Gulf War 

Air Power Survey 

Volume 111 

Washington, D.C. 

1993 

Gulf War Air Power Survey 

Staff 

Dr, Eliot A. Cohen, Director 

Col. Emery M. Kiraly 

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Kelley 

(Retired, USAF) 

Dr. Wayne W. Thompson 

Mr. Ernest D. Cruea 

Maj. Joseph W. Patterson 

Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek 

Lt. Col. Daniel T. Kuehl 

Lt. Col. Robert C. Owen 

Dr. John F. Guilmartin 

Mr. Richard A. Gunkel 

Dr. Thomas C. Hone 

Dr. Alexander S. Cochran 

Mr. Barry D. Watts 

Dr. Thomas A. Keaney 

Executive Director 

Senior Military Advisor 

Senior Historical Advisor 

ANSER Program Manager 

Executive Oficer 

Publishing Manager 

Chief, Statistics 

Chief, Chronology 

ChieJ Weapons, Tactics 

and Training 

Chiefl Logistics, Space, 

and Support 

ChieJ Command, Control, 

and Organization 

Chief, Strategy and 

Plans 

Chief, Operations and 

Egeects 

Chiefl Summary Report 

... 

111 

Foreword 

From 16 January through 28 February 199 1. the United States and its 

allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in history, 

a conflict in which air operations played a preeminent role. The Gulf 

War Air Power Survey was commissioned on 22 August 1991 to review 

all aspects of air warfare in the Persian Gulf for use by the United States 

Air Force, but it was not to confine itself to discussion of that institution. 

The Survey has produced reports on planning, the conduct of operations, 

the effects of the air campaign, command and control, logistics, air base 

support, space, weapons and tactics, as well as a chronology and a compendium of statistics on the war. It has prepared as well a summary 

report and some shorter papers and assembled an archive composed of 

paper, microfilm, and electronic records, all of which have been deposited 

at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, 

Alabama. The Survey was just that, an attempt to provide a comprehensive and documented account of the war. It is not a definitive history: 

that will await the passage of time and the opening of sources (Iraqi 

records, for example) that were not available to Survey researchers. Nor 

is it a summary of lessons learned: other organizations, including many 

within the Air Force, have already done that. Rather, the Survey provides 

an analytical and evidentiary point of departure for future studies of the 

air campaign. It concentrates on an analysis of the operational level of 

war in the belief that this level of warfare is at once one of the most 

difficult to characterize and one of the most important to understand. 

The Survey was directed by Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins 

University’s School of Advanced International Studies and was staffed by 

a mixture of civilian and military analysts, including retired officers from 

the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was divided into task forces, most 

of which were run by civilians working temporarily for the Air Force. 

The work produced by the Survey was examined by a distinguished 

review committee that included scholars, retired general officers from the 

Air Force, Navy, and Army, as well as former and current senior government officials. Throughout, the Survey strived to conduct its research 

in a spirit of impartiality and scholarly rigor. Its members had as their 

standard the observation of Mr. Franklin D’Olier, chairman of the United 

States Strategic Bombing Survey during and after the second World War: 

V 

Acknowledgments 

The Survey’s members owe a great debt of gratitude to Secretary of 

the Air Force Donald B. Rice, who conceived of the project, provided it 

with resources, and set for it the highest standards of independence and 

objectivity. Many organizations and individuals gave generously of their 

resources and time to support this effort. Various branches and commands of the Air Force were particularly helpful in providing material for 

and, in some cases, personnel to conduct the study. The United States 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aided with this study in different ways, 

including the sharing of data pertaining to the air war. A number of the 

United States’ Coalition partners also made available individuals and 

records that were vital to the Survey’s work. Many participants in the 

war, including senior political officials and officers from all of the Services were willing to speak with the Survey and share their recollections of 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Private students of the Gulf War also 

made available their knowledge of the crisis and conflict. Wherever 

possible and appropriate such assistance has been acknowledged in the 

text. 

The Survey’s independence was its reason for being. Each report is 

the product of the authors who wrote it and does not necessarily represent 

the views of the Review Committee, the Air Force or the Department of 

Defense. 

vii 
Security Review 

The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were 

submitted to the Department of Defense for policy 

and security review. In accordance with this review, certain information has been removed from 

the original text. These areas have been annotated 

as [DELETED]. 

viii 
Gulf War Air Power Survey 

Reports 

Summary Report 

Volume I: 

Volume 11: 

Volume 111: 

Volume IV 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Volume V 

Part I: 

Part 11: 

Planning Report 

Command and Control Report 

Operations Report 

Effectiveness Report 

Logistics Report 

Support Report 

Weapons, Tactics, 

and Training Report 

Space Report 

A Statistical Compendium 

Chronology 

ix 

Contents 

Foreword ......................................... v 

Acknowledgements ................................. v i i 

Security Review ................................... viii 

List of Reports ..................................... ix 

Part I: Logistics 

Index to Logistics Report 

Part 11: Support 

Index to Support Report 

Glossary 

(Note: Each of the two reports retained pagination independent of the 

other. Accordingly, the table of contents for each report accompanies 

each report independently of this table of contents). 

xi 

Part I 

Logis tics 

Part I 

Logistics 

Task Force Chief 

Mr. Richard A. Gunkel 

Principal Author 

Mr. Richard L. Olson 

Contributing Authors 

Mr. Roger K. Coffey 

Mr. Francis E. Cartwright 

Mr. Dennis K. Dakan 

Maj. Daniel L. Draper 

Mr. James A. Forbes 

Lt. Cot. Constance D. Graham 

Mr. John W. Schade 

Maj. Gen. Click D. Smith, Jr. (Retired, USAF) 

Contents 

... Report Acknowledgements ............................ xi11 

Introduction ...................................... xv 

1 Logistics of the Gulf War ........................ 1 

2 Preparation for a Southwest Asia Contingency ......... 27 

3 Deploying to the Theater ........................ 81 

4 Intra-Theater Airlift .......................... 141 

Appendix 4-A: Theater Prepositioned Equipment ...... 169 

Appendix 4-B: Theater Airlift Management ......... 171 

Appendix 4-C: Definition of Provisional Units Terms . . 175 

5 Air Refueling ............................... 177 

6 Arming the Force ............................ 221 

7 Supplying the Force .......................... 259 

8 Maintaining the Force ......................... 307 

Appendix 8-A: Summary of Gulf Conflict 

U.S. Air Force Battle Damage and Repair .... 365 

Appendix 8-B: AoR Maintenance Population Analysis . . 373 

9 Logistics Performance ......................... 381 

Index .......................................... 395 

V 
Tables 

1 

2 

3 

4 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

United States Air Force Aircraft Inventory versus 

Quantity Committed to Gulf War ............ 29 

Air Force Active Basing Structure ................. 36 

Civil Air Carrier Volunteers Before CRAF 

Stage I Activation ....................... 44 

Aircrews Available for Desert Shield 

on 2 August 1990 ....................... 44 

Worldwide Status of Prepositioning ................ 46 

Harvest Falcon Storage ......................... 47 

Coronet Warrior Exercises Expected and Actual Number 

of Fully Mission-Capable Aircraft ............ 67 

WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990 

CENTCOM Region ....................... 69 

Rated Air Force Units .......................... 73 

Measured Area Summaries ...................... 73 

Airlift Forces Beddown ........................ 146 

Cumulative Desert Shield Totals .................. 180 

Cumulative Desert Storm Totals .................. 181 

Tanker Deployment at the Peak of Desert Storm ...... 181 

Total USAF Refueling Events and Receiver Onloads .... 183 

Average Daily Air Refueling Statistics ............. 199 

Tanker Near Mid-Air Collisions .................. 208 

vi 
18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

Munitions Nomenclature and Description ........... 222 

Munitions at Prepositioned Storage Locations ........ 225 

Critical Munitions Status. 10 August 1990 ........... 

Munitions Requirements Growth ................. 234 

231 

CENTAF Supply Support Activity Sites .............. 276 

Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities ............ 283 

CENTCOM Fuel Storage ........................ 287 

Daily Requirements by Component ................ 292 

Daily Requirements by Product .................. 292 

Desert Storm Fuel Status ....................... 304 

ILM (Avionics) Beddown ....................... 312 

ILM (Engine) Beddown ........................ 313 

Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Team Deployment ..... 319 

2951 Combat Logistics Support Squadron Deployment 

to Desert Shield/Desert Storm .............. 320 

Queen Bee Engine Support ..................... 329 

Intermediate-Level and Heavy-Maintenance Production 

August 1990 . March 1991 ................ 335 

C-5 Repairable Asset Flow Times ................ 338 

C-141 Repairable Asset Flow Times ............... 339 

Fully Mission-Capable Rates Compared ............ 348 

vii 
37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

1 

Rationale for Differences Between April 1990 

OPLAN 1002-90 Assessment and Desert Shield 

Desert Storm Results .................... 352 

Summary Naval Aircraft Readiness Data ............ 355 

Percentage of Spare Parts on Hand During 

Desert ShieldDesert Storm ................ 355 

Army Aviation Summary Mission Capability Data ..... 356 

Calculation of Expected Number of Maintenance 

Personnel ............................ 375 

Levels of War .............................. 382 

Major Logistics Improvisations .................. 390 

Figures 

USAF Fighter Aircraft: Type 1 Failures/Hour versus 

Year of First Flight ...................... 31 

Aircraft Spare Parts Funding FY 80-90 .............. 32 

Exchangeable Repair Requiremenfiunding FY 80-91 .... 33 

Tactical Operational Fighters Mission 

Capability Rates ........................ 34 

Munitions Funding FY 81-90 ..................... 35 

Deliberate Planning Process ...................... 52 

Joint Planning Summary ........................ 55 

Coronet Warrior .............................. 67 

Lift Capability ............................... 76 

viii 
10 Sustainability ................................ 77 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

Preposi t ioning ............................... 78 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Missions 

7 August 1990 . 10 March 1991 ............. 93 

Desert Shielfisert Storm MAC Cargo 

7 August 1990 . I0 March 1991 ............. 93 

Desert ShieldDesert Storm MAC Passengers 

7 August 1990 . 10 Much 1991 ............. 94 

MAC Strategic Airlift Missions by Destination in AOR 

August 1990 . February I991 .............. 103 

Mission-Capable (MC) Aircraft and Aircraft Flown 

(Daily Averages) ....................... 105 

Desert ShieldlDesert Storm MAC Cargo: 

Unit and Sustainment ..................... 112 

NAVCENT Buildup: Fixed-Wing Aircraft ............. 116 

cENTAF Aircraft Beddown at End of Phase I .......... 118 

CENTAF Aircraft Beddown at End of Phase I1 .......... 119 

CENTAF Buildup: TAF Combat Aircraft ............. 120 

CENTAF Buildup: TAF Combat Support Aircraft ....... 121 

F-4G Air Refueling Track ...................... 124 

CENTAF Buildup: SAC Aircraft ................... 127 

CENTAF Buildup: MAC Aircraft .................. 135 

CENTAF Buildup: AFSOF Aircraft ................. 137 

MARCENT Buildup: Fixed-Wing Aircraft ............ 137 

ix 
28 Coalition Member Aircraft ...................... 138 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

MAC Strategic Airlift Sorties by Aerial Ports of 

Debarkation (Aug 90 . Feb 91) ............. 142 

Aerial Ports of Debarkation and 

Repositioning Sites ..................... 143 

Tactical Airlift Forces Beddown Locations .......... 145 

Airlift Organizations. Bases. and Units ............. 149 

Came1 and Star Routes ........................ 152 

Theater Main Supply Routes and Logistics Bases ...... 155 

Principal NAVCENT Logistics Bases ................ 157 

MARCENT Area .............................. 161 

Aeromedical Evacuation ....................... 162 

Atlantic Bridge Air Refueling ................... 190 

Tanker Beddown in the AOR .................... 195 

Air Refueling Tracks and Anchors ................ 198 

KC-1 35s Deployed from CONUS .................. 200 

Air Refueling Sorties Flown .................... 201 

Munitions Storage Locations Prior to Operation 

Desert Shield ......................... 227 

United States Munitions Storage and Port Locations .... 238 

Total Munitions Deployed ...................... 238 

Munitions Storage Locations. 16 January 1991 ....... 240 

AIM-7M Sparrow Missile ....................... 251 

X 
48 

49 

50 

51 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

59 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 

68 

AIM-9M Sidewinder Missile ..................... 

MK-82 Low- and High-Drag 500-Pound Bomb ....... 

M 1 1 7 (750-Pound) ........................... 

MK-84 (2.000- Pound Low- and High-Drag Bomb) ..... 

AGM-65 Series Maverick Missile .................. 

GBU-10 (Improved 2.000- Pound Bomb) ............. 

GBU-12 (500-Pound PGM) ....................... 

GBU-24 (Improved 2.000 .Pound Bomb .............. 

GBU-27 (2.000 .Pound PGM for F-117A) ............. 

CBU-52/58/71 (Cluster Bomb Units) ................ 

CBU-87 (Combined Effects Munition) .............. 

CBU-89 (Gator Antitank Munition) ................. 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm Aircraft Status 

CENTAF Supply Support Activity Configuration 

DFSC Fuel Locations .......................... 

ABDR Events by Aircraft Qpe ................... 

Damage Areas .............................. 

....... 

....... 

Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Time ............... 

A- 10 Aircraft Battle Damage Repair ............... 

MAC Maintenance Cycles ....................... 

Surge Requirements and Production (Cumulative) ..... 

252 

252 

253 

253 

254 

254 

255 

255 

256 

256 

257 

257 

260 

275 

288 

321 

321 

323 

323 

337 

342 

xi 
69 F-16 FMC Rate .............................. 347 

70 F-15 Break and Fix Rates ...................... 350 

71 Maintenance Population by Month ................ 358 

72 Maintenance Personnel by Base and Month .......... 359 

73 Maintenance Personnel: Planned vs Actual .......... 362 

74 Maintenance Footprint Analysis .................. 374 

75 Munitions Posture ............................ 387 

xii 
Report Acknowledgements 

The survey of logistics in the Gulf War brought together a formidable team with expertise that crossed every avenue of transportation, 

supply, maintenance, and the myriad aspects of logistics planning and 

coordination. Mr. Richard Gunkel was the Logistics, Support, and Space 

Task Force Leader, and Richard Olson led the authoring and development 

of the logistics report. The authors' efforts to sift, sort, analyze, and interpret were complemented by innumerable contributions of members on the 

Air Staff, at MNCOMs, and in base-level organizations who managed and 

fought both within and outside the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility and 

who shared their experiences for the benefit of those who follow. The 

study director, Dr. Eliot Cohen, provided a major challenge with his 

constant urging to describe the essence of logistics without turning the 

"hapless reader" into a technician. 

The authors met the challenge through a thematic approach by 

providing answers to questions of what happened. The basis for the story 

was laid in describing preparations for the war by Connie Graham, who 

provided new and original insights to the problems of theater logistics. 

Frank Cartwright provided special expertise on material might that could 

be focused in building a foundation for the conflict. Roger Coffey 

brought first-hand airlift experience to the description of deployment and 

positioning the force. Click Smith described the in-theater transportation 

and operational support with a special understanding of management and 

practice. Daniel Draper not only covered fuels, aerial refueling, as well 

as ground refueling, but brought reflections garnered from long hours in 

the Air Staff Logistics Readiness Center during the conflict. Dennis 

Dakan provided notable expertise to the essential aspects of munitions 

and arming the force. John Schade's intimate understanding of wholesale 

and retail supply provides keen insights to a massive undertaking of 

provisioning. Jim Forbes penetrating analysis transcended the whole of 

the Logistics survey to describe maintenance accomplishments. 

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Anthony J. Burshnick contributed significantly 

through his introspective critiques of organization and content. Mr Alan 

P. Heffernan deserves real thanks for solving automation challenges; Ms. 

Anne H. Predzin accomplished inspired editing by reining in our propensity to be too technical; and Ms. Barbara L. Gardien brought imaginative 

style for layout and design. The anchor in the process, from the beginning 

to the end, was Ms. Cecelia French, whose immeasurable support with 

answers, typing, organizing, and retyping sustained us with her energy. 

xiii 

Introduction 

This report discusses logistics in the Persian Gulf War as it 

applies to all military operations and in particular to air operations. 

Simply put, how did the United States equip its forces for Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm? Logistics also includes functions for maintaining an 

air base and support services. These aspects of logistics will be covered 

in the two parts of this volume. 

One of the simpler, but nonetheless comprehensive, definitions of 

logistics was documented by Baron Antoine Henri Jomini subsequent to 

the Napoleonic Wars, when he defined logistics as the "practical art of 

moving armies."' A Joint Chiefs of Staff definition expands on Jomini's 

version, expressing logistics as 

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and 

maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those 

aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and 

development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, 

maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition, or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition 

of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. * 

The Gulf War encompassed all of these aspects of logistics, and 

did so on a grand scale. One of the main reasons for success in this 

conflict was the ability of the U.S. military to respond logistically-to 

move, beddown, and sustain the combat forces. The primary focus of our 

survey was to examine airpower application in a theater devoid of prior 

operational presence. This unique environment presented airpower managers with severe challenges to assure efficient and effective application 

of combat force. We examine the state of logistics prior to the conflict, 

the characteristics of planning, the efforts to put combat and support 

elements in place, the support of air operations during combat; and in 

particular, how planners envisioned the role of logistics in supporting air 

forces to achieve Coalition objectives and execute military strategy. 

'Jomini, Antoine H. The Arf of War (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Publishing Co.. 1958). 

*Joint Pub 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

1 Dec 1989. 

xv 
We structured several specific themes in framing our review. 

Some of them surfaced late in the 1970s after Vietnam, and some were 

still pondered as the air campaign unfolded in January 1991. First is the 

nature and substance of the predeployment planning and preparation. A 

massive resource base, vastly expanded in preparation for a global conflict with the Soviets, served as a basis. How did this mass play in the 

Gulf conflict? Where was the mass? All of the forces and most of the 

assets required in the Middle East had to be moved into position. Moving required lift resources as well as time. What then was the significance of five and a half months to position, to set up, to organize, to gain 

efficiency, and to train for what was to be accomplished? 

A second theme focuses on planning that had been formulated, 

although a current, approved, and detailed plan did not exist. What was 

the evolution from the planning that existed, and what was the character 

of execution actions that took place in establishing the Desert Storm 

support structure of January 1991? Research showed that, for this theater, 

logistics operated without confirmation of priorities and with insufficient 

details to deploy efficiently. Was that important? If so, how were problems corrected? Our examination of Gulf War planning and execution 

confirms that the unique missions and institutionalized support processes 

of the major commands produced individualized support and organizational structures. How did these unique structures make a difference, if 

at all? This theme also addresses the level of chaos that existed, the 

improvisation that ensued, and the degree to which readiness and sustainability were affected. 

A third theme conce-ms the degree to which command and control 

affected basic logistics concepts of operation. How did automated systems 

and equipment designed for deployed operations perform where called 

upon? To what extent were pace and effectiveness of specific logistics 

operations tied to availability of information processing and the accessibility of in-theater and global communications? Was information available outside the area of responsibility to provide necessary assistance and 

support? 

Interwoven with these themes are some other fairly important 

questions. For example: Did the desert environment present unique 

problems? What were the relationships among the Services, and how 

were joint responsibilities for logistics in the theater assigned and accomplished? Since Gulf-related logistical efforts drained resources from other 

theaters, what were the airpower impacts outside of the Gulf War? How 

xvi 
well were the forces prepared? What was the impact of precrises training 

on Gulf War logistics? Many examples show that training practices and 

exercises prepared the United States well for the Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm task. At the same time, there are also examples illustrating how 

lack of realistic conditions or overscripting of training and exercise scenarios masked problems later confronted in the Gulf. This is especially true 

for many areas of logistics. 

As these themes suggest, the first report is focused on the substance and process of the plan and the benefits of a robust resource base, 

as well as the innovation required to respond to unforeseen contingencies 

as they arose. The themes are addressed within the following structure. 

Overview and Readiness 

Chapter 1, Logistics of the Gulf War, summarizes the achievements of airpower-related logistics during the Persian Gulf crisis and 

introduces basic concepts, while distilling everything in this volume. 

Chapter 2, Preparation for a Southwest Asia Contingency, outlines 

the state of logistic planning for contingency on the eve of the invasion 

of Kuwait. Subsequent chapters discuss execution in detail. This chapter 

provides an overview of the facilities available in the theater and shows 

how prepositioning had been planned. Central to the discussion (and 

somewhat contrary to the usual perspective) is the idea of the winghase 

rather than the aircraft squadron as the deployable unit. 

Mobility 

This section concentrates on logistical support delivered by air 

and on the logistics needed to sustain air operations. Sealift and ground 

transportation are considered, but only as they contribute to or affect air 

power. 

Chapter 3, Deploying to the Theater, describes the effort required 

to deploy CENTCOM units from all Services and includes the Navy’s 

deployment of carriers to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea in context 

with the first USAF fixed-wing deployment in the Gulf War. This chapter 

also covers the deployment of airlift, the deployment of land-based aviation (including Army and USMC aircraft), and the significance of the 

politically difficult acquisition of landing and overflight rights within the 

theater and along the airlift route structure. The network of overseas 

xvii 
bases played a significant role in combat readiness during the earliest 

phases of Desert Shield. The contributions of equipment, crews, the Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and the mobilization of reservists is included 

in this chapter. 

Chapter 4, Intra-Theater Lift, concentrates on airlift within the 

theater and also discusses land transport in support of air forces, the 

Army, and the Marines. 

Chapter 5, Air Refueling, during the deployment as well as 

during the air campaign, identifies the degree to which air refueling is 

integral and essential in getting the forces in position and carrying out 

combat operations. 

Sustainment 

Chapter 6, Arming the Force, presents the munitions story, 

including special operations munitions, precision-guided munitions, and 

prepositioning. Efforts required to move munitions to the theater, lead 

times involved, and distribution problems within the theater are also 

covered. A sense of timing in readiness to fight is developed. Finally, 

the quantities of munitions transported to the theater and used during 

the war are summarized and interpreted. 

Chapter 7, Supplying the Force, focuses on general supplies, 

including aircraft parts and petroleum products. Organizational and 

supply process innovations are considered, and the logistics role of 

TAC as CENTAF Rear is explored and compared with normal doctrine. 

Chapter 8, Maintaining the Force, sketches the maintenance 

support posture for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, on the flightline, in 

and out of the theater, and in Europe and the United States. This 

chapter also provides a careful study of mission-capable (MC) rates 

and their meaning, explaining why a number of systems had high MC 

rates, and why overall, the MC rates initially reported were unintentionally inflated. The challenges of operating in a desert environment 

when problems were encountered are documented. 

xviii 
Conclusion 

Chapter 9, Logistics Performance, explores in greater depth the 

themes raised in the introduction and in each chapter. It assesses logistics 

performance and implicitly raises issues for the future. 

While this logistic study has attempted to survey those areas involved in the Gulf War that gave rise to significant events in logistical 

operations, relating those events to air power, it does not include every 

conceivable event or exhaust all sources of information. It does, nevertheless, include materials from the following sources: 

0 Interviews with key personnel, 

0 Written accounts from all levels, perspectives, and functional areas, 

0 Unit histories, 

0 DOD, JCS, and Service reports and studies, 

0 Situation reports, message traffic, briefings, and official 

reports, 

0 Air Force Remedial Action Program lessons learned, 

Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS), and 

Relevant, publicly available books and articles. 

To the greatest degree possible, this study is based upon research 

in primary sources. There were, however, some methodological issues 

that bear on the study of logistics in the Gulf War air campaign. The 

first point is that it is difficult (sometimes impossible) to obtain accurate 

information on the actions of the people and the organizations which 

comprised and managed logistics-especially during the August through 

mid-September 1990 time period. In this volume, after-the-fact testimony 

from participants has been used extensively, with full understanding that 

memories may be faulty or that the participants may have rethought or 

embellished their experiences. Second, a great majority of data that could 

have been generated and collected during Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

xix 
appears not to have even been written down; this situation is a result of 

extensive use of voice communication. It is also, in part, the failure of 

automated systems to work and provide source data capture for the benefit of management in the theater as well as the United States. In addition, 

many important messages are known to have been transmitted only by 

facsimile and sometimes lost to history. 

The Gulf War Air Power Survey logistics effort nevertheless 

accumulated vast amounts of data available to provide a highly detailed 

account of the Gulf War. In fact, during the final weeks in preparing the 

final draft, researchers continued to uncover documentation that could 

have been pursued had time permitted. Other historians who follow can, 

we hope, use it to continue the analysis. 

xx 
1 

Logistics of the Gulf War 

The first question Logistics asks is, “Where and when do you want 

to fight.” When operational plans are executed, logistics activities must 

provide support where, when, how, for whom, and in sufficient quantities. 

In the Gulf War, logistics forces transported almost everything required 

to fight and sustain. The scenario began with mobilizing and deploying 

operations and support for Desert Shield and reached a crescendo of 

combat action in Operation Desert Storm. Key ingredients for eventual 

success were highly trained and very flexible personnel, capable and 

reliable weapon systems, a mature airlift system, the legacy of the 1980s 

spare parts buys, the Cold War force structure to draw upon, the Cold 

War thaw that permitted wide use of previously unavailable (for nonNATO and/or non-SIOP use) forces and equipment, an extensive air-refueling system, an unprecedented coalition of financial and force structure 

resources, prepositioned equipment and munitions, a Saudi air base structure to accommodate the buildup, and a cooperative enemy. 

Significant Factors 

Preparing for War in Southwest Asia 

In early 1990, preparation for a Gulf War was not first priority for 

U.S. General Purpose Forces. The main level of effort focused on a 

potential war in Europe, and most planning and preparation reflected that 

focus. Certain expectations making sense for a European War did not for 

the Gulf War. Although the unmet expectations became opportunities to 

innovate and excel, in some cases they created problems that had to be 

resolved in the midst of Gulf War operations. 

The Air Force recognized the concept of Bases and Lines of Communication as fundamental to its combat support doctrine. The basing 

structure on the eve of the Gulf Conflict was a product of the Cold War, 

and most of the bases were in either Europe or the continental United 

States (CONUS). Although the basing structure was rich, it was in the 

I 
wrong place for a conflict in Southwest Asia (SWA) and placed a premium on lines of communication. Much of the preparations for war in SWA 

centered on solving those problems. 

Traditionally, the aircraft squadron was viewed as a basic combat 

unit, and the concept of operations called for deploying aircraft squadrons from an operational base in the CONUS to another operational base 

somewhere overseas. That concept oversimplified logistics requirements 

for the SWA situation-an unprepared theater where almost all material 

had to be transported in and the pragmatic deploying unit was more 

nearly the wing and/or base itself. The concept of theater support for 

the Gulf War was a network of bare bases with host wings predominating. The host wings exercised authority over most functions in their 

respective locations, supported tenant wings, and prepared base support 

plans for bases to which they were deployed as hosts. Most support 

was initially furnished from homestation; but support remained linked 

to the CONUS, the reason why lines of communication were of paramount importance. 

Although no U.S. facilities existed in SWA, numerous others developed according to U.S. standards were being used by Saudi defense 

forces or for civilian purposes. The primary air bases and air logistics 

centers had been built or augmented largely because of long-standing 

security assistance relationships or U.S. funding. U.S. Air Force, Central 

Command (USCENTAF) identified fourteen locations of sufficient merit to 

beddown 750 aircraft and support approximately 30,000 personnel, 

Deploying to the Theater 

The Air Force had prepositioned $1 billion worth of fuel, ammunition, and equipment in Oman, Bahrain, and aboard three ships. At the 

beginning of Desert Shield, two of these ships were at Diego Garcia and 

the third was off the coast of France. The ships immediately headed 

toward their designated offload ports. This prepositioning effort eliminated an estimated 3,500 strategic airlift missions. Overall however, the 

airlift savings were small compared with the unused capabilities afforded 

by complete use of strategic airlift aircraft, full mobilization of reserve 

and guard aircrews and support personnel, and all three stages of the 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Additionally, incomplete planning, onload processing limitations, throughput congestion at enroute bases, lack of a 

2 
theater staging base, and mission handling equipment limitations contributed to delays and limited through put. 

Despite prepositioned fuel, ammunition, and equipment, the magnitude of the airlift effort during Desert Shield and Desert Storm was 

unprecedented. By 10 March 1991, strategic airlift .had moved over 

500,000 people and 540,000 tons of cargo. At the height of the Desert 

Shield airlift, Military Airlift Command’s (MAC’S) cargo movement 

averaged 17 million ton-miles per day, By comparison, during the 1973 

Arab-Israeli War, U.S. airlift moved 4.4 million ton-miles per day. Other 

historical comparisons include the World War I1 “Hump” at 0.9 million 

ton-miles per day, the Berlin Airlift at 1.7 million ton-miles per day, and 

Operation Just Cause at 2.0 million ton-miles per day. 

The magnitude of the airlift effort during Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm was unprecedented. 

From the moment Desert Shield began, the Military Airlift Command 

depended heavily upon the civil airline industry to fulfill its airlift requirements. Without the thousands of missions flown by civil air carriers, the Command’s airlift fleet could not have moved required troops and 

cargo to the Arabian Peninsula by the time the United Nations deadline 

expired on 15 January 1991. The airline industry’s readiness to participate in a major contingency such as Desert Shield was prearranged 

3 
through a Civil Reserve Air Fleet program. Under the program, participating U.S. civil air carriers voluntarily commit their aircraft and other 

resources to support U.S. national interests when Department of Defense 

airlift requirements exceed the capabilities of the Command's organic 

fleet. In addition, the Command resorted to extraordinary measures to 

maximize its own aircrew availability in August and September 1990. 

The deployment and use of airlift, particularly in the early days, was 

anything but well executed. Little information was available to deploying 

units about their possible beddown bases. Several locations were newly 

built, and others were bare bases. Changes to beddown bases further 

complicated unit deployment preparations and airlift prioritization. Beddown changes resulted from host nation sensitivities, ramp congestion, 

and mismatches between aircraft, munitions, and support equipment. 

Several units were never able to project their airlift requirements accurately. Near the end of its deployment, one major unit cancelled over 60 

missions-then shortly thereafter requested that some be reinstated. 

Because no approved plan to execute existed, no transportation-feasible time-phased force deployment document (TPFDD) was available as the 

basis for execution planning by MAC or Transportation Command. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Transportation Command had to work 

together to build the document (and have it entered into the Joint Operational and Planning Execution System) as it was being executed. MAC'S 

initial tasking consisted of an unprioritized list of units to be deployed as 

soon as possible. 

Airlift execution planning problems fell into two major categories: 

priorities and requirements. Of the two, requirements problems were 

more pervasive, persistent, and harder to understand. Hundreds of Air 

Force, Army, Navy, and Marine units were submitting data or making 

entries that wound up in the TPFDD. Entries contained so many errors 

that they were unreliable for determining airlift requirements. Common 

errors included major differences between stated and actual tonnage and 

passengers to be moved, failures to identify oversize and outsize cargo 

properly, wrong onload locations, and wrong available-to-load dates. As 

a result, some missions were sent to locations having no cargo or passengers to transport. For instance, MAC scheduled a Boeing 747 to fly from 

Paris to the East Coast to pick up 400 troops. The troops did not exist 

and the airplane returned to Paris empty. Other missions were scheduled 

4 
and then cancelled because there were no real requirements, and numerous missions had to be added to cover understated requirements. As 

a result of requirements uncertainty, estimated airlift requirements for 

the first seven deploying units increased by sixty percent between 11 

and 13 August. The increase forced the Command to schedule more 

sorties than originally planned for those units and to delay airlift for 

follow-on units. 

A major Joint Operations and Planning Execution System shortcoming 

was an inability to track partially deployed Unit Type Cases (UKs). Most 

deploying fighter squadrons did not receive all the airlift they required or 

expected. As a result, over half of the CENTAF TPFDD consisted of nonstandard UTCS created especially to capture cargo left behind by units otherwise 

considered closed. Each of these UKS had to be individually entered into 

the Execution System database, and detailed information on its contents 

was unavailable. As a result, automatically tracking what was deployed 

and what was not became impossible. Manual tracking of the loads was 

manpower intensive and inherently error prone. 

MAC’S computer models could not provide reports to analyze the 

schedule and determine where the flow would exceed the throughput 

capacity. Consequently, bases became backlogged because they could not 

support the magnitude of the flow. As stations at flow points were 

“maxed out,” the Command had no recourse except to interrupt the flow; 

that happened on several occasions. 

Because CINCCENT decided to deploy combat units ahead of logistics 

support and sustainment cargo, CENTCOM did not allocate airlift resources 

to channel operations until 24 August; then, it allocated four C-141s per 

day. Consequently, backlogs of sustainment cargo routinely built up at 

CONUS aerial ports. Compounding the problem was the fact that cargo 

caught in the backlogs was often assumed lost and subsequently reordered 

by users. MAC took periodic initiatives to keep sustainment cargo from 

backing up at CONUS aerial ports. The fact that the initiatives were 

needed demonstrated that peacetime criteria used by airlift clearance 

authorities to enter cargo into the airlift system are not responsive to a 

combat commander’s tonnage allocations and sustainment priorities. At 

one point in early September, fifty-two percent of sustainment cargo 

awaiting air shipment was coded at the top priority level. 

5 
Because locations and units involved were classified, much of the 

cargo shipped early in the operation was marked simply “Desert Shield”; 

most of it ended up at Dhahran. Due to uSCENTCOM deployment priorities, only limited support forces at Dhahran were available to sort and 

distribute arriving cargo. Cargo backlogs at Dhahran exceeded 1 ,OOO 

pallets and dwarfed backlogs at CONUS aerial ports. 

The innovative daily Desert Express mission for high-priority cargo 

achieved its objectives. At the end of 1990, Desert Express departure 

reliability from Charleston and Torrejon was one hundred percent, while 

arrivals at Dhahran and Riyadh averaged fifty minutes early. Desert 

Express cut response time for high-priority shipments from as much as 

two weeks to as little as seventy-two hours, and the users were very 

happy with the system. This splendid innovation was a fix to make up 

for serious problems with priorities and asset intransit visibility. 

However, the showstopper Desert Express support incurred a tradeoff 

cost. To ensure Desert Express reliability, missions had priority to delay 

other flights, C-141s were placed on alert to ensure departure deadlines, 

and missions went with less than full loads at times. 

Intratheater Lgt 

The need for a capability to distribute personnel, supplies, and equipment was immediate and of immense proportions. Strategic airlift delivered over 540,000 tons of cargo into the theater-fifteen percent of the 

approximately 3.5 million tons of dry cargo delivered during the deployment phase of Desert Shield and more than 500,000 passengers. Most 

of the cargo and personnel was delivered to four major aerial ports of 

debarkation. From there, cargo and passengers were forwarded throughout the area of responsibility (AOR) by intratheater airlift and surface 

transportation. As a result, the intratheater lift systems were an essefitial 

element of air power in the Gulf area; they were instrumental in the 

success of the entire Desert Shield/Storm operation. However, basic 

planning for intratheater distribution was marginal. The initial combat 

forces arrived before adequate combat service support and onward movement capability were established. The system did not cope well with the 

significant and cascading requirements, leading ultimately to a doubling 

of the force structure in the theater. The situation was lengthened by a 

6 
Cargo shipped early in the operation was marked simply 

“Desert Shield’’ (above). Cargo and passengers were forwarded 

throughout the area of responsibility (AOR) by intratheater airlift (below). 

7 
USCENTCOM decision to increase stockage levels in the theater from thirty 

to sixty days. Finally, the intratheater distribution problem was compounded by the poor in-transit cargo visibility capability of the various 

service systems. 

To support the ground campaign, tactical airlift was called on to airlift 

the entire Xvm Airborne Corps from King Fahd and nearby bases to Rafha, 

a distance of over 400 miles. The flow into Rafha averaged one landing 

every seven minutes for the first thirteen days of the move. The C-130 fleet 

utilization rate for this period was 8.0, twice the planned wartime rate, and 

14,000 personnel and over 9,OOO tons of equipment were transported. 

Air Refueling 

Air refueling played a significant role in every phase of air operations 

in the Gulf War. It extended the range of deploying aircraft, involved 

innovative tactics to compress closure time in getting combat units in 

place, and formed an integral part of virtually all strike, reconnaissance, 

and airborne command and control operations. A majority of all combat 

sorties required air refueling, either inbound, outbound, or both from their 

targets. (The B-52s based at [DELETED] were among the few aircraft 

not requiring refueling on the way to their targets.) 

Planning for air refueling was incomplete. The final commitment of 

tankers in support of Desert Shield far exceeded the requirements specified in the “on-the-shelf’ operational plans, but continuous experience in 

Tanker Task Force activity enabled quick response to deployment taskings. Twenty-one bases in twelve foreign countries were used as tanker 

beddown locations for over 300 tankers. The planning, employment, 

basing, and daily numbers of committed tanker aircraft were constantly 

adjusted throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

The aircrew manning level of Strategic Air Command’s (SAC’S) KC135 and KC-10 tanker force had a direct impact on tanker operations. 

The KC-1 35 manning level was 1.27 and was based primarily on supporting SAC’S Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) commitment. The 

manning level of the KC-10 was more than sufficient to support the 2.0 

AOR requirement. Although the Command was not explicitly tasked with 

an airlift role other than that associated with the dual-role KC-10, organic 

air movement proved necessary to move resources in support of B-52, 

8 
KC-135, KC-10, RC-135, and U-2 aircraft because MAC’S capability was 

saturated. The critical limiting factor affecting air refueling during Desert 

Storm was airspace. This problem was not confined to theater operations 

but was also a major factor on the TurkeyAraqi border and in the Mediterranean. Because of the Airborne Warning and Control System’s 

(AWACS’) ability to view a large part of the air war through the use of its 

radar, and because procedures were established for the tactical checking 

of aircraft, many tanker aircrews believed AWACS was functioning like an 

air route traffic control center in the CONUS. Limitations to the AWACS’ 

radar, computational capabilities, and workload of the personnel assigned 

do not allow the AWACS to function as an air traffic controller facility. 

In some instances, tanker crews, mistakenly believing they were under 

full radar coverage and flight-following protection, had near mid-air 

collisions with other Allied aircraft. 

Arming the Force 

The Air Force alone used over thirty kinds of munitions in Operation 

Desert Storm. Naval Air used nine varieties, and Army aviation units 

added thirteen to U.S. totals. Coalition air forces additionally employed 

some twenty-six unique types of their own munitions. As is true with 

other resources, the story of ammunition, conventional unguided bombs, 

cluster bomb units, precision guided munitions (“smart bombs”), and 

special operations munitions describes significant successes mixed with 

troubling disconnects. 

The more than 48,000 short tons of munitions stocks prepositioned 

within Southwest Asia and aboard the three prepositioned ships were the 

only sources of munitions initially available to USCENTAF forces. The 

stocks represented a basic mix of conventional ordnance, with the inventory 

primarily consisting of MK-80-series general purpose bombs, Vietnamvintage cluster bomb units ammunition, and laser-guided GBU-10 and -12 

component resources. The munitions and components had been maintained, 

inspected, and renovated over several years by a combination of contractor 

and Air Force personnel. When Operation Desert Shield was initiated, the 

munitions were found to be fully serviceable and “combat ready.” 

To replenish prepositioned stocks, original planning factors for an Air 

Force, Central Command air campaign included approximately a fortyfive-day “trip” to the Gulf. That estimate proved to be far too optimistic 

9 
as Desert Shield unfolded. The movement of munitions from U.S. storage locations to the Gulf actually required from fifty-five to seventy-two 

days. In many cases, the munitions items did not reach their intended 

destination in the Gulf within that timespan. Often, it took that long to 

deliver the munitions to the Gulf explosives port. 

Munitions movement within the Gulf was also difficult and required 

exceptional management actions. Dealing with host-nation drivers and 

vehicles was complicated, involving centuries-old distrust and national 

security concerns between the countries of Oman, United Arab Emirates, 

and Saudi Arabia. To solve this problem, CENTAF Logistics was afforded 

C-130 intratheater airlift to deliver critically short munitions and component stocks to Gulf locations. 

Movement in the European theater was also a problem. Three major 

munitions depots were involved in supporting Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm: RAF Welford in the United Kingdom, Camp Darby in Italy, and 

Morbach in the Federal Republic of Germany. Each depot reported major 

problems with moving explosives over local roads and rail lines to ports, 

as well as problems with local national drivers accepting the responsibilities 

for handling munitions shipments. A shortage of explosives-capable semitrailer trucks and experienced drivers in the United States also stymied 

movement of munitions to the two explosives-capable U.S. port facilities: 

Sunny Point in North Carolina and Concord in California. 

An accurate accounting of munitions components was essential to 

understanding what munitions were on hand at the operational locations. 

Unfortunately, the inventories had to be created manually by arriving 

personnel because accurate, automated munitions-counting systems were 

not available to the in-place forces early in Desert Shield. During the 

conflict, the problem was compounded because the identification of 

munitions on arriving ships was the “mother of all mysteries”- another 

indication of the intractability of intransit visibility. The problems were 

not resolved during the conflict-inventory tracking of munitions components throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm was done manually, 

resulting in significant inaccuracies in reported inventories, poor tracking 

of munitions in transportation channels, and lack of credible munitions 

information for senior Air Force managers. The nearly $1 00 million spent 

on the Combat Ammunition System since its inception in 1982 had not 

fully reached nor completely benefited the user. 

10 
An important positive lesson stems from the beneficial impact of the 

Air Force Combat Ammunition Center located at Sierra Army Depot, 

California. Lt. Gen. Leo Marquez established the center to replace vanishing Vietnam-era conventional combat ammunition skills. The first 

class graduated in the spring of 1985, and as of the start of Operation 

Desert Shield, nearly 3,000 students had completed the course. Centertrained personnel formed the backbone of munitions production teams 

throughout Southwest Asia. 

Finally, the disparity between the quantity of munitions shipped and 

the quantity used is but one indication of how large the available set of 

resources was. Nearly 350,000 short tons of munitions were shipped by 

air and sea by the time the cease fire was called; of this amount, 69,000 

short tons of munitions were expended. The cost of moving over 

350,000 short tons of munitions to combat, then using only 69,000, also 

reveals an important problem-is it possible to improve estimates of 

requirements for neutralizing the enemy? 

Supplying the Force 

Using the bottom-line measure of mission-capable aircraft, all of the 

supply support concepts used were effective. Various sources, including 

the CENTAF Rear Director of Supply, have stated that no missions were 

lost during Desert Storm for lack of supply support. We have found no 

evidence to contradict that statement. During Desert Storm, the overall 

not-mission-capable supply rate for aircraft was less than four percent. 

By contrast, the de-facto standard for peacetime supply performance was 

five percent, and the standards for wartime performance was up to twenty-fix:e percent at the end of thirty days of wartime activity. The high 

mission capability rates during Desert Ston-n were achieved, at least in 

part, in spite of poor preparation and planning. Some ways in which 

planning either worked or did not and the kinds of innovations instituted 

are recounted below. 

The basic supply concept of operations in support of air power called 

for preplanned requirements driven by specific threat assumptions. While 

primary spares support for aircraft in the AOR initially came from war 

readiness spares kits and mission support kits deployed with the units, 

other support concepts evolved. One of the earliest and biggest was 

SAC’S establishment of contingency supply support centers at Moron 

11 
Air Base in Spain, Andersen AFB, Guam, and later at RAF Fairford in the 

United Kingdom. Another major spares support concept was the development and deployment of follow-on spares kits built on the fly by Headquarters Tactical Air Command. Strategic Air Command also developed 

and deployed additional packages of spares to augment the war readiness 

spares kits and other spares at the operating bases and the contingency 

supply support centers. These spares packages were similar in concept 

to follow-on spares kits. 

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, all direct mission support 

requirements were ordered using Urgency of Need Designator A. As a 

result, all such requisitions translated to UJWriority Designator 01 (the 

highest value allowed) or 02, both of which translate to the highest 

transportation priority, Priority Group One. Hence, the relative needs of 

forces committed to Desert Shield and Desert Storm could not be distinguished until the Uniform Military Management and Movement Indicator 

System was for all intents and purposes overridden by dedicated airlift 

(Desert Express, European Express) and other on-the-spot innovations. 

Combined with aggressive spares sourcing and a nominal 72-hour delivery time to the AOR, Air Force, Central Command Logistics reported that 

. . . grounding mission-critical parts (MICAPS) decreased from over 500 

for 750 aircraft on I Oct 90, to 21 9 for 1229 aircraft on I7 Jan 91, the 

day Operation Desert Storm began, and a not-rnission-capable supply 

rate of four percent. This was an unprecedented achievement. 

In the early portions of Desert Shield, destination codes were not 

provided to the field-everything was shipped to Dhahran. As a result, 

hundreds of pallets sat in the Aerial Port facility at Dhahran; no one knew 

their intended destination or relative priority. The embedded deficiencies 

of the supply and transportation systems related to intransit visibility 

exacerbated the situation. While both systems had reasonably good 

tracking capabilities, visibility was often lost as an item moved from the 

supply system into the transportation system. Within the supply system, 

items were tracked by their requisition numbers. However, item movement within the transportation system was tracked by transportation 

control numbers. For shipping efficiency, many supply requisitions were 

consolidated into a single transportation movement unit. As a consequence, detailed traceability was often lost. When items needed for 

support of immediate mission requirements became delayed or lost within 

12 
the system, it was difficult, and often impossible, to track them down and 

expedite their movement to the point of need. To help resolve this 

problem, the Air Force Logistics Information File was developed. The 

Air Force file was patterned after an Army Logistics Information File that 

had been in use for several years. However, the Air Force file became 

operational only in the latter part of Desert Storm and could not have 

helped intratheater transport. 

At the time the first aircraft units were deployed to the theater, a 

traditional approach to deployed asset accounting was envisioned. That 

approach specified that each deployed unit would use the deployable 

combat supply system initially. Then the unit would return to its homestation for support; final transition would be to a full Standard Base 

Supply System “mainframe” environment within the theater. The deployable combat supply system was a stand-alone computer processing system 

that performed essential supply inventory management processes. The 

system was actually very limited in capability-doing little more than 

accounting for what was on hand. Perhaps its most serious limitation, 

however, was that its designed telecommunication capability never 

worked properly. As deployment proceeded, the Standard Base Supply 

System was abandoned. Major concerns were raised with respect to the 

transportable shelter systems (i.e., the mainframes). Concerns centered 

on the configuration of the computer systems, the numbers of systems 

that were available, and the ability of the transportable shelter systems to 

withstand a move to the desert. Before the end of August 1990, the idea 

of establishing mainframe support within the theater was scrubbed and 

replaced with a new plan envisioning a single CONUS mainframe supporting all theater supply accounts. 

By the end of the war, the resulting CENTAF Supply Support Agency 

(CSSA) comprised the largest Air Force retail supply account on record; 

the account listed 288,290 items with an asset value in excess of 

$1.5 billion. That total included most of the aircraft kits, but only fifty 

to sixty percent of nonaircraft kits such as combat communications. 

Many nonaircraft spares packages and most equipment, however, remained to be picked up, and the major task of establishing and maintaining operating stock levels for the full range of base support items was 

never executed. 

13 
The MICAP Asset Sourcing System, which had recently been installed 

at Tactical Air Command, proved to be effective in supporting MICAP 

requirements and was a noteworthy exception to preexisting systems that 

did not work. The new system provided worldwide visibility of assets, 

allowing the CSSA MICAP controllers to locate and request shipment of 

available assets quickly. Approximately forty-five percent of MICAP 

incidents were satisfied through lateral support actions requested through 

the CSSA. 

Approximately 8.5 million barrels of fuels were available before 

Desert Shield. However, about 4.1 million barrels of the storage were 

malpositioned outside the AOR, and most of the fuel in the AOR was not 

in the right place. Also, prepositioned fuel and equipment in or near the 

AOR were not adequate to support all forces eventually deployed during 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm; however, they did provide initial fuels capability and supplemented the primary source. 

Fuel bladder storage in AOR. 

Fuels support provided to U.S. and Coalition aircraft during Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm was an enormous undertaking. A total of 44,825,480 

million barrels (1,882,670,174 gallons) of petroleum products was consumed during Operation Desert ShieldDesert Storm. At the height of the 

war, the Air Force issued approximately 15 million gallons of jet fuel per 

day. This included over 11 million gallons per day issued in the AOR, 

and 4 million gallons per day issued to aircraft operating out of Europe. 

14 
In all, over 11 1,OOO U.S. and allied combat sorties were flown without a 

single refueling delay or incident. Over 120 R-14 air transportable hydrant refueling systems, 220 R-9 refueling vehicles, 679 50,000-gallon 

fuel bladders, and over 926 fuels personnel were employed to store and 

issue this much fuel. 

Unsuccessful negotiations with the Saudi Government to allow U.S. 

storage in Saudi Arabia had been going on for years. Therefore, a significant amount of reliance on host nation support would be required to provide adequate refueling capability. In the absence of any signed agreements, much of this support was based on hand shakes and assumptions. 

Host nation support was, however, a major contributing factor to the success of the fuels operation. All ground fuels and most of the jet fuel 

except for JP-5 (for Navy aircraft) and JITS was provided from within the 

theater. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Oman contributed 

41,835,132 barrels (1,757,075,564 gallons) of fuel for land, sea, and air 

operations. (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates donated the fuel 

free of charge.) Otherwise, extensive sealift would have been required, 

exposing the inadequacy of the U.S. tanker fleet. The dollar amount of 

the contribution (calculated in U.S. dollars at $1.20 per gallon) is approximately $2 billion. Additionally, commercial airport contractors provided 

plane refueling support, host military provided aircraft refueling at military bases, and host nation trucks and drivers provided most of the inland 

distribution of fuel from refineries and depots to the bases. These actions 

removed a major burden from Army Central Command, which was 

responsible for bulk fuel inland distribution and had committed most of 

its truck companies to moving fuel for ground forces. 

By contrast with the combat-trained munitions personnel, most fuel 

supervisory personnel had little or no knowledge on locating and setting up 

a bare base fuels management support equipment system. For example, at 

one location with over one-hundred fuels personnel, the R-14 mobile fuel 

hydrants were out of service because no one knew to flip the reset switch. 

Many individuals had no contact (i.e., training) with the equipment in over 

ten years. This lack of experience and knowledge required that Air Force, 

Central Command establish a special team to set up fuels management 

support equipment systems at most of the beddown locations. 

15 
Maintaining the Force 

Maintenance during Desert Shield and Desert Storm was generally 

without critical, mission-limiting problems. Even when problems arose, 

they were ameliorated by the relatively healthy supply and innovative 

procedures. With some exceptions, mission-capable rates during both 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm were roughly the same as peacetime rates 

or slightly lower, although variations OCCUK~~ from month to month and 

from one type of aircraft to another. Other services had similar experiences with their flying units. 

The tooth-before-tail (fighters before supply units, for example) 

nature of the deployment had a differential effect on mission-capable rates 

that varied with maintenance concept. During the first month of deployment, F-15 forces suffered a drop in combat-ready aircraft of between 

nine and fifteen percent compared to peacetime rates. The F- 16 and A-1 0 

forces, for which intermediate maintenance is less of a concern, did not 

experience that drop. 

Where maintenance methods used during Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm differed sharply from anticipated methods (e.g., establishing intermediate maintenance support in Europe rather than in theater), imbalances 

between maintenance and other logistics factors appeared quickly. The 

most prominent imbalance was with transportation and was aggravated by 

the lack of in-transit visibility. 

Most Tactical Air Command (TAC) and TAC-gained Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve Units deployed to the AOR received engine 

and avionics intermediate support from U.S. Air Force Europe locations. 

Strategic Air Command established similar capabilities in Europe and at 

Andersen in Guam. Compelling reasons for establishing centralized * 

support centers outside the AOR included (a) the resulting reduction in 

people and equipment in a theater with an already-strained bare-base 

support structure and (b) increased efficiency of an established facility. 

The European facilities were underutilized. Their limiting factor was the 

lack of retrograde components and engines on which to work. 

The desert environment appears to have had little persistent effect on 

equipment reliability. Major exceptions were T-64 and T-700 helicopter 

engines (used on the CmH-53 and MH-60 helicopters, respectively). 

16 
As a result of sand erosion problems, the engines achieved reliability 

levels approximately one-tenth that of peacetime levels. The T-64 unreliability was compounded by a two-level maintenance concept predicated 

on the normal reliability level. 

Maintenance men and women accounted for approximately thirtyeight percent of all Air Force personnel deployed to the AOR and, in 

terms of numbers, were the single largest manpower element, although an 

accurate count will probably never be available. The actual tail-to-tooth 

ratio was larger, since Desert Shield and Desert Storm maintenance was 

also supported from the European theater, Guam, and the continental 

United States. There is no evidence, however, that too many maintenance 

personnel were deployed in the AOR; in fact, the evidence indicates that 

the Air Force went to war with fewer personnel than it would have 

planned. There were actually thirty-three percent fewer personnel in the 

AOR than usually required to support and properly maintain the number 

of aircraft there. A study of eight primary bases is included in chapter 8. 

Both the base-level and industrial-level capacities exceeded demands 

generated by the Gulf conflict. At the industrial level, the number of 

repairable units produced was constrained primarily by lack of retrograded units on which to work. The acceleration of aircraft through programmed depot maintenance provided for almost I ,OOO additional flying 

days. However, the additional flying days were not fully used. Military 

Airlift Command only used approximately one-third of the 174 additional 

flying days made available for C-141 aircraft. 

An impression apparently created during the Gulf Conflict and remaining afterwards is that U.S. Air Force aircraft had mission-capable rates 

“equal to or better than” peacetime rates-often with an emphasis on “better 

than.” The mission-capable rates were generally good but they were not 

that good. Mission capability rates appear to have been approximately the 

same or lower than peacetime rates. The appearance of improvement was 

an illusion caused by the differences between peacetime systems and the 

largely ad hoc reporting systems of Desert ShieldDesert Storm. 

Automated maintenance management support to the theater was not 

available until late in the war (roughly December 1992). Absence of 

aircraft status information hampered attempts by various headquarters to 

ascertain the health of the fleet (although phone calls and messages 

17 
helped). The absence of configuration data, especially on engines, compromised the ability to perform maintenance, although again other factors 

such as healthy spares stocks prevented critical shortfalls. 

Measuring the Results 

Logktics Pegonnance 

No single factor made logistics support of air power a successful 

element of the Gulf War. The reality of what happened and how end 

results were achieved make an instructive story of serious problems and 

timely solutions. 

Fundamentally, but with some important exceptions, the resource 

requirements of the Gulf Conflict did not stress the resources and processes available at its inception. Basically, the needs of the conflict were 

satisfied by an existing logistics capability originally sized for a much 

larger conflict and augmented by significant host nation support, payment 

in kind, and other unplanned support. 

Logistics performance has some obvious measures, such as missioncapable rates, that are intermediate and partial indicators at best. For 

example, maintenance and supply may create a mission-capable aircraft, 

but correct ordnance may not be available. Operations requirements are, 

to a degree, determined by expectations of actual logistics capabilitieshence, the visible requirement may not be the “real” requirement. Unfortunately, a number of measures, including mission capability, inevitably 

involve a “who gets the blame” component-leading to inaccurately reported results. 

However, at least a provisional picture of logistics performance in the 

Gulf War can be drawn by using an evaluation framework from the four 

levels-of-war schema described in the EfSectiveness report.’ The four 

levels of war follow: 

‘This schema is also consistent with proposed joint logistics doctrine. Joint Test Pub 

4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, Jun 1990, p 1-1. The “test” 

publication promulgates the proposed doctrine. 

18 
Political - decisions and actions that set war objectives and overall 

conflict parameters 

Strategic - decisions, actions, and efforts bearing directly on the 

achievement of war aims 

Operational - decisions, actions, and efforts focused on the orchestration of the theater from the Commander-in-Chief’s view, and 

Tactical - decisions, actions, and efforts concerning how to plan or 

execute particular scenarios. 

The logistics discussion concentrates on the operational and strategic 

levels of support. At the operational level, relevant questions center on 

(a) what did the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command ask for and 

(b) to what extent did logistics satisfy or not satisfy the requests. 

Beginning with direct operational support: did the combination of 

intertheater airlift and sealift deliver the force where and when it was 

supposed to be? The Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command initially directed deployment of a force package consisting of an Army 

Corps, a Marine Division, three carrier battle groups, the 1 st TAC Fighter 

Wing, and twelve follow-on fighter squadrons. With a lack of initial unit 

prioritization plus desired closure dates of “now,” a cumulative movement 

requirement represented an airlift demand six to seven times normal 

capability. The initial deployment goal was quickly modified but continued to change rapidly as the perceived threat changed.* Thul-, a realistic 

view is that requirements matched capability rather than capability 

matched requirements. However, the issue is more complicated, since the 

airlift provided was constrained by a combination of self-imposed limits 

(i.e., the timing and extent of reserve call-up and Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

activation), a limited number of off-load locations in the AOR, and nearly 

useless automated information systems. 

Air refueling was provided on demand and was available with few 

exceptions when and as needed. There were two primary operational 

*Clayton H. Snedeker, Operation Deser/ Shield - Desert Storm: Also, The Vernon 

J. Kondra Notes, 24 Aug - 31 May 1991, Apr 1992, p 2. 

19 
efforts: refueling during deployment and combat sortie refueling in the 

AOR. An increased tempo of Tanker Task Force activity on a grand scale 

characterized the deployment; it required, however, a furious level of 

coordination to marry tankers and receivers while simultaneously acquiring beddown and overflight rights for the deployment route structure. 

Within the SWA theater, the single greatest limiting factor affecting air 

refueling was the availability of air space. During the heaviest flying 

period in Desert Storm, virtually no room existed in the air for additional 

refueling tracks. Nevertheless, more than four receivers for every boom 

or drogue were in the air at any time. 

In phase I of Desert Shield, ClNCCENT requested and received six 

squadrons of C-130s as intratheater airlift. A seventh squadron was 

considered but not ordered up because a beddown site was not available. 

Utilization overall was less than expected for wartime (3.71 sorties per 

day in Desert Shield and 3.42 during Desert Storm versus the wartime 

planning factor of 4.0 ), but the difference is easily understood. First, the 

SWA theater was quite large. The flying time from Riyadh to Tabuk, as 

an example, is over five hours. Additionally, assigned aircraft were 

withheld for potential air evacuation of casualties, and those aircraft are 

counters when calculating overall utilization rate. The most intense test 

of intratheater airlift occurred during the “Hail Mary” movement of XVIII 

Airborne Corps before the ground war. In that fourteen-day period, 

C-130s flew over eight sorties per day-twice the wartime planning factor. 

With regard to munitions, the evidence indicates that all missions requiring 

armament received it when they needed it. Not all missions received munitions preferred however. In particular, CBU 87/89s, Paveway n, and GBU 27 

munitions were in short supply and rationed. Management of munitions was 

not that much different from previous wars-it was done manually. 

The Air Combat Command Director of Supply made what appeared 

to be an astounding claim that not a single Desert Storm sortie had been 

lost due to supply. In the process of achieving this performance, however, supply revamped its planned use of the Combat Supply System and 

Standard Base Supply System, substituting the CENTAF Supply Support 

Agency in their place. Problem items included chemical gear, Halon, and 

personal weapons; lack of those items could have had a serious impact 

had the war taken a different turn. Further, the excellent supply performance did not always extend to support of communications equipment, 

20 
Harvest sets, and other airbase functions. But the bottom line is that 

supply produced sorties. 

Overall, maintenance also produced the sorties requested. The detailed narratives indicate that aircraft were ready.3 If sorties were lost, it 

was because of ground and air aborts. Desert Shield aborts occurred at 

approximately the same rate as in peacetime; Desert Storm rates were 

only slightly higher! Additionally, mission capability rates were generally excellent, even if they were about the same as peacetime rates rather 

than better. Battle damage rates were very low, and the repair rates were 

consistent with expectations of the ABDR program. 

’ In answering the question, what did the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) 

require and get, intertheater airlift arose as the only possible exception to 

a general conclusion that what was required was provided, when it was 

needed. Even in the intertheater case, however, there was no firm set of 

requirements against which to measure performance; therefore, the strategic view must be examined to create a holistic perspective. 

A strategic view raises the following questions: How “stretched” was 

logistics? Where were the long and short poles in the logistics tent? 

Where was there margin and how much? What was the reserve capability to fight an extended war or another war? From this view, a conclusion 

that intertheater airlift did not produce would make even less sense because its full capability was not exercised. First, the Civil Reserve Air 

Fleet 111 was never activated and Fleet I1 only partly utilized (an average 

of only fifteen commercial aircraft were needed and tasked per day5). 

Reserves were not called up until 22 August, and even then the call-up 

was partial for maintenance skills. An average of sixty C-141 and fifteen 

C-5 aircraft were withheld each day’ lo support missions other than the 

As an example: Ltr, Col Ralph J. Templin. 363 TFW(P)/DCM to AFKEYLEYM, subj: 

9actical Air Command, Desert Shield Desert Ston Logistics Dora (Langley AFB, 

’MAC History, Appendix 7. 

6Lt Col Bill Ewing and Lt John Walker, Eight Months oJDesert ShieldLSfonn. (Scott 

3 

The war from an F-16 maintenance perspective, nd. 

VA: TACILGP, Sep 1991), pp A-9 and A-10. 

AFB, IL: Hq MAC Command Analysis Group, Jun 1991), p 44. 

21 
Gulf War. Thus, despite the fact that the Gulf War airlift effort dwarfed 

the Vietnam and Berlin airlift efforts, it did it with reserve capacity. 

As was true for intertheater airlift, only part of the then-existing 

refueling capability was committed to the Gulf War; forty-four percent of 

the KC-135 and eighty-one percent of the KC-10 tankers force. The 

balance of tankers was withheld to support the Single Integrated Operations Plan and other normal missions, and both KC-135 and KC-10 

aircraft were used for intertheater airlift. Beyond that, it is not at all clear 

whether committing more tankers to Desert Storm would have been 

productive; airspace in the theater was saturated. 

A maximum of 149 C-130s were deployed to the theater during 

Desert Storm where they airlifted 154,000 short tons of cargo and 

184,000 passengers during Desert Storm, a substantial accomplishment. 

However, 149 C-130s represented only one-third of the Air Force’s C-130 

fleet.7 It must be concluded that a robust capability to expand intratheater 

airlift was available if there had been a need. 

During Desert Storm, 69,000 short tons of ammunition were dropped 

on the enemy. A much larger total of nearly 350,000 short tons was 

shipped by sea and air by the time hostilities ceased; most of the difference represented munitions in the sealift pipeline at the time the conflict 

terminated. It must be concluded that a robust capability was available 

to extend the war beyond 28 February if the need had arisen- although 

the amount of remaining armament varied by type. 

This chapter previously stated that no record was found of a sortie 

having been lost because of a supply problem. There are several reasons 

for this level of success. First, the size of the war readiness spares kits 

deployed to the theater had been determined on the assumption that no 

resupply and very limited intermediate maintenance would occur in the 

first thirty days; however, resupply began almost immediately and intermediate maintenance was available. Hence, an interruption in supply 

would actually have been planned and would not have been viewed as a 

serious problem. Second, worldwide resources were available to the war 

effort, and the combination of supply information systems with 

7All but one squadron of the active C-130 force were in the theater. The other 

two-thirds of the fleet were in the Reserves. 

22 
Desert Express demonstrated a reliable capability to move those resources 

to the user in three to four days. Since the most valuable supplies (and also 

the components most likely to cause a grounding condition) were repairable 

rather than consumable, the question then becomes maintenance’s ability to 

repair rather than supply’s ability to stock, store, and issue. The above 

reasons are also indicators of supply’s capability to have supported the 

conflict at higher levels or under different circumstances. 

What then was maintenance’s reserve capability? The evidence (except for the C-5) is reasonably convincing-the operational tempo was less 

than maintenance’s capability at all three levels: organizational, intermediate, and depothdustrial. Although the evidence at the organizational 

level is fragmentary, as indicated earlier, it is fairly conclusive at intermediate and depot levels. At the intermediate level in the AOR for example, 

one avionics shop per wing was deployed compared to the planned one 

per squadron.* Although direct evidence of the intermediate workload at 

Air Force avionics shops in Europe was not uncovered, a basis exists for 

concluding that engine shops were underutilized. Depot-level capability 

was clearly in excess of that demanded. The depot was able to accelerate 

program depot maintenance beyond operation’s requirements, and only 

selective surging of repairables was needed. 

Evaluating the Results 

The final values of the measures of merit for each logistics functional 

area are without question positive (and would hardly be credible otherwisewe won the war). Below the macro levels described previously, a combination of successes and serious problems appear to signal trends in at least five 

areas: precrisis preparation, precrisis planning, precrisis training (especially 

to the degree a combat-experienced nuclei demonstrated), logistics command 

and control, and improvisation. Each is summarized below: 

Precrisis preparation was one of the most important factors underlying 

the achieved success in the Gulf War. Prepositioning, as an example, 

saved the equivalent of over 3,500 strategic airlift sorties for Air Force- 

‘In addition, however. the peak maintenance manpower requirements in the theater 

never exceeded sixteen percent of total active duty Air Force Maintenance manning, and 

a full callup of reserve maintenance personnel was not exercised. 

23 
related equipment alone, and a total of greater than 10,OOO sortie missions 

overall. The importance of this prepositioning can be grasped by noting 

that only approximately 5,000 intertheater airlift sortie missions were 

flown during the phase I deployment. The prepositioned tonnage was 

equal to approximately one-half of the amount eventually dropped. 

Supply preparation, focused as it was on a potential central European war, 

provided a robust source of repairables and consumables for the Gulf 

War. More broadly, the sizing of air power, motivated as it was in 

general by a postulated central European conflict, entailed an across-theboard level of preparation that was more than adequate when compared 

with the demands of the Gulf War. The allied contribution of fuels, 

subsistence, vehicles, and construction equipment, among other needs, 

further enhanced the favorable supply situation. 

Chapters 2 and 3 make the points that deliberate, detailed TPFDD-level 

planning for a war in SWA did not yet exist in August 1990, the Joint 

Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) was immature, and 

not enough time was available to set up, load, and schedule missions 

using FLOGEN (a flow generation model). These circumstances are fact. 

However, to then conclude that had there been a complete TPFDD, a 

mature JOPES, and time to run FLOGEN, all would have been well is a 

mistake because the hidden assumption is that an adversary, allies, and 

even weather are willing to follow the planned script. In how many wars 

has that been the case? 

Unrealistic assumptions, planned capabilities that did not materialize, 

and providential capabilities already in place led to a series of improvisations during the conflict. Some have been touted with good reason as 

successful innovations; they can be viewed alternatively as necessary 

workarounds. 

Some of the major logistics improvisations follow: 

Desert Express helped ensure an adequate level of transportation 

supporting essential resupply. Users loved it, and it materially 

reduced backorders. It helped to fix a broken priority system that 

viewed all movement requests as equally urgent. 

24 
The CENTAF Supply Support Agency became a fast, effective 

instrument for perceiving need for and source of critical parts. It 

relieved problems with the combat supply system designed for an 

out-of-date, unusable tactical shelter system. 

Establishing the CENTAF Rear at Tactical Air Command at 

Langley AFB took advantage of in-place, knowledgeable capability. It eliminated the impossible requirement that CENTAF (9AF) 

move forward and, at the same time, create CENTAF Rear. 

The BlueBall Express expedited the movement of supplies from 

ports to in-theater bases. It made up for the Army inability to mount 

line haul-“teeth before tail” kept support assets in the CONUS. 

The Air Force Logistics Information File linked transportation 

and supply together to provide intertheater in-transit visibility. It 

helped correct the problem of losing track of parts as soon as 

they entered the transportation system. 

Putting intermediate-level maintenance in Europe and the Pacific 

took advantage of in-place, mature technical capability. That 

action solved difficulties with facilities and with moving intermediate level maintenance from CONUS to the AOR. It provided relief 

for the cap imposed on the growing military population in the AOR. 

Relying upon Military Airlift Command requirements augmentation was 

not an innovation, but a reversion to manual methods. The inability of 

JOPES and FLOGEN to handle rapidly changing requirements and tracking 

munitions manually were also not innovations, but reversions to traditional methods because alternatives were lacking. 

No single thread ties all of the improvisations together, but two 

themes (or evils) dominate: unrealistic prior planning assumptions and 

an inflexible command and control apparatus that stumbled in the face of 

change: The themes are not original with the Gulf Conflict and may be 

as old as war it~elf.~ In fairness to the “unrealistic” planners and architects of “inflexible” command and control systems, those themes are a lot 

’Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Lngistics from Wallenstein to Patton (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). pp 202-21 1. van Creveld further states that a 

clear connection between amount of prior preparation and success or failure does not 

appear to exist. 

25 
easier to discern in retrospect. Why, however, did they not impact the 

outcome? The answer is: a superb resource base plus five and one-half 

months to prepare. Now the resource base that made the difference is 

being reduced; future wars may or may not be preceded by nearly six 

months in which to prepare. The potential outcome with a different mix 

of resources and time deserves consideration. 

26 
2 

Preparation for a Southwest Asia 

Contingency, 1 August 1990 

The introduction to this report defined logistics as ". . .planning and 

carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces." This chapter 

focuses on precrisis actions with emphasis on creating forces and preparing for their sustained support in a Southwest Asia (SWA) contingency. 

Since air forces use complex weapon systems and are sustained from 

bases connected by lines of communication (LOCS),' understanding air 

power logistics preparation involves examining the four components: 

forces, weapons, bases, and lines of communication-as well as planning 

for their employment in war. Preparation timeframes are relatively long, 

particularly for weapon systems, for which preparation takes decades 

rather than years. Because timelines are long, the historical horizon for 

this chapter stretches back to the 1970s and earlier. 

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on 

preparation per se. The second section describes planning for war and 

includes the planning process and the status of logistical plans for a war 

in Southwest Asia. The final part summarizes the results of late 1980s 

exercises and readiness assessments as a way of clarifying the prevailing 

perception of air power logistics readiness on the eve of the Gulf War. 

Preparation 

The introduction to the Planning report notes that planners viewed the 

Gulf as essentially the right flank of NATO and placed primary emphasis 

on a war with the Soviet Union. The 1987 USAF War and Mobilization 

Plan, in fact, defined the most demanding 1990 scenario for the Air Force 

as a worldwide war, centered in Europe, and involving the Soviet Union. 

Thus the U.S. force structure and resources to support it were oriented 

towards the Central European scenario. 

'AFM 1-1, Combat Support Doctrine, I Apr 1987, p 1-2. 

27 
Table 1 compares the number of U.S. Air Force aircraft in the inventory with the number that were actually deployed and with the number 

projected to be used in the SWA theater during a worldwide war with the 

Soviets. The point of the table is that, in terms of the overall numbers, 

the Air Force had prepared for a much larger conflict than the Gulf War 

turned out to be. For example, only fifteen percent of F-I 5 aircraft in the 

force were deployed; the remaining eighty-five percent were a source of 

spare parts through cannibalization, and a ready maintenance manpower 

pool and other resources were available (not to mention enormous fire 

power). As the Support report and later chapters in this report show, 

however, important imbalances arose. 

Other reports (especially in the Weapons, Tactics, and Training report) 

discuss the direct combat capability implications of Coalition aircraft and 

munitions quality. The issue of quality has important meaning for combat 

support as well-particularly quality as it is demonstrated through reliability 

and maintainability (R&M). Published reports generally credit R&M 

investments during the 1980s with reducing the investment needed in 

spare parts and other resources? Actually, sustained, successful investment in R&M goes back much farther. Figure 1 shows the failure rates 

of USAF fighter aircraft as a function of the year of introd~ction.~ The F15E, with not quite double the reliability of the F-l5A, is a product of the 

1980s; the F-15C and F-16 aircraft were designed in the 1970s. All of the 

later designs are twice as reliable as Vietnam-era F-4 series aircraft. As 

is discussed more fully in the maintenance chapter, the improved reliability permitted planned and unplanned operation for 30 days or more without 

significant maintenance and resupply. 

*For examples see Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the 

Persian Gulf War, Apr 1992, p 399; Michael M. Self, “Air Force Logistics Command 

Operations in Desert Storm,” (AFMCIXPOX: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, Jul 1991). 

There are various ways of measuring reliability. Type 1 maintenance actions are 

by definition caused by some failure in hardware; they do not include can-not-duplicates 

(type 1) or induced failures (type 6). Because they exclude can-not-duplicates and 

induced failures, the type 1 maintenance actions are a reasonable indicator of design 

reliability. Sources of data: Air Force Maintenance and Operational Data Access System 

data for Sep 90-Aug 92 (for type 1 maintenance actions); Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 

84-85, 86-87, 89-90, 92-93 (for years of introduction). 

3 

28 
Table 1 

United States Air Force Aircraft 

Inventory versus Quantity Committed to Gulf War 

Worldwide 

Inventory Proven Gulf Wa

Aircraft USAF, Planned AOR AOR Force Total 

ANG, AFR 1 AugW 14 Jan91 

F-4E 

F4 

F-16 

F-15 

F-15E 

F-117 

F-111 

A-10 

AC- 130 

B-52 DIEGO 

GARLA, SPAIN, UNITED 

KINGDOM) 

RF-4 

EF-111 

UWMC-130 

247 

113 

1623 

781 

104 

285 

572 

20 

230 

236 

42 

104 

- 

[DELETED] 

- - 

48 

208 

96 

48 

36 

64 

144 

4 

20 

18 

14 

21 

12 

36 

24 

18 

6 

10 
Table 1 (Continued) 

United States Air Force Aircraft 

Inventory versus Quantity Committed to Gulf War 

Worldwide 

Inventory AOR AOR 

Pmven Gulf W

Airel%ft USAF, Planned 1AWw 14 Jan91 Force Total 

ANC, AFX 

- 

RC- I35 

JSTAR IN DEVELOPMENT 

E-3 

TR-IN-2 

KC- 135 

KC-I0 

C-I30 

c-20 

c-2 1 

MH-53 

MH-60 

TOTALS 

34 

23 

633 

59 

568 

13 

83 

41 

24 

5854 

[DELETED] 

- - 

6 2 

2 

10 2 

9 

2 194 12 

22 

128 

I 

8 

8 5 

8 

2 1117 I27 

Note: Thes figures came from several sources. The fourth column, figuns for. I Aug an from 'The Persian Gulf War, an Air 

Storm, Volume on Desert Shield, p 5. The next two columns (Forces in the Gulf just before the war) ~IX from the Srorisi

forces arc as of 14 Jan 90. the Proven Force forces arc ac of 19 Jan 90. The F-117 force went to 42 aircraft on the 26 of 

and 66 on 9 Feb. The figures for the planned European War, with the Sovie&, rn from the USAF War and Mobilizatio

specifically, the forces shown available for a war on 1 Oct 90 were used (pp e 1 91-1 thru e I 91-40.) Forces were includ

30. The figures in the Worldwide Inventory were provided by M/PEI, the Programs Integration Division, Ms. Rita Johnsob 
Figure 1 

USAF Fighter Aircraft: Qpe 1 Failureflour 

Versus Year of First FIight 

0.7- 

o* 

& 0.5- 

g 0.4- 

E 

2 

0s 

o1 

0.17 

0 

w;4c .................................... .............................................................................. . ............................... 

FF ........................................................................................ .............. ........._ ^............................... F-1SA 

......................................................................... -.....-.I.. 

.......... 

F-1M Iy &c7K 

...................................... !? ................................................... blY; ..... r. .............................................. 

6!aC 

&lo .......................................................................................................................................... .......-. ---..- 

I 

1960 lobs 1970 1975 183 tk I990 

The 1970s after Vietnam have been aptly described as an era of 

putting rubber on the ramp while postponing procurement of support 

resources until later.4 That strategy was largely responsible for the aircraft inventory shown in Table 1. “Later” turned out to be the early 

through the mid 1980s, when the Air Force provided healthy funding 

levels for supplies. The results made the relationship between investment 

and capability abundantly clear. Figure 2 shows aircraft spare parts funding for fiscal years 1980 through 1990.5 The absolute level of funding 

is more important than the comparison between requirement and amount 

funded because in the early 198Os, requirements were computed by 

Lt Col David C. Rutenberg, WAF, and Jane S. Allen, eds., The Logistics of Waging 4 

War (Gunter AFS, AL: Air Force Logistics Management Center, circa 1984). p 170. 

’Hq Air Force Aircraft and Missile Support Division (AFLGSW). 

31 
Figure 2 

Aircraft Spare Parts Funding FY 80-90 (BP15,WRM) 

($ in Millions) 

FiBcalVepr 

-t 

SM 

i 

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 68 89 90 

6792 980.3 1.118.8 677.4 828.4 798.6 8221 347.3 379.9 285.4 451.5 I I I I I I I I I I I 

Funan0 I 87.1 686.8 TI8.8 291.3 828.4 7W.6 615.0 316.4 187.1 532 401.1 

using a simple “flying hours times usage factor” method; later in the decade, capability-based methods were introduced? Coincident with the 

wave of spare parts funding were increases in war readiness spares kit 

(WRSK) funding and in funding for exchangeable repair-i.e., the repair of 

broken spare parts (Figure 3).7 The impact of changes in spares and 

exchangeables funding (both increasing and decreasing) is clearly evident 

in mission capability rates (Figure 4). The roughly three-year lag time 

%tvw, Mr. James A. Forbes with Col (Ret) Frank C. Cartwright, 6 Jan 1992. Col 

Cartwright was the Chief of the Air Forces Logistics Resources Integration Office 

(AF/LEXI) from 1983 to 1985. 

7The various types of spares are described in chapter 7. 

32 
between a change in funding and a change in capability is also evident.* 

Funding peaked in the 1985 timeframe; capability peaked just before the 

Gulf War. This is one of many indicators showing that Iraqi leadership 

chose a propitious time (for the United States) to initiate hostilities. 

FdYea W 

1.044.7 

Funan0 B6.9 

Figure 3 

Exchangeable Repair Requirement/Funding FY 80-91 

($ in Millions) 

81 82 83 04 @5 86 87 90 91 

1240.7 1,430.7 1.696.2 1.8620 1,848.6 1.585.9 1.743.1 1.524.6 l,p6 1,479.0 1.1596 

1228.8 1,426.8 1.6724 1.757.2 1.848.6 1.501.0 1.608.7 1.M7.4 1,441.6 1,331.5 1.1557 

'The calculated R2 (explanatory power) of a linear relationship between the mission 

capability curve and the exchangeables funding curve with a three-year offset is 0.87. 

That is, 87% of the change over time in mission capability is "explained" by a previous 

change in exchangeablcs funding. 

33 
Figure 4 

Tactical Operational Fighters Mission Capability Rates 

55' ' 

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 

Fiscal Year 

There was a similar investment in munitions (Figure 5) where the 

majority of the funding was in 1985, 1986, and 1987. The investment 

returns would prove to be vital to the supply of preferred munitions in the 

Gulf War. 

The Air Force formally recognized the concept of Bases and Lines of 

Communication as fundamental to combat support doctrine? 

Bases are the sites from which operations are originated or supported (or both), while the lines of communication (LOC) are the 

routes for transmitting resources between bases. Bases are the 

9AFM 1-1, p 1-2. 

34 
1.400 

1.200 

Figure 5 

Munitions Funding FY 81-93 

($ in Millions) 

critical junctures at which aerospace power is most dependent. 

For it is at the base that resources are concentrated in order to 

manifest combat power. 

The basing structure in existence on the eve of the Gulf War conformed to Air Force doctrine, which categorized bases as operational, 

support, or industrial. Strategic bomber bases and forward fighter bases 

35 
were examples of operational bases." Operational bases did not sustain 

themselves indefinitely, but had to be supported by the other two categories of bases through the lines of communication. The Air Force active 

basing structure as of August 1990 is shown in Table 2. 

Table 2 

Air Force Active Basing Structure 

Area Bases Comment 

CONUS 97 Includes 5 Air Logistics Centers 

Europe 26 Included Support Group Europe 

(SGE) at RAF Kemble which provided some industrial type support 

to the area bases (Kemble closed 

October 1990) 

Southeast Asia 8 

South and Central I Howard AFB 

America 

Southwest Asia 

Pacific 

0 Diego Garcia was a British installation with a U.S. Navy cadre. 

Includes 2 in Hawaii and Kadena 

which provides some industrial type 

support to the bases in the area. 

9 

Atlantic area 2 Includes Thule and Lajes 

It should be clear from Table 2 that the extant basing structure was 

a product of the Cold War, with most of the bases either in Europe or in 

the United States proper. Although the basing structure was rich, it was 

substantially in the wrong place to support a conflict in Southwest Asia. 

U.S. Air Force, Central Command (USCENTAF) had identified 14 potential 

operational base locations within the area of responsibility (AOR) with a 

''[bid. 

36 
capability to support a population of approximately 30,000 personnel.’’ 

All, however, were just that: potential locations. By comparison, there 

were 9 in-place U.S. air bases in the Pacific, 26 (some of which were in 

the process of being closed) in Europe, 2 in the Atlantic region, and one 

major base in Panama.’* / 

Arthough no U.S. operational facilities were located in SWA, numerous facilities had been developed according to U.S. standards but used by 

Saudi Defense forces or for civilian purposes. The primary Saudi airbases 

and air logistics centers were built or augmented largely through longstanding security assistance relationships or with the backing of U.S. 

f~nding.’~ Dhahran was even used during World War I1 as a resupply 

point for U.S. forces in Asia.I4 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers rebuilt the Dhahran Airfield in 1956 and constructed a civil terminal in 

1961 .Is A formal agreement that the Corps would furnish certain support 

for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) was executed in 1965 

and is still in existence at the time of this writing.I6 The agreement 

paved the way for construction of the King Faisal and the King Abdul 

Aziz Military Cantonments and King Khalid Military City. Other key 

projects completed under this agreement included separate headquarters 

for the Royal Saudi Air Force and MODA, the port at Ras a1 Mishab, and 

several school^.'^ A network of other facilities and bare base setups, too 

lengthy to enumerate, were constructed as part of an overall Saudi defense program. The details and existence of some of the facilities were 

“Col William Rider, CENTAFLG After Action Report. ca Mar 1990, p 19. 

”1991 Air Force Almanac, Air Force Magazine, May 1991, Vol. 74, NO. 5. 

‘”“Defense Exports in the Post Desert Storm Environment,” DISAhf Journal, Summer 

I4Maj Jim Dart, USAF, “USMTM: Point Guard on the Arabian Peninsuia,” DISAM 

U.S. Army Engineers had a long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia, and 

participated in numerous projects and facilities within and external to security assistance 

programs. Lt Gen Henry J. Hatch and Janet A. McDonnell, “Corps of Engineers: Laying 

the Groundwork for Theater Operations,” Military Review, Vol. LXXll Mar 1992, NO. 3, 

1991, Vol. 13, No. 4, p 12. 

Journal, Winter 1991/1992, p 2. 

IS 

P 3. 

I6lbid, p 3. 

I7lbid. 

37 
unknown to the United States at the time of the Gulf War, and planning 

factors were not accurate for some of the known facilities." 

Although the United States did not have large, established bases in 

the AOR, it did have contingency sites, used largely by the U.S. Navy. 

A small US. Middle East Task force had been established at Seeb, 

Oman, since the 1940s. but it and other Navy activities were fairly lowvisibility operations." Although not in the immediate vicinity, Diego 

Garcia was a prominent toe-hold in the region. Leasing facilities on the 

island from the British beginning in 1965 enabled the United States to 

build runways suitable for B-52 and C-5 operations as well as docks that 

accommodated prepositioned ships?' 

The Air Force described support bases somewhat tautologically as 

representing the "depth of combat support activity." Air logistics centers, 

program offices and laboratories, headquarters, ports, and training centers 

were considered support bases.21 In 1990, Air Force Systems Command 

(AFSC) designed and acquired aerospace vehicles and systems. Air logistics 

centers (ALCS) were responsible for supply, repair, distribution, and sustaining engineering under the direction of Air Force Logistics Command 

(AFLC). The Miliary Airlift Command (MAC) was responsible for peacetime management of various aerial ports worldwide?2 while the training 

centers were managed by Air Training Command (ATC). 

181bid. 

''(S/NF/WN) William T. Y'Blood, The Eagle andthe Scorpion, Center for Air Force 

"(S) Ibid, p 7. 

"AFM 1-1, p 1-3. This particular view of support bases unfortunately introduces 

terminological confusion because the work performed at a depot (one kind of support 

base) is generally thought of as industrial maintenance. Further, other support bases 

might only provide intermediate-level maintenance-that is, intermediate between depothndustrial-level and uniVorganization-level. We will use the three-fold distinction: 

operational, intermediate level support, and industrial-level support when discussing 

maintenance and as otherwise necessary to minimize the confusion. 

*'MAC'S global missions were accomplished through an airlift system which had 

78,000 people and 800 aircraft at 300 locations in 25 countries. MAC operated I3 bases 

in the United States and controlled facilities at Lajes and Rhein Main Air Base, GE. AF 

Almanac 1991. 

History, United States Air Force, Washington, DC, 1992, p 7. 

38 
AFLC and its ALCs provided supplemental logistics support to the operational commands. ALCS released materiel to base supply (thought of as a 

wholesale transaction); in turn, base supply released the materiel to consuming organizations on base (retail). AFLC defined requirements for weapons systems support and obtained resources from the national industrial 

base. During the decade before the Gulf War, AFLC made organizational 

changes and significant investments to better serve the needs of combat and 

support forces. AFE had combined its heavy maintenance organizations 

with buying agencies and those that provided technical support. This “integrated” management approach was intended to ensure that all logistics 

needs were considered for a particular aircraft type; one individual for each 

major system was accountable for ensuring integrati~n.~~ 

During the 1980s, AFLC invested over $130 million in aircraft maintenance facilities. At Warner Robins ALC, new hangars were constructed for 

performance of heavy maintenance and modification on C-141B aircraft. 

The new construction enabled aircraft repairs around the clock during the 

Gulf War. Expansion of engine overhaul facilities at San Antonio and 

Oklahoma City expedited Gulf War aircraft engine ~verhaul?~ 

Two air logistics support bases were located in the AOR. The first, 

called PM-SANG, resulted from a U.S. Air Force-sponsored program to 

help the Saudi Air National Guard (SANG) develop an industrial-level ALC 

similar in function to Air Force ALCS.~~ The second, the Defense Fuel 

Supply Point in Bahrain, was managed by the Defense Logistics Agency. 

The next nearest industrial-level support base to the AOR was RAF Kemble 

in the United Kingdom. It was home base for the European Distribution 

System (EDS), which routed high-priority cargo through the European 

Theater. RAF Kemble was in the process of being closed. 

Michael Self and Edward Kozlowski, AFLC White Paper: “Operations in Desert 23 

Storm,” Jul 199 I, p 1 I. 

24Self and Kozlowski, p 4. 

Maj Jim Dart, USAF. “USMTM: Point Guard on the Arabian Peninsula,” DISAM 2s 

Journul, Winter 199111992, p 4. 

39 
The final type of base, the national “industrial base,” included government and private research institutions, industrial plants, transportation 

and communications systems, the civilian labor force, and raw materiThe industrial bases of the United States, its allies, and SWA countries were favorably postured to support a gulf war.27 SWA countries had 

rich, oil-based economies; NATO Allies had a high level of preparedness; 

and Japan was a major provider of important technologies.2* 

Tying the bases together in peace and war were lines of communication?’ Air Force Combat Support Doctrine identified four LOC types: 

land, sea, air, and space.3o Two LOC types, sea and air, were part of a 

mobility triad of airlift, sealift, and prep~sitioning.~’ 

After World War 11, the primary strategic sealift mission was to move 

men and equipment to Europe rapidly for defense against a Soviet-Warsaw 

Pact attack. Sealift was a Navy responsibility, and sealift in support of the 

central front was to have been provided by over 600 NATO merchant 

vessels combined with the U.S. merchant fleet of 578 major ships (as of 

1978). On the eve of the Gulf War, however, this figure had dropped to 

367 active ships despite an investment of $7 billion in sealift during the 

26John T. Correll and Colleen A. Nash, “Declining, Diversifying, and Disappearing, ” 

27Since then, as is well understood, the U.S. defense-related industrial base has been 

in decline. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated in 1991 that two to four years would be 

required to regain levels of production achieved in 1990. John T. Correll, and Colleen 

A. Nash, “Declining, Diversifying, and Disappearing, ” Air Force Magazirte, Vol. 74, No. 

28John T. Correll and Colleen A. Nash, “Lifelines Abroad,” Air Force Magazine, 

297’o reemphasize, communication in this sense meant the pipelines or conduits 

30~~~ 1-1, p 1-3. 

Air Force Magazine, Vol. 74, No. 10, Oct I99 I, pp 36-40, p 38. 

10, Oct 1991, pp 36-40, p 36. 

Vol. 74, NO. 10, Oct 1991, pp 42-47. p 44. 

through which resources were transmitted rather than electronic communication. 

Capt Robert N. Kestlefoot, USN. “Force Projection by Sea: Cornerstone of Contingency,” from Defense 85, Aug 1985, pp 16-23. Published monthly by AFIS, Arlington, 

VA, in Air War College Associate Programs, Vol I, 2nd Ed, Lsn 19, p 474. 

31 

40 
1980~~~ As a result, the goal set for sealift in moving materiel to the AOK 

would be difficult ‘to achieve, given the decline of ~apabilities.~~ 

Sealift was grbuped into three categories: prepositioned, surge, and 

resupply. Assets prepositioned in ships close to the conflict allowed for 

near-immediate aacess, while surge shipping allowed for the movement 

of most of the eqhipment and initial sustaining supplies from the continental United Stab (CONUS). In resupply shipping, where the sea lines 

of communicatioq (SLOC) figured prominently, shipments followed surge 

shipping to provide sustainment stocks at rates determined by growth of 

force ’ 

The Military sealift Command (MSC) operated peacetime shipping and 

provided the nucldus of sealift capability. The Sealift Readiness Program 

(SRP) was a vollintary commitment of some carriers to contingencies. 

During emergencies, the President could authorize the Secretary of Transportation to drawlon additional U.S. flag shipping for crisis or wartime 

needs. The next hurce of support beyond the MsC and U.S. charter assets 

was the Ready Rkserve Force (RRF) ships. The Maritime Administration 

managed the RRF ‘for the U.S. Navy. The force was part of the National 

Defense Reserve meet (NDRF), and its assets were categorized in incremental 

readiness statuses of five, ten, or twenty days notice. RRF ships were activated by a request from the Navy to the Maritime Administration. 

There were tyo other sources of sealift. The first, the aforementioned 

600-ship NATO pqol, was managed by the NATO National Shipping Authority, which was authorized to reallocate ships among NATO member 

32This investmeot included 96 Ready Reserve Force ships (RRF), 25 Maritime prepositioned ships (MPS) for the Marine Corps, Afloat Prepositioned Ships (APS) for the Army and 

Air Force, eight fast sealift ships, (FSS), two 1.OOO-bed hospital ships, and two aviation 

logistics ships. The Vnited States Navy in Desert ShieWDesert Storm. Department of the 

Navy, Office of the chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC, 15 May 1991. 

Sealift planniog factors assumed little or no port facilities because ships were able 

to offload through the use of self-sustaining barges discharged from the ships, lighterage 

(which were sets of Self-powered ferries configured for landing), and other such arrangements. Capt Robert bI. Kestlefoot. uSN, “Force Projection by Sea: Cornerstone of Contingency,” from Defen$e 85, Aug 1985, pp 16-23. Published by AFIS, Arlington, VA, in Air 

War College Assocfate Programs, Vol I, 2nd Ed, Lsn 19, p 415. Also, see the 

CINCCENT’S assessment of lift later on in this chapter. 

34Kestlefoot, p 474, in Air War College Associare Programs. 

33 

41 
nations. The second was called the “Effective U.S.-Controlled Fleet” 

ships. These ships were owned by U.S. corporations although registered 

under the flags of Liberia, Panama, Honduras, and the Bahamas. They 

were available to the United States because the countries of registry did 

not have laws precluding the requisitioning of ships.35 

The air lines of communications were an Air Force responsibility 

through its Military Airlift Command.36 They were designed to ‘‘~Iose”~~ 

first but with a lesser throughput capacity than sealift. The 1981 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) established an airlift goal 

of 66 million ton-miles per day, which represented a target objective for 

effectively executing four specific warfighting scenarios developed in 

conjunction with the study?’ In 1987, considering all available airlift 

(including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, discussed below), only 48 to 51 

million ton-miles per day were a~hievable.~~ Moreover, the CMMS pointed out that one-third to one-fifth of the needed airlift would not be available for the first fifteen days for any of the four scenarios analyzed.40 In 

light of the diminishing Soviet threat, the Secretary of Defense revised 

the goal to 48 million ton-miles per day in April 1990. The new goal 

was not incorporated into long-range planning efforts before the Gulf War 

but made capability and requirements essentially the same.“ 

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was a significant part of airlift. 

When Desert Shield began, CRAF comprised five segments: long-range 

international, short-range international, aeromedical evacuation, domestic, 

and Alaskan. CRAF was further organized into three stages that could be 

activated incrementally to support DOD airlift requirements. The succesKestlefoot, p 475. 35 

”Kestlefoot, p 474. 

That is, reach the port of debarkation. 

Lt Col Rohert Kaufman, USAF, ‘The Airlift Strategy: A Credible Deterrent and Our 

Most Effective Mobility Option,” in Air War College Associate Materials, Vol I, 2nd Ed, 

Lsn. 16. p 232. 

37 

3R 

Lt Cot Kaufman, p 233. 39 

@Kaufman, p 23 1. 

J.A. Forbes, Memo for the Record, subj: Airlift Capability on the Eve of Desert 

Shield, 5 Nov 1992. The memo summarizes results of discussions with Mr. Lowell Jones, 

ANSER Area Leader for Special Operations Forces, Airlift, and Training. Original source 

of these figures is AFMOFM. 

41 

42 
sive stages, each with an increasingly larger number of aircraft, were 

intended to enable the Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command 

(CINCMAC) to tailor the size and composition of the strategic airlift force 

to meet expanding transportation requirement^.^' 

CINCMAC was authorized to activate CRAF Stage I. Upon activation, 

Stage I carriers had twenty-four hours to respond to HQ MAC tasking. j3 

Stage 11, which the Secretary of Defense was authorized to activate, had 

177 aircraft enrolled. It was to augment MAC organic aircraft for the next 

higher level of emergency. Stage I1 carriers also had twenty-four hours 

to respond to airlift tasking. Stage I11 had 506 commercial aircraft at the 

end of fiscal 1990. Following a Stage 111 call-up, the commercial carriers 

had forty-eight hours to begin supporting DOD airlift requirements. 

Stage I11 would only be activated “short of a defense oriented national 

emergency” as determined by the President or the Congress. Even without activating any stage of the CRAF, member airlines often volunteered 

aircraft when military airlift requirements became especially great. MAC 

paid for these flights using MAC uniform negotiated rates.44 Civil air 

carriers electing to participate committed varying numbers of their aircraft 

to the CRAF, sometimes in return for a proportionate share of DOD peacetime airlift contracts. If the entire CRAF had been activated in late 1990 

to support military transportation requirements during a major national 

emergency, its aircraft would have formed more than thirty-two percent 

of MAC’S cargo transport capability and ninety-three percent of the 

Command’s passenger airlift.4s 

On 2 August 1990, the day Iraq invaded Kuwait, MAC’S strategic 

aircrews available for mission tasking were as shown in Table 4.46 As 

can be seen, almost half of the strategic airlift aircrews originated from 

the reserves. 

42Rpt, MAC DCS Comptro~ler/AClB, “MAC Airlift Services Management Report. 

FY 90,” nd, p IS. 

Airlift Services Management Report, pp 15-16. 43 

44Airlift Services Management Report. p IS. 

4s Rpt, MAC DCS Comptroller/AClB. “MAC Airlift Services Management Report. 

461ntvw, J. W. Leland, MAC History, with Mr. J. M. Ledden, MAC Dcs Operations 

FY 90,” nd, p 15. 

and TransportatiotdAXO-S. 28 Jan 1991. 

43 
Table 3 

Civil Air Carrier Volunteers 

Before CRAF Stage I Activation4’ 

American Trans Air Hawaiian Airlines* 

Air Transport International 

Continental Airlines Rosenbalm Aviation 

Connie Kalitta Southern Air Transport 

Delta Airlines* Trans International Airlines* 

Eastern Airlines* Tower Air 

Evergreen International United Airlines 

Airlines 

Federal Express World Airways 

*Volunteers who did not have a Stage I commitment. 

Pan American World Airways 

Table 4 

Aircrews Available for Desert Shield 

on 2 August 1990 

Aircrews 

Aircraft Active Duty Reserve Total 

c-5 139 113 

C-141 463 424 

Source: CATD Log (S/Decl OADR), Entry for 0322002 Aug 90. 

252 

887 

Memo, MAC DCS Plans and Programs/xPxo, “Air Carrier Volunteers Prior To CRAF 47 

Stage 1 Activation,” nd. 

44 
Reserve manpower augmentation actually exceeded that of the active 

duty force in some Air Force specialty codes. In the entire Military Airlift 

Command, for example, approximately 18,000 aerial port specialists were 

authorized. Of those, nearly sixty percent were assigned to units of the Air 

Reserve Components ARC).^ Similarly, more than ninety percent of 

MAC’S aeromedical evacuation specialists were assigned to the ARC, while 

sixty percent of MAC tactical airlift personnel belonged to the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Re~erve.4~ Before the invasion, twenty percent of reserve associate aircrews were flying MAC missions on a typical day. It 

should be clear that activating large portions of MAC’S ARC resources 

during a major conflict was both necessary and expected-failure to do so 

would have imposed an immediate constraint on airlift.M 

The third part of the mobility triad was prepositioning. In the absence of established bases, having material close at hand diminished the 

need to stoke a long pipeline. All military services and theaters participated in some form of prepositioning as a strategy to reduce air and 

sealift dependencies. Table 5 presents the worldwide status of prepositioned equipment and ~upplies.~’ 

A special set of housekeeping equipment and facilities designed for 

the CENTAF austere desert environment was called Harvest Falcon. It 

included hardwall shelters, tent expandable modular personnel tents, 

equipment, and vehicles; provided power, water, facilities, and vehicles; 

and was air transportable. It could support up to 55,000 people and 750 

aircraft-thirteen bases and one forward operating location.’* According 

481ntvw, with Ledden. 

491ntvw, .I. W. Leland, MAC History, with Mr. W. J. Bush, MAC Command SectiodCsB, 8 &t 91; point paper, MAC DCS Phs and ProgramdXPB/XPMRM, “Air National 

Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFR) Forces in MAC. FQ4/YI,” 10 Jul 1991, Sup Doc 

Ltr (S/Decl OADR), MAC DCS Plans and ProgramdxPx to MAC History Office, 

“Review of Chapter 111 of 1990 MAC History, Operation DESERT SHIELD.” 6 Sep 1991, 

info used. 

5’Although this table is dated as of FY 1992. information is similar to FY 1990-91, 

3-28. 

50 

on the eve of the gulf war, JCS Mobilie Requirements Study, 23 Jan 1992, page IV-8. 

Harvest Falcon equipment was divided into 37 squadron-level sets, 14 independent (standalone) and 23 dependent sets, which wen: requid to be paired with a dependent set. 

Air Force Regulation 400-24, War Reserve Maferiel Policy, 31 Jul 1990, p 42. s2 

45 
Table 5 

Worldwide Status of Prepo~itioning~ 

Command Army Air Force Navy USMC 

Global 

(Note 1) 

USEUCOM 

(Note 2) 

USCENTCOM 

(Note 3) 

USPACOM 

USSOUTHCOM 

4 APS Ships 4 APS 

Diego Garcia Ships 

2 Med, 2 

Diego 

POMCUS Sets NATO 

(GE, NE, BE PreposiARMS (IT) tioning Procurement 

Package 

Equipment at Same 

sites under 

various programs, (HNS, 

WRS) 

Same as above Same 

Most in CO- Same 

NUS 

1 APS Ship 3 MPS 

Diego Gar- Squadrons 

cia (Listed Below) 

MEB 

Equipment 

(NO) MPS 

(4 ships) in 

Atlantic+ 

MPS (5 

Ships) in 

Indian 

Ocean) 

MPS (4 

ships) in 

West Pac 

Same Same 

Note 1: Three prep0 tanker ships at Diego Garcia are not included because 

they supported all services. 

Note 2: POMCUS=Prepositioned organizational material; collected in unit 

sets. Six heavy brigade sets and an Armored Cavalry regiment set. A 

heavy brigade set is located in Italy. 

Note 3: HNS=HoSt Nation Suppoft, WRS=Wartime Reserve Stocks. 

Although this table is dated as of FY 1992, information is similar to FY 1990-91, 53 

on the eve of the Gulf War. JCS Mobility Requirernenrs Srudy, 23 Jan 1992, p IV-8. 

46 
to the last CENTAF Operations Plan (OPLAN) in place before the beginning 

of Desert Shield, Harvest Falcon storage and aggregation units were 

located as shown in Table 6.54 

Table 6 

Harvest Falcon Storage” 

[DELETED] 

In the summer of 1990, eighty-two percent of the assets were in the 

CONUS, but by 6 August, seven sets were located in the AOR in sufficient 

quantities to support five squadrons totalling 10,800 people along with 

two more squadrons totalling 4,400 personnel if the last two squadrons 

had some other a~gmentation.’~ 

s4Annex D, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1002-88. 

55Annex D, p D-4. COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-88. 

56y’Blood, p 24. 

47 
The Marine Corps concept of operations for deploying aviation forces 

was to send the aircraft and personnel packages forward and then marry 

them with spares and sustainment on board specially prepositioned ships. 

The Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Ships (Mps) program involved 

thirteen ships, which were organized in three squadrons. MPS squadrons 

had tanks, artillery, vehicles, supplies, food, fuel, and water to sustain a 

single 16,500-man brigade for thirty dayss7 MPS-I, the first squadron, 

was deployed in 1984 to the Eastern Atlantic and was later associated 

with the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).58 MPS-3 was deployed 

in December 1985 and sent to the Western Pacific to be associated with 

the 1 st MEB. MPS-2 deployed in 1986 and was sent to Diego Garcia and 

aligned with the 7th MEfLS9 

Without the use of the MPS, the Marine Corps estimated that 4,400 

C-141 sorties would have been required to airlift each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) of the type associated with the MPS plus 250 C-141 

missions to carry MEF personnel.60 The-Navy indicated that contents of 

three prepositioning ships from MPS-2 were equivalent to 3,000 C-141 

flights for the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Had all equipment on 

the MPS ships destined to sustain the 1st Marine Division been used, 

2,100 C-5A sorties would have been required!’ 

57HQ USMC Requirements and Programs Division, Conceprs and Issues, Feb 1989, 

58A Marine Expeditionary Brigade has 8,000-18,000 Marines and sailors, is commanded by a General Officer, and carries 30 days sustainment. It is normally built 

around a reinforced infantry regiment and a composite aircraft group. Ibid. 

Maj Thomas c Linn, USMC,” MAGTF Capabilities in an Uncertain World,” Extract 

Marine Corps Gazette, May 1990, pp 33-37. Copyright 1990 by the Marine Corps 

Association. 

6olbid. 

“The United States Navy in Desert SIiielaYDesert Stonn, Department of the Navy, 

pp 1-1 to 1-16. 

59 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operitions, Washington, DC, 15 May 1991. 

48 
Planning 

In contrast to the Marine Expeditionary Force concept, the Air Force 

organization for both peace and war revolved around the wingbase and, 

hence, its planning for war did also. The wing was the primary selfsustaining operational unit in the Air Force. All U.S. Air Force main operating bases (MOBS) and most collocated operating bases (COBS) were run 

from a wing support structure.62 A base would typically support one 

wing, although some supported two. The wing commander exercised 

command over all wing activities on the base through deputy commanders, a support group commander (who was responsible for the airfield, 

personnel, and similar common functions), subordinate division chiefs, 

squadron commanders, and section and detachment commanders. 

The Air Force’s most common combat wingbase organization form 

was the trideputy organizational structure comprising a wing commander, 

deputy commander for operations, deputy commander for maintenance, 

and deputy commander for res0urces.6~ Volume V discusses the purely 

operational preparation-those actions pertinent to the deputy commander 

for operations. 

The squadron was the deployable unit in the Air Force. War plans 

tasked organizations by squadron, not by wing,64 and support revo1ve.d 

around providing for, employing, and sustaining squadrons. A typical 

aircraft squadron usually required the equivalent of twenty C-141 s for 

transporting the personnel and equipment. For purposes of deployment, 

squadrons were organized as dependent or independent units. Independent 

squadrons could deploy to form a wing at a given location, or dependent 

squadrons could deploy to augment existing wings and independent 

62rhe material on wing organization is excerpted from AFP 400-?7, USAF Warrinte 

Logistics Organization and Decision making. 2 Jan 1990. 

?here were actually two basic wing structures. The first was the trideputy, as 

described. The second was the dual deputy wing. The dual deputy wing had deputy 

commanders for operations and logistics plus a combat support group commander. The 

chief of maintenance and the chief of supply were subordinate to the deputy commander 

for logistics. Transportation, contracting, and the comptroller came under the combat 

support group. AFP 400-77. USAF Wartime Logistics Organization and Decision making, 

2 Jan 1990. p 9-B-1. 

%e fighter squadron was the archetype. 

49 
squadrons. In this manner, the Air Force planned to share resources to 

avoid redundancies in deploying equipment and personnel. 

Each Air Force operational squadron maintained a designed operational 

capability (Doc). In simple words, the DOC described the mission of the 

unit. For fighter squadrons, a DOC statement might indicate air-to-air 

combat, or air-to-ground combat. In addition to DOC statements, squadrons, 

along with all other units, were aligned in unit type codes (UTCS). The 

codes represented specific capabilities. Each unit had a UTC, units did not 

normally possess unique UTCs, and all units having the same code had 

notionally identical characteristics. As an example, the unit type code 

HEDAL represented intermediate maintenance support for sixteen C- 1 30E 

aircraft. It included 244 passengers and 32.9 short tons of equipment.65 

Above the wing level in peacetime were numbered air forces and 

major commands. On the eve of the Gulf War, the Tactical Air Command (TAC), as part of the tactical air forces, had three numbered air 

forces, three specialized centers, and the 28th Air Division (controlling 

the Airborne Warning and Control Center) with which to “organize, 

equip, and train” tactical air forces. U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and 

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) maintained tactical units and bases in their 

respective theaters. Air Reserve Components augmented active duty 

forces to fill out tactical air forces capable of being sent to unified commands for employment against various threats. 

One of the numbered air forces, the Ninth Air Force at Shaw AFB, was 

specifically dedicated to supporting SWA operations. The Ninth AF had ten 

wings but did not have air divisions like other TAC numbered air forces. 

Ninth AF was expected to “employ” and “support” during wartime as 

CENTAF, the Air Force component of Central Command (CENTCOM). 

During peacetime, the role of the Ninth Air Force was to plan for the transition from peacetime to wartime. The transition would prove quite 

difficult, and at least some of the seeds of this difficulty can be appreciated in retrospect. In accordance with AFP 400-11, USAF Wartime Logistics 

Organization and Decision Muking, CENTAF was responsible for tracking 

the deployment plan and monitoring the reception, beddown. and regenera65HQ USAWLGXX (LRC) MEFPAK !hnmary Report, 3 Sep 1992. 

50 
tion of forces.& However, it does not clearly identify the activity responsible for the actual beddown, reception, and regeneration of f0rces.6~ 

Like TAC, MAC was required to “organize, equip, and train” forces 

that could deploy to the AOR in support of MAC missions. This was a 

dual role. MAC was a supporting activity to CENTCOM because it was 

required to provide airlift for all CENTCOM forces. It did so as the air 

component of Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The Commanderin-Chief (CINC) of MAC dual-hatted as CINmANS. In the deployed AOR, 

MAC’S senior officer in CENTCOM was the Commander, Airlift Forces 

(COMALF). The COMALF, however, was not an organizational commander, 

since the term “airlift forces” did not connote a clear and distinguishable 

unit. The COMALF was responsible for coordinating airlift activities in 

theater. He was a member of the CENTAF’S staff, but in planning, he had 

no administrative control over deployed MAC forces.68 

The Strategic Air Command was tasked for two types of missions. 

Logistics preparations for the first, involving the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), differed from those involving SAC’S other mission, 

conventional warfare as required for support of CENTCOM. Most tasking 

for SIOP entailed in-place fighting using the homestation as a base of 

operations. This had important deployment implications. Units tasked 

only for the SIOP did not have deployable war readiness spares kits 

(WRSKS).~~ The net result was that fewer tanker WRSKS were available 

than deployed tankers and employment locations. The few available were 

configured for five, ten, and fifteen primary authorized aircraft (PAA) 

deployment packages7’ Combinations of the packages were formed to 

400-77, USAF Warlime Logislics Organization and Decision Making, 2 Jan 1990. 

”1bid. 

68Ltr, Col B. G. Hawley, MAC Staff Judge Advocate, to MAC Dcs Plans and Programs/xPMO, “Organization of Airlift forces for Operation Desert Shield,” 5 Oct 1990, 

Sup Doc 3-52; staff summary, MAC LXS Plans and Programs/XPPD, “Operation Desert 

Shield Command Relationships and Legal Issues,” 2 Oct 1990, w/Atch, Sup Doc 3-53. 

69They were authorized base-level self-sufficiency spares (~L‘js) kits, which were 

composed of different items than the WRSK kits. (SINF) Intvw, Dr. Theodore R. Jamison, 

with Maj Gen Charles J. Searock Jr., SAC’S Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Subject 

“Operation Desert ShieldDesert Storm, Aug 1990 to Mar 1991,” 4 Mar 1991, p 11. 

70Prirnary authorized aircraft are primary in the sense that backup aircraft are not 

included. Deployments were universally sized in terms of PAA. 

51 
support deployments of varying sizes at the numerous operating location~.~' Bomber WRSKs were also in short supply and did not have good 

fill rates. Mission support kits (MsKs) would need to be formed for both 

bombers and tankers from other peacetime operating stocks and AFW 

stocks to support aircraft in their deployments. 

Planning Processes 

The time available determines the planning process used. Deliberate 

planning for the Gulf War was used when time permitted; preparation and 

coordination of a deliberate plan took eighteen to twenty-four months. 

Time-sensitive or crisis action planning took place during emergencies. 

The time-sensitive planning process paralleled deliberate planning, but 

was more flexible to changing events.'2 Figure 6 lists the five formal 

phases of the deliberate planning process. 

Figure 6 

Deliberate Planning Process 

I. Initiation 

11. Concept Development 

111. Plan Development 

IV. Plan Review 

V. Supporting Plans 

Origin: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 

(WNF) Intvw, Dr. Theodore R. Jamison, 4 Mar 1991, p 2. 71 

72Because of the amount of detail, both deliberate and crisis planning were computer 

intensive. The volume of data was large enough that during deliberate planning, only the 

deployment phase was considered. AFSC Pub I. pp 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-12. 

52 
To support initiation of planning involving a SWA scenario as required 

by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), commanders-inchief (CINC~) 

prepared operation plans in abbreviated concept format (CONPLAN) full 

concept format (OPLAN). CONPLANs were developed because many situations did not warrant detailed preparation. They were tasked when the 

contingency was not crucial to national security, great demands on US. 

resources were not expected, the probability of Occurrence was low, or 

flexibility was desired.74 The logistics summary was abbreviated in a 

CONPLAN.” Computer support was usually not required, since detailed 

support was not calculated and strategic movements were not simulated?6 

An OPLAN fully developed the CINC’S concept of operations. It specified the forces and support needed to execute the plan and the transportation schedule required to move those resources. OPLANs were required 

when the situation was critical to U.S. national security, or when the military response would tax U.S. force, supply, or transportation ~apabilities.7~ 

In the plan development phase, the combatant CINC’S staff and service 

component staffs developed a detailed flow of resources into the theater to 

support the approved OPLAN concept. After forces were selected and timedphased, support requirements determined, and transportation computer simulated, the detailed planning information was generated and stored as a timephased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file.’* If the strategic transportation simulation indicated that forces and support could not be moved in time, 

then planners developed and incorporated compromise^.'^ 

Once concepts of operations were documented, the ClNC forwarded 

them to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.” The 

731bid, p 6- 12. 

741bid, p 6- 14. 

751bid, p 6-28. 

761bid, p 6- IS. 

7’1bid, pp 6- 14, IS. 

781bid. p 6-10. 

791bid, p 6-60. 

solbid, p 6-29. 

53 
Joint Staff reviewed the concepts for sufficiency to accomplish the assigned task, valid plan assumptions, and compliance with guidance.” 

CONPLANs and OPLANs received different reviews. The final review of 

each CONPLAN determined adequacy and feasibility. For each OPLAN, the 

Joint Staff performed a concept review to determine adequacy; concepts 

were approved for “continued planning only.”82 

Each subordinate and supporting commander assigned a task in the 

plan prepared a supporting plan, which was submitted for review and 

approval. The C1NC.s plan was not ready for implementation until the 

supporting mobilization, deployment, and employment plans were com- 

~lete.8~ Inthe SWA case, the deliberate planning process never ended 

because the plans were regularly updated. 

The joint deployment system (JDS) was designed to support the joint 

deployment and execution committee (JDEC).84 Although the JDS was 

designed for both deliberate and crisis planning, it was of most use during 

crisis planning because it allowed rapid translation of operations plans 

and associated time-phased force deployment documents into executable 

operations orders. Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between crisis and 

deliberate planning. It shows that the JDS is used in both types of planning but that deliberate planning stops at Phase V, while crisis planning 

goes through to execution. 

During planning to support postulated scenarios involving SWA, 

information was entered into JDS terminals using preformatted screens, 

that could be updated via tape or computer disk. Output was received in 

the form of reports, scheduling messages, or TPFDD tapes. The IDS database was the prime repository of deployment-related information. It was 

maintained at Scott AFB, Illinois (although other sites could serve as a 

backup or have additional information pertaining to unique site requirements). The database contained narrative information on plan scope, 

“/bid, p 6-75. 

x21bid, p 6-29. 

Ibid, p 6-10. R3 

‘?he JDS is a real-time, transaction-oriented database, which can be updated by a 

customer. The update can be transmitted over the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network, or 

WIN. The WIN can also be used for teleconferencing. 

54 
concept, and status; time-phased force and sustainment requirements; 

hypothetical information for notional taskings; actual unit information; 

and movement requirements that could be used to prepare a transportation 

schedule and manifest. Accessing various databases and reference files, 

planners created TPFDDs to support proposed COAS. TPFDDs could also be 

accessed via the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS). JOPS was 

designed for deliberate planning, but the JDS could access some of the 

JOPS files for other planning purposes. 

Figure 7 

Joint Planning Summary 

MOPLAW 

55 
The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Version 1, released in November 1989, was the first step toward a “true” joint 

operation planning and execution system. It started the process of bringing together the Joint Operational Planning System and the Joint Deployment System into a single system.R5 It gave the user a single entry point 

to access either JOPS or JDS. Some JOPS files were on-line, and there was 

one-way interface between JOPS and JDS.86 

JOPES Version 2, released in April 1990, made possible the crosslink 

between systems. It allowed users to sign on to one system (JOB or JDS) 

and use data resident in the other, use applications programs in the other, 

or transfer control to the other without having to go through sign-on/sign-off procedures.8’ 

Planning for the Gulf War 

In reality, crisis planning was used for the Gulf War because the 

actual situation differed substantially from the scenario postulated by the 

most recent planning for the area. Planning for the Gulf War was a 

challenge. CENTCOM’S headquarters was thousands of miles from the theater. The Command had no standing forces or forward bases.88 The infrastructure of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) was intended to offset 

CENTCOM’S adverse position of not having U.S. forward ba~es.8~ 

A few key bases and airfields were available, but few formal countryto-country and host-nation agreements existed because of cultural reluctance to execute formal arrangements. In general, Arab nations were 

reluctant to allow permanent basing of U.S. forces within the AOR because they wished to keep non-Arab influences at a minimum. Notable 

exceptions to this lack of presence were the long-established security 

assistance programs. Saudi Arabia and Egypt were two of our Nation’s 

largest foreign military sales customers, and they were among our 

staunchest allies during the Gulf War. 

~~ 

Ibid, p 8-7. 

Ibid, Q 8-8. 

”Ibid, p 8-8. 

6RWhite, Lt Col Gerald L., USAF. “US Central Command,” from Air War College 

891bid. 

85 

R6 

Associare Programs, Vol. 11, lsns 3132, introduction to lessons, p 1. 

56 
The Gulf States were blessed with abundant petroleum stores and the 

related income, leading to high standards of living. Local shops were 

well stocked with necessities and luxuries of great variety. Large pools 

of third-country nationals performed vital but menial services, and Saudi 

Arabia, in particular, was used to dealing with and supporting huge 

surges of exogenous population during holy seasons. 

Joint Logistics Doctrine, in draft format at the time of the conflict, 

stated: 

To exercise control at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of 

war, commanders must also exercise control over logistics. For a given 

area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be 

responsible for logistics, especially in the joint operational environment. 

The logistics support system must be in harmony with the structure and 

employment of the combat forces it supports. This unity of effort is 

best attained under a single command authority ... Commanders must be 

able to call forward in a timely manner those assets needed to initiate 

and sustain war.w 

However, for reasons mentioned elsewhere in this report, CENTCOM 

theater logistics operations in support of available and draft plans were 

based on the premise that each service would train, equip, and sustain its 

own forces in the AOR?’ Common user support, (such as water, food, 

etc.) would be provided by the component having the greatest presence, 

which in most instances, was the Army.’’ Host nations would also be 

called upon to provide support. 

gOJoint Chiefs of Staff Publication Joint Pub 40, Doctrine for Logistics Suppor~ of 

”Current Joint Doctrine is ambiguous on a concept of theater logistics. On one 

hand, the draft JCS publication 4-0, “Joint Logistics Doctrine,” states that logistics is a 

function of command and should be under a single command authority. Yet, elsewhere 

in the same directive, it allows the services to train, equip, and sustain respective forces 

in the theater and otherwise provide for its forces. 

92Support therefore, remained the purview of the military service while the CEWM 

staff “monitored” logistics to a large extent. The CINC, if he chose, could combine certain 

common support requirements with a single service as executive agent, at his discretion. 

During all phases of combat, Joint and Air Force logistics agencies and staffs “monitoml” 

and “assisted.” No office or function was charged with (and staffed for) command or 

orchestration of CENTCOM logistics at the overall theater level. 

Joint Operations, para e, p IV6. 

57 
The Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) maintained 

certain tools to use in planning for contingencies and executing war plans. 

The preparation of war plans was a cyclic process, and a plan was categorized and numbered on the basis of the theater, the threat, and the year. 

For example, U.S. Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command 

(USCINCCENT) OPLAN 1002-88 was the CENTCOM regional contingency 

involving Iran, while the USCINCCENT 1021-88 plan involved a global 

Soviet invasion of Iran. 

On 16 October 1989, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed 

CINCCENT to redirect planning from OPLAN 1021 (Soviet invasion of Iran) 

to a major revision of OPLAN 1002 (defense of the Arabian peninsula) with 

Iraq as the opponent. In November 1989, CINCCENT ordered the revision 

of 1002-88 (Defense of the Arabian Peninsula). The first draft of the 

revised OPLAN was scheduled for completion in July 1990. 

On 16 April 1990, an outline plan for USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 

(Operations to Counter an Intraregional Threat to the Arabian Peninsula) 

was published. The contingency embodied in the plan was an Iraqi 

invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The plan assumed [DELETED] 

warning and [DELETED] deployment time before the commencement of 

hostilities. The plan was completed in April 1991 (Draft USCINCCENT 

OPLAN 1002-90 (S/NF), April 16, 1990). 

On the eve of the Gulf War, the second draft for OPLAN 1002-90 was 

circulating for comment. The plan was based on a regional conflict, did 

not involve the Soviets directly, and was to be executed with the assumption that all tasked forces would be available when required. It did not yet 

have a TPFDD. The TPFDD normally provides the deploying unit, the 

beddown location, and the supporting host. Because it was still in draft 

form, CENTAF had not developed its supporting plan.y3 

The Air Force was required to prepare several plans. MAC was tasked 

to prepare a plan in a supporting role context as one of the components 

of the mobility triad. CENTAF, a component of CENTCOM, was required 

to plan for its forces. SAC was originally tasked to prepare a supporting 

plan for managing and deploying its conventional forces, but over time, 

y3(S) A Chronology of the Gurf War, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS). Mar 

1992 (draft). 

58 
SAC forces were to “chop” to CENTAF. CENTAF was to provide for all 

forces under its immediate control plus support the Air Force component 

of Special Operation Forces (SOF). 

Concepts of Operation 

A review of OPLANs for the AOR indicates that the concepts of operation did not significantly differ logistically between versions. The basing 

might be different, or the numbers of aircraft might have varied, but the 

Air Force planned to support its units according to doctrine. A network of 

bare bases would be linked initially to homestation for support; each wing 

commander would make the decisions on support provided for the base. 

Follow-on support would be phased in as soon as possible. Aircraft maintenance was provided according to type of aircraft, but management was 

centralized at each base. The support concept was “remove and replace” 

for most aircraft and “remove, repair, and replace” for some. 

Basing 

The concept of theater support called for a network of bare bases 

with host wings predominating. These host wings would exercise authority over most functions for their respective locations. Host wings were 

required to support tenant wings and to prepare base support plans for 

bases to which they were deployed as hosts. The component headquarters 

staff, CENTAF, was very small and served primarily as advisor and monitor of functional areas. Most support would be initially furnished from 

homestation, but in any case, support remained linked to the CONUS-the 

reason why the lines of communication were of paramount importance. 

Although all plans assigned the lion’s share of hosting responsibilities to 

1 TFW (Tactical Fighter Wing) at Dhahran; other wings were also tasked 

to serve as hosts. Some air reserve wings were initially scheduled to host 

locations with active tenants. Many of those bases had no buildings 

suitable for air force base operations or for living arrangements. 

The concept of operations outlined in the basic plan stated that the 

Commander, Airlift Forces (COMALF), would establish an airlift control 

center (ALCC) at Dhahran, designate a host wing commander (for MAC 

forces) at a given base, and conduct intratheater airlift when directed. 

The Commander, Strategic Air Command was required to provide a 
Director of Strategic Forces (STRATFOR) and to designate host SAC wing 

commanders at two bases, usually Cairo IAP and Diego Garcia. 

Special equipment and portable facilities accommodating an austere 

desert environment were designed for CENTAF; they were called Harvest 

Falcon equipment. Much of the equipment was prepositioned in or near 

the AOR and was air transportable. It provided intermediate and organizational level support for power, water, facilities, and vehicles. 

Logistics Support 

The concept of logistics support in the basic plans stated that initial 

supply support was to be provided from deployed war reserve kits, mobility bench stock, and mobility equipment at theater locations. Resupply 

was to be from home supply units until supply accounts were established 

in the AOR. Airlift would provide resupply from around C+3 (three days 

after deployment) until the sea lines of communication were established. 

Supply support was to be provided by homestations. USEUCOM would 

provide lateral support until a supply system was established in the AOR. 

Regular supply accounts (SRANS) were to be established for each base; by 

the last period, mobile supply computers were to be deployed, with 

remote devices at operating locations. Accountability for all items remained with homestation until the theater supply system was established, 

although shortfalls were to be reported to CENTAF/ Logistics (LG), with 

an information copy for the Major Air Command (MAJCOM). A combat 

supply system (Css) on microcomputers was to be used until a mobile 

computer mainframe was deployed.94 Three phases of Concept of Supply 

Operations were identified. The Initial phase consisted of using resources 

from war readiness spares kits, with mission-critical parts (MICAP) needs 

being filled from homestation. Information copies of messages asking for 

spares and other items from homestations were to be sent to CENTAF/ LG. 

The transition phase began when combat supply support activities (CSSAs) 

would be established. The CSSAS would operate manually, requisitioning 

both base and mission support items. Each CSSA was to be headed by a 

senior supply officer and comprised all supply personnel at the location, 

regardless of MAJCOM. The final phase occurred when the mainframe and 

(s) Annex D, p D-6, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-R8. 94 

60 
remote devices arrived. Additional personnel also were scheduled to 

arrive to augment the CSSA and to make it automated and operational. 

Responsibilities 

Although the CENTAFILG was charged with control and direction of 

CSSA units, the host wing CSSAs were the main players. They would 

maintain supply accountability, manage funds, obtain supplies, and function as chiefs of supply. 

Maintenance 

Maintenance support required units to be self-supporting because of 

bare base conditions. Maintenance organizations were to be aligned 

under AFM 66-1 procedures, and requests for depot level maintenance 

assistance would be routed through CENTAFlLOgiStiCS Maintenance (LGM). 

Oil analysis capability would be deployed in the initial maintenance 

support echelon. Aircraft and aircraft engine battle damage repair teams 

would be deployed by AFLC, would be under the operational control of 

CENTAF/LG, and would report to lead unit deputy chiefs of maintenance 

(DCMS).95 The CENTAFILGM was a staff advisor to deployed wings. Each 

base/installation having more than one wing would have a lead unit DCM, 

who would appoint senior tenant wing maintenance officers as assistant 

WMS. Collocated units were to be prepared to form joint maintenance 

operations centers (JMOCS) and job control (JC) units. 

Munitions 

Prepositioned munitions at Seeb [DELETED] Masirah and Thumrait 

was to be moved [DELETED]. Units were expected to account and prepare for munitions storage in their base support plans. Munitions being 

prepositioned in the AOR were to be air and sealifted to the AOR from the 

CONUS and other ClNCs for use by CENTAF at specific employment locations. Air Force munitions were available on three prepositioned ships. 

The MAC airlift command element (AWE) was scheduled to offload 

(S) Appendix 10, Annex D, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-88. 95 

61 
airlifted munitions at each employment location, while U.S. Army Forces, 

Central Command (ARCENT) was to line-haul munitions from seaport to 

employment location. 

Fuels Support 

Strategic airlift assets would arrive in-theater with sufficient fuel to 

return to points outside the AOR. CENTAF was required to coordinate 

requirements for intratheater airlift of bulk petroleum for the other components, and in turn was required to meet ARCENT’S fuels ground transportation requirements. Units would deploy with packaged fuel products 

sufficient for thirty days. Commercial fuels could be used, and in anticipation of this, units were required to deploy with ten days supply of fuel 

additives. ARCENT was tasked to schedule fuels resupply shipments.% 

Comptroller Support 

Deployed units would be fiscally sustained by home units until funding authority was granted to CENTAF. Support was to be limited to 

disbursing agents until comptroller operations would commence and sustaining personnel would be available at various theater locations. Units 

would be self-sustaining through their combat support elements (CSES), 

and were required to deploy with funding documents and a recommended 

imprest funding document authority of $2,000,000 for CSE units and 

$1 ,OOO,OOO for other units. Eventually, ARCENT would assume responsibilities as the central funding agent. Its duties consisted of obtaining U.S. 

currency and military payment certificates for the theater. 

Each component provided medical service for its own forces. Air 

Force care was organized into four echelons. Bases were responsible for 

the first echelon of care, and commanders were required to ensure that 

medical personnel deployed with the unit. 

Contracting Support 

Although CENTCOM was ultimately responsible for a properly coordinated acquisition program, the bulk of the contracting effort remained 

with each component. The Director of Contracting for logistics 

y6(s) Annex D, p D-6, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-68. 

62 
(CENTAFILGC) performed staff functions in issuing policy, procedures, and 

guidance to base-level contracting officers, who performed work at their 

locations under the authority of the base combat support group commander. Contracting personnel were required to deploy as part of the combat 

support group UTC. At multiwing locations, the host wing was tasked to 

provide a senior contracting officer. Contracting officers were expected 

to deploy with their warrant and civilian clothing to counter the assumed 

reluctance of the host population to deal with the U.S. military. 

Lines of Communication 

Sea lines of communication (SLOC): As previously stated, basedunits 

were expected to be self-sufficient until the closure of the SLOC. Units 

were expected to be self sustaining for 30 days. During this window, and 

before the establishment of the SLOC, logistics supplies were to be transported via MAC airlift. By then, normal sustainment and resupply would 

be expected to have begun and would be furnished via SLOC. However, 

ARCENT was tasked to furnish supply classes I, 111, IV, and V, all other 

classes would be furnished on a “pull” basis (i.e., they had to be requisitioned). The Air Force was tasked to furnish its own Class I until ARCENT 

was tasked to provide it. 

Transportation windows planning called for minimum windows between the earliest arrival date (EAD) and the latest arrival date (LAD). Five 

days were allotted for air movements and ten days for movement by sea. 

Theater stockage levels were specified for most classes of supply. No 

refrigerated rations were to be shipped for a specified time unless refrigerated storage was locally obtained?’ In Sealifwater Port Operations, 

Sms were expected to close first. U.S. military and civilian ships would 

cany out sealift operations. Forces and equipment moving by sea would 

normally use surface transportation to reach beddown locations. 

Ninety percent of resupply was expected to move by sealift. Resupply 

cargo from seaports was to be moved primarily by surface transportation. 

Planning factors for air shipments intratheater were: TAC airlift would 

move twenty percent of resupply cargo coming from aerial ports of 

debarkation (APODS) and a sealair interface would be required for five 

percent of cargo coming from Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs). Vehicles 

97(S) Annex D, p D-5, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-88. 

63 
were to be obtained from many sources: homestation, host nation, and 

war reserves. Host-nation support was the preferred means. Main operating base resources provided vehicle maintenance for geographically 

separated units. 

CENTCOM had a small joint staff to manage all of the responsibilities 

of the AOR from a great distance. CENTCOM had no forces assigned until 

C Day, at which time forces would be requested from the supporting 

components. As previously mentioned, the CINC planned to preposition 

assets in the AOR as an offset for the lack of presence?* Also, host-nation 

support in the AOR was part of the CINC's plan for regional contingency 

planning, since he had confidence in the capabilities and willingness of 

the countries to provide this support, should it be required. 

In the draft OPLAN 1002-90, CINCCENT identified host-nation support 

that could be provided in the following categories: POL, water, food and 

messing support; long haul trucking and mission handing equipment at 

airheads, warehouses, and stevedores; buses for troop movement; and 

3,OOO hospital bedsw CENTCOM was also forced by the lack of forward 

presence and small size to delegate many theater responsibilities normally 

provided by the CINC to its subordinate components.100 

The CENTCOM components were CENTAF, which was derived from 

9th Air Force, a numbered Air Force subordinate to Tactical Air Cornmand. CENTAF had the responsibility for theater field exchanges, intratheater airlift, and the mail, plus sustaining and supporting its own fortes."' ARCENT was furnished by the Third Army and was subordinate to 

FORSCOM - the Army equivalent of TAC. With the largest representation 

in the AOR, ARCENT had the responsibility for planning and providing for 

common-user supply support, food, water, intratheater transportation, 

vehicles, engineering, fuels pipelines, and graves registration services."* 

9R((s) /bid, p 74 

99(S) USCINCCENT 11312152 Aug 1990 Message, Logstat No. 001. 

'?he CINC's position was in direct contrast to that of the more robust warfighting 

ClNCs such as CINCEUR with headquarters in the AOR, large, dispersed regional support 

staffs, and assigned forces. 

'"(S/NF) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1002-90 Draft, Annex D. 

"*(S/NF) USCENTCoM OPLAN 1002-90 Draft, Annex D. 

64 
U.S. Navy, Central Command (NAVCENT) was originally to be supported 

by the Commander. Middle East Force (CMEF), and U.S. Marine Corps, 

Central Command (MARCENT) was furnished from the 1 st Marine Expeditionary Force.'o3 

The Air Force Headquarters, USCENTAF ADVON (advanced echelon), 

consisted of 117 personnel in OPLAN 1021-88, later swelling to 314 in the 

later OPLANS.'~ The ADVON was responsible for command and control 

of deployed air forces in the AOR. The size of the CENTAF staff, and 

particularly the Logistics staff, would figure prominently in the establishment of CENTAF (REAR) in the CONUS. 

Exercises, Assessments, and War Games 

The results of exercises, simulations, readiness assessments, wargames, and feedback to the planning process, all provided important 

windows through which to view logistics readiness as it was perceived 

before Desert Shield. 

Exercises 

SAC attributed one exercise as being particularly beneficial in terms 

of logistics equipage and training. The 1988 Bull Rider held at ClintonSherman Am in Oklahoma led SAC to set up B-52 WRSKs configured for 

seven Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) aircraft packages rather than 

fourteen PAA packages. The smaller packages provided greater deployment flexibility. The Bull Rider exercises also provided an empirical 

basis for calculating wartime demand for shares. Further, Bull Rider 

taught SAC to develop a WRSK for consumables and to obtain spare parts 

for auxiliary ground equipment (AGE) and support equipment.'Os 

lo3Title V Report to Congress Chapter K. 

'%e staff was later increased to 314 positions in the MEFPAK portion of the WMP 

3 at the time of the conflict. The Headquarters UTC was 9AABAA (the CENTAF AFFOR) and 

other augmenting UTCs. 

'"(S/NF) Intvw, Dr. Theodore R. Jamison, with Maj Gen Charles J. Searock Jr, 

SAC'S Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. subj: "Operation Desert ShieWDesert Storm, 

Aug 1990 to Mar 1991." 4 Mar 1991, pp 11-12. 

65 
The TAC equivalent to Bull Rider was Coronet Warrior. Three Coronet Warrior exercises represented the end result of a ten-year TAC effort 

to examine its ability to support a war.’06 Complementing these efforts 

were two exercises called Leading Edge I and I1 in the 1983 timeframe, 

which had examined alternate methods for assembling munitions. The 

Coronet Warrior exercises were born out of a diversity of opinion on 

wartime spares requirements. Dyna-METRIC, an optimizing spares model 

developed by RAND, was perceived to hold promise for providing a more 

credible means of determining spares requirements. However, the model 

lacked a credible combat environment data base. The F-15 Coronet 

Warrior exercise in 1987 isolated an F-I 5 aviation package (i.e., aircraft, 

crews, maintenance, and other deploying resources) at homestation with 

a representative spares package and then tasked the unit at wartime sortie 

rates for thirty days. The F-16 exercise in 1988 and A-I0 exercise in 

1989 did likewise. The results were much better than expected as illustrated by Figure 8.’” primarily because the rate at which parts failed was 

much lower than expected and repair rates were higher than expected. In 

fact, demands for repairs were less than half of the expected number. 

Coronet Warriors I1 and 111 replicated these results, as summarized in 

Table 7, although the difference between prediction and actual fully-mission-capable rate was not the four-to-one ratio of Coronet Warrior I. The 

results foreshadowed those that would be achieved during the Gulf War. 

‘?he three exercises were 

Coronet Warrior 1 (F-1%). July-Aug 1987. 

Coronet Warrior I1 (F-16s). May-June 1988. 

Coronet Wamor 111 (A/OA- IOs), Apr-May 1989. 

This Coronet Warrior discussion is based on brfg, “Coronet Warrior: A WRSK Flyout,” 

Maj Cen Henry Viccellio, Jr., Hq TAULG, ca Sept 1987; Hq TAULG Brfng “Coronet 

Warrior 11: An F-16 WRSK Flyout,” ca Aug 1988; Hq TAULG Brfg, “Coronet Warrior 111: 

An A-IO/OA-IO WRSK Fly-Out,” 24 Jul 1989; telephone intvw, Mr. James A. Forbes with 

Mr. Ed Merry, Hq ACULGY, 6 Jan 1993. 

‘07Notation for the three lines is as follows: “DO-29 Demands” is the fully mission 

capable (FMC) rate as predicted by Dyna-METRIC based on demand data in the Air Force’s 

DO-29 supply system. The “CW demands” line is the model prediction based on the 

actual demand rates experienced during the exercise. “Actual” is the experienced FbfC 

rate. To oversimplify only slightly, the difference between the DO-29 and CW lines is 

demand rate effects; the difference between the CW and actual lines is repair rate effects. 

66 
Figure 8 

Coronet Warrior 

FULLY 

MISSION 

CAPABLE 

AIRCRAFT 

20 - 

15- 

10- 

5- 

17 

14 

4 

I I I I I I I 

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 

DAY 

Table 7 

Coronet Warrior Exercises 

Expected and Actual Number of 

Fully Mission-Capable (FMC) Aircraft 

Predicted FMC Coronet Actual FMC Aircraft at the Warrior Aircraft End of 30 days 

I (F-15, 1987) 

I1 (F-16, 1988) 

111 (A-10, 1989) 

4 

14 

18 

17 

21 

27 

67 
Within CENTCOM, Exercise Internal Look was a command post computer-based exercise held in early July 1990 at Eglin AFEI in Florida. 

Internal Look's scenario was an invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by 

an unnamed country from the north. Although military forces were not 

involved, the exercise provided "significant information on the flow, 

reception and beddown of U.S. air and ground forces in the AOR."'~ 

Internal Look was designed to test the operational concept of USCINCCENT 

1002-90 and the outcome was timely and beneficial by testing the feasibility of 1002-90. In fact, while the plan had not been officially validated by 

the JCS, it was so organized and so specific in the requirements that its 

implementation would be a relatively easy matter.'@ 

Assessments 

The unit readiness assessment reporting system was called SORTS-the 

Status of Resources and Training System. Active and ARC unit commanders were required to assess their unit capabilities based on wartime tasking. 

SORTS was a method by which higher headquarters and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff could determine which organizations were combat ready, were converting to another weapons system and therefore unavailable for tasking, 

and had readiness or training problems. SORTS required each unit commander to assess his readiness by comparing fully trained personnel, aircraft in commission, and personnel and equipment levels with certain 

standards. The standard for each unit was the most stringent designed 

operational capability DOC)."^ The commanders were required to assign 

C-ratings that reflected their best judgment of their capability to go to war. 

The commanders then sent the C-ratings, along with associated data to the 

JCS. Theoretically, SORTS would provide an accurate picture of the readiness of each unit."' The following tables show the resources available to 

CENTCOM in 1990 along with their readiness ratings. Table 8 summarizes 

SORTS readiness ratings of seventy flying organizations. 

'@James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf (Air Force Association: Arlington, VA), 1992. 

'@(S/NF) William T. Y'Blood, The Eagle Md the Scorpion, Center for Air Force 

"'or most stringent Unit ~ype code (UTC) requirement for a non-flying unit. 

"'After the conflict, the GAO criticized SORTS for not being redistic, real-time, 

flexible or practical in its report Operation Desert Storm: War Highlights need to Address 

Problems of Nondeployable Personnel, GAO Code 391 145. 

History, United States Air Force, Washington, DC. 1992, p 25. 

68 
Table 8 

WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990 

CENTCOM Region 

And C-Rating for July 1990 compared to total MDS Rating Having C-1 

MDS PAA UTC Unit Location C-RAT MDS 

[DELETED] 

69 
Table 8 (Continued) 

WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990 

CENTCOM Region 

And C-Rating for July 1990 compared to total MDS Rating Having C-1 

MDS PAA urc Unit Loention c-mr MDS 

[DELETED] 

70 
Table 8 (Continued) 

WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990 

CENTCOM Region 

And C-Rating for July 1990 compared to total MDS Rating Having C-l 

MDS PAA UTC Unit Loeation C-RAT MDS 

[DELETED] 

71 
Table 8 (Continued) 

WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990 

CENTCOM Region 

And C-Rating for Jury 1990 compared to total MDS Rating Having C-1 

MDS PAA UTC Unit Location 

[DELETED] 

Table 9 illustrates that in July 1990, the percent of flying units claiming 

C-1 status was sixty-nine percent. 

12 
Table 9 

Rated Air Force Units 

Rating c-1 c-2 c-3 c-4 

Number 5 82 159 97 5 

Percent 69 19 12 1 

The next table provides the July 1990 ratings for specific areas of personnel, supplies, equipment condition, and training. 

Table 10 

Measured Area Summaries 

Personnel Supplies Condition Training 

c-1 721 (86%) 524 (64%) 699 (84%) 702 (84%) 

c-2 104 (12%) 205 (25%) 123 (15%) 79 (9%) 

c-3 7 (1%) 79 (10%) 7 (1%) 53 (6%) 

c-4 0 (0%) 13 (2%) 0 (0%) 3 ( 0.3%) 

SORTS was an ongoing, quite detailed, and fairly mechanical assessment 

process. 

Command Assessments 

The CINCS, on a yearly basis, also assessed readiness. General Johnson, who was CINCMAC and CINCTRANS, provided a TRANSCOM Preparedness Assessment Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1989. This report 

was nearly identical to that of his predecessor in the preceding .year."* 

United States Transportation Command History, 1989, p 6. I12 

73 
General Johnson assessed TRANSCOM as “Only Marginally prepared” to 

perform its mission, because all ClNC operational plans were constrained 

by transportation. Some command plans were considered “grossly feasible” for transportation because planning estimates made adjustments for 

what was possible within lift and force constraints. Other plans were not 

adjusted and command assessments found “dramatic shortages in lift.”113 

In TRANSCOM, lift concerns were divided into two categories, air and 

sea. It was pointed out that sealift suffered from a lack of a national 

policy and strategy to provide a viable U.S. maritime ~apabi1ity.l’~ 

Support for this rationale was the large percentage of sealift to be obtained through the civilian National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the 

Ready Reserve Force (RRF). A comparable analogy would be to have 

most of the Military Airlift Command’s potential assets in the Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet. There were also concerns expressed about NDRF and 

RRF deterioration. 

For airlift, it was noted an overall improvement in ton-mile capability 

had been realized, but the Military Airlift Command had still been unable 

to meet strategic airlift objectives. The CINCTRANS advocated acquisition 

of the C-17 as a solution to airlift needs.”’ Another part of the 

TRANSCOM assessment noted the improvement of airlift command and 

control capability. To improve information support, however, funding 

was required for further Joint Operations Planning and Execution System 

updates.lI6 A major decline was noted in the number of trained pilots and 

merchant mariners. They lacked chemicalhiological defensive protection, 

which further limited their capability. Finally, assessments indicated that 

the amount of prepositioned fuel in the AOR for jet aircraft was insufficient and posed a serious deficiency in strategic airlift capability. 

CENTCOM assessments highlighted lift, sustainability, and communications issues as vital to successful defense of Southwest Asia. Examples were given by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USCINCCENT, when 

131bid. 

114General Johnson categorized ships, skilled mariners and shipyards as part of sealift 

as a capability. United States Transportation Command History, 1989, p 6. 

“sUnited States Transportation Command History, 1989, p 7. 

161bid. 

74 
he presented his assessment of CENTCOM capabilities to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee (SASC) on 20 April 1989. These statements served 

as background for his 1990 budget submissions. While Gen. 

Schwarzkopf did not identify unit readiness problems, the status of other 

significant factors were of serious c~ncern.''~ 

CENTCOM assessments projected a shortfall in sealift and airlift that 

complemented the concerns of TRANSCOM. (Figure 9 illustrates lift resources.)"' It was estimated that CENTCOM planned deployments would use fifty 

percent of the 66 million ton-miles per day goal, even though only seventeen percent of the national force would be deployed to SWA. The large lift 

demand was exacerbated by the great distances involved. The CENTCOM 

assessment of sealift showed that only eighty-nine percent of the sealift requirements were available to move a million short tons of equipment to 

Southwest Asia within ninety days. It was further noted that because of the 

weight and cube of units and supplies, ninety percent of CENTCOM'S requirements were expected to go by sealift. There were major concerns 

about the sealift shortfall as opposed to the airlift differences, since no projected long-term fix was available for sealift shortage^."^ 

Due ,to strong congressional support for military construction 

(MILCON), much progress had been made in alleviating facilities shortfalls. 

From a CENTCOM view, the FY 88 program largely completed requirements at Diego Garcia and allowed a steady improvement in the prepositioning posture of the Gulf region. The proposed 1990 MILCON program 

had six projects totalling $53 million, which were to allow airfield deficiencies to be corrected at two strategic locations, and additional warehouses to be built for Army and Air Force needs. Additional hydrant 

fueling upgrades at Lajes would improve a critical strategic airlift and 

deployment enroute support location. In general terms, Central Command 

' "Schwarzkopf, General Norman H., Witness Statement Before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, 20 Apr 1989. In Air War College Associate Materials, Volume 11, 

2nd ed, Lesson 32, pp 98-102. 

"*Schwarzkopf, pp 98-102. 

According to the Schwarzkopf statement, a deficit of ready reserve crews, decline 

of shipyard facilities and skilled workers, and the decline of the Merchant Marine will 

double to 22% by the year 2000. 

I I9 

75 
had reduced its facility deficit, which once stood at $1.4 billion to $200 

million by the end of 1990.120 

Figure 9 

Lift Capability 

Airlift Sealift 

KC- 1 0 RRF 

CRAF CMI Re~mive Air Fleet CSM ContalnerWpMad 

FSS FastSealiiShips 

MPS MatitimePrepoShip 

RRF Ready Reserve Force 

CINCCENT defined sustainability as staying power, once a military 

force is deployed. The CENTCOM assessment indicated that there were 

shortages of major end items, medical supplies, repair parts, bulk petroleum, preferred munitions, and air-to-air missiles (Figure lo). A major 

shortcoming was a projected seventy percent shortfall in adequate medical 

facilities and equipment.'" Another area of concern was logistics over 

the shore (LOTS) capability-the ability to load, offload, and transfer equipment and supplies from ship to shore. The indicated capability was 9,800 

short tons per day against the goal of 21,000 short tons per day. 

120Schwarzkopf. pp 98-102. 

" ' Ibid. 

76 
Figure 10 

Sustainability 

120 T 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 

Supplies/ LOE Munitions POL TO Munitions 

Equipment 

Afloat LOE Level of Effort 

Ashore POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants 

Deficit TO Threat Oriented 

On-going efforts were geared to improve CENTCOM’S prepositioning 

posture by adding approximately 1.2 million square feet of storage space, 

6,000 shon tons of munitions, and 5 million barrels of petroleum.”’22 

In addition, prepositioning was employed to provide robust, survivable, 

theaterwide communications capability for effective command and control 

of assigned forces. Up to that time, the Defense Communications System 

Western edge had stopped at Turkey and the Eastern edge at the Philippines. CEhTCOM, however, had successfully prepositioned equipment to 

support the Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME) and United States embassies, among other units, in the AOR. The CENTCOM assessment presumed 

an actual deployment would be gradual and that the prepositioned equipment was located near planned communications sites.’23 

77 
Figure 11 

Prepositioning 

SuppliedEquipment Munitions POL 

Afloat upending 

War Games 

In a prelude to the Gulf War, the Naval War College Center for 

Naval Warfare Studies developed a global war game scenario involving 

an invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in the year 1996. Saudi Arabia was threatened in this scenario, and the Saudis requested military assistance but did 

not offer access. Limited access was granted for tactical aircraft, the 

AWACS, tankers, and reconnaissance assets.'24 

The use of the time-versus-effectiveness quotient as a measure became a common thread in the exercise. Although economic measures 

were initiated early on in the crisis, the sanctions received only moderate 

support from the international community. Political considerations pro124(S) Global War Game (GwG -~990), Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare 

Studies, Section 111 Part 3. 

78 
moted domestic and international support for overall U.S. objectives. 

Efforts to secure world cooperation became more difficult as the energy 

crisis ~0ntinued.l~' 

A key issue was the declaration of the national emergency and an 

associated partial mobilization of the reserves. Due to an increasing 

amount of combat, combat support, and combat service support being 

placed in the reserves: 

The time-distance continuum was paramount to military options. 

Because the National Command Authority (NCA) did not decide to deploy 

military power immediately, Saudi oil production facilities could not be 

defended: this time-distance issue caused the CINC to reevaluate his 

course of action. [DELETED]'27 

Conclusions 

Although preparation and planning efforts had been directed towards 

a rapidly diminishing Soviet threat, a war in the Persian Gulf area was 

'''(9 Ibid. 

'26(S) Ibid.' 

"'(S) Ibid. 

79 
not unexpected. Due to political sensitivities, however, the United States 

was more constrained in this AOR than in most other theaters. Innovations and force multipliers were devised to offset this lack of presence. 

As an example, prepositioning of sustainment assets was designed to 

avoid approximately 10,OOO airlift sorties. 

CENTCOM and subordinate components were well aware of specific 

shortfalls in sustainment, lift, and impediments in force structure. Much 

of the logistics and lift support was available in the reserve components, 

and it was therefore imperative to mobilize those components early in the 

effort to allow CENTCOM plans to be viable. Although all similar conflict 

theaters rely on the military components to sustain operations, the Gulf 

theater required the entire force to “move in” before any operations could 

begin. The Army, in particular, would be hard pressed to provide theater 

support. Any war fought in CENTCOM’S AOR would be fought under lean, 

austere conditions, and with a long logistics pipeline. Having completed 

a major global war game and Exercise Internal Look, in July, just before 

the Gulf War, the defense community was in the position to know that 

a gulf war would be a marathon and not a sprint. The exercises and war 

games had primed thinking for the Gulf War and provided opportunities 

to examine the “fitness” of the force. On the eve of the Gulf War, the 

United States was logistically prepared, albeit faced with a major challenge to transport the forces and support the operational campaign. 

80 
3 

Deploying to the Theater 

On 5 August 1990, Generals Schwarzkopf and Homer flew to Saudi 

Arabia as part of a team led by Secretary Cheney. There the team briefed 

Saudi officials, discussed deployment of U.S. forces, and worked out an 

agreement for those deployments. On 6 August, King Fahd formally 

requested U.S. help. Most of the team then returned to Washington. 

General Schwarzkopf would lead deployment execution from the continental United States (COWS); General Homer, designated Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward Commander, remained behind to lead the 

effort in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).’ 

The deployment wasn’t a typical reinforcement of forward deployed 

forces; it was the movement of an entire fighting force-air, land, and 

sea-to an environment with many bare bases. The planning task was 

complicated by (at least) four additional significant factors. 

First, there were no preexisting agreements for basing rights on the 

Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations were 

somewhat reluctant initially, but they eventually approved basing of U.S. 

(and other allied) troops. Similarly, essential en route basing rights were 

not necessarily ensured. For example, before the invasion of Kuwait, 

Spain had authorized Strategic Air Command (SAC) basing for only five 

tankers (with five more allowed for short periods of training). On 8 

August, Spain authorized basing for an additional ten, but ten was not 

enough to support upcoming fighter deployments. SAC advocated raising 

the total to fifty. On 17 August, following discussions with Air Force 

and State Department officials, Spain agreed to a total of thirty. Negotiating for bases and other support continued throughout Desert Shield and 

was often conducted on a case-by-case basis? 

‘(S) William T. Y’Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, The USAF Md the Desert 

Shield First-Phase Deployment 7 Aug-8 Nov 1990, (Washington, Dc: United States Air 

Force, Center for Air Force History, 1992), pp 29-30. 

2(S) Y’Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 2, 57. Strategic Air Command, 

History of the strategic Air command 1 Jon - 31 Dec 1M (Offutt AFB, NE: HQ SAdHO, 

1991). p 339. 

81 
Second, the ‘Iime-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) file had 

not been developed for CENTCOM Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90.~ Detailed 

transportation planning is accomplished during deliberate planning, where 

staffs for the supported Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and the Service components develop a flow of resources into the theater. If computer simulations 

indicate that forces and essential support cannot be moved to meet the 

CINC’S timetable, planners revise forces, logistics, and transportation data 

until the TPFDD file supports a feasible and adequate OPLAN.4 TPFDD conferences for CENTCOM OPLAN 1002-90 were scheduled for November 1990 and 

February 1991, but they were, obviously. overtaken by events.’ 

Third, the Commander-in-Chief, Central Command’s (CINCCENT’S) 

preliminary force package overwhelmed MAC’S airlift capability. On 3 

August, General Schwarzkopf directed his staff to plan for an Army corps, 

a Marine Division, three carrier battle groups, the 1st Tactical Fighter 

Wing, and twelve follow-on fighter squadrons. The staff itself estimated 

that airlift requirements for the first few days exceeded MAC’S organic 

airlift capability by a factor of six to seven.6 

Finally, when faced with imminent combat, nobody wanted to “travel 

light.” Units rushed to enter deployment data into the Joint Operation 

Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database for Desert Shield. They 

started with what they already had, which in most cases was old information from old plans. As time passed, they tended to add to their deployment packages. Estimated airlift requirements for the first seven deploy3A TPFDD is the computer-supported database portion of an OPLAN and contains timephased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the 

OPLAN. Information includes in-place units, prioritized arrival of units deployed to 

support the OPUN, routing of forces to be deployed, movement data associated with 

deploying forces, estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be 

conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces, and estimates of transportation 

requirements. Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Oficer’s Guide 

1991 (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, 1991), 

pp 1-34, -35. 

AFSC Pub 1, pp 6-10, -60, -70. 4 

’Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Cuff War (Washington, DC: 

Department of Defense, Apr 1992). p 352. 

6Douglas Menarchik. Powerlifring-Getting to Desert Storm; Strategic Transportation 

and Strategy in the New World Order (unpublished draft manuscript, prepared while a 

fellow at the Center for International Relations, Harvard University, 1992). pp 82-83. 

82 
units increased by sixty percent between 11 and 13 August. MAC had to 

schedule more sorties than originally planned for these units and delay 

airlift for follow-on units.' 

The deployment couldn't wait for these factors to be resolved, so 

ClNCCENT presented Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) with a list of 

nine combat units to move. He wanted the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing and 

the 826 Airborne Division deployed first; the rest of the list was 

unprioritized. CENTCOM and its supporting commands set about the 

process of building a TPFDD file even as deployment was being executed. 

For the first week, the task was even more challenging. The initial 

deployment order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did not allocate lift, 

so CENTCOM could not apportion lift to its supporting commands. 

TRANSCOM gave CENTCOM daily lift availability estimates until JCS began 

allocating lift on 13 August! 

CENTCOM planning Cells started working on the TPFDD file in one-day 

and three-day increments. On 10 August, CENTCOM froze the TPFDD file 

for 12-17 August. For 18 August and beyond, CENTCOM froze the TPFDD 

files the preceding day. No changes greater than 2.5 tons or ten passengers were allowed without general officer approval. Even so, on 12 

August, changes were still so numerous and frequent that JOPES operators 

could not maintain a current database. Nevertheless, planners had to 

continue. On 14 August, CENTCOM published a TPFDD file in enough 

detail to give TRANSCOM and MAC their first look at the full scope of the 

operation. CENTCOM acknowledged that its airlift requirements for 

12-15 August exceeded MAC'S capability by 200-300 percent. In fact, 

CENTCOM airlift requirements continued to exceed MAC'S capability for 

the first forty days? 

'(S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 57-58. (U) Intvws and 

anecdotal evidence suggest that units of all Services deployed more equipment and supply 

items than would have been specified by a completed CENTCOM OPLAN 1002-90. GWAPS 

did not undertake a unit by unit comparison of airlift missions actually used for deployment with airlift missions that would have been required by a completed OPLAN. Using 

a sample of eight bases in the AOR. GWAm did find that USAF aircraft maintenance 

personnel actually deployed totalled only two-thirds the number that wwld have been 

specified in a completed OPLAN. (See Chapter 8.) 

'Powerlifing, p 85. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and f& Scorpion, pp 2.44. 

gPowerlifing pp 83. 91. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 72. 

83 
Problems keeping JOPS up to date can be attributed to several factors. The software was still under development, the system was not user 

friendly, and TPFDD preparation was a demanding process. Only a few 

operators were trained to use JOPES, and some became overwhelmed by 

the workload.'o And the workload was increased by the necessity to 

create new Unit Type Codes (UTCs) for the TPFDD file." Some units had 

to develop new UTCS because their deployments were not hased on an 

existing OPLAN and TPFDD. Other units had to develop new Vrcs because 

JOPES could not track partially deployed Unit Line Number (ULNS)-J~PES 

considered a ULN either awaiting transportation or closed.'2 As the deployment progressed. TRANSCOM directed MAC to give a unit only the 

airlift allocated by CENTCOM. Once the abcated airlift was used, a ULN 

was considered closed. Many units were not allocated enough airlift to 

move their complete deployment packages; they therefore created nonstandard UTCS to request airlift for the remaining passengers or cargo. 

Each nonstandard UTC had to be individually entered into the JOPES 

database, and detailed information was not available on the UTC'S contents. Automatically tracking what was really deployed and what was left 

behind became impo~sible.'~ 

Order came gradually. By 22 August, CENTCOM was able to validate 

requirements two to three days ahead. JOPES came back on line on 24 

August. Around 28 August, the TPFDD was stable enough to use as a 

basis for planning, and JOPES could start being used for some of its 

loJULLS NUMBER: 91055-65325 (00141). submitted by HQ MAC CAT Director. 

' '(S) History of the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional): Operations Deserr 

Shield and Desert Storm 2 August 1990 - 2 August 1991 (George AFB, CA: 35 FwMO, 14 

Apr 1992). pp 19-20. (U) A UTC is a code associated with each type of unit and allows 

the organization to be categorized into a kind or class having common distinguishing 

characteristics. A unit may have several urns to describe its capabilities. Many UTCS 

reflect a basic capability tailored for a particular task or environment. 

"A ULN is a code that uniquely identifies each force requirement in the TPFDD. 

13JULLS NUMBER: 91 154-5081 I (OOIW), submitted by USCENTAF Rearm. (s) RAND, 

Assessment of Desert Shield Deploymenr, pp 55-56, 110. [DELETED) 

84 
intended functions. On 10 September, airlift mission numbers could 

finally be matched against ULNs in the TPFDD.14 

Executing the TPFDD necessitated obtaining diplomatic clearances for 

aircraft overflight and landing rights. The sudden increase in requests 

nearly overwhelmed the units that had to prepare the requests and the 

embassy staffs that received them. The process was expedited by international support for U.S. and Coalition action. Several key nations 

(France, Italy, Greece, and Egypt) en route to the Arabian Peninsula and 

on the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 

Emirates, and Oman) either issued blanket clearances or streamlined their 

procedures for granting permission to fly through their airspace." Switzerland and Austria also granted more frequent overflights. Later in the 

operation, several East European countries granted overflight rights.16 

Thailand and India granted overflight rights for Desert Shield missions 

through the Pacific." 

Throughout the operation, Spain required individual clearance requests and standard lead times. For a time, France allowed into its 

airspace only two aircraft per hour departing from Rhein-Main. A "work 

action" in the Santa Maria Oceanic Control Zone (which included Lajes) 

slowed air traffic there. Italy required notice for any U.S. military flights 

through Sigonella." 

Germany restricted overtlight and landing of munitions cargos to one 

ton per commercial flight and three tons per military flight. The German 

Powerlifing. pp 83, 91. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle und the Scorpion, p 44. 14 

"JULLS NUMBER: 21758-46626 (OOOSS), submitted by 306 SW/CC. 

'6Powerlifring, p 113. 

"Lt Gen Vernon J. Kondra, Operation Desert Shield-Desert Storm: The Vernon J. 

Kondra Notes, 24August 1990-31 May 1991. transcribed by Clayton Snedecker. 21st Air 

Force Historian (McGuire AFB. NI: 21st Air Force, 1992). pp 16-17. Then-Maj Gen 

Kondra served initially as MAC DCs/Plans and then as MAC DCdOperations during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

'*(S) Y'Blood, The Eagle Md the Scorpion, p 43. Spain initially required a 48-hour 

lead time for each diplomatic clearance request. Eventually, the requirement was reduced 

to 24 hours. Telecon with Mr. Tom Wellmon, 9 Dec 1992. During Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm, Mr. Wellmon worked for the, 21st Air Force DCs/Operations and was the 

individual principally responsible for requesting diplomatic clearances for MAC missions. 

85 
Government waived its restrictions for the first week of the surge, but 

Spain had fewer restrictions overall; therefore, munitions were normally 

routed through Spain. Later in the operation, German authorities enforced 

noise abatement restrictions that limited twilight and night departures from 

several airfields. At civilian fields, departures to the AOR were limited 

because MAC had to share takeoff times with civil traff~c.'~ 

The Desert Shield deployment unfolded in two phases. Phase I lasted 

from 7 August until early November. It was designed to deploy enough 

forces to deter further Iraqi aggression, prepare for defensive operations, 

and conduct combined exercises and training with multinational forces. 

At the end of October, the President authorized building an offensive 

force capable of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait with minimal U.S. and 

Coalition casualties. Phase I1 began on 8 November with the President's 

announcement that the United States would increase its presence in the 

theater by approximately 200,000 personneL2' 

CINCCENT made a crucial decision early in Phase I. Because the 

Iraqis greatly outnumbered Coalition forces, he decided to accelerate deployment of antiarmor forces while delaying arrival of theater logistics 

forces and sustaining supplies. The decision placed arriving units in a 

somewhat precarious logistics position. Some ground combat units 

experienced supply shortages before the theater logistics structure matured 

in mid-November. Phase I1 deployments saw a greater balance between 

combat forces and logistics support?' 

The remainder of this chapter first describes MAC strategic airlift 

operations in support of deploying units from all U.S. military Services 

and then describes deployment of air power to the CENTCOM AOR. De- 

'9Powerlijing, p 113. John Lund and Ruth Berg, Strategic Airlij in Operation 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm: An Assessment of Operational Eficiency (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND WD5956-AF, 1992). p 34. ("he second source is a working draft. Wherever 

it is cited in this chapter, the material has been reviewed by the Air Mobility Command 

staff and no exceptions taken.) 

2oConduct of rhe Persian Gulf War. pp 381, 387. There is not universal agreement 

on the start date for PHASE 11. In (S) The Eagle and the Scorpion, Y'Blood identifies 9 

November as the last day of Phase 1. TRANSCOM and MAC have identified midnight, 10 

November 1990, as the end of Phase 1. This chapter uses 8 Nov, the date from Conduct 

of the Persian Gulf War. 

2'~onciuct ofthe Persian GUY war, pp 34-35. 

86 
ployment descriptions cover sea-based air power of the U.S. Navy and the 

land-based air power of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Marine Corps, and 

Coalition allies. 

Strategic Airlift 

Airlgt Planning 

The primary goal of strategic airlift planning was to satisfy 

CINCCENT’S requirements by employing airlift resources effectively. To 

meet the goal, planners had to consider the entire airlift system and its 

interrelated parts. Aircraft had to anive where they were needed when 

they were needed. Each stop along the way had to have adequate runways, taxiways, ramps, and support facilities. Nonproductive ground time 

had to be minimized. The necessary equipment and trained personnel had 

to be on hand to load and unload passengers and cargo. Likewise, the 

necessary supplies, equipment, and trained personnel had to be on hand 

to service and maintain the aircraft. Where crew changes were required, 

a sufficient number of qualified and properly rested aircrews had to be 

available. If a necessary en route stop was denied, missions had to be air 

refueled. Command and control needed to be capable of monitoring 

mission progress, adjusting for problems, and responding to crises. 

On 2 August, a Crisis Response Cell (CRC) assembled in the MAC 

Command Center at Scott AFB, Illinois, to prepare for possible deployment operations. On 3 August, the CRC developed several routing options 

to the Gulf using Tonejon Air Base in Spain and Rhein-Main and 

Ramstein air bases in Germany as the principal en route bases. To check 

the status of the airlift system, the Cell inventoried strategic airlift aircraft 

and aircrews assigned to the active duty force, the Air Force Reserve 

(AFRES), and the Air National Guard (ANG). The Cell also checked on 

resources belonging to commercial airlines participating in the Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)?’ 

MAC activated its full Crisis Action Team (CAT) on 5 August. The 

pace of activities picked up when the MAC liaison officer at Headquarters 

CENTCOM advised the CAT Director to anticipate deployment for “a very 

*’(S) Military Airlift Command, MAC History 1990. Chapter 3 (Scott AFB, IL: HQ 

MACIHO, 1991)~ pp 12-13, 
large air campaign.” CINCMAC reviewed and approved plans to flow the 

airlift through Torrejon, with missions operating as required through 

Rhein-Main and Ramstein plus Zaragoza Air Base in Spain. He also 

wanted the first airlift missions be air refueled en route and flown nonstop to the 

To begin a large deployment to the Arabian Peninsula, the airlift 

system needed additional support capability at several key locations. 

Airlift control elements (ALCEs) were tasked for Pope and Langley AFBs 

and for Dhahran and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. Manpower augmentation 

was tasked for Torrejon.” 

JCS advised the CAT to expect a deployment order at approximately 

24002 on 6 August. The CAT Director suggested that the numbered air 

forces put their aircrews on alert; 21st Air Force placed all its aircrews 

on BRAVO standby, and 22d Air Force placed fifteen C-141 crews and 

five C-5 crews on BRAVO standby. The order was dated 7 August at 

00502 and directed that the deployment begin on 7 August at 1700Z.25 

CENTCOM airlift movement priorities flowed to the CAT through 

TRANSCOM. The CAT then determined the number of military and commercial airlift missions required, including any advance missions necessary to position AWES and cargo handling equipment. After assessing the 

availability of military and commercial aircraft, the CAT developed a daily 

airlift mission schedule. 

“(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 13. 

”Dave Davis and Orson Gover, Operation Desert Shield Desert Storm MAC Logistics 

(2nd draft) (Scott AFB, 1L: Headquarters Military Airlift Command Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Logistics and Engineering, 15 Mar 1991). An ALCE provides en route support as well 

as command and control for airlift flows at stations not normally frequented by MAC. The 

manpower and equipment packages needed to support an off-line location are tailored to 

meet its specific requirements. An AXE cadre comes from an airlift wing’s Airlift 

Control Squadron. Its purpose is to supervise the deployed augmentees. The augmentees 

are detailed from among the various functions within an airlift wing as deemed necessary 

for a particular deployment. AWES typically range in size from 10 to 350 people with 

accompanying equipment. 

(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 14. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deploymenf, p 53. (U) crew members on BRAVO standby are given I2 hours of pre-standby crew 

rest and then can be alerted. A crew must be capable of launching within approximately 

three hours after alert. 

25 

88 
Assigning missions to commercial aircraft was handled at the MAC 

force CATS to obtain necessary diplomatic clearances, task wings for 

aircraft and crews, and ensure that extra crews were properly positioned 

to keep missions moving without intenuption. The 21st Air Force at 

McGuire AFB, New Jersey, executed the airlift with support from 226 Air 

Force at Travis AFB, California. Responsibility fell upon 21st Air Force 

to manage the flow through European stage bases. A subordinate unit of 

21st Air Force, the 3226 Airlift Division at Ramstein, acted as the “spigot,” attempting to limit the flow from Europe to levels that would not 

exceed the capacities of offload bases in the AOR. 

level. The schedule for military aircraft was relayed to the numbered air T 

The massive airlift effort also required organizations to coordinate 

movements in the AOR. The first Commander, Airlift Forces (COMALF), 

was Brigadier General Frederic N. Buckingham, the Vice Commander of 

21 st Air Force. The COMALF managed theater-assigned airlift forces for 

CENTAF through an airlift control center (ALCC). From the ALCC, he also 

monitored MAC strategic airlift flights transiting the AOR. Under the 

ALCC, he had a number of AWES from various airlift wingsF6 

Once the airlift began, execution planning problems fell into two 

major categories: requirements and priorities. 

Of the two, requirements problems were more pervasive, persistent, 

and harder to understand. Hundreds of Air Force, Army, Navy, and 

Marine units were submitting data or making entries that wound up in the 

TPFDD. Entries contained so many errors that they were unreliable as a 

basis for determining airlift requirements. Common errors were major 

differences between stated and actual tonnage and passengers to be 

moved, failures to properly identify oversize and outsize cargo, wrong 

onload locations, and wrong available-to-load dates?7 As a result, some 

2%n mid-October, Brig Gen Edwin E. Tenoso, Vice Commander of 22d Air Force, 

became the COMALF. General Buckingham returned to 21st Air Force to assist in the 

management of the airlift flow. htvw. HQ MAC and HQ TRANSCOM staff, Scott AFB, IL, 

Feb 1992. Chapter 4 will provide more details on the COMALF, ALCC, and intratheater 

airlift. 

”Oversize cargo is air cargo that exceeds the usable dimensions of a 463L pallet 

loaded to the design height of 96 inches, but it is air transportable on C-130. C-141, DC10, Boeing 747, C-5, or C-17 aircraft. Outsize cargo exceeds the dimensions of oversix 

and requires the use of a C-5 or C-17 aircraft. 

89 
missions were sent to locations having no cargo or passengers to transport, other missions were scheduled and then cancelled because there 

were no real requirements, and numerous missions had to be added to 

cover understated requirements?’ 

To improve the accuracy of requirements data, the CAT established a 

“requirements augmentees” cell which telephoned deploying units and 

attempted to verify their TPFDD requirements before MAC scheduled their 

airlift. Information obtained by telephone was more reliable than JOPS 

information, but several units still couldn’t project their airlift requirements 

accurately. Near the end of its deployment, one major unit cancelled over 

sixty missions-then shortly thereafter requested that some be reinstated.29 

While some inaccuracies in TPFDD airlift requirements can be attributed to JOPES, others can be attributed to the joint operation planning 

process itself. Because of the work involved, no more than the first thirty 

days of OPLAN air and sea movement requirements normally undergo the 

intensive management needed to ensure database accuracy.M Consequently, rapid response units (such as Air Force fighter squadrons, the 82d 

Airborne Division, and the 1st and 7th MEBS) were the only ones for 

which current transportation feasibility information was a~ailable.~‘ 

Priority problems also disrupted airlift execution planning. Understandably, CINCCENT’S movement priorities were established, reconsidered, and changed on the basis of the situation in the AOR. For example, 

between 13 and 16 August, the 82d Airborne Division’s priority dropped 

from first to thirteenth. Such rapidly changing priorities disrupted efficient use of airlift. At times, MAC was ordered to divert airborne missions to respond to new priorities. Under such conditions, MAC could not 

provide users adequate warning of arriving sorties, causing delays in 

marshalling loads. Previous planning efforts were sometimes negated and 

aircrews, aircraft, ALCEs, and material handling equipment ended up in 

**JULLS NUMBER: 91OSS-65325 (00141), submitted by HQ MAC CAT Director. 

%hid; Kondra Notes, p 2. 

M~~~~ Pub I, p 6-80. 

“Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p 375. 

90 
the wrong location. Some units received unexpected airlift support; the 

airlift support of others was preempted in rnid-depl~yment.~~ 

At first, MAC could project ahead only about twelve hours. There 

was not enough time to set up, load, and schedule missions using MAC’S 

FLOGEN model. FLOGEN, an airlift flow generator, is a computerized tool 

for preparing and deconflicting airlift mission schedules. Unable to use 

FLOGEN, MAC and its numbered air forces resorted to personal computer 

spreadsheets and pencils to produce airlift schedules. While the situation 

improved somewhat, MAC could never look ahead more than three to 

five days.33 

Additionally, MAC’S computer models could not provide reports to 

analyze the schedule and determine where the flow exceeded the throughput capacity of the base structure.u Consequently, too many aircraft were 

passing through some parts of the system at one time, and bases became 

backlogged. MAC had to halt the flow on several occasions.3S 

In one effort to reduce backlogs, MAC and 21st Air Force planners 

developed “slot times” for departures from Europe to the AOR. The 

number and frequency of slot times were based on the throughput capacity of individual offload locations. Planners then matched missions 

against slot times to establish flow cont1-01.~~ 

”(s) RAND, Assessment of Desert shield Deployment, pp 58-59. JULLS NUMBER 

3195944622 (00352) and JULLS NUMBER 31%2-13204 (00353). both submitted by HQ ATC/U;T, 

highlight problems associated with airlift aircraft arriving with little or no advance notice. 

”KJLLS NUMBER: 9105565325 (00141), submitted by HQ MAC CAT Director. Kondra 

Notes, p 2. powerlifring, p 86. FLOGEN is being replaced by ADANS (Airlift Deployment 

Analysis System). 

%mimum number of aircraft on the ground, or MOG, is a commonly referenced 

measure of throughput capacity. MACR 55-28 defined MOG as “the highest number of 

aircraft being used in an operation which will be allowed on the ground during a given 

span of time based on simultaneous support.” 

35Bruce Babb, “Desert Shield: Experiences on the MAC Crisis Action Team,’’ Airliji, 

Winter 1990-1991, reprinted in Air Mobility School Supplemental Reading Text. 21st 

edition (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility School, 1992). p 409-2. 

%‘Desert Shield: Experiences on the MAC Crisis Action Team,” p 409-2. 

91 
Airlifii Execution 

A typical mission departed a MAC home station (such as McGuire, 

Dover, Charleston, McChord, Travis, or Norton) and proceeded to its 

CONUS onload location. After onload, the aircraft continued to a base in 

Europe. If more fuel was necessary to reach Europe, the aircraft either 

air refueled or stopped en route. In Europe, the aircraft was serviced, 

repaired as necessary, and provided a different crew.37 The aircraft then 

flew to the AOR, offloaded, and returned to Europe. For the trip from 

Europe to the CONUS, the aircraft was again serviced, repaired as necessary. and provided a different crew. 

Figures 12, 13, and 14 characterize the MAC airlift effort in terms of 

missions flown, short tons delivered, and passengers delivered. The 

workhorses of the airlift were the C-141 in terms of missions flown, the 

C-5 in terms of tons delivered, and commercial air in terms of passengers 

delivered. All three figures reflect the initial surge to establish a defensive posture, a brief respite, and a larger surge to build an offensive 

capability and support combat operations. 

37This prepositioning of crews is called “staging.” Staging is essential to keep 

aircraft moving without interruption, and it requires several crews for each aircraft. 

Aircrew stages normally operate on a directional basis. With some exceptions, crews are 

alerted in sequence of arrival time, provided missions are available during the period 

when the crews can be alerted. The concepts of directional and nondirectional stages can 

be illustrated with an example based on Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

The stages in Europe were nondirectional. Crews were prioritized for alert and assigned to missions as they became available without regard for direction. Some crews 

arriving from the CONUS returned to the CONUS without shuttling to the AOR. Other crews 

made multiple shuttles to the AOR before returning to the CONUS. If the stages in Europe 

had been directional, crews arriving from the CONUS would have entered an eastbound 

stage and would have normally flown to the AOR next. Crews arriving from the AOR 

would have entered a westbound stage and would have normally flown to the CONUS next. 

A nondirectional stage provides greater flexibility in manning missions. A directional 

stage ensures a more uniform distribution of workload among crews and facilitates 

cumulative flying time management for the entire aircrew force. 

92 
Figure 12 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Missions 

7 August 1990 - 10 March 1991 

3500 

3000 

2500 

2000 

1500 

1000 

500 

0 

[D-Day 17 Jan I 

Source: GWAPS Statistical Comper um 

Phase II 

AUg-90 

31.y 

Sep-90 Oct-90 Nov-90 Dec-90 Jan-91 Feb-91 Mar-91 

I C-141 0 c-5 c-9 KC-10 Commercial 

Figure 13 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Cargo 

7 August 1990 - 10 March 1991 

120000 I PDay 17 Jan (2) J 

100000 

S 

h 

0 80000 

r 

60000 

T 

0 40000 

n 

S 

20000 

ISTRANSC, Mi0 I I 

0 rl 

AUg-90 Sep90 Oct-90 Nov-90 Dec-90 Jan-91 Feb-91 Mar-91 

I C-141 0 c-5 KC-10 w Commercial I 

93 
120000 

100000 

80000 

60000 

40000 

20000 

0 

Figure 14 

Desert ShieldIDesert Storm MAC Passengers 

7 August 1990 - 10 March 1991 

1_ 

Source: GWAPS Statistical Compendium - 

Aug-90 Sep-90 

hit Phase I1 

OCt-90 NOv-90 Dec-90 

1 C-141 c-5 

! Jan-91 

Feb-91 Mar-91 

KC-10 Commercial 1 

Desert Shield Phase I 

From mid-August to mid-September, MAC was challenged to deploy 

combat units as rapidly as possible. The pace slowed on 19 September, 

when deployments of the largest troop contingents were completed. By 

the end of September, the focus had shifted from deploying forces to 

sustaining the forces already deployed. During the reduced Desert Shield 

flying activity between 1 October and Thanksgiving, MAC caught up on 

94 
deferred maintenance. The Command also used a limited number of C-5s 

and C-141 s to fly missions to other areas of the world?’ 

Maximizing Availability 

To meet the extraordinary demands for airlift at the start of Desert 

Shield, MAC took a number of steps to maximize aircrew availability. 

Premission crew rest was cut from 24 to 12 hours; postmission crew rest 

was waived altogether; the maximum crew duty day for a basic aircrew 

was extended from 16 to 20 hoursf9 the crew qualification requirement for 

the extra pilot on an augmented crew was reduced from first pilot to copilot;@ the maximum flying for a consecutive thirty-day period was raised 

from 125 to 150 ho~rs;~’ and after completing 12 hours of premission 

crew rest, dl crews were placed on permanent BRAVO standby?’ 

All “aircrew training requirements, currency events, and flight evaluations” were also waived for the duration of Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm and for sixty days thereafter. The waivers applied to aircrew members current and qualified as of 1 August 1990. On a case-by-case basis, 

the MAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations could grant waivers for 

crew members not current and qualified on that date:3 

The backlogs that plagued the airlift system at the start of Desert 

Shield meant that crews were working long duty days. Most C-5 and 

C-141 missions from the CONUS to Europe lasted between sixteen and 

eighteen hours, but some missions were longer.# Discussing the missions 

”(s) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 22-23. 

3YNormal crew duty time limitations (unless otherwise specified in the governing 

OPORD/OPLAN) are 16 hours for a basic crew and 24 hours for an augmented crew. 

40An augmented crew normally requires an additional pilot who is at least first pilot 

qualified, an additional loadmaster, and a more highly qualified complement of flight 

engineers. 

“Normally. crew members are not scheduled to fly or perform crew duties when they 

will exceed flying time limitations of AFR 60-1 (125 hours per 30 consecutive days and 

330 hours per 90 consecutive days). 

‘’(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 23-25. The requirement to have all crews on 

BRAVO standby was later relaxed. 

“(S) Ibid. 

u(S) Ibid. 

95 
from Europe to the AOR and back, the MAC Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations said: 

. . . if everything went perfectly it was about a twenty-two hour crew 

duty day. Then you throw in a nine hour wait for fuel . . . you just 

went past the twenty-four hour crew duty day. We had people, in the 

initial stages, who went up to thirty-six hours.“ 

The length of the round trip from Europe to the AOR necessitated the 

use of augmented aircrews on every mission. Using augmented crews 

was a mixed blessing. It gave Headquarters MAC considerable scheduling 

flexibility because it enabled an aircraft to onload at virtually any CONUS 

location and fly to Europe without a crew change. It dso caused crew 

members to accrue flying time so rapidly that many were projected to 

exceed the ninetyday limit of 330 hours. (Some actually did and were 

temporarily grounded.)46 

A rear area recovery base in the Middle East region would have 

eliminated the need to use augmented crews between Europe and the 

AOR, thereby increasing the capability of the aircrew force. The MAC 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations worked with CEmOM for nearly 

a month attempting to arrange for a staging base in Saudi Arabia for crew 

changes and aircraft refueling. For various reasons, CENTCOM denied 

MAC’S request, so MAC continued to investigate other options for alleviating crew bum-out problems!’ 

MAC also took a number of maintenance management actions to 

maximize availability of its organic aircraft. (See Chapter 8.) 

Route Structure Saturation 

Onload Base Saturation 

Because airlift operations continue around the clock in peacetime, 

MAC can shift to its wartime operating tempo on short notice. In the 

early stages of most deployment operations, MAC can generate airlift 

4’Kondra Notes, p 3. 

&(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3. p 25. 

4’K0ndra Notes, pp 8, 34. 

96 
missions faster than deploying units can generate loads. Desert Shield 

produced two noteworthy examples of airlift missions arriving at locations faster than cargo loaders could handle, resulting in ramp saturation 

and extensive loading delays.48 

Loading problems developed at Lmgley AFB during deployment of 

the initial F-15 squadron from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing. MAC had 

scheduled aircraft arrivals every half hour. Nine C-141s and three C-5s 

arrived in the first six hours, and delays started with the first mission. By 

05002 on 8 August, ten aircraft (three C-5s and seven C-141s) sat waiting to be loaded, and it took between six and twelve hours to launch 

them. Over a day and a half, eighteen of twenty-two missions experienced delays attributed to the deploying ~nit.4~ 

Sustainment cargo stored on flightline at Dover AFB. 

48JULLS NUMBER 91055-85701 (oOo59). submitted by HQ MAC, CAT Director. 

49(S) HQ TACYDOXRB briefing, 12 Apr 1991. strategic Airlifi in Operation Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm, Figure 8, pp 31-32. 

97 

360-140 - 93 - 5 : QL 3 
To deploy the second F-15 squadron from Langley, MAC and the 

Tactical Air Command (TAC) reduced the arrival rate to approximately 

one airlift aircraft per hour; departure reliability improved signifi~antly.~ 

The 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (m) received enough airlift to deploy 

completely during the first few days of the operation. Aircraft were diverted from Pope AFB to hgley when Army units weren't ready to deploy. 

With extra airlift, the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing was able to move two C-5 

loads of munitions plus its identified deployment requirements?' 

MAC began deploying the 826 Airborne Division from Pope on 8 

August. The initial plan was to send one airlift aircraft an hour into 

Pope. Beginning at 1700 EDT on 10 August, MAC increased the flow to 

two an hour. Over the next few hours, the unit couldn't generate cargo 

fast enough to keep pace with the arriving aircraft.52 

By O600 EDT the next morning, sixteen strategic airlift aircraft were 

on the ramp. Most had already exceeded their scheduled ground times; 

all eventually missed their scheduled departure times. Fifteen of the 

sixteen delays were attributed primarily to the deploying unit. Adding to 

the confusion was the fact that a squadron of C-130s also deployed from 

Pope on 11 August. To reduce the congestion and confusion, MAC began 

diverting aircraft to other fields. After interrupting the flow for about 

twelve hours, MAC resumed flying one mission an hour into Pope. Delays became less frequent and less severe.53 

Experiences at Langley and Pope helped convince MAC that scheduling more than one aircraft an hour into an onload base was counterprod~ctive.5~ 

In some instances, MAC contributed to congestion problems at its own 

bases. The Command initially planned to route all resupply cargo 

through Dover AFB. In August, it also started routing mail through 

?3trategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p 32. 

51(S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 110-1 11. 

"(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 18. Strategic Airlifr in Operation Desert Shield and 

"Strategic Airlifr in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Figure 6, p 30. 

"Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p 32. 

Desert Storm, p 29. 

98 
Dover. However, Dover’s aerial port-by far MAC’S largest in terms of 

tonnage processed-was already saturated with other high priority cargo. 

The added tasks made the situation untenable. The photograph below 

shows cargo stored on the flightline at Dover AFB because no other 

acceptable place was available. To alleviate some of the congestion, MAC 

established additional resupply routes through Charleston, McGuire, and 

Tinker AFBs as well as Norfolk Naval Air Station. In October, MAC made 

McGuire the major east coast mail departure point.” 

MAC’S CONUS aerial ports were the onload bases for most sustainment 

cargo. Because of CINCCENT’S decision to deploy combat units ahead of 

logistics support and sustainment cargo, cENTCOM did not allocate airlift 

to channel operations until 24 August, when it allocated four C-141s per 

day.% Consequently, backlogs of sustainment cargo frequently built up at 

CONUS aerial ports. Compounding the problem was lack of in-transit 

visibility over cargo in the airlift system. Cargo in these sustainment 

backlogs was often assumed lost and subsequently reordered by users?’ 

MAC took periodic initiatives to keep sustainment cargo from backing 

up at CONUS aerial ports. The initiatives highlighted the fact that peacetime criteria used by airlift clearance authorities to enter cargo into the 

airlift system are not responsive to a combatant CINC’s tonnage allocations and sustainment priorities. One check in early September revealed 

that over half of all sustainment cargo awaiting air shipment was coded 

at the top priority level. Much of the cargo in the aerial ports really 

didn’t need to go by air. In December, CENTCOM established “SWAT 

teams” headed by 0-6s that went into aerial ports, identified cargo that 

didn’t need to go by air, and designated it for sea transp01-t.~~ 

”Intvw with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CTNCMAUCV. Arlington, 

56A channel mission provides common-user airlift service on a scheduled basis 

between two points. A requirements channel serves two points on a scheduled basis 

depending on the volume of traffic. A frequency channel is based on mission essentiality 

and moves on a scheduled basis regardless of traffic volume. 

”(s) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 68. JULLS NUMBER: 00344- 

63454 (oo091). submitted by AFL~ST~X. 

”JULLS NUMBER: 31952-58451 (00218), submitted by Jerry Riffe. (s) RAND, Assessment 

of Desert Shield Deployment, p 68. Kondra Notes, p 67. 

VA, 30 NOV 1992. (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 59-60. 

99 
En Route Base Saturah’on 

From August 1990 through January 1991, eighty-four percent of 

MAC’S C-5 and C-’141 missions from the CONUS to the AOR staged 

through just four European bases: Torrejon, Rhein-Main, Zaragoza, or 

Ramstein. The remaining missions either staged through other European 

bases or air refueled en route to the AOR. During the period, approximately 8,000 C-5 and C-141 missions transited the bases: forty-four 

percent through Torrejon, twenty-seven percent through Rhein-Main, 

twenty percent through Zaragoza, and nine percent through Ram~tein.’~ 

On 15 August, Rhein-Main supported 138 arrivals and departures. 

At one point, sixty-eight aircraft were on the ramp even though RheinMain had parking spaces for only fifty-six aircraft. The wing CAT responded by parking aircraft “everywhere they would fit safely.” Frequently, aircraft had to be towed into and out of parking spots.60 

Billeting and food service facilities at European stage locations were 

also quickly overwhelmed. Emphasizing that extraordinary measures 

were required, CINCMAC personally intervened at some locations to get 

better support for airlift aircrews. By mid-October, billeting and food 

service had improved considerably!’ 

Offroad Base Saturation 

While congestion was bad in the CONUS and at en route bases, it 

reached critical proportions on the Arabian Peninsula. From August to 

November 1990, eighty-two percent of all MAC missions offloaded at just 

four locations: sixty-one percent at Dhahran, eleven percent at Riyadh, 

seven percent at Jubail, and three percent at King Fahd (which did not 

open for MAC use until September). In those first four months, Dhahran 

handled slightly over thirty MAC aircraft a day. Ground forces preferred 

”(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3. pp 15-16. 

”(S) Ibid, Ch 3, p 20. 

6’(S) ]bid, Ch 3, p 26. 
to arrive at Dhahran because its location facilitated onward movement of 

troops and cargo into the theater?’ 

Airlift throughput capability at Dhahran was constrained by refueling 

problems. The main problem was getting fuel from storage to the aircraft. 

Not enough fuel pits, fuel trucks. or drivers were available. Once the 

problem was recognized, CENKOM sent a storage system and fuel trucks 

to Dhahran. After the U.S. trucks arrived, it was discovered that their 

couplings did not match Saudi couplings; however, the problem was soon 

0vercome.6~ On 21 August, refueling capacity was saturated; a backlog 

of twenty aircraft awaited fuel. Departure delays were as long as eight 

hours-even longer if crew rest was required. European departures were 

held to alleviate saturation.64 To reduce the strain on Dhahran’s refueling 

capacity, MAC scheduled some missions to offload at Dhahran, then depart 

for refueling at another base in the AOR.~~ To further reduce ground 

refueling delays, C-5s and C-141s were sometimes air refueled just before 

landing or shortly after takeoff. However, a relatively small number of 

strategic airlift missions were actually air refueled during the first two 

weeks because Strategic Air Command (SAC) tankers were heavily committed to refueling fighter aircraft deploying to the Gulf.66 

Dhahran was saturated with cargo as well as aircraft. Because locations and units involved were classified, a considerable amount of cargo 

shipped early in the operation was marked only “Desert Shield.” Most of 

this cargo ended up at Dhahran. Due to CENTCOM deployment priorities, 

62Source: Military Air Integrated Reported System (MAIRS) data. MAIM is a subsystem of the MAC Integrated Management System (MACIMS) and thus a part of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). MAlRS is used to fohw 

missions and aircraft, determine schedule deviations, and evaluate mission execution. 

Data recoded in Strategic Airlifr in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Table 6, 

p 36. 

L3Powerlifting, p 102. Also (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 17 and Kondra Notes, p 3. 

aDavis and Gover, MAC Logistics. Lt Gen Kondra malls that on one day, MAC had 

28 aircraft on the ground awaiting fuel. Kondra Notes, p 3. 

65(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3. p 17. 

“(S) MAC History 1990. Ch 3, p 16. (U) Air refueling was not an option for every 

mission. Due to budget constraints, not all strategic airlift aircrews were air refueling 

qualified. lntvw with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMACICV, Arlington, 

VA, 30 Nov 1992. 

101 
limited support forces were available to sort and distribute arriving carChapter 4 of this report addresses cargo distribution problems 

within the theater. 

Both aircraft and cargo congestion could have been relieved if arriving airlift missions had been granted access to a larger number of offload 

bases. MAC lobbied for more offload bases from September to November. CENTCOM and the host nations made some new offload bases available, most notably King Fahd in September, but deploying ground forces 

were reluctant to use them.68 

Figure 15 shows offload base distribution in the AOR from August 

1990 through February 1991. For this period, fifty percent of all strategic 

airlift missions offloaded at Dhahran.@ 

Capability Shortfalls 

Command and Control 

Command and control deficiencies contributed to route structure 

saturation. MAC did not have the capability to determine where aircraft 

were on a real-time basis. The Global Decision Support System (GDSS), 

a distributed networking system supporting MAC'S command and control 

structure, was supposed to provide such a capability. However, most 

units had no capability to enter information into the system. GDSS served 

as an after-the-fact source of data. Further, no single element of the MAC 

(s) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 69. Davis and Gover, MAC 

Lagistics, entry for 21 Aug 1990. 

6RBecause of its proximity to the seaport at Ad Ammam, Dhahran remained the 

Army's airport of choice for cargo and passengers. On 10 December, despite the fact that 

Dhahran was already operating at maximum capacity, the Army was still validating 75 

percent of all its cargo for that destination. It was difficult to convince the Army that 

closure would be expedited by sending some passengers and cargo to other destinations 

and then moving them over land to Dhahran. Kondra Notes, p 68. Similarly, it was 

difficult to convince the Army to use all available seats on every C-5 departing Europe 

during the heavy passenger airlift portion of Phase 11. Kondra Notes, p 79. 

67 

@(S) MAC History 1990. Ch 3, p 21. 

102 
command and control system had the communications necessary to control the airlift fleet." 

Figure 15 

MAC Strategic Airlift Missions by Destination in AOR 

August 1990 - February 19917' 

For commercial aircraft, the carrier's own operations center was 

responsible for monitoring mission progress and updating the MAC numbered Air Force. There were some problems with this arrangement. 

Commercial aircraft sometimes arrived unannounced or on very short 

notice, causing confusion and occasional congestion at locations throughout the airlift system. Disruption was especially significant at onload 

locations when aerial port personnel had to drop what they were doing to 

prepare loads for unexpected arrivals. Sometimes no parking spots were 

701ntvw with La Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMAUCV. Arlington, 

"MAIRS data recorded in Strategic Airlijl in Operation Desert Shield and Desert 

VA, 30 Nov 1992. 

Storm, p 36. 

103 
available for unexpected arrivals. 

frustrated the deploying units, the commercial carriers, and MAC.’* 

Such communication breakdowns 

Many commercial aircraft had difficulty communicating with their 

operations centers while between Europe and the AOR. Aircrews were 

particularly concerned that they would be unable to receive orders to 

divert in the event their destination airfield was under attack.’j 

Computers and communications weren’t the only problems. MAC 

command and control organizations needed extra people to perform 

several vital tasks. Examples include the requirements augmentees cell 

at the MAC CAT and the augmentees who helped process the massive 

number of diplomatic clearance requests at 21st Air For~e.7~ MAC also 

tasked its airlift wings to augment command and control functions at 

nearly all levels. Wing augmentees deployed with the ALCC to the AOR 

and with AWES to the CONUS, Europe, and the AOR. Wing augmentees 

also performed aircrew management and mission planning functions at 

numbered air force headquarters and en route staging bases. In addition, 

the increased workload at homestation was more than wings could accomplish with their assigned operations staff personnel. In many cases, 

aircrew members were a wing’s primary source of personnel for these 

additional ta~kings.7~ 

Aircrafr and People 

From the beginning, MAC had access to all of its military aircraft, 

including those belonging to unit-equipped Air Reserve component units. 

Figure 16 illustrates how heavily those aircraft were tasked. For the most 

part, if a C-5 or C-141 was mission capable, it flew. Not every aircraft 

was committed to Desert Shield and Desert StOrm-MAC flew a limited 

number of other high-priority missions during the same time period. When 

an aircraft was committed to a Desert Shield or Desert Storm mission, it 

”(S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 14, 81-82. 

73(S) Ibid, p 82. 

74(S) Ibid, pp 59-60. 

75Lt Col Bill Dudley, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Strategic Airlift,” briefing for 

Air war College Course 6328, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2 Apr 1992. 

104 
flew hard. C-5s flying on these missions averaged over nine daily flying 

hours, and C-141s averaged nearly eleven daily flying hours.76 

Figure 16 

Mission Capable (MC) Aircraft and Aircraft Flown 

(Daily Averages)77 

While MAC had access to all its ahwaft, it did not have access to all its 

people. For the C-5, the Air Reserve components possess approximately 

sixty petcent of the aircrews and fifty-five percent of the maintenance 

personnel. For the C-141, the Air Reserve components possess approximately fifty percent of the aircrews and forty percent of the maintenance 

personnel. When fully mobilized, the Air Reserve components provide 

nearly sixty percent of MAC’S wartime aerial port forces. MAC started the 

operation with only active duty personnel, reserve personnel performing 

required periodic active duty, and some reserve volunteers. Without additional people, MAC could not continue surge sortie rates for a sustained 

76Lt Col Bill Ewing and Lt John Walker, Eight Months of Desert ShieM/Storm 

77This chart does not mean that MAC sometimes flew more aircraft than were mission 

(Scott AFB, IL: HQ MAC Command Analysis Group, Jun 1w1), pp 10, 43-44. 

capable. Differences in accounting systems are responsible for this appearance. 

105 
period. In mid-August, the MAC Command Analysis Group calculated that 

unless additional crews were called up, the C-5 and C-141 crew forces 

would use up permitted flying hours before the end of August.” 

Material Handling Equipment (MHE) 

CENTAF took two weeks to release prepositioned MHE for MAC operations. According to CENTAF, one factor in the delay was that MAC 

couldn’t specify quantity and type needed by location. According to 

MAC, that was impossible because a war plan detailing the information 

had not been implemented. During the standoff, the Airlift Control 

Center experienced serious difficulty in meeting offload requirements and 

frequently had to move material-handling equipment (MHE) around within 

the AOR. No shoring was stored with the MHE prepositioned at Thumrait, 

Seeb, and Masirah, so shoring had to be obtained before MHE could be 

distributed by C-1 ~OS?~ 

Onload and offload operations were hampered by MHE shortages and 

breakdowns. For MAC organic aircraft, the biggest problem was the 25K 

loader. For KC-10s and commercial wide bodies, the biggest problem 

was the wide body loader?’ 

”Letter, 24 Jun 92, HQ AMUXPB to HQ AMUXPY. Subject: RAND Study, “Strategic 

Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm: An Assessment of Operational 

Efficiency” by John Lund and Ruth Berg. Powerlifring, pp 80.94. Kondra Nores, pp 6-8. 

Strategic Airlifr in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp 27-28. 

Achieving planned wartime airlift aircraft flying hours normally requires that all 

aircrews be available. For each active duty strategic airlift unit, there are slightly fewer 

than two line-assigned active duty basic crews for each primary authorized aircraft, and 

slightly fewer than two Associate Reserve basic crews. For each unit-equipped Air 

Reserve component strategic airlift unit, there are slightly fewer than two Air Reserve 

component basic crews for each primary authorized aircraft. Using all augmented crews 

instead of all basic crews reduces by approximately a third the total aircraft flying hours 

the crew force can provide. 

79JULW NUMBER: 91335-10118 (00216). submitted by HQ MAC, CAT Director. JULLS 

NUMBER: 31450-27300 (00088). submitted by HQ USAFiLGT. Shoring is material placed under 

cargo to prevent damage to the aircraft. A common example is plywood placed under 

small wheels so that item weight is distributed over a larger area rather than being 

concentrated at a few points on the floor. 

soJULLS NUMBER 92155-13673 (00023), submitted by USCENTAF ReadLC. Intvw, MAC 

logistics and operations staffs, Scott AFB, IL, 1 Oct 1991. 
On 10 September, the COMALF reported that the poor condition of 

MHE was limiting the throughput capacity of some key bases. When the 

MAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations visited Dhahran in late September, five of ten 25K loaders were broken. The MHE spare parts kits 

shipped from storage sites in the AOR and through normal CONUS channels were inadequate in number and contents. Although providing and 

supporting MHE was a theater responsibility, MAC prepared an MHE spare 

parts kit for Dhahran?' 

To preclude adverse mission impact, wide-body loaders and staircases 

required intensive management and movement between air terminals. At 

the start of Desert Shield. the equipment was scattered around the world 

to support both peacetime and contingency requirements. It was limited 

in supply and difficult to move. Availability of wide-body equipment 

limited the number of airfields that could be used for Civil Reserve Air 

Fleet (CRAF) and KC-10 

The availability of pallets and nets also came close to limiting airlift 

operations. At one point, only 35,000 pallets (out of 140,OOO known to 

be in use) could be accounted for. AFLC directed release of all war 

readiness stocks worldwide to MAC and initiated emergency buys. The 

problem was that deploying units kept pallets as they moved forward. 

The units then abandoned the pallets, used them for construction material 

or storage, or retained them for redeployment. Recovery efforts met with 

limited success.83 

Increasing Capability 

Activating CRAF and the Reserves 

Recognizing that airlift requirements were outstripping the combined 

capability of the MAC organic force and volunteered commercial aircraft, 

"(S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 51. Kondra Notes, p 46. 

'?Paper concerning aerial port limitations, Lt COI Emmet Lung, HQ MAUXORP, 

831bid. JULLS NUMBER: 0253&86362 (oo063). submitted by HQ MAC, CAT Director. 

JULLS NUMBER: 31540-01700 (00089). submitted by HQ USAFILGT. 

27 Sep 1991. 

107 
CINCMAC activated CRAF Stage I on 17 August. This marked the first 

time that any stage of CRAF had been activated. Aircraft activated included seventeen passenger and twenty-one cargo aircraft. Because commercial carriers were already volunteering most of these aircraft, only ten 

were actually added to the total available. More importantly, however, 

twelve of the thirty-eight aircraft were Boeing 747 wide bodies, and 

activating Stage I gave MAC unilateral authority to schedule the aircraft.84 

On 22 August, the President approved a limited callup of reserves. 

Between 25 August and 4 September, the Air Force activated all eight 

Air Reserve Component C-5 squadrons (one ANG unit equipped, two 

AFRES unit equipped, and five AFRES Associate). Between 25 August and 

10 September, the Air Force activated six Air Reserve Component C- 14 1 

squadrons (one ANG unit equipped, one AFRES unit equipped, and four 

AFRES Associate). This callup came just as some aircrew members were 

reaching their maximum flying time limits. On 21 September, a limited 

contingent of reserve strategic airlift maintenance personnel were activated to help support increased operations at their home stations. Only one 

aerial port squadron was activated during Phase I, and it was deployed to 

Dover AFB.85 

Reducing Use of Augmented Crews 

In early October, MAC instituted a procedure that eliminated the need 

to use augmented crews on CONUS onload missions. The key feature was 

having C-5s depart for Europe from Westover AFB and C-141s from 

McGuire AFB. From their CONUS onload locations, C-5s and C-141s 

proceeded to these bases for refueling and a crew change. On the westbound leg from Europe to the CONUS, C-5s returned to Dover AFB and 

C-141s normally returned to Charleston AFB.~~ 

The new pattern of eastbound staging complemented another aircrew 

management policy begun in early October. To slow the rate at which 

aircrews were accruing flying time, MAC created C-5 and C-141 pilot 

pools at Torrejon, Zaragoza, Ramstein, and Rhein-Main. C-5 and C-141 

84(S) MAC History 1990. Ch 3, p 65. 

85(S) Ibid, Ch 3, p 34 and Table 3-6. 

86(S) Ibid, Ch 3, pp 26-27. 

108 
pilots from throughout MAC went to European stage bases on three-week 

TDY assignments. From there, they augmented missions between European bases and the 

Eastbound staging from Westover and McGuire coupled with pilot 

pools eliminated routine use of augmented crews, except on mission legs 

between Europe and the AOR.~~ The cumulative impact of activating 

reserve crews and establishing pilot pools was that crew bum-out was no 

longer a significant issue after Se~tember.8~ 

Using Tankers as Airriftern 

SAC tankers played a vital role in cargo and passenger movement. 

KC-10s and KC-135s moved more than 4,800 tons of cargo and 14,200 

passengers in SAC self-support operations. KC-10s flying dual-role 

missions moved more than 1,600 tons of cargo and 2,500 passengers 

while providing air refueling support for deploying Air Force and Marine 

Corps fighter units. At times, up to twenty KC-10s were allocated to 

MAC for airlift missions, moving more than 3,800 tons of cargo and more 

than 4,900 passengers.g0 

Because of heavy air refueling requirements, the full twenty KC-10s 

were not made available to MAC until January. Even then, it took 

87(S) Ibid, Ch 3. p 27. 

88(S) Ibid, Ch 3, p 27. 

89During August 1990, average flying time was 94.7 hours for line-assigned active 

duty C-5 aircrew members and 50.9 hours for Associate Reserve C-5 aircrew members. 

During September 1990, average flying time was 67.5 hours for line-assigned active duty 

C-5 aircrew members and 93.6 hours for Associate Reserve C-5 aircrew members. After 

September, the highest monthly average for either category was 77.6 in January 1991 for 

active duty aircrew members. The highest monthly average for the entire period for 

line-assigned C-141 aircrew members was 78.1 in August 1990 for active duty aircrew 

members. Data were not available for unit equipped Air Reserve Component squadrons, 

but averages are estimated comparable to Associate Reserve squadrons. (These averages 

are not broken out by crew position and do not focus on the limiting crew positions for 

each type aircraft. They include crew members who were not flying because they were 

detailed to perfom nonflying duties. While these averages do not tell a complete story, 

they are useful as general trend indicators.) Eight Months of Desert ShieWDeserr Storm, 

Appendix E. 

wConduct of the Persian Gulf War, p 413. 

109 
CINCMAC’S personal intervention to get twenty KC-10s committed to MAC 

airlift. After the air war began in mid-January, MAC didn’t again get 

twenty KC-10s for airlift until late April 1991.9’ SAC was not manned to 

operate the KC-10 in a dedicated airlift role-it had not called up reserve 

crews and lacked experience in operating an aircrew stage.= 

Desert Express 

On 30 October 1990, MAC inaugurated a specid mission called 

Desert Express. A C-141 flew daily from Charleston to Torrejon to the 

AOR, providing overnight delivery of “show stopper” logistics parts. The 

Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines each had a quota of pallet positions 

for each day’s flight. Allocations were adjusted periodically as missions 

and force compositions in the AOR changed. Initially, Dhahran was the 

only offload point, but Riyadh was added after one week. Aniving parts 

were taken to their final destinations by surface transportation or theaterbased C- 1 ~OS.~~ 

From 19 January to 14 March 1991, Desert Express operated twice 

daily out of Charleston Am. On 15 April, the Desert Express operation 

moved to Dover AFB, where it continued until 19 May. Desert Express 

cut response time for high-priority shipments from as much as two weeks 

to as little as seventy-two There was a tradeoff cost, however, 

for providing this support that made up for the serious problems with 

priorities and asset intransit visibility. To assure Desert Express reliability, missions had priority to delay other flights, C-141s were placed on 

(s) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 79. 

92K0ndra Notes, p 29. These are primarily MAC’S observations. See Chapter 5 for 

SAC’S observations on using KC-10s as aklifters. Activation of Air Mobility Command 

should eventually lead to a single perspective on this issue. 

93(S) MAC History 1990. Ch 3, pp 53-56. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp 415- 

416. 

94 

91 

(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 56. Kondra Notes, p 96. Conducr of the Persian 

Gurf War, p 416. (U) Some transportation experts contend that the need for Desert 

Express type of missions could be obviated by a better system for assigning priorities to 

cargo coupled with better in-transit visibility over cargo once it enters the transportation 

system. lntvw with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMAWV, Arlington, 

VA, 30 Nov 1992. 

110 
alert to assure departure deadlines, and missions occasionally went with 

less than full loads. 

Desert Shield Phase I1 

MAC’S Phase I1 concept of operations incorporated many lessons from 

Phase I. Commercial air carriers remained the primary means for moving 

troops. Commercial cargo aircraft and KC-10s were used principally on 

channel cargo missions. Wide-body loaders needed to support these 

aircraft were most readily available at major aerial ports where the channel missions originated: Dover, Tinker, and Travis AFB and Naval Air 

Station at Norfolk, Virgi11ia.9~ 

The Phase I1 strategic airlift flow to the AOR was built around the 

following maximum daily missions per location: sixty to Dhahran, twenty 

to Jubail, sixty to King Fahd. and twenty to King Khalid Military City?6 

The daily average of airlift missions offloading in the AOR grew from 

88 in December to 106 in January and 109 in Febr~ary.9~ While some 

of these extra missions were routed to places like Bahrain and King 

Khalid Military City, eighty-two percent still offloaded at the same four 

bases: forty-two percent at Dhahran, twelve percent at Riyadh, fifteen 

percent at King Fahd, and thirteen percent at Jubail. Average arrivals at 

Dhahran were up to forty a day in December?* The increased throughput 

was primarily a result of a concerted effort to reduce ground times.w 

CENTCOM’S 15 January deadline for troop deployment made passenger 

movement MAC’S greatest challenge in Phase 11. During December and 

January, MAC carried over 237,000 passengers. Most traveled on commercial aircraft, but CRAF Stage I and contracted aircraft couldn’t meet 

the total requirement. In late December and January, MAC converted 

some C-141s to passenger configuration. The numbers of passengers 

(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 51. 95 

“(S) Ibid, Ch 3, pp 51-52. 

97GWApS, Statistics of the Gurf War, Chapter 3. 

98S0urce: Military Air Integrated Reported System (MAIRS) data recorded in Strategic 

Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Table 6, p 36. 

w~~~r~ Nores, pp 101-102. 

111 
carried on C-5s, C-l41s, and commercial aircraft all increased in December and January.loo 

As Desert Shield and Desert Storm progressed, sustaining forces 

became increasingly important. Between 7 August 1990 and I0 March 

1991, airlift delivered approximately twenty-three percent of all sustainment cargo moved by TRANSCOM-slightly over twice the amount anticipated before the crisis.’o’ Figure 17 illustrates the breakout of unit and 

sustainment cargo during the deployment. 

Figure 17 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Cargo: Unit and Sustainment 

120000 

1OOOOO 

S 

8oooo 0 

r ‘ 6oooO 

T 

O40000 

8 

2oooo 

0 

Aug-90 SepW Oct-90 Nov-90 Dee90 Jaw91 -1 

H Unit Cargo 0 Sustainment 

Ei 

hlar-91 

Discussions about a stage base in the AOR began again at the beginning of the Phase 11 deployment. CENTCOM proposed Cairo West but 

stipulated that if war broke out, MAC would have to leave within twentyGWAPS, Slatisticaf compendium, Chapter 3. 100 

10IUS~~~~~~~~ briefing chart, “Desert ShieldDesert Storm Strategic Lift 

Summary Passengers and Cargo (As of 10 Mar 1991),” updated 21 Apr 1992. 

112 
four hours so that higher priority weapons could base there. MAC didn't 

consider it prudent to adopt a concept of operations that would have to 

be abandoned at such a critical time. The pilot pools were already operational and working well, so MAC declined CENTCOM'S offer.'OZ 

During Phase 11, additional reserve activations included six aerial port 

squadrons, three mobile aerial port squadrons, and one mobile aerial port 

flight. Also activated were over 600 personnel from the 439th Military 

Airlift Wing (AFRES) at Westover AFB.Io3 Extensive staging of eastbound 

C-5s through Westover would not have been possible without activation 

of those maintenance personnel.104 

The Phase I1 buildup drew a large number of American forces from 

Germany, creating a need for overnight delivery of high-priority spare 

parts from Europe to the AOR. MAC responded by initiating the European 

Desert Express on 8 December 1990. This daily C-141 mission onloaded 

cargo at Rhein-Main and offloaded at Dhahran. The European Desert 

Express was discontinued on 9 March 1991.'05 

Desert Storm 

The start of the war certainly didn't diminish the requirements for 

airlift. January was MAC'S busiest month for both cargo and passengers. 

February was MAC'S second busiest month for cargo.'06 

Because of additional cargo requirements, the Secretary of Defense 

activated CRAF Stage I1 on 17 January, providing access to another fifty-nine 

passenger aircraft and seventeen more cargo aircraft. Because commercial 

air carriers were volunteering more aircraft than required by Stage I, activating Stage I1 actually made only nine more cargo aircraft available.107 

IMKondra Notes, pp 33-34. (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 28. 

'03(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, Table 3-6. 

IDllntvw with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMACICV, Arlington, 

105C0nduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp 416-417. 

'%WAPS, Statistical Compendium. Chapter 3. 

'"Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. p 420. 

VA, 30 Nov 1992. 

113 
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, DOD also received 

donated commercial airlift support from South Ko~ea, Kuwait, and Italy. 

Japan provided funding to lease commercial airlift from US. carriers.'0s 

The possibility of chemical attacks on airfields in the AOR concerned 

both MAC and commercial carriers. At first, civilian crews didn't have 

chemical warfare defense ensembles, and MAC didn't issue them any. 

MAC'S plan was to give chemical gear to civilian crews when they landed 

in the AOR. After the outbreak of hostilities, MAC began issuing chemical 

gear to civilian crews before they left Europe.'Og 

Once Scud attacks started, several commercial carriers refused to fly 

to Dhahran, and several major carriers refused to fly to the AOR at night. 

No commercial aircraft were flying to King Khalid Military City because 

it was too far north. MAC scheduled all commercial flights to avoid the 

"Scud window" of 1600Z-2100Z. (Organic aircraft were scheduled 

during those times.) Because of restrictions at German civil airfields, 

MAC had difficulty in matching acceptable commercial aircraft departure 

times from Europe with acceptable arrival times in the AOR."~ 

Early in the war, Iraq launched Scuds against Israel. President Bush 

responded by ordering deployment of Patriot missile batteries. MAC and 

the Army had the first fire units deployed and ready for operation within 

twenty-nine hours of verbal notification. MAC used thirty-seven (2-5s (for 

the outsize equipment) and eight C-141s (for missiles and other equipment) to support the move."' 

Other vital cargo airlifted during January included heavy mobility 

equipment transports (HMETS) and heavy equipment transports (HETS) 

needed by armored units to prepare for the ground war. (2-5s onloaded 

these outsize items in Peoria, Illinois, and moved them quickly to the 

'OS(S) MAC History 1990. Ch 3, pp 69-74. 

'OgKondra Notes, pp 10,SS. 90. Interview with U Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, 

former CINCMAUCV, Arlington, VA, 30 Nov 1992. 

I "Kondra Notes, pp 84, 1 11, 1 14. Strategic Air18 in Operation Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm, pp 22-23. 

'"Kondra Notes, pp 99-100. Strategic Airlift in Operarim Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, pp 13-14. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p 389. 

114 
desert. In February, MAC organic airlift moved the newly developed 

GBU-28 guided bomb to the Gulf. Throughout the war, strategic airlift 

regularly demonstrated its flexibility and responsiveness by moving high 

priority items on short notice.”* 

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, MAC accounted for over 

ninety-nine percent of all passengers and nearly fifteen percent of all dry 

cargo delivered by TRANSCOM.113 MAC strategic airlift was clearly the 

predominant source of air transportation for deploying units, but it wasn’t 

the only source. MAC C- 130s provided most of the airlift for their own 

deployments. For some fighter deployments, SAC KC-10s provided both 

airlift and air refueling support. SAC tankers sometimes carried cargo and 

passengers to support tanker and bomber deployments. SAC’S RC-135s 

carried passengers to support their own deployments. With the exception 

of carrier-based air power, airlift-whatever the source-was a common 

thread running through all the deployments described below. 

Navy Component, Central Command 

(NAVCENT) Deployments 

On 2 August 1990, the Eisenhower carrier battle group was in the 

Mediterranean, nearing the end of a scheduled six-month deployment. 

The Independence carrier battle group was near Diego Garcia, just starting a scheduled Indian Ocean deployment. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, 

both battle groups were ordered to the crisis area. As early as 5 August, 

the Independence could have launched long-range air strikes. By 8 

August, both battle groups were on station, under CENTOM control, and 

ready to conduct air strikes-Eisenhower from the Red Sea and Independence from the Gulf of Oman.114 

112Kondra Notes, pp 97, 123. Strategic Airlifr in Operation Desert Shield and Desert 

*l3GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Table 20, ”Gulf War Strategic Lift Summary by 

Transportation Mode Plus Cargo Type.” Chapter 3. 

114Department of the Navy, The United States Navy in “Desert Shield” “Desert 

Storm” (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15 May 1991). pp 7. 11. 

Stom. pp 13-14. 

115 
The independence and Eisenhower delivered the first U.S. combat 

aircraft to the AOR, ready for sustained operations upon arrival. Each 

battle group carried fuel and ordnance for its aircraft plus a complete 

intermediate maintenance facility with spare parts, test equipment, and 

maintenance personnel. These carriers provided more than one hundred 

fighter and attack aircraft plus early warning, electronic warfare, and 

surveillance aircraft.' '' 

While Air Force combat aircraft began arriving in the AOR on 

8 August, and the Air Force ultimately provided the majority of fixed-wing 

aircraft, the Navy remained a key element of U.S. air power."6 On D-Day, 

six battle groups were on station. Figure 18 depicts the NAVCENT buildup 

of fixed-wing aircraft over the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

(Totals do not include Marine aircraft, which will be addressed later.) 

Figure 18 

NAVCENT Buildup: Fixed Wing Aircraft 

"'lbid, p 12. 

Il'lbid, p 13. 

116 
Air Force Component, Central Command 

(CENTAF) Deployments 

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, U.S. Air Force presence in the AOR consisted of a small MAC support detachment in Dhahran plus pilots and 

support personnel assigned to U.S. Military Training Mission-Saudi Arabia. 

As part of exercise Ivory Justice, two KC-135 tankers were operating in the 

United Arab emirate^."^ 

An advance echelon (ADVON) group led by Major General Thomas 

R. Olsen, CENTAF deputy commander, left Shaw AFB on 7 August and 

arrived in Riyadh on 8 August. On 9 August, General Olsen officially 

established CENTAF Forward headquarters in the Royal Saudi Air Force 

headquarters building."' 

On 8 August, airlifters and deploying US. Air Force aircraft began 

arriving in the AOR. The rapid buildup of combat and combat support 

aircraft continued throughout August and early September. Phase I deployments were essentially complete in midSeptember. Essential to the success of the deployment was $1 billion worth of fuel, ammunition, and 

equipment that the Air Force had prepositioned in Oman, Bahrain, and 

aboard three ships."' Figure 19 shows the beddown of CENTAF aircraft at 

the end of Desert Shield Phase I. 

Phase I1 deployments started in earnest at the end of November. In 

early December, the Iraqis began test-firing their Scud missiles and 

intelligence sources reported increased Iraqi forces in Kuwait. CENTCOM 

and CENTAF developed a stronger sense of urgency concerning deployment of Phase I1 units. Arrival dates were moved up. On 14 December, 

CENTAF requested all additional units be in place by 12 January. On 15 

December, General Schwarzkopf authorized General Homer to deploy air 

117Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp E-21,22. 

(S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 40-41. 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp E-14,15. (S) Y'Blood. The Eagle and the 

Scorpion, p 24. See Chapter 2 of this volume for a discussion of the Air Force prepositioning program and Chapter 4 of this volume for a discussion of distributing prepositioned materiel within the AOR. 

1 18 

119 

117 
Figure 19 

CENTAF Aired Beddown at End of Phase I 

Source: (S) Steven B. Michael, The Persian Gulf War: An Air Stuff 

Chronology of Desert Shield - Desert Storm, Washington, DC: United 

States Air Force, Center for Air Force History, 1991. 

assets as fast as airlift could support the moves.’” Figure 20 shows the 

beddown of CENTAF aircraft at the end of Desert Shield Phase 11. 

I2O(S) William T. Y’Blood, Sharpening the Eagle’s Talons, The UsAFand the Desen 

Shield Second-Phase Deployment Nov 9, 1990-Jan 17, 1991 (Draft) (Washington, DC: 

United States Air Force, Center for Air Force History, 1992), p 18. 

118 
Figure 20 

CENTAF Aircraft Beddown at End of Phase I1 

Source: (S) Steven B. Michael, The Persian Gulf War: An Air Staff 

Chronology of Desert Shield - Desert Storm, Washington, DC: United 

States Air Force, Center for Air Force History, 1991. 

Tactical Air Force Unit Deployments 

Tactical air force (TAF) units provided the majority of CENTAF combat 

aircraft. Figure 21 depicts the rapid CENTAF buildup of TAF combat aircraft 

over the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Phase I aircraft deployments, including sixteen tactical fighter squadrons from the CONUS and four 

from Europe, were essentially complete within four weeks. Phase I1 aircraft deployments, including six tactical fighter squadrons from the CONUS 

and six from Europe, began slowly in late November and then picked up 

sharply toward the end of December. 

119 
Figure 21 

CENTAF Buildup: TAF Combat Aircraft 

Tactical air force units contributed a much smaller percentage of 

CENTAF combat support aircraft. Figure 22 depicts the lower numbers and 

the slightly slower CENTAF buildup of TAF combat support aircraft over the 

course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Principally as the result of RF4C arrivals, the number of TAF combat support aircraft in the AOR doubled 

in the first two weeks of Jan~ary.'~' 

Tactical Air Force Deployment Pianning 

Tactical Air Command/xPx had peacetime responsibility to develop 

TP~DS for U.S. tactical air force deployments. Because of the close-hold 

nature of Desert Shield initial planning, XPX had negligible involvement 

before C-Day. After C-Day, Generals Homer and Olsen were both in the 

AOR, and no general officers were at CENTAF Rear. Plans anticipated that 

12'~~~~, Statistical Compendium, Table 6. 

1 20 
as the CENTAF staff deployed, reserve personnel from loth Air Force would 

be activated to backfill CENTAF Rear positions. The expected reserves were 

not activated. TAC and CENTCOM agreed to move CENTAF Rear to Langley 

AFB, where TAC/XPX assumed the unfamiliar responsibility for both building 

and executing a PFDD for a contingency in progress.122 

Figure 22 

CENTAF Buildup: TAF Combat support Aircraft 

During the early stages of the deployment, lack of usable information 

from JOPES precluded use of automatic data processing systems for planning.123 Communication by secure telephone, facsimile, and electronic mail 

was essential for planning unit moves. 

lZ(S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 105-107. lntvw with HQ 

TAC staff, Langiey AFB, VA, May 1992. (s) JULLS NUMBER: 41028-63422 (00380). submitted 

by RAND PAF. 

lUDocumented in detail by MAC in JL'LLS NUMBER: 91055-83676 (00129). submitted by 

HQ MAC, CAT Director. 
TAC subordinate units had access to JOPES terminals. These units could 

make authorized changes to their databases; they could also make inadvertent or unauthorized changes to the WFDD.’” Consequently, XPX maintained one JOPES database that subordinate units could access and another 

that was frozen daily for XPX planning. Each day, XPX would use the 

frozen data to develop a deployment plan for the next sevenday window. 

When units added to their deployment packages without realizing that XPX 

no longer updated their JOPD database, they sometimes ended with less 

airlift than they needed. This led to partially deployed ULNS, which JOPES 

could not track. TAC estimated that over half of its WFDD consisted of 

nonstandard UTCS reflecting cargo lefi behind by units which were otherwise considered 

XPX tried to plan deployments seven days in advance so it could coordinate airlift, tanker support, and diplomatic clearances. At the start of the 

deployment, XPX’S efforts were thwarted by inability to obtain clear planning factors concerning daily apportionment of airlift and by CENTCOM’S 

continually changing priorities. Changing priorities also meant that not all 

deploying units received the type of airlift aircraft for which they had 

planned their loads. Many deploying units had difficulty finding out types 

of aircraft and arrival times for their airlift support.126 

TAUDOXD was responsible for all TAC peacetime deployment exercises. 

During this deployment, DOXD prepared flight plans, arranged tanker support, and obtained diplomatic clearances for all TAC fighter aircraft as well 

as for U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) and Marine aircraft. DOXD began 

drawing up tentative routes on 5 August, and TAC settled on a single route 

for the majority of Phase I deployments. The single route simplified air 

refueling planning by allowing SAC tanker task forces to operate from the 

same locations. The nonstop route from CONUS to the AOR minimized 

requirements for diplomatic clearances and overflight rights. Most deploylntvw with HQ MAC and HQ TRANSCOM staff, Scott AFB, IL, Feb 1992. JULLS 

12Sht~W with HQ TAC Staff, LaIIgley AFB, VA, May 1992. (s) RAND, Assessment of 

Desert Shield Deployment, pp 55, 1 10. 

’26(s) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 110. (U) lntvw with HQ 

MAC and HQTRANSCOM staff, Scott AFB, IL. Feb 1992, substantiated that this problem was 

widespread. Essentidly the same problem is pointed out in JULLS NUMBER: 90737-22888 

(00123), submitted by OC-ALUIG. 

124 

NUMBER: 32865-88550 (OO~), submitted by PACOPSIDOU. 

122 
ing fighters overflew Egypt only, but A-10s and Marine fighters made an 

en route stop in Spain. Nonstop flight times from the CONUS were fifteen 

to sixteen 

Fighters normally deployed with a load of armament; the extra weight 

and drag necessitated refueling more frequently than normal. F4Gs were 

the most difficult deployment to plan, with each aircraft requiring fifteen 

air refuelings between the East Coast and the AOR. Fifteen was the maximum number the TAC air refueling flight planning system could handle. 

Fortunately, it was also the maximum number used by any squadron on a 

single day. The TAC flight planning system did not interface with air 

refueling planners at either at Headquarters SAC or SAC numbered air 

forces. Even so, TAC and SAC planners usually required no longer than 

twelve to fourteen hours to agree on air refueling plan^.'^ 

To illustrate the principal fighter deployment route from CONUS to the 

AOR, Figure 23 shows the F-4G refueling plan, with four refuelings between George AFB and Seymour Johnson AFB, then fifteen more on the 

nonstop leg to the AOR. 

A goal of Phase II deployment planning was to place less demand on 

the tanker force. No CONUS-based aircraft were initially scheduled to 

deploy nonstop to the AOR. A-10s were to stop for a day at both Lajes and 

Sigonella Other fighters were to stop for a day at Moron. USAFE-based 

A-10s deploying to the AOR were to stop for a day at Sigonella, but other 

USAFE-W fighters were to deploy nonstop to the AOR. Not all fighter 

deployments went as initially planned. In early December, an F-117 squadron deployed nonstop from Langley to Saudi Arabia, requiring ten additional 

KC-10s on the Atlantic Bridge and ten more KC-135Rs in the AOR.’*~ 

1z71ntvw with HQ TAC Staff, Langley AFB, VA, May 1992. (s) RAND, Assessment of 

Desert ShieM Deployment, pp 104-105, 108-109. See this Chapter 5 of this volume for 

a more extensive discussion of the “Atlantic Bridge.” 

12*(S) RAND. Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 109. 

129(S) History of the Strategic Air CommMd 1990, pp 355-356. See Chapter 5 for 

further discussion of air refueling operations. 

123 
Figure 23 

F-4G Air Refueling ”kack 

Tactical Air Force Deployment Execution 

Unlike the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), most fighter units did not 

get all the airlift they requested. The experience of the 23d TFW from England Am, which deployed closer to the end of the Phase I fighter surge, 

was more typical. The first squadron of A-10s departed on 27 August and 

arrived at King Fahd on 31 August. The second squadron departed on 29 

August and arrived on 2 September. Airlift support for the first squadron 

was fairly timely; the second squadron waited seven to ten days for its 

airlift to close.’” 

The 35th TFW from George AFB experienced changes in its departure 

date, airlift availability, and beddown location. In addition, the wing did 

not know until the last moment whether it would be the host unit or a 

tenant at its beddown location-and whether the beddown location would 

be a bare base. Airlift for the wing was spread out between 16 August and 

16 November. During the period, George AFB personnel loaded fourteen 

C-l41s, seven C-5s. one DC-10, and one L-1011. Both commercial passenger aircraft arrived on 20 August with almost no prior notification. To 

(s) RAND, Assessmenr of Deserr Shield Deployment, p 1 1 1. 1” 

1 24 
deal with the unpredictable airlift schedule, base personnel set up a cargo 

loading plan with C-141 and C-5 silhouettes on the ramp. When aircraft 

dropped in unannounced, base personnel simply filled the corresponding 

silhouette with the appropriate pallets from the “shopping row” cargo 

marshalling area.’” 

Tactical Air Force Basing Decision Impacts 

Some units were informed of their beddown bases just before departing 

for the AOR; beddown locations for others had changed while the units 

were en route. Changes to beddown bases complicated unit deployment 

preparations and airlift prioritization. Beddown changes resulted from hostnation sensitivities, ramp congestion, and mismatches between aircraft, 

munitions, and support eq~ipment.’~~ 

On 9 August, a squadron of F-15Es from the 4th ”FW left Seymour 

Johnson AFB for Seeb, Oman. While over the Mediterranean, the squadron 

was told to divert to Dhahran. The fighters and three of the C-141s carrying squadron equipment landed at Dhahran. After two hours, they were on 

the move to Thumrait, Oman. The airlifters carrying the remainder of the 

squadron’s personnel and support equipment received more timely notification and went to Thumrait. Additional logistics efforts were required when 

base support equipment at Thumrait did not match what had been expected 

at Seeb.’33 

Similarly, a squadron of F-16CYDs from the 363d TFw at Shaw AFB 

had its destination changed in midflight from Sharjah to A1 Dhafra in the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE). The squadron arrived on 10 August; another 

followed on 11 August. While the two squadrons were soon declared 

combat-ready, they were short on air-to-ground munitions, corrosion prevention fuel additives, materials to build living quarters and squadron 

facilities, and drinking water.’” 

(S) History of the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional). pp 9, 12-13, 19. 131 

I3*(S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 1 12. 

(S) 4th Tactical Fighter Wing in Southwest Asia, p 18. (S) RAND, Assessment of 

(S) Y’Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 51-52. 

I33 

Desert ShieM Deployment, pp 16-18, 11 1-1 12. 

134 

125 
Concerned over the conditions at A1 Dhafra, General Olsen instructed 

his logistics planners to send a Prime BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency 

Forces) team there immediately. He delayed arrival of additional pple 

and equipment while expediting two C-141s and sixteen C-13os carrying 

Harvest Falcon assets. Due to uncertainty over other beddown locations, 

and to give MAC time to finish missions supporting earlier deployments, 

CENTAF also delayed additional unit departures for three days.’3s 

SAC unit Deployments 

SAC designated Brigadier General Patrick P. Caruana, commander of 

the 426 Air Division at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, as Commander, 

STRATFOR.’” On 7 August, General Caruana and the rest of his team left 

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, aboard four 26 Bomb Wing (Bm) KC-10s. En 

route to Riyadh, the tankers performed a dual mission of escorting and 

refueling the initial group of F-15s sent to Saudi Arabia. General 

Caruana’s contingent arrived in Riyadh on 8 August.’37 

Figure 24 depicts the buildup of SAC bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, 

and tankers over the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

SAC Deployment Planning 

Special access restrictions limited the number of SAC staff members 

involved in deployment planning. On 9 August 1990, the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the deployment of U.S. forces to Southwest 

Asia as Operation Desert Shield and downgraded the classification to 

Secret. Removal of special access restrictions allowed participation of the 

full SAC staff and subordinate units.’38 

I3’lbid, pp 52-54. 

IMSTRATFOR (Strategic Forces Advisor) was a staff pianning group consisting of 

I3’(S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 331-332. 

‘38(S) History of he Strategic Air Command 1990. p 337. 

people knowledgeable in conventional operations. 

126 
Figure 24 

CENTAF Buildup: SAC Aircraft 

CENTCOM based most of its planning on its OPLAN 1002-90, but SAC had 

made limited inputs to this plan. SAC began initial ahcraft movements 

based on SAC OPLAN 1002-88, a regional support plan for Southwest Asia 

operations that included sections dealing with prepositioned assets and 

employment of aircraft from Diego Garcia. OPLAN 1002-88 had a JOPES 

database that planners could use and update, and it listed intended lead 

units, aircraft types, and forward operating locations. Most actual Desert 

Shield assignments differed from OPLAN 1002-88, but the plan nevertheless 

provided a valuable starting point.139 

JOPES did not extend down to the unit level in SAC. Headquarters used 

AUTODIN and telephone to transmit TPFDD information to deploying units. 

This was a lengthy process and much information was out of date by the 

time the unit received it. Units could not update the TPFQD, causing airlift 

(S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 39. 139 

127 
problems. MAC sometimes arrived at an installation only to find cargo had 

already been moved.14o 

SAC Tanker Deployments to the AOR 

During Desert Shield and Desert Stonn, SAC successfully performed a 

juggling act with its tanker force to meet strategic commitments, support 

CENT<30M air refueling and airlift requirements for deployments to the AOR, 

and provide air refueling support for CE"COM training and combat operations within the AOR. Tanker deployment orders changed daily in August 

as various commanders and staffs established force deployment priorities, 

levels of logistics support, and beddown locations. Different fighters had 

different refueling requirements, and their order of deployment affected the 

number of tankers needed on the Atlantic Bridge and in the AOR.'~' 

On 12 August, SAC identified a growing need for KC-10s to support 

planned B-52, F-117, A-10, Fa, and AV-8 deployments. With MAC 

heavily committed to Army unit movements, the KC-10 cargo capacity 

could be put to valuable use moving fighter en route maintenance packages. MAC and TRANSCOM agreed that KC-10s should be employed in their 

dual-role capacity; SAC therefore requested JCS to release KC-10s from the 

AOR. When JCS approved SAC'S request on 14 August, forty-two KC-135s 

and ten KC-10s were in the AOR. The JCS approval also authorized SAC 

direct liaison with CENTCOM for future tanker requirements. This gave SAC 

greater influence and flexibility in meeting tanker requirements in the AOR. 

SAC retained operational control of the tankers while SAC, STRATFOR, and 

CENTCOM worked together to resolve basing issues. The KC-10s were out 

of the AOR by 16 August, but the KC-135 total continued to grow as more 

bases became available. In addition, six KC-10s returned to the AOR at the 

end of September. By the end of Phase I, the USAF tanker force in the AOR 

totaled 116 KC-135s and 6 KC-10s.'42 

'40JULLS NUMBER 2144346794 (00169). submitted by HQ SAdffiXX. AFRES expressed 

a similar complaint about JOPES deployment in JULLS NUMBER: 03057-60563 (00371). submitted by HQ AFRESMXP. 

I4'(S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, p 345. 

I4*(s) History of the Strategic Air Command 15W, pp 346-341. GWAPS. Statistical 

Compendium, Table 6. 

128 
By the end of Phase 11, the USAF tanker force in the AOR had grown to 

202 KC-135s and 24 KC-10s. Planning for this expansion was a daunting 

task for SAC and STRATFOR. Since SAC forces did not typically deploy to 

the AOR as complete units, SAC designated “lead tanker units” at each 

beddown base to provide most of the support personnel and equipment.143 

In the early days of the deployment, SAC dealt with limited basing 

options by placing its most capable tankers-KC-10s and KC-135 Rs-in the 

AOR. The KC-135R has better takeoff performance and fuel offload capability than other model KC-1 35s. It also requires less logistics support than 

KC-135As. When the KC-10s were withdrawn from the AOR in mid-August, they were initially replaced by KC-135Rs. As more bases became 

available, KC-135Rs were in turn replaced by greater numbers of 

KC-1 35As and KC-1 35Es. [DELElEDILu 

SAC Bomber Deployments to the AOR 

On 8 August 1990, CEmOM asked for twenty-eight B-52Gs to perform 

conventional operations. Requested deployments to Diego Garcia were five 

aircraft by 16 August, fourteen more by 24 August, and nine more by 6 

September. A day later, JCS ordered SAC to deploy nine aircraft by 24 

August and five more by 6 September. Actual deployments were seven 

aircraft on 12 August, seven more on 13 August, and six more on 15 

August. The final eight B-52s requested by CENTCOM were not deployed 

because not enough additional ramp space was available at Diego Garcia 

and CENTCOM could not find an alternative beddown base within the theater. 

All aircmft deployed with forty-five M-l17R general-purpose bombs.’45 

By 22 August, SAC had four spare B-52Gs at Andersen AFB, Guam. 

This allowed Diego-based B-52Gs to rotate regularly through Guam for 

corrosion control treatment at the intermediate level maintenance facility. 

To keep twenty combat-ready aircraft in place, an Andersen-based 

‘43(S) Ibid; (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 99. 

‘“(S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 347, 349. 

I4’(S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 197, 199. 460. (s) RAND, 

Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 100. 

129 
B-52G landed at Diego before a Diego-based B-52G took off for Guam. 

This regular rotation aided in the munitions resupply of Diego Garcia.'& 

Over the next several weeks, SAC strove to obtain a second forward 

operating location. The main base under consideration was [DELETED], 

because of its outstanding facilities and collocation with other SAC assets. 

On 23 August, the SAC Support Battle Staff (SBS) learned that [DELETED] 

military authorities had tentatively approved basing fourteen B-52s at 

[DELETED]. Six days later, STRATFOR advised the SBS that the approval 

had been withdrawn. CENTCOM encouraged SAC to look toward RAF 

Fairford or Moron Air Base.14' 

On 2 October 1990, the Secretary of Defense halted efforts to find 

another B-52 base in the AOR, stating that such efforts were not to resume 

unless hostilities broke out. Nevertheless, [DELETED] officials maintained 

contact with STRATFOR concerning [DELETED]. On 13 October, SAC 

learned that the host government had approved basing fourteen B-52Gs 

[DELETED]. Once Desert Storm commenced, active operations began 

[DELETED]. By the cease-fire, the number of bombers on the ramp had 

grown to nineteen.'@ 

On 9 January 1991, Spain formally approved basing B-52s at Moron 

Air Base as long as there was no publicity and local authorities would 

receive advance notice of operations at the base. Initially, six B-52s were 

stationed there. By 24 January there were ten, and in early February, there 

were twenty-two aircraft-eighteen conducting strikes against Iraq and four 

undergoing intermediate level maintenan~e.'~~ 

On 1 February, SAC learned that the United Kingdom had approved 

basing B-52s at RAF Fairford. On 4 February, eight aircraft were directed to 

deploy, and they began conducting operations from Fairford on 9 Febmary.Im 

'&(s) History of the Strategic Air command 1990, p 199. (s) RAND, Assessment of 

I4'(S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 582-584. 

Desert ShieM Deployment, p 100. 

(S) Ibid, p 585. 

'49(S) Ibid, p 589. 

ls0(S) Ibid, pp 586-587. 

148 

130 
SAC Reconnaissance Deployments to the AOR 

Almost immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait, SAC was tasked to 

design R-135 reconnaissance tracks in Saudi Arabia. After receiving the 

necessary overflight clearances, the first Rivet Joint mission launched from 

Hellenikon, Greece, on 9 August and recovered at Riyadh. By 10 August, 

another RC-135 from Hellenikon and one from Offutt AFB had relocated 

to Riyadh. By 11 August, these three aircraft were providing twenty-fourhour reconnaissance coverage from tracks within Saudi Arabia."' 

Support personnel deployed on the RC-135s. Support equipment and 

supplies deployed on two C-141 sorties and one C-5 sortie.''* Total RC135s in the AOR grew to four at the end of August, seven in January, and 

nine in February.'53 

The 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Beale AFB was notified of 

proposed U-2 movements on 4 August. no U-2s were supposed to 

arrive in the AOR on 13 August, but they were held at RAF Alconbury 

until ground support equipment had been airlifted into the AOR. The first 

U-2 arrived at [DELETED] on 17 August and the second arrived a day 

later. Reconnaissance missions began on 20 August.'" 

On 23 August, two TR- 1 s from RAF Alconbury arrived at Taif. Their 

support equipment arrived aboard C-5s on 27 August. TR-1 reconnaissance missions commenced on 29 Aug~st.'~' 

Total U-2s in the AOR increased to three in mid-October, five in midJanuary, and six in early February. Total TR-1s in the AOR increased to 

four in mid-January and six in late February.'" 

"'(S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 102. (S) Y'BId. The 

''*(S) RAND, Assessment of Desert ShieM Deployment, p 102. 

IS3GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 3. 

I 54 

1 ss 

Eagle and the Scorpion, p 28. 

(S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp'37-38. 

(S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, p 467. (S) RAND. Assessment of 

Desert Shield Deployment, p 103. 

'%WAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 3. 

131 
SAC Organic Airlift 

SAC OPLAN 1002-88 called for a Pacific Bridge, but it never materialized as planned. What ultimately became known as the Pacific Bridge 

was an organic airlift effort to supply the B-52 force at Diego Gar~ia.'~' 

The effort began when SAC requested thirty-three C-141 sorties to 

move bare base equipment to Diego Garcia. The request was denied 

because of CENTCOM priorities, and SAC took action to help itself. On 15 

August, cargo and passengers began moving across the Pacific Bridge. The 

first order of business was to move a Harvest Eagle kit aboard KC-10s. 

The rest of the operation settled into a daily routine. A KC-135A would 

fly from Castle Am to Andersen Am, where the cargo and passengers were 

transferred to either a KC-135R or a KC-10 for the longer leg from Guam 

to Diego Garcia. (After the Harvest Eagle kit delivery was completed, KC10 participation in the Pacific Bridge was strictly limited.)'58 

Except for oversize or outsize cargo, SAC supplied most of its own 

airlift needs through the end of September. At the end of September, 

Pacific Bridge departures were reduced to three a week. MAC airlift 

support for SAC picked up in October, but SAC organic airlift still carried 

significant amounts into November.'S9 

MAC Unit Deployments 

When Desert Shield began, MAC'S first priority was managing the 

massive strategic airlift flow. Within a very short time, however, deploying a significant number of C-130s to the AOR became essential. In 

August 1990, CENTCOM established a Phase I requirement for ninety-six 

aircraft-six squadrons with sixteen aircraft each.'60 The first two squadrons to deploy came from the 317th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) at Pope 

AFB. One squadron left Pope on 9 August and arrived at Masirah, Oman, 

on 11 August. The second squadron left Pope on 11 August and arrived 

in Thumrait, Oman, on 13 August. The third squadron to arrive in the 

I5'(S) History of the Strategic Air Cd 1990, p 342. 

"'(S) Ibid, pp 342-343. 

'59(S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 97. 

160 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 38-39. 

132 
AOR came from the 314th TAW at Little Rock AFB and arrived in Bateen, 

UAE, on 16 August.I6' 

The first three squadrons deployed relatively quickly; some difficulty 

occurred with identifying and confirming beddown locations for the next 

three squadrons. 

On 16 August, a squadron from the 435th TAW left Rhein-Main for 

the AOR before all beddown issues had been resolved. After three aircraft 

landed at Thumrait, the COMALF turned back the remaining C-130s. and 

they landed at Cairo West or returned to Rhein-Main. After some negotiations, CENTAF and the UAE agreed upon A1 Ain as a beddown site. The 

squadron closed at its new home on 28 August.'62 

The next unit to begin arriving in the AOR was the 94th Provisional 

Tactical Airlift Wing (PTAW), an AFRES unit with aircraft and crews from 

five different locations. The 94th PTAW arrived at RAF Alconbury on 18- 

19 August and was held there awaiting a decision on beddown. Sharjah, 

UAE, was finally selected, but due to ramp space limitations, the 94th 

ITAW's arrival was spread from 30 August to 11 September.'63 

The final Phase I deployment was the 130th PTAW. an ANG unit, also 

with aircraft and crews from five different locations. After waiting for 

some time at Lajes, it moved to Avian0 on 5 September, and then to A1 

Ain on 7-9 September.Ia 

Phase I1 saw thirty-two more C-130s deployed to the AOR in early 

January. Eight each went to Al Kharj and A1 Ain; sixteen went to 

I6'(S) MAC History 1990. Ch 3, pp 39-40, Table 3-10. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle Md 

the Scorpion, pp 54-55. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 86. 

(S) 1630 TAW(P), History of Airlijl in the Desert: Circumventing the Iraqis (A1 Ah 

AB, UAE: 1630 TAW(P)/HO, 23 May 1991). p ix. (S) MAC History 1990. Ch 3, Table 3-10. 

Y'Blood, (S) The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 81-82. 

'63(S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, Table 3-10. Y'Blood, (S) The Eagle and the 

IM(S) MACHistory 1990, Ch 3. Table 3-10. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle ad the Scorpi162 

Scorpion, p 108. 

on, p 108. 

133 
Thumrait. After Desert Storm commenced, sixteen more C-130s arrived 

in late January. Eight each went to A1 Kharj and Th~mrait.'~~ 

MAC C-130 units provided most of their own air1ift;but they needed 

help to move headquarters and support personnel and equipment.'66 

Figure 25 depicts the CENTAF buildup of MAC aircraft over the course of 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Chapter 4 will provide more details on 

the MAC role in the AOR. 

Special Operations Force Unit Deployments 

Planning for deployment of Air Force special operations forces (SOF) 

began on C-Day when Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) sent a liaison officer to Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).'67 AFSOC representatives left Hurlburt Field, 

Florida, on 9 August to find a location to house AFSOC Central Command 

(AFSOCCENT) headquarters and an airfield for launching Air Force special 

operations missions. They settled on King Fahd International Airport, a 

nearly completed airfield just northwest of Dhahran.'@ 

As of 11 August, Riyadh, not King Fahd, was the designated beddown location for AFSOC forces. The 1 st Special Operations Wing (SOW) 

at Hurlburt Field launched an ADVON team with two MH-53 helicopters 

plus a command element, support equipment, and personnel. Carried by 

two C-141s and one C-5, the team arrived in Riyadh on 13 August. 

Within two hours after the first C-141 landed, the team learned that their 

beddown location had been changed to Dhahran-still not King Fahd. 

Acting quickly, the ADVON team kept the other two aircraft from unloading, squeezed as much extra equipment on them as possible, and had the 

crews fly them to Dhahran.'@ 

165GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 3. 

166 JULU NUMBER: 03054-86057 (00101), submitted by HQ AFRFSLGXP. 

167Air Force Special Operations Command, Air Force Special Operations Command 

in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Drafl) (Hurlburt Field, FL: HQ AFSOUHO, 

'68Air Force Special Operations Command in Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

'@Ibid, pp 5-6. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 73. 

1991). p 4. 

Storm (Draft), p 4. 

134 
Figure 25 

CENTAF Buildup: MAC Aircraft 

lbo more MH-53s were delivered to Dhahran by 15 August. However, AFSOC did not receive the support equipment because SOF airlift was 

preempted for higher priority moves. As a result, they had no guns, 

munitions, or spare parts. AFSOCCENT received guns and ammunition on 

20 August, but spare parts were not fully stocked for another month.I7' 

Also on 11 August, the 1 st SOW launched four MC-130s and four 

HC-130s for the AOR. The aircraft were held at RAF Woodbridge when 

their airlift was preempted. Using opportune airlift, they managed to 

complete their moves to Dhahran between 20 and 23 August."' 

ir Force Special Operations Command in Operations Desert Shield and Desert I 70A 

Storm (Drafr). p 8. 

17'(S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 13, 91. 

135 
In late August, the I st SOW was directed to move to King Fahd. This 

location became the consolidated beddown site for all SOF air assets in 

the AOR.’~’ 

Figure 26 depicts the CENTAF buildup of AFSOF aircraft over the 

course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Total AFSOCCENT aircraft in 

the AOR peaked at just under forty in late Febn~ary.”~ 

Marine Component, Central Command 

(MARCENT) Deployments 

U.S. Marine Corps aviation deployed to the theater in three increments. The fly-in echelon consisted of aircraft, initial spares and supplies, and support personnel. Elements brought in on prepositioned ships 

consisted of ordnance, support equipment, aviation fuel, and other items. 

Aviation logistics support ships provided maintenance and repair to 

sustain aircraft readiness.’74 

Figure 27 depicts the buildup of Marine fixed-wing aircraft during the 

course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

TAC/DOXD had the responsibility to plan air refueling for Marine 

aircraft deployments but did not have the necessary information on flight 

parameters for Marine aircraft. Information was obtained directly from 

the Marines using secure voice communications.’7s 

Other Force Deployments 

Figure 28 illustrates aircraft deployed to the AOR by other nations 

contributing to coalition air forces. 

I7=Air Force Special Operations Command in Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

173GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 3. 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p E-21. 

(S) RAND. Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, Q 109. 

Storm (Draft), p 7. (S) Y’Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 73 -74. 

174 

175 

136 

Figure 28 

Coalition Member Air~raft”~ 

[DELETED] 

Assessment 

The deployment to the Persian Gulf was the fastest buildup of conventional air power in history, and it challenged all facets of our Nation’s 

strategic mobility capability. The challenge was lessened somewhat 

because allies granted access to essential airspace and facilities en route 

to the Gulf and because host nations in the Gulf had good infrastructure 

and plentiful resources. U.S. forces also had time to overcome numerous 

difficulties associated with expanding CINCCENT’s operational concept 

into a workable deployment plan. The most vexing problems were 

changing deployment priorities, poorly defined lift requirements, and 

automated planning systems that couldn’t keep pace with actual events. 

Sea-based air power was first on the scene, followed shortly thereafter 

by land-based air power. Deployment of land-based airpower was 

(S) GWAPS, Sfalisfical Compendium, Chapter 2, Allied Air Order of Battle. Totals 176 

are as of 1 Dec 1990. 

138 
impacted by availability of beddown locations, air refueling, and airlift. 

Availability of airlift appears to have been the pacing factor. 

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, MAC C-5s and C-141s flew 

at an unprecedented rate. Early in Desert Shield, a shortage of aircrews 

threatened to cripple the airlift system, but reserves were activated in time 

to limit disruption. Reserve participation was essential because the Air 

Reserve Components represent approximately half of MAC’S military 

strategic airlift capability. MAC’S military strategic airlift aircraft were 

augmented by CRAF Stages I and 11 plus volunteers from domestic and a 

few foreign commercial carriers. This commercial participation was 

likewise essential. From 7 August 1990 to 10 March 1991, commercial 

aircraft carried sixty-four percent of all passengers and twenty-seven 

percent of all cargo delivered by MAC strategic airlift. Additionally, MAC 

C-130s and SAC tankers made limited airlift contributions to the deployment effort. 

Deployment and sustainment efforts highlighted a number of problems in the airlift system, including command and control deficiencies, 

airfield congestion, equipment shortages, and units that weren’t ready to 

move. Time allowed MAC to solve-or work around-most of its problems. 

Time also allowed MAC to deliver the support needed to build air power 

in the Gulf from a thin line in the sand to an effective, sustainable fighting force. 

As a result of deployment-related lessons learned during Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm, many problems have already been solved; some 

are being solved now, and others will be solved in the future. For the 

solutions to be of lasting value, they must be implemented with thoughtful consideration of two essential facts. First, the United States can never 

be certain exactly how long it will have to complete future deployments. 

Second, the Nation can always be certain that future deployments will not 

flow exactly as called for by any on-the-shelf plan. (The Gulf War was 

not the first conflict to surface these facts, but it certainly highlighted 

them.) Once a deployment is in progress, a theater commander will 

adjust deployment priorities as the evolving situation dictates. A plan 

will simply be a baseline from which to make changes. Flexibility and 

responsiveness must be the watchwords for future operation planning and 

execution procews as well as for future transportation resources. 

139 
140 
4 

Intratheater Lift 

In tra t heater Movement 

The need for a capability to distribute personnel, supplies, and equipment was immediate and of immense proportions. In addition to 501 ,OOO 

passengers, strategic airlift delivered into the area of responsibility (AOR) 

over 544,000 tons of cargo or about fifteen percent of the approximately 

3.5 million tons of dry cargo delivered by all modes during the deployment phase of Desert Shield.' The vast majority of the effort was delivered to four major aerial ports of debarkation APODS. From there, the 

cargo and passengers were forwarded throughout the AOR by intratheater 

airlift and surface transportation. 

Although prepositioning of Air Force assets saved over 3,500 strategic airlift sorties, arriving forces needed to have the assets moved to new 

positions as soon as possible.' Supporting this enormous requirement for 

surface and air distribution within the AOR required many innovations and 

was crucial to the success of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Moving 

cargo and passengers from aerial and sea ports of debarkation and from 

prepositioning sites to base camps and initial operating bases was essential to achievement of combat capability. 

Intratheater movement was accomplished in two ways: intratheater 

airlift and land transportation. Draft Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90 

'NDTA Fourth Transportation Symposium Oct 1W1, Airlift and Sealift Panels. 

(Presentations made by Lt Gen Vernon Kondra [then Maj Gen KO&], MAC W during 

Desert ShieldDesert Storm, and Vice Admiral Frank Donovan, Commander. Military 

Sealift Command during Desert ShieldStorm.) Also, (S) rpt MAC Historian, Operation 

Desert Shield Desert Storm, Scott AFB. lL, p 165. 

*Department of the Air Force, Reaching Globally, Reuching Powerfully: The United 

States Air Force In The Gulf War (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, Sep 

1991); and HQ USCENTAFhgiStiCS Plans (LGXM). Also. see Appendix 4A for a list of 

prepositioned Air Force equipment in the theater. 

141 
Figure 29 

MAC Strategic Airlift Sorties by Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODS) 

August 1990- February 19913 

established base line planning for intratheater distribution. [DELETED] 

Primary airlift tasks would be deployment and resupply until the sea line 

of communication (Sm) closed. Although Central Command (CENTCOM) 

planned to deploy more C-130 squadrons, actually it deployed only six 

during the deployment phase of Desert Shield because of beddown problems. The land transportation part of the plan called for host nation support (HNS) consisting of land vehicles to augment U.S. Army organic line 

haul capability." [DELETED] 

3Source: MAC Military Air lntegrated Reporting System (MAIRS). 

4(S/NF) OPLAN 1002-90, Mobility and Transportation, Appendix 4 to Annex D, 18 

Jul 1990, U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, n, pp D-4-9, D-4-10. 

142 
Figure 30 

Aerial and Sea Ports of Debarkation 

and Prepositioning Sites 

King Khaw ld'l 

SAUDI ARABIA 

The intratheater transportation system was overwhelmed for several 

reasons. First, the initial deployment of large combat forces arrived 

before adequate combat service support and onward movement capability 

were established. Second, USCENTCOM changed the supply stockage 

levels of food and munitions from thirty days to sixty days. Third, the 

cargo items could not be adequately identified once the containers or 

I43 
pallets arrived in theater because of poor in-transit cargo visibility provided by the information systems of the Services. To cope with the seemingly endless flow of equipment and personnel, the Services made the 

best use of HNS by renting thousands of heavy trucks, employing more 

than 2,000 civilian drivers, and creating an intratheater airlift channel 

system, which additionally serviced the strategic airlift “Desert Express” 

channel. Also, Air Force, Central Command (CENTAF) created an organic 

line haul capability known as the “Blueball Express.”’ 

Intratheater Airlift 

Intratheater airlift helped establish a defensive posture from the very 

beginning of Desert Shield and then reforged that capability into an 

offensive force for Desert Storm. U.S. C-130s were among the first 

forces to deploy to the Persian Gulf. Concurrent with the deployment of 

troops from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the first squadron of sixteen 

C-130s from the 317th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) at neighboring Pope 

AFB deployed to Masirah Island, Oman, on C+O4 (1 1 August 1990). By 

C+23 (the 30th of August 1990). a total of ninety-six C-130s had arrived 

at locations in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. Figure 31 depicts a map of the beddown locations. 

Operating from the UAE and Oman, the C-130s immediately began 

flight operations. They were tasked initially by the CENTAF airlift control 

center (ALCC)‘ to transport Harvest Falcon and Eagle equipment’ and 

munitions from prepositioned stocks to the beddown locations (initial 

operating bases of arriving forces). The C-130 force also interfaced with 

APODs, such as Riyadh and Dhahran, for the onward movement of cargo 

and passengers to final destination sites. In January and February 1991, 

another forty-eight C-130s plus five C-130s from the Republic of South 

Korea deployed to the AOR. The C-130 augmentation was necessary to 

support the increased force structure deployed into the theater before the 

’Intvw, with Lt col Robert E. Edmisten, Director of Transportation, HQCENTAF, 

‘See Appendix 48 for a discussion of the Airlift Control Center. 

’Harvest Falcon and Harvest Eagle assets are two of the Air Force’s three bare base 

Shaw AFB. SC, 8 Aug 1992. 

systems. For more information, refer to Chapter 2. 

144 
air and ground campaigns began. Thus, a total of 149 C-130s were under 

CENTAF control during peak operating times. Table 11 shows the original 

and final beddown sites for the C-130 force. 

Figure 31 

Tactical Airlift Forces Beddown Locations 

SAUDI ARABIA 

145 
Table 11 

Airlift Forces Beddowd 

Squadron BPse Number of Locp~on 

Ainmn 

40 TAS pope 16 Masirah 

41 TAS pope Thumrait (King Fahd 

12 Jan 91) 

16 

50 TAS Little Rock 16 Bateen 

37 TAS Rhein Main 16 Al Ain 

772 TAS Dyess 8 Al Kharj 

345 TAS Yokota 8 Thumrait (King Fahd 

19 Feb 91) 

ANG Charleston, WV 8 A1 Ain 

Dallas, TX 8 Al Ain 

St Joseph, MO 8 Al Ain 

Wilmington, DE 8 Al Kharj 

AFRES Niagara, NY 8 Sharjah 

Selfridge. M1 8 Sharjah 

Willow Grove, 8 Thumrai t 

PA 

Rickenbacker, 8 Thumrait 

OH 

ROK Republic of Ko- 5 At Ain 

rea (King Fahd 19 Feb 

91) 

TOTAL 149 

(NOTE: 41 TAS, 345 TAS, and the 5 ROK c-130~ transferred later to King Fahd) 

~ ~~~ 

'CoI David Davis, MACILEMM; Mr. Orson Gover, MACILERW; Operution Desert 

Shield Desert Storm MAC Logistics History, Headquarters. Military Airlift Command, Scott 

AFB, IL: 15 Mar 1991 (2d Draft). 

146 
C-5s, C-141s, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft flew between the United States and the AOR but remained under the control of 

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). C-130s deployed as 

partial units to the AOR? and operational control was passed to the theater 

commander-in-chief (CINC), who operated them within the theater through 

his air component commander. the commander of CENTAF. The CENTAF 

commander in turn, delegated command of the C- 130 force to the Commander, Airlift Forces (COMALF). 

The COMALF, a Military Airlift Command (MAC) Brigadier General, 

exercised command and control of the intratheater airlift forces. He 

worked for Lieutenant General Charles A. Homer, Commander of 

CENTAF, who was also the Joint Force Air Component Commander under 

CENTCOM. He provided command and control of airlift forces through 

the AWC; he also managed the aerial ports, the air evacuation (air evac) 

system, and CENTAF combat control teams." 

The COMALF and his staff were in place shortly after General Homer 

and his CENTAF staff arrived in theater from Shaw AFB, South Carolina. 

COMALF personnel, who are MAC assigned, came from all MAC units. For 

example, Brigadier General Buckingham, the first COMALF for Desert 

Shield, was the 21 st Air Force Vice Commander; his successor, Brigadier 

General E. Tenoso, was the 22d Air Force Vice Commander. The 

COMALF and CENTAF staffs worked closely together to coordinate schedules, validate airlift requests, allocate airlift assets, and improve the 

operational suitability of theater airfields." 

By the end of September 1990, personnel deployed to the AOR represented virtually every MAC career specialty. Unit cohesion and discipline 

were becoming problems for the COMALF because MAC-sourced commanders did not have administrative or disciplinary control over personnel 

deployed from other MAC units in the United States to augment their units 

'For example, the 317th Tactical Airlift Wing out of Pope AFB. NC, deployed about 

one-third of the total wing organization to the AOR. Once in the AOR, the unit had to be 

augmented. Source: Briefing, by Col Maxwell C. Bailey, Commander 317th Tactical 

Airlift Wing, to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 19 Jul 1991. 

"AFP m77, "USAF Wartime Logistics Organization and Decision Making," Revision 

"Refer to Appendix 4B for more information on theater airlift management. 

1, 2 Jan 1990. p 6-A-6. 

147 
in the AOR. MAC'S policy Of deploying personnel by Unit Qpe Code" 

rather than by organizational unit was one cause of the problem. Also, the 

relatively few MAC commanders deployed to the Middle East were not 

commanding the officers and enlisted personnel they had commanded in 

the states. The absence of MAC units and commanders meant that disciplinary infractions committed by MAC personnel in the AOR could not be 

adjudicated under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) without 

direct referrals to appropriate organizational commanders in the continental 

United States. Similarly, nonjudicial punishment, an administrative action 

for minor infractions of regulations, could not be implemented by the 

operational commander in the AOR. The resulting delays in judicial action 

and in nonjudicial punishment action disturbed the organizational integrity 

of the units and degraded morale. The situation was unacceptable to Gen 

Homer, Commander of CENTCOM's tactical air forces. He wanted disciplinary infractions resolved in theater. The Commander-in€hief MAC 

(CINCMAC) approved activation of a MAC provisional organidonal structure placing all MAC-SOUt-ced personnel under the administrative and disciplinary authority of MAC commanders in the AOR. The Air Force Reserve 

(AFRES) and Air National Guard (ANG) commanders concurred in this new 

organizational stru~ture.'~ (Figure 32 depicts the CENTAF airlift provisional 

wing structure.) 

Although the theater airfields were large, the infrastructure was not 

equipped to support the massive influx of people and equipment. Part of 

the COMALF'S job was to manage the aerial ports and ensure the rapid 

throughput of cargo and people. The ramps filled up quickly. Fuel became 

a limiting factor. Materiel handling equipment (MHE) was sometimes not 

sufficient to download the arriving aircraft quickly." In addition, vehicles 

"MAC used Unit Type Codes (IJTCS) on airlift manifests to deploy individuals to the 

Gulf theater, as opposed to organizational codes because entire organizational units did 

not deploy. Therefore, when the individuals arrived in theater, they were plrred in partial 

units which had deployed, but did not have organizational identity. CENTAF had operational control but not administrative or disciplinary control over these units. 

%MAC History, pp 45, 46. 

''haterial handling equipment (MHE) is the term for cargo handling equipment used 

to load and offload cargo aircraft. It may be forklifts for small airlift loads, or it could 

be 40K loaders, which are the large 40,OOO pound capacity self-propelled loaders used to 

handle large cargo aircraft such as C-141s. C-5s. and CRAF cargo aircraft. 

148 
Figure 32 

Airlift Organization, Bases, and Units15 

I 

1- 

1640 TAWP glq )(co TAWP 

1-1 T*v 

NOTE: On 23 January 1991, the 1610 Airlift Division (Provisional) (ALD[P]) 

formed the 1675 Tactical Airlift Wing (Provisional) (TAW[P]), later designated the 

1690 TAW(P) at King Fahd airbase, a Forward Operating Location (FOL). The 

wing was made up of C-130s from Thumrait and supported by C-130s from the 

1630 TAW(P) Al Ain (see Table 11). These aircraft were the first to be used in 

airlifting the XVIII Corps and U.S. Marine Corps, Central Command (MARCENT) 

forces into their tactical assembly areas after the air campaign started.'' 

"GWAPS statistical Compendium. USCENTAF Bases and units, HQ TAUXPM, as of 15 

'%MSgt James R. Ciborski, "History of Airlift in the Desert: Circumventing the 

Jan 1991. Also, refer to Appendix 4C for definitions of provisional units. 

Iraqis." 23 May 1991. A1 Ain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), pp 26. 27. 

I49 
parked in the sun for long periods were prone to blown seals and gaskets 

as a result of heat deterioration. Constantly blowing sand and dust added 

to maintenance pr0b1ems.I~ 

One of the initial challenges was sorting out the hundreds of pallets 

that the C-141 s, C-5s. and CRAF 747s left on the ramp. At first, some of the 

cargo was marked simply “Desert Shield,” with nothing to identify the 

Service or the unit that the cargo was intended for. Many of the cargo 

pallets arrived with only one identifying transportation control number 

(TCN) showing and with the primary APOD as the final destination. In fact, 

pallets often contained cargo loaded for multiple destinations within the 

theater; they had to be broken down and their cargos resorted to coincide 

with the intended destinations. The resulting workload significantly slowed 

down the efficiency of the terminal cargo transfer operation. Therefore, it 

was necessary to control the flow into certain bases to prevent gridlock on 

the ramps and in the aerial ports.’8 Another problem caused by the lack of 

in-transit cargo visibility was frustration on the part of units waiting for the 

cargo, whether it be nonunit cargo or resupply parts ordered to support the 

units’ combat capability. As a tesult, some parts were double ordered, and 

priorities on some items were ove~inflated.’~ Finally, CmM changed 

the supply stockage level of food and munitions desired from thirty days 

to sixty days. This action significantly increased airlift and sealift cargo 

requirements, and the cargo problem at the ports continued throughout 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm.” 

The Saudis had not anticipated the large supplies of fuel required by 

Coalition forces and the large numbers of aircraft that would be flying 

daily in their air traffic control system. Thus, their refueling capability 

and their air traffic control system were inadequate. To solve these 

problems, CENTAF deployed R-9 refuelers into some bases (for example, 

King Fahd and King Khalid airfields) and negotiated with the Saudis to 

procure more fuel. Also, CENTAF deployed air traffic control assets into 

17Brig Gen Edwin E. Tenoso, “A COMALF Perspective.” speech at Air Force Associa- 

‘81bid. 

I9See Chapter 7 for more discussion on supplying the force. 

20Briefing, by U Col Brad Christy, USAF ACP, 27 Nov 1991. Also. Department of 

Defense, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,” (Washington, DC: Deparbnent of Defense, 

Apr 1992), Appendix F, p F-19. 

tion Briefing Session VII, St Louis, MO. 2 Aug 1991. 

150 
the AOR to control the arriving air forces?’ Another problem was lack of 

sufficient APODS for the reception of forces. Initially, Dhahran and Riyadh received forces; in mid-August, Jubail was made available. In 

September, CENTAF negotiated with the Saudis to allow King Fahd and 

King Khalid airfields to receive forces and cargo. This action was necessary to alleviate some of the congestion at Dhahran and Riyadh. However, it entailed considerable effort on the part of the major commands 

supporting the forces. For example, MAC had to send additional Airlift 

Control Element (ALCE) and support personnel to facilitate the throughput 

of cargo and passengers. Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Strategic Air 

Command (SAC), on the other hand, had the responsibility for air base 

support at King Fahd and King Khalid airfields, respectively. However, 

MAC, through TRANSCOM, was not able to secure an additional recovery 

and staging base in the immediate AOR for the strategic airlifters.22 

A major priority item was an intratheater airlift system; immediately 

after it was set up, both frequency and requirements channels were established. The frequency channels ran on a given schedule, so the users 

knew when airlift was available. The channels were called Stars and 

Camels; Star missions hauled people and Camel missions flew mostly 

cargo. Figure 33 depicts typical routes providing airlift for Army, Navy, 

Air Force, Marines, and Coalition forces.23 

In addition to moving personnel, Camel Star, the joint intratheater 

airlift operation, had as its primary mission moving mail and time-sensitive information between numerous operating bases on the Arabian peninsula. The Camel Express missions providing daily cargo service throughout the theater of operations were planned so that the movement of cargo 

21**~ COMALF Perspective.” 

22Lt Gen Vernon L. Kondra Notes, “Operation Desert Shield - Desert Storm, 24 Aug 

1990 - 31 May 1991.” pp 33,68. (Lt Gen Kondra. then Maj Gen, was the MAC Dimor 

of Operations during the period of his notes.) After much negotiation, Cairo West was 

offered to MAC as a stage base. However, it was rejected when the MAC W was told that 

MAC would have to vacate within twenty-four hours after the war started. 

2366~ COMALF Perspective? 

151 
Figure 33 

Camel and Star Routes 

in theater was aligned with the arrival of strategic airlift missions at the 

principle A~DS Dhahran and Riyadh." However, as previously mentioned, King Fahd, Jubail, and King Khalid airfields were made available 

early in the deployment phase, but they were not twenty-four-hour certified in the begin11ing.2~ Several Camel missions were scheduled to coincide with the arrival of the C-141 Desert Express missions from the 

CONUS to ensure expeditious distribution of critically required "show 

24MAC History, p 214. 

"Kondra notes, p 68. The COMALF coordinated the installation of lights and other 

facility standards with the TAC and SAC host base commanders in order to obtain a 

twenty-four hour airlift operational capability. 

152 
stopper” parts. Approximately twenty-five Camel missions were run 

daily in support of operations.26 

In addition, some requirements channels responded specifically to 

user periodic needs. Because airlift was in great demand, a priority 

system was followed. A user’s request was first validated by his unit and 

service validator and then forwarded to CENTCOM for prioritization. 

Specifically, the CENTCOWJ4, through the Joint Movement Control Center 

(JMCC). prioritized requirements. By matching requirements with C-130 

capability, the JMCC was able to meet top priority requirements. When the 

JMCC had decided which missions were to be flown, it passed the information to CENTAF, which combined airlift missions into the daily air 

tasking order (ATO) along with fighter, bomber, and tanker sorties. That 

tasking was then passed to the ALCC for further tasking to the units?’ 

Approximately thirty-three percent of the C-130 fleet was deployed, and 

during Desert Shield, intratheater airlift moved 142,000 short tons of 

cargo and 134,000 passengers, thus satisfying over 3,500 airlift requests 

from units in the AOR?’ During Desert Storm, over 21,000 hours and 

13,000 sorties were flown, and a total of 159,000 short tons and 184,000 

passengers were deployed. Sortie rates could have been higher, but the 

average flying time from Thumrait to Riyadh was three hours and fifteen 

minutes, and from Riyadh to Tabuk, five hours. These flying times made 

achieving more than one sortie per aircraft difficult in a given crew day. 

Utilization rates for the C-130 fleet averaged 3.71 hours for Desert Shield 

and 3.42 for Desert Storm.*’ 

26When the Desert Express C-141 landed (normally in the late afternoon), the cargo 

was quickly downloaded, resorted for final destinations, pelletized, and loaded aboard the 

first C-130, which departed within one hour and thirty minutes after the C-141 landed. 

A C-130 departed every thirty minutes after the first C-130 departure until all Desert 

Express cargo was on its way. These flights were all primarily night missions to accommodate the C-141 schedule. 

A COMALF Perspective.” 27“ 

28Lt Col Robert E. Edmisten. Headquarters USCENTAF, Director of Transportation,” 

USCENTAF Desert ShieldlDesert Storm Transportalion: Milestones in the Sand,” Defense 

Transportation Joumul (Jun 1991), p 58. 

29Bailey briefing. Utilization rate is the hour per day flying time utilization of the 

C-130 fleet. The numbers given were averaged out over the reporting periods. The 

planned wartime utilization rate is 4.0. One of the reasons that the overall Desert Storm 

utilization rate is relatively low in spite of hours flown, is that low casualty rates made 

36 C-130s apportioned to the air evacuation role by COMALF relatively unproductive. 

153 
During the September-December period, COMALF concentrated on 

opening up new bases such as King Khalid Military City, where KC-1 35s 

and EC-135s were to be bedded down, and A1 Kharj, where F- I 5s, F- 16s, 

and additional C-130s were to be bedded down. Al Kharj was a bare 

base, with no fuel, billeting, communications, or lights.% CENTAF requested C-5 support to move outsize cargo for the F-1SEequipped 4th 

TFW, which was moving from Thumrait to Al Kharj. Although the 

request was not approved by TRANSCOM, C-130s flew 147 missions and 

moved 1,270 tons of cargo and 598 passengers in support of the move.31 

As the force continued to build, support systems became the limiting 

factor. Basics such as cots, tents, and latrines were in short supply. Acquiring fuel and a fuel distribution system wem paramount. Bladders were installed on the ground and filled as rapidly as possible. Also, MHE and support 

equipment was brought in as fast as the airlift priority system allowed?2 

Even after the MHE equipment was in place, significant effort was 

needed to keep it operating. For example, of the ten 25K loaders that 

were in place at Dhahran, five were out of commission in,September 

1990. CENTAF was not able to get the MHE equipment fixed at the major 

APODs, so MAC sent spares and technicians to repair them. MHE reliability 

was a continuing problem throughout the theater and had to be aggressively managed.33 

During the war, the C-I 30 played a vital role in resupplying forward 

Army logistics bases and Air Force FOLs. For example, they delivered 

approximately 600,OOO gallons of fuel to these bases. Also, C-130s 

delivered critical munitions and cargo to forward forces. Landing on 

narrow strips of road in northern Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq, the 

C-130s ran daily shuttle missions between staging areas and the forward 

logistics bases. (Figure 34 presents an example of such activity.) 

30Kondra notes, p 30 

Bailey briefing. 31 

32"A COMALF Perspective." (see Chapter 7 for more discussion on the priority 

33Kondra notes, p 46. 

system.) 

154 
Figure 34 

Theater Main Supply Routes and Logistics Bases 

The Army assisted in resupplying its forces by flying five C-23B Sherpa 

transport aircraft over 250,000 miles during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

These small turboprop aircraft airlifted critical Army combat weapon system 

repair parts from Abu Dhabi, Dhahran, and King Khalid Military City to 

forward locations in northern Saudi Arabia. They flew over 1,400 hours 

and airlifted 800,000 pounds of Army cargo and 400 passengers. However, 

they were limited to operating from improved runways.34 

The Navy and Marine Corps operated their own intratheater airlift to 

provide service-unique support within the theater. With twenty-five 

C-130s (five Navy, twenty Marine Corps) and various helicopters, the 

Navy and Marines linked with the principle MAC supply APODs to move 

34U.S. Army Aviation Center, Operation Desert ShieldStoim Ajier Action Report, 

Fort Rucker, AL, 22 Nov 1991. 

155 
critically required assets to forward deployed forces and to carrier onboard delivery and vertical on-board delivery pick-up points for shipboard 

delivery. Pick-up points were in Bahrain, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and 

Hurghada, Egypt.3s Figure 35 depicts the principal United States Navy 

Central Command (USNAVCENT) logistics bases. The replenishment and 

maintenance effort supported by the Navy and Marine “logistics air force” 

kept six battle groups on-station and ready throughout Desert Shield and 

Desert 

In addition to the logistics support mentioned above, the U.S. C-130 

force supported the sustainment requirements of the Marines during 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm through early March 1991 by flying 351 

missions to deliver 1,076.7 short tons of cargo, 1,071 pallets, and 61 6 

passengers. 7he CENTAF JMCC allocated the Marine Corps thirty-five 

missions a day during the ground war, but only an average of five to six 

sorties were flown. The reasons given for this limited use of air support 

are varied, but prime considerations were the expeditionary nature of the 

airfields and the displacement of the combat service support areas 

(CSSAs). For example, when the forward CSSA moved from Mishab to 

Kabrit and then to Khanjar, flight operations were halted until expeditionary airfields were constructed and certified for use. Each of the moves 

caused C-130 air cargo movement to cease for five to nine days while the 

process of construction and certification was accomplished. Even after 

certification, the thresholds of the airfields at Kabrit and Khanjar eroded 

after several C-130 landings and had to be regraded and rerolled. The 

refurbishing caused a halt in C-I30 operations varying from six to thirtysix hours. The Marine commanders deemed ground transportation as 

more reliable because of weather factors, the constant movement of units, 

the reliability of the Logistics Vehicle System (LVS), and the amount of 

cargo it could cany in a tandem tow configuration. For these reasons, the 

use of air assets for the movement of air cargo was underutilized.” 

%epartment of the Navy, “The United States Navy in Desert ShieWDesert Storm” 

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, IS 

May 1991), p 31. 

361bid. 

Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, Cornbar Service Support 

Operations in Southwest Asia, Battle Assessment Interim Report #I. edited by Lr Col 

Robert T. Forte (Quantico. VA: Marine Corps Operations Analysis and Assessment 

Group, 28 Aug 1991). p 81. 

37 
Figure 35 

Principal NAVCENT Logistics Bases 

Another intratheater airlift asset used in theater was the C-21. By 

October, eight C-21s were in the AOR; the CENTAF staff used them to fly 

the ATOs to air bases where CENTAF air assets were stationed. Since ATos 

were classified and secure communications to all bases were insufficient, 

ATOs were delivered by couriers in the C-21 Lear Jets.38 

Since all of the C-130 flying during the deployment phase was airland" and because most of the bases had wide, 10,OOO ft runways, the 

COMALF was concerned that the crews would lose their tactical proficiency: i.e., short runway takeoffs and landings, airdrops, formation flying, 

and low-altitude flying and navigation. Consequently, COMALF initiated 

%WAPS Statistical Compendium. Also, Kondra Notes, p 82. 

"Airland is the airlift term for flying to an airfield and landing before discharging 

passengers and cargo as opposed to air dropping the passengers and cargo. 

157 
a rigorous training program that included short-dirt-strip takeoffs and 

landings, low-level navigation training routes, and equipment drops on 

improvised drop 

Integration is always important, and the C-130s practiced with fighters, tankers, helicopters, Coalition aircraft, the E-3 Airborne Warning and 

Control System (AWACS), and the EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) to perfect operational procedures. 

Airspace control with a concern for the potential threat of a midair collision constituted one of the greatest challenges for the COMALF and 

CENTAF operational staffs. In the long run, safe airspace control turned 

out to be one of many major accomplishments by the CENTAF staff. 

New airdrop procedures were devised. Water was obviously going to 

be important. However, the large rubber bladders that, in the past, were 

used to air drop water were no longer in the inventory. Since bottled water 

was readily available, the C-130 crews practiced until they were able to air 

drop without breaking the bottles. Fuel would play an important part in a 

mobile battlefield, so bladders brought into the AOR could be carried in the 

C-130s. The C-130 crews practiced transfemng fuel to ground units under 

austere desert conditions. Under emergency situations, fuel could have 

been air dropped to units in fifty-five gallon drums:' 

Tactical airlift had its most rewarding test after the air war started. 

To prevent the Iraqis from shifting their forces, General Schwarzkopf 

directed that both XVIII Corps and VII Corps remain in their base camps 

until after the air war started and Iraq's ability to detect CENTCOM'S 

movements had been degraded. As a result, after the air campaign started, tactical airlift forces were called on to airlift the entire XVIII Airborne 

Corps from King Fahd and nearby bases to Rafha, a distance of over 400 

miles. The original plan called for seventy-two aircraft, with one aircraft 

landing at Rafha every ten minutes, twenty-four hours a day for fourteen 

days-a flow of over 2,000 sorties. In actuality, the flow into Rafha averaged one landing every seven minutes for the first thirteen days of the 

move; 14,000 personnel and over 9,OOO tons of equipment were transported. The C-130 fleet utilization rate for this period was 8.0-twice the 

4os6~ COMALF Perspective? 

4'lbid. 

158 
planned wartime rate. After the XVIII Airborne Corps was closed?* the 

relocation allowed the Corps to participate in what General Schwarzkopf 

called the “Hail Mary Pass” when the XVIII Airborne Corps drove north 

to the Euphrates River and then east to encircle the Iraqi Republican 

Guard. After closing the XVIII Airborne Corps, C-130 airflow was 

turned to building up logistic bases by hauling fuel, food, water, parts and 

supplies, and ammunition to places like “Log Base Charlie,” which was 

just a strip beside a highway adjacent to the Trans-Arabian oil pipeline 

in the vicinity of Rafha.“ 

About the same time, Lieutenant General Boomer, Commander of 

Marine Forces, decided that because of the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait, the 

Second Marine Division should be shifted to the northwest to penetrate 

Kuwait “at the bend in the elbow.’* The C-130 force accomplished the 

shift with approximately 500 sorties from Writ to Khanjar.“ [Figure 36 

shows the Kabrit and LZ 83 (Khanjar) areas and their positions relative 

to the Trans-Arabian pipeline.] 

Once the ground war started, a new factor for the U.S. C-130 force 

was added-airdrop. The first major call was for the C-130s to resupply 

VII Corps with ammunition. Because of bad weather, supply trucks had 

become mired in the mud, requiring an emergency resupply by air. The 

second and final major airdrop was to the lOlst Division on patrol along 

the Euphrates River. The division had out run its supply lines, so the 

C- 130s air dropped one hundred tons of food and water to it. Because the 

war lasted only one-hundred hours, over ninety percent of the C-130 air 

drops, however, were for water and MREs. The purpose. of course, was to 

feed the unexpectedly large number of Iraqi POWS.~ 

42This is the term given to completion of transporting a unit or organizational entity 

43Bailey briefing. 

44Gen Boomer is referring to the sharp turn in the demarcation line between Saudi 

Arabia and Kuwait. Also, David L. Dittmer. “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm,” Vol: “Overview and Summary”: Center for Naval Analyses, 

Alexandria, VA, Aug 1992, p 20. 

and its equipment from one point to another. 

A COMALF Perspective.” 45.. 

&Ibid. 

159 
C-130 Taking Off at “Log Base Charlie.” 

The COMALF had allotted thirty-six C-130s for the air evac role on the 

basis of an estimated 3,000 casualties per day. Air Force medical personnel, mostly Guard and Reserves, performed well. Many were at austere 

bases near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border to help interface with the Army and 

Marine hospitals. Over 1,400 Air Force medical personnel were in 

theater. Although only a small portion of their capability was used, they 

did process over 12,000 patients during Desert ShieldDesert Storm.47 

(See Figure 37 for map of the air evacuation system.) 

After the war, the C-130 force’s main task was to help the Army, 

Marines, and Air Force redeploy their troops and equipment to the main 

ports. The goal was to get the troops home as quickly as possible. 

TRANSCOM’S scheduling of CRAF worked very well, and CENTCOM began 

redeploying the troops home by the thousands. The goal was about 6,000 

a day. The C-130s’ work in the theater was not over, however. They 

continued to fly food, water, and supplies to POWS and refugees. One of 

the last big C-130 airlifts brought the last 6,000 refugees out of Safwan, 

Iraq, to relocation camps in Saudi Arabia. The UN took responsibility 
for the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait only after all the 

refugees had been airlifted out.48 

I 

Figure 36 

MARCENT Area 

161 
Figure 37 

Aeromedical Evacuation 

@ Medical Facility 

Land 'hamportation 

Common-user land transportation was the responsibility of the U.S. 

Army, which found itself unprepared to meet the needs of the other 

component services because of the priority given to deploying combat 

~nits.4~ The arrival of the Army's 7th Transportation Group on 11 August 1990 provided relief. Some of the personnel were assigned airport 

and seaport operations duties, and the robust transportation staff was able 

49Headquarters, Department of the Army, Desert ShieWDesert Storm Afrer Action 

Report, Volume 11: Main Report, Sep 1991. U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, p VIIEmployment-101. 

162 
to satisfy the immediate requirement for buses and trucks to move equipment out of the ports. However, throughout the operation, vehicle requirements far exceeded vehicle availability.s0 For example, the cargo 

backlogs at the APODs and SPODs were so great that, on C+38 

(14 September), U.S. Army Forces, Central Command (ARCENT) Support 

Command (Provisional) declared a crisis, and 500 more trucks were 

ordered.” Initial U.S. Air Force ground assets were provided from 

prepositioned sites in theater and the Air Force prepositioned ship “Advantage.” In addition to vehicles deployed with the units, nearly 3,400 

vehicles were distributed from prepositioned assets to support the first 

phase of arriving forces. But the realization that the available assets were 

being overwhelmed called for innovation by the CENXOM logistics staff. 

The staff looked to contracting, host nation support, and other donor 

Prepositioned Vehicles at Thumrait, Oman. 

%.S. Amy Center for Military History, CulfWar History of U.S. Amy Operations, 

5’Gulf War History of U.S. Army Operations, pp 3-25, 3-26. 

edited by Mr. Mickey Shubert, ND, p 3-17. 

163 
assistance for relief. The result was that most vehicle shortfalls were 

filled by over 2,700 rentals and approximately 2,000 vehicles contributed 

by Japan and the Saudi Assistance in Kind pr~gram.’~ 

Because the deployment flow emphasized the early arrival of combat 

forces, ARCENT could not meet the demands for common-user land transportation. In particular, delay in munitions movements caused an excessive backlog at the ports. As previously mentioned, the problem was 

accentuated by an early CENTCOM decision to increase stockage levels of 

food and munitions in theater from thirty to sixty days. Containers and 

munitions piled up at the ports, numerous ships “in the stream” awaited 

offload, and numerous pallets had inadequate identifications at the APODs. 

Contracting and HNS solved some of the problems, but individual Services 

had to arrange to augment their own surface transportation requirements. 

The Army was overextended in filling its own overland lift requirements, 

and the Marines’ organic line haul capability was fully committed. 

CENTAF began contracting for its own line haul capability through 

ARCENT’S Support Command (Pro~isional).’~ 

During the deployment and sustainment phases of Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm, CENTAF transporters sourced and allocated nearly 10,OOO Air 

Force vehicles to support twenty-five Air Force beddown locations. 

Rapid distribution of vehicles was first priority among steps to increase combat readiness. Early in the deployment phase, a twenty-oneman Air Force team was formed to depreserve and service the Southwest 

Asia (SWA) prepositioned fleet. At one of the preposition sites. the team 

made over 2,148 Air Force vehicles mission-ready in only twenty-one 

days, an average of 102 vehicles a day. Additionally, 244 vehicles were 

expeditiously downloaded from the Air Force prepositioned ship “Advantage” and provided crucial vehicle support for the entire western 

region of Saudi Arabia. Movement of all commodities was CENTAF’S 

next concern .% 

AFLC Operations in Desert Storm,” Air Force Logistics Command white paper, 52.6 

Jul 1991. 

531ntvw, with Lt Col Robert E. Edmisten. 

%SCENTAF “Milestones in the Sand.” p 58. 

164 
CENTAF requested C-141 strategic airlift support early in September to 

assist in moving oversized prepositioned equipment from Oman to beddown bases in Saudi Arabia. Because of CINCCENT’S deployment priorities, 

the Commander-in-Chief, Transportation Command (CIN~NS), denied 

the request, and surface transportation moved the oversized cargo.” The 

C- 130 fleet supported the distribution of the remaining items.” 

Because highways were limited within the theater, intratheater 

C-130 airlift became the vital link for moving personnel, equipment, and 

mission-critical items throughout Southwest Asia. The CENTCOM JMCC 

validated all theater airlift requests generating the airlift movement discussed earlier in the chapter. Also, two Joint Airlift Clearance Authorities (ACAS) at major APODs monitored and expedited all service ship 

ments. The ACAs tracked over 6,857 actions and expedited movement of 

822 critical Air Force sustainment and Army war-fighting cargos.” 

Blueball Express Tnrcks at Al Kharj Enroute to Taif. 

%tvw, with Lt Col Robert E. Edmisten; Kondra notes, p 35. 

S6Bailey briefing. 

’’IUSCENTAF “Milestones in the Sand,” p 58. 

165 
With the commencement of hostilities, most third-country nationals 

walked off the job-nearly crippling CENTAF'S contracted line-haul distribution. This was anticipated by the planning documents, and so it was 

not a surprise. The CENTAF logistics staff took immediate action to 

develop and implement the firstever sustained Air Force line haul operation, the Blueball Express. This operation entailed the use of 200 Air 

Force drivers from nearly every Air Force specialty code and 100 leased 

tractor trailers. During the war, Blueball Express primarily transported 

munitions and aviation fuel to sustain the air campaign and subsequent 

ground offensive. They operated out of four independent operating 

locations: Al Kharj (F-15s. F-16s. and C-130~)~ Jeddah (KC-135s and 

KC-10s). Riyadh (KW2C-135~. E-3s. C-21s. EC-130 AB~S and E-8s), 

and King Fahd (A-lOs, Ac/Ec/MC/HC/C-l3Os. MH-53s.and MH-60s). 

The Express delivered nearly twenty million pounds of sustainment and 

ammunition cargo directly to support Desert Storm combat air operations. 

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, over 150 million pounds of cargo 

were line hauled by a combination of commercial, Army, and Blueball 

Express assets?' 

Accountability and control of transportation resources throughout 

Southwest Asia were quickly solved by the ingenuity of experienced 

transporters on the CENTAF logistics staff. CENTAF transporters locally 

developed real-time vehicle database management programs to control 

and track assigned vehicles. They also developed extensive computerized 

personnel management systems to provide information on manning 

strength at each beddown site. The capability to access resource information instantaneously was invaluable in enabling responses to short-notice 

requests for support of forward operating location^.'^ 

When Desert Storm ended, the Blueball Express mission changed. 

American troops were being deployed to CONUS and bases were marked for 

closure. The Harvest Falcon and Eagle assets from those bases had to be 

moved to the reconstitution sites, primarily Al Kharj and Thumrait, where 

they would be inventoried, repaired, packed, and stored. The Blueball 

Express was tasked to transport much of the cargo, a task that could be 

done more effectively and efficiently if resources were combined. Consequently, the entire operation was consolidated and moved to the more 

centrally located Riyadh. Operating from Riyadh, the surface transportation 

166 
task continued through September 1992. By this time, the majority of 

Harvest Falcon and Eagle assets had been transported from the deployed 

sites to the reconstitution sites, and the Blueball Express began to scale 

down operations. Today, transportation line haul assets have been identified to meet future contingency requirements in Southwest Asia; they will 

be part of CENTAF’S continuing prepositioning program.6o 

Summary 

The intratheater lift systems were an essential element of air power 

in the Gulf area and vital to the success of the entire Desert Shield and 

Storm operation. However, basic planning for intratheater distribution 

was marginal. It did not cope with the significant and continued cascading requirements, which ultimately led to a doubling of the force structure 

in the theater. The APODs and SPODs were overwhelmed at the beginning 

because a conscious decision was made to load combat forces ahead of 

supporting forces. The situation was exacerbated by a CENTCOM decision 

to increase stockage levels of food and munitions in the theater from 

thirty to sixty days. And finally, the intratheater distribution problem was 

compounded by the poor in-transit cargo visibility capability of the 

various Service systems. 

Despite the problems, intratheater transportation systems were successfully implemented because of several factors. Additional C-130s were 

made available during the air and ground phases of the war to support the 

increased force structure in the theater. Generous support from host nations, Coalition members, and other donors helped satisfy increased requirements for surface transportation. And time was available to dedicated 

personnel for ad hoc planning and development of innovation solutions to 

transportation flow and in-transit cargo visibility problems. 

qntvw, with Lt Col Robert E. Edmisten. 

167 
168 
Appendix 4A 

Theater Preposi tioned Equipment 

Srr (000) C-141~* ~~ 

Bare Base 

Vehicles 

Medical 

Munitions 

Trap 

Rations 

Fuels Equipment 

Comm Equipment 

Totals 

14.7 

12.8 

1 .o 

42.5 

.4 

3.9 

.7 

- 

76.0 

655 

570 

90 

1,888 

19 

171 

29 

3,422 

*C-141 Equivalents 

169 
170 
Appendix 4B 

Theater Airlift Management 

Within the AOR, airlift supported air operations under the Joint Force 

Air Component Commander (JFACC), also known as the Air Force Forces 

Commander (AFFOR). 

The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) performed as the senior 

command and control element and coordinated all air movements and 

airspace control. As a subordinate element of the Tactical Air Control 

System (TACS), the Commander of Airlift Forces (COMALF) with Airlift 

Control Center (ALCC) and Airlift Wing Operations Centers (WoCs) 

operated as a command and control core for airlift forces. The TACC and 

ALCC were collocated. 

The COMALF was dual-hatted. As the AFFOR’S Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Airlift, he was the central manager for all theater airlift assets and was 

responsible for providing common-user airlift support for joint customers. 

He was also responsible to CINCMAC for monitoring and managing MAC 

forces that transited the theater. 

The ALCC was a MAC command and control element specifically 

tailored for a given scenario and deployed with the COMALF to provide 

airlift management and tasking. The ALCC director was directly 

responsible to the COMALF for all aspects of airlift operations. 

The ALCC had three primary divisions: 

Airlift Operations Division (DOO). Prepared the Airlift Mission Schedule (ALMSNSCD), a detailed mission summary, 

from preplanned airlift requests. 

Command and Control Division (DOC). Responsible for 

flight-following and executing the ALMSNSCD. Coordinated 

operations with wocs, deployed ALCEs, and CCTs. 

171 
Combat Operations Division (DOX). Responsible for coordinating of immediate airlift requests. Coordinated airfield 

and airspace issues with DO0 and DOC. Managed ALCE and 

ccr deployments and planned tactical events. 

The ALCC also had several supporting staff elements: 

Communications. Managed MAC organic communications 

and coordinated nonorganic communications requirements. 

Intelligence. Kept ALCC functional areas informed of enemy 

ground and air threats that affected present and future 

operations. 

Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center (AECC). Medical 

liaison. Coordinated airlift response for theater medical 

movement requirements and movement of wounded from 

theater. 

Aerial Port Control Center (APCC). Liaison. Controlled and 

allocated aerial port resources while monitoring unit 

capability and workload. 

Ground Liaison Officer (GLO). Liaison between Army Air 

Ground System and ALCC. Advised on Army tactics and 

employment matters. 

Logistics Readiness Center (LRC). Monitored and expedited 

movement and repair of airlift aircraft, aerospace ground 

equipment (AGE), and war readiness spares kits (WRSK). 

Weather. Provided current and forecast weather support for 

COMALF and ALCC. 

Within the AOR, two basic types of airlift requests occurred; they 

differ in time available to satisfy a movement requirement. 

Preplanned. Normally more than twenty-four hours to plan, 

coordinate, and execute through the ALMSNSCD. Request for 

common-user airlift support passed up through service chain 

to Joint Movement Center (JMC), which reviewed, prioritized, 

172 
and validated the requirement. ALCC executed validated 

requests in priority sequence until capability was saturated. 

The requirements were listed in DOO’S ALMSNSCD, and 

missions were tasked in the Air Tasking Order (ATO). 

Immediate. Movement required in less time than preplanned 

request, outside the ALMSNSCD publishing cycle. Like 

preplanned, service validated requirement (normally, 

immediate request traveled through operations channels 

instead of logistic), which was sent to JMC for joint 

validation. Because of time compression, field-assigned 

Theater Airlift Liaison Officer (TALO) and TALOs at each 

higher level informed the ALCC of the pending request 

through the Advanced Airlift Request Net (AARN). 

Therefore, when validation was received from the JMC, DOX 

had already planned the mission, including airspace, and DOC 

executed either by aircraft diversion or alert sortie. USMTF 

formatting is now the standard airlift request for both 

preplanned and immediate. 

173 
I74 
Appendix 4C 

Definition of Provisional Units Terms 

ALDP 

TAWP 

CSGP 

TASP 

ECS 

AREFSP 

AERO EVAC SQP 

MASP 

AVSP 

ALCSP 

WXGP 

Airlift Division (Provisional) 

Tactical Airlift Wing (Provisional) 

Combat Support Group (Provisional) 

Tactical Airlift Squadron (Provisional) 

Electronic Countermeasures Squadron 

Air Refueling Squadron (Provisional) 

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron 

(Provisional) 

Military Airlift Support Squadron 

(Provisional) 

Audio Visual Squadron (Provisional) 

Airlift Control Squadron (Provisional) 

Weather Group (Provisional) 

175 
176 
5 

Air Refueling 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm clearly demonstrated the 

tremendous value and contribution of aerial refueling to U.S. and allied 

worldwide military operations and the efforts expended to maximize its 

effectiveness. Air refueling was a significant factor in every phase of air 

operations in the Gulf War. It extended the range of deploying aircraft, 

applied innovative tactics to compress closure time in getting combat 

units in place, and was an integral part of virtually all strike, 

reconnaissance, and airborne command and control operations. This 

chapter reviews the job the tanker forces faced, the state of planning and 

preparation, and significant aspects of where, when, and how the job was 

accomplished. The following paragraphs summarize issues addressed. 

Planning was incomplete, but the continuous experience of forming 

and executing tanker task force (?TF) activity enabled quick response to 

deployment taskings. As the situation demanded, the planning, 

employment, basing, and daily numbers of committed tanker aircraft 

changed constantly throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm.' 

Air power operations involved every aspect of the tanker force, 

including airframe and aircrew availability, manpower issues, call up of Air 

National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFRES) forces, scheduling, 

deployment, employment, logistics support, and interoperability between 

U.S. and Allied aircraft. Coalition forces in the Southwest Asian theater 

assembled air refueling assets (including twelve different refueling aircraft) 

from five nations. The United States provided the Air Force KC-10 and 

KC-l3SA/E/Q/and R tankers, the Marine Corps KC-130, and the Navy 

carrier-based KA-6. U.S. air component tankers included ANC, AFRES, and 

active duty assets. The United Kingdom's tankers VC-10 and TriStar 

'(S) Tanker Study, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Plans and Resources (XP), 

1 Mar 1991, p 5-1. 

177 
K.Mk 1 and the French version of the KC-135R model were in theater. 

Canadian and Saudi air forces flew a Boeing 707 tanker derivative.’ 

An F-16 from the 363d TFW refueling during Desert Storm. 

Although the primary mission of Air Force tankers was air refueling, 

they also transported cargo and personnel. Tankers carried 4,817 short tons 

of cargo and 14,208 passengers during the operations. Strategic Air 

Command (SAC) released 20 KC-10s to U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM) for use in Military Airlift Command (MAC) channels. Those 

KC-10s hauled 25,172 tons of cargo and carried 4,185 pa~sengers.~ 

AFRES and ANG air refueling participation in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm consisted of 80 deployed tankers and over 5,000 mobilized air 

reserves and guardsmen. Air Reserve Component (ARC) units included 

*(S) Desert ShieldDesert Storm Tanker Assessment, Headquarters Strategic Air 

3Memo for the Record, SAULGL, “Movement of Passengers and Cargo,’’ 8 Jan 91, 

Command, Plans & Requirements (XP), 23 Sep 1991, p 1-3. 

in History, HQ SAC, Jan-Dec 91, p 493. 

178 
thirteen ANG KC-135E units, three AFRES KC-135E units, and three 

KC-1 0 associate units. Volunteers added significantly to the active 

forces. However, volunteerism did have limitations that point out the 

importance of timing in activating both the Reserve and the Guard.4 

Approximately 100 tankers operated from 9 countries to form the 

Atlantic and Pacific Air Refueling Bridges, which moved over 1,OOO 

fighter and bomber aircraft. Desert Shield and Desert Storm involved the 

largest, most complex tanker operations since the Vietnam War. The 

increased capability of the reengined KC-135R was the mainstay of air 

refueling support. Air refuelable tankers, which are presently limited to 

59 KC-10s and 8 KC-l35Rs, provided the greatest offload capability. 

Additional air refuelable KC- 135Rs would allow a decrease in the number 

of tankers required for deployment in future conflicts.' 

SAC KC-1 0 and KC-1 35 tankers refueled all United States Air Force 

aircraft, as well as the aircraft of Italy, Oman, Bahrain, and the United 

Arab Emirates (UAE). United States Air Force, U.S. Navy, and United 

Kingdom tankers refueled Navy aircraft. SAC and Marine tankers refueled U.S. Marine Corps aircraft initially, but eventually, Marine aviation 

completed its own refuelings. The tankers of the United Kingdom and 

France refueled their respective aircraft. Canadian and Saudi aircraft 

were refueled by their own and United States Air Force tankers. The 

Kuwaiti Air Force was not air refueled.6 

Airspace was the primary limitation for air refueling in Desert Storm. 

It was also a major factor for Proven Force operations. During heavy 

flying periods in the AOR, additional tankers, regardless of configuration, 

could not have been used because of airspace congestion. Air refueling 

tracks and anchors were used to maximize tanker availability. A relatively 

small two to three percent of attack packages were composed of both 

receptacle and probeequipped receivers, but the packages required either 

one KC-10 and one KC-135, or multiple KC-135s. Multipoint refueling 

aircraft could allow planners to decrease the total number of tankers used, 

4DS/DS Tanker Assessment, p 3-7. 

'Ibid, p 4-10. 

61bid, p 9-2. 

179 
but increasing the number of receivers per tanker imposes safety implications related to large-formation refuelings? 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm proved that airpower projection is 

critically dependent on air refueling. U.S. Air Force tankers alone flew 

over 34,000 sorties or 141 ,000 flight hours, performed 85,000 refuelings 

and, offloaded over 1.2 billion pounds (1 93,543,000 gallons) of fuel. 

Tables 12 and 13 summarize tanker activity during Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm.* 

A total of 262 KC-135s and 46 KC-10s operating out of 21 locations 

in 10 countries provided round the clack aerial refueling support to U.S. 

Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and Coalition forces during 

Desert Storm. Fully 81 percent of the United States Air Force's KC-10 

fleet and 44 percent of the KC-135 fleet were committed to the Gulf 

crisis during its peak. Table 14 depicts the diversity and magnitude of 

the tanker deployment? 

Table 12 

Cumulative Desert Shield Totals 

Aircraft Eventsl Total Offloads 

SPe Sorties* Hours Rcvr ARs (pounds of fuel) 

KC- 10 4,117 23,262 4,523 87,340,800 

KC- 135AAUQ 10,128 37,095 23,312 263,379,200 

KC- 135E 3,040 14,476 5,545 90,297,600 

Total 17,285 74,833 33,380 44 1,017,600 

*Sortie numbers include AR, airlift, MAC channel, and KC-10 dual role sorties. 

'lbid, p 9-3. 

'lbid, p 2- 13. 

'Briefing, SAC Battle Staff, 27 Feb 1991 

180 
Table 13 

Cumulative Desert Storm Totals 

Aircraft Events/ Total ornoads 

5Pe Sorties* Hours Rcvr ARs (pounds of fuel) 

KC- 10 3,278 16,717 10,915 283,616,000 

KC- I35AAUQ 9,897 34,635 27,390 353,030,000 

KC- 135E 3,690 14,886 13,391 164,090,OOo 

TOTAL 16,865 66,238 5 1,696 800,736,000 

Table 14 

Tanker Deployment at the Peak of Desert Storm 

KC-10 KC-135A KC-13SQ KC-135E KC-135R Total 

Deployed 29 36 26 66 65 222 

in AOR 

Supporting 17 25 3 IS 26 86 

outside the 

AOR 

Total 46 61 29 81 91 308 

Percent of 81 34 54 48 45 45 

type committed 

181 
The size and complexity of the Gulf War called for the involvement 

of aerial refueling assets of the extent shown in the following table. 

Although the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and the 

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps all provided refueling aircraft, Air Force 

tankers conducted the bulk of the aerial refueling during the operation. 

The assets conducting these operations came from 20 different active duty 

units, plus thirteen Air National Guard, three Air Force Reserve, and 

three associate units. Table 15 depicts the number of refueling events 

and total offloads provided by USAF tankers." 

Tanker Planning 

Commander-in-Chief. Strategic Air Command Operation Plan (CINCSAC 

OPLAN) 1002-88 was the baseline planning document for refueling operations in support of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Air 

Force Central Command (USCENTAF) OPLANs 1002. The SAC plan called 

for deployment of B-52~. RC-135s. and U-2s; KC-135s and KC-10s were 

to provide refueling support for operations. The KC-135s included 

KC-135Rs to support the B-52s at Cairo East and KC-135Es to support 

the AOR from Jeddah New. The balance of the tankers would support the 

fighter deployment and airlift, with KC-l35A/Rs operating from the 

continental United States (CONUS), KC-1 35A/Rs and KC- 10s operating in 

the Atlantic ~FS, and KC-135As in the Pacific. 

Changes in the CENTAF OPLAN in April 1990, added KC-135s to support the AOR from Sharjah, UAE. SAC later argued that the number of 

tankers in the area of responsibility (AOR) to support more than 500 

fighters plus Navy carrier air was insufficient. The changes also added 

additional KC-135s to Cairo East to support increased numbers of B-52s, 

more KC-135s to both the Atlantic and Pacific 'ITFs, and KC-10s for 

tasking in MAC channels. More KC-10s would serve in a dual role of 

refueling deploying Tactical Air Command (TAC) fighters and airlifting 

their supporting personnel and cargo. All of these aircraft allocations 

were overtaken by the events in Desert Shield." 

"DSIDS Tanker Assessments, p 2-3. 

"History of the Strategic Air Command, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 90, Volume I Narrative, 

p 335. 

182 
Table 15 

Total USAF Refueling Events and Receiver Onloads 

TOTAL ONLOAD REFUELING 

EVENTS SAC RECEIVERS 

KC-10 36 1 16,531,034 

KC-135 23 656,032 

B-52 2,166 137,225,933 

RC- 135 739 40,736,096 

EC- 135 69 3,295,603 

FB-111 130 1,673,875 

E-4 2 279,097 

SAC SUBTOTAL 3.490 200,397,670 

TAC RECEIVERS TOTAL ONLOAD REFUELING 

EVENTS 

F-16 

F-15 

EC- 130 

A-10 

E-3 

EF-I11 

F-4 

10.066 64,487,654 

10,007 168,208,013 

206 2,765,9 13 

2.863 12,344,576 

937 

1,262 

3.33 1 

54,912,230 

18,078,413 

36,975.098 

RF-4 436 4,635,936 

F-117 Not Releasable 1,941,196 

F-111 188 3,442,886 

TAC SUBTOTAL 29,296 367,791,917 

183 
Table 15 (Continued) 

Total uSAF Refueling Events and Receiver Onloads 

TOTAL ONLOAD REFUELING MAC RECEIVERS EVENTS 

c-5 

C-130 

C-141 

AC- 130 

EC- 130 

HC- 130 

WC- 130 

MC- 130 

187 

6 

316 

12 

9 

2 

2 

19 

13,647,565 

56.6 14 

16,942,522 

268,646 

113,491 

20,064 

19,110 

19 1.872 

MAC SUBTOTAL 553 3 1,259,884 

USAFE RECEIVERS REFUELING 

EVENTS TOTAL ONLOAD 

F-111 2,499 32,881,709 

EF-111 142 1,820,768 

FB-111 29 169,369 

RF-4 112 893,849 

F-4 1,730 20,648,53 1 

F-16 4,015 22.42 1,805 

F-15 2,260 30,673.65 1 

WC- 135 3 53,203 

EC-135 6 107,942 

EC- 130 10 75,046 

HC- 130 1 9,555 

A-10 852 3,151,776 

USAFE SUBTOTAL 1 1,659 11 2,907,204 

184 
Table 15 (Continued) 

Total USAF Refueling Events and Receiver Onloads 

AFRES RECEIVERS REFUELING TOTAL ONLOAD 

EVENTS 

F-16 20 120,736 

A-10 55 257,491 

C-5 28 2,082,630 

C-141 7 316,166 

KC- 10 2 177,600 

AFRES SUBTOTAL 112 2,954,623 

TOTAL ONLOAD REFUELING 

EVENTS SOF RECEIVERS 

AC- 130 

MC- 130 

84 

39 

1,195,846 

527,289 

SOF SUBTOTAL 123 1,723,135 

ANG RECEIVERS REFUELING 

EVENTS TOTAL ONLOAD 

A-10 

C-141 

EC- 130 

c-5 

RF-4 

F-16 

5 

8 

37 

16 

327 

118 

2,496 

37 1,564 

514,112 

1,174,636 

3,410,534 

828,057 

F-15 14 146.131 

ANG SUBTOTAL 525 6,447.530 

185 
Table 15 (Continued) 

Total USAF Refueling Events and Receiver Onloads 

USN RECEIVERS TOTAL ONLOAD REFUELING 

EVENTS 

F-14 4,085 33,969,581 

FIA- 18 5,252 8,234,240 

A-6 2,026 16,558,048 

KA-6 

EA-6 

A-4 

262 

682 

16 

3,286,630 

5,598.579 

46.2 14 

A-7 896 4,772,236 

s-3 97 421,875 

KA-3 2 15,475 

USN SUBTOTAL 13,328 72,997,060 

TOTAL ONLOAD EVENTS USMC RECEIVERS 

F/A- 18 

AV-8 

EA-6 

A-6 

68 1 

238 

101 

78 

7,498,060 

2,905,017 

1,301,9OO 

899,724 

USMC SUBTOTAL 1,098 12,604,704 

DROGUE 

REFUELINGS 14,426 85.601.76 1 

BOOM REFUELINGS 45.758 723.481.963 

GRAND TOTAL 60,184 809,083,724 

186 
Initial Response 

Air refueling operations began before Desert Shield. On 21 July 

1990, transmissions between the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi and the 

U.S. State Department requested that two SAC KC-135 tankers be assigned to refuel UAE Mirage 2000 fighters beginning the morning of 

22 July 1990. The UAE planned to fly combat air patrols and protect UAE 

oil wells from possible Iraqi aircraft attacks. U.S. tankers were needed 

to extend sortie durations and were perceived by the UAE as a non-provocative deterrence to attack.12 

Notification and deployment orders were sent almost simultaneously; 

within two hours of the initial notice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jcs) sent 

a draft deployment order to SAC placing SAC’S tankers under the operational control of U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central Command 

(USCINCCENT). While SAC agreed with placing conventional bombers 

under CINCCENT, it opposed CINCCENT operational control for its tankers. 

The draft order involved deploying two KC- 135R tankers and approximately fifty people from RAF Mildenhall to the airfield at A1 Dhafra. 

Although qualified as a bare base operation, SAC tankers routinely deployed to unimproved bases for short-term operations or exercises. SAC’S 

main concern was the lack of airfield information-a problem for all major 

commands in Desert Shield. The mode of coordinating with UAE surfaceto-air missile units, the legality of refueling foreign government aircraft, 

and methods of providing early warnings of hostile air attack were also 

of concern. The final JCS deployment order was received on 23 July 

1990 and the operation was called Ivory Justice. 

The U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi suggested that SAC switch to using 

KC-10s to refuel the Mirage because the KC-10’s long hose and soft 

basket placed less strain on the Mirage 2OOO’s probe. Time was not 

available to make the change, which actually proved unnecessary. Three 

Mirage 2000s refueled successfully on 31 July and 1 August 1990; the 

exercise was terminated on 2 August when Iraq invaded Kuwait.13 

‘*History. p 323. 

13DS/DS Tanker Assessments, p 4-1 1. 

187 
Deployment Phase 

On 2 August 1990, the Secretary of Defense directed deployment of 

U.S. forces to support military operations in the CENTCOM AOR. JCS 

immediately directed deployment of two KC-10s to Diego Garcia to join 

two KC-135s there on an exercise. Unlike the earlier draft order, this 

order allowed SAC to retain operational control of the tankers. Another 

order directed CENTAF to conduct execution planning for deploying one 

RC-135 and three KC-10 aircraft to the CENTCOM AOR. En route refueling 

support was required for the quick reaction module, which included fighters and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. SAC 

recommended against early JCS basing options at Riyadh and Dhahran 

because basing tankers there would place them within range of Iraqi 

missiles and aircraft. Jeddah New was suggested for tanker basing, since 

it was farther from Iraq.I4 CENTCOM agreed, but CENTAF prevailed, citing 

Riyadh as its headquarters location and the site of Royal Saudi Air Force 

(RSAF) tanker and E-3 operation^.'^ Brigadier General Caruana was designated as Commander Strategic Forces (STRATFOR) and departed with the 

initial module of forces to lead the SAC contingent in the CENTCOM AOR. 

SAC anticipated massive MAC air refueling requirements as well as 

fighter movement refuelings. As it turned out, MAC decided to make an 

enroute stop in Europe and ground refuel rather than air refuel. This 

action eased the tanker commitment to support TAC fighter deployments, 

which primarily called for non-stop CONUS-to-Southwest Asia flights 

requiring multiple refuelings.16 

By 8 August, force deployments were scheduled through C+40 (first 

day deployment commenced plus forty days). Initially, eighteen tankers 

were to be in the AOR, which was far fewer than planned in the latest 

draft of SAC OPLAN 1002. In reality, OPLAN 1002 was never used, but air 

refueling planners at the time were concerned that the number of tankers 

being considered would be inadequate." 

I4lbid, p 5-2. 

"History, p 332. 

I6DS/DS Tanker Assessments, p 5-2. 

"lbid, p 5-2. 

188 
On 9 August, JCS designated the deployment as Desert Shield, and the 

classification of operations was downgraded to Secret. This date marked 

the beginning of the tanker Atlantic Bridge, which would adjust support 

levels to match the fluctuating rate of deployment. 

Air Bridges 

In coordination with uSI"SCoM, air bridges were established on both 

Atlantic and Pacific routes to support cENTCOM deployment and to provide 

logistic support for SAC. Initially, approximately one and one-half fighter 

squadrons a day used the Atlantic Bridge from the CONUS to the AOR. 

ANG, AFRES, and active duty tanker aircraft provided refueling. Also, some 

MAC aircraft and straggler fighters on the way to rejoin their units were 

refueled along the bridge. Maintenance and support personnel, security 

police, fire fighters, communicators, and other personnel were deployed to 

support sustained tanker operations. The KC-135A model was used exteosively to free the KC-135R model for the Saudi peninsula. The Atlantic 

Bridge network freed MAC airlift aircraft to move other cargo and units as 

tanker organic lift capacity was employed to the maximum." 

Atlantic Bridge 

The Eighth Air Force operated the Atlantic Bridge; its bases in Europe 

included RAF Mildenhall, England; Lajes AB, Azores; Zaragoza and 

Moron ABs, Spain; Mont de Marsan, France; Malpensa, Italy; Incirlik AB, 

Turkey; and Hellenikon and Andravida, Greece. The bridge was the 

primary deployment route for all U.S. aircraft requiring aerial refueling. 

The number of tankers in place afforded the flexibility ro adjust refueling 

capability to deployment volume. Bridge tankers at bases along the route 

launched on short round-robin missioris to refuel deploying aircraft. KC135s or other KC-10s over the Atlantic and Mediterranean would refuel 

KC-10s acting as the escort refueling tankers for deploying fighter aircraft 

formations; the refueled KC- 10s in turn would refuel fighters in the formation (chicks-in-tow as such formations are called in the air refueling community because of the resemblance to a mother hen and her chick^).'^ 

"Ibid, p 4-3. 

''History, p 333. 

189 
Figure 38 

Atlantic Bridge Air Refueling 
Basing problems created an exception to the short round-robin missions 

performed by the KC-135s in the Atlantic Bridge. Because Eastern Mediterranean basing was unavailable, KC-I 0s out of Moron and Zaragoza were 

substituted to provide support for fighters transiting the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The sortie duration for these missions was from 

seven and one-half to nine hours; the substitutions continued until a base 

was established at Cairo West. 

Planning for eastbound deployments called for tanker task forces at 

Lajes, Moron, and Souda ABs and at Cairo East on the eastern end of the 

bridge. The deployment would allow support of collocated B-52s and 

naval aircraft operating from carriers in the Red Sea if hostilities erupted. 

Early changes brought in Mildenhall AB and dropped Souda AB because 

it had insufficient ramp space. These actions created a gap in the middle 

of the Mediterranean leg of the Atlantic Bridge and put an additional 

burden on Spain- and Egypt-based tankers to provide refueling support over 

the Mediterranean Sea. The use of the dual-role KC-10s increased and 

MAC'S decision to land in Europe and refuel also relieved the pressure on 

the eastern span of the Atlantic Bridge?' 

Fluctuating basing rights caused a domino effect in assignments for and 

numbers of aircraft. Moron, Spain became available in late August 1990, 

but before Desert Shield, was in drawdown status with minimum U.S. 

presence. Initially, ANG KC-135E tankers were deployed there, but they 

were replaced by KC-10s in late September to provide deep Mediterranean 

air refuelings. When the war began in January 1991, Spain agreed to base 

B-52s at Moron, and the KC-10s moved to Zaragoza and RAF Mildenhall 

in early February. When the war was over, the B-52Gs departed Moron 

on 21 March and KC-10s returned to assist with Atlantic Bridge redeployment operations?' 

SAC continued to stress the need for tankers in Egypt-if not at Cairo 

East, then in Cairo West, a remote military airfield. The lack of a Cairo 

base for tankers forced more of limited KC-I0 and KC-135R tanker assets 

to Atlantic Bridge operations. Also, OPLANS called for KC-10s in the MAC 

channel, and MAC airlift clearly was extended. Release of KC-10s for 

airlift duty would be limited by the lack of KC-135 bases in the eastern 

"DS/DS Tanker Assessments, p 4-4. 

"lbid, p 4-5. 

191 
Mediterranean. As a consequence, SAC also asked JCS to consider as 

possible ~17; operating locations Akrotiri on Cyprus; Incirlik in Turkey; 

Hellenikon in Greece; Antalya in 'Ibrkey; and Sigonella in Italy?2 

Constant coordination problems occurred involving multiple commands 

and levels of the State Department. Tanker Task Force Europe (m) 

regularly used Hellenikon AB for fuel and weather diversion and for 

supporting RC-135 operations. Hellenikon AB shares the runway with 

Athens International Airport in Greece. U.S. operations at Hellenikon were 

scheduled to be shut down and the airfield turned back to the Greek government by 30 June 1991. As part of the Mutual Defense Cooperation 

Agreement, U.S. Air Forces Europe's (USAFE'S) host operational support 

would end 1 February 1991. The European Command (EUCOM) plan was 

to move tankers to Andravida, a Greek air base west of Athens. There was 

much concern about U.S. operations leaving Hellenikon in the middle of 

the Gulf War, and Headquarters SAC directed that no changes be made 

before logistical and operational issues were resolved. The war ended in 

late February, and the tankers adjusted to Andravida; five KC-135Rs 

supported redeployment bridge taskings until late April 1991 ?3 

Over time, efforts by the Services and the State Department to maximize the tanker basing in Spain were very successful. At first, a Status of 

Forces Agreement limited permanently based tanker aircraft in Spain although more were allowed for short training periods. Operations were 

conducted from Zaragoza and Moron ABs, and less frequently from 

Torrejon and Rota. The number of tankers needed for the Atlantic Bridge, 

coupled with the number of aircraft stopping en route to the AOR, motivated 

negotiations for increasing the ceiling. Increases came slowly. An initial 

increase of KC-I 35Es at Moron AB was allowed, and their capabilities over 

those of KC-135As gave basing in the bridge the flexibility to move forward to the AOR, if required, to support combat aircraft. The next increment 

raised permanent tanker basing in Spain even further. Tankers making en 

route stops were not included in the count, which gave additional flexibility. 

Although KC-10s used Rota originally, safety considerations required that 

tankers not use Rota unless absolutely necessary. [DELETEDIu 

22History, p 338. 

23DS/DS Tanker Assessments. p 4-6. 

241bid. p 4-7. 

192 
The commercial airport at Malpensa in northern Italy was 340 nautical 

miles north of the planned B-52 tracks. It became a beddown for as many 

as twelve KC-10s providing pre- and post-strike air refueling for the B-52s. 

Operations at Malpensa began on 9 February 1991, and the Italian military 

provided 150 troops for security. There were many difficulties to overcome. Fuel was limited. Winter operations required de-icing of aircraft, 

and military aircraft were low priority compared to commercial flights. On 

at least one occasion, tankers were late because of de-icing delays and 

missed their assigned air refueling. As a consequence, Malpensa was one 

of the first bases shut down after the Gulf War. France was also cooperative and was one of the first countries to offer basing rights for tankers. 

The first U.S. KC-135R arrived in France on 7 February 1991 and was the 

first U.S. aircraft based there since 1966. Up to ten KC-135s were based 

at Mont de Marsan, a French Air Force base in southwestern France, but 

KC-IOAs could not use Mont de Marsan because of taxiway obstructions. 

The KC-135Rs based there provided pre- and post-strike air refueling for 

B-52G sorties. Other support included maintenance equipment, technicians, 

and translators. On one occasion, an engine tester from another base was 

flown in via a French KC-135R. Mont de Marsan operations were concluded in mid-March?’ 

In addition to Atlantic Bridge operations, RAF Mildenhall staged tankers 

deploying from Dyess AFB in Texas to Incirlik in Turkey were held at RAF 

Mildenhall awaiting diplomatic clearance. While Incirlik was an established USAFE base routinely supporting ETTF operations, ongoing diplomatic 

actions delayed deployments. When hostilities began, tankers joined the 

Joint Task Force (JTF) (known as Proven Force). SAC retained operational 

control of the aircraft and tactical control passed to USAFE This was the 

first time SAC tanker’s participated in a composite force; JTF Proven Force 

has been described as an early example of the United States Air Force 

composite wing concepty6 

PacijicBridge . 

The Pacific Bridge was not established and used as planned, since most 

deployment operations used the Atlantic Bridge. The Pacific Bridge mainly 

supported tanker, bomber, and airlift traffic en route to Diego Garcia in the 

2’Jbid, p 4-8. 

2b1bid, p 4-6. 

193 
Indian Ocean. Bridge operating locations were Hickam AFB in Hawaii, 

Andersen AFB in Guam, and Diego Garcia. Planning had also included 

Singapore, Malaysia, and Clark AB in the Philippines, but these locations 

were not used except for weather or fuel diversions?' 

The Marine AV-8s from Iwakuni in Japan were originally (OPLAN 1002- 

88) to deploy to the AOR using Pacific-based tankers. Also, the Harrier was 

only certified for refueling with KC-10s. Because of logistical constraints, 

the Marines requested that they deploy East through the CONUS and over 

the Atlantic Bridge. The deployment of twenty B-52s to Diego Garcia was 

the primary aircraft movement over the Pacific Bridge, and subsequent 

operations were designed for logistical support of the bombers and tankers 

from Andersen AB?8 A logistics shuttle called SAC Desert Express (not to 

be confused with the Airlift operation Desert Express, flown with C-141s 

from Charleston AFB) was started in mid-August 1990. KC-135As moved 

cargo and personnel from CONUS bases to Castle AFB in California. The 

SAC Desert Express then went from Castle AFB through Hickam AFB to 

Andersen AFB. From there, KC-135R or KC-10 aircraft replaced KC135As-the distance-limited KC- 135As could not fly Hickam to Diego 

because of the number of miles in~olved?~ 

The final number of tankers committed to Desert Shield far exceeded 

the requirements specified in the "on-the-shelf' OPLANS. Twenty-one bases 

in twelve foreign countries were used as tanker beddown locations for over 

300 tankers. To make it even more challenging, six of the bases in the 

AOR were bare base locations, i.e., essentially a runway, fuel, and water. 

Basic support such as cooks, security police, medical personnel, and civil 

engineers were flown in and literally built the base facilities from the 

ground up. Supply personnel, transporters, and maintainers were then 

needed to accomplish day-to-day activities supporting flying operations. 

Places to work, eat, and sleep were built while flight operations continued. 

During Phase I in Desert Shield, the requirement for tankers remained 

fairly constant at 115 KC-135s. As additional forces deployed in Phase II 

for the air campaign, tanker requirements more than doubled. Then in 

February when twenty more B-52s deployed to Moron and Fairford, addi- 

"Ibid, p 4-8. 

28History, p 344. 

29DS/DS Tanker Assessment, p 4-9. 

194 
tional tankers were deployed. The map at Figure 39 shows the final beddown locations of the tanker force in the AOR. 

Figure 39 

'Ignker Beddown in the AOR 

195 
Jeddah New supported the largest deployed tanker operation. An 

ANG Colonel, appointed as commander of the 1701 Provisional Air Refueling Wing, led a mixed SAC, ANG, and AFRES unit-a classic example of 

integrating the Reserve and ANG with the active force to create a total 

force package. Centrally located King Khalid International, a large, new 

commercial airport on the outskirts of Riyadh, was home to the 1703d 

Air Refuel Wing (AREFW). U.S., French, and British tanker forces shared 

the facilities. Riyadh was the first base to be used by tankers after JCS 

deployment began. It was first utilized by four KC-10s and became the 

1700th Strategic Wing, home of KC-135Qs and RC-135s. After the war, 

I5 KC-135Rs remained as the follow-on tanker force. 

At the invitation of the UAE, two KC-135Rs were based at Al Dhafra 

during Exercise Ivory Justice. During Desert Storm, AI Dhafra was shared 

by CENTAF and Italian forces and accommodated a maximum of seven KC135Rs. It was home to the 1705th Air Refuel Squadron (AREFS). Cairo 

West basing rights were secured on 27 September 1990, and, initially, 

accommodated three KC-l35Rs, succeeded by fifteen KC-135Es before 

hostilities. Flight clearances throughout Egypt were a problem during 

operations, and the likelihood of terrorist activity against the tanker beddown 

location there was assessed as very high. Seeb was home to the 1702d 

AREFW, which supported fifteen KC-135Rs and ten KC-10s. Seeb also 

supported Navy operations in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, and most 

of the offloaded JP-5 fuel came from this location. The politics of war 

came to the forefront in numerous situations. For example, on two separate 

occasions the Government of Oman requested that tankers move for short 

periods (1-4 days) during Omani National Days and Air Force Day. 

Masirah was the beddown location for five KC-l35Rs, increawd to ten. 

MAC was host at Masirah with C-130 operations. Dubai was the home of 

the 1713d AREFW, and operations were totally ANG. Since Dubai is a 

commercial airport, close coordination with local authorities was required. 

The 1712th AREFW, a composite ANG unit, was established at Abu Dhabi 

in December 1990. After initially deploying to Jeddah New, the wing 

moved to their final operating location in January 1991 before start of 

hostilities. 

Diego Garcia was unique in location and mission. It was the only site 

with a SAC presence and prepositioned materials before 2 August 1990. 

Tankers at this base were used solely for B-52 support. Communications 

capability was extremely limited, which contributed to many difficulties. 

196 
Follow-on Deployment Phase 

As USCENTCOM AOR combatant requirements grew, STRATFOR continuously tailored tanker requirements to support planned offensive operations. The final deployment position was 209 tankers (179 KC-135s and 

30 KC- 10s) to be in place in the AOR no later than 15 January 1991. The 

crew ratio in the event of hostilities was also established as 1.50 for the 

KC-135 and 2.0 for the KC-lO.m 

The final Desert Shield action for the tanker force was bedding down 

twenty-four KC-10s in the AOR. The organic lift capability of these 

aircraft was used again to support SAC’S final buildup of aircraft and personnel. At the start of Desert Storm, SAC had committed over 300 tankers to the AOR, nrkey, and the bridges.” 

Desert Storm 

When Desert Storm officially began at 0300, 17 January 1990, in the 

AOR, tankers had already offloaded fuel for strike, reconnaissance, command and control, and other combat support mission aircraft. (Refuelings 

had been accomplished hours earlier for B-52s en route from outside the 

AOR to their targets in Iraq.) KC-135s from Jeddah flew at an altitude of 

3,000 feet while refueling F-15Es scheduled to strike fixed Scud launching sites in Western Iraq. The low-level refuelings were necessary because the F-15s had to penetrate low and fast to surprise their targets. 

These were the only low-level refuelings planned for the air campaign. 

The rest of the schedule was executed with little change, and 296 of the 

planned 299 refueling sorties were flown. The operation was a success 

in spite of more than a little concern over air space saturation. The concern remained following a 6 January airspace saturation exercise highlighting the tremendous task of air space management and deconfliction 

of air space that were natural products of air operations of this magnitude. 

Airspace saturation will be discussed later in this chapter.” 

3olbid, p 5-8. 

&id. 

32History, p 365. 

197 
The [DELETED]-based B-52s, which flew 795 combat sorties during 

Desert Storm, were some of the few aircraft not requiring refueling on the 

way to targets. All of the other aircraft that required air refueling used the 

air refueling track structure, which was oriented to satisfy several objectives 

(See Figure 40 below). First, the long parallel tracks beginning in central 

Saudi Arabia and ending at the Iraqi border were positioned to refuel 

combat aircraft moving toward the center of Iraq. Second, initial tanker 

Figure 40 

Air Refueling Tracks and Anchors 

198 
orbit areas were positioned south and outside the range of Iraqi early 

warning/ground controlled intercept (EWIGCI) to preserve tactical surprise. 

Other objectives included keeping B-52 refueling tracks outside the heavily congested AOR airspace and providing several anchor orbits for supporting F-15 and F-14 air-to-air capabilities and combat air patrols CAPS).^^ 

The demand for air refueling in the AOR changed significantly during 

the transition from Desert Shield to Desert Storm. Putting the force in 

place, which took over five and a half months, had been a major undertaking. Once the positioning was accomplished, refueling proceeded at a 

relatively normal pace, until initiation of the 42 days of Desert Storm signalled a dramatic increase in refueling requimnents, as sbown in Table 16. 

Table 16 

Average Daily Air Refueling Statistid' 

Desert Shield Desert Storm 

KC-10 KC-135 KC-10 KC-135 

Sorties flowdday 2 66 35 215 

Hours logged 12 182 240 977 

Aircraft refueled 13 175 222 839 

Fuel Delivered 0.2 1.9 4.5 11.0 

(Million gals) 

Source: Totals for entire operations from HQ SACIDOOT. 

Another illustration of the change in pattern and intensity of air refueling 

activity is reflected in the following chart accounting for KC-135 tankers 

deployed from the CONUS from August 90 to the end of Desert Storm. 

33~bid. 

"Headquarters Strategic Air Commandm. 

199 
Figure 41 

KC-135s Deployed From CON US^^ 

1990 1991 

Virtually every type of strike and direct combat support mission required air refueling. The total of all U.S. and foreign combat sorties was 

69,399, an average of 1,650 per day. In addition to U.S. tankers, the 

tankers of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Saudi Arabia accomplished air refueling; the British and French tankers refueled their own 

aircraft. Canada’s tankers refueled approximately seventy-five percent of 

its aircraft; United States Air Force aircraft refueled the remaining twentyfive percent. Saudi Arabia’s tankers refueled fifty percent of its aircraft; 

United States Air Force tankers refueled the other fifty percent. Other 

foreign aircraft received United States Air Force refuelings. 

The total number of Air Force, Navy, Marine, and foreign refueling 

sorties in Desert Storm was approximately 15,100, or 360 sorties a day. On 

average, each tanker flown provided 4.5 refuelings to combat aircraft. The 

351bid. 

200 
following figure reflects the daily activity levels.36 During Desert Storm, 

nearly 107 million gallons were delivered by air to more than 43,000 

receivers. The air campaign was heavily dependent on air refueling, and 

the successful integration of air combat missions and related refueling 

missions was a major achievement. 

Figure 42 

Air Refueling Sorties Flown. 

450 

400 

350 

300 

250 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 2 4 6 0 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 

January February 1991 

USN mUSMC RForeign 

Redeployment 

USCENTAF, USAFE, and U.S. Marine Corps, Central Command fighters 

used the Atlantic Bridge to return to their home stations quickly and efficiently. Fighter streams flew from tanker to tanker on their legs from 

Southwest Asia to a remain-over-night location en route to the CONUS. 

European-based fighters redeploying directly to home stations used the 

same refueling procedure. The majority of CONUS aircraft were to remain 

over night in Spain, with the exception of A-lOs, which were to spend the 

night at Sigonella in Italy and Lajes in the Azores. The tanker bridge 

allowed SAC to support planned flow of one fighter squadron per day from 

36GWAPS Analysis of AT0 Data. 

20 1 
Southwest Asia to Spain and one fighter squadron per day from Spain to 

the CONUS. 

Airlift 

SAC was not explicitly tasked to participate in the airlift role except for 

the dual-role assigned its KC-10s. However, organic air movement provided necessary SAC resources to support B-52, KC-135, KC-10, RC-135, and 

U-2 aircraft. MAC was heavily tasked to support deployments to Southwest 

Asia and could not fulfill all airlift requirements. Unable to assign suffcient priority to strategic lift requirements, SAC had to use KC-10s and KC135s for cargo and passenger transportation. During the first 30 days of 

Desert Shield. SAC organic airlift carried 4,870 passengers and 2,612 tons 

of c~~g0.3~ 

SAC planners had to compete with MAC requirements for KC-10s. 

KC-10s could be placed in the MAC channel and used as airlifters under 

MAC control. KC-10s were in great demand because of KC-10 dual-role 

commitments and because a tanker base to anchor the Atlantic bridge was 

not available in the deep eastern Mediterranean region at the onset of 

Desert Shield. Five KC-10s were given to MAC on 24 August 1990, and 

five more were made available on 4 September 1990 for a purely airlift 

role to help USTRANSCOM overcome its backlogs. Ten KC-10s were given 

to TRANSCOM in March and April 1991 to assist MAC in redeploying forces 

from the AOR. During the early phases of Desert Shield, SAC utilization of 

KC-10s was high, and SAC planners recommended to the Headquarters 

Strategic Air Command Director of Operations (Hq SAUDO) that SAC delay 

making a large number of KC-10s available to MAC for the following 

reasons: 

MAC did not actively pursue using KC-10s to augment C-5 and 

C-141 missions until the F-117 deployment on 21 and 22 August 

1990. 

SAC had a JCS requirement to maintain sixteen KC-10s at Moron 

and Zarogoza in Spain to support bridge deployment operations. 

"DS/DS Tanker Assessment, p 5-5. 

202 
Twelve KC-1 0s were required to support a movement of twentyfour F-4G aircraft from the CONUS to the AOR. 

KC-10s were used extensively for dual-role and force extension 

missions (four to five missions per day). 

The 330 fighters and many other larger aircraft deployed to the 

AOR depended heavily on KC-1OA support. 

Operational requirements often resulted in a quick need for 

drogue-equipped tankers to move Navy and Marine aircraft. 

Drogue-equipped KC- 135s were not always immediately available. 

To help overcome USTRANSCOM’S backlogs, SAC offered KC-1 35 

support; but USTRANSCOM rejected this proposal, partly because of the 

incompatibility of MAC’S cargo handling equipment with the KC-1 35. 

Also, MAC preferred KC-1 0s because cargo bays in KC-1 35s do not have 

room for many of the standard loads packaged on MAC pallets. After 

USTRANSCOM’S rejection of KC-135s for airlift and a need for additional 

supplies to sustain on-going operations, SAC independently employed 

tankers to transport equipment and personnel to tanker forward operating 

locations (FOLS). Mighty Express was formed and utilized ANG 

KC-1 35Es to transport cargo and personnel from CONUS to Europe or to 

the AOR. Mighty Express was an airlift support initiative by Eighth Air 

Force Logistics and Operations approved by Hq SAC. The Express began 

operations on 21 January 1991 and was supported by Mather’s 940th 

AREFG KC-1 35Es. Mighty Express, flying from its Barksdale Aerial Port 

of Embarkation, in CONUS used two primary routes intersecting at Moron 

in Spain to facilitate rapid movement of cargo from CONUS to Southwest 

Asia. The Express moved nearly 700 passengers, 3,000 high priority 

parts, and almost 200 tons of cargo between January and April 1991, 

when it was terminated.38 

An interesting situation arose at Moron. The B-52s began dropping 

bombs in the AOR at such a substantial rate that Moron was expected to 

run out of munitions. Fortunately, 3,200 short tons of munitions were 

available in Bitburg, Germany. To maximize their air refueling support 

381bid, p 56. 

203 
to the B-52s on strike missions, as well as assist in resupply of ordnance, 

Zaragoza KC-10s launched for an air refueling mission and landed in 

Germany to pick up weapons. They offloaded the weapons at Moron, 

took off on a refueling mission, and recovered at Zaragoza. 

Aircrew Manning 

The aircrew manning level of SAC'S KC-135 and KC-10 tanker force 

had a direct impact on tanker operations. The KC-135 manning level was 

1.27 and was based primarily on supporting SAC'S SIOP commitment. The 

KC-10 manning level was 3.5 (2.0 active plus 1.5 reserves) and was 

dedicated to supporting contingency operations. Initially, the theater 

commander requested that all tanker forces in the AOR be manned at the 

2.0 level. Because SAC could not support a KC-135 crew ratio of 2.0 in 

the AOR, the 2.0 level was later reduced to 1.5. Despite the change, few 

tankers were available for training, and crew shortages forced continued 

back-to-back alert cycles even with the call-up of Reserve forces. 

The manning level of the KC-10 was more than sufficient to support 

the 2.0 AOR requirement. The call-up of one of the three KC-10 Reserve 

Associate units enabled a 3.0 crew ratio for KC-10 aircraft temporarily 

dedicated to TRANSCOM. The only significant KC- 10 manning problem 

occurred in the AOR when many crews pushed the flying-hour limitations 

of 125 hours per 30 consecutive days as specified in AFR 60-1, SAC Supplement 1. In an effort to keep only highly experienced crews in the 

AOR, the theater's no-rotation policy prevented SAC from rotating crews 

with high flying times. Therefore, SAC was forced to raise the flyinghour limitation from 125 hours to 150 hours per 30 consecutive days. 

Had additional crews been sent to the AOR, or if the no-rotation policy 

had been relaxed, the waiver may not have been necessary. Even with 

the waiver, crews approached or exceeded the 150-hour limit in isolated 

incidents. The 330-hour limitation per 90 consecutive days, as required 

by AFR 60-1, SAC Supplement 1, was not waived. 

While KC-10 manning was not as serious a problem, aircraft availability was. Because of limited availability and high demand, KC-10 

training came to a virtual standstill. During the period from 30 October 

1990 through 15 January 1991, a backlog of over 60 students developed. 

Hq SA~ dedicated three KC-I0 aircraft to combat crew training squadron (CCrS) training at March AFB in California. From 15 February 1991 

through 21 April 1991, over 130 student sorties were flown, and a total 

204 
of 44 students received their SACR 60-4 qualification evaluations. This 

brought the CCTS student load back to normal levels, and with increased 

KC-1 0 availability, the special CCTS was terminated and returned to unit 

level on 26 April 1991. 

To provide additional relief to the KC-135 force and to prevent the 

call-up of additional KC-10 Reserve associate units, SAC implemented 

STOP LOSS for all tanker specialties. This personnel program prevented 

voluntary separation of qualified tanker crew members and remained in 

effect until the first of June 1991 .39 

Operational Issues 

Air Tasking Order 

The number of SAC tankers allocated to the various strike packages 

was a USCENTAF decision. The U.S. Navy deemed the initial allocation 

of tanker support to Naval air unacceptable. This perceived problem was 

alleviated when the United Kingdom made tankers available to the Navy, 

four carriers were positioned in the Persian Gulf to reduce flight time and 

fuel requirements to target areas, and SAC tankers became available to 

Navy aircraft on a “when available” basis. 

The scheduling and assignment of tankers was labor intensive and a 

major factor in the time required to produce each air tasking order (ATO). 

Scheduling tankers was virtually the last part of the ATO construction 

process. The tanker schedulers had to wait until the receivers computed 

their routes of flight and onload requirements. This constraint allowed 

for only a short time (2 to 4 hours) to deconflict the airspace, schedule 

the tankers, and task the various air refueling units. Significant inroads 

were made toward improving the automation of scheduling as the operation progressed. Further improvement in the actual assignment of air 

refueling assets to receivers could result in an increase in total offload 

capability and shorten the AT0 processing time for future operations.40 

39DS/DS Tanker Assessments, p 5-7. 

&Ibid, p 8-2. 

205 
Airspace 

Air space was the critical limiting factor affecting air refueling during 

Desert Storm. This problem was not just confined to the theater of 

operations but was also a factor in the refueling areas on the Turkey/ 

Iraqi border and in the Mediterranean. Within the theater during heavier 

flying periods, additional tankers, regardless of configuration, could not 

have been used because airspace was unavailable. This was especially 

true as the war shifted to the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) and the 

vast majority of air refuelings were being requested for the northeastern 

section of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Within the theaters, additional tankers could have been scheduled during less intensive flying 

periods to reduce the overall utilization rate or to increase the overall 

number of attack sorties during a given twenty-four-hour period. 

Airspace was also a limiting factor for the forces stationed in Turkey. 

As an example, a dedicated air refueling area was used by the RC-135, 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization AWACS, and the F-15 CAP. The area 

was also utilized as an orbit area for the AWACS and the RC-135. Later, 

when aircraft flying combat air patrol were pursuing defecting Iraqi 

fighters, two smaller orbit areas were set up on the southeast comer of 

the border between Turkey and Iraq. 

Despite reduced civilian air traffic, the airspace above the Mediterranean Sea was extremely congested. The congestion problems were 

compounded by severe language barriers between aircrews and the foreign air traffic controllers. Multiple ship refueling formations would 

often be vectored off course because the controllers were unable to communicate that a single aircraft should take a different route!' 

Air Refueling Airspace Congestion 

During Desert Storm, the critical limiting air refueling factor was 

airspace congestion. Large strike forces were designed to overwhelm the 

enemy defenses. However, force size was constrained by the number of 

tankers that could be scheduled into the heavily congested air refueling 

tracks. This was especially true as the air campaign shifted to the KTO 

and the majority of air refueling took place over northeastern Saudi 

4'ibid, p 8-1 

206 
Arabia and the Arabian Gulf. As a result, there were more near mid-air 

collisions (NMACS). 

The USCENTCOM planning staff monitored air refueling airspace congestion carefully. When the staff refined the initial air campaign before the 

war, it ran computer programs to track the number of tankers and receivers 

and modified the flow of the strike forces to even out the peaks in airspace 

congestion. During the war, the tanker scheduler who developed the tanker 

portion of the daily AT0 flew on one of the AWACS. He would literally 

stand behind the AWACS controller at his console and assist with tanker 

track coordination. Having someone who knew the planned air refueling 

flow assist in monitoring the air traffic proved very useful. 

Nevertheless, the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center received 37 

NMAC reports for Desert Storm. It estimated that reported NMACs equaled 

only a small fraction of those actlially occurring. Table 17 shows selected NMAC details to illustrate the air traffic congestion and aircraft separation problems involving tankers. Of the 37 reports, 26 incidents had been 

fully investigated and closed out by I July. The balance of the reports 

may never be closed out because the incidents involved host nation air 

traffic control support. 

A disturbing trend is that these NMACS occurred at mid-to-high altitudes. Historically, over half of NMAcs occur at low altitude, below 5,000 

feet. One of the reasons for the mid-to-high altitude NMACs was the configuration of the minimum risk routes (MRRS). Returning strike aircraft 

would follow the MRR corridors until inside the Saudi border and then 

proceed directly to their landing base, often cutting across the air refueling 

tracks. The practice was particularly dangerous at mid-to-high altitudes 

because of the higher aircraft speeds involved. During a high-altitude, 

head-on NMAC, there was simply not enough time for man and machine to 

react and take evasive action. The “see and avoid” concept worked some 

of the time; however, the “big sky” theory was operating more often than 

not!’ Fortunately, only one mid-air collision actually occurred. 

42rhe “see and avoid“ concept requires pilots to scan the sky constantly for other 

aircraft and to take evasive action if a potential mid-air collision is detected. The primary 

problem with this concept is that it is vely difficult to detect a developing mid-air collision 

in bad weather. at night, or head-on. The ”big sky” theory is that one doesn’t need to worry 

about avoiding a mid-air collision because the sky is big enough to prevent one. 

207 
Table 1743 

Tanker Near Mid-Air Collisions 

Aircraft Flight 

Involved Level NMAC &talk Miss Dis (ft) 

C- 130 210 

KC-135 

KC- 135 280 

KC- 135 

KC-I 35 225 

KC- 1 0 

KC- 135 160 

2 F-14 

EC- 135 240 

KC- 135 

C-130 enroute observed 3 tankers 

at the same altitude, opposite direction. C-130 flashed lights and the 

tankers began evasive action. 

The first KC-135 reported that it 

had entered an air refueling orbit. 

The second KC-135, hearing the 

first KC-135's report, said that it 

was also in the same air refueling 

orbit. 

2 KC-135s were in altitude block 

FL 200-230. Due to traffic they 

were told to transition to an intrail, 

co-altitude formation. Shortly 

thereafter, the second KC- 135 

experienced a head-on NMAC with 

a KC-10. 

The KC-135 crew saw two fighters 

approaching from the rear and 

appearing to be rejoining on them. 

When it became apparent that the 

fighters did not see the tanker, the 

tanker crew accelerated in an attempt to gain spacing. 

While enroute the EC-135 saw the 

KC- 135 and took evasive action by 

banking up to 90 degrees. 

200 

Unk 

30-50 vertical 

and 100 

horizontal 

50-100 

200 

43Ait Force Inspection and Safety Center. 

208 
Multipoint Refueling 

Expedited Air Refueling 

A large formation of receivers can mean that the first receiver to 

refuel will have the least amount of fuel at the end of the refueling track. 

To expedite air refueling in Desert Storm, quick-flow procedures were 

institutionalized that allow a large number of receiver aircraft to engage 

a limited number of refueling booms quickly. This also resulted in higher 

receiver to tanker ratios. Quick-flow procedures were designed for up to 

three flights of four receivers per tanker, a 12 to 1 ratio. After the first 

receiver is in contact with the boom and taking fuel, the next receiver 

moves from the right observation position to an ondeck position. This 

can be visualized as a loose fingertip (pilot technique) right wing formation with the receiver on the boom. These procedures also provided 

assurance that all aircraft in a package were topped off with fuel by the 

end of the refueling track. Significant reductions in boom cycle time 

were realized by reducing the “no contact” time between disconnect and 

contact for multiple receivers. The net result was an increase in capability for more receivers to refuel in a given period of time. The procedure 

also made it possible for an entire strike package to amve at the refueling 

drop-off point with full tanks.44 

Air refueling can be expedited by placing more offload points on a 

tanker; i.e., adding wing-mounted air refueling drogues. However, the 

time allocated for air refueling in Desert Storm was normally sufficient, 

especially when the above quick-flow air refueling procedures were used. 

A few strike forces were composed of receptacle and probe aircraft requiring either a MJ-10 or multiple KC-135s with boom and drogues. Wingmounted drogues would have decreased the number of KC-135s needed 

for composite forces. Wing-mounted drogues on KC-135 and KC-10 

aircraft would have facilitated the refueling of Navy attack aircraft. 

KC-135 Boom Drogue Assemblies 

At the start of Desert Shield, one air refueling drogue was deployed 

with every three KC-135 aircraft. The supply of drogues was rapidly 

44(S/NF) Tanker Tactics in Southeast Asia, I7AD(P) Pamphlet 3/1, 10 Nov 1990. 

209 
exhausted. Units needing drogues began assigning drogue orders the 

highest priority available, putting a large demand on the supply system. 

Additionally, many of the drogues in storage developed leaks when exposed to fuel because of dry unused O-rings and seals. Replacements for 

drogues in storage were ordered, further increasing the demand on supply; 

finally, orders could not be filled in a timely manner. The majority of the 

inoperable drogues in the AOR were unserviceable because of coupling 

leaks. To provide relief, the drogue coupling leak limit was increased and 

limited field repair of seals and O-rings within the coupling was authorized. 

Also, a drogue repair team was established to travel within the AOR repairing drogue assemblies. Management and direction of drogues became 

impossible from CONUS and were turned over to theater headquarters. As 

a result, the availability of drogues in the AOR improved and mission 

shortfalls due to faulty drogues were no longer a problem!’ 

F-117 Air Refueling 

The F-117 had been used in previous contingency operations. However, throughout its development and certification, only a limited number 

of tanker units were involved in refueling these aircraft. The tankers 

were primarily KC-135Qs from Beale AFB and KC-10s from March AFB. 

[DELETED] The first squadron of F-117s from Tonopah were refueled 

en route to Langley AFB by KC-135Qs. KC-10s operating in a dual role 

carried cargo and refueled the F-117s across the bridge into Saudi Arabia. 

The second squadron of F-117s were supported solely by KC-10s. Early 

in the development of the Desert Storm plan, it was detennined that ten 

KC-1 35Qs at Riyadh would be insufficient to support planned F-117 

missions. An intensive training program was then developed to train and 

qualify KC-I35R crews at KKI to provide the additional air refueling 

capability required to support F-117 

45DS/DS Tanker Assessment, p 8-3. 

461bid, p 6-5. 

21 0 
The maximum number of F-117s allocated to one tanker was two. 

The KC-135R had the ability to support the two F-117s in both prestrike 

and poststrike phases. 

Navy Re fueling 

During initial refueling of Navy receivers, tanker planners decided 

that the majority of naval refueling for training purposes would be provided by KC-135s rather than KC-10s. The motive behind the decision 

was to decrease the resistance and apprehension naval aviators felt concerning refueling from behind the KC-135s. Following some months of 

air refueling training behind the KC-135, tanker planners travelled to each 

of the carriers in the Gulf. Statements made by Navy pilots and operations staffs on each carrier revealed that the pilots were no longer as 

uncomfortable refueling behind the KC-135. The scheduling of KC-1 35s 

for Navy receivers between August 1990 and October 1990 had extremely 

beneficial results. The same training program was attempted with the 

Marines; however, an early mishap, in which the radome of an F-18 was 

damaged by the basket of a KC-135, stopped further advancements. 

Following the incident, the Marines refused to refuel behind KC-1 35s at 

night and were hesitant to refuel behind them during daylight hours. The 

Marines specified KC-10s for all nighttime refueling and normally used 

their own KC-130 if their refueling could not be accommodated by an 

Air Force KC- 10. 

Air refueling rendezvous procedures were modified from the standard 

Air Force procedures to accommodate the Navy. Multiple tanker air 

refueling cells normally consist of tankers stacked at 5O(rfoot intervals. 

The Navy senior staff and the 17th Air Division (Provisional) Commander agreed to 1.000-foot intervals between tankers in the same cell. This 

change was primarily due to the method in which naval receivers rendezvous on KA-6 tankers. Instead of proceeding through an air refueling 

initial point as Air Force aircraft do, they approach the air refueling cell 

from any direction. They generally view the tanker cell from a side view 

and plan to rendezvous with their respective tanker at or just below their 

refueling altitude. Due to these established procedures, they felt it was 

inherently unsafe to have the tankers at 5Ocl-fOOt intervals. Upon the 

insistence of 17th Air Division (Provisional) planners, they agreed to 

conduct all rendezvous at an altitude 1,OOO feet below the lowest tanker 

21 1 
in the cell in accordance with Air Force Regulations. Upon attaining 

visual contact with the tanker cell, the receivers would climb and join 

their respective tankers. 

In the foreground, an AGE provides fuel from a “buddy store” for an A-7E, 

while in the distance, an EA-6B receives fuel from an Air Force KC-135E. 

Initially, the air refueling tracks consisted of an anchor at each end. 

These anchors were built with fifty-nautical-mile legs (as per Air Force 

regulations). During Desert Shield, numerous air refuelings were accomplished with naval receivers in tanker cells. On several occasions, the 

naval receivers complained that they had trouble finding the tankers orbiting in a twenty-by-fifty-nautical-mile anchor pattern and missed refueling 

even though the tanker cell was in the assigned orbit. The tracks were 

later modified to include pre- and postanchors with thirty-nautical-mile 

legs. Even when the legs were shortened to thirty nautical-miles, naval 

message traffic included complaints about the size of the anchor pattern 

and the difficulty of locating the tankers. The final solution was to shorten the anchor leg length to twenty nautical miles. All pre- and postanchors were reduced in size to twenty-by-twenty nautical miles and tested 

in Imminent Thunder, a joint multinational exercise conducted in December 1990. Positive comments from the Navy carrier groups concerning the 

21 2 
new track construction resulted in the modification of all Desert Storm 

tracks with anchor orbits to the twenty-by-twenty-nautical-mile anch~rs,’’~ 

AWACS 

The AWACS aircraft plays a critical role in the employment of Allied 

combat aircraft. Designed to provide early warning of airborne threats, the 

AWACS also provides controlling instructions to friendly aircraft. While 

not a complete air traffic control facility, it can provide limited flightfollowing and avoidance information. During Desert Storm, the AWACS 

was heavily involved in the detection, acquisition, and downing of enemy 

aircraft by Allied air-to-air systems. It provided command and control as 

well as real-time threat advisories to attacking Allied aircraft and assisted 

in the assembling of strike forces before border crossings. 

Air refueling and airspace deconfliction was an integral part of strike 

force assembly. Because of the heavily congested airspace over the Saudi 

Arabian peninsula and the criticality of air refueling to the overall air 

campaign, a joint agreement between the SAC planners in theater 

(STRATFOR) and the USCENTAF staff placed a tanker representative on the 

airborne command element (ACE) team aboard the AWACS. The ACE 

team, commanded by an Air Force colonel, was the USCENTAF Commander’s airborne command element charged with carrying out real-time 

changes to the air war as well as providing overall guidance to airborne 

Allied aircraft. The tanker representative-an individual familiar with air 

refueling procedures and the current AT0 being executed-on the ACE team 

could provide AWACS controllers with guidance on the best responses to 

air battle changes and to requests for emergency air refueling. 

ACE tanker representatives provided critical input to the successful 

execution of the air war. They advised the AWACS controllers on the 

movement of air refueling sources, provided threat advisories to the 

tanker crews, repositioned tankers for air refueling returning strike forces 

low on fuel, supported attacking aircraft missions generated on short 

notice because of real-time changes in the war, and planned fuel requirements for aircraft involved in the search and rescue of downed Allied 

aircrew members. They also provided input to the tanker planning pro4’Ibid, p 6-6. 

213 
cess by reporting on actual utilization of air refueling assets, thereby 

improving the assignment of tankers in the AID process. 

A source of confusion during Desert Storm centered on the AWACS' 

capability, or lack thereof, to function as a complete air traffic controller 

facility. Because the AWACS could view a large part of the air war with 

its radar, and because procedures were established for the tactical checking of aircraft, many tanker aircrews believed AWACS was functioning 

like an air route traffic control center in the CONUS. Limitations to the 

AWACS radar and computational capabilities plus the workload of the 

onboard personnel do not allow the AWACS to function as an air traffic 

controller facility. In some instances, tanker crews, mistakenly believing 

they were under full radar coverage and flight-following protection, had 

near mid-air collisions with other Allied aircraft. In most of these cases, 

the other Allied aircraft were not being viewed on the AWACS controller's 

radar scopes. An intensive educational process began to instruct tanker 

crews that even though they were being tracked by the AWACS, the system offered only a limited veil of protection!' 

Radio Communications 

Tanker radio configuration posed some communication problems in the 

theater of operation. The KC-135 deployed with two ultra high-frequency 

(UHF) and one high-frequency (HF) radios. Once in theater, one of the UHF 

radios was temporarily replaced with a very high-frequency (VHF) radio. 

The VHF radio was installed to facilitate communications with air traffic 

control facilities in the theater and surrounding areas. Following installation of the VHF radio and removal of the second UHF radio, the problem 

became one of too few radios with too many frequencies to monitor. An 

example of commonality problems surfaced with the Navy and involved 

the need for two UHF radios on each KC-135. Navy fighters do not have 

VHF capability. Without two UHF radios, the tankers could not arrange 

rendezvous with the Navy fighters. The prime UHF radios of the tankers 

were dedicated to conducting air refueling operations. No other type of 

communications could occur on the air refueling frequency for safety 

reasons. (The second UHF radios were later re-installed, and permanent 

VHF radios are now being installed on all U.S. KC-135s.) 

48DS/DS Tanker Assessment, p 6-7. 

214 
VHF radios did improve tanker radio reception range. However, 

AWACS had only two VHF radios from which to broadcast. This made 

communications with AWACS difficult during time-sensitive periods. SAC 

bomber aircraft did not possess VHF capability either and were unable to 

communicate with foreign air traffic controllers; therefore, tankers were 

used to relay bomber ~learances.4~ 

KC-I0 VS KC-135 

The majority of the probe-equipped fuel receiver aircraft community 

prefers the KC-10. The drogue and basket assembly on the KC-I0 features a longer hose and a softer basket as compared with those of the 

KC-135. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, a large number of 

receivers requested KC-10 rather than KC-135 aircraft. The limited 

number of KC-10s in theater were used for long-station-time and large 

offload requirements. Therefore, only a limited number of KC-10s remained for allocation to those who wanted a KC-10 refueling rather than 

to those who needed a KC-10 refueling. Following the extensive program to train Navy receivers in using the KC- 135 tankers for refueling, 

the “requirement” for KC-I 0 refuelings dropped dramatically as pilots 

overcame their preconceived prejudices. Follow-on examination of soft 

basket and longer hose drogue equipment and the benefits of additional 

tanker and receiver training may indicate potential solutions to the KC-I0 

versus KC-1 35 issue. 

Allied Receiver Aircraft 

Saudi E-3 (AWACS) and F-15 aircraft were air refueled throughout the 

entire operation. The U.S.-made aircraft were certified to air refuel with 

both the KC-135 and KC-10. Additionally, Saudi air crews maintain 

proficiency in United States Air Force air refueling procedures. Other 

aircraft requesting air refueling included Egypt’s F-4, F- 16, and Mirage 

2000; UAE’S Mirage 2000; Italy’s IDS Tornado; Oman’s Jaguar; United 

Kingdom’s VC-10; and Canada’s CF-18, of these, only the U.S.-made 

F-4, F-16, and CF-18 aircraft were certified for air refueling with United 

States Air Force tankers.s0 

491bid, p 8-3. 

solbid, p 8-6. 

21 5 
Receiver Certifiatwn 

Receiver aircraft are normally certified to air refuel with U.S. Air 

Force tankers in a test process conducted by Air Force Systems Command. Certification results in validated air refueling procedures published 

in both SAC tanker and receiver air refueling manuals. Certification 

consists of a technical assessment of the tanker and receiver fuel systems, 

including the compatibility of tanker and receiver offload and onload 

systems, i.e., probe and drogue. The assessment determines if flight 

testing is required. In some cases, certification is based on flight test data 

for previously cleared aircraft, and additional flight testing is not required. 

The certification procedure for foreign receivers is funded by foreign 

governments through foreign military sales (FMS). 

Legal Issues 

Two options are available to refuel foreign receivers legally. In both 

cases, the receiver aircraft must be certified to air refuel with U.S. Air 

Force tankers. First, SAC can provide air refueling under a current FMS 

agreement written specifically to include air refueling. Second, SAC can 

provide air refueling under the 1986 Air Force-approved “Concept of 

Operations for USAF Air Refueling of Foreign Military Aircraft in Joint 

Exercises.” The concept permits air refueling during combined exercises 

to ensure compatibility among Air Force tankers and Allied aircraft. It 

does not address Allied air refueling in an actual contingency or crisis 

and imposes restrictions on Allied receivers participating in an exercise. 

In an exercise, Allied receivers must have a valid requirement for U.S. air 

refueling and must refuel on a noninterference basis. Allied pilots must 

be current and qualified in U.S. Air Force procedures. No initial or 

requalification training may be provided. The foreign government must 

pay for or provide the fuel offloaded. 

Neither option satisfied the requirements of Desert Shield. The exercise guidelines were too restrictive to allow timely training and subsequent 

support of Allied aircraft in Desert Shield. The certification process is both 

expensive and time consuming when conducted under FMS agreements. 

216 
Joint Staff Guidance 

On 2 October 1990, Hq SAUDO requested that Hq USAF/XOO clarify 

U.S. policy on Allied air refueling with a view towards providing 

USCINCCENT maximum operational flexibility in supporting Allied air 

refueling requirements for Desert Shield. On 17 October 1990, SAC 

requested that USCINCCENT/CCJ3 bring the operational requirement for 

Allied air refueling to the JCS’ attention and request assistance in resolving policy issues preventing or limiting U.S. support to Allied receivers. 

On 20 October 1990, USCINCCENT requested that the JCS provide guidance 

to allow both air refueling training and operational support of Allied 

receiver aircraft. In November, the JCS authorized USCINCCENT to conduct air refueling operations with aircraft of Allied, GCC, and friendly 

nations in order to meet Desert Shield operational requirements. The 

following guidance was provided: 

1. Potential liabilities must be addressed through a memorandum of 

understanding or other acceptable agreement. 

2. Qualification/currency, briefings, and inflight procedures must be 

in accordance with Air Force regulations and manuals. 

3. Allied forces must pay for U.S.-owned fuel offloaded to Allied 

aircraft. 

After the JCS authorized Allied air refueling, USCENTAF began limited 

air refueling operations with Allied receivers who had not been previously 

cleared. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) issued a limited air 

refueling clearance for the Omani Jaguar and EgyptiadUAE Mirage 2000 

on the basis of technical assessments. These receivers were restricted to 

eighty percent fuel capacity because of incomplete data on their fuel 

systems. Additionally, the receivers were restricted to daytime air refueling because of their inadequate aircraft lighting. ASD issued an unrestricted clearance for the Italian IDS Tornado on the basis of previous flight 

test results provided the identical German IDS Tornado and unrestricted 

air refueling were involved in the tests. The initial assessment of the 

British VC-10 required inflight testing. Flight testing was never initiated 

and VC- 1 O/USAF tanker air refueling was never conducted.” 

“!bid, p 8-7. 

217 
Allied Interoperability 

The restrictions and delays involved in certifying Allied receivers and 

conducting subsequent air refueling operations impaired SAC’S ability to 

provide timely support of joint and combined contingency operations. 

The FMS process is slow and requires Allied governments to pay all costs 

associated with the certification effort, even though certification is mutually beneficial. Coalition air warfare would have been better served if 

certification and training efforts of Allied receivers had been conducted 

in peacetime. Air refueling support of Coalition forces is vital if Coalition allies are going to play a major role in the next air campaign. The 

Air Force should pursue certification of Allied receiver aircraft, particularly French and British, to ensure interoperability in a future crisis. 

Fuels: JP-5 Versus Jet A-I 

The U.S. Navy uses JP-5 fuel, which has a less volatile flashpoint 

than Jet A-I, the fuel used predominantly by the US. Air Force during 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The less volatile JP-5 meets U.S. Navy 

carrier operation safety standards whereas Jet A-1 does not. 

Concentrated efforts to fulfill requests for JP-5 to Navy aircraft were 

often negated by operational realities. In several instances, requests for 

Navy support were received too late to purge tanks and load JP-5. 

Jet A-1 was available at all locations within the AOR. However, Al Dhafra 

and Cairo West, which provided significant naval support, did not have 

a supply of JP-5. Logistically,. JP-5 was difficult to provide because it 

had to be trucked in from Alexandria and offloaded where tankers were 

located. Stock on hand was supplemented by establishing bladders, but 

the real limitation was resupply time-which dropped to less than a day 

at some locations during the height of the air war. A supply of JP-5 was 

introduced in the theater for the air refueling of carrier-based aircraft. 

JP-5 was available at Seeb and later at Jeddah. Operationally, Navy 

receivers onloaded any type of jet fuel available, including Jet A-1; then, 

if necessary, they corrected the flash point problem once back on the 

carrier (i.e., they dumped it over the side). 

The use of various fuels [Jet A-1 (JP-8), JP-4, JP-51 is a safety issue 

on the agenda of the Navy-Air Force Board as well as a concern of the 

Environmental Protection Agency, which prefers Jet A-1 because it 

21 8 
evaporates faster. 

involved and prefers JP-5 because of its greater safety margin. 

The National Transportation Safety Board is also 

Summary 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm refocused attention on the tremendous 

value and contribution of the tanker force to U.S. and Allied worldwide 

military operations. U.S. tankers refueled both U.S. and Allied receivers 

using boodreceptacle and probeldrogue configurations. At first, receiver 

certification and other legal issues limited U.S. tankers in providing 

international refueling support. Then, flexibility in tanker-receiver scheduling was increased through extensive training efforts during Desert 

Shield. Differences in fuel requirements posed some problems and 

specific fuel requests could not always be supported. Tanker placement 

in theater often made economic transport of some fuels to specific operating locations difficult, particularly on short notice. Multipoint refueling 

capability could have enhanced scheduling flexibility in a few situations; 

however, the tanker force, as configured, was able to support the air 

operations successfully, both in theater and between the CONUS and 

Southwest Asia. It is imperative that tanker aircrews, as well as their 

command and planning staffs, continue to receive training that includes 

worldwide operations. 

219 
220 
6 

Arming the Force 

The Munitions Story in 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

At the start of Desert Shield, a few older technology munitions were 

prepositioned in the area of responsibility (AOR). However, they were not 

at the location of the arriving operational units, and little airlift was 

available to move them. Total munitions requirements were unknown at 

that time because no agreed-to plan existed, and the size and mission of 

the force was changing rapidly. The movement of additional munitions 

to the AOR relied on a transportation system already heavily taxed with 

moving the operational units, and few places were available to store the 

munitions once they arrived in the AOR. These were the challenges 

facing men and women involved in arming the force. After the war, 

General Horner described the situation as: 

Initially our biggest problems from a logistics standpoint were munitions, fuels and bare base . . . but these were caused by the speed with 

which our fighter units deployed. We began the deployment under the 

auspices of one plan, . . . within the first day we switched to a second 

plan . . . and then abandoned all previously developed contingency 

plans and constructed one as we went along.' 

Some 5,500 Air Force munitions personnel deployed in the AOR, and 

nearly 18,000 munitions personnel throughout the Air Force ultimately 

supported the Gulf War activity? The Air Force alone used over thirty 

kinds of munitions in Operation Desert Storm. U. S. Naval Air used nine 

varieties, and U. S. Army aviation units added thirteen to U. S. totals. 

Coalition air forces additionally employed some twenty-six unique types 

of their own munitions. Munitions is a collective term that includes: 

Lt Gen Charles A. Homer WAF, Commander CENTAF, Article: Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm: An Overview. Air Power History, Published by Air Force Historical 

Foundation, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA 24450, Fall 1991, p 6. 

I 

21ntvw, Col J. A. Cyr, AWDPXC, 20 Apr 1992. 

22 1 
bombs, “dumb” or conventional unguided bombs, cluster bomb units, 

“smart” or precision-guided munitions, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and special operations munitions. A great variety of specific nomenclature, such as MK-82 and Mll7, was involved, and the nomenclature 

is essential to a description of the complexity of arming the force. Therefore, Table 18 provides a brief description along with common government nomenclature of munitions items that were used against Iraqi targets 

during Operation Desert Storm. 

Table 18 

Munitions Nomenclature and Description 

~~~ ~ 

General 

Description 

Item 

Designation Comments 

Air-To- Ai i 

Missiles 

Air-To-Surface 

Missiles 

20 mm Gun 

ammunition 

30 mm Gun 

ammunition 

General Purpose 

General Purpose 

Cluster Bomb Units 

(CBUs) 

AIM-7 

AIM-9 

AGM-45 

AGM-65 

AGM-88 

M61Al 

GAU-8 

MK-82 Low Drag 

MK-83 Low Drag 

MK-84 Low Drag 

MK-82 Air Retard 

MK-84 Air Retard 

MI 17 bombs 

M 1 I7 Air Retard 

CBU-52 

CBU-58 

CBU-7 1 

CBU-87 

CBU-89 

Radar 

Infrared 

Shrike, antiradiation 

Maverick 

Harm antiradiation 

Vulcan cannon 

Avenger Cannon 

500-pound 

1,000-pound 

2,000-pound 

500-lb high speed, low 

altitude delivery 

2,000-lb high speed, low 

altitude delivery 

750-lb Low Drag 

750-lb high speed, 

low altitude delivery 

Incendiary/frag bomblets 

Incendiarylfrag bomblets 

Incendiary/frag bomblets 

Light armorlanti-personnel 

An ti tank/anti personnel 

222 
Table 18 (Continued) 

Munitions Nomenclature and Description 

General 

Description 

Item 

Designation Comments 

Combined Effects 

Munitions (CEMs) 

Rockeye MK-20 

Precision-Guided Munitions GBU- 10 

(PGMs) also called laserguided bombs (LGBs) GBU- 12 

GBU-I0 (1-2000) 

GBU-24 

GBU-27 

GBU-28 

GBU-I5 

Conventional Air-Launched CALCM 

Cruise Missile 

UK- I 000 UK-1000 

Anti-armor cluster bomb 

MK-84, 2,000-pound 

wnaser guidance and control 

MK-82, 500-pound 

wnaser guidance and control 

BLU-109 w/improved 

penetration 

MK-84 low-level laser 

guidance 

BLU-109 for F-l17A 

Hard target penetrating 

munition 

Modular guided with either 

electro-optical or infrared 

capabilities 

B-52-delivered cruise 

missile wkonv warhead 

Runway cratering bomb 

built by British 

Background 

The munitions support story for Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

begins during the Carter Administration. In 1979, President Carter announced the doctrine of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to be used to 

meet contingencies anywhere in the world. The announcement signalled 

the start of policy development and programmatic actions that ultimately 

led to negotiations with the Omani Government establishing munitions 

storage depots in that nation and at Diego Garcia, a British-owned island 

in the Indian Ocean about 3,000 miles from the AOR. The Air Force was 

tasked to identify munitions stocks for the storage areas..' The first U.S. 

Air Force munitions were positioned and stored in the Persian Gulf in 

3(S) Intvw. Ms. Bev Hooper, AF/LGSP, 25 Mar 1992. 

223 
support of Central Command (CENTCOM) missions in October 1983. 

These were existing munitions, since new funds had not been appropriated for additional munitions stocks for that theater.4 As a result of State 

and Defense Department negotiations with the Omani government, three 

munitions depots were established at Thumrait, Seeb, and the former 

Royal Air Force post at Masirah.’ Initial munitions for the new depots 

came from excess stocks of the primary warfighting commands, U.S. Air 

Force Europe (USAFE) and U.S. Air Force Pacific (PACAF), and thus did 

not include “preferred” munitions. Also, the State Department and the 

Defense Department jointly decided that the latest technology weapons 

would not be placed in the Persian Gulf region for security and safety 

reasow6 

The Reagan and Bush administrations continued and expanded the RDF 

doctrine for the Persian Gulf region with the advent of Afloat €’repositioned 

Ships in Southwest Asia. The ships were to be loaded with both Army and 

Air Force munitions stocks when the Congress approved funding. 

Initial Stages 

Taskings, developed in support of the RDF for U.S. Air Forces, led to 

the deployment of 48,325 short tons of munitions in theater before Desert 

Shield. Approximately 11,993 short tons were stored at permanent explosives storage locations in Diego Garcia and Oman, and 36,322 short tons 

of munitions were located on three prepositioned ships [DELETED].7 

These prepositioned stocks within the U.S. Air Force, Central Command (CENTAF) arena were primarily iron bombs, unguided MK-82 (500- 

pound) and MK-84 (2,000-pound) bombs, Vietnam-era cluster bomb units 

(CBU-52/58/71S), and Vietnam-era antitank MK-20 Rockeyes.* The initial 

stocks of munitions available for combat operations did not include the 

4(S/NF/WN) Rpt, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, Vol111, p D43-45, Jan 1992. 

‘(S) Rpt, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, Vol Ill, p Dl I-IS, Jan 1992; and 

6(S) Intvw, Ms Bev Hooper. AFLGSP. 2 Apr 1992. 

’(S) Briefing, Lt Col Brad Christy, Ammunition Control Point (ACP), subj: “USAF 

*(S) HQ TAC History (Munitions Support Annex) Draft, 12 Jul 1991, p 2. 

(S) Ltr, Review of TAC History Draft, 12 Jul 1991. 

Global Asset Prepositioning.” undated. 

224 
newer precision-guided munitions except for the GBU-27 ordnance the 

deploying F-l17As ferried with them? Tactical forces were deployed to 

the AOR with air-to-air self-defense missiles (AIM-7s and 9s). 

The following table shows the items stored on the ground in Oman 

and aboard the prepositioned ships before Desert Shield. All numbers are 

in complete rounds. 

Table 19 

Munitions at Prepositioned Storage Locations 

In CENTAF Prior to Desert Shield'" 

Munition [DELETED] [DELETED] [DELETED] Afloat 

MK-82 General Purpose 6,372 2.520 6,000 27,000 

MK-84 General Purpose 500 

GBU-10 PaveWay 11 500 

MK-20 Rockeye 400 

GBU-12 PaveWay I1 630 

M117 

SUU-30 (CBU 52/58/71) 1,299 

RR-170 Chaff 

30 mm CPX 

20 mm HE1 

Durandal 780 

MJU-2 

MJU-7 Flare 

360 900 5,302 

12,090 

800 1 ,000 1,237 

730 1,200 12,830 

24,412 

l00K 46K 500K 

4,000 

l00K 500K 

lOOK 415K 2.5M 

9(s) IntvW, CENTAWLGW, 15 Apr 1992. 

'OCENTAF Master Storage Plan 1-89, CENTAF/LGW; confirmed by MSgt Reed, CENTAF 

LGW for Oman figures. (s) AWACP MSG 1102352 Aug 1990, subj; Saudi Deployment 

Ammunition Availability on Prep Ships, source for Afloat numbers. 

225 
These munitions and components had been maintained for several years 

by contractor and Air Force personnel. When Operation Desert Shield 

was initiated, the munitions were found to be fully serviceable and combat ready, having been inspected and renovated over the years of storage 

by CENTAF personnel and civilian contractors. 

Figure 43 shows the relative positions of munitions storage locations in 

Oman and aboard the three prepositioned ships prior to Desert Shield. 

As the CENTAF forces were bedded down, prepositioned munitions had 

to be pushed forward to support those forces. Air Force personnel moved 

to the forefront of early munitions support operations as they began emptying the Omani depots. The first forward shipment took place on 10 

August 1990 when 1 ,OOO MK-82 bombs were sent by truck to A1 Dhafra. 

Air Force personnel also assisted with downloading munitions from prepositioned ships at.ports throughout Southwest Asia, an effort that began on 

24 August 1990. They also participated in the early line-haul distribution 

of munitions assets to beddown locations for the tactical forces." 

Additional initial munitions for the AOR forces were to be provided 

through the standard air munitions packages (STAMP) and standard tanks, 

racks, adapters, and pylons packages (STRAPP) airlifted to tactical fighter 

locations. The STAMPS and STRAPPs were designed and built to move 

critical munitions components, bomb ''bodies." and supporting munitions 

handling gear rapidly to bare base fighter operational areas to support 

specific aircraft, such as the F-16 and F-15E. 

STAMP and STRAPP had been configured to fit within C-141 wartime 

cargo weight limits. By 11 August 1990, the Ammunition Control Point 

had identified 58 (2-141 sorties to move the standard packages to the 

Gulf region.I2 Problems arose when the Military Airlift Command (MAC) 

Deputy Commander for Operations allowed only peacetime cargo weight 

limits for Desert Shield operations. Peacetime cargo limits were used 

"(s) Intvw, CENTAFUW, 1s Apr 1992. 

I2lbid. 

226 
Figure 43 

Munitions Storage Locations Prior to Operation Desert Shield 

because in-flight. air refueling was not available and there was concern 

with structural problems in the C-141 wing. This necessitated reconfiguration of pre-packed pallets before ~hiprnent.'~ 

Munitions were also carried to the Gulf on Civilian Reserve Aircraft 

Fleet aircraft. When this occurred, all STAMP/STRAPP packages had to 

I3(S) Rpt, AFIACP Report to GAO on Munitions Ops, Jan 1992, p 8. 

227 
MK-82 500-pounders are off loaded before they are armed (above); 

500-, 1 ,000-, and 2,000-pound bombs are moved to newly constructed 

earthen berms (below). 

228 
be tom down and reconfigured to comply with height and cube dimension 

requirements for the civilian aircraft.I4 

In addition to the forces going to the Arabian peninsula, Strategic Air 

Command (SAC) employed twenty B-52Gs to Diego Garcia, British Indian 

Territory, in early August for interdiction and point target missions.” 

SAC was initially directed to load ten B-52Gs with M117R (retarded-fin 

configuration) 750-pound bombs and maintain a battlefield air interdiction 

role in CENTAF.’~ The order created a major task for munitions logistics 

operations, since the Diego Garcia munitions organization initially reported only 2,870 M117R bombs available as of 15 August 1990.17 

[DELETED] As Desert Shield progressed, the concern at Diego Garcia 

centered on having initial stocks of 750-pound bombs and CBUS to supply 

incoming forces. As a result of the conventional ordnance shortage at 

Diego Garcia, the initially deploying B-52s from Lonng AFB, Maine each 

carried 45 M117R bombs on the 20-hour deployment mission.’* To 

further assist in getting more munitions to Diego Garcia, SAC ensured that 

bombers departing from Andersen AB in Guam were loaded with either 

CBUS or M117 bombs.” 

As Desert Shield continued to unfold in late August, SAC asked 

USCENTAF to institute plans for using cluster bomb units, specifically 

CBU-58s and CBU-89 Gator mines?’ CBU-58s were most effective against 

enemy personnel or light armor concentrations, whereas the CBU-89 could 

“disrupt, delay, or channel the movement of hostile forces.”2’ SAC munitions supervisors advised that the B-52 could carry as many as fifty-one 

CBU-58s and up to thirty CBU-89s per aircraft. Obvious to both SAC and 

the Air Force Ammunition Control Point, the numbers of munitions 

14(S) Intvw, Maj Keller, Cmdr. 2701 Muns Maint and Test Sqdn, Hill AFB, UT. 

‘5(S/NF/RD) HQ SAC History, 1 Jan thru 31 Dec 1990, p 182. 

I61bid, p 200. 

12 Mar 1992. 

l7(s) Msg 43oOBW(P), 1503302 Aug 1990, subj: EARFLAP to HQ AFILRC, SAUBS, 

and AFIACP. 

“[bid, p 197. 

I9(S) Rpt, SAC History for 1990, pp 462-463. 

201bid, p 205. 

[bid. 21 

229 
capable of being carried on the B-52 had significant impact on getting 

large numbers of munitions into Southwest Asia. SAC’S initiative became 

a precursor to significant air movement of critically required B-52 ordnance as additional B-52 forces received host nation beddown approval 

and were deployed from November 1990 through January 1991. 

As Desert Shield activities increased, concerns were voiced in Hq 

U.S. Air Force Battle Staff meetings with the Chief of Staff on the status 

of critically required munitions within the Gulf region. Table 20 displays 

those concerns, showing amounts and specific locations of munitions. 

The critical munitions, whose status was being monitored early in 

Operation Desert Shield, were of a defensive nature: they included air-toair missiles, AGM-65NB Maverick air-to-ground missiles, CBU-89 Gator 

antitank mines, and AGM-88 HARM antiradiation missiles. The only prepositioned “critical” munitions, either in fixed storage areas in Oman or 

aboard prepositioned ships, were the MK-20 Rockeye antitank weapons. 

The Air Force Ammunition Control Point set priorities for earliest available movement of munitions considered critical by CENTAF. However, 

the munitions were then placed in the transportation system where priorities were set by USCENTCOM. The munitions did not arrive in theater for 

up to six weeks after the requirements had been determined. While these 

initial actions were underway to provide immediate support to the forces, 

a major effort was underway to identify munitions required by the force 

so that they could be moved to and stored in the AOR. 

Munitions Requirements 

Munitions requirements are largely a function of the size of the force 

and the plan that estimates how that force will be used. As Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm progressed, force size and use changed and, as a result, 

munitions requirements changed. When Desert Shield began, an agreedto plan had not been implemented, and the force structure was fluid and 

growing. Munitions planning factors were dictated by USCINCCENT 

OPLAN 1002-90 (Draft). The plan was under final review in August 1990, 

even as the invasion of Kuwait took place. However, Time230 
Table 20 

Critical Munitions Status, 10 August 19902* 

Positioned Saudi 

Spe in Saudi Oman prep0 FMS Europe 

AGM 65A/B 0 0 0 2,527 10,409 

AIM 9uM 180 0 0 1,177 4,521 

AIM 7FIM 180 0 0 909 1,666 

MK 20 0 1,800 2,96 1 0 16,019 

CBU 89 0 0 0 0 0 

AGM 88 0 0 0 0 2,445 

10 August 90 

h, **(s) Brfg Slide, CENTAF Critical Munitions Status, to Chief of Staff, 10 Aug 1990. 

2 
Phased Force Deployment Data requirements had not been completed, or 

made available to the military Services. The lack of a final deployment 

plan and the need to deploy a large number of fighting units rapidly made 

developing a full munitions requirement list difti~ult?~ The size of the 

force went from the 700 aircraft originally planned to over 1.200 at the 

start of Desert Storm. The basic mission of the force went from defense 

to offense, and aircraft types not planned for were deployed to the theater-e.g.. F-15Es and F-117As. 

As discussed previously, munitions were prepositioned in the AOR and 

aboard three ships in the area. They were not the most current. In some 

cases, the only munitions the operational units had were what they carried 

with them as they deployed. 

The Ammunition Control Point estimated that the prepositioned 

munitions stocks in Oman and aboard the three prepositioned ships could 

sustain limited air campaign operations only for less than ten days. This 

estimate was based on early information on units tasked to deploy to the 

Persian Gulf and on the concern that few air defense (self-protection) 

weapons were in theater. Munitions requirements were constantly debated throughout the crisis. 

While estimating requirements for the arriving forces was difficult, 

satisfying the requirements, whatever they were, was also difficult. 

CENTCOM was, very appropriately, establishing the priorities for moving 

items in the transportation system, and Air Force munitions were not the 

number one priority. The full burden of DOD activity in support of 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm weighed heavily on the available transportation system and its capacity for moving munition^?^ The 

“full court press” established at all levels of the DOD demonstrated the 

complexity in determining priorities for deploying munitions to the Gulf. 

Competition for transportation was extraordinary, and priority systems 

exercised in the past were burdensome and ineffectual.25 

23(S) Rpt, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, Vol 111, p D10-11. 

24Rpt. “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,” Final Report to Congress, Apr 1992, p 43, 

tile NS252. 

”USAFIACP report to the GAO. 

232 
Only two ports in the CONUS could load ships with munitions; similar 

situations existed in Europe, the Pacific, and in the AOR. The lack of 

appropriate loading ports created a bottleneck?6 The transportation 

system continued to be overtaxed as more forces were added to the AOR 

in November 1990?7 

Once munitions were in the transportation system, there was little 

visibility on where they were and when they would arrive at the debarkation port. Because the management information system used to track the 

munitions did not work senior munitions managers did not have 

confidence in the inventory figures from the AOR. 

The requirement for munitions continued to escalate throughout 

Desert Shield and the early stages of Desert Storm, creating turmoil and 

uncertainty for senior munitions planners and managers in the Air Force 

Ammunition Control Point, Air Force Logistics Readiness Center 

(AFILRC), and CENTAF Rear. Their reaction appears to have been to 

“push” as many munitions as possible into the Gulf region to ensure 

continuous support. Priorities were established by USCINCCENT. In 

August 1990, 48,000 short tons of munitions were prepositioned in the 

AOR. During Desert Storm, 69,000 short tons of munitions were expended. By the time of the cease fire, 350,000 short tons of munitions were 

either in the AOR or en route to the AOR in support of the U.S. Air Force. 

At the cease-fire, forty-eight major sea going vessels were either in the 

AOR or en route to the AOR with Air Force munitions. 

The specific requirements for each munition increased dramatically 

throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Initially, 48,000 short tons 

of munitions were stored in Oman and aboard the three ships in the area. 

On 16 August 1990, CENTAF Rear established a sevenday requirement 

for the AOR (see column 1, Table 21);r9 which exceeded the prepositioned 

assets and the assets brought to the theater by deploying fighters (see 

26Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict Vol 111, p 39. 

27(S) Rpt, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, Vol 111, p App F-32. 

**Intvw, Dakan with LC B. Swezey, CE”fAF/LOW, 15 Apr 1992. 

29(S) Msg, CENTAF REAR to AF/ACP, et al, “Seven Day Munitions Requirements,” 

1601052 Aug 1990. This is also the source of the “on-hand“ figures in column 2. 

233 
N 

cc, 

P 

Table 21 

Munitions Requirements Growth 

AIM-7 358 358 2,826 1,536 450 1,980 

Itcm Requirement OnHand JODays+ 6ODays*+ OaHPnd+ 9o~ap 

AIM-9 348 384 5,326 2,268 748 2.6 12 

SO cal 1,538.8K 

2omm 400,OOo 690,000 1.260K 2.575M -674K 2,875.0K 

3omm 1,100,OOo 0 3.1M 7.71M -206K 9.250.0K 

MK-82 Air 4,710 1,500 25,900 52,924 3.000 28,800 

MK-82R 29.700 78.200 

MK-84 Air 900 570 5.775 33.650 562 16.940 

MK-84R 10,900 

M117 72,220 6,928 98,380 

UK-1000 500 500 

CBU-52/5Wl 1,250 755 2,800 69,275 400 168.58K 

CBU-87 3.630 384 5,950 13,000 47 40,600 

CBU-89 3,630 288 5,950 8,410 0 11,010 

MK20 2,400 944 3.150 7.550 0 21.150 

GBU- 10 190 0 340 2,090 1 08 4,490 
GBU-1% 240 

Item Requirement OnHaad JODnys* 6ODap** OnHand* 9ObYs 

GBU-12 24 6,050 

GBU- 15 250 

GBU-24B (MK 84) 650 I ,OOO 

GBU-24A/B (1-2000) 800 1,100 

GBU-27 60 192 340 1,450 1,250 

GBU-28 

AGM-65B 1.500 360 1,350 3,500 50 3,750 

AGM-65D 1.640 360 1,730 5,100 336 6,870 

AGM-65G 1.300 

AGM 45 1,700 64 64 784 

AGM-88 1,080 1 ,oso 3,500 2,500 381 3.120 

BLU-82 

BLU-107 300 0 500 780 0 

Conv ALCM 
column 2). On 21 August 1990, CENTAF Forward established a 30-day 

requirement for the AOR (see column 334. On 29 December 1990. 

CENTAF Forward established a 60-day requirement (see column 43’). On 

24 January 1991, CENTAF Forward provided their estimate of a 90-day 

and a 120-day requirement for the theater (see columns 5 and 632). 

Column 7 lists the amount of each munition expended in Desert St01-m’~. 

and column 8 shows the quantity on hand at the cease fire.34 

Munitions Movement and Control 

Compounding the efforts required in determining munitions requirements for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was the need 

to design a munitions flow or movement program in support of deploying 

forces. Both AFnRC and the Ammunition Control Point pointed out the 

need early in Operation Desert Shield.35 

Significant efforts were required to determine where the munitions 

were, locate available transportation support from both sea and air, and 

cope with “throughput” factors arising because only two explosivescapable ports of debarkation from the United States (Sunny Point in 

North Carolina and Concord in California) were available. Munitions 

were transported to the Gulf from limited explosives port facilities in the 

European Command (EUCOM) and the Pacific Command (PACOM), and the 

resultant flow from all sources descended on the Gulf’s extremely limited 

and over-burdened ports of debarkation fa~ilities.’~ 

m(s) Msg. USCENTAF FWDILG, “projected Munitions Requirements,” USCENTAF 

FWDILG to AFIACP, et d. 21 13562 Aug 1992. 

3’(s) Msg, USCENTAF FWD/LG, USCENTAF Munitions Rqts, USCENTAFILG 10 USCENTAF 

REAR, AF/ACP, et d. 2915092 DW 1990. 

32(S) Msg, USCENTAFILGIDO, “Projected 90-day and 120-day Muns, CENTAFILGIDO 

Based on EARFLAPreports completed by AFILGMW and input from the Ammunition 

to USCENTAF REAR, AF/ACP, et ai, 2406152 Jan 1991. 

33 

Control Point. 

”Brfg, AFILGSP. Munitions Consumption, Operation Desert Storm, 17 Mar 1992. 

35(S) Msg, USAWACP 1103102 Aug 1%; and (s) Msg, USAFILRC 1 11202 Aug 1990. 

36(s) Msg, USAWACP, response to GAO questions on munitions support to operation 

Desert Storm. 

236 
The problems associated with munitions transit to ports of embarkation complicated munitions movement activities throughout both Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm.37 Within US. Air Force Europe (USAFE), three 

major munitions depots were involved in supporting Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm: Royal Air Force Welford in the United Kingdom, Camp 

Darby in Italy, and Morbach in the Federal Republic of Germany. Each 

of these depots reported major problems with moving explosives over 

local roads and rail lines to ports, as well as problems with local national 

drivers accepting the responsibilities of handling munitions shipments.38 

A shortage of explosives-capable semitrailer trucks and experienced 

drivers in the United States also stymied movement of munitions to the 

two explosives-capable port facilities in the United States: Sunny Point 

in North Carolina and Concord in Calif~rnia.’~ 

Getting munitions to the Persian Gulf area to support CENTAF was a 

prime consideration of the logistics community throughout Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Figure 44 shows locations within the 

United States from which Air Force munitions were shipped to ports of 

embarkation on both U.S. coasts. 

Figure 45 depicts the movement of munitions throughout Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm.40 

Original planning factors for a CENTAF air campaign included 

approximately a forty-five-day “trip” to the Gulf?’ That length of time 

as Desert Shield unfolded proved to be far too optimistic. The munitions 

community found that the movement of munitions from U.S. storage 

locations to the Gulf required from fifty-five to seventy-two days under 

optimum conditions; in many cases, it took that long to get munitions to 

the Gulf explosives port, not the intended destination in theater.42 

37(s) Msg, HQ USAFE, 1618002 Sep 1990. 

381bid. 

39(S) Rpt, USAF/ACP to GAO, Jan 1992. 

&Chrt. Movement of muns in DS/DS, AF/ACP, 2 May 1991. 

41(S) USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (Draft). 

42Rpt, USAF~ACP to GAO, “Munitions Activity in SWA,” Jan 1992. 

237 
Figure 44 

United States Munitions Storage and Port Locations 

A Munitions Storage 

0 Port Locations 

Figure 45 

Total Munitions Tons Deployed 

Total as 

of Date 

30 Aug 90 

14 Sep 90 

4 Oct 91 

10 Dec 91 

10 Jan 92 

16 Jan 91 

27 Feb 92 

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 

238 
Munitions movement within the Gulf was also difficult and required 

exceptional management actions. Dealing with host nation drivers and 

vehicles was complicated, involving centuries-old distrust and national 

security concerns among the countries of Oman, United Arab Emirates, 

and Saudi Arabia. To solve the problem, the CENTAF Director of 

Logistics was afforded C-130 intratheater airlift to move critically short 

munitions and component stocks to Gulf location^!^ During the Gulf 

War effort, 32,000 short tons were shipped by tactical air and 49,000 

short tons were line-hauled to points of intended use.44 

An accurate accounting of munitions components was the key to 

understanding what munitions were on hand at operational locations. 

Unfortunately, the accounting had to be done manually by arriving personnel, since an accurate, automated munitions counting system was not 

available to the in-place forces in Desert Shield!’ 

The Combat Ammunition System (CAS), an automated management 

information system being developed by the Standard Systems Center at 

Gunter AFB in Alabama, had not been developed sufficiently to be of value 

to the munitions community during the Gulf War. As a result, manual 

accounting procedures were instituted in the Gulf region as well as locally 

developed data base systems on personal computers brought into the 

theater. Although CAS had been implemented at Tactical Air Command 

(TAC), USAFE, and PACAF, the data provided were not accurate and did not 

assist in tracking the worldwide munitions inventory. As a result, inventory tracking of munitions components throughout Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm was done manually, resulting in inaccuracies in reported inventories, 

poor tracking of munitions in transportation channels, and lack of credible 

munitions information for senior Air Force managers.& 

43(~) CENTAFILGW Lessons Learned, May 1991. 

44(s) USAFIACP Report to GAO, Jan 1992. 

451bid. 

&(S) Intvw, Lt Col Brad Christy, AFIACP, Munitions activities in the Gulf War, 13 

Mar 1992; (S) Intvw, Maj Bob Lerner, CENTAFILGW. 15 Apr 1992; (S) Intvw. Lt Col Bill 

Swezey, ASDIALZ, 15 Apr 1992; (Lt col Swezey was the senior niunitions manager in 

CENTAF FWD during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm); Hq USAFE/LGW Lessons 

Learned, the Gulf War, undated. 

239 
Munitions Storage and Safety Conditions 

Once the .munitions reached the theater, there were problems in 

storing them correctly. Supporting the munitions operations and delivering munitions to the point of intended use within the Gulf was to be a 

major undertaking. Command and control issues were immediately 

apparent in view of initial deployment size.'" From the original four 

permanent munitions storage locations in Southwest Asia (SWA) established at the initiation of operation Desert Shield to the twenty-four 

explosives storage locations established by the end of the air campaign, 

ensuring intratheater support was a major task for all involved!* 

Figure 46 shows the munitions locations in support of Operation Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm. Constructing and organizing new bomb dumps 

in the desert was a major challenge; however, Persian Gulf nations were 

very cooperative in providing locations for munitions facilities. 

Figure 46 

Munitions Storage Locations, 16 January 1991 

47CEmAFffiW Lessons Learned briefing, May 1991. 

&(S) Msg, CENTAFLGW 2210162 Feb 1991. 

240 
To compensate for inadequate munitions storage capacity, a depot 

facility was established in the central region of Saudi Arabia in September 1990."9 This location, known as Al Kharj, provided USCENTAF with 

an explosives overflow capacity of 14 million pounds of class 1 .I (mass 

detonating) explosives. The location, coupled with construction of munitions storage areas at Jeddah, Al Minhad, A1 Dhafra, Taif, and Doha, 

increased Gulf munitions storage capacity to 47.8 million pounds of net 

explosives weight.% 

Explosives safety became a major concern throughout the build-up in 

the Gulf region. Detailed explosives storage planning factors, active 

explosives safety training programs, and strict emphasis on technical order 

discipline were key factors in maintaining a low explosives mishap rate 

throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm." Only three reportable minor 

explosives incidents occurred during logistics operations. However, several munitions reliability issues came to the forefront during the air campaign. The early burst problem of the FMU-139 bomb nose fuze was the 

most significant in the reliability arena and is discussed later. 

Explosives storage capability at most Gulf beddown locations was 

either nonexistent or insufficient to permit on-base storage of the required 

munitions stockpile. Deploying forces were faced with organizing munitions storage and accountability activities, developing flow plans and 

flight-line delivery functions, and organizing explosives safety programs. 

Because of the nature of combat preparation, none of the new barebase beddown locations had the required explosives storage licensing 

arrangements completed by the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center 

before accepting exp1osives.s2 However, CENTAF weapons safety and 

munitions personnel assessed proposed explosives locations, designed 

those locations to meet established explosives quantity distance criteria, 

established warehousing procedures, and wrote storage planning and 

training directives that included explosives quantity distance and basic 

weapons safety considerations. Where available, and with host nation 

49(~) USCOMCENTAF SITREP 181800 Sep 1990. 

"(S) Msg, USAWACP AMMO 1 Net 2820002 Nov 1990. 

5'(S) Msg, AFISUSEW 2216402 Mar 1991. 

AFISUSEW. Lessons Learned in Desert ShieldlDesert Storm, Jun 1991 52 

24 1 
approval, explosives storage locations were placed away from populated 

activities on base, thus decreasing explosives risks to base population^.^^ 

Desert Storm 

The “Air Bridge” 

From the outset of Desert Shield, SAC underscored the need to have 

forward basing to employ conventional ordnance with maximum 

effectiveness. As a result, Moron in Spain, and RAF Fairford in England 

were ultimately chosen for additional bomber bases beyond that already 

established in Diego Garcia.” The nearly threefold increase in B-52 

aircraft sent munitions requirements “off the map” in January 1991, 

creating special concern for sustaining Moron forces.” 

With the heavy M117, MK-82, and CBU loads that the B-52 force 

was able to carry, the Air Force Logistics Readiness Center, Ammunition 

Control Point, USAFE Director of Logistics, PACAF Director of Logistics, 

CENTAF Director of Logistics, TAC Director of Logistics, and SAC Director 

of Logistics began a concentrated effort to provide SAC with the necessary 

munitions. Major sealift actions continued, and an “air bridge” was 

developed. C-5, C-141, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), aircraft 

transported critically required munitions to the B-52 operational units in 

Diego Garcia, Spain, and the United Kingdom% The air bridge required 

the concerted actions of personnel involved in processing munitions from 

storage areas, line hauling them to aerial ports of debarkation, and 

accomplishing their aerial port transfers at both points of debarkation and 

ernbarkati~n.~’ There were 693 sorties flown in support of the air bridge, 

which began on 15 January 1991 and terminated 27 February.58 

53(s) IntVW, CENTAFlffiW, 15 Apr 1992. 

u(S) Rpt, AF/ACP, “Answers to GAO Questions on Desert Shield, Desert Storm,” 

p 16. 

”(s) Intvw, CENTAFILGW, 15 Apr 1992. 

%pt. AF/ACP Answers to GAO, Jan 1992, p 16. 

57(s) lntvw. LA Col E. B. Christy, AFIACP, 25 Apr 1992. 

’*(s) Msg, AFIACP to CENTAFILG and CENTAF REAR, subj: Proposed Munitions 

support CWTAF, 1215572 Jan 1991. 

242 
The munitions were taken from Guam and RAF Welford because of 

their proximity to the CENTAF area of responsibility and the fact that 

U. S. port facilities were saturated. Airlift to the Gulf was necessary 

because: (1) the supply needs of the force applied far outstripped the 

supplies prepositioned and (2) the politically sensitive climate surrounding 

the operational bases prevented overt identification of ammunition required or shipment de~tination.5~ 

Tempo and Training 

Munitions activity was on a continuous “high.” Forward operating 

locations were established, and redistributing munitions between depots, 

units, and between countries occurred on a daily basis to meet urgent 

operational tasking. Munitions personnel worked in 120-degree heat to 

meet critical mission takeoff times and to build up and deliver munitions 

to the flight line in support of Coalition air operations. They succeeded 

in the face of some of the most difficult conditions ever encountered by 

Air Force members, although they didn’t come under fire, for the most 

part, and were not subjected to actual chemical or biological warfare 

conditions. 

Training of munitions personnel involved in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm paid huge benefits to the Air Force. The five and one-half months 

of Desert Shield afforded senior leadership a rare opportunity to hone 

combat skills of the heterogeneous forces ordered to Southwest Asia. 

Interviews with many deputy commanders for maintenance revealed that 

personnel from as many as forty bases would be represented in the 

maintenance force at one Gulf base. Thus, training that newly formed 

force became essential. One statistic reveals most about quality 

munitions training: the zero significant explosives accidents involving 

Air Force personnel. That safety record is directly attributed to strong 

supervision, demand for following appropriate technical data, and emphasis placed on quality training and quality safety practices. 

A “force multiplier” in training the munitions personnel was offered 

by the Air Force Combat Ammunition Center (AFCOMAC) located at 

Sierra Army Depot in California. The Center was designed and developed as a combat-oriented, munitions production course offered to select243 
ed midgrade NCOS and junior officers directly supervising munitions 

production operations. In the early 1980s. Lt. Gen. Leo Marquez, Air 

Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Engineering, recognized 

that the Vietnam-experienced midlevel technicians and junior officers 

were leaving the Service. When nearly every Air Force base experienced 

problems in using live ordnance for mass munitions production, General 

Marquez ordered the establishment of a course designed to teach munitions combat production techniques. That course was developed, and 

facilities at Sierra Army Depot were offered as a location for instruction. 

The first class graduated in the spring of 1985, and by the time Operation 

Desert Shield began, nearly 3,000 students had completed the course. 

GBU-28 (Hard Target Penetration Munition) 

The GBU-28 Hard Target Penetration Munitions was specifically 

developed for Desert Storm. A need was established for a weapon with 

significantly more penetration power than that of the BLU-109 2,000-pound 

precision-guided munition. Demand increased for such a weapon and in 

January 1991, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 

surveyed organizations countrywide for ideas that could result in a quickly developed weapon for penetrating deep hardened targets. Aeronautical 

Systems Division worked closely with the Armament Division at Eglin 

AFB in Florida, the Tactical Air Warfare Center (TAWC) at Eglin, with 

competing contractor representatives from Lockeed, and Rockwell, and 

with several subsystem contractors including Texas Instruments. Around 

the clock operations began in both contractor and military facilities to 

produce the required weapon, test components, develop the explosives 

fiiler, and flight-test a weapon twice as heavy and nearly twice the length 

of any precision-guided munition in the Air Force inventory. 

On 2 February 1991, the Secretary of the Air Force directed Quick 

Look operational test of the newly developed GBU-28/B.60 The schedule 

was so tight that on 20 February, 1991, the bomb being used in the first 

60Article, “War Planner: Civilians Didn’t Change Target List,” Air Force Tunes. 8 Jul 

1992, (SD 4-16); (S/DECLASS: OADR) Msg, HQ TAC/DR to USAFrFWUCC, et al. subj: 

Seek Eagle Request (SER 41-Y1) Delivery Info for CBU-87/8Y and MK 84/82/20 with wing 

tanks on the F-ISE Desert Storm, 2323212 Jan 1991, (SD 4-17); (S/DECLASS: 

OADR) Msg, TAUCV to SAF QA, et al, subj: Desert Storm Deep Hardened Target Penetration Test, 1918032 Feb 1991, (SD 4-18); (SIDECLASS: OADR) Msg, USAFTAWUCC to 

HQTAUDO. et al, End-of-Test Report, GBU-2WB Quick Look, 2720002 Mar 1991. (SD 4-19). 

244 
captive test was still warm from the explosive filling process. Weapon 

testing was accomplished at the Tonopah Test Range and at Holloman 

AFB in New Mexico. On 26 February 1991, the 6585th Test Group 

conducted a sled run to test thick concrete penetration, Earlier that same 

day, two “production” GBU-28s wete picked up from Eglin for delivery to 

the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional) in Taif, Saudi Arabia. The 

431st TES F-111s Weapons Officer, a weapons loader from TAWC, and 

contractors from Lockheed and Texas Instruments accompanied the bomb 

delivery. The 431st TEs aircrew member carried a VCR tape of the 

Tonopah test and immediately began briefing F-111 aircrews. The targets 

included two command and control bunkers at and near Iraq‘s A1 Taji air 

base, north of Baghdad. Within five hours of delivery, on 27 February 

1991, the weapons were flown into combat. The first GBU-28 hit an 

underground bunker it was aimed at, but only clipped its corner due to 

crew error in designating the wrong aim point. The second GBU-28 made 

the successful “hit,” destroying a command and control complex 

containing senior staff members of the Iraqi miIitary.6’ 

The success of the GBU-28 weapon system development program 

resulted from rapid response, concurrent analysis and testing, a strong 

interaction between government and contractor agencies, and knowledgeable personnel in all aspects of the development and implementing 

groups. Further operational discussions of the GBU-28 are covered in the 

Operations and Eflects volume of this 

Development of the PGM 

The unquestioned value of the precision-guided munition spurred the 

rapid development and successful employment of the GBU-28. Penetration 

capability had long been a desired feature of air-delivered munitions. 

6’(FOUO) Videotape, GBu-28 Hard Target Penetrator Munition, various dates (Sup 

Video 2); Art. “GBU-28 Desert Storm Rapid Response,’’ TAC Attack, Jan 1992, p 4-7, (SD 

4-20); Intvw, Donna Clark, Historian, with Maj Phillip J. Siebert, 422 TES PRO F-111, 9 

Feb 1992; Art, “Pilot’s Last War Mission the First for New Bomb,” Air Force Times, 23 

Sep 1991. (SD 4-21); (UDECLASS: OADR) Msg. Det 3 ESANCC to DIA. et al. subj: 

IIR 1218 0104 sdDescnption of Underground Bunker Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, 

2316152 Aug 1990, (SD 4-22); Art, “Powerful GBU-28 Bomb used in Iraq Made of Old 

Gun Barrels.” Air Force Times, 3 Jun 1991 (SD 4-23). 

62(s) Intvw. Maj Wright, ASD program Manager, Kathy Douglass, ASD deputy 

program manager, and Art Spencer, Wright Lab (HERD), 28 Jun 1991. 

245 
Beginning in World War 11, the United States gained experience in trying 

to destroy hardened submarine bunkers and command posts. However, 

the armament developers of that period had trouble developing a hardened fuze that would survive the penetration requirements and still function. The problem remained through development of the Vietnam-era 

precision-guided munitions. 

The pst-Vietnam years saw two separate developmental tracks: 

developing much more sophisticated delivery platforms including the 

F-16, the F-15E and the F-117A. and continued research on precisionguided munitions technology. The delivery platforms received commensurate congressional appropriations; for the most part, precision-guided 

munitions technology remained in the laboratory testing stage. Procurement monies for precision-guided weapons did not keep pace with the 

new delivery platforms being brought into the Air Force inventory.63 The 

problem was somewhat rectified when specific procurement monies were 

made available for weapons deployed on the F-l17A in the late 1970s 

and early 1980s. Additionally, congressional appropriations allowed for 

procurement of the improved 2,000-pound MK-84 weapon variant and 

associated guidance, fuzing, and control equipment in the mid- 1980s." 

Concerted efforts in procuring new munitions centered on the combined 

effects munitions (CEM) and the sensor fuzed weapon (SFW) in the late 

1980s. The CEM became the "weapon of choice" in many Desert Storm 

operations; however, the SF" was still battling development problems as 

Operation Desert Shield unfolded!' 

BLU-82 (15,000-pound 6'Daisy Cutter',) 

On 29 January 1991, the CENTAF Director of Logistics received a 

requirement from the Commander of CENTCOM Special Operations Command (COMSOCCENT), for ten BLU-82 weapons.66 IIhe BLU-82 is a 15,000- 

pound gelled-sluny-fill bomb used in Vietnam to clear helicopter pads. 

63(s) Intvw, AFILGSP and AFIXOOTM, 20 Aug 1992. 

(s) Intvw, AF/LGSP, 21 Aug 1992. 64 

65(s) Intvw, AF/LGMW, 20 Aug 1992. 

"(s) Msg, 291 5302, Munitions Requirement, Operation Desert Storm, COMSOCCENT// 

socu/. Jan 1991. 

246 
[DELETED] The bomb is rigged with nylon webbing to a pallet and 

delivered by a C- 130 using the parachute extraction aerial delivery ~ystem.~’ 

The worldwide inventory of BLU-82 bomb cases on 29 January 1991 

was forty-eight. Cases are stored empty and require premix filling before 

they can be used. The first two bombs were filled and airlifted on 1 

February 1991. The remaining eight, to satisfy the COMSOCCENT 

requirement, were filled by priority contract and transported to Hill AFB 

on 3 February. Starting 5 February, two bombs per day were airlifted to 

the Gulf until eight had departed by 8 February. 

Anticipating future demand for more bombs, the Ammunition Control 

Point began making preparations to fill and ship the remaining thirtyeight empty BLU-82 cases. On 10 February 1991, COMSOCCENT directed 

the Ammunition Control Point to immediately ship the five available 

bombs (above the ten already shipped) and take actions necessary to 

prepare and ship the balance of thirty-three.68 The five bombs were 

shipped on 16 February. On 13 February, USCINCCENT/J3 requested that 

the Ammunition Control Point ship another eleven BLU-82s. The first 

three were ready on 22 February, and the remaining seven were ready on 

25 February for airlift to the Gulf. 

A total of eleven BLU-82s were expended during the war. After the 

war’s end, seven filled BLU-82s remained in the Gulf and eight were at 

Hill AFB. All the remaining BLU-82s were destroyed after the war because 

of concern about the stability of the explosive filler.69 

FMU-139 Fuzes 

The FMU-139NB fuze provides nose and tail fuzing for precisionguided bombs and MI17 and MK-84 General Purpose bombs in high67(S) Point Paper, on BLU-82, Maj Young, AFUYX, 14 Feb 1991. 

Msg, COMSOCCENT/SOCJ4, Number 51. 10021/10 Feb 1991, subj: Munitions 

@Intvw, CMSgt John Delaney. 2721 Munitions Maintenance and Test Squadron, Hill 

Requirements, BLU-82. 

AFB. 1 Apr 1992. 

247 
and low-drag releases. During Desert Storm, at least fifty-one reports of 

early bursts were attributed to the FMU-139 fuze. [DELETEDI7' 

The FMU-139NB fuze's early burst problem was not new. Similar 

problems had been documented in 1988 and 1989. An attempted fix 

involved several human factors related to properly made cable connections and a contractor rework of the FZU-WB power cable. The contract 

was awarded in December 1990. Reworked cables were to be fielded in 

August 1991. 

The reworked cables and engineering change proposals to incorporate the human factors had not yet been fielded when the war began. 

As a result of the early bursts in Desert Storm, the CENTAF Chief of 

Munitions restricted the operational employment of FMU-139MB-fuzed 

munitions and recommended the substitution of other, less desirable 

fuzing options?' CENTAF also requested that all new production fuzes 

and modified cables be released to it as soon as possible in order to build 

sufficient stock levels. Motorola began surge production of the modified 

cables with funds provided by Aeronautical Systems Division from Eglin 

AFB. The Ammunition Control Point initiated follow-on support contracts 

with monies provided by Air Force Headquarters. The first 5,000 cables 

arrived in the Gulf in only forty-eight hours. However, they were never 

used, since hostilities ended shortly thereafter. 

Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD)" 

Nearly one-third of the active-duty Explosive Ordinance Disposal 

(EOD) force, 320 personnel, were assigned to the Central Command AOR. 

EOD managers successfully integrated EOD personnel from many commands, sister Services, and host nations. The unit at Dhahran, for example, comprised disposal technicians from five Air Force Major Com- 

(S) Msg, 0913002 Feb 1991, Premature Detonation of MU-139- Fuzes, 

7'(S) Msg, 573, FMU-139 A/B FuzdCable Replacement, 1 Feb 1991, USCENTAF/LGW. 

"Maj D. Murray, USAF HQ/USAF/CEOR Memo, 16 Apr 1992. Additional details and 

confirmation provided by (S) interviews with CMSgt JJ Clover, HQ USAF EOD Manager 

during the war, 24 Apr 1992. and Cmdr M Mathews. NAVSCOLEOD, Indian Head NAS MD, 

24 Apr 1992. 

70 

1708BWP/CC. 

248 
mands, Britain, and Saudi Arabia. Host nation EOD personnel required 

extensive war-related training. 

To expand ordnance clearance operations, Central Command 

introduced two special types of vehicles for use at high-threat bases. The 

first type was a munitions clearance vehicle. Tbenty M60A3 main battle 

tanks with M9 combat engineer blades were procured from U.S. Army 

European depots to clear submunitions from runways and taxi surfaces. 

The second type was a base recovery vehicle. Thirty-seven M113A2 

armored personnel carriers, topped with SO-caliber rifles, filled that role. 

They served as reconnaissance vehicles and a platform from which to fire 

at unexploded ordnance to destroy it from a safe distance. 

In response to the terrorist threat in the Gulf, additional MK32 X-ray 

units, protective bomb suits, shields, and bomb blankets were shipped to 

EOD units. Production of the Andros robot for removal and safing of 

improvised explosive devices was also accelerated-the first four units 

going directly to Southwest Asia. [DELETED] 

One EOD unit cleared an Air Force munitions storage area hit by an 

errant Army Hellfire missile. While thousands of pounds of ordnance 

were destroyed in the accident and the resultant cleanup activity, there 

were no injuries. The local Air Force EOD unit, teamed with a nearby 

U.S. Army unit, had the storage area cleared of hazardous ordnance items 

and ready for reuse in just four days. 

During Desert Storm, EOD personnel responded frequently to weapon 

system emergencies involving combat aircraft, and, on other occasions, 

disposed of ordnance jettisoned from Coalition aircraft. At the request 

of Saudi Arabia, EOD units investigated Scud missile impact sites, 

recovering debris and sections of intact missiles. EOD technicians shipped 

several of these to U.S. intelligence agencies. 

During the liberation of Kuwait City, Air Force EOD teams provided 

direct support to Central Command Special Operations Forces by clearing 

hazardous ordnance from Kuwait International Airport. The teams also 

cleared booby traps and hazardous ordnance from key government and 

civilian buildings in Kuwait City and were the first to enter the U.S. 

Embassy compound. 

249 
Two special EOD teams were organized on short notice to deploy with 

Red Horse personnel and deny the enemy use of two air bases in southern 

Iraq. After hazardous ordnance was cleared from runways to provide a 

minimum operating strip for C-130 aircraft, heavy equipment and 

demolition explosives were airlifted directly to the sites. Captured Iraqi 

ordnance, technical publications, and even the contents of the Iraq EOD 

school were eventually returned to the United States. 

Despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in Southwest Asia, the EOD 

mission continued unabated for many months. Over a million items of 

U.S. and foreign ordnance were disposed of safely during the year after 

the close of Operation Desert Storm. Another posthostility mission was 

the inspection of Iraqi chemical and ballistic missile sites by United 

Nations personnel, with EOD technicians playing a key support role. 

/ \ 

250 
Munition Expenditures 

The following figures display the numbers of specific munitions 

consumed during Operation Desert Storm. Emphasis from the highest 

levels of the Air Force centered on availability and consumption of those 

munitions. The figures show the requirement level for munitions items 

before the war, consumption during Operation Desert Storm, and the Gulf 

on-hand inventory after the war.'3 

Figure 47 

AIM-7M Sparrow Missile 

0 Requirement Expended In War On Hand After War 

- 

AIM-7M Sparrow 

As of: 3 Mar 91 

73AFILGMW Briefing, Operation Desert Storm Munitions Expenditure report, As of 

2 Mar 1991. Based on EARFLAP reports. 

25 1 
Figure 48 

AIM3M Sidewinder Missile 

0 Requirement 0 Expended In War On Hand After War 

AIM-9M Sidewinder 

As of 3 Mar 91 

Figure 49 

MK-82 Low and High Drag 500-Pound Bomb 

0 Requirement 0 Expended In War On Hand After War 

MK-82 HD MK-82 LD 

As of 3 Mar 91 

252 


Figure 54 

GBU-12 (500-Pound PGM) 

0 Requlrernent c] Expended In War On Hand After War 

GBU- 12 LGB 

As of: 3 Mar 91 

Figure 55 

GBU-24 (Improved 2,000-Pound Bomb) 

0 Requirement Expended In War On Hand After War 

GBU-24 (MK-84) LLLGB 

As of: 28 Feb 91 

255 
Figure 56 

G3U-27 (2,000-Pound PGM for F-117A) 

0 Requirement c] Expended In War On Hand After War 

GBU-27 LGB 

As of: 28 Feb 91 

Figure 57 

CBU-52E8nl (Cluster Bomb Units) 

0 Requirement Expended In War H On Hand After War 

CBU-52/58/7 1 

As of 3 Mar 91 

256 

Observations 

During the initial stages of Desert Shield, a good deal of confusion 

existed concerning arming the force. Munitions in Oman and aboard 

ships in the immediate area, provided initial support. However, they were 

not the latest munitions and were not appropriate for air defense, the 

immediate concern. The deploying units flew in armed with AIM 7s 

and 9s. Confusion in the early stages of an operation are normal; however, it continued to cause problems in the munitions area. 

Requirements for munitions were not clear and escalated sharply as 

the mission and size of the force grew. There was difficulty in knowing 

what munitions were where, since the management information system 

being built to answer these questions did not perform well. The 

transportation system was overwhelmed because of the volume being 

shipped and lack of information on what assets were where. These 

factors contributed to the continuing confusion in arming the force. 

Numerous storage depots had to be and were built. The preconflict 

training of the munitions people on storing and building up bombs paid 

dividends. 

There were 48,000 short tons of munitions prepositioned for the AOR 

before the war; 69,000 short tons were dropped during Desert Storm. 

Three hundred and fifty thousand short tons available for the AOR were 

either in the AOR or en route to the AOR at the end of the war. The quick 

response to the requirements for special weapons is noteworthy. The 

GBU-28 was fielded very quickly for attacking bunkers, and the BLU-82 

Daisy Cutters were built up and shipped on very short notice and used for 

clearing minefields. 

In summary: there were no known instances of missions cancelled 

because munitions were unavailable. This record was accomplished with 

zero significant safety accidents involving Air Force personnel. 

258 
7 

Supplying the Force 

This Chapter addresses supplying the force with spare parts and fuels. 

The first part of the Chapter focuses on spares activities related to aircraft 

mission support. The second half of the Chapter addresses petroleum product support, exclusive of air refueling, which was covered in Chapter 5. 

Supplying Spare Parts 

The overall effectiveness of spares support during Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm is reflected in the aggregate aircraft status statistics recorded 

during those operations (Figure 60). Supply support exceeded both 

peacetime standards and wartime projections. This section describes how 

that was accomplished. 

To ensure unintempted maintenance, operating bases, maintenance 

depots, and storage depots maintain stocks of consumable and reparable 

spares. During steady-state operation, out-of-stock conditions that can 

ground aircraft or cause maintenance work stoppage are held to levels 

established on the basis of mission and economic considerations. The 

basic flow is from industry to the wholesale warehouse, to the user-level 

supply ctivity, and finally to the maintenance technician who uses the 

items to fix aircraft or aircraft components. Items that can be repaired 

come back into the system for reuse. 

When aircraft units were tasked to support Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, multiple events disrupted the steady-state balance of the supply 

pipelines. First, the tasked aircraft moved to new operating bases; most 

were thousands of miles from their home base. Second, spares usage 

patterns changed because of changes in flying activity and location. Third, 

the supply and maintenance resources initially moved to the new operating 

location constituted only a small portion of the home base resource. And 

fourth, supply pipelines were interrupted or constrained. The story of 

supplying the force during Desert Shield and Desert Storm is, in large part, 

the story of how the Air Force dealt with these four events. 

259 
Figure 60 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm Aircraft Status’” 

Desert Shield 

-X- MC% 

Desert Storm 

85 

80 

75 

cccccccccccccccccc 

++++++++++++++++++ 

345678911111111112 

000000001234567890 

00000000000 

‘Background Paper, “CENTAF Logistics Story;’ CENTAFRX;, Apr 1991. 

’Mission Capable (MC) is the term used to describe an aircraft or other type of 

equipment that is in a condition that would allow it to perform all of its assigned missions 

without restriction. The numerical values shown in the figure represent the average frequency over time of the aircraft conditions expressed as a percentage of the number of aircraft 

in the AOR. The Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) and Not Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM) rates represent, respectively, the percentage of time that aircraft were not MC 

awaiting parts or maintenance actions to be completed. 

260 
Supply Concept of Operation 

The basic supply concept of operations in support of air power calls 

for preplanned requirements determination driven by specific threat 

assumptions. It also calls for the use of various spares segments and 

packages to allocate and position available supply resources. The types 

and levels of support provided to particular units are tailored to their 

planned mission. That general concept of operations was the basis for 

supply preparations before the Gulf War and resulted in a spares-rich 

environment. As was demonstrated during Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, however, some of the systems and procedures needed to manage 

those spares effectively according to the concept of operations were either 

not in place, were not well documented, or did not work. 

From a supply perspective, spares were authorized, procured, and 

allocated to the forces sent to the Gulf on the basis of their wartime 

tasking and priority. Units designated for mobility tasking in the war 

plans would have to be moved from their home base to support a wartime 

operation, and were by policy authorized mobile spares package^.^" Units 

with documented wartime tasking to operate in place, such as most units 

stationed in Europe, did not have mobility spares packages. Rather, the 

spares required to support their day-today operations were augmented 

with additional assets to support the initial wartime period, when resupply 

is expected to be interrupted?" Since these units were not designated for 

deployment tasking, they did not have mobility bins to transport their 

spares. Their spares and equipment sizing were based upon operate-in3Most of the mobility spares packages that moved forward with the initial aircraft 

deployments were called war readiness spares kits (WSK). WRSKs are predetermined and 

prepackaged spares designed to support deployed units operating at planned wartime 

activity rates until reliable resupply lines can be established. WRSKs are authorized to 

units that are designated for mobility tasking in the War and Mobilization Man, Volume 

3 (WMP-3). Other types of spares packages include mission support kits (MSK) which are 

generally tailored packages of spares designed to support activities not documented in the 

WMP. 

4AF Regulation 400-24, Logistics War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Policy, Department 

%ese additive spares are called base level self-sufficiency spares (BUS). 

6AFR 400-24, p 36. 

of the Air Force, 31 Jul 1990, p 35. 

26 1 
place assumptions that included the continuation of a full base repair 

capability, and their supply people did not practice deployed operations. 

At the time of the Gulf War, the Air Force objective was to provide 

wartime-tasked units with sufficient prepositioned spares to support 

wartime operations for the first sixty days until wartime resupply channels 

could be established and operated on a routine basis? In practice, however, only thirty-day prepositioned stocks of most reparable spares were 

authorized.* For units operating out of fixed bases after deployment, as 

within the area of responsibility (AOR), the basic supply concept of operations called for a second spares package built and deployed around day 

30 of the c~nflict.~ Those spares would augment the initial spares package and support continued operations, which normally included expanded 

maintenance capabilities, until establishment of normal, dependable 

resupply support from the continental United States. 

Taking Supply to War 

The Gulf War was not business as usual for supply. Few things 

happened “by the book,” or in accordance with the basic supply concept 

of operations. For example: 

Units that were supposed to fight in place were deployed without 

mobility spares. 

The mobile supply computer systems did not work well, temporarily “blinding” Air Force, Central Command, the wholesale 

supply system, and the major commands. As a consequence, 

alternative computer support capabilities were developed. Target 

support levels were not accepted as good enough. 

’Report LS861050, Supply Wartime Planning and fiecution Guide, AFLMC, 

*AF Regulation 400-24, Logistics War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Policy, Department 

Sep 1987. p 11. 

of the Air Force, 31 Jul 1990, p 34. 

These packages are called follow-on spares kits (FOSK). The FOSK concept is to 

move a second increment of spares forward as a single package rather than processing the 

thousands of individual requisitions that would otherwise be required to move those 

spares. Although this support concept had been on the books for several years, the 

programs and procedures for executing it were not in place. 

9 

262 
Resupply of war readiness spares kits and other spares packages 

commenced almost immediately and continued even after sustainment spares had been put in place and routine resupply was certain. 

Several new spares support concepts were conceived and implemented. While some adjustments to plans and planning concepts 

are always needed, adjustments and deviations during Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm were not the exception; they were the rule. 

Upon deployment notification during Desert Shield, units attempted to 

fill shortages in existing spares packages or began assembling other types 

of packages." Base level actions included issuing available serviceable 

spares from stock, moving assets among the assigned spares packages, 

expediting local repair, contacting the supporting wholesale sources of 

supply, and selectively cannibalizing aircraft not needed to support the 

deployment. These initiatives were generally effective, and most kit fills 

were over ninety percent full at the time of deployment. Although not well 

documented, it appears that many units unilaterally increased authorized 

quantities of known problem items for their spares packages, built new 

packages to take items they thought they would need but that were not in 

existing packages, or simply overfilled their packages on selected items." 

For some units, preparing for deployment to the AOR was even more 

challenging. Several were tasked to deploy aircraft but were not authorized 

mobility spares, or at least not sufficient spares to support the number of 

aircraft deployed. These units had only minimum time to compute their 

requirements and build new spares packages to be deployed with 

As noted earlier, the operating convention has always been that only units 

authorized mobility spares were "available for mobility tasking." The 

'Orhe other types of spares packages built were typically some variation of a mission 

support kit (MSK). MSKs are built to support specific tasking that does not justify the 

authorization of additive war reserve materiel (WRM). Many of the MSKS built to support 

movements to the AOR were designated high-priority MSKs (HPMSK) to give them the same 

replenishment priority as WRSK. 

"Report, Desert ShieWStom Logistics - Observations by U.S. Military Personnel, 

'*Ibid. 

I3John H. Gunselman Jr.. Col, USAF. Documentary on Desert Shield/Sorm Supply 

GAOINSIAD-92-26, NOV 1991, p 24. 

Support, Air Force Journal of Logistics, Fall 1991. 

263 
deployment of units stationed in Europe, to the AOR, and to 'hrkey for the 

Proven Force operation demonstrated that these types of units can deploy 

and operate effectively, albeit with some difficulty, if they can be afforded 

time to prepare and be assured of continuous re~upply.'~ 

At the wholesale supply activities (which included Air Force air 

logistics centers and other Service and Defense Logistics Agency inventory control points), battle staffs, and twenty-four-hour customer support 

activities were set up to expedite resupply requirements and solve the 

ever-present problems. Similar operations were set up at the Service and 

Defense Agency headquarters to facilitate coordination of activities and 

handle unique requirements. Also, depot surge programs were initiated 

to accelerate repair of existing and potential problem items, and where 

appropriate, expedite procurement actions. Problem items were identified 

through supported command and Commander-in-Chief inputs, ongoing 

critical item management programs, and the use of capability assessment 

models. Additional repair resources and expedited procurement actions 

were taken as required to respond to mission needs. 

The specific items to be surged by the air logistics centers were 

identified by multiple sources. The sources included various logistics 

information systems and recommendations from system program managers and the commands using the aircraft. Data available in the automated 

systems were typically current at a point in time; as such, their value was 

time perishable. The data from automated systems were augmented with 

data from several other sources, including records of recent shortages of 

spare parts needed to repair aircraft or aircraft components and of known 

shortages in spares packages that are deployed with aircraft units. Over 

eighty-five percent of the items identified by the using commands as 

needing surge were already in the Air Force Critical Item Program and 

being ~0rked.I~ Air Force Logistics Command surged over 75,000 items 

''Additional implications could not be addressed here because of lack of data. One 

might infer that the capability of these units to deploy was at least in part due to the 

mobility experience of personnel previously assigned to mobility tasked units, e.g., prior 

TAC experience. Further, the impact on the capability of the residual USA= forces to 

meet a concurrent theater contingency remains an unknown. 

"Briefing, AFLC Desert ShieldStorm Lessons Learned, 12-13 Jul 91 Hot Wash 

Conference, AFLC Briefing Book. 

264 
through early March 1991 to fill spares packages and other priority spares 

requiremen ts.16 

Under the unit move concept, spares normally move forward with the 

aircraft. During the Desert Shield deployments, however, several decisions disrupted this integrated flow. The first reported disruptions were 

related to the accelerated deployment into the AOR of direct combat 

forces." To accomplish the acceleration, units tailored down their sup 

port packages. Later, priorities were realigned to give priority to personnel comfort items. As a result, the Air Force, Central Command Rear 

Director of Supply reported that at one point, over 100 pallets of spares 

were sitting on the ramps at Tactical Air Command bases waiting for 

airlift after the supported aircraft were already in the AOR.'*'I9 Had intense combat activity started before the spares arrived, a significant 

number of aircraft could have been grounded awaiting parts. 

Receiving and Storing Spares at Deployed Locations 

Spares were received and stored in a variety of ways in the AOR. In 

addition to location and facilities requirements, the types of spares being 

received and their methods of shipment made the process difficult or 

easy. Without question, the method of shipment easiest to deal with from 

a receiving and storing perspective was kitted spares packagcs shipped 

directly from the home base to the AOR beddown base as a part of a unit 

move. In such cases, the supported unit knew what they had and, even 

under the most austere conditions, could protect spares reasonably well 

because most items were in mobility bins. On the opposite end of the 

spectrum were individual spares "pushed" to the theater without unit 

designation, followed closely by loose resupply items and non-kitted 

spares packages. 

Serious difficulties in materiel movement were experienced early on 

in the AOR. The problems were most critical early on when beddown 

l61bid. 

17(S) Msg, 0 14o6002 Aug 1990, subj: OperDesert Shield, USCINCCENT CCJ3. 

'*lntvw, author with col van McCrea, CENTAF Rearkcs, 4-5 Aug 1992. 

"For TAC, this was significant because 100 pallets of WRSK could represent 5 to 10 

18/24 PAA fighter squadron's worth of spares. By comparison, however, a single 14 PAA 

WRSK for SAC B-52s might take as many as 60 pallets. 

265 
locations were classified and materiels were being shipped to the AOR 

with no specific address or indication of the unit the materiel was intended for. One of the best descriptions of the situation at that time was 

provided in a staff paper provided by Hq Military Airlift Command: 

In the early portions of Desert Shield, destination codes were not provided to the field and the field didn't ask. . . everything was just 

shipped to Dhahran. As a result, hundreds of pallets were sitting in the 

Aerial Port facility at Dhahran with no one knowing where they were 

to go, to whom, or the relative priority. Deployed tactical airlift units 

would fly the first sortie of the day to Dhahran and leave several people 

[from units deployed to the various operating locations] there to roam 

about the yard looking for their shipments and return on the last sortie 

of the day with whatever they had found.20 

While the above problems were worked out over time and, from a 

spares perspective, caused no documented impact on combat capability, 

they might have been critical had the deployed aircraft immediately 

engaged, had spares been in short supply, or had Dhahran come under 

attack before the cargo backlog was sorted out. 

As was discussed in the transportation chapters, the general flow of 

materiels into the AOR was not always smooth. This was especially true 

for materiels that were not part of a unit move. In the continental United 

States, backlogs occurred at major departure airports such as Dover, 

where at times over 3,000 tons of materiel, including spares, awaited 

airlift. The staff of Air Force, Central Command Rear perceived the 

problem to be so bad that anytime it became aware that a spare destined 

for the AOR had been routed into Dover, it rerequisitioned the item and 

requested specific routing to alternate airports such as Tinker AFB in 

Oklahoma, and, later Charleston AFB in South Carolina?' 

The inability of the supply and transportation systems to provide intransit visibility exacerbated the problems. While both systems have reasonably good tracking capabilities, visibility is often lost as an item moves 

from the supply system into the transportation system. Within the supply 

20~~C/~~~ staff paper, undated, provided during lntvw, author with Mr. Orson 

2'lntvw, author with col Van McCrea, CENTAF Rear/LGS, and SMSgt Karl Lubinger, 

Gover, HQ MACILGSW, 11-12 AUg 1992. 

CSSA Superintendent, 4-5 Aug 1992. 

266 
system, items are tracked by requisition number, but within the transportation system, item movement is tracked by transportation control numbers. 

For shipping efficiency, many supply requisitions are consolidated into a 

single transportation movement unit., which in turn is further consolidated 

for shipment. When such shipments were broken down at intermediate 

transportation hubs, detailed traceability was often lost. Therefore, when 

items needed to support immediate mission requirements became delayed 

or lost within the system, it was difficult, and often impossible, to track 

down and expedite movement to the point of need. New tracking system 

capabilities were developed to help work around the problem. 

Establishing physical control over deployed spares was not always 

easy in the AOR. Storage facilities given to the deployed units ranged 

from standard warehouse facilities to no shelter at all. While the wheeled 

bins used to store and ship most of the preestablished spares packages 

afforded reasonable protection for their contents, most of the new packages were deployed without bins. Storing these loose spares was a problem 

requiring local innovation. Had the deployed units needed to move from 

a location quickly after initial beddown, gathering and moving in-theater 

spares would have been extremely difficult. 

Deployed Supply Operations 

Of all the major planned Desert Shield and Desert Storm supply 

support concepts, only the Forward Supply System operated by Military 

Airlift Command (MAC) in support of strategic airlift operations stayed 

intact. Equally important, this supply support concept MAC used to 

support the war effort was essentially the same concept it used day-to-day 

in support of peacetime operations; MAC simply raised the tempo and did 

more of the same. 

The Forward Supply System is tailored to the C-5 and C-141 aircraft 

supporting MAC'S strategic airlift mission through a predetermined route 

structure linking a series of worldwide en route and turnaround stations 

with the east and west coast hubs of the continental United States. Centrally managed spares with quantities computed to support peak wartime 

tasking are dynamically allocated to the various locations within the route 

structure on the basis of planned operating tempos and prepositioned 

maintenance capabilities. To make the transition from peacetime to 

wartime operating tempos, MAC shifted spares and support personnel from 

the Pacific area of operation to the European area linking to a preestab267 
lished route base at Dhahran. Stock levels at Rhein Main, Torrejon, and 

Ramstein were increased by approximately thirty percent, while Pacific 

levels were reduced about the same amount. C-141 war readiness spares 

kits (WRSKS) were deployed to all three of the European bases, and C-5 

WRSKS were deployed to Rhein Main and Torrejon. 

While the primary spares support for aircraft in the AOR was initially 

from the spares packages deployed with the units, other support concepts 

evolved. One of the earliest and biggest was the establishment by Strategic Air Command (SAC) of supply centers at Moron AB in Spain, 

Andersen AFB on Guam, and, later, RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom.?2 The centers at Moron and Andersen were activated during the 

first thirty days of Desert Shield and provided automated supply inventory management and resupply for SAC aircraft at those locations and 

elsewhere within the AOR. In addition to providing equipment and repair 

part support to the maintenance centers collocated at those locations, the 

supply centers furnished resupply support for all SAC aircraft deployed in 

the AOR and European theaters. 

While the supply center at RAF Fairford remained relatively small (it 

never exceeded 2,000 line items), the supply operations at Moron AB and 

Andersen AFB were large. At its peak, the Moron account stocked over 

24,000 line items valued at over $120 milli~n~~-an especially noteworthy 

situation given that Moron was in a caretaker status at the beginning of 

Desert Shield. Although somewhat larger, the operation at Andersen was 

built upon an established supply account. 

Another major spares support innovation was the development and 

deployment of follow-on spares kits. These kits, which only Tactical Air 

Command built, were put together on the fly at the Command’s Headquarters. Requirements were centrally computed, and the required assets 

were requisitioned directly from the wholesale sources of supply using 

high-priority requisitions. Air Force, Central Command Rear Director of 

Supply made the decision to bypass base stocks from continental U.S. 

22Point Paper, Desert Shield/Desert Storm supply spares Support, HQ SAchx;SM, I2 

Feb 1591; Intvw, author with Col John Clark, HQ SAdLGS and Mr. Timothy Doolin, HQ 

SAOffiSM, 13-14 hug 1992, plus multiple SAC data sources. 

231ntvw, author with Mr. Timothy Doolin, HQ SAOLGSM, 13-14 Aug 1992, plus 

multiple SAC data sources. 

268 
bases building the follow-on spares kits for deployment because those 

bases were still supporting homestation flying activities.u (According to 

Air Force Logistics Command sources, the procedure for requisitioning 

the kits had not been coordinated with them.) The impact of the innovation on wholesale stocks was significant; over WOO million worth of 

follow-on spares kits were issued and put into transportation pipelines to 

the various Tactical Air Command bases, where they were aggregated and 

forwarded to that Command’s units in the AOR. 

Strategic Air Command also developed and deployed additional 

packages of spares to augment the spares initially deployed to operating 

bases and the supply centers. The spares packages were similar in concept to the Tactical Air Command’s follow-on spares kits, but were 

developed using Strategic Air Command’s unique automated retrieval and 

compare programs operating on failure and demand data from Strategic 

Air Command’s continental U.S. bases. Individual packages were developed to support the various types and numbers of aircraft at each beddown. They were centrally assembled at a continental U.S. location and 

were shipped as assembled spares packages to the supply centers and 

operating Iocati0ns.2~ 

In addition to being in a very favorable spares position as Desert 

Shield began, units tasked to support the effort were afforded the highest 

priority for the allocation of those spares. Under the basic Department of 

Defense system, available spares are allocated to fill field requirements on 

the basis of the unit’s relative priority and the date of the unit’s request for 

the spares. Requirements for the Gulf War were assigned the highest 

priority for issue and movement. Standard requisitioning procedures were 

interrupted, and the priority system became overloaded at the top. 

A problem noted early on was the inconsistent treatment of consumable26 spares in the mobile spares packages?’ Although the policy is that 

241ntvw, author with Col Van McCrea, CENTAF Rearlffis, 4-5 Aug 1992. 

251ntvw, author with Mr. Timothy Doolin, HQ SA~LGSM, 13-14 Aug 1992, plus 

multiple SAC data sources. 

26Consumable spares are often referred to as economic order quantity (EOQ) spares. 

This reference comes from the way requirements for such items are generally computed 

by using derivations of the classic Wilson EOQ formula. 

269 
units should build and deploy consumable spares along with spares that 

can be repaired, not all units had done so. In at least one case, consumable spares requirements had been established for the spares package, but 

consumable spares had not been put into the packages because funding 

for that type of spare was restricted?8 Another type of consumable spares 

problem was identified in the B-52 spares package. Although the requirements had been identified and filled in those packages, the requirements 

had not been reviewed and updated for several years, and the assets in the 

packages had not been inspected for serviceability. As a result, Strategic 

Air Command had to totally rebuild the B-52 consumable spares segments and ship them to the AOR and other forward operating bases.29 

JU~LIUII IUI 3upyulL UIU GIIUIII~ WILII csLaoiisnrntmi ma use or a IUII xandard Base Supply System “main frame” environment within the AOR. A 

subsequent cENTAF message in mid-August 1990 provided details of how 

this was to be done?’ The plan at that time was to use a three-phase 

approach. Phase I, covering the period C to C+O, envisioned use of the 

Combat Supply System, with each unit linked to its homestation for 

support. During Phase 11, C+61 to C+180, the deployed units were to 

transition to satellite accounts3* hosted off the core supply unit’s home 

27EOQ in WRSK has been a recurring problem for over 20 years and has been the 

subject of numerous Inspector General (IG) and General Accounting Office (GAO) reports. 

Intvw, author with MSgt Glover, 1 TFW/LGS, 5 Aug 1992. 28 

291ntvw, author with Mr. Timothy Doolin, HQ SAC/LGsM, 13-14 Aug 1992. 

30(S) Msg, 0 1320002 Aug 1990, subj: AdminlLog, USCINCCENT//CCCS//. 

”(S) Msg, R 1823092 Aug 1990, subj: Long Term Supply Support: Operation 

32A satellite account is a separate supply activity hosted on a base level mainframe 

computer that supports at least one primary (01) account. While satellite accounts could 

be located on the same installation, as used here, a satellite is typically configured as one 

or more computer terminal devices located at a remote site but connected to the host 

computer via some form of telecommunications link. 

Desert Shield, USCENTAF/BSD. 

270 
station account; Phase 111, C+181 on, involved a transition to a main 

operating base concept in the AOR with on-site Tactical Shelter Systems.33 

The message from CENTAF intended to fill a planning void while other 

alternatives were being considered.” 

As adjustments proceeded, the above supply support concept was 

abandoned. In addition to Combat Supply System problems, which are 

addressed in the next section, major concerns were raised with respect to 

the Tactical Shelter Systems. The concerns centered on the computer 

system’s configuration, the numbers of systems that were available, and the 

ability of the Tactical Shelter System to withstand a move to the desert. 

Before the end of August 1990, the idea of establishing mainfram e support 

within the AOR was scrubbed and replaced with a new plan that envisioned 

a single continental U.S. mainframe supporting all supply accounts in the 

AOR. CENTAF Rear Director of Supply selected the single continental U.S. 

mainframe option over other options, which included establishing individual 

satellite accounts hosted off existing home base computers and other Major 

Command-proposed variations addressed later.35 

The revised plan, which was the genesis of the CENTAF Supply Support Activity, called for establishing traditional satellite supply accounts 

at the AOR beddown locations and linking them back to the continental 

United States through a large communications processor to be located at 

Thumrait, Oman.% Unit rotation plans considered at the time were a 

main factor in the centralization decision. Also, Hq TACJLGS, as the 

CENTAF Rear supply activity, had access to the needed technical and 

personnel resources and felt it could best execute its responsibilities from 

a centralized continental U.S. fa~ility.~’ 

’%actical Shelter Systems are deployable Speny 1100/60 mainframe computers that 

were designed to provide mission critical systems support to multiple functional areas 

including supply, maintenance, military personnel, air crew operations, and surgeon 

general. 

341ntvw, author with Col Mike Christensen, AFSSCILGS, 18-20 Nov 1992. (Col 

Christensen was one of the main architects and operating chief of the CSSA at Langley, 

AFB, VA, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm). 

351ntvw, author with Col Van McCrea, CENTAF RW/LGS, 4-5 Aug 1992. 

’htvw, author with Mr. Frank Spruce, AFSS~, 22 Oct 1992. 

371ntvw, author with Col Mike Christensen, AFSS~S, 18-20 Nov 1992. 

27 1 
The above approach to supply support was not immediately accepted 

by the other participating Major Commands. In particular, US. Air Force 

Europe (USAFE) took strong exception to the plan and made a counter 

proposal to support the AOR using Air Force in-place resources in EuUSAFE recommended making dl AOR accounts satellites off USAFE 

bases, stating that the bases had both the resources and the capability to 

do the job at that time, which was early September 1990. Concurrently, 

MAC implemented support concepts that it felt were working and saw no 

need for the continental U.S. consolidation. Strategic Air Command 

(SAC) also implemented support concepts that were working. However, 

the concepts were dependent on scarce voice communications lines for 

support within the AOR. After initially resisting the CENTAF Supply 

Support Activity concept, MAC and SAC accepted the CEWTAF Supply 

Support Activity for their AOR-W units, with some variations that will 

be addressed later?9 

The primary approach to accounting for assets upon initial deployment to the AOR was to use the Combat Supply System, a small computer 

system designed to deploy with the early elements of aircraft units.& The 

main uses of the Combat Supply System were to (1) account for assets 

in the deployed spares packages, (2) prepare usage and requirements 

transactions to be sent back to a homestation computer to update inventory records, and (3) allow the homestation to act as the deployed unit's 

first source of supply. 

Although described in the supply manual as "a stand alone supply 

computer processing system which can perform essential supply inventory 

management processes independently,'J1 the Combat Supply System 

actually has very limited capability. Most of the Combat Supply 

System's functional limitations are documented in the Supply Wartime 

38(S) Msgs, P 0616302 Sep 1990, and P 2521312 Sep 1990, subj: Long Term 

Supply Support: Operation Desert Shield, P 2521312 Sep 1990, USAWLCS. 

3glntvws, author with Col Robert (Dean) Rich, HQ MAdffiS, and Mr. Orson Cover, 

HQ MAdLGSW, 1 1-1 2 Aug 1992, and Col John Clark, HQ SAC~LGS. and Mr. Tim Doolin, 

40Rpt, supply Warthe Planning OndExecution Guide, AFLMC Report LS861050, Maj 

Charles S. Johnson and Capt Robert E. Burleson, Sep 1987. 

41AFM 67-1, Volume 11, Part Five, Chap 1, para 3.c. 

HQ SAdLGSM. 

27 2 
Planning and Execution Guide!* Perhaps its most serious limitation is 

that its designed telecommunication capability never worked properly. 

The known Combat Supply System limitations were compounded 

during Desert Shield by equipment failures due primarily to heat, difficulty in getting deployed transactions back to the Standard Base Supply 

System, a general lack of user training, and the fact that not all units 

brought Combat Supply system^.'^ These problems were never fully 

resolved, and the resulting loss of asset visibility at the individual homestation accounts carried over to the wholesale supply system, which was 

effectively blinded. Also, the ineffectiveness of the Combat Supply 

System contributed to the loss of much of the spares consumption and 

field data for the August 1990 through January 1991 period, especially 

for Tactical Air Command units.” 

The deficiencies of the Combat Supply System were not a serious 

problem for local management of spares at the AOR bases, since alternate 

manual accounting methods could be used even if the computer failed. 

In the past, manual stock record cards or computer listings were used as 

the primary way to manage spares during deployments and contingencies. 

Fortunately that capability remained, and in fact, some of the deployed 

units used manual procedures as their basic asset accounting method. 

The high mission-capable rates in the AOR achieved, despite Combat 

Supply System problems, attest to the success of these manual and various innovative “work-around” procedures. 

The fact that the deployed units were able to survive and prosper with 

the noted deficiencies of the Combat Supply System does not imply that 

deployed computer support is not needed. Quite the contrary; an ability 

to continue automated processing of supply requirements would have 

greatly improved the overall efficiency of the operation and avoided most 

of the brute force heroics needed to keep the system running. For example, supply operations using preestablished or normal Standard Base 

42Rpt, Supply Wartime Planning and Emcution Guide, AFLMC Report LS861050, Maj 

43Rpt, Desert ShieWDesert Storm Supply Lessons Learned, Capt Raymond T. Daly, 

%tvw, author with CENTAF supply support Activity staff at Langley AFB, VA, 4-5 

Charles S. Johnson and Capt Robert E. Burleson. Sep 1987, p 15. 

Jr., AF~C Report LS912085, Mar 1992, Appendix B, interview with Col Seagrave. 

Aug 1992. 

273 
Supply System satellite account procedures (such as those used by the 

MAC Forward Supply System and Proven Force units) did not experience 

the above problems. Likewise, the CENTAF Supply Support Activity 

ultimately established for the AOR used a more standard, although much 

larger, satellite account structure that did not experience the noted Combat Supply System problems. 

Establishing of the CENTAF Supply Support Activity 

During the beddown of the Air Force units in the AOR, it became 

apparent that the residual supply staff at Ninth Air Force, CWAF Rear did 

not have sufficient manning to handle the large volume of policy and 

support requirements issues being generated. The bulk of the supply staff 

had been sent forward to establish the CWAF Forward supply operation. 

To fill this void, the Tactical Air Command Director of Supply was designated cENTAF Rear/LGS. Under that arrangement, the entire Tactical Air 

Command supply staff was brought to bear on AOR support issues. In 

response to the deficiencies noted earlier, CENTAF Rear/LGS decided to build 

a central supply support facility. That staff was subsequently augmented by 

supply personnel from the other commands and Defense organizationsPS 

After an extensive growth period, the CENTAF Supply Support Activity was directly supporting twenty-one supply accounts in the AOR. Units 

supported by CENTAF Supply Support Activity satellite accounts had 

visibility of assets within the AOR at bases having the same type of aircraft. Also, the CENTAF Supply Support Activity personnel at Langley 

had visibility of all assets in the AOR that had been loaded into the central 

system. Figure 61 shows the general configuration of the CENTAF Sup 

ply Support Activity. 

4Slntvw, author with col Van McCrea, CENTAF Rearlffis, multiple CENTAF Supply 

Support Activity staff personnel, and MSgt Greg Glover, I TFW/LGS, plus multiple other 

sources. 

274 
Figure 61 

CENTAF supply support Activity Configuration 

DCP-15 W-15 

DCP-15 

18 

FBuxn 

MlK-Modm 

12 

W1 

DCP-15 

13 14 

m11 - FB4ea 

DCP-15 DCP-15 

18 

lnnm*donW 

8 - 046 

-a- 102 -.- sao 

FB4821 

DCP-15 

+ ulbwnm&) 

From October 1990 through January 1991, most supply support for 

the major bases in the AOR transitioned to the CENTAF Supply Support 

Activity. Direct computer connectivity was provided to twenty-one sites 

established as Standard Base Supply System satellite accounts. The 

satellite accounts were organized from a systems perspective into three 

host supply accounts composed of groups called gangs (See Table 22). 

27 5 
Table 22 

CENTAF Supply Support Activity Sites 

GANG 1 GANG 2 GANG 3 

RIYADH 

BATEEN 

JEDDAH 

KING KHALID 

TAIF 

SEEB 

CAIRO WEST 

AL AIN 

MASIRAH 

THUMRAIT KING FAHD 

DHAHRAN SHAM ISA 

DOHA SHARJAH 

AL DHAFRA KKMC 

AL MINHAD 

AL KHAN 

TABUK 

KHAMIS 

By design, the gangs were arranged to cover like types of aircraft. 

Because of the mix of aircraft at some bases, however, there were some 

exceptions. For example, while most large aircraft were supported within 

Gang 1, nearly half the C- 130s were supported through Gang 2 or 3 bases. 

Likewise, the “fighter gang,” Gang 2, supported all F-15s, all F-117s. and 

most F-l6s, but the F-~Gs, RF-~CS, and all of the A-10s were supported 

through Gang 3 along with multiple other lowdensity aircraft. The terminals at each site in the AOR had direct visibility of assets at the other sites 

on the gang. The CENTAF Supply Support Activity, in turn, had total 

visibility of all sites within the AOR. The individual sites were activated 

over a two-month period starting in mid-November 19%. 

Each CENTAF Supply Support Activity support site was equipped with 

remote job entry terminals and a communications processorM that linked 

it, either directly or through another site, to another, but larger communications processor (called the Batmobile) located at Thumrait, Oman. 

Connectivity to the continental U.S. was via military satellite to Ft. 

Detrick, Maryland, and on to Langley AFB, Virginia, over a dedicated 

”he satellite accounts at each site were equipped with 15-20 UTWO or PC terminals 

tied to a DCP-I5 communication processor which was linked through tactical communications back to a DCP~O switch (called the Batmobile) located at Thumrait. The communications processors and transmission paths were shared with maintenance CAMS 

terminals. However, rather than processing CAMS at Langley, each maintenance activity 

in the AOR was routed through Langley to their home station computer. 

276 
commercial lease he. CENTAF Supply Support Activity operations at 

Langley were hosted on the Tactical Air Command (TAC) MAJCOM Development Center UNYSlS 2200/400 series computer, which was upgraded to 

provide the needed processing and storage capacity. By the end of Desert 

Storm, the CENTAF Supply Support Activity was the largest Air Force 

retail supply account ever assembled, with 288,290 item records and an 

asset value in excess of $1.5 billion.4' 

Given the absolute priority of aircraft support, the CENTAF Supply 

Support Activity concentrated first on providing spares for out-ofcommission aircraft and getting aircraft spares packages loaded on the 

computer. With the exception of some SAC and MAC aircraft addressed 

later, the CENTAF Supply Support Activity supported most aircraft spares 

requirements in the AOR. An automated system recently installed at TAC 

proved to be very effective in finding spares to support requirements in 

the AOR!' That system provided worldwide visibility of assets, allowing 

the CENTAF Supply Support Activity spares controllers to locate and 

request shipment of available assets quickly. Lateral support actions 

requested through the CENTAF Supply Support Activity satisfied approximately forty-five percent of spares requirements for aircraft out-of-commission in the AOR."~ 

Concurrent with providing spares support for out-of-commission 

aircraft, the process of transferring the spares packages in the AOR to the 

CENTAF Supply support Activity computer at Langley was started. 

Loading the spares records using home station data was a long and arduous process and highlighted serious quantity variations between the 

computer records and actual spares balances in the AOR. At the direction 

of CENTAF Rear LGS, existing balance discrepancies were corrected by 

adjusting kit quantities to the actual on-hand quantities determined by 

physical inventory.50 While these adjustments were essential to effective 

47CENTAF Supply Support Activity briefing slides, undated, provided by CENTAF 

Supply Support Activity during 4-5 Aug interviews. [Documents from CENTAF supply 

Support Activity]. 

4?hat system was called the MlCAP Asset Sourcing System (MASS). 

49John H. Gunselman Jr., Col, USAF, Documentary on Deseri ShieWStom Supply 

%tvw, author with SMSgt Karl S. Lubinger and with MSgt George Herman of the 

Support, Air Force Journal of Logistics, Fall 1991, pp 13-14. 

CENTAF supply support Activity staff at hgley AFB, VA, 4-5 Aug 1992. 

277 
current operations, consumption data were lost in the process. along with 

the audit trail for spares losses and gains. 

By the end of the war, 2,400 segments of deployed spares packages 

comprising over 220,000 records were loaded. The records covered most 

of the aircraft packages but only fifty to sixty percent of nonaircraft packages such as combat communications. In addition, accountability for only 

about ten percent of the equipment items deployed into the AOR had been 

picked up on CENTAF Supply Support Activity records?’ The major task 

of establishing and maintaining operating stock levels for the full range of 

base support items never occurred. Other major functions performed 

included all financial and fuels accounting for the deployed units. 

At its peak, the CENTAF Supply Support Activity was staffed with 

over 130 people drawn from several organizations, including the TAC 

Staff, First Air Force, TAC wings, SAC, MAC, Air Force Logistics Command, Air National Guard, and Defense Logistics Agency. Estimates 

indicated that operating the CENTAF Supply Support Activity as a central 

facility versus deploying mainframe computers to the AOR reduced supply 

and communication personnel requirements in the AOR by 400 to 600.52 

In the operation of the CENTAF Supply Support Activity, exceptions 

were made in supply transaction routing for SAC and MAC aircraft operating 

in the AOR. Requisitions for SAC B-52 and KC-135 aircraft located in the 

AOR were electronically passed to Moron A€3 for processing. Missioncapable (MICAP) parts requirements for those aircraft were called into the 

CENTAF Supply Support Activity, which in turn forwarded the requinments 

to Moron AB. Mission-capable-parts requirements for B-52s that could not 

be supported at Moron were passed to the Eighth Air Force at Barksdale 

AFB for processing. KC-1 35 mission-capable-parts requirements that could 

not be satisfied were sent back to the CENTAF Supply Support A~tivity.’~ 

Requisitions supporting MAC’S C- t 30 aircraft in the AOR were electronically 

passed to Rhein Main AB for processing. C-130 missioncapableparts 

5’lntvw, author with SMSgt Karl S. Lubinger and MSgt George Herman of the 

521bid. 

S31ntvw, author with Mr. Timothy Doolin, HQ SAdffiSM, 13-14 Aug 1992. 

CENTAF Supply Support Activity staff at Langley AFB, VA, 4-5 Aug 1992. 

27 8 
requirements were called directly into Rhein Main by the airlift control 

element teams located at the AOR operating bases.54 

Supply Support Targets Versus Actual Performance 

During Desert Storm. less than four percent of aircraft in the AOR 

were not operational because of a lack of spares.” By contrast, the de 

fact0 standard for peacetime supply performance has been to maintain 

that percentage below five percent, and the standard for war allows up to 

twenty-five percent of committed aircraft to be out of commission at the 

end of thirty days of wartime activity for lack of spares.% 

While the performance statistics far exceed the wartime planning 

targets, they reflect that support came from a tesource base designed to 

support a much more demanding “war and a half’ scenario. The resource 

base was intended to support intense wartime activities with resupply 

interruptions. While those planned activity levels were in many cases 

matched or exceeded during Desert Storm, especially in terms of flying 

hours, resupply was continuous; most requirements, nearly all of which 

were designated as high priority, were satisfied initially within two weeks, 

and after November 1990, within three or four days. 

The impact of having dedicated air transportation available to move 

high priority assets as implemented with Desert Express, and later with 

European Express, was significant. Desert Express began operating 

between Charleston AFB and the AOR on 30 October 1990. European 

Express began operating between Rhein Main AB and the AOR on 

7 December 1990. With these priority airlift capabilities, combined with 

aggressive spares sourcing and a nominal 72-hour delivery time to the 

AOR, “ . . . grounding MICAPs decreased from over 500 for 750 aircraft 

on 1 October 1990, to 219 for 1229 aircraft on 17 January 1991, the day 

Operation Desert Storm began, and a Not Mission Capable Supply Rate 

of four percent. This was an unprecedented a~hievernent.”’~ 

%vw, author with Mr. Orson Gover. HQ MAdMSW, 11-12 Aug 1992. 

55Backgrwnd Paper, “CENTAF Logistics Story,” C~AFRX;, Apr 1991. 

%ese not-mission-capable supplies (NMCS) target percentages for wartime are 

derived from factors called Direct Support Objectives (DSO), which are used in computing 

the spares requirements for units having wartime tasking. 

57Background Paper, “CENTAF Logistics Story.” CENTAF~, Apr 1991. 

279 
The impact of Desert Express and European Express was impressive 

in terms of the above reduction in numbers of spares on order, a corresponding reduction of two percent in the number of aircraft down for 

spares, and a similar increase in mission-capable rates. It should be 

noted, however, that at the time the Expresses were initiated, aggregate 

out-of-commission-for-spares rates were stable at around six percent, and 

mission-capable rates exceeded ninety percent. A second large increment 

of spares had been moved to the AOR in support of the Tactical Air 

Command units, and high-priority replenishment of deployed spares 

packages was continuing. In effect, a spares-rich environment had been 

created; all resupply requirements for the AOR were being intensively 

managed and were being afforded the highest possible priorities. 

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

Project Code 9AU was used to identify spares needed to fix out-of-commission aircraft authorized transit by Desert Express and European Express; the spares were needed to repair out-of-commission aircraft. JCS 

Project Code 9BU was used for all other requirements supporting the 

AOR. The use of the project codes served to establish absolute priority 

over any other worldwide requirements, including for example, a grounded F-15 in Korea. 

Summary of Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities 

With the notable exception of strategic airlift, supply operations 

during Desert Shield and Desert Storm were not conducted as planned. 

Further, multiple supply support concepts evolved, largely along major 

command lines. By the end of the conflict. CENTAF has put some standardized procedures into place, but full base support capabilities were 

never put into place and standard requisitioning and resupply procedures 

and priority rules were never used. 

Common themes could be discerned from retrospective analysis of the 

various supply support concepts that evolved just before and during the 

conflict. Some of the themes emerged repeatedly during various interviews; others emerged during analysis of the volumes of data assembled 

and reviewed. The themes were: 

Deployment and employment supply activities were largely ad hoc. 

Established plans were not followed, and new ways of doing business 

280 
were established on the fly. The most significant of these new concepts was the CENTAF Supply support Activity. 

From all accounts, spares in the system were sufficient to support all 

mission requirements. This was universally attributed to the full 

funding in the 1980s of requirements based on a “war and a half’ 

threat. However, the fact that many of the spares needed, were in 

depots awaiting repair raises repair funding and prioritization issues. 

Despite high levels of spares availability, the extraordinary supply 

support provided to mission forces was due in large part to individual 

aggressiveness and ingenuity. 

The early lack of adequate communications was a problem for all. 

Dedicated air resupply for “show stoppers” (items keeping combat 

essential equipment out of commission) was perceived as a primary 

contributor to the high mission-capable rates experienced, but the 

documented mission-capable rates over time suggest that deployed 

normal air resupply of spares packages was in fact working very well 

even before Desert Express was started. The more significant reduction was in the numbers of open MICAP incidents.” 

The combat supply system computer and tactical support shelter 

systems did not meet the needs of the supply system. Some of the 

problems were technical, others were management related. 

A lack of adequate procedures, compounded by a lack of attention to 

detail, resulted in inadequate consumable spares in the various spares 

packages. 

A lack of adequate policies, procedures, and automated support tools 

resulted in inefficient implementation of the follow-on spares kit 

concept . 

58An open MICAP incident is a single requirement for a single part. Since many 

NMCS aircraft are out of service for more than one part (sometimes resulting from consolidation of “holes” through cannibalization), a reduction in these open incidents typically 

reduces both the number of NMCS aircraft and the average number of parts needed per 

remaining NMCS aircraft. 

28 1 
With few exceptions, inadequate or conflicting guidance regarding the 

retrograde of reparables resulted in delays in getting reparable spares 

to the appropriate repair facilities. 

Central visibility of spares deployed to the AOR was initially lost 

when deployment began and was not regained until the CENTAF 

Supply Support Activity approached full operation five months later. 

Once established, the central visibility of AOR on hand spares and 

requirements was extremely valuable in managing supply support for 

such a large force operating out of over twenty locations. 

Table 23 summarizes planned versus actual supply activities during 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The items presented are grouped by 

subject area. The list is not intended to be all inclusive, but focuses 

instead on the subset of supply activities most closely associated with 

supporting aircraft units in a deployed operating environment. With a 

view toward the future need to establish and maintain a capability for 

deploying robust expeditionary forces into areas not having a U.S. presence or accessible logistics infrastructure, the Desert Shield and Desert 

-Storm experience can be used as a benchmark for making necessary 

adjustments to supply support concepts. The next time, we may not have 

a willing enemy and six months to sort things out. 

Petroleum Products Support 

Providing fuels to U.S. and Coalition aircraft during Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm was an enormous undertaking; 1.88 billion gallons of 

petroleum products were consumed during those operation^?^ At the 

"Defense Fuel Supply Center After Action Data Call, 4 Jun 1991. 

282 
Table 23 

Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities 

Support Area CONOPS/Plan* Actual 

Resupply 

Resupply 

Resupply 

Supported NC beddowns 

NC Availability 

NC Availability 

Spares Management 

Spares Management 

No routine resupply before D+60 (some plans 

start re-su ply at less 

than Dd). 

Send requisitions for needed items directly to 

Inventory Control Point 

(ICP). 

13-14 days for system to 

provide highest priority items (after resupply begins). 

MDS at multiple bases in 

1-2 squadron configurations. 

Si nificant numbers of 

Af C down for parts ex- pected and tolerated - 

specifically defined by 

Operations Priorit Matrix establishes reLtive 

balance of target sup rt 

at MDS and unit lever 

worldwide. 

Initially retain spares accountability at home 

station. 

Transition to in-theater 

Standard Base Supply 

System (SBSS) computer 

support and transfer war readiness spares kits 

(WRSK) (and other spares 

and equipment) to CINC. 

DSOS (e.g., 75%). 

Continuous resupply. 

Au ent ICP support 

witK!"cSs* sourcing (]ate&) if ICP status bad or delayed 

34 da s via Desert Express ?European Express, 

etc. 

All of some MDS at same location - other MDS 

collocated with like MDS 

of Coalition (Saudi F-15, 

Any AK3 down required immediate resolution. 

E-3A). 

All NC in AOR same highest priority. 

Same. 

TAC established CSSA at 

hgley; SAC linked 

support to SBSS through 

Moron/ Torrejon, and 

Anderson, and later parembedded FSS for strategic airlift and linked to 

SBSS at Rhein Main for 

tactical airlift, and later 

place computer assets. 

tially to CSSA; MAC Used 

to CSSA; USAFE Used in283 
Table 23 (Continued) 

Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities 

Support Area CONOPS/PIan* Actual 

Spares Management No resupply of WRSK. Continuous resupply of 

WRSK. 

Spares Management Units not authorized Deployed units not auWRSK cannot deploy. thorized WRSK; spares 

packages built on the fly. 

Spares Management Adjust home station Retained home station 

demand levels down after demand levels. 

A/C leave. 

Spares Management Economic Order Quantity Some units did not have 

(EOQ) items in WRSK. EOQ items in WRSK; 

others failed to rotate 

age-controlled items. 

Spares Management 

Spares Management 

Status on requisitions within 48 hours by policy/ system design. 

Use Combat Supply 

System (Css) for depioyed asset management 

until access to “host” 

SBSSS established. 

Spares Management Convert WRSK to oper- ating stock except if 

tasked for possible redeployment. 

CENTAF required Status within 8 hours. 

did not work well. 

SAC, MAC, TAC “adjusted“ 

differently. CSS finally 

evolved to CSSA as a common thread for AORbased units with exceptions, e.g., strategic airlift 

and USAFE. 

Kept all WRSK built-up. 

* Derived from multiple sources including AFR W24, AFM 67-1, WMP-1 (ANNEX E), draft 

Supply Concept of Operations (AFLGSS), Supply Wartime Planning and Execution Guide, 

and OPiAN 90-1 002. 

284 
height of the war, the Air Force was issuing approximately 15 million 

gallons of jet fuel per day, including over 11 million gallons per day 

issued in the AOR and 4 million gallons per day issued to aircraft operating out of Europe. In all, over 11 1 ,000 U.S. and allied combat sorties 

were supported. Storing and issuing this much fuel required over 120 R14 air-transportable hydrant refueling systems, 220 R-9 refueling vehicles, 

679 50,000-gallon fuel bladders, and over 926 fuels personnel.@ 

Fuels personnel coordinated several interoperability fuels issues with 

the Saudi hosts and Central Command. The issues ranged from loaning 

R- 14s to the Saudis, arranging offshore tanker deliveries, ensuring quality 

control, and installing and training personnel in the use of fuels mobility 

support equipment (FMSE). Fuels personnel also managed and coordinated use of the Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery System to move over 600,000 

gallons of fuel to sites as far north as Kuwait in support of allied forces. 

They also used that delivery system to move Jet Petroleum Thermally 

Stable (JPTS), which the U2/TR-1 uses, from bases in Europe to the AOR. 

Host nation support was a major contributor to the success 'of the 

fuels operation. All ground fuels and most of the jet fuel except for JP-5 

(for Navy Aircraft) and JP~S were provided from within the theater. 

Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Oman contributed 1.76 billion 

gallons of fuel for land, sea, and air operations?' (Saudi Arabia and the 

United Arab Emirates donated the fuel.) Without the contributions of 

those nations, the fuel would have required extensive sealift, which would 

have exposed the inadequacy of the U.S. tanker fleet!' The dollar 

amount of this contribution (calculated in U.S. dollars at $1.20 per gallon) 

is approximately $2 billion. Additionally, commercial airport contractors 

provided into-plane refueling support, host military provided aircraft 

refueling at military bases, and host nation trucks and drivers accomplished most of the inland distribution of fuel from refineries and depots 

to the bases. Host nation help with inland fuel distribution removed a 

major burden from Army Central Command (ARCENT), which was responsible for bulk fuel inland distribution and had committed most of its 

truck companies to moving fuel for ground forces. 

mibid. 

6'lbid. 

62Andrew E. Gibson and Commander Jacob L. Shuford USN, Desert Shield and 

Strategic Sealift, Naval War College Review, Spring 1991, p 17. 

285 
By the time the war started, Air Force fuels mobility equipment (air 

transportable hydrants, air transportable bladders, and air transportable 

pumps and transfer systems), refueling vehicles, and personnel combined 

with host nation personnel and fuels facilities were available at each deployed location (except at Al Kharj and the forward operating locations) to 

provide refueling support to sustain operations. Additionally, fuel distribution and storage equipment from the Army Southwest Asia Petroleum 

Distribution Operational Project was deployed from the continental United 

States to the AOR. The project consists of pipeline, tactical petroleum 

terminals, and pump stations for distributing large quantities of fuel across 

great distances. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, mote than 127 

miles of tactical pipeline were laid to respond rapidly to urgent operational 

support requirements and to enable movement and storage of greater quantities of fuel forward to support Army requirements. 

The Fuel Situation 

This section will cover all the major aspects of fuels during Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm. It describes the fuels situation before Desert 

Shield and during Desert Shield, build-up, Desert Storm, and redeployment. It ends by discussing the implications of successes and failures 

during those times. 

Before Desert Shield 

A supply of jet fuel (for planned arriving forces) was prepositioned 

in or near the AOR before Desert Shield. [DELETED]63 The fuels included product owned by the U.S. Air Force in Oman and product owned 

by the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) at storage sites in the theater, 

Somalia, Diego Garcia, Singapore, and Italy. DFSC also owned POL in 

three Afloat Prepositioning Ships which were stationed at Diego Garcia. 

As Table 24 depicts, approximately 8.5 million barrels of fuels were 

available before Desert Shield. However, as depicted in Figure 62, about 

4.1 million barrels of the storage was malpositioned outside the AOR. 

Even the fuel in the AOR was somewhat malpositioned, since very little 

of it was located at the places where the users needed it. Also, most of 

the jet fuel prepositioned in the AOR was JP-5. While JP-5 was not the 

63(S) Tel lntvw author with, Cdr Bill Blount CENTCOtdJoint Petroleum Officer, 

MacDill AFB, 4 Feb 1992. 

286 
fuel with the greatest demand, it was the CENTCOM choice of fuel for 

prepositioning for two reasons. First, JP-5 was more difficult to source 

in the AOR than JET A-I; second, JP-5 provides more flexibility in that it 

can be used by both ground- and sea-based aircraft as well as by ground 

combat support equipment.64 

Table 24 

CENTCOM Fuel Storage 

(Millions of Barrels)65 

ASHORE JP-5 JET A-1 DFM’ 

Bahrain 

Oman 

Djibouti 

Somalia 

Singapore 

UAE 

Italy 

1,536 

954 470 

117 382 248 

181 316 

1 29 22 

350 1 ,OOo 

2,028 

AFLOAT 

Bahrain (one ship) 13 

Diego Garcia (three 760 ships) - 

TOTAL 4,040 

- - 

3,432 1,034 

(source: USCENTCOM/JFQ) 

@Briefing USCENTCOM, “Desert ShieldDesert Storm Fuels support,” CENTCOM Joint 

65A barrel equals 42 gallons. 

66Diesel Fuel Marine. 

Petroleum Office. Cdr Bill Blount, Sep 1991. 

287 
288 
Although this fuel was prepositioned, its malpositioning would necessitate significant inland distribution. Therefore, plans called for a significant amount of reliance on host nations for adequate refueling support. 

However, in the absence of any signed agreements, much of this support 

was based on hand shakes and as~umptions.6~ The United States had 

been negotiating unsuccessfully for years with the Saudi Government for 

fuel storage in Saudi Arabia.@ Additionally, very little was known about 

the fuels capability at in-country airports and bases. Airport data from 

the Worldwide Automated Airfield Intelligence File Database published 

by the Defense Mapping Agency did not contain key information such as 

storage capacity, receipt modes and capacity, and distribution modes and 

capacity on most of the Southwest Asia airports.69 Because they lacked 

that information, fuel planners had difficulty in determining what each 

base would need to provide refueling ~upport.'~ 

In addition to prepositioning fuel, the Air Force also prepositioned 

some of its FMSE in the AOR. Knowing that deploying aircraft would 

beddown at host nation airports and military bases where additional fuels 

support would likely be required, the CENTAF fuels planners prepositioned 

59 R-9 refuelers, 42 R-14 portable hydrant systems, 139 50,000 gallon 

fuel bladders, 29 R-22 storage distribution pumps, and a 5-ton liquid 

oxygen generating plant in the Air Force prepositioning sites in Oman, 

Bahrain and aboard the three prepositioned ships in the Indian Ocean.7' 

Additional refueling units and FMSE were prepositioned in war reserve 

materiel status at Seymour Johnson and Myrtle Beach Air Force Bases.72 

These assets were maintained in a constant state of readiness and could 

be brought out of storage and set up at any bare base to provide quick 

and safe refueling support. A more detailed discussion of the prepositioned equipment will follow in this chapter. 

671bid. 

?el Intvw, author with Mr Bill Robinson, Deputy Director of Operations, Defense 

691ntvw, author with Lt Col Thomas Ashman HQ USAFILGSF, Pentagon, 10 Jan 1992. 

'?-el Intvw, author with MSgt Richard Willis CWAFILGSF, Shaw AFB, 3 Feb 1992. 

7'Intvw, author with Capt James Grant CENTAF~SF, Shaw AFB. 27 Apr 1992. 

721bid. 

Fuel Supply Center, Cameron Station, VA, 20 Feb 1992. 

289 
The combination of prepositioned fuel and equipment in or near the 

AOR was not adequate to support forces eventually deployed during Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm. However, it did provide some initial fuels capability and provided an excellent supplement to the host nation support. 

Desert Shield Build Up 

As forces began to deploy, an initial cadre of three fuels personnel 

arrived at Riyadh to guide force beddown and establish movement priorities.'3 In a short time, six more fuels specialists arrived to ensure twentyfour-hour coverage, effect liaison with Army forces, and conduct field 

assistance visits to determine which and how much fuels equipment and 

manpower should be depl0yed.7~ Unit fuels personnel and some fuels 

mobility equipment deployed with aircraft aviation and combat support unit 

type codes. However, it soon became apparent that additional equipment 

beyond that prepositioned in theater would be needed. Due to space 

limiting factors in the AOR, an additional ninety-two R-~s, thirty-six R-14s, 

twenty-five R-22s and various other FMSE owned by the Tactical Air 

Command and earmarked for deployment to Southwest Asia were in war 

reserve material status at Myrtle Beach and Seymour Johnson AFBs.~' As 

forces deployed, and beddown locations were made known, the equipment 

from Myrtle Beach and Seymour Johnson was airlifted to the AoR. 

The major refueling concerns during the early days of deployment were 

at Dhahran and Riyadh, which were the major Aerial Ports of Debarkation. 

Host nation refueling capability at these locations could not sustain the flow 

of aircraft, and some delays in takeoffs of MAC aircraft occurred. The 

situation existed for about two weeks until CENTAF established a forward 

operating location at Al Jubayl Naval Airport for intermediate refueling?6 

The situation was completely overcome when adequate FMSE and refueling 

units were in place. 

~ 

73~bid. 

741bid. 

7%el Intvw, author with Maj Leon Spackman HQ TAdffiSF, Langley AFB, 5 Feb 

1992. 

7%tvw, Capt Grant. 

290 
As force levels were increased over and above what had been previously planned, in-theater petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) require-ments 

increased proportionately. Fuels planners were not only responsible for 

determining how much manpower and equipment would be required at 

each location, but were also required to establish fuel requirements to 

support combat operations. The requirements were to be passed forward 

to Central Command’s Joint Petroleum mice, which in turn consolidated 

each Service’s requirements and passed them to the Defense Fuel Region/ 

Middle East (DFRIME), a subordinate element of the Defense Fuel Supply 

Center. Tables 25 and 26 depict the pre-Desert Storm daily requirements 

provided to Central Command by the Services. 

D~E identified sources of supply and, in coordination with the 

Military Sealift Command, scheduled the tanker ships to cany the bulk 

petroleum to the AOR. However, as previously stated, most of the requirements (ninety-three percent) were satisfied from within the AOR. In Saudi 

Arabia, the Saudi Arabian Marketing and Refining Company (SAMAREC) 

was tasked by the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) to provide 

fuel to all Coalition forces operating in country. A written agreement in 

November 1990 formalized the procedures and scope of fuel support the 

Saudis would provide. A written pre-Desert Shield agreement with the 

Omani Air Force made fuel support available to U.S. aircraft operating in 

Oman. All other agreements were either verbal or based on some other 

type of contractual agreement. In December 1990, MODA established a 

National Petroleum Management Council composed of representatives from 

MODA, SAMAREC, Petrolube, the Ministry of Petroleum, and the Arabian 

American Oil Company, which dealt primarily with crude production. A 

similar agency existed in the UAE. The councils coordinated Coalition fuel 

requirements and resolved problem areas. 

The CENTCOM stockage objective was to maintain a minimum of a 

thirty day POL supply despite that more aircraft were arriving than had been 

planned for in OPLAN 1002-88. 

29 1 
Table 25 

Daily Requirements by Component (Millions of Gallons) 

Theater Saudi 

Air Force 

Navy 

hY 

Marines 

Total 

~~~ ~~~~ 

10.8 7.6 

5.5 5.3 

6.3 6.3 

2.4 1.5 

25.0 20.7 

Table 26 

Daily Requirements by Product (Millions of Gallons) 

Theater Saudi 

Commercial Jet Fuel (Jet A-1) 15.0 10.9 

Army Preferred Diesel (DF2) 4.2 4.2 

Navy Preferred Jet Fuel (JP-5) 1.9 1.7 

Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) 3.5 3 -5 

Motor Gasoline (MG) 0.4 0.4 

Total : 25 .O 20.7 

Determining the POL requirements was a difficult task for the Services; 

Air Force requirements were the most sensitive. Not only was the Air 

Force the largest user, aircraft beddown locations as well as the number 

and type of aircraft being deployed were changing constantly. Requirements were estimated by multiplying the number of aimaft deployed by 

the War Mobilization Plan (Volume V, Daily Sortie Rates) times the 

292 
average hourly aircraft fuel bum rates established in AFR 144-4?7 More 

exact requirements could not be derived, as the estimators did not know 

how long the sorties would be or how many would be flown each day. 

This information could not be provided by any of the air campaign planners?' Thus, the requirements provided to CENTCOM were only rough 

estimates at best. 

Service requirements (when consolidated) were forwarded to SAMAREC 

officials who continually assured Defense Fuel Region and Central Command representatives that they could provide the fuel. SAMAREE officials 

also provided assurance that they could transport the fuel from their depots 

and refineries to the locations where it was needed. Inland distribution was 

a continuing concern by the entire fuels community and will be discussed 

later. As a side note, fuel requirements from the Military Airlift Command 

were passed forward to the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) as well. 

Fuel requirements at continental U.S. aerial ports of embarkation and 

intransit locations in Europe went up significantly when the deployment 

began. DFSC had to ensure that the supplier at these locations could meet 

the increased requirements. Problems encountered in Europe will be 

discussed later in this section as well. 

Fuel Additives 

Since JET A-1 (commercial grade jet fuel) was the primary jet fuel being 

provided by in-theater suppliers, Air Force fuels personnel were responsible 

for injecting the fuel with the proper additives before it was consumed by 

Air Force high-performance jet aircraft. Prescribed amounts of fuel system 

icing inhibitor, anticorrosion additive, and antistatic additive had to be 

injected into the fuel to avoid engine damage resulting from prolonged use 

of commercial grade fuel. With additives injected, JET A-l is identical to 

JP-8, the standard used in EuropejNATO. 

According to USCENTAF OPLAN 1021-88, each deploying unit was to take 

a tenday supply of additives with them when they deployed. However, 

many of the units did not take the additives, and additional stocks were 

required to resupply what additives had been taken. DFSC, the agency 

responsible for providing the resupply, needed to take some special con- 

"Tel intvw, author with MSgt Richard Willis CENTAF~LGSF, Shaw AFB, 5 Feb 1992. 

"/bid. 

293 
tracting initiatives to correct the situation. At the onset of Desert Shield, 

it was apparent that an inadequate inventory of additives was on hand in 

Saudi Arabia, especially if the conflict situation was prolonged. The 

quickest method to relieve the insufficiency was to purchase the additives 

through an existing contract in the Middle East. Therefore, DFSC arranged 

for the purchase of 9,361 drums of Fuel System Icing Inhibitor, 271 drums 

of Anti Corrosion Inhibitor, and 88 drums of Anti Static Inhibitor from 

Caltex Oil Products C0mpany.7~ 

With resupply made available from DSC, Air Force fuels personnel 

were responsible for injecting the additives into the fuel at all locations. 

This proved to be very difficult. The fuel additive injectors, as currently 

designed, slowed down fuel flow because the diameters of the piping 

within the injectors were smaller than those of the equipment used to 

offload tank This situation was exacerbated by numerous injector 

diaphragm failures and the lack of qualified repair technicians. Thus, the 

rapid initial lay-in and continued preservation and maintenance of fuel 

inventories was more important to fuels managers than actually injecting 

the additives. It cannot be determined if fuel additives were injected at all 

locations. However, fuel additives or the lack thereof were not "show 

stoppers"; aircraft flew with and without them, depending on location, with 

no apparent ill effects. 

Deployment Location Capability 

As fuel requirements were determined and passed forward, the CENTAF 

fuels planners turned their attention to aircraft refueling capacity at each 

location. Ensuring the proper mix between Air Force organic refueling 

capability (equipment and personnel) and host nation support refueling 

capability was a very sensitive area. Effort had to be made to ensure 

round-the-clock sortie-generation capability; yet the United States did mt 

want to offend the host by bringing in massive numbers of fuel trucks, 

hydrant systems, bladders, and personnel." 

79Tel intvw, author with Maj John Mdormick DFSWS, Cameron Station, VA, 6 Feb 

1992. 

Intvw, MSgt Willis. 5 Feb 1992. 80 

"htvw, author with Lt col John Anna, DFSC/NE Mffiuire AFB (formerly HQ TAU 

LGSF, Langley AFB, during Desert Shield). 

294 
Since little was known about deployment locations, the senior fuels 

technicians on the ground were basically responsible for determining their 

equipment and personnel requirements. Many of these technicians were 

junior grade non-commissioned officers (NCOS) with little experience in 

setting up mobility equipment to support combat The situation was caused by the combining of small unit type codes rather than the 

use of one large unit type code. The lack of senior supervision led to 

favoritism toward certain host base personnel, discontentment among 

personnel of the same rank, and a split of refueling responsibilities (i.e., 

"you refuel your aircraft and we'll refuel OUTS").^^ The lack of familiarity 

with fuels mobility support equipment also led to unnecessary delays in 

equipment operation. The vast majority of fuels supervisory personnel had 

little if any idea of how to actually set up and locate a bate base FMSE 

system.84 For example, at one location with over one-hundred fuels personnel, the R-14s were out-of-service because no one knew to flip the reset 

swit~h.8~ Over ten years had elapsed since many individuals had any 

contact (Le., training) at all with the equipment. To overcome this lack of 

experience and knowledge Air Force, Central Command established a 

specid team to set up FMSE at most of the beddown locations.86 

Once the requirements for refueling equipment and personnel were 

established at each of the beddown locations, CENTAP, with the assistance 

of the Tactical Air Command (TAC) Fuels Staff, was responsible for 

sourcing the assets to meet the requirements. Once sourced, the two 

organizations were responsible for ensuring that the requirements were 

provided to CENTCOM for inclusion in the Time Phased Force Deployment 

Listing. Initial sourcing of equipment came from the fuels equipment 

prepositioned in the AOR. Follow-on requirements were sourced from 

additional TAC prepositioned assets at MacDill and Seymour Johnson. 

When the stocks at MacDill and Seymour were exhausted, equipment 

from both USAFE and PACAF were sourced. In all, ninety-two percent of 

'*Intvw, author with Col Randy Harrington HQ USAF/LGSF, Pentagon, 25 Jan 1992. 

83Point Paper on Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm After Action Report, TSgt 

841ntvw, author with Mr. Jack Lavin HQ USAFILGSF, Pentagon, 25 Jan 1992. 

''Background Paper on Increasing Proficiency on Fuels Mobility Support Equipment 

'%tvw, Lavin, 25 Jan 1992. 

French, Hq USAFE, ffiSF, 12 Feb 1992. 

(FMSE), SMSgt Henderson, HQ USCENTAF, LGSF, 23 Jan 1992. 

295 
the worldwide inventory of MSE was deployed. This deployment left the 

other combatant commands with limited ability to establish any kind of 

bare base refueling capability, had it been necessary. 

JPTS Stocks 

The absence of an inventory of jet propellant thermally stable (JPTS) 

fuel in Saudi Arabia for U-2 and TR-1 aircraft generated one of the most 

time-consuming fuels problems to overcome by the fuels community in 

the first weeks of SWA operations?' Because POL managers at Taif were 

denied use of a storage facility on the base, CENTAF secured and received 

approval from the Saudi government to install several 50,000-gallon 

storage bladders. The closest sources of Jprs to fill the bladders were at 

Torrejon Air Base in Spain and Royal Air Force (RAF) Base Akrotiri on 

Cyprus. The JPTS at Torrejon consisted of 3,000 55-gallon drums, which 

were airlifted to Taif by SAC KC-10s and MAC C-141 s. The JPTS at RAF 

Akrotiri consisted of approximately 700,000 gallons stored in bulk fuel 

tanks. C-141s equipped with area bulk fuel delivery systems airlifted 

approximately 100,OOO gallons from Akrotiri to Taif. Trucks moved 

additional fuels in drums from the refinery in Texas to Barksdale AFB, 

Louisiana, where it was then airlifted to the AOR. Once a 60-day stock 

supply level was established in theater, resupply was established by sealift 

and line-haul tank trucks. 

Inland Distribution 

U.S. Army Forces, Central Command was responsible for inland distribution of bulk petroleum to supported Service components in the AOR.~' The 

475th Quartermaster Group (Reserve) was responsible for providing the 

necessary support. On 7 January 1991, the 475th, through the Commanderin-Chief, Central Command, published an Inland Distribution Plan. 

The publishing of the Inland Distribution Plan was delayed by the late 

arrival of the 475th QM Group, which did not arrive until the last part of 

"lntvw, author with Lt Col Patrick Chesterman HQ SAdLGSF, Offutt AFB, 15 Mar 

88USCINCCE~ Operation Desert Shield Joint Operations Center, Petroleum Distribu1992. 

tion Plan, Cdr Blount, 7 Jan 91. 

296 
October 1990.89 The arrival of this Reserve Group was delayed mainly 

because of the decision to give deployment of combat forces priority.g0 

According to the plan, the primary resupply of all storage facilities in 

theater was to be by commercial (host nation) and U.S. Army line haul. 

Support from theater bulk storage facilities forward to the Army Marine 

Corps, and CENTAF was accomplished primarily by a combination of host 

nation tank trucks and U.S. Army tankers. Distribution to each base was 

accomplished through use of in-place contracts, fixed airfield storage 

facilities, and host nation truck line haul in combination with U.S. assets 

received by airlift and sealift during the mobilization period. 

The expansion of U.S. support to the Eastern, Central, and Western 

Provinces of Saudi Arabia utilized the 127 miles of tactical pipeline laid 

to help meet operational requirements. The pipelines were laid by the 

Army Southwest Asia Petroleum Distribution Operational Project, which 

was a coordinated effort of military and contract personnel using prepositioned assets in the AOR. The effort augmented the host nation petroleum 

distribution system. 

Distribution to Saudi Arabia’s Central Province 

According to the inland distribution plan, the 226th Area Support 

Group, utilizing its organic petroleum assets, was to establish general 

support (GS) bases for units in and passing through its area of support. 

These bases were to be established at King Khalid Military City and 

Logbase Alpha to provide direct support and retail support to Echelon 

Above Corps units at each location and direct support to divisional and 

non-divisional units passing through their areas of operation. Additionally, the 226th Area Support Group was to provide gasoline and diesel 

support to CENTAF at King Khalid Military City. 

The 26 Area Support Base was to provide limited general support, 

direct support, and retail support for MOGAS and diesel in the Riyadh area 

of operations to Echelon Above Corps units, CENTAF, and units passing 

through the Riyadh support base area. In addition, Army-projected distribution planning for the Central Province included extending the six-inch 

tactical petroleum pipeline from the Eastern Province at Bastognein in a 

891bid, telephone interview with Cdr Blount. 

wlbid. 

297 
northwestern direction toward King Khalid Military City. CENTAF’S 55th 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing at Riyadh and the 340th Air Rescue 

Wing at King Khalid International were to be resupplied by host nation 

tank trucks. CENTAF storage facilities were used at the respective airbases. 

These plans were not fully implemented before Deseit Storm. 

Distribution to Saudi Arabia’s Western Province 

According to plan, the 475th Quartermaster Group was to provide 

class III bulk support to CENTAF locations through employing Liaison 

teams in the Western Province of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Liaison 

teams were to be responsible for ensuring orderly resupply of fuel at all 

beddown locations by host nation contracts, planning future support 

requirements, and providing an operational link with the 475th Quartermaster Group as operators of the inland petroleum distribution system. 

CENTAF beddown locations included the 190th Air Rescue Service at 

Jeddah New, the Tactical Fighter Wing at Khamis Mushait, the 33d Tactical Fighter Wing at Tabuk, and the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing at Taif. 

As was the case in the Central Province, these plans could not be fully 

implemented before Desert Storm. 

Distribution Outside Saudi Arabia 

In addition to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ARCENT through the 

475th POL Group was responsible for distributing Class 111 bulk to Service components located in Oman, uAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Egypt, which 

encompass the rest of the CENTCOM Theater of Operations. The major 

customer in these locations was CENTAF. Distribution to the locations 

was accomplished by plane, truck and bladder contracts initiated by the 

respective Service component through DFR-MIYDFSC. 

Host nation support was a major contributing factor to the distribution 

of petroleum within the theater. According to interviews with Air Force 

Lt. Col. David Herrick and Army Lt. Col. Bob Ross from the JCS/J4 staff, 

the Army could not have provided the required support if it were not for 

the assistance of the host nation. All but four of the twentyeight Army 

line haul units were in the reserve, and they did not arrive in-theater until 

after the Presidential call-up, causing significant concern on the part of 

CENTAF and Air Staff Logistics staffs. 

298 
The CENTAF logistics staff felt that host nation support for line haul 

would collapse once the shooting began?’ Knowing that the Army was 

stretched to its limit already, CENTAF took the initiative to establish its own 

line haul transportation organization. Dubbed the “Blueball Express,” its 

primary mission was to transport munitions and aviation fuel to sustain the 

air campaign and subsequent ground offensive.= Consisthg of over 200 

drivers and 11 8 commercially leased tractor trailers, the Blueball Express 

moved over 20 million pounds of USCENTAF cargo and munitions. 

JP-5 for the Navy 

The U.S. Navy required JP-5 for carrier based aircraft. Since the Air 

Force was providing tbe majority of the aerial refueling for Navy aircraft, 

JP-5 storage sites were established in Seeb, Oman, and Jiddah in Saudi 

Arabia, to provide the required product. Approximately 400,ooO gallons 

of JP-5 were available at Jiddah to support aircraft operating out of the 

Red Sea; 200,000 gallons were available in Seeb to support aircraft operating out of the Persian Gulf. All storage was in 50,000-gallon collapsible 

bladders. DFSC established resupply from stocks in Oman and afloat in the 

Red Sea. Air Force tankers operated from both Seeb and Jiddah to provide JP-5 aerial refueling for the Navy, in addition to the other locations 

throughout the AOR where the tankers operated with the standard host 

nation provided JET A-I. Although JP-5 was the aviation fuel the Navy 

preferred, dedicating part of the tanker force to JP-5 only to support the 

Navy was not practical. The Navy requested exclusive JP-5 support 

because of safety concerns once the aircraft landed on the carriers. JP-5, 

a more stable fuel, has a flash point of 140 degrees F?3 The flash point 

of JET A-I is 100 degrees F, which makes it less stable to handle. JP-4, 

the common fuel used in the continental United States, has a flash point 

or’ -20 degrees F. It was available at four (non-tanker) bases in the AOR 

and at Incirlik, Turkey. According to USCENTAWDO, the Air Force would 

provide JP-5 to the Navy whenever possible, and would inform the pilots 

when something other than JP-5 was issued.% A review of fuel issue 

9’1ntvw, Capt Grant; Intvw, MSgt Willis. 

92Maj Milton T. Siler, “Blueball Express,” Journal of Logistics, Fall 1991. 

93The Flash point of fuel is defined as the temperature the fuel will ignite given and 

ignition source. Thus, the higher the flash point, the more stable the fuel. 

Msg, USCENTAF, 0022592, k 1990. 94 

299 
records maintained in the Contingency Supply Support Agency computer 

data base at Langley AFB indicates that 20,386,486 gallons of jet fuel were 

issued by the Air Force to the Navy during Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm. Eighty-five percent of the fuel provided to the Navy was Jl?r A-I, 

5 percent was JP-5,7 percent was JP-4 and 3 percent was JP-8. 

Intransit Fuels Support (Europe) 

The fuel support to transiting aircraft as well as equipment and manpower provided by USAFE were major contributing factors to the success 

of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Proven Force. For example, USAFE 

fuels staff personnel sourced Command assets and worked airlift requirements for critical fuels issues in minimal time. The fuels division tasked 

356 USAFE fuels personnel for Desert Shield and Desert Storm, thereby 

placing over 35 percent of all fuels specialists at the forward operating 

locations.95 Over 300 fuels mobility support assets and approximately 

100 refueling vehicles were deployed. With almost 80 percent of the 

MAC airlift transiting USAFE bases and a large number of SAC tankers and 

B-52s bedding down at USAFE bases in England and Spain, the USAFE 

experienced a command-wide 200 percent increase in fuels consumption, 

equating to an unprecedented 600 million gallons of aviation fuel consumption during August 1990-February 199 1. 

The only significant problem arose in Spain where fuel consumption 

increased by 300 percent. Torrejon and Zaragoza Air Bases were saturated. While no sorties were lost, some diversions were made because fuel 

inventories at the terminals supplying the bases were reduced to critical 

levels. The resupply capability from the terminals to the bases was a key 

concern to those determining fuel supportability of scheduled MAC missions. Moron had little difficulty supporting fuel requirements, but the 

fuel system there was not tasked as heavily. The primary resupply to 

terminals supporting U.S. bases in Spain is through the Spanish Pipeline 

System operated by CAMPSA, the Spanish governmental petroleum transportation agency. CAMPSA must balance U.S. military requirements 

against those of the Spanish Military and the Civil Sector. USAE instituted unprecedented measures to resupply the terminals. Normally, only the 

U.S.-built Rota-Zaragoza pipeline supplies terminals feeding all three U.S. 

bases. However, fuel demands in southern Spain at Moron and Torrejon 

95Headquarters United States Europe Logistics History, Aug 1991. 

-300 
restricted the availability of fuel to northern Spain, which resupplies 

Zaragoza. In October 1990, negotiations resulted in an agreement to 

utilize a CAMPSA northern pipeline route, thus enabling the United States 

to receive fuel directly from Zaragoza. 

In mid-November 1990, it was evident that the northern pipeline 

route would not be able to maintain fuel stocks at Zaragoza. The aroundthe-clock pipeline receipts from the south were not sufficient to build fuel 

inventory levels at Torrejon. Fuel levels continued to drop at terminals 

resupplying Torrejon and Zaragoza. Since the rail system in Spain could 

not augment fuel deliveries, tank truck deliveries began in January 1991. 

At one time, as many as sixty trucks were delivering jet fuel from hundreds of miles away. When USAFE asked for additional tank truck deliveries, they were told by Spanish officials that the United States had 

saturated the CAMPSA fleet. However, base fuel levels continued to drop 

to as low as one day of supply. By late January 1991, the fuel situation 

in Spain, which was a priority issue in USAFE’S efforts to support the Gulf 

Crisis, received General Officer attention. In February 1991, the issue 

was elevated to the U.S. Ambassador, who requested more pipeline time 

from Spanish officials. At the expense of civil requirements, the United 

States was able to receive more pipeline time for fuel deliveries, allowing 

for full mission accomplishment without any loss of sorties. During 

August 1990-February 1991, over 300 million gallons of jet fuel was 

issued at USAFE bases in Spain-six times the normal amount. Torrejon 

alone issued sixty percent of this total, or seven times their normal peacetime workload. 

Single Fuel on the Battlefield 

During Desert Shield, CENTCOM designated JET A-1 as the single fuel 

on the battlefield. However, throughout Desert Shield the Army experienced a growing concern about the suitability of JET A-I as a replacement 

for diesel in tanks. The biggest operational problem cited was the lack 

of smoke-generating capability with JET A-1 in tanks. Because diesel 

smokes more than JET A-1, diesel fuel would give them more cover. 

There was also a concern that during the conversion of diesel burners to 

JET A-1, excessive filter clogging would occur because of the cleaning 

30 1 
nature of JET A-I.” Opefators also speculated that JET A-l lubricity was 

not as great as diesel fuel and would cause equipment failures. Finally, 

some equipment fires were attributed to the use of JETA-I instead of 

diesel. As a result of these concerns, ARCENT proposed giving their 

commanders a choice of using either JET A-1 or diesel fuel. CENTCOM 

concurred with this decision because the operational concerns outweighed 

the logistical advantages of using a single fuel. The decision optimized 

the Saudi’s capability to provide fuel to the forward Army Logbases. 

Specifically, the use of diesel by the Army allowed the Saudis to draw 

from some diesel storage sites located nearer to Logbases, thus reducing 

the transportation time. It also maximized the use of Saudi transportation 

because it allowed for the use of Saudi trucks and pipelines in diesel 

service that may not have easily converted to JET A-I. Finally, the decision maximized the Saudi refining capacity, which was at the maximum 

for JET A-I but had excess capability for diesel. 

Desert Storm: Sustaining the Flow 

During Desert Shield, CENTCOM established a goal to achieve a thirtyday fuel stockage objective. The fifty-day supply prepositioned ahead of 

time was no longer adequate, since requirements planned for in CENTCOM 

OPLAN 1002-88 more than doubled. The OPLAN stock level represented 

only about fifteen days of supply before the start of the war. To meet the 

thirty-day stockage objective, the remaining stocks were stored as fob 

lows: 

Five-day supply at base level (bladders storage plus host nation 

tankage) 

Ten-day supply at depots and refineries in the host countries. 

The CENTCOM/JPO coordinated with fuel representatives from each country, 

asking them to maintain fuel stocks equal to a ten-day supply. Saudi 

Arabia and UAE agreed, but other countries were either unable or unwilling 

to make the commitment. As a result, the Saudis agreed to supply fifteen 

days of fuel for Coalition forces based in Saudi Arabia. Using imported 

and fuel they produced themselves, the Saudis positioned 250 million 

“Briefing. USCENTCOM. “Desert ShieldDesert Storm Fuel support,” USCENTCOM 

Joint Petroleum Office, CDR Bill Blount, Sep 1991. 

302 
gallons in tankers off the coast of UAE. Before Desert Storm began, 

CENTCOM’S fuel supply had reached a level of twenty-six days theaterwide. 

Table 27 indicates that when Desert Storm began, both Air Forceowned fuel and equipment and host-nation-owned fuel and equipment were 

stored at each of the deployed locations. The combination of these assets 

allowed for the issue of 906 million gallons of jet fuel to support 11 1 ,O00 

Allied sorties without any delays or incidents. The months of preparation 

had provided the fuels community with ample time to build stocks and 

establish the infrastructure for sustaining combat operations. However, 

three significant concerns arose related to Desert Storm: (1) host nation 

drivers would walk off the job when the war began; (2) in-theater refineries 

and port facilities would be destroyed, thereby requiring stocks to be 

brought in from outside sources; and (3) keeping bases resupplied with fuel 

could be a problem in view of increased consumption rates. 

Some host nations drivers did walk off the job during the first few 

days of the war. However, Air Force drivers provided by the Blueball 

Express were able to take their places without any degradation in support. 

As the war went on, some of the host nation drivers came back to work. 

With the majority of the fuel being provided from sources within 

theater, the concern over the loss of in-theater refining capability was 

well founded. This concern prompted a study by DFSC in early November hypothesizing the loss of differing percentages of in-country refining 

capability. According to DFSC, only a degradation of one-hundred percent 

of the in-country refining capacity would result in fuel nonsupport. The 

concern that port facilities might be damaged or destroyed prompted the 

deployment of two Navy Offshore Petroleum Discharge Systems (OPDS) 

and the Army’s inland petroleum distribution system (IPDS). The systems 

provided the capability to establish over-the-shore fuel support in ports 

that had been damaged or in undeveloped coastal areas that required 

support. Personnel from the Navy Amphibious Construction Battalion 

deployed to the AOR to operate the Navy’s system, but the system was 

never employed?’ The magnitude of the host nation refining support, 

with the length of the mobilization period, created the ability to sustain 

fuel supplies so robust that it was never challenged. 

303 
Table 27 

Desert Storm Fuel Status 

Storage Equipment 

Location USAFMN (MIL GL) R-9 R-14 

Cairo 

Tabuk 

King Khalid Int’l 

King Fahd Int’l 

Jeddah 

Taif 

Dhahran 

A1 Kharj 

A1 Dhafra 

Thumrait 

Khamis Mushait 

Shaik Isa 

Bateen 

Doha 

Sharjah 

A1 Jubayl 

A1 Ain 

Seeb 

Masirah 

A1 Minhad 

Riyadh 

A1 Jouf 

Ships 

TOTAL 

.9511.09 

1 S12.45 

.035110.5 

2.8110.7 

1.7513.1 

2.51.3 

1.7613.9 

4.1710 

4.7512.16 

5.610 

,3412.5 

2.91.056 

.97/.32 

,241.245 

.2151.5 

.6UO 

S31. 19 

1.115.2 

7.812.1 

1.U.25 

.63515.0 

1.810 

1 14.Y130.5 

153.91191.1 

0 

9 

6 

25 

11 

9 

13 

24 

15 

9 

8 

20 

4 

8 

3 

0 

6 

7 

9 

10 

21 

2 

219 

4 

5 

2 

17 

12 

14 

5 

15 

6 

6 

3 

8 

3 

2 

1 

2 

2 

5 

2 

5 

5 

2 

126 

(Source: AFLRC) 

304 
Concern over the ability of resupply to keep up with fuel usage was 

equally well founded. At locations such as Jeddah New and King Khalid 

(major tanker beddown locations), where large amounts of fuel were 

expected to be consumed, only one to three days supply of stock were on 

hand at each base. Resupply would be vital to avoid runouts. CENTAF 

and CENTCOM staffs monitored closely daily inventories to see if resupply 

would keep up. Fortunately, resupply never became a problem at these 

or any other of the beddown locations. 

Redeployment 

At the conclusion of the Desert Storm Campaign, approximately 35 

million gallons of fuel were in Army and Marine Logbases and 

38 million gallons in Air Force bladders?8 The stocks were used to 

support redeploying forces and to refuel MAC aircraft. As the stocks were 

drawn down, some were replenished to support continuing redeployments; 

others stocks became unavailable as the fuels mobility support equipment 

was taken down. 

981bid. 

305 
I 

306 
Maintaining the Force 

Chapter 2 described the state of overall logistics preparation for a 

Southwest Asia contingency on the eve of the Gulf War. This chapter 

will relate the maintenance situations as it actually unfolded throughout 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Areas to be covered include: 

Reestablishment of maintenance capability during deployment to 

the AOR 

Maintenance activity in the AOR during Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm 

Maintenance support from outside the area of responsibility 

Maintenance indicators such as mission capability rates, break 

rates, and fix rates, and 

Maintenance footprint-how the requirements for maintenance 

personnel in the AOR were determined, how the number of personnel in AOR was tracked, and how the number in the theater 

compared with prior expectations. 

Generally, the discussion that follows will be aligned in terms of 

design and mission, highlighting where appropriate the influence of policy 

and external factors. Conflicts among data from different sources will be 

examined. Our review of how the maintenance concept of operation was 

actually practiced, produced both positive and cautionary lessons to be 

learned from the Gulf War. Major findings of the chapter are as follows: 

The tooth-before-tail nature of the deployment had a differential 

effect on mission-capable rates that varied with maintenance 

307 
concept.’ During the first month of deployment, F-15 forces 

suffered a drop in combat-ready aircraft of between nine and 

fifteen percent as compared to peacetime rates. The F-16 and A10 forces, for which intermediate maintenance is less of a concern, did not experience this drop, 

Maintenance during Desert Shield and Desert Storm was, in 

general, without critical, mission-limiting problems. With some 

exceptions, mission-capable rates during both Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm were roughly the same as in peacetime or slightly 

lower, although the rates varied from month to month and from 

one type of aircraft to another? Other Services had similar experience with their flying units. 

Both the industrial-level and base-level maintenance capacities 

exceeded the demands generated by the Gulf conflict. 

When the maintenance concepts used during Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm sharply differed from anticipated methods (e.g., 

establishing intermediate maintenance support in Europe rather 

than in theater), imbalances between maintenance and other logistics factors appeared quickly. The most prominent imbalance 

was with transportation. 

Each of the services organizes its logistics somewhat differently. For support of 

aircraft, the Air Force has historically organized around three echelons. These echelons 

(which parallel the operational, support, and industrial paradigm described in chapter 2) 

involve the resources to provide on-aircraft maintenance, off-aircraft ‘‘intermediate’’ repair 

of removed aircraft components, and depot maintenance of both the aircraft and its 

components. The intermediate level of support has most commonly been located on the 

same base as the aircraft. It can be located elsewhere, as happened in certain cases in the 

Gulf War, and may be totally absent if reliability is sufficiently high. The case where 

intermediate maintenance is absent is referred to as two-level maintenance and has 

important combat advantages because it reduces the amount of materiel that must be 

moved forward. 

*We are aware of the apparently widely held impression that mission-capable rates 

during Desert Shield and Desert Storm were better than in peacetime. This impression 

is in error. The subject is discussed more fully under the heading Quantitative Logistics 

Indicators. 

1 

308 
Even when problems arose, they were ameliorated by a relatively 

healthy supply stock and innovative procedures. 

The desert environment appears to have had little persistent effect 

on reliability. The major exceptions to sustained high reliability 

involved T-64 and T-700 helicopter engines (used on the 

CWMH-53 and MH-60 helicopters, respectively), which, as a 

result of sand erosion problems, achieved reliability levels approximately l/lOth that of peacetime levels. The T-64 unreliability was compounded by a two-level maintenance concept 

predicated on the normal reliability level. 

The 17,000 maintenance men and women in the area of responsibility (AOR) accounted for approximately thirtyeight percent of the 

Air Force population in the AOR and in terms of numbers constituted the single largest manpower element.’ The actual tail-to-tooth 

ratio was larger, since Desert Shield and Desert Storm maintenance 

was also supported from the USAFE theater, from Guam, and from 

the continental United States. Additionally, the evidence suggests 

that there were approximately one-third fewer maintenance people 

in the theater than would have been expected on the bases of 

normal wartime planning factors. 

Automated maintenance management support was not available 

until late in the game-approximately Dec 1990.4 Absence of 

aircraft-status information hampered the various headquarters in 

their attempts to ascertain the health of the fleet (although this 

was worked around via phone calls and messages). Absence of 

3(s) Briefing, AFMEAIMEMS. Desert Shield vs Europe Force bjectiodsupport, ca 

January 1991; (S) USAF Wartime Manpower and Personnel Readiness Team (AFWMPRT) 

Desert ShieldDesert Storm Electronic Database; United States Air Force Statistical Digest 

(Abridged): Fiscal Year 1991 Estimate, pp D-38 and D-48. Specialty codes included 

within maintenance are officer: 4024, 4054, 4016, 4096; enlisted: 391XX. 392XX. 

411XX, 452XX, 454XX, 455XX, 456XX. 457XX. 458XX. Using the Statistics Digest 

as a point of reference and the AFWPRT data for AOR counts, approximately 16% of all 

Air Force maintenance personnel were in the AOR during the peak months of Feb and 

Mar 1991. 

%he Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS) was the Air Force’s standard 

automated system for managing maintenance. On most bases in peacetime, it and the 

Standard Base Supply System (SBSS) shared the same mainframe computer system. 

309 
configuration data, especially on engines, compromised ability to 

do maintenance itself, although again other factors such as 

healthy spares stocks prevented critical shortfalls. 

Maintenance of Aircraft in the AOR 

[DELETED]’ The actual beddown split the intermediate maintenance 

capability between the AOR and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and 

was a compromise between the need to limit population in the AOR and 

the desire for self-sufficiency. The desire for self-sufficiency was more 

than a “we always do it that way” reaction and reflected concern over 

potential interruptability of the lines of communication if intermediate 

maintenance were to be located outside the AOR.~ A chronology of the 

tactical forces beddown illustrates how a balance was struck between a 

desire for self-sufficiency and the limited number of personnel the theater 

could support. 

24 Aug 1990: USAFE Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, citing 

the extended logistics pipelines between SWA and the continental 

United States (COWS), places intermediate-level repair capability 

at the disposal of U.S. Air Forces, Central Command (USCENTAF). 

’[DELETED] 

6(S) Msg, Hq USAWLGS to USCENTAF [Rearms. 2416002 Aug 1990, subj: Intermediate-Level Maintenance Support for Operation Desert Shield; (s) Msg, USCENTAF 

[Rear]/BsD to USAFULC 2816532 Aug 1990, Intermediate Level Maintenance (IN) 

Support for Operation Desert Shield; (S) Msg, USCENTAF [RearYBS to USCENTAF Fwwuj 

0610372 Sep 1990, Intermediate Level Maintenance (ILM) Concept of @erations; (S) Msg, 

USCENTAF [Rear] to 1, 363, 4. 35, 37, 48. 386, 354. 23 TFWs deployed, 552 AWACW 

deployed, and 33 TFS deployed 0916212 Sep 1990 (draft), subj: Intermediate Level 

Maintenance Concept of Operations; (S) USCENTAF [Rear] facsimile 10 Sept 1990 to US@ 

Logistics Readiness Center, subj: Intermediate Level Maintenance; (s) CWAF Intermediate Maintenance Game Plan as of TAC Msg 1723592 Sept 1990; (s) CENTAF Intermediate 

Maintenance Game Plan as of 0.518002 Oct 1990. Unless otherwise indicated this set of 

correspondence is the source for the tactical aircraft (F- 15, F-16, A- 10, F- 1 17) intermediate beddown description. 

310 
28 Aug 1990: USCENTAF Rear acknowledges USAFE offer and 

plans to use USAFE avionics capability when deployed avionics 

intermediate shops are down and until shops are up and running 

in the AOR. Emphasis remains on “developing all the forward 

capability we can.” 

6 Sep 1990: USCENTAF provides first consolidated game plan for 

intermediate-level maintenance (ILM) beddown. Avionics is 

essentially the same as shown in the 9 Sep 1990 column in table 

8-la and has all avionics ILM earmarked for the AOR. 

9 Sep 1990: USCENTAF Forward notes that “Base populations 

continue to increase and every effort must be made to limit deploying populations.” 

17 Sep 1990: Only in-theater avionics intermediate maintenance 

capability is at Dhahran, Tabuk, and Thumrait, as it has been all 

along, but the 401 st Tactical Fighter Wing will now be supported 

from Ramstein, Hahn, & Torrejon. 

5 Oct 1990: In addition to in-theater F-15C support, A-10 intermediate support is still planned for King Fahd; all other support 

will come from the USAFE theater. 

The evolution of the beddown is traced in Tables 28 and 29. 

(Re)establishing Maintenance Capabd$y Once in the AOR 

If one activity characterized maintenance after arrival in theater, it 

was foraging for support. Because the tooth (combat forces) was deployed before the tail (support forces), organic capability to support 

operations beyond refueling and simple removal and replace actions was 

31 1 
Table 28 

ILM (Avionics) Beddown 

Alrcrdl Number 

Akrdl Movement d Alnmfl 9 -P 17 Sep 

TYP unit Date Al~cdl Loation AIS Phn AIS Actual AIS Phn A

&1OA 

&1OA 

A-lOA 

F4G 

F-1SC 

F-1SC 

F-1SE 

F-16C 

F-lBC 

F-16C 

F-117A 

F-111F 

EFlll 

RF4C 

E-3A 

EC-1- 

EC1- 

46 

24 

24 

38 

48 

24 

24 

48 

4a 

24 

16 

32 

13 

6 

6 

6 

S 
Table 29 

ILM (Engine) Beddown 

Aired Number 

Aid Monnrnt of Aid 9- 17 sep 

TY P unit Dale Almd Loation JElMPbn JElM Actual JEiM Phn JEIM 

A-lOA 

A-1OA 

A-1OA 

FJCi 

F-1 SC 

F-15C 

F-15E 

F-16C 

F-lBC 

F-16C 

F-ll7A 

F-111F 

EFlli 

RFJC 

E-3A 

EG130E 

EG130E 

mm 

354TFW 

354TFW 

35m 

1TFW 

33TFW 

4m 

383TFW 

mFW 

401TFW 

3m 

46m 

366cFW 

ll?TRw 

SAWACW 

7AcCS 

41ECS 

46 

24 

24 

36 

48 

24 

24 

46 

46 

24 

18 

32 

13 

6 

6 

6 

5 
almost nonexistent? The foraging ranged from vehicles to forklifts to 

liquid oxygen to basic shoplevel repair capability.’ The effort was 

successful because of the presence of host nation support (in some cases 

leading to collocation) and contract-operated aircraft repair capability. 

It was this preexisting capability that carried the day until lines of communication were established and started forwarding the “gotta-have” and 

“ought-to-have” parts and equipment from home units. The units were 

in a position to overcome these sorts of initial problems as a result of 

getting ahead on scheduled inspections, goldplating war reserve spares 

kits, and robbing parts from nondeploying aircraft in the days or weeks 

from initial warning until they actually deployed.’ Additionally, after 

arrival they employed what is sometimes called “shade-tree” repair to 

work around limitations in test equipment and repair parts.” 

Although collocation with the host nations may have been a significant factor in other areas, it played a minor role in maintenance. Maintenance collocation in the sense of shared maintenance capability was 

limited to (1) those few instances when U.S. and Allied forces maintained 

the same type of aircraft (e.g., F-4Gs and F-15s) and (2) sharing of 

common shop equipment such as simple machine tools, battery chargers, 

parachute rigging, tubing benders, and the like.” 

’AFLLS Remedial Action Project report 40550-21733 (O0064). 4 May 1991; Intnv, 

Lt Col Dave Honderick, Lt Col Hank Taylor, Maj Dave Sanders, 1702 Air Refueling 

Wing, Seeb, Oman, 1 Jan 1991 (IRIS 00885904); Intvw, Lt Col Miles O’Brien, Assistant 

Dep Commander for Maintenance, 317 TAW, Thumrait AB, Oman, 27 Aug 1990 (IRIS 

00882906); Intvw, Lt Col Jeff Rimell, Deputy Commander for Maintenance, 1703 m, 

King Kahlid AB, Saudia Arabia, 19 Mar 1991 (IRIS 00885926); Intvw. Maj Dell Rose, 1909 

AREFW(P). I Jan 1991 (IRIS 00885933). 

*]bid; Ltr, Lt Col Thomas M. Beres, Commander 8 Special Operations Squadron, to 

Commander 1 Special Operations Wing, subj: Desert StodShield JULU Inputs; AFLLS 

Remedial Action Project Report 92539-29721 (00016), 25 Sep 1990. 

’A representative account is in Intvw. Maj Draper with U Col Vaden R. Gilloth, 

Deputy Commander for Maintenance 388th TFW Deployed, 12 Mar 1992, GWAPS NA422. 

‘?A, Mr. Edward H. Merry, Hq TAC Director of Performance Analysis, to Hq 

USAFLE, 13 Nov 1990. subj: Trip Report to Operation Desert Shield, atch 6. “Shade tree 

repair” is repair ordinarily not authorized. An example is field repair to the internal 

components of an avionics component that would normally be done at depot. 

“William M. Rider, After Action Report, ca Mar 1991, p 5. 

314 
Off-aircraft (Intermediate) Maintenance 

Off-aircraft intermediate maintenance of avionics, as described earlier, 

was split between locations in the AOR and the USAFE as part of a move 

to hold down the number of personnel in the theater. The desert environment had no appreciable adverse effects on the avionics intermediate shop 

test stations, whether they were housed in shelters or tents. Because 

initial demand on F-16 test stations was light and they were holding up 

well, one avionics intermediate shop per base was deployed rather than 

the expected one per squadron.’* The F-15E mobile electronic test set 

was a clear avionics success st01y.l~ This set of suitcase-sized automated 

test equipment was functionally similar to the room-sized equipment 

procured with earlier model F-15 aircraft. But at one-eighth the volume 

and one-seventh the weight, it deployed on a single ~al1et.I~ During the 

Desert Shield deployment, it was set up within ninety minutes of arrival, 

and in the first three months of desert operation, experienced one failure, 

a TACAN test package adapter. One of the few documented instances of 

lost sorties due to avionics maintenance occurred in late January 1991 

when A1 Kharj reported a backlog of twenty-six electronic countermeasures pods in maintenance.” 

The final ILM configuration had two jet engine intermediate maintenance (JEIM) facilities set up in the AOR; USAFE Queen Bee sites or other 

external sources (see Table 32) provided all other JEIM maintenance.16 

One in-theater site at Dhahran AB in Saudi Arabia repaired F- 1 OOPW- 100 

engines from the 1 st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional) F- 15C aircraft. 

The second, at Shaikh Isa AB in Bahrain, repaired 79-GE-17 engines 

”Rider, After Action Report, p 4. An ALS is a set of automatic test equipment consoles 

for testing various different types of electronic components (e.g., digital, analog, radio 

frequency) used on an aircraft. It takes a C-5 aircraft to move an AIS. Intvw, Col Mark 

Dracon, Commander 1702 Air Refueling Wing and staff, Seeb, Oman, 21 Mar 1991. 

13Ltr, Edward H. Merry, TACILGP, “Operation Desert Shield TAC~LGP Trip Report & 

Lessons Learned,” 14 Nov 1990. 

14AFP 800-7, USAF RIM 2oW Process, 1 Jan 1989, p 5. 

15Msg, COMUSCENTAF to AIG 9671, 2309002 Jan 1991, OPER/Desert Shield. 

‘%e term “Queen Bee” means what it sounds like-one centralized site provides 

shop-level repair for a number of other locations. 

315 
from F-4G Wild Weasel air~raft.'~ In addition, a C-130 propeller repair 

capability was set up at Al-Ain because of the difficulty of moving 

assembled propellers by airlift; C-130 engines themselves were repaired 

at Rhein Main.'* 

It would be inaccurate, however, to describe Air Force engine maintenance as a completely smooth operation. Tactical Air Command (TAC) 

reported, as an example, that most of their units deployed without engine 

records or otherwise lost track of engine status during the c~nflict.'~ 

Further, no engine management system was deployed.2o The result was 

that many serviceable engines sat in limbo until the records were forwarded 

from the United States or were otherwise reconstructed.2' Paperwork was 

not the only thing lost: engines themselves were lost in the transportation 

system. The result of lost engine histories and lost serviceable and repairable engines was, of course, extended pipeline times, although the extent 

of the lost engine availability has not been quantified?2 

The Army provided intermediate- and depot-level support for the 

T-700 helicopter engine; the Navy provided similar support for T-64-7N 

100 engines. Cross-Service support was However, at least for the 

Army, the support it received was not worse than it was able to provide 

for its own aviation units. The Army Aviation Center After Action 

Report states flatly that the Army aviation logistics system broke down, 

and at one time, over 1,700 SeaLand vans of aviation repair parts sat idle 

"Hq TAC. Tactical Air Command History-1991, Chapter VI: Desert Shield/Desert 

"Capt Dennis M. Crimiel, Desert Shield Analysis (C-5/C-141) (Gunter AFB, AL: Air 

"TAC Command History, p 345. 

2oJ. A. Forbes, Memorandum: "Summary of Desert ShieldlDesert Storm Discussions 

with AFLMC Personnel," 4 Sep 1992. 

2'This problem persisted at least until mid-Feb. See Col Ralph J. Templin's daily 

log from 10 Feb 1991 (Ltr, 363 TRK (Provisional)/MA to AFiLEY/LEYM, subj: The War 

from an F-16 Maintenance Perspective, nd). Col Templin was the Deputy Commander 

for Maintenance for the 363 lwd (F-160) at al Dhafra. 

%AC History, p 347. The flow of parts to and from an installation was usually 

called a pipeline-analogous to fuel pipelines, water pipelines, etc. 

23Air Force Logistics Lessons System (w) Remedial Action Report (RAP) 15840- 

21700, "Dependency on Other Services for Helicopter Spare Engine Support," 9 May 1991. 

Storm Special Topics, pp 345-346. 

Force Logistics Management Center, Sep 19!21), p 48. 

316 
at sea ports in Saudi Arabia.24 Additionally, Corpus Christi Army Depot 

(CCAD), the depot-level repair center for both Army and Air Force T-700 

engines, had just undergone a manpower cut (in FY 1990). To respond 

to both the much-higher-than-expected failure rate and the loss of manpower, CCAD went to two seventy-hour-per-week work shifts, which 

reduced depot flow days from seventy to fifty.25 The T-700 engine 

illustrates the dependency between repair concepts and reliability. It was 

commonly understood that a two-level maintenance concept required high 

reliability to work,?6 and the T-700 confirms the point. The T-700 was 

under a two-level maintenance concept predicated on the normal peacetime reliability. To offset the support shortfall caused by unexpectedly 

high failures and the long pipeline from Texas to the AOR, CCAD, in 

addition to surging, implemented a limited in-theater repair capabilityessentially two and one-half levels of rnaintenan~e.2~ 

Counterintuitively, the desert environment appears to have had a 

limited persistent effect on engine reliability, with the exception of T-64 

and T-700 helicopter engines?’ The helicopter engines experienced 

significant degradation, averaging 100 to 150 hours of operation between 

removals for cause during Desert Shield and Desert Storm; peacetime 

periods between removal were 700 hours for the T-64 and 1200-1500 

hours for the T-700. Major problems were severe erosion of compressors 

and clogging of turbine cooling ports. These helicopter engine reliability 

problems were, of course, shared by the Army and Marine Corps units 

flying the same engines. However, sand-induced engine reliability problems were not shared by Air Force engines. The General Accounting 

Office credits an unnamed “Air Force Logistics Command Official” with 

the observation that in the Air Force “ . . . continuous actions had been 

*‘Hq Department of the Army, Concepts. Doctrine, and Force Policy Division, US. 

Army Aviation Center Operation Desert Shield/storm Afrer Action Report (Coordinating 

Draft), (Washington, DC: Hq U.S. Army, 22 Nov 1991), p 92. 

25Briefing Book, AFLC Desert Shieldstorm Lessons Learned, section IV, tab 6. 

AFP 800-7, USAF R&M 2000 Process, 1 Jan 1989, pp 4-6, 32-33. 26 

27~bid. 

TAC history, p 347; Steven Prazak, “Maintenance Operations in Desert Storm: an 

28 

Interview with Col Davies,” Industrial Engineering, Oct 1991, pp 38-41. 

317 
taken to monitor, prevent, and/or eliminate problems [with fixed-wing 

aircraft engines].”29 

The theater was served by a transportable “FAST CAL” precision 

measurement equipment laboratory (PMEL) established at Riyadh Al3, 

although RAF Kemble, Moron AB, and the Royal Saudi Air Force provided some limited supp~rt.~ The Riyadh location had the advantage of 

being at the hub of the intratheater airlift system. The CENTAF Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics considered the laboratory highly successful 

in supporting Air Force, Army, and Marine requirements.” However, 

other evidence suggests that the Deputy Chief’s view was overly positive. 

One Strategic Air Command (SAC) unit, for example, reported that after 

the first sixty days, almost all of its equipment was overdue because it 

had no PMEL support.32 Additional reports indicated that, although the 

laboratory’s calibration standards were available, the laboratory personnel 

lacked technical data and spare parts.33 

Battle Damage Repair 

Air Force Logistics Command deployed forty-two aircraft battle 

damage repair (ABDR) teams, a total of 621 personnel, to the AOR in the 

first war-time test of the ABDR concept.” The split between active duty 

29U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives: Operalion Desert Storm, The Service’s Efforts to 

Provide Logistics Support for Selected Weapon Systems (Washington, DC: General 

Accounting Office, Sep 1991). p 44. 

%riding, Tactical Air Command to the Maintenance Officer Association, subj: 

Desert ShieldlDesert Storm: A Logistics Perspective, 27 Apr 1991. GWAPS NA 425. Precision measurement equipment (PME) is test equipment used to test and calibrate other test 

equipment. It, in turn, is calibrated to physical, electrical, and other measurement standards traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology. A PME installation 

is usually thought of as a laboratory rather than a shop because of the near clean room 

environment and accuracy of the standards. 

3’Rider After Action Report. p 5. 

32AFLLS Remedial Action Project Report No 40605-54247, 4 Jun 1991. 

33AFLLS Remedial Action Report No. 40765-81244, 7 Apr 1991; AFUS Remedial 

Action Report No. 476646951. 

34Brfg, AFLC Desert ShieldStorm Lessons Learned; History, Sacramento Air Logistics Center in Desert ShielaYDesert Storm. Volume Ill, Aircrafi. C3, and Space Systems 

Support, Sep 1992. 

318 
and reserve was as shown in Table 30. Individual teams ranged in size 

from five to thirty-four personnel; each team comprised an aeronautical 

engineer and specialists in engines, structures, egress systems, electrical 

systems, guidance and control systems, and other fields?’ The first team, 

from Warner Robins AFB and trained in F-15 repairs, deployed simultaneously with the first F-15 squadron. Additional ABDR teams and/or 

individual personnel deployed as CENTAF saw the need. For instance, 

Logistics Command offered to send additional teams in late September 

1990, but CENTAF declined with a request that they remain oncall in the 

United States.36 The deployment experience of the 2951st Combat Logistics Support Squadron from Sacramento Air Logistics Center is probably 

indicative of the overall deployment of ABDR personnel and is illustrated 

on Table 31. 

Table 30 

Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Team Deployment 

Source Active Reserve 

Number of Teams 39 

Number of Personnel 54 

3 

972 

3SWhite paper, Michael M. Self, “Air Force Logistics Command Operations in Desert 

”(s) Msg, USCENTAFiLG to Hq AFLC, 2801002 Sep 1990, subj: Aircraft Battle 

Storm” (AFMUXPOX: Wright Patterson AFB, OH, Jul 1991). 

Damage Repair (ABDR) Augmentation. 

319 
Table 3P7 

2951 Combat Logistics Support Squadron (CIS) 

Deployment to Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

DepsrtUR Return Date Number of Comments 

Date Personnel 

11 Aug 1990 

25 Sep 1990 

9 Oct 1990 

29 Dec 1990 

7 Jan 1991 

I6 Jan 1991 

20 Jan 1991 

I Jan 1991 

12 Oct 1990 

19 Mar 1991 

18 Mar 1991 

II Mar 1991 

I4 Mar 1991 

11 Mar 1991 

11 Mar 1991 

12 Mar 1991 

4 Augment F- 15 team 

3 Augment 406 ms 

48 2 F-Ill teams 

F-Ill team 

23 A-10 team 

23 A-I0 team 

23 A-10 team 

23 A-10 team 

4 Augment 2955 CLSS 

F-15 team 

Note that two of the A-10 teams arrived in the AOR as the war was starting. 

By various counts, approximately thirty aircraft sustained battle 

damage.’* A listing of the Air Force battle damage and repair activity, 

obtained from the Survivability and Vulnerability Information Analysis 

Center (SURVIAC), is in Appendix 8-A to this chapter, and shows overall 

trends.39 Figure 63 shows the number of ABDR events by aircraft type.@ 

37Memorandum for the Record, Capt Hawley. 295 I CLTS Maintenance Involvement 

in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, ca Mar 1991. 

3%e Self white paper indicates that ABDR teams returned 30 aircraft to service, 

exclusive of non-ABDR maintenance. A review of the individual ABDR record folders at 

the Survivability Vulnerability Information Analysis Center (SURVIAC) revealed 28 folders 

on aircraft with damage. 

’9Unless otherwise indicated, data summarized below were obtained on 16 Sep I992 

from individual record folders maintained by the Survivability Vulnerability Information 

Analysis Center (SURVIAC) at Wright Patterson AFB. OH. 

%-om briefing titled “Desert Storm Aircraft Battle Damage Repair,” part of Briefing 

Book for United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Logistics Cross Matrix Panel, 

24-26 Apr 1991. 

320 
Figure 63 

ABDR Events by Aircraft Type 

Figure 64 summarizes damage frequency by aircraft area!’ 

Figure 64 

Damage Areas 

7 (27.0%) 

- , IL(31 .0%) 

“Scientific Advisory Board briefing. 

321 
The histogram in Figure 65 characterizes the time required to repair the 

battle damage? Because of the limited number of aircraft sustaining battle 

damage, it is probably unwise to use the battle damage repair data as conclusive evidence of any particular trend. It is instructive, however, to compare the early expectations of the ABDR concept with the experience of 

Desert Storm. In 1976, the Institute for Defense Analysis published a report 

titled The Impact of Battle Damage on A-I0 Availability and Sortie Ra~e.4~ 

The report, citing the success of Vietnam-era rapid area maintenance teams, 

recommended the creation of teams specially trained to perform temporary, 

field-expedient battle damage repair on A-10 aircraft and is the report that 

led to the ABDR concept.44 Based on a fairly extensive simulation analysis, 

the study concluded that “A dramatic saving of time is possible by following the temporary repair doctrine. . . . ’*’ Figure 66 compares the repair 

times presented in the 1976 IDA report with those of the fifteen A-10 Desert 

Storm battle damage incidents on which we were able to obtain repair data. 

It should be evident that the Desert Storm A-10 ABDR experience is consistent with I976 expectations in the sense that over fifty percent of the aircraft 

were returned to service within four hours.* Because of the limited amount 

of battle damage to other than A- 10 aircraft, the comparison was not extended to other aircraft types. 

42Data are from appendix I to this chapter. The repair times recorded in the individual SURVIAC records jackets were usually in man-hours, in some cases in clock- hours, 

and in a few instances in terms like “approximately two days.” In almost all cases, the 

estimated repair time was recorded rather than the actual repair time. Core Automated 

Maintenance System data on ABDR are not available (according to SURVIAC personnel 

CAMS was not available in Desert Storm for ABDR repair recording). For this analysis, 

we took estimated hours to be equal to actual and also assumed that man-hours and clockhours are equal. The effects of the two assumptions are partly offsetting in that estimates 

of repair tend to be optimistic and (at least for repairs with higher man-hour estimates) 

clock-hours will be a smaller number than man-hours. 

43S.E. Johnson and Col E.D. Smith, The Impact ofBattfe Damage on A-IOAvailabifity and Sortie Rate (Institute for Defense Analysis, Arlington, VA, May 1976). 

+el intvw, J.A. Forbes, GwAPS staff, with Mr. J. Grier (SM-ALWIED), 5 Nov 1992. 

Mr. Grier was the Deputy Program Manager for the ABDR program. Mr. Grier also 

reviewed the data presented here for accuracy. 

45Johnson and Smith, p 48. 

46This is in spite of the fact that the IDA study considered only antiaircraft (AAA) fire 

(up to 23mm). The Desert Storm data presented include damage from all causes. 

322 
Fi ure 65 

Aircraft Battle d amage Repair Time (Data are man hours or clock hours) 

14- 

12- 

2 10- a, 

0 

8- 

a, 6- 

E 

.- 

Lc 

L 

0 

D 

24 

2 

0 

<=1 1-2 2-8 8-24 >24 Lost 

Repair time (hours) 

Figure 66 

A-10 Aircraft Battle Damage Repair 

.......................................................................... 

.............................................. ......................... 

............................................................................................... 

..................................................................................................... 

Clock hourdmanhours 

I --t Std Repair (Sim) - Temp Repair (Sim) ++ Desert Ston I 

323 
A result of the limited need for battle damage repair was that ABDR 

teams and technicians functioned in their traditional combat logistics 

support squadron (CLSS) roles (i.e., performing heavy maintenance) or 

were simply integrated into the maintenance organizations where they 

were stationed. The ABDR personnel at Taif are an illustration. Sourced 

from the 2951st CLSS, 406th CLSS, and 2953d CLSS, the 81st Taif ABDR 

technicians were integrated so thoroughly into the Taif maintenance 

organization that they held the supervisory positions in the Fabrication 

Shop, Structural Maintenance Shop, one of the Aircraft Maintenance 

Units, and the Electric Sh0p.4~ 

Environmental Effect3 on People and Equipment 

Other than sand-induced unreliability of helicopter engines, the desert 

environment did not cause the rash of major problems that had perhaps 

been feared. Minor problems either completely or at least partly solved 

during the Gulf conflict included sand frosting and scratching of aircraft 

canopies and higher than normal usage rates of propellers, tires, and 

brakes.48 Preventative maintenance such as washes reduced the effects of 

these problems. By October of 1990, deployed units were reporting 

imagery degradation due to sandblasting of Low Altitude Navigation 

Targeting Infrared Night (LANTIRN) seeker windows. 49 The design of the 

system, however, was such that the degradation was detected by the 

LANTIRN Intermediate Automatic Test Equipment before it was noticeable 

to pilots and it was that degradation being reported. The interim solution 

was to ship more spare windows and clear up confusion over the approved replacement procedures.5o The long-term solution, not completed 

before the end of Desert Storm, was development of a harder coating for 

the windows. 

47Memo, Capt Jim suzel, SM-ALCILAC, Combat Logistics Support Squadrons, 

48Michael M. Self, “Air Force Logistics Command Desert Storm Logistics Compara49Msg, Hq TAClLGM to Hq USAFLRC, subj: WlRN Lessons Learned. 2310002, 

50(S) Background paper, Hq TAUIN, subj: DRILG/IN Inputs to Saudi Arabia Trip, ca 

Mar 1991. 

tive Staff Study,” Aug 1991. 

Oct 1990. 

Oct 1990. 

324 
The one significant environmental problem from a "people" aspect 

appears to have been heat tolerance while wearing chemical protective 

gear?' As it happened, the problem had been anticipated, and the Air 

Force Human Systems Division at Brooks Am in Texas had started 

developing a multiman intermittent cooling system before Desert Shield. 

On 13 August, Hq TAC elevated the cooling system to an urgent requirement and the system was rushed into production. When the production 

contract was completed in December 1990,373 air distribution units and 

24,800 cooling vests had been produced for the theater. 

Embedded Sofiware 

Issues associated with embedded software during Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm seem to have been limited to Electronic Warfare equipment.52 This equipment requires reprogramming (actually only loading 

of changed data rather than new computer code) to respond to changed 

threats. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, five different Air Force 

electronic warfare systems required a total of eight mission data changes. 

Additionally, four foreign military sales systems required a total of twelve 

mission data changes. The time to prepare the changes averaged 103 

hours (range of 30 to 480). Wamer Robins Air Logistics Center created 

the data and then transmitted them through communications centers to the 

unit in the theater for upload into aircraft. The average time required to 

generate Air Force-organic changes was 37 hours (range of 16 to 60) 

versus the wartime programming goal of 72 hours. On the receipt end, 

most units used 1960s-technology ANIASM-660 punch-tape-based memory 

loader verifiers. The verifiers required approximately two hours to upload data into an aircraft. Newer program loader verifiers using current 

technology were entering initial operational test and evaluation and were 

not available during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

If there was a particular problem other than obsolete technology in 

the electronic warfare reprogramming area, it appears to be a lack of 

memory loader verifiers at the deployed locations in some instances. 

When EF-111 As from Upper Heyford England arrived in the theater, for 

example, two of the aircraft had malfunctions in the ALQW jamming 

"Talking paper, Hq AFWXRCO, subj: Multi-Man Intermittent Cooling System 

"Briefing Book for 12- 13 July HOT WASH Conference, np. 15 Jul 199 1, GWAPS NA-487. 

(MlCS), 5 JuI 1991. 

325 
subsystems. In both cases, the needed fix was a data reload requiring a 

memory loader verifier, which the deployed unit did not have initially and 

did not receive until A similar problem occurred with the QRC-01 

Pod carried on the AC- 130H; the 1 st Special Operations Wing deployed 

without a capability to reprogram the Pod.” The problem with the 

QRC-01 pod was expected to disappear with introduction, after the Desert 

Storm timeframe, of the newer ALQ-184 system, which was designed to be 

flightline repr~grammable.~~ 

Collection and Use of Maintenance Data 

Before Desert Shield began, the need for a deployable Aircraft Maintenance Information system was recognized. The Air Force Logistics 

Management Center had created a project to determine requirements in 

the areas of status and inventory, configuration control, engine tracking, 

aircrew debriefing, work order generation, and aircraft scheduling.s6 The 

perception of need appears to have been well founded, since the mainframe-based Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS) planned for 

wartime support was not available until approximately the one-hundredth 

day after deployment began and was never available to all units.57 Because, in the absence of automated support, the choices were to either 

revert to manual procedures or do without data, Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm provided a “window” into the importance of maintenance data to 

maintenance and, hence, to combat capability. To quote from one of the 

interviewees contacted by the logistics management center: “Work- 

”AFLMC, JULLS Maintenance Inputs (Gunter AFB AL: AFLMC, 4 Sep 1992), AFLLS NO: 

92153-95479 (O~~IS). A memory loader verifier was a device to upload digital data into 

memory onboard an aircraft, pod, or other system and then verify that the load was 

correct. 

QRC stands for quick reaction capability, i.e., it was designed and fielded faster 54 

than would be expected from normal procurement cycles. An EW pod is a self-contained 

electronic countermeasures (ECM) unit that is temporarily hung on an aircraft for a 

specific mission. 

”AFLMC, JULLS Maintenance Inputs, AFLLS No: 15856-12900 (00047). 

%apt James T. Silva, Deserf Shield Maintenance Automation Needs (Gunter AFB, 

AL: Air Force Logistics Management Center, Jun 1992), p 1. 

571bid. p I I. CAMS capability was provided at approximately the 100th day by 

remotely linking deployed units to mainframe computers at their home units in the United 

States. It appears that some units never did get capability. 1st Special Operations Wing, 

Desert Storm JuLLS Inputs, ISOWICC Letter 18 Apr 1991 with attached JULU inputs. 

326 
arounds [were] used for virtually everything. . . nothing came to a total 

grinding hiiIt.’*58 Thus, failure was gentle, and immediate impact on 

combat capability appeared to be absent. The lack of automation does 

seem to have increased the difficulty of determining aircraft mission 

capability at both the flightline and higher headquarters level. It severely 

compromised knowledge of the remaining usable life of components such 

as engines and removed the ability to use failure history as an aid to 

trouble~hooting.~~ All of these effects increased the labor-intensity of 

maintenance by either making it more difficult or making maintenance 

unnecessarily frequent. Quotations from interviews with Air Force Logistics Management Center personnel illustrate this point: 

We assigned about five guys for two days to get serial numbers accounted for.” 

Scheduling was a real headache because of the ops to maintenance 

interface problems. It was also very confusing because of the lack of 

knowledge of the complete status of the aircraft and the availability of 

parts (time frames to bring the aircraft back up to MC ~tatus).~’ 

When an engine was pulled and sent to Rhein Main for repair/overhaul, 

it is critical that the history accompanies the motor . . . . Thousands of 

hours of serviceability could be and were lost in the repair process.62 

58/bid, p 25. The workarounds included manually filling out standard forms and 

using “green” notebooks to keep status information; manually inventorying (and 

reinventorying aircraft); ad hoc programs on lap-top computers (usually in word-processing programs); and using mail, situation reports (SITREPS), and facsimile to exchange data 

with home units. /bid, pp 12, 20, 37. 

591bid, pp 20, 23. 26, 28, 38, 47; 1st Special Operations Wing, Desert Storm ILJLLS 

Inputs, I SOWKC Letter 18 Apr 1991 with attached JULLS inputs; A~LS Remedial Action 

Project No 15839-53600, Engine Management During Wartime Conditions, 9 May 1991; 

Tactical Air Command, Desert Shield Desert Storm Logistics Data (Langley AFB, VA: 

TAC/LGP. Sep 1991). pp ii, iii. Additionally. as discussed under the topic of Logistics 

Indicators and Aircraft Battle Damage Repair, missing data have made it difficult for all 

to analyze the lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

60/bid, p 20. 

6’Ibid, p 23. 

62/bid. p 26. 

327 
Maintenance Outside the Area of Responsibility 

Maintenance forces outside the AOR provided ILM to AOR units, 

maintained the WAF% Proven Force, SAC, and MAC aircraft, and also 

provided industrial-level support. 

Intermediate-Level Centralized Support to the AOR 

After the phase I deployment settled down, most Tactical Air Command (TAC) and TAC-gained Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve 

Units in the AOR received engine intermediate support from “Queen Bee” 

locations in Air Force Europe63 because, as the TAC 1991 History states, 

the units lacked adequate in-AOR facilities and equipment. While this is 

certainly the case, more specific and compelling reasons include reducing 

the influx of people and equipment into a theater with an already-strained 

bare-base support structure (as indicated earlier) and recognition that 

better efficiency was likely to be achieved by an established facility.&l 

The Air Forces, Central Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

also cited reduced airlift as a reason. Probably a more accurate statement 

would have been reduced front-end airlift because, at four engines per C141, the number of engines moving back and forth between USAFE and 

the AOR required over 150 equivalent sorties.6’ Table 32 summarizes the 

Queen Bee support picture. Only three out of the seventeen installations 

listed earlier in Table 29 received engine support from within the AOR. 

63Discussion of engine maintenance is based primarily on Hq TAC, Tactical Air 

Command History-1991, Chapter VI: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Special Topics, pp 343- 

347. The term Queen Bee refers to a base that provides centralized engine maintenance 

for a group of bases operating the same engine type. Queen Bee engine support was a 

quasi 2-level concept in that the supported units did not have collocated intermediate 

capability. Like any 2-level concept, it was dependent on high reliability (or excellent 

supply pipelines) for success. 

blRider, After Action Report, p 4. 

65The figure of 4 engines per aircraft is from the TAC Command History although 

TAC calculates 172 aircraft loads from their higher total number of engines. 

328 
Table 32 

Queen Bee Engine SupportM 

Deployed units *OR Supported from Fr

Location AO

'I)pe Acft/ 

Engine 

FlllN Mountain Home Taif 48 m. 13 

TF30-P- lo9 Lakenheath, England 

A-1OA &OA- 2d TFW. England King Fahd 81 TFW, RAF Bentwaters, 73 

1 ON AFB, LA; 354 TFW. England 

TF34-GE-100 Myrtle Beach Am, 

SC; 706 m, Naval 

Air Station New 

Orleans, LA 

%+theater locations are from Col Rider's After Action Report. TAC'S totals in the same report from w

engines repaired out of 330 received from the AOR. Col Rider's after action report cites 437 engines repaired

the numbers because of the problems during the conflict with engine status reporting. 

w 

h, 

\o 
w 

w 

0 

. Table 32 (Continued) 

Queen Bee Engine Support 

Deployed UIlb AOR Supported from Fr

Location AO

lsrpe Ad 

Engine 

347 TFW, Moody 

AFB, GA &. 388 F-1U 

F1lO-GE-lOO TFW, Hill AFB, UT 

F-1U 366 TFW, Shaw 

F100-PW-200 AFB. SC; 169 TK, 

McEntire ANGB, 

cock Field, NY 

SC; 174 TRV, Hm86TFW, Ramstein Ger- 41 

many 

50TFW, Hahn 14

Gelmany 

F-15C & F-l5E/ 33 m, Eglin AFB, Tabuk, A1 Khq' 36 TFW, Bitburg AB, 41 

F100-PW-200 FL (F-15C); 4TFW9 Gelmany 

Seymour Johnson 

AFB, NC (F-15E) 

TOTAL 312 287 
Although Table 32 indicated that Queen Bee sites returned ninety-two 

percent of engines to serviceable condition, the engines were not readily 

available to aircraft in the AOR. The experiences of the Ramstein operation are indi~ative.6~ As indicated in Table 32, the 86th Tactical Fighter 

Wing (TFW) at Ramstein supported the 347th TFW(Provisional), and the 

388th TFW(P), flying F100-100 engines on F-16 aircraft.@ Monthly 

engine production at Ramstein was about 400 percent higher than during 

peacetime and was achieved through compression of individual maintenance tasks. As an example, at the start of Desert Shield, F-100-110 

engines were in the middle of a high pressure turbin4ow pressure turbine 

time compliance technical order that typically took about two weeks per 

engine. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the more typical time 

was four days. But the Ramstein shop was in fact underutilized because, 

during almost all of the Desert Shield timeframe, moving retrograde (i.e., 

unserviceable) engines from the theater to Ramstein was a problem. The 

officer in charge of the 86th engine operation sent a message to the 347th 

TFW and the 388th TFW on this subject in December 1990. Instead of 

more repairable engines, however, the only immediate result of his message was a staff assistance visit from Hq U.S. Air Force Europe, also at 

Ramstein. Retrograde engines did not begin showing up until January 

1991, and after that, in ones and twos. Repair parts were also a limiting 

factor. The parts situation was caused largely by the condition of retrograde engines, which had been fairly well stripped during in-theater 

cannibalization. As an additional note, when the 86th moved serviceable 

engines to the Ramstein loading dock, the engines would sit there for one 

to four days-tending to confirm other indications of poor visibility and 

control over components in transit. 

Proven Force 

The 7440th Composite Wing (P) comprised RF4C, F4G, F-16, 

F-15C, F-1 lE, EF-111 A, MC/HC/EC-130, KC-135, E-3, and MH-53 air67J. A. Forbes, Memorandum, “Summary of Desert Shielwesert Storm Discussions 

with AFLMC Personnel,” 4 Sep 1992. 

68Both of the wings in theater had 18 authorized spare engines. This is three times 

the normal peacetime authorization; the additional spares were pulled from stateside units 

(see Memorandum with AnMC personnel). 

33 1 
~raft.6~ The wing established seven aircraft maintenance units (one for 

each flying squadron), a combined component maintenancdequipment 

maintenance section, and an ammunition branch out of the 39th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron and deployed U.S. Air Forces in 

Europe units.” The component repair and equipment repair functional 

areas provided fuel system, hydraulic, nondestructive inspection, electronics countermeasures, armament, precision measurement equipment, sheet 

metal, machine, electrical, environmental, and wheel and tire shops. 

Since the majority of intermediate-level repair (i.e., engine repair and all 

avionics except electronic countermeasures) was sourced out of European 

home stations, the wing, along with almost all units in the AOR, operated 

on a de fact0 two-level maintenance concept with Military Airlift Command channel and special airlift providing the lines of comm~nication.~~ 

Although the official history of Proven Force states that monitoring of 

parts flow was “highly effective.”72 it was also evidently cumbersome and 

manpower intensive, requiring manual tracing of as many as 500 pieces 

of cargo per As discussed previously, however, if mission-capable 

rates were the measure, then the net result was effective because Proven 

Force mission-capable rates were approximately the same as those for 

peacetime and for similar models of aircraft in other units. 

SAC Aircrafr 

The Strategic Air Command had deployed 234 air refueling aircraft, 

38 bombers, and 10 reconnaissance aircraft into the AOR by the time 

Desert Storm te~ninated.7~ Additional aircraft had been deployed outside 

the AOR, mostly to Spain and Diego Garcia. (Other reports in this series 

discuss the politically charged process of deciding where to bed down the 

aircraft and the uncertainties that resulted.) 

69(S) Hq United States Air Forces in Europe Contingency Historical Reports, Desert 

Storm, Week 1 (15-23 Jan 1991), Volume I of 111. 14 Feb 1991. (S) briefing titled: 

“Desert Storm Saturday 19 Jan 1991 D+03”; (S) History of Joint Task Force Proven 

Force, 13 Dec 1991. p 77. 

70(S) Hist, United States Air Forces in Europe, Calendar Year 1990, p 307. 

7’(S) Ibid. 

72(~) /bid, p 80. 

73(S) /bid. p 82. 

7kpt, Logistics After Action, 17th Air Division, Riyadh, Saudi Ambia, ca Mar 1991. 

332 
In July 1990, Strategic Air Command had two KC-135R aircraft in 

Southwest Asia (in the United Arab Emirates). By 12 August, 99 

KC-1 35 aircraft were supporting Desert Shield operations; a month later, 

the number grew to 150.75 To provide maintenance for the tankers, the 

Command created intermediate-level maintenance centers at Moron AB 

and RAF Mildenhall. By 7 September, the RAF Mildenhall facility was 

able to perform KC-1 35 phase inspections, fuel cell repair, and wheel and 

tire build-up. Moron in Spain by then had a much more complete capability for avionics maintenance, corrosion control, as well as some limited 

support for RC-135s. Other than the uncertainty caused by limited communications and limitations imposed by the War Readiness Spares Kits 

issues (see Chapter 7 of this report), creating an overseas maintenance 

capability for KC-I 35 aircraft was essentially unremarkable. 

When the KC-10 was procured, Strategic Air Command chose not to 

establish a KC- 10 intermediate-level maintenance capability because of the 

aircraft’s high reliability and the dy availability of Douglas Aircraft 

commercial upp port?^ So it should come as no surprise that KC-10 support 

was unproblematic. To ensure support, however, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center dispatched a Douglas logistics survey team to Europe to establish contingency distribution centers to expedite movement of spare parts?’ 

The fifty-seven KC-10 aircraft deployed were for all intents and purposes 

problem-free during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.’* 

After 8 August 1990 and until B-52 deployments to Moron and RAF 

Fairford began during Desert Storm, B-52s were stationed at Diego 

Garcia as part of the 4300th Provisional Bomb Wing?9 Intermediatelevel maintenance and heavy maintenance such as engine changes, corro- 

’5Theodore Jamison, SAC Logistics Support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm After the First 30 Days: Sep 1990-27 Feb 1991 (Draft), nd. p 6. The rest of the 

KC-135 data are drawn from this source. 

’htvw, Dr. Theodore Jamison with Maj Gen Charles J. Semk, SAC Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Logistics, 4 Mar 1991; Dr. Theodore Jamison, Notes from briefing: Hq 

SA~L (Col Linville) to JWJ4 (Col Remplo), 1 Oct 1994. The KC-I0 is an “off the 

shelf‘ commercial DC-I0 with modifications for air refueling. 

77Hist, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Fiscal Year 1991, p 137. 

78Searock interview. 

79(S-DRAFI‘) Rpt, SAC Logistics Support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm After the First 30 Days: Sep 1990-27 Feb 1991, ca Jun 1991, p 7. 

333 
sion washes, and phase inspections were not available at Diego Garcia 

and were instead provided from Andersen AFB, Guam.@' The capability 

at Andersen was fortuitous. Although the base had been closed the 

previous year, Maj. Gen. Searock, Strategic Air Command Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Logistics, had made and won a case for leaving the intermediate-level maintenance capability in place as a sort of insurance policy 

for the Pacific Theater?' Although proposals to create an intermediatelevel maintenance capability at Diego Garcia were discussed after Desert 

Shield began, nothing concrete transpired before Desert Storm ended.82 

In-theater B-52 intermediate-level maintenance was never seriously 

considered because of lack of facilities and ramp space. The problem 

was where else to put it once B-52s bedded down in theater.83 RAF 

Fairford had an inactive intermediate-level maintenance capability that, 

somewhat like the one at Andersen, had resulted from a fortuitous previous decision. In this case, the maintenance assets had previously been 

put in place (using assets from Mather AFB when the 420th Bomber Wing 

was inactivated) in what amounted to prepositioning for a war in Eur0pe.8~ The perspective of the Strategic Air Command Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Logistics is revealing: 

We knew that if we had a war in Europe or in the Pacific where we 

would go; we did not know-we had not thought through yet what we 

would do if we had a war in Southwest Asia." 

RAF Fairford, however, was too distant from the AOR to provide 

intermediate-level maintenance supp0rt.8~ Because Moron AB in Spain 

was already on the tanker air bridge, it was the logical choice. Moron 

had the advantage of being a reasonable distance from RAF Fairford and 

"SAC Logistics Support after first 30 days, p 10. 

"History of the Strategic Air Command 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1990. Volume I, Narrative, 

p 13; lntvw, Dr. Theodore Jamison with Maj Gen Charles J. Searock, SAC Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Logistics, 4 Mar 1991. 

''SAC Logistics Support After first 30 days, p 10. 

83Searock interview. 

84Hist0ry of the Strategic Air Conwnand I Jan - 31 Dec 1990. p 12; Searock interview. 

"Searock interview. 

'%AC Logistics Support After the First 30 Days, p 10. 

334 
became the second site for intermediate-level maintenan~e.'~ Table 33 

shows the combined KC-135 and B-52 intermediate-level and heavymaintenance production at Andersen and Moron for the period 

August 1990 through March 1991. 

Table 33 

Intermediate-Level and Heavy-Maintenance Production 

August 1990 - March 1991= 

Product Anderaen Moron 

B-52 Phase Inspections 28 19 

KC- 135 Phase Inspections 0 59 

B-52G Engine Changes 122 20 

KC- 135 Engine Changes 0 11 

B-52 Wash and Corrosion 

Control 

KC- I35 Wash and Corrosion 

Control 

Repaired line and shop replaceable units 

60 19 

0 90 

4,076 2,935 

"Searock interview. 

8%'he very large difference between Andersen and Moron engine changes is only 

partly due to the longer period of time Andersen was in business. Another reason was 

engine over-temperature during the long, heavy-weight flights both to and from Diego 

Garcia by aircrews who were not used to the weights involved (Searock interview). 

335 
Strategic Awl$ Maintenance 

The Military Airlift Command maintenance concept was fundamentally 

different from that of either Tactical Air Command or Strategic Air Command and also changed little between peacetime and wartime. Intermediate 

and heavy maintenance of C-5 and C-141 aircraft was centralized at home 

stations on the east and west coast of the United States. The Military 

Airlift Command’s C-5 and C- 14 1 maintenance cycle for repairable components during Desert Shield and Desert Storm is illustrated on Figure 67. 

As was true in peacetime, forward operating locations did not have intermediate repair capability; that capability was provided by Dover Am for 

the C-5 and McGuire Am for the (2-141. Overall reparable asset flow 

times were comparable to those of peacetime and are summaflzed ’ in Table 

34 for the C-5 and Table 35 for the C-141. The main purpose of presenting the data is that they provide one measure of the routine resupply 

and other logistics cycle times achievable when operational aircraft and 

their intermediate maintenance ate in different theaters. Note that the 

resupply times achieved by Desert Express (seventy-two hours) are significantly better than those of either the C-5 or C-141. 

Of equal importance with cycle times are failures experienced versus 

failures planned for. If “planned for” is taken to be the supply items in 

the War Readiness Spares Kits plus base-level self-sufficiency spares, 

there was only a partial match. For the C-5, for example, thirty-six to 

thirty-nine percent of the items in kits were not in demand at any time 

during Desert Shield or Desert Storm. 

Military Airlift’s C-141 and C-5 aircraft operated under an isochronally (i.e., equally spaced time intervals) scheduled maintenance concept, 

with home station checks every 50 days and alternating major and minor 

inspections every 200 days.89 To increase available airlift, the Command 

froze the calendar on scheduled maintenance at the beginning of Desert 

Shield and then reinstated the inspections in late September.w The 

‘Valking Paper, Hq USAFLEYM, subj: MAC Strategic Aircraft Scheduled Maintenance, 

w(S) Msg, CINCMAUCC to CSAF. 1723592 Sep 90, subj: Desert Shield Reserve 

17 Sep 1990. 

Logistics Augmentation (U). 

336 
Figure 67 

MAC Maintenance cycles 

Forward Uoun Oocralsnp 

/ OVE RSE A 5 

result of deferring maintenance, of course, was a bow-wave of delayed 

repair work (from an average of 37 open discrepancies to an average of 

46 per C-141 aircraft in the space of a month and a half)?’ To catch up 

on maintenance, the Command requested recall of 890 reservists.w It 

asked for only portions of the C-5/C-141 maintenance cadres assigned to 

the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, since mobilizing all the 

maintenance personnel would have produced more manpower than needed?3 The C-5/C-141 maintenance personnel called up helped augment 

increased airlift operations at Charleston, McGuire, Dover, and Westover 

”lbid. 

92LEyM Talking paper, CINCMAC Msg. 

93hfAC Hisrory. Chapter 111, Desert Storm, Section titled: “Role of MAC’S Air Force 

Reserve Component Forces,’’ electronic version available in GWAPS archives as 

MACSHLD.42. 

337 
Air Force Bases. During the second airlift surge in December and January, scheduled maintenance was deferred again. 

Table 34 

C-5 Repairable Asset Flow Timesw 

Figure 67 Description Average Comment 

reference time 

(days) 

E 

C 

D 

B' 

A 

F 

Retrograde forward 

site to SBSS 

Intermediate turn 

time (repaired) 

Intermediate turn 

time (NRTS) 

Retrograde from 

main base to ALC 

ALC turn time 

Order and ship time 

from ALC to main 

operating base 

Order and ship time 

from main operating 

base to forward base 

8.6 

5.3 65% of units were 

(Dover) repaired 

5 .O 45% of units were 

NRTS 

21.1 

no data 

19.1 

18.4 

Air Logistic Center (ALC) turnaround time in this table may not be a meaningful 

measure. The ALCS "surged" the most needed parts as identified by the operating commands rather than attempting to fix everything. See the discussion on industrial maintenance in this chapter. 

94 

338 
Table 35 

C-141 Repairable Asset Flow Times 

Figure 67 Description Average Comment 

reference time 

(days) 

E Retrograde forward 

Site to SBSS 

C 

D 

Intermediate turn 

time (repaired) 

Intermediate turn 

time (not repairable) 

B Retrograde from 

main base to ALC 

ALC turn time 

A 

F 

Order and ship time 

from ALC to main 

operating base 

Order and ship time 

from main operating 

base to forward base 

12.6 

6.9 

4.7 

15.3 

no data 

21.1. 

22.2 

42% of units were 

repaired 

58% of units were 

NRTS 

see footnote on 

C-5 table 

339 
Before the Gulf War, increased demands on the C-141 fleet (primarily 

low-level flying and increased heavy-weight refueling) accelerated structural damage to the aircraft, with a corresponding reduction in service life?’ 

The severity of the problem led the Military Airlift Command Council to 

conclude in May of 1990 that maintaining a viable fleet would not be 

possible beyond the turn of the century.% Naturally, the increased flying 

tempo during the Gulf War held the possibility of exacerbating the problem. To minimize impact, Hq MAC and 21st Air Division both put zero 

fuel weight and gross takeoff weight limitations on the aircraft.97 The 

impact of these decisions (although the precise trail of logic is not recoverable) was to restrict C-141 loads to twenty short tons.= The Command 

later estimated that this restriction reduced C-141 airlift capability by six 

to ten percent.99 Although the Gulf War resulted in about three years 

worth of flying hours during a one-year period, the effect on the C-141 

fleet was to shorten fatigue life by about one year. The reason for the 

moderate impact was reduced exposure during the Gulf War to stressful 

flight profiles such as air refueling, air drop, and low-level flying.Ioo 

Industrial Maintenance 

Air Force Logistics Command and its contractors participated in the 

Gulf War primarily by (1) increasing production of repair parts, (2) accelerating the output of aircraft from program depot maintenance lines, and 

(3) fielding combat logistics support squadrons. The first of these is 

called repairable surging. 

95Msg, CINCMAC to CSAF, 1700152 Jan 1990, subj: C-141 Airlift Capability; Talking 

%MAC Council Memorandum for CMCMAC. 23 May 1990, subj: C-141 Service 

97Ltr, Col Anthony E. Naddeo, MACILGX, to MAUXPY. Staff Comments on “Strategic 

Airlift Draft Report,” 18 Jun 1992; Ltr, Col Alvin C. Scheitzer 11, MAUXPX. to MAUXPY, 

subj: Staff Comments on “Strategic Airlift Draft Report,” 26 Jun 1992. 

Paper, Hq MA~LGMM, Force Structure Options, 4 Dec 1989. 

Lifmetirement. 

98Schweitzer Itr. 

wNaddeo Itr. 

looJohn Lund and Ruth Berg, Stmtegic Air18 in Operation Desert ShieM and Desert 

Storm: An Assessment of Operational Efectiveness (Working Draft) (WD-5956-AF. 

Santa Monica, May 1992), pp 66-68. This working draft is taken as credible in this 

matter because the MAC staff reviewed it and did not take issue with the assertions. 

340 
The normal peacetime production rate of repairable (sometimes called 

“exchangeable”) items is 60,OOO per month.”’ “Repairable surging” is 

increasing the rate at which Air Force Logistics Command “turns around” 

repairable items such as avionics line replaceable units and aircraft engines. 

An item was considered surged if it was either already undergoing repair 

and turned out faster than normal or entered earlier than normal into the 

repair process (and then repaired). Overall Logistics Command surge 

performance is depicted in Figure 68. As can be seen from the figure, the 

surge production (i.e., production over and above normal) rate was approximately 6,700 per month from late August through mid-Januaq and then 

climbed to 18,000 per month after mid-January.’M Note that production 

was linear in the two periods before and after midJanuary and fairly 

independent of the requirement. Throughout the January, February, and 

March periods, production trailed demand by about 10,000 components. 

It is not certain why this was so, but a reasonable conjecture based on 

after-action reporting is lack of carcasses to repair-the same problem the 

Air Force Queen Bee engine shops in Europe experienced.Ia Overtime 

rates varied widely, with some units reporting rates as low as seven percent 

and others as high as eighty percent.IM 

“‘White Paper, Michael M. Self, AFMCIXPOX. “Air Force Logistics Command 

Operations in Desert Storm,” Jul 1991. 

’%is figure is a synthesis of data from two sources. One source was 102 daily 

AFLC situation reports (SITREPs) from 27 Aug 1990 through 28 Mar 1991. The second 

source was a set of handwritten production tables maintained by Mr. Michael Self, a 

member of the staff of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Hq AFLC (AFLC/XPOX, “SOR 

Surge Item Production” (Hq AFMUXPOX: Wright Patterson AFB. OH, 4 Jan 1991). All of 

these data should be treated with some caution. First, there are obvious reporting errors 

such as the three data points in mid- and late Jan 1991. Second, data are missing. Third. 

AFLC indicated that total surge production was over 90,oOO components, and this accwnting indicates the total was approximately 81,000 through the end of Mar 1991. See the 

Self White Paper for the 90,000 figure. 

“’Ltr. Eva C. Ugarhovich, SM-ALC Directorate for Financial Management, to AW 

xpox, subj: Desert ShieldStorm After Action Reporting, 12 Apr 199 1, atch 1, p 12 and 

p 40; SM-ALC History, Vol 111. pp 3-5. 

‘@%even percent figure is from sM-ALC Ugarkovich Ltr. atch 1, p 37; 80 percent (72 

hour work week) figure is from Itr, Charles R. Wallace, Director of Financial Management, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, to Hq MLC/XP, subj: Inputs for the Dexrt 

Storm White Paper, Logistics Accomplishments, 29 May 1991, atch 1, p 1. 

34 1 
Figure 68 

Surge Requirements and Production (Cumulative) 

1 

Quantity produced is one consideration; a second is: were the right 

things being produced? To quote from two after action reports from the 

same Air Logistics Center (ALC): 

This [Command and Control Information] system was used to electronically transmit surge requirements to the Avionics Surge Center. The 

electronic data interface greatly speeded the surge notification process.loS 

Each ALC has their own rules on how to compute surge candidates. 

MAJCOMs and ALCs need to agree on how to identify surge candidates 

and how requirements will be computed. The local ccis was completely ineffective in identifying quantities and tracking.'% 

"'Ltr, Maj Gen Richard F. Gillis, Commander, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, 

to A~~YXP, subj: Desert ShieldlStorm After Action Reporting, 29 Apr 1991, atch 1, p 3. 

Ytr, Maj Gen Gillis, p 10 of atch 1. 1 

342 
The implication is that although requirements identification was fast, 

it was not necessarily accurate. The view that surge requirement identification and tracking was problematic is corroborated in other after-action 

reporting.lm However, it is also apparent that by the phase I1 deployment 

(mid-September 1990), much of the initial confusion had died down as 

customers (e.g., Air Force Special Operations Command, Tactical Air 

Command, Strategic Air Command, and Military Airlift Command 

scrubbed the initial lists generated by the Weapon System Management 

Information System and switched to using reports of actual War Readiness Spares Kit shortages and mission capability limiting items.'@ 

Finally, confusion existed over how surge was to be implemented and 

the purpose of Air Force Logistics Commandk Surge Contingency Plan 

70. The plan, as viewed by Logistics Command Headquarters and as 

stated in the introduction to the plan, was not intended to be implemented 

but was a guide for writing air logistics center-level plan^.'^ This intent 

was consistent with a concept of decentralized decision making on when 

and what to surge. But at the level of the air logistics centers, the 

expectation evidently was that Headquarters would make the decision to 

surge and that "Plan 70 should be implemented early to ensure consistent 

implementation across the One result of the confusion over 

who was supposed to decide to surge was an initial delay (of some weeks 

duration) as each weapon-system program manager "convinced" other 

Aws and peer directorates within the same AX to respond to surge 

requirements. l'' 

ImSM.ALC indicated that correlation between its previously prepared lists and requirements established by the commands during Desert Shield was as low as 15%. Ugarkovich 

Itr, atch 1, p 12. 

'OSLtr, Maj Gen Gillis, atch 1, p 16; Ugarkovich Itr, atch 1, p 44. 

Intvw. James A. Forbes with Mr. Tom Jenkins, Hq AFMULGSI, 23 Sep 1992; AmC 

Surge Contingency Plan 70, p iii. 

"'Ltr, Maj Gen Richard F. Gillis, atch I, p 3 and p 8. This same view is reflected 

in SM-ALC after action reporting (Ugarkovich Itr) and by RAND in their assessment of 

Desert Shield [Project Air Force Desert Shield Assessment Team, Project Air Force 

Assessment of Operation Desert Shield: Volume 11. The Buildup of Combat PowerTechnical Appendices (RAND N-3427-AF, Santa Monica, Jun 1992)]. 

109 

"'Ltr, Maj Gen Gillis, p 8. 

343 
The Air Force referred to production of an aircraft undergoing program depot maintenance earlier than originally planned as “acceleration.” 

AFLC accelerated approximately seventy aircraft during Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm-sixty-four within AM industrial facilities and another six 

that were undergoing program depot maintenance at contractor 

Of the seventy aircraft, four were C-5 aircraft and thirty-five were C141s.I13 The acceleration provided for almost 1,0oO additional flying days. 

However, the additional flying days were not fully used.”‘ For example, 

Military Airlift Command used approximately one-third of the 174 additional flying days made available on C-141 aircraft-the rest of the additional C-141 flying days were unused. Chapter 3 shows that, except at 

peak periods, more C-141 mission-capable aircraft were available than 

required; this should not be a surprise, but it does reinforce the point that 

industrial maintenance capability exceeded the demands placed on it. 

Quantitative Logistics Indicators 

One of the impressions apparently created during the Gulf conflict 

and then perpetuated afterwards is that Air Force aircraft had missioncapable rates “equal to or better than” peacetime rates. Often, the emphasis was on “better The mission-capable rates were generally 

II2Self white paper, p 7. 

“%ere is ambiguity on the number of C-5 and (2-141 aircraft accelerated. The Self 

white paper indicates 12 C-5 aircraft and 41 C-141 aircraft. A Warner Robins summary 

of C-5 and C-141 acceleration shows only 4 C-5s; tail numbers 90019,90005,80226, and 

90020; and 35 C-141s. Since the Warner Robins summary provides specific aircraft tail 

numbers, it is the preferred source. Summary of C-141 Aircraft Maintenance Repair 

(AMREP) data on C-5 and C-141 Aircraft, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, ca 15 Mar 

“4Summ~ of C-141 Aircraft Maintenance Repair (AMREP) data on C-5 and C-141 

II5James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education 

Foundation,l992), p 128; Dr. William Suit, ‘The Logistics of Air Power Projection,” Air 

Power History, Fall 1991, p17. 

199 1, GWAPS NA-506. 

Aircraft. 

]‘%he various mission capability definitions are: 

a) Fully mission capable (f%C)-an aircraft ready to perform all of its assigned 

missions, and 

344 
good, but they were not that good. With the exception of a few aircraft 

such as C-141s-with rates slightly higher in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm than in peacetime-the mission-capable rates of all other aircraft 

appear to have stayed about the same or decreased when compared to 

peacetime rates.’17 The text below assesses mission-capable rates, break 

rates, and fix rates. Mission-capable rate is a composite of many factors 

and thus inherently integrates the effects of design, policy, spares levels, 

manning levels, and other influences. The break rate is the number of 

returning sorties that need repair and is driven mostly by the basic reliability of the aircraft. Repair rate is the number of returning aircraft 

ready to go in a given amount of time (e.g., eight hours) after landing. 

Although repair rate is a function of inherent maintainability, it also 

reflects maintenance capability and spares availability. By considering all 

three rates (fully mission-capable, break, and fix) it is possible to get a 

feel for the influence of more immediate factors as well as those of 

longer duration. Air Force mission-capable rates can be compared with 

those of other Services, since the definition of the term is generally 

consistent across Services. 

b) Partially mission capable (PMC)-~~ aircraft that is ready to perform one or 

more of its assigned missions, but not all assigned missions. 

c) Non-mission capable (NMC)-~~ aircraft not able to perform at least one of its 

assigned missions. It may be non-mission capable for maintenance (NMCM), 

non-mission capable for supply (NMCS). or non-mission capable for both 

(NMCB). 

d) mc rate = mc/(mC + pMC + MC), the proportions of all aircraft that are 

fully mission capable. 

‘17There is evidence that the increase in apparent mission capability for MAC C-5 and 

C-141 aircraft was due at least in part to “hippocketing” discrepancies such as popped 

circuit breakers, bubbled windshields, and inoperative oil pressure gauges that would be 

cause for non-mission-capable-maintenance in peacetime. AFLLS remedial action project 

report 20553-31617 (oooO2). 5 Dtx 1990. For C-130 aircraft, the difference is probably 

due to a difference in what was being measured. In the AOR, C-130 aircraft were flying 

a relatively simple mission that did not need special avionics, radar, or the various C-I30 

drop modes. By comparison, these systems are included in normal peacetime readiness 

ratings. Intvw, Lt Col Miles O’Brien, Assistant Deputy Commander for Maintenance, 317 

TAW, Thumrait, om, 27 Aug 1990. 

345 
Miss w n - Capable Rates 

Because the Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS) was never 

fully fielded, reliable mission-capable rates were difficult to obtain during 

or after the conflict."* As a workaround, the CENTAF (Rear) battle staff 

at Langley AFB telephonically obtained once-per-day snapshots as of 

midnight in Riyadh.II9 The snapshot flying data inflated the missioncapable rates by about five percent to seven percent compared to rates 

that would have been obtained with the automated system. This inflation 

may be a source of the impression that the missioncapable rates were 

better than in peacetime."' Military Airlift Command collected data 

manually for a different reason. The combination of CAMS and the 

Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS) assumed that 

a Military Airlift Command aircraft remained mission-capable from the 

time it left home station until it returned-this practice also produced 

inflated fully mission-capable rates."' For the C-5, the inflation was as 

much as ten percent during the Gulf War. Another factor influencing the 

validity of the comparisons between wartime and peacetime rates is that 

a month-to-month variability (of say five percentage points or more) 

occurs normally without obvious cause. Hence, a value of five percent 

difference in either direction should be viewed skeptically. 

The pattern of the F-16's mission-capable rate is typical of Tactical 

Air Command aircraft. In Figure 69, the upper line is the reported rate 

and the lower line is the reported rate less six percent (i.e., the average 

inflation due to snapshot data collection). July was the last month before 

deployment. From the figure, the reader can decide that deployment 

"&Tactical Air Command, Desert Shield Desert Storm logistics Data (Langley AFB. 

VA: TA~LGP, Sep 1991). p iii. To quote: 

Data from August and September was sketchy at best. We were still working a 

classification issue for maintenance data, later it became FOR OFFlClAL USE 

ONLY. The result was an ad-hoc mix of lap-tops, local programs, manual records, 

facsimiles of daily logs, and attempts to use modems to interact with CAMS mainframes at home. None were entirely successful. 

''lbid; J.A. Forbes, telephone interview with Mr. Ed Merry, Air Combat Command, 

lzo~~~ Logistics Data, p iii. 

'*'REMiS was an AFLC system that aggregated data from individual base-level CAMS 

9 Aug 1992. 

installations. 

346 
initially degraded mission capability. However, most of the bugs were 

worked out of the system in roughly four months. Table 36 contrasts the 

average fully-mission-capable rates before deployment, during Desert 

Shield, and during Desert Storm for major U.S. Air Force aircraft. 

Break Rates and Fix Rates 

Why did the mission-capable rates go down in general after deployment? The answer can be seen in break and fix rates.’22 Tactical Air 

Command aircraft all followed a more-or-less common pattern that 

Figure 69 

F-16 FMC Rate 

80 b-- --t t 1 - --+----+ + - 

Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 

Month 

/lil Reported Data kztfd Aug-Feb less 6% I 

‘22The problems with CAMS during Desert ShieldDesert Storm preclude analysis of 

more universal measures. An attempt was made to analyze mean-time-between-maintenance trends using data from the Air Force’s Maintenance and Operational Data Access 

System for the period Sep 1990 through Aug 1992 but was not successful. It was 

apparent from wild month-to-month variations during the period of Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm that the data were corrupted. Discussions with personnel of the Air Force 

Logistics Management Center confirmed that many of the CAMS data tapes for this period 

were lost. Memorandum, J. A. Forbes, “Summary of Desert ShieldDesert Storm Discussions with AFLMC Personnel,” 4 Sep 1992. 

347 
Table 36 

Fully Mission-Capable Rates Compared’” 

~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

FMC Rate 

sourcing Before Desert Shield Desert Storm 

Command Aircralt Deployment Avg (a411 Avg (W) 

TAC F-15 84.6 13.2 78.8 

TAC F- 1 5E 79.4 84.6 19.9 

TAC F-16 90.7 81.7 80.8 

TAC OA-10 87.5 88.4 . 87.5 

TAC A-10 88.9 85.0 81.0 

TAC F-4G 83.3 77.7 72.5 

TAC EF-I11 15.8 59.5 47.2 

TAC F-117 82.4 79.5 72.5 

TAC RF-4C 79.7 13.1 61.3 

TAC E-3 81.4 79.6 82.2 

USAFE A-I0 88.9 nla 75.6 

Iz3Data compiled from multiple sources. TAC aircraft: Desert ShieldDesert Storm 

Logistics Data; USAFE Aircraft: USAFE Command Management Review; SAC Aircraft: 

Reconstructed from CENTAF mission capability data; MAC Aircraft: Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS) 18 Mar 1992; SOF Aircraft: Reconstructed from 

and Desert Storm aircraft status was reported using snapshot data and the reported data 

have been adjusted by 6% accordingly. USAFE figures are for Desert Storm only and 

exclude Proven Force. F-111 aircraft are not included in the USAFE figures because the 

data are evidently corrupted (starting Desert Storm in Nov 1990). The “before” column 

is Jul 1990 data in the case of TAC, the average of the three months before to deployment 

in the case of USAFE, and Jul 1990 REMIS data for C-5s and C-141s. For C-5 and C-141 

aircraft, Desert Shield is the average of August through Dec 1990. and Desert Storm is 

the average of Jan and Feb 1991. For C-5 and C-141 aircraft, data are always for the 

entire fleets and are as provided by Air Mobility CommandnC; facsimile 15 Dec 1992. 

me (2-141 and C-5 data were manually collected by AMC (then MAC) during Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm because REMlS did not collect data on overseas locations.] For 

all other aircraft, Desert Shield and Desert Storm data are only for aircraft that deployed. 

The C-130 peacetime rate is after the conflict (Apr 1991 - Aug 1991) rather than before. 

CENTAF mission capability data. TAC, USAFE. SOF, MAC (C-130) and SAC Desert Shield 

348 
Table 36 (Continued) 

Fully Mission-Capable Rates Compared 

Fhic Rate 

SouFcing Before Desert Shield Desert storm 

Command Aircraft Deployment Avg (MU) Avg (MU) 

USAFE RFX 78.8 nla 77.2 

USAFE F-4G 78.9 nla 63.6 

USAFE F-16 86.8 nla 79.1 

USAFE F-15 84.4 nla 74.6 

SAC B-52G not available 0.87 0.83 

(Diego 

Garcia) 

SAC B-52G not available 

(Moron) 

SAC KC-135 not available 

SAC KC-10 not available 

MAC C-141 79.7 83.3 84.4 

MAC c-5 69.8 68.7 67.8 

MAC c-1 30 81.5 _____ 90.1 

can be visualized by examining F-15 data (Figure 70). F-15 aircraft 

deployed to the AOR broke more often than did aircraft at home. It is not 

hard to understand why. Over and above being in a harsh environment, 

aircraft in the AOR were flying longer sorties than peacetime training missions. In addition, the rate at which broken aircraft in the AOR were 

fixed was worse than the rate at home station (although the AOR rate 

improved over time as the supply system. intermediate maintenance, and 

other capabilities came fully on line). For the C-5, maintenance ability 

to repair aircraft rapidly enough between missions appears to have been 

the limiting factor. As is discussed in chapter 3, Military Airlift Command flew all C-5 aircraft that were mission capable. 

349 
Figure 70 

F-15 Break and Fix Rates 

Percent of Sorties Returning Broken 

0- I 

Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 

Month 

~ ~~ 

-+ Break-home 

-I=- Rx-Deployed * Fleet Avg --t Fix-TAC Std 

--e Break-Deployed --)lt Fix-Home 

Why Were Capability Rates Better Than Expected? 

Although capability rates were not as good as appeared from the 

initial data, they were still better than ones forecast as late as April 1990. 

In that month, the AFLC Logistics Operations Center assessed Logistics 

Command’s ability to support OPUN 1002-90. The Center concluded that 

Logistics Command could fully support only two of thirteen aircraft types 

tasked in the OPLAN; the B-52 and C-141 were actually rated as unsupported.’24 Because of the disparity between prediction and outcome, the 

I2%e assessment was largely done mechanically by the Weapon System Management Information System supportability Assessment Module (WSMIS-SAM). WSMIS-SAM 

is a mathematical model that forecasts aircraft mission-capable rates (essentially availability percentage) based on availability of spare parts, pipeline times, repair rates, and similar 

data. Source of information for the following discussion is Michael M. Self, “Air Force 

Logistics Command Desert Storm Logistics Comparative Staff Study,” Aug 1991. 

350 
Command performed an after-the-fact assessment during the summer of 

1991 to uncover the reasons for the differences. Results are summarized 

in Table 37.12’ 

Three common threads run through Table 37. First, aircraft such as 

the F-4G and the F-16 simply “got well” between the initial assessment 

and the Desert Shield and Desert Storm deployment. Second, nondeploying aircraft and their WRSKs kits were extensively cannibalized.126 

Third, only small proportions of the respective fleets usually deployed, 

making extensive cannibalizing practical. Those that remained home 

became a ready source of supply for those that did deploy. The April 

assessment assumed there would be no cannibalization from nondeployed 

aircraft or their WRSKs. 

Comparison with Other Services 

Navy experience was essentially the same as Air Force experience. 

Eight carriers participated in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Center 

for Naval Analyses (CNA) analyzed the mission capability data and concluded that the Navy mission-capable rates were as high as those normally experienced in pea~etime,’~’ although CNA did not provide the equivalent peacetime rates. CNA’S summary data for Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm are presented in Table 38. Reasons given for the sustained mission-capable rates were (1) flying-hour usage rates were near planned 

wartime numbers, (2) carriers shared intermediate maintenance facilities, 

(3) and a healthy supply stock was available.IB A quantifiable measure 

of supply health is the range and depth fill rates of the Navy’s Aviation 

I2’Aircraft such as the F-l 1 IF and F-117 that were not tasked in WLAN IOOZ are 

necessarily absent from this comparison. 

Col Raymond Davies. Deputy Commander for Maintenance of the 4 TFW (P) 

probably portrays a typical approach to deployment when he desaibes cannibalizing 

approximately 300 parts from aircraft remaining behind. Steven Razak. “Maintenance 

Operations in Desert Storm: an Interview with Col Davies,” Industtiuf Engineering, Oct 

1991, pp 38-41 

I2’Ronald Nickel, et al, Desert Storm Reconstruction Report, Volume IX: Logistics, 

(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, Oct 1991). p 7-1. 

IzSIbid, p 7-15 

126 

35 1 
Coordinated Allowance List and rotable pools.’29 Fill rates are given in 

Table 39. 

Table 37 

Rationale for Differences Between April 1990 OPLAN 100%~ 

Assessment and Desert ShieldAlesert Storm Resultsi30 

Aircraft April 1990 Rationale for Diiference 

Me Assessment and/ or Comments 

A-10 Fully supported. Six squadrons deployed with six 

WKs but kits deployed were meant 

for a larger number of aircraft. Parts 

plentiful from the beginning and 

WRSKs kept filled by resupply. A-10 

level of activity could have been 

sustained for considerably longer than 

combat phase of Desert Storm. 

E-3 Marginally supported 

for two problem parts. 

Peacetime and wartime missions are 

the same, extensive desert operational 

experience, effective parts chaser 

operation at linker AFB (possible 

because of small number of E-3s). 

rotation aircraft transporting parts, 

preemptive cannibalization of problem 

parts from depot aircraft. 

Desert Express, and Weekly EC-135 

F-4G Unsupported because Of 13 problem parts. 10 had get-well 

dates before first F-4 deployment. 

Windscreen problems did not materiof 13 problem parts. 

Also anticipated windscreen problems. alize. 

RF-4 supported. No issues. 

1291bid, p 7-15 to 7-16. Range is the number of different types of parts. Depth is 

the total count of parts. The rotable pool (i.e.. rotatable) comprises the most important 

repairable items. 

”In this table, WRSK stands for war readiness spares kit, a “kit” of parts kept ready to 

deploy. BUS stands for base-level self-sufficiency, parts that a~ not intended for deployment. 

352 
Table 37 (Continued) 

Rationale for Differences Between April 1990 OPLAN io0%90 

Assessment and Desert Shield/Desert Storm Results 

Aircrait April 1990 Rationale for Dflerence 

me Assessment and/or Comments 

F-ISNB/CJD Rated marginally sup 

manually upgraded to 

substantially supported 

because of small proportion of F- 15 fleet 

tasked for 1002. 

Not assessed because 

aircraft was new and 

was in “grace” period. 

ported by WSMIS-SAM, 

F-15E 

F-16 

F-IIID 

EF-I 11 

Marginally supported 

because of one F- 16Aunique problem part. 

Substantially supported. 

Fully supported. 

Small proportion of Beet tasked. 

Inadequate WRSK-first squadron 

strengthened by cannibalizing from 2d 

Squadron. which had less than 50% 

fill rate to begin with, then 2d Squadron deployed. Problem solved by 

cannibalizing from nondeploying 

squadrons and production line. Mobile 

electronics test sets for F-15E permitted on-site repair of electronics versus 

transport to Europe for repair. 

Problem part resolved before to deployment. Each group of squadrons 

deploying to a single base were from 

same or compatible block numbers 

and had common engines, avionics, 

etc. 

Not deployed. 

WRSKs had high fill rates. Intermediate-level maintenance facility established at Taif. 

353 
Table 37 (Continued) 

Rationale for Differences Between April 1990 OPLAN 100290 

Assessment and Desert Shield/Desert Storm Results 

Aircraft April 1990 Rationale for Difference 

5Pe Assessment andtor Comments 

B-52 Unsupported for nu- Small number of aircraft participating 

in Desert Storm, cannibalization from 

nontasked aircraft and nondeploying 

WRSKS (proscribed in peacetime). 

merous parts. 

KC- 135 

c-5 

c-130 

C-141 

Substantially support- Cannibalized nontasked aircraft and 

ed. commingled WRSKS of collocated 

units. 

Marginally supported 

due to low WRSWBLSS 

fill rate. surging overhaul. 

Parts assessed as problems did turn 

out to be so but were resolved by 

All versions rated fully 

or substantially sup 

ported. 

Cannibalized parts from obsolete 

aircraft in storage, borrowed spares 

from Navy, Coast Guard, and allies, 

expedited contract repair. 

Unsupported due to 

low WRSWBLSS fill 

rate-in turn caused by 

a lack of funds to 

repair on-hand carcasses. 

Once Desert Shield was underway, 

funds became available. 

354 
Table 38 

Summary Naval Aircraft Readiness Data 

10/1/90 - 1YY90 - Y17/91 - 

Time Period 11/31/90 Ylml 2/28/91 

MC Rate 85 87 88 

FMC Rate 83 85 85 

SortiesDay 158 191 . 457 

Flight 385 455 1,376 

HourdDay 

Average sortie 2.4 3.7 3 .O 

length (hours) 

Table 39 

Percentage of Spare Parts on Hand During 

Desert ShieWDesert Storm 

AVCAL Rotable 

Rangmepth Range/Depth 

GOALS 95/93 100196 

Saratoga 96/93 100198 

Kennedy 96/93 100199.8 

Midway 92/87 100196 

Ranger 92/88 100196 

America 96/93 100198 

Roosevel t 96/93 100196 

Army rates were similar to those experienced by the Air Force and 

Navy, although the Army considered the results of the conflict to have 

validated its equipment more than its support concepts. As noted earlier, 

the Army Aviation Center stated that its aviation logistics system itself 

355 
broke d~wn.'~' The primary problems were lost parts and a relatively 

immobile aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) that was unable to 

keep up with the forward movement of aviation units. Summary data for 

the Army are in Table 40. 

Table 40 

Army Aviation Summary Mission Capability Data 

Aircraft Desert Shield 

FMC hh! 

Desert Storm 

FMC Rate 

AH-64 85 

OH-58D and armed 89 

OH-58D 

UH-60 

OH-58 NC 

84 

90 

91 

86 

85 

92 

How Large was the Maintenance Footprint 

and was it too Large? 

A perception has apparently formed that too many support personnel 

were in the theater.IJ2 The narrative record is ambiguous: some interviews created the impression that the deploying forces deliberately minimized the number of personnel sent to the AOR.'~~ This would make 

Hq Department of the Army, Concepts, Doctrine, and Force Policy Division, V.S. 

Amy Aviation Center Operation Desert ShieLdStonn Afer Action Report (Coordinating 

Draft) (Washington. DC: Hq U.S. Army, 22 Nov 1991), pp 63-74. 92-93. 

1321ntvw, Mr. Richard Gunkle with Lt Gen Trevor Hammond. Hq USAF Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics, 7 Oct 1992. 

'33A~ an example, the following is quoted from an interview with Maj Dell Rose, 

Deputy Chief of Maintenance, 1709 Air Refueling Wing (P): "We had 359 people here 

supposedly what it take (sic) just to manage and maintain 10 airplanes. We were tasked 

with sending over a group of 22 aircraft and they told us that we couldn't even have 359 

folks. . . . Now something doesn't make sense. If you are authorized 359 folks to 

manage 10 airplanes, and all of the sudden you have a force of 22 and they won't even 

let you take 359 and then they make you split that workforce between the air guard and 

131 

356 
sense considering the Commander-in-Chief Central Command’s cap on 

the number of personnel permitted in the theater. Contrary indications 

are that ABDR personnel worked as ordinary shop mechanics and in some 

cases maintenance personnel worked outside of their specialty codes. 

Out-of-specialty utilization can be an indication of either imbalance or 

“extra” personnel. A definitive count of maintenance personnel in the 

AOR or attached to forces directly supporting the AOR will probably never 

be available. Chapter 3 of this report described the deployment difficulties arising from lack of Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD); 

those same TPFDD that would normally be the basis for personnel accounting.’” However, data are not totally lacking.”’ The Air Force 

Wartime Manpower and Personnel Readiness Team at Site “R”, Ft. 

Ritchie, Maryland, maintained data on deployed personnel through deployment manning documents during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.‘% 

As shown on Figure 71, a peak of approximately 17,000 maintenance 

personnel were in the AOR (in March 1991), or 21,000 if one includes 

ARFs. something doesn’t make sense.’’ 

‘%e basis for this discussion is an interview with personnel of the Air Force 

Wartime Manpower and Personnel Readiness Team. Jim Forbes and Ted Beck, Memo for 

the Record: “Visit to Air Force Wartime Manpower and Personnel Readiness Team,” Ft 

Ritchie, MD, 2 Oct 1992, GWAS NA-482. 

‘3’Although, ironically, the Air Force Military Personnel Center maintained that this 

was so. Ltr, Kenneth S. Rogers, Maj, USAF, Chief, Readiness Systems Branch, Hq Air 

Force Military Personnel Center to SAF/oSG, subj: Data Request (SAFIOSG), 28 Feb 1992; 

Memorandum by Mr Murray R. Berkowitz, Lt Col, USAF. Chief Research Services, Gulf 

War Air Power Survey for Personnel Readiness Center and AFMKYDPMDF, subj: Data 

Request-Action Memorandum, 29 Jan 1992. 

I3%e deployment manning documents (DMDS) are actually requirements documents, 

but the AFWMPRT used them as a source of deployment data because the requirements 

were essentially “reverse engineered” by counting the personnel who were actually onhand at each Desert ShieldlDesert Storm deployed location. AFWMPRT personnel were 

“comfortable” with the data and felt that they were about 95% accurate for the months 

shown here (Sep 1990 and Jan through Apr 1991). Aug 1990 and Oct through Dec 1990 

were considered by the AFWPRT to be inaccurate and are not presented here. Also, for 

some unknown reason, data on Al Ain are not in the database. Inclusion of A1 Ain 

maintenance personnel would raise the totals by about 360 persons according to data in 

the 1630(P) Contingency History Report, 6-12 Jan 1991, “Desktop Locator for All 

Assigned Personnel,” dated 11 Jan 1991. 

357 
Andersen AFB, Diego Garcia, Incirlik, Lajes, and M0r0n.I~' Figure 72 

shows distribution of personnel by location.138 

Figure 71 

Maintenance Population by Month 

" 

Sep-90 Jan-91 Feb-91 Mar-91 Apr-91 

Month 

33 insmlabam I AOR ~ny I 

'37This is an incomplete accounting because it does not include Proven Force 

personnel at other than lncirlik. nor does it include the maintenance personnel providing 

intermediate-level maintenance (ILM) from USAFE. The CENTAF Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Logistics has stated that a couple hundred augmentees were deployed from CONUS bases 

to USAFE locations. Rider, After Action Report, p 4. 

I3%is figure also reveals some obvious inaccuracies in the data. There are 30 

maintenance personnel shown at Jedda New in Feb 1991 supporting 95 SAC aircraft-an 

impossibility. See the Chronology and Statistics Volume for the aircraft count. 

358 
2500 

2000 

1500 

1000 

500 

0 

Figure 72 

h 

W 

69 
How the Number of Personnel Deployed was Decided 

A SAC Lieutenant Colonel assigned to the 1703d Air Refueling Wing 

at King Khalid captured the spirit of the deployment in a March 1991 

interview. In his words: 

When Plattsburg was tasked to be the lead unit to come over and set up 

the A-models, our folks at Plattsburg had indeed built a TPFDD flow to 

get the right organizations and right people for a given size, the right 

support people packages for the given size, PAA that was supposed to 

be here, and so-on-and-so-forth. It was approved through 8AF and 

SAC, and it was the guideline that our unit was using to send folks over. 

Unfortunately, it never got to CENTAF forward or rear; thus it was never 

approved from their perspective, and they were not going by the same 

document at all. In fact, their document was largely an ad hoc document, built as it went along. . . . 

Although confusion is obvious, it would be stretching the facts to suggest 

arbitrary sizing of the deployed forces. The evidence indicates that, in 

the absence of solid guidelines, the various headquarters and deploying 

units held down the number of maintenance personnel deployingsometimes deploying a considerably leaner force than they would have 

used for the same number of aircraft in the United States.'@ This point 

was discussed earlier in this chapter. The question is, did they? 

Actual Number Deployed versus Number Computed from Unit Type 

Codes for Selected Bases and Units 

To answer the question, the survey team undertook a ministudy to 

compare the number of maintenance personnel at eight selected bases in 

the AOR with the number that would be expected if the deliberate planning 

'391ntvw, Lt Col Jeff Rimell. Deputy Commander for Maintenance, 380th Bomb Wing, 

Plattsburg AFB, NY. 19 Mar 1991. This picture was corroborated in an interview with col 

Tom Howard, Chief of Logistics Plans Division, Hq USAF. Frank Cartwright. Memorandum 

"Notes from Meeting with Col Tom Howard," ca 2 Oct 1992. GwAPS NA-481. 

'%her corroborating evidence is found in: Rider, After Action Report, p 4; AFUS 

NO 1585867900 (ooo48), 9 Apr 1992, AFUS NO. 32953-51176 (00033). 29 MU 1991. AFLLS NO. 

42029-47873 @0062), 23 May 1991, AFUS No. 40550-21733 (oO064), 5 Apr 1991. 

360 
process was used.I4' Appendix 8-B presents the detailed analysis; Figure 

73 summarizes the results. The top left pie in the figure shows the 

number of maintenance personnel expected on the basis of the deliberate 

planning process-a total of 7,021 for the eight bases. The deliberate 

planning process, however, following OPM 1002-90, would have placed 

dl intermediate-level maintenance in the AOR. A significant portion of 

that maintenance actually went to Europe; the lower left pie adjusts for 

this fact-of-life change. For these eight bases, centralized intermediatelevel maintenance support from Air Force Europe reduced the expected 

AOR population by almost 900 people or thirteen percent. The top right 

pie captures the actual Air Force Wartime Manpower and Personnel 

Readiness Team (AFWMPRT) AOR population for the eight bases (4,002 

persons) and an imputed number of persons providing intermediate-level 

maintenance from Europe.'" The telling comparison is between the two 

bottom pies. The number of persons that should have been expected in 

the AOR, given the actual maintenance beddown, is 6,135. The number in 

the AOR. according to the AFWMPRT data, was 4,002, a difference of over 

2,100 or almost thirty-five percent.'43 %o answers are possible. Either 

the AFWMPRT data are grossly wrong, implying that the Air Force had no 

idea how many people were in the AOR-a damning indictment of its 

personnel systems-or the Air Force went to war on the eight bases with 

one-third fewer maintenance specialists than it thought it needed. If the 

latter possibility is accepted, the perception that more people were in the 

AOR than needed is contradicted by the results of this study. 

'41Definition of maintenance personnel is the same as given earlier. The eight bases 

resulted from selecting installations (1) that had data in the AFWMPRT data base, (2) for 

which there were no obvious, gross errors, (3) had a single type of aircraft (e.g., F-IS). 

The third restriction reduced the potential for error when estimating the number of 

personnel who be expected to deploy. Personnel data are as of 15 Jan 1991. 

'"Imputed because the actual number is unknown. This number was estimated using 

Unit 5pe Codes appropriate to the support provided. Details are in appendix 2. 

'43General Schwarzkopf s ceiling of 530,000 personnel in the theater is not a factor, 

since that occurred on 19 Feb. a month later than the as-of date of the data presented 

here. (SMrNINTEUNOFORN) Capt Steven B. Michael, The Persian Gulf War: An Air 

Staff Chronology of Desert ShieWDesert Storm 1992. p xiii. 

36 1 
Figure 73 

Maintenance Personnel: Planned vs Actual 

8 Bases: Abu dhabi, Baleen, Dhahran. Doha. Khamis Mushail, Shaikh Isa. Sharjah. Tabuk 

AVlatlO" 0 AOR ILM 0 USAFE ILM AvialionSlLM 

- 

Summary 

The tooth-before-tail deployment's effect on mission-capable rates 

varied differentially with maintenance concept. During the first month 

of deployment, the F- 15 complement suffered a drop in combat-ready 

aircraft of between nine percent and fifteen percent compared to peacetime rates. The F-16 and A-10 complements, for which intermediate 

maintenance is less of a concern, did not experience the drop. Throughout the conflict, maintenance was generally without critical, missionlimiting problems, and the industrial-level and base-level maintenance 

capacity exceeded the demands generated by the Gulf conflict. With 

some exceptions, mission-capable rates during both Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm were roughly the same as or slightly lower than peacetime 

362 
rates, although rates varied from month to month and from one type of 

aircraft to another. Other Services had similar experiences. 

Where the maintenance concepts used during Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm differed sharply from anticipated methods (e.g., establishing 

intermediate maintenance support in Europe rather than in theater) imbalances between maintenance and other logistics factors appeared quickly. 

The most prominent imbalance was with transportation. Even when 

problems arose, however, they were ameliorated by a relatively healthy 

supply stock and innovative procedures. 

The desert environment seems to have had little persistent effect on 

reliability. The major exceptions to sustained high reliability were T-64 

and T-700 helicopter engines (used on the CWMH-53 and MH-60 helicopters, respectively), which, as a result of sand erosion, achieved reliability levels approximately one-tenth that of peacetime levels. The T-64 

unreliability was compounded by a two-level maintenance concept predicated on a normal reliability level. 

Maintenance men and women accounted for approximately thirtyeight percent of all Air Force personnel deployed to the AOR and, in 

terms of numbers, were the single largest manpower element (although 

an accurate count will probably never be available). The actual tail-totooth ratio was larger than that visible in the AOR, since Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm maintenance was also supported from the Europe theater, 

from Guam, and from the continental United States. There is no evidence 

that too many maintenance personnel were in the AOR; in fact, the evidence (for eight bases) is that the Air Force went to war with one-third 

fewer personnel than it would have planned. 

Automated maintenance management support was not available until 

late in the game-approximately December 1990. Absence of aircraft 

status information hampered the various headquarters in their attempts to 

ascertain the health of the fleet (although this was worked around via 

phone calls and messages). Absence of configuration data, especially on 

engines, compromised ability to perform maintenance, although, again, 

other factors such as healthy spares stocks prevented critical shortfalls. 

363 
364 
Appendix 8-A 

Summary of Gulf Conflict U.S. Air Force Battle Damage a

Tail Date of Description of 

Airrran Number Inddent Unit Severity Damwe Repair Tim

A-10 81-0964 17 Jan91 Io'mv Damaged Hole left wing leading 

edge, also in mid spar 

web. 

A-10 

A-I0 

A-10 

82-0664 17 Jan 91 ~SUFW Damaged Small calibrc holes, 2 

severed hydraulic lines, 

front spar web damage. 

79-0182 23 Jan91 Damaged Left leading edge wing, 

5-6 dime size punctures. 

82-0664 28 Jan 91 354m Damaged Holes in honeycomb, 

left elevator, and left 

horizontal stab. 

5 m/h est 

Pilot intervie

indicates ove

fix,2mlhat

m9l 

0.25 m/h (es

AFIU 97 using 

tape 

0.5 mlh 
Summary of Gulf Conflict U.S. Air Force Battle Damage and Rep

Tail Date of Description of 

Aircraft Number Incident Unit Severity Damage Repair Tim

A-10 78-0715 29 Jan 91 354m Damaged #5 Pylon broke off, 0.30 mh (e

couple of small holes 

in engine and stab. 

A-I0 76-0547 31 Jan 91 23 TASS Damaged Flack damage on left 30 mh est 

windscreen. 

A-10 78-0686 31 Jan 91 354m Damaged 8" gouge in vert stab. 2 mh (est) 

A-10 76-0450 31 Jan 91 Damaged Vert tail, horz tail, aft 2 weeks to 

fuselage, both wings, 

left engine cowling. 

recover 

and then 

to M

cannibalized 

A-10 77-0268 31 Jan 91 926~~ Damaged Shrapnel damage in about 79 mh 

left cockpit area, rt (at), no dat

engine, 37MM MA. when compl
~~ ~ ~ 

Tail Date of Description of 

Aircraft Number Incident Unit Severity Damage Repair Tim

A-10 

A-10 

A-10 

A-10 

A-10 

A-10 

A-10 

A-10 

w 

Q\ 

4 

80-01 86 

78-0715 

79-0248 

78-0675 

77-0255 

82-0664 

79-0206 

80-01 86 

1 Feb 91 

1 Feb 91 

2 Feb 91 

2 Feb 91 

5 Feb 91 

6 Feb 91 

11 Feb 91 

15 Feb 91 

23TFW 

354TFW 

23TFW 

354TFw 

354TFW 

354TFw 

23TFW 

23TFW 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Lost 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Front windscreen R&R front 

below HUD. windscreen, 

%hour cur

Minor flak damage Speed tape-

left engine inlet wing. next momin

hour to repa

Wing fence and pylon 

damage. m/h est 

Large holes left wing. 4-5 days, 1

left engine, right tail. m/h est 

Struck between no data 

Station 9 and right 

gear pod, hydraulics 

lost. 

Rt engine F.O.D. 

shrapnel. 23 only 

Hits both rudders, 

right elevator gone. 139 m/h 

Speedtape, 

13.5 mlh, sy

11 days-2 w
w 

o\ 

00 Summary of Gulf Conflict U.S. Air Force Battle Damage and Rep

Tail Date of Descrition of 

Aircraft Number Incident Unit Severity Damage Repair Tim

A-10 78-0722 15 Feb91 3547w Lost 

A-10 79-0130 15 Feb91 354m Lost 

A-I0 79-0181 22 Feb91 23~~ Lost 

AC-130 69-6572 no data lsow Damaged Popped rivits and 

cracked ribs. 

AC-130H 69-6567 31 Jan 91 ISOW Lost 

AH-64 85-25362 25 Feb 91 Lost 

B-52G 58-0248 18 Jan 91 42BW Damaged 6' of tail, aft of 1853 

bulkhead. 

No data exc

drawing of 

damage 

Repair for 1 

flight to Gua

Repair est: a

12 hrs 
~ 

Tail Date of Description of 

Aircraft Number Incident Unit Severity Damage Repair Ti

~ ~~ 

B-52G 58-0194 26 Jan 91 1708BW 

B-52G 26 Jan 91 

B-52G 58-0253 27 Feb 91 42BW 

EF-111A 66-0023 14Feb91 20l'~M' 

F-lllF 70-0442 17Ja1191 

F-lllF 70-0392 17 J~II 91 

F-lllF 70-2401 17 Jan91 48m 

F-15C 83-0226 22 Jan 91 1m 

F-l5E 88-1689 18 Ja1191 4W 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Lost 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Damaged 

Lost 

No data. No data 

No data No dab 

SAM, multiple holes 570 m/h 

below left wing, left 

aft fuselage, under 

tail. 

1.5" X .75" hole right 

side wing glove. 

Shrapnel underneath 3 hours 

#2 engine burner 

section. 

Unknown 

Groove in About 2 h

windscreen, 1" hole 

in tail. 

No data. 
Summary of Gulf ConfIict US. Air Force Battle Damage and Re

Tail Date of Description of 

Aircraft Number Incident Unit Severity Damage Repair Tim

F- 15E 88-1692 19 Jan91 4W Lost 

F- 16A 79-0391 26 Feb 91 174TFW Damaged Fuselage dents and 175 mh es

cracks, numerous 

holes right side of 

aircraft. 

F-16C 88-0257 19 Jan91 KI1TFW Lost 

F-16C 87-0228 19 Jan 91 41TFW Lost 

F-16C 88-0488 21 Jan 91 388” Damaged 14 hits, engine 

fodded, left wing 

damaged, etc. 

F-16C 88-0450 26 Feb 91 388~~ Damaged Small piece of 

transparency shaved 

off. 

AFID 97 ind

still down 

Jan approx 

mlh (est). 

Completed 

R&R canop

data on mh 
Tail Date of Description of 

Repair TOm

Aircraft Number Incident Unit Severity Damage -~ ~ 

F-IK 88-0495 27 Feb 91 388m Damaged Missile hit left wing Evacuated to 

leading edge, 112 AFB 00-ALC 

external tank, more. (Beyond Re

Theater) 

F-16C 84-1390 27 Feb 91 50~~ Lost 

OA-10 76-0543 19 Feb 91 23TASS Lost 

OA-10 77-0197 27 Feb91 23~~s Lost 

FOOTNOTES 

I. Data in this table wen obtained from individual mrd folders maintained by the Survivability Vulnerability Informat

Patterson AFB. OH, by 1. A. Forbes on 16 Sep 1992. Some of the folders were marked with an event number (e.g.. G8, E

the event numbers. In all other cases, the table shows the folder numbers marked on each folder in pencil. The data can b

example, no folder was available for a KC-135 aircraft. although a KC-135 was damaged during air refueling on 19 Jan 1

by an ABDR team from the 2953d ass (Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center) (ref: History of rhe Owahoma Air Logktics 

2. Cover sheet and free-form commentary only. 

3. This folder includes a briefing titled 2951CLSS Support to 2mS4 TFW ABDR DSIDS. 

4. Interview on USAFTAWC/D(MS Tactical AU Warfm Interview Questionnaire, all other interviews on this same form. 

5. No interview form. 
372 
Appendix 8-B 

AOR Maintenance Population Analysis 

This appendix describes the process used to compare the actual 

number of Air Force maintenance personnel in the Central Command AOR 

with the number that should have been expected. 

Figure 74 illustrates the overall process. Four separate sources of 

data were merged. They are: 

1. Bases and aircraft. Data are from the Air Order of Battle, 

Table 10 in the Statistical Compendium. 

2. Maintenance Beddown. Data are as presented in Table 41 of this 

chapter. 

3. Actual personnel. Data were obtained from the Air Force 

Wartime Manpower and Personnel Team (AFWMPRT) Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm Electronic Database (S). Specialty codes 

included within maintenance are officer: 4024, 4054, 401 6, 

4096; enlisted: 391XX. 392XX, 41 lXX, 452XX, 454XX. 455XX. 

456XX, 457XX. 458XX. 

4. Planned personnel. Data were built up by essentially the same 

process a unit following normal procedures would have used; 

i.e., the numbers result from determining how many aircraft were 

to be supported and if intermediate-level maintenance were to be 

collocated. On the basis of this information, the proper unit type 

codes were then selected. Sources of information were the USAF 

War and Mobilization Plan, Volume 3, Part 1, Combat Forces 

(WMP-3). 1 July 1987; MEFPAK Summary Report: UTC Movement 

Characteristics, 30 Sep 1992; and the AFlMOX AF MANFOR Detail 

Listing, 2 Jan 1992. 

Table 41 shows the detailed analysis. The left columns are the base 

names, type of aircraft, and Air Order of Battle on 1 Oct '90, 1 Nov 90, 

1 Jan 91, and 1 Feb 91. 

373 
The next three columns to the right are the actual personnel counts 

on 15 Sep 90, 15 Jan 91, and 15 Feb 91. As explained in the main body 

of this chapter, the data come from Deployment Manning Documents 

(DMDS) which are normally requirement documents, not personnel 

accounting documents. In this case, they are taken as accounting 

documents, since AFWMPRT indicated that the requirements were 

established from the actual counts of personnel in the theater. 

The next columns to the right indicate whether avionics and 

maintenance were collocated with the aircraft. The next eight columns 

show how the "expected" number of personnel was derived. As indicated 

at the bottom of the table, the number of aircraft on station as of 

1 February 91 is the basis for this build-up. There are two sets of 

determinations; the first set is the aviation packages and the second set 

the intermediate-level maintenance packages. Aviation packages are 

intended to deploy immediately with the aircraft. 

The right-most columns show the calculations of persons per aircraft 

(as of 15 Jan 91) and spaces per aircraft (as of 1 Feb 1991). Persons 

means actual count. Spaces means expected number of personnel. 

Figure 74 

Maintenance Footprint Analysis 

J 

Actual Planned 

Message Planning Data 

374 
Table 41 

Calculation of Expected Number of Maintenance Personnel 

Air Order of Battle 

Base Aircraft 1 Oct 1 Nov 1 Jan 1 Feb 

Abu Dhabi 

Abu Dhabi Total 

Bateen 

Bateen Total 

Dhahran 

Dhahran Total 

Doha 

Doha Total 

Shaikh Isa 

Shaikh Isa Total 

Khamis Mushait 

KC-135 

C-130 

C-29 

EC- 130H 

F-15C 

F-16C 

RF-4G 

w4c 

F-Il7A 

Khamis Mushait Total 

Sharjah C- 130 

EC- 130E 

Sharjah Total 

Tabuk F- 15C 

Tabuk Total 

All Bases in Sample 

16 

5 

21 

48 

48 

24 

24 

36 

36 

18 

18 

16 

6 

22 

24 

24 

193 

16 

1 

5 

22 

48 

48 

24 

24 

36 

36 

18 

18 

16 

16 

24 

24 

188 

16 

5 

21 

48 

48 

24 

24 

48 

6 

54 

36 

36 

16 

16 

24 

24 

223 

10 

10 

16 

8 

24 

48 

48 

25 

25 

49 

18 

67 

42 

42 

16 

16 

24 

24 

256 

375 
Table 41 (Continued) 

Calculation of Expected Number of Maintenance Personnel 

Actual Maintenance Personnel 

Aircraft 15 Sep 15Jan 15 Feb 

Abu Dhabi KC-135 

Abu Dhabi Total 5 226 226 

Bateen 

Bateen Total 

C- 130 

C-29 

EC- 130H 

Dhahran F- 15C 

Dhahran Total 

Doha F-16C 

Doha Total 

Shaikh Isa RF-4G 

RF-4c 

Shaikh Isa Total 

Khamis Mushait F-117A 

Khamis Mushait Total 

Sharjah C- 130 

EC- 130E 

Sharjah Total 

Tabuk F- 15C 

Tabuk Total 

All Bases in Sample 

509 367 378 

911 836 840 

317 334 344 

317 334 344 

622 1106 679 

222 463 258 

523 310 373 

408 360 370 

408 360 370 

3517 4002 3468 

376 
Table 41 (Continued) 

Calculation of Expected Number of Maintenance Personnel 

Collocated Maintenance 

ILM Allies 

Base Aircraft Avionics Engine 

Abu Dhabi 

Abu Dhabi Total 

Bateen 

Bateen Total 

Dhahran 

Dhahran Total 

Doha 

Doha Total 

Shaikh Isa 

Shaikh Isa Total 

Khamis Mushait 

KC- 135 no no 

C- 130 no no 

C-29 

EC- 130H 

F-15C Yes Yes F-lSC/D, A-4, 

Toronado 

F-16C no no CF- 18 

RF-4G Yes Yes F-15C, F-SW 

RF-4C 

F-117A Yes no 

Khamis Mushait Total 

Sharjah C- 130 

EC- 130E 

Sharjah Total no no 

Tabuk F- 15C Yes no 

Tabuk Total 

All Bases in Sample 

377 
Table 41 (Continued) 

Calculation of Expected Number of Maintenance Personnel 

MaInte~nce Spaces 

Calculated from UTCa UTCS 

BW Aircraft UE Aviation Spaccs Unit ILM Spaces Total 

Baw Pkg p4l spaAbu Dhabi KC-I 35 10 

Abu Dhabl Total 10 

Bateen C- 1 30E 16 

EC-I30H(CC) 4 

EC-I30H(CC) 4 

Bateen Total 

Dhahran F- 15C 

F- 15C 

Dhahrnn Total 

Doha F-16C 

Doha Total 

Shaikh Isa RF-4G 

Follow-on 

RF-4G 

RF-4G 

F-4C 

F-4C 

F-4C 

F-4C 

Shaikh Isa Total 

Khamis Mushait F-117 

F-117 

Khamis Mushait Total 

Sharjah C- 13OE 

C-l30E 

Sharjah Total 

Tabuk F- 15C 

F- I5C 

F-15C 

Tabuk Total 

All Bases in Sample 

24 

24 

24 

48 

24 

1 

25 

24 

6 

12 

6 

6 

6 

6 

66 

18 

18 

6 

42 

8 

8 

16 

10 

12 

2 

24 

255 

3YCAE 359 

3NCCA 253 

3DCAK 128 

3DCAK 128 

509 

3FQm 414 

3FQDc 474 

948 

3FKLI 354 

Pro-ram 15 

369 

3FSG 1 314 

3FSG2 154 

3RTEN (18 302 

ue) 

In 3RTEN 

3FSGT 163 

3FSGT 1 63 

3FGST 163 

3FSGT 1 63 

1422 

3FATA 266 

3FATA 266 

Pro-ram 94 

626 

3NCU 154 

3NCU 154 

308 

3FQDH 161 

BFQDH 161 

Pro-ram 31 

353 

4894 

SOTAS 

41Ecs 

41ECS 

7ITFS HFAZB 

71TFS HFAZB 

SITFS HFAZI 

SITFS 

152TRG HFASB 

67TRW 

52TFW 

52TFW 

52TFW 

52TFW 

415TFS HFAJA 

415TFS HFAJA 

63TAS 

Niagra Falls 

58TFS 

58TFS 

359 

359 

253 

128 

128 

509 

524 998 

566 1040 

1090 2038 

354 

15 

369 

74 388 

1 -54 

45 341 

IN 3RTEN 

119 

16 

16 

32 

0 

0 

1241 

163 

163 

163 

163 

1541 

282 

282 

94 

658 

154 

154 

308 

188 

188 

31 

407 

6189 

37 8 
Table 41 (Continued) 

Calculation of Expected Number of Maintenance Personnel 

RATIOS Out of AOR 

Persons/ Spaces ILM 

Alradt+ Aircraft UTC SPS22.6 35.90 

15.81 

32.00 

32.00 

15.29 21.21 

17.42 42.46 

14.75 

15.00 

1336 14.76 

16.17 

57.83 

27.17 

HFKBB 65 

HFKBC 18 

HFKAB 112 

HFKAC 39 

234 

WDAL 244 

HEDDB 39 

HEDDB 39 

322 

HFAHJ 92 

92 

27.17 

27.17 

27.17 

16.51 2335 

15.67 

15.67 

15.67 

11.02 15.67 

19.25 HFAHJ 92 

19.25 HFAHJ 92 

1938 19.25 184 

18.80 HFAZK 27 

15.67 HFAZK 27 

15.50 

15.00 16.96 54 

15.63 24.27 886 

* Number of personnel aq of 15 Jan 1991. number of aircraft as of 1 Feb 1991. 

379 
3 80 
9 

Logistics Performance 

Basic airpower combat effectiveness in the Gulf War is addressed in 

the GWAPS Effects and Effectiveness report; this chapter discusses an 

essential component of overall effectiveness-logistics performance. Some 

of the most obvious performance measures, such as mission-capable rates, 

are at best intermediate and partial indicators. What does it mean, for 

example, if maintenance and supply create a mission-capable aircraft but 

munitions is unable to provide the correct ordnance? Beyond this obvious sort of consideration, operations requirements are, as noted in chapter 

2 of this report, partly determined by expectations of what logistics is 

expected to be able to do-hence the visible requirement may not be the 

“real” requirement. In addition, a number of measures, including mission 

capability, inevitably involve a “who gets the blame” component-which 

can foster a natural tendency toward “gaming” reported results. And 

finally, as documented in earlier chapters of this report, the available data 

are fragmented and of sometimes questionable accuracy. 

No final resolution exists for these kinds of concerns; ambiguity is 

inevitable, even when hard numbers are available. However, a provisional 

picture can be drawn by establishing an evaluation framework and then, 

within the framework, attempting to shed some light on achieved performance. The 4-levels-of-war schema described in the Effects and Efsectiveness report provides a useful framework (Table 42).’ The following 

pages address logistics performance in the context of the operational and 

strategic levels of war as presented in the figure. They first discuss the 

operational level of logistics, review the strategic level, and then integrate 

performance indicators with cross-functional trends to create an underThis schema is also consistent with proposed joint logistics doctrine. Joint Test Pub 

4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations. June 1990. p 1-1. The “test” 

publication promulgates the proposed doctrine. 

I 

38 1 
standing of logistics performance during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

The chapter ends with a broader look at the role of logistics? 

Table 42 

Levels of War 

~ ~~~~~~ 

Political: Decisions and Actions that set war objectives and overall 

conflict parameters. 

Strategic: Decisions, actions, and efforts bearing directly on the 

achievement of war aims. 

Operational: Decisions, actions, and efforts focused on the orchestration of campaigns and operations, i.e., the CINC's view. 

Tactical: Decisions, actions, and efforts concerning how to plan or 

execute particular sorties, flights, missions, and mission packages. 

Operational Logistics Performance 

To what extent did logistics satisfy the operational requirements of 

the Gulf conflict and when did it not? To answer those questions this 

section examines the performances of intertheater airlift, air refueling, 

intratheater airlift, munitions, supply, and air maintenance components. 

Intertheater Airlgt 

With regard to intertheater airlift, the basic questions are: What did 

the Commander-in-Chief Central Command (CINCCENT) ask for? And did 

the combination of airlift and sealift get it there when it was supposed to 

be there? CINCCENT initially directed deployment of a force package 

consisting of an Army Corps, a Marine Division, three carrier battle 

groups, the 1st Tactical Air Command (TAC) Fighter Wing, and twelve 

follow-on fighter squadrons. The 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (TW) was 

first priority; all others were unprioritized, and desired closure dates were 

'In general, this chapter relies on evidence already cited in earlier chapters. For this 

reason, redundant footnotes are avoided, and citations are limited to corroborating evidence, summary data from other sources, and other information not previously provided. 

382 
not established. The emphasis, however, was get it there, and get it there 

now. This cumulative movement requirement represented an airlift 

demand six to seven times normal capability. The requirement was 

quickly recalculated, but continued to change rapidly as the perceived 

threat situation ~hanged.~ Thus, a realistic view is that requirements 

matched capability rather than capability matched requirements. However, the issue is more complicated, since the provided airlift was constrained by a combination of self-imposed limits (i.e., the timing and 

extent of Reserve call-up and Civil Reserve Air Fleet activation), limited 

number of off-load locations in the area-of-responsibility (AOR), and 

nearly useless automated information systems. 

Air Refueling 

Air refueling was provided on demand and was available with few 

exceptions when and as needed. Operationally, there were two primary 

efforts: refueling during deployment and combat sortie refueling in the 

AOR. An increased tempo of Tanker Task Force activity on a grand scale 

characterized the deployment; however, a furious level of coordination 

was required to marry tankers and receivers while simultaneously acquiring beddown and overflight rights for the deployment route structure. 

Also, a constant tug of war took place between Strategic Air Command 

(SAC) and Military Airlift Command (MAC) for control of the refueling 

and cargo-capable KC- 10. 

Within the AOR, the availability of air space was the single greatest 

limiting factor affecting air refueling. During the heaviest flying period 

in Desert Storm, virtually no airspace was available for additional refueling tracks. Generally, setting the available number of tanker sorties at 

300 per day satisfied a demand for fuel centered on 270-380 sorties per 

day throughout Desert Storm. Even so, there were more than four receivers for every boom or drogue in the air at any time. Early in the air 

campaign, after a series of weather days, planning requests for refueling 

actually exceeded that number. The imbalance between tankers and 

receivers was resolved by modifying the size and number of strike packages. Then, as the Tactical Air Control Center gained more experience, 

planning, coordinating, and controlling air refueling became routine. 

Clayton H. Snedeker, Operation Desert Shield-Desert Slorm: The Vernon J. Kondra 3 

Notes, 24 August - 31 May 1991, April 1992, p 2. 

383 
Intratheater Aid@ 

In phase I of Desert Shield, CINCCENT requested and received 6 

squadrons of C-130s as intratheater airlift. A seventh squadron was 

considered but not ordered up because a beddown site was unavailable. 

In phase 11, 3 more squadrons plus 6 aircraft from the Republic of Korea 

deployed for a total of 149 aircraft. All of the aircraft requested were 

provided. C-130 performance is usually measured in utilization (UTE) 

rate-the number of sorties per day. Utilization was overall less than 

expected for wartime (3.71 sorties per day in Desert Shield and 3.42 

during Desert Storm versus the wartime planning factor of 4.0). The 

difference is easily understood. First, the Southwest Asia (SWA) theater 

was quite large; flying time from Riyadh to Tabuk, for example, was over 

5 hours. Additionally, 35 of the assigned C-130s were withheld for 

potential air evacuation of casualties daring Desert Storm, and those 

35 aircraft are included when calculating overall UTE rate. The most 

intense test of intratheater lift occurred during the “Hail Mary” movement 

of XVIII Airborne Corps before the ground war. In that 14-day period, 

C-130s flew over 8 sorties per day-twice the wartime planning factor. 

With regard to munitions, the evidence indicates that all missions 

requiring armament received it when they needed it. Not all missions 

received the munitions they preferred however. In particular, CBU 87/89s, 

Paveway 11, and GBU 27 munitions were in short supply and rationed. 

Management of munitions was not much different from that of previous 

wars-it was done manually. 

After a year’s worth of fairly scrupulous research into the available 

historical record, the authors found very limited evidence of sorties lost due 

to supply. The very low total for non-mission-capable supply (TNMCS) 

rates tends to corroborate exceptional supply performance. In the process 

of achieving this performance, however, supply revamped its planned use 

of the Combat Supply System and Standard Base Supply System, substituting the Air Force, Central Command (CENTAF) Supply Support Agency in 

their place. Problem items, including chemical gear, Halon, and personal 

weapons, could have had a serious impact had the war taken a different 

turn. Further, the excellent supply performance did not always extend to 

support of communications equipment, Harvest sets, and other airbase 

functions. But the bottom line is that supply produced sorties. 

384 
In general, and with the exception of C-5 aircraft, the evidence indicates that maintenance also produced the sorties requested. The detailed 

narratives indicate that when sorties were lost, it was because of ground 

and air aborts rather than non-mission-capable aircraft? At that, abort 

rates, during Desert Shield, were about the same as in peacetime and only 

slightly higher in Desert Storm.’ Additionally, mission-capability rates 

were generally excellent, even if they were about the same as in peacetime, rather than better. Although battle damage rates were very low, 

overall battle damage repair rates were consistent with expectations of the 

Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) program. 

With the possible exception of intertheater airlift performance, then, 

logistics performance required was provided, and provided when it was 

needed. As for intertheater airlift, a firm set of requirements against 

which performance can be measured did not exist. 

Strategic Logistics Performance 

How “stretched” was logistics? Where were the long and short poles 

in the logistics tent? Where was their margin and how much? And how 

much reserve capability remained to fight an extended war or even another war? 

Viewed from a more strategic perspective, a conclusion that intertheater airlift did not produce would make even less sense because its full 

capability was not exercised. First, Civil Reserve Air Fleet Stage I11 was 

never activated, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet Stage I1 was only partly 

utilized (an overage of only fifteen commercial aircraft were needed and 

tasked per day6). Reserves were not called up until 22 August (and even 

then, only partial maintenance skills were included). An average of sixty 

C-141 and fifteen C-5 aircraft were withheld each day for support of 

missions other than the Gulf War. Thus, despite the fact that the Gulf 

War airlift dwarfed the Vietnam and Berlin airlifts in numbers, it did it 

with reserve capacity. 

4As an example: Ltr, CoI Ralph J. Templin, 363 TFW(P)/DCM to AFILEYILEYM, subj: 

’Tactical Air Command, Desert Shield Desert Storm Logistics Data (Langley AFB, 

6MAC History, Appendix 7. 

The war from an F-16 maintenance perspective, nd. 

VA: TAULGP, Sep 1991), pp A-9 and A-10. 

385 
As was true for intertheater airlift, only part of the then-existing 

refueling capability was committed to the Gulf War; sixty-six percent of 

the KC-135 and nineteen percent of KC-10 tankers were withheld to 

support the Single Integrated Operations Plan (Slop) and other normal 

mission requirements. Further, both KC-I 35 and KC- I0 aircraft were 

used for intertheater lift. Beyond that, it is not at all clear whether committing more tankers to Desert Storm would have been productive. A 

small but persistent pattern of tankers dumping fuel in order to land can 

be detected, an indication that more fuel was available in the sky over the 

AOR than could be used. The question is: Was this an indication of an 

absolute excess of capacity? Or was it an indication of inability to match 

tankers and receivers? The answer appears to be a combination of both. 

The maximum number of C-130s deployed to the theater occurred 

during Desert Storm when the 149 aircraft mentioned earlier were in the 

AOR. As much airlift capability as this represents (154,OOO short tons and 

184,000 passengers during Desert Storm), 149 C-130s made up only onethird of the Air Force C-130 fleet-two thirds of the fleet were either 

uncommitted or reserved for other missions.' It must be concluded that 

a robust capability was available to expand intratheater airlift and to 

handle more logistics activities on the ground if needed. 

Munitions 

During Desert Storm, 69,000 short tons of ammunition were dropped 

on the enemy. A much larger total of 349,000 short tons were shipped 

by sea and air by the time hostilities ended, although most of the difference represented munitions still in the sealift pipeline. It must be concluded that there was a robust capability to have extended the war beyond 

28 February if the need had arisen-although the amount of additional 

armament varied by type. Figure 75 shows the amount of munitions in 

the AOR in August 1990, at the time Desert Storm began, and at the end 

of Desert Storm. It also shows the percentages of stocks that would have 

been consumed had the conflict continued for an additional 60 or 120 

days with the same rates of consumption. 

'All but one squadron of the active C-130 force was in the AOR. The other twothirds of the fleet were in the Reserves. 

386 
Figure 75 

Munitions Posture 

AS OF: 4 MAR 91 

Earlier, this chapter noted that scant evidence was found of sorties 

having been lost because supplies were unavailable. The reasons for this 

level of success also indicate supply’s capability to have supported the 

conflict at higher levels or under different circumstances. First, the War 

Readiness Spares Kits deployed to the theater had been originally sized 

on the assumption that there would be no resupply and very limited 

intermediate maintenance for the first thirty days; however, resupply 

began almost immediately and intermediate maintenance was available. 

Hence, an interruption in supply would actually have been as planned, 

rather than a serious problem. Second, worldwide resources were available to the war effort, and the combination of supply information systems 

with Desert Express demonstrated a reliable capability to satisfy missioncritical-parts requirements by moving the resources to the user in three or 

four days. Since most valuable supplies (and also the components most 

likely to ground an aircraft) were repairable rather than consumable, the 

question then concerns supply’s capability to provide parts for repair and 

maintenance’s ability to accomplish that repair. 

387 
What was maintenance’s reserve capability? The evidence (except 

that involving the C-5) is reasonably convincing that the operational 

tempo required less than maintenance’s full capability at all three levels: 

organizational, intermediate, and depothdustrial. Although the evidence 

at the organizational level is fragmentary as indicated earlier, it is fairly 

conclusive for intermediate maintenance and depot levels. For the intermediate level in the AOR, for example, one avionics shop per wing was 

deployed to the AOR as compared to the planned one per squadron.* 

Although direct evidence of the intermediate workload at U.S. Air Force 

Europe avionics shops has not been uncovered, there is a basis for concluding that engine shops were underutilized. Depot-level capability was 

clearly in excess of that demanded. The depot was able to accelerate 

program depot maintenance beyond operation’s requirements and needed 

to implement only selective surging of repairables. 

What Does this all Mean? 

The final values for the measures of merit applied to each logistics 

functional area are without question positive (and would hardly be credible 

otherwise-we won the war). Was all an unalloyed success? Hardly. At 

levels of detail below the macro measures described above, a combination 

of successes and serious problems appear in at least five areas: precrisis 

preparation, precrisis planning, precrisis training (especially to create a 

combat-experienced nucleus), logistics command and control, and improvisation. Each is summarized below: 

Precrisis preparation was one of the most important factors underlying 

the success achieved in the Gulf War. Prepositioning, for example, saved 

the equivalent of over 3,400 strategic airlift sorties for Air Forcerelated equipment alone and more than 10,OOO sorties overall. The importance of this prepositioning can be grasped by noting that the total 

number of intertheater airlift missions during the phase 1 deployment was 

only one half the later number. Prepositioned munitions tonnage equalled 

approximately one-half of the amount dropped on targets. Supply preparation, focused as it was on a central European war, was a robust source 

of repairables and consumables for the Gulf conflict. In fact, U.S. air 

‘In addition, however, the peak maintenance manpower requirements in the AOR 

never exceeded 16 percent of total active duty Air Force Maintenance manning, and a full 

call-up of reserve maintenance personnel was not exercised. 

388 
power, motivated as it was in general by a central European conflict, 

entailed an across-the-board level of preparation that was much more than 

adequate to satisfy the demands of the Gulf War. The allied contribution 

of fuels, subsistence, vehicles, and construction equipment further enhanced the already favorable predeployment supply situation. 

Chapters 2 and 3 made the points that deliberate, detailed TPFDD-level 

planning for a war in SWA did not yet exist in August 1990, that JOPES 

was immature, and that there was not enough time to set up, load, and 

schedule missions using the flow generation (FLOGEN) model. These 

circumstances are fact, but to then conclude that all would have been well 

with a complete TPFDD, a mature JOPES, and time to run FLOGEN is a 

mistake because the hidden assumption is that an adversary, allies, and 

even weather would follow the planned script. In how many wars does 

that occur? As it happens, unrealistic assumptions extended well beyond 

JOPES and FLOGEN. Unrealistic assumptions, planned capabilities that did 

not materialize, and providential capabilities already in place led to a 

series of improvisations during the conflict. Some have been touted with 

good reason as successful innovations; they can be viewed alternatively 

as necessary workarounds (Table 43). 

No single thread ties all of the improvisations together, but two 

themes-unrealistic prior planning assumptions and an inflexible command 

and control apparatus that stumbled in the face of change-dominate. 

These themes did not originate with the Gulf conflict and may be as old 

as war itself? In fairness to the “unrealistic” planners and architects of 

“inflexible” command and control systems, such themes are a lot easier 

’Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Paiton (New 

York Cambridge University Press, 1977). pp 202-21 I. Van Creveld goes further to state 

that there does not appear to be any clear connection between amount of prior preparation 

and success or failure. 

389 
Table 43 

Major Logistics Improvisations 

Improvisation 

Desert Express 

CENTAF Supply Support Agency 

(CSSA) 

CENTAF Rear to Langley 

Blue Ball Express 

Air Force Logistics Information file (AFLIF) 

Intermediate-level maintenance 

(ILM) in Europe and Pacific 

MAC Requirements Augmentees 

Manual tracking of munitions 

Successful Innovation because: Workaround toh

Users loved it. Hi h priority response-reduced time for delivery bm as much as 2 weeks to 3 

days. in-transit visibility

Fast. effective ability to perceive need for and 

source critical parts. 

Took advantage of in-place, knowledgeable capability. forward an creatin

Got the stuff moving from ports to in-theater 

bases. 

Linked transportation and supply together to 

orovide intenheater in-transit visibility. 

“Broken” priority s

ment requests as eq

Combat Su ply Sy

ty; out-of-8ate. unu

terns. 

Impossibilit~ of ~

lY. 

Army inability to m

tail kept assets in th

Lost track of parts 

transpornon s ste

requisition nu&, 

transportation contr

Limitations on setti

posed on populatio

10PEs.and Ixo!3EN 

Abxnce of an insti

Took advantage of in-place, mature technical 

capability. 

Not an innovation, reversion to manual meth- odS. changmg rcquueme

Not an innovation, reversion to traditional 

methods. 
to detect in retrospect. Why, however, did they not impact the outcome? 

The answer is: a superb resource base plus five and one-half months to 

get ready. Unfortunately, the resource base that made the difference is 

currently being reduced; future wars may or may not be preceded by 

nearly six months in which to prepare. The potential outcome with a 

different mix of resources and time deserves consideration. 

A Longer View of Logistics Performance 

To this point, the context for logistics performance has been the Gulf 

War. Lessons worth noting may apply to other contexts. The following 

brief history of logistics may give the reader a longer view of logistics 

performance. 

Historically, airpower logistics has been concerned with lines of 

communication-described eloquently, if colloquially, as the logistics 

“tail.” The problems with picking up a base (the tail) and moving it 

across an Ocean were clearly evident in the Gulf War. Perhaps not every 

reader will recognize that this tail is largely an invention of the present 

century. In fact, before the end of the 18OOs, a moving armed force was 

easier to support than one that was stationary because support mostly 

meant providing food. Food was obtained through organized plunder of 

the land over which an army travelled, and a fixed army quickly stripped 

the land clean.” The advent of WW 1’s heavy armament and the munitions and fuels signaled a change. Before WW I, food made up the bulk 

of supplies provided; ammunition was only a minor part. By the end of 

WW 11, food accounted for less than twelve percent of supplies. Before 

WW I, an army had to keep moving. Afterwards, armies (and air forces) 

had difficulty moving. The relevance of this change is that the logistics 

tail became a fundamental limitation of air power: Air power can move 

forward and be sustained no faster than its lines of communication can 

supply and support it. To quote Hoffman Nickerson: “Airpower is a 

thunderbolt, launched from an eggshell, invisibly tethered to a base 

(emphasis added).”” 

The experience of the Gulf War suggests that another change is 

underway, a change with the potential for once again reshaping the 

logistics tail. In the World War I1 Normandy Invasion, in the Vietnam 

“Supplying War, pp 232-233. 

I1 Arms and Policy, in W. Thomas McDaniel, Jr., Logistics in High Intensity War 

(pre-publication draft), (Washington. DC: National Defense University Press, 1991), p 47. 

39 1 
conflict, and in the Gulf War, supplies initially moved forward by means 

of what is sometimes called a “push” system.’* Rather than waiting for 

units in theater to requisition (i.e., “pull”) supplies, the logistics system 

sent what it believed would be needed. In the Normandy Invasion, 

Vietnam, and the Gulf War, those in theater and in the rear quickly lost 

track of what was where because no effective process was available for 

accounting for or managing materiel as it moved forward. The solution 

was to send more and more, again and again-the logistics snowball. 

However, a remarkable change was evolving. In Normandy, visibility of 

supplies in transit was never really regained, except for the most basic 

commodities such as petroleum, oil, and lubricants and ammunition. In 

the Vietnam conflict, the forces in theater took three years (from 1965 to 

1968) to establish visibility over what they had and where it was. The 

factor that made it possible at all was the 1050-11 computer, introduced 

in the United States beginning in 1965 and then in Southeast Asia beginning in 1 967.j3 The equivalent period in the Gulf War was August 1990 

through early November 1990-roughly three months.14 The factor this 

time was the marriage of computer and instantaneous telecommunications, 

reified for Air Force logistics in the CENTAF Supply Support Agency, 

among other newly created enterprises. 

Both the popular press and other reports forming this study highlighted the importance of information to successful Gulf War operations. The 

same was true for logistics. The ongoing logistics changes, however are 

incomplete: visibility over what was in theater was established in three 

months, but visibility over items in transit was never fully established.” 

Neither were the information needs of maintenance, munitions, or fuels 

resolved.16 There are undoubtedly other examples. 

Supplying War, pp 202-215; Lt Col David C. Rutenberg. USAF, The Logistics of 

Waging War: American Logistics 1774-1985 Emphasizing the Development of Air Power 

(Gunter AFS: Air Force Logistics Management Center, ca 1984), pp 152-153. 

I2 

13Logistics of Waging War, pp 152-157. 

I4lt is difficult to pin down an exact date when visibility was constructively =tablished. Early November is consistent with the CENTAFILG’S after action report. See 

William W. Rider, After Action Report, pp 19-23. 

Capt Raymond T. Daly, Jr., Desert ShielaYDesert Storm Supply Lessons Learned 

(Gunter AFB, AL: Air Force Logistics Management Center, Mar 1992). p 8. There are 

other references to this problem scattered throughout our documentation. 

%apt James T. Silva, Desert Shield Maintenance Automation Needs (Cunter AFB, 

AL: Air Force Logistics Management Center, Jan 1992). 

1s 

392 
The change in warfighting that created the tail coincided with the 

change from an agrarian to an industrial economy, a shift usually marked 

at between 1900 and 1910 for the United State~.’~ Today’s ongoing 

logistics transformation is in the context of what is sometimes called a 

shift to a postindustrial or information society. Causative factors aside, 

the realized and potential influences on strategy and tactics are important. 

Pushing more and more supplies and people into a theater with the hope 

that if enough is pushed forward some will get where they belong is one 

solution to lack of knowledge of where things are and what is needed. 

It is the substitution of mass for knowledge, and we saw that take place 

in the Gulf conflict just as in previous conflicts. But we also saw the 

effective application of organizations, computers, and information systems 

to the knowledge problem accompanied by a considerable increase in the 

velocity with which a small number of high priority parts could be 

moved-Desert Express and European Express. Although we cannot prove 

it, we believe that a much smaller “tail” resulted than would have been 

the case otherwise. A smaller tail enables greater mobility, greater agility, and a change in vulnerability. Before, in-place supplies and people 

themselves were vulnerable. Now it is possible to have fewer of either 

in-place, and what is not there in the first place is obviously invulnerable. 

If better logistics information and faster transportation systems are substituted for mass, they become more vital, must be in place to be effective, 

and as a consequence become targets to be interdicted. 

While progress is being made to achieve more efficient and more 

effective logistics processes, it is evident that the logistics for the Gulf 

War was anything but a smooth operation. It is essential that logistics 

problems encountered be understood because the lessons learned can help 

those preparing for future wars, to the extent that future conflicts have 

features in common with the Gulf conflict. The authors would not suggest that all or even many of the problems and “friction” encountered in 

the Gulf War have solutions. The very fact that serious problems, such 

as overwhelming initial loss of control over deployed supplies, have 

occurred in every major US. campaign of this century argues persuasively for skepticism. At the same time, political, technological, and other 

forces at work have clearly ushered in significant change. Whether the 

logistics of war accommodates it, counters it, or simply goes along for 

the ride is yet to be known. Our task in this report was to create a 

framework to facilitate bringing the immutable and changing into focus. 

I7Dwight Waldo, The Study of Public Administrotion (New York: Random House, 

1955), p 19. 

393 
394 
Index 

A 

A4 186, 377 

A-6 147, 186 

A-7 186 

A-10 16, 21, 29.66.67, 123. 124, 

128, 167, 183-185, 201, 276, 308, 

310, 31 I, 320, 322, 323, 348, 352, 

362. 365-368, 385 

ABCCC 158, 155, 196, 375-378 

AC-130 29, 184, 185.368 

ACAS 165, 166 

ACE 213 

ad hoc 17, 168, 281. 327. 360 

AFCOMAC 244 

AFLC 38, 39,52, 61,99, 107, 164. 

350 

264,317, 319, 325, 341-344, 346, 

AFLIF 390 

AFR 45.95, 204, 261, 284.293 

AFSC 38, 52,82,90 

AFWMPRT 309, 357. 361,373, 374 

AGM-45 222 

AGM-65 222, 254 

AGM-88 222,230, 235 

AH-64 356, 368 

AIM-7 222. 225, 2.34, 258 

AIM-9 222,234 

air campaign 9,79,88, 149, 158, 

167. 195, 197.201, 206,207, 213. 

218.232, 237, 240, 241. 293, 299, 

383 

air defense 232,258 

air division 50, 126, 21 I, 332, 340 

Air Force Combat Ammunition Center 

11.244 

Air Force Human Systems Division 

325 

Air Force Logistics Command 28, 38, 

164.264. 269, 278. 317-319, 324, 

340.341, 343, 350 

177. 182,328,337 

Air Force Reserve 16.45, 87, 148, 

Air Force Special Operations 

Command 134-136. 343 

Air Force Systems Command 38, 216 

air interdiction 229 

Air Logistics Center (ALC) 39. 122, 

319. 322, 324, 325, 333, 338, 339, 

341-344, 371 

Air National Guard (ANG) 16, 39, 

45, 87, 148, 177. 182, 278, 328, 

337 

air order of battle 138, 373, 375 

air power 6. 11, 18. 24. 27, 58, 86. 

87, 115. 116, 138. 139. 168, 177, 

221, 261. 344, 357,389, 391, 392 

air refueling 8. 9. 19, 20, 101. 109. 

115, 122-124, 128, 136, 139, 175, 

177-179, 187-190, 193, 196, 198- 

201.203-218, 227. 259, 314. 315, 

332, 333, 340, 357. 371, 382-384 

air refueling squadron 175 

Air Rescue Wing 298 

Air Reserve Components 45, 50, 105, 

Air Staff 30, 299, 361 

air tasking order 153. 173, 205 

Air Transport International 44 

Airborne Warning and Control System 

aircraft availability 204 

aircraft battle damage repair 318-320, 

airfields 56, 86, 107. 114, 147. 148, 

Al Dhafra 125, 126. 187. 196. 218, 

ALC see Air Logistics Center 

Al Jaji AB, Iraq 245 

American Trans Air 44 

Andersen AFB, Guam 12, 129, 132, 

Andravida 189, 192 

139 

9, 158, 188 

323, 327, 385 

150-152, 156 

241, 276, 304, 3 16 

ALMSNSCD 17 I- 173 

194, 334, 358 

395 
ANG see also Air National Guard 

45, 87, 108, 134. 146, 148, 177, 

178, 185, 189, 191, 196, 203 

antiradiation missiles 222, 230 

APOD 150 

ARCENT 62-64. 163. 164, 285. 298, 

302 

area of operation 268 

area of responsibility 6. 7, 36, 81. 

141, 182, 221. 243, 262.307. 309, 

328 

AREFS 196 

armored cavalry regiment 46 

artillery 48 

ASM 325 

assumptions 387. 389, 11, 15, 22, 24. 

25, 54, 58, 261. 262. 289, 310, 322, 

387,389 

ATC 38, 91 

Atlantic bridge 123, 128, 189-194, 

201, 202 

AT0 see also air tasking order 153, 

157, 173, 201, 205, 207, 213, 214 

AUTODlN 127 

AVCAL 355 

Avian0 133 

AWACS 9,78, 158, 188, 206, 207, 

Aziz, King Abdul 37 

AV-8 128, 186, 194 

213-215 

B 

B-52 8, 29, 30, 38. 65. 128. 129, 

130. 132, 182, 183, 191. 193-195, 

197-199, 202, 203,204, 223, 229, 

230, 242, 265, 270, 278, 300, 333- 

335. 350,354 

bad weather 159, 207 

Bahrain 2, 39,47, 85, 111, 117, 156. 

Barksdale AFB, LA 126, 278, 296 

battle damage 21. 61, 318-320, 322. 

324,327,365,366,368,370, 385 

battlefield air interdiction 229 

179,287, 289, 290. 315 

beddown 2, 4, 8. 15, 20. 50, 51, 58, 

63, 68, 117-119, 124-126, 128, 129, 

133, 134, 136, 139, 142, 144-146, 

164, 165, 167, 193, 194-196, 226, 

230, 241, 265-267, 269, 272, 274. 

310-313, 361. 373, 383. 384 

289, 290. 292. 295, 298, 305, 

Berlin airlift 3, 22 

biological warfare 243 

BLU-I09 223, 244 

BLU-82 235, 247, 258 

Blueball Express 25, 144, 165, 167, 

Boeing 707, 177 

boomdrogue 209 

Boomer 159 

bridges 179, 189, 197 

briefing 81,97, 104, 112, 147, 150, 

153, 154, 159, 165, 180,217, 224, 

240,245, 251, 264. 277, 287, 302, 

309, 317, 318. 320. 321, 325, 332, 

333, 371 

168, 299, 303.390 

Brooks AFB, TX 325 

Buckingham, Frederic N. 89, 147 

Bull Rider 65, 66 

Bush, George 45, 1 15, 224 

C 

C-5 2 I, 23, 38, 44, 88-90, 92, 95. 97, 

98, 100-102, 104-106. 108, 109, 

134, 135, 147. 148. 150, 154, 184, 

185, 202, 242. 267. 268, 315, 316, 

385,386, 388 

112-114, 124. 125, 126, 131, 132, 

336-339, 344, 346, 348, 354, 357, 

(2-130 8, 10, 20, 22, 30, 89, 98, 106, 

110, 115, 125. 126, 132-135, 139, 

142, 144-147, 149, 153, 154. 155, 

156-160, 165, 167, 168, 184, 196, 

208, 239, 247. 250, 276, 279, 3 1 6, 

386 

89, 92, 95,97,99, 100, 101, 104, 

345, 348, 349, 354, 375-377, 384, 

C-141 5, 6, 17, 21, 44, 48, 49, 88, 
105, 106, 108-115, 124-126, 132, 

133, 134, 152, 153, 165, 169, 184, 

185, 194, 202, 226, 227, 242, 267, 

268, 296, 316, 328, 336, 337. 340, 

344, 345, 348-350.354, 357, 386 

C-21 30. 157. 167 

C-23B 155 

C-Day 120, 134 

C3 319 

Cairo East 182, 191 

Cairo West 112, 133. 151, 191, 196, 

218, 276 

CALCM 223 

Camel 151-153 

Camel Star 151 

Camp Darby 10,237 

CAMS 276, 309,322, 326, 346, 347 

Canada 182,200, 215 

cannibalization 28, 281, 33 I, 352, 

354,357 

CAP 25, 206, 357,390 

carrier 3, 4, 41. 43, 44, 83, 103, 104, 

116, 139, 156, 177, 182. 191, 205, 

211, 212. 218,249. 299, 351, 382 

carrier battle group 19, 82, 1 15, 382 

Caruana, Patrick P. 126, 188 

Castle AFB 132, 194 

casualties 20, 86, 160, 384 

CAT 84, 87, 88.90, 91, 97, 100, 

108, 111, 113-114, 115, 116, 139, 

104, 106, 107, 121 

242,245, 256, 257. 384 

CBU 20, 222, 225, 229-231, 234, 

CBU-52 222. 225. 234, 256 

CBU-58 222 

CBU-71 222 

CBU-87 222, 234, 245, 257 

CBU-89 222, 229, 230, 234, 257 

CEM 246 

CENTAF see also USCENTAF 5, 

10. 11, 13, 20, 25, 37, 45, 47, 50, 

51, 58-65, 89, 106. 117-121, 126, 

127. 133-137, 144, 145, 147, 148, 

150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 

164, 165, 167, 168, 182, 188, 196. 

221, 225, 226, 229, 230, 231, 233, 

236, 237, 239, 240-243, 247-249, 

260,265, 266, 269-282, 284, 289, 

290, 293-299, 305, 310, 318, 319, 

346, 348, 358, 360, 363, 384, 390. 

392 

CENTAF rear 11, 25, 120, 121, 233, 

243, 265, 266, 269, 271, 272, 274, 

277.390 

Command and USCENTCOM 4.5, 

CENTCOM see also Central 

50, 51, 56-58, 62, 64, 68. 74-77, 

80-84, 86-88, 96,99, 101. 102, 

111-113, 115, 117, 121, 122, 

127-130, 132, 142, 147, 148, 150, 

153. 158, 160, 163, 164,165, 168, 

188, 189, 224, 232, 247, 286, 287, 

291. 293, 295, 298, 301-303, 305 

Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 

centers of gravity 79 

Central Command see also 

159, 351 

CENTCOM 2, 4, 9, 12, 15, 19, 36, 

SO, 56, 58, 62, 65, 75. 81, 82, 115, 

163, 182, 187. 201, 224, 225, 249, 

250, 262, 265. 266, 269, 272, 285, 

382.384 

117, 134, 136, 142-144, 149, 156, 

291. 293, 295-297, 328, 357, 373, 

CF-18 215, 377 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 58, 

Charleston AFB, SC 108, 110, 194, 

chemical warfare 114 

chemicalibiological 74 

Cheney, Richard 81 

Chief of Naval Operations 40, 48, 

Chief of Staff 51, 65, 88.95, 96. 

126 

266. 279 

115. 156 

107. 147, 171, 230, 231, 244, 311, 

318. 328. 333, 334, 341, 356, 358, 

36 1 

397 
CINCCENT 5,20,41,58,64.76,82, 

83, 86, 87. 90, 99, 138, 165, 187, 

382, 384 

CINCMAC 

108. 110, 113, 114. 148. 171. 336, 

337,340 

43, 73, 88. 99-101, 103, 

CINCIRANS 51,73,74, 165 

civil reserve air fleet see also CRAF 

2,4, 19. 21, 42, 74, 76, 87, 107, 

147, 242, 383, 385 

close air support 239 

Coalition 1, 9, 14, 28. 85-87. 136, 

138, 150, 15 I, 158. 168, 177, 180, 

218. 221, 243, 250, 282. 283. 291, 

303 

Cold War 1, 36 

COMALF 51, 59.89, 107, 133, 147, 

combat air patrol 206 

combat service support 6, 79, 144, 

combat supply system 13. 20. 25. 60. 

combat support 1, 27. 28, 34, 38, 40, 

49, 62, 63, 79, 117. 120. 121, 175, 

197. 200, 287, 290 

combined effects munition 257 

command and control 8, 23, 25, 65, 

158, 171, 177, 197, 213, 240, 245, 

388. 389 

148, 150-154, 157-160, 171, 172 

156 

271-274, 281,284,384, 390 

74, 77, 87. 88, 101-104, 139, 147, 

composite wing 194, 331 

computers 60. 104, 239,271,278, 

Concord, CA 10,236, 237 

Congress 28,43,65. 224, 232 

Connie Kalitta 44 

Continental Airlines 44 

continental United States 1, 17, 41, 

81, 148, 182, 262, 266, 267, 272, 

286,300,309, 31 I, 363 

contingency plan 221. 343 

core automated maintenance system 

309, 322. 326. 346 

Coronet Warrior 66. 67 

327. 328, 393 

corps: 

VII 158, 159 

XVlll Airborne 8, 20, 149, 158, 

159, 384 

Corpus Christi Army Depot TX 317 

CPX 225 

CRAF see also civil reserve air fleet 

42-44, 87, 107, 108, 111, 113, 139, 

147, 148, 150. 160.242 

CRC 87 

crew ratio 197. 204 

crisis action team 87.91 

critical items 165 

css 60,284 

cw 66 

D 

D-Day 116 

Defense Fuel Supply Center 282. 

Defense Logistics Agency 39, 264. 

Defense Mapping Agency 289 

Delta Airlines 44 

Department of Defense 4, 28, 82. 

150. 224, 269 

deployment planning 120. 123, 126 

Desert Express 6. 12, 23, 24, 110, 

111. 113, 144, 152, 153. 194, 

279-281, 283, 336, 352, 388. 390, 

393 

19-21, 30, 40, 42, 44, 45. 47. 48, 

51, 65, 81-86, 88, 91-95, 97-99, 

101-107. 109, 111, 112. 114-136, 

139. 140-142, 144, 146, 147, 150, 

DCS 43-45, 51, 85 

286. 289, 29 1, 293 

278 

Desert Shield 1-3. 6-12. 14. 16, 17. 

151. 153. 155, 156, 159, 160, 162, 

189. 191, 194, 195, 197, 199. 202. 

164. 167, 168, 177-180, 182, 187. 

209. 212, 215, 216, 217-219. 221, 

223-227. 229, 230. 232, 233, 236, 

237. 239, 240. 241-244, 246, 

259-261, 263-269, 27 1-273, 277, 

398 
280, 282, 285-287.290. 291, 

294-296, 300-302, 307-3 10, 3 14- 

320, 326-328, 331, 333, 334, 336. 

340-349. 351-357, 361-363, 373, 

382, 383, 384,385, 392 

Desert ShieldStorm 6, 21, 105, 141, 

155, 263, 264, 277, 317, 319. 341, 

342, 356 

Desert Storm I, 3. 8-14, 16, 17, 

19-22, 28, 30, 37, 39.40, 48, 51. 

65. 68, 82, 84, 85, 86. 88, 92-95, 

97.98, 101, 103, 104. 106. 109, 

111-116, 120, 121, 126, 128, 130, 

134-139, 141. 144. 146, 150, 151, 

153, 155. 156, 159, 162, 164, 167. 

177-181, 196, 197-201, 206, 207, 

209, 210, 213-215. 218. 219. 

221-223.230.232, 233, 236, 237, 

239-248, 250, 251, 259-261, 263, 

267, 268. 271, 273, 277, 279, 280, 

282, 286, 287,290, 291, 295, 298, 

322. 324-328, 331,332, 333, 334, 

300, 302-305, 307-309, 3 14, 3 16, 

336, 337, 340, 341, 344-349, 351- 

357. 361-363, 373, 382-387, 392 

DFSC 286, 288, 293-295, 298, 299, 

303 

Dhahran 6, 12, 37, 59. 88, 100-102, 

107, 110-114. 117, 125, 134, 135. 

145, 151, 152, 154, 155, 188, 249, 

266, 268,276,290. 304, 311, 315, 

375-378 

DIA 245 

Diego Garcia 2, 36. 38. 46, 48, 60, 

75. 115. 127, 129, 130. 132, 188, 

194. 196, 223. 224, 229, 242, 286, 

287, 332-335, 349, 358 

Divisions: 

1st Marine Division 48 

826 Airborne 83,90,98 

DOC 45, SO, 51, 68, 171-173 

doctrine I, 18, 27, 34, 35, 40, 57, 59, 

DOD see also Department of Defense 

223, 224, 317, 322, 356, 381 

42,43, 114, 232 

Dover, DE 92, 98, 97, 99, 108- 1 I 1, 

Dyess AFB, TX 193 

266, 336, 338 

E 

E-2 369 

E-3 30, 158, 167. 183, 188, 215, 331, 

348, 352, 369 

E-8 167, 370, 371 

EA-6 186 

Eastern Airlines 44 

ECM 326 

ECS 175 

EDS 31, 39 

Eglin AFB, FL 68. 244. 249. 330 

Egypt 56. 85, 123, 156, 191, 196, 

215, 217, 298 

Eighth Air Force 189. 203, 278 

Eisenhower, Dwight D. 115, 116 

electronic warfare (EW) 116, 199. 

engineer 126, 249. 3 19 

EOD 249, 250 

EUCOM 56, 192, 236 

Europe 1. 14, 16. 23, 25, 27, 36, 37, 

40, SO, 89, 91, 92, 95, 96, 102, 104, 

108, 109. 113, 114, 119, 122. 188, 

189, 191. 192, 203, 224, 231, 233, 

237, 261, 264, 272, 285, 293. 300, 

361,363, 388, 390 

EC-130 167, 183-185. 331 

EF-II 1 29, 183. 184, 348, 353 

325, 327 

308-3 10. 328. 33 1-334, 341, 353, 

European Command 56, 192, 236 

Europan Express 12, 279, 280. 283, 

393 

exercises 27. 65-67, 80, 86, 122, 187, 

216 

explosives safety 241 

F 

F-4 28, 183, 184. 215, 352 

399 
F-4G 29, 123, 124, 128. 203, 276, 

314.316. 331. 348, 349, 351, 352 

F-5 369 

F-15 16. 27. 29, 66, 67, 97.98, 126, 

154, 167. 183-185. 197. 199, 206, 

215, 248, 276, 280. 283,308,315. 

319, 320, 348, 349. 350. 353. 369, 

370 

232, 245, 246, 315, 330,348, 353, 

369,370 

178, 183, 184. 185. 215, 226, 246, 

276, 308, 310, 315, 316, 332. 330. 

F-15E 28. 29, 125. 154. 197, 226, 

F-16 16, 21, 28, 29, 66, 67, 154, 167, 

331.346-349.351.353. 362, 385 

F-111 29, 183. 184, 245,320,348 

F-117 29, 30, 123, 128. 130, 183. 

202, 210, 211, 276, 310. 348, 351, 

354,378 

375-377 

facsimile 12 I, 3 10. 327. 346, 348, 

351 

Federal Express 44 

fire fighters 189 

F-117A 223, 225, 232, 246, 256, 

FMC 66, 67, 344, 345, 347-349, 355, 

356 

FMU-139 241, 248, 249 

FOL 149, 154,203 

FORSCOM 64 

FortBragg,NC 144 

France 2. 85. 179. 182. 189, 193, 200 

French Air Force 193 

FSS 40, 283 

fully mission capable 66. 344, 345, 

348, 349 

G 

GAO 68, 227, 232, 236, 237, 239, 

242,263, 270 

GAU-8 222 

GBU-I0 9, 223,225,234. 254 

GBU-12 223. 225, 235,255 

GBU-15 223, 235 

GBU-24 223, 255 

GBU-27 223, 225, 235, 256 

GBU-28 115,223, 235, 244-246, 258 

GCC 217 

GCI 199 

GDSS 102 

General Accounting Office 270, 317, 

George AFB, CA 84,123,124 

Germany 10, 85, 87, 113,203,204, 

Global Decision Support System 102 

global war 78, 80 

Greece 85, 131, 189. 192 

ground forces 15. 68. 100, 102. 286 

Guam 12, 16, 17, 129. 130, 132. 194, 

229, 243, 268,309. 334,363. 368 

Gulf of Oman 115. 196 

Gunter AFB, AL 239. 316, 326. 392 

318 

237,330 

H 

HARM 222,230 

Harvest Eagle 132, 144 

Harvest Falcon 45, 47, 60. 126. 144, 

167, 168 

HAS 18, 24, 28, 40, 48, 86, 129, 

194,218,263, 270, 273,279, 280, 

299,300, 308, 311. 316, 342, 356, 

358, 388, 391 

Hawaiian Airlines 44 

helicopters 16, 134, 155, 158, 247, 

309, 316, 317. 324, 363 

Hellenikon 131, 189, 192 

Hellfire 250 

Henry 37.66 

Henick 298 

Hickam AFB 194 

Hill AFB, UT 229, 247, 248, 330, 

HC-130 135. 184 

37 I 

HNS 46, 142-144, 164 

Holloman AFB 245 

Homer, Charles A. 81, 117, 120. 147, 

148, 221 

400 
hospital 40, 64 

host-nation support 64 

Hurghada, Egypt 156 

Hurlburt Field, FL 134 

Hussein see Saddam Hussein 

I 

1-2000 223. 235 

Imminent Thunder 21 2 

Incirlik 189, 192, 193, 300, 358 

Independence 115, 116 

infantry 48 

infrared 222, 223, 324 

infrastructure 56, 138, 148,282,303 

Institute for Defense Analyses 322 

interdiction 229 

intermediate maintenance 16, 22, 50, 

116, 308, 310, 311, 315, 336, 349. 

351, 356, 362, 363, 387, 388 

Internal Look 68.80 

interoperability 177, 218, 285 

IPDS 303 

Iran 58 

Israel 114 

Italy 10.46, 85. 114. 179, 189, 192, 

Ivory Justice 117, 187. 196 

193,201, 215, 237. 286,287 

J 

Jaguar 215, 217 

Japan 40. 114, 164, 194 

JCS see also Joint Chiefs of Staff 

45, 46, 57, 68. 83. 88, 128, 129. 

298, 333 

JDS 54-56 

Jeddah New 182, 188. 196, 298, 305 

JFACC see also Joint Force Air 

Joint Chiefs 40, 53, 57. 58, 68. 73, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 40, 53, 57, 58, 

187-189, 192, 196, 202, 217, 280, 

Component Commander 171 

83, 126, 187,280 

68. 73, 83. 126, 187, 280 

Joint deployment system 54, 56 

Joint Force Air Component 

Commander 147. 171 

joint logistics 18, 57. 381 

Joint Operations Planning and 

Execution System 24, 74 

Joint Operations Planning System 55 

Joint Staff 54.64.82, 217 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 52, 

Joint Task Force 77. 193.332 

Joint Task Force Middle East 77 

122, 127, 128, 389, 390 

53 

JOPES 24, 25.56, 82-84,90, 121, 

JOPS 55.56 

JP-5 15. 196. 218, 219. 285, 287, 

292, 299.300 

JPTS 15,285, 296 

JSCP 52.53 

JTF 193 

JTFME 77 

judge advocate 51 

Just Cause 3 

JP-8 218, 293, 300 

K 

KA-6 177, 186. 211 

Kaufman, Robert 42 

KC-10 8, 9, 22, 30, 107, 109-111. 

115 123. 126, 128, 129, 132, 167, 

177-181, 182, 183, 185, 187-189, 

191-194, 196. 197. 202-205, 208, 

209-211, 215, 296, 333, 349, 383. 

386 

129, 132, 177, 179, 180. 182, 183, 

KC-135 8, 9, 22, 30, 109, 117. 128, 

187-189, 191-193. 195, 197, 199, 

200,202-205,208,209, 211, 214, 

215, 231, 278, 333, 335, 337, 349, 

371, 375-378, 386 

KC-I35R 123, 129, 132. 177, 179, 

181, 182, 187, 189, 191-194, 196, 

210,211,333 

Khamis Mushait 298, 304, 375-378 

40 1 
King Fahd International Airport 134, 

304.31 1 

King Khalid Military City 37, I 11, 

114, 150-152, 154, 155, 196,276, 

297,298, 304, 360 

KTO 206 

Kuwait 43, 58, 68.78, 81, 86, 114. 

115-117, 131, 159, 160, 161, 179, 

187. 206. 230, 250, 285 

Kuwaiti Air Force 179 

L 

Lajes 36, 38. 75. 85, 123, 133, 189, 

191, 201, 358 

Langley AFB, VA 21, 25. 88, 97. 

98, 121-123, 210, 271, 273, 

275-278, 283, 290, 295,300, 327, 

346,385,390 

LANTIRN 324 

leadership 33, 243 

levels of war 18, 57. 381. 382 

LG 37, 60.61.66, 84, 106, 236, 243, 

260.272. 279, 280. 310, 319, 324, 

348, 392 

lines of communication 1, 2, 27. 34, 

36, 40.41, 59, 60. 63, 310, 314, 

332,391 

Little Rock AFB AK 133 

Log Base Charlie 159. 160 

logistics 1, 2, 5. 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 

19, 21, 23. 24, 25, 27, 28, 31. 32, 

36-40.49. 50, 51, 53, 57, 60-63, 

65.76, 80.82.86, 88.99, 101. 102, 

106, 110, 125, 126, 128. 129, 136, 

141, 146, 147. 154-157, 163, 164. 

167, 172, 177, 194, 203, 221, 229, 

233,237. 239, 241, 242, 244, 247, 

299,300, 301,307,308, 310, 311, 

340-348. 350, 351, 356, 358. 360. 

363. 371. 381, 382, 385, 386, 

260-264, 269, 270, 277-280, 282, 

316-320, 324-329, 332-336, 

388-393 

Logistics Readiness Center 172, 233, 

L€)TS 76 

LRC 50, 172, 229.233. 236, 304, 

324 

242,310 

M 

MI 17 222,225,229,234.242, 253 

MAC see also Military Airlift 

Command 3-5, 9, 21. 38, 43-45, 

51. 58, 59. 61, 63. 82-115, 117, 

121. 122, 126, 128, 132-135, 

139-142, 146-148. 151, 152, 154, 

155. 171, 172, 178, 180, 182, 184, 

188, 189, 191, 196, 202, 203, 226, 

284, 290,296, 300, 305.328, 336, 

337,340, 345, 348, 349, 352, 383, 

385, 390 

MAGTF 48 

mail 64, 99, 121, 151, 327 

maintenance data 326, 346 

maintenance manpower 23, 28, 388 

maintenance personnel 17. 23, 83, 

105. 108, 113. 116.307.309, 337, 

266-268, 272, 274, 277-279, 283, 

357-363, 373, 375-379, 388 

maintenance squadron 332 

Main 101. 103, 111, 142 

Major Commands (MAJCOMs) 

50,60, 151, 187, 249,272, 277, 

342 

Malpensa, Italy 189. 193 

MAP 144. 160. 195, 242 

MARCENT 65, 136. 137, 149, 161 

March AFB, CA 205,210 

Marine Corps 40, 48, 65, 87, 109, 

136. 149. 155, 156, 159, 177, 179, 

180, 182,201, 297, 317 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade 48 

Marine Expeditionary Force 48. 49, 

65 

marines 48, 110, 136, 151, 155, 156, 

160, 164, 194,211, 292 

maritime prepositioning ships 48 

402 
Marquez, Leo 11, 244 

Masirah, Oman 61. 106, 132. 144, 

MASS 277 

Maverick Missile 222, 230, 254 

Mffiuire AFB, NJ 85, 89, 108. 295, 

336 

MEB 46,48 

medical 62.76. 160, 169, 172. 195 

MEF 48 

146. 196,224, 276, 304 

MC-130 29, 135, 184, 185 

MH-53 16, 30. 134, 135, 167. 309, 

33 1-363 

MH-60 16.30. 167, 309, 363 

MHE 106, 107, 148. 154 

MICAP asset sourcing system 14, 60, 

277. 278. 281, 277 

Midway 355 

Mighty Express 203 

MILCON 75 

Military Airlift Command see also 

MAC 3, 17, 25, 42, 43. 45, 74. 87, 

88, 146. 147, 178,226, 266,267, 

293, 332, 336, 340, 343, 344, 346. 

349,352, 383 

military construction 75 

Military Sealift Command 41, 141, 

Ministry of Defense 37, 291 

Mirage 2000 187, 215. 217 

missiles 31, 76, 79, 114, 117, 187, 

291 

188, 222, 223, 225, 230, 250-252, 

254,371 

280,344, 345, 348,349 

mission capable 66, 104, 105. 260, 

mission support kits 11, 52, 261 

MJU-2 225 

MJU-7 225 

MK-20 223, 225, 230 

MK-82 222,223, 225, 226, 228, 234, 

242, 252 

MK-84 222,223,225, 234, 246, 253 

mobility 40, 42, 45, 46, 58. 60, 86, 

91, 110, 114, 138, 143, 261-265, 

285.286, 290, 295, 300. 305, 348, 

393 

mobility requirements study 45. 46 

mobilization 2. 27, 30, 54, 79, 261, 

293,297, 305, 373 

Mont de Marsan, France 189. 193 

Morbach, FRG 10, 237 

MPS 40.46,48 

MRR 207 

MSC 41 

munitions 1, 4, 9-1 1, 15. 20, 22, 25, 

28, 34, 35, 61. 62, 66, 76, 77, 

84-86,98, 125. 130, 135. 144, 150. 

1%. 164, 167-169.203, 221-227. 

229,230. 23 1-234.236-244, 

246-251, 257. 258,299. 381. 382, 

384,386, 387. 389-392 

munitions movement 10, 236. 237, 

munitions shipments 10. 237 

munitions storage 61, 223. 226, 227, 

Myrtle Beach. SC 289, 290. 329 

239 

238.240, 241. 250 

N 

National Defense Reserve Fleet 41, 

74 

NATO I, 27,40.41,46, 293 

naval 9.40. 48. 78.99, 111, 115. 

156, 159, 191, 205, 206, 211, 212, 

218, 221. 285. 290. 329, 351, 355 

Navy 285, 292. 299,300, 303, 3 16, 

351, 354. 356 

NAVCENT 65. 115, 116, 157 

navigation 158. 324 

NCA 79 

NDRF 41.74 

network 2, 37. 54, 59. 189 

Ninth Air Force 50. 274 

NMAC 207. 208 

NMCS 260, 279, 281, 345 

Norfolk Naval Air Station 99 

Norton AFB, CA 92 

403 
0 

OA-10 66, 348. 371 

offensive 86, 92, 144, 167, 197, 299 

offload bases 89, 102 

oil 40. 61. 79, 159, 187, 291, 294, 

Olsen, Thomas R. 117, 120, 126 

Oman 2. 10, 15. 38. 85. 115, 117, 

345, 392 

125, 132, 144, 163, 165, 179, 196, 

215,217, 223,224-226,230, 231, 

232,233, 239, 258, 272. 277, 

3 15,347 

OPDS 303 

operation plan 82, 182 

operational control 6 1, 128, 147, 148, 

187, 188. 193 

operational level 19, 381 

operations staff 104 

285-287, 289, 291. 298, 299, 314, 

OPLAN 47.53, 54, 58, 60-65, 82-84, 

90, 95. 127, 132, 141, 143, 182, 

188, 194. 230. 237. 270, 284, 286, 

291,293, 302, 310, 350-354, 361 

194, 291, 302 

OPLAN 1002-88 47.58, 127, 132, 

OPLAN 1002-90 58.64, 82, 83, 127, 

143, 230, 237, 270, 350, 352-354. 

361 

OPORD 95 

order of battle 138, 373, 375 

P 

Pacific bridge 132, 194 

Pacific Command 236 

Pan American World Airways 44 

Panama 37.42 

Patriot Missile 114 

Persian Gulf 28, 30, 79, 81, 82, 86, 

136, 138, 144, 150, 196,205, 206, 

224,232. 233, 237, 240, 299, 361 

90, 110, 111. 113-115, 117, 118, 

PGMs 223, 246, 255, 256 

phase I 20, 24, 86. 94, 108, 11 1, 

117-119, 122. 124, 128, 132. 133, 

134, 195, 271. 328, 384, 389 

123, 129. 133, 195, 271, 343, 384 

phase 11 86, 102, 111-113, 117-119, 

phase 111 271 

planning 1, 2.4-6. 8, 9, 11. 20. 

23-25, 27. 38, 41. 42, 49, 51-56, 

58, 63-65. 74, 79, 81-84, 87. 89, 

90,91, 104. 120-123, 126, 127, 

128, 129. 134, 138. 139. 140, 142, 

167. 168. 177, 179, 182. 188, 191, 

194. 202. 207, 211. 213, 219, 230, 

233, 237, 241. 262. 263.270, 

299,290, 292, 294, 295, 298, 309, 

343,361,364,383, 384, 388. 389 

271-273, 279. 289. 291. 293, 294, 

PM-SANG 39 

PMC 345 

PMEL 318 

POL 64, 286, 29 I, 292, 296. 298 

POMCUS 46 

Pope AFB, NC 98, 132, 144, 147 

population 25, 37, 57, 63, 309, 310, 

358,361,364,373, 390 

precision-guided munitions 9 

PREPO 46,225, 231 

President, US. 41, 43. 86, 108, 114, 

223,245 

presidential call-up 299 

PrimeBEEF 126 

priority system 24. 153. 154, 270, 

390 

Proven Force 30, 179, 193, 194, 264, 

274, 300. 328, 33 I, 332.348, 358 

Q 

Qatar 85, 298 

Queen Bee 315, 328-331, 341 

R 

R-9 Refueling Vehicles 15, 285 
R-14 Air Transportable Hydrant 

R&M 28,315,317 

racks 226 

RAF see also Royal Air Force 10. 

Refueling Systems I5 

12, 36, 39, 130, 131, 133, 135, 187, 

189, 191, 193, 242. 243, 268, 296. 

318, 329. 333-335 

RAF Alconbury 131. 133 

RAF Fairfield 12 

RAF Fairford 130, 242. 268, 333-335 

RAF Kemble 36. 39. 318 

RAF Mildenhall 187. 189, 191. 193, 

333 

Rafha 8, 158. 159 

RAND 66, 83, 86. 88, 91, 98, 99, 

102. 104, 106. 107, 121-125, 

129-133, 136, 343 

RC-135 9. 30, 115, 131, 167, 182, 

183, 188, 192, 196, 202, 206, 333 

readiness 3, 11, 12, 22, 27, 32, 41, 

51. 60, 65, 68, 73, 75. 107, 136, 

164, 172, 233, 242, 261,263, 268, 

283, 289, 309, 310, 333,336, 343, 

345, 352, 355, 357, 361,364. 387 

Ready Reserve Force 40, 41, 74, 76 

Reagan, ronald 224 

reconnaissance 8, 78, 126, 131, 177, 

Reconnaissance Wing 13 I, 2 10, 298 

reconstitution 167, 168 

recovery 96, 107. 151, 249 

Red Horse 250 

Red Sea 115, 191, 299 

refueling 1, 8, 9, 15. 19, 20, 22. 96, 

197, 210, 249, 298. 332 

101, 108. 109, 115, 122-124, 126, 

128, 136, 139, 150. 175, 177-180, 

182-191, 193, 194, 196, 197, 

198-201, 203-219, 227. 259, 285. 

286,290, 291, 294-296, 299, 300, 

311, 314, 315. 332, 333. 340, 357, 

360,371, 382. 383, 384, 386 

156,241, 308. 309,317, 328,333. 

345, 346, 348, 363 

reliability 6, 16, 17, 28, 98. 110, 154, 

reliability and maintainability 28, 

REMlS 346, 348 

Republican Guard 159 

reserve component 104, 106, 108, 

109, 178. 337 

reserves 21, 22, 43. 64. 79, 107. 108, 

121, 139, 160, 178. 204,385, 386 

resupply 22, 24, 28, 37, 41, 60, 62. 

63, 98.99, 130, 142. 150, 159, 204, 

284.294, 296-301, 305,336, 352. 

387 

retrograde 16, 282, 33 I, 338, 339 

RF-4C 120,276,331, 348,349, 

375-377 

Rhein-Main 85, 87, 88. 100, 108, 

113, 134 

Rivet Joint 131 

Rockeye 223, 225, 230 

Rosenbalm Aviation 44 

Ross, Bob 298 

Rota AB, Spain 192. 301 

Royal Air Force see also RAF 224, 

Royal Saudi Air Force 37, 117, 188, 

346. 348 

218.261-265.268, 279-281, 283. 

237.296 

318 

RR-170 225 

RRF 40.41, 74 

S 

S-3 186 

SAC see also Strategic Airlift 

Command 8, 11.51. 58-60, 65. 81. 

101. 109, 110, 115, 122, 123, 

126-132, 139, 151, 152, 178-180, 

182, 183, 187, 188, 189, 191-194, 

196, 197. 199, 201-205. 213, 215. 

216, 217, 218, 229, 230. 242, 265, 

268-270, 272, 277, 278, 283, 284, 

296, 300, 318, 328, 332-335, 348, 

349, 358, 360, 383 

319 

Sacramento Air Logistics Center, CA 

405 
Saddam Hussein 245 

SAM 350, 353,369 

SAMAREC 291. 293 

SANG 39 

SASC 75 

Saudi Air Force 37, 117. 188, 318 

Saudi Arabia 10, 15, 37, 56-58, 68, 

78, 81, 85, 88. 96, 117, 123, 126, 

182, 198, 200, 206, 207,210, 239, 

241, 245, 249, 250, 285, 289, 291. 

294,296299,302, 303. 315,317, 

324, 332 

131, 154-156, 159. 160. 164. 165, 

SBS 130 

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman 74,75,81, 

82, 117. 158, 159. 361 

Scud 114, 117, 197, 250 

sealift 15, 19, 22, 40-42, 45. 63, 74- 

76, 141, 150, 242, 285, 291. 296, 

297, 382, 386 

Sealift Readiness Program 41 

search and rescue 2 13 

Searock, Charles J. Jr., 51, 65, 

Secretary of Defense 42, 43, 113, 

Secretary of Transportation 41 

security 2, 10. 37, 53, 56, 189. 193, 

security police 189. 195 

Seymour Johnson AFB, NC 123, 125, 

SFW 246 

Sharp 159 

Shaw AFB, SC 50. 117, 125, 144, 

Sierra Army Depot 11, 244 

Sigonella, Sicily 85, 123, 192, 201 

slop 1.8,s 1,204,386 

SITREP 241 

SLOC 41.63, 142, 143 

SOCOM 134 

SOF 59, 134136, 185. 348 

software 84,325 

sortie length 355 

333-335 

130, 188, 217 

195, 224, 239 

289,290,330 

147. 289,293,330 

sortie rate 322 

SORTS 68, 73. 3 14 

Southeast Asia 36, 209, 392 

Southern Air Transport 44 

Spain 12, 29, 81, 85-88. 123, 130, 

189. 191, 192. 201-203, 242, 268, 

296, 300, 301, 332, 333, 335 

spare parts 1, 28. 31. 32, 65, 107, 

113. 116, 135.259, 264,318, 333, 

350.355 

222,247,250.314, 326, 327. 343 

134-136. 247, 343 

special operations 9.42. 134- 136, 

Special Operations Command 

Special Operations Squadron 314 

SPOT 12 

SRP 41 

STAMP 226. 227, 231 

Standard Base Supply System 13, 20, 

star 15I,152 

State Department 81, 187, 192.224 

Status of Forces Agreement 192 

STRAPP 226, 227, 231 

Strategic Air Command see also 

270, 273-275, 283, 309, 384 

SAC 8, 12. 16, 51, 59. 81. 101, 

123, 126, 128-132, 151, 177. 178, 

182, 199, 202, 229. 268-270, 272, 

318, 332-334, 336, 343, 383 

strategic level 381 

strategy 31. 42, 45, 74, 82, 393 

STRATFOR 60, 126, 128- 130, 188, 

197,213 

Sunny Point 10, 236, 237 

supply system 12, 13, 20, 25, 60, 66, 

210,262,267,270-275, 281, 283, 

284,309,349,384,390 

surface-to-air missile 187 

surge 41, 85.92, 105. 124. 249, 264, 

Surge Contingency Plan 343 

surge requirements 342, 343 

surgeon general 271 

surveillance and reconnaissance wing 

338, 341-343 

298 
sustainment 5, 41, 48, 55, 63, 80, 98, 

97.99, 112, 139. 156, 164. 166, 

167, 263 

SUU-30 225 

SWA 2, 20, 24, 27, 37, 40, SO, 53. 

54.75, 164, 237. 240, 296, 3 1 I, 

384, 389 

Switzerland 85 

T 

TAC see also Tactical Air Command 

16. 19, 21, 50. 51, 63, 64. 66, 97. 

182, 183, 188. 224, 225, 239, 242, 

245, 264, 265,272,277,278,283, 

98, 121-123, 130, 149, 151, 152. 

284, 290. 29 1, 295-297, 3 10. 

314317,324, 325,327-329, 346. 

348, 382, 385 

Tactical Air Command see also TAC 

12, 14. 16. 21, 25, SO, 64.98, 120, 

151, 182, 239, 265, 269, 273, 274, 

329, 336. 343, 346, 347,382, 385 

277, 280, 290, 295, 3 16, 3 18, 327- 

Tactical Air Control Center 171, 384 

Tactical Air Control System 17 1 

Tactical Air Warfare Center 244 

tactical aircraft 78, 310 

tactical control 193 

Tactical Fighter Wing 59, 82-84, 97, 

98. 124, 125, 245, 298, 311, 315, 

331, 383 

Tactical Shelter System 25, 271 

Tanker Task Force 8.20, 177, 192, 

383 

tankers 8, 20, 22, 51, 52, 78, 81, 101, 

109, 115. 117, 126, 128, 129, 139, 

TAF 119-121 

158, 177-179, 182, 187, 188, 189, 

191-197, 199, 200, 203-208, 

210-216, 218, 219, 297. 299, 300, 

303, 333. 383, 386 

tanks 48,209, 218, 226, 245, 249, 

296, 301 

target list 245 

TEL 286, 289, 290, 293, 294, 322 

Tenoso. Fdwin E. 

TFS 310 

TFW 21.59, 98, 124, 125, 154, 178, 

89, 147, 150 

270. 274, 314, 316, 329-331, 351, 

37 I, 383, 385 

Thumrait AB, Oman 61, 106, 125, 

132-134, 146, 149, 153, 154, 163, 

167,224. 272. 276, 304, 311, 314, 

345 

232 

time-phased force deployment data 

Tinker AFB. OK 266. 352 

Title V 65 

Tonopah 210, 245 

Torrejon AB, Spain 6.87,88, 100, 

108. I 10, 192, 268, 283, 296, 300, 

31 1 

Tower Air 44 

TPFDD 4. 5, 24, 53, 54, 58, 82-85, 

89, 90, 121, 122, 127. 357, 360, 

389 

TR 30. 132, 285, 296 

Trans International Airlines 44 

TR-I 30, 131, 285, 296 

TRANSCOM 51.73-75.83, 84.86, 

88, 89, 112, 115, 122, 128, 151, 

154. 160, 178, 202, 204 

TRAP 169 

Travis AFB, CA 

TriStar 177 

'ITF 177, 192 

Turkey 9, 77, 189, 192. 193, 197. 

89. 92, 11 1 

206,264,300 

U 

U-2 9. 30, 131. 182, 202, 296 

U.S. Air Force 272, 286, 331, 347, 

365.366, 368. 370 

U.S. Air Force Europe 16, 122, 224, 

237.272, 331, 388 

U.S. Air Force, Central Command 2, 

36. 225 

407 
U.S. Army 37, 62, 143, 155, 162, 

163, 249, 250, 296, 297,3 17, 356 

U.S. Army Forces, Central Command 

62, 163. 296 

U.S. Central Command 19, 58, 143, 

I82 

U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central 

Command 187 

U.S. European Command 56 

U.S. Marine Corps 46.48.65,87, 

136. 149, 159, 179. 180, 186,201 

U.S. Marine Corps, Central Command 

65. 149,201 

U.S. Navy 36, 38, 41. 65, 87, 179, 

180, 182, 205,218. 299 

U.S. Navy, Central Command 65 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

1 34 

U.S. Transportation Command 147, 

178 

UAE see also United Arab Emirates 

79. 125, 133, 144, 149. 179, 182, 

187, 196, 215, 217, 287, 291, 298, 

302. 303 

UCMJ 148 

UHF 214 

UN 160 

unit type code 50, 68, 148, 295 

United Airlines 44 

United Arab Emirates sec: also UAE 

UK-1000 223,234 

10, 15, 85, 117. 125, 144, 149, 179, 

239,285.333 

United Kingdom 10, 12, 39, 130, 

177, 179, 182, 200, 205,215, 223, 

234,237,242, 268 

United Nations 3. 250 

United States 

United States Air Force 2, 16, 17, 27, 

I, 41. 81, 182, 236, 

311 

29. 30, 36, 38, 39. 49, 68, 81, 87, 

117, 118, 122. 141. 163, 179, 180, 

182, 194,200,215,216,218, 224, 

225, 230, 233,237, 272,286, 309, 

320. 333, 350. 365, 366, 368, 370, 

388 

United States Navy 4. IS, 36, 38, 40, 

41. 46, 48, 65, 87, 89. 110, 115, 

116, 151, 155, 156. 177, 179. 180, 

182. 186, 196,200. 203,205, 209. 

211. 212, 214.215. 218, 285, 293, 

300, 301, 304,316. 354, 357. 359 

Upper Heyford 325 

US Central Command 56 

USAFE SO, 122. 123. 184. 192, 193, 

201,224, 237,239,242,264, 272, 

283, 284,295. 296, 300, 301, 

309-31 I, 315. 328. 348. 349, 358 

USCENTAF see also CENTAF 2, 

9,36,65, 84, 106, 141, 149, 153. 

164, 166, 182,201.205,213. 217, 

229, 236, 241, 249. 271, 293, 295, 

299, 300. 310, 311. 319 

USCENTCOM 6,8,46,64,144. 

182, 197,207. 230. 287.302 

USCINCCENT 58.64, 68,74, 143, 

187, 217, 230, 233, 237, 247, 265, 

270, 296 

USEUCOM 46,60 

USMC 46,48.186 

USNAVCENT 156 

USPACOM 46 

USS Ranger 358 

USS Saratoga 358 

USSOUTHCOM 46 

USTRANSCOM 112, 147, 189, 202, 

UTC 5, SO, 63, 65, 68, 84, 122, 148, 

203 

373, 378, 379 

V 

VC-10 177, 215, 217 

Vietnam 9. 11, 22, 28, 31, 179. 225, 

244, 246, 247, 322. 386,391, 392 

W 

war reserve material 290 
war readiness spares kits 172. 263, Y 

314, 333 

wargames 65 Y’Blood. William T. 38, 48, 68, 81, 

Warner Robins AFB, GA 319 83, 85, 86, 117, 118, 125, 127. 131, 

weather 24. 156. 159. 172, 175, 133, 134-136 

Welford, UK 10, 237, 243 Z 

Westover AFB, MA 108, 113 

WIN 54 Zaragoza, Spain 88. 100, 108, 189, 

World War I1 3, 37, 40, 246, 391 

Worldwide Military Command and 

192. 194, 207, 383.389 

World Airways 44 19 I - 193. 204, 300, 301 

Control System 101 

409 

Part I1 

Support 

Part I1 

Support 

Task Force Chief 

Mr. Richard A. Gunkel 

Authors 

Mr. Ted Beck 

Lt. Col. Donald G. Belle 

Capt. Ariane L. Desaussure 

Mr. Edgar L. Franklin 

Mr. Fonce E. Gipson 

Dr. Ronald B. Hartzer 

Lt. Col. Harry L. Heintzelman, IV 

Maj. Thomas R. MacPhail 

Dr. James S. Nanney 

Dr. Albert C. Pierce 

Lt. Col. Lorraine K. Potter 

Lt. Col. Michael L. Warden 

Maj. Michael H. Whitaker 

Contents 

Report Acknowledgements ............................. ix 

Introduction ....................................... xi 

1 Air Base Engineering and Services .................. 1 

2 Protecting the Air Bases ........................ 31 

3 Contracting Support ........................... 55 

4 Legal Support to Air Operations ................... 65 

5 Weather Operations ............................ 83 

6 Mobilization and Personnel Support ............... 103 

7 Media and Public Affairs ...................... 135 

8 Supporting The People ........................ 179 

9 Medical Support ............................. 201 

10 Conclusion ................................ 233 

Index .......................................... 289 

Appendix 

A Deployment of Engineering 

and Services Forces ........................ 249 

B Gulf War Air Base Characteristics ................ 253 

C Engineering Data as of 19 January 1991 ............ 261 

D Services Data as of 19 January 1991 .............. 263 

E MWR Program/Facility By Location ............... 265 

V 
Appendix 

F The Weather Information System ................. 269 

G Operations Desert Shie1dIDeset-t 

Storm Ground Rules ........................ 275 

H Public Affairs Chain of Command ................ 277 

I Guidelines for News Media ..................... 279 

J Historical Comparison 

of War Correspondence ..................... 281 

Tables 

1 Harvest Falcon Major Components 

Used in the Gulf War ......................... 7 

2 USAFE Billeting Support ........................... 28 

3 Threat Level Matrix .............................. 35 

4 Integrated Security Forces 

of U.S. Air Bases ........................... 49 

5 Contracts Transferred to Saudi Arabia ................. 61 

6 Composition and Strength 

of WAF Ready Reserve ..................... 105 

7 Presidential Selected Reserve Call.up. 

22 August 1990 ........................... 108 

8 Selected Reserve Cal1.up. 

I4 November I990 ......................... 110 

9 Partial Mobilization. 18 January 1991 .................. 111 

10 Partial Mobilization Authorities 

Compared to Number Activated ................. 118 

vi 
11 DOD Casualty Figures ............................ 129 

12 Deployability Problems Associated With 

Inadequate Dependent Care Plans .............. 130 

13 Opinion Poll .................................. 142 

14 Opinion Poll .................................. 144 

15 Opinion Poll .................................. 149 

16 Opinion Poll .................................. 151 

17 Average Weekly Transactions Processed ............... 192 

18 Medical Manpower Summary ...................... 206 

19 Aeromedical Evacuation Data ...................... 224 

20 Meteorological Tactical Equipment ................... 273 

Figures 

1 AOR AirBases .................................. 11 

2 USAF Ground Defense Forces ....................... 32 

3 Air Base Ground Defense .......................... 44 

4 Weather Support Forces ........................... 84 

5 Climatology for 10. OOO Ft . or Lower Ceilings ............ 85 

6 Joint Air Component Planning Cycle .................. 95 

7 Total Force Mobilization Resources .................. 104 

8 Past Use of the Air Reserve Component ............... 106 

vii 
9 Selected Reserve and 

Active Strength CompSrison ................... 112 

10 Employment of Reserve Chnpmmb 

During Desert ShkM ........................ 112 

11 Guard and Reserve Support Unit Sorts Jul 1990 .......... 119 

12 WAF Women Deployed and Total Fare ............... 126 

13 Active Air Force Nondeployables By 5pe ............. 131 

14 Military Post Office kai0ns ...................... 1% 

15 September 1990-May 1991 SwA Mail Vdume ........... 198 

16 Disease and Non-Battle Injury Rates ................. 207 

17 Air-Transportable Hospital Locations ................. 208 

18 Hospital Support of the Gulf War .................... 210 

19 Air Force Casualty Movement ...................... 216 

20 Theater Casualty Flow Plan ........................ 217 

21 CENTAF Aeromedical Evacuation 

Decision Time ............................ 218 

... 

Vlll 
Report Acknowledgements 

When the survey of support areas was assigned to the Logistics, 

Support, and Space Task Force under Mr. Richard A. Gunkel, it was 

decided that the functional areas would heavily contribute written rnaterials in developing the Support Report. 'Ihe responsibility for coordinating 

and managing these efforts, providing guidance, assessing inputs, editing, 

and rewriting materials fell upoa Mr. Fonce E. Gipson. In addition, Mr. 

Gipson authored the chapters on materiel and contracting; morale, welfare, and recreation; and coauthored with Mr. Ted Beck the conclusions. 

Mr. Beck also produced the chapter on personnel. The other chapters 

were written by Dr. Ronald B. Hartzer (air base engineering), Lt. Col. 

Donald G. Belle (air base defense), Capt. Ariane L. Desaussure with Lt. 

Col. Harry L. Heintzelman, IV (law of aerial warfare), Maj. Thomas R. 

MacPhail (weather operations), Dr. Albert C. Pierce with Lt. Col. Michael 

L. Warden (media and public affairs), U. Col. Lorraine K. Potter (chap 

laincy), Mr. Edgar L. Franklin (finance), Maj. Michael H. Whitaker 

(postal operations), and Dr. James S. NMNY (medical affairs). For 

writing the stones of these functional areas, these authors are to be highly 

commended. 

In the technical production of this work, we are indebted to Ms. 

Cecelia French and Mr. Alan P. Heffeman (for their adroit electronic 

manipulation), Mr. Chris Pankow (for his thorough editing), and Ms. 

Barbara L. Gardien (for skillful layout and design). 

ix 
Security Review 

The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were 

submitted to the Department of Defense for policy 

and security review. In accordance with this review, certain information has been removed from 

the original text. These areas have been annotated 

as [DELETED]. 

x 
Introduction 

The intent of this report is to capture and tell the stories of functional 

support areas. It is a truism that military commanders must carefully 

choose the exact mix of combat and support forces. Out of balance, this 

mix may spell disaster for combat operations and, in some cases, determine the difference between victory and defeat. In view of rapidly 

changing geopolitical and world economic trends, the need to learn more 

about combat support operations for limited and regional contingencies 

is of obvious importance. This report, we hope, will contribute to that 

end, with focus on those support areas that project air power. This 

support can best be characterized as either direct support: supporting the 

air base and air operations; or indirect: supporting the people conducting 

air operations. Within this framework, support forces must be structured 

to provide support for both normal, noncombat operations and intense 

combat operations (twenty-fours, seven days a week). 

This characterization lends itself to a three-part description. The first 

concentrates on supporting the air base, with chapters on air base engineering and services, protecting the air base with its materials, and contracting support. The second part, supporting air operations, discusses the 

law of aerial warfare, weather operations, mobilization, and personnel 

support. The third area, supporting the people, consists of media and 

public affairs, providing for troop morale, and medical support. The final 

chapter identifies specific problems for further investigation and offers 

conclusions on support operations. 

To elaborate on the first part, supporting the air base, the author 

examines air base engineering and services functions that pertain to 

building the air base infrastructure needed to support the overall mission 

of assigned aircraft. This chapter traces background material on air base 

construction and the force structure needed to accomplish that mission. 

It reviews Saudi modernization and industrialization program efforts 

concerning air base engineering, facilities, and support capabilities prior 

to the arrival of U.S. forces. The author addresses deployment of engineering forces to about twenty air bases throughout the region and the 

initial employment of those forces during Operation Desert Shield, interweaving Services-related functions, since they reported through engineering channels. The transition to war in Operation Desert Storm and the 

engineering postwar denial of Iraqi access to southern Iraq airfields 

conclude the deliberation on air base engineering and services. 

xi 
Discussions on protecting the air base include prewar planning and 

security police manpower determination standards. Pprticularly emphasized are air force structure requirements for protecting the air base and 

its assets. Here the author analyzes differences between the Army and 

the Air Force with regard to air base ground defense, their differing 

concepts of rear area security, and a deliberotion of the different doctrinal 

perspectives. This part of the report then focuses on employing security 

forces as a joint effort between Army, Air Force, and Coalition forces at 

various sites in the theater. The author discusses relations with host 

nation security forces as well as the gradual acknowledgment of mutual 

capabilities to protect both U.S. and Coalition assets and pcrsonnel and 

analyzes command and control issues with emphasis on the ground &- 

fenses in terms of Air Force and Amy nlationship. 'Ik Air Force 

contends that rear area security is more i- than dots the Army, 

since the majority of Army combat forces operate on the front lines. The 

Air Force contends, however, that Army close air support requirements 

provided by the Air Force justify protection of high-ddlar value assets by 

Army combat units. The final discussion of this part centers on maturing 

the security structure at beddown locations, materiel and contracting 

support related to the air base, including the services that support the air 

base. 

The second major area of this report contains chapters that address 

direct or indirect functions that support air operations. A chapter on law 

of aerial warfare discusses mobility, deployment. legal issues surrounding 

the activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, communications between 

forward and rear echelons, and international law pertaining to the Status 

of Forces Agreements between the United States, host nations, and civilian contractors. Air refueling of Coalition aircraft also involved the 

Status of Forces Agreements between the United States and host nations. 

Authors further deliberate rules of engagement, with specific emphasis on 

legal involvement in the targeting process, use of civilians. prisoner of 

war issues, and war claims. Civil law and kgal assistance absorbed 

attention with regard to Service members and their families; the Soldiers 

and Sailors Relief Act particularly emphasizes reemployment rights of 

those returning from the Gulf War. Contracting in the theater of operations, contract law dealing with leasing, and blanket purchasing agreements commanded attention because of their volume. A discussion of 

judge advocate redeployment includes issues surrounding property leased 

by the U.S. Government and property turned over to host nations. 

xii 
The author identified the impact of the weather support structure on 

air operations in ahwest Asia, dealing with climatology as it was 

predicted and comparing it to actual conditions. The chapter deals with 

the impact of mather OR tactics and the ability to launch missions in the 

thuJer of operations. It shows how joint weather support is provided and 

examines problematic issues of sharing weather information between 

Services; the value of weather support; examples where missions were 

planned on the basis of accurate weather forecasting; and in conclusion, 

what type of equipment is needed to support air operations. 

Concluding the second major part of the report is a chapter on mobiIirStiOn and personnel support. This chapter analyzes the U.S. Armed 

Forces structure and tbe call-up of Reserve and Air National Guardsmen. 

It addresses practices facing mobilization of reserve forces, training 

cxetcises, proMerns resolved over the last ten years, and deals with ReServe and Air National Guard volunteerism. The chapter describes how 

in the build-up phase the United States created an offensive capability to 

extract Iraq from Kuwait in conjunction with the presidential use of a 

partid mobilization authorization at the beginning of hostilities. It covers 

personnel accountability of Active, Reserve, National Guard and demobilization issues, procedures and capabilities of Personnel Support Continuing Operations (PERSCO), casualty services, and Operation Yellow Ribbon 

along with family support services. The chapter also addresses civilian 

personnel issues along with the use of contracting personnel in the Gulf 

War. 

The last functional area, supporting people, begins with coverage of 

the media and the air war. It focuses on several central issues that may 

have multiroles relating to wartime media coverage. It deals with information affecting decisionmakers, politicians, the public, and the war 

fighters in the field; it analyzes influence on the will of a nation to fight. 

Three primary themes direct the attention of the reader: media coverage 

and public opinion as measured by the government in weighing public 

opinion and how the public weighs the progress of the war; media coverage and political-military decisionmaking based on media coverage with 

its impact on future decisions; and media coverage of combat operations 

with inherent problems of allowing the media to cover actual combat 

operations. Such may stem from a logistical perspective, from the risk 

of danger to media personnel, or they may involve operational security. 

In providing for troop morale, a number of areas came under scrutiny: those of chaplaincy, morale, welfare and recreation, finance, and 

... 

Xlll 
postal services. Planning and deployment of chaplains, their role on the 

CENTAF commander's staff, and restriction placed on them during the 

Gulf War posed a number of problems and offered challenges associated 

with operating in an Islamic country. Practicing of one's faith in the Gulf 

region, such as observing Jewish Holy days and the increased interest 

displayed by armed forces members in studying the scriptures provided 

chaplains with valuable insight. Counseling was a major concern, both 

to Service members and their families back home. Discussion also focusses on problems associated with deployment and redeployment. 

The limited facilities available to provide for recreation and boost 

morale and welfare in a desert environment and the disparity of operating 

conditions throughout the area of operations afforded some investigation. 

Service members did benefit from rest and recuperation activities, celebrity tours, and from donated equipment and supplies provided by the 

general public. On the home front, discussion centers on support activities provided to family members of deployed personnel and Congressional 

intervention due to a lack of support associated with deployment. 

A central responsibility of the deployed finance and comptroller 

personnel was to accommodate the financial needs of Service people and 

to satisfy contracting requirements. A discussion addresses the skills and 

knowledge levels of financial personnel and how associated training 

prepared them for their mission in a combat environment. It also reviews 

the problems associated with a lack of a central command and control 

structure and the quality of instructions being provided to field finance 

personnel by some nineteen different agencies. 

A brief survey of postal operations provides background material on 

mail operations during World War I1 and the role of the Air Force as 

single service manager in Southwest Asia. Further discussion centers on 

deployment planning, existing postal infrastructure within the theater, 

mail-handling equipment and supplies, as well as interface requirements 

and restrictions imposed by host nation customs. Discussion explores 

Congressional intervention and establishment of free mail, as well as 

"Any Service Member" mail issues, the roles of the United States Postal 

Service, Military Postal Service Agency, Military Airlift Command, 

Federal Aviation Agency, and commercial mail-handling services. 

Medical support analysis begins with a description of mobile medical 

facilities during the Gulf War, with central themes on deployment and 

setup of the first medical facility on 14 August 1990. The analysis 

xiv 
highlights medical and dental problems of Reservists and the lack of 

sufficient medical equipment and supplies during the early stages of the 

deployment. The author addresses the activation of contingency hospitals 

in Europe along with inadequate facilities and slow movement of medical 

equipment and supplies to set up operations. Some did not become 

operational until as late as 28 February 1991. An outline of aeromedical 

evacuation procedures and problems emphasizes Joint Chiefs of Staff 

casualty estimate planning. Other medical areas cover preventive medicine and aircrew medical support issues, prediction rates for in and out 

patient versus actual experience (which were much lower than expected), 

aircrew problems such as fatigue and grounding of aircrews, biological 

and chemical warfare defense, as well as precautions taken against casualties and their associated problems. 

Many of the writers involved in compiling this survey participated in 

the support force that deployed to the Middle East. In reflecting on the 

Gulf War, the reader should keep in mind the purposes of the deployment. The first one, in August 1990, supported defensive operations to 

deter further aggression by Iraq; the deployment in November 1990, 

supported offensive operations intended to extract Iraq from Kuwait. 

Though this survey does not exhaust every conceivable source, it 

does include materials provided by functional areas, which consist of 

Written accounts from all levels, perspectives, and functional 

areas 

0 Unit histories and interviews with key personnel 

WD, JCS, and Service reports and studies 

SITREPS, message traffic, briefings, and official reports 

0 Air Force Remedial Action Program lessons learned 

Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) 

Hopefully, the conclusions reached as a result of this survey 

along with a discussion of issues and specific recommendations will spur 

further investigation within the functional areas discussed. It is realized. 

however, that firm conclusions and implications for future combat support 

operations will take time to evolve. 

xv 
xvi 
1 

Air Base Engineering and Services 

Air Bases and Aerospace Operational Art 

Background 

A major contributing factor to the successful prosecution of the air 

campaign during Operation Desert Storm was the availability and operability of a network of bases needed to support air power. To identify air 

power, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay said: “When I speak of air strength, I am 

not speaking only of airplanes. I am speaking of airfields, depots, stockpiles, control and communications centers, highly trained and skilled 

manpower-and airplanes. These constitute air power.”’ 

Air bases have undergone a vast transformation since the early days 

of World War I, when they consisted of no more than grass or dirt runways, a few structures, and often livestock. The limited range of early 

aircraft dictated that most airfields be located as near the front lines as 

practical. Although simple in design, they were quite expansive. The 

Amanty fieM in France, for example, was large enough to accommodate 

assembly and take-off formation of eighteen to twenty aircraft.2 

Recognizing the paramount importance of air bases and their need for 

dedicated engineering support, with the approach of WW 11, Gen. Henry 

H. Arnold organized battalions of Aviation Engineers to support basing 

requirements of the growing Army Air Corps. By the end of the war, 

these units served in all theaters and had built or upgraded 568 airfields 

‘(S) Air Force 2000: Air Power Entering the 21st Century, HQ Air Force Special 

Projects, 1982, p 167. Inronnation cited is unclassified. Cited in AFM 3-2, Civil Engineering ComW support Doctrine, L.C. Meilinger, AF~OXWD, 26 Apr 1991, published by 

Dept of the Air Force. Wash DC, p 29. 

‘The Fino1 Report, ed Maurer Maurer, The US. Air Service in World War I, Vol I 

(Washington: Offsc of Air Force History, 1978), p 357. 

1 
overseas3 Army Air Forces planners generally divided airfields into 2 

types: dry-weather and all-weather. Dry-weather fields had dirt or sand 

runways and parking areas unusable in wet weather. All-weather fields 

were surfaced with concrete, asphalt, crushed stone, coral, or matting. 

The IX Aviation Engineer Command was created to rehabilitate and 

construct airfields on the European continent. By V-E Day, 8 May 1945, 

they had constructed or reconditioned 241 airfields! In the Pacific, 

airfields became a primary objective of island-hopping toward Japan, and 

the capture of an island’s airfield or the construction of a new one was 

key in defending the region and extending the range for bombers.’ 

The Korean War renewed the appreciation for adequate air bases. 

The introduction of several new aircraft, including jets, required longer 

and wider runways, larger taxiways and parking aprons, and more stringent design criteria. Engineers constructed 9,000-foot all-weather runways at Osan, Taegu, Kunsan, and Suwon, and during the Korean War, 

they built or upgraded 55 airfields? 

Inadequate basing limited the build-up of American forces in Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s. To overcome the limitations, the Air Force 

built four major air bases in South Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat, 

Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa). Often parked dangerously close together, 

aircraft offered a lucrative target for terrorists and presented a safety 

hazard. On one occasion, the accidental explosion of a bomb on a parked 

B-57 at Bien Hoa triggered a series of blasts that killed or injured 100 

people and destroyed more than 50 aircraft and vehicles. In the face of 

31X Engineer Command, The History of IX Engineer Command: From its Beginning 

to V-E Day (Wiesbaden: Information Control Command, 1945), p 146 (located at Air 

Force Historical Research Agency [AFHRA]; Cap1 L. Dean Waggoner and Lt M. Allen 

Mw, A Histoty of Air Force Civil Engineering Wartime and Contingency Problems from 

1941 to the Present, AFlT Thesis, 1985, p 60. 

1X Engineer Command, The History of IX Engineer Command, pp 62-75. 4 

’Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World War fl, 

Services Around the World, Vol VII (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958 [New 

imprint: Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1983). pp 304-308. 

HQ Far Eastern Air Forces, FfiAf Report on the Korean War, Book 3. 15 Feb 1954, 

p 2 (located at AFHRA). 

6 

2 
such experience, engineers initiated a major program to construct revetments and aircraft shelters to protect the valuable assets.' 

Engineering and Services 

Air Force Engineers are organized into 2 basic types of units with 

complementary missions: Base Civil Engineering units and Civil Engineering RED HORSE units. Base Civil Engineering units, including Prime 

BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency Forces), participate with combat forces, 

providing direct support to the operational mission at each air base. The 

workforce in the United States is comprised of roughly 50 percent military and 50 percent civilians, who establish, maintain, and restore the 

base infrastructure and provide critical operational support, such as fire 

suppression and crash rescue. Prime BEEF is part of a Base Civil Engineering unit earmarked to deploy as 50-, loo-, 150-, and 200-person 

teams in support of contingencies. civil Engineering RED HORSE units are 

wartime-structured engineers that provide a heavy engineering capability 

but not base-level operations and maintenance. Mobile, rapidly deployable, and largely self-sufficient for limited periods of time, they perform 

wartime tasks, such as major force beddown, heavy damage repair, barebase development, and heavy engineering operations. 

The Army, Navy, and Marine engineer units train essentially full time 

for their combat roles. These units have no peacetime base maintenance 

tasks although they may accept specific projects for team skill training. 

Two-thirds of the Army Engineer capability consists of reserves, and they 

focus on joint operations, Coalition warfare, with a theater of operations 

orientation. They train to support battlefield functions-mobility, countermobility, survivability, general support engineering, topography engineering, and sustainment of all forces in the theater. The Navy Seabees focus 

on the sea-land bridge engineering problem and advanced base support; 

their force consists of about seventy percent reserves, and their battalions 

rotate from home stations to deployed locations for about six months at 

a time. Their training is conducted in close concert with the Marines for 

amphibious operations, and usually they are included in the amphibious 

assault follow-on force. The Marine engineers focus primarily on 

'HQ USAF, Director of civil Engineering Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest, 

Civil Engineering Support in Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 1965 - 31 Mar 1968, p 240. 

3 

grand and air combat roles and have a very structured training program. 

Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force engineer units are self-sufficient, but 

with different definiChs. For exampk, Air Force RED HORSE units are 

self sufficient for abut sixty days; %?bee battalions for ninety days. 

?he key common ground is that all units need logistics support from host 

nation resources.’ 

‘“Engineering Suppxt for U.S. Forces: Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines” New 

Mexico Engineering Resevck Institute, 1988, pp vi-viii. 

5 
Services personnel adopted the basic Prime BEEF concept in 1978 by 

creating the Pime RIBS (Readiness in Base Services) program. Using the 

mobile team concept, they provided base operations with food services, 

billeting, laundry, field exchange, and mortuary services. They deploy in 

teams of nine, eighteen, and twenty-five people. 

The Air Force first developed air transportable facilities in the 1950s, 

initiating the original portable-basing set, Gray Eagle, during the Vietnam 

War at Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang Air Bases. It was then renamed 

Harvest Eagle.’ In the 1960s and 197Os, basing sets incorporated new 

designs and were known as Harvest Bare.” Then in the 1980s, the 

Harvest Falcon” concept was originated, which combined aspects of both 

’An air transportable, lightweight package consisting of limited housekeeping 

equipment, operational support assets, spare parts, and supplies required to support US. 

Air Force general-purpose forces and personnel in bare base conditions. Each kit provides softwall housekeeping support for 1,100 personnel. Harvest Eagle was not intended 

to be an all inclusive package of logistics support for air operations; however, it was used 

until augmented by Harvest Bare. Harvest Eagle equipment, for example, may contain 

water purification units, tents, showers, and runway lights. Twelve kits are available, four 

each at TAC, USAFE, and PACAF. During peacetime. two kits in each storing command are 

untouchable. 

“A nickname for an air transportable ((436L) compatible] package of modular 

shelters, equipment. and vehicles required for base and personnel housekeeping and 

aircraft support in bare base conditions. Base and personnel support packaging consists 

of modular hardwell shelters and equipment designed to house, feed and conduct normal 

functions for populations up to 4,500 people of a combat support unit. Aircraft support 

consists of maintenance shelters, operations shelters, and shop equipment required to 

support an operational unit. 

An air transportable package of hardwall shelters, Tent Extendable Modular 

Personnel (TEMPER) tents, equipment, and vehicles designed primarily to provide bare 

base support for U.S. Air Force personnel and aircraft in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility, but capable of being deployed worldwide. Support provided includes power and 

water distribution. billeting, dining. aircraft and vehicle maintenance, warehouses, fire 

rescue, w. airfield lighting, and administrative facilities. Harvest Falcon provides the 

capability to bed-down 55,000 personnel and 750 aircraft. This capability is composed 

of 37 squadron packages that provide support at 14 separate beddown locations. The 37 

squadron packages consist of nine 2.200-person nonmunidons carrying hosts. four 2,000- 

person nonmunitions carrying hosts. one 1,700-person SOF host. and 23 1,100-person 

munitions carrying and nonmunitions carrying tenants. The package is designed to 

overcome host nation or U.S. infrastructure limitations and is prepositioned at planned 

operating bases, alternative storage locations inside and adjacent to the area of responsibility or at CONUS aggregation sites. Weapon-carrying host and tenant packages are stored 

at Holloman AFB. NM. Assets stored in CONUS are more readily available than those 

11 

6 
Harvest Eagle and Harvest Bare designs. Harvest Falcon was designed 

specifically for the Southwest Asia theater of operations (i.e., no freeze 

protection).” During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, major components of Harvest Falcon sets were used as shown in Table 1. 

Table 1 

Harvest Falcon Major Components Used in the Gulf War 

Q~Y Q~Y Held in 

Major Item Avail Deployed Reserve 

TEMPER Tents 

9-1 Kitchens 

Gen-Purp Shelters 

A/C Hangars 

Latrines 

Shower/Shave Units 

750kW Generators (Diesel) 

750kW Generators (Turbine) 

Secondary Distribution Centers 

Primary Distribution Centers 

50,000 CL Fuel Bladders 

20,000 CL Water Bladders 

Tactical Field Laundry Units 

Reverse Osmosis Water 

Purification Units 

Environmental Control Units 

High-Voltage Cable Sets 

5,873 

35 

24 1 

51 

246 

214 

93 

31 

898 

43 

679 

275 

1 I7 

44 

7,420 

298 

4,902 

30 

206 

42 

215 

177 

89 

19 

654 

31 

579 

204 

91 

31 

5,846 

153 

43 1 

4 

27 

4 

16 

16 

0 

7 

64 

4 

0 

18 

8 

6 

490 

60 

prepositioned to support NOPlan crises or contingencies worldwide, as directed by HQ 

USAF with USCENTCOM coordination. 

‘*“Civil Engineering Support in Southeast Asia,” pp 60-62; Lt Col Clifton T. 

Windham and Joseph H. Smith, “Bare Base: A New Frontier,” Air Force Engineering and 

Services Quarterly. Vol 24, No 4 (Winter 1983). pp 24-26; Capt Kenneth M. Weaver, 

“An Historical Analysis of the Air Force’s Bare Base Concept and Equipment,” AFIT 

Thesis, 1989. 

7 
Engineering contingency teams had concentrated on developing 

wartime skills, such as rapid runway rtpair, damage assessment, and 

operation of Harvest Eagle field kitchens. Yet, in August 1990, Air 

Force engineers found themselves performing bcddown operations with 

equipment and mobility basing sets they had never Sten bef0re.l3 

Laying the Foundation for 

Air Operations in the Gulf Region 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been developing projects in 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since 1951. Their first was rebuilding the 

airfield at Dhahran. Initially completed in 1956, this base became an 

important stopover point for U.S. Air Force and Navy air~raft.'~ Under 

a May 1965 Engineer Assistance Agreement, they constructed the King 

Khalid Military City (KKMC); it was finished in 1988 as a complete city 

and base facilities to support a projected population of more than 5O,OOO, 

with an airfield, hospital, and engineer center and school. in addition, the 

Royal Saudi Air Force working with the U.S. Air Force Logistics Coinmand completed 2 major efforts to upgrade aircraft support facilities.'5 

Under a phased modernization and industrialization program implemented by the Saudi government in 1974, the US. Army Corps of Engineers and Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) Foreign 

Military Sales Constmction Engineers designed and constructed several 

bases, including three major bases-Dhahran, Taif, and Khamis Mushait. 

Five of these state-of-the-art bases were each capable of supporting nearly 

the entire Royal Saudi Air Force. In August 1990, the Air Force still had 

an eighteen-man engineer group in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia working on the 

Peace Shield program. When Coalition aircraft began arriving at these 

locations, facilities were sitting empty or nearly empty. In addition, 

Saudi Arabia had specifically identified forty-five civil airfields to suppott 

8 
pilgrimages and the oil industry [forty-three supported the oil industry 

and two (Jeddah and Taif) supported pilgrimage^].'^ 

Contingency Planning 

Planning air operations for the Middle East was the responsibility of 

CENTAF, the air component of C~M. Their engineering plans primarily consisted of prepositioning assets in Southwest Asia and conducting 

training exercises in the theater. Beginning in 1979, training exercises 

such as Bright Star were held every two years to practice deployment, 

beddown aircraft and people, and fly combat sorties. Beginning in 1981, 

the 4449th Mobility Support Squadron began limited bare base training at 

Holloman Am, New Mexico, enrolling in the first class members of the 

Langley Am, Virginia, and Shaw Am, South Carolina, base engineer team. 

In anticipation of deployment, operational planners at CENTAF began 

selecting bases on 2 August 1990. Their initial criteria for selecting air 

bases and regional airfields included those with 10,OOO-fOot runways or 

longer, at least 500,000 square feet of parking ramp, and with load classification numbers high enough to support aircraft under consideration. 

They evaluated both civilian and military airfields. However, since 

published airfield reference information was dated 1985, much of the 

needed information was not available, thus complicating the selection 

process. In addition, Saudi Arabia and its neighbors had undertaken 

building or improving many of these airfields. Between 1985 and 1990, 

the following airfields were constructed: Al Kharj and King Fahd International Airport in Saudi Arabia, and Al Ayn in the United Arab Emirates 

and Shaikh Isa in Bahrain. Major airfield improvements had also been 

undertaken at Al Dhafra, Khamis Mushait, and Taif in Saudi Arabia, Seeb 

and Thumrait in Oman, and Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates.” 

Lt Col Harry W. Glaze and Lt Col Larry G. Garrison, ‘The Saudi Arabian Construction Program,” Engineering and Services Quarterly. Vol 2 1, no 2, (May 1980). pp 

20-23. 

17CENTAF/DE planners did have detailed knowledge on Seeb and Thumrait ABs, 

Oman because of the previous Air Force experience at the bases. Intvw, Capt Wayland 

H. Patterson with Dr. Ronald B. Hartzer. 10 Jul 1991. 

16 

9 
Consequently, the CENTAF staff and later the HQ TAC Battle Staff put 

together basing packages for individual air bases on the basis of very 

limited airfield data and no formal site surveys. Nevertheless, this information was critical in determining munitions storage, power generation, 

water requirements, and other infrastructure considerations to support 

sortie generation. With each plan, they determined base engineering and 

services requirements and prepared time-phased force and deployment 

data worksheets, passing this information to the Tactical Air Command 

Battle Staff for personnel and equipment sourcing.” 

Deployment of Forces 

A CENTAF engineer deployed to Saudi Arabia on 7 August 1990. 

Working from the Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters in Riyadh, he 

assigned personnel to conduct site surveys of potential Saudi airfields for 

use by incoming U.S. forces. Planning called for augmentation with the 

10th Civil Engineering Flight, a Reserve unit from Bergstrom AFB, Texas.19 However, the speed of deployment and a delay in the call-up of 

reserves prompted cancellation of this unit’s mobilization. As an alternative, Col. Michael A. McAuliffe, Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering 

and Services at Tactical Air Command headquarters, quickly elected to 

assemble active duty personnel to fill this role. 

Colonel McAuliffe selected Lt. Col. Karsten H. Rothenberg, the 

Director of Air Force Foreign Military Sales Construction Engineers, 

Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command, to head the staff at Riyadh. 

Colonel Rothenberg was familiar with Saudi construction programs but 

had not been involved with the CENTAF mission or the bare base assets 

program. The deployment and number of all engineering and services 

forces to the theater of operations by the bases they supported is reflected 

in Appendix A. 

”Lt Col David Ruschmann, “Operation Desert Shield,” TAC Engineering and 

hid; Intvw, Capt Wayland H. Patterson with Dr. Ronald B. Hartzer, 10 Jul 1991. 

Services Digest, Vol 12, no 3 (Jul-Sep IW), pp 4-8. 

19 

10 
Force Beddown 

U.S. Air Force personnel were initially deployed to two primary 

locations, Dhahran and Riyadh. This soon grew to twenty locations in 

the region, one of which was King Fahd International Airport, near 

Dhahran. Under construction since the mid-1980s. this airport was scheduled to open in 1993. Although not all of the infrastructure had been 

built, the contractor suspended construction activities while American 

forces were present. Then there was Khamis Mushait Air Base, Saudi 

Arabia, a modern military airfield that provided state-of-the-art facilities. 

The aircraft shelters spread throughout the base, and the existing utilities, 

billeting and dining facilities, fire station, and fueling capabilities offered 

outstanding working and living accommodations. Appendix B provides 

air base characteristics of the bases supporting U.S. air operations. 

Figure 1 

AOR Air Bases 
Engineering Tasks 

Engineer taskings upon arrival at a base fell into four main catege 

ries: 

1. Preparation of runways, runway lighting, navigational aid sites, 

and installation, utilities, fire protection, facility siging. and latrines; 

2. Sweeping aircraft ramps Md aprons, ammunition storage anas, 

aircraft revetments, and erection of facilities; 

3. Environmental and sanitirtion concerns. facility hardening, and 

road construction; and 

4. Basic operation and maintenance of the base and continued training. 

The priorities and timing of the above tasks varied according to the 

threat, timing of the deployment (August versus December). host nation 

resources, and availability of equipment and bare base assets. The primary tasking was normally force beddown. 

Electrical power became a critical ekment at all beddown locations, 

not only for aircraft support equipment but for computer operations and 

air conditioning as well. For bare base operations, the Air Force used 

WkW, 1oOPtW. and 750kW generators, white early in the deployment, the 

smaller 6OkW and 1 OOkW portabk generators provided primary electrical 

power to small clusters of tents or facilities. Such improvisions required 

frequent servicing of the equipment and refueling of generators, and often 

generator overload resulted in equipment failure. When those generators 

were later replaced or supplemented by 75OkW diesel generators, those 

Air Force power production personnel not familiar with the CENTAF 

mission were unfamiliar with them. The problem was conpounded by 

the unavailability of Technical Orders for the equipment. CENTAF Engineering did, however, overcome this sitmion by establishing power grids 

at the sites to provide electricity.20 

%SAFEIDE also Sent approximately 140 assorted generuotr (30 kW ud smalkr) to 

Soulhmst Asia sites. History, CENTAFIDE, c-day to C+M. 

12 
mu engineers 

provide primary 

eMal power for 

bmu facilities eprly 

if! aproy-. 

Generators' began failing kcwse of around-the-clock operations, and 

a severe shortage of filters and spare parts reduced the scheduled mainteMllce that could be accomplished. The Air Force established an eightpem depot repair capability for the 750kW generators at Thumrait, 

Onun. Of $re 90 7HwtW diesel generators initially used, 50 came from 

plegositioning sites in Southwest Asia; only 10 were operational. Another 

40 generatom came from Holkxnan AFB, New Mexico; only 6 were operati. Of the 74 generators that faikd to operate, some were missing 

pats, some had defective parts, and others required minor adjustments. 

Thc probkm was attributed to the lengthy time in storage and 

In August, a shortage of primary distribution centers complicated the 

estrblishmmt of effKient power distribution systems, which resulted in 

a lack of hookups to the primpry ekctrical distribution source. By 26 

!ikptember 1990, however, the Civil Engineering Maintenance, Inspection, 

Repair, and Training team at Ketiy AFB, Texas designed acceptable 

nQlacements from commercial off-the-shelf components and shipped 

13 
thirty-four primary distribution centers to the Gulf region sites and one 

to Sheppard Technical Training Center?2 

Water availability, its storage, and distribution were critical elements 

at beddown locations. CENTAF Engineering established minimum secure 

water storage requirement of 100 gallons per person for 5 days of usage. 

Drinking water initially was supplied as bottled water from local sources, 

and at some sites, it came from existing water distribution systems connected directly to commercial water sources. Other locations, such as 

Cairo West, had to truck-haul water and store it in bladders, most common of which was the 20,000-gallon bladder. Seventeen sites possessed 

water purification units capable of producing up to 600 gallons of potable 

water per hour from either seawater or fre~hwater.~~ 

Beddown of firefighters should take place before arrival of aircraft. 

However, in August and early September, aircraft sometimes preceded 

adequate fire services. At Cairo West, for example, few firefighters and 

no vehicles were available for the first two weeks, and this was true to 

varying degrees at other sites.24 

Engineer teams also assisted in planning and construction of air base 

defense works such as berms, concertina wire fences, and bunkers to 

protect vital equipment and power plant sources, as well as barriers on 

roads to slow down vehicles. Base engineers assisted in bedding down 

medical personnel, which normally consisted of pouring concrete or 

asphalt floors for air-transportable hospitals, connecting utilities, maintaining generators and environmental control units, and erecting the TEMPER 

tents used to house the hospitals. The sophisticated medical equipment 

and water and waste requirements for sanitation posed particular power 

22”Center’s Support to Desert ShieldStorm Outlined,” E&S Update. Vol 3, no 3, pp 

1-3; Mr Jack Struebing. “Bullet Background Paper on Harvest Bare Power Distribution 

Centers” 31 Aug 1990. 

’%ENTAF/DE. “Status Report,” 9 Feb 199 I. 

Personal History. CMSgt Hans P. Finkbeiner, 7 Sep - 6 Oct 1990. 24 

14 
requirements. 

additional strains on the food service system.” 

Specialized dietary requirements for patients imposed 

Services Tasks 

Although the Air Force feeding concept called for eating MREs 

(Meals, Ready to Eat) for the first ten days of a deployment, commanders 

were anxious to supplement the rations. Services personnel began to 

explore the availability of A Rations (fresh fruit, vegetables, meat, and 

baked goods) in the local area. Meanwhile, the HQ TAC Battle Staff 

worked with the Air Force Commissary Service to push B Rations (dehydrated and canned products not requiring refrigeration) to Southwest Asia. 

The Commissary Service also established a central distribution center for 

MRES and B Rations at the port of Ad Dammom, Saudi Arabia. 

Contract cook and mess attendant support augmented Air Force 

Services personnel at approximately half of the sites. Host nation assistance was generally limited to KP, serving, and ration handling services. 

Three sites, Jeddah, Khamis, Mushait, and Tabuk, were totally host nation 

contract feeding. Security and sanitation were major concerns wherever 

contractors were used. The potential for food sabotage and food-borne 

illness existed throughout the deployment. The use of contract food 

service workers required constant supervision by Services personnel. 

They trained the contract workers in sanitary food handling methods, but 

language and culture were barriers. The workers were third country 

nationals and few understood English or Western sanitation practices. 

Although measures were taken to prevent foodborne illness (FBI) or 

sabotage of the food supply, approximately 2.500 USCENTAF personnel 

experienced acute gastroenteritis in 15 FBI outbreaks. 

Billeting cadre placed incoming personnel in either tents or hard 

billets, maintained records of occupants, and assisted engineers in planning tent cities. Those who had been using automated systems stateside 

found themselves reverting to the stubby pencil and an index card system. 

When Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf ordered all troops out of hotels in 

’’History, CENTAFIDE, c+30 - c+60; Personnel History, Capt Wayland H. Patterson, 

CENTAFDE, 6 kt 1990 - 12 Mar 1991, p 8. 

15 
Bllieting personnel placed 

incoming troops In tents ot 

hard billets and worked with 

engineers In plannlng tent 

cities (sbove). Mobile Kitchon 

Trallers fed troops at severd 

shes (left). 

16 
Tactical Field Lamdry system was U0.d 

to provide laundry 

capadiity in the 

desert (above and 

right). 

17 
late August 1990, and on to a base because of the terrorist threat,26 the 

majority of the people then lived in TEMPER tents, but others lived in 

facilities such as Eskan Village at the southern edge of Riyadh, a massive 

housing compound of multibedroom villas in single-story and high-rise 

configurations, which the Saudi government offered to the U.S. military 

in mid-August?’ General Homer selected Col. George G. Giddens to 

serve as the Vice Commander for Combat Support operations at Eskan 

Village because of his prior experience in supporting contingency operations in Korea. Prior to the start of hostilities, about 18,000 U.S. Army, 

Air Force, Navy, and Marine personnel were housed there with monthly 

base support contracts exceeding $2 million. The move into Eskan Village involved a $26-miIIion contract through the Saudi government to 

provide furniture and other necessities.** Prime RIBS provided field 

feeding support at the compound, operating three Harvest Falcon 9-1 

kitchens, augmented with Saudi-provided contract laborers. 

Among the services provided was the Tactical Field Laundry system 

used to provide a laundry capability, but it fell short of expectations. The 

system consumed high volumes of water (240 gallons per hour) and 

suffered frequent and continuous mechanical failures. Of the 62 laundry 

systems in theater, fewer than half were in operation; 13 sites provided 

some level of contractor laundry service.29 

History, CENTAFIDE, c+30 - c+60. 26 

”Eskan Village is a modern housing complex of high-rise and single-level villas 

built by the Saudi government for the Bedouin people, who refused to live in these 

facilities. Because of lack of use, many of the vacant units needed plumbing 

repairs-some minor, others major. These repairs were done for the most part by USAF 

civil engineers. 

Maj Gen Robert A. Buethe, Jr., Command Surgeon, HQ TAC, blamed the reliance 

on host nation feeding for the large number of IS. “1 know you [Gen McAuliffe] 

worked hard during Operation Desert Shield to get airlift for field kitchens. Unfortunately 

in most cases our bases relied on host nation feeding. We paid a price for not having our 

own food service . . . . ” Jeddah AB experienced four separate FBIS attributed to food 

prepared in off-base facilities. One case affected 648 Air Force personnel during the Air 

War. Contaminated ice used to cool canned drinks was the culprit in two outbreaks at 

Bateen and A1 Dhafra. Letter w/atch, Maj Gen Robert A. Buethe, Jr., HQ TAUSG to Brig 

Gen.Michael A. McAuliffe, HQ TAUDE, 5 Jun 1991; CENTAFIDE “Weekly Status Report,” 

9 Feb 1991; Capt Robert W. Jensen. 2 SVS (Deployed) 9 May 1991. 

28 

29CENTAF/DE, “Weekly Status Report,” 19 Jan 1991. 

18 
A mortuary capability, critical from the outset of the deployment, was 

a task assumed by the Air Force as the Executive Agent for mortuary 

affairs until outbreak of hostilities, when the Army became responsible. 

On 15 August, a six-member team (four military and two civilian) led by 

Maj. Keith A. Howell, from Headquarters Air Force Engineering and 

Services Center, Tyndall AFB, Florida, deployed to assume control of 

mortuary affairs at Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Upon arrival, the 

team coordinated with the other Services and assured that people in the 

field were well-trained and possessed the equipment needed to handle 

casualties. Each of the sites received a Mini-Morgue kit to establish 

their own remains processing capability. Although the sites were wellprepared for casualties, issues such as contaminated remains and procedures for the transfer of executive agency to the U.S. Army were problem 

areas throughout the deployment.M 

Engineering and Services Challenges 

The fact that combat crews were deployed ahead of the support tail 

created problems for engineers and other support functional areas. For 

example, at A1 Dhafra, Uilited Arab Emirates, F-16 pilots from Shaw 

AFB, South Carolina slept under the wings of their aircraft upon arrival. 

In many cases, adequate latrines and shower facilities were unavailable 

to handle the number of people arriving. Food services personnel faced 

many similar obstacles. In some cases, contracts for food handling had 

already been established, causing confusion and often resulting in contract 

modification or reneg~tiation.~' 

Most engineers had never trained on the setup of Harvest Falcon 

equipment, and when TEMPER tents and utility systems began to amve, 

many without technical orders, the engineers were uncertain as to what 

constituted a complete set, how they were to be assembled, or how to 

repair the equipment. To remedy this situation, CENTAF Engineering 

obtained three sets of technical orders, reproduced sufficient copies, and 

wHistory, CENTAF Mortuary Assistance Team, 7 Aug 1990 - 6 Sep 1990. 

3'lntvw, Capt Deborah Van De Ven, 375 SVS, with Dr Ronald B. Hartzer, 2 Dw 

1991. 

19 
distributed them to the sites.32 Furthermore, the delivery of Harvest 

Falcon equipment was delayed, parts were missing, shipping containers 

inappropriately marked, and in some cases, equipment was appropriated 

by organizations other than the 

War Readiness Spares Kits (WRSK) for several Harvest Falcon items 

often did not accompany the delivery or were incomplete. In October 

1990, CENTAF reported: “We only have to date, 60 percent of the required 

WRSK kits in theater for electrical generators and the fill rate on some kits 

is less than 30 percent.”Y Inevitably, the most critical items were missing 

from the kits. Filters for generators were scarce, and engineers resorted 

to improvising with panty hose. Spares shortages forced operators to 

“abuse” their equipment. Many generators, for example, were operated 

for 16 maintenance cycles without any routine maintenan~e.~’ 

A major problem for engineering and services personnel was their 

i nabi 1 it y to monitor and control prepositioned equipment ( primari 1 y 

Harvest Falcon assets) and vehicles, a release, delivery responsibility 

assigned to the CENTAF Logistics Directorate. In mid-November, Colonel 

Rothenberg observed: “CENTAF Engineering continues to have little to no 

insight into the availability of Harvest Falcon assets, and the organization 

was often in a quandary over the management, division, and delivery of 

unknown numbers of equipment to sites that needed the equiprnenP6 

Even as late as February 1991, CENTAF Engineering reported they did not 

32History, CENTAFIDE, C-day - c+>o; Memo, TSgt Roben D. Blevins, HQ TA~E 

Battle staff to HQ TAOLGXW, subj: Tech Orders. 27 Sep 1990; Msg, USCENTAF WD HQ 

ElementlDE to USCENTAF TAC Langley AFB. VNBS-DE, subj: Technical Order Library, 

1717312 Oct 1990. 

33An entire L-101 1 aircraft load of B-rations disappeared off the Dhahran AB 

flightline in mid-Aug. Maj Howell discovered a complete Harvest Falcon 9-1 Kitchen 

set up and operating at an Army camp. History, 363 CES (Deployed), 2 Aug 1990 - 25 

Sep 1990. 

%apt Wayland H. Patterson, “Notes for the Worldwide WRhi Conference,” 19 Oct 

1990. 

3Slbid. 

%story, CENTAFIDE, ~+60 toC+W, p 2. 

20 
know how many water purification units, laundry units, latrines, mobile 

kitchens, and 150-cubic-foot refrigeration units were availabk for use.37 

The multicommand and multiservice presence at some bases also 

presented challenges for the engineers and Services people. At King 

Fahd, for example, elements of the 1st Special Operations Wing, the 23d 

and 354th Tactical Fighter Wings, and units from the U.S. Army’s 1Olst 

and 82d Airborne Divisions were collocated, and engineers fwnd themselves in separate living and working compounds. Although this contributed to unit integrity, it led to base operating inefficiencies.M Additionally, Prime RIBS provided Tactical Field Exchange services to Special 

Operations and U.S. Army forces. They were also tasked to assume 

remains recovery, since these units dcployed without Mortuary Affairs 

capabilities . Base Sustrri3lment 

Air Force, Army, and Navy engineers began to formulate a base 

construction policy in September 1990. ’ho standards applied during 

Operation Desert Shield: the “initial” standard characterized by austere 

facilities with minimal engineer construction efforts and intended for use 

from one to six months, and the “temporary” standard characterized by 

minimum facilities and intended to increase efficiency of operations for 

up to twenty-four months. On 6 September 1990. USCINCCENT Logistics 

adopted the policy in the theater to “build to initial standards. Construction or upgrade to temporary or permanent standards will not be accomplished without the approval of USCINCCENT.”39 A Project Review Working Group chaired by Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Olsen validated requirements 

and designated priorities for possible RED HORSE support. At the initial 

meeting in October, the Working Group assigned highest priorities to a 

37CENTAF/DE, “Weekly Status Report.” 9 Feb 1991. 

’?he engineers from the 834th CES, Hurlburt Field, FL, supported the 1st SOW, yet 

relied on the 354th CES for vehicle and equipment support. The Hurlburt engineers 

constructed and maintained a separate cantonment area for the 1st SOW, requiring inefficient use of critical Harvest Falcon assets. After Action Report, 3S4th CEF, Engineering 

Branch, nd. 

39Msg, USCENTAFIDE to multiple addressees, subj: Policy and Planning Guidance for 

Theater Construction, 15 17082 Sep 1990. 

21 
munitions storage area at Al Kharj and a munitions haul road at Dhahran, 

Saudi Arabia for the Army.@ 

In October, engineers began exploring the possibility of connecting 

with host nation’s commercial power or water systems. Sites without 

cable to hook to a commercial power source continued using portable or 

750kW generators. However, with growing power requirements and a 

protracting deployment, connection with commercial power became 

imperative. They began paving roads and walkways, constructing fixed 

latrines and showers, and preparing their equipment and people for a 

prolonged deployment. 

One major problem for sites was the disposal of waste and sewage. 

Wastewater was distributed either to underground storage tanks and 

pumped out by contractors or to a gray-water pond for evaporation or 

absorption. However, some sites with clay-sandy soil and a hard sandstone subbase did not permit absorption. Seeking solutions, engineers 

constructed lagoon-like systems to pipe the gray water further from the 

cantonment area and thereby reduce potential health hazards. As the 

deployment wore on, more permanent designs called for connections to 

host nation sewage systems. 

Fire Protection 

Firefighters established a fire protection capability by assembling 

vehicles, equipment, and firefighting agents (halon, dry chemical, and 

aqueous film-forming foam). They assessed the fire protection requirements of the site, evaluated host nation capabilities, and assisted engineers 

in planning site layouts. 

Their vehicles arrived from prepositioned storage sites in theater, 

some from European War Reserves Material storage, and one from Korea. 

Many of them were not operational, arriving with broken pumps, dryrotted fan belts and hoses, and few tools, hoses, or firefighting agents. 

Firefighting agent was not prepositioned and did not come with the 

vehicles. Empty prepositioned flightline fire extinguishers had to be 

refilled on the local economy at a much higher cost. Firefighters also 

@History, CENTAFDE, c+W to c+120, p. 3. 

22 
encountered problems with connections required to service halon tanks on 

vehicles, since the threads of U.S.-made vehicles did not match Britishmade equipment and required fabrication of connectors. As with other 

combat support areas, communication problems plagued the firefighters 

in the early weeks of the deployment. It was not until December, when 

the programmable radios arrived, that the communications shortfalls were 

remedied. Throughout the deployment, nearly all sites relied to some 

extent on host nation firefighting assistance whose capabilities varied 

from site to site. In the early weeks, Air Force firefighters often shared 

facilities and equipment with host nation firefighters4' 

Prime BEEF firefighters establish a fire protection capability 

by assembling vehicles, equipment, and firefighting agents. 

The Buildup 

In November, when President George Bush ordered additional forces 

to the Persian Gulf region to provide an offensive capability, Air Force 

operations expanded at several bases with additional planes and people. 

As many sites stretched to maximum capacity, General Horner requested 

Unit History, Fire Prokction Program Manager. CMSpr Finkhiner, 7 Oct I990 - '41 

I Mar 1991 

23 
more bases. For Engineering and Services this meant another push to 

beddown deploying forces. This time, however, support forces prepared 

the support structure for the arriving forces. Nearly every existing base 

added blocks of tents, erected bath houses, and assembled aircraft hangers, general-purpose shelters, and weapons storage areas, connecting them 

to power 

RED HORSE engineers tackled larger and heavier jobs such as parking 

ramps and taxiways. At Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain, the project called 

for constructing two concrete hardstands, 550 by 204 feet and 450 by 240 

feet, with aircraft grounds, laying 100-foot-wide asphalt taxitracks around 

each hardstand, tying taxitracks into the main taxiway, and constructing 

a 100-foot by 3,200-foot asphalt taxiway running parallel to the northern 

side of the south loop. They erected 36 revetments for the incoming 

aircraft. At A1 Minhad Air Base UAE, they constructed a 3W-foot by 

1,050-foot concrete and asphalt parking apron for an additional F-16 

squadron.43 At Jeddah, the engineers moved more than 15O.OOO cubic 

yards of earth and created more than 400,000 square feet of weapons 

storage area. The availability of a large-scale construction industry in the 

region enabled Air Force engineers to complete this type of work on time 

by contracting it out or by leasing equipment.44 

To put more aircraft closer to the Kuwaiti border, Lt. Gen. Charles 

A. Homer directed his engineers to open two new sites in Saudi Arabia. 

The first, about 60 miles south of Riyadh near the town of A1 Kharj, had 

been programmed as a massive Saudi military installation, but only a 

runway, taxiway, and parking apron had been constructed. This project 

presented one of the biggest challenges facing Air Force engineers during 

the war. On 12 November, RED HORSE accepted overall responsibility for 

construction, and the 4th Civil Engineer Squadron (CES) and other engineering personnel would augment them. The squadron would operate and 

maintain the base after completion. On 25 November, RED HORSE and 

Prime BEEF and contractor personnel went to work. The engineers built 

a pad 12 inches thick, compacting more than 200,000 cubic yards of red 

42History, 363 CES (Deployed) 5 Dec 1990 - 3 Jan 1991. 

43 820th RED HORSE CES, Desert Shieldksert Storm After Action Report, Jun 1991 ; 

8234 RED HORSE CES, Desert ShieldDesert Storm After Action Report, nd. 

Letter w/o atchs, Lt col Timothy N. Beally, Commander, 1701 PRWIDE, to HQ 44 

SAUDE, 14 Feb 1991. 

24 
clay to serve as the foundation for a tent city. Eventually, 630 TEMPER 

tents, 4 kitchens, a gymnasium, 21 latrines, and 26 shower and shave 

units were erected. They constructed a sanitary system, and a power 

plant of seventeen 750kW turbine generators, assembled an air-transportable hospital, and built 6 K-span structures. A1 Kharj was ready for 

aircraft in early January, and by the beginning of the war, the base was 

home to 4,900 Air Force personnel.45 

RED HORSE engineers tackled large and heavy jobs 

such as the creation of this munitions storage site. 

At the same time, another RED HORSE team was busy building a 

forward operating location only 50 miles from the Iraqi border at King 

Khalid Military City (KKMC), Saudi Arabia. This was initially planned 

as a small, 800-person site with a quick turn-around capability for aircraft 

flying missions to Iraq and Kuwait and to recover damaged aircraft. This 

required the installation of aircraft arresting barriers and an expanded fire 

response capability. The base continued to expand until it reached a 

population of 1,650 in mid-January and nearly 2,000 in February 1991. 

Once hostilities began, Khalid was prohibited from using contract 

employees because of security concerns, which caused a number of 

problems. One problem at Khalid was airfield lighting. After two air- 

"[hid; 82.33 RED HOUSE CES. After Action Report 

25 
craft crashed trying to locate the airfield in dense fog, the engineers set 

up a remote area lighting system for approach, but it was not until February 1991 that a strobe light set was available for installation. RED HORSE 

also had to complete integrated combat turn-pads on 17 January.46 

RED HORSE and Prime BEEF prepared beddown tasks 

in advance including construction of the blocks of tents above. 

One of the outstanding engineering accomplishments of the war was 

the construction of more than seven linear miles of revetment at King 

Fahd. The effort paid dividends when a missile on a parked A-10 accidently fired into a revetment wall. The aluminum revetment stopped the 

missile and prevented damage to aircraft parked nearby!7 Also, when 

several collapsing bunkers at different bases killed American military 

personnel, prompting CENTAF Engineering to issue guidance to all units, 

including the U.S. Army, on techniques for constructing personnel bunkcivil Engineering Unit History, KKMC, nd; 820th RED HORSE CES, After Action 

Personal History, Capt Patterson, 6 Oct 1990 - 12 Mar 1991, p 2. 

46 

Report. 

47 

26 
ers. Apparently, the weight of sandbags piled on plywood or a 463L 

pallet roof collapsed the bunker and suffocated the inhabitant^.^' 

During the buildup, mortuary affairs people continued to acquire 

refrigerated trailers, transfer cases, human remains pouches, fingerprint 

kits, and related materials. Major Howell and the CENTAF Mortuary 

Assistance Team visited twenty sites to provide training, answer questions, and distribute mortuary supplies and equipment. By 15 January 

1991, the teams had processed forty-nine remains. The one issue that 

was never satisfactorily resolved, however, was the disposition of nuclear, 

biological, or chemically contaminated remains.49 

Operations Outside Southwest Asia 

Air Force Engineering and Services personnel also deployed in Turkey, Spain, the Indian Ocean, England, Germany, France, Italy, Greece, 

and within the United States. Torrejon Air Base, Spain, and Rhein Main 

Air Base, Germany, served as major transit bases for deploying to and 

from Southwest Asia. Rhein Main engineers redesigned the hydrant 

system enabling them to double the refueling capacity by using more 

trucks over a shorter distance.s0 

The demands placed upon U.S. Air Force, Europe (USAFE) stopover 

bases stressed their base-level services functions to unprecedented levels. 

Table 2 illustrates the substantial billeting demands placed upon USAFE 

bases. Rhein Main and Torrejon both constructed tent cities to handle the 

flow of people. At Moron Air Base, Spain, rooms intended to house two 

people were packed with as many as six. Air crews, however, were given 

prioriry for on-base quarters because of crew rest requirement^.^' 

48/bid, p 4; Msg, CENTAFDE to AIG 10322, subj: Personnel Bunkers, 2019062 Jan 

History, CENTAF Mortuary Assistance Team, 7 Nov 1990 - 6 Dec 1990, p I; 

%e Tip of the Sword, HQ USAFE ES&ABO: We Keep the Fighters in the Fight,” 3 

”lbid, p 4; lntvw with Mr. Tim Wybie and Mr. Charles Johnson, 435 SVS, with Dr. 

1991. 

49 

CENTAFDE, “Weekly Status Report,” 19 Jan 1991. 

Jan 1992, p 6. 

Ronald B. Hartzer. 30 Jan 1992. 

27 
Table 2 

USAFE Billeting Supports2 

Daily Peak %Hour 

Avg+ Period Bpse 

Rhein Main 560 4959 

Ramstein 1 100 2893 

Mildenhall 839 1608 

Upper Heyford 70 3594 

Torrejon 213 2500 

Aviano 166 lo00 

Zaragoza 450 980 

Incirlik 700 So00 

* Pre-Desert Shield 

In December 1990, the Engineer and Services forces in Europe began 

deploying to bases in Turkeyaperation Proven Force. A seventeenmember engineering team from Ramstein Air Base, Germany, quietly 

worked inside a warehouse at Incirlik, ordering supplies and preassembling tent floors. When the Turkish government granted approval on 16 

January, engineers, aircraft crews, and other support personnel deployed 

to the base at Incirlik. The engineers constructed “Tornado Town” and 

helped beddown deployed per~onnel.’~ 

Preparations for deployment assumed a feverish pitch throughout many 

areas of the world. Engineering teams reopened RAF Fairford, United 

Kingdom, and Moron Air Base, Spain, to support flying operations at 

Moron, they patched the runway between missions to keep it open during 

Operation Desert Storm. Tankers were bedded down in France, Greece, 

and Italy. While support was supplied primarily by host nations, Air 

Force firefighters deployed to provide crash and rescue operations for the 

Briefing Slides, USAFEMWX, 17 Jan 1992. 52 

531Tip of the Sword,” pp 13- 17. 

28 
aircraft.s4 In the United Kingdom, engineers opened World War 11-era 

contingency hospitals at Nocton Hall, Bicester, and Little Rissington, 

where water storage capabilities had to be supplemented with bladders.5s 

Mortuary Processing Centers were established at RAF Lakenheath, Incirlik 

Air Base, and Torrejon Air Base. Specialized equipment and supplies 

were procured for each location to enable the facilities to process the 

remains resulting from deaths in medical facilities in Europe.% 

Operation Desert Storm 

At CENTAF, the Engineering staff could tell that the air war had 

begun because the phones stopped ringing. Coincidental with the onset 

of hostilities, ARCENT assumed Executive Agency of the Mortuary Program. At the Air Bases, firefighters assumed 12-hour shifts to support 

Coalition Air Forces with fire protection for integrated combat turns with 

hot pit refueling operations. As combat sorties increased, so did the inflight and ground emergencies, bamer engagements, and malfunctioning 

ordnance responses. Firefighters also extinguished fires on armed aircraft but not without problems resulting from battle damage. At one 

base, Khalid, the firefighters responded to 157 in-flight emergencies and 

785 integrated combat-turn standbys during Operation Desert Storm. 

Appendices C and D reflect selected Engineer and Services equipment 

available or used to support base operations shortly after the initiation of 

hostilities in January 1991 .57 

For the U.S. Army Patriot batteries at Riyadh Air Base, King Khalid 

International Airport, and near Eskan Village, RED HORSE personnel 

constructed security berms. They rigged front-end loaders to assist in 

reloading batteries, reducing the reload time from forty-five to five minutes. The Air Force also provided electricity to Patriot Batteries at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and Shaikh Isa, Bahrain Air Bases. On 17 January, 

the 820th deployed to Khalid to complete the integrated combat-turn 

Desert ShieldDesert Storm Engineering and Services Support,” HQ SACNO, nd; 

“Lessons Learned and Roblems Discovered, Deployment to Royal Air Force Station 

Fairford,” 91 CES, nd. 

’%rip Report on Fire Department Deployment, MSgt Richard L. Baker, 513th 

CEUDEF, nd; After Action Report, 48 CES Nocton Hall Contingency Hospital Support, nd. 

SJ,, 

Tip of the Sword,” pp 7-8. 56‘. 

57History, Fire Department, KKMC, nd. 

29 
project abandoned by the contractor.’* At the onset of hostilities, the Air 

Force was without contract support at nearly every site. Either the contract workers did not report for work or the base was closed to them. 

A joint RED HORSE-Explosive Ordnance Disposal team tackled the 

most challenging postwar project on 26 February, when General Homer 

tasked them to deny two air bases in southeastern Iraq any future use by 

returning Iraqi forces. Working with Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

personnel on 6 March, two teams of engineers arrived at Tallil and Jaliba 

Air Bases in Iraq. At Tallil, RED HORSE used approximately 80,000 

pounds of explosives, consisting primarily of £ shape charges and 

MK-82.500-pound bombs, to make cuts in the runway and taxiway every 

2,000 feet. At Jaliba Air Base, the engineers denied a concrete runway 

and two parallel asphalt taxiways, with 27 cuts (72 craters up to 40 feet 

wide and I2 feet deep) in the pavement. Only 4 days later, on 10 March 

1991, the final members of the team were aboard CH-47 helicopters 

returning to Saudi Arabia. When they were finished, the engineers concluded that it would cost less to build a new base than to clean up and 

repair the denied bases.59 

During the Gulf War, 3,000 Air Force engineers bedded down 

55,000 people and 1,200 aircraft at nearly 30 sites. They erected 5,000 

tents and constructed 300,000 square feet of building space. Nearly 

1,200 Services personnel prepared more than 20-million meals, provided 

billeting services and Tactical Field Exchanges, and worked to return 

deceased personnel with dignity. Air Force Commissary personnel managed receipt and distribution of over $55-million in rations supporting 

Army, Air Force, and Marine personnel. 

‘%M RED HORSE CES Report, p v. 

”“Desert Finale After Action Report,” (in 823d RED HORSE Report). 

30 
2 

Protecting the Air Bases 

During Operation Desert Shield, the initial deployment of combat 

forces took place much faster, while support forces deployed at a much 

slower pace. The plan also called for CENTAF forces to operate from ten 

main bases and four forward operating locations. By the end of the Phase 

I1 build-up period that had began in November 1990, CENTAF was operating from twenty-five locations.' 

The fact that there were 25 locations meant that twice as many security police and ground defense forces were required than identified in the 

OPLAN. However, due to CENTCOM-imposed Air Force manning levels, 

only 4,500 Air Force security police were deployed throughout Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm. Since CENTAF did not have sufficient 

security forces to adequately defend the air bases, joint security and 

ground defense operations were imperative. 

The total number of U.S. Air Force security police deployed to the 

theater almost exactly equaled the number deployed to Vietnam during 

that conflict. In 1970, at peak strength, there were approximately 5,000 

U.S. Air Force security police protecting 8 bases in the Republic of 

Vietnam. During Operations Desert ShieldDesert Stom, a total of 4,500 

security police, with approximately 3,900 plus at its peak, defended 3 

times that number of beddown sites.2 

'(s) OPLAN (SIOADR) OPLAN 1002-90, pp C-7 and A-2-1; Intvw, Lt Cen Charles A. 

'Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, Office of Air Force 

Homer, COMUSCENTAF, 28 Jan 1992. p 7. 

History, Washington, 1979, p 82; USCENTAF Deployed Roster. 21 Feb 1991. 

31 
Figure 2 

WAF Ground Defense Forces 

Almost a quarter of a century after Vietnam, a security police manpower standard for wartime operations did not exist. In the late 196Os, 

U.S. Air Force officials had abandoned the manpower standards based 

upon the number of aircraft or other resources assigned, in favor of one 

tied to “hot war” conditions and other factors such as terrain, rules of 

engagement, and the area to be defended. Several surveys were conducted, but they all produced different answers and, as a result, the U.S. 

Air Force never developed a ~tandard.~ 

The decision to deploy combat forces into the theater first, as well 

as the priorities assigned for deployment of support forces, resulted in 

the arrival of aircraft in theater ahead of security forces. This also 

31bid. 

32 
Security police 

guard the air base. 

Rear area security 

operations must 

assure adequate 

protection of air 

bases in order that 

the theater commander can fight 

the battles without 

disruption of the ail 

campaign. 

33 
meant that, at least in some cases, U.S. commanders had to rely on host 

nation security forces or provide their own personnel to protect them and 

their assets. Some commanders did augment their security forces with 

maintenance, supply, and other personnel. In addition, some of the more 

junior security police commanders, in the beginning of the operation, did 

not trust host nation security forces to provide that protection. They 

wanted the air base surrounded with U.S. Army military police or infantry forces. ARCENT had of course massed its forces near the Kuwaiti 

border, in accordance with their understanding of the air-land battle 

concept and the desires of the USCINCCENT! Commanders wanted to 

ensure their bases were protected against potential threats that could 

attack their personnel or equipment. 'Qpes of threats, examples, and 

appropriate responses to those threats were as indicated in Table 3. 

CENTAF security police leaders had been working with their host nation 

country counterparts for years and were well aware of their air base defense 

capabilities. For example, when it was decided to beddown transport 

aircraft at Thumrait, Oman, CENTAF did not have sufficient security forces 

to protect the base, but host nation security forces were available to fulfill 

this role. Yet, the Military Airlift Command questioned this decision, 

primarily because of a lack of U.S. security forces to guard the aircraft. 

CENTAF security police argued that Omani guards could provide the protection. The greatest threat to U.S. personnel and assets was during the early 

part of the deployment when there were insufficient forces to withstand an 

Iraqi ground attack into Saudi Arabia. However, the threat in Oman was 

low, due to their distance from Iraqi forces, and after all, the operation 

was a Coalition effort. At first, Military Airlift was reluctant but, after 

further consultation with CENTAF, accepted its recommendations. Omani 

guards protected the C-130s for two days, until CENTAF could move its 

own security forces into position.' The primary danger came from terrorists and surface-to-surface missiles. In Saudi Arabia, especially, the terrorist threat decreased considerably because the Saudi government deported 

anyone suspected of harboring pro-Iraqi sentimenk6 

4USCEMAF/SP Battle Cell Log. pp 1, 44. and 50; Conduct of the Persian Gulf War 

Final Report to Congress, Apr 1992, Vol 1, p 51. 

'USCENTAF/SP Battle Cell Log, p ix. 

%'atterns of Global Terrorism 1991, Dept of State Pub 9963, Apr 1992, p 28. 

34 
Table 3 

Threat Level Matrix 

~ 

Threat Level Examples Response 

Level I Agents, saboteurs, Unit/base/base clussympathizers, ter- ter self-defense mearorists sures 

Level I1 Small tactical units, Self-defense meaunconventional sures and response 

warfare forces, guer- force(s) with suprillas porting fires 

Level I11 Large tactical force Requires commitoperations including ment of a tactical 

airborne, heliborne, combat force 

amphibious, infiltration operations, and 

major air operations 

Host nations had not been willing, in some cases, to undertake joint 

security-related operations in the past. Furthermore, CENTAF and ARCENT 

had differing opinions regarding rear area securit~.~ Thus, air base security was bound to be a contentious issue during the deployment. 

CENTAF built its security police force on the basis of criteria outlined 

in Air Force Regulation 207-1, ‘The Air Force Physical Security Program,” and Air Force Regulation 125-37, “The Installation and Resources 

Protection Program,” with added manpower requirements factored in for 

force protection, internal air base ground defense, and limited external 

screening missions. Ground defense operations focused primarily on 

internal base security operations and placed the responsibility for external 

security on host nation or ARCENT forces. 

7Fo~, pp 82-83; and Minutes of Worldwide SP Lessons Lrarned Conference, 20-25 

Oct 1991; HQ USCENTAF/SP Battle Cell Log, 7 Aug 1990 - 27 Mar 1991. 

35 
Rear Area Security During Joint Operations 

Rear area security operations must assure adequate protection of air 

bases in order that the theater commander can simultaneously fight the 

deep, close, and rear battles without disruption of the air campaign. 

Inherent in rear area security operations is the need for early establishment of a theater-wide air base ground defense network that incorporates 

U.S. Army support during threat levels I1 and 111. Evolving doctrine 

draws heavily on command, control, communications, and intelligence 

(C31) and places demands on sensor and deep strike weapons technology.* 

Associated host nation warning and detection mechanisms that appropriately assess and counteract hostile threats must also be an integral part of 

the C31 network and must be compatible with U.S. equipment. 

According to General Homer, 'The initial deployment of air, naval, 

and ground forces was intended to deter an Iraqi ground attack and 

defend key ports and air fields along the Saudi northern gulf 

coast4isposition of forces eventually was expanded to block the two 

eastern avenues of approach."' The area defense plan called for establishing initial defenses near Al Jubay and Dhahran and for using air power 

to reduce Iraqi combat capabilities that could be applied against U.S. and 

Coalition forces. During this initial phase, USClNCCEhT considered air 

power crucial in deterring an Iraqi attack, thereby putting attendant stress 

on U.S., host nation, and Coalition security forces." For example, there 

was a fury of activity to ensure that stinger missile teams and other point 

air defense systems were quickly moved into the bases. Work shifts were 

extended and military working dog teams deployed to give air bases an 

early warning capability, especially at the most critical bases." 

However, there was some difficulty in establishing the Army's role 

in the defense of air bases and how air bases fit into the joint rear area 

security scheme. This was exacerbated by the fact that very few Air 

Force and U.S. Army security force leaders were thoroughly familiar with 

rear area operations. Except for limited discussions above the unit level, 

"Amy Times, 12 Mar 1990, p 5. 

'intvw with Lt Gen Horner, COMUSCENTAF, 20 Jan 1992, p 6. 

''/bid. 

"HQ USCENTAFISP Operations Battle Cell Log, pp 7-9, 20, 27. 

36 
there was little knowledge and even less understanding of the U.S. 

Army’s role in establishing theater rear area operations and when they 

would participate in airbase ground defense operations. Despite years of 

exercises and joint training efforts at the unit level, the divergent expectations of Army and Air Force leaders became manifest throughout the 

initial employment of their forces.” 

Security phnners at CENTAF expressed concerns to ARCENT with 

regard to rear area security procedures, and while there was agreement 

that there should be a focus of primal combat operations, these operations 

were constrained by U.S. Army and Air Force force structures. As long 

as the U.S. Army leadership was reluctant to commit combat maneuver 

forces to rear area operations, and as long as Army reservists represent 

the bulk of rear area personnel, including rear area security, all requiring 

a Presidential call-up of reserves, rear area security will remain a source 

of irritation to both the Air Force and the U.S. Army. 

These conflicts of interest stemmed from differing Army and Air 

Force views of joint rear area security concepts. As noted, the Army is 

primarily concerned with front-line troops, where it concentrates its combat forces.13 New Army doctrine stressed “base defenses, an increased 

combat role for military police, and the employment of major combat units 

in the rear area”-but only when ne~essary.’~ The Air Force, on the other 

hand, tended to believe that rear area bases had to be defended at all costs, 

because from these bases close air support and battlefield air interdiction 

missions were launched in support of the land ~ampaign.’~ However, the 

Air Force realized that some bases were more critical than others and did 

not want to extend this policy to all its bases. [DELETED]16 

’2~~~-~~ (S). Memo for Chief, USCENTAF/SP, subj: Military Police Support to Air 

Bases, 3 Dec 1990; (S) Msg, 2314002 Jan 1991, 35 CSG Provisional/CC, subj: SITREP, p 

4. 

13U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, p 218. 

I4fbid, p 218; Report to Congress on Gulf War, Appendix 1, p 331. 

”John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of 

Army Docrrine, 1973-1982, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Historical Office, 

1984, pp 8-9. JCS Pub 0-2 states that “maintaining the security of the command involves 

the development of contingency plans for self-defense.” 

j6[DELETED] 

37 
While the Air Force viewed air base ground defense as a crucial 

Army mission, the US. Army’s major concern naturally lay at the front 

or forward line of troops. In the Amy’s view, air base ground defense 

was just one of many rear area security issues. Its slightly more than 

17,000 military police guarded some 9,OOO kilometers of supply routes, 

172 critical facilities, and eventually more than 84,000 prisoners of war 

and civilian internees, in addition to normal “police functions.” In some 

cases, Army and Air Force rear area security interests coincided-but not 

necessarily for the same reasons. A good case in point was Dhahran and 

the smaller bases around it. From an Air Force perspective, air base 

ground defense in this area was critical because of the number of highvalue assets and personnel bedded down there. In this instance, the Army 

agreed, but mainly because Dhahran was the primary port of entry for its 

equipment and personnel. In other words, where Army and Air Force 

interests coincided-there was little conflict.” 

While they agreed in principle on the major aspects of rear area 

security, the Air Force and Army differed on the methods and procedures 

necessary to achieve it. For example, CENTAF’S position was that at some 

point, Air Force ground defense force commanders should have operational control of forces designated for the air base ground defense mission, 

so that they would have them available when and where they were needed. 

On the other hand, ARCENT was concerned with rear area security issues 

that went beyond the scope of air base ground defense and wanted to 

maintain operational control over all its forces until such time as the threat 

of attack on CENTAF sites became imminent.” The Army was prepared 

to provide what it called “active” air base ground defense to those locations within the “combat zone,” but the Air Force rarely established bases 

or bedded down valuable assets in areas that close to the front lines.’’ 

Bfrg, Third U.S. Army, “Blue Flag 92-1, Airland Battle,” nd; USCE~TAF/SXS. 3 

Aug 1992; Bfrg, Third U.S. Army Provost Marshall, 8 Jan 1992. 

”Bfrg, Third U.S. Amy, “Blue Flag 92-1. Airland Battle,” nd; HQ USCENTAF/SP 

OperationdBattle Cell Log, p 3; (S) Appendix 5 to Annex C to Operations Desert Storm, 

Unclassified extract from Airbase Ground Lkfense, p C-5-3. 

Bfrg, Third U.S. Amy Provost Marshall, 8 Jan 1992. 

17 

19 

38 
Despite these differences, ARCENT and CENTAF did join together on some 

issues. One such point of agreement was that base clusters should be used 

as the building blocks for the rear area security system.20 

Fundamental to the resolution of the issues was the need for Air 

Force planners to acknowledge the Army’s view with respect to the 

difficulty and complexity of the security problems. For example, designation of the front and rear lines may become “blurred,” and the commitment of combat ground forces to static defense could render decisive 

offensive operations ineffective and thereby delay enemy defeat. On the 

other hand, U.S. Army planners had to acknowledge the pivotal role of 

air power to the theater campaign and to acknowledge the fact that the air 

component projects its combat power from the rear area, and as such 

must be appropriately protected. In fact, these issues were never completely resolved, despite the fact that both General Homer and Lt. Gen. 

John Yeosock, ARCENT, discussed it in official letters.” 

The operational objectives of U.S. and Allied forces in Operations 

Desert ShieldlDesert Storm evolved in concept with the ongoing buildup 

of U.S. military capabilities in the theater. The relationship between 

strategic goals and force potential is interactive and variable over 

time. . . . early-deploying forces played more [ofl a deterrent [rather] 

than a defensive role. . . . As the U.S. buildup continued and allied 

defensive positions were consolidated, a broader range of military 

options to enhance both deterrence and defensive prospects became 

possible. Logistics support and command and control in the theater 

influenced other options and capabilities. A defense with air and light 

ground forces was probably feasible by midSeptember. This type of 

defense would have worn down the Iraqi forces at the sacrifice of 

territory.22 

Memo, DAMO-FDQ, 21 Nov 1989, “Agenda for the Joint Air Base Ground Defense 

2’(s) Ltr, COMUSCENTAF to COMUSARCENT, subj: Military Police support to Air 

Bases, 21 Sep 1990; (S) Ltr, USCENTAF/SP lo USARCENTK.~, subj: Base Cluster Management, 31 Dec 1990. Unclassified Extracts. 

22(S) R-4147, AF, Project Air Force Assessment of Operation Lksert Shield, Vol I, 

The Buildup of Combat Power, Mar 1992, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA. p 15. 

20 

Working Group Meeting,” p 2. 

39 
For Air Force planners, the key issue was to ensure that no Air Base 

was sacrificed. With the further arrival of ground forces through October, 

the defensive potential of the allied forces was more fully realized. The 

Phase I1 buildup in early November assured a successful defense and 

opened a range of offensive 0ptions.2~ 

Development of Rear Area Security 

The joint rear area security structure was slow to materialize. In fact, 

the rear area security command structure was so slow in maturing that it 

was difficult to address security requirements of the Coalition forces 

without some confusion and duplication of effort.24 This occurred because many of the combat service support units that make up the rear 

area security system consist primarily of reserve and national guard units. 

They are mobilized and deployed in the later stages of the force deployment schedule and do not compete well against combat units for early air 

and sea lift.25 The preliminary CENTAF security police contacts with 

CENTCOM and ARCENT military police units had been established prior to 

Operations Desert Shield deployment. The initial air base ground defense 

priorities were identified to ARCENT by a CENTAF message on 8 August 

1990?6 On 27 August 1990, the CENTAF security police and ARCENT 

military police staffs met to prepare more formalized plans for air base 

ground defense support. They identified the King Fahd and Dhahran 

areas as the initial two priorities for military police support, followed by 

the Riyadh and King Khalid International Airport areas. CENTAF 

informed ARCENT that it would reassess its priorities and refine them once 

evaluations of the air bases were clarified. ARCENT then informed 

CENTAF that their military police support to air bases would assume 

number one priority in their operations order.27 There was, however, no 

mutual understanding of what constituted an acceptable level of risk with 

2.7(S) Ibid. 

24Msg, 1223092 Sep 1990, COMUSARCENT Main/AFRD DCG to USClNCCENT Rear 

MacDill AF6. FL, subj: Situation Report; Minutes: Provost Marshall Security Meeting, 

USCENTCOM, 13 k 1990. 24 DW 1990. 

25HQ USCENTAF Operations Battle Celt Log, pp 24, 27, 32. 

2%sg, HQ, USCENTAFISP, 082002 Aug 1990. 

27(s) Ltr, USCENTAFISP 10 ARCENT/G~, subj: Base Cluster Management, 31 Dec 1990. 

40 
respect to vulnerability of air bases.’* Also, it did not take into account 

the requisite degree of “dedicated” support that military police forces 

would be able to provide. This was significant because the militmy 

police forces were a vital, if not pivotal, element that linked the Air Force 

air base ground defense troops with other rear area support units.” 

By 28 September 1990, officers from the U.S. Army 22d Support 

Command made initial contact with CENTAF security poke to begin a 

formal process in developing the rear area support group structure. The 

intent was to coordinate unit actions for rear area operations. They 

determined the number of air base ground defense liaison teams made 

surveys of the terrain, and determined among other things where the Rear 

Tactical Operations Centers would be established. 

The primary focus of security and air base ground defense initiatives 

was to contribute to a cohesive rear area security system and to combine 

the right force mix to stifle, thwart, or take away the initiative from the 

enemy. As stated earlier, the rear area security concept used base clusters 

as the building blocks of the security scheme. The air bases were considered clusters within themselves; therefore, the ground defense commanders developed directives and operating procedures to provide a capability 

to increase responsiveness of units to react to enemy activities. This was 

achieved by continuously sorting and assessing intelligence data provided 

by the security intelligence network-with confidence that the system 

would provide the early warning necessary to alert base units of potential 

attack. This, of course, required an iterative methodology in which each 

successive step in developing the rear area security plan continuously 

refined the previous one. 

’‘Ltr, USCENTAWSP to USARCENT/G3, subj: Rear Area Security Scheme, 6 Dec 1990; 

USCENTAFISP Info Report to COMMUSCENTAF, subj: Security Police Issues; Ltr, 

USCENTAF/SP to USARCENTPM, subj: MP Support to Air Base, 27 Dec 1990. 

USCENTAF/SP Operations Battle Cell Log Book, pp 47, 57, and 60. 29 

41 
The Dhahran area was one of two priorities for air base ground support. 

Photo above shows open storage at Dhahran. 

In this process, the commanders’ assessments of risk was a critical 

factor. The command relationship provided unity of command as well as 

the impetus for determining a deliberate and decisive response to any 

impending threat. Rear battle officers, acting for Maj. Gen. William G. 

Pagonis, U.S. Amy, 22d Support Command, the rear area commander, 

consulted with air base commanders and other cluster commanders to 

determine which procedures provided the greatest overall security to the 

rear area based on the threat and forces available. However, this was not 

formally established until early January 1991. 

Operation Desert Shield air base survivability assessments prepared 

by the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) at each location were used 

to assist in formulating decisions on security force structure and design. 

In concert with continuous analysis of threat level and the development 

of passive security measures at each location, including communication, 

operations, and tactical deception, measures were integrated to reduce the 

probability of attacks and to minimize their effects if they did occur. 

These elements included counter-surveillance operations, reconnaissance 

patrols, and concentration of available resources at fixed positions and at 

42 
critical points along main supply routes, alternate transportation routes, 

and lines of communication. They also included appropriately interfacing 

passive security measures, including counter-surveillance teams, reconnaissance patrols, and, in some locations, sensor-enhanced security without additional expenditure of manpower. Host nation forces provided 

security for key terrain surrounding critical facilities or bases. For example, at Dubai Air Base, United Arab Emirates, the Dubai civilian police 

heavily patrolled the outside perimeter and reported any suspicious activity to U.S. security forces. Also, camel and goat herders that worked in 

the area around the base possessed cellular telephones and assisted with 

lookout and surveillance. Any suspicious activities were called into the 

Minhad local civilian police.m 

While host nation security forces exerted rigorous circulation control 

over the indigenous population, Air Force security police provided circulation control within defended localities. As an added measure of flexibility, 

CENTAF security police staff developed a quick-reaction force of forty-four 

men, billeted at Riyadh Air Base, with the capability of being airlifted to 

any base. For example, this team moved forward to reinforce King Fahd 

Air Base when security police units responded to aircraft crashes that 

occurred during the intensive training leading up to the war. Safeguarding 

classified information demanded particular attenti~n.~’ 

Command and Control 

While Coalition Coordination Communications and Intelligence 

Center (C31C) was not a command echelon, it was used primarily to 

“harmonize” operational planning in areas such as host nation support and 

movement control. It became the “combined operations cornerstone,” 

especially for rear area security operations conducted by other host nation 

and Coalition forces in the Communications Zone (COMMZ), and for the 

coordination and execution of defense security operations. Overall planning and coordination was the responsibility of liaison officers of the 

MMsg, 18M5Z Sep 1990, from 388th TFW Deployed to CENTAF, subj: SITREP. 

”Msg, 140030 Nov 1990, subj: Situation Report, Shakiza AB, p 4; HQ USCENTAF~SP 

Operations Battle Cell Log, pp 74, 93. 

43 
Figure 3 

Air Base Ground Defense 

US Army - Outer Security 

Screening Force 

Transient US Army 

ReseNe/Response Capability 

* Distanl Early Warning 

Weaponr 

Side Arms 

Shoulder Fired Arms 

Stinger Missiles 

Ugh1 AnU-Tank Weapons 

Recoilless Rifles 

Crew %Ned Weapons 

Automatic Grenade Launchers 

Mortars 

Hand Grenades 

Claymore Mines 

Command Detonated Mines (Key Locations) 

Smoke Grenades 

Equlprnent 

Radios (Armored/Mobiie) 

Vehldes Serving as Fighting Platforms 

Convoy Vehicles 

AC-130 Gun Shlps 

Army Helicopters 

Early Warning Devices (tnfra.red sensors, 

Trip Flares 

Night ObseNatin Devices 

Mlcrowave Sensor Devices 

Selsmic Devkes 

Sensor Closed Clrcuit Tv (CCTv) 

Ground SuNeiiiance Radar. etc) 

'Malntenance and ownerluser personnel that 

can be armed to supplement Security Forces. 

44 
participating forces3* Once the rear area became formally established, 

security police units within the zone reported through one of three Rear 

Tactical Operations Centers. Those outside the zone, reported directly to 

the CENTAF security police operations cell at Riyadh.” 

Early during Operation Desert Shield when security-alerting system 

networks were strained to the limit, it became crucial that the joint communications electronic operating instructions (JCEOIS) used to coordinate 

U.S. Army support be addressed at CENTAF as well. After several meetings between CENTCOM and ARCENT, the Air Force obtained authorization 

to receive the same instructions. The U.S. Army military police accepted 

the CENTAF security police proposal for a classified joint emergency 

frequency that would be used by all police forces, including Royal Saudi 

Air Force police, the Ministry of Defense police, and all other Coalition 

military and civil police agencies. The frequencies were to be used only 

for emergency operations-and they were incorporated into the joint 

electronic operating instructions. 

Close Air Support for Rear Area Security 

Close Air Support for rear area security was both preplanned and 

available to meet more immediate requests.” For example, the 130th Rear 

Tactical Operations Center was assigned to the commander of the 22d 

Support Command to plan and coordinate rear area security operations in 

the Communication Z0ne.j’ Coordination between directorates of General 

Security, Traffic Internal Security and Civil Defense, played a crucial role, 

especially outside the zone, as host nation forces were responsible for 

external air base ground defense, port security, and harbor defense for 

bases and ports outside the combat zone, but within the theater. Command and control systems identified for rear area security operations had 

to be compatible with those of the tactical combat force (maneuver eleIbid, p 336; (S) Annex J-I, Combined OPLAN for Security of Riyadh, 28 Jan 1991. 

33USCENTAF Battle Cell Log, 7 Aug 1990 - 27 Mar 1991, p 20; (S) Msg 221 IOOZ 

Nov 1990, USCENTAF/SP to SWA AlG (All SP Units). subj: Security Reporting and Alerting 

System Procedures. 

”(s) Concept of Operations for Command and Control Of TACAlR in support of land 

forces, Desert Shield 1 Jan 1991. 

35(S) Appendix 9 to Annex C to Combined OPLAN Operation Desert Storm. 

32 

45 
ment) and systems used by CENTAF air base ground defense units. Liaison 

teams reported significant rear area activities through the C31C. 

Air Base Defense 

The development of security schemes at the beddown sites did have 

its problems, which were mostly resolved, however, after the first few 

weeks when personal relationships and cultural differences were worked 

out and procedures established. For example, at Shaikh Isa Air Base, 

Bahrain, CENTAF and MARCENT aircraft shared the runway, dong which 

the Air Force wanted to disperse its aircraft, the Marines wanted to group 

theirs in order to facilitate air operations coordination. Grouping caused 

concern for Air Force security officials because it presented lucrative 

targets and exposed a potential for multiple explosions should one or 

more aircraft be sabotaged. The CENTAF security police staff at Riyadh 

found it necessary to send a field grade officer to resolve the differences, 

and the result was an agreement that the Marines would provide external 

security, the Air Force internal.36 Therefore aircraft parking issues were 

resolved using the Air Force parking scheme to enhance security of the 

aircraft. This was accomplished because RED HORSE engineers constructed additional parking pads and provided additional security barriers. 

Defending allied personnel and assets in Riyadh presented a more 

complicated problem. CENTCOM assumed responsibility for protecting 

British and French elements, as well as its own, with the British and 

French providing a platoon of security forces to assist. If the security 

situation in Riyadh deteriorated, CENTCOM planned to use elements of the 

82d Airborne to protect the area, in which case it would be designated as 

the Tactical Combat Force. As long as the situation was not serious, each 

allied or component command basically provided security for the office 

buildings and quarters for its personnel. Thus, in the 130th RADC area 

and the Riyadh community CENTAF staff duties were limited to defense 

of Riyadh Air Base, the Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters, and Eskan 

36(S/NFIWN/OADR) AFOSl Air Base Operability ‘Threat” Assessment, Shakisa AB, 

Section B, 30 Oct 1990. 

46 
Village.37 To implement this plan, each allied or component command 

sent representatives to several coordinating committees. They functioned 

as elements of the Coalition Coordination Communication Integration 

Center, which operated on a twenty-four hour basis. In this manner, 

problems could be presented immediately and resolved quickly.38 

Each unit assigned to CENTAF developed security operations plans that 

outlined cooperation among CENTAF, allied, and host nation security 

forces. The final scheme was a “three tier defense system.” The outer 

tier consisted of plain-clothes detectives augmented by a second tier of 

civil police. The third tier was the internal security provided by Saudi 

and U.S. Air Force security forces.39 Individual host nation sensitivities 

were key factors in determining the degree of interaction between Air 

Force and host nation security forces in the employment of air base 

ground defense techniques. [DELETED]40s41*4z 

”(SIOADR) Combined OPLAN, ‘The Security of Riyadh,” 28 Jan 1991, p 3; (S) 

Record, subj: Provost Marshall Security Meeting, USCENTCOM, 13 Dec 1990, dtd Dec 

1990, p 2. 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Vol I, Apr 1992, p 

336. 

39(S) Office of Special Investigations Survivability Assessment for Taif, Saudi 

@[DELETED] 

4’[DELETED] 

42[DELETED] 

SfXUrity Police Issues Report, USCENTAF/SP to COMM USCENTAF, 8 Sep 1990, Memo for 

38 

Arabia, nd, p B-1-11. 

47 
In some cases, as in the United Arab Emirates, CENTAF security 

police formed armed patrols off-base. Generally, such less stringent rules 

regarding employment of U.S. security police forces were in force in 

nations farther away from the Iraqi-Kuwaiti borders, where there was less 

danger of direct enemy air or ground attack and less complicated fire 

support coordination requirements. In such cases, terrorists posed the 

biggest perceived threat in the form of sabotage or other small-scale 

strikes. Those bases closer to the perceived battle area were protected by 

Army forces, even though those units were not necessarily located immediately adjacent to or within the base itself.43 

Base security at Dhahran (specifically King Abdul Aziz Air Base) 

included Saudi Royal Air Force troops, U.S. Army air defense artillery 

units, and an initial contingent of about 209 Air Force security police 

from the 1st Combat Support Element out of Langley AFB, Virginia. 

Navy security forces provided port security. Due to changes in the 

perceived threat, CENTAF increased its security force strength at Dhahran 

to 409 prior to the opening of hostilities.44 Once again, Air Force security police provided weapon systems security, assisted by a 90-man Saudi 

Royal Air Force contingent. The Saudi Royal Air Force security forces 

protected the perimeter, and the U.S. Army I1 th Air Defense Artillery 

Battery manned a combination of Patriot and Stinger mi~siles.4~ CENTAF 

Security advised aircrews to take off and land in patterns that avoided 

dense and populated areas that were within the range of hand-held SA-7 

and SA-14 shoulder fired infrared surface-to-air missiles. These areas 

were rigorously patrolled by Air Force and host nation security forces.& 

(s) Security Police issues Report (USCENTAFISP), 14 Jan 1991; AFRD-PM Memo for 

Chief, CENTAFISP, subj: Military Police Support to Air Bases, 3 Dec 1990; Conduct of the 

Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Vol 1, Apr 1992, pp 51-53. 

43 

44(S/OADR) Brfg, USCENTAF Briefing ChM, 17 Feb 1991. 

45 (SMFIWNIOADR) AFOSI Threat Assessment, “Dhahran AB,” Section B: See Space 

report, Chapter 5 for additional information on the Patriot. 

%Is& 071 1032 Jan 1991, 1 CSE Deployed (Dhahran) SP, subj: Situation Report. 

48 
Table 4 

Integrated Security Forces of U.S. Air Bases 

U.S. Air Other US. Host Na- Other Host 

Air Base Force Service tion Mili- Coalition Nation 

bry Partner Civilian 

Abu Dhabi. UAE X X X 

A1 Ain, UAE X X X 

A1 Dhafra, UAE X X X 

A1 Jouf, SA X X 

A1 Kharj, SA X X 

A1 Minhad, UAE X 

Bateen, UAE X 

Cairo, Egypt X 

Dhahran, SA X X 

Doha, Qatar X 

Dubai, UAE X 

Jeddah, SA X 

X X 

X X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X X 

X 

X 

X 

Khamis Mushait, X X 

King Fahd, SA X X X 

KKlA, SA X X 

KKMC, SA 

Masirah, Oman 

Riyadh, SA 

Seeb, Oman 

Shaikh lsa, 

Sharjah, UAE 

Tabuk. SA 

Taif. SA 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X X 

X 

X 

X 

Thumrait, Oman X X X 

49 
Base security at Dhahran 

included a combination 

of Patriot and Stinger 

missiles. Patriot is 

shown at left. 

Initially, at some locations, such as Thumrait, Oman, the host nation 

did not allow arming any foreign military person. Therefore, it became 

the responsibility of Coalition partners to use their own security forces for 

external air base ground defense at sites where allied units were 10cated.~’ 

In these areas, security police forces initially functioned as liaison and an 

adjunct security reporting, alerting, and response force, much as security 

support forces (functional area ownerhser, maintenance, and combat 

service support forces) supplement security at all U.S. Air Force bases. 

And in some cases, U.S. security forces were restricted to operations with 

concealed weapons. These initial problems, however, were eventually 

resolved. U.S. security forces were armed and security police commanders given authority to expend war readiness material munitions for confidence and familiarization training and to train with Coalition forces.“ 

Msg. HQ USCENTAWSP to I702 AKTFWL) Dcpk~yed/CC. 221 400% oct 1990, subj: 47 

Security Police Utilization. 

Msg, 2508002 Jan 1991. 1702 CSG(P)/SP to USCENTAtISP, subj: SITREP; Msp 48 

USCENTAWSP to AIG (dl SP units), 250300% NUV 1990, subj: Expenditure Of eXceSS war 

reserve material munitions. 

50 
Coalition partners 

use their own 

security forces for 

external air base 

ground defense. 

The base beddown complicated security planning for several reasons. 

The protection of high value assets remained a concern throughout the 

war. For example, the E-3 AWACS aircraft were all initially located at 

Riyadh but were eventually dispersed to three different locations, primarily for security consideration^.^^ In addition, security forces at many bases 

were also strapped with manpower-intensive weaponllogistics convoy and 

escort duties, since cantonment complexes were dispersed as far as five 

to fifteen miles apart. As a result, air bases in the theater precluded any 

attempt to secure them in a “traditional” air base defense concept. Units 

developed air base ground defense concepts, devised security schemes, 

and secured key resources (dispersed aircraft parking areas, POL areas, 

munitions storage areas and billeting areas, etc.). Reliance on mobile 

response was widespread because of the distance between locations 

requiring protection. Furthermore, exercises and evaluations of security 

requirements had demonstrated that the density of detection mechanisms 

and the location of response forces were key to successful air base ground 

defense efforts. 

As stated above, rapid response was crucial to the rear area security 

system. Therefore, vehicles and communications quickly emerged as the 

primary problems for Air Force security-issues also of a major concern 

during previous conflicts. Security police vehicles did not receive priority 

“USCENTAF/SP Battle Cell Log, pp 24, 29. 

51 
for early airlift during deployment.m Because these specialized armored 

vehicles were required to support responses over austere terrain and to 

serve as weapons platforms for heavy and crew-served weapons, they were 

considered crucial to the successful defense of air bases. 

In this constantly changing environment, rear area security missions 

sometimes were redistributed, as U.S. Army units flowed in and out of 

various locations?’ When U.S. Army forces shifted positions, especially 

from places like Dhahran and King Fahd, the Air Force security police 

relied more heavily on sensor technology to provide force multipliers.52 

The Terrorist Threat 

Gen H. Norman Schwankopf and Lt. Gen. Charles A. Homer considered terrorism as a top priority, and anti-terrorism initiatives e~sential.’~ 

After the initial Coalition buildup, intelligence assessments indicated that 

the feasibility of an invasion of Saudi Arabia had dropped from the most 

likely to the least likely Iraqi option. During the Christmas holiday 

period, respective staffs were informed that General Schwankopf had become increasingly concerned with the possibility of a preemptive or 

surprise attack by Iraq. Such an attack might well be expected during the 

Christmas or New Year’s holidays, or prior to the deadline imposed by 

the United Nations for Iraq to get out of Kuwait. 

General Homer met with General Schwarzkopf to obtain approval of 

the CENTAF-recommended security plan for coping with this potential 

threat. CENTAF security police had developed the plan and disseminated 

it to all Air Force units. Instructions in it [DELETED] included physical 

security and anti-terrorist checklists to be used by all units and submitted 

as addendum to situation reports to CENTAF Security Police. The status 

of “open items” which represented potential areas of vulnerability were 

reviewed on a daily basis. 

%ox, Roger P., Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961 - 1973, Office 

Msg, 07141OZ Jan 1991, ICSE Deployed to USCENTAF/SP, subj: Tactical Sensor 

of Air Force History, Washington, DC, 1979, pp 76-92. 

System for Dhahran AB, SA. 

51 

52Army Times. 12 Mar 1990, p 5. 

”(S) USCENTAFLSP, Battle Cell Log, pp 24, 29; Memo for Record (Minutes) subj: 

Security Meeting, p 2. 

52 
The final preparations for Operation Desert Storm were masked by 

placing many aircraft on ground alert that would permit mission planning, 

crew rest, and aircraft reconfiguration without revealing Coalition plans. 

Obviously, this put increased burdens on the security forces. The internal 

dispersal of aircraft increased the posting requirements for both Air Force 

and host nation security police forces. Emphasis was placed on security 

status reporting to step up the intensity of rear area security and air base 

ground defense network during this period of vulnerability. Another 

period of vulnerability took place when U.S. Army units were shifted to 

the left flank in preparation for the ground offensive. During this period, 

military police units protected lines of communication, and only a squadsize force remained in Dhahran area." 

During this period, CENTAF security poke continued to receive 

sporadic and isolated reports of threats. Most of these reports were 

terrorist-related, but some indicated potential small arms sniper fire adjacent to installations." For example, on 3 February 1991, a civilian 

contract bus carrying three U.S. military, a Saudi military guard, and 

civilian driver from the Al Khalid hotel to the Jeddah Air Base and was 

fired upon. The incident occurred approximately three miles from base, 

in the city of Jeddah, on a major six-lane highway. The terrorists fired 

ten to fifteen 9-mm shots, all hitting the passenger side of the bus, spaced 

from front to rear, inflicting minor injuries on two U.S. military personnel. The Saudis apprehended four Palestinians and two Yemenis as a 

result of the incident. As the concerns that more attacks would follow, 

the importance of accurate intelligence became more pronounced, and 

multisource intelligence became a cornerstone of the rear area security 

and air base ground defense system. Each Service remained responsible 

"Report to Congress, p 141. 

"Air Force Office of Special Investigations Briefing (undated) presented to OSI 

Commanders Conference 1991, p 3. USCENTAF/SP Battle Cell Log (multiple entries), pp 

23, 29-30, 42. 

53 
for its own counterintelligence network, with intensive liaison to ensure 

a coordinated effort.56 

Security police guards perimeter of air base. 

56(s) Memo for Record, subj: Provost Marshall Security Meeting, USCENTCOM, 13 

Dec 1990. 

54 
3 

Contracting Support 

Background 

The CENTAF Contracting Directorate was responsible for contracting 

support for all CENTAF activities in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. They also provided lateral contracting support to the other 

CENTCOM Services that participate in activities sponsored by the Joint 

Chief of Staff. They assisted in contract management for Southwest Asia 

prepositioning program, including a $5 1 -million Air Force Caretaker 

Maintenance contract in Oman to support the prepositioning of more than 

$2-billion in vital war reserve material and equipment.’ 

Many statutory and regulatory documents have been provided to 

contracting officers to help guide them in the performance of their duties 

during contingency operations. Congress enacted some 350 laws which 

provide for a quick response in times of crisis. Two of them affect 

contracting in foreign countries during contingency operations: 

50 U.S. Code 1431-1435, The “National Defense Contracts 

Exempt From Certain Statutory Limitation,” authorizes the 

Department of Defense to enter into, modify, or make advance payments on contracts in the interest of the national 

defense without regard to certain statutory limitations. 

10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(2) authorizes the Department of Defense to forego formal advertising when its need for property 

or services “is of such an unusual and compelling urgency 

that the United States would be seriously injured. . . . ” 

The Defense Resources Act is designed to provide the authority necessary to meet various contingencies. Contingency Contracting Officers 

USCENTAF Operational Contracting Guide, Capt William J. Hauf and Capt Michael I 

s. Hdl, AFLMC Guide Lc 922137, Mar 1992, p 1. 

55 
cers should ensure that they are aware of exactly what has been authorized before using this authority. Some specific aspects of this Act reveal 

how far-reaching potential waivers could be. For example, Section 401 

provides the President with authority to authorize entering into contracts 

and into modifications of contracts without regard to the provisions of 

law whenever he deems such action would facilitate the performance of 

the national defense; except it does not authorize the use of the cost-plusa-percentage-of-cost system of contracting or any contract provision in 

violation of law relating to limitation of profits. Section 1214 states that 

all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act are 

hereby suspended to the extent of such conflict for the period during 

which this Act shall be in force. Even so, contracting officers are still 

required to adhere to sound contracting principles to the extent possible, 

and contracting records are subject to audit. Also, the contracting officer 

must thoroughly document reasons for not following normal procedures.* 

Deployment 

The inability to conduct site surveys in the area of responsibility 

resulted in paying up to sixty-five percent more for the supplies and 

services than what would normally be expected. Contingency contracting 

officers use site surveys to determine requirements, sources of supply, 

distance to market, contractors’ access to base, etc. However, contracting 

officers had to depend on host nation governments for sources of supply. 

They also used “jobbers” that were aware of local sources of supply. To 

make matters worse, some wing commanders and resource managers 

would not provide the contracting officers with the needed resources to 

do their job (i.e., locate sources of supply, obtain rental vehicles for use 

to identify sources, and provide mobile telephones to facilitate their 

work). As a result, contracting officers found it necessary to rely on 

vendors who came to the gate, where the contracting officer would provide them a list of requirements which the vendor would buy from the 

local market, then deliver to the location. This also resulted in much 

higher prices for the items being procured. As a result, the CENTAF contracting officer discussed this problem with wing commanders and pro- 

’Wartime Contingency Contracting Handbook Update, Capt Tom Robinson, AFLMC 

Rpt LC 922141, Jun 1992, pp 16-17. 

56 
vided justification to support contracting officers. Once wing commanders understood this, they normally supported their contracting officem3 

Contingency contracting officers 

established Blanket 

Purchase Agreements for food 

service. 

With an operational philosophy of getting “the iron on the ramp” for 

Operation Desert Shield and no predeployment site surveys, contracting 

support was severely degraded; as a consequence, thousands of military 

personnel slept on aircraft hanger floors and ate only Meals-Ready-To-Eat 

for approximately one week after arriving at beddown locations. Air 

Force units, almost without exception, deployed to Saudi Arabia ahead of 

logistical support teams even though many bases offered very little in the 

way of food, billeting, transportation, laundry, bottled water, ground fuel, 

etc. CENTAF contracting began to deploy contingency contracting officers 

from their headquarters to the beddown locations one or two days before 

’Trip Report, Desert Shield Orientation, Capt Michael E. Hall, Lessons Learned, 19 

Nov 1990. 

57 
the arrival of incoming units. These personnel established Blanket hrchase Agreements for hotel and other suitable contract quarters, food 

service catering, bottled water deliveries, rental cars and buses, and other 

necessary items on the local economy. Such foresight helped keep airlift 

assets concentrated on supplying units with warfighting capabilities, such 

as munitions, fuel equipment, spare parts, et~.~ 

The CENTAF Contracting Directorate deployed on 7 August 1990 with 

the advanced party. Initial concerns upon anival in Saudi Arabia were to 

set up contracts for quarters, rental vehicles, material handling equipment, 

heavy equipment, food service, bottled water, and ground fuels. During 

this phase, the contracting officer was responsible not only for purchasing 

but the pick-up and delivery of items to customers as well. CENTAF contracting personnel initially provided all contracting support for headquarters 

at CENTCOM, ARCENT, NAVCENT, CENTAF, and two Air Force operating 

locations in the Riyadh area along with fourteen attached units. Overall, 

they supported over 6,000 people in the Riyadh area. More than 13,000 

contracting negotiations worth almost $18 million were written between 7 

August and 30 September 1990 to support these units. During this time 

frame, 70 percent of the purchase requests were bought, picked-up, and 

delivered to the supported customers within a day or two of the order. 

Early in the deployment, contracting had problems interfacing with 

finance. Wing commanders and resource managers placed greater emphasis on finance, performing check-cashing and currency exchanges, rather 

than on their support as paying agents. In many cases, at least initially, 

contracting personnel performed both contracting and paying agent responsibilities. Finance hours of operation were inflexible and did not 

coincide with contracting needs. In many cases, contracting required 

paying agents to accompany them after normal business hours, which 

resulted in placing contracting officers in an awkward position where 

there were no checks and balances between buyers and payers. There 

were no procedures for submitting contractors' invoices to finance for 

payment, and some invoices had to be hand-carried by contracting offi- 

%rip Report, Desert Shield Orientation, Capt Michael E. Hall, Acting Director of 

Contracting, Lessons Learned, 19 Nov 1990. 

58 
cers through the payment process in order to get contractors paid within 

a reasonable time.’ 

By the end of August, the number of personnel and unit locations 

severely strained contracting capabilities to support the units. However, 

a few support units had arrived in Saudi Arabia with some contracting 

personnel. Lt. Col. Bradley R. Busch, Director of Contracting, CENTAF, 

used them to supplement his staff of eight in Riyadh, bringing the total 

at any given time to between twelve and fifteen contracting personnel. 

In order to meet the needs of combat forces arriving without support 

personnel, Busch divided the Riyadh-based contracting officers into small 

teams that were sent to beddown locations, some of which were ‘‘just a 

patch of runway and some sand and maybe a source of water.’“ 

Although port-handling and inland transportation fell within the scope 

of Army responsibilities, CENTAF contracting was tasked on several 

occasions to contract for offloading ships and arranging for transportation 

of critical assets to Air Force operating locations. The contractors responded to the challenge: off-loading critically needed munitions, special 

purpose vehicles, and Harvest Falcon assets from ports at Jeddah, Abu 

Dhabi, Muscat, and Raysuit to various beddown locations. These contracts were valued at more than $200,000. 

Unfortunately, Middle East businessman will not conduct business 

with females. In at least one case, the Tactical Air Command sent a 

female contracting officer to Saudi Arabia (Tabuk), and she was unable 

to negotiate contracts. Neither do Arab businessmen like to deal with 

enlisted men. Once contracting officers were allowed to wear civilian 

clothing, however, the problem with rank was re~olved.~ 

Contract ’kansfers to Saudi Arabia 

In October 1990, HRH Prince Bandar bin Sultan accepted a proposal 

to send a U.S. team to work out procedures for host nation support. The 

’Lessons Learned. ContractinglFinance Interface, USCENTAF/LGC, Lt col Busch, nd. 

Shopping From Scratch,” Air Force Magazine, Dec 1991, pp 78-79. 6.. 

7 Trip Report, Desert Shield Orientation, Capt Michael E. Hall, Acting Director of 

Contracting, Lessons Learned, 19 Nov 1990. 

59 
director of the Joint Staff, Lt. Gen. Michael P. C. Cams, directed Maj. 

Gen. James W. Ray, U.S. Army, director of Military Programs, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to travel to Saudi Arabia to put 

in place an operating process that used Saudi money to pay for fuel, 

water, transportation, and facilities. It was an excellent selection, since 

General Ray had spent five years in Saudi Arabia and three in Europe 

working on projects that involved host nation support agreements and was 

well qualified for the mission. 

General Ray and a team of specialists drawn from the Joint Staff and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense anived in Saudi Arabia on 17 

October, where they developed and negotiated a support agreement. 

General Dan Starling, CENTCOM/J4 (logistics director), and Saudi deputy 

commander for Saudi Joint Forces, Maj. Gen. Abdul Aziz A1 Sheik, 

signed the agreement. Under the agreement, which became effective 1 

November 1990, the Saudi government would provide, at no cost to the 

United States, fuel, transportation, water, food, and facilities to support 

U.S. forces from the time of initial deployment. Before General Ray left, 

the Saudis presented him with a check to the U.S. Treasury for $760 

million to cover in-country expenses from 7 August to 1 November. 

General Ray’s team recommended to the CENTCOM commander that he 

establish a 16- to 17-person cell, headed by a general officer, to monitor 

and implement host nation support, and CENTCOM approved the recommendation. Brig. Gen. Patrick M. Stevens IV, division engineer from the 

corps’ North Pacific Division, arrived in late November to head this cell 

and serve as General Starling’s deputy.’ 

As a result, the Air Force transferred to the Saudi government 141 

contracts valued in excess of $20 million at seven locations. The categories of the contracts and their dollar values are as indicated in Table 5, 

opposite page. 

‘Military Review, Lt Gen Henry J. Hatch, Cmdr, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 

Dr. Janet A. McDonnel, Historian, Laying the Groundwork for Theater Operations, Mar 

1992, pp 6-7. 

60 
Table 5 

Contracts Transferred to Saudi Arabia 

No. of Contracts Estimated Monthly 

Contract Category Transferred Dollar Value 

Fuel 12 

Transportation 68 

Water 13 

Food 18 

Facilities 30 

$96,060 

$1 2,898,688 

$442.055 

$2,287,356 

$4.52 1,500 

Total 141 $20,245,659 

However, the Saudi government did not have the contracting infrastructure to administer the contracts, provide responsive support, or disburse prompt payment to contractors. Because of this, contractors were 

reluctant to enter into negotiations with the Saudis, with an end result of 

late delivery or no contract. There was also a tendency of awarding 

contracts based purely on the “low-bid.” Moreover, the centralized system 

used by the Saudis for contracting everything in Riyadh did not respond 

to U.S. Air Force bases scattered throughout the kingdom. Fuel trucks, 

linehaul trucks, and construction equipment were all examples of inoperative or broken equipment rented for the United States by the Saudis, 

wasting their money and Air Force contracting officers’ time. The 

CENTCOM components lost faith in the system and contracted for critical 

operational requirements themselves. For example, the U.S. Army elected 

to contract for the majority of its requirements and only started to transfer 

their contracts to the Saudi government in March 1991. 

The biggest problems arose in trying to switch contract responsibility 

in mid-deployment-after the contracts had already been written and the 

61 
equipment was in use. Colonel Busch said, “You can’t just turn it in and 

have the Saudis write contracts from scratch. You just can’t do that 

when you’re in the middle of a deployment.”’ 

Also, in many instances, our own supply system could have supported 

requirements, but was not utilized.” 

In addition, new bases that came on-line after 1 November were 

heavily financed through Host Nation Support. For example, A1 Kharj 

used $18.2 million in Saudi contracting support between 1 December 

1990 and 31 January 1991. In spite of these successes, there were problems with Host Nation Support. CENTAF contracting devoted one fulltime person as liaison with the Ministry of Defense for Aviation (MODA) 

to ensure that all contracts were successfully transfed and accepted. 

Sustaining the Bases 

Between October 1990 and February 1991. the local suppliers learned 

the law of supply and demand. Rental rates for some logistic items, such 

as forklifts, tractor trailers, vans, and buses, quickly increased to such a 

magnitude that the equipment often could be purchased for what had been 

paid in several months’ rental. The immediate need, however, along with 

the uncertainty, and the lengthy process in obtaining approval often times 

precluded purchasing as an alternative to leasing.” 

Once the initial “combat” contingency mode of contracting transitioned into the sustaining phase, CENTAF established a rear area contracting office at Shaw AFB, South Carolina. This provided for the purchase 

of medical supplies and equipment, computer and communications equipment, etc., in the United States and transported it to the theater much 

more effectively. By changing the contracting strategy to “two fronts,” 

Shopping From Scratch,” Air Force Magazine, Dec 1991, pp 78-79. 9.‘ 

‘oJ~~ Rpt, 31 705-45206 (00089), submitted by Col Downey, CCJM-c. 17 Jan 1991. 

JULLS Rpt, 52237-50100 (00261). submitted by CUSNCR NP, Lt Snook, 17 May 91. 11 

62 
it was estimated that the U.S. government realized a cost savings of up 

to thirty percent.I2 

Contracting During the War 

When Operation Desert Storm began, contracting had to compensate 

for some adjustments. Contracting officers were restricted to base in 

most instances which meant that purchases could only be arranged over 

the phone. Most contractors closed after dark, thereby reducing the 

buying day by half. Contractors started demanding cash and carry only. 

Some contractors refused to come to work unless they were provided a 

gas mask. Some food services contracts were terminated, since protection 

of food sources from terrorist contamination could not be guaranteed. 

During Threatcon Charlie13 conditions, contractors were also restricted 

from entering installations. All such readjustments could result in paralyzing operations. Some D-day requirements for immediate contracting 

negotiation, included halon for F- I 6s, fuel trucks, linehaul trucks, concertina wire, sand bags, crash recovery vehicles, high-speed copiers to 

support Air Tasking Order production, and %-inch videotapes for aircraft 

gun cameras. 

At the peak of combat operations, the United States had received 

more than $444 million in assistance from Saudi Arabia, Germany, and 

Japan. Much of this support was in the form of contracts awarded by the 

Saudi government to Saudi-owned companies, and by Saudi law any 

business operating in Saudi Arabia must be at least partly owned by a 

Saudi citizen. The success of such assistance depended heavily upon the 

relationship between the U.S. forces and the Saudi go~ernment.'~ 

Sustaining this volume of support proved to be exceptionally challenging after 17 January 1991, when the air campaign began. Once the 

Iraqis began to retaliate by launching Scud missiles at cities in Saudi 

Arabia, laborers, stevedores, and truck drivers stopped working. (The 

'%rip Report, Desert Shield Orientation, Capt Michael E. Hall, Acting Director of 

'%reatcon Charlie applies when an incident occurs or when intelligence indicates 

Military Review, Lt Col Norman F. Hubler. U.S. Army Reserve, Jul 1992, p 76. 

Contracting, Lessons Learned, 19 Nov 1990. 

an imminent terrorist action against U.S. bases and personnel. 

14 

63 
majority of the Saudi work force is composed of third-country nationals 

under contract with Saudi companie~.)'~ 

Closing Out the Contracts 

With the cessation of hostilities, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Homer established a policy to cease new contracts except those required to support 

redeployment. Therefore, most of the contract effort shifted to terminating contracts, paying claims for damaged facilities and rental equipment, 

canceling contracts, and disbursing final payments to close out contracts. 

While contracting officers were the first in theater, they were the some 

of the last to leave. Even though many of the troops were leaving, the 

base close out teams still needed the same type contracts to support them 

in tearing down tent cities and reconstituting vehicles, hotel, food service, 

transportation, and other miscellaneous services. As of 30 June 1992, 

CENTAF had spent in excess of $244 million on contracts supporting the 

area of responsibility. 

One of the concerns 

upon arriving in Saudi 

Arabia was to set up 

contracts for food 

service. At the end of 

the war, new contracts 

were needed to support redeployment. 

"lbid, pp 17-78. 

64 
4 

Legal Support to Air Operations 

Operations Law 

The working relationship developed between CENTAF judge advocates 

and operations and intelligence personnel during exercises Gallant 

KnighUGallant Eagle 88, Internal Look 90, and Bright Star 90 facilitated 

the early involvement of judge advocates in both the planning and execution of the air campaign. Throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, judge advocates provided legal advice that helped craft operational 

guidance for defensive air operations, develop wartime rules of engagement, and review master attack plans, target selection, and weaponry 

decisions for all nominated targets. 

Transitional Rules of Engagement 

When the circumstances giving rise to the Persian Gulf War came 

about, there was no “off-the-shelf’ reviewed and uCS-approved Operations Plan available on which to base combat operations. When the 

Warning Order was issued, CENTAF lawyers assembled copies of the draft 

1002-90 plan and of USCENTCOM Regulation 525-1 1, the regulation 

containing the approved peacetime rules of engagement for the 

USCENTCOM area of responsibility. These rules had a strong maritime 

orientation consistent with their use during Operation Earnest Will. 

Although USCENTCOM Regulation 525-1 1 contained a four- or five-page 

annex setting out rules for “Air Forces Not Supporting Carrier Operations,” the rules of engagement were not designed to support the operational scenario presented by Operation Desert Shield. 

The problem posed by the absence of rules of engagement tailored to 

the defensive air operations conducted during Operation Desert Shield 

was complicated by the deployment of USAF units that had not supported 

CENTAF and did not have copies of the governing rules. After ensuring 

that the F-15 squadrons at Dhahran and the AWACS and Rivet Joint crews 

at Riyadh had been briefed on the rules of engagement, the Director of 

Air Defense and the Chief of Operations Law worked together to over65 
come this by drafting supplemental rules tailored to support Operation 

Desert Shield air operations. 

On 16 August 1990, USCENTCOM approved the release of supplementary guidance consistent with 525-1 I, and CENTAF transmitted its 

transition to subordinate, Naval, and Marine aviation units. Because the 

message constituted a “summary” of USCENTCOM Reg. 52501 1 and supplemental rules of engagement approved by the National Command 

Authority,’ it also acted as a means of lawfully conveying SECRET 

NOFORN U.S. rules of engagement to other members of the Coalition 

involved in air operations. 

During the initial, defensive phase of air operations, CENTAF’s principal focus in the promulgation of the rules was the protection of high 

value airborne assets and responses to penetration of Saudi airspace. 

Working with the Royal Saudi Air Force and the Royal Air Force-the 

other Coalition partners flying combat air PatrOkENTAF developed Operational Guidance, on 2 September 1990, that set out combined rules of 

engagement and Beyond Visual Range weapons release procedures. 

These procedures were distilled from the Transition Rules of Engagement 

transmitted on 16 August 1990 and could only be properly applied within 

the context of those rules. The Operational Guidance was designed to 

respond to both potential airborne Iraqi defectors* and preemptive strikes. 

[DELETED]’ 

In mid-October 1990, an Iraqi fighter penetrated the Saudi border and 

was almost shot down. As a result of this incident, Gen. H. Norman 

Schwarzkopf expressed concern about the provocative impact of shooting 

down an Iraqi aircraft near the border and suggested modification of the 

Operational Guidance [DELETED]‘ On 4 November 1990, CENTAF 

forwarded the revised Operational Guidance to the CENTCOM Directorate 

of Operations for coordination. In a 13 November 1990 message, 

CENTCOM approved the guidance and directed CENTAF to transmit it to the 

other components. 

‘CJCS message, “ROE Authorized Serial #I,” 0913352 Aug 1990. 

*[DELETED] 

’[DELETED] 

4[DELETED] 

66 
[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] 

[DELETED] [DELETED] .6[ DELETED]’ Ultimately, six nations 

agreed to the procedures contained in the operational guidance supplementing Operation Desert Shield transition rules of engagement.’ 

Wartime Rules of Engagement 

At the same time operations personnel and judge advocates were 

working issues regarding transitional rules, they began drafting wartime 

rules of engagement. This was complicated by the fact that the Director 

of Air Defense, the person principally responsible for promulgating the 

rules, was not aware of the planning activities of the Special Planning 

Cell, or “Black Hole.”’ In contrast, CENTAF’S principal operations lawyer 

had been busy in the Black Hole advising planners on legal issues associated with the offensive air campaign since August 1990. Upon direction 

of Brig. Gen. Buster Glosson and with the assistance of operational 

planners from the Special Planning Cell and CENTCOM, CENTAF lawyers 

drafted the first wartime rules of engagement in the Black Hole, in August 1990, and incorporated them into the Strategic Bombing Plan. These 

first wartime rules were drafted to cover the possibility that strategic 

bombing would begin before a more thorough version of rules could be 

staffed through the other components and CENTCOM. 

In September 1990, the Director of Air Defenses and the Judge 

Advocate’s Office began a more structured and formal review of wartime 

5[ DELETED] 

%ENTAFIDO letter. subject “CAP Manning,” dated 15 Dec 1990. 

’Msg, JHQ High Wycombe, 1620062 Dec 1990. 

‘AF Form 1768, Operational Guidance for Desert Shield, dated 21 Dec 1990 

’(S) Only a select group of planners directly involved with the development of the 

campaign and the senior staff were allowed into the planning area, or even had knowledge 

of their activities. Very few members of the CENTAF Combat Plans Division and Combat 

Operations Division were granted access. Cotntnarul and Conrrol report, Chapter 6. 

67 
rules. After reviewing the combat rules contained in the USCENTCOM 

OPLAN 1021 CENTAF lawyers suggested reducing wartime rules to their 

most basic precepts, only covering those contingencies that friendly 

operators might face. Their goal was to make the rules more “user 

friendly.” This suggestion was driven, in part, by a concern that the rules 

be universally understandable by U.S. aviators and air defense personnel 

and amenable to Coalition partners with a limited command of English. 

The revised rules of engagement were organized using an “onion 

peel” approach, establishing separate sections to cover rules of engagement for specialized missions such as “Air to Air Engagements*’ or 

“Ground-Based Air Defense Systems.** This revision permitted operators 

to shred out the rules of engagement pertinent to their mission for quick, 

easy reference. It also solved certain foreign releasability problems, as 

relevant sections could stand alone and be distributed to, or withheld 

from, Coalition partners on a need to know basis. 

With concurrence of the Director of Operations. the Judge Advocate 

at CENTAF drafted a new version of wartime rules of engagement that 

eliminated references, deleted definitions not pertinent to air or air defense 

operations, and reduced the rules to basics. The initial draft contained less 

than twelve paragraphs. Four major areas discussed were beyond visual 

range rules, ground-based air defense rules, long-range deployment rules, 

and command and control wartime identification procedures. 

As a way of illustrating how the rules of engagement were drafted, 

the final approved version of the basic Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), COMUSCENTAF, the Wartime Rules of Engagement read 

as follows: 

0 Upon the direction of USCINCCENT, the following rules of engagemen t apply: 

[DELETED] 

All reasonable measures must be taken to spare, as far as 

possible, buildings (such as mosques) dedicated to religion, 

historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and 

wounded are collected, provided they are not used for military purposes. 

[DELETED] 

68 
Targeting 

The essence of targeting is to exert every reasonable effort to pinpoint 

bombs on a military target. Absent specific target restrictions established 

under international law or imposed by commanders through mechanisms, 

such as the CENTCOM Joint No-Fire Target List, there are essentially two 

legal principles considered in targeting decisions-military necessity and 

proportionality." 

Strategic Targets 

General Glosson gave the Special Planning Cell's legal advisor the 

original strategic target list for review as soon as it arrived in theater in 

mid-August 1990. Many of the 84 targets on the original list were familiar to the legal advisor because they had been included in target sets 

compiled during Internal Look 90. The strategic target list was expanded 

to 238 targets over the next several months. The legal advisor worked 

with intelligence and operations personnel to ensure that the methods of 

engaging targets met the legal criteria for a military target and proportionality. In most instances the legal issue raised by a given target was how 

to design a means of attack that met the criteria of proportionality. 

Unquestionably, the strategic targets that posed the most challenging 

legal problems were Iraq's Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) assets. 

The intelligence and scientific community provided the Planning Cell 

with detailed information that helped in the development of attack methodologies meeting the requirements of international law. 

[DELETED] For example, the potential collateral damage caused by 

venting radioactive fallout into the atmosphere precluded conventional 

bombing attacks on the nuclear reactor where the fissile material was 

probably stored. After extensive discussions with engineers and studies 

"Most legal scholars opine that targeting decisions encompass three legal principles 

rather than two. These scholars would include the principle prohibiting the use of 

weapons that cause unnecessary suffering, according to Annex to Hague Convention 

Number lV, 18 Oct 1907. paragraph 27(e). This principle is not germane to most combat 

targeting decisions. Except for questions concerning the possession and use of expanding 

(dum dum) bullets, munitions deployed for use by US. forces undergo a legal review 

during the development and acquisition process to ensure their employment will not 

violate this prohibition. See DOD Instruction 5500.15, AFR 110-31, paragraph 6-7a. HHh. 

69 
of the building housing the reactor, an acceptable plan of attack that met 

collateral damage concerns was developed. Precision-guided munitions 

were employed against key points of the structure causing the building to 

collapse and precluding Iraqi access to or employment of nuclear material. Similar approaches were taken to develop attack sequences for the 

engagement of biological and chemical research and storage facilities. 

Planners demonstrated an appreciation of the legal issues involved in 

reviewing targets and weapon system and munitions selections to use 

against a target. Attacks on “dual use” facilities such as electric power 

generation stations, petroleum manufacturing and storage, communications, and transportation nodes were designed to temporarily disable the 

facility to avoid collateral damage concerns. POL storage tanks were 

destroyed rather than the cracking towers. In most cases electronic grids 

were targeted rather than electric generators. In each case, a lawyer 

reviewed the master attack plan and rarely had to voice legal concerns 

that required further review of the method and means of attack. 

Within CENTAF there was complete agreement between operators and 

lawyers on even the two most contentious targets-Saddam Hussein’s 

statue and the A1 Firdos bunker. The Hussein statue was one of several 

“psychological targets.” When this target was evaluated prior to the war, 

it was deemed a legitimate military objective because by its nature, 

location, and purpose, it contributed to the Iraqi war-fighting and warsustaining capability. Its destruction would reduce psychological support 

for Saddam’s regime and possibly sap the Iraqis’ will to resist. As the 

air campaign progressed, characterization of the statue as a legitimate 

military target changed. CENTAF lawyers argued that the statue remained 

a lawful target and that.any decision to deploy a weapon system, put an 

aircrew at risk, and expend munitions to destroy it was a commander’s 

decision. Lawyers at CENTCOM and in Tactical Air Control did not share 

this view. Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense decided against targeting 

Saddam’s statue because at that stage of the conflict such an attack would 

be gratuitous. 

The A1 Firdos bunker was one of the command and control bunkers 

listed on the final approved strategic target list. Because these command 

and control facilities were located in civilian sections of Baghdad and 

were not operational, planners in the Black Hole did not intend to target 

them. However, after inputs from the intelligence community indicated 

that the bunker at A1 Firdos was operational. it was selected as a target. 

70 
The review of imagery indicated the bunker was fenced off from adjoining public buildings, and civilian bomb shelters were located elsewhere 

in the vicinity. Based on the weapon system and munitions selected 

against the bunker, no legal problems were presented. Credible evidence 

supported the conclusion that A1 Firdos was an operational command and 

control center and a legitimate military target. As an added precaution, 

the attack was scheduled before dawn to avoid potential collateral injury 

to civilians outside the bunker's perimeter. 

Targets in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations 

From mid-August 1990 through the cessation of hostilities, the Joint 

Target Coordination Board (JTCB) met daily." For the first several 

months, target lists were built and updated by Army, U.S. Marines, 

MARCENT. and CENTAF representatives. (Only three people that participated on the board-two CENTAF targeteers and a CENTAF operations lawyer-were also involved in the initial planning of the Offensive Air Campaign in the Black Hole). When the air campaign shifted to targets in the 

Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO), the JTCB became the mechanism to 

feed validated targets nominated by Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and 

Coalition representatives into the Black Hole's KTO Cell.12 

Dependent on USCINCCENT'S announced priorities and the allocation 

of sorties by the Joint Forces Air Component Commander, the board 

consolidated validated target nominations submitted by the supported land 

and naval components into a single list in order of priority. 

To thwart potential criticism of the United States in its target selection within the KTO, the CENTAF Judge Advocate (with COMUSCENTAF 

approval) reviewed target nominations with representatives of the Kuwaiti 

Air Force and obtained concurrence on the nominated targets. Using a 

mosaic of overhead imagery of the KTO, the lawyer and the Kuwaitis 

would review the daily target lists. They would annotate the target lists 

with information that could be used in selecting the right mission package 

that would limit collateral damage. For example, when an Iraqi unit in 

Kuwait City was to be attacked, warnings were provided to the aircrew 

llCommand Md Control report, Chapter 6: Black Hole and its Impact. 

'=]bid. 

71 
assigned the mission to avoid damage to a nearby oil-gathering center 

that serviced the Kuwait City desalinization plant. 

After the list was created and approved at CENTCOM, it was returned 

to the planners in the KTO Cell for inclusion in the Air Tasking Order, 

subject to allocation by the Joint Force Air Component Commander. 

Judge advocates also resolved target selection issues raised by the combat 

operations section of the control center. For instance, when operators 

sought to strike Matherra airfield in Baghdad, known to be the location 

of the Iraqi Air Force Headquarters, lawyers were asked if it was permissible to strike commercial aircraft found on the field. Based on intelligence reports, judge advocates determined that Xraq had clearly used its 

civilian air fleet for military purposes, such as the movement of troops 

and equipment in and out of Kuwait City. Therefore, any protection 

which would otherwise be afforded civilian aircraft had been lost. 

Supporting Deployed Forces 

Use of Civilians in Combatant Roles 

Attorneys in the Gulf were confronted with situations requiring 

knowledge of the law of armed conflict. This was especially true regarding the status of civilians and service noncombatants involved in the Gulf 

War. Judge advocates helped interpret the sections of the 1949 Geneva 

Conventions that recognized a role some civilians could play in armed 

conflict without necessarily losing the protection accorded them as civilians. For instance, civilian members of aircrews and war correspondents 

were considered to be “noncombatants” for the purposes of the Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War so long as they did not 

directly take part in h~stilities.’~ However, upon capture they would be 

considered as combatants and therefore entitled to be protected as prison- 

(s) Memo for Record from col Kansala, CENTAFNA, to Brig Gen Glosson, 

I4(s) Letter from Maj Heintxlman, CENTAFNAI to USCINCCENTKCJA, 18 Feh 

”Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug 1949, 

13 

CENTAFm, 18 Feb 1991. 

1991. 

Art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW]. 

72 
ers of war. This status was vital to members of the news media who had 

been authorized, by the Secretary of Defense, to accompany aircrews on 

B-52, tanker, and AWACS missions in-theater.“ 

The crew of the Joint Stars aircraft included civilian contractor personnel largely responsible for on-board analysis of technical information 

acquired by mission-related systems.” Although civilian members of 

military aircrews were specifically protected under the convention, some 

argued that opposing forces would construe their participation as a direct 

support of the war, therefore removing any protection to which they may 

have been entitled. Nor would these civilians be considered as “lawful 

combatants,” because they did not satisfy the necessary requirements for 

such status (i.e., authorized by a competent authority to engage directly 

in armed conflict, commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, wearing a uniform or having a fixed, distinctive sign, recognizable 

at a distance, and carrying any arms openly). For civilians, the consequences of losing the protection of combatant as well as noncombatant 

status are serious: if captured they can be tried as spies under the criminal 

law and incarcerated or executed, as the offense permits. For this reason, 

civilian personnel participating in support of the Gulf War received 

careful legal scrutiny as well as legal briefings on the possible consequences of their participation. 

Medical and Religious Personnel 

Medical personnel and chaplains are also accorded noncombatant 

status. The 1949 Geneva Conventions recognized two categories of 

medical personnel: those “exclusively engaged” in medical duties (including administration of medical units)” and those considered part-time 

medical personnel.” Those considered exclusively engaged in medical 

duties are to be accorded respect and protection at all times. Upon capture, they are not to be considered as prisoners of war, and are to be 

6Msg from USCINCCENTKCCS to USCENTAF FWDKC. “B-52 Media Coverage,” 5 Feb 

”Peter Crier, “Joint STARS Does Its stuff,” Air Force Magazine, Jun 1991, p 40. 

“Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 

Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 Aug 1949, Art. 24, 6 u.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 

[hereinafter CW]. 

’‘lbid. 

I 

1991. 

73 
retained only until their services are no longer needed.20 Those that are 

considered part-time medical personnel are also to be respected and 

protected if they are performing medical duties at the time they fall into 

enemy hands?’ However, they are considered prisoners of war and are 

retained by the enemy until the end of active hostilities. By Air Force 

policy, permanent medical personnel are not assigned duties incompatible 

with their medical service. 

Despite this policy, questions arose regarding the protected status of 

medical personnel. In response to these questions, the CENTAF Judge 

Advocate promulgated opinions delineating the nonmedical duties of 

auxiliary medical personnel and describing permissible protection for 

aircrew members in the event of capture.” Requesting agencies were 

informed that it was not permissible to “sanitize” their flight suits, remove 

all identification, such as rank, name tags, and patches) to be certain they 

would be accorded protected status as noncombatants. However, it was 

permissible to arm themselves if extreme caution were exercised.23 

International Law 

Addressing issues of international law between U.S. and host nations 

was difficult because of the limited presence of U.S. forces in the region 

prior to Operation Desert Shield. The only official relationship took 

place through military assistance programs and annual or biannual exerGW, supra, note 19, Art. 33. 

2’GW, supra. note 19, Art. 25. 

22Letter from Lt col William Schmidt to HQ USCENTAF/SG, 30 Jan 1991. Memo 

23Letter from 161 1 st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Provisional) to All Operat.- 

ing Locations, 27 Jan 1991. See also Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, Chapter 7, “Uniform, 

Insignia, and Marking Requirements,” para 7-3. 19 Nov 1976. 

24(S) Letter from Capt Steven Miller, 401 st TFWP (CENTAF) to USCENTAFNA, 16 Jan 

2SLetter from Capt Kniffen to col Kansala (CENTAFIJA) undated: See also letter from 

20 

from Lt Col William Schmidt to Cot Kansala, 22 Feb 1991. 

1991; (s) Letter from CENTAFlJA to TFWP401/JA, 14 Feb 1991. 

CENTAFIJA to CENTCOM/JA regarding “Operational Law hue at Shaik Isa” (undated). 

74 
cises. Status of forces and other international law issues had only been 

raised on an ad hoc basis.26 

At the outset of Operation Desert Shield, the United States had status 

of forces agreements in effect with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 

Oman, all of which were primarily designed to cover security assistance 

personnel. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia extended the same immunity 

covering the diplomatic mission to all deploying forces. 

[DELETED] *’ 

Without a status of forces agreement in Qatar prior to Operation 

Desert Shield, judge advocate personnel were rebuffed during negotiations 

more than once by the ambassador and his staff when they tried to determine the status of negotiations.2s In the absence of any formal agreement, attorneys, security police, and the Office of Special Investigations 

coordinated with the Qatar Ministry of Information and Police and established informal procedures covering the exercise of criminal jurisdiction 

and other status of forces agreement issues. Pursuant to these informal 

procedures, several U.S. military personnel who committed minor criminal offenses were turned over to U.S. forces for disciplinary action. 

Canada and France also adopted such informal policies and procedures. 

The deployment of U.S. civilian contractors to the Gulf region presented the judge advocates a unique problem. Under the terms of the 

U.S. Saudi Exchange of Notes of 12 October and 3 November 1990,29 

civilian and military personnel were to be accorded status equivalent to 

the technical and administrative staff of the U.S. Embassy. What wasn’t 

clear was whether civilian contractor employees were considered part of 

the “United States Forces” as used in the agreement. The Joint Chiefs of 

26(s) Msg from HQ AFTOSA to USCENTAF Forward. “AOR Criminal Jurisdiction,” 29 

Aug 1990. 

27(S) Message from USCINCCENTKCJA lo USCENTAF Forward, “Host Nation Jurisdiction Over US. Forces Personnel Deployed in Saudi Arabia,” 3 Sep 1990. See also 

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 

of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Concerning United States Forces in Saudi Arabia, 

17 Aug 1990, US.-Saudi Arabia. 

”Lessons Learned from Capt Miller, 401st TFWNA. 

(S) See note 28, supra. 29 

75 
Staff legal advisor and the Service's Judge Advocates General's offices 

all agreed to interpret the agreement to include contractor employees as 

part of the U.S. Forces in the absence of any negotiated status for such 

personnel. However, because of the unilateral nature of this interpretation, U.S. contractors could have been placed in a rather precarious 

position had the Saudi Arabian Government ever challenged their presence in Saudi Arabia. 

In addition to the lack of status of forces agreement interpretations, 

operations were hampered by the lack of agreements to cover such contingencies as air refueling between host nations and third-party countries. 

U.S. law itself occasionally impeded actions because it was not flexible 

enough to respond immediately to the exigencies of the war. For example, 

the Arms Export Control Act prohibits U.S. personnel from performing 

duties of a combatant nature, including ''training and advising" foreign 

forces engaged in combat activities outside the United state^.^ As written, 

the Act seemed to preclude U.S. technical teams from continuing to assist 

Saudi forces because they were engaged in combat, even though they were 

allies. Without time to amend the law, key Congressmen resolved the issue 

at a briefing, agreeing to interpret the law in a broader sense. 

Legal advisors provided critical advice to commanders regarding the 

legal limits of their authority. For example, commanders were not generally aware that their authority to loan or transfer property to host governments was practically nonexistent. At Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, the host 

nation commander requested the U.S. loan or transfer essential equipment 

to his forces in support of the war eff~rt.~' Another time, the Turkish 

commander requested chemical gear for Turkish personnel guarding the 

base. In some cases, the only viable fix proved to be a demand for the 

return of the equipment provided, to the embarrassment of the US. 

commander and the frustration of the host nation commander. 

Claims 

The Department of Defense, through DOD Directive 55 15.8, assigned 

the Air Force responsibility, as Executive Agent, to administer claims for 

the entire theater (with the exception of Bahrain, where this responsibility 

30Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. Sect 2751. 2761-2762, as amended. 

Lessons Learned from Col Dennis Yoder, HQ TUSLOGIJA. 31 

76 
fell upon the Navy).32 The Air Force, in turn, delegated this authority to 

the CENTAF staff judge advocate (for CENTCOM) and the staff judge 

advocate of each air base, station, and fixed installation in the theater. 

However, during Operation Desert Shield, claims authority was 

redelegated to military attorneys in the other military Services.33 The 

senior military attorney at each installation became the staff judge advocate with delegated claims authority. Ultimately, judge advocates from 

other military Services were appointed as Foreign Claims Commissions 

to process and approve claims. 

Egypt and Oman waived intergovernmental claims with the United 

States. However, these agreements affected only a small portion of the 

military members deployed to the theater. At the commencement of 

Desert Shield, for example, the Air Force paid claims to Saudi Arabia and 

the United Arab Emirates for damages to government property. Subsequently, at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force accepted claims for damaged Saudi military property but declined to pay pending negotiation of a mutual waiver of claims. Similarly, the Air Force 

did not pay claims for death or injury to Saudi military personnel caused 

by its personnel acting in the scope of their official duties. 

During the Gulf War, payment of claims to individual claimants was 

also complicated by cultural and logistical differences. Because of this, 

the Air Force procedure for progovernment claims processing became 

largely unu~able.’~ For example, claimants in the Middle East were 

accustomed to asserting claims verbally and objected to signing any claim 

document, particularly a Standard Form 95.” In cases where potential 

claimants were illiterate, however, it was necessary to accept verbal 

requests for compensation as long as the requests were accompanied by 

sufficient proof of injury or damage. 

32Policy Letter from CENTAF~JA to All CENTAF Judge Advocates and Paralegals, 

33Lessons kvned Report, HQ USAF/JACC. 

”Lessons ~eamed (unsigned). 

Atch 1, 31 Aug 1990. 

)51bid. 

77 
Military Justice 

Overall, the military justice system functioned successfully during the 

Gulf War. However, there was an early, fundamental problem: the military justice system depends on the existence of properly created organizations (and officers to command them). Early in Operation Desert Shield 

those organizations did not exist.% Air Force personnel deployed primarily 

by Unit Type Code, not by unit, and in the theater of operations, there 

were no CENTAF or CENTCOM units to which Air Force personnel could be 

attached. As a result, deploying major command commanders had no units 

to command when they arrived in the theater. Without a definitive USAF 

organizational structure, Air Force officers were initially without authority 

to administer military justice, and confusion arose as to who was in command for administrative and disciplinary purposes, especially where active, 

Guard, and Reserve personnel were deployed. 

Under the terms of Air Force Regulation 26-2, CENTAF was not 

authorized to create units (only HQ USAF had that authority). To resolve 

the organizational problems, the participating major commands deployed 

provisional units, attached deployed personnel to them, and appointed 

commanders of the units. Strategic Air Command, Military Airlift Command, and U.S. Air Force Europe activated provisional units; Tactical Air 

Command initially set up “deployed” units [e.g., 1 TW (Deployed)], then 

converted to provisional units.37 A comprehensive organizational structure was not in place until about four months into Operation Desert 

Shield. Ultimately, CENTAFICC recognized Air Force hosts for each 

installation (from the participating major commands), and designated the 

senior commander of the host unit as a special court-martial convening 

a~thority.~’ CENTAFKC was the only such Air Force general authority in 

the theater. 

The Air Force reconsidered its position on the imposition of nonjudicia1 punishment (Article 15, UCMJ) on Air Force members of a joint 

command, when the joint commander represented a different Service.39 

’6Lessons Learned Report from Col William At Lee, Jr. 

”specid Order G-12, from HQ TAC, 13 Sep 1990. See also Msg from HQ TAUJA, 

17 Sep 1990. 

38Special Order G-4 from USCENTAF/CC, 10 Nov 1990. 

”Lessons Learned Report, Col William At Lee, Jr. 

78 
Tension existed between the competing interests of a joint commander 

needing the disciplinary authority of command and a Service’s interest in 

the consistency applying the code of military justice on its members. The 

Air Force regulation on nonjudicial punishment (AFR I 1 1-9) defines 

“commander” for Article 15 purposes as being an Air Force officer only. 

In at least one case, Article 15 action was delayed to find an appropriate 

Air Force officer to impose the Article 15, while the joint commander 

(Army, Joint Communication Support Element) was available and willing 

to take action. Ultimately, the rules of 337 Article 15s were imposed in 

the theater during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, all by Air 

Force Commanders. The Air Force did designate a joint commander to 

act on appeals from nonjudicial punishment imposed by CENTAFICC.~ 

Military justice problems did not end once nonjudicial punishment 

was imposed: punishment implementation problems were varied and 

pervasive. Forfeitures of pay often were not deducted in a timely manner,”’ obtaining pay statements while deployed was problematical, and 

installation-level administrative teams and CENTAF Directorate of Personnel staff were unable to enter new dates of rank into the personnel system 

for members reduced in rank?* Additionally, personnel information 

sheets were unavailable for processing military justice actions. In each 

case, a message had to be sent to the member’s home station requesting 

that the data be sent to CENTAF.4’ 

Another impediment to the administration of theater military justice 

was the unavailability of drug and alcohol deterrence and detection measures [blood alcohol (BAT) and urinalysis te~ting].~ This could have led 

to a host nation demanding surrender of an Air Force member for testing, 

a potentially serious problem, particularly in Saudi Arabia where alcohol 

consumption is a serious crime. 

%Sg from HQ USAFNAJM to HQ TAUJA, 21 DtX 1990. 

4’~ssons barn4 (unsigned). 

421bid. 

431bid. 

Letter from USCENTAFN to USCENTAFISG, 5 Jan 199 1. 44 

79 
Administrative Issues 

Mobility and Deployment 

Operation Desert Shield was the first rapid deployment of any magnitude ever undertaken by the Air Force Judge Advocate General. At the 

peak of the war, the theater was manned with forty attorneys and fortytwo paralegals at twenty-three office^.'^ 

Judge advocate provided legal assistance for more than 55,000 Air 

Force members deployed to the Gulf, as well as family members remaining behind. In spite of a concerted effort in recent years to ensure that 

everyone on mobility is counselled on the need for a will, roughly 46,000 

wills had to be prepared in conjunction with deployment.& 

Except for judge advocates at CENTAF, deployed attorneys lacked 

sufficient security clearances and were initially denied access to critical 

operational information needed to provide legal advice during combat 

operations.47 For example, the CENTCOM No-Fire Target List was initially 

a TOP SECRET document for which most attorneys were not cleared. To 

ensure deployed (wing-level) attorneys had access to this information, 

CENTAF judge advocates requested and received approval from CENTCOM 

to downgrade the classification to SECRET. 

From August through December 1990. only two attorneys had access 

to Special Compartmented Information (SCI) material necessary to determine the legality of targeting decisions. Because offensive air information 

was compartmentalized, access to strike plans and target lists was restricted to the CENTAF Special Planning Cell legal advisor. When the legal 

Because the Time Phase Force Deployment Date (TPFDD) utilized to support Desert 

Shield was cobbled together from previously approved OPtANs, it was not Force Sized 

appropriately; consequently, TAC and CENTAF elected to individually source legal personnel in order to tailor installation legal sections to meet the anticipated legal requirements 

of the supported organizations. See also Bullet Background Paper from Colonel Kansala, 

CENTAFIJA, 23 Apr 199 1. 

45 

%etter from HQ USAFIJACA to HQ USAFIJACI, 26 Mar 1991. 

471ntvw with Lt col hrry Heintzelrnan. former CENTAF/JAI, at the Pentagon, Washington, DC, 3 Aug 1992. 

80 
advisor performing this function received augmentation in December 1990, 

it took two weeks for the augmentee to obtain SCI access authorization.48 

Judge Advocate Reservists 

Gulf War operations resulted in widespread reliance on reserve pers0nne1;~ both in the theater and in backfill assignments. At the conclusion of the war, judge advocate Individual Mobilization Augmentees 

(IMAS) had served more than 8,000 man days at 35 locations. In addition 

to attorneys, approximately 36 Category B IMA paralegal augmentees 

served in support of Gulf operations. Furthermore, approximately 1 17 

Air Force Reserve attorneys and 45 paralegals were mobilized. Of these, 

one attorney and one paralegal were assigned to Southwest Asia. 

Unlike the Reserves, members of the Air National Guard (ANG) 

extensively deployed to the Persian Gulf. Although ANG and active 

forces worked well together, the initial policy of rotating personnel by the 

National Guard approximately every thirty days made it difficult to 

establish judge advocate continuity with theater commanders.m 

Computer and Communication Support in the Theater 

Legal operations were given a low priority for using communications 

systems, which impeded their ability to provide timely legal services. 

Communications between theater legal offices was also a problem.” 

Some bases were equipped with TACNET (the local equivalent of 

AUTOVON communication lines; some had commercial only, or a mixture 

of commercial and TACNET capabilities; others had a local system without 

a long-distance capability. Only a few offices had both systems). 

Since the staff judge advocate at CENTAF believed communications 

between major commands was essential, in August 1990 he began send48/b1d; Lessons Learned input from Lt col Schmidt, HQ USAFWJAI. See also kssons 

49Reserve personnel consisted of Category B IMA, Ready Reserve and Air National 

Sssons Learned, (unsigned). 

51Lessons Learned from Col Moms Tanner, Jr., 1st TFWII. 

Learned from Maj Walter Skierski, Jr., 67th TRWN. 

Guard personnel. 

81 
ing weekly messages to bases and their headquarters informing them of 

essential judge advocate a~tivities.’~ In this way, CENTAF was able to 

keep judge advocate offices, both in and out of the theater, informed of 

developments affecting operations. 

Nor did legal offices have a legal research capability. In September 

1990, the Judge Advocate’s Legal Information Services moved to resolve 

this problem. They scanned the Manual for Courts-Martial, a set of 

selected treaties, Status of Forces Agreements, and sixty-nine USAF regulations into electronic format. The information was archived, transferred 

to 3.5-inch floppy disks, and sent to the theater in December 1990. 

Known as the “REFLEX” system, it became the core of base legal research. 

Connecting theater base-level legal offices to the on-line Funded 

Legal Information Through Electronics system used for on-line legal 

research was difficult because of connectivity problems. This system was 

hosted on a mainframe operated by the Computer Service Center, in San 

Antonio, Texas,53 and attempts to access this database through the use of 

toll free and commercial number access points in the United States were 

unsuccessful. Finally, CENTAF contracted with a local company in Riyadh 

to pay for access to the data, and subsequently the Legal Information 

Services office was able to program their minicomputer to dial automatically and connect via the Defense Data Network. 

52Lessons Learned from col John Duncan, Jr.. HQ TAUJ. 

53LettW ffOm AFLSNJASF to HQ USAFIJAI, 28 JUl 1992. 

82 
5 

Weather Operations 

On 7 August 1990, the Air Weather Service initiated deployment of 

weather support forces.’ By the start of the Gulf War, this force consisted 

of 475 men and women organized as the 1690th Weather Group (Provisional) under the command of the CENTCOM Staff Weather Officer, Col. 

Jim Goldey. Equipped with the latest generation of tactical weather equipment, weather satellite receivers, and tactical communications, they were 

collocated with supported customers at operating locations throughout 

Southwest Asia (see Figure 4): The worldwide air weather service structure and the global weather communications system supported their efforts. 

A “Benign” Environment-The Influence of Expectations 

During Operation Desert Shield, weather played an inconsequential 

role in military operations. Week after week of clear skies, hot temperatures, and operations in areas without blowing sand confirmed the view 

already held by senior military leaders and planners that weather in the 

Persian Gulf was and would remain benign.3 This lack of significant 

weather minimized the perceived value of having a capable weather 

support force on scene and fully integrated into operational planning. 

Climatology provided by staff weather officers only further confirmed 

this view. Weather which could detract from air operations was indeed 

a climatologically rare event in the Persian Gulf region as compared to 

theaters in which U.S. or allied forces trained or had previous experience, 

(S) Air Weather Service Historian (AWSMO) Special Study, AWS Role in Operation 

’(S) Air Weather Service DESERT SHIELDIDESERT STORM Report No. 2, An Analysis 

3(S) USAF Environmental Technical Application Center Technical Note 92/003, Gurf 

I 

DESERT ST~RM/D€SERT SHIELD, Dr. William E. Nawyn, 27 Feh 1992, p 13. 

of A WS Support to DYDS, 6 Dec 199 I, p 25. 

War Weather, pp 2-1 to 2-2-57; AWS DSIDS Report No. 1, p 3. 

83 
such as Europe or Southeast Asia. For example, as shown in Figure 5,4 

a climatological comparison of Baghdad, Kuwait City, Frankfurt, Germany, and Hanoi, North Viet Nam for an operational goho go threshold of 

cloud ceilings at or below 10,OOO feet shows that “normal” January and 

February conditions would have been at least twice as bad in Germany 

or North Vietnam as in the Persian Gulf region. Looking at the frequency of weather which could affect low-level operations (clouds at or below 

1 ,OOO feet), the chances become dramatically smaller-less than 5 percent 

of the time. From a climatological viewpoint, the Persian Gulf is a 

relatively “benign” environment. 

Figure 4 

Weather Support Forces 

4USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center Study, Comparison ofCennuny, 

Vie1 Nam Climatology to Persian Gulf climatology and DESERT STORM-January through 

March, 19 May 1992, Capt R. D. Arnold and TSgt R. C. Bonam. 

84 
Figure 5 

Climatology for 10,000 Ft or Lower Ceilings 

Percent Frequency of Occurence 

.-- 1 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 

Jan Jan Jan Feb Feb Feb 

Morning Afternoon Evening Morning Afternoon Evening 

Baghdad 0 Kuwait City Frankfurt El Hanoi 

Comparison of climatology in the Persian Gulf also points out a 

valuable lesson for future contingencies in less “benign” climates like 

Europe or Southeast Asia. The successful high-level tactics employed in 

the Gulf War, which required visually acquiring and attacking targets 

from above 10,OOO feet, would be nearly impossible during a typical 

European winter or Southeast Asian monsoon. Targets in those theaters 

would be obscured by clouds ceilings at or below 10,OOO feet 80 to 90 

percent of the time. In fact, in comparing regional climates around the 

world, the Persian Gulf region is exceptional even in the cloudiest season, 

when high-level tactics could be used effectively. 

85 
Prepared for War 

Centralized forecast guidance flowed via the Automated Weather 

Network (AWN) from Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) at 

Offutt AFB, Nebraska, to the Desert Storm Forecast Unit (DSFU) and the 

ARCENT Weather Cell at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. These theater weather 

centers then blended the global guidance with theater weather data to 

Support Staff weather officers at CENTCOM, CENTAF, ARCENT, and 

SOCCENT and with field-deployed weather teams. Weather teams then 

built mission-tailored products for their operational customers, coordinating their operational forecasts back through their component staff weather 

officers when needed. At each level, weather support products were built 

using past information (climatology), current data (field observations and 

pilot reports), and centralized guidance. 

By January 1991, the widely dispersed weather support force was tied 

together by reliable theater-wide weather communications. Defense 

Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) meteorological satellites provided critical weather intelligence from data-denied enemy territory, and a 

light-weight, transportable upper air sounding system measured winds, 

temperature, humidity, and pressure for the upper atmosphere. The 

forecast unit was providing forecast guidance to staff weather officers and 

deployed weather teams based on expertise developed by the preceding 

months in theater. Weather teams at CENTAF airfields were providing 

face-to-face support to wing commanders and flyers, and Army commanders received support from attached Air Force weather teams that 

were trained and equipped to follow them into battle. 

Climatology Versus Actual Weather 

Weather during January and February 1991 was not typical for the 

winter months in the Persian Gulf. An analysis of cloud cover performed 

by Air Force Global on the basis of fourteen years of nephanalysis confirmed abnormally cloudier weather over Baghdad, Iraq, between 15 

January and 28 February. This analysis was a blending of cloud data 

compiled from Defense Meteorological Satellite Program imagery with 

surface and upper air observations. The 14-year January average of 1.7 

mean eighths of cloud cover compared to 3.4 mean eighths in January 

1991; the 14-year February average of 1.5 compared to 2.5 in February 

1991. This amounted to nearly twice the cloud coverage that would lead 

climatology to anticipate. 

86 
Such analysis for Kuwait produced similar results. In fact, February 

was more than twice as severe over Kuwait-2.2 versus an expected 

average of 0.8. The United States Air Force Environmental Technical 

Applications Center conducted a further statistical analysis of the fourteen-year climatology for Baghdad and the Kuwaiti theater of operations 

to estimate the likelihood of the weather for 1991. The probability of 

that much cloud cover over Baghdad was about two percent in January 

and five percent for February and less than one percent for both months 

over Kuwait. The 1991 Persian Gulf winter was indeed an unusually 

poor weather year-about twice as unusual as normal.’ The effects of this 

deviation from normal on the air war was significant. 

Weather Impacts Compounded by Tactics 

Though the 1991 Persian Gulf winter was worse than normal, weather over target areas became a major impediment to the conduct of the air 

war only after its effects were compounded by the change in air tactics. 

The achievement of air superiority by the third day of Operation Desert 

Storm meant the elimination of the threat of detection and enemy 

counterair. Since the necessity to fly low to avoid detection no longer 

existed, the aircraft faced the only remaining enemy threat: antiaircraft 

artillery. It became apparent that it was more effective to ingress, attack, 

and egress above enemy antiaircraft artillery-above 10,OOO feet. This 

new attack profile also dramatically increased the importance of cloud 

ceilings that obscured targets. Rather than focusing on a threshold of 

cloud ceilings at or below 1,OOO feet, a cloud ceiling up to 10,OOO feet 

became the important criterion in mission planning and target selection. 

During Operation Desert Storm operational thresholds increased the 

amount of time targets were below weather thresholds from around 1 to 

2 percent (for 1,OOO foot ceilings) to about 33 percent of the time. In 

1991’s “bad” weather year, clouds obscured targets over Baghdad and 

Kuwait as much as 40 percent of the time. Weather thus became a major 

impediment to the air campaign.6 

’(S) AWS DUDS Report No. 1, pp 1-3. 

6(S) /bid, p 1. 
Weather Support to Desert Storm Planning 

Senior military leaders and force planners used weather information 

in the early planning of operations of the Gulf War. The region’s climatological data were produced by the Air Force’s Climatology Center, the 

Environmental Technical Applications Center, and other agencies, such as 

the Air Force Global Weather Central, 26, 5th. and 7th Weather Wings, 

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the Naval 

Oceanography Command, and the U.S. Marines. The most useful product 

was the “descriptive climatology” of Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, a 

distillation of all available meteorological information (scientific studies, 

reports, and data-both published and unpublished) about the region. 

Staff weather officers used it to help planners predict weather impact 

on Gulf War operations including air and sea deployment; desert survival; 

nuclear-biological-chemical warfare; equipment storage, maintenance, and 

performance; targeting and bombardment; precision-guided munitions; 

and amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations.’ In particular, early 

planning focused on conditions expected to affect offensive air operations-low-level attacks, air refueling, landings and departures, etc.-and 

Army ground combat maneuvers. Staff weather officers and planners, 

therefore, focused on climatology for percentage occurrences of low cloud 

ceilings, restricted surface visibility, and precipitation. Early planning did 

not focus on the middle or high cloud ceilings which later became an 

important operational threshold. Accordingly, aside from the extreme 

heat, occasional sanddust storms, or an isolated thunderstorm, the Persian 

Gulf was expected to be and to remain a relatively “benign” environment 

for combat operations. 

Limitations of Climatological Support 

Accurate climatology provided to military leaders and planners was 

useful in preparing military forces to operate in the Persian Gulf region. 

However, climatological support alone did not anticipate the entire range 

of potential impacts to operations. For example, the strategic bombing 

of Baghdad was affected by persistent cloud cover which, according to 

’(s) AWS DyDS Report No. 2, pp 117-125. 

88 
climatology, was unlikely.* Clearly, weather anomalies experienced 

during the winter were not anticipated by using climatology which focuses on historical means and averages. Rare events are smoothed out. 

Furthermore, climatology for a region is only as good as the historical 

weather data upon which it is based. At airfields where both Air Force 

and host-nation observers took observations, practices were observed that 

raised questions about the climate database for that region. In general, 

host-nation observers appeared to report better weather than it was.’ 

These differences of typical observation practice may partially explain the 

“optimistic” climatology for the Persian Gulf region. It is also likely that 

the winter of 1991 was an unusual occurrence-the likes of which happen 

once every twenty years in the Persian Gulf. 

Early Weather Planning at the Pentagon 

Detachment 2, HQ Air Weather Service began satisfying requirements 

for climatology of the Persian Gulf region in August 1990. In September, 

detachment planners presented a point paper to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, on the climate in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 

and Kuwait for October 1990 through March 1991. As Operation Desert 

Storm planning accelerated in the fall of 1990, Air Staff planners and 

others provided climate information such as the probability of clouds at 

specific levels, monthly temperature extremes, monthly precipitation, dust 

and visibility conditions, and winter weather at European ports.” 

Weather suppod to HQ CENTCOM 

The amount of weather information needed by the CENTCOM staff 

increased dramatically at the start of Operation Desert Storm. Weather 

officers presented 4 briefings each day, with informal updates as often as 

every 3 hours, as weather began to affect the air campaign. The scope 

of the briefings also expanded from the next 24 hours to a detailed 0- to 

72-hour unfavorable-marginal-favorable forecast for the theater. To 

prepare for the start of ground operations, CENTCOM staff weather officers 

briefed an extended outlook-1 4 days beyond the 72-hour point-in categoUSAFETAmN-9u003, Gulf war Weather, USAF Environmental Technical Applica- 8 

tions Center, Mar 1992, pp 3-1 - 3-106. 

’(S) AWS DSlDS Report No. 2, pp 117-1 18 and 123. 

“(S) Ibid, pp 1 19-120. 

89 
ries of cloud ceilings (1 0,OOO-foot threshold), precipitation, wind direction, and speed. 

Weather support, particularly the provision and interpretation of 

weather satellite imagery, was particularly important to the CENTCOM 

Intelligence Directorate. Staff weather officers used this imagery along 

with climatic wind data for Kuwait City, to help the Directorate assess 

the impact of Iraq’s “scorched earth” policy. They also briefed weather 

to intelligence action officers, emphasizing impact of weather on intelligence collection and bomb damage assessments.” 

Weather suppod HQ ARCENT 

The ARCENT staff weather officers, as well as staff weather officers 

collocated with U.S. Army corps, divisions, regiments, and separate brigades in the field, were fully integrated for ground operations. Climatology 

was a key support input. During Operation Desert Shield, staff weather 

officers briefed climatology monthly to commanders and staffs, with emphasis on the impact of the desert environment on man and machine. For 

the ground war, the ARCENT staff weather officer provided General 

Yeosock with detailed climatology for key stations-Basra, Iraq; Kuwait 

City; Dhahran, Hafar A1 Batin, and Rahfa, Saudi Arabia. In particular, 

staff weather officers, in concert with the ARCENT terrain team, helped 

identify areas where there was significant potential for flash flooding.” 

As ARCENT ground forces began the transition from build-up to 

offensive action, HQ ARCENT weather support requirements increased 

dramatical1.y. On 23 January, staff briefings increased to four per day; 

a daily planning briefing for General Yeosock, the Operations Fire Support Element, a seventy-two-hour outlook for targeting, and the situational 

weather briefing for the Intelligence staff twice daily at shift changes. On 

16 February, two briefings were added for the Operations and Intelligence 

Center, and after 23 February, an afternoon briefing was added for General Yeosock. All briefings included a forecast weather map, a twentyfour-hour plain-language forecast covering the entire area of responsibility, a color-coded matrix showing potential weather effects, and illumination data. The ARCENT weather cell also produced a seventy-two-hour 

(S) Ibid, pp 77-78. 

(S) Ibid, pp 1 19- 120; (S) AWS DSDS Report No. I, p 24. 

II 

I2 

90 
outlook forecast for Riyadh, Dhahran, and King Khalid Military City, 

Saudi Arabia. A similar product was also disseminated through ARCENT 

in tel I igence channels . l3 

ARCENT Tactical Operations 

Weather support personnel provided ARCENT commanders with Tactical Operations Area Forecast and the Contingency Weather Package. The 

area forecast provided them with a tailored weather prediction for respective operational areas. Additional weather forecasts were presented for 

up to five days. On-site staff weather officers tailored ARCENT's area 

forecast to their supported commander's requirements. 

On 18 January 1991, the XVIII Corps and 101 st Airborne moved in 

support of the CENTCOM War Plan. The units stationed in and around 

King Fahd at the start of the air war were to shift to the vicinity of 

Rahfa, 500 miles northwest-an airlift vital to the success of the operation. 

The Rahfa airfield was not fully instrumented, and Saudi weather observers took only periodic observations. On 18 January, at the Rahfa airfield, 

Military Command aircraft aborted the mission because of weather in 

attempting to land. The Airlift Control Element at Rahfa reported that 

the Saudi observations did not represent actual conditions-weather was 

worse than reported. 

The IOlst Air Assault Division deployed a three-man Air Force 

weather team to Rahfa, Saudi Arabia on 19 January to take weather 

observations. These accurate Air Force weather team observations were 

reported to the Airlift Control Center and its staff weather officer, who 

was then able to forecast windows of opportunity when conditions would 

improve enough to permit landing. The center and the commander of 

airlift forces scheduled missions accordingly, enabling the airlift's completion on schedule despite marginal eath her.'^ 

As units moved forward, ARCENT imposed radio silence. Since the 

primary means of weather communications to deployed Amy weather 

teams was dispatched via high-frequency radio, units could only receive 

weather information, while the data from the field became unavailable to 

'?s) AWS DSmS Report No. 1, pp 24-25. 

I4(S) Ibid, Report No. I, p 31. 

91 
other weather support forces. The second problem was the speed and 

frequency of the Army’s advance into Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Weather teams attached to those units often did not have time to set up communications or weather equipment. The ARCENT Weather Cell began disseminating the weather package on 8 February to solve that problem. 

This package, a consolidation of the Tactical Operations Area Forecast, 

focused on information needed to bring the mobile weather team up-todate on the weather situation.” 

At the height of the ground campaign, an air assault by the 3d Brigade of the 1Olst Air Assault Division into the Tigris-Euphrates River 

Valley to secure the northern flank was scheduled for the evening of 25 

February. Based on a forecast of strong wind, the mission was cancelled. 

Observed conditions verified winds of thirty knots and rain showers. The 

same cycle was repeated on 26 February with winds to thirty-five knots. 

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence requested the 101 st Airborne 

Assault Division staff weather officer to forecast the next available “window” of opportunity. He predicted a window covering 26 February at 

13002 to 27 February at oooOZ. Based on the forecast, the mission 

successfully flew the evening of 26 February and dense fog closed the 

window at 00302 on 27 February as forecasted.I6 

Compromised on the early morning of 25 February, a long-range surveillance team from the XVIlI Airborne Corps near Tallil Airfield in Iraq, 

called for emergency extraction. Confronting raging winds of thirty-five 

to forty-five knots and visibility about one-half mile, the XVIII Airborne 

Corps staff weather officer advised aviators charged with the extraction 

not to launch immediately but to delay takeoff until the weather front 

passed, then fly due north to approach the area from the west. They did 

delay the mission, waited until the front had just passed the area, 

approached the landing zone safely, and extracted the team just as winds 

diminished and visibility improved. Had they launched immediately, 

success would have been que~tionab1e.l~ 

”(S) /bid, p 24; (S) AWS USDS Report No. 2, pp 90-93. 

I6(S) AWS DSlDS Report No. 1, p 3 1. 

17(S) Ibid, pp 30-3 I. 

92 
Support to HQ SOCCENT Planning 

Weather support to HQ SOCCENT included mission-tailored forecasts 

and briefings based on the Forecast Unit's Joint Operations Area Forecast. Most execution planning for Operation Desert Storm was downloaded to the Special Operations Command-Army as well as Air Force.18 

The daily weather briefing package contained a weather map, area forecasts, and forecasts for key bases. Area forecasts included forecasts for 

maximum pressure altitude, night vision goggle ranges, temperatures, and 

minimum cloud ceilings. Forecasts for electromagnetic refractive conditions using the integrated refractive conditions prediction system and sea 

state conditions at key locations were also in~luded.'~ 

Support to Strategic Reconnaissance 

The CENTCOM staff weather officers directly supported theater reconnaissance missions using Forecast Unit theater forecast guidance and 

forecasts issued by weather personnel supporting the Strategic Reconnaissance Center at HQ Strategic Air Command. The reconnaissance center 

validated nominated tagets and recommended platforms using numerous 

planning inputs, including forecasts from their weather personnel at the 

Directorate of Weather for Strategic Reconnaissance at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. [DELETED] The CENTCOM staff weather officer updated weather information and assumed goho go forecast responsibility. Satellite 

imagery was the best source of data for these last-minute forecasts.*' 

[DELETED]' ' 

Building the Air Tasking Order 

By the time the air war began, weather support to the Strategic Planning cell and Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting consisted of two 

'*(S) Ibid, p 6; (S) AWS DS~DS Report No. 2. pp 94-95 

I9(S) Ibid. 

"(S) AWS DSmS Report No. 1. pp 8-10. 

21 (S) /bid, pp 9-10. 

93 
daily briefings to Gen. Buster C. Glosson and his staff. no-day horizontal weather depiction charts showing major cloud areas, precipitation, 

and fronts, along with satellite imagery, were also posted in the Black 

Hole. This level of support, however, proved inadequate as weather 

began to affect missions, particularly the F-117 precision strikes on 

Baghdad. The importance of weather inputs to the target planning process grew dramatically, and staff weather officers “beefed up” their 

support to meet the need for timely and accurate weather intelligence and 

assistance necessary for decisions. 

The CENTAF staff weather officer instituted a planning support worksheet that covered successive %hour periods. Each sheet divided the 

theater into 4 broad regions and gave cloud conditions for the critical 

10,000-foot threshold in &hour segments. These sheets were then colorcoded (red unfavorable, green favorable) and posted on the primary target 

allocation maps in the Black Hole. The weather officers also presented 

formal briefings at key points in the planning process. Figure 6 depicts the 

planning cycle, indicating those points where weather inputs were made. 

Staff weather officers presented a weather briefing to General Glosson 

at oooOL to help determine which targets could be potentially fragged or 

held in reserve. They presented another briefing to the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting cell twenty-four hours later for a final scrub of 

nominated targets. Another weather briefing to General Glosson at 1300L 

would allow retargeting of missions scheduled for that night (tasked in the 

previous day’s air tasking order) and the following morning (primarily F117s). Opportunities for weather intelligence, of course, did not always 

wait for formal weather briefings. Staff weather officers met with planners 

frequently in the CENTAF weather office to discuss specific missions?2 

The CENTAF planning cycle allowed enough flexibility to adapt quickly 

to changes in the operational situation. By 29 January, weather support for 

this system provided structured threeday planning forecasts based primarily 

on the Desert Storm Forecast Unit’s Special Support Bulletin. Issued at 

oooOL, the forecast became most critical because the planning “machinery” 

was initially set into motion on the basis of this target weather guidance. 

The oooOL forecasts were correct about seventy-five percent of the time for 

Baghdad and about seventy percent for Kuwait City. Compared against a 

94 
“no skill” forecast based on persistence (what it is now is what it will be), 

forecasters improved twenty-four-hour planning effectiveness by more than 

fifteen percentage points with their oooOL forecast. This, of course, does 

not account for any additional value added by weather intelligence in the 

dynamic force and mission execution process that permitted some on-thefly targeting and/or weapons changes as the weather situation changed.23 

Figure 6 

Joint Air Component Planning Cycle 

SWO BRIEFS TARGET 

AREA OUTLOOK FORECAST 

SWO BRIEFS TARGET 

AREA FORECAST 

FINAL WEATHER 

INPUT 

63 HOURS -29 HOURS -18 HOURS .10 HOURS FLY 

Collocated staff weather officers and weather teams provided CENTAF 

unit-level execution. The volume and nature of the support depended on 

the aircraft mission profile and weapons delivery system. Most base-level 

weather support involved standup briefings from the wing commander 

and staff, including flight weather briefings and alert flimsy packages. 

23(S) /bid, pp 14- 18. 

95 
F-111 Weather Support 

Since the forecast provided for each F- 11 7 mission flown was carefully recorded along with mission pilot debriefs, the procedure facilitated 

the reconstruction of an accurate picture of forecast support. During 

Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm there were 1,832 F-117 sorties. 

Staff weather officers accurately forecasted the weather for 1,477-an 8 I 

percent correct rate. Forecasts were overly optimistic for 193 sorties-unfavorable and overly pessimistic on 162-unfavorable when conditions were actually favorable. Some missions were flown, nevertheless, 

despite an unfavorable forecast, as dictated by the priority of the target. 

As the war progressed, forecast accuracy improved significantly as forecasters benefited from valuable pilot feedback and familiarized themselves 

with the weather in the target areas.24 

Since each mission flown by the F-117 was verified, air weather 

service was able to calculate directly the value of weather support. By 

weighing the actual weather observed in a specific region by the percentage of missions to that region, it was determined that F-117 missions 

would have encountered favorable conditions about 65 percent of the 

time. Using weather forecasts, the F-117s actually had a mission success 

rate of 74 percent. This 9-percentage-point improvement results directly 

from the inclusion of weather intelligence in mission planning and execution. In terms of sorties, this means 160 fewer sorties were required to 

strike the same number of targets, or in another way, those same targets 

were all hit 3.7 days sooner.25 

The change in mission profiles by the third day of the air campaign 

greatly affected the weather support concept for deep interdictors. The 

planned mission profile of a low-level ingress and pop-up weapon delivery that required support tailored for low-level weather, target acquisition, 

and lock-on ranges using electro-optical tactical decision aid software 

became invalid. Such software only helped a pilot anticipate his target 

scene. As with the F-117, a cloud ceiling at or below 10,OOO feet was 

the key goho go weather support threshold. The need to predict a cloudfree line of sight to the target further complicated support requirements 

for missions using laser-designating weapons. Forecasters became adept 

24(S) Ibid, pp 19-21. 

25(S) /bid, pp 28-30. 

96 
at predicting cloud layers and amounts in the area; they were less capable 

of predicting percentage of cloud cover along a diagonal line-of-sight 

through the atmosphere.26 

Close Air Support 

The tactics employed for close air support missions drove aircrews 

and mission planners to rely upon weather forecasts more for situational 

awareness than operational goho go decisions. A-10s. for example, flew 

missions in assigned “kill boxes.” Each kill box measured one-half 

degree latitude by one-half degree longitude, or about 900 square miles. 

The controller in the Airborne Command and Control Center cleared one 

or two A-10s into the box for a thirty-minute period to shoot any available targets. CENTAF tasked such missions around the clock. 

At King Fahd, for example, half the A-10 squadrons were placed on 

a daytime schedule and half on a night schedule. Forecasters supported 

missions with a weather flimsy package that included forecasts for cloud 

conditions in target areas. If the forecast predicted no ceiling above 

10,OOO feet, the entire first wave launched. If weather was suspect, 

CENTAF launched a weather scout to find a suitable area before launching 

the entire wave. Once aircraft launched, real-time weather “nowcasts” 

were provided by the staff weather officer via an Airborne Command and 

Control Center voice link to the A-10 pilots, and forecasters got feedback 

from pilot reports. During several periods of marginal weather over 

target areas, the A-10 staff weather officer was able to help redirect A10s to areas with more favorable weather?’ 

Support to Air Force Special Operations 

Psychological operations-leaflet drops-required precise wind forecasts 

provided by the staff weather officer. MC-130s completed 17 leaflet 

drops from above 10,OOO feet, and aircrew feedback indicated that the 

forecast wind direction was 94 percent accurate wind speed was 98 

percent accurate. Such precise forecasting was largely possible due to the 

real-time upper level wind measurement capability data provided by Air 

26(S) Ibid, p 22. 

”(S) Ibid, p 22. 

97 
Force Special Operations Command weather team members deployed near 

the IradKuwait border with a portable rawinsonde system?’ 

Value Added by Weather Support 

Air weather service postanalysis of forecast support, based largely on 

the F- 1 17 and F- 11 1 missions, quantifies the value added of their forecast 

support to the air ~ampaign.2~ Many nonquantifiable measures, particularly related to ARCENT support, were documented as anecdotes and testimonials from supported commanders. Together these quantitative and 

subjective measures indicate that on-scene weather support forces contributed significantly in minimizing the cost, saving lives, fortifying resources, and winning the war. 

Factors Affecting Weather Support Effectiveness 

Operation Desert Storm was not always a smooth road to success. 

Commanders encountered several challenges in the course of deploying, 

building, and operating a capable weather support force during the operations. The most significant of these are indicated below. 

Joint or Combined Interoperability 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy No. 5 assigned responsibility for weather support to the Air Force. Execution of the policy and 

coordination of joint weather support requirements fell upon the 5th Weather Wing and 1st Weather Squadron, whose commander served as the 

CENTCOM Staff Weather Officer. The execution of joint weather support, 

however, did not proceed according to deliberate plans. From the start, 

there were coordination and interoperability problems between CENTCOM 

and the independent weather support forces of NAVCENT and MARCENT. 

Differing views on the role of the unified command staff weather 

officer and inadequate joint guidance pointed to the need for the joint 

doctrine to define “joint” weather operations under a unified command. 

Moreover, weather support interoperability extended beyond the Air Force 

weather support forces. The Navy weather support force operated auton28 (S) Ibid, p 24. 

29(S) Ibid, pp 24-32. 

98 
omously throughout the Gulf War, but it did receive transmissions of the 

Joint Operations Area Forecast and land-based observations and forecasts 

via automated network from the Forecast Unit. MARCENT weather forces 

also operated autonomously, although the Marine Corps staff weather 

officer attempted to obtain and use Forecast Unit products and guidance. 

Unfortunately, USMC-Navy tactical weather communications incompatibility, personnel shortages, and equipment maintenance problems continually 

hampered his efforts.M 

Weather Support Tools 

To operate effectively, weather forecasters and observers must have 

a full arsenal of weather support tools in theater. In the early days of 

Operation Desert Shield, some weather support “pillars” such as upper air 

rawinsonde sounding equipment were eliminated or delayed until later in 

the deployment and therefore unavailable to meet theater weather support 

requirements. The demands for upper wind data during operations pointed to the error of excluding a “doctrinal” weather support tool without 

sufficiently analyzing the impact of that loss in capabilities. Operation 

Desert Storm also demonstrated that weather suppo~ force equipment 

should not be planned to meet “best case” weather requirements or on 

assumptions about “benign” environments. 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm also confirmed that smaller was 

better. Ironically, some standard weather equipment that had been excluded from deployment because of constrained airlift was replaced by 

smaller, more easily transportable substitutes. For example, the tractor 

trailer-sized GMD-5 upper air system was replaced with a footlocker-sized, 

tactical MARWIN upper air system that successfully provided needed upper 

air data. Similarly, a small Rapidly Deployable Imagery Terminal was 

deployed to provide increased imagery capabilities in place of additional 

DMSP Mark IV vans that require an entire C-141 to transport. 

Tactical Communications 

Never had an Air Force weather support force, such as in the Persian 

Gulf, employed tactical communications on a large scale. Weather forecasters at deployed locations produced weather data and supervised theater 

30(S) AWS DslDS Report No. 2, pp 242-246. 

99 
guidance for customers from nearly the first hours on the ground. However, these systems-the Quick Reaction Communications Terminal (QRCT), 

GOLDWING, and USAREUR Automated Weather System (UAWS)-relied on 

high-frequency radios. Such communications are inherently difficult to 

establish and maintain, being subject to ionospheric fluctuations, assigned 

frequencies, and other environmental conditions difficult to control. 

Operators also require an understanding of high-frequency radios, radio 

wave propagation, and network control procedures beyond those typical 

of most weather personnel. Consequently, weather support sometimes 

suffered as a result of inadequate communications. Air Force weather 

teams made their tactical communications work only with nearly constant 

attention that detracted from their primary weather support duties. 

Even then, the high-frequency systems were barely adequate to meet 

requirements for continuous, high-volume theater weather communications. Units supporting the Army during the ground campaign found that 

the communications systems took too long to set up, and by the time they 

could be established, it was time to tear down and move again with their 

rapidly advancing Army customer. As a result, weather teams with the 

Army in Iraq and Kuwait often did not send critical battlefield weather 

data or receive needed theater forecasts with which to support their Army 

 commander^.^' 

Meteorological Satellite and Other Support Capabilities 

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program imagery was the most 

valuable source of weather data in the Persian Gulf. It was the only 

source of high-resolution cloud data for data-denied enemy target areas. 

However, because the satellites of this program are polar-orbiting, there 

were six- to eight-hour periods between satellite passes, resulting in a 

lack of data for that time period. Though the National Oceanographic 

and Atmospheric Administration polar-orbiting satellites helped fill this 

void, they produced imagery of lower resolution. Their signal, moreover, 

was unencrypted and could have been shut off to deny the imagery to the 

enemy. Other foreign geostationary satellites also helped fill gaps in the 

imagery coverage, but their coverage produced even less data than the 

civilian polar-orbiters, since the Persian Gulf was situated on the extreme 

3'(S) /bid, pp 171-181. 

100 
edge of their coverage footprint. All in all, Operation Desert Storm 

demonstrated the value of and necessity for weather satellite imagery.32 

Although weather satellite imagery provided a critical capability to 

detect clouds and large-scale weather features over enemy territory, other, 

finer resolution weather data were needed. The lack of surface-derived 

weather data from Iraq and Kuwait such as temperatures, winds (speed 

and direction), pressure, visibility, precipitation (intensity and amount), 

and detailed information on cloud types, heights, and extent significantly 

degraded our capability to characterize battlefieldtarget area conditions 

or to forecast future conditions accurately. Improved weather support to 

contingency operations in data-denied regions requires the capability to 

sense remotely and report key weather parameters.’’ 

To forecast the Persian Gulf region’s weather accurately, weather 

forecasters relied on automated numerical weather prediction models run 

on high-speed, mainframe computers at Air Force Global Weather Center. 

Using worldwide weather data collected via the Air Force’s automated 

weather network, the center’s computers forecast global weather parameters, such as winds and temperatures at various level of the atmosphere, 

and produced forecast products transmitted to field units. This chain of 

centralized support exhibited some weak links during Operations Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm. 

Weather facsimile circuits between the Forecast Unit and Global 

Weather Center were not operational until December 1990. This limited 

capability deprived deployed weather support forces of the full benefits 

of sophisticated automation and numerical weather prediction capabilities. 

In the interim, the Desert Storm Forecast Unit relied on facsimile products received from the Naval Oceanography Commands Fleet Numerical 

Oceanography Center and foreign sources including the British and Saudi 

meteorological services. These sources, however, did not include Air 

Force data collected from the theater and transmitted to the Global Weather Center via the automated weather network and were not specifically 

tailored to Air Force or Army operational requirements.34 

32(S) /bid. pp 159-170. 

33AWSID0 Joint Universal Lessons Learned Input (31852-41900), Maj Norman Buss 

”(s) AWS DWS Report No. 2, pp 207-213. 

(AWSIDOJ), 29 May 1991. 

101 
Even after facsimile support was available from the center, the numerical model guidance received was based on global-scale numerical 

models. Theater-level support required a finer resolution model-a regional forecast model that could predict smaller, theater-scale weather events. 

The center’s global model, though extremely useful for describing and 

predicting large-scale global weather patterns, was not able to predict the 

development or progression of small, theater-scale storms or weather 

events that were prevalent. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the 

need for improved forecast accuracy available from a regional, finerresolution forecast modeling ~apability.~~ 

DMSP van receiving 

data from orbiting 

DMSP satellite. 

35(S) Ibid, pp 1 1 I - I 12. 

102 
Mobilization and Personnel Support 

The call-up of more than 34,000 Air Force reservists during the 

Persian Gulf War provided a new perspective of mobilization and management of the Air Reserve Component. It also provided personnel 

managers the opportunity to implement wartime policies and procedures. 

some for the first time. This chapter focuses on Air Force mobilization, 

manpower, and personnel support actions during the Persian Gulf War. 

Air Reserve Component: Structure, Mobilization and 

Readiness 

The United States armed forces depend on reserves and national 

guard to augment active forces during contingency operations. The 

concept of “citizen soldier” and “minutemen” indeed outlines the tradition of active forces. However, prior to World War 11, the U.S. reserve 

force structure differed considerably from today’s composition. Prior to 

%W I1 the only reserve organizations of any relative size were,the Army 

National Guard and the Army Organized Reserve.’ These included Air 

Corps units of the reserve and guard that now comprise the Air Force 

Reserve and Air National Guard. 

The major Reserve categories consist of the Ready Reserve, Standby 

Reserve, and Retired Reserve. With the exception of the National Guard, 

each Service component has members in each category. As of 30 September 1990 5,501,380 DOD personnel were available for mobilization 

(Figure 7). 

‘David Rodney, Robert W. Downey, Jonathan Geithner, Desert Storm Reconstruction 

Report, Volume X: Reserve Manpower (Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, Oct 1991). 

P 1. 

103 
Figure 7 

Total Force Mobilization Resources 

Source: DMDC 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared the Selected 

Reserve as essential to wartime missions, and it is the most combat-ready 

Air Force resource of the Ready Reserve. Funded and equipped, its 

members actively train to augment active duty forces in times of national 

emergencies. Comprising the Selected Reserves2 of the USAF are the Air 

National Guard, Air Force Reserves, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees or IMAs (members of the Air Force Reserves assigned to an 

active duty Air Force unit for training and utilization purposes). Table 6 

illustrates the composition and strength of the Air Force Ready Reserve 

as of 30 September 1990. 

The Persian Gulf War marks the first large-scale operational use of 

reservists in a total force concept since DOD adopted the “Total Force 

Policy” in 1972.’ Figure 8 compares activation of Air Force reservists in 

support of the Korean War, Berlin Airlift, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam 

Zrhe term “reserves” includes both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves. 

’Rep. Les Aspin, Rep. Beverly Byron, and Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Iraq, 

Saudi Arabia, and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessons for a Future Force Structure, 15 Oct 1990, p 2. 

104 
Table 6 

Composition and Strength of USAF Ready Reserve 

United States Air Force Ready Reserve: 265,493 

Selected Reserve: 201,291 

Guard and Reserve 

Units 

187,976 Reserve 

1 16,933 7 1,053 13,315 

Guard Reserve IMAS 

~ 

Ind Ready Reserve: 64,202 

Air National Air Force 

Guard Reserve 

0 64,202 

Source: DMDC 

War, and the Persian Gulf War: The mobilization of the Air Reserve 

Component during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm can be divided 

into five phases. 

2 August 1990, Invasion of Kuwait: Reserve Volunteerism 

After the invasion of Kuwait, but before call-up authority (22 August 

1990), Air Force reservists volunteered under Title 10 U.S. Code 672 (d) 

to participate in Operation Desert Shield for service in the United States 

and in the theater of operations. By the end of August, more than 6,000 

reserve volunteers were supporting the active ~omponent.~ They formed 

strategic and tactical airlift, air refueling, reconnaissance, and special 

operations crews, and served as maintenance and aerial port personnel. 

The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, “Reserve Compo51ssue Paper. HQ USANDPXCX, “ARC Participation in Desert ShieldStotm.” 21 Aug 

4 

nents,” Jun 1992, pp 23, 24. 

1991. 

105 
Thousands 

160 

140 

120 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 

Figure 8 

Past Use of the Air Reserve Component 

................................................................................................................................................................................... ’I 

........................................................ ................................................................................. 

Korea Berlin Cuba Vietnam Desert 

Storm 

UAFRES BANG 

Swrce: OASD Reserve Affairs 

The volunteers played a major role in completing the largest airlift in 

history. Thousands volunteered within hours of the initial U.S. response 

to support the defense of Saudi Arabia.6 Guard and Reserve volunteers 

flew 42 percent of all strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of refueling 

missions.’ Near the end of August 1990. reserve volunteers had moved 

7 million tons of cargo and 8,150 passengers to the theater of operations. 

Before the decision to activate reserves, volunteers provided manpower in direct support of reserve and active duty missions. The absence of 

these reserve volunteers from their parent units prior to mobilization 

The Reserve Components of the United Stares Armed Forces, “The Contributions 

Ibid. 

6 

of the Reserve Components to the Persian Gulf War,” Jun 1992, p 40. 

7 

106 
could affect readiness and their ability to meet subsequent mobilization 

requirements.* During Operation Desert Storm this was averted because 

units were not activated in structured form, and commanders generally 

controlled more people than tasked under mobilization orders. 

At the beginning of fiscal year 1991, the Air Force determined all 

man-days normally allocated to major commands for reserve active duty 

tours would be used exclusively for the Persian Gulf War. Fiscal year 

1990 Operation Desert Shield mandays totaled 353,000 at a cost of 

$50 million. During fiscal year 1991, more than I .2 million Operation 

Desert Storm man-days were used at a cost of $161 million. 

22 August 1990 Presidential Call-up (200K) 

On 22 August 1990, President Bush provided the Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, recall authority under Title 10 U.S. Code 673 b.’ 

This legislation allows the President to authorize the Secretary of Defense 

to order to active duty up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve 

to augment active forces for any operational mission for a period of 90 

days. The law also provides for an extension of an additional 90 days if 

it is in the interest of national security. 

For Operation Desert Shield, Mr. Cheney’s initial DOD guidance for 

the recall of Selected Reserves was:” 

Limited to the projected needs of Operation Desert Shield. 

Based on the current force structure. 

Not to provide support for other possible contingencies. 

Not to include Army Reserve or Coast Guard Reserve combat 

units. 

*The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, ‘The Contributions 

of the Reserve Components to the Persian Gulf War,” Jun 1992, p 40. 

’Title 10 of the U.S. Code and Presidential Executive Order of 22 Aug 1990, 

“Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces.” 

“Memo, Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, to The Secretaries of the Military 

Departments and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subj: Call of Selected Reserve 

Units and Personnel Active Duty, 23 Aug 1990. 

107 
To apply the ninety-day limitation on a unit-by-unit basis, and to 

be measured at the time the unit was actually called to active 

duty." 

Limited to a unit, group, or detachment of two or more individuals organized to perform a particular function, regardless if it is 

part of a larger group.I2 

Initial DOD call-up authorities are shown in Table 7. 

Table 7 

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up, 22 August 1990 

Service Authorities 

Army 25 ,000 

Navy 6,300 

Marine Corps 3,000 

Air Force 14,500 

DOD Total 48,800 

The process for the call-up of reserves to support Operations Desen 

Shield/Desert Storm began with U.S. Commander in Chief, Central 

Command, Gen. H. Norman Schwankopf, U.S. Army. His staff determined the overall force size needed to support CENTCOM'S mission. The 

Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Chief of Staff, and supporting major 

commands determined requirements for Air Force reservists, which were 

reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with recommendations sent to Mr. 

Cheney, and finally to the President. Once the call-up authority was 

granted, Mr. Cheney informed the Service secretaries the overall strength 

ceilings authorized for recall. 

"Ltr. Everett G. Hopson, Chief, General Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General. to HQ USAF/XOOTC, subj: Questions on the Order of Reserve Components 

to Active Duty, 17 Aug 1990. 

"lbid. 

108 
On 23 August 1990, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Secretary of the Air Force, Donald Rice, to recall 14,500 members of the 

Selected Reserve (Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard units, and 

Individual Mobilization Augmentees) for a period of 90 days. This 

authority was further delegated to General Michael Dugan, Air Force 

Chief of Staff. (See Table 7 for the numbers of personnel authorized by 

the Department of Defense.) 

During the call-up, the Chief of Staff approved major command requests, a time-consuming procedure, in some cases taking as long as 

fourteen days.13 However, during partial mobilization, MAJCOM commanders were assigned quotas and managed force mobilization. 

14 November 1990, Call-up Authority Increased 

The President extended the period of active duty of personnel of the 

selected reserve to 180 days.I4 Mr. Cheney increased the call-up ceiling 

twice. On 14 November it was increased to 126,250.15 This included a 

1,250 authority for the Coast Guard. On 1 December 1990, the total was 

increased to 1 89,250.16 The first change increased the Air Force authority 

from 14,500 to 20,000. It remained at that level until 19 January 1991. 

The second increase provided additional call-up authority for the Army, 

Navy, and Marine Corps. DOD call-up authority remained at 188,OOO 

until Partial Mobilization on 18 January 1991. The increased DOD ceilings are shown in Table 8. 

13HQ USAF DPXCX, “GWAPS After Action Input,” 29 Apr 1992, unnumbered. 

14Presidential Executive Order, “Authorizing the Extension of the Period of Active 

Duty of Personnel of the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces,” 13 Nov 1990. 

I5Ltr, Donald J. Atwood, Assistant Secretary of Defense, to The Secretaries of the 

Military Departments and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subj: Call of Additional 

Selected Reserve Units and Personnel to Active Duty, 14 Nov 1990. 

I6Ltr, Dick Cheney. Secretary of Defense, to The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subj: Call of Selected Reserve Units 

and Personnel to Active Duty, 1 Dec 1990. 

1 09 
Table 8 

Selected Reserve Call-up, 14 November 1990 

Service Increase New Authority 

Army m,oOo 115,000 

Navy 23,700 30,000 

Marine Corps 20,000 23,000 

Air Force 5.500 20.000 

DOD Total 139,200 188,000 

18 January 1991, Presidential Partial Mobilization 

On 16 January 1991 the air campaign began. Two days later the 

President declared a National Emergency and authorized Partial Mobilization under 10 U.S. Code 673.” This legislation allowed the President to 

authorize the involuntary mobilization of up to 1 ,000,000 members of the 

Ready Reserve for a period up to 24 months. However, for Operation 

Desert Storm, the President authorized the mobilization of 360,000 

members of the Ready Reserve (Selected Reserve units, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and Individual Ready Reserve) for a period of 12 

months. The Air Force share of 52,000 included the 20,000 allocated 

during call-up.” The Coast Guard call-up of 1,250 was not part of the 

360,000 DOD authority. Mobilization through these authorities worked as 

shown in the following table: 

”Presidential Executive Order, “Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces 

to Active Duty,” 18 Jan 1991. 

‘*Ltr, Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, to The Secretaries of the Military 

Departments and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subj: Call of Ready Reserve 

Units and Personnel to Active Duty, 19 Jan 1991. 

I10 
Table 9 

Partial Mobilization, 18 January 1991 

Service Increase New Authority 

Army 105,000 220,000 

Navy 14,000 

Marine Corps 21,000 

44.000 

44,OOo 

Air Force 32,000 52,000 

DOD Total 172,000 360,000 

With inputs from commanders and approval from Secretary Rice and 

General McPeak, Air Staff operational and personnel planners developed 

mobilization requirements for each command and operating agency. 

Carefully scrutinizing the requirements, Secretary Rice allocated 41,560 

[of the 52,000-authorization] to Major Air Force components of Unified 

Commands and Special Operating Agencies." The commands and agencies received a ceiling of 39,660. Two hundred mobilization augmentees 

and 1 ,000 members of the individual ready reserve were authorized to be 

activated. Each command had authority to mobilize reservists and 

guardsmen to meet operational needs as they saw fit, both in the United 

States and in the theater of operations. Additionally, the Secretary of the 

Air Force, under Title 10 U.S. Code 688, authorized the activation of 700 

active duty retirees. 

A comparison of Air Force selected reserve and active duty strength 

levels during Operation Desert Storm is illustrated in Figure 9.*' Figure 

10 shows the numbers and functions the reserves performed during 

Operation Desert Storm deployment.*' 

"Msg, SAF to ALMAJCOM-SOA Commanders, subj: Presidential klaration of Partial 

"Strength figures for Desert Storm represent peak period of Mar 1991. Source is 

"The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, 'The Contributions 

Mobilization, 2222452 Jan 1991. 

Defense Manpower Data Center. 

of the Reserve Components to the Persian Gulf War," Jun 1992, p 48. 

111 
Figure 9 

Selected Reserve and Active Strength Comparison 

FY 90 Strength Desert Storm Deployed 

AFRES 

12.1 

Actlve 72% Active 78% 

Expressed in thousands 

'Selected Reserves only 

Source: DMDC 

Figure 10 

Employment of Reserve Components During Desert Storm 

Aerornedical Evac 

Medical 

Strategic Airlift 

Air Refueling 

security Police 

Strat Airlift Maint 

Tactical Airlift 

Civil Engineering 

Aerial Port 

Tactical Fghteni 

ServlceS 

Special Operations 

TAC Airlift Malnt 

Cornmunicatlons 

Transportatlcm 

Tactical Rec 

Airfield Operations 

Other Support 

1000 2000 3Ooo 4000 5000 0 

As of March 1991 

112 

Source: OASD Reserve Affairs 
For the first time, on a large scale, the Air Force utilized members of 

the Individual Ready Reserves, active duty retirees, Stand-by Reserves, 

and retired reserves, otherwise known as the Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM), which do not train with an active unit. Generally considered 

less ready from a military perspective, this resource of personnel does 

possess many critical skills (medical, engineering, scientific, etc.) needed 

during wartime. On 12 January 1991, under Title 10 U.S. Code 688, the 

Secretary of the Air Force implemented Push-Pull and eventually recalled 

1 18 active duty retirees,22 who filled specific needs as physicians, enlisted medical technicians, and explosive ordinance disposal technicians. 

The medics provided critical skills needed to backfill medical facilities in 

the United States, and the ordinance technicians assumed duties at munitions facilities and ranges. During partial mobilization, 842 individual 

ready reservists were a~tivated.2~ Again, the medical personnel were 

mainly utilized as backfills in the United States. 

Members of the U.S. Air Force debark from a C-141 B Starlifter 

aircraft upon their arrival in Saudi Arabia. 

22Msg, SAF to ALMAJCOM-SOA Commanders, subj: Presidential Declaration of Partial 

23JCS-JI Operation Desert Storm Manpower & Mobilization Report, 171 8002 Mar 91. 

Mobilization, 2222452 Jan 199 1. 

113 
A concern voiced by pretrained reservists was the short time-span 

given between notification and reporting dates?4 Since the overwhelming 

majority were doctors, it was necessary to transfer patient loads before 

reporting to active duty. Although policy allowed for delays and exemptions, some reservists were not aware of this option. For that matter, a 

number of problems in command and control surfaced between planning 

and reality in mobilizing the reserves. 

Unlike the Army and Marine Corps, where entire units deploy as one 

wartighting entity, the Air Force planned and used during the Gulf War 

deployment by unit type codes (W). That is, the Air Force deployed in 

groups of less than unit size and strength that were combined with other 

functions and units to form larger force packages of both combat and 

support functional areas. Such “units” brought with them the people and 

equipment needed to perform a specific wartime mission. 

In the past, both active and reserve planners assumed that air reservists would be mobilized and utilized as entire units and accessed into the 

active duty personnel system. The unit and individual reservist would 

then be completely transferred into the active component. This concept 

was not based on limited regional contingencies, but on post-World War 

I1 experiences and global war scenarios. It was also assumed that mobilized reserve units would be utilized for an extended period of time, 

certainly more than the six months of Operation Desert Storm.25 

During the Gulf War, the reserve component was mobilized, 

deployed, and utilized exactly like the active forces-by unit type codes. 

Mobilized in small functionally aligned groups, and in some cases split 

and simultaneously redeployed to multiple locations in theater, the nonunit integrity approach was a departure from previous planning assumptions. Economy of force, the nature and relative size of the contingen24HQ ARPURC. “JULLS Long Report Number 52447-93900 (00039),” 12 Feb 1991, p 

25Global war scenarios (Base Case) were the major planning assumptions behind 

72. 

mobilization planning since JCS began exercising Mobilization in NIFTY NUGGET 78. 

114 
cy-compared to a global war scenario-were factors leading to the lessthan- w hole unit approach .26 

Operational control of reserve component personnel and units passed 

to the gaining major commands as planned. However, administrative 

control remained with the Air Reserves. This was not planned, and the 

division of administrative and operational control created confusion 

among personnel planners at all levels. 

This confusion resulted in conflicts of policy guidance in the areas of 

reserve personnel programs and entitlements. Reservists called to active 

duty fell under active-duty personnel policies for accountability, benefits, 

and entitlements. Moreover, they remained under administrative control 

and management of the Air Reserves, and they also fell under reserve 

personnel policies for promotion, pay, leave accounting, and records 

(automated as well as paper) management. This led to further confusion 

in determining administrative treatment of mobilized reservists.” Furthermore, mobilized reservists would frequently receive conflicting guidance 

from major commands, the reserve component personnel planners, as well 

as their home units. 

In a survey conducted by the General Accounting Office of forty 

activated reservists from eighteen different reserve and guard units in all 

three services, ten Air Reserve members from Aerial Port units indicated 

a broad range of problems associated with their mobilization,” specifically dissatisfaction with: 

limited notice received before mobilization, 

uncertainty of the period of mobilization, 

calling up only parts of units and disregarding unit integrity, 

assignment to jobs not trained to perform, 

initially, not receiving timely pay and travel reimbursement. 

26Rep. Les Aspin, Rep. Beverly Byron, and Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Iruq, 

Saudi Arabia, and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessonsfor a Future Force Structure, 15 Oct 1990, pp 5-7. 

*’HQ ARPURC, “JULLS Long Report. 52130-73600 (=),I’ 12 Feb 1991, p 10. 

’goperation Desert Shield Problems Encountered by Activated Reservists, “Report 

to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,’’ United States General Accounting Office, Sep 1991 (GAO/NSIAD91-290), p 1. 

115 
As discussed earlier, the Air Force did not mobilize entire units. 

Since Air Reserve Component support personnel who normally provided 

services to their units were not mobilized, active duty units were not 

staffed or trained to handle the problems raised in mobilizing reserves. 

Mostly, the survey participants considered the difficulties inherent to the 

mobilization process, especially during a short ~ontingency.2~ The assistance they sought dealt primarily with the uncertainty of reemployment 

rights following demobilization. 

To achieve cooperation and understanding among reservists, guardsmen, and their employers with regard to mobilization and employee 

rights, reservists chartered the National Committee for Employer Support 

of the Guard and Reserves. The committee was active during and after 

the Persian Gulf crisis,j' through advertising campaigns targeted at employers and other postwar assistance programs. During a 14-day period 

in August 1990, the committee's Ombudsman Program handled more than 

5,300 telephone inquiries-more than a 200 percent increase for assistance 

concerning reemployment rights, compensation, and the implications of 

voluntary versus involuntary activation. Legal opinions of Title 38, U.S. 

Code Chapter 43, Section 2024, rendered during the Gulf War indicated 

that reserve component volunteers activated under Title 10 U.S. Code 672 

(d) authority had the same reemployment rights as those involuntarily 

activated. As a result of Operations Desert ShieldIDesert Storm, many 

employers developed personnel programs and improved policies to support their reservist- employee^.^' 

28 February 1991, Cease Fire: Demobilization 

Offensive operations ended, and on 8 March 1991 the Secretary of 

the Air Force directed early demobilization of reservists,32 delegating this 

authority to the major command^?^ This flexibility allowed them to 

291bid, p 2. 

wThe Reserve Components of the United Stales Armed Forces, "Employer Support," 

"]bid, p 56. 

32Msg, SAF to ALMAJCOM-SOA Commanders, subj: Execution of Demobilization, 

'3Msg, SAF to ALMAJCOM-SOA Commanders, subj: Execution of Demobilization, 

Jun 1992, p 53. 

0801002 Mar 1991. 

0801002 Mar 1991 

I16 
demobilize forces when they were no longer needed. On 18 April 1991, 

DOD published demobilization guidance to the Services.” 

From a planning perspective, demobilization had been treated as a 

low priority. The last opportunity requiring demobilization on this scale 

was at the close of the Berlin Crisis in 1961-62.35 As mentioned earlier, 

mobilization plans were based on post-World War I1 scenarios designed 

for global war. No real emphasis had ever been placed on practicing 

demobilization, even during JCS annual mobilization exercises. Therefore, 

existing policies and procedures were sketchy and untested. 

Inexperience with the demobilization process coupled with early 

demobilization presented situations not anticipated by personnel planner~.~~ To help reservists transition to civilian status required modification of policies dealing with problems such as finance, medical, etc. As 

with mobilization, tracking the progress of demobilization manually was 

a difficult task. Table 10 compares the selected reserve manpower ceiling 

compared to the number activated by each Service as of 17 March 1991 .37 

Readiness of the Reserves 

Readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure are the 

four components of combat capability. The Defense Department defines 

readiness as the ability of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment 

to achieve the results for which they were designed. It also includes the 

ability to deploy without unacceptable delays, quality, training, and 

manning levels of military personnel, condition and maintenance of 

equipment, state of training in units, and others. Measuring the readiness 

34Ltr, Christopher Jehn, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management & 

Personnel; Stephan M. Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. to: 

Secretaries of the Military Departments and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subj: 

Policy Guidance Regarding the Separation Processing of Members of the Ready Reserve 

being released from Active Duty in Support of Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm, 

18 Apr 1991. 

3sThe Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, “A Brief History of 

the American Citizen Soldier,” Jun 1992, p 1. 

36HQ ARPURC, “JULLS Long Report Number 52434-57600 (00028),” 12 Feb 199 1, p 

37JCSll-l Manpower Mobilization and Accession Status Report, 1718002 Mar 1991. 

55. 

117 
of a unit is a complex issue and should consider both the objective as 

well as the subjective. 

Table 10 

Partial Mobilization Authorities Compared to Number Activated 

Amy Navy Marine Air Force Total 

Authority 220,000 44,OOO 44,000 52,000 360,000 

Activated 133,060 20,433 25,720 34.34 1 21 3,554 

Percent 60% 46% 58% 66% 59% 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff designed the Status of Resources and Training System to provide active and selected reserve units with criteria for 

reporting the level and condition of unit resources and level of training 

on a particular date. These criteria consist of four resource areas: personnel, equipment and supplies on-hand, equipment condition, and training. The category levels, or C-levels, progress from C-1 through C-5. 

Category C-1 identifies a unit with required resources and training to 

undertake a full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. 

Level C-2 identifies a unit that can undertake the bulk of the wartime 

mission for which it is organized or designed. Units reporting level C-3 

can undertake major portions, while units reporting C-4 require additional resources ador training in order to undertake its wartime mission 

but could be directed to undertake portions of the mission with resources 

on-hand. Units undergoing a service-directed resource change and not 

prepared to undertake wartime mission report category level C-5. 

As indicated in Figure 11, ninety-five percent of the guard and reserve support units reported a level of readiness in categories C-1 or C-2 

118 
during the Gulf War, while only five percent reported C-3 or (2-4.'' Of 

the support units reporting C-3 or C-4, less than one percent reported C-4. 

Figure 11 

Guard and Reserve Support Unit Sorts July 1990 

1 100% 

Source: USAFIXOOCR 

A unit's readiness cannot be reflected in such a report alone. Other 

considerations, including subjective and intangible factors such as age, 

job stability, education, skill retention, and career continuation, as well as 

leadership, morale, and physical fitness, also affect combat readiness. 

Results of mobilization tests, operational readiness inspections, combat 

diness evaluations, and combat skills competition should also be considered. 

"USAF/XOOCR Jut 1990 SORTS Report for Hying and Non-flying units. NOW: 

Reserve units were activated by mC. SORTS data represent the entire unit. 

119 
The most critical concerns affecting the readiness of Air National 

Guard units during fiscal year 1990, according to the Reserve Forces 

Policy Board, were a shortage of state-of-the-art simulators and computerbased training systems, as well as aircraft and ground support spares. 

The Reserves reported an inadequate number of fully trained personnel 

in aeromedical evacuation, combat communications, liquid fuels maintenance, and rapid runway repair units. Nevertheless, even with these 

known shortages, the evidence indicates that the Guard and Reserves 

were ready to perform their wartime mission in August of 1990. 

Air Force Guard and Reserve units continue to have the highest 

personnel continuation rates among all Selected Reserves in the Department of Defense.39 For fiscal years 1988 through 1990, continuation rates 

for first-term and career personnel averaged eighty-four and ninety-one 

percent respectively, a six percent higher rate for first-term and a three 

percent higher rate for career personnel than the other Services. For 

fiscal year ending 1990, the Air Force Reserves and Air National Guard 

also had the highest percentage of enlisted personnel fully qualified in 

their current duty positions with ninety-six and ninety-four percent 

respectively.@ In comparison, the Navy Reserves had ninety-two percent; 

Army Guard, eighty-two percent; Marine Corps Reserve, seventy-five 

percent; and the Army Reserve, seventy-three percent. Additionally, the 

Air Reserve Component continues with higher than average numbers of 

reservists having prior active duty e~perience.~' 

Keeping trained and talented people provides for a level of stability 

in the reserve force. In this respect, the Air National Guard and Air 

Force Reserves also have a higher percentage of personnel between the 

age of thirty-five to fifty than the active force. In particular, when comparing ages of active and reserve officer corps, the Reserves and Guard 

have almost thirty percent of their officers between the age of forty-one 

and forty-five, compared with only about fifteen percent of the active 

officer corps.42 While not absolute, it does reflect a more mature and 

experienced reserve force to work and train with the same equipment. 

~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ 

39Defense Almanac 90, OASDIFhMP, Nov/Dec 1990, p 34. 

% 1990 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Mar 1991, p 68. 

4'lbid, p 82. 

Defense AImnnac 90, p 34. 42 

1 20 
Some reserve crew chiefs have been assigned to the same individual 

aircraft for as long as ten years, while their active counterpart may average only three to four. This aspect manifests itself in air-to-air and air-toground competition and in performance, gunnery, and maintenan~e.~~ 

Personnel Management 

The focal point for Air Force Personnel management during wartime 

is the Air Force Manpower and Personnel Readiness Center network 

made up of manpower and personnel planners from base level to the Air 

Staff. Empowered to monitor and coordinate wartime manpower and 

personnel actions, the Center is the lead activity responsible for monitoring and informing senior leadership of significant wartime situations that 

can affect personnel policies. 

Beginning in August 1990, this network operated on a twenty-fourhour schedule. The Air Staff Personnel Center, collocated with the Air 

Force Combat Operations Staff, served as the lead manpower and personnel agency for the JCS and Air Staff operational and personnel planners. 

Augmented by Personnel and Manpower planners from the Air Staff, 

Center staffers became a part of the Air Force Chief of Staff’s Crisis 

Action Team. During the war, they undertook hundreds of personnel and 

manpower actions and inquiries affecting every facet of personnel management. The immensity of this task was tremendous in deployment and 

strength accounting. 

While the Air Force had vigorously trained for mobility, no one 

expected to deploy so many people from so many units to so many bases 

in such a short period of time. The speed of the deployment was unprecedented-1 0,OOO personnel deployed during the first 10 days-and 30,000 

deployed within the first 39 days of the operation.44 

The need to deploy as many combat aircraft to the theater as quickly 

as possible prevented commanders from taking the number of support 

personnel normally needed. This situation exerted such a strain on the 

Air Combat Command History of William Tell and Gunsmoke, ACCMO. 

Ltr, Lt col Jerry W. Crowe, Chief Personnel Readiness Division, HQ TAUDPXX, to 

col Henry L. Cyr Jr., Chief Personnel Readiness Division, HQ USAF/DPXC, subj: Gulf 

War Air Power Survey, 2 Mar 1992 

43 

44 

121 
Contingency Operation Mobility Planning and Execution System that it 

never caught up. Additionally, the lack of a plan that would identify a 

starting point for personnel requirements was a contributing factor in 

matching requirements with deployed resources. The lack of a centralized 

statement of Air Force manpower requirements compelled each supporting 

command to develop its own manpower document. As a result, many 

command documents used nonstandard codes, which made automated 

consolidation of all Air Force requirements next to impossible.’5 

Since the plan was being modified daily, requirements could not be 

built as fast as personnel deployed. This lack of planning created situations where people were not properly accounted for in the theater of 

operations. Commanders lacked accurate information on current or future 

requirements for their mission, or type of personnel arriving in the near 

future. Manpower planners, not part of the initial deployment, established 

requirements upon later deployments at each site based on schedules 

when personnel had deployed. Once in place, they made progress in 

catching up, until the push to double the force in December 1990, and 

again the accountability system became cumbersome and inflexible. It 

was not until January 1991 that the requirement numbers began to reasonably match the personnel numbers in theater. 

Exacerbating the accountability problem was the lack of in-theater 

trained Combat Personnel Control System operators. When personnel 

requirements data did arrive, many of the operators did not know how to 

process the incoming data.& Inaccurate projections sent from stateside 

bases complicated matters even more. When this loop broke, so did 

accountability. 

To fix the accountability problem, bases in the United States established work-arounds, such as projection of all personnel departures, then 

transferred this information by modem to each site. CENTAF-Rear Manpower and Personnel planners sent people to the theater to help with 

communication and personnel control, requirements documents, and 

modem interfaces. Although this method of transferring data was not 

planned, timely, or accurate, it did allow CENTAF to pass accountability 

4SAFWMPRT, “JULLS Long Report Number SiS40-06748 (ooo02),” 17 Oct 1991, p 2. 

%e Inspector General of the Air Force Report, Functional Munagement Review 

of the Combat Personnel Control System (cpcs) II, 17 Jun 1992, pp 1-3. 

122 
information to the Military Personnel Center, U.S. bases, supporting 

major commands, and the Air Staff. 

Personnel Support for Contingency Operations 

As a result of lessons learned from the conflict in Vietnam, in 1973 

the Air Force established Personnel Support for Contingency Operations 

(PERSCO) teams. This team concept was introduced to provide deployed 

commanders with basic strength accounting and casualty reporting. 

Additionally, Combat Personnel Control Systems were developed in 1989 

to give deployed personnel support teams an automated means to perform 

strength accounting and other personnel actions. The Gulf War was the 

first time that the Combat Personnel Control System was used in a wartime environment. At the height of the contingency, 41 support teams 

representing almost 200 personnel along with 33 Control System machines were deployed to the theater of operations. These personnel 

represented 39 Air Force bases. By the end of the conflict more than 370 

control and personnel support staff had served in Southwest Asia.47 

Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm identified the need to redesign 

personnel control for deployed commanders with more long-term personnel sustainment support. During Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm, 

deployed commanders requested more routine personnel support than had 

been envisioned. Early deployed teams did not have the right mix of 

expertise and training to provide commanders with full service personnel 

actions. In many cases the personnel office based in the states had to 

support the member. Later in the deployment, line remarks added to the 

deployment requirements document identified the added specialized 

qualifications for each team. A combined staff assistance visit by the Air 

Staff, the Personnel Center, and the CENTAF-Rear staff to the theater 

confirmed the need for a broader range of personnel services. 

After-action reports noted training deficiencies in all personnel support areas. Very few people knew how to operate the Combat Personnel 

Control System, and even fewer were prepared to process automatic 

Ltr, James H. Ermis, Chief Readiness and Mobilization Division Air Force Military 

Personnel Center, to: HQ USAFIDPXC, Lt col Kenneth Roy, subj: PERSCO Demographics 

From the Persian Gulf War, 17 Aug 1992. 

47 

123 
digital network data?8 Of 342 deployed members in the Personnel Support for Contingency teams, only 28 percent had received the special 

experience identifier to certify as a fully trained team member.49 

stop-Loss 

The President extended to the Services authority to suspend provisions of the law relating to promotions, retirements, and separations. This 

authority is known as Stop-Loss. As in the call-ups, the President delegated this authority to the Secretary of Defense, who in turn delegated it 

to the Service secretaries on 27 August 1990.% Stop-Loss was limited 

to members of the armed forces who: 

were or were about to be involved in operations in or around the 

Arabian Peninsula, 

were or were about to be involved in direct support of Persian 

Gulf operations, 

possessed critical skills associated with Gulf operations, 

possessed skills in short supply. 

On 17 September 1990, the Secretary of the Air Force implemented 

a limited Stop-Loss for individuals with separation or retirement dates 

between 2 October and 31 December 1990.” This affected approximately 

1,500 Air Force personnel whose separation or retirement date was adjusted to I January 1991. In the months following September, the Air 

Force revised the Stop-Loss list, adjusting both the scope and period, so 

that airmen could not leave the Air Force indefinitely because of the 

uncertainty created by the Gulf Crisis. The revised list would have affected nearly 11,500 members. In January 1991, 75 officer and 63 enlisted 

specialties were on the list.52 People in these career areas made up ap4EAFMpc/DPM, GWAPS After Action Input, “PERSCO Operations,” 29 Apr 1992. 

491bid. 

Semo, Maj Delores Street, Chief, Officer Retirements and Separations Policy, HQ 

USAFIDPXO, to col Henry L. Cyr. Jr., Chief, Personnel Readiness Division, HQ USAFIDPXC, 

subj: 1991 History, 5 May 1992. 

unnumbered. 

”/bid. 

Maj David E. Edwards, AFMPUDPMARS, Posilion Paper on Expansion of Slop-Loss, 52 

21 Feb 1991. 

124 
proximately 44 percent of the Air Force. However, only about 2.4 

percent were potentially prevented from leaving the Air 

Guidance from the Air Force Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Personnel, however, “minimized” the impact of StopLoss on its 

members.” While the Army initially applied Stop-Loss to all its personnel, then later relaxed its policy, the Air Force began by limiting it to 

specific units or specialties identified by the commands. A limited Stop 

Loss had never been exercised. While this approach proved to keep only 

those people needed to support the war, it also proved that the Personnel 

Data System was not as flexible as the personnel policies it was intended 

to support. 

During the war, the Air Force Military Personnel Center studied the. 

varying degrees of StopLoss implementation.” They determined that while 

it would have appeared more appropriate to expand StopLoss throughout 

the Air Force, the discriminate approach with modifications as needed met 

the immediate warfighting needs and minimized the effect on Air Force 

people. Additionally, the expansion of StopLoss would have been inconsistent with several ongoing and planned force reduction programs.56 

531t was difficult to determine how many people were actually prevented from 

leaving the Air Force. While numbers are not available, many Air Force members whose 

separation date was affected by stop-loss would have reenlisted any way. 

”Ibid, Note 53. 

”see note 53. 

56/bid. Note: Force reduction programs implemented prior to and during the war 

were enlisted date of separation rollback, officer voluntary early release program, lowered 

high year of tenure separations, and Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBS). Those 

under consideration were officer and enlisted RIFs, and additional SERBS. All these were 

part of the MD-wide drawdown. It would appear counter-productive to implement StopLoss and drawdown at the same time. However, the pressures to meet end-strengths after 

the (assumed to be of short duration) war was over were not going to go away. The Air 

Force did, however, later receive end strength relief for FY 91. 

125 
Role of Women 

(U) More than 40,000 U.S. Service women deployed to the theater of 

 operation^.^' As of March 1991, the Army had sent 30,094; Navy, 4,685; 

Marine Corps, 1,225; and Air Force, 4,095 women to the Persian Gulf. 

That equates to about 7 percent of all the deployed forces.s8 Percentages 

of Air Force women in the total force with those deployed to the Persian 

Gulf War is illustrated in Figurel2. 

Figure 12 

USAF Women Deployed and Total Force 

Air Force Deployed Total Air Force 

Source: DMDC as of March 1991 

Women performed a myriad of functions-administrators, security 

police, communicators, reconnaissance and airlift pilots, and crew members, as well as jet engine, aircraft maintenance technicians, and crew 

chiefs. Although they did not serve in direct combat units, five Army 

women were killed in action and twelve wounded in action. Two Army 

women were also taken prisoners of war by the Iraqis. No Air Force 

women were killed in action or captured. 

"DMDC statistics as of Mar 1991. 

"9.6% of Army, 4.4% of Navy, and 1.5% of Marine Corps deployed were female. 

126 
Women performed 

many functions during 

the Gulf War. Here, 

female chaplain holds 

services. 

In the very early stages of the deployment, there was some hesitation 

in deploying some functional areas and women on the first departing 

aircraft. It was associated with determining what the Saudi position 

would be regarding US. Service women deployed to Saudi Arabia. This 

concern was soon dismissed, however, and commanders as well as functional areas deployed personnel without regard to gender. 

Air Force Casualty Services 

This function, controlled and administered by the Directorate of 

Casualty Matters at Randolph AFB, Texas, served as the single focal point 

for Air Force casualties during the Persian Gulf War. The twenty-fourhour-a-day Casualty Operations Center included receiving all reports of 

casualties, coordinating notifications, and directing assistance to the next 

of kin. Casualty reporting by Personnel Support teams, however, was 

sometimes hindered by deployed commanders, directors of operations, 

and the medical community. Casualty message traffic would sometimes 

be overclassified or critical identification information would not be immediately released to the Personnel Support team for reporting to the Casualty Center.59 This generally occurred, with concern over security, and was 

often unavoidable. 

127 
Air Force Casualty Matters developed an automated casualty reporting system that provided a capability to produce cumulative casualty 

statistics generated daily and provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Air 

Force Contingency Support Staff, Air Force Military Personnel Center, 

Air Staff, and SAF Public Affairs. Guidance concerning the public release of casualty information from OSD, Public Affairs was lacking.@ The 

Air Force was the only Service to develop an automated capability to 

report casualty information. 

The CENTAF-Forward personnel staff served as a vital link to the 

deployed personnel community working with CENTAF-R~XU toensure that 

casualty information was appropriately declassified and released to the 

Personnel Support teams. Additionally, they coordinated casualty issues 

with field hospitals and the other Services. 

Operation Yellow Ribbon 

Upon cessation of hostilities, releasing prisoners of war and reuniting 

family members became the universal concern. The Defense Department 

had not faced such an undertaking since the release of pows from the 

Vietnam War. During the Persian Gulf War, however, all U.S. pows 

were returned and there were no people missing in action. 

The coordinating agency for repatriation became the task of the Air 

Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations on 1 March 1991, 

three days before release of the first POW. The Air Force Operation 

Yellow Ribbon After Action Report, issued on 16 May 1991, recommended that the Air Force be appointed as the executive agent for organizing and beginning formal POW/MIA repatriation planning for future 

contingencies.6' During the Gulf War itself, the United States suffered 

few casualties, as indicated in the figures released by the Defense Department shown in Table 11. 

mibid. 

WD After Action Report, Operation Yellow Ribbon Desert Storm POW Repatria- 61 

tion. p 28. 

128 
Table 11 

DOD Casualty Figures 

NonDead 

Service KIA WIA POW Hostile 

USA 96 365 5 127 

USN 6 9 3 48 

USMC 23 87 5 44 

USAF 20 9 8 15 

Female* 4 16 2 7 

Total 145 470 21 234 

Source: Washington Hq Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 

Reports and JCS/J-1. *Female casualties are included in Service counts. KIA: 

Killed in action; WIA: wounded in action; POW: prisoner of war. 

Air Force Personnel Nondeployable Rates 

To assess the efficacy of the reserve program, in September 1990 and 

February 1991 the Air Force conducted a survey of the dependent care 

program. The results in Table 12 indicate the number of reported nondeployables relating specifically to dependent care problems." 

"AFMPUDPM, GWAPS After Action Input, "Dependent Care Responsibilities Program," 29 Apr 1992, unnumbered. 

129 
Table 12 

Deployablity Problems Associated With 

Inadequate Dependent Care Plans 

USAF Single Member Military Couples 

Sponsors wmependents 

(SMS) (MCD) 

10,487 13,707 

Total Deployed SMS: 1,398 TOtd Deployed MCD: 235 

Percent of SMS Deployed: Percent of MCD Deployed: 1.7% 

13.3% 

Members not able to deploy: 73 (4.5%) 

Members returned to CONUS due to dependent care reasons: 88 

(5.4%) 

Members revising care plans after notification of deployment: 69 

(4.2%) 

Members who revised care plans and deployed: 62 (90%) 

Members with civilian spouses incapable of self-care deferred 

from deployment due to inadequate dependent care plans: 30 

Guard and reserve nondeployability rates were partially masked, since 

they were not mobilized by entire units, and commanders selected volunteers that were most fit to deploy. In that regard, there were no reportable nondeployables. The active-duty forces deployed in much the same 

manner as the reserves, and their commanders also could choose from a 

large pool of qualified personnel. However, there were numbers of 

active-duty personnel coded nondeployable in the Personnel Data System. 

Since the active-duty Personnel Data System can only indicate who 

was deployed, there is no basis to determine who was asked and did not 

deploy. Since the numbers of nondeployables is a snapshot in time, a 

person coded nondeployable in the morning could be deployable in the 

afternoon. For an accurate picture of the active Air Force nondeployables 

during the Persian Gulf War, three snapshots in time were taken at the 

end of September and December 1990 and March 1991 with the results 

130 
averaged. They revealed a total of 466,752 deployables and 81,925 

n~ndeployables.~~ Of the nondeployables, 68,452 were changing permanent duty station. (Personnel are coded nondeployable until they have at 

least 60 days at their new duty station.) These codes are routinely 

waived by commanders making them deployable. Figure 13 shows 

13,528 active personnel coded nondeployable (excluding the 68,452 

personnel coded for permanent duty station moves). Comparing male and 

female rates in all categories shows that 1.8 percent of the total male 

population was coded nondeployable, and 6.4 of the females. 

Medical Deferment 

Training 

DNg Use 

Pregnant 

Figure 13 

Active Air Force Nondeployables By Qpe 

L - 3577 

2350 

12247 

1720 j 

Not Joined Unit 

Hospitalized 

Material Witness 

PrisonerlConfined 

AWOUDeserterlPOW 

International Hold 

ObJector/Soie Survr 

Time on Station 

0 Male (8.560163%) Female (4.96&137%) 

a 676 

w523 : 

1449 j 

I433 

3 21 2 

71.0 

173 

55 

Scum: HO USMlDPXOA 

63Briefing, undated, “Air Force Non-deployability, Presidential Commission Tasking,” HQ USAFIDPXOA. 

131 
Family Support Activities 

At the outset of Operation Desert Shield, 107 family support centers 

provided a wide range of programs to address family needsu as the onbase focal point. During the deployment, the centers augmented their 

ongoing programs in financial management, information and referral, and 

volunteer assistance to meet the increasing needs of the community. 

After the initial deployment, support centers also implemented new 

programs to assist family members. In January 1991, Air Force Family 

Matters conducted a survey of center directors to assess the early 

response to families and found a significant increase in the use of Family 

Support Centers by Guard and Reserve families.65 The survey pointed 

out that the family support network transcended family support centers in 

that they provided emotional, educational, informational, and social 

support-but especially “peace of mind” for family members and military 

alike. While the effect of family worries or distractions on combat operations may not be directly measurable, such factors certainly contribute 

to morale and affect job performance. 

During combat operations, the need for services and support increased 

as families faced ongoing media updates on the events of the war. In the 

category of “support during family separation,” for example, contacts 

multiplied from an average of 3,000 per quarter prior to Operation Desert 

Shield to more than 75,000 during the period associated with the war.& 

Air Force Civilian Personnel and Contractor Support 

Air Force civilian employees and independent contractors became an 

integral part of the total force during the Persian Gulf War. even though 

they were not technically in the armed forces. They worked along side 

their military counterparts and suffered the same unpleasantries. More 

than 200 Air Force civilian employees served in Southwest Asia during 

61~~ USAFDW, CWAPS After Action Input, “Family Support Activities,” 29 Apr 1992. 

65Data Analysis of United States Air Force (HQ USAFIDPPH), Desert Shield Surveyfor 

661bid. 

unnumbered. 

Family Support Centers, 4 Mar 1991, pp 1-1-1-7. 

132 
Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm.67 In addition, approximately 6,000 

Air Force civilian employees were called to active duty as part of the 

Reserves or National Guard, which represents 1.4 percent of the total DOD 

reservists activated during the Persian Gulf War. 

“Tech Reps” were also used by the Services to provide technical 

assistance on many weapon systems deployed to the Persian Gulf War. 

They were both civil service and independent contractors, often retired 

military and always highly trained by the manufacturers in the maintenance of various aircraft and other high-tech systems. They offered years 

of experience and corporate knowledge during the war.68 At the 388th 

Tactical Fighter Wing Provisional, for example the Air Force Engineering 

and Technical Service Reps fixed as many as seventy items a month for 

F-16s that would have normally been sent back to Hill Air Force Base, 

Utah for repair. They also developed a method to cool aircraft canopies 

for protection from the extreme desert heat while parked on the ramp. 

Given the nickname “Old Guys” by Lt. Col. Bob Gilloth, assistant deputy 

commander for maintenance, these civilians played a vital role in the 

completion of the 388th wartime mission.w 

The Tactical Air Command provided the largest number of civilian 

employees deployed, and the single largest group (forty-one) came from 

TAC’S Air Force Engineering and Technical Services. They provided 

technical advice and support for the F-15, F-16, F-1 1 1. RF-4, F-4 GE, 

A-1 0, AWACS, Compass Call, ground TACCS, Combat Communications, 

and the Corps Automated Maintenance System. 

Seventy-nine defense contractor representatives from Grumman, 

Martin Marietta, Chicago Aerial, Northrop, McDonnell Douglas, and 

67Ltr, Roger L. Schennerhom. Acting Chief, Requirements and Applications Division, Directorate of Civilian Personnel, HQ USAF, to Colonel Henry L. Cyr, Jr., Chief 

Personnel Readiness Division, HQ USAFIDPXC, subj: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 9 Mar 

1992. 

68At the 388th TFW(P) the six members of the Air Force Engineering and Technical 

Service Team had a combined military and civilian maintenance experience of almost 200 

years. 

69Fighrer in Country, Vol 2, Number 14. “Old Guys Play Vital Part in 388th.” Sgt 

Gary J. Kunich. 388th TFW(P), Public Affairs, 10 Feb 1991. 

133 
Hughes Aircraft also deployed to the theater of operations.” They provided essential wartime technical support to a myriad of systems including radar systems, navigation target pods, RF-4C cameras, and electronic 

warfare systems, to name a few. One very successful air-to-ground 

mission was a direct result of a Grumman Corporation contractor. 

Aboard one of the surveillance aircraft, the Tech Rep picked out a cluster 

of forty Iraqi armored vehicles on the ground, resulting in the destruction 

of twenty-nine by U.S. aircraft.” 

Air Force civilian employees also provided support for logistical, civil 

engineering, intelligence, procurement, personnel systems, and mortuary 

affairs. Prior to the invasion, 123 Air Force civil service employees were 

already assigned to permanent duty stations in Southwest Asia. A departure of nonessentials reduced that number to 87. Another 66 deployed to 

the theater of operations during Desert Shield from Air Force Logistics, 

Military Airlift, Systems, Strategic Air, and Special Operations Commands, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe. They performed a myriad of 

functions in battle damage repair, fuels quality assurance, telecommunications, and others. 

Akin to their military counterparts, accountability of deployed civilians 

was also a problem.’2 Currently, the Manpower and Personnel Module of 

the Contingency, Operation, Mobility Planning and Execution System does 

not interface with the civilian personnel data system; hence, procedures to 

account for civilian or contractor employees deployed in support of a 

contingency did not exist. Furthermore, policies and procedures on issuing 

identification cards, uniforms, chemical defense gear, and passports for 

contractor personnel must be included in base mobility plans. While not 

a show stopper, the lack of firm guidance created minor problem^.'^ 

7%tr, Dick Speakman, Chief Engineering and Technical Services Division, HQ Air 

Combat Command, to Mr. Ted Beck, Research Analyst, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 

26 Oct 1992. 

”Wall Street Jouml, “Tech Reps Taste Battle in Desert Storm, Civilians Make 

House Calls to Repair High-Tech Military Gear,” Rick Wartzman, I5 Mar 1991, p A5A. 

’*HQ USAFDKR. “JULLS Long Report Number 32066-19312 (ooOOl),’’ 4 Feb 1991, 

73/bid. 

P 1. 

134 
7 

Media and Public Affairs 

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated that press coverage is an unavoidable yet important part of military operations. Experience again proved that while the press could be managed more or less 

successfully, it could not be ignored, and it could not be controlled. 

More specific to the air campaign, the military also learned new aspects 

of public relations. 

For example, the inaccessibility of American air bases in the Persian 

Gulf during Operation Desert Shield hampered the creation of a comfortable working relationship between the press and the United States Air 

Force. Also, many Air Force commanders were skittish about talking to 

the press, having witnessed the dismissal of Air Force Chief of Staff, 

General Michael Dugan for indiscretion. During Operation Desert Storm, 

a number of factors contributed to distribution of press coverage of the 

air war: journalists’ lack of understanding of air operations, restricted 

access by reporters to air crews, bases, and aircraft, and the misleading 

nature of television footage covering precision-guided weapons. 

This chapter examines two important and interrelated aspects of 

coverage of the air war: what the press covered and how the military, 

particularly the Air Force, organized to manage that coverage. To that 

end, the two parts of this chapter address the different public affairs 

aspects of the campaign. The first is a qualitative examination of press 

coverage of the war, with particular emphasis on the air campaign and its 

impact on public support for the war effort and on decisionmakers, and 

the second elaborates on the public information mechanism that was put 

in place by the military for handling press coverage, with specific interest 

in the manner that military public affairs organizations handled the air 

war story, followed by conclusions. 

135 
Part I 

The Media in the Gulf War 

This chapter focuses on central issues related to media coverage of 

the Gulf War, especially the air campaign. It is important to make clear 

at the outset what this chapter is not. It is not a chronological or thernatic explication of the full range of broadcast and print coverage of the 

entire war or the air war, nor is it an after-action report on how WD, Air 

Force, or other Service public affairs personnel handled the media during 

the war. It is not a blow-by-blow, who-did-what-to-whom account of 

military-media relations. 

Rather, this essay selects a small number of important issues related 

to media coverage of military operations and attempts to illuminate them 

in the context of the Gulf War air campaign, while looking towards future 

conflicts. The issues discussed were selected because they not only played 

a significant role during the Gulf War air campaign, but are likely to 

reappear. Thus this chapter has one eye on the past and one on the future. 

It should be noted that extensive literature on the presdmedia and the 

Gulf War has developed and is likely to continue to build during the next 

several years. At least three types of books have appeared so far: anthologies, insider accounts, and interpretative analyses. The most comprehensive of the anthologies is The Media and the Gulf War: The Press and 

Democracy in Wartime. edited by Hedrick Smith.' The insider accounts 

were written by working journalists or someone working within a major 

news organization. An example of the former is Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War by John J. Fialka of the Wall Street Jouml 2; an 

example of the latter is How CNN Fought the War: A View From the 

Inside by Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF (ret).3 The interpretative 

analyses were sometimes written with an ideological bent, sometimes 

without. Three examples are War and the Media: Propaganda and 

Persuasion in the Gulf War by Philip M. Taylor4; Second Front: Censor- 

'Washington, D.C.. Seven Locks Press, 1992. 

Washington, D.C., The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991. 

'New York, A Birch Lane Ress Book, published by Carol Publishing group, 1991. 

'Manchester, England, Manchester University Press, 1992. 

2 

136 
ship and Propaganda in the Gulf War by John R. MacArthu?; and The 

Persian Cuff Tv War by Douglas Kellner.6 

Many of the important issues that emerge from a study of broadcast 

and print media during wartime fall into two clusters-media coverage and 

the public, and media coverage and the policymakers. These clusters 

overlap, to be sure, but they are analytically distinct. 

Media Coverage and the Public 

Here, there are two issues of special significance-first, how the public 

learns from the media what it most wants to know, i.e., how the war is 

going, and second, how press coverage of civilian casualties affects public 

support for the war. It would also be useful, after exploring those two 

issues, to examine briefly overall public support for the Gulf War. 

Whut the Public Wanted to Know 

Once military operations are underway, the first and most basic 

question most citizens probably ask is, “how is the war going?’ The 

problem in answering this straightforward question is that there are few 

if any handy, public, widely accepted measures of progress, or lack 

thereof, in a war or any other military operation. Not since Korea has a 

single, simple line on a map provided reasonable indication of progress. 

It is certain, however, that almost everything the public learns about 

an ongoing military operation is learned from the media, especially 

television. (The importance of television as the principal source of news 

for most members of the public is difficult to exaggerate; for example, a 

Gallup poll conducted in the first days of the Gulf War found that eightynine percent described television as their “main source of information 

about the war,” eight percent radio, and two percent newspapers).’ 

Almost as certain is the tendency of government officials, reporters, 

editors, producers (the counterpart in broadcast news to editors in the 

print media), and citizens to search for simple measures of progress. In 

’New York, Hill and Wang, 1992. 

%odder. Colorado, Westview Press, 1992. 

’The Gallup Poll Monthly, Jan 1991, p 21. 

137 
an age of instant information usually conveyed in abbreviated, almost 

short-hand form, the search for a “measure of merit” may pose problems 

not just for the journalist and the professional analyst but also for the 

average citizen, newspaper-reader, and television-viewer. 

One of these measures used frequently during the early days of the 

Gulf War was aircraft losses. Newspapers and television news programs 

provided coverage of daily and cumulative losses, allied and enemy. 

These were simple numbers, and there were only a few of them to track. 

While not providing as comprehensive a measure of progress as the forward-line-of-troops in Korea, the aircraft loss figures could provide a 

simple, easily understandable, albeit partial measure of progress in the war. 

For government and military public affairs offices, it was an easy, 

obvious, and useful task to publish these figures on a regular basis-if for 

no other reason than that it was an easy, obvious, and useful question for 

reporters to ask at news briefings! But these same numbers also posed 

a potentially difficult problem for those managing the politics and public 

affairs dimensions of the war. In a campaign such as the Gulf War, in 

which one side was flying hundreds of aircraft in thousands of sorties 

every day, and the other was essentially hunkering down, the former 

could easily find itself losing more planes than the latter. This could be 

a political problem for the former if such results, when released, were to 

lead its public to conclude that it was losing, or at least not doing very 

well, or doing well at too high a cost. 

In fact such a problem never materialized during the air war, in part 

because comparative aircraft losses were not prominent in the coverage, 

in part because other aspects of the war (especially the Scud problem) 

came to dominate the news in the first days of combat, and in part because allied losses were so small. 

First, aircraft loss figures, while included in most coverage in the 

early days of the war, were not portrayed as prominently as they might 

have been, and they were not used as a simple, single measure of progress. The Washington Post and The New York fimes-two of the most 

influential daily newspapers in the country, which are read by most 

members of Congress, senior government officials, and journalists in 

Washington-provided extensive and intensive coverage of the Gulf War. 

A close examination of their coverage in the early days of the air cam138 
paign indicates that aircraft losses were not a prominent feature in the? 

reporting, and further that other numbers (such as comparative troop 

strength, numbers of aircraft in theater, sorties flown, prisoners of war, 

Scuds launched and destroyed) were given at least as much prominence. 

A review of the relevant transcripts of network evening news stories 

during this same period reveals similar treatment of comparative aircraft 

loss figures by ABC, CBS, and NBC: they were reported, but were not 

prominent in the coverage. 

Thus, aircraft loss figures appear to have been no more dominant in 

early coverage of the war than many others-including daily and cumulative numbers of sorties, and percentages of “successful” sorties-leaving 

the public without a single, simple measure of progress. 

A second factor reducing the visibility and salience of the comparative loss figures was that even in the early days of the air campaign, there 

were bigger war fish for the media to fry, including allied pilots taken 

prisoner by Iraq and the “video-game” footage of allied precision-guided 

munitions destroying Iraqi targets. 

By far, however, the most important development diverting press 

attention from aircraft losses was the sudden, very early, and (to many) 

surprise appearance of the Scud missile threat, which quickly took center 

stage. Indeed, on the front page of the Post’s second-day-of-the-war 

edition (1 8 January), the six-column, two-line headline was “Iraq Retaliates With Missile Attacks Against Israeli Cities, Saudi Air Base.”9 Four 

separate articles that day, including the two leading stories on page one, 

focused on the Scud attacks, and the allied, Israeli, and other responses 

to them. The next day’s paper reflected the same emphasis-another sixcolumn, two-line, page-one headline (“More Iraqi Scud Missiles Hit 

Israel, Increasing Chances of Retaliation”),” and nine separate Scudrelated stories, including the top three on the front page, one of which 

811 should be noted that there are no newspapers which can rival national television 

news (broadcast and cable) as vehicles to reach a ms, nutionul audience. The Posr and 

The Times are used here because of the elite nature of their readership, not its size. 

The Washington Post, 18 Jan 199 1, p I. 

“The Washington Post, 19 Jan 1991, p 1. 

9 

139 
added another element of drama to the Scud story-“U.S. Hunt for Missile 

Launchers Like ‘Needle in Haystack’ Search.”” 

(U) On television, the Scud story was even more dramatic, with 

extensive and frequent footage of damaged areas in Israel and Saudi 

Arabia, civilian casualties, gas-mask drills, even live reports on imminent 

and actual attacks, including colorful, gripping footage (which later 

became quite controversial)’* of the (alleged) interception of Scuds by 

U.S. Patriot missiles. 

For all the media, both for editors and producers, and for readers and 

viewers, drama always plays better than mere data. This is especially 

true for television, which is, above all, a visual medium. “Write to the 

pictures,” is a television news byword.” A perverse Gresham’s Law is 

at work: Good pictures always drive out dull data. In the words of the 

Daily Telegraph, ‘Television is a marvelous medium of impression, a 

hopeless medium of analysis . . . .’I4 

Of course, the Iraqi Scud attacks were more than human drama. 

Given the severe internal pressures on the Israeli government to retaliate, 

and the likely effects that Israeli entry into the war might have had on the 

cohesion of the Gulf War Coalition, serious and volatile geopolitical 

factors were at work. How effective the Scud attacks would be, whether 

they would continue, who would retaliate and how-all would have con- 

”lbid. p 1. 

‘’See, for example, Eliot Marshall, “Patriot’s Scud Busting Record Is Challenged,” 

Science, 3 May 1991; Theodore A. Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War Patriot Experience,” 

Infernarional Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 199111992); Eliot Marshall, “Patriot’s 

Effectiveness Challenged.” Science, 8 Nov 1991; Barbara Opall, “Patriot Debate Resumes,” Defense News, 18 Nov 199 1 ; Reuven Pedatzur and Theodore Postol. ‘The Patriot 

Is No Success Story.” Defense News, 2 Dec 1991; Charles Zraket, “Patriot Gives Stellar 

Gulf Performance,” Defense News, 9 Dec 1991; and correspondence by Robert M. Stein 

and Theodore A. Postol in the Summer 1992 issue of Intemrional Security, Vol. 17, No. 

1. 

I3lnteresting, authoritative, and eloquent on this subject is two-time NBC News 

president Reuven Frank. See especially his Out of Thin Air (New York: Simon & 

Schuster, 199 1 ). 

1415 Feb 1991, as cited in Philip M. Taylor, War and fire Media, (Manchester 

University Press: Manchester, 1992), p 212. 

140 
siderably more to do with perceptions of the war’s progress than would 

comparative aircraft losses. 

A third factor that mitigated the potential impact of comparative 

aircraft loss data was the (surprisingly to many) small scale of the allied, 

especially U.S., losses. 

For months prior to the war, the press and Congress had been publicly 

airing casualty estimates by well-known military analysts, and the numbers 

were sobering. In December Time reported that “analyst Edward Luttwak 

figures that, under the most favorable circumstances . . . the U.S. would 

suffer ‘several thousand killed in action.’ Trevor N. Dupuy, a retired 

Army colonel, has worked out methods of predicting casualties that have 

proved startlingly accurate . . . . For a war with Iraq, he calculates 1,200 

to 3,000 dead, 7,000 to 16,000 wounded-in the first 10 days.”’s 

The public also came to share these predictions: Even as late in the 

crisis as January 10-11, Gallup found that 62 percent of the public 

thought that U.S. casualties would number in the thousands, and only 

28 percent thought they would number less than 1,OOO. But after the war 

began, and even in its first few days, public predictions of the numbers 

of casualties dropped significantly; they rose somewhat in early February, 

then dropped again towards the end of the war, as shown in Table 13. 

As late as the day after the war began, some publicly circulated 

official or quasi-official estimates of possible losses were considerably 

higher than those which in fact soon occurred. On 17 January, the Post 

reported: “Total U.S. losses in the air war are uncertain, The House 

Armed Services Committee estimated the number at ten planes or more 

a day; Air Force officials believe losses to be lower.”’6 

lSMichael Kramer, “Deadline: Jan IS.” Time, 10 Dec 1990, p 35. 

16The Washington Post, 17 Jan 199 I, p A26. 

141 
Table 13” 

Now thal the US. ha^ taken mililcvy action against Iraq, do you think that the 

number of Americans killed and injured wiU be. . . 

Less Several Upto Several Teasof 

than100 Hundred 1,OOO 1,OOO’s 1,000’s 

24 Feb 10% 31% 20% 20% 3% 

22 Feb 10 22 20 28 5 

7-10 Feb 6 21 17 39 8 

17-20 Jan 12 24 16 29 4 

17-18 Jan 12 21 14 28 4 

10-11 Jan 4 11 13 44 18 

18-19 Oct 6 15 15 35 18 

Not only did the allied losses remain low, but as the air campaign 

continued with attacks on Iraqi airfields and as many Iraqi aircraft fled 

to Iran, Iraqi total aircraft losses continued to mount, and the allied loss 

figure never exceeded the Iraqi figure. 

It would probably be reasonable to assume that in future contingencies the American public will pay considerable attention to casualties, and 

that U.S. aircraft losses will be spotlighted not only as absolute numbers, 

but also in relation to enemy losses (as a measure of how much is gained 

at what price). 

Casualties did seem to be on the media’s, and by extension the 

public’s, mind during the Gulf crisis and war. In one survey of the most 

frequently used terms or concepts in news coverage from August 1990 

through February 1991, after Vietnam (7.299 references), those print and 

broadcast media surveyed used human shields (2,588 references) and 

aflied/U.S. casualties (2,009) more often than any other of a dozen terms 

The Gallup Poll Monthly, Feb 1991, p 18. In the 18-19 Oct 1990, and the 10- 1 1 17 

Jan 1991, polls, the question began, “If the U.S. takes military action . . . .” 

142 
and concepts studied.I8 According to one study of ABC, CBS, and NBC 

television evening news broadcasts during the war, “The most frequently 

televised images ofthe Cuff War were not of combat or military casualties, but of damage and injuries inflicted on civilians. We coded 1,217 

individual camera shots of nonmilitary damage . . . . Nearly haff(48%) 

of these shots showed damage to civilian areas inside Iraq . . . . Ironically, the number of air combat visuals [594] virtually equalled the number 

of images of Iraqi civilian damage (590):’ [Emphasis in original.]” 

Further, the public did seem sensitive to casualties, as one measure 

of the costs of a military operation or war. The results of a survey taken 

just before the Gulf War (1 1-15 January 1991) are interesting. The Roper 

Center for Public Opinion Research asked three questions, one to each 

third of a national sample; those in the first third were asked 

straightforwardly about support for going to war, those in each of the 

other thirds were asked a similar question, with the addition of a hypothetical estimate of U.S. casualties. All three questions were prefaced by, 

“As you may know, the United Nations Security Council has authorized 

the use of force against Iraq if it doesn’t withdraw from Kuwait by 15 

January 1 99 1 .” 

Sixty percent of the first third favored going to war if Iraq does not 

withdraw from Kuwait; in the second third, 52 percent favored going to 

war if that meant 1,OOO Americans would be killed in action; in the last 

third, only 37 percent favored going to war if that meant that 10,OOO 

Americans would be killed.20 So in this case at least, support for going 

to war seems clearly related to public perceptions of the costs, the most 

prominent of which is casualties. It would probably be unreasonable and 

unwise to assume that in this dimension the Gulf War was unique. 

Related to these results are those of a Los Angeles Times poll taken 

immediately after the war began, which measured the public’s perception 

of victory in terns of cost in U.S. casualties (Table 14). 

Everette E. Dennis et al, The Media At War: The Press and the Persian Guy 

Media Monitor, Volume V, Number 4, Apr 1991, pp 5-6. 

18 

Conflict (New York: Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991), p 42. 

19 

’%oper Center for Public Opinion Research Data taken from Public Opinion Online 

service. Survey was taken for The Washington Post. 

143 
Table 142’ 

Assuming Iraq leaves Kuwait, would you consider the war with Iraq a success if 

- American bwps died, or not? 

Number of US. troops killed Yes, a success 

none 

500 

1 ,Ooo 

5 .Ooo 

10,000 

20.000 

80% 

50 

37 

27 

20 

16 

Beyond the broader point about the public’s concern about casualty 

figures and how those might be related to support for the war or other 

military operations, John Mueller’s argument in his study of public opinion during the Korea and Vietnam wars is also relevant: ‘‘ . . . one assumes that the public is sensitive to relatively small losses at the start of 

the war but only to rather large ones towards its end.”” Given that with 

the exception of Korea, Vietnam, Beirut (1982-84), and Desert Storm, 

most of the more than 200 U.S. military operations since the end of 

World War IIZ3 have been measured in days or weeks, not months or 

years, the public’s hypothesized sensitivity to low numbers of casualties 

in the early days of an operation may be the only part of Mueller’s twopart assumption that becomes operative: The first few days may be the 

only days! 

”As reported in John Mueller. “American Public Opinion and the Gulf War: Trends 

and Historical Comparisons,” prepared for presentation at the conference on The Political 

Consequences of War, in Washington, D.C. on 28 Feb 1992, Table 52C, p 69. The initial 

question asked in the poll used SO0 American troops; poll takers were instructed to accept 

“considers no American troops died as a success’’ as a volunteered response. 

22John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, John Wiley & Sons, 1973, p 

23See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Withour War (Washington, 

D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978) and Philip D. Zelikow, “Force Without War, 1975- 

1982,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Mar 1984, pp 29-54. 

60. 

144 
There is, however, some evidence that, indirectly at least, calls into 

question Mueller’s thesis. A study of coverage of the Gulf crisis and war 

by The New York i%nes and The Los Angeles limesu indicates that allied 

casualties were not a prominent topic in front-page stories in the two 

papers during two critical periods-in only four percent of the articles during 

1-23 January25 (which includes the first week of the air campaign) and only 

six percent during 16 February through 1 March% (which includes approximately ten days of the air campaign and the entire ground campaign). 

Nonetheless, it still seems reasonable to argue that in future conflicts, 

which might involve a more balanced (i.e., between the two sides) air 

war, U.S. losses may be higher in absolute andor relative (i.e., compared 

to the enemy’s) terms than in the Gulf War air campaign, and press 

coverage of those losses may be more prominent and therefore have 

adverse effects on public support for the war effort. 

Civilian Casualties 

This is another potentially volatile issue in terms of public attitudes, 

and it was intermittently salient for the American public during the air 

campaign. Stated simply, the issue is that press coverage of civilian 

casualties might lead to a loss of support for the war effort. In other 

words, public support for the war might be contingent not only on the 

number of U.S. casualties (see results of surveys above), but on the 

incidence of civilian casualties on the other side as well. 

It appears that during the early days of the air campaign, this latent, 

potential concern was quickly and effectively mitigated by the footage 

*%dward S. Loomis and Paul S. Phillips, “Selected Elite Newspapers and Coverage 

of the Persian Gulf War,” paper prepared for a graduate-level journalism class at Marshall 

University, 18 Nov 1991. 

”/bid, Table 19. Seven topics were more frequently included in front-page stories 

- in descending order of frequency: unitlsoldiedequipment performance, U.S./allied 

diplomacy, purpose of U.S. involvement, civilian casualties, congressional debate, lraqi 

commentary, and military readiness. 

26/bid, Table 25. In this case, only four topics appeared more frequently-again in 

descending order of frequency: unit/soldier/equipment performance, Sovietllraqi diplomacy, U.S./military strategy, and lraqi commentary. 

145 
of precision-guided munitions (including the Tomahawks) and diverted 

by the contrast with the Iraqi Scud attacks, especially on civilian areas 

in Israel. Later, however, this issue was brought dramatically into the 

public eye, especially by the I3 February attack on the Amiriya command and control facility, which apparently also housed hundreds of 

Iraqi civilians that night. 

The first point to be made here about the incident is that it was big 

and dramatic news in the United States. Less than nine hours after the 

attack itself, CNN was the first to run the story (at 5:04 a.m. EST),27 and 

correspondent Peter Amett’s words set the tone for all the succeeding 

broadcast and print coverage: “We have the makings of a major tragedy 

here in Baghdad today.”28 

That evening all three broadcast networks included several reports on 

the incident, with graphic footage of the recovery of bodies from the 

ruins of the building. The pictures of the scene were perhaps the most 

emotionally striking shown up to that point during the four-week-old war. 

Indeed CBS anchor Dan Rather introduced the pictures with the words, 

“We caution you that some [of the pictures] may not be suitable for 

children.”29 

Likewise, the next day’s (Thursday, 14 February) papers gave the 

story major play, minus of course the full drama of the pictures shown 

on television. “Bomb Strike Kills Scores of Civilians in Building Called 

Military Bunker by U.S., Shelter by Iraq,” was the two-line, six-column 

headline across the top of the front page of The Washington Post, which 

ran three page-one stories on the attack. “Bombs Killed Victims as They 

Slept” and “Air War’s Political Risks Dramatized” were the headlines on 

the other two. In all, the Post ran twelve attack-related stories that day, 

along with the text of the White House statement on the incident and 

lengthy excerpts of the Pentagon daily briefing, which was dominated by 

discussion of the bombing. Several of those stories focused on the politiAccording to Philip M. Taylor, War Md the Media (Manchester: Manchester 21 

University Press, 1992). p 189. 

281bid. 

Defense Dialog, 14 Feb 1991, p 2. 29 

146 
ramifications of the bombing and on the U.S. government’s response to 

the public reports of the incident. 

This was true as well of The New York Times’ coverage of the incident.jO The bombing was big news in the Emes-the main headline on 

the 14th (“Iraq Says U.S. Killed Hundreds of Civilians at Shelter, But 

Allies Call it Military Post”) and a total of ten articles, four of them on 

the first page. On the next day the main headline signalled the next turn 

in the story, towards the implications and aftermath of the bombing- 

“Allies Study New Steps to Avoid Civilians in Bombing.’’ At the same 

time the U.S. version was given equal prominence, in a page one headline 

“U.S. Stands Firm on Bomb Attack and Says Investigation is Closed.” 

By 16 February, the story had disappeared in the Times. 

Thursday evening, both ABC and CBS-bUt not NBC-gave significant 

coverage to the aftermath of the bombing, featuring larger casualty estimates and the implications of the attack for U.S. and Coalition bombing 

strategy and priorities for the air campaign. But on the morning of 15 

February (Friday), the attack was no longer the top headline in the Post 

(“U.S. Raises Estimate of Iraqi Armor Destroyed” led the front page), but 

the incident and its implications were featured in no less than five separate articles. By Saturday’s editions, the bombing incident had receded 

from view, displaced by the news of Iraq’s offer to withdraw from Kuwait (subject to certain conditions), a story of larger and more immediate 

political import. 

The second major point is that the U.S. government4vilian and 

military, in Washington and in Riyadh-appears to have made an intensive 

effort to “get on top of’ the bombing incident story, to coordinate its 

responses to the questions being raised, and to provide its own interpretation early and consistently. CENTCOM public affairs officers argue on the 

one hand that this incident wasn’t handled any differently than any other 

story, but on the other hand that the issue probably received the most 

high-level attention of anything briefed to the press during the entire war. 

Indeed as evidence of the latter they cite (CENTCOM briefer) Brigadier 

General Neal’s frequent telephone conversations with Secretary Cheney, 

General Powell, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Williams explaining to them in advance what he would be saying about this incident. 

%x Current News, Early Bird editions of 14-16 Feb 1991 

147 
To be sure, none of this means that the government tried, or even 

wanted, to distort or whitewash reality. Rather, the point is-and, for the 

government, was-that this was a dangerous story, dangerous in the sense 

that it could threaten domestic and international support for the war effort. 

Absent such a concern, it is hard to imagine why the government 

went to such efforts to manage how the story was handled by its various 

public affairs briefers, and in turn by the press. As one government 

official told the Post, the pictures of the bombed facility would be “the 

story of the day and we needed to have our game together fast.”31 The 

New York Times reported “intelligence, operations, and public affairs 

officers scrambling from one office to the next in a concerted effort at 

damage control.”32 

According to the Post, the “public presentation appeared to have been 

carefully worked with the government having orchestrated what 

information and insights would be released by whom and where (Central 

Command in Riyadh, the Pentagon, State Department, and White House), 

and in what sequence. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said, 

“We felt that the military would have to say how it happened and we 

would say why it happened.”“ 

There is no doubt that much of the government’s concern was based 

on the emotional power of the pictures being shown from Baghdad, from 

the site of the bombing incident. In Fitzwater’s words, “The power of the 

image on television is so much stronger than the power of the word. It 

doesn’t matter how much caveats [sic] you put in there, the picture tells 

a story that establishes itself in the mind’s eye no matter what is said.”” 

The Washington Post, 14 Feb 1991, p A25 31 

3214 Feb 1991, p 17. 

The Washington Post, 14 Feb 1991. p A29. 

”The Washington Post, 14 Feb 1991, p A29. 

351bid. 

33 

148 
Third, the issues raised by these powerful images of the aftermath of 

the bombing were central-the quality of intelligence, the accuracy of the 

weapons (even the “smart” ones), the targeting priorities (including the 

special problems posed by “dual-use” facilities), the number of civilians 

killed (at this facility and elsewhere), the possibly differing views within 

the Coalition on how much of what to bomb, and even whether these 

(and other) civilian casualties were accidental or intentional.” And more 

precisely and more importantly, there was the question of public perceptions and the effect of those perceptions on public support for the war, 

both in the United States and in Arab and Western European countries of 

the Coalition. 

Fourth, there is evidence that, despite these seemingly well-grounded 

concerns, not only did public support for the war not drop off, but the 

public seems to have reached conclusions similar to the government’swhether because of the government’s efforts to get out its side of the 

story, or independently, is not clear. 

A Washington PO~I-ABC News poll taken the evening of 14 February, 

after two days of television news and one day of newspaper coverage of 

the bombing incident (Table 15). indicated no drop in support for the war 

from levels found earlier in the week, before the bombing. 

Table 15” 

Do you approve or disapprove of the United Stales 

having gone to war with Iraq? 

14 Feb 78% [approve] 

12 Feb 78 

10 Feb 7s 

All of these issues can be found in TV coverage and in articles in The Warhingron 36 

Posr and The New York Times during 14- I6 Feb 199 1. 

37The Washingion Posr, 16 Feb 1991, p A19. 

149 
Further, in response to a question offering both the Iraqi and U.S. 

versions of the incident?* eighty-one percent said they thought the facility 

was a legitimate military target. When asked, “Who do you hold most 

responsible for the deaths at the bombing site? ” seventy-nine percent 

volunteered Saddam Hussein or Iraq, only four percent said George Bush 

or the United States. On the related question, “Do you think United 

States bombers should pass up some possible military targets if Iraqi 

civilians might be killed in the attack, or not?’ the results were essentially 

unchanged (i.e., were within the margin of error) from a survey taken 

almost one month before the incident: on 20 January, thirty-seven percent 

said pass up the targets and fifty-six percent said don’t; on 14 February, 

the comparable numbers were thirty-four percent and sixty percent. 

Another question, asked on 14 February and 12 February polls (Table 

16). probed respondents’ views regarding efforts of the United States to 

avoid bombing civilian areas; here too the results indicate no significant 

change after the bombing incident. 

Overall the 14 February poll results reveal basic support not only for 

the U.S. war effort but more specifically for the U.S. version of the 13 

February bombing incident and the U.S. bombing policy. 

Another poll taken immediately after the Amiriya bombing gives a 

somewhat different impression of public attitudes towards this cluster of 

issues. In a Los Angeles Times ~011’~ conducted 15-17 February, only 

half (fifty-two percent) felt that “what the United States has accomplished 

in the war against Iraq so far has been worth the number of deaths and 

injuries suffered by civilians in the war zone,” compared to almost twothirds (sixty-three percent) who felt those gains were “worth the number 

of deaths and injuries suffered by American forces.” 

’@The question was, “Iraq says hundreds of civilians were killed when the United 

States bombed an air raid shelter in Baghdad on Wednesday. The United States says the 

site was being used as a military command bunker. Do you think the site was a legitimate military target or not?” The Washington Post, 16 Feb 1991, p A19. 

39As reported in Mueller, “American Public Opinion and the Gulf War,” Table 68, 

P 96. 

150 
Table 1640 

Which of these stutements comes closer to your own view: 

A. The United States should be making a greater effort to 

avoid bombing civilian areas in Iraq; or 

B. The United States is making enough of an effort to avoid 

bombing civilian areas in Iraq; or 

C. The United States is making too much of an effort to avoid 

bombing civilian areas in Iraq. 

14 Feb 12 Feb 

A. Greater effort 13% 13% 

B. Doing enough 67 60 

C. Doing too much 18 22 

A fifth, and more speculative, point is what effect another such 

dramatic, publicly revealed incident with large numbers of civilian casualties might have had on public attitudes towards the war in general or U.S. 

bombing policy and priorities in particular. Were there to be a repetition 

of such incidents, perhaps the concerns-about the competence with which 

the war was being waged, or about whether the civilian casualties were 

accidental or intentional, or about whether the United States was making 

sufficient effort to avoid or at least to minimize civilian casualties-would 

have materialized and would have adversely affected public support for 

the war. 

A sixth and final point would be to examine whether after the 13 

February incident any significant changes were made in Coalition bombing and targeting policy and practices. If such changes were made, one 

might reasonably conclude that senior officials, having weathered one 

incident in terms of sustained public support for the war, might have 

concluded that another one might have broken the dam of public support, 

151 
or at least seriously weakened it. In fact, the record indicates that after 

this incident, the Coalition did not bomb any other similar facilities in the 

immediate Baghdad area!’ 

Public Support for the War 

It is worth briefly highlighting hem the results of polls concerning 

public approval for the war effort. A review of Gallup data during the war 

indicates that overall public support for the war, once it actually began, 

started out-and remained-at very high levels. For example. in six Gallup 

polls taken during the first month of the war, between seventy-nine and 

eighty-one percent said they agreed with the decision to go to war?* Six 

polls taken for The Washington Post during the same period found that 

between seventy-five and eighty-thm percent of respondents approved of 

the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq.‘3 Thus, overall support for the 

war seems to have been high-and highly insensitive to the unfolding of 

events, at least during the first four weeks of the air campaign. 

On another related issue, evidence from Gulf crisis opinion surveys 

indicates that it is not necessarily press coverage, or a change in press 

coverage, that leads to changes in public support for a war or other crisis 

policy. In a late September 1990 poll covering a range of Gulf crisis 

issues, those interviewed were asked: “If the confrontation with Iraq 

continues for a long time, where do you think support is likely to drop 

first?” One-third (thirty-four percent) said the drop would appear first 

among the American people, while only eight percent said it would start 

with the news media.44 These results seem to indicate that some of the 

public, at least, thinks that people’s opinions on the war might change 

independently of press coverage, and not necessarily because of it. 

Please see Chapters 5 and 8 in the GWAK Operafions report. 

The Gallup Poll Monthly, Feb 1991, p 10. 

43The Washington Post, I6 Feb 1991, p A 19. 

41 

42 

The Use of Force-Showdown in the Gurf 19W. Americans Talk Security Survey 44 

#14, p 40. 

152 
Media Coverage and Polilical-Military Deciswnmaking 

The Gulf War seems to have invalidated much of the conventional 

wisdom and some standard hypotheses about the effects of press coverage, particularly television coverage, regarding governmental decisionmaking, especially during crises. 

Part of the public policy and political heritage of the 1970s and 1980s 

is a sense or belief that television news reports skew the business of 

government, especially during crises. Prominently articulated in 1 984J5 

by Lloyd Cutler, the veteran Washington insider and counsel to President 

Jimmy Carter, this argument says that television news creates severe and 

dysfunctional pressures on the timing and the substance of governmental 

decisionmaking. Cutler concluded that “learning how to adjust to [TV’s 

influence] is central to the art of governing today.’* 

According to Cutler, television news has an impact far greater than 

print journalism, first, because its audience is considerably larger-12 to 

15 million for each of the three network evening news programs, compared with only one to 3 million each for the four major national newspapers (The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Wall Street 

Journal, and The Washington Post). The second reason is because the 

power of videotape or film footage greatly outstrips that of cold print or 

even photographs run in newspapers: “If a picture is worth 1 ,OOO words, 

sounds and pictures together must be worth 10,000.’47 

Despite a grab-bag of suggestions at the end of his article for how 

government officials might manage or even mitigate these insidious 

effects of television coverage on the business of government, Cutler’s 

overall message is pessimistic, especially regarding the agenda-setting 

power of television news: 

. . . an appraisal of television’s impact on public policy must distinguish 

between its damaging effect on the time available for crisis decisions 

Lloyd N. Cutler, “Foreign Policy on Deadline,” Foreign Policy, Number 56, Fall 45 

1984, pp 113-128. 

461bid, p 1 14. 

47/bid, p 113. 

153 
and its sometimes harmful, sometimes helpful, effect on the substance 

of broad policy. The most harmful effect of TV news is its tendency 

to speed up the decisionmaking process on issues that TV news is 

featuring . . . . In a very real sense, events that become TV lead stories 

now set the priorities for the policymaking agenda.48 

Following the logic of Cutler’s argument, one would expect that 

television news would have wielded noticeable, even significant influence 

on aspects of the air war, parts of which, as noted above, lent themselves 

to the drama of television coverage. Yet, his persuasive analysis and 

prognosis seem not to have been supported by the events of Operation 

Desert Storm. 

Both senior National Security Council staff member Richard Haas 

and Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz are on record arguing that 

television had negligible influence on most of the major decisions before, 

during, and after the actual fighting in the Gulf War. In separate presentations to a 26 September 1991 conference cosponsored by The Johns 

Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute and The Annenberg Washington Program of Northwestern University, the two senior officials, both of whom 

played major roles in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm decisionmaking, identified eight (Haa~)~~ or nine (Wolfowitz) key decision points 

and argued that television news’ impact on policymaking was minimaLW 

48/bid, p 121. 

49Haas listed: 1 .) policymaking before 2 Aug 1990; 2.) the decision to resist after the 

2 Aug invasion; 3.) the key decisions in the fall of 1990 (to double U.S. forces and to get 

a United Nations resolution to support use of military force; 4.) the decision in Jan and 

Feb 1991 to seek a Congressional vote, as well as the Congressional debate and vote 

itself; 5.) the mid-Jan decision to initiate the air war; 6.) the U.S. decisions on Israeli 

participation in the war after the Scud attacks; 7.) the late-Feb 1991 decision to initiate 

the ground phase of the war; and 8.) the late-Feb decision to end offensive operations. 

Wolfowitz listed decisions: 1 .) to confront aggression; 2.) on the size of the force to 

deploy; 3.) to develop a ground offensive option; 4.) as to whether force would be 

necessary if sanctions didn’t work; 5.) on war aims; 6.) on an extended air campaign; 7.) 

to try to keep Israel out of the war; 8.) to end the war; and 9.) regarding the Kurds in the 

north, after the end of offensive operations by the Coalition. 

SOAuthor’s notes, taken at the conference, are the source for this section of the 

chapter. Author’s notes, impressions, and conclusions are quite consistent with those of 

Walter Goodman of The New York Times. See his “How Bad Is War? It Depends on the 

TV Pictures,” The New York Times, 5 Nov 1991, p C18. 

154 
Several of the key decision points cited by the two officials involve 

the air campaign. The first was the mid-January decision to initiate the 

air war. Haas said that television had no impact on the decision to begin 

or the date to begin, but that it did have an effect on the decision to exert 

extraordinary efforts to avoid collateral damage. 

The second was the decision, cited by Wolfowitz, to pursue an extended air campaign, which he said was related to the question of ending 

it quickly. According to him, some officials worried that weeks of coverage of the bombing campaign would cause problems for some parts of 

the Coalition, but those fears never materialized. When the images came 

in, he said, they tended to buoy public support. 

The third was the February decision to end offensive operations, 

which was discussed by both officials. Haas said that television may 

have had some effect on that decision, because there was some concern 

about, in his words, “piling on.” The decision to end the war, Wolfowitz 

said, was mainly made in principals-only meetings, so the public record 

is thin here. Wolfowitz cited a tension between “how do you justify 

unnecessary killing?” and the belief that getting rid of Iraqi military 

power is a good thing. No one, he continued, thought that Iraqi units 

could do much damage if they went home. He didn’t think that television coverage directly affected the decision to stop the war, but that 

television coverage of the secalled “Highway of Death” may have had 

some influence. 

This last observation by Wolfowitz raises some interesting 

points-first, that memories of even vivid and important events (and the 

sequence of events) may be faulty, and second, the distinction between 

the effects of actual coverage of events and the anticipated effects of 

possible coverage. 

On the first, it is important to arrange the sequence of events: Iraqis 

began to flee Kuwait City in large numbers the weekend of 23-24 February 1991; the ground campaign began Saturday night, Iraqi time, followed 

by air (and later ground) attacks on Iraqis leaving Kuwait City; and the 

President made his decision to end the war on Wednesday, 27 February, 

announcing it that evening in Washington. 

155 
There was no coverage of the so-called “Highway of Death” on the 

three broadcast networks evening news programs, nor was there any in 

The New York Etnes, prior to the President’s decision to end hostilities. 

On the day he made that decision (Wednesday, 27 February), however, 

there was an article in The Washington Post, written by a media pool 

reporter from the Providence Journal on board the USS Ranger, on the 

allied attacks on Iraqis departing Kuwait. Its headline was dramatic-“‘Like Fish In a Barrel,’ U.S. Pilots Say”-but its placement-the second 

page of the special second section-was not. Also dramatic was much of 

its content, including references by U.S. pilots to “bumper to bumper” 

traffic and “sitting ducks.” 

It is difficult to assess with any certainty the effect such coverage had 

on the timing and substance of decisions at the highest levels of the U.S. 

government. The “fish in a barrel” theme was not a prominent aspect of 

Gulf War news coverage: The ground campaign dominated the news, 

whereas the Post article cited above appeared inside the second section 

and was not even reprinted in that day’s Pentagon Current News Early 

Bird edition, and network evening news programs on Monday, Tuesday, 

and Wednesday ran no stories along those lines. Whether any senior 

decisionmakers read the Post article that Wednesday, and what effect it 

might have had on them, is unclear. 

Nonetheless, it is plausible that such coverage, albeit limited, and, 

more importantly, the anticipated effects of additional such coverage, 

had some real effect. After all, such articles might become more frequent 

and more prominent if the war were to continue, television might gain 

access to and become interested in the story, and after-action reports 

along these lines might have reached the highest levels of political and 

military decisionmakers. 

Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s own account5’ reinforces this line of 

reasoning, although it differs with it in some details. He relates a phone 

call from Gen. Colin Powell late in the afternoon (Riyadh time) of 

Wednesday, 27 February, in which the Chairman told him: “We ought to 

be talking about a cease-fire. The doves are starting to complain about 

Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf. It Doesn’r Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 51 

1992). 

156 
all the damage you’re doing.” In the book, Schwarzkopf goes on to 

explain: 

What had happened, of course, was that journalists were now interviewing Air Force pilots who’d been hitting the convoys fleeing Kuwait. 

And as soon as we’d liberated the’ area around Kuwait City, reporters 

who had once been part of the media pools had taken pictures of Highway 6, where we’d bombed a convoy Monday night. It was a scene of 

utter destruction that they’d named the “Highway of Jk3W-a four-lane 

road strewn with the burned-out wreckage of more than a thousand 

military vehicles and stolen civilian trucks, buses, and cars. That was 

what people saw when they sat down Monday evening and turned on 

their television sets. Powell informed me that the White House was 

getting nervous: ‘The reports make it look like wanton killing.’s2 

But General Schwarzkopf’s account must be put into the context of 

the Haas and Wolfowitz versions, and the absence of any reference to the 

“Highway of Death” or any other such events in the transcripts of network evening news programs prior to the President’s decision to terminate offensive operations. Looking at this fuller context, one might 

reasonably conclude that Powell’s concerns, as recounted by General 

Schwarzkopf, may have been triggered by such limited and low-visibility 

stories as the Post’s Wednesday morning media pool report and by a 

worry that if such coverage were to become more frequent and more 

prominent, then adverse political consequences might follow. 

But the evidence does not support Schwarzkopf’s contention that 

“Highway of Death” coverage was included in network evening news 

programs prior to the President’s decision. Indeed, it is interesting to 

note that after his famous “Mother of All Briefings” in Riyadh on the 

afternoon (Washington time) of 27 February, none of the three dozen or 

so questions he was asked referred at all to the “Highway of Death.”” 

There is some evidence that military officials in theater were concerned about the potential for such coverage and its possible effects. 

Less than two weeks after the end of the war, The Washington Post ran 

”lbid, p 468 

s~ran~npt of CENTCOM News Brfg Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, Riyadh, 

Saudi Arabia, Wednesday. 27 Feb 1991 - 1:OO pm (EST). 

157 
a lengthy article (“U.S. Scrambled to Shape View of ‘Highway of 

Death”’) saying that the highway bombing “also was the focus of a public 

relations campaign managed by the U.S. Central Command in Riyadh-a 

campaign designed to shape perceptions of the war’s last and most violent 

phase . . . .’” 

The article cited political problems potentially posed by the way the 

war was ending: “Continued allied attacks raised the specter of a onesided slaughter of retreating Iraqi troops, possibly complicating U.S. 

political problems in the Arab According to the Post, on Tuesday the 26th U.S. military btiefers in Riyadh began to emphasize that the 

Iraqis were not retreating, and that, in the briefer’s words, the United 

States did not “‘have any real evidence of any withdrawal at this 

time . . . .There are still not any indications of a significant amount of 

movement in any direction, north or south . . . .There’s no significant 

Iraqi movements to the nonh.”’% 

“By noon Tuesday, interviews with U.S. attack pilots conducted by 

media pool reporters that morning and circulated on news wire services 

had undermined the briefer’s portrait of the Iraqi movements . . . . 

“As the day wore on, senior officers with the U.S. Central Command 

in Riyadh became worried about what they saw as a growing public 

perception that Iraq’s forces were leaving Kuwait voluntarily and that 

U.S. pilots were bombing them mercilessly, according to U.S. military 

sources. Relaying these womes to the Pentagon as they prepared for 

Tuesday’s scheduled televised news briefing, senior officers agreed that 

U.S. spokesmen needed to use forceful language to portray Iraq’s claimed 

‘withdrawal’ as a fighting retreat made necessary by heavy allied military 

pres~ure.”~’ 

This led to an intense and coordinated U.S. government approach to 

managing the problem, including making a careful and clear distinction 

between a “retreat” and a “withdrawal.” 

The Washington Post, I 1 Mar I99 1, p 1, 54 

55/bid. 

%/bid. 

”lbid. 

158 
“‘Saddam Hussein has described what is occurring as a withdrawal,’ 

[Brig. Gen. Richard] Neal said [in a Riyadh briefing for newsmen]. ‘By 

definition, a withdrawal is when you pull your forces back, not under 

pressure by the attacking forces. Retreat is when you’re required to pull 

your forces back as required by the action of the attacking forces. The 

Iraqi army is in full re~eat.’”~’ This was not a merely semantic distinction: According to the law of war, retreating soldiers are legitimate 

targets of attack. Nor was this concern abandoned with the end of the 

war. The final DOD report on the war included a four-page discussion of 

“The concept of ‘surrender’ in the conduct of combat operation^."^' 

The only way to resolve these uncertainties about the effects of actual 

coverage of the “Highway of Death” or the effects of anticipated further 

coverage would be to interview the senior decisionmakers themselves. 

Observations 

Looking back on the three issues featured in this chapter, one sees 

different ways in which press coverage seems to have influenced public 

attitudes and policymaking on the war. In the first, the press did not fall 

into the trap of relying on a single measure of merit on the progress of 

the war, in particular comparative aircraft losses. In fact, the press avoided any such short-hand indicators of progress, for a variety of reasons 

(none of which will necessarily occur in future situations). Thus, the 

press did not-in this case, anyway-skew public perceptions of how well 

the war was going. 

In the second, press coverage of civilian casualties became, albeit 

briefly, intense, graphic, and dominant. The U.S. government clearly went 

into a crisis-management mode to deal with the coverage and its possible, 

even (seemingly) likely, consequences. That these negative consequences 

in fact failed to materialize is no guarantee that they will not in future 

conflicts. If in the Gulf War changes were made in bombing policies and 

practices, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they were made in response to the spotlight of this dramatic, powerful coverage. 

~___ ~ 

”/bid. 

s9C0nducl of the Persian Gulf War, Appendix 0, pp 0-32 to 0-35. 

159 
In the third, press, especially television, coverage generally did not 

seem to affect government decisionmaking in the ways one might have 

anticipated given the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s. One exception 

seems to be the influence not of actual coverage of the so-called “Highway of Death,” but rather of anticipated coverage of the attacks on Iraqi 

forces in what turned out to be the last hours of the war. 

This last phenomenon is intriguing because it reflects a mind-set that 

takes possible press coverage and possible public reaction to that coverage very seriously. It is a damage-avoidance or damage-limitation mentality, rather than a damage-control approach. It indicates that particular 

kinds of press coverage can have important effects even before they 

occur, indeed even if they never do. It reflects a proactive approach, 

rather than a reactive one. In many ways, it may be the most interesting 

and poignant demonstration of the power of the press in wartime. 

Part I1 

The Military and the News Media in War 

Scholars and historians have noted that throughout the history of 

warfare the problem of communicating war news has always been a huge 

and intricate undertaking requiring “painstaking and elaborate planning.’@ 

How the press reported war was dictated largely by the degree of preparation by both, the military and the news media, in advance of covering a 

story. World War I1 popularly exemplifies the spirit of cooperation that 

existed between the military and the news media covering that war. At 

the other extreme, Vietnam poignantly illustrates a mistrust of the military 

and opposition to the war effort by the news media covering that conflict. 

Neither characterization of the relationship is entirely accurate. However, 

the lessons of both events helped shape the military’s efforts to manage 

press coverage of the Persian Gulf War. 

60Joseph J. Mathews, Reporting the Wars. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 

Press, 1957, p 180. Mathews’ book is regarded as the most authoritative scholarly 

treatment of the history of war correspondence through the Korean War period. 

160 
The military and the news media bring very different concerns to the 

battlefield. As Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower once observed, 

The first essential in military operations is that no information of value 

shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and 

broadcasting is wide-open publicity. 

And, as General Eisenhower admonished reporters in Europe covering the 

pending invasion at Normandy, 

it is your job and mine to try to reconcile these sometimes diverse 

considerations.6’ 

Reconciling these seemingly irreconcilable considerations in Operations 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the responsibility of public affairs. 

While World War I1 often serves as the model of military-media 

cooperation, history paints a very different picture of the relationship. At 

its outset, the Nazis were better prepared “with official news machinery 

for war” than were the British and the French, and, initially at least, 

secured definite advantage over the Allies in the “news war.” ‘* The 

experience in the United States was not much different than in Europe. 

The U.S. Navy, stung by early defeats and setbacks in the Pacific, fought 

a more successful campaign against press disclosures that earned it the 

derisive label, “the silent service” from reporters and commentators of 

that period.63 Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations at the 

time, when asked what his public relations philosophy was for the war 

reportedly remarked: “Don’t tell them anything. When it’s over, tell them 

who won 

The Navy followed that philosophy, at least as long as events favored 

the Japanese and the news was “bad” for the United States. The full 

6’From regulations for war correspondents accompanying Allied Expeditionary 

‘*Mathews, p 192. 

63Mathews. p 189. 

wRobert Debs Heinel, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, Annapolis, 

Forces in World War 11, 1944. 

MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966, p 258. 

161 
story of the damage inflicted by Japan at Pearl Harbor wasn’t officially 

acknowledged by the Navy for almost a year. During the first disastrous 

months of the war, the American public got more dependable, though 

somewhat exaggerated, news of the Pacific from Japanese shortwave 

broadcasts than it got from its own Army or Navy.65 But, as one scholar 

of war correspondence observed: “It has always been easy to tell the 

truth when the military news is favorable.’* When the tide of war turned 

to favor the U.S. and its allies, the information flow to the American 

public improved markedly. It is that period of American and Allied 

military successes, matched with a greater military openness, that World 

War I1 is remembered for and held up for public view as a model of 

military-media cooperation. 

Since World War 11, the diverse considerations of newsgathering and 

warmaking have become no less contentious. In many ways, the advancement of technologies used by newsgathering organizationsparticularly the growth and internationalization of television news-and the 

experiences of Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama all served to exacerbate, 

not reconcile, the media-military relationship. As we will see, the experiences of covering the Persian Gulf War would further strain the military’s 

relations with the press. 

“With an arrogance foreign to the democratic system, the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia is trampling on the American people’s right to 

know,” Walter Cronkite complained in testimony before a Congressional 

committee examining press policies in the Persian Gulf. “The military 

is acting on a generally discredited Pentagon myth that the Vietnam war 

was lost because of the uncensored press coverage of it, particularly 

Ronald T. Farrar, ed. Elmer Davis, Report to the President, Austin, TX: Association for Education in Journalism, 1968, p 15. In an effort to halt “mounting (public) 

dissatisfaction with government information, and particularly the handling of news of 

military and naval operations,” President Roosevelt consolidated most of the news 

disseminating agencies of the federal government under a single Office of War Information. In 1942, the President appointed as head of the new owl, Mr. Elmer Davis, a 

civilian and former radio commentator for CBS. From then until the end of the war Davis 

was in charge of approving all information about the war, including military information, 

that was released by the agencies including the Departments of State, War, and Navy. 

His personal report to the President, submitted at the conclusion of the war and his tenure 

at OWL, was classified until its release by Congress in 1963. 

6S 

Qathews, p 177. 

162 
television’s bloody battle scenes piped directly into American homes,” 

Cronkite warned. ‘The military would do better to pattern its public 

relations after its handling of the press in World War XI, a war we won 

and which left few questions about the press-military relationship,” the 

former anchorman for CBS concluded. 

The news media’s experience covering Operation Desert Storm proved 

to be yet another contentious chapter in the relationship. 

Setting the Stage 

On 6 August 1990, Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, secured 

an agreement with the Saudi government to accept U.S. forces to deter 

or defend against an Iraqi invasion. It was decided not to announce the 

agreement until after the initial forces had arrived on Saudi soil. Both the 

Americans and the Saudis feared that a premature announcement might 

provoke Iraq to advance into Saudi Arabia before U.S. forces could 

arrive:’ The stakes would be raised if Saddam Hussein’s military attacked with U.S. forces in place. 

At 9 a.m. on 8 August 1990, President Bush announced the decision 

in a televised address to the nation. The morning’s announcement was 

followed by a press conference by Secretary Cheney and General Powell 

at the Pentagon at 1 p.m. that afternoon. However, because Operation 

Desert Shield was an “ongoing operation” and security of the forces was 

of paramount concern, neither Secretary Cheney nor General Powell 

would answer questions about specific unit deployments, when they 

would deploy, their destination, or their strength. 

Recognizing that veteran Pentagon correspondents would quickly 

uncover much of the deployment information, General Powell appealed 

directly to the assembled media (and through them to the American 

public watching the announcement on television): 

I also would ask for some restraint on your (the press’s) part as you find 

out information. . . . [I]f you would always measure it against the need 

67Bob Woodward, The Coders, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, p 275. 

163 
for operational security to protect our troops. That should be uppermost, I think, in all our minds.68 

It was reminiscent of General Eisenhower’s appeal to reporters in 

World War 11, asking for their cooperation with the military. But this 

time, the military wasn’t cooperating with the news media. 

Details of the military commitment to Saudi Arabia were purposely 

vague.69 And the military did not accommodate U.S. newsmen to accompany U.S. forces deploying to Saudi Arabia because Western reporters 

were not welcomed by the Saudis. Based on past experience, the Saudis 

were reluctant to permit Western reporters into their country-for any 

reason.’’ Because of a potential military confrontation with a fellow Arab 

nation, the Saudis were even less inclined to agitate their neighbors by 

inviting American reporters on the scene. 

As a result, no Western reporters were on hand to record the historic 

event when U.S. Air Force F-l5s, C-l41s, and C-5s, as well as the 82d 

Airborne Division, began arriving in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. That decision to exclude reporters, and the Pentagon’s apparent acquiescence to it, 

drew a firestorm of criticism in the American press,7’ forcing Secretary 

Cheney to pressure the Saudis to accept Western reporters, They finally 

agreed to accept only a limited number of journalists under strict U.S. 

military control. The Pentagon then turned to the DOD National Media 

Pool to rush Western reporters to the theater.72 Almost one week after 

%OD Transcript. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Gen Colin Powell Press 

69Woodward. p 279. 

7%ete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, statement before 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, 20 Feb 1991, reprinted in S. Hrg. 

102- 178, Pentagon Rules on Media Access to the Persian Gulf War, Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 

7’See for example, “Pentagon Pool Not Sent to Gulf,” New York Times. 9 Aug 1990, 

p A14. Paul Farhi and David Mills, “Media Shut Out at the Front Lines,” The Washington Post. 9 Aug 1990, p D1. 

’he DOD National Media pool is a rotating group of reporters and cameramen 

representing U.S. national news organizations. A ”typical” media pool consists of two 

wire service representatives, one reporter, one photographer, a television team of two or 

three, and DOD escorts. Membership is rotated among news organizations and networks. 

Although membership and composition of the pool varies with events, locations and 

Conference, Pentagon, 8 Aug 1990. 

Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings. 

164 
U.S. troops were committed to defend Saudi Arabia, an initial group of 

seventeen journalists, photographers, technicians, and their military escorts arrived in Dhahran on an Air Force C-141 transp~rt.’~ This 

time-unlike in Grenada and Panama-the press had arrived on the scene 

because of the Pentagon, not in spite of it. 

However, because CENTCOM knew the Saudis were reluctant to allow 

Western journalists into their country-even in peacetime-they had developed no plan in advance for accommodating Western reporters or the 

DOD National Media Pool. General Schwankopf and his staff were 

preoccupied, instead, with moving 250,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines along with their equipment to the theater. CENTCOM’S own public 

affairs staff remained in Florida, along with Schwankopf. Therefore, 

when the Pentagon finally activated the National Media Pool, the only 

public affairs people in Saudi Arabia on hand to arrange for and accommodate the news media in theater were a few public affairs augmentees 

and unit public affairs people who had deployed with the 82d Airborne 

and the 1st TAC Fighter Wing.74 These combined resources provided the 

initial “ad hoc” public affairs support in the early stages of Operation 

Desert Shield.75 

available logistics the average size of the pool prior to Desert Shield consisted of twelve 

plus two military escorts. For an authoritative history of the WD National Media Pool, 

see Gregory H. Hattung (XDR, USN), Now Is The Time To Plan For Media Pools, 

Newport, R1: U.S. Naval War College, 3 Feb 1989. 

’he WD National Media Pool arrived in Dhahran on 13 Aug 1990 after stopping 

7’h-w0 Air Force captains were sent to Saudi Arabia as augmentees to the CENTCOMI 

PA staff; one from Tactical Air Command headquarters, the other from Military Airlift 

Command. Eventually they were joined by other augmentees from EUCOM and charged 

with responsibility for making preparations for the WD National Media Pool. lntvw with 

Maj Tom LaRock, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, Pentagon, 11 Dec 

1992. 

”Maj LaRock intvw. According to Maj LaRock, the initial public affairs support 

in Saudi Arabia was done without any preplanning from either CENTCOM or WD and was 

completely “ad hoc” from their arrival on in the AOR until the CINC’s own permanent 

public affairs staff arrived several weeks later and began setting up an organizational 

infrastructure to accommodate growing news media interest in Operation Desert Shield. 

Even after the arrival of the CENTCOM staff, it was apparent to Air Force public affairs 

officers already in theater that there was no public affairs plan to accommodate news 

media and no “concept of operations” for press operations there. 

off at MacDill AFB. FL. at CENTCOM headquarters to receive briefings. 

165 
Uncomfortable with the presence of Western reporters, the Saudi 

government was slow to approve their visas for lengthy stays. Initially, 

they approved only one entry visa per news organization. That presented 

problems for news organizations, especially for television networks who 

needed several “crews” of reporters, cameramen, and technicians to cover 

a military operation the size and complexity of Operation Desert Shield. 

Therefore, Washington bureau chiefs of news organizations appealed 

directly to Secretary Cheney and Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United 

States, Prince Bandar, to intercede on their behalf. With their intercession, the Saudi government finally loosened their visa quotas and permitted what eventually became a flood of reporters into their country?6 

Organizing to Tell the Story 

How the military organized to tell the story of Operations Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm had a definite impact on the quantity and quality of 

press coverage. From the very beginning, the complex undertaking of 

Operation Desert Shield required a public affairs strategy that balanced 

the military‘s need for operational security and secrecy with the political 

necessity to marshall public support. This delicate balance between 

military and political interests resulted in highly centralized control by 

DOD over public affairs policies for all the Services and units involved in 

Operation Desert Shield. Once in theater, CENTCOM set public affairs 

policy-including policy for press coverage-for the command.77 

However, when it came to dealing with the news media-whether in 

Washington or Riyadh-the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public 

Affairs, Pete Williams, was in charge. While his responsibility for setting 

broad public affairs policy stemmed from his position, his unchallenged 

authority to dictate press policy even to a theater commander sprang from 

7%ere were approximately 1,200 reporters in Saudi Arabia-most of them in 

Dhahran-on 16 Jan 1991. By Feb when the ground csmpaign commenced, there were 

over 1,500 reporters, cameramen, and technicians. A totd of over 3,500 news representatives traveled to Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm between Aug 

1990 and Mar 1991. Another 3,000 to 4,000 were awaiting approval of visas to enter the 

country by the time the war ended. See Pete Williams statement in !Senate Hearing. 

77An organization chart for public affairs and information policy during Desen 

ShieldlDesert Storm is included as an appendix to this chapter. 

166 
his close and personal relationship with his longtime boss, Secretary 

Cheney. Williams conferred with CENTCOM regularly, met with the 

directors of public affairs of the Services frequently, and negotiated 

directly with the Washington bureau chiefs of national news organizations. However, he alone made all the major public affairs policy decisions during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Many of those 

decisions directly affected the Air Force story and, ultimately, in communicating the air campaign to the American public. 

When General Schwarzkopf moved his headquarters element forward 

to Riyadh, he brought most of his public affairs staff with him, but the 

staff had to be considerably augmented by public affairs personnel from 

the Services, Guard, Reserves, and from his supporting commanders. 

Joint Information Bureaus (JIBS) were established in Dhahran and in 

Dubai to handle media coverage of U.S. military units arriving in the 

region and of U.S. Navy ships afloat in the Persian Gulf. Both of the 

bureaus, manned by augmentee public affairs staffs, were operating before 

the CENTCOM staff arrived. When the CENTCOM Public Affairs staff 

finally arrived in Riyadh, one other JIB handled media coverage at the 

Hyatt Hotel across the street from General Schwarzkopfs headquarters at 

the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation. 

The joint bureaus were the sole focal point from which all the news 

flowed from the theater regarding Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 

and all media activities were funneled through them. The JIBS were the 

theater commander’s equivalent to press centers or press rooms, where 

public affairs staff officers could deal with members of the news media 

in one central location. All media support and services provided by the 

military to news media were handled by JIB staff. By their very nature, 

JIBS were jointly manned during their tenure, usually by augmentee public 

affairs officers and specialists provided through component commands or 

by the military Services. 

CENTCOM’S JIBS served very different functions. The Dhahran JIB, 

where most of the Western journalists were located, was a logical selection for reporting. Dhahran was the largest, most modern Saudi city 

nearest the Kuwaiti border. Its proximity to the front and modem commercial communications and Western amenities made it a natural operating center for servicing the large press contingent housed in the Dhahran 

International Hotel. The pools of reporters covering Desert Shield and 

167 
Desert Storm were dispatched from the Dhahran JIB.’’ Each Service 

component operated a press desk at the Dhahran JIB-^^ Army, Navy, 

Marine, and Air Force Desk-manned by a public affairs officer or NCO 

of that service twenty-four hours a day. Each desk handled Serviceunique questions from the news media and all logistical operations for 

visits to deployed units of the component commands. 

Despite their proximity to the front, the Dhahran JIB was not a reliable source of operational information for most journalists. Planning and 

operations staffs were in Riyadh, and the Dhahran JIB had no access to 

them. There were no dedicated military communications between the JIB, 

Riyadh, the component commands, or units in the field. Commercial 

telecommunications facilities served as the outlet for stones, a situation 

that severely hampered the Dhahran JIB’S ability to keep abreast of sensitive military information and operations. Nevertheless, this was the JIB 

for all reporter pools from whom they would obtain logistical support and 

transportation during Desert Storm. 

In contrast, the Riyadh JIB had fewer reporters until 16 January, when 

it became the center of world attention and the site of “the show”-the 

daily cENTCOM and Coalition press briefings televised live all over the 

world. Although organized similarly into Service press desks, the focus 

of the Riyadh JIB dealt almost exclusively with preparing daily press 

briefings and not in moving reporters to units in the field. 

The JIB in Dubai was the smallest of the public affairs centers. Only 

two or three public affairs officers were assigned to that JIB at any given 

time, mostly to handle news media related to U.S. Navy ships in the 

Persian Gulf and some military units arriving at ports outside of Saudi 

Arabia. Dubai also became a holding area for many journalists traveling 

to the theater still awaiting visas for entry into Saudi Arabia. The Dubai 

JIB was set up to handle those reporters. 

In addition to the public affairs staff at CENTCOM, and those of the 

JIBS, each component commander managed his own public affairs staff, 

each headed by a public affairs colonel or lieutenant colonelkommander. 

CENTAF had the smallest and least experienced public affairs staff of all 

the component commands-two public affairs officers (a major and a 

?he pools were called Combat Correspondent Pools during Desert Storm. 7 

168 
captain) and two noncommissioned officers (one public affairs technician 

and one administration specialist). The component command public 

affairs staffs served as the primary interface between CmOM, the JIBS, 

and units in the field. Visits by news media in theater to units in the 

field were channelled through the individual component public affairs 

office for approval and coordination with the units. Since the JIBS had 

no dedicated military transportation, they often depended on units or 

component commands for travel as well. 

Every CENTAF tactical fighter unit (squadron or greater size) deployed 

with at least one public affairs officer or noncommissioned officer and a 

public affairs contingency kit.79 Unit public affairs personnel worked 

directly with the JIB in Dhahran with little or no guidance from CENTAF 

until the CENTAF Forward public affairs office was established in Riyadh. 

Initially, this arrangement was not much of a problem, since most U.S. 

Air Force units weren't getting much news media coverage.s0 Because of 

Saudi sensitivities, Western reporters were permitted to visit only Two 

operating air bases-Dhahran and King Fahd-each within easy driving 

distance from the Dhahran JIB and visible from the main highway. The 

only other location the press could cover CENTAF operations was in 

Riyadh, where the air base and international airport shared the same 

runway. All other locations remained closed to Western reporters because of Saudi and other host nation sensitivities. 

CENTAF Forward public affairs, under pressure from the Pentagon, 

attempted to obtain Saudi permission for the press to visit additional 

'%e requirement for public affairs support and deployment of Public Affairs 

Contingency Kits was laid out in the Public Affairs Annex F to CENTAF'S ORAN 90-1002. 

While TAC fighter units deployed generally well prepared for sustained operations in the 

desert, some MAC and SAC units did not. The CENTAF Forward Public Affairs staff deployed with no Public Affairs Contingency Kit or supplies of any kind and had to borrow 

typewriters and laptop computers until they could acquire their own. 

8?ntvw with MSgt Bobbie Shelton. USAF Fighter Weapons Center, Office of Public 

Affairs, Nellis AFB. NV. 1s Jan 1993. Sergeant Shehon was public affairs NCO for the 

37th Fighter Wing (Deployed), supporting the F-117 unit in Saudi Arabia throughout 

Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm. 

169 
bases where U.S. Air Force units were located; however, they were 

unsuccessful?’ Due to the segregation of the kingdom’s government and 

military into regions, each headed by a different Saudi prince, no one 

person short of King Fahd himself could issue a “blanket” approval 

granting access to all airfields where U.S. Air Force units were operating. 

With many of CENTAF’S forces operated outside of Saudi Arabia, the 

problem of getting permission for reporters to visit these bases would 

entail government-to-government negotiations. Therefore, to open more 

air bases CENTAF had to negotiate through local unit commanders directly 

with local government and senior military representatives base-by-base. 

Negotiations to open additional bases were either unsuccessful or never 

took place.** The record is unclear+mly the result is certain. 

Consequently, most of the “air campaign” story remained off limits 

and untold to Western reporters. Certainly one reason was inaccessibility 

of air bases by reporters. Another reason was that commanders-those 

best suited to inform, educate, and prepare journalists-were too busy 

preparing for war to accommodate visits from Western reporters.83 Moreover, the firing of Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mike Dugan for revealing certain information to the news media caused many deployed Air 

Force commanders to refrain from talking to reporters. Most unit public 

affairs officers and noncommissioned officers also lacked the necessary 

authority and experience to push the issue of press access with their 

commanders. Without a strong push through the operational chain-ofcommand for greater access and more openness with the news media, 

many public affairs officers felt it was just not worth pursuing with their 

commanders.R4 

lntvw, Brig Gen H. E. “Ed” Robertson, USAF, command director, NORAD Command 

Operations staff, Cheyenne Mountain Complex AFB, Co, 5 Jan 1993. Gen Robertson was 

the director of public affairs for the Secretary of the Air Force during Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm. 

lntvw with Maj Louis J. Tiedemann (USAF, Retired), 13 Jan 1993. Maj Tiedemann 

served as director of public affairs. CENTAF Forward, during Operations Desert 

ShieldlDesert Storm. 

81 

82 

83Maj Tiedemann intvw. 

%a& on intvws with several unit public affairs officers, and post-Desert Storm 

public affairs “lessons learned“ conferences, the issue of increased access and openness 

with the news media in theater was never forthcoming through the operational chain of 

command (JCS, CENTCOM, or CEMAF). 

170 
As a result, Western reporters saw only a very small part of the total 

U.S. Air Force presence and preparations prior to 16 January 1991. The 

vast majority of reporters, therefore, lacked familiarity with Air Force 

operations, weapons systems, and their capabilities by the time the air 

campaign began. Unprepared and ill-equipped to cover air power, they 

understood little of what they saw during Operation Desert Shield or the 

strategic air campaign of Operation Desert Storm. 

In the United States the Air Force tried to compensate for the limitations in the theater. Here too, however, DOD’s centralized control over 

public affairs and policies relating to Operations Desert ShieldDesert 

Storm severely limited the Service’s efforts. Services and units in the 

United States were permitted to provide only “fact sheet” background 

material that had already been cleared and released concerning weapons 

systems, units, and tactics. Nothing specifically connected to Operation 

Desert Shield or Desert Storm could be independently released by any 

unit or Service unless it had already been cleared and released by the 

Defense Department or CENTCOM. Those were the rules of engagement 

in dealing with the news media.85 

In the Pentagon, Air Force Public Affairs (SAFIPA) attempted to 

provide the news media with a readily accessible source of background 

information (“fact sheets”). Once the air campaign started, its press desk 

became manned around the clock. A group of subject experts on fighter 

operations, airlift, command and control, strategic, space and reconnaissance, electronic combat, and warfighting concepts and doctrines from the 

Air Staff who could provide background information to members of the 

press were made available through SAFIPA twenty-four hours a day. The 

Air Force Press Desk in SAFIPA served as a clearinghouse and information 

“broker” for the news media-depending further upon subject experts from 

the Air Staff whenever public affairs staff resources and expertise were 

insufficient. 

*’SecDef (ASDIPA) Msg, 1719162 Jan 1991, subj: Operation Desert Storm Release 

Authority. SecDef (ASWPA) Msg, 2418122 Aug 1990, subj: Operation Desert Shield 

Release Authority. ~D’s intent was to preserve the “joinlness” of the military’s efforts 

in the Persian Gulf, and a desire to dampen any efforts by the individual services to 

trumpet their own contribution to the effort at the expense of the other Services. This 

was one of the reasons cited by Secretary Cheney for his tiring of Gen Mike Dugan for 

remarks the Secretary believed reflected Service parochialism. &e mD Transcript, 

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney press conference, 18 Sep 1990. 

171 
Shortly after the air campaign began, this office expanded the list of 

experts to include transportation, munitions, and supply from the Air 

Staff‘s logistics community. All of this effort was intended to “fill in the 

blanks”-providing necessary background, context, and color that the Air 

Staff felt the news media were not getting in the cut and dry press briefings in Riyadh and Washington.” While those efforts and others by Air 

Force Public Affairs and the Air Staff served many reporters covering the 

war from the Pentagon, the vast majority of information concerning the 

war in general, and the air campaign specifically, came from the Riyadh 

briefings and eyewitness accounts of pool reporters in theater. Understandably, the press focused on events happening in the Persian Gulf and 

about to happen, mc on the U.S. Air Force headquarters’ perspective of 

what was OCCU~.~’ 

While the public affairs organizational structure had a definite impact 

on information about Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm communicated to the American public, there were other factors that affected what the 

public saw and heard of the air campaign. The ground rules developed 

for covering combat, and the public information release system put in 

place for the war also had profound effects. 

How the System Was Designed to Work 

The daily CENTCOM update briefings held in Riyadh at the end of 

each day of operations (usually 11 :30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time) served 

as the primary mechanism for communicating the war’s progress to the 

American public and to the world at large. Pentagon briefings held in 

mid-afternoon (usually 2:30 pm. EST) weekdays supplemented the 

CENTCOM updates. These overall theater (Riyadh) and politico-military 

861ntvw with Lt Cot Mike Cannon, 10 Dec 1992. Cot Cannon was one of the team 

”In post-Desert Storm intvws, the general consensus of most public affairs staff 

officers was that while these efforts aided many of the new second and third-string 

reporters assigned to the Pentagon for the first (and probably last) time to cover the 

Persian Gulf War. it made only a relatively minor contribution to the body of press 

coverage. Although no records were maintained that permit an objective. quantitative 

analysis of who made use of these services, most of the staff interviewed indicated that 

the most frequent callers were small news organizations and reporters from “outside the 

Beltway”-too small to be able to afford sending their own reporter to Saudi Arabia and 

not important enough to get their calls returned by DOD. 

chiefs on the Air Force Press Desk’s “Storm Cell.” 

172 
(Washington) perspectives were supplemented with unofficial and “independent” eyewitness accounts of reporters operating in “combat correspondent pools” with military units in the field would represent the public 

account of the war. 

How many reporters there would be in the field with military units 

at any given time depended on the number of “slots” available for them 

in each pool. The Pentagon, in negotiation with CENTCOM, determined 

the numbers before the war.88 The press decided which reporters from 

which news organizations filled those slots from the ranks of U.S. journalists assembled and dispatched out of the Dhahran JIB. 

Under the operating rules of pools, each member of a combat correspondent pool would observe and record (in words, pictures, or video) 

what he or she saw in the field. Public affairs escort officers would 

review those words, pictures, and video footage for security and conformity to ground rules. Once cleared, the reports would be sent back to the 

JIB in Dhahran, where they would become available to all other reporters, 

faxed to the JIB in Riyadh, and dispatched to each pool reporter’s parent 

news ~rganization.~~ 

DOD and CENTCOM intended to create a public information system that 

would provide pieces of the mosaic from the battlefield and from the 

881n theory, the number of slots was determined by the logistics and support that 

field commanders said was available to accommodate reporters. In practice, the numbers 

were arbitrarily determined by the Pentagon and CEhTCOM-having been apportioned 

equally among the component commands to ensure “equitable” news coverage. Initially, 

each component command got two pools of about fifteen reporters per pool. Two 

additional smaller “quick reaction” pools of reporters were formed for coverage of 

unexpected events. 

*%ere were 132 reporters assigned to various “pools” covering combat units in the 

field at the start of Desert Storm. As the ground phase of Desert Storm approached, 

Washington bureau chiefs, network presidents, and Congress complained that there 

weren’t enough reporters in the combat correspondent pools. Using that criticism and 

Congressional interest as a wedge, Pete Williams was able to force CENTCOM to create 

more “slots,” and the pools grew to accommodate 60 additional reporters. By the time 

the ground war started, there were 192 reporters operating in pools. See “Media Policy,” 

Annex S to Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Washington, 

D.C., Department of Defense. Apr 1992, p 655. For a detailed description of the mechanics of the pool system. see John Fialka’s. Hotel Wum’ors: Covering the Gulf War, Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991, esp. Chapter 4. 

173 
headquarters, forming the bigger picture of the war's progress for the 

American public. The pools, according to Pete Williams, achieved the 

objectives of getting independent reporters out to combat units to view, 

first hand, the battle, as it unfolded; while, at the same time, limiting 

the number of reporters that field commanders, charged with fighting the 

war, had to accommodate.g0 

The combat correspondent pools in the field with units had to operate 

under a strict set of ground rules established by the Pentagon. Reporters 

agreed to them as a precondition for accreditati~n.~' As it took a long 

time for the major news organizations to negotiate the ground rules and 

the concept of combat coverage with the Pentagon and CENTCOM, the 

public affairs planning process developed very late prior to the war. 

Negotiating the Rules for Press Coverage 

In a memo dispatched on 14 December 1990, to the Washington 

bureau chiefs, Pete Williams outlined a three-phased plan for covering 

hostilities by the media. The plan called for the organization of press 

pools. In Phase I-which began immediately, according to Williams' 

memo-the CENTCOM Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran would form 

two pools of reporters, equipped and randomly exercised to provide 

training for news media representatives and U.S. military personnel. The 

intent of DOD and CENTCOM was to familiarize reporters with troops and 

military equipment they would be covering before hostilities broke out 

and to exercise a workable system of filing pool reports from the field. 

Phase I1 would begin by enlarging the number of active pools and 

deploying them when hostilities were imminent-placing them with units 

and at locations to witness and cover the first stages of combat. Membership in the pools would be rotated to ensure continuous coverage by the 

maximum number of news media representatives in theater. The system 

for security review and dissemination of pool material was also implegosee intvw, of Pete Williams by Larry Grossman in "Newshounds and the Dogs of 

War," Government Executive, Sep 1991, pp 26. Also, see A Gulf War Media Review, 

Williams' remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 14 Mar 1991. 

"The ground rules and form signed by journalists agreeing to abide by them are 

included as an appendix to this chapter. 

174 
mented in this phase?’ Ground rules for what could be reported 

remained essentially unchanged from those observed during Operation 

Desert Shield. 

Phase III was envisioned to provide for open coverage (not pooled) of 

combat activities. The military would disband all pools; all media would 

be permitted to operate and report independently. However, because of the 

dangers of traveling in a war zone, and the requirements of Saudi Arabia 

that the news media had to be under strict military control when traveling 

in their country, CENTCOM escort would still be required?3 

While Phase 111 held out the promise of open coverage by the press, 

Washington bureau chiefs vehemently objected to the provision that initial 

coverage of hostilities combat units would be permitted only by pools. 

However, because of the sheer size of the press corps in Saudi Arabia, the 

logisrics of moving them safely and providing support and accommodations in the field, commanders and public affairs officers in country determined that the only feasible way to accommodate news coverage was by 

forming “pools” of news media. According to Colonel Bill Mulvey, 

director of the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran, “the numbers overwhelmed us . . . . We had to resort to media pools for Desert Storm 

because of the huge numbers. We didn’t have any other choice.”” 

92“Security review” was a term adopted from the military’s peacetime practice of 

submitting all information intended for release to the public and the Congress to an 

administrative process of review and coordination for conformity to security guidelines 

and U.S. Government, DOD, and Department of the Air Force policy. This system, called 

“security and policy review,” is used only for information developed by the military for 

release, not by non-military writers, journalists, and reporters. However, because there 

was no longer any formal authority for the imposition of wartime field press censorship, 

“security review” was adopted as a ready and convenient mechanism for the review of 

reports prepared by combat correspondent pools. Although criticized by news organizations as “censorship” by another name, final authority for determining what was published 

or aired did not rest with the military reviewers, it rested with the editors and producers. 

See Williams’ testimony in Senate Hearings. 

93Department of Defense Contingency Plan for Media Coverage of Hostilities, 

Operation Desert Shield, draft dated 13 Dec 1990. 

94Col William L. Mulvey. a U.S. Army public affairs officer and veteran of the 

Vietnam War. was director of JIB-Dhahran. He recounts his experiences there in “Inside 

Media Relations: Observations from Desert Storm,” U.S. Amy Public Affairs Monrhly 

Update (Washington, D.C.: Secretary of the Army Office of Public Affairs), Aug 1991. 

175 
Apparently, Washington and CENTCOM were concerned that field 

commanders could not accommodate unexpected and uncontrolled numbers of reporters traveling to their units. There was also the fear that 

once ground units began their move to reposition to the west for the 

planned flanking attack of Iraqi forces, their movements would be inadvertently revealed by independent reporters traveling outside of control 

by the system of pools and with lackadaisical regard for security review. 

Of course, these concerns could not be directly shared with reporters or 

their editors at this early and uncertain stage of preparing for war. But 

Pete Williams understood commanders’ concerns and tried to balance 

them with the news media’s legitimate role in covering the war. 

Williams spent several weeks negotiating changes and clarifications 

to the plan he had presented to Washington bureau chiefs in mid-December before he finally issued a revision less than one week before the air 

campaign would begin. On 7 January Williams issued what Bill Headline, Washington bureau chief for CNN, called a ‘‘more realistic” set of 

guidelines. However, once again, Washington bureau chiefs wanted more 

concessions, more clarifications of rules, and more assurances from 

Williams that their appropriate interests and needs would be met by 

CENTCOM. They wanted clarification of the escort requirement and of the 

provision for security review so that commanders knew that the final 

decision for publishing disputed material rested with the news organizations, not with them or with Pentagon. But most of all, the bureau chiefs 

and the superiors did not want pools?s 

Williams attempted to accommodate news organization concerns, 

incorporating last-minute changes before distributing a final set of guidelines to the Washington bureau chiefs and CENT<~OM dated 14 January 

199l-the day before the U.N.’s deadline to Iraq; two days before Desert 

Storm. The final rules went to CENTCOWA and to the JIBS barely in time 

to put them in place for Desert Storm. But they went through functional 

(public affairs), not operational (command), channels. There was little 

Report from Nancy Traver, Washington Bureau, Time magazine, “TV in the Gulf,” 

Desert Srorm: The War in rhe Persian Gulf, compilation of Time magazine correspondent 

reports, eyewitness accounts. photographs, audio recordings, maps, charts, and documents 

gathered during the war by Time-Warner’s editorial staff and published on CD-ROM 

(Burbank, CA: Warner New Media, 1991). 

9.5 

176 
time to educate or to train the news media or the military; even less time 

to “exercise” the system. 

The final guidelines did contain the clarifications the bureau chiefs 

sought on escorts and security review; however, they did not eliminate the 

system of pooled coverage of combat. To CENTCOM and to the Pentagon, 

the pool system made the most Sense from the military’s perspective. The 

pool system had been instrumental in gaining for the press access to Saudi 

Arabia and getting reporters to visit widely dispersed units in the desert 

that only the military, equipped with satellite positioning hardware and 

accurate maps, could locate safely and reliably. The military and the 

media were familiar with pools and knew that they could work to get 

some reporters up to the front-representing the rest left behind-in position 

to directly observe and report on Desert Storm as it unfolded. The press 

remained skeptical, but Williams pleaded in a Pentagon press conference 

covering the rules: “Judge us by how well we do it.”% 

How Well Did We Do? 

Of course, the pool system did what it was supposed to do the evening 

the war began. When the first F-IS& took off to strike targets deep inside 

Iraq, American reporters were on hand to report the event at their desert air 

bases. When the US. Navy fired Tomahawk cruise missiles from ships in 

the Persian Gulf headed toward targets in downtown Baghdad, American 

reporters were there as well. Whether it functioned well enough to tell the 

whole story of the air campaign is more difficult to assess. 

Because of pools and limited access to air bases, few of the thousands 

of journalists assembled in Saudi Arabia to cover the war were prepared 

to understand or report on the air campaign. The system of public information that CENTCOM and Washington put in place for communicating the 

progress of the war did little to improve their understanding. 

Despite the fact that the air campaign consumed five of the six weeks 

of the war, air commanders were featured in only two of the daily 

DOD Transcript, Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, % 

Press Conference, Pentagon, 8 Jan 1991. 

177 
CENTCOM briefing^.^' No air commander or U.S. Air Force senior officer 

ever appeared in the daily Pentagon briefings. And despite the ready 

availability of vast amounts of gun camera, cockpit, and other types of 

munitions footage through Joint Combat Camera, neither CENTCOM nor 

CENTAF made use of it as part of a broader public relations strategy. The 

only footage released by CENTCOM throughout the war was selected and 

released as part of General Schwarzkopfs briefings. The CINC's selective 

use of video served to provide a very narrow perspective of the air campaign-one that permitted Saddam Hussein to exploit and magnify the 

issue of civilian casualties more fully than he might have had a more 

accurate and comprehensive portrayal of the air campaign been presented 

to the press and to the public. 

Finally, many of the ground rules for press coverage and the system 

to accommodate the news media were fashioned to meet the needs and 

concerns of commanders preparing to fight a ground war, not an air 

campaign. Many of those rules were unnecessary, for a majority of the 

war was fought in the air from fixed and relatively secure air bases and 

carrier decks. Briefly, there should have been a mechanism and set of 

rules flexible enough to accommodate all aspects of the campaign instead 

of the relatively inflexible rules more appropriate for a ground campaign. 

These and other lessons for future public affairs planners are discussed more fully in the conclusions chapter of this report. 

Gen Homer appeared in one press briefing conducted by the CINC on 18 Jan 199 1. 

Gen Glosson appeared in one other briefing conducted by the CINC on 30 Jan 1991. No 

other senior CENTAF or Air Force officers appeared in any other significant briefings 

throughout the air campaign. 

97 

178 
Supporting The People 

More than 55,000 Air Force personnel deployed to the deserts of 

Southwest Asia; fewer than ten percent were fliers. This chapter deals 

with the morale and welfare needs of the operational as well as support 

forces, and how they were met. The challenge was unique, as men and 

women reared in the customs of Western civilization were transplanted 

to fight for and beside people of ancient customs that viewed Western 

ways, religious beliefs, and codes of conduct with antipathy and suspicion. To bridge the cultural gap, U.S. military authorities instituted for 

their personnel certain guides of conduct. 

The first of these, issued in August 1990, prohibited specific activities by U.S. military personnel assigned to the theater of operations. The 

order was necessary to preserve U.S. and host nation relations and the 

combined operations of U.S. and Coalition forces. Also, Islamic law and 

Arabic customs prohibited or restricted certain activities generally permissible in Western countries. These added to the cultural shock. 

Essentially, the CENTCOM General Order restricted or prohibited the 

purchase, possession, or use of many items normally available to Westerners. Alcohol, firearms, sexually explicit material (whether pornographic or not), and gambling were prohibited. Entrance into a Mosque or 

other Islamic religious sites, unless required by military necessity, was 

also prohibited.' 

Religious and cultural limitations within the theater varied, depending 

on which Southwest Asian country personnel were deployed. Personal 

Bibles were allowed, but could not be distributed to local nationals. 

Moslems openly proselytized for converts among Service personnel.2 

Worship services on U.S. sites were not impeded, but any public gathering for non-Moslem worship outside the U.S.-controlled site was prohibit- 

'USCENTCOM, General Order (30-1, Prohibited Activities for U.S. Personnel Serving 

'Ltr, Chaplain Lt col James T. Elwell, CENTAF Staff Chaplain, to USCENTAFKC. subj: 

in the USCENTCOM AOR. 30 Aug 1990. 

End of Tour Report, 24 Sep 1990, p 4. 

179 
ed. Initially, the Saudis requested that terms such as “church services” 

and “chaplains” be substituted with “morale services” and “morale officer~.’’~ Commanders also asked chaplains to refrain from wearing the 

emblem of their faith on the uniform once outside a U.S.-controlled site.4 

Not until January 1991 could the ban on the terms “chaplain” and 

“church service” be lifted by Lt. Gen. Charles A. Homer. 

Restrictions set for female personnel included modest dress codes and 

excluded walking or riding in a car in public together with a man, other 

than one’s husband, and no demonstration of public affection. On military compounds in Saudi Arabia where American Servicewomen were 

isolated from local nationals, cultural restrictions and social prohibitions 

were relaxed. However, more restrictions were often imposed on people 

near major urban areas than in rural areas or on those deployed to the 

United Arab Emirates and Oman. The lack of consistency was difficult 

to accept for some U.S. Servicewomen. Yet, they saw the need to adhere 

to the restrictions as part of the military ~bligation.~ For them, this was 

the same dichotomy that faced chaplains in the execution of their mission. 

The Role of the Chaplain 

The mission of the Chaplain Service is to provide a comprehensive 

ministry in support of maximum readiness and combat effectiveness of 

the Air Force, assuring the right to the free exercise of religion for all 

Service members. To fulfill this mission, chaplains serve on the staff of 

commanders as advisors on religious, ethical, and quality of life concerns. 

To serve commanders in these functions, the Air Force established 

Pastoral Ministry Teams (PMT), each consisting of a chaplain and an 

enlisted chaplain Service member. Their primary function is to nurture’ 

the living, provide spiritual care for casualties, and to honor the dead. 

The influence that Air Force chaplains provided in support of air power 

may be best measured by the potential for serious morale problems of the 

combat force created had they not deployed at all. 

31bid, note 2. 

4Chaplain, Lt Col James T. Elwell, End of Tour Report, 24 Sep 1990. 

’lbid. 

180 
The services of chaplains were available 

when needed to personnel of ail faiths. 

Below, chaplain performs wedding ceremony. 

181 
Chaplain Support Planning 

As of August 1990, the Headquarters CENTAF Operations Plan did not 

provide for a chaplain structure, and there was no designated Ninth Air 

Force chaplain responsible for organizing for such a contingency. This 

function fell upon the Tactical Air Command, CENTAF Rear, who monitored a deployment manning document, listing manpower requirements 

and unit taskings, and adjusted the time-phase. force and deployment list 

as required. Accordingly, it was the Tactical Air Command chaplain 

mission capabilities statement that served as the manpower guideline for 

deploying chapel function personnel to Southwest Asia.6 

The keys to any measure of success in ministering to the troops was 

adherence to existing Air Force Chaplain Service regulations and policies 

coupled with additional training. In December 1990, the theater had 

twenty-two installation staff chaplains and fifteen chapel support personnel who had never ministered under the threat of war in a bare-base 

environment. The implementation of the Pastoral Ministry Team concept 

to minister under threatening environment was emphasized during all site 

visits and in written communications. It also became a primary focus at 

the Installation Staff Chaplain and Chief of Chapel Support Activities 

Conference held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in December 1990. 

By January 1991 the Pastoral Ministry Teams made a strong effort 

to serve in the flying squadrons and remain easily available to pilots and 

aircrew. When pilots were aloft, the teams focused on the maintenance 

and support personnel. They also served in hospital facilities, where it 

was important to be readily available and recognized in the event of mass 

casualties; their services extended twenty-four hours a day. When aircrews became the center of attention, Pastoral Ministry Teams were on 

hand for prayer and support during mission briefings, preflights, takeoffs, 

and recoveries. For example, the teams would gather people from various 

support functions to send off pilots with a final salute prior to missions. 

In September, the CENTCOM chaplain also tasked the CENTAF chaplain 

to prepare a plan for Jewish personnel needs during High Holy Days. 

CENTAF coordinated with Army and Navy counterparts to arrange for a 

6History of HQ. USCENTAFMC, Vol I: IS Aug - 31 Dec 1990, p 4. 

182 
central gathering place for all Jewish personnel to meet for these services.' 

Because of the limited number of Jewish chaplains in the theater, the Air 

Force Jewish chaplain planned site visits along the Western Star mail plane 

circuit. The Army Jewish chaplain worked the eastern circuit and the Navy 

Jewish chaplain visited Navy ships within the theater of operations. 

In March 1991, the Pastoral Ministry Teams changed their focus by 

helping men and women cope with changes at work and by preparing 

them for reunion with family members after a long separation. Preparations were also made for the Jewish holiday of Passover. Headquarters 

U.S. Air Force and CENTAF Rear supported the theater by obtaining 

Kosher foods, and in conjunction with this holiday, they planned an 

interservice Passover Retreat for all Jewish personnel. With the approval 

of Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Passover Retreat was conducted 

from 29 to 31 March 1991 aboard the R&R ship Princess Cwtard, in 

Bahrain. The retreat included the observance of Seder services. More 

than 400 Jewish service members attended 3 separate worship services. 

Many soldiers, isolated from their families and attempting to deal 

with the harsh desert environment, discovered an increased interest in 

religion.' Soldiers were cautioned, however, to refrain from displaying 

religious symbols out of doors and in areas frequented by the Saudis. 

Chaplains in Southwest Asia conducted 17,394 Protestant services 

attended by 649,281 people. In addition, 9,421 Catholic services attracted 

425,772 people, and 390 Jewish services drew an attendance of 9,803. 

The Army estimated that about 1,OOO Jewish soldiers deployed to Southwest Asia. Almost 900 other types of religious services were held for 

22,539 worshippers.' Working with the Saudi government, the chaplains 

also organized a pilgrimage to Mecca for U.S. Muslim soldiers." 

'Chaplain, Lt Col Donald R. Bickers, USCEMAF, Rear, Battle Staff Operations 

Report, Mar 1992, p 9. 

'Oral History Interview with Chaplain (col) Gaylord E. Hatler, ARCENT Staff 

Chaplain during Desert ShieldDesert Storm, 14 Jun 1991, interviewers Dr Henry 0. 

Malone and Dr Susan Candy. 

'lbid. 

"Ibid. 

183 
The 681 chaplains included 560 Protestants, 115 Catholics, and 6 

Jewish. They distributed a variety of religious literature and material, 

among them more than 300,000 books and pamphlets, 150,000 audio 

tapes, and 700 menorahs. This material, transported to Southwest Asia 

by the Military Airlift Command, was not subject to mailing prohibitions. 

Service personnel of all faiths practiced the faith of their choice, and most 

had access to chaplains when needed.” 

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 

Although several Middle East exercises held by JCS prior to the war 

provided valuable experience for the CENTCOM theater of operations, 

personnel charged with morale responsibility during base-level mobility 

exercises were often tasked to perform other duties. As a result, they 

were unfamiliar with their primary duty of setting up and operating 

deployed bare-base activities for morale, welfare, and recreation.I2 

Unlike situations during Operations Urgent Fury (Grenada) and Just 

Cause (Panama), five and one-half months elapsed between the initial 

deployment and commencement of combat operations. U.S. forces were 

training and preparing for combat every day. Quality of life became a 

major concern, especially since host nation laws and culture limited the 

scope of recreational programs that could be offered. This created a 

disparity in the standard of living between units deployed to different 

countries. The harsh environment (heat and sand) eliminated a number 

of possibilities to set up sports fields and similar athletic programs. On 

the other hand, the Persian Gulf War enjoyed overwhelming public 

support which led to a tremendous outpouring of contributions from the 

private sector. These contributions were ultimately funneled into recreational channels,” and the combat force was provided opportunities to 

relax and enjoy many of the same stress-reducing activities to which they 

were accustomed in the United States. 

”Information Paper, “Religious Support for Deployed Personnel During Operations 

Desert ShieldDesert Storm (All Services),” Chaplain Jack Anderson, DAPE-HR-S; 

Geraldine Baum, “Baptism of Fire,” Lo5 Angeles Times, 2 Jan 1991. 

I2Ltr, Robert M. Doane. Major, USAF, Director of MWR. CENTAF-FWD, to USCINCCENT 

CU;. subj: Deployment After Action Report, 20 Mar 1991. pp K-l - K-3. 

‘316id, pp D-l - D-IS. 

184 
During the deployment phase, each Service provided support for 

morale, welfare, and recreation in a different fashion. The Navy used 

existing support through their fleet recreation coordinator at Bahrain and 

their facilities at Diego Garcia. The Marines deployed sports equipment 

at the unit level and assigned military personnel to recreational functions 

as an additional duty. During the 1980s the Army had traded military 

morale, welfare, and recreational authorizations for light infantry authorizations; therefore, the Army had virtually no deployable capability for 

this role.“ The Air Force, adequately staffed and equipped with Sports 

and Recreation Mobility Kits, was able to provide such needs anywhere 

within the theater of operations. 

Thirty days into deployment, 79 morale, welfare, and recreation personnel, were deployed to Southwest Asia. Maj. Bob Doane. chief of this 

support activity at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, was designated 

CENTAF Forward Director of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation, with responsibility for coordinating Air Force support within the theater. Initially, coordination between CENTAF Forward and Rear functions and supporting major command functional managers worked exceptionally well. 

However, when identification of personnel requirements went outside the 

computer system, some support teams arrived in the theater before they 

were needed, and others reported to the wrong site, causing unnecessary 

redeployment. As additional combat units were deployed, however, more 

assets were redeployed and reallocated where needed. Ultimately, 221 

morale, welfare, and recreation personnel, including 17 officers and 35 

Sports and Recreation Mobility Kits, from 7 major commands deployed 

to establish and operate the programs at 22 deployed location^.'^ 

14Maj Robert M. Doane, CENTAF-FWD Director of MWR, “Summary of Air Force 

MWR Involvement in Operation Iksert Stodksert Shield,” undated, p 2. 

’sibid, pp AI - A-S. 

185 
186 
Various types of facilities were used throughout the theater. They 

ranged from makeshift outdoor theaters and athletic fields to modern host 

nation sports complexes. Seven Air Force deployment locations were in 

or near major metropolitan areas that offered three or more host nation 

recreational facilities.“ The bare-base Air Force locations initially relied 

on self-help until RED HORSE and civil engineer support provided vital 

support; for example, by paving volleyball/basketball courts.17 

Basic programs, such as intramural sports, weight-training tents, 

recreation equipment, libraries, and movies were available at all deployed 

Air Force sites. Beyond the basics, there were activities such as overnight stays in hotels, shopping tours, cultural orientation tours, golf, and 

“better than a letter” videotaped messages to loved ones. The Army 

rented the Princess Cunard Luxury Liner, docked for the duration of the 

war on the northern tip of Bahrain. The ship accommodated 900 passengers at a time, out of which the Air Force received an allotment of 112 

16/bid, p I- I. 

I7/bid, p J- 1. 

187 
for cycles of 4 days and 3 nights. More than 3,000 Air Force personnel 

eventually participated in this program.'* 

Resale operations, established at all locations, sold souvenir T-shirts, 

coffee mugs, baseball caps, sodas, snacks, and beer (where allowed; i.e., 

UAE, Oman, and Bahrain) by host nation laws. These activities generated 

substantial nonappropriated fund revenues.I9 

The USAFE Library Service Center served as the focal point for shipment of library materials for Air Force personnel in the Persian Gulf.20 

The USAFE Library Center shipped a total of 200,000 paperbacks; another 

25,000 arrived with the mobility kits. Tactical Air Command set up a 

subscription for 2,500 copies of USA Today and Air Fome Emes, while 

publishers donated 20,000 copies of 21 popular magazines. 

Because of the variety and scope of such activities, USCINCCEW 

designated the Air Force to take the lead in providing support within 

CENTCOM,~' and the CEWAF Director of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 

became responsible for coordinating distribution of donated goods, managing three distribution circuits of Army and Air Force Exchange Services, and coordinating all support for celebrity and entertainment visits. 

Three entertainment circuits established for Operation Desert Shield22 

were designed to ensure an equitable distribution of entertainment. 

However, this principle was changed so that most, if not all, US0 tours 

were also scheduled for front line areas. 

During the Persian Gulf War, the overwhelming public support produced an avalanche of private-donation gifts to support the troops,23 

which sent them a strong message that, unlike Vietnam, the public 

staunchly supported them. Early in Operation Desert Shield, handling 

such donations presented a problem, since no provision for them existed. 

~ ~~ ~ 

'*/bid, pp H-1 - H-2. 

"/bid, p A-3. 

20 . 

21 . 

Ibd, p G- 1. 

Ibrd, pp D-3, E-I. 

22/bid, p E-2. 

23Ltr, Robert M. Dome, Major, USAF, Director of MWR, CENTAF-FWD, to USCINCCENT 

CCJI, sub]: Deployment After Action Report, 20 Mar 1991, pp D-1 - 3. 

188 
The Defense Logistics Agency then became the donation receiving agent 

for the Services and assumed responsibility for shipping donated items to 

CENTCOM. Prior to hostilities, the Military Airlift Command transported 

them to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and CENTAF coordinated distribution to the 

Services. Distribution was based on a percentage of deployed population 

(Army 56 percent, Marines 16 percent, Navy 14 percent, and Air Force 

14 per~ent).’~ Inadequate storage facilities within the theater, however, 

hampered distribution. 

Funding for morale, welfare, and recreation likewise presented readjustments as a result of deployment. CENTAF decided early to fund 

Operations Desert ShieldiDesert Storm requirements using appropriated 

funds to the maximum extent allowed by law. As a result, very little 

support costs were paid with nonappropriated funds. With the exception 

of library materials purchased by USAFE early in the operation. only resale 

items, or other goods not authorized from appropriated funds, were purchased with nonappropriated funds. Tactical Air Command Headquarters 

authorized a $l00,OOO grant, and the Air Force MWR Board authorized a 

$300,000 line of credit.25 Fees were not charged for recreational programs, and resale profit margins were kept to a minimum. However, due 

to sheer volume, approximately $300,000 in nonappropriated profits were 

generated abroad.26 

The Chairman of the House Anned Services Committee MWR Panel, 

Representative Lancaster, expressed concern early in Operation Desert 

Shield over the financial impact of deployment on such programs stateside. 

The estimated “lost income” impact at Air Force bases with significant 

deployment ranged between $1.5 and $2.5 million during the first quarter 

of Fiscal Year 1991 .27 DOD requested from each of the Services a request 

for relief to compensate for the Persian Gulf War extraordinary losses. 

24ibid. 

2sMaj Robert M. Doane, CEKTAF-FWD Director of MWR, “Summary of Air Force 

26ibid. 

2’1bid. 

MWR Involvement in Operation Desert StodDesert Shield,” undated, p 4. 

189 
Personnel Finance During Deployment 

Beginning in August 1990, three to four accounting and finance 

personnel from the base comptroller organization deployed to the Persian 

Gulf to establish disbursing offices. They supported contracting officers 

for on-the-spot payments to local vendors for goods and services; they 

responded to inquiries from individual members regarding pay, travel 

entitlements, allowances, cashed checks, and currency exchange; and they 

accomplished basic accounting requirements to track obligations and 

reports to the home station. 

Disbursing agents were appointed on orders to act on behalf of the 

home station Accounting and Finance Officer. They were legally accountable to the home station for cash, checks, and funding documents 

issued to them. They were also responsible for ensuring that funds were 

used only for those things for which they were appropriated. These 

agents acted as a bank in that they cashed personal checks for deployed 

personnel and exchanged U.S. currency for foreign currency to be used 

for purchases on the local economy. 

Because disbursing agents were not in theater during the early stages 

of deployment, contracting officers were left without the financial support 

to make immediate payments to host nation vendors." Additionally, 

safeguarding of funds was difficult. Field safes were deployed, but 

agents lacked secure facilities to store them. Security Police provided 

some security, but not enough to provide twenty-four-hour guard. Therefore, disbursing agents slept next to the money to provide the required 

security. 29 

Most of the deployed comptroller personnel were trained disbursing 

agents but did not have enough experience or skill to support contracting 

officers in the field. The initial function for disbursing agent operations 

was to travel with contracting officers and pay for purchases, such as 

Ltr, John J. Nethery. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Systems, and Analysis, 28 

Financial Management, to SAFIOSG, subj: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 24 Mar 1992. 

29/bid. 

190 
billeting, bottled water, subsistence requirements, and aircraft fuel.30 

Specifically, disbursing agents did not fully understand contracting regulations or fathom the multitude of legal requirements and restrictions. 

Cash Operations 

Agents deployed with cash, checks, and funding authority documents 

ranging from $250,000 to $1.5 million in cash, up to $21 million in 

checks, and up to $27 million in funding a~thority.~’ By 12 August 

1990, disbursing agents at 12 sites had a total of 37 comptroller personnel 

assigned. By 30 August, this number had increased to 19 sites with 

77 comptroller personnel assigned. By mid-September 1990 comptroller 

strength had risen to 90 personnel at 21 sites. By October 1990, these 

sites were staffed with 127 personnel from 7 major commands. By this 

time, they held $60 million in funding authority, $5 million in cash, and 

more than $45 million in checks. At the peak of operations, monthly 

comptroller activity exceeded 8,000 partial and casual payments and 

47,000 cashed personal checks in theater.32 The on-site disbursing agent 

responded to questions and paid all members regardless of component. 

Problems occurred when active duty finance personnel did not understand 

the reserve pay and entitlement system.33 

These 127 people supported approximately 55,000 Air Force members, in addition to members from the other Services. Another 43 people 

deployed to Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Diego Garcia, and contingency 

hospitals in the United Kingdom and Germany, bringing the total Air 

Force comptroller personnel to 170 people.” The majority of them came 

from Military Airlift, Strategic Air, and Tactical Air Commands. U.S. 

30Ltr, C. Ronald Hovell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 

Financial Management, to Distribution List, subj: Financial Management and Comptroller 

Desert ShieldStorm Lessons Learned Action Items, 13 Aug 1992. 

Ltr, John J. Nelhery, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Systems, and Analysis, 

Financial Management, to SAF/OSG, subj: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 24 Mar 1992. 

’*Mr Lee Franklin, SAF/FMPC Briefing, “Desert ShieldStorm Lessons Learned,” 

undated. 

33Ltr, C. Ronald Hovell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 

Financial Management, to Distribution List, subj: Financial Management and Comptroller 

Desert ShieldStorm Lessons Learned Action Items, 13 Aug 1992. 

31 

”Ibid. 

191 
Air Forces in Europe provided agent support and the Air Force Reserves 

and Air Naticnal Guard had comptroller personnel in theater. A sample 

of a typical week’s business at the 21 sites is portrayed in Table 17.35 

Table 17 

Average Weekly Transactions Processed 

~- 

%ansaction Number/DoUars 

Pay Inquiries 

Allotment 

Entitlement Actions 

PattiallCasual 

Payments 

Travel Payments 

Checks Cashed 

Currency Exchanged 

Vendor Payments 

SF 44 Purchases 

9382 

1199 

4374 

7542 

233 

44,660/$3.5M 

$2.1 M 

107 1 /$6.3M 

2314/$6.3M 

Entitlement and Payment Methods 

The on-site disbursing agent was available to respond to questions 

regarding pay and allowances, including travel payments. Initially accomplished by message, mail, or phone, it became possible to provide a 

Leave and Earnings Statement to deployed members as time went on. 

By December 1990, terminals via satellite linked deployed agent 

offices through the supply system communication lines. This system 

provided the capability to perform real-time inquiries in response to 

member’s questions, and it provided disbursing agents with an electronic 

35Ltr. John J. Nethery, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Systems, and Analysis, 

Financial Management, to SAFIOSG, subj: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 24 Mar 1992. 

192 
mail capability. Ten of the twenty-one sites were using this capability by 

the end of December, and all locations had it by mid-February. 

Some systems for posting wartime and contingency entitlements were 

not up to date. For example, the program for Uniformed Services Saving 

Deposit Program, not used since the Vietnam War, became obsolete and 

needed updating.% Similarly, the program to post combat zone tax exclusions required work before it became usable. 

Comptroller Training 

Experience levels of comptroller technicians during the Gulf War 

indicate a need for more realistic training.37 As mentioned previously, 

they deployed to the theater of operations trained in disbursing functions, 

well prepared to accomplish military pay and travel tasks, but not to 

resolve issues that required accounting knowledge. 

Some commanders requested items that could not be purchased from 

funds at the disposal of the agent.38 For example, to respect host nation 

sensitivities, a commander wanted to use operations and maintenance 

funds to purchase new uniform blouses that would cover women’s arms. 

Provision for such purchases, however, is covered by a clothing allowance, and neither the agent nor the commander could have authorized a 

civilian clothing allowance for personnel assigned to positions where 

wearing short sleeve blouses posed a problem. Better training would 

have afforded the agent sufficient understanding of regulations to support 

the commander’s need. 

193 
Comptroller Command and Control 

The early stages of Operation Desert Shield vividly revealed the need 

for a clear chain of command to guide comptroller policies. Without a 

forward headquarters accounting and finance element, there was no 

central authority for appealing funding, guidance, and direction for further 

res~lution.~~ Nor was it possible to deploy disbursing agents to the 

theater or assign them to a central accounting and finance officer who 

could provide cash, checks, and funding documents. Each agent in 

theater reported to the Accounting and Finance Office in the United 

States or Europe; twenty-one agents reported to nineteen separate offices 

in seven different commands.@ As a result, agents responded to direction 

from nineteen different sources with differing command views and to 

guidance from the Defense Finance and Accounting Center. Obviously, 

this complicated operations at the disbursing agent level. 

Postal Services 

Postal services were divided into domestic operations, international 

transportation, and overseas mail processing, each handling all mail. The 

U.S. Postal Service bears responsibility for domestic and international 

transportation of mail.'" To support the Persian Gulf, the Postal Service 

also established mail gateways in New York City, and San Francisco, 

with liaison activities in Seattle, Chicago, Miami and Jacksonville, Florida, DallasFort Worth, and Bayonne, New Jersey!2 To accommodate 

large volumes of mail, the Postal Service opened an additional military 

distribution center in Dallas, and acquired supplemental buildings in New 

York City, Washington D.C., and San Francisco. They also hired 666 

new personnel to handle the mail 

39Ltr, C. Ronald Hovell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 

Financial Management, to Distribution List, subj: Financial Management and Comptroller 

Desert ShieldStorm Lessons Learned Action Items, 13 Aug 1992. 

@/bid. 

41Congressional Testimony Statement, Ms Diane K. Morales, Dep Asst Sec of 

42Congressional Testimony Statement, Col (P) Patricia P. Hickerson, Executive 

Congressional Testimony Statement. Mr. Allen Kane, Asst Postmaster General, 20 43 

Defense (Logistics), 20 Feb I99 I. 

Director, Military Postal Service Agency, 20 Mar 1991. 

Feb 1991. 

I94 
Postul Single Service Manager 

CENTCOM designated CENTAF as its single Service manager for postal 

operations in 1982; in 1984 these responsibilities were further refined.& 

In 1986, CENTAF activated the 4401 st Air Postal Squadron to serve as the 

single Service manager for postal operations. Though the 4401st had 

participated in command exercises, they pnmady focused on warfighting 

capabilities, and because of the short duration and low mail volume, the 

squadron never adequately faced postal operations on the scope of the 

Persian Gulf War. This was the first true test of postal operations under 

the single Service manager concept. 

Postal Operations 

On 1 August 1990, there were I1 military post offices in the theater 

of operations employing 13 Air Force postal specialists supporting some 

5,500 personnel in Military Assistance Programs, embassies, and naval 

ships.45 These military post offices became the key to establishing postal 

operations during the initial stages of the deployment. Figure 14 depicts 

the location of theater postal operations. 

On 15 August 1990, Maj. Michael H. Whitaker, Commander of the 

4401st Air Postal Squadron and MSgt. Eugene Ickes, Director of Postal 

Operations, deployed to Saudi Arabia. Prior to departing, they received 

approval for a 16-ounce restriction on mail going to Southwest Asia. 

They also requested an initial cadre of 140 postal-augmentees. During 

a stopover in Europe, Sergeant Ickes signed for $70,000 worth of stamps. 

Within 3 days the stock was depleted, and within 2 months the stamp 

account grew to approximately $5-million. Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, the 4401st worked out of the military post office in Riyadh located 

on the U.S. Military Training Mission compound. 

Ltr. USCENTCOM to USCENTAF, subj: USCENTAF Responsibilities as USCENTCOM's 

Congressional Testimony Statement, Ms Diane K. Morales, Dep Asst Sec of 

44 

Single Manager for Postal Service, 28 Nov 1984. 

Defense (Logistics), 20 Feb 199 1. 

45 

195 
Figure 14 

Military Post Office Locations 

Other existing military post offices were located in Dhahran and 

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Contractor-staffed post offices were established in 

Tabuk, Khamis, and Taif, Saudi Arabia. Embassy or DOD-staffed postal 

operations were located in Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, and the 

Seychelles Islands. The only aerial mail terminal in Saudi Arabia prior 

to the deployment was at the Dhahran Royal Saudi Air Base, a large 

warehouse to become the largest air mail operation in the world. Commercial air carrier mail routes were established at Riyadh and Jeddah, 

which reduced mail volume at Dhahran by 75 percent. Outside Saudi 

Arabia, the Air Force ran a military post office at the American Embassy 

in Cairo, Egypt. The Navy processed mail through Bahrain, while the 

Marine Corps set up mail operations in Al Jubail. Eventually, 203 military post offices were operating in Southwest Asia manned by more than 

1,300 full-time postal specialists supporting half a million personnel in 

the theater. 

196 
By late October, the mail volume quickly outpaced the postal airlift 

capabilities that had begun in August, with U.S. civil air carriers shouldering the load. To handle the increases, mail was trucked to Dover AFB, 

Delaware, from commercial gateways for airlift on Military Airlift Command organic aircraft or on civil flights. Because of other high-priority 

cargo, Dover’s aerial port capabilities soon became stretched to the limit, 

and in anticipation of the holiday season, the airlift command moved the 

East coast mail departure point to McGuire AFB, New Jersey. Desert 

Mail, then nicknamed for postal airlift, quickly became the main cargo. 

By November 1990, there were not enough civil carriers available to 

carry the all the mail. 

During the Persian Gulf War, the Military Airlift Command airlifted 

between 150 and 170 tons of mail each day to Southwest Asia.46 That 

was equal to approximately 90 percent of the mail delivered to the area. 

Figure 15 illustrates the volume of mail into and out of Southwest Asia 

from September 1990 to May 1991. 

On 14 August 1990, Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Sikora, U.S. Army, Executive Director, Military Postal Service Agency, requested the DOD for free 

mail service for active duty members of the Armed which would 

eliminate the need for establishing full postal services in a combat zone, and 

streamline the delivery process. In September 1990, Congress began deliberating the issue, and provided the President or the Secretary of Defense 

with authority to grant, by executive order, the free mailing privileges.48 

46Article, E. Cafasso, “Air Transport Chief US Ready for Action,’’ Boston Hearld, 

28 Nov 1990, p 8. 

Memo Exec Dir, MPSA to Asst Sect of Def (Rod and Log), subj: Authorization of 

Free Mail for Active Duty Members of the Armed Forces, 14 Aug 1990. 

480pening Statement by Chairman Charles Hayes, Hearing on H.R. 5563 - Free 

Mailing Privileges for the Armed Forces Deployed in the Persian Gulf. 12 Sep 1990; 

Testimony of Congresswoman Beverly B. Byron before the Subcommittee on Postal 

Personnel and Modernization on H.R. 5561, 12 Sep 1990; Statement of Representative 

Frank McCloskey, 12 Sep 1990. 

47 

197 
Figure 15 

September 1990 - May 1991 SWA Mail Volume 

14,000,000 

p 12,000,000 

O 10.000,000 

n 8,000,000 

U 

d 

s 6,000,000 

4,000,000 

2,000,000 

0 - Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May 

Chancing that DOD would eventually approve free mail, the U.S. 

Postal Service accepted and delivered free mail from Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain-twenty-nine days before the executive 

order was signed.49 The Secretary of Defense finally signed the executive 

order on I 1 October I990 and added the countries of Kuwait and Qatar.’” 

By March 1991, free mail privileges were also authorized to members in 

Egypt, Israel, and portions of Turkey.’’ The costs associated with free 

mail, some $21 million, were absorbed by DOD.” 

49Msg, Exec Dir, MPSA to 4401st AIRPS, subj: Free Mail, 1317152 Sep 1990. 

’ktr. Sec of Def to Hon Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster General, 11 Oct 1990. 

Ltr, Sec of Def to Hon Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster General, 4 Mar 1991. 51 

521nformation Paper, MPSA, subj: Free Mail, 30 Apr 1991. 

198 
The increased volume of mail, especially with free mail privileges, 

led to increased security measures, which on 15 January 1991, the Federal 

Aviation Administration put into effect. This meant that U.S. and foreign 

carriers had to meet special FAA screening requirements before accepting 

mail for transport. If carriers could not meet them, alternate plans had to 

be developed to move mail. Screening consisted of one of the following 

methods: X-ray, DOD-certified bomb dogs, decompression chamber, FAAcertified explosive detection systems (none were available in overseas 

areas), or presenting parcels opened for inspection prior to acceptance by 

military post offices. At most locations, a combination of these methods 

was used. For example, bomb dogs and X-ray equipment were used at 

Dhahran, and X-ray equipment was eventually used at Riyadh and Kuwait 

City. The Saudi government provided the X-ray equipment. Air carriers 

that could not meet this requirement were required to accept mail only if 

it had been screened by the U.S. military using a DOD-approved explosive 

inspection pr~cedure.'~ Also, by the end of January, the U.S. Postal 

Service implemented new mail security measures to ensure that the 

domestic postal system was not used as a conduit by te~~orists.'~ Shortly 

thereafter, the U.S. customs service discovered four pounds of C-4 plastic 

explosives in a parcel mailed by a Service member at a military post 

office in Saudi Arabia?' 

When offensive operations began in January 1991, USCINCCENT asked 

everyone to voluntarily limit incoming mail to first class letter mail and 

audio cassettes. At the same time, military post offices were directed to 

accept only machineable letter class mail, eleven ounces or less (both 

personal and official). Military post offices were instructed to return all 

mail that did not meet those specifications, but by 26 January, mail up to 

sixteen ounces was a~cepted.'~ In February 1991, delivery times 

Msg, 6005th AlRPS to multiple addresses, subj: Mail Security Procedures, 170101Z 

''Memo, HQ. MPSA, subj: United States Postal Service (USPS) Security Contingency 

"Msg, Exec Dir Mil Postal Agcy to multiple addresses, subj: Mail Security Proce- 

'ksg, USCINCCENT/CC to Exec Dir Mil Postal Agcy, subj: Operation Desert Shield, 

1813002 Jan 1991; Msg, 4401st AlRPS to multiple addressees, subj: Mailing Restrictions 

for Desert Shield Operations, I817002 Jan 1991; Msg, 4401sl AMPS to multiple addresses, 

subj: Mailing Restrictions for Desert Shield Operations, 2610342 Jan 1991. 

Xi 

Jan 1991. 

Plans for Domestic Mail, 31 Jan 1991. 

dures, 01 14102 Feb 1991. 

199 
increased because of Operation Desert Storm, while delays were caused 

only by airlift and security.” 

Between 150 and 170 tons of mail were airlifted to Southwest 

Asia each day during Operation Desert Storm. 

~ 

57 Msg, Exec Dir Mil Postal Agcy to multiple addresses, subj: Mail Routing, 0615 10% 

Feb 1991. 

200 
9 

Medical Support 

Fifteen air-transportable hospital equipment packages, comprising 14 

operational hospitals at 13 sites, with help from a 250-bed contingency 

hospital staffed by the Military Airlift Command, supplied most of the 

in-theater hospital beds and staff for the Air Force in Operation Desert 

Storm. First-stage medical care and evaluation were available at 31 deployed squadron medical elements, including a few from the Strategic Air 

Command. The Air Force eventually provided almost 900 staffed hospital beds and 750 aeromedical staging beds in Southwest Asia. In Europe 

the Air Force identified about 3,700 beds, or two-thirds of the beds 

available in the European Command. In the United States, the Air Force 

identified 2,178 beds, and could provide more if needed. The total Air 

Force bed contribution amounted to about 6,800. The Southwest Asian 

theater was served by 4,868 Air Force medics, who accounted for 9 

percent of the total Air Force deployment of 55,000 personnel to the 

Gulf. In addition, the Air Force deployed 6,892 medics to Europe. 

Medical Assemblages 

The Air Force Medical Service used three types of overseas medical 

facilities for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm-the air-transportable clinic (no beds), the air-transportable hospital (14-50 beds), and the 

prepositioned contingency hospital (250-1.500 beds). 

The air-transportable clinic contained first aid and emergency medical 

supplies and was staffed by a squadron medical elementconsisting of one 

physician and two technicians. The elements were organic units in each 

flying squadron of Tactical Air Command and deployed as an integral 

part of those squadrons.' 

'Concept Paper, HQ TAUSGX, "Air-transportable clinic (ATC) Concept of Operations," 

1980. 

201 
The backbone of the deployable medical treatment system 

is the air-transportable hospital, here being assembled by crews. 

The deployment also required the sophisticated medical services of 

an air-transportable hospital, a combination of hardwall shelters and 

modular tents. As the backbone of the deployable medical treatment 

system, each hospital met the short-term medical needs of a deployed 

tactical fighter wing of three to five thousand people. Its mission included support of squadron medical elements, air-transportable clinics, and 

aeromedical staging facilities. Each hospital may be constructed in any 

of three sizes: fourteen beds, twenty-five beds, or fifty beds. The fiftybed version, along with its staff of personnel and mobility bags, can be 

transported by six C-141 Starlifters or two C-5 Galaxies. Once on site, 

the hospital can become operational within twenty-four to forty-eight 

hours. 

History of the air-transportable hospital spans more than two-decades, 

but Operation Desert Shield was the first operational deployment for this 

type of hospital in a combat contingency. Development of the air-transportable hospital began with preparations for a major military crisis in the 

Middle East shortly after the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan, and 

Iranian revolutionaries seized American diplomatic hostages in the 1980s. 

Military planners had assumed that modem combat would be marked by 

202 
high casualty rates. In late 1983, the Air Force Surgeon General approved a five-year program to enlarge the standard twenty-four-bed airtransportable hospital to fifty beds. By mid-1990 the Air Force had 

acquired more than two dozen of these hospitals. Most were assigned to 

fighter wings in the United States for rapid deployment. The U.S. Ninth 

Air Force, a component of U.S. Central Command, relied on the Tactical 

Air Command surgeon and medical assets for mobilization planning and 

deployment to Southwest Asia. 

By the late 1980s, the Air Staff predicted that contingency airlift 

would be scarce. As a result, medical service planners prepositioned 

medical supplies and equipment, including some air-transportable hospitals and ambulances in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific. This 

prepositioning included contingency hospitals, which ranged in size from 

250 to 1,500 beds. Hospitals in Europe and the Pacific usually functioned as “turn-key” facilities providing sophisticated medical services 

and needed only round-out augmentation from the United States to begin 

operations. They served as an intermediate stage of care before evacuation of patients to fixed Air Force hospitals. 

The Medical Deployment to Southwest Asia 

The CENTAF Forward medical system encompassed six countries to 

include Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 

and Egypt? In the first weeks of Operation Desert Shield, the medical 

deployment developed with unprecedented speed. On 8 August 1990, 

two air-transportable clinics from Langley AFB, Virginia moved to 

Dhahran while two clinics from Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, deployed to 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The personnel and equipment of the 1st Airtransportable Hospital left Langley Am on 11 August and anived in 

Dhahran the following day. The medical facility became operational on 

14 August. The CENTAF Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center and 

several mobile aeromedical staging facilities, staffed by active duty personnel from the 1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, Pope AFB, North 

Carolina, began to organize in Riyadh by mid-August.’ For the first four 

2Paper, Lt Col Bob Ferguson, HQ USCENTAF/CXM, to the Associ~oo of Military 

Surgeons of the United States (AMSUS) Convention, “Operation Desert Shield and Storm: 

Air Force Medical Plans and Operations.” 25 Nov 1991, p 10. 

31ntvws, Dr. J.S. Nanney, AFISGI, with TAUSGX staff, Sep 1990 and Mar 1991. 

203 
weeks of deployment and until the partial activation of the U.S. Navy’s 

shore-based Fleet Hospital No. 5, Air Force medical facilities provided 

the only deployed medical support to U.S. forces in the theater. 

Air-transportable 

hospitals were flown 

from Langiey AFB, 

Virginia to Dhahran 

and became operational within two days 

after arrival. 

However, the deployment of reservists (and to a lesser extent active 

duty personnel) presented several clinical challenges. A number of 

mobilized reservists suffered from limiting or disqualifying dental and 

medical problems. In contrast, the preventive dental program for active 

duty troops avoided complications upon deployment. Entitled dental care 

only during extended active duty, many Air Force reservists (later estimated to be at least twenty percent) needed extensive dental treatment 

before deployment. Enroute to the Gulf, many unit commanders requested U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) to screen their troops dentally and 

provide corrective treatment. Some of the reserve and active duty troops 

deployed with a variety of other disqualifying medical condition^.^ 

Rpt, Maj Gen Vernon Chong, HQ ATUSG to HQ USAFISGHR, “Medical Lessons 4 

Learned-Desert ShieldStorm,” 15 Apr 1991. 

204 
Furthermore, logistical shortfalls in the medical area appeared almost 

immediately. Generally, hospital table of allowances had never been 

tested in a long deployment? and deploying units in the United States 

assigned their flight surgeons only a minor role in predeployment preparations. In addition, deployed hospitals found that they lacked equipment 

needed in the desert, such as spare air conditioning units, ice machines, 

and primary generators. Because of the oppressive desert heat, construction of the hospitals caused an operational delay of a few days, even 

when units worked through the night? Critical logistical items, such as 

air conditioners, were obtained within a few weeks. 

In spite of these initial problems, by the end of 1990, Tactical Air 

Command had readied many of its medical groups and air-transportable 

hospitals for war. By 18 January 1991, USAFE had also deployed an airtransportable hospital from Torrejon Air Base, Spain. On 19 December, 

medical personnel of the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing redeployed from 

Thumrait in southern Oman to A1 Kharj, Saudi Arabia, about forty miles 

southeast of Riyadh. Lt. Gen. Charles A. Homer, CENTAF commander, 

then directed the Military Airlift Command to deploy medical personnel 

for the twenty-five bed hospital at Thumrait. Military Airlift Command 

had never before been tasked to staff an air-transportable hospital.’ A 

summary of medical personnel is shown in Table 18. 

Because air-transportable hospitals met only part of CENTAF Forward’s medical requirements, the CENTAF surgeon insisted on exploring 

the activation of a 250-bed contingency hospital at Seeb, Oman. But the 

Tactical Air Command surgeon noted that Seeb, on the coast 20 miles 

west of Muscat, Oman, needed to improve its inadequate base infrastructure and remedy significant shortfalls in medical supplies and equipment 

before it would be ready to treat serious battle casualties. 

’Brfg, SGHR to SG Senior Staff, “Operation Desert ShieldlStorm-Medical Lessons 

Learned: An Information Briefing,” Jun 1991. 

Brfg, Col J. Melchiorre, TAUSGX, [CENTAF Lessons Learned] to Medical Planners’ 

Conference, Bolling AFB, Wash DC, 14 May 1991. 

’Intvw, J.S. Nanney with Lt Col Robert Ferguson, CENTAF~XM. 1 I Jun 1992; Paper, 

Lt col Bob Ferguson, HQ USCENTAF/CXM, to the Association of Military Surgeons of the 

United States (AMSUS) Convention, “operations Desert Shield and Storm: Air Force 

Medical Plans and Operations,” 25 Nov 1991. 

6 

205 
Table 18 

Medical Manpower Summary 

Reserve 

Location Active Duty Component Total 

Southwest Asia 2,342 2,526 4,868 

Europe 3,874 3,019 6,893 

CONUS 28,662 6,295 34,957 

On 14 October 1990, CENTAF Forward dispatched a small advance 

team to Seeb, Oman, to prepare for a contingency hospital in a hardwalled warehouse. Although the target date for full activation at Seeb 

was 15 November, it did not become fully operational until mid-January 

1991, with medical staff from Scott U.S. Air Force Medical Center. 

Eventually, its staff merged with a collocated Army medical unit, the 

365th Evacuation Hospital.* 

The greatest demand for patient care arose in the first months of 

deployment, primarily due to the excess heat and rigors of field conditions in a hostile environment. In spite of the conditions, strict water and 

sanitary discipline kept the disease and nonbattle injury rates to one-half 

of the prewar predicted levels. This represented a major victory over the 

greatest casualty generator in military history. In the first few months, 

treatment of patients related mostly to dental problems, since they camed 

over from civilian life? 

Rpt. USAF Medical Center Scott, “Medical After Action Report for Operation Desert 

Shielmesert Storm1702d Contingency Hospital,” 10 May 1991. 

’Paper, Lt Col Bob Ferguson, HQ USCENTAFKXM, to the Association of Military 

Surgeons of the United States (AMSUS) Convention. “Operation Desert Shield and Storm: 

Air Force Medical Plans and Operations,” 25 Nov 1991, p 23. 

8 

206 
Figure 16 

Disease and Non-Battle Injury Rates 

Reported By USCENTAF MTF's 

Theater Average 

Gastroenterites 

Ophthalmological 

HeaVCold Injury 

Source: HQ TAClSGPM 

0 5 10 15 20 25 

CASESHOO0 TROOPSMEEK 

Operation Desert ShieWDesert Storm 

The excellent aviation infrastructure of most host nations resulted in 

a greater number of beddowns than could be supported with a fully 

staffed air-transportable hospital. Furthermore, squadrons deployed with 

more people than predicted, forcing the clinics to care for a base population sometimes as large as 1,200 personnel. 

During the first month of the deployment, thirteen of seventeen 

beddown sites were supported only by squadron medical elements. This 

was due to CENXOM-established deployment priorities, not a shortage of 

deployable hospitals. Airlift priorities often precluded air-transportable 

clinics from arriving concurrently with the squadron medical element, or 

else forced a downsizing of the clinic pallets. At ten of fourteen squadron medical element locations, the air-transportable clinic equipment 

207 
packages arrived more than four days after the squadron medical element, 

and sometimes not at all.’’ 

Figure 17 

Air-Transportable Hospital Locations 

To alleviate this problem, CENTAF established a squadron medical 

element support system soon after initial deployment; each beddown site 

was augmented with a bioenvironmental engineer and environmental 

health technicians. Accompanying them was a medical technician or 

general practitioner to provide flight surgeons time off and allow the 

squadron medical element to provide twenty-four-hour coverage. Each 

in-theater squadron medical element was also assigned to an air- 

%pt, HQ USAFISGPA. “Aerospace Medicine: Consolidated After- Action Report-Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm,” Jan 1992, p 7. 

208 
transportable hospital for preventive medicine consultation, hospitalization, and resupply. 

Medical support was generally adequate at isolated locations.” Until 

the arrival of comprehensive medical resources, the early arriving squadron medical elements and air-transportable hospitals served as the primary 

sources of medical care for forward-deployed Air Force units, as well as 

units from other Services. 

Activating U.S. Air Force Europe Contingency Support 

Shortly after the deployment began, the European Command surgeon 

and component Service surgeons decided to rely primarily on prepositioned Air Force contingency hospitals to meet command requirements 

for a 5,500-bed capability. The USA= surgeon was tasked with providing 

3,750 beds, and this was accomplished primarily by manning USAFE 

contingency hospitals. Also, a few fixed facilities were expanded, especially the Wiesbaden, Germany, medical center. Four prepositioned 

contingency hospitals became operational: the 870th at RAF Little 

Rissington, 310th at RAF Nocton Hall, 317th at RAF Bicester, United 

Kingdom, as well as the 609th at Zweibrucken, Germany. Denmark also 

opened a contingency hospital at Holstebro. Bed capacities were increased at five preexisting medical facilities at Torrejon, Spain; 

Lakenheath and Upper Hey ford, United Kingdom; Wiesbaden, Germany; 

and Incirlik, Turkey. USA= received 6,892 medical personnel deployed 

from the United States. Most of these (3,874) were active duty.12 

These contingency hospitals took longer to activate than existing 

facilities and encountered several major problems in achieving full operational readiness. Although Nocton Hall received ninety-three percent of 

its total required staff, the hospital faced staffing shortages in certain 

Paper, Lt Col Bob Ferguson, HQ uSCENTAFICXM. to the Association of Military 

Surgeons of the United States (AMSUS) Convention, “Operation Desert Shield and Storm: 

Air Force Medical Plans and Operations,” 25 Nov 1991, p 13; Rpt, HQ USAFBGPA. 

“Aerospace Medicine: Consolidated After-Action Report-Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 

Jan 1992. 

Brfg, Brig Gen Charles H. Roadman 11. uSAFEJSG, “USAFE Medical Support for 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.” to USUHS Conference, ‘The Spectrum of Medical 

Support for Operation Desert Shield/Storm,” 13-15 Apr 1992. 

11 

12 

209 
Figure 18 

Hospital Support of the Gulf War 

specialties; not severe enough, however, to cause a problem during the 

Gulf War.I3 

Although staffing levels did not present a problem at RAF Little 

Rissington and RAF Bicester, the staffs encountered other problems. At 

Little Rissington for example, laundry, electricity, water supply, sewage, 

13 Rpt, 310th USAF Contingency Hospital, RAF Nocton Hall, UK, “Medical AfterAction Report-Desert Storm;’ 15 Mar 1991. 

210 
communications, food services, and transportation would have been a problem with a full patient load. RAF Bicester reported that it was totally unprepared to discharge its mission as the center for acute burn care patients. 

Bicester’s physical layout was also less than satisfactory, with the operating 

rooms housed separately from other key sections. Low rates of admission 

from the Gulf War relieved the hospitals from serious ~hal1enges.l~ 

A shortage of up-to-date medical supplies posed a major problem at 

all European contingency hospitals. At RAF Bicester, about 85 percent of 

the supplies were either outdated or deteriorating. The USAFE commander 

had recently placed a moratorium on replacement of outdated war reserve 

material, resulting in a large stock of useless supplies. The U.S. Army 

depot at Pirmasens, Germany, was eventually able to replenish the stocks. 

A key obstacle that hampered USAFE’S ability to make contingency 

hospitals operational was the relatively low priority assigned medical 

supplies for airlift. In early December, the USAFE medical system was 

tasked with providing almost two-thirds of EUCOM beds needed for Gulf 

War casualties. These contingency hospitals did not become fully operational until several weeks after the start of the air war. Even if all the Air 

Force beds were available at the outset of hostilities, it appeared doubtful 

that the European Command would have enough beds to handle the 

anticipated casualty flow for more than a few days. To make matters 

worse, host nation support was apparently not capable of providing 

sufficient help.I5 

EUCOM and CENTCOM agreed that after the war began, EUCOM would 

initially provide only “flow-thru support,” holding 80 percent of anticipated patients in Europe no more than three days. After getting improved 

airlift support, the USAFE contingency hospital system was expected to 

achieve full operational capability within nine days after the war began. 

However, three hospitals were not operationally ready until 8 February, 

and a fourth, RAF Bicester United Kingdom, was not ready until 28 

February 1991, after the ground war ended. Estimates of the number of 

Rpt, 870th USAF Contingency Hospital, RAF Little Rissington, UK. “Medical AfterAction Report-Desert Storm,” 14 Mar 1991; Rpt. 317th Contingency Hospital, RAF 

Bicester, UK, “Medical After-Action Report, 17 Jan - 6 Mar 1991,” 19 Mar 1991. 

15(S/DECL OADR) Brfg. Maj Mike Jones, HQ USAFUSG to HQ USAFUSGP/SGHR, 

“Medical support.” Bolling AFB, Wash, DC, 12 Dec 1990. 

14 

21 1 
patient evacuees to Europe soon exceeded the contingency hospital’s 

capability, in effect forcing the entire system into a flow-through mode.I6 

Although many of the supply, equipment, infrastructure, and personnel problems in the contingency hospitals had been resolved before the 

ground war in the Gulf started, the chief surgeons in Europe were worried that contingency hospitals, aeromedical staging facilities, and the 

evacuation system would have difficulty accomplishing their missions. 

The USAFE surgeon was concerned that a major ground war might cause 

the cENTCOM commander to downgrade the airlift priority of medical 

items, especially aeromedical equipment, which was already in short 

supply. Three-fourths of the USAFE strategic aeromedical evacuation 

kits, which contained the basic supplies for transporting stable patients 

between theaters, were incomplete.” The aeromedical system was not 

fully prepared on the eve of the ground war. 

Host Nation Medical Support-Europe and Southwest Asia 

To assure the highest level of care and to account for U.S. patients, 

the Air Force attempted to minimize host nation hospital use except for 

emergency cases. Although assistance with medical supplies, laboratory 

services, and consultation was available from some host nation military 

hospitals, the Air Force limited host nation contact. The Army and Navy 

medical services, on the other hand, who had not built facilities specifically for Southwest Asia, actively sought host nation support on the 

Arabian Peninsula.’* 

’6(S/DECL OADR) Msg, EUCOM/SG to Distr., “EUCOM Medical Support for Operation 

Desert Shield,” WIN Teleconferencing Transcript, 17 Jan 199 1 ; After Action Reports, 

USAFE Contingency Hospitals, Spring 1991. 

”(S/DECL OADR) Msg, OF5 support center RamsteidCAT-AECC to HQ MAUCAT-SG, 

“MEDRED-C as of 2224002 Feb 1991,” 2304112 Feb 1991; Facsimile, HQ MAUSG to HQ 

USAF/SGI, ‘TA 887: TAUSTRAT Kit Inventory for Gulf war,” 25 Sep 1992. 

“Paper, Lt Col Bob Ferguson, HQ USCENTAFKXM, to the Association of Military 

Surgeons of the United States (AMSUS) Convention, “Operation Desert Shield and Storm: 

Air Force Medical Plans and Operations,” 25 Nov 1991, p 8; Intvw, J.S. Nanney with 

Lt col Bob Ferguson, USCENTAF/CXM, 11 Jun 1992. 

212 
Naval medical 

services actively 

sought host 

nation support. 

Denmark and several Mediterranean countries offered support in 

hospital space, but only a portion could be accepted, mainly because there 

was no time to inspect the facilities. Some support was accepted for bum 

patients and patients requiring advanced scanning techniques.’’ 

Food-borne gastrointestinal illnesses, primarily caused by host nation 

food services, were a major problem throughout deployment. Such cases 

accounted for 32 percent of all gastroenteritis cases treated by Air Force 

medics. There were 16 separate outbreaks of gastrointestinal illnesses at 

ten theater locations from August 1990 through March 1991, afflicting 

some 2,700 personnel. The three primary sources of the pathogens were 

hot meals, catered meals in mess tents and dining halls, and boxed lunches. 

Without a deployable food service capability, CENTAF commanders 

usually decided to take advantage of free host nation food to supplement 

standard packaged meals. This free food, however, was difficult to 

inspect because the host nation sources varied greatly. Food handling 

standards in host nations were also inadequate in many respects. Commanders generally lacked the authority to select from available food 

suppliers and to dismiss host nation workers suspected of harboring 

common foodbome illnesses. Even so, commanders were reluctant to 

I9Memo, SGHR to SGI, “Host Nation Support in SWA and Europe,” 30 Jan 1992. 

21 3 
follow medical recommendations to negotiate for contract food services 

because of the potential adverse impact on morale?’ 

Early in Operation Desert Shield, the CENTAF surgeon predicted that 

a number of expatriate medics working in Saudi Arabia would flee during 

wartime. This happened at Tabuk and Khamis Mushait precisely as 

expected, and wing commanders at both locations immediately requested 

air-transportable hospitals. The 8326 TAC Hospital deployed a Coronet 

Bandage I1 capability to Tabuk, and it became operational on 24 January. 

Another newly built air-transportable hospital deployed to Khamis 

Mushait, Personnel from the 554th Medical Group set up a Coronet 

Bandage I facility (the 37th TAC Hospital) there on 25 January?’ 

Aeromedical Evgcuation 

A high-capacity, smooth-flowing aeromedical evacuation system was 

essential to medical support of U.S. troops. Although the airevac system 

in place in February 1991 could easily have handled more patients during 

Operation Desert Storm, the deployment revealed a number of areas that 

need improvement. The complexity of the airevac system, for instance, 

was confusing to many users. Command and control of aeromedical 

evacuation was divided, to varying degrees, among the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff logistics division, U.S. Transportation Command, Military Airlift 

Command, CENTCOM commander of airlift forces, CENTAF Air Evacuation 

Control Center, CENTCOM Joint Medical Regulating Office, CENTCOM 

surgeon, and the CENTAF surgeon. This division of authority corresponded to prewar doctrine, which regarded air evacuation as a multicommand, 

retrograde mission. A dedicated aeromedical system able to handle 

thousands of casualties each day would be fully configured only on an 

emergency basis, and only if the required airlift and medical resources did 

not degrade higher priority missions. In view of this doctrine, the respon- 

’%pt, Col Don Butts, CENTAFtTAC, “Operations Desert ShieldlDesert Storm - Environmental Health Experienced Issues,” I1 Jul 1991. 

*‘Paper. U Col Bob Ferguson. HQ USCENTAF/CXM, to the Association of Military 

Surgeons of the United States (MSUS) Convention, “Operation Desert Shield and Storm: 

Air Force Medical Plans and Operations,” 25 Nov 1991, p 24. 

214 
sible airevac agencies could only respond with strenuous efforts in response to shifting casualty estimates and changing war plans?’ 

Aeromedical units and offices participated fully in the rapid deployment of August 1990. On 8 August, the first aeromedical evacuation 

support unit-active duty personnel from the 1 st Aeromedical Evacuation 

Squadron (AES), Pope AFB, North Carolinadeparted for Riyadh. The 

CENTAF Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center, staffed by this squadron, 

became operational in Riyadh in mid-August as the control unit for 

aeromedical evacuation. By 15 August two Aeromedical Evacuation 

Liaison Teams (AELT) and two Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facilities 

(MASFS) became operational. 

On 16 August, the CENTAF surgeon established a directive that served 

as the basis for CENTCOM air evacuation until late December 1990. In 

accordance with this plan, intratheater evacuation began to use turboprop 

C-130 aircraft, and intertheater evacuation on C-141 jet transport aircraft. 

All Air Force specially equipped aeromedical aircraft, the C-9 Nightingales, remained in the U.S., European, and Pacific theaters to support 

further casualty distribution within their hub and spoke ~ystems.2~ (On 

8 November all aeromedical units were combined into the 161 1 th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, Provisional). 

On 15 December 1990, the Military Airlift Command’s Crisis Action 

Team distributed its first comprehensive design for posthostility aeromedical operations. By the start of the air war, initial casualty treatment 

in the Gulf was available at medical facilities near five specially designed 

strategic and tactical aeromedical evacuation hubs. Each hub contained 

both medical and aeromedical assets, including mobile and immobile 

staging facilities. For intratheater evacuation, the one or more mobile 

staging facilities at each hub permitted transferring of patients to the most 

appropriate locations in Southwest Asia. The staging facilities staff, aided 

by a collocated aeromedical evacuation control element, received patients 

”Rpt, 161 1 th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Provisional), “Aerornedical Evacu- 

’31bid. 

ation (AE) After Action RepodOperation Desert ShieldStorm,” 17 Apr 1991. 

21 5 
Figure 19 

Air Force Casualty Movement 

1 st Echelon 

2nd Echelon 

------- 

- (JMRO) - 

-(ASMRO)- 

0 

v) 

3 

z 

RTD Return to Duty 

MTF Medical Treatment Facility 

i 

Means 

------------ 

Walking 

Litterbearer 

Ground Ambulance 

Air Ambulance 

------ 

Ground Ambulance 

Air Ambulance 

USAF Aircraft 

Ambulance Train 

- - - - - - 

USAF Aircraft 

Ambulance Train 

USN Surface Vessel 

- - - - - - 

USAF Aircraft 

USN Surface Vessel 

21 6 
Figure 20 

Theater Casualty Flow Plan 

Level (Emergency 

Room) 

CRTS 

ASF Aeromedical Staging Facility 

ATC Air Transportable Clinic 

ATH Air Transportable Hospital 

BAS Battalion Aid Station 

CCP Casualty Collection Point 

CRTS Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ship 

CSH Contigency Support Hosital 

MASF Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility 

MASH Mobile Army Surgical Hospital 

SABC Self-aid, Buddy Care 

SME Squadron Medical Element 

21 7 
Figure 21 

CENTAF Aeromedical Evacuation Decision Time 

from in-theater medical facilities and prepared them for movement out 

of theater?4 

For the air and ground campaigns, Military Airlift Command aircraft 

were responsible for supporting all intertheater, intra-U.S., and intratheater 

aeromedical evacuation, except in the Army combat zone and to and from 

Navy ships and interface points. All patients with exposure to biological 

and chemical warfare agents were to be decontaminated before entering 

the evacuation chain. 

(S/DECL OADR) Msg, HQ MAUCAT to Distr., “Draft Aeromedical Evacuation 24 

Concept of Operations,” 1519472 Dec 1990. 

21 8 
An efficient evacuation system was essential to 

medical support of U.S. troops. Here wounded are 

evacuated and transported to base hospitals. 

For intertheater evacuation, the Commander of Airlift Forces and 

CENTAF evacuation control center planned to use during the last weeks of 

Operation Desert Shield both retrograde and dedicated aeromedical missions to support a high casualty load during the ground war. Estimates 

of high numbers of daily intertheater patient evacuees forced Air Force 

medical planners to ask serious questions about the ultimate capabilities 

of the airevac system. (The estimates came from the Medical Planning 

219 
Module operating on Joint Chiefs of Staff computers in the Pentagon, 

with planning factors provided by Central Command.) Even so, the 

CENTAF Forward medical phners constructed an intratheater evacuation 

system that, given adequate airlift resources from U.S. Transportation 

Command, probably could have handled the highest estimated casualty 

load for only a few da~s.2~ 

The intertheater evacuation system, however, was probably not capable of handling such a load without major reinforcements and workarounds. By the end of December, the peak evacuation requirement was 

expected to last one week. The estimated CENTCOM and European Command patient outflow threatened to exceed known airlift strategic evacuation capabilities in patient care equipment. It also had the potential to 

exceed aircraft and litter requirements. Although stocks of deployed 

airevac equipment were bolstered in January, CENTAF and USAFE commanders still noted shortfalls for current casualty estimates. If needed in 

a major emergency, civilian Boeing 767s could theoretically be used as 

a dedicated aeromedical fleet. But equipment needed to configure these 

Boeing 767 aircraft for patient evacuation was not available during the 

Gulf War. Although the U.S. Transportation Command contracted for 

accelerated production of ten airevac equipment sets, the earliest estimated delivery date was July 1991?6 

Creating adequate reception points for patients arriving in the United 

States was another challenge. On 24 December 1990, Air Force aeromedical planners and operating units started to execute instructions issued 

by the Military Airlift Command for locating aeromedical staging facilities in the states. Casualties would arrive at one of six bases: McGuire 

AFB, New Jersey, Andrews AFB, Maryland, Charleston AFB, South Carolina, Kelly AFB, Texas, Scott AFB, Illinois, and Norton AFB, California with 

25Paper, Lt col Bob Ferguson, HQ USCENTAF/CXM, to the Association of Military 

Surgeons of the United States (AMSUS) Convention, “Operation Desert Shield and Storm: 

Air Force Medical Plans and Operations,” 25 Nov I99 1 ; Intvw, J.S. Nanney with Lt Col 

Bob Ferguson, CENTAF~XM, 1 1 Jun 1992. Lt Col Ferguson, the CENTAF Forward medical 

planner, was also not alarmed by the highest casualty estimates because he considered 

them unrealistic in light of CENTAF’S leadership and military capabilities. 

2%pt. 161 1 th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Provisional), “Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) After Action RepodOperation Desert ShieldStorm,” 17 Apr 1991; Telecon, 

J.S. Nanney with Col Carol Bloomquist, MAUSGX, [Aeromedical PlanNng], 10 Apr 1992; 

Intvw, J.S. Nanney with Col Robert Brannon, 1 AESICC, 26 Jun 1992. 

220 
the three east coast facilities receiving most patients. On 18 January 

1991. CENTAF requested the Air Force to activate them and assign additional aeromedical personnel and support aircraft. On 25 February, once 

the ground war had started, MAC headquarters directed all aeromedical 

staging facilities to be ready for patients. Andrews AFB would be the 

primary reception center, but patient requirements could dictate routing 

to the other hubs?’ 

After 17 January 1991, Central Command tried to utilize its limited 

medical resources more efficiently. The Seeb complex, originally designated a convalescent center, on 20 January was renamed the U.S. Military 

Medical Complex, Oman, and tasked with receiving casualties directly 

from the front lines. The joint Army-Air Force complex contained 1,100 

beds and 15 operating tables. The Air Force facility, the 17026 Contingency Hospital, housed 250 beds supported by a staff of 399. Before it 

packed up and redeployed after the war, it had admitted 91 patients and 

treated slightly more than 5,000 outpatients?’ 

In December 1990 and January 1991, rising estimates of patient 

evacuees also increased requirements for strategic aeromedical flights. 

With insufficient strategic crews, some tactical crewmembers were tasked 

with strategic assignments, but it became necessary for the Air Force to 

fragment many Guard and Reserve aeromedical units, a practice that 

caused morale problems and necessitated retraining?’ 

During the Gulf War, CENTAF departed from normal peacetime procedures and used some of its flight surgeons in the aeromedical system 

rather than in tactical hospitals. The prospect of very high casualties 

raised the specter of long evacuation flights to Europe filled with unstable 

patients who required special medical monitoring. The initial aeromedical 

27Msg, Joint StaffhCMRD to USTRANSCOM, “Aeromedical Evacuation COWS 

CONOPS,” 21 23232 Feb 1991; Msg, HQ MAWAT to 21 AF/CAT et al, “Aeromedical Evacuation MissiodAeromedicaI Staging Facility ( ASFYAeromedicaI Evacuation Control Element 

(AECE) Support for Desert Storm.” 2505312 Feb 1991. 

2’Videotape. MAC Combat Camera, “I 702 AREFW Contingency Hospital, Seeb, Oman: 

Operation Desert ShieldStorm,” Jan - Mar 1991; Paper, Lt Col Bob Ferguson, 

HQ USCENTAF/CXM. to the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States (AMSUS) 

Convention, “Operation Desert Shield and Storm: Air Force Medical Plans and Operations,’’ 25 Nov 1991, p 21. 

29MuIem0, SGHR to SGI, “Fragmenting Reserve Units,” 30 Jan 92. 

22 1 
physician plan called for using twelve strategic and twelve tactical aeromedical evacuation flight surgeons, with four to six physicians serving at 

each C- 130 beddown site, while the standard strategic flight surgeon team 

consisted of two physicians. 

CENTAF also planned to draw on physicians from the 17026 Contingency Hospital to form two-person advanced trauma life support teams 

at four mobile aeromedical staging facilities. Two or three physicians at 

each aerial point of embarkation in the strategic evacuation system advised aeromedical crewmembers, monitored the quality of patient care, 

reported all in-flight deaths and emergencies, and recruited additional 

physician support from nearby medical facilities.w 

In mid-February the CENTAF surgeon warned squadron medical elements and air-transportable hospitals that physician support to the aeromedical system was a secondary mission. Because of the primacy of 

aircrew medical support, squadron medical element physicians were 

prohibited from augmenting aeromedical evacuation crews. Nevertheless, 

twenty-two Air Force flight surgeons were assigned to aeromedical evacuation duty at six C-130 beddown locations and five strategic hub locations. Partly because of this program, no deaths or morbidity were attributed to the aeromedical system.” 

In another departure from doctrine, CENTAF’S C-130s performed 

front-line evacuation missions when the Army aeromedical helicopters 

proved inadequate to bridge the long gap between the rapidly advancing 

Coalition forces and the slower-moving Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals. 

However, the lack of a good interservice and interfacility communications 

mMemo, CENTCOI~CCSG to AE Flight Surgeons, “Physician Support for the Strategic 

Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) System for Operation Desert Storm,” 30 Jan 1991; Msg, 

USCENTAFlSG to AIG 8598/Cds~, “USCENTAF Physician Support for Aeromedical Evacuation,” 19 17052 Feb 199 1 ; Paper, Lt Col Bob Ferguson, HQ USCENTAFKZXM, to the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States (AMSUS) Convention. “Operation Desert 

Shield and Storm: Air Force Medical Plans and Operations,” 25 Nov 1991, p 36; Point 

Paper, col Earl W. Mabry. HQ MAUSGP, “Physician Support for the Aeromedical Evacuation System During Operation Desert Storm,” n.d. 

Rpt, 161 1 th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Provisional), “Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) After Action Repodoperation Desert ShieldStorm,” 17 Apr 1991. See also 

Chapter 3 of the Logistics Report for further details on transportation adequacy of the 

aeromedical system. 

31 

222 
system sometimes delayed the arrival of C-130 airevac flights by several 

Table 19 shows aeromedical evacuation data. 

Despite some innovative solutions, the joint aeromedical system in 

the Gulf War caused considerable concern at high levels. Patient regulating, evacuation, and personnel tracking, were major problems in Operation Desert Shield for the joint command and the Air Force. These 

problems eased in some respects during the air and ground wars, only 

because of new workaround systems. After the war, both the combat 

surgeons testified to Congress that the Air Force was fortunate in that the 

low casualties sustained during the war did not tax the aeromedical 

evacuation system.33 

Medics of the Air Force Reserve Components 

The Gulf War deployment validated the total force policy for Air 

Force medical readiness. During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 

the Air Force activated 9,462 medics from the Air Force Reserves and 

2,505 from the Air National Guard. Furthermore, 2,331 Air National 

Guard and 1,293 Air Force Reserve volunteered. These personnel, especially large numbers of aeromedical evacuation crews, were available 

from the first days of Operation Desert Shield. The reserves accounted 

for almost 97 percent of the aeromedical evacuation cadre, of whom 

substantial numbers deployed to Europe or Southwest Asia within several 

Memo, SGHR to SGI. “Rotary-Wing Aeromedical Evacuation,” 30 Jan 1992; Memo, 

SGHR to SGI, “Scope of Air Force Forward Evacuation,” 30 Jan 1992; Brfg, CENTCOM/SC, 

“U.S. Central Command Medical Forces Overview, Operation Desert Storm.” 1 Aug 

1991; Rpt. 161 1 th Aeromddical Evacuation Squadron (Provisional), “Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) After Action RepodOperation Desert ShieldStorm,” 17 Apr 1991. 

33Rpt, HQ 375th Military Airlift Wing (MAC), “Medical After-Action ReportOperations Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 16 Apr 1991; Rpt, HQ USANSGPA, “Aerospace 

Medicine: Consolidated After-Action Report-Desert ShieldlDesert Storm,” Jan 1992, p 

11; Testimony (POUO), Col Leonard Randolph, CENTCOWSG. to HASC, “Wartime Medical 

Readiness-Lessons Learned from Desert Storm,” 5 Feb 1992. pp 40-41; Brfg, Col Carroll 

R. Bloomquist. MAUSG. ”The Spectrum of Medical Support for Operation Desert 

ShieldStorm,” 13-15 Apr 1992; Intvw, J.S. Nanney with Brig Gen Charles Roadman, HQ 

AMUSG. Scott AFB, IL, 22 May 1992. 

32 

223 
months. USAFE received 26 percent of the mobilized reserve personnel; 

Southwest Asia, 21 percent. 

Table 19 

Aeromedical Evacuation Data 

Aeromedical Evacuation Data 

Operation Desert Shield 

Patient Air Evacuation Litter/Ambulatory Total 

Intratheater Movement 496/1,505 2,001 

From Gulf Region to Europe 1,15312,023 3,176 

From Europe to CONUS 57811,767 2,345 

Aeromedical Evacuation Data 

Operation Desert Storm 

Patient Air Evacuation Litter/Ambulatory Total 

In tratheater Movement 1.1 0419 19 2,023 

From Gulf Region to Europe 1,529/1,836 3,365 

From Europe to CONUS 961/1,7 19 2,680 

However, the mobilization and deployment of reserve medics, like the 

entire Air Force reserve mobilization, exposed several areas for improvement. Many medical service reservists, especially aeromedical evacuation 

crewmembers, were not always properly trained for their specific wartime 

missions and equipment. Many airevac crewmembers, although proficient 

in direct patient care, had never escorted patients inflight. Deemed 

qualified only as a result of wartime waivers, they were generally unfamiliar with proper procedures for using the aircraft. Many airevacs also 

224 
lacked the necessary field training to establish operations in austere desert 

conditions. Because of high turnover rates in peacetime, about ten percent of the reserve aircrews required a course of instruction to qualify for 

this aircraft mission.” 

Some reserve component physicians, although highly trained in 

peacetime medicine, were unfamiliar with contingency procedures, equip 

ment, and supplies. At RAF Bicester UK, for instance, the Air National 

Guard augmentees required extensive training before they could qualify. 

After the war, the CENTAF Surgeon, Col. Leonard Randolph, testified to 

Congress that the level of training and familiarity with the deployable 

medical systems varied among Reserve units, ranging from poor to excellent. He also noted a lack of familiarity with the clinical aspects of 

battlefield medicine. Other senior medical managers noted that a few 

reservists were reluctant to use or train themselves to use “austere” medical equipment and ~upplies.~’ In July 1991, the Surgeon General’s Medical Readiness Division noted how a substantial number of field reports 

commented on inadequate skills among the reserve medics. A postwar 

survey by the Air Force Reserve Personnel Center showed that only about 

one-half of the medics mobilized thought their peacetime training fully 

prepared them for their assignments. Nearly ten percent felt their training 

3~ntvw, J.S. Nanney with Brig Gen Charles H. Roadman 11, former USAWSG, Scott 

AFB. IL, 22 May 1992; Rpt, 161 lth Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Provisional), 

“Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) After Action ReportlOperation Desert ShieldStorm,” 

17 Apr 1991; Intvw, J.S. Nanney with col Carroll R. Bloomquist, HQ MAUSGX, Scott AFB. 

IL, 21 May 1992. 

35Brfg, Maj Robert Munson, “Wartime Need for Aeromedical Evacuation Physician,” 

to usms Conference, ‘The Spectrum of Medical Support for Operation Desert 

ShieldStorm,” 13-15 Apr 1992; Rpt, 317th USAF Cont Hosp, RAF Bicester, UK, “After 

Action Report, 17 Jan - 6 Mar 1991.” p 19; Testimony (FOOO), Col Leonard Randolph 

to HASC, “Wartime Medical Readiness-Lessons Learned from Desert Storm,” 5 Feb 1992, 

p 49; Brfg, Brig Gen Charles H. Roadman 11, USAWSG, ‘’USAFE Medical Support for 

Operation Desert ShieldDesert Storm,” to USUHS Conference, ‘The Spectrum of Medical 

Support for Operation Desert ShieldStorm,” 13-15 Apr 1992; Brfg, Col J. Melchiorre, 

TAUSGX. [CENTAF Lessons Learned] to Medical Planners’ Conference, Bolling AFB, 14 

May 1991; Brfg. SGHR to SG Senior Staff, “operation Desert Shieldstorm-Medical 

Lessons Learned: An Information Briefing,” Jun 1991; Intvw, J.S. Nanney with Brig. Gen. 

Charles H. Roadman 11, former USAFmG, Scott AFB, IL, 22 May 1992. 

225 
did not prepare them for their wartime assignments.” The USAF Medical 

Center Scott (MAC), staffing the 250-bed contingency hospital in Oman, 

offered an assessment: 

As nurses and physicians, reserve personnel were generally well prepared to assume their roles at the deployed location. However, they 

generally lacked military supervisorylmanagement experience necessary 

for a military deployment situation, e.g., understanding of logistical and 

ancillary support matters and military supervision and discipline. Regarding enlisted personnel, unless they had prior enlisted active duty 

service, most were not able to perform their medical duties, primarily 

because their civilian jobs were altogether different-many had not even 

attended USAF technical training schools.n 

In spite of such problems, eighty to ninety percent of commanders 

and supervisors of Air Force reservists (including reServe medics) were 

completely satisfied with their performance. Training observations, 

moreover, may on occasion have resulted simply from malassigned 

reserve personnel. The primary Air Force skill code for individual reservists was too often an inadequate guide to their real skills, and Air 

Force regulations prevented their proper assignment. All told, there was 

a shortage of contingency training in the reserve components, despite a 

substantial upgrading of reserve contingency training in the 1980s. 

36Rpt, Maj Gen Vernon Chong, HQ ATUSG to HQ USAFISGHR, “Medical Lessons 

Learned-Desert ShieldStorm,” 15 Apr 1991; Brfg, Lt. Col. Larry Hettick, SGHR, to SG 

Senior Staff, “Desert ShieldDesert Stom: Medical Lessons Learned, An Information 

Briefing,” 3 Jul 1991; Rpt and Brfg. HQ Am0 (Ms. Roma Simons), “Desert Storm 

SurveylResults,” 25 Jun 1991. Almost forty percent of the 9.462 reserve medics were 

mobilized as individuals-as individual mobilization augmentees, individual ready reservists, or retired regulars-rather than in units. Most of the Air Force’s mobilized ready 

reservists and retired regulars were medics, and nineteen percent of commanders and 

supervisors responded that such medics were not adequately prepared for their wartime 

mission. Telecon, J.S. Nanney with Roma Simons. HQ ARPUHO, 23 Jun 1992. 

”Rpt, USAF Medical Center Scott, “Medical After Action Report for Operation 

Desert ShieldDesert Storm-l702nd Contingency Hospital,” 10 May 1991. Such observations were echoed in the Aeromedical After Action Report - Rpt, 161 Ith Aeromedical 

Evacuation Squadron (Provisional), “Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) After Action ReporVOperation Desert ShieldStorm,” 17 Apr 1991. The USA= surgeon also made the 

observation: Intvw. J.S. Nanney with Brig Gen Charles H. Roadman 11. former USAFW 

SG, Scott AFB, IL, 22 May 1992. 

226 
After the Vietnam War, the Air Force Medical Service concentrated 

on specialized medical training for Air Reserve medics. Deciding to 

reverse this trend in the 198Os, the Surgeon General instituted a common 

core medical readiness training program for individual active duty and 

reserve medics. It included an eight-day Combat Casualty Care Course, 

Continuing Medical Readiness Training program, and a Battlefield Nursing program. In addition, the Air Force established an annual field 

training exercise known as Medical Red Flag. 

Although recipients benefitted from this training, in August 1990 

many reserve medics had enrolled in the training courses or participated 

in exercises. During the mobilization, accelerated contingency training 

programs did not fully solve the lack of contingency training, which was 

especially notable among reserve component aeromedical personnel. 

Training shortfalls, especially in combat trauma care and contingency 

equipment familiarization, were also noted among active duty medics, but 

not to the same extent as among reservists. During Operation Desert 

Shield, CENTAF held several special training seminars to familiarize its 

medics, both active duty and reservists, with contingency medical care.38 

By the end of 1991 it became apparent that the Medical Service lacked 

adequate numbers of Selective Reservists in some specialties to fully staff 

an expanded wartime medical system, while at the same time maintaining 

quality services and graduate medical education programs in the United 

38Brfg, HQ MAUSG to HQ USAFISGHR, “Revised Guidance [Lessons Learned],” 14 May 

1991; Brfg, HQ AWSGXO to SG Conferees, Boiling AFB, Wash., m., May 1991; Brfg, 

HQ AFREM, col. Koenigsberg, to SG Conferees, Bolling AFB. Wash., Dc, May 1991; Rpt, 

HQ 375 Military Airlift Wing, “Medical After-Action Report,” 16 Apr 1991; Art, Col 

R.G. Parsi et al, “ATLS Training in the Reserve: A Pilot Program,” USAF Medical Service 

Digest, Winter 85, pp 8-10; Art, Capt P. Banus. “To Make or Break C4 The TAC Officer 

Takes Charge,” USAF Medical Service Digest, Winter 85, pp 11-12; Ltr. HQ SAUSGA to 

HQ USAFEGHR. “Medical Lessons Learned-Desert ShieldStorm,” I7 Apr 199 1, wlatch: 

Lessons kamed; Issue Worksheets, ANGISG, “Desert ShieldDesert Storm Lessons 

Learned,” Mar 1992; Invw, J.S. Nanney with Maj Hany Kendrick, ANG/SGX, Andrews 

Am, MD, 23 Mar 1992; Brfg, ANGSGX to Aerospace Medicine Conference, “Operation 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm: An ANG Perspective,” Feb 1992; Brfg. Ofc of the Air Surgeon, “Operation Desert ShieldDesert Storm-[ ANG] Medical Service Participation,” 8 Apr 

1991; After Action Report, 37th TAC Hospital Deployed, “Medical After Action Report 

for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 1991; Rpt. 161 1 th Aeromedical Evacuation 

Squadron (Provisional), “Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) After Action RepodOperation 

Desert ShieldStorm,” 17 Apr 1991; Intvw, J.S. Nanney with Brig Gen Charles H. 

Roadman 11. MAUSG and former USAFWSG, Scott AFB, IL, 22 May 1992. 

227 
States. A wartime expansion would require more than 7,000 additional 

personnel. A possible solution would be to backfill the seven medical 

centers at 100 percent and the remainder of the facilities at 80 percent. 

Facilities backfilled at the 80 percent level would maintain full services by 

working longer hours and transferring patients to more adequately staffed 

facilities. The 80 percent backfill, however, ran counter to wishes of 

Congressman John P. Murtha that backfills be staffed on a one-for-one 

basis. Ultimately, only an overall 91 percent backfill was 

After the war, the Air Force Surgeon General testified to Congress: 

Although we had sufficient manpower to staff our deployed medical 

facilities, the unanticipated requirement to maintain peacetime levels of 

CONUS care stressed our available ARC resources. Even with the resources gained by stop loss and partial mobilization, shortages in critical 

specialties (to include surgeons, nurse anesthetists, surgical technicians, 

and medical technicians) could have affected our ability to fully expand 

designated CONUS casualty receiving hospitals in preparation for heavy 

Despite attendant problems, the mobilization and deployment of 

reserve medics were essential to the Medical Service’s contribution. 

One-half of the Air Force medics in Europe and Southwest Asia by 

February 1991 came from the Air National Guard and the Air Force 

Reserve. By late February 1991, the Air Force mobilized almost 12,000 

members of its medical reserve component. These reserve medics accounted for a third of all Air Force reservists called up for Operations 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 

Preventive Medicine and Aircrew Medical Support 

Both heat and disease casualties were lower than expected throughout 

the first months of the deployment. From August to December, nonbattle 

injuries accounted for most of the patients who were evacuated from 

Southwest Asia to Europe. The most common in-theater nonbattle injury 

was lacerations; the second most common injury was back or ankle 

sprain. Orthopedic injuries alone accounted for about forty percent of the 

39Memo, SGHR to SCI, “Non-active Duty Beneficiaries in Desert ShieldlDesert 

‘%tatement, Lt Cen Alexander Sloan, USAFISG, “Witness Statement (House Armed 

Storm,” 30 Jan 1992. 

Services Committee),” 5 Feb 1992. 

228 
evacuees. Food-borne illnesses were a recurring problem at a few bases 

where contamination was traced to local food products prepared by host 

nation contractors!’ 

The disease, nonbattle injury rate was only one-half to one-third of 

that predicted for the theater. The predicted outpatient rate for Southwest 

Asia per day per 1,OOO personnel was 27; during the war the rate was 17. 

The predicted inpatient rate was three per day per 1,OOO personnel; the 

actual rate was .34 per day. The four most common disease categories 

for all patients were upper respiratory illnesses (20.9 percent), nonbattle 

injuries (12.34 percent), dermatological illnesses (8.5 percent), and gastroenteritis (7.69 percent)!* 

From 19 August 1990, to 28 February 1991, Air Force medical 

facilities in Southwest Asia treated 120,845 outpatients and admitted 

approximately 3,250 inpatients. Eighty percent of the inpatients were Air 

Force personnel, despite a heavy patient load from the other Services in 

the first two months of the depl0yment.4~ 

Among aircrews, fatigue was the most significant and pervasive 

problem in Operation Desert Storm. Heavy air tasking orders, especially 

at the start of the war, forced significant deviations from normal rest and 

regular scheduling for aircrews. Fatigue contributed to at least two 

noncombat fatal mishaps during Operation Desert Storm.@ 

After the war, Tactical Air Command conducted an anonymous 

survey of stimulant and sedative drug use among its deployed fighter 

pilots, and unit after-action reports corroborated the survey’s results. 

During Operation Desert Shield, sixty-five percent of respondents who 

4’Rpt, Col Don Butts, CENTAF~AC. “Operations Desert ShieldlDesert Storm - Environmental Health Experience and Issues,” 11 Jul 1991. 

Brfg, USCENTAFISG, “Central Command Air Force Medical Operations for Operations Desert ShieldStorm,” Mar 1991; Rpt, Col Don Butts, CENTAF~AC, “Operations 

Desert ShieldStorm - Environmental Health Experience and Issues.” 11 Jul 1991. 

Rpt, HQ Air Force Office of Medical Support (AFOMS), “Report of Patients,” Aug 

*Rpt, HQ USAFISGPA. “Aerospace Medicine: Consolidated After-Action Report-Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm,’’ Jan 1992. This report is the source for the remaining paragraphs 

in this section on aircrew medical support. 

42 

43 

1990 - Mar 1991. 

229 
used “Go” pills reported adverse side effects. In some units, the usage 

was as high as eighty-three percent. During Desert Storm, “Go” medications were used by fifty-seven percent of the pilots; sixty-one percent who 

used them considered the pills essential to operations. Fifty-four percent 

of respondents used “No-go” medications at some time during the deployment, most often because of excess noise and difficulty in relaxing after 

a mission. 

The most common reason for grounding pilots in theater was attributed to upper respiratory illness. This was true at all locations except 

Riyadh. The second most common reason was gastroenteritis (true at all 

locations except Sharjah). Spatial disorientation was also a significant 

problem in the featureless terrain of the Arabian and Iraqi deserts, causing 

two noncombat fighter losses. Although contact lenses deteriorated more 

rapidly in theater, and resupply was extremely difficult, they worked well 

for aviators who used them. Throughout Operations Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm, the Air Force did not cancel any planned operations due to medical reasons.4’ 

Biological and Chemical Warfare Defenses 

The initial deployment revealed deficiencies in preparing for biological and chemical warfare defenses, as many people deployed without 

chemical warfare equipment or antidotes. 

Preparations for chemical warfare continued to pose a problem even 

into December 1990. Individual mobilization augmentees were arriving 

in theater without chemical gear and appropriate immunizations, mainly 

because they did not pass through a mobility line. There were supply 

shortages as well. On 3 December 1990, US. Forces Command (U.S. 

Army) reported that shortages of nerve agent antidote kits might not be 

overcome for at least sixty days. CENTAF-Rear eventually acquired 

45Paper, Lt Col Bob Ferguson, HQ UXENTAFICXM, to the Association of Military 

Surgeons of the United States (AMSUS) Convention, “Operation Desert Shield and Storm: 

Air Force Medical Plans and Operations,” 25 Nov 1991. 

230 
adequate stocks from Europe and the United States and transferred them 

to the theater.& 

The Air Force deployed decontamination teams (trained in chemical 

decontamination procedures) to each air-transportable hospital at risk of 

chemical attack. Some of these nineteen-person teams later redeployed in 

theater to higher threat locations. This was the first contingency that used 

patient decontamination teams, and Air Force hospitals were the only U.S. 

medical facilities that deployed with their own decontamination ~apability.~’ 

The Air Force also used the deployment to adopt a new substance to 

treat nerve agent casualties. On 14 August, General Buethe asked the 

U.S. Army to supply the Air Force with autoinjectors of diazepam, the 

muscle relaxant in Valium, to counteract effects of nerve agents. Within 

a few days, the other Services’ Surgeons General approved this request 

and ordered their own stocks of diazepam.‘* 

Physicians dressed in chemical protective gear are generally incapable 

of performing surgery, and in the mid-1980s. Tactical Air Command was 

planning to develop means to protect the air-transportable hospitals from 

chemical warfare agents. Shortly before Operation Desert Shield, the 

program transferred to the Army’s research and development effort on 

deployable medical systems; it was still incomplete in August 1990. In 

November 1990, the CENTAF TAC surgeon agreed to accelerated production of the chemically hardened air-transportable hospitals to support 

*(S/DECL OADR) Msg, USCINCCENTCCJ3 to HQ TAUSG. “Request for Atropine and 

Pralidoxme Chloride Autoinjectors,” 0623012 Aug 1990; Log (S/DECL OADR), TAUSG, 

“Battle Staff Log,” 29 Aug 1990, 1645. 

Paper, Lt Col Bob Ferguson, HQ USCENTAF/CXM. to the Association of Military 

Surgeons of the United States (AMSUS) Convention, “Operation Desert Shield and Storm: 

Air Force Medical Plans and Operations.” 25 Nov 1991, p 10. 

481nfonation Paper, U.S. Army sGPS-PSP to Army Surgeon General, “Diazepam 

Autoinjector,” I5 Aug 1990; Background Paper, SGHR. “CENTAFISG Requirements for 

Parenteral Diazepam in Support of Desert Shield,” IS Aug 1990; Point Paper, sGHR, 

“CENTAWSG Requirement for Parenteral Diazepam in Support of Desert Shield,” 

14 Aug 1990; Point Paper, SGHR, “Service Requirements for Diazepam Autoinjectors in 

Support of Desert Shield,” 16 Aug 1990. 

41 

23 I 
Operation Desert Storm, but the program was far from complete at the 

time of the cease 

The deployment brought to light several lessons regarding the effects 

of biological and chemical warfare antidotes. In 1985 the Tactical Air 

Command had begun ground-testing all aircrews with pyridostigmine 

bromide. The reported side effects were so low (less than one percent) 

that testing was discontinued in 1987. In late February 1991, some units 

began using pyridostigmine bromide prophylaxis; however, only nine 

percent completed the full seven-day course. Side effects were much 

more common than predicted by prewar tests. Forty percent of respondents to a survey reported gastrointestinal effects. However, those who 

took the tablets reported no missions cancelled because of the side effects. Additionally, side effects were not the predominant reason for not 

taking the complete dose; uncertainty about a new drug and the apparent 

low threat of chemical contact were also reasons. Aircrews were concerned about harmful effects from long-term use, and many crewmembers 

in some locations, assessing the chemical threat as low, chose not to take 

the tablets.% 

The anthrax vaccine also produced unexpectedly high rates of minor 

side effects. In one survey of aircrew members, ninety-two percent 

reported some reaction, although only three percent thought the reactions 

were severe enough to affect flying duties?’ 

Point Paper, TACISGXO, “Chemically Hardened Air-transportable hospital (CHATH),” 

%Rpt. HQ USAFISGPA, “Aerospace Medicine: Consolidated After-Action Report5’1bid. 

49 

18 JuI 1991.. 

Desert ShieldlDesert Storm,” Jan 1992. 

232 
10 

Conclusions 

Air Force support forces had to initially overcome the challenges of 

deploying after the combat forces. The challenge of playing catch-up was 

overcome for the most part within the first couple of months although 

shortages of equipment and supplies continued to surface. To a large 

extent, the fact that Saudi Arabia and the other Arab nations had a sup 

port infrastructure that was able to sustain the forces for a short time was 

a major contributing factor to the success of Operation Desert Shield. 

Another contributing factor was that advantage of having five and a half 

months to develop the needed support infrastructure to support air operations. Even so. there were significant shortcomings that surfaced that 

must be dealt with by the Air Force. 

Air Base Engineering and Services 

The deployment plan called for ten main operating locations and four 

forward operating locations, but in reality that number grew to twentyfive locations. There was insufficient information about military airfields available early in the planning process that could be used to plan 

for munitions storage, power generation, and water requirements, as well 

as other infrastructure considerations. Site surveys of the air bases and 

the local community had to be accomplished once support forces arrived 

in theater. This resulted in delays in establishing a base infrastructure 

to support air operations and affected contracting activities in the local communities. 

The prepositioning program included a $51 -million caretaker maintenance contract in Oman supporting the prepositioning of over $2- 

billion in materials and equipment. The unavailability of technical 

orders for much of the Harvest Falcon assets resulted in problems with 

maintenance and determining what constituted a set and how equipment 

was to be set up. 

233 
Engineering and Services had difficulty in determining bare base 

equipment requirements due to a lack of visibility of engineering and 

services assets. This problem was still manifesting itself even in February 1991. The lack of sufficient care of supplies in storage of prepositioned equipment resulted in 80 percent of the 750kW generators requiring some sort of maintenance once the equipment was issued to units. 

Also, 750kW generators sent to the theater from the United States experienced maintenance-related problems with 66 percent of those generators. 

Missing or defective parts and minor adjustments were required. Firefighting vehicles arrived with broken pumps, dryrotted fan belts and 

hoses. few tools, or firefighting agent. The Tactical Field Laundry system experienced a high rate of failures-less than half were operational 

throughout the deployment. Problems were also experienced with a 

shortage of par% with War Readiness Spares Kits. 

The Air Force experienced difficulties with the transfer of executive 

agency for mortuary affairs to the U.S. Army. Also, disposition of remains of nuclear, biological, or chemically contaminated remains was 

never satisfactorily resolved. 

Protecting the Air Base 

Air Force security personnel are trained and expect U.S. Army units 

to provide external air base security during contingency operations. 

During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm rear area security operations evolved slowly. When the U.S. Army did not provide the anticipated external security, it caused concern to both Air Force and Army rear 

area security personnel. 

Many of the rear area forces are reserve or national guard units 

(fifteen-twenty percent), whose activation and deployment to the theater 

was uncertain. During the Gulf War, deployment priority was given to 

combat forces; thus, support forces were deployed at a much slower pace 

leaving holes in rear area security operations. The Air Force relied 

heavily on augmentation of host nation security forces to make up for the 

shortage of U.S. Army support. While the Army seems to be content to 

rely on host nation augmentation, the Air Force is reluctant to do so. 

Since Vietnam, the Air Force has not adopted a wartime manning 

standard to determine wartime security police requirements. While 

CENTAF security did use existing Air Force regulations to determine these 

234 
requirements, it was not conducive to a rapid deployment situation. 

During the Gulf War, the Army envisioned using its combat forces for 

rear area security purposes only if the rear came under a direct attack by 

enemy forces. 

Contracting Support 

The deployment of combat forces ahead of support forces even 

though many bases offered very little in the way of food, billeting, transportation, laundry, bottled water, ground fuel, etc., resulted in thousands 

of Air Force personnel sleeping on aircraft hanger floors and eating only 

meals-ready-to-eat for approximately one week. On the other hand, 

many arriving personnel obtained quarters in modem hotels. Contracting 

personnel also had interface difficulties with finance personnel, placing 

them in a situation of no checks and balances between buyers and payers. 

The transfer of support-related contracts valued in excess of $20- 

million in November 1990 to the Saudi government for administration 

was not the most effective and efficient use of host nation support. 

While the Saudi government was willing to pay for the support, Air Force 

contracting was better organized to administer them and ensure Air Force 

requirements were met. 

Legal Support to Air Operations 

Because Air Force personnel were deployed to the cEm0M area of 

responsibility primarily by Unit ‘Qpe Code, there were no existing 

CENTAF or CENTCOM units to which Air Force personnel could be attached. Furthermore, CENTAF was not authorized to create units, and 

therefore, MAJCOMs deployed provisional units and attached personnel to 

them. It was not until November that a comprehensive organizational 

structure was in place. 

Legal offices in the theater were not able to communicate with home 

bases or conduct legal research with existing communication capabilities 

in the theater. Eventually, a contract was established with a host nation 

company and access gained to the online funded legal information 

through electronics (FLITE) system in San Antonio, Texas by means of the 

Defense Data Network. 

235 
The use of civilians during the Gulf War became a legal issue because of the threat of losing their protection under the Geneva Conventions as noncombatants. In addition, status of forces agreements between 

the United States and host nations had to be established. Although the 

United States adopted an interpretation that included these civilians as 

part of U.S. forces, it is unclear how host nations would have interpreted 

the agreement. 

Weather Operations 

The ability to provide weather services in a joint environment was 

hampered because of inconsistent views of the role of the unified command staff weather officer and inadequate joint guidance to support all 

forces under a unified command. Also, weather services were not interoperable between the Services, especially between the Air Force and 

Navy and Marines. 

Long-range communication lines were used to transmit weather data 

between the United States, Europe, and the CENTCOM area of responsibility by means of landlines and satellite links. However, the frequent 

bridging of equipment, the use of different types of circuits, and multiple 

satellite hops created serious signal degradation. Furthermore, incompatible modems complicated interfaces between landlines and satellite links 

and connections in the United States and Europe. Also, numerous problems arose with tactical communications capabilities. For example, full 

duplex capabilities were envisioned at each site, but only four sites had 

this capability. And even so, two sites did not become operational until 

midJanuary and one in early February 1991. 

The air weather service maintenance plan called for a two-level 

maintenance concept, requiring equipment to be returned to the United 

States for repairs. While this concept works well with highly reliable 

equipment, it is not responsive to user needs when equipment has significant maintenance problems. For example, of the eighty-seven TMQ-34 

Tactical Meteorological Observing System, fifty-one experienced failures 

with eighteen pieces of equipment being returned to the United States for 

repairs. By the end of the war, the Air Force was planning to establish 

an in-country maintenance capability for the tactical weather equipment. 

236 
Mobilization and Personnel Support 

Air Force Mobilization, Manpower and Personnel operations during the 

Persian Gulf War were never “show stoppers.” However, it was evident 

that the data systems and the Contingency Operations Mobility Planning 

and Execution System were not integrated nor flexible enough to effectively support the limited mobilization and wartime accountability process. 

Command and control, systems policies, and capabilities were based 

on plans and routines to mobilize and track the reserves by entire units. 

The systems did not track and report anything short of complete unit 

mobilization. Furthermore, flexibility and effectiveness of deployed 

command and control systems were significantly reduced by inflexible 

and complicated Manpower and Personnel Data Systems. COwS-based 

Manpower and Personnel data systems and deployed command and 

control systems together were not flexible enough to sustain the automated and integrated command and control they were designed to achieve. 

Planning provides valuable insight into the processes, policies, and 

procedures expected to be used during contingency operations. Air Force 

Manpower and Personnel Data Systems and mobilization policies and 

procedures were in part planned and exercised based on a large-scale 

contingency and whole unit mobilization. What occurred during the 

Persian Gulf War was a limited regional contingency of limited duration 

and partial unit (Unit Spe Code) mobilization. 

Manpower and Personnel planners modified systems and implemented 

wartime policies and procedures-for a limited regional contingency 

scenario-for the first time. There is a need to plan and develop more 

flexible Personnel and Manpower data and command and control systems, 

policies, and procedures. flexibility will enable support for the full range 

of military actions-from a limited regional contingency to a global war. 

Media and Public Affairs 

Despite the predictable and understandable frustrations it represented 

to the news media there, the public affairs “system” in place in the theater worked. However. some components of the system worked better 

than others and some components had an impact on the U.S. Air Force’s 

ability to tell the air campaign story to the American people. We’ll look 

237 
at some of the more significant components of the public affairs system 

in place during Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm. 

The DOD National Media Pool. Because of the existence of the 

National Media Pool the Pentagon was able to put Western reporters into 

Saudi Arabia to cover deployment of U.S. troops when no reporters were 

already on scene. The DOD National Media Pool, subject of much 

criticism during the Persian Gulf tanker reflagging and Panama invasion, 

was used appropriately during Operation Desert Shield. Without it, 

negotiations with the Saudis over permitting Western reporters into their 

country could have been protracted. 

However, the National Media Pool offered the Pentagon a ready 

mechanism to quickly move reporters to the theater while assuring the 

Saudis that the number of journalists could be manageable, their access 

controllable, and their care the total responsibility of the U.S. military. 

The pool proved to be the “foot-in-the-door” that eventually permitted 

larger numbers of Western reporters on-scene as the Saudis became more 

accustomed to and comfortable with their presence. 

CENTCOM Public Affairs Planning. As scholars and historians have 

noted, throughout the history of warfare the problem of communicating 

war news has always been a huge and intricate undertaking requiring 

“painstaking and elaborate planning.”’ For example, preparations for the 

news coverage of the Allied landings at Normandy in World War I1 

“were as carefully worked out as any other phase of the action.”’ 

CENTCOM’S failure to plan for accommodating press interest in U.S. 

military operations in their theater of responsibility and the lack of a 

“concept of operation” for dealing with news media exacerbated tensions 

that already existed between the military and the media and unnecessarily 

strained the relationship in theater. 

‘Joseph J. Mathews, Reporting the Wars, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 

Press, 1957) p 192. 

’Mathews. Ibid. For an excellent history of the American experience of militarymedia relationship in war. see Peter Braestrup’s, Battle Lines: Report of the Twentieth 

Century Fund Task Force on /he Military and the Media. (New York: Priority Press, 

1985). 

238 
Nevertheless, CENTCOM finally put in place a system for disseminating information to the press and the public during Desert Storm before 

hostilities started. The system that eventually evolved (a system of 

security review of news reports, “pooled” reporting, daily update briefings, background education and training sessions for less experienced 

“combat correspondents”) developed and was in place only because 

CENTCOM had the luxury of time on their side-almost five months in 

which to experiment and conduct lengthy, long distance negotiations 

between the Pentagon, Saudi Arabia, the press and the theater commander-and was not one that had been planned in advance by the major 

participants. But for all its limitations and shortcomings, the system 

worked-at least initially. 

And for the better part of Operation Desert Storm-particularly during 

the air campaign fought from fixed air bases and off carrier decks-the 

system functioned reasonably well. It collapsed as a viable mechanism 

for reporting when the ground war began and movement of military units 

overwhelmed logistical support capabilities, mobility requirements, and 

communications necessary for the pools to continue to work. That’s 

when the pool system collapsed under the weight of events, the remarkable success of U.S. and Coalition partners, and the pressures of media 

competition to “get the story.” When the pools started to collapse, 

CENTCOM was again caught unprepared to substitute a more workable 

accommodation for the legitimate and predictable needs of the press. 

Combat Correspondent Pools. How well did this mechanism for 

release of information about the war work? For all its shortcomings, in 

the military’s view this system also worked. While it may not always be 

appropriate, combat correspondent pools have been and will continue to 

be a workable mechanism for press coverage of combat that accommodates the press’s legitimate role of providing independent coverage of war 

within militarily reasonable bounds of security, safety, and logistics. As 

importantly, it was a system that CENTCOM and field commanders understood and were prepared to support in the midst of fighting rapidly unfolding air and ground campaigns. 

However, as a mechanism for coverage of the air campaign, the pool 

arrangement was not necessary. With U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine, and 

Coalition aircraft operating against targets in Kuwait and Iraq from fixed 

bases and carriers, concern over control of news media, logistics, and 

accommodations were less severe than for the more numerous ground 

239 
forces maneuvering through hostile territory in comparatively austere 

conditions. After air and naval superiority was well established by the 

Coalition, the threat to fixed air bases in the rear and carriers at sea was 

virtually nonexistent. Although pools were a convenient mechanism to 

cover swiftly maneuvering ground forces, the pooling mechanism was not 

necessary for accommodating news coverage of US. Air Force units. 

Security Review. Security review of pool copy was not the onerous 

intrusion into the reporting process that has been popularly portrayed in 

news media commentary. Security review, as practiced in the Gulf War, 

ensured at least a modicum of control over inadvertent release of information that might compromise security, jeopardize operations, or threaten 

the safety of units and troops. Although there were a few isolated examples of inadvertent breaches of the ground rules sufficient to worry the 

theater CINC? there is no verifiable evidence that Iraq was ever able to 

take tactical advantage of any information released through the combat 

correspondent pools. 

Access to Air Buses. CENTCOM and CENTAF'S failure to get more air 

bases in the theater opened to media visits reduced the Air Force's opportunity to educate news media representatives on air operations; familiarize 

them with units, weapons systems, and doctrine; or to establish a credible 

working relationship between the press and airmen in advance of hostilities. As a result, reporters were familiar with only a small part of the 

total air contribution to Operation Desert Shield and were unprepared to 

cover air power's role in Operation Desert Storm. 

Gun Camera video. The ready availability of acceptable quality gun 

camera and HUD video helped bridge a yawning gap that has always 

existed in portraying an air campaign-particularly a strategic bombing 

campaign far over enemy territory. However, not enough of it was 

released during Operation Desert Storm and that video which was released conveyed the mistaken notion that all ordnance dropped was 

precision ordnance, and every precision-guided munition (PGM) hit its 

target every time. A related issue has to do with Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). Use of video from precision-guided munitions inevitably 

generated the logical question from the press-what was the effectiveness 

H. Noman Schwarzkopf, it Doesn't Take A Hero: An Autobiography (New York: 3 

Bantam Books, 1992). 

240 
of the munition? Did you not simply hit what you aimed at; was what 

you hit disabled, destroyed, or otherwise rendered combat-ineffective? 

Neither CENTCOM nor the Pentagon was able to address the important 

questions about BDA raised by CENTCOM’s selective release of PGM video 

during press briefings. Therefore, despite the relatively successful use of 

gun camera video during Operation Desert Storm, a gap still exists in 

telling the air campaign story in an increasingly visual, immediate, and 

interconnected global communication environment. 

Spokesmen. Because the mechanism that had been set up to release 

information to the press relied mainly on official briefers in Riyadh and 

Washington to provide the context and analysis to a largely lay audience, 

telling the air campaign story during Operation Desert Storm most often 

fell to “purple suit” spokesmen. Most of those spokesmen and briefers 

wore “green” or “khaki” and not “blue” uniforms. That is to say, the 

responsibility for telling the air campaign story fell not to aviators or 

airmen, but to mostly soldiers and marines. 

In a quantitative analysis of network television reports on Operation 

Desert Storm, the Center for Media and Public Affairs, a Washington 

research group, determined that Air Force sources were quoted in less 

than twenty percent of footage aired by the three broadcast networks. In 

a war dominated by an air campaign, the most frequent sources telling 

that air campaign story weren‘t aviators by background or training, they 

were infantrymen! The only Service component playing a less “visible” 

role-at least as measured in broadcast reports on network TV-was the 

U.S. Navy, whose spokesmen appeared in less than ten percent of the 

footage aired by network news during Operation Desert St01-m.~ 

The Instant Replay War: Television News Coverage of the Persian Gulf War,” 

Media Monitor (Wash, D.C.: Center for Media and Public Affairs), Apr 1991. According 

to the study: “Among the services, Marines were quoted most often. Their 306 appearances outranked the Army’s 262. despite frequent sound bites from Army Gen Powell (36) 

and Schwarzkopf (80). Air Force personnel were quoted only 159 times, and the Navy’s 

only 75 times,” p 3. 

%he Center for Media and Public Affairs conducts continuing content analyses of 

broadcast news programs of the three networks. The Center, a nonpartisan, nonprofit 

research organization, conducts scientific studies of how the media treat social and 

political issues. The results of the research are published in the Center’s monthly publication, Media Monitor. Unfortunately, they do not analyze CNN, a cable not broadcast 

television network. 

4. 

24 1 
As a partial result of the dominance of Marine and Army sources, 

broadcast television stories focusing on the topic “Ground War” ranked 

a close second (303 stories aired) behind stories coded as treating the 

topic “Air War” (339 stories)! Clearly, the air campaign story wm 

affected by the mechanism that had been put in place to release information to the press and the public during Operation Desert Storm. Having 

few senior Air Force spokesmen appearing on television was one important reason. 

Media on Combat Aircraft. The difficulty of visually portraying the 

air campaign-a historic problem in modem warfare-was another reason 

the airpower story was not fully told during Operation Desert Storm. 

Video from precision guided munitions and fighter aircraft heads-up 

displays helps tell the story, but does not fill the void-it only tells part, 

a very small part, of the total air campaign story. The CENTAF commander’s decision to bar newsmen from combat aircraft-including B-52seffectively crippled the press’s and CENTCOM’S ability to portray the whole 

air campaign story to the American people.‘ 

Initially, the CENTAF commander’s decision made sense-there were 

few combat aircraft that could accommodate more than one person and 

the risks were too great to expose untrained noncombatants to the demands and dangers of aerial missions over hostile temtory. However, 

after establishment of air superiority those concerns became less compelling. Throughout the history of aerial warfare, newsmen have accompanied U.S. and allied airmen on combat missions in combat-coded aircraft 

in far more dangerous, hostile conditions than existed over Kuwait and 

even Iraq.’ Those experiences and lessons from past wars were not 

emulated nor were they improved upon in Operation Desert Storm-they 

were ignored. 

6Media Monitor, Apr 199 1, p 2. 

’Maj Tiedemann, CENTAF/PA during Desert ShieldStom, confirms that Lt Gen 

Homer prohibited newsmen from flying on board combat aircraft. Despite frequent 

appeals through public affairs channels to open combat aircraft-particularly B-52s-to 

reporters, Gen Homer refused to revise his policy. 

*Edward R. Murrow and Walter Cronkite and other reporters flew on board American bomber aircraft on missions over Germany. Newsmen also flew on board FAC and 

EB-66s on combat missions during Vietnam. In peacetime, newsmen routinely fly on 

board WAF combat aircraft including the F-15, F-16 and B-52. 

242 
Educating the Media. The level of military expertise within the cadre 

of reporters assembled in Saudi Arabia to cover the war of the news 

media in theater was generally low. Although there were many excellent 

and experienced reporters in theater, particularly from the networks and 

the national daily newspapers and the wire services, there were very few 

correspondents (save some from the specialty and trade press such as 

Aviation Week and Air Force Ems) who had a strong understanding of 

the military in general, or of the Air Force in particular. Even fewer 

were able to comprehend the operational concepts of a strategic air campaign. As a result, a great deal of time and resources-commanders and 

public affairs people-had to be expended by CENTCOM and by the various 

public affairs entities (Joint Information Bureaus, Pentagon, services, 

units, etc) to “educate” the news media about the military, the individual 

services and units, and operational concepts. This had to be done while 

being careful not to reveal operational details or planning to an enemy 

who was equally capable of reading, seeing, listening, and hearing everything that was being produced by the news media about the war for the 

American people and their Coalition partners. 

However, the presence of some news organizations was questionable. 

Why, for example, did the military feel obligated to give equal treatment 

and accommodate Mirubella, a women’s fashion magazine, as it did a 

national news weekly like Newsweek? The time and resources expended 

to bring many reporters up to a level of basic competency in military 

affairs detracted from communicating the war story through correspondents who already understood. Some mechanism needs to be developed, 

in concert with reputable national news organizations, that sets a “minimum standard” for war reporting that requires some level of subject-area 

competency. In Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm the only apparent 

requirement for covering the war was that a reporter possess a plane 

ticket to Dhahran and a visa. The American public deserves a higher 

standard of military reporting? 

See John Fialka’s treatment of this subject in his book, Hotel Warriors. Boston 

University’s Center for Defense Journalism is the only specialized training program 

offered in the U.S. to prepare and educate reporters covering military affairs. According 

to Col Gallagher and other public affairs officers in Riyadh, CENTCOM attempted to 

compensate for the lack of education of many of the reporters covering Desert Storm by 

conducting “background” sessions with military experts in Riyadh on military subjects 

including amphibious landings, close. air support, and mine clearing to familiarize reporters with the concepts. The sessions were conducted off camera, after official briefings, 

9 

243 
In sum, CENTCOM'S preoccupation with the logistics of supporting 

hundreds of news media assembled in theater, insufficient public affairs 

resources deployed to the theater, and lack of experience with joint military operations by most of the news media and many of the deployed 

public affairs officers were the most serious detractors from telling the air 

campaign story to the press and, through the press. to the larger American 

public. Access to air bases, access to commanders and airmen, access to 

aircraft of all types-not simply those on the ground, but those in the air; 

not only combat support aircraft, but combat aircraft as well-and access 

to senior commanders who are thoroughly familiar with and conversant 

in air power, must be dramatically improved to tell the air campaign story 

better. These are all lessons still to be applied to future air campaigns." 

Press Coverage 

Numbers. Looking back on the three issues featured in this chapter, 

one sees different ways in which press coverage seems to have influenced 

public attitudes and policymaking on the war. In the first, the press did 

not fall into the trap of relying on a single measure of merit for how the 

war was going, in particular comparative aircraft losses. In fact the press 

avoided any such short-hand indicators of progress, for a variety of 

reasons (none of which will necessarily repeat themselves in future situations), as laid out above. Thus, it did not-in this case, anyway-skew 

public perceptions of how well the war was going. 

Civilian Casualties. Press coverage of civilian casualties became, 

albeit briefly, intense, graphic, and dominant during Desert Storm. The 

U.S. government clearly went into a crisis-management mode to deal with 

the coverage and its possible, even (seemingly) likely, consequences. 

That these negative consequences in fact did not materialize is no guarantee that they will not in future conflicts. If, in the Gulf War case, changes were made in bombing policies and practices, it is hard to avoid the 

conclusion that they were made in response to the spotlight of this 

dramatic, powerful coverage and likely will be in future conflicts. 

to avoid embarrassing the news media representatives attending them. 

%ese and other public affairs-specific "lessons learned" from the war are expounded on in greater detail in U.S. Central Command Air forces, Public Aflairs Lessons 

Learned Report: Operations Desert ShielcUDesert S~onn, Aug 1990 - Feb 1991 (Vol 1 & 

11) (hgky AFB. VA: ACC/PA, 1991). 

1 

244 
Efsects of Press Coverage. Press, especially television, coverage 

generally did not seem to have the effects on government decisionmaking 

one might have anticipated given the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s. 

One exception to that seems to be the influence not of actual coverage 

of the so-called “Highway of Death,” but rather of anticipated coverage 

of the attacks on Iraqi forces in what turned out to be the last hours of 

the war. 

This last phenomenon is intriguing because it reflects a mind-set that 

takes possible press coverage and possible public reactions to that coverage very seriously. It is a damage-avoidance or damage-limitation mentality, rather than a damage-control approach. It says that particular kinds 

of press coverage can have important effects even before they occur, 

indeed even if they never do. It reflects a proactive approach to dealing 

with the press, rather than a reactive one, which was in evidence throughout Operation Desert Storm.” This may, in many ways, be the most 

interesting and poignant demonstration of the power of the press and the 

importance of public affairs in wartime. 

Supporting the People 

Both CENTCOM and CENTAF were without assigned chaplains at the 

beginning the Gulf crisis and the responsibility for organizing the deployment fell on the Tactical Air Command. Religious and cultural restrictions varied in the theater depending on which Southwest Asia country 

personnel were assigned. The term “church services” and “chaplain” had 

to be substituted with “morale services” and “morale officer” resulting in 

dissatisfaction among both the chaplains and other military personnel. 

However, the CENTCOM chaplain was able to get this restriction removed 

in January 1991. 

Intvw with Colonel Phil Lacombe, director of Public Affairs, U.S. Space Command, Peterson Am. CO, 29 Dec 1992. Colonel Lacombe, then a lieutenant colonel, was 

a USAF augmentee to the CENTCOM staff in Riyadh, serving as a special assistant to Cpt 

Ron Wildermuth (USN). director of Public Affairs for CENTCOM. Colonel Lacombe and 

other members of the CENTCOM staff, as a matter of course, attempted to be as proactive 

in their approach to handling issues and assessing their potential impact in the press, 

rather than waiting and then reacting to press coverage. But in war, as in peacetime, 

that’s not always possible. 

II 

245 
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) activities varied depending 

on which country personnel were stationed, but the overall program was 

very good. The Air Force was designated the lead Service for MWR 

activities in the theater because of its substantial capabilities. Due to 

public support of the war effort, the theater was overwhelmed with private donations and the Air Force managed the distribution of these items 

to the other Services. However, recreational activities at home bases 

suffered a loss of revenues of between $1.5 and $2.5 million in the first 

quarter of FY91 and DOD had to request relief from those losses through 

the House Armed Services Committee MWR panel. 

Disbursing agents did not have the experience nor the training needed 

to support operations in Southwest Asia. They were trained as disbursing 

agents and did not have the full range of financial accounting knowledge 

needed. Complicating the problem was the fact that guidance and direction was received from nineteen separate finance offices in seven different 

commands, thus complicating operations at the disbursement agent level. 

The Air Force, as the single Service manager for postal operations for 

CENTCOM experienced difficulties in managing postal operations in the 

theater. This was primarily due to the Army’s inability to handle the 

large volumes of incoming mail and reluctance to follow procedures 

established by the Air Force. Furthermore, insufficient in-country transportation assets bogged down the mail. as well as mail volumes stretching 

the limits of even the United States Postal Service. The many complaints 

from both Service members and their families resulted in numerous Congressional hearings on mail issues. At the outset of hostilities, the Federal Aviation Agency established further mail security procedures, thereby 

creating additional mail handling precautions and backlogs. However, 

these precautions proved to be necessary when C-4 explosives were found 

in a parcel mailed from Saudi Arabia. 

Medical 

Besides making many adjustments during the deployment, the Air 

Force Medical Service engaged in an extensive postwar analysis of its 

readiness posture. On direction from the Surgeon General, the major 

medical staffs of the Air Force Medical Service surveyed the after-action 

reports of all Medical Service units to learn what the experience meant 

for medical readiness. Within a year of the Gulf War ceasefire, the 

Surgeon General concluded that none of areas identified for improvement 

246 
were significant enough to tarnish the success of the Desert ShieldlDesert 

Storm medical deployment. 

The aeromedical evacuation system, moreover, which served as a 

safety valve for all the EUCOM and CENTCOM component medical systems, had only mixed success in preparing for a major ground war. On 

the positive side, the Air Force was able to compensate in part for some 

problems in Army forward evacuation, and the Air Force created its own 

effective intratheater evacuation system. But the limited capacity and 

incompatibilities of the joint patient regulating systems meant that probably not all seriously wounded and injured patients in a mass casualty 

ground war would have been transported speedily to the most appropriate medical facilities. Command and control of airevac missions demanded greater centralization than allowed by prewar doctrine, and the 

Air Force could take only minor remedial action before the ground war. 

Furthermore, casualty rates at the highest levels estimated by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff would have demanded a major reinforcement of dedicated 

airevac planes and equipment from CONUS, at time when the dedicated 

airevac fleet of CRAF 111 was still not operationally ready. 

Despite several areas for improvement, the Total Force policy for Air 

Force Medical Service worked well. Reserves provided almost half of 

the medical manpower committed to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Their 

skills, flexibility, and hard work were essential to mission accomplishment. The Gulf War, however, emphasized the need for a continuing 

and substantial investment in contingency training for reserve and active 

duty medics. 

247 
Joyous Americans welcome home troops from 

the Persian Gulf War. 

248 
Appendix A 

Deployment of 

Engineering and Services Forces 

Base 1 Sep 1 Dec 19 Jan 23 Feb 

A1 Ayn 

Engineers 0 99 99 99 

Fire Fighters 10 33 33 34 

Services 0 43 49 49 

Base Population 417 1300 1600 1650 

A1 Dhafra 

Base Population 1977 2100 2850 3150 

Engineers 153 130 135 135 

Fire Fighters 24 35 40 42 

Services 79 71 73 73 

A1 Jawf 

Base Population 

Engineers 

Fire Fighters 

Services 

650 

12 

12 

15 

A1 Kharj 

Base Population 

Engineers 

Fire Fighters 

Services 

150 4400 4900 

107 155 155 

36 60 59 

2 97 99 

A1 Minhad 

Base Population 1650 2500 2650 

Engineers 99 130 130 

Services 32 50 50 

Fire Fighters 28 35 35 

249 
Deployment of 

Engineering and Services Forces (Continued) 

Base 1 Sep 1 Dec 19 Jan 23 Feb 

Bateen 

Base Population 765 1050 1100 1200 

Engineers 100 91 109 109 

Fire Fighters 14 14 14 18 

Services 25 32 29 29 

Cairo 

Base Population 

Engineers 

Fire Fighters 

Services 

400 850 900 

52 57 57 

48 48 48 

37 36 36 

Dhahran 

Base Population 2354 3150 3500 3750 

Engineers 50 108 108 108 

Fire Fighters 12 35 44 44 

Services 72 73 73 73 

Diego Garcia 

Base Population 1107 1450 1450 1865 

Engineers 51 47 47 47 

Fire Fighters 10 35 35 35 

Services 45 44 44 44 

Doha 

Base Population 62 850 950 loo0 

Engineers 0 47 47 47 

Fire Fighters 6 12 12 16 

Services 0 36 36 36 

Jeddah 

Base Population 1230 1650 3200 4100 

Engineers 52 38 66 66 

Services 9 9 41 41 

Fire Fighters 24 36 49 49 

250 
Deployment of 

Engineering and Services Forces (Continued) 

Base 1 Sep 1 Dec 19 Jan 23 Feb ~ ~~~~~~ 

Khamis Mushait 

Base Population 842 850 1300 1450 

Fire Fighters 30 24 24 24 

Services 41 16 18 18 

Engineers 95 56 55 55 

King Fahd 

Engineers 150 245 267 267 

Services 43 83 132 132 

Base Population 1846 3400 5200 7000 

Fire Fighters 46 58 72 90 

King Khalid 

Base Population 720 1300 1550 1750 

Engineers 0 13 34 34 

Fire Fighters 0 0 1 1 

Services 0 10 15 29 

KKMC 

Base Population 

Engineers 

Fire Fighters 

Services 

100 lo00 1800 

0 61 102 

0 25 44 

0 47 50 

Masirah 

Base Population 606 750 950 1000 

Engineers 50 17 52 52 

Fire Fighters 0 22 23 24 

Services 25 24 31 31 

Riyadh 

Engineers 76 114 141 141 

Fire Fighters 14 37 49 46 

Services 48 60 78 91 

Base Population 2840 5000 5550 7900 

25 1 
Deployment of 

Engineering and Services Forces (Continued) 

Base 1 Sep 1 Dec 19 Jan 23 Feb 

Seeb 

Engineers 50 51 

Fire Fighters 24 23 

Services 18 59 

Base Population 517 600 800 1300 

51 51 

24 36 

59 59 

Shaikh Isa 

Base Population 1200 1550 

Engineers 100 96 

Fire Fighters 24 24 

Services 27 27 

2400 2700 

118 118 

24 24 

45 45 

Sharjah 

Base Population 203 650 750 

Engineers 0 12 32 

Fire Fighters 0 12 16 

Services 9 37 37 

800 

34 

16 

37 

Tabuk 

Base Population 70 800 850 

Engineers 35 30 31 

Fire Fighters 0 24 22 

Services 0 5 5 

lo00 

31 

24 

5 

Taif 

Base Population 1192 1800 2600 2850 

Engineers 100 102 105 105 

Fire Fighters 48 28 48 40 

Services 36 61 101 99 

Thumrait 

Base Population 2040 1850 1300 1350 

Engineers 200 192 195 195 

Fire Fighters 26 35 35 24 

Services 59 111 57 57 
Appendix B 

Gulf War Air Base Characteristics 

A1 Am. 15 miles E of Civilian- 13,124 x 148 Parallel (I) 1,574,448 No 

United Dubai Under Link (1 3) 

Arab Construction 

Emirates 

A1 DWm 75 miles SW Abu Dhabi 12,057 x 150 Parallel (I) 2,214,029 

United of Dubai Air Force (taxiway to 

Arab main runway), 

Yes 

Emirates Link (It) 

(short taxiway 

that links two 

taxiway, 

Dispersal (34) 

(kads to 

shelter or site 

away from 

major runway) 

runways or 

LOOP (20) 
Gulf War Air Base characteristics (Continued

-P Host Nat

space CrasWRc

wary Runways (Sq Fire 

BPse Location USe (Feet) Taxiaays Feet) Protec

Al Jawf, 10 miks E of Joint Use-- 12,000 x 148 Parallel (1) 265.200 YeS 

Saudi Al Jawf RS AFlSaudi Link (3) 

Arabia Airlines Dispersal (4) 

A1 Khaj. 52 miks SE of Military-- 12,000 x 148 Parallel (1) S,OOO,OOO No 

Saudi Riyadh Under Link (5) 

Arabia Construction 

Al Minhad, 14 miles S of UAE Air 9,843 x 148 Parallel (1) 494,788 Yes 

United Dubai Force Link (17) 

Arab 

Emirates 
Bateen, 7 miles SE of Abu Dhabi 10.500 x 131 Parallel (I) 3,942.509 Yes 

United Abu Dhabi Air Force Link (6) 

Arab Dispersal (2) 

Emirates 

22 miles SW Joint Use- 13,779 x 197 Parallel (3) 6,500,150 Yes 

Khalid, of Al Batin RSAF/Saudi 13,779 x 197 Link (32) 

King 

Saudi Airlines 10,500 x 197 

Arabia 

King 35 miles SW RSAF 10,610 x 148 Parallel (I) 2,663,945 Yes 

Wid of Al Batin Line (2) 

Military Dispenal (6) 

City 

(KKMC). 

Saudi 

Arabia 

Masirah, Masirah Omani Air 10.005 x 148 Parallel (2) 6.080.820 Yes 

Om Island, 10 E of Force 8,446 x 148 Link (4) 

Arabian LOOP (1) 

Peninsula 
Gulf War Air Base Characteristics (Continue

bP Host Na

-pry Runways Space(Sq CrasldRc

BW Location USC (Feet) 'hiways Fat) FircProtc

Riyadh, 3 miles "E Joint Use- 13.287 x 148 Parallel (2) 6,080,820 Yes 

Saudi of Riyadh RSAF/Saudi 11,778 x 148 Link (12) 

Arabia Airlines 

*b. 14 miles W of Joint Use- 11,762 x 148 Parallel (2) 4,367,432 Yes 

Oman Muscat Omani Air 2.461 x 98 Link (28) 

ForcelCivil 

Aviation 

Shaikh Is4 Island of Bahraini Air 12.541 x 148 Parallel (I) 1,116,511 Yes 

Bahrain Bahrain Force Link (11) 
Shajah. 12 miles ENE Joint Use- 12,336 x 148 Parallel (I) 3,527,064 Yes 

United of Dubai UAE Air Link (11) 

Arab Force/Civil 

Emirates Aviation 

Cairo 16 miles Egyptian Air 9,730 x 1% Parallel (2) 2,445,964 YeS 

west. WNW of Force 9.125 x 147 Link (15) 

Egypt Cairo 9.915 x 130 Dispersal (67) 

Perimeter (1) 

Dhahran. 2 miles SE of Joint Use-- 12,008 x 148 Parallel (4) 11.547.32 YeS 

Saudi Dhahran RSAF/Saudi 11,811 x 148 Link (34) 0 

Arabia Airlines 8,268 x 98 LOOP (5) 

Dispmal (3) 

Diego Chagos us 12,000 x 200 Parallel (I) 4,U23,750 YCS 

Garcia Archipelago, NavylRoyal Link (10) 

lndian Ocean Navy 
Gulf War Air Base Characteristics (Continued

Host Nat

hP crpJblRes

Runaays Space (Sq Fire 

Base Location U!U (Fw Taxiways Feet) Rotdo

Doha, 3.5 miles SE Joint Use- 15,000 x 151 Parallel (1) 2,636,049 Yes 

of Doha Commercial/ Link (17) 

Qatari Air Dispersal (1) 

Qatar 

Force 

-ary 

Jeddah, 12 miles N of Joint Use- 12,467 x 197 Parallel (4) 17,349,71 Yes 

Arabia Airlines 10,827 x 197 

Saudi Jeddah RSAF/Saudi 12.106 x 148 Link (45) 6 

Khamis 5 miles E of RSAF 12,467 x 148 Parallel (3) 3,053,701 Yes 

Mushait, Khamis 12,467 x 148 Link (23) 

Saudi Mushait 

Arabia 
King Fahd, 25 miles NW Saudi 13,790 x 197 Parallel (2) 2,846,935 N

Saudi of Dhahran Airlines-- 13.790 x 197 Link (1) 

Arabia Under 

Construction 

Tabuk, 4 miles SE of Joint Use-- 10,991 x 148 Parallel (2) 1,094,248 Y

Saudi Tabuk. 60 RSAF/Saudi 10,007 x 148 Link (1 5) 

Arabia miles SE of Airlines Dispersal (3) 

Jordan 

Taif, Saudi 14 miles NE Joint Use- 12,254 x 148 Parallel (3) 3,599,300 Y

Arabia of At Taif RSAF/Saudi 10,991 x 148 Link (14) 

Airlines Dispersal (30) 

Link (16) 

2,050 x 130 Dispersal (2) 

Thumrait, 44 miles N of Omani Air 13.123 x 148 Parallel (2) 3,284,914 Y

Oman Salalah Force 19,176 x 164 

!2 

\o 
260 
Appendix C 

Engineering Data as of 19 January 1991’ 

Water Purification 

Units 

Generators (On Hand/ Shower1 

BSI? 750 KW Barriers In Use) shaves 

A1 Ayn 5 im 6 

A1 Dhafra 8 (2)BAK-12 1/0 10 

A1 Kharj 17 (2)MAAS 242 26 

Bateen 4 O/O I 

an, 4 (2)BAK-12 110 4 

A1 Minhad 5 (1)MAAS 2/0 3 

Dhahran 3 (2)BAK-14 211 9 

CENTAFDE “Weekly Status Report,” 19 Jan 1991. 1 h, 

m - 
Engineering Data as of 19 January 1991 (Conti

Water Purification 

Generators units (on Hand/ Shower/ 

750 KW Barrlel3 In Use) Shaves 

BilS 

Doha 3 (I)BAK-12 I I0 2 

Jeddah 0 110 1 

Khamis Mushait 0 (2)BAK- 12/14 w0 0 

King Fahd 11 (1)MAAS 510 11 

King Khalid 0 wo 3 

MaSirah 2 310 0 

Riyadh 4 (1)MAAS 21 5 

Seeb 2 wo 8 

Shaikh Isa 5 (2)BAK- 14 43 6 

SharJah 2 111 1 

Tabuk 0 (2)BAK-14 2/1 0 

Taif 8 (4)BAK-14 2/0 12 

(1)BAK-I 2 

KKMC 3 (I)BAK-I2 110 3 

(1)BAK-I 3 

(2)BAK-I 2 

(1)BAK-I 2 

Thumrait 7 (I)BAK-13 I I0 7 
Appendix D ~~ 

Services Data as of 19 January 1991' 

Be Source Kitchen MRES CTentMard WaU) 

Feeding 9- 1 Billeting 

A1 Ayn P. RIBS I 10,200 13501250 

A1 Dhafra P. RIBS 2 70,800 265W200 

A1 Khq' P. RIBSlContract 4 175,900 44o010 

A1 Minhad P. RIBSKontract 0 98,748 2000/500 

Bateen P. RIBS 1 74,600 550/550 

Cairo P. RIBS I 26,200 85WO 

Dhahran P. RIBSIContract 2 37,300 1300/22OO 

Doha P. RIBS 1 101,196 m50 

MREs: Meals Ready to Eat; TFL: Tactical Field Laundry; P. RIBS: Prime Readiness in Base Service

'CENTAFIDE, "Weekly Status Report," 19 Jan 91. 
Services Data as of 19 January 1991 (Continue

~~ 

BW Source Kitchen MRES (Tent/HardWd) 

Feeding 9-1 Billeting 

Jeddah Contract 0 115,044 W3200 

Khamis Mushait contract 0 92,868 300/1000 

King Fahd P. RIBS/Contract 4 148,800 47wm 

King Khalid P. RIBSlContract 0 80,400 300/1250 

KKMC P. RIBS 1 76,600 1OOO1O 

Masirah P. RIBS 0 63,912 95wo 

Riyadh P. RlBSlContract 4 98,256 W5150 

Seeb P. RIBS 2 124,000 80010 

Shaikh isa P. RIBS 0 134,436 2050/350 

Shatjah P. RIBS 1 59,008 65W100 

Tabuk Contract 0 55,956 01850 

Taif P. RIBS/Contract 3 146,760 1700/900 

Thumrait F? RIBS 2 40,848 1300/0 
Appendix E 

PROGRAM/ 

FAClLlTY 

Ree CcnertTc~ 

Tapcd Moncu" 

RerrldSnack Bar 

MWR Program/Facility By Location 

United Arab 

Saudi Arabia Emirates 

KK A 

K K* IH LAA 

AJUC R. IAH M 

ADAAAA~A ARAHABEJI

NHT D J H K FACN 1 INHH

IA NA IL 

D MNL CL DU SM 

HE8 KIT DLADIDAAS 

RDHFHY AT F H N UTRI 

IAIHIDUIrMIAIDAEAA

BHA 

AA 

A AHAHAAHAAAAHH 

AAAAA A AAHAHAA A A AAAA 

A AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
MWR Program/Facility By Location (Continue

MWR ProgrardFacility By Location (Continued) 

A . Amcricnn F.cility/knt 

H - Host Ndon Facility 

- AF Fuilitb Available to Other savioc 

** . Other Service Facilities Anilibk to M 
Appendix F 

The Weather Information System 

Weather support for contingency operations calls for full duplex (i.e., 

send and receive) teletype and receive-only facsimile circuits for all air 

bases and Army divisional size units. However, during Operations Desert 

ShieldDesert Storm, various factors such as airlift constraints, communications engineering limitations, communications saturation, and the size 

of deployment led to deviations from this doctrinal concept of operations.' Moreover, the distinction between long-range and tactical communications systems became blurred during the Gulf War. Long-range 

circuits became tactical circuits in many cases. For example, the Standard Base Level Computer system and the Automated Digital Network 

were used by both the Air Force and the Army to pass weather information between units and headquarters elements within the theater. 

Long-Range Communications Systems 

The Automated Weather Network (AWN) and the Air Force Digital 

Graphics System (AFDIGS) were the primary systems used to transmit 

weather information to and from the Gulf region. To some extent, Automated Digital Network and the Navy's Naval Oceanographic Data Dissemination System (NODDS) were also used? 

Weather data were transmitted by way of landlines and satellite links. 

However, the multiple conversions of the data from analog to digital 

format resulted in serious signal degradation. Frequent bridging of equipment, the use of different types of circuits, and multiple satellite hops were 

the principal causes of the degradation. Incompatible modems complicated interfaces between landlines and satellite links and between the automated digital weather switches in the United States and western Europe 

'(S) Dr. William E. Nawyn, AWS Historian, Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm, 

'lbid. 

Chapter Ill, The Weather Information System. 12 Mar 1992, p 13. 

269 
and the terminal equipment in the theater. In addition there was a shortage of terminal equipment within the theater to send and receive data.3 

A short-term solution implemented by the Air Force was to use the 

Standard Base Level Computer (SBLC) network connection. This system 

was a standard Air Force network used primarily by TAC for supply 

purposes. It had intratheater circuits as well as a long-range circuit to 

Langley AFB, Virginia. This system was largely operative in mid-January? The Automated Digital Network system was used by CENTAF as 

well as ARCENT. In addition, it supported secure communications up to 

SECRET and was a reliable back-up hard-wired communications system. 

But, the system was slow and became saturated very quickly with weather data in its demand to support many customers? 

CENTAF began receiving weather bulletins over the Automated Digital 

Network on 11 August and received a dedicated send and receive terminal on 28 September. ARCENT received their dedicated terminal on 18 

October. Weather teletype circuits to CENTCOM and CENTAF were established by means of a landline from Air Force Global Weather Center 

through the Carswell weather switch to Forts Meade and Detrick, Maryland, and then by satellite relay to the theater. The CENTCOM Joint 

Operations Center had a receive only teletype transmission capability by 

28 August and full duplex capabilities by 26 September; CENTAF had full 

duplex teletype capabilities by the end of August. ARCENT weather 

stations, although able to receive teletype data, never acquired full duplex 

capabilities by means of the Automated Weather Network. ARCENT 

received its teletype data from Croughton through an Army communications site at Landstuhl, Germany! 

31bid, p 12. 

41ntvw, Col William S. Koenemann, Cmdr, 5th Weather Wind and Dr. William E. 

Nawyn, AWS Historian, 4 Jan 1991, p 14. 

51ntvw, Lt Col Gerald F. Riley, Staff Weather Officer to CENTCOM and Dr. William 

E. Nawyn, AWS Historian, 29 May 1991, p 5; (S) Dr. William E. Nawyn, AWS Historian, 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Chapter 111, The Weather Information System, 12 

Mar 1992, p 20. 

6(S) Dr. William E. Nawyn, AWS Historian, Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm, 

Chapter Ill, The Weather Information System, 12 Mar 1992, p 15. 

270 
Both the Air Force and ARCENT had problems with facsimile transmitted weather data. The Air Force turned to the U.S. Navy for help in 

receiving facsimile data during the four-month period when long-range 

lines were not available. This was accomplished by means of the Naval 

Oceanographic Data Dissemination System, which transmitted from the 

Navy Fleet Numerical Weather Center at Monterey, California to the Air 

Force Desert Storm Forecast Unit. On the other hand, in early October, 

ARCENT sought to acquire facsimile data by means of a dedicated European Digital Graphics System circuit originating at RAF Croughton. The 

circuit routed through Pimasens, Germany, but the quality of the data 

was not very good.' 

Tactical Communications Systems 

Tactical communications systems included Quick Reaction Communications Terminal (QRCT) for the Air Force and the Goldwing highfrequency radio system for the U.S. Army. Also, the Tactical Imagery 

Dissemination System (TIDS) was used for in-theater distribution of 

satellite imagery and a hard-wire tactical facsimile (TACFAX) circuit was 

acquired. The quick-reaction terminal, a slightly modified version of the 

Goldwing (officially the AN/GRC-27) was in the process of distribution to 

weather teams when the Gulf War started.' 

By mid-September, CENTAF communications and weather support 

personnel had coordinated a communications package. The configuration 

reduced the number of hard-wired teletype sendreceive locations to four 

and required the use of high-frequency radio communications. The full 

duplex capabilities were installed between Carswell and weather sites 

located at Riyadh, Dhahran, A1 Dhafra, and Taif. The plan called for the 

further dissemination of the weather data to in-country locations by 

means of high-frequency radio. This method gave them a receive-only 

teletype data capability at most in-country weather sites. Dhahran and 

Taif sites became operational in mid-January, and Al Dhafra did not 

become operational until early February? 

71bid, p 19. 

'hid, p 13 

'&id, p 16. 

27 1 
After the VII Corps arrived in Saudi Arabia in November 1990, 

ARCENT subdivided its network into XVlll Corps, VII Corps, and SOCCENT 

nets. The VII Corps high-frequency network became operational on 21 

December. They had brought with them the U.S. Army, Europe Automated Weather System, thus introducing a second high-frequency tactical 

communications system into the theater. However, the &ems were not 

compatible with the Goldwings or the quick-reaction terminals used by 

other Army and Air Force units. They found it necessary to exchange 

floppy disks between the two for retransmission to weather teams." 

Maintenance of Meteorological Equipment 

There were six pieces of tactical meteorological equipment deployed 

to the Persian Gulf region. Three of the systems had been recently 

procured, and many weather units had not received all the equipment nor 

had any significant training for them been accomplished. Table 20 lists 

the meteorological equipment deployed and the number of failures experienced with the equipment. 

The maintenance concept employed for the tactical meteorological 

equipment was a two-level maintenance concept. Equipment not repairable at the unit level was to be returned to the United States for repairs. 

The turnaround time for the equipment was inadequate to meet customer 

needs. By January 1991, the Air Weather Service was working towards 

establishing an in-country maintenance capability for the equipment.'' 

Maintenance-related problems were primarily due to moisture, heat, 

dust, and sand. Moisture was the prevalent factor early in the deployment, while heat-related problems as well as difficulties with dust and 

sand surfaced later. Thirteen GMQ-33s were returned to the United States 

for repairs with seven being returned to the theater before the end of the 

war. Eighteen TMQ-34s were returned, fifteen because of failed components and three because of wiring problems. Only one MARWIN system 

had maintenance problems and the TQM-36, BOS, and Tps-68 had 

'Ofbid, pp 24-26. 

"lntvw, Col William S. Koenemann, Cmdr. 5th Weather Wing and Dr. William E. 

Nawyn, AWS Historian, 4 Jul 1991, pp 15-17. 

272 
Table 20 

Meteorological Tactical Equipment” 

Equipment Number 

Deployed 

Number of 

Failures 

GMQ-33 Transportable Cloud 

Height Detection Set 60 

TMQ-34 Tactical Meteorological Observing System 87 

TMQ-36 Tactical Wind Measuring System 13 

Back-up Observing System Components 

Marwin Tactical Upper Air 

Measuring System 8 

13 

51 

0 

NA 

1 

TPS-68 Tactical Radar Set 2 0 

none. However, the MARWIN and TPS-68 systems were not deployed until 

January 1991 and the BOS was used as back-up eq~ipment.’~ 

The maintenance concept for uAWS required broken systems to be 

returned to Germany for repairs. The system had few maintenance problems and sufficient spares were brought to support the system. QRCr and 

I2(S) Dr. William, E. Nawyn. AWS Historian, AWS Role in Operation Desert 

I3(S) Dr. William E. Nawyn, AWS Historian, Operations Desert ShieldDesert Storm, 

StodDesert Shield. 27 Feb 1992. Chp 3, pp 3-11. 

The Weather Information System, 12 Mar 1992, pp 4-10. 

273 
Goldwing on the other hand experienced many hard disk fail~res.'~ Both 

the Air Force and the Army purchased additional cartridges, but the new 

hard drives did not anive in country before the war ended. In addition, 

software defects caused the systems to reject garbled message traffic and 

to prevent polling of the nodes by the network control station. Other 

problems included the slowness of the system in handling data transfer, 

insufficient power (12 watts), and difficulty in finding usable Frequencie~.'~ 

The Air Force had no in-country maintenance capability, but the 

Army deployed two communications maintenance detachments to support 

their Goldwings. The Air Force obtained an agreement with the Army 

to repair their QRCrs also. However, maintenance procedures required 

both Army and Air Force customers to bring their equipment to the 

maintenance shops for repairs. While this procedure worked well for the 

Army, CENTAF units found it difficult because the shops were located 

near Army units while they themselves were spread across the theater. 

As the Army began to move its forces closer to the Iraqi border in January 1991, the maintenance detachment moved with them, thus making it 

even more difficult for Air Force weather teams to locate them.16 

14(s) Intvw, Lt col William H. Campbell, ARCENT Staff Weather Officer, 7th 

"lntvw, Col William S. Koenemann, Cmdr, 5th Weather Wing and Dr. William E. 

I61bid, p 14. 

Weather Squadron and Dr. William E. Hawyn. AWS Historian, 1 Jul 1991. p 23. 

Nawyn, AWS Historian, 4 Jun 1991, p 13. 

274 
Appendix G 

Operations Desert Shield/ 

Desert Storm Ground Rules 

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives: 

(1) For U.S. or Coalition units, specific numerical information on 

troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies 

(e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of 

ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. 

Unit size may be described in general terms such as “company-size,” 

“multibattalion,” “multidivision,” “naval task force,” and “carrier battle 

group.” Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described 

in general terms such as ‘‘large,’’ “small,” or “many.” 

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, 

or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations. 

(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the 

specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military 

installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all 

Navy embark stories may identify the ship upon which embarked as a 

dateline and will state that the report is coming from the “Persian Gulf,” 

“Red Sea,” or “North Arabian Sea.” Stories written in Saudi Arabia may 

be datelined “Eastern Saudi Arabia,” “Near the Kuwaiti border,” etc. For 

specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is 

coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged 

its participation. 

(4) Rules of engagement details. 

(5) Information on intelligencecollection activities, including targets, 

methods, and results. 

275 
(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop 

movements, tactical deployment, and disposition that would jeopardize 

operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names 

of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by 

CENTCOM. 

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as 

land- or carrier-based. 

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting. direct and indirect fire, intelligence- collection, or security measures. 

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aid or 

ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway. 

(I 0) Special operations forces’ methods, unique equipment, or tactics. 

(1 1) Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., air angles of attack 

or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such 

as “low” or “fast” may be used. 

(1 2) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could 

be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or 

major personnel losses of specific U.S. or Coalition units, until that 

information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, 

therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be 

described as “light,” “moderate,” or “heavy.” 

276 
n 

cw 

0 

E 

u 

.m 

E" 

277 
278 
Appendix I 

Guidelines for News Media 

14 Jan 91 

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and 

professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for 

professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc. 

Night Operations-Restrictions in exposing light will be followed. The 

only approved source of light is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible 

light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene 

commander. 

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public 

affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because 

of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host 

commander, 

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the 

next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of 

all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member 

of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next 

of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through 

the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. 

Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other 

identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have 

been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far 

outweighs the news value of the photograph, film, or videotape. News 

coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with 

the instructions of doctors and medical officials. 

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the 

U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial 

279 
combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in 

Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, 

providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who 

are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will 

maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will 

exclude from the area of operations all unauthorized individuals. 

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM 

Media Pools: 

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their 

respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations. 

(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to 

review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information 

about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation 

or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely 

for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to 

express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort 

officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems 

with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement 

can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send 

the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and 

the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be 

reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review 

with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication 

will be made by the originating reporter’s news organization. 

(3) Correspondents may not cany a personal weapon. 

280 

Historical Comparison of 

War Correspondence (Continued) 

War Comments Reporters 

ww1 

WWII 

British and French 

banned correspondents 

from the front for an 

entire year. 

Only under pressure from the press 

and American 

entry into the war 

did they relent and 

accredit reporters 

to headquarters 

and the field. 

mr The British practice was to assign 

quarters, a car, 

driver, and “escortlcensor“ to 

each accredited 

journalist. 

Office of Censorship 

created by President in 

1941. 

British accredited six 

journalists initially 

to its headquarters. 

Thirty-eight reporters were accredited 

to General 

Pershing’s American 

Expeditionary Force 

in 1917-1918. 

Hundreds of unaccredited journalists, 

freelancers, “visi - 

tors” were to follow. 

Four hundred sixtyone reporters and 

photographers from 

Allied press and 

radio accredited to 

SHAEF for D-Day 

(including 180 

Americans). 

282 
Historical Comparison of 

War Correspondence (Continued) 

War Comments Reporters 

D PubIisheda"C0de 

of wartime Ractices" with full coop 

eration of the pies 

that codified kinds 

of information 

could not be pub 

lished without oficial authorization. 

p Established a clearance procedure in 

U.S. for official 

authorization of 

information for 

domestic publication. 

Military retained full 

authority to censor all 

dispatches from overseas theaters of war. 

* Censorship in the 

field and again at 

the headquarters 

where dispatches 

were cleared. 

First photos of U.S. 

war dead killed in 

battle weren't published 

at home until 1943. 

Walter CrOnLite! of 

preme HQAir, along 

with eight other U.S. 

news persons. 

UP assigned to suOnly 27 U.S. newsmen went ashore with 

elements of aIl Allied 

armies, others came 

later (only six on 

Omaha Beach where 

pivotal battle of invasion took place). 

Estimates that 

throughout the war a 

total of some 2,250 

American journalists 

covered the conflict 

all over the world. 

283 
Historical Comparison of 

War Correspondence (Continued) 

War Comments Reporters 

By Normandy, U.S. two 

years of experience with 

press covering military 

operations in North 

Africa and Sicily. 

accedited to HQ (Supreme HQ or various 

echelons of land, air, or 

naval contingents). 

forms, assimilated rank 

of Captain in U.S. 

Army, were subject to 

the Articles of War. 

First news of Normandy invasion came from 

London, not from the 

beaches ... communication system set up for 

correspondents broke 

down, was out for 28- 

hours. 

Newsmen were 

Newsmen wore uniKorean MacArthurexpefi- Five newsmen actroops sent to reinforce South Korea 

(later joined by 70 

others after three 

days). 

War mented first with “vol- companied first U.S. 

untary censorship.” 

284 
Historical Comparison of 

War Correspondence (Continued) 

~~~~~ 

War Comments Reporters 

~ ~~ 

* Under "voluntary" Eventually 270 rerules, there were porters (American 

almost daily security/rules violations. 

and foreign, accredited to Tokyo HQ to 

cover Korea). 

* Rate of disclosures Fewer than one-quaralarmed members 

of Congress who 

called on press and time. 

radio to stop disclosures, to no 

avail. 

ter were ever at the 

front at any given 

At request of reporters, 

MacArthur imposed 

WW II-like field and 

headquarters censorship 

in December 1950. 

Dominican 

Republic 

'Aventy-two journalists accompanied 

the April 1%5 deployment of U.S. 

forces. 

Vietnam No censorship imposed Number of correticality cited). increased as US. 

War (political reasons, prac- spondents accredited 

troops commitments 

increased . 

U.S. Mission in Saigon In 1960, fewer than 

provided "dedicated 

spaces" for newsmen correspondents. 

on in-country transport. 

half a dozen fulltime 

285 
Historical Comparison of 

War Correspondence (Continued) 

War Comments Reporters 

Set up major “press 

camps” in each of 

Vietnam’s three outlying regions with direct 

telephone communication and daily flights 

tdfrom Saigon. 

Helicopters occasionally assigned exclusively 

to transport reporters to 

units in the field. 

Newsmen often 

“hitchhiked” on 

helicopters and 

aircraft. 

Action unpredictable, 

never any assurance of 

contact with enemy. 

~~ 

In 1964.40 US. and 

foreign correspondents. 

In 1965, 400 plus 

(MACV’S daily briefings regularly attended by 130 correspondents). 

In 1966,419 news 

media accredited 

from 22 nations (1 79 

American including 

In 1968, 637 (at 

height of Tet); 1969 

support). 

- 467; 1970 - 392; 

1971 - 355; 1972 - 

295; 1974 - 35. 

Grenada No censorship. 

No ground rules. 

No regular briefings. 

At D’48 hours, one 

pool of 15 reporters 

taken to island. 

At D”72 hours, pool 

of 24 reporters. 

At D+96 hours, pool 

of 47 reporters. 

286 
Historical Comparison of 

War Correspondence (Continued) 

War Comments Reporters 

As one journalist described the situation 

there: “no briefings, no 

press releases, no nothing.” 

No media plan in place 

with deployment of 

troops. 

Public Affairs Officers 

deployed to Barbados 

after war well under 

way (press already 

there). 

At &I20 hours, day 

five of operation, 

182 transported and 

pool restrictions 

lifted. 

Total of 370 journalists on Barbados 

waiting to cover the 

war (estimates have 

gone as high as 700). 

Panama Fifty to 100 resident 

journalists in country 

at time of invasion. 

DOD Media (I 4 plus 

two technicians, 

three escorts). 

Day Two, 300 media. 

Total of 855 media 

accredi tdprocessed 

through SOUTHCOM 

Media Center. 

287 
Historical Comparison of 

War Correspondence (Continued) 

War Comments Reporters 

Persian Pool coverage of comGulf War bat. 

Security Review of 

pool reports “at the 

source.” 

0 Ground rule violations only. 

m No “editorial” 

changes. 

Final decision to 

print story up to 

editor or bureau 

chief. 

Military escort required. 

~ ~~~~~~~~~ 

No Western press in 

Saudi Arabia. 

At start of air campaign, 1,200 reporters (130 reporters in 

pools with units). 

A start of ground 

campaign, 1,500 

reporters (192 reporters in pools with 

units). 

Pools dissolve when 

events outpace 

pools. 

288 
A 

A-10 26, 96 

ABC 139, 143, 147, 149 

Abu Dhabi 50, 59, 253, 255 

AFDIGS 269 

AFGWC 85 

AFLC 8 

AFR 70, 80 

air campaign I, 33, 36, 63, 65, 67, 

71, 72, 86, 88, 95, 97, 135, 136, 

139, 142, 145, 147, 152, 154, 155, 

244, 287 

air defense 36, 49, 65, 67, 68 

air defense artillery 49 

Air Force Historical Research Agency 

Air Force Logistics Command 8, 10 

Air Force Reserve 82, 192, 223-225, 

103, IOQ, 108, 109, 120, 228 

Air Force Special Operations 

Command 97 

air interdiction 37 

Air National Guard (see also ANG) 

air power I, 36, 40, 17 I, 180, 190- 

air refueling 77, 87, 105 

Air Staff 88, 171, 172, 203 

air superiority 86, 242 

air tasking order 63, 73, 92, 93 

airfields I, 2, 5, 8-10, 85, 88, 142, 

Al Dhafra 9, 18, 19, SO, 249, 253, 

A1 Firdos 71, 72 

ANG (see also Air National Guard) 

82, 227 

anthrax 232 

antiaircraft artillery 86 

ARCENT 29, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 

46, 58, 85, 89, 90, 91, 97, 183, 

167, 170-172, 176-178, 237, 239- 

2 

82, 192, 223, 225, 228 

192,240,244 

170, 233 

263, 270 

269-272 

area of operation 279 

area of responsibility 6, 56, 64, 65, 

ARM 75 

Arms Export Control Act 77 

Army AirCorps 1 

Army Air Forces 2 

Arnold, Henry H. 1, 83 

Article 15 79, 80 

artillery 49, 86, 275 

assumptions 98, 144 

ATC 201, 204, 226 

AUTOVON 82 

Avian0 28 

AWACS 53, 65, 74 

AWN 85, 269 

89, 235, 236 

AWS 83, 86-92, 98, 100, 269-273 

B 

B-52 74, 242 

Bahrain 9, 24, 29, 47, SO, 76, 77, 

183, 185, 187, 188, 196, 198, 203, 

256, 265 

Baker, Richard 29 

Basra 89 

base level computer system 269 

battle damage 29, 240, 276 

battlefield air interdiction 37 

BDA 240, 241 

beddown 3,6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 24, 

26, 28, 31, 34, 47, 52, 57, 59, 207, 

208, 222 

beyond visual range 66,68 

Black Hole 67, 71, 72, 93 

Blue Flag 38 

briefed 65, 88, 89, 147 

briefing 13, 28, 49, 55, 74, 77, 88, 

89, 92-94, 138, 146, 157-159, 165, 

168, 172, 178, 191, 205, 225, 226, 

239, 241, 243, 285, 286 

Bright Star 9, 65 

Busch, Bradley 59, 62 

Bush, George 23, 150, 163 

Byron 197 

289 
C 

C31 36 

C31C 44,47 

C4 227 

C-5 38, 164, 202 

C-130 34, 215, 222, 223 

C-141 98, 113, 164, 165, 202, 215 

C-Day 12, 20 

Cairo West 14, 257 

Camel 44 

Canada 76 

CAP 67 

Carns, Michael 60 

carrier 65, 178, 196, 197, 199, 239, 

240, 239, 275, 276 

carrier battle group 275 

casualties 19, 137, 140-145, 149, 151, 

159, 178, 180, 182, 205, 211, 214, 

220, 221, 223, 228, 231, 244, 276, 

279 

CAT 2, 212, 218, 221 

CBS 139, 143, 146, 147, 162, 163 

CEMIRT 13 

CENTAF 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18-22, 

26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 

40-42, 44, 46-49, 54-59, 62, 64, 

65-68, 71-73, 75, 78-83, 85, 92, 93, 

94, 96, 168- 170, 178, 179, 182- 185, 

188, 189, 195, 203, 205, 206, 208, 

231, 234, 235. 240, 242, 245, 261, 

263, 269, 270, 273 

CENTAF Rear 182, 183 

CENTCOM (see also Central 

213-215, 218-222, 225, 227, 229- 

Command) 9, 31, 41,46, 47, 55, 

58, 60, 61, 66, 67, 70, 71, 73, 75, 

78, 79, 81, 83, 85, 88-90, 92, 97, 

108, 147, 157, 165-179. 184, 188, 

189, 195, 207, 211, 212, 214, 215, 

220, 222, 223, 235, 236, 238-247, 

270,276, 280 

CENTCOM) 148, 158, 203, 220, 

221, 223, 229, 244 

Central Command (see also 

CES 20, 2 I, 24-26, 29, 30 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

chaplains 74, 180- 184, 245 

88, 109, 110 

Charleston Am, SC 220 

chemical 22, 70, 7 I, 77, 87, 21 8, 

chemical warfare 87, 218, 230-232 

Cheney, Richard 107, 108, 109, 110, 

147, 163, 164, 166, 167, 171 

Chief of Naval Operations 161 

Chief of Staff 10, 55, 91, 135, 170 

civilian internees 38 

civilian police 44 

CJCS 65, 66 

close air support 37, 46, 96, 243 

CNN 136, 146, 176, 241 

coalition 3, 8, 29, 34, 36, 41, 44, 46, 

149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 168, 179, 

222, 239, 240, 275, 276, 280 

combat air patrol 66 

combat service support 41, 52 

combat support 1, 6, 8, 18, 23, 49, 

combined OPLAN 46, 48 

command and control 40, 44, 46, 67, 

68, 71, 72, 96, 146, 171, 194, 214, 

237, 247 

COMMZ 44 

computers 100, 169, 220 

Congress 34, 37, 48, 49, 54, 55, 138, 

230-232 

48, 50-52, 54, 66, 68, 72, 140, 147, 

244 

141, 162, 173, 175, 197, 223, 225, 

228, 284 

55-57 

contingency contracting officers 

contingency plans 37, 175, 199 

counterair 86 

counterintelligence 56 

CRAF 247 

crisis action team 2 I5 

critical action team 215 

critical items 20 

CSC 37, 52 

D 

Daily Telegraph 140 

D-Day 63, 282 

deception 43, 276 

Defense Logistics Agency 189 

Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program 85, 99 

290 
Defense Resources Act 55 

Denmark 209,213 

Department of Defense 55, 77, 171, 

173, 175 

Desert Mail 197 

Desert Shield 7, 10, 14, 18, 21, 24, 

28, 29, 31, 40, 41, 43, 46, 57-59, 

63, 65-67, 75, 76, 78-81, 83, 89, 

95, 98, 100, 105, 107, 108, 115- 

117, 123, 132, 133-135, 154, 161, 

163, 165-167, 169-172, 175, 183- 

185, 188. 189, 191, 194, 199, 201- 

208, 209, 212, 215, 219-234, 238, 

240, 242, 243, 244, 247, 269, 270, 

272, 275,277 

Desert ShieldStorm 14, 105, 191, 

194, 204, 205, 209, 215, 220-223, 

225-227, 229, 242 

Desert Storm I, 7, 13, 24, 28, 29, 31, 

38, 40, 46, 54, 63, 65, 80, 83, 

103, 105, 107, 110, 111, 113, 116, 

117, 123, 128, 133, 135, 144, 154, 

85-88, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 

161, 163, 166-173, 175-177, 183- 

185, 189, 200, 201, 206, 208-211, 

214. 221, 222-230, 232, 234, 238- 

245, 247, 269, 270, 272, 275, 277 

Dhahran 8, 11, 19, 20, 22, 36, 38, 41, 

43.49, SO, 52-54, 65, 89, 90, 164- 

169, 173- 175, 196, 199, 203, 204. 

243, 250, 257, 259, 261, 263, 270, 

280 

Diego Garcia 185, 19 1, 250, 257 

director of air defense 65, 67 

Divisions: 

air assault division 90, 91 

IOlst Air Assault 90, 92 

82d Airborne 21, 47, 164, 165 

DMSP 85,97, 102 

doctrine 1, 36, 37, 97, 214. 222, 240, 

247 

125, 128, 129, 133, 136, 159, 164, 

199, 238, 246, 286 

Dover AFB, DE 197 

DSFU 85 

Dugan, Michael 109, 135, 170, 171 

Dupuy, Trevor 141 

DOD 70, 77, 103, 104, 107-110, 117, 

164-166, 171-175, 177, 189, 196- 

E 

EB-66s 242 

E-2 188 

E-3 53 

EDS 2 

Egypt SO, 76, 78, 196, 198, 203, 257, 

265 

Egyptian 257 

Eisenhower, Dwight 161, 164 

electric 71 

electrical power 12, 13 

electricity 12, 29, 210 

engineer 2, 3, 5, 8-10, 12. 14, 21, 24, 

28,29, 60, 187, 208 

EUCOM 165, 211,212, 247 

Europe 27-29, 60, 79, 83, 84, 161, 

192, 194, 195, 201, 203, 204, 206, 

23 I, 236, 269, 27 I 

European Command 201, 209, 21 1, 

220 

exercises 9, 37. 53, 65, 76, 184, 195, 

227 

explosive ordnance disposal 30 

209, 211-213, 221, 223, 224, 228, 

F 

F-15 65, 164, 242 

F-15E 177 

F-16 19, 24, 242 

F-16s 63 

F-Ill 96, 98 

F- I I7 94, 96, 98, 169 

FAA 199 

FAC 242 

facsimile 100, 101, 212, 269, 270 

FAHD 9, II, 21, 26, 41, 44, SO, 53, 

90, 96, 169, 170, 251, 259, 262, 

265 

FBI 15 

Federal Aviation Administration 199 

field training exercise 227 

Fitzwater, Mmlin 148 

fire fighters 249-252 

France I, 27, 28, 76 

29 1 
G 

Gallant Knight 65 

Geneva Convention 73, 74, 236 

Germany 27, 28, 63, 83, 191, 209, 

2 I 1, 242, 270, 272 

Giddens, George 18 

Global war 237 

Glosson, Buster 67, 70, 73, 93, 178 

Goldey, Jim 83 

GOLDWING 99, 270, 272 

Greece 27, 28, 191 

Grenada 162, 165, 184, 286 

ground forces 36, 40, 41, 89, 240 

GMQ-33 272 

H 

H-l 188 

H-2 188 

Harvest Bare 6, 7, 14 

Harvest Eagle 6-8 

Harvest Falcon 6, 7, 18-21, 59, 233 

HAS 8, 56, 136, 137, 141-143, 150, 

153, 159, 160, 162, 234, 236, 238, 

240, 275 

Heintzelman, Harry 73, 80 

helicopters 30, 222, 285 

highway of death 155- 160, 245 

high value airborne assets 66 

Holloman AFB, NM 6, 9, 13 

Homer, Charles A. 18, 23, 24, 30, 

31, 36, 40, 54, 64, 178, 180, 205, 

242 

hospital 8, 25, 29, 182, 201-214, 221, 

222, 226, 227, 23 1, 232, 255-258 

hostages 202 

House Armed Services Committee 

141, 189, 228, 246 

Howell, Keith 19, 20, 27 

human shields 142 

Hurlburt Field, FL 21 

Hussein (see also Saddam Hussein) 

71, 150, 159, 163, 178 

1 

IMA 82 

Incirlik, Turkey 28, 29, 77, 209 

infantry 34, 185 

infrared 49 

infrastructure 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 61, 165, 

205, 207, 212, 233 

intelligence staff 89 

interdiction 37 

Internal Look 65, 70 

interoperability 97 

Iran 142 

Iraqi air force 73 

Iraqi army 159 

Israel 139, 140, 146, 154, 198 

Italy 27, 28 

J 

J-1 46, 187 

Japan 2,63, 162 

JCS 37, 170, 184 

JIB (see also Joint Information 

Bureau) 167-169, 173, 175, 280 

JFACC (see also Joint Force Air 

Component Commander) 68 

Johns Hopkins 154 

Joint Chiefs 76, 78, 88, 97, 214, 220, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 76, 78, 88, 97, 

247 

104, 107-110, 117, 118, 128, 214, 

220, 247 

Commander (see also JFACC) 68, 

72 

Joint Information Bureau (see also 

JIB) 174, 175 

Joint no-fire target list 70 

Joint Staff 60, 221 

Jordan 196, 259 

JTCB 72 

judge advocate 68, 72, 75, 76, 78, 

Just Cause 184 

Joint Force Air Component 

8 1-83 

K 

Kelly AFB, TX 13, 220 

Khalid' 8, 25, 29, 40, 55, 90, 251, 

Khainis Mushait 8, 9, 11, 50, 214, 

255, 262, 265 

25 1, 258, 262, 265 

292 
kill box 96 

killed in action 141, 143 

King Fahd International Airport 9, 11 

Korean War 2, 160, 284 

KTO 72, 73 

KTO cell 72, 73 

Kuwait 25, 54, 72, 73, 83, 86, 88, 89, 

91, 93, 97, 99, 100, 143, 144, 147, 

Kuwaiti 24, 34, 49, 72, 86, 167, 275 

Kuwaiti Air Force 72 

155-158, 198, 199, 239, 242 

L 

Langley AFB, VA 9, 20,49, 203, 

204,244,269 

leadership 37, 220 

leaflet drops 96 

LeMay, Curtis 1 

lines of communication 44, 54 

logistics 5, 6, 8, 10, 20, 21, 40, 53, 

60, 165, 172, 173, 175, 189, 194, 

195, 214, 222, 239, 244 

logistics directorate 20 

LQS Angela Times 143, 145, 150, 

153, 184 

M 

MAC (see Military Airlift Command) 

mail 183, 192-200, 246 

major commands 79, 82, 235 

MAP 89, 92, 137 

MARCENT 47, 72,97, 98 

Marine Corps 72, 98, 196 

marines 3, 5, 47, 72, 87, 165, 185, 

Mark 1V 98 

Masirah, Oman 49, 251, 255, 262, 

MASS 139, 182, 247 

master attack plan 71 

McAuliffe, Michael 10, 18 

McCloskey, Frank 197 

McGuire AFB, NJ 197, 220 

McPeak, General I1 1 

169, 2 12, 2 18, 220-223, 225-227 

189, 236, 241 

265 

MC-130s 96 

meals ready to eat 264 

medical 14, 29, 62, 74, 75, 201 -2 15, 

medical support 201, 204, 209, 211, 

212, 214, 219, 222, 223, 225, 228, 

229 

Military Airlift Command (see also 

MAC) 34, 79, 165, 184, 189, 197, 

201, 205, 214, 215, 218, 220 

2 18-23 1, 246, 247, 279 

Ministry of Defense 46, 62, 167 

missile 26, 34, 36, 49, 52, 63, 139, 

140 

MK-82 30 

mobility 3, 8, 9, 81, 184, 185, 188, 

202,230, 237, 239 

mobilization 10, 82, 203, 224, 226- 

228, 230, 237 

mortuary affairs 19, 2 1, 27, 234 

munitions 6, 10, 22, 25, 52, 53, 58, 

59, 70-72, 87, 139, 146, 172, 178, 

233, 240-242 

munitions storage 10, 22, 25, 53, 233 

N 

National Oceanographic and 

National Security Council 154, 

naval 36, 66, 72, 87, 100, 161, 162, 

165, 195, 213, 240, 269, 270, 275, 

276, 283 

Atmospheric Administration 87, 99 

NAVCENT 58, 97 

Navy 3, 5, 8, 18, 21, 49, 72, 78, 97, 

98, 161, 162, 167, 168, 177, 182, 

183, 185, 189, 196, 204, 212, 218, 

236, 239, 241, 257, 269, 270, 275 

NBC 70, 139, 140, 143, 147 

Nellis AFB, NV 169 

nerve 230, 231 

network I, 36,42, 54, 56, 83, 85, 

98-100, 139, 153, 156, 157, 173, 

235, 241, 269-271, 273 

New York Times 138, 145, 147-149, 

Ninth Air Force 182, 203 

NODDS 269 

North Vietnam 83 

Norton AFB. CA 220 

153, 154, 156, 164 

293 
nuclear 27, 70, 7 I, 87, 234 

nuclear reactor 70 

0 

offensive 23, 40, 41, 54, 67, 72, 81, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 60 

oil 9, 73 

Olsen, Thomas 21 

Oman 9, 13, 34, SO, 51, 55, 76, 78, 

180, 188, 198, 203, 205, 206, 221, 

226, 233, 255, 256, 259, 265 

87, 89, 154, 155, 157, 199 

Omani 34, 255, 256, 259 

operational art 1 

operational control 38 

operational security 164, 166, 276 

operations staff 170 

operations and maintenance 3, 193 

operations order 41 

OPLAN 3 I, 46.48.68, 169 

OPLAN 1002-90 31 

P 

PA (Public Affairs) 8, 165, 171, 176, 

242, 244, 280 

Pagonis, William 43 

Panama 162, 165, 184, 238, 286 

Pastoral Ministry 180, 182, 183 

Patriot 29, 50, 52, 140 

Peace Shield 8 

Persian Gulf 23, 34, 48, 49, 65, 

82-88, 98-100, 103-107, 111, 116, 

123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 132, 

133, 135, 157, 143, 145, 159, 160, 

162, 164, 167, 168, 171-173, 176, 

177, 184, 188-190, 194, 195, 197, 

237, 238, 241, 248, 271, 275, 287 

PGM 240, 241 

phase I 174 

phase I1 31, 41, 174 

phase 111 175 

planners 2, 9, 37, 40, 41, 67, 71, 73, 

83, 87, 88, 93, 96, 178, 202, 203, 

205, 219, 220, 225, 237 

planning 9, 10, 14-16, 21, 22, 44, 52, 

54, 65, 67, 70, 72, 81, 83, 86-89, 

92-95, 160, 168, 174, 172, 203, 

2 19, 220, 23 I, 233, 236-238, 243 

POL 53, 71 

POL storage 71 

Pope AFB, NC 203, 215 

population 8, 25, 44, 189, 207, 249- 

postal operations 195, 196, 246 

Powell, Colin 88, 147, 156, 157, 163, 

164, 241 

precision guided munitions 242 

president 23, 56, 107, 109, 110, 124, 

282 

252 

140, 153, 155-157, 162, 163, 197, 

presidential call-up 37, 107, 108 

Prime BEEF 3, 4, 6, 23, 24, 26 

Prime RIBS 6, 18, 21 

propaganda 136, 137 

Proven Force 28 

psychological operations 96 

public affairs 135, 136, 138, 147, 

148, 161, 164, 165, 166-178, 237, 

public affairs officer 168, 169, 175 

238, 241-245, 277, 279, 280, 286 

Q 

Qatar 50, 76, 198, 203, 258 

QRCr 99, 270, 272 

R 

RAF 28, 29, 209-2 1 I, 225, 270 

RAF Fairford 28 

RAND 40 

Ray, James 60 

readiness 6, 20, 52, 103, 107, 117- 

121, 123, 124, 133, 145, 180, 209, 

223, 225, 227, 234, 246, 247, 264 

Rear Tactical Operations Center 46 

Rear Tactical Operations Centers 42, 

reconnaissance 43, 44. 92, 105, 126, 

recovery 21, 63, 146 

Red Flag 227 

Red Horse 3, 5, 21, 24-26, 29, 30, 

47, 187 

Red Sea 275 

46 

171 

294 
Reflex 83 

refueling 12, 27, 29, 77, 87 

research and development 231 

reserve component 225, 227, 228 

reserves 3, 10, 22, 37, 82, 103, 104, 

108, 109, 120, 167, 192, 223, 237, 

247 

resupply 209, 230 

retrograde 214, 219 

Rice, Donald 109, 111 

Rivet Joint 65 

Rothenberg, Karsten 10, 20 

Royal Air Force 29, 49, 66 

Royal Saudi Air Force 8, 10, 46, 47, 

RSAF 254-259 

rules of engagement 32, 65-68, 171, 

66 

275 

S 

SA-7 49 

SA-14 49 

SAC (see also Strategic Air 

Commnad) 24, 29, 169, 227 

Saddam Hussein (see also Hussein) 

71, 150, 159, 163, 178 

Saudi Air Force 8, 10, 46, 47, 66 

Saudi Arabia 8-1 I, 15, 19, 22, 24, 

25, 29, 30, 34, 48, 54, 57-61, 63, 

64, 76-78, 80, 85, 88-90, 140, 157, 

162-166, 168-170, 172, 175, 177, 

180, 182, 189, 195, 196, 198, 199, 

203, 205, 214, 233, 238, 239, 243, 

287 

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman 15, 54, 66, 

108, 156, 157, 165, 167, 178, 183, 

240, 241 

Seabees 3 

search and rescue 276 

SECDEF (see also Secretary of 

Secretary of Defense (see also 

246, 254-259, 265, 271, 275, 280, 

Scud 63, 138-140, 146, 154 

Defense) 71 

SECDEF) 60, 71, 74. 107, 109, 

110, 115, 124, 147, 163, 164, 166, 

171, 177, 197, 198 

Secretary of the Air Force 108, 109, 

Secretary of the Army 175 

security 15, 25, 29, 31-38, 40-44, 

111, 113, 116, 124 

46-56, 76, 81, 140, 143, 152, 154, 

163, 164, 166, 173-177, 190, 199, 

200, 234, 235, 239, 240, 246, 275, 

276, 279, 280, 284, 287 

security police 31-35, 41, 42, 44, 

Shaw AFB, SC 9, 19, 62 

Sikora, Thomas 197 

SITREP 37, 44, 52 

situation report 41, 44, 49 

SOCCENT 85, 92, 271 

SOF 6 

software 95, 273 

sortie generation 10 

Southeast Asia 2, 3, 7, 83, 84 

Spain 27, 28, 191, 205, 209 

spare parts 6, 13, 58 

special compartmented information 

81 

special operations 21, 92, 96, 97, 

105, 134, 276 

Special Operations Command 92, 97, 

134 

special operations forces 276 

SPOT 190 

STAMP 195 

State Department 148 

Starling, Dan 60 

Status of Forces Agreement 76, 77, 

Stevens, Patrick 60 

strategic air campaign I7 1, 243 

Strategic Air Command (see also 

SAC) 79.92, 201 

strategy 62, 145, 147, 166, 178 

Sudan 196 

Sultan, Prince Bandar bin 59 

supply system 62, 192 

surgeon general 203, 225, 227, 228, 

23 1, 246, 247 

sustainment 3, 21 

SWA 46, 198, 213 

46-49, 52-54, 56, 76, 190, 234 

82 

295 
T 

TAC (see also Tactical Air Command) 

169, 201, 203, 205, 212, 214, 225, 

227, 229, 23 I, 232, 269 

6, 10, 15, 18, 20, 79-81, 83, 165, 

TACAIR 46 

Tactical Air Command (see also TAC) 

10, 59, 79, 165, 182, 188, 189, 201, 

203, 205, 229, 231, 232,245 

tactical deception 43 

Tactical Fighter Wing (see also TFW) 

202,205 

TAG 279 

Tallil 30, 91 

tankers 28 

tanks 22, 23, 7 1, 275 

target list 70, 7 I, 8 1 

target lists 72, 81 

TEMPER 6, 7, 14, 18, 19, 25 

terrorism 34,54 

TFW (see also Tactical Air 

The Times 139, 147 

Thumrait AFB, Oman 9, 13, 34, SO, 

Tinker AFB, OK 203 

Command) 44, 76, 79, 82 

51, 205, 252, 259, 262, 265 

TMQ-34 236, 272 

TMQ-36 272 

Tomahawk 177 

Torrejon AB, Spain 27-29, 205, 209 

TPFDD 81 

Training and Doctrine Command 37 

TRAP 159, 244 

Turkey 27, 28, 76, 191, 198, 209 

Turkish 28, 76 

TPS-68 27 I, 272 

U 

U.N. 176 

U.S. Air Force 6, 8, 11, 27, 31, 32, 

48, SO, 52, 6 I, 791 64, 169- 172, 

178, 183, 206, 209, 237, 239, 240 

US. Air Force Europe 79, 209 

US. Army 8, 18, 19, 21, 26, 29, 34, 

36-40, 42, 43, 46, 49, 53, 54, 60, 

61, 63, 89, 175, 197, 211, 230, 231, 

234, 265, 270, 27 I, 284 

U.S. Army Reserve 63 

U.S. Central Command 158, 203, 

223, 244 

US. Navy 161, 165, 167, 168, 177, 

204, 241, 245, 257, 270 

U.S. Space Command 245 

U.S. Transportation Command 2 14, 

UAE 24, 50, 188, 254, 257 

UAWS 99, 272 

UCMJ 79 

UK 210, 21 I, 225, 265 

unit type code 79 

United Arab Emirates 9, 19, 44, 49, 

220 

77, 180, 198, 203, 253-255, 257, 

265 

211 

United Kingdom 28, 29, 191, 209, 

United Nations 54, 143, 154 

United Nations Security Council 143 

United States 203, 205, 206, 209, 

212, 214, 220, 221, 222, 222, 230, 

23 1 

United States Air Force 86, 135 

unit type code 235, 237 

Upper Heyford 28, 209 

USAFE 6, 12, 27, 28, 82, 188, 189, 

204, 205, 209, 21 I, 212, 220, 224, 

225-227 

USCENTAF 15, 20, 21, 31, 34-38, 

40-42, 44, 46, 48, 49, 52-55, 59, 

74-76, 79, 80, 179, 182, 183, 195, 

203, 205, 206, 209, 212, 214, 220- 

USCHVI"OM 6, 7, 6, 7, 41, 48, 56, 

USCENTCOM Regulation 525-1 1 65 

USClNCCENT 2 1, 34, 36,41, 68, 

USMC 98 

US0 188 

USS Ranger 156 

USTRANSCOM 221 

222, 229-231 

65, 66, 68, 179, 195 

72-74, 76, 184, 188, 199, 23 I 

296 
V X 

Vietnam 2, 6, 31, 32, 53, 83, 142, XVlll Airborne Corps 91 

144, 160, 175, 188, 193, 227, 234, 

242, 285 

XVlll Corps 90, 271 

VII Corps 272 Y 

W Yeosock, John 39,90 

Wall Street Journal 134, 136, 153 Z 

war reserve material 52, 55, 21 1 

Washington I, 2, 31, 53, 81, 136, Zaragoza, Spain 28 

138, 139, 141, 143, 144, 146-150, 

152-158, 164, 166, 167, 172-177, 

194-, 24 1 

Washington Post 138, 139, 141, 143, 

146, 148-150, 152, 153, 156-158, 

164 

weather 2, 83, 85-101 

weather information 87, 88, 90, 92, 

Williams, Pete 147, 164, 166, 167, 

weather satellite 83, 89, 100 

WIN 212 

Wolfowitz, Paul 154, 155, 157 

World War 1 1 

World War I1 2, 29, 103, 114, 117, 

236, 269-273 

173-177 

144, 160-164, 238 

297 
Glossary 

AAA 

AAAM 

AADC 

AAI 

AAV 

AAR 

AASLT Div 

AB 

ABCCC 

ABDR 

ABF 

ABFDS 

Abn Corps 

AC 

ACA 

ACAS 

ACC 

ACCS 

ACE 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Advanced Air-to-Air Missile 

Area Air Defense Commander 

Air-to- Air Interrogator Set 

Amphibious Assault Vehicle 

After Action Report 

Air Assault Division (US) 

Air Base 

Airborne Battlefield Command and 

Control Center 

Aircraft Battle Damage Repair 

Advanced Bomb Family 

Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery System 

Airborne Corps (US) 

Active Component 

Airspace Control Authority or 

Airlift Clearance Authorities 

Air Combat Assessment Summary 

Air Component Commander or 

Airspace Coordination Center or 

Arab Cooperation Council 

Airborne Command and Control 

Squadron 

Airborne Command Element (USAF) 

or 

Aviation Combat Element (USMC) or 

Air Combat Element (NATO) or 

Armored Combat Earthmover (US 

Air Combat Maneuvers 

Army 1 

ACM 
ACO 

ACR 

ACV 

AD 

ADA 

AIDACG 

ADOC 

ADX 

AECC 

Aegis 

AELT 

AES 

AEW 

AFB 

AFCOMAC 

AFDIGS 

AFEWC 

AFGWC 

AFHRA 

AFLC 

AFLIF 

AFLMC 

AFh4SS 

AFR 

Airspace Coordination Order or 

Airspace Control Order 

Armored Cavalry Regiment 

Armored Combat Vehicle (US Army) 

or 

Air Cushion Vehicle (USN) 

Air Division 

Air Defense Artillery 

ArrivalDeparture Airfield Control 

Group 

Air Defense Operations Center 

Air Defense Exercise 

Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center 

Ship based long-range air defense 

system. 

Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team 

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron 

Airborne Early Warning 

Air Force Base 

Air Force Combat Ammunition Center 

Air Force Digital Graphics System 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Center 

Air Force Global Weather Center 

Air Force Historical Research Agency 

Air Force Logistics Command 

Air Force Logistics Information File 

Air Force Logistics Management 

Center 

Air Force Mission Support System 

Air Force Reserve 
AFSC 

AFSOC 

AFSOUTH 

AFWMPRT 

AGE 

AGL 

A1 

AIF 

AIR 

AIWS 

ALARM 

ALC 

ALCC 

ALCE 

ALCM 

ALMSNSCD 

ALO 

AM1 

AMRAAM 

AMU 

ANG 

ANGLCO 

A0 

AOB 

AOR 

APC 

Air Force Systems Command or 

Air Force Specialty Code 

Air Force Special Operations Command 

Allied Forces, South (NATO) 

Air Force Wartime Manpower and 

Personnel Readiness Team 

Aerospace Ground Equipment 

Above Ground Level 

Air Interdiction 

Automated Installation File 

Air Inflatable Retarder 

Advanced Interdiction Weapons System 

Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile 

Air Logistics Center 

Airlift Control Center 

Airlift Control Element 

Air-Launched Cruise Missile 

Airlift Mission Schedule 

Air Liaison Officer 

Aeronautical Militare Italiana 

Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air 

Missile 

Aircraft Maintenance Unit 

Air National Guard 

Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison 

Company (USMC) 

Area of Operation 

Air Order of Battle 

Area of Responsibility 

Armored Personnel Carrier 
APCC 

APOD 

APS 

ARBS 

ARC 

ARCENT 

AREFS 

ARM 

ARNG 

ARS 

ARW 

ASARS 

ASD(PA) 

ASD(S0-LIC) 

ASM 

ASMA 

ASOC 

ASUWC 

ATACMS 

ATAF 

ATC 

ATGM 

AT0 

ATI'G 

Aerial Port Control Center 

Aerial Port of Debarkation 

Afloat Preposition i ng Ship 

Angle Rate Bombing Set (USMC) 

Air Reserve Components 

U.S. Army Forces, Central Command 

Air Refueling Squadron 

Antiradiation Missiles 

US. Army National Guard 

Air Rescue Service 

Air Rescue Wing 

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar 

System 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public 

Affairs) 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special 

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) 

Air-to-Surface Missile 

Air Staff Management Aide (UK and 

Air Support Operations Center 

(Army /US AF) 

Anti-to-Surface Unit Warfare 

Commander (USN) 

Army Tactical Missile System 

Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO) 

Air Training Command (USAF) 

Anti-Tank Guided Munition 

Air Tasking Order 

Automated Tactical Target Graphic 

Iraq) 
AUTODIN 

AVCAL 

AVLB 

Avn Bde 

AWACS 

AWN 

AWS 

BAAF 

BAI 

BARCAP 

BAS 

BBBG 

BCE 

BDA 

Bde 

BDU 

BE or BEN 

BEEF 

BLT 

BMP 

BMS 

BMW 

B/N 

BND 

BTG 

BVR 

BW 

Automatic Digital Network 

Aviation Coordinated Allowance List 

(UW 

Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge 

Aviation Brigade (US) 

Airborne Warning and Control System 

Automated Weather Network 

Airborne Warning System 

Bahrain Amiri Air Force 

Battlefield Air Interdiction 

Barrier Combat Air Patrol 

Basic Allowance for Subsistence 

Battleship Battle Group 

Battlefield Coordination Element 

Bomb Damage Assessment 

Brigade (US) 

Battle Dress Uniform 

Basic Encyclopedia (number) 

Base Engineer Emergency Force 

Battalion Landing Team (USMC) 

Soviet armored personnel carrier 

Bombardment Squadron 

Bombardment Wing 

Bombardier/Navigator 

German Federal Intelligence Service 

Basic Target Graphic 

Beyond Visual Range 

Biological Warfare 
C-Day Deployment Day 

c3 

C3CM 

C31 

C3IC 

c4 

CA 

CADOB 

CAF 

CAFMS 

CAFT 

CALCM 

CAMS 

CAP 

CAS 

CASSUM 

CAT 

CB 

CBU 

CBW 

CCD 

Command, Control, and 

Communications 

Command, Control, Communications 

Countermeasures 

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Intelligence 

Coordination, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence 

Center 

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Computers 

Civil Affairs 

Consolidated Air Defense Order of 

Battle 

Canadian Air Force 

Computer Aided Force Management 

System 

Center for Anti-Fratricide Technology 

Conventional Air Launched Cruise 

Missile 

Core Automated Maintenance System 

Combat Air Patrol 

Close Air Support or 

Combat Ammunition System 

Close Air Support Summary 

Crisis Action Team 

Chemical/Biological 

Cluster Bomb Unit 

Chemical/Biological Weapons 

Camouflage, Concealment and 

Deception 
CCIP 

CCRC 

CEM 

CEMIRT 

CENTAF 

CENTCOM 

CEP 

CES 

CEV 

CFT 

CI 

CIA 

CIFS 

CINC 

CINCCENT 

CINCMAC 

CINCSPACE 

CINCTRANS 

CINCTRANSCOM 

CJCS 

CMMS 

Continuously Computed Impact Point 

Combined Control and Reporting 

Center 

€ombined Effects Munition 

Civil Engineering Maintenance, 

Inspection, Repair, and Training 

U.S. Air Force, Central Command 

U.S. Central Command 

Circular Error Probable 

Civil Engineering Squadron 

Combat Engineer Vehicle 

Conformal Fuel Tank 

Civilian Internees 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Close-In Fire Support (USMC) 

Commander-in-Chief 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central 

Command 

Commander-in-Chief, Military Airlift 

Command 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Space 

Command 

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 

Transportation 

Commander-in-Chief U.S . Transportation Command 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Congressionally Mandated Mobility 

Study 

CNN Cable News Network 
COCOM Combatant Command (Command 

Authority) 

Commander, Airlift Forces 

Composite Air Operation 

Communications Zone 

Contingency Operations Mobility 

Planning and Execution System 

Communications Security 

Commander of Tactical Air Command 

Commander, U.S. Air Force, Central 

Command 

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

Center for Naval Analysis 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Communications Intelligence 

Communications Satellite 

Continental United States 

Corps Support Command (US Army) 

Command Post Exercise 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

Control and Reporting Center 

Combat Support 

Combat Search and Rescue 

COMALF 

COMA0 

COMMZ 

COMPES 

COMSEC 

COMTAC 

COMUSCENTAF 

COMUSCENTCOM 

CNA 

CNO 

COMINT 

COMSAT 

CONUS 

COSCOM 

CPX 

CRAF 

CRC 

cs 

CSAR 

CSG 

css 

CSSA 

CT 

CTJTF 

CVBG 

Contingency Support Graphic 

Combat Service Support 

CENTAF Supply Support Agency or 

Combat Service Support Area 

Counterterrorism 

Counterterrorism Joint Task Force 

Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (USN) 
cw 

CWEP 

CWP 

D&D 

DACT 

DARPA 

DAS 

DASC 

DCA 

DCI 

D-Day 

DDN 

DF 

DFR/ME 

DFSC 

DFSP 

DIA 

DIS 

DISA 

Div 

DLA 

DLIR 

DMA 

DMDC 

DMI 

Chemical Warfare 

Conventional Weapons Enhanced 

Penetration 

Contingency Weather Package 

Decoy and Deception 

Dissimilar Aerial Combat Tactics 

Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency 

Deep Air Support (USMC) 

Direct Air Support Center (USMC) 

Defense Communications Agency 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Unnamed day on which an operations 

begins 

Defense Data Network 

Direction Fired or 

Direct ion Finding 

Defense Fuel Region, Middle East 

Defense Fuel Supply Center 

Defense Fuel Supply Point 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Daily Intelligence Summary 

Defense Information Systems Agency 

Division 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Downward Looking Infrared 

Defense Mapping Agency 

Defense Manpower Data Center 

Directorate of Military Intelligence 

(Israel, Iraq, Egypt) 
DMSP 

DMPI 

DNA 

DOC 

DOD 

DOE 

DOPMA 

DOS 

DOT 

DOWSR 

DPA 

DPG 

DSB 

DSCS 

DSFU 

DSMAC 

DSP 

EAC 

ECM 

ECS 

EDS 

EDT 

ELINT 

EMIS 

Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program 

Desired Mean Point of Impact 

Defense Nuclear Agency 

Designed Operational Capability 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Defense Officer Personnel Management 

Act 

Department of State 

Department of Transportation 

Directorate of Weather for Strategic 

Reconnaissance 

Defense Production Act 

Defense Planning Guidance 

Defense Science Board 

Defense Satellite Communication 

System 

Desert Storm Forecast Unit 

Digitized Scene Mapping and 

Correlation 

Defense Support Program 

Echelon Above Corps or 

Eastern Area Command 

Electronic Countermeasures 

Electronic Combat Squadron 

European Distribution System 

Eastern Daylight Time 

Electronic In tell igence 

Electro-Magnet ic Isotope Separation 
EOB 

EOD 

EOGB 

EOTDAS 

EPW 

ESA 

EST 

Em 

EUCOM 

EW 

EWO 

EWWS 

FAC 

FAE 

FAF 

FAPES 

FEBA 

FEWS 

FHTV 

FID 

FLIR 

FLOGEN 

FLOT 

FMC 

FMF 

FhJiS 

Electronic Order of Battle 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

Electro-Optically Guided Bomb 

Electro-Optical Tactical Decision Aid 

Software 

Enemy Prisoner of War 

European Space Agency 

Eastern Standard Time 

European Tanker Task Force 

European Command 

Electronic Warfare 

Electronic Warfare Officer 

Electronic Warfare Warning System or 

Set 

Forward Air Control 

Fuel Air Explosive 

French Air Force 

Force Augmentation Planning and 

Execution System 

Forward Edge of the Battle Area 

Fol lo w-on Early Warn i ng S y s tem 

Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles 

Foreign Internal Defense 

Forward-Looking Infrared 

Flow Generation computer model 

Forward Line of Own Troops 

Fully Mission Capable 

Fleet Marine Force 

Foreign Military Sales 
FMSE 

FMTV 

FNOC 

FOL 

FORSCOM 

FOSK 

FOV 

FROG 

FSCL 

FSS 

FTX 

G-Day 

GAO 

GC 

GCC 

GCI 

GCU 

GDSS 

GENA 

GLO 

GMT 

GNA 

GOB 

GOK 

GOSC 

Fuels Management Support Equipment 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 

Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center 

(USN) 

Forward Operating Location 

U.S. Army Forces Command 

Follow-on Spares Kits 

Field of View 

Free Rocket Over Ground 

Fire Support Coordination Line 

Fast Sealift Support 

Field Training Exercise 

Day the ground war began 

General Accounting Office 

Geneva Convention 

Gulf Cooperation Committee 

Ground Control Intercept 

Guidance and Control Unit 

Global Decision Support System 

Ground Air Navigation Aids radar 

(U. K./Saud i) 

General Headquarters (usually theater 

level) 

Ground Liaison Officer 

Greenwich Mean Time 

Goldwater-Nichols DOD 

Reorganization Act 

Ground Order of Battle 

Government of Kuwait 

General Officer Steering Committee 
General Purpose bomb 

Global Positioning System or Satellite 

Specific time at which operations 

commence 

Heavy Armor 

High Speed Antiradiation Missile 

Hardened Aircraft Bunker 

Hardened Aircraft Shelter 

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical 

Truck 

Heavy Equipment Transporter 

High Frequency 

High Density Airspace Control Zone 

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle 

Host-nation Support 

Hard Target Penetrator Munitions 

Heads-Up Display 

Human Resources Intelligence 

High Value Airborne Assets 

Indications and Warnings 

Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces 

Iraqi Air Defense Forces 

Integrated Air Defense System 

International Atomic Energy 

Commission 

GP 

GPS 

H-Hour 

HA 

HARM 

HAB 

HAS 

HEM'IT 

HET 

HF 

HIDACZ 

HMMWV 

HNS 

HTPM 

HUD 

HUMINT 

HVAA 

I&W 

IAADF 

IADF 

IADS 

IAEC 

IAF 

ICAO 

Italian Air Force 

International Commercial Aviation 

Organization 
ICRC 

IDF 

IFF 

IFR 

IFV 

IIR 

ILM 

ILMC 

IMA 

IMET 

IMINT 

IMQT 

INS 

IOC 

IOT&E 

IP 

IPDS 

IR 

IRR 

ISW 

ITAC 

ITF 

IZAF 

J- 1 

International Committee of the Red 

Cross 

Israel Defense Force 

Identification Friend or Foe 

Instrument Flight Reference 

Infantry Fighting Vehicle 

Intelligence Information Report or 

Imaging Infrared 

Intermediate-Level Maintenance 

Intermediate-Level Maintenance Center 

Individual Mobilization Augmentee 

International Military Education and 

Trai n i ng 

Imagery In tell igence 

Initial Mission Qualification Training 

Inertial Navigation System 

Intercept Operations Center or 

Integrated Operations Center 

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 

Initial Point 

Inland Petroleum Distribution System 

(US Army) 

Infrared 

Individual Ready Reserve 

Integrated Strike Warfare 

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center 

(US Army) 

Intelligence Task Force (DIA) 

Iraqi Air Force 

Manpower & Personnel Directorate 

(Joint) 
J-2 

5-3 

5-4 

J-5 

J-6 

5-7 

5-8 

JAAT 

JAG 

JAIC 

Jaguar 

JAMPS 

JCEOI 

JCMEC 

JCS 

JCSE 

JDOP 

JDS 

JFACC 

JFC 

JFC-E 

JFC-N 

Intelligence Directorate (Joint) 

Operations Directorate (Joint ) 

Logistics Directorate (Joint) 

Strategic Plans & Policy Directorate 

(Joint) 

Command, Control & Communications 

Systems Directorate (Joint) 

Operational Plans & Interoperability 

Directorate (Joint) 

Force Structure Resource & 

Assessment Directorate (Joint) 

Joint Air Attack Team 

Judge Advocate General 

Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee 

Land-based ground attack aircraft 

Joint Automated Message Program 

Joint Communications Electronics 

Operations Instructions 

Joint Captured Material Exploitation 

Center 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Communications Support Element 

Joint U.S./Saudi Directorate of 

Planning 

Joint Deployment System 

Joint Force Air Component 

Commander. 

Joint Forces Commander 

Joint Forces Command East 

Joint Forces Command North 
JFLCC 

JFMCC 

JFSOCC 

JIB 

JIC 

JIPC 

JIST 

JMCC 

JMEM 

JOPES 

JPEC 

JPTS 

JRC 

JRCC 

JS 

JSCP 

JSEAD 

JSIPS 

JSOTF 

JSPS 

JSTARS 

JTACMS 

JTCB 

Joint Forces Land Component 

Commander 

Joint Forces Maritime Component 

Commander 

Joint Forces Special Operations 

Component Commander 

Joint Information Bureau 

Joint Intelligence Center 

Joint Imagery Production Center 

Joint Intelligence Survey Team 

Joint Movement Control Center 

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 

Joint Operations Planning and 

Execution System 

Joint Planning and Execution 

Community 

Jet Propellant Thermally Stable 

Joint Reconnaissance Center 

Joint Rescue Coordination Center 

Joint Staff 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

Joint Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defenses 

Joint Service Imagery Processing 

System 

Joint Special Operations Task Force 

Joint Strategic Planning System 

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System (E-8) 

Joint Tactical Missile System 

Joint Target Coordination Board 
JTF 

JTFME 

JTIDS 

JULL 

KAF 

KCATF 

KHZ 

KKMC 

KIA 

KTO 

LAMPS 

LANDSAT 

LANTCOM 

LANTIRN 

LAV 

LCAC 

LCC 

LDGP 

LENSCE 

LG 

LGB 

LGGAIR 

LIATE 

Joint Task Force 

Joint Task Force Middle East 

Joint Tactical Information Distribution 

System 

Joint Tactics, Techniques and 

Procedures 

Joint Uniform Lessons Learned 

Kuwaiti Air Force 

Kuwait Civil Affairs Task Force 

Ki lo hertz 

King Khalid Military City 

Killed In Action 

Kuwait Theater of Operations 

Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System 

(USN) 

Land Satellite, NASA/NOAA Satellite 

Program 

Atlantic Command 

Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting 

Infrared System for Night 

Light Armored Vehicle 

Air Cushioned Landing Craft 

Land Component Commander 

Low Drag General Purpose bomb 

Limited Enemy Situation/Correlation 

Equipment 

Log is t ics 

Laser Guided Bomb 

Logistics Airlift 

LANTIRIN Intermediate Automatic 

Test Equipment 
LOC 

LOS 

LOTS 

LRC 

LRI 

LVS 

MAC 

MACCS 

MACG 

MAG 

MAGTF 

MAIRS 

MAJCOMS 

MAP 

MARCENT 

MARDIV 

MASF 

MASS 

MAW 

MCI 

MCM 

MEB 

Mech Div 

MEF 

MEL 

Lines of Communication 

Line of Sight 

Logistics Over the Shore 

Logistics Readiness Center (USAF) 

Long Range International 

Logistics Vehicle System 

Military Airlift Command 

Marine Air Command and Control 

System 

Marine Air Control Group 

Marine Airlift Group 

Marine Air Ground Task Force 

Military Airlift Integrated Reporting 

System 

Major Commands 

Master Attack Plan 

U.S. Marine Corps, Central Command 

Marine Division 

Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility 

MICAP Asset Sourcing System 

Marine Aircraft Wing 

Ministry of Culture and Information 

(Iraq) 

Mine Countermeasures or 

Multi-Command Manual 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

Mechanized Infantry Division 

Marine Expeditionary Force 

Mobile Erector-Launcher used for 

mobile missiles 
METS 

METSAT 

MEU 

MHE 

MIA 

MIF 

MICAP 

MILCON 

MILS ATCOM 

MILSTAR 

MI0 

MIPE 

MIS 

MISREP 

MLRS 

MLV 

MOBREP 

MOD 

MODA 

MOPP 

MPES 

MPF 

MPS 

MRE 

Mobile Electronic Test Set 

Meteorological Satellite 

Marine Expeditionary Unit 

Materiel Handling Equipment 

Missing In Action 

Maritime Interdiction Force 

Mission Critical Parts or 

Mission Capable or 

Mission Capability Limiting 

Military Construction 

Military Satellite Communications 

Military Strategic and Tactical Relay 

System 

Maritime Intercept Operations 

Mobile Intelligence Processing Element 

Military Intelligence Study 

Mission Report 

Multiple Launch Rocket System 

Memory Loader Verifier 

Manpower Mobilization and Accession 

Status Report 

Ministry of Defense 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation 

(Saudi Arabia) 

Mission Orientzd Protective Posture 

Medical Planning and Execution 

System 

Maritime Prepositioning Force 

Maritime Prepositioning Ships 

Meals Ready to Eat 
MRR 

MRS 

MSC 

MSE 

MSI 

MSK 

MTACC 

MTI 

MTL 

MTMC 

NAC 

NALE 

NATO 

NAVCENT 

NAVEUR 

NAVSTAR 

NBC 

NCA 

NCTR 

NDRF 

NDS 

NF or NOFORN 

NGB 

NGFS 

NIE 

NMAC 

NMCS 

Minimum Risk Route 

Mob i I i t y Requirements Study 

Military Sealift Command 

Mobile Subscriber Equipment 

Multi-Spectral Imagery 

Mission Support Kits 

Marine Tactical Air Command Center 

Moving Target Indicator 

Master Target List 

Military Traffic Management Command 

Northern Area Command 

Naval Amphibious Liaison Element 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

U.S. Navy, Central Command 

Naval Forces, Europe 

Navigational Satellite liming and 

Ranging 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

National Command Authorities 

Noncooperative Target Recognition 

National Defense Reserve Fleet 

NPIC Data Systems 

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals 

National Guard Bureau 

Naval Gunfire Support 

National Intelligence Estimate 

Near Mid-Air Collision 

Not Mission Capable Supplies 
NMCM 

NMIC 

NMIST 

NOAA 

NOB 

NODDS 

NPIC 

NSA 

NSC 

NTC 

NVG 

O&M 

OAS 

0 AS D/( DR&E) 

OASD/(SO/LIC) 

OB 

OCA 

OCP 

OICC 

OP 

OPAIR 

OPCON 

OPDS 

Not Mission Capable Maintenance 

National Military Intelligence Center 

National Military Intelligence Support 

Teams 

National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

Naval Order of Battle 

Naval Oceanographic Data 

Dissemination System 

National Photo Interpretation Center 

National Security Agency 

National Security Council 

Night Targeting Cell (in GAT) 

Night Vision Goggles 

Operations and Maintenance 

Offensive Avionics System 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Defense Research & 

Engineering) 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Special OperationsLow 

Intensity Conflict) 

Order of Battle 

Offensive Counter Air 

Observation Command Post 

Operational Intelligence Crisis Center 

Observation Post 

Opposing Air 

Ope rational Control 

Offshore Petroleum Distribution System 

(USN) 
OPEC 

OPLAN 

OPORD 

OPSEC 

OSD 

OSI 

OSP 

PACOM 

PA 

PA0 

PCITF 

PGM 

PIN 

PLO 

PLS 

PLV 

PMC 

PMEL 

PMT 

PNVS 

POG 

POL 

POMCUS 

POW 

PREP0 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries 

Operation Plan 

Operation Order 

Operational Security 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Office of Special Investigations 

WAF) 

Operational Support Package 

Pacific Command 

Public Affairs 

Public Affairs Officer 

Positive Combat Identification Task 

Force 

Precision Guided Munitions 

Primary Identification Number 

Palestine Liberation Organization 

Palletized Loading System 

Program Loader Verifier 

Partially Mission Capable 

Precision Measurement Equipment 

Laboratory 

Pastoral Ministry Team 

Pilot Night Vision System 

Psychological Operations Group 

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants 

Pre-positioning of Material Configured 

to Unit Sets 

Prisoner of War 

Pre-posi tioned 
PSYOP 

PSYOPS 

PTAS 

QEAF 

QRCT 

R&D 

R&M 

RADIC 

RAF 

RAFVR 

RAM 

RC 

RCAF 

RCC 

RDAF 

RDF 

RDIT 

RDJTF 

Red Horse 

REMIS 

RFI 

RFMD 

RGFC 

Psychological Operation 

Psychological Operations 

Provisional Tactical Airlift Squadron 

Qatari Emiri Air Force 

Quick Reaction Communications 

Terminal 

Research and Development 

Reliability and Maintainability 

Rap id I y Deployable Integrated 

Command and Control system 

Royal Air Force (U.K.) 

Royal Air Force Voluntary Reserve 

Radar Absorptive Material 

Reserve Component 

Royal Canadian Air Force 

Rescue Coordination Center or 

Revolutionary Command Council (Iraq) 

Royal Dutch Air Force 

Rapid Deployment Force or 

Radio Direction Finding 

Rapid Deployment Imagery Terminal 

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 

Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy 

Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer 

Re1 iabil i ty and Maintainability 

Information System 

Request for Information 

RED FLAG Measurement Debriefing 

Republican Guard Force Command 

(Iraq) 

RIBS Readiness in Base Services 
WAF 

RLT 

RORO 

ROE 

ROTHR 

RPV 

RRF 

RSADF 

RSAF 

RSLF 

RTNEPH 

RW 

RWR 

S&TI 

SA 

SAAF 

SAC 

SAG 

SAM 

SAMAREC 

SANG 

SAR 

SAS 

SATCOM 

SBS 

SBSS 

Royal Jordanian Air Force 

Regimental Landing Team (USMC) 

Roll OnPRoll Off 

Rules of Engagement 

Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar 

Remotely Piloted Vehicle 

Ready Reserve Force or 

Ready Reserve Fleet 

Royal Saudi Air Defense Force 

Royal Saudi Air Force 

Royal Saudi Land Force 

Real-Time Nephanalysis 

Reconnaissance Wing 

Radar Warning Receiver 

Scientific and Technical Intelligence 

Selective Availability 

Saudi Arabian Armed Forces 

Strategic Air Command 

Saudi Arabian Government or 

Surface Action Group (USN) 

Surface-to-Air Missile 

Saudi Arabian Marketing and Refining 

Company 

Saudi Arabian National Guard 

Search and Rescue 

Special Air Service (U.K.) 

Satellite Communications 

Special Boat Service (U.K.) 

Standard Base Supply System 
SCUD 

SCI 

SCIF 

SEAD 

SEAL 

SECDEF 

SFG 

SFW 

SHAPE 

SHF 

SIDS 

SIGINT 

SINCGARS 

SIOP 

SITREP 

SLAM 

SLAR 

SLOC 

SMESA 

SNIE 

SOAF 

SOC 

SOCCENT 

Sov ie t surface- t 0-s u rface mi ssi le 

Sensitive Compartmented Information 

Sensitive Compartmented Information 

Facil i t y 

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 

Sea Air Land 

Secretary of Defense 

Special Forces Group 

Sensor Fuzed Weapon 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, 

Europe 

Super High Frequency 

Secondary Imagery Dissemination 

System 

Signals Intelligence 

Single Channel Ground/Airborne Radio 

Subsystem 

Single Integrated Operations Plan 

Situation Report 

Standoff Land Attack Missile 

Side-Looking Airborne Radar 

Sea Lines of Communications 

Special Middle East Shipping 

Agree men t 

Special National Intelligence Estimate 

Sultanate of Oman Air Force 

Sector Operations Center (Air Defense) 

or 

Special Operations Command 

Special Operations Command, Central 

Command 
SOCOM 

SOF 

SOFA 

SOG 

sos 

sow 

SPACC 

SPEAR 

SPINS 

SPOT 

SRBM 

SRP 

SRW 

SSA 

SSM 

STAMP 

STGP 

STON 

STPJ 

STRAPP 

STRATFOR 

STU 

SURVIAC 

Special Operations Command 

Special Operations Forces 

Status of Forces Agreement 

Special Operations Group 

Special Operations Squadron 

Special Operations Wing 

U.S. SPACECOM Space Control 

Center 

Strike Projection Evaluation and AntiAir Warfare Research (USN) 

Special Instructions 

French Satellite Probatoire 

d’observation de la Terre 

S hort-range B al I ist ic Missile 

Sealift Readiness Program 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing 

Selective Service Act 

Surface-to-Surface Missile 

Standard Air Munitions Package 

Special Tactics Group (USAF) 

Short Ton (2,000 pounds or 0.9 metric 

tons) 

Special Tactic Paramedics (USAF) 

Standard Tank, Rack, Adapter, and 

Pylon Package 

Strategic Forces Advisors 

Secure Telephone Unit 

Survivability and Vulnerabiliry 

Information Analysis Center 

SWA Southwest Asia 
SYERS 

TAC 

TACAIR 

TACC 

TACON 

TACP 

TACS 

TACSAT 

TADIL 

TAF 

TAG 

TAIRCW 

TALD 

TALO 

TANKREP 

TAOC 

TARCAP 

TARPS 

TAW 

TAWC 

TBM 

TCN 

TDA 

-EL 

TEMPER 

TER 

Senior Year Electro-Optical 

Reconnaissance System 

Tactical Air Command 

Tactical Air 

Tactical Air Control Center 

Tactical Control 

Tactical Air Control Party 

Tactical Air Control System 

Tactical Satellite 

Tactical Digital Information Link or 

Tactical Data Interface Link 

Tactical Aircraft Forces 

Tactical Airlift Group 

Tactical Air Control Wing 

Tactical Air-Launched Decoy 

Theater Airlift Liaison Officer 

Tank Killer Report 

Tactical Air Operations Center (USMC) 

Target Combat Air Patrol 

Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod 

System 

Tactical Airlift Wing 

Tactical Air Warfare Center 

Tactical B a1 1 i s t ic M i ss i 1 e 

Transportation Control Number 

Tactical Decision Aid 

Transporter-Erector-Launcher 

Tent Expendable Modular Personnel 

Triple Ejector Rack 
TERCOM 

TFS 

TFW 

TIALD 

TIARA 

TIBS 

TIROS 

TIS 

TLAM 

TMD 

TO 

TO&E 

TOAF 

TOT 

TPFDD 

TPFDL 

TR 

TRADOC 

TRAM 

TRANSCOM 

TRAP 

TRG 

m 

m 

Terrain Contour Matching 

Tactical Fighter Squadron 

Tactical Fighter Wing 

Thermal Imaging and Laser 

Designating 

Tactical Intelligence and Related 

Activities 

Tactical Information Broadcast System 

WAF) 

Television and Infrared Observation 

Satellites 

Tactical Intelligence Squadron 

Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile 

Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense 

Technical Order 

Table of Organization and Equipment 

Tactical Operations Area Forecast 

Time Over Target 

Time-Phased Force Deployment Data 

Time-Phased Force Deployment List 

Theater Reserves 

Training and Doctrine Command (US 

Army) 

Target Recognition and Acquisition 

Multisensor (USN) 

U.S. Transportation Command 

Tanks, Racks, Adapters, and Pylons 

Tactical Reconnaissance Group 

Tanker Task Force 

Tactical Target Material 
TTP 

UAE 

UAEAF 

UAV 

UAWS 

UCMJ 

UHF 

UK 

ULN 

UMMIPS 

UN 

UND 

UNSC 

USACE 

USAF 

USAFE 

USAFR 

USAR 

USC 

USCENTCOM 

USCG 

USCINCCENT 

USCINCCENT 

USDAO 

USEUCOM 

USG 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

United Arab Emirates 

United Arab Emirates Air Force 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

USAREUR Automated Weather System 

Uniform Code of Military Justice 

Ultra High Frequency 

United Kingdom 

Unit Line Number 

Uniform Military Management and 

Movement Indicator System 

United Nations 

Urgency of Need Designator 

United Nations Security Council 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

United States Air Force 

U.S. Air Force Europe 

United States Air Force Reserve 

U.S. Army Reserve 

United States Code 

Central Command 

U. S. Coast Guard 

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central 

Command 

U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central 

Command 

U.S. Defense Attache Office 

U.S. European Command 

United States Government 
USIA 

USMC 

USN 

USNAVCENT 

USNR 

USPACCOM 

USSOCOM 

USSOUTHCOM 

USSPACECOM 

USTRANSCOM 

UTC 

UTE 

VA 

VCJCS 

VFR 

WAM 

WATCHCON 

WCDC 

WFOV 

WHNS 

WIA 

WIN 

WN or WNINTEL 

WOC 

WRM 

WRSK 

wso 

U.S. Information Agency 

U.S. Marine Corps 

U.S. Navy 

U.S. Navy, U.S. Central Command 

U.S. Navy Reserve 

U.S. Pacific Command 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

U.S. Southern Command 

U.S. Space Command 

U.S. Transportation Command 

Unit Type Code 

Utilization Rate 

Department of Veteran’s Affairs 

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Visual Flight Reference 

Wide Area Mine 

Watch Condition 

War Crimes Documentation Center 

Wide Field of View 

Wartime Host-Nation Support 

Wounded in Action 

Worldwide Military Command and 

Control System Intercomputer Network 

Warning Notice: Intelligence Sources 

and Methods Involved 

Wing Operations Center 

War Reserve Material 

War Readiness Spares Kits 

Weapons System Operator 
WWIMS Worldwide Indicators and Monitoring 

System 

WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and 

Control System 

WXG Weather Group 

Q U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1993 0 - 360-140 : QL 3