that includes industry members to determine who can purchase HA-LEU 

2 
16 


from the Department may present conflicts of interest or an unfair advantage to certain players in 

an emerging market. In the ncar term, NNSA will continue to review existing programmatic 

needs and will make every reasonable effort to accommodate industry requests for material when 

they are submitted. 

NNSA recognizes the commercial need for HA-LEU; however, additional draws on the limited 

supply ofl·!EU from the Department's inventory would have unintended national defense, 

economic, and medical consequences. 

In addition, a shortage of material to supply research reactors and medical isotope production 

may deter reactors from converting to HA-LEU fuel from HEU fuel in the future. There also 

may be a shortage of life-saving medical isotopes. 

Additional HEU for down-blending would have to be identified from the existing inventory of 

weapons and weapon components, many of which are held for potential reuse in future weapons 

designs. If additional materials are earmarked for HA-LEU, the Department may be forced to 

make premature decisions on future nuclear weapon stockpile makeup and design. Although 

NNSA does not currently anticipate needing to down-blend additional HEU to LEU for tritium 

production, this issue could be exacerbated ifNNSA needed to bridge a gap to a full scale 

enrichment capability. 

DOE's Civil Nuclear Technology Export Authority 

The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects that installed nuclear generating capacity 

outside the United States will increase by nearly 80% from 2015 to 2050. The growing 

international market presents a critical commercial opportunity for the U.S. nuclear industry, and 

the exports of U.S. nuclear technology need to be carefully managed. Under the Atomic Energy 

Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), the Secretary of Energy has the authority to authorize proposed 

exports of unclassified U.S. nuclear technology and assistance with the concurrence of the 

Department of State (DOS) and after consultation with the Departments of Defense and 

Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This authority is implemented in the 10 

CFR Part 810 regulation (Part 810), which DOE/NNSA is responsible for administering. 

As the Secretary stated in his December 22, 2017 letter to this Subcommittee, the Department is 

committed to reducing processing times for applications under Part 81 0 while maintaining strong 

nonproliferation controls on U.S. nuclear technology. DOEINNSA and other pertinent U.S. 

Government agencies have made significant progress in improving the efficiency and 

transparency of the Part 810 regulatory regime, including through implementation of 

DOE/NNSA's Part 810 Process Improvement Plan. Key accomplishments to date include the 

following: 

• The Department published a revision to the Part 810 regulation that, among other 

benefits, establishes fast track approval processes for a number of activities that 

previously would have required specific authorization. 

3 
17 


• The Department established an electronic submissions portal ("e81 0") that is operational 

and available for industry use. This website was a long-standing request from industry 

groups and has been available to exporters since January 2017. The e81 0 system reduces 

the paperwork burden for industry and increases transparency by allowing the applicant 

to view where their request is in the reviewing process. 

• DOE established a single point of contact for all exporters, standardized internal 

documents, and clarified internal review processes. 

• DOE/NNSA has begun an effort to clarify the Part 810 compliance policy to encourage 

exporters to self-identify issues and violations. 

• DOE/NNSA worked with the DOS to provide an earlier contingent concurrence on 

applications, enabling most reviews to be completed concurrently while DOS works to 

obtain the required government-to-government nonproliferation assurances from the 

country that would receive the assurances. Previously, DOS did not concur until they had 

received the required assurances, and DOE's final review did not start until receiving 

DOS's concurrence. 

• DOE/NNSA coordinated across the Department to establish timely and realistic deadlines 

for intemal reviews of Part 810 applications to reduce processing times and improve the 

predictability of the application process for applicants. 

• DOEINNSA expanded industry outreach and assistance, including with regional events at 

nuclear industry hubs, and began issuing an annual public report summarizing Part 810 

review activities. 

Because of these and other changes, the average processing time for specific authorization, 

renewal, and amendment requests under Part 810 has dropped from a high of more than 18 

months to approximately 12 months. In addition to these recent accomplishments, future 

planned improvements include establishing user groups and training sessions for e81 0, 

developing a risk-based procedure for the analysis of reports submitted under Part 810, 

expanding the system's functionality to include electronic reviews of documents by DOE and the 

interagency, and creating a publicly available online archive of Part 810 authorizations and 

determinations. NNSA is working to ensure these improvements are implemented in a timely 

manner. 

Despite continuous improvements in the Part 81 0 process, the lengthiest part of the specific 

authorization process remains the time it takes partner countries to provide the required 

governmental nonproliferation assurances which can result in processing delays of six months to 

well over a year. 

Efforts to expedite the Part 810 process must also accommodate the requirements of the Fiscal 

Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, which added a heightened level of review for 

proposed technology exports to China and Russia. 

4 
18 


Draft Discussion Legislation on Improvements to the 10 CFR Part 810 Process 

Through amendments to Section 161 of the AEA, this bill would remove language prohibiting 

the Secretary from delegating his authority under section 57 b. of the AEA to approve exports of 

nuclear technology and assistance. 

The bill also amends Section 57 of the AEA to direct the Secretary to establish expedited 

procedures to process Part 810 applications involving the transfer of "low proliferation reactor 

technologies" to certain countries, as designated by the Secretary, and with the caveat that China 

and Russia arc ineligible. 

Once implemented in regulation, these expedited procedures would work similarly to the "fast 

track approval" process for requests to provide operational safety assistance that was introduced 

in the 2015 revision to the Part 810 regulation. 

The transfer of all nuclear power reactor technologies (other than technology for reactors 

especially designed for the production of plutonium or uranium-233) is already generally 

authorized to all countries that have Agreements for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (!23 

Agreements) with the United States, other than China, India, and Russia. 

As such, the impact of the expedited procedures will be limited to certain special cases. For 

example, the expedited procedure could be used to quickly approve deemed export applications 

for nationals of non-sensitive countries, as well as applications from U.S. nuclear companies to 

outsource information technology services to non-sensitive countries that have established nonproliferation commitments, but generally authorized destinations under Part 810. 

The Department supports reforms to streamline the Part 810 review process and appreciates the 

language recognizing the Department's own progress in implementing its Part 810 Process 

Improvement Plan. DOE looks forward to working with the Committee on this legislation and to 

continuing to improve the Part 810 process. 

Conclusion 

DOE appreciates the ongoing bipartisan support of this Committee, and looks forward to 

working with the Committee on the legislation on today's agenda and any future legislation. 

5 
19 

Mr. UPTON. Thank you so much. 

Mr. McGinnis. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD G. MCGINNIS 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Thank you very much, Chairman Upton, Ranking 

Member Rush, and other members of the subcommittee. I am very 

pleased to appear before you today to discuss legislation addressing 

advanced nuclear energy technologies, including high-assay low-enriched uranium, which I will refer to in shorthand during my testimony as high-assay LEU. 

Although the administration is still evaluating your bills and has 

not taken an official position at this time, the Department greatly 

appreciates the committee’s interest in these topics and recognizes 

the potentially very important role high-assay LEU may well play 

in meeting our Nation’s energy and national security needs. 

Over the last seven decades, the nuclear energy capabilities pioneered by the United States have served and supported our Nation’s energy security and, in turn, national security. In recognition 

of this vital role, the White House-led review of U.S. nuclear energy policy is underway, and we are already beginning to take 

steps to revitalize and expand our civil nuclear energy sector. The 

outcomes of the civil nuclear review will inform our approach to revitalizing this critical sector. 

While our Nation’s nuclear infrastructure, supply chain, and 

manufacturing base have been significantly degraded, the United 

States still leads the world in other key areas of nuclear energy. 

In fact, we believe the most mature advanced U.S. designs could 

potentially be deployed as early as the mid to late 2020s by the private industry. This is where the need for high-assay LEU arises. 

Nearly all U.S. advanced nonlight-water reactors under development will require high-assay LEU, including advanced microreactors. The advanced reactor community has stressed the near-term 

need and importance of high-assay LEU for advanced nuclear fuel, 

qualification testing, and for potential demonstration reactors. 

No commercial enricher currently provides high-assay LEU. 

While current enrichment plants could be modified to produce highassay LEU, it is unlikely that a commercial capability would be 

pursued without further indication of progress towards deployment 

by advanced reactor vendors. The Department recognizes the industry’s concerns regarding high-assay LEU fuel, and we are taking a number of actions to support the development of high-assay 

LEU in the near and longer term. 

First, the Department is working with industry to refine its nearterm R&D needs for fuel development and qualification, particularly how much material is needed, when, and in what form, and 

also to understand more about projections for longer-term needs. 

Second, we are leveraging our expertise in support of the technical aspects of commercial high-assay LEU infrastructure. The Department is aware that high-assay LEU may be needed in various 

fuel forms by different vendors. On the transportation side there 

are no large scale shipments of uranium enriched above 5 percent. 

And the transportation packages currently used for these smaller 

shipments may not support commercial-scale operations. 

20 

Third, the Department is reviewing materials across the DOE 

complex with an eye toward materials and processing options that 

may support some near-term industry R&D needs. Once industry 

needs in terms of quantities, forms, tolerances for impurities, and 

timing are known, the Department can then evaluate specific requests from industry for material, alongside our ongoing needs for 

research, reactor fuel, and medical isotope production. Current Department mission needs are supplied from our finite and diminishing supply of high-enriched uranium. 

In conclusion, the Department is working closely with U.S. nuclear innovators to define the challenges to bringing the next generation of advanced nuclear reactors and power into the marketplace, and are embarking on a number of actions to support the development of a commercial fuel cycle for high-assay LEU. 

We look forward to working with Congress, including in particular the subcommittee here, industry, and our partners across 

the Department on defining and exploring high-assay LEU issues 

now and in the future. 

And, finally, I would just like to say that we greatly appreciate 

the work and focus of this subcommittee on such important matters 

to our Nation’s energy and national security. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McGinnis follows:] 

21 


Testimony of Edward G. McGinnis 

l'rincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittee on Energy 

May 22,2018 

Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Rush, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am very pleased 

to appear before you today to discuss high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), that is, 

uranium that has greater than 5% of the fissile U-235 isotope, but still less than 20%, the cutoff 

for highly enriched uranium (l-IEU). and the role it may play in meeting our Nation's energy and 

national security needs. Although the Administration is still evaluating the bills and has not taken 

an official position at this time, the Department appreciates the Committee's interest in these 

topics. 

Over the last seven decades, the nuclear energy capabilities pioneered by the United States have 

served and supported our Nation's energy security. and in turn, national security. Nuclear energy 

is the largest source of clean energy in the United States, providing over 56 percent of our 

Nation's emission-free electricity in 2017. Nuclear power plants have served as bedrocks to 

communities across the country, providing high-paying, skilled jobs to hundreds of thousands of 

Americans. 

Beyond the vital role that nuclear energy plays in support of our economy and environment, and 

as part ofthe foundation for reliability and resiliency of our electric grid, nuclear energy is 

essential for achieving important national security missions. U.S. nuclear energy capabilities 

strongly support our global nuclear nonproliferation objectives, enhance our country's role as a 

world leader, and provide a unique and strategically important source of fuel supply for our 

nuclear Navy. 

In recognition of the vital role nuclear energy serves for our Nation, and the current need for our 

Nation's nuclear energy sector, a White House-led review of U.S. nuclear energy policy is 

underway, and we arc beginning to take steps to revitalize and expand our civil nuclear energy 

sector. The outcomes of the Civil Nuclear Review will inform our approach to revitalization of 

this critical sector. 

While our Nation's nuclear infrastructure, supply chain, and manufacturing base have been 

significantly degraded, the United States still leads the world in other key areas of nuclear 

energy, including reactor operation efficiency, reactor safety operations, advanced reactor 

designs, and other new innovative approaches, such as accident tolerant fuel and additive 

manufacturing. 

Strong bipartisan support is critical to our collective efforts to revitalize and expand our Nation's 

nuclear energy sector. The Department of Energy (DOE) is committed to working closely with 

this Subcommittee to build our nuclear energy revitalization, and we are working hard to fully 
22 


leverage DOE's world class national laboratories in strong partnership with U.S. universities and 

industry. 

Some of the most exciting innovation is coming from the U.S. advanced nuclear reactor design 

sector, with approximately 50 innovative reactor designers working to develop and deploy 

advanced reactor concepts in North America. These designs, such as advanced small modular 

reactors, offer the potential for step-change safety enhancements including walk-away safe 

reactor designs; unprecedented versatility including load-following capability, non-electric 

applications, and distributed power; dramatically improved financing; and the ability to consume 

waste as an energy resource. These design features, if proven and commercialized, could be truly 

transformational and game changing. 

To support the nuclear sector revitalization, the Department's investments are focused on early 

stage research and development of new technologies. With limited U.S. Government research 

and development investment, we believe that the most mature, advanced U.S. designs could 

potentially be deployed as early as the mid-to-late 2020s by private industry, demonstrating 

U.S. leadership in this burgeoning area, as well as enhancing U.S. competitiveness in an 

emerging global market while supporting U.S. nonproliferation objectives. This is where the 

need for HALEU arises. Nearly all U.S. advanced reactors under development will require 

HALEU, including advanced micro reactors. The advanced reactor community has stressed the 

near-term need and importance ofHALEU for advanced reactor fuel qualification testing and for 

potential demonstration reactors. 

HALEU is also important to national security needs. The Department currently provides HALEU 

to research reactors globally, many of which have been converted from l-IEU fuel as part of our 

Material Management and Minimization program to help meet nonproliferation objectives. 

Successful conversion of these reactor facilities to HALEU essentially eliminates the risk of 

diversion and potential misuse of l-IEU while allowing for continued operation to conduct 

various research activities and produce vital medical isotopes, such as molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), 

critical for diagnostic medical imaging. 

No commercial enricher currently provides HALEU. While current enrichment plants could be 

modified to produce HALEU, it is unlikely that a commercial HALEU capability would be 

pursued without futiher indication of progress toward deployment by advanced reactor vendors. 

Further efforts toward deployment of advanced reactors require the development and 

qualification of 1-IALEU fuels. ln addition, significant efforts are needed to ensure the 

development of a fuel cycle infrastructure that supports the use of l-IALEU. This includes 

transportation and packaging, conversion of the HALEU to various fuel forms, and fuel 

fabrication capabilities. 

The Department recognizes the industry's concerns regarding HALEU fuel qualification and 

testing as well as the development of a robust HALEU fuel cycle infrastructure for testing and 

ultimate deployment of U.S. advanced reactor concepts. We arc taking a number of actions 

intended to support the development of HALEU in the near and longer term. 

2 
23 


First, the Department is working with industry to refine its near-term R&D needs for fuel 

development and qualification, particularly how much material is needed, when, and in what 

fonn, and also to understand more about projections for longer-term needs. We are also refining 

our own needs for HALEU, including for research reactors, Mo-99 production, and other 

nonproliferation requirements. Understanding these requirements will better inform our efforts in 

support of infrastructure development, as well as our development of options to meet those 

needs. 

Second, we are leveraging our technical expertise in support of the technical aspects of a 

commercial HALEU infrastructure development. The Department is aware that l IALEU may be 

needed in various fuel forms (e.g., metallic, oxide, liquid) by different vendors, each of which 

may result in slightly different infrastructure needs. On the transportation side, there are no large 

scale shipments of uranium enriched above 5% U-235, and the transportation packages currently 

used for these smaller shipments may not support commercial-scale operations. The development 

and certification of shipping packages appropriate for HALEU is an identified gap in the 

HALEU fuel cycle infrastructure. 

Third, the Department is reviewing materials across the DOE complex with an eye toward 

materials and processing options that may support some near-term industry R&D needs. These 

options may include material recovery and down blending of certain inventories of fuel from 

former Department reactor programs. Many of the options under consideration involve fuel that 

has been irradiated, so the utility of the material for research and proof-of-concept activities will 

depend upon the tolerance of the advanced reactor designs for certain impurities. Once industry 

needs in terms of quantities, forms, tolerances for impurities, and timing are known, the 

Department can evaluate any specific requests from industry for material, alongside our own 

ongoing needs for research reactor fuel and medical isotope production. Current Department 

mission needs are supplied from our finite and diminishing supply ofHEU. 

The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Domestic Uranium Enrichment 

program seeks to create a domestic source of enriched uranium to support tritium production for 

the nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA is currently evaluating options, including the status quo 

and potential commercial and government alternatives, while considering cost, schedule, risk, 

and effectiveness. 

This work has synergies with efforts for a HALEU enrichment capability in the longer run. For 

example, NNSA's 2017 Request for Information (RFI) for the Supply of Enriched Uranium 

sought information from industry about their interest and capabilities for producing LEU, HEU, 

and HALEU for research and test reactors as well as for emerging commercial needs for 

advanced power reactors. The RFI and subsequent discussions have been coordinated with the 

Office of Nuclear Energy and we intend to continue our productive collaborations on HALEU in 

the future. 

Conclusion 

The Department is working closely with U.S. nuclear innovators to define the challenges to 

bringing the next generation of advanced nuclear power into the marketplace. As noted earlier, 

3 
24 


we recognize the importance of HALEU fuel development and qualification, as well as the 

development of a robust HALEU fuel cycle infrastructure, for testing and ultimate deployment of 

these U.S. advanced reactor concepts. We are embarking on a number of actions intended to 

support the development of a commercial fuel cycle for HALEU in the near and longer term. 

We look forward to working with Congress, including this Subcommittee, industry and our 

partners across the Department on defining and exploring HALEO issues now and in the future. 

4 
25 

Mr. UPTON. Well, thank you both. And appreciate your kind 

words. And we do work, try to work in a bipartisan way in potentially all the things that we move through this subcommittee. And 

we look forward to working with you. 

I would say as we talk about these bills, and the sponsors are 

here, we intend to move these bills. And there is a legislative process. We want your input. I know that you have not taken a formal 

stand with staff on any of these, but we would like your technical 

assistance, but also your continued input as these bills begin to 

move through the process. So if you can take that back to your department heads, that would be great. 

Quick, couple of quick questions from my vantage point. You 

know, we know that, according to the EIA and World Nuclear Association data, there are presently about 50 nuclear reactors under 

construction around the world, mostly in Asia. There are about 150 

to 160 reactors on order or planned, and upwards of 300 that have 

been proposed. Almost all of that growth is in Asia, the Middle 

East, with a little bit in Russia. 

Not a lot here in the U.S., I think primarily because of the cheap 

natural gas. We’re seeing big advancements there in terms of new 

permitting. I’ve got a facility in my district that looks to break 

ground a little bit later this fall. And I have got a nuclear plant, 

it is like a plant that is looking to phase out now over the next couple years, the Palisades plant. And more power will have to be generated by other sources, whether it be renewable, gas, that type of 

thing. 

So as the U.S. companies are competing primarily with China, 

Russia, France, South Korea, if we are unable to successfully compete and are excluded from those emerging markets, including the 

Middle East, will the dominance of China, Russia in these markets 

be beneficial to international nuclear security, nonproliferation, 

and nuclear safety? How will that all fit as we lose probably our 

leading role as we see the number of domestic facilities here in the 

U.S. actually be reduced without any real plans to finish construction. 

The new plants won’t make up for the ones that are being taken 

offline. How does that work with what is happening internationally? 

Dr. PARK. Thank you. First of all, I agree with your assessment 

that the U.S. needs to reclaim the leadership clearly. There is no 

question in your statement. And how we go about doing that is 

what is on the table for us to discuss. 

I think we are taking your leadership and guidance from this 

committee to make sure we streamline many of these approval 

processes and so on. But we need to do better. I acknowledge that. 

And in terms of actually not playing in the theaters that you just 

talked about, many dozens of nuclear reactors being built and 

being designed and so on, we need to get into that world as quickly 

as possible and work closely with any other sectors to make sure 

we have a competitive edge. 

Again, our—as a nuclear physicist I am happy to share with you 

we actually have the edge on the nuclear technologies on the 

science and technology side, we just need to better transfer these 

26 

proven technologies in a safe, secure—in a safeguarded format. We 

are doing our very best at the moment. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. McGinnis, do you have anything? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Thank you very much. I would say that the implications to the United States trending out of its nuclear leadership 

role, which most of the DNA still today around the world in nuclear technologies is from the United States and some great 

innovators, if we continue with this trend and if we don’t find a 

way to re-vector into a sustainable growth potential, it goes far beyond electricity. Resiliency is really important. But when it comes 

to the global, competitive, strategic state of play in nuclear with 

Russia and China, the implications go directly into our national security interests and not just our energy security interests. 

So it is vital that we begin building again. We have had an extraordinary run of our fleet, which is by far the most efficiently run 

in the world. And we still lead as the greatest innovators. We know 

how to disrupt and innovate like other industries we are witnessing in aerospace and others in the United States. Frankly, our 

competitors are hoping that we don’t find and tap that innovation 

in this moment for nuclear. 

I strongly believe we are at that point where we are in the process of disrupting the market, innovating right now. And so we have 

a great opportunity, and I want to say in large part because of the 

really unprecedented, I would say in my career, bipartisan support 

from Congress, including such as is reflected in this subcommittee. 

So thank you. 

Mr. UPTON. And before I yield there to my friend Mr. Rush, I 

want to insert into the record a report from the Atlantic Council 

titled ‘‘U.S. Nuclear-Power Leadership and the Chinese and Russian Challenge.’’ And without objection, so ordered. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Mr. UPTON. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Illinois, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSH. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Park, you noted Secretary Perry’s December 2017 letter to 

this subcommittee detailing the agency’s commitment to reducing 

processing time for application on the Part 810. You stated that 

DOE and NNSA have already made significant progress in improving efficiency and transparency on the Part 810 regulatory regime 

by implementing the Part 810 process improvement plan. 

These improvements help to reduce the average processing time 

for a request under Part 810 from a high of more than 18 months 

to approximately 12 months. In light of this process improvement 

plan do you see a need for legislation such as the discussion draft 

that is before us today that will amend the Atomic Energy Act to 

improve the process for authorizing the transfer of civilian nuclear 

commerce, technology, and assistance. And does this bill overlap 

with aspects of the improvement plan? 

Dr. PARK. First of all, I did a really detailed analysis of the committee’s help and guidance, by the way. That is in concert with this 

committee that we have been developing PIP, performance improvement plan. We actually had implemented many of your guidance in our planning, by the way. 

27 

For example, as we are developing e810 for example, your example, we actually, I think we shared with your staff that the internal 

processing—this is only an example by the way—instead of waiting 

for State Department to do—to wait for official assurance on operation requirements we actually do a parallel process, number one. 

Number two, as it turns out that many of the things that we 

used to do in paper form, the industry partners did not know what 

kind of progress they were making with us, through e810, for example. If they are able to have a transparency into where are their 

packages and, you know, ask us how to speed things along and so 

on, there are a lot of improvements that we have made. We still 

need to do more. 

But, again, there are enough of positive signs. Yesterday I asked 

my staff to give me statistics on what kind of uses we have for 

e810. I am happy to report to the committee that the improvement 

of the usage has gone up substantially from last year to this year 

on month-by-month rollout. Compared to 2017, 2018 usage of e810 

is 50 percent higher. It is too early to tell whether this will really 

seal the deal in terms of expediting the approval process and so on 

and so forth. 

But so far, indicators are that we are making a positive difference and we are training the interested partners so they know 

how to work with us. So this is all being realized. 

Mr. RUSH. Right. So on the proposed legislation, will that enhance your ability or will that retract from your ability? 

Dr. PARK. So, I don’t think I could comment on whether that 

would help or whatever. But I appreciate the fact that there are 

many, many useful guidelines out of this committee. So we will 

look for ways to work with the committee. 

Mr. RUSH. Thank you. I am going to ask you another question. 

In your written statement, you say that the Avanced Nuclear 

Fuel Availability Act, as written, may be redundant to existing requirements and initiatives currently being conducted at the agency. 

You also note that ‘‘allowing a consortium that includes industry 

members to determine who can purchase HA–LEU from the Department may present conflicts of interest or an unfair advantage 

to certain players in the emerging market.’’ Can you briefly discuss 

both the redundancies that are found in this bill with regards to 

your current practice? 

Also, what recommendation will you suggest to help avoid the occurrence of conflict of interest or unfair advantage for industry 

members helping to decide who can purchase HA–LEU? 

Dr. PARK. So, appreciate your thoughtful question. 

As it turns out, I would not look at the word ‘‘redundancy’’ as a 

negative word. The fact that we actually have been working with 

your staff of this committee for quite some time we then implemented the redundancy of the word would come in the form of, we 

heard you already. If the bill actually incorporates these guidelines, 

we are happy to absorb, follow the guidelines. But we have been 

doing quite a bit already in the form of, we are actually working 

with any and other parts within DOE to collectively promise from 

industry partners. 

We have some rough numbers that we got. But, again, we are 

actually incorporating that into our projections, as I shared with 

28 

you in my oral testimony. Our supply would run out in early 2040s, 

so we are required to update our projections as we collect information from industry partners or other players. So, to that extent, ‘‘redundancy’’ is not a bad word, number one, if that helps you. 

Mr. RUSH. I get your point. 

Mr. UPTON. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Barton. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have too many 

questions. 

My primary question is about the discussion draft by Congressmen Hudson, Wilson, Norcross, and Peters about these microreactors at Department of Energy—I mean Department of Defense facilities. I’m not real sure what a microreactor is. So I want a definition. And I also want to know who would have jurisdiction. Would 

it be the Defense Department or would it be the Energy Department? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Thank you very much for that question. Microreactors, depending on who you talk to, define it by the power 

level. And one conventional range is 1 to up to 10 megawatts electric. Some companies are defining it 1 to 30, even in the kilowatt 

range. 

But it is smaller, lower level than what is a conventional small 

modular reactor, number one. 

Number two, this is a very interesting emerging technical sector 

that I am witnessing, we are witnessing right now in the United 

States with regards to microreactors. There are a number of exciting designs and companies in different parts of the United States, 

some of which we are working with at the Department of Energy 

on supporting an appropriate technical role early stage on supporting the proving out of these microreactors. 

In fact, we have an MOU with one such microreactor where they 

are targeting 2021 to have the first demonstration built at Idaho 

National Lab, just to give you a sense of how fast this is moving. 

These microreactors, the key—I know about this from the fuel supply—is they all, virtually all, require high-assay LEU, maybe 

smaller amounts, but if they prove out the business line they are 

going to, they will be selling many of them. 

Now, on the question of the Department of Defense and Department of Energy, what I can say is that we are certainly working 

with the Department of Defense. We are in communications with 

them. We are sharing our information and know-how on microreactors with the Department of Defense, more than one part of the Department of Defense. We are sharing information with them from 

the infrastructure side, the Assistant Secretary as well as from 

Army. And we see, frankly, great potential, significant potential 

with regards to the role and value of microreactors. 

And I think, frankly, this could be one of those surprise disruptive, very positively disruptive sectors that may, may catch a lot of 

us by surprise in a very good way. And I am excited about it. 

Mr. BARTON. I yield back. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Peters. 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate having this 

hearing today. 

29 

Nuclear energy technology is an important part of increasing our 

zero mission energy sources. We need this energy generation and 

the clean air standards it can help us achieve. And for these reasons, and many more, I supported research and development in 

next generation energy technologies, particularly advanced nuclear 

development in small modular reactors. 

And I am one of the, with Mr. Hudson, one of the lead sponsors 

of the draft bill before us today. And I appreciate his work on that. 

My bill would—our bill would—direct the Department of Defense 

and Department of Energy to work together in analyzing how 

microreactors can bolster energy resiliency for national security. 

In my home district in San Diego and in the nearby region, we 

have piloted microgrids at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar. We 

have tested battery generation rucksacks at Camp Pendleton, and 

performed other energy development project partnerships between 

the Navy and the University of California at San Diego. DoD has 

been a willing and helpful partner in testing clean and innovative 

energy sources. It is not because they are tree huggers or doctrinaire environmentalists, but from their perspective energy resilience is a life and death question. 

For instance, the fewer batteries that Marines have to carry, the 

more ammunition they can take in their pack; and that could be 

what saves their life in a firefight in a faraway country. It is a 

stark reminder of how energy resilience is critical. I think the partnership in this bill makes sense and I hope to see it advance quickly. 

To Mr. McGinnis, I had a question about research funding. I am 

an advocate for early stage innovation and research support from 

the Federal Government. I wanted to just give you an opportunity 

to say if you think we are missing any areas of nuclear research 

and innovation, where we need to bolster that investment. 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Thank you very much. 

There, as indicated, we are in the process of revitalizing our nuclear energy sector. We made it clear that we have experienced 

great degradation, frankly, including in our test capabilities, 

whether it is not having fast neutrons for a fast spectrum reactor 

to be able to test those key components for the next class of reactors coming in, or advanced fuels, or whether it is other technical 

capabilities that we need as a key element of our nuclear sector. 

So I can say, first of all, that the authorization language that we 

have seen today, and also the appropriations has been very important to support our efforts to revitalize. We don’t just rely on Idaho 

National Lab, although Idaho National Lab is a flagship lab for nuclear energy, we are relying on Oak Ridge, we are relying on many 

of the others, and Lawrence Livermore and other labs. But if we 

are going to get back in the game we have got to get our fuel cycle 

R&D test capabilities back to where it belongs, back in a robust 

area. 

We are on a good trajectory now. And all I can say is strong support is greatly appreciated as we work with a private/public posture where we are finding that sweet spot to support and dispatch 

the technical challenges that with our labs and our capabilities 

that our U.S. industry can most benefit from. 

30 

So, thank you very much for the support. And we stand ready 

to follow additional laws that may come in that you are moving 

through. 

Mr. PETERS. Maybe I will just explore a bit more kind of what, 

what areas you might see us investing in, what particular areas in 

nuclear that you think offer promise? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. One is, of course, the fast test capability is very 

important, having testing capabilities for the new class of reactors. 

We are experience—we are seeing a lot through our new industry 

funding opportunity mechanisms where it also becomes an opportunity to hear from industry where they most need us. Whether it 

is testing, whether it is benchmarking data, simulation modeling 

and simulation, even supporting the NRC with our modeling and 

simulation and supporting their development of advanced guidelines, frankly, industry needs us to support them in the data and 

benchmarking as they go through certification. That is one of the 

biggest challenges for our new innovators. 

But also, having the testing capabilities, just continuing to support our reinvestment in establishing our test capability for both 

the front and back end and for reactors, fuels. And also, very important, if not most important, is our efforts to support the continued life and longevity of the fleet of reactors operating in this country now. 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McGinnis, I have a lot to go through so let’s be efficient with 

our time if we can. Are you aware of an enrichment facility located 

in Eunice, New Mexico? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Is that enrichment facility licensed by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. In order to meet future demand for high-assay 

low-enrichment uranium, is that facility capable of making the material for commercial use? If the facility secures the appropriate 

modification to its NRC licensing basis? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I believe yes. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Are you aware of a recent GAO report that found 

DOE’s cost estimate to develop new enrichment options lacked 

credibility because it was not well documented or accurate? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I am aware of the GAO report in general. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And have made no judgment on being aware of the 

GAO report as far as accuracy? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I would have to get back with you on the specifics 

on my view on that. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. It is just important because as you go forward if 

GAO’s analysis is not accurate then we don’t want to do our basis 

of decision making on that fact. 

Based on the availability of U.S. enrichment capabilities for commercial use would you agree that the U.S. Government does not 

need to spend billions of dollars of nondefense money to subsidize 

Government-backed competition to an existing operational facility? 

31 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I certainly don’t support subsidies. But I think it 

is premature to say whether there would be a need for a second 

supply for enrichment. I can tell you that some companies have 

come to me strongly encouraging the support of at least two suppliers to have good, robust competition and pricing. Notwithstanding, though, we are very fortunate and very thankful for having that top world class facility in New Mexico in the form of LES. 

But the question is whether—and I am just basing it on what we 

are hearing from certain industry—whether that is the final end 

state if they end up establishing a cascade for high-assay LEU, or 

do you want to get to the point where you have a couple of suppliers, such as in the fuel fabrication business where you have pretty strong competition because—and pretty good pricing because of 

that competition. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, you know, other pricing debates that we 

have in the other realm of fuel. So, also we want, we really want 

to be cautious about in this time of fiscal constraints. I do believe 

in competition. I do believe that that drives that through. But we 

have dealt with Government subsidization of helping infrastructure 

to move to markets that weren’t existing. Not saying that they 

needed competition, but there was no business plan or model for 

that. 

So, again, I am just raising some concerns. 

Dr. Park, if the United States funds a Government-sponsored facility to support both defense and nondefense purposes would you 

be concerned that this could send conflicting messages to the international community about developing dual-purpose fuel cycle facilities? 

Dr. PARK. So U.S. segment has made a commitment to international partners. For example, when they downgrade from HA– 

LEU to lower level LEU, we would provide the fuels because, actually, it’s going to be the right thing for us to do to minimize the 

risks of HA–LEU falling into the wrong hands. So we need to follow through on those commitments. And we also follow through on 

the medical isotope production efforts and so on. 

The first example that I used is high performance reactors that 

require the use of HA–LEU and so on. So there are different examples. But to answer your question, it actually depends on case by 

case. We need to actually analyze the benefits and risks and then 

make appropriate recommendations. So I don’t think that we could 

provide some general, overall, you know, response that this is what 

we are going to do. It really depends on who the players are, who 

are partners are, and so on, and other considerations that we need 

to fold in. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Yes, and I was listening carefully to my colleague 

Scott Peters from California. And when he was asking really Mr. 

McGinnis what other things, you know, he was trying to reach 

what other things should we be looking at? My point would be we 

need to look at the front end here to address the international concerns and the commitments, but also the Government being involved in an area where we may not need to be involved, and how 

much of those nondefense dollars which are always, we are scrambling for, goes to that when there is an available, looks like there 

will be an available commercial production facility already in place. 

32 

So those are my concerns. We have aired them out now publicly. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back my time. 

Mr. UPTON. The gentleman yields back. The Chair would recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. McNerney. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just last week Mr. Flores approached me and asked me if I 

would support his bill on HA–LEU. And I think it is a good bill. 

I am glad to do that. But I do have a concern about proliferation. 

I think that is something that we all are worried about. 

The world has changed in the last few months, and I am worried 

about where we are going with additional capabilities, especially if 

it is in the commercial sector. Could you address that, Mr. Park? 

Dr. PARK. Your concern is to certify everybody in this room and 

throughout the Government system. But, again, we have not relaxed reviews and assessments of how we share our nuclear technologies with our partners, international partners and so on. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Were you to have more commercial control of 

that information? 

Dr. PARK. From my perspective, and obviously Ed McGinnis actually should chime in, but again as the person responsible for 

issuing the safeguards aspect of sharing the nuclear technologies, 

we first have to evaluate the whole big picture. It is a balancing 

act. Cannot delay forever. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Right. 

Dr. PARK. We cannot expedite without actually doing the right 

analysis so we know what the risks are and we need to mitigate 

those. And as far as country partnership and the—what we are actually concerned about is more of with the technologies that we 

share with country A could be sent to somewhere else without our 

knowing. So safeguards is not one-to-one, it’s actually one of many 

that we have to worry about. 

So that is where my guys come in to do a very careful analysis 

working with the State Department and other interagency partners. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Mr. McGinnis, do you see SMRs and microreactors becoming prominent in the next decade or two? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes, very possibly I do. And they offer many attributes that one does not see in the current class of reactors, from 

far more passive safety aspects. Some of these reactors will—are 

designed to safely shut down even in the event of a complete loss 

of power indefinitely, or a complete loss of coolant. 

Some of these reactors, micro and others, reactors are smaller 

source term, more manageable. Some of these have life of core 

where you do not need refueling such as every 18 months for a fuel 

reactor, so, or a large reactor. 

But with respect to international I would just like to make one 

thing very clear in my view. I have worked international as the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for 11 years. There is no other country 

on this planet that has a higher standard, more stringent standard 

on nonproliferation and safety than us. I can assure you the Russians, the Chinese, and the others, they do not insist on the level 

of nonpro and safety, even in our current 123 and our Part 810 

process and the others. We are very proud of it. And I think you 

will hear the U.S. industry continue to say that is a key aspect of 

33 

our product, that we bring the safest products and with the highest 

levels of nonproliferation. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, I think the SMR promise is good. And I 

am looking forward to seeing that realized in our country. And I 

recognize, along with everyone here I think, that the industry is 

struggling at the moment. But how do we make it easier for the 

industry to prosper without harming the NRC’s ability to regulate 

effectively? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes, indeed, that is the question. We, in my view, 

we want the most efficient process for the regulatory reviews. And 

we want the least costly but in a manner that does not compromise 

in any way, shape, or form the current standard of safety. That is 

our objective. 

The Department of Energy is ready. We made it clear with the 

NRC and we continue to do it, make all of our capabilities, model, 

in simulation and testing, available to help them and help the vendors go through this process. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. McKinley. 

Mr. MCKINLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Not long ago the Defense Science Board put out a report that 

said our grid system, our national grid system is fragile, vulnerable, and near its capacity. And as a result of that, or perhaps influenced by that, DoD has been expressing more and more of an 

interest in using small nuclear reactors, and much like maybe Barton was talking about, the microreactors on plant or on bases so 

that they could be islands of independence from the grid, a fascinating concept with that. 

Do you, do either of you agree with the Defense Science Board, 

with their conclusion? Because we have been having quite a few 

hearings about this grid reliability, about reliability and resilience, 

do you agree with their, their findings that there are problems with 

the—with reliability and resilience? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I agree that resiliency is a huge issue. And it is 

only going to get more challenging if we don’t get new baseload 

plants coming in, including nuclear. 

I would also say there is still no other energy source on the planet that compares to the attributes of nuclear power: clean baseload, 

no refueling for at least 18 months. The new SMRs coming in they 

could possibly go 4 years or longer. 

With regards to resiliency and microreactors and the 2016 Defense Science Board, we think it certainly, while we see that it is 

driving the Department of Defense in evaluating their options with 

microreactors now for that very purpose of resiliency. Obviously, 

resiliency—— 

Mr. MCKINLEY. If I could on that, I might disagree slightly with 

you on that, and that is your own department there—excuse me, 

DOE, has come out with its own report saying that actually to improve reliability and resilience it is nuclear and coal because of the 

storage, the capabilities of onsite storage and the lack of interruption of supply. 

So you are saying you share that concern? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Oh yes, indeed. 

34 

Mr. MCKINLEY. Let me go to the next issue that is a little bit 

more sensitive to this. Because I am fascinated with the nuclear industry. We don’t have any plants in West Virginia but we did have 

a shipping port that was not very far from where I live and in my 

district. 

But not long ago, it was just last October, The Hill came out with 

a report that talked about how Russia’s Putin was trying to influence and get involved and take more influence, control over our 

atomic energy business in the United States. And he was using, according to the article, there was litigation over bribery, kickbacks, 

extortion, and money laundering, all that took place in and around 

sale of Uranium One and how we—how CFIUS apparently dropped 

the ball and allowed us to lose a lot of control of our uranium. 

So with this issue of nuclear energy as much, how do we, how 

do we restore the confidence that we are not, we are not allowing 

a foreign entity like Russia to influence our nuclear energy field, 

given that the history. And I am curious, what has taken place internally to reverse the damage that was done under the previous 

administration as a result of this? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I would say first of all it is very important to 

have a diversity of supply. In the United States there is about 5 

percent of the uranium that comes from U.S. uranium mining miners. That is an historic low. 

For enrichment, apart from LES, again which we appreciate for 

an enricher in the United States, but the fact is we have zero 

American-owned enrichers. 

With regards to supply, between 17 and 20 percent of all the enrichment that comes into our Nation’s 99 reactors comes from Russia. There is a suspension agreement that limits them to go where 

they cannot supply more than 20 percent. That suspension agreement is slated to end in 2020. The Department of Commerce is following that very closely. 

I can’t speak to the details of what you said, but I can say that 

it is very important for us to have a balanced and diverse supply, 

including strong supply capability for the front end, as was mentioned, for fuel supply in this country. 

Mr. MCKINLEY. And my time has expired. So I just going to ask 

you if you could please, could you stop by my office? I would like 

to have more of a conversation about this, how we—what are the 

next steps that need to be done. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Rush, for holding this hearing. 

We are discussing these four important bills that deal with various aspects of domestic nuclear energy. As a fuel source, nuclear 

energy generates 20 percent of our domestic power and constitutes 

over 60 percent of the country’s clean energy. While renewables 

have grown by leaps and bounds in recent years, I think it is important to remember that nuclear generation is the original environmental friendly source of power generation. 

While most of our fleet is under strain from economic factors, the 

legislation we are discussing today has the potential to reshape our 

focus and bring our nuclear fleet into the 21st Century. I particuVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:51 Jan 04, 2019 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 I:\115THCONGRESS\115X132DOENUCLEARLEGPDFSAVED\115X132DOENUCLEARPDF
35 

larly want to thank my friend Congressman Doyle for working on 

language to address the burden that our NRC fee structure places 

on plants. 

Mr. Park, Mr. McGinnis thank you for being here today. I would 

like to talk about my friend Mr. Flores’ bill, the Advanced Nuclear 

Fuel Availability Act. This legislation is aimed at addressing many 

of the challenges faced by the high-assay low-enriched uranium 

fuel, HA–LEU, or HA–LOW. I don’t know how, in my Texas accent. 

Mr. Park, would you talk about how the enriching process is different compared to the typical uranium? 

Dr. PARK. If you are talking about HA–LEU or H–A-L–E-U, right 

now the only way we can do it is by downblending from the aging 

stockpile that we have. Right now we can only enrich up to 5 percent. The HA–LEU is over 5 percent, below 20. So you need more 

work to get to HA–LEU, yes. 

Mr. GREEN. In 2016, the Office of Defense Programs began working to establish domestic uranium enrichment capability in time to 

establish a supply of need for tritium production. What is the current domestic capacity for this production? And what do you expect 

the DOE capacity to be going forward when it comes to HA–LEU? 

Dr. PARK. So, right now our current projection is we will run out 

of tritium production capacity in about 20 years or so from today. 

2038 is the projected time line. So we are actually in the Office of 

Defense Programs at NNSA is in the process of looking at the options to see if we can actually produce our own enrichment enriched uranium for tritium production. And what we are looking for 

is industry partners working with Ed McGinnis and others to actually share with us their requirements. 

It might be possible for us to fold in that requirement on top of 

DOE. We are actually very anxious to look for purpose of opportunity with the industry partners. And so it is in progress. 

Mr. GREEN. What are the challenges that transportation of this 

highly enriched uranium lead to in comparison with the typical levels of enrichment? 

Dr. PARK. So, obviously the 5 percent is the LEU. When you go 

to higher level of enrichment it requires totally different containers, transportation methods, and so on and so forth. And the 

quantity—and this is worth pointing out, and I’m going to hand it 

over to Ed to talk about this—quantity we are potentially facing is 

much larger than we ever faced. It requires a different look at 

the—a bit of R&D on top of everything. 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. McGinnis? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes, indeed. In fact, transportation is key. I 

would like to express appreciation for this subcommittee and the 

bill to address the issue of transportation. I think it is time, very 

timely to look at it now. We need to plan in advance to support, 

hopefully, a successful advanced reactor fleet coming in through 

the pipeline with new high-assay LEU fuel. 

As Dr. Park said, right now we are relying on a limited and everdecreasing supply of high-enriched uranium. Ultimately there are 

a couple of additional pathways one can secure that supply. And 

the most traditional way is through enrichment. 

And as Dr. Park said, the Department of—well, the NNSA side 

of the Department of Energy is looking at it from defense requireVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:51 Jan 04, 2019 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 I:\115THCONGRESS\115X132DOENUCLEARLEGPDFSAVED\115X132DOENUCLEARPDF
36 

ments primarily in tritium production. So that time line I would 

suggest—and this is part of the challenge—we may have a much 

earlier time line in the commercial sector, maybe as soon, as I indicated, mid-2020s where the commercial sector will need high-assay 

LEU. When you get that, you also not just need enrichment cascades, but you are going to need conversion, you are going to need 

fabrication, you are going to need actually new NRC license packages, transportation packages. So there is quite a lot to be done. 

Mr. GREEN. One last question. Do you think—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. GREEN [continuing]. The legislation addresses these challenges? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I would say that I appreciate the focus. We do believe that it addresses the challenges. And we stand ready to work 

with the subcommittee. 

Mr. GREEN. Appreciate the chairman. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Pretty sneaky getting that last question in there. 

The chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, and 

one of the authors of this legislation, Mr. Kinzinger, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for your 

leadership on this issue as well. And thanks for holding today’s 

hearing. 

As many of you know, my district is home to four nuclear power 

plants. And I continue to be deeply concerned that we are ceding 

U.S. global leadership in the nuclear space. I introduced H.R. 1320, 

the NUKE Act, with Congressman Doyle to make common sense 

reforms in the NRC recovery structure, fee recovery structure. And 

I am pleased to see it included. 

I still like NUKEPA, but in the spirit of our Founding Fathers 

and compromise, I was happy to relent on that. 

Section 2 of Congressman Johnson’s bill requires the Secretary 

of Energy to report on all legal, regulatory, and commercial barriers imposed on our domestic nuclear industry. Compare those to 

our foreign—compared to our foreign competitors and recommend 

ways to improve our global competitiveness. 

Dr. Park, as part of your confirmation process you stated that 

you would continue to work with American companies so that they 

may engage in civil nuclear commerce around the world. Based on 

your previous experience, as well as your initial impressions leading NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Proliferation Office, have you identified some of the actions that inhibit competitiveness at the U.S. nuclear industry? 

Dr. PARK. So the standard practice asked me that. As I mentioned earlier, we look at the big picture and we do the best we 

can. And now the challenge is that the world is evolving so fast, 

as it was stated, in the last four months alone the world changed. 

And that there are new actors coming in to have more nuclear 

power and so on and so forth. And I need to recognize the fact that 

our policies, and procedures, and processes are a little bit behind 

time at times, and that we need to find a way to accelerate it and 

make it more meaningful so that we can apply the latest standards. 

So I would not necessarily call them deficiencies. That is how our 

system works. But at the same time, I appreciate your involvement 

37 

and the committee’s engagement so we can actually better implement the guidelines you might give to us. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

Mr. McGinnis, you have heard me speak about the DOE’s Nuclear Energy International Program. Could you offer some preliminary observations about how our foreign competition, specifically 

the Russians and the Chinese, use state-backed resources to strategically use their civilian nuclear programs and undercut our interests? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Indeed they do. And they use the full breadth of 

resources that they can draw on from their respective governments. 

I have seen it firsthand with Rosatom in Russia and the Big 3 utilities in China. 

The competition, one cannot overstate how foreboding and how 

challenging it is for American companies to compete against states. 

That is the fact. They bring financing. They bring deep, deep offers 

for training, for resources. In many other areas we are working 

really hard to try and support in our own—let me back up and say 

what we don’t want to do is try and compete and be seen like a 

Russian company, like a Chinese company. We believe we are far 

more innovative, far more appealing. We bring our systems, our 

safety and security. So we do believe we can compete and win. 

But it takes strong Government support and advocacy from the 

United States. And it takes—and I think we need to all be, you 

know, just always continue to say we need to try and do better, in 

our efficiency for our regulatory reviews, for our license reviews. 

We need to continuously try and maintain the high level of safety 

while making it as easy as possible for these companies that are 

already in a formidable position to be able to complete and win. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Let me ask you, and I am sorry to do this, but 

put yourself in the sick and twisted mind of Vladimir Putin. What 

would be the reason you would want government support for the 

nuclear industry? What is your 10- or 20-year goal in that? What 

do you want to see a world that looks like X? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Well, in just my own opinion, again having 

worked with Rosatom employees for quite some time in a competitive way, first of all they want to dominate the nuclear sector. I 

don’t think, at least my colleagues, I have had difficulty with my 

Russian company colleagues seeing the virtue of competition. It is 

more of a monopoly objective. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And let me ask you more specifically, do you 

think Vladimir Putin looks at this as an economic benefit to his 

country or a national security benefit and ability to spread influence of Russia? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Oh, so my first point was economically or sectoral-wise dominating as much as possible, but strategically nuclear energy goes well beyond, certainly in foreign countries, well 

beyond just electricity on the grid. So when one wins a commercial 

nuclear deal for a reactor, it is a 100-year relationship. It is a 

unique leverage point one has with those foreign countries. And it 

is, frankly, coveted by our competitors from a strategic perspective. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. And thanks, Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. 

38 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair now 

recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Doyle, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Park, I appreciate the Department’s commitment to streamlining the processing times to export nuclear-related goods under 

the Part 810 process. International markets represent a critical opportunity for domestic nuclear companies and their suppliers. And 

the ability to export these products remains important for U.S. 

companies. These opportunities can mean hundreds, even thousands of jobs, for hardworking Americans. 

My question is, how is the NNSA working with other agencies 

to ensure that this trade can continue to support American jobs 

without violating the NDAA review requirements and without posing a threat to national security? And more specifically, can you 

provide more information on the agency’s overall strategy with regards to exports to China? 

Dr. PARK. So, when it comes to China, there is a very specific requirement under NDAA 2016 that requires OD&I review. And it 

gets very difficult. So I would be more than happy to provide additional information. 

When it comes to NNSA doing its job to help accelerate the appropriate sharing, peaceful use of nuclear technologies and so on, 

I think that with this committee’s help and assistance and guidance I think we have got the right frame of mind in terms of what 

we can do. For example, as I stated earlier, there is parallel processing. In other words, we don’t wait for State Department to 

achieve, to get the country assurance on safeguards. We actually 

do the processing as if it is a done deal and we converge at the end. 

So instead of doing things in serial or the sequential manner, we 

do things in parallel at the same time. This new e810 process that 

we have adopted that you encouraged us to pursue is putting more 

what I call a transparency to all the users. They know what the 

package is. It is actually worth repeating a couple more times because instead of—in the past they didn’t know where their package 

was in the approval process. But now they can actually call us. 

You know, some of the stories that my staff have been sharing 

with me, for example. You know, a couple of them got to know how 

to use the e810 system. It took them a while, but now they are 

thinking, the program managers are sitting in the back or they 

help because they can actually move things along much faster than 

ever before. And these are repeat users that we are talking about. 

And I am happy to report to you, again, roughly 15 percent of the 

users from the commercial sector using our e810, I think that number would grow. 

And so there are some really good signs with the e810 process. 

And, again, I need to caution all of us, you know, much of the delay 

does not come from our side. But, again, we have to wait for country assurances through the State Department, and sometimes that 

takes a year or more. 

Mr. DOYLE. I would appreciate you corresponding with our office. 

We’d like to get a better sense of the strategy with regards to 

China. And I would appreciate that. 

Dr. PARK. Yes. 

39 

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. McGinnis, I am glad to see your department’s 

commitment to nuclear energy. We all know that investments in 

research and advanced nuclear technology are important, and in 

addition to supporting our existing fleet. I am concerned, though, 

that the President’s fiscal year 2019 budget has proposed to reduce 

funding for nuclear energy by cutting $259 million below the FY 

2017 enacted level. 

Do you think that reforming the NRC fee structure could reduce 

the downward pressure on nuclear plant operators? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. With regards to the—thank you very much for 

the question. I respectfully would need to defer to the NRC as an 

independent agency on the fee structure. But I will say overall, obviously as indicated earlier, the fees are a significant factor in 

many U.S. companies attempting to get their technologies licensed 

and their operation license received. So it is a very significant factor. 

And so we certainly support the most efficient, least costly pathway with the highest standards of safety that makes us world-class 

products that we have to provide. 

Mr. DOYLE. Let me ask you this, too. I do think that energy markets currently consider carbon, the carbon-free attributes of nuclear 

energy. And we have seen State policies that take these attributes 

into account. And I want to—do you support States’ ability to properly account for these attributes? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Certainly respect the States’ decisions to do, to 

decide how to do that. That is the States’ rights. And so we approach it from a resiliency perspective, trying to address the structural issues that, frankly, at times don’t price, or don’t price the 

value of resiliency. 

But with regards to States, certainly we respect that approach to 

support their electricity sources. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. UPTON [presiding]. Mr. Long. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McGinnis and Dr. Park, I have got a question for both of 

you. Dr. Lyman’s testimony suggests that any country that has access to light-water reactor technology is just a step away from becoming a nuclear weapons state. However, his testimony neglects 

to mention the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards that are in place in addition to the U.S.’s capability to monitor nuclear fuel cycle programs around the world. 

Would you please describe the respective roles of NNSA and the 

Office of Nuclear Energy in supporting the IAEA program? 

Dr. PARK. So, yes. NNSA does work closely with IAEA. In fact, 

we provide much of the technologies to IAEA and train them, and 

in terms of light-water reactor and so on and so forth. 

Any nuclear technology that actually produces plutonium we care 

about, we worry about. And there are no exceptions. As I stated 

earlier, we actually look for who these partners are and how they 

actually protect the materials, spent fuels, or whatnots, to make a 

determination as to what kind of arrangement we could have. But, 

again, there is no one-size-fits-all approach that we have. 

40 

But, again, the light-water reactor, the fuel does have plutonium 

built in, so we need to worry about the results. We cannot ignore 

that aspect. 

Mr. LONG. Mr. McGinnis? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes. The Office of Nuclear Energy also works 

closely with the IAEA and also the NNSA. And we do commit a significant amount of funds for that work, including for safeguards, 

and security, and safety ultimately, both directly and indirectly. 

I would say one other point. And this is my view, it is just reality. We have these large state-owned suppliers. They are going to 

provide the choice if we don’t provide an option to foreign countries 

that are considering nuclear energy. If we just say no, then they 

will very likely still proceed. And they will just proceed with another supplier with a lower level of safety and security. And we will 

also have lost a great number of other benefits, including a 100- 

year relationship with the highest standards of safety and security. 

Mr. LONG. Again for both of you, can you briefly describe the 

U.S. programs to track and identify emerging international nuclear 

programs? 

Dr. PARK. So, obviously, there is open literature. And we actually 

do track, you know, the progress being made throughout the world. 

And we have avenues, as well, that I am more than happy to brief 

you at appropriate locations. 

Mr. MCGINNIS. And we do participate in the materials tracking 

within the Department, with NNSA playing a lead role. 

Mr. LONG. Well, would you agree with Mr. Lyman’s assertion 

that any country that has access to nuclear energy can easily develop a nuclear weapons program, presumably without the international community’s knowledge? 

Mr. PARK. So, as a physicist, is it a possibility? Yes. Is it likely? 

It is very difficult. Especially at what we call the production scale, 

I hope our monitoring technologies, and our partnerships with 

IAEA, and our international partners we should be able to do a 

good job on who these actors might be. 

And should I be concerned? Of course. But, again, we have adequate technologies to help us to monitor the situation globally. 

And, again, I am more than happy to provide you with additional 

information. 

Mr. LONG. Yes, well that is what I would hope. And that is, that 

is what I would think. But I just wanted your opinion. 

Mr. McGinnis, do you care to weigh in? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I do not believe it would be easy. 

Mr. LONG. OK, thank you. 

For you, Mr. McGinnis. In your testimony you mentioned the advancements around nuclear reactor design that are currently underway. Can you talk a little bit about these technologies and, if 

proven to work, how they can help revolutionize or revitalize, excuse me, revitalize our nuclear energy sector? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Thank you very much. Yes, we are in my view 

at the precipice of an entirely new, innovative phase in the U.S. 

nuclear energy sector. I don’t say that lightly. We are seeing it happen right now. 

The advance reactors such as the advanced SMR for the first 

time going through the NRC, receiving the first phase approval, inVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:51 Jan 04, 2019 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 I:\115THCONGRESS\115X132DOENUCLEARLEGPDFSAVED\115X132DOENUCLEARPDF
41 

cluding passive safety features, validates that they do not need any 

electric pumps or motors in order to be able to safely shut down 

because of the passive safety system. This is just one example of 

many of the advanced reactor designs that are coming out of the 

United States’ nuclear innovation community that offers a step 

change, step change improvement on what is already strong safety 

in our reactors, number one. 

Number two is their versatility. We are witnessing reactors being 

designed that are unlike anything we have seen. We have reactors, 

advanced reactors that are designed to be able to go from 0 to 100 

percent power in 60 minutes. That is load following. We haven’t 

seen that with large reactors. 

We have finance ability for the advanced reactors unlike what we have seen. Instead of $8 billion per unit, not including financing, 

we are talking maybe a billion, maybe a billion and a half for a 

substantial generating capacity. 

We also have distributed opportunity where we have the opportunity now to place smaller reactors, modular scaled-up reactors in 

locations we never could do with a large reactor. So, product choice, 

versatility in application, desalinization or hydrogen production, 

this is an entirely new class of disruptive reactors, and that is why 

we are so excited about this. 

Mr. LONG. This is a very important hearing we are having here 

today. And I want to thank both of you for taking the time to be 

here and sharing your knowledge with us. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. UPTON. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Tonko. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, 

gentlemen, for joining us and for your insights on these bills. 

Administrator Park, Dr. Park, I have a few questions on the discussion draft that addresses the Part 810 process. It is my understanding that Section 3 would expedite the review process for, and 

I quote, ‘‘low proliferation risk reactor technologies.’’ However, I do 

not believe that these technologies are defined in the draft. 

Can you offer us a sense of what types of technologies would be 

captured by these low proliferation risk reactor technologies? 

Dr. PARK. Yes. So, obviously this is interagency effort. DOE does 

have a lead on determining what would go in the category, but at 

the same time we need to coordinate that review process with the 

other agencies, including State, for example. Again, it’s to a large 

extent a case-by-case. But there is no single category that says if 

it falls in the category, it’s free for all. It doesn’t work that way. 

Really because one agency appreciates or gives us flexibility at 

the same time as different challenges. But what is in the middle 

is country assurance. And that actually changes the calculation by 

the way. If it is a country that we have a 123 agreement with, it 

is straightforward. But, again, if it is not one of those countries, or 

China, India, or other countries it is very difficult. So we need to 

look at it from what I call a totality or big picture perspective. 

So to that extent you can actually categorize as light-water, lowrisk, et cetera, but it really depends on who the recipients are. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. Currently, would those Part 810 reviews 

qualify as low proliferation risks? 

42 

Dr. PARK. I need to get back to you. I don’t, basically don’t have 

specifics on. 

Mr. TONKO. OK, thank you. Does the Part 810 process look just 

at the technology or also the conditions within the potential partner country? That is to say is the current review process the same 

for each potential partner country? 

Mr. PARK. I also need to get back to you because it is quite different from, you know, case to case. So maybe it might be more appropriate for us to give you solid data with a sample, with great 

examples as to what we are doing for several countries so you have 

appreciation for the challenges that we have. 

Mr. TONKO. OK. And you will forward that to us? 

Dr. PARK. Yes. 

Mr. TONKO. Your testimony mentions that currently the 

lengthiest part of the review is the time it takes partner countries 

to provide the required governmental nonproliferation assurances. 

Can you give us some examples of these assurances? 

Dr. PARK. So, we actually apply conditions so that they can actually enjoy U.S.-developed technologies. But these conditions require 

that they do not share with the third parties, and they do not actually modify without conditions and so on. It goes on and on and on. 

Oftentimes the host countries or the recipient countries when I 

think about this because there are obviously ramifications for they 

sign up for some things without fully understanding. But so it’s 

along that line that satisfies. 

Mr. TONKO. But are these assurances different for each export 

partner country? 

Dr. PARK. To a large extent. There is variation, obviously. As, for 

example, countries that we have a 123 agreements went through 

the review process with us at the highest level, so they know the 

what I call boundary conditions as to how to receive our U.S.-developed technologies. 

But, again, when you leave that small group of countries, which 

is 20-some-odd countries, the rest of the world still needs to go 

through the category process, how they respond to our requests and 

so on. We do a lot of hand holding but there is a limit as to how 

much we can do. We cannot speak for their countries. 

Mr. TONKO. My understanding is that the discussion draft would 

allow DOE to continue the review while it waits for the State Department to secure the assurances. Would this bill reduce or limit 

the time it takes for the State Department to secure those given 

assurances? 

Dr. PARK. It is a separate process, somewhat decoupled. At the 

same time because of our experience working with our international partners and our industry partners who are actually trying to export the technologies, I think we can actually give them 

the right answers. It is up to them whether to take them or not. 

But, again, we can actually show them what steps they need to 

take. And, again, this is open to test, if I can use that phrase. 

Mr. TONKO. But do you think there should be limitations on how 

long the State Department might have to obtain these assurances? 

Dr. PARK. So, it also depends on whether we have agreement 

with a country. I would stress, as was stated, that it really depends 

43 

on what kind of assurance they provide us to safeguard our technologies. 

The biggest fear I personally have is our technologies go into 

wrong hands and we don’t have any assurance that we know what 

they do with that technology that we have transferred. Safeguards 

concerns are monumental in what we do, even in the e810 process. 

Mr. TONKO. So those limitations are—could be critical. 

Dr. PARK. Yes. 

Mr. TONKO. With that, Mr. Chair, I thank you and yield back. 

Mr. UPTON. The gentleman yields back. 

Dr. Bucshon. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Department of Energy’s public/private partnership with 

Nuscale Power which followed a similar effort that led to the licensing and construction of Southern Company’s new nuclear reactors has proven to be a successful model to address a costly regulatory approval process for new nuclear technologies. Congressman 

Flores’ legislation builds on that model with a public/private partnership for advanced nuclear fuel needs. 

Mr. McGinnis, DOE’s Isotope Program includes an industry consortium to help meet specific needs, material needs of californium252, which is used for an assortment of industrial applications. 

This consortium could be a model for the consortium in Mr. Flores’ 

bill. 

Has your office discussed how the Isotope Consortium could 

apply to an advanced fuel program? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Thank you very much. Isotope production is very 

important. There are certainly applications for advanced reactor 

technologies. But with regards to the lead for isotope production, 

that is both within the Office of Science and also NNSA. So if you 

don’t mind, respectfully I may ask Dr. Park. I don’t know if you 

have any refer—anything you want to say on the isotope production. 

Dr. PARK. If it is appropriate we will get back to you because it 

involves yet another member within the DOE family, and they do 

more of that work. And isotope production that we are responsible 

for is really just purifications for medical isotopes or in R&D. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Yes, if you can get a response back to the committee, that would be great. I would appreciate it. 

I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I thank my colleague. 

I just wanted to follow up on Adam Kinzinger’s comments about 

the international aspect of this. I deal a lot with the Baltic countries, Eastern European issues, so I focus a lot on the Astravets 

plant being constructed on the border between Lithuania and 

Belarus. And I just want to highlight a couple issues on this. 

The International Atomic Energy Commission recommended a 

six-step process to review building of nuclear power plants to prevent disasters like Chernobyl and also, recently, Fukushima. 

Belarus has chosen to skip four of the six steps. That already identifies a concern. 

When asked why they want to build this plant, the President of 

Belarus said, ‘‘This is a,’’ and I quote, ‘‘a fishbone in the throat of 

the European Union and the Baltic States.’’ So it is not a power 

44 

plant being constructed for energy security, energy efficiency, it is 

really economic warfare against Eastern European countries. 

Nuclear power plants in sensitive areas should be discussed 

within the Espoo Convention, which this is not. Nearly all of Lithuania is 300 kilometers of the plant, which means that if a disaster 

were to strike, long-term food consumption in the country could be 

affected, the drinking water could be affected. 

But there is also concerns, again highlighting what Adam was 

trying to raise on the national security aspects of this. Incidents occurring and cast on Belarus’ commitment to working with neighbors and ensuring the plant’s safety. In 2016, six serious incidents 

occurred, and Belarus has failed to be up front with Lithuania 

about any of them. A 330-ton nuclear reactor shell was allegedly 

dropped from about 13 feet. This was two summers ago now, not 

last summer. Belarus did not reveal anything about the incident 

until independent media reported it, and then downplayed it. 

Earlier, a structural frame at the site collapsed after workers, 

apparently under time pressure, filled it too quickly. 

So, and this is all based upon a statement in the record I did for 

the Congressional Record on the floor just raising this issue. So the 

international concern, state-sponsored actors versus competitive 

marketplace do bring a point of needed discussion to this debate. 

So I appreciate that. I just wanted to be additive to what Congressman Kinzinger has stated. 

With that, I want to thank my colleague from Indiana and yield 

back to him. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Yes, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JOHNSON [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. 

We now recognize the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Castor. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you very much. And thank you, Dr. Park and 

Mr. McGinnis, for being here today. 

I am very passionate about the United States remaining a leader 

in technology and innovation, especially in nuclear energy. I believe 

the commercialization of nuclear technology can be positive in that 

expanding and exporting this technology can be beneficial to businesses here on our economy and on international security. 

But I have concerns about the discussion draft that makes 

changes to DOE’s Part 810 process. I believe the Secretary of Energy should have more discretion when reviewing authorization. 

But I question whether or not the legislation as drafted is as precise as it should be, actually providing a firm definition of low proliferation risk. 

And then I am also concerned that the application time line for 

low proliferation risk reactor technology will be untenable in the 

long run. 

Dr. Park, can you share with us how DOE currently defines low 

proliferation risk? 

Dr. PARK. So with the—because of the many different parameters 

in reviewing the applications, for example, again the biggest factor 

is the recipient country risk. It is not a simple formula that actually would work for us. So only as they fit in the certain categories, 

for example, as I stated earlier, if we already have established a 

relationship through 123 agreements we can go through a 5-week 

45 

expedited process. It is not a big deal. We actually have done that 

before. 

But, again, if you don’t belong in that category it becomes much 

more difficult. We need to actually work with them so they know 

what we are looking for and they can provide responses that we 

need to have to make sure that our technologies aren’t shared in 

a manner that is not appropriate. 

So I do appreciate the fact that we need to find a way to expedite 

the processes. Again, we are somewhat limited in what we can do 

in terms of whether they already have an agreement with us or 

not. So, to that extent I would like to look for ways to work in these 

countries as best as we can so we can minimize, we can actually 

manage the risks in sharing U.S. technologies with these countries. 

I do apologize for giving you a roundabout answer, but it really 

depends on who the host countries are. 

Ms. CASTOR. Mr. McGinnis, do you have a comment on that? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Just to say, obviously the Office of Nuclear Energy, its mission, the U.S. nuclear industry greatly relies upon this 

very important Part 810 process, as well as the two other export 

control authorities at the Department of Commerce and also NRC, 

as well as the 123. So this is a process, I think, that we are all 

collectively always trying to improve. 

Ms. CASTOR. Maybe you can rally those folks to look at that, that 

portion of and definition. 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes. 

Ms. CASTOR. That would be helpful. 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Will do. 

Ms. CASTOR. Dr. Park, do you foresee any challenges with the 

draft legislation that could hinder the U.S. as a producer of commercialized nuclear technology? 

Dr. PARK. I don’t see any showstoppers. If I can give you that as 

a response. The fact that the committee is very involved with us 

and asking our technical assistance and interpretations, we welcome it. We look forward to continue the relationship. I think it is 

a positive step where we see many positive signs. 

Ms. CASTOR. How about national security risk? I know you can’t 

go into detail, great detail there, but are there any national security risks that could develop as a result of the changes made in the 

discussion draft? 

Dr. PARK. There are always possibilities and potentials. And I 

think we are comfortable, we are confident that we can actually 

mitigate some of those risks along the way. And again, the minimizing and managing risks is what we do on NNSA’s side. And so 

far I think that we have a pretty good handle on how to move forward with this whole situation and as far as the process of technology sharing and so on and so forth. 

But again, there are some things that just take time. And we appreciate your patience on it. 

Ms. CASTOR. Sometimes time is important when we are talking 

about national security. But I, I believe that the U.S. has to remain 

the leader in nuclear technology. And as I mentioned before, there 

are many benefits associated with reforming Part 810, but there 

could also be unintended consequences. And that’s what we need 

to focus on. 

46 

I want to ensure, I want to ensure that we are proactive and efficient, as you said, when it comes to the commercialization of the 

nuclear technology. But we are counting on you and the experts out 

there to help poke and prod at this piece of legislation to make sure 

there are not unintended consequences. 

Dr. PARK. We will. And we will work with you. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The gentlewoman yields back. The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Dr. Park, I understand that for many years the Department allowed the Secretary to delegate signature authority on Part 810 authorizations. And it was only recently that DOE’s general counsel 

revised its previous interpretation to disallow this delegation. 

Section 3 of my discussion draft simply clarifies in the Atomic 

Energy Act that the previous process was acceptable. So do you 

know if there were any delegations to your knowledge that involved 

unacceptable proliferation risk or created an unacceptable lack of 

visibility by the Secretary’s office over the proposed exports? 

Dr. PARK. So, my understanding is that there was not a delegation because of interpretation of the law, the way our general counsel read the law. And it is not because of lack of the appreciation 

for our technical staff. 

But again, we actually welcome this opportunity to delegate 

some of these ‘‘routine’’ things, although there is nothing routine 

about sharing nuclear technologies. But again, we appreciate it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But I mean back when they were, because it was 

previously delegation was allowed. So when delegation was allowed 

are you aware of any delegations that, that involved any unacceptable proliferation risks? 

Dr. PARK. I don’t think there was any delegation in the past. 

That’s my understanding. 

I am more than happy to correct myself after this hearing and 

get back to you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. Well, based on your understanding of the decision, was the legal interpretation made in any way because staff 

weren’t qualified or able to appropriately consider the impacts of 

the specific application? 

Dr. PARK. Not at all. I think there is the highest confidence from 

the beginning of all the secretaries we have had on the technical 

qualifications and their judgment. It is a matter of how one read 

the law, and it is as simple as that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Back to that first question. Would you, would you 

go back and take a look at that? Would you look and see if there 

were any delegations? Because it was my understanding that we 

used to do it that way and that there were. So I would like to clear 

that one up. 

Dr. PARK. We will get back to you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK, thank you. 

Based on NNSA’s review of the process, would enactment of this 

bill to revert to the previous delegation process have the practical 

effect of shortening the review process with minimal proliferation 

risk? Do you think it is a smart thing to do? 

Dr. PARK. One-word answer: Yes. And obviously, as a physicist 

I will give you a 10-minute answer which you don’t need right now. 

47 

But, again, I think there are enough good qualities in the proposed 

legislation, and we will work with you. I think this is a positive 

sign. So, there are many things that we know how to fix. And this 

legislation will certainly help us to achieve that goal. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. All right. 

Dr. Park, continuing on, could reverting to the pre-2005 process 

by which DOE can review an authorization in a concurrent process 

as the State Department’s required process, would that help reduce 

the overall time frame, approval time frame? 

Dr. PARK. Yes. The biggest challenge, again, is waiting for our 

partner countries to provide assurances. And there is just no simple way to get the answers. 

At the same time, one of the things that we have been doing is 

that we actually give ‘‘credit’’ for these countries having 123 agreements with us. So there are some exceptions that allow us to accelerate the sharing the technologies. But, again, there are just a few 

dozen countries that we have a relationship with. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. All right. And would this change to the approvable process in any way reduce information that is reviewed, 

weaken the rigor of such reviews, or alter the various agencies that 

concur, or consult on the authorization in a manner that could undermine our national security interests? 

Dr. PARK. So when I look at the positive side of this legislation 

it might actually help us because, for example, this online system 

would allow all the reviewers to actually look at each others’ comments, for example, in real time. So I see potential positive changes 

that this system, this legislation will produce. But, also, we will 

look for unintended consequences along the way. You don’t want to 

hurry up too fast, too much on some of the review processes. 

But, again, there are enough positive signs that we are really 

embracing this legislation. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. All right. Well, I will yield back my total of 

21 seconds. And with that I think we have no colleagues on the left 

that want to ask questions. 

Mr. Flores, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FLORES. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

witnesses also for joining us today. This is an important discussion. 

Nuclear power is the ultimate admissions-free, green-power source, 

particularly when it comes to the generation of baseload electricity. 

And so it is important for our country moving forward, not only for 

economic opportunity, national security, and also for the environment. 

Earlier this year I asked both Under Secretary Menezes and you, 

Mr. McGinnis, about collaborating to develop a policy to provide 

high-assay LEU. NNSA officials also testified at both of these hearings. Thus far DOE and NNSA’s input in this discussion draft has 

been limited. 

Dr. Park’s testimony notes that there are efforts underway relating to high-assay LEU, and I hope to increase our collaboration as 

we work towards formally introducing this legislation. 

Let’s turn to a few questions. One provision in my discussion 

draft relates to the need to develop what is known as criticality 

benchmark data. This data is important to develop the underlying 

information to establish the necessary safe regulatory framework 

48 

for the provision of nuclear fuels. Mr. McGinnis, can you succinctly 

describe the nature of this criticality information, why it is necessary, and what Government or non-Government facilities will be 

able to gather this type of data? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Thank you very much. The benchmarking data is 

very important for a number of reasons, including transportation 

and packaging. This, in part, is because the criticality issues where 

you have a higher level of enrichment, and so whether it is needing 

new NRC licensed transportation systems to be able to transport 

in the U.S. enriched fuel above 5 percent, much of the fuel that is 

anticipated to be needed will be as high as 17, 18, or 19 percent. 

Mr. FLORES. Right. 

Mr. MCGINNIS. So the configuration, the way the materials is 

packaged. But a lot of this also is driven by what we are waiting 

on. And that is waiting to get a better sense, even though we want 

to get as much data as possible, who are the first movers? And 

what are the types of reactors—are we talking metal or are we 

talking oxide fuel? And different reactors designs have different 

types of fuels. 

Then there are other options for transportation as well, including 

in gas form. 

Mr. FLORES. Can we move to the next part of the question, that 

is, what Government or non-Government facilities are available to 

gather this type of data? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Well, the Department of Energy—first of all let 

me, again, recognize that the front end enrichment capacity is addressed, is being addressed fairly well in the U.S., particular by— 

in particular by LES for the enrichment services. And I would say 

that the industry is poised to respond to additional needs, including 

high-assay LEU when they see the market coming and the customers coming in at a sufficient volume. So, in the meantime the 

Department of Energy does stand ready to make available its facilities to be able to do that data benchmarking, and other testing. 

We are doing some now. We are working with industry now in 

order to get as much of a clear understanding of what types of fuels 

are going to be needed when. 

Mr. FLORES. OK. Dr. Park, you indicate in your testimony that 

you agree that advanced reactors will require HA–LEU. You note 

further that you will evaluate that need alongside the needs for our 

Nation’s defense programs. The question is are these two programs 

on the same time frame or different time frames? 

According to your testimony there is ample fuel for weapons use 

available today. But it is unclear that there will be ample fuel for 

advanced civilian reactor use over the next 10 years. Is it appropriate to suggest that DOE’s civilian nuclear program should focus 

on the near term commercial needs while your office can look at 

the longer term defense enrichment requirements? 

Dr. PARK. So, as it turns out, even for the self-absorption program tritium production requirement that we need to start the 

work today because of the long lead time it takes to get the production up and running. So time is appropriate for us to collect the requirements from industry partners. 

It doesn’t necessarily mean we will incorporate the commercial 

sectors we find through our DOE. Our commitment is to review all 

49 

possibilities and make sure we stretch every dollar that we have 

to produce the enriched uranium. But, again, at the earliest moment we can collect and incorporate the requirements we will have 

a better idea as to what actions are available. If indeed we start 

with the enriched uranium enrichment then later it will stretch out 

into much longer and that will give us more options in terms of entertaining possibilities of supporting commercial sectors. 

So it really depends on the requirements within—— 

Mr. FLORES. It is possible our bill could help you in terms of our 

Nation’s defense needs, as well as taking care of HA–LEU for advanced, for the advanced sector. 

OK, we have run out of time. I will submit additional questions 

for the record. I appreciate those responses. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The gentleman yields back. And I want to, seeing 

that there are—I am sorry, I didn’t see Mr. Griffith walk in. Mr. 

Griffith is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McGinnis, nearly a year ago President Trump announced the 

administration was going to conduct a complete review of the Nation’s civil nuclear policy. Following your appearance before this 

committee in early February you were asked to provide information 

for the record regarding this ongoing review. Nearly three months 

after those questions were submitted to you, we have not yet received a response from you or your team. 

So, I would like to ask a few questions about this ongoing civil 

nuclear review, and I would request that you please answer yes or 

no so we have time to get to all of them. 

As a principal on the National Security Council is the Secretary 

of Energy providing direct input into this ongoing review? Yes or 

no? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Are you aware if the review is engaging with other 

governmental agencies such as the Department of Commerce and 

the Department of State? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Are you aware if this review is receiving input 

from non-Government stakeholders? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I cannot say yes or no on that one. I do not know. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. OK, thank you. 

Are you aware if the review intends to seek input from Congress 

to inform the review? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Again, I can’t speak for the White House on 

whether they, when they plan, if they plan to give input. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. But input’s a good thing from Congress, wouldn’t 

you agree? Yes or no? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. It’s a good thing. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. All right. To the best of your understanding, and 

obviously this can’t be yes or no, to the best of your understanding 

when do you expect the review to be completed? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. I do not know the answer to that, other than the 

fact that I can tell you that we have attended quite a few meetings, 

very substantive. We have made significant progress. 

50 

And I can also say that our charge at the Department was not 

to wait for any completion to be able to do things that we can do 

now, whether it is loan guarantees, whether it is notice of proposed 

rulemaking, whether it is industry quotas or supporting the revitalization. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. And I appreciate that. And I hope included in that 

would be recommendations that you need legislative support. And 

that was the last of my series of questions as to the best of your 

understanding where the review makes specific legislative recommendations for Congress to consider. And I would hope that 

even if it is not finished, if you find one let us know, because we 

cannot operate on those suggestions if you don’t give them to us. 

Mr. MCGINNIS. And, respectfully, I would like to apologize for not 

getting those answers to you. I am fully aware of them. I have been 

part of that process giving the answers. But, unfortunately, it is 

taking longer than we had hoped for to get them back to you. We 

will get them back to you. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, I appreciate that. I am glad we were able to 

clear this up a little bit today. 

As this morning’s hearing clearly indicates, as well as the dozens 

of other Energy and Commerce Committee hearings in this Congress there is a strong bipartisan support to address key challenges 

confronting our Nation’s nuclear sector. And I hope the administration will commit to working with us as we go forward. 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Absolutely. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you very much. And I yield back. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The gentleman yields back. 

We are now pleased to recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hudson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first thank 

Chairman Upton and Ranking Member Rush for holding this very 

important hearing. Thank both our witnesses for being here and 

taking so much time with us. 

A number of studies have identified the potential benefits of applying advanced nuclear reactor designs to fill specific national security needs. Mr. McGinnis, you have talked a lot about the microreactors and sort of what you see in the future. I represent Fort 

Bragg, the largest military base in America. This is an issue that 

I am very interested in. 

I believe it is critical that we have your input on how we can improve the safety and security of our soldiers in the field on military 

installations, as well as critical DOE sites around the country. Mr. 

McGinnis, I asked for information regarding ongoing DOE and Department of Defense discussions on this topic back in February 

after a subcommittee hearing. And I am disappointed that I 

haven’t gotten any response. I really wanted to get some of this 

feedback as we were developing my discussion draft. 

I hope you will carry this message back to the Department’s senior leadership that this committee expects more timely and coordinated response in advance on our agenda because, again, we value 

your input and think it will improve the process. 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Again I apologize. But I would like to reinforce 

the importance of microreactors as a key aspect potentially for resiliency and also, of course, security, establishing a secure energy 

51 

supply chain by having indigenous generation on site. So there is 

tremendous potential value to having a microreactor potentially on 

site supplying power for a base or other Federal or non-Federal facility. 

Mr. HUDSON. I appreciate that. 

And I want to thank Mr. Peters for working with me on the discussion draft. Our discussion draft asks a number of questions to 

help identify key components of how a pilot program might be developed. Briefly, Mr. McGinnis, are the topics in this bipartisan bill 

the right questions to ask for Congress to make a fully informed 

decision on the framework of this pilot program? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Yes, indeed. In fact, I have been meaning to say 

how timely and how appropriate and, frankly, how important the 

issues that have been addressed, are addressed in these four pieces 

of legislation, are incredibly important. We are in a key moment in 

time to revitalize, and the support as we are seeing in this legislation, the issues that are going to be vital if we are to succeed. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you for that. 

Are there any additional issues that we should be aware of relative to, particularly, my discussion draft? 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Just to say, again, we are in a key moment in 

time. Industry needs all the help we can give them in the appropriate way to get back on a revitalized footing to be able to not only 

supply resilient power in the United States but to be globally very, 

very competitive. Thank you. 

Mr. HUDSON. I appreciate that. 

Dr. Park, Congressman Johnson’s discussion draft includes a section that creates an expedited process or procedures for low proliferation risk technologies. Will you please describe how you envision the development and implementation of that process? 

Dr. PARK. As we have been building up the cases where we were 

able to, we are able to transfer technologies we would like to be 

able to copy that over as much as possible. But, again, there are 

challenges related to who the host countries are. So we still need 

to juggle both ends to make sure we actually provide safeguard assurances at the same time we do expedited process and approval. 

So it’s a balancing act. 

Mr. HUDSON. Appreciate that. 

Like the other sections of this discussion draft, these procedures 

will help enable our domestic suppliers to more effectively compete 

in the world market, as has been mentioned by my colleagues, 

while not impacting our national security interests, and allowing 

NNSA to focus on the applications that truly present national security risks. Do you believe this section will have that intended effect? Do you think we strike the right balance? 

Dr. PARK. I think it is on the right path. 

Mr. HUDSON. Great. I appreciate that. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The gentleman yields back. 

And now seeing that there are no further Members wishing to 

ask questions I would like to thank our panelists, our witnesses for 

joining us here today. You are excused. 

We will call up our second panel, if they would take their seats. 

These include Jeffrey S. Merrifield, partner at Pillsbury Winthrop 

52 

Shaw Pittman; and Melissa Mann, president of URENCO; Nick 

Irvin, Director, Research and Development for Strategy in Advanced Nuclear Technology, Southern Company; and Edwin 

Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists. 

And as soon as our second panel takes their seat, just for Members’ understanding and information, we will get through as many 

of these introductory or the witness testimonies as possible before 

we have to break for an anticipated vote sometime in the next 10, 

15 minutes or so. 

So, with that, Mr. Merrifield, would recognize you for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENTS OF JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD, PARTNER, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, AND SENIOR ADVISOR, CLEARPATH ACTION; MELISSA C. MANN, PRESIDENT, 

URENCO USA, INC., AND MEMBER, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR 

INDUSTRY COUNCIL; JAMES NICHOLAS IRVIN, DIRECTOR, 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY, ADVANCED NUCLEAR, AND CROSSCUTTING TECHNOLOGY, SOUTHERN 

COMPANY, AND MEMBER, ADVANCED REACTOR WORKING 

GROUP, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE; AND EDWIN LYMAN, 

PH.D., SENIOR SCIENTIST, GLOBAL SECURITY PROGRAM, 

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Thank you. Chairman, Ranking Member Rush, 

and members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to testify before 

a committee that I had the opportunity to be in front of when I was 

an NRC Commissioner. I am here today as a senior advisor to 

ClearPath Action, although I am a full-time partner in Pillsbury 

Law. 

Founded by businessman Jay Faison, ClearPath Action’s mission 

is to accelerate conservative clean energy solutions. To advance the 

mission, ClearPath Action develops cutting-edge policy and messaging and works with policymakers and industry. 

During my time at the NRC and in positions I have held since 

then, I have had the opportunity to visit all 99 nuclear power 

plants in the United States, and over half of the 450 nuclear power 

plants around the world. I have been impressed by the commitment 

to excellence in nuclear power operations that I have seen at all 

the plants I have visited. 

I would first like to turn to the matter of advanced nuclear reactors. These designs, which utilize high temperature gas, molten 

salt, and liquid metal, among other designs, range from microreactors of a few megawatts to large gigawatt-size reactors. While they 

represent a diversity of sizes and cooling methods, they generally 

possess enhanced safety features as well as improved economics 

when compared to existing reactors. 

In a report issued by ClearPath in the Nuclear Industry Council 

in February, Pillsbury identified that of the over 50 advanced reactor designs in North America the vast majority of these are planning to use higher enrichments of fuel, typically between 8 and 

19.75 percent. And some of these designs could come to the U.S. 

market by the mid to late 2020s. 

53 

As the development of a fuel supply and regulatory approval can 

take multiple years, work must begin immediately to ensure a sufficient supply of this high-assay low-enriched uranium. Unfortunately, the Department of Energy, which has been a traditional 

supplier of these enriched levels of material, does not currently possess the high-assay enriched uranium or enrichment capabilities 

that are needed for advanced reactors as the current inventory is 

dedicated to other needs such as research reactors and the Navy 

propulsion program. 

The draft legislation sponsored by Representative Flores is a 

positive step in the right direction to address the need for DOE to 

create an inventory of HA–LEU material, the need for criticality 

information to develop and license transportation packages, and 

the need for the NRC to develop an appropriate and timely licensing framework. 

In addition to strongly supporting this legislation, ClearPath Action’s written comments provide specific suggestions for improving 

this legislation. 

We also support the draft legislation offered by Congressman 

Wilson to require the DOE to prepare a report on the potential deployment of privately developed microreactors at DoD and DOE facilities. ClearPath’s written testimony also includes a recommendation for strengthening this legislation. 

The NRC has continued to make commendable progress in 

rightsizing its workforce and budget. ClearPath Action believes the 

Commission can and should take further steps to streamline its 

services consistent with the mission to protect public health, safety, 

and the environment. 

The legislation sponsored by Congressman Kinzinger and Congressman Doyle appears to be a common sense step to provide the 

agency with a funding mechanism that aligns its mission and costs. 

We applaud the provision that excludes fees for the development of 

the regulatory infrastructure for advanced reactor technologies. We 

believe this exclusion will allow the NRC to be appropriately prepared to review these technologies, yet avoid placing the cost burden for these preparations on the nascent developers of these promising designs. 

As it relates to the provision in the bill to require a study about 

the elimination of the Foreign Licensing Restrictions of Section 

103(d) and 104(d) of the Atomic Energy Act, while I would prefer 

the outright elimination of the ownership requirement, I understand the rationale for commissioning a study and support it. 

Recently, the U.S. has had several perfectly good nuclear reactors shut down for economic reasons. Previously, Pillsbury was previously approached by several European utilities who were interested in purchasing U.S. nuclear reactors but were prohibited from 

doing so. Eliminating this requirement could provide an opportunity to save these vital clean energy facilities through investment 

by friendly foreign utilities. 

I would note that in 2008, British Energy’s nuclear fleet faced 

similar financial hardships, and a decision to permit EDF to purchase these units allowed the continued operation of these clean 

UK energy assets. 

54 

We have reviewed the draft submitted by Congressman Johnson 

to facilitate the process by which DOE authorizes export of civilian 

nuclear technologies. We believe this legis—we support this legislation and believe it makes an important step to further streamline 

the process for some applications submitted under 10 C.F.R. Part 

50.10. That said, we remain concerned that the legislation only targets a limited portion of the nuclear technology export approvals 

process. We have submitted some specific suggestions for improvement in our written testimony. 

Thank you. And we thank you for allowing me to testify on this 

important topic. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Merrifield follows:] 

55 


U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Energy and Power 

Hearing on "DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, 

Regulation, and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies" 

The Honorable .JeffreyS. Merrifield Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(1998-2007) 

Partner, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman & 

Senior Advisor, Clear Path 

May 22,2018 

Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Rush and members of the Subcommittee, it is indeed a 

pleasure to testify before a Committee that I had the opportunity to testify previously during 

the time I served as a Commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). I 

am appearing here today in my role as Senior Advisor to ClearPath Action, although my full 

time occupation is as a Partner in the nuclear energy practice group of Pillsbury Law Finn. 

Founded by businessman Jay Faison, ClcarPath Action's mission is to accelerate conservative 

clean energy solutions. To advance the mission, ClearPath Action develops cutting-edge policy 

and messaging and works with policymakers and industry. 

My testimony today will focus on the future of the U.S. nuclear program, opportunities for 

growth and export of U.S. nuclear technologies and areas where support from the Congress 

and the Trump Administration would be helpful in spurring these positive developments. I 

will also provide comments on the four legislative measures that are the subject of this 

hearing. 

Today, there are approximately 450 nuclear power plants worldwide that operate in 30 

countries and there are approximately 60 additional plants that are under construction in I 7 

countries. These plants produce II% of the total world power generation and 35% of the 

world's carbon free generation. In the United States, we have 99 nuclear units, and 

collectively these plants produce 20% of our total power, 60% of the U.S. carbon free 

generation and operate over 92% of the time. This is an extraordinary record of 

accomplishment of providing safe, clean, reliable and resilient power. 

During my time at the NRC and in positions I have held since then, I have had the opportunity 

to visit every nuclear plant in the United States and over half of the nuclear plants in the 

world. I have been impressed by the commitment to excellence in nuclear power operations 

that I have seen at the plants I have visited. Yet, I have also been disappointed by the lack of 

appreciation that many in government, the public and the media have for the vital role that 

these nuclear units serve in ensuring our nation's energy security, sustainable economic 

growth and clean energy supply. 

Over the last several decades, at both the state and federal level, significant incentives, grants 

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and portfolio standards have been established to support renewable power programs, namely 

wind and solar. While that has helped to diversify our nation's energy portfolio with 

additional carbon free generation, these policies gave short shrift to the clean energy benefits 

of nuclear power. I commend this Committee as well as the Trump Administration for 

recognizing the need for our nation to have a balanced energy portfolio and that the clean and 

reliable power that nuclear energy provides to our nation deserves equal standing and support. 

Status of Nuclear Power Construction and Advanced Reactors 

While it was just over a year ago, in March of2017, that Westinghouse Corporation declared 

bankruptcy, today things look far different. Just a few weeks ago, China announced that 

Sanmen Unit!, which is a Westinghouse APIOOO unit, would begin loading fuel as a prelude 

to initiating operations in the next few months. This was a major milestone, and China may 

have as many as three API OOO's, two at Sanmcn and one at Haiyang, that could begin 

operations in 2018. While construction was, unfortunately, halted at two Westinghouse units 

in South Carolina, Southern Company is continuing positive momentum in its efforts to 

complete two new APIOOO Units in Georgia at the Vogtle site. All of this positive progress is 

reinforced by a recent decision of the Bankruptcy Court to allow the sale of Westinghouse to 

Brookfield for $4.6 billion. 

Y ct, when one looks worldwide, China, India, Russia and Korea continue to lead the United 

States in the deployment of large I 000+ megawatt nuclear units, despite the U.S. possessing 

the leading Generation III+ technologies. While there are a number of opportunities on the 

horizon for U.S. nuclear suppliers in Saudi Arabia, India, Poland and Jordan among others, 

continued support of the U.S. Government, including appropriate support of the Exlm Bank 

will be needed to level the playing field for these efforts. 

An area of future growth for the U.S. nuclear industry is the continued development of 

advanced nuclear reactors. These designs, which utilize high-temperature gas, molten salt 

and liquid metal among others designs, range in size from micro-reactors of a few megawatts 

to large gigawatt size reactors. While there is a diversity of sizes and cooling methods among 

these designs, they generally possess enhanced safety features as well as improved economics 

when compared to existing reactors. Given those capabilities, these advanced reactors not 

only provide an opportunity to replace some of the nuclear units that will be retiring in the 

U.S. over the next 20+ years, but their enhanced safety profile could allow them to be 

deployed at a wider range of sites and applications than the current U.S. nuclear fleet. 

Need for High Assay Low Enriched Uranium 

While the pending development of advanced reactors brings with it the potential for improved 

economics, lowered operating costs, higher utilization factors, enhanced safety margins and 

greater modularity, the fuels used to operate these reactors will be of a much greater variety in 

their form and composition. Additionally, many, but not all of these advanced designs, will 

utilize higher enrichments of fuel (between 8% and 19.75%) than the current light water reactor 

("LWR") fleet (typically 4%-5%). 

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As I stated in a report I wrote on this subject back in February, "To fully document the potential 

for the advanced reactor designs, Third Way, which is a Washington, D.C. based think tank, 

issued a report on May 18, 2017, that indicated that there are currently 56 advanced nuclear 

concepts in North America under development with large numbers also underway outside the 

U.S. 1 From information that the authors (Pillsbury) gathered, the vast majority of these reactor 

designs are planning to utilize higher enrichments of fuel, and some of these designs are 

proposed to come to the U.S. market in the mid to late 2020s. Further, a March 2017 survey of 

18 leading U.S.-based advanced reactors developers found that 67% of the companies said that 

an "assured supply of High Assay LEU" was either urgent or important, with squarely 50% of 

the overall respondents saying it was "urgent." 2 As the development of a fuel supply and 

regulatory approval can take multiple years, work must begin immediately to ensure sufficient 

supply ofHA-LEU. 

As the infrastructure for the production of civilian nuclear fuel, as well as the regulatory 

processes overseeing its production and use, have all been based on the existing L WR market, 

virtually every element of the nuclear fuel cycle 3 has been tailored precisely for these reactors. 

As development and future deployment of many of the current advanced reactor designs requires 

utilizing fuel with higher enrichments of uranium, appropriate sources of this material will need 

to be identified or created, as no commercial, domestic source currently exists. This includes the 

means to enrich, transport, manufacture, store and dispose of this fuel. For its part, the NRC will 

also need to tailor its regulatory framework to meet this need. 

Unfortunately, the Department of Energy ("DOE"), which has been the traditional supplier of 

these enriched levels of material, does not currently possess the high assay enriched uranium or 

enrichment capabilities that is needed for advanced reactors as the current inventory is dedicated 

to other needs such as research reactors and the Navy propulsion program. Our understanding is 

that DOE has identified some materials that could be modified to meet these needs and the recent 

Energy and Water Appropriations Bill that was recently marked out of Subcommittee provides 

helpful funding to initiate DOE's efforts. 

The draft legislation that has been sponsored by Representative Flores, entitled, the "Advanced 

Nuclear Fuel Availability Act" is a positive step in the right direction to address the need for 

high assay low enriched uranium otherwise known as HA-LEU. This draft legislation quite 

rightly recognizes the importance of HA-LEU in the development of advanced reactors and 

focuses on key issues such as the need to have DOE create an inventory of this material, the need 

for criticality information to develop and license transportation packages, and the need for the 

NRC to develop an appropriate and timely licensing framework. For these reasons, ClearPath 

strongly supports this legislation. 

We would note that Section 2 (B)(7) requires that DOE develop a program for full cost recovery 

of providing this I!A-LEU. While we understand the fiscal discipline intended by this provision, 

1 http://www.thirdway.org/infographic/the-global-race-tor-advanced-nuclear 

2 Advanced Fuels- Looming Crisis in Fueling Advanced and Innovative Nuclear Reactor Technologies, Clearpath/Nuclear 

Infrastructure Council White Paper on High Assay Low Enriched Uranium, p.2. 

3 The nuclear fuel cycle includes all the steps needed to mine, process, enrich, manufacture, use, store and permanently dispose 

of radioactive materials, including U-235 based fuels that are used for civilian and naval power and propulsion purposes. 

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and support the concept that this program should ultimately be self-sustaining, we are concerned 

that imposing the initial DOE startup costs on a group of developers in the early stages of this 

effort could he prohibitive and counter-productive to jump-starting this effort. We would be 

happy to work with the Committee to identify options for modifying this language. 

Pilot Program for Micro Reactors 

Consistent with our comments above, we would also support the draft legislation offered by 

Congressman Wilson to require the Department of Energy to prepare a report on the potential 

deployment of privately developed "micro-reactors" at Department of Defense and Department 

of Energy facilities. We believe that this legislation has the potential to provide an important 

kick-start for the prompt deployment of multiple advanced reactor designs and is consistent with 

previous efforts to support the development of clean energy technologies at federal facilities. 

That said, there is one area we would suggest for strengthening the legislation. 

In previous work Pillsbury has done regarding the development of power projects on federal 

facilities, we have found the federal contracting framework to be both confusing and overly 

complicated. Further, we have sometimes found our federal counterparts to be less than 

enthusiastic and sometimes uncooperative in carrying out Congressional mandates to develop 

power generation at federal facilities. You may wish to consider a new section of the report that 

would authorize the Government Accountability Office to review existing federal power 

purchase and power siting agreements and make recommendations on how they may be 

streamlined in a way that would better meet the intentions that you so rightly support in this draft 

legislation. 

NRC Fee Policies, Corporate Support Cost aud Licensing 

Two years ago, when I most recently testified in front of this Committee, I noted that"! 

understand and sympathize with the concerns previously voiced by members of this Committee 

regarding the size of the Agency, the decrease in efficiency of the Agency's licensing actions 

and a view that the-overhead-activities at the Agency have grown to a level which is not 

commensurate with the number of licensees currently under the purview of the NRC." 

Since that time the NRC has continued to make progress in rightsizing its workforce and 

budget and has also demonstrated an improved ability to be more timely in processing licensing 

actions. To that extent, we would commend the Agency. Nonetheless, we believe the 

Commission could and should take further steps to streamline its services consistent with its 

mission to protect public health, safety and the environment. 

ClearPath Action believes that H.R. 1320, the Nuclear Utilization and Keynote Energy Act, 

sponsored by Congressman Kinzinger and Congressman Doyle, which is focused on reducing 

the NRC's corporate support costs and realigning the Agency's fee structure, appears to be a 

common sense step to provide the Agency with a funding mechanism that aligns its mission 

and costs. Specifically, we would applaud section (3)(b)(l)(B)(iii) which provides an exclusion 

of fees for those costs associated with the development of the regulatory infrastructure for 

advanced nuclear reactor technologies. We believe this exclusion will allow the NRC to be 

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appropriately prepared to review these technologies, yet avoid placing the cost burden for these 

preparations on the nascent developers of these promising designs. We would also suggest that 

the Committee consider the potential to allow some of these off-the-fee-base funds be directed 

towards anticipatory regulatory research that would better position the NRC to efficiently and 

effectively oversee advanced nuclear technologies. 

We commend the Committee for continuing to encourage the Agency to focus on providing 

more timely and risk informed decision-making. For the purposes of developing advanced 

reactors, having a timely and predictable licensing process is critical, and we urge this 

Committee to hold the Commission accountable in this area. Consistent with this focus, we 

support the provisions in Section 7 of the bill which would streamline the Agency's licensing 

and environmental review process. As a Commissioner, I led a task force that looked at many 

of these same issues, and I concur with the recommended changes that are included in the 

discussion draft. 

Finally, I would like to comment on a number of the other reforms that are included in 

Congressman Kinzinger' s discussion draft. 

Foreign Licensing Restrictions, Mandatory Hearing and Informal Hearing Procedures 

As it relates to the study included in Section 4 of H.R. I 320 that would eliminate the Foreign 

Licensing Restrictions of Sections 1 03( d) and 1 04( d) of the Atomic Energy Act, while I would 

preferred that Congress simply eliminate this provision as an antiquated artifact of the Cold 

War, I understand the rationale for commissioning a study and support it. When I was on the 

Commission during the early 2000s, I and my colleagues testified in favor of the elimination of 

this provision as today we live in a world in which the United States is but one of 30 countries 

that operate civilian nuclear reactors. 

Currently, Section 1 03(d) contains a two-part test, the first of which prohibits the issuance of a 

license to an individual or company that is" owned, controlled or dominated by an alien, a 

foreign corporation or a foreign govemment." The second test allows the Commission to 

prohibit issuing a license if in its view, "the issuance of a license to such person would be 

inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public." In my 

view, as long as the second test is maintained, the blanket prohihition on foreign ownership is 

unnecessary, stifles innovation and is inconsistent with free trade. 

Over the last several years, we have had a number of perfectly good operating nuclear reactors 

shut down because of economic challenges posed by the current market for electrical power, 

with recent news that First Energy has said it will shut down its 4 units at Beaver Valley, Davis 

Besse and Perry. I can say, unequivocally, that our law firm has been approached a number of 

times within the last few years by utilities located in Europe which would like to purchase U.S. 

nuclear reactors but could not do so because of this prohibition. Lifting the foreign ownership 

provision could potentially provide an opportunity to save these vital clean energy facilities 

through investment by friendly foreign utility partners. I would further note that in the United 

Kingdom, the nuclear fleet operated by British Energy was faced with similar financial 

hardships and the decision to allow the French company, EDF, to purchase these assets in 2008 

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allowed for the continued operation of this key element of the UK energy system. 

As an NRC Commissioner, I led a task force that looked at how to make the NRC new reactor 

licensing process more efficient. Among the recommendations that were included in our report 

was a proposal to eliminate the mandatory hearing requirements related to the issuance of 

power reactor licenses under Part 50 and Part 52. We made this recommendation because the 

Administrative Procedure Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, combined with the 

very open and inclusive public comment process that has been established by the NRC, 

provides stakeholders with fulsome opportunities to comment on proposed new reactors. For 

this reason, we support the study included in Section 5. 

Efforts to Streamline the Part 810 Export Licensing Process 

In order to ensure that the United States continues to play a leading role in the export and 

development of nuclear projects worldwide, it is vital that the Federal Government promptly 

evaluates, and where appropriate, approves these transfers. Unlike 30 years ago, when the U.S. 

had a virtual monopoly in nuclear commerce, today, we are just but one of many highly 

competitive countries vying for a role in supporting the development and operation of nuclear 

power plants overseas. 

We have reviewed the discussion draft submitted by Congressman Johnson which would 

facilitate the process by which the Secretary of Energy authorizes the transfer of certain civilian 

nuclear technology and assistance. We support the legislation and believe it takes an important 

step to further the efforts to streamline the process for some applications submitted under 10 

CFR Part 810. That said, we remain concerned that the legislation only targets a limited portion 

of the nuclear technology export approvals process and does not go far enough to establish a 

truly expedited process. Specifically, we submit the following comments: 

I. The legislation seeks to establish an expedited process for process of"low 

proliferation technologies" to be designated by the Secretary. We submit that "low 

proliferation technologies" should be defined as technologies for the development, 

construction and operation of commercial nuclear reactors other than reactors 

especially designed to use mixed-oxide fuel. 

2. The expedited process proposed by the legislation for low proliferation technologies 

maintains the laborious interagency approval process. This involves a review by five 

different agencies and includes the State Department concurrence process, which 

requires obtaining assurances from foreign governments. We note that DOE and 

NNSA have already made a valiant effort to improve the Part 810 process, and any 

additional improvements would be significantly limited by maintain the interagency 

review process. Accordingly, we submit that the interagency review process for low 

proliferation technologies should be limited to DOE/NNSA approval. If governmentto-government assurances are to be sought, there should be a streamlined State 

Department concurrence based on obtaining a generic set of assurances from foreign 

governments. 

ClcarPath Action supports efforts that would allow U.S. companies to swiftly obtain Part 810 

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approvals and have the ability to compete effectively in nuclear export markets. We support the 

Committee's efforts to assist in this regard. 

Ensuring the Vitality of the Current and Future Nuclear Fleet 

The companies and people who operate our nation's 99 nuclear power plants have done a 

tremendous service in providing clean, safe, reliable and resilient power. As a country, not 

only should we continue to support this key clement of our carbon free generation, but we 

also need to adopt measures to promote the development of a new generation of advanced 

nuclear reactors that will allow U.S. companies to regain their leading role in the international 

nuclear export market. The host of legislation that this Committee is considering today is 

consistent with this vision, and Clear Path Action would commend them to you for adoption. 

We stand ready to work with the Committee to assure their prompt passage. 

Thank you for allowing me to testify on this important subject. 

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62 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Merrifield. 

Ms. Mann, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MELISSA C. MANN 

Ms. MANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rush, 

and members of the subcommittee. We appreciate your leadership 

on nuclear energy issues. And it is a privilege to speak with you 

today about means of increasing the competitiveness of the nuclear 

fleet and advancing advanced technologies and infrastructure. 

I am Melissa Mann, president of URENCO USA and the owner 

of the only operating uranium enrichment facility in the United 

States. But I am also here today as a member of the U.S. Nuclear 

Industry Council, whose 82 members represent the full breadth of 

the nuclear supply chain. 

On behalf of the Council we salute the full committee and this 

subcommittee’s laser focus on sustaining the current fleet and 

pushing forward advanced technologies. And we salute the multifaceted initiatives that are covered by the four bills under discussion today. I would like to focus specifically on Mr. Flores’ discussion draft on what we now know we call HA–LEU, or high-assay 

low-enriched uranium. 

The current nuclear fleet relies on a uranium fuel enriched to 

just under 5 percent in the uranium-235 isotope. And we have a 

fuel cycle that is able to process that material. But a comparable 

fuel cycle does not exist for many advanced designs because they 

require higher enrichment at levels above 5 but just below 20 percent. 

There is a broad community of users who would benefit from 

HA–LEU supply. They include research and test reactors, including 

those currently fueled by the Department of Energy, both here and 

abroad. 

It includes many advanced reactor designs and advanced fuels, 

including accident tolerant fuels. 

It includes producers of targets for medical isotope production, 

and even existing light-water reactors who are seeking certain fuel 

reliability and cost performance enhancers. 

A complete and sustainable HA–LEU fuel cycle would necessarily 

include three components: an enrichment facility; a conversion facility to take that material to the form of metal or oxide; and one 

or more fabrication facilities to manufacture the full type of fuel 

forms required. 

And there is a strong potential to develop the HA–LEU fuel cycle 

in the United States. The New Mexico enrichment plant, the technology that it uses is already capable of producing at the full 

gamut of HA–LEU enrichments. And only an NRC license amendment is required to bring that capacity to bear. 

Two fabrication facilities supporting NNSA missions already operate at much higher enrichment levels, demonstrating both the viability of licensing and operating at these greater enrichments. 

There is several, three in particular, critical fleet conditions that 

need to be met before we can move forward: 

First, it is imperative that you license and develop the enrichment, conversion, and fabrication capabilities concurrently, otherwise you will have critical gaps. 

63 

Secondly, we need a predictable and streamlined licensing framework, and the regulator needs the appropriate resources to manage 

timely and contemporaneous reviews. 

And we have talked a little bit about nuclear criticality benchmarks. We need those both for the fixed facilities and for transportation packages. We are also seeking clear NRC guidance on physical protection, security, and material control and accountability. 

And, finally, those companies that are making investments in 

HA–LEU facilities need to be assured of a reasonable return on investment. A consortium-based approach in cooperation with DOE, 

as envisioned by this discussion draft, is a good step in that direction. 

I am speaking about these recommendations not just as a member of the fuel cycle. My company is also a designer of a small 

microreactor, 10-megawatt, thermal, high-temperature, gas-cooled 

design that itself relies on HA–LEU. What we know is that without 

fuel, reactors don’t run. And that is perhaps the most significant 

aspect of the discussion draft, that it recognizes the need for collaboration, because unless the users of this material, the fuel cycle 

itself, the Department, and the NRC effectively hold hands and 

jump forward together, we won’t be able to reap the benefit of 

these designs. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Mann follows:] 

64 


Testimony of Melissa C. Mann 

President, URENCO USA, Inc. and Member, United States Nuclear Industry Council 

Before the 

U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittee on Energy 

May 22,2018 

Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Rush, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

your leadership on nuclear energy issues. It is a privilege to speak with you today about means 

of increasing the competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear energy industry and facilitating the 

development of advanced nuclear energy technologies. 

I am Melissa Mann, President, URENCO USA, Inc., owner and operator of this nation's only 

operating uranium enrichment facility. 1 I am here today on behalf of my organization and as a 

member of the United States Nuclear Industry Council (USNIC) whose 82 members represent 

the breadth of the commercial nuclear supply chain community. 2 Our companies are focused on 

revitalizing the existing industry and leading the development of critical new advanced nuclear 

energy infrastructure. 

On behalf of the Council, we salute the full Committee and this Subcommittee's laser focus on 

sustaining the current fleet and propelling advanced nuclear energy as well as development of 

critical new infrastructure. These initiatives include U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) oversight 

1 The URENCO USA uranium enrichment facility is located in Lea County, New Mexico and was the first facility to be 

licensed and constructed under a Nuclear Regulatory Commission-approved Combined Construction and Operating 

License. The facility received its license in 2006 and entered into operation in 2010. At its current capacity, the 

facility is capable of meeting roughly one-third of U.S. reactor demand for low enriched uranium and holds a 

license authorizing a doubling of its output. 

2 A full list of USNIC members is available at https:/lwww.usnic.org/clients. 

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and modernization, NRC reform and modernization, an updated Nuclear Waste Policy Act 

Amendments and accelerated nuclear energy innovation. 

To this end, we welcome the multi-faceted initiatives proposed by the suite of four bills under 

discussion today as a means of enhancing these goals. In general we support the objectives 

inherent in H.R. 1320 in enhancing NRC licensing surety and fee reform. Similarly, we support 

the thrust of the discussion draft to streamline the DOE's Part 810 export review procedures. 

We have provided specific enhancements to Rep. Johnson on this draft which are absolutely 

pivotal to U.S. exports and jobs. We applaud as well the discussion draft to require the 

Secretary of Energy to develop a pilot program to site, construct and operate "micro-reactors" at 

critical government facilities. Along with Gen 3+ reactors, SMRs and non-light water SMRs, 

micro-reactors can be a workhorse to provide resilient power for national security grid 

requirements as well as the commercial market in the U.S. and globally. 

We particularly applaud the currently-entitled "Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act" and its 

efforts to drive development of a new fuel supply chain needed to support critical activities, 

including development of advanced technologies. The comments and recommendations 

identified herein reflect our experience as a member of the current nuclear fuel cycle but we 

also well understand the pressures facing advanced reactor designers. My company is also 

involved in development of a micro-reactor- the U-Battery, a 10 MWt high-temperature gascooled reactor. As with other designers, our ability to bring this design to market is dependent 

on the ability to obtain the fuel. 

We welcome the opportunity to discuss: 

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(1) The need for a High Assay Low Enriched Uranium fuel cycle and the community of users 

it would support; 

(2) The type of supply chain needed to serve this demand; 

(3) Need for an appropriate regulatory environment and security framework; 

(4) Critical packaging and transportation needs. 

High Assay Low Enriched Uranium 

The current fleet of light water reactors (LWRs) in the United States relies on uranium fuel 

enriched in the isotope uranium-235 at a percentage less than 5.0%235U. A nuclear fuel cycle 

industry exists to mine, convert, enrich, and fabricate the uranium into suitable forms and to 

package and transport these materials between each of the steps in this supply chain. 

A comparable fuel cycle does not exist for many advanced reactor and fuel designs because 

they require higher enrichments at levels between 5.0%235U and 20.0%235U. We refer to such 

material as High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HA-LEU). This designation reflects the clear 

distinction between HA-LEU and highly-enriched uranium (HEU)- uranium enriched to levels 

above 20.0%235U which could represent a security and proliferation threat due to its potential 

application in nuclear weapons. 

There is a broad community of users who stand to benefit from HA-LEU supply: 

Research and test reactors, including reactors fueled by the U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE) in the United States and overseas: Many of these facilities currently rely 

on fuel enriched to 19.75%235U. The U.S. also has a policy of encouraging other 

research and test reactors currently using HEU fuel to convert to HA-LEU as part of the 

nation's non-proliferation strategy; 

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Advanced reactors, including many non-LWR designs; 

Advanced fuel designs, including Accident Tolerant Fuel for LWRs; 

Producers of targets for medical isotope production; and 

Operators of existing LWRs seeking improvements in fuel reliability and costs 

through higher fuel burnup3 and extended operating cycles: Enrichment levels of 

6.0%235U to 8.0%235U could allow utilities to obtain more power from their fuel before 

replacing it. This means that the reactors can operate longer between refueling and use 

less fuel per reload batch. 

DOE currently services its research and test reactor clients through use of inventories including 

HEU stocks that are down-blended to HA-LEU. These are finite resources and DOE's National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is investigating industry interest in developing a HALEU fuel supply capability. NNSA held an Industry Day in November 2017 and received several 

strong indications of interest to participate in development of such a fuel cycle. 

Response to NNSA's Industry Day demonstrates clear commercial interest in developing a HALEU fuel cycle but much more is needed to ensure that a fully-functioning HA-LEU fuel 

production capability exists. 

The HA-LEU Fuel Cycle 

A complete and sustainable HA-LEU fuel cycle would include three fundamental capabilities: 

A uranium enrichment facility licensed to produce enrichments up to 19.9%235U: Such 

uranium will be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UFs); 

'Higher burn up is generally deemed to exceed the current, average burn up of roughly 45 gigawatt-days per metric 

ton of uranium (GWd/MTU). 

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A conversion facility to convert HA-LEU UF6 into metal or oxide as appropriate for 

different reactor designs and fuel types; 

One or more fabrication facilities that can manufacture the specific fuel types required 

by the various reactor and fuel designs. 

There is strong potential to develop a HA-LEU fuel cycle in the United States. While the existing 

New Mexico enrichment plant delivers material at a maximum level of 5.0%235U, its advanced 

gas centrifuge design is currently capable of producing at the full span of HA-LEU enrichments 

without further development or testing. Only an amended Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) license would be required to support a new HA-LEU enrichment module. We estimate 

that if detailed design, site permitting and contractor selection were undertaken during the NRC 

review process, we could construct, commission and start-up such a module within 24 months 

of NRC licensing. 

Two U.S. fuel fabrication plants are already licensed by the NRC to use higher enrichments: the 

Nuclear Fuel Services facility in Erwin, Tennessee and the BWXT Nuclear Operations Group 

facility in Lynchburg, Virginia. These facilities are employed in support of the U.S. Naval 

Reactors program but also support NNSA in its existing HEU down-blend activities and the 

production of research reactor fuel. These currently-operating facilities demonstrate the viability 

of licensing and operating at higher enrichments. 

Three critical factors underpin the further development of this new U.S. fuel cycle: 

Firstly, it is imperative that enrichment, conversion and fabrication capabilities be licensed and 

developed on concurrent schedules. Otherwise there will be gaps in the fuel cycle and the 

industry will not be able to reap the benefits of advanced designs and Accident Tolerant Fuels. 

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Secondly, the licensing framework needs to support development of the HA-LEU fuel cycle. 

Earlier this year USNIC partnered with the Nuclear Innovation Alliance and the Nuclear Energy 

Institute to highlight the need for a streamlined and predictable licensing pathway for 

development of new nuclear technologies. Many of the same principles apply to licensing the 

new and/or modified fuel facilities needed for the HA-LEU community. Moreover, the regulator 

needs to have sufficient resources to support timely, contemporaneous licensing reviews. 

Finally, companies making investments in HA-LEU facilities need to be sufficiently assured that 

appropriate return on these expenditures is viable. 

A consortium-based approach involving the full gamut of the user community- in partnership 

with the DOE -to purchase HA-LEU materials and to develop a schedule for full cost recovery 

as articulated in the "Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act" would be a significant step in 

providing such assurance. 

This approach would also be key to positioning U.S. companies to develop a robust HA-LEU 

fuel cycle and serve the growing community of users. Such public-private cooperation would: 

foster development of a domestic infrastructure supporting HA-LEU supply to already-operating 

research and test reactors; provide suitable HA-LEU materials for testing and start-up of 

prototype fuels and reactors by the middle of the next decade; and further support deployment 

of advanced technologies by the end of that decade. 

Licensing and Security Aspects of the HA-LEU Fuel Cycle 

NRC licensing of HA-LEU fuel facilities involves several technical and regulatory issues, many 

of which are linked to nuclear criticality controls associated with HA-LEU enrichment levels. 

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Existing LWR fuel facilities are licensed to deliver materials at an enrichment level of up to 

5.0°/o235U. Significantly, the criticality analyses and benchmarking codes underpinning these 

existing licenses do not adequately address HA-LEU enrichment levels. 

New criticality benchmarking data will be required to support licensing of enrichment, conversion 

and fabrication facilities (as well as transport packages) at HA-LEU enrichments. Ideally, such 

data would also be developed on a consortium basis with DOE backing. This would provide for 

use of consistent data across the industry and allow the NRC to focus its resources on 

evaluating use of these federally-backed codes for specific applications and facilities. The 

language proposed in the "Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act" is a significant step in 

supporting this need. 

HA-LEU at enrichments between 1 0.0%235U and 20.0°/o235U is classified as "Special nuclear 

material of moderate strategic significance," also known as "Category II" material, under NRC 

safeguards regulations. HA-LEU fuel facilities licensed to handle and produce Category II 

material must be capable of developing and implementing appropriate physical protection and 

security plans. Development of clear NRC guidance for implementing such programs, especially 

if done in coordination with DOE, would provide a consistent approach for licensees. 

Similarly, Category II facilities need to develop Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) 

programs that are responsive to special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. In 

combination with physical protection plans, MC&A procedures allow licensees to effectively 

deter, prevent or respond to unauthorized possession or use of enriched material via theft or 

diversion and to take measures to protect against radiological sabotage of such materials and 

facilities. The NRC has clear MC&A guidance for the existing low enriched facilities (Category Ill 

facilities) and for HEU facilities (Category I) but does not currently have full guidance available 

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for Category II sites. This gap should be addressed in the near-term to support HA-LEU 

licensing needs. 

The balance of NRC licensing requirements for fuel cycle facilities will also need to be met. The 

U.S. nuclear energy industry has decades of experience in licensing activities, experience that 

provides a strong baseline for new regulatory approvals. One means of reducing the time and 

burden associated with new licensing reviews is to consider siting of HA-LEU capabilities on 

existing NRC-licensed sites so as to take advantage of well-characterized and understood 

geographies and environmental impacts and of existing site infrastructure, manpower and 

security. 

Critical Packaging and Transportation Needs 

The specially-designed packages currently used to transport commercial volumes of low 

enriched uranium between existing fuel cycle facilities are licensed for a maximum enrichment 

of 5.0%235U. Critical to the HA-LEU fuel cycle is development and certification of new packages 

for the transport of higher enrichments. The time frame required to design, test and license new 

packaging designs for fissile contents- in my experience typically between four and seven 

years- means that activity should be undertaken with dispatch in order to ensure that new 

reactor testing and deployment schedules are not disrupted. 

Especially critical is development of a new shipping package that is authorized for uranium 

hexafluoride at HA-LEU enrichment levels. NRC regulations for transport packages (10 U.S. 

Code of Federal Regulations Part 71) impose additional performance criteria for UFs exceeding 

5% enrichments. 

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Approved packages are also required for HA-LEU materials once converted to metal or oxide 

form and additionally for fabricated fuels. Given the potential diversity of final fuel forms, multiple 

package designs are likely to be required for fabricated materials. 

An alternative approach for managing UFs packaging needs would be to consider the colocation of HA-LEU enrichment and conversion facilities. Such co-location would allow 

consolidation of HA-LEU processing at fewer sites and would obviate the need to transport HALEU as UFs on public roadways, thus reducing the expenses associated with new packages for 

this transport segment. Co-location could conceivably be extended to encompass the fabrication 

step as well. 

As with facility licensing, new nuclear criticality codes will be required to support licensing of 

new package designs. Such codes should be developed via an industry-DOE-NRC approach 

and used on a consistent basis. The proposed bill clearly and appropriately recognizes this 

need. 

Summary 

In summary, we welcome the timely and crucial focus on increasing the competitiveness of the 

U.S. nuclear energy industry and facilitating the development of advanced nuclear technologies. 

The multiple initiatives proposed by the four bills under discussion today advance discussion on 

improvements that can be made. 

The "Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act" is a significant step in advancing the development 

of advanced reactor and fuel technologies as it recognizes the critical importance of the fuel 

cycle in enabling the deployment of these innovative designs. 

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In general we support the objectives inherent in H.R. 1320 in enhancing NRC licensing surety 

and fee reform. 

Similarly, we support the thrust of the discussion draft to streamline the DOE's Part 810 export 

review procedures. 

We applaud as well the discussion draft to require the Secretary of Energy to develop a pilot 

program to site, construct and operate "micro reactors" at critical government facilities. 

We look forward to working further with members of Congress on these issues of mutual 

interest. 

......................•..................................................•..... 

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Mr. JOHNSON. Ms. Mann yields back. Mr. Irvin, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. And if I could remind our witnesses votes 

have just been called. We are going to get through both of your testimonies. Don’t want to cut you short but we will not hold it 

against you if you speak fast. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES NICHOLAS IRVIN 

Mr. IRVIN. Shouldn’t be a problem as I am from Alabama, sir. We 

speak pretty fast in the south. 

Thank you for the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Member Rush, to appear before you about this very important topic of 

advanced nuclear technology. My name is Nick Irvin. I am the Director of R&D at Southern Company. And I have responsibility for 

developing advanced reactor technology, as well as supporting our 

efforts to modernize the licensing framework for those technologies. 

At Southern Company we talk a lot about providing our customers with clean, safe, reliable, and affordable energy. And for me 

personally that is a very important concept in that I believe that 

access to energy is foundational to maintaining a high quality of 

life for every human on this planet. 

In addition, I was raised in a home where continuous learning 

is—was a requirement, and not only to be a continuous learner but 

to also put that learning to good use. And so, to work at a company 

like Southern Company that provides energy but also provides a 

strong focus on innovation makes me one of the lucky ones. 

When it comes to innovation, a very important component of innovation is collaboration. And a very important collaboration that 

we have maintained for the entirety of our history in R&D is a 

strong relationship with the Department of Energy through public/ 

private partnerships. We believe public/private partnerships are essential to help manage the transition of new technology, particularly in the energy space, from concept to deployment and where 

the technology and financial risks become married in that process. 

To that end, we currently operate as a contractor to the Department of Energy, developing an advanced reactor in collaboration 

with a company called TerraPower where we are in year two, approaching year three, of a 5-year agreement to advance that technology towards deployment in the mid-2030s. We believe it is an 

important technology that has a potential to not only advance the 

components of the advanced reactors that we think about, nominally safety, baseload electricity, but also do so in a very cost competitive way, which is important, again, to protect the interests of 

our customers. 

Additionally, we are working in partnership with the Department of Energy on a project called a licensing modernization 

project. It is an effort to reflect the differences in the nature of 

these advanced reactors and how the regulatory approach needs to 

be modified so that we can be efficient and effective in regulating 

those to the same standards as we currently regulate the lightwater reactor fleet. 

As we look at the four bills that were presented from the subcommittee, we feel like they are all very supportive and aligned 

with our mission goals and our activities at Southern Company. 

Specifically, this idea of an efficient and effective regulator is a 

75 

critically important component to maintaining the competitiveness 

of nuclear reactor technology in the nuclear industry, both domestically and globally. We do see nuclear energy as a global market. 

And as a consumer of nuclear technology, we see the vital importance of having a healthy supply chain in order to maintain access 

to those, those components and technologies here domestically. 

And given that the market domestically is challenged, the international markets may maintain that foundation from which we 

need to build advanced reactors. 

Given the prior comment about a global market, we can’t miss 

the opportunity to take advantage of near-term opportunities such 

as the ones identified in the bill discussing microreactors as it relates to resiliency with the Department of Defense. We think these 

microreactors can be deployed in the near term, and do provide a 

great opportunity to, for lack of a better term, pilot the entire, the 

entire concepts necessary to deploy advanced reactors in a very 

measurable way, given their size and scale. 

And then as was previously mentioned, none of these machines 

operate without fuel. And so, access to HA–LEU is a critically important component that I do believe it is time to begin working towards if we want to support early or mid-next decade either deployment of microreactors, or demonstration reactors, or some 

other technologies. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to provide comments and 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Irvin follows:] 

76 


Statement of James Nicholas Irvin 

Southern Company 

BEFORE TilE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COMMERCE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, and Competitiveness of 

Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

May 22,2018 
77 


Good morning Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Rush and Members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is James 

Nicholas ("Nick") Irvin, and I am the Director of Research and Development (R&D); Strategy, 

Advanced Nuclear, and Crosscutting Technology at Southern Company. It is an honor to appear 

before this Subcommittee to share my views on advanced nuclear technologies and the four pieces 

of legislation affecting these technologies before the Subcommittee today. This is an area that is 

pivotal to our nation's future and worthy of this Subcommittee's interest and attention. In my role 

as Director of R&D at Southern Company, I am responsible for the evaluation, development, and 

demonstration of innovative technologies to support Southern Company's operations, including 

advanced nuclear technology. I lead an internal portfolio of cross-cutting R&D programs, as well 

as representing Southern Company in many external alliances, including energy R&D 

collaborative programs with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). I also serve as a 

representative to the Policy Committee of the Generation IV Nuclear International Forum on 

behalf of the U.S. nuclear industry, in addition to numerous other industry committees. In my 

testimony today, I will discuss Southern Company's efforts to develop advanced nuclear 

technologies. I will also share my personal perspectives on prospects for advanced nuclear reactors 

and the merits of continued governmental and private sector interest and investment 

Southern Company 

Southern Company is a natural gas and electric utility holding company headquartered in 

Atlanta, Georgia, with executive offices also located in Birmingham, Alabama. The nation's 

premier energy company, Southern Company provides clean, safe, reliable, affordable energy to 9 

million gas and electric utility customers in II states. Southern Company is developing the full 

portfolio of energy resources, including carbon-free nuclear, advanced carbon capture 
78 


technologies, natural gas, renewables, energy efficiency and storage technology, and creating new 

products and services for the benefit of customers. 

Innovation is a central part of our strategy. We foster a culture that seeks to make 

transformational changes and understand that innovation and technology are engines of American 

greatness. This belief is demonstrated by Southern Company's 50-year commitment to the 

research, development and deployment of emerging energy technologies. We actively collaborate 

with the U.S. government, other utilities, universities and technology developers and remain at the 

forefront of technology development for the production, delivery and end-use of energy. It is 

within this context that Southern Company is investing in advanced reactor technology R&D and 

looking ahead toward the steps needed to promote the licensing, construction and utilization of 

these technologies. 

Southern Nuclear 

Southern Nuclear, a subsidiary of Southern Company, currently operates six nuclear reactors: 

Units l and 2 at Plant Farley near Dothan, Alabama; Units I and 2 at Plant Hatch near Baxley, 

Georgia; and Units I and 2 at Plant Vogtle near Augusta, Georgia. 1 We have been in the nuclear 

power business for almost 50 years, dating back to Southern Company's decision in 1967 to build 

Plant Hatch, our very first nuclear power plant, which began commercial operation in 1975. Together, 

Plants Farley, Hatch and Vogtle provide approximately 20% of the electricity used in Alabama and 

Georgia. This is made possible by our talented and committed workforce of more than 4,000 men and 

women working at our fleet of nuclear power plants and corporate offices, all of whom are also part 

1 Plant Farley is owned by Alabama Power Company. Plants Hatch and Vogtle are co-owned by Georgia 

Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, the Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and Dalton Utilities. 

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of the larger Southern Company team of over 32,000 employees who are building the future of energy 

for the customers they serve. 

Nuclear power is a leading source of affordable, reliable, clean, American energy that powers 

our economy, protects our national security, preserves the environment, and provides high-paying 

jobs for thousands of our fellow citizens. Southern Nuclear's top priority is the safety and health of 

the public and our employees. We are committed to the safe operation of our nuclear generating 

facilities with equipment and systems that meet rigorous safety and design regulations. 

Delivering the Next Generation of Nuclear Power 

Southern Company is leading the nation by constructing first of a kind new nuclear units 

at Plant Vogtle. Taken together, these state-of-the-art Westinghouse APIOOO units are projected 

to supply over 2,200 megawatts (MW) of new, baseload, zero-emission electric generation, 

creating more than 5,000 total construction jobs and 800 permanent jobs. 

An important stimulus for the Vogtle project has been the consistent support of Congress 

and the Department of Energy (DOE) in fostering a central role for nuclear power in the nation's 

energy policies. The Energy Policy Act of2005 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 

2007 sought to expand the commercial utilization of nuclear energy in the United States, while 

also reducing emissions and ensuring affordable, reliable, and clean domestic energy for 

Americans. Those acts made substantial investments in programs designed to promote the 

development and deployment of modern nuclear reactors and to improve the nuclear licensing 

process. These policies, combined with an innovative and constructive state regulatory 

environment, were a catalyst for the construction of new reactors at Plant Vogtle, and support for 

the continuation of the loan guarantee program, tax benefits, and licensing reforms for advanced 

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nuclear, among other policies, by DOE and subsequent Congresses has been essential to the 

survival of that project. 

However, even as we make significant progress toward commercial deployment of 

"Generation ll!+" reactors I ike the API 000 at Plant Vogtle, we are already exploring the next 

generation of nuclear technologies commonly referred to as "Generation IV" (or "Gen-IV") 

reactors. Our Advanced Nuclear R&D program is a robust program designed primarily to support 

the evaluation and development of new technology. Through these activities, which are with a 

wide variety of technologies including liquid metal cooled fast reactors, high temperature gas 

reactors, as well as molten salt reactors, we provide our perspective and expertise on technology 

requirements and developmental strategies garnered from our over 40 years of operating and R&D 

experience. 

A specific example of close collaboration with an emerging technology developer is our 

work with TerraPower and the Department of Energy. On January 15, 2016, the Department of 

Energy through its Advanced Reactor Concepts program selected a Southern Company-led 

proposal as one of two recipients of approximately $40 million, 5-year program to explore, develop 

and demonstrate advanced nuclear reactor technologies. Our partners in this public-private 

partnership are TerraPower, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), EPRI, and Vanderbilt 

University. The technology research activities of our project will bolster the development of 

molten chloride fast reactors (MCFR), an advanced concept for nuclear generation under 

development by TerraPower. 

In addition to our R&D activities, Southern Company subsidiary Southern Nuclear 

Development (SND) provides program management consultation to technology and project 

development partners. Specifically associated with the Advanced Reactor Concepts program 

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mentioned above, SND is supporting X-Energy, the other DOE award recipient, on conceptual 

design for its high temperature gas-cooled pebble bed reactor. 

As a company, we are proud to be afforded these opportunities and we look forward to 

seeing additional collaboration to strengthen this partnership through delivering results for our 

partners, DOE, and the American taxpayers. 

As I noted earlier, nuclear energy enjoys tremendous advantages over other forms of 

electric generation: zero emissions, capacity factors exceeding 90%, safety records that exceed 

those of other energy sources, as well as affordahility over the long term without the price swings 

common to other fuels. The API 000 design adds even more layers of safety redundancies and with 

a simplified plant design. We believe the next generation of advanced reactors will build on these 

advantages, with even more advanced safety systems, less byproduct materials, and greater cost 

efficiencies. Gen-JV reactors will use non-light water reactor technologies with higher temperature 

output and size variations ranging from rather small electric generators to massive power plant 

reactors exceeding the size of many of the largest nuclear power plants in operation today. Further, 

these designs afford opportunity for nuclear energy to extend into other sectors of the economy 

including industrial process heat and transportation fuels, offering the same benefits of zero 

emissions and security of supply for generations to come. 

Innovation Requires Collaboration 

. Within our own company, we take great pride in our culture of innovation and desire for 

step-up performance improvement in all facets of our business. We also believe that our federal 

government partners have the capability to create the right environment for innovation in the 

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nuclear technology arena to flourish, and allow the market to respond. This includes public-private 

partnerships that can harness the power of collaboration. 

In much the same way, we cannot achieve sustainability in innovation by ourselves. 

Collaboration among private sector, governmental, academic, and international actors is key. 

The NEI's Advanced Reactor Working Group (ARWG) was created with the 

understanding that decisions as to what technologies will replace recent and upcoming nuclear 

reactor retirements will be made within the next 10-20 years. In the short- to medium-term, light 

water reactors will remain the dominant and most economic means of electricity production from 

nuclear energy. If utilities are to consider advanced (Generation IV) non-light water reactors in 

their future decision making, significant progress toward commercialization is necessary. 

With this reality in mind, the ARWG is charged with developing an industry vision of a 

long-term sustainable program that will support the development and commercialization of 

advanced reactors, ultimately supporting the commercial availability of advanced reactors for 

utilities or other entities in the 2035-2040 timcframe. 

Achieving this will require this kind of collaboration, resulting in innovative policies, 

licensing frameworks, and regulatory structures that facilitate the efficient and predictable 

deployment of these new technologies and encourage private investment. l believe it will also 

require our federal partners to share the cost of state-of-the-knowledge improvements. DOE, 

universities, vendors and our centers of knowledge will need to leverage the best talent our nation 

has to offer. 

Public-private partnerships are, in the context of advanced reactors, uniquely necessary as 

these technologies are subject to an extensive and expensive regulatory regime requiring complex 

technical work necessary to build the safety case for new reactors. These endeavors also require 

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new fuel types to be developed and tested, the development of supply chains for new kinds of 

equipment, design and testing of prototypes and, ultimately, the design, approval, construction, 

and operation of a first-of-a-kind commercial reactor. We are already seeing increased private 

sector investment in proposed new reactor startups and systems reaching, by some estimates, more 

than $1 billion. Nonetheless, because of the expense, regulatory uncertainty, and timeframes 

involved, continued public sector investment will be necessary to make the leap from the 

laboratory to commercial deployment. 

Additionally, as was true in the early days of nuclear technology development, we need to 

work with our national labs to safeguard our nation's significant investment in nuclear technology 

and to demonstrate newer, more advanced nuclear technologies, to ensure we remain the world 

leader in this area. I greatly appreciate the work of the Idaho National Lab, which, as DOE's lead 

Nuclear Energy Laboratory, is doing phenomenal work in the area of nuclear energy technologies. 

The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, in conjunction with the Idaho, Argonne, and Oak Ridge 

National Laboratories, has a program called "Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear" 

(GAIN), which is intended to "provide the nuclear energy community with access to the technical, 

regulatory, and financial support necessary to move new or advanced nuclear reactor designs 

toward commercialization while ensuring the continued safe, reliable, and economic operation of 

the existing nuclear fleet." A key element of the GAIN initiative is to provide all nuclear 

stakeholders with a "single point of access" to the host of federal assets and programs, including 

the DOE complex and national labs. 

Southern is proud to be partnering with Oak Ridge National Laboratory and TerraPower 

on the DOE-awarded research project involving the MCFR technology and we commend ORNL's 

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role in supporting the use of nuclear technology for the nation's security as well as commercial 

interests, 

As a range of technology options are explored, we will advocate for and encourage 

similar industry-led collaboration with DOE, vendors, utilities, universities and national labs to 

leverage capabilities and share some of the risks. We will continue to monitor, and assist where 

appropriate, the complete range of technology options, to ensure the highest probability of 

success for this critical suite of technologies. 

Modernizing the Licensing Framework for Advanced Reactors 

Our current regulatory framework for the licensing of nuclear power plants has its roots in 

the federal government's initial efforts to promote commercial nuclear power after the passage of 

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (the "AEA") when the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) began 

to encourage the development of commercial nuclear power production in the private market. The 

federal government helped spur innovation and investment in nuclear power production through 

research and development efforts such as test reactors and laboratories that would eventually share 

information with the private nuclear power industry. At the same time, the federal government 

provided economic assistance to those private companies willing to take the first steps to construct 

and license nuclear power plants. The AEC and the private sector researched and experimented 

with several different types of reactors, including light-water reactors, salt-cooled reactors, and 

fast-breeder reactors. 

Prompted by the backing of the AEC, the commercial nuclear power industry started to 

take shape, and the United States led the way in nuclear power innovation as the nuclear power 

industry grew rapidly throughout the 1960s. Eventually, the AEC and the industry focused on 

light-water reactor technology. The reactor licensing framework and process grew up around the 

8 
85 


need to license the light-water reactor designs the industry planned to construct and was, therefore, 

molded to fit the needs of licensing nuclear power plants with light-water reactor designs. This 

tailoring of the regulation to the dominant technology resulted in a more efficient licensing process 

and one in which the nuclear power industry could remain generally assured of the regulatory 

framework for its investment, for the time being. 

With the passage of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, the AEC was abandoned, and 

its dual functions of regulating the nuclear power industry while simultaneously promoting nuclear 

power to the private sector were split among the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the 

Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), respectively. In 1977, ERDA's 

functions were transferred to the Department of Energy (DOE), an agency deserving of credit for 

much of the innovation in commercial nuclear power after the passage of the Act. Because the 

DOE is charged with the promotion of commercial nuclear power, most of its nuclear facilities 

and programs are exempt from NRC regulation, allowing it to research and develop technologies 

that may otherwise remain unexplored. Consequently, much of the research and development in 

the nuclear power industry hinges on decisions of the federal government. 

NRC's adoption of, and Congress's later codification of(in the EPAct of 1992), a more 

efficient regime in 10 CFR Part 52 and incentives in the EPAct of 2005 were major drivers in the 

development of the only nuclear power plant under construction in the United States, but they have 

not to date been sufficient to achieve the nuclear renaissance predicted early in this century. 

Construction oflarge light water reactors is still an expensive and time-consuming proposition. In 

order to retain the benefits of the current fleet of nuclear power plants as aging plants are 

decommissioned over the next thirty years, the federal government, state and local governments, 

and private industry wi II have to continue to work together to develop technologies that can be put 

9 
86 


into commercial use more quickly and with less expense, while still retaining or improving on the 

safety and environmental benefits of the current fleet and Gen III+ designs like the AP-I 000. 

So, the nuclear power industry stands at yet another crossroads. Commercial nuclear power 

is expanding across the world yet the United States is not currently at the center of the 

technological innovation driving much of the expansion. In April of this year, China began loading 

fuel into a Westinghouse AP-1 000 reactor--one of 4 under construction in that country, with larger 

designs in the planning stages. In contrast, at this time, the only active advanced nuclear 

construction project in the U.S. is at Southern Company's Vogtle site. 

While the new Part 52 one-step licensing process has proved beneficial to the industry, the 

fact that it, like the initial two-step licensing process, is based on light-water reactor technology 

limits its efficacy for the licensing of the next generation of advanced nuclear reactors. While 

possible using a patchwork approach with many exemptions, licensing advanced nuclear reactors 

that do not use light-water reactor technology in the current regulatory scheme remains ineffective, 

creating a barrier against engagement of the private sector in the required public-private 

partnership. The introduction of a new regulatory scheme that effectively addresses the needs 

associated with licensing non-light-water reactors will signal to the industry that it can invest in 

research and development of advanced reactors knowing that the licensing environment docs not 

favor a single technology. 

As Congress recognized in 1992, an efficient, predictable, licensing framework is 

imperative to the success of advanced reactors in the United States. Safety must remain a key 

focus, although the regulatory framework should be performance-based, risk-informed, and allow 

for various kinds of technologies to be developed and licensed. When developing a licensing 

framework that can work for advanced reactors, I would endorse the "triple A" approach. That is, 

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where existing regulations are appropriate, "adopt" them; where simple changes are needed to 

modify existing rules in order to make them a better fit for advanced reactors, "adapt" them; and 

where the characteristics of advanced reactors require new regulatory structures and programs, 

"advance" them. In all respects, the safety regulator (NRC) should determine the required safety 

performance metrics, while the industry and its partners should focus, through consensus standards 

organizations, on developing the "how" to comply with performance standards and design 

requirements. By doing so, we can prevent stagnation in the development of advanced reactor 

designs and ensure that the newest, safest, and most efficient nuclear reactors will be built in the 

United States. 

To this end, the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) is a Southern Company-led effort, 

cost-shared with the DOE, to develop foundational elements of a modernized technology-inclusive 

regulatory framework. Such a framework uses a risk-informed and performance-based 

methodology to set technical requirements for design and licensing of advanced non-LWRs. As 

such it incentivizcs innovative approaches to safety improvements by leveraging these 

enhancements to reduce regulatory complexity and by removing unnecessary burden. The work 

also allows the regulator to be able to be better prepared for structured conversations with a number 

of developers who are developing spectrum of technologies and designs. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission plans to endorse the LMP proposals via a regulatory guide in 2019. 

To this end, I commend the House for passing the Advanced Nuclear Technology Development 

Act of 2017 (H.R. 590), cosponsored by Congressmen Latta, McNerney, Fleischmann, Doyle, 

Hudson, and Tonko. This bill would encourage cooperation between DOE and NRC to develop a 

new framework for licensing advanced nuclear energy technologies and directs the NRC to develop 

an efficient, risk-informed, technology-neutral framework for advanced reactor designs. 

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Encouraging a more technology-neutral, performance-based and safety-focused regulatory process 

would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, reduce licensing and operating costs, and improve 

the economic viability of these newer technologies. 

H.R. 1320, Nuclear Utilization of Keynote Energy Act 

H.R. 1320, Nuclear Utilization of Keynote Energy Act, co-sponsored by Congressmen 

Kinzinger and Doyle, would mandate a long-overdue refonn of the NRC fee structure. As the 

testimony previously provided to this Committee by Maria Korsnick, on behalf of the Nuclear 

Energy Institute, indicated, the nuclear industry believes that H.R. 1320 provides a more rational 

fee recovery process for the NRC that limits spending on corporate support and caps annual fees on 

operating reactors, while continuing to provide sufficient funding for the Commission's public 

health, safety and security missions. Notably, the bill docs not affect "fee for service" activities 

such as the resident inspector program and other safety and security inspections and reviews, and 

provides vital resources for the development of a regulatory infrastructure for advanced reactor 

licensing. The industry also supports the refonns contained in H.R. 1320 that would fight 

"regulatory creep" by focusing licensing reviews on areas that are safety-significant. 

H.R. (Discussion Draft) Nuclear Energy Competitiveness 

As noted in previous testimony before this Subcommittee, the nuclear industry 

supports efforts to streamline the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 810 with regard to the export 

of non-classified nuclear technology. Requiring individual DOE approval for each 

application has put U.S. suppliers at a distinct disadvantage with regard to overseas 

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competitors. Nuclear technology is a global market, and the United States is in imminent 

danger of ceding leadership to our international competitors, as China and Russia and others 

aggressively pursue market opportunities in the developing world. These overseas markets, 

and the export of clean, safe American nuclear technology, would provide efficiencies of 

scale that would support a nuclear manufacturing and engineering infrastructure that can 

simultaneously create American jobs and improve national security by allowing the U.S. to 

continue to influence worldwide nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation policies. We 

greatly appreciate your attention to our request for review of Part 81 0; systematic reform of 

the export approval process will allow U.S. suppliers to compete in international markets 

and restore the U.S. to a position of leadership with regard nuclear technology. 

H.R. (Discussion Draft) Report on Pilot Program for Micro-Reactors 

Construction of advanced reactors at DOD and DOE facilities is another way to "harness 

the power of collaboration" that I referenced above, and will support the development and 

commercialization of advanced nuclear technologies while enhancing the resilience of our 

national security infrastructure. The type and size of reactors that are likely to be utilized in this 

service will allow for agile and efficient deployment, providing for early experience in the 

regulatory processes necessary to support deployment of larger, utility scale technologies in the 

coming years. If we can successfully combine the purchasing power of the Department of 

Defense, the technological expertise of the Department of Energy and the innovation and agility 

of the private sector, the whole truly will be greater than the sum of its parts. Another word for 

this is "synergy." Sometimes overused, Webster's tells us that the term is based on the Greek 

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90 


word "sunergos" which translates as "work together." Because these technologies are so new, 

our recommendation is that DOE be allowed some flexibility with regard to both the type and 

size of the reactors that qualify for the program. 

H.R. (Discussion Draft) Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act 

Many of not all of the advanced reactor concepts rely on a new or innovative fuel design, often 

requiring High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (between 5% and 20% enrichment) for commercial 

deployment. Further, and perhaps more critically from a timeliness perspective, many of the 

demonstration scale reactors will also require HALEU. It is imperative that the DOE and private 

sector initiate programs to support not only the supply of HALEU, but also the infrastructure 

requirements necessary for its transport and regulation. 

Conclusion 

I applaud this Subcommittee and the Congress, as a whole, for its support of advanced 

nuclear technologies. l would also stress our appreciation for the DOE's and the Administration's 

continued support for nuclear innovation. We face a pivotal moment for the nuclear industry in the 

United States. Congress, DOE, the nuclear industry and other stakeholders must to work 

collaboratively to create a technological and regulatory framework that will allow advanced 

reactor technologies to become a commercial reality. The legislation before the Subcommittee 

today would make significant strides toward that goal. The benefits to American citizens in terms 

of U.S. national security, global leadership, global economic competitiveness, technological 

superiority, development of high paying jobs, and the environment are vast and justify a strong 

federal role. 

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Thank you for allowing me to appear before this Subcommittee today. I will be glad to 

answer any questions you might have. 

15 
92 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Irvin. 

Dr. Lyman, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF EDWIN LYMAN 

Dr. LYMAN. Thank you. On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists I would like to thank the chairman, ranking member, and 

other members of the committee for the opportunity to testify 

today. 

UCS supports DOE investment in nuclear energy research and 

development, but with a focus on increasing safety and security of 

the once-through cycle. 

In the near term we see promise in projects such as developing 

accident tolerant fuels for current light-water reactors. But our 

analysis to date has not identified any advanced reactor design 

that offers clear safety and security improvements over today’s 

light-water reactors. 

So, it is in that spirit that I would like to comment on the four 

bills today. 

We support the discussion draft on advanced nuclear fuel availability. We think it makes sense for an assessment to be made of 

the availability or the likely availability of HA–LEU. And that will 

help to assess the viability of advanced reactor declining in midterm. But the acquisition of HA–LEU should be closely tied to realistic projections of the need for the material. 

A couple of additions. We think that the study shouldn’t evaluate 

the larger nonproliferation implications of the production of HA– 

LEU. Even though HA–LEU is low-enriched uranium and cannot 

be directly used in nuclear weapons, the material does pose proliferation security concerns and if there is going to be expanded 

production and use of that material, as well as the potential for exports of reactors that would use it, and foreign customers, we think 

that that is not—that evaluation has not been made yet, and it 

should be. 

On H.R. 1320, we oppose most aspects of the bill because we do 

not support so-called streamlining of licensing that might lead to 

shortcuts in the approval of advanced reactors without fully resolving the safety and security concerns that are unique to these new 

designs. 

On the nuclear energy competitiveness discussion draft we share 

a lot of the concerns that we have heard today about the definition 

of lost proliferation risk technology, and how that must be evaluated within the context of any export, especially today. 

And I would just like to clarify the record. My testimony did not 

say that it is easy for a country to misuse a light-water reactor to 

produce plutonium for weapons, however, it is not out of the question. In fact, the technology for processing has been available now 

publicly for many decades. So you can’t discount that. And you 

need to consider the risk of breakout—that is, throwing the IAEA 

inspectors out and using the facilities you have to make weapons 

rapidly—in any export consideration. 

Finally, on the issue of microreactors, we do not share the optimism about the promise of these facilities, especially for Department of Defense sites and energy resilience. We think that the 

military should cast a skeptical eye on the stories that they are 

93 

being told about how these reactors are going to be so safe and secure they can’t melt down, and especially how they can provide resilience. In fact, any nuclear reactor really requires electrical power 

to operate safely, and the only way these reactors could provide 

power and disconnect it from the grid is in what is called island 

mode, which is not well established in any designs. 

So, I would urge that the study include an assessment of the 

safety and security, and the potential applications for the safety of 

U.S. military personnel and usability of military facilities if there 

were a safety, or security, or sabotage incident that would lead to 

large-array large release. 

I hope these observations are useful. I welcome your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lyman follows:] 

94 


Testimony of Dr. Edwin Lyman 

Senior Scientist, Global Security Program 

Union of Concerned Scientists 

"DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, and 

Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies" 

Before the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittee on Environment 

U.S. House of Representatives 

May 22,2018 
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SUMMARY OF UCS TESTIMONY 

• The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) supports federal investment in nuclear energy 

research and development focused on increasing the safety and security of the oncethrough fuel cycle. 

• UCS supports the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability initiative, provided that the 

program includes a study to address the proliferation and security implications of 

commercial-scale production and use of high-assay low enriched uranium (HA-LEU). 

• UCS is neutral on the provisions in H.R. 1320 regarding Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

corporate support and user fee caps but opposes the provisions regarding regulatory 

streamlining in Sections 4-7. 

• UCS believes the provisions in Section 3 of the Nuclear Energy Competitiveness 

discussion draft regarding improvements to the Part 810 process are premature and raise 

proliferation concerns. They should first be evaluated in the Section 2 review. 

• UCS does not sec a compelling need for the pilot program to develop micro-reactors at 

critical national security locations that would be defined by the study called for in the 

Report on a Pilot Program for Micro-Reactors discussion draft. In addition, the study 

outlined in the draft does not specifically address crucial considerations, such as the 

safety and security of micro-reactors. 

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On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists, I would like to thank Chairman Upton, Ranking 

Member Rush, and the other distinguished members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to 

provide our views on the legislation being discussed today. 

The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) has more than half a million supporters, united by a 

central concern: that we need sound scientific analysis to create a healthy, safe, and sustainable 

future. UCS, while neither pro- nor anti-nuclear power, has served as a nuclear safety and 

security watchdog for nearly fifty years. Combating the threat of global climate change is one of 

our priorities, and we have not ruled out an expansion of nuclear power as an option to help 

reduce greenhouse gas emissions-provided that it meets high standards of safety and security. It 

is from this perspective that I offer the comments below. 

UCS supports DOE investment in nuclear energy research and development, with a focus on 

increasing the safety and security of the once-through fuel cycle. This applies to both 

evolutionary improvements in current-generation light-water reactor technology and advanced 

reactor development. In the near term we see promise in projects such as the Accident Tolerant 

Fuel program, designed to improve light-water reactor fuel behavior during both normal 

operation and accidents. However, our analysis to date has not identified any advanced reactor 

design that offers clear safety and security improvements over today's light-water reactors. In 

fact, some reactor concepts introduce new and significant safety and security issues. These must 

be effectively resolved in the design phase if advanced reactors arc to be viable candidates for 

wide-scale deployment. 

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Unfortunately, there are troubling trends today that have the potential to undercut advances in 

nuclear safety and security. The commercialization of any non-light water reactor will take 

decades and require billions of dollars in investment. There are no feasible shortcuts in the 

technology development process that is required. Attempting to accelerate the commercialization 

of advanced reactors by allowing reactor applicants to bypass important technical work and 

mandating "streamlined" regulatory reviews could result in the premature deployment of designs 

whose safety characteristics have not been fully validated. Also, a drive to reduce capital and 

operating costs to make advanced reactors more competitive could be counterproductive if it 

involves weakening the standards that apply to current-generation reactors, including 

requirements for a high-strength, leak-tight containment building, a robust security force to 

protect against terrorist attacks, and off-site emergency evacuation plans. We hope that in 

addition to the issues addressed by the legislation being discussed today, the Subcommittee will 

take a hard look at all the necessary aspects of a program that would facilitate the deployment of 

a new generation of reactors that are genuinely safer and more secure than the current one. 

We address the four pieces of legislation below. 

I. Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability (Discussion Draft) 

UCS supports the initiative that would be authorized by this bill. A number of advanced reactor 

designs would require large quantities of high-assay low enriched uranium (HA-LEU) fuel 

(which has greater than 5 percent and less than 20 percent uranium-235). In addition, some 

accident-tolerant fuels for light-water reactors may require HA-LEU toward the lower end of the 

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enrichment range. But the existing supply chain for this material is very limited, and is currently 

needed to support operation of research and test reactors and medical isotope production 

facilities around the world. The draft's provision in Section 2(b )( 4) for periodic surveys to assess 

demand for HA-LEU is sensible. The study will also provide useful data on the cost and time 

needed to establish a reliable supply ofHA-LEU, as well as the infrastructure to support its 

processing, and will help to assess the viability of advanced reactor deployment in the near term. 

Acquisition ofHA-LEU by the DOE should be closely tied to realistic projections of need for the 

material. The DOE should also be prepared for the possibility that it may need a substantial 

supply ofHA-LEU to fuel the Versatile Test Reactor now under consideration. Although the 

DOE's preferred fuel for the reactor is plutonium, it is likely, in our view, that plutonium fuel use 

will prove infeasible. 

We recommend a few additions to the discussion draft. First, the DOE program should prioritize 

acquisition of HA-LEU through down blending of excess highly enriched uranium (HEU) stocks. 

A recent independent assessment by a scholar at Princeton University estimates that the U.S. has 

more than 100 metric tons of HEU reserved for military purposes that could be declared excess 

to nuclear stockpile requirements. In addition, should relations with Russia improve, as we hope, 

a revived nuclear cooperation program to purchase Russian HEU for down blending to HA-LEU 

would be a win-win endeavor. 

Second, the draft should require that the DOE evaluate separately HA-LEU with enrichments of 

less than 10 percent uranium-235 and !-lA-LEU with more than 10 percent uranium-235. Both 

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the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) classify these materials differently with respect to security. A I 0-kilogram quantity of 

the latter material is classified as Category II, whereas 10 kilograms of the former would be 

Category III, the same as LEU with enrichments of 5 percent or less. This is an important 

distinction because, as the committee staff's hearing memo points out, the U.S. does not have 

any Category II commercial fuel cycle facilities. Understanding the differences in projected 

demand between these two categories of enrichment would help to guide the DOE's 

development of an appropriate acquisition strategy. 

Finally, the report to Congress that Section 3 requires should include a non-proliferation and 

security impact assessment of any new DOE program for acquisition and supply of HA-LEU. 

Although HA-LEU is classified as low-enriched uranium and is therefore regarded as highly 

impractical for direct use in a nuclear weapon, the material does pose proliferation and security 

concerns, especially in the higher enrichment range, as reflected by the NRC and IAEA Category 

II classifications. HA-LEU with enrichment just below 20 percent was deemed too risky by the 

international community to be stockpiled by Iran. Therefore, the DOE should carefully evaluate 

the international impact of the precedent that the U.S. would establish by creating a new program 

for HA-LEU supply. Moreover, since U.S. advanced reactor developers may seek to sell HALEU-fueled designs overseas, and foreign advanced reactor vendors may seek to purchase U.S. 

!!A-LEU, the proliferation and security implications of U.S. HA-LEU exports warrant close 

examination. 

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2. H.R. 1320. Nuclear lJtilization of Keynote Energy Act 

lJCS has many concerns with this bill. We oppose the bill's arbitrary deadlines for completing 

environmental reviews and licensing actions, and the provisions that would curtail the hearing 

rights of intervenors in regulatory proceedings. In our view, such changes are unlikely to have a 

meaningful effect on the time required for the commercial deployment of advanced reactors, but 

will compromise safety and security. There will be new technical and policy issues associated 

with new reactor technologies, and addressing those issues may be time-consuming and 

resource-intensive. It may simply be infeasible to speed up the process. In any event, addressing 

these issues during the design and preliminary licensing stage will be easier and cheaper than 

doing so during construction or after startup. 

We also do not support H.R 2340's attempt to micromanage the NRC by imposing arbitrary caps 

on corporate support costs and user fees. However, we acknowledge that the provisions limiting 

these costs and fees, Section 3(a)(3) and Section 3(b)(3), contain the caveat that they arc imposed 

only "'to the maximum extent practicable." Moreover, the bill provides for a 1-year waiver of the 

annual fee cap hy the NRC. To the extent that these measures give the NRC the ability to 

routinely exceed the caps as necessary to ensure safety and security, we take a neutral position 

on the cap provisions. 

We strongly oppose most other sections of the bill for the above-stated reasons. Section7(c)(1) 

imposes one-size-fits-all timelines on the NRC's environmental and safety reviews for new 

reactors, without any technical justification. Section 7(c)(4) would allow the NRC to grant 

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licenses for nuclear reactors or spent fuel reprocessing plants before hearings on the license 

applications are concluded. And Section 6 would automatically impose informal hearing 

procedures for nuclear reactor licensing actions, with very limited exceptions, instead of 

allowing the presiding officer of the hearing to make that determination, as is currently the rule. 

We also have concerns about Sections 4 and 5. These would require the Comptroller General to 

provide studies on the implications of repealing restrictions on foreign ownership, control, or 

domination of nuclear facilities in the United States, and on the implications of eliminating the 

requirement for mandatory hearings in NRC licensing proceedings. Although UCS does not 

oppose studies, provided they are well-formulated, in these cases we see little point in more 

study of dangerous proposals. With regard to elimination of mandatory hearings, I would refer 

you to our 2016 Senate testimony opposing a similar provision in the Nuclear Energy Innovation 

and Modernization Act, S.2795 (which was subsequently stricken). 

3. Nuclear Energy Competitiveness (Discussion Draft) 

This bill would amend the Atomic Energy Act to allow for the expedited consideration of 

requests for transfers of"low proliferation risk reactor technologies." The Secretary of Energy 

would be given the authority to determine which technologies could be classified as "low 

proliferation risk." Fuel fabrication and other fuel cycle technologies (e.g. "sensitive nuclear 

technologies") would be excluded. 

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The purpose of the draft bill appears to be creation of a fast track for authorizing exports of 

nuclear reactors that use low-enriched uranium fuel to countries that are predetermined to be 

trustworthy. But the proliferation risk of any technology is not an intrinsic and absolute 

characteristic, and the potential proliferation threat posed by any country depends on many 

factors and can change rapidly. Technology transfers cannot be undone. Any light-water reactor 

can become a plutonium factory if a country decides to do so and develops a reprocessing 

capability. As the example of Iran has shown, the latent proliferation potential of technology 

acquisition and the risk of"breakout" must be fully considered, with an eye to the future. Given 

today's geopolitical dangers, the scope of proliferation impacts of nuclear technology transfersboth direct and indirect-should be broadened, not limited. 

For instance, exporting nuclear reactors to a country that already has an established nuclear 

industry, such as the United Kingdom, could have quite different proliferation implications than 

exporting the same reactors to a country that is new to the nuclear business, such as Saudi 

Arabia. And if that new entrant uses the acquisition of nuclear reactors as justification for 

developing indigenous enrichment or reprocessing facilities, or its neighbors are prompted to 

acquire nuclear technology themselves, the proliferation risk of the reactor exports could be 

significant. These types of considerations are presumably part of the DOE's current assessment 

of applications tor activities requiring specific authorizations, such as nuclear reactor technology 

exports. It is not clear that fast-tracking the review process can be done without increasing the 

risk that important factors may be overlooked that could ultimately jeopardize our own security. 

9 
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In any event, as NNSA Assistant Deputy Administrator Art Atkins testified before this 

Subcommittee in February of this year, the long pole in the tent is not the DOE review, but the 

often lengthy period of time that foreign countries take to submit the assurances that the 

Department of State requires for concurrence. A fast track that eliminated the need for these 

assurances would not be advisable. 

Finally, we do not give credence to the often-heard argument that the United States needs to 

engage in a race to the bottom with other, less responsible nuclear export nations by weakening 

critical nonproliferation criteria to make U.S. expotis more competitive. U.S. nuclear vendors 

should focus on making products that are so safe and secure that foreign customers would be 

glad to accept a slightly longer wait to receive them. 

We therefore propose that rather than modify current law, the discussion draft should incorporate 

its Section 3 proposal for a fast-track into the review of civil nuclear commerce required by 

Section 2. This will enable a full evaluation of its risks and benefits. 

4. Report on Pilot Program for Micro-Reactors (Discussion Draft) 

This discussion draft would require the Secretary of Energy to develop a report describing "a 

pilot program to provide resilience ... at Department of Defense and Department of Energy 

facilities by contracting with a commercial entity to site, construct, and operate at least one 

licensed micro-reactor" by December 31, 2027. (In the draft, "micro-reactor" is defined as a 

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reactor with a power capacity of up to 50 megawatts. Other sources, such as ARPA-E, define it 

as a reactor of 10 megawatts-electric or Jess. A 50-megawatt reactor, such as a single NuScale 

module, is typically considered a "small" modular reactor.) 

As stated above, UCS will not object to a good study that will advance knowledge and 

understanding. But the list of required elements of the study in the discussion draft is not 

sufficient to furnish all the information needed for a fair evaluation of the merits of the proposed 

pilot program, or of the risks and benefits of a plan to deploy micro-reactors at DOD and DOE 

sites to provide "energy resilience." 

For instance, the draft vaguely calls for "assessments" of different nuclear technologies, but does 

not explicitly require analyses of nuclear safety and security: top-line information that a base 

commander would want to know. Even a so-called micro-reactor would contain enough 

potentially dispersible radioactivity to render large areas of a site instantly unusable or even 

uninhabitable in the event of a severe accident, sabotage, or an enemy military strike. It is not 

clear why the military would want to be saddled with the additional burden of protecting nuclear 

reactors and their irradiated fuel, and having to deal with the aftermath of a radiological release. 

The 2016 Defense Science Board study on energy systems for forward/remote operating bases, 

while barely addressing safety issues, includes a recommendation that the "Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA) with the Department of Energy (DOE) should conduct a study to 

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assess ... consequence management scenarios" for very small reactors. Such a study, including a 

comprehensive safety and security review, should be incorporated into the discussion draft's 

proposed pilot plant report. 

Some advocates for micro-reactors underplay safety and security risks, asserting that the reactors 

are "passively safe." But passive safety systems are not infallible-especially with respect to 

sabotage-- and no nuclear reactor is completely immune to meltdown. For instance, a 2017 

Idaho National Laboratory study of one of the candidate micro-reactors, the two megawattelectric Special Purpose Reactor, identified many unknowns that are "major concerns," including 

seismic event impacts. Flooding was also found to be a potentially serious accident initiator. And 

the study found that the reactor lacked sufficient defense-in-depth to prevent fission product 

release. 

In addition, the INL study sheds light on the key question of to what extent micro-reactors could 

improve "energy resilience" in practice. As demonstrated by the 201 I Fukushima nuclear 

disaster, which was initiated by a total loss of power, nuclear reactors generally require access to 

independent sources of power to remain safe in an emergency. This is also true for passively safe 

micro-reactors. The !NL study considered events where the Special Purpose Reactor would lose 

electrical power and found the "potential for significant core damage," with the "potential need 

for [a] backup generator" and "battery backup." Thus the reactor that is supposed to provide 

energy resilience itself needs backup diesel or battery power to keep from melting down. Some 

small modular reactor designs, such as NuScale, have proposed an •'island mode" of operation in 

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which a subset of modules is designated to supply electrical power to other modules in the event 

of a loss of external power. But this requires deployment of multiple modules and introduces 

complexity. Issues such as these should be included in the pilot plant study in order to make it as 

balanced and useful as possible. 

We hope that these observations are useful for the Subcommittee's deliberations. Thank you for 

your attention. 

13 
107 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Dr. Lyman. 

The committee will now stand in recess until after votes. And we 

will reconvene and begin our rounds of questions. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. The hearing will come to order. And the Chair will 

now recognize himself for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. Merrifield, your testimony notes that the discussion draft’s 

expedited process for low proliferation risk technologies could be 

improved. How can the legislation find the right balance between 

having a defined set of technologies that would clearly be directed 

under the new process while still providing flexibility going forward 

that future innovations are not limited? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, there are a couple 

aspects that we would focus on. One is obviously how you define 

low proliferation technologies. And we, it is our view that defining 

that, those technologies, commercial nuclear reactors other than 

those which are designed to utilize mixed oxide fuel would be a 

common sense way of doing that. 

We have a, you know, obviously, very stringent process with the 

NNSA here in the United States, as well as IAEA, which looks very 

closely at countries that operate those, those reactors. That is a 

solid and common sense framework that provides I think an appropriate level of protection. 

As it relates to the U.S. Governmental process, I think one of the 

issues that really drags these things out right now is the interagency process. That, combined with the assurance processes is, as 

it is currently put in place, has really caused many U.S. companies 

which are exporting these technologies to really be put at disadvantage and they are having their applications really dragged out far 

longer than they need to be. 

So, simplifying that process for obtaining those assurances potentially by having more standardized form of assurances we think 

makes a whole lot of sense. At the end of the day if we make it 

too hard to export U.S. technologies, people will go elsewhere to 

countries that don’t have those concerns. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Well, thank you. 

Ms. Mann, the legislation that I am proposing to reform DOE’s 

Part 810 review process is meant to provide the U.S. nuclear industry at least a level playing field in the global nuclear marketplace, 

as in some countries, the suppliers are primarily, if not exclusively, 

government-owned vendors. 

In your experience can you tell me how has, how has your experience been working with DOE on 810 applications? What have you 

experienced? 

Ms. MANN. Thank you. So because our, our activity involves uranium enrichment we are absolutely caught entirely by the 810 system, and at the very highest level of the licensing restrictions for 

everything we do. You know, that process is not necessarily fun or 

painless, but we have found that the Department of Energy has 

been incredibly professional in working with us. 

Now, do those approvals take longer than they need to? In many 

cases they do. That is partly due to the problem we have been talking about, getting the foreign government assurances. But we see 

that many of the reforms that have been made to date with elecVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:51 Jan 04, 2019 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 I:\115THCONGRESS\115X132DOENUCLEARLEGPDFSAVED\115X132DOENUCLEARPDF
108 

tronic licensing, increased transparency, and accountability have 

been incredibly helpful. 

But I do think that your draft makes some very useful recommendations: the delegation of authority, and looking at ways 

that you can improve what falls into the general license category, 

will definitely support American users. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. Well, what further needs to be done to ensure 

that regulatory requirements don’t have a chilling impact on U.S. 

exports of nuclear technology and assistance to those countries requesting it? 

Ms. MANN. The balance between promotion and protection is always a tricky one. And as a company that does deal with very sensitive technology, that is the balance that we are always looking to 

have in place. 

I think that, again, the transparency and the accountability in 

the process go far towards supporting that process. The recommendation that Commissioner Merrifield is making about a 

more standardized form of assurance helps. And whatever you can 

do to get those time frames down. 

But I also note that the 810 system does something for the U.S. 

that we don’t see our competitors having an advantage of, and that 

is the general license system. So, to the extent that we can improve 

that further, we will get better, you know, better gains. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did you want to comment? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Well, I was just going to say one thing I forgot 

to mention in our suggestion is also the notion of reducing the 

number of agencies that need to concur. The DOE and NNSA are 

perfectly capable of doing the vast bulk of these. We ought to let 

them go ahead and do it and not necessarily need some of the others in the process. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. Nuclear power plants last a long time. And 

I would think U.S. engagement with those reactors around the 

world can help ensure many years of economic cooperation and 

peace. According to the EIA, almost 200 gigawatts of new nuclear 

energy capacity are projected to be added throughout the world by 

2050. These plants are going to be built. 

Mr. Merrifield, in your testimony you mention that today the 

U.S. is but one of many highly competitive countries vying for a 

role in supporting the development of, development of operations of 

nuclear power plants overseas. Can you describe the type of competition U.S. suppliers face and the benefits of U.S. engagement in 

these opportunities around the world? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Well, it is—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. And I am already out of time. So if you can make 

it a quick answer I would appreciate it. 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Yes. It is very strong competition. You have got 

China and Russia, which are often very competitive technologies 

with a lot of financing behind them. You have Korea, which has a 

demonstrated technology which is going to deploy four units in the 

UAE, which is a very aggressive competitor. And France has been 

very successful in a variety of other countries. 

109 

The U.S. has strong competition. We don’t have the same economic tools behind us. We really do need all of the effort of the 

U.S. Government if we are to increase these U.S., these vital U.S. 

technologies. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I yield—— 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Oh, I was going to say these are 100-year relationships. That is what our competitors know and that is what we 

need to focus on. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The long term. 

I yield back the balance of my time, which I have none, and I 

recognize Mr. McNerney for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, I thank the Chair. And I thank the witnesses. I apologize for missing your testimony. I was in another 

committee. 

I am going to start with Mr. Lyman. What are the costs associated with fabricating HA–LEU through downblending of excessive 

highly enriched uranium stocks as opposed to using conventional or 

alternative fabrication methods? 

Dr. LYMAN. Well, I think until—it is hard to talk about the cost 

of the alternative until the scope of the program has been established, as well as what it would take not only to—what it would 

take really to support Ms. Mann’s effort to acquire a capability to 

reconfigure plants and license them for producing HA–LEU. 

So until that scope is recognized, there are a factors on the costs, 

so I couldn’t say. But clearly if existing HA–LEU stocks are available, that downblending, depending on the quality of the source 

material, could be, you know, a competitive option I would think 

since—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. What about the nonproliferation 

comments, could you expand on that a little bit? 

Dr. LYMAN. Yes. Well, in general HA–LEU, even though it is 

below the 20 percent enrichment threshold, it is only if you look 

at a material that is right below that threshold it only takes about 

one-tenth of the separated work to produce weapons grade uranium 

over 90 percent as it does for natural uranium. 

So, having a stock of that moderately enriched uranium does give 

a leg up to a nation that might want to start producing high-enriched uranium for weapons. And that is our point now, that is 

why Iran, there was so much concern about Iran stockpiling this 

material. 

In addition, that material could be used for radiological weapons 

which has been their study in the past. 

So it is important to examine those issues if you do develop a 

new demand and production capacity for this material, start exporting, other countries may be kind of interested in similar designs, want to start producing HA–LEU themselves. I think that 

warrants further exploration. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Irvin, where does the Southern 

Company see small modular reactors fitting into their business 

model? 

Mr. IRVIN. That is a good question and it is an interesting one. 

We view SMRs as being a critical component of the maintaining 

the supply chain as we go forward for advanced reactors. We are 

always looking at our customers’ needs and evaluating what they 

110 

are telling us with regards to their price and performance requirements. 

I believe that SMRs have a critical challenge with respect to 

being competitive against natural gas combined cycle in the U.S. 

That doesn’t mean that that future is not bright. And certainly 

there is a significant opportunity for SMRs, but I do think it is 

challenged. 

We, we see advanced reactors as providing a potential to drive 

down the costs low enough to be competitive with the natural gas 

combined cycle. And so really the core component of SMR is providing a bridge to that future. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Good segue. 

Mr. Merrifield, how do you, how do we help jump start the industry without hampering the NRC’s capability to do their job? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Well, I think, I think, you know, a number of 

pieces of legislation that you have before you today would be, would 

be helpful. In terms of the NRC’s process, I think the agency’s 

made a lot of, a lot of progress on right-sizing itself. I think putting 

in specific deadlines for reviewing applications, reviewing environmental reviews, I think that is certainly appropriate and I certainly would support that. 

Overall, in the part of the advanced reactor community, I think 

having appropriate funding through other committees of Congress 

is going to be important to your technologies which have great 

promise. They are certainly deployable in the late 2020s, and the 

U.S. is ahead in this technology. Certainly want to take advantage 

of that for export purposes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. So in honor of the sitting chairman, what about 

the nuclear waste issue? Do you see a resolution of that in the 

works or what are your feeling about that? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Is that directed toward me? 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Yes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Well, I have a specific prohibition against lobbying Congress on Yucca Mountain related issues. So, with that caveat I think that there are common-sensical ways to address the 

material. There are several proposals for interim storage facilities, 

both in Texas and New Mexico, which provide I think common 

sense ways of dealing with this in the interim. 

At the end of the day, my personal view as an American is Yucca 

Mountain is a perfectly safe place to put that fuel. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman yields back 

his time. 

It is great to have you here. It is great to be in the chair for the 

Energy Subcommittee. So let me go with my round of questions, 

kind of similar to what I did with the first panel. I want to go to 

Ms. Mann. 

Your testimony notes that your NRC-licensed facility is capable 

of producing high-assay LEU or low-enrichment uranium for advanced nuclear fuels. I would like a brief clarification. Are there 

any technical, regulatory, or other legal restrictions from your enrichment plant to make high-assay LEU for commercial purposes? 

Ms. MANN. Certainly the technology is fully capable now of doing 

that. The site that we have we think is certainly suitable. We do 

111 

need a nuclear NRC license amendment to build a HA–LEU enrichment module. But there are no other restrictions on that technology or that proposal other than, of course, having a market that 

we can serve. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Markets are important as you directly put. 

Are you aware—and you were in here for the first panel, so this 

is a similar question—are you aware of the GAO report that recently analyzed the NNSA’s preliminary cost estimates and mission 

statement regarding future enrichment needs for American defense 

purposes? 

Ms. MANN. I am generally familiar. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Based on your experience in building and operating the only enrichment plant in the United States, what is your 

perspective on GAO’s conclusions on NNSA’s cost estimates? 

Ms. MANN. There are certainly two very different things. We 

built a greenfield commercial enrichment facility in New Mexico, 

taking it from what was a effectively a square mile of scrub brush 

and coyotes in 2006, and turning it into a high class enrichment 

facility. And investment to date is about $5 billion. 

I think that is very different than the cost range that was envisioned for a much smaller footprint of capacity for the DOE domestic uranium program. 

Two comments on that. One, I do believe there is strictly a clear 

delineation between civil and military programs. I can also tell you 

that the cost estimates that are in that GAO report are 

unsustainable, whether it be for the commercial fleet or for an 

emerging advanced reactor community. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So you were, again, here during the first panel. 

And what do you respond—and he could have stayed, too—Mr. 

McGinnis’ comments on the similar question? 

Ms. MANN. I certainly appreciate that the Department has other 

missions it needs to fulfill. And I understand that they may be 

looking to merge some of those. But what we are looking at is the 

near-term need for HA–LEU fuel for commercial reactors, on a relatively small demand, even if you aggregate all of those small 

pieces from different users. 

If you try to put the defense program on that backs of that, you 

will break it. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And Mr. McGinnis’ comment which, you know, I 

fleshed out a little bit but not enough, he seemed to be making the 

debate of competitive marketplace and having two production facilities. How would you comment on that? 

Ms. MANN. We certainly support competition. And I can tell you 

we are very much aware of the competition that we see, both in 

the enrichment market and other parts of the fuel cycle. And that’s 

really up to the market to bear. 

We know that utilities, like Southern here, like a very diverse 

range of supplier. I think the question is until we know what the 

full demand profile is, how many advanced designs, advanced fuel 

types move forward I am not sure what that industry is capable 

of sustaining in the earliest years. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, I think that’s been my point, too, because I 

would concur that we would like to have multiple sources, like to 

have competition. We want lower costs and more efficiencies. 

112 

But I am also concerned about the Government overbuilding on 

a projected market which may not be there immediately to fulfill 

the production needs and desires, and you will have stranded costs 

there in producing fuel that you may not need to do. 

Ms. MANN. I will just tell you quickly that the existing fuel cycle 

is under quite duress due to the falling demand, to the significant 

amount of inventories, to state-sponsored competition. We are trying to sustain that. And if you look at trying to add additional pressures on top of that, it’s not sustainable. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, and I follow it very closely because I have 

the Honeywell facility. And I have talked with DOE quite a bit 

about the multiple individual markets that don’t produce it, but 

then the repurposing of, in essence, Government-subsidized ability 

to purchase and buy and then also create fuel waste. It makes it 

hard for a corporate entity to be able to provide that certainty. 

So, I am going to yield back my time. And thank you for answering those questions. And then yield to Mr. Green for 5 minutes, 

from Texas. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our witnesses for 

waiting here today. 

Mr. Merrifield, based on your vast experience in the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission I would like to ask you a few questions on 

the NRC’s fee and Mr. Kinzinger and Mr. Doyle’s bill. 

Section 3(b) of the bill would provide an exclusion of fees for 

those costs associated with the development of regulatory infrastructure for advanced nuclear reactor technology. Can you talk a 

little bit about why this provision is so important to this new industry and how our current NRC fee structure stifles growth in the 

sector? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Yes. Thank you very much, Congressman, for 

that question. 

A couple of things. First, I think if you look historically, with the 

current fee in nuclear reactors they did not have to pay those kind 

of fees when those reactors were developed in the 1960s, 1970s, 

and 1980s. So concurrently I think that is one issue. 

The second one is these are nascent technologies. These are not 

large companies that are developing these technologies. They are 

smaller. They are innovative. And they are currently in the market 

seeking funding to bring those designs forward. 

Placing on top of all of that effort the costs of the NRC, building 

its regulatory infrastructure would be, would be potentially crushing. And that’s really a role and responsibility that is more appropriately left to the U.S. Government. And so I believe, and 

ClearPath Action believes that the language is appropriate. 

Mr. GREEN. As more and more nuclear plants go offline across 

the country, the fee burden is felt more heavily by those who remain. Do you feel the current NRC structure is sustainable? And 

if not, is there a tipping point that you expect to come? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I think that is, I think that is a great question. 

And I agree with the direction from which it comes. 

Yes, I do think Congress is going to have to continue to take a 

look at the number of reactors and adjust the amount of fees that 

are put on licensees as a result of it. The NRC has certain breadth 

of work that they have to do. But there will become a point at 

113 

which I think there will need to be increased general revenues 

dedicated to that to make sure that that fee structure isn’t overly 

burdensome to U.S. utilities. 

Mr. GREEN. So, do you have a year. I mean, because some of this 

legislation needs, sometimes it takes years to get something 

passed. Do you have any idea when that may be, looking into the 

future? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Well, I think, I think this is something that this 

committee should be thinking about and Congress should be thinking about right now. I mean the discussion is as many of a quarter 

of the reactors could potentially go offline. I think, you know, 

changing the current ration that previously was 90:10, I think taking it to a different ratio makes sense currently right now. 

Mr. GREEN. Do you feel the draft legislation adequately addresses these challenges? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I think the legislation is a great step in the 

right direction. 

Mr. GREEN. While I made clear before that I am not fond of 

DOE’s recent notice of public review that proposed subsidizing certain industries, I do think we face a challenge that needs to be addressed. We have heard from many witnesses on multiple pieces of 

legislation. 

What else should Congress be looking at to shore up the domestic 

nuclear energy production in the coming year other than these legislations? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Well, I think having, having the fast reactor capability out in Idaho is going to be important for the testing of the 

various rules that will be used for these reactors. So I think that 

is an important one. 

I think the actions that Congress has made to make sure the 

DOE loan guarantee program stays in place is important. 

I think the Ex-Im Bank is an important tool for the export of 

these reactors, so I would certainly recommend continuation and, 

frankly, some strengthening of their nuclear capabilities. 

Those are among some of the things I think Congress ought to 

look at. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, hopefully next time we reauthorize Ex-Im 

Bank it won’t take such a battle as we had last time. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time. And thank you for my 

earlier extra 20 seconds. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. And the Chair 

recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Irvin, your testimony focuses a lot on the research and development of advanced nuclear reactors. What are the long-term benefits your customers will see after Southern Company invests in 

these new technologies? 

Mr. IRVIN. So, the industry at large, we talked a lot today about 

the nuclear industry being in the crossroads, but I think the industry at large is at a crossroads as well. We have seen the influx of 

lots of new technologies being disruptive across the board. And so 

as we look forward, we believe investing in technology that is, I am 

going to use the phrase, options positive. So I want to create options. Knowing that I am believing that the future is uncertain I 

114 

want to create technologies that provide multiple options for my 

customers. 

So, the first and foremost for me is the technology, does it have 

a potential to drive down the cost of energy? I believe advanced reactors do have that potential. 

But further than that, does the technology have the potential to 

serve more than just electricity needs? Does it have options for a 

multitude of product slates? And these advanced reactors and the 

nature in which they operate creates opportunities for nuclear energy to be transitioned into the industrial sector, into the transportation sector, but certainly providing low cost electrons. 

And so, we see the opportunity for this long-term, stable energy 

supply to be pervasive across the entire energy economy. 

Mr. LONG. What does Congress or the Department of Energy 

need to do to help companies like Southern Company and other 

companies streamline the development of these advanced reactors? 

Mr. IRVIN. Well, I think the one of the most important things 

there, and it is something I have seen out of the Department over 

the last 5 years do more and more is really seek out industry’s 

input and partner with industry in a collaborative way, and take 

that feedback from industry as to where we need to move the technologies to. I think industry, in partnership with the Department, 

can accelerate. And we need that collaboration with the Department on things like fundamental science, testing capabilities such 

as the advanced reactor, fast test reactor that was mentioned earlier. 

But then, ultimately, as that collaboration matures we need the 

Department and Federal Government to allow industry to then 

move forward and commercialize and take advantage of the investment that has been put in before it. 

Mr. LONG. OK. This next question is for everyone. We will just 

start Merrifield, Mann, Irvin, and Lyman down the line if we can. 

But for all of you, I have seen some of your testimonies reference 

the—in reference to China starting to load fuel into new nuclear 

power, a new nuclear power plant, and India, Russia, and Korea 

leading the United States in deploying large nuclear reactors over 

1,000 megawatt units. Is the United States falling behind these 

countries in the field of nuclear energy and nuclear technology in 

your opinion, Mr. Merrifield? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. That is—I have got a mixed answer to that. 

Frankly, the reactor that is being built in China is a Westinghouse 

technology. The United States continues to possess the most modern nuclear design out there in that particular technology, so we 

are leading in that regard. 

In terms of construction, obviously Southern Company has two of 

those reactors that continue to be built. It is unfortunate that the 

cost of natural gas is what it is, which is hindering utilities like 

Southern, more and more of those. But certainly there is a robust 

export market. And certainly the United States should be a leader 

in that, in that regard. 

Mr. LONG. OK. Ms. Mann, is the United States falling behind 

these other countries in the field of nuclear energy, nuclear technology in your opinion? 

115 

Ms. MANN. Mr. Long, my specialty is on the nuclear fuel cycle. 

And in that regard the answer is clearly no. 

But in order to be able to supply into China we need to have an 

open market. And that is one of the things we are concerned about 

is to make sure that they are able to continue to receive the output 

of American technology in their home. 

Mr. LONG. Mr. Irvin? 

Mr. IRVIN. Personally, I think the race is a little too close to call 

right now. But I think the reference to natural gas being low, by 

the way it is a good thing for Southern Company if natural gas 

prices are low, but it is a clear indication that when the U.S., when 

we put U.S. innovation to work through collaboration with the Federal Government, like we did with learning how to frack, and finding shale gas, then we can clearly stay ahead and put ourselves 

further ahead than the rest of the world. And so that is the reason 

why we are so focused on innovation. 

Mr. LONG. Dr. Lyman? 

Dr. LYMAN. Well, I would say the answer is no. From our perspective safety and security are paramount. And I do agree with 

Mr. McGinnis when he said that the U.S. as far as its safety and 

security infrastructure for nuclear power is probably the best in the 

world. 

So we would like to see those concepts, you know, exported. We 

don’t want to see a race to the bottom where the U.S. has to compromise on its own principles just to compete with China on nuclear safety concerns. So we think that that is the best selling point 

of U.S. technology is that backbone of safety and security. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Doyle, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Commissioner Merrifield, welcome back. I want to thank you for 

taking the time to speak to the committee on nuclear energy issues 

and the NUKE Act. The NUKE Act made several changes from the 

discussion draft that was under consideration when you last testified before the committee. These changes include significantly 

longer time lines for major license applications, milestones for new 

plants, and the removal of deemed approved language. 

Under the current version of the NUKE Act, if the NRC does not 

meet the time lines that are laid out in the bill will that have any 

effect on an operator’s application? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Yes, I would have to go back and look at the 

explicit detail, but I think it does provide an opportunity for that 

process to continue. So I don’t think it has a hindrance. But I will 

certainly look at that and give you some comments. 

Mr. DOYLE. Now, do you think the current language gives the 

NRC sufficient flexibility? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I do. I do. 

Mr. DOYLE. Do you think the current NRC fee structure is able 

to appropriately adjust to reflect current market and future 

changes to our national energy portfolio without congressional action? 

116 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. As I indicated—great question—as I indicated 

in the questions earlier, I believe there needs to be additional revisions to that fee structure, part of which is envisioned by the legislation we have been talking about today. I think that is going to 

be a continually evolving issue if there are additional U.S. reactors 

that go into decommissioning prematurely. 

Mr. DOYLE. Can you speak to the current budgetary burden that 

is placed on remaining nuclear reactors when a plant retires? I 

mean, how do you anticipate this is going to affect our nuclear fleet 

if it is not addressed? 

And do you see the changes that are proposed in the NUKE Act 

as helping to address this problem? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Well, I will start with, I will start with the second question first. I do think they are helpful. But there is no question there are certain fixed assets that the agency has that it needs 

in order to be an effective regulator. At some point that will become 

large enough that the burden placed on the individual reactor operators will become larger and larger. And that is troublesome and 

problematic because it makes even more complicated the likelihood 

that some of those reactors will be shut down. And I don’t think 

that is a good thing. 

Those are important, carbon-free, clean-generating assets for our 

country. I think there are some that have shut down that have 

been, frankly, a real shame. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair 

would now like to recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Kinzinger, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 

being here today. I very much appreciate it. 

Mr. Merrifield, Section 7 of H.R. 1320 sets time lines and goals 

for the NRC to issue environmental impact statements and safety 

evaluation reports for several NRC licensing actions such as early 

site permits, construction or operating permits, and combining operating licenses. Are the time lines in Section 7 generally reasonable to expect based on historical processing times? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I believe so. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And in your view would instituting such time 

lines in any way weaken the underlying stringency of the established reasonable assurance regulatory requirements? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I do not believe so. And frankly, you know, we 

looked, and as I mentioned in prior testimony before this committee, I led a task force that looked at some of these very same 

issues when I was on the Commission. We felt at that time there 

was really a need to streamline some of those processes, and it 

didn’t really happen. I think the language that you all have put 

into that draft will be very—would be a very welcome change and 

would give the discipline necessary for you just to go ahead and do 

that without sacrificing their mission of protecting public health, 

safety, and the environment. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

Ms. Mann, your enrichment facility holds an NRC license and is 

subject to NRC’s fee recovery. My bill, or our bill creates reasonable 

and predictable expectations for NRC’s fee recovery process. I unVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:51 Jan 04, 2019 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 I:\115THCONGRESS\115X132DOENUCLEARLEGPDFSAVED\115X132DOENUCLEARPDF
117 

derstand the number of licensees who fund NRC fuel cycle activities has decreased recently without a reduction in overall NRC 

staffing. 

Will you discuss recent trends associated with NRC fuel cycle facilities? 

Ms. MANN. Certainly. What we are seeing on the fuel cycle in 

many way echoes what we have just talked about with regard to 

the reactors. The first I would note is that since our enrichment 

plant started operation in 2010, we have seen on average a 12-percent-a-year increase across the board. And even though the amount 

of work that is being done at our facility has slightly gone down 

now, we are fully operational. 

As the number of fuel cycle facilities that are licensed has 

dropped, the fees, the total fees that they are trying to collect have 

not gone down. And we are, in fact, spreading those fees across a 

fewer number of licensees. And so, by that logic, if we were to perhaps be the last one standing we would be bearing the full $25-million-a-year burden. 

What I think is also notable, and we touched on it a little bit, 

is there are things that have to be paid for at the NRC that have 

nothing to do with the operation of an individual facility. And right 

now what we are looking at is that 74 percent of our fees go to 

those nondirect services rather than directly to licensing our site. 

And we certainly understand the need to share that burden, but 

that burden is becoming prohibitively high. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. And how does this embed cost in the 

nuclear fuel cycle that you have touched on, business, and ultimately impact the commercial nuclear industry and electricity 

rates that my constituents pay? 

Ms. MANN. Well, I can tell you sitting next here to one of the 

utilities is that it is highly unlikely we would be able to pass those 

additional costs along to any of our utility customers. They have 

other choices and they have other suppliers who don’t bear the burden of those fees. So we need to be careful. 

And, likewise, we understand why Nick couldn’t do that, he can’t 

pass it on to his customers. So the question is what is a more rational way to spread those total fees across, and then also reflect 

the individual licensing work being done at each of our sites. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And that, by definition, would skew the whole 

energy mix anyway, which is something that we are obviously very 

concerned with. And so, would enacting this legislation help control 

those costs in your mind? 

Ms. MANN. Yes, it would. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

Mr. Lyman, H.R. 1320 contains substantially similar language 

regarding NRC’s fee structure as the Nuclear Energy Innovation 

and Modernization Act sponsored by the Senate EPW Chairman 

Barrasso. With respect to that, though, your organization said the 

bill balanced reforms to the licensing process while allowing the 

NRC flexibility to regulate in the public interest and the Union of 

Concerned Scientists took a neutral position on the bill. Does that 

position also apply to the same language fee that is included in my 

legislation? 

118 

Dr. LYMAN. Yes, it does. And as you see in my testimony with 

regard to the fee cap and the corporate support costs, we also, you 

see that we take a neutral position because we think there is language in there that provides enough flexibility. We just don’t want 

to see Congress mandate an arbitrary cap that would force the 

NRC to curtail important safety and security work and needs some 

flexibility. And I think the way the language is written now they 

would have that. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back. At this time the Chair 

recognizes the ranking member of the Environment Subcommittee, 

Mr. Tonko, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TONKO. We have the environment team here and—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. They are taking over. 

Mr. TONKO [continuing]. The energy team. So only kidding. 

Welcome to our witnesses, and thank you for your input. Mr. 

Merrifield, H.R. 1320 would exempt a number of activities from 

NRC’s fee structure. Can you give us the sense of what those activities would include? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I don’t have, I don’t have the list in front of me 

right now. The one that we focused on is an exclusion for costs associated with developing a regulatory infrastructure for regulation 

on advanced reactors. We think that that, that particular language 

makes a lot of sense. It is important the NRC put that structure 

in place. It is working very hard to do so right now. 

There are upfront costs that are associated with that kind of activity. And certainly we think that should be borne by the general 

revenues rather than individual developers. 

One of the elements I included in my written testimony is the 

suggestion that you may wish to increase that to allow some degree 

of regulatory research as part of that advanced reactor program so 

the NRC had the tools looking forward to appropriately regulate 

those, including an appropriate balance of risk-informed regulation 

in that part. So that, we certainly think that that is a very good 

element of that program. 

Mr. TONKO. So the NRC currently recovers approximately 90 percent of its budget from license fees? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Yes. 

Mr. TONKO. Are any activities exempted under this bill currently 

recoverable by NRC? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I would have to look at, I would have to look 

at the individual elements of the legislation that go past it. And 

there are certainly some areas where there may be an overlap, but 

I would have to confirm that. 

Mr. TONKO. OK, thank you. 

And do you have any estimates, and if not, Mr. Chair, maybe we 

could ask NRC, of how this bill might change that 90:10 cost recovery, if enacted? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I do not have an estimate of that. And I do 

think you are quite correct, directing that to the NRC would be 

more appropriate. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. The bill also places a cap on the fees 

that NRC can charge an operating reactor. Mr. Merrifield or Mr. 

119 

Irvin, do you know the current average annual fees assessed on operating reactors? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I am going to pass that one to Mr. Irvin. 

Mr. IRVIN. Unfortunately, I don’t, I don’t know that. I am in the 

R&D sector, not the operations side, so. 

Mr. TONKO. OK, thank you. 

Dr. Lyman, you expressed concerns about the expedited review 

process in Section 7 of H.R. 1320, which would require the draft 

environmental impact statement within 24 months and a 42-month 

deadline for technical review process and final environmental impact statement. Can you explain your concerns with the time line 

for these reviews? 

Dr. LYMAN. Yes. As a policy matter we don’t support the micromanagement by Congress of regulatory agencies to that extent that 

they should be given these strict time lines to conduct environmental reviews. Often during the review new issues will arise that 

simply take time to resolve. And I do not think that it is appropriate to try to force resolution of those where they are right. 

So that is why we don’t think, unless there was more discretion 

to the agency to be able to exempt those time lines, we don’t think 

it is appropriate. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. And, Dr. Lyman, again, and let’s switch 

to Part 810, it seems you believe we should err on the side of caution for nuclear technology transfers. What role should the State 

Department play in assessing proliferation threats? 

Mr. IRVIN. I think the State Department has a critical role and 

brings its own expertise to these reviews. And in particular by taking a broader view that we did hear about this morning, that any 

technology export has to be seen in context. So, even a light-water 

reactor without any fuel cycle technology could potentially pose 

undue risk if it goes to, let’s say, a region of the world like the Middle East or Saudi Arabia where the countries are stating its desire 

to acquire fuel cycle technology possibly from somewhere else. 

So if, if we give them cover to be able to acquire that technology, 

possibly for eventual misuse for nuclear weapons, I think that 

would be a dangerous development. 

Mr. TONKO. And is it important to be able to reassess those risks 

in real time? 

Mr. IRVIN. Yes. One would hope getting information and making 

decisions is always based on the best available information at the 

time, but also by looking ahead. And understanding we heard earlier a nuclear reactor, you know, could be a 60- or a 100-year proposition. Well, that cuts both ways. Governments often don’t last 

that long. So you have to look forward and make conservative projections about what may happen in the future with that technology. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you to all of you. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the 

panel for being here. 

Ms. Mann, your testimony notes that there is a need to address 

packaging and transportation needs. But you also note that we already transport nuclear fuel to meet the needs of the commercial 

120 

fleet. Additionally, we currently ship HA–LEU for research reactors 

and other purposes. 

Can you please provide a bit more context on what is different 

about the needs and designs for transportation packages for HA– 

LEU on a larger scale? 

And, second, why are the existing packages not adequate for 

widespread commercial use for uranium enriched at higher levels? 

Ms. MANN. Certainly. Thank you. 

One of the things that we, that we know is that the HA–LEU 

is at a higher enrichment level than the commercial industry. And 

when we look at the HA–LEU fuel cycle, the first piece of that, the 

enrichment piece, will come out in the form of what we call uranium hexafluoride. There are no current commercial packages that 

are suitable for HA–LEU enrichments of uranium hexafluoride. 

Moreover, existing NRC regulations require additional performance requirements for such packages. So what we need to do is to 

develop that, that capability. Similarly, we don’t have packages for 

higher enrichments of oxides in most cases. We do for some metals. 

And we have used the research reactor fuel that is in metallic 

form. However, there is only a handful of I think six to ten packages in total that would not serve the full breadth of the industry. 

So what we are looking to do is develop that capability. Or, alternatively, is one of the things we suggest in our written testimony 

is you could obviate some of that need by collocating one or more 

of those HA–LEU fuel cycle steps on a single facility, thus avoiding 

public transportation. 

Mr. WALBERG. Is that in the works? 

Ms. MANN. Certainly we would be happy to find a dance partner 

if there were somebody who wanted to collocate with us in New 

Mexico. That makes a lot of sense as well from an economic standpoint, as well as from a regulator standpoint, because these existing licensed sites are known to the NRC, they are well characterized. We could take advantage of existing infrastructure, security, 

manpower. 

Mr. WALBERG. You also note that the design, development, testing, and NRC certification for transportation packages typically 

take between 4 to 7 years. Would the program required by the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act help move the time frame 

earlier through a public/private partnership for the design and the 

DOE efforts to develop criticality benchmark data? 

Ms. MANN. It would in two important ways. First, it recognizes 

that there is a transportation challenge. And I think that has been 

lower on the priority list, as much of the focus has appropriately 

been on the reactor design. 

But, secondly, we talked a little bit in the earlier session about 

the need for nuclear criticality benchmarks. And this is a sort of 

data analysis to see how will these nuclear materials perform. And 

to the extent that we can come up with a common set of those 

benchmark codes that we can use in our enrichment facility, that 

converters and fabricators can use, and that are also used in transportation packages, gives us a single set of data to focus our attention on and to allow the NRC to focus on that, rather than reviewing multiple different sets of submissions. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you. 

121 

Mr. Irvin, I understand that a research reactor in Norway, 

known as the Halden Reactor, is currently shut down for maintenance. And the Norwegian Government is discussing the future of 

the reactor. My question is, what sort of capabilities does that reactor provide for American research needs? And what are the implications for the advanced nuclear community if the reactor is shut 

down? 

Mr. IRVIN. So, my understanding is that reactor is a boiling 

water reactor. And if I am not mistaken, much of the interest in 

that reactor has to do with evaluating something called accident 

tolerant fuels which would be used in the existing fleet. 

Certainly, in general, access to research and testing capabilities 

for the existing fleet as well as for the future fleet is of critical importance. There has been some talk today about a fast neutron 

source. I am not intimately familiar with the level that the industry is relying on that reactor right now, so I can’t comment really 

any further than that. 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Congressman, if I may? 

Mr. WALBERG. Yes. 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I had the opportunity to visit the Halden Reactor when I was a member of the NRC. The NRC actually contributes money toward that program. There are a variety of countries 

around the world that are members of their research programs 

there. It is a critical research facility. It is one that has some of 

the longest fuels in there for some of the longest periods of time 

in the world. It would be a real loss to the international nuclear 

community if Norway were to make the choice not to—— 

Mr. WALBERG. So there is a potential role for the U.S. in that? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I would, I would say certainly. There certainly 

is a role. If we don’t have—right now we don’t have the ability to 

do a lot of research that we need to do in U.S. fuels. We use the 

hindsight mind, who I support, if we can’t get it done here in the 

U.S. you have got to look to Russia, you have got to look to China, 

you have to look elsewhere, and we really shouldn’t be in that position. 

We, as a country, are the world’s inventor, and innovator, and 

leader in nuclear technologies. We should not lose that leadership. 

And certainly we are at risk of doing so. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Rush, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. RUSH. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Merrifield, in your written testimony you state that eliminating the foreign ownership provision, as Section 4 of H.R. 1320 

proposes, there could be essentially provide an opportunity to save 

the messy nuclear facility fuel investment by friendly foreign utility 

partners. Can you briefly discuss how that would work? 

Also, do you have any concern about unintentional consequences 

that are listed in this provision might cause? And I would like to 

invite anybody in the panel who would want to have some input. 

So, Mr. Merrifield, will you answer the question? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

122 

So, I will start off with the second half of that first, and that is 

regarding the concerns. As currently written in statute, the foreign 

ownership provision really has two elements to it, one of which is 

an absolute prohibition on the foreign entity owning a majority of 

the U.S. nuclear power plant. 

The second half of that requirement is one that imposes a 

inimicality test where a determination is made whether the own— 

whether ownership in whole or in part would be inimical to the interests of the United States. 

I have testified many times before this committee and before the 

Congress dating back to when I was on the Commission where we 

said, as a member of the Commission, we really felt the first half 

of that question is unnecessary. And the inimicality test, if left in 

place, would give an appropriate tool to make a determination 

about whether that ownership was against the interests of the 

United States. 

I used in both my written and my verbal testimony an example 

where the decision of the United Kingdom to allow E ́ lectricite ́ de 

France to purchase U.K. nuclear units had the beneficial aspect of 

allowing those reactors to continue to operate. And they have done 

so effectively and safely since the late 2000s. 

In terms of the potential in the United States, I can’t, I would 

be—it would be inaccurate for me to say I have got a list of foreign 

utilities that today wish to purchase U.S. nuclear power plants. 

What I was suggesting in my testimony is there are past examples 

of utilities that I am aware of that have expressed an interest in 

purchasing U.S. nuclear plants but made the determination not to 

do so when they found out they couldn’t purchase the plants in 

their totality because they were prohibited from that under U.S. 

law. 

So the suggestion is that perhaps if that provision were to be 

taken out of law, there may be the emergence of companies currently not on the market who may be interested in owning U.S. 

generating assets in the nuclear arena. 

Mr. RUSH. Does anybody else want to weigh in on that? Mr. 

Lyman? 

Dr. LYMAN. Just briefly. I think I may sound like a hawk here, 

but from the national security perspective I think removing these 

requirements and allowing a foreign nation to own, exert control 

over dominant U.S. nuclear facilities would be an irresponsible 

move. So we certainly oppose. We opposed that provision in the 

Senate version. We oppose, we don’t think there is any point in reviewing it in the study that is proposed in this committee. 

Mr. RUSH. Mr. Lyman, you think a study in this proposal would 

be dangerous? 

Dr. LYMAN. I am sorry, could you repeat the question? 

Mr. RUSH. You point out concerns with Section 4 and 5. 

Dr. LYMAN. Yes. 

Mr. RUSH. Which involved the GAO study on implication of repealing restriction on ownership, control, and domination by a foreign entity of nuclear facilities here in the U.S. And you are not 

in favor of the study? 

Dr. LYMAN. Oh, I am sorry, in the Senate there is a bill, Nuclear 

Energy Innovation and Modernization Act. In the original version 

123 

of that bill, it had a provision to strike the restrictions on foreign 

ownership, control, and domination. So we opposed that provision 

in that bill that ended up being stricken from the final version that 

was passed by the committee. 

Mr. RUSH. I am concerned about this GAO study. Is there anything in your opinion that you are opposed to GAO conducting a 

study on foreign ownership? 

Dr. LYMAN. Yes, the draft or the H.R. 1320 calls for a review and 

calls for a study on elimination of foreign licensing restrictions 

done by the Comptroller General in consultation with the Secretary 

of Energy. As we say, you know, generally we don’t oppose a study 

as long as it is done properly, because studies always bring more 

information. So we wouldn’t oppose the study. But we think that 

the results of that study would probably support strongly the conclusion that those restrictions should be maintained. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman’s time is far expired. The Chair 

recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina for 5 minutes. We 

thank him for being very patient. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you guys for 

being here and being very patient. It will all be over soon; I am 

last. 

Mr. Merrifield, you talked a lot about the benefits of nuclear energy. And I agree with you, I have long been a proponent of the 

industry. And being from South Carolina you have talked today 

about VC Summer and what happened there. I also heard the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, talk about China, and Russia, and 

others that are leading the United States in nuclear technology, 

and research and development. 

So I have got to ask you, have we lost the ability here in the 

United States to do big things in the nuclear power sector? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I don’t think so. I mean, I think what we had 

is we had some first-of-the-kind activities for the United States 

that we hadn’t done in 20 or 30 years. Although it is unfortunate 

that there was a decision made to, hopefully, temporarily shut 

down the VC Summer construction, I certainly give credit to Southern Company for moving forward with those AP1000 reactors at 

the Vogtle site and fully expect to help them celebrate those going 

online years down the road. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So we all know that there is a lot of Government 

bureaucracy, and the regulatory environment seems to be getting 

tougher and tougher for these type projects. What steps could be 

considered potentially for a cumbersome and inflexible regulatory 

regime from inhibiting new nuclear development. Do you think the 

gentleman from Illinois Mr. Kinzinger’s legislation will help with 

that? 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I do. I think there is a couple of things here. 

One is I do think it is appropriate to have time lines for the agency 

to conduct review of various activities. I think there is nothing 

wrong with that. We did those kind of things when I was a Commissioner. 

I think as well making sure that the agency is the right size and 

has the appropriate mix of people and dollars is important. They 

have reduced to a certain extent. I think there is more than can 

124 

be done in the areas of the agency, frankly, having gotten the focus 

it probably should have. 

So, I think between the two, the legislation, and then things that 

NRC can do on its own are going to be important in getting there. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And to Mr. Irvin, I am glad to see that Vogtle is 

moving on there for Southern Company, given what happened in 

South Carolina. 

One of my biggest concerns is continuing private sector investment. I mean if the tens of billions of dollars that are required to 

build new nuclear reactors in this country and the long regulatory 

framework that takes place before construction, then starts the 

long construction period as we see with Vogtle and VC Summer, 

and then 7 years into the project the construction side of it the rug 

gets pulled out from under the project and those investors lose that 

money or the ratepayers are on the hook for something possibly in 

South Carolina, how are we as a nation going to get the investors 

and attract the investors to invest in these type projects going forward? 

And that has got to be a question Southern is asking itself. 

Mr. IRVIN. This is a question I get asked often in terms of our 

need to try and get more investment in developing technology. I 

think, I think the answer, maybe because I am an R&D guy, is innovation. 

If you look at the work we are doing on advanced reactors, as I 

said earlier, we believe they have the potential to drive down that 

cost. And they drive down that cost in multiple ways. But in a very 

notable way it is shortening construction time lines, it is simplifying plants, it is making the time from concept to delivery much 

more effective and efficient for the resources. 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is a good point. We want to reinvent the 

wheel every time we do a new nuclear project when we have got 

proven reactor technology out there, and then design. But we are 

spending all this money to reinvent. 

Mr. IRVIN. Certainly I think one of the reasons we are having to 

spend time to reinvent the technology space is that the rest of the 

industry has moved forward. So, if you look at 15 years ago relative 

to natural gas combined cycle, the technology we have right now, 

we have today to deploy, we are highly competitive. And with the 

innovation that happened in that sector, they no longer are. 

And so, I think we, as a nuclear industry, are challenged to not 

reinvent for reinventing’s sake, but to seek those technologies that 

provide the right level of benefit to our customers that can also be 

deployed in a timely manner and in the right characteristics. 

Mr. MERRIFIELD. I was going to say just on that score, I mean 

these new technologies provide also some different avenues. You 

know, the traditional technologies, AP1000, 1,000 megawatt baseload power; some of the molten salt reactors, high temperature gas 

reactors are smaller. They can be used in different ways. They can 

be used for desalinization. They can be used in remote locations in 

some circumstances. And they can be used for process technologies 

to provide very high temperature heat for chemical and industrial 

processes. 

So, in that regard although we are doing something different, it 

is meeting a series of demands that currently are met. 

125 

Mr. DUNCAN. My time has expired. 

Mr. Chairman, at any given time we have got over 100 small reactors floating around the seas of the world in the United States 

Navy. So, I didn’t hear small modular reactor technology enough 

from this group. I don’t hear thorium and molten salt technology. 

I hope the industry is looking at that because they are safer, 

they are easier. SMRs may be the future for the cities across America and also, you know, improving the quality of lives of folks on 

other continents, possibly. 

So, thanks for the hearing. Thanks, guys. And I yield back. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. Seeing there 

are no further Members wishing to ask questions, I would like to 

thank all the witnesses for being here today and being very patient 

as we had to go to vote. 

Before we conclude, I would like to ask unanimous consent to 

submit the following documents for the record: A letter from 

NuScale Power; an awesome floor speech by Mr. Shimkus on 

March 28th, 2017, regarding the nuclear power plant in Belarus. 

You are not objecting to that, are you? Maybe it wasn’t that awesome. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And pursuant to committee rules, I remind Members that they have 10 business days to submit additional questions for the record. And I ask that witnesses submit their response 

within 10 business days upon receipt of the questions. Without objection. 

The subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you for being here. 

[Whereupon, at 2:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

126 


"'"'"""''"9 t,! S <.,-OVJ;RNMEN'1 

lNFORMATiON 

GPO 

115TII CONGRI~SS H R 1320 1ST SESSION 

• • 

To amend the Onmibus Budget Recol!ciliation Act of 1990 related to l\uelcar 

Hcgulatory Commission user fees and annual charges, and for other pu111oses. 

IN THE HOUSE OF R:BJPRESENTATIVES 

lVIARCII 2, 2017 

:\fr. KINZTNGER (for himself and Mr. l\lrCHABio F. DOY!o}} of Pennsylvania) 

iHtroduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on EllCl'h'Y and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 

related to Nuclear Regulatory Commission user fees and 

annual charges, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 lives (~l the United States qf'America, in Congress asseml!led, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 'l'his Act may be cited as the "Nuclear Utilization 

5 of Keynote Encrb'Y Act". 
127 


2 

1 SEC. 2. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USER FEES 

2 AND ANNUAL CHARGES THROUGH FISCAL 

3 YEAR 2019. 

4 (a) It\ GE:-.JEH"\L.-Section 6101(c)(2)(A) of the Om5 nibus Budget Hcconciliation Act of 1~)90 ( 42 U.S.C. 

6 2214(c)(2)(A)) is amended7 (1) in clause (iii), by striking "and" at the end; 

8 (2) in dansc (iv), by striking the period at the 

9 end and inserting"; and"; and 

10 

11 

(3) by adding at the end the follmving: 

"(v) amounts appropriated to the 

12 Commission for the fiscal year for activi13 tics related to the development of a regu14 latory framework for advanced nuelear re15 actor technologies.". 

16 (b) REPEAL-Effective October 1, 2019, section 

17 6101 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 1\.ct of 1990 

18 (42 U.S.C. 2214) is repealed. 

19 SEC. 3. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USER FEES 

20 AND ANNUAL CHARGES FOR FISCAL YEAR 

21 2020 AND EACH FISCAL YEAR THEREAFTER. 

22 (a) A.~Kl:AI, BUDGET ,JUSTIFICATIOI\.-

23 (1) 1:-.J GE:-.JEH.AL.-In the annual budget jus24 tification submitted by the Commission to Cone,>Tess, 

25 the Commission shall expressly identify anticipated 

26 expenditures necessary for completion of the re-

•HR 1320 1H 
128 


3 

quested activities of the Commission anticipated to 

2 occur during the applicable fiscal year. 

3 (2) Rgs'J'HICTION.-Budgct authority granted 

4 to the Commission for purposes of the requested ac5 tivitics of the Commission shall be used, to the max6 imum extent practicable, solely for conducting re7 quested activities of the Commission. 

8 (3) JjDIITATIO:\T 0:\T CORPORATE SUPPORT 

9 COSTS.-With respect to the annual budget justifica10 tion submitted to Congress, corporate support costs, 

11 to the maximum extent practicable, shall not exceed 

12 the following percentages of the total budget author13 ity of the Commission requested in the annual budg14 et justification: 

15 (A) 30 percent for each of fiscal years 

16 2020 and 2021. 

17 (B) 29 percent for each of fiscal years 

18 2022 and 2023. 

19 (C) 28 percent for fiscal year 2024 and 

20 each fiscal year thereafter. 

21 (b) FEES AND CHAHGES.-

22 (1) A1'\NUAT, ASSESSl\IEKT.-

23 (A) IN GENEIUL.-Each fiscal year, the 

24 Commission shall assess and collect fees and 

25 charges in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 

•HR 1320 IH 
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(3) in a manner that ensures that, to the maximum extent practicable, the amount collected 

is equal to au amount that approximates-

(i) the total budget authority of the 

Commission for that fiscal year; less 

(ii) the budg-et authority of the Commission for the activities described in subparagraph (B). 

(B) EXCI,GDED ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.-

The activities referred to in subparagraph 

(A)(ii) are the following: 

•HR 1320 IH 

(i) An activity not attributable to an 

existing XRC licensee or class of licensee 

as identified by the Commission in '!'able 

III of the final rule of the Commission entitled "Revision of Fee Schedules; Fee Recovery for Fiscal Year 2016" (81 Fed. 

Reg. 41171 (,June 24, 2016)). 

(ii) "~mounts appropriated for a fiscal 

year to the Commission-

(!) from the Nuelear \Vaste Fund 

established under section 302(e) of 

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 

(42 U.S.C. 10222(e)); 
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•HR 1320 IH 

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(II) for implementation of section 

3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2005 (50 U.S.C. 2601 

note; Public h1w 108-375); 

(III) for the homeland security 

activities of the Commission (other 

than for the costs of fingerprinting 

and background checks required 

under section 149 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2169) 

and the costs of conducting security 

inspections); 

(IV) for the Inspector General 

services of the Commission provided 

to the Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board; 

(V) for research and development 

at universities in areas relevant to the 

mission of the applicable university; 

CVI) for a nuclear science and engineering· grant program that will support multiyear rm~jects that do not 

alig11 with programmatic missions but 

arc critical to maintaining the dis-
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cipline of nuclear science and eng'lneering; and 

(VII) for any other fee-relief activity described in the final rule of the 

Commission entitled "Revision of Fee 

Schedules; Fcc Recovery for Fiscal 

Year 2016" (81 Fed. Reg. 41171 

(June 24, 2016)). 

(iii) Costs for activities related to the 

development of res'11latory infrastructure 

for advanced nuelear reactor technologies. 

(C) EXCEP'l'IOX.-The exclusion described 

in subparagraph (B)(iii) shall cease to be effective on ,January 1, 2031. 

(D) REPOHT.-Xot later than December 

31, 2029, the Commission shall submit to the 

Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on l{invironment and Public 'Works of the 

Senate and the Committee on Appropriations 

and the Committee on Encrh'Y and Commerce 

of the House of R.cprcscntativcs a report describing the views of the Commission on the 

continued appropriateness and necessity of the 

funding describc<l in subparagraph (B)(iii). 

•HR 1320 IH 
132 


7 

(2) }'J~gfl POH SimYICg em 'l'Hll'\G OP YAf,tm.-

2 In accordance with section 9701 of title 31, United 

3 States Code, the Commission shall charge fees to 

4 any person who receives a service or thing of value 

5 from the Commission to cover the costs to the Com6 mission of providing the service or thing of value. 

7 (3) JL'll'\UAL F'EES.-

8 (1\) I~ GENEHAI,.-Subject to subpara9 graph (B) and except as provided in subpara10 graph (D), the Commission may charge to any 

11 licensee or certificate holder of the Commission 

12 an annual fee. 

13 (B) CAP OK AKNrAI~ PEES OP CERTAIN LI14 CEKSEES.-

15 (i) IK GENERAT,.-The annual fee 

16 under subparagraph (A) charged to an op17 crating reactor licensee, to the maximum 

18 extent practicable, shall not exceed the an19 nual fcc amount per operating reactor li20 censee established in the final rule of the 

21 Commission entitled "Hevision of li'ee 

22 Schedules; Ii'ce Hecovery for Ii'isca1 Year 

23 2016" (81 Fed. Reg. 41171 (,Tune 24, 

24 2016)), as may be adjusted annually by 

25 the Commission to reflect changes in the 

•HR 1320 IH 
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•HR 1320 IH 

8 

Consumer Price Index published by the 

Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of I~abor. 

(ii) IVAIVER.-'l'he Commission may 

waive, for a period of 1 year, the cap on 

annual fees described in clause (i) if the 

Commission submits to the Committee on 

Appropriations and the Committee on Environment and Publie \Vorks of the Senate 

and the Committee on Appropriations and 

the Committee on Energy and Commeree 

of the House of Representatives a written 

determination that the cap on annual fees 

may eompromise the safety and security 

mission of the Commission. 

(C) .AMOUNT PEl{ r,ICENSEE.-

(i) IN GENimAL.-'l'he Commission 

shall establish by rule a schedule of fees 

fairly and equitably alloeating the aggregate amount of charges described in subparagraph (A) among licensees and certificate holders. 

(ii) REQUIREMRt\T.-The schedule of 

fees under clause (i)-
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•HR 1320 IH 

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(I) to the maximum e:\.ient practieable, shall be based on the eost of 

providing regulatory services; and 

(II) may he based on the allocation of the resourees of the Commission among licensees or certificate 

holders or classes of licensees or certificate holders. 

(D) ExK.\Il'TION.-

(i) DEFINITIOK OJ? ItESEARCH REACTOit-In this subparagraph, the term "research reactor" meaus a nuclear reactor 

that-

(I) is licensed by the Commission 

under section 104 c. of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 (42 1J.S.C. 

2134(c)) for operation at a thermal 

pmver ](wei of not more than 10 

megawatts; and 

(II) if licensed under subclause 

(I) for operation at a thermal power 

level of more than 1 megawatt, docs 

not contain-
135 


10 

1 (aa) a circulating loop 

2 through the core in which the li3 censee conducts fuel e:x.lJcriments; 

4 (bb) a liquid fuel loading; or 

5 (cc) an e:x.1)erimental facility 

6 in the core in excess of 16 square 

7 inches in eross-section. 

8 (ii) BXE:\IPTIO:\'.-Subparagraph (A) 

9 shall not apply to the holder of any license 

10 for a federally owned research reactor used 

11 primarily for edueational training and aea12 demic research purposes. 

13 (c) PERFOR[\IAl'\CE Al'\D REPOHTil'\G.-

14 (1) I.\T GENEHAh-'l'hc Commission shall de15 velop for the requested aetivitics of the Commis16 SlOll17 

18 

19 

(A) performanee metrics; and 

(B) on each request, milestone sehedules. 

(2) DEijAYS I:\' ISSUASCE OF FI.\TAij SAFETY 

20 IWALt:ATIOl'\.-Thc Bxecutive Director for Oper21 ations of the Commission shall inform the Commis22 sion of a delay in issuanee of the final safety evalua23 tion for a requested activity of the Commission by 

24 the eompletion date required by the performance 

•HR 1320 IH 
136 


11 

metrics or milestone schedule under parab:rraph (l) 

2 by not later than 30 days after the completion date. 

3 (3) DELAYS I:\ ISSUA:\CE OF FINAIJ SAFETY 

4 EVALUATIO:\' EXCETmH\G 180 DAYS.-If the final 

5 safety evaluation for the requested activity of the 

6 Commission described in paragraph (2) is not com7 pleLed by the elate that is 180 days after the comple8 tion date required by the performance metrics or 

9 milestone schedule under paragraph (1), the Com10 mission shall submit to the appropriate congres11 sional committees a timely report describing the 

12 delay, including a detailed explanation ac<~ounting 

13 for the delay and a plan for timely completion of the 

14 final safety evaluation. 

15 (d) ACClTRATE I"\'VOICING.-With respect to invoices 

16 for fees and charges described in subsection (b )(2), the 

17 Commission shall18 (1) ensure appropriate management review and 

19 concurrence prior to the issuance of invoices; 

20 (2) develop and implement processes to audit 

21 invoices to ensure accuracy, transparency, and fair22 ness; and 

23 (3) modifY reb'11lations to ensure fair and appro24 priatc processes to provide licensees and applicants 

25 an opportunity to efficiently dispute or othenvise 

•HR 1320 m 
137 


12 

seck rev1ew and correction of errors m invoices for 

2 fees and charges. 

3 (c) REPOH'l'.-Not later than September 30, 2021, 

4 the Commission shall submit to the Committee on Appro5 priations and the Committee on Environment and Public 

6 \Yorks of the Senate and the Committee on Appropria7 tions and tho Committee on Energy and Commerce of tho 

8 House of Representatives a report describing tho imple9 mentation of this section, including any impacts and rec10 onunondations for improvement. 

11 (f) DEFI:'-JT'l'TOKS.-In this section: 

12 (1) ADVAKCED KUCLEAR HEACTOR-Thc term 

13 "advanced nuclear reactor" means a nuelcar fission 

14 or fusion reactor, including a prototype plant (as do15 fined in sections 50.2 and 52.1 of title 10, Code of 

16 Federal Ro~:,mlations), with significant improvements 

1 7 compared to commercial nuclear reactors under conIS struetion as of the date of enaetment of this Aet, in19 eluding improvements such as20 (A) additional inherent safety features; 

21 (B) significantly lower levelized eost of 

22 eleetrieity; 

23 (C) lower waste yields; 

24 (D) greater fuel utilization; 

25 (E) enhanced reliability; 

•HR 1320 HI 
138 


13 

1 (F) increased proliferation resistance; 

2 (G) increased thermal efficiency; or 

3 (H) ability to integrate into electric and 

4 nonelectric applications. 

5 (2) APPLIGA!\T.-The term "applicant" means 

6 an applicant for a license, certification, permit, or 

7 other form of approval from the Commission for a 

8 commercial advanced nuclear reactor or a research 

9 and test reactor. 

10 (3) APPIWPIUA'I'E CO~GHESSIOKAI~ COl\IMI'I'-

11 TEES.-Thc term "appropriate congressional com12 mittees" means the Committee on Environment and 

13 Public Works of the Senate and the Committee on 

14 Energy and Commerce of the House of Representa15 tives. 

16 ( 4) Col\DITSSIOl\ .-The term "Commission" 

17 means the Xuclear Regulatory Commission. 

18 (5) COHPORATE SUPPOHT COSTS.-The term 

19 "corporate support costs" means expenditures for 

20 acquisitions, administrative services, financial man21 agement, human resource management, information 

22 management, information technology, policy support, 

23 outreach, and training, as those categories arc de24 scribed and calculated in Appendix A of the Con-

•HR 1320 IH 
139 


14 

gref'lsional Budget Justification for Fiscal Year 2017 

2 of the Commission. 

3 (6) REQUESTED ACTIV1TY OF TilE COl\Tl\fiS4 SIO:\f.-'l'hc term "requested activity of the Commis5 sion" means6 (A) the processing of applications for7 (i) design certifications or approvals; 

8 (ii) licenses; 

9 (iii) permits; 

10 (iv) license amemlments; 

11 (v) license renewals; 

12 (vi) certificates of compliance; and 

13 (vii) power uprates; and 

14 (B) any othee activity requested by a li15 censce or applicant. 

16 (g) EI~FECTivE DATE.-This section takes effect on 

17 October l, 2019. 

18 SEC. 4. STUDY ON ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN LICENSING 

19 RESTRICTIONS. 

20 Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment 

21 of this Act, the Comptroller General, in consultation with 

22 the Secretary of Energy, shall transmit to Congress a re23 port containing the results of a study on the feasibility 

24 and implieations of repealing restrictions under sections 

25 103d. and 104d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 on 

•HR 1320 IH 
140 


15 

issuing licenses for certain nuclear facilities to an alien 

2 or an entity owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, 

3 a foreign corporation, or a foreign government. 

4 SEC. 5. STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF THE ELIMINATION OF 

5 

6 

MANDATORY HEARING FOR UNCONTESTED 

LICENSING APPLICATIONS. 

7 Not later than 18 mouths after the date of enactment 

8 of this Act, the Comptroller General, in consultation 'vith 

9 the Secretary of Eneq.,ry, shall transmit to Congress a re10 port containing the results of a study on the impact of 

11 the elimination of mandatory heari11gs for uncontested li12 censing and construction permit applications under the 

13 Atomic Energy Act of Hl54. 

14 SEC. 6. INFORMAL HEARING PROCEDURES. 

15 (a) PROCEDURES.-Section 189 a. of the Atomic En16 ergy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 22i39(a)) is amended by add17 ing at the end the follmv:ing: 

18 "(3) 1\ny hearing under this section shall be con19 ducted using informal adjudi(~atory procedures in aeeonl20 ance ·with sections 55:3 and 555 of title 5, l.Jnited States 

21 Code, unless the Commission determines that formal adju22 dicatory procedures are necessary23 "(A) to develop a sufficient record; or 

24 "(B) to achieve fairness.". 

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16 

1 (b) HEARI~GS OK LTCE~SIKO OF UHAKHDI ENRICH2 l\IE::\T FACILITIES.-Section 193 b. of the Atomic Energy 

3 Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 224:1(b)) is amended4 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking "on the 

5 record" and all that follows through "and 63" and 

6 inserting· "if a person the interest of whom may be 

7 affected by the construction and operation of a ura8 nium enrielnncnt facility under scetions 53 and 63 

9 has requested a hearing regarding the licensing of 

10 the construction and operation of the facility"; and 

11 (2) in paragnlph (2), by striking "Such hcar12 ing" and inserting "If a hearing is held under para13 gTaph (1), the hearing". 

14 SEC. 7. APPLICATION REVIEWS FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY 

15 PROJECTS. 

16 Section 185 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 

17 U.S.C. 2235) is amended by adding at the end the fol18 lmving: 

19 "c. Appr,rcATIOK HE\'TK\VS F'OH Xucr,EAR ENERGY 

20 PRO.TECTS.-

21 "(1) STHEAl\II,IKIKG LICEKSE APPT,ICATION RE22 \'TEW.-With respect to an applieation that is dock23 cted seeking· issuance of a construetion permit, opcr24 ating license, or combined eonstruction permit and 

25 operating lieensc for a production or utilization facil-

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17 

ity, the Commission shall inelude the follmving' pro2 cedures: 

3 "(A) Undertake a.n C)q)edited environ4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

mental review process and issue any draft cnviromncntal impact statement \Vithin 24 months 

after the application is accepted for docketing. 

"(B) Complete the teclmical review process 

and issue any safety evaluation report and any 

final cnYironmcntal impact statement ·within 42 

months after the application is accepted for 

doekcting. 

"(2) EARLY SITE PBH?IIIT.-

" (A) SUPPI,El\IEKTAL E~\'THOJ'\1\IEKTAL Ii\IPACT STA'l'E:\IEKT.-In a proeccding for a combined eonstrnetion permit and operating liecnse 

for a site for which an early site permit has 

been issued, any environmental impaet statement prepared by the Commission an<l cooperating ag·cneics shall be prepared as a supplement to the environmental impact statement 

prepared for the early site permit. 

"(B) INCOHJ'ORATIOK BY REFEHE~CE.­

'fhe supplemental environmental impact statement shall-

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2 

3 

4 

5 

18 

"(i) incorporate by referenc~e the analysis, findings, and conclusions from the env1romnental impact statement prepared for 

the early site permit; and 

"(ii) include additional disenssion, 

6 analyses, findings, and eonelusions on mat7 ters resolYed in the early site permit pro8 eeeding only to the c2-'tent neeessary to ad9 dress information that is new and signifi10 cant in that the information woulJ materi11 ally change the prior findings or eonelu12 sions. 

13 "(3) PIWDUCTIO~ OH UTII,f~ATIOK PACU,ITY 

14 LOCATED AT AX EXTS'fiKG SITE.-ln revievving an 

15 applieation for an early site permit, eonstruetion 

16 permit, operating license, or combined construction 

17 permit and operating license for a production or uti18 lization facility located at the site of a licensed pro19 duction or utilization faeility, the Commission shall, 

20 to the extent praetieablc, nse information that was 

21 part of the licensing basis of the licensed produetion 

22 or utilization facility. 

23 "(4) HEAIU~G ON EARLY SITE PERMIT, C0:\-

24 STRGCTIOK 1'Iml\HT, AKD COMBIXED COXSTHUCTIOK 

25 PEnl\fiT AKD OPERA'riKG r,ICEXSE.-'rhe Commis-

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19 

1 sion shall issue and ma.ke immediately effective an 

2 early site permit or construction permit for a pro3 duction or utilization facility upon finding that the 

4 application therefor satisfies the requirements of this 

5 Act, notwithstanding the pendency before the Com6 mission of a request for a hearing. Follmving com7 pletion of any required hearing, the Commission 

8 shall take any appropriate action with respect to the 

9 early site permit, construction permit, or combined 

10 construction permit and operating license to the cx11 tent necessary to account for the hearing results. 

12 "(5) RBGCL~TIOXS.-The Commission shall 

13 initiate a rulemaking·, to be completed 1 year after 

14 the date of enactment of the :\uclear Utilization of 

15 Keynote Energy Act, to amend the regulations of 

16 the Commission to implement this subsection. 

17 "(6) REIJATIOXSITIP TO OTHER LA\V.-:\othing 

18 in this subsection exempts the Commission frorn any 

19 requirement for full compliance with section 

20 102(2)(C) of the Xational Environmental Policy Act 

21 of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4:i:i2(2)(C)).". 

22 SEC. 8. NUCLEAR REACTOR DECOMMISSIONING. 

23 (a) RCLE:\IAKI?\G.-Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy 

24 Act of 1954 (42 1J.S.C. 2201-2210i) is amended by add25 ing- at the end the folloV"\ing nc\v seetion: 

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20 

"SEC. 170J. DECo:\E\liSSIO:t\ING XUCLEAH HEACTOH 

2 Hn,E:\IAKING.-

3 "The Commission shall, not later than 90 days after 

4 the date of enaetment of this section, initiate a mlemaking· 

5 proceeding, inelucling notice and opportunity for public 

6 comment, to be completed not later than 48 months after 

7 that date, to address the reg11latory framcwork for decom8 missioning nuclear reactors licensed under section 1 oa or 

9 104b.". 

10 (b) TABI,E OF SECTIONS .. Al\IENDl\m:-JT.-The table of 

11 sections for chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 

12 is amended by adding at the end the follm:ving new item: 

''SPc. 170J. DeeommiHsionillg' nuelear rPaeior· rnlemaki1lg. ''. 

0 

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[DISCUSSION DRAFT] 

115m coi'\mmss 

2D SESS!0:-.1 H.R. 

To mneml the Atomic Energy "\et of 1 H5·± to improve the process by which 

the Secretary of Energy authori:ccs tlw transfer of civiliau nuelear c•omnwree tcehuology aud <-U~t-;i}.;hmee, and for other purposes. 

IX THE HOUSI<J OF' HEPl'lESEXTATIVES 

l\Ir. ,JOJI:\SON of Ohio introduced the following bill; which wns rpfprred to the 

Committee on -----~-~~-----· 

A BILL 

To amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to Improve the 

proeess by whieh the Secretary of Energy authori:r,es 

the transfer of eivilian nuclear eommerrc technology and 

assistanee, nnd for other pnrposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and HmlS(: til' Reprcscnta2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. 

4 (a) FIKDINGS.-Congress finds the following: 

5 (1) Section 1 of the Atomic Energ}' Act of 1954 

6 (42 U.S.C. 2011)-

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(A) states that atomic energy "is capable 

2 of application for peaceful" purposes; and 

3 (B) declared to be the policy of the ·united 

4 States that5 (i) "the deYeloprnent, usc, and control 

6 of atomic energy shall be directed so as to 

7 make the maximum contribution to the 

8 general welfare, subject at all times to the 

9 paramount ol1jeetive of making the max10 imum contribution to the common defense 

11 and security"; and 

12 (ii) "the development, usc, and control 

13 of atomic energy shall be directed so as to 

14 promote world peace, improve the general 

15 \Yelfare, inerease the standard of living, 

16 and strengthen free competition in private 

17 enterprise.". 

18 (2) A predictable and efficient rcg11latory ap19 proval proecss for nuelear suppliers to participate in 

20 domestic and foreign civil nuclear commerce is bene21 fieial to the interests of the Uuited States. 

22 (il) A robust civilian nuclear infrastructure ad23 vances the economic and national ~;ecnrity interests 

24 of the United States. 

25 (b) PUHPOSE. -The purpose of this Act is tog:IVHLC\051418\051418.165xml 

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( 1) identifY regulatory, legal, and other policies 

2 affecting civil nudear commerce; 

3 (2) improve the predictability and efficiency of 

4 the authorization for foreign nuclear commerce; and 

5 (8) assess methodology to meet the retrospec6 tivc risk requirements on the Convention on Supple7 mentary CompensMion for Nuclear Damage as re8 qnii'ed by section ~84( e) of the Energy Independence 

9 and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17:i7:i(e)). 

10 SEC. 2. REVIEW OF CIVIL NUCLEAR COMMERCE. 

11 (a) HEPORT.-Xot later than 180 days after the date 

12 of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall 

13 submit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 

14 House of Representatives and the Committees on Energy 

15 and Natural Resources and on Environment and Public 

16 Works of the Senate a report on United States civil nu17 clear commerec. 

18 (b) Col'\TEK'rs.-The report required mHlcr sub19 section (a) shall inelude20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

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(1) an assessment of-

(A) current legal, regulatory, policy, and 

commercial practices of the United States with 

respect to the civilian nuclear industry of the 

United States; and 

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4 

(B) the impacts of such praeticcs on such 

2 civilian nnelcar industry in the United States 

3 and in international markets; 

4 (2) a comparison of the practices of the United 

5 States described in paragraph (l) to practices of for6 cign countries 1vith respect to the civilian nuelcar in7 dustry of such cotmtries; 

8 (3) recommendations to improve the competi9 tiveness of U nitcd States civil nuclear commerce; 

10 and 

11 ( 4) options on how to apply section 170 of the 

12 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210) (com13 monly known as the "Pricc-Amlerson Aet") with rc14 spect to advanced nuclear technologies. 

15 SEC. 3. IMPROVEMENTS TO PART 810 PROCESS. 

16 (a) Cr,AHIFICATIOK o:-.r PROIIlBITIOK OI" DEr,EGA17 '1'10:-.J.-Seetion 1G1n. of the 1\.tomic Energy Act of 1954 

18 (42 U.S.C. 2201(n)) is amended by striking "57 b." and 

19 inserting "57 b. (only with respect to enrichment andre20 processing of special nuclear material)". 

21 (b) EXPJ~DITED PIWCEDUHES li'OH JjOiY PROLTFERA22 TIO:-.f RISK HEACTOR TECIIKOU)GIES.-Scetion 57 d. of 

23 such Act (42 U.S.C. 2077(d)) is amended24 (1) by inserting "(1)" before "The Commission 

25 is authorized"; and 

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5 

1 (2) by adding at the end the follmving new 

2 paragraph: 

3 "(2)(A) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary 

4 of Energy shall establish procedures for e;qx;dited consid5 eration of requesti:l for authorization under this section re6 garcling the transfer of low proliferation risk reactor tech7 nologies designated by the Secretary for purposes of this 

8 subparagraph. 

9 "(B) The procedures established under subparagraph 

10 (A) shall11 "(i) apply with respect to each application to 

12 transfer low proliferation risk reactor technologies 

13 described in such subparagraph to foreign countries 

14 designated by the Secretary for purposes of such 

15 subparagraph (except that the Secretary may not 

16 designate a foreign country that is a nuclear-weapon 

17 state, as defined by Article IX(8) of the 'l'reaty on 

18 the ?\on-Proliferation of ?\nclear Weapons, signed at 

19 Washington, London, and J\ioscow July 1, 1968, 

20 other than the United Kingdom or !<'ranee); and 

21 "(ii) ensure that eaeh sueh application is ap22 proved or denied by not later than 80 days after the 

23 date on whieh the foreign eountry transmits any re24 quired assnranees to the Seerc>tary of State. 

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6 

1 "(C) The proeedures established under subparagraph 

2 (A) may not apply to the transfer of fuel fabrication tech3 nology or any fuel eyele technology. 

4 "(D) The Secretary of Energy shall establish the pro5 cedures under subparagraph (A) with the concurrence of 

6 the Seeretary of State and in consultation with the Sec7 retary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and the 

8 Nuelear Hegulatory Commission.''. 

9 (c) 1\SSGH.A:-.<CES.-Section f)7h.(2) of such Act ( 42 

10 U.S.C. 2077(b)(2)) is amended by inserting after "meeha11 nisms." the following new sentence: "To the extent prac12 tieable, the Seeretary of Energy shall continue to process 

13 sueh requests during sneh interagency review iu a manner 

14 that enables the Secretary to make such determination as 

15 soon as practicable after the receipt of assurances by a 

16 foreign country to the Secretary of State, if any such as17 suranees are required.". 

18 (d) SrmsE oP Co:\formss Ol'\ E810.-It is the sense 

19 of Congress that20 (1) the Seeretary of Energy should eontinue the 

21 ongoing Process lmprovcment Plan for authoriza22 tions pursuant to seetion 57b.(2) of the Atomic En23 ergy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)(2)); and 

24 (2) Congress iN supportive of the progress made 

25 by the Seereta.ry in such proeess a!1(1 is especially ing:\VHLC\051418\051418.165.xml 

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7 

1 tcrested in the eontinued work for the electronic sub2 1msswus portal for such applications known as 

3 "e810". 

4 SEC. 4. RISK POOLING PROGRAM. 

5 (a) REPOR'r.-)Jot later than 1 yem· after the date 

6 of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall 

7 earry out a review of, and submit to the Committee on 

8 Energy and Commerce of the House of Hepresentatives 

9 and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of 

10 the Senate a report on, the Secretary of I~nergy's aetions 

11 'With respect to the program described in section 984( e) 

12 of the Energy Independence and Seeurity Aet of 2007 ( 42 

13 U.S.C. 17873(e)). 

14 (b) CO:\'TE>JT::-i.-The report described in subsection 

15 (a) shall include16 (1) an assessment of the Secretary of Energy's 

17 actions to determine the risk-informed assessment 

18 formula under section 934(e)(2)(C) of the Energy 

19 Independenc(~ awl Security Aet of 2007; 

20 (2) a review of the Secretary of Enerf_,ry's meth21 odology to collect information to determine and im22 plement the formula; and 

23 (B) an evaluation of the program deseribed in 

24 section 984( c) of the Energy Independenee and Se25 curity 1\ct of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17873(e)), including 

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8 

1 the Secretary of Energy's actions with respect to 

2 such program. 

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[DISCUSSION DRAFT] 

115TH CO).J(HlESS 

2D SESSIOl\ H.R. 

To reqnire the Seeretary of B11ergy to e~tah1ish mtd <·.arry out a program 

to ~upport the un1ilnbility of IIA-JJgU for eommcrcial use, am! for 

other purposes. 

IN 'l'IIE HOUSE OF' REPRESEXTATIVES 

:\Ir. FLORES iutrocluecd the following bill; which was rcfCJ'l'Cd to the 

Committee nH -··~-·--··-----··-~-·--· .. 

A BILL 

To require the Secretary of Energy to establish and carry 

out a program to support the availability of liA.~JJEU 

for commercial nse, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 ·lives of the United Stales qfilrnerica in Congress asse1nbled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 'fhis Act may he cited as the "Advanecd Xuclcar F'uel 

5 Availability Act". 

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2 

SEC. 2. PROGRAM. 

2 (a) ESTABLfSIL\IE?\T.-The Secretary shall establish 

3 and earry out a progTam to support the availability of 

4 JIA-I,EU for eommercial use. 

5 (b) PnOGH.Al\I ELK\IE?\TS.-In carrying out the pro6 gram under subsection (a), the Secretary7 (1) may make funds available to commereial en8 tities to design transportation paekagcs for IIA9 LEU, including canisters for metal, gas, and other 

10 fL'i-IJEU compositions; 

11 (2) shall, to the extent praeticable12 (A) b)' .January 1, 2021, have commercial 

13 entities submit such transportation package de14 signs to the Commission for certification by the 

15 Commission under part 71 of title 10, Code of 

16 Federal Regulations; and 

17 (B) have such transportation package de18 signs so certified by the Commission by ,Tanu19 ary, 1, 2023; 

20 (3) shall submit to Congress a report on the 

21 Department's uranium inyc•ntory that may he avail22 able to be processed to HA-I.JEU for purposes of 

23 sueh program; 

24 ( 4) not later than one year after the date of en25 actmcnt of this Act, and bienniall~c thereafter 

26 through September 80, 2025, shall eonduct a smTey 

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of stakeholders to estimate the quantity of llL"-LEU 

2 necessary for commercial usc for each of the five 

3 subsequent years; 

4 ( 5) shall assess options available for the Sec5 retary to acquire HA-LEU for such progTam; 

6 (G) shall establish a consortium of commercial 

7 nuclear companies to partner with the Department 

8 to support the availability of HA-LEU for eormner9 cia! usc, including by10 (A) providing information to the Secretary 

11 for purposes of surveys conducted under para12 graph ( 4); and 

13 (B) purchasing· HA-LEU made available 

14 to members of the consortium hy the Secretary 

15 under the program; 

16 (7) shall, prior to acquiring HA-I~EU under 

17 paragraph (8), in coordination with the consortium 

18 established pursuant to paragraph (G), develop a 

19 schedule for fnll cost recovery of HA-I~EU made 

20 aYailable to members of the consortium pursuant to 

21 paragTaph (8); 

22 (8) may, not later than 3 years after the estab23 lishment of a eonsortium under paragraph ( 6), ac24 quire IIA-LEU, in order, to the extent praetieable, 

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4 

to make such H.A.-LEU <wailable to members of the 

2 consortium by January 1, 2025; and 

3 (9) shall develop, in consultation with the Com4 mission, criticality benchmark data to assist the 

5 Commission in6 (A) the licensing and regulation of cat7 egory II fuel fabrication and enrichment facili8 tics under part 70 of title 10, Code of F'cderal 

9 Rq:,ru]ations; and 

10 (13) certification of transportation pack11 ages under part 71 of title 10, Code of I<'cderal 

12 Hcgulatimts. 

13 SEC. 3. REPORT TO CONGRESS. 

14 Not later than 12 months after the date of enactment 

15 of this Act, the Commission shall submit to CongTess a 

16 report that includes17 ( 1) identification of updates to regulations, cer18 tifications, and other regulatory policies that the 

19 Commission determines arc necessary in order for 

20 HA.-I~EU to be commercially available, including 

21 certifications relating to transportation packaging, 

22 and licensing of enrichment and fuel fabrication fa23 cilities, for HA-LEU; 

24 (2) a description of such updates; and 

25 (3) a timeline to complete such updates. 

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5 

1 SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) COl\DITSSlOl'\.-The "Commission" means 

4 the Xuclear Hegulatory Commission. 

5 (2) DEPARTliiE~T.-The term "Department" 

6 means Department of Eneq.,ry. 

7 (3) IL\-LEU.-Thc term "HA-LKU" means 

8 high-assay low-emiched uranium. 

9 (4) HIGH-ASSAY LOW-BI\IUCIIIm l:RAi'\IU:\1.-

10 The term "hig·h-assay low-enriched uranium" means 

11 uranium having an assay greater than 5.0 weight 

12 percent and less than 20 weight percent of the ura13 nium-235 isotope. 

14 (5) SECHETAHY.-'l'he term "Secretary" means 

15 the Secretary of Energ:v. 

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[DISCUSSION DRAFT] 

115TH COl\GRESS 

2D SESSIO?\ H.R. 

To require the Secretary of Em~rgy to deYclop a report on a pilot Jn·ognnn 

to site, construct, ami operate micro-readors at critical national secmity 

locations, and for other pmvoses. 

IN 'l'HE HOUSJ<J OF REPRESE~'l'ATIVES 

:\It·. WJI,SO:\ of South Carolina (for himself, i\lr. NOHC'lWSS, i\Ir. Ill'l.lSON, 

ami :\Ir. PETERS) introduced th\' followi1Jg bill; >Yhich was referred to the 

Committee 011 

A BILL 

'l'o require the Secretary of Energy to develop a report 

on a pilot program to site, construet, and operate microreactors at critical national security locations, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be -it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 lives of the United States ofilmerica in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPORT ON PILOT PROGRAM FOR MICRO·RE· 

4 ACTORS. 

5 (a) REPORT REQTTIHED.-Xot later than 12 mouths 

6 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 

7 deYelop and submit to the Committee on .A.rmcd Services 

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2 

and the Committee on Energy and Commerce in the 

2 House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed 

3 Services and the Committee on Energy and :\"atural He4 sources in the Senate a report describing the requirements 

5 for, and components of, a pilot program to provide rcsil6 icnce for critical national security infrastructure at De7 partment of Defense and Department of Energy facilities 

8 by contraeting with a eo1mnereial entity to site, eonstruct, 

9 and operate at least one licem:ed micro-reactor at a facility . 10 identified nnder the r6port by December :n, 2027. 

11 (b) Co:.<SULTNI'I0;\1.-As necessary to develop there12 port required under subscetion (a), the Secretary shall 

13 consult with14 (1) the Secretary of Defense; 

15 (2) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and 

16 (:3) the Administrator of the General Sen'iees 

17 Administration. 

18 (c) Co\JTEl\"TS.-The rl'port n•quirc>rl und(•r sub19 section (a) shall iucludc>-

20 (l) identification of potential locations to site, 

21 construct, and operate a micro-reactor at a Depart22 ment of Defense or Department of Enl'rgy facility 

23 that contains eritieal national security infrastructurl' 

24 that the Secretary determines may not be energy re25 silil'nt; 

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(2) assessments of different nuclear tech2 nologies to provide energy resiliency for critical na3 tioual security infrastructure; 

4 (i1) a survey of potential commercial stake5 holders with \vhieh to enter into a contract under the 

6 pilot program to construct and operate a licensed 

7 micro-reactor; 

8 ( 4) options to enter into long-term eontraeting, 

9 iudnding various financial mechanisms for such pur10 pose; 

11 ( 5) identification of requirements for micro-re12 actors to provide enerb'Y resilience to mission-critical 

13 functions at faeilities identified under paragraph (1); 

14 (6) an estimate of the costs of the pilot pro15 gram; 

16 (7) a timeline with milestones for the pilot pro17 gram; 

18 (8) an analysis of the existing authority of the 

19 Department of Energy and Department of Defense 

20 to permit the siting, eonstruction, and operation of 

21 a micro-reactor; and 

22 (9) recommendations for any legislative changes 

23 to the authorities analyzed under paragn1ph (8) nec24 essary for the Department of :BJnergy and the Deg:\VHLC\051518\051518.197.xml 

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partment of Defense to permit the siting, construe2 tion, and operation of a micro-reactor. 

3 (d) DEFIXITIO:'\S.-In this section: 

4 (1) CTUTICAL :'\ATIO:'\Alj SEGCHTTY I:.JFHA5 STHUC'nam.-The term "critical national security 

6 infrastructure" means any site or installation that 

7 the Sccretar:· of Energy or the Secretary of Defense 

8 determines supports critical mission f\metions of the 

9 national security enterprise. 

10 (2) LICENSED.-Thc term "licensed" means 

11 holding a license under section 103 or· 104 of the 

12 Atomie Energy .L\ct of 1954. 

13 (3) :\Ircrw-HEACTOR-The term "miero-reae14 tor" means a nuelear reactor that has a power pro15 duetion capacity that is not greater than 50 

16 mcgmvatts. 

17 ( 4) PILOT PROGI~XH.-'l'he term "pilot pro18 gram" means the pilot program clcsm'ihed in snb19 section (a). 

20 (5) SECRETARY.-The term "Secretary" means 

21 Secretary of Energy. 

22 (c) I<\>Ini.-The report required under subsection (a) 

23 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but, if the Sec24 retary determines it necessary, may inelude a elaRsified ap25 pcndix. 

g:\VHLC\051518\051518.197.xml 

May 15, 2018 (12:01 p.m.) 

(69458816) 
163 


G:\CMTE\EC\15\EN\EP\SMR_OI.XML [Discussion Draft] 

5 

1 (f) l.JDflTATIO~fl.-This Act docs not authorize the 

2 Department of Eneq.,'".v or Department of Defense to enter 

3 into a contraet with respeet to the pilot program. 

g:\VHLC\051518\051518.197.xml 

May 15, 2018 (12:01 p.m.) 

(69458816) 
164 


ISSUE BRIEF 

i} Atlantic Council 

GLOBAL ENERGY CENTER 

US Nuclear-Power 

Leadership and 

the Chinese and 

Russian Challenge 

1Bh#iit4eif:@ DR. ROBERT F. !CHORD, JR. 

D espite the ascendancy of natural gas and renewable energy, 

nuclear power continues to play a significant role in the 

global energy transition, providing about 10 percent of global 

electricity production in 2016.1 Nuclear, besides being a 

significant carbon-free source of electricity, is also critically important 

from a strategic and defense standpoint. While the United States has the 

largest number of nuclear plants in the world, the US global leadership 

position is declining as efforts to build a new generation of reactors have 

been plagued by problems, and aging plants have been retired or closed 

in the face of economic, market, and financial pressures, The situation is 

not unique to the United States; except for the UK, major US allies are 

closing (Germany), scaling back (France and South Korea), or debating 

the reopening (Japan) of their nuclear-power plants.2 In contrast, 

China and Russia are continuing to develop their nuclear industries and 

aggressively pursuing global markets, especially in critical regions such 

as the Middle East and South Asia. 

In the December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS2017), the 

Donald Trump administration states its intention to "embrace energy 

dominance" by pursuing five main actions: reducing barriers to US energy 

development; promoting exports of energy, technology, and services; 

ensuring the energy security of the United States and its allies; attaining 

universal energy access; and furthering the US technological edge ln 

energy.' Although there is clearly a strong fossil-fuels orientation behind 

constrt.;ction worldwide""' However, nuclear power stil! those in the European Union, they are a

Chma's.;a 

2.6 lbd,p IS 

Figure 1. ProjechH:! installed Nuclear Generilt!on Capacity (GW) in Selected Countries and EU, 201

100 2040 YEAR 5or,Jrce. F.gure creut,;,d from m Energy Ag•:mcy, World Er>ergy Outlook ?017, Sdect\>d Co«r>try Annexes, Nl!W 

THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR MARKET AND US FOREIGN POLICY World NucJ,;t "NucleM Power "' Russicl" ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

AlLANTIC COUNCIL one w1th China on building, new roactors; GE has won turbine generators for new R"'"arr-'"

Hungary and Turkey,., On the other 

China are for expanded Influen

cntical to namely Iran

and Russia, the recent NSS2017 1$ quite 

Paula Ster

Robert J. Robert L 

·EUen 0. T

Nathan D. 

CharlesF.

Michael F. HONORAR

David C AMadeleine James A. B

Harold BroFrank C. C

Ashton B. 

Robert M. 

MiChael G. 

JohnW. W

Wilham H. 

•fxecuti\te C

ust<>so1Ma
170 

171 


."NUSCALE 

POWER'" 

May21,2018 

The Honorable Fred Upton 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Bobby Rush 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Chairman Upton and Ranking Member Rush: 

On behalf of NuScale Power, I am writing to express our support for the legislative efforts of the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce to address the development, regulation, and competitiveness of 

advanced nuclear energy technologies. Specifically, legislation offered by Rep. Joe Wilson to require 

the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop a pilot program to site, construct, and operate 

microreactors at DOE and Department of Defense (DOD) facilities is an important step forward to 

realizing the potential of advanced nuclear technologies. 

NuScale Power's small modular reactor (SMR) design application recently completed the first and 

most intensive phase of review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This major 

achievement brings NuSclale Power closer to introducing the country's first SMR to market, putting the 

US on a path to beat foreign competitors like Russia and China at a global SMR race. 

Our reactor is small, and within the definition of a "microreactor" contained in Rep. Wilson's legislative 

proposal. The application of microreactors at DOE and DOD facilities can provide resilience for critical 

national security infrastructure, and we applaud your efforts to address this matter. 

Sincerely, 

Chairman and CEO 

John L. Hopkins 

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 

6650 SW Redwood Lane, Suite 210 I Portland, OR 97224 

971-371-1585 Tel I 971-371-1602 Fax I jhopkins@nuscalepower.com 
172 


The Nuclear Power Plant in Astrava, Belarus 

M_. Speaker, I rise to address concerns brewing in Lithuania and 

other Baltic states about the construction of a nuclear power plant. 

This plant is 121

/z miles from the Lithuanian border and in sight of 

Vilnius, Lithuania's capital and largest city. I speak here not only as a 

friend of the Baltic peoples and as a descendant of Lithuanian immigrants, but also as Co-chair of the Baltic Caucus and Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on the Environment. And like all of my colleagues here, 

I am concerned about ensuring the security, integrity, and safety of 

nuclear projects in Europe and around the world. 

Background 

• It was not long ago that we were concerned about the effects of other nuclear power plants in Belarus. It was the 

planned site of a Soviet nuclear power plant until the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, which contaminated a quarter of 

Belarus. 

• But by 2019, Belarus is supposed to house a different Moscow-run nuclear power plant, this one run by the Russian 

state-owned company Rosatom. 

• This project is very environmentally sensitive. Both Lithuania and Belarus have agreed to discuss such environmentally sensitive projects near shared borders as part of the 

Espoo Convention. 

• Building a nuclear power plant is hard, especially when it's 

a country's first. That's why the International Atomic Energy Agency's recommended a six-step review process 

meant to prevent disasters like Chernobyl's and the more 

recent one in Fukushima, Japan. 
173 


Problems 

• But Belarus has chosen to skip four of the six steps, including crucial steps that ignore the people and land of Lithuama. 

• There is real concern that the main purpose behind the 

project is to grow Russian influence and power, especially 

over energy in the European Union. 

o The president of Belarus said that the Astrava plant 

and another Russian plant are "a fishbone in the 

throat of the European Union and the Baltic States." 

• Nuclear power plants in sensitive areas should be the discussed within the Espoo Convention. 

o Nearly all of Lithuania is within 300 kilometers of the 

plant, which means that if disaster were to strike, 

long-term food consumption in the country could be 

severely affected. 

o The country's drinking water could also be affected, 

since the plant is supposed to draw rivers from a river 

that supplies drinking water to Lithuania. 

• But incidents are occurring that cast doubt on Belarus's 

commitment to working with neighbors and ensuring the 

plant is safe. 

o In 2016, six serious incidents occurred, and Belarus 

has failed to be upfront with Lithuania about any of 

them. 

o A 330-ton nuclear reactor shell was allegedly 

dropped from about 13 feet last summer. 
174 


• Belarus did not reveal anything about the incident until independent media reported it, and 

then downplayed it. 

o Earlier, a structural frame at the site collapsed after 

workers, apparently under time pressure, filled it too 

quickly. 

Points of Concern 

• Building a nuclear power plant requires care in construction, according to the most stringent standards, ·with the 

utmost transparency, and for the best reasons. 

• This plant fails all four counts. 

o It is in the wrong location. 

o It has been irresponsiblY handled. 

o Instead of transparency, we have stonewalling and obfuscation. 

o Instead of making the most economic sense, this 

plant seems to make good geopolitical sense, and for 

Russia, not for Belarus. 

Let me be clear, M_. Speaker. No one here objects to the safe, secure 

design, construction, and running of nuclear power plants. But the 

people of Lithuania are firmly opposed to irresponsible attitudes towards nuclear power, particularly so close to their most populous city. 

This concern makes sense. As chairman of the House Subcommittee 

on the Environment and a longtime observer of Eastern Europe, M_. 

Speaker, I can assure you that the people of the United States have no 

better friend than the people of Lithuania. Lithuanians have the right 

and the responsibility to ensure their and their children's environmental security. They should not be expected to accept inadequate or misleading information about a serious, environmentally sensitive project 
175 


right on their borders. The government of Belarus should respect the 

commitments it has made, including with its neighbors. Until these issues arc resolved, M_. Speaker, I cannot fault the Lithuanian people 

for their concern about the Astrava nuclear power plant. I share their 

concerns. I hope Belarusian ·will calm their fears by allowing in international experts and representatives. Belarus should also comply with 

the International Atomic Energy Agency's recommendations for the 

design, construction, and running of safe nuclear power plants. Thank 

you, M_. Speaker, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Background materials 

• http!i;llw.w:.w.,i\\~3 ... QXgln~.w.~.<;;.~D.t.<;:t/pr~.~-$J.~.l~g-~-~~l..ifl~-~:-®!i!ii.QD.:: 

~.Qnd-JJ.<;k~--=--~-~t~.:.?.n.d::~~t.<;:m.~l:-.~Y.~D.t.~.:.d~.~~.gn:-.~.~~-d::t~B~w:-.in.:.P.~.lfl:: 

N.~ 

• http;l)gi?.m.Qs;lQ,~Qmhh~::fit~.t::nJJ.d~.~t:_pQw~r:-_pl.\\nt.:in::b.d~ru.~:: 

i.~.:_q._:.d3ng~t.QJJ..~.:.l7..8.5.QZ44Z.8 

• http.;)J:v:gi~~!i ... JJ.q._t~Qn.i!-l_g~_ggmp_h.i~ ... <;.QXP.l2Ql.7./0.2/.2~l\\~.px.<;:Y.~.n.t:: 

.i!-.Rk::-.n.1Jd~3X.:tDX~.\\t:Y-Q.IJ::ffiQ§t:likdy.:.dQD.t::kn.QW::-.\\QQ.V..t/. 

• Materials from Lithuanian Ambassador 
176 


GREG WALDEN, OREGON 

CHAIRMAN 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

fRANK PALLONE, JR., NEW JERSEY 

RANKING MEMRER 

{!ottgte£iii' of tbe Wnitei:l ~tate£i 

J!Jou~e of l\cpm.icntatilte~ 

COMMITIEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN HousE OmcE BulLDJNG 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 

The Honorable Brent Park 

Majrmtv 

Mn'or1ty 

June 19,2018 

Deputy Administrator, Defense Nuclear Proliferation 

National Nuclear Security Administration 

U.S. Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20585 

Dear Dr. Park: 

Thank you for appearing befure the Subcommittee on Energy on Tnesday, May 22,2018, to 

testify at the hearing entitled "DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, 

Regulation, and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies." 

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record 

remains open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, 

which are attached. Also attached are Member requests made during the hearing. To facilitate the 

printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions and requests with a transmittal 

letter by the close of business on Tuesday, July 3, 2018. Your responses should be mailed to Kelly 

Collins, Legislative Clerk, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2125 Rayburn House Office 

Building, Washington, DC 20515 and e-mailed in Word format to M!Jy.Collinslmmail.housc.Ji,QY. 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

ly, /~ 

Fred Up~ 7 v--" 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Energy 

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rush, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy 

Attachments 
177 


QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN UPTON 

NNSA RFI on High-Assay LEU 

Q 1. Please describe the current status of the NNSA's Request for Information DE-SOL0008552 for Supply of Enriched Uranium and what NNSA's next steps are as it relates to 

information received under this solicitation. 

A 1. NNSA released its Request for Information (RFI) for Supply of Enriched Uranium in 

January of2017. The RFI complies with DOE Order 413.3B and allowed NNSA to 

conduct market research on any commercial entities with an interest in meeting the 

Department's various enriched uranium needs (Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) for tritium 

production; High Assay LEU for research reactors, advanced commercial reactors, and 

medical isotope production; and Highly Enriched Uranium for naval propulsion). 

NNSA received responses to the RFI in March 2017 and held an industry day in 

November 2017 to meet with interested parties. Information gathered through this RFI 

and at the subsequent Industry Day will inform an NNSA acquisition strategy in 

accordance with DOE Order 413.38. The Department approved the mission need critical 

decision- 0 (CD-0) for a domestic uranium enrichment capability in December 2016, 

and is currently executing an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The AoA is estimated to be 

completed at the end of calendar year 2019, as stated in the Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), pages 2-33 to 2-34. 
178 


QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN UPTON 

Atomic Energy Act and International Nuclear Markets 

Q2. The purpose of the Atomic Energy Act is to provide: "a program of international 

cooperation to promote the common defense and security and to make available to 

cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely as 

expanding technology and considerations of the common defense and security will 

permit." However, the statute was enacted when the U.S. was one of only a small handful 

of countries that had access to atomic energy. 

a. Would you agree that the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act to provide for 

international peaceful use of atomic energy remains important for the nation, even while 

the global nuclear landscape has changed? 

b. Would you consider it beneficial for Congress to modernize the Atomic Energy Act to 

reflect the current reality, to ensure continued U.S. participation in the global nuclear 

power development and use? 

A2. Pursuant to Section 1 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), it is the 

policy of the United States that the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall 

be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all 

times to the paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common 

defense and security. Providing for international peaceful use of atomic energy, as 

called for in the AEA, remains important for the nation despite changes in the global 

nuclear landscape. If Congress proposes to amend the Atomic Energy Act, the 

Administration would review such legislation for consistency with the President's 

program. 

2 
179 


QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN UPTON 

Nuclear Export Requirements 

Q3. For US persons to directly or indirectly provide assistance for the production of special 

nuclear material pursuant to l 0 CFR Part 810 it currently requires the Secretary of 

Energy's approval and the concurrence of the State Department. What other nuclear 

export control regulations require the Secretary or equivalent cabinet-level approval? 

A3. l 0 CFR Part 810 is the only U.S. nuclear export control regulation that uniformly 

requires approval by the Secretary or an equivalent cabinet-level official. The FY 2019 

National Defense Authorization Act permits the Secretary to delegate approval of certain 

applications, and DOE is in the process of implementing this new legal direction. 

3 
180 


QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN UPTON 

Secretarial Approval for 810 Authorization Requests 

Q4. Is the Secretary's approval required for extension or minor-amendments such as the 

changing of an applicant's name of authorizations already in force? If so, how long does 

it typically take obtain the Secretary's approval for these minor amendments? 

A4. When a specific authorization under 10 CFR Part 81 0 is issued, the approver signs a 

formal determination that describes the scope of the authorization and its duration. 

Extension of a specific authorization beyond its original duration requires further 

approval by DOE. Substantive changes to the scope of a specific authorization, such as 

transferring a new type of technology, also require further approval by DOE. However, 

non-substantive changes, such as changes in an applicant's name, do not require further 

approval by DOE. 

Obtaining approval for renewals of and amendments to existing specific authorizations 

takes approximately the same amount oftime as requesting a new authorization, because 

DOE must obtain the same government-to-government nonproliferation assurances and 

must complete the same interagency concurrences and consultations. Pursuant to the 

Administrative Procedure Act, U.S. companies that file timely requests for the renewal of 

existing specific authorizations are permitted to continue ongoing activities until a final 

decision is made on the renewal request. 

4 
181 


QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN UPTON 

AEA Secretary Actions 

Q5. Do all of the Department's civil nuclear regulatory obligations in the Atomic Energy Act 

require the Secretary of Energy's approval to allow normal transactions to take place? 

AS. No, DOE has other statutory civil nuclear obligations under the Atomic Energy Act, as 

amended (AEA), that may be delegated to officials subordinate to the Secretary. For 

example, as authorized under Section 161 n. of the AEA, the Secretary has delegated his 

authority under Section 131 of the AEA to enter into subsequent arrangements under an 

agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. These arrangements are used to convey U.S. 

consent for retransfers and other activities associated with U.S.-obligated nuclear 

material. Additionally, the FY 2019 NDAA authorizes the Secretary to delegate approval 

authority for certain Part 810 applications. 

5 
182 


QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE BUSCHON 

Ql. Has your office discussed how the isotope consortium could apply to an advanced fuel 

program? 

A 1. No, we have not yet explored how the National Isotope Development Center, a program 

within the Department of Energy Office of Science, could apply to an advanced fuel 

program. 

6 
183 


QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON 

Ql. Do you know if there were any delegations to your knowledge that involved unacceptable 

proliferation risk or created an unacceptable lack of visibility by the secretary's office 

over the proposed exports? 

A I. The authority to approve requests to directly or indirectly engage or participate in the 

development or production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States 

has never been delegated, because, until recently, Section 161n of the AEA prohibited 

delegation. However, as discussed above, other authorities under the AEA related to civil 

nuclear cooperation have been delegated, as allowed by law. I am aware of no instance 

where such delegations involved unacceptable proliferation risk or created an 

unacceptable lack of visibility for the Secretary's office. 

7 
184 


QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE DOYLE 

Q l. How is the NNSA working with other agencies to ensure that trade can continue to 

support American jobs without violating the NOAA review requirements and without 

posing a threat to national security? And more specifically, can you provide more 

information on the agency's overall strategy with regards to exports to China? 

AI. The U.S. Government increasingly is concerned with the attempted illicit appropriation 

of U.S. technology by China. 

The 2015 Agreement for Cooperation with China Regarding the Peaceful Uses of 

Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement) included unique nonproliferation controls meant to 

address this nonproliferation challenge. The 123 Agreement includes unclassified 

peaceful nuclear technology exports within the scope of its terms, as well as a provision 

in the Agreed Minute that mandates the United States and China to create a joint training 

program to help exporters in both countries understand the legally binding terms and 

obligations in the agreement. 

The 123 Agreement received a great deal of Congressional attention over concerns about 

China's potential for improperly diverting or retransferring items or technology subject to 

the agreement. In response, Congress included provisions in the FY 2016 National 

Defense Authorization Act that require review of potential transfers of nuclear 

technology by the Office of the Director ofNationallntelligence, in order to provide the 

Department of Energy (DOE) and other interested Departments and Agencies with 

greater insight into China's activities in this area. 

8 
185 


The Administration has built upon the prior improvements to the nonproliferation 

architecture to address this continually evolving threat As noted in the 2017 U.S. 

National Security Strategy (NSS), China wants to shape a world antithetical to U.S. 

values and interests and is building the most capable and well-funded military in the 

world, after our own. Part of China's military modernization and economic expansion is 

due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, and competitors such as China steal 

U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars each year. The NSS 

identifies a number of steps that the United States will take to address this threat, 

including to protect intellectual property through counterintelligence and law 

enforcement activities, tighten visa procedures, and protect data and underlying 

infrastructure. The policy direction in the NSS guides the Administration's regulation of 

exports of U.S. nuclear technology and assistance. 

In January 2017, Allen Ho, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in China, pled guilty to 

conspiring to unlawfully engage or participate in the production or development of 

special nuclear material outside the United States, without the required authorization 

from DOE, in violation of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, and I 0 

CFR Part 810 (Part 81 0) regulations. Subsequently sentenced to two years in prison, 

Ho's prosecution constitutes the first criminal prosecution for violations of Part 810 

regulations. China General Nuclear (CON), a major Chinese state-owned nuclear power 

company, also was indicted. CON has failed to respond to the indictment, and the FBI's 

investigation into "un-named co-conspirators" in the indictment is ongoing. The United 

States continues to deliberate how to handle exports involving CON given this 

9 
186 


information, but understands that other countries (United Kingdom, France, South Korea, 

and Saudi Arabia) are cooperating with CGN on their nuclear programs. 

For these reasons, DOE applications for export of nuclear-related technology and Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission applications for export of equipment to China are backlogged, as 

we have been unable to obtain required concurrence from the Department of State or 

positive reviews from the other agencies involved. No particular company or particular 

proposed transfer has been singled out; this applies to all potential transfers to China. 

The Administration has initiated a policy review of the overall U.S. approach to civil 

nuclear cooperation with China and is considering economic value to U.S. companies as 

part of the on-going dialogue on this issue. 

10 
187 


QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE TONKO 

Q 1. Currently, would those Part 810 reviews qualify as low proliferation risks? 

A I. Section 4(b) of the Advancing U.S. Nuclear Competitiveness and Jobs Act directs the 

Secretary to establish procedures for expedited consideration of requests for 

authorizations regarding the transfer of low-proliferation risk reactor technologies to 

certain designated foreign countries. The bill authorizes the Secretary to designate which 

technologies and foreign countries are eligible, with certain limitations. Should this bill 

become law, DOE will work with the U.S. interagency to develop recommendations for 

the Secretary as to which reactor technologies and destinations should be designated as 

eligible for the expedited procedures. 

Until that process is completed, I cannot provide a specific estimate of the proportion of 

Part 810 applications that would be eligible for the expedited procedures for low 

proliferation risk reactor technologies. However, China and Russia are ineligible for the 

expedited procedures pursuant to the bill's draft text, and they are two of the destinations 

with the highest volume of requests for specific authorization under Part 810. As such, I 

expect that the expedited procedures would apply to less than half of the applications for 

specific authorizations submitted under Part 810. 

II 
188 


QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENT ATlVE TONKO 

Q2. Does the Part 810 process look just at the technology or also the conditions within the 

potential partner country? That is to say, is the current review process the same for each 

potential partner country? 

A2. In considering whether to approve an application for specific authorization under Part 

810, the process takes into account an analysis of the technology to be transferred as well 

as the foreign company and government that would be receiving the technology. The 

specific factors to be considered are documented in 10 CFR 810.9, Grant of Specific 

Authorization, and include the significance of the transferred technology relative to the 

existing nuclear capabilities of the recipient country, whether the recipient country is in 

good standing with its acknowledged nonproliferation commitments, whether the country 

has accepted JAEA safeguards obligations on all nuclear materials used for peaceful 

purposes and has them in force, and seven other factors. 

12 
189 


GHEG WALDEN, OREGON 

CHA!HMAN 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., NEW JERSEY 

RANKING MEM8EH 

l!ongre~~ of tiJe mntteb ~tate~ 

!!,)ouile of l\tpreilrntatibcs 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN HousE OFFICE BuilDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 

Mr. Ed McGinnis 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Office ofNuclear Energy 

Department of Energy 

!000 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washing1on, DC 20585 

Dear Mr. McGinnis: 

\202)175·29j7 

(?0~) 225·"3641 

June !9, 2018 

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Energy on Tuesday, May 22,2018, to 

testify at the hearing entitled "DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, 

Regulation, and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies." 

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record 

remains open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, 

which are attached. Also attached are Member requests made during the hearing. To facilitate the 

printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions and requests with a transmittal 

letter by the close of business on Tuesday, July 3, 2018. Your responses should be mailed to Kelly 

Collins, Legislative Clerk, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2125 House Office 

Building, Washington, DC 20515 and e-mailed in Word format to t=!.!.;C~===="-'""""'"'-'c'-' 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rnsh, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy 

Attachments 
190 


COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22,2018 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN UPTON 

Halden Reactor 

Q l. The Halden Reactor in Norway provides critical research capabilities that are utilized by 

the U.S. commercial nuclear industry. Are DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission aware of the potential loss of the reactor? 

Q Ia. Is DOE examining what specific steps the U.S. government can undertake to assure this 

reactor is maintained for use by the international research community? 

A Ia. The Department of Energy (DOE) understands that the Institute for Energy Technology 

(!FE) in Norway has decided to permanently shut down the Halden Reactor. DOE is 

moving quickly to develop a mitigation plan to ensure that the capabilities of the reactor 

are identical or re-established at other facilities and laboratories in the United States and 

abroad. We have initiated discussions, and are receiving information from the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Nuclear Energy Institute, Electric Power 

Research Institute, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development/Nuclear Energy Agency. 

Representatives from all of these organizations met at the Idaho National Laboratory 

(INL) in July to seek consensus on these capabilities and begin to develop credible 

pathways to re-establish these capabilities. Of immediate need is to ensure that 

capabilities that are unique to Halden and that are critical for accident tolerant fuel 

development and qualification are addressed in order to meet the schedules that the 

nuclear industry requires. 

Q lb. Has DOE discussed the potential loss of this facility with the NRC and is there as mutual 

recognition of the Halden Reactor's capabilities? 

Alb. Yes, DOE has initiated discussion. Both DOE and NRC have a history of collaborations 

at the Halden Reactor, and are well aware of the capabilities of the reactor and the 

technical experts associated with the reactor project. The NRC has provided the 

1 
191 


COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

Department with Halden capabilities that arc important to them, and NRC participated in 

the July meeting at INL. 

Atomic Energy Act and International Nuclear Markets 

Q2. The purpose of the Atomic Energy Act is to provide "a program of international 

cooperation to promote the common defense and security and to make available to 

cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely as 

expanding technology and considerations of the common defense and security will 

permit." However, the statute was enacted when the United States was one of only a 

small handful of countries that had access to atomic energy. 

Q2a. Would you agree that the purpose of the Atomic Energy Actto provide for international 

peaceful usc of atomic energy remains important for the nation, even while the global 

nuclear landscape has changed? 

A2a. Yes, the Atomic Energy Act has long served as the legal basis by which the United States 

achieves its objective of fostering the development, use, and control of atomic energy in 

such a way as to maximize the common defense and security. 

Q2b. Would you consider it beneficial for Congress to modernize the Atomic Energy Act to 

reflect the current reality, to ensure continued U.S. participation in the global nuclear 

power development and use? 

A2b. If Congress proposes to amend the Atomic Energy Act, the Administration would review 

such legislation for consistency with the President's proe,'l'am. 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Competition 

Q3. During the hearing, Congressman Shimkus asked about the Office of Nuclear Energy's 

plans relating to developing an enrichment facility to serve commercial markets. Mr. 

McGinnis noted his support for competition and pointed to fuel fabrication facilities. 

However, there exists a lack of demand for enriched uranium and additional nuclear 

reactors ceasing operation in the next 7 years. 

Q3a. What are the market risks of subsidizing commercial competition in enrichment facilities 

that result over supply of enriched uranium? 

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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

A3a. The nuclear industry has identified the critical need for high-assay low-enriched uranium 

(HALEU) for development of advanced reactors. There is only one commercial 

enrichment facility operating in the United States and it does not have HALEU 

capability. This capability needs to be developed due to limited supplies of highly 

enriched uranium that can be processed or recovered. 

Q3b. Has the Department requested any funding for the Office ofNuclear Energy to develop or 

build an enrichment facility for commercial HALEU production? 

A3b. DOE did not request funding in FY 2019 to develop or build an enrichment facility for 

commercial I !ALEU production. 

Q3c. Will you commit to notifying the Committee prior to providing any such fmancial 

assistance? 

A3c. Any funding request for enrichment or other options for HALEU would he made through 

the annual budget process. 

Russian Uranium Imports 

Q4. What steps is the Department taking to review the pending expiration of the limitation on 

uranium imports from Russia that will expire in 2020? 

Q4a. The U.S is now importing 93% of our nation's need for uranium. What is DOE doing to 

revive the U.S. domestic uranium production industry'? For example, has anyone from the 

Department discussed revised regulation of U.S. mining facilities by the Environmental 

Protection Agency? 

A4a. The Department of Commerce (DOC) is responsible for the Agreement Suspending the 

Antidumping Investigation on Uranium from the Russian Federation (Russian 

Suspension Agreement). DOC initiated an Administrative Review of the Russian 

Suspension Agreement in December 2017; we understand that the Administrative Review 

is ongoing. In addition, on July 18, 2018, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an 

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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

investigation under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862) to 

determine the effects on the national security of imports of uranium. 

DOE recognizes the vital role that nuclear energy plays in support of our economic and 

environmental goals, as well as our national security missions. We are aware that the U.S. 

Energy Infonnation Administration reported recently that 93% of the uranium purchased 

by owners and operators of U.S civilian nuclear power reactors, and 87% of the uranium 

in fuel assemblies loaded into our reactors in 2017, was foreign-origin uranium. A White 

House-led review of U.S. nuclear energy policy is underway. We are confident that the 

outcomes of that review will inform our approach to revitalization of the U.S. nuclear 

energy sector. 

Recycling Navv Spent Fuel 

Q5. Has the Department conducted a cost estimate to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from the 

U.S. Navy for high-assay LEU? 

Q5. Prior to conducting any demonstration or large scale project to reprocess Navy spent 

nuclear fuel, will the Department commit to conducting such a cost estimate? 

A5. DOE has assembled a '14 scale pilot plant, using unirradiated materials (cold tests), at the 

Idaho National Laboratory to conduct research on the feasibility of reprocessing Navy 

spent fuel for HALEU production. As part of this R&D effort, the Department is 

currently conducting a cost estimate for a potential full scale facility as one option for 

consideration. Results of the current research, potential costs and other policy 

considerations would inform any decision whether or not to move forward beyond the 

current feasibility tests, to be evaluated through future budget requests. 

Need for Underlying Benchmark Data 

Q6. Criticality benchmark data are key to develop the underlying information for the 

regulatory framework to help provide advanced nuclear fuels. Please describe the nature 

of this information, why it is necessary and what government or non-government 

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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

facilities are available to gather the data. 

A6. Criticality benchmark data are obtained from criticality experiments that are designed to 

have configurations with nuclear and geometric similarities representative of, for 

example, nuclear materials in fuel manufacturing facilities or of nuclear fuels used in 

reactors or being stored and transported. The data are used by criticality safety 

organizations worldwide, including DOE laboratories, along with the NRC and its 

licensees, to assess criticality safety margins associated with the uses and di~position of 

nuclear materials. The data is often used to assess the validity of (or benchmark) nuclear 

safety computer code models. 

Consortium and Cost Recovery for I-lA-LEU 

Q7. The Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act would establish a public-private consortium 

to provide material for advanced nuclear fuels and sets up a structure by which 

consortium members would have access to the material, provided the private entities 

covered the cost of the nuclear materia I. 

Q7a. If DOE sets up this cost recovery structure, could such a program be carried out with 

limited budgetary impacts on DOE's overall mission needs? 

A 7a. If such a structure were established, the Department would evaluate how to implement it 

most efficiently, and apply its resources in a way that minimizes any potential effects on 

other priority missions. 

Q7b. DOE currently provides some high-assay LEU for research needs. How is the cost 

structure set up for those recipients of l-IALEU? 

A 7b. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) manages the Research Reactor Infrastructure 

(RRI) program that provides HALEU fuel at no cost to 23 university research reactors for 

use at their on-campus reactor facilities. The title of the fuel remains with the U.S. 

Government, and when these universities no longer require the fuel, the RRI program is 

responsible for managing the return and disposition of the used nuclear fuel. Typically, 

other research uses of I-I A LEU, such as fuels development, involve small quantities of 

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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modcrni?11tion: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

HALEU, and the research is conducted at DOE's Idaho National Laboratory. In this 

case, the HALEU is never transferred to an external entity and there is no cost recovered 

for the material itself. 

National Nuclear Waste Transportation Program Funding 

Q8. On April 16, 2018, the Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition wrote the Department 

expressing concern about the decrease in the Department's support for State Regional 

Groups and Tribal Radioactive Materials Transportation Committee. 

Q8a. Does DOE remain committed to continuing to provide the same level of funding and 

engagement for these programs? 

A8a. DOE is committed to ensuring that spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste 

are transported and disposed of safely and in a manner that protects both human health 

and the environment. Part of that commitment is to work cooperatively with state and 

tribal governments that are likely to be impacted. Our level of engagement and funding 

is commensurate with both Congressional direction for nuclear waste program activities 

and Congressional appropriations. 

Q8b. Please describe why the Department curtailed the activities identified by the letter. 

A8b. DOE is focusing appropriations and available staff resources on activities that serve both 

disposal and long-term fuel storage. These activities include generic transportation 

analyses and planning, and supporting state and tribal engagement with the Department. 

The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) continues to fund the four State Regional 

Groups mentioned in the Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition letter and the Tribal 

Radioactive Materials Transportation Committee to support the operation of their 

regional meetings and projects. In addition, NE staff continue to participate in DOE's 

National Transportation Stakeholders Forum (NTSF, led by DOE's Office of 

Environmental Management), including attending the NTSF Annual Meeting in June 

2018. 

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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

Q8c. Please provide list of meetings conducted with those organizations beginning in fiscal 

year 2015 through now. 

A8c. Below is a list of in-person meetings DOE's NE staff conducted with State Regional 

Groups, the Tribal Radioactive Materials Transportation Committee (formerly the Tribal 

Caucus) and the National Transportation Stakeholders Forum and its Working Groups 

from FY 2015 to the present. Staff from other DOE radioactive materials transportation 

programs participated in some of these meetings, in addition to others specific to their 

own shipping programs. 

Council of State Governments Eastern Regional Conference -Northeast High-Level 

Radioactive Materials Transportation Task Force 

November 2014, Port Jefferson, NY 

October 2015, Portsmouth, NH 

November 2016, Atlantic City, NJ 

November 2017, Portland, ME 

Council of State Governments Midwest - Midwestern Radioactive Materials 

Transportation Committee 

November 2014, Traverse City, Ml 

November 2015, Des Moines, !A 

November 2016, St. Louis, MO 

Western Interstate Energy Board- High-Level Radioactive Waste Committee 

October 2014, Lake Tahoe, CA 

November 2015, Spokane, WA 

December 2016, Phoenix, AZ 

October 2017, San Diego, CA 

Southern States Energy Board - Radioactive Materials Transportation Committee 

December2014, Charlotte, NC 

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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

December 2015, New Orleans, LA 

December 2016, Myrtle Beach, SC 

Tribal Radioactive Materials Transportation Committee 

January 2015, San Diego, CA 

January 2016, Palm Springs, CA 

January 2017, Charlotte, NC 

DOE NTSF Annual Meeting 

May 2015, Albuquerque, NM 

June 2016, Orlando, FL 

June 2017, Pittsburgh, PA 

June 2018, Omaha, NE 

NTSF Spent Nuclear Fuel Rail/Routing Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting 

May 2015, Albuquerque, NM 

November 2015, Des Moines, lA 

April 2016, Fort Worth, TX 

June 2016, Orlando, FL 

November 2016, St. Louis, MO 

June 2017, Pittsburgh, PA 

August 2017, Colorado Springs, CO 

NTSF Section 180( c) Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting 

October 2014, Atlanta, GA 

May 2015, Albuquerque, NM 

August 2015, Boston, MA 

March 2016, Washington, DC 

June 2016, Orlando, FL 

June 2017, Pittsburgh, PA 

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COMMITfEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Teclmologics 

Tuesday, May 22,2018 

DOE-NE Transportation Core Group Meeting 

March 2015, Washington, DC 

August 2015, Boston, MA 

March 2016, Washington, DC 

August 2016, Chicago, IL 

March 2017, Washin~orton, DC 

August 2017, Colorado Springs, CO 

Q8d. Please provide a breakdown of funding provided under this program beginning in fiscal 

year 2015 through now. 

A8d. From FY 2015 to now, NE has provided $2.9 million in total funding through cooperative 

agreements with four State Regional Groups, and $815,000 in total funding to the 

National Conference of State Legislatures to support the Tribal Radioactive Materials 

Transportation Committee. 

USEC Restrictions on Enrichment Services 

Q9. How does the Department of Energy reconcile its statements noting interest to develop 

uranium enrichment capability for high-assay low enriched uranium against the 

prohibition to provide enrichment services under Section 3112 of the USEC Privatization 

Act ( 42 USC 2297h-l 0)? 

A9. DOE is considering a number of options to ensure the availability of high-assay lowenriched uranium for advanced reactor development. Any option pursued would be done 

in a manner consistent with Section 3112 of the USEC Privatization Act. 

Isotope Consortium and HA-LEU Applicability 

Ql 0. The Department created the National isotope Development Center to interface with the 

user community and manage the coordination of isotope production across the 

Department's facilities and business operations involved in the sale and distribution of 

isotopes. Would a similar organization or DOE-led consortium within the Department 

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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

provide the stability and guidance to the commercial HA-LEU production and user 

community? 

A I 0. The DOE Isotope Program, managed by the Office of Nuclear Physics within the Office 

of Science, established the National Isotope Development Center (NIDC) to primarily 

interface with the stakeholder community and implement the business aspects of the sales 

and distributions of isotopes. The Department could certainly explore whether the NIDC 

model and mission would be applicable to coordination across entities engaged in the 

commercial production of HALEU. 

Report on Price Anderson 

Qll. The NRC has previously reported that advanced nuclear technologies would likely have 

differing requirements under what is known as "Price Anderson Act." The Price 

Anderson insurance requirements are based on the risk and generation output of the 

existing fleet of commercial nuclear power plants. Has DOE had any discussions yet on 

how the liability requirements under the existing Price Anderson framework would be 

applied to safer and smaller advanced nuclear designs? 

A 11. DOE agrees with NRC that advanced nuclear reactors may require different treatment 

under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA) than existing commercial nuclear power plants but 

has not begun any detailed consideration of this issue. 

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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: LegL~lation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE BILL FLORES 

Q 1. Will you outline for us the number of different regulatory approvals, facility updates, 

transportation issues, and other milestones that will have to be accomplished to have the 

advanced fuels available in time for the first movers? 

A l. While long-term supply of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for advanced 

reactors will involve industry-driven solutions, industry has identified specific challenges 

for which government support is needed to enable the deployment of advanced reactors 

in the United States by the early 2030s. 

DOE is exploring options for making HALEU available for early start-up fuel including 

from existing stocks of enriched uranium. 

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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, Regulation, 

and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE JOliN SHIMKUS 

Q I. Are you aware of a recent GAO report that found DOE's cost estimate to develop new 

enrichment options lacked credibility because it was not well documented or accurate? 

A I. The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) response to the GAO report 

notes that the preliminary cost estimate docs not include the full lifecycle cost of 

constructing a uranium enrichment facility that could meet the range of enriched uranium 

needs. The rough order of magnitude estimates prepared by NNSA were for the purpose 

of determining Critical Decision (CD) authority under DOE Order 413.38. NNSA 

determined that it is not required or cost beneficial to include the life-cycle costs of a 

potential facility at this early stage. NNSA will produce higher fidelity estimates of the 

final alternatives including appropriate life cycle cost estimates of potential facilities as it 

continues through the process leading to selection of an alternative. DOE's Office of 

Program Management Oversight and Analysis conducted an Independent Cost Review of 

the preliminary estimates and deemed them appropriate for the intended purpose. 

12 
202 


GREG WALDEN, OREGON 

CHAIRM,\N 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., NEW JERSEY 

RANKING MEMBER 

<!Congress- of tbe m:ntteb ~tates­

.l!Jouse of l\tprcsentatitH'£1 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN HousE OFFICE BuiLDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 MajO!tly {70~)725·2927 

MnlOftty {202)?/5·3()41 

June 19, 2018 

The Honorable JeffreyS. Merrifield 

Partner 

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 

1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20036 

Dear Mr. Merrifield: 

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Energy on Tuesday, May 22, 2018, to 

testify at the hearing entitled "DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, 

Regulation, and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies." 

Pursuant to the Ru.Tes of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record 

remains open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, 

which are attached. Also attached are Member requests made during the hearing. To facilitate the 

printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions and requests with a transmittal 

letter by the close of business on Tuesday, July 3, 2018. Yonr responses should be mailed to Kelly 

Collins, Legislative Clerk, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2125 Rayburn House Office 

Building, Washington, DC 20515 and e-mailed in Word format to Jl:.!'llv.Collins@!lli).il.hous£,£9.Y· 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and dejivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

Chairman 

Subcommittee 

~u~F on Energy 

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rush, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy 

Attachments 
203 


~1llsOur~ 

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 

1200 Seventeenth Street, NW I Washington, DC 20036 I tel 202.663.8000 I fax 202.663.8007 

July 31,2018 

The I Ionorable Fred Upton, Chairman 

House Energy and Commerce Committee 

Subcommittee on Energy 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20515-6115 

Jeffrey S. Merrifield 

Re: DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, 

Regulation, and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies 

Dear Chairman Upton: 

Thank you for the honor of allowing me to appear before the Subcommittee on 

Energy on Tuesday, May 22, 2018, to discuss legislation addressing the 

modernization of the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 

Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies. 

As you have requested, I have enclosed responses to several questions that were 

raised regarding my testimony. I hope these answers provide you the information that 

you and the other Members of the Committee were requesting. 

www.pillsburylaw.com 
204 


July 31,2018 

Page 2 

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rush 

Jeffrey S. Merrifield 

Partner and Energy Section Leader 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy 

Attachment (I) 

www.pillsburylaw.com 4850-0608-3437.vl 
205 


Prepared Answers of the Honorable JeffreyS. Merrifield to the Additional Questions for the 

Record for the Subcommittee on Energy Hearing Dated Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

Question l from the Honorable Bill Flores 

The recommendations contained in the paper ynu authored on high-assay LEU helped inform 

many of the provisions in the discussion draft, and your thoughtful input is appreciated. The 

focus of this discussion draft is to provide a targeted and limited program to address the 

challenges to overcome these hurdles for the first movers, not to create a permanent government 

program. What would be the appropriate date to sunset this program? 

Merrifield Answer to Question l 

First, thank you very much for considering the recommendations !made on behalf of ClearPath. 

It was an honor to testify before the Subcommittee and I appreciate the bi-partisan spirit with 

which you and your fellow Members are attempting to support this exciting new opportunity for 

American nuclear power. 

Given the interactions I have had with various developers of advanced nuclear technologies, I 

believe these technologies will be rolled out beginning in the late 2020's through the middle of 

the 2030's. For this reason, I believe that an appropriate sunset time for this program would be 

calendar year 2035. 

Question 2 from the Honorable Paul Tonko 

Are any activities exempted under H.R. 1320 currently recoverable by the NRC? 

Merrifield Answer to Question 2 

While I have not been able to make an exhaustive review of the legislation, the principal area 

included in H.R. 1320 which is currently recoverable is Section (3)(b )(1 )(B)(iii) pertaining to 

"costs for activities related to the development of regulatory infrastructure for advanced nuclear 

technologies." As I discussed in my testimony, I believe this is an appropriate item to be taken 

off the fee base as the current NRC fee structure could serve as a further impediment for the 

development of these promising advanced reactor technologies. Additionally, eliminating this fee 

for advanced reactors would provide better alignment with the current fleet of nuclear units, most 

of which were licensed and built prior to the passage of OBRA 1990 which created the NRC fee 

structure. 

Section 3(b)(2) and (3) appear to serve as a means to cap the annual fees of certain current 

licensees to "cover the costs to the Commission of providing the service or things of value." 

While the authors of the legislation are better placed to explain precisely how this legislation is 

intended to work, to the extent it places a cap on the fees that the Commission can charge a 

specific licensee, any additional costs, by their very nature, would need to be covered by some 

other source. Typically, this would occur through recovery in another fee structure, or by 

recovery in general revenues. 
206 


GREG WALDFN, OREGON 

CHAIBMAN 

Ms. Melissa Mann 

President 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FRANK PALLONE, JR •• NEW JERSEY 

RANKING MEMBER 

ttr:ongrt£\5 of tbe Wntttb i>tatt£\ 

j!}ou!le of 1\eprrsentatibc!l 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN House OFFICE BuiLDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515--6115 Mlli{)"lY 

Mmo"ty 

June 19,2018 

URENCO USA, Incorporated 

1560 Wilson Boulevard; Suite 300 

Arlington, VA 22209 

Dear Ms. Mann: 

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Energy on Tuesday, May 22, 2018, to 

testify at the hearing entitled "DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, 

Regulation, and Competitiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies." 

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record 

remains open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions for the record, 

which are attached. To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these 

questions with a transmittal letter by the close of business on Tuesday, July 3, 2018. Your responses 

should be mailed to Kelly Collins, Legislative Clerk, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2125 

House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515 and e-mailed in Word format to 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subconunittee. 

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rush, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy 

Attachment 
207 


July 2, 2018 

Congressman Fred Upton 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515-6115 

Dear Congressman Upton: 

On behalf of URENCO USA and the US Nuclear Industry Council (USNIC) I would like to express my 

appreciation for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on Energy on Tuesday, May 22, 

2018 to testify at the hearing entitled "DOE Modernization: Legislation Addressing Development, 

Regulation, and Competiveness of Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies." 

Please find enclosed our responses to additional questions for the record that we received from the 

Subcommittee on June 19, 2018. I appreciate the opportunity to clarify for the Subcommittee the 

importance of identifying how existing commercial nuclear assets in the U.S. can be best used to 

advance our nuclear industry, thereby limiting the amount of time and funds necessary to stand up this 

critical capability. 

Should the Subcommittee have any further questions or briefing needs, we would be pleased to support 

those requests as best as we can. 

I would also like to take this opportunity to invite you and the members of the Subcommittee to tour 

our uranium enrichment plant in Eunice, NM to provide a first-hand understanding of the need to 

protect and take advantage of these critical national facilities. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee. 

President 

URENCO USA, Inc. 

URENCO USA Inc. 

1560 Wi!son Boclevard Suite 300, Arlington. Virginia 22209 2463, USA T: + 1 703 682 5208 F: + 1 703 46S 2784 

E: melissa.mann@urenco.com w: www.urenco.com 
208 


July 2, 2018 

RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN FLORES' QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

1. Your testimony notes the many different steps that are required to advance in a concurrent 

fashion to align the timeframe to deploy advanced reactors with the material availability. 

What is the expected length of time to do the following: 

a. About how long would it take to develop the criticality benchmark data to inform the 

different regulatory requirements? 

Nuclear criticality control is a key requirement for nuclear facility operations and the industry 

and national laboratory system have a good supply of qualified criticality experts. A focused 

program should be able to yield solid criticality analyses within a 24-month period. Ideally, 

such a program would be developed on a consortium basis with backing from the U.S. 

Department of Energy {DOE). 

The value of such an undertaking is to provide a consistent set of data that can be utilized by 

reactor and fuel designers, fuel cycle facilities, and transportation package designers alike. 

This approach would also mean that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission {NRC) would not 

have to independently verify multiple, bespoke benchmarking codes. 

b. About how long would it take to design, test, certify, and construct the transportation 

packages? 

Packages designed for the transport of fissile nuclear materials on public roads must meet 

rigorous performance standards. There are additional requirements imposed on packaging 

HA-LEU materials in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UFG). Industry experience shows that 

the process of designing, testing, licensing and manufacturing such packages is a multi-year 

process, likely to require four to seven years on average. 

An alternative approach for managing UFG packaging needs would be to consider the colocation of HA-LEU enrichment and conversion facilities. Such co-location would allow 

consolidation of HA-LEU processing at fewer sites and would obviate the need to transport 

HA-LEU as UFG on public roadways, thus reducing the expenses and time associated with the 

development, licensing and manufacture of new packages for this transport segment. 

c. What is the expected time for you to go through the process to modify URENCO USA's 

NRC license to be a Category-2 facility? 

The NRC reviewed, approved and issued the initial combined construction and operating 

license for the URENCO USA uranium enrichment facility in Eunice, New Mexico in just over 30 
209 


months. This was a first-of-a-kind approval for use of advanced gas centrifuge enrichment 

technology in the United States. 

The URENCO USA facility currently produces low enriched uranium at an enrichment level of 

less than 5.0% 235U. At this enrichment level, the facility is licensed to Category Ill physical 

protection requirements. 

The full gamut of HA-LEU enrichments (up to ~19. 75% 235U) falls into Category II physical 

protection requirements. Licensing of a HA-LEU enrichment capability at the URENCO USA site 

would require either that the entire facility be upgraded to Category II physical protection 

requirements or that a small HA-LEU capability be separately licensed on site as a Category II 

facility. In either scenario, URENCO USA is able to rely on existing site characterization data, 

utilities, plant processes, safety control systems, etc.- all of which are already familiar to the 

NRC- while ensuring that additional requirements for Category II operations are met in full. 

Assuming that the NRC has clearly defined requirements for Category II facilities, review and 

approval of a HA-LEU capability at the URENCO USA site should be feasible within a 24 to 30-

month period. 

d. About how long would it take to construct the new enrichment capabilities at your 

facility? 

We estimate that if detailed design, site permitting and contractor selection were undertaken 

during the NRC application review process, URENCO USA could construct, commission and 

start up a HA-LEU production module within 24 months of NRC license approval. This 

estimate reflects our actual construction experience for the most recent construction phases 

at the URENCO USA facility. 

e. About how long do you expect it might take to do the similar work at the fuel fabrication 

facilities? 

While URENCO USA and fuel fabrication facilities are held to similar regulatory requirements, 

URENCO USA is not in a position to speak directly for the fabrication community. The answer 

will likely largely depend on whether existing fabrication facilities can be utilized or whether 

greenfield sites are proposed, but our hope is that the NRC would be able to review, approve 

and issue other fuel cycle licenses in a relatively similar time frame as for enrichment 

activities. 

One means of reducing the time and burden associated with new licensing reviews (as well as 

reducing the number of transportation steps and packaging requirements) is to consider colocating a HA-LEU enrichment capability with conversion and fabrication capabilities. As 

stated during the May 22, 2018 hearing, URENCO USA is willing to consider hosting such 

capabilities at its New Mexico site. 

2 
210 

Æ 


f. Are there other items that have not been mentioned that need to be addressed, such as 

uranium mining facilities or conversion facilities? 

A complete and sustainable HA-LEU fuel cycle would include three fundamental capabilities: 

(1) a uranium enrichment facility producing HA-LEU enrichments in the form of uranium 

hexafluoride (UF5); (2) a conversion facility to convert HA-LEU UFG into metal or oxide as 

appropriate for different reactor designs and fuel types: and (3) one or more fabrication 

facilities that can manufacture the specific fuel types required by the various reactor and fuel 

designs. As such, a conversion capability is as important as the enrichment and fabrication 

steps. 

g. Based on your experience in the fuel cycle, when do all the steps described above have to 

be completed by to provide the fuel for deployment? 

DOE is already seeking a HA-lEU capability for research and test reactor use in the relative 

near term. Additionally, advanced reactor and advanced fuel designers are seeking supply of 

test quantities of material to demonstrate viability in the mid-2020s, and seeking commercial 

supply shortly thereafter. 

URENCO USA is interested in and capable of serving a broad community of users who stand to 

benefit from HA-LEU supply. This includes: (1) research and test reactors, including reactors 

fueled by DOE in the U.S. and abroad; (2) advanced reactors; (3) advanced fuel designs 

including Accident Tolerant Fuels; (4) producers of targets for medical isotope production; and 

(5) operators of existing light water reactors seeking improvements in fuel reliability and costs 

through high fuel burn up and extended operating cycles. 

2. Based on that description, it is clear there is a sense of urgency to initiate this program 

now? 

Absolutely, there is a sense of urgency to pass the draft legislation and initiate this program. Nearterm action in developing a viable HA-LEU fuel cycle- including availability of appropriate 

packaging- is required to ensure that lack of fuel does not hinder operation of existing 

research and test reactors or the ability to benefit from the development and possible broadscale deployment of advanced reactors and advanced fuel types.