## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 20

- 00067

- CV

LT ( J.G.) GREGORY K. PARSONS U.S. NAVY, PDRL , Appellant
V.
CONNIE K. COPELAND PARSONS , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 62nd District Court Lamar County, Texa s Trial Court No. 87113

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ. Opinion by Justice Stevens2 

### O P I N I O N Gregory K. Parsons appeals the dismissal of his claims following the trial court ’ s grant of a plea to the jurisdi ction. W e determine that t he trial court properly found it was without subject

matter jurisdiction over Parsons ’s impermissible collatera l attacks of prior judgments setting Parsons’s child support obligations. As a result, we affirm the trial court ’ s j u dgment.
I. Factual Backgrou nd On December 19, 2017, Parsons sued his former spouse, Connie K. Copeland Parsons , and the Texas O ffice of A ttorney G eneral C hild S upport D ivision (OAG) in the 62nd Judicial
District Court of Lamar County for t he purpose of collaterally attacking orders and decisions
entered before 2015 in other courts related to his child support obligations

. Parsons and
Connie ’s decree of divorce was entered in Hunt County, which also entered a n order in a suit modifying the parent

- child relationship in 2009 th a t Pars on s ’s current law suit sought to collaterally attack

. Hunt County later transferred jurisdictio n to Williamson County , 1 which entered the remaining child support orders forming Parson s ’s complaints

. 2

1 See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 155.206(a).

2 Our prior opinion in In re A.K.P

. , No. 06

- 19

- 00075

- CV, 2020 WL 465281 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana Ja n. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op. ), set forth the following relevant facts:
In June 2 0 09, the 196th Jud icial District Court of Hunt County (the Hunt District Court) entered a n order that increased Parsons ’ s court

- ordered child support. The Hunt District Cou rt included Parsons ’ s VA disabi lity benefits in calculating his net resources for t h e purpose of dete rmining Parsons ’ s child support liability. Apparently, in October 2009, [Connie] and the OAG made a request to the VA Regional Office in Waco for an appor tionment of Parsons ’ s VA disabi lity benefits on behalf of [their children]

. That r e quest was denied in April 2009. In 2010, the case was transferred to the 395th Judicial District Court of Williamson County (the Williamson District Court), which then acq uired contin uing, exclusive jur isdiction. A fter the transfer, that court entered o r ders in July 2010 , April 2012, and June 2012 modifying Parsons ’ s3

Because Pars on s ’s Lamar County petition sought t o modif y his child support obligations
and Williamson County still retain ed exclusive con tinuing jurisdiction over the case, t he OAG filed a plea to the jurisdiction

. T he trial court granted the OAG’ s plea and dismisse d Parson s ’s
claims against the OAG , w ith pre judice

. After Parson s filed an interlocutory appeal from that order, we affirmed the trial court ’s grant of the plea to the jurisdiction

. In r e A.K.P

. , 2020 WL 465281, at *3

. On June 26, 2020, Parson s file d a second amended petition against Conni e that a gain sought to collaterally attack orders from H unt and Williamson C ounties. On C onnie ’ s behalf, the
OAG filed another plea to the jurisdiction. On Augu s t 11, 2020, the trial court g ranted the pl ea and di smissed Parson s ’ s second amended petition a gainst Connie , with prejudice. Parsons appeals.
II. Standard of Review Subject

- matter jurisdiction is required for a court to have authority to decide a c ase and is never presumed. Tex. Ass ’ n of Bus. v. Tex. Ai r Control Bd

. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 443

– 45 (Tex

. 1993). As a result, t he plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirm atively demonstrating that the trial court has subject

- matter jurisdiction. Id

. at 446

.

court

- ordered child supp ort. In entering each of those orders, the Williamson District Court included Pars ons ’ s VA dis ability benefits in calculatin g his net resources for the purpose of d e t ermining Parsons ’ s child support liability. Parsons did not appeal any of the modificati on orders entered by the Hunt and Williamson District Courts. Also, it is undisput ed that Pars ons was served with notice of th e petitions requesting modification an d of the hearings o n the petitions and that he appeared, personally and through counsel, at several of the hearings.
Id. at *1 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).4

A plea to the jurisdiction c hallenges the trial c ourt ’ s subject

- matter jurisdiction over a

ca se. B land Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000)

. “ Whether a court has subject [

- ] matter jurisdiction is a question of law.” Tex. Dep ’ t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 13 3 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Te x. 2004) (citing Tex. Nat. Res. Conservati on Comm ’ n v. IT

- Davy , 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)). Unless a case involve s “disputed evidence of jurisdictional facts that also implicate the merits of the case,” we review questions of jur isdiction de novo. I d

. III. The Trial Court Properly Determine d It Did Not Have Subject
- Matter Jurisdiction Over Parsons’s Collateral Attac k s

“ A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment in a proc eeding brought for a different pur pose. ” In re X.B. , 3 69 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 20 12 , no p et

. ) (citing In re Ocegueda , 304 S.W.3d 576, 579 ( Tex. App.

— El Paso 2010, pet. denied ) ).

“ A void judgment may be collaterally attacked. ” Id. (citing B rowning v. Prostok , 165 S.W.3d
336 , 346 (Tex. 2005); B rowning v. Placke , 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Te x. 1985) (per curiam) )

. A judgment is void w hen the court rendering it “had no jurisd iction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdictio n to enter the partic ular judgment, or n o capacity

to act

. ” Id. (citing Browning , 69 8 S.W .2d at 363 )

. “ Errors other than lack of jurisdiction may render a judgment er roneous or voidable, and are thus subject only to direct attack. ” Id. (citing
Cook v. C ameron , 733 S.W.2d 13 7, 140 (Tex. 1987) ) ; see Underwood, Wilson, Berry, Stein &
Jo hns on, P .C. v. Sperrazza , No. 07

- 10

- 0435

- CV, 2012 WL 1252970, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Apr. 12, 2012 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) ( “ Errors other than lack of jurisdiction, such as ‘ a
court ’ s action cont rary to a statute o r statutory equivalent, ’ merely render the ju dgmen t voidable
which is correctable through the ordinary appellate process or other proper proceeding. ” (citing5

Reiss v. Reiss , 118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003) ) ) ; Edwards v. Edwards , 624 S.W.2 d 635, 637 (Tex. A pp.

— Houston [ 14th Dist.] 1981, no pet.)

. “[ T] h e va lidity of the judgment under attack ” is presumed , and “[e] xtrinsic evidence may not be used to establish a lack of jurisdiction when collaterally attacking a judgment. ” In re
D.L.S. , No . 05

- 08

- 00173

- CV, 20 09 WL 1875579, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Dallas July 1, 200 9, no pet.) (me m. op.); see In re A.G.G

. , 267 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2008, pet

. denied) . “ To prevail on a collateral attack, the challenger must show t hat the judgment is void
on its face. ” In re A.G.G

. , 267 S.W.3d at 16 9 (citing So tel o v . Scherr , 242 S.W.3d 823, 830 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2007, no pet.). “ A collateral attack fails if the judgment contains jurisdictional recitals, even if other parts of the record show a lack of jurisdiction. ” In re D.L.S. , 2009 WL 1875579, at *2

. Her e, H unt County and Williamson Count y had jurisdiction to enter the orders that Parsons complains of , and Par sons raises no challenge to the jurisdiction of these courts provided
b y the Texas F amily C ode. See T EX
. F AM

. C ODE A NN
. § 155.001 (Supp.) , § 155 .003, 1 5 5.206

. Even so, Parson s ’s petition complain s of the following orders : (1) a June 5, 2009, order in a suit to modify the parent

- child relationship entered by the 196th J udicial Distr ict Court of Hunt
Co unty , Texas ; (2) a July 7, 2010, order enter ed by th e 395th J udicial District Court of
Wil liamson County , Texas , modifying the parent

- child relationship ; and (3) a September 24, 2012, order from the County Court of Williamson County adopting a n Apr il 20, 2012 , proposed6

support decision on Pa rsons ’s child su pport arreara ge
. 3 A review of each of those orders shows that they contained the appropriate jurisdictional recitals. Because the validity of th o se orders is presumed and the face of t hos e orders does not show that the y are void , Parsons fails to
demon s t rate that they can be collaterally attacked. Instead, the nature of Parsons’s complaint reveals an argument that must be presented in
a direct attack. Parsons argues that federal preem pt ion related to the withholding of veteran ’ s disability benefits re n d ered void the challenged orders. T he first two orders Parson s complains
of stated that his child support obligations could be satisfied from withholding from earnings,
and nothing in those order s s pecifically mentioned hi s disa bility benefits. The Sept e m ber 24,
2012 , order reduc ed Pa rsons ’s child support obligation and found that the children should
“receive benefits directly from the Social Security Administration

. . . [ p ] urs uant to § 154.132”
of the Texas F amily C ode. 4
Section 154.062 of the Texas F a mily C ode s tates , (a) The court shall calculate net resources for the purpose of determining child support liability as provided by this section. (b) Resources include:

3 Parso ns also chal lenged an administr ative review decision that concluded that his chil d s upport obligat ion did not meet the criteria for modification.

4 Section 154.132 states,

In applying the child support guidelines for an obligor who has a disability and w ho is required to pay support for a child wh o receives benefits as a result of th e o b ligor ’ s disability, t he court shall apply the guidelines by determining the amount of child support that would be ordered under the child support guidelines and subtractin g from that total the amount of bene fits or the value of the benefits paid to or f o r the child as a result of the obligor ’ s disability.
T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 154.132.7

. . . . (5) all other income actually being r eceived, including

. . . social s e c u rity benefi ts other than supplemental security income, [and] United States Department of Veterans Affairs disability benefits other than non
- service

- connected disability pensio n benefits.
T EX
. F AM

. C ODE A NN
. § 154.062 ( Supp.)

. The relevant portions of 4 2 U.S.C.A. , Section 659 , the
federal statute that Parsons c ites in support of his argument , contain the following language:

(h) Moneys subject to process (1) In general

. . . moneys payable to an individual which ar e considered to be based upon remun e r ation f or employme nt, for purposes of this section

-- (A) consist of

--

. . . . (ii) periodic benefits (including a periodic benefit as defined in section 428(h)(3) of thi s title) or other p ayments

--

. . . . (V) by the Secretary of Veterans Affai r s as comp ensation fo r a service

- connected disability paid by the Secretary to a former member of the Armed Forces who is in receipt of retired or retainer pay if the former mem ber has waived a por tion of the retired o r r etainer pay in order to receive suc h compensa tio n ;

. . . . (B) do not include any payment

--8 . . . . (iii) of periodic benefits under Title 38, except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii)(V). 42 U.S.C.A. § 659(h)(1)(A)(ii)(V) , (h)(1)(B)(iii) (West, W estlaw through P

. L

. 117

- 5 2 Nov. 10, 2 021 )

. Al so, (a) A ll or any part of the compensat ion, pension, or emergency officers ’ retirement pay payable on account of any veteran may

-- (1) if the veteran is being fur nished hospital treat ment, institutional, or domiciliary care by the United Sta t e s, or any political s ubdivision thereof, be apportio ned on behalf of the veteran ’ s spouse, children, or dependent parents; and (2) if the veteran is not living with the veter an ’ s spouse, or if th e veteran ’ s children ar e not in the custody of the veteran , be apport ioned as ma y be prescribed by the Secretary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5307 (a) (West, We stlaw through P.L. 117

- 52 Nov. 10, 2021) . I n 2010, after reviewing court documents , the Department of Veteran s affairs denied C onnie ’ s request for additional apportion m e nt of ben efits

. Poi nting to this denial, Parsons argues that the orders he complained of were void as a result of federal preemption.
Parsons ’s argument relies on extrinsic evidence

. A t best, t he argument shows that the orders might be voidable, not v o i d. S ee In re C. E.A.Q

. , No. 09

- 19

- 00037

- CV, 2020 WL 5240458, at *2 (Te x. App.

— Beaumont Sept. 3, 2020 , pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Rose v.
Rose , 481 U.S. 619, 622 (1987 ) ) ; Ruffin v. Ruffin , 753 S.W.2d 824, 827

– 28 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1988 , n o pet. ) ; see also In re Smith , No. 04

- 08

- 00285

- CV, 2008 WL9

2116594, at *2 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio May 21, 2008 , orig. proceeding ) (per curiam) (mem.
op .) ; Batcher v. Wilkie , 975 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir . 2020)

. 5
We conclude that Parson’s petition constit u t ed impermissibl e collateral attack s of prior
orders

. As a result , we find that the tri al court properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm th e trial court ’ s ju dgment.

Sc ott E. Steven s Justice
Date Submitted: May 25 , 2021 Date Decide d: November 18 , 2021

5 We cite these cases merely to show that Parsons’s argument of federal preemption here do es not render the child support orde rs void and express no opinion on the merits of P arsons’s complaints.