20-Year-Old Warship’s

Dogged Determination

USS RUSSELL's (DDG 59) team spirit 

instrumental in ship's top shape

10 TCRM ON THE JOB

Ordnance On-Load at Sea 

USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75)

16 BEST PRACTICE

Train for the Worst To Be the Best 

USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45)

22 FLIGHT DECK AWARENESS

Just Another Day

USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD 18)

PAGE 8
ON THE COVER: The crew and officers of USS RUSSELL (DDG 59) pause 

from work for a team photo during an extended drydock selective restricted 

availability at BAE naval shipyard. (U.S. Navy Photo)

FACING PAGE: CS2 Tyrone Davis jumps rope during his personal physical 

fitness training aboard guided-missile destroyer USS O’KANE (DDG 77). 

(U.S. Navy Photo/MC2 Mark Logico)

EDITORIAL STAFF

Head, Media Division Derek Nelson

Editor Evelyn Odango

Art Director Allan Amen

Graphics and Design John W. Williams

Webmaster Darlene Savage

Social Media Manager Christopher Jones

EDITORIAL OFFICE

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Attn: Sea Compass

375 A Street

Norfolk, VA 23511-4399

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General email: safe-seacompass@navy.mil

Editor's email: evelyn.odango@navy.mil

Afloat Safety Programs

Telephone: 757-444-3520, ext. 7831 (DSN 564)

Afloat mishap line: DSN 564-1562 / 7130; Fax: DSN 564-8636

Afloat safety email: safe-afloat@navy.mil

ABOUT SEA COMPASS

Sea Compass (ISSN 1550-1434) is published twice yearly (spring-summer and fallwinter). The editorial content of this magazine is edited and approved by the Naval Safety 

Center Public Affairs Office. Sea Compass is an authorized publication for members of the 

military services and distributed to ships, submarines, diving commands, shore-based 

commands, and DoD agencies. Contents and opinions expressed are not necessarily the 

official views of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy and do 

not imply endorsement thereof. Unless otherwise noted, photos and artwork are for illustrative purposes only. Reference to commercial products or links to non-DoD resources do 

not imply Department of the Navy endorsement. Unless otherwise stated, material in this 

publication may be reprinted without permission; please credit the magazine and author.

SUBMISSIONS

Submit your stories or news items to safe-seacompass@navy.mil. Email letters to: evelyn.

odango@navy.mil or write to: Commander, Naval Safety Center, Attn: Sea Compass, 375 

A Street, Norfolk, VA 23511-4399. We reserve the right to edit all submissions for clarity, 

applicability and length.

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form at http://www.public.navy.mil/comnavsafecen/pages/media/subscription.aspx.

Sea Compass is published by Commander, Naval Safety Center, at 375 A Street, Norfolk, 

VA 23511-4399. Periodical postage paid at Norfolk, Va. 

Postmaster: Send address changes to Commander, Naval Safety Center, Attn: Sea Compass, 375 A Street, Norfolk, VA 23511-4399.

Commander, Naval Safety Center RDML Christopher J. Murray

Deputy Commander Col Glen Butler, USMC

Director, Afloat Safety Programs CDR Rosario D. McWhorter, USN

Department Head, Media and Public Affairs Maggie Menzies

AFLOAT SAFETY PROGRAMS

To contact a safety analyst by phone, call the main number (757) 444-3520 and 

dial the extension at any time during the greeting.

Surface Division 7831

safe-afloat@navy.mil

Diving Division (DIVERS/DJRS) 7837

safe-divesalvage@navy.mil

Submarine Division 7838

safe-submarines@navy.mil 

MAGAZINE ADVISORY BOARD

CDR Jinadu Atkins jinadu.atkins@navy.mil

Division Head, Surface Ship

CDR Jason Eaton jason.eaton@navy.mil

Assistant Division Head, Surface Ship

LT John Oravitz john.oravitz@navy.mil

Division Head, Submarine

CWO3 William Turner william.r.turner@navy.mil

Division Head, Diving

Steve Scudder steve.scudder1@navy.mil

Afloat Safety Analyst

CONTRIBUTING SAFETY ANALYSTS

LCDR James Bostick james.c.bostick@navy.mil

Surface Seamanship Lead

EMC(SW) Michael Lavergne michael.lavergne@navy.mil

Fleet Electrical Analyst

DCC(SW/EXW) Justin Jones justin.m.jones1@navy.mil

Damage Control/Firefighting Analyst

FLEET CONTRIBUTORS

LTJG Mike Chahinian, Assistant Weapons Officer/Public Affairs Officer

USS RUSSELL (DDG 59) 

ENS Alexander Gatlin, Assistant First Lieutenant/Assistant Safety Officer

USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45)

IS1(SW/IDW/AW) Thomas A. Irwin, Intelligence Specialist 

USS O’KANE (DDG 77)

AN Jeremy Taylor

USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD 18)

Join us on the web or your mobile device through these social networks:

CONNECT WITH US

The Anymouse program provides an 

outlet for safety concerns that have been 

submitted to the chain of command but 

remain unresolved. You can find the 

Anymouse icon on the main page of the 

Naval Safety Center web site.

The Naval Safety Center Magazine for Surface, Submarine and Diving Operations
Spring-Summer 2015, Vol. 5, No. 1

FEATURES

COVER STORY

8 20-YEAR-OLD WARSHIP’S DOGGED DETERMINATION

Fresh out of the yards, USS RUSSELL (DDG 59) implements shipwide 

effort to correct discrepancies. By LTJG Mike Chahinian

TCRM ON THE JOB

10 ORDNANCE ON-LOAD AT SEA

Sailors load an estimated 3.9 million pounds of ammunition in three days.

By MCSN J.A. Mateo/Navy News Service

BEST PRACTICE

16 TRAIN FOR THE WORST TO BE THE BEST

USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45) encounters danger, crew spurs into action 

during UNREP in the Arabian Gulf. By ENS Alexander Gatlin

SAFETY AND HEALTH

20 ARABIAN HEAT

Keen situational awareness prevents heat-related injuries during USS 

O’KANE’s (DDG 77) Arabian Gulf deployment. 

By IS1(SW/IDW/AW) Thomas A. Irwin

DEPARTMENTS

2 EDITOR’S NOTE I Determined

4 LEADERSHIP PERSPECTIVE I Zeroing in on Excellence

6 WATERFRONT WIRE I Safety Seminar in Real Time

12 ORM PLAYBOOK I Halon Operational Test

14 B2BPMS I Electrical Workbench Grounding Straps

15 ASK THE EXPERTS I Capstans, Lagging Pads & Bulletins

19 COMBAT READINESS I Safety Officer Toolbox

20 Arabian Heat

FLIGHT DECK AWARENESS

22 JUST ANOTHER DAY

Airman’s attentiveness and assertiveness may have prevented a serious 

mishap aboard USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD 18). By AN Jeremy Taylor

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

24 SHALLOW WATER BLACKOUT

Despite grave consequences, divers and swimmers still practice hyperventilating or breath-holding techniques. By Evelyn Odango

SAFETY CULTURE

28 SOMETIMES HUMOR TEACHES US SOMETHING

Seasoned writer Derek Nelson promotes good decision-making habits by 

turning summaries of mishaps into Friday Funnies. By Christopher Jones

OFF DUTY

30 I SURVIVED A RIP CURRENT

A boogie boarder in survival mode remembers surf warnings from 

weather channel to stay alive. From the National Weather Service/NOAA
EDITOR’S note

Determined

Dedication to the core values of a unit is a contributor 

to mission success. As the 270-plus crew and officers 

of USS RUSSELL (DDG 59) have demonstrated this 

past year, it takes a team to create a climate of shared 

responsibility.

This issue’s cover story takes us step-by-step into 

RUSSELL’s tenacity to bring the 20-year-old warship 

out of the shipyard and get it back into service. Aside 

from correcting material discrepancies, the ship’s 

crew and leadership worked together to implement 

a shipwide effort. From the safety officer to division 

representatives, with the commanding officer’s support, 

the team made the right decisions at the right level. 

The crew and officers met the challenge head on and 

successfully achieved their goals, to the astonishment of 

the Naval Safety Center’s assessment team.

Bringing together a group of people with different 

levels of responsibility and experience became a true test 

of RUSSELL’s strength of character. The cornerstone 

of the ship’s success was its proactive approach to the 

challenge. Detailed planning, constant communications, 

thorough documentation, and teamwork all contributed 

to achieving milestones, such as firing this main fiveinch gun for the first time in over two years.

USS RUSSELL’s experience is just one of the many 

stories about mitigating risks and improving situational 

awareness in this issue. Whether you’re relaxing at 

home, working long hours or playing at the park, make 

the right decision to keep harm at bay.

I hope you enjoy this issue and continue to send us 

your best practices, lessons learned, and perspectives on 

risk management. Have a great summer!

U.S. Navy Photo/ENS Maideline Sanchez

We want to hear from you!

Viewpoints and Opinions

Is there an issue that you need to 

voice out? Maybe you want to 

start a dialouge about a safety 

matter. Articles will be published 

in the “Viewpoint” section of the 

magazine (based on content availability). Send your 

op-ed (opinion editorial) to evelyn.odango@navy.mil.

Letter to the Editor

We want to hear what you think about something you 

read in Sea Compass magazine. Letters must include 

your name, email or phone number (for verification). 

Letters may be published anonymously if you prefer.

BZs and Attaboys

Nominate yourself or someone 

from your command/unit for 

a job well-done. Write a brief 

narrative (500 words) including 

name of the nominee and 

reason for the nomination. 

Please include your name and 

contact information.

Lessons Learned and Safety Culture

Help us preserve combat readiness and save lives by 

sharing your lessons-learned story in Sea Compass. 

Maybe you’ve experienced one of the factors that 

influence risk tolerance. How did that shape your 

behavior and/or your command’s safety culture? Send 

articles (450 words minimum,1,500 words maximum) to 

safe-seacompass@navy.mil.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Articles submitted for publishing are subject 

to editing for style, accuracy and length. 

For more information on how to submit your 

articles, refer to the link below. 

http://www.public.navy.mil/comnavsafecen/

Documents/media/magazines/Submission_Guidelines.pdf

We do our best to cover stories, articles and 

information that may be helpful or necessary to 

manage your safety program and/or promote safety 

awareness on and off duty. If you have a question or 

opinion about anything you read in Sea Compass, 

send us your comments. Email general inquiries to safeseacompass@navy.mil. You can also send a direct 

email to the editor at evelyn.odango@navy.mil.

2 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
Overestimating capability 

(younger people) and experience (role models). Reflect on 

your role as a mentor, admit 

that despite your experience the 

exposure is still there. Acknowledge skill but reinforce policies 

and procedures.

Confidence in equipment.

Overconfidence in technology 

increases risk tolerance. Ensure 

technical training captures 

the limits of equipment and 

engineering. Promote the ABCD

process and on-the-spot risk 

assessment. Make sure Sailors 

know how to gauge risk. Teach 

them to ask, “What if it fails?”

Familiarity resulting in complacency. Encourage Sailors 

to focus on the task like it’s 

the first time they have done 

it. How would I teach this to a 

new person? Stop and think. 

Draw from knowledge, skill and 

techniques.

Confidence in PPE and rescue.

Relying solely on PPE and 

rescue efforts increases risk 

tolerance. Emphasize the 

limits of protection and rescue 

measures. Ensure Sailors 

understand these as “last line 

of defense” or “not to be relied 

upon” controls. Provide appropriate ORM and TCRM training.

Personal experience with an outcome. If you’ve seen a mishap 

or a near-miss that ended badly, 

you will be less tolerant of the 

risk. However, as incident rates 

improve, fewer leaders will have 

had these experiences resulting in scepticism. Know what 

incidents have occurred and 

point out the consequences. Tell 

sea stories.

Underestimating seriousness 

of the outcome. A hazard could 

involve a “pinch point” but the 

outcome actually results in 

amputation or crushing. Hazard 

identification should better 

define the outcome. Get people 

to ask, “How bad could it really 

be?” Apply the ABCD process. 

Teach Sailors worst-case 

scenarios.

Cost of non-compliance. Identify 

the cost of non-compliance 

and increase where necessary. 

As the actual or perceived cost 

increases, the risk tolerance 

decreases. Remove barriers and 

reward those who gauge risks 

and mitigate the factors that 

increase the potential for error.

Voluntary actions and being in 

control. Key factor in off-duty 

risk (people are 28 times more 

likely to be hurt off the job). 

Overconfidence and false sense 

of control may lead to underestimating risks. Integrate “stop and 

think” moments into personal 

activities. Use checklists to 

improve situational awareness.

Role models accepting risk.

Leaders’ actions influence the 

mindset, behavior and decisionmaking abilities of their workers. 

Identify and address risk-taking 

leadership (in the appropriate 

situations). Recognize perceived 

pressure that could lead to erosion of standards and address 

immediately. 

Potential profit or gain. Perceived or actual (fiscal, emotional, physical) gains increase 

or decrease risk tolerance. 

Remove rewards for risk taking. 

Eliminate barriers to doing it the 

right way. Bring these concepts 

into leadership discussions to 

increase awareness. 

As a safety professional, you can positively shape the risk decision making 

of your Sailors. Although they may 

identify hazards and understand the 

outcome, a variety of factors may still 

influence them to accept more risk than 

they should. Let’s take a look at what can 

influence risk tolerance and what safety 

leaders can do to shape those behaviors.

Adapted from “Strategies for Understanding and Addressing 

Risk Tolerance,” Exxon Mobil, 2011. (U.S. Navy Photos/File)

The 10 Factors of Risk Tolerance 

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 3
Zeroing in on 

Excellence 

4 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
This summer I challenge you to help our Navy save a life. If each of 

us makes that a personal goal, I know that we can have a significant 

impact on reducing our summer mishap rate. 

With that said, your safety leadership goes beyond the summer 

season; it’s enduring. I want you to remember that there will not 

be a day spent as a chief petty officer in the United States Navy that you won't or 

shouldn't be actively shaping risk decision-making on and off duty. Your leadership 

and engagement matter. 

Last summer we had 22 mishaps. Let's work as a Navy-wide CPO Mess to cut 

that number in half (yes, in half) this year, with the goal of continually reducing 

mishap rates into the future. If you can help prevent one mishap, our combined 

efforts will help shape our Navy-wide safety culture.

With the summer season [here], I think it's important for all of us to take time 

to reflect on our role in mishap prevention. Consider for a moment the millions of 

risk decisions that are made by our Navy and Marine Corps team in the course of a 

typical day. From the moment we wake up, we are engaged in activities that involve 

hazards and require risk decisions. Our Sailors operate and maintain dangerous 

warfighting systems and platforms, take those platforms to sea, and take them into 

combat situations. 

As you know, what we do is inherently dangerous. The risk decision-making 

process only takes a matter of seconds but can result in outcomes that have 

significant financial, operational, and emotional cost for the individual and 

organization. As chief petty officers, we can help positively shape the decisionmaking [abilities] of our Sailors. We must understand that although our people may 

identify hazards and understand the outcomes, a variety of factors can influence 

them to take more risk than they should. Factors such as complacency, lack of 

experience, and perceived pressure affect our Sailors’ willingness to take risk. Our 

leadership is key to influencing this decision making on and off duty. 

This is why our continuous, engaged presence on the deck plates is so 

important. You help identify emerging hazards during maintenance and evolutions; 

you train our Sailors on the potential severe outcomes of poor decision-making. You 

know your people well enough to understand how factors such as fatigue, stress, 

and decision-making maturity can impair their decision making and increase their 

chances of being involved in a mishap or contributing to one. 

As outlined in "Zeroing in on Excellence," this is "controlling what we own." 

When the CPO mess pulls on the same rope, together there is nothing we cannot 

accomplish.

Editor’s Note: MCPON Stevens released his “Zeroing in on Excellence” initiative in the 

form of four letters to the Navy Chiefs' Mess on Nov. 6, 2012. It consists of three focus 

areas: developing leaders, good order and discipline, and controlling what we own. 

Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Mike Stevens

RELATED ARTICLES

MCPON Releases “Zeroing in on Excellence” Initiative

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=70532

“Zeroing in on Excellence” Focus Areas

http://www.navy.mil/features/MCPON%20ZEROING%20IN%20ON%20EXCELLENCE.pdf

MCPON(AW/NAC) Mike Stevens 

speaks to area command master 

chiefs and senior enlisted 

leaders at Naval Station Mayport, 

Fla., about his “Zeroing in on 

Excellence” initiative. (U.S. Navy 

Photo/MC2 Thomas L. Rosprim)

From MCPON’s Message to the CPO Mess, April 2015

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 5

LEADERSHIP perspective
More than 400 commanding officers and junior 

Sailors from Commander Fleet Activities 

Yokosuka shore and sea commands attended 

the Naval Safety Center’s (NAVSAFECEN)December 

2014 safety seminar. Afloat Training Group Western 

Pacific hosted the event. 

The purpose of the seminar was to talk one-onone with Sailors, discussing the nine surface ship areas 

(safety administration, deck, main propulsion, auxiliary, 

weapons, damage control, NAVOSH, combat systems, 

and electrical safety) covered during a shipboard safety 

assessment. Ten subject matter experts (SMEs) from 

NAVSAFECEN’s Afloat Safety Program Directorate 

discussed each of these mission areas’ top-10 mishap 

trends. The team also presented data contributing to 

these trends and provided resources for managing risks.

At the invitation of Ship Repair Facility (SRF) 

Yokosuka safety director and in coordination with the 

Commander, Pacific Fleet safety officer, the team also 

assessed a mock-up lab used for training fire marshals 

and SRF repair personnel. The lab was designed to 

assist in organizational-level training of command duty 

officers, gas-free engineers, safety assistants, and petty 

officers to recognize housekeeping and fall-protection 

hazards during industrial availabilities. The lab can 

help ship operators learn to better identify hazards 

in an industrial availability environment. There are 

currently no training facilities that address hazards in a 

maintenance availability (shipyard) environment at this 

level in any other fleet concentration area.

These seminars educate COs, XOs, CMCs, safety 

officers, wardrooms, chiefs’ mess, and junior Sailors 

about managing risk and creating a safety culture that 

promotes proactive attitudes. The SMEs discuss the 

benefits of operational risk management and time 

critical risk management. The SMEs provide visual 

materials gathered from previous assessments to portray 

what to do and what not to do in the different areas 

of safety, including the planned maintenance system 

(PMS) and zone inspections. 

A valuable element of the seminar allows SMEs 

to interact with the attendees and answer questions. 

This face-to-face time with Sailors lets NAVSAFECEN 

analysts discuss best practices and ensures Sailors are 

maintaining a safe working environment. (See “Ask the 

Experts” on Page 15.)

Subject matter experts in the various mission areas 

supply references for maintaining the ship’s gear. These 

include the “General Specifications for Overhaul of 

Surface Ships,” the “Naval Ships’ Technical Manual,” 

PMS, and OPNAV instructions. This ensures Sailors 

follow standard procedures and eliminates the use of 

“tribal knowledge” (“this is how we always did it”) 

approach. 

Sailors who cannot attend can get a CD containing 

the seminar topics and SME information from their 

TYCOM safety office. The surface ship division plans to 

schedule similar seminars throughout the year. 

LCDR Bostick is the surface seamanship lead in the Afloat Safety 

Programs Directorate.

Safety Seminar in Real Time

By LCDR James Bostick, Naval Safety Center

RELATED ARTICLE

“San Diego Shipboard Sailors Sharpen Safety Skills” by MC1 Trevor Welsh, Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=85738

6 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
Sailors assigned to San Diego-based afloat commands attend the Naval Safety Center Afloat Safety Seminar 

at the Naval Base San Diego theater. The first 2015 safety seminar held in February centered around safety 

administration, mishap prevention, and warfare-area-specific safety. (U.S. Navy Photo/MC1 Trevor Welsh)

Sea Compass Reader Survey Results

111

18

20

During the December 2014 safety seminar in San Diego, junior Sailors and officers responded to our reader survey. We wanted to find out if our 

readers are getting the information they need and/or want from Sea Compass magazine. Thank you for taking the time to give us your inputs; we 

appreciate your comments. If you are not subscribed to the magazine or are not receiving your subscription in a timely manner, please contact us 

at safe-seacompass@navy.mil or download the subscription form at http://www.public.navy.mil/comnavsafecen/documents/media/magazines/

mag_subscribe.pdf.

Total number of responses by age group: 18-29 (50), 30 up (49), unknown (12)

Personnel in supervisory positions: 18-29 (5), 30 up (12), unknown (1)

Top-3 topics/sections by age group: 

18-29 #1: E, H

#2: K

#3: D

30 up #1: H 

#2: E

#3: F

Unknown #1: C, E, G, H 

#2: I, K

#3: B, D

Not interested in any of the topics/sections covered in Sea Compass: (A) Editorial, (B) Waterfront Wire, (C) ORM Playbook, (D) B2BPMS 

(Back-to-Basic PMS), (E) Ask the Experts, (F) Safety Standdown Best Practices, (G) Case Studies, (H) Lessons Learned, (I) Attaboys 

(BZ), (J) Viewpoint, (K) Off-Duty Recreation/Traffic 

Most popular method of receiving the magazine:

• Electronic/web 

• Wardroom, mess deck and ship mail (print)

Comments:

“Lessons learned articles should be more personalized and hit home 

with all Sailors to adequately get the message across.”

“More issues delivered to waterfront ships.”

“I love the insight and tips offered in Sea Compass. Great publication!”

“More case studies of discrepancies and mishaps, and more pictures.”

“Hard copies; email isn’t always up.”

“Have more mishaps/lessons learned put into it. People want to [read] 

stories - best way to educate our Sailors.”

“Never heard of this magazine.”

“I would make it more readily available to Sailors. Not many members 

are aware of what it is.”

“We do not receive [Sea Compass] on our ship.”

“I honestly take advantage of Sea Compass while waiting for briefs in 

the wardroom. I flip to the above sections and focus on these.”

“[Have] hard copies delivered to ship and distributed to ship’s library, 

wardroom and chief’s mess.”

“I am not familiar with the contents of Sea Compass.”

“Web articles to all ships and NIINs for parts needed to correct safety 

issues.”

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 7
I

t was RUSSELL’s first safety survey since 

undergoing an $84 million extended dry dock 

selective restricted availability (EDSRA), and it 

proved to be a challenge. The crew was green; 

many of them had never been underway before. 

The focus of the crew during the EDSRA was to 

correct the many material discrepancies that came to 

light after 20 years of hard driving at the forefront of the 

fleet. 

“The key to a successful safety survey in such 

challenging conditions was to plan well ahead of time,” 

said LT Joseph Hamilton, RUSSELL’s safety officer at 

the time. “We contacted the Naval Safety Center early 

and remained in [touch] with them.”

“We reached out to other ships on the waterfront to 

see what lessons they’d learned, and incorporated those 

COVER STORY

20-Year-Old Warship’s 

By LTJG Mike Chahinian, USS RUSSELL (DDG 59)

into our own plan,” said Chief Operations Specialist 

Marvin Hudson. 

The linchpin of Hamilton’s plan was to identify all 

of RUSSELL’s discrepancies ahead of time and present 

them to the survey team along with a detailed plan of 

action and milestones (POA&M). “It was a total ship 

effort that showed we cared,” said Hamilton. 

This approach ensured there were no surprises the 

day of the survey, which was crucial considering that 

there would be no time to correct discrepancies in the 

immediate days before the sea trials. 

To facilitate the shipwide effort, a safety 

representative was appointed in every division. This 

person helped ensure that every division was acting with 

safety in mind and that the ship’s leadership received 

detailed inputs for the POA&M. 

USS RUSSELL had just concluded type commander sea trials when the ship went 

through a two-day safety survey in late October last year. The sea trials were the 

culmination of nearly two years in the yards, following a crew swap with USS HALSEY

(DDG 97) in January 2013. RUSSELL had just gotten underway on ship's power for the 

first time in 662 days on Oct. 28, two days before the survey began.

8 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
Dogged Determination

Editor’s Note: Beginning this spring, the Naval Safety 

Center has transitioned from conducting surveys into 

performing safety assessments. This switch aligns with the 

fleetwide safety management system initiative and supports 

a standard process for capturing lessons learned. These 

assessments also focus more on safety and risk management 

culture and leave most of the compliance and procedural 

concerns to INSURV.

LEFT: A line handler releases the mooring lines of guided-missile 

destroyer USS RUSSELL (DDG 59) as the ship departs Joint Base Pearl 

Harbor-Hickam for the last time while homeported in Hawaii. (U.S. Navy 

Photo/MC2 Daniel Barker)

USS RUSSELL also used the afloat safety officer 

course (CIN# A-4J-0020), which is offered by Surface 

Warfare Officer’s School twice a year. Locations vary. 

“The course was key because it gave us contacts 

all the way up the chain of command to Commander, 

Surface Forces,” Hudson said. 

Documentation is important in any shipboard 

review, and a safety survey is no exception. The safety 

officer kept two years of records of safety committee 

meetings and training in a folder on the ship’s server. On 

the day of the survey, the survey team simply opened the 

folder and reviewed all the contents. 

Another important aspect of maintaining 

documentation was to send the mishap reports off-ship 

as soon as possible. Although there is a 30-day window 

for sending the mishap reports off-ship, Hudson 

recommends sending them immediately to prevent a 

build-up. 

To ensure a swift and smooth survey, all key players 

— including the safety officer, assistant safety officer, all 

departmental safety representatives, and key divisional 

representatives — used radios [to communicate]. “I 

think they [surveyors] were blown away by how quickly 

we corrected some discrepancies right on the spot,” said 

Hamilton. 

“I’m proud of how the ship came together as a team,” 

said USS RUSSELL Commanding Officer CDR James 

Harney. “It showed tenacity and resolve to answer all 

bells and knock a critical [assessment] out of the park.” 

LTJG Chahinian, assistant weapons officer, is USS Russell’s

public affairs officer.

RIGHT: ENS Joseph C. Walker checks the telescopic alidade onboard the 

guided-missile destroyer the morning of the ship’s return to port following 

the first underway period in nearly two years. (U.S. Navy Photo/OS3 Nicolas 

I. Mahone)

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 9
TCRM ON THE JOB

Early this summer ( June 

1-3), the aircraft carrier USS 

HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 

75) loaded an estimated 3.9 million 

pounds of ordnance in preparation 

for the ship’s upcoming work-up 

cycles and follow-on deployment.

MH-60S Sea Hawk assigned 

to the Nightdippers of Helicopter 

Sea Combat Squadron Five (HSC5) transferred weapons including 

missiles, small arms, and generalpurpose bombs to TRUMAN by 

vertical replenishment from the 

Military Sealift Command dry 

cargo and ammunition ship USNS 

WILLIAM MCLEAN (T-AKE 12).

ORDNANCE

ON-LOAD AT SEA

LCDR J. L. Bell, TRUMAN’s 

ordnance handler officer, said the 

completion of this on-load makes the 

carrier fully equipped and capable of 

conducting combat operations.

The ship will be loaded to 

complete all the training for Tailored 

Ship’s Training Availability/Final 

Evaluation Problem (TSTA/FEP) 

and Composite Training Unit 

Exercise (COMPTUEX). TSTA/

FEP is the first combined training 

event in the inter-deployment 

training cycle and places emphasis 

on damage control, flight deck 

operations and simulated combat. 

COMPTUEX is a series of training 

scenarios set to qualify TRUMAN 

as a deployment-ready carrier. The 

exercise is designed to bring together 

a battle group and its components 

into a fully functional fighting team.

By MCSN J. A. Mateo, USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75)

Navy News Service

10 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
situation while considering the safety 

of their shipmates.

“Safety was the primary 

responsibility of everyone involved 

with the on-load,” said Osorio. 

“Every station had leadership such 

as officers, master chiefs, chiefs and 

leading petty officers to monitor the 

movement of every ammunition.

Sailors also moved ammunition 

with, at least, one other safety spotter 

to make sure the path was cleared and 

the movement was meeting all safety 

standards.”

MCSN Mateo is assigned to the USS 

HARRY S. TRUMAN public affairs department. 

Sailors move more than 1,340 pallets of ammunition in three days

“Over 1,340 pallets of ordnance 

were transferred to TRUMAN 

during a three-day evolution,” said 

Bell. The ordnance is available for the 

ship and squadron to use during the 

training cycle.

TRUMAN’s Gun Boss, CDR 

J. D. McDonald, said a successful 

evolution is based on the cooperation 

of many departments.

“Although this is [a weapons] 

department evolution, it is truly an 

all-hands effort,” said McDonald. 

“Supply department made sure we 

had food and drinks during the long 

hours, AIMD and Air department 

contributed by moving ammunition, 

while security kept traffic in the 

hangar bay and flight deck secured.”

Bell said the success of the onload was a combination of training 

and supervision.

“Every Sailor that was involved 

with transporting ordnance earned 

qualifications and completed training 

throughout the year,” said Bell. 

“We conducted ordnance handling 

training, forklift courses in the hangar 

bay and in the magazines as well as 

weapons elevator training. The entire 

Weapons department was involved 

with the training and execution of 

this evolution.”

Aviation Ordnanceman 2nd 

Class J. Osorio explained the large 

role safety plays during an on-load. 

Sailors practiced time-critical risk 

management by assessing every 

Left and above photos: An MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the Nightdippers of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Five (HSC-5) retrieves ammunition from the Military Sealift Command dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS WILLIAM MCLEAN (T-AKE 12) during an ammunition on-load with 

aircraft carrier USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75). (U.S. Navy Photos/MC3 J. S. Richardson)

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 11
Halon Operational Test

By DCC(SW/EXW) Justin Jones, Naval Safety Center

Playbook ORMMANAGE RISK. ENSURE SUCCESS. COMPLETE THE MISSION.

I

t had been a normal day at Pier 5, Naval 

Station Norfolk, but it could have been at 

any pier on any base, or even underway. 

Sailors for the repair/damage control division 

had scheduled a halon operational test, in which they 

test-operate the halon system and test-operate remote 

actuation for halon/heptafluoropropane (HFP) system. 

The test is part of the 36-month scheduled maintenance 

requirement.

The damage control assistant (DCA), LCPO, LPO 

and work center supervisor (WCS) had meticulously 

planned the maintenance so that it could easily be 

accomplished and wouldn’t interfere with other tasks 

listed in the “Plan of the Week.” Originally, a chief was 

the on-station safety supervisor. The DCA was the 

coordinator in the damage/central control station (D/

CCS). A DC1 was leading the team in clearing tags. A 

DC2 was in the space with stop-watch. Another DC2 

was resetting and reconnecting the actuating piston 

heads. And a DC3 was discharging the CO2 actuator. 

They had all done these assignments before and had 

been briefed on how the maintenance would proceed. 

On the day of the event, all the participants were 

present at quarters and were again briefed on the test. 

DCFA Elizabeth Brizuela checks the pressure of a halon tank. (U.S. Navy Photo/MCSN Wesley J. Breedlove)

12 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
The “Plan of the Day” (POD) was read, and there were 

no ship’s evolutions that would interfere. However, as we 

all know, the POD can change rapidly and often.

At 0830, personnel began arriving on station. After 

a communications check, everyone was ready to start. 

Suddenly an unplanned working party was called away, 

and the DC1 was sent off to look for a hull maintenance 

technician fireman (HTFN) for the working party. The 

maintenance had begun to change before it even started.

Was the DC1 only a small part of the equation? 

He was only on the team that would restore the system 

after the checks were done.

Assessing the change, the LCPO decided to 

continue the test. The DC1 was supposed to be back 

before the system was ready to be restored. Or the 

second DC2 could handle restoring the system by 

himself.

After testing the primary halon system for MER2, 

the team was ready to move to the reserve system in 

MER2. The DCA communicated his intentions again to 

the engineering duty officer (EDO) in D/CCS and was 

told that MER2 personnel had just started the lube oil 

purifier. The DCA told the LCPO, and the team moved 

to MER1.

The second DC2 entered D/CCS. The DCA told 

him that they were done with primary in MER2 and 

were moving to MER1 primary. The EDO stopped the 

DC2 and told him that he needed to take the roving 

watch, because the MM2 who was originally assigned 

had to go to medical. The DC2 decided to find a 

replacement for the testing, so he went to the shop and 

got an HT2 to join the maintenance team and help 

reconnect the actuation heads. Now we have reached a 

point in the evolution where TCRM must be applied to 

re-address the balance of personnel.

How was the loss of the resetting-and-restoring supervisor going to affect the process?

Was HT2 adequately trained and experienced with this maintenance so that he could replace the second DC2?

Did the safety supervisor know about the changes to the original plan? 

Had the A-B-C portion been effectively executed, then there may have been ways to Do (complete the task) 

and then Debrief where the shortfalls existed and how they were mitigated or could have been prevented.

Assess 

Balance 

Communicate 

Do and Debrief 

The DC1 passed the LCPO (who was standing 

outside MER1) after he fetched the HTFN for the 

working party. The LCPO briefed the DC1 that the 

second DC2 was resetting and reconnecting the 

actuation heads for MER2 primary, but that they’d had 

to delay testing MER2 reserve. The DC1 saw the HT2 

standing outside the halon cylinder bank, but thought 

nothing of it. He thought that the second DC2 was 

inside the space. The DC1 arrived in D/CCS and saw 

the second DC2 with a clipboard. The DC1 told the 

DC2 that he was on watch, so the HT2 was taking over 

for him.

Did the LCPO know about this change? Did the 

second DC2 communicate with the EDO, DCA, and 

LCPO about his current assignment and how the 

EDO was taking him away from that assignment?

The DC1 assessed the situation and decided that 

the testing for MER1 primary could continue, because 

an interruption at this point would cause even more 

confusion. After the LCPO reported back to D/CCS 

that MER1 primary testing was completed, the DC1 

told everyone to stop the evolution and assemble in D/

CCS. All personnel showed up except for the HT2, who 

didn’t have a radio. 

The DC console/summary alarm panel suddenly 

indicated a release of halon in MER2. Moments later, as 

repair/damage control division personnel were exiting 

D/CCS en route to the halon cylinder bank, they ran 

into personnel running out of MER2. Arriving at the 

door to the halon cylinder bank, they saw the HT2 

standing there, shaking and white as a ghost. The team 

knew exactly what had occurred.

DCC Jones is the lead damage control analyst in the Afloat Safety 

Programs Directorate.

Had TCRM been applied consistently and effectively, the halon 

maintenance team would have been able to succeed in the midst of a 

changing environment.

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 13
B2BPMS is your basic guide on how not to fall a victim of complacency. It is a 

common-sense approach to keeping your ship on the right course. Have you ever 

taken a shortcut to save time, but instead, cost you and your ship time, resources 

or people? Share your short story with our readers so they might learn from your 

experience. Submit your article to safe-seacompass@navy.mil.

By EMC(SW) Michael Lavergne, Naval Safety Center

How many times have you been in an electrical/

electronic shop and noticed that there were 

single, green wires with something attached 

(that looked like an alligator clip) coming from the work 

bench?

It isn’t just an ordinary wire. It is a lifesaving device 

known as a “grounding strap,” and it connects that piece 

of equipment to the hull. Electric current likes to flow in 

the path of least resistance. When there’s a problem, the 

current will flow to ship’s hull instead of shocking (or 

killing) the worker. 

Grounding straps are covered by PMS MIP series 

6652/006(or L06) A-1+ and NSTM 300. You must 

have one grounding strap for every four feet of work 

bench. Grounding leads and grounding straps must have 

green insulation or be marked with green-colored tape 

or green-colored adhesive labels. Grounding straps must 

be at least 40 inches long and able to reach every part of 

the work bench.

A 50-amp, blunt-nose, battery-type clip and 

insulating sleeve must 

be installed at the free 

end. The Servit post 

must be sealed with 

two coats of varnish 

(A-A-1800) or other 

suitable preservation to 

protect from moisture or 

corrosion. The ground 

stud should be welded 

to the hull (if feasible) 

or to a main member 

on the bulk head. The 

grounding stud should 

be connected to ground 

using three nuts or a 

collar stud with two hex 

nuts.

A ground bus 

serving a row of 

workbenches must be 

continuous (unsliced) 

cable no longer than 50 

inches.

Resistance from the ground (battery type) clip 

to a point beside the deck grounding stud must be 

greater than or equal to 0.1 ohm. If less than 0.1 ohms 

resistance, tag out the disconnect switch and test panel, 

notify work center supervisor, repair or replace as 

necessary, remove safety tags and return equipment to 

readiness condition.

NSTM 300, Electric Plant-General, states ships 

shall have a minimum of one electrical workbench 

maintained all times.

More information on standardizing electrical 

workbenches/requirements can be found in: 

• Sea Compass, fall-winter 2013 (http://www.public.

navy.mil/comnavsafecen/documents/media/

magazines/sea-compass/fall-winter2013.pdf)

• Naval Ship’s Technical Manual (NSTM 300 

Appendix H)

• PMS MIP 6652/006(or L06) A-1+

EMC Lavergne is a fleet electrical analyst in the Afloat Safety 

Programs Directorate.

Electrical Workbench Grounding Straps

Source: NSTM 300, Page 300-H-1

14 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
QUESTIONS, MYSTERIES AND UNCLEAR ISSUES ANSWERED BY NAVAL SAFETY CENTER ANALYSTS

Send your questions to safe-seacompass@navy.mil.

What can you use to remove rust [to prevent corrosion] on the working 

area of the capstan?

Use light grit sand paper to remove any surface 

rust on the working area. The use of any petroleum products or lubricants (i.e., silicon, 

linseed oil) or any other type is strictly 

prohibited.

REF: “Navy Safety and Occupational 

Health Program Manual for Forces 

Af loat” (OPNAVINST 5100.19E), 

C0602U(3)(A). Note: It does not, 

however, discuss what to use or prohibit 

silicon or linseed oil. 

Why do we need removable 

lagging pads on the flexible 

hose connections?

All f lex hoses and connections’ 

lagging must be removable so that 

you can complete required PMS 

checks. 

REF: “Planned Maintenance 

System Maintenance Index Page” 

(PMS MIP 5000 series)

Why does the NSC not send 

out the Ships’ Safety Bulletin

anymore?

The Ships’ Safety Bulletin (SSB) is 

still in circulation. To get the most 

current SSB, send an email to safeafloatfdbk@navy.mil.

CAPSTANS, LAGGING PADS & BULLETINS

Questions and answers from the December 2014 Safety Seminar

SN Nicholas Dalton polishes one of the ship’s capstans, 

located on the foc’sle of USS DONALD COOK (DDG 75). 

(U.S. Navy Photo/MCC Alan J. Baribeau)

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 15
I

t’s easy to get complacent when things go 

smoothly 10 out of 10 times. It’s easy to maintain 

your composure when the only emergencies you 

have ever faced are drills and walkthroughs. The 

true test of a ship crew’s character and preparedness comes when challenged with a situation such as the 

one USS COMSTOCK recently faced. 

The underway replenishment (UNREP), just like 

the previous 10 UNREPs, was unfolding uneventfully 

in the Arabian Gulf. Suddenly a group of dhows (Arab 

sailing vessels) appeared ahead of COMSTOCK, USNS 

RAINIER (T-AOE 7) and the French ship Jean Bart 

shortly after commencing replenishment. 

Faced with imminent danger, the efficiency and confidence of the ship’s crew — built and refined through 

long hours of study, preparation and practice — became 

more valuable than gold. 

BACK STORY

Four months into deployment, the Sailors and 

Marines aboard COMSTOCK had become adept at 

executing a timely, efficient, and safe UNREP. Their 

skills were due to more than simple repetition. Part of 

the credit went to the safety and training procedures put 

in place by COMSTOCK’s chain of command for this 

high-risk evolution.

During every UNREP debrief, each watch station 

discusses the goods and bads of the evolution, what 

was done well, and what needs improvement for the 

next time. The safety officer compiles operational risk 

management (ORM) assessment sheets to cover every 

detail concerning the evolution and capture talking 

points during each debrief. These points are distributed 

as lessons learned at the next UNREP brief. 

At every special evolution brief, ORM is stressed 

The Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS JOHN 

ERICSSON (T-AO 194) takes on heavy waves during a replenishment-atsea with the amphibious dock landing ship USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45).

Forward lookout maintains a vigilant watch during an 

underway replenishment between the USS COMSTOCK 

(LSD 45) and USNS RAINIER (T-AOE 7). 

By ENS Alexander Gatlin, USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45)

Photos by MC3 Lenny LaCrosse

BEST PRACTICE

16 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015

SN Matthew Romback uses a sound-powered telephone to pass 

information to the bridge aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS 

COMSTOCK (LSD 45) during an underway replenishment-at-sea. 
to ensure that each individual is fully aware of the risks 

involved with each step and process. Every potential 

hazard is addressed in detail, as are ways to mitigate 

risks. The CO and XO stress to the crew that procedural 

compliance and technical proficiency are key to their 

safety and of the ship’s. These structured protocols are 

applied during the evolution and improved upon later. 

Hands-on training is a top priority. The navigation 

department conducts flag-hoist drills to ensure that 

all personnel in the department are proficient with the 

flags and day-shapes required for an UNREP. In addition to regularly scheduled departmental UNREP training, COMSTOCK’s deck department conducts safety 

and station walkthroughs the day prior to any UNREP 

and again immediately prior to stationing the UNREP 

detail. Running through the roles and responsibilities 

of every station — from safety observer to deck rigger 

to signalman to line handler — ensures that everyone 

involved with the evolution knows their roles. 

The amphibious dock landing ship USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45) is underway in the Gulf of Aden. (U.S. Navy Photo/MC3 Stephen M. Votaw)

Suddenly a group of dhows (Arab sailing vessels) appeared 

ahead of COMSTOCK, USNS RAINIER (T-AOE 7) and the 

French ship Jean Bart shortly after commencing replenishment.

USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45) conducts an UNREP with USNS RAINIER (TAOE 7) and USS SAN DIEGO (LPD 22).

A deck rigger aboard USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45) ensures a proper lineup 

of a fuel probe and receiver during underway replenishment.

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 17
We prepare the primary UNREP station(s) 

and back-up station the day before. During actual 

UNREPs, watch standers do emergency breakaway 

drills to improve their proficiency and confidence. 

This repetition increases everyone’s ability to fully 

comprehend and execute procedures — from chain 

of command to Sailors and Marines conducting the 

evolution — with no room for errors.

COMSTOCK also has implemented a new policy 

during this deployment. Before any personnel are 

allowed to stand a watch station under instruction 

(U/I), they must meet with their qualified watch 

stander to discuss (and, if necessary, walk through) all 

of the actions and responsibilities they are required 

to know. The senior watch officer then allows the 

U/I to stand the watch under instruction during the 

next evolution. This practice provides an excellent 

instructional tool and enables these prospective watch 

standers to seamlessly step into their roles. It reduces 

errors caused by lack of experience or understanding, 

and it improves efficiency. 

THE TEST

The training had already paid dividends aboard 

COMSTOCK during this 11th UNREP of her 

deployment. When the scope operator on the bridge 

saw 15 small dots 10nm out, directly in the path of the 

three ships, the operator proceeded to perform the next 

steps. The lookouts and officers on the bridge wing 

confirmed the sighting. Everyone executed their roles 

and responsibilities as they had trained. For all intents 

and purposes, the same situation had happened 10 times 

before on this deployment.

The crew went into action but it seemed futile: 

numerous radio transmissions went unheeded, the 

flashing of spotlights went unanswered, and one 

prolonged blast from the ship’s whistle fell on deaf 

ears. The crew on the rig, on the bridge and in the 

engineering plant knew exactly what to do. 

The ship sounded five short blasts, and the 

word came over the 1MC to initiate the emergency 

breakaway. Pumping ceased, the rig was returned and 

lines were recovered — all in the span of a few short 

minutes. This efficiency on station gave the bridge team 

ample time to safely maneuver through the swarm of 

fishing boats, a complex task in its own right. 

The time, effort and training dedicated to safety and 

technical proficiency enabled the crew of COMSTOCK

to execute without damage to equipment or injury to 

any personnel onboard. This culture of safety excellence 

was put to the test that day and her crew passed with 

flying colors.

ENS Gatlin is USS COMSTOCK’s assistant first lieutenant.

18 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
COMBAT readiness

SAFETY OFFICER TOOLBOX

OUR MISSION IS TO HELP YOU PRESERVE COMBAT READINESS AND SAVE LIVES.

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run a command safety program. 

If you can’t find what you’re looking for and 

need help, please email us at safe-oshfdbk@navy.mil. Your email will be answered 

within one working day.

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER RESOURCES

Visit us at http://www.public.navy.mil/comnavsafecen

LT Nickolaus Kesler, safety officer aboard the amphibious assault ship USS 

KEARSARGE (LHD 3), communicates with the bridge while measuring wind 

speed as the ship approaches the fleet replenishment oiler USNS LARAMIE

(T-AO 203) and the amphibious dock landing ship USS CARTER HALL (LSD 

50) for a replenishment-at-sea. (U.S. Navy Photo/MC2 Jonathan Vargas)

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 19
Before returning to home port in Pearl Harbor 

following a nine-month deployment, USS 

O’KANE spent most of 2014 in the Arabian 

Gulf. Anyone who has deployed to the U.S. 

5th Fleet – on land or at sea – knows that the Gulf has 

very little rain. Daily temperatures and humidity levels 

are extremely high during the summer months. 

An average August day in Manama, Bahrain has 

a high temperature of 100 degrees Fahrenheit, with 

humidity ranging from 40 to 100 percent. Although 

O’KANE operated in all areas of the Gulf, the crew 

generally experienced the same temperatures and 

humidity levels as Bahrain. O’KANE participated in 

Operation Inherent Resolve and maritime security 

operations requiring a high operational tempo. 

The crew regularly conducted f light quarters; 

replenishments at sea (RAS); drills for damage control 

(MOB-D), engineering (MOB-E), and seamanship 

(MOB-S); and small-arms qualifications. 

On top of this demanding environment, O’KANE’s 

crew maintained a culture of fitness throughout the 

deployment. It was not unusual to walk topside and see 

several Sailors working out on the aft missile deck in the 

afternoon heat. It was a priority for O’KANE’s Sailors 

to have options for regular workouts, which helped 

alleviate stress. The crew was able to sustain physical 

readiness throughout the nine-month deployment. 

The heat and humidity of the Gulf — combined 

with high stress and physically demanding work — 

posed a serious challenge to the health and safety of 

the crew. Commands normally observe flag warnings 

and prohibit topside work involving heavy exertion and 

workouts during a black-f lag condition. For O’KANE, 

this method would have kept the crew from doing 

topside work or workouts for almost 80 percent of the 

deployment. 

Keen situational awareness was a key factor in 

overcoming this challenge. It helped control heat 

Wearing of body armor or NBC uniform adds approximately 10 points to the measured WBGT index. Exposure limits should 

be adjusted accordingly. (Source: Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, Boone Branch Health Clinic)

SAFETY AND HEALTH

By IS1(SW/IDW/AW) Thomas A. Irwin, USS O’KANE (DDG 77)

Illustration by John W. Williams

20 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
exposure and prevent heat-related injuries. The 

leadership and crew followed the heat-stress program 

guidelines, using the physiological heat exposure limit 

(PHEL) curve and stay-time model for evolutions. 

These guidelines were strictly enforced both internal to 

the ship and topside, from RAS to personal workouts. 

The PHEL curve model is typically used as an 

engineering watchstanding tool, but O’KANE and its 

crew effectively adapted it to all facets of deployment 

life.

Each day, the independent duty corpsman (IDC) 

conducted a wet bulb globe temperature (WBGT) 

survey at 0800 and 1200. The WBGT survey measured 

the overall temperature and humidity, helping determine 

how long personnel could remain in that environment 

based on their level of exertion. Light exertion allowed 

for longer stay times, and heavy exertion allowed for 

shorter stay times in accordance with Chapter B2 of 

the “Naval Safety and Occupational Health Program 

Manual for Forces Af loat” (OPNAVINST 5100.19E).

The IDC also posted a sign listing an updated 

WBGT and the stay time for both light and heavy 

exertion (including exercise) on all airlocks leading to 

the weatherdecks. The signs were prominent and easy to 

read, so Sailors knew their limits when exiting the ship. 

Heat stress was also addressed within the skin of the 

ship. O’KANE had installed WBGT thermometers in 

engineering spaces in support of the automated heatstress survey system. The ship’s engineering department 

used a time-weighted mean method to determine stay 

times for personnel who stood watch in these spaces.

For special evolutions such as RAS, small-arms 

qualifications, and sea-and-anchor detail, O’KANE

leadership enforced stay times for watchstanders based 

on exertion levels. Prior to every evolution, leaders and 

safety observers briefed both predicted temperature and 

stay times. The watch bills were written accordingly, 

with reliefs ready to take over once the watchstander 

had reached the stay time. 

O’KANE’s success is a testament to the ship’s culture 

of safety. All hands were aware of the heat-exposure 

limits, and leadership enforced those limits. Sailors were 

able to relieve stress through regular workout programs, 

which supported both mental and physical health. 

By adapting the PHEL system to topside heat stress, 

O’KANE was able to maintain operational readiness the 

entire time.

IS1 Irwin wrote this article while he served as an intelligence 

specialist aboard USS O’KANE.

Clockwise from left: BMSN Jesse Lopez and BMSN Brock West receive pallets of supplies under the POIC, BM1(SW) Gabriel Reyes, and safety officers 

LTJG Andrew Musgrove and BMC(SW) Neizen Pasqual, during a replenishment at sea on USS O’KANE (DDG 77). (Photo courtesy of USS O’KANE)

During this deployment, O’KANE

completed an astounding number 

of high-risk evolutions without a 

single incident:

● 105 flight-quarters (consisted 

of 235 deck landings and 23 

vertical replenishments)

● 23 small-boat operations

● 29 underway replenishments

● 3 precision anchorages

● 26 sea-and-anchor details

● 36 small-arms qualifications

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 21
Just Another Day

FLIGHT DECK AWARENESS

light quarters are an exciting, challenging, 

and moderately risky evolution on 

deployment. There are many hazards and 

obstacles to be aware of when a Sailor works 

the flight deck. In this particular story, the 

hazard was not to me, but to a helicopter flight 

crew for which I was the landing signalman enlisted 

(LSE). At the time, my actions seemed routine and 

simple, but I just may have saved a helicopter and its 

crew from a mishap.

It was the last month of an eight-month 

deployment. The ship had conducted flight quarters 

almost every day so, needless to say, we were in the 

groove. Flight ops had become routine and it had been 

a long deployment. We had been very fortunate to this 

point in the deployment with zero aviation accidents or 

injuries. We were experts in our roles, but were we too 

comfortable to prevent a mishap?

Like any other day, flight operations began with 

a safety brief and a discussion of what was going to 

occur that day. The plan was to launch three aircraft 

simultaneously. We were pretty comfortable in our 

responsibilities by this time, and all the LSEs were 

cracking jokes and calling out which aircraft they wanted 

to launch. We were tired but spirits were high since the 

end of the deployment was in sight. 

Everything started off normally with my helicopter. 

They gave me the signal that they were going to go hot 

on the auxiliary power unit (APU). I called up to the 

tower, got the clearance, and signaled to them to start 

the APU. At this point, it is normal for the helicopter to 

remain on APU for a while. The LSE should be giving 

them the hold signal the entire time, so that the crew 

does not inadvertently start a main engine without 

clearance and red deck. The time can vary, but in this 

particular case, it was about 20 minutes before the pilots 

signaled that they were ready to start the engines. It’s 

important to note the time, because as I stated, it had 

been a long deployment. 

Many LSEs may not have paid much attention to the 

aircraft during this time; attention sometimes wanders 

to other things when you are doing something for the 

200th time. Luckily for that crew, that was not the case 

with me. I take my job very seriously, and I realize that I 

am in a great vantage point being LSE compared to the 

crew in the helicopter. I am the last line of defense with 

regard to noticing something wrong before takeoff.

The pilot gave me the signal that he was going 

hot on engine number one. Engine started; no issues. 

Then engine number two. Once again, it was a normal 

start. After both engines were fully up and running, 

the crew chief conducted his pre-takeoff walk around. 

At this time, I could have let my mind wander while 

waiting. But I stayed focused. I noticed something on 

the ground near the aircraft cabin. At first, I thought it 

just might be a piece of trash that had rolled out of the 

cabin, but with this inherently risky evolution, there was 

always a concern for foreign object damage. It could be 

catastrophic for that “trash” to get sucked into one of the 

engine intakes.

I signaled the crew chief and pointed at what I saw. 

The crew chief took one look at the object, and then 

looked back at me and gave me the “cut-throat” signal — 

the signal to kill the engines. The pilots shut down the 

aircraft without incident.

The piece of “trash” turned out to be a blade stop 

brake for the rotor system. This part helps stabilize the 

rotor blades while they’re spinning. Losing this critical 

item could have caused catastrophic failure of the rotor 

system, loss of the helicopter, and loss of the crew had 

the aircraft taken off. I didn’t know any of this at the 

time; I just wanted to make sure the crew was aware that 

something was near their aircraft. 

Afterward, all I could think about was complacency. 

Had I paid a little less attention, I might not have even 

noticed the object on the ground. Had I not been 

trained in crew resource management (CRM), I may 

have not had the assertiveness to speak up and let 

By AN Jeremy Taylor, USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD 18)

22 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
the crew chief know what I had seen. I now see the 

importance of staying alert and doing the job correctly. 

Even the smallest omitted action or misstep can lead 

to disaster. I am glad I stopped the aircraft from taking 

off. When the crew chief told me that I had potentially 

saved all of their lives, all I could think to say was “You’re 

welcome, that’s what we are supposed to do.”

AS3 James Rockwell guides a CH-53E Sea 

Stallion helicopter during take off from the 

flight deck of amphibious transport dock ship 

USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD 18). (U.S. Navy 

Photo/MC2 Gary Granger Jr.)

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 23
Blackout

By Evelyn Odango, Naval Safety Center

The Danger Zone

By hyperventilating before going underwater, 

the swimmer decreases or eliminates the amount of 

carbon dioxide (CO2) in the blood stream. Carbon 

dioxide supplies the body’s primary urge to inhale while 

breathing. Taking a series of breaths expels the carbon 

dioxide, causing the CO2

 level to drop below normal. 

This allows the swimmer to stay underwater longer 

before feeling a need to breathe. 

During the breath-hold, it takes a significant amount 

of time for the CO2 to return to the normal level then 

to rise to the point where it stimulates breathing. While 

descending underwater, the levels of CO2 and oxygen 

(O2) will increase. During the breath-hold at depth, 

the body uses the O2

 and turns it into CO2, which will 

eventually signal the swimmer to breathe. During the 

ascent, the O2

 levels decrease even further while the 

CO2

 increases (a condition called hypoxia), causing the 

swimmer to lose consciousness.

S

hallow-water blackout (SWB) results from hyperventilating or taking a series of short breaths 

before going underwater. It is the leading cause of drownings for experienced swimmers. Most 

people can hold their breath approximately one minute, but usually not much longer without 

training or special preparation. SWB can affect anyone, even physically fit swimmers. Some 

survive because of quick rescue efforts; others succumb. 

Breath-Hold Diving and Consequences

Articles and reports on SWB-related deaths pervade 

safe-community websites and the news media, where 

survivors tell their stories so others may live. Warning 

signs are going up in major cities’ recreation centers 

and pool houses. Reuter’s news agency reports that 

New York City and Santa Barbara have already banned 

breath-holding in public schools.

Extended breath-holding after hyperventilation is 

not a safe procedure, and the Navy community is not 

immune to the danger of this phenomenon. The U.S. 

Navy Diving Manual states that hyperventilation is a 

common cause of breath-holding mishaps in swimming 

pools. Although hard to track, SWB-related deaths have 

been documented for decades. 

In October 1998, an article in the Navy & Marine 

Corps Medical News reported about the drowning of 

three Sailors who succumbed to SWB during training. 

According to the report, one of the victims was a chief 

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

24 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
Image Source: Aquatics International

SHALLOW WATER BLACKOUT RESULTS FROM HYPOXIA (LOW OXYGEN) TO THE BRAIN.

WHO IS AT RISK:

• Free-Divers

• Special Forces Combat Divers

• Snorklers

• Competitive Swimmers

• Spearfishing Divers

• Marine Raiders

WHERE IT CAN OCCUR:

• Pool

• Lake

• River

• Ocean

SWB can occur in any body of water, regardless 

of depth.

petty officer who was a skilled swimmer. He died alone 

in the base pool. 

In 2013, a U.S. Air Force Safety Investigation Board 

polled more than 3,300 airmen who regularly swam 

as part of their workout routine; of that number, 86 

percent were not aware of SWB. During the same year, 

the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) safety investigation of 

an airman’s drowning in an underwater training led to 

changes in the service’s high-risk activities program. 

Personal risk management, such as having a swim 

buddy, has become a major component of this program.

Recently, the “U.S. Navy Diving Manual” has also 

been updated. The revisions from November 2014 

effect changes in mishap and near-mishap reporting, 

planning and ORM, breath-hold diving, and calculation 

of scuba air supply. Commanders and safety leaders urge 

instructors, swimmers, divers, and lifeguards to maintain 

constant awareness. 

Retired Chief Hospital Corpsman (DSW) Dean Del 

Favero, formerly a diving specialist with the Naval Safety 

Center, emphasized an important safety reminder in an 

issue of the diving newsletter, Diving Safety Lines. 

“Refresh your knowledge on breath-hold diving,” 

he said. In an email, Del Favero added that “breath-hold 

diving is rarely performed in Navy diving, so it is a rare 

occurrence for our community.” 

The Navy prohibits the technique. It is, however, 

practiced quite often in special operations training. 

The diving manual also specifically states, “breath-hold 

diving shall be confined to tactical and work situations 

that cannot be effectively accomplished by the use of 

underwater breathing apparatus.” The manual further 

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 25
states, “hyperventilation shall not be practiced because 

of the high possibility of causing unconsciousness 

underwater.”

Call for Awareness

SWB can affect anyone at any time. Victims typically 

have no prior medical problems, are physically fit, and 

give no warning. In recent years, a series of SWB-related 

drownings involved victims between the ages of 15 and 

26. They had all been holding their breath underwater.

An organization called Shallow Water Blackout 

Prevention has started a movement to increase 

awareness and promote prevention after the death of 

Gene “Whitner” Milner, who died at the age of 25 in his 

family’s swimming pool. According to the organization’s 

website, Milner was performing hypoxic training to 

increase his dive time for spear fishing. After his death 

in 2011, his family founded the organization to prevent 

senseless deaths caused by SWB. 

A Naval Diving and Salvage Training 

Center instructor stands ready to 

offer assistance to a diver student 

if he is not able to regain his own 

air supply during a problem solving 

exercise at the pool confidencetraining portion of the student’s 

course. Students are trained to stay 

calm during loss-of-air situation 

while following carefully supervised 

procedures to regain their air supply 

without going to the surface. The 

school is located in Panama City, 

Fla., and is the center for navy diver 

training. (U.S. Navy Photo/PHC Andy 

McKaskle)

Similarly, retired surgeon Dr. Ernest Campbell, 

who is also an avid diver, hosts a website that offers 

information about diving and undersea medicine for 

the non-medical divers and swimmers. According to the 

website, shallow-water blackout was a hot research topic 

for diving physicians in the 1960s, when they worked 

out the basic physiology of this phenomenon. They also 

studied the case histories of SWB victims, identifying 

several factors that can contribute to this condition. 

These include hyperventilation, exercise, a competitive 

personality, a focused mindset, and youth. 

The website (www.scuba-doc.com) further explains 

that “medical researchers feel that many pool deaths, 

classified as drownings, are really the result of shallow 

water blackout. Most victims are male adolescents 

and young adults attempting competitive endurance 

breath-holding, frequently on a dare. Drowning victims, 

especially children, have been resuscitated from long 

periods of immersion in cold water 30 minutes or more. 

The same is not true for victims blacking out in warm26 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
for SWB, stay proactive. Generate action and discussion 

by sharing lessons learned, improving high-risk activity 

programs, maintaining awareness, and making decisions 

at the right level.

Sources for this article include the Pacific Air Forces 

Safety, Bureau of Medicine, West Bend Mutual Insurance 

Company, and the U.S. Navy Diving Manual.

Ms. Odango is the editor of Sea Compass and Decisions magazines.

water swimming pools. Warm water hastens death by 

allowing tissues, especially brain tissues, to continue 

metabolizing rapidly; without oxygen, irreversible cell 

damage occurs in minutes.”

It takes a concerted effort between command 

leaders, safety supervisors, trainers, swimmers, and 

divers to mitigate the hazards of underwater activities. 

Educate family members and friends about the dangers 

of breath-holding or hyperventilating. If you – or 

someone you know – have been affected by or are at risk 

	Do not practice prolonged breath-holding. Institute and enforce a ban on any 

prolonged, repeated, and competitive breath-holding activities.

	Inform parents and swimmers why breath-holding activities are not allowed.

	Never hyperventilate.

	Underwater breath-holding should never be encouraged, but if practiced the rule 

of thumb for safety is: One Breath-Hold, One Time, One Lap, ONLY.

	Never swim alone.

	Repetitive breath-holding increases risk of SWB. If breath-holding underwater, 

a buddy must be next to you tapping you on your shoulder so you can signal 

that you are OK. Your buddy’s total focus needs to be you and your safety. The 

buddy should never breath-hold with you. Do not rely on lifeguards. SWB is 

difficult to detect above water.

	Understand that any strenuous exercise performed underwater drastically 

decreases the amount of time a swimmer can stay submerged.

	Never hesitate; if a swimmer is sitting motionless on the bottom of the pool pull 

them out immediately.

	Train lifeguards on the dangers of hyperventilation and shallow water blackout.

Sources:

Pacific Air Forces Safety

West Bend Mutual Insurance Company/Culture of Safety

DROWNING STATISTICS PREVENTION STRATEGIES

MARINE CORPS FATALITIES

FY Off Duty On Duty

2008 1 0

2009 6 0

2010 4 2

2011 3 0 

2012 4 0

2013 1 0

2014 2 1

2015 0 0

Total 21 3

NAVY FATALITIES

FY Off Duty On Duty

2008 7 1

2009 5 3

2010 2 1

2011 4 1 

2012 4 1

2013 5 5

2014 5 0

2015 0 2

Total 32 14

Until the two recent on-duty drownings, there 

had been no SWB-related death since 2001. 

We had eight total between 1990 and 2001.

Naval Safety Center Data, FY08-15

(Oct. 1, 2007 - June 8, 2015)

ONLINE RESOURCES

Sea & Shore Articles: “The Facts About Breath-Hold Diving,” “Shipmates Who Became Victims,” “Shallow-Water Blackout: 

It’s No Joke,” and “Tips to Avoid Becoming a Victim.”

http://www.public.navy.mil/comnavsafecen/pages/media/magazines/sea%20compass/archives.aspx

U.S. Navy Diving Manual (SS521-AG-PRO-010)

http://www.supsalv.org/00c3_publications.asp

Shallow-Water Blackout Prevention

http://shallowwaterblackoutprevention.org

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 27
elcome to the latest edition of the 

Summary of Mishaps, a.k.a the Friday 

Funnies. Actually, this is not the latest 

edition – it’s a tribute to the beloved blog 

and to the man who, for the last 13 years, has combined 

mishaps, stupidity and humor in an instructive way.

Derek Nelson is the assistant department head for 

the media department at the Naval Safety 

Center. His responsibilities include 

supervising the editing process for 

the magazines (including Approach, 

Decisions, Mech, and Sea Compass). 

One of his favorite duties is 

selecting the Photo of the 

Week. Nelson chooses the best 

photograph that depicts what he 

summarizes as “people doing 

stupid stuff ” to show his 

audience what not to do in a 

humorous but informative 

way.

His claim to fame, however, is the Friday Funnies, 

distributed as a Navy safety message. 

“The Friday Funnies is a very unusual Navy message 

because it’s intended to be humorous” Nelson said. 

“In the world of safety there are tons of serious and 

sometimes boring products.”

Nelson combines humor with safety messages 

because he understands people tend to get drowsy and 

have a hard time paying attention when they are learning 

about safety.

His material comes from mishap reports, and every 

bit of the information in the Summary of Mishaps is 

true. He tosses in an occasional quirky comment, but 

the one about service members making a propanefueled potato gun actually happened. One of the 

designers of the device looked down the tube and got 

shot in the face with a potato. I don’t care who you are, 

that’s funny. It’s also a great lesson learned.

Nelson has to wade through hundreds of 

reports for every one that is ridiculous 

enough to earn a spot in the Friday 

W

SAFETY CULTURE

By Christopher Jones, Naval Safety Center

Photos by John W. Williams 

28 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015
Funnies. Twisting your ankle on an icy basketball court 

isn’t enough. Riding your motorcycle while wearing 

bedroom slippers and losing control on a patch of wet 

grass could be in the next edition, thus making you an 

example of what not to do. That one was in an October, 

2005 edition.

“I look for incidents that involve poor decisionmaking,” he explains. “It’s the human factor that people 

see when they look in the mirror.”

His method appears simple. He reads the short 

narratives of the mishap, usually three or four lines. If 

the narrative seems routine or mundane, he skips to 

the next narrative. If the mishap involves a coconut or 

raccoon, Nelson probes more deeply. 

He puts in just enough information (such as time of 

day, rank, and general location) so his readers get a sense 

of reality, but he removes identifiable information, such 

as names and specific commands. In this way, he allows 

a subject to save what little dignity remains after trying 

to grab a remote-controlled airplane while its propellers 

are spinning. Yes, that did happen. It can be found in the 

Best of the Friday Funnies special-issue magazine. 

In 2002, Nelson inherited the task of writing the 

“Funnies” from a former chief of staff, Bill Mooberry, 

who had provided the funny yet important safety 

message as far back as the 1980s.

“He was truly hilarious” Nelson said. “My sense of 

humor is much dryer than his was.”

Nelson takes pride in the fact he has contributed 

to mishap-prevention efforts for Sailors and Marines 

during his three-decade-plus career at the Naval Safety 

Center. People have contacted him to say they took an 

extra five minutes to get a ladder instead of using a table 

and chair because they “didn’t want to end up in the 

Friday Funnies.”

“I treasure the fact the Navy has a sense of humor,” 

he said. “It is part of the reason why I’ve been able to 

stick around so long.”

Nelson has never had a hard time finding material. It 

seems he has read a mishap about every possible way a 

person can do something wrong.

“You shouldn’t have to learn the hard way,” he said. 

“But some people seem determined to.”

What about when he passes on the task of writing 

the Funnies and someone else takes over? The seasoned 

author has a simple wish: “I hope it makes me laugh.” 

One of his favorite quotes is from the movie “Spinal 

Tap”: “There’s such a fine line between stupid and 

clever.”

That line will be drawn over and over every week, 

thanks to the Sailors and Marines who announce, “Hey, 

check this out,” and the man who shares the story with 

the rest of us.

That's all for this time students, class dismissed. 

Mr. Jones is the Naval Safety Center’s social media manager.

Derek Nelson, a seasoned writer and author, talks about turning plain safety messages into priceless life-saving lessons. People have contacted him to 

say they took an extra five minutes to get a ladder instead of using a table and chair because they “didn’t want to end up in the Friday Funnies.”

Spring-Summer 2015 SEA COMPASS 29
OFF DUTY

I

t was August 2011, and a 

tropical storm had just passed 

but was well out to Bermuda. I 

was body surfing with my boogie 

board on Figure Eight Island, 

N.C., with some surfers. The waves 

weren’t breaking much closer to 

shore, so I decided to paddle out to 

where the surfers were in head deep 

water. Finally, a wave came that the 

surfers caught and rode. I was out 

for several more minutes expecting 

the surfers to return where I was. 

Instead they stayed in much closer 

to shore. I then realized that I 

couldn’t hear the waves anymore. 

There were also bubbles on the 

surface all around me, but they 

didn’t seem to be moving. I realized 

I was caught in a rip current.

I could see my wife and the 

beach umbrella getting smaller 

and smaller on the shore. She was 

looking in my direction, but never 

saw me waving for help. 

I tried to swim with the boogie 

board at first, but if you’ve ever 

tried to do that you know that won’t 

work. I kept it with me though 

using the side stroke to swim. I 

had watched the weather channel 

NOAA warnings and knew what to 

do when caught in a rip current. 

I remembered to swim parallel 

to the shore for a while and then 

make my way back to shore. I was 

so exhausted when I made it to 

shore that I dropped. Nobody on 

the beach noticed what happened. I 

kissed the ground. 

Downloaded from NWS/NOAA website: 

June 9, 2015.

I Survived a Rip Current

Greg’s Story ...

The story below originally appeared on the National Weather Service (NWS)/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

website. It was submitted by a rip current survivor. For more rip current survivor stories, visit the NWS/NOAA website at http://www.

ripcurrents.noaa.gov/real_life.shtml.

Do you have a survival story (on duty or off duty) you would like to share in Sea Compass? Contact us at safe-seacompass@navy.mil.

Coastal scientists have been investigating rip currents for more than 75 years. This research has 

been conducted through field observations and measurements, laboratory measurements and wave 

tank experiments, and computer and numerical modeling. The mechanics of rip current development are complex and involve interactions between waves and currents, waves and water levels, 

waves and the shape of the nearshore bottom (bathymetry), as well as wave-wave interaction. Rip 

currents can occur along any coastline that features breaking waves. Scientific investigations of 

wave and current interactions along the coast have shown that rip currents are likely present on 

most beaches every day as a component of the complex pattern of nearshore circulation. 

For more on the science of rip currents, go to http://www.ripcurrents.noaa.gov/science.shtml 

(Source: NWS/NOAA)

Rip Currents vs. Rip Tides

Rip currents are not rip tides. A specific 

type of current associated with tides may 

include both the ebb and flood tidal 

currents that are caused by egress and 

ingress of the tide through inlets and the 

mouths of estuaries, embayments, and 

harbors. These currents may cause drowning deaths, but these tidal currents or tidal 

jets are separate and distinct phenomena 

from rip currents. Recommended terms for 

these phenomena include ebb jet, flood 

jet, or tidal jet.

What is Undertow?

An often misunderstood term, undertow 

refers to the backwash of a wave along 

the sandy bottom. After a wave breaks and 

runs up the beach face, some of the water 

percolates into the sand, but much of it 

flows back down the beach face creating 

a thin layer of offshore-moving water with 

a relatively high velocity. This backwash 

can trip small children and carry them 

seaward. However, the next incoming 

wave causes higher landward velocities, 

pushing them back up on the beach. 

Undertow does not pull you underwater or 

out to sea.

30 SEA COMPASS Spring-Summer 2015

Risk is inherent in all tasks, training, missions, operations, and in personal activities no matter how routine. 

ORM: OPNAVINST 3500.39C

 U.S. Navy File Photo/SN Andrew K. Haller

The most common cause of task degradation or mission 

failure, specifically the inability to consistently manage risk.
 U.S. Navy File Photo/MC3 Caine Storino

Reduces or offsets risks by systematically identifying hazards and assessing and 

controlling the associated risks allowing decisions to be made that weigh risks against 

mission or task benefits.
I’m proud of how the ship came together 

as a team. It showed tenacity and resolve 

to answer all bells and knock a critical 

[assessment] out of the park.” 

— USS RUSSELL Commanding Officer CDR James Harney