III 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 302 

Censuring the President and Vice President. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 3, 2007 

Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. HARKIN, and Mrs. BOXER) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

RESOLUTION 

Censuring the President and Vice President. 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE. 

3 (a) IRAQ’S ALLEGED NUCLEAR PROGRAM.—The 

4 Senate finds the following: 

5 (1) In December 2001, the intelligence commu6 nity assessed that Iraq did not appear to have recon7 stituted its nuclear weapons program. 

8 (2) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es9 timate assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear 

10 weapon or sufficient material to make one, and that 

11 without sufficient fissile material acquired from 


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1 abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a 

2 weapon until 2007 or 2009. 

3 (3) On October 6, 2002, the Central Intel4 ligence Agency advised the White House to remove 

5 references to Iraq seeking uranium from Africa from 

6 a Presidential speech, citing weak evidence. 

7 (4) In November 2002, the United States Gov8 ernment told the International Atomic Energy Asso9 ciation that ‘‘reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure 

10 uranium from Africa are fragmentary at best.’’. 

11 (5) On March 7, 2003, the Director General of 

12 the International Atomic Energy Association re13 ported to the United Nations Security Council that 

14 inspectors had found ‘‘no evidence or plausible indi15 cation of the revival of a nuclear weapons program 

16 in Iraq.’’. 

17 (6) On March 11, 2003, the Central Intel18 ligence Agency stated that it did not dispute the 

19 International Atomic Energy Association conclusions 

20 that the documents on Iraq’s agreement to buy ura21 nium from Niger were not authentic. 

22 (7) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi23 dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the nature and 

24 urgency of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by 

25 making repeated, unqualified assertions about an 


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1 Iraqi nuclear program that were not supported by 

2 available intelligence, including— 

3 (A) on March 22, 2002, President George 

4 W. Bush stated that ‘‘[Saddam] is a dangerous 

5 man who possesses the world’s most dangerous 

6 weapons.’’; 

7 (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President 

8 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[m]any of us 

9 are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear 

10 weapons fairly soon.’’; 

11 (C) on September 8, 2002, Vice President 

12 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[w]e do know, 

13 with absolute certainty, that he is using his pro14 curement system to acquire the equipment he 

15 needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nu16 clear weapon.’’; 

17 (D) on September 20, 2002, Vice Presi18 dent Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘we now 

19 have irrefutable evidence that he has once again 

20 set up and reconstituted his program, to take 

21 uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade, 

22 so that it will function as the base material as 

23 a nuclear weapon.’’; 

24 (E) on October 7, 2002, President George 

25 W. Bush stated that ‘‘[f]acing clear evidence of 


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1 peril, we cannot wait for the final proof—the 

2 smoking gun—that could come in the form of 

3 a mushroom cloud.’’; 

4 (F) on December 31, 2002, President 

5 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[w]e don’t know 

6 whether or not [Saddam] has a nuclear weap7 on.’’; 

8 (G) on January 28, 2003, President 

9 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[t]he British gov10 ernment has learned that Saddam Hussein re11 cently sought significant quantities of uranium 

12 from Africa.’’; and 

13 (H) on March 16, 2003, Vice President 

14 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[w]e believe 

15 [Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear 

16 weapons.’’. 

17 (b) SADDAM’S ALLEGED INTENT TO USE WEAPONS

18 OF MASS DESTRUCTION.—The Senate finds the following: 

19 (1) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es20 timate assessed that ‘‘Baghdad for now appears to 

21 be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist at22 tacks with conventional or CBW against the United 

23 States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement 

24 would provide Washington a stronger cause for mak25 ing war’’ and that ‘‘Iraq probably would attempt 


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1 clandestine attacks against the United States Home2 land if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened 

3 the survival of the regime were imminent or un4 avoidable, or possibly for revenge.’’. 

5 (2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi6 dent Richard B. Cheney made misleading state7 ments, that were not supported by the available in8 telligence, suggesting that Saddam Hussein sought 

9 weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of an 

10 unprovoked, offensive attack, including— 

11 (A) on August 26, 2002, Vice President 

12 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘. . . there is no 

13 doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons 

14 of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is 

15 amassing them to use against our friends, 

16 against our allies, and against us.’’; 

17 (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President 

18 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[t]hese are not 

19 weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq; 

20 these are offensive weapons for the purpose of 

21 inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so 

22 that Saddam can hold the threat over the head 

23 of anyone he chooses, in his own region or be24 yond.’’; and 


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1 (C) on October 2, 2002, President George 

2 W. Bush stated that ‘‘On its present course, the 

3 Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. We 

4 know the treacherous history of the regime. It 

5 has waged a war against its neighbors, it has 

6 sponsored and sheltered terrorists, it has devel7 oped weapons of mass death, it has used them 

8 against innocent men, women and children. We 

9 know the designs of the Iraqi regime.’’. 

10 (c) SADDAM’S ALLEGED LINKS TO AL QAEDA AND

11 9/11.—The Senate finds the following: 

12 (1) Before the war, the Central Intelligence 

13 Agency assessed that ‘‘Saddam has viewed Islamic 

14 extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat, and his 

15 regime since its inception has arrested and executed 

16 members of both Shia and Sunni groups to disrupt 

17 their organizations and limit their influence,’’ that 

18 ‘‘Saddam Hussain and Usama bin Laden are far 

19 from being natural partners,’’ and that assessments 

20 about Iraqi links to al Qaeda rest on ‘‘a body of 

21 fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of 

22 varying reliability.’’. 

23 (2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi24 dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the threat posed 

25 by Saddam Hussein by making unqualified asserVerDate Aug 31 2005 02:52 Aug 06, 2007 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\SR302.IS SR302

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1 tions that were not supported by available intel2 ligence linking Saddam Hussein to the September 

3 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and stating that Saddam 

4 Hussein and al Qaeda had a relationship and that 

5 Saddam Hussein would provide al Qaeda with weap6 ons of mass destruction for purposes of an offensive 

7 attack against the United States, including— 

8 (A) on September 25, 2002, President 

9 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[Y]ou can’t dis10 tinguish between al Qa’ida and Saddam when 

11 you talk about the war on terror.’’; 

12 (B) on September 26, 2002, President 

13 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[t]he dangers we 

14 face will only worsen from month to month and 

15 from year to year. . . . Each passing day could 

16 be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives an17 thrax or VX—nerve gas—or some day a nu18 clear weapon to a terrorist ally.’’; 

19 (C) on October 14, 2002, President George 

20 W. Bush stated that ‘‘[t]his is a man that we 

21 know has had connections with al Qa’ida. This 

22 is a man who, in my judgment, would like to 

23 use al Qa’ida as a forward army.’’; 

24 (D) on November 7, 2002, President 

25 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[Saddam is] a 


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1 threat because he is dealing with al Qaida . . . 

2 [A] true threat facing our country is that an al 

3 Qaida-type network trained and armed by Sad4 dam could attack America and not leave one 

5 fingerprint.’’; 

6 (E) on January 31, 2003, President 

7 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘Saddam Hussein 

8 would like nothing more than to use a terrorist 

9 network to attack and to kill and leave no fin10 gerprints behind.’’; 

11 (F) on March 16, 2003, Vice President 

12 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘we also have to 

13 address the question of where might these ter14 rorists acquire weapons of mass destruction, 

15 chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear 

16 weapons? And Saddam Hussein becomes a 

17 prime suspect in that regard because of his past 

18 track record and because we know he has, in 

19 fact, developed these kinds of capabilities, 

20 chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s 

21 used chemical weapons. And we know he’s re22 constituted these programs since the Gulf War. 

23 We know he’s out trying once again to produce 

24 nuclear weapons and we know that he has a 


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1 long-standing relationship with various terrorist 

2 groups, including the al-Qaeda organization.’’; 

3 (G) on March 17, 2003, President George 

4 W. Bush stated that ‘‘The danger is clear: 

5 using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear 

6 weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the ter7 rorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and 

8 kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of in9 nocent people in our country or any other.’’; 

10 (H) on May 1, 2003, President George W. 

11 Bush stated that ‘‘[t]he liberation of Iraq . . . 

12 removed an ally of al Qaeda.’’; 

13 (I) on September 14, 2003, Vice President 

14 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘the Iraqi 

15 intelligen[ce] service had a relationship with al 

16 Qaeda that developed throughout the decade of 

17 the 90’s. That was clearly official policy.’’; 

18 (J) on September 14, 2003, Vice President 

19 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[i]f we’re suc20 cessful in Iraq . . . we will have struck a major 

21 blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, 

22 the geographic base of the terrorists who have 

23 had us under assault now for many years, but 

24 most especially on 9/11.’’; and 


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1 (K) on March 21, 2006, President George 

2 W. Bush said at a press conference, ‘‘But we 

3 realized on September the 11th, 2001, that kill4 ers could destroy innocent life. And I’m never 

5 going to forget it. And I’m never going to for6 get the vow I made to the American people that 

7 we will do everything in our power to protect 

8 our people. Part of that meant to make sure 

9 that we didn’t allow people to provide safe 

10 haven to an enemy. And that’s why I went into 

11 Iraq.’’. 

12 (d) INADEQUATE PLANNING AND INSUFFICIENT

13 TROOP LEVELS.—The Senate finds the following: 

14 (1) The intelligence community judged in Janu15 ary 2003 that ‘‘[t]he ouster of Iraqi dictator Sad16 dam Hussayn would pose a variety of significant pol17 icy challenges for whoever assumes responsibility for 

18 governing Iraq’’ including ‘‘political transformation, 

19 controlling internal strife, solving economic and hu20 manitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent 

21 foreign policy and security concerns.’’. 

22 (2) The intelligence community judged in Janu23 ary 2003 that ‘‘a post-Saddam authority would face 

24 a deeply divided society with a significant chance 

25 that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict 


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1 with each other unless an occupying force prevented 

2 them from doing so.’’. 

3 (3) These judgments were delivered to the 

4 White House and Office of the Vice President. 

5 (4) Then Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki 

6 testified on February 25, 2003, that ‘‘something on 

7 the order of several hundred thousands soldiers’’ 

8 would be needed to secure Iraq following a success9 ful completion of the war. 

10 (5) General Abizaid, then-CENTCOM com11 mander, testified before the Senate Armed Services 

12 Committee on November 15, 2006, that ‘‘General 

13 Shinseki was right that a greater international force 

14 contribution, United States force contribution and 

15 Iraqi force contribution should have been available 

16 immediately after major combat operations.’’. 

17 (6) After President George W. Bush declared 

18 the end of major combat operations in Iraq, there 

19 were insufficient troops to prevent the outbreak of 

20 violence and lawlessness that contributed to the 

21 flight of millions of Iraqis and the deaths of tens of 

22 thousands of Iraqis. 

23 (7) The Government Accountability Office pro24 vided testimony to the Subcommittee on National 

25 Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on 


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1 Oversight and Government Reform, on March 22, 

2 2007, that due to insufficient troop levels, United 

3 States forces were unable to secure conventional 

4 weapons stockpiles in Iraq that continue to pose a 

5 threat to American servicemembers. 

6 (8) President George W. Bush failed to ensure 

7 that plans were prepared and implemented to ad8 dress the challenges that the intelligence community 

9 predicted would occur after the ouster of Saddam 

10 Hussein, and in particular failed to ensure that 

11 there were sufficient coalition troops in Iraq after 

12 major combat operations ended to maintain security 

13 and secure weapons stockpiles. 

14 (e) STRAIN ON MILITARY AND UNDERMINING HOME15 LAND SECURITY.—The Senate finds the following: 

16 (1) Retired Major General John Batiste, former 

17 commander of the First Infantry Division in Iraq, 

18 testified before the House Committee on Foreign Af19 fairs on June 27, 2007, that ‘‘[o]ur Army and Ma20 rine Corps are at a breaking point at a time in his21 tory when we need a strong military the most. The 

22 cycle of deployments is staggering. American forma23 tions continue to lose a battalion’s worth of dead 

24 and wounded every month with little to show for it. 

25 The current recruiting system falls drastically short 


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1 of long-term requirements and our all-volunteer 

2 force can not sustain the current tempo for much 

3 longer. The military is spending over 

4 $1,000,000,000 a year in incentives in a last ditch 

5 effort to keep the force together. Young officers and 

6 noncommissioned officers are leaving the service at 

7 an alarming rate.’’. 

8 (2) Extended deployments of 15 months, and 

9 insufficient time to rest and train between deploy10 ments, have undermined the readiness of the Army. 

11 (3) The Army National Guard reported as early 

12 as July 2005 that equipment transfers to deploying 

13 units ‘‘had largely exhausted its inventory of more 

14 than 220 critical items, including some items useful 

15 to nondeployed units for training and domestic mis16 sions.’’. 

17 (4) The Government Accountability Office 

18 found, in September 2006, that ‘‘[a]mong the items 

19 for which the Army National Guard had shortages 

20 of over 80 percent of the authorized inventory were 

21 chemical warfare monitoring and decontamination 

22 equipment and night vision goggles’’. 

23 (5) President George W. Bush’s policies in Iraq 

24 have undermined homeland security by depleting the 


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1 personnel and equipment needed by the National 

2 Guard. 

3 (f) INSURGENCY IN ‘‘LAST THROES’’.—The Senate 

4 finds the following: 

5 (1) Multi-National Force-Iraq reports indicate 

6 that the number of attacks on coalition forces has 

7 increased since the beginning of military action. 

8 (2) The Government Accountability Office, in 

9 March 2007, reported that attacks using improvised 

10 explosive devices continued to increase between 2005 

11 and July 2006. 

12 (3) On June 23, 2005, General John Abizaid, 

13 in his capacity as head of Central Command, testi14 fied before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

15 about the state of the insurgency that ‘‘[i]n terms 

16 of comparison from 6 months ago, in terms of for17 eign fighters I believe there are more foreign fighters 

18 coming into Iraq than there were 6 months ago. In 

19 terms of the overall strength of the insurgency, I’d 

20 say it’s about the same as it was.’’. 

21 (4) President George W. Bush’s Initial Bench22 mark Assessment report from July 12, 2007, states 

23 that ‘‘[a]s a result of increased offensive operations, 

24 Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased 


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1 attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and 

2 Salah ad Din.’’. 

3 (5) Vice President Richard B. Cheney made 

4 misleading statements that the insurgency in Iraq 

5 was in its ‘‘last throes,’’ including— 

6 (A) on May 30, 2005, Vice President Rich7 ard B. Cheney said, ‘‘The level of activity that 

8 we see today from a military standpoint, I 

9 think, will clearly decline. I think they’re in the 

10 last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.’’; and 

11 (B) on June 19, 2006, Vice President 

12 Richard B. Cheney was asked whether he still 

13 supported the comment he made in 2005, re14 garding the fact that the insurgency in Iraq 

15 was in its ‘‘last throes,’’ to which he responded 

16 ‘‘I do.’’ 

17 SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE SENATE. 

18 The Senate censures President George W. Bush and 

19 Vice President Richard B. Cheney for— 

20 (1) misleading the American people about the 

21 basis for going to war in Iraq; 

22 (2) failing to plan adequately for the war; 

23 (3) pursuing policies in Iraq that have strained 

24 our military and undermined our homeland security; 

25 and 


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1 (4) misleading the American people about the 

2 insurgency in Iraq. 

Æ 


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