Gulf War 

Air Power Survey 

Volume I 

Planning 

and 

Command and Control 

Washington, D. C. 

1993 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Gulf War Air Power Survey 

p. cm. 

Gulf War Air Power Survey directed by Eliot A. Cohen. 

Includes an unnumbered summary report by Thomas A. Keaney and 

Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 

Contents: v. I. Planning and Command and Control -- v. 2. Operations and 

Eliot A. Cohen. 

Effects and Effectiveness -- v. 3. Logistics and Support -- v.4. Weapons, Tactics, 

and Training and Space Operations -- v. 5. A Statistical Compendium and Chronology. 

1. Persian Gulf War, 1991--Aerial operations. American. 2. United States. 

Air Force--History--Persian Gulf War, 1991. I. Cohen, Eliot A. 11. Gulf War Air 

Power Survey (Organization : U.S.). 111. United States. Dept. of the Air Force. 

IV. Title: Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report. 

DS79.724.U6G85 1993 

956.7044’248--d~20 93-3060 1 

CIP 

For sale by the US. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop! SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISBN 0-16-042909-9 
Gulf War Air Power Survey 

Staff 

Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director 

Col. Emery M. Kiraly 

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Kelley 

(Retired, WAF) 

Dr. Wayne W. Thompson 

Mr. Ernest D. Cruea 

Maj. Joseph W. Patterson 

Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek 

Lt. Col. Daniel T. Kuehl 

Lt. Col. Robert C. Owen 

Dr. John F. Guilmartin 

Mr. Richard A. Gunkel 

Dr. Thomas C. Hone 

Dr. Alexander S. Cochran 

Mr. Barry D. Watts 

Dr. Thomas A. Keaney 

Executive Director 

Senior Military Advisor 

Senior Historical Advisor 

ANSER Program Manager 

Executive Oficer 

Publishing Manager 

Chief, Statistics 

Chief; Chronology 

Chief; Weapons, Tactics 

and Training 

Chief, Logistics, Space, 

and Support 

Chief, Command, Control, 

and Organization 

ChieJI Strategy and 

Plans 

Chief; Operations and 

Efects 

Chief; Summary Report 

... 

111 
Gulf War Air Power Survey 

Review Committee 

Hon. Paul H. Nitze. Chaintuut 

Diplomat in Residence 

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 

Gen. Michael J. Dugan (USAF, Retired) 

Multiple Sclerosis Society 

Adm. Huntington Hardisty (USN, Retired) 

Center for Naval Analyses 

Dr. Richard H. Kohn 

The University of North Carolina 

at Chapel Hill 

Dr. Bernard Lewis 

Princeton University 

Mr. Andrew W. Marshall 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Mr. Phillip Merrill 

Former Assistant Secretary General 

for Defense Support, NATO 

Dr. Henry Rowen 

Stanford University 

Hon. Ike Skelton 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Gen. Maxwell Thurman (USA, Retired) 

Association of the U.S. Army 

Maj. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr. (USAF, Retired) 

Former Assistant Chief of Staff (Studies 

and Analysis) 

Dr. James Q. Wilson 

University of California at Los Angeles 

iv 
Foreword 

From 16 January through 28 February 1991, the United States and its 

allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in history, 

a conflict in which air operations played a preeminent role. The Gulf 

War Air Power Survey was commissioned on 22 August 1991 to review 

all aspects of air warfare in the Persian Gulf for use by the United States 

Air Force, but it was not to confine itself to discussion of that institution. 

The Survey has produced reports on planning, the conduct of operations, 

the effects of the air campaign, command and control, logistics, air base 

support, space, weapons and tactics, as well as a chronology and a compendium of statistics on the war. It has prepared as well a summary 

report and some shorter papers and assembled an archive composed of 

paper, microfilm, and electronic records, all of which have been deposited 

at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, 

Alabama. The Survey was just that, an attempt to provide a comprehensive and documented account of the war. It is not a definitive history: 

that will await the passage of time and the opening of sources (Iraqi 

records, for example) that were not available to Survey researchers. Nor 

is it a summary of lessons learned: other organizations, including many 

within the Air Force, have already done that. Rather, the Survey provides 

an analytical and evidentiary point of departure for future studies of the 

air campaign. It concentrates on an analysis of the operational level of 

war in the belief that this level of warfare is at once one of the most 

difficult to characterize and one of the most important to understand. 

The Survey was directed by Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins 

University’s School of Advanced International Studies and was staffed by 

a mixture of civilian and military analysts, including retired officers from 

the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was divided into task forces, most 

of which were run by civilians working temporarily for the Air Force. 

The work produced by the Survey was examined by a distinguished 

review committee that included scholars, retired general officers from the 

Air Force, Navy, and Army, as well as former and current senior government officials. Throughout, the Survey strived to conduct its research 

in a spirit of impartiality and scholarly rigor. Its members had as their 

standard the observation of Mr. Franklin D’Olier, chairman of the United 

States Strategic Bombing Survey during and after the second World War: 

“We wanted to burn into everybody’s souls that fact that the survey’s 

V 
responsibility . . . was to ascertain facts and to seek truth, eliminating 

completely any preconceived theories or dogmas.” 

The Survey attempted to create a body of data common to all of the 

reports. Because one group of researchers compiled this core material 

while other task forces were researching and drafting other, more narrowly focused studies, it is possible that discrepancies exist among the reports 

with regard to points of detail. More importantly, authors were given 

discretion, within the bounds of evidence and plausibility, to interpret 

events as they saw them. In some cases, task forces came to differing 

conclusions about particular aspects of this war. Such divergences of 

view were expected and even desired: the Survey was intended to serve 

as a point of departure for those who read its reports, and not their analytical terminus. 

This first report in this volume deals with the genesis and development of the plan for the air campaign of the Gulf War as executed in 

Operation Desert Storm; the second report explains how the United 

States air forces were organized, what challenges faced the command and 

control process, and how the commanders dealt with them. 

vi 
Acknowledgments 

The Survey’s members owe a great debt of gratitude to Secretary of 

the Air Force Donald B. Rice, who conceived of the project, provided it 

with resources, and set for it the highest standards of independence and 

objectivity. Many organizations and individuals gave generously of their 

resources and time to support this effort. Various branches and commands of the Air Force were particularly helpful in providing material for 

and, in some cases, personnel to conduct the study. The United States 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aided with this study in different ways, 

including the sharing of data pertaining to the air war. A number of the 

United States’ coalition partners also made available individuals and 

records that were vital to the Survey’s work. Many participants in the 

war, including senior political officials and officers from all of the Services were willing to speak with the Survey and share their recollections of 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Private students of the Gulf War also 

made available their knowledge of the crisis and conflict. Wherever 

possible and appropriate such assistance has been acknowledged in the 

text. 

The Survey’s independence was its reason for being. Each report is 

the product of the authors who wrote it and does not necessarily represent 

the views of the Review Committee, the Air Force or the Department of 

Defense. 

vii 
Security Review 

The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were 

submitted to the Department of Defense for policy 

and security review. In accordance with this review, certain information has been removed from 

the original text. These areas have been annotated 

as [DELETED]. 

... 

Vlll 
Gulf War Air Power Survey 

Summary Report 

Volume I: 

Volume 11: 

Volume 111: 

Volume IV 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Volume V 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Planning Report 

Command and Control Report 

Operations Report 

Effectiveness Report 

Logistics Report 

Support Report 

Weapons, Tactics, 

and Training Report 

Space Report 

A Statistical Compendium 

Chronology 

ix 

Con tents 

Foreword ......................................... v 

Acknowledgments .................................. vii 

... Security Review ................................... viii 

List of GWAPS Reports ............................... ix 

Part I: Planning 

Index to Planning Report 

Part 11: Command and Control 

Glossary 

(Note: Each of the two reports retained pagination independent of the 

other. Accordingly, the table of contents for each report accompanies 

each report independently of this table of contents). 

Glossary 

, 

xi 

Part I 

Planning 

Part I 

Planning 

Task Force Chief 

Dr. Alexander S. Cochran 

Principal Authors 

Dr. Alexander S. Cochran 

Mr. Lawrence M. Greenberg 

Mr. Kurt R. Guthe 

Dr. Wayne W. Thompson 

Mr. Michael J. Eisenstadt 

Principal Contributors 

Capt. John R. Glock 

Maj. Mark Clodfelter 

Lt. Col. Allan W. Howey 

Contents 

Report Acknowledgments .............................. xi 

Introduction ...................................... xiii 

1 The Air Campaign Plan of 16 January 1991: 

Anoverview ........................... i 

2 Pre-Crisis Air Planning for the Persian Gulf ............. 17 

3 Iraq: The Road to War ........................... 55 

4 Policy Objectives. Restraints. and Constraints ............ 83 

5 Instant Thunder and Desert Shield ................... 105 

6 Evolution of the Offensive Air Campaign Plan .......... 143 

7 Intelligence for Air Campaign Planning ............... 191 

8 Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign: Retrospective ...... 223 

Appendix 

A Military Organization Glossary ..................... 233 

B USCINCCENT Regional Plans ............... [DELETED] 

Index ......................................... 235 

Tables 

1 Coalition Campaign Objectives ....................... 7 

2 CENTAF Target Categories (Sets)-December 1990 .......... 10 

3 USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-88 Force Requirements .......... 22 

4 USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-88 Key Assumptions ........... 25 

V 
5 USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Milestones ................ 26 

6 USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept Of 

Operations Force Requirements and 

Deployment Schedule ........................ 28 

7 USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept Of Operations 

Key Assumptions ........................... 30 

8 Draft USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (July 90) Force 

Requirements and Deployment Schedule ........... 33 

9 Comparison of USAF Aircraft In-Theater OPLAN 

vs Desert Shield ............................ 34 

1 O Draft USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (JUIY 90) 

Key Assumptions ........................... 36 

11 Evolution of USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002 ................. 39 

12 Exercise Internal Look 90 Participants ................. 45 

13 USCENTAF Internal Look 90 Target List: 

15 June 1990 .......................... 48 

14 Internal Look 90 (for OPLAN 1002-900 

Target Lists ........................... 50 

15 Planned U.S. Aircraft Beddown-April I990 .............. 52 

16 Prioritized USCENTAF Mission List 

Exercise Internal Look 90 ................. 53 

17 Force Requirements and Deployment Schedule U.S. 

Central Command Preliminary Planning ....... 130 

18 USCINCCENT Preliminary Planning Assumptions .......... 131 

19 Target Growth by Category ........................ 146 

20 Target Growth by Category ........................ 185 

vi 
21 AT0 Targets Planned for Attack by Day .............. 189 

22 CENTAF Target Sets by OPLAN 1002-90 Objectives ........ 193 

23 CENTAF Target List-1 5 June 1990 ................... 193 

24 CENTAF and CENTCOM Target Lists .................. 199 

25 Known Iraqi Targets by GAT Category-2 August 1990 .... 201 

26 Estimates of Iraqi Ground Forces-I 6 January 1991 ....... 203 

27 Iraqi Pre-War Ground Order of Battle ................ 204 

28 Iraqi Air Force as of 2 August 1990 .................. 207 

29 Known Iraqi AIF Targets by Category: 

16 January 1991 ........................... 212 

30 Growth of Known Iraqi AIF Targets by GAT (CENTAF) 

Category Before and After Operation Desert Storm ... 216 

31 Growth of GAT Target Sets Before and After 

Operation Desert Storm ...................... 217 

32 Overall Growth of Known Iraqi AIF Targets 

by GAT Category .......................... 219 

33 Percentage of Total Targets by Category ............... 226 

34 Military Organization Glossary ..................... 233 

35 USCINCCENT Regional Plans Summary ........ [DELETED] 

Figures 

1 D-Day Sequence ................................. 8 

2 G-Day Sequence ................................. 8 

vii 
3 Warning and Deployment Timelines ................... 31 

4 Crisis Planning Assumptions vs Actual Response .......... 37 

5 Anticipated Iraqi Attack ........................... 43 

6 Iraqi Ground Force Deployment in the KTO: 

16 January 1991 ........................ 76 

7 Extract from "THE" Target List 

Provided to CINC. UCS. SECDEF .............. 89 

8 D-Day Plan (ATO-Bravo) Proposed Targets ............ 138 

9 Punishment AT0 Attack Plan ...................... 141 

10 Concept to Execution Planning ..................... 144 

11 Attack Plan First Day. AM-Night .................... 176 

12 Attack Plan First Day. AM-Night .................... 177 

13 Attack Plan First Day. PM-Day ..................... 178 

14 Attack Plan First Day. PM-Night .................... 179 

15 Attack Plan Second Day. AM-Night .................. 180 

16 Attack Plan Second Day. AM-Day ................... 181 

17 Attack Plan Second Day. PM-Day ................... 182 

18 Attack Plan Second Day. PM-Night .................. 183 

19 AT0 Targets by Category ......................... 190 

20 CENTAF Iraqi Target Study-Kuwait ................... 195 

21 a CENTAF Iraqi Target Study Attack Plan-Iraq ........ 196 

21b CENTAF Iraqi Target Study Attack Plan-Iraq ........ 196 

21c CENTAF Iraqi Target Study Attack Plan-Iraq ........ 197 

21 d CENTAF Iraqi Target Study Attack Plan-Iraq ........ 197 

... 

Vlll 
22 Iraqi Ground Force Deployment in the KTO: 

16 January 1991 ....................... 205 

23 Intelligence Estimates of Iraqi Scud Missiles ............ 210 

24 Growth of Iraqi AIF Targets by Category. 

July 1990 . July 1991 ................... 221 

ix 

Report Acknowledgements 

The primary author of this report was Dr. Alexander S. Cochran; 

major portions were written by Lawrence Greenberg. Kurt Guthe, Wayne 

Thompson, and Michael Eisenstadt. Mark Clodfelter, John Glock, and 

A1 Howey provided significant input. Richard Kohn, a member of the 

Review Committee, Abe Shulsky from the Office of the Principal Deputy 

Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources, and Michael 

Hayden from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force offered significant comments that were gratefully incorporated into the study. The 

views on planning presented in the volume, however, are those of the 

primary author. 

xi 

Introduction 

The focus of air planners was to envision the use of air power in 

achieving coalition objectives and military strategy. This report begins 

with the genesis of that plan with some background to place it within an 

historical perspective and traces its development through what existed on 

16 January 1991. 

The planning task force addresses three specific questions. First, 

what were the origins of the air campaign plan that was developed prior 

to the outbreak of the Gulf War in late July 1990? In brief, there were 

two: one, a series of contingency plans, the 1002 family of plans developed by planners for the region. In early August, however, the plan 

proved unable to provide the answers to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 

threatened attack of Saudi Arabia. The second set of origins was the 

scenario rehearsed during Exercise Internal Look, a Central Command 

(CENTCOM) wargame conducted only days before the Kuwaiti invasion. 

Though time prevented planners from implementing solutions to problems 

encountered, the exercise did focus their attention on the Gulf and provided them with a precursor of the final air campaign. 

In addressing the second question, why did planners of the air campaign develop the plan as they did from August 1990 through January 

1991? What were the determinants? Five positive influences are identified. First were the national objectives along with constraints and restraints prescribed by the President early in the crisis. Washington clearly 

outlined the goals and expectations of the air campaign plan, and its 

planners maintained them in the forefront throughout their efforts. Second was the overall concept for Instant Thunder, a plan for an independent offensive air campaign proposed by air planners in early August and 

remained the sole offensive option available to Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Central Command commander, during the first month of the crisis. 

Even after it was overcome by the arrival of additional resources, air 

planners used it as the basic blueprint for the final air campaign plan. 

Third were the various defensive plans made to support Desert Shield, the 

defense of Saudi Arabia, which remained the focus of U. S. concern 

through October. Air planners’ efforts here, particularly in target selection 

and tactical development, facilitated their expansion of the Instant Thunder concept into the Desert Storm plan. Fourth was the overall theater 

campaign plan in which CENTCOM planners from the outset had featured 

air power as the essential element. Even after additional ground forces 

xiii 
were added in October and the final phases of the offensive operation 

were developed, they retained air power as the key to all phases. And 

lastly, there was the planning process used by CENTAF planners in outlining just how they would use air power within the overall construct of the 

theater campaign and the concept of operations suggested by Instant 

Thunder to achieve national objectives. From the outset they followed 

a logical procedure that linked centers of gravity to specific target sets. 

There were also several factors which, in retrospect, limited the 

planners in their development. Most significant here was the less than 

satisfactory relationship between intelligence analysts and planners. 

Intelligence analysts often lacked detailed or timely information on Iraq, 

while operational planners excluded them from much of the planning 

process. Air planners made faulty assumptions about such important 

issues as the Iraqi employment of mobile Scuds as well as expectations 

on availability of bomb damage assessment essential to the development 

of their plan. Operational planners did not ask the right questions; neither 

did intelligence analysts anticipate them. 

The final question posed here dealt with the final plan as planners 

turned it into an execution order on January 16, 1991. Just what was that 

plan? What were the expectations of its planners? Here authors discovered several points. First, planners had put forth an extraordinary amount 

of work on the first phase of the air campaign plan-the strategic air campaign-particularly the first forty-eight hours. However, they had devoted 

surprisingly little detailed planning for the last two phases of Desert 

Storm. Second, planners’ selection of total numbers of targets within 

target categories remained remarkably similar to those first proposed in 

the Instant Thunder plan. Both of these suggest the degree to which air 

planners remained convinced that air power alone could achieve the 

overall objectives. 

The focus of this report is the air campaign plan; that is, the plan for 

using air power throughout the entire Desert Storm campaign. From 

November 1990 CENTCOM planners expected an air campaign of approximately one month. The time frame for developing the plan lasted from 

August 1990 through January 1991, which proved to be an extraordinarily 

long period for planners. Likewise, they were assured from mid-September of having in theater all air power resources needed to execute the 

plan. 

xiv 
This investigation focuses on the substance as well as the process of 

the plan, with emphasis on the former, and it views “a plan” as the 

simple expression, written or otherwise, of implementing strategy and 

using military resources to achieve objectives. It consists of a statement 

of intentions-normally expressed as mission-a vision to be realized, 

sometimes referred to as a “concept of operations,’* and tasks for subordinate elements that may or may not be specific in nature, but from which 

orders flow. Included also is a sense of priorities for these subordinate 

tasks, particularly if they are to be sequenced or if resources are limited, 

and an established system of command and control: who works for 

whom. Implicit in such statements are a sense of measurement, of success-a reference by which the plan may be determined to have succeeded 

or overtaken by events, a point at which victory may be proclaimed or 

another plan required. 

The planning section of this report is organized into three parts. The 

first provides background for the discussion of the plans themselves. It 

does not deal with the logistical build-up or requirements for support of 

air operations; these are outlined in the GWAPS report on logistics. 

Chapter One presents an overview of the air campaign plan that planners 

translated into the order for Operation Desert Storm on 16 January 1991. 

Chapter Two outlines American planning for the Gulf Region prior to the 

invasion of Kuwait including the wargame, Internal Look. In Chapter 

Three, the report investigates the Iraqi perspective on the Kuwait invasion, the period between the invasion and the coalition offensive and the 

situation on the eve of Desert Storm. 

The second part of planning, the major effort, concentrates on the 

actual plans, while details of the planning process have been left to the 

GWAPS report on Command and Control, which appears as Part I1 of this 

volume. Likewise, the consideration of the day-to-day training and 

operational activities of the U.S. Air Force from September 1990 through 

January 1991 in preparation for the air campaign can be found in the 

other volumes of GWAPS. Chapter Four describes the formation of national policy objectives, restraints, and constraints that shaped the overall 

theater campaign. Instant Thunder is described in Chapter Five, as are 

the various air plans, both defensive and offensive, formulated from 

August through December 1990 for the defense of Saudi Arabia, Chapter 

Six deals with the evolution of the final air campaign plan for Desert 

Storm. The role that intelligence played-both in theory and in reality-in 

the formulation of these plans is discussed in Chapter Seven. 

xv 
The final section of the planning report returns to the questions 

initially introduced and expands them with particular reference to the air 

campaign plan in midJanuary 1991. 

The authors encountered several matters during their research and 

analysis of planning that deserve mention at the outset-in particular 

sources, perspective, and precedent. To the greatest degree possible, this 

study is based upon research in primary sources. The GwAPS effort has 

been blessed with massive amounts of records on the conduct of the Gulf 

War. With regard to air campaign planning at the U.S. Air Force level 

to include CENTAF and the Ninth Air Force, this is particularly true. 

Frequently, however, the authors encountered both “too much” and “too 

little” at the same time. Thanks to the copying machine, in many instances, planning documents-to include very sensitive and highly classified ones-were reproduced in numbers and placed in varied files. Thus, 

at first blush a researcher is happily confronted by cubic feet of files, 

only to discover that the majority were merely copies of copies. Often 

they proved difficult to trace or date. On the other hand, there were 

many decisions or substantive discussions that the GWAPS researchers 

simply could not document. Some may have been recorded in informal 

minutes or notes still classified; others could only be derived from interviews and oral histories; many remain locked in individual memories. 

The authors also encountered references that may be confusing to 

readers and which should be brought to their attention. The reference 

“day” used in the Gulf War Air Power Survey in many instances is based 

on Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), known in the U.S. military as “Zulu” 

or ‘2‘’ time. In other references of the Survey, however, the time period 

may be expressed in local time, which of course varies from GMT. Key 

local time conversions are derived in the following manner: Eastern 

Standard or Daylight Savings Time (Z - 5 or Z - 6 hours) and Saudi 

Arabian as (Z + 3 hours). Thus, if an event occurred at 1700L (Local) 

time in Riyadh, it may be reported as having occurred at 14002. A 

detailed comparison of reference days for air tasking orders appears as 

Table 176, “AT0 Reference Dates,” in A Statistical Compendium, Volume V of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. 

U.S. military messages are cited throughout the GWAPS reports by 

their distinguishing date-time group (DTG). Normally appearing at the 

head of all U.S. military messages, a DTG indicates the time of initial 

transmission. Thus, a DTG of 032100 Nov 90 indicates that a message 

was transmitted on 3 November, 1990, at 2100 hours. 

xvi 
Gulf War planners may have been the first in history to record their 

concepts and decisions on briefing slides and scripts instead of written 

operation plans and meeting minutes. While conducting research, the 

authors found it essential to understand the misleading nature of “bullet 

slides” and blandness of “canned scripts” as well as the purpose of “backup slides” that may or may not have been used. 

This study is close in time to the event. After a year of research, the 

report’s authors continued to find new documentation that altered their 

analysis. One can only assume that such revelations will continue as new 

planning documents are opened for official research and more senior 

decision makers reveal their own roles and attitudes. 

Throughout, the authors were conscious that the World War I1 U. S. 

Strategic Bombing Survey, the GWAPS model, produced no report that 

dealt with the planning effort per se. Thus, they had no precedent; 

neither did they have a standard against for comparison. Lacking such 

guidance, the authors based the study upon judgment that the plan for the 

Gulf War air campaign was worthy of close study and detailed analysis. 

As with all human endeavors, it had its virtues, and it had its weaknesses. 

This report deals with both. 

xvii 

1 

The Air-Campaign Plan of 16 January 1991: 

An Overview 

The Desert Storm Campaign Plan 

Planners for the Gulf War air campaign plan of 16 January 1991 relied 

upon the “U.S. eyes only” theater operation plan for Desert Storm that had 

been published on 16 December 1990. Coalition planners delayed 

publishing their own version of the offensive plan until 17 January 1991 

for reasons that will be discussed in greater detail in this report. In both 

of these documents, U.S. and coalition planners laid out the purpose of 

their offensive plan-to counter Iraqi aggression and secure and restore 

(“provide for the establishment of‘) the legitimate government of Kuwait.’ 

The mission for both U.S. and coalition military forces flowed from 

these purposes. Planners saw Operation Desert Storm as an offensive 

operation to be executed when directed by higher authorities. Coalition 

forces viewed their objectives as twofold: (1) eject Iraqi forces from 

Kuwait and (2) be prepared to secure and defend Kuwait. The CENTCOM 

plan for U.S. forces was more detailed, though noting that their job was 

“in concert with coalition forces.” U. S. forces were to neutralize Iraqi 

National Command Authority, eject Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait, 

destroy the Republican Guard, destroy Iraqi’s ballistic missile, nuclear, 

biological and chemical warfare capabilities as early as possible, and 

assist in the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait? 

‘Information used in this chapter was taken primarily from the following two 

Operation Plans: (S) OPLAN USCENTCOM, Riyadh, HQ Joint ForcedTbeater of Operations, 

Riyadh, (S) Combined OPUN for Offensive Operations to Eject Iraqi Forces from Kuwait, 

17 Jan 91, GWAS NA-106, hereafter cited as (S) Coalition Combined OPUN; and (WF) 

USCINCCENT, U.S. OPUN Desert Storm, 16 Dec 1990. GWAPS. CHC 18-2. hereafter cited as 

(SMF) USCINCCENT OPUN Desert Storm. 

’(S) Coalition Combined OPUN, p 3; (S/NF) USCINCCENT OPUN Desert Storm, p 9. 

1 
Central Command, as well as coalition planners made use of the 

concept of “centers of gravity.” Defined by the 19th century philosopher 

of war, Carl von Clausewitz as “the hub of all power and movement, on 

which everything depends . . . the point against which all our energies 

should be directed,” this notion had gained acceptance in military thinking and planning over the past decade.3 As this report (and others in 

GWAPS) will make clear, both political decisionmakers and their military 

planners differed on just what constituted centers of gravity for this war? 

U.S. and coalition planners for the Gulf War offensive identified Iraq as 

having three “primary centers of gravity”: (1) leadership, command and 

control (U.S. planners were even more precise here, identifying Saddam 

Hussein); (2) chemical, biological, and nuclear capability; and (3) forces 

of the Republican Guard. There also was agreement that “these will be 

targeted throughout . . . to ensure destruction, neutralization, elimination 

or degradation as soon as p~ssible.”~ With one exception to be noted, 

planners did not attempt to quantify or further define tasks such as “destruction, neutralization, elimination, degradation, or attrit.” 

From the overall mission and centers of gravity came specific 

objectives. U.S. planners first stated the U.S. national objectives that had 

been central to their efforts for the past five and a half months were to 

achieve the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi 

forces from Kuwait; restore the legitimate government of Kuwait; and 

remain committed to the restoration of security and stability of the Arabian Gulf. Both sets of plans then laid out “operational campaign objectives”: (1) destroy Iraq’s military capability to wage war (US. planners 

were more precise here, saying “neutralize Iraqi leadership and command 

and control”); (2) gain and maintain air supremacy; (3) cut Iraq supply 

lines (the U. S. document added the word “totally”); (4) destroy Iraq‘s 

chemical, biological, and nuclear capability; (5) destroy Republican Guard 

forces; and 6) liberate Kuwait City with Arab forces! 

3Clausewitz, Carl, On War. ed Michael Howard and Peter Paret, etc, pp 595-6. 

Clausewitz wrote a single Center of gravity; however Central Command planners assumed 

that there could be several. 

‘For further discussion on this matter, see GWAPS report on Effects and Effectiveness. 

’(S) Coalition Combined OPUN, p 4; (S/NF) USCINCCENT OPUNDesert Storm. p 9. 

6(s) Coalition Combined OPUN, p 2; (WF) USCINCCEm OPUN Desert Storm, p 5. 

2 
3 
Planners of the Gulf War offensive, Desert Storm, worked from 

several key assumptions. The first was that this plan’was the logical 

extension of their earlier plans to “deter further Iraqi aggression” and 

“defend critical port and oil facilities.” Second, they assumed “application 

of overwhelming air, naval, and ground combat power” and *contribution 

of many nations’ forces.** And last-here again U.S. planners were more 

precise-offensive operations would be followed by “security of Kuwait. . . as a result of the offensive campaign or a political settlement, . . . regional security . . . (through) conflict termination, . . . (and) 

strategic redeployment of designated U.S. for~e.’” 

Desert Storm planners envisioned an offensive operation in four 

phases, each with its own separate set of objectives and time estimates. 

The operation was to commence with 

. . . an extensive strategic air campaign . . . against targets in Iraq 

focusing on enemy centers of gravity. The air campaign will progressively shift into the KTO (Kuwait Theater of Operations) to reduce the 

effectiveness of Iraqi defenses and isolate the KTO (U.S. planners again 

were more precise here adding ‘inflict maximum enemy casualties’). 

On order, a multi-axis ground, naval, and air attack will be 

launched . . . to create the perception of a main attack in the east. The 

main effort . . . will be in the western ~~0.8 

They noted that “execution of the phases is not necessarily discrete or 

sequential; phases may overlap as resources become available or priorities 

shift.”’ 

They entitled Phase I “Strategic Air Campaign.” The designation 

“strategic” had different connotations for air planners and their ground 

counterparts, but remained undefined throughout the plan. Interestingly, 

in some cases it was introduced in capital letters while in other instances 

it was “lower-cased,” perhaps avoiding the issue. Regardless, the campaign’s objective was clear in the U.S. plan: 

’(SAW) USCINCCENT OPW Desert Storm, pp 3-4. 

‘(S) Coalition Combined OPUN, pp 4-5; (S/NF) USCINCCENT OPW Desert storm. 

9(S) Ibid. 

pp 9-10. 

4 
. . . attack Iraq’s strategic air defenses, aircraftlairfields, strategic chemical, biological and nuclear capability; leadership targets; command and 

control systems; RGFC (Republican Guard Force Command) forces; 

telecommunications facilities; and key elements of the national infrastructure, such as critical Lots (lines of communications) between 

Baghdad and the KTO, electric grids, petroleum storage and military 

production facilities.” 

Planners expected this phase to last six to nine days, anticipating “disruption of Iraqi command and control, loss of confidence in the government, 

significant degradation of Iraqi military capabilities and isolation and 

destruction of the RGFC.”~’ 

The phase was to be both joint and coalition as special operation 

forces were to destroy intercept operations centers on the Iraq-Saudi 

border, resistance forces were to disrupt key communication sites in 

Kuwait and Iraq, while naval forces were to initiate sea control and 

counternine operations in the Gulf. And finally, under the cover of the 

air campaign, ground forces were to move into attack positions for the 

final phase of Desert Storm, a move that planners estimated would take 

fifteen days,” 

Exactly when planners expected Phase 11, Air Supremacy in the KTO, 

to begin was not clear, though they noted that “the phase will be initiated 

coincident with, or immediately following, the strategic air campaign.” 

They also noted that “as strategic air campaign objectives are met, . . . 

Phase II begins with priority of air effort shifting to the KTO to roll back 

Iraqi air defenses and sever supply lines.”13 Specific attack objectives 

included aircraft, airfields, air defense weapons, and command and control systems in Iraq and Kuwait “to provide an environment in which B52s. tactical air and attack helicopters can operate effectively in subsequent phases.” They expected this phase to last from one to two days.14 

“(SMF) USCINCCENT OPUN Desert storm, p 12. 

“(s) Coalition Combined OPUN, p 5; (SmF) USCINCCENT OPlANDesert Storm, p 12. 

”(SMF) USCINCCENT OPUN Desert storm. p I 2. 

I3/bid, p 1 1. 

I41bid, 12. 

5 
Phase 111, Battlefield Preparation, was to be an extension of Phase 11, 

with increased attacks against “Iraqi ground combat forces and supporting 

missile/rocket/artillery units.” Planners directed a shift to “tactical air and 

naval surface fires” to interdict supply lines and destroy command, control, and communications systems in southern Iraq and Kuwait. Planners 

projected this phase to last eight days. The purpose of this effort was “to 

open a window of opportunity for initiating ground offensive operations 

by confusing and terrorizing Iraqi forces in the KTO and shifting combat 

force ratio in favor of friendly forces.” The desired effects were to cut 

the Iraqi supply lines (the U.S.-only plan specified this as “totally”), and 

reduce Iraqi combat effectiveness in the KTO by at least fifty percent.” 

As will be discussed in this report, just what planners meant by fifty 

percent was never clear; indeed it varied widely by component and level. 

The U.S.-only plan specified the percentage as “particularly the RGFC,” 

noting also destruction of Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities. They also anticipated that this phase might commence during the 

short Phase 11, if air defense systems had been degraded. 

If all went as envisioned, planners estimated that Phase IV, Ground 

Offensive Operations, would commence approximately three weeks after 

the launching of Desert Storm. The objectives for this phase were to 

liberate Kuwait, cut critical lines of communication into southeast Iraq, 

and destroy the Republic Guard. The main attack was to be conducted 

along the western border of Kuwait to “destroy Republican Guard forces,” It was to be a ground attack, “combined with continuous B-52 

strikes, TACAIR (tactical air) attacks, and attack helicopter operations.” 

Planners envisioned four secondary attacks, by coalition. U.S. Army, and 

the U.S. Marine forces along with a series of feints, demonstrations and 

amphibious operations. In anticipation for the main attack, “the bridges, 

roads and rail line immediately south of Basra will be cut to block withdrawal of RGFC and to form a kill zone north of Kuwait.”16 Though the 

planners did not specify in writing exactly how long they expected this 

phase to last, a graphic in the U.S.-only plan indicated: “Republican 

”(S) Coalition Combined OPLAN. p 6; (S/NF) USCLNCCENT OPUNDesert Storm, p 13. 

“(s) Coalition Combined OPLAN, pp 6-7; (S/NF) USCINCCENT OPLAN Desert storm, 

pp 13-14. 

6 
Guard destroyed, establish defense SE Iraq and Kuwait” by G+6 Day, 

thus assuming that Phase IV would be completed within a week.I7 

U.S. and coalition planners included two matrixes in the Desert Storm 

plan. The first as shown below outlined specific objectives along with 

the phases during which they were to be accomplished: 

Table 1 

Coalition Campaign Objectives 

Military 

Objective 

Source: (S) Coalition Combined OPUN, 17 Jan 91, Riyadh, p 4. 

Planners did not include in this matrix the objective to “destroy Iraq’s 

chemical, biological, and nuclear capability.” The second matrix was one 

that aligned the specific phases and selected tasks along a time line, as 

noted in Figures 1 and 2. As these charts made clear, planners expected 

Desert Storm to last a month or less. 

~~ 

“(S/NF) USCINCCENT OPUN Desert Slorm, Appendix 17 to Annex c, np. 

7 
Figure 1 

D-Day Sequence 

Republican 

Guards 

1 st corps RACO 

-1 

Marines 

supporting 

anack 

culs LOCS 

pGzr] Fl [pGX] -1 

Strategic Air Supremacy Battlefield Ground Offensive 

Air Campaign 

3 - 9 Days 1 - 2 Days 5 - 8 Days 

establish 

emergency 

WVbS 

____ J- __ 

- Begin repositioning Sea control 

forces continues 

SOF Operations 

(10'2. CSAR, DA) 

Sea control 

Surface fires 

cut LOCs 

Ground foka G-1 

movement Amphib 

complete demo 

I 

G-7 

Amphib MEB moves 

Souru: USCINCCENT OPUN &sari StonR &pen& 17 

to Annex C. np; Wi Cambined OPW. p 6. 

Figure 2 

G-Day Sequence 

Source: USCINCCENT OPUN Deserl Sfm. Appendix 17 to AMex C. np. 

8 
The key-indeed in some phases the critical-role in the overall 

operation plan as well as individual phases was to be played by air power. In the U.S.-only plan, the Commander U.S. Central Command Air 

Force (COMUSCENTAF) was designated “Joint Force Air Component 

Commander for the USCENTCOM AOR (Area of Operations).” Included 

were responsibilities to “plan, coordinate, allocate and task sorties . . . direct coordination . . . to ensure integration of the air campaign . . . (and) integrate supporting maritime air resources.”” While the 

coalition plan was not that specific, these planners did direct COMUSCENTAF to accomplish tasks including “prepare an air campaign plan to 

destroy Iraq’s military capability to wage war . . . in coordination with 

Commander, Royal Saudi Air Force.”19 

Both plans gave COMUSCENTAF tasks that were specifically tied to the 

phases already discussed, such as “cut bridges, roads and rail lines immediately south of Basra to block withdrawal of RGFC forces and block reinforcement andor resupply of Iraqi forces from the west and to isolate Iraqi 

forces in the KTO . . . (and) be prepared to assist in securing and defending 

of Kuwait City.”” These served to emphasize the tasks outlined. 

The Desert Storm air campaign plan 

From the outset of the Gulf War crisis, theater planners had relied 

upon air power, featuring it initially in defensive and then in offensive 

theater campaign plans that evolved as will be discussed in detail in this 

report. Early in this crisis, CENTAF planners produced a plan that followed the classic “five paragraph field order” format (situation, mission, 

execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal) format?’ However, for reasons that are not clear, planners of the Gulf War 

air campaign in their subsequent efforts turned to different formats to 

outline and detail the specifics of the air plan for the Gulf War for both 

decisionmakers and operators. 

(S/NF) USCINCCENT OPUN Desert Storm. p c-2. 18 

I9(S) Coalition Combined OPUN, p 10. 

“(S) Ibid, pp 9-10. 

”(S) OpOrd. COMUSCENTAFOffensive Campaign-Phase 1,2 Sep 90. GWAE files. 

9 
The initial format planners used to lay out the specifics of the air 

campaign was that of briefings. ”0 days after CENTCOM planners had 

issued the U.S.-only Desert Storm plan, the chief CENTCOM air campaign 

planner, Brig. Gen. Buster Glosson, briefed his USAF wing commanders-the operators-on their role in the air campaign plan?* SeveraI days 

later, he briefed the Secretary of Defense- major decisionmaker-on the 

role of the air campaign in the theater plan. From these two briefings 

came the air campaign plan for Desert Storm. 

As will be discussed in this and other GWAPS reports, air planners 

were guided by the CENTCOM concept of centers of gravity, though they 

modified the last one from “forces of the Republican Guard” to “military 

forces.’’ They then matched these against general target sets and picked 

specific targets within these sets. By the time of the briefings in midDecember, 238 specific targets were selected in the following categories: 

Table 2 

CENTAF Target Categories (Sets) - December 1990 

Target Set Number of 

Targets 

Strategic Air Defense 

Strategic Chemical and Scuds 

Leadership 

Republican Guards and Military Support 

Telecommunications 

Electricity 

Oil 

Railroads 

Airfields 

Ports 

Total 

28 

25 

32 

44 

26 

16 

7 

28 

28 

4 

238 

Source: (S) Brfg, “Theater Air Cam 

90. Glosson’s notebook, GWAPS Box r# older 4, MAP. 

n” Briefing for Wing Commanders, 18 Dec 

”Ibid. 

10 
These target sets provided General Glosson and his air campaign planners 

with a framework within which they constructed specific “attack plans” 

that were then placed within the overall construct of the four theater 

campaign phases. 

Air planners assigned no specific objectives for Phase I, the strategic 

air campaign. Instead they expected to “destroy leadership’s military 

command and control, destroy nuclear, biological, and chemical capability, disrupt and attrit Republican Guard Forces, disrupt leadership’s ability 

to communicate with populace, destroy key electrical grids and oil storage, (and) limit military resupply capability.” They estimated that the 

phase would last for six days, with Phase II starting on the fourth day and 

Phase 111 on the fifth day. Planners laid out a detailed “attack plan” with 

specific targets selected from the list of 238 for the first two days. On 

the succeeding four days, they planned to “reattack 20% of first and 

second day targets, key targets requiring additional attacks (BDA) [meaning that re-attacking would be based upon bomb damage assessment], and 

remainder of targets not covered during the first 48 hours.” Notionally, 

they divided each twenty-four-hour period into four segments: “pre 

dawn, morning, afternoon, and night.” They envisioned more than 1 ,OOO 

attack sorties per day during this pha~e.2~ 

Air planners described the objective for Phase 11, KTO Air Supremacy, 

as “provide a threat free environment allowing unhindered air operations 

in the Kuwait Theater of Operations.” They told Secretary Cheney that 

the objective was to “establish air supremacy over the Kuwaiti Theater 

of Operations and provide an environment conducive to the conduct of 

air to ground attacks.” They expected 305 sorties over a two-day period 

to “destroy all radar controlled surface-to-air threats and establish air 

supremacy in the KTO.” As noted earlier, this phase would commence 

during Phase I. 

For Phase 111, Shaping the Battlefield in the KTO, planners wanted to 

“shape the battlefield for initiation of offensive ground campaign.” They 

further refined the definition for Secretary Cheney to “continue Phase I 

operations into Iraq to prevent reconstitution and resupply, SEAD 

Brfg (S), “Theater Air Campaign” Briefing for Wing Commanders. 18 Dec 1990, 23 

in Glosson’s notebook in GWAW Box 1, Folder 4, MAP. 

11 
Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf in Coalition Operations center in Riyadh. 

[Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses] operations as required, and battlefield preparations continue as an air operation against Iraqi ground forces 

in Kuwait with a focus on Republican Guards and artillery.” They expected “an air operation against Iraqi focusing on the Republican Guard, 

approximately 600 U.S. sorties a day, with 300 sorties a day available in 

case of Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia.” They also saw this as a continuation of Phase I1 SEAD operations. 

Fifty percent attrition of Iraqi ground forces by air power was expected by the planners, “arty (artillery), armor, and troops,” by the fourth day 

of Phase 111. Their projections showed ninety percent attrition by the 

ninth day. This phase would conclude with “Kuwaiti Theater of Operations prepared for offensive ground campaign to liberate Kuwait.” They 

noted for Secretary Cheney that this “achieves Presidential objectives with 

12 
minimal loss of life.” Planners envisioned “Republican Guard Forces in 

the KTO . . . no longer capable of launching an attack or reinforcing Iraqi 

forces in Kuwait (and) should be possible for the majority of friendly 

forces re-occupying Kuwait to be Arab.”” 

, 

During the four weeks between the issuance of the CENTCOM Desert 

Storm plan and the actual execution of the air campaign plan, air planners 

worked to translate the concepts into the final document-the Air Tasking 

Order (ATO)?’ Traditionally, they had relied upon the “five paragraph field 

order.” However, for the Gulf War offensive planning, CENTAF planners 

tried a new planning tool, the so-called Master Attack Plan. It was this 

format and procedure that they used to translate the purpose, mission, 

objectives, and tasks as outlined in the Desert Storm Theater Operations 

Plans into the Desert Storm Air Campaign Plan on 16 January 1991. 

On the eve of Desert Storm execution, planners had three Master Attack 

Plans, one entitled “First 24 Hours,” the next “Second 24 Hours,” and the 

last, ‘Third 24 Hours.”26 Each outlined several specifics: MSN# (mission 

number); BEN (basic encyclopedia number), TGT (target); Description; and 

AC (aircraft). Earlier versions of this format included a category labeled 

“effects” chat was dropped as planning progressed. Perhaps the most significant entries on the master plan were the lists of “targets” and “description.” 

As discussed above, air planners very early in their efforts had matched 

centers of gravity and military objectives against exact target categories 

called “target sets.” They then assigned a two-digit alphabetic code with 

more precise target description which allowed a sense of how that mission 

fit into the overall air campaign plan concept. 

The Master Attack Plan did not break the period into four segments 

as had been formulated during the earlier briefings. Rather, planners 

subdivided their twenty-four-hour plan into groups that focused upon a 

24f6id. 

2sF~r a detailed discussion of the ATO. both procedure and content, see GWAPS 

Report on Command and Control. After the war, a CENTAF planner pointed out that “the 

ATO was the most critical part in air campaign planning. The importance of the Master 

Attack Plan was the concepts embedded in the flow.” Intvw, Col Sam Baptiste with A. 

S. Cochran, CWAPS, 10 Nov 92. 

26(S) Doc, Master Attack Plan, First 24 Hours, 1/167/91 21:21; Master Attack Plan, 

Second 24 Hours, 17 Jd1600; Master Attack Plan, Third 24 Hours, 14 Jan, 2247, all 

found in Box 1, Master Attack Plan, GwAPS Files. 

13 
particular type target such as command and control, Scuds, or Republican 

Guards, as well as specific aircraft like F-117 or A-10. In some instances, these were identified as “packages”; however, more than often, air 

planners grouped them by a desired functional effect or target category.” 

The first twenty-four-hour MAP was the most detailed, as planners 

outlined specific targets and time on target for some seven hundred 

combat aircraft including not only USAF aircraft but also U.S. Army 

helicopters, USMC aircraft and drones, and US Navy aircraft and Tomahawk land attack missiles. During the first twenty-four hours, they 

envisioned some seventy-six individual groups of attacks, thirty-two in 

the first wave during darkness (€3-Hour to daylight), twenty-six during 

daylight hours, and eighteen from dusk to midnight. The first wave 

featured F-117 Stealth fighters flying as individual attack aircraft, a 

handful of F-ISEs, and some thirty US. Navy Tomahawk missiles. 

Sorties were directed against command and control and leadership facilities in Baghdad, Tallil, and south central Iraq-specifically designed to 

cripple Iraqi air defense. Equally important were known Scud launch 

areas in H-2 and H-3 that directly threatened Israel. Also scheduled were 

Scud storage sites as well as chemical bunkers. During daylight hours of 

the first day, F-l6s, A-10s. B-52s, and F-111s were to strike the bulk of 

the targets. Sorties continued against H-2 and H-3 potential Scud launching areas, chemical weapon bunkers, and airfields. Added were more air 

defense installations, command and control bunkers, and Republican 

Guard formations. B-52~. launched from the continental United States 

and using conventional air-launched cruise missiles for the first time, 

would also strike command and control facilities. During the final phase 

of the first twenty-four hours, El 17s were to return against leadership 

and command and control targets in the Baghdad area, while other aircraft were to attack bridges and airfields. 

In the second twenty-four-hour Master Attack Plan, planners scheduled fifty-four sets of strikes, again sequenced in three waves. The first 

wave, initially F-117s then F-111 s, were to continue attacks of air defense 

facilities and airfields as well as biological weapons bunkers. During the 

daylight wave, the attacks were to be continued by A-IOs, again pounding 

the Republican Guard just north of Kuwait, while F-16s focused on Scud 

production facilities and storage bunkers in the Baghdad area. Naval 

14 
Tomahawk land attack missiles were to be targeted against oil and electric facilities while F-18s were to hit naval port facilities. During the 

final evening wave, strikes were targeted across the country. The F-117s 

were to return to command and control targets, while A-6s and B-52s 

were targeted against oil refineries. The F-111s were to strike both 

chemical and manufacturing facilities. Thus, in the second twenty-fourhour plan, planners shifted the air campaign from air superiority targets 

to war making production facilities. 

The third twenty-four-hour period had always been seen by planners 

as the time when they would react to intelligence and bomb damage 

assessment which presumably would indicate targets to be reattacked. 

The planners laid out this scheme in the Master Attack Plan for this 

period, which was less definitive in targeting and overall priorities; it 

relied on CENTAF “to provide near real time battle damage assessments.’*zs 

More than fifty separate sets of targets were grouped into the three wave 

periods. During the first midnight-to-dawn wave, F-1 1 1 s, F- 16s, and F18s were to strike Republican Guard locations and military storage sites. 

In the daytime wave, F-14s, F-l6s, and F-18s were assigned against 

bridges, canals, and Republican Guard, while F-16s were to strike leadership and chemical targets in Baghdad. Large numbers of A-10s were 

unassigned, presumably to be used against targets that needed to be hit 

again. RAF aircraft were to continue to pound airfields. After dusk, the 

F-117s were to continue to hit leadership targets, and revisit command 

and control facilities. A-6s were to hit highway bridges, F-1 1 1s were to 

strike electric transformers and chemical plants while F-15s were targeted 

against ammunition facilities. The final entry was for F-l17s, “rBDhased 

on BDA”-tO be determined based upon bomb damage asse~sment?~ The 

planners thus intended to continue efforts against Iraqi war-making capabilities while awaiting intelligence on their first forty-eight-hour effort. 

While planners had given some thought to what would occur after 

this initial seventy-two-hour period, Master Attack Plans for this period 

were only notional. As such, they were not part of the overall Desert 

Storm air campaign plan. The air campaign plan for Desert Storm that 

28(S) Coalition Combined OPUN, p 10. 

291bid, p 13. 

15 
launched the coalition air armada on 17 January represented the results 

and included these written products and the expectations they embodied. 

It is to the evolution of the air campaign plan that we now turn. 

i 

16 
2 

Pre-Crisis Air Planning for the Persian Gulf 

While the essential elements of U.S. air planning for the Persian Gulf 

during the two decades prior to the 1990 Iraq invasion-national 

objectives, military strategy, and air power-were critical for the final 

campaign plans, the roots for each extend back sixty years.’ An underlying aspect of U.S. national policy since 1939 had been unrestricted access 

to oil. What made that aspect more dominant after World War XI was the 

decline in crude oil production in North America and the rise in production from the Persian Gulf? As U.S. reliance on imported oil became 

more explicit in national policy, this translated into an objective of regional stability and reliance upon two conservative regimes in the region-the “Twin Pillars” of Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

Designing a military strategy to support this policy proved difficult 

for planners who lacked a definable external threat for the region. 

Compared to Europe and Southeast Asia with their Soviet and Communist China threats, the possibility of active U.S. military involvement in 

the Persian Gulf region seemed remote. As a result, strategists relied on 

“containment” policy-military aid and assistance through treaty arrangements-that seemed to have worked in the preceding decades. Moreover, 

they viewed the Gulf within the broader context of Europe, in essence the 

right flank of NATO. Military planning for the past two decades relied 

heavily upon air power as the most appropriate response to a regional 

threat. U.S. military leaders supported military assistance and arms sales 

to Iran and Saudi Arabia and the construction of or access to airfields 

capable of staging large numbers of strategic and fighter bombers such 

as Diego Garcia and Dhahran. 

‘Background here is taken from Amitav Acharya, U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf 

(New York RoutledgeJ989). Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm: The United 

Stares Navy ad fhe Persian Gulf(Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1992). and works 

by Mr Kurt Guthe. GWAPS. 

United States Department of Energy figures as cited in Acharya, op. cit, p 7. 2 

17 
The overthrow of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 

dramatically changed this. The Carter Doctrine declared as a national 

interest unimpeded access to Gulf oil and proclaimed that any external 

attempt to disrupt this flow would be repelled by necessary means, including military force. Coupled with this declaration was the swing of 

U.S. regional commitments from Iran to Iraq and the identification of the 

threat as being external-the Soviet Union. Given this direction, the first 

military response was the formation of a new theater command-Rapid 

Deployment Joint Task Force. The creation of this headquarters, separate 

from European-based forces, led to a subtle change in military strategy 

from regional stability through assistance and aid to defense and deterrence through force projection. Rapid Deployment planners quickly 

realized deficiencies such as lack of logistical infrastructure as well as an 

inadequate force structure. Still, the headquarters-which was redesignated 

from a temporary task force structure to a permanent unified command 

(Central Command) in 1983-began designing strategy and plans. 

CENTCOM planners believed the dominant military force would be the 

ground element with its priority mission to deter aggression or defend 

against a Soviet thrust from Iran into Saudi Arabia. Their emphasis for 

the air component stressed force projection both to and within the region 

and highlighted the development of regional airfields, including the 

development of Diego Garcia as “the hub of U.S. efforts to project power 

into the Gulf regi~n,”~ and procurement of inter- and intra-theater transport and support aircraft. For direct combat application, early CENTCOM 

analysts envisioned air power supporting ground operations in traditional 

combined arms operations. 

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, American 

contingency planning changed little throughout the 1980s despite the IranIraq War. Both CENTCOM and U.S. Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) planners continued to address a scenario in which the Soviets 

would invade the region (and Saudi Arabia) through Iran. Since planners 

assumed that this would be part of a worldwide Soviet military strategy, 

CENTCOM adopted a twenty-eight day unambiguous warning time‘ as a 

’Acharya, p 96. 

4Unambiguous warning time can be defined as that period before actual hostilities 

during which a nation and its military forces are. taking identifiable steps, such as mobilization and deployment of forces, as a prelude for military operations. Ambiguous 

18 
planning assumption and, because the command lacked prepositioned 

forces in the region, would use this period to deploy large numbers of 

ground troops and logistical support into Saudi Arabia prior to the start 

of hostilities. Planners therefore saw defense of Saudi ports and air fields 

as key initial objectives, and the importance of these potential points of 

entry carried forward into CINCCENT OPLAN 1002 planning prior to the 

1990 Gulf crisis. 

Air power planning for CENTCOM was essentially defensive in nature. 

Under these conditions, planners viewed tactical air power as the means 

to gain and maintain air superiority primarily to protect ports of entry, to 

serve as a force multiplier for defensive ground operations, and to 

participate in a ground-based counteroffensive, if needed, to reestablish 

preconflict international borders. Central Command planned to use any 

excess air power against interdiction targets. The most important aspect 

for air power was in the requirement for force projection into the theater 

by air. This led to the continued construction-even “overconstruction”-of 

air bases. 

Senior political and military planners were surprised by the sudden 

collapse of the Soviet threat during the latter part of the decade. In the 

Gulf region this removed the major threat against which most military 

planning had been done. In early 1989, planners in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) began to update plans 

on a worldwide basis. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz undertook development of the new Defense Planning Guidance for 

Fy 1992-97 that emphasized the importance of U.S. interests in Southwest 

Asia amidst regional instability that supplanted the external Soviet threat. 

Eventually signed by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney on 24 January 

1990, the document directed the DOD to be prepared to defend the Arabian Peninsula against regional military threats. [DELETED] Cheney 

highlighted his concerns by defining American goals in the following 

statement: 

warning defines steps that may be related to pending operations but could also be related 

to non-hostile exercises or internal activities. 

19 
[DELETED] We will work with allies and friends to ensure the 

protection of free world oil sources. [DELETED]' 

On 16 October 1989, three months prior to the publication of the new 

Planning Guidance, the newly confirmed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (~CS), Gen. Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, summoned Gen. H. 

Norman Schwankopf, US. Army, to Washington to discuss contingency 

planning for Southwest Asia. Powell believed that recent changes in the 

Soviet Union produced such dramatic changes in the world's situation 

that they necessitated a change of focus for the basic planning document 

upon which major Southwest Asia contingencies were built [DELETED] 

that envisioned hostilities in the Middle East as a prelude to and a 

secondary front in a global war in Europe. 

According to a participant at the meeting, General Powell told 

Schwarzkopf-who became CINCCENT in November 198840 update Central Command's existing contingency plan6 to deter and defend the Arabian Peninsula. The focus of the revised plan, according to the Chairman, 

would reflect the current regional political-military situation that, by the 

fall of 1989, indicated how Iraq posed the greatest threat to regional 

stability. General Schwarzkopf's lack of response to the change of planning focus-that is, he did not indicate that Central Command was already 

working on this change of direction-indicated that CENTCOM had yet to 

undertake aggressively the updating of contingencies against potential 

intra-regional threats that did not involve aspects of a greater, Europeanbased global war.' 

'(SINF) Rpt, Rear Adm met) Grant Sharp, "Sharp Study" Planning for the Gdf 

War, Draft of 3 Dec 91, prepared for Office of Principal Deputy, Under Secretary of Defense (S&R). pp 2-4. Located GWAPS holdings. 

6USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-88. 

I (s) Intvw. Lawrence M. Greenberg. GWAPS. with Col Clifford Krieger, USAF. 

Director Strategy and Operations Division, National Defense University. 21 Feb 92; (S) 

Notes, Col. Bryan A. Sutherland, USA, C~M J-5, handwritten notes, 3 Oct 90, GWAPS 

and AFHRA 00881768, reel 23630. 

20 
USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-88 

General Powell wanted Schwarzkopf to update OPW 1002-88, 

“Operations To Counter Intraregional Persian Gulf Conflict Without 

Direct Armed Soviet Involvement.,** which outlined CENTCOM response, 

in concert with host and allied forces, to regional attacks on critical oil 

facilities on the Arabian Peninsula-specifically Saudi Arabia. At the time 

this plan was written, contingency planners considered the greatest regional threat coming from Iran. [DELETEDIE As with previous plans, 

they viewed force projection as critical; hence, the plan relied heavily on 

early deployment of USAF assets to demonstrate American resolve, protect 

follow-on deployment of both air and ground forces, and to assist these 

forces should ground combat become necessary. 

In April 1988, Central Command planners forwarded OPLAN 1002-88 

to the Joint Staff for review. The document received JCS approval on 31 

August 1988 and was subsequently amended in February 1989. That fall, 

the joint command and execution community conducted a ‘zime-Phased 

Force Deployment Datag maintenance teleconference to finalized priority 

deployment planning, thus essentially completing the deliberate planning 

process for the contingency plan.” 

The contingency plan was primarily a deployment document that 

outlined only a vague notion for the use of air power along with a general 

concept for ground operations. Similar to other theater contingency plans, 

planners devoted their effort to defining forces, establishing command 

relationships, and developing a scheme to move forces to the theater to 

support CINC missions4eterrence and defense-with the possibility of some 

limited counteroffensive action. They made no mention of an offensive 

American operation or an independent offensive air campaign. 

*[DELETED] 

’Joint planners create a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data file during the plan 

development phase of deliberate planning. Information for the computerized file comes 

from sources throughout the Joint Planning and Execution Community and allows planners to manipulate unit deployments according to capability, manning, and lift requirements. Detailed discussions of the TPFDD and TPFDL are. located in the GWAPS Logistics 

volume. 

Buckley, USCENTCOM J-5-P, 1 Jun 90, GWAPS and AFHRA 00881768. reel 23630. 

“(s) act sheet, “USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90-~rabian peninsuw COI JO~ L. 

21 
Central Command and Joint Staff planners allocated component force 

packages and deployment time phases almost identical to those in the 

preceding plan, OPLAN 1002-86. As a result, air forces remained virtually 

unchanged in type or numbers with USAF air superiority and ground 

attack aircraft supplemented with support aircraft and modest naval and 

USMC air. For ground forces planners relied on those Army and Marine 

units that could be moved quickly into the theater-light forces that lacked 

significant anti-armor capabilities. At the time, CENTCOM planners 

believed these forces capable of defending Saudi Arabia from the 

potential threat. 

Table 3 

USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-88 Force Requirements 

USAF U.S. Army USN/USMC Special Ops 

TFS” Abn Corps CVBG 

TAS HQ SAG 

TRS AASLT Div (-) 

B-52 ADA Bde MEB 

AWACS acrft Mech Bde (on call) 

KC-135 

Source: (s) Fact sheet, Col Buckley, CENTCOM J-5-P, “USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002- 

%Arabian Peninsula.” MacDill AFB, 1 Jun 90, GWAPS 00881768, reel 23630. frames 

598-689. 

“Fighter aircraft include (in order of arrival): F-1% F-16, Fa, F-11 ID, A-IOA, 

RF-4C. F-15E. F4E. USCINCCM OfLAN 1002-88. pp xii-xiii. 

22 
Planners developed a traditional two-phase (defense and limited 

counterattack) concept of operations that followed a preconflict period.12 

The preconflict interval began on ambiguous warning and continued to 

C-Day (the beginning day of troop deployment) and reflected the necessity of some degree of international and domestic consensus before employing overt military options and the first movement of troops. During 

this time, planners anticipated the President employing political and 

economic measures against the aggressor to demonstrate U.S. resolve and, 

if necessary, culminating in a show-of-force. [DELETED] Finally, 

should a lack of warning time preempt separate preconflict actions, these 

steps would occur concurrently with Phase I.” 

During Phase I, CENTCOM planners envisioned air power as an 

essential foundation for success. Their plan called for a defensive Phase 

I [DELETED] that depended heavily on earlydeployed combat Air Force 

assets to protect deploying forces from enemy attack. Planners assumed 

that, due to the theater’s remote location and lack of permanent U.S. 

military presence, the Air Force would be the first service capable of 

placing substantial combat resources on the Peninsula. During this 

defensive period air, ground, and naval forces would enter the theater and 

assume a defensive posture. If airfields were in friendly hands, the 

ground forces would arrive directly and establish local defenses for 

follow-on units. [DELETED] Once the critical ports of entry were 

secure, additional air, ground, naval, special operations forces, and 

amphibious forces would arrive at ports and airfields on the eastern side 

of the Arabian Peninsula, while naval forces ensured access to the Straits 

of Hormuz and the Bab El Mandeb, a strait at the southern end of the 

Red Sea near the spur on the southwest tip of Yemen.I4 

As part of the routine deliberate planning system used to produce 

OPLANs, supporting component planners produced their own contingency 

plans to supplement those written by the theater commander. At MacDill 

Air Force Base, CENTAF planners treated concepts of air power operations 

I2(S) Fact sheet, USCENTCOM 1-5-P. *~USCINCCENTOPLAN 1002-88-Arabian Peninsula,” 

l3(S) Background paper, HQUSAFXOXXM. “Background Paper on USCINCCENTOPLAN 

I4(S) Background paper, HQ USAFXOXXM. “Background Paper on USCINCCENT OPLAN 

1 Jun 90. 

1002-88 (Change I),” 2 Jun 89. GWAPS CHC 9-2. 

1002-88 (Change I),” 2 Jun 89.; (S) VSCINCCENT OPW 1002-88,Plan Summary, p vi. 

23 
in broad, general terms. While defining overall objectives divided into 

defensive and offensive phases, their overriding concern was getting 

forces into the theater and then, once the situation crystallized, to clarify 

and define specific roles for air power. They made no detailed plans for 

air operations, nor were they expected to do so. Instead, they called for 

air-to-air assets to provide defensive counterair and air-to-ground assets 

would arrive to support Army forces and conduct deep interdiction 

 operation^.'^ 

Planners envisioned Phase I1 of CENTAF'S OPLAN, the offensive, to 

begin on or after the date specified for the completion of sealift 

deployment. At this point, they changed the mission to offensive operations in support of and in conjunction with a ground campaign, to restore 

the territorial integrity of the host nation (Saudi Arabia) and terminate the 

conflict. As with other Cold War-era contingency plans, neither 

CENTAF'S nor CENTCOM'S OPLAN 1002-88 mentioned continuing the fight 

beyond [DELETED] limited offensive air strikes into the aggressor's 

homeland or destroy its war fighting capabilities and made no suggestions 

of an independent strategic air campaign. 

[DELETED] 

''(S/NF/NC/WN) OPLAN, COMUSCENTAF Operalwns Plan 1002-88.30 Sep 89, with 

Change 1. dtd 2 May 90. Located Air Force Studies and Analysis Library, AFSAA/SAKI. 

The Pentagon, 1D363A. document SAMI 9000283, p xi. 

24 
Table 4 

USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-88 Key Assumptions 

International Domestic Military 

[DELETED] 

Source: (s) Fact sheet, Buckley, “USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90.”; (s) USCINCCEhT 

OPLAN 1002-88, p vii; (S/NF/NC) OPLAN, COMUSCENTAF Operations Plan 1002- 

88 30 Sep 89, with Change 1. dtd 2 May 90, pp ix-x. 

Perhaps the most significant change that CENTCOM planners incorporated 

into the new plan were assumptions involving the size of the American 

response. OPLAN 1002-88 was predicated on a limited, though unspecified, deployment of forces to the Arabian Peninsula. 

USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 

The month after General Schwarzkopf’s meeting on the future of 

Southwest Asia contingency plans with General Powell in October 1989, 

CINCCENT directed his staff to shift its efforts from supporting a second 

front of a global war to updating OPLAN 1002-88 for a regional threat 

from Iraq against Saudi Arabia. One result of this shift was the 16 April 

1990 USCINCCENT C-oncept of Operations that served as the basis for 

developing a revised, fully-coordinated OPLAN.’~ 

(SNF) AAR USCINCCENT. Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Exercise InternaI 16 

Look 90 After Action Reports, 11 Jul 91. p 2. 

25 
In November 1989, Central Command planners began the process to 

develop a new contingency plan. Using a routine deliberate planning 

schedule (Table 5), planners at MacDill Air Force Base anticipated the 

process to develop an approved OPLAN would take approximately twentytwo months. 

Table 5 

USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Milestones 

2 Apr 90 

13 Apr 90 

28 Apr 90 

Nov 90 

Dec 90 

Feb 91 

30 Oct-9-Nov 90 

Mar 91 

Apr 91 

Aug 91 

Final Concept Brief to CINC 

Concept to JCS for approval 

Draft Plan distribution 

Phase I Conference 

TACWAR refinement 

Draft Plan with Annexes published 

Phase I1 TPFDD Conference finul drafr Plan 

Desert Challenge Analysis 

Plan to JCS 

Supporting plans due 

w/TPFDD 

Events precluded by the Gulf crisis 

Source: (S) Fact sheet, Buckley, “USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90.” 

CINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept of Operations 

Faced with new guidance that shifted the focus of a regional threat 

to Iraq, CENTCOM planners began to update force levels and planning 

assumptions for the new OPLAN. To begin with, they realized that the 

modest force package envisioned in OPLAN 1002-88 [DELETED] was too 

light to counter a potential Iraqi force [DELETED].’7 

I7(S/NF) USCENTCOM. USClNCCEhTOPlAN 1002-90 concept of operation, 16 Apr !XI, 

COVW Itr, p 6. AFSAL, SAM1 9001253 and GWAPS CHC-13. 

26 
To respond to the increased threat level, planners significantly 

increased the number of U.S. ground, naval, and marine amphibious 

forces from those in OPLAN 1002-88. They augmented American air 

power with additional fighter squadrons, airlift squadrons, numbers of B52s, and increased special operation forces dedicated to the contingency 

plan.’* In addition to the increase in air power, they added armored and 

mechanized units to fight the armor-heavy Iraqi Army. 

Schwarzkopf’s concept of operation became the foundation of OPLAN 

1002-90 and included expanded deployment and employment options as 

compared to OPLAN 1002-88. In addition to 1002-88’s three operational 

phases-deterrent, defensive, and Counteroffensive-CENTCOM planners 

added counterair and interdiction to the defensive phase. The revised 

phasing-a standard format for contingency plans-also included larger 

deployment to support deterrence, defensive and counterair operations, 

and the offensive phase to secure lost territory and end hostilities. 

In Phase I, deterrence, the plan’s authors envisioned rapid deployment 

of air, ground, naval, marine, and special operations forces to Saudi 

Arabia and neighboring nations with the goal of convincing Iraq that the 

price for further aggression would be too high for the rewards. Initially, 

Air Force fighter units would be deployed to Saudi Arabia along with 

“(S) Fact sheet, Buckley. “USCINCCENT OP~N 1002-88”; (S/NF) USCI”C€NTOPUN 

1002-90 Concept of Operation, pp 19-20. 

27 
Table 6 

USCINCCENT OPLAN 100290 Concept of Operations Force 

Requirements and Deployment (Arrival) Schedule 

USAF U.S. Army USNKJSMC Special Ops 

TFS 

TAS 

AWACS 

TAS 

TFS 

AWACS 

ABCCC 

EC- 1 30 

B-52 

Avn Bde TF 

Airborne Div 

Phase IVIII: 

AASLT 

Div(-) 

Mech Bde(-) 

Mech Div (-) 

MTZ Bde 

Mech Div(-) 

Mech Bde 

(wo) 

Mech Bde 

(wo) 

CVBG 

MEB 

Amphibious 

MEB 

BBBG 

CVBG 

MEB 

Phase MII: 

Amphibious 

MEB close 

CVBG 

RLT 

Note:"C" dates reflect days after Presidential deployment authority granted 

Source: (S/NF) USCINCCENT OPlAN 1002-90 Concept of Operations 16 Apr 90, 

p 19-20. 

28 
carriers and special operations and Army Ranger units. They would be 

followed by additional fighter and support aircraft, B-52s, naval forces, 

and Marine forces.” 

Planners believed that Baghdad might ignore initial American moves, 

and anticipated defensive and counterair/interdiction missions for Phase 

11. During the second phase, U.S. air forces would initiate a counterair 

and interdiction campaign to gain air superiority, protect U.S. forces and 

divert, disrupt,. delay enemy forces. [DELETEDI2’ [DELETED] 

Planners anticipated that the defensive portion of Phase I1 (primarily 

Army and Marine) would be initiated concurrently with the counterair 

and interdiction campaign. [DELETED] 

CENTCOM planners wanted Phase 111, the counteroffensive, to begin 

when the enemy’s combat power had been sufficiently reduced to the 

unspecified level where the correlation of forces changed to favor the 

U.S. Objectives for this counteroffensive included seizing lost facilities 

and territory, and terminating the conflict. Despite the importance of this 

phase of operations, General Schwarzkopf provided his component commanders only vague guidance. [DELETED]” 

In summary, CENTCOM planners reacted to Schwarzkopf’s change in 

intent by adding additional forces but left prior planning assumptions 

largely unchanged. [DELETED]*’ 

One of the areas in which Central Command and Joint Staff planners 

agreed was the time necessary to deploy significant forces. [DELETED] 

I9[DELETED] 

20[DELETED] 

(SMF) USCINCCEM OPLAN 1002-90 concept of operation, pp 22-27 21 

22(s/NF) USCINCCEM OPlAN 1002-90 Outline Plan, Draft, 6 Apr 90. AFHRA in 

Heinrick Continuity Book. p 5 

29 
Table 7 

USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept of Operations Key 

Assumptions 

International Domestic Military 

[DELETED] 

Source: (SAW) USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept of Operations, p 7. 

30 
Figure 3 

Warning and Deployment Timelines 

Enemy 

Anacks 

Source: OPLAN (SNF). USCINCCENT OPUN 

1W2-90 Concept of Operalhs, p16. 

USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Second Drafc 

On 18 July 1990, CENTCOM headquarters published the second draft 

of USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90, Operations to Counter An Intraregional 

Threat To The Arabian Peninsula, that incorporated comments received 

from the Joint Staff and other commands after they reviewed Central 

Command’s Concept of Operation and the May first draft of OPLAN 1002- 

90. By this time the new second draft included the majority of its 

supporting annexes, less the Time-Phased Force Deployment List. To 

continue the review process, ClNCCENT requested additional comments on 

the draft by 14 September-following the scheduled Internal Look 90 

command post exercise23 (cPx)-for inclusion in the next draft OPUN to 

23Exercise Internal Look 90 (IL-90) was a USCENTCOM sponsored and conducted 

command post exercise conducted between 9 July and 4 August 1990 and is discussed in 

depth later in this chapter. 

31 
be published in early October 1990 and in preparation for the Phase I 

deployment conference scheduled for late October or early November. 

This was the OPLAN used during Internal Look 90. 

While writing the draft, CENTCOM planners gave Air Force units and 

deployment schedules the most, albeit still minor, attention, moving up 

deployment dates for several [DELETED] squadrons [DELETED] and 

delaying slightly the departure of [DELETED] squadrons. They also 

increased the number of support aircraft although the draft OPLAN does 

not list exact numbers. [DELETED] Army, Navy, and special operation 

forces remained virtually identical with only minor changes. The 

planners did, however, increase the number of Marine f0rces.2~ 

“(SNF) USCI”T OPUN 1002-90 Second Draft, 18 Jul 90, p iii-iv. 

32 
Table 8 

Draft USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (July 90) Force 

Requirements and Deployment Schedule 

USAF U.S. Army USNNSMC Special Ops 

[DELETED] 

Source: (SMF) (ISCINCCEW OfUN 1002-90 Second Draft, 18 Jul 90, p. iii-iv. 

Table 9 compares aircraft by type and number as detailed in OPLAN 

1002-90, those deployed during Operation Desert Shield, and those in 

theater on the eve of Operation Desert Storm. It is supplied to demonstrate the differences between planning figures and those airframes deployed. [DELETED] 

33 
Table 9 

Comparison of USAF Aircraft In-Theater 

OPLAN vs. Desert Shield 

A-10 

(Table is SECRET) 

1 Nov 90 16 Jan 91 

96 132 

AC- 130 

B-52 

c-21 

C- 130 

E-3 AWACS 

E-8 

EC- 130 

EF-111 

F-4G WW 

F- 15C 

F-15E 

F-16 

F-111 

F-111F 

F-117A 

HC-130 

HH-3 

KC- 10 

KC-135 

MC- 130 

MH-53J 

MH-60 

OA- 10 

W-4c 

RC- 135 

u-m- 1 

Total USAF 

- 

[DELETED] 

5 

20 

8 

95 

6 

0 

13 

14 

36 

72 

24 

1 20 

32 

18 

4 

6 

114 

4 

8 

8 

0 

6 

4 

5 

718 

4 

21 

8 

132 

10 

2 

14 

18 

48 

96 

48 

210 

64 

36 

4 

4 

22 

194 

4 

8 

8 

12 

18 

6 

9 

1132 

34 
Table 9 (cont’d) 

Comparison of USAF Aircraft In-Theater 

OPLAN vs. Desert Shield 

Aircraft 

Aircraft OPLAN 1002 In Theater In Theater 

1 Nov 90 16 Jan 91 

- - 

US. Navy 

U.S. Marine 

Craps 

U.S. Army 

JTF Proven 

Force 

Total U.S. 

- - 

[DELETED] 

283 552 

70 aircraft 108 aircraft 

+ 188 helo + 310 helo 

873 helo 1 193 helo 

n/a 138 aircraftb 

+ I helo 

2132 3428 

Sources: (S/NF) USCiNCCEhT OPM 1002-90 Second Draft, 18 July 1990, p iii-iv.; 

(S/NF) Staff Study, AFLUXPOX; Steven B. Michael, “Operation Desert Storm: A Chronology.” (Draft) OAFH. USAF, Washington, D.C., 1991; (s) “USAF Deployment status 

Report aS Of 180505 Jan 1991,” GWAPS, CHSH #68; (S) CINCCENT sitreps, GWAF‘S CHST 

#68- 1 through #68-3 1; (s/NF/WN/NC) GWAF’S Skzristicaf Compendium; (SMFWN) Brfg 

Slides, USAFWOSUCAT, “Desert Storm, Thursday, 17 Jan 91, D+Ol,” 17 Jan 91, USAFE/HO, 

Contingency History, 14 Feb 91, Volume I, Document 2-9. 

Planners retained three operational phases to deter, defend, and 

recapture lost territory and facilities in a mid-intensity environment, 

following a preconflict period during which U.S. authorities initiate 

intense political, diplomatic, economic and military actions to show 

resolve to potential enemies. Possible actions included forming regional 

and international coalitions, modifying foreign aid as an incentive or 

punishment, conducting noncombatant emergency operations, and freezing 

belligerent’s assets in the United States?’ 

”(SlNF) USCINCCEW OPLW 1002-90 Second Draft. 18 Jul 90. pp 22-26. GWAF‘S 

NA-41. 

35 
[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

Table 10 

Draft USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (July ’90) 

Key Assumptions 

International Domestic Military 

[DELETED] 

Source: (S/NF) USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Second Draft, pp viii-ix. 

The planning assumptions set forth in OPLAN 1002-90 were deficient 

in regard to warning time, presidential willingness to authorize military 

*?s) Background paper, HQ WAF. XOXXM. “Background paper on USCINCCENT 

27(S) Background paper, HQ USAF. XOXXM. “Background paper on USCINCCENT 

OPLAN 1002-90 Outline Plan.” 4 Aug 90. GwAPS CHC 9-3. 

OPLAN 1002-90 Outline Plan.” 4 Aug 90. 

36 
actions before hostilities, cooperation among friendly regional states and 

the willingness of Middle East political leaders to ask for visible U.S. 

military assistance, and the size and complexion of the U.S. military 

response. However, before blame for faulty plan assumptions is placed 

too quickly on CENTCOM'S doorstep, we should consider that similar 

thinking on warning and deployment times appeared in the JCS 13 July 

1990 Class 111 Scenarios for Southwest Asia.= 

I 

Figure 4 

Crisis Planning Assumptions vs. Actual Response 

I-- I 

I I 

I 

Noln: (a) For Desnrt Shleld: Ready 

Resewn Mnl .niVah on D4; 

CRAF I VtiValDn on D+15: President aulhorued Y)K call-up on D+m. 

I 

I I 

I 

Ambiguous 

Warning 

Unambiguous 

Warning 

L Deployment 

Begins (note a) I 

=(S/NF) As part of the deliberate planning process for contingency operation plans, 

JCS J-8 planners developed Class 111 Scenarios for OPM 1002-90. The scenarios were 

based on real-world situations and intelligence estimates and, while not intended to predict 

the future, were developed to help guide planning and programming decisions and net 

assessments for all DOD agencies and commands involved in such planning. [DELETED] 

((S/NF) Staff Summary. Class 111 Scenario Assumptions. 13 Jul 90. GWAPS Thompson 

files.) 

37 
Like many other “operations” plans, USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 

primarily was a deployment plan, geared heavily toward logistic support 

and troop deployment considerations with only a broad concept of combat 

operations. Central Command planners’ thinking about precisely how 

forces might be employed in combat had not been committed systematically to paper. 

Table 11 graphically represents the evolution of USCINCCENT OPLAN 

1002 by examining key elements of each plan starting with 1002-86. 

Key aspects of each plan are detailed for easy comparison. An 

examination of key planning assumptions shows that many critical assumptions-tended to flow without much change from one edition of 1002 

to the next with little concern for domestic and international politics. 

These assumptions also had direct effect on required force levels as 

shown in the breakdown for OPLAN and military service. [DELETED] 

Lastly, the table demonstrates relatively little change in the OPLAN’S 

concept of execution over the years, retaining a basic three phase operation that followed traditional doctrine, flowing from deterrence to defense 

to counteroffensive. 

38 
dission 

Ley 

issumption 

hY 

Table 11 

Evolution of USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002 

OPLAN 100286 

December 1985 

DELETED] 

DELETED] 

DELETED] 

OPLAN 100243 

28 February 1989 

IELETED] 

IELETED] 

IELETED] 

OPLAN 100290 

April 1990 

:ounter lmqi 

itnrregional threat to 

;uwait/Saudi Arabia 

DELETED] 

DELETED] 

OPLAN 100290 

July 1990 

DELETED] 

DELETED] 

DELETED] 

39 
Table 11 (cont'd) 

Evolution of USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002 

ir Force 

lavy 

larine 

'orps 

pecial 

lperations 

xecution 

OPLAN 1002-86 OPLAN 1002438 OPLAN 100290 OPLAN 1002-90 

December 1985 28 February 1989 April 1990 July 1990 

[DELETED] [DELETED] DELETED] [DELETED] 

[DELFiTED] [DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED] 

[DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED] 

[DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED] 

[DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED] 

40 
would constitute the first combat forces to reach the theater. These assets 

would occupy regional airfields and provide defensive protection for 

deploying ground forces and follow-on aircraft. If enemy forces attacked, 

these aircraft, along with available ground forces, would delay the enemy 

advance until U.S. and allied forces could initiate a counterattack to push 

them back. During the counteroffensive, the Air Force would support the 

ground campaign through traditional offensive counterair, close air sup 

port, and interdiction missions. In essence, the Air Force participated in 

traditional roles, providing indirect (interdiction) and direct (close air 

support and counterair) support for ground forces. Independent air campaigns, regardless of size or scope, simply were never mentioned. 

Another important theme about air power that transcended the 

evolution of OPLAN 1002 was the theater commander’s guidance. In 

contrast to that provided to other components, none of the OPLAN 1002 

series of plans provided any detailed guidance about the complexion of 

the air campaign. This may have reflected confidence in air power’s 

flexibility or, alternatively, a disinclination to think in terms of a distinct 

air campaign. 

Exercise Internal Look 90 

In July 1990, Central Command planners tested OPLAN 1002-90 in a 

regularly scheduled three-phase command post exercise at Duke and 

Hurlburt Fields in Florida, and at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina-Internal Look 

90. In Phase I (9 to 19 July), deployment, commanders and staff moved 

to exercise locations and, for the first time, established command, control, 

and communication facilities using actual bare base equipment. Phase II 

(20 to 28 July), employment, consisted of three parts: (1) a two-day staff 

exercise to check communications and command procedures, (2) a three41 
day employment exercise that simulated delaying and interdiction operations for D+8 to D+10, and (3) a three-day simulation of D+18 to D+20 

with emphasis on defending Saudi Arabia. Internal Look’s third phase, 

redeployment, lasted until 4 August?’ 

To develop the scenario for the exercise, CENTCOM intelligence 

analysts examined national-level threat estimatesM supported with known 

order of battle information and historical data from the Iraq-Iran War. 

[DELETEDI3’ 

[ DELETED]32 

(s) AAR, HQ USCENTCOM. Operation Desert ShicWOperatbn Desert Storm, July 

15. 1991; (s) Brfg. USCENTAF, Internal Look 90, nd. both in GWAPS, NA-131. 

30(S) A primary source for threat assessments was the Joint Intelligence Estimate 

for Planning (JIEP) Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1992-1993, published by the JCS in 

December 1989. This periodic document covers the entire world and highlights threats 

and capabilities of potential enemies for the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, 

Specified and Unified Commands, and Defense agencies. [DELETED] ((S/NF) Doc, 

JCS, Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (J~EP) Strategic Capabilities Plon FY 

3’(~~ DOC. security Environment 2w0: A CEKICOU view, US Central Command, 21 May 90, p 111-2, GWAPS Clock files; (WF) Rpt Rear Adm (Ret) Grant 

Sharp, “Sharp Study” Planning for the Gulf War. Draft of 3 Dec 91, prepared for 

Office of Principal Deputy, Under Secretary of Defense (S&R). p 9, GWAPS Task 

Force V files. 

32Sharp Study, p 11; and (YNF) USCIA’CCENT OPUN 1002-90 Draft Outline Plan, 6 

Apr 90, AFHRA in Heinrick Continuity Book and GWAPS Greenberg files. 

29 

1992-1993, SM-991-89, 22 Dec 89, p 1-6-34, GWAPS NA-335.) 

42 
Figure 5 

Anticipated Iraqi Attack 

... 

Saudi Arabia 

Source: Rpt (SMF) Rear Adm (Ret) Grant Sharp, “Sharp Study” Planning for 

the Gulf War, Draft of 3 Dec 91, p 9, GWAPS Task Force V files. 

All of CENTCOM’S component and supporting commands sent 

commanders or senior staff representatives and planners to the command 

43 
post exercise.33 (Table 12) Generals Schwarzkopf and Homer attended the 

exercise and, with their primary staffs, participated actively throughout 

the simulation. For CENTAF this proved particularly helpful during Operation Desert Shield when the headquarters, all of whom had participated 

in exercise Internal Look, deployed_ to Saudi Arabia." 

33(S/NF) MR. USCINCCENT. Operations Desert ShielrvDesert Storm, Exercise Internal 

Look 90 Ajier Action Reports, 1 1 Jul 91. p IL appendix, GWAPS NA-131. [The sudden 

emergence of the Gulf crisis in August caused delays in the publication of Exercise 

Internal Look after action reports.] 

"Personal recollections of Capt John Glock, USAF, who participated in Internal Look 

and served in both the CENTAF intelligence cell and the Black Hole in Riyadh. 

44 
Table 12 

Exercise Internal Look 90 Participants 

Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

Central Security Service (CSS) 

Defense Communication Agency (MA) 

Defense Courier Service (DCS) 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 

Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) 

Defense Security Assistance Agency 

Department of State 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

Forccs Command (USFORSCOM) 

HQ, Department of the Army 

HQ, European Command (USEUCOM) 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

National Security Agency (NSA) 

Office of the Secretary of thc Navy 

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force 

Pacific Command (USPACOM) 

Space Command (SPACECOM) 

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

Special Operations Component. CENTCOM 

Strategic Air Command (SAC) 

Tactical Air Command (TAC). 

Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) 

U.S. Air Force Component, CENTCOM 

US. Army Component. Central Command 

U.S. Information Agency (USIA) 

US. Marine Corps Component. CENTCOM 

U.S. Navy Component. CENTCOM 

Source: (S/NF) Doc, USCINCCENT. Operations Desert Shiemesert Storm, 

Exercise Internal Look 90 Afer Action Reports, 11 July 1991, p IL appendix, 

GWAPS NA- 13 1. 

During the computerdriven exercise, Central Command commanders 

and planners examined all functional areas of joint air, ground, and naval 

combat with emphasis on command relationships, long-range interdiction, 

defensive operations, intelligence support, Patriot missile defense, 

freedom of sea lanes of communication, follow-on force attack, mine 

countermeasures, chemical operations, and special operations forces 

employment-all using OPL~ 1002-90 as the backdrop. While not defined in applicable documents, the use of “long-range interdiction” here 

can be interpreted broadly to include anything not considered offensive 

or defensive counterair. An examination of the associated CENTAF Target 

45 
List showed that even these non-offensive or defensive counterair categories included targets that would certainly be considered “strategic” during 

Desert Storm.35 As exercise participants developed the combat situation, 

they used extensively the C3 computer simulations such as the Joint 

Exercise Support System for Ground and Air Operations, Tactical Simulation for Intelligence, and the Enhanced Naval Wargaming System for 

Maritime operation^.^^ 

Because the plan’s overall strategy was defensive, U.S. forces did not 

undertake large-scale offensive operations. [DELETED] However, 

during the final two days of the exercise (simulating D+19 and D+20), 

the exercise National Command Authority granted “Cross Border 

Authority,” and planners struck a limited number of key command and 

control and leadership targets in Baghdad?’ Operations players selected 

the targets from the Internal Look Target List prepared by CENTAF for 

just this contingency-presidential authority to strike important facilities 

in Iraq to slow their advance [DELETED]. Waiting until the final hours 

of the exercise to authorize actions into Iraq reflected sensitivities about 

offensive operations against an enemy’s homeland, especially in the 

context of a defensive contingency plan. Its incorporation into the 

exercise, practically as a last minute “add on,” also reveals the very 

limited nature of offensive air power contemplated in pre-crisis planning. 

Although circumstance prevented the integration of most of the 

exercise recommendations into the final Desert Storm OPLAN, its timing 

no doubt improved the U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion.38 Internal 

3SExamples of non-offensive or defensive counterair targets include: the Ministry 

of Defense, power plants, communication facilities, refineries, pumping and terminal 

stations, and NBC research, production, and storage facilities. ((SMFIWN) Target 

Study, 9 TIS, “Iraqi Target Study,” 15 Jun 90, GWAPS NA-168.) 

36(S/NF) Doc USCINCCENT. Desert ShieWDesert Storm, Internal Look 90 Afer 

Action Reports, 15 Jul 91, p IL appendix, GWAPS NA-9. [The sudden emergence of the 

Gulf crisis in August caused delays in the publication of Exercise Internal Look after 

action reports.] 

37(S/NF) Fact Sheet, Heidrick, ‘9 TlMNT Planning Procedures,” p 3. 

% addition to CPX Internal Look 90, CENTAF participated in a number of 

deployment and contingency exercises in the months preceding the Gulf Crisis. Major 

exercises included Quick Force 90-2 (US based CAS/ABCCUASOC exercise, 27-30 

April), Iron Cobra 90 (USEgyptian. combined logistic field training, 19 May - 13 

June), Shadow Hawk 90 (Combined US/Jordanian planning and operations exercise, 7 

46 
Look focused commanders and staffs on the theater, reviewed anticipated 

joint operations to include the production of an air tasking order that 

proved remarkably similar to that used early in Operation Desert Shield 

and later incorporated into Desert Storm, and highlighted Iraq’s capabilities. As such, Internal Look provided the backdrop for the initial deployment of U.S. forces and was credited by the Army with “providing a 

solid foundation and point of departure for success on the battlefield and, 

more than any other single event, prepared commanders and staffs for 

Operation Desert ShieldDesert Storm.”39 

In addition to forcing a potential Persian Gulf crisis to the forefront of 

planners’ thinking, Internal Look proved critical for the opening days of 

the Gulf War in at least three areas: (1) the development of an Iraqi 

target list, (2) providing initial guidance for air operations and a mission 

list, and (3) highlighting problems related to the incomplete nature of the 

OPLAN. 

To produce the Internal Look target list, CENTAF intelligence officers 

produced a methodical “target study” based on Iraq’s political, economic, 

and political infrastructure and capabilities. Their goal was to 

systematically identify those targets whose destruction would lead to 

achieving the objectives of OPLAN 1002-90.40 Reflecting the shift in 

focus to Iraq-considered a modem, industrial SOCietY-CENTAF intelligence 

planners added petroleum (POL), electricity, and command, control, and 

communications (C3) targets to support CINCCENT objectives in gaining 

air superiority, protecting friendly forces, and ensuring the safety of 

June - 1 July). For additional information on these exercises, see GWAFS Training 

Volume. Also, information on Shadow Hawk 90 located in USClNCCEN“ Joint Task 

Force Charlie Shadow Hawk 90 EXPLAN, 1 May 90, in Ninth Air Force History, Jan - Dec 90, Vol XV, in IRIS reel 26569. frames 868-1377. ((S) Doc, David Rosmer, 

History of the Ninth Air ForcdUSCEhTAF Jan - Dec 90, Vol I-A, Shaw AFB, 1 Jan 92, 

pp 184-191, IRIS reel 26563, frames 6-349.) 

39(S/NF) Doc, USCINCCENT. Desert ShieldDesert Storm, lnternal Look 90 Afrer 

Acrion Reports. 1 5 Jui 91, p IL, GWAFS NA- 13 1. 

‘%ENTAF intelligence officers used data from OPLAN 1002-88, DLA’s Automated 

Installation file, and various reference documents from the 9 TIS library to compile the 

new target list. 

47 
friendly nations' oil and transshipment facilities. In addition, known 

"high-value" targets such as nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) warfare facilities and Scuds were included. By the end of July 1990, this 

was the only integrated target study of Iraq produced by the U.S. intelligence community.4' 

Table 13 

USCENTAF Internal Look 90 Target List -15 June 1990 

Category Targets Category Targets 

Air Defense 72 POL 22 

NBC 3 Military Support 22 

Scuds 7 Airfields 37 

Leadership 3 Ports 7 

Electric 6 c3 14 

Railroads and Bridges 25 

TOTAL: 218 

Source: Target Study (S/"), 9 TIS, "Iraqi Target Study," 15 Jun 90. 

Once Lt. Gen. Charles Horner approved their list, targeting officers 

searched for maps, imagery, and additional information to initiate weaponeering sheets that together made target folders for each of the 218 

"Although CENTCOM produced its joint target study in late June, it was a compilation of service and component nominated targets and was not an organized study as was 

the CENTAF product. ((S) Intvw, Cap John R. Glock, HQ ACCILNAT, with Maj John 

Heidrick, 9 "T, 7 Jan 92, GWAPS Task Force V files and GWAPS NA-267.) 

48 
sites. However, many of the identified targets lacked sufficient imagery 

or information, particularly detailed data in DIA’S Automated Installation 

File, to produce complete package^.^' 

In addition to the CENTAF target list, Central Command, in the spring 

of 1990, requested its subordinate and supporting commands submit their 

own nominations for the theater joint target list. This list differed from 

the Air Force-related CENTAF target list in that it contained target 

nominations from all service components-thus producing large differences 

in the number of targets selected for various target categories. 

Schwarzkopf’s planners in Tampa assembled the individual lists and 

published the first joint target list to support OPLAN 1002-90 in late June 

1990. Table 14 compares the earlier CENTAF list with the larger Central 

Command joint list. Considering the joint target list’s multiservice nature, it is interesting to note the joint list’s relatively small increase over 

that from CENTAF. This meager increase in targets is a result of the lack 

of emphasis placed on Iraq (and on the theater in general) in the years 

preceding the August 1990 crisis. 

Lt Gen Charles A. Horner USAF, 

Commander 9th Air Force and 

U.S. Air Forces, Central Command 

(USCENTAF). 

42Adequate imagery existed on only 128 of the 218 potential targets. For more 

detailed discussions on this topic, see Chapter 7, Intelligence. (Heidrick intvw.) 

49 
Table 14 

Internal Look 90 (for OPLAN 1002-90) ’hrget Lists 

CENTAF CENTCOM 

Target Categories Target List Joint Target 

List 

Leadership: Civilian 0 0 

Military 3 4 

Command, Control and Communication: 

Military 

AIwMtrv 14 19 

0 2 

Air Defense 

Airfields 

Nuclear 

Biological 

Chemical 

72 4 

37 58 

1 0 

1 1 

1 1 

Military Production and Support 22 81 

Electric 6 0 

POL: Storage 

Scuds 

Distribution 

9 16 

13 3 

7 0 

Republican Guard 0 0 

Ground Forces 0 8 

Lines of Communications 25 79 

Naval Forces (Ports) 7 17 

TOTALS 218 293O 

Sources: (SINFMrN) Target Study, 9 TIS, “Iraqi Target Study,” 15 Jun 90; 

(S/NFINC/WN) Doc, USCENTCOM Joint Target List, Tab A to Appx 4 to 

Annex B to USCINCCENTOPLAN 1002-90,27 Jun 90. 

43(S/NF) Installations listed under more than one category in the Joint Tarst List 

have only been counted once if the overall category was the same. For example, 

[DELETED] Naval Base was listed 11 times. however in this table it was counted twice: 

once as a naval installation and once as a naval headquarters. 

50 
Three months prior to Internal Look, General Horner had briefed 

General Schwarzkopf on a concept of air operations to support the new 

OPLAN 1002-90. Homer’s concept recognized the contribution that air 

power would play in a Southwest Asia scenario and relied on deploying 

sizable air assets to the theater. In addition, he proposed employing 

Patriot missiles to defend airfields and population and religious centers“ 

and integrating American forces with the Saudi Air Force and air defense 

system. The first aircraft to arrive would provide electronic surveillance, 

intelligence collection, and air defense, with follow-on units assuming 

counterair and ground attack roles, Homer anticipated basing his joint 

U.S. air forces in theater?’ 

In addition to the deployment of operational forces, General Homer 

discussed his concept of the Joint Forces Air Component Commander 

(JFACC) with CINCCENT. While expressing the need to consolidate air 

power under joint, noncomponent-specific control, Horner also stated his 

intent to generally relinquish control over Marine air forces to the Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force commander, but to maintain close coordination 

with him to ensure unity of effort.& 

While preparing for Internal Look, in July General Homer distributed 

guidance to subordinate units for air aspects of Internal Look, along with 

information copies for CENTCOM’S Joint Operations Center as well as to 

Marine and Naval components in the Central Command. [DELETED] 

The stated intent of this guidance was to assist Internal Look planners in 

producing an exercise air tasking order (Am) for 26-27 July, EX D+18 

%ENTCOM’S command post exercise Internal Look 90 included Patriot missile play 

by the Army’s 1 lth Air Defense Artillery Brigade, attached to the rapid-deployment US 

Army XVIII Airborne Corps. The 11 th Brigade’s part in the exercise involved briefings 

by the newly-installed brigade commander, Col Joseph G. Garrett, 111, in late July to the 

Central Command and ARCENT commanders and staffs on the capabilities of his brigade. 

Garrett highlighted the deployment and operational potential of the Patriot air defense 

missile system. (Doc,Whirlwind War, Draft of Jun 92, US Army Center of Military 

History, Washington, DC, p 403; Bob Woodward, The CommMders (New York: Simon 

and Schuster, 1991). pp 208-209; Garrett intvw; “Desert Victory: ADA Protects Maneuver 

Forces During 100 Hours of DESERT STORM’S Ground Campaign.” 1991 Air Defense 

Artillery Yearbook. p 38; US. News and World Report. 18 Mar 91, pp 34-35.) 

4s(S/NF) Brfg, Lt Gen Homer to Gen Schwarzkopf. “OPLAN 1002 Air Operations.” 

Apr 90. GWAPS NA-256. 

%or detailed JFACC discussions see the Command and Control volume. 

51 
Table 15 

Planned U.S. Aircraft Beddown - April 1990 

Country Location 

[DELETED] 

Country Location 

[DELETED] 

Source: (S) Briefing, “OPLAN 1002 Air Operations,” Presented by Lt Gen 

Homer to Gen Schwarzkopf at MacDill AFB, Apr 90, in preparation for Exercise 

Internal Look-90. GWAPS NA-256. 

52 
(simulated exercise D+18): Important insights into General Homer’s 

concept of air operations in Southwest Asia can be gained by examining 

this guidance-the first specific indications of an eventual air campaign!’ 

General Homer envisioned a much smaller force deployment than 

either eventually took place. [DELETED]“ 

To employ his air forces, Homer developed a prioritized mission list 

shown in Table 16. The types of missions, along with the division of 

effort into the three major areas of air defense, close air support, and 

interdiction, reflect the defensive nature of OPLAN 1002-90 and indicate 

Homer’s attitude, at least during the summer of 1990, to follow more 

traditional air power doctrine as expressed in OPLAN lC~I2.4~ 

Table 16 

Prioritized USCENTAF Mission List 

Exercise Internal Look 90 

~~ ~ ~ ~~ 

1. Defend rear areas, maintain air superiority over battlefield (major effort) 

2. Suppress forward deployed enemy air defenses 

3. Conduct close air support for friendly troops (major effort) 

4. Conduct interdiction to delay and reduce advancing enemy (major effort) 

5. Conduct offensive counterair against southern airfields 

6. Conduct recon of enemy rear, command and control, and lines of communication 

Source: (S) Ltr, Col Richard B. Bennett, “Internal Look 90 COMUSCENTAF Air 

Guidance Letter,” 24 Jul90. 

(S) Ltr, Col Richard B. Bennett, WAF, Dir Combat Plans to distro., Subj: “Internal 

48(S) Ltr, Bennett, Subj: “Internal Look 90 COMUSCENTAF Air Gukbnce Letter.” 24 

49(S) Ltt. Bennett. Subj: “Internal Look 90 COMUSCENTAF Air Guidance Letter.” 24 

47 

Look 90 COMUSCENTAF Air Guidance Letter.” 24 Jul 90. GWAPS NA-163. 

JuI 90, GWAPS NA-163. 

JuI 90, GWAPS NA-163. 

53 
As the exercise progressed, participants identified several areas that 

needed further examination or modification to meet anticipated needs. In 

addition to the widely accepted and CENTCOM-identified shortages of 

precision guided munitions and naval mine countermeasure vessels, 

Internal Look highlighted other problems including the need for an additional heavy corps prior to initiation of ground operations and a requirement for additional air tanker support for the carrier battle groups. Regarding deployment of units, exercise participants identified problems 

caused by OPLAN 1002-90's incomplete status. This problem was most 

acute in identifying the many separate small and generally logistic support units-more so than the large wings, divisions, or corps-needed to 

support a significant deployed force.s0 As many of these units required 

access to reserve service components, the process to acquire them required political decisions by the President on m~bilization.~' 

Another proposal resulting from Internal Look that proved vital 

during subsequent Operation Desert Storm operations was the suggestion 

to change a major portion of the USMC mission in the Central Command. 

Rather than deploy forces ashore, Internal Look planners proposed that 

most of the amphibious force should be kept afloat off Kuwait City to 

hold thousands of Iraqi troops in place defending against a possible 

amphibious assault?* 

In retrospect, while the defensive contingency plan did little to 

prepare the U.S. military for the offensive actions taken during Operation 

Desert Storm, planning and exercises that took place as part of the deliberate planning cycle formed the basis for initial defensive Desert Shield 

operations and highlighted difficulties that could, and did, affect actual 

contingency operations. The chapters that follow will trace the evolution 

of these pre-crisis deliberate plans and exercises as CENTCOM, CENTAF, 

and Air Staff planners in Saudi Arabia and Washington incorporated large 

portions of them into the defensive and offensive operation plans executed during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

MD~, Whirlwind War, Draft of Jun 92. US Army Center of Military History, 

(S/NF) Doc, USCINCCENT. Desert ShieWDesert Storm, Internal Look 90 Afrer 

'*(S) Notes, Col Bryan A. Sutherland, USA, CENTCOM J-5, handwritten notes, 3 Oct 

Washington, DC, p 85. GWAPS NA-304. Task Force V files. 

Action Reports. 15 Jul 91, GWAPS NA-9. 

90, GWAPS and AMRA 00881768, reel 23630. 

51 

54 
3 

Iraq: The Road to War 

The origins of the Gulf War were rooted in Iraqi President Saddam 

Hussein’s regional ambitions and the economic crisis which gripped his 

country in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War. On the military level, Iraq 

attempted to create a military foundation for its regional ambitions 

through a major build-up that began after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. This 

effort gained momentum during the Iran-Iraq War and included the 

development of unconventional (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons and ballistic missiles, the creation of a massive 1.25-million-man 

military and the dramatic expansion and modernization of its conventional 

ground, air, and naval forces, and an extensive hardening program to 

protect the country’s political and military leadership and key military 

assets from nuclear and conventional attacks. 

Iraq’s foreign policy under Saddam had been driven by an unusual 

combination of aggressiveness and insecurity which was largely a 

function of Saddam’s personality.’ While the Iran-Iraq War initially 

dampened his aggressive instincts and spurred him to seek rapprochement 

with rivals and former enemies once the war was over, Saddam, controlling the largest military in the region, soon reverted to his former pattern 

of aggression and paranoia. -This factor, as well as Iraq’s post-war economic crisis, and the tremendous power asymmetries between Iraq and its 

neighbors provided the background to the Gulf War. 

The Iran-Iraq War ended dramatically in August 1988 after a series 

of successful Iraqi offensives against Iran’s crumbling military. The 

regime-exhilarated by its successes-portrayed it as a great victory, even 

though Ayatollah Khomeini had not been removed, the Islamic republic 

had not been toppled, Iraq had not acquired an outlet to the Gulf, nor had 

it retained oil-rich areas in Iran. Instead, the eight-year conflict had cost 

‘Seth Cams, “The Genie Unleashed: Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Weapons 

Programs,” (DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), Policy Paper 

Number 14, p 4. 

55 
Iraq 420,000 casualties (120,000 killed and 300,000 wounded), 70,000 

prisoners of war held by Iran, and a generally weary and demoralized 

military and civilian population. It left Iraq saddled with a debt of $80 

billion and a reconstruction bill estimated at $320 billion? As a result, 

Iraq suffered from growing unemployment, inflation, and a declining 

standard of living which contributed to a deterioration in economic and 

social conditions, and growing domestic unrest. 

Nonetheless, Baghdad continued post-war defense outlays at wartime 

levels ($12.9 billion in 1990). compounding hardships on the population. 

The inconclusive outcome to the war-the failure to conclude a peace 

treaty or a negotiated settlement-meant also that only limited 

demobilization could occur, since the situation at the front remained 

uncertain. Difficulties in integrating demobilized soldiers into the depressed civilian economy and the resultant threat of unrest kept Iraq from 

releasing more men from active service. 

Following the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam adopted a confrontational stance 

towards his Arab neighbors and Israel, and abandoned his accomodationist 

wartime policies. While these initiatives did not appear to conform to any 

master plan, they highlighted a new regional role for Iraq. These steps 

included a brutal offensive that witnessed Baghdad’s use of poison gas 

against Kurdish peshmergu guerrillas and civilians in August 1988 to 

crush the Kurdish opposition and punish them for disloyalty during the 

war. On the diplomatic front, Iraq initiated a series of inconclusive 

contacts with Kuwait in August and December 1988, and February 1989, 

concerning the demarcation of the border, with Iraq demanding, inter uliu, 

the long-term lease of Bubiyan and Warba Islands; Saddam provided arms 

to Lebanese General Aoun to punish Syria for its support for Iran during 

the war. He also broadened military cooperation with Jordan to bolster 

the Hashemite kingdom and secure his western flank while laying the 

foundation for a rejuvenated eastern front against Israel. Finally, Saddam 

demanded from his former Arab supporters that $35 billion in war-debts 

be forgiven and for an additional $30 billion in aid from Saudi Arabia and 

other oil-producing states. If the monies were not forthcoming, Saddam 

warned that “. . . if they don’t give it to me, I will know how to take it.”3 

%e Independent (London), 20 Jul 88. 

3Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, Saddm Hussein and the Crisis in the Cu& (New 

York: Times Books, 1990). p 12. 

56 
At the same time, Baghdad’s behavior towards the U.S. and Israel 

revealed his deep seated insecurities. In a series of speeches in February, 

May, and July 1990, Saddam articulated a new vision of the international 

order and the region. As a result of the decline of the Soviet Union, he 

believed the U.S. had emerged as the preeminent superpower and would 

use its new freedom of action to impose its will on the Arabs and encourage Israel to embark on military adventures. Thus, he called on the 

Arabs to join Iraq to challenge the U.S. and create new alliances with the 

Soviet Union, Europe, and Japan in order to “find a new balance.” This 

was particularly important, since the Gulf had become the “most important spot in the region and perhaps the whole world” due to the growing 

international demand for oil. Consequently, he demanded that the U.S. 

terminate its naval presence in the Gulf, called on the Arabs to transfer 

funds invested in the U.S. elsewhere, and threatened to use oil as a political weapon! 

In response, Iraq attempted to strengthen its deterrent capability 

against Israel and, in February 1989, U.S. intelligence detected construction of fixed ballistic missile launchers in the western part of the country.’ 

His fears of Israel stemmed in part from Israel’s nuclear potential as well 

as memories of its attack on his Osirik nuclear reactor in June 1981. In 

the spring of 1990, he saw international criticism of both his efforts to 

develop strategic weapons and Iraq’s human rights record as part of a 

U.S.-British-Israeli conspiracy to prepare international opinion for another 

Israeli attack against Iraqi strategic weapon sites! Within this context, 

Iraq announced a doctrine of deterrence based on two fundamental principles: (1) Iraq would respond to an Israeli nuclear strike with a chemical 

counterstrike and use appropriate means to respond to a conventional 

attack’; and (2) Iraq would assist any Arab state threatened by foreign 

aggression, if requested to do so.* 

INA, 19 Feb 90; Jordan Television, 24 Feb 90. 

%OD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. p 16. 

6Radio Baghdad, 16 Apr 90. See also Radio Baghdad, 2 Apr 90. 

’In the event of an Israeli nuclear strike, Saddam had authorized commanders of air 

and missile units automatically to retaliate with chemical weapons. Radio Baghdad, 16 

Apr 90. 

Radio Baghdad, 5 Jan 90,2 Apr 90, 16 Apr 90, and 28 May 90; WA, 7 Apr 90, 17 

Apr 90. 19 Apr 90. 

4 

8 

57 
The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait had actually begun two 

decades earlier, when, in June 1961, Iraq refused to recognize the newlyindependent state of Kuwait and threatened to occupy it. Subsequently, 

Iraq had tried to secure a foothold on Bubiyan and Warba islands and had 

attempted to renegotiate their common border. As part of this effort, on 

several occasions Baghdad created border incidents in an effort to pressure Kuwait to meet its terms. These efforts yielded no substantive 

changes and tensions persisted. 

A second set of negotiations began after the Iran-Iraq War but, like 

its predecessor, was inconclusive. In April 1990, Iraq sent a confidential 

letter to Kuwait accusing it of temtorial encroachments, and in July, 

tensions reached a crisis point when Iraq publicly accused Kuwait and the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) of economic aggression by exceeding their 

OPEC quotas and driving down the price of oil. Saddam likened these 

policies to a “poisoned dagger” thrust into Iraq’s back, claiming that his 

Arab brothers had cost Iraq $89 billion in income between 1981-90, and 

that their economic policies would cost him an additional $14 billion a 

year as long as they continued. He accused Kuwait and the UAE of 

“trying to destroy the Iraqi economy and reduce its revenues.” Additionally, he charged Kuwait with “the gradual, systematic advance toward 

Iraqi territory” by setting up “military establishments, police posts, oil 

installations, and farms” on its territory, and of having “stolen” about 

$2.4 billion worth of oil from the Rumayla oil field which straddles the 

border? 

It was these allegations that led to the 1990 summer crisis. In midJuly, several days before Iraq leveled these accusations against Kuwait, 

Saddam had placed the Republican Guard on alert and ordered all eight 

Republican Guard divisions to deploy to the border,” suggesting that its 

campaign against Kuwait and the UAE was part of a contrived crisis 

intended to lay the groundwork for the invasion of Kuwait. On 24 July, 

Hussein met with Egyptian President Husni Mubarek and asked him to 

reassure the Kuwaitis that Iraq would do nothing until they had time to 

discuss the crisis further. But, Saddam warned, if a solution was not 

forthcoming, Iraq would take action rather than be economically stran- 

’Speech by Saddam Hussein, Radio Baghdad, 17 Jul 90. and letter from Foreign 

‘‘(S/NF/WN) Information Intelligence Report, hereafter cited as 11R. 

Minister Tariq Aziz to the Arab League, Radio Baghdad, 18 Jul 90. 

58 
gled." The following day, 25 July, Saddam requested a rare meeting 

with the U.S. Ambassador, April Glaspie, apparently to sound out the 

U.S. concerning its likely response in the event of hostilities. 

In the meantime, Kuwait and the UAE sought to resolve the problem 

and accepted a compromise at the OPEC meeting on 26 July by agreeing 

to higher oil prices and lower production quotas. However, these 

concessions failed to placate Saddam and, at a meeting in Jeddah, Saudi 

Arabia on 31 July, Iraqi diplomats submitted new demands: (1) that 

Kuwait remit $2.4 billion for oil extracted from the Rumayla field and 

cede the part of the oil field within its border; (2) cancel its $10 billion 

debt; and (3) grant Baghdad access to Bubiyan and Warba islands. These 

terms ultimately were rejected by Kuwait, and the talks collapsed after a 

few hours with Iraq accusing Kuwait of arrogance and intransigence. 

It remains unclear when Saddam initiated planning for the invasion 

or when he decided to invade Kuwait. Fragmentary evidence suggests 

that his planners may have commenced their efforts as early as January 

1990, and the actual preparations may have begun in May 1990.12 The 

rapid deployment of eight Republican Guard divisions with 120,000 

troops and 1,OOO tanks to the border with Kuwait in late July is evidence 

of a certain amount of prior planning. 

Regardless, on 2 August Iraq invaded Kuwait. It was this combination 

of Iraqi military power and financial need, and Kuwaiti wealth and 

vulnerability that Baghdad found irresistible. By invading Kuwait, Iraq 

intended, in a single stroke, to establish a hegemonic role in the Gulf and 

secure the means to fulfill its regional ambitions and its self-proclaimed 

historical mission as the leader of the Arab world. Conquest of Kuwait 

would put it in control of $208 billion in Kuwaiti financial assets, twenty 

percent of the world's proven oil reserves and permit unimpeded access 

to the Gulf. Most Iraqis-who looked upon Kuwaitis with contempt and 

envy-supported the in~asi0n.l~ Three days later, Baghdad announced the 

* 'New York Times. 23 Sep 90. 

12[DELETED] 

I3Most senior military officers supported the invasion. Nonetheless, there was some 

opposition within the military to this move. According to press reports. approximately 

120 officers, including six generals, were executed after expressing opposition to the 

invasion. Al-Majallah, 9 Jan 91. pp 14-15, 18. 

59 
mobilization of nearly 25 divisions and the Popular Army to reinforce its 

forces in Kuwait and strengthen its deterrent posture.14 

It appears that Saddam intended to rule Kuwait through a puppet 

government installed after the invasion. However, in response to the 

harsh international reaction to the invasion, on 8 August he announced 

the “eternal” and “irreversible” annexation of Kuwait and its incorporation as Iraq’s “1 9th Provin~e.”’~ Baghdad commenced the “Iraqization” 

of Kuwait’s state institutions and population, while systematically plundering the country. Iraqi civilian and military intelligence organizations 

and Popular Army personnel were introduced to fulfill internal security 

duties, Iraqis and Palestinians were resettled in Kuwait, Kuwaitis were 

encouraged to leave, Kuwait’s administration was reorganized and cities 

and streets renamed to eliminate all vestiges of an independent identity. 

Likewise, Baghdad ordered foreign embassies closed, Iraqi currency 

substituted for Kuwaiti currency, and Iraqi identity cards, licenses, and 

personal papers issued to all residents. In addition, a great deal of equipment belonging to the Kuwaiti armed forces was removed to Iraq, as was 

about $4 billion in gold bars and foreign currency reserves from the 

central bank, 50,OOO cars, the country’s eighteen-month supply of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and valuables from shops and private homes.I6 

While Iraq had the means to invade Saudi Arabia, Saddam apparently 

did not intend to da so. While Saddam had prepared the Iraqi people for 

the invasion of Kuwait with a media campaign calculated to inflame 

passions against the country and its people, he conducted no such 

campaign against Saudi Arabia. While his planners may have drawn up 

plans for such an operation, there is no evidence to indicate that Iraqi 

forces had rehearsed them or were prepared for such a contingency.” 

Early in the crisis, Saddam announced that “if (a) war breaks out 

between the United States and Iraq . . . I think that the United States will 

no longer be superpower number one. And the harm that will be inflicted 

INA, 2 Aug 90; Radio Baghdad, 5 Aug 90. 14 

‘’Radio Baghdad, 8 Aug 90. 

16Bengio. Iraq, p 26. 

”Gen H. Norman Schwankopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, 

1992), pp 313-314, 331. 

60 
on the invaders will be even more severe than what they experienced in 

Vietnam, and Iraq will come out on top.”’* Within this context, Saddam 

fashioned a political-diplomatic strategy calculated to fracture and undermine the U.S.-led coalition, to deter the coalition from going to war, and 

undermine or circumvent the sanctions which had been imposed after the 

invasion of Kuwait. His military strategy complemented his politicaldiplomatic strategy focusing on concentrating sufficient forces in the 

theater to deter the coalition from going to war, or producing sufficient 

casualties in the event of war to fracture the coalition. 

He was confident that Iraq’s relative strengths and the coalition’s 

relative weaknesses preordained a favorable outcome for Iraq. Central 

was his assumption that the U.S. and the coalition possessed only two 

options-a long and costly war, or sanctions-and that the coalition would 

not hold together long enough for either to have a significant impact on 

Iraq. In a newspaper interview published shortly after the invasion, 

Saddam stated that if the U.S. attacked Iraq expecting a rapid victory, it 

would be proven wrong, since a war would continue “for some time.” 

Iraq had fought for eight years against Iran, and “if need be,” Saddam 

stated, it could fight for “three, four, or five or six more years.” In a 

protracted war, the U.S. would be unable to maintain “its level of supremacy,” since its “international position” would decline as the war 

dragged on while Iraq “will not remain alone in such a war” due to the 

mobilization of popular opinion in the Arab world. Conversely, if the 

U.S. chose to continue sanctions, Iraq was “prepared . . . to stand this for 

years.”” Thus, Saddam believed that whether the U.S. chooses “war or 

boycott,” it “will lose.”20 

Saddam believed that the possibility of death and destruction on a 

massive scale would deter the U.S. from going to the brink as he and his 

senior government spokesmen, and the Iraqi media repeatedly warned that 

the coming war would be long, world-wide in scope, and bloody?’ If 

attacked by nuclear weapons, he promised that Iraq would retaliate with 

“Radio Baghdad, 30 Aug 90. 

’9Uilliyet. 19 Sep 90. 

2oFrorn Saddam’s 21 August open letter to President Bush. Radio Baghdad, 21 Aug 

91. 

Radio Baghdad, 7 Jan 91; Der Spiegel, 8 Oct 90. 2’ 

61 
chemical weapons. In the event of war, he would attack Israel, launch 

terrorist attacks against U.S. interests around the world, use foreign 

detainees as human shields at strategic installations, and destroy oil 

installations in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region leading to 

economic chaos and environmental disaster.22 

Baghdad had clearly underestimated the depth of the change in Soviet 

foreign policy and the amount of support he could expect from this 

quarter. Saddam also may have reasoned that the Soviet Union would 

play its traditional role of counterbalance to the U.S., persuading 

Washington not to attack Iraq and, if necessary, intervene to save it from 

defeat. He apparently hoped that Moscow would ignore the sanctions and 

continue to provide military assistance. In the end, the Soviet Union 

supported the UN efforts to expel Iraq from Kuwait and abided by the 

~anctions.2~ 

Concurrently Saddam attempted to gain the support of the 

ArabIslamic world by portraying Iraq as the defender of the Arabs and 

Islam, the Palestinian cause, and the guardian of Arab dignity and honor. 

Iraqi propaganda idealized Iraqi motivations, wrapped Iraqi policies in a 

cloak of virtue, and employed appeals for Arab and Islamic solidarity 

(emphasizing themes such as jihad and anti-imperialism) while impugning 

the motives of the U.S. and its allies. Saddam expected the Arab world 

to support Iraq against what he perceived as illegitimate and weak 

g0vernments.2~ He also expected that Arab troops in the coalition would 

not fight against their Iraqi brethren, but would either join the Iraqis or 

break and run. The Iraqi ambassador to Washington, Muhammad Sadiq 

al-Mashat, stated in a December interview that “It is an illusion if anyone 

thinks that an Egyptian or a Syrian or a Moroccan will fight the Iraqis. 

22~~~, 18 Aug 90; In a television interview in late December, Saddam warned that 

“if aggression were to take place, we should assume that Israel has taken part in it. 

Therefore, without asking any questions we will strike at Israel. If the first strike is dealt 

to Baghdad or the front, the second strike will target Tel Aviv.” INA, 27 Dec 90. See also 

Radio Baghdad, 23 Sep 90; Jordan Television, 9 Jan 91; Radio Baghdad, 23 Sep 90. 

Norman Cigar, “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War: Blueprint for 

Defeat.” Journal of Strategic Studies, Mar 92, p 20. 

23 

241bid, p 17. 

62 
If they are forced by military orders to fight, then there will be mutinies 

and revolts against their leaders.”25 

Finally, Saddam fostered divisions between the U.S., Western Europe, 

Japan, and other members of the coalition through diplomatic initiatives, 

bilateral dialogues, and the selective release of detainees. With the failure 

of Iraq’s efforts to forestall the emergence of a US-led coalition, 

Saddam tried to destabilize Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other hostile Arab 

governments, by issuing appeals to “the Arab masses and all Muslims” 

to revolt against the “oil amirs [sic].*’“ Moreover, he accused the Saudis 

of placing the holy places under “foreign protection” and allowing 

“infidel” troops to defile them with “alcohol, whores, and all kinds of 

heroin and narcotics,” of permitting Israeli aircraft and troops into Saudi 

Arabia, and of permitting coalition troops with AIDS to introduce the virus 

into the regi011.2~ 

As part of an effort to establish a diplomatic fall-back position and 

project an image of flexibility, Iraqi officials floated a number of private 

proposals for a diplomatic solution involving a partial withdraw from 

Kuwait that would still leave Iraq in control of the Rumayla oil fields and 

Bubiyan and Warba Islands. According to Jordan’s King Hussein, 

Saddam told him after the invasion that he had decided to seize all of 

Kuwait, instead of the part of territory long in dispute, because he 

expected the United States to defend the sheikhdom with force and believed he would be in a stronger position militarily and politically if he 

could eventually withdraw to a point that left Iraq with the disputed 

territory only?’ These efforts may have also been intended to delay 

military action and split the coalition. 

In the event war came, Saddam believed he could defeat or inflict 

heavy losses on the U.S. and the coalition and emerge from the war with 

most of his military capabilities intact. This would ensure the survival 

of his regime and he would be in a strong position to dominate the re25Jordan Times, 31 Dec 90. 

26Radio Baghdad, 10 Aug 90. 

27Radio Baghdad, 20 and 25 Aug 90; INA, 25 Aug 90. 

28The Jordan Times, 17 Oct 90. For additional details concerning lraqi hints of 

flexibility, see FBIS Trends, 31 Oct 90, pp 2-3; FBlS Trends, 28 Nov 90, pp 5-6. 

63 
gion. Thus, his military strategy hinged on ensuring his own survival 

while creating a credible defense that would deter the U.S. or, if deterrence failed, lead to a protracted ground war. Saddam claimed that as 

such a war dragged on, U.S. resolve would wane as their casualties 

mounted and that the coalition would fracture as more countries (particularly the Arab and Islamic countries) rallied to his side. These factors, 

Saddam believed, would increase the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement 

on his terms?9 

In a February 1990 speech to the Arab Cooperation Council, Hussein 

stated that “all strong men have their Achilles’ heel” and that “the United 

States has been defeated in some combat arenas” despite “all the forces 

it possesses” and has shown signs of “fatigue, frustration, and hesitation 

when committing aggression.” Thus, the United States “departed 

Lebanon immediately when some Marines were killed” while the “whole 

U.S. administration would have been called into question” had the forces 

that took Panama “continued to be engaged” by the Panamanian armed 

forces.30 And, in a subsequent interview with German television, Saddam 

stated that “We are sure that if President Bush pushes things toward 

war . . . once 5,000 of his troops die, he will not be able to continue the 

war.”31 

This was particularly important, since the Iraqis believed that their 

experience during the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated the importance of 

national will and morale on the outcome of wars.32 In assessing U.S. and 

Iraqi military capabilities, Saddam believed that Iraq’s experience in its 

war with Iran and his own reading of history, proved that ground forces 

comprised the branch of decision in warfare. It followed that the air 

force was not decisive. On the other hand, Iraq-with 1.2 million men 

under arms, 66 divisions, 5,800 tanks, 5,100 infantry fighting vehicles, 

and 3,800 artillery pieces-had one of the largest armies in the world, one 

that was experienced and battle-tested. Saddam believed that the army 

would be able to expand to meet any new coalition deployments and, as 

See the interview with Saddam in the Turkish paper. Milliyet, 20 Sep 90, cited 29 

previously. 

30Jordan Television, 24 Feb 90. 

311NA, 22 h 90. 

32AI-Jumhuriyya, 2 Nov 90, p 3, in Cigar, p 15. 

64 
a result, the coalition would not be able to bring to bear sufficient ground 

combat power to achieve its objective^.^^ For example, in an interview 

in the early phase of the crisis, he explained that: 

The United States depends on the air force. The air force has never 

decided a war in the history of wars. In the early days of the war 

between us and Iran, the Iranians had an edge in the air. They had 

approximately 600 aircraft, all U.S.-made and whose pilots received 

training in the United States. They flew to Baghdad like black clouds, 

but they did not determine the outcome of the battle. In later years, our 

air force gained supremacy, and yet it was not our air force that settled 

the war. The United States may be able to destroy cities, factories and 

to kill, but it will not be able to decide the war with the air force.34 

Saddam and his generals did expect that a short (several days) air 

campaign would precede the ground campaign. They expected that Iraqi 

air defenses and passive defensive measures (hardening high value targets, dispersed and dug-in forces, and hiding mobile assets) would protect 

his ground and air forces and missiles from coalition air p0wer.3~ Previously he had expressed great confidence in the survivability of his mobile 

missile force, asserting in April that “if (Israel) strike(s) one missile base, 

what will that mean? Is it the only base we have built? Our missiles are 

mobile. Today you see them in Baghdad, tomorrow in Mosul, and the 

next day you launch them from Basra al-Sulaymaniyah, or al-Qadisiyah 

governorate. We can launch missiles every hour and from different plates. For each base they hit or destroy on the ground, we will manufacture 

and build another They believed that coalition air power and high 

technology weaponry would be adversely affected by the harsh desert 

climate, and that clouds, smoke, and dust would obscure observation of 

the battlefield, hindering the location and identification of targets, and 

degrading the performance of complex weapons system^.^' This added 

33Radio Baghdad, 19 Nov 90. 

%adio Baghdad, 30 Aug 90. 

35Lt Col Sergey Bezlyudnyy, “I Taught Saddam’s Aces to Fly,” Komsomokkaya 

Pravda, 23 Feb 91, p 3. Sawf af-Sha’b, 12 Jan 91. p 15, quoted in Cigar, p 18; MA, 19 

Apr 90. 

361NA, 19 Apr 90. 

37Sawf al-Sha’b, I2 Jan 9 1, quoted in Cigar, p 19. 

65 
to his belief that the coalition would not be able to bring to bear its 

technological advantages (particularly with regard to fire support and 

electronic warfare) during a ground campaign, while Iraqi “experience, 

readiness to sacrifice, and morale” would prove the decisive factor in 

determining the outcome of a war with the U.S.-led coalition.38 

The Iraqi build-up and mobilization that preceded the war was 

intended as an all-out effort to field the largest possible force in the 

Kuwaiti theater while retaining the smallest force necessary to maintain 

security at home. Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq’s ground forces 

consisted of eight corps with forty-six standing divisions. Following the 

invasion, Saddam’s generals fielded an additional twenty-five divisions, 

including four new Republican Guard infantry divisions, two new regular 

armored divisions, and more than twenty new and reserve regular infantry 

divisions.39 In addition, they reactivated the Popular Army, with nearly 

five million people (mainly teenagers and men over forty) volunteering 

to serve to fulfill occupation duties in Kuwait and provide rear area 

security at home. In addition, the military command distributed arms to 

Ba’ath Party members.@ Even the pro-regime Kurdish militias (originally 

formed during the war with Iran) were reactivated to help secure the 

home front!’ 

Baghdad took other steps to increase its readiness. In August, Iraq 

dispersed its inventory of Al-Hussein missiles from the central missile 

support facility at Taji to deployment areas in western and southern Iraq 

as a defensive measure and to ready them for possible retaliatory strikes. 

[DELETED]42 In addition, the army transferred chemical munitions to air 

bases and storage bunkers in southern Iraq, and established several 

decontamination facilities. The chemical munitions were subsequently 

withdrawn shortly before the war, possibly in response to retaliatory 

38 Al-Jumhuriua, 2 Nov 90, cited in Cigar, p 15. 

391NA, 2 Aug 90; Voice of the Masses, 2 Aug 90, Radio Baghdad, 5 Aug 90; INA, 

@Baghdad Television, 23 Aug 90; Radio Belgrade, 6 Aug 90. 

4’Radio Amman, 28 Dec 90. 

42[DELETED] 

23 Aug 90. 

66 
threats by western political and military leaders.43 The regime also used 

the prolonged build-up period prior to the war to evacuate critical 

equipment from its unconventional weapon production facilities, as well 

as missiles, chemical, and biological weapons from storage facilities 

which it anticipated would be hit by coalition bombing.*4 In October, 

Saddam replaced Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Nizar ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khazraji 

(a political appointment) with Lt. Gen. Hussein Rashid Muhammad alTikriti, one of Iraq’s most outstanding soldiers. In December he replaced 

Defense Minister General ‘Abd al-Jabber Shanshal, another political 

officer, with Lt. Gen. Sa’di Tu’ma ‘Abbas al-Jabburi, an experienced and 

capable commander. 

President Bush’s decision on 8 November to deploy the VII U.S. 

Corps and additional air and naval forces proved a turning point in the 

Iraqi mobilization, causing Saddam to alter his assessment of the likelihood of war. In his view, deployment of the VII Corps to the region 

“will make it easier [for the U.S.] to push things toward war, not peace” 

and raised the chances of war to “50-50.’*5 As a result, on 19 November, 

Baghdad announced that it would send another 250,000 troops (including 

150,000 draftees and reservists, 60,000 farmers previously exempted from 

service to participate in the winter harvest-especially important considering international sanctions) and seven divisions to the theater. The 

Armed Forces General Command concluded that as a result of these 

mobilizations, the U.S. would need three million men to attain the necessary three to one force ratio to achieve its objectives. The Iraqis saw the 

new U.S. deployment as proof of the success of their previous mobilization efforts. An Iraqi general, writing in mid-November, stated that the 

U.S. “would have started shooting’, already if not for the Iraqi “countermeasures” which have “rendered the chances of (U.S.) success . . . less 

likely.’, Moreover, he continued, the “fresh (U.S.) reinforcements rushed 

to the area will fail to be of any significant effect” since Iraq enjoys a 

43Remarks of Maj Karen Jensen (USA), UN Special Commission Chemical and 

Biological Weapons Inspector, Non-Proliferation Breakfast Group Press Luncheon, 19 

Aug 92. 

Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee Defense Policy Panel, 27 Mar 92; Statement of the 

Director of Central Intelligence before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 

Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 8 May 92. 

44 

451ntvws with Saddam carried by INA, 17 Nov 90, and Paris TV. 2 Dec 90. 

67 
number of advantages, including “the element of surprise . . . the edge in 

land forces in terms of numbers, equipment . . . field experience . . . (and 

the) ability to transfer the field of battle beyond the immediate theater of 

operations.’* Saddam was confident that the 250,000 troops to be added 

to those already in the theater as well as a large number of troops with 

“more than a decade of fighting experience” would more than counterbalance the additional 100,OOO U.S. troops to be deployed in the regi0n.4~ 

The actual number of troops added by these mobilizations probably 

fell far short of this number, however, as many reservists and conscripts 

failed to report for duty. Moreover, nearly all of the divisions organized 

during this period were low-grade formations that lacked personnel, 

equipment, and spares. For instance, the 27th Infantry Division, deployed 

to the theater in late November with about seventy-five percent of its 

authorized strength. The armed forces subsequently called up an 

additional 37,000 men to bring the 27th and other infantry units like it up 

to ninety percent of their authorized strength. However, only 5,000 men 

reported for duty in response to this call-up. The 27th, which had 

requested augmentees, received none!’ 

To protect his ability to direct his military, Saddam relied on an 

elaborate system devised to protect him against coups. Saddam used a 

variety of sites as work-places and residences, including underground 

bunkers in the Baghdad area, various government buildings, palaces, 

private residences, two dozen mobile command vehicles (modified 

civilian recreation vehicles) and even mosques in order to complicate 

efforts to locate him!9 His whereabouts and movements were routinely 

shrouded in secrecy, and he moved frequently, rarely remaining in one 

place for more than a few hours, relying on false convoys and look-alikes 

to confuse potential coup-makers or assassins. Moreover, he exercised 

&Baghdad Radio, 19 Nov 90. Staff Maj Cen Mundhir ‘Abd-al-Rahman Ibrahim, 

‘The American Decision and the Crisis of War or No War,” A/-Qadisiyah, 17 Nov 90, 

P 3. 

471NA. 22 NOV 90. 

48[DELETED] 

49For instance, Soviet envoy Y. A. Primakov related in a post-war interview that a 

wartime meeting he had with Saddam and the Ba’ath leadership in Baghdad was. to his 

surprise, held in a private residence, and not a government facility. Literatumaya Gazeta, 

27 Feb 91, p 4. 

68 
command and control of the military through a sophisticated, redundant, 

and secure system of communication that had proved its reliability and 

efficiency during the Iran-Iraq War when Saddam came to rely heavily 

on face-to-face meetings [DELETED] and also used messengers to 

communicate with his generaksO Saddam’s preference for face-to-face 

meetings probably also stemmed from a desire to more directly influence 

the conduct of the war and to control and intimidate his generals through 

his personal presence. 

By December, and probably several months earlier, Iraq ceased 

operations at facilities involved in unconventional weapon and ballistic 

missile production and development. The regime removed and dispersed 

critical equipment and materials, as well as stocks of chemical and biological weapons, to ensure that damage to its weapon production capabilities would be minimized and it could emerge from the war with at least 

some of its unconventional military capabilities intact.” Finally, in December, Iraq stepped up civil defense preparations and exercises in Baghdad and elsewhere, including an evacuation exercise involving 1.5 of the 

4 million residents of the capital and published instructions on nuclear 

and chemical defense in order to shore up popular support for the regime 

and prepare the people for war.” 

Saddam took measures to ensure the survival of the air force, which 

he viewed as Iraq’s strategic deterrent arm. He apparently believed that 

if necessary, his air force could ride out the war in their hardened 

shelters, which Soviet advisors had told him were invulnerable to 

conventional weapons, “even superaccurate ones.”53 In addition, Iraq 

dispersed a number of military transport and civilian aircraft to several 

neighboring countries prior to the onset of h~stilities.’~ According to an 

article that appeared after the war in the armed forces daily newspaper, 

Al-Qudisiyuh, Iraq struck an agreement with Iran in early January 1991 

m[ DELETED] 

”Radio Cairo, 25 Oct 90. 

52Radio Baghdad, 19 Dec 90; Al-‘Iraq. 20 Dec 90. p 10; Radio Baghdad, 22 Dec 90; 

Radio Monte Carlo. 22 Dec 90; Radio Baghdad, 24 Dec 90; Af-‘Iraq, 31 Dec 90, p 10. 

53Sergey Bezlyudnyy, “1 Taught Saddam’s Aces to Fly,” Komsomokkaya Pravda, 

23 Feb 91. p 3. 

54[ DELETED] 

69 
to allow Baghdad to send military and civilian transport aircraft there, for 

safekeeping, during the war. [DELETED]” 

Iraqi air and air defense planners operated on the assumption that 

while its air force could not contest coalition control of the skies, its 

ground-based air defenses could neutralize or degrade the coalition’s 

effectiveness. While ground-based air defenses would provide point 

defense of vital civilian and military targets, the air force would conduct 

hit and run or suicide operations against high value targets such as 

AWACS aircraft and large naval vessels in the Gulf, and attempt to pick 

off straggling coalition aircraft.” 

Finally, Saddam’s planners took great pains to ensure the Republican 

Guard and heavy regular army divisions which formed the backbone of 

the army would survive a coalition attack. Vehicles were deeply dug-in 

and camouflaged, while formations were widely dispersed to reduce their 

vulnerability to air attack?7 Vehicle and weapon crews constructed 

personnel bunkers nearby where they could sleep and spend their free 

time. It was expected that these measures would significantly degrade the 

effectiveness of coalition air attacks. 

Units were expected to observe strict operations security. Saddam, 

in a meeting with his commanders in early January, exhorted them to 

establish both primary and alternate headquarters, to camouflage vehicles, 

change vehicle bumper numbers from time to time, and remove all signs 

indicating unit location^,'^ and to move their units frequently to 

complicate detection by reconnaissance satellites. In addition, the military 

command enforced strict communication security procedures, to include 

severe punishment (death or imprisonment) for violations of radio discipline.” 

Saddam played a major role in the formulation of war plans and held 

several meetings with members of the general staff, as well as corps and 

”[DELETED] 

”[DELETED] 

57[DELETED] 

”[DELETED] 

59[DELETED] 

70 
division commanders in the theater, to discuss his concept of the war 

plan.@’ Many of his commanders did not seriously believe that Saddam 

would lead Iraq to war and felt that he would withdraw from Kuwait at 

the last moment. One saw the systematic looting of Kuwait as evidence 

that the invasion of Kuwait was just a raid and an indication that Iraq 

would eventually withdraw:’ Regardless, commanders were hampered 

by a lack of detailed planning guidance. Corps commanders provided 

division commanders with only general mission-type orders (such as 

“defend in sector”) and very little additional guidancea Most detailed 

planning occurred at the division level and below, with very little 

coordination between echelons or adjacent ~nits.6~ 

A problem for Saddam and his commanders was the lack of detailed 

information about coalition intentions and capabilities necessary for 

detailed planning. Although Iraq had archival SPOT satellite imagery, it 

was probably unable to acquire much current imagery due to sanctions. 

Iraq’s prewar collection effort included a small number of aerial electronic intelligence and photographic reconnaissance platforms, ground 

reconnaissance patrols, and the use of bedouin as human intelligence 

sources, although these efforts failed to yield significant information to 

assist planning. Moreover, whatever information was available to the 

General Staff was not shared with tactical commanders. Each corps 

disseminated a general daily situation report but provided little else in the 

way of detailed intelligence, and division commanders likewise rarely 

shared information with their subordinates.a Many commanders complained that they were forced to rely on the BBC, Voice Of America, or 

Radio Monte Carlo for coalition order of battle information and situation 

 update^.^' They were unable to test their assumptions concerning coalition intentions and capabilities before the war or develop a realistic 

@‘Caryle Murphy, “Papers Left in Kuwait Offer Glimpse of Iraqi Occupiers,” The 

Washington Post, 6 Oct 9 1, p A30. 

6’Patrick Cockburn, “Lower Death Toll Helped Saddam,” The Independent (uK), 5 

Feb 92, p 11. Vern Liebl, ‘The View from the Other Side of the Hill,” Command 

Magazine, Nov-Dec 1991, p 33. 

62[ DELETED] 

63[ DELETED] 

61[ DELETED] 

65[DELETED] 

71 
defensive plan based on a correct assessment of coalition capabilities and 

the range of options available to them. 

Finally, Saddam suffered from an inadequate appreciation of the 

capabilities of his own forces. Commanders frequently misreported the 

condition of their units-particularly readiness and maintenance problems, 

low morale, and widespread desertion-for fear of retribution.66 This 

problem was compounded by the considerable resources, time, and effort 

absorbed by defensive military construction projects in the theater. The 

construction of defenses absorbed considerable resources, time, and effort. 

Iraqi defenses in theater consisted of defensive belts along the border with 

Saudi Arabia, as well as reinforced and camouflaged fighting positions, 

and dispersal revetments and personnel bunkers located in depth throughout the theater. 

The quality of the engineer effort varied dramatically within the 

theater. Defensive works built for the Republican Guard and some of the 

better regular armored and mechanized divisions were well executed and 

offered good cover and concealment in deep, and well laid-out, equipped 

b~nkers.6~ Conversely, many constructed for the lower grade armored and 

mechanized units and front-line infantry units lacked adequate resources 

or time to prepare, and consequently their defensive works were not 

constructed in accordance with doctrinal standards.68 

Since many units lacked adequate engineer support, defensive 

preparations consumed a great deal of time, and prevented many units 

from either conducting training and other activities necessary to maintain 

combat readiness prior to the war or from digging-in properly.69 As a 

result, many of the units lacked adequate cover and concealment when 

the air campaign began.” When the air campaign began, two battalions 

of one Iraqi brigade were completely exposed, while one battalion was 

dug-in to a depth of less than one meter. In a humorous aside, the men 

DELETED] 

67Hammick, “Iraqi Obstacles,” p 989. 

681bid, pp 989,991. 

69[DELETED] 

70[ DELETED] 

72 
in one unit hoped for a B-52 strike in their proximity so that they could 

shelter their exposed vehicles in the resulting bomb crater^.^' 

Along the border with Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi front-line defenses 

consisted of two linear belts of brigade-size fighting positions with positions for tanks, artillery, and infantry, reinforced by mine fields and 

obstacles, including fire trenches, tank ditches and berms, and barbed 

wire.72 While the plan was well conceived, it was poorly irn~lernented.~~ 

Many positions were poorly designed and constructed and lacked mutual 

support, with gaps along sector boundaries, and obstacles were often not 

covered by fire.74 Defenses in some areas, moreover, had been neglected-alternate fighting positions and trenches filled up with sand while 

some mine fields had been exposed by the wind and the mines could be 

seen by air and ground forces.” Units defending the coast were deployed 

in lightly reinforced buildings and trenches which overlooked obstacles, 

including mine fields, hedgehogs, stakes, concertina, and booby-traps, 

arrayed on the beach and beyond the water line, as well as offshore mine 

fields. Shore based defenses were reinforced by Silkworm missiles, 

tanks, artillery, and naval commando forces?6 

The Iraqis made extensive logistical preparations before the war to 

support the defense of Kuwait, creating an impressive logistical 

infrastructure in the theater. In addition to several major permanent GHQ 

(theater) level supply depots in southern Iraq, numerous corps and division level supply depots were established in central Kuwait that contained 

sufficient ammunition, food, water, POL, and spares to support sustained 

combat.77 In addition, Iraqi engineers built more than 2,000 kilometers 

of roads in Kuwait, a 150-kilometer railroad spur-line to connect Kuwait 

city with the Iraqi national railroad, and installed a 100-kilometer water 

71[ DELETED] 

72[DELETED] 

73Murray Hammick, “Iraqi Obstacles and Defensive Positions,” International Defense 

74Hammick. “Iraqi Obstacles,” p 989. 

DOD, Conduct of the war. p I 13. 

7%ammick, “Iraqi Obstacles,” p 99 1. 

n[DELETED] 

Review, Sep 91, pp 989-991. 

75 

73 
pipeline connecting southern Iraq with Kuwait.” These theater-level 

stocks were supplemented by unit-level stocks (down to company level) 

of food, water, and ammunition, which in most units were sufficient for 

between 10-30 days of c0mbat.7~ 

The Republican Guard enjoyed priority logistic support, followed by 

the regular heavy armored and mechanized divisions, and finally the 

regular infantry divisions at the front.80 The fact that Iraqi planners 

organized their theater logistical structure around major theater depots 

located in southern Iraq, that they did not establish larger depots in 

Kuwait, and that they did not protect the main supply route in the theater 

with air defense assets indicated that the military command did not anticipate that coalition aerial interdiction would significantly degrade their 

logistical effort. Despite these preparations, the long distance between 

deployed divisions and their respective depots resulted in the attrition of 

wheeled transports even before the war began.8’ 

By January 1991, Iraq had eleven corps or corps-level headquarters 

and sixty-six divisions, eight corps or corps-level headquarters and 

elements of fifty-one divisions (including Republican Guard units),82 all 

of its regular armored and mechanized divisions, and a large number of 

infantry divisions, in the Kuwaiti theater. The build-up occurred in two 

major surges. From August to September, with the arrival of lead 

elements of the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps in Saudi Arabia, Iraq committed a large number of active units to the Kuwaiti theater, including the 

Republican Guard divisions, nearly all of its heavy armored and mechanized divisions, and its best infantry divisions, which were later joined by 

a number of newly mobilized reserve divisions. They also ordered two 

major call-ups of military retirees and reservists during this period. In 

addition, a number of foreign Arab workers and students were impressed 

into military service (a practice from the war with Iran), while the regime 

78Jordan TV, 7 Nov 90; INA, 4 Sep 90. 

79Many units also installed underground water storage tanks. INA, 8 Jan 

80[ DELETED] 

81[ DELETED] 

82(S) Four [DELETED] Republican Guard units [DELETED] stayed at home to 

91; 

[DELETED]. 

maintain internal security. [DELETED]. 

74 
announced a general amnesty in August for prisoners and detainees in an 

effort to increase available manpower and to consolidate domestic support 

for the regime. These Iraqi forces deployed primarily in the southeastern 

corner of Kuwait-the expected focus of a possibly coalition attack. From 

November to December, following the U.S. decision to deploy the VII 

Corps, Iraq conducted four additional call-ups and newly mobilized and 

formed infantry divisions were deployed to fill gaps along the border with 

Saudi Arabia and to extend the western flank of its defenses. 

Knowing that a stated coalition objective was the liberation of Kuwait 

City, Iraqi strategists focused on its defense. They assumed that the main 

effort would likely consist of an assault through Khafji along the coastal 

road in the east, with supporting efforts, including a thrust from the west 

up the Wadi al-Batin towards Kuwait City, and an amphibious assault near 

Kuwait city in the ea~t.8~ Iraqi forces were deployed to support an attrition 

strategy intended to maximize coalition casualties. The first line of defense 

consisted of two obstacle belts behind which were deployed a large number 

of infantry divisions, backed by heavy armored and mechanized units 

deployed in depth, organized into corps (tactical), theater (operational), and 

GHQ (strategic) reserves. Ground forces were organized into geographic 

corps (the 111, IV, VI, and VII Corps, and the Gulf Operations Forces) with 

defined areas of responsibility, or maneuver corps (the Republican Guard, 

the Jihad Corps, and the I1 Armored Corps) with specific functions. 

During the course of the build-up, Iraqi forces in the theater underwent 

several reorganizations in order to rationalize command and control and 

better meet the perceived threat-additional corps were committed to the 

theater or created in response to operational requirements, areas of 

responsibility were adjusted, and units were realigned.&2 

83Hammick, “Iraqi Obstacles,” p 991, 

84F0r instance, in November, 111 Corps units withdrew to behind the Wafra oil fields 

in order to simplify the defense of their sector. 

75 
Figure 6 

Iraqi Ground Force Deployment in the KTO - 16 January 1991 

Legend of Iraqi Republican Guard Divisions: 

T = Tawakalna H = Hammurabi B = Baghdad AF = Al Faw 

M = Madinah N = Nebuchadnezzar A = Adnan SF = Special Forces 

Sources: Multiple sources including Rpt (SAWN) Conduct of the Persian 

Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, Pursuant to litle V Persian Gulf 

Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public 

Law 102-25). July 1991. 

In accordance with Iraqi defensive doctrine, planners ordered front 

line infantry divisions to defend in sector from prepared positions, 

reducing coalition forces and forcing them to reveal their main effort. At 

the appropriate time, tactical reserves would counterattack coalition 

penetrations in their respective sectors. The operational reserve would 

76 
then either block or counterattack coalition penetrations, further attriting 

coalition forces in the process. After the coalition main effort had been 

reduced by the tactical and operational reserves, the Republican 

Guard-the strategic reserve-would conduct a corps-level counterattack 

against the flanks of the surviving coalition force to destroy it. However, 

the Iraqi plan oriented towards the defense of Kuwait City had not anticipated other contingencies, such as a wide flanking attack from the west.'' 

Nor did most Iraqi units have the ability to rapidly redeploy for an attack 

from this direction, due to the lack of prepared defenses in this area and 

a shortage of organic transport. 

In addition to a narrowly-focused defensive plan, none of the Iraqi 

units deployed in theater were at full personnel or equipment strength. 

While nearly all the Republican Guard units deployed at about ninety-five 

percent authorized strength, most of the regular army units deployed at 

about seventy-five to eighty-five percent of their authorized strength, and 

many lost an additional twenty to twenty-five percent through desertion 

even before the onset of hostilities, bringing many units down to fifty to 

sixty percent strength on the eve of the war.86 The low level of readiness 

of many units was manifested by equipment and personnel shortages, and 

low in-service equipment rates due to inadequate maintenance and a lack 

of spares. These factors, in concert with the general phenomena of war 

weariness, the harsh conditions at the front, and the negative impact of 

Iraqi propaganda on its own troops, served to undermine morale even 

before the eruption of hostilities. Finally, none of the infantry divisions 

deployed with their assigned reconnaissance regiments or commando 

battalions-the former had been consolidated at corps level while 

divisional commando battalions had been disbanded as part of an effort 

to reduce manpower requirements prior to the war. [DELETED]'' 

Shortages of qualified personnel in key positions affected many units. 

In some, tanks and crew-served weapons were not fully manned, a 

problem that was exacerbated by desertions prior to the commencement 

of hostilities. Moreover, personnel replacements often were not available. 

In addition, due to the expansion of the army, many units were commanded by personnel with insufficient rank and experience, resulting in 

"[DELETED] 

86[DELETED] 

"[DELETED] 

77 
brigades being commanded by lieutenant colonels, battalions by majors, 

companies by lieutenants, and platoons by non-commissioned officers." 

Personnel problems extended beyond the theater and adversely 

affected Saddam's military operations. Officers suspected of disloyalty 

were often executed or retired from the military. Prior to the Gulf War 

Saddam relieved his defense minister, chief of staff, and at least two 

corps commanders, and executed a number of senior officers who had 

opposed the invasion of Kuwait. While these moves ensured that the 

military remained compliant, it also ensured that on the eve of the war 

several key slots were filled by inexperienced officers. and that command 

relationships had not been routinized when the war began. 

Finally, thousands of Iraqi soldiers deserted and hundreds defected to 

coalition forces prior to the war. Reports of desertions among Iraqi 

soldiers serving in Kuwait surfaced as early as August 1990, and the 

problem was apparently serious enough by October 1990 for the General 

Staff to order the formation of execution squads in each unit to deter 

deserti~n!~ In one extreme case, 52d Armored Brigade air defense 

[DELETED] platoon of the 52d Armored Division [DELETED] deserted 

en musse.w In addition, the fact that Iraq was facing a thirty-one nation 

coalition that included the U.S., Britain, France, as well as a number of 

Arab and Islamic states caused some Iraqi soldiers to question the justice 

of their cause, as well as their odds of survival?' In other units, ethnic 

cleavages compounded the desertion problem. [DELETED]'* 

Sanctions had an expected effect on Iraqi readiness and sustainability. 

On the operational and tactical level, they resulted in lower maintenance 

standards and spares shortages that had a significant impact on readiness 

rates. By the time the war began, about twenty percent of Iraqi combat 

aircraft were grounded due to maintenance problems, as Iraq had 

depended on Soviet and other foreign technicians-who had left the 

"[DELETED] 

"AFP, 12 Aug 90 ; [DELETED]. 

w[DELETED] 

"(S) Ibid. 

"[DELETED] 

78 
country-to maintain its air f0rce.9~ Likewise, the army was unable to 

conduct depot-level maintenance due to the loss of foreign personnel. 

Much of the equipment was in poor condition to begin with. due to Iraqi 

maintenance practices and the shortage of spares, which was exacerbated 

by sanctions. All this prevented the repair of deadlined vehicles and 

equipment deployed in theater?4 

By January, Baghdad had deployed elements of several fighter 

squadrons to 'Ali al-Salem and Ahmed al-Jaber air bases in Kuwait and 

to forward and dispersal airfields in southern Iraq, supplemented by fixed 

(SA-2l3) and mobile (SA-6) surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft 

artillery units?' In addition, the Iraqi air force logged abnormally high 

rates of air activity in the months prior to the war, indicating intensified 

preparations and efforts to enhance readiness." Air force activities 

including heavy transport and resupply operations (largely in support of 

the logistical build-up in the Kuwaiti theater), defensive fighter patrols 

over southeast Iraq and Kuwait, reconnaissance flights (including photo 

reconnaissance and ELINT and SlGlNT collection missions), electronic 

jamming missions directed at coalition communications, Adnan I/Baghdad 

airborne early warning aircraft operations, training, and test/evaluation 

flights, day and night ground-controlled and independent intercept training, air-to-air and air-to-ground training (including deep strike as well as 

battlefield support missions), airfield and area familiarization training, and 

limited probes of Saudi airspace to test coalition alert and response procedures. As the 15 January deadline for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from 

Kuwait approached, the prewar surge in air activity was followed by a 

lull (starting in early Jan~ary).~' 

In spite of this, by mid-January, Saddam seemed confident that the 

United States would not initiate hostilities but, if it did, that he had 

ordered all necessary preparations?' The armed forces had completed 

A Soviet Operational Analysis," p 59. 93'' 

94[ DELETED] 

95(SlNF/WN) Steven B. Michael, The Persian Gurf War: An Air Staff Chronology 

%(S/NF/WN) Ibid, p 85. 

97[DELETED] 

9'Radio Moscow, 16 Jan 9 1. 

of Desert StodDesert Shield, (DC: Center for Air Force History: 1992). 

79 
most of their defensive preparations, which were intended to deter U.S. 

and coalition forces, or engage them in a costly ground campaign if 

deterrence failed. [DELETEDIw 

In the end, Saddam believed that the balance of power favored Iraq 

and that the U.S. would not attack his dug-in military. He had opted for 

confrontation rather than compromise. At the same time, his constant 

public repetition of Iraq’s claims to Kuwait and his repeated refusal to 

countenance withdrawal made him a prisoner of his own rhetoric and 

limited his political freedom of maneuver. In this context, Saddam may 

have interpreted the offer by President Bush on 30 November for a 

meeting of foreign ministers as a sign of U.S. weakness. This meeting 

was portrayed by First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan as 

a U.S. “retreat” in the face of “world and Arab public opinion.”’OO At the 

9 January meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign 

Minister Tariq ‘Aziz in Geneva, Iraq reiterated its adherence to its 12 

August initiative as the sole acceptable basis for the settlement of the 

crisis. This was rejected by the U.S., sealing the fate of this last-minute 

effort to avert war. 

Saddam’s strategy proved to be flawed by misjudging the coalition’s 

cohesion and resolve, and he ceded the initiative to dictate the time, 

place, and terms of battle to his enemies. He had overrated both his 

appeal among Arab nations and the fragility of the coalition. His efforts 

to undermine the coalition were contingent on others acting in an anticipated fashion, and when they did not, his military-diplomatic strategy 

collapsed. Nonetheless, several Arab coalition members felt constrained 

to adopt a number of self-imposed limitations on their participation in the 

war in order to limit their vulnerability to Iraqi propaganda and to appease domestic opinion. In the end, a combination of adroit U.S. diplomacy, the caution of Arab coalition members in not exceeding the limits 

imposed by popular sensibilities, and Israeli restraint enabled the coalition 

to preserve its cohesion. 

The Iraqi army that U.S. and coalition forces faced on the eve of the 

war suffered from numerous self-inflicted wounds which put them at a 

significant disadvantage. The dramatic expansion of the army before the 

99[DELETED] 

‘OORadio Baghdad, 4 Dec 90. 

80 
war had weakened Saddam’s army rather than strengthen it. Although 

the Republican Guard was at nearly full strength, the regular army 

divisions were not. This situation adversely affected the confidence of 

his troops. In addition, the regular army-recently bolstered with large 

numbers of untrained recruits-was weary from a decade of combat 

against Iran and the Kurds and demoralized by the prospect of a war 

against the coalition. 

Finally, Iraqi arrogance-which afflicted both Saddam and his 

generals-and which manifest itself in a predisposition to inflate Iraqi 

capabilities and underestimate those of their enemies, had a significant 

impact on his assessment of the balance of forces. These important, yet 

difficult to quantify, factors influenced nearly every decision made prior 

to the war and precluded Saddam or his advisors from accurately identifying coalition strengths and weaknesses, and recognizing Iraq’s own 

significant shortcomings. 

81 
82 
4 

Policy Objectives, Restraints, and Constraints’ 

Policy Objectives 

Throughout the entire planning effort for the Gulf War, leaders such 

as Generals Schwarzkopf and Homer and their military planners such as 

Gen. Buster Glosson and Col. John A. Warden, consistently worked from 

and to achieve national objectives that were laid out early in the crisis. 

The President and his Secretary of Defense themselves prescribed this 

guidance, and those charged with writing the Gulf War plan worked to 

ensure that these defined the strategic aims of their campaign plans. 

The President himself outlined the objectives. From the outset, he 

clearly had more in mind than just to deter or repel an Iraqi invasion of 

Saudi Arabia, a point not lost in either Washington or Riyadh. Within a 

week of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he announced “[flour simple principles” that would guide U.S. actions in the crisis. These policy objectives 

were: (1) securing the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal 

of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; (2) restoring the legitimate government of 

Kuwait; (3) assuring the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region; 

and (4) protecting American lives? The President deliberately made a 

clear statement of objectives to ensure that US. diplomatic and military 

responses to Iraqi aggression were aligned with the central aims of U.S. 

policy. Repeated recitations of these ends by ranking Bush Administration officials guaranteed that they would remain at the forefront of U.S. 

strategies for resolving the crisis. Between the outbreak of the crisis and 

the start of the war, the “four simple principles” were unchanged and 

gave strategic guidance for its conduct. 

‘This chapter is drawn from a more extensive treatment of the subject, Kurt Guthe, 

’Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces 

to Saudi Arabia, 8 Aug, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George 

Bush, 1990 (Book 11) (Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Record 

Administration, 1991). p 1108. 

etc. GWAPS files. 

83 
The degree to which military leaders and their planners were sensitive 

to these objectives throughout their planning was evident in the slides that 

they used in the various key briefings of their efforts as well as the 

numerous versions of the plans produced from August 1990 through 

January 1991. In all cases, they explicitly cited these strategic goals. 

From being listed at the beginning of the 2 September OPORD for Phase 

I to the 16 December OPLAN and 17 January coalition plan where they 

were characterized as the “National Objectives,” these objectives formed 

the boundaries for operational planners? 

For them, the meaning of the first two objectives was clear-cut as 

they recognized that, with the failure of diplomatic efforts and economic 

sanctions, it would be necessary for military operations to dislodge the 

Iraqi army from Kuwait. The meaning of the third objective was not as 

clear. The liberation of Kuwait and the defense of Saudi Arabia and 

other nations in the region obviously would contribute to the “security 

and stability of the Persian Gulf.” In addition, however, the objective 

could be interpreted as requiring military operations to reduce the longterm as well as the immediate threat from Hussein’s armed forces. The 

vice president had suggested such a view only a month before the start 

of the war’ when he warned that even if the first two objectives were 

realized, the U.S. would still have to ensure security and stability in the 

region. “[W]e will still have to work to see that the President’s final 

objective-maintaining security and stability in the region-is achieved. 

We cannot allow a situation in which an aggressive dictator has a millionman army, thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, hundreds of jets, and 

access to billions of petro-dollm.’“ The Secretary of Defense also 

voiced similar concern, saying that “[ilf Iraq‘s ambitions are not curbed 

they will just grow stronger. . . . its military power will be greater. It 

will come armed not just with 5,600 tanks, a million-man army, chemical 

weapons and ballistic missiles [but also could] possess nuclear weapons 

and long-range-missiles to deliver them.”’ 

3(s/NF) COMUSCENTAF OPORD, Offensive Campaign-Phase 1.2 Sep 90. p 1, GWAPS; 

and (SMF) USCINCCENT OPLAN Desert Storm, 16 Dec 90. p 4. AFHRA 0269602. 

kemarks at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 18 Dec 90. in US Department of 

State Dispatch, 24 Dec 90. p 350. 

’Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Crisis in the Persian 

GulfRegwn: U.S. Policy Options and Implicatwns, IOlst Congress, 2d sess (Washington, 

1990). p 657. After the war, Cheney said publicly that U.S. military objectives in the 

84 
The planners could thus use this objective to justify operations aimed 

at not just ejecting Iraqi forces in Kuwait but also eliminating Baghdad’s 

offensive capabilities for committing future acts of aggression. Likewise, 

they could have interpreted this to suggest as a military objective the 

elimination of Saddam Hussein; for with him out of the way, many 

planners were convinced that the Iraqi army would withdraw from Kuwait, a move that would fulfill the first U.S. policy aim in the Gulf 

conflict. Conceivably, the goal of improving the long-term security and 

stability of the region also would have been furthered by the presence of 

a less bellicose government in Baghdad. The case for a link between 

eliminating the Iraqi dictator and promoting the Wid objective of assuring the security and stability of the Gulf was plausible; however, little 

documentary evidence in the planning exists to date. Indeed, as will be 

discussed later, civilian authorities were unwilling to make Hussein’s 

political or physical demise an explicit U.S. objective! 

Planners had most difficulty with the fourth objective, which referred 

to the U.S. citizens Saddam Hussein held hostage. In their eyes, this 

implied that any planned military action against Iraq had to take their 

safety into account. As will be discussed later, this was a consideration, 

until December, when they hostages were released. As the final plan as 

executed came after this objective was achieved, a clear understanding of 

its influence remains difficult to assess. 

Restraints 

Having set the policy objectives for which the Desert Storm campaign 

would be waged, the top civilian authorities implicitly placed some 

restraints on military leaders and thus military planners. Notionally, the 

President and his Secretary of Defense sought an oversight role with 

regard to the evolving war plans. On the surface, they appeared to want 

to avoid “micromanaging” their military commanders and planner. 

Generals Homer and Glosson were adamant in their desire to avoid the 

problems of Rolling Thunder air campaign against North Vietnam, when 

President Johnson and his chief civilian advisers selected targets and 

Gulf War “were two-fold: to liberate Kuwait, and secondly, to strip Saddam Hussein of 

his offensive military capability, of his capacity to threaten his neighbors.” (Transcript, 

Remarks to the Detroit Economic Club. 14 Sep 92, p 7). 

6(S) Intvw. Gen Glosson with GWAB Staff, 12 Dec 91. Cochran notes. 

85 
made other tactical decisions during their ‘r’uesday luncheons” at the 

White House.’ The President referred to this when announcing the start 

of the air campaign, “. . . this will not be another Vietnam . . . . Our 

troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they 

will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their backs.”’ 

Cheney, too, saw strategy as his province, and operational planning as 

that of the military? According to one of his deputies, ‘‘. . . what distinguished the President’s . . . and also Secretary Cheney’s management of 

this was not to try to micro-manage the details. Secretary Cheney said 

at one point . . . it’s their plan, they have to make it, but before this is 

finished, I’m going to own it. And to be sure he knew and had confidence in everything about it.*’’’ 

The Gulf War introduced a new dimension in oversight, primarily 

through the use of secure STU-111 telephones.” During the Vietnam war 

and subsequent conflicts, senior military leaders had communicated on a 

regular basis outside established direct channels through a process called 

“back channel,” a privileged “eyes only” telecommunications link that 

facilitated direct message traffic among senior officers without fear of 

compromise. In theory, no one but the addressee read these personal 

messages. The STU-111 allowed this form of private communications to 

continue, but this time by secure and instantaneous telephone. Though 

’Maj Gen Buster C. Glosson. quoted in John D. Morrocco. “From Vietnam to Desert 

Storm:’ Air Force Magazine, Jan 92. p 73; (S) intvw. Glosson, 6 Mar 91. p 11; (S) intvw, 

Center for Air Force History with Maj Gen Buster C. Glosson, 12 Dec 91. p 26, GWAPS, 

Historical Advisor’s files; Richard Mackenzie. “A Conversation with Chuck Homer,” Air 

Force Mug&, Jun 91, p 63; (S) intvw. GWAPS staff with Lt Col David A. Deptula, 20 

and 21 Dec 91. p 3, GWAPS. 

‘Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, 16 

Jan 91, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Office of the Federal Register, 

National Archives and Records Administration, 21 Jan 91). Vol 27, p 51. 

’Videotaped talk, Col Garry R. Trexler, “The OSD [Office of the Secretary of 

Defense] Perspective,” to Air War College Course 6328: Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm-Lessons for the Future, 9 Mar 92; (S) intvw. Kurt Guthe, GWAPS, with Trexler. 26 

Mar 92. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Trexler was Military Assistant in the Office 

of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

‘?ranscript, American Enterprise Xnstitute for Public Policy Research, ‘The Gulf 

War Conference.” 7 Dec 91, pp 239-240. 

“For more information on the impact of the STU-III telephone on the Gulf War, see 

GWAPS report on Command and Control. 

86 
General Schwarzkopf was adamant that no one in theater talk to Washington without going through channels, his directive was disregarded 

virtually from the onset. General Homer talked on a regular basis with 

the Air Force Chief of Staff, General McPeak, while his Army counterpart did so with the Army Chief of Staff. General Glosson talked frequently with a wide variety of official contacts both inside and outside of 

military channels during the planning phase.” The so-called “Black 

Hole” institutionalized daily contact between air planners and the Air 

Staff that widened within the Washington c~mmunity.’~ General Glosson’s deputy planner, Lt. Col. Deptula, remained assigned to Secretary 

Rice’s office throughout the war, maintained constant contact with individuals there, returned several times to Washington to conduct direct 

briefings on the planning effort for both the Secretary and General McPeak.“ 

Though participants on this Gulf War “back channel’, communications 

have been open to discussions since the war, precise documentation on 

what was actually discussed, confirmation with whom it was discussed, 

and evidence as what the actual outcome was remains sketchy at best. 

One can, however, assume that this practice introduced a new and much 

more subtler form of micro-management. The STU-111 telephone allowed 

quick and secure discussion about extremely sensitive planning information on a scale never before in warfare. Though “off line” and out-ofchannel briefings to individuals outside of the planning community facilitated bureaucratic procedures and assisted in solving logistical problems, 

larger number of individuals in the Washington area, both military and 

otherwise, were aware of the planning situation. 

On a formal basis, there were several key briefings by General 

Glosson, the chief air planner, during which the President, the Secretary 

of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff (their chief 

military adviser) exercised oversight such as the 13 September briefing 

”(S) Intvw. Homer with GWAPS Senior Staff, Shaw AFB. SC. 9 Mar 92. Cochran 

notes; (S) Intvw. ARCENT Historian with Cochran, Ft. Leavenworth KS. 24 Mar 92: (S) 

Intvw. CENTCOM Historian with GwAPS. MacDill AFB. FL. 20 Apr 92, Cochran notes; (S) 

Glosson intvw, op cif. Cochran notes. 

13For more on the Black Hole, see GWAPS report on Command and Control. 

14(S) Intvw. Secretary Rice with GWAPS Senior Staff, Washington DC. n.d. Cochran 

notes. 

87 
for General Powell, the 10 and 11 October briefing for the President, 

Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, and the 20 December discussions with Secretary of Defense and the Chairman in Riyadh (and reported to the President after leaving the theater and returning to Washington). 

The substance of these briefings will be developed in greater detail in 

Chapter 6. During these meetings, the chief air planner reviewed national 

and military objectives, concept of operations, forces available, planned 

targets (in some detail), execution sequence, and expected results. In 

November, as the possibility of the offensive operation became more 

evident, members of the Joint and Air Staff began at the secretary’s own 

request a series of briefings intended to familiarize him with various 

aspects of war planning and air operations. The subjects included air 

power missions (e.g.. interdiction, close air support), target categories, 

strike package planning, sortie deconfliction, munitions effects, and 

collateral damage.” 

One explicit way in which civilian authorities exercised restraint 

during the planning for the air campaign was in review of target lists. 

Listed below is a version of the target list that was current at the outset 

of the war and was given to the CINCCENT, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs, 

and the Secretary of Defense. This list, or one like it, was used in the 

target review sessions involving Powell, Cheney, Baker, and Bush. 

”(S) Memo, Lt Col Paul Dordal to DJS. subj: Proposed SECDEF Briefings. 3 Nov 90. 

Gw~ps; Trexler intvw. 26 Mar 92; and Bob Woodward, The Coders (New Yo&. 

19!31), p 330. 

88 
Figure 7 

Extract from “THE” Target List 

Provided to CINC, CJCS, SECDEF 

FIGURE DELETED 

The list is broken down into a dozen categories, with the objective for 

each category summarized, individual targets identified. target locations 

indicated by geographic coordinates and region, strike aircraft matched 

against targets, strike times recorded, and the area around each target 

characterized as “isolated,” “sparsely populated,” “residential,” “industrial,” containing chemical weapons facilities, or having hospitals or 

mosques. [DELETED]’6 

General Powell took steps to ensure that the staffs in the White 

House and the Pentagon would not get involved in the details of target 

selection. General Glosson confirmed that the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs “did not permit anybody . . . in Washington to have a copy of the 

‘6Target list, with the following handwritten note by Deptula: ‘This was the target 

list, by category (target set), with objectives for that target set and weapon system fragged 

on which day with comments concerning population density-“THE‘ target list we started 

the war with-copy to CWC, UCS, and SECDEF.” 

89 
(authoritative) target list,” and said that Powell was very effective in 

keeping second guessers away during the war.17 

In December, planners for the Desert Storm air campaign plan had 

finalized their target list, and various versions were circulated at the 

highest level in Washington.” Several days before the offensive began, 

for example, Cheney reportedly showed the President the targets to be 

struck in the imminent air offensive.” The next day, Secretary of State 

James Baker and Under Secretary of Stak for Political Affairs Robert 

Kimmitt went to the Pentagon to examine the target list with Cheney and 

Powell. After the war, the Chairman recalled that he “personally took 

them through the target list and the nature of the targets and [explained] 

in general why they were selected, what we were hoping to achieve.”” 

According to Kimmitt, “it was very clear to both Secretary Baker and 

me . . . . that those political considerations that had been expressed. both 

at the Cabinet level and [in the Deputies Committee of the National 

Security Council], had been well taken into account, and we both left the 

meeting very comfortable from a political perspective.”” Planners made 

very few changes. [DELETED]= 

Though formal restraints by civilian authorities on the military planners were never articulated, in retrospect five can be identified. First, 

casualties among Iraqi noncombatants would be held to a minimum. 

Second, harm to structures of cultural and religious significance to the 

Iraqi people would be avoided. Third, damage to the Iraqi economy and 

its capacity for postwar recovery would be limited. Fourth, the lives of 

the hostages held by Iraq would be protected to the extent possible. 

Fifth. nuclear weapons would not be used. 

I7“did not permit . . . list”: Glosson quoted in Casey Anderson, “War Planner: 

Civilians Didn’t Change Target List,” Air Force Times. 8 July 91, p 27; “effective in 

keeping . . . if they did”: (S) intvw, Glosson, 12 Dec 91. p 25. 

18(S) Intvw. Gen Scowcroft with GWAPS staff, 23 Sep 92, Cochran notes. 

”The CommMders, p 364. 

%anscript, ‘The Gulf Crisis: The Road to War,” Part 3 of a three-part television 

series conceived and arranged by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 

Research and produced by Brian Lapping Associates for the Discovery Channel, p 4. 

”The Gulf War Conference,” p 236. 

22[DELET”ED] 

90 
One of the most interesting restraints concerned targeting Saddam 

Hussein himself. While key policy-makers expressed reservations about 

targeting him, they did nothing to discourage such action and sanctioned 

efforts to weaken his government. As noted earlier, General Glosson 

pushed for a commitment from the President for Hussein as a target at the 

early October briefing. Secretary of State Baker managed to deflect this 

initiative to the extent that the question was never really addressed. After 

the war, General Schwarzkopf opined that Hussein never could be considered a legitimate target for the simple reason that he was too difficult to 

track down-as had General Noriega in Just Cause.23 General Scowcroft 

confirmed this rationale in postwar discussions.” 

With respect to the first implicit restraint, limiting civilian casualties, 

the President set the tone from the outset. Many times throughout the 

crisis, the President publicly declared that “the United States has no 

quarrel with the Iraqi pe~ple.’”~ In discussions with Generals Homer and 

Glosson, he made clear that it was imperative to limit civilian losses?6 

The president formalized this requirement in his war directive for Desert 

storm. 

While presidential stress on limiting harm to innocent Iraqis 

undoubtedly arose from deep-rooted moral beliefs, it also reflected political realities. Both civilian and military leaders recognized that domestic 

and international support for military action against Saddam Hussein 

would disappear rapidly if large numbers of noncombatants were killed 

or maimed in coalition attacks. Glosson, remembering Vietnam, believed 

that sustained popular support was essential if the air campaign was to 

23H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York. 1992). pp 499-500. 

“(S) Scowcroft intvw, Cochran notes. 

”Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the 

Federal Budget Deficit, 11 Sep 90, in Public Papers of the Presitlcnts of the United 

Stutes, p 1221. See also Address to the People of Iraq on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 16 Sep 

90, in ibid.. p 1239; Address Before the 45th Session of the United Nations General 

Assembly. 1 Oct 90, in ibid., p 1331; Remarks to United States Army Troops Near 

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 22 Nov 90. in ibid.. p 1669; Address to the Nation Announcing 

Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, p 52. 

“(S) Intvw Homer, 4 Mar 92. p 1; Homer, speech at Dadaelian Dinner, 11 Sep 91. 

p 1; Homer, quoted in Barry Shlachter, “A US. General Assesses the War After One 

Year.” Ft. Worth Star-Telegrum, 17 Feb 92, p 15; (S) intvw, Glosson. 6 Mar 91, pp 11- 

12; Glosson, cited in “From Vietnam to Desert Storm,” p 73. 

91 
achieve its objectives?’ He also remembered World War 11, feeling that 

the public would not tolerate “another Dresden.”28 With regard to the 

Iraqi populace, both he and many of his planners believed that focused 

air strikes that enervated Hussein’s regime while sparing his subjects 

would help separate ruler from ruled, promoting conditions for the Iraqi 

leader’s overthrow. 

Such Presidential instruction for planners of the air campaign also 

meant limited collateral damage. All were conscious that the Law of 

Armed Conflict prohibited direct attacks on civilian populations. The 

overall tone here was set by Colonel Warden and his initial plan, Instant 

Thunder, showed both perception and sensitivity to civilian causalities 

and collateral damage. What the President’s concerns did, in Glosson’s 

view, was to make the Black Hole err on the side of caution in planning 

strikes that might cause collateral da1nage.2~ These same concerns may 

also have indicated that his unwillingness to micromanage war planning 

was conditional. As the civilian casualties incurred in A1 Firdos bunker 

incident was to demonstrate, Iraqi civilian losses under certain circumstances could prompt the higher authorities-in this case, General Powell, 

to set aside their objections to micromanagement. In retrospect, both 

civilian authorities and military planners may have been overzealous on 

this point. 

Following the example set by Colonel Warden and Instant Thunder 

planners, air campaign planners incorporated the civilian casualty/ 

collateral damage restraints underscored by President Bush in the planning for the air campaign. In Phase I, the strategic air campaign of the 

operations order specified that “Civilian casualties and collateral damages 

will be kept to a minimum. The target is Saddam Hussein’s regime, not 

the Iraqi populace . . . . Anything which could be considered as terror 

attacks or attacks on the Iraqi people will be avoided.”30 In the 16 December OPLAN, planners likewise required that planned strikes accord 

with the guidance issued by the National Command Authorities (the 

27(S) Intvw. Glosson. 12 Dec 91, p 9. 

28(S) Intvw. Glosson, 9 Apr 92. 

29(S) Intvw. Glosson. 6 Mar 91, p 11. 

30(~) OFORD, ‘affensive campaign-phase I; 2 Sep 90. p 3. 

92 
President and the Secretary of Defense)?’ Estimates of the number of 

civilian casualties incidental to F-117NGBU-27, F-11 lF/GBU-24, and 

sea-launched cruise missile attacks on Baghdad were sent to the Black 

Hole by Checkmate in the fall of 1990?2 To limit noncombatant injuries 

and deaths, planners avoided hitting certain targets, checked all targets in 

the Baghdad area for collateral damage conflicts, timed strikes to maximize their effectiveness and minimize civilian casualties, employed weapon systems with the best delivery accuracy (F-117s and F-1 1 1Fs with 

laser-guided bombs) against targets in densely populated areas, reduced 

the likelihood of target misidentification through thorough aircrew familiarization with flight routes and targets and used attack axes that lessened 

the chance of weapons landing outside targeted a~as.3~ 

While planners took pains to hold down civilian casualties, they also 

hoped that some of the effects of attacks on military-related targets would 

fuel popular opposition to Hussein and the war effort. Indeed they 

expected an overthrow of the Iraqi regime. One of the purposes behind 

targeting the telecommunications network, according to General Glosson, 

was “to put every [Iraqi] household in an autonomous mode and make 

them feel they were isolated. I didn’t want them to listen to radio stations and know what was happening. I wanted to play with their psyche[~].”” General Homer believed the strikes would disrupt the electrical 

system, bring the war home to the people of Baghdad, and show that 

Saddam Hussein was powerless to counter the U.S. air ~ffensive.~~ One 

of the air campaign planners thought that one of the messages of the 

shutdown of electrical power was, “Hey, your lights will come back on 

as soon as you get rid of Saddam.”36 The planners expected that the 

bombing campaign would produce bonus psychological effects on the will 

3’(s) OPLAN Mft Storm, 16 kC 90. p B42. 

32crs/S) Memo, Col John A. Warden 111 to Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, 14 Nov 90, 

GWAPS.; and (SMFIWN) Rpt. BDM International. Inc., Threat Refuted Attrition (Threat) 

Model Application. BDhUMCL-91-0036-TR (McLean. Va. 1991). GWAPS. 

33(TS/L,IMDIS/SAR) Talking Paper, “Limiting Collated Damage,” [no author, no 

date], GWAPS; Homer, quoted in “A Conversation with Chuck Homer.” p 61. 

?S) Intvw, Glosson, 12 Dec 91. p 15. 

35H0mr, cited in Julie Bird, “Hornec Further AF Role in Gulf Not Needed,” Air 

“(S) Intvw. Center for Air Force History with L4 Col David A. Deptula. 8 Jan 92, 

Force Times, 18 Mar 91. p 8. 

p 43. GwAPs. Historical Advisor’s files. 

93 
of the Iraqi people on conjunction with the role of the enemy population 

in Colonel Warden’s “five rings’’ conceptual framework and Checkmate’s 

Instant Thunder plan. 

The second restraint that planners worked under was to limit damage 

against structures of cultural and religious significance to the Iraqi people. 

Reasons here were similar to those defining the first restraint. During 

General Glosson’s 11 October briefing at the White House, the President 

asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to make certain that no religious 

or historically valuable structures were on any target list for the air 

campaign. Powell assured the president that planners had taken this 

limitation into account from the very start, and Glosson noted some of the 

measures taken to spare religious b~ildings.3~ As a result, planners 

constructed a Joint No-Fire Target List for the air campaign, drawn up 

with the aid of the State Department and the intelligence agencies, that 

included a significant number of religious and historical structures. 

The third implicit restraint placed upon planners by civilian 

authorities limited damage to the Iraqi economy and its capacity for 

postwar recovery. Of most interest to planners here was its energy-producing sector. Their aim here was to deny support for military operations 

without prolonging postwar recovery. Thus, for example, they selected 

transformers as aim points for strikes against electric power plants, which 

would take months to repair, rather than generator halls, which would 

take years.’” [DELETED] Campaign planners themselves were concerned 

about from the outset. In recounting the briefing he received from 

Colonel Warden and the Checkmate team on 17 Aug, Schwarzkopf 

recalled that, ‘Though no one had told us, ’We don’t want you to destroy 

Iraq as a nation,’ my assumption in directing the planners had been that 

the United States would continue to need Iraq as a regional 

counterbalance to Iran. Warden had come up with a strategy designed to 

cripple Iraq’s military without laying waste to the country.”39 

37(S) Glosson. Memorandum for the Record. Subj: Q&A During Presidential Briefing, 11 Oct 90. 

’sMemo, Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson to All Plans Offices, subj: Target Guidance, 

12 Jan 91. This memo actually was issued in February, but dated 12 Jan to reflect the fact 

that the instructions it contained had been expressed verbally before the start of the war. 

”H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New Yo&. 1992), p 318. 

94 
[DELETEDIm Glosson, prior to the war, foresaw a U.S. role in helping 

to rebuild the Iraqi economy, particularly the electrical power system, and 

thus wanted to make that task no more difficult than necessary:’ 

Colonels Warden and Deptula likewise had Iraq’s postwar reconstruction in mind, and thought the ability to supply or deny assistance in 

restoring the oil and electrical power industries would give the United 

States leverage over Baghdad!2 While these positions were not derived 

from strategic guidance coming from the White House or the Pentagon, 

they were consistent with the general U.S. policy of fostering a balance 

of power in the Persian Gulf region. After the war had begun, the President confirmed this, arguing that the objective of assuring security and 

stability in the Gulf required that Iraq not be destroyed or “so destabilized 

that [it] could become a target for aggre~sion.’~~ Of most significance 

here, planners, commanders, and decisionmakers presupposed that in the 

postwar reconstruction of Iraq Saddam Hussein would be toppled as a 

consequence of Desert Storm. 

The third restraint concerned targeting facilities at which hostages 

were located, one that became irrelevant in the final stages of planning 

when the hostages were released. However, as noted earlier, protecting 

American lives was one of the “four simple principles” that the president 

outlined as defining U.S. policy in the Gulf crisis. When Hussein took 

hostages and employed them as “human shields” to ward off air strikes 

on Iraqi military and industrial installations, a tension was created for 

planners between the need to safeguard American lives and the other 

three objectives of U.S. policy. The President sought to undercut Saddam 

DELETED] 

41(S) Intvw. Glosson. 12 Dec 91, p 17; (S) intvw. Glosson. 9 Apr 92. 

“(S) Deptula intvw. 8 Jan 92. pp 39, 41. 42 and 43; GWAPS Task Force V1 draft, 

“Attacking the ‘Strategic’ Core of Iraq’s Military Power,” 30 Apr 92, p 7. 

“Remarks at the Annual Convention of Religious Broadcasters, 28 Jan 91, in 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Office of the Federal Register, National 

Archives and Records Administration, 4 Feb 91), Vol27, p 88. See also Address Before 

a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 29 Jan 91. in ibid.. p 94; and 

The Resident’s News Conference, 5 Feb 91. in Weekly Compilation of Presidential 

Documents, 11 Feb, Vol27, p 127. 

95 
Hussein’s tactic by declaring on a broadcast carried on Iraqi TV that, 

“Hostage-taking . . . will not work . . . it will not affect my ability to 

make tough decisions.’w 

Yet all involved with planning had to take into consideration the fate 

of the hostages in any decision involving the crisis. As one State 

Department official later admitted, “It would have been . . . double tough 

to start bombing a place when you have three thousand Americans in 

there.”45 Those planning the air campaign recognized the importance of 

the hostages as they kept track of targeted installations where hostages 

were held. General Glosson had a backup slide for his 11 October 

briefing at the White House that contained a list of targets with hostages.& Whether the President or his top advisers privately told Generals 

Schwarzkopf, Homer, or Glosson not to hit those targets is unclear from 

available evidence. According to Wolfowitz, “the President made it clear 

that we were not going to have our war plans constrained by [Saddam’s] 

use of people as human shields.’*7 Horner, when asked in a postwar 

interview whether the use of hostages would have “affected the employment of air power,” replied, “Not one iota. We knew where the hostages 

were being kept, but even so, you cannot be blackmailed in war.’* His 

deputy, however, has said that Glosson ordered that targeting installations 

with hostages be avoided. Consequently, very few (some elements of the 

electrical power system protected by “human shields”) were targeted with 

Tomahawk cruise mi~siles.4~ 

Any problems associated with the hostages disappeared when Hussein 

released his prisoners in early December. This move, in the words of one 

of Baker’s deputies, made “the lives of a lot of people a lot easier, from 

epAddress to the People of Iraq on the Persian Gulf Crisis, p 1239. 

45Quoted in U.S. News Bi World Report, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported 

History of the Persian Gdf War (New York, 1992). p 189. 

%riefing, 11 Oct 90. See also (S) briefing. “Offensive Campaign: phase 1.” 3 Sep 

90, GwAPS. CHP Folder 3 (A notation by Deptula on the cover of this briefing reads, “3 

Sept Draft for CMC.”) 

477‘The Gulf War Conference,” p 194. 

48(S) Intvw, Burton with Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, Mar 91, p 27. GWAPS. 

49Deptula intvw. 8 Jan 92. p 50. See also “Limiting Collateral Damage” and John 

M. Broder, “With Its Hostages Out, U.S. Revises List of Iraqi Targets. Los Angela 

Times, 13 Dec 90, p 11. 

96 
military planners through the President, who was very concerned about 

people getting caught in harm’s way.”Jo In retrospect, it seems clear that, 

had they not been released, the air campaign plan would have been 

influenced. Put another way, the release of the hostages also released 

planners from what could have been a major restraint. 

The final restraint faced by planners concerned nuclear weapons, 

which were not part of the plan for the Desert Storm offensive air campaign, as White House officials never seriously considered their employment?’ [DELETED]” [DELETED]. 

Political authorities and their chief military commanders were influenced by numerous factors here. First were their expectations that the 

large and capable conventional forces assembled in the Gulf were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the planned campaign. Likewise, they 

felt that there simply were no targets warranting the use of nuclear weapons. They also realized that any revelation of plans to use nuclear weap 

ons would have severely eroded support both at home and abroad for 

U.S. military actions against Iraq. Lastly, they recognized the tradition 

of nonuse and the likely long-term political costs of nuclear use.53 Nuclear threats may have been conveyed to the Iraqi leader to deter him from 

employing weapons of mass destruction, but operational plans emphasized 

nonnuclear strikes against high-value targets in retaliation for chemical or 

biological attacks. The primary option that planners and senior officials 

maintained was retaliation with chemical weapons. as will be discussed 

in greater detail in Chapter 6. 

Though senior officials and planners both hoped for the demise of 

Saddam Hussein, all were wary of making that an express aim of Desert 

Storm. Soon after the air campaign began, Bush said publicly that, “We 

SoRobert Kimmitt, in “The Gulf War Conference,” p 193. 

”R. Jeffrey Smith and Rick Atkinson. “U.S. Rules Out Gulf Use of Nuclear, Chemical Arms,” Washington Post, 7 Jan 91, p Al. (S)Intvw, Homer with GWAPS Staff; 

(S) Intvw, Glosson with GWAPS Staff. Cochran notes. 

(S) OPLAN Desert Storm, 16 Dec 90. p C-1-1. 52 

53“U.S. Rules Out Gulf Use of Nuclear, Chemical Arms”; John M. Broder. “U.S. 

Forces Have No Nuclear Arms in Gulf States, No Plans to Use Them,” Los Angeles 

Times, 2 Oct 90, p 6. 

97 
are not targeting any individual.”” Powell and Schwarzkopf also announced publicly that Saddam Hussein was not specifically targeted.55 

There seem to have been at least three reasons for this reluctance. First, 

prior to the war, some were concerned that targeting Hussein might be 

contrary to Executive Order 12333, which prohibits U.S. Government 

involvement in “assassination.”j6 This was a major reason cited by 

Secretary Cheney in his relief of Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Dugan, and it sent a clear message to the chief air campaign planner on this point.” Second, planners were aware that the United Nations 

(UN) resolutions around which the coalition coalesced said nothing about 

eliminating Saddam Hussein. They appeared to realize that setting goals 

that went beyond those of the UN would necessitate complex and possibly counterproductive negotiations with the alliess Third, and perhaps 

most important, they were conscious that they could not guarantee strikes 

aimed at killing Hussein would have their intended effect, remembering 

the difficulties in tracking Manuel Noriega during Operation Just Cause 

the previous year.59 Adopting the physical demise of Hussein as a stated 

objective, and then failing to meet that objective would mar the military 

”‘The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict,” 18 Jan 91. in 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 21 Jan 91. p 56. 

5~ranscript. Gen Colin L. Powell, news briefing (with Secretary of Defense Cheney), The Pentagon, 16 Jan 91, p 5; transcript, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, new 

briefing, Riyadh, 18 Jan 9 I, p 4. 

%xecutive Order 12333-United States Intelligence Activities, 4 Dec 81, in Office 

of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Codi$cution of 

Presidential Proclamatwns and Executive Orders (Washington, 1989). p 647. 

57(S) Intvw, Glosson with GWAPS, dated, Cochran notes. Transcript, Secretary of 

Defense Dick Cheney. news briefing, The Pentagon, 17 Sep 90, p 1. 

’*President Bush, Remarks on the Nomination of Edward R. Madigan as Secretary 

of Agriculture and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, 25 Jan 91, in Weekly 

Compilation of Presidential Documents, 28 Jan 91, Vol 27, p 80; Vice President Quayle, 

cited in “Quayle on Hussein: ‘He is totally irrational’.” U.S. News & World Report, 18 

Feb 91, p 27; Robert Kimmitt, in ‘The Gulf War Conference,” p 293. 

59(S) Intvw. Gen Scowcroft with GWAPS. Cochran notes; Triumph Without Victory, 

p 142; Robert Gates. ‘The Gulf Crisis: The Road to War,” Part 3. p 19; transcript, Gen 

Colin L. Powell, news briefing (with Secretary of Defense Cheney), The Pentagon. 17 Jan 

91, p 6; Schwatzkopf, in Department of Defense Appropriatwns for 1992, p 277. 

98 
as well as political success of Desert Storm. After the war, both General 

Schwarzkopf and his chief air planners confirmed this view.60 

The President and his advisers were less hesitant about authorizing 

actions intended to bring about Saddam Hussein’s political demise, 

which, Ira$ politics being what it was, would have brought about his 

physical demise as well. The President had approved operations designed 

to weaken popular support for the Hussein government and directed that 

if Iraq used nuclear biological and chemical weapons, supported terrorist 

acts, or destroyed Kuwaiti oil fields. [DELETED] It is worth noting that 

the President, in his 5 January letter to Saddam Hussein (which Baker 

showed to Foreign Minister Tariq ‘Aziz at their 9 January meeting in 

Geneva) cited these same three ‘’Unconscionable acts” as requiring the 

“strongest possible response” from the United States, one that would 

make the Iraqi leader and his country “pay a terrible price.’*’ 

Despite somewhat ambiguous policy guidance, the chief architects of 

the air campaign targeted Saddam Hussein and planned air operations 

meant to create conditions conducive to his overthrow. [DELETED]62 

Planners believed that Hussein, as a military commander, was a legitimate 

target during the war.63 As noted above and more to the point, they 

clearly expected that Saddam Hussein’s demise would result in the 

Army’s withdrawal from Kuwait, thus achieving one of the major 

national objectives. 

Planners not only wanted to incapacitate the Hussein government 

[DELETED] but to try to change it.64 [DELETEDI6’ 66 [DELETED] ‘’ 

60H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York, 1992), pp 499-500; 

(S) Intvw, Glosson with Gwm staff, ~ochran notes. 

“Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on President Bush’s Letter to President 

Saddam Hussein of Iraq, I2 Jan 91, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 

21 Jan 91, Vol27. pp 43-44. 

62(S) Glosson intvw. 12 Dec 91, pp 29 and 31; Deptula intvw. 8 Jan 92. p 30. 

63(S) Intvw. Glosson, 12 Dec 91, p 29; Deptula intvw, 8 Jan 92, p 36. 

64(TS) Doc, USCMCCENT cc J3 to JCS Joint Staff, subj: Follow-Up Execute Order-uscwccENT OWRD 001 for Desert Storm, 170012 Jan 91, GWAPS, CHC 8-1. 

6’0bservationr on the Air Campaign Against Iraq, p 17. 

99 
Brig Gen Buster 

Glosson confers 

with his chief 

planner, Lt Col 

David Deptula, in 

Riyadh. 

66(S) Draft Working Paper, Augmentation Cell, Central Command J-5 War Plans 

Division, Offensive Campaign Concept-Ground Campaign Concept of Operations, 14 Oct 

90, Appendix E, Central Command J-5 Plans War Division Augmentation Cell Afrer 

Action Report, GWAPS. 

67“Air ops summary of air war.” The copy of summary in GWAPS D-19H bears a 

notation by Deptula that reads, “As provided by UC Deptula and BG Glosson during 1% 

hour discussion with Gen Homer.” 

100 
Constraints 

While higher authorities prescribed restraints essentially as the 

“don’ts” for the planners of the air campaign, they also laid out some 

“dos” or constraints. There were two key constraints: (1) planners had 

to insure that any offensive was both quick and decisive; and (2) they had 

to neutralize Iraqi Scud (or Scud-derived) short-range ballistic missiles in 

early in offensive air operations. General Glosson and his planners were 

in total agreement with the first, and it served from the very beginning 

as a guiding principle in the planning of the air campaign. The second 

proved more difficult for all, as it concerned civilians more than military 

planners. 

Top civilian officials left little doubt in their statement that they 

expected rapid victory to avoid high casualties and military stalemate, 

both of which would undermine support for the campaign against Iraq.68 

The President “instructed [his] military commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible and with the greatest degree of 

protection possible” for U.S. and allied forces.69 This guidance was 

consistent not only with the principles of war but with senior military 

leaders’ belief in the costs of gradualism in Vietnam. As Homer recalled 

(after mentioning the Vietnam experience), “We were absolutely going to 

be the most violent and intensive campaign possible, the reason being it 

seemed like the only way to shorten the war, limit the suffering, and get 

this thing over as quickly as po~sible.”’~ 

@President Bush, The President’s News Conference, 30 Nov 90. in Public Papers 

of the Presidents of the United Smtes, p 1720; Secretary of State Baker, in Hearings 

before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf. 

IOlst Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 1991). pt I. p 107; Secretary of Defense Cheney. in 

Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Crisis in 

the Persian Gulf: SMcriOns, Diplomcy Md War. lOlst Cong, 2d sess (Washington, 

1991), p 570; Vice President Quayle, Address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 

8 Jan 91, US Department of State Dispatch, 14 Jan 91. p 28. 

69“Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, p 

51. 

%peech at Dadaelian Dinner, 11 Sep 91, p 4. 

101 
To ensure a swift and sure victory, the President and his advisers 

were prepared to send to the theater whatever forces were necessary.” 

As a general principle, Bush, along with Cheney, Powell, Baker, and 

Brent Scowcroft believed that in conflicts calling for the employment of 

military power, the United States should assemble and apply “overwhelming force” capable of crushing the enemy in short order and with minimal 

loss of life.” In November, after the President and his advisers had 

decided to increase substantially the U.S. forces deployed in the Gulf so 

as to give the coalition “an adequate offensive military option,” planners 

were informed that CENTCOM would have all the forces needed for a 

successful campaign should the decision be made for offensive a~tion.’~ 

The President, in Glosson’s words, “decided to give [us] all the forces 

that we wanted or could use.”74 As will be developed in Chapter 6, some 

air planners believed that the USAF already had sufficient forces to execute at least Phase I of the campaign. Indeed by the start of the war, 

General Glosson’s deputy characterized the situation as “an overabundance of air assets.”75 Thus air planners never had to face a question of 

priorities in achieving the “quick victory” constraint ; rather they had the 

luxury of doing essentially whatever they chose. 

The constraint requiring prompt destruction of enemy Scuds proved 

to be more significant for planners. From early in the crisis, officials at 

the White House, State Department, and Defense Department were preoccupied with the Scuds.’6 With these missiles maintained under tight 

centralized control, Saddam Hussein had the capability to attack Israel 

71(S) Intvw, Gen Scowcroft with GWm Senior Staff, Cochran notes. 

72Rick Atkinson and Bob Woodward, ‘Gulf Turning Points: Strategy, Diplomacy,” 

Washington Post. 2 Dec 90. p Al. See also, Powell, cited in Triumph Without Victory, 

p 71. 

7%he President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, in Public Papers of 

the Presidents of rhe United States, p 1581; “all the forces . . . would be the U.S. strategy”: (SNF) Rpt, Rear Adm Grant Sharp, Planning for rhe Gulf War (draft). 3 Dec 91, 

p 43, GWAPS. 

74(S) Intvw. Glosson. 12 Dec 91. p 9. 

75(S) Intvw, Center for Air Force History with Lt Col David A. Deptula, 29 Nov 91. 

p 52, GWAPS. Historical Advisor’s files. 

76wolfowitz. Kimmitt. Dennis B. Ross, and John H. Kelly, in “The Gulf War 

Conference,” pp 258,259,262 and 267; and Cheney. in ‘The Gulf Crisis: The Road to 

war.” Program 3. p 7. 

102 
and threaten the basis for the coalition. To avert this danger, the United 

States launched a number of diplomatic efforts to persuade Israel to show 

restraint in the face of Iraqi provocations. Several days before Desert 

Storm began, the President sent Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence 

Eagleburger and Paul Wolfowitz to Jerusalem to discourage the Israelis 

from launching either preemptive or retaliatory strikes against Iraq. 

Eagleburger told Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that the United States 

would treat any attack by Hussein as a cmus belli and take immediate 

military action. Significantly, Eagleburger assured Shamir that U.S. air 

operations rapidly would neutralize the Scuds that threatened Israel from 

sites in western Iraq.n 

The degree to which civilians in Washington worried about the Scuds 

more than military planners in Saudi Arabia became evident in October 

when JCS planners, at the instigation of Secretary Cheney and with input 

from one of his primary civilian deputies, seriously considered moving 

ground forces into the suspected Scud launching areas. CENTCOM 

planners as well as their commander regarded such efforts as unrealistic, 

not considering either the terrain or the possibility that the Iraqis might 

well counterattack into the void left by the US troop movement.” In 

December, this option again surfaced in Washington. Although the 

option was twice rejected by CENTCOM planners, it did alert them and 

their commanders to the degree of policy-makers’ concern about the 

Scuds and suggested some civilian doubt about the ability of air power 

alone to deal with the problem posed by the Scuds. 

After the war, senior leaders, including the President’s national 

security adviser, admitted that they had underestimated the threat posed 

by Saddam Hussein’s missile^.'^ Military leaders viewed the Scuds as 

Triumph Without Victory. pp 208-21 1. 77 

78(S/NF‘) Rpt. U.S. Central CommandJoint Forces and Theater Operations, J-5 Plans 

Afier Action Report, Vol VI: Miscellaneous Documents (MacDill AFB, Ha.. 1991), Tab 

X (Combat Analysis Group After Action Report), ~WAPS; J-5 Plans Afrer Action Report, 

Vol1: After Action Report (Basic Report with Tabs). Tab P (SAM [School of Advanced 

Military Studies]); Phnning for the Gdf War, pp 40-41. On Defense Department involvement, see “Operation Scorpion” attached to Itr from Harry Rowen to Alexander 

Cochran, Apr 92, GWAPS. NA 271; (S) htvw. Lawrence Greenberg, GWAPS. with Col Paul 

Dordal, J-3, 20 Feb 92, GWAPS; Triumph Without Victory, pp 167-168; and (S) intvw, 

Glosson, 9 Apr 92. p 12. 

79(S) Intvw Scowcroft with GWAPS. Cochran notes. 

103 
“militarily irrelevant” (Schwarzkopf), “not militarily significant” (Glosson), and “lousy weapon[s]” (Homer).” At the time of war, some planners recognized that the military unimportance of the missiles did not 

make them politically inconsequential. However, Homer and Glosson, 

by their own admissions, failed at the time to recognize was just how 

critical the neutralization of the Scud threat was to the civilian leadership 

and the diplomatic conduct of the war.8’ Neither were they precise in 

communicating their own view of this constraint to civilians. During the 

20 December briefing in which General Horner reviewed the air campaign plan with Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Powell, the Secretary of Defense 

asked for the details of how the Scuds would be eliminated. He explained that all the fixed launch sites would be hit, but that some Scuds 

would be fired because, “[y]ou can’t get them 

It does seem clear that commanders and planners in the theater 

neglected to prepare for any aggressive Scud-hunting because they considered the missile threat of little military consequence. They proposed 

a plan to silence the fixed launchers, destroy a limited number of suspected launch-and-hide locations for mobile launchers (to do what could be 

done, short of a major armed-reconnaissance effort). Through this, they 

hoped to alleviate the pressure from Israel and Washington while maintaining the integrity of the strategic air campaign. Perhaps it might also 

deny Iraq the capability to produce ballistic missiles in the future. The 

alternative was to a search-and-destroy operation that promised a costly 

and unproductive diversion of strike sorties from the main objectives of 

the strategic air ~ampaign.’~ 

In retrospect, planners entered this war with policy objectives that 

defined the strategic aims of their campaign. Likewise, they operated 

within the context of restraints that told them what not to do and constraints that gave them a sense of what needed to be done. In combination, these ends and conditions created the parameters within which the 

air campaign plan for the Gulf War was built. 

“Schwarzkopf, ‘Talking with David Frost” (transcript of TV interview), 27 Mar 91, 

p 4; (S) Intvw. Glosson 6 Mar 91, p 7; Homer, Speech at Dadaelian Dinner, 11 Sept 91, 

“(S) Intvw, Horner, 4 Mar 92, p 10; Horner, Speech at Dadaelian Dinner, 11 Sept 

91, p 5; and (S) intvw, Glosson, 6 Mar 91, p 7. 

”(S) Intvw. Horner, 4 Mar 92, p 10. 

”For additional discussion and analysis on the effectiveness of the Scud campaign, 

P 5. 

see GWAPS Effectiveness Report. 

104 
5 

Instant Thunder and Desert Shield 

Planners of the Gulf War air campaign used two other planning 

efforts-ne a concept plan for an independent air offensive devised in the 

early days of the crisis by Air Staff planners in Washington and the other 

an on-going series of plans written by the CENTAF staff in Riyadh to 

defend Saudi Arabia. Both of these planning efforts contributed to the 

Desert Storm air campaign. 

Interestingly, the first plan that was executed was one that surprised 

both CENTCOM and CENTAF planners. Within hours of the outbreak of the 

crisis, General Powell directed the immediate execution of USCENTAF 

Rapid Response Plan (RRP) 1307-88, a CENTAF-only contingency plan for 

a demonstration-sized combat Air Force package into the region. 

[DELETED] Planners anticipated the arrival of the first aircraft in theater 

within 48 hours of notification and become operational on C+4 (four days 

after the beginning of deployment). They also included unspecified 

options for including carrier battle group assets and shipborne Tomahawk 

Land Attack Missiles to increase strike capabilities.’ The plan mentioned 

no specific threat and was never intended to be used to counter a force 

as large and potentially capable as the Iraqi war machine? 

At the same time, General Powell issued a warning order informing 

the American military community of the crisis on the Arabian Peninsula. 

To assist commanders in preparing their forces for possible employment, 

Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) warning orders contain references to appropriate 

OPLANs. In this case, General Powell referenced RRP 1307-88, not the 

‘David L. Rosmer (S) Ninth Air FO~~~/USCEATAF in Desert Shield: The Initial Phase, 

August 1990. Shaw Am, SC: Headquarters. Ninth Air FO~C~USCENTAF. [lo Jan 921, p 

52, GWAS NA-I 88; Rosmer, (S) History of the Ninth Air FOK~USCEATAF Jan-Dec 90. 

Vol. I-A, 1 Jan 92. AFHRA, p 82.; (S) Background paper, HQ USAF. XOXXM. “COMUSCENTAP Rapid Reaction Plan 1307-88.” 3 Aug 90, Gwm CHC 9-1 

(S) Brfg Slides, USCENTCOM. “Preliminary Planning.” 2-6 Aug 90. GwAPS NA-117 

and AFHRA, Desert Shield file; folder USCENTCOM heliminary Planning, 2-6 Aug 90. 

2 

105 
1002 plan.3 This no doubt reflected 1002-90’s incompleteness as well as 

the capability to incorporate 1307’s forces into larger follow-on 

deployment. But, most importantly, it reflected his uncertainty on the 

nature of the U.S. political response, a decision to be made by the President. In this context, the initial responses by affected commands-Military 

Airlift Command, Strategic Airlift Command, and Ninth Air Force in 

particular-was for a limited. exclusively USAF response. 

Commanders and planners at CENTCOM’S supporting commands and 

agencies worked under these assumptions for the first three days of the 

crisis. At Tactical Air Command, commanders reviewed 1307 objectives 

and, lacking further JCS guidance, assumed a relaxed posture. From the 

outset, it was clear that the Chairman’s choice of contingency options was 

inadequate to meet the potential threat. Yet, it demonstrated his concern 

about rushing to deploy light ground forces specified in the 1002-series 

of plans to Saudi Arabia at a time when the host nation had yet to request 

such assistance and when the massed Iraqi army stood within easy striking distance. 

Matters changed on 4 August when President Bush convened a 

National Security Council (NSC) meeting at Camp David to discuss possible options and military preparations that would alter the complexion of 

the American response to Baghdad’s aggression? After CIA representatives presented an assessment of Iraqi strength in Kuwait, Schwarzkopf 

briefed the President on OPLAN 1002 and indicated that he would need one 

month to position minimum defensive forces and [DELETED] to reach the 

full OPLAN 1002 force levels [DELETED]. In addition, he stated a target 

date upon which it would be practical to pursue offensive operations? 

3(S) Rpt. Project AIR FORCE Desert Shield Assessment, Vol XI Draft WD-527OIl-AF. 

Santa Monica: The RAND Cop. Mar 91, GWAPS NA-26; (WF) Doc, USCWCCENT. Desert 

ShieWDesert Storm. Internal Look 90 Afer Action Reports, 15 Jul91. 

4Present at the morning meeting were President Bush, Vice President Quayle, White 

House Chief of Staff John Sununu. National Security Advisor Adm Brent Scowcroft. MidEast Security Advisor Richard Haass, White. House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, 

Secretaries Baker and Cheney, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Generals 

Powell and Schwamkopf, CENTAF Commander Lt Gen Homer and his Chief of Staff Maj 

Gen Robert Johnston, JCS J-3 Lt Gen Thomas W. Kelly, CIA Director William Webster. 

and JCS J-2 VAdm J. “Mike” McConnell. (Rosmer, 9th AF History). 

Rosmer. (S) 9th AF History; (S) Intvw, AFCHO with Lt Gen Charles Homer, 

28 Jan 91. 

5 

106 
During the meeting, General Homer raised the possible use of air 

power to thwart an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. First he outlined a 

conceptual plan for a limited strategic air campaign against high value 

targets that the President could use to retaliate against Baghdad if they 

used chemical weapons against allied troops. Then, he maintained that 

American aircraft operating from Saudi bases and from aircraft carriers 

in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea could fly several hundred combat sorties 

a day and establish air superiority within a period of days! General 

Homer thus provided capabilities immediately available to the President 

in lieu of the acknowledged problems of distance and deployment schedules for large numbers of heavy ground forces. 

Others at the meetingaecretary of Defense Richard Cheney and NSC 

Advisor Brent Scowcroft-emphasized that significant numbers of ground 

forces would be necessary to protect Saudi Arabia and cautioned the 

President on the limits of air power to achieve national objectives without 

the ground element. General Powell felt that, while air power was 

important, the defense of Saudi Arabia would require the deployment of 

substantial numbers of ground forces. He cautioned: “If you want to 

deter, don’t put up a phoney deterrence. . . .If you do it, do it real and do 

it right.” The meeting concluded with no firm decision. President Bush 

chose rather to see whether Saudi King Fahd Ibn Abdel-Aziz would ask 

for assistance. While the President contacted King Fahd to offer military 

assistance, Schwarzkopf, Homer, and CENTCOM Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. 

Robert Johnston returned to Florida.’ 

The following day, 5 August, President Bush again met with his close 

advisors, this time in Washington and agreed to alert the 82d Airborne 

Division. He directed Secretary Cheney to lead a special team to Riyadh 

and meet with King Fahd and his senior military and political advisors to 

secure a request for U.S. assistance. The team, composed of Cheney, 

Gates, Homer, Schwarzkopf, Wolfowitz, Williams, Ambassador Charles 

W. Freeman, Jr., and representatives from State and the CIA, met with 

kosmer, (S) 9rh AF History, p 2. 

’(SnUF) USCENTCOhi. Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Exercise Internal Look 

90 Afrer Action Report,15 Jul 91. GWAPS NA-117. 

1 07 
King Fahd on 6 August and succeeded in convincing the monarch of U.S. 

resolve to act swiftly and decisively to defeat Iraq's invasion. The King 

requested U.S. military assistance? 

Between the 4 August Camp David meeting and the departure of 

Cheney's special negotiation team to Riyadh, General Powell informed 

the military community to forget RRP 1307 and use USCINCCENT OPLAN 

1002-90 for planning. As commands received the new guidance, planning resumed at an accelerated pace? 

For decisionmakers and their military planners alike, the opening days 

of the Gulf crisis were filled with uncertainty and general anxiety over 

both the nature of the anticipated U.S. response and Baghdad's intentions. 

Military commanders were all too conscious of the inadequacy of existing 

contingency plans to deal with the emerging situation. It was clear to 

them that, whatever the eventual U.S. response, U.S. air forces would 

comprise the preponderance of the initial available force. 

This fact was not lost on General Schwarzkopf either. Recent experiences in Internal Look had demonstrated the need for an additional offensive option-not only to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait but more immediately 

to retaliate should Saddam Hussein use chemical weapons or harm hostages. Within this context, he turned to the US Air Force. As Gen. 

Michael J. Dugan, Air Force Chief of Staff, was away from Washington, 

on 8 August, Schwarzkopf spoke to the Vice Chief, Gen. John M. Loh, 

and requested help in finding ways to retaliate against some new hostile 

act by Iraq-seizure of the American embassy in Kuwait, for example, or 

a chemical attack." 

Members of the Air Staff already were thinking about an air campaign that might, by itself, eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. On the day 

before Schwankopf's call to Loh, Col. John M. Warden 111, deputy 

director of plans for warfighting concepts, had sent members of his staff 

*(S/NF) Ibid. 

9(s) Project AIR FORCE Assessment of operation Desert ShieU Working Draft. WD5270-1-AF. Santa Monica: The RAND Corp, Jan 91. GWAPS NA-25. 

"(S) Intvw, Diane T. Pumey, Center for Air Force History, with Gen H. Norman 

Schwarzkopf (USA, ret). 5 May 92. GWAPS. NA 268; (S) memo, Wayne Thompson, GWm, 

subj: Visit to TAC HQ. 30 Oct 91, GWAPS, Historical Advisor's Files. 

108 
to begin work on the idea in the Checkmate briefing room in the basement of the Pentagon.” 

Within a few days, this planning group had written a briefing for 

General Loh which contained the essentials of what became known as 

Instant Thunder. They took the President’s objectives from his speech of 

8 August: (1) Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; (2) restoration of Kuwaiti 

sovereignty; (3) security and stability of the Persian Gulf; (4) protection 

of American lives. Initially they expressed the President’s third objective 

as securing the free flow of oil, but soon recognized the President’s 

broader interest in stability. The Checkmate planners used the President’s 

objectives to fashion military objectives: (1) force Iraqi withdrawal from 

Kuwait; (2) degrade Iraq’s offensive capability; (3) secure oil facilities; 

(4) render Saddam ineffective as a leader.12 

The centerpiece of Instant Thunder in Colonel Warden’s view was his 

fourth military objective. His book, The Air Campaign, had suggested 

that command was a center of gravity to be attacked, but had cautioned 

that a commander would be difficult to target and that his staff might be 

able to carry on without him. Warden viewed the decision element of 

command, while more important, as usually less vulnerable to attack than 

other elements. Rather it was the information gathering and communication elements that should be targeted. The commander could be rendered 

ineffective by isolating him from his forces and his sources of information through attacks on his communications and his intelligence gatherers 

Although not used previously for war planning, the Checkmate facility had been 

the setting for prominent undertakings involving the other services and the intelligence 

agencies. For most of the years following its establishment in 1976 by Gen David C. 

Jones (WAF Chief of Staff). Checkmate used red and blue teams to examine possible 

wartime interaction between Soviet and NATO forces in Europe and the Middle East. 

Checkmate had also hosted a joint effort to further interservice cooperation in projects 

like the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (ISTARS). In response to 

CENTCOM’S spring 1990 draft of Operations Plan 1002-90, Col Warden had sent a Checkmate team to visit CENTAF and CENTCOM headquarters where his team argued for an air 

offensive which he called “the air option.” On the eve of the Gulf crisis in July 1990, 

a Checkmate team participated in the Naval War College’s Global War Game, where the 

scenario that caught the most attention was an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 

‘?(S) Brfg, Col John A. Warden 111 for Gen John A. Loh, vCSAF, “Iraqi Air Campaign,” 8 Aug 90, GwAPS, CHSH 7-1 1; (S) notes, Lt Col Bernard E. Harvey, Checkmate, 

11 

7-8 Aug 90, GWAPS, CHP 9-1, 

109 
PHOTO DELETED 

~~~ 

Devising the Instant Thunder plan in the Air Staffs 

Checkmate office in the Pentagon. 

(for example, his radar^).'^ As to the relatively slight possibility of 

killing the enemy leader, while Warden was writing his book in 1986, the 

Air Force and the Navy came close enough to killing Libya’s dictator to 

cause a sharp reduction in his international activity. 

I3John A. Warden 111, The Air Campaign (Washington: National Defense University, 

1988), pp 51-58. Warden sought to meet a need for a book about the theory and practice 

of air warfare at the operational level (rather than the strategic or tactical level). His 

advice on how to conduct an air campaign is bolstered by historical examples, especially 

from World War 11. He borrowed Clausewitz’s emphasis on the enemy center of gravity: 

“Perhaps the most important responsibility of a commander is to identify and strike 

appropriate enemy centers of gravity” (p 10). 

110 
During the four years between the Libyan raid and the Gulf crisis, 

Warden developed his thoughts on attacking enemy command into a 

targeting concept illustrated by five concentric rings. The central ring in 

his theory of target importance was leadership. He planned attacks on the 

other four rings (key production, infrastructure, population, and fielded 

forces on the outer rim) in terms of their potential effect on leadership. 

Many viewed his notion of concentric rings as a dangerous oversimplification. Yet Warden believed that the simplicity of his model was a great 

strength both for planning under pressure and for selling the resulting 

plan to decision maker^.'^ Indeed this very simplicity would shape the 

Gulf War air campaign plan. 

At the heart of Warden’s plan was the targeting of leadership. The 

Iraqi situation seemed tailor-made for the theory. Saddam was not merely the Iraqi commander. As Iraq’s dictator, he seemed to be the source 

of most of America’s problems with Iraq. An Iraq without Saddam 

promised to be an Iraq with which the United States would have much 

better relations. Since killing Saddam from the air would require luck, 

Warden hoped to isolate Saddam not only from his forces but also from 

his people. Even if Saddam survived, he might lose his capability to 

govern and he might be overthrown. Television and radio stations would 

be attacked so that they could be taken off the air and replaced by coalition broadcasts delivering the message that the Saddam regime was the 

objective of the attack and not the Iraqi people.” 

By trying to avoid civilian casualties, Warden clearly anticipated the 

President’s preferences. But Warden was not being cautious. Rather he 

thought he was making a positive contribution to his own strategy by 

designing a campaign which would divide Saddam from the Iraqi people-not bolster Saddam’s control through hostility to a common American 

enemy. In Warden’s view, the Iraqi people should be the target of psychological operations, not bombs; damage to the Iraqi economy should 

be quickly repairable at the end of the war with American help.16 

’he fullest exposition of Warden’s five rings theory is his unpublished 1990 essay 

“Centers of Gravity: The Keys to Success in War,” CWAPS, Historical Advisor’s Files. 

%ol Warden’s views may be traced in his series of (S/NF/WN/NC) Instant Thunder 

briefings, 8-17 Aug 90, GWAPS. CHSH 5 and 7. 

‘6(TS/LlMDIS) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan, 17 Aug 90, GWAPS. CHSH 9, p 3. 

I 

111 
Warden was also conscious that twenty-five years earlier President 

Lyndon Johnson’s worries about civilian casualties had resulted in an air 

campaign against North Vietnam that took a mounting toll because it 

lasted years-years that were also costly for American aircrew and aircraft 

and left many in the Air Force bitterly determined to avoid a repetition. 

An OV-10 pilotin Vietnam, he was determined to avoid such gradualism 

and named his plan Instant Thunder to emphasize the rapidity with which 

he planned to defeat Iraq from the air.” 

Instant Thunder was an air campaign designed to last some six to 

nine days against eighty-four strategic targets, all of which were in Iraq 

not Kuwait. With the exception of attacks on Iraq’s air defenses and its 

deployed chemical weapons, Warden’s campaign would leave Iraq’s 

fielded forces intact. He expected Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without 

much of a fight. 

Two days after General Schwarzkopf requested input from the Air 

Staff, Warden briefed him on his concept in Florida. The next day, as 

requested by the CENTCOM commander, Warden briefed General Powell 

in Washington. Given the lack of attention to attacking enemy ground 

forces, Warden might have encountered considerable skepticism, but he 

was offering Schwarzkopf and Powell the only offensive option they 

would have for months. Schwarzkopf said that the briefing restored his 

confidence in the Air Force. Powell’s major objection was that he wanted Iraqi tanks destroyed so that Saddam could not again threaten Iraq’s 

neighbors.” Warden had a green light to continue his planning. 

For several weeks, Warden would devote little thought to attacking 

ground forces. Rather his immediate concern about Iraqi ground forces 

was to deal with the argument that Instant Thunder might trigger an Iraqi 

invasion of Saudi Arabia. He argued that Iraqi ground forces would not 

I7[DELETED](S) rpt, Maj (Robert M.) “Sky” King, Checkmate, Trip to CENTAF and 

cENTCOM, 6 Jul 90, with Warden’s note to Alexander, HQ USAF/XOX, 9 Jul 90. GWAPS 

Historical Advisor’s Files. 

‘8Harvey Notes. 10-1 1 Aug 90, GWAPS. CHP 9-1; (S) memos, Lt Col Harvey. subj: 

Brfgs to CINCCENT and Chairman JCS, 10-11 Aug 90, GwAPS. CHP 7-1 through 74, 

(S) intvw, Lt Cols Richard Reynolds, Suzanne Gehri and Edward Mann, Air University 

CADRE, with Dr Donald B. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force, 1 I Dec 91, GWAPS. NA 234. 

After telling his Checkmate briefers on 10 Aug that they had restored his confidence in 

the Air Force, Schwarzkopf repeated that view to Secretary Rice on 15 Aug. 

112 
want to expose themselves by moving south beyond their ability to 

supply themselves effectively, but if they did, ninety-six A-1 0s. forty AV8Bs, thirty-six F/A-1 Ss, thirty AH-1 Ws and seventy-five AH-64s would 

have no trouble stopping them before they could reach Dhahran or Riyadh. There would be no need to divert other aircraft from the strategic 

air campaign. Whatever might happen, Warden insisted that the strategic 

air campaign should go forward, for it was the strategic air campaign that 

would win the war. He frequently referred to Germany’s Schlieffen Plan 

to invade France early in the First World War, a plan which Warden 

thought had been gutted of the necessary force to make its great enveloping sweep to the right effective.” 

Once the Instant Thunder concept had gained approval, the Checkmate planning group was enlarged and began converting Warden’s concepts into an executable plan. Staff officers from other parts of the Air 

Staff, from the Air Force Intelligence Agency, from the major commands, 

from Central Air Forces and from the other services joined the effort in 

the Pentagon basement. As many of these people as possible were 

jammed into Checkmate’s offices. Lt. Col. Ronnie Stanfill, a Libyan raid 

planner, recruited two pilots (Maj. Michael B. Hoyes and Maj. Allen E. 

Wickman) who had flown on the raid. Stanfill was one of four lieutenant 

colonels Warden relied on most heavily for Instant Thunder. The others 

were Lt. Col. David A. Deptula (from the Secretary of the Air Force’s 

staff support group), Lt. Col. Bernard E. Harvey, and Lt. Col. Richard 

Stimer.” Stimer was responsible for deception: Harvey served as 

Warden’s special assistant; Stanfill and Deptula organized most of the rest 

of the growing Checkmate staff to prepare an operations plan. 

Stanfill and Deptula as lieutenant colonels were in awkward positions. 

They could not take charge of the full colonels who came from Tactical 

Air Command (TAC) and Strategic Air Command (SAC). Warden asked 

the three TAC colonels (Richard E. Bigelow, Richard D. Bristow and 

Douglas S. Hawkins) to help his deputy, Col. Emery M. Kiraly, develop 

plans for attacking Iraqi ground forces. Because the TAC commander, 

Brfg, Warden to Lt Gen Adams, HQ USAFRO, Instant Thunder, 13 Aug 90, 1330, 

GWAPS. CHSH 5-17. Gen Schwarzkopf did not like the Schlieffen Plan analogy and told 

Warden not to use it. See (S) notes, Lt Col Bernard E. Harvey, Checkmate, 17 Aug 90, 

%tanfill, Harvey and Stimer all belonged to Warden’s directorate; Deptula had 

19 

GWAPS. CHP 9-4. 

worked there before joining the Secretary’s support group. 

113 
Gen. Robert D. Russ, objected to any Air Staff role in campaign planning, his emissaries were viewed with suspicion by some Air Staff planners. TAC had already sent to General Horner in Riyadh the text of 

Warden’s first briefing with TAC’S proposed alternative. TAC planners 

envisioned a more gradual air campaign with much more emphasis on 

interdiction and close air support of ground force movement.2’ As for 

SAC, its participation in the Checkmate planning group was enthusiastic 

and substantial, ultimately with ten personnel under Col. Mike Mankin.” 

General Powell had told the Air Staff to bring the other Services into 

the Checkmate planning group. The Navy sent a half dozen officers 

under Capt. William Switzer, and the Marines sent a similar group under 

Lieutenant Colonel Slade Brewer. In addition to briefing the Chief of 

Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Colonel 

Warden also prepared a briefing for the Chairman to give the President. 

When Warden returned to Central Command in Florida with a draft plan 

on 17 August, the Instant Thunder briefing bore the logo of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and he was accompanied by Major General James W. 

Meier (USAF) from the Joint Staff?3 

Msg, Brig Gen Griffith, HQ TAC, to Lt Gen Homer, subj: Air Campaign Briefing, 

22(s) Rpt, J. Parsons, HQ SACIXPA, “Air Staff Desert Shield Planning,” GWAPS. NA 27. 

23(s) Rpt, Capt Johnson (USN), J-MOD, subj: CINCCENT Trip, 17 Aug 90, GWAPS. NA 

203; (S) briefing slides, Checkmate to Chairman JCS. 14 Aug 90, for briefing to President. 

21 

1001452 Aug 90. GWAPS CHP 13A. Homer also had a CENTAF officer in Checkmate. 

15 Aug 90, GWAPS, CHSH 5-16. 

114 
PHOTO DELETED 

~ ~ 

Air Force, Navy, and Marines representatives select and allocate targets 

for Instant Thunder at Checkmate In the Pentagon. 

The foundation for Instant Thunder's target selection scheme was 

Colonel Warden's five rings theory. Planners divided the central leadership ring into two target categories: (1) the Saddam Hussein regime; (2) 

command and control and telecommunications. Considering the importance of the regime in Warden's thinking, this target category was slim 

indeed, with only five targets. [DELETED] By January the regime 

category alone would swell to more than thirty targets." 

Checkmate planners divided telecommunications targets between a 

command and control category of nineteen targets within the leadership 

ring and a strategic air defense category of ten targets (of which two were 

"(TSLIMDIS) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan, 17 Aug 90, AMeX C, Operatioas, 

GWAPS. CHSH 9, p 15. 

115 
telecommunications sites not collocated with air defense control centers) 

within the fielded forces ring. The original telecommunications targets 

were radio and television sites. [DELETED]” 

From the outset, however, Iraq’s electrical grid offered Warden 

planners an indirect way of getting at Iraqi telecommunications as well 

as industry and lighting. Colonel Warden believed that “putting out the 

lights” in Baghdad would have a psychological impact, and he thought 

that backup generators would quickly prove inadequate once the national 

grid had ceased to function. His electrical target category within the key 

production ring consisted of seven power plants and three transformer 

stations. Although more electrical targets would be added, the initial list 

may well have been sufficient to take down the grid. Planners hoped at 

least to reduce Baghdad’s power supply by sixty percent and Iraq’s as a 

whole by thirty-five percent. An interesting aspect of Warden’s thinking 

on electrical targets was his desire to do as little long-term damage as 

possible by avoiding generators and bombing switching yards. Just as he 

wanted to avoid civilian casualties for his own reasons, Warden was not 

reacting to a cautious Bush administration in seeking to limit damage to 

electrical production. Rather, Warden’s own strategy envisioned a prosperous postwar Iraq.% 

Warden expected that the United States would help Iraq get back on 

its feet after the war, partly to underscore that the enemy had been the 

Iraqi regime rather than the Iraqi people, partly to build a prosperous Iraq 

which would neither attack its neighbors nor be attacked by them, and 

partly to get Iraq’s oil flowing again to America’s allies. His planners 

sought to reduce oil products available for Iraqi consumption by seventy 

percent. Oil targets totaled three refineries and three military fuel depots. 

Planners would eventually add more than a dozen oil targets to the list. 

Like the electrical targets, most of the key oil targets were obvious from 

the begi11ning.2~ 

25(TS/LIMDIS) [bid, pp 13 and 16-17. 

26flS/LIMDIS) Ibid. p 18; (S) brfg. Col Warden to Gen Schwankopf, “Iraqi Air 

27(TS/LIMDIS) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan, Annex C, p 19; 17 Aug 90 briefing. 

Campaign Instant Thunder.” 17 Aug 90, GWAPS. CHSH 7-1 1. 

116 
Warden’s views on oil and electricity were a variation on traditional 

targeting. He knew that World War II U.S. Army Air Forces plans to 

focus on electricity had not been executed and that the U.S. Strategic 

Bombing Survey had concluded that electricity should have been a focus. 

He also knew that in the debate between those who favored oil targets 

and those who favored railroads, a critical function of the railroads had 

turned out to be the transport of coal fundamental to German industry. 

In Iraq, oil was clearly fundamental, but was it a good target? The 

American experience bombing oil storage in North Vietnam had not been 

successful, because the North Vietnamese had been able to disperse their 

oil in barrels adequate to meet their relatively light needs. Similarly, 

North Vietnamese portable generators had sufficed in a country which 

had never used much electricity. For Warden, however, the Iraqi economy and military more closely resembled the Germany of 1940 than the 

North Vietnam of 1965.= 

What was new about Warden’s targeting of electricity and oil was his 

intention to avoid long-term damage. Not only did this reflect his certainty that the war would be short, but also his equal certainty that American bombing could be so accurate that parts of a facility could be 

bombed while purposely leaving specific parts unscathed. His confidence 

in the precision of American bombing would prove largely warranted, but 

his philosophy of bombing did not travel as far as he hoped. Wing 

operations and intelligence officers were accustomed to seeking maximum 

damage, and generator halls were the obvious electrical target. When left 

to choose their own aim points. they would choose generator halls?’ 

Warden expected that shutting down the electrical power grid would 

have a pervasive effect on military and civilian activities, but he did not 

consider specifically the impact on water pumping. Since his war would 

last little more than a week at most and the United States would quickly 

turn on the electricity again, the civilian water supply may not have 

caused him much concern even had he thought of it. 

28See U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report, European War (Washington, 

1945). pp 12-14. Warden’s Air CMlpaign argues that “power and transportation are 

particularly critical: Interviews and studies after World War 11 indicated that power and 

transportation were the weakest points in German and Japanese war production”@ 43). 

29se the GWAPS report on Effectiveness. 

117 
PHOTO DELETED 

Ajaji Electrical Power Plant. 

Within the key production ring, electricity and oil were Warden’s war 

winners, but for the long-term stability of the Middle East, he knew that 

it was essential to destroy Iraq’s capability to produce nuclear, biological 

and chemical weapons. No aspect of Checkmate intelligence was weaker 

than its knowledge of this target category. Since before Israel’s El6 raid 

on the nuclear research facility at A1 Tuwaitha near Baghdad in 1981, 

that site had been well known. But the newer and more important facility 

at Al-Atheer only began to attract the attention of American intelligence 

near the end of the Gulf War. Although the major biological weapons 

center at Salman Pak was on Central Command’s July 1990 target list, 

Warden’s intelligence analysts did not acquire imagery for it during his 

118 
initial search and it was not on the Checkmate list which went to 

Schwarzkopf. Indeed Checkmate did not become aware of a significant 

near-term biological threat for several weeks. As for nuclear weapons, 

the American intelligence community estimated that Iraq could produce 

a crude nuclear weapon by the end of 1992.30 

In contrast to their fairly relaxed view about the immediacy of Iraq’s 

nuclear and biological capabilities, Warden and his planners took the 

chemical threat more seriously. Iraq had used chemical artillery shells 

during the Iran-Iraq War. There was a possibility that Iraq’s long range 

delivery systems, its Scud missiles and its aircraft, could attack Riyadh, 

Dhahran, or Israel with chemical warheads. An attack on Israel might 

provoke a retaliation which could threaten Arab loyalty to the coalition. 

Prospects for stopping such an attack were not bright. Checkmate targeted the Scud storage facility at Taji together with Tallil Airfield and 

chemical storage bunkers, but some Scud launchers were known to be 

mobile, and in the months to come more chemical bunkers would be 

discovered. There was a good possibility of eliminating the production 

of chemical weapons at Samarra and Habbaniya, but Warden had to 

admit that Checkmate could not solve the Scud pr~blem.~’ 

The remainder of Warden’s key production ring and his infrastructure 

ring were treated rather perfunctorily by his plan. Instant Thunder listed 

fifteen military supply depots, factories, and repair shops, including the 

ammunition dumps north of Baghdad at Taji and Tikrit (Saddam’s home 

town). Two ammunition dumps south of Baghdad near An Nasiriyah 

were also targeted, but ammunition storage sites closer to the new front 

in Kuwait were not yet identified. Since Warden’s war was projected to 

last only a few days, Checkmate did not give much attention to interdiction, and the infrastructure ring contained only three targets: the Baghdad 

%or the evolution of U.S. intelligence estimates of Iraqi nuclear capabilities, see the 

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee’s (S/NF/RD) rpt 90-0094, Nov 90, GWAPS. 

CHSH 114-4. On Checkmate’s later involvement in biological targets, see GWAPS. CHSH 

100. Salman Pak was on Checkmate’s 12 Aug 90 list (CHSH 18-18) of 90 targets but was 

subsequently cut. SECDEF Final Report to Congress Conduct of the Persian Gulf War 

Apr, 1992. p 97 

3’17 Aug 90 (TS/LIMDIS) brfg; Instant Thunder Campaign Plan. Annex C. p 14. 

The problem of locating mobile Scuds in time to attack them on the ground remained 

unsolved throughout the Gulf War. 

119 
rail yard, the Az Zubayr rail yard near Basra, and the As Samahwah 

railroad and highway bridge over the Euphrates between Baghdad and 

Basra.'2 

Colonel Warden took a keen interest in his population ring, but since 

he wished to minimize civifian casualties, no bombing targets were listed 

there. Nevertheless, destruction of targets in other rings was intended to 

produce psychological effects. [DELETED] This was the aspect of 

Instant Thunder which would receive the least attention in Desert Storm, 

when troops in Kuwait would be bombarded by ldets but Baghdad 

would be more bombed than pr0pagandized.3~ 

Although fielded forces constituted Warden's outermost ring, their 

priority in his bombing scheme was not necessarily last. True, Warden 

largely ignored the big Iraqi army deployed in Kuwait and southern 

Iraq-for him those forces were most dangerous as a distraction from the 

principal business of bombing. Iraq's air defenses, on the other hand, and 

Iraq's ability to project air power provided targets at the top of Warden's 

list. On this priority no airman was apt to disagree. Nevertheless, in the 

light of later knowledge, Checkmate's list of air defense targets was far 

from complete. Iraq's air defense headquarters in Baghdad led the list, 

but Checkmate targeted only two of the four sector operations centers in 

Iraq. [DELETED]. Of the subordinate intercept operations centers, 

Checkmate targeted only three, all in the southern sector. In the months 

preceding Desert Storm, planners would learn much more about Iraq's air 

defense system, and the remaining operations centers would be targeted 

along with dozens of radar and surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites.u 

Instant Thunder sought to suppress rather than destroy Iraqi SAMs and 

aircraft. SAM and early warning radars would be jammed and threatened 

by radar-seeking missiles. Iraqi runways would be cratered and mined. 

American aircraft would attack Iraqi aircraft on the ground and in the air, 

where they would be deprived of their accustomed control from 

operations centers on the ground. In these ways coalition aircraft would 

32CTS/LIMDIS) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan, Annex C. p 20. 

"CTSUMDIS) Ibid, Annex J; 17 Aug 90 (SINFNNMC) brfg. See the GWAPS 

uCTS/LIMDIS) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan, Annex C. p 13. Iraq set up a fifth 

report on Effectiveness. 

sector operations center in Kuwait. 

1 20 
PHOTO DELETED 

Baghdad Air Defense Headquarters, Rashid Airfield. 

Command bunkers and support facilities. 

121 
gain quick control of the medium altitude airspace-safely above most 

anti-aircraft artillery. But Checkmate targeted only eight of Iraq’s principal airfields, and Desert Storm’s airfield target list would ultimately be 

ten times as long? 

As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven of this report, 

intelligence played a vital role in air campaign planning. The 

rudimentary state of intelligence on Iraq was a major problem. When the 

Air Force’s director of targets, Col. James R. Blackbum, Jr., began to 

support Colonel Warden’s effort on 8 August, he first obtained a computer listing of all known targets in Iraq from the Defense Intelligence 

Agency and a much shorter list from Central Command of 48 targets in 

which Central Air Forces was most interested. Blackburn brought a staff 

of thirteen targeteers to Checkmate, where they began to work with 

planners in selecting targets and desired mean points of impact.J6 

Blackbum’s targeteers found that while they were supporting a 

planning effort authorized by General Schwarzkopf, Central Command 

was continuing to develop its own target list with priority for assistance 

from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Blackburn ameliorated the low 

priority of his effort by sending his people to visit Defense Intelligence 

Agency analysts in their offices. Imagery was taken from Air Force 

Intelligence Agency archives and reproduced; requesting the collection of 

new imagery at this point seemed out of the question. Through these ad 

hoc methods, Blackburn’s team was able to come up with 84 targets 

which fit the planners’ target categories and for which enough imagery 

was available to select impact points and pin-prick the photographs 

accordingly. During this week of work, Central Command prepared its 

own list of 109 targets, 76 of which were on the 84-target Checkmate list. 

On 16 August, Central Command authorized Checkmate to select impact 

points for all 109 targets, and for the first time Blackburn had sufficient 

priority to task the Defense Intelligence Agency for assistance. By 23 

August, the pin-pricked photographs were in St. Louis at the Defense 

Mapping Agency, which converted the pin pricks into exactly mensurated 

coordinates for each desired mean point of impact.’7 

(TSILIMDIS) Ibid, p 21. 35 

%(S/NF) Memo, Col James R. Blackbum Jr, Dir of Targets, HQ USAF. subj: USAFm 

37(S/NF) Ibid. 

Targeting/Mc&G Support to Desert Shield, 17 Oct 90, GWm. NA 269. 

122 
While coping with intelligence problems, Warden’s planners tried to 

use computer analysis to fine tune their plan. As they developed Instant 

Thunder, they fed aircraft data into their Theater Warfare Model together 

with Colonel Warden’s estimate of the importance of each target category 

and subcategory?* Computer runs helped planners to estimate munitions 

requirements: for [DELETED] laser-guided bombs; Tomahawk sealaunched cruise missiles; air-launched cruise missiles; Maverick 

television-guided missiles; anti-radar missiles; cluster bombs; unguided 

high-explosive bombs. [DELETED]. If Instant Thunder had been flown 

as modeled, it would have achieved an intensity comparable to actual 

Desert Storm operations flown in January 1991, despite the fact that 

Desert Storm would use twice as many aircraft. Instant Thunder’s 

intensity was to be attained by sending attack aircraft on two sorties per 

day, twice the rate of Desert Storm.39 

Checkmate planners believed that the timing and sequence of strikes 

could have a major impact on the success of an air campaign. Their 

campaign would attempt initial strikes on all major targets within the first 

two days-beginning at night by attacking Iraq’s air defenses. To get the 

maximum number of strike sorties on the first night, they wanted to send 

a wave soon after dusk and return many of the same aircraft on a second 

wave just before dawn. Subsequently there would be one wave each 

morning, afternoon, and night. Colonel Deptula introduced a strike sortie 

flow list, a planning device which would be renamed “master attack 

plan.” Targets for each wave were listed in the sequence they would be 

struck and the type and number of aircraft to attack each target was 

specified. For example, the initial F-117 strikes on opening night were 

then planned against the air defense sector operations centers. Eight F11 7s were scheduled against each target. The sortie flow list broke the 

attack on each sector operations center into two cells of four F-117s each. 

[DELETED] Before turning the flow list into an air tasking order, 

3%e Theater Warfare Model and the computer analysts who ran it had been in 

Checkmate only a few months when the Gulf crisis broke. The model had not been 

designed to support campaign planning but to support the budget process through the old 

mission area analysis division, which Warden had recently merged with Checkmate. 

39(TS/LJMDIS) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan, Annex D, pp 3-4; intvw, Wayne 

Thompson, GWAPS. with Joseph T. McNeer, Synergy Inc, 23 Jan 92; (S) intvw, Thompson 

with Maj Roy ‘‘Mack” Sikes, HQ USAF/XOXWF, 7 May 92. See also col Warden’s (S) 

estimates of target category importance. 8 and 11 Aug 90, Theater Warfare Model 

printouts, 11-13 Aug W, both in GWAPS Historical Advisor’s Files. 

123 
planners would have to add a time on target for each strike. A flow list 

permitted planners to grasp quickly when each strike was supposed to 

occur in the context of other strikes.40 

Checkmate held meetings of pilots with expertise- in the available 

aircraft types to determine which aircraft should attack each target. Navy 

and Marine pilots attended these meetings. Although Checkmate planners 

hoped for coalition participation, they could only assign American aircraft 

to targets at this point. The resulting flow list for the first two days 

would be changed again and again in the coming months as available 

forces and knowledge of targets and air defenses increased." 

At the Checkmate meetings, Navy representatives were confident that 

A-6s and F-18s could attack Baghdad targets. Similarly, Air Force pilots 

thought that F- 1 SEs, F- 1 1 1 s, and F- 16s could go downtown. Consequently, F-1 17s and cruise missiles did not have the exclusive role in Baghdad 

strikes they would later assume when Central Air Forces decided not to 

risk their more vulnerable aircraft in the highest threat areas. Instant 

Thunder scheduled as many as eight F-117s to attack a single target like 

the Tallil sector operations center. Not only would the number of F-117s 

available increase, but most targets would be assigned a single F-117 and 

consequently F-117s could hit a high percentage of the welldefended 

targets." 

40CrSnIMDIS) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan, Annex C, p 39. 

(S) Notes, Wayne Thompson, Checkmate historian, Final Attack Flow Meeting, 16 

Lt Col Deptula began to put each PI17 on a different target in late Aug 90. 

41 

Aug 90. 1130, GWAPS Historical Advisor's Files. 

(S) Intvw, Wayne Thompson, GWAPS, with Deptula, Pentagon, 26 Aug 91. 

42 

124 
PHOTO DELETED 

Above, Navy pilots participate in target planning in Checkmate for Instant 

Checkmate. 

Thunder. Below, Marine pilots participate in target planning in 

PHOTO DELETED 

125 
Planners envisioned that cruise missiles would play a prominent role. 

[DELETED]. The Air Force’s air-launched cruise missiles were 

scheduled to join the first night’s attack. The very existence of these airlaunched conventional cruise missiles was so closely held that Checkmate 

planners used the term “LRB” (for “long range bomb”) in planning 

documents so that their security classification could be held to a 

reasonable level. [DELETED]43 

When Colonel Warden delivered the Instant Thunder plan to General 

Schwarzkopf in Florida on 17 August, the plan ran to about 200 pages 

with more than a dozen annexes. Warden believed that this effort had 

given Central Command a two-week head start on a plan that might have 

to be executed in less than two weeks. But execution was in fact five 

months away, and Checkmate’s role in planning an air campaign would 

continue throughout those months and beyond. That role would necessarily change from leading to supporting the offensive air planning effort. 

Schwarzkopf told Warden to take his plan to Saudi Arabia where General 

Homer had already been given a preliminary overview of the concept. 

Homer was less than delighted with Air Staff involvement, and he sent 

Warden back to Washington. But Homer kept three of Warden’s planners (Deptula, Harvey, and Stanfill) and inadvertently created a context 

for the evolution of Warden’s remaining planners in Washington as a 

support office for Horner’s planners in Riyadh.” 

43(TS/LlMDIS) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan, Annex C. pp 39-45. 

*4(S) Intvw. GWAPS with Lt Gen Homer, 9 Mar 92; (S) Harvey notes, Warden’s 

briefing of Homer, 20 Aug 90, GWAPS. CHP 94, (S) transcript, Lt Gen Homer’s taped 

responses to written questions of CMSgt John Burton, CENTAF historian, Mar 91, GWAPS. 

CHP 13A; (S) Thompson notes, Warden’s debriefing to Checkmate staff on trip to Saudi 

Arabia, 22 Aug 90, 0815, GWAPS Historical Advisor’s Files. See also GWAPS rpt on 

command and control. 

126 
Checkmate planners present Instant Thunder plan to LtGen Horner in 

Riyadh. L to R: LtCol Bernard E. Harvey; Col John A. Warden 111; 

LtCol David A. Deptula; LtCol Ronnie A. Stanfill. 

The Instant Thunder plan that General Horner received on 20 August 

used new technologies to refurbish ideas about strategic bombing that 

could be traced at least to the Army Air Forces in World War 11. These 

technologies permitted a much different air campaign than any which had 

ever been waged. The old American preference to strike at urban targets 

without destroying the surrounding neighborhoods could now be 

implemented. But did Americans or their allies know enough about Iraq 

to pick the right targets? General Horner’s coolness to Instant Thunder 

was a reaction not only to its source but also to its disregard for what he 

considered the most important target, the Iraqi army which threatened to 

move into Saudi Arabia. If Instant Thunder triggered such an invasion, 

would there be enough air power to stop it by bombing either those 

forces or their supply lines or Baghdad? Horner could not build up much 

127 
enthusiasm for an offensive air campaign until a large coalition ground 

force lay between him and the Iraqi army." 

Since General Homer's arrival in Saudi Arabia (he had been a member of Secretary Cheney's party in early August and had remained as the 

Acting CmOM commander until General Schwankopf arrived in late 

August), all planning had been defensive. Since the outbreak of the 

crisis, General Schwarzkopf and his CENTCOM planners understood their 

mission as being to deploy forces to the Arabian Peninsula and to 

undertake actions with host nation forces to deter and, if necessary, 

counter Iraqi attacks on the Arabian Peninsula to protect key oil facilities 

and maintain U.S. and allied access to the region's vital resources-oil.*6 

To accomplish this, he now anticipated deployments of U.S. forces in 

numbers smaller than outlined in the draft version of OPM 1002-90, 

probably due to concerns about getting enough credible combat force to 

Saudi Arabia to deter further Iraqi moves southward. Since he lacked 

completed, coordinated deployment plans for the forces specified in 

OPLAN 1002, [DELETED] he began to select forces that were combat 

ready and could be moved with a minimum of delay. 

In the days immediately following the start of the crisis, CENTCOM 

planners anticipated an initial deployment of eleven tactical fighter squadrons," one B-52 squadron, along with two carrier battle groups, the 82d 

Airborne Division, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, one Ranger Regiment, and a Special Forces Group. A scheduled second major deployment would begin three and four weeks later and include five fighter 

squadrons [DELETED], a third and fourth carrier group, and tbe Missouri 

and Wisconsin battleship groups. The initial ground forces would likewise be bolstered by an Army aviation brigade, the lOlst Air Assault 

Division, a mechanized infantry brigade, and two more Marine expeditionary brigades. From the end of this phase until week 17, the last 

deployments mentioned, Central Command planners called for a second 

B-52 squadron, a fifth carrier battle group, and another mechanized 

infantry division and armor brigade. While these figures differed from 

"(S) Ibid. 

"(S) Brfg, "USCENTCOM Preliminary Planning. 2-6 Aug 90." CWAPS NA-1 17. 

4'(S) Aircraft arriving in theater by C+11 (listed in order of first arrival) included F15, AWACS, RC-135, KC-135, (2-130, F-16, F-156 F4E, EF-111. EC-130, F-111, F117. and B-52. (Brfg (S), "US~COM Preliminary Planning, 2-6 August 1990.") 

128 
those eventually deployed (see comparison of air assets in Chapter 2, 

Table 9), they provide an insight into Schwarzkopf‘s thinking at the 

beginning of the crisis when his priorities were to get forces into theater, 

protect these troops from a numerically superior enemy, and defend vital 

ports and installations in Saudi Arabia. 

Lacking early strategic warning, and as a result, nearly a month’s 

time for an orderly and balanced deployment of forces, General Schwankopf was first concerned about getting a sizable number of air superiority 

and ground attack aircraft into the theater. Once these “shooters” were 

on hand, he could concentrate on deploying enough ground forces to 

Saudi Arabia to deter Baghdad from moving south. If this failed, or if 

Iraq decided to move during the early phases of ground troop deployment, Schwarzkopf had to rely on his air power to both reduce and delay 

the enemy while simultaneously providing air cover for American ground 

forces. Although this concept of air operations was never called a defensive air campaign plan, in fact it was just that and provided the foundation upon which defensive planning for Operation Desert Shield would 

be based. 

As shown in the following table, after two weeks of deployment 

Schwarzkopf anticipated having an airborne division at his disposal, in 

addition to a dozen fighter squadrons supplemented with a B-52 squadron 

and two carrier battle groups patrolling the skies and poised to blunt any 

Iraqi move into the Saudi Kingdom.*8 [DELETED]. By the end of the 

first month, however, the deployed combat forces Schwarzkopf envisioned during his preliminary planning in August exceeded those in the 

pre-crisis operations plan. 

@(S) Brfg, USCmM “Preliminary Planning,” 2-6 Aug 90. 

129 
Table 17 

Force Requirements and Deployment Schedule 

U.S. Central Command Preliminary Planning 

Week 1 Week 2 Weeks 3-4 Weeks 5-1 7 

USAF 2F-I5 Sqn C+l 1 F-lll Sqn C+II 5 TFS 1 6-52 Sqn 

5 AWACS C+l 1 F-117 Sqn C+11 

12 KC-135 C+l 1 B-52 Sqn C+11 

3 RC-135 C+l 2 F-16Sqn C+11 

48 C-130 C+1 

3F-16Sqn C+3 

1 F-15Sqn C+3 

1 P15ESqn C+3 

1 F-4ESqn C+3 

1 EF-111 Sqn C+3 

1 x-130 sqn c+3 

15 KC-135 C+3 

U.S. Amy 1 Ahrne Bde 2 Airborne Bde 1 Mech Infantry 1 Armor Bde 

Bde 1 Mech Div 

1 Air As.~ult 

Div 1 Aviation 

B& 

USN/USMC 2 Carrier Battle I Marine Expedi- 2 Carrier Battle I Carrier Battle 

Gtoups tionary Bde Groups Group 

2 Battleship I Regimental 

2 Marhe Exped 

Bade Grp Landing Team 

Bde 

SOF 1 Special Forces 

Grp 

1 Ranger Regt 

Source: (S) Brfg, USCENTCOM “Preliminary Planning,” 2-6 August 1990. 

Schwarzkopf’s early planning assumptions showed the difference 

between writing a deployment plan, where weak or unfounded assumptions had been used to make the contingency effective, and implementing 

an actual combat deployment against a real and potentially powerful foe. 

The long-planned scenario of deploying credible deterrent forces to Saudi 

Arabia prior to Iraqi military actions disappeared on the morning of 2 

August when Baghdad attacked Kuwait. Instead of basing time-phased 

130 
deployment on early warning and presidential authority to commence 

operations before hostilities, Central Command’s preliminary planning 

used assumptions based on the facts at the time, i.e., current, real political 

and military constraints, and Iraqi armed forces within striking distance. 

Table 18 

USCINCCENT Preliminary Planning Assumptions 

International Domestic Military 

[DELETED] 

Source: (s) Brfg, USCENTCOM, “Preliminary Planning,” 2-6 August 1990. 

CENTCOM planners facing other problems identified through proposed 

target sets had already begun to affect early plans for a war with Iraq. 

In addition to thirteen economic and ten military command, control, and 

communication and air defense targets identified in precrisis exercises, a 

new “political” category appeared on a proposed CENTCOM targets list. 

Heretofore unmentioned in contingency planning, the political category 

(incorporated by CENTCOM planners after discussions with the Air Staff 

Checkmate office on the Instant Thunder plan) included the presidential 

palace in Baghdad. It appears clear that traditional military, economic, 

and infrastructure targets would be supplemented with others, whose 

purpose would be to weaken the Iraqi leadership by destroying visible 

symbols of Saddam’s power and in~ulnerability.4~ 

49(S) fbid; (S) Lt Col Fischer, HQ USCmOM. CAC, faxed these slides to Lt Col 

Guilette, USCENTAF. Battle Staff. on 4 Aug 90. 

131 
An essential element in planning for the Gulf War was integrating 

Saudi forces and support efforts into the U.S.-developed plans. On 14 

August, just eight days after King Fahd requested U.S. military assistance, 

Central Command took a significant step to increase planning coordination with the Saudis with the formation of the U.SJSaudi Joint Directorate of Planning (JDOP) at the Saudi Ministry of Defense headquarters in 

Riyadh. The organization, first discussed by the CENTCOM J-5 and the 

Saudi J-3 on 8 August, was chartered by U.S. and Saudi military leaders 

to help develop combined operation plans and consisted of the CENTCOM 

5-3, J-5, several Saudi general officers, and a working group of US. and 

Saudi field grade planners (Saudi J-3/5). The group set up operations in 

a large, common office area and shared two conference rooms. This 

proximity proved vital in promoting interaction and cooperation among 

the planners and, despite initial problems with language and Saudi 

attitudes toward staff work, enhanced overall theater combined planning.% 

Their first combined plan, OPORD 003, directed the deployment and 

possible employment of U.S. forces to defend Saudi Arabia. Published 

on 20 August 1990 as an interim combined defense plan, OPORD 

003-built on USCINCCENT OPORD mi5’ (published 10 August)-was updated periodically and was intended to help American commanders understand Saudi capabilities, intentions, tasks, authorized liaison, and coordination with coalition forces to establish an integrated defense. In the 

order, planners assigned CENTCOM forces the mission to act in concert 

with Saudi and coalition regional forces in defense of Saudi Arabia and 

to be prepared to conduct other operations as required. The concept of 

operations outlined by the joint planners was to delay and reduce attacking forces as far forward as possible. U.S. forces shielded Jubayl and Ad 

DammamIDhahran to protect deploying U.S. forces at major airfields and 

sea ports of debarkation. In the event of an Iraqi attack, General Homer, 

as joint forces air commander, would coordinate an interdiction campaign 

w(!YNF) Doc, USCENTCOM Desert ShieWDesert Storm, Internal Look 90 Afer Action 

Reports, 15 July 1991; (WF) Doc USCENTCOM J5 Plans Afer Action Report, pp 5-6. 

GWAps NA-259; (SMF) Rpt. Rear Adm (Ret) Grant Sharp, ‘‘Sharp Study” PIaMing for 

the Gurf War, Draft of 3 Dec 91. prepared for Office of Principal Deputy, Under Secretary of Defense (SLR), p 26, GWAPS Task Force V files. 

”(S) Msg, USCINCCENT OPORD 001, 101 10OZ Aug 90. 

132 
to gain air superiority, delay and interdict enemy forces, and isolate the 

battlefield?2 

Although the plan’s distribution was limited to U.S. commands, it 

was developed by the joint planning group and contained Saudi input. 

Combined OPORD 00453 (based on OPoRD 003 and published 17 September) continued its predecessor’s objectives and intent and became the 

basis for the final defensive plan published by the Joint Directorate of 

Planning, Combined OfLAN for Defense of Saudi Arabia, on November 

29, 1990. [DELETED] ?4 

Signed by Rear Adm. Grant Sharp, USN, and Maj. Gen. Yousef 

Mohammed Al Madan, representing Central Command and the Saudi 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation respectively, the Combined OPUN for 

Defense of Saudi Arabia dealt mainly with administrative command and 

control procedures that provided valuable coordination and employment 

information during the period before the arrival of additional U.S. forces 

and subsequent redeployment in anticipation of offensive operations. 

Joint Directorate planners retained the broad scope and generally defensive guidance from previous plans in their Combined OPLAN, and relied 

heavily on forward defense using ground and air interdiction to slow an 

enemy advance.” [DELETED] 

’here was also a USCINCCENT OPORD 002 for maritime interdiction. (OFQRD (s), 

USCWCCENT Desert Shield OPORD 002, Defense of Saudi Arabia, GWAPS IRIS 23993, 

frames 616-653); Information on Combined OPORD 003 contained in (S) Msg, USCINCCENT OWRD 003, Desert Shield Operations, 201 2302 Aug 90, GWAPS IRIS 10261, frames 

“(s) Msg, USCINCCENT OPORD 004 for Operation Desert Shield. 1713452 !kp 90, 

54(S/NF) Rpt Rear Adm (Ret) Grant Sharp, “Sharp Study” Planning for rk Gulf 

War, Draft of 3 Dec 91, prepared for Office of Principal Deputy, Under Secretary of 

Defense (S&R), p 17. GWAPS holdings; (S/NF) Doc, uSCENTCOM Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm, Internal Look 90 Afier Action Reports, 15 Jul 91. 

”(S) OPLAN HQ US Central Command and Joint Forces and Theater of Operations, 

Combined OPUN for Defense of Saudi Arabia, 29 Nov 90. GWAM CHC 18-4 and IRIS 

10261 frame 1181. 

1075-1 140. 

GWAPS IRIS 23981, frames 106-147. 

133 
In a major deviation from normal procedure, CINCCENT waived the 

normal requirement for subordinate commands to submit supporting plans 

for the Combined OfLAN of 29 November. [DELETED].56 

[DELETED].57 

[DELETED]. Instead, they focused on defending and repelling Iraqi 

forces from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. To accomplish this, planners 

relied on traditional forward defense doctrine that traded time for space 

while allied ground, air, and naval forces reduced advancing Iraqi forces 

through a series of defensive meeting engagements and air interdiction 

attacks without becoming decisively engaged. [DELETED]. The role of 

U.S. and allied air forces envisioned in the OPLAN likewise followed 

traditional doctrine to: 

. . . support the land campaign. [DELETED] Air forces provide 

counterair, interdiction, and close air support to land forces throughout 

the area of ~peration.~" 

Although the U.S./Saudi Joint Directorate of Planning got off to a 

good start-early on briefing Saudi planners on OPLAN 1002-9Whe special 

group soon was overwhelmed trying to deal with wartime coordination. 

While the Joint Planning Group remained active throughout the operation 

and produced a total of four combined operation plans?' the primary 

focus for its members became a forum to identify and resolve coalition 

problems, to institutionalize a plan development process for the Saudis 

and, perhaps most importantly, to provide a conduit for rapid access to 

Saudi policy makers. Planning for Operation Desert Shield and Desert 

56(S) Ibid. 

57(S) OPLAN originally TS/NF/SPECAT, USCINCCENT, U.S. OPUN Desert storm, 16 

5*(S) OPLAN, HQ US Central Command and Joint Forces and Theater of Operations. 

Combined OPUN for Defense of Saudi Arabia, 29 Nov 90. p 6, CWAPS CHC 18-4 and IRIS 

0268606. 

'%he four major plans were: 1. (S) Combined OPLAN for Defense of Saudi Arabia, 

29 Nov 1990 (GWAPS IRIS 10261 frame 1181 and CHC-18-4); 2. (S) Combined OPLAN for 

Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, 13 Jan 1991 (GWAPS IRIS 10261 frame 1438 and CHC18-5); 3. (S) Combined OPLAN to Eject Iraqi Forces from Kuwait, 17 Jan 1991 (GWAPS 

IRIS 10261 frame 1615); and 4. (S) Combined OPLAN for Defense of Kuwait and Saudi 

Arabia, 22 Feb 1991 (GWAPS IRIS 23981 frame 208 and CHC-18-3). 

DeC 90, p 6, GWAPS. CHC 18-2. 

134 
Storm remained with CENTCOM planners supported by the Air Staff's 

Checkmate special planning office in Washington.60 

CENTAF planners, who only ten days before had been involved in 

wargaming at Internal Look in Florida, also were preparing for battle in 

Riyadh with the knowledge that at that time the United States lacked 

sufficient forces in theater to stop an anticipated Iraqi armored attack on 

Saudi Arabia. They knew that the threat was real, that enemy intent was 

vague, and that their first priority was defense. To accomplish this, they 

first had to deal with two major problems encountered during the early 

phases of Operation Desert Shield-bedding down arriving aircraft and 

integrating and coordinating this infant force with arriving ground troop 

units and with host nation air forces."' Although the GWAPS Logistics 

report deals with these problems in much greater depth, these two areas 

are directly related to CINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 or, more precisely, to 

their lack of detailed precrisis planning. 

This does not imply that the writers of OPLAN 1002 were negligent 

in identifying either the importance or the difficulty involved in these 

related issues, but only that the plan was immature and incomplete. In 

addition, there was not a great deal of history in dealing with this problem for the Arabian Peninsula. Previous contingency plans identified airrelated deployment difficulties but, due to sensitivities about American 

presence in the region and a lack of diplomatic agreements between 

Washington and regional governments, the plan provided little more than 

outlines for basing American air power. [DELETED].62 Fortunately, 

despite a small number of miscues between American planners and local 

sheiks-such as when a 4th TFW flight of twenty-two El5Es was denied 

landing rights at Seeb, Oman on 8 August 1990, and had to be diverted 

in-flight to Thumrait, Oman-events tended to follow this wishful scenario 

60(S/NF) Doc. USCEmOM Desert ShieWDesert Storm, InternalLook 90AfrerAction 

Reports, 15 July 1991; (SMF) Doc USC~OM J5 Ph Afrer Action Report, pp 5-6. 

61(S/NF) Intvw, Dr Perry Jamison and Mr Rick Davis from AMO and Dr Barry 

Barlow, CENTAFMO with Lt Gen Charles Homer, COMCENTAF/9th AF, 4 Mar 92. Tapes 

62(S/NF) Ltr, Maj Gen R. B. Johnston, USMC. CENTCOM Chief of Staff, to 

USCINCLANT et al., subj: Review of USCRJCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (!kcond Draft), 13 Jul 

90. cited in (!WF) Study, William Y'Blood. Center for Air Force History, The Eagle Md 

The Scorpion, Washington DC, 1992, p 23. 

at AFCHO. 

135 
in the fall of 1990.63 Top commanders firmly placed blame for initial 

deployment problems on the draft and incomplete OPLAN which 

Schwarzkopf was forced to execute. [DELETED]. The beddown 

problem was not addressed at Internal Look, but should have been.64 

Between 8 and 18 August, CENTAF operation and intelligence officers 

developed two defensive plans. In the first, known as both the “D-Day 

Plan” or “AT0 Bravo,” they countered the possibility of a large-scale Iraqi 

attack on Saudi Arabia with an integrated, two-day Air Force and naval 

air campaign against enemy forces in Kuwait and Iraq, and a transition 

to full-scale American offensive operations. To meet General 

Schwarzkopf‘s stated objectives-that remained basically unchanged since 

the July version of OPLAN 1o02-90m-CENTAF planners developed an air 

concept of operation that relied heavily on planning at Internal Look in 

July and included a detailed air tasking order for the first day and rough 

planning for the second. Planners intended the two-phase D-Day Plan to 

disrupt and reduce an Iraqi ground thrust as quickly as possible and thus 

allow arriving U.S. ground forces time to deploy to defensive positions 

under friendly air cover. 

In the plan’s first stage, planners envisioned concentrating counterair, 

interdiction, and close air support on a series of “kill boxes” placed 

astride probable Iraqi avenues of approaches. In the event of an Iraqi 

attack, they saw U.S. E-3 AWACS directing Air Force and Navy aircrafts 

against enemy ground formations as they entered these designated, 

although arbitrarily placed, kill bo~es.6~ To ensure 24-hour coverage, 

63(S/NF) Chronology “Desert Shield Contingency Historical Chronology.” USCENTAF 

@(S/NF) Intvw. TSgt Turner. CENTAFIHO with Maj Gen Thomas R. Olsen. 30 Sep 

65[DELEPED] ((S/NF) Document, Drufi OfLAN 1002-90. USCENTCOM, 18 Jul90. p 

s(S/NF) Brfg. Cmdr D. W. McSwain, USN. “Riyadh Perspective.” 27 Aug 91. 

67The AT0 Bravo kill boxes differed significantly from those used later during Desert 

Storm. Unlike the Desert Storm areas that covered the entire KTO, AT0 Bravo planners 

drew arbitrary boxes only along Iraqi lines of supply and suspected routes of advance 

(primarily roads) through Kuwait and into Saudi Arabia As such, there were many fewer 

than used for Desert Storm. (Clock intvw) 

02 Aug - 17 Nov 90. AmRA in Vol XIX of 9th AF 1990 Command History, p I. 

90. GWAPS and AMRA. 23978, frames 6-174. 

c-15-2. GWAPS NA-41.) 

GWAPS NA-254. 

136 
planners developed separate tasking orders and alert packages for day or 

night initiation to attack command, control, and communication targets 

in Iraq as well as the Iraqi Corps headquarters. The difference in the two 

alert packages involved calling for more capable night attack precisionguided munition-capable aircraft (F-111F and A-6E) to be used in 

darkness instead of F-16s and F/A-l8s specified for daytime retaliation. 

After these initial air attacks, CENTAF planners wanted to transition 

to limited counterattacks in phase II with constant close air support and 

attacks on other targets taken from their Iraqi Target Study, supplemented 

with targets identified since they arrived in the theater. The CENTAF 

targets included southern airfields, air defense sites, ammunition storage 

areas, troop concentrations and critical command, control, and 

communication nodes in the south. As the situation stabilized and the 

United States established air superiority, additional command, control and 

communication targets, electrical power production facilities, refineries, 

the petroleum distribution system, and the nuclear facility on the June 

CENTAF Target Study moved up the priority target list.@ 

(S) On August 14, General Homer accepted the D-Day Plan that 

lacked only designated fire support coordination lines from Army Forces 

Central Command (ARCENT). By that time-thanks to newly arrived strike 

aircraft that included twenty-two F-l5E, forty-six F-15C, forty-four F-16, 

and fourteen B-52Gs. with an additional seventy-two A-10, eighteen F117A, twenty-four F4G, and six B-52G due within the week-the CENTAF 

targeting cell was able to apportion most of its effort for offensive 

counterair operations with the remaining designated for battlefield and 

limited deep interdiction.@ As with nearly all airpower planning, early 

emphasis on obtaining air superiority was the first step toward freedom 

of mobility and action, especially against a ground-based enemy. 

@(S/NF) Study, William Y’Blood, Center for Air Force History, The Eugle Md The 

@(WF) Ibid. 

Scorpion. Washington DC, 1992, p 78; also Olsen and Clock interviews. 

137 
Figure 8 

D-Day Plan (ATO-Bravo) Proposed Targets 

FIGURE DELETED 

Following the execution of the D-Day Plan, CENTAF planners intended 

to revert to a normal air tasking order cycle using the full range of nonalert U.S. and coalition aircraft. By the end of August, CENTAF planners 

expanded the D-Day plan to include known Scud targets in western Iraq 

as well as other new targets. Once initiated, and after the hand-off to the 

full tasking order, they anticipated that the combination of the D-Day Plan 

with the transition to full offensive air operations would destroy significant 

138 
Iraqi armor, artillery, and ground forces.” Unlike most tasking orders 

produced to meet a specific requirement and then be superseded, the DDay Plan evolved continuously, changing to reflect new aircraft (and 

capabilities) as they arrived in theater and incorporating new targets as 

they were identified by the intelligence community. Most, if not all, of 

the targets identified in the D-Day plan eventually found their way into 

offensive tasking for Operation Desert Storm.” 

Even when it became obvious to senior U.S. commanders in late 

September that Baghdad was not going to attack Saudi Arabia,72 the DDay plan retained its importance. Unlike other special, security-classified 

offensive plans being developed in the Black Hole and known only to a 

few planners and commanders, the D-Day plan retained its less restrictive 

collateral classification and was widely distributed to U.S. and coalition 

planners. Thus, although it was never implemented, the D-Day plan 

focused planning efforts on retaliatory and air-to-ground strikes, as well 

as allied attacks on a limited number of strategic targets included in its 

transition to the full-scale offensive campaign. By doing this, it demonstrated the intent for coalition air forces to eventually conduct offensive 

operations against Iraqi forces in both Kuwait and Iraq while serving as 

a facade for, and effectively masking the full scope of offensive operations being planned in the still highly compartmented Desert Storm plan.73 

The second defensive plan produced by CENTAF targeters was known 

as the “Punishment ATO (Air Tasking Order).’’ The purpose of this plan 

was a single retaliatory response to a preemptive Iraqi chemical Scud 

attack on U.S. or allied forces. Unlike the D-Day plan, the Punishment 

AT0 did not include provisions for transitioning to large-scale, continuous 

70(S) Brfg, Cmdr Purser, NAVCENT-Riyadh, “Follow-On D-Day ‘AT0 BRAVO’.’’ 21 

Nov 90. GWAPS CHC-14; (SMF) Fact Sheet, Heidrick, ‘9 TlSnNT Planning Procedures,” 

p 5, GWAPS NA-267; (SMF) Brfg, Cmdr D. W. McSwain, USN. “Riyadh Perspective,” 27 

Aug 91, GWAPS NA-302. 

71(S/NF) Fact Sheet, Heidrick, “9 TMNT Planning Procedures,” p 4. 

72Evidence obtained from interviews between GWAPS personnel and Generals Homer 

and Glosson, and Commander C. W. McSwain, USN, strongly suggest that after midSeptember 1990, neither Gen Schwarzkopf, Horner nor Glosson expected a preemptive 

Iraqi attack against US and allied forces in Saudi Arabia. ((SNF) Intvw. Dr Alexander 

Cochran, GWAPS. with Lt Gen Horner, Brig Gen Glosson, and Cmdr McSwain, GWAPS 

Task Force V Cochran tiles.) 

73(S/NF) Fact Sheet, Heidrick, ‘9 TIS/INT Planning Procedures,” p 5. 

139 
offensive operations. Work on the Punishment ATO began on the 

evening of 8 August after General Homer directed General Olsen to 

develop a list of strategic targets in Iraq. Produced in only 48-hours 

under the tutelage of Col. James Crigger, then CENTAF Forward DCs/ 

Operations, the short-fuzed plan contained a tasking order for retaliatory 

strikes against seventeen installations specifically chosen to punish Baghdad and hinder its war-making capability. Like the D-Day plan, CENTAF 

planners relied heavily on work done for General Homer’s April discussions with General S~hwarzkopf.’~ 

If implemented, the Punishment ATO would have directed U.S. 

aircraft to hit political, petroleum, and power grid targets that included 

the known nuclear and biological facilities, the Presidential Palace. 

[DELETED]. One of the major problems faced by Homer’s planners in 

developing this response was the lack of complete targeting packages on 

the seventeen potential targets.” Despite these problems, Punishment 

AT0 provided CINCCENT a strong retaliatory strike without depleting his 

overall capability to adequately defend U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. 

Unlike the D-Day plan that received continuous attention and revision, 

work on the Punishment ATO stopped in mid-August and, by midSeptember, the one-shot retaliatory plan quickly lost its relative 

importance as planners shifted from defensive to offensive operation^.^^ 

74Rosmer. 9thAF Hisrory; (S) Intvw, AFCHO with Lt Gen Charles Homer, 28 Jan 91, 

75(S/NF/WN) Target study. 9 TIS, “Iraqi Target Study,” GwAPS NA-1 68.; Rosmer, 

76(S/NF) Intvw, Dr Alexander Cochran, GWAPS, with Lt Gen Homer, Brig Gen 

P 2. 

Ninth Air FOI-C~USCENTAF In Desert Shield: The Initial Phase, p 63.; (S) Olsen intvw. 

Glosson, and Cmdr McSwain, GWAPS Task Force V Cochran files. 

1 40 
Figure 9 

Punishment AT0 Attack Plan 

FIGURE DELETED 

In mid-August, General Homer learned that General Powell had 

authorized detailed work on an offensive air campaign against Iraq and 

that initial work was being done by the Checkmate office in Washington?’ Then, after Colonel Warden and his planners briefed General 

Homer on Checkmate’s Instant Thunder plan on 20 August, some CENTAF 

77Doc, Air War College lesson, “Planning the Air Campaign.” Air War College, 

Maxwell Am, AL. 

141 
planners7’ were given access to the proposed offensive campaign and 

realized for the first time that their mission had expanded from defending 

Saudi Arabia to preparing a large-scale offensive air campaign.79 

For several weeks only a few CENTAF planners and intelligence 

analysts were assigned to the development of Instant Thunder. But, as 

the second phase of air tasking declined in importance, General Homer 

shifted more of his resources to offensive planning. By late December, 

the defensive phase was no longer being maintained and all CENTAF’S 

planners and targeteers were supporting offensive planning.80 

7%is initial group of CENTAP planners included: Col Hubbard and Captains Heidrick 

79(S/NF) Fact Sheet, Heidrick, ‘9 TI^ Planning Procedures,” p 5. 

%or detailed discussions of the CENTAF reorganization that created the Guidance, 

Allocation. and Targeting Division (GAT) refer to Chapter 6, GWAPS Command and 

Control report. 

and Glock (CENTAF Intelligence) and Majors Rhoeler and Null (CENTAF Operations). 

142 
6 

Evolution of the Offensive Air Campaign Plan 

During the five months between the formulation of the Instant 

Thunder air campaign plan and the execution of the offensive air campaign plan as part of Operation Desert Storm, air planners sought to 

translate the national objectives as articulated by the President and his 

political advisers and the military strategy outlined by General Schwankopf and his theater planners into a design that exploited air power to its 

maximum. 

The Bush administration very early in the Gulf crisis had provided 

General Schwankopf with four specific national objectives: 1) secure the 

immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from 

Kuwait, 2) restore the legitimate government of Kuwait, 3) assure the 

security and stability of the Persian Gulf region, and 4) protect American 

lives. These provided the initial boundaries within which the air campaign planners operated. 

Airpower resources were the first available in adequate numbers to 

General Schwarzkopf for possible offensive uses. Thus while both 

CENTCOM and its Army planners were faced with the daunting task of 

planning an offensive for which they had scant resources and in which 

they had little confidence (at least until the October decision to commit 

VII Corps from Europe), planners in the Black Hole or the Special 

Planning Group moved out ahead in their offensive planning, using 

conceptual notions from Instant Thunder. 

CENTCOM planners adopted the conventional “estimate of the situation** and “five paragraph order” approach, no doubt reflecting the Army 

orientation of their commander. Command guidance was given to planners against which they evaluated various courses of action. They recommended one for the commander, and after approval, constructed a plan 

along a simplified format that moved from a summary of the situation 

and a statement of overall purpose to a detailed assignment of tasks for 

143 
subordinate commands and a discussion of logistics and command and 

control arrangements. This format was also used by the Joint Staff. 

General Glosson's planners adopted another approach, one that 

proved logical and familiar to Air Force officers. Yet it was distinctly 

different from that used by both CENTCOM and the Joint Staff. Though 

the precise origins of this format are still not clear, in general the process 

looked as listed below in Figure 10: 

Figure 10 

Concept To Execution Planning 

FIGURE DELETED 

It provided General Glosson and his planners with a clear and logical 

construct.' Similarly, General Glosson used it to assure senior decision 

makers that the air plan was linked directly to national objectives. He 

continually used the same set of briefing slides outlining objectives, 

centers of gravity, and target categories to brief President Bush, General 

Powell, Secretary Cheney, and General Schwarzkopf.* 

'(U) For further discussion of this format and background, see chapter 7, (S) GWAPS 

'(S) General Glosson Briefs, GWAPS BH 3-60. 

report on Effects and Effectiveness. 

144 
General Glosson and his planners started from the presidential 

objectives, confirming these with General Horner as soon as he began 

work. Glosson then addressed “centers of gravity.” Colonel Warden and 

his planners had outlined four in their Instant Thunder plan: “( 1) Saddam 

Hussein’s political and military leadership and internal control network; 

(2) his strategic chemical warfare capability; (3) the telecommunications, 

industrial, and transportation systems that support his rule; and (4) critical 

military systems such as the Iraqi air defense net~ork.”~ In their initial 

Operations Order, Offensive Campaign, Phase I, issued on 2 September 

1990, Glosson’s planners used these verbatim! Eleven days later, when 

General Glosson briefed General Powell, these had been consolidated 

into three: (1) leadership, (2) military forces, and (3) infrastructure? By 

December, the “infrastructure” center of gravity would be replaced by 

“nuclearchemical-biological capability.” 

(U) Warden had used ten target categories: 

Strategic Air Defense 

Strategic Chemical, including one Scud storage facility, one 

nuclear research facility, and one biological warfare facility 

National Leadership 

Telecommunications (civil and military) 

Electricity 

Oil-Internal Consumption (Refineries and storage, not oil fields) 

Railroads (one bridge and two rail marshalling yards) 

Airfields 

Port (only one target) 

Military Production and Storage? 

Warden’s planners had then selected 84 targets from within these categories (See Table 19, Target Growth by Category). 

3(S/NF/WN/NC) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan presented to CINccM 17 Aug 90 

4(~) COMUSCENTAF Operations Order (u), Offensive campaign. phase I, 2 Sep 90. 

5(S) Brfg for ucs, 13 Sep 90. in Glosson’s Briefs. Folder 60. Box 3. GWAPS. 

6(~~~~~~) Instant Thunder Campaign plan. C-I 2. op cir. 

by COl John Warden. GWAPS CHSH 9. 

145 
Table 19 

Target Growth by Category 

Instant 13 Sep 11 Oct 1 Dec 18 Dec 15 Jan 

Thunder 90 90 90 90 91 

Strategic Air Defense 10 21 40 28 27 

C he m i c avNB C 8 20 20 25 20 

Scuds 

Leadership 

n/a n/a note a note a 16 

5 15 15 32 31 

C3 (Telecom) 19 26 27 26 30 

Electricity 10 14 18 16 16 

Oil 6 8 10 7 12 

Railroads and Bridges 3 12 12 28 28 

Airfields 7 13 27 28 28 

Naval and Ports 1 4 6 4 4 

Military Support 15 41 43 44 38 

Republican Guard n/a note b note b note b 12 

Breaching 0 0 n/a n/a 0 

SAMS 0 0 n/a n/a 0 

Totals 84 174 218 238 262 

Snapshot Dates: 

13 Sep 90 CJCS Briefing 

11 Oct 90 Presidential Briefing 

1DeC90 Theater Campaign Briefing 

18Dec90 Secretary of Defense Briefing 

15 Jan 91 Day before Desert Storm 

Notes: 

(a) Scuds included in Chemical category 

(b) Republican Guards included in Military Support category 

58 

23 

43 

33 

59 

17 

12 

33 

31 

19 

62 

37 

6 

43 

476 

Source: (S) Brfg slides for snapshot dates located in “General Glosson Briefs,” 

GWAPS Box 3, Folder 60. 

146 
PHOTO DELETED 

Gen Glosson (Right Center) goes over offensive air planning with his 

Black Hole planners in Riyadh. 

Instant Thunder planners had specified an attack priority for these 

targets as part of the attack flow plan that they felt would be dictated by 

intelligence “and with emphasis on preventing retaliatory chemical attacks 

and securing air superiority.” They laid out the priority as chemical 

delivery systems, air defense systems, command and control nodes, 

leadership, telecommunications, industrial infrastructure, and military 

support facilities.’ In subsequent plans, Glosson’s planners dropped such 

explicit listings of priorities but continued to develop the Instant Thunder 

flow list that became known as the master attack plan. Though only two 

target categories (Scuds and Republican Guard) were added, the numbers 

of targets within each category grew rapidly (See Table 19). 

’(S/NF/W”C) Ibid, p C-2. 

147 
In deciding which targets to attack, planners were influenced by the 

overall theater campaign and how air power fit into General 

Schwarzkopf's overall concept. Generals Homer and Glosson translated 

this concept into specific applications of air power against specific targets. 

Just how General Schwarzkopf envisioned air power and CENTAF as 

part of his concept was fairly clear. From the outset he thought an 

offensive would probably be necessary to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 

In his postwar memoirs, he credited, Colonel Warden's Instant Thunder 

briefing as crystallizing his own thodghts on a four-phased plan to do so, 

designating it Desert Storm." At that time, the only offensive option he 

had entailed air power. His planners, as well as their boss, were convinced that the plan did not allocate sufficient ground forces to CENTCOM 

for any scheme of maneuver other than a frontal attack into the teeth of 

the entrenched Iraqi army in the Kuwait Theater of Operation (KTO)? 

Thus he turned to air power initially, should he be directed to go on the 

offensive. 

This limitation disappeared in October when President Bush decided 

to double U. S. forces allocated to CE~OM, most notably the addition 

of the VII Corps from Germany. CENTCOM and its Army planners were 

now able to envision ground phase of an offensive option that offered a 

promised degree of success through a flanking maneuver west of the Iraqi 

forces in the theater. Now General Schwarzkopf had sufficient forces to 

plan for a combined arms offensive operation. 

By December, CENTCOM planners envisioned Desert Storm in four 

phases as follows: 

Phase I - Strategic Air Campaign 

Phase I1 - Air Supremacy in the KTO 

Phase 111 - Battlefield Preparation 

Phase IV - Ground Offensive Campaign 

'(U) Gen H. Norman Schwankopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, Bantam Books. NY. Oct 

9(S) Intvw, Col Richard Swain, ARCENT Historian, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Apr 92, 

92. pp 319-320. 

Cochran notes. 

148 
At that time, they assigned the following tasks to General Homer and 

CENTAF. Phase 1 Was to 

. . . be conducted against targets in Iraq focusing on enemy centers of 

gravity. The air campaign will progressively shift into the KTO to inflict 

maximum enemy casualties and reduce the effectiveness of Iraqi defenses and isolate the KTO. . . .A multi-axis ground, naval, and air attack 

will be launched . . . to create the perception of a main attack in the 

east. 

Among other tasks, General Schwarzkopf instructed General Homer to 

. . . conduct the strategic air campaign phase to destroy Iraq’s strategic 

air defense, aircraft/airfields; chemical, biological and nuclear capability; 

leadership targets; command and control systems; RGFC forces; telecommunications facilities; and key elements of the national infrastructure 

such as critical ms, electric grids, petroleum storage, and military 

facilities, cut key bridges, roads and rail lines to block withdrawal of 

RGFC forces, cut bridges, roads and rail lines to block reinforcement 

and/or resupply of Iraqi forces from the west and isolate Iraqi forces in 

the KTO, and to provide air support (CAS) throughout all phases.” 

By December, CENTAF planners had completed their own plan, as will 

be discussed shortly. Thus CEmOM planning specifics here did not 

influence them. However, from the earliest planning stages, Generals 

Homer and Glosson were aware of General Schwarzkopf’s concept of 

operations. Their planner used this along with the centers of gravity to 

develop target categories. From this effort came an air concept of operations that would carry out the tasks assigned by General Schwarzkopf. 

For air planners there was one mission that had to be accomplished 

prior to attacking centers of gravity-the achievement of air superiority. 

Air superiority, the ability to use the enemy’s airspace, was their first and 

foremost concern for airpower planners. Defined in joint doctrine as “the 

degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which 

permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea 

and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference 

by the opposing force,” the air planners looked at “gaining and maintain- 

‘‘(cs) CENTCOM Operation plan, op cit. 

149 
ing the freedom of action to conduct operations against the enemy.”” 

For reasons not entirely clear, both CENTCOM and CENTAF planners 

substituted the goal of air supremacy for air superiority in writing their 

plans (though it was changed back to the latter when the actual operation 

order was issued on 16 January 1991). Air supremacy, while defined in 

joint doctrine at the time as “that degree of air superiority wherein the 

opposing air force is incapable of effective interference,” was only mentioned in air force doctrinal manuals. Interestingly, it was General 

Schwarzkopf rather than General Homer who insisted a separate Phase 

11 be devoted to air superiority in the Kuwait theater campaign plan.12 

CWAF planners had intended to pursue air superiority in both Iraq and 

the Kuwait theater from the beginning of Phase I. 

Air campaign planners needed air superiority for several reasons. 

First, air operations to eliminate the Iraqi integrated air defense system 

and render its Air Force ineffective were essential before most coalition 

aircraft could attack the centers of gravity with low losses.” (Planners 

intended to use F- 117s against centers of gravity without air superiority). 

Second, planners needed to insure that Iraq would not execute air strikes 

against the coalition. Prior to the war, there were fears that once the 

allied campaign began, Saddam would react with punitive air attacks, 

perhaps involving chemical weapons, on coalition forces or economic 

fa~i1ities.l~ Third-and most important to General Schwarzkopf-air superiority was required to disguise the movement of large ground forces in 

eastern Saudi Arabia to forward positions farther to the west. From there 

coalition ground force could deliver a sweeping “left hook” into the Iraqi 

right flank “under the cover of the air ~ampaign,”‘~ but they could not 

start moving until the air campaign was underway. If coalition air power 

controlled the skies, planners assumed that Saddam and his commanders 

could not acquire intelligence on coalition movements through aerial 

“(U) Jcs Pub 1-02, 1 Dec 89. Also see (U) AFM 1-1, 1984. 2-11. 

12 (S) Intvw, Gen Homer with OWAS. Feb 92, Cochran notes. 

”(S) MR, Lt Col David A. Deptula, subj: Observations on the Air Campaign Against 

I4[DELETED] (SMF/WN/NC) Navy SPEAR; and (S) c~~K0hi. Operation Desert 

”(S) CENTCOM, Operation Desert Storm OPLAN, pp 5. 11 and 12. 

Iraq, Aug 90 - Mar 91, 29 Mar 91. p 3, GWAPS, Safe #12. D-01. 

Stom OPLAN, p B-22. 

150 
reconnaissance. And if they did realize what was taking place, coalition 

air power could be used to thwart attempts to redeploy Iraqi forces.16 

Air planners also intended to conduct their overall campaign without 

suffering unacceptable losses, a presidential objective. While civilian 

decision makers and military commanders never explicitly defined what 

would constitute "unacceptable losses," they received estimates of likely 

aircraft attrition at various points in the planning of the campaign. For 

example, at the end of August., CEmOM analysts projected that during 

the sixday Phase I strategic air campaign, Iraqi ground defenses and 

fighter interceptors would inflict a loss of 56 aircraft. In the two-day 

Phase 11 air battle over the Kuwait theater, they predicted that antiaircraft 

and surface-to-air missiles deployed in Kuwait would down 10 to 15 

aircraft. In the 6-day Phase III air operations against tbe Iraqi army, they 

forecast the loss of 48 to 78 aircraft [DELETED]. This early estimate put 

losses at 114 to 141 aircraft for the first three phases of the campaign." 

These predictions made it even more essential that air superiority be 

achieved quickly. 

To achieve this, planners designated two specific target categories-strategic air defense and airfields. Under the first category, they 

listed a variety of targets: Iraqi command-and-control centers, communications nodes, and radars to "induce the maximum amount of shock and 

violence" against enemy air defenses." To counter this threat, the initial 

Instant Thunder plan identified ten targets, 12% of the total targets. As 

the Desert Storm air campaign plan matured through January 1991, this 

number of targets grew to 58; however, the percentage of total targets 

(12%) remained ~onstant.'~ 

Early in the crisis, the Special Planning Group had identified the 

centralized command-and-control system managing Iraqi air defenses as 

16(u) Iraqi use of remotely piloted vehicles for aerial reconnaissance never matured 

"(S) U.S. Central Command, Offensive Campaign: Desert Storm, Briefmg. 24 Aug 

'*(U) Homer, Speech at Dadaelian Dinner, 11 Sept 91. p 4. 

into an a significant issue. 

90 [mc briefed to ucs 24 Aug; CJCS briefed to President 25 or 26 Aug]. 

(S) Instant Thunder Campaign Plan, C-12, op cd. 19 

151 
a key vulnerability.20 This system, called “Kari.” was a web of reporting 

posts, interceptor operations centers (IOCS), sector operations centers 

(socs), and the national air defense operation center (Am). The intercept 

centers received information from the reporting posts, provided data to 

the SWS, and controlled intercepts by fighter aircraft or surface-to-air 

missiles. Sector centers correlated the data from the intercept centers, 

monitored the large sectors into which Iraqi airspace was divided and 

determined how fighters and surface-to-air missiles would be allocated 

against hostile aircraft. The air defense centers, located in the capital, 

coordinated activities among the sectors and reportedly was under the 

direct control of Saddam. Using early warning radars, the reporting posts 

gathered air surveillance information?’ 

They intended to attack elements of the air defense command-andcontrol system in the first 48 hours of the air campaign, the air defense 

center in Baghdad as well as the sector and intercept centers located at 

sites throughout Iraq and in occupied Kuwait. Ground-based early warning radars (as well as two rudimentary early warning aircraft) also were 

slated for attack?2 They felt that the air defense command centers did 

not need to be destroyed, but simply rendered in~perative?~ Planners 

expected that command and control of the Iraqi air defense network also 

could be degraded through tactics not involving direct attacks on critical 

nodes. [DELETED].u In addition, some thought that damage to Baghdad electric power facilities caused by cruise missile strikes shortly after 

20(S) Deptula intvw. 8 Jan 92. p 48. 

2’(S) Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Ground and Air Forces Doctrine. Tactics 

and Operations, p 115; (S/WN/NF/NC) Navy SPEAR. P 3-1 1. 

”(S) Master Attack Plans for the first and second 24 hours of the air campaign. CHST 

Folder R~~<ENTAP Master Attack Plans, Items 57-4 and 57-5. 

23(~) Deptula intvw with GWAPS staff, 20 and 21 ~ec 91, p 7; (s) Deptula intvw, 20 

Nov 91, p 11; (S) Deptula intvw, 29 Nov 91. p 45; (S) Deptula intvw, 8 Jan 92, pp 21-22; 

and (S) Deptula, “Lessons Learned.” p 1 1. 

u(S/NF/WN/NC) SPEAR messages, 10 Aug 90 and 23 Aug 90. in Black Hole Box 

8. Folder 9; (S)Iraq Gnd and Air Forces. Doctrine, Tactics and Ops; [DELETED] 

(S/NF/WN/NC) Navy SPEAR; (S) Glosson intvw, 12 Dec 91, p 29; and (S) Deptula intvw, 

8 Jan 92, p 15. 

152 
H-Hour might impair air defense operations by shutting down equipment 

or at least forcing units to switch to emergency generators.” 

Planners intended to strike all main operating bases and active 

dispersal airfields of the Iraqi Air Defense Force and Air Force. Runways, support facilities, and hangars at the airfields were to be attacked?6 

Their objective here was to deny enemy aircraft the use of airfield runways and shoot down any Iraqi aircraft that managed to take 0ff.2~ 

Colonel Warden’s planners initially had identified 7 airfields. By October, Black Hole planners had tripled that number. In the final effort, they 

selected 31 targets in this category, 6% of the planned overall effort. 

[DELETED] .% 

Part of the air superiority mission included the suppression of surfaceto-air missiles batteries through the use of electronic countermeasures or 

high-speed antiradiation missiles. Planners anticipated destroying a number of surface-to-air missile sites. most in Kuwait, through bombing sorties. While conventional (non-stealthy) and low-observable F-117 strike 

aircraft were neutralizing enemy air defenses, planners scheduled other F117s and cruise missiles for strikes on select leadership, command-andcontrol, and electric power targets before actual air superiority or supremacy was achieved?’ This reflected the planners’ beliefs that there was 

25(S) Master Attack Plan for the first 24 hours of the air campaign, CHST Folder 

#57-CENTAF Master Attack Plans. Item 57-4 and (S) Deptula intvw, 8 Jan 92, pp 17 and 

40-41. 

26(S) Target list; Offensive Campaign, Briefing, 20 Dec 90 in CHp Folder 3, Lt Col 

Deptula, Air Campaign Briefings #l-Copy (3-ring notebook) [“Gen Homer Brief to 

SEcDEF’’]; and (S) Master Attack Hans for the first and second 24 hours of the air 

campaign, CHS” Folder #57-CENTAF Master Attack Plans, Items 574 and 57-5. 

27(S) Master Attack Plans for the first and second 24 hours of the air campaign, CHST 

Folder #~~-CENTAF Master Attack Plans. Items 574 and 57-5. 

28[DELETED] 

29(S) Master Attack Plans for the first and second 24 hours of the air campaign, CHST 

Folder #~~-CENTAF Master Attack Plans, Items 574 and 57-5. 

153 
PHOTO DELETED 

A1 Taqaddum Airfield. 

154 
“an inherent degree of air superiority built into any stealth 

With stealth aircraft, there was no need to “roll back” opposing defenses, 

progressively destroying them from the periphery inward, before other 

campaign objectives could be pursued.31 Moreover, F-117 missions did 

not require other aircraft for suppression of enemy air defenses and force 

protection routinely included in strike packages built around non-stealthy 

aircraft. Finally. F-117s could be employed against targets in Baghdad, 

where it would have been difficult to silence all of the antiaircraft 

artillery without causing inordinate collateral damage?2 

The first center of gravity to be attacked was “leadership.” The 

Instant Thunder plan had focused heavily upon the “leadership ring,” and 

the CmOM list had placed it first among its centers of gravity. Just 

how to attack this targets category proved a matter of considerable debate 

among both planners and senior decision makers. [DELETED].33 

[DELETED]. During the first 48 hours of the campaign, they included 

attacks on the Baghdad presidential residence and bunker, among other 

government facilities. [DELETEDIM 

Planners selected leadership targets they believed could weaken 

Saddam’s power to govern with attacks against Iraqi’s internal security 

organs, political elite, and armed forces ( special attention devoted to 

shattering the Republican Guard).” They even selected an otherwise 

insignificant pilot training base near Tikrit to be struck by two B-52s in 

the first hours of Phase I operations because Saddam and many of his 

M(s) Deptula intvw. 20 Nov 91, p 13. See also (s) Deptula intvw with GWAPS staff, 

(S) Deptula, “Lessons Learned,” p 24, (S) Lkptula intvw. 20 Nov 91, pp 13-14; 

20 and 21 Dec 91. p 6. 

(S) Glosson intvw, 12 Dec 91, p 32; and (S) Glosson intvw, 9 Apr 92. 

31 

32(S) Deptula, “Lessons Learned,” p 25. 

33(~) Intvw, Gen Scowcroft with GWAPS staff. op cir. cochran’s notes. 

?S) Master Attack Plans for the fmt and second 24 hours of the air campaign. CHST 

Folder #57-CENTAF Master Attack Plans, Items 57-4 and 57-5; and Msg (TS/SPECAT). 

USCINCCENT CC J2 to JCS, Subj: USCENTCOM Target List for Operatioa Desert Shield, 

Change 4 (U), 0912002 Dec 90. 

35(TS) Target list Msg, US~CCENT CC J2 to JCS. Subj: USCENTCOM Target List for 

Operation Desert Shield, Change 4 (U), 0912002 Dec 90, and (S) Master Attack Plans 

for the first and second 24 hours of the air campaign. CHST Folder #57-<ENTAF Master 

Attack Plans, Items 57-4 and 57-5. 

155 
inner circle and senior commanders came from the Tikrit area, and since 

“there were no really lucrative targets in downtown Tikrit,” planners 

wanted to “make sure that people in Tit knew that war had come to 

their [hometown, that it] wasn’t just located down . . . in the KT0.”36 

They also slated elements of the Iraqi military command for attack during 

the first and second days of the war, such as the Ministry of Defense 

building, the Ministry of Defense computer center, air force headquarters, 

and the headquarters of military intelligence?’ They targeted the Republican Guard not only because of its military importance in the Kuwait 

theater but more because they considered it a “critical node of [the] 

Hussein regime.”38 

The Black Hole planners also sought to isolate and “incapacitate” 

Saddam Hussein’s regime by targeting the leadership’s military command 

and control and disrupting the leadership’s ability to communicate with 

the Iraqi pe0ple.3~ Wanting to separate the regime from the army and 

people, the Back Hole expected that severing Hussein’s communication 

links with forces in the field would impair coordination of operations 

while striking command-and-control system for employing Scud missiles 

and weapons of mass destruction.” Such strikes would inhibit communi- 

“(S) Master Attack Plan for the first 24 hours of the air campaign, CHST Folder 

#57<ENTAF Master Attack Plans. Items 57-4; Quote is from Deptula (S) intvw. 8 Jan 

92; and MFR (S). K. M. Beck, Historian, Talk by Maj D. Karns, sAcIDoo1, [Refleuions 

on STRATFOR Role in Persian Gulf War (LJ)]. to SAC Bomb-Nav Conference, 23 Apr 91. 

in (S) History of the Strategic Air Command, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1990, Volume XISupporting Documents. 9 Mar 92, p 2. 

37(S) Master Attack Plans for the first and second 24 hours of the air campaign, CHST 

Folder #57<ENTAF Master Attack Plans, Items 57-4 and 57-5; and Msg (TS/SPECAT), 

USCINCCEN“ CC J2 to JCs, Subj: USCENTCOM Target List for Operation Desert Shield, 

Change 4,09 12002 Dec 90. 

38(S) Target list. 

39(S) MR. Lt Col David A. Deptula, subj: Observations on the Air Campaign Against 

Iraq. Aug 90 - Mar 91, 29 Mar 91, p 3, GWAPS, Safe #12. D-01; Congressional hearing 

(v). Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. 

Senate, Operation Desert ShieWDesert Storm, 102d Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 1991), 

p 237; brfg (S/LIMDIS). Theater Campaign, 1 Dec 90, GWAPS, CHP Folder 3. 

(S) CENIWIM, Operation Wen Storm OWN, pp B-11, B-45. B-63. and B-68; 

VS) US Central Command, Offensive Campaign: Desert Storm. Briefing. 24 Aug 90 (S) 

[CINC briefed to CJCS 24 Aug; clcs briefed to President 25 or 26 Aug); (S) COMUSCFNTAF 

Operations Order, “Offensive Campaign-phape 1,” pp 2, 5, B-4 and C-1; (S) “Air ops 

40 

156 
cations from Saddam to the Iraqi people, reducing his own propaganda 

efforts both within and beyond Iraqi borders.“ To do this, they targeted 

radio transmitters, receivers and relays; television transmitters; communications centers; public telephone and telegraph facilities; fiber-optic cable 

repeaters; and command posts!2 By creating a sort of communications 

vacuum, planners believed that they would help “incapacitate” the regime. 

Initially planners identified this category as telecommunications but 

eventually it was called command, control and communications (C3). 

At both CENTCOM and CENTAF, planners seemed to believe that not 

only could they incapacitate Saddarn’s government (or, in the words of 

the Desert Storm execute order, “neutralize [the] Iraqi National Comd 

Authority”), but they might even change it, though they remained vague 

on just how this might happen.“ With Saddarn out of the way, air 

planners hoped that the Iraqi army would withdraw from Kuwait, a move 

that would fulfill the first U.S. policy aim in the Gulf conflict. This 

expectation of air power was most prevalent between late August and the 

middle of September when the strategic air campaign was the principal 

summary of air war written by Lt Gen Homer after 8 95 days of combat 261 100291 .” in 

TACC CUD0 Current Ops Log (NA-215). and (S) D-19H-Gen Homer Air War Summary 

Meeting with Deptula, 26 Jan 91; (S) Glosson intvw, 12 Dec 91. p 29; Lt Col Bernard 

C. Harvey, quoted in James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf(Arlington, VA, 1992). p 44, 

and Intelligence message, Subj: Possible C3 Node, 13 Jan 91, S/NF/NUOC. 

4’(S) Target list; (S) Deptula intvw, 20 Nov 91, p 1; (S) Deptula intvw, 8 Jan 92. p 

38; and Harvey, quoted in Airpower in the Gurf, p 44. 

42(S) Target list; (!YNFINUOC) Intelligence message, Subj: Possible C3 Node, 13 

Jan 91; (S) Deptula intvw, 8 Jan 92, pp 23 and 40, and (S) Master Attack Plans for the 

first and second 24 hours of the air campaign, CHST Folder #57<ENTAF Master Attack 

Plans, Items 57-4 and 57-5. 

43(TS) Msg USCINCCENT//CU3 to RUEKJCS/loint Staff! Subj: Follow-Up Exearte 

order-USCINCCENT OPOm 001 for Desert Storm (U), 1700012 Jan 91 CHC Folder y8. 

CENXOM - OPORD, CHC Document #8-1. 

157 
158 
military option available to the United States; however, it remained 

present throughout the development of the plan.4 

Instant Thunder planners had identified five targets in the leadership 

category and 19 in telecommunications, respectively 5% and 23% of the 

total effort, or 28% overall. While Black Hole planners added considerably to both categories - leadership growing to 33 and C3 to 59 - the 

final proportion of this larger effort devoted to leadership and C3 was 

reduced to 19% in the final plan. 

The second center of gravity addressed by the air planners was called 

“infrastructure” by Instant Thunder planners and hitially by CENTCOM. 

Before the 11 October briefing for the President, CENTCOM had 

redesignated the category as “Nuclear-Chemical-Biological Capability.” 

This center of gravity would give planners and decision makers their 

biggest challenge; in retrospect, it gave them their biggest disappointment. 

By January 1991, most considered destruction of Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare capability to be on par with smashing 

Saddam’s regime and dominating enemy airspace as main objectives of 

the initial operations planned for the air campaign.“ 

Planners were not overly concerned with the nuclear threat, though 

they were aware that Iraq was working to build a nuclear weapon. An 

intelligence report in November estimated that with a “crash program,” 

Iraq might fabricate one or two “crude nuclear explosive devices” in, at 

best, six months to a year. The utility of these devices would have been 

limited, however, by their dubious reliability, low yield, and lack of 

e((S/LIMDIS) See Offensive Campaign: Phase I. Briefmg. 27 Aug 90. in CHP Folder 

3, Lt Col Deptula, Air Campaign Briefings #t-Copy (3-Mg notebook) [“Version to 

accommodate Gen Homer inputs on 26 Aug brief-Built by Glosson & Deptula”]; 

COMUSCENTAF Operations Order, ‘affensive Campaign-Phase I.” pp 2-5; Offensive 

Campaign: Phase 1. Briefings (Draft), 2 Sep 90 (SIL1MDIS). in CHp Folder 3. LT COL 

Deptula, Air Campaign Briefings #l<opy (3-ring notebook) r3 Sept Draft for CINC]; 

and Offensive Campaign: Phase I, Briefing, 13 Sep 90 (SLIMDIS), in CHP Folder 3. Lt 

Col Deptula, Air Campaign Briefings #l-Copy (Zring notebook) r’Brief to ucs in 

Riyadh-Built by Glosson & Deptula Briefed by Glosson’q 

“(S) Intvw, Rich Davis, Center for Air Force History. with Lt Col David A. Deptula, 

20 Nov 91. p 14. GWAPS, (S) intvw. Center for Air Force History, with Deptula. 8 Jan 92. 

159 
delivery vehicles. [DELETED].& Given the state of the Iraqi nuclear 

program and the expected time line for the conflict, planners assumed that 

“[nluc~ear weapons will not be used.*“7 

They had different feelings about chemical and biological threats. 

Intelligence analysts were aware that Iraq had stockpiled several tons of 

mustard and nerve agents, integrated chemical weapons into its military 

planning, and had employed these weapons against the Iranians and the 

Kurds. They also knew that Iraq had the potential for using two biological agents, anthrax and botulinum toxin.@ 

Understandably, CENTCOM and its component commands assumed 

throughout that Saddam would use his chemical weapons in the event of 

hostilities. The President and his Secretary of defense were told in midOctober that “Iraqi forces will use chemical weapons.*“9 This was reiterated to Secretary Cheney and General Powell in December.so Analysts 

were less certain about Baghdad’s use of biological agents, primarily 

because of its lack of operational experience with these weapons?’ They 

could only speculate that Saddam might resort to biological weapons to 

&[DELETED] See also (S) OPLAN Desert Storm, 16 Dec 90. pp B-44 - B-45. 

47 (S) OPLAN Desert Storm. 16 Dec 90, p 8. see also 20 and 21 Dec 90 CENTCOM 

briefing to SECDEF and UCS. 

[DELETED] msg (TS/SPECAT). DIA, to USCENTCOM Rear, USCTNCCENT, Info 

USCENTAF Fwd, subj: Salman Pak CBW Research, Production. and Storage Facility, 

0113352 Oct 90, GWAPS. CC-61-WCC Folder 68; paper [DELETED] with memo 

(TS/SPECAT/LIMDIS). Maj Gen Burton Moore, CENTCOM J-3 to COMUSCENTAFIW, 

[classified title], 20 Dec 90. GWAPS. BH, Box 12, Folder 2; CENTCOM OPLAN (S/NF) 

“(S) Brfg, Maj Gen Robert Johnston, CENTCOM Chief of Staff, for Joint Staff and 

National Command Authorities, “CENTCOM Offensive Campaign,” 10 and 11 Oct 90, in 

rpt (S). CENTCOM J-5 Plans, Augmentation Cell, Afrer Action Report [Vol IX SAMS], Tab 

C, 28 Feb 91. GWAPS. NA 259. 

(S) OPLAN Desert Storm. 16 Dec 90, pp 6, 7-8 and B-60, Briefing. CENTCOM for 

Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney and Gen Colin L. Powell, Ua, 20 and 21 Dec 

90, in rpt (S), cm J-5 Plans, Augmentation Cell. Afrer Action Report [Vol IX 

SAMS], Tab T, 28 Feb 91. GWAPS, NA 259. 

”(S) WLAN Desert Storm, 16 Dec 90. pp 7-8 (emphasis added). [DELETED] 

48 

Desert Storm. 16 Dec 90, pp B-45 - B-49, AMRA 0269602. 

50 

160 
preempt a coalition offensive, achieve certain battlefield objectives, or 

save himself and his regime from de~truction.~~ 

CENTCOM told CENTAF “to destroy Iraqi capability to produce and 

weapons of mass destruction,” and to achieve this end “as early as 

po~sible.”’~ Because planners considered chemical weapons to be the 

most probable threat in August, they had created a chemical target category. Later on, they added nuclear and biological targets to this chemical 

category. Instant Thunder planners had picked seven suspected chemical 

weapons facilities and the nuclear research facility at ’hwaitha near 

Baghdad. By November, the list had grown to 25 targets with the addition of suspected manufacturing plants and additional bunkers. In terms 

of overall effort, the percentage of total targets (10%) remained constant 

throughout plan development. 

This target category surfaced a new series of problems for planners. 

Given the presidential desires to minimize civilian casualties, they 

pondered possible widespread dispersal of radioactive contaminants, 

chemical agents, or virulent microorganisms and toxins that might result 

from bombing. They feared high-explosive bombs striking these buildings might produce clouds of aerosolized agents that could travel long 

distances, contaminate large areas, and poison thousands or even millions 

of people within and outside Iraq.” 

CENTCOM planners realized that destroying Iraq’s nuclear-biologicalchemical capabilities was a coalition war aim in case Saddam launched 

chemical or biological attacks. [DELETED]” 

’*(S) OPLAN Desert Storm. 16 Dec 90. pp 5-6; [DELETED] 

53(S) OPLAN Desert Storm, 16 Dec 90, pp 4 and 9. 

”(U) Homer Dadaelian speech, p 4; (U) Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, cited in David 

A. Brown, “Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Still Intact,” Aviation Week & Space Technology. 1 

July 91, p 23; (S) Deptula intvw. 20 and 21 Dec 91. p 8; (S) intvw, Rich Davis, Diane 

T. Putney, and Perry Jamieson, Center for Air Force History, with Lt Col David A. 

Deptula. 29 Nov 91, p 41, GWAPS. Historical Advisor’s File; (S) Deptula intvw. 8 Jan 92, 

P 24. 

”[ DELETED] 

161 
[DELETED].’6 [DELETED].” 

The final center of gravity to be attacked was military forces and 

aligned with the CENTCOM assigned mission to “destroy Iraqi offensive 

military ~apability.”’~ Black Hole planners used two target categories 

here: “Republican Guards and military support” and “Ports”. Instant 

Thunder planners had picked 15 targets under the category of “Military 

Support”: primarily the infrastructure for Iraq’s armed forces. This comprised 18% of the overall effort. At the urging of Generals Schwarzkopf 

and Powell, this category was expanded to include strikes on the Republican Guard (hence the new category designation). By early December, the 

number of targets had grown to 44; however the overall percentage of 

total targets remained at 18%. Warden’s planners had picked only one 

naval port. By December, General Glosson’s planners had added three 

more naval facilities. 

Air planners intended to attack the key elements of the military as 

well as their supporting industries. They included military aircraft, 

ballistic missiles, and Republican Guard units as military targets while 

including defense research and development centers, armaments plants, 

POL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and electric power facilities in the 

industrial gr~uping.’~ They intended to gut the foundations of Iraqi 

”[ DELEXED] 

57[DELETED] 

”(S) Desert Storm, 16 Dec 90, p 4. 

’9(S) Lt Col David A. Deptula, USAF. subj: Observations on the Air Campaign 

Against Iraq. Aug 90 - Mar 91, 29 Mar 91, p 2. GWAPS, D-01; (U) Lt Gen Charles A. 

Homer, in Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Operation Desert 

ShieWDesert Sfom, 102d Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 1991). p 237; (S) Deptula intvw, 

20 and 21 Dec 91, p 10. 

162 
163 
military strength and thus not only compel a withdrawal from Kuwait, but 

also prevent additional Iraqi aggression, a rationale consistent with the 

strategic goal of assuring the security and stability of the Persian Gulf 

region. 

Development of this part of the air campaign plan revealed a 

philosophical difference between short-range military and long-range 

political objectives. A quick and decisive air offensive might destroy 

enough of Iraq*s military strength to free Kuwait and bring hostilities to 

a close, yet end before depriving Iraq of its ability to commit future acts 

of aggression. These potential conflicts did not go unnoticed. Generals 

Powell and Schwankopf, motivated by concerns about postwar regional 

stability, intended from the start to eliminate the offensive ground power 

of the Iraqi army before it withdrew from Kuwait. During the 11 August 

briefing in which he was shown the conceptual plan for Instant Thunder, 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs maintained that the strategic air campaign should not simply pressure Saddam to pull out of Kuwait. Rather, 

it should continue until the Iraq army was destroyed. [DELETED]@’ 

Schwarzkopf, too, wanted the army de-fanged, and was “obsessed” (Glosson’s word) about trapping and annihilating the Republican Guard before 

it could retreat?’ For the theater commander and the President’s principal 

military advisor, assuring the stability of the Gulf (Bush’s third policy 

objective) evidently was at least as important as freeing Kuwait (the first 

policy objective). 

Air planners worried that the conflict could end before the bombing 

campaign could cause major damage to the Iraqi military establishment. 

Glosson feared that the campaign might last no more than a few days, 

that “all of a sudden the war was going to stop and . . . we [would] have 

a hell of a lot more stuff to do.*a At the time, he believed that offensive 

air operations might be shut down prematurely by an Iraqi surrender, an 

offer by Saddam to negotiate a political settlement, or a unilateral 

“(S) Lt Col Ben Harvey. HQ us~F/XOxws, subj: “Instant Thunder” Briefmg to am, 

11 Aug 90. GWAPS. CHP 74, Airpower in the Gulf. p 45; Capt Ed O’Connell, “Desert 

Storm: A Look Into Air Campaign Planning.” unpublished manuscript, n.d.. p 6. See also 

(S) Deptula intvw, 1 Nov 90. p 18; (S) Deptula intvw, 20 Nov 91, p 12; (S) Deptula 

intvw. 29 Nov 91. pp 42-43. 

6’(S) Deptula intvw. 12 Dec 91. pp 24 and 25. 

62(S) fbid, p 51. 

164 
bombing halt by the coalitio11.6~ Thus as the plan execution date grew 

closer and additional aircraft arrived in country, Black Hole planners 

sought to spread sorties across as many of the target categories as 

possible, rather than concentrate on the neutralization of all or most 

targets in one category before the next became the focus of attacks.@ 

Another problem arose as top civilian decision makers paid increasing 

attention to destruction of Scuds. Instant Thunder planners limited Scud 

targets to a storage facility in the chemical target category and a warhead 

plan in the military production category. However, as the perceived 

importance grew of wiping out Saddam’s ballistic missile force in order 

to prevent attacks against Israel that could provoke retaliation, draw the 

Jewish state into the war, and thus lead Arab countries to abandon the 

carefully built coalition, the Black Hole planners created a separate Scud 

target category. By late December, they had identified and targeted 16 

weapons complexes and fixed launch sites, 6% of the target base at that 

time. By mid-January, that percentage of total targets had grown to 9% 

as planners now listed 43 targets. 

The President, in prewar guidance, said that efforts should be made 

to “preclude” missile strikes on Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other countries 

in the region, as well as attacks on coalition military forces. Thus planners selected targets to “[rleduce [the] offensive threat to regional states 

and friendly forces” by attacking fixed launchers, support bases, 

surveyed launch sites for mobile launchers, aircraft shelters in which 

Deptula intvw, 20 Nov 91 pp 22-23; (S) Deptula intvw, 8 Jan 92. p 10; 

(S) Deptula intvw, 20 and 21 Dec 91, p 11. 

(S) Deptula intvw. 20 and 21 Dec 91. p 11. 64 

165 
PHOTO DELETED 

Jaiibah SRBM Launch Complex. Four surveyed positions (B1 - 84). 

mobile launchers might be hidden, and-in keeping with the need to 

diminish Iraq’s long-term military potential-missile research and 

production facilities!’ Very early on, General Homer had informed 

Secretary Cheney that some number of mobile launchers would escape 

destruction and fire their missiles.66 However, no one seemed attuned to 

the magnitude of the problem that would be posed by mobile launchers. 

6s(S) Target list (with objectives for each target category, including Scuds). GWAPS. 

66(S) Homer intvw. 4 Mar 92. p 42. 

BH, Other Documents, Folder 8. 

166 
Complicating this was incomplete nature of U. S. knowledge about 

the size, character, and operation of the Iraqi Scud force. Intelligence 

analysts thought Iraq to have some mix of several hundred Scud B, 

Hussein, and Abbas missile^.^' [DELETED].68 They had located 

complexes for fixed launchers in the western part of the country oriented 

toward Israel. [DELETED].@ In contrast, they had “[n]o- accurate 

accounting of numbers of mobile launchers or where they were based [or] 

hiding.”” 

The CENTCOM and CENTAF commanders and their staffs viewed these 

missiles as ineffective weapons against the military facilities and forces 

of the coalition. Given the limited accuracy and small high-explosive 

payload of the Scuds (the Soviet-produced Scud B and its longer-range, 

Iraqi-built variants, the Hussein, and Abbes), they were more of a terrorist 

weapon against cities than a serious threat to military forces.” 

The problem for the air planners was tracking and attacking Iraqi 

mobile missiles. [DELETED]’* The infrastructure for the Scud force was 

targeted, the mobile launchers were not. For planners, mobile Scuds 

represented an intractable problem. [DELETED].73 [DELETED].’4 

67(SlNF/WN), subj: SRBM Fact Sheet (U), 14 Jan 91, GWAPS, CIS 32; (s) OPLAN 

68(S/NF) Facthformation Sheet; (S) Brfg, “Offensive Air Campaign,” 20 Dec 90. 

69(S) Desert Storm Scud Missile Working Group 111, Desert Storm Scud Missile 

Lessons Learned Conference, 28-30 May 91, p 9, GWAPS, NA 108. 

”(S) How to Kill Scud Missiles. See also intvw (S/NF/WN), Diane T. Putney, 

Center for Air Force History and Ronald H. Cole, JCS Historical Division, with Rear Adm 

J. “Mike” McConnell. 14 Feb 92, GWAPS, NA 261. 

’‘(S) Intvw, Senior GwAPS staff with Lt Gen Charles Horner, Shaw AFBSC, 9 Mar 

91; also intvw (S) Capt Edward P. O’Connell, GWAPS, with DIA, DB-6, 19 Aug 92, 

GWAPS, notes in Kurt Guthe’s files; intvw (secure telecom) (S), Capt Edward P. 

O’Connell and Kurt Guthe. GWAPS, with DIA, DX-7, 1 Sept 92, GWAPS, notes in Kurt 

Guthe’s files. 

Desert Storm, 16 Dec 90, p B-14; (S) Brfg, “Offensive Air Campaign,” 20 Dec 90. 

72(S) Intvw, 8 Jan 92, p 47. 

73(S/NF/WN) Memo, JIC [Joint Intelligence Centervraqi Scud Targeting Support 

Cell (TSC) to JIG. subj: Lessons Learned From Operation DESERT STORM (U). 6 Mar 

91, Capt Edward P. O’Connell’s files; intvw (S), Kurt Guthe. GWAPS, with Capt John R. 

Glock, 8 Sep 92. 

167 
To belay Israeli anxiety about Saddam’s ballistic missiles, planners 

did assign aircraft missions in the vicinity of the H-2 and H-3 airfields in 

western Iraq, an area where Scuds were located. [DELETED].75 

[DELETED] .‘6 

General Homer still recognized that Scuds might compel Israel to 

retaliate against Iraq, and he made preliminary plans to deal with that 

situation. General Schwarzkopf believed that an Israeli decision to strike 

back could have had grave political, as well as military, consequences and 

might destroy the ~oalition.’~ [DELETED]. Israeli violations of Jordan’s 

airspace could draw that country into the ~ar.7~ 

[DELETED] .‘9 [DELETED]. 

74(S) Background paper (S), Maj Russ Thompson, Capt Tom Clemmons, Capt Philip 

Sauer, Lt Ed Zellen, How to Kill Scud Missiles: Lessons Learned from Desert Storm (S). 

n.d., attached to memo (S), Capt Tom Clemmons to ~TIWCCIIN~NT~NA, subj: Scud Lessons 

Learned Conference Trip Report (S), 5 June 91, in Capt John Heidrick’s Desert Storm 

Continuity Book (UNF), available from AFHRA. 

75(S) Memo, to RADM [Conrad] Lautenbacher [NAVCENT Riyadh] from Brig Cen 

Buster C. Closson, subj: H-UH-3 Area Coverage Day 1, n.d., GWAPS, BH, Box IIC, 

Folder 21. 

76(S) Attack Plan for first 24 hours. See also briefing (SNF), Cmdr Donald W. 

“Duck” McSwain for Vice Adm R.M. Dunleavy, “Riyadh Perspective (usN),” n.d., 

GWAPS, NA 254. 

77(S/NF) TV intvw with Frost, 27 Mar 91, p 3. 

(SINF) Intvw, 4 Mar 92, p 40. 78 

79(S) Doc, ‘Third Party Attack on Iraq,” n.d., GWAPS, BH, Box 13, Folder 5, BH 13- 

5-3. 

168 
[DELETED] .w [DELETED] .81 [DELETED]. 

[DELETED] !* 

By aligning the three centers of gravity plus air superiority against 

target categories and following the construct laid in the Instant Thunder 

plan, General Glosson’s planners laid the foundation for the Desert Storm 

air campaign plan. The three target categories not specifically alignedElectricity, Oil, and Railroads and Bridges-were cast in the larger missions for air power such as interdiction and attacking the morale of the 

people. Together these targets constituted 19% of the Instant Thunder 

and September CENTAF Target List. In the final Desert Storm plan, this 

percentage of total targets dropped to 13% primarily because of the static 

nature of these target categories while the others were growing. 

From the outset of the Gulf crisis, General Schwadcopf thought in 

terms of a phased offensive 0peration.8~ So did his air component 

commander and principal air planner.84 Only Colonel Warden’s Instant 

Thunder plan sought to win the war in only six days of bombing. In 

August, air power was all that was available to planners for an offensive 

operation. Thus Instant Thunder seemed a viable plan without phasing 

to other offensive operations. However, by early September, planners in 

the Black Hole had incorporated this concept into the larger CENTAF plan 

in which the air campaign outlined in Instant Thunder was specified as 

Phase I. 

w(TS) “Response to Enemy Preemptive First Strike.” briefing, n.d.; and intvw, Lt 

Col Mark B. “Buck” Rogers, by A. Howey (GWAPS), 19 Feb 92, p 8. (TS) Master Attack 

Plan, 12 Dec 90, p 1 [Black Hole Files, Box 4. Folder 71; and (TS) Rogers, “Desert 

ShieldStorm After Action Report.” p 2. 

8’(TS) “Response to Enemy Preemptive First Strike.” 

”(TS) Master Attack Plan. 10 Jan 91, p 1 [Black Hole Files. Box 4. Folder 71; and 

”(U) Schwankopf memoirs, pp 319-320. 

“(S) Intvw Gen Homer with GWAPS staff, Feb 92, and (S) intvw Gen Glosson with 

“Reflex: Response to Enemy Preemptive First Strike.” 

GWAPS Apr 92, Cochran notes. 

169 
For CENTCOM theater planners of Desert Storm, the first two phases 

remained the air-only campaign against Iraqi targets (Phase I) and the 

achievement of air superiority over the Kuwait theater (Phase II). What 

changed after mid-October were Phases III and IV. Significantly though, 

the entire concept of operations rested on the success of air power in 

Phases I and 11, which were essential to permit Phase III’s 50% attrition 

of ground forces in the Kuwait theater and cover the movement of ground 

forces into attack positions for Phase IV. 

The question for planners became the CENTAF transition from a total 

air war (Phases I, II, and III) to the conduct of the combined arms war 

(Phase IV). From early in their planning effort, CENTCOM planners 

envisioned that this transition would be a fifty percent attrition of Iraqi 

forces in the KTO prior to the launching of Phase IV, the ground offensive. As early as 14 August, General Schwarzkopf’s combat analysis 

group concluded that for a coalition offensive to be successful with a 

single corps, the air campaign would have to achieve fifty percent attrition of enemy ground forces first?’ 

General Glosson first discussed the fifty percent goal in September 

with Lt. Col. Joe Purvis, chief of a special group of Army ground 

planners which Schwarzkopf had recruited from graduates of the Army’s 

School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Just exactly 

what was meant by fifty percent attrition remained unclear, not to mention who would determine when that the goal had been reached. At that 

time, army planners seemed most interested in bombing armor, artillery, 

and troops.86 

One reason that General Glosson may not have pushed the point at 

that time was his hope that air power might prevail alone. As he 

”(S) Rpt. Combat Analysis Group. 21 Mar 91. in Vol VI of CFNKOM J-5 After 

Action Rpt. GWAPS NA-259. (U) The Bush administration’s November decision to double 

the forces for a two-corps ground offensive did not change the computer calculations 

because intelligence reported that Saddam had also deployed more forces to the KTO. 

86(S) Intvw, GWAPS staff with Maj Gen Glosson. Pentagon, 4 Apr 92; Chronology 

(S), S~S Team, Tab P in Vol I of Centcom J-5 After Action Rpt, 5 Mar 91, GWAPS NA259. Speech, Gen Glosson, Air War College, 27 Oct 92. 

170 
confided to an Air Force historian at the time, 

I think it’s accurate to portray the history of the Air Force as one in 

which it has always been in support of either the ground forces, the sea 

forces, or the Marines. With the exception of Libya, there have not 

been many instances that one can refer to and say this was an air operation. In that context, this was and is an entirely different situation. 

We’re being asked to meet Presidential established objectives solely 

with the use of air power. Now there are a lot of critics that say that 

can’t be done. I don’t happen to be one of those individuals. I believe, 

with the objectives that the President has laid down, if we execute this 

air campaign and the leadership has the patience, he will realize all the 

objectives that he’s established to include the country of Kuwait being 

returned to the proper people and the removal of Iraqis from Kuwait. 

I say that because I’m firmly convinced that the intensity and the free 

dom the President has laid out in guidelines for us in executing this air 

campaign, permits us to go to the trunk of the tree, or the heart, and 

we’re not snipping on limbs. We are absolutely decimating the leadership of Iraq and we are making his capacity to command and control 

both the military and getting information to his civilian populace almost 

impossible. We are making it for all practical purposes impossible for 

him to resupply the troops that he has in Kuwait. So once you’ve done 

that, the only thing you have to do is have the patience to wait out the 

effect of what you’ve already ac~omplished.~~ 

He predicted that about ten days after “we complete” Desert Storm’s first 

phase (the strategic air offensive in Iraq), the Iraqi army in the Kuwait 

theater would begin to run out of food and water. By then they would 

be enduring the full force of the third phase of Desert Storm, the direct 

attack on their positions, their supplies, their tanks, their artillery and their 

morale. 

The key question for planners was just how long it would take for air 

power to achieve the fifty percent figure. First to tackle this were 

analysts with Air Staff‘s Checkmate planning group. In mid-October, the 

RAND Corporation had briefed the Air Staff on the results of their Gulf 

wargame, suggesting that Iraqi ground forces be bombed by B-52s for at 

”(U) Words in boldface indicate General Glosson’s emphasis. (S) Intvw. MSgt 

Thdore J. Turner. CENTAF history office, with Brig Gen Glosson, Riyadh, 18 Oct 90. 

171 
least a month before a coalition ground offensive. Donald Rice, the 

Secretary of the Air Force (and former head of RAND), took an interest 

in the RAND briefing and directed that Warden make his own examination 

of Phase III. Warden believed that the Bush administration had to be 

persuaded that air power in Phase III could destroy the Iraqi army, and 

he told his staff that their Phase 111 study was “the most important work 

in Washington now.”88 

Checkmate analysts assumed that precision-guided munitions would 

be used for destruction of armor and artillery while cluster bombs would 

be used against troops in the open. They concluded that nine days were 

required to achieve fifcy percent destruction of Iraqi armor, artillery and 

troops in Kuwait only. Informed of these results on 23 October, Glosson 

noted that Schwarzkopf’s emphasis was on the Republican Guards in 

southern Iraq, not the front line troops in Kuwait!’ 

Checkmate analysts ran the model again, this time against both the 

Republican Guards and the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Comments from the 

Air Force’s Center for Studies and Analysis and from RAND caused them 

to adopt a more conservative estimate of the percentage of sorties which 

would find a target to bomb (the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual’s 

standard of seventy-five percent, rather than the ninety-five percent they 

first used with the justification that targets were easy to spot in the 

desert). Checkmate concluded in early November that twenty-three days 

would be required to reach fifty percent attrition.90 

“(S) Notes, Wayne Thompson, Checkmate historian, 16 Oct 90, GWAPS Historical 

89(S) Notes, Wayne Thompson. Checkmate historian, 23 Oct 90. GWAM Historical 

90(S) The series of Checkmate briefings reporting its findings are in GWAPS CHSH 6 

and 8; see especially the briefings of 19 Oct (8-10) and 31 Dec (6-2). (U) The same 

model was rerun at the end of December increasing the estimate of the number of Iraqi 

forces in the KTO. Now analysts predicted that twenty-two days and 24,OOO strike sorties 

would be required to reach a fifty percent attrition. 

Advisor’s Files. 

Advisor’s Files. 

172 
Since this estimate did not take into account the increase in U.S. 

forces being deployed, General Glosson reduced it to seventeen days in 

a briefing for General Schwarzkopf?’ CENTCOM cut it further. The 

Desert Storm Operations Plan of 16 December allotted only eight days for 

Phase III. General Schwarzkopf remained adamant not to launch the 

ground offensive until his intelligence staff could tell him that the opposing force had been degraded fifty percent by air. His planners left the 

duration of Phase III in the Operation Order of 16 January “to be determined.”92 

For CENTAF planners, the integration of the emerging ground 

campaign plan with the fully mature air campaign plan in mid-December 

solidified their overall concept of operation. The realization that the air 

campaign would probably be executed led to a reorganization and series 

of briefings for wing Commanders. General Homer established a unified 

planning organization under General Glosson with Colonel Deptula’s Iraq 

cell and Lt. Col. Samuel J. Baptiste’s KTO cell. Before this merger, the 

Iraq cell had been totally involved with the offensive planning for Desert 

Storm while the KTO cell had handled the Desert Shield defensive planning as well as the daily air tasking orders for daily training flights. Now 

the KTO planners focused on offensive planning for Phases II, III, and IV 

while the Iraq group continued to work on Phase I plans. In addition to 

putting General Glosson in charge of all planners, General Homer made 

him an air division commander over the fighter wings. After Glosson 

briefed his fighter wing commanders on the impending campaign, General 

Homer used essentially the same briefing for Secretary Cheney and 

General Powell when they visited Riyadh in mid-De~ember.9~ 

91(s) Brfg, Theater Campaign, Glosson to CWC, 1 Dec 90. GWAPS CHP 3-1. 

92(S) USCWCCENT OPORD 91-001. Desert Storm, 1617352 Jan 91, GW~ NA-357; 

93(S) Brfg, 18 Dec 90 Theater Campaign Brief to Wing Commanders, Tab 4, Gen 

USCENTCOM OF” (S), Desert Stom. 16 Dec 90, AFHRA 269602. 

Glosson Briefs, Box 3, Folder 60, GWAPS Files. 

173 
Above, on way to Riyadh briefing. L to R: Lt Col Ben Harvey, 

left, Gen Powell in Saudi Arabia. Below right, Secretary of Defense 

Lt Col John Warden, Lt Col Dave Deptula, Lt Col Ron Stanfield. Below 

Richard Cheney in Saudi Arabia. 

1 74 
Glosson’s briefing for his wing commanders outlined the campaign’s 

four phases: Phase I - Strategic Air Campaign; Phase I1 - KTO Air Supremacy; Phase I11 - Destroy Enemy Ground Forces in KTO; and Phase 

IV - Ground Attack. He also laid out the three centers of gravity, Leadership, Nuclear-Chemical-Biological Capability, and Military Forces. He 

specified the results for each phase: for Phase I, to destroy leadership’s 

military command and control, destroy nuclear-biological-chemical capability, disrupt and attrit Republican Guard Forces, disrupt leadership’s 

ability to communicate with populace, destroy key electrical grids and oil 

storage, and limit military resupply; for Phase 11, destroy all radar-controlled surface-to-air threats and establish total air supremacy in the 

Kuwait Theater of Operations; for Phase 111, make certain that Iraqi forces 

in the Kuwait Theater of Operations were no longer capable of resisting 

attack, let along launching an attack; and for Phase IV, complete the 

destruction of the Republican Guard Forces, remove Iraqi forces from 

Kuwait, and restore the legitimate government of Kuwait. 

Glosson covered each phase briefly, outlining essentially how air 

power would be used in each and for how long (Phase 1-6 days; Phase II- - 

2 days; Phase 111-1 4 days, and Phase IV- 18 days). The phases overlapped 

(e.g., Phase I1 started during Phase I) and the total campaign was projected to last 32 da~s.9~ 

Glosson’s briefings used maps with targets by target categories 

(airfields, air defense, SAMIAAA threat, Scud threat, Scud storage, Scud 

production, chemical, biological and nuclear production, and storage 

facilities). The details of the first 48 hours of the air campaign were 

summarized as listed in the charts below. On the first day, attacks would 

start after midnight (Figure 11) against 7 groups of targets, leadership in 

the Baghdad area, air defense operation centers near Baghdad and Tallil, 

94(S) Brfg, 20 Dec 90 CENTAWCC Brief to the SecDef, T0b 5, ibid. 

175 
Figure 11 

Attack Plan First Day, AM - Night 
X. 

177 
Figure 13 

Attack Plan First Day, PM - Day 

Source: Brlenng (S) Theater Ah Campaign I0 Wlnp Commander. 18 Dec 90 In Glossen’: notebook In 

GWAPS box 1, ndr 4. 

x Major AlrUeldS 

Major FOLS 
Figure 14 

Attack Plan First Day, PM - Night 

I AM Transm

TransmittedReceiver 

9ource: Erleilnp (S) "healer Alr Campalpn lo WlnQ 

Commsndef 10 Dec 90 In Glorson'r nolebook In GWAPS box 1. ndr 4. 

a Major AlfleldS 

Malor FOLs 
I 

E 

c 

X. 

180 
a Major Almeldr 

Major FOLs 

Figure 16 

Attack Plan Second Day, AM - Day 

, ,. , ._I A1 Asad Airfield 

Latlfiyah Ammo Plant 

A1 lshkandariyah Arm Plant 

Al Taqaddum Airfield 

A1 Taqaddum CW Bunker 

Source: Brienng (S) Theater Nr Campalpn to Wlnp Commande? 18 Dec 90 In Glosson's notebook In GWAPS box 1, ndr 4, 
‘. .., ... 
Abu Ghurayb Presidential Gro

Abu Ghurayb Presidential Bun

Baghdad Security Forces HO 

Baghdad International Receive

Ministry of Defense 

r Research Fa

Source: Brleflng (S) Theater Ah Campaipn lo Wlnp 

Commander 18 Doc 90 In Glosson'r wteboOk in 

~~~~~boxi.ndr4. 

x Major Alfields 

Major FOLr 

Figure 18 

Attack Plan Second Day, PM - Night 

I Taii Presidential Retreat 
airfields and Scud storage sites in A1 Jarrah area, Scud storage and airfield just north of Kuwait, airfields and strategic air defense targets along 

the southwestern Iraq border, and Scud sites in the H-2 and H-3 area. 

The second wave would start at first light (Figure 12) with attacks against 

command and control and electrical targets in northern Iraq, the Baghdad 

area, along the northern Kuwait border and in the Tallil area, while Scud 

sites were to be struck in Kuwait itself. The third wave of the first 24 

hours would be in the afternoon (Figure 13) again against Baghdad, 

chemical bunkers and air defense sites in southern Iraq, oil facilities and 

railroad on the Iraq-Kuwait border, and again against Scud targets in the 

H-2 and H-3 area. The final strikes of the first 24 hours (Figure 14) after 

dark featured once again leadership, command and control, and other 

targets in the Baghdad area, airfields in central and eastern Iraq, strategic 

air defenses and chemical storage bunkers in the north, and another strike 

against targets in the H-2 and H-3 area. 

The second 24 hour period began after midnight (Figure 15) with 

strikes planned primarily against strategic air defense targets in western, 

central, and eastern Iraqi, more attacks against leadership targets in Baghdad along with the nuclear research facility at Tuwaitha, and Scud storage 

facilities in Kuwait. In the early daylight of the second day (Figure 16). 

strikes were to be flown against Scud, chemical, and biological production facilities in the Baghdad area while the Republican Guard Forces 

located just north of Kuwait were to be hit. The second afternoon strikes 

were scheduled (Figure 17) against Iraqi military forces to include a navy 

port just north of Kuwait, the Tallil Airfield, and H-1 air defense headquarters. The final wave of airstrikes would be launched after dark 

hitting all over Iraq (Figure 18) including massive strikes against leadership targets in the Baghdad area, air fields and air defense installations 

along the Iraqi-Saudi Arabia border, airfields, air defense installations in 

northern Iraq, H-2 airfields, airfields in Kuwait, and major production 

facilities just north of the Kuwait border. 

Day Three through Six would consist of reattack of 20% of first and 

second day targets, key targets requiring additional attacks (obtained from 

BDA), and the remainder of targets not covered during the first 48 hours. 

Thus in the first six days (Phase I) of the air campaign, planners intended 

to strike all 262 target listed on the 18 December target list. (See Table 20) 

1 84 
Table 20 

Target Growth by Category 

Instant 13Sep 11 Oct 1 Dec 18Dec 15Jan91 

Thunder 90 90 90 90 

Strategic Air Defense 10 21 40 28 27 58 

ChemicavNBC 8 20 20 25 20 23 

Scuds da da notea notea 16 43 

Leadership 5 15 15 32 31 33 

C3 (Telecom) 19 26 27 26 30 59 

Electricity 10 14 18 16 16 17 

Oil 6 8 10 7 12 12 

Railroads&Bridges 3 12 12 28 28 33 

Airfields 7 13 27 28 28 31 

Naval & Ports 1 4 6 4 4 19 

Military Support 15 41 43 44 38 62 

Republican Guard da noteb noteb noteb 12 37 

Breaching 0 0 da da 0 6 

SAMS 0 0 da da 0 43 

Totals 84 174 218 238 262 476 

Snapshot Dates: 

13 Sep 90 UCS Briefing 

11 Oct 90 Presidential Briefing 

1 Dec 90 

18 Dec 90 

15 Jan 91 

Theater Campaign Briefing 

Secretary of Defense Briefing 

Day before Desert Storm 

Notes: 

(a) Scuds included in Chemical category 

(b) Republican Guards included in Military Support category 

Source: (S) Brfg slides for snapshot dates located in “General Glosson Briefs.” GWAPS 

Box 3. Folder 60. 

185 
The plan for Phase I1 was not as precise but did list a number of 

sorties. All attacks would take place in or just north of Kuwait. 

[DELETED]. 

For Phase 111, Defining the Battlefield in the Kuwait theater, planners 

projected 600 aircraft per 24-hour period. They expected to destroy 50% 

of the Republican Guard armor, artillery, and personnel by the end of the 

fourth day. Then shifting to the regular ground forces while continuing 

Phase operations into Iraq to prevent reconstitution and resupply and 

Phase I11 operations to suppress enemy air defenses as required, they projected 50% attrition of armor on the tenth day, artillery on the eleventh 

day, and personnel on the twelfth day. 

For the final phase, Ground Campaign, the briefing only mentioned 

missions for the ground units: “secure coast and seal battlefield” for the 

Marines, “liberate Kuwait City and seal battlefield” for the Saudi forces, 

“destroy Republican Guard” for VII U.S. Corps and “control access to 

KTO and seal battlefield” for XVlll U.S. Corps. This phase was anticipated to last fourteen days. 

During the four weeks between these briefings and execution of the 

plan, only two major changes were made. First, new aircraft arrived and 

planners adjusted the master attack plans and air tasking orders. The 

number of F-117s in theater had doubled from 18 to 36 in early December (and would increase again to 42 during the campaign); F-1 1 1Fs 

increased from 32 to 64 by mid December; F-15Es from 24 to 48 by 

early January. Most of these precision-bomb droppers were allocated into 

Phase I targets before being shifted to Phase I11 targets; the F-117s would 

focus on Phase I targets throughout the campaign. Newly deployed F- 16s 

(90 for a total of 210) and A-10s (42 for a total of 144) could be dedicated to Phase I11 from the beginning of the ~ampaign?~ 

Second and most significant, planners almost doubled the size of their 

overall target list adding 214 targets (See Table 20). They added two 

new categories - breaching with 6 targets and surface-to-air missile sites 

with 43. Other categories almost doubled with strategic air defense 

adding 31, chemical adding 27, military support adding 24, and C3 

95(U) For more deployment data, see the (S/WN/NF/NC) CWAPS Statistical 

Compendium. 

186 
adding 29. Scuds (which had been separated from chemical in December) almost tripled its number with 43, while naval and ports went from 

4 to 19. 

The remainder of the planning effort for Desert Storm was spent 

refining master attack plans for the first seventy two hours. General 

Homer decided not to prepare air tasking orders before the campaign for 

more than the first two days-the situation after that he judged too unpredictable. There was a sense that the beginning of the campaign was 

critical to everything that followed, and there was a need to adjust to 

better intelligence and more aircraft.% Planners did fashion what they 

called master attack plan “shells” for the third and fourth day; however, 

they essentially listed the aircraft available for these days?7 

By early January, CENTAF planners had settled on 477 individual 

targets (See Table 21). They now labored to determine which were to be 

hit first, during either the first, second, or third twenty four hours, or held 

until latter. They also tried to determine which targets would require 

restrikes. They chose 60% of the targets on the list to hit in the first 

seventy two hours. (See Figure 19) Their priority for the first twenty four 

hours-as had been since the Instant Thunder days-went towards the 

achievement of air superiority with 34% of the targets in the strategic air 

defense and airfield categories. Second, were strikes against communications (14%) followed by equal number of strikes against Scuds, leadership, and chemical weapons, all categories designated as centers of gravity. During the second twenty four hours, they again assigned air superiority as the top priority (43%) and moved leadership into second (19%). 

Significantly, they programmed almost 70% of the restrike missions 

against these target categories (strategic air defense, airfields, and leadership). In the third twenty four hours, they scheduled 20% of the strikes 

against airfields, 22% against leadership, and 19% against railroads and 

bridges. During this series of strikes, planners began a shift to military 

support (15%) and Republican Guards (8%). 

After the first seventy two hours, planners presumably would direct 

strikes against the remaining targets not struck (the breaching and 

%(S) Intvw. Dr Perry Jamieson. Center for Air Force History, with Lt Col Baptiste, 

97(S) Intvw, Lt Col Robert Eskridge with A. S. Cochran, 16 Dec 92. 

Shaw AFB. SC. 5 Mar 92. 

187 
surface-to-air missile target categories were clearly to be struck after 

Phase I). Many of these targets to be struck were military support (22%) 

and Scuds (13%). 

In the remaining days before the air campaign, planners continually 

reviewed target selection. making last minute adjustments. Most of these 

had to do with assignment of aircraft. There were also minor changes in 

targets scheduled for strikes. In essence, the plan remained ~nchanged.~~ 

On 16 January, the Desert Storm air campaign plan was ready. 

Rather than a formal operation order like that issued by CENTCOM, 

CENTAF issued an air tasking order for each twenty-four-hour period. 

Day One would begin at 0300 Saudi time on 17 January and end at 0300 

on 18 January. Little had changed from the plan outlined in the previous 

month to the wing commanders. For each package, planners specified 

time on target, mission number, target category and target number, a brief 

description of the target, and the number and type of aircraft assigned to 

hit that target. Planners also listed missions for aircraft without specific 

targets such as combat air patrol for F-lSCs, suppression of enemy air 

defenses for F-4Gs and EF-111s. Scud alert for F-lSEs, deception for 

drones, and reconnaissance for RF-4Gs. 

Planners had air tasking order ready for the first two days, but, in 

keeping with General Homer’s wishes, had only rather sketchy master 

attack plans for third day and nothing for the subsequent days. Planners 

left sorties open on the third day (including F-117s) to restrike whatever 

would be indicated, presumably by bomb damage assessment. They 

would develop plans for the third and successive days as the air campaign 

unfolded. While planners may have had in mind what targets would be 

hit in the remaining three days of Phase I, they did not commit this to 

paper until after the first day’s plan had been executed. 

%(S) Target Attacks by DaylAircraft, 15 1~~/2000, Dough Hill data base, etc. 

188 
Table 21 

AT0 Targets Planned for Attack by Day 

8 January 1991 

Total 1st 2d 3d Re- Not 

24 hrs 24 hrs 24 brs strikes Hit 

itrstegie Air 54 22 14 2 13 27 

Meme 

3emkal 1912 6 6 5 2 

1-31 

1-3. 

15 January 1991 

Total 1st 2d 3d Re- Not 

24brs24hrs24hrsstrikes Hit 

58 26 21 7 15 9 

7-3. 

2310 8 10 8 3 

1-3. 

Note: 

(a) Notation indicptea a number of targets to be mtruck pod the times it will will be redrucl; ie, 1- 

3x indicates one target will be restruck 3 times; 16.34~ indkatea 16 targets will be restrucL 3 or 4 

timea. 

~ 

Sources: (S) Attack Databpsc compiled by MJ. Hill, GWAPS; (S) Doc, 15 January 1991 

liarget Attack by Day and Aircrpn, in GWAPS MAP Ble. 

189 
Figure 19 

AT0 Targets by Category 

Oil 

c3 

Military Support 

Republican Guard 

Naval & Ports 

Railroads & Bridges 

Electricity 

Leadership 

Scuds 

-. . . I I cnemical 

.. . . 

I 

3d 24 hrs 

0 2d 24 hrs 

1st 24 hrs 

Airtielas T 

Strategic Air Defense 

0% 4% 8% 1 2% 16% 20% 

As General Homer was keenly aware, no plan could be expected to 

survive in detail after the first moment of execution. Consequently, 

CENTAF air campaign planners devoted an extraordinary amount of work 

to the first 48 hours of a campaign projected to last thirty two days. 

Whatever happened in the first two days, planners would be under great 

pressure to prepare air tasking orders for the following days in no more 

time than it took to execute them. 

190 
7 

Intelligence For Air Campaign Planxiing 

As in past conflicts, intelligence enabled the planning for Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm-it did not formulate it. In the case of defensive 

planning for USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90, intelligence analysts were 

caught in the post-Cold War transition from Soviet-European emphasis 

to smaller, but more numerous regional threats. As a result of the region's relatively low priority before Desert Storm, their information on 

Iraq was less than comprehensive and woefully out of date. Even when 

those analysts who were watching the Arabian Peninsula detected early 

signs that Baghdad might be preparing for military operations, they were 

unable at first to capture the attention of senior policy makers who, up 

until the summer of 1990, had been advised that Iraq had been exhausted 

by its war with Iran and would limit its bellicosity to the diplomatic 

arena.' 

In February 1990, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf tasked the 

commander of his air component, Lt. Gen. Charles Homer of Ninth Air 

Force (CENTAF) to develop a concept of air campaigns for OPLAN 1002- 

90, the new contingency plan for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula 

(particularly Saudi Arabia) against an attack from Iraq. As part of this 

effort, CENTAF intelligence planners began to select potential targets in 

Iraq and Kuwait to support Homer's objectives to gain air superiority, 

protect friendly nations, their oil fields and transshipment facilities, and 

delay and attrit Iraqi forces. In addition to these general objectives, 

Homer added the requirement to counter the potential Iraqi chemical 

threat with a series of retaliatory strikes against high value facilities in 

Iraq: 

'[DELETED] (SMF) Doc, Security Environment 2000: A CEhTCOM Kew. US. 

'(S/NF) Intvw. Perry Jamison, Rich Davis, and Barry Barlow with Lt Gen Homer, 

Central Command, 21 May 90, p 111-3; [DELETED] GWAPS Glock files. 

4 MU 92. p 12. CWAPS N~-303. 

191 
The intelligence officers first developed seven traditional target sets 

to meet Homer’s objectives. (Table 22) Unlike their later plans, this first 

look at Iraq limited potential leadership targets to those facilities directly 

involved in military command and control. Likewise, they planned 

strikes against the Iraqi infrastructure with the intent to deny direct 

support to the military and therefore limit Baghdad’s offensive capability. 

They selected “high value” targets solely to dissuade Baghdad’s use of 

chemical or biological weapons against U.S. and friendly forces. 

From this baseline, intelligence planners developed specific target lists 

for each of their major categories using the Joint Target List from 

CINCCENT OPLAN 1002-88. the Automated Installation File (Alp)? and other 

documents in their reference. Within each category, they selected only 

those targets or facilities they believed directly supported the stated 

objectives of OPLAN 1002-90.(See Table 7-2) Air bases across Iraq housing 

fighters and fighter-bombers were selected to meet the offensive counterair 

objective. To delay and reduce attacking forces, they selected interdiction 

targets such as bridges and supply depots! Close air support would be 

directed as required to blunt the expected Iraqi attack. Finally, in response 

to Iraq’s chemical threat, the targeteers chose sites including chemical 

weapons production and storage and “high value” targets that targeters 

believed the Hussein regime would not want to place in jeopardy? 

?’he Defense Intelligence Agency maintains a computerized database known as the 

Automated Installation File. The AIF served as a baseline for all target databases and is 

the single most authoritative source for U.S. targeting. With its Basic Encyclopedia (BE) 

numbering system, it stores, manipulates. and allows retrieval of a wide variety of target 

information. The AIF does not prioritize targets, but rather serves as a menu from which 

planners can select, or exclude, targets to achieve the objectives of any contingency or 

operation plan. 

4(S) Brfg, “OPLAN 1002 Air Operations,” by Lt Gen Homer to Gen Schwarzkopf at 

MacDill AFB, Apr 90, in preparation for Exercise Internal Look-90. GWAPS N~-256. 

’(S) Homer briefing. 

192 
Table 22 

CENTAF Target Sets by OPLAN 1002-90 Objectives 

Objective Target Sets Components 

Gain and maintain air Air Defense System Air defense command. control and 

superiority 

Rotect friendly na- tions, oil fields. and 

transshipment facilities 

Delay and attrition of 

ground forces 

Counter chemical 

Offensive Air System 

Offensive Missile System 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

System 

Ground Force System 

NBC System 

High value target System 

communication (~3) netwok 

ew/oci Radars 

Surface-teak missile sites 

Airfields 

Airfields 

Air Force C3 

Ballistic Missile sites 

Offensive Missile C3 

Missile Support Facilities 

Nuclear. Biological, and Chemical 

storage facilities 

NBC production facilities 

Ground Forces 

Ground Force C3 

Lines of Communications 

Logisticdsupport facilities 

NBC Storage 

NBC production 

Targeki of high value to enemy 

Source: Brfg (S), "OPLAN 1002 Air Operations." by Lt. Gen. Homer to Gen. Schwankopf at MacDill 

AFB, April 1990. GWAPS NA-256. 

Table 23 

CENTAF lslrget List - 15 June 1990 

GAT Category Known Targets GAT Category KnownTargets I 

Airfields 37 Leadershi (military) 3 

Nuclear 1 POL Storage 9 

C3 (military) 14 Naval 7 

Chemical 1 Military &ppofi 22 

Biological 1 POL Distribution 13 

Electrical 6 Air Defense 72 

Lines of Communication 25 scuds 7 

Total 'hrgets: 218 

Source: Target Study (S/NF/WN). 9 ns. "Iraqi Target Study." l'5 Jun 90. 

193 
As the lists took shape, CENTAF targeting officers began to build 

target folders. These target-specific portfolios contained an annotated 

1:25O,OOO map, existing imagery, available miscellaneous data on the 

target, and a weaponeering sheet. At this stage, the intelligence analysts 

discovered that many of the installation file records (the primary source 

of targeting information) were incomplete and lacked information on 

construction, function, or military significance. In many cases, no sup 

porting infomation was available. In addition, there was a significant 

lack of imagery on 128 of the 218 potential targets they had identified. 

To complicate this important issue further, imagery that did exist generally was outdated (some dated back to 1973) and therefore of limited use. 

In April, the CENTAF Intelligence staff (the 9th Tactical Intelligence 

Squadron) submitted its target recommendations to General Homer and 

informed him of existing intelligence shortfalls! CENTAF targeteers 

completed their Iraqi Target Study on 15 June 1990, and used it both 

during Exercise Internal Look 90 and as the foundation for initial defensive and retaliatory planning during Operation Desert Shield. 

At the same time CENTAF intelligence planners were assembling their 

target list for General Horner, the Central Command staff queried its 

component commands (Army, Navy, Marines and Special Operations) for 

additional target nominations for the Joint Target List that would 

accompany OPLAN 1002-90. The CENTCOM joint target list was completed on 27 June 1990 and is shown below in Table 24 alongside the 

CENTAF target list. It is interesting to note the different numbers of 

targets in several of the categories in each target list. For example, the 

CENTAF list detailed seventy-two air defense facilities while the CENTCOM 

list contained only four. Also, CENTAF showed twenty-two military 

production and twenty-five communication targets while CENTCOM specified eightysne and seventy-nine respectively. The reason for these 

discrepancies depended on each command’s particular focus. CENTAF 

planners naturally concentrated on air-related targets, while planners at 

CENTCOM had a joint outlook and thus incorporated facilities important 

to ground, naval, and marine forces and eliminated some air-related 

facilities that they felt were of a lesser value. 

6(S) lntvw, Capt John Glock with Maj John Heidrick. 9 TIS/lNT, 7 Jan 92. GWAPS NA267. 

194 
Figure 20 

CENTAF Iraqi Target Study - Kuwait 

Source: Doc (S/NF/WN), 9 "r, Iraqi Target Study, 15 Jun 90, GWAPS 

NA- 168. 

195 
a 

Figure 21a and 21b 

cmAF Iraqi Target Study Attack Plan - Iraq 

All Positions Approximate 

196 
C 

d 

Figure 21c and 21d 

CENTAF Iraqi Target Study Attack Plan - Iraq 

All Positions Approximate 

197 
PHOTO DELETED 

Rumayiah Ammunition Storage Area. 

198 
Table 24 

CENTAF and CENTCOM Target Lists 

Target Categories CENTAF CENTCOM 27 

15 Jun 90 Jun 90 

Leadership: Civilian 

Military 

Command, Control and Communication: 

Military 

AM/FM/Tv 

Air Defense 

Airfields 

Nuclear 

Biological 

Chemical 

Military Production and Support 

Electric 

POL: Storage 

Distribution 

Scuds 

Republican Guard 

Ground Forces 

Lines of Communications 

Naval Forces 

Total Targets 

0 

3 

14 

0 

72 

37 

1 

1 

1 

22 

6 

9 

13 

7 

0 

0 

25 

7 

218 

0 

4 

19 

2 

4 

58 

0 

1 

1 

81 

0 

16 

3 

0 

0 

8 

79 

17 

293 

Sources: Target Study (S/NF/WN), 9 ns, “Iraqi Target Study,” 15 Jun 90; Doc 

(S/”c/WN), USCENTCOM Joint Target List (m), IISCI“TOPL~N 1002-90, 

Annex B, Appx 4, Tab A, 27 Jun 90. 

199 
These two lists reflected target development accomplished through the 

deliberate planning system by 2 August 1990. Despite the fact that these 

lists were produced before Iraq invaded Kuwait and became the focus of 

increased U.S. intelligence gathering, they provided a sound foundation 

for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Yet, both target lists clearly lacked 

adequate information on nuclear, biological and chemical target sets 

while, by the nature of precrisis plan objectives and policies, ignored 

civilian leadership completely in favor of military headquarters. Mobile 

Scuds were ignored, and only seven fixed launchers were identified on 

the CENTAF target list. Despite these oversights, CENTAF planners 

identified forty-six percent of the targets eventually planned for the first 

day of the air campaign and listed on the 16 January 1991 Master Attack 

Plan. Likewise, the OM target list detailed forty-four percent of the 

firstday targets. Combined, the two list identified sixty-three percent of 

the targets on Desert Storm’s D-Day air tasking order.’ 

The target lists maintained by the intelligence staffs did not, nor were 

they intended to, contain all identified potential targets in Iraq. To the 

contrary, target lists detailed only those installations listed in the 

installation files that intelligence and operations planners thought necessary to achieve the objectives of a specific plan. Thus, separate contingency plans developed for different scenarios-for example, removal of 

citizens from an embassy under hostile conditions as opposed to large 

scale military operations-would by nature require quite divergent target 

lists. The following graphic (Table 25) supports this important notion 

and summarizes, according to target categories developed and used by 

Brig. Gen. Buster Glosson’s Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting 

division (the Black Hole) for air tasking order development throughout 

the war, all Iraqi installation file records that existed at the outbreak of 

the crisis, as well as the much smaller number that planners believed 

were required to achieve for the defensive objectives in OPLAN 1002-90.8 

7(SMF/WN) Target Study, 9 ns, “Iraqi Target Study,” 15 Jun 90, (S/NF/NC/WN) 

*(WNFMWN) GAT (Black Hole) categories and AIF (Automated Installation Files) 

Doc. USCENTCOM Joint Target tist (Jn). 

records are used throughout this chapter to analyze and compare target growth. 

200 
Table 25 

Known Iraqi Targets by GAT Category - 2 August 1990 

GAT Category TGTS GAT Category TGTS 

Airfields 122 Leadershiphlilitary 126 

NBC 40 Support 

c3 

Electrical 

20 1 Oil 21 1 

230 Naval 46 

Railroads and Bridges 532 

SAMS 214 

Scuds 24 

Strategic Air Defense 493 

Known Target Related Records: 2,239 

Total AIF Records: 39302 

Source: Target database (SAW), compiled by Capt John Glock, GWAPS. Infomation extracted from DIA AIF reports for the dates shown. 

Table 25 demonstrates the selective nature of target list development 

as well as the broad coverage of diverse installations provided by the 

Automated Installation File. Taking the second area first, one notices a 

difference of 1,063 entries between the number of the file entries on 2 

August 1990 and the total number of potential targets. This resulted from 

the encompassing nature of the file that contained records for all types of 

installation [DELETED]. A comparison of this table with Table 24 also 

highlights a significant difference between the number of potential targets 

on the CENTAF and CENTCOM target lists (218 and 293) and those 

identified in the AIF. 

This raises the question of what the U.S. intelligence community 

knew of Iraq’s and Saddam Hussein’s intent and physical capabilities. 

[DELETED]? However, Iraq had emerged from the Iran-Iraq War with 

’[DELETED] 

20 1 
the most formidable military in the Gulf: 

[DELETED]." 

In May 1990, CENTCOM'S intelligence staff estimate of Baghdad's 

military ambitions was that "Iraq is not expected to use military force to 

attack Kuwait or Saudi Arabia to seize disputed territory or resolve a 

dispute over oil policy."" Gen. Schwarzkopf's analysts also chose to 

reinforce the [DELETED] warning about Iraqi military strength: 

Iraq's army significantly outnumbers all others on the Arabian Peninsula. Additionally, it possesses bombers and fighters with sufficient range 

to strike oil fields and other strategic targets. . . .It currently has the 

capability to conduct a limited ground offensive as well.I2 

Amidst heightened tensions between Iraq and Kuwait in the summer 

of 1990 and the resulting increased level of U.S. intelligence gathering 

and analysis, on 25 July 1990, an intelligence analyst, attempted to warn 

senior administration and military decision makers about potential Iraqi 

aggression.I3 [DELETED].I4 [DELETED]. 

Yet, the U.S. intelligence community saw the Iraqi Army as the 

largest, most experienced, and best-equipped regional force. Moreover, 

Baghdad possessed and had demonstrated the unique capability in the 

region to conduct multicorps offensive operation^.'^ By January 1991, 

both DIA and CIA had fair estimates of the number of Iraqi troops and 

equipment deployed in the Km. (Table 26 and Figure 22) The Washington-based intelligence analysts did have, however, an excellent picture 

of how the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard divisions were deployed 

into three stages: (1) front lines to meet, slow, and reduce an initial allied 

"[DELETED] 

I '(SMF) Doc, Security Environment 2000: A CEWCOM View, U.S. Central Command, 

'*Emphasis added. (S/NF) Securiw Environment 2000: A CEhTCOM View, p 111-2. 

13[DELETED] 

14(S/NF) Intvw, Capt John R. Glock, GWAPS, with [DELETED], 10 Jul 92. 

"(SlNF) Doc, DIA. Iraqi Ground and Air Forces Doctrine, Tactics and Operations 

(CAW), DDB-2600-6123-90, Defense Research Reference Series, Feb 90, GWA~ Glock 

file, pp 134-135. 

21 May 90, p 111-3. 

202 
attack; (2) tactical and operational reserves of armor and mechanized 

divisions throughout central Kuwait and southern Iraq to reinforce and 

block coalition penetrations; and (3) Republican Guard divisions north 

and west of Kuwait as strategic reserve to counterattack the main coalition attack.l6 

Table 26 

Estimates of Iraqi Ground Forces - 16 January 1991 

Major Item 

~~ 

Total In KTO 

Personnel 1 Million 336,000'' 

Tanks: including T-72 5,OOo+ 3,475 

Armored Personnel Carriers 1o.m 3,080 

Artillery 3.000+ 2,475 

Source: Report (S/NF/"), DIA, Military Intelligence Summary, Vol III, Part 

11, Middle East and North Africa (Persian Gulf), Jul 90; [DELETED] 

On the eve of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army consisted of eleven corps 

or corps-level headquarters with seventy-one divisions, including twelve 

Republican Guard divisions, six armored divisions, three mechanized 

infantry divisions, and fifty-one infantry divisions. Fifty-one of these 

divisions were deployed in the KTO, with another-four Republican Guard 

brigades in Baghdad, eighteen infantry divisions along the Turkish border, 

two infantry divisions along the Syrian border, and three divisions on the 

Iranian border.'* 

16(S/NF/NC) Memo, Director CIA. subj: Iraq as a Military Adversary.sm Memoran- 

"Personnel figure contains adjustments to 540.000 total for actual unit manning 

dum to Holders of SNIE 36.2-5-90 (CMF), 2 Jan 91. 

(-120.000) and troops on leave (-84.OOO) for 43 divisions and independent brigades in 

KTO on 17 January 1991, [DELEZED] US House of Rep. Comm. on Armed Services, 

Defense for a New Era, Lessons of the Persian Gulf War (Wash, DC. 1992) 

'*(S/NF) Brfg. at GWAPS; DOD, COnducl ofthe war, p 1 11. 

203 
Table 27 

Iraqi Pre-War Ground Order of Battle 

Republican Guards (12 Divisions) 

Hpmmurabi Armored Division 

'hwakalna Med~anid Division 

AI-FOW InIpntr). Divbioo 

Adorn Infantry DivisJon 

Al-Mustafa Infantry Division 

Medins Armored Divislolr 

Baghdad Mechadzd Division 

NebuchPdnuzPr Infan&y Division 

Special Forced Division 

Al-Qudr Infantry Division 

Al-Nida' Infantry Division &'AM hlfMtry DiviSbO 

Armored and Mechanized Infantry Divisions (6 ADB Mech) 

MAD 12th AD 1.1 Mccb 

61hm 17th AD 5th Mech 

loth AD 52d AD 5ld Mecb 

Infantry Divisions (51) 

zdm 18thID 25thID 32d ID 39th ID 47th ID 

7th ID WID 27thID MID 41st ID 49th ID 

8th ID 21.1 ID 28th ID 35th ID 42d ID 50th ID 

llthID 22dID 29th ID -ID MID 53d ID 

14thID 23d ID 3othID 37thID 45thID 54thID 

l5thID 24thID 3ldID 38th ID 46thID 56th ID 

16th ID 

4th ID 19thID 26thID 33d ID mID 48th rn 

Bddface entries indicate units located in the KTO during the war ~~ 

Notes: 

(a) The Hammurabi, Medina, and Tawakalna Divisions spearheaded the 

invasion of Kuwait while the remaining Republican Guard divisions 

served as follow-on and reserve forces. The Al-Nida', AL'Abed, AlMustafa, and Al-Quds Divisions were formed after the invasion of Kuwait and performed internal security roles during the war. 

(b) Eight infantry divisions remain unidentified. 

Sources: Multiple. 

204 
Figure 22 

Iraqi Ground Force Deployment in the KTO - 16 January 1991 

Legend of Iraqi Republican Guard Division: 

T = Tawakalna H = Hammurabi B = Baghdad AF = A1 Faw 

M = Madinah N = Nebuchadnezzar A = Adnan SF = Special Forces 

Sources: Multiple sources including Rpt (S/NF/WN) Conduct of the Persian 

Gurf Conjlict: An Interim Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V Persian Gulf 

Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public 

Law 102-25). Ju~ 91. 

Regarding air forces, the national intelligence community saw the 

Iraqi Air Force as capable of threatening its neighbors but hindered by 

highly centralized planning, a lack of fully trained pilots, and a defensive 

205 
doctrine.” In a paper prepared for General Powell during the early weeks 

of the crisis, DIA emphasized that despite its large size and capable 

aircraft (Table 28) the Iraqi Air Force was unable to defend its airspace 

during the Iran-Iraq War and had preferred to protect its aircraft and 

pilots than risk them to accomplish difficult missions.20 [DELETED] Iraq 

would be unable to defend its airspace from a coalition attack and would 

either be neutralized quickly in the air or would choose to withhold its 

aircraft from action in hardened shelters. After only a few days of combat [DELETED] the only real threat to coalition pilots would come at low 

level [DELETED] from antiaircraft artillery and portable surface-to-air 

missiles?’ 

As mentioned previously, American intelligence recognized the highly 

centralized nature of the Iraqi military and political systems. And this 

leadership resided in the person of Saddam Hussein. The CIA, DIA, and 

State Department devoted a great deal of effort examining him and 

concluded that he would remain in power for the foreseeable future 

despite the presence of numerous, ineffective, and demoralized opposition 

groups?2 Intelligence analysts saw that Saddam Hussein based his power 

structure on three interrelated pillars-the Ba’ath Party, intelligence and 

security services, and the military. Saddam and the Ba’ath Party maintained their power through a pervasive, effective and harsh intelligence 

and security apparatus that periodically infiltrated and decimated internal 

opposition gr0ups.2~ Thus, both CENTCOM and CENTAF staffs targeted 

leadership before the crisis erupted, but only the military portion of this 

19(S) Doc. “Air ops summary of air war written by Lt Gen Homer after 8 M days 

of combat 261 I~z91,” in TACC CclDo Current ops Log, GWAPS NA-215; and (s) D19H-Gen Homer Air War Summary Meeting with Deptula, 26 Jan 91 (“As provided by 

UC Deptula & BG Glosson during 1 H hour discussion with Gen Homer”); [DELETED] 

(SINF) Doc. DIA, Iraqi Ground and Air Forces Doctrine, Tactics and Operalions (c/NF), 

DDB-2600-6123-90. DIA. Feb 90. p 110. 

’%aper, “Iraqi Air Defense Capabilities.” DINDB-8C3. for c?J~, nd. (cover letter 

dated 24 Aug 90. stated the paper was prepared during the past two weeks.) 

”[DELETED] 

22(SINF/W”INc/pR) Docs, MIS, Volume III, Part Il, Middle East and North Africa 

(Persian GulfXCINF). DLA, Jul 90, Iraqi section p 1; [DELETED] State Department, 

Memorandum for Brent !kowcroft. Subject: ‘‘Options Paper on Iraq.” May 16. 1990 p 2. 

23(SlNFIWN/NCIPR) Ibid. 

206 
foundation that supported the Baghdad regime.u The inclusion of additional political targets into air campaigning occurred only after the United 

States was committed to Operation Desert Shield. 

able 28 

Iraqi Air Force as of 2 August 1990 

Major Items Estimated Number 

Personnel 

All-Weather Fighter 

VFR Fighter 

Fighter Bomber 

Ground Attack 

Bomber 

18,000 

326 

140 

292 

46 

15 

Source: Doc, (S/NF) DM, Iraqi Gmund and Air Foxes Doctrine, Tactics and 

Operations, DDB-2600-6123-90. Feb 90; Report (s/NF/"), DIA, MIS, vol 

III, Part II, Middle East and North Africa (Persian Gulf), Jul90. 

U.S. intelligence analysts also had a long-standing interest in Iraq's 

preoccupation with developing weapons of mass destruction. 

[DELETED] ?5 

[DELETED] ?6 [DELETED] ?7 

2?he CEWCOM Joint Target List did not include government control centers or 

ministries. The CEWAF (9 ns) Iraqi Target Study did not have a leadership category. 

Both lists included military headquarters as Command and Control targets. 

25[DELETED] 

26(S/NF) Intvw, Capt John R. Glock, GWAPS, with [DELETED] CIA. 10 Jul92. 

27CENTAF may not have known of A1 Qaim because it did not [DELETED] carry 

a nuclear related category code in the AIF. 

207 
208 
A second aspect of Baghdad's weapons program that attracted U.S. 

attention was chemical. Before the war, the intelligence community 

agreed that Iraq had embarked on a long-term chemical weapons program 

with the goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of precursor 

chemicals, chemical agents, and chemical munitions.28 While not yet 

self-sufficient, Iraq already had produced and weaponized large quantities 

of blister and nerve agents and adapted them for delivery by standard and 

cluster bombs, air-to-surface rockets, artillery and mortar, and possibly for 

surface-to-surface missiles, including S~uds.2~ 

As important as knowledge of Iraq's chemical capabilities was to 

U.S. theater campaign planners on 2 August 1990, information on Baghdad's intentions was even more sought after. Everyone knew they had 

chemical weapons and that they had used them in the past, but would 

Saddam Hussein order their use against U.S. forces if we became embroiled in the region? [DELETED].M American military planners 

assumed this throughout their planning. 

The final leg of the Iraqi weapons triad was biological warfare. 

Based on prewar information and analysis, Iraq possessed the most 

advanced and aggressive biological warfare program in the third world. 

This arsenal contained anthrax and botulin toxin; and their scientists 

continued research into several other agents, while their military intended 

to use them if Iraqi territory was threatened.3' Iraq was also thought to 

be able to produce the munitions to deliver the toxins, although there was 

no hard evidence at the time to prove it?2 This, however, did not lessen 

the potential threat, since many existing Iraqi chemical weapons could be 

used to deliver biological toxins." 

28[DELET'ED] Also (SMFIWN) Offensive Chemical Wagare Programs in the Middle 

East (c), DIA, 15 Mar 90, p 6. 

29(S/NFIWN) [DELETED] NTIC-DA~I. 

30(S/NF) Iraqi GroundandAir Forces Doctrine, Tactics and Operations (C/NF), DIA, 

Feb 90, pp 74-75. 

"(S/NF/WN) Paper, [DELETED], unknown author, n.d. The paper was included in 

a package of DIA reports produced for the Secretary of Defense, UCS, et a1 Cover letter 

dated 24 Aug 90. 

"(SMFNN) Paper, [DELETED], NTIC-DA31.7 Aug 90. 

33(S/NF/WN) Paper, [DELETED]. 

209 
Warned of this serious potential threat, U.S. theater air campaign 

planners naturally sought information on all known biological production 

and storage facilities. [DELETED] As a result, the sole biological 

warfare facility known by theater planners was Salman Pak with its four 

suspected storage bunkers.” 

Disagreements among military and civilian intelligence analysts on 

Iraqi equipment and capabilities went beyond Baghdad’s weapons of mass 

destruction to include different views on its short-range ballistic missile 

program. Key within this area was knowledge about Iraqi Scud missiles 

where, once again, information available before the crisis was sketchy and 

limited. DIA believed that Baghdad had purchased approximately 600 

missiles from the Soviet Union between 1976 and 1979 along with 

twenty-two mobile Scud-B Mu-DELETED] transporteremtor-launchers 

capable of launching Iraq’s standard and modified Scuds. 

Figure 23 

Intelligence Estimates of Iraqi Scud Missiles 

Estimated r ..................... 

..................... .................... - - - Purchormd 

1976-1 979 

1990 

In addition, DIA estimated that Baghdad built as many as 12-15 more 

launchers domestically, bringing the potential number to 34-37. 

[DELETED]. Discounting the missiles expended during the eight-year Iraqu[DELETED] 

210 
Iran War, U.S. intelligence estimated that Iraq had approximately 400 

missiles and between 22 and 37 mobile launchers when they invaded 

With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the launching of Operation 

Desert Shield came an associated surge of intelligence-gathering and 

analysis to support yet undetermined U.S. military and political response 

options. CENTCOM and DIA, [DELETED]” activated Crisis Situation 

Rooms and Crisis Action Teams, as did Ninth Air ForCdcENTAF, MAC, 

SAC, and TAC following the Warning Order issued by the Chairman, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, at 07592 2 Aug~st.~’ From that moment until the 

initiation of the air campaign in January 1991, Iraq supplanted all other 

areas as the primary focus for the intelligence community. 

Iraq’s increased priority caused significant growth in its Automated 

Installation File entries. Intelligence collection resoureces were redirected 

to scour Iraq and Kuwait for targets that presented direct or potential 

threats to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and coalition forces as they deployed to 

the Arabian Peninsula. As new threats or political or economic facilities 

were identified, intelligence analysts added them to the file. Existing 

installation file entries also received new attention, with emphasis placed 

on updating and expanding available information in the national database. 

As a result (see Table 29), the overall Iraqi Automated Installation File 

grew some thirty-eight percent (potential targets grew by forty-three 

percent) between August 1990 and January 1991. This marked the 

greatest period of quantitative growth in intelligence information on Iraq 

and far exceeded that which occurred during or after the war. 

35(SINFM”) Brfg, [DELETED] DM (Technical Intelligence) to GwA~, 30 Sep 92; 

(SMFMWNIPR) Doc, MIS, Vol Ill. Part II, Middle East and North Africa (Persian 

Gum, [DELETED] Jul 90, p IS; (SINF) Brfg, USCEM%OM Preliminary Planning 2-6 

August 90, USAF HRA Desert Shield Files, n.d. 

36[ DELETED] 

37[DELETED] 

21 1 
Table 29 

Known Iraqi Targets by Category - 16 January 1991 

GAT Category Records Number Increase Percent Increase 

Airfields 128 6 5 

NBC- Associated 60 20 33 

c3 

Electrical 

Military Leadership & 

Oil 

Naval 

Railroads and Bridges 

Strategic Air Defense 

SAM- Associated 

Scud- Associated 

SUPPOfi 

Target-related records: 

Total records: 

604 403 200 

242 12 5 

213 87 69 

218 7 3 

53 7 15 

596 64 12 

614 181 37 

285 71 33 

121 97 404 

3,194 (+955 entries or 43% growth) 4,543 (+1,241 entries or 38% growth) 

Source: Target database (SMF). 

21 2 
The target growth reflected in the above table occurred more as a 

result of an expanding collection rather than assigning relative importance 

by senior political and military policy makers to individual target 

categories. [DELETED].% 

Others facilities, such as airfields, electrical, oil, and naval bases, 

while important, generally were well known and documented before the 

crisis-although not always fully annotated or supported with timely 

imagery. Even the most important categories-nuclear-biological-chemical, commandcontrol and communications, air defense, and 

Scuds-experienced uneven growth due to a combination of excellent Iraqi 

security measures to prevent disclosure (nuclear-biologicalchemical grew 

by twenty targets). The sudden increase of targets could also be attributed to post-invasion dispersion of fielded Iraqi forces (command-controlcommunications and air defense grew by 584 sites), and even to changes 

in accounting methods. 

Significant additions to the categories of weapons of mass destruction 

during Desert Shield included the A1 Qaim nuclear facility (added to both 

the Joint Target List and the Master Target List by 15 August 1990) and 

the biological warfare-related Salman Pak installation and its associated 

bunkers. [DELETED]?9 [DELETED]. 

Meanwhile, planners at Checkmate passed DIA information about 

three additional biological production facilities and seventeen storage 

bunkers to theater planners.'o This increase in potential targets caused the 

biological storage category to achieve the greatest percentage of growth 

during Desert Shield, moving from only two known facilities on 2 August 

to nineteen identified sites by the time the air campaign began. 

38(S) Brfg, "USCENTCOM Preliminary Planning 2-6 Aug 90." USAF HRA Desert Shield 

Files, n.d.; CWAF list is the "Rioritized Political Target List." n.d.; (S) MSG. From 

CCJ2-P, subj: USCENTCOM Joint Target List for Operation Desert Shield, dtg 1620052 

Aug 90. 

39(S/NF/RD) Rpt, Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee. Nuclear Proliferation 

Working Group, JAElC 9o-o@)x Nov 90. GWAPS. CHSH 114-4. see also (MF) OPLAN 

Desert Stom, 16 Dec 90, pp B-44 - B-45. 

"OtDELmD] 

213 
Of all the Black Hole target categories, Scuds had the second most 

dramatic growth during Desert Shield, rising from twenty-four installation 

file entries on 2 August to some 121 records by 16 January 1991. The 

increase in targets did not equate to increased knowledge but rather 

reflected a change in DIA’S accounting methodology. Beginning in 

December, DIA issued individual basic encyclopedia target numbers to 

each launch site and associated facility rather than using a single entry for 

an entire facility. Thus, a facility with several fixed launch sites that, 

prior to the end of 1990 had a single target number, suddenly grew to 

multiple entries without an associated substantive growth in knowledge 

about the facility. Some new sites were also located and added to the 

file, but their numbers were insignificant, when compared to military and 

political problems caused by Baghdad’s surface-to-surface missiles during 

Desert Storm. 

This was what CENTCOM and CENTAF air campaign planners knew 

about Iraq on the eve of war in January 1991. The air campaign plan for 

Desert Storm, so carefully massaged for five months, likewise was based 

on this body of knowledge. Senior military and political leaders also 

used it as the blueprint with which to judge the effectiveness and success 

of the air campaign. Unknown targets, or those with outdated or incorrect information, would cause oversights or misdirected effort that could 

have been used more profitably against other threats. As will be highlighted in the following section that compares pre- and postwar knowledge, outdated or inaccurate information further complicated air planning 

as was made abundantly evident in the two areas of nuclear production 

and mobile Scuds. 

Intelligence enabled the plan-it did not formulate the plan. As such, 

it functioned in a manner consistent with its traditional role of supporting 

combat operations, although in this case, it was late to join the planning 

process. There is no evidence to suggest that Air Staff Checkmate 

operational planners who developed the Instant Thunder plan used 

intelligence information to sculpt their concept of operations. Rather, 

they used intelligence to locate and define targets within the series of 

large, objective-oriented target categories upon which their plan, and 

eventually the Desert Storm air campaign, was built. 

When aerial campaign planning shifted from the Air Staff to CENTAF 

in Riyadh, its basic tenet of striking a broad range of targets whose 

destruction would influence Baghdad to cede to U.S. political objectives 

214 
was already wellestablished, and planners went with it. Intelligence still 

played an important role supplying operational planners with details of 

specific targets and constantly adding new ones, but it did not cause 

significant modification to the concept or execution of air campaign plans. 

By the time the air campaign commenced in January 1991, the 

intelligence community had identified the majority of potential enemy 

facilities. Of the sixteen Black Hole target categories that have been 

examined in this study, four (nuclear, biological production, leadership, 

and strategic air defense) experienced more than forty-five percent growth 

during and after the war. In fact, there was almost no growth in the target 

base during Desert Storm. CmM operations and intelligence planners 

froze the database just prior to initiating Desert Storm, both to avoid 

confusion during the anticipated period of accelerated combat activity and 

to provide intelligence analysts the opportunity to purge the existing 

database of duplicate or inaccurate entries made during Desert Shield:l 

One of the few additions to the target database during the war was the Al 

Atheer nuclear facility. Air planners became aware of this site during 

Desert Storm and added it to the Master Target List after the air campaign 

was underway." Therefore, most of the growth detailed in Table 30 

actually occurred after the ground war from information obtained both 

during the campaign and from postwar surveys and inspections. 

4'lntvw, Mr Lawrence M. Greenberg, GWAPS with Maj Lewis Hill, USAF, GWAPS 

based on his first-hand experience during Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the GWAPS 

Target Strike Database. 

42(s/NF/WN/NC) MTL (originally TWLIMDIS), dated 1/16/91, BH. Master Target 

Folder, Box 2, Folder 23. 

215 
Table 30 

Growth of Known Iraqi Targets by GAT (CENTAF) Category 

Before and After Operation Desert Storm 

GAT Categories Known Known 

16 JM 91 July 92 

Airfields 128 122 

NBC-Associated 60 86 

c3 604 692 

Electrical 242 266 

Military Jxadenh ‘P 213 270 

suppolt 

Oil 218 224 

Naval 53 53 

Railroads and Bridges 5% 620 

Strategic Air Defense 614 988 

SAM-ASSOCW 285 328 

Scud - As soc i ated 121 154 

TotaIidentiliedtarge4s 3,194 3,813 

Total Records 4.543 5.153 

Notes: 

# Change % Change 

16 Jan 91 - Jd92 16 Jan 91 - Jul92 

4‘ -5 

26 43 

88 15 

24 10 

59 62 

6 3 

0 0 

24 4 

314 41 

43 15 

33 36 

619 19 

61ob 13 

216 
Table 31 

Growth of GAT firget Sets 

Before and After Operation Desert Storm 

GAT Categories 16 Jan 17Feb 26Feb # % 

1991 1991 1991 Change Change 

Airfields 31 38 46 15 48 

Chemical (NBC) 23 23 34 11 48 

c3 56 84 146 90 161 

Electrical 17 22 29 12 71 

Leadership 33 37 44 11 33 

Military Support 73 77 102 29 40 

Oil 12 12 28 16 133 

Naval 17 20 20 3 18 

Railroads and Bridges 33 46 95 62 188 

Republican Guards 37 38 39 2 5 

Strategic Air Defense 56 73 85 29 52 

SAMS 45 45 45 0 0 

Scuds 48 52 59 11 23 

Total GAT targets 481 567 772 291 60 

Sources: Doc (S), Master Target Lists for indicated days located in Master 

Attack Plan “Day Folders” at GWAPS. 

[DELETED]!3 In fact, most of the additional nuclear facilities came 

to light only after the war and as a result of defectors, United Nations 

inspections, and continued efforts by the U.S. intelligence community. 

The thirty-six-percent increase in Scud-related targets resulted 

primarily from counting individual launch and support sites rather than 

43(S/NF9 [DELETED] interview. 

217 
PHOTO DELETED 
Table 32 

Overall Growth of Known Iraqi Targets by GAT Category 

GAT Categories Known Known Known tChangeAug90 %Change 

2 Aug 90 16 Jan 91 July 92 Aug 90 - Jul92 2 Aug 90 - JuI 92 

Airfields 122 128 122 0 0 

NBC- Associated 40 60 80 46 107 

c3 201 604 692 491 244 

Electrical 230 242 266 36 16 

Military Leadership & 126 213 270 144 106 

Support 

Oil 211 218 224 13 6 

Naval 46 53 53 7 15 

Railroads and Bridges 532 5% 620 88 17 

Strategic Air Defense 493 674 988 495 100 

SAM- Associated 214 285 328 114' 53 

Scud- Associated 24 121 154 13od 583 

Total identified targets 2,239 3,lW 3,813 1,574 70 

Total Records 3,302 4.543 5.153 1.851 56 

Notes: 

(a) Increase resulted from defector re- and postwar UN inspections. 

(b) Growth resulted from counting dispersal sites to which munitions were moved after original 

facilities were struck. 

(c) 86% of this growth resulted from counting tactical SAM sites. 

(d) 64% of growth resulted from assigning each surveyed launch site and fixed launcher an individual record. Others came from sites nominated as targets by Israeli intelligence during the war. 

Sources: Target database compiled [DELFiTED]. Infodon extracted from DIA AIF reports for 

the dates shown.; also Brfg (S/NF/WN).[DELETED] DIA, presented to GWAPS 30 Sep 92. 

219 
grouping several into a single Scud launch complex as had been 

calculated prior to the war. [DELETED].44 [DELETED]?5 

The confusion regarding Baghdad’s Scud program persists to this day. 

[DELETED]& 

Another way to examine how intelligence influenced the planning and 

execution of Desert Storm’s air campaign is to look at target growth in 

each of the Black Hole-defined categories. Figure 24 graphically 

illustrates the evolution of these target categories. The chart highlights 

the growth of individual Installation File entries correlated to specific 

categories for three snapshot periods-what was known before the invasion 

of Kuwait on 2 August, on the eve of the air campaign on 16 January, 

and a baseline of what was known in the summer of 1992. This last 

snapshot includes those targets discovered while the war was in progress 

as well as others found by U.S. and United Nation forces and inspectors 

after the conflict. 

JqArticle. Reuven Pedatzur, ‘The Gulf War, A First Critical View,” Muurahot 321. 

May-June 1991, pp 6-1, cited in unpublished paper by Dr Aron Pinker, “Israel and the 

Gulf War.” n.d., Greenberg files. Mr Pedatzur is a lecturer in political science at the TelAviv University and a militiuy reporter for Haaretz. 

‘’(WNFIWN) Brfg, [DELETED] DIA Target Intelligence, to CWAPS. 30 Sept 92. 

‘6[DELEiTED] 

220 
Figure 24 

Growth of Iraqi AIF Targets by Category 

July 1990 - July 1992 

Airfields 

Nuclear 

Biological Production 

Biological Storage 

Chemical Production 

Chemical Storage 

c3 

Electrical 

Leadership 

Military Support Ill// Naval 

Railroad & Bridges 

Strategic Air Defense 

SAMs 

Scud 

I I I I I I 

I' I I I I I I 

811 Jul-92 

0 Jan-91 

Jul-90 

L I 

Source: Targets Database (S/NF), compiled by Capt John Cilock, GWAPS. 

The initial decision to assigned responsibility for producing an air 

campaign in a highly compartmented special planning cell within the Air 

Staff rather than relying on established theater organizations in effect 

segregated the theater intelligence apparatus from the planners. This 

should not imply that there was no intelligence input to the Instant Thunder plan, only that it was done beyond the realm in which CENTAF intelligence operated. In fact, the CENTAF intelligence staff was not given 

access to the air campaign until 18 August, a week after it received JCS 

blessing and had become the defucfo CENTCOM air campaign ~lan.4~ By

entering at such a late date, the established intelligence community had 

47(s) Intvw. capi John R. Glock. HQ ACULNAT, with Maj John Heidrick. 9 "T, 

7 Jan 92, GWAPS Task Force V files and GWAPS NA-267. 

22 1 
little opportunity to influence plan development and had no choice but to 

assume a supporting role. The concept was set, intentions were preformed, and all intelligence was asked to do was supply the targets. 

The largest single external force affecting the role of intelligence in 

war planning was the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the 

apparent end of the Cold War. Caught in this transition, the community 

had not yet reallocated its considerable intelligence-gathering apparatus 

or its human analytical resources from Western Europe and nuclear 

conflagration to the broader, and often more difficult arena of conventional regional conflict. Space and air breathing platforms positioned and 

well suited for monitoring Soviet missile fields and troop movements 

were both mis-positioned and mal-equipped for watching the Arabian 

Peninsula. A satellite designed to observe individual silos or detect 

activity in the limited area of a missile field, for example, was illequipped to scan the Iraqi desert searching for mobile Scud launchers. 

In addition, and of equal importance, was the division of labor throughout 

the intelligence analysis community where the Soviet threat had received 

unchallenged resource priority for nearly five decades. There, the relaxation of tensions with the East Block had not yet resulted in a redistribution of assets to bring other areas of interest out of their relative and 

routine obscurity. This fledgling redirection of effort directly resulted in 

the inadequate and outdated condition of the Iraqi Automated Installation 

File on 2 August 1990. 

222 
Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign: 

Retrospective 

What then was the Gulf War air campaign plan on the eve of its 

execution in mid-January 19913 On paper, it consisted of three master 

attacks plans that outlined the details of the upcoming air war-ininute-byminute, hour-by-hour, aircraft-by-aircraft, target-by-target-of the first 

seventy-two hours. It was also a vision of air power in the minds of its 

planners who had spend the five months since the invasion of Kuwait 

crafting one of the most complex air campaign plans in history. Yet, its 

roots came from pre-Gulf War crisis planning, modified to reflect the 

expectations of planners as they faced new military and political factors 

in the late summer of 1990. 

With respect to precrisis contingency plans for the Gulf region. 

several points deserve repeating. Planners had very different views on 

how to employ air power. Air forces in general and the U.S. Air Force 

in particular were assigned the traditional role to protect deploying 

ground troops and eventually providing direct support for a ground campaign that would reestablish preconflict territorial boundaries. At the time 

that regional contingencies plans were developed, the focus was on Europe, where the employment of air power was carefully confined to sup 

port ground forces due to political considerations and fears of escalation. 

Planners gave no serious consideration of operations that required a longterm independent, or even semi-autonomous, air campaign to precede the 

ground battle. Indeed, the entire series of plans assumed that the central 

element of a conflict in Southwest Asia would be ground warfare, with 

air forces providing them protection. 

Perhaps because of this, the plans devoted little time and space to the 

CENTAF mission. By contrast to sometimes specific guidance provided 

by CINCCENT to his other component commanders concerning the concept 

of operation and employment of ground forces, none of the OPLAN 1002 

series of plans provided any detailed guidance about the complexion of 

the air campaign. What little guidance appeared was general in nature 

223 
and limited to broad objectives such as deterrence, defense, and supporting ground forces. Perhaps CENTAF planners believed in the flexibility 

of air power and chose to rely on this inherent capability to “play it by 

ear” according to the circumstances at the time. In the few instances 

when planners abandoned their ambiguous stance on air power, such as 

the introduction of the Joint Forces Air Component Command concept in 

1002-88, they dwelt on administrative matters and command relationships 

without venturing into a discussion of combat operations. Even then, 

however, one is hard pressed to find clear, definitive guidelines for the 

Joint Forces Air Component Command. 

On the eve of the Gulf crisis, OPM 1002-90 contained overly 

optimistic and unrealistic assumptions with respect to requests for assistance, deployment authorizations before hostilities, and warning times. 

A key was the assumption that thirty days would be available for deployment of significant forces. Planning appears to have been built around 

this deployment “truth” regardless of actual warning times. Just as importantly, the need for thirty days to get U.S. forces into position seems 

to have driven the more important assumption on presidential deployment 

authorization; that it, that the President would authorize combat deployment before hostilities-in essence “launch on warning.” This is a prime 

example of “reverse planning” where less than precise assumptions are 

given unwarranted veracity in order to support a plan that depends on 

moving significant forces a great distance into generally unprepared 

positions. 

Exercise Internal Look surfaced a number of problems for planners 

with respect to the use of air power in a Gulf contingency. One of these 

was the lack of any planning for the defense of Kuwait. At the time, 

cENTCOM lacked the forward based troops or even access agreements 

with regional governments that would be necessary to defend the Emirate. 

Also noted were difficult strategic lift considerations and Kuwait’s small 

size and shared border with Iraq. Thus faced with these serious 

handicaps that made defense of Kuwait militarily untenable, CENTCOM 

planners decided to sidestep the entire issue and concentrate on defending 

Saudi Arabia. 

The exercise also alerted intelligence analysts to their lack of 

adequate information on targets in Kuwait and Iraq. They began a more 

aggressive effort here and developed the first Iraqi target list in June 

1990. The majority of the targets that they selected subsequently showed 

224 
up on the Instant Thunder target list and later served as the foundation of 

Desert Storm targeting. They also attempted to bring to the attention of 

operational planners the inadequacies in the bomb damage assessment 

process as it existed in mid-1990. Here they were less than successful 

both during the exercise and only days later when the invasion of Kuwait 

precluded any further steps. Perhaps the most significant aspect of Internal Look was the degree to which it focused planners on the problem 

ahead. 

In retrospect, precrisis planning had not yet matured to an acceptable 

level when the Iraqi invasion took place. But even in its incomplete 

form, the 1002 plan provided a deployment scheme that pushed air power 

to the front as the most readily available combat resource, even if it 

lacked any substantive employment scheme to cope with the invasion. 

Not surprisingly, given this planning vacuum, General Schwarzkopf 

turned initially to air power to provide both an immediate defensive 

capability and then his first offensive option. 

During the five-month period between the invasion of Kuwait and 

Desert Storm, air campaign planners developed and refined the air campaign plan that was the centerpiece of the CENTCOM offensive campaign 

launched in mid-January 1991. They were significantly influenced by 

several factors. 

The first factor was the list of national objectives laid out by 

President Bush early in the crisis and the constraints and restraints that 

were developed around those goals during subsequent months. From the 

outset, air planners kept these foremost in their efforts, selecting centers 

of gravity to achieve them. lbo of these goals, the withdrawal of Iraqi 

forces from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait government proved 

relatively easy to translate into achievable military objectives and thus to 

measure when achieved. The third, protection of American lives became 

a moot point when hostages were released in December. However, the 

remaining objective, the security and stability of the Persian Gulf, proved 

to be both difficult to define and impossible to achieve. Targets chosen 

to achieve this vague goal included not only the destruction of nuclear, 

chemical, and biological weapons and the Iraqi army but also leadership 

in general and Hussein in particular. In retrospect, the problem here 

became finding the military means-such as air power-to achieve a political goal: political stability. 

225 
While national objectives gave planners their initial direction, the 

Instant Thunder plan produced by the Air Staff in Washington during the 

initial days of the crisis not only provided CEmOM planners with the 

needed offensive option which 1002-90 sorely lacked; it provided the 

conceptual base and overall blueprint from which the Special PlanningGroup and eventually CENTAF worked initially to fashion the concept of 

operations. Conceived as a one component and single-phased air campaign, the target categories that were selected by Colonel Warden’s 

planners remained throughout the five months of planning. While many 

of the actual targets selected had already been identified by CENTAF 

during Internal Look, the more important fact was the percentage of total 

targets in each category remained fairly consistent as noted in Table 33. 

Table 33 

Percentage of Total Targets by Category 

Instant Thunder Desert Storm Phase I 

Strategic Air Defense 12 13 

ChemicaVNBC 8r Scuds 10 15 

Leadership 6 8 

C3 (Telecom) 23 14 

Electricity 12 4 

Oil 7 3 

Railroads&Bridges 4 8 

Airfields 8 T 

Naval & Ports 1 4 

Military Support & 18 23 

Republican Guard 

Note: 

gories are shown combined as in the Instant Thunder plan. 

“ChemicaVNBC and Scuds” and “Military Support and Republican Guards” cateSources: (S) Instant Thunder plan presented to CmCCENT 17 Aug 90 by Col John Warden, 

GWAPS CHSH 9; (S) Brfg slides in “General Glosson Briefs.” GWAPS Box 3, Folder 60. 

226 
PHOTO DELETED 

Tuwaltha Nuclear Research Center. Markings designate potential ta

highlighted by Checkmate planners. 
PHOTO DELETED 

Hardened Aircraft Shelters and Bunkers at Tallil Airfield. 
The significant growth in percentages (chemical, nuclear-biologicalchemical, Scuds, military support, and Republican Guard) and comparable drop 

in other categories (C3, electricity, and railroads and bridges) reflect the 

planners’ reaction to specific guidance from Washington as the plan 

developed. 

Conceptually, Instant Thunder represented a radical revision in the 

way both air and theater planners viewed the application of air power. 

The offensive use of air power at the same time that the coalition was 

espousing a defensive strategy resulted in this concept being “tightly 

held” within both CENTCOM and the coalition planning community. 

These two factors resulted in Instant Thunder planners and their successors in the Black Hole working under extreme “close-hold” circumstances. In retrospect, these conditions may have aggravated the operatorintelligence split that will be discussed below. 

The third factor that determined the development of the final air 

campaign plan were those efforts made by the CENTM planners concerned 

with both the defensive and offensive planning in support of Desert 

Shield, the defense of Saudi Arabia. A goal of this planning was to deter 

Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia, and this never occurred. Though 

there is good reason to believe that the Iraqis never intended to attack 

past Kuwait, one must assume that planners were successful here. More 

to the point were target development and selection that occurred during 

this planning as well as the exercising of the Air Tasking Order (Am) 

system in the daily tasking for both training and air defense. While 

Instant Thunder provided the blueprint, efforts such as ATO Bravo and the 

Punishment ATO fleshed out the detail for the final Desert Storm plan. 

General Glosson’s decision to assign planners in the Special Planning 

Group to develop offensive planning while others in the KTO Cell worked 

on defensive planning in essential isolation from each other was dictated 

by security reasons mentioned above. However, it did lead to an elitist 

“we” on the part of the Black Hole planners versus “they” for the KTO 

planners that prevailed even after the two cells merged in December. 

Planners were also influenced by the cENTCOM theater campaign. 

Contingency plans for the region had always envisioned a phased operation, and planners continued this approach after the crisis erupted. Initial 

CENTCOM thinking followed the phases outlined in the 1002 family of 

plan. In September, while planners contemplated the one corps attack 

229 
into the teeth of the Iraqi army in Kuwait, they still envisioned the campaign in four phases. Even when the plan was significantly modified in 

substance after the November decision to increase the force level, the four 

phases remained. Within this context, air planners had consistently 

regarded the initial phase as an air-only option against targets deep in 

Iraq. The remaining phases were to achieve air superiority over the area 

of ground operations, shape the battlefield, and then operate in conjunction with ground forces. The four phased concept of theater operations 

shaped the approach for air planners and guided their own concept of 

operations. 

Theater campaign plans featured air power as the essential element 

in all but the final phase. Planners were clear hemwithout air power, 

their plans simply would not work. There never was any doubt to CENTAF 

planners as to the centrality of their efforts to the overall theater plan. In 

retrospect however, air planners stayed focused upon the initial phase at 

the expense of planning for the latter phases. This raised concerns by 

other component commanders and their planners as to just how wellprepared CENTAF was for entire campaign. 

The final factor that influenced air planners was the process which 

they chose to translate objectives into plans, one that focused upon 

designated centers of gravity. Instant Thunder planners had aligned these 

against specific target categories. General Glosson’s planners continued 

this approach, refining categories and selecting additional targets. What 

emerged from this was an air concept of operations that allowed tbe 

development of a master attack plan. From this scheme, air planners then 

fashioned detailed twenty four hour attack plans. The logic of system 

was well understood by select Black Hole planners as well as by some 

in the Washington Checkmate cell. 

A problem with the process was that, while it was understood by the 

offensive air campaign planners in the Black Hole, it was not so clearly 

grasped by those outside of that tightly controlled group. This tended to 

aggravate the “we” versus “they” condition already cited. Likewise, the 

process assumed that bomb damage assessment would be readily available 

and form the basis for most planning after the initial two days of strikes. 

In retrospect, this proved to be erroneous assumption, even though 

Exercise Internal Look experiences had alerted planners to these 

problems. (Likewise, the process allowed planners to focus all their 

efforts upon the first two days of the plan, a factor already cited.) 

230 
Within the U. S. Air Force traditionally has existed an invisible but 

finite wall between the operations and intelligence staffs. It existed prior 

to the crisis as evidenced in the problems surfaced during Exercise 

Internal Look with regard to bomb damage assessment, and it continued 

throughout the planning efforts in both Washington and Saudi Arabia. 

The situation was aggravated by the fact that Cold War priorities had 

resulted in the paucity of background information on Iraq among intelligence analysts, as evidenced by deficiencies in the Automated Installation 

File. Intelligence was behind operations from the outset. 

Intelligence analysts never really caught up with operational analysts 

in Gulf War planning; thus they did not play a full role in planning the 

air campaign. Intelligence functioned in a manner consistent with its 

traditional role of supporting combat operations, although in this case, it 

was late to join the planning process. There is no evidence to suggest 

that Air Staff Checkmate operational planners who developed the Instant 

Thunder plan used intelligence information to sculpt their concept of 

operations. Rather, they used intelligence to locate and define targets 

within the series of large, objective-oriented target categories upon which 

their plan, and eventually the Desert Storm air campaign, was built. 

Perhaps because intelligence analysts lacked detailed or up-todate 

targeting information on Iraq at the start of the crisis, operators initially 

bypassed established intelligence channels and later were reluctant to 

return to it. This was most evident in targeting the Scuds where 

operations planners ignored both mobile launcher and Baghdad’s Scud 

employment strategy. Intelligence analysts realized they had been circumvented and did not seem to volunteer information, remaining in a 

“reactive” rather than assume an “anticipatory” mode. Most obvious here 

was the lack of appreciation of Iraqi intention in Kuwait after September 

as well as the tendency to “worse” case the Iraqi army as being a fonnidable foe rather than the “hollow force” that it now appears to have been. 

In retrospect, intelligence support for planning of the air campaign 

was simply not adequate. Perhaps because planners had all the resources 

that they required from September to execute their plan, no one sought 

to correct the problem. When operational planners needed intelligence, 

they worked around the problem through direct contacts to Washington. 

The real solution, however, was neither at the operator nor intelligence 

level. Rather it was at the next higher. 

23 1 
As a result of these roots and influences, the air campaign plan on the 

eve of its execution was several things. First it was a series of twentyfour hour master attack plans in which the planners clearly laid out by 

aircraft, target, target category, and phasing the first seventy-two hours of 

the theater campaign. What they expected after the first three days in 

what was projected to be a month long campaign remained notional. 

They had constructed several more days of master attack plans that were 

really “strawmen” upon which further detailed planning could be done. 

Of course while they had four weeks to fashion two days, now they 

would only have one day to work on one day. 

The first days of the air campaign plan were remarkably similar to 

those proposed five months before by Instant Thunder planners. Desert 

Storm priority of attack and percentage of overall sorties went towards 

the same keys for success-strategic air defense and leadership. What 

CENTAF planners had added was at the direction of Washington-Scuds 

and chemical weapons. They demonstrated faith in new technology 

specifically, sending stealth aircraft against targets without suppression of 

enemy air defenses; and confidence in air power in general by sending 

strength against strength, aircraft against air defenses. 

What was most central to the Desert Storm air campaign plan was the 

planners’ own vision of success, their own vision of victory. By 

concentrating all their efforts toward the first phase of the overall theater 

campaign plan, they implicitly stated their vision that air power alone 

would prevail and victory would come within the first week. Just how 

realistic that conviction was to be tested in the hostile and dark skies over 

Iraq on January 17, 1991. 

232 
Appendix A 

Personnel I Definition I Abbreviation 

Table 34 

Military Organization Glossary 

Typical Major 

Components 

us Army 

AASLT Div Air Assault Division 16.100 9 Infantry Battalions 

Abn Corps HQ 

Abn Div 

ADA Bde (n) 

Airborne Bde 

Armor Div 

Armor Bde 

Avn Bde (a 

Mech Div 

Mech Bde 

MTZ Bde 

Ranger Regt 

SFG (h) 

Airborne Corps Headquacters 

Airborne Division 

Air Defense Artillery 

Brigade 

Airborne Brigade 

Armor Division 

Armor Brigade 

Aviation Brigade 

Mechanized Infantry 

Division 

Mechanized lnfantry 

Brigade 

Motorized Brigade 

Ranger Regiment 

Special Forces Group 

250-350 

13.600 

1.5oO-2,5OO 

4,800 

17,250 

5,300-5.500 

600-1.800 

17,500 

5.500 

Administrative staff & support 

for Corps 

9 Infantry Battalions 

3-5 Air Defense Artillery 

Battalions 

3 Infantry Battalions 

6 Armor Battalions + 

4 Infantry Battalions 

2-3 Armor Battalions + 

1-2 Infantry Battalions 

1-3 Aviation Battalions + 

SUPpofl 

5 Armor Battalions + 

5 Infantry Battalions 

1-2 Armor Battalions + 

2 Infantry Battalions 

equivalent to Armor Brigade 

1.750 3 Ranger Battalions 

450-675 2-3 Special Forces Battalions 

+ support 

233 
Table 34 (cont’d) 

Military Organization Glossary 

Abbreviation Definition Personnel Typical Major 

Components 

3,500-4,000 

CVBG (’) Carrier Battle Group 

MAGTP Marine. Air-Ground 

Task Force 

MARDIV(~) Marine Division 

(USMC) 

MEB (‘) Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade (USMC) 

RLT (” Regimental Landing 

BLT Battalion Landing 

SAG (‘) Surface Action Group 

Team (USMC) 

Team (USMC) 

6,300-7.500 

Highly tailored 

20,000-25,000 

I5.000- 18.W 

8.000-9.000 

1 ,000-1,500 

I Battleship. 

1 Cruiser, 

1 Destroyer. 

2 Frigates, 

1 Support ship (oil or ammo) 

1 Carrier with 

8-10 air squadrons, 

2-3 Cruisers. 

1-2 Destroyers, 

1-2 Frigates, 

2 Support ships (oil and ammo) 

Combined air, ground, logistic 

team of combat, aviation and 

support elements under single 

commander 

3 lnfantry Regiments of 

3 Infantry Battalions, 

I Artillery Regiment, and 

1 Tank Company each 

Mix of Infantry, Artillery, 

Armor, and organic fixedwing and helicopter support 

and attack aimraft 

Same as MEB but smaller 

Marine Infantry Battalion + 

support 

equivalent to Battleship Battle Group 

Notes: (a) Organization highly flexible and tailored to fit individual hqk 

(b) Organization tailored to geographic acea of responsibility 

(c) Organization varies according to task and acea of responsibility 

Sources: lntvws (U). Mr. John Wilson. Reference Division, us Army Center of Military History, 

Washington. D.C.; Capt (Ret) Paul Bloch, USN. GWAPS; Mr. Robert Aquilina, Reference Branch, US 

Marine Corps History Office, Washington. D.C. 

234 
Index 

A 

A-I0 

A-6s 15, 124 

14, 15. 34, 113, 137, 186 

ABCCC 28.46 

ad hoc 121 

ADA 22,51, 233 

Adnan 77, 80, 204, 205 

ADOC 152 

AFHRA 20, 21, 29,42,54, 84, 105, 

AFLC 35 

AIF 192, 200.201. 207. 216, 220, 

222 

air assault division 128, 235 

air campaign 1. 3-5, 9-11. 13, 15-17, 

AC-130 34 

136. 160, 168. 173 

21. 24, 41, 53, 65, 72, 85, 86, 88, 

90-94, 96, 97, 98-101. 105, 

107-114, 116, 117. 121, 123, 

126-129. 136, 141, 142, 143. 

148-153, 155-157, 159, 162, 164, 

167, 169, 170. 171, 173, 175. 184, 

188, 190, 191, 200, 210,211, 213, 

232 

53, 70, 75, 79, 115, 116, 120, 122, 

214, 215, 221-226, 229, 230, 231, 

air defense 5. 6, 10, 14, 48, 50, 51, 

123, 131, 137, 145-147, 149-153, 

175, 184-187, 193. 194. 199, 201, 

206,212, 213. 215-217, 220. 226, 

231, 234, 235 

air defense artillery 5 1, 233 

air division 173 

air interdiction 133, 134 

air power 9, 12, 17-19. 21, 23, 24, 

27, 40, 41, 46, 51, 53, 65, 88, 96, 

104, 107, 120, 127, 129. 135, 143, 

148, 150, 151, 157, 169, 170-172, 

175, 223-226, 229, 230, 232 

Air Staff 3. 54, 80. 87, 88, 105, 108. 

110, 112-114, 126, 131, 135, 171, 

214.221. 226, 231 

air superiority 15, 19, 22, 29, 47, 53. 

107, 129, 133, 137, 147, 149-151, 

153, 155, 169, 170. 187, 19 1, 193. 

230 

air supremacy 2, 5. 7, 11, 148, 150. 

175 

air tasking order 13, 47. 5 I, 124, 136, 

138. 139. 188. 200.230 

airborne early warning 80 

airfields 5, 10, 14. 15, 17, 18, 23, 41. 

48, 50, 51, 53. 80. 121, 132, 137, 

145, 146. 149. 151. 153. 168. 175, 

184, 185, 187, 189. 193. 199,201. 

212.213, 216, 217, 220, 226 

A1 Faw 77, 205 

A1 Firdos 92 

A1 Jarrah 184 

A1 Madan 133 

A1 Qaim 207, 208,213 

A1 Taqaddum 154 

A1 Tuwaitha 11 8 

Al-Atheer 118 

Al-Hussein 66 

al-Jabber Shanshal 67 

An Nasiriyah 119 

anthrax 160, 209 

antiaircraft artillery 80, 121, 155, 206 

antiradiation missiles 153 

Aoun, General 56 

Arab Cooperation Council 64 

ARCENT 51, 87, 137, 148 

area of operation 134 

area of responsibility 236 

ARM 69 

Army Air Forces 117, 127 

artillery 6, 12, 51, 64, 74. 80, 84, 

119, 121, 139, 155, 170-172, 186, 

203. 206, 209, 233, 234 

assumptions 4, 19, 25, 26, 29, 30, 36 

39, 61, 70, 72, 94, 106. 130. 131. 

224, 232 

Atlantic Command 44 

AT0 (see also air tasking order) 13, 

AT0 bravo 136. 139, 23 1 

automated installation file 47, 49. 

192,201,211, 216,223, 230 

51, 136, 138-141, 189, 190, 229 

235 
AV-8Bs 113 

AWACS 22, 28. 34, 70, 128, 130. 

136 

Az Zubayr 120 

Aziz, Tariq 58, 81, 99, 107 

Bubiyan 56, 58, 59, 63 

Bush, George 61. 64, 67, 81, 83. 88, 

92, 97-99, 102, 106, 107, 116, 143, 

144, 148, 164, 170, 172, 225 

C 

B 

B-52s 5, 6, 14, 15, 22, 27, 28, 29, 34, 

74, 128-130, 155, 171 

Baker, James 80, 88, 90, 91, 96, 99, 

102,106 

Baptiste, Samuel 13, 173, 187 

basic encyclopedia I92 

Basra 6, 9, 65, 120 

battalion landing team 236 

battle damage 15 

battleship 130 

battleship battle group 236 

BBBG 28, 234 

BDA (see also bambdamage 

assessment) 11, 15, 184 

BDE 22, 28, 130, 233 

beddown 52, 136 

BEN 13, 164, 174 

Bigelow, Richard E. I13 

biological warfare 145, 209, 210, 213 

biological weapons 14, 55, 67, 69, 

118, 160, 192, 226 

Black Hole 44, 87, 92, 93, 139, 143. 

147, 152, 153, 156. 159, 162, 165. 

169, 200, 214216,221. 229, 230, 

Blackburn, James R. 122 

BLT 236 

bomb damage assessment 15, 188, 

225, 230 

botulin 209 

botulinum 160 

breaching 146, 185-187, 189 

Brewer, Slade 114 

bridges 6, 9, 14, 15, 48, 146, 149, 

169, 185, 187, 189, 192, 201, 212, 

216,217, 220, 226, 229 

briefings 10, 11, 13.51, 52, 84, 87, 

88.91.94.96, 98. 104, 109, 111, 

112, 114, 116. 126, 134, 144, 146. 

148, 151, 153, 156, 159, 160, 164. 

168, 169, 172-175, 185, 186, 192 

Bristow. Richard 113 

C-12 145, 151 

C-130 34.35, 128, 130 

c-21 34 

C-Day 23 

C3 (see also command, control, and 

communications) 46-48, 146, 157, 

159, 185, 186, 189, 193, 201, 212. 

216,217, 220,226, 229 

Camp David, MD 106, 108 

carrier battle group 54, 105, 128-130, 

236 

carriers 29, 35, 54, 105, 107, 128- 

130,203, 236 

CAS (see also close air support) 46, 

149 

casualties 4, 56, 61, 64, 76, 90-93, 

101, 111, 112, 116, 120, 149, 161 

CAT 35 

CBW 160 

CENTAF 9, 10. 13, 15, 23, 24, 

44-50, 54. 105, 106, 109, 112, 114, 

126, 135-142, 148-150, 152, 153, 

155-157, 161, 167, 169-171, 173, 

175, 187, 188, 190, 191, 193-197, 

199-201, 206, 207, 211, 213, 214, 

216, 222, 223, 224, 226, 229-231 

234 

191, 194.222 

CENTAF intelligence 44, 47, 142, 

CENTAF target study 137 

CENTCOM (see also Central 

Command) 1, 10, 13, 18-27, 29, 

31, 32, 37, 42-44, 48, 50, 51, 54, 

87. 102, 104-107, 109, 112, 128. 

131, 132, 135, 143, 144. 148, 

149-151, 155-157, 159-162, 167, 

170, 173, 188, 191, 194, 199-202, 

206,207, 211, 214, 215, 222, 

224-226, 229, 230 

CENTCOM target list 200 

centets of gravity 2, 4, 10, 13, 109, 

110, 111, 144, 145, 149, 150, 155, 

236 
159. 162, 169, 175. 187, 225. 232 

29, 31, 38, 41, 42, 44, 49, 51, 54, 

100. 104, 114, 118, 121, 126, 128, 

191, 194, 202 

Central Command 2, 9, 18-22, 26, 

130, 131, 132-134, 137, 151, 156, 

Central Intelligence Agency 44 

Central Security Service 44 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Checkmate 93.94, 109, 110, 

20, 87, 211 

112-115. 118-121, 123-127, 131, 

135, 141. 171, 172. 213, 214, 228, 

230,231 

chemical 1. 2, 5-7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 44, 

48, SO, 55, 57, 62, 66, 67, 69, 84, 

89, 97, 99, 107, 108, 112, 118, 119, 

139, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 159, 

160, 161, 165, 175, 184-187, 189, 

191-193, 199, 200, 209, 213, 217, 

226, 229, 232 

chemical warfare I, 145, 209 

chemical weapons 57, 62, 84, 89.97. 

99, 107. 108, 112, 118, 119, 150, 

160, 161, 187, 192, 209,232 

Cheney, Richard 11, 12. 19, 84, 86, 

166, 173. 174 

88,90,98. 102-108, 128, 144, 160, 

Chief of Naval Operations I14 

Chief of Staff 67, 79, 87, 98, 

China 17 

CIA (see also Central Intelligence 

105-109, 135, 160 

Agency) 44. 106, 107. 202, 203, 

206, 207 

CINCCENT 19, 20, 25, 26, 31, 35, 

47, 51, 88, 112, 114, 134, 135, 140, 

145, 192, 223, 227 

UCS (see also Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff) 20, 89, 145, 146, 151, 

156, 159, 160, 164, 185, 206, 209 

close air support 41, 53, 88, 114, 

134, 136, 137, 192 

cluster bombs 123, 172, 209 

Coalition I, 2, 4-7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 

6 1-67. 70-72, 75-82. 84, 9 I, 98, 

102, 103, 111, 119, 120, 124, 128, 

132. 134, 138, 139, 150, 151. 161, 

165, 167, 168, 170, 172,203, 206, 

21 I, 229 

Cold War 24, 191, 223, 232 

combat air patrol 188 

combined OPLAN 1, 2, 4-7, 9, 15, 

COMCENTAF 135 

command and control 2. 5, 11, 13-15, 

46, 51. 53, 69, 76, 86, 87, 115, 126, 

133. 142, 144. 147, 149, 152, 156, 

171. 175, 184, 192, 207 

133. 134 

command post exercise 31, 41.43. 51 

command, control and communication 

50, 137, 193, 199 

Congress 77, 84.91.95, 1 19, 205 

continental United States 14 

contingency plans 20, 21, 23-25, 26, 

27.46.54, 105. 108, 135, 191,200. 

223, 230 

corps: 

V11 Corps 67,76, 143, 148, 186 

XVlll Airborne Corps 5 I, 75 

XVlll U.S. Corps 186 

counterair 24, 27, 29, 41, 45, 46, 51, 

CPX 31.46 

Crigger, James 140 

css 44 

CVBC 22. 28, 234 

53. 134, 136. 137, 192 

D 

D-Day 8, 136-140, 200 

D-Day plan 136-140 

DCA 44 

deception 113, 188 

Defense Courier Service 44, 140 

Defense Department 103, 104 

Defense Intelligence Agency 44, 121, 

Defense Mapping Agency 44, 121 

Defense Planning Guidance 19 

Defense Security Assistance Agency 

Department of Defense 98 

Department of Energy 17 

Department of State 44, 84, 101, 102 

deployment planning 21 

Deptula, David 86, 87, 89, 93, 95. 

96.99, 100, 103, 113. 123, 124, 

152, 192 

44 

237 
126, 127. 150, 152, 153, 155-157, 

159, 161. 162, 164, 165, 173. 174. 

206 

Deputies Committee 90 

Desert Shield 25, 33-35, 42-44, 46. 

47, 54, 80, 86, 105-108, 114, 121, 

129, 132-136, 140, 155, 156. 162. 

169, 173, 191, 194, 200.207, 211, 

213-215.230 

Desert ShieldStorm 169 

Desert Storm 1, 2, 4-7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 

17, 25, 33. 35, 42-44,46,47, 51, 

54. 80, 84, 85, 86, 90, 91. 93, 95, 

97, 99, 100, 103, 105-107. 120, 

121, 123, 132-136, 139, 143, 146, 

148. 150. 151, 156. 157. 160, 161, 

162, 164. 167-171. 173, 185, 187, 

188, 191, 200, 213,214,215-217, 

221,225, 226, 229, 230,231, 232 

desired mean point of impact 121 

Dhahran 17,91, 113, 119. 132 

DIA (see also Defense Intelligence 

Agency) 44, 47, 49, 160, 167, 

213,214, 220, 221 

Diego Garcia 17, 18 

Divisions: 

201-203, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 

AASLT DIV 22,28, 235 

IOlst Air Assault 128 

24th ID 204 

82d Airborne 107, 128 

DMA 44 

DOC 13, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50, 51, 54, 

100, 106, 132, 133, 135, 141. 168, 

189, 191, 195, 199, 200,202, 206, 

207, 211, 217 

150, 152, 202, 206, 207, 209 

Defense) 19, 37, 57, 74. 203 

doctrine 18, 38, 53, 57, 77, 134, 149, 

DOD (see also Department of 

drones 14, 188 

Dugan, Michael 98, 108 

E 

E-3 34, 136 

E-8 34 

Eagleburger, Lawrence 103 

EC-130 28, 34, 128, 130 

EF-Ills 34, 128, 130, 188 

Egypt 46, 58, 62. 63 

electric 5, 15, 48, 50, 94, 149, 152, 

153, 162, 199 

electrical power 93, 95, 96, 118, 117, 

137 

electricity 10, 47, 117, 118, 145, 146, 

169, 185, 189,226,229 

electronic warfare 66 

ELlNT 80 

engineer 72 

Europe 17, 20. 57, 63, 109. 143, 223 

European Command 44 

exercises 19, 46, 47, 54, 69, 13 I 

F 

F-4G 34, 137, 188 

F-15 15. 128, 130 

F-15E 14, 22, 34, 124, 135, 128, 130, 

137, 186, 188 

130, 137, 186 

F-16 14. 15, 22, 34, 118, 124, 128, 

F-Ills 

F-117 

14, 15, 34, 124, 128. 130 

14, 15.93, 123, 124, 128, 130, 

150. 153, 155, 186, 188 

F-117A 34, 93, 137 

FAA 44 

FAHD 107, 108, 132 

FBI 44 

Federal Aviation Administration 44 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 44 

Fitzwater, Marlin 99, 106 

France 79, 113 

Freeman. Charles W. 107 

G 

G-Day 8 

GAT 142, 193, 200, 201, 212, 216, 

217. 220 

GBU-24 93 

GBU-27 93 

GCI 193 

generator halls 94, 117 

Germany 113, 117. 148 

global war 20, 25, 109 

Clock, John 42,44,48, 136, 137, 

142, 167, 191, 194, 201, 202, 207, 

238 
222 

89-101, 103, 104, 139, 140, 

144-149, 152, 155, 157, 159, 162, 

164, 168, 169-173, 175, 185, 200, 

Glosson, Buster 10, 11, 83. 85-87, 

206, 216, 227, 230,231 

175 

government of Kuwait 1. 2, 83, 143. 

Griffith, Brig. Gen. 114 

ground forces 5. 12, 21-23, 41, SO, 

64,66,74,76, 104, 106, 107, 112, 

113. 128, 129. 136. 139, 148, 150, 

170, 171, 175. 186, 193. 199, 203, 

223, 224, 230 

ground order of battle 204 

H 

H-1 184 

H-2 14, 168. 184 

H-3 14, 168, 184 

Haass, Richard 106 

HARM 60,90,91,97. 108 

Harvey, Bernard 109, 112, 113. 126. 

127, 157, 164, 174 

HAS 62, 64.65, 84,91,96, 171, 

202,232 

Hawk 46.47 

Hawkins, Douglas 11 3 

helicopters 5, 6, 14, 236 

Homer, Charles A. 44, 48, 49, 51-53, 

HC-130 34 

HH-3 34 

83, 85-87, 91, 93. 96, 97. 100, 102, 

104-107, 114, 126, 127, 128, 132, 

135, 137, 139. 140, 141, 142, 145, 

148-151. 153, 156, 157, 159, 161, 

162, 166, 167-169, 173, 187, 188, 

190, 191-194. 206 

hostages 85. 90, 95-97, 108, 225 

Hoyes, Michael I13 

human intelligence 71 

human shields 62, 95, 96 

Hussein, Sadam 2, 55. 56, 58, 63, 64, 

66, 67, 84, 85, 9 1, 92, 93, 95- 100, 

103, 104, 108, 115, 145, 156, 167, 

192,201, 206, 209,226 

I 

infantry 64, 66. 68, 72, 74-78, 128, 

infrastructure 5, 18, 47, 74, 1 11, 119, 

130,203, 204. 235, 236 

131, 145, 147, 149, 159, 162, 167, 

192 

Instant Thunder 92.94, 105, 109, 

110, 109, 111, 112, 113-116, 119, 

120, 123-127, 131. 141-143, 

145-148, 151, 155, 159, 161, 162, 

164, 165, 169, 185, 187, 214, 222, 

225-227, 229-232 

integrated air defense system 1 SO 

intelligence staff 173, 194, 202, 222 

interdiction 19, 24, 27, 29, 41, 42, 

44, 45, 53, 75, 88, 114, 119, 

132-134, 136, 137, 169, 192 

Internal Look 25, 31, 32, 41-44, 

46-48, 50-54, 106-108, 132, 133, 

135, 136, 192, 194, 224-226, 232 

Iran 17. 18, 21, 42, 55, 56, 58, 61, 

64-66, 69, 70, 75, 82, 94, 119, 191, 

202,206, 211 

Iran-Iraq War 18, 55, 56, 58, 64, 69, 

119, 202, 206 

Iraq cell 173 

Iraqi air force 80, 205-207 

Iraqi army 27. 81, 84, 85, 106, 120, 

127, 128, 148, 151, 157, 164, 171, 

172,202. 203, 226, 229, 231 

Iraqi target study 46, 48, 50, 137, 

Israel 14, 56, 57, 62, 65, 103, 105, 

118, 119, 165, 167, 168, 211, 221 

140, 193- 197, 199. 200, 207 

J 

J-2 106 

J-3 

J-5 

104, 106, 114, 132, 160 

20-23, 54, 100, 104, 132, 160, 

I70 

J-8 37 

Japan 57, 63 

JCS (see also Joint Chiefs of Staff) 

19, 21, 26, 37, 42, 44. 100, 

167, 222 

104-106, 112, 114, 150. 155, 156, 

JIC 167 

239 
Johnston, Robert 106, 107, 135, 160 

Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee 

Joint Chiefs 19. 20, 44, 87-89, 94, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 19, 20, 44, 87, 

Joint Directorate of Planning 132-1 34 

Joint Force Air Component 

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 

Joint no-fire target list 94 

Joint Staff 21. 22. 29, 31, 42, 100, 

114, 144, 157. 160 

Joint target list 49, 50, 192, 194, 199, 

200, 207, 2 13 

Joint Task Force 18, 35, 47 

Joint Task Force Charlie 47 

Jordan 56, 57. 62-64, 75, 168 

JSTARS 109 

Just Cause 9 I, 98 

213 

114, 164, 211 

114, 211 

Commander 9. 51 

172 

Kuwait theater of operations 4, 1 1, 

175 

Kuwaiti 11. 12, 59, 60, 66, 75, 80, 

99, 109 

1 

leadership 2, 5, 10, 11, 14, 15, 46, 

48. SO, 55, 68, 104, 111, 115, 131. 

171, 175, 184, 185, 187, 189, 192, 

145-147, 149. 153, 155, 156, 159, 

193, 199-201, 206,207, 212. 

2 15-2 17, 220, 226, 232 

leaflets 120 

Leavenworth 87. 148, 170 

Lebanon 64 

Libya 110, 171 

lines of communication 6, 53. 193 

logistics 9, 21, 135, 144, 193 

Loh, John 108. 109 

Los Angeles Times 96, 97 

M 

K 

Kari 152 

Karns, D. 156 

KC-10 34 

KC-I35 22, 34, 128, 130 

Kelly, Thomas 103, 106 

Kennedy, USS 35 

Khafji 76 

kill boxes 136 

Kimmitt. Robert 90, 97, 98, 103 

Kiraly, Emery 1 I3 

Kirkuk 158 

KTO (see also Kuwait theater of 

operations) 4-6, 9, 11, 13. 77, 136, 

148, 149, 156, 170, 172, 173, 175, 

186, 202-205, 230 

KTO cell 173, 231 

Kuwait 1, 2, 4-7.9, 11-13. IS, 39, 

54. 56, 58-63, 66, 71, 74-76, 78-81, 

83-85, 99, 106, 108, 109, 112, 119, 

120, 130, 134, 136, 139, 143, 148, 

175, 184, 186. 191, 195. 200, 

202-204, 211, 221, 223-225, 230, 

23 I 

150-153, 156. 157, 164, 170-172, 

MAC (see also Military Airlift 

Command) 211 

Madinah 77, 205 

MAGTF 236 

major commands 1 13 

Mankin. Mike 114 

MAP (see also master attack plan) 

MARDIV 236 

Marine Corps 40.44, 114, 234 

marine division 236 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade 128, 

234 

marines 64, 114, 115, 171, 186, 194 

MASS 97, 156, 161, 193, 207.210. 

213 

master attack plan 13-15, 123. 147, 

153, 156, 169, 187, 200,217, 230 

master target list 213, 215 

Maverick 123 

McConnell, Mike 106, 167 

McPeak. Gen. 87 

McSwain, D.W. '136, 139, 140, 168 

MEB 22, 28, 236 

10, 11, 14, 189. 194 

MC-130 34 

240 
mech div 28, 130. 233 

mechanized infantry division 128, 

Meier, James 114 

Midway 35 

Military Airlift Command 106 

military construction 72 

military production 5, SO, 145, 165, 

military support 10, 48, 146, 147, 

233 

MH-60 34 

194,199 

162, 185-188, 193, 201, 217. 226. 

229 

mine countermeasures 44 

Ministry of Defense 46, 132, 133, 

156 

missiles I, 6, 14, 15, 44, 51, 55, 57, 

65-67, 69, 74. 80, 84, 93, 96, 101, 

103-105, 119, 120, 123. 124, 126, 

151-153, 156, 162, 165-168, 186, 

188, 193, 206, 209, 210, 211. 214, 

219, 223 

Missouri 128 

mobility 137 

mobilization 18, 54, 60, 61, 66, 67 

Moore, Burton 160 

MTL 215 

Muhammad al-Tikriti 67 

munitions 54, 66, 88, 123, 137, 172, 

209,220 

mustard 160 

N 

national command authorities 92, 160 

National Security Agency 44 

National Security Council 106, 107 

NATO 17, 109 

naval 4-6, 15, 17, 22, 23, 27, 29, 44, 

46, 50, 51, 54, 55, 51, 67, 70, 74, 

109, 114, 134, 136, 146, 149. 162, 

185. 187, 189, 193. 194, 199, 201, 

212,213, 216, 217, 220,226 

NAVCENT 139 

Navy 14, 17, 32, 35.40,44, 110, 

114, 115, 124, 125, 136, 150. 152, 

184, 194, 234 

NBC (see also nuclear, biological, and 

chemical) 46,48, 146, 159, 185, 

193, 201, 212, 216, 217, 220, 226 

Nebuchadnezzar 77, 204, 205 

nerve 160, 209 

network 93, 145, 152. 193 

New York Times 59 

Ninth Air Force 47. 105, 106, 140, 

Nizar ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khazraji 67 

Noriega, Manuel 91.98 

North Vietnam 85, 112, 117 

North Vietnamese 11 7 

nuclear 1, 2, 5-7, 11, 48, 50, 55, 57. 

61, 69, 84,90, 97, 99, 118, 119, 

137, 140, 145. 149, 159, 160, 161, 

175, 184, 193, 199, 200,207, 

191, 211 

213-215, 217, 223, 226, 228, 229 

nuclear program 160 

nuclear reactor 57 

nuclear weapons 61, 84, 90, 97, 119, 

nuclear, biological, and chemical 11, 

159, 161 

55, 159, 193 

0 

OA-10 34 

offensive 1-4, 6, 9, 11-13, 21, 24, 27, 

41, 45, 46, 53, 54, 56, 84, 85, 88, 

90. 92, 93, 96, 97, 100-103, 105, 

106, 108, 109, 112, 126, 128, 133, 

136, 137, 138-143, 145, 147, 148, 

151. 153, 156, 159-162, 164, 165, 

167, 169-173, 192. 193, 202, 209, 

225, 226, 229-231 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 19 

Office of the Secretary of the Air 

Office of the Secretary of the Navy 

oil 4, 10. 11, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21.48, 

Force 44 

44 

55-59. 62, 63, 76, 95, 99, 109, 

116-118, 128, 145, 146, 169, 175, 

184, 185. 189, 191, 193, 201, 202, 

212, 213, 216, 217, 220, 226. 234 

oil production 17 

Olsen. Thomas 136, 137, 140 

Oman 135 

OPEC 58, 59 

operation order 1 SO, 173, 188 

24 1 
operation plan I, 9, 149, 192 

operational level I 10 

operations order 92, 145, 156, 159 

OPLAN 1, 2, 4-7, 9, 15, 19-39, 41, 

42, 44, 46, 47, 49-54, 84, 92, 93, 

97, 106, 108, 128, 133-136, 150, 

156, 160, 161, 167, 173. 191-194, 

199,200, 213, 224,235. 236 

OPLAN 1002-88 20-27.39.47. 192 

OPLAN 1002-90 2 I, 22, 25-33, 

35-39. 41, 42, 44, 47, 49-51, 53, 

54. 108, 128, 134, 135, 136, 

191-194. 199, 200, 224 

OPLAN Desert Storm I. 2, 4-7, 9. 

OPORD 9.84.92, 100. 132, 133. 

OPORD 001 100, 132, 157 

OPORD 002 133 

OPORD 003 132, 133 

OPORD 004 133 

opposing air 150 

order of battle 42, 71, 204 

OSD 86 

Osirik 57 

ov-10 112 

84.93,97. 134, 160. 161, 167,213 

157. 173 

P 

Pacific Command 44 

Panama 64 

Patriot 44, 51 

Persian Gulf 17, 21, 47, 57, 77, 80. 

83, 84, 86, 91, 95, 96, 98, 102, 103, 

107, 109, 119, 143, 156, 164, 203, 

phase I 4, 9, 11, 23, 26, 27, 32, 41, 

156, 159, 169, 170, 173. 175, 184, 

186, 188, 226 

phase 11 5, 6, 11, 12, 24, 26, 28. 29, 

41, 137, 148. 150, 151, 170, 175, 

186 

170. 172, 173, 175, 186 

205-207, 211, 225 

84, 92, 96, 103, 145. 148-151, 155, 

phase 111 6, 11, 12, 29. 148, 151, 

phase IV 6.7. 148, 170, 175 

planners 1, 2, 4-7, 9-19, 21-27, 29. 

32, 35. 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 

47.49, 51. 54, 59, 60,IO. 15, 11, 

83-85, 87, 90, 92-95, 97. 98, 

99-106, 108, 109. 114-116. 

119-121, 123, 124, 126. 127, 128, 

131-145, 147-153, 155, 156, 157, 

159-162, 164, 165, 167, 168-171, 

173, 184, 186-188, 190-192, 194, 

228, 230, 231. 230-232 

200, 209, 210, 213-216, 222-226, 

planning 2, 3. 13. 17-21. 23, 26, 29, 

33. 36-38, 40. 42, 43. 46, 54, 59, 

71. 83-88, 92. 95, 96, 101, 103-105, 

108. 109, 111-114. 121. 123, 125, 

126, 128, 129-137. 139, 141-144, 

147, 149, 151. 160. 164, 170, 171, 

173, 187. 191. 194,200. 205, 209, 

211, 213, 214, 221-226. 229-231 

POL 47, 48. 50. 74, 162. 193, 199 

POL distribution 193 

POL storage 193 

population 51, 56. 60. 89, 94, 11 1, 

Post 31, 41, 43. 51. 5.5, 56, 68, 71, 

Powell, Colin 20, 21, 25, 88-90, 92, 

141, 144, 145, 160. 162, 164, 173. 

174, 206 

I 20 

97. 102, 191, 213 

94. 98, 102, 105-108. 112. 114, 

precision guided munitions 54 

president 23, -S4, 55, 58, 61, 64, 67, 

107, 109, 111, 112, 114, 143, 144, 

148, 151, 156, 159, 160, 164. 165. 

17 I, 224, 225 

8 I, 83-88, 90-99, 102- 104, 106, 

presidential palace 131, 140 

presidential residence 155 

propaganda 62, 78, 81, 157 

Proven Force 35 

psychological operations 11 1 

Punishment An> 139-141, 230 

Purvis, Joe 170 

Q 

Quayle, Dan 98. 102, 106 

R 

RAF 15 

RAND 106, 108, 171, 172 

242 
Ranger 29, 128, 130, 235 

readiness 66, 72, 78-80 

reconnaissance 70. 71, 78, 80, 105, 

151, 188 

reconstitution I I. 186 

recovery 90,94 

Red Sea 23, 107 

Reflex 169 

regimental landing team 130, 236 

regular army 70, 78.82 

reliability 69. 159 

reorganization 142, 173 

Republican Guard I, 2, 5. 6, 10- 15, 

146. 147. 155. 156, 162, 164, 175, 

229 

RC-I 35 34, 128, 130 

50, 58, 59, 66, 70, 72. 75-78, 82, 

184, 185, 186, 199, 203-205, 226, 

research and development 162 

reserves 59, 60.76-78.203 

resupply 9, It. 80. 149, 171. 175. 

1 86 

RF-4C 22, 34 

Rice, Donald 87, 112, 172 

RLT 28, 236 

Rogers, "Buck" 169 

Rolling Thunder 85 

Ross, Dennis B. 102 

Royal Saudi Air Force 9 

RRP 1307 105, 108 

Rumayla 58, 59, 63 

Russ, Robert 114, 168 

S 

SA-2 80 

SA-U3 80 

SA-6 80 

SAC (see also Strategic Air 

Command) 44, 113, 114. 156, 211 

Saddam Hussein 2, 55-72, 79-82, 85, 

91-93.95-99, 103, 104, 108, 109. 

111, 112, 115. 119. 131, 145, 150, 

168, 170. 201, 206, 209 

152, 155-157, 159-161, 164, 165. 

SAG 22, 236 

Salman Pak 118, 119, 160, 210, 213 

SAM 13, 104, 120, 146, 170, 175, 

185, 189,201, 212, 216 217, 220 

SAR 93 

Saudi Air Force 9, 51 

Saudi Arabia 12, 17-19, 21, 22, 24, 

25. 27, 39, 42, 44, 54. 56, 59, 60, 

62, 63, 72, 74-76, 83, 84. 91. 

104-107, 109, 112, 126-130, 

132-136, 139. 140, 142, 150, 165, 

174, 184, 191, 202, 211. 224, 229, 

230 

27, 29, 43. 49, 51, 52, 60, 83, 87. 

112. 113, 116. 119, 121. 126, 

Schwankopf. Norman 12. 20, 21, 25. 

91, 94, 96. 98. 99. IOQ, 106-108, 

128-130, 136. 139, 140, 143, 144, 

148-150, 162, 164, 168-170, 172, 

173, 191-193. 202,225 

Scowcroft, Brent 90.91. 98, 102, 

Scud 14, 15, 101, 104, 105, 119, 138, 

104. 106, 107. 155.206 

139, 145, 156, 165, 167, 168, 175, 

184. 188, 210. 212. 216, 218-221. 

223, 221 

Scud alert 188 

Scud-B 167, 210 

Scuds 10, 14, 48, 50, 103-105, 119, 

146, 147, 165-168, 185, 187-189, 

193, 199-201, 209, 210. 213, 214, 

217, 226, 229, 231, 232 

SEAD II, 12 

SEAL 186 

sealift 24 

SECDEF (see also Secretary of 

Defense) 88, 89, 119, 153, 160, 

175 

Secretary of Defense 10, 19, 20, 42, 

83-88, 93, 98, 102. 105-107, 132, 

133. 146, 160, 174, 185, 209 

1 03 

Secretary of State 81, 90, 91, 102, 

Secretary of the Navy 44 

sector operations center 120, 123, 

1 24 

security 2, 4, 42, 44, 60, 66, 70, 75. 

83-85.90.95. 104, 106, 109, 126, 

139, 143, 155. 164. 191,202, 203, 

206,213, 225, 230 

SFG 235 

Shadow Hawk 46.47 

Shamir, Yitzhak 103 

243 
Sharp, Grant 20. 42, 43, 103. 132, 

Shaw AFB 47, 87, 105, 187 

short-range ballistic missile 210 

SIGlNT 80 

SILKWORM 74 

situation report 71 

133 

smoke 65 

SNIE 203 

SOF (see also special operations 

forces) 130 

Southeast Asia 17 

SPEAR 150, 152 

special forces 77, 128, 130, 204, 205, 

Special Forces Group 128. 235 

special operations 23, 27, 29, 40, 44, 

Special Operations Command 44 

special operations forces 23, 27, 44 

Special Planning Group 143, 151, 

SPOT 57.71, 172 

SRBM (see also short range ballistic 

missile) 166, 167 

Stanfill 113, 126, 127 

Star 91 

State Department 94, 96, 103, 206 

stealth 14. 155, 234 

stealthy 153, 155 

Stimer, Richard 11 3 

strategic air campaign 3-5. 1 I, 24. 

92. 105, 107. 113, 148, 149, 151, 

157, 164, 175 

Strategic Air Command 44, 113, 156 

strategic air defense 10, 1 IS, 145. 

233 

194 

226,230 

146, 149, 151, 184. 185-187, 201, 

212, 215-217, 220, 226, 232 

Strategic Bombing Survey 1 17 

strategy 17, 18. 20, 46, 61, 64, 76, 

81, 86, 94, 102. 103, 111, 116, 143, 

229, 231 

STRATFOR 156 

STU 86, 87 

suppression of enemy air defenses 

155, 188, 234 

surface-to-air missile 153, 186, 188, 

surge 80, 211 

Switzer. William 114 

Syria 56 

Syrian 62, 203 

193 

T 

TAC (see also Tactical Air Command) 

TACAIR 6 

TACC 157,206 

Tactical Air Command 44, 106, 113 

Tactical Intelligence Squadron 194 

tactical level 79, 110 

Taji 66, 119 

Tallil 14, 119, 124. 175, 184, 230 

tanks 59, 64, 74, 75, 78, 84, 11 2, 

target list 46-50, 88-90, 94, 11 8. 12 1, 

44, 108, 113, 114, 211 

171,203 

137, 153, 155-157, 166. 169, 184, 

186, 192-194, 199-201, 207, 213, 

215. 22s 

target lists 50. 88, 192, 199-201, 217 

Tawakalna 77, 204, 205 

TEL 62, 221 

TFS 22, 28, 130 

TFW 135 

The’limes 189 

Thumrait 135 

Tikrit 119, 155, 156 

time-phased force deployment data 

time-phased force deployment list 31 

TIS (see also Tactical Intelligence 

Squadron) 46-48, 50, 139, 140, 

21 

142. 193-195, 199, 200, 207, 222 

Title V 77, 205 

Tomahawk 14, 15, 96, 105. 123 

TPFDD 21, 26 

TPFDL 21 

TR 34.93 

Tu’ma ‘Abbas al-Jabburi 67 

Turkish 64, 203 

Tuwaitha 118, 161, 184, 228 

TR-I 34 

244 
U V 

US. Air Force 44, 223 

US. Army 6, 14, 20. 22, 28. 33, 35, 

U.S. Central Command (see also 

44, 117, 130 

Central Command) 9, 18, 104, 130, 

133, 134, 151, 156, 202 

U.S. Information Agency 44 

U.S. Navy 14, 35.44 

u-2 34 

UK 71 

UN 62,67.98, 220 

United Arab Emirates 58 

United Nations 91. 98, 217 

United States 64 

US Air Force 108 

US Army 5 1, 54. 233, 234 

US Marine Corps 236 

US Navy 236 

USAFFi 35 

USCENTAF 18, 42, 47-49, 53, 105, 

131, 136, 140, 160 

Command) I, 9. 21, 23, 26, 31, 42, 

155. 156, 160, 173, 199,200. 211, 

213 

USCENTCOM (see also Central 

50. 105, 107, 128-133, 135, 136, 

USCINCCENT 1. 2, 4-7.9, 20-23. 

25-33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42-44, 46, 

47, 50, 54.84, 100, 106, 108, 

191, 199, 235, 236 

131-135. 155, 156, 157, 160, 173, 

USEUCOM 44 

USlA 44 

USLANTCOM 44 

USMC (see also Marine corps) 14, 22, 

USN (see also U.S. Navy) 22, 28, 33, 

USNR 206 

USPACOM 44 

USS Midway 35 

USSOCOM 44 

USTRANSCOM 44 

28, 33, 54, 130, 135, 234 

114, 130, 133, 136, 139, 168, 234 

Vietnam 61, 85, 86, 91, 102, 112, 

117 

Voice of America 71 

W 

Warden, John A. 83. 92-95, 108-121, 

123, 126, 127, 141, 145, 148, 153, 

162, 169, 172, 174,226,227 

wargame 171 

wargaming 46, 135 

Washington 3. 17, 20, 35. 51, 54, 55, 

62, 71, 83, 84, 87-90, 97, 98, 102, 

104, 105, 107. 108. 110. 112. 117. 

126, 135, 137, 141, 156, 162, 172, 

203,226, 229, 230-232. 234 

Washington Post 71, 97. 102 

weaponeering 48. 194 

weapons of mass destruction 97, 156, 

161, 193, 207, 210, 213 

weather 207 

Webster, William 106 

Wickman, Allen I13 

Williams 107 

WIN 113, 169 

Wisconsin 128 

Wolfowitz, Paul 19, 96, 103, 105-107 

World War I1 17, 92, 110, 117. 127 

Y 

Y’Blood, William 135, 137 

Yemen 23 

245 
246 
Part I1 

Command and Control 

Part I1 

Command and Control 

Task Force Chief 

Dr. Thomas C. Hone 

Principal Authors 

Dr. Thomas C. Hone 

Dr. Mark D. Mandeles 

Lt. Col. Sanford S. Terry 

Principal Contributors 

Dr. Eliot A. Cohen 

Maj. Robert J. Heston 

Lt. Col. Frank D. Kistler 

Maj. Anne D. Leary 

Ms. Georganne Thibault 
. . 
Contents 

Report Acknowledgements ............................. ix 

Introduction ....................................... xi 

1 Command and Control: Methodology and Concepts ........ 1 

2 Case Studies in Command and Control .................. 7 

3 Lt . Gen . Charles Horner as the First Joint Force 

Air Component Commander ..................... 41 

4 Building the Tactical Air Control System ............... 77 

5 The CENTAFTACC ............................... 131 

6 The Black Hole and Its Impact ..................... 157 

7 The TACC and GAT in Desert Storm .................. 205 

8 BDA and the Command and Control 

of the Air Campaign .......................... 265 

9 The Airborne TACS at War ......................... 305 

10 Conclusion ................................... 329 

Index .......................................... 395 

Appendixes 

1 Definition of Terms ............................. 339 

2 The Origins of the JFACC ......................... 351 

Use of C3 Modeling Aids to Prepare for and Predict War ... 

4 Gulf War Command Arrangements ................... 381 

3 369 

V 
Tables 

1 AA Package of F-1 11 s Attacking H3 and H2 Airfields ...... 25 

2 Support Package of Table 1 ......................... 25 

3 Tasking Draft of Master Attack Plan .................. 28 

4 F-15E as Tasked on Targeting Worksheet ............... 36 

5 D+23. Air Tasking Order Y. 9 Feb 1991 . F-15E (4th Tactical 

Fighter Wing based at A1 Kharj) ................ 40 

6 Gulf War Communications Planned versus Actual ......... 110 

7 Planned Activities: Day 2 of the Air Campaign 

in Directorates for Campaign Plans 

and Combat Operations ........................ 209 

8 Planned Sorties versus AT0 Changes (Days 1. 2 and 3) ..... 213 

9 AT0 Changes. Day I-Day 43 ....................... 216 

10 Sorties Planned. Sorties Changed. Target and 

Timing Changes Day 1 through Day 43 ............ 233 

11 Anti-Scud Sorties ............................... 244 

12 Total Reconnaissance Sorties. 17 Jan . 28 Feb 1991 ....... 257 

13 Imagery Exploitation and Production In-theater 

(October 1990) ............................. 285 

14 Areas of Sensor Commitment ...................... 285 

15 Total Air Force Munitions Expenditure versus 

B-52 Munitions Expenditure .................... 292 

vi 
Figures 

1 The Planning Cycle ............................... 9 

2 First Draft of Master Attack Plan ..................... 11 

3 Completed. Approved Master Attack Plan ............... 12 

4 Target Planning Worksheet ......................... 16 

5 Air Tasking Order ............................... 18 

6 Air Tasking Order Change Logbook ................... 20 

7 Air Tasking Order Change Sheet ..................... 22 

8 Mission Report (MISREP) ........................... 23 

9 Targets and Bases From Which F-11lFs Launched 

the Mission ............................... 26 

10 Map of Area Flown 

11 Tactical Air Control System (TACS) ................... 78 

12 Saudi Eastern Sector Control Center at Dhahran .......... 93 

.............................. 33 

13 AWACS Orbits over Saudi Arabia ..................... 98 

14 Organization of Saudi Air Defense Sectors ............. 122 

15 Tactical Air Control Center Divisions ................. 133 

16 CENTAF Organizational Structure .................... 134 

17 Four Major Functional Divisions of the 

Combat Plans Division ........................ 136 

18 Combat Planning Staff Works With Others To Develop 

Air Tasking Orders ........................... 138 

19 Combat Operations Division In Riyadh ................ 140 

vii 
20 Combat Operations .............................. 141 

21 Prewar Plan of Intelligence Organization 

to support TACC ........................... 143 

22 Page From Air Tasking Order ...................... 146 

23 Proposed Sorties Apportionment .................... 151 

24 CENTAF Forward Organization ...................... 161 

25 “Black Hole” Strategic Air Command Planners .......... 165 

26 Relationship of Saudi Air Force Building to SClF ......... 178 

27 Relationship Among Planners Before Reorganization ...... 188 

28 Relationship Among Planners After Reorganization ....... 189 

29 Anticipated Planning Cycle ........................ 194 

30 Reality: Timeline ............................... 211 

31 Planned Sorties (ATO) versus Sorties Changed 

(TACC Change Log) .......................... 220 

32 Sorties Changed as a Percentage of Sorties Planned ....... 222 

33 Sum Weather-related Changes ...................... 226 

34 Map Showing Assigned Targets ..................... 238 

35 Theater Intelligence Organizational Relationships ......... 273 

36 Collection Management Flow of Requests to CENTCOM. 

National and Tactical Theater Assets ............... 276 

37 U.S. and Saudi AWACS Orbits Near the Border with Iraq .... 306 

38 The Service Chain of Command .................... 383 

39 The Unified Combatant Command Organization ......... 386 

viii 
Report Acknowledgements 

This study of command and control in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm led the individuals of the Task Force throughout the United States 

as well as to Europe. Members journeyed, among other sites, to the 

office of Lt. Gen. Charles A. Homer at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, to 

Space Command Headquarters, Colorado, to the Office of the Secretary 

of the Air Force in the Pentagon, to the Tactical Air Command at Langley AFB, Virginia, and to Rome Laboratory at Griffiss AFB, New York. 

On all travels, numbers of talented and cooperative officers, enlisted 

personnel, and civilians extended their welcome and rendered their assistance. We hope our effort justifies the help they gave us. 

Piecing the story of command and control in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm presented a formidable challenge. It was impossible to read all the 

relevant documents or interview the multitude of command and control 

personnel active in the Middle East during the conflict. Nevertheless, the 

Task Force uncovered an impressive mass of documentation. In our 

efforts to do so, we were ably supported by the following individuals: 

Capt. Guy Cafiero, who provided materials on AWACS and ABcCC, Capt. 

Linwood N. Gray, our expert in air traffic control; Maj. Lewis D. Hill, 

who pulled the GWAPS sortie database into shape; retired Col. Donald A. 

Kellum, who uncovered the full story of close air support from records 

at Shaw AFB; Capt. Edward L. Simpkins, who worked to untangle the 

story of bomb damage assessments; and Lt. Col. B. John Wampler, for 

his advice on our Chapter 6. All made essential contributions to the Task 

Force’s understanding of command and control in the Gulf War. 

The Task Force is also indebted to our reviewers: Dr. Thomas Keaney, Lt. Gen. Anthony J. Burshnick, uSAF (Ret.), Lt. Col. Robert D. Eskridge, Prof. Richard H. Kohn, Lt. Col. Daniel Kuehl, Prof. James Q. 

Wilson, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Kelley, USAF (Ret.), Mr. Barry Watts, Dr. 

Wayne Thompson, Col. Emery M. Kiraly, Mr. Larry Lausten, Gen. Michael J. Dugan, USAF (Ret.), and Lt. Col. David A. Deptula. We particularly want to thank General Kelley for his efforts to help us master the 

finer points of controlling air operations at the theater level. 

Dr. Mark Mandeles, the Deputy Task Force Leader, and Lt. Col. 

Sanford Terry, the Task Force’s Chief Military Advisor, carried the 

burden of the day-to-day research and administration. Along with Dr. 

Thomas Hone, they wrote the bulk of the report. Finally, the Task Force 

ix 
owes a debt it cannot repay to Ms. Cecelia A. French, our administrative 

assistant, resident optimist, and manager. We could not have completed 

this report without her hard work and her professionalism. Thanks are 

due also to Mr. Chris Pankow, who had the thankless job of editing our 

manuscript. 

Command and Control is a controversial subject. There are as many 

types of command and control experts as there are expert economists, 

and, like economists, they often disagree among themselves about what 

they do, what they should study, and about what really matters in their 

field. Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director of GWAPS, gave us freedom to decide 

what we meant by command and control. Though there are three principal authors of the study, all errors of fact and of judgment are the responsibility of the head of the Task Force, Dr. Thomas C. Hone. 

X 
Introduction 

The Command and Control report is not a detailed history of command and control of air operations during Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm. Instead, the report considers those command and control issues 

that are inherent to the use of air power and crucial to its effective use. 

The first chapter outlines the problems facing the task force and the 

approach used in analyzing the command and control process. Chapter 2 

illustrates the complexity of modem air operations as revealed in specific 

air operations conducted during Desert Storm. The examples used in the 

chapter were chosen at random from among thousands, but they show 

how important it was for different types of aircraft to work closely together on a routine basis. Such close coordination required a tight linkage among different parts of a large air operations plan. It placed a 

heavy burden on planners. If they decided to change one element of their 

plan, they had to be sensitive of its effects on other elements. As the 

examples show, changes to operations plans tended to cascade through 

the theater-wide Air Tasking Order. 

Chapter 3 analyzes the performance of Lt. Gen. Charles A. Homer, 

the first Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). Homer’s 

formal responsibility was to plan and direct a theater-wide air campaign 

against Iraq and its forces. The chapter discusses the authority he was 

given as JFACC and how he used it, his relationship to the theater commander (General Schwarzkopf) and to his fellow component commanders, 

his leadership style, and his approach to Coalition warfare. As the first 

JFACC, Homer stepped into a new and controversial position. Chapter 3 

discusses his actions and what they may portend for future Joint Force 

Air Component Commanders. 

Homer directed the theater Tactical Air Control System (TACS) 

through the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). Chapter 4 describes the 

TACS and explains how its components were assembled during Desert 

Shield. The center of the Tactical Air Control System is the Tactical Air 

Control Center, a ground-based complex of command and control and 

communications personnel and their equipment. Chapter 5 describes how 

the TACC was set up in Riyadh and how it was organized. Chapter 6 

describes the “Black Hole”-the secret ad hoc organization put together 

during Desert Shield by Brig. Gen. Buster Glosson to plan the air offensive against Iraq. It also discusses what happened when, in December 

xi 
1990, the Black Hole became the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting (GAT) cell (and officially replaced CENTAF Combat Plans) at the heart 

of the TACC in Riyadh. 

Chapter 7 continues the analysis of the Tactical Air Control Center 

by examining how it operated during Desert Storm. The interaction 

between the Black Hole and the other organizational elements of the 

TACC was awkward. The Black Hole’s planners found it difficult to work 

smoothly with their colleagues in intelligence and operations, and the 

resulting friction affected the process of compiling the Air Tasking Order, 

which in turn influenced the conduct of the air campaign. Chapter 7 also 

shows that what senior air commanders in the Tactical Air Control Center 

thought was happening in the air campaign was sometimes not what was 

happening at all. That senior commanders had problems keeping track 

of the “real” air war should come as no surprise; their counterparts in 

earlier air wars had the same problem. Finally, Chapter 7 covers the 

command and control problems of detecting Scud missile launches and 

then of hunting mobile Scud launchers. The latter, not surprisingly, 

turned out to be much harder than the former. 

Chapter 8 examines the valuative side to command and control during 

the air campaign by explaining and then analyzing the process of bomb 

damage assessment. A number of organizations participated in this 

process, including intelligence agencies located outside the theater (and 

beyond the control of the theater commander). Bomb damage assessment 

also was conducted within the Tactical Air Control Center, in ways not 

planned for before Desert Storm began. The result was a very complicated and often confused process. 

Chapter 9 considers airborne command and control, especially that 

exercised by the personnel in the Airborne Warning and Control System 

(AWACS), the Joint Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance System 

(JSTARS), and the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center 

(ABCCC) aircraft. In managing airspace defense, aerial refueling, and airto-ground operations, these systems revealed the maturing capability of 

airborne, decentralized command and control. 

Chapter 10 pulls all the chapters together around the distinction 

introduced earlier in this section: the difference between organizational 

outputs and outcomes and the likelihood that the two will be confused 

during wartime. The original United States Strategic Bombing Survey 

noted that the air campaigns conducted against Germany and Japan were 

xii 
handicapped by large gaps in intelligence (both prewar and during the 

war) and by a lack of integrated military command at the theater level 

and above. The Strategic Bombing Survey prompted action to remedy 

these defects. Such action, designed to connect organizational outputs 

systematically to the outcomes produced by those outputs, was still being 

taken as late as 1986, when the Goldwater-Nichols act was passed, and 

through the late 1980s, when the Services were discussing the proper role 

and authority for the Joint Force Air Component Commander. The 

chapters in this report will show the progress in solving these two major 

problems. 

... Xlll 
Security Review 

The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were 

submitted to the Department of Defense for policy 

and security review. In accordance with this review, certain information has been removed from 

the original text. These areas have been annotated 

as [DELETED]. 

xiv 
1 

Command and Control: 

Methodology and Concepts 

The command and control process is made up of a series of actions. . . . The process begins with assessing the battlefield situation 

from available information. Following this assessment, the commander 

decides on a course of action. The commander then implements this 

decision by directing and controlling available forces. The final 

step. . .is evaluating the impact of the action on both friendly and 

opposing forces. This evaluation then serves as an input into an updated assessment of the situation, and the process continues.’ 

This concept of the command and control process is straightforward; 

its practice in war, however, is difficult. Appendix 2 to this report (“The 

Origins of the JFACC”), which reviews the history of command and control of air forces at the theater level, shows just how difficult it has often 

been to implement “the command and control process” in past air conflicts. In the case of the coalition war against Iraq, multinational air 

forces were wielded successfully against complex air defenses to achieve 

an overwhelming battlefield victory. We will explain how U.S. air forces 

were organized and led to that victory, working from the definition of 

“the command and control process” given by Tactical Air Command 

Manual 2-1 quoted above. We will focus on the challenges of implementing “the command and control process” during Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm, how those challenges were dealt with-sometimes successfully and sometimes not-and the consequences of specific actions taken 

for theater-level command and control during the conflict.2 

‘Tactical Air Command, TAC Manual 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, Aug 1991, pp 5-1 

’At the end of 1991, Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak stated 

publicly that the command and control process for the air war against Iraq might have 

collapsed altogether if it had been subjected to “really difficult combat conditions.” Tony 

Capaccio, “USAF Chief Pans War’s Command Chain,” Defense Week, 2 Dec 1991, p 1. 

and 5-2. 
The Task Force’s Perspective 

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm air operations, command and 

control was exercised by individuals working in specific offices within 

larger organizations, as often visualized in line and box organizational 

diagrams. Yet organizations are not just line diagrams. A set of boxes 

and lines on a chart does not do justice to the complexity, flexibility, and 

power of the kinds of organizations through which air commanders 

exercise the control of air units. 

The Tactical Air Control System-the focus of this report-is, for example, a collection of organizations, including (to name just a few) the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), one or more Air Support Operations Centers 

(for Army-Air Force coordination), and the small but critical groups of 

personnel who man systems such as AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and ABCCC (Airborne Battlefield Command and Control 

Center) aircraft. Each of these parts of the overall organization (the Tactical Air Control System) is itself a structured but flexible collection of 

trained personnel and the coordinated activities in which they engage. 

The purpose of these organizations (and many others) is to implement 

or support the directives of a theater-level commander. Put another way, 

what these organizations do (communicate, analyze, decide, etc.) and how 

they do it is the command and control process. It is that process that this 

Gulf War Air Power Survey Task Force has studied. 

We approached the process from two perspectives: outputs and 

outcomes. An organization’s outputs are what it does. Wings and squadrons, for example, fly missions. Organizational outcomes are the results 

that its outputs produce. Ideally, outputs, such as sorties, produce the 

right outcomes, such as degraded enemy defenses. 

Generally, senior commanders find it difficult during combat to distinguish outputs from outcomes and to discover outcomes. In fact, the inability to discern outcomes (damage to specific enemy capabilities) is usually 

the reason why senior commanders focus strongly on outputs, such as 

sortie rates. Professional soldiers understand this. Gen. Norman 

Schwarzkopf, for example, wanted measures of how air attacks against 

Iraqi army targets in Kuwait were reducing the combat capability of Iraqi 

divisions opposed to coalition forces. He was outcome-oriented, and 

properly so. He also understood that his desire for outcome indicators 

could easily be interpreted by his and his component commanders’ staffs 

2 
as a need for numbers of outputs. To avoid what he regarded as a potentially dangerous focus on outputs, Schwarzkopf actually discouraged staffs 

in the theater from gathering and reporting certain kinds of output data. 

General Schwarzkopf and his component commanders understood that 

they had to stay focused on outcomes. They also understood, however, 

that doing so would not be easy. Poor weather, the uncertainties of 

reconnaissance, and deliberate deception and defense on the part of the 

Iraqis would all combine to obscure outcomes. At the same time, as U.S. 

and allied forces struggled to plan and then mount missions from unfamiliar bases during the inevitable confusion caused by a rapid build-up, 

even outputs would be uncertain and obscure. As Lt. Gen. Charles A. 

Homer, the Joint Force Air Component Commander later observed, 

command in war is a matter of “managing chaos.”3 Put another way, 

senior commanders found that staying focused on outcomes was always 

a serious challenge. It required constant attention to all the elements of 

the command and control process. 

The Task Force has focused on how that attention was given, by 

whom, under what circumstances, and on the results produced. As a 

result, the chapters which follow pay much more attention to people and 

to their interactions (with one another and with the machines they operated) than to “hardware” (such as communications equipment). The study 

assumes that successful command and control-the balancing of outputs 

to achieve desired outcomes-is not a given but instead requires careful 

planning and deliberate, continuous management-to say nothing of the 

exercise of sound military judgment-by personnel at all levels. 

The paradox of modem military command at the theater level is that, 

though the responsibility of one officer, it must be exercised within a set 

of complex organizations. Commanders such as General Schwarzkopf 

and Lieutenant General Horner understood that they had to do more than 

find their enemy’s weak points and direct forces against those points. 

They also had to make sure that what they wanted done (the “outputs” to 

achieve the desired “outcomes”) was in fact done and done in the right 

way. Obviously, they had to work through their staffs and through their 

subordinates’ staffs. They had practiced doing just that. Yet they also 

knew, even before August 1990, that planning could not anticipate all the 

3(S) Intvw, Barry Barlow, Richard G. Davis, and Perry Jamieson with Lt Gen 

Charles A. Homer, Commander 9th AF, 4 Mar 1992. 

3 
factors that would affect their ability to command and control the forces 

assigned to them. No matter how much they and their staffs practiced, 

they would have to deal with unanticipated problems-to adapt4nce a 

crisis unfolded. 

The story of that adaptation and its consequences for command and 

control of the air campaign is one of the most interesting to come out of 

the war with Iraq. It is important because military command and control 

rests on the assumption that there will almost always be a difference 

between peacetime exercises and wartime action. Military command and 

control is, consequently, flexible and adaptable. Peacetime exercises are 

less a form of drill than learning experiences. The most fruitful peacetime simulations add to the skill, confidence, and sophistication of personnel in command and control organizations. 

What a commander wants to take with him into war is a set of organizations that can learn while they execute their missions. What those 

organizations can learn in peacetime is not so much precisely what to do 

in war but how to learn, and learn quickly, what to do. If they learn how 

to learn, then they give the commander (and every member of his force) 

an advantage. They give him added skill in assessing a situation, choosing among alternative courses of action, implementing the course he 

directs, and then studying its effects. Supported by such adaptable, 

quick-to-learn organizations, a commander can seize the military initiative 

and keep it until victory is achieved. 

However, there always will be a tension between organizational 

adaptability and organizational procedures in military command and 

control. If, facing the uncertainty and stresses of war, the personnel in 

military command and control organizations abandon their practiced and 

codified procedures and create informal and ad hoc organizations and 

procedures, they run two risks. The first is that they will get bogged 

down in efforts to put together a new structure to support the theater 

commander. That is, they will spend too much time just explaining what 

they’re doing and why to the other elements of command and control 

with which they must work. The second risk is that their new procedures 

will actually not work as efficiently as they anticipate, leaving them with 

ineffective command and control at the theater level. 

Command and control personnel must, therefore, balance the need to 

respond to the situation against the equally important need to maintain a 

structure within which information can be organized and analyzed and 

4 
decisions made and quickly communicated. As Lieutenant General 

Homer observed, there will be chaos in war, but that chaos must be 

managed. Just how that was done during Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

is the concern of this report. 

The Problems of Studying Command and Control 

It is difficult to describe accurately wartime command and control for 

several reasons. First, it is not easy to obtain accurate information on the 

behavior of the personnel and equipment that together comprise command 

and control systems. After all, the people who directed the air campaign 

against Iraq and all the supporting air activity were primarily interested 

in winning the war. Available records make that point clear. Not everything which might now throw light on the workings of command and 

control in the Gulf War was written down-or saved. 

Consequently, great use has been made of the testimony of participants and witnesses, despite the obvious risks that their memories may 

have faded or that they may have reinterpreted their experiences with 

hindsight. People also tend to see different things depending on their 

organizational positions. In this study, the testimony of some witnesses 

and participants may differ from or even contradict that given by others. 

The study has tried to canvass all perspectives and all points of view in 

order to cover all the detail of the command and control process, but 

there was simply not enough time to gather and consider carefully all the 

important perspectives on command and control of air operations in the 

war against Iraqi control. 

A second problem is that operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

generated huge amounts of data. Researchers were like crash investigators trying to discover what had caused an airplane to go down: there 

was so much evidence, and so much of that evidence was in the form of 

fragments, that it was difficult sometimes to know where to begin and 

when to stop collecting. Even worse, the substantial volume of information made available to researchers did not guarantee that the really crucial 

records had been preserved. As General Schwarzkopf himself noted in 

his memoirs, for example, “there was no official record of many” of the 

5 
communications between him and Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

This problem of not being sure of having enough of the right information was to some degree a function of the extensive use of secure 

telephones (for both conversations and facsimiles) during Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm. In addition, many command and control organizations 

and relationships affecting the air campaign were ad hoc-invented and 

then disbanded once their tasks were completed. Several of these organizations left few records of their activities; others left many records. The 

Task Force tried to avoid becoming “captured” by those records kept in 

the greatest quantity. However, we cannot be sure that the records kept 

and then given to it reflect a full and accurate record of command and 

control at all levels. 

The final problem which hindered effective research was the unreliability of records retained by some command and control organizations, 

especially once the air war began in earnest in mid-January 1991. For 

example, the accuracy of the entries in the Air Tasking Order Change 

Log kept by personnel manning the Tactical Air Control Center in Riyadh 

during Desert Storm is questionable. It is likely that the GWAPS Composite Sorties Database also contains errors. Yet these documents had to be 

used by the Task Force; they held the best data available. 

These three general problems-not always having the right information, being overwhelmed by all the information that was preserved, and 

being forced to use some unreliable information because nothing better 

was available-forced the Task Force to spend a great deal of time just 

reviewing its sources and cross-checking its data. Thus, inferences drawn 

from our data reflect the limitations of those data. 

H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York, 4 

1992), p 325. 

6 
2 

Case Studies in Command and Control 

The air campaign in the Gulf War required the planning, tasking, and 

execution of more than 2,000 sorties a day.’ The planning and execution 

of this daily operation was an effort of immense complexity, involving 

such tasks, among many others, as coordinating times over target into 

time blocks of 15 minutes or less. Sorties frequently were planned and 

flown in “packages,” groups of aircraft supporting one another in an 

attack against a particular target or target area. A package normally 

consisted of ground attack aircraft accompanied by fighter aircraft (providing escort or cover against enemy aircraft), and electronic combat and 

defense suppression aircraft (jamming or destroying enemy air defenses). 

Attack and fighter aircraft frequently had to refuel in order to reach their 

targets or to loiter in the target area. Their flights, therefore, had to be 

coordinated with those of tanker aircraft. In addition, while enroute to 

and from the target area, they might receive command guidance, threat 

updates and warnings, or targeting updates from airborne command and 

control or intelligence gathering aircraft. 

The process of planning for the launch of only a few sorties is not 

necessarily difficult; planning to launch more than 2,000 sorties a day 

from many locations is extremely complex. The following two case 

studies will give the reader a sense for how this vast enterprise was 

orchestrated by illustrating the planning and tasking process and the 

challenges confronted. The cases were chosen at random; our purpose is 

to portray difficulties encountered in controlling an air campaign and in 

documenting its conduct. We begin with a general description of how 

attacks were planned and coordinated. 

‘A sortie is defined in JCS Pub 1-02 as “an operational flight by one aircraft” 

(Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 Dec 1989. p 337). 

During Operation Desert Storm, coalition aircraft flew an avemge of 2,847 sorties per 

day. On 23 Feb 1991. 3.279 sorties were flown, the greatest daily total of the war. On 

20 Jan 1991.2.31 1 sorties were flown-the fewest number of the war. (GWAPS Composite 

Sorties Database; see CWAPS Statistical Compendium. 

7 
The Planning Cycle 

The cycle of selecting, developing, tasking, executing, and evaluating 

a mission is less complicated when these individual tasks for a single day 

are considered in isolation? Figure 1 depicts the planning cycle.3 An 

appreciation of the complexity of this planning cycle is essential to understanding the case studies. 

The planning cycle started when the Guidance, Apportionment and 

Targeting (GAT) cell4 arrived at work.5 For the purposes of this 

description, we call this Day 1 of the planning cycle. The officers in this 

cell began planning by translating General Horner’s guidance (who, in 

turn, received guidance from General Schwarzkopf), into a coherent, 

%’he normal planning cycle required three days, although that cycle could be circumvented at a number of points in order to take advantage of fresh information or in order 

to cope with unexpected changes (e.g.. bad weather or maintenance problems). On any 

single day, the planners worked on planning, coordination, and orchestration tasks for 

“today,” “tomorrow,” and the “day after tomorrow.” See Chapter 5 for a more detailed 

discussion of the three day planning cycle. 

3(S) USCEN~AF Combat Plans Handout, Jan 1991. pp 1-6. See also Briefing, Lt Col 

David A. Deptula, SAFIOSX, ‘The Air Campaign: Planning and Execution, 26 Nov 91”; 

see also Briefing, Lt Col Sam Baptiste, 9th AF, “ATO Preparation,” 4 Dec 1991. 

%he GAT, also known as the “Black Hole,” came into existence after the reorganization of the CENTAF staff in Dec 1990. This reorganization incorporated the special 

Planning Groupthe original Black Hole-into the CENTAF Tactical Air Control Center 

(TACC) staff (see GwAPS Chapter 5). During Desert Storm, the GAT operated out of a 

room in the basement of the Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters building in Riyadh. 

This room. measuring approximately 30 feet by 50 feet, was divided by plywood walls 

into eight office spaces: (a) the Iraqi and Kuwaiti theater planning cells, (b) the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) cell, (c) the Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE), (d) the 

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, (e) Scud cell, (9 Administration, (g) Studies and Analyses, 

and (h) an office for Gen Glosson. 

%here was no “official” starting time for the beginning of the planning cycle. Lt 

Col Deptula briefed that the planning cycle began at 0800 local time. Lt Col Deptula was 

chief planner in the CENTAF Special Planning Group during Desert Shield, and director, 

Strategic Planning Cell during Desert Storm. (Briefing, Lt Col David Deptula, SAF/OSX, 

“The Air Campaign: Planning and Execution,” 26 Nov 1991.) The Jan 1991 USCWAF 

Combat Plans Handout showed the AT0 cycle starting with a lo00 CC (Gen Homer) 

discussion with the CAT (pp 1-6). Lt Col Sam Baptiste. Chief of Weapons and Tactics 

at 9th AF HQ, did not give any specific timeframe for this start of the planning process. 

(Briefing, Lt Col Baptiste, “AT0 Preparation,” 4 Dec 1991.) 

8 
Figure 1 

The Planning Cycle 

I 

1900 

CINC's 

Meeting 

Day 1 

0800 Fragger 1800 AT0 Rele

Situational to Units via CA

Update Brief 

0500 

b 

I I 

I 

1400 Fraggerl 

Tanker Inputs to 

CAFMS Cell 

0800 2000 0430 

GAT * Niaht 

Targeting 

Cell Master Attack Plan 

(MAP) Development 

Force Packages, Call Signs, 

Target DMPls, etc. (Target 

Planning Worksheets-TPW) All T
coordinated plan-the Master Attack Plan (MAP). In addition to the Commander in Chief’s guidance, the attack plan also included intelligence 

information received overnight and bomb damage assessment from various sources. For example, at least one member of the GAT would attend 

the morning meeting in the Tactical Air Control Center’s combat operations area, during which the night shift gave way to the day shift. This 

meeting relayed information on the previous day’s missions and updated 

the next day’s planned missions for officers working the oncoming shift. 

It also provided opportunity for General Homer to issue guidance and 

instruction to the Central Command Air Forces staff as a whole. Later, 

around lOOOL, General Homer also would speak informally with GAT 

officers and receive updates on the course of planning. 

The GAT worked on the attack plan for Day I from approximately 

0800 in the morning until 1800 at night. As the sample page at Figure 26 

indicates, the first draft of the Master Attack Plan consisted of handwritten worksheets, which contained six kinds of information: (a) the 

time on target (TOT) for the attack, (b) a mission number (often left blank 

in the first iteration), (c) the basic encyclopedia number (BEN4 standard 

reference to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s automated installation file 

identifier), (d) a target code (based on the Guidance, Apportionment, and 

Targeting cell’s own categories, which consisted of a two-digit number 

and a one- to three-letter identifier, such as “L” for leadership and “SC” 

for Scud-related), (e) a target description (normally the name and short 

description such as “ammunition storage”), and (f) the number and type 

of aircraft conducting the attack. The Master Attack Plan would be 

keyed into a personal computer file as it was built. Gen. Buster C. 

Glosson, Director, Campaign Plans, signed completed attack plans. 

Figure 3 shows the first page of a completed, approved Master Attack 

Plan for 21 January 199 1 .’ 

6(S) Master Attack Plan Draft, 21 Jan 1991, D4, 5th 24 Hours, GWAB BH, box 1, 

’(S) Master Attack Plan, 21 Jan 1991, D+4, 5th 24 Hours, GWAPS BH, box 1, folder 

folder 9. 

9. 

10 
Figure 2 

First Draft of Master Attack Plan 

11 
6:48 PM 

20 JAN11600 

Figure 3 

Completed, Approved Master Attack Plan 

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-_ 1 F-117 

333bA c2 1 ABU GHURAYB BW PT 2 F-117 3 3 3PA c22 ABU GHURAYB VACCINE PT 1 F-117 

3 3 3154 CCC28 BAG TELECOM CTR 2 F-117 334137 [DELETED] UQII NAT c3 BKR wc nsmw Fat 1 F-117 

%% C23 TAJI BW FAC 1 F-117 

0215 3327A LO4 N TAJI C3 FAC 112 sazaam L19 INTEL SERVICE HQ 

SAD28 AL TAJI IOC 

*DUAL DOOR GBU-10 

0215 4411A(U) A0 8 AR RUMAYLAH 8 GA-1* SEAD 

AN NUMANIYAH 8 GR-2 TO 4421A(U) [DELETED] A31 

0230 SEAD 2EF-111 *COORD EF-111 W/MSN 0471X 

12 
A draft Master Attack Plan would be largely completed when the 

night targeting cell (NTC)’ arrived at 1800 in the evening. The night 

targeting cell officers would adjust and “massage” the draft attack plan 

by weaponeering the targets: building and coordinating force packages, 

assigning call signs, and performing the other tasks required to translate 

the concept embodied in the plan into an executable plan. This process 

was very informal; the night targeting cell did not follow a “checklist 

procedure.” For example, the B-52 representative would examine the 

nominated B-52 targets and missions on the draft attack plan. First, in 

conjunction with intelligence planners, he would do a quick “sanity 

check” on the targets to identify any glaring inconsistencies or errors. 

Second, he would coordinate support from defense suppression or escort 

aircraft, if so required by the target area threat or planned tactics. He 

would then complete the target planning worksheet with the applicable 

weapon and aimpoint selection data. Finally, he would contact all the 

applicable units via secure telephone to give them a “heads up” on the 

forthcoming Air Tasking Order.” 

%’he GAT night shift became the nucleus for the CENTAF NTC once Desert Storm 

began and the tempo of the planning process increased. The NTC was identified as an 

organization under the Combat Planning Division of the CENTAF Combat Plans Organization (S) (USCENTAF Combat Plans Handout, at 1990, p ii). After the CENTAF reorganization in Dec 1990, the NTC does not appear on the Jan 1991 (S) USCEWAF Combat Plans 

Handout organizational chart as a distinct division or organization within the Campaign 

Plans organization (p ii). Rather, the term, “night targeting cell” referred to the night shift 

in the GAT and AT0 Divisions, which collectively built the packages, filled in the target 

planning worksheets, etc. People assigned to many functional divisions throughout the 

CENTAF staff were involved in this process. 

’Weaponeering “is the process of determining the quantity of a specific type weapon 

required to achieve a specified level of damage to a given target, considering target 

vulnerability, weapon effects, munitions delivery errors, damage criteria, probability of 

kill, weapon reliability, etc. When the objective of force employment is to employ lethal 

force against a target, targeters use a variety of weaponeering methodologies to determine expected damage levels. These weaponeering methodologies include both nonnuclear and nuclear weaponeering techniques. Common to both methodologies is 

aimpoint selection and weapons effects analysis.” Department of the Air Force, An 

Inlroduction to Air Force Targeting, AF Pamphlet 200-17. 23 Jun 1989, p 21. 

‘%ased on personal experience of a Task Force IV member. Lt Col Sanford S. 

Terry, then Major, was assigned to the SAC Strategic Forces Advisors (STRATFOR) at 

USCENTAF Headquarters, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia from 26 Jan 1991 to 25 Apr 1991. While 

in this position, Lt Col Terry worked in the night shift in the GAT and performed the 

functions normally performed by the NTC. 

13 
As planners assembled packages, they coordinated the package support 

(for example, mission times on target and numbers of aircraft) to make 

scarce resources, such as F-4Gs, available to support as many strike packages as possible. Changes made to a particular sortie had to be coordinated 

with the other night targeting officers and the officers in the daytime Iraq 

and Kuwaiti theater cells. In this way the initial pencil draft of the Master 

Attack Plan was updated throughout the night until it was completely 

coordinated. The 1900 Commander in Chief's meeting each evening 

provided another source of changes to the draft plan." Changes from the 

1900 meeting also were coordinated through the night targeting cell. 

Targets and missions of B-52s (above) were supported by 

as many as possible F-4Gs (below). 

(S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, SAF/OSX. 20 Nov 1991. I1 

14 
The night targeting cell coordination process resulted in the entries 

on the target planning worksheet (TPW). Every sortie that released a 

weapon on a target had a worksheet completed for that particular mission. 

In addition, the worksheet for each attack package included support 

sorties such as suppression of enemy air defenses and combat air patrol 

missions. The target planning worksheet, when filled in properly, included all the information necessary for Central Command Air Force officers 

to build an Air Tasking Order, from which unit officers would plan their 

assigned missions and fly a particular sortie.’* Figure 4 shows a target 

worksheet filled in for six B-52s attacking a target on 9 February 1991 .I3 

This worksheet gave all the target and mission information necessary for 

officers from the 1708th (Provisional) Bomb Wing to plan and execute 

the particular mission. Such information included the following: (a) 

recommended ordnance, (b) the package designator, (c) supporting 

aircraft and their mission numbers, (d) air refueling instructions, (e) 

specific target objectives and aimpoints, and (f) probability of destruction 

derived from the Joint Munitions Effects Manual, or JMEM.I4 

By 0430L of Day 2, the target planning worksheets were completed 

and given to the Air Tasking Order (ATO) Division,” who completed the 

coordination (among tankers, air space controllers, and units)16 and entered the tasking data into the Computer Assisted Force Management 

System (CAFMS), the computer-based system used to disseminate the 

‘+he individual weapon system representatives filled out TPWS to varying degrees 

of completeness; the purpose of this exercise was to ensure that the fundamental tasks 

involved in successfully flying the particular aircraft mission or package had been completed. 

(S) USCENTAF Target Planning Worksheet, D+23,9 Feb 1991, GWAPS, BH Box 9. 

’‘1ntelligence officers train to determine a particular level of target destruction. 

Formulae and weapons data found in the JMEMs and data on specific aircraft capability 

and weapons loads form the basis of targeteering-determining the number and type of 

weapon needed to achieve a desired probability of kill. JMEMS are discussed at length in 

GWAPS Volume 11. 

”(S) [ISCEWAF Combat Plans Handout, Jan 1991, pp 1-6. See also briefing, Lt Col 

Sam Baptiste, “AT0 Preparation,” 4 Dec 91. 

16Air refueling tasking was not included in the MAP. This coordination was very 

difficult because of the high density of planned air traffic and the requirements for aerial 

refueling support. 

13 

15 
Figure 4 

Target Planning Worksheet 

I I I I I1 1 I I I II 

I: I I I I I I1 

1'; I I I 1 

I I II 

I I I1 I1 
‘completed Air Tasking Order to the tasked Air Force units.17 This remaining airspace and air refueling information was due to the CAFMS 

operators no later than 1400L on Day 2 of the planning cycle,” so that 

the tasking order could be transmitted by 18oOL.I9 

After receipt of the tasking order, sometime around 1800L. each unit 

would begin its own mission planning. The order’s effective period 

began at 0500L?’ If the process was flowing smoothly the minimum 

amount of planning time a unit had between Air Tasking Order receipt 

and time on targets was eleven hours. Delays at any part of the cycle 

could delay the unit’s receipt of the tasking order, thus reducing its time 

for planning. Figure 5 provides one page of a Central Command Air 

Forces-published Air Tasking Order?’ 

Guidance, Apportionment. and Targeting Cell officers could change 

the Master Attack Plan, and the subsequent Air Tasking Order, before the 

air order was transmitted to the units. For example, officers working at 

night could change the pencil draft of the attack plan based upon the 

1900 Commander in Chief’s meeting, late intelligence information, or 

Mission Reports. It is possible to follow the development of the Master 

Attack Plan” from its initial draft to the final form approved by General 

Buster C. Glosson, Director, CENTAF Campaign Plans, because most of 

the printed plans have two clock times or dateshimes printed on them. 

”At times, the completed daily ATO was approximately 1,OOO pages long (this was 

not an everyday occurrence). It contained all the information a unit needed to plan and 

fly each particular mission. The CENTAF ATO was based upon the ATO message format 

found in the US. Joint Message Text Format Handbook published by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. (Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 6-4, U.S. Message Text Formatting Program, 

OPR: AF/XOR, at 1992, Chapter 3.) 

‘*Briefing, Lt Col Sam Baptiste, “ATO Preparation,” 4 Dec 91. 

191bid. 

2olbid. 

(S) Air Tasking Orders, GWAPS, css Safe 6, Desert Shield - 20 Jan 1991. For a 

definition of each individual field and nomenclature in a CENTAF AT0 see GWAPS Volume 

11, Chapter 3. 

For example. changes to missions, targets, and TOTS can be tracked by arraying 

successive iterations of a MAP for a particular day. 

21 

22 

17 
Figure 5 

Air Tasking Order 

COhhENTS : HSNDAT 

TGTLOC 

REFUEL 

REFUEL 

PENTAGON OPERATXONS DIRECTORATE 

[DELETED] 

AhPN/ 

HSNDAT/f 

COMENTS: TAW BECH ARTY// 

nxoci 

ABPN/ 

WNDAP 

TGTLOC 

ABPN/ 

WNDAT 

TGTLOC 

REFUEL 

REFUEL 

COMENTS: 

COME NTS : 

BINISTRY OF 

HlNlSTRY OF 

[DELETED] 

NFO// 

[DELETED] 

NFO// 

[DELETED] 

ABPN/ 

WSNDAi 

TGTLDt 

REFUEL 

REFUEL 

AUPN/ 

HSNDAT/ 

COMENTS: BAGHDAD NUC FA[// 

CnHhENTS: BAGHDAD NUC FAC FA(// 

TGTLOti 

REF UEL/ 

RE FUEL/ 

AHPN/ REHARK IDENTIFIER(S): A E J K T 

BSN D AT / 

TGTLOt/ 

REFUEL/ 

REFUEL/ 

ABPN/ REhARK IDENTIFIER(S): A C E F K T 

HSNDAT/ 

TGTLOC, 

REFUEL 

COMENTS: HED ARTY CP// 

COMENTS: NAJEF IOC/RDR// 

TGTLOti 

REF UEL/ 

RE FUEL/ 

AHPN/ REHARK IDENTIFIER(S): A E J K T 

BSN D AT / 

TGTLOt/ 

COMENTS: HED ARTY CP// 

IDENTIFIER(S): A C E F K T 

K: NAJEF IOC/RDR// 

REFUEL/ 

REFUEL/ 

ABPN/ REhARK 

COME N' 

HSNDAT/ 

TGTLOC, 

REFUEL 

REFUEL 

AMPN/ 

HSND AT/ 

COhHENTS: NEJEF NEW AFLD// 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

TGTLOC/ REFUEL/ [DELETED] 

REFUEL, 

AHPN/ REHARK IDENTIFlER(S): A E K T 

COMENTS: AL JAHRAH USL FAG:// 

NARR/ UNIT REBARKS: 35TFU 

UN IT REUARKS A 

SEE TANKER SPINS FOR AAR INFORMTION. 

UNIT RERARKS C 

UNIT REBARKS E 

CONTACT EAST AWACS FOR DIRECT CONTROL. USE EAST COM PLAN. 

UNIT REBARKS F 

THIS PACKAGE IS TASKED FOR WLTIPLE TARGETS. SEE HISSION 

COHfiANDER OPORD IN CAFfG. 

UNIT REBARKS H BT 

CONTACT CENTRAL AWACS FOR DIRECT CONTRDLe USE CENTRAL COM P 'LAN. 

MCN-01020/20616 TDR~SlO20/11132 IAD'D1020/11302 CDSN-UAP374 OUR FORCE YESSAGE. PAGf 3 OF 2 2015SSZ JAN 01 

SECT (4 OF 04 18 
The first clock time, given by date and time, was entered into the document by the keyboard operator. In the Master Attack Plan in Figure 3, 

this datehime identifier is 20 Jan/1600. The second time, given just as 

a clock time, was generated by the computer as it printed the copy of the 

plan. On Figure 3, this clock time identifier is 6:48 pm. 

Changes made to a Master Attack Plan had to be coordinated, regardless of whether the night targeting cell was compiling the target 

planning worksheets or the ATO Division was assembling the Air Tasking 

Order-otherwise, the order would be released with obsolete data. While 

attack plan changes did not pose a large coordination problem to the 

night targeting staff, they were a larger problem for the AT^ Division, a 

Central Command Air Forces staff component. The AT0 Division was 

not collocated with Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting; it was 

manned by officers who were unfamiliar with their people and procedures. In most cases the ATO Division never saw a Master Attack Plan; 

the plan was used by the targeting team and senior staff and was not 

distributed widely. Conscious coordination between the GAT and the AT0 

Division was necessary whenever changes were made after the target 

planning worksheets had been completed. In the absence of this coordination, conflicts and errors regarding times on targets, targets, and mission support cascaded to the units below. In addition, since targeting 

planners could be less certain that their plans were even executed, there 

would be more uncertainty that planned outcomes had been achieved. 

New or different tasks were assigned to units even after the AT0 was 

published. Initially, the change logbook in the Tactical Air Control 

Center (TACC) Combat Operations Division (also known as the “Bubble”) 

was the only means to track the changes and ensure that they were coordinated among the units effe~ted.2~ Figure 6 displays a page from this 

log covering 19 January 1991 (D+02, AT0 D).24 Combat Operations officers executed each Air Tasking Order and managed the change process 

once an order had been published. A tasking order change sheet was 

23Assuming GAT officers informed Combat Operations Division officers of MAP 

24(S) USCENTAF TACC change logbook, GWAPS, NA #370. 

changes made after the AT0 was published. 

19 
Figure 6 

Air Tasking Order Change Logbook 

20 
developed during the first week of the war (illustrated in I:igure 7125 to 

cope with the number and complexity Of the changes that occurred in 

early Air Tasking Orders. This sheet was Used to change, udd, or cancel 

missions and to ensure that all the applicable coordination hud been done 

by Combat Operations. While the change logbook and sheets do not 

cover every change that occurred, they provide a generally accurate 

picture of the process and execution of changes to a tasking order. 

Unit-level officers would complete a Mission Report (MISREP) after 

each sortie containing information critical to the targeting team planners, 

such as the pilot's perception of his weapon accuracy, information on 

threats encountered, and takeoff and landing times. Figure 8 shows a unit 

MISREP?~ Mission Reports varied greatly in quality. In some cases, 

pilots viewed completion of them as formality; in others, pilots gave 

detailed accounts of what they had seen. Even the niost accurate of 

observers, however, could err in recalling events from attacks launched 

at several hundred miles per hour and 10,m to 20,000 fect above the 

target. While completion of a Mission Report culminated a particular Air 

Tasking Order planning cycle, the reports were not Systeniutically forwarded to Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting. Certain kinds of 

mission-related products were forwarded to the targeting cell, notably 

videotapes of bomb drops. Unfortunately, videotape recorders (capable 

of recording weapon impact on the target) were only available on a few 

systems: F-l17A, the F-l5E, and the F-11 l EZ7 Furthermore, the quality 

of imagery from these systems varied, with the F-117A probably providing the best infrared imagery for use in bomb damage assessment. 

The process of planning, tasking, executing, and evuluuting aircraft 

sorties as flown under the command of General Horner, the Joint Force 

Air Component Commander, during Desert Storm was coinplex. In 

"(S) Master Attack Plan, D+22, 8 Fcb 1991, 23rd 24 Hours. CiWhl'S, BH Box 1, 

Folder 27. (U) The ATO change sheet ihstrated iS a later vcrsioii ol' illc form used to 

make changes. An earlier version existed. It had a slightly difl'crcnt l'orlilil( but ordered 

essentially the same information. 

26(S) Mission Report, 2117002 Jan 1991, 363d TW, Mission #04011;, 21 Jan 91, 

27All fighter aircraft have airborne video tape =orders; most of tlicnc systems film 

363d TFW OSS/OSIO. 

the heads-up display only at weapons release. 

21 
Figure 7 

Air Tasking Order Change Sheet 

UNIT 3') 16L3 CHANGEU TANKER 

INPUT TlbiE m AWACS ___ 

RWESTED BY VAN ENTRY #/BY 

I TARGET REQUESTOR OLD NEW ATOlD X 

CIRCLE ADDON CHANGE CANCEL PACKAGE CWRD 

AIRSPAI E 

___ BASE I0 scoo 

/ AOCCC - 

REASON FOR CHANGE TYPEFCO 

MSN LENGTH 

TANKER PAE MSN f ARCT TRACK ALTITUDE 

POST 

cF;;Lop 

22 
Figure 8 

Mission Report (MISREP) 

***SECRET*** 

02 2117002 ZRN 9: OC ssss IN 

36Z TFW FROVISlONAL//IY// 

USCENTAF//IN// 

SECRET 

DPER/DESERT SHIELD// 

MSSID/~IEREP/~~~~FW/Z~~~~~~// 

fist4 NDt0401F/BXf-l6/f 

A. 

2/ [DELETED] 332B50N0435900E// 

8. DTGITOT: 211312Z// 

t. RESULTS: SUCCESSFUL/16 X tlK 04 EXPENDED/REVIEW OF VTR SktOWS 

HITS OY 4 EASTERN STOKAGE AREaS AND PR@B HITS 3N PRODUCTION ClREP 

%ND WESTERN STORADE AREA// 

-1. TARGET 085EhVATION: HDDEKPTE 37 tlM AQA 1s TGT AREA/RCVD U RWY IN 

IGT AAEA PRO6 FKOM AL Tfi@ADDJr( AND YClRTrl OF TGT AREA// 

D2. ENROUTE QPSEFWATICJN! GHALAYSW AFLD A.=PEARED TO HAVE ONE CRATER 

Oh NORTH SIDE OF RNWY, ONE Oh TAXIWAY, AN3 ONE NEFG BUNKERS/RCdD BR-2 

RWR PHOB FROM SA-2 VZC 330tNOC540E// 

TARGET IDE~?IFIER/LOC~TIONIHA~~ANI~RH POSS CW PROD FACILITY 

DL TRSWI; ooaix// 

REMARKEt AMACS REPORTED U/I ACFT 20rJM SE OF AL ASAD HDG SOilfHfPOSS 

cIcm FIRED BY UNK ACFT// 

SAPIE AS RELERSER 

23 
In addition, as the preceding discussion illustrates, it was a labor-intensive 

system based upon written products communicated through several different groups of planners, each with a specific function. The following two 

case studies illustrate how the process worked, problems encountered with 

the process, and how problems were overcome. 

AARDVARKS BUSTING BUNKERS, 

D+16, 2 FEB 1991, AT0 R 

This case study examines use of precision munitions to attack hardened aircraft shelters (HAS). It follows F-1llFs from the 48th Tactical 

Fighter Wing (m) tasked to attack these targets on D+16, 2 February 

1991; this was AT0 "R." The mission involved a group of these aircraft 

(known unofficially as "Aardvarks") to attack the airfields at H-2 and 

H-3, in western Iraq. The ATO day, D+16, began at 0202002 and ended 

at 0302002 and covered taskings in the period 02O001Z to 030300Z?8 

F-111 Fs (above) were known unofficially as "Aardvarks." 

The first pencil draft of the Master Attack Plan for D+16 lists a large 

package of F-1llFs attacking the H3 and H2 airfields, between 02002 - 

(S) Air Tasking Orders, GWAPS, CSS safe 6, Desert Shield - 1 Feb 1991. 28 

24 
0220Z?9 Tables 1 and 2 present this package, identified as "AA," and its 

support package. Figure 9 shows the targets and bases from which the 

F-1 1 1 Fs launched the mission. 

lsrble 1 

AA Package of F-111s Attacking H3 and H2 Melds 

Mission GAT Target Target Number of 

Number Number Aircraft ~~ ~ 

01 11A C05 H3 Afld CW FOW F-11 1F 

Bunker 

BE# A 

0121A/0131A A03 H3 Afld Tbelve F-I I IF 

HA SIRWYIFAC 

BE# A 

0141A A1 1 H2 Afld Four F-lllF 

HASlRWYlFAC 

BE# B 

Table 2 

Support Package of Table 1 

Mission Number Mission Number of Aircraft 

0151X SEAD TWO EF-I 11 

0161W SEAD WO F-4G 

0171C SweepPorce protection Two F-15C 

[SEAD: suppression of enemy air defenses.] 

29 (S) Master Attack Plan, D+16, 2 Feb 1991, 17th 24 Hours, GWAPS. BH Box 1. 

Folder 21. 

25 
Figure 9 

Targets and Bases From Which 

F-111Fs Launched The Mission 

The first source of error in this attack plan is in the designation of the 

targets. Targets were identified on this draft plan in two ways: (a) by 

the Black Hole’s nomenclature (C05, A03, and All), which had been 

devised as an attempt to simplify the targeting process, and (b) by the 

basic encyclopedia (BE) numbers. The draft attack plan BE number 

given for the chemical warfare bunker at H-3 was incorrect. The target 

26 
for mission number 01 1 IA, C05h-I-3 AFLD CW bunker, was listed with 

BE number A. Yet, this BE number is inconsistent with the Master 

Target List (MTL) description of target C05 as the H-3 AFLD (munitions 

storage facility chemical bunker), with BE number C.30 The H-3 airfield 

facilities, A03 in the target list, had a BE number A.31 The attack plan 

draft, while listing the desired target as the chemical warfare bunkers at 

H-3, C05, listed the BE number for the airfield facilities at H-3, A03, 

instead. 

A second pencil copy of the Master Attack Plan draft had small 

changes to the planned package, and missions and numbers of aircraft for 

the package were laid out in greater Table 3 shows the tasking 

as it appeared in this draft. The suppression of enemy air defenses support, sweep/force protection, and the times on targets had not changed 

from the original pencil draft. However, confusion over the specific 

tasking at the H3 airfield remained. Mission number 0111A was still 

targeted against the H3 AFLD CW bunker (GAT target number C05), but 

the BE number remained the BE A-which corresponded to the GAT target 

number A03 for the H3 airfield facilities. 

With two minor exceptions, the target planning worksheets completed 

for this package were the same as the two drafts of the Master Attack 

The first exception was an increase from two to four in mission 

0161 W's F-~Gs, and second, the error in the listing of the BE number for 

the chemical warfare bunker was corrected. Each mission, except 01 1 I A, 

was given the task of attacking hardened aircraft shelters. Mission 01 1 1 A 

was tasked to attack the chemical warfare bunker at the H3 airfield (C05 

on the target list). Remaining ordnance was to be expended on the 

airfield facilities as detailed in the worksheets. Coordinates were given 

for specific structures to be attacked, and all the missions were tasked to 

use precision-guided weapons (GBU-24 or GBU- 10) against the targets. 

30(S) Master Target List, GwAPS, BH Box 8. 

3'lbid. 

(S) Master Attack Plan. D+16, 2 Feb 1991, 17th 24 Hours, GWAPS, BH Box 1, 

33(s) Target Planning Worksheets, AT0 D+16,2 Feb 191, HQ%hAF/OSX, Shaw AFB, 

32 

Folder 21. 

NC, Lt Col Jeffrey Feinstein. 

27 
Table 3 

Tasking Draft of Master Attack Plan 

Mission GAT Target Target Number of 

Number Number Aircraft 

0111A co5 H3 Afld CW Four F-1 1 1 

Bunker 

BE #A 

0115A A03 H3 Afld Four F-111 

HASlRWYlFAC 

BE #A 

01 21 A 

0125A 

0141A 

A03 H3 Afld Four F-11 1 

HASIRWYIFAC 

BE #A 

A03 H3 Afld Four F-111 

H ASIRWYIFAC 

BE #A 

A1 1 H2 Afld Four F-1 1 1 

H ASIRW YlFAC 

BE #B 

There were three printed draft attack plans for this particular day. 

The dates and times on these plans show they were constructed after the 

target planning worksheets were turned into the AT0 Division. The first 

draft attack plan had a computer-printed datehime of ‘W1/91 9:32 am” 

(operator-entered datehime is 1 Feb/l 700).34 The second plan was dated 

“2/2/91 12:28 pm” (operator-entered datdtime is 1 Feb 12OO).” The final 

plan, which was signed by General Glosson, was dated “2/1/91 3:41 pm” 

(operator-entered date remained 1 Feb 1200).36 These three versions of 

34(S) Master Attack Plan, D+16, 2 Feb 1991, 17th 24 Hours, GwAPS, BH Box 1, 

35(S) Ibid. 

36(S) Ibid. 

Folder 2 1. 

28 
the Master Attack Plan had identical tasking for package AA-the times 

on targets, support and fighter escort aircraft remained as planned in the 

earliest draft attack plans?' However, the target focus shifted as successive draft plans were printed. The tasking on the three printed versions 

of the Master Attack Plan called for all the missions to H3 to focus on 

the chemical warfare bunkers (GAT target number C05), instead of the 

hardened aircraft shelters.'* But, the target BE number on these printed 

attack plans remained the BE number for the H3 airfield-not the BE 

number for the CW bunkers. 

The Air Tasking Order printed for D+16 contained the tasking for the 

48th Tactical Fighter Wing package AA as detailed on the target planning 

worksheets, with the exception that the time on target was changed to 

010020130Z. This tasking order assigned mission 01 11A to attack the H3 

airfield CW b~nker.3~ The specific BE number for that H3 airfield CW 

bunker, number C, was placed in the unit remarks section under item Z. 

The other missions to H3, 0115A. 0121A, and 0125A were assigned to 

attack H3 airfield. The BE number for these missions in remark Z, number 

A, was the correct BE number for the H3 Airfield facilities. The tasking 

order stated the first priority for attack was the remaining hardened aircraft 

shelters at the H3 airfield. Remaining ordnance was to be expended on the 

airfield facilities, exactly as detailed in the targeting worksheets. Unit 

remark V detailed the sorties' desired mean points of impact (DMPIS) as the 

remaining hardened aircraft shelters followed by the airfield facilities. 

Mission 0141A was tasked against the H2 airfield (with the correct BE 

number for that airfield) and had similar instructions in the remark V.& 

However, these air tasking instructions did not correspond to the targets 

assigned the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing in the attack plans printed after the 

targeting worksheets had been submitted to the AT0 Division. 

"The number of Fas tasked to SEAD in the draft MAR increased from two to four 

38As noted above, these three MAPS were printed after the TPWS were turned into the 

39(S) Air Tasking Orders, GWAPS, CSS Safe 6, Desert Shield - 1 Feb 1991. 

%e tasks assigned in the published AT0 for SEAD and fighter sweep/force protection were as detailed in the Tpws and the MAPS. The AT0 tasking for the F-15 escort 

mission (mission 0171C from the 33d TFw at Tabuk), the Wild Weasel support (mission 

0161W from the 35th TFW at Shaika Isa), and the EF-I11 support (mission 0151X from 

the 366th TFW at Taif), also matched the F-111 package ATO tasking exactly. 

on the TPWs. 

AT0 Division. 

29 
Apparently, no one in the ATO Division was alerted to the discrepancy between instructions for this mission contained in the Air Tasking 

Order and the Master Attack Plan (as signed by General Glosson). The 

tasking order change logbook for 2 February 1991 (ATO R) showed only 

one change to any of the aircraft in this package; change "R-58" denoted 

a change to the air refueling for the EF-111 suppression of enemy air 

defense support mission, 01 5 1 X."' 

The attacks prosecuted by the F-Ills may be followed from the 

Mission Reports."* For mission 01 11 A, two of the four aircraft assigned 

to attack the chemical warfare bunkers at H-3 dropped bombs successfully, destroying CW bunkers 2 and 4 at the H3 airfield. The other two 

aircraft had laser and radar problems and did not release any bombs. The 

Mission Report noted that two other chemical warfare bunkers and several hardened aircraft shelters were targeted but not atta~ked.4~ The unit 

also identified the target attacked with the BE number for the airfield, and 

not with the BE number for the chemical warfare bunker-the target 

assigned the unit by the Air Tasking Order. 

The Mission Report is sketchy for mission 01 1 5A.44 The unit reported that two aircraft successfully dropped two GBU-lOs each, the third 

aircraft dropped one of two CBU-10s successfully, and the fourth aircraft 

was unsuccessful. The report did not specify which targets were attacked. 

The target description and the BE number reported for this attack were 

for the H3 airfield and facilities. Most of the Mission Reports describe 

anti-aircraft fire!' 

Mission 0121A reported limited success" One aircraft did not release 

its weapons, two aircraft had no guidance on their weapons, and a fourth 

4'(S) USCENTAF TACC change logbook, GWAPS, NA #370 

42The 48th TFW assigned individual mission numbers to its aircraft. For example, 

mission 01 1 1 A in the MAP became missions 01 11 A, 01 12A. 01 13A, and 01 14A. Other 

units did not follow this practice. 

43(S) 48th TFW Mission Report, 0305302 Feb 1991, GWAPS Missions Database. 

?his mission was identified by the 48th TFW as missions 01 15A-0118A. 

45(S) 48th TFW Mission Report, 0303412 Feb 1991. GWAPS Missions Database. 

?he MAP mission 0121A consisted of four aircraft; the unit separated that mission 

into four separate missions, 0121A-0124A. 

30 
reported a successful hit on a hardened aircraft shelter. The Mission 

Report identified the mission target as “H-3 AFLD HAS/CW BUNKER.”47 

Only one aircraft from the fourth package against H-3, Mission 

0125A,48 successfully hit H-3. No specific target information was provided.49 The fifth and final package, Mission 0141A,50 directed against H-2 

was unsuccessful. Only three of the four aircraft were mentioned in the 

Mission Reports, and they aborted the mission because of cloud cover 

over the target.” All of the support missions, OlSIX, 0161W, and 

0171C, flew as tasked?2 

What was achieved in this attack? Was information about these missions fed into plans for future attacks? There are no unambiguous answers 

to these questions. Aircraft from four separate bases were coordinated and 

arrived at their targets. However, only four bombs from two aircraft 

landed on the chemical warfare bunkers initially targeted in the Master 

Attack Plan. Five other aircraft reported hitting their targets. But, given 

the inconsistency between the Air Tasking Order and the final attack plan, 

it is not clear whether the targets attacked were those specified in the 

former or the latter. Given the organizational obstacles to receiving appropriate information, it also is not known whether targeting cell planners or 

Central Command Air Forces staff received information about this mission, 

or whether adjustments were made in future plans and orders. 

47(S) 48th TW Mission Report, 0304452 Feb 1991, GWAPS Missions Database. 

4%e Mission Report separated this mission into four missions, numbered 

(S) 48th TFW Mission Report, 0304052 Feb 11991, GWAPS Missions Database. 

%e Mission Report separated this mission into four missions, numbered 0141A- 

”(S) Mission 0143A was not reported. 48th TFW Mission Report, 0304402 Feb 

”(S) 48th TFW Mission Report, mission number 0151X, 0304152 Feb 1991, GWAPS 

01 25A-0128A. 

49 

0144A. 

1991, GWAPS Missions Database. 

Missions Database. See also CAFMs-derived data, GwAPS Missions Database. 

31 
STRIKE EAGLES ON CALL, D+23,9 Feb 91, ATO Y 

This case study examines how F-15E aircraft from the 4th Tactical 

Fighter Wing (based at A1 Kharj) were targeted by the Joint Surveillance 

and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). The missions were tasked and 

flown on D+23, 9 February 1991, AT0 Y. Figure 10 provides a map of 

the area flown. 

By 9 February, F-15Es had been largely diverted from the strategic 

targets campaign to Scud hunting, road reconnaissance, and JSTARS 

targeting. The concept of JSTARS targeting was very similar to an intercept type of mission. The aircraft would launch, contact an airborne 

controller, and attack a target assigned by that airborne controller. In this 

case, instead of the controller being on AWACS or Airborne Command, 

Control and Communication (ABCCC) aircraft, it was on the JSTARS aircraft. The tasking order provided back-up targets if the JSTARS did not 

have targets for the F-15Es. The intent of JSTARS targeting was to provide F-15Es with near-real-time targets. 

The earliest drafts of the Master Attack Plan for D+23 assigned F15E aircraft to perform road reconnaissance or to fly along convoy routes 

rather than to JSTARS targeting. The final printed and approved plan 

containing the tasking for the JSTARS targeted F-15Es was prepared at 

1300 on 8 February-the day before the mission was to be flown and 

several hours after the target planning worksheets would have been 

submitted to the ATO Division.53 

53(S) Master Attack Plan, D+23, 9 Feb 1991, 24th 24 Hours, GWAPS, BH Box 1, 

folder 28. 

32 
Figure 10 

Map of Area Flown 

Riyadh 

Al Kahrj 

4TFW 

The targeting worksheet turned in to the ATO Division matched the 

tasking later included in the Master Attack Plan. This worksheet listed 

eight separate F-15E missions allotted to JSTARS targeting for D+23.% 

Each mission, two aircraft, was assigned a fifteen-minute time on target 

block. Every fifteen minutes, two F-l5Es would be available for JSTARSdirected targeting. The blocks started at 15 15Z-15302 and continued 

54(s) Target Planning Worksheets, AT0 D+23.9 Feb 1991, HQ9rh AF/OSX. Shaw AFB. 

NC, Lt Col Jeffrey Feinstein. 

33 
F-15E aircraft (above) were targeted by the Joint Surveillance 

and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) (below) 

34 
until 2045221002. Table 4 displays the F-15E missions, as tasked on the 

targeting worksheet and the attack plan printed s~bsequently.’~ 

The target planning worksheets and the approved version of the 

Master Attack Plan for Air Tasking Order Y (D+23, 9 February 1991) 

contained identical taskings.% Unit remarks J provided information on 

how the mission would be controlled and who would be responsible for 

passing targets to the aircraft. Unit remarks K listed the backup targets 

for each flight should JSTARS targeting not be available. 

No tasking order change sheets for ATO Y affected any of these 

JSTARS targeted F-15E missions. However, an entry in the Tactical Air 

Control Center Air Tasking Order change log (for D+23, AT0 Y) changed 

two missions. Change Y-38 cancelled missions 3507 and 35 11 A “due to 

Aircrew/ A/C.”’7 No reasons for this unavailability were given in the 

change log. The unit reported, through CAFMS, that those two mission 

were cancelled because of “aircrew/aircraft availability.”’* The other 

missions appear to have flown as tasked. 

The targets struck by the F-15E missions, and whether they struck a 

JSTARS-assigned target or their tasked backup target, can be tracked in 

two ways. The first method is to review the JSTARS mission log and the 

JSTARS End of Mission Report. The JSTARS mission log recorded the 

significant events of each mission. The End of Mission Report, 

submitted by the mission commander, detailed the aircraft tasked and the 

targets struck. The second method of tracking targets struck by each 

mission is through the unit Mission Report. 

5%he Jan 1991 USCENTAF Combat Pfans Handout specified that the utilization rate 

for the F-15E would be 2.00 sorties Wr day. The mission numbers 3501A. 3503A2, and 

3505A appearing later as 3501B. 3503B. and 35058 show where aircraft planned to fly 

in the earlier TOT blocks were replanned to fly in later TOT blocks as well. In actual 

practice, the unit might have not always used the same specific aircraft due to maintenance, battle damage, etc. However, the missions would have been flown. 

“(S) GWAPS, CAT0 folder 17, Day 24, D+23, 9 Feb 1991. 

”This remark means that the aircrew or aircraft were unavailable. USCENTAF TACC 

58(S) CAWS-derived data, GWAPS Missions Database. 

change log book. 

35 
Table 4 

F-15E as Tasked on Targeting Worksheet 

Mission Number Time Over Target 

3501 A 

3503A 

3505A 

3507A 

3511A 

3501B 

3503B 

3505B 

151 5Z1530Z 

1 5452 1 6002 

161 521 6302 

1645217002 

17 152- 17302 

194522ooOZ 

201 5220302 

204522 1 OOZ 

JSTARS missions were assigned the task to “locate and pass to assigned 

fighter aircraft targets for immediate attack in the Kuwait Theater of 

Operations (KTO) with emphasis on Republican Guard Ground Order of 

Battle and mechanizedarmor units in the first echelon tactical reserve.”s9 

The JSTARS mission 027 was assigned this duty for 9 February 1991 

According to the JSTARS mission log, mission 3501A, using call sign 

Edsel 01, contacted JSTARS at 15032, twelve minutes before the planned 

time on target.61 The two F-15Es were directed to an “assembly area of 

70 plus” vehicles, which were then successfully struck with twenty-four 

Mark 82 five hundred pound bombs!* Edsel 01’s Mission Report 

indicated that the F-15E’s saw the vehicles in the aircraft’s forwardlooking infrared vision ~ystern.6~ The attacks were actually conducted at 

15362, or six minutes after the planned time on target.64 

~ 

(s) USCINCCENT Msg 1317002 Jan 1991, subj: Joint STARS Utilization. 59 

-his Joint STARS mission number was not a CENTAF ATO-asSigned mission number. 

61(S) Joint STARS Mission Log, D+23,9 Feb 1991, CWAPS NA 340; (S) microfiche, 

Joint STARS Mission and Log Reports, Desert Storm, Jan - Mar 1991. 

62Edsel 01 reported to Joint STARS that the attack was successful. 

63(S) 4th TFW Mission Report, 0919102 Feb 1991, GWAPS Missions Database. 

64(S) Ibid. 

36 
The F-15E mission 3503A (call sign Buick 03) checked in with the 

JSTARS at 1527Z.6s The aircraft were directed to “AAA site 294937N 

472842Eta and at 16152 reported inflight bomb damage assessment of 

“successful-four gun emplacements hit. no secondaries but concentration 

of troops to The Mission Report reported the bomb damage 

assessment as “unknown” and included the following target description: 

Buick 03 designated probable small RDR return that may have been 

AAA-not really sure. Aircrew reported numerous vehicles in laager 

(circle) approx 1/2NM from tgt. JSTARS directed Buick 04 to tgt vehicles 

nearby. Buick 04 tgted cluster of vehicles in area also in laager, 1/2 - 

3/4NM from tgt. No secondaries reported following weapons release.68 

The F-15E mission 3505A (call sign Stingray 05) checked in with the 

JSTARS at 1605Z@ and was assigned a target consisting of an “assembly 

area of 70 plus veh 295347N 470323E (vicinity of Edsel 01 target).”70 At 

16202 Stingray 05 reported inflight bomb damage assessment of 

“successful-vehicles located.”71 However, the unit reported bomb damage 

assessment as “unknown” in its Mission Report for mission 3505A. The 

target observation stated “Stingray flight reported numerous vehicles in 

circular formation-both jets tgted vehicles in area. Stingray Flight reported 

good radar designation from both jets. Aircrew noted possibly one 

secondary-but not sure if it was a long bomb-following weapons release.”72 

65(S) Joint STARS Mission Log, D+23,9 Feb 1991, GWAPS NA 340. (S) microfiche, 

Joint Stars Mission and Log Reports. Desert Storm, Jan - Mar 1991. 

“6Note: the 4th TFW and the Joint STARS controllers used different conventions to 

express geographic coordinates. The 4th TFW expressed coordinates in terms of degrees, 

minutes, and seconds. The Joint STARS controllers expressed coordinates in terms of 

degrees, minutes, and tenths of minutes. At a minimum, the use of these different 

conventions added a translation task to the many activities performed by pilots and 

controllers. If such calculations were not performed, the pilot and airborne controller 

communicated about distinctly different sites. 

(S) Joint STARS End of Mission Report, D+23. 9 Feb 1991; (S) microfiche, Joint 67 

STARS Mission and Log Reports, Desert Storm, Jan - Mar 1991. 

68(S) 4th TFW Mission Report, 0919002 Feb 1991, GWAPS Missions Database. 

69(S) Joint STARS Mission Log, D+23,9 Feb 1991, GWAPS NA 340; (S) microfiche, 

70(S) Joint STARS End of Mission Report. D+23, 9 Feb 1991; (S) microfiche, Joint 

7’(S) Ibid. 

72(S) 4th TFW Mission Report. 0919152 Feb 1991. GWAN Missions Database. 

Joint STARS Mission and Log Reports, Desert Storm, Jan - Mar 1991. 

STARS Mission and Log Reports, Desert Storm, Jan - Mar 1991. 

37 
The inconsistency between the inflight bomb damage assessment reported 

to JSTARS and the postattack Mission Report was not resolved. 

Missions 3507A and 351 1 A were cancelled. There is no JSTARS 

mission log or End of Mission Report record of mission 3501B checking 

in with JSTARS. Mission 3501B, according to the Unit Mission Report, 

attacked the alternate target. The Unit Mission Report contained the 

following remarks: Edsel flight reported could not comm with JSTARS or 

ABCCC, pressed with alt tgt. Edsel flight was 2 minutes from alt tgt and 

AWACS called and said they had a priority tgt. Edsel flight proceeded and 

dropped on alt tgt (Edsel commented too late-gas was also a 

The alternate target attacked, listed in the Air Tasking Order for JSTARS 

aircraft and as reported in the Mission Report, was a revetted logistics 

site at 3001.1 N 04747.5EY4 

At 20002, according to the JSTARS mission log, the second Buick 03, 

mission 3503B “checked in” and was “Sent to Alleycat + Bulldog for 

SAR.”75 The JSTARS End of Mission Report also reported that Buick 03 

was “diverted to SAR.”76 However, the F-l5E’s, stated “Buick flight 

reported never able to contact JSTARS. ABCCC finally came on and gave 

tgt. Buick flight had to hold for 20 minutes before getting tasking.” The 

unit reported that the F-15Es attacked an artillery battery at 2914.34N 

0471 3.22E with unknown damage assessment. The report also included 

a target observation and declared that twenty-four MK-84 weapons were 

released on the target.’7 

The final F-15E mission in this case study, mission 3505B. never 

appeared on the JSTARS mission log or End of Mission Report. The Unit 

Mission Report stated that “Stingray flight reported could not contact 

ABCCC and JSTARS could not get a tgt passed. After numerous attempts 

on all freqs Stingray flight pressed on with back-up tgt.” The pilots 

reported “unknown” bomb damage assessment against a fuel storage area 

73(S) 4th TFW Mission Report, 10012SZ Feb 1991, GWAB Missions Database. 

74(S) GWAPS, CAT0 folder #17, Day 24, D+23, 9 Feb 1991. 

75The acronym SAR stands for Search and Rescue. See Joint STARS Mission Log, 

D+23,9 Feb 1991; (S) microfiche, Joint STARS Mission and Lug Reports, Desert Storm, 

(S) Joint STARS End of Mission Report, D+23. 9 Feb 1991; (S) microfiche. Joint 

Jan -Mar 1991. 

76 

STARS Mission and Log Reports, Desert Storm, Jan - Mar 1991. 

77(S) 4th TFw Mission Report, 1001 122 Feb 1991, GWAPS Missions Database. 

38 
at 3001N 04739E, which was one of the backup targets included in the 

Air Tasking Order." 

This relatively simple account has three features of interest. First, the 

discrepancies between inflight bomb damage assessment-the comments 

of pilots relayed to JSTARS-and the postattack Mission Reports generated 

by the unit intelligence based upon postmission pilot interviews suggest 

some of the difficulty in reliably assessing damage, particularly as a result 

of attacks prosecuted at night. Second, the persistent problems in 

communication are noteworthy, even though the aircraft showed up pretty 

much as scheduled, and on time. It is striking that of eight missions 

planned two were cancelled, and three were unable to link up with 

JSTARS. Only three missions went as planned (see Table 5). Finally, the 

organizational complexity of scheduling many different aircraft placed 

great analytical, computational, communication, and bargaining demands 

on planners. The size, difficulty, and tempo of the planning effort-as the 

Guidance, Apportionment, and Target planners constructed daily plans for 

more than 2,000 sorties-affected how the centralized control of air power 

would be controlled. 

"(S) 4th TFW Mission Report, lo00462 Feb 91. GWAPS Missions Database. 

39 
P 

0 Table 5 

D+23, Air Tasking Order Y, 9 February 1991 

F-15E (4th Tactical Fighter Wing based at A1 Kharj) 

Contacted 

Mission ABCCC or Contacted JSTARS Alt AT0 Inflight BDA 

Number Launch AWACS JSTARS Target Target Reported a

3501A 

3503A 

3505A 

~ 

Yes Yes Yes Yes -- “successful

Yes Yes Yes Yes -- “successful

Yes Yes Yes Yes -_ “successful-veh

located” 

3507A 

3511A 

3501B 

3503B 

3505B 

no 

no 

-- Yes no no 

Yes 

-- 

Yes 
3 

Lt. Gen. Charles Horner as the 

First Joint Force Air Component Commander 

Lt. Gen. Charles A. Homer, USAF, the first wartime Joint Force Air 

Component Commander (JFACC), was also Commander, Ninth Air 

Force/CENTAF.’ His authority as Joint Force Air Component Commander 

was assigned by Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the theater commander. 

but his authority as Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force was 

independent of his Joint Force command. How General Homer balanced 

these two interrelated positions, each with its own set of responsibilities, 

will be the primary focus of this chapter. 

General Homer’s primary concerns in early August 1990, when he 

was the acting Commander in Chief in Riyadh: was to “beddown” the 

arriving forces in the theater and to prepare those forces for the defense 

of Saudi Arabia against an attack by Iraqi forces. Gen. Schwarzkopf 

returned to the United States after briefing King Fahd on the threat to the 

Saudi Kingdom and on plans to orchestrate the movement of forces into 

the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. General Homer stayed in Riyadh 

to put together a basic command organization and to work out command 

relations with the Saudis. He regarded the latter task as one of the most 

important he would carry out during what became Desert Shield and 

Desert St01-m.~ 

Homer’s actions and decisions can be understood only in the context 

of an initially confused and constantly changing military situation. With 

hindsight, it is tempting to forget that, in August and September, Homer 

had to focus on organizing the air assets present in Saudi Arabia into a 

force that could deter the Iraqis from moving their ground forces south 

‘Ninth Air Force is a peacetime command, under the Tactical Air Command. In the 

Gulf, Lt Gen Homer was commander of CENTCOM’S air component (CENTAF). 

*On 6 Aug 1990, after a briefing for Saudi King Fahd, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf 

named Lt Gen Horner CINCCENT Forward. H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It 

Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York. 1992), p 306. 

3(S) Intvw, CMSgt John Burton with Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, Mar 1991. 

41 
or from sending their air force against American and Saudi forces operating from Saudi airbases. Given the great aerial victory of Desert Storm, 

it is also understandable why observers might forget that the command 

and control infrastructure (for example, communications, meteorological 

forecasting, intelligence analysis, photo reconnaissance) available to 

Homer and his staff was extremely limited in August 1990 and then 

changed constantly in the months of Desert Shield. Finally, it would be 

a mistake to ignore the fact that the position of Joint Force Air Comp 

nent Commander was not only new‘ but somewhat controversial (see 

Appendix 2 for historical background to this controversy). Some 

Marines, for example, referred to the Joint Force Air Component 

Commander as a “coordinator” but not a “commander” even after the war 

was over.’ 

Given this setting, it should come as no surprise that General Homer, 

in his public statements and confidential interviews, identified four issues 

which required most of his attention and time as the first Joint Force Air 

Component Commander. The first issue came from the need to adapt the 

%he USCINCCENT operations order for Desert Shield, issued 10 Aug. which had 

made him the JFACC and had given him responsibility for recommending to General 

Schwarzkopf “apportionment of theater air sorties” and for “coordinating interdiction 

planning.” (S) Msg, 101 lOOZ Aug 90, OPORD/USCINCCENT, ‘Task Organization,” Sections 

3E26D2 and 3E26M. 

5(S) Intvw, Thomas C. Hone, Lt Col Frank D. Kistler, Mark D. Mandeles, Maj 

Sanford S. Terry with Brig Gen Richard 1. Neal, USMC. 13 Jan 1992. (Hereafter refed 

to as Neal Intvw, 13 Jan 1992); (U) an even stronger position was taken by Lt Gen Royal 

N. Moore, Jr, USMC (Marine air commander in Desert Storm) in the U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings, Nov 1991, pp 63-70. On the other hand, Maj William R. Cronin, USMC 

refers to the JFACC is referred to as a “commander.” See Cronin, “C31 During the Air 

War in South Kuwait,” Marine Corps Gazette, Mar 1992, pp 34-37. 

Gen Schwarzkopf s 10 Aug operations order contained a clause which stated, as the 

Omnibus Agreement required, that the “Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MACTF) 

Commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets.” (S) Msg, 101 lOOZ 

Aug 90, OPORD~CTNCCENT, ‘Task Organization,” Section 3E26G. The order also gave 

Homer, as JFACC and CENTAF Commander, the authority to require the air units in the 

theater to consult in their planning and execution of interdiction operations, but it did not 

give him the authority to “compel agreement” if they differed over the proper conduct of 

those operations. As the order noted, when and if air units under different component 

commanders could not agree on the conduct of interdiction missions, “the matter shall be 

referred to USCJNCCENT.” (S) Msg, 101 IOOZ Aug 90, OPORLVUSCINCCENT, ‘Task Organization,” Section 3E26M.) 

42 
Tactical Air Control System (TACS) to coalition warfare! The second 

issue had its roots in the other Services’ concerns about the JFACC. The 

third issue grew out of the relationship between General Schwarzkopf, as 

the theater commander, and General Homer, as his chief air deputy. The 

final issue concerned General Homer’s methods of directing the air 

campaign against Iraq through the Tactical Air Control System. This 

chapter will consider General Homer’s approach to each of these issues. 

The JFACC and the Coalition 

On 4 March 1992, Gen Horner told Air Force historians that his first 

priority was to set up an effective working relationship with the leaders of 

the armed forces of Saudi Arabia.’ Prior to the deployment, there had been 

no combined Saudi-U.S. command organization. Homer, however, had 

worked with Lt. Gen. Ahmad Ibrahim Behery, commander of the Royal 

Saudi Air Force (RSAF) for several years, and the two got along weK8 Yet 

when Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney offered U.S. forces to the 

Saudi government on 6 August, there was no combined operations plan. 

Both an organization and a combined (or coalition) operations plan had to 

be created as U.S. and allied forces moved into the theater? 

‘See Chapters 4 and 5 for a discussion of the Tactical Air Control System and 

Tactical Air Control Center established in the theater. 

7(S) Intvw, Barry Barlow. Richard G. Davis, and Perry Jamieson with Lt Gen 

Charles A. Horner, Commander, 9th Air Force, 4 Mar 1992. (Hereafter referred to as 

Horner Intvw. 4 Mar 1992.) (U) Homer had done the same in his Mar 1991 interview, 

cited earlier. Dealing successfully with the other members of the coalition is a theme that 

runs consistently through all the interviews of Lt Gen Homer, including that conducted 

by GWAPS investigators on 9 Mar 1992. 

8(S) Intvw, Wayne W. Thompson with Lt Gen Ahmad lbrahim Behery, 11 Jul 1992. 

90n 20 Aug. the third version of CWCCENT’S basic operations order charged Homer, 

as COMUSCENTAF, with furnishing “counterair, interdiction, and close air support to U.S. 

and Saudi forces. . . . ” [(S) Msg. Desert Shield OPORD, 201230Z-Aug 90, Section 3C10.1 

The operations order specified that his command would do so through a Tactical Air 

Control Center (TACC) manned jointly by U.S. and Saudi personnel. [Msg (S), Desert 

Shield OPORD, 201 2302 Aug 90, Section 3E2.1 

43 
General H. Norman 

Schwankopf with 

Lt Gen Khalid bin 

Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, 

the Saudi theater 

commander (above); 

Lt Gen Charles A. 

Horner, USAF (left); 

Secretary of Defense 

Richard Cheney confers with Generals 

Calvin Waller, Colin 

Powell, and Norman 

Schwankopf (below). 

44 
As the Department of Defense later reported to Congress, the Saudi 

government agreed separately with each allied nation that sent forces. In 

the case of the United States, “initial agreement allowing the entry of 

U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia provided for ‘strategic direction’ of U.S. 

forces by the Saudi Military Command,” through CENTCOM “assumed the 

phrase to mean general guidance at a strategic level with no actual command authority. . . . ”I0 Initiative in the production of allied guidance lay 

with General Schwarzkopf. His staff-CENTCOM-had the only detailed 

plan (OPlan 1002-90) for the defense of Saudi Arabia, and they briefed 

it soon after their arrival in the theater to a combined planning group 

composed of CENTCOM Plans and Policy personnel, Saudi Ministry of 

Defense and Aviation operations officers, and various other Saudi and 

American officers.” The CENTCOM and Saudi personnel then worked 

together to produce, on 20 August, Operations Order 003 as a working 

plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia.’* 

The two nations did not create a tightly knit combined command, 

despite close cooperation by U.S. and Saudi staff officers in planning the 

defense of Saudi Arabia. Instead, they kept their existing command 

structures separate, but parallel. At first, General Homer, acting in 

Schwarzkopf’s place as CINCCENT Forward, dealt directly with Gen. Mohammed al-Hammad, the Saudi Chief of Staff, while General Olsen 

worked with General Behery (Commander, Royal Saudi Air Force). 

Likewise, Rear Adm. Grant Sharp, CENTCOM’S Plan and Policy officer, 

and Schwarzkopf’s Navy deputy talked directly with Vice Adm. Salim alMofadi Talal, head of the Royal Saudi Navy, and Lt. Gen. John Yeosock, 

CENTCOM Army component commander, cooperated with Saudi Lt. Gen. 

Yusif Abdul Rahman al-Rasheed. Rather quickly, it became apparent to 

Horner that the key Saudi military commander was in fact Lt. Gen. 

Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, a prince of the royal family.I3 As 

General Khalid gradually gained more official authority (he was eventual- 

“Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Apr 1992, p 1-7. 

“lbid. 

(SINF) Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Central Command, Ajler Action Report, Operation 

(S) Homer Intvw, 4 Mar 1992; (U) Homer communicated with Lt Gen Khalid by 

12 

Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, 15 Jul 1991, p 6. 

copying the Saudi practice of speaking with “innuendo and notion.” 

13 

45 
ly appointed the Saudi theater commander, General Schwarzkopf’s counterpart, in October), Horner’s dealings with him grew more direct.“ 

According to the Central Command Afrer Action Report, the continuation of parallel US. and Arab (the Saudis spoke for all the Gulf Cooperation Council forces) commands “required close coordination between 

USCINCCENT and General Khalid in all planning, operational and logistics 

rnatters.”I5 This was accomplished through the coalition Coordination, 

Communication and Integration Center (known as the “C’IC”) in Riyadh, 

which had been formed from a rudimentary combined headquarters set up 

in early August by Army Maj. Gen. Paul Schwartz, who had been serving 

as General John Yeosock‘s deputy when Iraq invaded Kuwait.I6 In 

Schwartz’s combined headquarters, a Saudi officer translated CENTCOM 

operations instructions and regulations into Arabic, General Khalid signed 

them, and then they became the guidelines for the C31C.17 

The C31C was a “bridge” between CENTCOM and the Saudi command.” From the Joint Force Air Component Commander’s perspective, 

however, the C’IC was not the appropriate tool for coordinating all coalition air units across the theater. The proper tool was the Air Tasking 

Order, or ATO. One of the JFACC’S tasks was to bring the Saudis into the 

AT0 process-without at the same time making them feel captives of U.S. 

procedures or subordinate to US. officers. As it happened, the Saudis 

seemed to welcome the ATO process. As General Horner noted, the 

Saudis “were faced with this monster coming into their midst. They had 

no idea how to control it, and the training ATO gave them a way to 

control it.”” The existence of a Saudi air defense system based on US.- 

I4(S/NF) Rpt, U.S. Central Command, Afier Action Report, 15 Jul 1991, pp 6-7; 

(S) Homer Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. 

(S/NF) Rpt, HQ, US. Central Commund, Afier Action Report, 15 Jul 1991, p 7. 

(S) Horner Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. 

I5 

16 

17(S) Ibid. 

“Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Apr 1992, p 494. 

”(S) Homer Intvw. 4 Mar 1992; Lt Gen Ahmad lbrahim Behery, RSAF Commander, 

made the same point to Wayne W. Thompson in an interview on 11 Jul 1992. 

46 
made equipment (such as AWACS) also helped U.S. and Saudi air commanders and their staffs to work together, as did the fact that “airmen 

have English as their language.”20 

Though CENTCOM’s planning staff was the “focal point for combined 

planning and integration of U.S. and coalition planning efforts,”21 CENTAF 

personnel worked with their Saudi counterparts to develop daily air 

tasking orders?2 As, first, 

CINCCENT Forward and, later, as Joint Force Air Component Commander, 

General Homer did not, for example, unilaterally dictate the scope of U.S. 

and coalition theater air operations. On 18 August, for instance, Homer, 

at the request of the Saudi government, removed all low-altitude jet 

aircraft flights, all practice air-ground attacks, and all supersonic aircraft 

runs from the By the end of September, however, these restrictions were hampering the training of deployed U.S. air units, and Horner, 

again in his role as JFACC, pressed Lt. Gen. Ahmad Ibrahim Behery to 

open Saudi air ranges to U.S. aircraft. It took a month for Homer to win 

his p0int.2~ 

This was in fact a cooperative effort. 

The cooperative relationship with the Saudis continued throughout 

Desert Storm. The Current Operations Log of the Tactical Air Control 

Center, for instance, contains several examples of direct communications 

from General Khalid and Brig. Gen. (Prince) Ahmad bin Musaid AsSudayri, the Royal Saudi Air Force’s Chief of Operations, to the duty 

officer at the Tactical Air Control Center through Homer’s operations 

deputy, Maj. Gen. John Corder?’ General As-Sudayri also recalled that 

he often dealt directly with Generals Homer and Glosson during Desert 

20(S) Ibid; Speech, Lt Gen Charles Horner, Dadaelian Dinner, 11 Sep 1991, p 9. 

2’(SnUF) Rpt, Headquarters, US. Central Command, Ajler Action Report, 15 Jul 

22(S) Horner Intvw. 4 Mar 1992. 

23(S/NF/WN) William T. Y’Blood. The Eagle and the Scorpion (Washington, DC, 

24(S/NF/WN) fbid, p 132. 

25(S) TACC/CC/DO Current Ops Log, entries for 29 Jan 1991 (no time given) and 

30 Jan 1991 (13102). Microfilm No. 0882616, Checo Team, GWAH New Acquisition 

File No. 215. 

1991, p 10. 

1992), p 93. 

47 
Storm.26 The American officers did not abandon cordial and close relations with the Saudis once the air war began.27 

In addition to the Saudis, the JFACC had to deal diplomatically with 

senior military officers from other nations. During Desert Storm, Homer 

grew concerned about British Royal Air Force losses suffered during lowlevel attacks on Iraqi airfields. As he later recalled, “I wanted to tell the 

British not to fly low level, but I wouldn’t . . . . I just suggested we have 

a multi-national tactics board.”28 The suggestion had, apparently, the 

desired effect. Homer believed that the British understood his signal and 

realized that it had freed them from adherence to an accepted tactic. If 

so, then he had achieved his goal as JFACC without resorting to a direct 

assertion of his formal authority as Schwarzkopf‘s air deputy. Homer 

could also, like any seasoned diplomat, ignore a potential cause celebre. 

When the French army ground commander insisted that only French 

aircraft fly over his forces, Horner remembered saying, “Yes, you are 

absolutely right,” but he also noted that French planes nevertheless “flew 

where it was best for them to fly.”29 

These instances suggest that the JFACC’S influence extended beyond 

what was considered to be his formal authority (directing the theater-wide 

air effort), but his formal authority (exercised through the Tactical Air 

Control Center) was real enough.30 It included not only the responsibility 

26(S) Intvw, Wayne W. Thompson with Brig Gen (Prince) Ahmad bin Musaid AsSudayri, RASF Chief of Operations, Jul 1992. 

270n 28 Jan 1991, for example, Maj Gen Corder wrote to Brig Gen Glosson suggesting that the authors of the Master Attack Plan organize packages of Gulf Cooperation 

Council aircraft for strikes in order to “build a network of military cooperation.” See the 

(S) TAC~C~DO Current Ops Log. 

28(S) Homer Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. 

29(S) Homer Intvw, 4 Mar 1992; (U) Brig Gen Claude Solanet, commander of 

French air units just before and during Desert Storm, said Homer deserved a lot of credit 

for the success of the air campaign, and that Horner was like a “big brother.” [(S) Intvw, 

Wayne W. Thompson with Brig Gen Claude Solanet, 30 Apr 1992.1 Brig Gen Solanet 

obviously accepted Homer’s judgment about where French aircraft should fly. 

%e authority of COMUSCENTAF was spekd out in the CINCCENT OP Order for 

Operations Desert Shield (1 1002, 10 Aug 1990, in GWAH Files). As the Order noted, 

“IFACC responsibilities include: . . . Planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking based 

on USCINCCENT apportionment decisions. . . . Direct Coordination with COMUSARCENT, 

ensure integration of air operations within USCINCCENT’s Concept of Operations. . . . COMUSMARCENT, COMSOCCENT, COMUSNAVCENT, COMJTFME and supporting forces to 

48 
for producing the daily Air Tasking Orders, but also the air-to-air and airto-ground Rules of Engagement. In October 1989, CENKOM Regulation 

525-11 had established these rules for emergency deployment of U.S. 

aircraft to the Middle East. On 9 August 1990, the President had approved 

supplements to those existing rules to cover the likelihood that Iraqi and 

U.S. aircraft might engage in the skies over the KuwaiVSaudi border. The 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had informed CE”rmM of the President’s 

decision immediately, and Schwarzkopf‘s operations order, issued the next 

day (10 August), put the Rules of Engagement of Regulation 525-11- 

supplemented by the additions from the President-into effect3’ 

One week later, the CENTAF staff issued specific “transition rules of 

engagement” for U.S. aircraft, and the Joint Force Air Component Commander was allowed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reveal 

“certain portions of both the peacetime and transition [rules] ROES” to the 

Saudis and other members of the coalition.32 This was a delicate issue. 

Rules of Engagement were ultimately the President’s responsibility as 

commander-in-chief; he could not delegate that responsibility to a coalition 

command. Yet, the United States could not impose its rules on the coalition without consultation. In consequence, the Commander in Chief and 

the Joint Force Air Component Commander had to persuade the other 

coalition members to adopt the American rules. Doing so took a lot of 

time.33 An important consequence, however, was that the JFACC’s authority 

to coordinate the employment of coalition air forces was sustained. 

’ 

Integrate supporting Maritime air resources through COMITFME. . . . Serve as the Area 

Air Defense Commander (AADC) with the authority to establish and operate a combined, 

integrated air defense and Airspace Control System in coordination with component and 

other supporting and friendly forces. . . . Serve as coordinating authority for USCENTCOM 

interdiction operations with the responsibility of coordinating interdiction planning and 

operations involving forces of two or more services or two or more forces of the same 

service. . . . Conduct Counterair, Close Air Support, and Interdiction operations. . . . Support Airdrop, Airland, and Aerial Resupply operations for U.S. and friendly forces, 

as directed. . . . Assume responsibility for Combat Search and Rescue Operations. . . .” 

(Section 3826) 

31(S) Msg, “Task Organization,” Operation Desert Shield, USCINCCENT, MacDill AFB, 

32(S/NF/WN) The Eagle and rhe Scorpion (Washington, DC, 1992). p 71. 

33(SMFIWN) Ibid, p 71. 

FL, 101 100Z Aug 90, Section 3F8. 

49 
The JFACC and the Other Services 

As Joint Force Air Component Commander, General Horner also 

attempted to reduce potential friction between his Tactical Air Control 

System and the other Services, who would have to work within it.34 The 

interaction between Horner and Lt. Gen. Walter Boomer, U.S. Marine 

Corps, Central Command, was important. The Marine Corps had never 

been comfortable with the idea that an overall theater air commander 

would be able to shift Marine Corps aircraft away from the direct support 

of their ground forces.” The language of the 1986 “Omnibus Agreement,’ among the Services (that the “Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

[MAGTF] Commander will retain operational control of his organic air 

assets”) was Section 3E26G of CINCCENT’s 10 August operations order?6 

That section also noted that “Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support 

requirements will be provided to the Joint Force Commander for tasking 

through the air component commander . . . ,” and “Nothing herein shall 

infringe on the authority of the . . . Joint Force Commander, in the 

exercise of operational control, to assign missions . . . to insure unity of 

effort . . . .”37 The 10 August operations order, like the Omnibus Agreement, did not reconcile the two very different views of the Marine Corps 

and the Air Force regarding the JFACC’S authority. 

It did not take long for these different views to conflict. On 19 

September 1990, the Marine Corps liaison officer attached to CENTAF 

prepared a classified memo for CENTAF’S Director of Operations in which 

he called the latter’s attention to what seemed to be inadequate planning 

for “actions on D+l and D+2 . . . where ground and air strategy will 

”See James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Curf (Arlington, VA, 1992), p 155; 

(S) Homer Intvw, 4 Mar 1992; Speech, Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, Dadaelian Dinner. 11 

Sep 1991, p 8. Lt Cen Boomer, the leader of the Marine Corps component, confirmed 

Homer’s view that, as IFACC, he had dealt judiciously with his fellow component commanders. According to Boomer, Homer’s initial comment to him when they met face-toface for the first time in the theater was, “1 don’t want your airplanes. 1 just want to win 

the war.” (S) Intvw. GWAPS with Lt Gen Walter Boomer, USMC, 17 Feb 1992. 

35See Appendices 2 and 4. 

361986 “Omnibus Agreement,” p 111-5. 

37/bid, pp 111-5 and 111-6. 

50 
intertwine in a joint effort to influence the battlefield.”38 The Marine 

officer was concerned about developing means for managing “air power 

over a fluid battlefield.”39 The Marine Corps had a technique for managing close air support which placed control over such sorties in the hands 

of specially trained personnel in Division Air Support Centers (DASCS). 

Strikes farther away from front line positions were managed by a Tactical 

Air Operations Center (TAW), which monitored and directed aircraft in 

separate High Density Airspace Control Zones (HIDACZS).~ The Marine 

liaison was trying to move his Air Force counterparts in CENTAF toward 

an organization that looked familiar. 

Lt. Gen. Royal N. Moore, Jr., the commander of Marine air units in 

the theater, may have felt that the efforts of his liaison officer had failed. 

After the war, Moore acknowledged that he had “kind of gamed the AT0 

process” because it did “not respond well to a quick-action battlefield.”41 

Moore openly referred to the AT0 process as one of “coordination,” and 

he described his method of dealing with it: 

What I did . . . was write an Am that would give me enough flexibility . . . . So I might write an enormous amount of sorties, and every 

seven minutes I’d have airplanes up doing various things-and I might 

cancel an awful lot of those. This way I didn’t have to play around 

with the process while I was waiting to hit a target.” 

By contrast, a Marine Corps Gazette article argued that Marine commanders questioned the effectiveness of the Joint Force Air Component 

Commander concept during Desert Storm because they did not understand 

why it took as long as it did for Marine air assets to shift their focus from 

38(S) Memo, “AT0 Planning Beyond D-Day,” from Marine Liaison, CENTAF, to 

39(S) Ibid. 

&(S/NF) Briefing, Desert Storm MARCENT Command Brief, 28 Mar 1991, GWAPS 

41Lt Gen Royal N. Moore, Jr., uSMC, “Marine Air: There When Needed,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings, Nov 1991, p 63. see dso (S/NF) Briefing, Desert Storm MARCENT 

Command Brief, Mar 28, 1991. GWAPS Task Force 4 Files. 

42Lt Gen Royal N. Moore, Jr., USMC, “Marine Air: There When Needed,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings. Nov 1991, p 63. 

Director of Operations, CENTAF. 19 Sep 1990, GWAPS Microfilm Files. 

Task Force 4 File. 

51 
targets in rear areas to targets in southern Kuwait opposite Marine ground 

~nits.4~ 

However, to prevent further division of the airspace and air defense 

system among the various components, Homer adopted the existing Saudi 

air defense system.44 To work safely, the Saudi system had to have a 

daily Air Tasking Order; Tactical Air Control Center personnel, working 

with RSAF officers, produced the ATOs. So the need for a daily AID, 

according to Homer, “established the Joint Force Air Component 

Commander. . . . Without the ATO, you don’t have the JFACC. With the 

ATO, you don’t have anything but a JFACC.’“5 

Adopting the Saudi air defense system also helped General Homer 

justify turning down a suggestion in early August by the Commander, 

Middle East Force, Vice Adm. Henry Mauz, that the Navy and Air Force 

each take responsibility for separate “Route Packages” like those used in 

the air war against North Vietnam.& Homer remembered being adamantly opposed to this proposal.‘“ He was just as strongly opposed to creating 

a buffer zone along Iraq’s border with Iran; it was too much like what 

had been done in the air campaign against North Vietnam.48 Homer may 

have misinterpreted Admiral Mauz’s suggestion. The Air Force liaison 

officer attached to Mauz’s command (NAVCENT) noted in his end of tour 

report that NAVCENT had recommended to the Joint Force Air Component 

Commander that the latter create an “omnibus ATO as a fallback,” just in 

43Maj W. R. Cronin, USMC, “C31 During the Air War in South Kuwait,” Marine 

44(S) Homer Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. 

45(S) Homer Tntvw, 4 Mar 1992. 

46(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, 9 Mar 1992. 

47(S) Homer Intvw. 4 Mar 1992; (U) the 10 Aug 1990 Operations Order had 

specifically told the Navy’s Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East to “Be prepared 

to conduct counterair, close air support, and interdiction operations; provide aircraft 

sorties to the JFACC. . . . ” (Section 3E28E.) However, it is important to remember that 

Lt Cen Homer accepted something very much like Route Packages when he divided Iraq 

between the forces responding directly to him from Riyadh and those operating as part 

of Joint Task Force Proven Force in Turkey (see Chapter 7. footnote 42). Homer was 

concerned about the symbolism of a geographic separation of Navy and Air Force 

responsibilities. 

Corps Gazette, Mar 1992, p 35. 

48(S) Homer GWAPS Tntvw. 9 Mar 1992. 

52 
case a terrorist or Scud attack put the Tactical Air Control Center in 

Riyadh out of action.49 

If the JFACC had misinterpreted a Navy proposal, it would not have 

been an isolated incident. A Navy captain (sent by the Director of the 

Navy’s Historical Center to NAVCENT [at sea on command ship Blue 

Ridge] and to the Navy’s carriers operating as part of Desert Storm) 

wrote a critical trip report on his return from the theater. He observed 

that “several senior officers expressed reservations about the Navy’s 

involvement in an air campaign centrally directed” by a Joint Force Air 

Component Commander. They apparently feared the consequences of 

flying missions in accordance with the instructions given by an Air 

Tasking Order which their staffs did not create. As the captain noted, 

however, “the Navy has no alternative to the AT0 system.”s0 

The Air Force liaison officer to the Navy also commented on the 

Navy’s concerns with the Joint Force Air Component Commander’s role. 

He felt that the Navy officers’ doubts about this role were expressed as 

“an attitude of resentment towards the Air Force and distrust of the 

CENTAF staff, reflected by such measures as the close scrutiny of every 

document establishing procedural guidance for the conduct of the air war 

in a search for the hidden agendas they were believed to contain.”” 

CENTAF officers did not help matters by using stationery with the Ninth 

Air Force letterhead to issue JFACC directives?2 CENTAF officers manning 

the Tactical Air Control Center also left the wrong impression with their 

Navy liaison colleagues, two of whom noted that 

Early on, the USAF committed fully to the forward deployment and 

utilization of every possible facet of their force structure. This 

49(FOUO) Memo, “End of Tour Report as Air Force Liaison Officer to Commander, 

US. Naval Forces, Central Command (COMUSNAVCENTIAFLO), for Operations Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm, from l2AFlSE to COMUSNAVCE~WOI, 5 Mar 1991, p 3. 

”Memo, “Trip Report,” from Capt S. U. Ramsdell, USN. to Director, Naval 

Historical Center, 14 May 1991, p 3. 

’‘(FOUO) Rpt, “End of Tour Report as Air Force Liaison Officer to Commander, 

U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command,” 5 Mar 1991, p 2. 

S21ntvw, Thomas C. Hone, Maj Anne D. Leary. Mark D. Mandeles with Col Peter 

F. Herrly, USA, Joint Staff, 19 Feb 1992. Note, no JFAcC stationery was printed for use 

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

53 
positioning was only thinly veiled . . . as positioning and preparation 

for the upcoming ‘Battles with Congress.’ The JFACC planning cell had 

a member of the Secretary of the Air Force’s personal staff-he was the 

second senior member in the planning cell. There never was any 

question that the senior leadership in the Air Force was a constant 

factor in the direction of the ‘war plan.’53 

Inadvertent indiscretions aside, Navy and Joint Force Air Component 

Commander relations were complicated by several avoidable problems. 

The first was having Vice Adm. Stanley Arthur, CENTCOM Navy 

Component Commander, at sea, on Blue Ridge. Indeed, as the Navy 

captain cited earlier discovered, Admiral Arthur himself was “frustrated 

with his location.” He “was not in a position to influence the unified 

commander directly nor to participate effectively in the JFACC process . . . ,” and he knew it, but he decided not to try to change his location 

because, when he took command during Desert Shield, Blue Ridge was 

already acting as the command ship, and a move ashore would have 

complicated planning for Desert Storm.” Related to this problem was 

another: the fact that he also had responsibilities as Commander, Seventh 

Fleet that kept him from spending time dealing directly with the Joint 

Force Air Component Commander?’ Finally, there was the 

inconvenience caused by the fact that Air Tasking Orders had to be flown 

out to the carriers daily because the Navy had not installed (and, as it 

happened, could not take) terminals for the Air Force’s Computer 

Assisted Force Management System?6 

53(S) Background Paper, Desert Shield and USN Strike Planning, Cdr Donald W. 

McSwain and Cdr Maurice Smith, Dec 1990, Task Force 4 Files, GWAPS. 

’‘Rpt, “Trip Report,” Capt S. U. Ramsdell, USN, 14 May 1991, p 5. 

’’(FOUO) Rpt, “End of Tour Report as Air Force Liaison Officer to Commander, 

U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command,” 5 Mar 1991, p 7. 

S60ne reason the Navy did not install CAMS terminals was the absence of a 

worldwide CAFMS system. The software for European terminals was incompatible with 

terminals used in the Pacific. Navy carriers could be deployed in any theater or in several 

theaters in quick succession. They needed a universal system. As it happened, the only 

such “system” was hand delivery. 

54 
Relations between the Navy at Riyadh and the Joint Force Air 

Component Commander’s staff were pr~fessional.’~ However, the fact 

that Navy personnel afloat (on Blue Ridge and on the carriers) had not 

worked with the CENTAF staff before Desert Shield and could not do so 

in person during the months before Desert Storm meant that they did not 

develop an understanding of the Air Tasking Order process and how best 

to participate in it?’ An Air Force liaison officer to CENTCOM’S Navy 

Component commander’s staff argued that this lack of experience and 

understanding led the Navy staff to create a “Fleet Defense” sortie 

category “to give NAVCENT the flexibility to strike targets felt to be 

important to the Navy but ignored by the” regular AT0 pr0cess.5~ 

Avoiding ATO tasking did not fully solve the Navy’s problem, which was 

rooted in carrier aviation’s lack of a command and control system 

effective in sustaining an extended air campaign.@ 

Horner did not let tension between CENTAF and NAVCENT staff afloat 

shape his approach to NAVCENT. Admiral Mauz, for example, sent a 

group of Navy intelligence officers to Horner in August to augment the 

still-arriving Ninth Air Force command staff, and, in Homer’s own 

words, “we formed a joint Air ForceNavy intelligence operation right off 

the start to do air intelligence. That was a big step in faith on the part of 

the Navy.”“ After Mauz had been replaced as the Navy component 

commander by Admiral Arthur, Arthur and Homer had occasion to 

disagree about who should issue the Rules of Engagement governing 

Navy combat air patrol fighters flying above the Persian Gulf. Arthur 

wanted Schwarzkopf to promulgate the rules; Homer asserted that it was 

a Joint Force Air Component Commander responsibility. Horner told 

Arthur to appeal his case to General Schwarzkopf. Arthur did, Homer 

57As noted by the Air Force NAVCENT liaison officer and the Navy captain cited 

above. See (FOUO) Rpt, “End of Tour Report as Air Force Liaison Officer to 

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command.” 5 Mar I99 1 ; Memo, ‘Trip Report,” 

from Capt. S. U. Ramsdell, USN, to Director, Naval Historical Center, 14 May 1991. 

”(FOUO) Rpt, “End of Tour Report as Air Force Liaison Officer to Commander, 

U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command.” 5 Mar 1991, pp 5-6. 

59(~~~~) IW, 5. 

@Memo, ‘Trip Report,” from Capt S. U. Ramsdell, USN, to Director, Naval 

Historical Center, 14 May 1991, p 4. 

6’(S) Horner Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. 

55 
offered his rejoinder, and Schwarzkopf decided in Homer’s favor.62 As 

Homer later noted, he did not feel that Arthur had unfairly challenged his 

authority, or that Schwarzkopf, in making his decision, had shown any 

lack of confidence in Horner’s ability to work successfully as JFACC!3 

Fortunately, Admiral Arthur and General Homer kept the tone of their 

communications professional, even when the issue at hand was serious for 

them both. On 23 January 1991, for example, Arthur complained to 

Homer directly about the lateness of the Air Tasking Order: “Since Day 

Three, the ATO time late has been driving all of us to distraction.”@ 

Given the delay in completing the Am, Arthur believed that there was 

too much pressure to maintain a high rate of sorties. He also told Homer 

that “None of the aircraft that are a threat to me have been targeted even 

though they are in the open.’*’ In ending his message, however, Arthur 

noted that “the coordination there in Riyadh is super,” and he closed with 

“Keep ’em flying. Very respectfully, Stan.’& Homer responded by 

describing his staff’s efforts to “have the ATO available to the units 12 

hours prior to the effective time of the ATO,” and by sharing Arthur’s 

concern about untargeted aircraft!’ As Homer observed, “Fighter pilots 

who pass up aircraft in open when striking an airfield don’t have the big 

picture.’&’ But Homer also reminded Arthur that the air campaign was 

based on the guidance of the Commander in Chief, which placed less 

priority on strikes against Iraqi forces in Kuwait than on attacks against 

Iraq’s leadership, its nuclear, chemical and biological installations, and its 

command and control fa~ilities.6~ Homer finished by thanking Arthur for 

62(s) Ibid; also. Msg (S/NF), from COMUSNAVCENT, to USCENTAF, “Persond for Lt 

Gen Homer from Arthur,” subj: “Rules of Engagement,” 0 1121202 Jan 91 ZYB, 27-22 

GWAPS File. 

63(S) Homer Intvw. 4 Mar 1992; also, (S/NF) Msg. from COMUSNAVCENT, to 

USCENTAF, “Personal for Lt Gen Horner from Arthur.” subj: “Rules of Engagement,” 0 

1121202 Jan 91 ZYB, 27-22 GWAPS File. 

@(s) Msg, from COMUSNAVCENT, to USCENTAF, subj: Air Campaign. 23 Jan, 07272, 

65(S) Ibid. 

66(S) Ibid. 

67(s) Msg to COMUSNAVCENT. from USCENTAF, cc, subj “Air Campaign,” 26 Jan 

68(S) Ibid. 

69(S) Ibid. 

in GWAPS Deptula File, No. 36D. 

1991, 21302, in Deptula File, GWAPS. 

56 
“your candidness” and by saying, “Jointly, we will successfully meet a11 

. . . objectives. . . . *’70 This exchange seems typical of the HomerArthur message traffic, and it confirms Homer’s postwar assertions that 

his relationships with the other component commanders were professional 

and mutually respectful. 

As Joint Force Air Component Commander, Homer was willing to 

make tradeoffs with senior officers in the other Services in order to avoid, 

apparently, open conflicts over the JFACC’S status and authority. Marine 

General Royal Moore wrote that Horner approached him during Desert 

Storm to offer trading Air Force sorties for Marine air sorties and making 

“tradeoffs back and forth as we worked through the air war.”7’ General 

Horner did not appear to regard incidents of such horse trading as 

diminishing his authority as JFACC. However, he also admitted that the 

U.S. air effort was never really pressured by Iraq: “We never had to 

make a decision as to whether the French brigade died or the Marine 

brigade died or the Saudi brigade died. If we had had to make those 

kinds of decisions, it would have been a lot more diffic~lt.”~~ 

In fact, Homer’s relationship with the Marine Corps also was shaped 

by instructions from Schwarzkopf, once the air campaign was well under 

way, for Homer to consult regularly and carefully with the ground 

commanders. On 31 January, Schwarzkopf told Homer that 

Target development and nomination during the early phases of the 

campaign were clearly led by the . . . (JFACC). As we move into 

battlefield preparation, maneuver commander input into the target 

selection process becomes even more important. Therefore, the 

opportunity for corps and other subordinate commanders to plan for and 

~ 

”(S) Ibid. 

71,. Interview: Lt Cen Royal N. Moore:. Jr.,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov 

1991, p 64. 

(S) Homer lntvw, 4 Mar 1992. 72 

57 
receive air sorties to fly against targets of their choosing must 

increase.” 

To provide for that opportunity, Schwarzkopf had Homer meet daily with 

Lt. Gen. Calvin Waller (Schwarzkopf‘s deputy). Schwarzkopf instructed 

the two officers to allocate sorties among the ground commanders at the 

beginning of each Air Tasking Order cycle. The ground commanders 

could review that allocation and, if necessary, request changes. Homer 

and Waller would evaluate any change requests in time to submit a final 

allocation recommendation to Schwarzkopf by forty-eight hours prior to 

the execution of the ATo.’4 Implementing this process left Horner and 

Waller with two agenda items daily. The first was to develop a 

recommended initial allocation of sorties (seventy-two hours prior to the 

execution of the ATO). The second was to take the comments of the 

ground commanders on yesterday’s recommended allocation, review 

them, and then make a final proposal to Schwarzkopf (forty-eight hours 

prior to ATO execution). 

On 1 February, Schwarzkopf told Lt. Gen. Boomer: 

I want you and Chuck Horner to work together to ensure that we strike 

key Iraqi targets in Southeastern Kuwait. We must continue to utilize 

the JFACC concept to integrate all available air assets while giving you 

maximum flexibility to shape the battlefield . . . continue to work 

closely with CENTAF and keep them informed of your intent and the 

focus of your efforts. . . . ” 

This was not unambiguous support for the position that the JFACC was 

solely responsible for planning the air campaign. It explains Homer’s 

decision to negotiate with General Boomer (and Marine General Moore), 

and it also shows how the decision by the Joint Chiefs to affirm both the 

73(s) Msg, from USCINCCENT, to COMUSCENTAF, subj: “Air Apportionment Planning,” 

31 Jan 1991, 16502, in TACUCUDO Current Ops Log, Microfilm No. 0882616, GWAPS 

New Acquisition File No. 215. (U) Written on this message is a note from Maj Gen 

Corder: “This msg is an important piece of the Airhnd Battle puzzle. . . . ” 

74(S) Ibid. 

”(S) Msg, to CG I MEFMAIN, from CINCCENT. info to CENTAF. subj: “Marine 

Aviation,” 1 Feb 1991, 13302, in (S) TACC/CC/DO Current Ops Log. Microfilm Roll 

Number 0882616, CHECO. 

58 
Joint Force Air Component Commander concept and the Omnibus 

Agreement created a context for disagreement between the Joint Force 

Air Component Commander and the Marine Corps component 

commander. 

In postwar interviews, though, Homer recalled being less concerned 

about the Marines, who came equipped with their own close air support, 

or the Navy than about the Army.’6 He wanted as many aircraft as 

possible engaging the enemy at any given time once Desert Storm began. 

“Push CAS” promised to give the JFACC the sorties required by the 

Commander in Chief and, once the ground war started, those needed by 

the Army as well. During Desert Shield, Homer also decided. that Army 

division and corps commanders probably would ask for more sorties than 

they would really need because they would not want to risk running 

sh0rt.7~ He was trying, as JFACC, to anticipate their true needs and plan 

accordingly. 

Homer’s concem that the theater ground commanders would press 

General Schwarzkopf for control over air support sorties dated from at 

least 11 November 1990. On that day, General Glosson, responsible to 

Homer for planning the offensive air campaign against Iraq, briefed the 

ground commanders, and they objected to what they felt was their 

inability to control the air attacks planned against Iraqi forces dug-in in 

Kuwait?’ The ground commanders’ concerns did not go away, even as 

the bombing launched during Desert Storm progressed. During a Desert 

Storm conference in February 1991 among Schwarzkopf and his 

component commanders, Army corps commanders and the Army 

Component Commander’s staff “bitterly complained that the Air Force 

76For example, Homer had developed the “Push CAS” concept (in April 1990) 

because he did not want aircraft sitting on runways waiting for a call from attacking 

Army divisions. 

77(S) fbid, p 12. 

”Rpt, Excerpts from HQ CENTCOtdJoint Forces and Theater Operations, J-5 Plans 

After Action Report, Vol. I - After Action Report, Chronology. Wayne W. Thompson 

also interviewed Maj Gen Rhame, commander of the 1st Infantry Division (Vll Corps) 

during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and Maj Gen Rhame noted that he and his fellow 

division commanders in the VII Corps had been quite irritated by Brig Gen Glosson’s 

brief to them because it gave them no control over what they regarded as their own 

airspace. lntvw (S), Wayne W. Thompson with Maj Gen Rhame, Jul 1992. 

59 
was not hitting the targets they had ~hosen.”’~ As Homer later recalled, 

“I knew that was going to happen.” As he also had expected, the 

Marines, “out of self-protection,” followed the Army’s lead.80 Homer 

believed that they acted on a misunderstanding of the best use of 

airpower and the tendency of Army corps to “fight in isolation.”S’ In 

response to the ground commanders’ demands that sorties be allocated to 

their fronts, Homer apparently dug in his heels and said “No.” Recalling 

this incident later, Homer said, “Schwarzkopf laughed when I fell on my 

sword. He didn’t give any support at all. But then he summarized it by 

saying, ‘Guys, it’s all mine, and I will put it where it needs to be put.” 

The CINC never raised the issue again.82 

Yet Schwarzkopf took a very active role in determining targets once 

the initial objectives of the strategic campaign against Iraq were met and 

air units shifted their efforts to isolating and weakening Iraq’s army in 

Kuwait. For example, in the three weeks before the ground war began, 

the Army and Marine component commanders submitted ranked lists of 

targets to Schwarzkopf’s operations staff. With the help of the 

intelligence officers in CENTCOM who were in touch with Washington, the 

operations staff led by Maj. Gen. Burton R. Moore would then brief Lt. 

Gen. Calvin Waller, Schwarzkopf’s deputy, and Waller would consult 

with Homer (per Schwarzkopf’s 31 January message). Homer would 

then brief the Commander in 

As Horner discovered through experience, however, Schwarzkopf 

apportioned air assets across the front of the ground formations. In the 

evening briefings where targeting choices were presented to the 

Commander in Chief, Schwarzkopf-as Homer remembered-would say 

things like, “Why are you hitting them? I want THEM [emphasis in the 

transcript] hit! Do you understand? THEM!” Homer and Glosson 

would “just sit there and take notes.”84 

79Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds, The Whirlwind War: rhe United 

States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Draft, (Washington, DC, 

1992), p 276. 

“(S) Horner Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. 

81(S) Ibid. 

”(S) Ibid. 

83(S) Neal Intvw. 13 Jan 1992. 

84(S) Horner Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. 

60 
The Joint Force Air Component Commander and the 

Commander in Chief 

General Homer believed that he had a very good professional 

relationship with General Schwarzkopf. That is, the Commander in Chief 

had, in Horner’s view, a clear idea how to use his JFACC and what the 

Joint Force Air Component Commander’s authority should be, and that 

approach was one which Homer himself accepted. However, Homer also 

made a strong effort to develop a close personal relationship with his 

commander. Horner believed that his endeavor to complement his 

professional relationship to the Commander in Chief with his effort to 

win Schwarzkopf‘s personal trust paid off. In Horner’s view, the benefit 

was that Schwarzkopf became “very trusting with the Air 

Homer also understood that Schwarzkopf was under pressure from 

Washington, and he acted to help him by having the personnel in the 

Tactical Air Control Center, during Desert Storm, quickly send reports of 

the air action to Schwarzkopf’s staff. As Homer told the center, the 

CENTCOM staff would “get Mucho Heato from D.C.” when they could not 

“feed the Info Monster every 3-4 hours.”86 

Horner recalled only one problem: his relationship with 

Schwarzkopf’s Operations staff, headed by Maj. Gen. Burton Moore. 

Horner did not want CENTCOM Operations to control his access to 

Schwarzkopf; he believed that, as a commander, he should report directly 

to the Commander in Chief, his s~perior.~’ CENTCOM Operations already 

had many duties, for example, the responsibility to support the 

Commander in Chief in all warfare areas, not simply aviation. The 

Operations staff was, consequently, flooded with information from all 

component commanders and spent most of their time organizing that 

information for the Commander in Chief.88 Ideally, Schwarzkopf’s 

Operations staff should have played a strong role in organizing and 

supporting a theater command-level joint targeting board. The board, 

”(S) Homer Intvw, 4 Mar 1992; (U) and, in his memoirs, Schwarzkopf praised the 

way Homer managed the process of putting together the air campaign: “Horner had done 

an extraordinary job.” See H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a 

Hero (New York, 1992), p 420. 

86(S) TACUCCIW, Current Ops Log, Microfilm No. 0882616, CHECO, 30 Jan 1991, 

17012, GWAB New Acquisition File No. 215. 

87(S) Homer GWAB Intvw, 9 Mar 1992. 

“(S) Neal Intvw, 13 Jan 1992. 

61 
composed of the component commanders, could have advised 

Schwarzkopf regarding the proper allocation of air sorties across the 

theater. It also could have served as a forum in which the Commander 

in Chief would make the reasons for his choices regarding the allocation 

of airpower clear to his component commanders. The concept of a board 

was packaged with the concept of the Joint Force Air Component 

Commander; the idea was that board would advise the Commander in 

Chief, and the Joint Force Air Component Commander would then 

implement the Commander in Chief’s guidance across the theater, using 

all available aviation resources. 

Schwarzkopf did not organize such a board. He vested responsibility 

for planning the air campaign in Homer’s organization (specifically the 

Tactical Air Control Center), which had the expertise and personnel 

required to put such a plan together, and he continued to rely on Homer 

and on Homer’s subordinates (such as General Buster C. Glosson) to 

implement the overall air campaign plan once the war actually began. In 

off-the-record postwar interviews, representatives of the Marine Corps 

and the Joint Staff argued that Schwarzkopf probably made a mistake in 

not creating such a board.89 The Deputy for Operations, however, was 

not convinced that “CENTCOM’S operations staff” could have done the 

required work or that General Schwarzkopf even believed that it needed 

to be done.w 

‘%ere was a Joint Target Coordination Board, but its members were not general 

officers or even full colonels. (S) See USCENTAF Combat Plans records and schedules, 

GWAPS Microfilm No. 23654, Frames 773 (S) (USCENTAF Combat Phs Handout, 1 Jan 

1991) and 852 (S) (USCENTAF Combat Plans Handout, 1 Oct 1990). See also Chapter 6. 

w(S) Neal Intvw, 13 Jan 1992; (U) note, an officer in CENTCOM J-3(Air) stated that 

his chief, Maj Gen Moore, vetoed a suggestion by several officers of the J-3 staff in 

October 1990 that Moore recommend to Schwankopf creation of a high-level joint 

targeting board. Intvw, Maj Anne D. Leary with Lt Col Royce Crane, CE~OM J-3/Air, 

Apr 14. 1992. 

62 
Regardless of the reasons for not establishing a theater commandlevel target advisory board, the absence of such a board meant that a 

formal communications channel did not exist for Army corps 

commanders to express their concerns to the Commander in Chief and the 

Joint Force Air- Component Commander about targeting. From their 

perspectives, the coalition air attacks were not doing a lot of apparent 

damage to enemy forces facing Army units. Instead, the ground 

commanders approached Schwarzkopf *s deputy, Gen. Calvin Waller.g’ 

Schwarzkopf, however, followed the progress of the air campaign against 

Iraqi ground units using information made available to him by Homer. 

The latter described the process this way: 

I would never give Schwarzkopf BDA [battle damage assessment] 

because I didn’t want to get into the ‘what have you done for me lately’ 

type thing. He understood that, but every night . . . Buster [BGen 

Glosson] would give me that data [tank plinkings, etc.], and then I 

would always have it open on my notebook right there. Schwarzkopf 

would always look at it . . . !* 

Army and Marine representatives were always present at the 19oOL target 

selection briefings given by Horner and Glosson to Schwarzkopf and his 

complete staff, but these briefings focused on gaining Schwarzkopf’s 

approval of a list of 

Homer did not have the authority to create a forum to discuss 

targeting on his own. Only Schwarzkopf could have created a joint 

targeting board, just as it was Schwarzkopf‘s responsibility to use the 

CENTCOM staff to keep the ground commanders aware of the progress of 

the air campaign against the Iraqi units arrayed opposite them. But there 

was no effective joint campaign oversight on the part of CENTCOM’S staff. 

The fact that CENTCOM operations officers served as shift workers in 

CENTCOM’S operations room, instead of matching reports from the JFACC 

against an overall theater combined arms campaign plan, tends to 

91(S) Intvw, 13 Jan 1992. 

92(S) Homer Intvws, 4 Mar 1992 and with GWAPS. 9 Mar 1992. 

93(S) Neal Intvw, 13 Jan 1992. 

63 
substantiate this point.94 Schwarzkopf had delegated management of the 

air campaign to Homer, but Homer’s staff lacked the resources required 

to explain the theater-wide and corps-specific consequences of the air war 

to Army and Marine ground commanders. 

The uncertainty shifted once the ground war began. Then, it was the 

Joint Force Air Component Commander who was concerned, especially 

about fratri~ide.9~ How fast were the ground units moving? Where were 

the ground units? Or, were the fire support coordination lines too far out 

so that coalition strike aircraft could not attack vulnerable enemy targets?% 

Homer’s philosophy regarding close air support was straightforward: 

“ . . . if it’s inside the Fire Support Coordination Line, don’t bother to tell 

me. If it’s [not], put it in the ATO. Get the air cover; get the ECM 

support; get the TOT; get the coordination; get all the benefits from being 

in the ATo.”97 

To support the ground commanders, the JFACC had developed timephased fire support coordination lines, activated by code words, so that 

ground units could move into areas that had been under his control 

941ntvw, Maj Anne D. Leary with Lt Col Royce Crane, CENTCOM J-3/Air, 14 Apr 

95(S) Horner Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. (U) The (S) TACC~CC~DO Current Ops Log has an 

entry from 17 Feb 1991 where Homer writes, “NO MORE Fratricide . . . NO MORE!” 

On 18 Feb, Homer wrote, “NO FRATRICIDE.” On 24 Feb (1352Z), the KO sent a 

message to all wing operations centers, telling them to caution the squadrons. The 

Current Ops Log is Microfilm Roll Number 0882616. 

%An air-ground coordination problem sometimes effected the FSCL when ground 

commanders (who established the FSCLS) moved the FSCL with insufficient warning to the 

IFACWACC. For example, on 17 Feb (15032). the Army’s Battlefield Coordination 

Element notified the TACC that the XVllI Airborne Corps had moved its FSCL “3 minutes 

ago” without warning TACC personnel. (S) (TACUCUDO Current ops Log, 15032, 17 Feb 

1991, Microfilm Roll Number 0882616. CHECO.) That same day, the Marine Corps 

liaison officer in the TACC had informed the 9th Air Force colonel heading the staff there 

that a Marine FSCL would change in five minutes. There had been “no prior 

coordination” with the TACC. (S) (TACUCUDO Current Ops Log, 14542, 17 Feb 1991.) 

1992. 

97(S) Horner Intvw. 4 Mar 1992. 

64 
without risking attack by friendly air forces?* The problem, according 

to a CENTAF staff officer questioned a year after the ground war took 

place, was that the Army's Battlefield Coordination Element in the 

Tactical Air Control Center could not speak for both corps, so that the 

JFACC (and the staff of the Tactical Air Control Center) did not always 

know just where the advancing Army units were.w By contrast, the 

Army's draft version of its official history of Desert Storm says that the 

Army worked directly with Air Force wings to avoid fratricide.Im 

Despite such differences, all accounts of close air support and battlefield 

air interdiction during the ground war note that it was almost impossible 

in many cases for the JFACC'S staff to track the ground advance, despite 

Homer's efforts to guarantee effective air-ground staff coordination."' 

The Joint Force Air Component Commander and the 

Tactical Air Control Center 

The last issue concerns General Homer's methods of directing the air 

campaign through the Tactical Air Control System's (TACS) Tactical Air 

Control Center (TACC). The center worked for Horner, turning his guidance (which supposedly reflected the theater commander's overall plan) 

into a Master Attack Plan (MAP), and then into a daily air tasking order 

(Am). The center also evaluated reports from the wings to determine the 

effectiveness of missions already flown so that Control Center mission 

planners could base their plans on an accurate assessment of what had 

already been achieved across the whole theater. Details of the tasking 

process during Desert Storm will be presented in Chapter 7, but it is 

important here to discuss General Homer's approach to managing the 

Tactical Air Control Center (which in turn managed the air campaign). 

In 1992, Horner said that he deliberately rejected the option of having 

the Tactical Air Control Center prepare Desert Storm ATOS beyond the 

98(s) Briefing, Lt Col Perozzi. CENTAF Staff, 9 Mar 1992, Shaw AFB. SC. 

w(S) Conversation with Lt Col Peroui, 9 Mar 1992, Shaw AFB, SC. 

lmThe Whirlwind War: the United States Army in Operations Desen Shield and 

"'This made Homer very angry because he believed it was an Army problem. 

Desert Storm, p 217. 

(S) Homer GWAPS Intvw, 9 Mar 1992. 

65 
first two days.Im He wanted the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting 

planners to learn “how to do chaos war.”103 Yet, he did not want chaos 

in the Control Center. There was some risk of that because, first, the 

workload (in terms of numbers of sorties) on center personnel was beyond what they had trained for. Second, in order to give it the strength 

required to handle that heavy load of sorties, the addition of large numbers of personnel to CENTAF’S Tactical Air Control Center meant that 

there were a lot of strangers in the organization.lW For example, the 

peacetime strength of CENTAF’S Control Center was about 300 personnel; 

during Desert Storm, the number was close to 2,000, counting intelligence 

 specialist^.'^^ This added strength was required for the center to put 

together Air Tasking Orders with large numbers of sorties. As General 

Glosson observed, “We had a system established that should have supported about 1,500 to 2,000 sorties a day, 2,400 max. . . . [0]n about 

day ten I was asking them to produce an AT0 in excess of 3,000 sorties 

a day. They had never experienced anything like that.”lw Maj Gen John 

A. Corder, Homer’s operations deputy at CENTAF, later confirmed 

Glosson’s portrait of the Command Center personnel initially struggling 

during Desert Storm to produce daily tasking orders on time.Im 

Horner employed at least four tactics during Desert Storm to ensure 

that the CENTAF Control Center operated as well as it could under the 

circumstances. One was to bring in General Corder,’08 who arrived in 

Riyadh on 22 November 1990 in order to add the authority of his rank 

to match the Army’s rapidly growing theater force (and rank) structure. 

As a major general, Corder could (and did) deal more easily with senior 

CENTCOM staff officers than did Col. James Crigger, who was Corder’s 

‘OZ(S) Homer Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. 

lo3(S) Horner Intvw, 4 Mar 1992. (U) Horner rejected preparation of more scripted 

ATOS because he believed that type of planning was inappropriate for the action-reaction 

of conventional warfare. See (S) Chapter 7. 

‘04See (S) Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the make-up of the Black 

lo5(S) Briefing, Lt col Ptiefer, USAF, CENTAF Staff, 9 Mar 1992, Shaw AFB, SC. 

‘OSNotes from “Planning and Execution of the Offensive Air Campaign Against 

Iraq,” (S) intvw. Brig Gen Buster Glosson, 6 Mar 1991, RSAF HQ, Riyadh, SA, p 23. 

Im(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Maj Gen John A. Corder, May 18, 1992. 

‘@%en Corder led the Tactical Air Warfare Center at Eglin AFB, R. 

Hole and TACC. 

66 
predecessor as operations deputy.lW Another was to make General 

Glosson, Schwarzkopf's behind-the-scenes offensive air campaign planner 

during Desert Shield, the leader of the organization which produced the 

Master Attack Plan during Desert Storm."' A third was to make sure 

that either he or Glosson was available to visit the Control Center at any 

time once the air war began.'" A fourth was to give Glosson responsibility for releasing videotapes or photographs to the media during Desert 

Storm.112 In these cases, Homer used his authority as Air Force component commander to place Air Force officers whom he knew in positions 

where he believed that, as JFAcC, he needed subordinates in whom he 

could place special trust. 

His concern was to put together quickly a working, effective organization that included significant allied participation. He naturally turned 

to those officers whom he knew and with whom he had worked. As he 

noted at the time, 

I got people together based on personalities (not organizational and 

management skills). American lives are very disorganized and chaotic. 

They wait until one o'clock to decide to go to the ball game. But they 

go. I got these particular people together to fight the war. We'll fight 

and win and then the organization will di~appear."~ 

This comment reveals Homer's approach to organizing for theater air 

war: people mattered more than structure, or organization. Winning 

mattered more than running an efficient operation. The legitimacy of his 

command organization was less a function of the way it worked than of 

the character of the people who staffed it. The paragraphs which follow 

will explore this philosophy of command in more detail. Chapters 6 and 

7 will discuss the organizational consequences which this philosophy 

created within the Tactical Air Control Center. 

'09(S) Neal Intvw, 13 Jan 1992; see also (S) Chapter 6. 

"'(S) SIX Chapter 6. 

'I1(S) Intvw, GWAW with Maj Gen Buster C. Glosson, 14 Apr 1992. 

'"(S) Ibid. 

'13(S) Intvw. Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, WAF. GWAPS Microfilm Files No. 269523, 

P 60. 

67 
During Desert Storm, Homer usually would visit the Control Center 

early, at 0530, to talk with Glosson in the Guidance, Apportionment, 

Targeting group about the Master Attack Plan. Homer would then make 

a brief presentation to as many as 400 personnel gathered in the Control 

Center.”‘ These brief, informal talks show Homer as coach, as when he 

exhorted center personnel to “Ask questions,”115 or to speak up if they 

had any “good ideas about tactics or target selection.”lI6 On 31 January, 

he told these personnel that “we’ve got to be prepared to manage chaos; 

we’ve got to keep the units informed; and we’ve got to be able to react 

without jerking the units around too Since wing representatives 

worked in the Control Center, these short speeches were also a means 

Homer used to communicate indirectly with the wings. Through the 

center, informally, he sent the wings messages regarding target priorities 

(for example, Scuds were high priority on 20 January but not by the 

24th)”’ and his campaign priorities (“We just can’t have casualties” on 

30 January, but “No excuses” regarding close air support on 24 February).’Ig He also reassured his team, as when he told them, after he and 

they learned that there had been civilians in the Al Firdos bunker, “war 

is groping in the or when he said that “we can expect to go 

through a learning curve again as ground operations start.”12’ Horner 

usually made these kinds of comments in the company of General 

Behery, the Saudi Air Force Commander. Homer often went out of his 

“‘Before 1 I Feb, Horner would talk to the TACC staff at 0730. After that date, the 

talks were scheduled for O900. (S) TAC~C~LXI Current Ops Log, 11 Feb 1991, 10102, 

Microfilm No. 0882616, CHECO, GWAPS New Acquisitions Fib No. 215. 

Daily Comments of Lt Gen Charles A. Homer. 17 Jan through 28 Feb 1991,” HQ 

USCEmAF Office of History, 20 Mar 1991. p 1 (comment from 17 Jan 1700 talk). 

115~ 

“?bid, p 3 (0730 talk on 18 Jan 1991). 

Il’llbid, p 22 (31 Jan talk at 1700). 

I181bid, p 5 (0730 talk on 20 Jan), and pp 11-12 (1700 talk on 24 Jan). 

‘‘’/bid, p 18 (0730 talk on 30 January), and p 63 (O900 talk on 24 Feb). 

la0lbid, p 41 (1700 talk on 14 Feb). 

12’lbid, p 56 (1700 talk on 21 Feb). 

68 
way to promote and praise coalition cooperation, and he was careful not 

to ridicule Iraq or its common soldiers.I2’ 

Once he had made his morning presentation within the Control Center, 

Homer examined the Air Tasking Order. Then he often met again with 

General Glosson until noon, when-during Desert Storm-he would present 

the Air Tasking Order for the next day’s operations to Army, Marine 

Corps, and Navy officers representing the other component commanders. 

Homer was then “free” (officially) until later in the afternoon, when he 

would visit the center again, make another short speech at 1700, and then, 

at 1800 (or so), meet again with General Glosson. Both would visit General Schwarzkopf at 1900 to brief the Commander in Chief about the progress of the air campaign and the JFACC’S plans for future operations. 

The Tactical Air Control Center was not just a sounding board or 

instrument Homer used to control the direction and scope of the air campaign. It also was also a source for targets and the missions flown against 

the enemy. It was the organization that turned guidance into specific plans 

and mission directives for the air units. As such, it was not a passive 

organization. Its members were expected to tum a concept of operations 

into specific missions. This is why Homer chose Glosson to be his chief 

campaign planner. Glosson understood what the air campaign was sup 

posed to achieve. As Homer told center personnel during Desert Storm, 

“Bean counters are concerned about holes in runways. They are missing 

the point.”lZ3 Glosson was made chief planner to make sure the point was 

emphasized. At the same time, the planners and the Air Tasking Order 

“fraggers” had to work together smoothly if the tasking were to emerge 

from the center on time. As Homer stressed, “We’re servants, we’re not 

masters.”’” Time and again during Desert Storm, he emphasized the need 

Iufbid, p 33; on 8 Feb, for example, Homer expressed the hope that Hussein would 

be overthrown by his own military before the land campaign began. thereby saving many 

Iraqi lives. 0730 talk. 

”sfbid, p 10 (0730 remarks, 23 Jan). 

‘241bid, p 15 (1 700 talk, 26 Jan). 

69 
of the Control Center to stick to a routine that put out the Air Tasking 

Order on time and kept the number of late changes down.125 

But some of the problems Homer perceived in his Control Center were 

the consequences of decisions which he himself had made as the Air Force 

component commander. If, as JFACC, Homer needed an effective Tactical 

Air Control Center, then, as Air Force component commander, he had to 

apportion operational authority over his many air units among his subordinates. On 5 December 1990, he organized CENTAF for war by creating two 

provisional air divisions, the 14th and the 15th, each headed by a brigadier 

general, to serve alongside the two (the 17th and the 1610th Airlift Division) already in place. The 14th Air Division(P) was established to “provide operational control of assigned tactical fighter wings,” while the 15th 

folded together electronic warfare, reconnaissance, command and control, 

and other units.’% With his appointment as commander, 14th Air Division(P), Glosson became a major operational authority as well as the 

commander of the planners scoping out the offensive air war against Iraq. 

Glosson’s deputy planner, Brig. Gen. Glenn A. Profitt, became head of the 

15th Air Division(P). Brig. Gen. Patrick P. Caruana, Strategic Force 

commander since 8 August, had led the 17th Air Division(P) since 24 

August. In one stroke, General Homer gave his two “Black Hole” senior 

planning leaders top positions in CENTAF’S combat ~rganization.’’~ 

This decision had several consequences. First, once the air campaign 

began, it drastically increased the workload of Generals Glosson and 

Profitt. In retrospect, Glosson, for example, said his hands were 

full-probably too full-as the chief planner and as 14th Air Division(P) 

commander.”* Yet Homer’s decision reduced his span of control. His 

‘’’On 16 Feb. at his 1700 talk, Homer said, “A lot of business is done over the 

telephone, and we need to keep a record of it.” (p. 47) The (S) TAC~C~DO Current Ops 

Log for 13 Feb 1991 (17332) noted, “World event: AM Out on time. . . . Of course 

it . . . required 231 changes but it got out on time.” 

lZ6Msg, CCWGORG, from Lt Gen Horner, 120600 Z. GWAPS File. 

Iz7(S) See Chapter 6. 

‘”(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Maj Gen Buster C. Glosson, 14 Apr 1992. (U) In the 

(S) TAC~C~DO Current Ops Log for 28 Jan 1991, Horner observed that “I came to work 

RESTED only to find Profitt and Glosson looking like -. They don’t know enough 

to go to bed.” Homer was teasing them. He knew very well that they were overworked. 

But that was their job. 

70 
primary operational deputy, General Glosson, was also his senior planner. 

Meetings between the two, which took place at least twice every day 

during Desert Storm, covered both plans and operation^.'^^ As Joint 

Force Air Component Commander, Horner had to devote a great deal of 

time and thought to resolving issues with the Saudis and other allies, 

dealing with the other Service component commanders, and supporting 

General Schwarzkopf. As commander, CENTAF, Homer had also to carry 

operational responsibilities. By combining his plans and operations 

deputies, Homer reduced the number of subordinates he had to deal with 

and guaranteed that the operational concept basic to the air campaign was 

translated directly into the Air Tasking Order, the JFACC’S primary control 

tool. However, offsetting these advantages was one disadvantage: 

Glosson could-and did-bypass the Air Tasking Order process and issue 

orders directly to his wing commanders.’30 

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Glosson was serving as the Deputy 

Commander, Middle East Joint Task Force. When CENTCOM was ordered 

to implement OPlan 1002-90, Glosson’s position was superseded by the 

movement of CENTCOM and CENTAF into Saudi Arabia, and he 

approached General Homer. What matters here is that he had personal 

contacts at very high levels in the National Security Agency, the Central 

Intelligence Agency, and the White Glosson also had a “personal relationship” with the Secretary of Defense. During Desert Shield, 

the Secretary, according to the general, called him in Riyadh to ask what 

role air power would play if the coalition attacked Iraq.13* Finally, 

Glosson had had a direct relationship with General Schwarzkopf since 

becoming the Commander in Chief’s chief air campaign planner. 

129(S) Homer GWAPS Intvw. 9 Mar 1992; (S) GWAPS with Maj Gen Buster C. 

Glosson. 14 Apr 1992. 

I3O(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Maj Gen Buster C. Glosson, 14 Apr 1992. (U) Glosson 

said that he had very strong support from his wing commanders, six of whom had worked 

for him before in one capacity or another. See also Chapter 7. 

See also 

(S) Chapter 6. 

I3’(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Maj Gen Buster C. Glosson, 9 Apr 1992. 

‘32(S) Ibid. 

71 
There was some potential for Glosson to run the air war on his own. 

He and his Black Hole staff were convinced, when Desert Storm began, 

that they-better than anyone else in the Control Center-understood the 

concept of operations on which the air campaign was based.’33 As his 

deputy, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, wrote at the end of March 1991, 

“There was no misunderstanding or dilution of intent of the plan between 

the planner and those executing the plan because the same individual was 

in charge of both.”’” Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting was a 

special kind of battle staff, and Glosson was its leader. As Deptula later 

said, he and his colleagues did not just match air assets against a list of 

targeting prioritie~.’~’ Instead, they applied a concept of operations to a 

campaign.’” What matters in this chapter is whether General Homer, as 

JFACC, was in fact the actual leader of the Tactical Air Control Center, 

despite whatever views the Guidance, Apportionment, Targeting staff 

might have held. 

The evidence indicates that he was. There are, for example, many 

cases in the Tactical Air Control Center’s Operations Log where Homer 

issues instructions to the Tactical Air Control Center (those on fratricide 

have already been mentioned), or where he approves actions taken by his 

subordinates. In mid-February, he ordered a strong bombing effort 

against an Iraqi division that had mistreated coalition ~0ws.l~~ He also 

directed the Control Center to check up on requests for air support by 

units of the Special Operations Command near the border with Iraq.’38 

There are other examples. Taken together, they indicate that Homer was 

tracking the course of the air campaign and directing that course when he 

believed he had to do 

133(S) See Chapter 7. 

‘”(S) Background Paper, Lt Col David Deptula, 29 Mar 1991, Gw~ Files. 

I3’(S) Briefing, Lt Col David A. Deptula, SAFIOSX to GWAPS. 20 Nov 1991, p 21. 

‘”(S) [bid, p 43. 

‘”(S) TAC~C~W Current Ops Log, oooOZ. 12 or 13 Feb 1991. 

13’(S) fbid, 13002, 16 Feb 1991. 

Glosson often referred to Homer as “Boss” in the (S) TAC~C~DO Current Ops 139 

Log. See, for example, the entry for 03002, 26 Feb 1991. 

72 
Summary and Review 

The idea that there should be a theater-level air commander reaches 

back to World War 11, when, on a temporary basis, it was implemented 

in the European Theater, though the commander, General Eisenhower, 

was not himself an aviation officer.” As an issue among the Services, 

the idea carries through the Korean War and the conflict in Southeast 

Asia. In these cases, senior Air Force officers argued persistently for a 

“single manager for air” across the theater. 

With what results? It is difficult to say because it is impossible to take 

that one factor-the existence of a Joint Force Air Component Commander-and separate its influence on the conduct and outcome of the air war 

from so many others. The overwhelming allied air superiority reduced the 

amount and degree of conflict over resources among allies and among 

Services. Fewer resources, or a more effective opponent, might have 

increased competition within the coalition for aviation. Experience and the 

personality of key leaders mattered, too. The fact that Homer had worked 

for three years as CENTAF commander before Desert Shield was, in his 

mind, crucial. He knew the area and key people in friendly governments; 

he was on friendly terms with other component commanders, such as 

generals Yeosock and Boomer; he was able to work well with his chief, 

General Schwarzkopf, because he already understood his command’s 

problems and potential. He had, both as JFACC and as CENTAF commander, 

trained and energetic and talented counterparts and subordinates. 

Even the enemy helped. As CENTCOM Forward in August 1990, 

Horner was concerned that his command and his force might be forced 

to withdraw in the face of a concerted Iraqi assault, much as U.S. forces 

withdrew when pressed by North Korean forces in the summer of 1950. 

Instead, theater air forces had time to prepare for an offensive campaign, 

one which Horner, Schwarzkopf and other senior officers-supported by 

the President-vowed would not be a repeat of the 1960’s Rolling Thunder 

effort against North Vietnam.I4’ 

I4OSee Appendix 2. 

14’See Lt Gen Homer’s comments in Larry Grossman, “Beyond Rivalry,’’ Government Execulive, Vol. 23. No. 6, (Jun 1991), p 13. 

73 
Perhaps a better question to ask is “Did the JFACC act in ways which 

supported the legitimacy of his position?’ The answer seems to be “yes.” 

If Horner made any mistake in this capacity, it was to fail to have ready 

a truly joint Tactical Air Control Center when Iraq invaded Kuwait. But 

he was not alone in this error. The Navy and Army, component commanders did not insist that Homer accept as deputies in the Control , 

Center general officers from their staffs. The Navy, Army and Marine 

component commanders did send teams of liaison officers to support the 

JFACC, but that was not the same thing. Homer recalled that he preferred 

officers from other Services to act as liaisons rather than to work for him 

(as JFACC).14* 

Homer’s experience also suggests a close relationship between technology and the effectiveness of command and control. The Tactical Air 

Control Center Operations Log for 20 February contains this observation: 

“An amazing event has just occurred: we were able to talk secure, direct 

to all four AWACS, simultaneously . . . we also had an air picture from 

coast to coast at the same time. Unheard One minute later, the 

Tactical Air Control Center lost the air picture from the Navy. As the 

Log noted, “Perfection didn’t last quite as long as hoped for.” Nevertheless, this-and similar-incidents may be glimpses of a future, perhaps not 

very distant, when a theater air commander will be able to follow the 

course of an air campaign in real time, intervening selectively to take 

advantage of the flexibility of air power. As it was, using essentially 

paper and pencils supplemented by personal computers and systems such 

as Computer Assisted Force Management System, the Joint Commander 

and his Control Center organized and coordinated an overwhelmingly 

successful joint and coalition air campaign of unprecedented magnitude. 

Nothing like it had ever been done before. 

General Homer could not and did not plan on using this technology. 

The Control Center which supported him did not use very sophisticated 

management support systems. No part of the center, for example, used 

interactive software, even though such a system might have proved its 

worth to the planners who sketched out their alternatives with paper and 

pencil and tracked the course of the air campaign with charts drawn by 

I4’(S) Horner GWAPS Intvw, 9 Mar 1992. 

143(S) TAC~C~DO Current Ops Log, 10302.20 Feb 1991. 

74 
hand, mission videotapes taken directly from returning aircraft, and Cable 

News Network broadcasts.’& Center personnel did try the MSS-I1 system, 

where data from the reports of returning aircraft were fed into an automated display system. Unfortunately, as Deptula pointed out, “ . . . it’s 

just like a computer, garbage in and garbage That is, there was 

more to the automation of command and control than the development of 

interesting electronic displays. Having more-especially more immediate-information on what was happening in the air campaign was useful, 

yet it was not sufficient to give the Control Center a significantly improved ability to control the course of the campaign. To have improved 

control, the center needed an interactive, automated Air Tasking Order 

planning and development process, as well as a system equally rapid and 

reliable to feed damage assessments back into that process. 

Finally, General Homer’s perception of which issues mattered to him 

as JFACC is a list that future Joint Force Air Component Commanders 

might want to consider. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, there 

were four types of such issues: (a) those concerning allies, (b) those 

among the Service component commanders, (c) those affecting the 

JFACC’S standing with the theater commander, and (d) those related to the 

JFACC’S management of the organizations-mainly the Tactical Air Control 

Center-through which he maintained control over theater air. The importance of these issues will change from case to case. However, failure to 

give any one set of issues due attention is likely to rob the Joint Force 

Air Component Commander of the legitimacy he needs to gain and hold 

the confidence of the theater commander, allies, or other component 

commanders. 

14(S) Draft Transcript of a Briefing to GWAPS by Lt Col David Deptula, 20 Nov 

1991, p 24. See also Notes from “Planning and Execution of the Offensive Air Campaign 

Against Iraq,” (S) intvw with Brig Gen Buster Glosson, 6 Mar 1991, pp 17-18. 

I4’(S) Ibid, pp 17- 1 8. 

75 
76 
4 

Building the Tactical Air Control System 

Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, exercised his authority through his Tactical Air Control System, 

or TACS. As Tactical Air Command Regulation 55-45 notes, the TACS is 

“the organization, personnel, procedures, and equipment necessary to 

plan, direct, and control tactical air operations and to coordinate air 

operations with other Services and Allied Forces.”’ This chapter has two 

tasks. First, it will provide a basic understanding of how a TACS and its 

major components function. Second, it will describe how selected major 

components of the Central Command Air Forces TACS were assembled 

during Desert Shield. Our primary focus will be on the deployment and 

initial operation of the basic airborne elements of the TACS-the Airborne 

Warning and Control (AWACS) and Airborne Battlefield Command and 

Control Center (ABCCC) aircraft, crews, and planning staffs. We also will 

examine the communications which linked these aircraft to one another 

and to command positions on the ground. These airborne and ground 

components of the TACS were tools used by General Homer to control the 

air campaign. 

Major Components of a TACS 

Each theater or contingency where air forces are employed, whether 

in conjunction with ground forces or by themselves, requires some form 

of tactical control of planning and operations. The major components of 

the TACS provide the air component commander with the tools necessary 

to adapt his specific command and control system to his unique requirements. This first section will describe the major components of the TACS 

used in support of both air-to-ground and air-to-air operations. Figure 11 

illustrates these components. 

‘Tactical Air Command Regulation 55-45. Tactical Air Force Headquarfers and rhe 

TACC, 8 Apr 1988, p 5-1. See also Joint Pub 1-02 (formerly ICS Pub I), Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associared Tern. 1 Dec 1989. 

77 
Figure 11 

Tactical Air Control System (TACS) 

____- 

I AIRLIFT I 

TACTICAL AIR 

CONTROL CENTE 

r---------- 

I FRIENDLY GROUN

I *BATTALION 

I *BRIGADE 

*COMPANY 

! - - - - - - - 

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL *MARINE CORPS -, I
Tactical Air Control Party 

The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) consists of experienced tactical 

aircrews, tactical air command and control specialists, communications 

personnel, and technicians collocated with each appropriate command 

echelon of the supported ground forces, TACPS are subordinate to the Air 

Support Operations Center (ASOC), deploy with Army divisions, brigades, 

and battalions: and “advise and assist the ground Commander, request and 

coordinate preplanned and immediate tactical air support, and meet other 

requirements of the individual ground force echelon supp~rted.”~ The 

Tactical Air Control Party passes requests for air support from the ground 

commander to the Air Support Operations Center. TACPs provide a “picture” of the ground situation to air forces to direct air attack against enemy 

units and help prevent fratricide. Intermediate echelon TACB may coordinate requests for air support as they travel up the chain of command. 

Forward Air Controller 

The Forward Air Controller (FAC). either ground or airborne, functions as an extension of the TACP and performs terminal attack control for 

close air support (CAS) missions or acts as a tactical air coordinator. The 

forward air controller operates close to enemy forces and helps the attacking pilot identify friendly and enemy positions. He can also direct the 

pilot providing close air support to the specific target. 

Air Support Operations Center 

Air Support Operations Centers (ASOCs) are specialized Air Force 

operation centers responsible for detailed execution planning, direction, and 

control of the tactical air effort in close air support4 of land forces? They 

’TAC Manual 2-1, p 5-21. 

3TAC Regulation 55-45, Tactical Air Force Headquarters and the TACC. 

4“Close air support is the application of aerospace forces in support of the land 

component commander’s objectives.” (Air Force Manual 1 - 1, Basic Aerospuce Doctrine 

of the United States Air Force, Mar 1992). 

%he Marine corollary to the ASOC is the Division Air Support Center (DASC). The 

DASC has comsponding responsibilities (to the ASOC) and similar subordinate groups 

(such as TACPs and FAG). 

79 
are located at the senior Army tactical headquarters levels (normally corps) 

and collocated with the corps-level Tactical Operations Center (roc). In 

a multicorps environment, there is normally one Air Support Operations 

Center for each corps, and each of these Air Support Operation Centers 

reports individually to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).~ Air Support Operations Center personnel are under the control of the TACC, and 

they pass immediate Army requests for air support to the TACC. In turn, 

the Tactical Air Control Center usually grants Air Support Operations 

Center personnel authority to schedule forward air controller missions 

flown in support of Army maneuver units (such as battalions).' In addition 

to passing Army requests for air support to the TACC, the Air Support 

Operations Center provides Air Force expertise to senior Army tactical elements, assisting and advising on the capabilities and limitations of 

airpower, coordinating on Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) missions in support of air-land operations, and establishing and operating the Air Force air 

request net to control close air support and reconnaissance sorties distributed to the corps by the TACC in the air allocation process? 

Control and Reporting Center 

Three elements of the Tactical Air Control System are each capable 

of directing airborne aircraft to the target area. The first of these, the 

Control and Reporting Center (CRC), is a ground station which normally 

uses ground- or AWACS-based radar to control air traffic. Once it receives 

a request for air support from the Air Support Operations Center, the 

Control and Reporting Center directs available aircraft from within its 

area of control to where they are needed or passes control of aircraft to 

another portion of the TACS (Airborne Battlefield Command and Control 

Center or Forward Air Controller). If the Control and Reporting Center 

does not have resources available to fill the request, it will request assistance from either AWACS (which can divert airborne assets) or from the 

Tactical Air Control Center (which can launch ground alert aircraft). 

%he TACC is the senior air element of the TACS. It is described in detail in Chapter 

'TAC Manual 2- 1, Tacrical Air Operatiom, Aug 199 1, p 5-20. 

'Ibid, p 5-3. 

5 of this report. 

80 
Tactical Air Command Regulation 55-45 states that inherent in Control and Reporting Center functions 

are the requirements to supervise subordinate radar elements, provide 

threat warning for friendly aircraft, implement procedures to ensure that 

air defense assets of all services are employed in mutually supporting 

roles, establish coordination procedures based on friendly artillery plans, 

establish the means for air traffic regulatiodidentification, and support 

air rescue operations . . . . The CRC detects and identifies hostile airborne objects, recommends changes in air defense warning conditions 

and, when authorized, assigns weapons (aircraft and ADA [air defense 

artillery]), plus scrambles/diverts air defense capable aircraft? 

AWACS and the Control and Reporting Center can be used in combination or separately, depending upon how the airspace is organized. For 

example, the AWACS, because of its large radar and radio coverage, may 

be assigned to control the airspace over an entire sector of the theater 

including enemy territory. The ground-based Control and Reporting 

Center may be assigned a small subsector on the friendly side of the line 

between friendly and enemy airspace. In this case the AWACS would 

identify and track hostile aircraft as they approach friendly lines and warn 

the CRC of the potential threat. As enemy aircraft enter the CRC's 

subsector, the CRC could direct air or ground forces to shoot them down." 

Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center 

The Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) is a 

containerized command and control center designed for EC-130E aircraft. 

It contains communications equipment rather than radars or other sensors. 

Its main role is to coordinate strike aircraft carrying out air-to-ground 

missions. Like the Control and Reporting Center, the ABCCC can direct 

airborne aircraft to support requests from the Air Support Operations 

Center. ABCCC crews, headed by a Director, Airborne Battlestaff, serve 

as flying tactical air control centers or air support operations centers. 

Weapons and aircraft controllers on the ABCCC direct forward air control 

9TAC Regulation 55-45, Tactical Air Force Headquarters and The Tactical Air 

'%he AWACS could direct friendly air defenders to engage the hostile aircraft while 

Control Center, 8 Apr 1988. 

still over enemy territory. 

81 
aircraft, airlift flights into their area, and air strikes against ground targets. 

ABCCC personnel control flights in their area by monitoring and maintaining communications among all the various aircraft (strike, reconnaissance, 

and transport) “working” their area. However, the ABCCC is not limited 

to coordinating ground attack missions and can be used to complement 

almost any battlefield command and control agency. ABCCC communicators also talk with their counterparts on AWACS and RlVFT JOINT (discussed later in this chapter) and pass along situational and threat data 

from these systems to the aircraft focused on air-to-ground operations. 

This combination of the Tactical Air Control Parties, Air Support 

Operations Centers, and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control 

Centers is designed to facilitate Army-Air Force communication and 

coordination from the battalion level all the way up to the joint force 

level at theater air command headquarters. Army Battlefield Coordination 

Element (BCE) personnel (described in detail later in this chapter), after 

consulting with the Army’s component commander, help shape the Air 

Tasking Order. The BCE, in turn, advises ABCCC crews what sorties to 

expect in their areas of operation. Forward air controllers, Tactical Air 

Control Parties, and Air Support Operations Centers sense the ground 

situation, call for air support, and then direct that air support when it 

arrives overhead. The ABCCC backs up both the Tactical Air Control 

Center and the Air Support Operations Center; its crew can work both 

functions in case communications with these ground command elements 

are disrupted or lost. Finally, by talking to all aircraft flying in its area, 

the ABCCC can respond to immediate changes in the air or ground situation, exercising control over air-to-ground operations when necessary. 

The mobility and communications advantage inherent in the Airborne 

Battlefield Command and Control Center platform enable it to stay 

abreast of the current ground and air situation within its assigned area of 

responsibility. And because the ABCCC is airborne, it normally can 

manage tactical forces operating beyond the normal communication 

coverage of ground TACS elements such as the Air Support Operations 

Center and Control and Reporting Center. 

82 
Airborne Warning and Control System 

The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is both an 

airborne radar surveillance and control platform and the working location 

of the Airborne Command Element (ACE)-the direct link to the Joint 

Force Air Component Commander. The AWACS, like the Control and 

Reporting Center and ABCCC, can direct aircraft to fulfill Air Support 

Operation Center requests. 

The E-3 AWACS provides highly mobile, survivable airborne surveillance and command and control functions for tactical and air defense 

forces. The AWACS 

has the ability to provide detection and control of aircraft below or 

beyond the coverage of ground-based radar, or when ground-based radar 

elements are not available. The AWACS radar and radio coverage permits air defense warnings, aircraft control, navigational assistance, 

coordination of air rescue efforts and changes to tactical missions." 

The E-3, operating in conjunction with U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, Army, 

Air Force, and allied units, provides a radar picture spanning the entire 

theater of operations'* that can be data-linked with other TACS facilities. 

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it provided real-time information to 

most coalition command centers. The E-3 is capable of establishing a 

data sharing network with the RC-135V RIVET JOINT, ABCCC, TACC, and 

Navy E-2 Hawkeyes. 

The AWACS also provides support to all aircraft requiring pre- and 

poststrike air refueling. Normally, the air combat plan contains a detailed 

plan to match tanker aircraft with aircraft requiring aerial refueling; 

however, last minute changes in targets or takeoff times may require en 

route modification to the refueling plan. AWACS, using its radar picture 

and radio contact with aircraft, can direct refuelings at any time. 

"TAC Regulation 55-45, Tactical Air Force Headquarters and The Tactical Air 

I2While an individual AWACS has a limited radar coverage, multiple aircmft "picControl Center. 

tures" can be linked together to cover a vary large geographic area. 

83 
Adhitional Airborne Platforms 

Two additional airborne platforms, while not officially part of the 

Tactical Air Control System, were critical elements of the command and 

control system during the Gulf War. RIV~ JOINT (RC-135V) is an electronic intelligence collection platform that works with AWACS and selected 

ground sites to provide enhanced awareness of enemy air and ground 

activity. [DELETED]13 RIVET JOINT flies a standoff profile as close to 

the target airspace as the threats permit.14 

The second platform, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar 

System (JSTARS),” provides near-real-time wide-area surveillance and deep 

targeting capability to ground and air commanders.16 The system is able 

to detect, lacate, and track high-value targets, such as mobile missile 

launchers, vehicle convoys, logistics depots, and assembly areas, and pass 

this information to air and ground commander^.'^ The intelligence information from RIVET JOINT and JSTARS is relayed to ground and air commanders to assist them in assessing the combat situation and allocating 

air assets. 

13(S) Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to 

Congress, Apr 1992, Appendix T, “Performance of Selected Weapon Systems.” 

14[DELETED] (SINF) USAF TAWC. Tactical Air Forces Guide for Integrated Electronic Combat, Oct 1987, pp A-18, A-19; see also Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, Second Edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989), p 177; William E. 

BUKOWS, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York, 1986), pp 

169-71. 

‘%he Joint STARS platform designation is the EC-135. 

“(S) WD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Apr 1992, 

Appendix T. “Performance of Selected Weapon Systems.” 

171ntvw. Thomas C. Hone, Maj Anne D. Leary. Mark D. Mandeles with Brig Gen 

George K. Muellner, DCslRequirements, TAC, 16 Apr 1992. See also, for example, Peter 

Grier, “Joint STARS Does Its Stuff,” Air Force Magazine. Jun 1991, pp 38-42; Edward H. 

Kolcum. “Joint STARS E8s Return to U.S.; 20-Aircraft Fleet Believed Assured,” Aviation 

Week and Space Technology, 1 1 Mar 1991. p 20. 

84 
Basic airborne elements of 

the TACS are the Airborne 

Warning and Control System (AWACS) (above), and 

Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center 

(ABCCC), interior view 

(right); Rivet Joint (below) 

works with AWACS to provide enhanced awareness 

of enemy activity. 

85 
Air Traffik Control and Air Defense Systems 

During combat, the control of the airspace over the theater frequently 

is relinquished by the civil air traffic control authorities and turned over 

to the military, which divides the airspace into sectors and subsectors 

depending upon the size of the theater. Each sector or subsector is then 

placed under the control of an element of the TACS. such as AWACS or a 

Control and Reporting Center. Control of airspace is turned over to the 

military because of (a) the high volume of air traffic, (b) the necessity to 

provide specialized control of military aircraft, and (c) the requirement to 

defend against possible attack by enemy air forces. Most of the procedures for airspace control and defense are theater specific. We will 

discuss the particular procedures used in the Gulf later in this chapter. 

TACS in Support of Land Forces 

Air attacks conducted to support ground forces are controlled in four 

ways: through (a) the Air Tasking Order (which assigns specific aircraft 

to ground-attack missions, often against specific targets), (b) the actions 

of Air Support Operations Centers (which schedule and coordinate the 

flights of forward air controllers), (c) Tactical Air Control Parties (which 

accompany ground units), and (d) ABCCC, a specially modified C-130 

aircraft (which is an extension of the Combat Operations Division of the 

Tactical Air Control Center). Air Force missions in support of Army 

ground operations are under Air Force control. At the same time, such 

missions must respond to Army needs, and those needs will depend on 

the tactical situation in which Army maneuver units (battalions, brigades 

and divisions) find themselves. 

When the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), the forerunner 

of USCENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), was formed in early 1980, the 

Air Force’s Tactical Air Command (TAC) and the Army’s Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) were completing new air-land battle procedures that placed less emphasis on the central region of Europe, had 

worldwide applicability for unilateral Army and Air Force operations, and 

focused on contingencies that were more likely to occur, such as defense 

of critical facilities in the Persian Gulf region. The new procedures also 

increased emphasis on defeating second echelon forces by extending the 

battlefield to include enemy forces that would have a near-term effect on 

air-land operations and require more detailed coordination between the air 

86 
component commander (ACC)” and the land component commander (LCC) 

in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) development process. 

The Army and Air Force components (later USARCENT and USCENTAF) 

of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force adopted the Tactical Air Command-Training and Doctrine Command procedures for use during exercises 

and contingency plans. The RDJTF evolved into the Unified Command for 

Southwest Asia, U.S. Central Command, which was activated on 1 January 

1983. Although the new doctrine grew out of the “31 initiative^"'^ ArmyAir Force Agreement of 1982 and had its beginning as the first TACTRADOC “Camouflage Manual” addressing joint attack of the second 

echelon, (J-SAK) it had far-reaching implications beyond second echelon 

attack. The new doctrine recognized, for the first time, the concept of a 

single air component commander and land component commander and 

increased the amount of joint coordination required between land and air 

units in conducting tactical air support for land forces. To accomplish this 

increased coordination, the Army formed the Battlefield Coordination 

Element (BCE)?’ an organization of approximately twenty-five Army 

personnel to be collocated with the Tactical Air Control Cente8’ during 

wartime with a mission to process land force requests for tactical air 

support, monitor and interpret the land battle situation for the Tactical Air 

Control Center, and provide the necessary coordination between air and 

land elements through face-to-face coordination with the air component 

headquarters and the Tactical Air Control Center.u 

“Later referred to as the Joint Force Air Component Commander during joint or 

combined operations. 

”Richard G. Davis, The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force - Ann?. Cooperation 

(Washington, DC. 1987). 

’%he Battlefield Coordination Element (ECE) ‘’ . . .is COMUSARCENT’S [Commander, 

US Army Central Command] coordination agency which exchanges detailed operational 

and intelligence information with the . . . ” Air Force’s command and cmtrol organizations. ‘The BCE processes USARCENT’S requests for tacticd air support, monitors and 

interprets the USARCENT battle situation for the TACC. and provides the necessary interface 

for the exchange of current operational and intelligence data.” (USCENTAF Regulation 55- 

45, United States Central Command Air Force Air Employment Planning Pmess, 27 Jun 

1990, p 3-12). 

”The TACC is described in detail in Chapter 5 of this report. 

%ACP 50-29 and TRAWC Pam 525-45, General Operating Procedvres for Joint 

Arrack of the Second Echelon, 3 1 Dec 1984, p 3- 1. 

87 
The new air-land battle procedures did not change organization or 

command, control, and communications in Air Force TACs units designed 

to support various land echelons; the overall tactical command and control 

system remained the Air Ground Operations System. The system still 

consisted of two parts, Air Force elements of the TACS dedicated to supporting the land component commander in conducting air-land operations, and 

Army Air Ground System elements which interact with TACS units to ensure 

that tactical air support is responsive and meets Army requirements. 

The Tactical Air Control System and Army Air Ground System 

perform two functions in providing air support to land operations. First, 

they provide a conduit through which land force commanders at all levels 

can request air support. This conduit transfers requests (a) for immediate 

air support by troops engaging the enemy and (b) to strike targets which 

could affect future land operations. Second, the two systems’ interaction 

is designed to prevent fratricide; they help pilots distinguish enemy from 

friendly forces and keep friendly ground forces from shooting down 

friendly aircraft. 

How Command and Control for Close Air Support Works 

The preceding paragraphs described the concept and historical context 

of tasking and control of air power in support of land operations. The 

remainder of this section will put the pieces together by describing how 

requests for air support, specifically close air support, flow from the requester to bombs or bullets on target. We must begin by explaining the two 

different types of requests for close air support, each with its own coordination or control channels: “immediate” requests, wherein air support is 

needed at once by the troops on the front lines, and “preplanned close air 

support,” which comprises requests for support of future operations. 

Requests for immediate close air support usually originate at the 

lowest levels of the land force’s command structure-the individual platoon or company. These requests are made to a Tactical Air Control 

Party, where they are validated and then passed to the Air Support Operations Center?3 The Air Support Operations Center, normally collocated 

with the Army Corps Tactical Operations Center, ranks the requests with 

23TACP~ at the intermediate echelons between the requester and ASOC can intervene 

if necessary. Silence by the intermediate TACH usually means concurrence with the 

request. 

88 
those from other air control parties based upon urgency and the 

commander’s operational plans. 

From this point a description of the process becomes more complicated, because there are several routes a request could follow depending 

upon how the airspace is organized. It is feasible, depending upon available resources and the allocation of these resources, to have the airspace 

over the battlefield under the control of a Control and Reporting Center, 

Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, Airborne Warning 

and Control System, the Air Support Operations Center, or a combination. 

For example, if the Air Support Operations Center is controlling the close 

air support aircraft, the Air Support Operations Center simply calls on the 

radio to the available aircraft in their sector and direct them to the area 

where support is needed. If the Air Support Operations Center is controlling the airspace but does not have any aircraft available to support the 

request, it could call the Tactical Air Control Center and request support. 

The TACC will direct aircraft on airborne alert to the Air Support Operations Center’s area of responsibility or, if necessary, launch aircraft from 

ground alert.24 

In a more complicated example, we’ll suppose that the Air Support 

Operations Center is not the controlling agency-assume that the subsector 

over the battlefield is controlled by Airborne Command, Control, and 

Communications, and that Airborne Warning and Control is controlling 

the entire sector. In this case, the ASOC would forward the request to 

ABCCC. If aircraft were available, ABCCC would direct them to the appropriate area. If aircraft were not available, ABCCC would contact the 

AWACS, which would direct aircraft from its resources into the subsector 

for ABCCC’S control. If the AWACS was also short of resources, it, like 

the Air Support Operations Center in the case above, would contact the 

Tactical Air Control Center to divert or launch fixed-wing alert aircraft. 

In our notional example, once the ASOC, ABCCC, AWACS, or CRC 

(which also could be controlling the airspace) directs the flight to the 

appropriate area, the flight is told to contact the forward air controller 

(FAC) (either airborne or on ground). The FAC helps the strike aircraft 

identify the target and friendly forces and directs the attack. 

24(S/NF) Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, Tactical Employment, Volume I, 

General Planning and Employment Considerations, 19 Dec 1986. 

89 
Preplanned close air support25 is handled in a slightly different way. 

Requests for close air support of planned operations originate throughout 

the command and control system, from both staff agencies and field 

units-anyone who anticipates a need for air support. These requests are 

“ . . . collected by the Battlefield Coordination Element of the TACC and 

prioritized to support ground force objectives.”26 From here the targets 

go through the planning process, are tasked in the Air Tasking Order?7 

and flown by the tasked unit. 

TACS in Support of Air Operations 

A major task of the Tactical Air Control System is to control friendly 

aircraft in flight. This is a multifaceted task with a number of objectives 

in mind. For example, the TACS: 

allows the Joint Force Air Component Commander the 

flexibility to retask aircraft en route to ensure effective and 

efficient application of air power within a very dynamic 

combat environment; 

ensures airborne control of where strike aircraft and tanker 

aircraft meet for pre- and poststrike aerial refueling; 

controls friendly airspace to deconflict air traffic and avoid 

midair collisions, much like a civilian air traffic control 

system; and 

identifies and tracks enemy aircraft to direct interceptions. 

The system components described earlier are used by the JFACC to build 

a TACS to meet the specific needs of his operation. Since the procedures 

and rules of engagement that govern the operation of the airborne portion 

of the TACS are situationally dependent, we will not attempt to describe 

the many options available to the commander. The specific procedures 

used in the Gulf are discussed later in this chapter and in following 

chapters. 

25(S/NF) Ibid. 

26(S/NF) Ibid, p 4-3. 

27The planning process and the Air Tasking Order are described in (S) Chapter 5. 

90 
Establishment of the Central Command Air Forces 

TACS in the Theater 

The immensity of the task of deploying, assembling, manning, and 

operating the TACS cannot be emphasized enough.28 In the Gulf War, the 

U.S. Central Command Commander in Chief‘s initial mission was to 

“deploy to the area of operations and take actions in concert with host 

nation forces, friendly regional forces, and other allies to defend against 

an Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia and be prepared to conduct other operations as directed.”29 This mission was enormously complexm and extremely risky.3’ The complexity of the task and the rapidly changing 

requirements of the mission simply could not be supported by the limited 

host nation command and control systems. Host Nation Command and 

28Military leaders of both allies and former adversaries expressed great admiration 

for this phase of the operation. See, for example, “More Than an Operation, Less Than 

a War: Interview with Brig Gen ‘Y,’ Beit’On Chel Ha’Avir. January 1992 (translated by 

Aron Pinker). 

29(S/NF) Msg, 101 IOOZ Aug 90, USCINCCENT to Supporting Commands, subj: 

USC~NCCENT Order for Operation Desert Shield. The military objectives for maritime 

interdiction were transmitted separately. 

mFor example, in the issue of transportation communications, Air Force Logistics 

Command (AFLC) declared that the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, a 

component of WWMCCS, was not designed to accommodate the type of rapid changes as 

occurred in Desert Shield. In addition, no arrangements were made to ensure the proper 

flow of communications. See AFLC JULLS Number 01048-44637 DSW Database. See 

also (S) Logistics report. 

”(S) On 12 Aug 1990, Schwarzkopfs Combat Analysis Group argued that as of 

C+7. American and Saudi forces were insufficient to defend Al Jubayl against an attack 

by only three Iraqi divisions. (S/NF) AAR, CENTCOM J-5, Combat Analysis Group, 21 

Mar 1991, p 7. 

Lt Gen Homer described his thoughts about this situation in a public speech: 

The idea was that we were to deter an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia, and if an 

invasion did come we had to be prepared to defend . . . . Those were some of 

the worst nights of my life, because I had good information as to what the Iraqi 

threat was, and, quite frankly, we could not have issued speeding tickets to the 

tanks as they would have come rolling down the interstate highway on the east 

coast. It was an opportunity the Iraqis did not take, but every night we’d get 

some more forces, and we’d sit down and get a game plan of what we’d do if 

we came under attack. (Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, Speech to Business Executives for National Security, 8 May 1991.) 

91 
Control capabilities had to be augmented by Air Force equipment and 

personnel to accommodate the needs of the combined command. 

Saudi AWACS 

U.S./Saudi cooperation in the use of AWACS began in 1979. when the 

government of the United States permitted U.S. manufacturers to sell E-3 

AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Under the Elf One program, the Air 

Force sent four of its own AWACS aircraft to supplement and exercise 

with the new Saudi AWACS force. The combined U.SJSaudi AWACS 

focused mainly on the threat of Iranian air action against Saudi Arabia 

during the war between Iraq and Iran. The nine-year effort familiarized 

numbers of U.S. AWACS aircrew and maintenance personnel with their 

Saudi 6th Flying Wing counterparts and with the facilities in Riyadh. 

Though the formal Elf One program ended in April 1990, the U.S. 

AWACS aircraft sent to Saudi Arabia as part of Desert Shield returned to 

the same facilities and quarters they had used during Elf One.” 

Saudi AWACS aircraft were controlled from the Saudi Eastern Sector 

Control Center at Dhahran (as shown in Figure 12). This facility had 

ultra-high-frequency, line-of-sight radios to communicate with orbiting 

Saudi AWACS, and the AWACS themselves had the ability to communicate 

their airborne radar “picture” to escorting Saudi fighters flying combat air 

patrols. However, what the Saudis had in place in August 1990 was 

much different from the tactical air control system to which U.S. aircrews 

were accustomed. The Saudis, for example, had neither a Tactical Air 

Control Center nor an Air Support Operations Center. Their Eastern 

Sector Control Center was simply designed to keep Iranian aircraft from 

making surprise attacks on Saudi airfields and destroying Saudi aircraft 

on the gr0und.3~ 

32(S) Memo, “Notification and Employment,” from Capt Guy Cafiero, to Task Force 

4, Aug 1992, in GWAPS Task Force 4 AWACS File. 

33(S) Briefing. “Saudi Command and Control Structure,” Surveillance Procedures 

Brief, Desert Shield, Captains J. Larson. E. McNamara, and K. Warburton. GwAPS Task 

Force 4 AWACS File. 

92 
Figure 12 

Saudi Eastern Sector Control Center at Dhahran 

Saudi ESCC \\, - 

US Satellite I \- 

Bahrain 

US Satellite 

Communications 

Terminal 

(ELF ONE) 

C o mmunicat ions 

Existing Communications Facilities in Saudi Arabia 

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States had three small communications centers in the theater: one satellite communications terminal 

each in Bahrain and in Riyadh (which was being dismantled after being 

used to support Elf One operations%) and a terrestrial communications 

link between Bahrain and Dhahran.” There also were commercial satellite links at Riyadh and Dhahran (see Figure 12). However, the authors 

of Operations Plan 1002-90 had no illusions about the status of communications in place in Saudi Arabia. In April 1990, they noted that, if U.S. 

forces were committed to the defense of Saudi Arabia, “communications 

support will be austere with heavy reliance on early airlift and satellite 

systems.”36 Saudi Arabia had a digital commercial phone system, but it 

was not well developed throughout the country and did not extend to all 

”(S) Intvw. Col Charles M. Pettijohn. Commander, 4409th OSW. 29 Dec 29 1990. 

James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf(Arlington, VA, 1992), p 157. 35 

36(s) USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90, “Outline Plan,” 16 Apr 1990, p 32. 

93 
of the members of the Gulf Coordination C~uncil.’~ Senior Saudi military leaders did not have secure high-frequency radio links to their own 

ground force^.'^ Finally, Saudi air defenses were so oriented toward the 

threat of an Iranian sneak attack that the Saudi government could not 

guarantee Central Command that the latter’s command and communications equipment, once deployed, would be shielded from air attack by the 

larger and more capable Iraqi air f0rce.3~ 

Initial Deployment of AWACS 

On 2 August, the 552d Airborne Control Wing at Tinker Air Force 

Base was notified to prepare to deploy five E-3 AWACS aircraft to Riyadh. 

The aircraft and their crews were ready to leave within a day. On 7 

August, the aircraft were ordered to Saudi Arabia, and they reached 

Riyadh after a 17-hour nonstop flight. On 8 August, eight C-141s and 

three (2-5s left Tinker with support equipment and over 400 operations, 

maintenance, and support personnel.& The first U.S. E-3 flew an orbit 

over Saudi Arabia on 10 August, escorted by F-15s of the 1st Tactical 

Fighter Wing!’ 

Though the 507th Tactical Air Control Wing, which manned the 

Ninth Air Force Tactical Air Control Center and its associated Message 

Processing Center in Riyadh, did not arrive in the theater from Shaw Air 

Force Base until 14 August, U.S. AWACS functioned effectively from the 

moment they flew. AWACS aircraft normally functioned as an element of 

the TACS-as an airborne extension of the Tactical Air Control Center and 

its associated ground-based radars!* However, if the TACC were attacked 

and damaged, or if its communications were disrupted, AWACS aircrew 

37~~~, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p K-28. 

381bid, p K-30. 

39(FOUO) “AFPRIS RSAF Transition Air Defense System Proposed,” Version 2.0.25 

“(S) Memo, “Notification and Employment,” from Capt Guy Cafiero, to Task Force 

4’(S) “Operations History,” 552d Airborne Waming and Control Wing, History 

42Brief, “AETACS,” Tactical Air Command, 28th Air Division, 552d AWACS Wing, 

JuI 1990, pp 3-5. 

4, Aug 1992, in GWAPS Task Force 4 AWACS File. 

Office, Chap. 11, p 19, Task Force 4 AWACS File, GWAPS. 

nd, Task Force 4 AWACS File, GWAPS. 

94 
could monitor and direct the fighters and electronic warfare aircraft that 

engaged in air-to-air combat and strikes against enemy targets. 

U.S. AWACS aircraft had an advantage over their Saudi counterparts 

in this regard because one of the U.S. AWACS always carried an “Airborne Command Element,’’ or “ACE team.*d3 Headed by a colonel, the 

ACE team could, when necessary, assume the command authority of a 

Tactical Air Control Center over aircraft flying combat air patrol with an 

AWACS or over airborne strike formations preparing for an attack mission.& As Mission Director, the colonel heading the ACE team was 

responsible for seeing to it that COMUSCENTAF guidance, as set forth in 

the Air Tasking Order and Rules of Engagement, was followed. Usually, 

he was supported by five other officers: a deputy and specialists in 

fighter operations, intelligence, airborne refueling, and electronic warfa1-e.4~ The presence of this trained team of combat planners and leaders 

gave U.S. AWACS the ability to direct air operations. 

Because of the rapid deployment of AWACS aircraft and their support 

personnel, U.S. and Saudi E-3s could fly one, ’round-the-clock radar 

surveillance orbit by 17 August. This gave Central Command Air Forces 

a rudimentary defensive counterair capability. The obstacle to flying more 

orbits was numbers. Though an E-3 could fly, with midair refueling, a 

maximum of twenty-two hours, aircrew fatigue could limit flights to half 

that, or a bit more.& It also took about an hour for a fresh E-3 to fully 

relieve one which had been at its post, and an alert, back-up E-3 was 

always kept on the ground or in the air, in case the E-3 flying its orbit had 

a major equipment malfunction. [DELETED] Because of these considerations, E-3s initially flew shorter flights than they would have in, say, 

Europe, but they flew more flights to maintain the necessary coverage. 

43USAF AWACS are E-3C variants and have significant upgrades over the E-3As sold 

to Saudi Arabia. The E-3C variants had a greater sensor and communications capability 

as well as provisions for HAVE QUICK antijamming equipment. Mark Lambert, ed, Jane’s 

All the Worlds Aircraji 1991-92 (Alexandria, VA, 1991), pp 364-5. 

&Memo, “Airborne Command Element,” from Capt Guy Cafero, to Task Force 4, 

GWAPS, Aug 1992, in Task Force 4 AWACS File. 

45Brief, “AWACS-ACE Integration,” Maj Kevin Dunlevy, Jul 1992. Task Force 4 

specid AWACS File, GWAPS. 

&(smF) Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, AWACS, Vol. XV, see especially “E-3 

Capabilities and Limitations.” 

95 
This rotating schedule forced the E-3 crews and the AWACS personnel 

to work long hours. [DELETEDI4’ The demands of the theater were 

already placing significant stress on the entire AWACS force. 

It was crucial that the U.S. and Saudi AWACS fly, however, because 

the Tactical Air Control Center, its associated Message Processing Center 

in Riyadh, and the Control and Reporting Center in Dhahran were not 

operational by the 17th. The AWACS aircraft, supported by RC-135 RIVET 

JOINT aircraft (from the Strategic Air Command’s 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing), were the first line of detection and control in the air 

defense of the coalition build-up in Saudi Arabia?* 

By September, the basic elements of a mature Tactical Air Control 

System (including airborne and ground elements) were operational or in 

the process of becoming operational. The question was whether the TACS 

could shift from a defensive posture to an offensive one. In September, 

AWACS crews had begun preparing for offensive operations by developing 

a “Tactics Certification Program,” which gave them practice in offensive 

counterair operations, search and rescue procedures, protecting certain 

“high value” assets (such as EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft), and 

controlling tanking operations.s0 

47[DELETED] (S) Brief. Lt Col Mark Benda, subj: “AWACS Availability and Pro48(S) Briefing, “AWACS & GND TACS,” as of 17 Aug 1990. 0550. XO Brief, 17-18 

Aug 1990, CSS Folder No. 166, css Safe No. 3, GWAPS. RIVET JON operations are 

described in R. S. Hopkins, 111, “Ears of the Storm,’’ Air Force Muguzine, Vol. 75, No. 

2 (Feb 1992). 

49(S) Strategic Reconnaissance Center, HQ Strategic Air Command, RC-135 RIVET 

JOINT Integration Guide. 30 Nov 1990. 

sOMemo, “Desert Shield Tactics Certification Program,” from 552d AWACWiDO, to 

All Crewmembers, nd, Task Force 4 AWACS file. GWAPS. 

posed Changes,” AFNOOTC, 1 NOv 1990. 

In September. the 55% AWACS Wing also set up a formal Tactics Planning Cell in 

the Tactical Air Control Center. The Cell planned daily AWACS missions, briefed AWACS 

crews, and compiled a set of “lessons learned.” Members of the Cell also monitored the 

performance of AWACS personnel to see if the ‘Tactics certification Program” training 

was in fact working. Within the Cell, a Mission Planning Team took the daily Air 

Tasking Order and provided those parts of it (especially the communications instructions) 

necessary to effective AWACS coordination of airborne operations to the AWACS crews. 

(S) “Deployed Tactics Cell Responsibilities (for Large Force E-3 Deployments).” 5526 

96 
Central Command Air Force communications personnel also worked 

to improve the communications between the Tactical Air Control Center 

in Riyadh and the AWACS aircraft in their orbits in northern Saudi Arabia. 

[DELETED]5’*52J3 [DELETED]”.s5 

AWACS E-3s flew four orbits: one over the eastern pa13 of the border 

area, a second over the central portion, a third over the western part, and 

a fourth-working as a back-upnear King Khalid Military City.% 

[DELETEDIS7 Figure 13 displays these orbits. 

By the end of October, CENTAF was ready to test its tnatmhg AWACS 

system. Beginning O6002 on 25 October, E-3s from the 5526 AWACS 

Wing and the Saudi 6th Flying Wing flew four continuous orbits for the 

next 36 hours. According to an official account, “The operation was tasked 

through the CENTAF daily AT0 and involved nearly every flying unit intheater.”ss Combined, the Saudi and U.S. units flew almost 200 hours; 

AWACS Wing Tactics Planning Cell Continuity Book, Sep 1990, Task Force 4 Special 

AWACS File, GWAPS. 

”Figure 13 depicts the general orbit areas that the AWACS aircraft flew during Desert 

Storm. The distance from the Central AWACS Orbit over Rahfa was approximately 

miles from the TACC in Riyadh. An AWACS orbiting around 35,000 feet, given near 

perfect atmospheric conditions, would have a line-of-sight UHF range of about 250 miles 

to ground-based UHF receivers. Increasing the altitude of the AWACS to increase the lineof-sight range does not necessarily increase the range of the UHF radio. In general, the 

effective range of an UHF radio depends on the power output of the transmitter and the 

gain of the receiver. Letter. HQ 552d AWACW Provisional/DOW to MCCs and ASOs. Capt 

Kirk R. Warburton, 25 Feb 1991. 

52[DELETED] 

53[ DELETED] 

”(S) “552D Airborne Warning and Control Wing,” Operations History, p 24. 

55C01 Randy Witt, ed (DCS, Communication and Computer Systems, HQ USCENTAF 

and 9th AF, Headquarters United States Central Command Air Forces, Riyadh, Saudi 

Arabia, Mar 1991). Air Force Tactical Communications in War, the Desert ShieWDesert 

%(S) Chart, 552d AWAC Wing, Capt E. McNamara, Sep 1990, in Task Force 4 

57(S) “Surveillance Procedures Briefing,” Tactics Planning Cell. Training Program, 

58(S) “Surge Operations Procedures, 24-26 Oct 1990.” Capt S. Chewning, 552d 

Stom COW Story, pp 2-10 and 2-1 1. 

AWACS File, GWAPS. 

Cap& J. Larson, E. McNamara, and R. Wolarer, in Task Force 4 AWACS File, GWAPS. 

AWACS Wing, in Task Force 4 AWACS File, GwAPS. 

97 
about three-fourths of that time was spent on station. E-3s refueled 17 

times and controlled 96 fighters, 350 strike aircraft, and 110 tan king^?^ 

Figure 13 

AWACS Orbits over Saudi Arabia 

Eastern A WACS 

Saudi AWACS Riyadh 

SAUDI ARABIA 

The exercise was a success. It demonstrated that both US. and Saudi 

control centers could be linked simultaneously with the orbiting AWACS. 

It also showed that adjacent E-3s could “cover” for one another while one 

refueled and that adjacent AWACS aircraft could avoid interfering with one 

another’s radar transmissions. The exercise also substantiated the value 

of having a back-up or “goalie” AWACS. It also proved that a voice and 

digital net could link all the major air control centers in the theater. As 

the 552nd Wing’s report noted, the AWACS aircraft maintained “a massive 

RIDS and Link 11 [for the Navy] picture that spanned comm connectivity 

throughout the theater, as well as mutual strike and CAP [combat air 

patrol] responsibilities.’a With the completion of this exercise, U.S. and 

coalition AWACS units had shown that the airborne coordination of a 

massive air campaign against Iraq was possible; the AWACS component 

of the Tactical Air Control System was ready for war. 

59(S) “Surge Operations Procedures, 24-26 Oct 1990.” 

“(S) “Surge Operations Procedures, 24-26 Oct 1990.” para 8. 

98 
Airborne Battk$eeld Command and Control Center 

On 26 August, the aircraft and personnel of the 7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron deployed to Sharjah airfield in the United 

Arab Emirates. Within a day of its deployment, the Squadron had one 

ABCCC aircraft on alert; within three days, the Squadron was prepared for 

’round-the-clock wartime operations!’ Ninth Air Force had already 

deployed its Battlefield Coordination Element on 14 August, as part of 

the movement of the elements of the TACC.~ Similarly, the 6826 Air 

Support Operations Center deployed with the elements of the XVIIIth 

Airborne C0rps.6~ Central Command Air Forces judged its Tactical Air 

Control System, the overall architecture necessary to execute full-scale 

operations, operational by 9 September.64 

The 7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron deployed even 

though it was short five of its authorized twelve Director, Airborne 

Battlestaff positions. One Director was left behind at Keesler AFB to 

conduct acceptance testing of the new ABCCC “capsuIe~.’*~ CENTAF staff 

rounded up another two officers who could serve as Directors. The other 

positions went unfilled. Despite this handicap, the Squadron organized 

enough battlestaffs to support initially deployed Army units.& To com- 

(S) “7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron (7 ACCS),” Lessons Learned, 

Para: “Unit Introduction,” nd, Task Force 4 ABCCC File, GWAPS. 

Observations on Joint Combat Operations at Echelons Above Corps,” Lt Col W. 

G. Welch, US Army, Air Land Bulletin, TAC-TRADOC Alfa, No. 92-1 (31 Mar I%!), p 

14. 

63Rpt, “Northern Area Command,” Lt Col M. Simek, US Army, in “Desert Storm 

Conference-Lessons Learned,” 712 ASOC, Bergstrom AFB. TX, nd, Task Force 4 ABCCC 

File, GWAPS. 

64(S) “Concept of Operations, Tactical Air Request Net, CAS, Interdiction and 

ABCCC,” 9 Sep 1990, GWAPS Microfilm Roll Number 23603, Frames 1054-1066. 

6%e “capsule” is a module containing communications equipment and battlestaff 

consoles, each with high-resolution cathode ray tube multicolor displays. The capsule 111 

replaces capsule 11, which was an upgraded version of a system developed in 1964 and 

used in Vietnam. See Peter Rackham, ed, Jane’s el Systems 1991-92 (Alexandria, VA, 

19911, p 78. 

*‘7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron (7 ACCS),” Lessons Learned, No. 

11. “Undermanning of Critical Crewmember Positions,” nd, Task Force 4 ABCCC File, 

GWAPS. Each ABCCC squadron normally flew six aircraft and twelve crews, allowing the 

squadron to keep one aircraft in the air at all times. In September, the 7th ACCS could 

only field ten crews and eight Directors. 

61 

62,. 

99 
municate with the deployed Marine Corps Direct Air Support Center, 

ABCCC aircraft began carrying Marine officers on 11 September. By 20 

September, the Marine liaison officers could maintain reliable and constant contact with their Direct Air Support Center c0lleagues.6~ 

A month after arriving in the theater, the 7th Airborne Command and 

Control Squadron and its six aircraft were moved to Riyadh. That put the 

ABCCC crews in close contact with the Battlefield Coordination Element 

personnel in the Tactical Air Control Center. This was essential if the two 

groups were to work out a concept of operations for the ABCCC, sell it to 

Lieutenant General Homer, and then train for it.68 At about the same time, 

a Marine liaison officer flying on an ABCCC aircraft first directed CENTAF 

attack aircraft in coordination with the Marine Direct Air Support Center.@ 

Joint Service coordination of air-ground operations was a reality. 

The crew of the orbiting ABCCC could talk to aircraft in its area, as 

well as to the Tactical Air Control Center and the Air Support Operations 

Centers. It would do the same for forward air controllers and the Marine 

Direct Air Support Center. [DELETED] For these reasons, the ABCCC 

battlestaff was very dependent on having the Air Tasking Order as a 

guide to the types and numbers of aircraft it would have to control during 

a mission cycle. 

ABCCC battlestaffs successfully controlled air-ground action during the 

major exercise of 25-26 October 1990. The exercise was the first large 

one which covered all the coalition and allied forces. Central Command 

Air Forces flew approximately 600 close air support sorties each day of 

the exercise to test its concept of operations, with apparent success.’o 

From it, CENTAF drew four lessons. First, the multinational character” 

67(S) “ABCCC Marine Liaison Team Det Chronology,” 5 Mar 1991, USMC Liaison 

68“7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron (7 ACCS),” Lessons Learned, “Unit 

69(S) “ABCCC Marine Liaison Team Det Chronology.” 5 Mar 1991. 

“(S) Memo, “Desert Shield Training and Exercises,” uSCEWAF, 20 Mar 1991. 

710ne officer described the situation as a “federation of tribes.” (This description 

is attributed to LtC M. Simek, U.S. Army, in the Northern Area Command’s “After 

Action Report.’’ Desert Storm Confetence. “Lessons Learned.” 71 2 ASOC, Bergstrom AFB, 

m.) Each “tribe” had its own communications equipment acquired from a variety of 

sources. Some of the equipment was incompatible with that of other “tribes.” 

Team, 7th ACC Squadron, in Task Force 4 ABCCC File, GWAPS. 

Introduction.” 

100 
of the Northern Area Command meant that its tactical air control parties 

could not contact the Combined Air Support Operations Center directly 

via the U.S. HF Tactical Air Request Net. Instead, their requests for air 

support had to be radioed (via UHF) to a senior air control party selected 

by the Joint Force Air Component Commander. The latter would review 

their requests, set priorities among them, and then pass the ranked requests to the Combined Air Support Operations Center, where they would 

be reviewed again, this time by Saudi or American army officers. The 

need for this two-stage review process was the second lesson drawn from 

the major exercise. The third lesson was that ABCCC battlestaff could 

indeed serve as the Joint Force Air Component Commander’s on-scene, 

air-ground battle managers, allocating “push CAS” to “the most lucrative 

 target^."^' The fourth lesson was that British air liaison officers, trained 

to NATO air support standards, could work as an integral part of the U.S. 

Tactical Air Control SystemP 

In December, CENTAF attack aircraft flew night exercise attacks 

against U.S. Army formations to practice identifying targets and to refine 

the command and control of air-ground operations. The lessons learned 

in these (and other) practice sessions were codified in CENTAF’s “Concept 

of Operations for Command and Control of TACAIR in Support of Land 

Forces,” issued 1 January 1991. This directive made specific the guidance later implemented during Desert Storm. Specifically, 

a. close air support took place only short of the Fire Support 

Coordination Line and required “the supported ground 

commander’s clearance . . . ”; 

b. air interdiction sorties tasked in the Air Tasking Order but 

without a “preplanned target” were to be directed to kill zones by 

ABCCC; 

72(S) “Concept of Operations. CAS. Interdiction and the TACS,” 22 Nov, Change 1, 

731ntvw. Col Donald Kellum, USAF (Ret), with Lt Col R. E. Duncan, Chief USCENTAF 

CENTAF. GWAPS Microfilm No. 23654, Frames 413-421. 

TACS Division, 1 JUl 1992, Shaw AFB, SC. 

101 
c. kill zones beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line were 

“assumed to be open unless closed by the TACC DCO [display 

console operator]” those short of the Line could only be opened 

by “the applicable land component force commander”; 

d. Air Support Operations Centers and the Marine Corps Direct 

Air Support Center were to give attacking aircraft “a Forward 

Air Controller (FAC) call sign, contact frequency, and contact 

point”; 

e. preplanned close air support sorties whose targets were already struck were open to ABCCC direction into a kill zone; 

and 

f. untargeted air interdiction sorties would be directed into a kill 

zone by ABCCC.’4 

This concept of operations made the ABCCC “an airborne extension” of 

the Combined Tactical Air Control Center?’ By January 1991, Central 

Command Air Forces possessed all of the Air Force’s AB~C aircraft, and 

their crews and communications were tested in a threeday exercise 

conducted at the end of the first week of that month.76 

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) was the 

product of a joint Air ForcdArmy project to develop a sensor and 

controller that would do for the ground battle what AWACS had done for 

the air battle. JSTARS was still in full-scale engineering development in 

1990; no operational tests had been conducted by the Air Force and Army 

on the whole system when it was deployed to Saudi Arabia in 199 1. 

JSTARS was developed to aid air-ground coordination in attacks 

against second echelon forces of the Warsaw Pact on the NATO front. 

74(s) “concept of Operations for Command and Control of TACAIR in support of 

Land Forces,” (hereafter “Concept of Operations,” 1 Jan 1991). 1 Jan 1991. UsCrn~Fm, 

Combat Plans, Task Force 4 ABCCC File, GWAPS, Section 3 and Section 5. 

75(S) “Concept of Operations,” 1 Jan 1991, Section 6. 

76(S) Msg, 22442, 15 Jan 1991, from Joint Staff, Washington, to ~Sc~ccrn. CC-J3, 

subj: “Airborne Relay Command and Control Units.” 

102 
JSTARS itself is basically a combination of five subsystems: (a) a modified 

Boeing 707, which serves as the airborne platform; (b) an advanced radar 

which can focus on moving targets or on terrain features; (c) an operations and control display and software integration package which 

processes radar returns and generates target graphics; (d) a secure voice 

and data link which ties the JSTARS aircraft to other aircraft and to ground 

terminals; and (e) an Army-developed Ground Station Module which 

allows Army personnel attached to corps commands to analyze radar data 

sent from the plane via a special Surveillance and Control Data Link.77 

JSTARS was not supposed to become operational until the mid- 1990s, 

but it was deployed in the Gulf War because of a set of successful 

developmental exercises staged in Europe in September and October 

1990. One witness to these controlled tests was Lt. Gen. Frederick 

Franks, commander of the Army’s VII Corps. Franks and his superior, 

NATO commander Gen. John Galvin, recommended JSTARS to General 

Schwarzkopf. and the latter asked for a briefing on the The 

briefing, given by a team of officers from the Tactical Air Command, the 

Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, and the military agencies 

developing the system, warned General Schwarzkopf that JSTARS was by 

no means a completed system. What it could do was search for moving 

targets across the likely front, conduct a detailed real-time radar search 

of a much smaller ground area, and provide the data needed to build 

maps of areas swept by its radars. [DELETED]79 

Even with these limitations, Schwarzkopf asked for JSTARS soon after 

being briefed; the Joint Chiefs ordered the Air Force and Army to deploy 

the system on 21 December. General Schwarzkopf had been told that 

using JSTARS would cost a lot of money (about a million dollars per day), 

but, as he told Col. George K. Muellner of the Tactical Air Command, 

who briefed him on the system, he didn’t care if deployment cost a 

77“Concept of Operations for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

(Joint STARS);’ Section 1, HQ Tactical Air CommandKPJB, GWAPS Microfilm No. 10238, 

Frames 382-442. 

781ntvw. Thomas C. Hone, Maj Anne D. Leary, and Mark D. Mandeles, with Brig 

Gen George K. Muellner. Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements, HQ TAC/DR, Langley 

AFB, 16 Apr 1992. 

79(SMF/WN) Briefing, “Joint STARS, Support of Desert Shield,” GWAPS Microfilm 

Roll No. 10238, Frames 443-475. nd (the actual presentation was 17 Dec; see brief, “Joint 

STARS, Desert Storm.” by Brig Gen G. Muellner, TAC, and col M. Kleiner, TRADOC, in 

Task Force 4 Joint STARS File, GWAPS). 

103 
billion dollars a day-he meant to have JSTARS.~ Muellner, his associates 

at Tactical Air Command and the Army’s Training and Doctrine 

Command, contractor employees, and personnel from the Air Force 

Systems Command began preparing for the move to the Middle East. 

One of their tasks was to prepare a detailed “concept of operations” that 

would inform the users of the system of its capabilities and limitations. 

As Muellner recalled later, ‘’there was nobody on the execution side that 

really understood the system.”” They also had to get two aircraft ready 

(remember that these aircraft were test platforms) and assemble as many 

working Ground Station Modules (each of which was built on an Army 

five-ton truck) as possible. 

At the beginning of January 1991, the Tactical Air Command’s Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Requirements formally warned the Air Force Chief of Staff 

of the risk in sending JSTARS to the Middle East. The software was “only 

two-thirds complete,” communications on the aircraft were being altered to 

fit those in use in the theater. system operators were not prepared for 

combat, and maintenance and logistics were pnrnitive.8’ To make JSTARS 

work, the Air Force would have to deploy civilian industry and government 

technical personnel who had never served in combat positi0ns.8~ 

On 9 January 1991, the Tactical Air Command and the Air Force 

Systems Command agreed on a concept of operations for JSTARS.84 On 

11 January, the two E-8A aircraft flew nonstop to Saudi Arabia. Colonel 

Muellner had convinced General Homer to base the aircraft with the 

AWACS and RlVET JOINT aircraft at Riyadh. Muellner believed that the 

three airborne systems would work together better if they were based 

together. Muellner also recalled that Central Command Air Forces headYntvw, Hone, Leary, and Mandeles with Brig Gen G. K. Muellner, 16 Apr 1992. 

According to the TAC Historian’s account, CENTCOM first requested Joint STARS in August 

1990. See Chap. 3, “Requirements,” 1990 TAC History, HQ TACMO. 

‘‘lntvw, Hone, Leary, and Mandeles with Brig Cen C. K. Muellner, 16 Apr 1992. 

‘*(s) Ltr. proposed, from HQ TAC. office of the Commander, to Chief of staff of the 

Air Force, 4 Jan 1991, CC-010706, in Task Force 4 Joint STARS File, GWAPS. 

83TAC’s 1990 History (Chapter 111. p 16) noted that the newly created 4411th 

Joint STARS Squadron had sixty Air Force personnel, five from the Army, and sixty-eight 

from private industry. The Ground Station Module detachment had forty-two Army 

personnel and seven from industry. 

84(S) Draft, “Desert Shield Concept of Operations,” 9 Jan 1991, GWAPS Microfilm 

Roll Number 10238. Frames 476-522. 

104 
quarters was ten minutes away, while Central Command was twelve 

minutes off, and “Gen Yeosock’s ARCENT [Army Central Command] was 

right there in the The six Ground Support Modules (one came 

from the United Kingdom) were sent to the headquarters of the XVIII and 

VII corps, Marines Central Command, ARCENT Forward, ARCENT (for use 

by CENTCOM 5-2), and CENTAF’S Tactical Air Control Center. 

JSTARS (above) was the product of a joint Air ForcdArmy project. 

The JSTARS “Employment Concept” stated that “USCENTAF will use 

JSTARS as an aid to destroy and disrupt enemy forces through real time 

targeting.”86 This was in line with Army expectations, especially those of 

Lt. Gen. Franks.87 However, formal operational control of JSTARS was in 

the hands of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, who was 

to “provide guidance and direction for JSTARS employment.”88 This 

established the potential for conflict between the Joint Force Air 

”Intvw, Hone, kary, and Mandeles with Brig Gen G. K. Muellner. 16 Apr 1992. 

86(S) “USCENTAF Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) 

871ntvw, Hone, Leary, and Mandeles with Brig Gen C. K. Muellner, WAF, 16 Apr 

88(s) USCENTAF, “Joint STARS Employment Concept,” Section 11-“Command and 

Employment Concept,” GWAB Microfilm Roll Number 10238, Frames 523-532. 

1992. 

Control,” Microfilm Roll No. 10238, Frames 523-532. 

105 
Component Commander and CE~M J-2 over JSTARS tasking. The 

“Employment Concept,” for example, noted that “The JFACC exercises 

operational command and control over JSTARS through the CE”’ Deputy 

Commander for Operations. Requirements for JSTARS . . . support from 

ground component commands will be consolidated by USCmWJ2 and 

given two missions: real-time targeting and intelligence. 

will then be passed to the JFA~ACC.”89 ht another way, J!jTARS Was 

The “Employment Concept** laid out a pattern of operations for realtime JSTARS applications. The ISTARS crew would update the locations 

of interdiction targets as attack aircraft entered kill zones; AWACS 

controllers would “hand off’ attacking aircraft to JSTARS for “refined 

target coordinates.*m For close air support, JSTARS, with the permission 

of the appropriate Air Support Operations Center or of the Marine Corps 

Direct Air Support Center, would pass target coordinates to close air 

support flights?’ This policy gave the weapons controllers on JSTARS an 

important role in both interdiction and close air support. 

Developing a Communications Infrastructure 

Before continuing with a description of the developing Tactical Air 

Control System, it is important to discuss the creation of the communications infrastructure which tied together the system’s ground elements 

(such as the Tactical Air Control Center) and those in the air (AWACS and 

ABCCC, for example). The construction of this infrastructure-this complex 

network of communications-proceeded along with the deployment of tbe 

elements of the TACS. The infrastructure itself also served many users 

besides those who formed the TACS. Satellite communications, for example, were used to send intelligence data to the theater and route requests 

for spare parts from the theater to bases in the United States. Most of the 

communications network built in the theater was not involved with the 

operations of the TACS. However, the evolution of the network affected 

the strength of the TACS; that is, as the former grew more sophisticated, 

the elements of the latter became more integrated. 

”(s) USCENTAF, “Joint STARS Employment Concept,” Section lll-*’coacept of ~mw(s) USCENTAF, “Joint STARS Employment Concept,” Section Ill-“cmpt of Employment.” para D. Microfilm Roll No. 10238. Frames 523-532. 

ployment.” para F.2.b., Microfilm Roll No. 10238, Frames 523-532. 

g’ibid, para F.I 
No matter what the Saudi government could offer in the way of 

communications support, Central Command planned to deploy its own 

communications equipment and personnel. On 8 August 1990 the initial 

communications package for CENTCOM arrived in the theater (without 

support from the Joint Operational Planning Execution System=). This 

package, the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), included a 

“super high frequency (SHF) multichannel satellite terminal, several ultra 

high frequency (UHF) single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) terminals, 

and associated terminal equipment, to provide secure voice, facsimile and 

Defense Switched Network (DSN), Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), 

and Worldwide Military Command and Control System ~onnectivity.”’~ 

The Joint Communications Support Elementw linked Riyadh to Washington through the Worldwide Military Command and Control System 

(wWMCCS). It also allowed Central Command Forward to establish UHF 

tactical satellite links to U.S. forces deploying to the theater?’ 

Central Command Air Forces communications were slower to arrive. 

The CENTAF Advanced Echelon of twenty-two people arrived in the 

theater on 8 August. Their initial contact with the CENTAF and CENTCOM 

rear elements was not accomplished until 10 August, using the ultra-highfrequency tactical satellite system that they had installed in the basement 

of the Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters building in Riyadh.% Contact 

between CENTAF and its deploying units was established by telephone and 

through the tactical satellite communications equipment at Elf One, 

which, though then manned by “liaison personnel only,” was alongside 

91The Joint Operational Planning Execution System (JOPES) is a manual and software 

system used by TRANSCOM to assemble transportation requirements. such as TPFDDs. 

JOPES was not flexible enough to be used for initial crisis planning, and was not usable 

until after c+12. (SMFMUORCON) Briefing. HQ TAC, “Desert Storm Lessons Learned.” 

in USAF Desert Shield/Desert Storm Hot Wash, Maxwell AFB, AL, 12-13 Jul 1991. 

”Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. p K-27. 

?’he JCSE is organized under the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose is to 

provide tactical command, control, and communication support for operations by the 

unified and specified commands. The JSCE deployed to the Riyadh included both UHF and 

SHF SAXOM radios, line-of-sight radios, HF radios, and circuit and message switching 

equipment (Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p 27). 

95Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp K-27, K-28. 

%Air Force Tactical Communications in War, the Desert ShieWDesert Storm Comm 

Story, Colonel Randy Witt. ed, WS, Communication and Computer Systems, HQ 

USCENTAP and 9th AF, Headquarters United States Central Command Air Forces, Riyadh, 

Saudi Arabia, Mar 1991. 

1 07 
the Saudi AWACS control center?’ As the Plans report of the Survey 

shows, the Commander in Chief, Central Command had chosen to change 

the priority for the shipment of forces into the theater to favor combat 

units?” One result was that communications units arrived slower than 

planned.* Without the planned communications support, Tactical Air 

Control Center personnel were forced to find alternative means of 

communicating with their deployed units. For example, the TACC sent out 

initial Air Tasking Orders to U.S. wings through the Airlift Control 

Center tactical satellite computer interface and via high-frequency, 

“quick-reaction package” equipment in airlifted vans.’O0 

Deploying fighter aircraft wings also lacked communications support. 

On 8 August 1990, for example, F-15s flying from Langley Am, 

Virginia, landed at Dhahran without their dedicated combat 

communications unit. Until the latter anived from Warner Robbins AFB, 

Georgia, three days later, the deploying unit relied on Secure Telephone 

Units (STU-111s) and a small Rapid Initial Communications Kit (which 

linked with UHF tactical satellites) to talk to CENTAF. The wing initially 

received the Air Tasking Order in hard copy form from Military Airlift 

Command C-21~. which flew nightly circuits among the airfields where 

U.S. aircraft deployed.”’ 

This delay was typical. In early August 1990, combat communication 

equipment from three stateside locations in Georgia, Florida, and 

Oklahoma arrived in theater 3 to 14 days after the aviation package it 

supported. By the eighth day of deployment, only four C-141 equivalent 

loads of communications equipment had been moved.Im The discrepancy 

Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” p 1-7; (S) Intvw, Col. Charles M. 

98See also H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New 

97‘‘ 

Pettijohn. Commander, 4409th OSW, 29 Dec 1990. 

York, 19921, pp 306, 310-12. 

Desert ShieldDesert Storm Hot Wash, Maxwell AFB, AL, 12-13 Jul 1991. See (S) Table 

5-1, below, for comparison of projected and actual dales for receipt of selected key 

communications equipment. 

Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” pp 1-7 and 1-8. This “fix” was 

possible because the first Air Tasking Orders were relatively short. 

“‘(s) Ltr. col James Crigger, Jr.. DCSIO. USCENTAF FWDm to COMALF ALCC, subj: 

C-21 Taskings, 21 Aug 1990. 

(SINFINUORCON) Briefing, HQ TAC. “Desert Stom Lessons Learned,” in USAF 99 

100,. 

(s) Briefing, TAC Dtscrt Shield Lessons Learned, Jun 1991. 102 

108 
between the planned and actual movement of communications support 

meant there were only 135 USAF communications technicians in the Gulf, 

instead of the planned 1,128. Moreover, it was difficult to locate and 

activate much of the communications manpower destined for deployment.Io3 More than two-thirds of Air Force combat communications 

personnel deployed to the Gulf were part of the Air National Guard and 

Reserves, and these specialists could not be called up for extended service 

without a Presidential order.IM Table 6 illustrates the difference between 

the planned and actual numbers of communications systems and 

personnel in-theater. 

On 12 August the Saudi Government agreed to merge its commercial 

phone system with the tactical phone networks of CENTCOM’S component~.’’~ This move opened the way for the construction of an in-theater 

telephone network based upon the Secure Telephone Unit (sm-HI). STU111s were used extensively to provide secure voice and fax communication 

capabilities as CENTCOM and CENTAF forces deployed to the theater. Maj. 

Dave Schultz, one of the initial communications Advanced Echelon 

personnel who arrived in the theater on 8 August 1990, noted 

Host nation commercial telephone service was the most readily available 

source of communications, but we had to follow a bureaucratic process, 

tightly controlled by the Saudis to obtain these lines, which ultimately 

required a formal request from the USCENTAFkC to the RSAF [Royal 

Saudi Air Force] commander. Once this was accomplished, we were 

able to acquire the remaining seven internal lines available in the RSAF 

building and use STU-111s brought over with the ADVON [Advanced 

‘03Difficulties in locating manpower were partly a result of not initiating an 

immediate reserves call-up, and the rotation policy of Guard volunteers. 

‘%tvw, Maj Anne D. Leary and Mark D. Mandeles with Brig Gen Bruce J. Bohn, 

23 Mar 1992. The shortage of personnel stayed critical. On 26 Nov 1990. for example, 

the Air Force Chief of Staff informed CENTAF Rear at Langley AFB that ‘The combat 

communications units have deployed all available assets and personnel.” That is. the Air 

Force could not support CENTAF’S request for additional equipment and personnel by 

drawing on regular or Air National Guard units. (s) Msg, from NGB Andrews AFB, MD, 

Operation Desert Shield.” 

‘051bid, p 1-8. 

to USCENTAF RW. b&’ AFB, VA, subj: “SekCted reserve call-up Of TTC-39A UTC for 

1 09 
Echelons] package for secure voice communications to the rest of the 

world.lM 

Table 6 

Gulf War Communications 

Planned versus Actual’07 

[DELETED] 

The STU-Ill hooks quickly into any digital telephone system and, when 

in secure mode, automatically encodes voice or digital messages sent over 

it. As noted in the Title V Report, use of the STU-IIIS, especially for 

transmitting data from personal computers, was “unprecedented” during 

the first month of Desert Shield.Ios However, the extensive use of STU-111s 

was an undesirable alternative; using the STU-111s to link computers 

“degraded secure voice service and restricted computers to low datainterchange rates.’”Og Given the state of Saudi Arabia’s communications 

infrastructure and the inability to get other forms of communications to 

the theater, there were no other options. Deployed wings needed information+specially the daily Air Tasking Orders. 

The widespread use of the STU-111s caused some headaches for Central 

Command and Central Command Air Forces, however. As one senior 

officer noted, “a lot of people picked up their STU-IIIS and took them with 

lMAir Force Tactical Communications in War, The Desert ShiekVDcsert Storm 

Comm Story, ed by Colonel Randy Witt. XS, Communications and Computer Systems, 

HQ USCENTAF and HQ 9th AF, Headquarters United States Central Command Air Forces, 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Mar 1991. 

107(SMF/NC/ORCON) Briefing, HQ TAC, “Desert Storm Lessons Learned,” in USAF 

Desert ShieldDesert Storm Hot Wash, Maxwell AFB, a, 12-13 Jul 1991. 

‘08(S) Department of Defense, Conduct of the Gulf War (Washington, DC, 1992), 

p K-41. (There also is an unclassified version of this report.) 

‘Og( S) Ibid, p K-4 1. 

110 
them.”’” This had not been anticipated, and, in consequence, the ground 

radios sent with the deploying wings were not compatible with the 

unexpected STU-111s.”’ This was a technical problem, eventually fixed. 

Harder to solve was the diplomatic problem caused by the Saudis’ desire 

to possess the STU-IIIS, which were based on a sensitive technology; the 

Saudis had never before been given access to it. To satisfy the coalition, 

the National Security Agency, which set policy for the use of cryptographic 

equipment, modified a commercial version of the STU-III (the SVX-2400) and 

distributed sets to Arab forces in An SVX-2r100, however, 

could only communicate with another of its type; it could not link with a 

STU-111. Neither could the svx-24oos work with the STU-11s used by NATO 

forces. As a result, U.S. commanders had to use multiple phones and lines 

to talk to all the members of the ~0alition.l’~ Finally, the Saudis demanded 

a lot more SVX-2400s than Central Command or the National Security 

Agency had anticipated, and the need to service all the additional phone 

sets placed a major burden on deployed Agency personnel.”‘ 

The need for so many phone lines threatened to swamp the tactical 

satellites being used in the theater as well as the Saudi phone system. 

The advantage of the Defense Department’s voice switched phone 

network was (and is) its priority levels, so that urgent calls can take 

precedence over routine communications. Even so, users state their own 

priority level, and the system is open to abuse-normally not a problem 

because of the large capacity of the network. During Desert Shield, 

however, so-called “priority” input quickly overwhelmed the network’s 

capacity; in late September, only sixty-five percent of users were gaining 

access to the system on the first try. Central Command Air Forces got 

access to the network under control by the beginning of Desert Storm, but 

only by sharply limiting the number of “morale” calls from Air Force 

units in the theater to the United States “Official” calls were given strict 

“‘lntvw, Maj Anne Leary and Mark Mandeles, with Brig Gen Bruce J. Bohn, 23 

I ‘Ibid. 

1’2“Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” p 2-38. 

‘l3lbid, pp 2-38 and 2-39. 

1’41bid, pp 2-40 through 2-43. 

Mar 1992. 

111 
pre~edence."~ Central Command also helped by constructing a network 

of microwave transmission towers which handled calls among bases in 

the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.116 

While the lack of infrastructure for rapid, reliable, and secure data 

communications within the theater forced CENTCOM and CENTAF, as more 

personnel deployed, to rely on voice messages passed over the STu-Ills, 

other equipment-satellite terminals and dishes, and high- frequency 

transmitters and receivers-was pressed into service as soon as it reached 

the theater. CENTCOM'S command and control problem was to take this 

equipment as it came and organize it into an effective network. Brig. 

Gen. Roscoe M. Cougill, USAF, Central Command's director of 

communications and computers, later observed, "We were building our 

communications . . . as the forces deployed. We built, modified and 

remodified on a daily CENTCOM and CENTAP forces deployed, 

communications personnel responded, and CENTAF'S super high-frequency 

network was largely in place by the end of August.11* 

Early in August, however, Central Command Air Forces and Central 

Command communicators differed over the kind of satellite links they 

thought the theater should have. CENTAF communications planners 

wanted to link Air Force units deploying to Riyadh and Dhahran directly 

to the Defense Satellite Communications System through Ground Mobile 

Forces gateway^."^^' CENTCOM 5-6 feared that allowing CENTAF to put 

such a system in place would lead to multiple direct links (through multiple "gateways") to satellites from major units of the other Services. That, 

lI5"Air Force Tactical Communications in War." pp 1-16 and 1-17. According to 

(S) HQ, US Central Command Afrer Action Report. 15 Jul 1991 (p 20). the voice 

switched network handled a maximum of 700,000 telephone calls a day. 

Air Force Tactical Communications in War," pp 4-6 and 4-7. The microwave 

towers began as a back-up to the tactical satellites but eventually became the primary 

communications system within much of the theater. However, it took three months just 

to gain Saudi approval to build the microwave towers. 

116.. 

117Coyne. Airpower in the Cu& p 158. 

"*Intvw. Thomas C. Hone with Maj John Murray. CENlYXlM J-6. 10 Mar 1992. See 

daily AFKO briefing for the locations of SHF network. 

"'Defense Communications Systems Ground Mobile Forces Gateways are the entry 

for satellite communications into the defense-wide communications network. Signals are 

fed to the these gateways from tactical satellite terminals. "Air Force Tactical 

Communications in War," footnote 8, p 8. 

112 
in turn, would likely undercut CENTCOM’S intent (set forth in the second 

draft of Operations Plan 1002-90) to control access to satellite band 

width.” Bandwidth was the scarce resource, and the commander of 

CENTCOM J-6, Brigadier General Cougill, did not want to let it out of his 

control.’2’ He believed that satellite bandwidth would be quickly saturated if he did. 

The compromise struck between CENTAF and CENTCOM was the “hub” 

concept, in which the satellite gateways would be shielded from 

saturation by shunting all CENTAF communications into a hub before they 

were relayed to an orbiting satellite.’” The amount of access through the 

hub was dictated by CENTCOM. CENTAF, however, was permit€ed to build 

its own system of “spokes” into the hub, thereby allowing CENTAF communicators to control the rate at which digital communications flowed 

through their whole theater system. The compromise gave both CENTCOM 

and CENTAF the kind of control over communications flow that each 

believed it needed.’= 

The first theater hub was established at Thumrait Air Base, Oman, 

because it was beyond Scud range and, given the fluid situation in 

August, it was likely to remain in place no matter how units were moved 

around within Saudi Arabia.’“ A1 Dhafra, in the United Arab Emirates, 

was the second hub; in late November 1990, Riyadh became the third.’25 

To accommodate the data flow through these three hubs, Space 

l2OSee (s) GWAPS. space Operations in the Gulf war, Chapter 3. 

121 Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf, p 158. 

1224‘Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” p 1-13. 

‘23(S) HQ, US Central Command, Afrer Action Report, 15 Jul 1991, noted that the 

decision to adopt the “hub” concept made the theater communications system “truly 

joint”(p 20). The reason was that CENTCOM J-6 stood astride the hubs, and J-6 was in 

fact a joint staff, working under the CIWs theater guidance. If each component had a 

separate gateway to the Defense Satellite Communications System, then the components 

would have had to negotiate with one another and with the CNC for bandwidth. Given 

the “inordinate number of unplanned requirements for radios and phones,” (p 1-6 of “Air 

Force Tactical Communications in War”). such negotiations would have been chaotic. 

The compromise focused both CENTCOM and CENTAF on their proper responsibilities: 

CENTCOM as “traffic cop” and CENTAF as communicator to and among the deployed units 

and elements of the TACS. 

1246‘Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” p 1-14. 

lbid. pp 1-14. 1-15. 125 

113 
Command, with the permission of the Joint Chiefs, reoriented a “spare” 

Defense Satellite Communications System The Defense 

Communications Agency was also authorized to use the United 

Kingdom’s SKYNET satellite and to lease bandwidth on commercial satellite~.’~’ CENTCOM J-6’s concern in August 1990 that the data flow 

through uncoordinated satellite “gateways” might overwhelm the Defense 

Satellite Communications System seems to have been justified.I2’ 

opes of Tactical Communications 

Within the Tactical Air Control System there are basically two forms 

of communicatiowvoice and digital. The latter links two display terminals; 

that is, they share the same radar picture, or the second gets a filtered piece 

of the picture displayed on the first. [DELETED]129 With digital links, 

two platforms need not talk to communicate; they share displays. 

Voice communication is carried by radio, usually ultra-high frequency 

or high frequency. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. aircraft 

“talked” to one another and to the ground by using HAVE QUICK, a 

frequency-hopping antijam system. HAVE QUICK radios change their 

frequencies many times each second in order to keep enemy signals 

intelligence personnel from eavesdropping on or jamming friendly communications. The key to the successful application of this technology is 

the ability to synchronize all the HAVE QUICK radios in a given area to the 

”‘(S) Leland Joe and Dan Gonzales. Command and Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence in Desert Storm Air Operatwns. draft report, WD(L)-5750-AF, Chap. VII, 

“ADP and Long-Haul Communication Systems,” (Santa Monica, 1991). Also, 

(S) Briefing, Lt Gen T. S. Moorman, Jr., USAF. Commander, Air Force Space Command, 

at Space Command HQ, Peterson AFB, CO, 16 Dec 1991. 

127(S) Briefing, Lt Gen T. S. Moorman, Jr., uSAF, Commander, USAF Space 

Command, at Space Command HQ, Peterson AFB, co, 16 Dec 1991. The commercial 

satellites used were those of the INTELSAT and INMARSAT systems. The Navy also used 

Communications Agency, Washington, DC, subj: “Defense Comm System Satellite RqmtDesert Shield,” 15 Nov 1990. 

‘**(S) For example, HQ US Central Command Afrer Action Report. 15 Jul 1991 (pp 

20-1) [DELETED]. . ” Lt Gen T. S. Moorman, Jr., Commander, Air Force Space 

Command, in a 16 Dec 1991 briefing to GWAPS staff, characterized the war against Iraq 

as the “first satellite communications war-both inside and outside the theater.” 

‘29[DELEiTED] See (S) “JTIDS Operations in the Persian Gulf,” no author, nd, JTIDS 

UHF MILSATCOM satellites. SIX dS0 (s) Msg, from USCENTAF, to RUHDCA/Defense 

Folder in Task Force 4 AWACS File, GWAPS. 

114 
same pattern of frequency-hopping. [DELETED] However, since the 

Saudis lacked HAVE QUICK, talking to the Saudis meant taking a much 

greater risk of being overheard or of being jammed. So there was the 

danger, during the early days of Desert Shield, that Iraqi forces would 

jam U.S.-Saudi voice radio links. 

The challenge facing Central Command Air Forces controllers and 

communicators during Desert Shield was to link the elements of a multinational Tactical Air Control System without at the same time revealing 

more than absolutely necessary about sensitive U.S. equipment, procedures, and tactics. The Tactical Air Control Center, for example, needed 

secure communications with the following U.S. elements of the Tactical 

Air Control System: the Airlift Control Center, the Control and Reporting Center, the Air Support Operations Center, the Marine Corps Tactical 

Air Operations Center, the Navy, and the Army’s air defense command 

post (controlling Hawk and Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries). The 

Tactical Air Control Center also needed secure communications with 

Saudi air operations and air defense centers. Finally, the Tactical Air 

Control Center needed the right kinds of links (digital or voice) with each 

element of the overall Tactical Air Control System. 

Though the architecture of linkages that evolved was complex (and 

not easily described), it worked, as the AWACS exercise of late October 

showed. Digital data links tied together elements of the Tactical Air 

Control System that needed to share data. AWACS radar displays also 

were transmitted to the Tactical Air Control Center and the Saudi Air 

Command Operations Center in Riyadh. The Tactical Air Control Center 

took the AWACS picture sent to it and transmitted it to the Control and 

Reporting Center, which then retransmitted it to the Marine Corps 

Tactical Air Operations Center. The latter sent it to Navy ships.‘” 

”(S/NF) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol. 91-2 (Jul 1991), USAF Tactical Fighter 

Weapons Center, 57th Fighter Weapons Wing, Nellis AFB, Nevada. Chapter 11. (S) Also 

“E-3 Ops in Desert Shield,” from HQ. Tactical Air Command, to Air Staff, XOORC, 19 

Dec 1990. plus various untitled connectivity charts and diagrams. The various linkages 

changed over time, making it difficult to describe the TACS network. In several cases, for 

example, TADlL A links were replaced by TADIL 1. Units tried to open the best links they 

could, and, with theater communications literally changing from day to day, the records 

of communications links are either spotty or difficult to trace. 

115 
A more effective system would have linked the U.S. AWACS directly 

with all U.S. air defense assets in its vicinity. Such multi-Service, 

multiplatform direct data links did not exist. [DELETED] 

Deployment of Communication and Control Systems-The Air Tasking Order Problem 

Arguably the most important task facing the quickly developing 

communications system in the theater was its ability to support the Tactical Air Control Center in transmitting an Air Tasking Order to the deployed units. The first Air Tasking Order was transmitted through a 

combination of a Saudi-only military fax system, the use of the Airlift 

Control Center UHF tactical satellite, and the message terminals in the 

Quick Reaction Package vans with the deployed Eventually, the 

Computer Assisted Force Management System (CAFMS) was used to 

transmit the Air Tasking Order throughout the theater. 

CAMS used dedicated computer terminals and specially formatted 

software to organize and print the Air Tasking Order. The CAFMS central 

processor, located at the Tactical Air Control Center in Riyadh, was 

eventually linked directly to Wing Operations Centers, and additional 

terminals to receive the Air Tasking Order via CAFMS were set up at 

Control and Reporting Centers, Air Support Operations Centers, and the 

Marine Corps Tactical Air Operations Center.’” By December, Central 

I3l(C) Memo, untitled, 552d AWAC Wing, Capt E. McNamara, 23 Jan 1991, in Task 

132(S/NF) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Vol. 91-2, Jul 1991, p 11-5. 

133(s) Memo, “E-3 Ops in Desert Shield,” from HQ. TAC, to Air Staff, XOORC, 

“Air Force Tactical Communications in War, The Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

corn story. ed, Col Randy Win. DCS. HQ USCENTAF and 9th AF, Headquarters 

USCENTAP. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Mar 1991. 

‘”(s) Briefing, “computer Assisted Force Management System,” SAT/P~~-GOSC 

Review, 21 Dec 1990, Maj Rick Jensen, Desert Shield RRP, Case No. 023. Each CAMS 

van took input from 20 terminals in the Tactical Air Control Center and sent it to 11 

remote terminals via AUTODIN (the Defense Department’s Automatic Digital Network). 

Force 4 AWACS File, GWAPS. 

19 Dec 1990. 

116 
Command Air Forces had three CAFMS central processors in place, each 

of which communicated directly with eleven remote terminals. But there 

was a need for five more central processors and their associated terminals. 

On 24 December, U.S. Air Force Headquarters directed the Tactical Air 

Command to procure the additional equipment.’” 

This action did not enable CENTAF and Navy communicators to get 

Air Tasking Orders to Navy carriers electronically by the beginning of 

Desert Storm, despite what appear to have been their best efforts. When 

CAMS first became operational during Desert Shield, its operators in the 

Tactical Air Control Center made paper tape copies of daily Air Tasking 

Orders and then sent them to a Navy UHF communications van in Riyadh. 

The van beamed the contents of the daily Orders via satellite to the 

Navy’s Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) switching center on Guam. 

There, the Air Tasking Order was fed into the Navy’s Computer 

Processing and Routing System, which then sent it back to Navy carriers 

via a Defense Communication System satellite.”’ The ATOs took this 

circuitous route during the first weeks of Desert Shield because the 

carriers did not have CAFMS terminals and because, initially, the paper 

tapes did not fit the Navy’s communications formats.’38 

Other forms of transmission to the aircraft carriers were tried, but 

none bettered the means developed during Desert Shield: voice radio 

communications by Navy liaison officers serving in the Tactical Air 

Control Center supplemented by hand-delivered, hard-copy Air Tasking 

Orders flown directly to the carriers them~elves.’~~ Because the carriers 

lacked super high-frequency terminals, 

could not send the ATOS to them.’@ 

the Tactical Air Control Center 

[DELETED]I4’ Using hand- 

‘”Msg, from HQ, WAF, to HQ, TAC (Langley AFB), subj: “Combat Mission Need 

Statement for the Computer Assisted Force Management System (CAMS),” 24 Dec 1990, 

12002, sc~Cn1718. 

137“Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” pp 2-26 and 2-27. 

‘38“Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” p 2-27. 

139“Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” pp 2-27 through 2-32 list all the 

measures tried. The Task Force found no reliable evidence that Air Force communications personnel deliberately ignored Navy concerns or that Navy communicators did not 

try hard to tie up to the ATOS produced by the TACC. 

‘@“Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” p 2-30. 

117 
delivered copies of the Air Tasking Orders proved a hardship for Navy 

air sortie planners, especially for Navy airspace controllers on its AEGIS 

missile cruisers stationed in the Persian Gulf. but the problem could not 

be overcome either before or during Desert Storm.14* 

Communications Architecture for Desert Storm 

In October 1990, one U.S. Air Force communications officer, after 

returning from an inspection trip to Riyadh, argued that communications 

in the theater had grown like a cancer.’43 There was some truth to this 

claim. During Desert Shield, Central Command established more 

“connectivity” in Saudi Arabia than had been assembled in Europe since 

the end of World War 11. [DELETED]’” The communications 

established by Central Command Air Forces alone were staggering. 

In effect, the components, under Central Command’s guidance, 

established and maintained a huge data flow-a veritable torrent within the 

theater and between the theater and other commands (especially Washington). CENTAF’S problem was to ensure that this tremendous flow did not 

undermine the communications which held together the various parts of 

the Tactical Air Control System. To solve this problem, CENTAF staff set 

up an Airborne Communications Planning Cell in the Tactical Air Control 

Center in Riyadh to manage the allocation of all radio frequencies among 

all the elements of the Tactical Air Control Sy~tern.’~’ By January 1991, 

the daily Air Tasking Orders contained over 900 frequencies-the TACC’S 

Airborne Communications Planning Cell was allocating “virtually the 

I4’C. Kenneth Allard, in Command, Control, and the Common bt$ense (New Haven, 

1990). explains how this happened (pp 189-237). Norman Friedman, in World Naval 

Weapons Systems 1991/92 (Annapolis, 1991). describes the Navy systems and their 

functions. 

‘““Exocets, Air Traffic, and the Air Tasking Order,” by LCdr L. Di Rita, USN. in 

Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute (Aug 1992. pp 59-63), places the blame for this 

problem of coordination on CENTAF in particular and on the Air Force in general. 

However, his analysis of the causes of the problem is much less secure than his statement 

of how the late arrival of the AT0 affected the operations of the airspace managers on the 

AEGIS cruisers. 

‘43(S) Briefing. “After Action Report,” Maj James Hale, Air Force SPACECOM, 5 Oct 

‘“(S) Defense Science Board, Lessons Learned During Operations Desert Shield & 

145“Air Force Tactical Communications in War,” p 2-8. 

1990, to XOO, USAF HQ, Washington. 

Desert Storm, (Washington, DC, May 1992). p 5. 

118 
entire spectrum.’*146 Inevitably, this caused some problems. The Saudis, 

for example, did not have a frequency assignment policy, so their communications sometimes interfered with those of CENTCOM and CENTAF. 

Similarly, U.S. Army units located under AWACS and mccc orbits also 

broadcast in ways which blocked transmissions from and to the aircraft.l4’ 

Finally, there were so many frequencies in use that the Airborne Communications Planning Cell in the Tactical Air Control Center stopped changing them daily, and that posed a communications security risk.’” Yet the 

only major communications problem within the Tactical Air Control 

System not overcome by the beginning of Desert Storm was the delivery 

of daily Air Tasking Orders to Navy carrier task forces. 

Other Support for the TAB 

Air Space Control 

Air defense and combat air traffic control are two key, related 

functions of the Tactical Air Control System.’49 The TACS, when it works 

effectively, allows an air commander and his forces to keep enemy aircraft away from high-value friendly targets while admitting into friendly 

airspace combat and transport aircraft. During Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, the normally complex problem of monitoring, controlling, and 

defending a large airspace was compounded by the need to support the 

Saudi civil air traffic control process without supplanting it. In addition, 

Lt. Gen. Homer, as theater Airspace Control Authority, was responsible 

for seeing to it that aircraft from a multinational coalition flew freely 

above their own ground forces and those of their allies. This was no 

simple task. Even more than in the cases of communications and intelligence, the creation of effective airspace monitoring and control required 

the development of sensible, workable policy, as well as the installation 

of equipment and the deployment of trained personnel. 

The Saudis insisted on deliberate airspace control of all coalition 

aircraft, and they required that a training range schedule be published 

1461bid, p 2-13. 

I4’1bid. 

1481bid, p 2-16. 

149AlthWgh the air traffic control function is part of the TACS, it is not pictured in 

Figure 11. 

119 
(and strictly followed) for each of the thirty-six air training ranges two 

weeks in advance.150 For that to happen, daily Air Tasking Orders issued 

jointly by the Royal Saudi Air Force and Central Command Air Forces 

had to cover all training flights in theater. The Saudi government, however, did not have an integrated airspace monitoring and control system 

(radars supported by effective communications and displays). 

In the mid-l980s, the United States and Saudi Arabia had agreed to 

have the Boeing Company develop and field an integrated airspace 

monitoring and control system called “Peace Shield,’’ which would tie 

together ground-based radars and control facilities with AWACS aircraft. 

The system was not in place in August 1990,15’ so coalition air forces, 

especially U.S. air forces, would not be able to track the many training 

flights they wanted to schedule-one reason why it took Lieutenant General Homer a month to persuade the Saudis to allow training flights on a 

large scale. 

As it was, the Saudis had British Ground Air Navigation Aids (GENA) 

radars of 1960s vintage at Tabuk, Dhahran, Salbuk, Taif, and Khamis 

Mushayt, and three of the newer Peace Shield radars at Rafha, Nairyah, 

and Qaysumah, along the Persian Gulf.15* None of the air defense 

operations centers slated to serve as command posts for Peace Shield 

were complete. As a result, U.S. forces had to bring their own airspace 

control systems and personnel, and equipment brought by CENTAF often 

was electronically incompatible with what the Saudis already had 

deployed. As one memo noted, there was “limited exchange of real time 

situation information between the Saudi and US” system^.'^' Saudi 

AWACS aircraft, for example, could not send their air radar picture directly 

to their U.S. AWACS counterparts. Instead, it went first to the Saudi 

Sector Operations Center in Riyadh; then, only part of it was transferred 

to the adjacent U.S. Tactical Air Control Center. Similarly, though the 

TACC could provide the Saudi AWACS Information System in the Sector 

Operations Center with the full U.S. AWACS picture, that picture could not 

‘ynp Report. Capt Robert L. Humbertson, HQ AFSOCISCF, nd (after 7 Feb 1991). 

Rpt (S), ‘Talking Paper on Saudi C3,” Maj Anne Leary, for AF/XO, nd. 

Rpt (S). ‘Talking Paper on Saudi C3,” Maj Leary. Also, (S) “Background Paper 

153(S) Rpt, “Background Paper on Desert Shield C2,” Maj Leary, xOOTC. 7 Aug 

151 

152 

on Desert Shield C2,” Maj Leary, XOOTC, 7 Aug 1990. 

1990. 

1 20 
be transmitted to airborne Saudi AWACS aircraft.154 In practice, this meant 

that Saudi F-15s accompanied Saudi AWACS during the early days of 

Desert Shield (on daytime patrols), while U.S. AWACS worked with U.S. 

interceptors during their nighttime circuits.155 

Air Defense 

Air defense is really more than just defense. It is also a matter of not 

shooting down friendly aircraft. In the case of the Gulf War, moreover, 

U.S. forces had to be integrated into “the existing SauddGulf Cooperation 

Council (GCC) air defense system. . . . ” Under this system, allied 

airspace was “divided into seven air defensdairspace control sectors to 

allocate air defense and airspace management resources.*”s Figure 14 

illustrates the organization of Saudi air defense sectors. 

’%(S) Rpt, “Background Paper on Desert Shield C2,” Maj Leary. 

155(S) Rpt, “AWACS Orbits,” Maj John Adamdcss Tac Clt, 14 Aug 1990. 

(S) Ibid, p 1, para 2b. 

(S) CENTAF, Report, Air Defense Information Gathering Visit, 9-12 Oct 1990. 

(S) Ibid, p 2-2. 

interviews with USCENTAF staff. 

156 

I57 

158 

‘59(S) Air Defense and Airspace Control Procedures for Operation Deserl ShieM and 

I6O(S) Air Defense and Airspace Control Procedures, p 2-3. 

I6’(S) Ibid. 

121 
Figure 14 

Organization of Saudi Air Defense Sectors 

The traditional organization for a U.S. air defense system is based 

upon three lines of defense. The first line is composed of surface-to-air 

missiles (SAMS) deployed in a line parallel to the front: the “SAM belt.” 

This line of defense is backed up by air-to-air fighters tasked to destroy 

any enemy aircraft which penetrate the SAM belt. The final defense 

against enemy air attacks are point air defense short-range, surface-to-air 

missiles and antiaircraft guns defending high-value assets such as airfields, command and control centers, and supply depots. 

I22 
The air defense system was modified to meet local conditions. 

[DELETED]I6* The first line of air defense became the airborne and 

ground alert air defense aircraft. In addition, there was no U.S. point air 

defense; the U.S. Army did not deploy point defense missiles and guns 

that were not already part of the ground units being sent to the Gulf. 

The purpose of this-or any-air defense system is to defend friendly 

forces from attack by fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, or ballistic missiles. 

To accomplish this task, a basic air defense system consists of some 

means (for example, radar) to detect enemy target, and then to destroy 

them (by surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft artillery). Because the first 

line of defense against enemy fighters and bombers consisted of valuable 

and scarce AWACS E-3 aircraft, it was important to keep Iraqi aircraft 

from getting in among the AWACS and shooting them down. That placed 

a premium on knowing the identity of radar contacts as early as possible. 

But this was not easy given the many different types of coalition aircraft 

that were flying in the theater. To distinguish friend from foe, coalition 

forces employed a combination of electronic and procedural means. 

The primary electronic means of identifying aircraft was IFF 

(Identification Friend or Foe) equipment-transponders on aircraft which 

responded automatically to special cueing signals broadcast by friendly 

radars. U.S. aircraft carried IFF transponders which could respond to coded 

signals from radars in four modes. [DELETED] However, IFF alone could 

not discriminate between friendly and enemy aircraft. Procedural measures 

had to be established which would apply equally to all allied aircraft and 

yet not allow Iraqi aircraft to penetrate allied airspace ~afe1y.I~~ 

There are many different procedural methods for identifying friendly 

and enemy aircraft. Some are used by friendly aircraft to ensure their 

safe passage from their bases to the target and back. Other procedures 

identify certain flight characteristics, that (when unknowingly used by 

enemy aircraft) identify those aircraft as hostile. Both approaches were 

used during the Gulf War. The Air Tasking Order, for example, specified 

takeoff times, flight routes, and the times when coalition aircraft would 

appear over their designated targets. With this information, air defense 

‘62[DELFiTED] (S) Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, et al., 1912002 Jan 1991, subj: 

163(s) hformation Paper, "identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Procedures,” DAMO-FDE, 

COMUSCENTAF Wartime Rules of Engagement, para 4c. 

14 Sep 1990. 

123 
units would know when to anticipate the appearance of friendly aircraft. 

The Special Instructions attached to the Air Tasking Order and the 

Airspace Control Order identified Minimum Risk Routes, or air corridors, 

through which friendly aircraft were expected to fly when entering or 

leaving coalition airspace. The Commander in Chief Central Command 

also promulgated Rules of Engagement which defined hostile acts. For 

example, any unidentified aircraft ftying an “attack profile’’ against 

friendly forces could be assumed “hostile.”’bo 

Airspace Management 

Airspace management is the complement to air defense. The latter 

aims to keep out intruders. The former aims to keep friendlies from 

interfering with one another, especially over friendly tedtory. In short, 

airspace managers are the traffic cops of the sky, regulating the 

movement of aircraft along air comdors, within air refueling tracks, and 

around friendly fields. 

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Central Command Air 

Forces combat airspace management branch used a unique computer tool, 

the Combat Airspace Deconfliction System (CADS), to build the Airspace 

Control Order. No other Air Force Major Command or numbered air 

force had the system. In April 1990 Lieutenant General Homer warned 

General Schwarzkopf that the skies over Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would 

be congested with aircraft if the United States had to deploy sizeable 

forces to the region.’65 Homer told Schwarzkopf that the boundary 

between Kuwait and Iraq was roughly the distance between Tampa and 

Miami. Refueling operations in this area for a high number of sorties 

would saturate the available airspace, endangering both tankers and the 

aircraft they were reheling.lM The lack of airspace might severely limit 

the ability of air forces to generate numbers of sorties s~fely.’~’ 

la(s) Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, et d.. 1912002 Jan 1991, subj: COMUSCENTAF 

(S) Briefing, Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, CENTAF. “OPLAN 1002. Air Operations,” 

‘‘(S/NF) Study. “Desert Shield Desert Storm Tanker Assessment,” HQ Strategic 

I6’(S) T. A. Marshall. Strategic Air Command Bomber and Tanker Operations in 

Wartime Rules of Engagement, para 4A(6). 

to Gen Schwarzkopf. 

Air Command, Plans and Resources (XP), 23 Sep 1991. 

Desert Stonn, draft report, Rand Corporation, 1991 (WqL]-56608-AF), p 28. 

165 

1 24 
The expectation of crowding led Central Command Air Forces staff 

to plan on introducing U.S. air traffic controllers and their equipment if 

and when a crisis began. he-Desert Shield plans, however, did not 

accurately forecast the tremendous volume of air traffic, which threatened 

to overwhelm the ability of the existing route structure to handle it.'68 

For example, the Jeddah Air Control Center handled the air routes that 

connected Saudi Arabia with Europe and Africa. Prior to 2 August 1990, 

the Jeddah Air Control Center handled approximately 36,000 operations 

per month. By 15 September 1990, the traffic flow at Jeddah Air Control 

Center had increased to an average of 54,OOO operations per month, and 

it remained at that level until 15 January 1991.'@ 

Because of large gaps in radar and radio coverage in Saudi airspace, 

serious flight safety problems quickly emerged as the volume of air traffic 

increased during Desert Shield. To regain control over the situation, 

Central Command Air Forces brought more air traffic control equipment 

and personnel into the theater. Eventually, there were 7 deployed Radar 

Approach Control Facilities, augmentation to 17 airbase towers, and 

liaison elements in 3 host nation air control centers. Staffing numbered 

161 controllers at U.S. facilities, 85 US. controllers augmenting host 

nation controllers, 60 controllers in the liaison function, and 14 

controllers on the CENTAF staff to help manage combat air~pace.'~' The 

Army, Navy, and Marines also deployed their organic combat air traffic 

control equipment and controllers to support helicopter, marine, and 

carrier air operations. 

By Desert Storm, combat airspace managers separated multi-Service, 

multinational air forces flying 3,000 sorties per day in a complex airspace 

structure. The numbers of areas, zones, routes, and orbits which had to 

be monitored and controlled are impressive: 

o 160 restricted operation zones 

o 122 airborne refueling orbits 

o 32 combat air patrol areas 

'%tr. from Maj J. H. Steeves. Chief, Air Traffic Control Operations & Procedures, 

'@Ltr Capt Moms J. Spence, Chief, Combat Airspace PlandPrograms to GWAPS, TFImFax, Maj Howdeshell. AFCC Air Traffic Svc to Maj Leary. SAFmSG, subj: Air 

Dcs/Operations. USAFE. to HQ. AFWATCO, subj: Gulf war Study. 

IV, subj: Terminal AX, Theater ATC. Role of Liaison, 24 Apr 1992. 

Traffic in Support of Desert Storm, 27 May 1992. 

125 
0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

10 air transit routes 

36 training areas 

76 strike routes 

60 Patriot engagement zones 

3 12 missile engagement zones 

11 high-density aircraft control zones 

195 Amy aviation flight routes 

14 air corridors 

46 minimum risk routes 

60 restricted fire areas 

17 air base defense zones 

numerous Aegis engagement zones."' 

Outside the theater, some portions of the world's civilian air traffic 

control network were initially swamped by the rapid increase in military 

air movement through their regions.'" One reason for this was that many 

areas lacked the radio and radar coverage required to give ground 

controllers positive control of flights. To overcome this lack of coverage, 

an aircraft flying outside positive radar coverage usually is given an 

Altitude Reservation for a specific period of time, allowing the spacing 

between aircraft to be maintained by time intervals and altitude 

separation. During Desert Shield, this worldwide system was disrupted 

by the large increase in the number of flights crossing the Oceans and 

going into theater. Stateside air flow planners did not always anticipate 

the effect increased military air movements would have on the world's 

civil air traffic control system. Initially, the planned and scheduled 

deploying aircraft flights could not get approved flight plans due to 

congestion in the altitude reservation portion of the worldwide civil air 

traffic control system. In the Pacific, for example, it took the U.S. 

defense attaches' involvement with certain host nation governments to get 

the regional Air Traffic Control Centers to issue timely altitude 

reservations for transitting u.S. military aircraft.173 

'"(S) Defense Science Board, Lessons Learned During Opemtions Desert Shield & 

Desert Storm, (DDRE, May I992), pp 20- 1. 

'"Ltr Capt Todd G. Baker, Chief. PACMARF, 633d Operations Support Squadron to 

Maj Christianson, HQ PACAF/DOF. subj: Gulf War Study Tasking [Air Control Centers], 

28 Apr 1992. 

173~. 

1 26 
A typical air 

traffic control 

tower during 

Desert Storm. 

At the start of the air campaign on 16 January 1991, the military took 

wartime control of the airspace over Saudi Arabia. At 0300L on 16 

January 1991, the Jeddah Air Control Center had 315 civilian aircraft 

under its control. With only 10 minutes of notification, the center began 

transferring aircraft from civilian to military control. In 48 minutes all 

civilian air traffic either landed or departed the flight information region. 

In the neighboring Egyptian flight information region, numerous missions 

were bound for Saudi Arabia. U.S. air traffic control liaisons assisted the 

Egyptians in coordinating landing permission at Cairo East International 

for some of the missions and assisted in arranging with the Jeddah Air 

Traffic Control Center for critical military missions to ~0ntinue.I~~ The 

ease and safety in transitioning the airspace from national peacetime 

control to wartime coalition military control reflected exceptional 

planning and cooperation. 

174~tr Maj Steeves, Chief, ATC Operations Procedures, DCS/Operations, USAFE to 

HQ AFCUATCO (Capt Gray), subj: Gulf war Study. [Input to letter was provided by Capt 

Ray A. Mandery, who deployed as air traffic control liaison to Cairo, Egypt during Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm.] 

127 

360-141 0.: 93 - 14 : QL 3 
Meteorology 

Meteorological support for CENTAF and CENTCOM was, like many 

communications units, deployed late to the theater. According to a Joint 

Chiefs Memorandum of Policy, the Air Force was supposed to provide 

staff meteorological support to Commander in Chief Central Command 

and to the component commanders under him.’75 This requirement was 

not met by the small meteorological staff deployed. As planned, Central 

Command’s Staff Weather Officer flew to Saudi Arabia in August with 

the rest of the CE~OM staff, but he and his personnel depended on the 

5th Weather Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, to supply them 

with data from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. In midSeptember, a special van for receiving the satellite data was flown to 

Ri~adh.”~ Moreover, the rest of the meteorological support for CENTCOM 

and its components flowed piecemeal into the theater, and the number of 

personnel who did deploy did not match the standard called for by 

accepted doctrine. 

Summary and Review 

This chapter has surveyed the development of the Tactical Air 

Control System in the theater. It has not been a detailed survey. We 

tried to show how elements of the TACS function, and how complicated 

developing the TACS was. The TACS is the working manifestation of what 

Air Force personnel refer to as “centralized control and decentralized 

execution.” As such, its conceptual architecture is straightforward. 

AWACS aircraft, for example, monitor the movement of friendly and 

hostile aircraft, pass their pictures of the air situation to fighters and 

ground command centers, and then direct other aircraft to carry out the 

orders which commanders on the ground give to that portion of the 

Tactical Air Control System. 

Yet, the actual communications links which supported this part of the 

Tactical Air Control System were quite complex, involving equipment 

and personnel from multiple Services and nations. Moreover, the actual 

links were less than ideal, and they were modified, over time, to fit the 

peculiarities of the situation in the Gulf. So the straightforward 

conceptual architecture described in official manuals was 

modified-sometimes literally “on the fly.” 

175(S) Intvw. Maj Thomas R. MacPhail, WAF, Arlington, VA. 9 Dec 91 

’761bid. 

128 
The growth of the Tactical Air Control System was delayed by the 

Commander in Chief‘s decision to put a higher priority on the movement 

of combat units into the theater. However, in a month, Central Command 

Air Forces had put together a working Tactical Air Control System. By 

the end of 1990, the System was multinational. As the Commander in 

Chief Central Command noted in a message dated 26 December, 

We have firmly integrated the multinational forces into our 

overall command and control structure. U.S. and Saudi air 

defense forces have recently formed a combined control and 

reporting center (CCRC) for the Northeastern Sector of Saudi 

Arabia. Syrian, Egyptian, and French liaison officers maintain 

24 hour contact with their air defense (AD) forces through 

US.-supplied communications equipment located in the CCRC 

. . . . A secondary communications channel has been 

established from the CCRC through the U.S. Air Support 

Operations Center to our Tactical Air Control Parties located 

with each nation’s force^."^ 

There was even a plan to use U.S. AWACS to alert Israel in case Iraq’s air 

force tried to strike at Israeli targets through Jordan.’7S 

Setting up an effective Tactical Air Control System, however, did not 

come cheap. By the beginning of Desert Storm, all of the Air Force’s 

Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center aircraft were under 

CENTAF’S ~ommand.’~’ At that time, CENTAF had 6 of the 8 available 

EC-130 COMPASS CALL electronic warfare aircraft, 3 of the 5 deployed 

Air Support Operations Centers, 2 of the 5 deployed Control and 

Reporting Centers, both of the developmental E-8A JSTARS aircraft, and 

124 of the 184 deployed Tactical Air Control Parties.’” The European 

Command sent 25 percent of its intelligence manpower to CINCCENT and 

most of its tactical communications to Saudi Arabia or to Proven Force 

177(s) Msg, 21 152’26 kc 1990, from USCINCCENT, to AIG 904. subj: SITREP. Section 

5, “Commander’s Evaluation.” 

I7’(S) Memo, to Lt Col Stanfil, from Lt Col McCormick, subj: “Air Defense 

17’(S) Msg, 22442, 15 Jan 1991, from Joint Staff, Washington, to USCINCCENT, 

Memo, ‘%en McPeak’s Speech to National Defense University (mu) Input,” 

Warning to Israel. 30 Jan 1991. 

CC-J3, subj: “Airborne Relay Command and Control Units.” 

from as-Tactical Control Duty Officer, to ~0x0, 14 Feb 1991. 

129 
in Turkey.’81 Finally, the Strategic Air Command committed all available 

RC-135V RIVET JOINT aircraft, which were national assets, under Joint 

Chiefs’ control, to the theater.182 

Tactical Air Command Manual 2-1. Tactical Air Operations, defines 

the Tactical Air Control System as a “system for planning, directing, 

coordinating, and controlling theater air operations.’*183 In Operation 

Desert Shield, that system was put together piecemeal. Yet it was 

operating as a whole system in a month and was multinational by the end 

of December 1990. Giving it that capability, however, depleted the 

command and control units in the United States and Europe and left the 

United States with no effective tactical air command and control reserve. 

Overall, however, the story of the development of the Tactical Air 

Control System in the theater is noteworthy because of both its 

complexity and its success. The latter enabled General Homer, the first 

Joint Force Air Component Commander, to bring the full weight of 

coalition air power to bear on the forces of Iraq. 

-- 

‘“(S) Msg, from Gen,Galvin, to Gen Powell, subj: “Status of USEUCOM Forces 

IE2Robert S. Hopkins. 111. “Ears of the Storm,” Air Force Magazine. Vol. 75, No. 

lB3TAC Manual 2-1, ‘Tactical Air Operations,” HQ Tactical Air Command, Langley 

Following Deployment to SWA.” 20342, 20 Feb 1991. 

2 (Feb 1992). p 42. 

AFB, VA, AUg 1991, p 5-9. 

130 
5 

The CENTAF TACC 

Air Force Manual 1-1 states that a Tactical Air Force Commander 

should have one centralized control point from which to direct his forces.’ 

The Tactical Air Control System (TACS) provides this capability through 

the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), which is the highest operational 

element of the Tactical Air Control System and serves as the operations 

center for all air activity within the Tactical Air Control System’s area of 

responsibility? As such, the Tactical Air Control Center plans, coordinates, and directs the tactical air effort and supervises all tactical air 

control f~nctions.~ Intheory, the center is a staff organization working 

for the Director of Operations (DO) and the Director of Intelligence (IN), 

both of whom report to the Air Component Commander! The TACC, as 

envisioned and initially established in the theater by U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF), mirrored what had been prescribed in CENTAF 

Regulation 55-45’ This chapter will describe the CENTAF Tactical Air 

Control Center’s initial organization, its functions, and the evolution of 

those functions. 

Department of the Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air 

Force, AFM 1-1. 16 Mar 1984, see esp. pp 4-1, 4-2. The revised AFM 1-1 makes essentially the same argument. See Department of the Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine 

of the United States Air Force, AFM 1-1. Volume I, Mar 1992, p 18; Department of the 

Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, AFM 1-1, Volume 

11, “Essay W. Organizing to Win,” Mar 1992. 

(SRVF) Department of the Air Force, Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, General 

Planning and Employment Considerations, Volume 1, 19 Dec 1986, p 4-1. 

he TAC Regulation 55-45 stated that “as the Commander’s operation center/ 

command post, the TACC provides the facility and personnel necessary to accomplish the 

planning, directing and coordinating of tactical air operations.” TACR 55-45, Tactical Air 

Force Headquarters and the Tactical Air Control Center, 8 Apr 1988. 

?he TACC also supports the Joint Force Air Component Commander when, as in the 

Gulf war. the air component commander is appointed as the JFACC. 

USCENTAF Regulation 55-45. United States Central Command Air Employment 

Phning Process, 27 Jun 1990, p 2-2. The TACC in theater also was similar to the 

generic TACC prescribed by HQ TAC. 

1 

2 

5 

131 
The hitid CENTAF TACC 

The Tactical Air Control Center as envisioned and initially established in the theater by Central Command Air Forces mirrored what had 

been prescribed in CENTAF Regulation 55-45,6 published on 27 June 1990, 

just over a month before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In addition, 

Central Command Air Forces exercised this Tactical Air Control Center 

organization during the exercise Internal Look in July 1990. The Tactical 

Air Control Center comprised four major staff divisions: Combat Plans, 

Combat Intelligence, Combat Operations, and the Enemy Situation Correlation Division. These divisions supported two functional areas (operations and intelligence) and time periods (future plans and current operations). The Combat Plans Division built plans for future operations 

(seventy-two hours into the future) based upon intelligence support provided by the Combat Intelligence Division. Ongoing operations were 

monitored and controlled by the Combat Operations Division, supported 

by the Enemy Situation Correlation Division. Liaison elements such as 

the Army's Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) and the Naval Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE) were included in the TACC to coordinate 

operations. Figure 15 illustrates this relationship? 

The Combat Plans Division and the Combat Operations Division were 

organizationally subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. 

The Director of Combat Intelligence (DCI) reported to the Deputy Chief 

of Staff, Intelligence and directed the activities of the Combat Intelligence 

Division, the Enemy Situation Correlation Division, and the All-source 

Intelligence Center. The Tactical Air Control Center also included a 

Director of Air Defense (DAD), responsible directly to the Director of 

Operations and Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). In 

addition to these functions, the initial CENTAF organizational structure 

included an Airlift Control Center (ALCC) commanded by the Commander, Airlift Forces (COMALF), and a group of Strategic Forces Advisors 

(STRATFOR), commanded by a STRATFOR Commander. Figure 16 displays 

'USCENTAF Regulation 55-45, United Stales Central Command Air Employment 

Planning Process, 27 Jun 1990, p 2-2. The TACC in theater also was similar to the 

generic TACC prescribed by HQ TAC in Tactical Air Command Regulation 55-45, 8 Apr 

1988. 

'TACR 55-45, Tactical Air Force Headquarters and the Tactical Air Control Center, 

8 Apr 1988. 

132 
the CENTAF organizational structure, in its entirety. as it appeared on 24 

August 1990. 

Figure 15 

Tactical Air Control Center Divisions 

TODAY'S 

WAR 

TOMORROWS 

WAR 

COMBAT 

OPERATIONS 

DIVISION 

COMBAT 

PLANS 

DIVISION 

I BCE/NALE + 

ENEMY 

SITUATION 

CORRELATION 

DIVISION 

OENSCD) 

COMBAT 

INTELLIGENCE 

DIVISION 

(CW 

OPERATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE 

The following sections describe the functions and duties of the CENTAF 

Tactical Air Command Center divisions and offices. 

Combat PJans Division 

The Combat Plans Division planned for the employment of assigned 

forces in future Air Tasking Order (ATO) periods, that is, tomorrow's war. 

This division, staffed by officers and technicians experienced with the 

tactical weapon systems employed, tried to ensure that planning included, 

for example, appropriate force packaging, efficient use of electronic 

combat assets, and air-to-air refueling support.* The planning contained, 

'TACR 55-45. 

133 

in addition to unit tasking, unique or recently changed control instructions 

and directives' and was disseminated to all concerned .in the form of an 

Air Tasking Order." To accomplish this task the Combat Plans Division 

was organized into several divisions. As shown in Figure 17 the four 

major functional divisions were the Combat Operations Planning Division 

(COPD), the Fighter Plans Division, the Special Support Division, and the 

TACS Division. 'Avo specialized functions also were included in the 

Combat Plans Division: the ATO Division (or the CAFMS Division) and 

the Airborne Control Element (ACE) Coordinator." 

The Combat Operations Planning Division received and disseminated 

the commander's guidance letter and oversaw the joint targeting process, 

but its main function was to ensure the accomplishment of the planning 

process for the production of a flyable Air Tasking Order. To do this, 

the Division had three functional branches and a planning staff the 

Employment Plans Branch, the Long Range Plans Branch, the Night 

Targeting Branch, and the Combat Planning Staff (COPS).'' The Combat 

Planning Staff, working with other component and allied liaison officers, 

'For example, rules of engagement, the airspace structure and control procedures 

included in an Airspace Control Order and search and rescue information are examples 

of types of information normally included in a tasking order. Special instructions to units 

and rules of engagement were published separately with daily updates. 

"In general, the size or scale of the operation governs the mearis of AT0 dissemination. A limited operation might require a simple ATO transmitted verbally. An operation 

with a large number of units at diverse locations would require a large ATD constructed 

specifically for the unique aspects and size of the operation. An AT0 format also can be 

altered with changes to the air commander's objectives. Modern, automated systems have 

improved the speed of development and transmission of an AT0 significantly. One 

secondary requirement for the ATO is that it must be able to be developed, published, and 

disseminated manually should the automatic equipment fail. This places a premium on 

having enough trained personnel in a TAW. They serve as a manual back-up to an 

increasingly automated process. See TACR 55-45, Tactical Air Force Headquarters and 

the Tactical Air Control Center, 8 Apr 1988. 

"(S) USCENTAF Combat Plans Handout, Oct 1990. 

"USCENTAF Regulation 55-45, United States Central Command Air Employment 

Planning Process, 21 Jun 1990. 

135 
Figure 17 

Four Major Functional Divisions of the Combat Plans Divisi

LT GEN HORNER 

ADO CULALEXANDER 

I I BCECHIEF CI COL BEhWElT 

LTC EINSTEIN CAFMS LTCCOOMBS LTC BERZINCI 

DIVISION LTC BoElTcHER 

COMDAT PLANNING 

DIVISION (COPD) LTC BAPIISIE LTC EASIWAN 

I MAJ WATERSTREET 
was responsible for developing the initial plans for the use of airpower 

in defense of Saudi Arabia. This arrangement is illustrated in Figure 1 8.13 

Fighter Plans Division 

Once the Combat Operations Planning Division staff finished the 

planning for an Air Tasking Order period, the Fighter Plans Division 

completed the final coordination. Fighter Plans was composed of working sections representing all the forces being tasked by the ATO, including 

liaison officers from other U.S. Services and coalition nations. Fighter 

Plans Division “fraggers” worked closely with (a) the Special Support 

Division to develop air refueling tanker schedules and coordinate electronic combat, search and rescue (SAR), and special operations forces 

(SOF), (b) the TACS Division’s Airspace Branch to produce the Airspace 

Control Order (ACO),’~ and (c) the Combat Intelligence Division to coordinate enemy order of battle and intelligence collection management.” 

AT0 Diviswn 

The completed and coordinated Air Tasking Order was passed to the 

Air Tasking Order Division, where it was typed into the Computer Assisted Force Management System (CAFMS) and broadcast to the various units 

and agencies. The CENTAF Air Tasking Order cycle and the equipment 

used to disseminate the completed ATO will be examined in greater detail 

below. 

Combat Operations Division 

The Combat Operations Division was the CENTAF Tactical Air Control Center’s second major element. The Combat Operations Division 

I3(S) USCENTAF Combat Plans Handout. 

‘he ACO was included in the AT0 as part of the Special Instructions. which 

included communication information, rules of engagement, and search and rescue procedures. 

‘?’he Combat Plans Division cannot adequately plan and task any air operation 

without the Combat Intelligence Division providing the necessary information and analysis 

to (a) identify targets, (b) estimate threats (ground-to-air, as well as air-to-air), and (c) 

assess damage from strikes. 

137 
Figure 18 

Combat Planning Staff Works With Others 

To Develop Air Tasking Orders 

F-117 A-10 ] I 

ALLIES 

1 AC-130 I 

XEEKiFl 

AWARE BR 

{ EF-111 I 

138 
provided real-time central control, coordination, and integration of ongoing air operations for the air commander.I6 In doing so, its chief responsibility was to execute the Air Tasking Order, but it also approved and 

implemented changes to the Order,” monitored the conduct of the air 

campaign, and managed all tasked assets through the Fighter Duty Officers assigned to the Tactical Air Control Center.” Combat Operations 

Division officers managed the displays and information readouts presented to senior battle staff during their duty period. Figure 19 shows the 

organization of the Combat Operations Division as it existed in Riyadh.’’ 

Figure 20 displays the physical layout and organization of the Combat 

Operations Division (the “bubble”) as it was finally set up in the basement of the Royal Saudi Air Force headquarters?’ As envisioned by 

CENTAF, the Joint Force Air Component Commander and Director of 

Operations were to rely upon the Combat Operations Division to “fight” 

the air campaign. 

Director of Air Defense 

Within the Tactical Air Control Center, the Director of Air Defense 

was responsible to the CENTAF Director of Operations for the combined 

interoperability with, and integration of, U.S. forces and host nation(s)’ 

“USCENTAF Regulation 55-45, United States Central Command Air Employment 

Planning Process, 27 Jun 1990. 

17(U) TheCombat Operations Division was assigned responsibility for the next day’s 

AT0 ten hours prior to the AT0 effective time. 

‘*(U) For example, Combat Operations monitored the communications links with 

airborne assets such as the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) 

and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. The total air situation 

display was monitored by the Combat Operations Division and adjustments were made 

to the air order of battle based upon the recommendations of its personnel. 

lgMemo, Charles H. Shipman, Lt Col, USAF. Director, Manpower and Organizations, 

USCENTAF to A/Mo, 26 Mar 1991, subj: HQ USCENTAF Desert Storm Organization 

Structure. Although this chart described the organizational structure used during the war, 

this structure had been established during Desert Shield. 

Briefing, 9th AF Commander, USCENTCOM, Operation Desert Storm Hogwash, 20 

Maxwell AFB. AL, 12 Jd 1991. 

139 
Figure 19 

Combat Operations Division In Riyadh 

FDOs -- 

RDO -- 

SARDO 

SACLO 

i 

CASDO 

1 

-- ECDO 

i 

MARL0 MACLO iml 

NAVLO SOFLO =--I-= I 

4 CAFMS I 

-1 ADMIN I 

{ CT/ST 1 

IRSPACE 

140 
Figure 20 

Combat Operations 

DO cc RSAF DCO DEFENSIVE 

RF-4 F-4G 

I EF-111 1 I F-15C F-16 CAF I 

ARMY ABCCC CAS A-10 FAF 

AIRSPACE 

TANKERS B-52 USMC LNO NAVY LNO 

CAFMS 

1 MACLO F-15E F-117 F-111 SOF SARLO 

ADMIN REPORTS DW wx 

\ / 
air defense systems, forces, and airspace procedures and facilities?l 

Hence, the Director of Air Defense occupied a critical position in the 

Tactical Air Control System. He negotiated the agreements that covered 

the airspace structure, air traffic control procedures, command and control 

procedures and instructions, combined rules of engagement, and safe 

passage and minimum risk routing procedures. The monumental job of 

the Director of Air Defense was further compounded by the ever increasing number of forces arriving in theater. 

Intelligence Support to the TACC. 

Intelligence representation in the Tactical Air Control Center came 

under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence through 

the Director of Combat Intelligence to the Combat Intelligence Division 

and the Enemy Situation Correlation Division. The primary duty of the 

Combat Intelligence Division was to provide pertinent and timely intelligence in support of air campaign planning and execution?2 Inherent in 

the Division's activities was the task of maintaining the flow of intelligence information among the Combat Planning Staff, Combat Plans 

Division, and the Enemy Situation Correlation Division. The Director of 

Combat Intelligence also oversaw the operations of the Enemy Situation 

Correlation Division, which had three primary functions: (a) providing 

combat intelligence to the TACC Combat Operations Division, which 

could change the execution of the air plan, (b) providing near-real-time, 

all-source intelligence relevant to the Tactical Air Control Center's other 

functions and reviewing and validating targets prior to plan exe~ution?~ 

and (c) managing the flow of intelligence information and staff into the 

center from the Combat Intelligence Division, collection systems, and 

other intelligence 0rganizations.2~ Figure 21 represents the Intelligence 

"USCENTAF Regulation 55-45, United States Central Command Air Employment 

221bid. 

231bid. 

24For example, intelligence information and staff coming into the TACC included 

battle damage assessments, intelligence systems operators and target collections. and 

administration representatives. See TACC Mission statements, USCENTAF/HO TO 

Planning Process, 27 Jun 1990. 

USCENTAF/PA, 27 Rb 1991. 

142 
L 

P 

w 

COMBAT 

Figure 21 

Prewar Plan of Intelligence Organization to support TAC

ENEMY SITUATI

CENTAF/IN 

I 

INTEL DIV I 

(ClW 

CORRELATION D

(ENSCO) 

ELECTROhX 

INTEL (I") SITUATION 

- 

TARGETS 

. 

COLLECTIONS OPERATIONS 

(CMB) (INS) 
Organization as it was envisioned in prewar planning to support 

the TACC?5 

A note is necessary concerning the organizational relationship between the Tactical Air Control Center’s intelligence and combat plans and 

operations components. Unlike the Combat Plans Division and the 

Combat Operations Division, the Combat Intelligence Division and the 

Enemy Situation Correlation Division worked for the CENTAF Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Intelligence-not for the CENTAF Director of Operations. 

Thus, although intelligence analysts were tasked to support the Director 

of Operations’s activities, their organizational chain of command led to 

Intelligence. This arrangement created a potential for conflict in the way 

intelligence personnel responded to taskings from Combat Plans or Combat Operati on s ?6 

Development of the CENTAF Air Tasking Order Process 

The Tactical Air Control Center, as well as the entire Tactical Air 

Control System, is tied together by the Air Tasking Order. This Order 

promulgates the air campaign plan developed by the Combat Plans and 

Combat Intelligence Divisions and transmits the plan throughout the 

TACS. The Air Tasking Order, however, is not itself a plan; it is the 

means by which tasks are communicated to the applicable units. The Air 

Tasking Order is a message containing most pertinent information about 

flight operations during a specific period.27 It usually contains takeoff 

times for all aircraft under the control of the issuing commander?* air 

”USCENTAF Regulation 55-45, United States Central Command Air Employment 

Planning Process, 21 Jun 1990. 

26Fo; example, In Oct 1990, Brig Gen Glosson noted that Intelligence organizations 

were not supporting operations planners. He argued that one reason for this failure was 

that “unlike the remainder of our profession, [Intelligence] works truly for someone else 

other than the commander on the scene.” (S) Intvw, TSgt Theodore J. Turner, USCENTAF 

History Office with Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, 14th Air Division (P) Commander and 

Director, USCENTAF Campaign Phs, 18 Oct 1990. 

27U.S. forces do not always train and use a standard AT0 format. For example, 

where U.S. forces are involved in operations with allied nations-e.g., NATO-different AT0 

formats are used. ATOS are issued daily and, most often, cover twenty-four hours. 

’%e Air Component Commander or Joint Air Component Commander may not 

control all air assets in theater. Specifically, the Marine and Naval commanders may 

retain a significant portion of their air assets for use by their Service. In this case, the 

ATO may contain only those air forces allocated by the Service component to the air 

144 
refueling times and locations, and targets and times over targets (TOT) for 

a specific period. In addition, the Order often contains daily updates to 

the Special Instructions (SPINS) and Airspace Control Order (ACO), which 

tell the pilots the procedures to be followed en r0ute.2~ 

Central Command Air Forces used the format published by the Joint 

Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency for its Air 

Tasking Order.30 Mission orders were arranged first by organizations, for 

example, tactical fighter wings or squadrons and Navy CVs, and then in 

order of times over targets. Figure 22 reproduces a page from an Air 

Tasking Order from Desert Shield?' The description of each mission is 

formatted. The first line details mission data, including: 

a unique alphanumeric mission identifier for the aircraft 

described in the mission order; 

an alphabetic package code which referred to all missions 

taking part in a particular launch-not all aircraft in a single 

package would be assigned to attack the same target; 

the flight leader's call sign-other aircraft would take the 

flight leader's name but be distinguished from the flight 

leader by succeeding numbers; 

the number and type of aircraft in the mission; 

commander. 

29Joint User Handbook for Message Text Formats, Joint Tactical Command, Control 

and Communications Agency, 1 Sep 1988. 

30Joint User Handbook for Message Text Formats, Joint Tactical Command, Control 

and Communications Agency, 1 Sep 1988. However, U.S. forces do not always train 

and use a standard AT0 format. For example, where U.S. forces are involved in operations with allied nations4.g.. NATo-different AT0 formats are used. AMS are issued daily 

and, most often, cover twenty-four hours. 

3'(S) Air Tasking Orders, Desert Shield, 30 Nov 1990, GWAPS, css Safe 6. 

145 
Figure 22 

Page From Air Tasking Order 

PENTAGON OPERLTIONS OIRECTORATE 

IhhEOIATE/ROUTINE ZYUW RHIUFHA4679 3341315 0 K )0!300Z NOV 90 ZFF-1 FK HQ USCENTAF FWO//HQ RSAf OPERATIONS// 

TO AlG8589 

RUFTLEA/ZOTFW RAF UPPER HEYFORO UK//CC// 

RUFLEPA/ZOTFW OEPLOYEO INCIRLIK AB TU//CC// 

RUHGPEh/435ALCE OET ONE DEPLOYED// 

SECTION 1 OF 37 OPER/OPERATION DESERT SHIELD// MSGlO/ATOCONF/USCFNTAF-TRT PIIZfI 

NARk/USCENTAFlRSAF DESEii'SHiEib' AT0 G DAY C+l 16 01 OEC 90 THE FOLLOWING WILL SERVE AS A TEMPORARY KEY TO ALL SETS CONTAINED 

WITHIN THE AIR TASKING ORDER. 

WI 

ANY FIELDS .___ THAT nn -- NnT rnNTdlU --.. .-. .. "ATA "" LL BE REPLACE0 WITH A HYPHEN. 

[DELETED] 

UNTIL THE LAST MANOATORY FIELD. 

WITHOUT DATA ARE DROPPED.// 

ALL FIELDS ARE ACCOUNTED FOR ALL TRAILING OPTIONAL FIELOS PERIO/ 010100Z/TO:020300Z// 

AIRTASK/UYIT TASKING// 

TASKUNIT/ ~ C41// 

MSNDAT/2703/ZN/BAOMAN 03/IA-6E/GINT/ 

)?SNLOC/ 

AfiPN/ REMARK IOENTIFIER(S): A E 12 

PISNOAT/ 

MSNLOC, 

AhPN/ 

MSNDAT/ 

MSNLOC, 

AhPN/ 

NARR/ UNIT REMARKS: C41 

UNIT REMARKS A 

SEE TANKER SPINS FOR AIR INFORMATION. UNIT REMARKS E 

CONTACT EAST AWACS FOR DIRECT CONTROL, USE EAST COMM PLAN. UNIT REMARKS G CONTACT GULF WHISKEY. 

..................................................................... 

// 

COMENTS: 24 HOUR STRIKE. ALERT// 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

*** AF SECTION MESSAGE *** 

DISTRIBUTION 3 

ACTION 

INFO XO(1) CSS VtA XOXO(1) FILE CY(1) 

AF SECTION MESSAGE (I) 

(A) 

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRE0 3 

MCN-S0334/21951 TOR.S0334/13482 TAD.S0334/1348Z COSN-MA0271 

-AIR FORCE MESSAGE. PAGE 1 OF 2 3013002 NOV SO SECT 01 OF 37 

146 
an abbreviation identifying mission type, for lexample, “INT” 

for interdiction; 

a field to indicate alert status; 

two fields to indicate the required ordnance loadout; and 

two fields to provide Identification Friend or Foe squawks in 

Modes I1 and III. 

The second line lists either target location (TGTLOC) for strike missions 

or mission location (MSNLOC) for nonstrike missions. This line includes 

fields for the following data: 

time on target (TOT); 

time off target (TIT); 

target identification-normally a basic encyclopedic number, 

or BEN-sometimes a short description; 

target type (seldom used); 

aimpoints or designated munitions point of impact (DMPI); 

and 

the request number for targets requested from field forces-for 

example, army or marines-for tactical air strikes. 

The data fields for aerial refueling, intra-theater airlift, mission support (for example, ABCCC and AWACS), and reconnaissance missions are 

similar to those described above. Task unit entries end with remarks 

which add instructions related to special instructions, detailed aimpoints, 

or command and control. 

Upon arrival in theater, CENTAF priorities included bedding down the 

deploying forces and developing a plan to defend Saudi Arabia. The 

147 
Combat Planning Staff32 assumed the task of assembling a coherent plan 

for Saudi Arabia’s defense. The focus of that initial planning effort was 

the use of air power to interdict and destroy Iraqi ground forces while 

coalition ground forces moved to defensive positions.33 By late August, 

Central Command Air Forces was publishing two distinct Air Tasking 

Order products: (a) the daily Air Tasking Orders, which assigned tasks 

such as training and groundairborne alert commitments and (b) the 

ATO B for D-Day, which included the tasks inherent in the developing 

plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia. The daily Air Tasking Orders 

detailed the ground and airborne alert commitments, air refueling activity, 

and airlift within the theater. Each Air Tasking Order identified alphabetically (AT0 B, AT0 C, AT0 D, etc.), was superseded every day by a new 

Order with the subsequent alphabetic designation. The first daily Air 

Tasking Order published by CENTAF staff in the theater was AT0 B, 

published on 12 August 1 990.M 

The Air Tasking Order continued to expand and develop as the 

coalition grew and more U.S. and allied forces became available. By late 

August, CENTAF also began publishing daily training in the ATO. Greater 

training requirements led to increases in the size and complexity of the 

ATO. CENTAF adjusted the designation sequence for subsequent Air 

Tasking Orders once the alphabetic designation reached ATO 2 on 26 

September 1990, or C+50.3’ The designation of the ATO for 27 September did not revert to the beginning of the alphabet; the designation for 27 

32As illustrated in Figure 18, the Combat Plans Division hierarchy had several levels. 

The COPS (along with Employment Plans Branch, Long Range Plans Branch, and Night 

Targeting Branch) was under the Combat Planning Division, which, in turn, was a major 

element in the Combat Plans Division. 

33The first Air Tasking Order published on 12 Aug 1990 gives an example of the 

tasking given to the units in these early days of the deployment. The F-ISEs (from the 

4th TFW) were assigned to assume ground alert loaded with an “equal mix of SCLS and 

load maximum number of aircraft and place on 30mh GND alert. Be prepared to counter 

an Iraqi invasion of SA. Plan for 4 ship int msns. max sortie surge rates.” (S) (HQ 

USCENTAF FWD msg 120402 Aug 1990, operation Sandwedge ATO-8, GWAPS Microfilm 

Roll Number 23969, Frame Number 400. 

’“SJ USCENTAF msg 1204042 Aug 1990, Operation Sandwedge A’IY)-B, GWAPS Microfilm Roll Number 23969, Frame Number 400. 

GWAPS CSS Safe 7, folder “Desert Shield Air Tasking Orders (ATOS),” 16-30 Sep 1990. 

(SJ USCENTAF msg 2513502 Sep 1990, USCENTAF ATO-Z, c+m. 26 !kp 1990, 35 

148 
September (or C+51) was AT0 F.36 CENTAF continued to use the alphabetic identifiers F through Z for the daily Orders until the air campaign 

began on 17 January 1991. 

The daily Air Tasking Order designation was changed to avoid confusion with the second Am: AT0 B for D-Day. Unlike the daily ATO, AT0 

B for D-Day included specific taskings, targets, missions, and procedures 

that would be executed should Saudi Arabia be attacked by Iraqi forces.37 

Throughout the fall and early winter of 1990 AT0 B for D-Day was 

updated and published several times. The last versions of AT0 B for DDay reflected the tasking inherent in the Combined Operations Plan for 

the defense of Saudi Arabia published on 29 November 1990?* 

The Special Instructions, published in the Daily Air Tasking Order, 

solved a critical problem facing CENTAF Forward staff when they arrived 

in theater, that is, there were no standing airspace plans, search and 

rescue procedures, or communications procedures. Negotiations had not 

been completed among the various countries and agencies on such issues 

as training ranges and routes, safe passage procedures across national 

borders, and air refueling procedure^.^^ Negotiations on these issues had 

to be accomplished while the forces deployed and the coalition was 

formed. As agreements were reached and plans developed, the Special 

Instructions published in the Daily ATO and D-Day ATO grew in size and 

(S) USCENTAF msg 261 2052 Sep 1990, USCENTAF ATO-F. c+s1, 27 Sep 1990, 36 

GWAPS CSS Safe 7, folder “Desert Shield Air Tasking Orders (ATOS),” 16-30 Sep 1990. 

371n Nov 1990. Lt Col David A. Deptula, the chief air planner for the CENTAF 

Special Planning Group, noted that the “D-Day Plan was a required contingency plan for 

when the folks got over here in the event Saddam rolled over the border. . . . [Tlhere had 

to be a defensive plan.” See (S) lntvw TSgt Theodore J. Turner, USCENTAF History office 

with Lt Col David A. Deptula, Chief Air Planner, USCENTAF Special Planning Group, 1 

Nov 1990. 

3% avoid confusion caused by changes in unit taskings copies of ATO-8 for D-Day 

were destroyed as new versions were published. The final version of ATO-6 for D-Day 

was published on 17 Dec 1990. This version of the AT0 illustrates the final development 

of the defensive air taskings supporting the Combined OPLAN for the defense of Saudi 

Arabia. (GWAPS Microfilm Roll Number 23974, Frames 3930-1 128.) 

391n other theaters (e.g., EuropdNATo), procedures and agreements have been 

negotiated and put “on the shelf’ for possible use. Refinements of existing procedures 

and agreements take place through live flying and command post national and multinational exercises. 

149 
complexity. By late September 1990, the Special Instructions had grown 

to include the following ten separate sections?' General Information, 

Electronic Combat Information, Communications Plan, Safe Passage 

Procedures, Command and Control, Search and Rescue Procedures, 

Rules of Engagement, Target Guidance, Air-to-Air Refueling Tanker 

Information, and the Airspace Control Order. Each Special Instructions 

section contained information critical to the execution of tasking contained in the Air Tasking Order. Daily training and staff practice refined 

the Instructions so that key matters (such as supporting airspace structure, 

and command and control procedures) were fully developed and coordinated when the strategic air campaign began. 

Figure 23 illustrates the planning cycle (to publish the Air Tasking 

Order) initially established by Central Command Air Forces in Saudi 

Arabia. The CENTAF staff planned to use this cycle in the event they 

would execute the D-Day ATO. The cycle to plan, produce, and execute 

an Order was spread over three days, or seventy-two hours!' Initially, 

the AT0 execution period covered a twenty-four hour period from OlOOZ 

through 00592 the next day:' Action on each Air Tasking Order cycle 

began at 09002 (1200L)43 with a meeting of the Combat Planning Staff. 

Immediately following that meeting, the Joint Target Coordination Board 

convened to discuss targeting strategy, deconfliction, and sortie apportionment. Between 10302 and 11302, the ATO Guidance Letteru and 

40For example, See (s) Msg, CENTAF FWD/HQ RAF Operations to Subordinate Units, 

2608152 Sep 1990, subj: specid hstructions, USCENTAF AT0 Master Weekly SPINS, 27 

Sep through 3 Oct 1990. 

4'0ccasionally the cycle is referred to as thirty-six or forty-eight hours long. The 

difference is simply where one starts and stops the clock. For example, if measured from 

the first hour rather than the last hour of the twenty-four hour ATO period, the cycle is 

forty-eight hours. 

Ltr, Col James C. Crigger. Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, CENTAF. to 

ARCENT/G3. MARCENT/C3, NAVCENTiN3. RAWLNO, RAF, subj: Air Tasking Order (ATO) 

Nominations, 3 Sep 1990. 

43Riyadh local time, e.g., 1200L, is derived by adding three hours to Zulu time, e.g., 

09oOZ. 

%e Guidance Letter is issued by the JFACC but is based upon guidance from the 

42 

Theater Commander. 

150 
Figure 23 

Proposed Sorties Apportionment 

Day 1 Day 2 

4 

COPS/ US Army Target 

JTCB Nominations 

Begin 

Planning 

07002 

I 

21 002 

NTCI dgooz 

II 

1030 - 11302 

AT0 Guidance/ 

Apportionment 

12302 

COMUSCENTAF 

Apportionment 

Approval 

I 

Published 
apportionment4’ briefing for the Deputy Chiefs of Staff were prepared. At 

12302 the COMUSCENTAF (Central Command Air Forces Commander) 

apportionment meeting was held, at which the Commander approved the 

AM Guidance Letter and transferred the apportionment to the Commander 

in Chief, Central Command. Between 13002 and 14002, information was 

prepared for the night targeting cell. U.S. Army target nominations were 

due at 17002; they were merged, ranked, and forwarded to the intelligence 

and targeting specialists. Intelligence specialists validated each target, 

gathered the required mission planning data, and weaponeered46 each target 

for a suggested mix of aircraft and weap0ns.4~ This process was completed by 21002, when the sortie allocation process began. The night targeting working between 21 00Z and 07002, produced a proposed sortie 

allocation by using the Commander’s apportionment guidance, combined 

with munitions and weapon system ~apability.4~ 

45Apportionment is a statement of the level of effort which is to be given to missions. For example, fifteen percent counterair, forty-three percent interdiction, two 

percent strategic offense. and forty percent planned CAS. 

”eaponeering “is the process of determining the quantity of a specific type weapon 

required to achieve a specified level of damage to a given target, considering target 

vulnerability, weapon effects, munitions delivery errors, damage criteria, probability of 

kill, weapon reliability, etc. When the objective of force employment is to employ lethal 

force against a target, targeteers use a variety of weaponeering methodologies to determine expected damage levels. These weaponeering methodologies include both nonnuclear and nuclear weaponeering techniques. Common to both methodologies is 

aimpoint selection and weapons effects analysis.” Department of the Air Force, An 

Introduction to Air Force Targehg, AF Pamphlet 200-17. 23 Jun 1989, p 21. 

47Targeteering is a complex and difficult subject to master. According to AFP200-17, 

the targeter must understand “doctrine; strategy; operational plans and planning cycles 

(both ours and the enemy’s); weapons systems and tactics; research and development 

processes; mapping. charting, and geodesy; quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques; physics; and structural engineering.” Targeting involves integrating “intelligence 

threat information, the target system, and target characteristics with operations data on 

friendly force posture, capabilities, weapons effects, objectives, rules of engagement, and 

doctrine.” See Department of the Air Force, An Introduction to Air Force Targeting, AF 

Pamphlet, 23 Jun 1989, pp 8-9. 

4%e Night Targeting Cell, a component of the Night Targeting Branch, was located 

in the Combat Planning Division. See Figure 18. 

4%ere are differences between the times setting deadlines for actions between the 

letter sent by Col Crigger, DCSO (to ARCENT, MARCENT, NAVCENT. RAF, and RSAF) and 

the USCENTAF/RAF procedures handout published one month later. (S) See the 

USCENTAF/RAF. Desert Shield Combat Plans Handout, Oct 1990. See also Ltr. Col James 

c. Crigger, Jr.. Deputy Chief of staff, Operations. CENTAF, to ARCENT/G3, MARCENT/C3, 

NAVCENTlN3, RAFiLNO, RAF, subj: Air Tasking Order (ATO) Nominations, 3 Sep 1990. 

152 
This proposed sortie apportionment was submitted to the CENTAF 

Commander by 06302 on day 2. Once he approved the Air Tasking 

Order, it was passed to the fighter division where it was completed and 

prepared for transmission to the units. The final proof of the fighter part 

of the AT0 was released at 07002. At 08002, no further changes were 

accepted to the day’s Order, and it was published between 09002 and 

12002. Upon receipt of the ATO, the units would plan their missions and 

begin execution at 01002, day 3-the start of the next Air Tasking Order 

execution periodM 

Once H-hour of the particular ATO was reached, control of it was 

turned over to the Combat Operations Division, with intelligence support 

from the Enemy Situation Correlation Division. If the Joint Force Air 

Component Commander wanted to change a mission at this point, the 

Combat Operations Division would notify the specific unit and the other 

agencies or units associated with that mission. For example, if the Commander directed a change in takeoff time of a strike mission, the unit 

flying the strike mission and the escort aircraft units, the refueling aircraft, and the air defense system would have to be notified. 

Over time, the Computer Assisted Force Management System became 

the primary means to distribute the Air Tasking Order within the theater. 

Initially, however, the CAFMS was not established widely, and the first AT0s 

were distributed by a variety of other means, including the use of STU-IIIS 

and modems, backed up by Saudi secure FAX machines and a Saudi secure 

logistics management net~ork.~’ Although Central Command Air Forces 

In the September letter, Col Crigger notes that the then-current AT0 cycle covered “a 

twenty-four hour period from Ol00Z through 00592 the next day.” He added that target 

submission times were largely driven “by the limited communications connectivity 

throughout the theater which increases ATO transmittal/distribution time.” The Desert 

Shield Combat Plans Handout describes the planning process with greater detail. There 

are two key differences between the Crigger letter and the Combat Ph Handout. The 

first difference is the deadline for submission of target nominations from the components. 

The Crigger letter specified that target nominations were due at 13002; the Combat Plans 

Handout specified 17002. Second, the Crigger letter set the AT0 publishing period at 

12002 to 15002; the Combat Plons Handout set the publishing period from O9002 to 

12002. 

%r. Col James C. Cngger, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, CENTAF, to 

ARCENTIG3, MARCENTIC3, NAVCENTM.1, RAFILNO, RAF, subj: Air Tasking Order (ATO) 

Nominations, 3 Sep 1990. 

nd. 

”Briefing, “Air Tasking Order (ATO) Preparation and Composite Force Packaging,” 

153 
staff realized that the information transfer situation would improve over 

time, they feared that the limited ATO distribution system would become 

saturated rapidly. A backup to the electronic system was needed should it 

break. To solve this problem, on 21 August 1990, the CENTAF Director of 

Operations, Col. James C. Crigger, Jr., requested that C-21 aircrafl be made 

available to fly the Order to several bases?* Aircraft courier flights continued throughout the war and were considered the backup should the AT0 

transmission system Aircraft courier flights were also used to provide the AT0 to naval carrier task forces.” 

Ltr. col James c. Crigger, Jr., Director of Operations, CENTAF FWD. to COMALF, 

ALCC, subj: C-21 Taskings. 21 Aug 1990. 

53Use of the CAFMS entailed risks concerning reliability, or “back-up.” and transmittal. First, if the system were disabled or shut down for even a short period of time-a few 

hours-it would have been impossible for the ATO to be distributed throughout the theater 

within an acceptable period of time. Second, the size of the document generated difficulties in transmitting the ATO electronically to Air Force (and Navy) units. 

”In 1989, there was an Air Force-Navy initiative to install CAFMS on the USS MT 

WHITNEY in support of Operation Solid Shield. The test was supported by a SHF SATCOM 

link through the Norfolk Naval Ground Station. The link supported successfully a 1,OoO 

sortie AT0 and the transfer of more than 100 messages between SO7 TACCS (located at 

Shaw AFB, SC) and the uss MT WHITNEY. However, the lessons learned from this installation were not appIied-CAFMSS were not installed on carriers, training did not continue, and 

neither the Air Force nor the Navy expressed a desire to put CAFMS on other ships. 

52 

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the JFACC was required to support six carrier 

fleets and forty-two additional remote terminal users. Typical organizational problems 

in disseminating the ATO were compounded by procedural and mechanical limitations. 

Navy personnel were not trained to use or maintain CAMS. There had been no pre 

conflict training, there had been no exercises, nor had the lessons’of the USS MT WHlTNEY 

in Solid Shield 89 been applied. Mechanical obstacles included an insufficient quantity 

of equipment initially deployed to support the size of the campaign, the communications 

links were incapable of supporting a very large daily ATO. unintempted WWMCCS links 

were unreliable and unable to transmit the ATO, and the deployed carriers failed to 

dedicate a SHF SATCOM link to support receiving the ATO. 

During Desert Shield, the Navy tried at least five ways to receive the ATO: AUTODIN 

(too slow), WWMCCS (ATO too long, satellite link unreliable), PC transfer to Pentagon then 

forwarded to FLTCOMM (too slow), software conversion program developed to put ATO in 

Navy message format-Janap 126-then paper tape was cut on CAFMS and passed to Navy 

over FLTFLASH (too slow). use of S-3 aircraft to hand carry the ATO. The final sohtion-use of S-3 aircraft-proved the fastest and most effective. Briefing, Maj Whitehurst. 

TAUDOYY, HQ TAC. subj: USAFIUSN ATO Interface, nd. See also (S) Center for Naval 

Analyses, Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Volume VIII: c‘/space and Electronic 

Warfare (Alexandria, VA, 1992), p 1-13; (S) Center for Naval Analyses, Desert Storm 

Reconstruction Report, Volume 11: Strike Warfare (Alexandria, VA, 1991), p 2-16; 

154 
Summary 

Moving, modifying, manning, and managing the military organization 

created to defend Saudi Arabia and reclaim Kuwait was difficult. This 

chapter reviewed and described the organization of the CENTAF Tactical 

Air Control Center in Riyadh. The role of this chapter was not merely 

to provide a description of the CENTAF process for planning and exercising command and control over forces. The chapter also set the stage for 

a detailed description of how the special offensive planning organization 

was created, grew, and assumed central importance in the command and 

control of U.S. and allied air forces. 

Briefing, “Air Tasking Order (ATO) Preparation and Composite Force Packaging,” nd. 

See (S) Chapter 3 for a discussion of the JFACC’S role in dealing with the CENTAFNAVCENT communications problems. 

155 
156 
6 

The Black Hole and Its Impact 

Almost immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, planning began at 

the Air Staff to develop a strategic air campaign against Iraq.’ Under the 

direction of Col. John A. Warden, 111, Deputy Director for Warfighting, 

HQ USAFKOXW, the concept of an offensive, strategic air campaign was 

developed, briefed to a variety of audiences, and taken to the theater? 

The development of this plan influenced the ongoing planning process at 

Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) and affected the make-up of the 

developing theater command and control system. In particular, this chap 

ter will examine the Special Planning Group, also known as the “Black 

Hole,” which was established outside of the CENTAF Tactical Air Control 

Center (TACC) organization and assigned the task of expanding and completing the Air Staff concept for a strategic air campaign plan. We also 

will analyze the relationship among the Black Hole, the CENTAFTACC, and 

intelligence organizations. Finally, we will describe the CENTAF TACC 

reorganization, which (as offensive action approached) combined the Black 

Hole with the Tactical Air Control Center planning staff. 

Black Hole Origins 

On 19-20 August 1990, Colonel Warden and several of his staff 

briefed their strategic campaign plan, “Instant Thunder,” to key members 

On 10 Aug 1990, Gen Schwarzkopf called Gen Powell to ask that Air Force 

planners begin work “on a strategic bombing campaign aimed at Iraq’s military.” H. 

Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre. It Doesn’t Take Q Hero (New York, 1992), p 31 3. 

In addition, see (s) Hist, 9th AFNSCENTAF (David L. Rosmer), 9 AFKWAF in Desert 

Shield: The Initial Phase, Aug 1990, 10 Jan 1992. p 13; see also GWAPS Planning report. 

‘Work on the offensive air concept began at the request of Gen H. Norman 

Schwarzkopf in a telephone conversation with Vice Chief of Staff Gen John M. Loh (on 

5-6 Aug 1990). Col Warden and a group of staff officers were sent to Riyadh by Gen 

Schwarzkopf on 19 Aug. Before going to Saudi Arabia, Warden had briefed Gen H. 

Norman Schyarzkopf, Gen Colin Powell, Gen Alfred M. Gray (usMC Commandant), and 

Adm Frank 8. Kelso (Chief of Naval Oprations). 

1 

157 
of the Central Command (CENTCOM) and CENTCOM Air Force staffs in 

Saudi Arabia. Gen. Homer, acting as Commander in Chief, Central 

Command (Forward), was dissatisfied with the plan because it ignored the 

large number of Iraqi forces on the Saudi border? Brig. Gen. Buster C. 

Glosson, who had been assigned to-the Joint Task Force Middle East 

aboard the USS LaSuZZe, saw the Instant Thunder briefing and volunteered 

to oversee the development of a strategic-offensive-air campaign against 

Iraq? Three key members of Warden's team were asked to stay in Saudi 

Arabia to become the nucleus of a planning team (that came to be) called 

the Black Hole. In addition to the three Air Staff officers who remained 

in the theater, people from the Central Command Air Forces staff, other 

Services, and coalition partners, as well as officers from the deploying 

units and Tactical Air Command headquarters, were detailed to man the 

select planning group: This group was organized into a Special Studies 

3According to Lt Gen Homer, Col Warden was unable to answer practical questions 

about the disposition of forces or effective responses to potential Iraqi actions. (S) Intvw. 

Barry Barlow. Richard G. Davis, and Perry Jamieson with Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, 9th 

AF Commander, 4 Mar 1992. 

4(S) Intvw, Richard G. Davis, Perry Jamieson, and Bany Barlow with Lt Gen 

Charles A. Homer, Commander, 9th AF. 4 Mar 1992; (S) Intvw, TSgt Theodore J. 

Turner, CENTAF History Office with Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson. 14th AD (P) Commander and Director, USCENTAF Campaign Plans, 17 Oct 1990, (S) Tntvw, Thomas A. Keaney, 

Mark D. Mandeles, Williamson Murray, and Barry Watts with Lt Col David A. Deptula, 

SAFIOSX, 20-21 Dec 1991. Lt Col Deptula served as the Chief Air Planner, Special 

Phnning Group, CENTAF FWD, during Operation Desert ShieldStom. 

'In Oct 1990, Brig Gen Glosson recalled that his first action was to ensure he: 

had an expert in building ATOS. a person that was very familiar and had 

built numerous OP Orders, a person that had been involved in execution 

planning, to include the entire gamut from the SEAD aspects, to munitions, to weapons systems . . . including the timing, AWACS, tankers, 

RIVET JOINT, and all the support elements. Once I got those requirements covered from Ninth Air Force staff, I asked each of the units that 

were going to he participating to provide two people. The reason I got 

two people is I let the unit commander decide who he sent and I figured 

that there would never be a situation where a person would select the 

exact people that I would-so out of the two people I would get at least 

one that I could hang onto for a while. (S)Intvw. Tsgt Theodore J. 

Turner, CENTAFIHO with Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, 14th AD (P) 

Commander and Director, USCENTAF Campaign Plans, 17 Oct 1990. 

158 
Division aligned under Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Olsen, acting CENTAF 

Forward Commander! The 24 August 1990, CENTAF Foiward organizational chart illustrates this relationship (see Figure 24): Because of the 

political sensitivities concerning planning offensive operations against 

Iraq, access to the Special Studies Division (the Black Hole) work areas 

was tightly controlled? Only a select group of planners directly involved 

with the development of the campaign and the senior staff were allowed 

into the planning area, or even had knowledge of their activities? Very 

few members of the CENTAF Combat Plans Division and Combat Operations Division were granted access. No mention of the concept would be 

made until the developing coalition was ready to accept such a plan." 

60n 6 Aug 1990 Gen Schwarzkopf and Lt Gen Homer, among others, accompanied 

the Secretary of Defense to Saudi Arabia for discussions with the Saudi Arabian government. After gaining Saudi Arabian approval for the deployment of U.S. forces to the 

Kingdom Gen Schwarzkopf returned to the United States leaving Lt Gen Horner in the 

Kingdom as CINCCENT Deployed. On 8 Aug 1990 Maj Gen Thomas R. Olsen arrived 

in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia with the first contingent of U.S. Air Force, CENTCOM (i.e., 

CENTAF) personnel to set up the headquarters of CENTAF Forward. The job of establishing 

the CENTAF TACC in the theater fell to Maj Gen Olsen as the acting CENTAF Commander 

FWD. Gen Olsen continued to act as COMUSCENTAF (FWD) and Gen Homer as CINCCENT 

(FWD) until 24 August 1990 when Gen Schwarzkopf returned to the theater. At this time 

Gen Homer took up the duties of COMUSCENTAF. 

'Under Title V. which includes chart CENTAF Organizational Chart, CENTAF Microfilm record, GWAPS. 

'(S) Intvw. Thomas C. Hone, Mark D. Mandeles. and Maj Sanford S. Terry with Col 

Paul Dordal, Joint Staff, Operations Directorate (J-3), Joint Operations Division, 

EUCOMKENTCOM Branch, 9 Jan 1992. [DELETED] As a result of political sensitivities 

and security concerns, initial offensive planning was conducted on a unilateral basis by 

a small group of USCENTCOM, USCENTAF, and Air Staff planners. These efforts were 

extremely sensitive [DELETED]. 

'Even some officers assigned to work on the strategic air campaign did not immediately have access to the Instant Thunder plan. Cdr Donald W. McSwain recalled that 

he and the other naval officer assigned to the Black Hole, Cdr Maurice Smith, were read 

into part of Instant Thunder on 23 Aug-they received the rest of the briefing later. (S) 

Intvw, Mark D. Mandeles and Maj Sanford S. Terry with Cdr Donald W. McSwain, CNO 

Op 741, 21 Apr 1992. 

(S/NF) AAR CENTCOM J-5. Plans, 5 Mar 1991, p 9. 

'Osee (s) GWAPS Planning report. 

159 
Lt Col Ben Harvey, Col John Warden, Lt Col David Deptula, 

and Lt Col Ron Stanfil enroute to Riyadh to brief 

Instant Thunder to Cen Horner. 

In the initial days of August 1990, the prime tasks facing Central 

Command Air Forces staff were bedding down deploying air forces and 

developing a plan to defend Saudi Arabia." Tactical forces were unprepared to apply the full range of combat power immediately after initial 

deployment-unit deployments were made before support aircraft, command, control, communications and intelligence packages, and preferred 

munitions arrived." In the meantime, however, as early as 8 August 

1990, elements of the CENTAF staff also began to .develop offensive 

"(s) Hist, 9th AFNSCENTAF (David L. Rosmer), 9AF/CENTAF in Desert shield: The 

12(~~~~~~~~~Briefing, HQ TAC, "~esert Storm Lessons Learned" in 

Initial Phase, Aug 1990, 10 Jan 1992, p 63. 

USAF Desert ShieldDesert Storm Hot Wash, 12-13 Jul 1991, Maxwell AFB. AL. 

1 60 

options against Iraq.13 The earliest offensive concept was called the 

“punishment ATO [Air Tasking Order].”I4 The concept was limited in 

scale and not designed to be an integrated strategic air campaign, involving simultaneous attack on geographically dispersed targets to cripple the 

ability of Iraq to wage war. It did include an option to attack deep, 

strategic targets in Iraq. CENTAF officers also began developing an Iraqi 

target catalog .Is 

Yet, the primary focus of CENTAF’S Combat Plans Division was different from that of the Black Hole. General Glosson and his staff developed 

a plan which diverged from official Army and Air Force thought about the 

concept of air-land battle. The Black Hole’s plan was based upon the 

concept of strategic airpower as a complete, independent force on the 

battlefield. The resulting campaign plan was consistent with the nucleus 

of the Instant Thunder plan. Instant Thunder proposed that a major, if not 

deciding, factor in forcing nation-states to surrender was precise, overI3At the end of Feb 1990, during its annual Southwest Asia Symposium, CENTAF 

revealed publicly that it was refocussing attention on Iraq. (S) MR. David L. Rosmer, 

Chief, USCENTAF/9th AF History Office. subj: Notes from the Third Annual USCENTAF 

Symposium on Southwest Asia, Conducted at Shaw AFB, SC, 28 Feb - 1 Mar 1990, 

(S) 9AF/CENTAF in Desert Shield: The Inilia1 Phase. p 13. 

Other organizations which also developed offensive options included HQ TAC. In 

early Aug 1990, TAC developed a plan beginning “with demonstrative attacks against high 

value targets . . . [and then] escalat[ing] as required until all significant targets are 

destroyed. . . . This strategy allows time and opportunity for Hussein to reevaluate his 

situation and back out while there is something to save.” (S) See fax from Brig Gen 

Griffith, TAClXP to Maj Gen Alexander, AF/XOX, 11 Aug 1990. ‘CENTCOM Air Campaign 

‘%he D-Day ATO, rather than the punishment ATO, would have been employed if the 

Iraqis had crossed the border into Saudi Arabia. See (S) Planning report. 

‘%his work was based on then-recent CENTCOM studies of Iraqi military capabilities, 

including (S) USCENTCOM. Security Environment 2000, A CENTCOM View, 21 May 1990, 

p 111-3; (S) RAdm Grant Sharp, The Sharp Report, Planning for the Gulf War, 3 Dec 

1991, p 5. Ninth TIS targeteers completed a target study of Iraq on IS Jun 1990-six 

weeks before Iraq invaded Kuwait. The 9th ns target study contained 183 Iraqi and 35 

Kuwaiti targets. See (S) Planning report. 

PIaII,” GWAPS, CHSH-14. 

162 
whelming aerial attack against “centers of gravity”: key political, industrial, economic, social, and military institutions or systems.I6 

Lt Col Deptula reviewing attack plan for Gen Glosson. 

Around 23 August, staff officers selected to serve in the Black Hole 

began adapting the Instant Thunder plan to theater conditions. This attack 

plan was not a full Air Tasking Order, such as those produced by 

CENTAF’S Combat Plans Division. There was not enough time or resources to employ a “business as usual” approach to building an ATO. Instead, 

the attack plan matched available air assets with priority targets to achieve 

“maximum strategic impact.” On 29 August, the Black Hole’s first fully 

%ee (S) GwAPS Planning report for discussion of the goals of the Black Hole’s 

strategic air campaign plan. 

163 
coordinated Air Tasking Order (based on the attack plan) was published," 

and it was the basis of the plan that was executed on 17 January 1991 .I8 

Over time, the number of targets grew from 84 to 712. . 

Background on how the Black Hole (a) developed the Master Attack 

Plan (MAP), (b) transformed the MAP into a flyable Air Tasking Order, 

and (c) issued the AT0 is necessary to explain the role of that group in 

the theater command and control system, and especially the Tactical Air 

Control Center." As noted above, the Black Hole initially was isolated 

from the TACC'S other divisions for reasons of operational security. In 

late August 1990, the Black Hole consisted of approximately thirty planners (listed in Figure 25) headed by General Glosson.20 Of these planners, joint and allied representation was provided by two U.S. Navy 

commanders?' one U.S. Army lieutenant colonel?' and one British Royal 

Air Force wing commander?' Only a few U.S. Air Force Intelligence 

officers were assigned to the group?' Glosson selected operations 

"(S) Briefing, Lt Col Deptula. SAFIOSX, Instant Thunder (Offensive Campaign Phase 

I) Planning Assessment-24 Sep 1990, Presentations to SECAF and XOXW. nd [Briefing 

presented upon retum from first trip to Saudi Arabia, late Sep 1990.1 

(S) Intvw. CMSgt John Burton, HQ TAC History Office with Lt Gen Charles A. 

Homer, Commander, 9th AF, nd [Mar 19911. 

18 

'%e TACC was located at CENTAF Headquarters in Riyadh. 

'%he list is neither official nor exhaustive. It is based on the recollections of several 

"Cdr Donald W. McSwain and Cdr Maurice Smith. 

"Lt Col William Welch. 

23Wing Commander Mick Richardson. 

24Air Force intelligence community representation included Lt Col Robert Kershaw 

and Capt John Glock. It also should be noted that not every intelligence officer who was 

"read-in'' to the Instant Thunder plan on 20 August remained to help the planning effort. 

Five intelligence officers received the briefing in August-Capt John Heidrick, Capt John 

Glock, Capt Jay Bachhuber, Capt Tim Carver. and Capt Tom Clemmons. The day after 

the briefing, Heidrick became ill and did not return to the Special Planning Group. 

Clemmons went home (to the US.) and did not retum until late September. Memo, Capt 

John Glock to Lt Col Daniel Kuehl and Lt Col Sanford S. Terry, GWAPS. subj: lntelligence personnel in the Black Hole. 18 Aug 1992. 

officers who were assigned to the Black Hole. 

164 
Figure 25 

“Black Hole” Strategic Air Campaign Planners* 

Involved from August and September 1990 

Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson** 

Brig Gen Larry Henry‘ 

Lt Col Dave Deptulab** 

Lt Col John Turk‘ 

Lt Col Rodger Greenawalt 

Lt Col Bob Kershaw 

Wg Commander Mick Richardson 

Commander “Duck)’ McSwain*** 

Commander “Fast Eddie” Smith”’ 

Lt Col Bill Welch 

Lt Col Bert Pryor 

Lt Col Jim Pritchett 

Major Bob Eskridge” 

Major Scott Hente 

Major John Kinser 

Major Mike Oelrich 

Major Jefferey L. “Oly” Olsen 

Major Gary Alexander 

Major John Sweeneyd 

Major Dave Waterstreet 

Captain Bill “Burners” Bruner** 

Captain Jim Hawkins 

Captain Eric Holdaway 

Captain Kirby Lindsey 

Captain Randy O’Boyle 

Captain Rolf “Bugsy” Siege1 

Captain John Clock 

Major Al Vogel 

Major Harry Heintzelman 

Director, Campaign Plans 

Director, Electronic Combat 

Chief Attack Planner 

Air-to-Air 

Gen Glosson Exec 

Intelligence Representative 

RAF Representative 

Persian Gulf Representative (A-6) 

Red Sea Representative (F/A-18) 

Army Representative 

AWACS Planner 

Tanker Planner 

F- 1 17 Representative 

Tanker Planner 

Air Command Element 

Electronic Combat 

USMC Representative (F/A- 18) 

Electronic Combat 

AT0 PmCeSS 

AT0 PrOCeSS 

NBCjScud Planner 

B-52 Planner 

ELJNT/SIGINT Representative 

Logistics Representative 

SOF Representative 

USMC Representative 

Intelligence PhndBDA 

AWACS Representative 

Law of Armed Conflict 

Onboard October and November 1990 

Brig Gen Glen Profitt’ 

Colonel Bob Osterloh 

Major Abdulhameed Alqadhi RSAF Representative 

Major Dave Karns B-52 Planner 

Electronic Combat 

Assistant Plans Division Chief 

165 
Major Ernie Norsworthy F-16 Planner 

Major Mark “Buck” Rogers 

Major F. T. Case 

Captain Mike “Cos” Cosby 

Capt Turki Bin Bandar 

Bin Abdul Aziz RSAF Representative 

Flight Leftenant Callum Steel 

Assistant Attack Planner 

Models and Analysis 

Mission Support System 

RAP Intelligence 

Onboard January 1991 

Colonel Anthony J. Tolin 

Lt Col Sam Baptiste” 

Lt Col Phil Faye 

Lt Col Steve Head 

Lt Col Rick Lewis 

Major Charley Allan 

Major Michael “Chip” Setnor 

Major Cliff Williford 

Major Gary Green 

Chief, Plans Division 

Director, KTO Planning Cell 

OCA Planner 

Intelligence Planner 

Special Assistant Glosson 

Models & Analysis 

F-117 Representative 

F-111 Representative 

F- 15E Representative 

Only includes Strategic Air Campaign planners in Riyadh - does not include planners 

involved from CHECKMATE in Pentagon nor all those associated with KTO or defensive 

planning. 

USAF Fighter Weapons School Graduate, compilation based on memo, Charles H. 

Shipman. Director. Manpower & Organization. USCENTAF to 9th AFIMO. HQTACIXPM, subj: 

HQ USCENTAF Desert Storm Organization Structure, 26 Mar 1991. 

*** 

.. 

Naval Strike Warfare Center (also known as “Strike U”) graduate. 

’ Original EC Chief Planner - departed for new assignment in November 1989. 

In January 1991 became Director. IraqlStrategic Target Planning Cell. 

In January 1991 became Assistant Director, IraqlStrategic Target Planning Cell. 

In January 1991 became Assistant Director, KTO Planning Cell. 

Replaces Brig Gen Henry. 

‘ Prior to January 1991 was responsible for defensive planning on CENTAFlW staff. 

1 66 
planners on the basis of their experience and knowledge in their respective weapon ~ystems.2~ Very few of the CENTAF staff had access to the 

Black Hole. 

Knowledge of the Black Hole’s first Air Tasking Order (29 August), 

known as ATO-I, was kept strictly within “need to know” channels but 

included the most senior Central Command Air Force officers.26 ATO-1 

was not published or transmitted through the CENTAF’S normal ATO 

distribution system, the basis of which was the Computer Assisted Force 

Management System (CAFMS). Instead, Am-1 was written on personal 

computers in the Black Hole, printed after normal working hours on the 

CENTAF AT0 Division printers, and hand carried, along with the latest 

version of the Master Attack Plan, to “trusted agents’**’ in each of the 

Oct 1990, Brig Gen Glosson described his concerns on staffing in an interview 

with the CENTAF history office. See (s) Intvw, TSgt Turner with Brig Gen Glosson, 

17 Oct 1990. 

Brig Gen Anthony J. Tolin, the Chief of CENTAF’S Plans Division (beginning Jan 

1991), pointed out two reasons Brig Gen Glosson staffed his group primarily from outside 

9th AF/CENTAF. First, the 9th AF staff was fully employed-doing the day-to-day administration of U.S. and allied air assets in theater. Second, although there were some good 

people in 9th AF. (Glosson and others believed) the overall quality of the staff was not 

high. Tolin also believed that General Russ. TAC Commander, told Lt Gen Homer that 

Homer could borrow any TAC officer for wartime duty. Intvw, John F. Guilmartin, Jr., 

with Brig Gen Anthony J. Tolin. Commander, 57th Fighter Wing, 30 Jan 1992. 

A Navy member of the Black Hole reported that he asked that particular officers (by 

name) be assigned to the Black Hole. He knew these officers from previous assignments. 

(S) Intvw, Mandeles and Maj Terry with Cdr McSwain, 21 Apr 1992. 

26Col Ryder and Col Crigger were read-in on the strategic plan very early. General 

Thomas R. Olsen knew about the plan from the beginning. Brig Gen Glosson briefed 

selected members of the CENTAF staff on the strategic air campaign about the third week 

of September. so that they could start studying how to operate when the plan was executed. (S) Intvw, Brig Gen Glosson, 20 Oct 1990. 

27There were at least two “trusted agents” in each wing: the wing commander and 

the chief of weapons (who also may have led the wing mission planning cell). In some 

wings, e.g.. the F-117A’s 37th TFW, there may have been one more trusted agent. In the 

case of the 37th TFW, the additional trusted agent was the chief of intelligence. 

167 
wings and organizations throughout the theater?’ ATO-I was classified Top Secret, Limited Distribution; copies of ATO-1 and its associated 

Master Attack Plan were destroyed as they were superseded.?’ Hence, 

copies of the earliest ATO-1s no longer exist.30 

In the meantime, Central Command Air Forces published two distinct 

Air Tasking Orders through open channels. These ATOS were the daily 

ATO and AT0 B for D-Day?’ The majority of officers believed they 

would execute the CENTAF ATOs; they knew nothing of the strategic air 

campaign, as embodied in ATO-1, until the decision had been made to 

execute an offensive operation against Iraq. 

The few liaison officers assigned to both the Black Hole and Combat 

Plans Division ensured that CENTAF’S daily and D-Day ATO Special 

 instruction^^^ reflected the requirements of the Black Hole’s strategic air 

campaign. Once a requirement was identified by the Black Hole planning 

staff, liaison officers would carry that requirement to the CENTAF Combat 

Operations Planning Division, where it was put into the CENTAF’S AT0 

”For example, see the message sent, on Department of the Air Force, USCENTAF 

(Shaw AFB) stationery. from Brig Gen Glosson to Col Hal Homburg, commander of the 

4th TFW. Brig Gen Glosson added a handwritten note to the bottom of the message: 

“Please annotate the ATO to reflect your desired munitions and provide estimated results 

with the data available.” (S) Msg, Brig Gen Glosson, CEKTAF to Col Hornburg, 4th TFW, 

Thumrait, subj: See also 

(S) briefing, Lt Col Deptula, SAF/OSX, Instant Thunder (Offensive Campaign Phase 1) 

Planning Assessment-24 Sep 1990, Presentations to SACAF and XOXW, nd [Briefing 

presented upon return from first trip to Saudi Arabia, late Sep 1990.1; (S) Intvw, Lt Col 

Terry with Lt Col Eskridge, GwAPS, 10 Aug 1992. 

Offensive Air Campaign (Desert Storm), 29 Aug 1990. 

29(S) Intvw, Lt Col Terry with Lt Col Eskridge, GWAPS, 10 Aug 1992. 

30(S) Briefing. Lt Col Deptula, SAFIOSX, Instant Thunder (Offensive Campaign Phase 

I) Planning Assessment-24 Sep 1990, (S) Intvw, Lt Col Terry with Lt Col Eskridge, 

GWAPS. 10 Aug 1992; (S) Intvw, TSgt Turner. CENTAF History Office with Brig Gen 

Glosson, 14th AqP) Commander and Director, USCENTAF Campaign Plans, 20 &t 1990. 

”See (S) Chapter 5. 

”For example, the Special Instructions sections on airspace procedures and communications plan were written to reflect the Black Hole’s strategic air campaign. (S) Intvw, 

Lt Col Terry with Lt Col Eskridge, GwAPS, 10 Aug 1992. 

168 
Special instruction^.'^ Training needed to prepare units for specific 

missions in support of the strategic air campaign was also entered into the 

Air Tasking Order in this way. For instance, if a mass launch were 

planned for the strategic air campaign Black Hole planners would get that 

tactic included in training tasked in the daily Thus, the units were 

able to prepare for the eventual strategic air campaign without knowing 

such a campaign would be ~aged.’~ 

The establishment of the Black Hole created a second (and ad hoc) 

phning effort-parallel to the formal CENTAF planning effort. The relative importance of each to the objectives of Commander in Chief, Central 

Command changed over time. In the first few weeks of the deployment, 

CENTAF and CENTCOM staff worked feverishly to develop plans to defend 

Saudi Arabia. This planning effort would have been critical if, in midAugust 1990, Iraq had continued its aggression and violated Saudi territory. Every day the Iraqis delayed invading Saudi Arabia increased the 

likelihood that the Black Hole’s campaign plan would be executed. 

General Horner believed-very early in Desert Shield-that the Black 

Hole’s strategic air campaign would be executed.% His recollection is 

supported by the direction given to Brigadier General Glosson to have the 

”For example, when an air refueling track was needed to support the strategic air 

campaign, that requirement was passed to the Combat Operations Planning Division by 

one of the tanker planners in the Black Hole. The Division would build the track, coordinate the airspace, and publish these instructions as part of the Airspace Coordination 

”Many of the Black Hole planners were “dual hatted.” Thus, they were able to have 

the unit suggest a tactic, e.g.. a mass launch, which would then be included in the daily 

training ATO, say. for every Friday. In this way, the requirements of the strategic planners 

became a routine part of the weekly training. 

35[DELETED] In like manner, Operation Desert Trianglewhich involved F-14 

flights in Saudi Arabia along the Iraqi border-was facilitated by being included in the 

daily training ATO. Desert Triangle included EA-6Bs to record Iraqi responses. 

[DELETED] (S) Intvw. Cdr McSwain. 

’%y mid-September, Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf had decided that should 

there be any conflict, the Air Force’s response would be the offensive air campaign. In 

Gen Homer’s words, “I think anybody would have come to that conclusion.” See 

(S) lntvw, Barry Barlow, Richard G. Davis, Perry Jamieson with Lt Gen Homer. 

Order in a CENTAF ATO. 

169 
Black Hole campaign ready by 15 September 1990, only six weeks after 

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.37 

Implications of the Black Hole: Plans, Process, and Authority 

The two planning staffs employed different approaches to the development of their respective campaign plans. In planning for the immediate 

defense of Saudi Arabia, Central Command Air Forces staff saw their 

efforts as part of a joint campaign. Missions were divided into roles of 

Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), Close Air Support (CAS), Air Interdiction (AI), Offensive Counter Air (OCA), and Defensive Counter Air 

(DCA). Doctrine on air-land battle provided the context for plans devoted 

to offensive operations against Iraq. Many targets were common to the 

planning efforts of both CENTAF and the Black Hole?’ but the main focus 

of the CENTAF Combat Plans Division effort was the combined arms 

campaign for the defense of Saudi Arabia. Tremendous effort was expended in CENTAF and CENTCOM developing the Combined Operations 

Plan for the Defense of Saudi Arabia, published on 9 December 1990. 

The AT0 B for D-Day was an integral part of that operation. In contrast, 

the Black Hole focused upon offense-to devise a plan to achieve national 

and military objectives, to win the war, through air power alone; that is, 

to make the ground campaign unnece~sary.~~ 

In addition to the different planning foci, the processes used to plan 

in CENTAF and the Black Hole were distinct. CENTAF staff used proce37(S) Intvw, Brig Gen Glosson, 17 Oct 1990. 

38Forty-six percent of the targets planned for D-Day-based on the 16 Jan 1991 

Master Attack Plan-were on the 15 Jun 1990 CENTAF target list. Forty-four percent of 

CENTCOM’S 27 Jun 1990 joint target list were integrated into the 6 Jan 1991 MAP. See 

(S) GWAPS Planning report. See also the discussion of target set growth in (s) GWAPS 

Operations and Effectiveness volume. 

39As with the similar efforts of Checkmate theoreticians, it is still an open question 

whether Black Hole officers correctly identified Iraqi “center[s] of gravity”-those targets 

which could disable the ability of Iraq to wage war. It is clear that Col Warden’s prediction that Iraq would surrender after six days of bombing (in clear weather) did not come 

to pass-after more than forty days of bombing. Certainly, those forty days of bombing 

were equivalent to more than six days of clear weather bombing. See also (S) GwAPS 

Planning report for discussion of warfighting objectives of air power theoreticians. 

170 
dures and expertise developed through numerous joint exercises. The 

most recent of these joint exercises was Internal Look 90; a Joint Warfare 

Center controlled exercise (focusing on the defense of Saudi Arabia), 

which had just been completed.40 In the main, the CENTAF planning effort 

had some Central Command involvement, especially in the intelligence 

area. CENTAF staff allocated assets based upon the Commander in Chief‘s 

guidance and apportionment. Target priorities were established by the 

intelligence analysts and updated daily. In mid-September, approximately 

one month after the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) had been 

established, target allocations and Service requests were discussed at the 

board with the other components. The importance or authority of the 

Board is questionable as it was staffed with relatively low-ranking officers: a Marine lieutenant colonel, an Army captain and an Air Force 

captain!’ However, the JTCB could have conducted joint oversight of the 

target selection process. All nominated targets were validated by trained 

targeteers and weaponeers for the proper mix of aircraft and weapons. 

Black Hole planning resulted in a Master Target List and Master 

Attack Plan. but development of these and the subsequent Air Tasking 

Order was not “joint” in the same way as the CENTAF effort. Black Hole 

operations planners made target nominations and sortie allocations. The 

planners assigned to the Black Hole from the other Services and allies 

provided some oversight of the effort, but there was no formal Joint 

Targeting Board or “joint” staff review:* General Glosson, as the director 

of the Black Hole, answered directly to the Joint Force Air Component 

Commander and Commander in Chief, Central Command. The 

combination of overwhelming Air Force representation in the Black Hole 

“(S) After Action Report, HQ UscENTCOM, Operation Desert ShieldOperation Desert 

Storm, 15 Jul 1991; Intvw, (S) Maj Leary, Mandeles, Lt Col Terry with Lt Col Ross 

Dickinson, Joint Warfare Center, 8 May 1992. 

41(S) Intvw, Lt Col Frank D. Kistler. Mark D. Mandeles, Maj Sanford S. Terry with 

Capt John Glock. SACAN. 30 Jan 1992. Capt Glock was one of the SAC augmentees sent 

to CENTAF in Aug 1990 and was one of the first intelligence planners assigned to the 

Special Planning Division. 

421ndividual planners assigned to the Black Hole had varying amounts of interaction 

with their units and Services, but there was no formal process of briefing or describing 

the status of the planning effort to commanders outside of the CENTCOM organizational 

hierarchy. 

171 
with compartmentalization of the planning effort reduced the amount of 

interaction and coordination with Central Command and component staffs. 

Intelligence Planning and Support 

The Black Hole and CENTAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence had 

different perspectives on the amount of time it took to put together 

targeting materials. To plan, intelligence analysts and targeteers rely on 

an extensive supply of data, for example, in the form of target pictures and 

mensurated coordinates. Yet, the intelligence community had not devoted 

a lot of resources to Iraq, and the necessary data were. unavailable. 

CENTAF staff did not deploy with the types of target materials needed to 

support the planning effort for the strategic air campaign. In addition, 

intelligence and Black Hole officers applied different criteria-measures of 

effectiveness-to evaluate the purpose and outcome of attacks. Intelligence 

officers train to determine a particular level of target destruction. 

Formulae and weapons data found in the Joint Munitions Effectiveness 

Manuals (JMEMS) and data on specific aircraft capability and weapons 

loads form the basis of targeteering-determining the number and type of 

weapon needed to achieve a desired probability of 

In contrast, the Black Hole officers, under pressure to put together a 

viable campaign quickly, did not have time to wait while the intelligence 

community gathered hard data, studied and assimilated it, and produced 

target planning materials. This caused operations planners enormous 

frustration. When their initial requests for support came up short, either 

because of lack of data or because of a difference of opinion on what was 

needed, the operations planners quickly turned away from relying on the 

CENTAF intelligence community for any meaningful help in building the 

campaign and relied on their own experience and training.u 

The few Intelligence officers assigned to the Black Hole expected to 

employ standard formulae and procedures to analyze each target selected 

for the air campaign. In contrast to this approach, the strategic air 

43See (S) GWAPS Weapons, Tactics, and Training report for a discussion of 

44(S) Intvw, Brig Gen Glosson, 18 Oct 1990. 

weaponeering and targeteering. 

172 
campaign entailed (a) attack against an entire target base simultaneously 

and (b) use of different damage criteria. General Glosson’s planners 

abandoned absolute target destruction in favor of functional effect!’ 

Glosson explained his perceptions about this basic difference in an interview shortly after the cease fire: 

The intelligence community gets too hung up at the local level on data 

and not information. They’re too concerned about how to tabulate every 

piece of data that we get. They are too concerned about making sure 

that a certain level of destruction is reached on a target that corresponds 

to some preconceived notion or JMEM. One 2,000 bomb in a center of 

a building (if it explodes inside), even if the building on the exterior 

remains intact, means that the mission is probably 100% 

accomplished . . . . Some level of operational understanding must be 

present as a base.& 

In Glosson’s opinion, the use of stealthy, precision systems such as 

the F-117 also negated the need for the standard intelligence analysis of 

targets. The capabilities of precision-guided munitions, as General 

Glosson argued, were not reflected accurately in Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals. For example, to achieve a desired level of destruction 

or probability of kill of a facility, JMEMs calculations might require five 

F-111 s carrying nonprecision weapons. Black Hole planners, however, 

believed an adequate functional effect could be achieved by a single 

F-l 1 1F delivering a precision-guided m~nition.~’ In addition, Colonel 

Deptula believed, given the training and experience of officers in the 

Black Hole, they could targeteer without support from the traditional 

intelligence system. In retrospect, Deptula noted: 

45(S) Intvw. Keaney, Mandeles, Murray, Watts with Lt Col Deptula; (S) Intvw, 

46(S) Intvw, Brig Gen Glosson, 6 Mar 1991. 

47Yet, the majority of weapon platforms in the theater were not precision weapon 

carriers but “dumb” bomb carriers. When employing dumb bombs, JMEMs calculations 

give the planner an analytical tool with which to evaluate the effectiveness of his desired 

weapon and aircraft against a particular target. See also (S) Intvw, Keaney, et al., with 

Lt Col Deptula, 20 Dec 1991. 

Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula. SAF/OSx. 8 Jan 1992. 

173 
Relying on my weapons school background-familiar with the aircraft 

capabilities, and familiar with the types of weapons and their associated 

effects-combined with knowing the desired effects to be achieved on 

the targets from our strategy, I could pretty'much come up with a force 

package to go against a particular group of targets to achieve a respectable amount of damage or to have the desired impact we want to 

achieve.@ 

This perspective led some planners to believe that they could plan an air 

campaign successfully without dedicated targeteering and weaponeering 

organizational supp0rt.4~ 

The rift between the planners and the intelligence community was 

widened by "turf battles" between key intelligence officers and operations 

planners.50 Three examples illustrate the range of encounters. The first 

example began in late August and reached its climax in September. It 

concerns the difficulties the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing had in receiving 

intelligence information critical to planning missions. The F-117 mission 

planners needed specific photographic data to plan an attack?' but Central 

Command Air Forceflntelligence did not provide such data to the F-117 

wings. When the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing could not get the required 

imagery from theater intelligence sources, its commander, Col. Alton C. 

Whitley, coordinated with Headquarters, Tactical Air Command to find 

and supply the needed data."2 Colonel Whitley also addressed the difficulty of getting information from CENTAF Intelligence on two separate 

48(S) Intvw, Tsgt Turner with Lt Col Deptula, 1 Nov 1990. 

49Weaponeering and target development was accomplished by officers assigned to 

the Black Hole, as were intelligence analysis of information, order of battle development, 

target selection and validation, and situation updates. These tasks also were being 

accomplished by the formal intelligence system, but only in support of the CENTAF 

planning process. Those performing weaponeering and targeteering in the Black Hole 

were. not trained in those military occupational specialties. (S) Intvw, TSgt Turner, with 

Lt Col Deptula; (S) Intvw, Capt Glock. 30 Jan 1992. 

"(S) Background Paper, Observations of the Air Campaign against Iraq, Aug 90 - 

Mar 91, Lt Col Deptula. 29 Mar 1991. 

"(S) lntvw, Maj Heston, 16 Oct 1992. 

52(S) Msg, 37th TFW(Deployed)//CC/I. 1019162 Sep 90, subj: Situation Update 

(personal for Col Crigger). 

174 
occasions in messages to Col. Crigger, then CENTAF Director of 

 operation^.'^ When the situation did not improve, Colonel Whitley took 

his complaint to General Glosson.s 

In a message sent to Glosson on 13 September 1990, Colonel Whitley 

contended that the information his wing needed to plan missions was 

available in the CENTAF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 

(sCIF). Tactical Air Command had forwarded the information to the 37th 

Tactical Fighter Wing through appropriate intelligence channels. Yet, 

CENTAF’S Director of Intelligence Col. John A. Leonardo, Jr., withheld 

the information from the wing. One of Colonel Whitley’s wing personnel 

assigned to support Col. Leonardo, MSgt. Marvin Short, was ordered to 

leave the target materials needed by the 37th TFW unopened in the SCIF.55 

Whitley added that one of his pilots, Maj. Robert D. Eskridge.” had been 

threatened by Colonel Leonardo; unless the wing stopped requesting 

information, he would “pull the plug” on that 37th TFW’S Tactical ELINT 

(electronic intelligence) Proce~sor.~’ [DELETED] Colonel Leonardo was 

replaced shortly after this incident. The second example concerns 

disagreements over the simple numbering or cataloging of targets. The 

intelligence community identified targets with a Basic Encyclopedia 

Number (BEN). Lieutenant Colonel Deptula, the Black Hole’s Chief 

Planner, wanted to employ a different numbering system for targets on 

the Master Attack Plan. His system used an abbreviation based upon the 

type of target and a number (for example, Strategic Air Defense target 

number 4 was designated SAM). This approach made it easier for the 

operation planners to work with and manipulate packages in the Master 

Attack Plan during the planning, and later, execution phase of a 

53(S) Ibid; (S) Msg, 37th TFW(Deployed//CC, 1120302 Sep 90, subj: Required 

%(S) Msg, 37th ~~w(Depl~yed)//CC//, 1314OOZ Sep 90. subj: Intelligence Support 

”(S) Msg, 37th ~~w(Depl~yed)//CC//. 101916Z Sep 90, subj: Situation Update 

’%aj Eskridge also was assigned to the Special Planning Division-the Black Hole. 

57[DELETED] 

Intelligence Support (personal for Col Crigger). 

(personal for Brig Gen Glosson). 

(personal for Col Crigger). 

175 
~ampaign.~' The intelligence community insisted on using Basic 

Encyclopedia Numbers. As Capt. John Glock, one of the intelligence 

officers assigned to the Black Hole, explained, 

It's not that we couldn't [use the Black Hole's target identification 

system]. It's just that we recognize that anything that you are going to 

do within the intelligence community-if you are going to want any sort 

of support for target materials or anything-else you are going to have 

to use those basic encyclopedia numbers?9 

The planners in the Black Hole used their own numbering system primarily, and the intelligence (especially the targeteering) community continued 

to use its own.6o Efforts were made to use both numbering systems 

simultaneously, but the use of two distinct numbering systems was a source 

of contention (and sometimes confusion) throughout the entire operation:' 

The final example of conflict between intelligence and operations 

planners concerns the effects the physical arrangement of office space had 

on the nature of staff interaction. Initially, Central Command Air Force 

intelligence personnel worked in the Air Combat Operations Center 

located in the basement of the Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters. 

Once established, the Black Hole staff operated out of a conference room 

on the third floor of the same building. This room was outgrown rapidly; 

there was insufficient space to store the types of target and planning 

materials needed to plan the air campaign and still have room to work. 

General Glosson recognized the difficulty in working in small and 

cramped quarters and proposed that a planning tent be set up in the 

58(S) Intvw. Keaney, et al., with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Dec 1990; (S) Intvw. TSgt 

59(S) Intvw, Capt Glock, 30 Jan 1992. 

"(S) Intvw, Keaney, et al., with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Dec 1991. 

6'During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Black Hole planners used both target 

identification systems in the MAP. But mistakes in matching the two systems introduced 

confusion into the tasking and assessment of missions. The units were unsure which 

targets to attack. The planners were unsure whether targets had been attacked. See the 

case studies in (S) Chapter 2 and 7. 

Turner with Lt Col Deptula, 1 Nov 1990. 

176 
Electronic Security Command facility!’ Intelligence personnel assigned 

to the Black Hole moved into this facility almost immediately. The 

operations planners remained in the conference room on the third floor 

of the Saudi Air Force building. 

The physical arrangement of the work space impeded cooperation 

between intelligence staff and the Black Hole. To get materials or information, planning staff had to depart the Saudi Air Force building, walk 

across a parking lot and through a hole that had been knocked in the wall 

around the United States Military Training Mission compound, pass a 

Saudi guard, walk through the Training Mission compound and, finally, 

pass through the guard post controlling entry to the SCIF. This journey 

is illustrated in Figure 26. 

Enforcement of security regulations with a SCIF further exacerbated 

coordination difficulties. When Electronic Security Command personnel 

were the main users of the SCIF, the Black Hole operational planners were 

granted ready access-regardless of whether they had an Sensitive 

Compartmented Information (SCI) clearance. However, by mid-October, 

when CENTAF Intelligence had left the basement and moved to the SCIF, 

entry rules were enforced rigorously. 

Unescorted entry to the SCIF was granted only to those with an 

appropriate SCI clearance, and those without an SCI clearance had to be 

escorted. Most Black Hole operations planners did not have SCI clearances, 

thus reducing their interaction with intelligence staff. This situation 

continued after the Black Hole moved (in late October) from the third floor 

conference room to the basement of the Saudi Air Force building. 

These three examples only outline the range of “turf’ conflicts 

between key operations planning and intelligence officers during Desert 

Shield. The effect of these conflicts was to reduce the amount of those 

6%his facility was placed on the soccer field of the U.S. Military Training Mission 

compound next to the RSAF headquarters. Originally, this facility was designed to be a 

SCIF to support RC-I35 operations in the theater. The Special Access Required tent for 

the Special Planning Division was set up in the SCIF around 22 Aug 1990. See 

(S) lntvw, Capt Glock, 30 Jan 1992. 

177 
Figure 26 

Relationship of Saudi Air Force Building to SCIF 

.-I 

mvwD 

PARKM 
kinds of coordination and interaction needed to plan and execute an air 

campaign using the formal CENTAF organization. 

Interpersonal Relationships 

One of the biggest problems faced by deployed personnel was how 

to respond and adapt to changes in deployment plans. Habits and 

personal relationships enhanced the cohesion and interaction of the staffs 

during the first hectic days of Desert Shield. These habits and relationships had been established in a variety of ways-through participation in 

exercises and in the course of previous assignments. For example, most 

of the CENTAF staff who deployed early in Desert Shield had just participated in Internal Look 90 (including the augmentees from supporting 

commands such as the Strategic Air Command), so they were familiar 

with each other (and staff functions) when they began the Desert Shield 

deployment on 7 August 1990.63 In addition, key CENTAF personnel had 

held their positions for several years, allowing close working relationships 

with other officers to develop. Such longstanding relationships helped 

establish and run the new organization in Saudi Arabia. Staff officers 

631ntemal Look 90 (IL-W), a USCENTCOM sponsored and conducted command post 

exercise, was designed to enhance readiness of USCENXOM and subordinate commands. 

IL-90 represented the First time commanders and staff set up bare base headquarters using 

real-world bare base equipment and tactical communications in a simulated wartime 

environment to counter an Iraqi invasion of the Arabian peninsula. Previous exercises 

addressed the “Defense Guidance” scenario to counter a Soviet invasion of Iran. 

USCINCCENT draft OPLAN 1002-90 provided the framework for the exercise. IL-90 was 

divided into three phases conducted at Duke Field (Florida). Hurlburt Field (Florida), and 

Fort Bragg (North Carolina). In Phase I (the deployment), held between 9 and 19 July, 

exercise forces moved from home stations to exercise locations and established command, 

control, and communications facilities. Phase I1 (employment), held between 20 and 28 

July, involved three parts. First, a two-day STAFFEX (20-21 July) checked communications and validated C2 procedum and organization. Second. from 23 to 25 July, events 

simulated days D+8 through D+10 of draft OPLAN 1002-90 (i.e., delayhnterdiction operations). An eighteen-hour pause followed this period during which computer simulations 

were reprogrammed and staff graphics were adjusted to facilitate transition from delay to 

defend. From 26 to 28 July, events simulated days D+18 through D+20 of draft OPLAN 

1002-90 (i.e., defend operations). Phase 111 emphasized redeployment. The redeployment 

began on 29 July with the departure of main bodies and concluded on 4 August when the 

last trail party departed the exercise area. See (S) After Action Report, HQ USCENTCOM, 

Operation Desert ShieldOperation Desert Storm, 15 July 1991; (S) Brief, “USCENTAF 

Internal Look 90,” nd. 

179 
were comfortable with their own roles and duties and understood the 

capabilities and weaknesses of other officers and the various staff agencies. Augmentees from outside the CENTAF staff were brought into an 

organization with a well-defined purpose and structure. 

Unlike those assigned to Central Command Air Forces, personnel in 

the Black Hole could not rely on common expectations, built through 

participation in command post exercises, to help plan the strategic air 

campaign. Yet, other factors affected the capability to plan. First, there 

was very specific mission guidance. Second, the organization was small, 

which enhanced the formation of personal relationships. Third, the tight 

security of the planning group and the perceived critical nature of their 

task helped create an esprit de corps. Finally. since they came from a 

variety of backgrounds and assignments, Black Hole officers also could 

employ personal contacts with a variety of agencies outside CENTAF 

organization. Contacts with Air Staff officers, for example, helped set 

up critical information channels to intelligence agencies. Some members 

of the Black Hole were U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School graduates, which opened up links in the world of tactics and weapons employment.@ For example, planning for the use of tanker assets would have 

been extraordinarily difficult without the Strategic Air Command tanker 

planners assigned to the group, who used their experience and contacts 

to overcome information and analysis ga~s.6~ 

Beginning in August 1990, informal communications channels connected several levels of the Black Hole with disparate parts of the U.S. 

defense establishment outside the Central Command area of responsibility. Examples of informal communications channels include 

Brigadier General Glosson receiving target (and other) information from 

Rear Admiral McConnell in Washington,66 Lieutenant Colonel Deptula 

%ost of the key individuals in the Black Hole were USAF Fighter Weapons School 

graduates, including Brig Gen Glosson, the Director of Campaign Plans, Lt Col Deptula, 

Chief Attack Planner and later, Director of the Iraq Planning Cell, Lt Col Sam Baptiste, 

Director of the KTO Planning Cell. 

6SFor the previous ten years, SAC tankers had been assigned to refueling operations 

in Operation Elf One. See (S) Chapter 4 for discussion of Elf One. 

66(S) Intvw, Brig Gen Glosson, 6 Mar 1991. 

180 
receiving similar information from the Air Staff’s Checkmate:’ and Cdr. 

Roy Balaconis (with the Black Hole’s TLAM cell) organizing an informal 

network to employ and evaluate the effectiveness of the Tomahawk Land 

Attack Missile.68 Yet, these informal communications channels or 

organizations were not always able to link information users with 

appropriate information provides. A Navy staff officer who served in the 

Black Hole evinced surprise upon learning, after the war, that four naval 

officers (from OP-741) worked in Checkmate. He claimed that he would 

have used them to provide another source of data and information.@ 

Over time, the informal communications channels and networks 

increased in number, compensating for “disconnects” between the Black 

Hole and offiCia~<ENTAF-organization (and its formal procedures), or for 

the key planners’ perceptions that CENTAF staff could not perform the 

appropriate andysis.” 

67(S) Intvw, TSgt Turner. with Lt Col Deptula; (S) Intvw, Keaney. et al., with Lt Col 

Deptula, 20 Dec 1991; (S) Intvw. Keaney, et al., with Lt Col Deptula, 21 Dez 1991; 

(S) Intvw, Hone and Mandeles with Lt Col Deptula, 2 Jan 1992. 

this case, the impetus for establishing an informal network came from an officer 

assigned to the Joint Staff. In Dec 1990 Cdr Roy Balaconis was reassigned to 

Washington from the Persian Gulf. Before being reassigned, Balaconis developed a 

number of personal contacts with middle-level officers at CINCCENT and NAVCENT. In 

Washington, Balaconis was assigned to the Joint Staff‘s Operations Directorate (J-3), 

headed by U Gen Thomas W. Kelly. [DELETED] See (SMF) Briefing. J-3. Joint 

Operations Division, ‘Tomahawk: Employment and Effectiveness During Desert Storm.” 

13 Feb 1992; (S) Intvw, Cdr McSwain, 21 Apr 1992. 

@(S) Intvw, Cdr McSwain, 21 Apr 1992. 

701n this respect, Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice noted: 

I think when you look at what was involved in planning the strategic air 

campaign it is wholly unrealistic to expect that it could have been done 

out in Riyadh. The resources that the Checkmate operation were able 

to pull together that in many cases involved accessing things that probably could only have been accessed in Washington or through contacts 

that had to be made in Washington, you just couldn’t have done that out 

in the field. That’s not to say they couldn’t have planned some level 

of strategic air campaign plan out there but a lot of the details about 

how the telephone system worked . . . [lot of details that we got on 

the actual construction and layout of the buried bunkers, and command 

and control centers, and special facilities in the key Iraqi buildings, and 

in the palaces, and all kinds of things of that sort, . . . the Checkmate 

operation [obtained this information] through intelligence sources. I 

181 
The relationship between General Glosson and Rear Admiral Michael 

McConnel17’ further illustrates the importance of the informal communications channels to those planning the air campaign and building the Master 

Attack Plan. As noted above, Glosson decided that little usable information would be forthcoming from interaction with the CENTAFKENTCOM 

intelligence agencies.72 To compensate, Glosson and the other planners 

in the Black Hole established an extensive intelligence network through 

informal contacts with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA), Checkmate (AFIXOXWF), and individuals at the 

don’t see how that level of stuff ever could have been done out in 

Riyadh. . . . [Vhe work that was done in Checkmate was always . . . passed at the colonel or lieutenant colonel level. 

Intvw. (S) Lt Col Suzanne Gehri, Lt Col Edward Mann, and Lt Col Richard Reynolds 

with Dr. Donald Rice, Secretary of the Air Force, 11 Dec 1991. 

7’RAdm Michael McConnell was JCS J2 and Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

721n an interview conducted in mid-October 1990. Brig Gen Glosson reported “a total 

breakdown in intel’s ability to support our effort.” (S) Intvw, TSgt Turner with Brig Gen 

Glosson, 18 Oct 1990. Later, Glosson added that his conversations with 

RAdm McConnell compensated for the failures of the local intelligence organization. In 

Glosson’s words: 

The most difficult aspect of prosecuting this war from my standpoint 

was the ability to keep your arms around intelligence and have data 

transformed into information in a timely fashion. That did not happen 

at the local level during this war. If it had not been for my personal 

friend, Admiral McConnell, who is the number three guy in DIA, I 

shudder to think of some of the mistakes we would have made. The 

shortcomings that I have just described in intelligence would have 

resulted in a ten-fold size problem, if not for the information passed 

directly from Admiral McConnell. I can’t put enough importance on 

that one point in the prosecution of this war. Had it not been for that 

man’s willingness to ensure that we had the best information as fast as 

possible, we would have had numerous embarrassing moments and we 

would have lost a lot more lives. We would have actually looked inept 

at times due to a lack of intelligence. 

(S) Intvw, MSgt Turner with Brig Gen Glosson. 6 Mar 1991. We examine CENTAF~ 

officers’ perceptions of this relationship in (S) Chapter 8, “BDA and the Command and 

Control of the Air Campaign.” 

182 
MAJCOMS?3 This informal network extended to the wings deployed in 

theater. The STU-III (secure telephones) allowed planners the capability 

to talk and receive information and intelligence from sources worldwide 

without having to rely on hard copy messages sent through the military 

message traffic system. The Black Hole planners perceived that a large 

percentage of target information and target intelligence they used came 

through these informal sources.74 

The working relationship between Glosson and McConnell began 

when Glosson returned to the United States in October 1990 to brief the 

President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the air campaign. Glosson’s frustration with the intelligence community had reached 

the “breaking point.” At the direction of Secretary of Defense Richard 

B. Cheney, Glosson spoke with McConnell, and the beginning of a 

modus operandi was e~tablished.~’ As the war progressed, Glosson and 

McConnell spoke more frequently. Eventually, they talked two or three 

times a day?6 McConnell gave Glosson direct intelligence information 

about Iraqi forces and kept him informed about decisions and decision 

makers in Washington. Glosson, in turn, passed information from 

McConnell to General Schwarzkopf-helping to keep CINCCENT “ahead” 

73(S) lntvw, Thomas C. Hone (and other GWAPS) with Maj Gen Glosson, 

9 Apr 1992. 

79arget information and intelligence includes identification of new targets and 

proving proper target coordinates or characteristics. There is no formal GWAPS database 

detailing, by source, the intelligence information used by Black Hole planners (Black 

Hole planners did not construct such a database either). Hence, planners were able to 

give (and we can report) only subjective estimates of the sources and importance of target 

information and intelligence. See (S) Intvw, TSgt Turner with Lt Col Deptula, 1 Nov 

1990; (S) Intvw, Keaney. et al., with L.t Col Deptula, 20 Dec 1991; (S) Intvw, Keaney. 

et al.. with Lt Col Deptula. 21 Dec 1991; (S) Intvw, Richard G. Davis, Perry Jamieson, 

and Diane T. Putney with Brig Gen Glosson, SAFLL, 12 Dec 1991. 

751t is not entirely clear from the interviews how or when Glosson and McConnell 

met. The two might have met casually during the summer-a few months earlier. 

(S) Intvw. GWAPS staff with Brig Gen Glosson, 9 Apr 1992. In February 1992, RAdm 

McConnell recalled that he first met Brig Gen Glosson in October 1990. McConnell saw 

that Glosson was “Mr. Decisionmaker,” and therefore sought him out to offer his personal 

help. (VNFIWNINTEL) Intvw. Ronald Cole and Diane T. Putney with RAdm Michael 

McConnell, DIA, 5 Feb 1992. 

76h.fcConnell recalled that in December a secure telephone (STU-HI) was installed at 

home in his bedroom. It was used very frequently during the first two weeks of Jan. 

(SMFIWNINTEL) lntvw, Ronald Cole and Diane T. Putney with RAdm Michael McConnell, 

DlA. 5 Feb 1992. 

183 
of policy concerns or questions from Wa~hington.’~ Schwarzkopf wanted 

to keep contacts outside the theater to a minimum+specially in the 

planning and execution of the air campaign-but he permitted the 

Glosson-McConnell link because of its usefulness.” 

Brigadier General Glosson claimed to have contacts in the White House 

who informed him of discussions and concerns that would be addressed to 

the Commander in Chief, Central Command.” Glosson was able to use 

this information to alert General Schwarzkopf to impending questions or 

issues. Glosson was also well acquainted with Secretary Cheney. This 

relationship began when Glosson was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Legislative Affairs.@’ Cheney and Glosson talked on the 

telephone several times during the planning phase of the strategic air campaign and met occasionally. This interaction gave Glosson an opportunity 

to promote his ideas and strategy for the air campaign. 

Glosson’s personal contacts extended to senior leaders of Arab regimes; he repeatedly referred to his “royal friend” in interviews. This 

individual kept Glosson informed on issues and concerns being expressed 

by senior Arab leaders. Although Glosson was only a brigadier general, 

he had greater access to information and to senior national leaders than 

individuals of higher rank and authority?’ 

Informal intelligence links also developed at the staff level. Raw 

intelligence data and other types of planning information passed between 

77McConnell recalled that while he sent much material to Brig Gen Glosson, he also 

sent copies of that material to CINCCENT and the JFACC. (S/NF/wNImL) Intvw, RAdm 

McConneIl, 5 Feb 1992. 

78(S) Intvw, Keaney, et al., with Brig Gen Glosson, 9 Apr 1992. 

Glosson did not name his White House contacts. (S) Intvw, GWAPS staff with 

Glosson, 9 Apr 1992. In a separate interview. Glosson declared that his name was on a 

very short information routing list: “I’ve got sheets of paper I can show you, and the 

sheets of paper say: President of the United States, Vice President. Secretary of State, 

Secretary of Defense, Schwarzkopf, and Buster Glosson. I can show you those pieces of 

paper.” (S) Intvw. Davis, et al., with Maj Gen Buster C. Glosson, 12 Dec 1991. 

79 

%losson held this position from Sep 1988until Jul 1990. 

‘‘Some officers on Glosson’s staff also had greater access to information and to 

senior national leaders than individuals of higher rank and authority. Lt Col David A. 

Deptula. Glosson’s chief planner, was assigned to CENTAF from the Secretary of the Air 

Force’s staff policy group (SAFIOSX). As a consequence, Deptula had a direct connection 

with the Secretary of the Air Force, Donald Rice. 

1 84 
members of the Black Hole and the Air Staff at the Pentagon. The Air 

Staff, through Air Force Checkmate, provided a variety of services to 

Black Hole planners in a fraction of the time it would have taken the 

formal intelligence system. Checkmate officers developed relationships 

at the staff officer level with individuals and offices in all the major 

intelligence organizations: DIA, CIA, the National Security Agency, and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Air Staff action officers were assigned to the 

intelligence agencies to help gather information needed by the planners 

in Checkmate and in the theater. As a result of these informal relationships, intelligence information was passed from the intelligence agency 

to the user quickly and with no intervening processing by the organized 

intelligence system in 

The CENTAF Reorganization 

In December 1990, General Homer reorganized Central Command 

Air Forces’ organizational structure and staff. His stated purpose in this 

reorganization was to “strengthen and standardize our organizational 

alignment.”” Homer’s CENTAF planning staff reorganization was preceded by a critical decision related to organizational structure. On 5 December 1990, the 14th and 15th Air Divisions(P) were created, bringing to 

four the number of provisional air divisions.a The strategic [the 17th Air 

Division(P)], and airlift forces [the 161 0th Airlift Division(P)] had already 

been organized into Provisional Air Divisions on 24 August 199OX5 and 

31 October 1990, respectively.86 The 14th AD(P) was now established 

and given operational control (OPCON) of all the tactical fighter units in 

the theater. The 15th AD(P) was formed with operational control of 

electronic combat, command and control, and reconnaissance assets.” 

Each air division was assigned a different level of command authority. 

82(S) Lt Col Deptula, “Observations on the Air Campaign, Aug 90-Mar 91,” 

83(s) Msg, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 10322, 1206002 DtX 90; (s) IntVW. Barlow, et d., 

29 Mar 1991. 

with Lt Gen Homer. 4 Mar 1992. 

structure. 

84Msg, COMUSCWTAF to AIG 10322,1206002 Dec 90. subj: USCENTAF Organization 

85Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Special Order GB-084, 24 Aug 1990. 

‘%leadquarters Military Airlift Command, Special Order GA-I I. 31 Oct 1990. 

“HQ Tactical Air Command, Special Order GB-14, 5 Dec 1990. 

185 
The authority exercised by each air division commander tells much about 

the execution of the air 

Under the previously existing command relationship, the 17th AD(P) 

and the 1610AD(P) had no direct operational authority over deployed 

forces.89 Tasking and execution authority were held bycentral Command 

Air Forces or commanders outside the theater. With the reorganization, 

the 14AD(P) and 15AD(P) commanders got operational control of their 

assigned assets.g0 Operational control gave each air division commander 

much greater flexibility in directing how the assets assigned to that division would execute each tasking. In effect, the reorganization transformed brigadier generals assigned staff functions within CENTAF 

(Brigadier Generals Glosson and Profitt) into commanders having warfighting command authority?' Of the four air division commanders, the 

reorganization had the greatest implications for General Glosson. As 14th 

AD(P) Commander, he had operational control of all fighter and attack 

aircraft. Every U.S. Air Force aircraft with the capability to put ordnance 

on a target, with the exception of the B-52, came under operational 

control and command authority of Brigadier General Glosson. 

After he had reorganized the air division structure, General Horner 

turned his attention to the CENTAF planning staff. The role played by 

Combat Plans changed due to the decisions to prosecute the offensive air 

campaign as visualized by the Black Hole. Officers in Combat Plans had 

88For example. the Strategic Air Command passed to USCINCCENT OPCON of B-52s 

deployed in support of Operation Desert ShieldStorm. OPCON of SAC air refueling and 

reconnaissance assets remained with the SAC numbered air force, 8th or 15th Air Force. 

reconnaissance assets was passed to the 17th AD(P) commander. (Msg CINCSAC to 8th 

AF, 15th AF, 3d AD, 7th AD, 14th AD, 17th AD(P), 43OOd BMW(P), 24 19002 Aug 

90, subj: Command relationships of SAC Forces Supporting Desert Shield.) OPCON of 

in-theater airlift assets was given to USCINCCENT. USTRANSCOM maintained OPCON of 

strategic airlift. All other Tactical Air Force units deployed to the USCENTCOM area of 

responsibility were assigned Combatant Command (COCOM) to USCINCCENT. (Msg, 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2223352 Oct 1990, Operation Desert Shield Command 

Relationships.) USCENTAF then exercised OPCON of the deployed tactical forces. See 

Appendix 4 for detailed discussion of command relationships. 

TACON Of air refueling assets was passed to COMUSCENTAF as the JFACC. TACON of SAC 

89Although, the 17th AD(P) had TACON of reconnaissance assets. 

gOHeadquarters Tactical Air Command, Special Order GB-14, 5 Dec 1990. 

See Appendix 4 for discussion of the difference between staff and command 91 

authority. 

186 
planned for the defense of Saudi Arabia; its efforts had resulted in numerous Operations Orders and the subsequent Air Tasking Orders that supported these plans. The efforts of the smaller Black Hole centered on 

building a plan to conduct a true strategic attack against an enemy’s 

infrastructure and leadership. 

On 17 December 1990, General Homer created the Campaign Plans 

Division by combining the planning staffs of the Black Hole and the 

Combat Plans Division. Campaign Plans replaced Combat Plans in the 

CENTAF Tactical Air Control Center organizational hierarchy. All functions falling under Combat Plans Division such as the Combat Operations 

Planning staff, Tactical Air Control System (TACS) Division, and Computer Assisted Force Management System (CAFMS) Division were integrated 

into the new Campaign Plans. Figure 27 displays the relationships among 

planners before the reorganization?’ Figure 28 illustrates the relationships after this reorganization?’ The functions of the Special Support 

Division, TACS Division, Fighter Plans Division, and CAFMS Branch now 

came under the AT0 Division. The Airborne Command Element (ACE) 

Division and the Liaison Division remained basically intact. The Combat 

Operations Planning Division (COPD) became the nucleus of the Kuwait 

Theater of Operation (KTO) Cell within the Guidance, Apportionment, and 

Targeting (GAT) Division, and the Black Hole became the Iraq Cell in the 

GAT. In addition, the GAT included nuclear, biological, chemical/Scud, 

ground, and air liaison cells?4 

92(S) USCENTAF Cotnbat Plans Handout, Oct 1990. See (S) Chapter 5 for a full 

93(S) USCENTAF Combat Plans Handout, Jan 1991. 

941n March 1992, Lt Gen Homer recalled that the reorganization occurred because 

of “evolutionary” changes taking place rather than a “thought-out process.” In Homer’s 

words, 

discussion of the CENTAF planning staff. 

The evolution was this: You had Jimmy Crigger running the day-to-day 

operations for Desert Shield. The TACC was doing the day-to-day 

operations to include the defensive planning and execution. Then you 

had the Black Hole; well, the Black Hole became [emphasis on tape] 

the plans function as we shifted from defense to offense, so we always 

kept this residual defense plan, but it sort of shrunk down to the tail. 

Buster is doing all the planning, and because of the secrecy-because we 

did not want to jeopardize diplomacy-Jimmy’s guys were never really 

directly involved in Buster’s-the Black Hole-thing. So the natural 

evolution is that you go ahead and make the Black Hole the Plans, and 

187 
Figure 27 

Relationship Among Planners Before Reorganization 

1 SO7 TACC CC 

CAFMS 

t I 

t 

DIVISION - 

71 TACS 

DIVISION SUPPORT DIV DIVISION 

:$z MARINE 

I 

ELECTRONIC 

WARFARE BR E EF-111 

E SOLO 

EMPLOYhlEhT 

DEFENSE BR 

- A.F. 

RANGE 

PLANS BR 

MARINE TCT BR 

- NAVY 

- ALLIES 

KITE 

CELL I 

C2 BR AIRSPACE BR 

P AWACS 

I- 

~GNDI 

TACS 

{ ARMY I 

{YEiiq 

{ NAVY 1 

m 

188 
I 

- 

I 

UlOQNWH SNWld 1WEUO3 
The December Reorganization’s Organizational Context 

After the December 1990 reorganization, General Homer continued 

his established patterng5 of dealing primarily with problems relating to his 

nstitutional role as Joint Force Air Component Commander.” Once the 

decision had been made to employ an offensive plan against Iraq, many 

issues were raised by flag-level officers of other Services and countries 

directly to General Homer, rather than through Col. James Crigger, Jr.. 

the CENTAF Director of Operations Director of Operations. With hindsight, Maj. Gen. Corder argued that Homer, overwhelmed by matters he 

did not have the time to handle, brought Corder to Saudi Arabia to be 

CENTAF Do, replacing Colonel Crigger?’ General Corder believed one of 

in the reorganization, we just took the residual-Sam Baptiste and the 

guys who were in Ops-and pushed them in with the Black Hole guys, 

and said, ‘Now you are Combat Plans.’ 

(S) Intvw, Barlow. et al., with Lt Gen Horner. 

95See (S) Chapter 3. 

%(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Maj Gen John A. Corder, Deputy Commander for Operations, USCENTAF (November 1990 to March 1991). 18 May 1992. Corder’s view is 

supported by Brig Gen Glosson’s report in an October 1990 interview. Glosson remarked 

that Horner “has given me total freedom and has not put any constraints on us as far as 

trying to militarily develop the best strategic air campaign that we can possibly develop. 

I have had no meddling and no tinkering at all.” (S) Intvw. TSgt Turner with Brig Gen 

Glosson. 

Gen Horner-as JFACC-also was able to take a more philosophical view of day-to-day 

operations than others. For example, as the battle of Khafji was developing, Homer 

received a frantic telephone call from a Saudi commander pleading for 8-52 bombers to 

attack the Iraqis. Gen Horner answered, 

Khalid, you are going to get more air than you have ever seen in your 

life. He said, ‘I’ve got to have air!’ I said, ‘Khalid, trust me. You 

are going to get a lot of air, more air than you need.’ He said, ‘Are 

you sure? I said, ‘Khalid, trust me. You are going to get a lot of air.’ 

He said, ‘Okay.’ Then this little devil that lives in all of us said, 

‘Khalid, I want you to keep one thing in mind, though.’ ‘What’s 

that? I said, ‘Your ass is in Khafji. My ass is in Riyadh.‘ (Laughter) 

(S) Intvw, Barlow, et al., with Lt Gen Horner. 

97Corder noted that Crigger had been doing a “superb” job as DO, an opinion echoed 

by Gen Homer. (S) lntvw GWAPS with Maj Gen Corder, 18 May 1992; Gen Homer 

called Crigger “one of the real heroes.” Homer believed that Crigger was disappointed 

190 
his main tasks was to relieve Horner of having to divert attention from 

more important institutional matters. In addition, Corder believed Homer 

wanted him to oversee (but not control) the actions of Brigadier Generals 

Glosson, Profitt, Caruana, and Tenoso?’ 

General Corder also saw a key task in melding together the Guidance, 

Apportionment, and Targeting staff with the CENTAF staff. Combining 

the two staffs was deemed necessary in order to prepare the third day’s 

(and subsequent day’s) Air Tasking Order.w As the interaction among 

events, differing interpretations of tasks, and personalities played out, 

taking charge of the Tactical Air Control Center as Director of Operations 

proved quite difficult. This situation seems to have been acceptable to 

General who, like many commanders and senior executives, 

managed tasks by channeling his subordinates’ competition.’” 

The Revised Air Tasking Order Development Process 

General Horner created Campaign Plans in the Tactical Air Control 

Center reorganization. This agency made slight changes to the Air Tasking Order planning cycle. Three ATOs were still prepared at any given 

time. Our description of the planning process, and the changes to it, 

begins with the creation and uses of the Master Attack Plan. 

The Master Attack Plan was a command and control planning innovation developed by the chief Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting 

planner to help focus planning efforts on simultaneous and relentless 

upon being replaced by Corder. Yet, according to Homer. Crigger “said, ‘fine.’ saluted, 

and kept on working and doing things. He had every right to pout, piss, and moan; be 

mad, angry, and down-hearted; but he is a soldier. He really is a great guy.” (S) Intvw, 

Barlow, et al., with Lt Gen Homer. 

981n Gen Corder’s words, one duty was to “chase after” the Air Force brigadier 

generals working for Homer. (S) Intvw, Maj Gen Corder. 

w(S) Intvw. Maj Gen Corder. 

‘OOFor example, Homer noted that “sometimes John Corder and Buster Glosson 

would get into it a little bit. Sometimes 1 would let them fight each other, and then 

sometimes 1 would get them both so mad at me that they were buddies and fighting me. 

That’s the way it works . . . . ” (S) Intvw. Barlow, et al.. with Lt Gen Homer. Maj Gen 

Corder also described several situations in which Homer managed through competition 

between Glosson and Corder. (S) Intvw, Maj Gen Corder. 

‘“For example, see Richard E. Neustadt. Presidential Power (New York, 1960). 

191 
attack against targets critical to supporting the Iraqi war machine, relationships among targets to be attacked, and operational-level effects.lm 

The Master Attack Plan was crucial to the planning process,’m both as a 

means to facilitate the planning process and as a tool to centralize authority in the hands of the planners. The impetus for creating this new 

planning tool was in the tasks performed and approach to campaign 

planning taken by the Black Hole.’@’ In retrospect, Major General Corder 

argued that “he who controls the target list”-and the sequence in which 

targets are attackecL”contro1s the war.”’OS Of course, this aphorism 

makes sense only if the units can-and do-execute the tasks assigned to 

them. In any event, he who controls the target list certainly controls the 

planning process. Black Hole planning was facilitated by its own target 

list, the Master Target List. 

The Master Attack Plan Document 

The Master Attack Plan was assembled prior to the Air Tasking 

Order. Mediated by the target planning worksheets, the Attack Plan 

formed the basis of the Air Tasking Order. The AT0 was simply an 

administrative vehicle to (a) transfer the daily plan to the wings and (b) 

provide call signs, times on targets, and other detailed information required for the execution of the plan.’06 Those working in Guidance, 

Apportionment, and Targeting viewed the Master Attack Plan as a significant tool for planning an air campaign. In their view, the existence of the 

Master Attack Plan made processing an Air Tasking Order much more 

than simply matching a ranked target list with air assets. Lieutenant 

Colonel Deptula noted that, with the MAP, the GAT had a “coherent plan 

that was thought out on the basis of the kind of effect we wanted to 

achieve on an individual basis, not simply matching a list of targets to a 

‘9arget Planning Worksheets (TPws), an existing planning tool, were used to 

transfer information from the MAP to the ATO. The existence and use of TPWS was an 

important carryover from earlier or past procedures. The TPWS supplied a familiar form 

for the presentation and transmission of objectives and information. Deptula noted that 

doing away with TPWS would have risked failures in transfer of information from the MAP 

to the ATO. (S) Intvw, Keaney, et al., with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Dec 1991; (S) Intvw. 

Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Nov 1991. 

‘03However. the three-day planning cycle was not new. 

‘“‘(S) Intvw. Keaney, et al., with Lt Col Deptula. 20 Dec 1991. 

‘”(S) Intvw, Maj Gen Corder. 

‘06(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Col Deptula, 21 Dec 1991. 

192 
bunch of assets or servicing the target list mentality.”’07 After the war, 

General Homer recalled he viewed the MAP as a “distillation” of the Air 

Tasking Order.lW 

Lieutenant Colonel Deptula led the effort to assemble the Master 

Attack Plan. Deptula’s typical workday ran from 0630 to 2400 or-0100. 

Figure 29 depicts the anticipated planning cycle.lW His day began with 

morning meetings, including the Combat Operations shift changeover 

briefing (sometimes termed the JFACC Staff meeting) attended by CENTAF 

staff officers. Homer would be briefed on the previous night’s activities 

and lay out the Central Command Commander in Chief’s analysis of the 

situation. Then Homer would dismiss the big meeting and convene a 

battle staff meeting with all the two-star generals and intelligence and 

planning officers. This meeting would include a long discussion based 

on the Defense Intelligence Agency information that had arrived the night 

before. At the end of the meeting, Horner would present his guidance. 

Deptula would then assemble the GAT staff to pass out the information 

received from the battle staff meeting, lay out the direction for the day’s 

work, and be briefed by Maj. “Buck” Rogers on the previous night’s 

changes. The weather staff officer would contribute a weather forecast. 

‘07(S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula. 20 Nov 1991. In 

addition, Deptula proposed a simple measure to improve the process: put the master 

attack list on a simple interactive database with multiple screens. The database must be 

capable of being updated with bomb damage assessment, additional intelligence information. and new targets. During the war, updating the MAP was accomplished by hand. 

‘08(S) Intvw, Barlow, et al., with Lt Gen Homer. 

‘09(S) Briefing, U Col Deptula to Gulf War Air Power Survey, ‘The Air Campaign: 

Planning and Execution,” 26 Nov 1991. 

193 
Figure 29 

Anticipated Planning Cycle 

GROUND ATTACK ALERT FORCE 

3 

33 Hrs 

- 1- -IATO DISTRIBUTION^ 

INTELL/BDA 

MISSION 

Meetlng 

I 

I800 
Then, around 1000, Horner would come in to talk”’ about the specific 

attacks planned for that day and night.”’ In the meantime, the weapons 

“‘Homer described his morning stroll, stopping to talk with Deptula (about targets 

two days in advance), Lt Col Sam Baptiste, Army Lt Col Jack Welch (who picked Army 

targets), and staff in the Scud room. In Horner’s words, ‘That [walk] became more of 

a daily operation rather than the planning thing. All we could do was just put forces up 

and do the best we could.” In the afternoon, Homer and Glosson would brief 

Schwarzkopf. who would only change attacks against Army divisions. (S) Intvw Barlow, 

et al., with Lt Gen Horner. 

‘“(S) Intvw. Keaney, et al., with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Dec 91. Homer said he went 

to the Black Hole around 0900 to ask about targets two days from now. (S) Intvw 

Barlow. et al., with Lt Gen Homer. Brig Gen Tolin recalled that Gen Homer would stop 

by at “mid-day.” Intvw, John F. Guilmartin, Jr., with Brig Gen Anthony J. Tolin, 30 Jan 

1992. 

As noted in Chapter 1. the chief problem in relying on interviews conducted some 

time after an event is that memories fade. This is not an issue of truthfulness, but does 

raise a concern about the verisimilitude of accounts based solely on interviews. In many 

cases, the discrepancies among accounts may not matter; for example, the apparent 

disagreement above about when Gen Homer went to the Black Hole to discuss targeting. 

In another example, there appears to be a disagreement concerning the start time of the 

actual planning cycle. In Lt Col David A. Deptula’s 15 Oct 1991 presentation, (S) ‘The 

Air Campaign: Planning and Execution,” he included a chart showing the planning cycle 

starting at 0800 Iocd time. (Lt col David A. Deptula, Chief Planner, CENTAF Specid 

Planning Group [Desert Shield], Director, Strategic Target Planning Cell [Desert Storm], 

(S) ‘The Air Campaign: Planning and Execution,” presentation given to the Defense 

Science Board’s Sub Panel on Air Operations, IS Oct 1991.) In a later version of this 

briefing, given to GWAPS on 26 Nov 1991, Deptula changed the briefing slide to show a 

0500 planning cycle start time. He also added a JFACC Staff Meeting somewhere between 

0500 and 0800. (Lt col David A. Deptula, Chief Planner, CENTAF special Planning 

Group [Desert Shield], Director, Strategic Target Planning Cell [Desert Storm], (S) ‘The 

Air Campaign: Planning & Execution.” presentation given to the Gulf War Air Power 

Survey, 26 Nov 1991.) The USCENTAF (S) Combat Plans Handout dated Jan 1991 showed 

the ATO cycle starting with a loo0 CC (Gen Horner) discussion with the GAT. The 

Warrior briefing. (S) “Air Tasking Order (ATO) preparation and Composite Force 

Packaging,” given to the CSAF and to GWAPS by Lt Col Sam Baptiste, Chief of Weapons 

and Tactics at 9th AF HQ, did not give any specific time frame for the start of the 

planning process. The script of the briefing only states that the “initial planning for an 

AT0 period began in GAT with Guidance from four primary sources . . . .” (Lt col Sam 

Baptiste, Chief of Weapons and Tactics, 9th AF HQ, “Air Tasking Order [ATO] 

Preparation and Composite Force Packaging,” Project Warrior briefing given to Gulf War 

Air Power Survey, 9 Mar 1991. Note, this briefing focuses on the actual timing of the 

planning process when the CENTAF staff began the construction of the AT0 Document 

itself). 

195 
systems specialists were collecting and assimilating the bomb damage 

assessment”2 and talking to units about the previous night’s effort^."^ 

The information from the units was used to update the target list 

“scorecard”-the list used to monitor progress in achieving the air 

campaign objectives. Glosson would arrive at the GAT around 12OOL. 

A Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB) meeting was held each day at 

about the same time to rank target nominations from Army, Navy, 

Marine, and coalition representatives. Deptula and Glosson would 

examine the scorecard and go over near-term campaign objectives. 

Glosson would talk with Rear Admiral McConnell, and based upon 

McConnell’s newest intelligence updates, Glosson would adjust the 

Master Attack Plan currently under development. Glosson and Deptula 

would then walk over to Combat Operations, where they would review 

the Air Tasking Order being executed; based upon the most current 

information, they might direct changes to the current Order.”4 They also 

would review “tomorrow’s attack plan,” the Air Tasking Order being 

assembled from the targeting planning worksheets, for possible changes. 

After Deptula and Glosson’s review of changes to the current and next 

day’s ATO, the planning staff would perform an overall quality control 

check.”’ By late afternoon, Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting had 

produced a draft Master Attack Plan that contained the targets, times over 

targets, and types of aircraft tasked against each specific target. 

Given these various accounts, it is difficult to say when planning for a particular AT0 

cycle actually started. Yet, the disconnect between the other sources is probably not 

critical to understanding the process. Planning started in the GAT when the GAT planners 

arrived at work. 

“%he presence of the weapon system experts in the Black Hole was very helpful. 

Deptula noted that these weapon system representatives provided feedback and input for 

the particular weapons systems, and they represented their units. They would tell Deptula 

if there were “something stupid in the . . . package.” lntvw (S), Office of Air Force 

History with Lt Col David A. Deptula, SAFIOSX, 20 Nov 1991. 

“%his last step of collecting information from the units was a “work around of 

Intel.” Black Hole officers could not wait for the ranked target nominations list (which 

normally arrived between 1400 and 1600L). (S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with 

Lt Col Deptula, SAFIOSX, 29 Nov 1991. 

“%‘hree ATOs were prepared at any given time. The planning process began with 

the GAT working on the “day after tomorrow” ATO. The MAP would be used to develop 

the ATO. Concurrently, the GAT would develop the USCENTAF/CC Guidance Letter. which 

detailed the level of effort and emphasis for the planning cycle in progress for the units 

“’(S) Intvw. Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, SAF/OSX. 20 Nov 

and CWTAF staff. 

1991. 

196 
Target nominations came in to the Targeting cell at all times of the 

day. Deptula recalled that he had to find time to add these targets to the 

Master Attack Plan. In the meantime, Deptula built the MAP for the “day 

after tomorrow” using CINCCENT guidance and information from the daily 

19OOL component commanders meeting.II6 Glosson would return to Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting around 2000L and review the “day 

after tomorrow’s’’ Master Attack Plan with Deptula, who would give it to 

the night targeting cell to create target planning work~heets.”~ The transfer 

of this information to the night targeting cell completed the target planning. 

Intelligence and operations planners examined each target to select 

actual impact points for the weapons, build force packages, assign mission information such as call signs and mission numbers, and do a “sanity 

check” on the plan as it then stood. At 0430L hours, the information was 

forwarded to the AT^ division in the form of target planning worksheets.”’ The AT^ Division’s fraggers completed the final coordination. 

By 1400L each day, all inputs from fraggers and others were due to 

operators, who completed the process of building the Air Tasking Order 

and transmitted it to the units by 18OOL. 

Superficially, this Air Tasking Order development cycle was similar 

to the cycle used by the Combat Planning Division for several months in 

planning the D-Day AT0 and daily training ATOs. However, there were 

three differences; two major and one minor. Because of these differences, the reorganized AT0 cycle altered the process of identifying, ranking, 

and assigning targets. The first major difference concerned the joint 

nature of air mission planning. During Desert Shield, the CENTAF Combat Planning Division had employed a rudimentary “joint” planning 

process when it planned for the defense of Saudi Arabia; a Joint Target 

Coordination Board had worked with Central Command Intelligence and 

the other components to list and rank targets. After the reorganization, 

a joint planning process was used only on Kuwaiti theater of operations 

targets to identify Army-nominated targets in the preparation of the 

I16Brig Gen Glosson also attended these meetings. (S) Intvw, Office of Air Force 

‘171ntvw, (S) Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Nov 1991. 

History with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Nov 1991. 

Briefing, Lt Col David A. Deptula to Center for Strategic and International 118 

Studies, “Lessons Learned: The Desert Storm Air Campaign,” Apr 1991. 

197 
battlefield. The joint planning process was used mainly on targets in the 

Kuwaiti theater. 'I9 

In contrast, the planning process in the Iraq Cell did not rely principally on information generated '2ointly." Members of the Iraq cell briefly 

reviewed the ranked target list produced by CENTAF and CENTCOM intelligence and other Services but relied more on information from other 

sources to plan.'m The Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell 

operations staff selected, ranked, and analyzed targets and assigned assets 

against specific targets. There was little intelligence review of selected 

targets. As noted above, weaponeering, designated munitions point of 

impact selection, force packaging, and discussion of suppression of enemy air defense support and enemy threats were accomplished by the 

operations planners and the one or two intelligence officers assigned to 

the night shift. The Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual process was 

seen as too unwieldy. The CENTCOM Joint Targeting Coordination Board 

did not review target nominations generated by the GAT.'^' 

The second major-and critical difference is that in the Central Command Air Forces planning process, no changes were accepted after 08002 

on Day 2.'22 The revised planning process established after the December 

CENTAF reorganization did not include such an injunction. Changes could 

be made at any time. 

The third, and minor, difference due to the reorganization was a shift 

in the effective AT0 period from 01002 - 00592 to 02002 - 0159Z. This 

t'91ntvw, (S) Thomas C. Hone, Lt Col Frank D. Kistler, Mark D. Mandeles, and Maj 

Sanford S. Terry with Brig Gen Richard I. Neal. USMC, 17 Jan 1992. Brig Gen Neal was 

Deputy J-3, CENTCOM during the Gulf War. 

'mBriefing, "Air Tasking Order (ATO) Preparation and Composite Force Packaging," 

nd [1991]. 

12'However. Gen Schwarzkopf and Gen Homer were fully aware of, and in agreement with, the target selections. Prior to the war, Schwarzkopf and Homer approved 

Special Planning Group plans and targets lists. With the onset of the war, Gen Homer 

or Gen Glosson would brief the target selection for the next AT0 at every 1900L 

CENTCOM staff meeting. Target priorities would be discussed at that meeting. This 

discussion ensured that the overall CINC priorities were met. However, ils the ground war 

approached, components wanted to have a greater voice in target selection. Also see 

Intvw. (S) Brig Gen Neal. 

'"See (S) Chapter 5, p 5-28. 

198 
shift gave units more time to plan ini ividual mission sortiesiz3 ant 

provided a more useable night tasking window for special aircraft, such 

as the F-117. These three changes played a significant role in how the 

air campaign was executed. 

While the Master Attack Plan helped Guidance, Apportionment, and 

Targeting officers focus their planning efforts, it also disrupted established procedures. In theory, the GAT officers would look at a seventytwo hour period encompassing Day 1 to Day 3 of the Air Tasking Order 

planning cycle. The role played by the GAT in this cycle would be concentrated on preparing the strategic guidance-the Master Attack Plan-for 

the attacks to be conducted on Day 3 (the "day after tomorrow"). The 

ATO Division would put together the Air Tasking Order for Day 2 of the 

planning cycle ("tomorrow")+ollating information and guidance to remove conflicts among times over target. The Combat Operations Division would monitor "today's" execution of the Air Tasking Order (Day 

1) and incorporate target changes based on new intelligence or bomb 

damage assessment into the AT0 being executed. However, this theoretical picture did not describe what actually happened. The GAT officers 

operated independently of CENTAF staff officers; their actions were not 

circumscribed by CENTAF procedures for organizing and issuing the Air 

Tasking Order. 

It is not clear if General Glosson purposely set out to change the 

planning cycle or whether the ultimate form of the planning cycle-as 

practiced in Desert Storm-was the outcome of other actions. It is clear, 

however, that Glosson believed he could receive bomb damage assessment a lot faster than the process promised and hence respond more 

flexibly and rapidly to a dynamic combat situation. This belief played a 

large role in how General Glosson led the planning effort during Desert 

Storm.'" Between October and December 1990, briefings were presented 

to senior civilian and military leaders, including President Bush, which 

contained a slide stating that bomb damage assessment would be used to 

'23Briefing. "Air Tasking Order (ATO) Preparation and Composite Force Packaging," 

nd [1991]. 

lZ4ln Chapter 7 we will show that one result of the GAT'S independence was the 

circumvention of the forty-eight to seventy-two hour planning process, primarily for 

targets in Iraq. 

199 
plan Day 3 attacks against targets previously hit.125 This timetable could 

be met only if the planners expanded their responsibilities beyond Day 1 

and Day 2 and assumed the responsibility for execution of the Day 3 (or 

current) Air Tasking Order. We will discuss this point in detail in the 

next chapter. 

Summary and Review 

In this chapter, we described how the Black Hole (a) developed the 

Master Attack Plan, (b) transformed the MAP into a flyable Air Tasking 

Order, and (c) published the ATO. We also showed how the Tactical Air 

Control Center developed in ways far different from its paper line diagram description or from the generic model suggested by Tactical Air 

Command Regulation 55-45 or USCENTAF Regulation 55-45. 

The reorganization of CENTAF'S planning staff put the former Black 

Hole staff firmly in charge of the air campaign planning effort. General 

Glosson was named Chief, Campaign Plans-complementing his authority 

as 14th AD(P) Commander. Glosson now controlled the entire planning 

and execution effort.126 The leader of the most critical element of Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting, Lieutenant Colonel Deptula of the 

Iraq Cell, had contributed to the offensive plan from the beginning. The 

GAT'S KTO Cell was led by Lieutenant Colonel Baptiste. While Baptiste 

had access to the strategic air campaign early in Desert Shield, he was 

deeply involved in the daily training and D-Day Air Tasking Orders-not 

in the planning for the strategic air campaign. With the reorganization, 

there would be no more duplicate Air Tasking Orders, no more separate 

ground and air campaigns, and no question of planning and execution 

authority. The driving focus of the Black Hole-the strategic air campaign 

against Iraq-became the focus of the CENTAF staff as a whole. 

1251ntvw, Brig Gen Tolin. In contrast to Brig Gen Tolin's recollection, Deptula 

recalled that Black Hole officers planned to begin making adjustments as BDA began to 

amve. (S) Intvw. Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Nov 1991; (S) 

Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Col Deptula; 20 Dec 1991. 

I2'Gen Glosson, as the chief of Campaign Plans or as 14th AD(P) Commander, was 

subordinate to Gen Homer. Glosson as chief of Campaign Plans also worked for the 

CENTAF DO. Maj Gen John A. Corder. As the chief planner Glosson was a staff officer 

and had no command authority at all over the execution of the ATO. However, as an air 

division commander he had command authority over those assets assigned him, and was 

responsible to the JFACC for execution of taskings given to his units via the ATO. 

200 
Participants in the planning process ascribe great importance to the 

reorganization. Lieutenant Colonel Deptula believed that the centralization of authority in Glosson’s hands was a key to the overall success 

of the air campaign. According to Deptula, 

This arrangement was highly successful in facilitating the execution of 

the air war. There was no misunderstanding or dilution of intent of the 

plan between the planner and those executing the plan because the same 

individual was in charge of both. Highly effective in concept as well 

as in actual impIementation.’” 

If Deptula is correct, this arrangement integrated or merged two distinct 

chains of command below, rather than at, the position of Joint Force Air 

Component Commander (Lieutenant General Hornerkand allowed Brigadier General Glosson to control the planning and execution process in 

the Tactical Air Control Center. 

Looking ahead to Desert Storm, the integration of planning and 

execution authority in General Glosson’s hands may have had consequences beyond promises of reducing “misunderstanding” between the 

“planner and those executing the plan.” Unit-level representatives cited 

in the Tactical Analysis Bulletin 9 1-2’28 suggest that Glosson’s proclivity 

to make changes, in the context of centralized planning and execution 

authority, caused confusion in executing the Air Tasking Order.IZ9 The 

F-16/F-111 case study in Chapter 7 illustrates this situation. In addition, 

back-channel communications, informal links between Riyadh and Washington, and reliance on past friendships and confidences created a situation in which the strategic air campaign could be planned in an environment free of traditional “staff’ thinking and parochial constraints. 

Yet, there may have been significant “costs” to the reorganization. Not 

least of these was the willingness of GAT officers during Desert Shield (and 

lZ7Lt Col Deptula, (S) “Observations on the Air Campaign, Aug 90-Mar 91,29 Mar 

‘%(S) USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Tactical Analysis Buffelin, Volume 91- 

2. Jul 1991. 

‘29(S) That is, Gen Glosson provided verbal guidance directly to the combat wings 

in the field. Lt Gen Horner understood that Glosson was calling the units to order 

changes in the AT0 before launch. However, Horner believed that the changes ordered 

by Glosson did not have a detrimental impact on the war effort. (S) Intvw, Barlow, et 

al., with Lt Gen Horner. 

1991. 

201 
later, during Desert Storm) to make decisions on the basis of little, or 

poorly understood, data and information. Theater intelligence officers 

believed that information received through informal channels by the Black 

Hole from the Air Staff was %on validated.”1m In addition, the information came from up to four different sources,131 making it even more difficult-under strict time constraints-to array and analyze information in a 

coherent fashion. Because of the capability to pass classified information 

over the S’W-III, target information could be accessed as quickly and easily 

as a phone call to senior-level officials in Washington, D.C. The theater 

intelligence community could not keep up with the very short lag times 

between the development of a target idea in Washington, D.C. [DELETED] 

and transmission of that information to the GAT. None of this target information passed through the CENTCOM CU2 and CENTAF target intelligence 

organizations for analysis and further target development. 

The reorganization also did not reintegrate theater intelligence agencies into the campaign planning process. Theater intelligence planners 

contended that targets were attacked unnecessarily because of the way 

information entered the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell. 

Intelligence officers argued that targets selected and struck often (a) did 

not meet Commander in Chief, Central Command targeting objectives, (b) 

did not have the appropriate preparatory analysis to identify aim points 

and desired mean points of impact, and (c) bypassed standard target 

material producti~n.’~~ Indeed, initially the GAT did not employ a data 

management system to track and catalog the rapidly arriving intelligence 

inputs and targets nominations. Eventually, Guidance, Apportionment, 

Targeting Cell officers managed the variety of target information they 

received by developing a target nomination worksheet. The worksheet 

gave structure to the information coming from CENTAF/IN, TACC Combat 

Operations, DIA, CENTCOM 52, JCS 52, Checkmate, USSOCOM, [DELET- 

‘90 targeting officers. this relationship between Black Hole and Air Staff officers 

was a major source of irritation. See, for example, (S) JUUS Report Number 50641- 

13128 (00066), USCENTAF Special Planning Group, Impact on Targeting, submitted by 

Gen Glosson and the GAT received target information from Checkmate, DOD-JIC. 

I3’(S) JULU Number: 50641-13128 (00066), submitted by CUZ-SG. Capt M. Menke, 

CCJZSG, IS JuI 1991. 

131 

and CENTCOM. 

15 Jul 1991. 

202 
ED].’33 Anyone with a contact in the GAT could supply intelligence or 

nominate a target. New information arriving in the GAT was reviewed, 

added to the Master Target List, and marked for action. 

The number of personnel in the Desert Storm Tactical Air Control 

System eventually reached almost 5,000, excluding those at the tactical 

airbases.IM The geographic spread, number of interactions, and number 

of occupational specializations combined to form a very complex organizational architecture to support the Joint Force Air Component Commander. And this organizational complexity partly accounts for difficulties encountered in devising and executing the air campaign. The institutional context in which planning was conducted to establish command 

and control of a large and diverse air force generated tension and conflict 

between formal organization (that is, CENTAF) and ad hoc organization 

(the Black Hole). Officers created informal communications channels to 

deal with that conflict or to get information more quickly.135 These 

informal channels also compensated for the confusion caused by abandonment of existing deployment plans. 

‘331ntvw (S) Lt Col Frank D. Kistler and Mark D. Mandeles with Maj Gen Thomas 

R. Olsen, USAF (ret), formerly Deputy Commander CENTAF, 9 Mar 1992. For example, 

see (s) Msg. M. P. c. cams, Lt Gen, USAF, JCSlDJS (signed by M. McConnell) to 

CENTCOM//I2/13//INFO CENTAF/DOIINTACUINT//, 13 15352 Feb 9 1, subj: Israeli Proposed 

Scud Targets in Western Iraq. 

‘”(S) lntvw Donald A. Kellum with Col John Duane, Commander, 507th Air 

Control Wing, 14 Jun 1992. 

l3’F0r example, information about air campaign planning activities in Riyadh flowed 

to Washington. Lt Col Deptula and Maj Mark “Buck” Rogers provided Lt Col Paul 

Dordal. who worked on the Joint Staff, such information. (S) Intvw, Thomas C. Hone, 

Mark D. Mandeles, and Maj Sanford S. Terry with Col Paul Dordal, Operations Directorate (J-3). Joint Oprations Division, EUCOM/CENTCOM Branch, 9 Jan 1992. The Secretary 

of the Air Force. Donald Rice, also received information from Lt Col Deptula (who was 

assigned to USCENTAF from SAF/OSX) during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The 

communications were primarily “back channel.” See, for example, (S) Memo Lt Col 

Deptula to Secretary Rice, subj: Feedback from SECDEWCJCS Meeting with CINC and 

Component Commander, 9 Feb 1991. 

203 
YY 

204 
7 

The TACC and GAT in Desert Storm 

In previous chapters we examined the responsibilities and tasks of 

officers at different organizational levels of U.S. Central Command Air 

Forces. In Chapter 3, we analyzed the types of problems faced by Lt. Gen. 

Charles A. Homer as he managed the diverse activities of many different 

offices and performed the institutional role of the Joint Force Air Component Commander. In Chapters 4 and 5, we described selected key components of the CENTAF Tactical Air Control System (TACS) and the organization of the CENTAF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). In Chapter 6, we 

surveyed the origins and evolution of the Black Hole during Desert Shield. 

These chapters show that the organization conducting the war was very 

complex, replete with sometimes cross-cutting formal lines of authority, ad 

hoc organizations, and informal communications channels. 

Chapter 7 deals with the relationship between centralized control (and 

planning conducted) in Riyadh and decentralized execution of the Air 

Tasking Order (ATO) by the wings. The context for this analysis is in the 

coordination among officers assigned to the formal organization (CENTAF) 

and those comprising the war’s critical ad hoc organization-the Black 

Hole. The December 1990 CENTAF reorganization placed the Black Hole 

within CENTAF’S Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting group (GAT).’ 

In this chapter we will examine the role of the Master Attack Plan (MAP) 

in the three-day ATO planning cycle as we compare the command and 

control of the first three days of the air campaign* with subsequent days.3 

‘As described in Chapter 6, the “Black Hole” was the popular. name given to the 

staff function of developing an offensive plan against Iraq. The Special Planning Group 

was among its many official names. The official name of the Black Hole changed several 

times. In previous chapters, we used the name “Black Hole” to refer to the group of 

officers led by Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, who developed the offensive plans during 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. With the December 1990 CENTAF reorganization, the 

chief reason to disguise the presence and function of the Black Hole ceased. The organization acquired a new name, the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting Division, or 

GAT. In this chapter we will use the name GAT to refer to the planning division as it 

existed after the December 1990 reorganization. 

%e ATOs for the first two days and the MAP for the third day of the air campaign 

were completed during the five months of Desert Shield. 

205 
We will also survey Desert Stom command and control in the context of 

(a) adjustments to bad weather, (b) the Scud hunt, and (c) Intelligence 

support. 

Chapter 7 also approaches the task of describing how the air campaign 

was executed from an unorthodox angle. Rather than viewing government 

agencies from the “top-down,” that is, in terms of their structure, purposes, 

and resources,4 we supplement the recollections of the chief planners 

devising and executing the air campaign with a view from the units-the 

“bottom-~p.”~ The contrast between top-down and bottom-up analyses also 

will help explain the differences between building and executing an Air 

Tasking Order for a “dynamic” and “static” environment. 

Operation of the GAT 

During Desert Shield, a period of about five months, Days 1 and 2 

of the air campaign were “fully scripted,” and the Master Attack Plan for 

Day 3 was prepared.‘ In putting together the MAP for the first two days, 

the choice of targets and attacking aircraft was considered carefully? 

General Horner thought the resulting offensive air plan was “too precise.” 

Horner would have been happy with about half of the objectives the 

’The planning for subsequent days of the air campaign was conducted in parallel 

with ongoing combat operations. 

40f course, this approach has been applied in most studies of command and control. 

For example, see C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense (New 

Haven, 1990); Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command (Boston, 1975); Thomas P Coakley, ed. el: Issues of Command and Control 

(Washington, DC, 1991); Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, 1985). 

he difference between “top-down,” and “bottom-up” approaches to understanding 

organizational behavior is explained by James Q. Wilson in Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York, 1989). 

‘GAT planners assembled the Master Attack Plans for Days 1 and 2. transformed 

them into ATOS, printed the ATOS for Days 1 and 2, and sent these to the wings via 

courier. GAT planners also put together a MAP for Day 3. Under the logic of the planning 

process-on Day 1 of the air campaign-the GAT would begin working on the Day 4 MAP, 

and the AT0 Division (using Target Planning Worksheets generated from the Day 3 MAP) 

would begin constructing the Day 3 ATO. 

’For a discussion of how rules of engagement regarding legal targets were written, 

see (U) GWAPS Volume 111, Supon, Chapter 4. 

206 
Black Hole planners tried to achieve on the first two days.* Homer was 

correct in his view that many strike, refueling, support; and reconnaissance operations (for example, suppression of enemy air defenses, electronic warfare support, and tankers) were tightly coupled. Each mission 

was linked closely to other missions or support activities. A change to 

one mission cascaded through the plan, affecting the other missions and 

multiplying the number of departures from the original plan.’ The complexity of this script or plan was so great that the air campaign planners 

were surprised there were not about four to five midair collisions with 

tankers that first day.” Implications of the Air Tasking Order’s great 

complexity were evident for at least a month before combat began. Maj. 

Gen. John A. Corder noted that even during December 1990, when a few 

changes were made to the Master Attack Plan, it would take a week to 

address the effects of those changes in other parts of the plan.” 

In Homer’s view, it was necessary to prepare the planners for the 

effects of Murphy’s Law. He believed that detailed war planning was 

more appropriate for nuclear warfare and explicitly drew the comparison 

between conventional and nuclear war planning in cutting off the GAT’S 

preparation of ever more Master Attack Plans and Air Tasking Orders in 

advance of actual combat. In contrast to nuclear planning, conventional 

warfare planning must be flexible. In Homer’s words, 

8Deptula reported the conversation in interviews conducted after the war. (S) Intvw, 

GWAPS with Lt Col David A. Deptula, SAF/OSX, 20 Dec 1991. When questioned on this 

vignette by Air Force historians, Homer did not remember the conversation. but believed 

he might have made that argument to Deptula. (S) Intvw, Barry Barlow, Richard G. 

Davis, and Perry Jamieson with Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, Commander, 9th AF, 4 Mar 

1992. 

’(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Col David A. Deptula, SAF/OSx, 21 Dec 1991; (S) Intvw, 

Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula. 20 Nov 1991. 

‘%tvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Nov I99 1 ; (S) Intvw, 

GWAPS with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Dec 1991. Lt Col James Philips noted, “God had to have 

been with us ’cause we didn’t have a midair. We knew we were going to have one and 

we didn’t. It was so congested. We attempted to control it, but it was so congested, and 

some of the people didn’t play by the rules.” (S) Intvw, Jacqueline R. Henningsen, HQ 

SAC, DcS/Plans & Resources with Maj Scott Hente, HQ SAuD00, Maj John Heinz, HQ 

SAC/DOO, Lt col James Philips, HQ SAUDOO. and Lt col James Schroder, 99th Strategic 

Weapons Wing, 11 Mar 1991. 

“(S) Intvw. GWAPS with Maj Gen John A. Corder, Deputy Commander for Operations, USCENTAF (Nov 1990 to Mar 1991), 18 May 1992. 

207 
conventional war [is a matter of] actionheaction a lot, and you have got 

to be able to capitalize on mistakes the enemy makes . . . . So what I 

wanted [the GAT planners] to do, I did not want them to become so 

enthralled with preplanning that they were unable to react when the war 

started. That is why I would never let them do a full-day third-day 

ATO. I wanted them immediately to start-and you saw the perfection 

of the first two-day plan, and then you saw them kind of drop off in 

terms of really good planning for about three or four days until they 

learned how to do chaos war, and then they suddenly became very good 

again . ’ * 

Table 7 illustrates the key planning cycle activities and products that 

the Campaign Plans (which contained the GAT and the AT0 Division) and 

Combat Operations Divisions were designed to accomplish as combat 

began on Day 2.13 

When the air campaign began, the GAT officers believed they were 

the only ones who understood the logic and contents of the campaign 

plan14-such as the relationship among objectives, target sets, and weapons 

in-theater. The GAT planners’ belief probably was reinforced on Day 2 

by witnessing the rampant confusion in the AT0 Division as officers 

attempted to translate the Day 3 Master Attack Plan into an Air Tasking 

Order.l5 In an interview conducted after the war, Corder recalled he 

12(S) Intvw, Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, 4 Mar 1992. 

‘%his table is based on a slide in a briefing prepared by Lt Col David A. Deptula. 

Briefing, Lt Col David A. Deptula, SAF/OSX, subj: ‘The Air Campaign: The Planning 

Process,” rev 3. nd [ 19921. 

I4(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Dec 1991. (U) When Lt Col Mark 

“Buck” Rogers reviewed the command post exercises held on 6 and 13 January 1991, he 

also noted that only he, Lt Col Deptula, and Brig Gen Glosson had a thorough understanding-in terms of theory and practiceof the air campaign. Lt Gen Homer was 

comfortable with the plan but did not have the level of understanding of the other three. 

This perception was confirmed by the 13 January exercise, which was a “dry run” of 

transforming the Day 3 MAP into the ATO. One “lesson” of this exercise was that either 

Rogers or Deptula had to be in the GAT at all times. (S) Intvw. Lt Col Frank D. Kistler 

and Mark D. Mandeles with Lt Col Mark “Buck” Rogers, SAF/LL, 31 Jan 1992. 

lsMaj Gen Corder noted that the officers working in the ATO Division were unable 

to complete the AT0 on time. Corder sent only partially completed AT0 to the wings. 

See (S) Intvw, GWAPS with Maj Gen John A. Corder, 18 May 1992. 

208 
Table 7 

Directorates for Campaign Plans and Combat Operations 

Planned Activities: Day 2 of the Air Campaign in 

Organization 

Product 

I 

I 

GAT (Guidance, 

Apportionment, 

’Lgrgeting) 

o Master 

Attack Plan 

o Guidance 

Letter 

o Target Planning 

Worksheets 

Sheets 

o Change 

AT0 (Air wng 

Order) 

0 AT0 (CAFMS) 

- Adddetail 

(callsigns, . 

squawks, 

SPINS. etc.) 

- Airspace 

deconfliction 

- Tanker tracks 

o ATO transmission 

om (Combat 

Operations) 

o Execution 

Management 

- Coordination 

- Immediate 

Taskings 

- Changes 

Planning: Day 4 I Processing: Day 3 I Execution: Day 2 

believed in mid-January that Glosson would send GAT staff to help assemble the AT0 when the war began. Glosson did not. CENTAF staff 

quickly found itself, in Corder’s words, “discombobulated,” trying to 

coordinate varied and manifold details of operations. And, the task took 

much longer than anticipated: nine to ten hours instead of two to three. 

On the second day, at 18OOL. the third day’s ATO was to have been 

generated. At 22OOL, only about thirty or forty percent of the AT0 had 

been generated, including some of the critical strike packages. At this 

point, Corder decided to send the mas it stood-to the wings. For 

various reasons, including tanker availability, a sizable portion of the 

planned strike packages were cancelled.16 

At this time, instead of exclusively preparing the MAP for Day 4, the 

GAT officers started to assume responsibility for some of the functions 

I6(S) Intvw. GWAPS with Maj Gen Corder, 18 May 1992. (U) The sortie change data 

indicate only a small number of cancellations (approximately 35) and a moderate number 

of additions (about 100). The cancellations Corder describes probably never were entered 

into the ATO sent to the wings. These missions were rolled over into later versions of the 

MAP and ATO. 

209 
envisioned for other Tactical Air Control Center divisions. They began 

monitoring the execution of the Day 1 and 2 ATOS (the function of Combat Operations) and making changes to Day 3 while that AT0 was being 

prepared for publication by the AT0 Divi~i0n.l~ 

As shown in Chapter 6, CENTAF officers before the reorganization 

were restricted from making changes to their plan after 08002 of the 

second day in the three-day ATO planning cycle.‘8 The revised planning 

cycle instituted after the reorganization contained no such rule. In effect, 

GAT planners were able to change, without justification to another staff 

element or senior officer, the planned targets and time over targets after 

the AT^ itself should have been completed. As Desert Storm began, the 

absence of an outside (the GAT) restriction on making AT0 changes also 

altered the relationship between the separate Campaign Plans and the 

Combat Operations divisions. GAT officers assumed not only some of the 

duties of the other division within Campaign Plans, the AT0 Division, but 

also some of the duties of Combat Operations in monitoring and executing the current day’s ATO. In effect, the separate functions of planning 

and execution were combined in one office. The GAT’S influence expanded to cover a wider share of command and control for the air campaign. 

Figure 30 illustrates a GAT planner’s postwar view of how the GAT came 

to control planning and ATO execution over the full three-day planning 

cycle.” The ability of GAT planners to make changes at any point in the 

ATO planning cycle resulted in a marked departure from how this process 

had been visualized in Desert Shield. 

How to Assess the Command and Control 

of the Air Campaign 

One way to assess the effectiveness of command and control is to 

examine changes and adjustments made to a plan after it had been released as an Air Tasking Order. Wo types of questions pertain to AT0 

”See (S) Chapter 4 for discussion of the functions of the TACS. 

“See also (S) Chapter 5. 

%his figure is a slide in a briefing prepared by Lt Col David A. Deptula. 

(S) Briefing, Lt Col Deptula, SAF/OSX, subj: ‘The Air Campaign: The Planning Process.” 

rev 3, nd [19!?2]. 

1 

210 
Figure 30 

Reality: Timeline 

I 

GAT (Guidance, 

Apportionment, 

I I Targeting) I 

~~ 

AT0 (CAFMS) 

** Detail (callsigns, 

squaks, SPINS, etc) 

** Airspace deconfliclion 

0. Tanker tracks 

AT0 transmission 

Command E

Current 011s

Executio

Managem

-0 Immed

taskings 

** 

Coordi

Chang

I osob odoo 200t 04hO I ebo 0500 

I 
changes in the “chaos war” of Desert Stork First, there is the general 

question: What do planning changes-Am changes-measure? Second, 

there are the specific questions about planning and execution during 

Desert Storm. Did the changes reflect something wrong with the planning process? Did the changes reflect recent information about the 

target? Did they merely reflect the “responsiveness” and “flexibility” 

inherent in airpower? Can we distinguish changes which have no effect 

on ultimate campaign goals from those changes which have a positive 

effect on campaign goals? Answers to these questions will have to await 

a fuller examination of Desert Shield and Desert Storm records. However, we will try to provide a context in which to evaluate them. 

Changes made to the Air Tasking Order reflect on the planning and 

execution aspects of command and control.M The GAT planners made 

changes to the ATO under the assumption that those changes would improve the effectiveness of the air campaign. Yet, in terms of planning, 

ATO changes may reveal problems in the quality and timeliness of information used to make decisions. GAT officers planned and made comparisons among strike options despite uncertainty about the future (outcomes 

of planned strikes) and about the present (outcomes of strikes which had 

already taken place). In terms of execution, the way the GAT officers 

chose to handle uncertainty-making last-minute changes at the Combat 

Operations Division and at the wings instead of feeding the changes into 

the end of the three-day planning process-further reduced the quality of 

information GAT officers worked with. The case study later in this chapter illustrates pitfalls in the assumption that last-minute changes would 

help achieve campaign goals; the AT0 changes introduced yet another 

source of uncertainty for GAT planners and units to work with. 

Table 8 contrasts Days 1,2, and 3 planned sorties with the total number of sorties changed and the number of timing and target changes made 

to the ATO. There were no changes for Day 1 and only a small number of 

changes on Day 2. On these days the units executed the Am essentially 

as written by GAT planners, and they saw little reason to order changes. 

20‘‘~T0 changes” refer to changes made by GAT officers to targets, times over targets 

(TOTS). support packages, and so on. The term does not include those situations, for 

instance, where the pilot had to abort the mission after launch (e.g., because of an 

equipment malfunction), or where the target could not be found or seen. 

21 2 
Table 8 

Planned Sorties versus AT0 Changes 

Days 1, 2, and 3*' 

Timing 

sorties & '18rget Total Sorties 

Planned Changes Changed 

Day 1 2,759 0 0 

Day 3 2/44 1 112 449 

Day 2 2,900 16 68 

The first two days of the air campaign had gone well. Day 3, however, was very troublesome to all concerned-for example, many sorties 

were cancelled from the Am because of tanker nonavailability,22 or 

tankers were not in the right places. On Day 4, the ability to match 

tanker and support aircraft with strike aircraft in the AT0 declined further. 

The problem with the tankers was traced to the continued attempt to plan, 

over a short period of time, a tight schedule linking strike aircraft with 

tanke1s.2~ Over the five months of Desert Shield, the use and placement 

of tankers had been planned carefully for the first two days of combat. 

As Brig. Gen. Patrick P. Caruana put it, "we had [the initial plan worked 

out] down to the minute."24 General Glosson admitted a planning shortfall on this matter?5 He solved the problem by changing the goal of 

"Sources: GWAPS Composite Sorties Database and TACS Change Log. 

%anker aircraft were not listed in the Black Hole's MAP. Instead, tanker tracks and 

assignments were added by officers in the ATO Division, who, during the initial days of 

the air campaign, had little understanding of the MAP or its components. 

23(S) Intvw. Jacqueline R. Henningsen, DCSlPlans & Resources, HQ SAC with Brig 

Gen Patrick P. Caruana, Commander, 42d Air Division, SAC, 13 Mar 1991. 

24(S) Ibid. 

25(S) Intvw. MSgt Theodore J. Turner, USCENTAF. History Office with Brig Gen 

Buster C. Glosson. Director, USCENTAF Campaign Plans, 6 Mar 1991. (U) Brig Gen 

Caruana noted that after the start of Desert Storm it came "almost as a shock" to the 

planners that tankers comprised a limiting factor in air operations. (S) Intvw, Brig Gen 

Patrick P. Caruana. 

21 3 
tanker planning. Rather than tasking tankers to particular sorties or 

packages, planners placed tankers in particular tracks: areas, orbits, and 

altitudes. One effect of this change was to reduce by twenty to forty the 

planned number of tankers employed every day.26 

The much larger number of changes on and after Day 3. illustrated 

by the tanker example above, reflects a major shift in the planning and 

execution processes. The process of planning the subsequent days of the 

war has been called “the dynamic planning process.”” Changes were 

made on a nearly “constant basis.” A key GAT planner argued that there 

was a reason for every target change, although the planners did not have 

the time to record all the reasons?’ The process had dynamic results. 

Table 9 presents number of changes to the daily Am-Day 1 through 

Day 43 of the air campaign-based on nine sources (that is, additions and 

can~eIIations).*~ 

*%’he number of tankers tasked fell from a range of 270 to 290 a day to about 250 

tankers. Maj Gen Corder recalled he told Glosson the problem with tankers was that 

there was no flexibility in tanker use. Corder’s solution was to plan for the use of a 

proportion of the fleet and to use the rest to fill in on emergency bases. (S) Intvw, Maj 

Gen John A. Corder, Brig Gen Caruana also argued that he solved the problem by not 

“fragging” more than 265-275 tanker sorties per day, which gave them the flexibility to 

add approximately 25 sorties to fill in for trouble spots. (S) Intvw, Brig Gen Patrick P. 

Caruana, Commander, 42d Air Division, SAC, 13 Mar 1991. 

27(S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Nov 1991. 

28(S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 8 Jan 1992. 

2%e numbers of sorties planned per day are taken from the GWAPS Composite 

Sorties Database. These daily totals include both combat hd support aircraft. The 

numbers of sorties changed were compiled from the TACS change log and the CAFMS 

Database. Changes for both combat and support aircraft were totaled. 

All data on the types of changes made to the planned sorties comes from the entries 

in the TACS Change Log. This log was initiated to monitor and track the changes submitted to the TAG. Record-keeping improved during the course of the war. Initially, 

changes were logged as they were received-leading to mixed days and making it more 

difficult to assign a sequential change number. For example, the fourth change received 

for ATO D would be entered as change DO4. The data for the ATO c through E are 

mingled. Beginning with AT0 F, log book sheets were reserved for specific days. 

Log entries included the change number, mission number@) or package@), time on 

target, package, type of change, remarks, tanker (a “check mark” if applicable), AWACS 

(a “check mark” if applicable), and the initials of the log keeper. Additional information 

was added on aircraft type and the number of aircraft to some records. This happened 

more frequently towards the last half of the war. 

214 
By correlating dates and mission numbers with entries in the CA~S Database, it wa.4 

possible to fill in much of the missing information on the number and type of aircraft 

changed. The mission planning guide had some information linking mission numbers 

with aircraft types. When specific data could not be located, the number and type of 

aircraft were estimated based on the package, mission number, and information on aircraft 

tactics (e.g., F-14 normally fly as pairs under a single mission number, tankers, and 

individual mission numbers). 

This process does not yield a precise count of the numbers of sorties changed per 

day. It does provide the best estimate possible based on the available data. Note, it may 

make more sense to refer to the change data in terms of the nearest ten changes to avoid 

the appearance of having more precision than can be justified. 

21 5 
Table 9 

AT0 Changes, Day 1-Day 43' 

ATOhy Scud Non- Timing Other Addi- Weather Other Mai

Hunt weather Changed Change' tion' Change Cancella- nan

Change Target ti0d canc

or Addi- Change' latio

tionb 

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2 0 14 2 3 20 29 0 

3 28 76 36 120 105 47 29 

4 12 1 I6 57 95 225 109 1 29 

5 74 124 83 89 91 395 63 

6 12 50 62 109 208 26 56 

7 2 168 43 244 129 71 12 

8 13 123 86 162 66 0 63 

9 0 80 41 87 126 76 83 

10 40 50 52 143 158 0 43 

II 10 104 67 106 165 85 48 

12 4 68 67 71 116 0 41 

13 10 11 70 57 66 0 6 

14 0 82 240 48 158 4 37 

15 0 142 139 73 80 0 109 

16 0 309 106 58 36 0 9 

17 8 163 51 125 87 47 7 
Table 9 

AT0 Changes, Day 1-Day 43' 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

0 

73 

0 

0 

76 

0 

48 

34 

0 

0 

14 

19 

0 

10 

0 

0 

14 

179 

165 

159 

82 

71 

191 

133 

65 

79 

172 

166 

161 

62 

203 

147 

162 

178 

76 

108 

144 

169 

127 

102 

62 

34 

50 

23 

158 

79 

80 

39 

133 

42 

85 

151 

114 

166 

220 

110 

28 

70 

153 

119 

76 

183 

137 

67 

124 

81 

80 

95 

82 

88 

47 

90 

88 

74 

15 

80 

109 

65 

108 

53 

98 

81 

54 

67 

92 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

23 

134 

0 

0 

23 

100 

51 

41 

87 

30 

37 

56 

16 

27 

118 

28 

29 

47 

11 

9 

49 
Table 9 

ATO Changes, Day 1-Day 43' 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

Totals 

1 

b 

C 

d 

c 

I 

J 

h 

i 

j 

t 

0 

0 

2 

16 

2 

0 

25 

7 

0 

553 

194 

45 

347 

147 

277 

196 

218 

327 

59 

5865 

132 109 

41 64 

107 69 

68 36 1 

73 141 

107 165 

89 150 

97 212 

123 58 

3,550 4953 

58 67 

50 10 

76 0 

116 0 

147 26 

146 39 

325 64 

1 29 0 

87 0 

49261 122 

65 

48 

57 

30 

52 

76 

34 

149 

61 

29w 

Source: GWAPS Composite Sorties Database, TAG Change Log. 

Sorties diverted to Scud hunt, or new sorties added to hunt Scuds. 

Changes to mission target for any reason other than weather. 

Changes to time over target, or air refueling control time (AR~). 

Changes to mission numbers, call signs, tanker assignments, and unspecified changes. 

New sorties. 

Target changes, timing changes, @ssion adds, and cancellations caused by bad weather at the base or target 

Unspecified cancellations. 

Cancellation because aircraft required maintenance. 

Crew rest, aircraft unavailable, tanker unavailability. 

Most of these changes were to SPINS; some changes were to Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. 
Figure 31 plots the number of planned (ATO) sorties against the 

number of sorties changed (as counted in the TACC log).3o This figure 

shows that (after Day 2) GAT planners made an average of more than 500 

changes each day. Examination of the planned sorties versus ATO timing 

%eginning with the ATO for Day 2 of Desert Storm, officers h the TACC logged 

ATO change requests to monitor and better organize the change process. As Deptula noted 

above, not all changes were entered onto the change sheets. The use of the telephone 

resulted in many verbal change requests. 

Changes were recorded for ATOS designated C through Z (covering Days 2 through 

24) and ATOS A through S (covering Days 25 through 44). The hand-written record is 

the best available source of the number and type of changes processed for each ATO and 

is the basis for the change data presented in this report. 

Change numbers were assigned in the log with an alpha-numeric designator. For 

example, change D-42 was the forty-second change received for ATO D. Date-time 

groups for the change or the affected mission were not recorded, but page numbers could 

be used to assign changes to the appropriate AT0 D. Changes for the first AT0 C through 

E appear to have been entered as they arrived, since changes for ATOS D and E were 

mixed in with changes for ATOS C and D. Beginning with AT0 F (Day 5). specific pages 

were reserved for each ATO, probably to make it easier to assign consecutive page 

numbers-there were a few errors in change numbers for the first three ATos. 

The TACC log book was organized into column for the change number, mission 

number(s) effected, TOT, package number, type of change (add, change, cancel), remarks, 

check marks for tankers and AWACS coordination, and initials (probably the person 

making the entry). The columns are not complete for all entries. Additional information 

on the type of aircraft affected was often included. The number of sorties was included 

less often. The number of logged changes varied from a low of 19 for Day 2 (ATO C) to 

a high of 158 for Day 39-the first day of the ground campaign. Eighty to 100 changes 

were common until the last 10 days of the war, when the number increased to the 130- 

150 range. 

To better interpret the impact these changes had on the TACC and the execution of 

the ATO, the data in the change log were correlated with the Composite Sorties Database 

to get more information about the number and type of aircraft changed and the type of 

changes made. Then these augmented log data were categorized by type of change and 

summed by day to create daily totals of the number of sorties changed. The categories 

used are the following: sorties changed or added for Scud hunting; sorties added; weather-related additions or target changes; timing changes; target changes; other changes; 

weather cancellations; maintenance cancellations; operational cancellations; and other 

cancellations. Changes to the specid Instructions (SPINS) section of the AT0 and changes 

to the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile missions wen logged but not used in this analysis. 

219 
- 

m 

0 

-1 

Q 

UI 

C 

m 

c 

u 

0 

0 

z 

x 

4 

5 

m 

C 

m 

ln 

Q 

cn 

ln 

3 

.- 

E 

9 

F 

Y 

a 

ln 

Q 

r 

0 

u) 

U 

0, 

C 

C 

m 

.- 

h 

I 

I 

I 

I 

0 0 

In m 

I 

I 

220 
and target changes shows a great deal of variabilit~.~’ The cause of this 

variability is not readily apparent. Not all changes to a plan, the AW, will 

have the same impact on the overall execution of that plan. Specifically, 

target changes, timing changes, and major changes to complex mission 

scenarios will have a greater impact on current operations than changes 

based on weather, maintenance availability, or crew rest. Figure 32 presents this same information as a comparison of the sorties changed as a 

percentage of the sorties planned each day. 

After the war, senior GAT planners recalled expecting grave coordination problems after Day 2. The CENTAF planning system was established to support a maximum of 2,400 sorties a day?2 By Day 10, 

3’We began this analysis with Day 6, rather than Day 3, because many changes (on 

Days 3, 4. and 5) were made due to bad weather and learning how to work within the 

three-day ATO planning cycle. We stopped analysis at Day 39 because many ATO changes 

were ma& to accommodate the ground campaign. 

When examining all 9 sources of change to the ATO (see Table 9), there is a mean 

of 518 ATO changes per day and a standard deviation of 129. If the number of changes 

made by GAT planners had “leveled off.” we should see a much smaller standard deviation-a lot less dispersion around the mean. When examining only 2 key sources of ATO 

changes (timing and target changes) over the same Day 6 through Day 39 period, the 

same wide dispersion appears. The average number of timing and target changes is about 

226. with a standard deviation of 91. Again. if the number of timing and target changes 

made by GAT planners had leveled off, we should see much less variability. Due to the 

time limit on this project, we did not correlate the variability in daily AT0 changes with 

factors such as the quantity and quality of intelligence information received (on a particular day) from Washington, Scud launches, or personnel fatigue. One explanation for the 

variability in ATO changes which also can not be rejected is that the frequency and tempo 

of changes ordered by GAT officers early in the air campaign induced a cycle of other 

changes over several days. Since the planning and execution of the AT0 cycle involved 

overlapping activities, the AT0 planning praws was unable to reach some sort of steady 

state. This issue regarding the implications of constant changes made in a process is 

similar to one described by W. Edwards Deming. See “On Some Statistical Aids Toward 

Economic Production,” Interfaces, Vol. 5 (August 1975). pp 1-15. 

32Soon after the end of the war, Glosson noted that the system should have supported 

between 1,500 and 2,000 sorties a day, with a maximum of 2,400 sorties. The maximum 

number of sorties run in an exercise was 2,400. (S) Intvw, MSgt Theodore J. Turner with 

Brig Gen Glosson, 6 Mar 1991. The system was overloaded by the attempt to generate 

and transmit more sorties than appropriate to the number of terminals in theater. 

221 
cw 

0 

T 

a 

e 

M 

8 .- ti 

m 

222 
Brigadier General Glosson was asking for more than 3,000 sorties a day?3 

In Glosson’s words, 

They had never experienced anything like that. And as a result, 

it was just overwhelming. It took us almost half of the war to 

get the AT0 out at a time that was acceptable to me. That being 

about 1500 to 1700. For the first three weeks, the ATO would be 

published somewhere between 1800 and 2100.M 

PHOTO DELETED 

Strategic and KTO planning cell chiefs, Lt Cols Deptula and Baptiste, 

discuss air allocation during planning session 

Changing the ATO while it was being coordinated, and especially after it 

had been released to the wings, increased the complexity and fragility of 

the process. To compensate for late changes to the Master Attack Plan, 

the GAT would often call the wings and tell them what the first two or 

three hours of the Air Tasking Order were going to be, so they could plan 

33An alternate interpretation of Deptula and Glosson’s expectations of coordination 

problems would include mentioning that the GAT did not “use” the CENTAF system to 

generate the air plan. Thus, it did not matter that the CENTAF system was designed to 

handle up to 2,400 sorties. Was victory dependent upon generating 3,000 sorties a day? 

Could we have won the air war by flying fewer than 2,400 sorties per day? 

”(S) Intvw, MSgt Theodore J. Turner with Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, 6 Mar 1991. 

223 
their missions.35 Glosson admitted that he did not realize at the time that 

the size and complexity of the ATO had driven the Computer Assisted 

Force Management System (CAFMS) software near to exceeding its capability.” In particular, according to Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, Glosson 

expected package and mission commanders to exercise tactical initiative, 

that is, to find their own tankers or to make major in-flight adjustment^.'^ 

And planning and intelligence officers at the squadrons did coordinate 

operations.38 This coordination was made possible by the possession of 

STU-111s (secure telephones) and other means of reliable, secure communication at the wing le~e1.3~ 

35RAND analysts, Leland Joe and Dan Gonzales. noted some undesirable consequences of last-minute changes upon the units. 

[Slome changes to the AT0 were made very close to mission execution. In 

these cases, the necessary target graphics for the delivery of precision munitions 

were sometimes not available. In addition, many of the target changes did not 

specify desired mean points of impact (DMPIS). leaving the choice up to the 

wing. Since the wings were not equipped to handle these functions, or did not 

have necessary target graphics available, the 9th TIS at the TACC in Riyadh 

frequently became involved in picking DMPls and providing target graphics 

material. The latter could involve the Defense Mapping Agency facility in St. 

Louis. which kept a library of mapping materials. If necessary data [were] 

available at DMA. mensurated coordinate data could be provided to the TACC 

within a few hours. 

(S/NF) Leland Joe and Dan Gonzales. Command and Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence in Desert Storm Air Operations, WD(L)-S750-AF (Santa Monica: RAND 

Corporation, Feb 1992). pp 30, 32. 

“(S) Intvw, MSgt Theodore J. Turner, with Brig Cen Buster C. Glosson, 6 Mar 

1991. 

37(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Dec 1991. 

38For example, F-11 IF units communicated directly with F-ISE and F-I17 units to 

conduct their own bomb damage assessment. These communications “prevented striking 

hardened targets that had previously been hit by other PGM units.” (S) USAF Tactical 

Fighter Weapons Center, Tactical Analysis Bidleiin, Volume 91-2, Jul 1991, p 7-3. Other 

interviews with wing-level operations officers complements the assessment reported by 

TAB. 91-2. (S) Intvw, Thomas C. Hone with Maj John Nichols, 401st TFW during Desert 

Storm, 20 Jul 1992; (S) Intvw, Mark D. Mandeles and Lt Col Sanford S. Terry with Maj 

Robert J. Heston, 37th TFW (P), Director of Intelligence (during Desert ShieldDesert 

Storm), 16 Oct 1992. 

(S) Intvw. Maj Robert J. Heston, 16 Oct 1992. 39 

224 
It appears that Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting officers did 

not anticipate the need to develop specific procedures to mitigate ATO 

change coordination problems.q0 As the war progressed, the GAT-CENTAF 

coordination problems had several sources. First, General Glosson believed putting together the AT0 was an administrative function which 

could have been accomplished very easily with the “latest state-of-the-art 

computer support and a few sergeants. I didn’t need all those officers in 

there that didn’t understand that all they were doing was a mechanical 

cookbook process.’4’ Second, as Major General Corder noted, the physical separation of the GAT from the AT0 Division made face-to-face interaction less likely. Third, the first time CENTAF officers putting together 

the ATO ever saw the type of GAT “inputs” that would be used for the 

campaign was on the first day of the air campaign-when GAT officers 

submitted target planning worksheets comprising the third day’s attack 

packages!2 

Weather-Related AT0 Changes 

A major cause of changes unrelated to organizational and planning 

factors within the CENTAF staff was weather. Figure 33 shows the number of changes blamed on weather!’ On Day 4, about 100 sorties were 

changed due to various weather problems. Day 5 saw the most weatherrelated changes of the war: approximately 400. After the first week, 

qOOn 6 and 13 January 1991, the GAT held planning exercises which tested the AT0 

building process for the Day 3 ATO. The exercise did not include participation of the 

other Divisions in the TACC. (S) lntvw Lt Col Mark B. “Buck” Rogers; (S) Intvw, 

GWAPS with Maj Gen John A. Corder, 18 May 1992. 

4’(S) Intvw, Richard G. Davis, Perry Jamieson, and Diane T. Putney with Lt Gen 

Buster C. Glosson, 12 Dec 1991. 

420rder recalled that “in the first couple, three days, [Brig Gen] Buster [C. Clossonl 

would come down and set: what was going on. He’d see this chaos [in the TACC] . . . . He thought . . . [an] inept bunch of people [in] the TACC were trying to run the thing.” 

(S) Intvw. GWAPS with Maj Gen John A. Corder, 18 May 1992. 

“As noted in footnote 19, all data on the types of changes made to the planned 

sorties come from the entries in the TAG Change Log. Figure 33’s weather-related 

changes includes “weather additions and target changes” and “weather cancellations” due 

to bad weather at the base or target area. See Table 9. 

225 
t 

0 0 m 

+ 

0 0 m 00000000 

0000 l.lDln-rs?~Z 

226 
weather-related changes did not seem to cause major perturbations in the 

planning process. One explanation for this is that planners used the 

weather forecasts to avoid assigning targets in areas having forecasts of 

bad weather (especially in Iraq).44 

While Air Tasking Order changes are an imperfect measure of effectiveness of the AM planning process, they may be used to assess how 

well the process communicated the intent of the campaign planners to the 

flying units, and how well the flying units understood that tasking. As 

the preceding pages illustrate, AT0 changes, changes made to the tasking 

given to a unit after an AT0 had been published, comprised a significant 

percentage of the total number of sorties flown during the air campaign. 

The impact of those changes, as a measure of the command and control 

process, is discussed in the next section. 

Centralized Planning, Decentralized Execution 

From the onset of hostilities, the duration of the war was a major 

uncertainty for air campaign planners. Initially, Glosson feared the air 

campaign would not be allowed for more than a few days.“’ Hence, his 

direction to Deptula was to hit every strategic target in Iraq as quickly as 

possible. The objective of the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting 

planners was to use every sortie available to hit the most important 

targets, across all target categories, every day.& This attitude was reflected in the willingness to (a) concentrate planning attention on platforms 

~~ 

@See (S) Volume 111, Suppri, Chapter 5. 

45(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Col Deptula, 21 Dec 1991. (U) We also should note 

that although Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev offered political support to the 

coalition, there were concerns that the Soviets simultaneously were pursuing other agenda. 

For example, five days after the start of the air campaign, Soviet officials were still 

attempting to broker peace. (Andrew Rosenthal, “Bush Demands Iraq Start Pullout Today 

Despite Its Assent to 3-Week Soviet Plan.” The New York Times. 23 Jan 1991. p 1.) 

These Soviet efforts continued. On 29 Jan 1991, a joint statement by Secretary of State 

James Baker, 111 and Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh asserted a cease 

tire was possible. (Bill Nichols and Johanna Neuman. “U.S. Soviet Cease-fire Plan 

Offered.” The Washingion Times, 30 Jan 1991, p 1 .) On I 1 Feb 199 I, Soviet envoy 

Yevgeny Rimakov arrived in Baghdad to discuss a possible ceasefire with President 

Saddam Hussein. (Rick Atkinson, “Bush: No Immediate Plan to Start Ground War. U.S. 

Will Rely ‘For a While’ on Air Power Against Iraqis,” The Warhingron Post. 12 Feb 

1991. p 1.) 

“(s) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt COI Deptula, 21 ~ec 1991. 

227 
capable of delivering precision-guided munitions4’ and (b) call wing 

operations officers directly with instructions about new or different targets. For example, when the weatherman came in to the GAT and said 

the weather was bad over Baghdad that night, Glosson would tell Deptula 

to come up with “thirty-four more new targets for the [F-]117s, and add 

jokingly ‘Oh, by the way, you have twenty minutes.”“’ 

From his position as planner and commander, Glosson did not 

consider changes to the ATO a problem. In other words, you make 

changes to the ATO based on intelligence. You make changes to the 

ATO based on weather, which caused more changes than anything else. 

The way the ATO process is set up, if you lose a target to weather you 

have the choice of rolling them back in two days later or making a 

change to the next day’s ATO. An aircrew flying to the same target that 

you planned to fly the night before is not a difficult task. Although on 

paper it may seem that it’s a little more ratcheting. The key is to make 

the change early, then the impact on the aircrew is minimum!9 

47Although the MAP included targets for Proven Force, Proven Force did not employ 

aircraft capable of delivering EMS. (Proven Force was not initially in the ATO.) This 

may account for the GAT allowing Proven Force a good deal of discretion in planning and 

execution. During the first weeks of the war, Deptula gave Proven Force officers “mission-oriented” orders, that is, they were given a list of targets in a geographic area and 

left to work out their own strike plans, tankers, coordination, deconfliction. In effect, 

Proven Force had its own route package-despite Gen Homer’s great antipathy for the 

route package system employed in Vietnam. [(S) Intvw, Barlow. et al.. with Lt Gen 

Homer. Brig Gen Glosson also expressed great resolve to avoid the types of mistakes 

made in Vietnam. (S) Intvw, Msgt Theodore J. Turner, with Brig Gen Glosson. 6 Mar 

1991 .] Latitude line 34 north was used to deconflict operations. Eventually, Homer told 

Deptula to control Proven Force operations. To do so, Deptula had a target book, with 

which he would compare Proven Force target nominations with his own guidance. 

Deptula made no change in Proven Force plans when there was agreement between 

Proven Force target nominations and GAT targeting guidance. Deptula assumed the 

Proven Force planners knew their weapons systems and their geographical area better than 

he did, so he allowed Proven Force officers to specify the numbers and types of aircraft 

going into their strike packages. [(S) Intvw. GWAB with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Dee 1991; 

(S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula. 29 Nov 1991; (S) Intvw. Lt 

Col Mark “Buck” Rogers, 31 Jan 1992.1 

48Sometimes the twenty-minute deadline was used as a joke to emphasize the tempo 

of operations. (S) Intvw. Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula. 20 Nov 1991. 

(S) Intvw, MSgt Turner with Brig Gen Glosson, 6 Mar 1991. 49 

228 
PHOTO DELETED 

Gen Glosm, Col Tolln, and Lt Col Deptula discuss attack plan while 

Maj Ernle Norsworthy works on F-16 Issue. 

Glosson’s position on AT0 changes was partly a result of his view 

about the nature of war. For Glosson, war is a problem in 

managing chaos. That doesn’t mean you don’t plan, that doesn’t mean 

you don’t try to make everything as predictable as possible, but it’s just 

not that way. There are other people that refer to this as the fog of war. 

You cannot let yourself get to the point where you are so predictable 

that everything is just like a cookbook. That’s how you get people 

killed, that’s how you lose.-w 

But Glosson’s position on AT0 changes also reflected a lack of appreciation for the results last-minute ATO target or timing changes had on the 

rest of AT^ and on the people putting the AT0 together?’ In addition, 

s’(S) Intvw. MSgt Turner with Brig Gen Glosson, 6 Mar 1991. 

”(S) Intvw. Brig Gen Caruana. 13 Mar 1991. (U) However, on many occasions. 

Brig Gen Glosson asked his staff in the GAT whether the ATO changes he ordered were 

proving a too difficult task on the units. (S) Intvw. Mark D. Mandeles and Lt Col 

Sanford S. Terry with Lt Col Robert D. Eskridge. 15 Dec 1992. 

229 
other senior planners also did not appreciate the effects changes (to a 

tightly scheduled plan) had on the units.'* The planners made procedural 

changes when the changes ordered by senior planners threatened to 

thoroughly disrupt the conduct of the air campaign, as with tankers during 

Days 3 through 7.53 

According to the units, ATO changes were a major source of mission 

planning instability.% Unit-level officers also believed that the planners 

did not appreciate the effects last-minute ATO changes had on their ability 

to strike targets. For example, the P15E community wrote: 

Time needed to plan air interdiction missions is critical. Aircrews need 

to have ATO changes at least six hours prior to take-off in order to plan 

interdiction package missions properly. On several occasions AT0 

changes were received with little or no time to plan, brief, and upload 

the appropriate munitions. Aircrews became less effective in executing 

interdiction missions when there was insufficient planning time. Changes to the ATO should be the exception, and changes that are not time 

critical should be incorporated in the follow-on Am." 

'*Col Anthony J. Tolin admitted that late ATO changes were a significant problem 

for the wings-"the people on the end of the whip." That is, he recognized the difficulties 

incurred for the units when a late ATO change also required new target study, weapon 

changes, and new packaging to get to new targets. However, he explained it was important to not waste sorties by attacking targets that had just been destroyed. Intvw, John 

F. Guilmartin, Jr. with Brig Gen Anthony J. Tolin. Commander, 57th Fighter Wing, 30 

Jan 1992. 

'3Brig Gen Caruana noted that tanker planners had to insert themselves more forcefully into the planning process. It was only after "strict controls" were placed on the 

number of tanker sorties which would be planned that the dynamic combat situation was 

managed better. (S) Intvw, Brig Gen Caruana. 

"(SINFIWNINC) USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Tactical Analysis Bulletin, 

Volume 91-2. Jul 1991. 

55(S/NF/WN/NC) [bid, p 3-1 I. 

230 
Officers from the F-117 community reviewing the war, reiterated the 

E15E officers’ position.56 In sum, they noted that 

the amount of changes that were made in the AT0 daily became almost 

overwhelming. . . . While we were able to accept changes later (up to 

step time), the planning of the missions suffered and protection of the F117A suffered. Greater than four line changes became dangerous as 

deconfliction and threat avoidance were hurriedly accomplished. Rigid 

rules need to be established at the TACC to prohibit last minute changes?’ 

Officers from the F-111 community echoed the views expressed above. 

They stated that the 

CENTAF planning cell [GAT] would call directly to a unit with tasking 

that the TACC was unaware of, thus making coordination extremely 

difficult. Tasking should have gone through TACC to ensure proper 

support packaging. Instead individual units were forced to initiate, 

develop and procure support?’ 

Planning officers, who also understood the difficulty of keeping track 

of operations when many last-minute changes were made to the Air 

Tasking Order, complained during Desert Storm about people making 

last-minute changes without acknowledging the way those changes would 

effect the rest of the plan. In some cases targets would be abandoned in 

favor of a “hot biscuit”-a (perishable) high-value mobile target?’ 

As noted in Chapter 6, one implication of consolidating planning and 

command authority at Brigadier General Glosson’s level was that he 

could easily change the ATO after it had been distributed to the wings.60 

56Regarding changes, the F-117 community stated “make them early, concise and 

coordinated or don’t make them at all. We tended to reduce our sortie effectiveness when 

the changes came in late.” (S/NF/WN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Jul 1991, p 5-5. 

s7(S/NFIWN/NC) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Jul 1991, p 5-8. 

58(S/NF/WN/NC) Ibid, p 7-4. 

59(S) Intvw, Thomas A. Keaney, Mark D. Mandeles, Williamson Murray, and Barry 

Watts with Lt Col David A. Deptula, SAFIOSX. 20 Dec 1991. 

60Glosson, as Director of the newly formed Campaign Plans, was subordinate to 

Corder, the Director of Operations. However, Glosson, as an Air Division commander, 

was directly responsible to Homer through a separate chain of command. Corder, as DO, 

concerned himself with the organization and process necessary to produce a daily combat 

23 1 
Table 10 displays planned sorties against timing and target changes, the 

types of changes most likely to cause problems for a unit. While the 

ATO changes may be broken down into distinct classes for analysis, the 

classes are not equal in importance. When evaluated in terms of their 

effect on the wings, target changes and timing changes caused the most 

disruption. A single ta-rget or timing change created the need to recoordi 

nate or resynchronize with other strike and support sorties and tankers. 

In addition, these changes affected crew rest and maintenance cycles. 

Target changes also created new opportunity costs for mission planners 

as the last-minute demand for target descriptions and imagery crowded 

out activities in the planning cycle. 

Target changes:' timing changes, sorties added, and other changes 

(including unspecified changes and changes to callsigns, tankers, weapons 

loadouts, mission numbers, and number of sorties per mission) account 

for the bulk of the ATO changes. Of these, target changes (excluding 

weather-related target changes) is the largest category with a median of 

145 changes per day, and 4 days where the number of target changes 

ranged from 275 to 347. In all, approximately 23,000 changes were 

processed during the Gulf War. More than 5,800 of these were target 

changes, and 3,500 were timing changes. Together, these two categories 

accounted for more than 40 percent of the Am changes.62 

tasking, the ATO. Glosson. as chief campaign planner and air division commander, 

oversaw the development and execution of the air campaign. The combination of line 

and staff authority in the person of Glosson seemed to be acceptable to Homer, but 

created conflict with Corder. (See (S) Chapter 6.) 

6'Target changes include switching one target for another, and adding or changing 

secondary targets. Some target changes included TOT changes, but were counted only as 

a target change. Timing changes are made to TOT and air refueling control time (ARCT). 

They varied in duration from twenty minutes to several hours. 

6%ese numbers raise a critical issue in understanding the logic of the air campaign 

plan. If one of the prime purposes of the air campaign was to attack the Iraqi ability to 

understand what was happening to them and to defend against attack, then attention to 

absolute physical destruction of targets-as the intelligence community recommended and 

the GAT planners rejected-was unnecessary. After the start of tbe war, Glosson and 

Deptula argued, it was more important to keep the Iraqi military confused and disorganized by a relentless and constant attack. Yet, if functional degradation was of overriding 

importance. then was it necessary to have so many last-minute target and timing changes? 

The new target could easily have been added to the third day of the planning cycle. 

232 
Table 10 

Sorties Planned, Sorties Changed, Target and Timing Changes 

Day 1 through Day 43 

Sorties Total Target Timing Sum Timing 

AT0 Day Planned Sorties Changes Change and Target 

Changed Changes 

day 1 2,759 0 0 0 0 

day 2 

day 3 

day 4 

day 5 

day 6 

day 7 

day 8 

day 9 

day 10 

day 11 

day 12 

day 13 

day 14 

day 15 

day 16 

day 17 

day 18 

day 19 

day 20 

day 21 

day 22 

day 23 

day 24 

day 25 

day 26 

2,900 

2,441 

2.31 1 

2,286 

2,539 

2,803 

2,990 

2,657 

2,844 

2,555 

3,03 1 

2,914 

2.69 1 

2,859 

2,796 

2,607 

2,972 

2,856 

3.01 9 

2,581 

2,798 

2.929 

2.883 

2,854 

2,808 

68 

449 

81 3 

975 

552 

687 

544 

53 1 

526 

604 

367 

220 

577 

543 

518 

488 

514 

650 

57 1 

61 2 

56 1 

433 

377 

426 

385 

14 

76 

116 

1 24 

50 

168 

123 

80 

50 

104 

68 

11 

82 

142 

309 

163 

179 

1 65 

159 

82 

71 

191 

133 

65 

79 

2 

36 

57 

83 

62 

43 

86 

41 

52 

67 

67 

70 

240 

139 

106 

51 

76 

108 

144 

169 

127 

1 02 

62 

34 

50 

16 

112 

173 

207 

112 

21 1 

209 

121 

1 02 

171 

135 

81 

322 

28 1 

41 5 

214 

255 

273 

303 

25 1 

198 

293 

195 

99 

1 29 

233 
Table 10 (cont’d) 

Sorties Planned, Sorties Changed, Target and Timing Changes 

Day 1 through Day 43 

sorties Total Target Timing Sum Timing 

AT0 Day Planned Sorties Changes Change and Target 

day 27 2,863 363 172 23 195 

day 28 2,906 747 166 158 324 

day 29 2,778 488 161 79 240 

day 30 2,868 336 62 80 142 

day 31 2,656 530 203 39 242 

day 32 2,332 564 147 133 280 

day 34 3,149 517 178 85 263 

day 35 2,580 629 194 132 326 

day 36 2.91 9 260 45 41 86 

day 38 3,279 745 147 68 21 5 

day 39 3,309 718 277 73 350 

day 40 3,073 738 196 107 303 

day 41 3,27 1 905 21 8 89 307 

day 42 2,911 98 1 327 97 424 

day 43 723 394 59 123 182 

Total 1 16,818 22,942 5,865 3,550 9,415 

Changed Changes 

day 33 3,158 369 1 62 42 204 

day 37 3.1 19 667 347 1 07 454 

Source: GWAPS Composite Sorties Database and TACS Change Log. 

234 
Analysis of the distribution of the target and timing changes indicates 

that they were at their lowest levels during the first two weeks of the war, 

and they appear to be independent of the number of sorties planned. 

They did not peak on the same days. The number of target and timing 

changes combined per day tended to remain below 350 changes and did 

not exceed approximately 450 ~hanges.6~ It is not clear whether the 

desire to attack as many targets as possible-as quickly as possibleaccounted for more wasted sorties than would have occurred had changes 

been rolled into the ATO for the “day after tomorrow.’a In the view of 

one GAT planner 

in retrospect, and it’s . . . the point some of us were making at the 

time, ‘Look, if you just let us execute as planned then we roll what we 

didn’t do today, no we will skip and leave tomorrow alone-that’s already planned-the guys are out there working on it’ . . . drove the one 

set of team guys nuts, because they and the [F-] 11 1 s were on the short 

string all the time and had to respond to almost hourly changes.6” 

Comparing the air campaign’s command and control of Days 1 and 

2 with that of the subsequent days is somewhat like comparing night and 

day. Days 1 and 2 were largely programmed, or “scripted.” Critical or 

difficult decisions about operational performance were irrelevant to the 

planning process. Measures of effectiveness-either functional degradation 

or absolute physical destruction4id not play a large role in near real-time 

operational assessments. The script for Days 1 and 2 would have been 

played out, largely as written, even if there had been several midair 

tanker collisions or other problems. The planners decided what was 

important (that is, which targets), and the planners decided the appropriate 

sequencing of actions to attack the targets. In addition, this plan or script 

was written over a fairly long period of time, and the planning cell offi63The data do not permit an answer to the question of whether we reached limits of 

the capacity to make changes. 

% is important to note that errors in a plan vary in significance, and only those 

errors that singly or in combination affect key functions should be inhibited. It may not 

be reasonable, wise, or possible to detect every potential error. Planners should be 

attuned to finding and correcting those errors which an critical to mission success. In 

this context, faced with the prospect of stopping the air campaign on a moment’s notice, 

Deptula recalled the choice was made to try to identify and correct all potential errors and 

to order last-minute changes. (S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with U Col Deptula, 

20 Nov 1991. 

65(S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 20 Nov 1991. 

235 
cers essentially were able to choose with whom they would interact 

outside the planning cell. Together, these factors made the decision 

problem for the planners clear and well-structured and the process manageable. 

Command and control of the subsequent days of the air campaign 

was an entirely different matter. Assessment of the results of strikes 

became very important as a guide for future strikes. Now, the GAT had 

to interact and coordinate planning and assessments with a far larger 

group of officers and agencies, some of whom were purposefully uncooperative.& But even for those officers and agencies which tried to cooperate with the GAT, coordination was not easy. Knowledge of which organizational procedures applied to what situation was not distributed evenly 

throughout USCENTAF. GAT officers invented ad hoc procedures, further 

complicating coordination with those trying to apply established process 

and rules of procedure. Now, the viewpoints and concerns of various 

senior leaders in the United States and Central Command became factors 

to consider every day in planning and executing Air Tasking Orders?’ 

Now, the vast number of aircraft available to be used and the short time 

available to plan greatly increased the difficulty of planning. Together, 

these factors made the decision problem for the planners muddy and illstructured and the process difficult to manage. The GAT planners tried to 

adjust to this new situation by working even harder and by transforming 

what they could do-for example, ordering changes directly to units-into 

what they should do. 

The tendency to transform what could be done into what should be 

done was evident at other levels of CENTCOM too. There was a pronounced tendency of CENTCOM Headquarters staff and leaders to try to 

influence planning in ongoing dynamic engagements. Corder and Brig. 

Gen. George K. Muellner described just such a situation. In the early 

%ee (S) Chapter 6 for a discussion of how personality and bureaucratic conflicts 

impeded cooperation. This discussion is amplified in (S) Chapter 8, where we discuss 

more fully problems in supplying and integrating bomb damage assessments during Desert 

storm. 

67For example, Gen Schwarzkopf described several broad cases in which senior 

leaders (and others) working in Washington. DC exerted pressure on him. He specifically 

discussed Scud launches at Israel. whether enough bombing had taken place to accomplish 

our strategic objectives, and when to begin the ground campaign. See H. Norman 

Schwankopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York. 1992). pp 418,430, 

441-43. 

236 
days of Desert Storm, when CENTOM staff worked only with hardcopy 

photos, an Army officer visiting the JSTARS Ground Support Module saw 

a target developan Iraqi convoy was moving. The Amy officer took a 

hard copy of the imagery to CENTCOM J2. Coincidentally, while the 

Army officer was showing the image to Brig. Gen. Leide, Gen. 

Schwarzkopf walked in and saw the image. Consequently, Schwarzkopf 

called Homer and demanded to know what air assets were being deployed 

against those vehicles. Homer did not know what Schwarzkopf was 

talking about, and so Schwarzkopf became angry, ordered attacks against 

the vehicles, and offered to send the image to Homer. By the time Army 

officers delivered the image to CENTAF, the scene was several hours old. 

Corder received the assignment of resolving the issue. He asked hide 

whether the targek had moved. hide did not know. But Corder demanded the real-time information to obey Schwarzkopf’s order. Corder’s point 

was to remove headquarters staff from targeting. In the end, the headquarters involvement was unnecessary. JSTARS had already directed an 

attack against the convoy.68 

A T& of lkro Packages: Day 4 

The planning, tasking, and execution of two separate aircraft packages 

on 21 January 1991, or D+4 of the air campaign, illustrates senior 

leaders’ beliefs of controlling the air campaign and the difficulty of 

dynamic planning. At least five versions of the Master Attack Plan for 

the D+4 Air Tasking Order were produced (containing these two packages) by 20 January at 2002L. The first package was composed of F-16s 

from the 363d Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Al Dhafra, and the second 

package was made up of F-l 1 1 s from the 48th TFW at Taif. The initial 

MAP development for this tasking began on 19 January around 0800. The 

effective time of this particular AT0 was 20 January 23202 to 22 January 

0501Z.69 Figure 34 presents a map showing assigned targets. 

68(S) Intvw. GWAPS with Maj Gen Corder, 18 May 1992; Intvw. Thomas C. Hone, 

Maj Anne D. Leary, Mark D. Mandeles with Brig Gen George K. Muellner, 

Dcs/Requirements, HQ TAC. 16 Apr 1992. 

@(S) CWAPS. css Safe 6. Desert Shield 20 Jan 1991, Air Tasking Orders. 

237 
Figure 34 

Map Showing Assigned Targets 

Riyadh 

In the initial rough draft of the MAP for 21 January, a forty aircraft 

F-16 package from the 363d TFW wards assigned targets in the Baghdad 

area with a time over target at 1300-1 3302, and an eight-aircraft F-111 

attack package from the 48th TFW was assigned targets in the Tallil area 

with a time over target at 0230-02452. Both packages were supported 

by enemy air defense suppression forces, EF-111s and F-~Gs.~ The 

second version of this MAP (prepared at 19 January, 2100) was nearly 

identical to the first pencil draft?’ 

Comparison of the Target Planning Worksheets (TPWs) prepared to 

translate the draft MAPS into the ATO reveals conflicting instructions. The 

F-16 aircraft from the 363d TFW were called “package A.” The TPW 

70(S) GwAPS, BH Box 1, Folder 9, Master Attack Plan, D+4, 21 Jan 1991. 5th 24 

7‘(S) Ibid. 

hours. 

238 
listed the time on target against Baghdad area targets as 13152-13302. 

approximately the same time on target listed in the draft MAP. However, 

the number of F-16s in the package was reduced from forty to twentyfour. The TPWS tasked F-4G aircraft from the 35th TFW and EF-111 

aircraft from the 366th TFW to support package A.72 

The F-11 1 aircraft from the 48th TFW were called “package D.” In 

both drafts of the Master Attack Plan (the initial pencil copy and the 

21 00L versions) and the corresponding Target Planning Worksheets, the 

F-111s were assigned targets in the Tallil area with the time on target 

block between 02302 and 02452. The TPWS assigned the same F-4G and 

EF-111 mission numbers to support both the F-16s (package A) and F11 1 s (package D).’3 However, the number of aircraft tasked changed. 

During Desert Storm it was common for the same flight of F-4Gs and 

EF-111 s to support different attack packages. In this type of situation the 

different package targets were near each other, and the times over targets 

were synchronized. In the case of the D+4 ATO, however, the targets, 

Tallil and Baghdad, were separated by approximately 200 miles, and the 

times over targets (1 3002-1 3302 for package A and 02302 for package 

D) were 11 hours apart. The same suppression of enemy air defense 

support could not have been used for both attack packages. 

The D+4 Air Tasking Order instructions for package A (the 363d 

TFW’s F- 16s) were identical to the tasking in the corresponding Target 

Planning Worksheets. Minor errors crept into the ATO with respect to 

some of the support missions (for example, the TPW listed F-15C missions for escodsweep, while none were listed in the ATO), but the essential information was the same.74 However, part of the AT0 tasking for 

package D (the 48th TFW’S F-1 11s) did not match the Master Attack 

Plans or the Target Planning Worksheets. For example, the information 

for the sweep/escort support did not match the TPW. More importantly, 

the target in the ATO was changed to the H2 airfield.” No record of the 

reason for this change, or the change itself, can be found. 

72(s) Target Planning Worksheets, AT0 DA, 21 Jan 1991, HQ9h AF/OSX, Shaw AFB, 

73(S) Ibid. 

74(S) Desert Shield 20 Jan 1991, Air Tasking Orders. 

75(S) Ibid. 

NC, Lt Col Jefferey Feinstein. 

239 
The Air Tasking Order was transmitted on 20 January at 1855L. 

shortly after the CENTAF goal of 1800LJ6 In this Am, as in the targeting 

worksheets, the taskings for the SEAD support for package A (the F-16s) 

and package D (the F-111 s) were in conflict. The tasked suppression of 

enemy air defenses simply could not support packages separated by 

widely different times and locations. The origin of the conflict between 

instructions contained in the Master Attack Plan and AT0 may be found 

in the way the AT0 was completed and published. Another MAP was 

printed at 1427L (the operator entered 20 January, 14OOL into the computer file). The tasking for package A printed in this Master Attack Plan 

was identical to earlier Plans. The MAP still listed forty P16s in the 

package instead of the twenty-four tasked in the Target Planning Work 

sheets and the ATO. However, changes to the package were written in 

pencil on the printed MAP. The F-16 package was lined out, the time on 

target was changed to 0400204302, and the target changed to the H2 

and H3 airfields. The tasking for package D (the F-111s) remained 

essentially ~nchanged.~' 

The next Master Attack Plan, and the first one approved (and signed) 

by General Glosson, was printed at 1848L. It assigned package A against 

the H2 and H3 airfield complexes with a change in time on target, as the 

penciled changes to the previous MAP indicated (forty F-16s were still 

listed). Package D was still tasked against the Tallil area. Pencil changes 

on this MAP indicate that package D was "retargeted to H2," which 

matched the published ATO tasking." 

A final Master Attack Plan. printed at 2002L and also signed by 

Generals Glosson and Deptula, was identical to the previous, 1848L 

version. Package A remained assigned against the H2 and H3 airfields. 

Package D still was tasked against the Tallil area targets, despite the 

tasking in the published ATO and the penciled change on the previous 

(1 848L) MAP?9 

"(S) Ibid. 

77(S) Master Attack Plan, D+4, 21 Jan 1991, 5th 24 hours. 

78(S) Ibid. 

79(S) Ibid. 

240 
Sometime in the planning process, someone assigned packages A and 

D to attack the Hm3 airfield area. This decision can be tracked using 

the different versions of the MAP. With respect to package A (F-l6s), the 

change in the target area and time on target was not entered into the Air 

Tasking Order. It is not clear whether this change was passed to the 

363d TFW via telephone. Moreover, no version of the Attack Plan 

registered a reduction from forty to twenty-four in number of F-16s 

assigned to strike the target. In contrast, the AT^ assigned package D 

(the F-111 s) to attack the H2 airfield, a target change which was not 

specified in the corresponding MAPS. The AT0 also did not include 

synchronized enemy air defense suppression; this support as tasked in the 

ATO could not accompany both packages. 

The Tactical Air Control Center change log for the 21 January Air 

Tasking Order included three notes which might relate to package A. 

The first note addressed a minor confusion concerning the sweep/escort 

tasking. The second note adjusted air refueling control times for the F-16 

package, which could have supported the changes to the F-16s’ target and 

time on target found in later versions of the Master Attack Plan. The 

third note is confusing. The Control Center change log identified the 

F-16 aircraft in package A by individual mission number and assigned 

them to strike the “C-7 Chem Prod FadAl Taqaddum Afld.”*’ This 

target does not match any of the targets assigned in previous MAPS or the 

published Am. 

What finally happened? All twenty-four F-16s in the 363d Tactical 

Fighter Wing in package A successfully launched and attacked targets. 

However, the F-16s attacked neither the initial Baghdad area targets nor 

the H2/H3 airfield targets identified later in the MAP. Mission Reports 

obtained from the 363d TFW indicate that the unit attacked the 

Habbaniyah Possible Chemical Warfare Production Facility Number 2 and 

the A1 Taqaddum airfield-targets which were approximately thirty miles 

west of the initial Baghdad area targets but which were in agreement with 

the change found in the TACC change log. All the times on targets for 

these attacks were in the original TOT block (1 30021 3302) specified in 

“(S) GWAPS, TACC AT0 Changes, NA #370. 

24 1 
the first MAP and corresponding AT0.8' The GAT planners entered some 

of these results into their tracking system. Eight F-16s were shown to 

have struck the Habbaniyah Chemical Warfare facility. Whether these 

were the eight E16s from the 363d TFW is not known. The sixteen F-16s 

which attacked the Al Taqaddum airfield were not noted in the log." 

The 48th Tactical Fighter Wing's Mission Reports tell another story. 

The ATO assigned package D (F-1 1 Is) to targets in the H2 airfield area. 

Of the eight F-1 I1 s assigned these targets, only two aircraft released 

weapons on target. Four aircraft aborted the mission, upon AWACS direction, due to absence of tanker support. Two others aborted because of 

computer or inertial navigation system problems.83 According to CAFMS 

data, the F-4G mission support package was aborted.84 It is not known 

whether other F-4Gs provided support. The EF-111 support from the 

366th TFW flew as scheduled in the ATO. It is not known where the 

aircraft flew?' And GAT planners did not know what happened either. 

The GAT'S records show that no F-111 aircraft hit the H2 targets assigned 

to the F-1 1 1 s in package D for that day. The log shows, however, that 

forty F-16s attacked that 

The Great Scud Hunt 

A second issue in implementing centralized planning and decentralized execution concerns the presence of information required to make 

decisions. The Scud hunt demonstrates the importance-for a centralized 

planning office-of information and appropriate procedures to analyze it. 

"(S) 363d TFW Mission Reports, 21 17002, 21 17302, 21 17302 Jan 1991, GWAPS 

'9arget Attacks By Day By Aircraft H-Hour Thru Day +32, GWAPS, Box 2, 

83(S) 48th TFW Mission Reports, 2104152, 2106402, 2108502 2113272 Jan 

"(S) GwAPS Mission Database. 

85(S) Ibid. 

86Target Attacks By Day By Aircraft H-Hour Thru Day +32, GWAPS. Box 2. 

Mission Database. 

Folder 56. 

1991. GWAPS Mission Database. 

Folder 56. 

242 
Beginning Day 1, sorties were planned to address the Scud launch 

threat.87 Given the press coverage of Scud attacks, one might have 

expected a greater number of sortie changes to attack Scuds. The evidence does not seem to support this expectation. Approximately 4,750 

anti-Scud sorties (see Table 11)” were planned between Day 1 and Day 

43. Approximately twelve percent of these planned sorties were changed 

or added. 

The number of daily Scud hunting sorties varied between 75 and 160. 

During Desert Storm, Iraq launched 88 missiles at Israel and Saudi Ara87Called Scuds, the missiles were actually “A1 Husseins,” Soviet designed and 

supplied Scud B models modified by the Iraqis. The program initially entailed 

cannibalizing three Scuds to produce two Al-Husseins. Two design changes am 

important. First, more than 1,OOO kilograms of propellant were added to increase 

range. Second, the payload was reduced from 800 to only 190 kilograms. See W. 

Seth Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Iraq’s Al-Husayn Programme, Part 1.” 

Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990, pp 204-09; W. Seth Carus and Joseph S. 

Bermudez, Jr.. “Iraq’s Al-Husayn Programme, Part 11,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence 

Review, June 1990. pp 242-48. 

%’he DOD’s Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, also known as the Title V Report 

(April 1992. UNCLASSIFIED), lists Scud hunting sorties planned in the ATO by 

day-but only in chart form. The GWAW Consolidated Sorties Database does not 

contain enough detail to provide a good estimate of the number of Scud-hunting 

sorties planned. The TACC Scud-Chasing Log included in the (S) Institute for Defense 

Analyses (IDA) draft report, Desert Storm Scud Campaign (Alexandria, VA, Apr 

1992), documents the sorties generated in response to specific Scud launch threats. 

The IDA report identifies a total of 539 sorties for the 43 days of the air campaign. 

8 

The Scud sorties planned data presented here in chart and tabular form were 

taken from the Title V chart and are correct to within two sorties. The smallest unit 

marked on the Title V chart, Daily Total (for sorties) scale was four sorties. 

The data on Scud-related sorties added or changed were taken from the TACC 

Change Log and correlated with the GWAR Composite Sorties Database. 

Task Force 2’s launch numbers were used in this study to show the maximum 

amount of Iraqi missile launch activity driving the Scud hunt. The Task Force 

assumes that (a) these daily sortie totals reflect the final version of the AT0 after 

changes and (b) the changes or additions for Scud hunt totals, based on the TACC 

Change Log. are accounted for in the Scud sortie daily totals. See (S) GWAPS Volume 

11, Weapons, Tactics, and Tmining. 

243 
Table 11 

Anti-Scud Sorties 

Sorties Change or Scuds 

AT0 Day Date Planned Addition Launched 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

17 January 

18 January 

19 January 

20 January 

21 January 

22 January 

23 January 

24 January 

25 January 

26 January 

27 January 

28 January 

29 January 

30 January 

3 1 January 

1 February 

2 February 

3 February 

4 February 

5 February 

6 February 

7 February 

8 February 

9 February 

154 

92 

40 

70 

165 

133 

105 

1 26 

117 

147 

1 24 

149 

83 

83 

142 

111 

103 

75 

84 

106 

1 20 

147 

100 

90 

0 

0 

28 

12 

74 

12 

2 

13 

0 

40 

10 

4 

10 

0 

0 

0 

8 

0 

73 

0 

0 

76 

0 

48 

1 

7 

4 

8 

1 

7 

5 

0 

10 

6 

0 

2 

0 

0 

1 

0 

3 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

1 

244 
Table 11 

Anti-Scud Sorties 

Sorties Change or Scuds 

AT0 Day Date Planned Addition Launched 

25 10 February 114 34 0 

26 11 February 153 0 3 

27 12 February 135 0 0 

28 13 February 98 14 0 

29 14 February 121 19 5 

30 15 February 153 0 1 

31 16 February 132 10 4 

32 17 February 148 0 0 

33 18 February 130 0 0 

34 19 February 1 24 14 1 

35 20 February 95 0 0 

37 22 February 100 2 0 

38 23 February 116 16 3 

39 24 February 96 2 3 

40 25 February 90 0 5 

41 26 February 104 25 0 

42 27 February 88 7 0 

43 28 February 149 0 0 

36 21 February 90 0 6 

TOTALS 4,753 553 88 

Sources: GWAPS Composite Sorties Database and TACS Change Log. 

245 
bia. Almost 60 percent of those missiles were launched over the first 12 

days of the war. The data do not show an obvious relationship between 

sorties and Scud 1a~nches.B~ The average daily Scud hunt represented 

approximately 6 percent of the average daily strike sorties. However, 

Generals Homer, Glosson, and others reported devoting a greater proportion of thought and attention to hunting Scuds than to other missions." 

The problem of defeating the Scuds after they had been launched may 

be divided into three parts. The first was detecting a Scud launch. Once 

ignited, Scud missile motors produced a visible and very hot plume, and 

this plume was the key to sensing Scud launches and then trying to attack 

the mobile transporter-launchers. The second was alerting a Patriot 

antimissile battery that one or more Scuds were approaching. The third 

was solving the Patriot's fire control pr~blem.~' The third piece of this 

problem is covered by the Space report.= The first two pieces, plus the 

effort to smash the mobile launchers before they could get away, are 

command and control topics. The paragraphs which follow detail the 

command and control of the Scud hunt and explain why coalition air 

strikes were not particularly effective against the mobile Scud launchers." 

Coalition air used standard reconnaissance, targeting, and attack 

procedures to find and then attack the Scud production and assembly 

89Access to more highly classified data might show a link among Scuds launched 

and sorties planned or changed. 

"(S) Intvw, Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, Commander, (S) Intvw, Davis, et al.. with 

Lt Gen Glosson, 12 Dec 1991. There was great concern at the highest levels of U.S. 

govemment-including President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense 

Cheney. and Gen Powell-that the coalition would fracture if Israel attacked Iraq in 

retaliation. RAdm McConnell echoed this belief. (S) Intvw, Ronald Cole and Diane 

T. Putney with RAdm Michael McConnell. DIA, 14 Feb 1992. 

"(S) Defense Science Board, Lessons karned in Operations Desert Shield & 

Desert Storm, Jun 1992, p 68. 

=see (s) spce report. 

9?he focus of this section is on how CENTAF dealt with the missiles, rather than 

. on their technical performance or psychological and diplomatic effects. 

246 
areas and fixed launch sites.94 However, finding and striking forward 

assembly areas logistic bases, and then the missile transporter-launchers 

which operated from these dispersed facilities, challenged existing techniques of command and control?’ It also was an unsuccessful effort.% 

The “hunt” really began as the mobile missiles were deployed, as the 

missiles were first fueled and the transporter-launchers then moved to the 

launch sites. Once at the site, a missile crew had to erect tbe missile, 

start the launch sequence, fire the missile, lower the erector, pack up, and 

get out. The whole cycle took less than one hour, and all of it could be 

(and was) done at night?’ 

Most Coalition air units lacked equipment capable of finding mobile 

Scud launchers unless they knew where to look beforehand.= That is, 

they had difficulty transforming successful area surveillance into effective 

pinpoint targeting. [DELETED] Forward Looking Infrared sensors 

(FLIRS) on Air Force and Navy attack planes easily spotted trucks at 

night. FLlR sensors were useful for short-range targeting-especially if 

9%he approach used by CENTAF had three parts: (a) preplmed attacks against 

production, storage, and fixed launch sites; (b) day and night visual searches for 

transporter-launchers moving to their launch sites; (c) airborne patrols to attack the 

transporter-launchers after they had fired their missiles. (S)TACC/CCIDO Current Ops 

Log, 23002.27 Jan 1991, Microfilm Roll Number 0882616, CHECO. 

9%e Iraqi facilities which built Scuds were very vulnerable to conventional air 

attack. The fixed missile launch sites were also difficult to hide. However, the 

mobile launchers and the decoys, the missile assembly areas which supported them 

and the logistics which sustained them were very difficult to locate (or track). Yet it 

was precisely these activities and areas which air forces were pressured to attack (and 

assumed they could find and attack) during Desert Storm. 

(S) Rpt, Desert Storm Scud Missile Working Group 111. 30 May 1991, Defense 

Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., GWAPS New Aq. File No. 108. Also 

(S) Lessons Learned During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Stonn, pp 64-14 

(U) On 9 Feb 1991. for example, two F-ISEs patrolling in an area from which Scuds 

had been fired witnessed an actual launch, but they could not locate the transporterlauncher. See the (S) TACC/CC/DO Current Ops Log. 9 Feb 1991, 00% Microfilm 

Roll Number 0882616, CHECO. 

(S) Lessons Learned in Operations Desert Shield & Desert Stonn, 8 Jun 1992, 

96 

97 

pp 6467. 

98(S) Ibid, p 67. 

247 
cued-but not for area searches due to their narrow fields of view. Finally, special forces units sometimes found mobile Scud launcher^.^ 

Sensors picked up the missiles as they began their flights: the Defense Support Program (DSP). [DELETED]Im The DSP satellite's sensors "typically detected and verified the launch. [DELETED]'" 

The DSP satellites provided Space Command with observations that 

were then used to calculate the approximate location of the missile's 

launch site. Its launch time could be determined to within seconds. 

[DELETED]Im [DELETED]'03 

Space Command and Central Command had developed a "Scud warning system" capable of alerting Patriot batteries of approaching Scud warherads by the beginning of Desert Storm.'"' [DELETED]'m The existence 

of this space-based warning system allowed CENTCOM'S Patrid batteries to 

avoid staying on constant, around-theclock alert. [DELETED]'w 

[DELETED] '07 [DELETED] '08 [DELETED] '09 

w(S) Ibid. 

'mAlso (S) Memo, "Input to Title V Final Report on the Conduct of the Persian 

'"(S) Lessons Learned in Operations Desert Shield & Desert Stonn, p 68. 

'02[ DELETED] 

'03Discussions with Lt Cdr R. Morgan, USN, and Col F. Hem. USAF, Space 

'"'See (S) GWAPS Space report, Chapter 5. 

"'(S) Rpt, "SAC Scud Warning," GWAPS New Acq. File, No. 128. 

'06Conduct of the Persian Guy War, Appendix T. pp 755-56. 

'07[DELEi'IED] 

'?n addition to TRAP. and if data were relayed from RC-135Vs in some fashion. 

'09(S) Memo, "Input to Title V Final Report." p 2; also, (S) Briefing, "Air Force 

Intelligence Support to Air Operations: Desert Storm Examples." 26 Feb 1992. GwAPS 

Files. 

Gulf Conflict." Air Staff (XOOSO), pp 1-2. 

Alternate Command Center (SPACC), USSPACECOM. Falcon AFB. CO. 16 Dec 1991. 

248 
This part of the Scud alert and hunt system was developed in early 

August 1990 after a Strategic Air Command (SAC) Senior Controller, 

Brig. Gen. K. F. Keller, commented to a young SAC watch officer in 

SAC'S Command Center that it was "a shame" SAC strategic warning 

systems did not support CENTCOM. The watch officer, Capt. John 

Rittinghouse, volunteered to rig something up and was given permission 

to proceed. Rittinghouse and another young Captain, J.D. Broyles, first 

contacted Space Command, then CENTCOM'S command center, where the 

senior controller said that CENTCOM welcomed their help. SAC personnel 

talked back and forth with CENTCOM, worked out a communications link, 

and then tested voice warning. Once they were satisfied with it, they 

added data on missile launch and trajectory.'" Then they turned the 

whole set of procedures over to Space Command, whose personnel used 

them during Desert Storm.'" 

"'(S) Rpt. J. Rittinghouse and J.D. Broyles, subj: "The Development of Strategic 

Air Command Scud Missile Alerting Procedures Used During the Iraqi War of 1991," 

nd. GWAPS New Acquisition File, No. 128. 

"he alert process resembled. in its details, that used to warn RAF squadrons of 

impending attacks by V-Is against England in June and July 1944. Then, the elements 

(air search radars, air defense coordination centers, interceptors. barrage balloons, and 

layered rings of antiaircraft guns surrounding prime targets) of an existing air defense 

system were altered from a system to defeat manned bombers to one which filtered 

out attacking cruise missiles. Because the numbers of V-Is sent against England 

(1280 fell on London alone in the month between mid-June and mid-July 1944) were 

high, and because the missiles approached targets like London from many angles 

simultaneously. the Royal Air Force's air defense system was at first overwhelmed. 

Single telephone lines into interceptor bases, for example, were simply too slow a 

means for transmitting the kinds of data needed by planes sitting on the ground who 

needed to get airborne and then chase down many low-flying missiles. But improved 

data collection and transmission, coupled with a new weapon (antiaircraft shells with 

proximity fuzes). allowed the defenders to reduce the V-1 from a major military threat 

to a minor one. Something very similar to this happened in the Gulf: sensors 

reporting to Space Command began a sequence of communications which alerted the 

point defense system (Patriot) and the units tasked with finding and striking Scud 

batteries. See W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate. eds. The Army Air Forces in World War 

11, Vol. 111, (Chicago, 1951). pp 526- 545; see also, John Terraine, A Time for 

Courage, The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (New York, 1985), pp 

652-653. 

249 
With approximately four minutes warning, Patriot battery commanders could assign targets to appropriate fire units, assume the appropriate 

ATBM firing mode, and employ a firing doctrine of launching at least 

two-and in many cases three or four-Patnot missiles against each engageable object in order to achieve a sufficiently high probability of kill.”’ 

From CENTCOM’S perspective, however, the real need was to find and 

destroy the mobile Scud launchers firing from Iraq. The key to wrecking 

the mobile launchers before they could escape (hide, and then reload) was 

fixing the location of any given mobile launcher within an area small 

enough to be quickly scanned by targeting sensors (for example, FLIR) 

carried by U.S. aircraft orbiting overhead. 

The need to target the mobile launchers was well understood before 

Desert Storm, as was the difficulty of doing ~0.”~ [DELETED]”‘ Iraqi 

officers had learned to employ Scuds in ways other than according to 

Soviet doctrine. [DELETED]”’ Uncertainty about the mobile launchers’ 

deployments and operating patterns precluded predicting where they 

would hide during the day and how long they could stay in the field 

before having to return to a central facility for maintenance.l16 

The Defense Intelligence Agency deployed a number of National 

Military Intelligence Support Teams to CENTCOM Headquarters as well as 

to a number of component headquarters and key commands in the Gulf 

region. The National Military Intelligence Support Teams were tasked to 

expedite both collection requests and rapid and responsive results dissemination. They typically were manned by knowledgeable intelligence personnel who were equipped with secure radios, personal computers, and facsim- 

“‘(SINFIWN) Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Appendix T, pp T-199 through 

T-203; (S) Briefing, Lt Cen T. S. Moorman. Jr., Commander, Air Force Space 

Command, I6 Dec 199 I, Peterson AFB. CO. 

(S) Information Paper, “Tactical Missile Defense (TMD), Operation Desert 

Shield,” 27 Aug 1990, CIS Folder No. 43, “Organization/Opetations.” CHST File, 

GWAPS. 

113 

“‘(S) Ibid. 

“’(S) Ibid. 

“6(S/NF) Msg, “Rll-1056, lndicationo of Scud Refuelings,” 2 Dec 1990, DIA, CIS 

Folder No. 43, “OrganizatiodOpera~ons,” CHST File, Container 34, GWAPS. 

250 
ile machines and who had been assigned accesses to secure satellite communications links for expertly requesting and receiving intelligence data. 

ED]’” 

[DELETED]”7 [DELETED]”’ [DELETED]’’9 [DELETED]’m [DELET- 

[DELETED] ‘”[DELETED] 

For post-launch detection, the systems available to find and then attack 

mobile Scud launchers from the air simply did not have the information 

they needed in time to cany out their mission successfully.’” Aircraft 

orbiting above likely launch areas needed fairly precise information. 

F-lSEs, for example, needed an estimate of a launcher’s location (the 

“launch point”) [DELETED]’u The Iraqis also used decoys to deceive 

U.S. sensors, so that even if the area of a launch were known, it was not 

therefore certain that attacking aircraft would hit the Scud or the decoy.’% 

‘I7(S) Msg ‘Trip Report, 9-12 Oct 1990,” from R. Butler to the RAND Corpora- 

“*(S) Briefing. “NORADNSSPACECOM Intel Support to Desert Storm,” Lcdr R. 

‘19(S) Msg. “Launches,” from DIA to CENTAF, 7 Dec 1990, in CIS Folder 43. 

im 

12’(S) Briefing, ‘Tactical Ballistic Missile Warning Support to Desert Storm.” 

Iu(S) Memo, “Scud Attack Plan,” nd, Document No. 42-3-6-10-5, Cis File, 

Folder 40, CHST Records, Container 34, GWAPS. The (s) TACCICUDO Current operations Log gives several cases like that for 00362, 9 Feb 1991, where two F-15% on 

station over a suspected Scud launch area actually witnessed a launch but cwld not 

find the launcher afterward. Microfilm Roll Number 0882616, CHECO. 

tion, GWAPS RAND File in New Acquisition File. 

Morgan, USN, 16 DeC 1991, Peterson AFB, CO. 

“OrganizatiodOperations,” CHST File, Container 34, GWAPS. 

(S) Msg, “R11-I 056, Indications of Scud Refuelings.” 

‘23(S) Lessons Learned in Operations Desert Shield & Desert Storm, p 10. 

‘“(S) Ibid, p 69. 

I2’(S) Ibid. 

‘26(S) Rpt, Desert Storm Scud Missile Working Group 111. 

25 1 
Even the use of JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System) did not significantly improve the targeting of mobile Scud 

launchers. [DELETED]I2’ By the time U.S. attack aircraft received 

information on the launcher’s location, the launcher was usually gone. 

[DELETED] 

Because mobile Scud transporter-launchers were so difficult to locate, 

one postwar conference concluded that “Scud CAP [combat air patrol] was 

flown continuously with no major success in finding launchers on a 

routine basis.”129 F- 15Es, the mainstay of Scud combat air patrols, were 

sent to patrol areas of Iraq “to continuously appear to threaten potential 

launch sites.”1m Nothing much better could be done. As the Defense 

Science Board concluded in its draft report regarding post-Scud launch 

results, “There was no doctrine and there had been no training. Procedures and integration were ad hoc and not optimum. Information to 

enable successful attack could have been available with existing assets. 

Relatively minor changes should have made a difference.” The Board also 

remarked that “A capability to find and destroy . . . Scuds before they 

launch implies hitherto unachieved integration and a new level of processing or surveillance data.”131 Put another way, the obstacles to attacking 

the mobile launchers were rooted primarily in the command and control 

procedures employed. 

The process of finding and then targeting Scud mobile launchers 

involved a sequence of actions: (a) wide area surveillance, (b) analysis of 

the data from this surveillance in theater command and control centers, 

(c) the localization and identification of targets, (d) attack by defending 

12’(S) Lessons Learned in Opetations Desert Shield & Desert Storm, p 69. 

I2*(S) Msg, “Launches.” 

IB(S) Rpt, Desert Storm Scud Missile Working Group 111. The (S) TACUcUDO 

Current Operations Log for 23302. 11 Feb 1991 notes that F-1SEs which obtained the 

coordinates of a Scud transporter-launcher within five minutes of an actual launch 

were still unable to locate a target. 

Im(S) Msg, Air Tasking Order, 8 Feb 1991. Section 13, Unit Remarks X, from 

”‘(S) Lessons Learned During Operations Desert Shield & Desert Storm, p 74. 

HQ. USCENTAF, to HQ, RSAF Operations. 

252 
forces, and (e) the assessment of the results. The Defense Science Board 

believed that the systems required to perform this process were available, 

but that they did not work together effectively enough and often enough 

to destroy the mobile Scud launchers.i32 A combined DIA/Defense Department working group said much the same thing-that the Scud hunters 

needed accurate data appropriate to their weapons and means of moving 

those data quickly from detection and processing systems (such as 

JSTARS) to orbiting attack aircraft.133 This is a command and control 

problem, and it is almost precisely the same problem faced by the Air 

Force once it accepted the mission of finding strategic relocatable targets 

(mobile Soviet ICBMS) in the mid-1980s. 

In the Scud hunt, wide area surveillance of launches was a success; 

it gave Patriot batteries sufficient warning. Unfortunately, localization 

and identification were not equally successful. [DELETED]’% Desert 

Storm revealed that information, in the right place at the right time, was 

the key to narrowing a search for a “stealthy” enemy. The problem of 

locating the mobile Scud transporter-launchers was never really solved. 

[DELETED]135 

The above two subsections provide only a flavor of the difficulty in 

(a) developing effective procedures for the employment of airpower and 

(b) synchronizing and orchestrating the many different aircraft into the 

Air Tasking Order. The problem of orchestrating so many aircraft had 

special implications for the planners in assessing the effects of strikes 

contained in Ams just executed. The following section describes some 

of those implications. 

I3*(S) Ibid. 

(S) Rpt. Desert Storm Scud Missile Working Group 111, p 8. I33 

“(SMF) Memo, “Iraqi Mobile Scud Launcher Inventory and Employment 

Strategy” (DIM 54-91). Defense Intelligence Agency, Feb 1991. CIS Folder No. 6, 

“correlation/ Analysis,” CHST File, Container 34. GWAPS. 

I3’(s) TACWUDO Current Ops Log, 23002, 27 Jan 1991. 

253 
Intelligence Support for Planning and Command and Control 

Lieutenant General Homer, Joint Force Air Component Commander, 

expected-and accepted-intelligence deficiencies. He had to decide 

whether to make an issue out of the allocation of intelligence resources. 

In his words, 

I think you are always going to have intelligence shortfalls. My criticism of Intelligence is that in peacetime it goes to Washington, and in 

wartime it should go to the theater. We tried to establish where it comes 

down in theater. The problem is, the Army overloaded it immediately 

with requests for stuff, so I didn't even bother; I mean, I couldn't get 

my foot in the door, so I just said, 'To hell with it."% 

Nevertheless, planners in the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting 

cell had different notions of (a) the usefulness of intelligence support and 

bomb damage assessment and (b) the necessity of obtaining such support. 

Intelligence support and bomb damage assessment in the form of imagery 

was deemed critical to the efficient allocation139 of precision-guided munitions and the types of aircraft capable of precise delivery of munitions. 

Given the difference between General Homer and GAT planners' views, 

how did the GAT planners evaluate their information resources, and how did 

they respond to the implications of those evaluations? 

'"(S) Intvw, Lt Gen Charles A. Homer. 

137See Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Volume of Data Cripples Tactical Intelligence 

System," Armed Forces Journal International (Jun 1992). pp 35-37; see also 

(S) GWAPS space report. 

13'(S/NF) Joe and Gonzales, Command and Control, Communications, and Intelligence in Desert Storm Air Operations, p 9. 

'39Deptula's concern for efficiency was manifested in his use of measures of 

effectiveness. Deptula preferred a functional measure of destruction rather than absolute measure of physical destruction. As a rule of thumb, Deptula recalled, he never 

put more than two GBUS on a target at any one time. This strategy allowed him to 

apply the aircraft and munitions to more Iraqi targets. (S) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Col 

David A. Deptula, 20 Dec 1991. 

254 
The CAT% Intelligence Support Problem 

From the start of the air campaign bomb damage assessment presented three types of problems to the GAT planners. The first was organizational and concerned the proper division of labor and specification of 

communications channels to deliver required information. The second 

problem involved the allocation of assets which could provide appropriate 

imagery or other raw data. The third problem concerned what data were 

available to evaluate operations. 

The division of labor and communication of information within-and 

betWeen-CENTAF and CENTCOM presented a difficult situation for the GAT 

planners. Reconnaissance needs were discussed and validated every day 

at lOOOL at the Daily Aerial Reconnaissance Review meeting, chaired by 

the CENTCOM 5-2. Requests for bomb damage assessment were then 

forwarded to agencies controlling the assets for further review and evaluation with other competing demands. This process separated the control 

of reconnaissance systems from the in-theater users. The sensor taskers 

were unaware of the rationale behind the tasking requests or of lastminute changes in attack plans. The in-theater units were unaware of 

which requests for coverage had been approved. As a result, CENTAF 

targeteers in the Tactical Air Control Center relied on in-theater reconnaissance systems for most target development.I4 

In addition, as noted above, the GAT'S use of a shorter, informal 

planning cycle for Iraqi targets reduced the ability to coordinate with 

Central Command Air Forcedntelligence (CENTAFAN) the GAT'S information requirements. CENTAF/IN generally was two to three days behind the 

GAT'S planning cycle."' The implication of this time lag was that by the 

time CENTAFIIN had produced bomb damage assessment on a given target, 

the GAT already had reached a judgement about it from sources in Check- 

(S/NF) Joe and Gonzales, Command and Control, Communications, and Intelligence in Desert Storm Air Operations, pp 9- 10. 

14'Chapter 6 showed that because of informal communications channels, the 

Black Hold GAT received critical information from Washington twenty-four to fortyeight hours before CENTAFIIN. The ability of GAT planners to receive information 

quicker than CENTAFIIN remained during Desert Storm. 

140 

255 
mate, responses to direct inquires to the wings, or aircraft videotape 

recorder (AVTR) tapes.'42 

The second bomb damage assessment problem concerned the allocation of assets to collect data. The number of theater reconnaissance 

aircraft available to acquire bomb damage assessment was much smaller 

than the number of daily strike sorties. Hence, many strikes were not 

accompanied by asses~ment."~ Table 12 displays the number of in-theater-based reconnaissance sorties during the war. 

Coalition aircraft flew 3,236 reconnaissance-type sorties over the 43 

days of the war, for an average of 75 sorties a day. Meanwhile, U.S. 

forces flew an average of 1,600 strike sorties each day.'" The number 

of strike sorties, therefore, overwhelmed the ability of in-theater reconnaissance assets to provide a broad assessment of functionakr absolutedamage done to Iraqi targets. 

'"(S) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Col David A. Deptula. SAF/OSX. 20 Dec 1991; see 

Chapter 8. footnote 11 for description of AVTR. 

'43[DELETED] See (S) Chapter 9 of this report and (S) GWAPS Space Operations 

in the Gulf War, Chapter 4. 

question may be raised about the relationship drawn between reconnaissance-type sorties and attack sorties. A given attack package may contain twenty-four 

to thirty-six aircraft. Hence, the proper relationship may be between reconnaissance 

sorties and attack packages. However, at present, the data do not permit matching 

reconnaissance sorties with attack packages. Thus, the less precise relationship will 

have to suffice. 

256 
Table 12 

Total Reconnaissance Sortie~'~ 

17 January to 28 February 1991 

Reconnaissance* Side-Looking Observation 

Aperture Radar" Flight'" 

2,406 147 683 

*Reconnaissance missions flown by U.S. A-6, A-7, EA-6B, F-14, F/A-18, P-3, 

RC-135. RF-C, S-3, MH-60. and coalition RF-5, Tornado GR-1, Jaguar, Mirage 

F1-CR, and Mirage 2000 aircraft. 

**SLAR missions flown by U.S. OV-1D and RC-12 aircraft. 

Observation flight missions flown by U.S. A-6, F-16. F/A-18, and S-3B *** 

aircraft. 

The third bomb damage assessment problem was a matter of what data 

were needed to evaluate the effectiveness of operations. In one sense, this 

issue concerns whether the planners could design and incorporate feedbacks 

into their decisionmaking process. Feedback systems operate on the basis 

of a measurable or observable discrepancy between the actual and desired 

situation. Being able to measure the distinction between actual and desired 

results allows a planner to pick out errors, which he can then act to correct 

by changing the plan for future operations. Unfortunately, for most of the 

missions on the Air Tasking Order, the post-strike data and information 

available to the GAT were not clear enough to show GAT planners that their 

goals had been achieved (that targets had been degraded, damaged, or 

14?'hese data were compiled from the GWAPS Composite Sorties Database. 

257 
destroyed) so that restrikes could be scheduled.’46 Put another way, planners did not get timely theater feedback.’47 

In many respects, the sensing of error in the air campaign was quite 

intuitive because only imperfect information was available about many 

details of how the air campaign was being conducted.’* Sometimes, 

figuring out what was happening, or deciding whether an error had been 

made, was a matter of negotiation. For example, high-speed antiradiation 

missile (HARM) (AGM-88) fratricide incidents illustrate how important the 

quality of information was for detecting errors. In one incident, a U.S. 

Army artillery radar was attacked by a friendly aircraft. Consequently, 

an order was sent to the F-4G squadrons to check their electronic warfare 

libraries to ensure that the signatures of U.S. artillery radars could not be 

read into a HARM’S memory. After that order was issued, Major General 

Corder thought that the problem had been solved. Simultaneously, Brig. 

‘%hen the problems encountered by planners to get appropriate information to 

evaluate the effectiveness of air operations, it is ironic that senior Iraqi officers assumed 

that the planners knew everything. [DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

(S/REL UK) Joint Debriefing Center, ‘The Gulf War: An Iraqi General Officer’s Perspective,” date: 9 103 I I. 

‘47A~ the Defense Science Board observed, the lack of timely BDA was a function of 

poor weather; sometimes lack of external observables on the target; delays in receipt of 

exploited, high-resolution imagery; lack of high-quality cameras on the delivery aircraft; 

need for better methods of exploit and document aircraft video. Also “intelligence collection management was not tied to the attack plans, and the intelligence and planning staff 

were not collocated or sufficiently integrated. There were no information processing 

support tools to maintain the master target list and status of targets.” In addition, the 

reconnaissance capability could not deliver the coverage or the detail needed to regularly 

and effectively assess the damage inflicted by the new, precision, standoff weapons. 

(S) Lessons Learned During Operations Desert Shield & Desert Storm. pp 20, 86. 

I4During an interview with Lt Col Deptula, one member Of GWAPS remarked that Gen 

Glosson claimed that Deptula had kept the planning process “on track.” Deptula noted that 

he constantly argued against a “sortie generation mentality.” Criteria he used to do keep the 

planning process on track included “cohemncy and timing.” But there were no ‘‘hard‘’ 

indicators of either coherency or timing. (S) Intvw, GWAPS with Lt Col Deptula 

25 8 
Gen. Profitt, as commander of the 15th AD, believed the fratricide problem could be handled by replacing HARMS with Shrikes (AGM-45) and 

Mavericks (AGM-65). Corder discovered the change in missile loadouts 

two days later; he tried to convince Profitt to reinstate the HARM, because 

the Shrike-a less advanced missile than the HARM-was more likely to 

lead to fratricide. Profitt would not reinstate the HARM. The issue was 

presented to Homer, who sided with Corder.149 

Reflecting on his Gulf War experience, Major General Corder argued 

that people expect too much from bomb damage assessment-for example, 

perfect information. The call to have better BDA is used to avoid having 

to make difficult military judgements. In his words, 

At a certain point in time, you’re going to have to stand up based 

on your complete understanding of all sources available . . . . If 

you wait . . . until you’re absolutely sure . . . that the BDA 

problem [is] solved, you might have missed the opportunity.150 

Within the Tactical Air Control Center, Corder had a “gross understanding” of bomb damage assessment based on Mission Reports.I5’ His 

strategy to understand the effect of air operations had two components. 

First, Corder looked at the daily summaries concerning how many targets 

we planned to attack, how many were attacked, and how well they were 

hit. Second, he spoke via telephone to officers at the wing command 

post to get an idea of how well the attacks proceeded. He added, “the 

way you find out [what the strike’s effects were was to] go and talk to 

people who are on the scene twenty-four hours a day.”1S2 It is not clear 

149Note. Corder could not command Profitt; Profitt was responsible to Homer. 

I5O(S) Intvw, GWA~ with Maj Gen John A. Corder, 18 May 1992. 

‘”However, the AT0 and MlSREPs do not provide a lot of information about what 

the air assets were doing. The AT0 was changed a great deal, even after it had been 

completed. Because of all these changes, MlSREPs will not be linked to the ATO. For 

example, in many cases, “all you ever see in [MISREPdATO] is airplanes going to Joint 

STARS.” (S) Intvw, GWAPS with Maj Gen John A. Corder. 

(S) Intvw, GWA~ with Maj Gen John A. Corder, 18 May 1992. 

I5*(S) Ibid. 

259 
that Corder’s solution to developing bomb damage assessment was superior to that of the GAT planners. 

The GAT% Solution to Intelligence Support Problems 

Central Command Air ForcesAntelligence took more time to develop 

its ranked target nomination list than the pace of dynamic planning altheir target nominations were slow in arriving or out-of-date.’” 

The Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell’s solution to these 

problems-an apparently unresponsive organization and inadequate reconnaissance assets-was to rely ever more strongly on its own intelligence 

acquisition and analysis system.’” The Checkmate analyses helped GAT 

planners decide what targets to attack next.’” In other words, Checkmate 

provided both critical information and a strategic thought 

The GAT planners also created their own tools to track bomb damage 

assessment information. During the early days of the war, a good deal 

of attention was devoted to aircraft videotape recorder film. One GAT 

planner recalled spending several hours a day looking at AVTR imagery 

from F-117 and F-1 1 1F aircrdft which could provide “film” on their own 

strikes. Over time, this exercise convinced planners that if the weather 

lS3(U) Deptula recakd, when the GAT planners wanted input on a particular 

critical or fixed target, Glosson called McConnell. McConnell forwarded the 

photograph in about four hours. The OAT acted on that information. Twenty-four 

hours later, the GAT received the same photo from CEMAF/IN. and CENTCOM/J2 

provided the same photo another twenty-four hours later. (S) lntvw, Office of Air 

Force History with Lt Col David A. Deptula. sAFIOSX, 20 Nov 1991. 

‘”[DELETED] 

”’As shown in (S) Chapter 6, planning officers in Saudi Arabia spoke with 

counterparts in Checkmate daily during Desert Shield to acquire information and 

analysis unavailable in theater. According to Deptula, the real value of Checkmate 

during the war was as an information fusion center. The GAT, during the war, got 

plenty of direct information, e.g.. from Electronic Security Command. (S) Intvw, 

Office of Air Force History with Lt CoI Deptula, 20 Nov 20 1991. 

[DELETED] (S) lntvw. Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 20 

Nov 1991. 

157(S) /bid; (S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 8 Jan 

156 

1992. 

260 
was acceptable, and the F- 1 17. F- 15E, or F- 1 1 1 F pilot said he dropped 

a munition on a fixed target's desired mean point of impact, it could be 

removed from the target list."' 

PHOTO DELETED 

Lt Col Deptula briefing Gen Horner on Baghdad targets. 

The second solution was to acknowledge the inadequacy of information and make do with the information available by using different 

measures of effectiveness. Since timely imagery was unavailable for 

most target sets, it was often not possible to determine absolute physical 

damage. During Desert Shield, Lt. Col David Deptula proposed using a 

different measure of effectiveness (M0E)-a disabling functional effect on 

Iraqi targets.Is9 The effect MOE was not in the Instant Thunder plan.I6O 

'58Eventually, Deptula did not spend a lot of time examining AVTR. (S) Intvw, 

Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula. 20 Nov 1991; (S) Intvw, GWAPS with 

Lt COl kptula, SAFDSX. 21 b 1991. 

See (S) Volume V1, Effectiveness, Chapter 1. I59 

26 1 
Deptula, however, proposed the MOE to General Glosson, who agreed to 

use it in the theater. The advantage of this MOE was that it reduced 

planning time-units could get their target assignments and begin to prepare force packages, mission plans, and route plans much earlier than if 

the planners were waiting for information indicating absolute physical 

destiuction of targets. And. when the target materials did arrive, they 

were incorporated into later Air Tasking Orders as necessary.I6l 

Summary and Review 

To control large numbers of air sorties, the Air Force has built a very 

complicated organizational architecture. This architecture combines 

technology, compartmented information, many people having myriad 

occupational specialties and perspectives, sometimes conflicting organizational responsibilities, and numerous agencies-with so many linkages and 

pathways that naming let, alone tracing, all the connections may be 

impossible. Yet, as such human-organization-machine systems become 

more integrated and complex, more interdependent and interlocked, the 

probability of system failures increases. And at some point, the system 

may become so complicated that Gulf War-type organizational ad hoc 

solutions or fixes may be inadequate. 

The story of the GAT during Desert Storm presents several compelling 

contrasts. First, building and executing an Air Tasking Order for a static 

environment (where the decision problem was clear and well-structured) 

was very different from doing the same for a dynamic environment 

‘60Although the effect MOE was introduced to Glosson in Augbst, it was not on 

any of the viewgraphs used in the briefings delivered to President Bush, Chairman 

Powell, General Schwarzkopf, Secretary of Defense Cheney, or the theater wing 

commanders during the months between October and December 1990. We cannot 

prove that the effect MOE was not discussed at these briefings. (S) Briefing, Brig Gen 

Buster C. Glosson. “Offensive Campaign, Phase 1.” to Ucs. Gen Colin Powell, 13 Sep 

1990, (S) Briefing. Brig Gen Glosson. “Offensive Campaign, Phase I.” to President 

Bush, 11 Oct 1990; (S) Briefing, Brig Gen Glosson. ‘Theater Campaign. Phases 11 & 

Ill,” to CINC, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, 1 Dec 1990, (S) Briefing, Brig Gen 

Glosson, ‘Theater Campaign. Phases I1 & 111,” to Wing Commanders. CENTAF, 18 Dec 

1990; Briefing, Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, “Offensive Air Campaign” to Secretary of 

Defense Richard B. Cheney, 20 Dec 1990. 

(S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 29 Nov 1991. 161 

262 
(where the decision problem was ill-structured and less manageable). 

Hence, the type of ad hoc organizational fixes possible in the Gulf War 

may be more difficult to invent and implement in another situation. The 

present organizational structure is identical with the one which, as the 

Defense Science Board noted, 

produced the lack of readiness which characterized our posture on 

August 1, 1990, the lack of interoperability of the force deployed, the 

failure to anticipate the kind of weapons and sensor interactions which 

became so obviously necessary during Desert Shield, the failure to 

realistically exercise this contingency scenario and learn from it when 

it was recognized as the most probable use of military forces. It is the 

same structure that has consistently failed to address the identification 

problem in a comprehensive way, failed to create and practice concepts 

for BDA for the weapons and sensors which were clearly evident, and 

failed to anticipate the roles that space sensors, communications, and 

navigation systems would be required to play in this, the most likely, 

application of U.S. forces. . . . [Tlhe basic institutional processes have 

not changed. . . . ’’I6* 

Second, there was a difference between what senior leaders and planners believed they could manage and the reality of this war. For example, 

General Homer believed he “had real-time control of the air. The only 

thing I didn’t have real-time control of was the El 17s because when they 

go Stealth, they go silent, but they were generally in Baghdad anyway.”163 

Yet, the evidence shows that bomb damage assessment was often 

inadequate or nonexistent, and communications between the GAT and the 

wings were often confusing. As a result, Homer’s quotations are revealing for what they show he knew about the conduct of the war effort at 

the unit level. Horner may have had real-time control of air at times. 

But those times were short. Furthermore, the control of operations exercised by the GAT planners was constrained by their lack of adequate BDA 

and by their conflicts with CENTAFAN. 

la(S) Lessons Learned During Operations Desert Shield & Desert Storm, pp 61- 

2. 

(S) Intvw, LA Gen Homer, 4 Mar 1992, I63 

263 
In one respect, the large number of aircraft available may have been 

a decisive aid in avoiding critical command and control decisions. When 

a key GAT planner complained that some air assets were not being used 

to greatest effect (for example, Marine AWBs), Homer responded there 

was no need to cause an internal squabble among the Services over 

doctrine. The coalition had so many aircraft in theater that it could do 

whatever its leaders wanted done and afford to let the Marine Corps do 

what it wanted to do.164 In another context, Homer added, the reason the 

war was easy 

is because we weren't stressed. Let's be truthful about it. We never 

had to make a decision as to whether the French brigade died or the 

Marine brigade died or the Saudi brigade died. If we had had to make 

those kinds of decisions, it would have been a lot more difficult.'a 

At each level of CENTAF key and significant officers believed they were 

managing the chaos of war. However, when the activities of the many 

significant participants are pieced together, the problem is that neither 

planners nor General Homer, the Joint Force Air Component Commander-knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how 

well the campaign was going. Chapter 8 will examine the issue of bomb 

damage assessment in greater detail. The chapter describes how assessments were conducted and the implications of the assessment process for 

command and control. Chapter 9 will survey how significant operational 

decisions were made below the level of the GAT planners or the Joint Force 

Air Component Commander. Officers aboard airborne command and 

control platforms were able to manage the chaos of war and compensate 

for the difficulty of coordinating a large and complex Air Tasking Order. 

. 

'@(S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col Deptula, 29 Nov 1991. 

(S) Intvw, Lt Gen Horner. 165 

264 
BDA and the Command and Control 

of the Air Campaign 

In testifying to members of Congress, Gen. H. Norman Schwankopf 

commented at length on the intelligence support given his command during 

the war against Iraq.’ General Schwarzkopf said, “We had very, very good 

intelligence support. We had terrific people. We had a lot of capabilities.” 

At the same time, however, Schwarzkopf noted that 

BDA [bomb damage assessment] . . . was one of the major areas of 

confusion. And I feel that was because there were many people who 

felt they were in a better position to judge battle damage assessment 

from a pure analysis of things like photography, and that sort of thing, 

alone, rather than allowing the theater commander . . . to apply good 

military judgment to what he is seeing. That led to some reports that 

were confusing. It led to some disagreements. As a matter of fact, it 

led to some distancing on the part of some agencies from the position 

of Central Command at the time, as to what the battle damage assessment really was . . . . 

The confusion over how best to do battle damage assessment was not, 

according to Schwarzkopf, a minor issue. As he put it, 

There were certain very specific trigger points, to use the term, that we 

felt that we had to arrive at before we could successfully launch the 

ground campaign. And it was important that we had good analysis of 

how we were coming, how we were progressing towards those trigger 

points before we were in a position to recommend to the president of 

the United States that we do launch a ground campaign. 

The General told Congress that he did not get that required “good 

analysis.” 

‘(S) Rpt, Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, Intelligence 

Successes and Failures in Operation Desert ShieWStonn, House of Representatives, 

102nd Congress, 2nd Session, nd. 

265 
Schwarzkopf also described in some detail what he thought his 

command’s problem in this area was: the inability to give him, in “near 

real time,” the information he needed at his level. In fact, he also told 

Congress that his component commanders had the same problem: they 

did not receive the intelligence they needed when they most needed it. 

He attributed this lack of useful intelligence to a preoccupation with 

“what might be called national systems which respond more to the national directive out of Washington.’* 

In sum, General Schwarzkopf said that BDA reporting complicated 

his ability to know whether his air forces were achieving their campaign 

objectives and thereby increased the risk, in his eyes, that he would order 

his land forces to attack at the wrong time. That is, he could not be sure 

of the outcome of air operations because he did not receive outcomerelated information or receive it in time. 

This is a very serious charge. General Schwarzkopf argued that 

theater-level and CENTAF intelligence organizations did not perform well 

despite the quality of their personnel and equipment. What hurt them, in 

his view, was the way intelligence gathering, analysis, and reporting was 

organized and managed. In this chapter, we consider Schwarzkopf’s 

point by examining the process of producing BDA and the impact of that 

process on the construction and execution of the Air Tasking Order 

(ATO). In particular, we will explore the character of the data and information available to operations planners in the Special Studies Division 

[initially called the “Black Hole” and later the Guidance, Apportionment, 

Targeting (GAT) group] and how the management of the BDA process 

affected the command and control of the air campaign. Before we do 

that, however, we must define bomb damage assessment and explain its 

role in shaping the Air Tasking Order. 

Why do BDA? What is it? 

Bomb damage assessment is a specialized process. Its roots go back 

to World War 11, when air commanders learned that aircrews consistently 

overestimated the damage they had inflicted on enemy targets3 The first 

BDA methodology was the systematic analysis of photographic reconnais- 

*Reporting of BDA information should not be confused with fused intelligence. 

3David Maclsaac, Strategic Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United 

Stares Srraregic Bombing Survey (New York, 19761, p 26. 

266 
sance. That now well-established methodology has been supplemented 

in the years since World War I1 by techniques which rely on other forms 

of intelligence, especially electronic and signals intelligence. At the same 

time, however, the all-weather, ’round-the-clock nature of modern tactical 

air warfare has prompted combat planners to demand BDA within twentyfour hours so that they can better distribute their sorties across the range 

of enemy targets. As more and sometimes more accurate data on damage 

and effects have become available, the pressure to analyze and then use 

the data quickly as the basis for planning has also increased. 

The formal definition of bomb damage assessment is “the determination of the effect of all air attacks on targets. . . . ’J The process of BDA 

attempts to determine if, first, the weapons hit their targets and then if the 

weapons achieved the results desired. BDA also involves estimating how 

long it will take enemy units to repair the damage and whether additional 

strikes are needed to complete the destruction of the target or impede 

enemy repair efforts. BDA is only one element of a larger process called 

“combat assessment,” which estimates the overall effectiveness of an air 

campaign? Combat assessment includes bomb damage assessment but 

also covers other forms of assessment, including whether attacks on physical targets have achieved psychological, social, or economic objectives.6 

BDA analysts must have some basic intelligence about the targets of 

missions before the missions themselves are flown, including information 

on the layout and appearance of the target and the types of weapons scheduled to be used against it. Once the mission is flown, the analysts must 

know whether there were any changes to the planned attack. Were different munitions used? Were they dropped from an altitude different than that 

planned? Was the aimpoint the same as that planned? BDA analysts draw 

required target data from target intelligence files. They get information on 

planned missions from the Air Tasking Order. They rely on Mission 

4JCS Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

1 Dec 1989. See also Tactical Air Command Regulation 55-45, Tactical Air Force 

Headquarters and the Tactical Air Control Center. 

’Department of the Air Force, AF Pamphlet 200-17, An Introduction to Air Force 

Targeting, 23 Jun 1989. 

6~~~ should not be confused with Munitions Effectiveness Assessment. The latter 

is conducted by scientists and engineers concerned about the physical effects of explosives, or the reliability of sensors, or whether the tactics used on missions make the most 

of a system’s destructive capabilities. BDA focuses on what targets are like after attack. 

Mission Effectiveness Assessment focuses on what weapons do to targets. 

267 
Reports for data on how missions were actually flown. Clearly, BDA is 

very dependent on accurate, timely data. Missing or inaccurate data at any 

stage of the process (from imagery of the target before attack to postattack 

Mission Reports) must reduce the validity of BDA. 

Force-level decisionmakers’ view BDA as a measurement stick to 

evaluate the success or failure of their plans. They use it to determine if 

a restrike is required or if the air assets under their control C~JI be sent to 

another target. By contrast, the unit-level planner and aircrew (often the 

same people) view BDA as confirmation that the attack hit the target or 

as evidence that the next attack should be conducted differently. This is 

an important distinction. It means that the same basic information, such 

as photographs of a strike, will be used to answer different questions at 

the unit and force levels. It also means that planners at the unit and force 

levels will press for the BDA useful to them. 

BDA must satisfy the needs of the force-level planner and the 

unit-level planner. To do that, it must be based on a sound methodology 

which answers the needs of both types of planner. It must, in short, say 

whether the damage criteria have been met and whether the weapon used 

performed as expected. Bomb damage assessment must be done from a 

distance, without perfect information. Yet the better the information, and 

the faster it reaches both force-level and unit-level planners, the better the 

answer to the question, “How much damage did we doY8 Idklly, planners will receive target damage results very soon after a strike? This upto-date information can be used within the Air Tasking Order planning 

cycle to tailor the air effort. 

’For the purposes of this study, the term “force-level decisionmaker“ refers to the 

planner one level up from the unit (e.g., wing). In this case, the force-level decisionmaker is the GAT phner located in the TACC. 

‘An Introduction to Air Force Targeting, para 9-4, 9-5, 9-6. 

’And in some cases, BDA was in the planner’s hands within an hour of a strike. For 

example, BDA was transferred to the Black Hole on TLAM strikes within 45 minutes of an 

attack. See (S) Chapter 6. footnote 68. Lt Col Deptula also recalled incidents in which 

RAdm McConnell was able to provide BDA within four hours of a request from Brig Gen 

Glosson. Needless to say. this short turn-around time was much faster than CENTAF~N 

or C~OM 12. (S) Intvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Col David A. Deptula. 

SAFIOSX. 20 NOv 1991. 

268 
What Information was Available to Build the AT0 in Desert Storm? 

Information used to assess bomb damage came in several formats 

during Desert Storm. Gathering that information began with the filing of 

In-flight Pilot Reports and post-flight Mission Reports." Each report had 

its own key place in the BDA process. In-flight Reports were transmitted 

from attack aircraft at predetermined times or points following attacks on 

their targets. Transmissions were in the "clear" and provided unclassified 

information about the attack, for example, whether the mission succeeded 

or failed. In many cases, Airborne Command, Control, and Communications (ABCCC) or the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 

received and forwarded the data to Combat Operations in the Tactical Air 

Control Center. The In-flight Report information formed the basis for the 

Mission Reports, which were prepared by unit intelligence personnel 

immediately after each sortie was completed. Using the In-flight Report 

and aircraft videotape recording (AVTR)," or gun camera and radar film, 

the aircrew was debriefed. Then, the Mission Report was prepared and 

forwarded to the CENTAF Combat Intelligence Division. 

At the direction of Brig. Gen. Buster Glosson, 14th Air Division 

Commander, F-1 17 and F-1 1 1F units prepared videotape summaries of 

all the aircraft videotape recordings and forwarded them to the GAT 

planners,'* initially so that CENTAF would have evidence of the accuracy 

of the bombing of targets in Baghdad. The point was to allay speculation 

on the part of the news media that the attacks on Baghdad were killing 

~ivi1ians.l~ However, these video summaries were also a summary 

means-a short cut-to BDA, and GAT personnel began using them for that 

p~rpose.'~ Frequently, the aircraft videotape recorder was the only evi- 

"(S) Chapter 2, Figure 8, Desert Storm Mission Report. 

"Only three types of coalition aircraft (F-117A. F-I5E, F-1 I IF) possessed AVTR 

systems capable of viewing and recording bomb impact on target. For example, the 

F-15E WIN targeting pod did not go fully on-line until the middle of February 1991. 

With a few exceptions, up until that time the majority of AVTR inputs were from F-117A 

and F-111F (using the PAVE TACK pod). 

"(S) Intvw. Mark D. Mandeles and Lt Col Sanford S. Terry with Maj Robert J. 

Heston. the 37th TFW (P) Director of Intelligence from 9 Aug 1990 to 31 Mar 1991, 

19 Oct 1992. 

13(S) Intvw. Mandeles and Terry with Maj Robert J. Heston, 16 and 19 Oct 1992; 

"See (S) Chapter 7, footnote 159. 

see also the section on the THREAT model in Appendix 3. 

269 
dence reviewed within the GAT of weapon impact and detonation. Mission Reports contained the bulk of information about the effects of detonations, but the GAT planners were not addressees for Mission Re~0rts.l~ 

In addition to these unit products, GAT planners had available to them 

other tactical, theater16 and national intelligence.” These included intercepts of Iraqi communications and signals, as well as imagery (from the 

visible, infrared, and radar portions of the electromagnetic spectrum). 

The Iraqis clearly had some idea of U.S. capabilities in these areas because they exercised careful communications discipline. They also broadcast radar signals selectively and infrequently, making it difficult for GAT 

planners to accurately gauge the status of many radar sites. Lt. Gen. 

Charles A. Horner’s decision to keep Iraqi radars on CENTAF’S “active” 

threat list until the Tactical Air Control Center had positive photographic 

proof that they had been destroyed kept the Constant Source database 

fu11.18 A later section of this chapter will show why that was a problem. 

Planned BDA Process: Theater 

Planned Organization in Theater 

U.S. Central Command’s pre-Desert Shield plans for action were laid 

out in USCINCCENT Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90 (Second Draft) of 18 

July 1990. Annex B, covering intelligence, gave Central Command 5-2 

the responsibility for preparing guidelines for component intelligence 

‘he CENTAF~N created the Address Information Group (AIG), which is the standard 

list of addresses for particular pieces of information. For example, the PI 17A Director 

of Intelligence did not address MISREPS to the GAT because the GAT was not on the AIG. 

He did talk with the FLW in the TACC and members of the GAT to describe the outcome 

of his unit’s missions. Yet, their conversation did not include all data on the mission, and 

the extent of communication between the GAT and other unit-level intelligence officers 

is not known. See (S) Intvw, Maj Robert J. Heston, 16 and 19 Oct 1992. 

16As illustrated in (S) Chapter 7, Table 11, U.S. and Allied forces flew an average 

of seventy-five reconnaissance type intelligence collection missions each day between 

17 Jan and 28 Feb 1991. 

17[DELETED] See (S) Task Force Ill’s Spuce Operation in the Gulf War, Chapter 

4; (S) Ltr, [DELETEiD], USAF, Chief, Target Intelligence Division, Office for Global 

Analysis, DIA to Col Emery M. Kiraly, Executive Director, GWAPS. subj: Gulf War Air 

Power Survey, 2 Dec 1992. 

“(S) lntvw, Thomas C. Hone, GWAPS with Maj Lewis Hill, WAF, GWAPS, 5 Nov 

1992. 

270 
organizations and control over any contacts between those organizations 

and intelligence organizations outside the theater.” This concept gave 

CENTCOM J-2 the responsibility for managing all the intelligence functions 

supporting the theater. CENTCOM J-2, however, did not have the personnel required to monitor the component and national intelligence collection 

systems, let alone the expertise to direct the thousands of specialists in all 

the supporting intelligence organizations?’ 

In the area of overhead imagery, for example, Operation Plan 1002- 

90 assigned CENTCOM J-2 “overall responsibility.”21 To exercise that 

responsibility, CENTCOM 5-2 planned to establish a Collection Management Office, and the latter, located in the Joint Intelligence Center, would 

“compile all collection activities . . . ** in the theater?2 The plan was that 

each component would set up its own Collection Management Office and 

send a representative to sit on the Daily Aerial Reconnaissance and 

Surveillance conference chaired by the CENTCOM 5-2 Collection Management Office. The daily conferences would serve as the means of passing 

CENTCOM guidance to the component intelligence organizations and, more 

importantly, as the forum where the components would make their specific requests known to Central C0mmand.2~ 

[DELETED]” [DELETED]26 [DELETED]27 

”(S/NF) uSC~NCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (Second Draft), 18 Jul 1990, Annex 7 to 

Annex B (Intelligence), pp B-7-1 and 8-7-2. 

”(S) Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/stonn. p 5. 

The April 1990 StufDirectory for the Headquarters, U.S. Central Command lists approximately 150 personnel in CENTCOM J-2. 

21(S/NF) OPLAN 1002-90 (Second Draft), I8 Jul 1990, Annex 7 to Annex B, p B-7-3. 

22(S/NF) Ibid. 

23(S/NF) Ibid, p 8-7-2. 

24[DELETED] 

25(S/NF) Ibid, p 8-74. 

26(S/NF) Ibid, p B-7-3. 

27(S/NF) Ibid, p 8-74. 

27 1 
U.S. Central Command Air Forces planned to have intelligence 

personnel participate actively in constructing the Air Tasking Order?" 

assessing the results of missions flown, and determining long-range plans 

beyond the routine AT0 cycle. Intelligence was to be an active participant 

in each and every phase of the An> production process. Unfortunately, 

Central Command Air Forces did not have enough intelligence personnel 

to fulfill this major responsibility. In addition, the intelligence personnel 

who did deploy worked in different locations, which hindered mutual 

~upport.2~ Their separation was made all the worse by a lack of sufficient 

secure communications links that otherwise would have allowed them to 

communicate directly and quickly with the GAT planners. 

Planned Theater Intelligence Organizational Relationships 

In addition, the Tactical Air Control Center did not function as 

planned after CENTAF deployed. For example, USCENTAF Regulation 55- 

45 called for the CENTAF Target Intelligence Division to become a branch 

of the Combat Intelligence Division of the Tactical Air Control Center 

and support the Combat Plans Division. Intelligence personnel also were 

assigned to the Enemy Situation Correlation Division (ENSCD), where they 

supported the Combat Operations Division. Figure 35 illustrates the 

organizational arrangements proposed by Regulation 55-45. 

According to planning done before Desert Shield, CENTAF'S Targets 

Division (INT) would comprise three sections: Target Nominations 

Branch (INTN), Combat Assessment Branch (INTA),~ and ENSCD.31 Under 

the plan, target analysts working in the Target Nominations Branch were 

supposed to nominate specific targets for strikes they believed would 

fulfill the commander's guidance and Central Command's campaign 

objectives. Each Target Nominations Branch analyst was supposed to be 

assigned to a specific aspect of the air campaign (that is, offensive counter air, air interdiction, command and control) to identify, weaponeer, and 

rank targets and target types for attack. In the plan, these analysts were 

"USCENTAF Regulation 55-45, Air Employment Planning Process, 27 Jun 1990, p 

29See (S) Chapter 6. 

30~m and IKTA supported the CID and Combat Plans. 

ENSCD supported the Combat Operations Division. 

3-3. 

31 

212 
supposed to help the Combat Operations Planning Staff develop the Air 

Tasking Order. 

COMBAT 

OPERATIONS 

DIVISION 

Figure 35 

Theater Intelligence Organizational Relationships 

COMBAT 

PLANS 

DIVISION 

ENEMY 

SITUATION 

CORRELATION 

DIVISION 

CENSCD) 

OPERATIONS 

*_---.--....< 

INTELLIGENCE 

COMBAT 

INTELLIGENCE 

DIVISION 

(CD) 

In the pre-Desert Shield plan, analysts in the Combat Assessment 

Branch were given responsibility for monitoring the current status of 

targets. In that capacity, they would alert the Target Nominations Branch 

to targets which had to be reattacked. In addition, Combat Assessment 

analysts would produce an Air Combat Assessment report documenting 

the effectiveness of combat operations, enemy reconstitution capabilities, 

and the reliability of coalition weapon systems. 

According to the plan, the Enemy Situation Correlation Division 

target analysts would nominate near real-time targets. They would search 

for high-value, fleeting targets for attack by alert or diverted aircraft, then 

monitor the execution of the Air Tasking Order to determine which 

targets had been attacked. Then they would pass this information back 

273 
to the Target Nominations Branch.’* The ENSCD was the third organization within the Tactical Air Control Center that needed accurate and up 

to-date BDA, because, in the prewar plan, it supported Combat Operations 

in executing “today’s” war. 

The Intent of USCENTAF Regulation 55-45 

USCENTAF Regulation 55-45 specified that targeting guidance from 

the Commander in Chief Central Command and the Commander of the 

Central Command Air Forces be applied to the selection and ranking of 

targets through the Joint Targeting Coordination Board using the Daily 

USCENTAF Guidance Letter.33 Regulation 55-45 anticipated a continual 

interaction between operations and intelligence analysts.” In the prewar 

plans, the Combat Assessment Cell was given the responsibility for 

supporting this interaction by maintaining a list reflecting the status of 

previously fragged targets. This list-the strike history-was the point of 

reference to which all parties using bomb damage assessment in the 

Tactical Air Control Center were, in the plan, supposed to refer.35 

BDA Collection Management 

The success of this organization for the provision and analysis of 

bomb damage data depended on the timely inputs made by the collection 

managers assigned to the Combat Assessment Cell. Figure 36 illustrates 

the planned flow of requests made by collection managers to Central 

Command, national, and tactical theater assets. Collection managers 

would be responsible for providing the Chief of Targets and senior weapons and tactics officers with reports needed on each target nominated for 

reatta~k.’~ CENTAF Combat Assessment Cell collection managers were 

expected to review and approve the collection requirements presented by 

all CENTAF’S air units. In this capacity they were to ensure that requests 

for intelligence were properly integrated, reviewed, and, where possible, 

satisfied from information already available in the Tactical Air Control 

32Air Employment Planning Process, p 2-3. 

 bid, 3- I 2. 

3s~bid, 3-4. 

”Ibid, p 3-3. 

”lbid. 

274 
Center. If the center did not ..ave the needed data, these managers were 

supposed to make sure they were ~ollected.~' 

Under the plan, the collection managers had very critical responsibilities. They were expected to remain aware of new or changing 

collection opportunities while ensuring that Tactical Air Control Center 

personnel were apprised of the total collection potential. To do this, they 

would have to work with operations and target intelligence personnel to 

ascertain if collection requests had been satisfied. At the same time, they 

were supposed to remain aware of the capabilities of Air Force, national, 

and other Services' collection resources. The latter could be tasked 

through a request made by the CENTAF representative on the 

USCENTCOMIJ2C collection management board.38 Unfortunately, of the 

five CENTAF personnel eventually assigned as collection managers, only 

two had had limited experience working in that p0sition.3~ In addition, 

Central Command had rated all component staffs as marginal in planning 

and managing the production of their requirements for intelligence support.4o As a result, CENTAF collection managers evidently lacked the 

ability to use effectively the intelligence information management systems 

with which the component commands deployed. 

"llbid, p 5-9. 

"Ibid, Chapter 5. 

39USCENTCOM, Baseline Assessment Document-Third Mition (BAD-3) for the Theater 

Intelligence Architecture Program (Final), 12 Sep 1990, p 4-5. There is no way to 

determine by position and AFSC that people assigned to particuhf functions within CENTAF 

Collection Management were properly trained for their job and had the background to 

support collection efforts. It is also impossible to determine where these individuals 

were assigned before the war and whether they were logically assigned based on experience. 

4oBaseline Assessment Document-Third Edition (BAD-3) for the Theater Intelligence 

Architecture Program, p 4-5. 

275 
Figure 36 

Collection Management 

Flow of Requests to CENTCOM, National and 

Tactical Theater Assets 

t t 

t 

44 t t 

CENTAF ARCENT NAVCENT MARCENT 

CMO CMO CMO CMO 

The Importance of the Combat Assessment Cell 

SOCCENT 

CMO 

Planning for BDA focused on the Combat Assessment Cell, which was 

subordinate to the Chief of Targets. The Combat Assessment Cell was 

formally assigned the responsibility for analyzing the cumulative effects 

of bombing and for preparing estimates of how long it would take the 

Iraqis to repair the damage. CENTAF Regulation 55-45 specified that the 

Combat Assessment/BDA Cell was to pass pertinent information to both 

CENTAF CENTAF 

PLANNERS TARGETS 

276 

- 

UNITS - 

- 

- 
the Enemy Situation Correlation Division and the Combat Intelligence 

Division’s target developers!’ 

In the plan, the Combat Assessment/BDA Cell received a hard copy 

Air Tasking Order and then posted BDA to it. In addition, its personnel 

were supposed to prepare periodic target summaries using the BDA data 

collected through all the means, photographic and otherwise, available to 

the theater. Based on its findings this Cell was to provide collection 

requirements to the collection managers and present daily BDA/ combat 

assessment briefings to the Commander of the Central Command Air 

Forces!2 

The Flaws in Precrisis Plans 

However, for all of the regulations and operations plans, an architecture for the collection and dissemination of bomb damage assessment 

did not exist in Central Command or its components!’ The architecture 

was only a concept; it did not describe a working system. General intelligence guidelines specifying which agencies reported “what” and “to 

whom” were in place, but an operative and cohesive mechanism for 

tracking, collating, and disseminating BDA had to be created once personnel were in place.44 As the Center for Naval Analyses put it, “The theater 

BDA process suffered from a cold start, in which the lack of adequate 

procedures, practice, and manpower were felt.”” 

Unit support, collection, and production were ill-defined, or, in some 

cases, defined just prior to deployment. One USCENTAF officer noted in 

an after action report that “when we deployed we would have had trouble 

4’Air Employment Planning Process, Chapter 5. 

421bid. 

“Baseline Assessment Document-Third Edition (BAD-3) for the Theater Intelligence 

Architecture Program, pp 5-1 - 5-7. 

%Sgt William K. Shenvood, ImlS NCOIC. Weaponeering. Trip Report - Operation 

Desert ShieldStorm, 10 May 1991. We should add, tne troubles experienced in Internal 

Look 90 were not attributed to the organization of intelligence support. Intvw. Maj AMe 

D. Leary, Mark D. Mandeles, Lt Col Sanford S. Terry with Lt Col Ross Dickinson. Joint 

Warfare Center, 8 May 1992. 

‘’Frank Schwamb. et al.. (S) Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Vol. I!: Strike 

Warfare, Center for Naval Analyses (CRM 91-178), Oct 1991, p 3-3. 

277 
running a major exercise much less conducting a war.** In fact, any 

exercise, conducted anywhere by U.S. forces prior to Desert Storm, would 

probably have revealed that collecting and processing BDA in adequate 

quantity and quality just was not likely." Given the fact that it would 

always be under great pressure to produce results quickly, the exercise 

Control Cell would probably make up the results that the senior staff 

wanted. The fact that it was difficult to duplicate realistic BDA inputs and 

demands under extreme time pressure in peacetime exercises inhibited 

effective, realistic planning.& 

An Effort to Devebp Theater-Level BDA Software 

CENTAF did make an effort in the year before the war to take advantage of computer capabilities to develop and produce bomb damage 

assessment to support the Air Tasking Order generation process. An 

intelligence augmentee to CENTAF apparently was assigned responsibility 

to modify existing software for this purpose. The new software was 

46(S) AAR, USCENTAF/IN After Action Report and Lessons Learned, 25 Mar 9 I, from 

Col [no first name] Rauschkolb. to Col [Christopher L.] Christon (CENTAF/IN), with 

17 Attachments. 

47BDA during any phase of an exercise, in both quantity and quality, is inadequate. 

Within the artificialities of an exercise targeting and intelligence will always give the 

appearance of working as expected. One of the problems is that intelligence is often 

included more for the operations staff than for training of intelligence personnel. It is rare 

that new targets are interjected to reflect the increased attention from the national intelligence community. Collection management also suffers. It does not get sufficient exercise in performing its function, especially within the parameters required by the operators. 

There is little Air Force-wide training for theater-level assets. Rarely is anyone concerned 

with checking that a tasked unit in fact has the target materials required to fly a mission. 

Also the intelligence dissemination process is not sufficiently tasked. Component-level 

exercises tend to support the decision makers. However. during these exercise crises 

much of the effort is directed down to the operational units-units which are almost always 

simulated and very undemanding. 

%Sgt Shewood, Trip Report - Operation Desert ShieldStorm. 10 May 1991. SSgt 

Shewood noted: 

1 mentioned we exercised this plan [BDA] successfully during Exercise IMMINENT THUNDER. The measure of success has to be qualified, because the key 

factor of having a database with the targeting and mission data readily available 

and formatted at the start of each AT0 day was simulated. This simulation was 

approved at the time. because the actual ATO database, AT0 Bravo . . . had 

been 'hand-poked' into the computers, but follow-on ATOS were to be generated 

automatically using a computer system called TEMMR. 

278 
ready in time for testing during the exercise Imminent Thunder, which 

was held two months before Operation Desert Storm bkgan. The BDA 

program itself was a database of all of the targets in the Air Tasking 

Order, with BDA data fields added. The goal was to create a baseline 

database with all of the Air Tasking Order data in place before any of the 

BDA reports rolled in. 

This database could be entered into a computer by hand. It could 

also be created using an electronic ASCII file transfer from the Computer 

Assisted Force Management System, which Tactical Air Control Center 

personnel thought they would use (if war came) to build the Air Tasking 

Order. By using the AT0 data from CAFMS, the BDA Cell would automatically tie all of the targets to the aircraft assigned to strike them, and have 

times over targets, mission numbers, call signs, and targeting data as well. 

The point was to prepare a database which presented as complete a 

picture of the air war as possible. It had to be done with a stand-alone 

program because of the inherent limits of the CAFMS software. These 

limits forced developers in CENTAF to take data generated by CAFMS and 

translate them into an ASCII file format, placing them on floppy disks. 

The data could be used to build a separate but representative database for 

actual correlating target/mission data with BDA. Databases from three 

different systems had to be tied together if a total “target picture” were 

to exist. General Homer approved an effort to develop this database:’ 

The plan was to process bomb damage assessment using three separate computer workstations. This would allow three people to use information in the BDA database simultaneously, thereby expediting the handling of incoming message traffic. At the first workstation, an operator 

correlated Mission Reports and In-flight Reports (first-phase BDA) to the 

targets assigned in the Air Tasking Order. At the second workstation, 

another operator would enter BDA collected from national assets (secondand third-phase BDA). At the third workstation, the operator-a combat 

assessments officer-could analyze the available BDA and then recommend 

whether to nominate a target for another strike. 

49SSgt Shewood, Trip Report - Operation Desert ShieldIStorm. The problem with 

CAMS was that targeting information was never standardized, e.g.. target coordinates 

could be expressed in different formats. 

279 
BDA inputs also were to be “fused” (that is, merged with other types 

of intelligence data) and then passed to Central Command, where a BDA 

cell would estimate general attrition trends. At the beginning of each 

AT0 day, a cumulative strike history, with BDA and real-time mission and 

targeting data, could be analyzed, and new BDA could be entered quickly 

into the database to update the target recodw 

The plan was to take bomb damage assessment collected from national assets and transfer it from the second workstation, via a floppy 

disk, to the first workstation, where it could be read into the master 

database. The first workstation would do all the reporting. The purpose 

of this system was to take advantage of the ease with which data in a 

digital format can be analyzed and displayed.” The process by which 

CENTAF’S Air Tasking Order was assembled in 1990 still involved a lot 

of pen-and-pencil work. If BDA were to be posted and transferred by pen 

and pencil, the AT0 process would become less responsive to changes in 

targets. Unfortunately, the CENTAF BDA analysis system was not problem-free by January 199 1. Moreover, Guidance, Apportionment, and 

Targeting cell planners did not know about this system, and so they put 

together one of their own after the beginning of Desert St01-m.’~ 

Planned BDA Process: Washington 

Organization in Washington 

The Joint Staff understood that Central Command was responsible for 

conducting reconnaissance in-theater. Components and supporting commands would produce their own required intelligence or get assistance 

from CENTCOM.” The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was prepared to 

direct the allocation of strategic reconnaissance assets in response to 

Commander in Chief, Central Command requirements. CENTCOM, for 

example, had to be given the authority to direct the U-m-ls used in 

the theater, and CENTAF directly controlled only its RF-4s. 

%Sgt Shewood, Trip Report - Operation Desert ShieldStorm. 

%id. 

”Ibid. See also (S) Chapter 7. 

”JCS Publication 3-56.], Chapter IX. Volume 11, pp 8-20, B-21. 

280 
[DELETED]” [DELETED]” 

As Central Command forces deployed to the Persian Gulf area, the 

480th Tactical Intelligence Group, out of Langley AFB, Virginia, analyzed reconnaissance imagery and produced targeting materials for use in 

the theater. [DELETED] In pre-Desert Shield plans, requests to DIA for 

imagery were supposed to come through USCENTCOM 5-2 collection managers, who were given the responsibility for reviewing and ranking requests from the deploying components.% 

How Did GAT Planners Actually get BDA? 

The Basic Problem 

Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting planners requested that BDA 

be produced as soon as possible after each strike?’ Had it been produced 

as planned, BDA would have been used in the Air Tasking Order planning 

cycle. GAT planners attempted every day during Desert Storm to get such 

imagery. In fact, the ATO Planning Guidance identified a need for imagery “against any target struck on previous air task orders which [had] 

either not yet been covered or inadequately covered for bomb damage 

”Ibid, pp 10-16. 

551bid, p 16. , 

”(S) Desert Stonn Afrer Action Report. from Lt Col Steme, Lt Col Byrd, 

Maj Massey, 7 Mar 1990 (sic); see also (S) Lt Col Bondzeleske, Weapon Effects Officer 

DX-S (AFIXOXWD). Afrer Action Report, 18 Mar 1991; see also, (SINFN”) Capt Steve 

Hedger, AFIAIMKS, Point Paper on BDA Imagery kpbitation, 21 Sep 1990, and see also 

Checkmate BDA Team - Daily Tasks (As of 26 Jan 91), from Lt Col Allan W. Howey, 

Deputy, Checkmate BDA Team; see also (s) DIA’s Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) 

Process briefing [CHST 51-10], with note from Lt Col Ben Harvey to Colonel Warden 

“here’s updated BDA brief-recommend we get on LGEN Adam’s calendar this week.” 

”Air Employment Planning Process, p 3-12; see also AT0 Planning Guidance for 

D+3 - 33 and D+3S - 43 (reel number 23978, frames 936-1080). Besides the usual 

distribution to the commanders copies were provided to USCENTAFIIN. Combat OH, SAC 

Director. SAC Planners. ESC. RSAF. RAF. US Navy, US Marine corps, BCE, Canadian LNO, 

French LNO and outside of USCENTAF it was provided to USCENTCOM JUJ3IC31. See also 

Master Attack Plans for Days D+lS (pages 2,4,S) D+19 (reel number 23674, pp 7-8). In 

each case RF-4Cs and RF-Ss were tasked to provide reconnaissance in the KTO, some 

specifically against bridges. 

(s) DX BDA CON OF’S, 11 Sep 1990-the latter two fikd in CHST 51-12; See dS0 (s) 

28 1 
assessment purposes.”58 GAT planners felt so strongly about this matter 

that they did not change the “Collection Management Guidance” for the 

duration of Desert Storm. 

However, CENTAF collection managers had to satisfy both unit- and 

force-level requests for BDA?9 As noted in a report prepared by the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (for Command, Control, Communications 

and Intelligence), several factors kept the collection managers from satisfying both these “clients.” First, the concept of the air campaign (and 

how the campaign changed over time) was not clearly briefed to the 

collection managers. Second, some collection managers, rather than 

being centrally located in the Tactical Air Control Center, were not in the 

Center or were moved several times. Only in the third week of Desert 

Storm were all the collection managers finally linked up with the imagery 

analysts in the Tactical Air Control Center they were supposed to be 

working with all along.@’ Third, the different imagery and intelligence 

collection units working for Central Command were not practiced in 

putting the theater command’s plan into effect in realistic exercises. 

Their relationships with each other were never well defined!’ 

These problems placed CENTAF collection managers at a disadvantage 

in what turned out to be a competition for the attention of Central Command. CENTCOM 5-2 decided which component requests for intelligence 

data would be satisfied first. As a result, CENTAF’S requests were often 

not satisfied on time to meet the needs of the Air Tasking Order planners 

58(S) AT0 Planning Guidance for D+3 - 33 and D+35 - 43 (reel 23978, frames 936- 

1080). Collection Management Guidance in Priority Order. Besides the usual distribution 

to the commanders copies were provided to USCENTAF~N, Combat OH, SAC Director, SAC 

Planners, ESC, RSAF. RAF, US Navy, US Marine corps, BCE, Canadian LNO, French LNO and 

outside of USCENTAF it was provided to USCENTCOM Jz/J3/C31. see also Master Attack 

Plans for Days D+15 and D+19 (reel 23674, pp 2-8). In each case RF-4s and RF-5s were 

tasked to provide reconnaissance in the KTO. Some of those missions were against 

bridges. 

59[DELETED] 

@‘(S) lntelligence Program Support Group, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), Operation Desert 

ShielaDesert Storm Intelligence Disseminalion Sludy-Final Report, Appendix L-CENTAF, 

28 May 1992. 

‘‘ Baseline Assessment Document-Third Edition (BAD-3) for the Theater Intelligence 

Architecture Program (Final), pp 4-1 1, 4-12. 

282 
or the unit-level planners.62 Put another way, the availability of BDA to 

CENTAF was hampered by the implementation of CEmOM’s precrisis 

intelligence concept and by a lack of practice on the part of the collection 

managers working in or for the Tactical Air Control Center. 

For example, the Iraqi -Air Defense Operations Center in Baghdad 

was a very high-priority target when the air war commenced on the night 

of 16/17 January 1991. Consequently, two F-l17As were assigned to 

attack it. The Air Defense Center ceased to be a target when GAT planners decided that postmission pilot debriefs and cockpit video footage 

showed that all bombs had hit on, or extremely close to, their desired 

mean points of impact and had properly detonated. This is the kind of 

assessment which GAT planners wanted to be able to make for all targets. 

Unfortunately, different types of targets require different types of 

BDA. For example, analysts could usually decide whether point targets 

such as Baghdad Air Defense Operations Center were destroyed or nonfunctional by examining a few images. The same sort of analysis did not 

work for Republican Guard divisions entrenched in or near Kuwait. Air 

operations against them were essentially attritional and-hopefullycumulative, with no particular aimpoint being of higher priority until 

ground operations were imminent. Under these circumstances, it was 

difficult to decide, just from aerial photographs, whether any given Republican Guard unit was capable of fighting effectively. 

Without bomb damage assessment, GAT planners considered all 

targets as still functional, still dangerous. Imperfect knowledge about the 

effectiveness of strikes led to unnecessary restrikes, the waste of munitions, and to placing crews and equipment unnecessarily at risk. Unnecessary restrikes also kept GAT planners from allocating aircraft and munitions to other targets. The planners did not correct this situation because 

they did not know where and how to obtain all the BDA they needed. In 

accordance with regulations, the daily AT0 Planning Guidance letter 

6%is was not just a problem for CENTAF; it dso effected NAVCENT. According to 

an analysis done by the Center for Naval Analyses, BDA was such a scarce resource 

during Desert Storm that many targets assigned to the Navy’s carrier battle groups in the 

Red Sea and Persian Gulf were not adequately covered. See Frank Schwamb, et al., (S) 

Desert Storm Reconrfructwn Report, Vol. II: Strike Warfare, pp 3-19 and 3-20. 

283 
stated, in general terms, those req~irements.6~ The problem was that the 

requirements were often not met. 

Collection Systems Thal Were Employed 

By the time the war started, Central Command had established U-2R6" 

and TR-16' in the theater.66 [DELETED]67 Strategic Air Command imagery interpreters were able to analyze Senior Year Electrosptical Reconnaissance System (SYERS) film,@ and produce imagery interpretation 

reports. [DELETED]@ [DELETEDI7' 

Table 13 lists the major theater imagery exploitation systems supporting CENTAF targeting and possessing the ability to support Desert Storm 

BDA operations by October 1990.'2 

63(S) Intvw, Lt Col David A. Deptula. Deptula noted that the Guidance Letter also 

was used to provide information to the people putting together the Am. 

%e Lockheed U-2R is considered a national, rather than tactical, intelligence asset. 

The planes can be outfitted with either cameras or equipment. depending on the nature 

of a particular mission. 

6%he TR-1 is an updated version of the U-2. but considered a tactical, instead of 

national. intelligence asset. 

66(S/NF/WN) Robert J. Butler, Intelligence Support for BDA and Targeting in Operation Desert Storm, RAND WD(L)-5633-I-AF (Santa Monica, Nov 1991). (S/NF/WN) See also 

(S) Leland Joe and Dan Gon-iales. Command and Control, Communications, and Intelligence in Desert storm Air Operations, RAND WD(L)-5750-AF (Santa Monica, Feb 1992). 

See also CENTCOM. Desert Shield Chronological list of events - Aug 90 - Apr 91. 

[DELETED] 

67[DELETED] 

@(S/NF) SYERS is an electro-optical sensor. [DELETED] 

@(S/NF/WN) Robert J. Butler. Intelligence Support for BDA and Targeting in Opem- 

''(S/NF/WN) Command and Control, Communications. and Intelligence in Desert 

7'(S/NF/WN) Intelligence Support for 8DA and Targeting in Operation Desert Stonn. 

72(S/NF/WN) Ibid. (S/NF/WN) See also Project Air Force Assessment of Operation 

Desert Shield: Volume II, The Buildup of Combat Power-Technical Appendices, pp 17 1 - 

twn Desert Storm. 

Storm Air Operations. 

76, 197-99. 

284 
Table 13 

Imagery Exploitation and Production In-theater (October 1990) 

[DELETED] 

Table 14 depicts the disposition of U.S. intelligence sensors available 

to the theater as of 20 January 1991 .73 

Table 14 

Areas of Sensor Commitment 

[DELETED] 

By mid-January 1991, JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System) and RF-4s with long-range oblique photographic, side-looking, 

and forward-looking panoramic cameras were based in the theater. These 

assets were complemented by additional Strategic Air Command TR-1 s 

with ASARS-11 and by British Jaguars and Tornados with side-looking IR 

sensors and long-range oblique photography. TARPS (tactical air [photographic] reconnaissance pod system) for the F-14 were deployed on 

aircraft carriers employed in Desert Storm. The Royal Saudi Air Force 

RF-SE aircraft rounded out the tactical reconnaissance force for Central 

Command. 

Processing Collected Data 

As additional assets became available the need for more personnel 

and equipment to exploit, produce. and disseminate images grew pressing. 

DIA, CENTCOM, and CENTAF tried to address these needs collectively with 

the formation of a Joint Imagery Production Center (JIPC-pronounced 

bgypsy”) .74 

The JlPC was created from existing assets. It had key elements: [DELETED], a mobile intelligence processing element from the 9th Remote 

73S0UrCe: (S/NF) HQ USAFIINX, OADR. 

74(S) Operation Desert ShieWDesert Storm Intelligence Dissemination 

Study-Final Report, Appendix WENTAF. p 4- 1 1. 

[DELETED] 

285 
Tracking Station at Beale AFB, and a joint imagery exploitation cell with 

200 imagery interpreters from several organizations. This organization was 

fully operational by 10 January 1991 and capable of producing 1,700 prints 

per day. By 15 January, the JIPC was exploiting [DELETED] imagery and 

U-2 camera film brought by courier daily from Taif to Riyadh." 

The JIPC had trouble starting up because it was created ad hoc in the 

theater. Getting organized, combined with the increasing demand for 

imagery by operational users, kept the J~PC from meeting user demands 

and made the component staffs extremely unhappy. For example, the 

JlPC was designed to support CENTAF with liaison to CENXOM. The 

JIPC'S role later changed to CENTCOM support, with the primary user 

being the U.S. Army.'6 

The original concept also called for the JlPC to process one to two U2 missions per week. This task was expanded to daily mission processing, which placed a greater demand on JIPC personnel than they were able 

to satisfy. In addition, the JlPC was also directed to play a major role in 

the bomb damage assessment process for the Commander, Central Command, which meant that half of the interpreters who had been available 

to process reconnaissance were instead doing target analy~is.'~ By the 

end of Desert Storm, the JIPC had processed 1.3 million feet of U-2 

imagery and produced over 53,000 selected prints." 

75(S/NF/WN) Intelligence Supporl for BDA and Targeting in Operation Desert Storm. 

76(S/NF/WN) Ibid, p 15. See also USCENTAF~N, Msg dtg 0507262 Feb 1991. subj: 

Unit lmagery Distribution. 

CENTAF~N acknowledges the need for timely premission imagery in this message. 

CENTAF~N personnel concentrated on those units going to the KTO and attacking the 

Republican Guard units. The initial intent was to provide (a) RF-4 imagery from the JIPC 

and (b) U-2R mosaics, which would require assembly at the unit. CENTAF~IN attempted 

to complete work on one Iraqi division each day, The information would be distributed 

via C-21 from the JIPC at Riyadh, or from Shaikh Isa. 

77(SMF/WN) Intelligence Support for BDA and Targeting in Operation Desert Storm, 

p 15. 

[DELETED] 

78(S/NF) DCS/hlelligence Operation Desert Shiela7Stonn Afrer Action 

Report-Executive Edition, 30 Aug 1991, p 9. 

286 
[DELETED]79 [DELETED]” [DELETED]” 

CENTCOM finally accepted the creation of the Jlpc in time to assist the 

Desert Storm air operation with imagery support. However, CENTCOM’S 

slow organizational response to the dynamics of the deploying (Desert 

Shield) force intelligence requirements resulted in a delay in the improvement of the quality and quantity of intelligence available to theater commanders. CENTCOM never recovered from this delay?* 

The Role of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 

in BDA 

DIA Analysis of Satellite Data 

[DELETEDIa3 [DELETEDIM 

“(S) Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operation Desert Shield/storm, p 4. 

“(S) Ibid, p 7. 

‘%e Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) discovered that Navy carrier battle staffs 

often pressed for permission to schedule second strikes on targets while the TACC was still 

waiting for data from CENTCOM and national sources. As the CNA analysis put it, the 

“BDA system” just could not keep pace with “the dynamic strike campaign.” See (S) 

Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Vol. 11: Strike Warfare, Q 2-19 and p 3-25. 

83DIA’~ Technical Program Office passed structural analyses of hard targets to 

Checkmate. (S/NF) Ltr, [DELETED] to Col Kiraly. subj: GwAPS, 2 Dec 1992. 

(S) Desert Storm Afrer Action Report, 7 Mar 1990 (sic); see also (S) Lt Col 

Bondzeleske, Afrer Action Report, 18 Mar 199 1 ; see also, (SRVFIWN) Capt Hedger, Point 

Paper on BDA hagety fiploitalbn, 21 Sep 1990, and see also, (s) DX BDA CON OW, 

11 sep 1990-the latter two are filed in CHST 51-12; see also (s) checkmare BDA Team - 

Daily Tasks (As of26 Jan 1991), from Lt Col Howey; see also (S) DIA’S “Bomb Damage 

Assessment (BDA) Process” briefing [CHST 51-10]. 

84 

287 
[DELETED]’’ 

Air Staff Cooperation with DIA 

DIA’S concept of operations was based on the premise that theater 

assets would focus on tactical targets in the Kuwait Theater of Operations, while national assets would concentrate on strategic targets in Iraq. 

DIA itself would be the lead agency for strategic BDA. DIA asked the staff 

of the operations deputy to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for help 

in the BDA process.86 Checkmate, an Air Staff group, was given this 

responsibility. The group had already shifted its activities from wargames 

and simulations to joint air campaign planning. Checkmate’s Air Force 

personnel were augmented by Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers.87 

Liaison with intelligence agencies was provided by DIA, Central 

Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency liaison personnel, who 

worked next to Checkmate’s space in the Pentagon. This Joint Intelligence Center evolved into a BDA collection cell at the onset of hostilities?’ During the first stage of imagery analysis, the Checkmate cell was 

involved deeply in the BDA process. An open-line consultation was 

conducted around-the-clock. During the second stage, Checkmate provided one Air Force analyst to the DIA cell, and Air Force weapon system 

experts were on call. During stage three, Checkmate also provided an 

”(S) Thomas P. Christie. John N. Donis, and Gregory A. Corliss, Desert Srom 

Strategic Air Campaign Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA). Institute for Defense Analyses 

Document D-1088, Jan 1992. See also (S) Desert Storm Afer Action Report, 7 Mar 1990 

(sic); see also (S) Lt Col Bondzeleske,AferAction Reporf, 18 Mar 1991; (SMFIWN) see 

also Capt Hedger, Point Paper on BDA Imagery Exploitation, 21 Sep 1990; and see also, 

Checkmate BDA Team - Daily Tasks (As of 26 Jan 1991). from Lt Col Howey. Deputy, 

Checkmate BDA Team; see also (S) DIA’S “Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) Process” 

(s) DX BDA CON OPS, 11 sep 199(khl? latter two filed in CHST 51-12; See dS0 (s) 

briefing [CHST 51-10]. 

86(S) Ibid. 

87See (S) Chapter 6; Volume V. Plans and Strategy. 

“(S/NF/WN) See footnote 85. 

288 
analyst, while weapon system experts and planners were on call for more 

in-depth con~ultation.~~ 

The DIA-Directed BDA Process in Washington 

[ DELETEDIw 

[DELETED] 

[ DELETEDI9' 

In DIA'S view, bomb damage assessment support to Central Command 

provided timely assessments of attack results on selected strategic targets 

which facilitated in-theater retargeting and restrike decisions. In addition, 

DIA was able to answer basic questions about strike results such as whether the target was hit or what functional or structural damage was 

achieved.* 

The Split Between GAT Planners (Black Hole) 

and CENTAFm 

The antipathy between Brigadier General Glosson and his GAT planners, on the one hand, and the intelligence analysts assigned to CENTAF 

on the other could not have been more unfortunate, especially given the 

overabundance of data flowing to the theater from Washington. It merits 

attention in this volume because it shows how the best intentions of 

qualified, motivated personnel can be overcome by organizational arrangements which, at first, appear to be benign. 

As noted earlier, General Glosson viewed the theater force-level 

(TACC) intelligence organization as unresponsive to his and his planners' 

89(S/NF/WN) Ibid. 

w(S/NF/WN) See footnote 85. 

9'(SMF/WN) Ibid. 

*(S/NF/WN) See footnote 85. 

289 
needs?3 The intelligence personnel, by contrast, did not know during 

Desert Shield that Glosson and his staff would plan the actual air war, 

and they apparently found the Black Hole’s requests for information both 

a surprise and a burden. In an understandable reaction, Glosson created 

his own intelligence network using personal contacts in Washington, 

D.C., and selected individuals on the CENTAF staff who willingly kept 

him informed on BDA issues.94 The Task Force could not identify all the 

individuals in this network, but the network did exist, and Glosson apparently felt that he had no choice but to organize and then use it. 

However, many CENTAF intelligence personnel resisted supporting 

General Glosson even after he and his staff emerged from their “Black 

Hole” and became the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell. 

Once Desert Storm commenced, most of the force-level analysts remained 

in their special SClF (facility for compartmented information). Hence 

there were two “camps”-the GAT and the force-level analysts, each in its 

own special, secure area, and each suspicious of the other. One consequence of this mutual suspicion was that CENTAFIIN officers did not begin 

filling information requests until Black Hole leaders invited more targeting officers into the planning process?’ Even then, intelligence support 

93See (S) Chapters 6 and 7; also (S) Intvw. Lt Col Frank D. Kistler, Mark D. 

Mandeles, Maj Sanford S. Terry with Capt John Clock, ACC/Im. Langley AFB. VA. 

30 Jan 1992. During the August 1990 period, Clock admitted, “we really weren’t in any 

way responsive to them (Black Hole), in fact. at one point, [Lt] Col [David A.] Deptula 

was asking for a chart or trying to do something, and I told him we don’t work for you.” 

94As (S) discussed in Chapters 6 and 7; see also (S/NF/WN) BDA Tapes, Black Hole 

Working Materials folder from Riyadh [NA-3171; Memo, Lt Cdr Muir (Special Navy 

briefer attached to CENTAF~N) to Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, Commander 14th AqP), 

20 Feb 1991. Memo states ready access to RF-4 BDA photography of bridges, direct 

discussion with DIA concerning bridges, and “I will task national systems through the 

collection management process.” 

951n their after action report, the targeting cell complained bitterly about their 

credibility with the planning staff and the fact there were direct feeds to Brig Gen 

Glosson with no info copies to them. They went so far as to admit that the planning staff 

gave little consideration to their “limited ability to support rapidly changing target lists.” 

They also identified the fact that senior intelligence targets people never attended meetings to discuss target selection until one of them had been assigned to work airfields 14 

days into the war. (S) AAR, USCENTAFhN After Action Report and Lessons Learned, 25 

Mar 1991, from Col [no first name] Rauschkolb to Col [Christopher L.] Christon 

290 
to the planners may have been grudging.% Another consequence was that 

GAT planners did not ask for BDA in the right way. For example, their 

daily guidance letters repeated the same requests over and over, when in 

fact the force-level intelligence analysts needed to know what the 

planners, priority was for BDA. 

BDA analysts work best when information about targets (which installation and which aimpoint, for example) and weapons is included in the 

Air Tasking Order and its subsequent changed versions. Unfortunately, 

force-level BDA analysts received only pieces of the Am, and subsequent 

changes were often not provided?’ The many changes made by the GAT 

over secure phone lines to the wings were also not sent to analysts in the 

combat assessment cell. Because there was only (at best) a loose infor- 

~ 

(CENTAF/N), INT Attachment. 

%or example. targeteers pointed out that GAT phners requested imagery through 

CENTAF/N. However, the planners were told no imagery was available. Later, planners 

discovered that the imagery had never been ordered. Intelligence collection efforts began 

on future attack plans around Day 16 of the war-after intelligence officer augmentees 

were assigned to the airfield attack team. (S) USCENTAF~N After Action Report and 

Lessons Learned, 25 Mar 91, from Col Rauschkolb to Col Christon, WT Attachment. 

97DCs/lntelligence Operation Desert ShieldBtorm, Executive Mition, pp 24. 25. 27. 

The UCS requested any tactical BDA results to “enhance total campaign assessment.” 

In addition, the message stated: ‘To facilitate complete. efficient planning and solve 

demands for information contained in the ATO, request confirmation of the Strategic 

Target List by category, and submission of critical BDA facts by target and electronic 

transmission of the AT0 via AUTODIN message system.” (S) UCS Msg 1904472 Jan 1991, 

subj: Transmitting Air Tasking Order (ATO). 

After the first week of combat, staff in theater and Washington complained about 

incomplete BDA information. A JCS message stated, in part, that ‘‘ . . . despite the absence 

of key target information” identifying critical items needed as “designated weapons, 

desired damage, DMPI, etc” the system providing BDA and status of targets is working. 

Except for the first day of combat “information necessary to conduct BDA has been 

limited.” All Washington agencies, including Joint Staff and DIA “separately and in 

concern,” have “addressed the need for the information to all levels of CWI(TCOM and 

CENTAF repeatedly since last October.” A FLASH message has produced limited response 

in the form of a partial target data base. The only other data received are from a partial 

ATO faxed 3-4 hours prior to execution. “Of the information needed for BDA, that partial 

ATO contains only type of aircraft, time over target, and target name, BE, or coordinate.” 

(S) CJCWJ~J Msg, 2422562 Jan 1991 (subj is unknown). 

29 1 
mation link between force-level planners and BDA analysts, planning 

decisions were made on the basis of incomplete and imperfect information. 

The effect of this lack of adequate information on operations can be 

seen in the employment of B-52s. Table 15 shows the B-52 munitions 

expended against ground targets during the war?8 It was nearly half the 

total tonnage. 

Table 15 

Total Air Force Munitions Expenditure versus 

B-52 Munitions Expenditure 

(in tons) 

Total USAF' Total B-52" Percentage 

BJ2iTotal Air 

Force 

55,856 25,635 46% 

* Munitions included are: Mk-20. CBU-89. CBu-SUS8nl, CBU-87, GBU-IOII1O00, and CALCM. 

2000. GBU-12, GBU-15, GBU-24fi-2000, GBU-27, GBU-28, Mk-84, Mk-82, M-117, UK 

*I Munitions included are: CBU-SUSWl, CBU-87, CBU-89, M-117. Mk-82, UK 

1000. and CALCM. 

Strategic Air Command imagery interpreters in Omaha were familiar 

with the fixed installation targets assigned to the B-52~. but they did not 

have access to the complete Air Tasking Order every day or to a comprehensive strike history (none was kept). Consequently, they were not 

alerted ahead of time to strikes by other aircraft on the installations 

~ 

98Data derived from WD. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, M3, Apr 

1992) and GWAPS Missions Database. 

292 
covered by the B-52~. and they did not receive changes to the B-52 

portion of the AT0 because the changes were passed directly to units in 

Diego Garcia, Spain and the United Kingdom via telephone. Other 

changes were radioed directly to the aircraft enroute to the target by 

Strategic Air Command Advance Liaison personnel. This mattered 

because approximately forty percent of B-52 missions experienced basic 

target changesw The fact that the B-52 imagery interpreters did not 

know precisely what their bombers had struck and whether other aircraft 

had attacked the same targets made it difficult to draw sound inferences 

of when damage was inflicted and by what aircraft.'@' 

Yet a third negative consequence of the separation between the GAT 

and CENTAF/IN was that the GAT planners did not understand that their 

operatordesigned target numbering system confused and frustrated the 

force-level intelligence analysts supporting the Tactical Air Control 

Center."' When the GAT planners used their own target numbering 

system to identify targets for the units, they made it very difficult for the 

force-level intelligence analysts to track the air campaign by referring to 

a master list of targets. Moreover, because GAT planners relied on their 

own numbering system, unit targeting officers were forced to contact 

CENTAF targets for information. The latter, in turn, took matters up with 

GAT planners, who often wondered why targeting officers could not keep 

wBackground Paper, Maj Lewis Hill, USAF, GWAPS, "BDA, Reporting, Targeting, and 

the Database," draft, Sep 1992. 

'@'General Accounting Office analysts argued after the war that SAC imagery analysts 

could not tell B-52 mission planners whether the bombers were dropping their bombs in 

an inaccurate but consistent way (and hence in a way that could be corrected). According 

to the GAO analysts, there was a systematic error, and it was not corrected until the last 

days of the war. If true, this claim would have an important implication: that only about 

twenty percent of the unguided bombs dropped by the B-52s (or ten percent of all Air 

Force munitions expended) were aimed accurately. See "Operation Desert Storm: Limits 

on the Role and Performance of 8-52 Bombers in Conventional Conflicts," General 

Accounting Office, draft (Washington, DC. nd). pp 3. 57. 

"'Lt Col Deptula claimed that he invented the Black Hole's target numbering 

system. (s) IntVW. GWAPS with Lt c01 Deptula. SAFK)SX, 20 kC 1991. 

293 
track of the air campaign.Im A forced collocation of Operations and 

Intelligence might have set it right. 

The direct “feeds” of information from Washington to the GAT also 

blocked the efforts of force-level intelligence analysts to provide useful 

inputs to the planning process. Text, STU-111 secure voice transmissions, 

and information gathered by the National Military Intelligence Support 

Terminals network (even though it was located in the SCIF) were not 

provided as information copies to CENTAF intelligence. The direct communication between General Glosson and RAdm. McConnell, which the 

force-level intelligence analysts were not party to, worsened the situation 

for two reasons. First, it encouraged Glosson to talk directly to Washington as often as he could. Second, it stifled the ability of the intelligence 

analysts attached to the Tactical Air Control Center to produce BDA. 

What they did produce appeared less than adequate when Glosson compared it to what he was getting from Washington. As a result, targets 

chosen by GAT personnel “often did not meet CINCCENT objectives [and] 

had inappropriate aim points. . . . ** lo3 

Consequences for Pilots and Aircrew 

Theater- and national-level intelligence support during Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm often failed to meet pilots’ expectations.Iw Target 

‘OZ(S) USCENTAF~IN After Action Report and Lessons Learned, from Col Rauschkolb 

to Col Christon, INT Attachment, p 3-8. 

Io3(S) JULLS Long Report submitted by Capt M. Menke - CU2-SG, JULLS Number: 

50641-13128 (OOO66), p 119 (U). “ . . . r]his unofficial operatorlagency targeting 

process produced targets that: (a) often did not meet CINCCENT objectives; (b) had inappropriate aim points selected; and (c) by-passed the target material production, 

weaponeering, and precise coordinate mensuration processes. The requisite check against 

the no-fire target list was also bypassed.” He goes on to say that because of this nonstandard ATO construction procedure the CINCCENT’S targeting objectives weren’t met, which 

resulted in restriking targets unnecessarily. 

IwAs the Center for Naval Analyses (S) Desert Storm Reconstruction Report Vol. 

ff: strike Warjhe observed, “Initial BDA information was so poor that fraggers were 

unable to track whether ATo-scheduled targets had in fact been struck or whether the 

strike had been diverted . . . or canceled altogether. . . . ” See p 3-19, (S) CNA CRM 91- 

178, Oct 1991. The point is that the lack of timely. adequate BDA had an effect which 

cascaded through the whole mission planning process, from the TAW to both Air Force 

294 
materials were distributed unevenly, and there were no qualified targeting 

officers in some units.'05 There appeared to be several reasons for these 

problems. First, the different levels of theater command and control had 

different BDA needs. CENTCOM'S needs, for example, were different from 

those of the GAT planners in the Tactical Air Control Center, yet the same 

basic in-theater processing system tried to support both. Second, the 

center itself was not designed to support the units. That role was given 

to Central Command Air Forcedntelligence. But CENTAF/IN was not 

working hand-in-glove with the GAT planners, so many Air Force units, 

responding to the Air Tasking Order, were not receiving the BDA support 

they needed (or thought they needed). Finally, GAT planners had not 

participated in the operations planning for Desert Shield, yet that planning 

is what guided the use of the many imagery generating systems (such as 

the U.S. Marine Corps unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles) available 

to coalition forces. 

Pilots and aircrew may have believed that force-level intelligence 

officers were unaware of their requirements and unable to ensure that 

sufficient amounts of targeting materials would be available to conduct unit 

missions.'% The apparent result of this absence of critical information was 

a number of unnecessary reattacks. Despite a huge effort to produce and 

then distribute imagery and other aids to targeting, pilots and aircrew 

criticized national-, theater-, and force-level intelligence support (from 

premission target photos to postmission BDA) throughout Desert Storm.'"' 

Differences Between Plans and Reality: 

The Consequences 

Organizational: The Proliferation of Targeting Cells 

In mid-December 1990, as the bulk of CENTCOM planning shifted 

from defensive to offensive actions, CENTAF'S duplicative planning cells 

and Navy wings. 

'"Maj Hill, "BDA, Reporting, Targeting, and the Database." 

'06(S) USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center. Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Volume 91- 

2, JuI 1991, pp 7-8. 

(S) Ibid, p 3-10. 107 

295 
for defensive and offensive operations were merged.'"'' CENTAF became 

responsible for battle damage assessment of strategic targets in Iraq and 

of interdiction targets along the lines of communication from Iraq to 

Kuwait. Central Command's Army Component was responsible for 

assessing damage to Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait, and its staff produced 

lists of ground targets in the Kuwaiti theater of operations.'0g By this 

time, CENTAF had three targeting/BDA support cells in operation. 

One targeting/BDA cell was in the Tactical Air Control Center, located 

in the Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters. CENTAF targeteers in this cell 

supported the TACC combat operations staff by receiving and keeping 

track of Mission Reports and information transmitted over the phone 

concerning recent strikes."' The second CENTAF BDA cell operated in a 

SCIF on the U.S. Military Training Mission soccer field adjoining the 

Saudi Air Force Headquarters compound."' This combat assessment cell 

received all transmitted intelligence reports, made target recommendations, and produced an Air Combat Assessment Summary. The Summary 

was the "fused" report of the evidence (including bomb damage assessments) of the results of the air campaign to date. It was distributed both 

to the wings and to the Joint Force Air Component Commander. CENTAF 

Intelligence officers had designed the combat assessment cell to be the 

center of BDA activities."' The third CENTAF cell was created by GAT 

planners, who established their own BDA process when they did not get 

the information they wanted from the Tactical Air Control Center or 

combat assessment cell analysts.'" 

'"''See (S) Chapter 6. 

'09[ DELETED] 

'"(S) AAR, USCENTAFhN After Action Report and Lessons Learned. 

'''(S) AAR, USCENTAFhN After Action Report and Lessons Learned. 

"*Maj Hill, "BDA, Reporting, Targeting, and the Database." 

113Analysts with the Center for Naval Analyses argued in (S) Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Vol. 11: Strike Wa$are that there were too many BDA databases being 

analyzed in too many places at the same time. One consequence was that "intelligence 

support to the Navy officers assigned to help select and schedule targets was an ad hoc 

affair." See p 3-2 of (S) CNA CRM 91-178, Oct 1991. 

See also 

Chapter 6. 

296 
Methodological: Videotapes as a BDA Tool 

During Desert Storm, GAT planners could get videotapes (AVTR) from 

F-117, F-111F, and F-15E units (sometimes as quickly as four hours) 

before any other imagery was a~ailable.”~ As Col. Anthony J. Tolin 

noted, this AVTR information permitted planners to send a “sortie on to 

some other bridge” instead of wasting a sortie on that same bridge.’*lI5 

But AVTR film was not a panacea for planners. Electmoptical imagery 

systems mounted on the aircraft delivering munitions were often blanked 

out by the flash of their weapons. In addition, poor weather sometimes 

blocked or obscured targets from aircraft videotape equipment. Finally, 

A-I0 and El6 AVTRs tape the HUD, or heads-up display, that is projected 

on the pilot’s winsdscreen. In these cases, the weapon release but not 

weapon impact is recorded. Other aircraft, such as the B-52, do not have 

an AW. In cases such as these, planners had to decide whether to order 

a second strike right away or wait for a fuller intelligence assessment 

based on data from a variety of sources, including satellites. 

The Relationship Between Organization and Information 

At the force level, the CENTAF BDA plan was scrapped at the last 

minute for two reasons. First, the computer system for matching BDA 

with the Air Tasking Order-described earlier in this chapter-never became fully operational. Second, CENTAF/IN did not have enough trained 

personnel to do BDA.”~ This would not have been a problem if the 

computer-based system had worked, but it did not, leaving a pile of work 

in the hands of a few individuals. 

CENTAF/IN bomb damage assessors realized forty-five minutes after 

H-hour that there were serious problems with the BDA software they were 

trying to use. To compensate, they consolidated the three BDA workstations into one. They also rewrote the system’s data entry programs so 

‘I4(S) Intvw. Maj Robert J. Heston. 16 and 19 Oct 1992. See also Maj Hill ‘‘BDA, 

lI5(S) Intvw. John F. Guilmartin, Jr. with Brig Gen Anthony J. Tolin, Commander 

“6SSgt Sherwood, Trip Report - Operation Desert ShieldlStorm. 

Reporting, Targeting, and the Database.” 

57th Fighter Wing, 30 Jan 1992. 

297 
that all the information needed could be handled at this one station. The 

USCENTAF BDA Cell released an Air Combat Assessment Summary from 

this location every twelve hours. An additional report, released every 

three to four hours, provided interim BDA information. These interim 

reports were disseminated by hand throughout USCENTAF.117 

This minimally capable BDA process required two people per shift to 

correlate manually 1,500 messages a day, or more than one per minute. 

BDA information gleaned from these messages was then typed into the 

BDA program. One week into the war, targets personnel began producing 

strike history files and consolidating the twelve-hour summaries into one 

product. About this time, operators of this one BDA terminal became 

aware of DIA's second- and third-stage BDA analyses arriving in theater."' 

The apparent inability of BDA analysts to catch up to operations once 

the air campaign began led GAT personnel to make their own damage 

assessments. However, as CENTAF Director of Combat Intelligence, Col. 

Jeffery Hage, noted, GAT officers had little Tactical Air Control Center 

experience. This relative lack of experience led GAT officers to misuse 

theater intelligence assets available for validating targets."' 'No examples illustrate the problem. First, an inadequate understanding of weap 

ons effects by one GAT planner (with a primary air-to-air background) 

caused him to set laser-guided 1-2000 penetrator bombs (with delayed 

fuzes) against bridge spans.Im Unfortunately, these weapons caused only 

minor damage because they punched through the decks of the bridges and 

exploded harmlessly beneath them.I2' The resulting unsuccessful strikes 

were wasted sorties; reattacks brought unnecessary risk to aircrews. 

"'lbid. 

"'Ibid. 

"'See also (S) Chapters 6 and 7; (S) USCENTAF~N After Action Report and Lessons 

Learned; (S) After Action Report by Col Jeffrey M. Hage, CEWAF Director of Combat 

Intelligence. 

lmA targetcxr, using the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM), can give the 

mission planner a choice of aircraft and weapons optimized for the target. 

121(SMFiM") Tucrical Analysis Bulletin, Volume 91-2, Jul 1991, pp 7-6,7-11,7-12. 

298 
The second example concerns assignment of the desired mean points 

of impact, or DMPIs.'~~ The GAT planners made a conscious decision to 

permit some wings (for example, the 37th TFW) to select DMPIs for their 

assigned targets. This decision made good use of the targeting and BDA 

expertise in the El 17 wing, but in some other wings there was a substantial lack of expertise to perform this task. Permitting wings to assign 

DMPls further complicated the national- and force-level BDA analysts' 

efforts to assess damage because they did not know the DMPIs chosen by 

wing officers. In addition, no wing-level organization possessed a complete database of enemy installations. For instance, no wing-level 

targeteer possessed details on the internal construction of Iraqi hardened 

underground facilities. This situation apparently forced many wing 

targeteers to contact the CENTAF targeting cell for 

It often took several days to get BDA from the Joint Imagery Production Center." This delay contributed to inadequate force-level BDA 

analysis and led Central Command to order unnecessary re~trikes.'~' The 

delay in getting information from the JIPC was partly due to an oversight 

in prewar planning; it was not intended to be involved in the BDA process. By the second day of the air war, however, BDA imagery production accounted for almost half of the laboratory's select print effort. 

Normally, the Jlpc would send such developed imagery to the units 

assigned bombing missions in the Air Tasking Order, but the fact that it 

often took a relatively long time for the GAT to complete daily Master 

Attack Plans meant that the Jlpc often did not know in time which wings 

were to get the imagery available. The scope of the air campaign against 

12%e desired mean point of impact (DMPI) is the intended point which the bomb 

or munition should hit. Setting the DMPI is especially important for hardened targets, 

where the targeteer wants the explosive to go through armor or concrete before detonation. Setting the DMPl properly is equally important where the target is soft or spread out. 

A high explosive can shatter an antenna, but it needs to be placed where the blast pressure from its detonation is the greatest. Hence the need to train specialists in the methods 

of determining proper DMPls. 

123(S) Intvw, Maj Heston, 19 Oct 1992. 

INLt Col F. L. Talbot, USAF, CEATAF Intelligence Targets Division Afer War Report, 

18 Mar 1991, p 20; see also (S/NF) Defense Science Board, Lessons Learned During 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Draft, Jun 1992. 

12'(S) USCENTA~IN After Action Report and Lessons Learned. MT Attachment. 

299 
Iraq just compounded this problem. Delays in getting the proper and 

needed BDA to the wings just added to the task of covering all the important targets with the necessary quantity and type of ordnance. BDA problems made it harder to put together an Air Tasking Order that reflected 

the Commander in Chief's guidance, and lapses in the Am just made 

accurate BDA that much harder to achieve. It was a vicious circle. 

The Central Command Air Forcedhtelligence after action report 

asked and answered the key question: "Were we organized right to go 

to war? The answer is a resounding no!'*126 The CENTAF/IN*S most 

critical failure was its inability to provide bomb damage assessment for 

the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell.1n The CENTAF after 

action report concluded that probably the major reason for that failure 

was the physical separation of Intelligence from the GAT in its special 

access space, as well as security barriers to entry into the intelligence SCI 

Facilities.'28 

CENTAF intelligence also failed to fuse aircrew Mission Reports.'29 

At the unit level, debriefing and Mission Report preparation proved to be 

the biggest time consumer, second only to target database management 

and threat updates.'" However, at the CENTAF level, strike results provided in Mission Reports were not considered credible without national or 

tactical reconnaissance. Moreover, most of the Mission Reports were 

never passed from the theater to agencies such as the CIA and DIA. The 

ingrained flexibility within tactical combat units was the key to surmounting this underutilization. Units used secure telephones as work-arounds 

to share the necessary information to accomplish mission ~lanning.'~' 

BDA analysts themselves misinterpreted precision-guided munitions 

weapon effects and, consequently, mission success. In World War 11, 

'"(S) USCENTAF~N After Action Report and Lessons Learned. with 17 Attachments. 

'"(S) bid. See also (S) Chapters 6 & 7. 

'**(S) USCENTAF~N After Action Report and Lessons Learned. 

'29(S/NF/WN) Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Volume 91-2, Jul 91, p 1 1-8. 

1" (S/NFIWN) Ibid, pp 7-8, 7-9. 

I3'(S) Intvw. Maj Heston, 16 and 19 Oct 1992. 

300 
shortfalls in the photographic evidence of BDA were of little importance. 

The unguided weapons dropped on targets typically resulted in widespread damage in and around the desired aimpoints. Strategic targets, 

such as factories or railyards, were either heavily damaged or partially 

damaged, or even missed altogether, and photographic interpreters were 

able to distinguish among levels of damage because of the homogenous 

nature of the explosives, the aiming methods, and the reliance on cumulative effect to assess destruction. 

However, precision weapons permit functional targeting, in which 

destruction of one node accomplishes the mission with no mass destruction. In an attack with precision munitions on a hardened shelter, for 

example, unless the contents of the shelter explode violently, a post-attack 

photograph would show only a small entry hole. There might be little 

evidence of damage inside the shelter. Classic photo-interpretation would 

describe the target as slightly damaged. However, AVTR tape, capturing 

the impact of the weapon, might show the weapon exploding (and modern weapons generally and any secondary explosion venting out 

doors and ventilators. Unfortunately, most BDA photos, and many AVTR 

tapes, simply do not capture entry holes or indications of secondary 

 explosion^.'^' BDA methodology has been evolving as both weapons and 

reconnaissance technologies have evolved. Unfortunately, most of the 

Tactical Air Control Center’s personnel involved in damage assessment 

were not current in this evolving technology. 

Use of national asset capabilities enables the definition of more precise 

target sets and thus allows greater compliance with national policy and the 

laws of armed conflict. However, CENTAF could not adequately implement 

these requirements during an air campaign conducted at so rapid a pace 

because the Tactical Air Control Center lacked automated access to the 

requisite information. Targeteers in the theater were more dependent on 

132Approximately fifteen to twenty percent of bombs dropped during WW I1 did not 

explode. And this figure is not unusual-even for unguided weapons manufactured quite 

recently. 

13%e aspect of angle of BDA photos can be crucial. Photos taken from straight 

overhead may miss a bomb hole caused by a weapon with a shallow-angle flight path. 

Similarly, if the photo is taken from the side of the target, an entrance hole on the far side 

will be invisible to the interpreter. 

30 1 
national systems because Central Command did not have at its disposal a 

variety of tactical reconnaissance systems. Yet targeteers in the theater 

found their access to national systems blocked or impeded. In addition, 

some intelligence information collected by national assets was either not 

sent to the theater or not released below the general officer level.” 

Despite these organizational obstacles, many wings were able to get 

the information they needed by communicating directly with other units. 

During Desert Storm, many squadrons were sent to bomb airfields and 

told to choose their own mean points of impact. After the first two 

nights it became necessary for the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing(P), 37th 

TFW(P), and 48th W(P) to maintain duplicate photos and maps reflecting 

the DMPIS each had struck or would strike.13’ Without this type of management, pilots discovered-after their weapons had been released-that the 

desired mean point of impact they were to attack had been hit earlier. 

For the wings, preventing unnecessary target restrikes required numerous 

hours on the telephone and continuous coordination. 

The units literally were swamped by the growth in the threat database. It grew beyond their ability (in terms of time and manpower) to 

manage because there was not enough tactical or national BDA imagery 

to confirm many kills and so remove enemy targets from the active list. 

What the wings needed from the Tactical Air Control Center was a 

continually updated list of targets based upon comprehensive combat 

assessment. When they did not get it, units demanded copies of each 

other’s Mission Reports. They tried to validate their databases based on 

actual threat emissions picked up by aircraft radar warning receivers and 

often not displayed by Constant Source. Wing mission planners and 

intelligence officers used this technique to get a better, although not 

totally comfortable, feeling as to what threats were active in a particular 

target area on a given day. 

Tactical Air Control Center and wing personnel managed to put 

together a BDA process that “worked,” but it did not work the way it was 

‘“Tactical Air Force Intelligence Desert Storm Lessons Learned Conference, Final 

I3’(S) Intvw, Maj Heston, 19 Oct 1992. 

Report, Jan 1992, p 49. 

302 
supposed to. GAT planners and their counterparts in the wings had to 

perform extraordinary feats of informal coordination each night.IM But 

it was not enough to satisfy users. Consider the testimony of General Schwarzkopf to the investigations subcommittee of the House Armed 

Services Committee, cited at the beginning of this chapter. After listening to that testimony and weighing the available evidence, the subcommittee noted that 

BDA is now neither art nor science. The operations and intelligence 

communities will undoubtedly bicker for years over post facturn calculations. The arguments will be useful if they help these two communities 

devise a doctrine for tactical BDA so that commanders in the future can 

be better ser~ed.’~’ 

Summary and Review 

The national intelligence community appeared unfamiliar with or 

unresponsive to the intelligence needs of the warfighting commander^.'^^ 

There also were substantial shortfalls in the management, fusion, and 

application of tactical intelligence. [DELETED] When that information 

was not forthcoming (“CENTAF was perhaps the worst offender in this 

regard.”’39), lower level units created their own informal networks to get 

whatever current information they could. Higher level staffs were often 

not informed of this, which meant that, at times, higher level staffs (such 

as CENTAF) and unit staffs did not share the same sense of how the air 

campaign was going. 

‘%ey were not alone. A similar problem afflicted personnel in Proven Force. As 

two members of the latter pointed out, “one could more easily detect ‘battle damage’ 

inflicted upon beleaguered BDA andysts by frustrated senior staff than the genuine 

destruction visited upon the Iraqi enemy by coalition airpower.” Maj J. M. England and 

MSgt M. G. Rolirad. both of EU2-T, HQ UsEUCOM. “Battle Damage Data Base to the 

Rescue (Almost),” in Target Director’s Update, Edition No. 15 (Aug 1991). p 11. 

I3’(S) Committee on Armed Services, Report on Intelligence Successes and Failures 

13’(S) Ibid. 

‘39(S) Ibid. 

in Operation Desert ShieWStom. 

303 
The real source of this problem was a lack of prewar training at 

headquarters and between headquarter staffs and the units. CENTAF 

intelligence staff, for example, had not trained to support an air campaign 

with such a high sortie rate. They also were not prepared to assess the 

effects of the strikes of so many different kinds of offensive air units. 

CENTAF intelligence staff had trained to support the Ninth Air Force, not 

the multi-Service, multinational air armada which was eventually pulled 

together under Lieutenant General Homer’s leadership. Because the 

command and control (including computer hardware and software) of 

tactical air forces was different in each theater, it was not possible for 

assessment personnel from other theaters to jump right in and augment 

CENTAF BDA specialists. The supply of the right kinds of BDA simply 

could not keep up with the demand.” There were not enough trained 

specialists who had worked together, and the automated systems they 

used were not tied together effectively. 

‘40M~COM Commanders’ “Hot Wash,” Maxwell AFB, 12-13 Jul 1991, 9th AF 

briefing slide 5, Section 19. 

304 
9 

The Airborne TACS at War 

The airborne portion of the Tactical Air Control System consisted of 

This chapter will focus primarily on the use of AWACS, ABCCC, and 

JSTARS as command, control, communications and coordination systems. 

AWACS, JSTARS, ABCCC, RIVET JOINT aircraft, and forward air controllers. 

[DELETE] During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, RIVET JOINT 

aircraft were controlled by the Strategic Air Command, and the ways in 

which they work are classified at a level above that which the Task Force 

wished to use in this study. Thus, we will state here only that RIVEZ 

JOINT provided real-time intelligence coverage. 

AWACS, Airborne Command, Control, and Communications (ABCCC), 

and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) were 

employed to bring order to the confusion and chaos of the pace of action 

during Desert Storm. Just how these systems and their crews did that 

will be the subject of the sections which follow. 

AWACS 

By the beginning of Desert Storm, the 552d Airborne Warning and 

Control Wing had eleven AWACS aircraft and nineteen crews in Saudi 

Arabia, three aircraft and five crews at Incirlik, Turkey, and two other 

aircraft with their crews as a reserve at Mildenhall, England.’ On the 

night of 16 January 1991, U.S. and Saudi AWACS aircraft followed firststrike coalition aircraft to patrol orbits near the border with Iraq. Figure 37 illustrates the four U.S. and one Saudi orbit? The airborne U.S. 

‘(S) Briefing, Capt Ted Robertson, USAF, 55% ACWmW, subj: “AWACS Involvement 

in Combat Airspace Management During Desert Storm,” Jun 1991. (U) There also was 

another AWACS plane and crew in reserve at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. 

’(S) Briefing, Capt Robertson, “AWACS Involvement in Combat Airspace Management During Desert Storm.” 

305 
spare covered the other three AWACS when any one of them left station 

(for example, for refueling or maintenance). The Saudi AWACS was the 

final air defense shield and was positioned in an orbit over Riyadh. It 

also maintained communications with the Tactical Air Control Center 

(TACC) at Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF).3 [DELETEDI4 The 

three U.S. Air Force and NATO AWACS based at Incirlik allowed a single 

aircraft to be on station around the clock to watch Turkish airspace. 

Figure 37 

U.S. and Saudi AWACS Orbits Near the Border with Iraq 

I \- \ IRAQ L King Khalid Military City 

Western A WACS 

CentralA WACS 

n Eastern A WACS X 

0 Riyadh Saudi A WACS 

SAUDI ARABIA 

The Air Tasking Order (ATO), the key air mission control document 

for the combat wings, was also the basis for the effectiveness of AWACS. 

An AWACS Tactics Planning Cell in the TACC represented the AWACS 

Wing, and its members helped develop the Air Tasking Order. If the 

552d’s Mission Planning Team at Riyadh found any problems with the 

3(S) Memo, Capt Guy Cafiero. USAF. 552d ACW to Task Force 4. GWAPS, subj: E-3 

Employment Desert Storm, 1992. (U) Note: the Royal Saudi Air Force had five E-3A 

AWACS aircraft. 

4(S/NF) Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, Volume XV, Tactical Employment, 

AWACS. 1 Mar 1992. 

306 
daily Am (such as a conflict in radio frequencies assigned two different 

flights of aircraft), they called their colleagues in the Tactics Planning 

Cell in the Tactical Air Control Center. If there were no conflicts, the 

Mission Planning Team would use the Computer Assisted Force Management System (CAFMS) to obtain from the Air Tasking Order the information that the AWACS crews needed to predict the arrival of friendly aircraft 

in their patrol zones? Boeing Military Aircraft Company personnel aided 

the Mission Planning Team in compiling and printing the time-line charts 

and combat air patrol summary sheets given to the AWACS ccews during 

their preflight briefings! 

[DELETED]' [DELETED]' 

[DELETED]' 

The three forward AWACS aircraft performed several important functions. First, they stood watch to alert combat air patrol fighters if Iraqi 

aircraft approached the Saudi border. Second, the AWACS monitored coalition strike flights as they moved from friendly to hostile airspace and re- 

'(S) Memo, Capt Catlem. OWAPS. E-3 Employment Desert Storm. 1992. (U) The 

memo includes copies of some of the strike package work sheets prepared for the AWACS 

crews. 

6(S) Memo, Capt Guy Cafiero. USAF. 5526 ACW to Task Force 4, GWAPS, subj: Air 

Tasking Order Execution. 1992. (U) The strike package time-line charts, read from left 

to right, showed which flights of which aircraft would enter the radar coverage of all 

three AWACS forward zones, and-most importantly-when. Using such charts, AWACS 

controllers could anticipate the arrival and departure of friendly aircraft in their areas. 

The time-line charts were supplemented by illustrations of CENTAF air refueling tracks and 

of strikes against enemy targets. The CAP summary sheets contained data on radio 

callsigns and mission times and tracks for combat air patrol fighters (USAF. Saudi, Canadian, USN, and RAF). 

'(S) Memo, Capt Guy Cafiero, USAF, 5526 ACW to Task Force 4, GWAPS, subj: 

Concept of Operations [during Desert storm], LauncNRecovery of E-3, MCUAC G Crew, 

1992. 

'(S) Memo, Capt Guy Cafiero, USAF, 552d ACW to Task Force 4, GWAPS. subj: 

(S) Memo, Capt Guy Cafiero, USAF. 552d ACW to Task Force 4. Gw~, subj: E-3 

Typical Sortie. 1992. [DELETED] 

Radar Detection, 1992. 

9 

307 
turned. Third, the E3s kept track of so-called “high value assets,”.such as 

electronic warfa planes. Finally, AWACS crews assisted search and rescue 

efforts and specid operations forces. The AWACS mission was always to 

counter enemy attacks while simultaneously preventing fratricide.” 

Soon after the beginning of Desert Storm, AWACS was also assigned 

the mission of monitoring aerial refuelings. In November, Central Command Air Forces had laid out a complex pattern of aerial refueling orbits 

for use by aircraft on missions against Iraqi targets.” The primary means 

of controlling the refueling process was a schedule and a series of tanker 

orbits at different altitudes. In effect, tanker tracks were stacked at 1 .OOOfoot intervals like the layers of a cake. This procedural solution (used 

effectively during Southeast Asia air operations in the late 1960s and 

early 1970s) to the problem of mating tankers with refueling aircraft 

worked well the first two days of the air war. 

Then, bad weather forced aircraft seeking tankers to climb for better 

visibility. In addition, the amount of time needed to translate the target 

planning worksheets into the Air Tasking Order kept many units from 

receiving the AT0 until late in their mission planning cycles, so aircraft 

needing fuel were often not sure precisely where they would find their 

assigned tankers.’* The resulting confusion left senior Tactical Air Control Center officers with no choice but to have AWACS air controllers 

coordinate aerial refueling, though they were not “responsible for routing 

[civilian and airlift] . . . air traffic over the Arabian Peninsula during 

operation~.”’~ 

“(S) Briefing. Capt Robertson, “AWACS Involvement in Combat Airspace Manage- 

“(s) Paper, “Tanker Anchors.” Tactics Planning Cell, TACC. CENTAF. Nov 1990, 

“(S) 28th AD, Desert ShieldDesert Storm Lessons Learned. nd [ca 19921. See also 

l3(s) Memo, Capt Guy Cafero, USAF. 552d ACW to Task Force 4, GWAPS, subj: 

ment During Desert Storm.” 

Task Force 4 AWACS File, GWAPS. 

Chapter 7. 

Airspace Management, 1992. 

308 
[DELETED] 

[DELETED]I6 [DELETED]” 

[DELETED]’* [DELETED]I9 

The need to track and keep in contact with numbers of flights and 

many different kinds of aircraft kept AWACS crews busy. By the end of 

January 1991, an AWACS combat airspace management crew normally 

consisted of one “high value” air asset controller (for example, for control 

of EC-13OH COMPASS CALL electronic jamming aircraft), one tanker controller, two controllers to watch strike packages, one controller each for 

defensive and offensive counterair, one more to check every aircraft in the 

E-3’s assigned zone of radar coverage, and-finally-a Mission Crew Commander. East and west AWACS E-3s also carried Navy liaison officers. 

I4(S) Memo, (Col B. R. Witt. USAF. Dcs, Comm-Computer Systems) USCENTAFBC 

to TACCWCC and others, subj: Communications Test Results-TACC- AWACS UHF TACSAT, 

27 Oct 1990. 

”(s) Ltr, CENTAFBCOO, subj: 

%omething like this had been done in Southeast Asia in 1968-69. when the Marine 

Corps linked Navy and Air Force air surveillance systems. 

17(S) Briefing, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Weapons School (CAEWWS), subj: 

“Desert ShieldStorm E-2 Lessons Learned, 9 Oct 1991 .” See the section on “Data Link.” 

“(S) hid. See the section on “E-2/E-3 Operations.” 

I9(S) 28th AD, Desert ShieldDesert Storm Lessons Learned, nd [ca 19921. 

GATR Site PfOCedUfeS for Airborne Users, 21 Jan 

1991. 

Also, 

“Desert Shieldstorm E-2 Lessons Learned” 9 Oct 1991. p 3, in Task Force 4 AWACS 

File. 

“(S) 28th AD, Desert ShieldDesert Storm Lessons Learned, nd [ca 19921, see 

especially “Us NavylAWACs Operations.” 

”(S) SMSgt Vincent C. Presley, The 28th Air Divisiod552 Air Control Wing History 

1991-92, draft, Chapter 11, pp 26-29. 

”(S) fbid. Chapter 11, p 29. 

309 
The back-up E-3 carried an Airborne Command Element (of three or four 

personnel, headed by a senior officer), which coordinated communications 

among the orbiting E-3s and assumed control of the whole AWACS formation if contact with the Tactical Air Control Center were lost?3 

Given the scale of the air offensive against Iraq and its forces in 

Kuwait, AWACS crews were kept very b~sy.2~ The speed with which 

coalition forces gained air superiority over Iraq reduced the pressure on 

AWACS crews to monitor Iraqi airborne threats. However, the Commander in Chief‘s decision to use coalition airpower to isolate and then pound 

Iraq’s forces in Kuwait meant that “The most concerted airspace management effort was kill box dec~nfliction.”~~ 

Beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line, aircraft attacking ground 

targets were to operate in “kill zones” (later called “kill boxes”). Central 

Command Air Forces divided the Kuwait theater into 30 by 30 nautical 

mile squares. Entry of strike aircraft into the airspace of these squares 

beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line was monitored and controlled 

by AWACS (and sometimes ABCCC or JSTARS) crews. The attacking 

aircraft were then handed over to either the ABCCC or JSTARS for actual 

targeting and control. The success of kill box missions depended on 

close “coordination between [sic] AWACS, ABCCC, the aircraft involved in 

targeting, a Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and finally the 

ground commander.”26 The sheer volume of coalition air action meant 

that the risk of fratricide was high. In one case, “an F-16 flight was 

cleared by the ACE [Airborne Command Element] to dump weapons 

inside the F-15E kill box. The weapons fell between the F-15E’s during 

23(S/NF) Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1. Vol XV, Tactical Employment, AWACS, 

1 Mar 1991, pp 3-16 to 3-18. Also (s) Memo, Capt Guy Cafiero, USAF. 552d ACW to 

Task Force 4, GWAPS, subj: Weapons Director Functions, 1992. 

24(S) Briefing, Capt Robertson, “AWACS Involvement in Combat Airspace Management During Desert Storm.” (U) Capt Robertson also noted that each AWACS tanker 

controller managed, on average, “1 5 tankers at any given time.” (P 5 of text accompanying slides.) 

(S) Briefing, Capt Robertson, “AWACS Involvement in Combat Airspace Management During Desert Storm,” p 8. 

(S) Ibid. 

25 

26 

310 
The long-range air search radar In the AWACS 

could operate on six frequencies. 

their attack run.”27 As a result, the TACC Director of Combat Operations 

informed dl AWACS Airborne Command Elements, all ABCCC aircraft, and 

both JSTARS planes that “No controlling agency will direct non-scheduled 

flights into an active kill box . . . without Tactical Air Control Center/ 

Display Console Operator (Grouch) approval.”28 In this case, “Grouch” 

was aptly named. Kill box deconfliction will be dealt with more in the 

next section of this chapter, which covers the Airborne Battlefield Command, Control and Communications system. 

[ DELETEiDIz9 [DELETED] 3o 

The AWACS story during Desert Shield/Desert Storm was not without 

flaws. Minor problems arose that, while not seriously hampering operations, tended to cause friction within the command and control system. 

27Ltr, Col Michael F. Reavey. Director Combat Operations (Night), CENM to: 

”Ibid. 

29(S) Ltr, Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, Commander to ACE Directors, subj: Tactical 

30(S) Memo, To US AWACS, subj: Link Fact Sheet-Turkey AWACS, 4 Feb 1991. 

ACEJABCCCJJSTARS, subj: Control of Kill Box Airspace. 20 Feb 1991. 

Operation Notes, nd [ca Jan 19911. 

31 1 
Confusion over the role of the Airborne Command Elemene’ and training 

of Element personnel onboard the AWACS, nonstandard fighter check in 

procedures, misunderstanding of who controlled what in the kill boxes 

(especially late in the air campaign), and using the AWACS as an air 

refueling control agency are examples of some of these minor, but nevertheless important, problem areas.32 

Overall, the AWACS effort in Desert Storm was impressive. During 

the 5 months of Desert Shield, AWACS E-3s based in Saudi Arabia flew 

397 sorties for a total of 5,052 flying hours. During Desert Storm, the 

Saudi-based E-3s flew 356 sorties for a total of 5,028 hours in the air. 

AWACS flying as part of Proven Force logged almost 518 hours in the air 

during Desert Storm.33 The “surge” for Desert Storm is clear from the 

figures on E-3 operations. The busiest flying month during Desert Shield 

was December, when the E-3 AWACS flew over 1,085 hours. In January, 

however, the aircraft were in the air approximately 2,500 hours; in February, the comparable figure was 2,300 hoursu The Proven Force AWACS 

assisted in the destruction of 6 Iraqi aircraft; the Saudi-based AWACS 

helped shoot down 38 Iraqi aircraft (of the 41 shot down)?5 Saudi-based 

E-3s even planned and executed missions over Iraqi territory in an effort 

to cut off the Iraqi aircraft that fled to Iran.36 

ABCCC 

I had an Army target I wanted to hit . . . . No Air Force air was available. . . . The weather was bad over Kuwait City, so the Marines 

”The Airborne Command Element, working on the AWACS, is the direct link to the 

32(S) USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center. Tactical Analysis Bulletin, Volume 91- 

33(S) Memo, Capt Guy Cafiero, GwAPS, subj: E-3 Employment Desert Storm. 1992. 

34(S) 28th AD, Desert ShieldDesert Storm Lessons Learned, “Numerical Statistics 

35(S) SMSgt Presley. The 28th Air Divisiod552 Air Control Wing History 1!291-92. 

”(S) Ltr. Maj Kevin Dunleavy, 552d ACW/WW, Tactics Planning Cell, CENTAF, subj: 

JFACC. see Chapter 4. 

2. JuI 1991, pp 2-1. 3-10.49, 11-10, 11-15. 

for E-3 Aircraft.” nd [ca 19921. 

Chapter 111, p 56. 

Central E-3 Operations North of Saudi-Iraqi Border, nd [Dec 19901. 

312 
found me a six-ship of A-6s loaded up. And so now you have an Army 

target, off the Army target list, struck by Navy A-6s. scrounged up by 

the Marine [liaison officer] via an Air Force Command & Control 

platform. And if that ain’t purple, I don’t know what is.” 

This quotation illustrates the “good news’’ and the “bad news” of the 

air-to-ground campaign, which was monitored and often controlled by 

ABCCC air crews with the cooperation of Army, Marine Corps, and Navy 

personnel. The air-to-ground portion of the Tactical Air Control System 

was joint and multinational, and it was largely successful. But getting 

theremaking the coordination work day after day-was difficult; it demanded constant vigilance, and even real diplomacy, on the part of the 

air- and ground-based elements of the Tactical Air Control System 

charged with the responsibility for pulling it off. 

With the concept of a Joint Force Air Component Commander in 

place, the Tactical Air Control Center was nominally in control of the airto-ground campaign, especially before the ground assault began on 24 

February. Yet Lieutenant General Homer was well aware of the concerns 

of the theater ground commanders that air strikes against entrenched Iraqis 

might not be sufficiently under their control?8 His plan for coordinating 

air action against the Iraqi army was based upon the previously discussed 

concepts of the kill zone and the Fire Support Coordination Line. The 

CENTAF Air Support Operations Centers (there was one with the XVIII 

Airborne Corps and another with Saudi forces) would activate and deactivate the boxes, and the crew in the ABCCC would clear “push close air 

support” attack aircraft into and out of them. The Director of the ABCCC 

Battlestaff was also responsible, under guidance from the Operations Deputy at the Tactical Air Control Center, for shifting air from interdiction in 

the kill zones to support of hard-pressed ground ~nits.3~ 

37(S) Intvw, Maj AM^ D. Leary. Mark D. Mandeles, and Lt Col Sanford S. Terry 

with Capt Randall A. Soboul, USA. Maj Michael S. Mathews, WAF, and Maj Wiley L. 

Hill, USAF, 7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron, Keesler AFB. MS. 7 May 1992. 

’*See (S) Chapter 3. 

(S) USCENTCOM. Concept of Operations: Tactical Air Request Net, US. Interdic- 39 

tion and ABCCC, Desert Shield, 9 Sep 1990, paras 3.a, 3.d., and 3.h. 

313 
Attack air sorties were to be allocated among kill boxes based on 

targeting decisions made after consultation between the Army’s Battlefield Coordination Element in the TACC and the TACC’S Air Force planners and targeteers. The Fire Support Coordination Line was to be the 

dividing line between close air support sorties and Air Interdiction sorties. 

Close air support sorties would have to be cleared with Tactical Air 

Control Parties or with forward air controllers. Interdiction sorties would 

be flown as part of an orchestrated effort directed by the Commander in 

Chief and implemented through the Joint Force Air Component Commander and the Air Control Center (and through the TACC’S extension, 

the ABCCC). 

General Homer had already chosen to apply a “push close air sup 

port” concept to any operations against Iraqi forces. CENTAF would put 

the aircraft in the air. Ground units would ask their associated Tactical 

Air Control Parties (or Marine Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies) for 

support. These requests would be passed to Air Support Operations 

Centers, which would organize them, set priorities among them, and then 

turn the list of targets over to the ABCCC. The Director, Airborne Battlestaff was authorized to assign available attack planes to targets.& Marine 

Corps ground units were to work within their own system; if they needed 

more help than organic air could provide, they were to contact their 

Direct Air Support Center, which would then talk to the orbiting ABCCC. 

If the ABCCC needed Marine aviation, it could call the Marine Corps 

Tactical Air Control Center or the Direct Air Operations Center!’ 

Ground commanders were unhappy with this arrangement. It was not 

the arrangement Amy units had worked out with the Air Force in Europe, and it also was not what the Marine Corps usually did. The division commanders under Lt. Gen. Franks, commander of the VII Corps, 

openly opposed it!* They wanted to “own” the airspace in front of their 

divisions. That way, the corps would have a “free hand in artillery fires 

(S) fbid. paras 2.a. and 2.c. 

(S) fbid, para 2.e. 

42See (S) Chapter 3. 

40 

41 

314 
as well as air defense.”43 Their opposition to giving the TACC control 

over the air bombardment of enemy ground units was not based on 

Service parochialism. They simply did not feel secure working with a set 

of procedures that had not been tested in combat. They also did not 

know how they would direct their own artillery fire effectively if they 

could not also direct their own air s~pport.~ 

The use of the Fire Support Coordination Line to coordinate air 

operations against ground targets caused, according to an official source, 

“more confusion and concern than any other” among Army VII Corps 

division ~omrnanders.4~ The latter saw the Line as a device that would 

restrict their movements instead of bring them the close air support they 

would need once the ground war started. General Homer womed about 

the possibility of ground forces moving beyond the Line without coordinationpa and hence beyond the area where close air support was tightly 

controlled from the gr0und.4~ 

The abundance of airpower (including attack helicopters), coupled 

with the Army’s concern that it be applied intelligently and flexibly, 

placed the Airborne Command, Control, and Communications crews on 

the spot. ABCCC crews were the contact point between two command and 

control systems. The first collected and filtered planned Army air support 

requests from the corps’ targeting cells through the corps’ commands to 

Army Central Command and then to the Battlefield Coordination Element. The most important of these requests would be placed into the Air 

Tasking Order, and ABCCC crews would carry this list of anticipated 

43(S) After Action Review. 8th Air Support Operations Group (ASOG), Operations 

44 

Desert ShieldStorm, 6 Dec 1991, p 3. 

(S) Ibid, p 9. 

45(S) Ibid, p 7. 

%tvw. Robert L. Mandler with Col Michael F. Reavey, 21 Dec 1991. 

47At 02002 on 26 Feb 1991. for example, the western ABCCC discovered in a 

message from a VI1 Corps artillery commander that lead elements of the V1I Corps were 

at least two hours ahead of where they were supposed to be. The TACC and Battlefield 

Coordination Element were not aware of the precise location of the VII Corps. (S) 7th 

Air Command and Control Squadron (7th ACCS)/TACC Liaison Officer’s Log, 26 Feb 

1991. 

315 
strikes with them on their daily missions. The second command and 

control system reached from the Tactical Air Control Parties with the 

Army’s maneuver units to the Air Support Operations Centers at corps 

level. This system brought more immediate requests to the ABCCC, via 

radio. If a conflict existed between what was planned and what was 

asked for, the Director, Airborne Battlestaff on the ABCCC made the call.@ 

The hitch in this “balancing act” was that how the Director, Airborne 

Battlestaff made his decision depended on the information he received 

from his own crew, other parts of the Tactical Air Control System (especially the Tactical Air Control Center and the Air Support Operations 

Center), and the strike pilots (who were a key source of intelligence on 

Iraqi dispositions and movement^)?^ Army planners understood this and 

tried to use it to their advantage. For example, the TACC target list given 

to west ABCCC aircrew on 16 January 1991 did not include interdiction 

targets in the order that they were given in Army Central Command’s 

“Deep Operations’, target nominations worksheet.m The TACC’S target 

priorities (which supposedly reflected the Commander in Chief‘s guidance) were not the same as the Army’s. Yet an Army liaison officer was 

part of the crew of the ABCCC. His job was to recommend to the Director, Airborne Battlestaff the tradeoffs (if any) to be made between 

planned attacks md attacks made in response to last-minute requests from 

Tactical Air Control Parties. The Army liaison officer was, in effect, 

another link with the attacking aircraft, and Army corps’ targeting cells 

tried to divert attack sorties to “pop-up” targets through him.” 

Put another way, ABCCC controllers were under pressure from multiple sources simultaneously. They had the Air Tasking Order in front of 

@(S) Log, 7th ACCS (ABCCCY~ACC Liaison Officer Log, 14 Feb 1991, after 07102, 

put it very well: (U) ‘The DABS must consider all variables and decide what will be the 

appropriate balance between diverting everything and diverting nothing.” 

49602d Tactical Air Control Wing, Deputy Commander for Operations LL. Desert 

Storm Conference, Detachment 7, Fort Bliss, TX. nd. 

m(S) ‘Target Worksheet,” 13202. 16 Jan 1991; (S), USARCENT Deep Operations, 

“Target Nominations Worksheet,” 13412, 16 Jan 1991. 

”(S) After Action Review, 8th ASW. Operations Desert ShieldSto?. 6 Dec 1991, 

P 9. 

316 
them. They were supposed to facilitate its implementation. At the same 

time, they were supposed to stay in touch with the Air Support Operations Centers and the Tactical Air Control Parties. The east ABCCC, with 

a Marine liaison officer on board, was supposed to clear air attacks 

through the Marine Corps Direct Air Support Center. There was often a 

conflict between what was planned and what the ground units wanted. 

On 25 January, for example, the deputy director of combat operations 

in the TACC told the west ABCCC not to authorize changes in the targets 

planned without his approval.52 On 1 February, the duty officer in the 

7th Air Command and Control Squadron (supporting the TACC) told 

CENTAF that “everybody [sic] is now running their own little war, sometimes in the same place. It’s going to get dangerous if somebody doesn’t 

figure a way to get all C3 [command, control, and communications] assets 

integrated.”53 General Homer asked his deputy for operations to “Please 

get to bottom of this.”” Homer could not orchestrate a systematic campaign against Iraqi ground forces if his Tactical Air Control Center could 

not be sure just where strikes were going or what effect they were having 

once they bombed their targets. 

General Homer’s command and control problem with respect to airground operations had two parts. The first has already been discussed: 

ABCCC crews were often subject to a number of simultaneous demands for 

air support, and they were sending aircraft to targets in ways which the 

TACC often could not follow. The second cause of confusion regarding just 

who was in charge was the inability of ABCCC crews to communicate with 

the aircraft they were supposed to be ditecting and monitoring. 

[DELETED]% 

’*(s) Log, 7th ACCS (ABCCCY~ACC Liaison Officer Log, 07502 25 an 1991. 

53(S) Msg, 7 ACCS Deployed, DO to USCENTAF, DO 02302 1 Feb 1991, Microfilm 

”Homer’s handwritten comments are on the message. 

55(S) Log, 7th ACCS (ABCCC)hACC Liaison Officer Log, 22 Jan 1991. 

”(S) Memo, CA~ABCCC A1 Coordinators to KC. 22 Feb 1991. subj: ABCCC and 

AWACS Communications Survey, p 1, Microfilm Roll Number 26399. Frames 957-962, 

Roll Number 23986. Frames 962-966, GWAPS. 

GWAPS. 

317 
ABCCC crews, the contact point between two command and control 

systems, were sometimes flown on EC-130s. 

ABCCC crews were supposed to be traffic cops and data gatherers. 

They were to check strike aircraft into and out of kill boxes and gather data 

from the egressing aircraft about the locations and conditions of targets. 

In fact, they became battle managers, picking and choosing among targets 

even before the ground war began on 24 February. Amy and Marine 

Corps liaison officers on the ABCCCs reviewed their component target lists, 

the target lists given them by the TACC staff, and requests for support from 

ground units and made judgments about which targets aircraft were to be 

a~signed.5~ That ABCCC aircrews became battle managers was not a prob57(S/NF/WN) USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Tactical Analysis Bulletin, 

'*(S) Log, 7th ACCS (ABCCC)/TACC Liaison Officer Log, 3 Feb 1991. 

Volume 91-2, Jul 1991, pp 11-6, 11-7. 

(S) Intvw, Leary, Mandeles, and Terry with Capt Soboul, USA, Maj Mathews, 59 

USAF, and Maj Hill, USAF. 

318 
lem so long as (a) the TACC could track what targets were hit and (b) strike 

aircraft did not stack up waiting for target coordinates within kill boxes 

while the ABCCC liaison officers discussed with the Director, Airborne 

Battlestaff what to do. At times, however, the TACC lost track of what was 

happening, because aircraft had problems checking in with AB- and 

acquiring targets. 

On 3 February, for example, on orders from General Homer, special 

F-16 “killer scouts” began working with the ABCCCs. no of these F-16s 

were assigned to orbit over selected Iraqi divisions. They were given the 

mission of selecting targets; the ABCCCs would relay the target coordinates 

to waiting attack aircraft and then pick up the reports from the attackers as 

the latter left the area.@ Poor communications with the ABCCC aircraft 

frustrated this innovation.6’ ABCCC crews thought at the time that their 

HAVE QUICK radios were being jammed inadvertently by E-130I-I COMPASS CALL electronic warfare aircraft, but the evidence did not fully support 

their suspicions.m Homer was concerned enough about the problem to 

demand a ~olution.6~ 

On 7 February, as a short-term measure, the Tactical Air Control 

Center limited the number of A-10s in any kill box at any given time to 

two 2-ship flightsw This caused A-10s flying missions against kill box 

coordinates to stack up, so the TACC advised the west ABCCC to divert the 

surplus A-10s to other target^.^' On 8 February, the TACUDireclor of 

Operations (DO) ordered the ABCCC and AWACS wings to develop potential 

solutions in time for a 13 February meeting.66 The solutions they came up 

with were both technical and procedural. 

@(S) Log, 7th ACCS (ABCCCYTACC Liaison Officer Log, 15212, 3 Feb 1991. 

(S) Ibid, 03152, 5 Feb 1991. 61 

62(S) Ibid, 0951Z, 6 Feb 1991, and 7 Feb (no time given). 

63(S) Ibid. 15102, 7 Feb 1991. 

&l(S) Ibid, 17102, 7 Feb 1991. 

6s(S) Ibid, 23302. 7 Feb 1991. 

66(S) Memo, Lt Col R. Duncan, uSAF, Combat Plans, TACS Division, to CEKTAF/W, 

subj: Utilization of AWACS Aircraft by ABCCC Battle Staff, 8 Feb 1991, Microfilm Roll 

Number 23654, Frames 639-640 and 650-656. 

319 
On 13 February, for example, the TACC/W decided that, until the 

ground war began, VII Corps would not get an immediate response to its 

requests for air interdiction.6’ The point was to cut down on the number 

of communications to the ABCCC. The next day, TACCJDO ordered the 

ABCCC crews not to divert “priority” missions in the Air Tasking Order.& 

On 17 February, the TAWDO ruled that attack aircraft flying strikes against 

certain kill boxes could not drop their ordnance unless they first checked 

in with either AWACS or ABCCC.@ These solutions appear to have helped, 

but the problems had made ground commanders cautious. The 1st Armored Division, for instance, “never simultaneously employed [close air 

support] aircraft, artillery, and attack helicopters in the same target area-not 

because the assets were not available, but because of the coordination 

difficulties involved.**m 

ABCCC and the Marine Corps 

Marine officers rode the east ABCCC aircraft; they acted much like the 

Army liaison officersehecking aircraft into and out of kill boxes, responding to requests for immediate support from the ground, and supporting the 

Marine Corps Direct Air Support Center. Because the Marines had their 

own system of air support,” they had at first resisted the kill box concept. 

During the air campaign, however, the Marine Direct Air Support Center 

assumed de fact0 control over entry into the kill boxes in front of U.S. 

67(S) Ibid. 02002, 13 Feb 199 I. 

&(S) Ibid, 07102, 14 Feb 1991. 

69(S) Ibid, 18382, 17 Feb 199 1. 

70(S) After Action Review, 8th Air Support Operations Group (ASOG). Operations 

Desert ShieldStorm, 6 Dec 1991. p 5. 

7’USMC aircraft, before making a strike, would check in with their Tactical Air 

Command Center. The Center would pass them to the USMC Tactical Air Operations 

Center to see if there were any potential conflicts with other flights. The Tactical Air 

Operations Center would then shift control to the Direct Air Support Center (which was 

sometimes airborne) for any last minute mission update. The DASC would then contact 

the ABCCC and tell the latter that USMC planes were heading for a kill box. Coming back 

from a mission, control was passed back through the same organizations. Background 

Paper, Deconfliction of Air Within the MARCENT Area of Responsibility, nd. 

320 
Marines Central Command forces?* Indeed, the Direct Air Support 

Center’s influence was so great that the Eastern Area Command told 

Central Command Air Forces in January that “they did not feel confident 

that their air support needs would be met by USMARCENT in a high paced, 

limited air asset a~ti~n.~’~~ 

That fear turned out to be unjustified, but Marine liaison officers on 

the east ABCCC did relish the opportunity to direct the airplanes of other 

Services. Working with their own Direct Air Support Center, these 

Marine liaison officers directed A-10s against Iraqi units in Kuwait, 

relayed information from a remotely piloted vehicle (drone) to help 

battleships Wisconsin and Missouri bombard shore targets. and even 

coordinated B-52 ~trikes.7~ 

As far as the Marine liaison personnel were concerned, work on an 

ABCCC was just an opportunity to grab attack aircraft looking for a~tion.’~ 

On 25 February, for example, “the USMC xepresentative onboard ABCCC 

requested and received permission to control the roads running North out 

of Kuwait City.”76 On 27 February, the Marine Corps liaison was busy 

finding ways to circumvent the TAW’S policy of restricting the number of 

attack flights working a kill box at any given time.n 

72(S/NF) Briefing, MARCENT, Desert Storm. MARCENT Command Brief, 28 Mar 1991. 

73(S) Memo, Lt Col R. E. Duncan, USCENTAF Combat Plans. TACC. TACS Division. 

to DCP, DCO. ADO. DO, subj: CAS Trip Report, 24 Jan 1991, Microfilm Roll Number 23654. 

Frames 574-575, GWAPS. 

74(S) Chronology, ABCCC Marine Liaison Team Det Chronology, (7th ACCS. 5 Mar 

75(S) Ibid, p 13. 

“(S) Ibid, p 14. 

77(S) Ibid, p IS. 

1966). pp 10-11. 

32 I 
Tactical Air Control Parties 

Anyone familiar with the history of close air support in past wars78 

will know what it was like for the Tactical Air Control Parties: communications problems, vehicle problems, problems just getting food and 

shelter and keeping warm and dry.’9 They had to stay with the Army 

units they were assigned to support. As in past wars, many of the vehicles which carried them were unarmored, and Control Party personnel 

were wounded by enemy fire. The brackets holding their radios were 

often not strong enough or could not withstand vehicle vibration. The 

vehicles (especially the Army’s high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled 

vehicle, or HMMWV) often did not produce enough electric power to 

sustain communications equipment. 

On the positive side, however, the Tactical Air Control Parties had 

Global Positioning Satellite receivers, which they found “invaluable.”80 

They also praised communications with AWACS and ABCCC and coordination with “Fast FAC” F/A-l8Ds.8’ Though the Army’s aviation brigades of 

attack and assault helicopters did not range out in front of their armored 

divisions, as they had planned to do in a war with the Warsaw Pact in 

Europe, they nevertheless apparently benefitted from having Party liaison.82 

Air Force Tactical Air Control Party personnel also noted the importance 

of the training they received during the months before Desert St0rm.8~ 

78Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ed, Case Studies in the Development of Close Air 

Support (Washington, DC. 1990). 

79All these problems are documented in the Desert Storm lessons learned conferences 

held by the 602d Tactical Air Control Wing, Deputy Commander for Operations. 

80(s) Briefing, Maj Miles Batt, USA, USAF ACOSISAJ, subj: Desert Storm, Presentation to Maj Anne D. Leary, Mark D. Mandeles, and Lt Col Sanford S. Terry, 8 May 

1992. (The briefing was prepared upon Maj Batt’s return to the U.S. from Kuwait.) 

“(S) Ibid. See also 602d Tactical Air Control Wing, Deputy Commander for 

Operations LL, Desert Storm Conference, Lessons Learned, Detachment 1-2, “Historical 

Input,” 24 Feb 1992. 

‘*(S) Ibid. 

83602d Tactical Air Control Wing, Deputy Commander for Operations LL, Desert 

Storm Conference, Detachment 7, Fort Bliss, TX. nd. p 3. 

322 
The 8th Air Support Operations Group, however, noted that the problem of fratricide, once the Army units it supported moved against the 

enemy, was never overcome. Despite the use of orange markers, Global 

Positioning Satellite receivers, signal mirrors, dedicated forward air controllers, and Tactical Air Control Parties, there was no guaranteed way of 

avoiding attacks on friendly forces. “The problems in friendly vehide 

identification at night were enormous, and in most cases insurmountable. 

As a result, night [close air support] sorties flown during the ground offensive were all employed well forward of the FLOT (Forward Line of 

Troopst5 Km or more.”84 

Matters were even more hectic for the Air Support Operations Center 

and the ten Tactical Air Control Parties which supported the Northern Area 

Command (which mixed Saudi, French, Syrian and Egyptian forces). Air 

Force personnel put their close air support communications together “with 

bits and pieces from all tactical command^."^' As their Air Support Operations Center struggled to get the Air Tasking Order daily (“CAFAMS [sic] 

is slooooow’i),86 they relied on Army Special Forces personnel to keep 

them in contact with the Arab units, most of whom had little or no experience working with attached or supporting fixed-wing aviation. 

ABCCC Pe~ormance 

An Air Force major, part of an Airborne Command, Control, and 

Communications crew, told interviewers an interesting story. During a 

postmission brief, an A-10 pilot cursed ABCCC for not having a target for 

him. The major asked the pilot why he had the problem. The pilot answered, “Well, I checked in and they acted like they didn’t know who I 

was.” The major then asked the pilot what frequency he used to check 

in. The pilot responded with the AWACS frequency and callsign. When 

informed of his mistake, the A-10 pilot said, “AWACS, ABCCC, what the 

84(S) After Action Review, 8th Air Support Operations Group (ASOG), Operations 

”602d Tactical Air Control Wing, Deputy Commander for Operations LL, Desert 

861bid. 

Desert ShieldStorm, 6 Dec 1991, p 11. 

Storm Conference, Lessons Learned, 23 TASS, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, p 1. 

323 
hell is the difference?”” Maybe this instance highlights one of the major 

problems that the ABCCC faced during the war; the level of knowledge 

was unequal between the ABCCC controllers and the attack pilots they 

were to control. 

[DEL,ETED]88 [DELETEDIs9 [DELETEDlw 

The Joint SurveiuanCe Tqet Attuck Radar System (JSTARS) 

In Desert Storm, JSTARS stole the show. Anyone who has seen the 

JSTARS moving target indicator radar displays, for example, of the Iraqi 

retreat from Kuwait City, will know why. Indeed, the screen images can 

be saved, combined, and then run sequentially, and the effect is magical. 

The enemy’s forces deploy, scatter, and then regroup right in front of the 

viewer’s eyes. JSTARS is visual; it shows you where your enemy is and 

what he’s doing now. It should not surprise anyone that JSTARS was in 

great demand during Desert Storm. 

Operations 

JSTARS missions began on 14 January?’ Each E-8 aircraft flew in 

random mission tracks within an assigned operating area.= Flights were 

scheduled in the Air Tasking Order. From its orbit, the JSTARS aircraft 

”(S) Intvw, Leary. Mandeles. and Terry with Capt Soboul. USA. Maj Mathews, 

“(S) After Action Review. 8th ASOG, Operations Desert ShieldStorm. 6 Dec 6 1991. 

89(S) Intvw, Leary. Mandeles, and Terry with Capt Soboul, USA, Maj Mathews, 

90602d Tactical Air Control Wing, Deputy Commander for Operations LL, Desert 

9’(S) Msg, Maj Gen John A. Corder. USCENTAF/DO to USCINCCENT//CUZ3. 

=USCENTAF, Employment Concept, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar 

USAF, and Maj Hill, USAF. 

P 1- 

USAF, and Maj Hill, USAF. 

Storm Conference, Detachment 7. Fort Bliss, TX, nd, p 6. 

2220302 Jan 1991, subj: Joint Stars Operations. 

System (JSTARS), nd, Microfilm Roll Number 10238, Frames 523-32, GwAPS. 

324 
could pick up moving targets. The aircraft’s synthetic aperture radar could 

be applied to any spot within its area coverage to detect stationary 0bjectsP3 

(S) The crew would usually find moving objects. They also looked for 

signs of stationary targets that merited examination with the synthetic 

aperture radar. If they found any indicators of potential targets, they 

contacted strike aircraft, ABCCC, or the Tactical Air Control Center. 

[DELETEDIM [DELETED]” 

Yet, ground commanders were quick to realize what it could give 

them, and they competed among themselves to gain coverage for their 

fronts. Before JSTARS missions, the ground component commanders would 

submit target coordinates for the one JSTARS platform flying at any given 

time to examine. Once in the air, the JSTARS crew found itself under siege 

from ground commanders who communicated with the E-8 through their 

Ground Support Modules.% As Brig. Gen. George K. Muellner, JSTARS 

commander during Desert Storm, recalled in an interview, “every night 

we’d get into a battle. . . . the VII Corps wanted to run it his way, and 

MARCENT wanted to run it their way.*m Central Command tried to meet 

all the requirements placed on JSTARS, but, as Muellner observed later, 

“there was NOBODY [emphasis his] early on to say, ‘Hey, we’ve looked 

at your requirements.”** 

The solution to this problem of setting priorities came when General 

Schwarzkopf‘s deputy, Lt. Gen. Calvin Waller, held daily meetings to set 

93(S/NF/WN) Briefing, Col George Muellner, Col Martin Kleiner, Col Harry 

Heimple, Col Mendel Solomon, Col Royce Grones, subj: Joint s~~~sSupport of Desert 

Shield, nd, Microfilm Roll Humber 10238, Frames 443475, and Microfilm Roll Number 

1021 1. Frames 179-223, GWAPS. 

M(S) Briefing. Maj J. Coates, 12th Tactical Intelligence Squadron, subj: Joint STARSDesert Storm, 4-6 Jun 1991, Microfilm Roll Number 26572, Frames 1823-1847, GWAPS. 

951ntvw. Thomas C. Hone, Maj Anne D. Leary, Mark D. Mandeles with Brig Gen 

George K. Muellner, Ms-Requirements, HQ TAC. 16 Apr 1992. 

%Ibid. 

97~bid. 

98~bid. 

325 
JSTARS was in great demand during Desert Storm 

due to its moving target indicator displays. 

JSTARS coverage, to decide where the JSTARS would fly.w Before that time, 

JSTARS spent a great deal of time hunting Iraqi Scud missiles from one or 

both of its western orbits. By 28 January, for example, the Air Tasking 

Order was designating certain aircraft as “Scud CAP” [combat air patrol]. 

These planes flew orbits over suspected Scud launch sites and were at the 

call of the JSTARS E-8.Iw “And that was a prime irritant to the ground 

component commanders.”1o1 

JSTARS worked better when its radars were applied to Iraqi ground 

units. Even then, however, Colonel Muellner found that his crews had 

to do much of their own analysis. Maj. Gen. Corder, General Homer’s 

deputy for operations in the Tactical Air Control Center, helped the 

JSTARS crews obtain color printers for their display consoles. The crews 

would mark the color output to show enemy movement and give it the 

TACC’S intelligence personnel. With Corder’s approval and the help of 

~~~ ~ ~ 

wlbid. 

lw7th ACCSK’ACC Liaison Officer Log, 02002 28 Jan 1991. 

’“’Intvw, Hone, Leary, and Mandeles with Brig Cen Muellner. 

326 
Brig. Gen. Kenneth Minihan, intelligence deputy at the Tactical Air Command, and Army Lt. Gen. John Yeosock, Muellner and his subordinates 

put together a joint “planning and exploitation cell” in time for the 

ground war.’” 

Once the air war began, JSTARS personnel discovered that Airborne 

Command, Control, and Communications and Marine Corps Direct Air 

Support Center personnel had problems knowing how to interpret dynamic, 

real-time targeting data. They would direct attack aircraft to where an 

enemy target had been and not to where it would soon kven though 

JsTARS provided “velocity vectors.” To improve their understanding and 

confidence, Muellner had a Director, Airborne Battlestaff from an ABCCC 

and some of his subordinates fly with a JSTARS; he did the same with 

Direct Air Support Center personnel. This seemed to work.’03 

[DELETED] ‘04 

JSTARS was involved successfully in the defeat of the Iraqi force that 

attacked Khafji. The system also detected the “mother of all retreats” from 

Kuwait City on 25 February and directed (with the East ABCCC) the air 

interdiction attacks on the traffic fleeing from the city. During Desert 

Storm, JSTARS flew 49 combat sorties over 535 hours. The two E-8s 

located over 1 ,OOO important targets and controlled over 750 attack sorties. 

The two aircraft were available 85 percent of the time; the radars were up 

80 percent of the time. Contractor support in the theater contributed significantly to the system’s success.’05 

The Aerial TACS in Action-An Assessment 

The technical sophistication of the airborne elements of the Tactical Air 

Control System should not obscure the performance of its human operators. 

AWACS, RIVEr JOINT, ABCCC, and JSTARS put in long, stress-filled hours; 

‘“/bid. 

Io3/bid. 

‘04[ DELETED] 

(SMFNN) See footnote 97. I05 

327 
those personnel had to bring great concentration to their jobs. The enemy 

did not help. Iraqi aircraft rehearsed threatening passes against RIVET JOINT 

and AWACS aircraft during Desert Shield.’% Fighters held them off; all 

airborne TACS assets (except forward air controllers) were “high value air 

assets” and were protected accordingly, but the threat of destruction was 

present nonetheless. The work of these airborne command and control 

platforms showed that flying command stations could carry the ’round-theclock air battle to the enemy and even coordinate night &/ground operations against hostile forces. 

~~ 

‘06Robert S. Hopkins, 111. “Ears of the Storm,” Air Force Magazine, Feb 1992, pp 

41-43. 

328 
10 

Conclusion 

In an interview after the war, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Homer characterized himself and his fellow Gulf War senior commanders (including 

Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf) as good, competent professionals, but 

certainly not as heroes or military geniuses.' He was trying, in an offhand way, to explain that the success of U.S. forces was due as much to 

their planning, their training, their systems, and their topto-bottom professionalism as it was to the skill of their theater commanders. Put 

another way, the "depth" of U.S. command and control (broadly defined) 

meant that any well-trained, professional team of American leaders, 

commanding an above-average force, could spectacularly outperform the 

best team of leaders Iraq could put in the field. 

Why this should have been so is what this report has been all about. 

After all, it is not as though everything went smoothly for American and 

coalition command and control. Missions sometimes did not go as 

planned, as several of the examples from Chapter 7 show? There were 

also disagreements among senior commanders about how best to use the 

air units available to the coalition, about which aircraft and sorties belonged in the Air Tasking Order, and, once the ground war started, about 

which commanders had the authority to adjust the Fire Support Coordination Line. Finally, there were cases in which the Tactical Air Control 

Center staff misunderstood what was happening in the air campaign. 

Victory was not automatic. To see Desert Storm as an inevitable walkover would be wrong. 

'(SMF) Intvw, Barry Barlow, Richard G. Davis, Perry Jamieson with Lt Gen Charles 

A. Homer, Commander, 9th AF, 4 Mar 1992. See also H. Norman Schwarzkopf with 

Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York. 1992). 

ZThe Scud Hunt, for example, was clearly unsuccessful tactically. However, to the 

extent that it persuaded Israeli leaders and population that the United States was serious 

about combatting the Scud threat and therefore contributed to keeping Israel out of the 

war, the Scud Hunt was a strategic success. 

329 
Some of these problems would have arisen anyway, no matter who 

the U.S. and coalition commanders were. On the one hand, the difference 

between the Air Force and the Marine Corps over the authority of the 

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), for example, had not 

been resolved when Iraq invaded Kuwait (see Appendix 2). 

Schwarzkopf, Horner, and the other component commanders had to settle 

the disagreement during Desert Shield through discussions and negotiations. Because the authority of the JFACC was a matter of importance to 

all the component commanders, those negotiations continued on tacitly 

into Desert Storm. Some problems, on the other hand, can be traced 

directly to the personalities of the commanders involved. For example, 

the domination of the Air Tasking Order process during Desert Storm by 

the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell (GAT), described in 

Chapter 7, was one consequence of Brig. Gen. Buster C. Glosson’s strong 

personality and aggressive leadership style. Clearly, people are at the 

heart of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS), and their perceptions and 

personalities cannot be ignored when considering the effectiveness of any 

TACS in any particular conflict. 

The Importance of Effectiveness (or Outcomes) 

But effectiveness is the concern of this report-whether the TACS used 

the great resources placed at its disposal effectively, in spite of the problems always inherent in commanding forces during a war. Chapter 1 of 

this report argued that there was a connection between how well a military organization perceived and then solved its command and control 

problems and challenges, and how well it performed in war. As noted in 

Chapter 1, military organizations experience their most important reality 

(war) only infrequently. Most of the time, military organizations can 

only simulate war through practice exercises and in training. As a result, 

war usually brings many surprises. and military organizations-which are, 

after all, composed just of people, with the limitations of people-must try 

to anticipate those surprises and cope with them. Military organizations 

that cannot cope with the unexpected lose wars. 

How simple yet how frustrating this situation is. Because war is full 

of surprises, military leaders must try to create and maintain command 

and control systems (composed of personnel, procedures, and equipment) 

that can adapt to the unexpected by sensing, analyzing, and then solving 

330 
the problems which the surprises endemic to war create. But there is no 

way to know for sure in peacetime that the command and control which 

performs well during exercises will respond equally well to the confusion, 

uncertainty, and stress of wartime operations. 

To use the terms introduced in Chapter 1, impressive peacetime 

outputs are no guarantee of successful wartime outcomes. However, 

because individuals and organizations focus in peacetime so much on 

output, senior leaders must monitor the people (in organizations) they 

lead so as to detect and then, if necessary, correct any focus on outputs 

which obstructs the achievement of the proper outcomes. This is not easy. 

Consider the Tactical Air Control Center during Desert Storm. The 

GAT was focused on outcomes. Central Command Air ForcesAntelligence 

(CENTAFAN) did not, apparently, grasp the concept of operations, which 

stressed outcomes over outputs. The two organizations, which should 

have worked closely together to help produce Air Tasking Orders, did not 

work well together at all. General Glosson pushed ahead anyway (see 

Chapter 7), handing his GAT planners CENTAFIIN’S responsibilities and 

using his authority as 14th Air Division(P) Commander to communicate 

directly with the wings under his command. Glosson monitored the 

situation and then took “corrective” action, but was it the right action? 

And, given the pace of the air war, how could Glosson know whether his 

action was right or not until some time after the conflict had ended? 

One reason why the personnel in the GAT found it difficult to work 

with the other organizations within the Tactical Air Control Center during 

Desert Storm was because the members of the GAT had been cut off from 

the routines maintained within the Center during Desert Shield. Isolated 

unavoidably as they secretly planned for an offensive air campaign, the 

members of the GAT developed a shared concept of operations-an outcome concept-which other parts of the Tactical Air Control Center did 

not. General Glosson shared this concept. Furthermore, he had developed “special” sources of intelligence information, and the fact that he 

had access to “inside” information gave him and his subordinates in the 

GAT confidence that they could achieve victory even without the support 

they felt they deserved from CENTAFIIN. 

33 1 
The friction between the GAT and CENTAWIN shows why the distinction between outputs and outcomes is important: because organizations 

will tend, even in war, to produce those outputs developed during peacetime training. One reason this happens is because there are two types of 

rationality in the minds of command and control personnel during a 

conflict. The first focuses on outcomes; those who are “rational” in this 

way feel that whatever outputs do not contribute to victory are simply 

wasted effort. Those who define “rationality” in output terms, however, 

fear that deviating from the routines which produce “proper output” will 

only lead to organizational confusion and chaos. Both views make some 

“sense,” and knowing that both do allows those interested in bettering 

command and control to compare and tradeoff the advantages of each 

position, and that is the first step toward setting command and control 

systems on a sensible foundation. 

Command and Control: What Does It Mean? 

There are many obstacles to effective command and control of air 

forces across a whole theater, despite decades of research, development, 

and innovation in the field of command and control. In World Wars I 

and 11, an air commander could often do little more than send his 

aircrews off and then pray for their safe return. Now, the aircrews, in 

concert with systems such as AWACS, ABCCC, and JSTARS3 can implement 

a concept of operations developed by senior commanders and consult 

both with those commanders and with one another while the operation is 

in progress. The potential this mode of command gives to air units is 

tremendous. The whole air campaign, including air-to-air engagements 

and air-to-ground attacks, can be directed from the air itself, and elements 

of the campaign, such as interdiction, can be modified in real time to suit 

a changing situation. 

However, the problems of coordination and problem-solving this 

advanced system of command and control creates are enormous. Innovation has come hand-in-hand with increasing complexity, and the latter has 

required the users of this increasingly complex system to learn to coordi3AWAC!3 Airborne Warning and Control Systems; ABCCC: Airborne Command, 

Control, and Communications; JSTARS: Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. 

332 
nate even more of their actions with one another. Where this lesson has 

not been learned-as when GAT personnel feuded with their counterparts 

in CENTAF/IN-the system has not worked as anticipated. Where the lesson 

has been learned-as in the operations of AWACS and ABCCC aircraft-there 

has been a great payoff. 

There has been a revolution in the command and control of air operations in recent years. That revolution has two sides. The first side is 

technological: advanced electronics and high-technology command and 

control systems can be made to support command and control of highvolume, sophisticated air operations. The second side is social: the 

“professional” Services have learned to use these systems. In terms of 

outputs and outcomes, the Services, through simulations and realistic 

exercises, have developed organizational “outputs” that are closely suited, 

even in peacetime, to giving them the situational “outcomes” that they 

must have to be victorious. There has been, in short, a fruitful interaction 

between maturing systems and the people who train to use them. 

This interaction, however, was supplemented during Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm by a shared commitment among senior commanders to 

avoid the apparent mistakes of the past. Lieutenant General Horner might 

well have made his motto a defiant, “No more Vietnams.” In the terms 

used in this report, he thoroughly rejected any approaches to being the 

JFACC that he thought were too focused on outputs instead of outcomes. 

In pushing and prodding the Tactical Air Control Center and his air units 

to face and solve problems, he promoted an ethic of leadership which was 

outcome oriented. Homer consciously chose to err on the side of stressing outcomes because of his sense of what had been the mistakes of the 

air war against North Vietnam. It is this aggressive outcome-oriented approach that characterizes the story of USAF theater-level and unit-level 

command and control during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

Despite the revolution in the technology of command and control, 

Desert Storm was much like past air campaigns. Commanders’ personalities clashed, communications sometimes failed, and informal and ad 

hoc organizations sprang up to deal with real or perceived problems that 

existing organizations could not deal with. At times, aircraft dropped 

bombs where they should not have; at other times, they kept dropping 

bombs where they no longer needed to. Precrisis intelligence was 

333 
skimpy. Wartime intelligence fell on the theater like an avalanche. 

Intelligence staff fought with planners, and operators cursed both. Nothing new here; nothing unexpected here. Nothing here suggests that 

problems are unresolvable, either. The record of Desert Storm, however, 

suggests that these traditional problems of command and control may 

never-be totally overcome before a conflict actually begins. 

Key Findings 

1. From the perspective of command and control, the primary 

obstacle faced by the commanders of coalition Air Forces during Desert 

Storm was not Iraqi resistance but organizational problems within the 

Tactical Air Control System itself. Chief among these was the 

unanticipated growth in the responsibilities of the Guidance, 

Apportionment and Targeting division of the operations directorate of the 

Tactical Air Control Center. Given the authority to develop daily attack 

plans and promulgate operational direction of the air campaign in December 1990, the GAT quickly took control of the entire Air Tasking Order 

generation process. In doing this, it exercised responsibilities which had 

been formally assigned to other divisions under the operations directorate 

of the Tactical Air Control Center. The GAT also took over much of the 

intelligence directorate’s function and even conducted its own bomb 

damage assessments. 

2. Because the other personnel manning the Tactical Air Control 

Center had not trained for this change, and because GAT personnel could 

not do well all the duties they had assumed, the Air Tasking Order process 

itself lost efficiency quickly. For example, changes issued to the Air 

Tasking Order after it had been published comprised a significant 

percentage of the total number of sorties flown after the first two days of 

the air war. The wings kept pace with the many changes through frequent, 

secure conversations with members of the Tactical Air Control Center. 

3. The Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting division was just 

one of many important ad hoc command and control organizations. 

Another was the network of communications established among ABCCC 

and AWACS crews, Tactical Air Control Parties accompanying U.S. 

ground forces, and “Fast FAC” forward air controllers as they worked to 

send coalition strike aircraft against the Iraqi army deployed and dug in 

334 
opposite coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. The fact that there were many, 

unanticipated ad hoc organizations was significant. 

4. The ad hoc organizations were supported by great numbers of 

relatively easy-to-use secure communications devices, particularly the 

ubiquitous Secure Telephone Unit (STU-111). These secute transmitters and 

receivers, working through satellite links, allowed personnel in Saudi 

Arabia to communicate easily and often with one another and with 

Washington. The volume of this communication nearly overwhelmed the 

communications equipment and personnel assigned to the theater, and the 

nature of much of the communication changed the character of command 

and control. For example, Brigadier General Glosson, head of the GAT, 

and RAdm. Michael McConnell, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, talked frequently on the phone. McConnell 

passed sensitive information to General Glosson-information which 

Glosson used to compensate for what be believed were weaknesses in the 

workings of the Tactical Air Control Center’s intelligence directorate. 

5. The rapid pace (or velocity) of the air campaign, coupled with the 

ability of new sensors such as JSTARS to monitor enemy movements in 

real time, outran the procedures by which the theater-wide Air Tasking 

Order was constructed and then disseminated. As General Glosson 

recognized, the ATO process was archaic. It depended on a lot of paperand-pencil work and could not keep up with needs of units for planning 

materials such as accurate and timely bomb damage assessments and 

estimates of enemy movement at night (which JSTARS provided). 

6. Decisionmakers at various levels of the Tactical Air Control 

System often did not get the information they needed to direct the air 

campaign or did not get that information on time, despite all the 

technological innovations (such as satellite communications) which had 

been introduced in the years before Desert Shield and Desert Storm. For 

example, the Tactical Air Control Center lacked a process for developing 

timely bomb damage assessments for the air campaign’s planners. Faced 

with no information or delayed information, campaign planners called 

directly to sources in Washington or used videotapes sent by wings 

whose planes were flying strike missions. Once planners obtained 

information, however, they often did not use it effectively because they 

were not fully trained in its interpretation. 

335 
7. The existence of many ad hoc command and control organizations 

increased the impact of individual personalities. Because information 

such as bomb damage assessment was often lacking, individuals who 

could get it or get it faster gained influence over the direction of the air 

campaign. The networks these individuals created to gain information 

were usually based on informal contacts that grew out of past 

associations. For example, GAT personnel with Fighter Weapons School 

training reached out to other graduates. In the ad hoc organizations, these 

contacts based on past associations took the place of the standard operating procedures and routines that linked personnel in formal organizations. 

(See Chapters 6 and 7.) 

8. The JFACC’S role was a difficult one to fill. Lieutenant General 

Homer had to deal with the Commander in Chief, the coalition air 

commanders, the other Services, and the Tactical Air Control System, 

which was his primary tool for managing the air campaign. Homer chose 

to focus his attention outside the TACS, leaving its day-to-day 

management to his deputies. He managed the TACS “by exception,” 

intervening only when he believed it was necessary. 

9. Centralized direction of a theater-wide air campaign is possible. 

During Desert Storm, the lack of common procedures, training, 

equipment, and software among the Services was a major obstacle to 

effective centralized command and control. 

10. Command and control of air operations was often exercised from 

airborne platforms such as AWACS, ABCCC, and JSTARS. These platforms 

gave the Tactical Air Control System substantial reliability. Because 

AWACS, ABCCC, and JSTARS had related or overlapping capabilities, 

however, personnel manning them had to develop means of coordinating 

their operations. Put another way, redundancy had a high coordination 

“cost.” 

11. U.S. Air Force and Navy problems in the area of command and 

control were caused by a lack of compatibility of communications and 

tasking systems and by insufficient joint training in command and control. 

12. The ad hoc Scud warning system worked well. The ad hoc 

mobile ScudAauncher localization and targeting procedures did not work 

336 
effectively. The former was effective while the latter was not because the 

equipment for actually targeting the mobile Scud launchers was 

inadequate for the task (though, because it was all that was available, it 

had to be used). 

13. Communications barely kept up with the deployment of air 

forces during Desert Shield, and only strenuous efforts kept the communications “system” in the Gulf from collapsing. 

14. The months of training during Desert Shield were valuable 

because they gave the many individuals manning the various elements of 

the Tactical Air Control System time to focus on the specifics of a campaign against Iraqi forces. Chapter 9, for example, noted how important 

it was for Air Force liaison officers working with Army ground units to 

put their training and equipment to the test in prewar exercises, and 

Chapter 3 showed that it took time for all the air units in the coalition to 

become accustomed to working from the Air Tasking Order. 

Lieutenant General Horner, and the many air units under his control, 

did win an overwhelming victory, despite fears-expressed in the press 

and privately within the government before Desert Storm-that they would 

win only at great cost. The magnitude of that victory, however, was due 

in a substantial way to a very effective combination of training, tactics, 

and equipment. This was a revolution in the relationship of peacetime 

outputs to wartime outcomes. In plain language, training was more 

realistic. The Gulf War also showed that the scope and tempo of operations upon which an air commander can act has increased. However, 

technological and organizational innovations to solve old command and 

control problems have created new problems of coordination and problem-solving for command and control. The events of the Gulf War also 

suggest, however, that these new problems can-and will-be solved. 

337 
338 
Appendix 1 

Definition of Terms 

administrative control - (DOD, NATO) Direction or exercise of authority 

over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters 

not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other 

organizations. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

airborne battlefield command and control center - (DOD) A United 

States Air Force aircraFt equipped with communications, data link, and 

display equipment; it may be employed as an airborne command post or 

a communications and intelligence relay facility. 

air command - (DOD) A major subdivision of the Air Force; for operational purposes, it normally consists of two or more air forces. (JCS 

Pub 1-02) 

air defense - (DOD) All defensive measures designed to destroy attacking 

enemy aircraft or missiles in the earth’s envelope of atmosphere, or to 

nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

air ground operations system - (DOD, NATO) An Army/Air Force 

system providing the ground commander with the means for receiving, 

processing, and forwarding the requests of subordinate ground commanders for air support missions and for the rapid dissemination of information 

and intelligence. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

airspace management - (DOD) The coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of airspace of defined dimensions. 

air support operations center - (DOD, NATO) An agency of a tactical 

air control system collocated with a corps headquarters or an appropriate 

land force headquarters, which coordinates and directs close air support 

and other tactical air support. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

339 
allocation - (DOD) The translation of the apportionment into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operatiodtask. (JCS Pub 

1 -02) 

apportionment - (DOD, NATO) The determination and assignment of the 

total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be 

devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given 

period of time. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

area air defense commander - (DOD) Within an overseas unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander 

will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. 

Normally, this will be the Air Force component commander. Representation from the other Services’ components involved will be provided, as 

appropriate, to the area air defense commander*s headquarters. (JCS 

Pub 1-02) 

area command - (MID, NATO) A command which is composed of those 

organized elements of one or more of the armed Services, designated to 

operate in a specific geographical area and placed under a single commander. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

basic encyclopedia - (DOD) A compilation of identified installations and 

physical areas of potential significance as objectives for attack. (JCS 

Pub 1-02) 

bomb damage assessment - (DOD) The determination of the effect of 

all air attacks on targets (e.g., bombs, rockets, or strafing). (JCS 

Pub 1-02) 

call sign - (DOD, NATO) Any combination of characters or pronounceable 

words that identify a communication facility, a command, an authority, 

an activity, or a unit; used primarily for establishing and maintaining 

communications. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

chain of command - (DOD, NATO) The succession of commanding 

officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is 

exercised. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

change of operational control - (DOD) The date and time (Coordinated 

Universal Time) at which the responsibility for operational control of a 

340 
force or unit passes from one operational control authority to another. 

(JCS Pub 1-02) 

close air support - (DOD, NATO) Air action against hostile targets which 

are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. 

(JCS Pub 1-02) 

Combatant Command (command authority) - (DOD) Non-transferable 

command authority established by title 10, United States Code, section 

164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant 

commands. Combatant Command (command authority) is the authority 

of a Combatant Commander to perform those functions of command over 

assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and 

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative 

direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. 

Combatant Command (command authority) should be exercised through 

the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is 

exercised through the Service component commander. Combatant Command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ 

commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish 

assigned missions. Also called COCOM. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

command - (MD) 1. The authority that a commander in the military 

Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively 

using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, 

directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, 

welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given 

by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the 

purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an 

organization, or an area under the command of one individual. 4. To 

dominate by a field of weapon fire or by observation from a superior 

position. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

command - (Combined) Command is the authority and responsibility 

for effectively using available resources and for planning the controlling, 

organizing, directing, coordinating, and employment of military forces for 

the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility 

34 1 
for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. (Combined OPlan) 

control - (WD) 1. Authority which may be less than full command 

exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or 

other organizations. 2. In mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a 

collective term for a system of marks or objects on the earth or on a map 

or a photograph, whose positions or elevations, or both, have been or will 

be determined. 3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the 

intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. 4. An 

indicator governing the distribution and use of documents, information, 

or material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community 

agreement and are specifically defined in appropriate regulations. (JCS 

Pub 1-02) 

control and reporting center - (DoD) An element of the U.S. Air Force 

tactical air control system, subordinate to the tactical air control center, 

from which radar control and warning operations are conducted within its 

area of responsibility. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

coordinating authority - (WD) A commander or individual assigned 

responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving 

forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to 

compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. (JCS 

Pub 1-02) 

daily intelligence summary - (WD) A report prepared in message form 

at the joint force component command headquarters that provides higher, 

lateral, and subordinate headquarters with a summary of all significant 

intelligence produced during the previous 24-hour period. The “as of’ 

time for information, content, and submission time for the report will be 

specified by the joint force commander. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

D-day - (DOD) 1. The unnamed day on which a particular operation 

commences or is to commence. An operation may be the commencement 

of hostilities. a. The date of a major effort. b. The execution date of 

an operation (as distinguished from the date the order to execute is issued); the date the operations phase is implemented, by land assault, air 

strike, naval bombardment, parachute assault, or amphibious assault. The 

342 
highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of D-day within the aforementioned 

definition. If more than one such event is mentioned in a single plan, the 

secondary events will be keyed to the primary event by adding or sub 

tracting days as necessary. The letter “D’ will be the only one used to 

denote the above. The command or headquarters directly responsible for 

the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the 

planning, will do so in light of the meanings specified by the highest 

planning headquarters. 2. Time in plans will be indicated by a letter that 

shows the unit of time employed and figures, with a minus or plus sign, 

to indicate the amount of time before or after the referenced event; e.g.. 

“D* is for a particular day, “H” for an hour. Similarly, D + 7 means 7 

days after Dday, H + 2 means 2 hours after H-hour. If the figure 

becomes unduly large, for example, D-day plus 90, the designation of D 

+ 3 months may be employed; i.e., if the figure following the letter plus 

a time unit (D-day, H-hour, etc.) is intended to refer to units of time other 

than that which follows the letter, then the unit of time employed with the 

figure must be spelled out. 

direct air support center - (DOD) A subordinate operational component 

of a tactical air control system designed for control and direction of close 

air support and other tactical air support operations, and normally collocated with fire-support coordination elements. 

draft plan - (DOD, NATO) A plan for which a draft plan has been coordinated with the other military headquarters (and agreed upon by those 

headquarters) and is ready for coordination with the nations involved, i.e., 

those nations who would be required to take national actions to support 

the plan. It may be used for future planning and exercises and may form 

the basis for an operational order to be implemented in time of emergency. 

exercise - (DOD, NATO) A military maneuver or simulated wartime 

operation involving planning, preparation, and execution. It is camed out 

for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a combined, joint, 

or single Service exercise, depending on participating organizations. 

fire support coordination line - (DOD, NATO) A line established by the 

appropriate ground commander to insure coordination of fire not under 

his control but which may affect current tactical operations. The fire 

support coordination line is used to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea 

weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. 

The fire support coordination line should follow well-defined terrain 

343 
features. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be 

coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the 

fire support coordination line, without prior coordination with the ground 

force commander, provided the attack will not produce adverse surface 

effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Attacks against surface targets 

behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate ground force 

commander. Also known as FSCL. 

forward air controller - (DOD) An officer (aviator/pilot) member of the 

tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, 

controls aircraft in close air support of ground troops. 

ground liaison officer - (DOD) An officer trained in offensive air sup 

port activities. Ground liaison officers are normally organized into parties 

under the control of the appropriate Army commander to provide liaison 

to Air Force and naval units engaged in training and combat operations. 

intelligence - (DOD) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 

intelligence cycle - (DoD) The steps by which information is converted 

into intelligence and made available to users. There are five steps in the 

cycle: 

a. 

b. 

C. 

d. 

planning and direction - Determination of intelligence requirements, 

preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to 

information collection agencies, and a continuous check on the productivity of collection agencies. 

collection - Acquisition of information and the provision of this 

information to processing andor production elements. 

phcessing - Conversion of collected information into a form suitable 

to the production of intelligence. 

production - Conversion of information into intelligence through the 

integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data 

and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or 

anticipated user requirements. 

344 
e. dissemination - Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable 

form. 

joint force air component commander - (DOD) The joint force air 

component commander derives his authority from the joint force commander, who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign 

missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, and 

redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force 

air component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint 

force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, 

planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force 

commander’s apportionment decisions). Using the joint force 

commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other 

Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the 

joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions 

or geographic areas. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

joint task force - (DOD) A force composed of assigned or attached 

elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, 

or two or more of these Services, that is constituted and so designated by 

the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a 

specified command, or an existing joint task force. 

link - (DOD, NATO) In communications, a general term used to indicate 

the existence of communications facilities between two points. 

National Command Authorities - (DOD) The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA. 

operational command - (Combined) Operational control is having the 

full authority to organize and employ the unitdforces as the commander 

in operational control considers necessary to accomplish the assigned 

missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authority 

for logistics matters, administration, discipline, internal organization, or 

unit training. (Combined OPlan) 

operational control - (DOD) Transferable command authority which may 

be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of 

345 
combatant command. Operational control is inherent in Combatant 

Command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those 

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, 

and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. 

Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions 

assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised 

through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this 

authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. 

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. 

Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

operational control authority - (DOD, NATO) The naval commander 

responsible within a specified geographical area for the operational control of all maritime forces assigned to him and for the control of movement and protection of all merchant shipping under allied naval control. 

(JCS Pub 1-02) 

reporting post - (DOD, NATO) An element of the control and reporting 

system used to extend the radar coverage of the control and reporting 

center. It does not undertake the control of aircraft. 

rules of engagement - (DOD) Directives issued by competent military 

authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which 

forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 

encountered. 

search and rescue - (DOD, NATO) The use of aircraft, surface craft, 

submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and 

rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. 

sortie - (mD, NATO) In air operations, an operational flight by one 

aircraft. 

specified command - (DOD) A command that has a broad continuing 

mission and that is established and so designated by the President through 

the Secretary of Defense with advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs 

346 
of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from but one Service. (JCS 

Pub 1-02) 

supported command and supporting command - Support is the action 

of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in 

accordance with a directive requiring such action, or a unit in battle such 

as aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire used as a support for infantry, or 

an element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces 

in combat. Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander 

of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction 

of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation of 

targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and 

other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. Normally, 

the supporting commander will be permitted to prescribe the tactics, 

methods, communications, and procedures to be employed by elements 

of the supporting force. (JCS Pub 0-2) 

tactical air control center - (DOD, NATO) The principal air operations 

installation (land or ship based) from which all aircraft and air warning 

functions of tactical air operations are controlled. 

tactical air control party - (DOD, NATO) A subordinate operational 

component of tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison 

to land forces and for the control of aircraft. 

tactical control - (DOD, NATO) The detailed and, usually, local direction 

and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (DOD Note: Also called TACON.) (JCS Pub 1-02) 

tactical control - (Combined) Tactical control is the detailed direction 

and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (Combined OPlan) 

time on target - (DOD) 1. Time at which aircraft are scheduled to 

attacWphotograph the target. 2. The actual time at which 

aircraft/photograph the target. 3. The time at which a nuclear detonation 

is planned at a specified desired ground zero. 

unit - (DOD, NATO) 1. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of organization and equipment; specifically, part of an organization. 2. An organization title of a 

subdivision of a group in a task force. 3. A standard or basic quantity 

347 
into which an item of supply is divided, issued, or used. In this meaning, 

also called “unit of issue.” 4. With regard to reserve components of the 

Armed Forces, denotes a Selected Reserve unit organized, equipped and 

trained for mobilization to serve on active duty as a unit or to augment 

or be augmented by another unit. Headquarters and support functions 

without wartime missions are not considered units. 

unified command - (MD) A command with a broad continuing mission 

under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services, and which is established and so designated 

by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and 

assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, when so authorized by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, by a commander of an existing unified command established by the President. (JCS Pub 1-02) 

zulu time - (NATO) Greenwich Mean Time. 

348 
References 

Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 December 1989 (JCS Pub 1-02) 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 0-2, Unijied Action Armed Forces 

(UNAAF), 1 December 1986; Change 1, 21 April 1989. (JCS Pub 0-2) 

Combined OPlan for Offensive Operations to Eject Iraqi Forces from 

Kuwait, 17 January 1991. (Combined OPlan) 

349 
350 
Appendix 2 

The Origins of the JFACC 

This appendix briefly describes the history of Air Force experience 

with theater control of air resources (or the lack thereof) in World War 11, 

Korea, and Vietnam. It also summarizes the development of the Joint 

Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept in the 1980s. The 

actions of officers in the different Services responsible for planning and 

executing the air campaign in the Gulf War cannot be understood without 

also considering the origins of the ideas, attitudes, and command philosophies that each Service brought to the crisis. In particular, the Air Force 

held a position about the control and use of air power across a theater that 

had its origin in previous wars. In addition, the actions of air officers in 

the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were shaped by the formal negotiations and discussions which had taken place among the Services as the 

JFACC concept was developed in the 1980s. Hence this appendix can 

serve a detailed prologue to the events of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

A Brief History of the Theater Command of Air Forces 

The idea that separate air forces in a theater of war should be under the 

control of one air officer can be traced back to World War 11, when it was 

possible for the first time for air commanders to actually plan theater-wide 

air campaigns. The concept of theater-wide command was expressed 

clearly in War Department Field Manual FM 100-20 of 21 July 1943: 

The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset. This 

flexibility makes it possible to employ the whole weight of the available 

air power against selected areas in turn; such concentrated use of the air 

striking force is a battle winning factor of the first importance. Control 

of the available air power must be centralized and command must be 

exercised through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility 

and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited.' 

'War Department Field Manual FM 100-20, CommMd and Employment of Air 

Po)%% 21 Jul 1942 (Washington: GPO, 1944), p 2. 

35 1 
This approach to air operations, though not implemented fully in World 

War I1 (nor later in Korea or Vietnam), became the ideal for Army Air 

Corps officers, and that ideal was handed on to their successors in the 

independent Air Force. 

An illustration from World War 11, however, reveals some of the 

problems inherent in implementing the concept and suggests why its first 

serious test had to wait for the Gulf War. The illustration is the command 

of Allied air forces before and during the invasion of Normandy in June 

1944. Gen Eisenhower, the theater CINC, had command of the expeditionary armies and the tactical air forces supporting them. He also had a 

nominal command of both American and British heavy bombers, and 

could, if necessary, divert them from their primary mission of bombing 

Germany to support the Allied armies. However, even though 

Eisenhower’s chief deputy was Arthur Tedder, a British Royal Air Force 

Air Chief Marshall, there was no overall air commander for the theater. 

Instead, there were two strategic air force commanders (one U.S., the other 

British) and one expeditionary air force leader (Air Chief Marshall Trafford 

Leigh-Mallory of the Royal Air Force). This arrangement forced the three 

senior air commanders to negotiate the allocation of aircraft between tactical and strategic missions, and dragged Eisenhower and Tedder into any 

conflicts among them? 

Air Corps aviation commanders, basing their position on this - and 

similar - cases, argued after World War II for a separate military Service 

(called the U.S. Air Force) and, then, Air Force control over both strategic 

and theater air assets? Their position was that Eisenhower’s problem before 

Normandy (and later, too) was- that he didn’t really have an air deputy with 

the experience to control all theater air forces. They argued during and after 

the war that creating a separate and equal aviation Service would provide 

the kind and level of leadership able to serve effectively in a theater air 

commander’s position. By the beginning of the Korean War in the summer 

2W.A. Jacobs, ‘The Battle for France, 1944,” in Case Studies in the Development 

of Close Air Support, ed by B.F. Cooling (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 

1990). 

he similar cases were (a) the appointment of Air Marshall Tedder as commander 

of allied air forces in the Mediterranean in 1943, (b) Gen George Kenney’s service as 

Gen MacArthur’s air deputy - where he planned missions for Army and Navy aircraft - 

in the Southwest Pacific Area, (c) the combined efforts of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps 

aviation in the Guadalcanal campaign of 1942-43, and (d) the combination of tactical 

Army and Marine Corps aviation during the conquest of Okinawa in 1945. 

352 
of 1950, the founders of the Air Force had gained independence for their 

Service. They had also gained independent control of strategic air units, but 

they had not been installed as theater air commanders. 

They would not be given formal command of theater aviation during 

the Korean War, either. In June 1950, the President, responding to the 

emergency in Korea, designated Gen. Douglas MacArthur, cormnander of 

the U.S. Far East Command, as both U.S. theater commander and commander of United Nations forces. MacArthur was supposed to have a joint 

staff, but in fact he had “continued his World War II practice of maintaining a theater staff that was joint and unified only in name. . . . Lt. Gen. 

George Stratemeyer, USAF, commanding the Air Force units based in Japan, 

Guam, and the Philippines (the Far East Air Forces), was almost immediately faced with a call, from the Navy theater component commander, for 

“exclusive use” of the skies over much of northwest Korea? 

From that moment, and then through most of July 1950, Stratemeyer 

and his staff waged a quiet, persistent bureaucratic battle to place control 

over all theater air (allied as well as U.S. Navy) in his hands or in those 

of his operational subordinate commanders. Despite the fact that 

Stratemeyer was not close personally or organizationally to General 

MacArthur, he and his deputies were, to a great degree, successful. By 

mid-July 1950, they had (a) pulled control of tactical theater air operations from MacArthur’s headquarters staff, (b) successfully delegated that 

control to Stratemeyer’s Fifth Air Force in Korea, (c) forced MacArthur 

to recognize Stratemeyer as senior theater air commander, and (d) reached 

at least an accommodation with the Navy over the issue of unified control 

of theater air assets. By the end of that month, Stratemeyer had also 

gained de facto control over the theater-level air targeting committee 

which advised General MacArthur. Yet MacArthur had refused to appoint the Air Force component commander the theater air commander, 

and there the matter rested throughout the Korean War, much to the 

irritation of Stratemeyer and his successor, Lt. Gen. 0. P. Weyland. 

4B. F. Cooling, ed. Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1990). p 358. 

%’he story of Lt Gen Stratemeyer’s efforts is taken from R.F. Futrell, The United 

States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington: Office of Air Force History, U.S. 

Air Force, 1983). 

353 
The U.S. Air Force did not want the control of theater air forces in 

Southeast Asia to be divided and dispersed among different commands 

and among the Services. Vietnam was not supposed to be, in command 

terms, another Korea. Unfortunately, that is precisely what it was. In 

1965, for example, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) 

was responsible for all military operations in South Vietnam. The commander, 26 Air Division was the Air Force component commander under 

the commander. MAW. The latter reported to the theater commander, the 

Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). However, the commander of the 

Navy’s carrier Task Force 77, which operated in the Gulf of Tonkin, also 

reported to CINCPAC, but through the commander. 7th Fleet and then 

through the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). 

On paper, it looked like Air Force and Navy air operations could be 

coordinated by CINCPAC, the overall theater commander. In fact, however, the commander, MACV reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and to the President. Moreover, CINCPAC’S air component commander 

(Commander, Pacific Air Forces, or CINCPACAF), was neither the theater 

air commander nor CINCPAC’S principal air advisor. When U.S. planes 

began bombing North Vietnam in earnest in 1965, representatives of the 

2d Air Division from MACV and of Camer Task Force 77 formed the 

Rolling Thunder Coordinating Committee to apportion Navy and Air 

Force strikes. The Committee chose to divide North Vietnam into six 

geographic areas, called “route packages,” and three were assigned to the 

Navy, two to the Air Force, and the sixth was shared. In effect, the local 

air commanders, with the approval of CINCPAC, set up separate Air Force 

and Navy air wars. 

As the Air Force effort in both South and North Vietnam increased 

in 1966, the 2d Air Division was superseded by the 7th Air Force, with 

headquarters in Saigon. By then, there were at least three air wars in 

Southeast Asia, with no overall commander. The commander, MACV 

“essentially ran air operations within South Vietnam, using the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, as his Deputy COMUSMACV for 

Air. . . . ’* Commander, MACV also directed the interdiction bombing of 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, though his planned strikes had first to be 

cleared with the U.S. ambassador there, who was using air in a variety of 

%. A. Cosmas, “General Westmoreland and Control of the Air War.” in Command 

Md Control of Air Operations in the Vietnam War, Colloquium on Contemporary History, 

23 Jan 1991 (Washington: Naval Historical Center, Navy Department), p 30. 

354 
ways to support elements of the Laotian population that were resisting the 

North Vietnamese. 

CINCPAC, as the senior theater commander, was officially responsible 

for the air war against North Vietnam, and the commanders of the Seventh Air Force and the 7th Fleet took orders from him through their 

component commanders (CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT, respectively). But 

it was the President and his advisors (especially the Secretary of Defense) 

who really directed the Rolling Thunder campaign against North Vietnam; the theater commander (CINCPAC) was only nominally in charge. 

In addition, B-52s of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) that flew combat 

missions in the theater remained under SAC’S control, even when they 

attacked targets in South Vietnam (where MACV furnished the bombers 

with their target coordinates). Finally, Marine Corps aviation in South 

Vietnam, under the command of the I11 Marine Amphibious (later Expeditionary) Force, flew close air support missions under the direction of 

Seventh Air Force after 1966. 

This dispersion of authority over air operations resulted from and 

added to inter-Service conflict and disputes among the various air commanders within the theater. In 1965, for example, the commander, MACV 

challenged the authority of CINCPAC, the theater commander, to direct the 

bombing of North Vietnam. He took his case right to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, who sided with CINCPAC. The commander, MACV however, still 

controlled close air support missions in South Vietnam through (after 

1966) Seventh Air Force and I11 Marine Expeditionary Force. Despite 

requests from the commander, Seventh Air Force that he unite the theater 

air effort under one air officer, CINCPAC refused to appoint a subordinate 

theater air manager. The message in all this was clear: authority over air 

assets was dispersed and therefore negotiable. As a result, when the 

commander, Seventh Air Force tried to take command of the 1st Marine 

Air Wing in January 1968, the Commandant of the Marine Corps fought 

the effort all the way to the President, who decided in favor of the commander, Seventh Air Force.7 

Managing the multiple air wars in Southeast Asia remained a matter 

of negotiation among the theater commander and the local commanders 

71bid, p 31. For more on command and control in Southeast Asia, see “Command, 

Control and Communications Structures in Southeast Asia,” Vol. 1. Monograph 1 of The 

Air War in Indochina. 

355 
through operations Linebacker I and Linebacker 11 (the bombing of 

Hanoi) in 1972. The pattern had been set in 1965, with the creation of 

the Rolling Thunder Coordinating Committee, and only the pressure of 

events forced the Services to set aside their resistance to effective joint 

coordination of air action. Lt. Gen. John Vogt, Seventh Air Force Commander (April 1972-September 1973) during Linebacker I &d 11 (spring 

of 1972 through December), noted in an interview with Air Force researchers that the close cooperation between officers of his staff and their 

counterparts in the Amy’s Air Operations Section in Saigon was due to 

the fact that many staff officers had been sent home before the North 

Vietnamese launched their attack on the South.’ It was a matter of 

collocated staffs short of personnel having to improvise, and not the result 

of having a joint staff structure or command. 

Indeed, local Navy, Air Force, and Marine air commanders had 

learned to coordinate their actions despite the lack of a joint command. 

Perhaps the major reason why local and theater commanders did not 

resolve their inter-Service differences by developing an effective joint 

command was the involvement of senior civilians in Washington in daytoday operations. That involvement encouraged local and theater commanders to appeal their differences to Washington, which encouraged the 

civilians to intervene even more. The chain of command was so loose 

and confused that there was a kind of bargaining free-for-all, where 

different field commanders worried about their informal ties to influential 

civilian bureaucrats in Washington? 

This unfortunate situation actually helped hinder the resolution of a 

major problem in the technology of the command and control of air 

operations. One reason why Navy officers in Southeast Asia resisted Air 

Force efforts to create a single theater-wide air manager was because the 

control of many air sorties required “extremely high information flows” 

that existing Air Force Tactical Air Control Centers (TACCS) could not 

handle.” The Navy’s position was that no one TACC could really plan the 

whole air battle in the theater, despite advances in ground-to-air communications and in the means of handling large amounts of data (that is, 

‘lntvw, Office of Air Force History with Lt Gen John W. Vogt, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, 31 Jan 1986, p 15. 

%e negative effects of all this essentially political activity are explored in Martin 

Van Creveld‘s Cod in War (Cambridge, MA Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), Chap. 7. 

‘o“Command, Control and Communications Structures in Southeast Asia,” p 146. 

356 
with computers). As one Air Force study noted, the Navy was close to 

the truth: “the introduction of automation has resulted in the essentially 

independent growth of a multitude of C3 automated systems which have 

become interconnected through a series of ad-hoc arrangements.”” In 

effect, the Navy’s argument against the Air Force position that there 

should be a single manager for air at the theater level was that the Air 

Force was making essentially a case based on faith and not upon what 

existing technology in the existing organization could do. 

The Air Force position, by contrast, was that improvements in the 

technology of command and control, especially automated tactical displays, effective radio links between attacking flights and surveillance 

aircraft, and integrated radar track data from ground and airborne radars, 

had in fact made it possible for commanders in ground command centers 

to monitor and direct complex air actions.12 The Navy, so the argument 

ran, had not kept up with the evolution of Air Force command and control in the theater. By the end of 1968, the Air Force operated in Southeast Asia airborne communications relay aircraft and other planes performing the early warning mission. Air Force units had also (a) installed 

a system (codenamed SEEK DATA) which automated mission reports and 

threat intelligence, (b) linked Air Force tactical communications with 

Navy and Marine Corps tactical data displays through the USMC’s air 

operations center, and (c) developed a secure voice communications net.” 

The Air Force position was that these systems were the ones essential to 

a functioning Tactical Air Control System. The Navy did not agree. 

Where the Air Force saw evolution toward a coherent system, the Navy 

saw confusion. 

In World War 11, theater control of air operations was essentially a 

matter of allocating responsibility for types of targets, as when General 

Eisenhower ordered his strategic air commanders to bomb railroad yards. 

By 1968, however, the Air Force was in the process of developing near 

“lbid, p 151. 

Rpt, Lt Col R. M. Burch. Command and Control, 1966-1968, Project CHECO, HQ 

PACAF, Directorate, Tactical Evaluation, CHECO Division, Office of Air Force History, 

Washington, DC. 

‘’]bid, p 35. In 1967-68, the 7th Air Force linked its EC-121 radar surveillance and 

early warning aircraft with its Airborne Battlefield Command, Control and Communications planes and its Tactical Air Control Center in Saigon. The purpose was to allow the 

TACC to shift strikes in support of ground forces from one region in south Vietnam to 

another, adjacent region if the ground situation changed. 

12 

357 
real-time control of air operations through its Tactical Air Control Center, 

so that an aviation commander on the ground could, in theory, direct 

flights of aircraft across much of North and South Vietnam. By 1972, 

during Operations Linebacker I and 11, signals intelligence personnel were 

able to alert U.S. units flying in North Vietnamese airspace that enemy 

fighters were taking off to attack them.I4 Did this ability to exploit the 

enemy’s communications and provide that critical intelligence to friendly 

aircraft in time for them to intercept the enemy mean that a theater air 

commander could direct sorties as well as allocate them to mission categories? The answer was not clear in 1972, but most of the systems 

which now make up a Tactical Air Control System were present in at 

least rudimentary form. 

Veterans of Rolling Thunder such as Lt. Gen. Charles Homer and his 

senior operations deputy during Desert Storm, Maj. Gen. John Corder, 

carried some lessons away from their experience. They had worked 

within an evolving theater air control and surveillance system, but they 

had also experienced the negative consequences of a divided theater 

command structure. As a result, they were firmly committed to having 

an Air Force officer as theater air commander in a setting like that in 

Vietnam. A second lesson was the need to oppose the kind of negotiating with officials in Washington that had characterized the control and 

command of air forces during Rolling Thunder. Added to these lessons 

was a confidence that central command of theater-wide air forces from 

multiple Services was organizationally and technically possible. 

The Emergence of the JFACC Concept in the 1980s 

Two issues came together during the early years of the Reagan Administration. The first, pushed by Congress and accepted by the White 

House, was an effort to give the theater commanders more say in the 

development of strategic plans and Service programs. The second, fostered by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, aimed at 

increasing the effectiveness of joint operations and the authority of joint 

commands and led eventually to the Goldwater-Nichols act (the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986). A spin-off of these two 

‘%his was “Teaball,” a ground control intercept facility which first went into 

operation in August 1972 and gave U.S. pilots real-time warning of North Vietnamese 

MiG interceptor attacks. See Rpt, M. F. Porter, Linebacker: Overview of the First 120 

Days, Project CHECO, 27 Sep 1973, HQ PACAF, Directorate of Operations Analysis, Office 

of Air Force History, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, pp 68-69. 

358 
issues was growing support among the Services themselves for the concept of a joint theater air commander. 

In 1982, the Joint Chiefs established a Joint Doctrine Pilot Program, 

inviting submissions from the unified and specified commanders. Three 

years later, the Commander in Chief of the European Command 

(CINCEUR) formally submitted to the Chiefs a joint doctrine for theater 

counterair operations. One element of this proposed doctrine was the 

concept of the Joint Force Air Component Commander, an officer appointed by the theater or Joint Force Commander to plan and coordinate 

a jointly fought air campaign.” On 21 February 1986, the Chiefs approved CINCEUR’S proposal as JCS Publication 26, Joint Doctrine for 

Theater Counterair Operations. 

In a message communicating their decision, the Chiefs noted that 

“The Joint Force Air Component Commander’s responsibilities will be 

assigned by the Joint Force Commander (normally these would include, 

but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based 

on the Joint Force Commander’s Apportionment decision).”16 In the 

same message, the Chiefs also confirmed the policy, expressed in an 

“Omnibus Agreement,” which governed the command and control of 

Marine Corps tactical aviation: 

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander will retain 

operational control of his organic air assets. . . . The MAGTF Commander will make sorties available to the Joint Force Commander, for tasking 

through his Air Component Commander, for air defense, long-range 

interdiction and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF 

direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint Force Commander. . . .” 

The decision of the Joint Chiefs to grant authority to theater commanders 

to create a joint air component commander was balanced against the 

demand of the Marine Corps that its Air-Ground Task Force aviation not 

be removed from the control of MAGTF commanders. 

I5Msg, from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; subj: “Joint Doctrine for Theater 

I6lbid. p 2. 

Ibid, p 2. 

Counterair Operations,” 4 Mar 1986, p 1. 

17 

359 
This balance was not stable, despite the Chiefs’ attempt to make it so. 

For example, JCS Publication 26 (now 3-01.2, Joint Doctrine for Theater 

Counterair Operations), issued 1 April 1986, contained both the descrip 

tion of the Joint Force Air Component Commander’s responsibilities and 

the statement from the Omnibus Agreement that the Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force commander would “retain operational control of his organic 

air assets.” However, the publication also said that, “Normally, the 

[JFACC] will be the Service component commander who has the preponderance of air assets to be used and the ability to assume that responsibility.,’ The key phrase was “ability to assume.’* The Marines would later 

argue that no Air Force JFACC really had the ability to assume responsibility for controlling the aviation side of Marine combined arms operations. The Air Force would respond that the Marine air-ground perspective, though valid for them, should not be allowed to threaten the unity 

of a theater air campaign. 

JCS Publication 26, however, did not cover just airborne counterair 

operations. It also covered ground-based air defenses, dividing air defense systems into those “organic” to ground units and those under the 

operational control of the Area Air Defense Commander (who was also, 

normally, the JFACC).’~ In addition, Publication 26 gave the Area Air 

Defense Commander responsibility for promulgating, under the theater 

commander’s guidance, “weapons controf procedures” for all groundbased air defense systems.lg Finally, JCS Publication 26 gave the JFACC 

the responsibility for recommending the apportioning of air forces and for 

actually allocating the “air sorties apportioned to perform counterair 

operations by the joint force commander. . . . lr2’ 

In August 1986, the Joint Chiefs issued Joint Publication 12, “Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint 

Operations,”” as part of the process of explaining the methods by which 

the JFACC’S responsibilities would be implemented. Joint Publication 12 

defined terms such as “apportionment” and “allocation” and noted that 

‘The actual allocation of those air sorties apportioned by the JTF ComPub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations, 1 Apr 1986. p 111-5. 

l9m, 111-S. 

*‘/bid, p 111-6. 

”1t3 Pub 12 (now Pub 3-56.24), Tactical Command and Control Pluming Guidance 

and Procedures for Joint Operations, Joint Interface Operational Procedures (J1OP) 

Message Text Formats, 1 Aug 1986. 

360 
mander to support the JTF as a whole will be prescribed by the Joint 

Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). . . . “22 Publication 12 also 

defined the “air tasking cycle,” and it defined the product of the cycle as 

“an intra-Service Air Tasking Order.”23 It also specified that the JFACC 

would coordinate close air support operations when the “supporting 

Service component cannot satisfy the supported Service component’s 

requirements. . . . 

Publication 12 also exempted Army helicopters from the JFACC’S 

control. By definition, they did not fly sorties, and they did not “perform 

the functions of close air support, escort, or airlift.”2s The Army thought 

of its helicopters the way the Marine Corps thought of its fixed-wing 

aviation - as “organic” to a “combined anns team” and therefore normally “controlled by the Army Component Commander.”?6 However, if 

another Service wanted Army helicopter support, it would have to pass 

its request through the JFACC, the JFACC would have to “validate” the 

request, and, if the request were approved by the joint force commander, 

the JFACC would “task the Army to perform the mission via an Operations or Fragmentary Order.” That done, the requesting Service would 

work directly with the Army component commander to work out the 

details of Army helicopter support?7 

Joint Publication 12 also specified in some detail the procedures that 

the Services would follow to work within what it called an “air tasking 

cycle.”28 Clearly, the JFACC could not serve as the coordinating and 

planning agent for the theater or joint force commander if there were no 

common standard among the Services for requesting air missions and for 

planning and tasking them. The level of detail in Joint Publication 12 

was put there to satisfy that need and indicates that the commitment to 

the JFACC concept by the Chiefs was serious. The major issues - including the status of Army helieopters and the relationship between the Marine Corps and the JFACC - were addressed in detail, and the policies and 

221bid, Vol. 1V. Part V. p 111-45. 

23~bid. 

241bid. p 111-46. 

251bid. p 111-47. 

261bid. 

271bid. p 111-48. 

‘*hid, pp 111-48-50. 

36 1 
procedures laid out in Joint Publication 12 were consistent with the 

guidance that the Joint Chiefs had promulgated the previous April in Joint 

Publication 26. 

In 1987, the Joint Staff modified JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, to include, for the first time, a definition 

of the Joint Force Air Component Commander and his responsibilities. 

The latter included “planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based 

on the joint force commander’s apportionment de~ision.”’~ Itlooked like 

the promise of effective theater control of air power was being realized 

at last. However, in June 1988, JCS Test Publicationm 3-03.1, Follow-On 

Forces Attack, listed the responsibilities of the JFACC only as coordinating 

and deconflicting the joint air interdiction effort. The Air Force officially 

differed (as it had every right to do) with that language, prefemng planning, as well as coordinating and d~onflicting.~’ That change would 

have brought Test Publication 3-03.1 into line with joint test publication 

3-04, Joint Maritime Operations (Air), of 1 May 1988, where the JFACC’S 

responsibilities were given as including, but not limited to, “planning, 

coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the [Joint Force 

Commander’s] apportionment decision.”32 

According to officers on the Air Staff, the JFACC concept was first 

tested in exercise Ocean Venture-88 (May 1988) by the staff of the Atlantic 

Command. The Commander, lbelfth Air Force served as the JFACC, and 

he used an air tasking order to allocate WAF and Navy sorties (in excess 

of fleet air defense requirements) among close air support and interdiction 

missi0ns.3~ However, representatives of the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic 

and of the Tactical Air Command and the lbelfth Air Force were subsequently unable to agree completely on a concept of operations for the 

29JCS Pub 1 (now Pub 1-02), 1 Jun 1987, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, p 201. 

m~CS publications move through a definite sequence of drafting and approval, starting 

with an ‘‘initial draft,” then becoming a “formal draft,” then being circulated and applied 

as a “test publication,” and then, finally, gaining formal approval as a “joint publication.” 

3’1CS Test Publication 3-03. I, Follow-On Forces Attack. 16 Jun 1988, p 111-7. The 

Air Force’s “Difference of Opinion” is in Appendix B, p 1. 

’2JCS Test Publication 3-04, Joint Maritime Operations (Air), 1 May 1988, p Ill-5. 

”Point Paper, subj: Joint Form Air Component Commander (JFACC) and JFACC 

Implementation, 13 at 1989. XPJD/47567; plus discussions with officers in USAF XoXD, 

the Pentagon. 

362 
JFACC that would apply to the next year’s joint exercise. Yet that exercise 

(already given the name “Solid Shield”) had been scheduled as a test of 

Joint Test Publication 3-04. Joint Maritime Operations (Air). 

Despite Air Force objections, the exercise was run with a “JFACC 

Concept of Operations,” which specified that the “JFACC will execute air 

operations using sorties made available by air capable component commanders . . . in accordance with [the commander, joint task force’s] 

apportionment decisions.”” From the perspective of participating Air 

Force officers, this concept of operations was too limited. Their argument was that it left the JFACC too dependent upon the “air capable” 

component commanders, thereby violating the spirit (if not the letter) of 

the Joint Chiefs’ message of 4 March 1986 (“Joint Doctrine for Theater 

Counterair operation^").^^ 

Because there was still no agreement among the Air Force, the Navy, 

and the Marine Corps about the proper scope of the JFACC’S authority, the 

Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command issued a letter (dated 9 March 1989) which attempted to define the 

proper relationship between the JFACC and the Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force Commander.% The letter reaffirmed the Marine Corps’ commitment 

to the authority of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Commander and to 

the JFACC concept. However, it also argued that (a) the JFACC was not 

directly in the chain of command, (b) the JFACC was not empowered to 

command “forces other than those organic to him as a Service component 

commander,” and (c) the JFACC had “no inherent authority to exercise” 

operational control of air forces?’ The letter also recognized, however, that 

the precise authority of the JFACC was “subject to interp~etation.”~~ 

The letter proposed to clarify the interpretation by arguing, first, that 

“operational control” meant “possession of assets,” so that operational 

34Msg, Commander Second Fleet, 1815422, Feb 1989. 

3SPoint Paper, subj: Joint Force Air Component Commander (IFACC) and IFACC 

Implementation, pp 4-5. 

%tr, from Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 

subj: The Joint Force Air Component Commander and Command and Control of Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force Aviation, 9 Mar 1989. Quantico. VA. 

371bid, p 6. 

381bid. 

363 
control lay only in the hands of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

Commander. Second, that the authority to task assets was de facto the 

authority of operational control. However, because the JFACC did not 

have operational control over Marine air assets, he could not task them. 

Third, what he could do was task those sorties which, by the Omnibus 

Agreement, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Commander was pledged 

to offer to the Joint Force C~mrnander?~ These sorties were not excess, 

however, because they were "distinct contributions to the overall joint 

force effort. . . . With this argument, the letter proposed to dismiss 

the objection Air Force officers had raised to the JFACC concept of operations used during exercise Solid Shield. 

While the Services were trying to clarify the meaning of the JFACC 

concept, CENTAF was responsible for preparing, for CEN'KOM, an operations plan. OPlan 1021-88, dated 30 May 1989, drew its terms and its 

concept of authority from the newly revised or written JCS documents, 

such as JCS Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Tern.'" 1021 -88 made the Commander, Central Command Air Forces 

the Joint Force Air Component Commander, the Area Air Defense Commander, the Airspace Control Authority, and the Coordinating Authority 

for Interdiction. As JFACC, the Commander, CENTAF was given the 

authority to plan, coordinate, allocate, and task air sorties in accordance 

with the theater commander's guidance. The JFACC was also given the 

responsibility for recommending to the theater commander the proper 

apportionment of sorties among the various kinds of missions, such as 

close air support. The other component commanders were given the right 

to forward their own apportionment recommendations, but the Plan 

specified that "such separate recommendations should be the exception, 

not the rule, in that such recommendations are contrary to the fundamental principle of a JFACC.'"~ 

Once the theater commander had apportioned the sorties on a percentage basis among the required mission types, the JFACC was responsible 

for allocating the sorties among the aviation units which were under the 

391bid, pp 6-7. 

aIbid, p 4. 

4'(S) COMUSCENTAF OPlan 1021-88. Annex c. Appendix 16, "Joint Force Air 

"(S) OPlan 1021-88, p C-16-3. 

Component Commander (JFACC) Functions." p C-16-1. 

364 
operational control of the theater commander. The Marine component 

commander retained “allocation and tasking responsibility for direct 

supp~rt.’~’ However, as area air defender, the JFACC was responsible for 

airspace control.44 Navy air defense in CENTCOM’S Area of Responsibility 

was to be “integrated with the JFACC land-based or airborne air defense 

C2 network.’45 Planning for offensive counterair operations, under the 

theater commander’s guidance, was also the JFACC’S responsibility.* 

In the mission area of interdiction, the JFACC’s powers were limited. 

OPlan 1021-88 specifically noted that 

. . . COMUSCENTAF has the responsibility for coordinating the interdiction effort of all components and the authority to require consultation 

among the components, but does not have the authority to compel 

agreemen t.4’ 

At the same time, the JFACC was given the responsibility for planning, 

coordinating, and deconflicting “the execution of the overall theater air 

interdiction campaign.’48 That there might be a conflict between “coordinating” and “planning” a theater-wide air campaign was not lost on the 

Air Staff in the Pentagon.49 The problem for them - and for the Commander, CENTAF - was that the scope of the JFACC’S powers was still 

being negotiated at the Service level. 

In August 1989, for example, the Tactical Air Command responded 

to the Marine Corps letter of the previous TAC’S difference with 

the Marine Corps was clear from the initial paragraphs of that response: 

“The JFACC will plan the joint air operations campaign to exploit the 

43(S) Ibid. 

44(S) Ibid. 

451bid, p C-16-5. 

*[bid. 

471bid, p C- 16- 12. 

481bid. 

49Memo, subj: Review of Proposed USCINCCENT OPlan 1002-90, from XOXW to 

+AUXPJ Proposal: Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Concept of 

xoxx, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, 14 May 1990. GWAPS Files. 

OperatiOnS, 29 Aug 1989, TAC HQ, hgky AFB, VA. 

365 
capabilities of air power in support of joint force objectives. . . .5’ The 

JFACC has authority to allocate and task sorties flown by air forces assigned to or supporting the joint force. . . .52 The JFC and the JFACC must 

evaluate and assess the impact of air action on both the enemy and 

friendly forces. This assessment serves as a basis for subsequent decisions regarding the employment of air power.”53 If the Marines saw the 

JFACC as a kind of traffic cop, coordinating overlapping air efforts, the 

Air Force, by contrast, saw the JFACC as the chief air planner and the 

joint force commander’s chief air deputy. 

This was a very real difference. It mattered in Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm because it had not been officially resolved by August 1990. 

Hence it formed a backdrop to the actions of Lt. Gen. Charles Homer, 

USAF, the Joint Force Air Component Commander during these operations, and to those of the Navy and Marine Corps component commanders. The Air Force position, forcefully presented in the TAC paper of 

August 1989, was that the JFACC, the component commander with the 

preponderance of combat air assets in the theater, was responsible for 

directing the theater-wide air effort. The Marine Corps and Navy were 

not committed to this position, had not trained for it, and had not purchased the equipment (such as the Computer Assisted Force Management 

System terminals) required to implement it effectively.” 

Though the Service chiefs had formally accepted the concept of the 

JFACC in 1986, they had also endorsed the Omnibus Agreement, which 

the Marine Corps had steadfastly held on to as protection against the 

possible loss of “organic” aviation during a combat operation. The 

concerns of the Marine Corps go back to the 1930s, when the Fleet 

Marine Force was created to conquer Japanese-held islands as part of a 

U.S. offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. At that time, the 

Navy had assured Marine Corps commanders that Navy carrier aviation 

would provide Marine ground troops with adequate close air support. 

Marine Corps leaders did not accept the Navy’s assurances and fought - 

%id, 1. 

52~bid, 2. 

”Ibid, p 6. 

”One problem for the Navy was that the software for CAFMS differed from theater 

to theater, so that terminals configured to work with CENTCOM would not, apparently. 

automatically work in the Pacific. 

366 
successfully - for the expansion and modernization of their own air arm.55 

Since 1947, Marine Corps operations had been based on the assumption 

that “organic” aviation would sustain Marine ground units engaging the 

enemy. Marine Corps combined arms combat organization and training 

was based upon “organic” air. 

So it was almost inevitable that, after 1986, as the specifics of the 

JFACC concept were worked out through exercises and JCS joint publication reviews, Marine Corps and Air Force officers would disagree. That 

they disagreed about the JFACC’S authority, however, should not obscure 

areas where they came together. Both Services, for example, agreed that 

the JFACC was responsible for setting up systems for air traffic control 

and area air defense during joint operations. Both Services also agreed 

that the JFACC, in coordination with the component coders, would 

make air apportionment recommendations to the theater or joint force 

commander. Navy, Air Force, and Marine air commanders under the 

Commander in Chief, Central Command had also agreed that their air 

planning would be done using the Air Force Air Tasking Order Process, 

and that the JFACC had the authority to make changes in the AT0 when 

the situation necessitated it.56 Where their parent Services disagreed the 

most was over the air component commander’s authority when he acted 

as JFACC. 

Central Command’s Operations Plan 1 OO2-90 reflected this disagreement. It gave the JFACC responsibility for (a) “Planning, coordination, 

allocation, and tasking based on USCINCCENT apportionment decisions,” 

(b) “Recommending to USCINCCENT apportionment of theater air sorties,” 

(c) coordinating with the component commanders “to ensure integration 

of air operations,” (d) “Integration of supporting maritime air resources 

through” the Navy component commander, (e) area air defense, (f) airspace control, and (g) conduct of “counterair, close air support, and 

interdiction operation^."^' These responsibilities were given as tasks. 

The potential for conflict between the JFACC and the component 

commanders was contained in them. How, for example, could the JFACC 

55S“Procurement of Airplanes for Fleet Marine Force,” Hearings before the General 

Board of the Navy, 22 Sep 1938, p 175, National Archives. 

”(S) OPlan 1021-88, p C-16-13 and p C-16-14. 

57(S/NF) USCINCCENT OPlan 1002-90, Outline Plan, HQ, US Central Command, 16 

~pr 1990, pp 23-25. 

367 
conduct operations if his powers were only to coordinate separate Service 

efforts? And what was the status of Commander, CENTAF’S OPlan 1021 - 

88 under the new ClNCCENT OPlan 1002-90? How could the JFAcc be 

held accountable for tasks if his office did not have the authority to 

compel the component commanders to accept his guidance? These 

questions were a very important part of the background to the JFACC’S 

actions during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

368 
Appendix 3 

Use of C3 Modeling Aids 

to Prepare for and Predict War 

“Never has a war been so programmed, so modeled. I guarantee it.” 

Brig. Gen. Buster C. Glosson’ 

It might be more accurate to say that some of the command and 

control for Desert Storm was more programmed, moce modeled than 

command and control in any previous air war. As Chapters 7 and 8 

show, a lot of what happened in the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) 

and in the Tactical Air Control System (TACS) during Desert Storm was 

improvised. Nevertheless, models were used, and this appendix will 

illustrate how software models were employed (in Washington and in 

theater) during Desert Shield and Desert Storm and suggest when and 

why they were employed successfully. 

Such models were developed because experience with operations 

research during World War I1 convinced military officers that specialists 

trained in the techniques of modeling and simulation could contribute to 

the solution of complex military problems? The faith in the utility of 

models and simulations as aids in making decisions in the areas of development and operations grew during the postwar years, and all the Services trained and hired professionals skilled in the use of such techniques. 

The limited range of topics operations researchers were asked to 

consider during Desert Shield/Desert Storm continued the pattern of 

‘Cited in Tony Capaccio, “Computer Runs Hod Attacks on Nuclear. Chemical 

Sites,” Defense News, 5 Aug 1991, p 3. 

*Jacob A. Stockfisch, former Asst. Secretary of the Army for Research and Development, showed in his book, Plowshares info Swords (New York, 1973), p 189, that 

operations research (or operations analysis) helped allied military leaders figure out how 

best to use the weapons they had and also how to avoid pouring money into projects that 

would have little payoff during the war. 

369 
constraining such specialists to analyses that would not call into question 

the authority exercised by operational commanders. The decision tools 

and models used by operations researchers in the Persian Gulf War 

reduced the anxiety of the senior leadership about tactics and force mixtures but did not alter the basic conception of how to wage the air campaign. The range of topics and issues considered was limited to those for 

which the operators running the Black Hole needed answers. 

Modeling and Decision Aids in the Theater 

Operations researchers brought several models to Saudi Arabia that 

helped operators understand the implications of tactical- and theater-level 

force packaging decisions. One theater-level force packaging model was 

C3ISIM. a hybrid monte car10 or deterministic simulation developed for the 

U.S. Army Missile Command by Teledyne Brown Engineering. C31SIM 

was developed to study alternative command and control structures needed to defeat the tactical ballistic missile threat in central E~rope.~ However, the model’s information needs were severe, and the relevant data 

were not readily available. 

Characteristics of C3ISIM 

On the one hand, several features of the C3ISIM model facilitated its 

choice as a decision tool. First, a unique feature of C3ISIM was that the 

command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities of real systems 

were modeled with a high degree of accuracy, which made the model a 

desirable tool for assessing attacks against a Soviet-style integrated air 

defense system. Second, the model’s high-resolution graphics output 

allowed an analyst to view a battle from high above, synchronize activities to an elapsed time clock, and replay a mission. In effect, the model 

permitted an operations planner to see the strengths and weaknesses of a 

plan as the planned operation unfolded. On the other hand, C3ISIM required many detailed data inputs, such as radar frequencies, antenna gains 

and transmit power levels, positions of air defense systems and waypoints 

of all aircraft, and probabilities of kill for every missile and bomb against 

C. Bradford Cooper. “Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM) History,” unpub- 3 

lished, nd. 

370 
a variety of targets. In August 1990, “much of the necessary data were 

missing,” and the modeling team responsible for running C31SIM had no 

experience building such a large ~cenario.~ 

Use of C3lSlM 

On 4 or 5 August 1990. armed with a terrain map of Iraq and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) enemy order of battle, Air Force Studies 

and Analysis Agency (AFISAA) analysts began-on their own initiative-to 

look at how C31SIM’ could be used to analyze the air defense networks in 

Saudi Arabia and Iraq! On 25 August, three weeks after AFBAA analysts 

began using C~ISIM to analyze air defense networks, Maj. Gen. Minter 

Alexander, Air Force Director of Plans (AFIXOX), asked Maj. Gen. George 

Harrison (Director of AFISAA) to estimate the attrition incidental to the 

campaign being drafted in Checkmate. AFISAA’S Theater Force Directorate conducted three analyses to answer Alexander’s request. The first 

analysis provided a “quick and dirty” answer to AF/XOx within one week 

by using a spread sheet model and attrition estimates generated from a 

previous AF/SAA study effort. The second analysis employed AF/SAA’S 

theater-level campaign model, TAC Thunder, to look at attrition levels for 

a ten- to fourteen-day campaign and a thirty-day campaign. The results 

of this work were submitted to the Concepts Analysis Agency as input to 

a ground warfare model? The third analysis used the unproven C~ISIM 

model to examine the first twenty-four hours of the allied air attack plan. 

The C~ISIM model was well suited for a detailed, mission-level study. It 

4Frederic T. Case, Analysis of Air Operations During Desert ShieWDesert Storm 

(USAF Studies and Analysis Agency, Washington, DC, Nov 1991). p 2. 

’In the late 1980s. Teledyne Brown Engineering Company developed C31Slh4, a 

hybrid monte carloldeterministic simulation, for what was then the US Army Missile 

Command. Currently, the US Army Strategic Defense Command manages the model. 

The model was conceived as a tool to study alternative command and control structures 

needed to defeat the tactical ballistic missile threat to Central Europe. Several names 

have been associated with the C~ISIM model. It also has been known as ThiD C31Slh4, and 

as the Extended Air Defense Simulation - EADSIM. Case, Analysis of Air Operations 

During Desert ShieldDesert Storm, pp vii, 1-2. 

htvw, Mark D. Mandeles and Jim Vernon with Lt Col Frederic T. Case, Air Force 

Studies and Analyses Agency, 30 Mar 1992. 

71~. 

37 1 
played out engagements between fighters and surface-to-air missiles and 

fighters. It accounted for the effects of centralized command and control 

centers. Furthermore, a graphic playback of the results was used to 

examine the progress of the simulated battle as it unfolded? 

During September and early October, AF/SAA analysts collected a 

great deal of data necessary to give validity to the model's calculations; 

they then developed a prototype model of the air campaign. Developing 

and running of the prototype model revealed that it was difficult to feed 

into the model both enemy sensor locations and the C3 network that tied 

those sensors together? In addition, the model simplified emissions 

control of friendly or enemy radar systems by having them radiating at 

all times. This simplification precluded modeling an effective IADS where 

normally the radars are off the air. The model also did not account for 

confusion at the command nodes; instead, it assumed a near-perfect level 

of performance at enemy command centers. Finally, the model assigned 

a single value to the outcome of missiles fired or shots taken but did not 

consider speed, altitude, or aspect angle of the missile engagement." 

While still stationed in the Pentagon, AF/SAA analysts did not have 

access to the details of the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell's 

(GAT'S) Master Attack Plan, which they needed in order to conduct a 

thorough analysis." AWSAA analysts therefore simplified their working 

assumptions. They assumed that Iraq's air force would not pose an early 

threat. Fuel consumption rates and the probabilities of kill for Iraqi 

optically guided antiaircraft artillery were not modeled. In addition, the 

attacking aircraft were started and stopped at their air refueling drop-off 

'Ibid; Case, Analysis of Air Operations During Desert ShieWesert Storm, p I. 

'Case, Analysis of Air Operations. p 2. 

'Olbid, p 3. 

""he structure of the Master Attack Plan is well-suited to providing needed information for the modelers. The MAP is essentially a list of attack packages. The list details 

the target(s). the programmed time-over-target, and the number and type of aircraft 

scheduled to attack that target. In addition, the MAP is tied together by mission numbers 

and package identifiers. See Chapter 6. 

372 
points in northern Saudi Arabia, and no estimates were made of operational losses within the attack plan.I2 

The simulation was run in order to estimate red and blue losses. The 

model allowed analysts to trace the effect of attrition on different force 

levels, attack strategies, and targeting tactics. It also identified, based on 

targeting strategy, which threat surface-to-air missile was most lethal. 

The basic scenario was run ten times. The average blue attrition rate was 

about four percent of the force involved in the attack. This result was 

very close to the first, one-week, “quick-and-dirty,” AF/SM study effort. 

The highest loss rates were experienced by the packages tasked to attack 

heavily defended areas without sufficient suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) upp port.'^ The ability to do this sort of analysis, though not 

used in the first stages of Desert Shield, was helpful later, after midSeptember, to GAT planners. It allowed them to experiment with different 

force packages and tactics without at the same time showing the coalition’s hand to the Iraqis. 

Use of Modeling and Decision Aids in Preparation for War 

During the first week of October, AFlSAA analysts briefed the model 

results through the AF/SAA chain of command. By mid-October, Major 

General Alexander and Maj. Gen. Charles A. May, Jr. (Assistant 

XS/P&O) had heard the briefing. On 15 October, a message was sent to 

Brig. Gen. Buster C. Glosson offering the model, a team of four analysts, 

and equipment. In part the message stated: 

AF/SA has developed a computer analysis capability which has use 

in developing and evaluating air operations . . . the model was 

excellent for that analysis, but has potential for many other applications such as designing a SEAD campaign, identifying attrition 

‘hot spots,’ or finding vulnerability in the Iraqi IADS.I4 

”Case, Analysis of Air Operations During Desert ShieldDesert Storm, p 4. 

131bid, pp 4-5. 

‘hsg, Maj Gen Alexander to Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, IS 17152 Oct 1990. 

373 
Glosson answered positively. On 16 October, AF/SAA began planning to 

deploy to Riyadh.'' 

On 21 October, the first two (of four AFISAA) analysts arrived in 

Riyadh. Upon arrival, they briefed both Brigadier General Glosson and 

Brig. Gen. Larry Henry (CENTAF chief of Electronic Combat) on the 

prototype model and plans to model the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The 

AT0 analysis would support Glosson, while the SEAD analysis would 

support Henry. Glosson asked for a quick assessment of operations plans 

and alternative courses of action. Unfortunately, working conditions for 

computer modeling were difficult. The day before, a GAT opetations 

planner had plugged a coffee pot into an open socket, which caused a 

circuit breaker to pop. As a result, half of the computers and all cooling 

fans in the GAT lost power. Within two days of seeing that conditions in 

the Black Hole were not optimal for the computing equipment, the 

AF/SAA analysts requested, purchased locally, and then installed a 10,OOO 

watt transformer with four 20 ampere circuits. On 26 October, the computer system was running."j 

In the meantime, the primary analysis task was to acquire and convert 

allied mission data into c31S1M format. no difficulties in this stage of 

work were the volatility of the daily ATO and the layout of the threat. 

There was no automated input into C31SIM of either the missile order of 

battle or electronic order of battle, and AF/SAA analysts could not keep up 

with the changes. They employed a simplification in order to gain experience with the model: the date of the plan and the threat were frozen. 

Results of runs of the order of battle at a particular date were summarized, and subsequent attention was devoted to the changes that had 

occurred since the dates were fixed. The threat database problem remained throughout the stay in Saudi Arabia.I7 

On 12 November, AFlSAA analysts began their first executable runs, 

based on the ATO dated 9 November. By this time, the team had become 

I5Msg, Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, 18 12052 Oct 1990; Case, Analysis of Air 

'bse, Analysis of Air Operaiions, p 6. 

Operations During Desert ShielaYDesert Storm. p 5. 

17~bid, p 7. 

374 
established as a working part of the planning cell. These runs covered 

the first three hours of real time (from H-hour minus one to H-hour plus 

two) but required almost eight hours to execute on the computer. lko 

executions of the model were conducted each day, and a total of nine 

runs of the model were made. The model confirmed previously identified 

dangerous areas in Iraq and helped to recommend ways to deal with 

them." AF/SAA analysts showed that one to two A-6s were being lost in 

attacks on targets in downtown Baghdad. The threat array was formidable and could not be suppressed sufficiently. In the next update to the 

plan, the A-6s were no longer conducting attacks in downtown Baghdad. 

In another example, the model showed that point area defenses in western 

Iraq were able to shoot down F-15Es using low-altitude tactics against Al 

Hussein missile sites. An alternative tactic was suggested by the Black 

Hole's F-15E mission planner: ingress at low altitude to surprise the air 

defenses, then popup above the air defense sites' maximum engagement 

altitude to deliver ordnance. In future executions, this change resulted in 

no F-15E losses. The results were briefed on 18 November.'' 

The task for the next model update was to examine as much as 

possible the first day's attacks. The modelers had to develop a methodology to account for losses incurred by the Iraqi air defenses and include 

these losses in a defensive force for the next wave of attacks. The scenario was run nine times, and after group discussion among the EC 

planners and analysts, two distinct second-wave threat laydowns were 

developed. The same process was used to produce third-wave laydowns, 

based on the outcomes of the second-wave attacks.20 The analysis of the 

first day's attacks was limited by significant simplifications. The C31s1M 

model did not include the air-to-air threat; programmers were unable to 

emulate the employment tactics they suspected the Iraqis would use. 

Programmers also lacked a critical factor for modeling-parametric data 

for fuel flows for coalition and Iraqi aircraft.2' 

"Navy officers already had argued that the dense AAA threat in downtown Baghdad 

made an attack with A-6s too costly. (S) Intvw, Mark D. Mandeles and Sanford S. Terry 

with Cdr Donald W. McSwain, CNO oP-741E. 21 Apr 1992. 

''Case. Analysis of Air Operations, pp 8-9. 

201bid, p 9. 

''lbid, p 9. 

375 
A forecast for the outcome of the first twenty-four hours was produced using the Air Tasking Order and threat laydown of 5 December. 

Shortly after this analysis had been completed, additional forces were 

programmed into theater and the size and scope of the ATO began to 

grow. In the meantime, the AFlSAA team began another analysis task-to 

examine the first night’s congestion during air refueling operations. This 

analysis was completed in early January.= 

On 28 December, Brigadier General Glosson requested an analysis of 

air refueling operation for night one. Operations planners in the GAT 

were concerned about the possibility of mid-air collision^.?^ In the meantime, AFlSAA analysts met with C31SIM software engineers from Teledyne 

Brown to draft and rank modifications to the model. Delivery of the 

modifications to Riyadh took a lot of time-almost as much time as it took 

to develop, code, and test the software modification. The delivery problem was solved by establishing a defense data network channel between 

Huntsville, Alabama and Riyadh. Code modifications were transferred 

electronically from the computer host in Huntsville to Riyadh. Without 

this electronic connection, the code corrections and modifications would 

not have been delivered in time to be used. The modified code was 

delivered and used to complete the air refueling analysis?‘ 

On 12 January 1991, the air refueling analysis was completed. Maj. 

Scott Hente, an architect of the air refueling plan noted: 

. . . we thought we had done it [the air refueling scheduling plan] right 

and your analysis confirmed our suspicions . . . it raised our confidence-level and confirmed our gut feel . . . we knew it would be 

congested and your analysis helped confirm that we were within acceptable limits?’ 

After completing the analysis of air refueling, AFlSAA analysts returned to the attrition modeling for the ~n> as it existed on 13 January. 

221bid, pp 9- 10. 

23(S) Intvw, MSgt Theodore J. Turner with Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson. 6 Mar 1991. 

24Case, Analysis of Air Operations During. p 1 1. 

251bid. 

376 
They were ready to begin iterative runs when the execution order was 

received and attrition estimates were no longer needed.% By this time, 

it was clear that C31SIM was unusable for real-time operations planning 

unless major productivity enhancements were made?’ By mid-January, 

C31SIM was not able to model each day’s activity; the daily Am was very 

complex, and changes were frequent and numerous. Once Desert Storm 

began, AF/SAA analysts looked for other tasks which did not involve the 

entire scenario, for example, analyses of aircraft losses by region, and the 

effects of tactics against a specific target or larger areas. AF/SAA analysts 

also continued their attrition analysis.28 

Modeling and Decision Aids in Washington 

During the first week of September 1990, AFmOXW called upon 

Human Systems Division (HSD) of Air Force Systems Command to assess 

potential noncombatant casualties resulting from attacks on selected 

Baghdad military targets in support of the CINCCENT. This request for 

support was in response to the President’s goal of minimizing noncombatant casualties.29 HSDNAO had been studying the effects of air-delivered munitions on personnel in structures and thus was best able to 

address the President’s concerns.30 The study employed a computer-based 

model, Threat Related Attrition System (THREAT), to produce recommendations regarding specific weapons, delivery platforms, tactics, and rules 

of engagement to minimize noncombatant casualties. 

The analysis focused only on casualties resulting from weapon system 

malfunction or human error. It is important to note that this analysis 

%Ibid, p 10. 

2’Ibid, p 12. 

281bid, p 14. 

291nt~~, Mark D. Mandeles with Col Thomas G. Smogur and Dr. James M. Whitehead, 14 Apr 1992. Gen Glosson stated that only PI 17s were used to attack targets in 

Baghdad because of the goal of minimizing collateral casualties. See (S) Intvw. MSgt 

Theodore J. Turner with Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson. 6 Mar 1991. 

30(S) Final Report, J. M. Whitehead, T. G. Smogur, R. J. Casey, S. Harris, M. A. 

Stika, and M. J. Fed, T!fi?mTModef Application (Final) (BDM/MCL~I-~~~&TR), 31 Aug 

1991, p 2. 

377 
would not have been possible without the presence of a large quantity of 

empirical research-for example, operational follow-on test and evaluation 

reports and contractor reliability studies-which formed critical database^.^' 

Six issues were examined, including what might happen to civilians if 

and when weapons aimed at a target in fact hit something else, and the 

minimum and maximum number of civilian casualties resulting from 

sustained attacks on Baghdad. 

The study was conducted on-site at AF/XOXW during the last week of 

September and first week of October 1990. The analysis produced recommendations regarding the specific weapons, delivery platforms, tactics, 

and rules of engagement to mitigate the risk of noncombatant casualties 

in Baghdad. Upon completion, the study results were briefed to the 

National Command Authority?2 to key members of the Air Staff,33 and 

to theater planners. On 14 November 1990, Col. John A. Warden I11 sent 

the briefing and related material to Brigadier General Glosson.” Warden 

claimed that the analysis showed how noncombatant casualties could be 

minimized with careful “pre-mission planning to avoid misdesignation of 

targets (the principal driver of noncombatant casualties) and the employment of suitable aircraft and weapons systems.” 

Unfortunately, a lack of understanding of how the air war was in fact 

being fought in real time undermined the ability of planners to use models 

to correct their errors. At the national level, for example, preventing errors 

3’lntvw. Col Smogur and Dr. Whitehead. The BDM report lists some of the studies 

used to build the THREAT system databases. See Dr. Whitehead, et al., THREAT Model 

(Final) report. 

321ntvw. Col Smogur and Dr. Whitehead; see also Bob Woodward, The Commanders 

(New York. 1991). p 341, which describes a 1 Dec 1990 Joint Staff presentation to 

President Bush. General McPeak cites figures and issues taken from the THREAT analysis. 

33There were approximately eight briefings to key individuals on the Air Staff. See, 

for example. the following, all given by Col Thomas Smogur, AFSCMSD: (S) Briefing to 

AF/XOXW, 19 Oct 1990, (S) Briefing to Maj Gen Alexander, 23 Oct 1990, (S) Briefing 

to Col Blackbum, AFm, 25 Oct 1990; (S) Briefing to Lt Gen J.V. Adams. 25 Oct 1990. 

(S) Briefing to Gen John Loh and Maj Gen R.M. Alexander. 26 Oct 1990. See also Dr. 

Whitehead, et al., THREAT Model (Final) report, pp 29, 72-1 18. 

”(S) Memo, Col John A. Warden 111 to Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, subj: Briefing-Noncombatant Casualties in Iraq, 14 Nov 1990. 

378 
(that is, causing civilian casualties) had to wait until the errors themselves 

were made, which meant that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and the President could do little more than restrict the 

types of targets selected. This is exactly what they did after the 12 February 1990 Al Firdes bunker strike. At the theater-level, misdesignation of 

targets was inevitable once errors were introduced into target selection and 

mensuration through clerical mistakes and through the use of different 

notation systems (worldwide geodetic system or relational mapping). 

Three “quick-and-dirty” analyses followed the initial analysis of 

casualties in Baghdad. In the first, THREAT was used to assess Iraqi 

claims about the number of civilian casualties from the 12 February strike 

on a hardened bunker in Baghdad. The second case concerned questions 

about the relation between the number of personnel wounded in action 

(WIA) and the number killed in action (KIA), and the need to extrapolate 

from numbers of WlAs reported to be treated at hospitals near an air 

attack to the numbers of KIA that might have been associated with that 

attack. The third case involved the Iraqi-launched Al-Hussein missile that 

hit a hangar near Dhahran Air Base, killing and injuring many U.S. Army 

troops. This incident provided an opportunity to assess the credibility of 

THREAT Facility model results against the actual number of casualties 

caused by a missile.” 

Summary and Review 

Proponents of computer-based modeling often assume that more and 

better equipment would solve all problems. They promise computer 

systems that will remove the organization from the vagaries of judgmental decision and place its decision process on a more “rational” basis.” 

AF/SAA analysts did not make this assertion; they did not promise more 

than they could deliver. The limitations of this type of computer model 

in a fluid, rapidly changing environment grew to be well understood by 

3s(S) Dr. Whitehead, et al., THRMT Model (Final) report, p 30. 

36Russell Stout, Jr., Management of Control? The Organizational Challenge 

(Bloomington. 1980). p 90. 

379 
modelers and their commander^.^^ In addition, senior Desert Storm 

leaders constrained the uses of computer-based decision aids by asking 

narrow questions and by retaining a healthy skepticism regarding the 

answers they received and the usefulness of those answer^.^' 

37(S) EOTR. Maj Gen George B. Harrison, Commander, Air Force Studies and 

Analyses Agency, I2 Nov 1991. p 3; Lt Col David A. Deptula noted that C~ISIM was 

helpful in some planning but was not critically valuable. Intvw, Thomas A. Keaney, 

Mark D. Mandeles. Williamson Murray, and Barry Watts with Lt Col David A. Deptula, 

38For example, civilian modelers, asking broad questions, supplied predictions which 

were orders of magnitude higher than what transpired. Unconstrained use of such models 

by commanders (or civilian leaders) could have seriously distorted military policy. For 

example, Joshua Epstein, a political scientist at the Brookings Institution. used a computer 

model to determine that American casualties would range between 3,344 and 16,059. 

Epstein briefed these results widely to high-level civilian and military audiences, including 

the JCS. See Jacob Weisberg. ‘Yiulfballs: How the Experts Blew It, Big-Time,” The New 

Republic, 25 Mar 1991. p 18. 

SAFIOSX, 21 DW 1991. 

380 
Appendix 4 

Gulf War Command Arrangements 

An understanding of the formal organization of the allied forces in 

the Persian Gulf War is fundamental to an understanding of how 

decisions were made and how the war was prosecuted. As shown in this 

report, the war effort was in large part driven by informal relationships 

and ad hoc organizations. However, the formal structures bestowed upon 

the leaders the authority to institute ad hoc organizations or use the 

informal communications channels to influence the actions of the formal. 

The fonnal structures provided the framework upon which relationships 

were later built. In addition, the fonnal structure provided the foundation 

to which individuals turned to resolve questions of authority. 

There are three elements of command relations that together describe 

the formal structure of any military organization. The first element is the 

division of labor represented by the organizational chart.’ The second 

concerns functional relationships among organizational units; for 

example, a tactical reconnaissance squadron has a specific function which 

is different from that of a tactical airlift wing. The third element of 

command relationships is the type of authority one level in the 

organization has over another. 

We must begin with a few words about semantics. The terms 

“command” and “control” and adjectives such as “operational” and 

“tactical,” as in “operational control,” have very specific meanings when 

used in the context of command relationships. These terms, and others 

that will be described in detail later, give or constrain an individual’s 

specific (often legal) authority. Other terms do not imply specific types 

of legal authority but simply refer to organizational structures in total or 

to individuals within the formal structure. For this purpose, we will use 

‘The organizational chart of lines and boxes. typical of military (and civilian) 

organization shows the formal organization structure: who works for whom and which 

units are subordinate or superordinate. 

381 
the terms “line of authority” or “organizational structure” when referring 

to a hierarchy of superordinates and subordinates without reference to 

specific types of authority. 

During the Gulf War there was no single formal line of organizational 

authority from the President to the pilot in the cockpit, but rather several 

lines of different types of authority, some overlapping, some parallel. The 

following paragraphs describe three lines of authority: (a) the “Service 

Organization,” the formal structure through which each of the military 

Services (Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army) manage their peacetime functions, (b) the “Unified Combatant Command,” which combines 

elements of two or more of the Services to conduct joint operations, and 

(c) the “Joint Task Force Organization,” created by Gen. H. Norman 

Schwarzkopf to facilitate the accomplishment of his specific mission. 

The Service Organization 

As Commander of the Ninth Air Force, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner 

was part of a line of authority which ran from the President through the 

U.S. Air Force organizational structure. Referred to as the “Service” 

chain of command, each of the Services has lines of authority that tie it 

together. See Figure 38. 

Air Force lines of authority begin with the President under constitutional authority granted the Commander in Chief in Article 11, Section 

2. This authority then flows through the Secretary of Defense’ to the 

Secretary of the Air Force as the head of the Department of the Air 

Force. Under Section 8013, Title 10, United States Code, the Secretary 

is responsible for “all affairs of the Department of the Air Force,” including recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and 

development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, 

maintaining, and the construction, outfitting, maintenance, and repair of 

military equipment, buildings, structures, and facilities.’ 

he Secretary of Defense’s authority will be described below. 

%itle 10, United States Code (10 USC). Armed Forces; Subtitle D, Air Force; 

Chapter 803, Department of the Air Force; Section 8013, Secretary of the Air Force. 

382 
Figure 38 

The Service Chain of Command 

President 

1 

Secretary 

of Defense 

- 

Secretary of 

the Army 

Commander 

Tactical Air 

Commander 

Ninth Air Force 

Secretary of Secretary of 

the Air Force the Navy 

I 

Air Force 

Chief of Staff 

The Air Force Chief of Staff is appointed by the President to “transmit the plans and recommendations of the Air Staff to the Secretary [of 

the Air Force] and advise the Secretary with regard to such plans and 

recommendations” and “after approval . . . by the Secretary, act as the 

agent of the Secretary in carrying them into effect . . . .’* In addition, the 

Chief of Staff will “exercise supervision . . . over such of the member 

and organizations of the Air Force as the Secretary determines. . . . ‘* In 

practice this means that the commanders of Air Force major commands 

(MAJCOMS) such as the Tactical Air Command.“ Military Airlift Com- 

%he organizations described herein are those organizations in existence at the time 

of the Gulf War. The Air Force reorganization of 1992 has changed many of these 

MAICOMs. 

383 
mand, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe work7 for the Chief of Staff, who, 

in turn, works for the Secretary of the Air Force. Basically, the Chief of 

Staff is an advisor to the Secretary of the Air Force; he provides trained 

and equipped forces to the combatant commanders for employment in 

combat but is not a commander and does not have “command” authority 

over the employment of forces in combat. 

The Tactical Air Command (TAC), headquartered at Langley AFB, 

Virginia, had three subcommands, or numbered air forces. The commander 

of TAC exercised “command” authority over the members of these subcommands. One of these was the Ninth Air Force stationed at Shaw AFB, 

South Carolina. The commander of the Ninth Air Force, General Homer, 

exercised command over those units assigned to the Ninth Air Force. As 

“commanders” with “command authority” the Commander of the Tactical 

Air Command and the Commander of Ninth Air Force have the 

authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and 

for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned 

missions! 

Command authority also includes legal authority under the Uniform Code 

of Military Justice; for example, the authority to convene a court-martial? 

In addition, these commanders are responsible for health, welfare, morale, 

and discipline of assigned personnel. 

This Service chain from the President through the Secretary of the 

Air Force and the Chief of Staff, through the commanders of Air Force 

major commands and numbered air forces, down through the commanders 

7Most of the Air Force MAJCOM commanders also “work for” commanders of unified 

commands; for example, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe 

reports to both the Chief of Staff and the Commander in Chief of U.S. European Command. In reference to the Gulf War, as we shall discuss later, the Service chain of 

command and the unified chain of command come together with the commander of 9th 

AF instead of at the MAJCOM level. 

‘Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Assuciated 

Terms, Dec 1989. (JCS Pub 1-02) See also Volume IV, Appendix 1, “Glossary.” 

10 USC, Chapter 47. 

384 
of wings, groups, and squadrons, to the individuals assigned to the organizations includes “administrative control.” That is, the 

[dlireclion or exercise of authority over subordinate or other 

organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included 

in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organization. lo 

That portion beginning with the commanders of major commands down 

to the squadron commanders also includes, as their titles indicate, command authority. That is: 

. . . the authority and responsibility for effectively using available 

resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, 

coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of 

assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, 

morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.” 

The Unified Combatant Command Organization 

In addition to the Service organization structure, Title 10 also legislated the establishment of “unified combatant commands . . . to perform 

military missions.”’2 While the Service structures are focused on providing administrative, logistical, and training support to combat forces, the 

combatant command structurei3 is focused on combat employment of 

those forces. The unified commands comprise military units designated 

by the four Services. See Figure 39. 

“Ibid. 

“JCS Pub 1-02. 

I2 

13 

10 USC, $161, para (a). 

For the purposes of this report, the terms “combatant command,” “unified command,” and “unified combatant command“ are synonymous. At the time of the Gulf War 

there were eight unified combatant commands: U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. 

Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Special 

Operations Command (UssoCOM), U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSC~M), U.S. 

Space Command (USSPACECOM), U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), and U.S. Central 

Command (USCENTCOM). 

385 
Figure 39 

The Unified Combatant Command Organization 

-- Advisory Commander - in - Chief 

US Central Command - - - - - - - - 

The combatant command structure begins, as the Service structure, 

with the constitutional authority of the President, but unlike the Service 

structure, the line of authority goes through neither the Service Secretary 

nor the Chief of Staff. “Unless otherwise directed by the President, the 

chain of command to a unified . . . combatant command runs-(l) from 

the President to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of 

Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”“ 

The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1 98615 clarified the 

extent of authority to be exercised by the commanders of the unified 

commands and the authority the combatant commander over the Service 

components of their command. This authority, called combatant command 

(COCOM) authority,I6 gave General Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of 

the U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT), authoritative direction over his 

1410 USC, 8162. (b). 

90 USC, 8164. 

‘sPublic Law 99-433. 1 Oct 1986. 

386 
command, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and 

logistics. COCOM authorizes the combatant commander to prescribe the 

chain of command within his command and to organize the command and 

its forces as he considers necessary to accomplish the missions assigned 

by the Secretary of Defense and the President. While unit administration, 

support, and discipline are a Service Secretary responsibility, COCOM 

gives the combatant commander coordination and approval authority over 

those aspects affecting the accomplishment of his mission. Because of 

the Service responsibilities for administration and support, unified commands normally maintain a peacetime organizational structure which 

parallels the Service structure as did Central Command. That is, the daytoday functions of the forces are managed by the Service components. 

Unlike most unified commands, the Air Force headquarters designated 

as Central Command’s Air Force component was not a major command. 

Instead, it was a level of command below the major command-the numbered air force.” Thus, General Homer was appointed both the Commander of U.S. Central Command Air Forces (the Air Force component to 

USCENTCOM) and Commander, Ninth Air Force (a command echelon below 

the Tactical Air Command major command). In addition, the members of 

General Homer’s staff functioned as both a numbered air force staff and 

as the staff of the Air Force component to a unified command. 

U.S. Central Command also was unique in that it had no air forces, 

other than the Air Force component command (CENTAF) headquarters 

staff assigned to the unified command in peacetime.I8 The Air Force 

units apportioned for use by Central Command in event of war came, as 

planned, from other unified and specified commands or U.S.- based 

forces assigned to the Tactical Air Command. Most of the forces tasked 

were not assigned to uSCINCCENT prior to deployment. Hence, the deployment orders issued by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on behalf 

of the Secretary of Defense and the operations orders published by 

USCINCCENT specified USCINCCENT’S level of authority over the deploying 

”U.S. Southern Command, headquartered in Panama, also has a numbered air force 

I8For example, U.S. European and Pacific Commands have Air Force fighter aircraft 

as its Air Force component command. 

assigned and stationed within their area of responsibility during pacetime. 

387 
forces. Generally, all unified commanders would transfer combatant 

command” of forces to USCINCCENT as those forces entered 

USCINCCENT’S area of responsibility (Southwest Asia).ao Forces to be 

employed by USCINCCENT but stationed outside uSCINCCENT’s area of 

responsibility were “CH0~’ed” (Change of Operational Control) to 

USCJNCCENT. Thus forces were placed under the operational control2’ of 

USCJNCCENT, allowing General Schwankopf to task the units. In October, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consultation with the 

Joint Chiefs, sent a message to all the combatant commanders clarifying 

these relationships. 

”Combatant command authority is the nontransferable command authority established by Title 10. United States Code, Section 164. exercised only by commanders of 

unified or specified combatant commands involving organizing and employing commands 

and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over 

all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the 

missions assigned to the command. Combatant command, usually exercised through the 

Service component commander, provides full authority to organize and employ commands 

and forces as the mc considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Also called 

CocoM. See Appendix 1. 

2%ere were a few exceptions to the norm of transferring COCOM of deployed forces 

to USCINCCENT. USCINCrRANS transferred OPCON of theater airlift assets and retained 

control of strategic (intertheater) assets ((2-141 and c-5 aircraft). CINCSAC passed OPCON 

of all deployed B-52 and any CONUS based B-52 tasked to support Desert Shield to 

USCINCCENT; however, SAC refueling assets (KC-I35 and KC-10 aircraft) remained under 

the operational control of 8th Air Force. 15th Air Force. and 17th Air Division (all SAC 

organizations). 

2’Operational control is the transferable command authority which may be exercised 

by commanders at any echelon at. or below, the level of combatant command. OFCON 

is inherent in Combatant Command and is the authority to perform those functions of 

command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and 

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and providing authoritative direction 

necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned 

to the command. OFCON, usually exercised through the Service component commanders, 

provides full authority to organize commands and forces to employ those forces as the 

commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. 

OXON does not include authoritative direction of logistics, administration, discipline, 

internal organization. or unit training. See Appendix 1. 

388 
(I) Tactical Air Force units deployed to the USCENTCOM AOR are 

reassigned COCOM to USCINCCENT unless COCOM was or is specifically designated to another command in the Deployment Order. 

(2) CINCSAC B-52s supporting Desert Shield are attached OPCON 

to USCINCCENT. CINCSAC Support assets (such 

will be provided in support of or TACON to USCINCCENT, as directed by Deployment (Air Tasking) Orders. 

tanker aircraft) 

(3) When directed, USTRANSCOM airlift personnel and assets are 

attached OPCON to USCINCCENT?2 

The Joint Task Force Organization 

The Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command recognized as 

early as 1988 that the peacetime, Service-oriented organizational structure 

would not satisfy the wartime needs of the combatant commander. 

Therefore, the USCINCCENT Operational Plan (OPlan) 1002-88 reorganized 

the air power elements of the Central Command under a single individual 

called the “Joint Force Air Component Commander.”23 This functional 

organization of air forces was carried forward in the 1990 draft version 

of USCINCCENT OPlan 1002 and all the post 2 August 1990, Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm plans. 

As the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), General 

Horner was responsible for: 

(1) planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking [of air assets] 

based on USCINCCENT apportionment decisions, 

(2) recommending to USCINCCENT apportionment of theater air 

sorties to various missions or geographic areas in coordination 

22(S) Msg, acs to combatant commanders, 2223352 Oct 1990. subj: Operation 

23Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of the Joint Force Air Component ComDesert Shield Command Relationships. 

mander; a history of the JFACC concept is in Appendix 2. 

389 
with COMUSARCENT, COMUSMARCEPJT, COMUSNAVCENT, 

COMSOCCENT, and other commanders supporting USCENTCOM as 

appropriate, and 

(3) direct coordination with COMUSARCENT, COMUSMARCENT. 

to ensure integration of air operations within USCINCCENT’S concept of 0perations.2~ 

COMSOCCENT, COMUSNAVCENT, COMJTFME and supporting forces 

In order to accomplish this, the Joint Force Air Component Commander was given specific authority over elements of both U.S. and allied 

forces. First, as the Ninth Air Force Commander and Commander of 

U.S. Central Command Air Forces, General Homer already had authority 

over U.S. Air Force forces, as described in the previous two sections; 

therefore, as Joint Force Air Component Commander, he was not given 

any additional authority over the Ninth Air Force. As the JFACC, however, he was given additional authority over Naval and Marine air units. 

It is important to note that General Homer did not have a joint air 

forces staff; that is, he had no staff comprising members of each of the 

Services to support his role as Joint Force Air Component Commander. 

Instead, he relied upon his Air Force staff (USCENTAFminth Air Force 

staff) supplemented by “liaison officers” from the other Services as well 

as representatives from the Military Airlift Command and Strategic Air 

Command to augment the Tactical Air Control Center staff. 

In order to ensure that the joint air forces could safely execute the air 

campaign plan, General Homer was also appointed the Area Air Defense 

Commander and Airspace Control Authority.- As the former, he was 

responsible for defense of the airspace over friendly forces, a task which 

included ensuring that enemy air forces could not successfully attack 

friendly ground forces and that friendly air forces could safely transit 

24(S) Msg, USCINCCENT to Joint Staff. et a!., 101 lOOZ Aug 1990, subj: USCWCCENT 

Order for Operation Desert Shield. 

25Combined OPlan for Offensive Opemtions to Eject Iraqi Forces from Kuwait, 1 I 

Jan 1991, designated the Commander of Royal Saudi Air Forces as the Airspace Control 

Authority; however, there is no indication that there were any changes in policy or 

procedures with this appointment. 

390 
friendly airspace without being attacked by their own air defense assets. 

Also as Area Air Defense Commander, Homer established procedures for 

and “adjust[ed] weapons control status”z6 of the air defense radar network, 

airborne and ground alert air defense aircraft, and the friendly surface to 

air missile ~nits.2~ As the Airspace Control Authority, General Homer 

was responsible for establishing effective airspace control procedures; that 

is, basic air traffic control procedures. 

There were actually two joint task forces conducting combat operations during Desert Storm: Central Command and the Joint Task Force 

Proven Force, under combatant command of and established by Gen. 

Galvin, Commander in Chief U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), on 

21 December 1990.2’ The mission of the Joint Task Force was to: 

Develop a substantial joint and combined combat capability in 

Turkey to deter hostilities in Southwest Asia. In the event of 

hostilities and with permission of Turkish government, coordinate 

and conduct military operations in response to mission tasking 

from USCINCCENT?9 

The initial Operations Order also included a simple statement of the 

relationship between the Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF), 

USCINCEUR, and USCINCCENT. 

USCINCCENT is supported commander. USCINCEUR is supporting 

commander. USCINCEUR will exercise OPCON over component 

signed TACON [tactical control], in direct support, to USCINCCENT 

for mission specific tasking and/or geographic area of responsibilforces through CJTF PROVEN FORCE. CJTF PROVEN FORCE is as26 Ibid. 

27~~~~~ authority did not include land-based, short-range air defense or point air 

defense system which remained under the OKON of their respective component commanders. 

Dec 1990, Msg 1D: Order/UsClNCEUR/001/Dec. Final version of USClNCEUR Order 001 

was transmitted at 2312432 Dec 1990. 

2R(s) Msg, USCINCEUWECJ3 to USEUCOM Components and USCWCCENT/J3, 2107452 

29~bid, para 2. 

39 1 
ity [AOR] within CENTCOM AOR as mutually agreed between C~TF 

and USCINCCENT. Component commanders provide forces TACON 

AOR. CIA, DIA, and NSA are supporting agencies.30 

to CJTF PROVEN FORCE for operations in Turkey and/or CENTCOM 

Some explanation is required to understand the ground-rules (as stated 

in this Operations Order) under which the Joint Task Force was operating. The relationships embodied by USCINCCENT being the supported 

commander, USCINCEUR being a supporting commander, and the Central 

Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National 

Security Agency being supporting agencies simply restate the relationships established by the Secretary of Defense in deploying the U.S. 

Central Command to Southwest Asia.3’ As “supported commander,’, 

USCINCCENT was given the authority to designate targets or objectives, set 

the timing and duration of supporting actions, and establish “other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency”’of operations?2 As 

detailed in the Unijied Action Armed Forces, “[tlhe supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and 

take such action to fulfill them as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned task^.*"^ 

By not delegating operational control, General Galvin retained the 

authority to organize and employ Joint Task Force forces, assign tasks, 

designate objectives, and give “authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.”” There are two reasons the Commander in Chief, 

Europe would want to retain operation control of forces deployed to JTF 

Proven Force rather than delegate this authority below the unified command level as is common practice. First, as a “supporting commander,’, 

USCINCEUR was responsible for USEUCOM’s support to Central Command; 

by retaining OPCON, he could ensure the link between USCINCCENT and 

?bid, para 5A 1. 

3’(Ts) Msg, UCS to USCINCCENT et d.. 0700502 Aug 1990. 

32JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Acrion Armed Forces (UNAAF), 1 Dec 1986 (Change 1.21 Apr 

1989). p 3-18. 

331bid, pg 3-19. 

%JCS Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

1 Dec 1989. 

392 
Commander, Joint Task Force. If General Galvin had delegated operational control to Maj. Gen. Jamerson, the commander of Proven Force, 

Jamerson could, in theory, establish objectives and conduct operations 

independent of USCINCCENT. Second, at the time the Joint Task Force 

was established, there was a large Iraqi ground force deployed along the 

Iraq-lbrkey border. If Iraqi forces had attacked Turkey, NATO mighthave been called upon to take action to defend Turkey, and General 

Galvin would have needed the JTF forces. 

By assigning tactical control of JTF Proven Force forces to the Commander of the Joint Task Force, Jamerson was given the "local direction 

and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned"3s by USCINCCENT, or if necessary, USCINCEUR as 

the holder of operational control. 

393 
394 
A 

A-6 165, 258, 312, 374 

A-7 258 

A-10 296, 323, 319, 321A-7 258 

AAK 50 

ABCCC 2, 32, 39, 41, 77, 81-83, 85, 

86, 89,90,99. 100-102. 106, 118, 

139, 147, 269, 305,310-323, 

325-327, 332, 334, 336 

Abdulhameed Alqadhi 165 

ACE 83, 95, 135, 187, 310, 311 

ACO 137, 145 

ad hoc organization 203, 205 

ADA 81 

AEGIS 117, 126 

ACCS 99, 100, 314-319, 321, 325 

AGM-45 259 

AGM-65 259 

AGM-88 259 

air campaign 4-8, 42, 49, 52, 53, 

127, 139, 142, 144, 149, 150, 

56-60, 62-67, 69-72, 74, 75, 77, 98, 

1 57- 159. 162, 163, 165- 169, 

171-174, 176, 179-186, 190, 192, 

193, 195-197, 199-201, 203, 

205-210, 212-214, 221, 225, 227, 

230, 232, 235-237, 243, 256, 259, 

262, 265-267, 272, 282, 288, 293, 

296, 297, 299, 301, 303, 311, 320, 

329, 331, 332, 334, 335, 336, 351, 

359, 360, 365, 370, 372, 390 

297 

air combat assessment summary 296, 

air defense 8, 30, 47, 50, 52, 81, 83, 

139, 142, 153, 175, 198, 238, 239, 

241, 250, 283, 305, 314, 339, 340, 

359, 360, 362, 364, 365,367, 370, 

371,373, 374, 390 

200, 213, 214, 232, 269,309, 312, 

33 I, 354, 388 

86, 94, 96, 115, 119-124, 129, 132, 

air division 70, 94, 144, 185, 186, 

Air Force Logistics Command 91 

Air Force Systems Command 104, 

air interdiction 65, 101, 102, 169, 

Air National Guard 109 

air order of battle 139 

air power 2, 40, 52. 71, 74, 88, 90, 

275,377, 376 

230, 272, 313, 319, 327, 362, 365 

130, 148, 170, 193, 195, 227, 270, 

351,362, 366, 389 

air refueling 15, 17, 30, 83, 124, 133, 

137, 145, 148-150, 168, 186, 218, 

232,241, 307. 31 1, 372, 375, 376 

Air Staff 115, 157-159, 180, 181, 

185, 202, 249, 288, 362, 365, 377, 

383 

air superiority 73, 309 

Air Support Operations Center 2, 

79-82, 86, 88, 89, 92, 99, 100, 101, 

102, 106, 115, 116, 119, 129,313, 

315.316, 323. 339 

air tasking order (see also ATO) 6, 

13. 15, 17-22, 29-31, 34, 35, 39-41, 

46, 52, 53, 56, 57, 59, 65, 69-71, 

75, 82, 86, 87, 90, 95, 96, 100, 101, 

108, 115, 116, 117, 123, 124, 133, 

152, 153, 155, 163, 164, 167, 168, 

135, 137, 139, 144-146, 148-150, 

171, 191-193, 195, 196-201, 

205-210, 212, 223,227, 231, 237, 

239-241, 253, 254, 258, 263, 265, 

266, 268, 272, 273, 277-282, 29 I, 

292, 294, 297, 299, 306-308, 315, 

316, 320, 323-325, 329, 330, 334, 

335,336, 361, 362, 367, 373, 375 

Airborne Command and Control 

Squadron 99, 100, 312 

airborne early warning 309 

Airborne Warning and Control System 

2, 83, 85, 89, 139, 269 

aircraft availability 36 

airfields 24, 25, 49, 92, 108, 122, 

240, 290, 301 

395 
airspace control order 124, 135, 137, 

airspace coordination order 168 

A1 Dhafra 113, 237 

Al Firdos 68 

A1 Hussein 374 

A1 Taqaddum 241,242 

Al-Hussein 378 

al-Mofadi Tala1 45 

al-Rasheed 45 

Alexander, Maj Gen 162, 165, 227, 

371,373, 377, 378 

Allan, Charles 166, 281 

antiaircraft artillery 123, 372 

ARCENT 104, 105, 150, 152, 153 

ARCT 218, 232 

area air defense commander SO, 340, 

360,364,390 

area of responsibility 41, 82, 89, 131, 

180, 186, 320, 342, 365, 387, 388, 

39 1 

145, 150 

ARM 367 

Army Air Corps 352 

Army Air Forces 250 

Arthur, Stanley 55-58, 352 

artillery 39, 81, 123, 259, 314, 320, 

347,372 

ASARS 285 

assumptions 4, 212, 367, 372 

ATC 125, 127 

Atlantic Command 362, 385 

AT0 (see also air tasking order) 8. 

33, 35. 37, 41, 46, 48, 52, 53, 56, 

135, 137, 139. 144, 145, 148, 149, 

168, 169, 170, 187, 191, 192, 195, 

13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 24, 27-30, 32, 

57, 59, 64-66, 70, 87, 97, 117, 133, 

150, 152-155, 158, 162-165, 167, 

196, 197-201, 205, 206, 208-210, 

212-214, 216, 219-221, 223-225, 

227-232, 235, 237, 238-243, 254, 

260. 266, 269, 272, 278-284, 291, 

292,294, 299, 306, 308,335,367, 

373,374, 375, 376 

AT0 bravo 278 

AT0 change 21, 219, 225, 230 

AUTODIN 107, 1 16, 154, 291 

automated installation file 10 

AWACS 2, 32, 39, 41, 48, 74, 77, 

AV-8Bs 264 

80-86, 89, 90, 92,9498, 102, 104, 

106, 107, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 

123, 128, 129, 139, 147, 158, 165, 

319, 320, 322, 323, 327, 332, 334, 

336 

214. 219, 242, 269, 305-312, 317, 

Aziz, Tariq 44, 46, 166 

B 

B-52 13-15, 165, 186, 190, 291-293, 

296,321, 355, 388 

bad weather 8, 206, 218, 221, 225, 

227,308 

Bahrain 93, 111 

BAT 169 

Baker, James 227, 246 

Baptiste, Sam 8, 15, 17, 180, 188, 

basic encyclopedia 26, 340 

battle damage 34. 142, 265, 295, 302 

Battle of Khafji 190 

battlefield air interdiction 65, 169 

Battlefield Coordination Element 8, 

64, 65, 82, 87,90,99, 100, 132, 

BCE 8, 82, 87, 132, 281, 282 

BDA (see also bomb damage 

195,200,223 

313-315 

assessment) 41, 63, 165. 182, 200, 

259,260,263-270. 274, 276-303 

beddown 41 

Behery, Ahmed Ibrahim 43, 45, 47, 

48, 68 

BEN 10, 147, 159, 175, 281 

Bin Abdul Aziz 44, 46, 166 

Bin Bandar 166 

Black Hole 8, 26, 66, 70, 72, 

157-159, 162-1 65, 167-1 77, 

180-183, 185-188, 192, 195, 196, 

200, 202, 203, 205, 207, 213, 256. 

396 
266, 268, 289, 290, 293, 370, 373, 

374 

Blackburn, Col 378 

Blue Ridge 55, 56 

Boeing 707 102 

bomb damage assessment (see also 

BDA) 10, 21, 38-40, 193, 196, 199, 

224, 255-258, 260, 261, 264-268, 

274, 277-283, 286, 288, 289, 299, 

335,340 

Boomer, Walter 51, 59, 73 

bridges 281, 282, 290, 298 

briefing 8, 15, 17,41, 52, 61, 63, 65, 

66, 72, 75, 92, 96, 97, 103, 107, 

108, 110, 112-114, 116, 118, 124, 

139, 152, 153-155, 158-160, 164, 

168, 171, 181, 193, 195, 197-199, 

208,210, 249-25 I, 262, 277, 281, 

288, 303, 305, 307, 309,310, 320, 

322, 324, 325, 373, 377, 378 

Bruner, William 165 

Bush, George 199, 227, 247, 262, 377 

C 

C3 119, 120, 150, 152-154, 316, 357, 

369, 370, 372, 373 

C31 42,52,99, 206, 281,282 

c31c 46 

C31SIM 370, 371, 374-376, 379 

C-5 94,388 

C-21 108, 154, 286 

C-130 86 

C-141 94, 108, 388 

cable news 75 

Cable News Network 75 

CAFMS 15, 17, 31, 36, 55, 116, 117, 

135, 137, 153, 154, 167, 187, 209, 

214, 215, 224, 242, 279,307, 366 

Cairo East 127 

CALCM 292 

Callum Steel 166 

CAP 98, 253, 307,325 

Cams 203 

carrier 53, 55, 56, 116-1 18, 125, 154, 

173,283, 285, 287. 309, 354, 367 

carrier battle groups 283 

Caruana, Patrick 70, 191, 213, 214, 

229, 230 

CAS (see also close air support) 60, 

79. 99, 101, 152, 169, 313, 317, 

321 

casualties 68, 376-379 

CBU 292 

CBU-52 292 

CBU-87 292 

CBU-89 292 

CCRC 129 

CENTAF 8, 13, 17, 37, 41, 42, 48, 

50-53, 56, 59, 65, 66, 70, 71, 73, 

97, 99-101, 105, 107-109, 111-113, 

116-118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 128, 

129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 139, 

144, 147, 148-150, 152-155, 

157-1 64, 166- 174, 176, 179- 182, 

184-187, 190, 191, 193, 195, 

196-200, 202, 203, 205, 209, 210, 

221, 223, 225, 231, 237, 240, 247, 

251, 256, 261, 262, 264, 266, 

268-270, 272, 274, 275, 276, 

278-280, 282, 283, 285, 286, 

289-291, 293-301, 303, 306-308, 

311-313, 316, 319,'331, 332, 364, 

365, 368, 373, 387 

CENTAF intelligence 172, 174, 176, 

182, 202, 256, 261, 264, 266, 268, 

270, 278, 286, 289, 290, 293, 294, 

296, 297, 299, 303, 33 I, 332 

CENTAF rear 109 

CENTCOM (see also Central 

Command) 41.45, 46,48, 50, 55, 

56, 60-64, 66,71, 73,91, 103, 

105-107, 109, 111-113, 118, 128, 

157, 159, 162, 169-171, 182, 198, 

202, 203, 236, 237, 249, 250, 251, 

256, 261, 268, 27 I, 276, 280, 

391 

283, 287, 294, 296 

282-287, 291, 294, 295, 364-366, 

Center for Naval Analyses 154, 277, 

397 
centers of gravity 163 

Central Command (see also 

CENTCOM) 10, 15, 17, 19, 31,45, 

46, 48, 51, 53, 55, 56, 77, 86, 87, 

91, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100, 102, 

128, 129, 131. 132, 135, 139, 142, 

144, 145, 148, 150, 152, 153, 157, 

184, 185, 186, 193, 197, 198, 202, 

205, 236, 249, 256, 260, 265, 271, 

272, 274, 275, 277, 280, 281, 282, 

306, 308, 310, 315, 320, 325, 331, 

390, 391, 392 

Central Intelligence Agency 7 I, 182, 

185,288, 300, 391 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

6, 50, 183, 388 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 107, 

186, 359, 387 

Checkmate 166, 170, 181, 182, 185, 

202,256, 261, 281, 287,288, 371 

chemical 8, 26, 27, 29-31, 57, 187, 

241, 369 

chemical warfare 26, 27,29-31,241 

Cheney, Richard 43,44, 183, 184, 

247,262 

Chief of Naval Operations 157 

Chief of Staff 1, 45, 103, 104, 109, 

104-114, 116, 118, 119, 124, 125, 

158, 160, 167-171, 174, 176, 180, 

284-286, 289, 294, 295, 299, 301, 

358, 364, 367, 368, 385-387, 389, 

132, 142, 144, 150, 152, 153, 157, 

171, 288, 383, 384, 386 

CID 272 

CINCCENT 41,43,45,48,49, 51, 

59, 129, 159, 181, 183. 184, 197, 

294,368, 376 

CJCS 203, 262, 291, 388, 391 

close air support 43, SO, 52, 60, 64, 

169, 313, 314, 322, 323, 339, 341, 

343, 344, 352, 353, 355, 361, 362, 

364, 367 

65, 68, 79, 80, 88-90, 100-102, 106, 

CNA 287, 294, 2% 

coalition 1, 2, 7, 42, 43, 46, 48, SO, 

63, 64, 69, 71, 72-74, 83, 96, 98, 

100, 110, 111, 119, 123, 124, 127, 

130, 137, 148, 149, 158, 159, 196, 

227,247, 248, 257, 258, 264, 269, 

273, 294, 302, 305, 307, 309, 310, 

329, 333-336, 373. 375 

COCOM 186, 341, 386-388 

COMALF 108, 132, 154 

combat air patrol 15, 56, 95, 125, 

307 

combat intelligence division 132, 

137, 142, 144, 269, 272, 277 

combat operations planning staff 187, 

273 

combat planning staff 135, 138, 142, 

148, 150 

combat search and rescue SO 

combined control and reporting center 

combined OPLAN 149, 342, 345, 

command and control 1-7, 41, 56, 57, 

129 

347, 349, 390 

70, 74, 75, 77, 79-85, 87-90, 92, 

99-102, 105, 107, 112, 113, 122, 

129, 130, 139, 142, 147, 150, 155, 

157, 164, 181, 182. 185, 191, 203, 

205, 206, 210, 212, 224,227, 235, 

272, 284, 294, 303, 311, 312, 314, 

236, 247, 248, 253-256, 264-266, 

315, 316, 318, 327, 329-337, 339, 

354-357, 359, 360, 363, 369, 370, 

37 1 

command post exercise 179 

command, control and communication 

communications security 1 18 

Compass Call 129, 309, 319 

computers 74, 110, 1 12, 167, 251, 

Congress 45, 55, 84, 265, 266, 358 

Constant Source 270, 302 

contingency plan 87, 149 

COPD 135, 187 

COPS 124, 135, 148, 318 

Corder, John 48, 49, 59, 66, 190, 

32 

278, 357, 373 
19 1, 190- 192, 200, 207-209, 2 14, 

225, 232, 236, 237, 259,260, 324, 

326, 358 

VII Corps 60, 103, 105, 314, 319, 

325 

XVlll Airborne Corps 64, 3 13 

XVlllth Airborne Corps 99 

corps: 

Cosby, Mike 166 

Cougill, Roscoe. I12 

counterair 43, 50, 52, 95, 96, 152, 

309, 359, 360. 363, 365, 367 

CRC 80, 81, 90 

Crigger, James 66, 108, 150, 

152-154, 167, 174, 187, 190, 191 

critical items 291 

CSS 17, 24, 29, 96, 120, 129, 145, 

148, 149, 237 

CW 25, 27-31 

D 

D-Day 52, 148-150, 162, 168, 170, 

D-Day plan 149 

DAD 132 

daily AT0 17, 52, 97, 149, 154, 168, 

DASC 79, 310, 320 

197, 200, 342, 343 

169, 214, 221, 283, 306, 374, 376 

DCS 84, 97, 107-109, 116, 125, 127, 

152, 207, 213, 237, 287, 291, 308, 

325, 373 

deception 3 

Defense Communications Agency 

113, 114, 170 

Defense Intelligence Agency (see also 

DTA) 10, 182, 193, 248, 25 1, 254, 

287, 334, 37 I, 39 1 

Defense Mapping Agency 224 

Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program 128 

Defense Science Board 118, 126, 

195,247, 2.53, 259, 263,299 

Defense Support Program 249 

Department of Defense (see also 

DOD) 7, 45, 46, 77. 84, 110, 111, 

116, 254, 267, 349, 358, 362, 384, 

392 

149, 158, 159. 163, 164, 168, 

193, 195, 196, 197, 200,201, 203, 

207, 208, 210. 214, 219, 223, 224, 

Deptula, David 8, 14, 57, 72, 75, 

172-175, 180, 181, 183-185, 192, 

227-229, 231, 232, 235, 240, 255, 

256,259, 261-264.268, 284, 290, 

293, 379 

Desert Shield 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 17, 24, 

29, 41-43, 45, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 

60, 61, 65, 67, 71, 73, 77, 83, 91, 

92, 96, 97, 100, 103, 104, 107-111, 

114-121, 124-127, 130, 139, 145, 

148, 149, 152-154, 157, 158, 160, 

162, 169, 170, 175, 177, 179, 186, 

187, 197, 200, 201, 203, 205, 206, 

210, 212, 213, 224, 237, 239, 

247-249, 25 1-253, 259, 26 1-265, 

271-273, 277-282, 284-287, 290, 

291, 294, 297, 299, 302, 305, 308, 

327, 330, 331, 333, 335, 336, 351, 

309, 31 1-314, 316, 320, 323, 324, 

366,368-373, 388, 389 

Desert ShieldStorm 158, 186, 265, 

271, 277, 278, 279, 280, 287, 291, 

297, 302, 309, 3 14, 3 16, 320, 323, 

324 

41,42, 45, 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 

Desert Storm 1, 2, 5-8, 13, 21, 37-39, 

58, 60, 61, 62, 65-69, 71, 72, 83, 

97,99, 101, 103, 107-111. 113, 

114, 116, 117-119, 124-127, 129, 

139, 154, 160, 166, 168, 170, 175, 

206,210, 212, 213, 219,224, 231, 

179, 181, 197, 199, 201-203, 205, 

236, 237, 239, 243, 247, 248-256, 

259, 263, 264, 269, 277-288, 290, 

293-296, 299, 301, 305-312, 315, 

320, 322-327, 329-331, 333, 335, 

336, 351, 358, 366, 368-373, 376, 

379, 389, 390 

desired mean point of impact 261, 

399 
298, 301 

Dhahran 92,93, 96, 108, 112, 120. 

378 

DIA (see also Defense Intelligence 

Agency) 182, 183, 185, 202. 247, 

297,300, 371, 391 

25 I, 254, 270, 28 I, 285, 287-29 1, 

Dickinson, Ross 170,277 

Diego Garcia 292 

Direct Air Support Center 99, 100, 

102, 106, 310, 313, 316, 320, 321, 

326,327, 343 

director of air defense 132, 139, 142 

Divisions: 

DMA 224 

DMPl 147, 291, 298 

doctrine 79, 86, 87, 103, 128, 131, 

1st Armored Division 

152, 170, 250, 251, 253, 264, 302, 

359,360, 363 

Defense) 84, 94, 202, 243, 29 I, 

drone 321 

DSN 107 

DOD (see also Department of 

339-348 

E 

E-2 83, 309 

E-3 83.92, 94-98, 1 15, 123, 306, 

307, 309, 311, 312 

E-8 84, 324, 325,327 

EC-130 129, 318 

ECM 64 

EDS 61, 250 

Eglin AFB, FL 66 

Egypt 127 

Egyptian 127, 129, 323 

Eisenhower, Dwight D. 73, 352, 357 

electric 322 

electronic order of battle 374 

electronic warfare 70, 95, 96, 129, 

154,207,259, 307, 319 

Elf One 92, 93, 107, 180 

EF-I 11 25, 29, 30, 96, 238, 239, 242 

ELINT 165, 175 

Eskridge, Robert 

EUCOM 159,203 

Europe 86, 95, 103. 118, 125, 130, 

149,314,322. 370, 371, 384, 392 

European Command 129,359, 384, 

385,391 

exercises 4, 87, 100, 103, 105, 149. 

154, 170, 179, 180, 208, 225, 278, 

282, 330, 333, 336, 341, 343, 367 

exploitation 281, 285, 286. 288, 326 

165, 168, 174, 229 

F 

F-4G 14, 25, 27, 29, 238, 239, 242, 

259 

F-IS 29, 94, 108, 120 

F-15E 21, 32-39, 41, 148. 166, 224, 

230, 231, 248, 252, 253, 261, 269, 

296,3 1 I, 374, 375 

296, 310, 319 

F-16 165, 201, 229, 237-242, 258, 

F-111 25, 28-30, 166,173, 201, 231, 

237-242 

F-l I7 165, 166, 173, 174, 199, 224, 

23 I, 261, 264,269,296,298, 377 

F-117A 

FAC 25, 28, 79, 90. 102, 241, 322, 

334 

facsimile 6, 107, 251 

FAHD 41 

fax 109, 116, 125, 153, 162 

Feinstein, Jeff 27, 33, 239 

fire support coordination line 64, 101, 

fleet defense 56 

FLIR 248, 251 

fog of war 229 

Fort Bragg 179 

forward air control 81 

France 352 

Franks, Frederick 103, 105, 314 

fratricide 64, 65, 72, 79, 88, 259, 

FSCL 64,344 

21, 167, 231, 269, 270, 283 

310.313, 314, 329, 343, 344 

260,307, 310, 322 
G 

Galvin, John 103. 130, 391, 392 

GAT 8, 10, 13, 19. 25, 27-29, 187, 

192, 193. 195, 196, 198-203, 

205-210, 212, 214, 219, 221, 223, 

225, 228, 229, 232, 235, 236, 241, 

242,255, 256,258, 260,261, 263, 

264, 265, 266, 268-270, 272, 281, 

282, 283, 289-291, 293, 294, 

296-299, 302, 330-332, 334, 335, 

372,373, 375 

GBU-I0 27.30, 292 

GBU-I2 292 

GBU-15 292 

GBU-24 27, 292 

GBU-27 292 

GBU-28 292 

GCC 120 

General Accounting Office 293 

Germany 352 

global positioning satellite 322, 323 

Glock, John 164, 165, 171, 173, 175, 

Glosson, Buster 8, 10, 17, 28, 30, 48, 

176, 289 

49, 60, 61, 63, 66, 67, 68-72, 75, 

144, 158, 162-169, 171-174, 176, 

180, 182, 183, 184, 186, 190, 191, 

195, 196, 197-202, 205, 208, 209, 

213, 214, 221, 223-225, 227-229, 

231, 232, 240.246, 247, 259, 261, 

262, 268, 269, 289, 290, 293, 294, 

330, 331, 334, 335, 369, 373, 375, 

377, 378 

Goldwater-Nichols 358. 386 

GOSC 116 

Griffith, Gen. 162 

ground control intercept 358 

ground forces 41, 51, 77, 79, 81, 86, 

88, 94, 119, 148, 295, 314, 316, 

334, 357, 390 

GR-1 258 

ground order of battle 37 

ground station 80, 103, 104, 154 

ground station modules 104 

Guam 116, 353 

guidance, apportionment and targeting 

guidance, apportionment, targeting 

8,333 

68.72, 202, 209, 266 

H 

H-2 24, 31 

H-3 24, 26, 27, 30, 31 

hardened aircraft shelter 31 

HARM 259,260 

Harvey, Ben 160, 28 1 

HAS 1-3, 5, 25, 28, 3 I, 40, 53, 57, 

64, 74, 77,79, 83. 128. 129, 190, 

206, 214, 263, 267, 278.291, 301, 

316, 324, 329, 332, 333, 337, 342, 

343,345, 346, 357, 360, 365, 366, 

369, 371, 373, 381-383, 387, 392 

Have Quick 95, 114, 319 

Hawk 115 

helicopter 125, 315, 320, 322, 361 

Henry, Larry 52, 166, 373 

Hente, Scott 165, 207, 376 

HMMWV 322 

Holdaway 165 

Homer, Charles A. 3, 5, 8, 10, 21, 

41-49, 51, 52, 56-75, 77, 91, 92, 

100, 104, 119, 120, 124, 130. 

190, 191, 193, 195, 198,200, 201, 

255, 260, 262, 264, 265, 270, 279, 

303, 311, 313, 314, 316, 319, 326, 

329, 330, 333, 335, 336, 358, 366, 

382,384, 387, 389, 390 

House Armed Services Committee 

302 

Hurlburt Field, FL 179 

Hussein 69, 162, 227, 374, 378 

157-159, 164, 167, 169, 185-188, 

205-208, 228, 232, 237. 246, 247, 

I 

1-2000 292, 298 

IADS 8, 372, 373 

40 1 
identification friend or foe 123, 147 

IFF 123 

Imminent Thunder 278, 279 

lncirlik 305. 306 

Independence 199, 353 

inertial navigation system 242 

infantry 60,347 

infrared 21, 37, 248, 270 

infrastructure 41, 106, 110, 111, 187 

INMARSAT 113 

Instant Thunder 157- 159, 162- 164, 

Institute for Defense Analyses 243, 

integrated air defense system 8, 370 

intelligence staff 176, 303, 333 

INTELSAT 113 

interdiction 42, 43, SO, 52, 65, 91, 

99, 101, 102, 106, 147, 152, 169, 

179, 230, 272, 295, 313, 315, 319, 

327, 332, 354, 359, 362, 364, 365, 

368 

168,262 

288 

Internal Look 132, 170, 179, 277 

interoperability 139, 263 

Iran 52, 92, 179, 312 

Iraq cell 187, 198, 200 

Iraqi air force 94 

Iraqi army 2, 313,334 

Israel 129, 236, 243, 247, 329 

J 

J-2 

5-3 

J-5 60, 91, 159 

J-6 112, 113 

105, 256, 271, 281, 282 

63, 64, 159, 181, 198, 203 

Jaguar 258 

Jamerson, James 392 

Japan 353, 367 

JCS (see also Joint Chiefs of Staff) 7, 

77, 123, 124, 182, 202, 203, 267, 

360,362, 364, 367, 379, 384, 385, 

392 

280, 291, 339-342, 345-349, 359, 

JCSE 107 

JFACC (see also Joint Force Air 

Component Commander) I, 41, 42, 

46. 48-53, 55. 57-60, 62-65, 67, 

69-75, 90, 105, 106, 131, 132, 150, 

154, 155, 184, 186, 190, 193, 195, 

200.31 I, 330, 333, 335, 351, 358, 

360,361, 362-368.389, 390 

JFC 366 

JIC 202 

JlPC 286, 287, 299 

JMEM 15, 172, 298 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (see also JCS) 6, 

17. SO, 59, 103. 107, 113, 128, 130. 

183, 185, 186, 280. 346, 348, 349, 

354, 355, 359, 360, 362, 363, 378, 

387,388 

1 07 

Commander (see also JFACC) 3, 

joint communications support element 

Joint Force Air Component 

2 1, 41, 42, 46, 48, 50-53, 55, 56, 

58, 60, 62-65, 71, 73, 75, 77, 83, 

87, 90, 101, 105, 130, 131, 132, 

139, 153, 171, 190, 201, 203, 205, 

255, 265, 296, 312, 313, 330, 345, 

35 I, 359, 360-364, 366, 389, 390 

Joint Intelligence Center 271, 288 

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 

Joint Operations Planning and 

Joint Staff 53, 63, 102, 113, 129, 

198,298 

Execution System 91 

159, 181, 203, 280, 291, 353, 356, 

362, 377, 389 

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System 102, 103, 324 

Joint target list 170 

Joint Task Force 52, 7 I, 86, 87, 158, 

Joint Task Force Middle East 52, 158 

JOPES 107 

Jordan 129 

340, 345, 363, 382, 389-392 

JSTARS 32-41, 84, 102-106, 129, 

237, 253. 254, 285, 305, 310, 311, 

324-326, 325-327, 332, 335, 336 

402 
JTCB 170, 171, 196 

JTF 361, 392 

JTIDS 98, 114 

Loh, John 157, 378 

M 

J 

KC-I0 388 

KC-135 388 

Keller, K.F. 249 

Kelly, Thomas W. 181 

Khafji 190,327 

Khalid 44,46,48,97, 190 

KJA 378 

kill box 310, 31 I, 319-321 

kill boxes 310, 311, 313, 318, 320 

killed in action 378 

killer scouts 3 19 

Kiraly, Emery 270, 287 

Korean War 73, 352, 353 

KTO 37, 166, 180, 187, 200, 223, 

KTO cell 200 

Kuwait 2, 37, 42, 46, SO, 52, 57, 

281, 282, 286 

59-61, 71, 74. 93, 124, 132, 155, 

157, 162, 169, 187, 283, 288, 295, 

309, 310, 312, 321, 322,324, 327, 

330, 349, 390 

Kuwait theater of operations 37, 288 

Kuwaiti 8, 14, 162, 197, 198, 295 

L 

Langley AFB, VA 103, 108, 109, 

LANTIRN 269 

leadership 10, 55, 57, 187, 303, 330, 

333, 352, 370 

Leonardo, Col 174, 175 

Lewis, Rick, 166 

Linebacker 1 356, 358 

Linebacker II 356 

lines of communication 295 

Link 11 98 

logistics 39, 46, 84, 91, 104, 153, 

116, 128, 130, 281, 289, 366, 384 

165, 248, 341, 345, 346, 386-388 

M-117 292 

MAGTF 42.51, 359 

maintenance personnel 92 

major commands 183, 303, 383, 384 

MAP (see also master attack plan) 

10, 15, 17, 19, 30, 32, 33, 65, 164, 

170, 175, 192, 193, 196, 197, 200, 

205.206, 208,209,213, 228, 237, 

MARCENT 52, 150, 152, 153, 320, 

325 

Marine Corps 42,51, 52, 58,60, 63, 

64, 69, 83,99, 102, 106, 115, 116, 

264, 281, 282, 288, 294, 308, 

330, 345, 351, 352, 355, 357, 359, 

361, 362, 363, 366, 367, 382 

Marine Expeditionary Force 355 

marines 42, 60, 61, 105, 125, 147, 

mark 82 37 

Marvin Short 174 

MASS 168, 169, 300 

master attack plan,(see also MAP) 

238-241, 342, 371, 372 

312-314, 316, 318, 320, 321, 326, 

312, 320, 360, 366 

10-14, 17, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27, 28, 

168, 170, 171, 175, 182, 191, 192, 

29-34, 49, 65, 67, 68, 164, 167, 

193, 196, 197, 199, 200,205-209, 

223, 237-241, 372 

master target list 27, 171, 192, 203, 

Mauz, Henry 52, 56 

Mavericks 259 

McConnell, Michael 180, 182-1 84, 

196,203, 247, 261, 268, 293, 335 

MCM 89.95, 131. 306, 309 

McPeak, Memll 1, 129, 377 

McSwain, Donald 55, 159, 164, 165, 

meteorology 128 

259 

167, 169, 181, 374 

MH-60 258 

403 
Middle East Joint Task Force 71 

Military Airlift Command 108, 185, 

MILSATCOM 114 

Ministry of Defense 45 

Mirage 2000 258 

missile 84, 115. 117. 122, 123, 126, 

181, 218. 219, 242, 243, 247-254, 

259,325, 339. 370-372, 374, 378, 

390 

mission report 21, 23, 30, 3 1, 36-41, 

269, 299 

383,390 

MK-20 292 

MK-82 292 

MK-84 39, 292 

mobility 82, 322 

mobilization 348 

Moore, Royal 42, 52, 58, 59, 61-63 

moving target indicator 324, 326 

MTL 27 

Muellner, George 84, 103-105. 237, 

munitions 13, 15, 24, 27, 147, 152, 

324-326 

158, 160, 167. 172, 173, 198, 224, 

228, 230, 255, 261, 267, 283, 291, 

292, 293, 296, 298, 300,377 

munitions storage 27 

national command authorities 345 

N 

National Military lntelligence Support 

National Security Agency 71, 1 10, 

Teams 251 

111, 185, 288, 391 

NATO 101-103, 111, 144, 145, 149. 

306. 339-341, 343, 345-348, 392 

nature of war 229 

naval 42, 52, 53. 55, 56. 58, 117, 

132, 144, 154, 157, 159, 166, 181, 

277, 283, 287, 294, 296, 3 13, 342, 

344,346, 347, 354, 390 

NAVCENT 52,53, 56, 150, 152, 

153, 155, 181. 283 

navigation 120, 242, 263 

Navy 45, 52, 53, 55, 56.60, 69, 74, 

164, 167, 181, 196, 248, 281, 282, 

283, 287, 288, 290, 294, 296, 308, 

83, 113, 115-1 18, 125, 145, 154, 

309, 312, 336, 345, 351-354, 356, 

357, 362, 363, 365-367, 374, 382 

NBC 165 

NCA 345 

Nellis AFB, NV 115 

network 49, 75, 83, 106, 107, 109, 

111, 112, 115, 116, 126. 153, 

375,390 

181-183, 290, 293. 334, 365, 372, 

New York Times 227 

Night Targeting Cell 13-15. 19, 152, 

1 97 

Ninth Air Force 41. 53, 56, 94, 99, 

158,303, 382, 384, 387, 389, 390 

Norsworthy 165, 229 

North Vietnam 52, 73, 333, 354, 355 

North Vietnamese 355, 356, 358 

Northern Area Command 99, 101, 

323 

NTC 13 

nuclear 8, 13, 57, 152, 187, 207, 347, 

369 

0 

O’Boyle, Randy 165 

OCA 166, 169 

Oelrich, Mike 165 

offensive 60, 66, 67, 70, 73, 75, 96, 

155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 164. 

168, 169. 170, 186. 190, 200, 205, 

206, 262, 272, 295, 303, 309, 323, 

331,344, 349, 365, 367, 390 

offensive counter air 169, 272 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense 282 

“Oly” Olsen 165 

Olsen, Thomas 45, 158, 159, 165, 

167, 203 

Oman 113 

Omnibus Agreement 42, 51, 60, 359, 
360,364,366 

OFCON 185, 186,346, 388,390-392 

operational control 42, 51, 70, 105, 

185, 186, 340, 341, 345,346, 359, 

360, 363, 364, 365, 381, 388, 392 

operational security 164 

Operations Directorate 159, 18 1, 203, 

operations order (see also OPORD) 

operations staff 61-63, 198, 278, 295 

OPLAN 45, 71,93, 124, 149, 179, 

271, 342, 345,347, 349, 364, 365, 

367, 368, 389, 390 

271, 365, 368 

OPORD 42,43 

order001 391 

order 003 45 

order of battle 37, 137, 139, 173, 

371,374 

Osterloh, Bob 165 

333.334 

42,43,45,50-52, 391 

OPLAN 1002-90 45, 71, 93, 179, 

P 

Pacific Command 385 

Panama 387 

Patriot 1 IS, 126, 247, 249, 250, 254 

PaveTack 269 

Peace Shield 1 19, 120 

Persian Gulf 45, 46, 56, 84, 87, 94, 

107, 114, 117, 120, 165, 181, 243, 

249, 250, 281, 283,291, 369, 381 

PGM 224, 228 

phase I 164, 168, 179, 262 

phase11 179 

phase 111 179 

planners 8, 13, 14, 19, 21, 24, 31, 40, 

65, 66, 69, 70, 74, 95, 112, 117, 

126, 144, 157, 159, 164, 165, 

166-169, 171-176, 180-183, 185, 

187, 192, 196- 198, 200, 202, 

206-208, 210, 212, 213, 214, 219, 

221, 221, 228, 230, 232, 235, 236, 

241, 242, 254-256, 258-261, 

263-270, 272, 280-283, 289-291, 

293, 294, 296, 298, 302, 3 13, 3 15, 

331, 333, 335,373,375, 378 

planning 3, 7-10, 13, 15-17, 19, 21, 

55. 59, 60, 63, 66, 70, 75, 77, 79, 

27-29, 32-34, 40, 42, 45, 46, 48-52, 

87, 89-91, 96, 97, 107. 118, 127, 

130-133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 142, 

144, 148, 149. 150. 152, 153. 155, 

157, 158, 159, 162-164, 166-177, 

180, 181, 182, 184-187, 191-203, 

205, 206, 207-210, 212-215, 221, 

223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 230-233, 

235, 236-240, 242, 255, 256, 259, 

260-262, 267, 268, 272-278, 

281-283, 288, 290, 291, 293, 294, 

295,299, 300.306, 307, 308, 312, 

326, 329, 335, 341, 343-345, 351, 

359-362, 365, 367. 373, 374, 376, 

378,379, 384, 385, 389 

population 329, 355 

Powell, Colin 6, 44, 130, 157, 169, 

247,262 

preplanned close air support 88, 90, 

I02 

president SO, 73, 183, 184, 199, 227, 

247, 262, 265, 345, 346, 348, 

353-355, 377, 378, 382-384, 386 

Pritchett, Jim 165 

Profitt, Glenn 70, 186, 191, 259, 260 

Proven Force 52, 129, 228, 302, 31 1, 

Pryor, Bert 165 

Punishment AT0 162 

push CAS 60, 101 

312, 390-392 

Q 

Qatar 111 

quick-reaction package 108 

R 

RAF 150, 152, 153, 165, 166, 250, 

28 1, 282, 307 

405 
Rafha 120 

RAND 124, 224, 25 I, 284 

readiness 179, 263 

reconnaissance 3, 32, 41, 70, 80, 82, 

RC-135 96, 176, 258 

96, 147, 185, 186, 207, 247, 

256-259, 261, 267,270. 271, 

280-282, 284, 285, 287, 294, 300, 

301, 359, 381 

Reconnaissance Wing 96 

reconstitution 273 

recovery 307 

Red Sea 165, 283 

reheling 7, 15. 17, 30. 83, 90, 95, 

124, 125, 133, 137, 145, 147-150, 

153, 168, 180, 186, 207, 218, 232, 

241, 305, 307, 308, 31 1, 372, 375, 

376, 388 

reliability 13, 152, 154, 267, 273, 

336, 377 

remotely piloted vehicle 321 

reorganization 8, 13, 157, 185-1 88, 

190, 191, 197, 198, 200-202, 205, 

210, 358, 383, 386 

Republican Guard 37, 283, 286 

research and development 152, 369, 

reserves 109 

resupply SO 

Rice, Donald 181, 182, 184, 203 

Rivet Joint 82-85, 96, 104, 130, 158, 

305, 327 

Rogers, "Buck" 165, 193, 203, 208, 

225, 228 

Rolling Thunder 73, 354-356, 358 

route package 52, 228, 354 

Royal Air Force 49, 164, 250, 352 

Royal Saudi Air Force 8, 43, 45, 48, 

107, 119, 139, 176, 285, 295, 306 

RSAF 43,47,52,66, 94, 109, 152, 

165, 166, 176, 253, 281,282 

rules of engagement 50, 56, 57, 91, 

95, 123, 124, 135, 137, 142, 150, 

152,206, 346, 377 

382 

RF-4C 258, 281 

Russ, General 167 

S 

S-3 154, 258 

SAC 13, 171, 180, 186. 207, 213, 

214. 249, 250, 281, 282, 293, 355, 

388 

Saddam Hussein 149, 227 

SAM 8, 15, 17, 122, 166, 180, 188, 

195 

SAR 39, 137 

SATCOM 107, 154 

satellite communications 93, 106, 

Saudi Air Force 8. 43, 45, 48. 68, 

107, 112-1 14, 251, 335 

107. 1 19, 139. 176- 178, 285, 295, 

296,306 

Saudi Arabia 13, 41, 43, 45, 71, 

91-98, 102, 104. 107, 109-111, 113, 

116, 118, 119, 124, 125, 127, 128, 

129, 137, 147-150, 155, 157-160, 

162, 164, 168-170, 179, 187, 190, 

197, 243, 261, 305, 311, 334, 370, 

37 1, 372, 374 

Schultz, Dave 109 

Schwartz, Paul 46 

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman 2, 3, 5, 6, 

69, 71, 73, 91, 103, 108. 124, 157, 

159, 169, 183, 184, 195, 198, 236, 

237,262,265,266, 302,325, 329, 

330, 382, 386, 388 

8, 41, 42, 44-46, 49. 50, 56-64, 67, 

SClF 174, 176, 178, 290, 293, 295 

Scud 8, 10, 32, 53, 68, 113, 165, 

187, 195. 203, 206,216,218, 219, 

329, 336 

Scud alert 249 

Scud B 242 

Scud CAP 253, 325 

Scud hunt 206, 216. 218, 242, 243, 

246, 247, 254, 329 

Scud warning 249, 336 

SEAD 25, 29, 158, 240, 373 

221, 236, 242, 243, 246-254, 325, 

406 
search and rescue 39, SO, 96, 135, 

137, 149, 1 SO, 307, 346 

Secretary of Defense 43, 44, 71, 159, 

183, 184, 203, 247, 262,282, 345, 

346,348, 355, 378, 382,386, 387, 

39 1 

Secretary of State 184, 227, 247 

Secretary of the Army 369 

sector operations center 120 

secure telephone unit 109,334 

security 71, 84, 92, 110, 111, 118, 

159, 162, 164, 176, 180, 185, 261, 

288, 299, 391 

Setnor, Chip 166 

Sharp, Grant 45, 162 

Shaw AFB 27, 33,65, 66, 101, 154, 

162, 167, 239, 384 

SHF 107, 112, 154 

SlGlNT 165 

signals intelligence 114, 267, 358 

SITREP 129 

SKYNET 113 

SLAR 258 

Smith, Maurice 55, 159, 164, 165 

SOF 137, 165 

software 55, 74, 102, 104, 107, 1 16, 

154, 224, 278, 279, 297, 303, 336, 

366,369, 375 

sortie generation 259 

sortie rate 303 

Southeast Asia 73, 308, 354-357 

SPACC 249 

space operations 112, 257 

Spain 292 

special forces 248, 323 

special instructions 124, 135, 137, 

145, 147, 149, 150, 168,219 

special operations 72, 137, 307, 385 

Special Operations Command 72, 385 

special operations forces 137, 307 

Special Planning Group 8, 149, 157, 

158, 164, 195, 198, 202,205 

SPINS 145, 150, 209, 218, 219 

SPOT 315, 324 

spareparts 106 

stealth 264 

stealthy 173, 254 

strategic air campaign 1 SO, 157, 159, 

162, 163, 165, 166-169, 171, 172, 

180, 181, 184, 190, 200, 201, 288 

179, 180, 185, 186, 249, 250, 284, 

285,292, 305, 355, 390 

Strategic Air Command 96, 124, 130, 

strategic air defense 175 

Strategic Bombing Survey 266 

strategic level 45 

strategy 51, 150, 152, 162, 173, 184, 

STRATFOR 13, 132 

254,255, 260, 288, 372 

STU 108-111, 153, 183, 202, 224, 

293, 334 

Sudayri 48,49 

Sultan 44,46 

super high frequency 107 

suppression of enemy air defenses 15, 

25, 27, 207, 240 

surface-to-air missile 1 15. 372 

surge 97, 98, 148, 311 

SWA 130 

SYERS 284 

Syrian 129, 323 

T 

table of organization and equipment 

TAC (see also Tactical Air Command) 

104, 107, 108, 110, 115, 116, 120, 

167,237, 325, 366, 371, 384 

347 

I, 79-81, 83, 84, 86, 87, 99, 103, 

130-132, 154, 160, 162, 164, 166, 

TACAIR 101, 102 

TACC (see also Tactical Air Control 

Center) 2, 8, 19, 30, 35, 36, 43, 

74, 77, 79, 80, 83, 87, 89, 90, 94, 

97,99, 101, 106, 108, 117, 118, 

120, 131, 132, 135, 142, 143, 144, 

157, 159, 164, 187, 202, 205, 219, 

220, 224, 225, 231, 241, 243, 247, 

48, 49, 59, 62, 64-66, 68, 70, 72, 

407 
248, 252, 253, 254, 268, 270, 287, 

289,294, 295, 306, 308,3 1 1, 3 1 3, 

369 

314, 315-321, 325, 326, 356, 357. 

TACON 186, 347, 388, 391 

TACP 79, 88 

TACS 42, 65, 77, 80, 82, 83, 85, 86, 

88,90,91,94,96, 101, 106, 113, 

115, 119, 128, 131, 135, 137, 144, 

187. 205, 210, 213, 214, 218, 225, 

305,319, 321, 327, 330,335, 369 

Tactical Air Command (see also TAC) 

I. 41. 77, 79, 81, 86. 87, 94, 103, 

104, 115, 116, 130, 132, 133, 158, 

174, 185, 186, 200, 267, 320, 326, 

363, 366. 383, 384, 387 

Tactical Air Control Center (see also 

TACC) 2, 6, 8, 10, 19, 35, 42, 43. 

48, 49, 52, 53, 62, 63, 65-67, 69, 

70, 72, 74, 75, 80-83, 86-89, 92, 

94-97, 100, 102, 105, 106, 108, 

137, 139, 142, 144, 155, 157, 164, 

187, 191, 200, 201, 205,210, 241, 

256, 260, 267, 269, 270, 272, 274, 

114, 115-118, 120, 131-133, 135, 

275, 279, 282, 283, 293-297, 301, 

302,306, 308, 309, 31 1-316, 319, 

325, 326, 329, 331, 333-335, 342, 

347,357, 358, 369, 390 

Tactical Air Control Party 79, 88, 

322, 344, 347 

Tactical Air Control System 2, 42, 

51, 65, 77, 80, 84, 88, 90, 92, 96, 

98,99, 101, 106, 114. 115, 118, 

205, 305, 3 12, 3 15, 327, 330, 333, 

335, 336, 339, 342, 343, 347, 357, 

358,369 

119, 128-131, 142, 144, 187, 203, 

Tactical Air Control Wing 94, 315, 

Tactical Air Operations Center 52, 

Tactical Air Warfare Center 66 

tactical ballistic missile 251, 370, 371 

tactical control 77, 129, 347, 392 

322-324 

115, 116, 320 

Tactical Fighter Wing 24, 29, 32. 41, 

Tactical Intelligence Squadron 325 

TADIL 115 

Tallil 238-240 

tankers 15, 124, 158, 180, 207, 

94, 174, 237, 241, 242, 301 

213-215, 219, 224, 228, 230, 232, 

308,309 

tanks 91 

TAOC 52 

target list 27, 170, 171, 192, 193, 

196. 198, 203, 259. 261, 290, 291, 

294,312, 315, 318 

targeteering 15, 152, 172, 173, 175 

TARPS 285 

Tenoso, Brig. Cen. 191 

TFW (see also Tactical Fighter Wing) 

21, 24. 29-31, 37-40, 148, 167, 168, 

174, 175, 224, 237-239, 241, 242, 

269, 298, 301 

The Times 27, 29, 123, 152, 239, 241 

Thumrait 113, 168 

time over target 37,218, 238, 291 

Tinker AFB, OK 305 

TIS 162, 224 

Title V 110, 159, 243, 249 

TLAM 181, 268 

TMD 251, 371 

Tolin, 

296 

Tomahawk 181, 218, 219 

TOT 10, 34, 64, 145, 147, 219, 232, 

TR 280, 284, 285, 377 

166, 167, 195, 200, 229, 230, 

24 1 

TR-1 280, 284, 285 

TRADOC 86-88,99, 103 

Training and Doctrine Command 86, 

TRANSCOM 107 

Turkey 52, 130, 305, 311,391, 392 

Turkish 306, 391 

87, 103 

U 

U.S. Air Force 116, 117, 159, 164, 
180, 186, 306, 336, 342, 352-354. 

365,382, 389 

259, 286, 370,378 

86, 87.91, 10.5, 131, 205, 271, 272, 

385, 386, 387, 389.391 

39 1 

Corps) 51, 83,294 

51 

U.S. Army 101, 118. 123, 152, 164, 

U.S. Central Command 45,4648, 

U.S. European Command 384, 385, 

U.S. Marine Corps (see also Marine 

U.S. Marine Corps, Central Command 

U.S. Navy 164,353 

U.S. Pacific Command 385 

U.S. Space Command 385 

U.S. Special operations Command 

U.S. Transportation Command 385 

UHF 97, 101, 107, 108, 114, 116, 

ultra high frequency 107 

United Arab Emirates 99, 11 1, 113 

United Kingdom 104, 113, 259, 292 

United Nations 353 

United States 11 1 

United States Air Force 79. 131, 339, 

United States code 341, 382, 387 

USAFE 125, 127 

USCENTAF (see also CENTAF) 8, 

13, 15, 19, 30, 34-36, 57, 63, 68, 

121, 131, 132, 135, 137, 139, 142, 

385 

U-2 280, 284, 286, 287 

308 

353 

USC 382, 384-386 

87, 97, 100-102, 105-109, 114, 116, 

144, 148, 149. 150, 152, 157-160, 

162, 166-168, 179, 185-187, 190, 

195, 196, 200, 202, 203,207,213, 

236, 253, 272, 274, 277, 278, 281, 

282, 286,290, 293, 295, 296-299, 

308, 3 16, 32 I, 324, 390 

Command) SO, 86, 105, 139, 159, 

162, 170. 179, 186, 275, 281, 282, 

USCENTCOM (see also Central 

313. 385. 387-389 

USCINCCENT 37.42.46.49, SO, 

59, 91, 93, 102, 123, 124, 129, 179, 

86, 271, 324, 365, 367, 368, 

386-389, 391, 392 

USEUCOM 130, 302, 385, 391, 392 

USLANTCOM 385 

USMC 42,51,52, 100. 157, 165, 

USN 53, 55, 56, 117, 154, 249, 251, 

USPACOM 385 

USS Missouri 321 

USSOCOM 202,385 

USSOUTHCOM 385 

USSPACECOM 249, 251, 385 

USTRANSCOM 186, 385, 388 

UTC 109 

198, 320, 321, 357 

307 

V 

Vietnam 52. 73, 99, 228, 333, 351, 

Vogel 165 

352, 354, 355, 357, 358 

W 

Waller, Calvin 44, 59, 61, 63. 325 

Warden. John 157-159, 170, 281, 

wargames 288 

Washington 48, 50, 61, 62, 87, 102, 

107, 110, 114, 118, 129, 180, 181, 

236,248, 255,256,266, 280, 289. 

290, 291, 293, 294, 322, 3.34, 335, 

378 

183, 184, 201-203, 206, 221,227, 

351-354, 356-358, 369, 370, 376 

Washington Post 227 

Waterstreet 165 

weaponeering 13, 152, 172, 173, 198, 

277.294 

weather 3, 8, 128, 170, 193, 206, 

216, 218, 219, 221, 225-228. 232, 

259,261,267, 296, 308, 312 

Welch, W.G. 99, 164, 165, 195 

409 
Whitley. Alton C. 174 Y 

WIA 378 

WIN 48, 51,62,67, 131, 170, 336 Y’Blood, William T. 48 

World War 11 73, 118, 250, 266, 267, Yeosock, John 45,46, 73, 104, 326 

300, 35 1, 352, 353, 357, 369 

Worldwide Military Command and 

Control System 107 

wounded in action 378 

410 
Glossary 

AAA 

AAAM 

AADC 

AAI 

AAV 

AAR 

AASLT Div 

AB 

ABCCC 

ABDR 

ABF 

ABFDS 

Abn Corps 

AC 

ACA 

ACAS 

ACC 

ACCS 

ACE 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Advanced Air-to- Air Missile 

Area Air Defense Commander 

Air-to-Air Interrogator Set 

Amphibious Assault Vehicle 

After Action Report 

Air Assault Division (US) 

Air Base 

Airborne Battlefield Command and 

Control Center 

Aircraft Battle Damage Repair 

Advanced Bomb Family 

Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery System 

Airborne Corps (US) 

Active Component 

Airspace Control Authority or 

Airlift Clearance Authorities 

Air Combat Assessment Summary 

Air Component Commander or 

Airspace Coordination Center or 

Arab Cooperation Council 

Airborne Command and Control 

Squadron 

Airborne Command Element (USAF) 

or 

Aviation Combat Element (USMC) or 

Air Combat Element (NATO) or 

Armored Combat Earthmover (US 

Army) 

ACM Air Combat Maneuvers 
ACO 

ACR 

ACV 

AD 

ADA 

A/DACG 

ADOC 

ADX 

AECC 

Aegis 

AELT 

AES 

AEW 

AFB 

AFCOMAC 

AFDIGS 

AFEWC 

AFGWC 

AFHRA 

AFLC 

AFLIF 

AFLMC 

AFMSS 

AFX 

Airspace Coordination Order or 

Airspace Control Order 

Armored Cavalry Regiment 

Armored Combat Vehicle (US Army) 

or 

Air Cushion Vehicle (USN) 

Air Division 

Air Defense Artillery 

ArrivalDeparture Airfield Control 

Group 

Air Defense Operations Center 

Air Defense Exercise 

Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center 

Ship based long-range air defense 

system. 

Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team 

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron 

Airborne Early Warning 

Air Force Base 

Air Force Combat Ammunition Center 

Air Force Digital Graphics System 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Center 

Air Force Global Weather Center 

Air Force Historical Research Agency 

Air Force Logistics Command 

Air Force Logistics Information File 

Air Force Logistics Management 

Center 

Air Force Mission Support System 

Air Force Reserve 
AFSC 

AFSOC 

AFSOUTH 

AFWMPRT 

AGE 

AGL 

A1 

AIF 

AIR 

AIWS 

ALARM 

ALC 

ALCC 

ALCE 

ALCM 

ALMSNSCD 

ALO 

AM1 

AMRAAM 

AMU 

ANG 

ANGLCO 

A0 

AOB 

AOR 

APC 

Air Force Systems Command or 

Air Force Specialty Code 

Air Force Special Operations Command 

Allied Forces, South (NATO) 

Air Force Wartime Manpower and 

Personnel Readiness Team 

Aerospace Ground Equipment 

Above Ground Level 

Air Interdiction 

Automated Installation File 

Air Inflatable Retarder 

Advanced Interdiction Weapons System 

Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile 

Air Logistics Center 

Air1 ift Control Center 

Airlift Control Element 

Air-Launched Cruise Missile 

Airlift Mission Schedule 

Air Liaison Officer 

Aeronautical Militate Italiana 

Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air 

Missile 

Aircraft Maintenance Unit 

Air National Guard 

Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison 

Company (USMC) 

Area of Operation 

Air Order of Battle 

Area of Responsibility 

Armored Personnel Carrier 
APCC 

APOD 

APS 

ARBS 

ARC 

ARCENT 

AREFS 

ARM 

ARNG 

ARS 

ARW 

ASARS 

ASD(PA) 

ASD(S0-LIC) 

ASM 

ASMA 

ASOC 

ASUWC 

ATACMS 

ATAF 

ATC 

ATGM 

AT0 

ATTG 

Aerial Port Control Center 

Aerial Port of Debarkation 

Afloat Prepositioning Ship 

Angle Rate Bombing Set (USMC) 

Air Reserve Components 

U.S. Army Forces, Central Command 

Air Refueling Squadron 

Antiradiation Missiles 

U.S. Army National Guard 

Air Rescue Service 

Air Rescue Wing 

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar 

System 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public 

Affairs) 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special 

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) 

Air-to-Surface Missile 

Air Staff Management Aide (UK and 

Iraq) 

Air Support Operations Center 

(ArmyAJSAF) 

Anti- to-S u rface Unit Warfare 

Commander (USN) 

Army Tactical Missile System 

Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO) 

Air Training Command (USAF) 

Anti-Tank Guided Munition 

Air Tasking Order 

Automated Tactical Target Graphic 
AUTODIN 

AVCAL 

AVLB 

Avn Bde 

AWACS 

AWN 

AWS 

BAAF 

BAI 

BARCAP 

BAS 

BBBG 

BCE 

BDA 

Bde 

BDU 

BE or BEN 

BEEF 

BLT 

BMP 

BMS 

BMW 

B/N 

BND 

BTG 

BVR 

BW 

Automatic Digital Network 

Aviation Coordinated Allowance List 

(USN) 

Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge 

Aviation Brigade (US) 

Airborne Warning and Control System 

Automated Weather Network 

Airborne Warning System 

Bahrain Amiri Air Force 

Battlefield Air Interdiction 

Barrier Combat Air Patrol 

Basic Allowance for Subsistence 

Battleship Battle Group 

Battlefield Coordination Element 

Bomb Damage Assessment 

Brigade (US) 

Battle Dress Uniform 

Basic Encyclopedia (number) 

Base Engineer Emergency Force 

Battalion Landing Team (USMC) 

Soviet armored personnel carrier 

Bombardment Squadron 

Bombardment Wing 

BombardierMavigator 

German Federal Intelligence Service 

Basic Target Graphic 

Beyond Visual Range 

Biological Warfare 
Deployment Day 

Command, Control, and 

Communications 

Command, Control, Communications 

Countermeasures 

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Intelligence 

Coordination, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence 

Center 

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Computers 

Civil Affairs 

Consolidated Air Defense Order of 

Battle 

Canadian Air Force 

Computer Aided Force Management 

System 

Center for Anti-Fratricide Technology 

Conventional Air Launched Cruise 

Missile 

C-Day 

c3 

C3CM 

C31 

C3IC 

c4 

CA 

CADOB 

CAF 

CAFMS 

CAR 

CALCM 

CAMS 

CAP 

CAS 

CASSUM 

CAT 

CB 

CBU 

CBW 

CCD 

Core Automated Maintenance System 

Combat Air Patrol 

Close Air Support or 

Combat Ammunition System 

Close Air Support Summary 

Crisis Action Team 

Chemical/Biological 

Cluster Bomb Unit 

ChemicaVBiological Weapons 

Camouflage, Concealment and 

Deception 
CCIP 

CCRC 

CEM 

CEMIRT 

CENTAF 

CENTCOM 

CEP 

CES 

CEV 

CFT 

CI 

CIA 

CIFS 

CINC 

CINCCENT 

CINCM AC 

CINCSPACE 

CINCTRANS 

CINCTRANSCOM 

CJCS 

CMMS 

Continuously Computed Impact Point 

Combined Control and Reporting 

Center 

Combined Effects Munition 

Civil Engineering Maintenance, 

Inspection, Repair, and Training 

U.S. Air Force, Central Command 

U.S. Central Command 

Circular Error Probable 

Civil Engineering Squadron 

Combat Engineer Vehicle 

Conformal Fuel Tank 

Civilian Internees 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Close-In Fire Support (USMC) 

Commander-in-Chief 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central 

Command 

Commander-in-Chief, Military Airlift 

Command 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Space 

Command 

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 

Transportat ion 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. 

Transportation Command 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Congressionally Mandated Mobility 

Study 

CNN Cable News Network 
COCOM 

COMALF 

COMA0 

COMMZ 

COMPES 

COMSEC 

COMTAC 

COMUSCENTAF 

COMUSCENTCOM 

CNA 

CNO 

COMINT 

COMSAT 

CONUS 

COSCOM 

CPX 

CRAF 

CRC 

cs 

CSAR 

CSG 

css 

CSSA 

CT 

CTJTF 

CVBG 

Combatant Command (Command 

Authority) 

Commander, Airlift Forces 

Composite Air Operation 

Communications Zone 

Contingency Operations Mobility 

Planning and Execution System 

Communications Security 

Commander of Tactical Air Command 

Commander, U.S. Air Force, Central 

Command 

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

Center for Naval Analysis 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Communications Intelligence 

Communications Satellite 

Continental United States 

Corps Support Command (US Army) 

Command Post Exercise 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

Control and Reporting Center 

Combat Support 

Combat Search and Rescue 

Contingency Support Graphic 

Combat Service Support 

CENTAF Supply Support Agency or 

Combat Service Support Area 

Counterterrorism 

Counterterrorism Joint Task Force 

Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (USN) 
Chemical Warfare 

Conventional Weapons Enhanced 

Penetration 

Contingency Weather Package 

Decoy and Deception 

Dissimilar Aerial Combat Tactics 

Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency 

Deep Air Support (USMC) 

Direct Air Support Center (USMC) 

Defense Communications Agency 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Unnamed day on which an operations 

begins 

Defense Data Network 

cw 

CWEP 

CWP 

D&D 

DACT 

DARPA 

DAS 

DASC 

DCA 

DCI 

D-Day 

DDN 

DF 

DFR/ME 

DFSC 

DFSP 

DIA 

DIS 

DISA 

Div 

DLA 

DLIR 

DMA 

DMDC 

DMI 

Direction Fired or 

Direction Finding 

Defense Fuel Region, Middle East 

Defense Fuel Supply Center 

Defense Fuel Supply Point 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Daily Intelligence Summary 

Defense Information Systems Agency 

Division 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Downward Looking Infrared 

Defense Mapping Agency 

Defense Manpower Data Center 

Directorate of Military Intelligence 

(Israel, Iraq, Egypt) 
DMSP 

DMPI 

DNA 

DOC 

DOD 

DOE 

DOPMA 

DOS 

DOT 

DOWSR 

DPA 

DPG 

DSB 

DSCS 

DSFU 

DSMAC 

DSP 

EAC 

ECM 

ECS 

EDS 

EDT 

ELINT 

EMIS 

Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program 

Desired Mean Point of Impact 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Designed Operational Capability 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Defense Officer Personnel Management 

Act 

Department of State 

Department of Transportation 

Directorate of Weather for Strategic 

Reconnaissance 

Defense Production Act 

Defense Planning Guidance 

Defense Science Board 

Defense Satellite Communication 

System 

Desert Storm Forecast Unit 

Digitized Scene Mapping and 

Correlation 

Defense Support Program 

Echelon Above Corps or 

Eastern Area Command 

Electronic Countermeasures 

Electronic Combat Squadron 

European Distribution System 

Eastern Daylight Time 

Electronic In tell igence 

Electro-Magnetic Isotope Separation 
EOB 

EOD 

EOGB 

EOTDAS 

EPW 

ESA 

EST 

El-TF 

EUCOM 

EW 

EWO 

EWWS 

FAC 

FAE 

FAF 

FAPES 

FEBA 

FEWS 

FHTV 

FID 

FLIR 

FLOGEN 

FLOT 

FMC 

Fh4F 

FMS 

Electronic Order of Battle 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

Electro-Optically Guided Bomb 

Electro-Optical Tactical Decision Aid 

Software 

Enemy Prisoner of War 

European Space Agency 

Eastern Standard Time 

European Tanker Task Force 

European Command 

Electronic Warfare 

Electronic Warfare Officer 

Electronic Warfare Warning System or 

Set 

Forward Air Control 

Fuel Air Explosive 

French Air Force 

Force Augmentation Planning and 

Execution System 

Forward Edge of the Battle Area 

Follow-on Early Warning System 

Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles 

Foreign Internal Defense 

Forward-Looking Infrared 

Flow Generation computer model 

Forward Line of Own Troops 

Fully Mission Capable 

Fleet Marine Force 

Foreign Military Sales 
FMSE 

FMTV 

FNOC 

FOL 

FORSCOM 

FOSK 

FOV 

FROG 

FSCL 

FSS 

FTX 

G-Day 

GAO 

GC 

GCC 

GCI 

GCU 

GDSS 

GENA 

GHQ 

GLO 

GMT 

GNA 

GOB 

GOK 

GOSC 

Fuels Management Support Equipment 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 

Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center 

Forward Operating Location 

U.S. Army Forces Command 

Follow-on Spares Kits 

Field of View 

Free Rocket Over Ground 

Fire Support Coordination Line 

Fast Sealift Support 

Field Training Exercise 

Day the ground war began 

General Accounting Office 

Geneva Convention 

Gulf Cooperation Committee 

Ground Control Intercept 

Guidance and Control Unit 

Global Decision Support System 

Ground Air Navigation Aids radar 

(U. K./Saudi) 

General Headquarters. (usually theater 

level) 

Ground Liaison Officer 

Greenwich Mean Time 

Goldwater-Nichols DOD 

Reorganization Act 

Ground Order of Battle 

(USN) 

Government of Kuwait 

General Officer Steering Committee 
General Purpose bomb 

Global Positioning System or Satellite 

Specific time at which operations 

commence 

Heavy Armor 

High Speed Antiradiation Missile 

Hardened Aircraft Bunker 

Hardened Aircraft Shelter 

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical 

Truck 

Heavy Equipment Transporter 

High Frequency 

High Density Airspace Control Zone 

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle 

Host-nation Support 

Hard Target Penetrator Munitions 

Heads-Up Display 

Human Resources Intelligence 

High Value Airborne Assets 

Indications and Warnings 

Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces 

Iraqi Air Defense Forces 

Integrated Air Defense System 

International Atomic Energy 

Commission 

Italian Air Force 

International Commercial Aviation 

Organization 

GP 

GPS 

H-Hour 

HA 

HARM 

HAB 

HAS 

HEMlT 

HET 

HF 

HIDACZ 

HMMWV 

HNS 

HTPM 

HUD 

HUMINT 

HVAA 

I&W 

IAADF 

IADF 

IADS 

IAEC 

IAF 

ICAO 
ICRC 

IDF 

IFF 

IFR 

IFV 

IIR 

ILM 

ILMC 

IMA 

IMET 

IMINT 

IMQT 

INS 

IOC 

IOT&E 

IP 

IPDS 

IR 

IRR 

ISW 

ITAC 

ITF 

IZAF 

J- 1 

International Committee of the Red 

Cross 

Israel Defense Force 

Identification Friend or Foe 

Instrument Flight Reference 

Infantry Fighting Vehicle 

Intelligence Information Report or 

Imaging Infrared 

Intermediate-Level Maintenance 

Intermediate-Level Maintenance Center 

Individual Mobilization Augmentee 

International Military Education and 

Trdi ni ng 

Imagery Intelligence 

Initial Mission Qualification Training 

Inertial Navigation System 

Intercept Operations Center or 

Integrated Operations Center 

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 

Initial Point 

Inland Petroleum Distribution System 

(US Army) 

Infrared 

Individual Ready Reserve 

Integrated Strike Warfare 

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center 

(US Army) 

Intelligence Task Force (DIA) 

Iraqi Air Force 

Manpower & Personnel Directorate 

(Joint) 
Intelligence Directorate (Joint) 

Operations Directorate (Joint) 

Logistics Directorate (Joint) 

Strategic Plans & Policy Directorate 

(Joint) 

Command, Control & Communications 

Systems Directorate (Joint) 

Operational Plans & Interoperability 

Directorate (Joint) 

Force Structure Resource & 

Assessment Directorate (Joint) 

Joint Air Attack Team 

Judge Advocate General 

Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee 

Land-based ground attack aircraft 

Joint Automated Message Program 

Joint Communications Electronics 

Operations Instructions 

Joint Captured Material Exploitation 

Center 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Communications Support Element 

Joint U.S./Saudi Directorate of 

Planning 

Joint Deployment System 

Joint Force Air Component 

Commander. 

Joint Forces Commander 

5-2 

5-3 

5-4 

J-5 

5-6 

5-7 

5-8 

JAAT 

JAG 

JAIC 

Jaguar 

JAMPS 

JCEOI 

JCMEC 

JCS 

JCSE 

JDOP 

JDS 

JFACC 

JFC 

JFC-E 

JFC-N 

Joint Forces Command East 

Joint Forces Command North 
JFLCC 

JFMCC 

JFSOCC 

JIB 

JIC 

JIPC 

JIST 

JMCC 

JMEM 

JOPES 

JPEC 

JPTS 

JRC 

JRCC 

JS 

JSCP 

JSEAD 

JSIPS 

JSOTF 

JSPS 

JSTARS 

JTACMS 

JTCB 

Joint Forces Land Component 

Commander 

Joint Forces Maritime Component 

Commander 

Joint Forces Special Operations 

Component Commander 

Joint Information Bureau 

Joint Intelligence Center 

Joint Imagery Production Center 

Joint Intelligence Survey Team 

Joint Movement Control Center 

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 

Joint Operations Planning and 

Execution System 

Joint Planning and Execution 

Community 

Jet Propellant Thermally Stable 

Joint Reconnaissance Center 

Joint Rescue Coordination Center 

Joint Staff 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

Joint Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defenses 

Joint Service Imagery Processing 

System 

Joint Special Operations Task Force 

Joint Strategic Planning System 

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System (E-8) 

Joint Tactical Missile System 

Joint Target Coordination Board 
JTF Joint Task Force 

JTFME 

JTIDS 

JlTP 

JULL 

KAF 

KCATF 

KHZ 

KKMC 

KIA 

KTO 

LAMPS 

LANDSAT 

LANTCOM 

LANTIRN 

LAV 

LCAC 

LCC 

LDGP 

LENSCE 

LG 

LGB 

LGGAIR 

LIATE 

Joint Task Force Middle East 

Joint Tactical Information Distribution 

System 

Joint Tactics, Techniques and 

Procedures 

Joint Uniform Lessons Learned 

Kuwaiti Air Force 

Kuwait Civil Affairs Task Force 

Kilohertz 

King Khalid Military City 

Killed In Action 

Kuwait Theater of Operations 

Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System 

(USN) 

Land Satellite, NASA/NOAA Satellite 

Program 

Atlantic Command 

Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting 

Infrared System for Night 

Light Armored Vehicle 

Air Cushioned Landing Craft 

Land Component Commander 

Low Drag General Purpose bomb 

Limited Enemy SituatiodCorrelation 

Equipment 

Log is t ic s 

Laser Guided Bomb 

Logistics Airlift 

LANTIRIN Intermediate Automatic 

Test Equipment 
LOC 

LOS 

LOTS 

LRC 

LRI 

LVS 

MAC 

MACCS 

MACG 

MAG 

MAGTF 

MAIRS 

MAJCOMS 

MAP 

MARCENT 

MARDIV 

MASF 

MASS 

MAW 

MCI 

MCM 

MEB 

Mech Div 

MEF 

MEL 

Lines of Communication 

Line of Sight 

Logistics Over the Shore 

Logistics Readiness Center (USAF) 

Long Range International 

Logistics Vehicle System 

Military Airlift Command 

Marine Air Command and Control 

System 

Marine Air Control Group 

Marine Airlift Group 

Marine Air Ground Task Force 

Military Airlift Integrated Reporting 

System 

Major Commands 

Master Attack Plan 

U.S. Marine Corps, Central Command 

Marine Division 

Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility 

MICAP Asset Sourcing System 

Marine Aircraft Wing 

Ministry of Culture and Information 

(Iraq) 

Mine Countermeasures or 

Multi-Command Manual 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

Mechanized In fan try Division 

Marine Expeditionary Force 

Mobile Erector-Launcher used for 

mobile missiles 
METS 

METSAT 

MEU 

MHE 

MIA 

MIF 

MICAP 

MILCON 

MILSATCOM 

MILSTAR 

MI0 

MIPE 

MIS 

MISREP 

MLRS 

MLV 

MOBREP 

MOD 

MODA 

MOPP 

MPES 

MPF 

MPS 

MRE 

Mobile Electronic Test Set 

Meteorological Satellite 

Marine Expeditionary Unit 

Materiel Handling Equipment 

Missing In Action 

Maritime Interdiction Force 

Mission Critical Parts or 

Mission Capable or 

Mission Capability Limiting 

Military Construction 

Military Satellite Communications 

Military Strategic and Tactical Relay 

System 

Maritime Intercept Operations 

Mobile Intelligence Processing Element 

Military Intelligence Study 

Mission Report 

Multiple Launch Rocket System 

Memory Loader Verifier 

Manpower Mobilization and Accession 

Status Report 

Ministry of Defense 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation 

(Saudi Arabia) 

Mission Oriented Protective Posture 

Medical Planning and Execution 

System 

Maritime Prepositioning Force 

Maritime Prepositioning Ships 

Meals Ready to Eat 
MRR 

MRS 

MSC 

MSE 

MSI 

MSK 

MTACC 

MTI 

MTL 

MTMC 

NAC 

NALE 

NATO 

NAVCENT 

NAVEUR 

NAVSTAR 

NBC 

NCA 

NCTR 

NDRF 

NDS 

NF or NOFORN 

NGB 

NGFS 

NIE 

NMAC 

NMCS 

Minimum Risk Route 

Mobility Requirements Study 

Military Sealift Command 

Mobile Subscriber Equipment 

Multi-Spectral Imagery 

Mission Support Kits 

Marine Tactical Air Command Center 

Moving Target Indicator 

Master Target List 

Military Traffic Management Command 

Northern Area Command 

Naval Amphibious Liaison Element 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

U.S. Navy, Central Command 

Naval Forces, Europe 

Navigational Satellite Timing and 

Ranging 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

National Command Authorities 

Noncooperative Target Recognition 

National Defense Reserve Fleet 

NPIC Data Systems 

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals 

National Guard Bureau 

Naval Gunfire Support 

National Intelligence Estimate 

Near Mid-Air Collision 

Not Mission Capable Supplies 
NMCM 

NMIC 

NMIST 

NOAA 

NOB 

NODDS 

NPIC 

NSA 

NSC 

NTC 

NVG 

O&M 

OAS 

OASD/( DR&E) 

0 ASD/( SOLIC) 

OB 

OCA 

OCP 

OICC 

OP 

OPAIR 

OFCON 

OPDS 

Not Mission Capable Maintenance 

National Military Intelligence Center 

National Military Intelligence Support 

Teams 

National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

Naval Order of Battle 

Naval Oceanographic Data 

Dissemination System 

National Photo Interpretation Center 

National Security Agency 

National Security Council 

Night Targeting Cell (in GAT) 

Night Vision Goggles 

Operations and Maintenance 

Offensive Avionics System 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Defense Research & 

Engineering) 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Special OperationsLow 

Intensity Conflict) 

Order of Battle 

Offensive Counter Air 

Observation Command Post 

Operational Intelligence Crisis Center 

Observation Post 

Opposing Air 

Operational Control 

Offshore Petroleum Distribution System 

(USN) 
OPEC 

OPLAN 

OPORD 

OPSEC 

OSD 

OSI 

OSP 

PACOM 

PA 

PA0 

PCITF 

PGM 

PIN 

PLO 

PLS 

PLV 

PMC 

PMEL 

PMT 

PNVS 

POG 

POL 

POMCUS 

POW 

PREP0 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries 

Operation Plan 

Operation Order 

Operational Security 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Office of Special Investigations 

(USAF) 

Operational Support Package 

Pacific Command 

Public Affairs 

Public Affairs Officer 

Positive Combat Identification Task 

Force 

Precision Guided Munitions 

Primary Identification Number 

Palestine Liberation Organization 

Palletized Loading System 

Program Loader Verifier 

Partially Mission Capable 

Precision Measurement Equipment 

Laboratory 

Pastoral Ministry Team 

Pilot Night Vision System 

Psychological Operations Group 

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants 

Pre-positioning of Material Configured 

to Unit Sets 

Prisoner of War 

Pre-positioned 
PSYOP 

PSYOPS 

PTAS 

QEAF 

QRCT 

R&D 

R&M 

RADIC 

RAF 

RAFVR 

RAM 

RC 

RCAF 

RCC 

RDAF 

RDF 

RDIT 

RDJTF 

Red Horse 

REMIS 

RFI 

RFMD 

RGFC 

Psychological Operation 

Psychological Operations 

Provisional Tactical Airlift Squadron 

Qatari Emiri Air Force 

Quick Reaction Communications 

Terminal 

Research and Development 

Reliability and Maintainability 

Rapidly Deployable Integrated 

Command and Control system 

Royal Air Force (U.K.) 

Royal Air Force Voluntary Reserve 

Radar Absorptive Material 

Reserve Component 

Royal Canadian Air Force 

Rescue Coordination Center or 

Revolutionary Command Council (Iraq) 

Royal Dutch Air Force 

Rapid Deployment Force or 

Radio Direction Finding 

Rapid Deployment Imagery Terminal 

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 

Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy 

Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer 

Reliability and Maintainability 

Information System 

Request for Information 

RED FLAG Measurement Debriefing 

Republican Guard Force Command 

(Iraq) 

RIBS Readiness in Base Services 
WAF 

RLT 

RORO 

ROE 

ROTHR 

RPV 

RRF 

RSADF 

RSAF 

RSLF 

RTNEPH 

RW 

RWR 

S&TI 

SA 

SAAF 

SAC 

SAG 

SAM 

SAMAREC 

SANG 

SAR 

SAS 

SATCOM 

SBS 

SBSS 

Royal Jordanian Air Force 

Regimental Landing Team (USMC) 

Roll On/Roll Off 

Rules of Engagement 

Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar 

Remotely Piloted Vehicle 

Ready Reserve Force or 

Ready Reserve Fleet 

Royal Saudi Air Defense Force 

Royal Saudi Air Force 

Royal Saudi Land Force 

Real-Time Nephanalysis 

Reconnaissance Wing 

Radar Warning Receiver 

Scientific and Technical Intelligence 

Selective Availability 

Saudi Arabian Armed Forces 

Strategic Air Command 

Saudi Arabian Government or 

Surface Action Group (USN) 

Surface-to-Air Missile 

Saudi Arabian Marketing and Refining 

Company 

Saudi Arabian National Guard 

Search and Rescue 

Special Air Service (U.K.) 

Satellite Communications 

Special Boat Service (U.K.) 

Standard Base Supply System 
SCUD 

SCI 

SCIF 

SEAD 

SEAL 

SECDEF 

SFG 

SFW 

SHAPE 

SHF 

SIDS 

SIGINT 

SINCGARS 

SIOP 

SITREP 

SLAM 

SLAR 

SLOC 

SMESA 

SNIE 

SOAF 

SOC 

SOCCENT 

Soviet surface-to-surface missile 

Sensitive Compartmented Information 

Sensitive Compartmented Information 

Facility 

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 

Sea Air Land 

Secretary of Defense 

Special Forces Group 

Sensor Fuzed Weapon 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, 

Europe 

Super High Frequency 

Secondary Imagery Dissemination 

System 

Signals Intelligence 

Single Channel GroundAirborne Radio 

Subsystem 

Single Integrated Operations Plan 

Situation Report 

Standoff Land Attack Missile 

Side-Looking Airborne Radar 

Sea Lines of Communications 

Special Middle East Shipping 

Agreement 

Special National Intelligence Estimate 

Sultanate of Oman Air Force 

Sector Operations Center (Air Defense) 

or 

Special Operations Command 

Special Operations Command, Central 

Command 
SOCOM 

SOF 

SOFA 

SOG 

sos 

sow 

SPACC 

SPEAR 

SPINS 

SPOT 

SRBM 

SRP 

SRW 

SSA 

SSM 

STAMP 

STGP 

STON 

STPJ 

STRAPP 

STRATFOR 

STU 

SURVIAC 

Special Operations Command 

Special Operations Forces 

Status of Forces Agreement 

Special Operations Group 

Special Operations Squadron 

Special Operations Wing 

U.S. SPACECOM Space Control 

Center 

Strike Projection Evaluation and AntiAir Warfare Research (USN) 

Special Instructions 

French Satellite Probatoire 

d'observation de la Terre 

Short-range Ballistic Missile 

Sealift Readiness Program 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing 

Selective Service Act 

Surface-to-Surface Missile 

Standard Air Munitions Package 

Special Tactics Group (USAF) 

Short Ton (2,000 pounds or 0.9 metric 

tons) 

Special Tactic Paramedics (USAF) 

Standard Tank, Rack, Adapter, and 

Pylon Package 

Strategic Forces Advisors 

Secure Telephone Unit 

Survivability and Vulnerability 

Information Analysis Center 

SWA Southwest Asia 
SYERS 

TAC 

TACAIR 

TACC 

TACON 

TACP 

TACS 

TACSAT 

TADIL 

TAF 

TAG 

TAIRCW 

TALD 

TALO 

TANKREP 

TAX 

TARCAP 

TARPS 

TAW 

TAWC 

TBM 

TCN 

TDA 

TEL 

TEMPER 

TER 

Senior Year Electro-Optical 

Reconnaissance System 

Tactical Air Command 

Tactical Air 

Tactical Air Control Center 

Tactical Control 

Tactical Air Control Party 

Tactical Air Control System 

Tactical Satellite 

Tactical Digital Information Link or 

Tactical Data Interface Link 

Tactical Aircraft Forces 

Tactical Airlift Group 

Tactical Air Control Wing 

Tactical Air-Launched Decoy 

Theater Airlift Liaison Officer 

Tank Killer Report 

Tactical Air Operations Center (USMC) 

Target Combat Air Patrol 

Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod 

System 

Tactical Airlift Wing 

Tactical Air Warfare Center 

Tactical Ballistic Missile 

Transportation Control Number 

Tactical Decision Aid 

Transporter-Erector-Launcher 

Tent Expendable Modular Personnel 

Triple Ejector Rack 
TERCOM 

TFS 

TFW 

TIALD 

TIARA 

TIBS 

TIROS 

TIS 

TLAM 

TMD 

TO 

TO&E 

TO@ 

TOT 

TPFDD 

TPFDL 

TR 

TRADOC 

TRAM 

TRANSCOM 

TRAP 

TRG 

lTF 

lTM 

Terrain Contour Matching 

Tactical Fighter Squadron 

Tactical Fighter Wing 

Thermal Imaging and Laser 

Designating 

Tactical Intelligence and Related 

Activities 

Tactical Information Broadcast System 

WAF) 

Television and Infrared Observation 

Satel I i tes 

Tactical Intelligence Squadron 

Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile 

Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense 

Technical Order 

Table of Organization and Equipment 

Tactical Operations Area Forecast 

Time Over Target 

Time-Phased Force Deployment Data 

Time-Phased Force Deployment List 

Theater Reserves 

Training and Doctrine Command (US 

Target Recognition and Acquisition 

Multisensor (USN) 

US. Transportation Command 

Tanks, Racks, Adapters, and Pylons 

Tactical Reconnaissance Group 

Army 1 

'I'dnker Task Force ' 

Tactical Target Material 
TrP 

UAE 

UAEAF 

UAV 

UAWS 

UCMJ 

UHF 

UK 

ULN 

UMMIPS 

UN 

UND 

UNSC 

USACE 

USAF 

USAFE 

USAFR 

USAR 

USC 

USCENTCOM 

USCG 

USCINCCENT 

USCINCCENT 

USDAO 

USEUCOM 

USG 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

United Arab Emirates 

United Arab Emirates Air Force 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

USAREUR Automated Weather System 

Uniform Code of Military Justice 

Ultra High Frequency 

United Kingdom 

Unit Line Number 

Uniform Military Management and 

Movement Indicator System 

United Nations 

Urgency of Need Designator 

United Nations Security Council 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

United States Air Force 

U.S. Air Force Europe 

United States Air Force Reserve 

US. Army Reserve 

United States Code 

Central Command 

U. S. Coast Guard 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central 

Command 

U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central 

Command 

U.S. Defense Attache Office 

1J.S. European Command 

United States Government 
USIA 

USMC 

USN 

USNAVCENT 

USNR 

USPACCOM 

USSOCOM 

USSOUTHCOM 

USSPACECOM 

USTRANSCOM 

UTC 

UTE 

VA 

VCJCS 

VFR 

WAM 

WATCHCON 

WCDC 

WFOV 

WHNS 

WIA 

WIN 

WN or WNINTEL 

WOC 

WRM 

WRSK 

wso 

U.S. Information Agency 

U.S. Marine Corps 

U.S. Navy 

U.S. Navy, U.S. Central Command 

US. Navy Reserve 

U.S. Pacific Command 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

U.S. Southern Command 

U.S. Space Command 

U.S. Transportation Command 

Unit Type Code 

Utilization Rate 

Department of Veteran’s Affairs 

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Visual Flight Reference 

Wide Area Mine 

Watch Condition 

War Crimes Documentation Center 

Wide Field of View 

Wartime Host-Nation Support 

Wounded in Action 

Worldwide Military Command and 

Control System Intercomputer Network 

Warning Notice: Intelligence Sources 

and Methods Involved 

Wing Operations Center 

War Reserve Material 

War Readiness Spares Kits 

Weapons System Operator 
WWIMS 

WWMCCS 

WXG 

Worldwide Indicators and Monitoring 

System 

Worldwide Military Command and 

Control Sy,stem 

Weather Group